Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription

Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
Author(s): E. Herbert Norman
Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1943), pp. 47-64
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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SOLDIER AND PEASANT IN JAPAN:
THE ORIGINS OF CONSCRIPTION
E.
HERBERT
NORMAN
THE historicalbackgroundof conscriptionin Japan goes far beyond the importedinfluencesof Westernpolitical thoughtand military
science. The fact that the firstconscriptionlaw in Japan was enacted
in 1872 (enforcedin 1873), only four or fiveyears after the political
revolution of the Restoration,should draw the close attention of the
student to the social foundation for such a reformwhich lies deeper
than can be revealed by probing into the transmissionand transplantation of foreignthoughtinto Japan.1
almostrevolutionary,act folThis conscriptionlaw was a far-reaching,
lowingas it did upon long yearsof feudalismin which the arm-bearing
ruling class was rigidlydefined and limited,while the oppressed and
disarmedclasses,chieflythe peasantry,were consideredeitherunworthy
or too unreliable to be trustedwith arms. In fact so revolutionarywas
the idea of general conscriptionthat its stoutest proponent, Omura
Masujiro, was assassinatedin 1869 while Vice-Ministerof War by outraged Reactionarysamurai of his own clan. But of this,more later.
To discuss the historicalbackground of conscriptionin Japan it is
necessaryfirstof all to set the question in its proper framework.The
idea of conscriptiondid not arise throughany flamingdemand for the
levee en masse, that is, a people's army fightingin defenseof a young
and embattledrevolutionaryregimeas in France duringthe Great Revolution.2 Rather should its frameworkbe seen in the long, complicated
1 The Imperial mandate accompanyingthe ConscriptionAct of November28,
1872 reads in part: "The militarysystemof the West is thoroughand detailed,
for it is the result of the studies and testsof centuries. But the differenceof
governmentand geographicalconditionswarns us against indiscriminateadoption of the Western system." Gotaro Ogawa: The Conscription System in
Japan, New York, 1921, p. 4.
2 This referenceto the leve'een masse is not made to imply that the history
of general conscriptionin Europe developed over night,full-grown,from this
one act and without any previous history. But it was the basic precedentfor
the ConscriptionAct which on the advice of General Jourdan in 1798 became
part of the Constitution,and for its later extensionunder Napoleon, which in
turnwas at once the cause and model for the militaryreformsin Germanyin
the days of Clausewitz,vom Stein,Scharnhorstand Gneisenau. Thus the French
levee en masse may be taken as the symboland foundation of both the idea
( 447
)
Pacific Afazrs
and subtly shiftingrelationship between the peasantryand the ruling
feudal class, whetherlord (daimiyo)or warrior (samurai). In this relationshipone can see developingunevenlyand incompletelythe recognition by a small part of the feudal ruling class of the peasantryas a reservoirof manpowerwhichcould be tapped to meet the emergencygrowing
frominternal tension (league of clans against the Tokugawa hegemony
and peasant revolt) and fromthe pressureof Westernpowers,particularlyafterthe visitof Perryin 1853 and Poutiatin in the followingyear.'
The more astute feudal administratorshad noted the undisciplined,
half-blindbut earth-shakingpower of the peasantryas displayedin the
continualjacquerie of the Tokugawa era. In the eyes of those observers
the peasantryhad proved over and over again its capacity to fightin its
own defense,whethersinglyor in bands,or even in small armies,against
unbearable feudal oppression. These clan bureaucrats,especially those
with good historical memories,valued. even if grudgingly,the potentialities of the peasantryas soldiers and attempted,sometimessuccessfully,to harnessthe drivingforce of their anti-feudalresistanceto the
interestsof the ruling class whetherfeudal beforethe Meiji Restoration,
or ostensiblyto the interestof thenationas a whole afterthe Restoration.
Accordingly,much of the following historical background for conscriptionin Japan will not only tracein verylarge outline the relations
of the peasant to the warriorclass, but will discuss the question of the
nohei, that is of the peasant soldieror peasant-militia,a termwhichcanand practise of general conscriptionin modern Europe. To anticipate the
argumentof this essay,one might generalize at the risk of over-simplification
and say that while the origin of conscriptionin Europe was of revolutionary
inspiration,in Japan it arose from a deliberate counter-revolutionary
design,
despite the motivesof some of its advocates.
3 Contemporary
were surprisingly
well informed
Japanese scholarsand officials
of such events as the defeat of China by Great Britain in the Opium War of
1840-41and were quick to seize upon some of its lessons. Japanese interestin
the militarydetails of the war are reflectedin the questions put to the head of
the Dutch tradingmonopoly in Deshima; these questions relate to Britishtactics in China, the number of the troops, their naval complement,etc. Both
questions and the Dutch answers to them appear in C. R. Boxer: Jan Compagnie in Japan, The Hague, 1936,Appendix 5. Chinese accountsof the war
were in great demand in Japan and one of these entitledL-fei-fan-ching-wenchien-lu,which is known in Japanese in an abbreviated formas Bunkenroku,
was published in Japan in 1857 withoutthe name of any author or editor. A
Japanese scholar,Saito Chikudo,wroteand published in 1843 theAhen-shimatsu
(CircumstancesConcerning the Opium War). I am indebted for these references to the interestingstudy of Dr. R. H. van Gulik entitled "Kakkaron: A
Japanese Echo of the Opium War" in Monumenta Serica, Peking, Vol. 4, 1940,
pp. 511-12.
( 48 D
Soldierand Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
not here be convenientlydefined with precision as it meant different
thingsto different
writersof the Tokugawa period.
It would take us too far afield to trace the position of the peasantry
and its relationsto the warriorclass fromthe days of the Taika Reform
(645-650A.D.) throughthe manorial (shoen) era which saw the beginning of feudalismand pari passu, the decline of the semi-independent
peasantry,and finallyto the completesubjugation of the peasant to the
daimyo-samuraiclasses during Tokugawa feudalism.4But it is necessary
to point out that the husbandman (call him peasant or farmer)of prefeudal or early feudal times was often an armed and sturdyyeoman,
perhapseven a betterfighterthan a plowman,who banded togetherwith
his fellows to resist the encroachmentsof some land-hungrybaron, or
who donned a priestlygarmentand foughtas a templepriest to defend
or enlarge the enclaves of Buddhist secular power, or finally,perhaps,
seekingto escape the perils of an anarchic and fluidsociety,commended
himselfto some powerful"protector."
The artificialand stiltedpraise of "Bushido," the glorificationof the
disinterestedand generous warrior who protected the helpless (and,
therefore,cruellyexploited) peasant, had not as yet created the myth
of samurai philanthropyor of samurai superiorityeitheras a fighteror
as a man of feeling.
During the period of the great civil wars in the twelfthcenturybetweenthe rival houses of Minamoto and Taira, the position of the independent cultivatordeteriorated.There was a sharp differentiation
into
a professionalfightingclass owing fealtyto a lord on the one hand, and
a purely agricultural,but not as yet wholly disarmed,subjugated class
of cultivatorson the other. As the peasants still possessedarms, and as
therewas as yet very little specialization in arms, the rustyhalbert in
strongplebian hands could well be a matchforthe tassledspear in more
refined,aristocratichands. The great peasant revolts (tsuchi-ikki)of
the Muromachi period (1392-1490) showed that the peasants were far
frombeing defenselessin the face of mountingfeudal pressure.
These peasant revoltswere also a portentto the feudal ruler pointing
to the necessityof disarmingthe peasantryif his writ was to run in his
own domain. He looked to his fightingmen or bushi now as the exclu4The term "peasant" is here used veryloosely. In a careful historicalstudy
of peasant-samurairelations in Japanese historyone would have to define the
historicalcontentof the word "peasant" for each period because obviously the
peasant of the Taika era was in a quite different
social categoryfromthe peasant of the Muromachi (1392-1496) or Tokugawa (1603-1867) eras.
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Pacific Affairs
sive instrumentforthe defenseor expansion of his land, and forthe suppressionof peasant unrest. The most dramatic single act in enforcing
this policywas Hideyoshi's Great Sword Hunt of 1587.5
In the wordsof a Japanese scholardescribingthe significanceof Hideyoshi'spolicy, "These sturdypeasants who, taking their weapons, had
activelystood forthwith otherson the fieldof battle, now became submissiveand soft as we have already seen and the chief reason for this,
beyond any doubt, was Hideyoshi's SwortHunt."6 However, Hideyoshi
merelyenforcedon a national scale what lesserlords had been practising
since the great uprisingsof the Muromachi period.7
now be appropriateto attemptan historicaldefinitionof the
termnohei. In the Edo period (1603-1867),nohei had acquired a definite meaning which was colored by the Confucian ethics and special
historiographicaltraining of Tokugawa scholars. Such men as Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691), Ogyu Sorai (1666-1728), and Fujita Toko
(1806-1855) referred with nostalgic feeling to pre-Shogunate times
when soldier and peasant were identical; when, like Cincinnatusof old,
the peasant-soldierat a time of crisiswould lay down his hoe, take up
his spear, and respond to the muster.
One of the mostoutspokenof these criticsof Tokugawa rule was Rai
Sanyo (1780-1832), who wrote eloquently of a time when therewas no
distinctwarriorclass; when Societylike the State was not divided into
militaryand civil-a time which knew not the authorityor name of a
militarydictator (shogun) who exercisedan usurped power whichought
by prerogativeand tradition to have remained vested in the Imperial
IT
WOULD
person.8
5 The text of the actual decree of Hideyoshi in which he enforcedthe Sword
Hunt, therebydeprivingthe peasantryof arms,appears in Dai Nihon Komonjo
(Historical Documentsof Japan) in the 11thof the House Documents (le-wake
Monjo), the Kobayakawa Documents,Vol. I, p. 503.
6 Hanami Sakumi, in his essay entitledAzuchi Momoyama Jidai No Nomin
(The Peasantryof the Azuchi Momoyama Period) in the volume Nihon Nomin
Shi (The Historyof the Japanese Peasantry) published by the Nihon Rekishi
Chiri Gakkai (Learned Society of Japanese Historyand Geography), Tokyo,
1925, p. 106.
7 In 1578 Shibata Katsuie (1530-1583) carried out a sword hunt in Echizen
with the definitepurpose of drawingthe teethof the peasants and so rendering
themhelpless beforethe demands of the feudal ruling class. For this reference
see Nakamura Kichizo in his monographentitledKinsei Shoki Noson no Mondai (Agrarian Problems in the Early Modern Period), p. 46; this monograph
appears in Vol. 4 of the Iwanami collection,Nihon Rekishi (Historyof Japan).
8 This long account of early Japanese society,when the Emperor was also
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Soldier and Peasant in Japan: 'The Origins of Conscription
In the eyes of certainTokugawa writers,then,the samurai class arose
throughthe simple processof nohei-bunri,the separationor disunion of
peasant and warrior,which came about quite naturally through the
usurpationsof a warrior-landlordclass in the period of the Civil Wars
of the Taira and Minamoto,althoughthe historicalsignificance
of Hideyoshi's Sword Hunt is not sufficiently
appraised by these writerswho
have more of the moralistor utopist than the historianin them. It is
interestingto note that regardlessof the precise historicalexplanation
concerningthe disarmingof the peasant class, these Tokugawa writers
all assumed thatat one time the peasants were armed and that at a later
time, dates being left vague, the peasants appear as a disarmed class,
distinctlymarked offfroma dominant warriorclass.
One of the firstTokugawa writersto explain the phenomenonof a
samuraior warriorclass lordingit over the restof societyand whichhad
arisen through this simple act of nohei-bunri,is Kumazawa Banzan
whose XIIth Chapter of his Dai Gaku Wakumon is entitled "Abolition
of the Separate Soldier Classes." The firstquestion in this chapterreads:
"For a long time therehave been two classes of subjects, the samurai
(soldiers) and the farmers.Is it not possible to join them again into
one class as in olden times?"9
These Tokugawa sociologists,often violating historyin the interests
of ethics and propaganda, idealized early Japanese society as it had
existedbeforethe rise of a professionalwarriorclass. To them,the nohei
was a kind of sturdy,independentyeomanwho tilled his fieldsin peacetime and took up his arms to fightat the command of the centralgovernmentin time of war. What appealed to the more practicalof these
Tokugawa writer-administrators
was that such an armyof independent
yeomenwould cost the Treasury verylittle since they obedientlycame
forwardwith theirown arms at the call of dutyand returnedto make a
living offtheirfieldswhen the year's campaigningwas finished.
It will be seen that this Tokugawa view of the nohei has verylittle
in commonwiththatalternativedefinitionwhichwas adumbratedabove,
namely of peasants especially in M/Iuromachi
times (1393-1490) who
were organizedto fightagainst the feudal lords in theirown interests.
and led his armies in the field,appears in the Preface to
Commander-in-Chief,
the Hei-shi (Historyof the Hei, i. e. Taira Clan) in Rai Sanyo's famousNihon
Gaishi (UnofficialHistory of Japan) Book I, Part I, Vol. I of the Kambun
Sosho edition, Tokyo, 1929.
9 Galen M. Fisher: "Kumazawa Banzan: His Life and Ideas," Transactions
of the AsiaticSocietyof Japan, Second Series,Vol. 16, Tokyo, May 1938, p. 313.
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Pacific Affairs
Actually then thereare two conceptsof nohei whichmust be taken into
account: one traditionaland essentiallyfeudal, derivingfrom the subjective and idealized views of Tokugawa times; the second historical,
that is, based on an attemptto understandthe actual processesin which
a pre-feudalor early feudal peasantrysecured arms and foughtin selfdefenseagainst feudal encroachmentand tyranny.
These two views at timesmay become confused. Neither of them can
be used exclusivelyin understandingthe nohei question at the end of
the Tokugawa and in the earlyMeiji periods. It mightbe safe to generalize in the followingway. Most late Tokugawa thinkerswhen they
spoke of a nohei systemhoped by introducingcertain militaryreforms,
and injecting,as it were, freshblood into a badly diseased body, to
strengthenthe power of a feudalismwhich had become moribund.10To
themthe nohei simplymeant a feudal armygreatlyincreasedby the use
of large numbersof peasants. This in itselfof course was a radical departure from strictTokugawa practice which eschewed the arming of
peasants. Further,thisarmyof peasantswould definitelybe used to fight
under the orders of the old Tokugawa militarybureaucracy-whether
against foreigninvasion or in suppressinginternal unrest. This might
be called the orthodoxview of the nohei, and when we discuss the attitude and practice of the Tokugawa authoritiesin regard to the nohei,
it is thisview or modificationsof it which we shall meet. On the other
hand we musttake note of the idea and experienceof a peasant armyas
a genuine people's army,fightingin the interestsof the oppressedclasses,
against the absolutismof the Tokugawa regime. But this democraticor
anti-feudal concept of the nohei is rarely met in a pure form; it
oftenhas generous admixturesof the orthodox or conservativeTokugawa view, so that in disentanglingthe various ideas and uses of nohei
we have a complex and interestinghistoricalproblemon our hands.
AFEW of the more far-sightedTokugawa administratorsadvised the
institutionof a nohei systemto meet the needs foran increasedarmy
in the face of growingforeignpressureand so particularlyfor a militia
10One of the most original Tokugawa thinkerswho in some
ways came close
to the ideas of the French Physiocratsin associatingvalue with land, and so
estimatingagriculturalistsabove all other classes,was Sato Shinen. In the section entitled Rikugun-bu (militarysection) of his Suito Hissaku written in
1857, he proposes that many plebeian typesbe used to formthe mass basis of
a new, invigoratedarmy. Listing 15 professionsor sub-professions,
which he
consideredsuitable for active service,he specificallymentionsand recommends,
porters,grooms,herdsmen,wagoners,litter-bearers,
day-laborers,couriers,hunt-
a 52 v
Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
recruitedfrompeasantsto act as a coastal patrol." The advocatesof militaryreformwere usually more interestedin the technical rather than
the social aspect of such reform,a preferencewhich theirposition in the
Tokugawa administrativehierarchynaturallytended to heighten. One
of the best known of the advocates of militaryreformboth technical
(especially in artillery) and social in his experience with nohei, was
Egawa Tarozaemon (1801-1855). He was a pupil of Sakuma Shozan
(1811-1864) who paid with his life forhis studyof Westernlearningand
militaryscience.'2
of
Egawa was also acquainted with the two greatestmilitaryreformers
his generationwhom we shall meet later on: Takasugi Shinsaku and
Omura Masujiro. He held the position under the Bakufu (The Tokugawa Government)of daikan (magistrateof an administrativeunit) of
the districtof Nirayama which was a coastal area in the Izu Peninsula,
not farfromEdo. In 1849,in thiscapacity,he recommendedin a memQrial to the Bakufu the adoption of the nohei system.His memorialreads
in part: "If one could select suitable persons fromthe administration
(of the Bakufu) and in the neighborhoodof Nirayama in Izu, and if
one were to drill them not only in the science of artillerybut in other
militaryinstructiontaking advantage of the time they were not busy
farming,then when an emergencyarose, it would be possible and easy
ers, pole-bearers,gate-keepersand butchers,-all typesof the lowest social category in feudal Japan, but men whose socially useful functionsand physical
toughnesscommendedthem to Sato. He advocated a thoroughmilitarytraining
for them,with special barracks,parade-grounds,etc. for their use. Nihon Keizai Taiten (A Cyclopaedia of Japanese Political Economy) edited by Takimoto
Seiichi, Tokyo, 1928, Vol. XVIII, pp. 653 et seq.
:' In order to strengthenthe coastal defencesof Uraga, an anonymouswriter
of Choshu memorializedin 1853 as follows: "To use peasants as soldiers (as in
the excellentadministrationof the ancient Empire) is a methodof saving needless expense. Furthermore,it is reported that in Western nations soldiers are
chosen fromamong the peasants and, afterfulfillingtheir trainingin the militaryarts,become peasants again as before." Quoted in Oito Toshio: Bakumatsu
Heisei Kaikaku Shi (A Historyof MilitaryReformat the End of the Bakufu),
Tokyo, 1939, pp. 183-4.
12
Writingin 1858 a private letterto a pupil of his, Yanagawa Seigan, Sakuma Shozan shows his admirationof foreignmilitarysystemsbased on a widely
recruited,well trained army. But Japan, he complained, was torn by the
quarrels and intriguesof petty states or fiefswhich jealously seek their own
interestsforgettingthe welfareof the whole nation so that Japan is left inadequately armed and helplesslyexposed to any invader who is well supplied with
modernweapons. He is also thinkingof the fate of China in this regard. See
Miyamoto Chu: Sakuma Shozan (Biography of Sakuma Shozan) Tokyo, 1936,
p. 302.
q
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Pacific Affairs
to take themto battle. It also would be of use in one sectionof administrativecontrol,and such a group mightbe of help in servingthe public
during some emergency."13
In 1863 Egawa succeeded in creatingon a small scale a nohei or peasant militia in his administrativedistrictof Nirayama. He chose as the
core of this nohei the sons of village nanushi or headmen. This was, of
course, the most logical procedure since if any elementsin the village
could be regarded as probably literate and most likely loyal to the
Bakufu theywould be the familiesof the village headmen.
In thisconnectionit should be mentioned,if only in passing,that the
role of a countrysquirearchy,knownas goshi (literally,countryor rustic
samurai), is very importantin the understandingof Japanese feudal
society.Although theiroriginsand position differedwidelyin time and
place, the goshi have been happily describedby the historianMurdock,
in a phrase borrowed fromLord Redesdale, as 'bonnet lairds.' They
bridged the social gap between the cultivatorand the sword-bearing
samurai class since they were either independent cultivatorsor small
scale landowners with permission to carry arms and use a surname
(myoji taito gomen). Sometimes they were only rustic samurai who
bad neverbeen gatheredinto the castletownsof the fief(as in Satsuma),
or again theywere membersof defeatedclans whose new lords did not
wish to punish them too savagely,allowing them to retain their arms
and work small holdings in remote parts of the fief (as in Tosa when
the Yamanouchi familysucceeded to the fiefafter the defeat of the
older Chosokabe familywhich had espoused the losing side in the struggle between Ieyasu and Hideyori in 1614-15). In many fiefsin order
to encourage the cultivationof new land the clan chiefsrewardedthose
who were willing to reclaim land under contract (ukeoi) by granting
them the status of goshi. In this way wealthypeasants and even merchantsenteredthe ranks of goshi,a processwhich mightbe describedas
the back door entry into the samurai class.14
These goshi who went to swell the ranks of lower officialswere very
active in village administrationat the close of the Tokugawa era. They
13Yada Shichitaro: Bakumatsu no Ijin EgawlaKetsu-an (The Great Figure at
the Close of the Tokugawa Era-Egawa Ketsu-an), p. 75.
14 Officially
the Bakufu frowned on the acquisition of the right to wear a
sword and assume a surname throughthe virtual purchase of goshi status by
such means as described above. But like so many of their prohibitionsit was
more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Tokugawa Kinrei-ko
(Commentarieson Tokugawa Laws and Inderdicts,edited by Ministryof Justice) 1st folio of the Supplementarycollection,p. 274.
( 54 )
Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
were often the leaders of local militia and skirmishingtroops who
foughtagainstthe Bakufu armiesin the war of the Restoration (1867-8).
Socially and historicallythe goshi of Satsuma were among the most
interesting.These Satsuma goshi were very old, some of their families
stemmingback to Kamakura times (12th century). They werea strongly
traditionalisttypeof countrygentry,reminiscentof the Tudor Justices
of the Peace in their combinationof parochial pride, intense conservatism,and loyaltyto theirsuzerain. These Satsuma goshi were numerous
and scatteredwidely througheven the remoteand mountainousregions
of the clan; theywere renowned for their tough martial qualities and
the Tokugawa authoritiesreputedly entertained a cordial dislike of
them.'
These Satsuma goshi were landowners,who personallysupervisedthe
work of peasants who tilled the land for them so that they rarelyput
hand to hoe or plough, and were the gentryof village society.They were
definitelyof samurai, that is, sword-bearingstatus,but their coarse and
rusticmanners made them an object of railleryand contempt to the
haughtycastle-bornsamurai."6
These pettysquires of Satsuma ruled the peasantrywith a none too
gentlehand. They were the channel throughwhichthe clan government
enforcedits decreesupon the rural population and theyalso acted as a
sort of counter-espionageservice against any pryingagents who were
sent fromtime to timeinto Satsuma by the Bakufu to gain detailed informationabout this powerfuland hostile clan.
The goshi of Satsuma were the claws and teethof the feudal authorities in the suppression of agrarian unrest. The tight rein which the
goshi of this clan kept upon the peasantrythroughthe tojo system (literally "separated fromthe castle," that is, a systemof settlingsamurai
on the countrysideat a distance from the castle-town),was the reason
why this clan rarely experienced a peasant revolt during the whole
length of the Tokugawa period."
It is only natural then that both the Tokugawa and clan auhorities,
15Accordingto the Horeki census of the 6th year of Horeki (1756) there
were 20,000goshi in the Kagoshima clan. Ono Takeo: Goshi Seido no Kenkyu
(A Study of the Goshi System),p. 78.
16The Kagoshima clan regulationsrequired thatgoshi must
not appear drunk
in the cityof Kagoshima. They mustpay special respectto the samurai and the
castle-townand were not allowed to lead a horse throughthe citystreets.(Ibid.
p. 87).
17 Ono Takeo:
Nihon Heino Shiron (An Historical Discussion of SoldierPeasants in Japan), Tokyo, 1940,pp. 192-3,
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in theirdiscussionsof the advisabilityof creatinga nohei or peasant army
should look to the village headmen or to this goshi class as the core
around which to build such a militarysystem.
In the various documentswhich are available18 concerningthe discussion by Tokugawa authoritiesof the advantagesor disadvantagesin the
nohei system,we see croppingup again and again a fear of entrusting
arms to a sullen and oftenrebellious peasantry. Those who advocated
the adoption of a nohei systemin order to by-passthe danger which
might arise fromindiscriminatearmingof peasants,chose to limit the
?ohei to thesegoshi or village gentry,or again to give them a predominant position of authoritywithin the nohei.
It is impossiblehere to quote or even analyze the veryconsiderable
documentarymaterial on the question of nohei. Sufficeit to say that
the advice of such Tokugawa reformersas Egawa Tarozaemon was rejected by the Bakufu. The Bakufu was torn between its desire on the
one hand to increase its arms to meet the challenge to its supremacy
growingfromrival clans or foreignpressureand its fear on the other
of increasingthe hazards fromagrarianunrestby arming the peasantry.
Decaying feudalismgave support to two mutually conflictingtheories,
one advocating the adoption of a nohei systemand the other opposed
to it. A thorough-going
adoption of a nohei systemmeant abandoning
the whole elaborate class systemof feudalism,while to reject all social
and militaryreformwould leave the Bakufu exposed to the greatlyincreased armies of the more enterprisingclans and even to the danger
of foreignattack. Terrifiedby the Scylla of social reformthe Bakufu
founderedupon the Charybdisof social stagnation.s
18
Perhaps the most interestingof these are a series of documentswrittenby
various high Tokugawa officialsincluding Ometsuke or chiefsof the political
and moral police, writtenin reply to queries fromthe Bakufu concerningthe
advisabilityof adopting a nohei system.These documentshave been collected
and partiallyprintedby Oyama Shikitaroin Bakumatsu Keizai Shi Kenkyu (A
Studyof Economic Historyat the End of the Bakufu), published by the Nihon
Keizai Shi Kenkyu-jo (The Japanese Economic History Research Institute at
Kyoto), pp. 216-238.
19 A curious
parallel in this attitudeof reluctanceon the part of feudal lords
to create a peasant army,even for defense of the country,can be seen in the
experience of Czarist Russia. During Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812
guerilla forcessprang up in the countrysidebehind Napoleon's armies thereby
contributinggreatlyto the final defeat of the French. However, in a careful
studyof this campaign it has been shown that in many instances the feudal
lords in Russia feared the guerilla forcesof their own peasants so much that
they discouraged this spontaneous and voluntarymilitia and in extremecases
c 56 z
Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
Althoughthe Bakufu rejected the idea of adopting a nohei system,we
can see fromreferencesin local historiesas well as in the memoirsof
chroniclersof the time that many of the more advanced clans instituted
this systemin the years before the Restoration. For instance we read:
"Beforethe Restoration,therewas a gradual change in the general trend
within the Empire and accordingly there appeared urgent military
preparationsboth for internal and external purposes. The need frequently arose for each clan to increase the number of its soldiers and
of the formerclan soldiers,the clans orkeenlyfeelingthe insufficiency
ganized troopsby summoningthe dependentsof the regularsoldiers,or
by recruitingpeasants and commoners,Shinto and Buddhist priests,and
others.In order to maintain them they gave them stipends and every
clan without exception did this."20
clans are too numerousto be widely
Examples of the nohei in different
cited here but we shall referbrieflyto a few of the more interesting
examples. In the clan of Tosa a Mimpei, or People's Militia, was instituted in September 1854. The leading elements in this Mimpei were
ronin (samurai who for any reason no longer owed fealtyto a lord),
village headmen, and goshi, while the rank and file were largelycomposed of peasants,sailors,and hunters;chonin (merchants) could only
serveif theyfirstbecame peasants.The chieffunctionof thisMimpei was
to guard the coastsof Tosa whichwere exposed on threesides to the sea.
Consequently,theywere recruitedexclusivelyas a watch against foreign
danger,and as the clan was friendlyto the Tokugawa authoritiesuntil
the eve of the Restoration,it was not aimed against the Bakufu as in
the case of othernohei.21
An example of nohei organizedby staunchLoyalists (i. e. anti-Bakufu
leaders) who gained permissionfromthe clan authoritiesto formsuch
a peasant militia is found in the case of the Ashikaga clan in 1865. The
Tazaki
leader of this group of anti-Bakufumilitia was the patriot-artist
Soun, and the name of the corps was the Seishintai (literally,Band of
even suppressedthem.See Eugene Tarl6: Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, New
York, 1942, pp. 353-4.
20 ChitsurokuShobun Enkaku Gaiyo (An Outline Historyof the Settlement
of Capitalized Pensions). This treatiseappears in the Meiji Zenki Zaisei Keizai
ShiryoShusei (Collection of Historical Material on Finance and Economy in
the Early Years of the Meiji Era), edited by Tsuchiya Takao and Ouchi Hyoei,
Tokyo, 1931, Vol. 8, p. 296.
21A detailed account of the organization and historyof the Tosa Mimpei
fromwhich the above summarywas taken is to be found in an article by Hirao
Michio: "Kochi-han no Mimpei Seido" (The Mimpei System of the Kochi
Clan) in Tosa Shidan (Historical Discourses on Tosa), No. 35, pp. 79-85.
c
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Pacific Affairs
the Whole-hearted).Accordingto the account in his biography,he was
the actual commanderof the corpsalthoughnominallyit was under clan
jurisdiction. It took part in the fightingagainst the Tokugawa forces
beforethe Restorationand distinguisheditselfin the battle of Kamata.2
In the clan of Kii a certainTsuda Mataro, beginningin 1863, trained
men of all classesin the use of Westernarms. In the same yearmembers
of this corps took part in the anti-Bakufuuprisingat Gojo in Yamato
led by the court noble Nakayama Tadamitsu. This was one of the first
local uprisingsin which anti-Bakufuslogans were openly used by the
rebels who called themselvesthe Tenchugumi ("Heaven's Avengers").23
In the same clan, shortlyafterthe Restoration,a German soldier,Sergeant Karl Kdppen, was hired to give militaryinstructionin the latest
Westernstyle;he succeeded in traininga corps of 5,000 men,giving this
clan, in the years beforeconscription,quite a high reputationfor mili24
tarytraining.
Our last and most interestingexample of clan nohei is the case of the
Kiheitai of Choshu. As the Bakufu entered its last decade of rule, the
men of Choshu, most aggressiveand hostile to the Bakufu of all clans,
were engaged in intrigues,plots, and violent emrneutesdirected against
the Bakufu. The leaders in the anti-Bakufumovementwere ronin, and
the lowersamurai, restlessand impoverishedmen whose feverishactivity
in Kyoto culminated in the bloody streetfightingof 1865, afterwhich
the Bakufu securedan Imperial decree outlawing them fromthe capital
22 Fujii Jintaro: Ishin Zengo no Nohei (The
Nohei of the Time of the
Restoration) in the volume Nihon Heisei Shi (The History of the Japanese
MilitarySystem), published by the Nihon Rekishi Chiri Gakkai (Learned Society of Japanese History and Geography), Tokyo, 1939, pp. 234-235.
23This uprising led by lower classes of samurai and a court noble (kuge),
and financiallybacked by some local merchantswith the actual fightingdone
by samurai, ronin and free-lancepeasants, was a small scale rehearsal, as it
were, of the Meiji Restoration in which the same classes, in almost the same
order of importance,overthrewthe Tokugawa rule. See Ogimachi Kito: Meiji
Ishin no Senku-sha, Tenchugumi Nakayama Tadamitsu (A Precursorof the
Meiji Restoration,Nakayama Tadamitsu of the Tenchugumi), Tokyo, 1935,
pp. 189-206; 291-297. On the anti-Bakufusongs and slogans of the Tenchugumi see Kajiya Nobuhei: Bakumatsu Kinno TenchugumiResshi Senshi (Loyalists at the End of the Tokugawa Era; A War Memoir of the Tenchugumi
Patriots), p. 216.
24 Karl Koppen. See article entitled Wakayama ni okeru Karl Koppen (Karl
Koppen in Wakayama) by Shigehisa Atsutaro in the journal Meiji Bunka
Kenkyu (A Study of Meiji Culture) No. 6, November 1935, pp. 53-65. There
is a brief referenceto Karl Koppen and his stay in Wakayama in J. J.Rein:
Japan: Travels and Researches Undertakenat the Cost of the Prussian Government,English translation,London, 1884, p. 512.
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Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
and compellingtheirlord to retirein disgrace,and to live fora year or
more under voluntaryhouse arrest.
Before this,however,therehad been brewingwithin Choshu itselfa
crisis in clan politics between a radical party of youngersamurai and
the dominantclique of older clan bureaucrats. These conservativeclan
councillors,morecompromisingin theirpolicy towardsthe Bakufu,were
purged in a coup de main in which several of them were assassinated,
and the radical partyof youngerofficialsthen dominated the clan government. The elder lord of Choshu, Mori Motonori,realizing that the
growingintransigenceof his clan would soon draw down upon it the
armed wrathof the Bakufu, decided to entrustthe reorganizationof his
armyto the youngermore daringand imaginativesamurai. To this end
he summoned the brilliant strategistTakasugi Shinsaku, then only 25
yearsof age. This Choshu samurai had studied under Japanese masters
of Dutch learning at Edo, had acquired a considerable knowledge of
gunnery and Western military science. Like other younger Choshu
samurai,he was a violentpartisanof the Sonno Joi movement (literally,
"Revere the Emperor,Expel the Barbarian." It was under this slogan
that the anti-Tokugawa movement outmanoeuvred and finally overthrew the Bakufu.) Takasugi's interviewwith his lord took place on
June 6, 1863 and he securedvirtuallya freehand fromMori in order to
reformthe clan army.His views as recordedin one of the clan histories
were veryradical; he did not hide his contemptfor the samurai of his
day. His actual wordswere: "The stipendiarysamurai have become soft
and indolent throughyearsof peace and idleness. Their martialprowess
has been dulled, and to re-invigoratean army one must recruitvolunteerswith spirit,courage and skill regardlessof theirclass, whetherthey
"25
be samurai,peasant or artisan.
His viewson the decay of the samurai spiritare expressedeven more
colorfullyin words attributedto him in anotherhistoryof Choshu. "It
was Takasugi's opinion that the bushi (i.e. samurai) who in formertimes
receivedhereditarystipends,are no use in battle since theyare cravenhearted (koshi-nuke). The properway to organizean armyis to recruit
freshsoldiers who are brave and strong whether they be peasant or
chonin (commoneror merchant) if theyare only of a bold spiritand a
sturdybody, theycan be recruitedand formedinto an army."26
25
Nohara Yusaburo: Bo-cho Ishin Hiroku (A Secret Chronicle of Choshu at
the Time of the Restoration), Tokyo, 1937, p. 460.
26 Tadamasa-Ko Kinno jiseki (Historical Memoirsof the Loyalist Lord Tadamasa) as narrated by Nakahara Kunhei and recorded by luchi Taro, Tokyo,
1909,Vol. I, pp. 280-281.
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With his lord's permission,Takasugi at once set on foot the creation
of a band of troopscalled the Kiheitai (literally,"surprisetroops") who
were allowed to enlist regardlessof social status. But again it is more
instructiveto let the documentsthemselvesreveal to us therevolutionary
nature of thisarmy. In his firstorderof the day, Takasugi set forthhis
plans forthe Kiheitai. He stated thatvolunteerswould be accepted only
if theywere brave and had initiativeand withoutregard as to whether
theywere rear-vassals(bashin) or clan samurai. In accord with the saying that even the most humble person cannot be deprived of his ambition, therewould be no discriminationagainst personsof lowlyorigin.
The only qualificationswere skill, daring, and obedience to the commanderwho would punish and rewardeach man accordingto his merits.
Both Japanese and Westernarms would be used in fightingbut special
opportunityfor acquiring familiaritywith Western arms would be
given.27An historicalanalogy that comes to mind both in the sobriety
and the strictdiscipline of the leader, togetherwith his daring experimentsin militarymatters,is Cromwell.Takasugi's words quoted above
are almost an echo of Cromwell's: "I had rather have a plain russet
coated captain that knows what he fightsfor and loves what he knows,
than that which you call 'a gentleman'and is nothingelse."28
AND NOW we come to the most crucial question of the nohei at the
end of the Tokugawa era: the question whetherthe soldier-peasants
should remain serfsbound both to the land and the lord while serving
as a peasant militia (that is to say, as unfree agents acting under the
ordersand in the interestsof the feudal government)or whetherthey
should be emancipated peasants freelyjoining volunteer armies which
were strugglingagainst feudalism.
Most of the examples are of the former,that is the unfreetype. The
Kiheitai of Choshu was not a pure, anti-feudal,emancipated band of
peasants but a mixtureof freeand unfree,of merchant,ronin and shoya
(village headmen). Yet it is an interestingtransitionaltype,containing
in it the seeds of the armies of the early Meiji era, when all fourclasses
wereregardedas equal in statusand when thegovernmentarmyrecruited
fromall classes routed the old samurai armies of feudal reaction,particularlyin the suppressionof the SatsumaRebellion of 1877.
The nohei systemof the late Tokugawa was a verycomplex phenome27Bo-choIshin Hiroku, cited pp. 462-463.
28Thomas Carlyle: Cromwell'sLetters and Speeches, edited by Lomas, Vol.
i, P. 154.
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Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
non. As faras we know,nowherewas it made up purelyof unfreeserfs
nor on the other hand of completelyemancipated peasants. The nohei
systemof the late Tokugawa presentsvarious mixtures-troopsconsisting
mostlyof goshi, nanushi or shoya, ronin and wealthier peasants, with
perhaps a sprinklingof unfreepeasants; otherswith thesesame elements
but with the proportionschanged; others again like the Kiheitai with
strongronin elementsin the leadership of commoners,well-to-dopeasants and run-awaypeasants.29
The historicalsignificanceof the nohei systemas it appeared in all
its complexityat the end of the Tokugawa period goes far beyond the
mere giving of arms to peasants for the purpose of training them as
troopsto supplementthe Tokugawa or clan armies. It was a problem
which cut to the very root of a feudalism that had been obstructing
everyavenue of advance whetherin the political,social, or culturalfield.
Thus a new militarysystemcalled for a new social organization. The
keen minds of the age, notably Takasugi Shinsaku, Omura Masujiro,
and theircompanionsof Choshu saw the need for drasticchangesin the
cultural and social life of the nation if lasting reformin the military
systemwas to be effected.What then,is the special interestto us of the
Choshu Kiheitai, aside fromits role in the struggleagainst the Bakufu?
It is preciselyin its mixtureof free and unfreeelements-and the fact
that it welcomed to a certainextentrun-away,that is to say, self-emancipated peasants.
This does not imply that the lord and councillorsof Choshu issued
some dramatic decree of peasant emancipation. It means rather that
Choshu, like all feudal Japan, had experienced the whirlwindviolence
of peasant revolt and so with considerable skill these young Choshu
leaders tried to canalize the power of peasant insurrection,divertingit
fromits narrow class economic motivation to the broader channel of
political struggleagainst the feudal hegemonyof the Tokugawa. We
have convenientlyat hand documents which illustrate this policy of
Choshu, so similarin many ways to early Meiji policy,namelywinning
the allegianceof the ronin and peasantryin order to utilize themagainst
their common foe, the Bakufu, which representedthe heart of feudal
reaction, exploiting the peasant more efficiently
even than the other
clans, and thwartingthe talents and ambitions of samurai in the great
toutside" clans such as Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen. Let us now
turnto our basic source,the Kiheitai Nikki, which is a collectionof the
29Tokugawafeudalismstrictly
forbadepeasantsto migratefromvillageto
to city.
villageor fromcountryside
a
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diaries, journals, and other documentswrittenby Kiheitai leaders. Instructionsissued in connectionwith the Kiheitai, dated the 9th day of
the 12th month of Bunkyu 3rd year (1863) read as follows: "As for
peasants and chonin, those who leave behind them a substitute (heir)
to farmor pursuebusinessare given permissionto enterthe ranksof the
Kiheitai if they wish. Those peasants who have fled,or those chonin
who have let theirhouse go to ruin are strictlyordered to returnhome.
But those who have been in the armyand are skilled in sharpshooting
and are courageous will receive furtherinstructionsafter firstbeing
examined."30
Choshu was perhaps the most intransigentlyanti-Bakufu clan; its
Kiheitai not unexpectedlywas anti-feudalinsofaras it recognized the
need of freeingpeasantsfromthe feudalyokeand utilizingtheirreleased
energies in the anti-Bakufustruggle. Thus the Kiheitai representsa
kind of peasant revolt controlledfrom above and directedagainst the
Bakufu; historyhas recordedhow formidablea weapon was this small
but intrepidarmy. A contemporarychroniclerwritingas a Bakufu partisanadmitsthestrengthof thisarmy."The rebelsof Bocho (i.e. Choshu)
are trulymostskilled in the use of Westernarms; fromreportsreceived
it seemsscarcelycredible (literally,"human") the way theyadvance and
retreatalong mountains and precipices; indeed theirs is a formidable
power. But when the allied clans (i.e. the Bakufu and its allies) attack,
theyuse old-fashionedtypesof gun, notablythe match-lock(hinawaju).
In this way from the verystart the rebels gain the advantage and the
attackingside showsits weaknessand forthisreason the Bakufu infantry
mustever be going to the aid of the allied troops."31
Although the rank and file of the Kiheitai were comparativelyraw
troops in years of servicecompared to the Tokugawa armies,they constantlyoutfoughtthe Tokugawa soldiers,displayingfargreaterskill particularlyin theiruse of Westernarms. We mightcite a Westernjournalist,thenlivingin Japan, on the superiorityof theseChoshu troops."One
circumstancethat alwaysappears to me worthyof notice with regard to
Satsuma and Choshu is, that both of them practicallyacknowledged
the superiorityof foreignappliances in war, by obtaining riflesand
80Kiheitai Nikki (Kiheitai Diaries), edited by the Nihon Shiseki Kyokai (Society of Japanese Historical Works), entryfor the 9th day of the 12th month
of the 3rd year of Bunkyu (probably Vol. II).
31Hyo-in Renjo Mampitsu (Random Notes Writtenon Trips fromCastle to
Castle in the Year Hyo-in, i.e. 1866), edited by the Nihon Shiseki Kyokai,
Vol. I, p. 149.
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Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription
ammunition,and largelyarming theirmen with them,adopting,at the
same timeas far as theycould, foreigndrill and discipline. But in the
fightwith Choshu that was about to take place, many of the samurai
(i.e., of the Tokugawa Army) to whom rifleswere offered,refusedto
to trustto the old bows
use them,or to undergothe new drill,preferring
and arrows,the trustysword,and the tacticsof Old Japan."32
More than this,the Kiheitai was led by men of the highesttalent,certainlyamong the best brains in the country. One was Takasugi Shinfromconsaku, already mentioned,who died at the age of twenty-eight
sumptionon the eve of the Restoration (1867). But therewas an even
more imaginativespiritwhose tastesand interestswere far broaderthan
those of the fanatical,more provincial Takasugi. Omura Masujiro deservesperhapsmore than any otherone man the title of founderof the
modern Japanese Army. He studied Dutch under the famous scholar
Obata Koan, knew and admired von Siebold, acted as guardian and
teacherof the latter'sdaughter,1ne. He studiedEnglish froman American in Shinagawa. He read widely in science, including medicine,
economics,and foreignstudies; in 1864 he translatedfromthe Dutch a
workon strategywrittenfromthe standpointof German militarytheory
which was then under the spell of Napoleonic influence. It is thus of
some interestthat in the finalcampaign againstthe Bakufu,the Kiheitai
under Omura and his companions made use of contemporaryEuropean
militarystrategy.A man of strongcharacter,Omura had come to entertain such disgust at the cramped militarysystemof feudalism that a
storyis told of his refusingto talk to a close companion at arms who
offendedhim by wearing his long samurai sword during a conference.
Omura mightwell be startledwere he alive todayto see the fashionnow
currentin theJapanese armywhereit is a commonsightto see an officer
trundlingabout with a long cumbersomesamurai sword at his side.
However, Omura was as advanced in his historical perception and
imaginationcompared with presentJapanese militaryleaders as Clausewitz was in advance of the Nazi generals. With his ideas of sweeping
social reformsas a prerequisitefor a national army,and particularly
with his plan forgeneral conscriptionwhich struckat the very citadel
of samurai privilege,Omura roused the fierceresentmentof the clan
reactionaries.He was assassinatedin 1869 when,as Vice-Ministerof War,
he had begun to enforcethe firststeps towardsthe goal of general conscription,and the modernizationof the Japanese army,leaving behind
32John R. Black: Young Japan, London, 1880, Vol. I, p. 318.
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Pacific Affatrs
him a group of disciples such as Yamagata Aritomo,Yamada Kengi and
Kido Koin, who lived on to completehis work.3
We can say then that the Kiheitai was to a certainextentboth revolutionaryand anti-Bakufu.But on the other hand, its leaders, with the
possible exceptionof Omura, for the most part did not look beyondthe
feudal order of society. They were primarilystrategistsand patriots,
absorbed in the struggleto overthrowthe Bakufu; theywere not social
reformersinterestedin peasant emancipation. Thus their feudal viewpoint led them to put the brakes upon the freeunrestrictedmovement
of run-awaypeasants into the Kiheitai-a movementwhich threatened
the feudal basis of Choshu as well as of the Bakufu.
83There are quite a few biographies of Omura. A recent one from which
the above is taken, and which thoughpopular in formgives quite a few clues
as to Omura's political views is by Tanaka Chugoro, entitled Kinsei Gunsei
Soshi-sha, Omura Masujiro (The Creator of the Modern Military System,
Omura Masujiro). For our more restrictedpurpose, namely,Omura's ideas on
conscription,the most authoritativereferenceperhaps is the chapter on that
subject in Matsushita Kimio's Chohei-reiSeitei no Zengo (The Time of the
Establishmentof the ConscriptionAct), Tokyo, 1932, pp. 31-47.
Note: Mr. Norman's article will be concluded in the next issue of PACIFIC
AFFAIRS.With additional notes and appendices it will also be published as
a pamphletby the International Secretariatof the I.P.R.
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