i komparativna Hrvatska

Transcription

Hrvatska
i komparativna
javna uprava
Croatian and Comparative Public Administration
Cˇ A S O P I S
Z A
T E O R I J U
I
P R A K S U
J AV N E
U P R AV E
BROJ
2015.
Godina
15.
UDK
25(497.5:100)
I N S T I T U T Z A J AV N U U P R AV U
P R A V N I F A K U L T E T S V E U Cˇ I L I Š T A
U
ISSN
2
1848-0357
Z A G R E B U
HRVATSKA I KOMPARATIVNA JAVNA UPRAVA
Časopis za teoriju i praksu javne uprave
CROATIAN AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
A journal for theory and practice of public administration
Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava izlazi tromjesečno, u ožujku, lipnju, rujnu i prosincu
Croatian and Comparative Public Administration is published four times a year, in March,
June, September and December
Nakladnici/Publishers:
INSTITUT ZA JAVNU UPRAVU (Institute of Public Administration), Sv. Ćirila i Metoda 4,
10000 Zagreb
PRAVNI FAKULTET SVEUČILIŠTA U ZAGREBU (Faculty of Law), Trg maršala Tita 14,
10000 Zagreb
Uredništvo/Editorial Board:
Glavni i odgovorni urednik/Editor in Chief: prof. dr. sc. Ivan Koprić
Pomoćnik glavnog urednika/Assistant Editor: doc. dr. sc. Vedran Đulabić
Izvršni urednik/Executive Editor: dr. sc. Romea Manojlović
Članovi/members: prof. dr. sc. Hrvoje Arbutina (Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu), izv. prof. dr. sc.
Boris Bakota (Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Osijeku), Slavica Banić (sutkinja Ustavnog suda), prof. dr. sc.
Robert Blažević (Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci), mr. sc. Marija Burić Pejčinović, prof. dr. sc. Tamara
Ćapeta (Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu), Ante Galić (predsjednik Visokog upravnog suda), izv. prof.
dr. sc. Mirko Klarić (Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Splitu), izv. prof. dr. sc. Boris Ljubanović (Pravni fakultet
Sveučilišta u Osijeku), Anita Markić (Ministarstvo uprave), doc. dr. sc. Anamarija Musa (Pravni fakultet
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu), doc. dr. sc. Ana Petek (Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu), dr. sc.
Zoran Pičuljan (zamjenik ministra uprave, Ministarstvo uprave), dr. sc. Nikola Popović (Hrvatska agencija
za mrežne djelatnosti), Dubravka Prelec (Državna škola za javnu upravu, Zagreb), doc. dr. sc. Tereza Rogić
Lugarić (Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu), izv. prof. dr. sc. Marko Šikić (Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u
Zagrebu), mr. sc. Franka Vojnović (Ministarstvo regionalnog razvoja i fondova Europske Unije)
Dopisno uredništvo/Corresponding members: Professor Harald Baldersheim (Faculty of Social
Sciences, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo), Em. Professor Christian Brünner (Faculty
of Law, Institute for Austrian, European and Comparative Public Law, Political Science and Administrative
Studies, University of Graz), Professor Tom Christensen (Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of
Political Science, University of Oslo), Professor Colin Copus (Faculty of Business and Law, Department
of Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester), Professor Borče Davitkovski (Iustinianus Primus
Faculty of Law, University of Skopje), Professor Klaus H. Goetz (Geschwister-Scholl-Institute, University
of Munich), Professor Božo Grafenauer (retired from the Faculty of Law, University of Maribor), Professor
John Halligan (Faculty of Business and Government, University of Canberra, Australia), Em. Professor
Chris Himsworth (School of Law, University of Edinburgh), Professor Walter J. M. Kickert (Faculty of
Social Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam), Professor Sabine Kuhlmann (Department for Political
Science, Public Administration and Organization II, University of Potsdam), Professor Edward C. Page
(London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Government, London), Professor
Leslie A. Pal (School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University Ottawa, Canada), Professor
B. Guy Peters (University of Pittsburgh, Political Science, USA), Professor Ulrich Ramsauer (Faculty of
Law, University of Hamburg), Professor Tiina Randma-Liiv (Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of
Public Administration, Tallinn University of Technology), Professor Herwig Reynaert (Faculty of Political
and Social Science, Department of Political Science, Centre for Local Politics, Ghent University), Professor
Stanka Setnikar Cankar (Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana), Professor Pawel Swianiewicz
(Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, Department of Local Development and Policy, University
of Warsaw), Professor Gorazd Trpin (Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana), Em. Professor Norbert
Wimmer (Faculty of Law, Department of Public Law, State and Administrative Theory, University of
Innsbruck), Em. Professor Hellmut Wollmann (Social Science Institute, Humboldt-University of Berlin)
Adresa uredništva/Address:
HRVATSKA I KOMPARATIVNA JAVNA UPRAVA, Sv. Ćirila i Metoda 4, 10000 Zagreb,
tel. +385(1)4895–629, faks +385(1)4895-669, e-mail: [email protected]
Croatian
and Comparative
Public Administration
VOL. 11. (2011.) • • No. 2 PP. 319–564
No 4. PP. 1–???
VOL. 15 (2015)
•
ZAGREB, 20110. • • UDK 25(497.5:100)
UDK 35(497.5)
ZAGREB, 2015
••
ISSN 1331-6443
ISSN 1848-0357
Contents
LOCAL DEMOCRACY
Norbert Kersting: Local Political Participation in Europe:
Elections and Referendums
319
Colin Copus: Ideology or Realism in Local Governance:
A Case of RealLokalPolitik in English Local Government
335
Michele Breuillard: Local Democracy in France:
Improvements and Shilly-Shallying
357
Dawid Sześciło: Participatory Budgeting in Poland:
Quasi-Referendum Instead of Deliberation
373
Ivan Koprić, Mirko Klarić: New Developments in Local
Democracy in Croatia 389
Anamarija Musa, Domagoj Bebić, Petra Đurman: Transparency and
Openness in Local Governance: A Case of Croatian Cities
415
Simona Kukovič, Marjan Brezovšek: E-Democracy and E-Participation
in Slovenian Local Self-Government 451
Ivan Koprić, Daria Dubajić, Tijana Vukojičić Tomić: County Elections in
Croatia: On the Path to Genuine Regional Politics 475
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
The County Court in Zagreb (Damir Juras)517
The Administrative Court in Osijek (Damir Juras)521
The Civil Service Commission (Damir Juras)523
NEWS AND INFORMATION
Conference Decentralization Policies: Reshuffling the Scene (Daria Dubajić)529
Conference European Local Governance at a Glance (Iva Lopižić)535
Conference Insourcing and/or Outsourcing: How do They Contribute
to Public Administration Reform? (Jasmina Džinić)538
Conference The Challenges of Functioning of the Croatian Public Sector
in the European Union (Mihovil Škarica)540
Public presentation of the book Europeization of the Croatian
Public Administration (Petra Đurman) 543
IN FOCUS
Ivan Koprić: Open Questions on Property Restitution or Compensation
for the Property of Former Land Communities
545
Hrvatska
i komparativna
javna uprava
GODINA 15. (2015.)
•
BROJ 2. STR. 315–564
•
ZAGREB, 2015.
•
UDK 25(497.5:100)
•
ISSN 1848-0357
Sadržaj
LOKALNA DEMOKRACIJA
Norbert Kersting: Local Political Participation in Europe:
319
Colin Copus: Ideology or Realism in Local Governance:
A Case of RealLokalPolitik
335
Michele Breuillard: Local Democracy in France:
357
Dawid Sześciło: Participatory Budgeting in Poland:
373
Ivan Koprić, Mirko Klarić: New Developments in Local
Democracy in Croatia 389
Anamarija Musa, Domagoj Bebić, Petra Đurman: Transparency and
Openness in Local Governance: A Case of Croatian Cities
415
Simona Kukovič, Marjan Brezovšek: E-Democracy and E-Participation
in Slovenian Local Self-Government 451
Ivan Koprić, Daria Dubajić, Tijana Vukojičić Tomić: County
Elections in Croatia: On the Path to Genuine Regional Politics 475
SUDSKA I UPRAVNA PRAKSA
Županijski sud u Zagrebu (Damir Juras)517
Upravni sud u Osijeku (Damir Juras)521
Odbor za državnu službu (Damir Juras)523
VIJESTI
Conference Decentralization Policies: Reshuffling the Scene
(Daria Dubajić)529
Conference European Local Governance at a Glance (Iva Lopižić)535
Konferencija Insourcing and/or Outsourcing: How do They Contribute
to Public Administration Reform? (Jasmina Džinić)538
Znanstveni skup Izazovi funkcioniranja hrvatskoj javnog sektora u
Europskoj uniji (Mihovil škarica)540
Predstavljanje knjige Europeizacija hrvatske javne uprave (Petra Đurman)543
AKTUALNA TEMA
Ivan Koprić: Otvorena pitanja rješavanja problema povrata imovine
ili naknade za imovinu bivših zemljišnih zajednica
545
LOCAL DEMOCRACY – LOKALNA DEMOKRACIJA
319
Local Political Participation in Europe:
Norbert Kersting*
Since the 1970s, political protests have been growing in
many democracies and the demand for political participation has become obvious. The 1990s also saw more open,
dialogue-oriented participatory instruments (century of
participation). The proliferation of participatory instruments in the field of talk-centric deliberative democracies
is called the deliberative turn. Most new instruments of
participation are implemented at the local level. However,
it is argued that these instruments do not lead to binding
decisions. Compared to elections, the number of citizens
participating is rather small and selective. New forms of
vote-centric direct democracy (referendums and other initiatives) are also implemented. The paper presents a model
of offline and online participation with focus on representative and direct participation that can lead to binding de-
*
Norbert Kersting, Professor, University of Muenster, Institute of Political Science,
Chair of Local and Regional Government, Germany (prof. dr. sc. Norbert Kersting, Insitut
za političke znanosti, Sveučilište u Muensteru, Njemačka, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
342.573:352/353(4)
352.075.31(497.5)
342.84:352(497.5)
Preliminary scientific paper / prethodno znanstveno propćenje
Received / primljeno: 12. 11. 2014.
Accepted / prihvaćeno:17. 4. 2015.
320
Kersting, Norbert (2015) Local Political Participation in Europe ...
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
cisions. Legal frameworks of different European countries are presented and compared. Is the turnout declining?
Who is included and who is excluded? The article uses the
analyses of the latest opinion polls survey data (World Value Survey).
Key words: participation, Internet, referendum, elections,
local government
1. A Conceptual Framework for Political
Participation
Political participation is defined as an activity to influence political decision-making at the local, regional, and (supra-) national level. Not all
forms of communal self-help, such as civil engagement, can be classified
as political participation. The focus on the production of certain services
often does not consider any kind of decision-making competencies. It is
a kind of communal self-help and co-production that is not primarily oriented towards the influence of decision-making. This civic engagement,
however, has an important social function especially when it comes to the
development of social capital.
Political participation can be divided into four different political spheres –
participation in representative democracy, participation in direct democracy, deliberative participation and demonstrative participation (see for
details Kersting, 2013, 2014). These spheres are characterized by different
intrinsic logics and specific online and offline participatory instruments.
Thus, in the following part, online and offline instruments of political participation, as well as their main and collateral functions will be described
using a model of participation with four spheres of participation.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
321
Figure 1: Hybrid and blended participation
The first sphere of participation is called demonstrative democracy. Individualism, societal change of values and political disenchantment lead to
new forms of expressive participation, inter alia, political demonstrations,
and wearing campaign batches. Online participations comprise civil society protests like shit storm and flash mobs (Della Porta, 2013). Demonstrations are locally realized, like in the case of Puerta del Sol in Madrid,
Tahir Square in Cairo, and Maidan in Kiev. A look at the major issues of
the demonstrations range from, among others, protests against the war,
nuclear power, and austerity policies to local issues such as nuclear waste
repository, or building of railway stations. While some of these demonstrations focus on national or international politics, it is obvious that the
triggering effect is often related to local politics such as the building of
a big shopping mall in Istanbul, the increase in local bus fares in Rio de
Janeiro and the building of a new railway station in Stuttgart.
Protest against local project is smaller than national protest. In Stuttgart
2010, around 60,000 (official police data) and 150,000 (organizers’ data)
were on the streets against the building of a new railway station. This was
Source: Kersting 2012, 2013
322
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
between 15 per cent and 30 per cent of Stuttgart’s population. Even five
years later after smaller demonstrations, a process of mediation, and a
binding referendum a group still met at the railway to protest. Protest can
be much bigger on the Internet. Online shit storms focus on local politics
but more on individual websites or companies. These can mobilize around
1 million participants globally (Kersting, 2012).
Deliberative participation is by nature talk-centric. It has its origins in the
deliberative turn in the last decade of the 20th century (Kersting, 2008,
2014: 62). There are three types of deliberative instruments. Open forums
are based on self-selection of the participants. New representative mini
publics (citizen juries) consist of groups which choose representative random samples out of the citizenship and use these participants for the discussion on certain political and planning issues. Stakeholder conferences
encompass new modern forms of advisory boards representing particular
interest groups such as youth parliaments or advisory boards for old people, for disabled or handicapped people or for foreigners and sub-municipal councils, to mention the most important. Deliberative instruments
were positively influenced by local agenda processes in the 1990s. Participatory instruments such as participatory budgeting were developed in
Porto Alegre in the new millennium, became popular in Brazil and Latin
America and spread all over Europe and other continents (Diaz, 2014;
Sintomer et al., 2008).
The rate of offline deliberative participation is generally small by nature.
In Online participatory budgeting processes there are a couple of hundred
participants. For example, in bigger cities there are up to 10,000 participants in the online participatory budgeting process (Kersting, 2012).
The following two spheres are not talk-centric, but vote-centric. Direct
democratic and representative participation are part of the numeric democracy. This means that they are focusing on large numbers and representativeness. However, these are also included in the legal framework
with certain controlled procedures, rules, and regulations regarding democratic principles like openness, transparency, control of power, as well as
majority rules and minority rights.
The sphere of direct democracy participation is the third area of democratic involvement, which is issue oriented and vote-centric. Direct democracy participation is mainly used in the form of referenda and citizen
initiatives which can produce binding decisions. There are other online
and offline instruments that are vote centric and issue oriented such as
opinion polls.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
323
Representative participation, representation, and elections are a characteristic of modern liberal democracies. In modern liberal democracies all
other forms of direct democratic instruments, deliberative instruments as
well as demonstrative participation are secondary to representative democracy. Representative democracy is vote-centric based on elections.
Online participation includes internet-voting or direct contact to politicians via e-mail or Facebook (Kersting, 2012: 17f; 2014: 66ff). Despite
the fact that representative participation is faced with a severe crisis and
is gradually declining, elections clearly remain the most important forum
and have become an instrument of political participation.
Representative participation is a dominant form of liberal democracies.
European local governments are primarily based on the competition between political parties and political candidates. The institutions of representative democracy are formalized and enshrined in the constitution,
local charters, and other legal frameworks. Representative democracy is
characterized as numerical democracy where delegate trustees are chosen by a majority on one hand, while on the other hand, minorities’ rights
have to be protected. Representative participation encompasses other
forms of participation, such as direct contact with the incumbents, membership in political parties, campaigning, and candidature for political
mandates etc.
Most European countries are experiencing a decline in local elections voter turnout (see Dalton et al., 2003). With a few exceptions (for a long time
France had a very high local voter turnout), voter turnout in local elections is mostly lower than at the national level (see Kersting et al., 2009).
For example, during the last decade only 35 per cent and 60 per cent
cast their votes at local elections in England and Germany respectively.
Sweden holds national and local elections simultaneously and this leads to
a higher turnout of 78 per cent. France is an exception because its voter
turnout at the local level is around 69 per cent, which is even higher than
that of national elections. The comparative study shows that regarding
the electoral turnout there is no significant relationship between countries
with different electoral systems (list proportional or FPTP), directly elected mayors, different terms of office/mandate etc. (see Table 1). However,
electoral turnout is relatively high in some Eastern European countries
with notable variations (see Romania, Poland).
2. Representative Participation at the Local Level
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
324
5
No Referendum
9.5 290
Open list PR
5
77.5
Indirect
5
No Referendum
Netherlands
16.9 418
List
Pro-portional
4
63.0
Indirect
appointment
4
No
France
60.2 35,000
List
Pro-portional
5
69*
Indirect
5
No Referendum
Spain
46.6 8,117
List
Pro-portional
4
61.9
Indirect
4
No
–
60.9 82
Sweden
Referendum
(Mostly)
indirect
England
Recall
35*
Cumulative
82.6 12,366* and Panache,
PR
Term of Office
5
Germany
Mayor (in) direct Election/ Appointm.
Voted at local election %
FPTP
Council:
Voting System
Direct
Number of
Municipalities
62.8
Population (Mio.)
4–5
Country
Term of Office
Table 1: Local Elections and Referenda
6–8
Yes
Referendum/
Initiative
–
Slovakia
5.4 1,890
Majoritarian
(Multi member
districts)
4
53*
Direct
4
Yes
Referendum/
Initiative
Estonia
1.3 226
List
Pro-portional
4
50.3
Indirect
4
No
–
Croatia
4.3 556
List
Pro-portional
4
44*
Direct
4
No
–
Slovenia
2.1 211
List
Pro-portional
4
51.6
Direct
4
Yes
Referendum/
Initiative
Poland
38.5 2,479
List
Pro-portional
4
60.7
Direct
4
Yes Referendum
Romania
19.9 3,181
List
proportional
4
70.1
Direct
4
No
–
Source: For additional sources, see Kersting et al., 2009; CCRE 2012; World Value Survey,
2014
*Here real turnout at the last local election is used according to Statistical Offices. All other
data on voter turnout are based on opinion polls from World Value Survey 2014 (‘have done’
etc.), because these data are used in the further detailed analysis of the voters.
It can be shown that certain groups are no longer motivated to cast their
vote in national elections. The younger generation, migrants are absent
in some countries. The strong relationship between social status, educational level, and income is obvious (Dalton, 2008). This is also the case
for second order elections such as local government elections (see further
details in Kersting et al., 2009). Marginalized groups are characterized by
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
325
a precarious social situation and, generally, lower education. This group is
less active in participating in elections (s. Bertelsmann, 2013). Similarly,
it can be shown that local elections turnout is lower because of different
reasons. These are not only related to a lack of media coverage, but also
to a lack of competencies, and weaker laymen candidates in these second
order elections (see Kersting et al., 2009).
The overall analysis confirms other studies that education and age are
relevant aspects for voting behaviour and voter turnout (see e.g. Dalton,
2008). There is a strong positive relationship between political interest
and voting. Citizens who have a higher interest in elections will not claim
that they will never vote. The same applies to people who trust political institutions; here a combined index for trust in government, political parties, parliament, and administration is used. Members of clubs and associations are more likely to vote at local elections. Women are more likely to
claim that they will never vote. Social trust is not significant when it comes
to local elections. However, these overall results hide national differences. The logistic regression analysis shows that the models for individual
European countries differ. In Germany and the Netherlands, the level of
education is relevant to voting. Only in Germany and Romania the membership in clubs is related to voting in local elections. However, in all other
countries there is no difference when it comes to voting and non-voting in
the local elections. In all countries there is significant relationship between age and voting abstention. Younger age groups vote locally less frequently. Social trust is not relevant to local voting behaviour, but we can see
that trust in institutions at the national level is significant in Germany,
the Netherlands, Poland, and Estonia. However, there is no significant
correlation in the other countries. The most interesting is the educational
level and voting. Only in Germany, the Netherlands and Romania high
education is significantly related to voting in local elections and low education level to voter abstention. In all other countries non-voters at the
local level have all educational degrees. Thus, even well-educated citizens
claim that they will never vote in local elections. Meanwhile, in the first
group of countries, electoral apathy predominates as a reason for non-
The following discussion will focus on providing deeper analysis of the
groups which in the surveys claimed they ‘will never vote at local elections’. Who is this group that would never vote at a local election? The
analysis shows that the reasons for non-voting differ within the countries.
In the following analysis France, England, Slovakia, and Croatia are not
included because they were not part of this comparative survey (6th wave
of the World Value Survey 2010-2014) or these data were not published.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
326
voting and non-voters are not interested because of a lack of knowledge.
In all other countries there is also political cynicism. Well-educated and
poorly-educated citizens are not interested in local elections.
Table 2: Electoral Abstention at Local Government Election Logistic Regression (‘Would never do’) Voting at Local Elections
Full
Model
(Intercept)
1.39
***
(0.18)
Secondary
education
Higher
secondary
education
University
education
Female
***
Age
centred
squared
***
(0.34)
***
-1.17
(0.09)
(0.17)
***
***
-0.58
-0.96
(0.11)
(0.23)
***
-0.89
-1.54
(0.12)
***
0.24
***
***
NED
***
SWE
*
0.61
-0.86
-0.72
0.97
(0.46)
(0.57)
(0.61)
(0.48)
(0.66)
***
-0.01
-0.03
-0.37
-1.44
0.33
-0.10
(0.21)
(0.47)
(0.31)
(0.35)
(0.59)
(0.36)
(0.56)
-0.95
-0.20
0.01
-0.43
-0.69
0.43
-0.60
(0.30)
(0.39)
(0.27)
(0.46)
(0.45)
(0.50)
(0.56)
0.54
-0.80
**
***
0.02
(0.32)
(0.26)
(0.46)
(0.33)
(0.48)
-0.02
0.18
0.21
0.13
0.55
(0.15)
(0.16)
***
(0.24)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
(0.08)
Political
***
interest
-0.67
(Scale, 1–4)
*
-0.76
-0.53
***
EST
(0.57)
-0.04
(0.00)
SLO
(0.37)
-1.18
***
ROM
-0.92
-0.04
***
POL
0.53
-0.05
0.00
ESP
2.66
-0.04
Member
***
sports/
-0.52
recreational
club
Trust others yes
2.32
-0.53
(0.07)
Age
centred
GER
***
-0.72
*
(0.21)
***
(0.27)
**
**
-1.55
(0.55)
(0.39)
-0.13
0.52
(0.29)
(0.23)
***
*
(0.58)
0.57
***
***
(0.16)
***
-0.06
-0.02
-0.04
-0.04
-0.02
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
*
***
***
*
*
-1.09
-0.35
-0.25
-0.22
-0.43
0.12
-0.35
-0.30
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.26)
(0.31)
(0.42)
(0.43)
(0.26)
(0.23)
***
***
***
***
***
*
***
***
-0.58
-0.65
-0.80
-0.76
-0.64
-0.42
-0.76
-0.69
(0.04)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.14)
(0.16)
(0.17)
(0.15)
(0.11)
-0.11
0.10
-0.16
-0.16
-0.29
-0.18
0.09
0.04
-0.19
(0.08)
(0.15)
(0.17)
(0.25)
(0.28)
(0.35)
(0.51)
(0.29)
(0.17)
-0.29
-0.01
-1.01
-0.46
-0.41
-0.46
Institutional
***
trust (In-0.49
dex, 1–4)
***
-0.51
***
-0.81
***
***
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
(0.15)
(0.06)
(0.13)
(0.19)
(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.23)
(0.13)
AIC
6098.84
1224.74 1095.42 521.94
644.32
468.84
457.42
590.52
1050.74
BIC
6228.61
1285.44 1155.12 574.89
698.46
520.69
514.72
644.41
1108.26
Log
Likelihood
-3031.42 -601.37
Deviance
6184.31
1299.34 1073.42 501.26
636.52
448.63
425.08
568.52
1038.98
Num. obs.
9994
1842
1014
824
1351
991
1380
-536.71
1682
(0.21)
327
-249.97 -311.16 -223.42 -217.71 -284.26 -514.37
910
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.Logistic Regression. Dep. var.: Vote at local elections
“would never do”. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference category education: No formal
or only primary education. Reference category countries: Estonia. Weights applied.
Education combined “complete” and “incomplete” categories. Trust index combines trust
in government, political parties, parliament, and administration (one dimensional, high
Cronbach’s Alpha).
Source: WVS, 2010–2014
Direct democracy encompasses instruments such as mandatory referenda, plebiscites, and initiatives (see Qvotrup, 2014). Mandatory referenda
are more often held on constitutional reforms at the national level, whereas plebiscites or council referenda are frequently an element of opposition
and oppositional parties. These are organized in a top-down manner within the parliament or initiated by the executive (by the mayor). Initiatives
are an important element because they have agenda-setting functions and
they have stronger effects on the political behaviour of politicians and the
executive (Damocles’ sword). Referenda can be binding or consultatively
determined by constitutions or electoral law. There are different defined
legal settings such as quorums, time frames, and other legal requirements
for direct democracy. In the following sub-chapter a brief overview will be
presented. It focuses on legal settings of local direct democracy and on
the reality of implementation.
Participation in direct democracy focuses on direct decision-making and
on making thematic decisions directly, and not on the election of incumbents. Direct democracy is vote-centric. Direct democracy is en vogue
at the national level but internationally. The legal base for referenda at
the local level is to be found predominantly in European countries (and
Northern America). In some European countries, direct initiatives, organized through a bottom-up approach, seem to boom at the local level
(Schiller, Setälä, 2013; Qvotrup, 2014). In the 1990s, in many European
3. Direct Democratic Participation
328
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
countries local referenda became part of the local Charters. However,
particularly in Southern European countries, such as Portugal and Greece, as well as in some countries in Eastern Europe, such as in the Baltic
region, referenda have not been well established yet. At the local level (as
well as at the national level) Switzerland is one of the few countries that
often use direct democracy instruments. With the exception of the agenda initiative (which exists and is used extensively in Poland), most direct
democracy instruments lead to a ballot vote. Here it is important whether
it is a binding or an advisory referendum. Consultative local referenda
have been introduced in Italy, Sweden, Bulgaria, Norway, and Finland.
Binding referenda exist in Switzerland, Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Poland as well as France, Lichtenstein, and Slovakia.
The legal framework for (local) direct democracy exists in a number of countries. However, the requirements to start referenda are sometimes very
restrictive (Schiller, 2012). In countries such as Switzerland, Germany,
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, and Sweden (since 2010)
requirements are liberal. Countries such as France, Lichtenstein, Slovakia, the Roman cantons in Switzerland, Bulgaria, Denmark, Norway, and
Finland have very restrictive procedures to start a local referendum especially in bigger cities (see Schiller, 2012; Schiller, Setälä, 2013). It seems
though, that binding referenda mostly have stronger restrictive thresholds
and quorums.
Mandatory referenda are very rare at the local level. There are only a few
mandatory referenda outside of Switzerland. Obligatory referenda at the
local level exist in Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland,
and the United Kingdom. These obligatory referenda are mostly connected to territorial reforms and mergers. In most other European countries referenda are facultative, which means organized top-down (by the
mayor, the council) or bottom-up (by the citizen).
Plebiscites, which are initiated either by the mayor or by the municipal
council, exist in few countries. In Finland and Norway and to a certain
extent in Germany, municipal councils can start a referendum and councils use this instrument quite often.
Some scholars define the recall of the mayor as a form of an instrument of
local direct democracy. In Europe, a recall can be found in Austria where
it is initiated by the municipal council, and in Germany, Poland as well as
in Slovakia where between 10 per cent and 30 per cent of the electorate
can start the recall. With the introduction of direct election of mayors in
some countries the recall was often introduced. Accordingly, the recall is
also used at the local level in Uganda and Ethiopia.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
329
Countries with a strong parliamentary tradition are often hesitant to introduce local direct democracy instruments. Until recently, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Italy did not use consultative referenda. This changed
with the introduction of advisory local referenda in Sweden and Italy,
and the referenda on the direct election of mayors in the UK. In France,
the legal regulation of local democracy was, until recently, strictly committed to the principle of representative democracy, which is historically
and conceptually probably rooted in the Jacobinist doctrine that the sovereignty of the nation, as embodied in the national parliament, does not
tolerate any rival source of decision-making. Furthermore, in practical
and local power terms, mayors, politically well entrenched in cumul de
mandats, were wary of local referenda as possibly challenging their local
powers. The 1992 and 1995 local referenda, although merely consultative in nature, were allowed by national legislation. It was only in 2003
that binding referenda (referendums décisionnels) were finally adopted in
national legislation, though with the proviso that the initiative for a local
referendum lies solely with the local council.
Here there is no space to discuss the impact of local referenda, but it can
be shown that with certain thresholds there is no inflation of referenda.
With thematic exclusions some topics are not on the agenda, such as minority rights. In general, referenda are sometimes focused on a particular
interest (not in my backyard initiatives), but can also be more conservative (against privatization), often focusing on fiscal austerity (against mega
sport events, big infrastructural projects such as airports etc.) (Schiller,
2011; Qvotrup, 2014).
Voter turnout at referenda is extremely low and it is mostly lower than
the turnout at local government elections. In the Czech Republic and
Germany, it is in general below 50 per cent. In some cases it does not
meet the obligatory quorums and participatory thresholds. However,
Switzerland shows that at local referenda citizens have more possibilities
to vote and fewer citizens are excluded from the elections and referenda
(see Serdult, 2012). When it comes to representativeness in referenda,
In the Czech Republic, Germany, as well as in Italy, referenda were implemented to restrict party dominance. Citizen initiatives to initiate local
referenda are possible in Germany, Austria, Finland, Switzerland, Italy,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In countries such as Denmark, Finland, Norway, though, with the exception of Germany, there is almost no
local binding initiative. The initiative implies an important veto function
for civil society groups.
330
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social composition of the voters is regarded as similar to local government
elections. Nevertheless, participation is generally lower and depends on
the appeal of the topic. Local politics is less interesting to young people,
but there are some exemptions because politics such as town planning or
sustainability can attract a higher percentage of the younger generation.
4. Conclusions
In the last decade, a democratic innovation has become obvious (Smith,
2009). The possibilities for political participation are growing (Fung,
Wright, 2003; Kersting et al., 2009). New information and communication technologies include online instruments often intermingling, interdependently in blended participation. Some of the online instruments are
online imitations of existing offline instruments and in some cases they
enhance the quality of offline instruments.
Democratic innovation at the local level includes new ‘deliberative instruments’ such as open forums, participatory budgeting, stakeholder conferences, and sub local councils (see Dryzek, 2002; Kersting, 2013). Deliberative democracy focuses on communication and community-building
processes. It allows the development of social capital within the group.
It forms part of the decision-making process and is important for agenda
setting and the articulation of protest. However, because of the non-representativeness and the lack of legal requirements, its results are nonbinding and consultative. The critique of deliberative democracy is often
that it is mostly consultative.
In recent decades more direct democratic instruments have been implemented at the local level, such as local referenda and initiatives. These
instruments of vote-centric numeric democracy are regulated (thematic
exclusion, thresholds) and can lead to binding decisions. It can be shown
that these often produce quite a few positive effects for local government
(Sword of Damocles against excessive local government spending).
The analysis shows that despite a decline in voter turnout because of a
lack of citizen duty (Dalton, 2008), local election and to a certain extent
referenda are still by far the most popular participatory instruments. In
most Eastern European countries, the voter turnout at the local level
is relatively high. In Western Europe, local elections are becoming less
attractive to marginalized groups (lower education and lower income) but
this marginalization is even stronger in the majority of other participa-
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
331
tory deliberative instruments. Additionally, in Eastern Europe the better
educated social groups are more cynical about politics and do not vote in
local elections.
The invented space – and here in most countries direct democracy is
included – is defined by constitutional and other legal frameworks and
regulations. The new deliberative instruments are consultative and cannot
lead to binding decisions. Exceptions can exist at the sub-local level and
within certain policy fields. Power still lies in the hands of elected representatives such as councillors. The fact that deliberative instruments are
consultative does not mean that they are powerless. In order to make
them more sustainable, institutionalization and legal and constitutional
bases are necessary.
References
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Archive. Jerusalem: Databanks International Barnes, Samuel H., Max Kaase (1979) Political Action: Mass Participation in
Five Western Democracies. Sage: Beverly Hills
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Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge Studies on Contentious Politics
CCRE (2012) Local and Regional Government in Europe. Strasbourg: CCRE
Dalton, Russel J. (2008) Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation. Political Studies 56, 76–98
Dalton, Russel J., Susan E. Scarrow, Bruce E. Cain (ed.) (2003) Democracy Transformed? Expanding Citizen Access in Advanced Industrial Democracies.
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Della Porta, Donatella (2013) Can Democracy Be Saved: Participation, Deliberation and Social Movements. Cambridge: Polity Press
DETR (1999) A Better Quality of Life. www.environment.gov.uk/sustainable/quality/life
In order to include them into the process of binding decision-making process, deliberative instruments have to be combined with ‘direct democratic instruments’ such as referenda and initiatives. The question is how
to combine both to overcome certain fallacies in direct and deliberative
democracies to connect these participatory instruments (‘first talk, then
vote’; Goodin, 2008). This combination can reinvigorate local representative democracy and become the future of local governance.
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Diaz, Nelson (2014) Hoped-for Democracy: 25 Years of Participatory Budgeting
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ESS (2010-2012) European Social Survey 2010–12
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Verso
Goodin, Robert E. (2008) Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice after the Deliberative Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Kersting, Norbert (2013) Online Participation: From ‘Invited’ to ‘Invented’ Spaces. International Journal of Electronic Governance 4: 270–280
Kersting, Norbert (2008) Politische Beteiligung. Einführung in dialogorientierte
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Verlag
Kersting, Norbert (2014) Online Beteiligung, Elektronische Partizipation – Qualitätskriterien aus Sicht der Politik. In: Katrin Voss (ed.) Internet und Partizipation. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 53–90
Kersting, Norbert (Hrsg.) (2012) Electronic Democracy. Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich
Kersting, Norbert, Philippe Schmitter, Alexander Trechsel (2008) Die Zukunft
der Demokratie. In: Norbert Kersting (Hrsg.) Politische Beteiligung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, pp. 40–64
Norris, Pippa (2012) Political Mobilization and Social Networks. The Example of
the Arab Spring. In: Norbert Kersting (ed.) Electronic Democracy. Opladen:
Verlag Barbara Budrich, pp. 53–76
Qvotrup, Matt (2014) Referendums around the World. London: Palgrave
Schiller, Theo (2011) Local Direct Democracy in Europe. Wiesbaden: VS
Schiller, Theo, Maja Setälä (2013) Citizen Initiatives in Europe. London: Palgrave
Sintomer, Yves, Carsten Herzberg, N. Röcke (2008) Der Bürgerhaushalte in Europa. Wiesbaden: VS
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World Value Survey (2010–2014) World Value Survey – Data Sets. 6th Wave. Representative Comparative Opinion Polls
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
333
LOCAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE:
ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS
Political protests are growing in emerging and established democracies. Since the
1970s, the demand for political participation has become obvious. The 1990s
saw more open dialogue-oriented participatory instruments, which began to be
implemented in some countries (‘century of participation’). The proliferation
of participatory instruments in the field of talk centric deliberative democracies
has been called the ‘deliberative turn’ (Dryzek, 2002). A new push is also attributed to the open government data, the movement initiated by the US President
Obama’s government when it set up its open government data initiative in 2009.
These include online and offline participation (Kersting, 2013). It is a practice
that most new instruments of participation are implemented at the local level.
It is frequently argued that these deliberative forums do not lead to binding
decisions. However, compared to elections, the number of citizens participating
is rather small and selective. New forms of vote-centric direct democracy such
as referenda and other initiatives are implemented in some countries. The paper
presents a model of offline and online participation. The focus will be on representative and direct democratic participation. Participation in elections and
proliferation of referenda and initiatives will be analysed. Participation in these
spheres of numeric democracy can lead to binding decisions. Legal frameworks
of different European countries is presented and compared. Is the turnout at the
local level small and declining? Who is included and who is excluded? In the
empirical part, the article predominantly uses the analyses of the latest survey
data from representative comparative opinion polls such as the World Value
Survey (WVS).
Key words: participation, Internet, referendum, elections, local government
Summary
334
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 319–334
LOKALNA POLITIČKA PARTICIPACIJA U EUROPI:
IZBORI I REFERENDUMI
Sažetak
Politički protesti postaju učestaliji i u novim i u starim demokracijama. Od
1970-ih insistiranje na političkoj participaciji postaje očigledno. U nekim su
se zemljama tijekom 1990-ih počeli primjenjivati otvoreniji, dijalogu okrenuti participativni instrumenti (stoljeće participacije). Bujanje participativnih
instrumenata u na pregovore usredotočenim predstavničkim demokracijama naziva se predstavničkim zaokretom (Dryzek, 2002). Novi trend pripisuje se i
otvorenom pristupu državnim podacima, pokretu koji je inicirala vlada američkog predsjednika Obame prilikom pokretanja svoje inicijative za otvoren pristup
vladinim podacima 2009. To uključuje participaciju na Internetu i izvan njega
(Kersting, 2013). Praksa je da se većina novih instrumenata participacije primjenjuje na lokalnoj razini. Često se prigovara da takvi forumi ne vode do obvezujućih rezultata. U usporedbi s izborima, broj građana koji sudjeluju u takvim
forumima vrlo je malen i selektivan. Novi oblici izravne demokracije usmjerene
na birače, poput referenduma i drugih inicijativa, primjenjuju se u određenim
državama. Rad analizira model participacije putem Interneta i izvan njega. U
središtu pozornosti je predstavnička i izravna demokratska participacija. Analizira se sudjelovanje na izborima i bujanje referenduma i drugih inicijativa.
Participacija u tim sferama brojčane demokracije može dovesti do obvezujućih
rezultata. Prikazuju se i uspoređuju pravni okviri u različitim europskim zemljama. Je li izlaznost na lokalnoj razini mala te smanjuje li se i dalje? Tko
je uključen, a tko isključen? U empirijskom dijelu rad se uglavnom koristi analizama najnovijih podataka dobivenih iz komparativnih anketa poput World
Value Survey (WVS).
Ključne riječi: participacija, Internet, referendum, izbori, lokalna samouprava
Ideology or Realism in Local Governance:
A Case of RealLokalPolitik in
English Local Government
Colin Copus*
The paper reports the results of research conducted among
councillors in England which explored how they operate in
complex governing networks with a range of public and private bodies. Councillors cannot control such networks or
their members. Rather, councillors are faced with devising
strategies to exert influence over and to try to shape and
direct the policy decisions taken by the individual players
and to draw a myriad of decisions into an overall direction
and coherence. Councillors can either act ideologically (a
key set of political principles and goals) or pragmatically
(an assessment of what it is possible to achieve). The paper explores the approaches councillors have developed to
engage in governance networks and assesses whether or
not they act ideologically or pragmatically. It introduces
*
Colin Copus, Professor of Local Politics, Local Governance Research Unit, Department of Politics and Public Policy, De Montfort University, Leicester, England (prof. dr.
sc. Colin Copus, profesor lokalne politike na Odsjeku za politiku i javne politike, Sveučilište
De Montfort, Leicester, Engleska, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
352:321.01(410)
Original scientific paper / izvorni znanstveni rad
336
Coups, Colin (2015) Ideology or Realism in Local Governance ...
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 335–356
the concept of RealLokalPolitik to explain the tension and
choice between these approaches. The paper also explores
how the need to operate in governance networks re-shapes
our understanding of councillors as trustees, delegates or
party loyalists.
Key words: local politics – England, local governance, councillors, RealLokalPolitik
1. Introduction
Councillors are central to any conceptualisation of local representative democracy but no longer inhabit centre-stage in the locality, rather they face
a struggle for engagement in a complex series of governance networks as
well as challenges from their own neighbourhoods (see, Sorensen, Torfing,
2005a; Lowndes, Sullivan, 2008). The shift from local government to local
governance places an additional burden on councillors who must now engage in and exert influence over complex multi-layered networks, within
which they confront higher-level players (Wilson, 1999; 6P et al., 2002;
Stoker, 2004; Denters, Rose, 2005). Councillors however, by virtue of
holding an elected office, have a legitimacy and moral leverage lacking to
most of those with whom they must now work within the complexity of
modern governance networks (Saward, 2003; Bekkers et al., 2007; Klijn,
Skelcher, 2007). The paper reports the findings of research among councillors in England which explored how the demands of working within
governance networks, as elected representatives, is re-shaping the role of
the councillor.
As councillors, and leading councillors in particular, increasingly act within multi-layered governance networks which operate on different spatial
levels they are presented with the task of channelling to a range of public
policy players, their own views (as a trustee), the citizen view, however
articulated (as a delegate), or the decisions and polices of their party (as
a party loyalist) (Eulau et al., 1959; Egnar et al., 2013 passim). Moreover,
councillors face a choice of either approaching these interactions with
agencies in governance networks from an ideological and rigidly partisan stance, or more pragmatically and incrementally to use their political
leverage and position to influence others into making certain decisions,
taking certain actions, or adopting preferred policies.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 335–356
337
The paper examines whether councillors act ideologically or diplomatically within governance networks and how, if at all, they employ their
electoral mandate as a resource through which to express and use their
political authenticity as elected representatives to effect action. The paper
is based on research conducted among councillors in England which consisted of 38 separate interviews, six focus groups of seven councillors, 12
paired discussions with councillors and observations of public and private
meetings. In all 104 councillors took part in the research throughout 2013
and 2014. Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Independent, UKIP
and Green councillors were represented in the research sample in proportion to their representation in local government; all types of English councils were included in the sample: Counties, districts, unitary councils and
London and metropolitan boroughs. The councillor sample also included
executive councillors (leaders and cabinet members) and non-executive
back bench members. The research data and findings provide a rich and
deep well of material from councillors across the political spectrum of
English local politics and the depth of the empirical data provides for
theoretical conclusions to be drawn. The paper also draws on interviews
with councillors conducted for other related research projects. The sample quotes used in the paper are provided to elaborate and illuminate the
general conclusions drawn from the overall data.
The next section of the paper introduces the concept of RealLokalPolitik
as an exploratory tool to understand whether councillors act ideologically or diplomatically within governance networks to secure influence. The
third section explores the various sources of councillor legitimacy and
how the electoral chain of command (Dearlove, 1973) provides leverage
to councillors in governance networks. The fourth examines the process of
governing through influence rather than power and explores councillors’
experiences in this regard; the fifth returns to examine the basis of councillor action within networks and to ask whether it is based on ideology or
The paper explores how councillors engage with the complex world of
public and private bodies and interests beyond the council to assess what
strategies are developed and employed to enhance councillor influence in
an arena where they have little or no control. Indeed, rather than making decisions as authoritative politicians with powers to enact change,
councillors must interact in networks of different size and scope to exert
pressure, pursue influence and use local political diplomacy to attempt to
shape the decisions and policy of a vast range of organisations. The task
for councillors is to develop the approach which best enables them, as
elected politicians, to shape the behaviour and decisions of others.
338
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 335–356
influence. The paper concludes by drawing out the lessons for strengthening the role of the councillor as a governor who cannot govern and how
the idea of RealLokalPolitk can help us understand the actions taken by
councillors.
2. RealLokalPolitik
The world of international relations and diplomacy provide us with the
theories and practices of Realpolitik, a concept which emerges from a
framework of international policy making that operates on considerations
of power, practical politics, and what is possible to achieve, rather than
what an ideological world view would set out to secure (see Williams,
1989; Wayman, Diehl, 1994; MacNiell, 2000). A component of Realpolitik is that it operates on the basis of a self-interested set of objectives that
lack ethical or moral direction or indeed concerns about what might be
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ but is about achieving objectives through the use of power (see Kratochwil, 1993). The realism of Realpolitik (Rahe, 1995) stands
in stark contrast to operating from a set of ideological views about the
good life and how to secure it through international policy and diplomacy,
and Realpolitik is orientated towards achieving movement and goals while
at the same time appreciating the practical limitations on those goals. Realpolitik need not, however, be seen as a purely negative, power-wielding
concept as it also poses realistic aims and possible achievements against
unrealistic aims driven by unswerving, ideologically focused principles
(Grant, 1997).
Realpolitik can provide a framework for understanding political interactions that take place outside of the world of international policy and action around political issues that have a location in national and sub-national politics (Lane, 1998; Harris, 1998). The idea of RealLokalPolitik
therefore is presented as a way of exploring how councillors reconcile the
tension between acting from a party-centric view-point in the context of
party-dominated local government, with the need to interact outside the
council with those not part of the party political world or familiar with
operating from a party-based ideological view. When councillors operate
on a realistic assumption of what can be achieved through co-operation
within governance networks and when they engage in inter-network diplomacy from a sense of what can realistically be achieved, they step away
from the ideological certainties of the party and the party group and thus
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 335–356
339
require a frame of reference within which to locate their activities: RealLokalPolitik provides that frame of reference to understand the basis on
which councillors construct and maintain links with a wide range of individuals and organisations within and beyond their localities and how they
approach the task of mediators of conflicting and competing interests
across the locality. Operating in governance networks requires councillors
to formulate not only a view of the local public interest but also the best
way of achieving it while interacting with other agencies. Indeed, governance interactions face councillors with pressures to compromise their
ideological or party-interest principles and to operate outside of any fixed
or established procedures, processes, or ways of thinking.
3. Councillors: Legitimacy and Governing within
Governance
At the time of writing, in England, the main three national political parties – Conservative, Labour and the Liberal Democrats hold just over 90
per cent of all council seats; in a party politicised system of local government councillors can pursue party policy by claiming that votes are ‘absolute trumps’ when acting in governance networks (Green, 1990; Phillips,
1994). Thus, there is a link between councillors and parties which is sustained by the act of voting and the transference of a legitimacy to act politically from the voter to the councillor. Holding the office of councillor is
the product of local elections which provide a link between the authoritative body of the council and the citizen. The electoral chain of command
however, has been criticised by Dearlove (1973: 25–31) because it often
ignores the attenuating role of political parties in local democracy. Yet,
the chain of command provides a starting point for understanding how
councillors can operate in governance networks. As Dearlove (1973: 26)
explains, with the electoral chain of command: ‘causal connections are
RealLokalPolitik is not a predictive tool. Rather, it is a way of understanding how councillors act in circumstances that challenge their ideological or party commitment and which demand realistic political exchanges
within networks: do they operate with a strict adherence to party principles, or do they negotiate, compromise, seek agreement, and achieve the
best in any given circumstances for the general local interest? It is to that
question we now turn by examining the role of the councillor within a
governance framework.
340
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 335–356
posited between electors, councillors and officers and the vote is regarded as the starting point of a chain of command’. However, parties act as
links in the chain at more than one point, and our chain must now be extended beyond the council as an institution, thus: ‘voters-parties-councillors-parties-council chief-officers-parties-councillors-external governance
networks/agencies/actors-parties.’
Parties at one and the same time weaken the link with electors, but also
provide electors with a clear reference point for understanding the actions taken by their councillor, thus also strengthening the link. When
parties are placed between councillors and officers, they act as a source
of strength for councillors in facing a powerful, well resourced, and professional administrative machine, but when parties are placed between
councillors and external networks, they can provide a source of reference
which potentially weakens the councillors’ room for manoeuvre. Councillors’ actions within networks of policy and decision-makers require of
them to have an outward focussed style of interaction when influencing
the behaviour of those developing public policy and spending public money, but doing so without a mandate from the citizen. Moreover, effective
engagement within governance networks requires councillors to forge alliances and coalitions (Cole, John, 2001; Stoker, 2004).
Given the decline in the status and role of local government, which has
been well documented (see for example, Jones, Stewart, 1983; Young,
Rao, 1997; Stoker, 2004; Reynaert et al., 2005; Denters, Rose, 2005;
Chandler, 2007), and given the relative lack of discretion that rests with
English local government (see Page, Goldsmith, 1987; Hesse, Sharpe,
1991; Goldsmith, Page, 2010), councillors attempting to influence higher
level players in governance networks do require a source of legitimacy for
their actions. An electoral mandate provides councillors with something
that few, if any, other players within governance networks hold; but is that
mandate sufficient when trying to convince others who hold the resources
to solve policy problems of the way in which their resources and actions
should be employed (Perri 6 et al., 2002)? Equally, will the councillor
stress the party element of that mandate, which would result in approaching governance interactions from an ideological stand; or is that mandate
used in a more Burkeian frame and councillors seek to influence others as
a trustee rather than a party delegate?
The office councillors hold and the electoral chain of command is a source
of legitimacy for them to act outside the council, to negotiate, persuade
and to influence how others behave and the decisions they make. As a
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341
Councillors, when operating within networks outside of the council, will
find that that they act in circumstances and theatres of representation (Copus, 2004) where there has been no pre-party agreed line, but that does not
mean, however, that they focus any less on their party group or are any
less loyal to it. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that councillors
are turning from their parties. Recent evidence has shown that councillors
who are members of the national political parties are no less inclined to
promote a party line or to be loyal party members, even when operating
in governance networks (see Egner, Sweeting, Klok, 2013). Councillors
continue to represent their parties in networks because of the contract
of loyalty that they have with them (Copus, 2004). They simply have to
develop new ways of promoting the views of the party from a non-ideological and pragmatic basis and by employing diplomatic skills, because
in governance networks the ability to persuade and convince, rather than
act as a unified bloc of party colleagues as in council meetings, is the way
to ensure some degree of successful influence over network outcomes.
Stoker (2004: 15) points out that the ‘governance account’ of the competition experienced by the elected councils in governing an area and the
complexity of the interactions that now make-up the local policy landscape, show local government no longer has the dominance it once experienced and no longer acts on its own (Stoker, 2004: 16) across a range
of policy-fields. Stoker (2004: 16) identifies the weakening of overhead
representative democracy where citizens controlled councillors who in turn
controlled managers and administrators (the electoral chain of command)
and its replacement – although not totally so – by forms of political decision-making that stretch into a range of intergovernmental networks (Stoker
2004: 19). While Stoker refers to new lines of accountability (p. 17), the
councillor still has a legitimacy that others lack – the open and inclu-
councillor summed up in an interview: ‘what’s the point of being elected
if it doesn’t count for anything? It [a mandate] enables me to be present
and take part in decision-making, outside the council, which I would otherwise have no way of influencing as a citizen’. The chain extends from
the voter to governance networks to provide councillors with a legitimacy
to influence all players in a complex set of interactions between a range
of public and private players outside the council. Despite the complexity
of governing networks and despite the low level of political and governing
power held by councils and councillors in England, elected local representative democracy has a role in shaping what unelected and often unaccountable networks do. Indeed, it may be fast becoming the only role left
to local government in some contexts.
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sive electoral process that delivers a mandate to govern that no others
can claim. Moreover, we cannot take parties out of the electoral chain
of command outlined above simply because councillors operate outside
the council. Indeed, councillors’ membership of a national political party
provides them with a constant reference point for their activities and anchors them into a representative institution which in turn provides them
with the legitimacy to act within governance networks; operating within
governance network challenges councillors’ behaviour, not party loyalty
(Copus, 2014).
Councillors are now faced with the emerging role of being a conduit for
the views of local citizens and their parties, or transferring such views for
reasons of their own when operating in governance networks using their
office as a mechanism for the political accountability of public and private
agencies within those networks. Indeed, such a relationship with external
bodies logically extends an import role of the councillor into new territory. It is how councillors interact to achieve accountability and influence
in networks collectively and their network partners, individually, that the
paper now turns.
4. Councillors: Authority and Influence
As elected politicians granted a mandate by the voters, councillors are
faced with the task of influencing the decisions and actions of independent players within a web of external relationships (Klijin, Skelcher, 2007)
and so the sovereignty and authority of the council has to be employed
in new ways (Sorensen, 2006). The notion of democratic anchorage seeks
to explain the democratic performance of governance networks and how
the democratic deficit of governance networks can be overcome (see
Skelcher, 2005; Sorensen, Torfing, 2005b; Torfing et al., 2009; Sorensen,
Torfing, 2014). What is explored here is the councillor’s role in that process of democratic deficit reduction. The role of the councillor becomes
two-fold. First, holding network players accountable and answerable for
their actions; and second, attempting to mould the activities of actors
within networks to match the policy preferences and political vision of
the council as an elected body (see Stubager, 2003). Or, as one councillor
in an interview very clearly posed it: ‘how can we as councillors who have
been elected, be relegated behind those who haven’t and how without the
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343
power to get them to do what the people who have voted for us want, can
we control them?’
‘The LEP (Local Enterprise Partnership) is not elected so how do we
hold it to account? I worry that the presence of councillors on the
board only gives the LEP a legitimacy it doesn’t have or deserve. It is
doing the work of the councils and its money ultimately comes from
what should be with the council. What I do is to give a voice to the
community at the LEP, not just to the council ... the LEP area is so
big that it tends to overlook local areas or worse does things that will
in the long run affect some areas very badly. Councillors have to be
part of the LEP as a strategic body, but we have to make sure that
what it does reflects the needs of our own areas and the views of our
voters.’ (Labour County Councillor)
‘The LEP is just an example of where councils are being engineered
out of any responsibility or control over what goes on and we are the
ones that have been elected! The LEPs are not answerable to us or
to anyone really.’ (Conservative County Councillor).
‘I go to these LEP meetings and they are extremely important and
it is right that the people that are there, business leaders, have an
important input to the issues that are being considered. But, you
can’t give our election to those that have been appointed ... it should be elected councils that make the final decisions.’ (Conservative
District Councillor).
‘Yes, I attend the board meetings, but I find I get more say over
what happens by meeting and discussing things privately with board
members, separately. I meet the chair of the LEP regularly, outside
the meetings, and we discuss problems and solutions and the needs
of the area – not just my council either. It is much more conducive to
A strong local democracy would indeed enable elected councils and councillors to control the activities and policies of those that casually operate
within governance networks, developing public policy and spending public
money, with no real democratic mandate – anchored or otherwise. Currently however, councillors must settle for influence over their unelected
counter-parts and the difficulties involved in securing any influence over
those with whom they engage in governing the locality is a major source of
frustration for many councillors. That frustration is displayed in following
comments about councillors’ input to the Local Enterprise Partnerships
(formed in 2011 as regional partnerships between local government and
business focussed on an economic development and growth agenda):
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 335–356
being able to help his [the LEP chair] thinking develops.’ (Conservative County Councillor and District Council Leader).
It was often in the informal interactions with members of partner organisations that councillors felt they had an opportunity to exert effective
influence. A councillor sitting on a probation trust commented:
‘I’m the only councillor on the Trust and therefore the only one that
has been elected to anything, but that appears to count for nothing
at formal trust meetings. It is very difficult to get others to recognise
not only that I represent a council, a party and my voters but that I
come to the table with a mandate and ... the council has a range of
polices about community safety and other related service areas that
address what we are trying to achieve for the people that use the probation service... The Trust is one way we can achieve those objectives
but only if it comes along with us.’ (Labour Borough Councillor).
The same councillor admitted to the importance of private meetings with
the chair of the Trust, individual board members, and Trust officers as a
more effective way of shaping thinking about policy and decisions than
taking part in formal meetings. Indeed, the research for this paper indicates that councillors operate in governance networks in similar ways to
how they operate within their councils. Formal meetings are the place for
formal debate of business and decision taking; it is in more private interactions that they attempt to encourage, convince, and influence others of
the rightness of a preferred policy option. They do so however, without
the certainty of outcome from the formal setting that is provided by any
private pre-council meeting of councillors. Such informal influence extends to the managers, not just the members, of network partners and
councillors interact outside of official meetings with managers to build
support and convince them that a particular decision should be made or
policy developed. As one councillor reported in an interview:
‘I meet privately with officers, talk to staff and the experts here and
try to convince them of what I’m thinking – or, let them convince me
otherwise.’ (Liberal Democrat Borough Councillor).
It is no surprise councillors operate within governance settings in the same
way they operate at their council. If an informal approach to influencing
works in the council, then it is a reasonable assumption for councillors
that informal influence will work in non-council settings. Yet, if councillors are unable to effectively influence, or hold to account, those organisations on which they sit by virtue of being elected to the council, the sense
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345
of democratic distance and lack of accountability of the trust or board
will be starkly felt. Here councillors fall back on their role as an external
scrutineer of an unelected body, as a councillor summarised in interview:
‘I question, challenge and ask for explanations and use it [a water
customer liaison panel] to stand up for local people and try to get the
best possible service for them. But, they have to answer questions.’
(Liberal Democrat Councillor)
As public agencies are reformulated and reshaped the only body with a
democratic mandate to act, remains the council. But, whatever the shape
of that landscape, the councillors navigating the array of partners and
actors they now interact with to seek to influence and to pursue preferred
policy options, means they are also able to try to strategically join together
the disparate decisions taken by others. The situation here then is that an
elected official is attempting to influence unelected officials rather than
the other way around, but in so doing they become metagovernors (Jessop, 1998; Sorensen, Torfing, 2009). To operate as metagovernors, there
must be cohesive action on behalf of the councillors scattered across various bodies and an attempt by councillors to co-ordinate action, otherwise
there is no governing strategy.
The success of democratic anchorage and metagovernance rests on the
existence of actual not perceived influence by councillors and certainly not on their mere presence alone within networks or on partnership
boards (Sorensen, Torfing, 2014). It also rests on the existence of cohesive strategies for influence and accountability developed and employed
by councillors and the effective use of an electoral mandate to shape the
policy preferences of actors external to the council (see Sorensen, Torfing,
2005b). Without that, there is not so much democratic anchorage, but
councils and councillors acting as democratic breakwaters which merely
reduce the intensity of the waves of un-democratic, unaccountable, and
unelected organisations that control great swathes of public policy. As
a result of the assessment of the way councillors operate in governance
networks and the purpose of that activity, it is now necessary to return
What must be kept in mind is the sheer range and variety of purposes,
shapes, scale and interest of the bodies on which councillors find themselves sitting and attempting to influence and of the shifting landscape of
the governance agencies with which they engage. As a Labour councillor
commented in an interview: ‘I was on the RDA [Regional Development
Agency] now I’m on the LEP [Local Enterprise Partnership]; all that’s
changed is the initials they use.’
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to the source of the motivating factor for their action: Ideology or RealLokalPolitik.
5. Ideology or Influence?
‘We have 150 outside bodies on which to appoint our 48 members and
only half of those members are on outside bodies. The problem is in a lot
of cases the member doesn’t even get notification of meetings, let alone
have the chance to think about what they are doing on these bodies.’
That comment, by a Conservative County Council leader, summarises
the challenge faced by councillors and councils when it comes to structuring and focusing their interactions within governance networks. The
sheer scale of the task faced by councils in providing shape and direction
to governance networks is not insurmountable, however. A council leader
of a large urban authority in England commented:
‘It is a central part of what we do as politicians to work with key partners
in the city to generate growth and the local and regional economy. As a
council we don’t have the power or resources to do it alone, so we broker
deals between partners and provide them with a set of policy objectives
that match what they want and need to achieve. As a socialist I’m working
all the time with business leaders and trying to attract private enterprise –
I leave the political knock-about and proselytising for the council chamber
– it would scare the horses otherwise.’
The comment above summarised the view of the overwhelming majority
of councillors, across the political spectrum interviewed for the research,
who, when seeking to influence and shape the activities of governance
networks, left the party (though not the politics) at the council. Conservative and Liberal Democrat councillors echoed the comments from
the Labour councillor above: ‘I don’t preach politics’; ‘I’m not looking for
voters or to convert, just to get things done’; ‘You can’t batter someone
around the head with your political views and then expect them to meekly
do what you want; you have to be cleverer than that’: these comments
were indicative of the views expressed by councillors to describe the approach they pursued in governance interactions. Indeed, the councillor
who could be said to be acting as a governor recognised the interrelated
nature of the actions of bodies on which they sit and actively attempted to
draw them into alignment with the overall policy direction of the council.
That in itself is a political act, but it is not pursued in a party or ideological
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347
On the other hand, there are councillors who take a far more ideological view of their actions within networks and with partner agencies even
though RealLokalPolitk may be the dominant approach. It was clear from
the research that a more ideological edge in governance interactions existed for some councillors. That ideology displayed itself over issues such
as women’s equality, multi-culturalism, and the employment of local labour which were pursued by Labour councillors pursuing a broader ideological set of objectives than the immediate subject of the interaction
with which they were engaged. A Labour council leader commented: ‘I
overheard a remark in a break in a meeting about this area being like
the ‘United Nations’ so I said I won’t work with racists’. That comment
indicates how close to the surface ideological and political views can
operate even in circumstances that demand a pragmatic and more restrained approach. Conservatives also espoused Conservative values but
as the focus on much local government activity in England is currently
economic growth and development their preference for private sector
activity seems to have less of an ideological edge and to be operating on
the basis of a more practical, pragmatic set of objectives when pursued
in governance networks.
Those councillors that sought to achieve ideological goals did so by focusing not only on the services that their councils provided as a way of promoting the interests of the sections of society they saw as the client group
for their political action. Ideologically inclined councillors, driven by a
clear set of political goals focussed, for example, on altering the local balance of power in favour of certain client groups, also operated in networks
to pursue those broad ideological objectives while recognising a limit to
the extent they could pursue those ideological goals when attempting to
shape the policy of other organisations. There is a difference in recognising those limitations but remaining focused on an ideological objective
to operating from a more pragmatic and realistic perspective. For the
ideologically driven councillor, all network interactions are an opportunity
to espouse an ideology and that opportunity is a positive outcome from
network interactions; for the pragmatic councillor, any shift by network
players towards a direction which they favour or which is favourable to
other policy objectives is the outcome that matters.
fashion. The councillor operates so as to shape the policy agenda across a
number of bodies and the councillor particularly skilled in this approach
may have little need to openly employ, as leverage, the mandate that attaches to the office of councillor.
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All councillors from political parties interviewed for the research, without
exception, claimed they were loyal party members but that did not result
in them pursuing raw party advantage within governance networks, or
a set of objectives that could not be diplomatically pursued within and
through other organisations. It was for all councillors, results that mattered and in the current climate of austerity results were often focused
on economic growth, development, and employment opportunities. Thus,
local political policy was centred on a very narrow perspective during the
time of the research but one which required councillors to operate outside
of their council, to indulge and embrace the uncertainty of network based
interactions, and to shape the policy of a disparate range of organisations
to achieve the best possible movement towards a desired set of objectives
(see Sorensen, 2006).
Governance may now be the only game in town for English local government and one which replaced ideas of a sovereign council delivering
all the important public services in its area and making all the important
public decisions (see Young, Rao, 1997; Stoker, 2004). That is not to
say that local government does not have an important delivery role in
public services, as it still provides a range of infrastructural and welfare
services vital to modern industrial societies. In England, public service
responsibilities are open to being transferred in and out of local government by the centre as it seeks to re-shape the landscape of public provision to suit its own policy objectives. Additionally, the current period
of austerity has seen central government reductions in council budgets
of 40 per cent across local government from the 2011–12 financial year
to the financial year 2015–16. Indeed, the Local Government Association estimates that central funding support for some council services will
have been reduced by 66 per cent over a decade (LGA, 2014a, 2014b).
Moreover, local government lacks the financial and legal powers to simply replace that loss of central support to fund the public services for
which they are responsible.
The research for this paper shows, however, that there is a positive outcome from the squeeze on public finances and austerity, the legal, constitutional, and financial constraints on local government and the gradual
loss of its primacy as a service providing body. Councillors report that
they are responding to these circumstances by becoming more aware of
the need to operate outside the council – within governance networks
– and to attempt to influence and shape the decisions made by others.
Thus, councillors are developing a role that encompasses attempts at
governing through interaction within networks. Indeed, we can see that
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349
councillors, and particularly leading councillors, are jettisoning – even if
reluctantly – ideological politics focused on exchanges in the council and
embracing network interaction and by wielding influence within governance networks are governing through diplomacy. As a Labour council
leader summarised the situation in her council:
Councillor diplomacy within governance networks, however, is only effective if conducted through a process of negotiation, compromise, and the
willingness to accept limits on the successes that can be obtained. But by
accepting such limitations and by engaging with networks are councillors
acting as metagovernors (Sorensen, Torfing, 2009)? The research for this
paper suggests that the mere presence of councillors operating in governance networks is no guarantee that those bodies will be anchored in
any democratic fashion or necessarily responsive to messages that arrive
via the route of a democratically elected councillor. Indeed, councillors
reported that they experienced resistance and that the process of attempting to shape policy preferences (Ward, 2006) was not an easy or automatically accepted as being an appropriate role for them when interacting
within networks. In formal settings councillors reported that they were
viewed by others as simply members of a board and their democratic mandate counted for little in formal interactions. In more informal settings
however, it was clear that being a councillor was what gave an individual
entrance to the informal setting in the first place and the council as an authoritative and legitimate body was as one councillor put it: ‘like an aura
around us [councillors] not that it made me special, far from it, but I can
refer to the council and the chief executive and what the council has done
and does and it adds weight to my position.’
What is also clear is that the mere presence of councillors in governance
networks is no guarantee that they will take on the role of metagovernors.
Councillors as individual politicians will undertake the roles, responsibilities, and functions that they play outside the council in ways which suit
their own conceptualisation of those roles. Unless governing through other bodies and bringing some order to the chaos of governance networks,
‘I focus my time meeting with business, public bodies, a lot of time
talking to the health people, government agencies, trying to get them
to respond to the problems we have here and trying to join up what
they all do separately. You have to be very aware of what they all
think of each other, what their priorities are, who gets on and who
doesn’t; it must be like making deals at the UN; what can be achieved through which deals with which partners.’
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or holding such networks and their players to account is part of councillor’s governing assumption, then there is little chance of that councillor
being engaged in a process of bringing democratic oversight to governing
networks. Moreover, we must move beyond democratic oversight, which
rests on councillors’ ability to employ diplomatic skills and assess the realistic and achievable goals within the particular networks within which
they operate, to a situation where councils and councillors are granted the
powers to provide democratic direction and control over networks.
If local government faces competitors in the world of service provision
and by consequence a lightening of the load of public service delivery,
then the alternative that remains for local government is to focus on government through governance networks. If this relies on the individual
councillor’s skills and on them making a realistic assessment of the RealLokalPolitk, then the success of democratic oversight will be marginal
and thinly spread. Indeed, much democratic anchorage could be said to
be left to luck, or more charitably to the development in any one council
area of a critical mass of councillors that recognise a broader political role
beyond the council and dedicate themselves to such a task. In addition,
that critical mass of councillors would require the support and resources
of their council to be able to conduct a strategically focussed approach to
shaping and controlling network activity; councils as well as councillors
must see their role as using networks to govern and therefore commit the
resource to such activity.
Councillors must be both willing and able to establish strong links with
external partners at all levels and to transfer the policy preferences of the
democratic body that is the council, to good effect, within those bodies.
Without that willingness and ability, councils and councillors merely attenuate the power of unelected governance networks, rather than direct
or control them. But they must engage in networks with a clear understanding of the diplomatic skills required and of the consequences for
shaping policy preferences of those with whom they engage by taking an
ideological or realistic approach to political interaction.
6. Conclusion
Local government is confronted with a continual struggle for influence
over the decisions, policies, and resource expenditure undertaken by unelected operators within their locality that make up the networks through
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351
Councillors are well aware that their office is sanctioned by the public
vote and that this provides them with a moral and political lever to be used
within governance networks and to shape the actions of particular public
agencies. Within those networks, they can either operate as a delegate
of the voters or party, or act as a trustee. The diplomatic skills required
of councillors attempting to influence the decisions and shape the policy
preferences of those organisations over which they have no control, will
mean that they will act largely as trustees of the wider public good. However, that wider public good is assessed by the councillor through the lens
of party political membership. What is then required for the councillor to
successfully shape the decisions and preferences of organisations beyond
the council is a willingness to operate outside of a strict ideological set
of objectives and within a framework that recognises what is achievable,
how far and when to move in an incremental fashion towards a strategic
political goal: RealLokalPolitik.
Governance may describe the process of interaction between independent
but interconnected agencies but the implication with a term that sounds
like ‘government’, is that there is something democratic within those interactions, but it is just that: an implication. The existence of councillors
within networks can at best add an element of direction and bring the
activities of those bodies into some form of alignment with the direction
preferred by the elected council. The task, however, is made all the more
difficult when the boundaries of the network and the public agencies of
which it consists extend spatially beyond local government boundaries.
Where networks extend beyond a council boundary, councillors must in-
which much public policy is developed and implemented. The council and
its councillors have a mandate granted by the voters in an electoral chain
of command, which links voters to parties, councillors, and the council
and then into the disparate and diffuse governance networks. The idea
that the council is a sovereign political body within any one locality has
been replaced by its role as one player among many in any locality that
develop and implement public policy – it is also questionable whether the
idea of the sovereign council was ever a reality in the English context. Yet,
with the numerous agencies that operate alongside local government the
council is the only body with any direct link to the community through
the mechanism of the public vote. It is commonplace today to criticise
that link and claim that public agencies that are not elected are somehow
better placed to make decisions about key areas of public policy than an
elected council. But, none of those claims can replace that direct line of
accountability that rests with the council and its members.
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teract with councillors from other councils and indeed even other regions,
as well as with network players with a greater spatial reach than a single
council. In such interactions, a grasp of the RealLokalPolitik and a shift
from the certainties of ideologically driven politics becomes all the more
necessary.
Time, resources, advice, and support are required to enable councillors to
use networks not just to provide a veneer of democratic accountability,
but to be able to shape and direct networks and to influence their policy
preferences. Moreover, to govern through governance, councillors must
see their role as more than injecting a vicarious element of accountability
to networks and their players and move from the assumption, where it
exists, that the presence of a councillor within a network or on the board
of a partnership is sufficient to democratise it and its decisions. There are
indeed councillors highly skilled in local diplomacy that operate as strategically focused politicians operating beyond the scope of their councils
to govern through governance networks. But such engagement cannot
be left to a scattered pattern dependent on particular councillor’s ability
and willingness to see governing through governance as now a foundation
to local politics and that the place for sterile ideological discourse is the
council chamber and not the network. If governance networks and their
players are to be democratically anchored and local government able to
govern in the broadest sense, then the role of the councillor as a governor
within governance networks must be fully embraced as an operating principle for local politics and government.
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IDEOLOGY OR REALISM IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE:
A CASE OF REALLOKALPOLITIK IN
ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Summary
Key words: local politics – England, local governance, councillors, RealLokalPolitik
The paper reports the results of research conducted among councillors in England which explored how they operate in complex governing networks where they
interact with a range of public and private bodies. Councillors cannot control
such networks or their members. Rather, councillors are faced with devising strategies to exert influence over and to try to shape and direct the policy decisions
taken by the individual players and to draw a myriad of decisions into an overall
direction and coherence. Councillors can either act ideologically (a key set of
political principles and goals) or pragmatically (an assessment of what it is possible to achieve). The paper explores the approaches councillors have developed
to engage in governance networks and assesses whether or not they act ideologically or pragmatically. It introduces the concept of RealLokalPolitik to explain
the tension and choice between these approaches. The paper also explores how
the need to operate in governance networks re-shapes our understanding of councillors as trustees, delegates or party loyalists.
356
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IDEOLOGIJA ILI REALIZAM U LOKALNOJ VLADAVINI:
REALPOLITIKA U ENGLESKOJ LOKALNOJ SAMOUPRAVI
Sažetak
Rad analizira rezultate istraživanja provedenog među lokalnim vijećnicima u
Engleskoj koje se bavilo načinom na koji oni djeluju unutar složenih mreža
vladavine u kojima se nalaze u međudjelovanju sa širokim rasponom javnih i
privatnih tijela. Vijećnici takve mreže ni njihove članove ne mogu kontrolirati.
Naprotiv, suočeni su s potrebom stvaranja načina da ostvare utjecaj na njih i
pokušaju oblikovati i usmjeravati odluke o javnim politikama koje donose pojedini akteri te tom mnoštvu odluka dati zajednički smjer i koherentnost. Vijećnici mogu djelovati s ideoloških stajališta (skup političkih načela i ciljeva) ili
pak pragmatično (procjenjujući što je moguće ostvariti). U radu se razmatraju
pristupi koje su vijećnici razvili da bi se uključili u mreže vladavine i procjenjuje
se ponašaju li se oni ideološki ili pragmatično. Rad uvodi koncept realpolitike
na lokalnoj razini (RealLokalPolitik) kako bi se objasnila napetost koja vlada
te izbor između tih dvaju pristupa. Također se istražuje na koji način potreba
djelovanja unutar mreža vladavine preoblikuje naše poimanje vijećnika kao upravljača, delegata ili pak stranačkih lojalista.
Ključne riječi: lokalna politika – Engleska, lokalna vladavina, vijećnici, realpolitika na lokalnoj razini (RealLokalPolitik)
Local Democracy in France:
Michèle Breuillard*
The paper presents an up to date analysis of the French
local government system and its potential for realisation
of local democracy. It is structured into three sections in
which the pros and cons, the improvements and shilly-shallying delineate local democracy in France. First, through
the restricted French vision that participative democracy
only supplements, not enriches representative democracy.
Second, the structural and organisational crisis of representative local democracy will be examined against the
context of continuing process of decentralisation. Finally,
the paper concludes that the way local democracy is being
defined and operated in France today raises more questions than it provides answers. Whichever the point of view
is taken, several questions need answers. To which degree
are representatives answerable? Can participative democracy end up in no democracy?
*
Michèle Breuillard, PhD, retired research fellow, France (dr. sc. Michele Breuillard,
umirovljena znanstvena istraživačica Sveučilišta u Lilleu, Francuska, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
352/353: 321.7(44)
35.072.1: 321.7(44)
Preliminary scientific paper / prethodno znanstveno propćenje
358
Breuillard, Michêle (2015) Local Democracy in France ...
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 357–372
Key words: local government – France, local democracy,
participative and representative democracy
1. Introduction
Since the 19th century, the successive constitutions of the French Republic have clearly shown a continuous hostility to giving the people tools of
direct democracy despite what Jean-Jacques Rousseau described as the
Ideal State in reference to the rural communities of Switzerland (Landsgemeinden) and their long tradition of self-government and direct democracy (Le Contrat Social). The fact is that the French have kept a long
memory of Napoleon Bonaparte’s plebiscites as so many symbols of Césarisme. President De Gaulle’s philosophy about power only ensured the
continued existence of referendums-plebiscites dedicated to the head of
state. This spectre of plebiscites explains why the 2008 constitutional reform was reluctant to introduce the right to popular initiative in referenda
at the national level. In fact, it only provides for a referendum based on a
shared initiative that is very unlikely to succeed: indeed the bill must be
introduced by one fifth of all 925 MPs1 and supported by one tenth of all
registered voters, i.e. 4.5 million citizens!
On the other hand, in France as much as in other democratic states, representative democracy is said to be simply outdated or its reputation is
under severe criticism. Alternatives to representative democracy have
been experienced under the various forms of so-called opinion democracy, participative democracy, or even direct democracy: as if inherited from
the ideal type of Ancient Greece. In fact – and this is fortunate for the
most vulnerable members of Western societies – only some means of the
Ancient Greek regime have inspired lawmakers in contemporary Europe
– in the view of reviving democracy at large. However, what is in crisis is
not so much representative democracy in itself as the official image that
politicians and journalists tend to give it.
Such an endless debate creates a fake competition between representative and participative democracy, especially at the local level, particularly
in France, although it is obvious that they are supplementary and not
in opposition to one another: citizens’ participation in the management
1
The Parliament is composed of 348 Senators and 577 Representatives in the Assemblée Nationale.
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359
of local affairs could be considered as the corner-stone of a compelling
evolution towards the inclusion of ‘outsiders’ – not contenders – into
decision-making processes. Keeping in mind that a democratic regime
consists of checks and balances, men and women equally able to elect
their best possible representatives who are empowered to answer their
needs and expectations, this paper will be structured into three sections
in which the pros and cons, the improvements and shilly-shallying, delineate local democracy in France: first through the restricted French
vision that participative democracy only supplements, not enriches representative democracy; secondly the structural and organisational crisis
of representative local democracy will have to be examined against the
context of continuing process of decentralisation; finally we will be somewhat forced to conclude that the way local democracy is being defined
and operated in France raises more questions than answers. To which
extent are representatives answerable? Can participative democracy end
up in no democracy?
If local authorities are praised as ‘the foundation of democracy’, ‘the laboratory for democracy improvements’ France should rank high on the list
of the ‘most democratic’ countries in the world giving the size of its local
government units. The fact is that France rather suffers from a curious
and unique syndrome among European countries. While the national office for statistics (INSEE) shows that 95 per cent of the French population live in urban areas, ‘under the influence of cities’ (INSEE, 2011)
current regulation about local government responsibilities and legitimacy
seems to ignore that urbanization often expands beyond the historical
borders of communes that remain the unchallenged basis for any local
government reform. We have the smallest commune (Rochefourchat, in
the Southeast) with only one inhabitant. We even have communes with
no inhabitants at all: six ‘dead communes’ (mortes pour la France), totally
destroyed in WW1 are kept ‘alive’ and the mayor is appointed by central
government’s representative (préfet). On the contrary, Paris is the biggest
French city with over 2.2 million, but is still much smaller than its British
or German counterparts that represent their whole urban regions. The average size of French communes is 1,750 inhabitants while the EU average
2. Local Participative Democracy as a Mere
Supplement to Representative Democracy
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360
size is 5,130 inhabitants. So far successive attempts to merge municipalities have failed to overcome the strong sense of identity that citizens are
said to develop in smaller units.
Table 1: Distribution of population in France and in European larger
countries
Total Population
(2010; million)
European Union
NUTS 2
Regions
NUTS 3
Départements
Local Authority
Units Communes
501.25
271
1,303
121,601
France
64.70
26
100
36,682
Germany
81.75
39
429
12,379
Italy
60.39
21
107
8,101
United-Kingdom
62.04
37
133
10,664
Source: Eurostat
Median population in a French commune is 423 inhabitants, as opposed
to 2,300 inhabitants in Italy and 11,000 in Belgium. More than 31,500
communes have less than 2,000 inhabitants (‘rural’ communes), 255 are
over 30,000, and only 11 are over 200,000 inhabitants (Sénat, 2009).
As the French example shows physical closeness of representatives is not
enough to ensure a better representation of the communities’ interests
and their involvement in local politics. As far as the people’s involvement
in the management of local affairs is concerned, Switzerland is certainly
‘top of the European class’ since it has experienced citizens’ direct participation in decision-making processes since the first half of the 19th century.
Since 1947, the Italian Constitution has provided for three direct democracy mechanisms: bills to be proposed through popular initiative (Art.
71), consultative constitutional referenda, and referenda that can repeal
a law (Art. 75). The prize list could include Germany after re-unification
(municipal and Land referenda), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and
Slovenia, which have added all three direct democracy processes to their
constitutions at the time of their democratic transition. Similarly, citizens’
popular initiative has been included in the Lisbon Treaty since April 1st,
2012; the trouble is that the mechanism comes up against so many obstacles that it seems more theoretical than real.
Apart from the 1793 Constitution (Constitution montagnarde of the First
Republic), which gave the people a right to popular initiative and veto
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that had never been enacted, local democracy was restricted to the representative model in all successive regimes.
Again, it took another ten years for citizens to be more closely included
into the making of local decisions through area-meetings (conseils de quartier). Interestingly, at the same time, the rights of opposition party groups
in local councils were reinforced and local councillors’ conditions for election and status improved (Loi du 27 février 2002 relative à la démocratie
de proximité). The mechanisms of participative democracy have recently
multiplied: ‘public debate’, ‘citizens’ workshops’, ‘participative budget’ are
becoming common phrases in newspapers and political speeches. However, France is still testing local direct democracy: the 2003 Constitutional Reform Act opened up the possibility for local councils to hold decision-making referenda in restricted circumstances. Then only indirectly,
the 2004 Charter on Environment Protection tackled local democracy3
in relation to the very topics it dealt with. The 2012 implementing legislation4 proposed to test the possibility of using participative democracy
devices to improve the impact of public enquiries on the elaboration of
some categories of by-laws and ministerial decrees, for an eighteen-month
period from 2013 onwards. In July 2013, a report to the Ministry of Ur-
2
Conseil d’Etat, arrêt «Commune d’Aigre», 7th April 1905; arrêt «Commune de
Brugnens», 15th January, 1909.
3
Article 7 of the Charter: Everyone is entitled to free access to environment-related
information that is held by public authorities; they are entitled to take part in the public
authorities’ policy-making that may have impact on the environment.
4
LOI n° 2012–1460 du 27 décembre 2012 relative à la mise en œuvre du principe de
participation du public défini à l’article 7 de la Charte de l’environnement
It took the notion of local democracy ten years after the 1981–1982 decentralization reforms to make its first appearance in the constitutional
framework. Popular participation in councils’ decision-making processes
or consultation was simply forbidden after two successive judgements by
the Supreme Administrative Court.2 Thus, an Act of Parliament had to
be passed to officially seek people’s advice about local policies. The 1992
Act (Loi pour l’orientation territoriale de la République) tackles the right of
local communities to be better informed and to be asked for their advice
through consultative referenda only. Budgetary documents must be put
at disposal, decisions made in the field of economic public intervention
must be officially published, direct consultative processes are created but
strictly supervised, and customers of local services can be called into consultative committees to have their say.
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ban Policy on citizenship and empowerment of inhabitants in poor areas
was titled Ça ne se fera plus sans nous (Never again without us) (Bacqué,
Mechmache, 2013) expressing acutely that the traditional tools of citizens’ participation as known for the last twenty years have never been beyond mere exercise of public relations or consultation. Sadly, the appalling Sivens dam affair in the Southwest has illustrated this critical report,
when in November 2014 a young man died in a demonstration against
a planned reservoir to be built on the protected wet lands by a publicly
owned company with the approval of the local (provincial) council5. No
wonder why the news was broken as un drame de la décision publique à
la française (A tragedy of the French-style decision-making process, Le
Monde, 21th November, 2014): ‘The tragedy reveals weaknesses in the
management of public decision-making in France … (which very much)
depends on the balance of political powers on the spot’. In the aftermath,
President Hollande proposed to the Conférence Environnementale (National Conference on the Environment) a new model of participative democracy which would be based on local referenda. This is to say that until now
participative democracy in France has implied an unfinished business of
allowing local communities to take part in the life of their own areas.
So what does participative democracy consist of? If we reckon that country and city planning are its most favoured and complex playfields, we can
find the three commonly assumed aspects of participative democracy –
information, consultation, and dialogue that only reinforce the idea that
participative democracy is mainly seen as a supplement to representative
democracy.
As said before, the number of tools for citizens’ participation is expanding in France as elsewhere and they mirror the local politicians’ various
views if not contradicting expectations: some tools are genuinely made to
deepen the case for more democracy, others are created to control and
adapt the local structures to the law, while still others are definitely purely
instrumental in the hands of local politics (Bacqué, Sintomer, 2009; Blondiaux, 2008). Some of these tools are becoming commonplace, like referenda, public enquiries and the various forms of mandatory or voluntary
meetings for inhabitants and voluntary sector (comité de quartier, conseil de
développement) or their representatives (conseil des jeunes, conseil municipal
des enfants, conseil des anciens, conseils des résidents étrangers, commissions
extra-municipales), etc. Some remain exceptional, like people’s initiatives,
5
Conseil départemental du Tarn.
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363
Participative democracy is expected to achieve numerous goals such as
improving local management, social cohesion and democracy at large,
and is based on a kind of ideology of closeness (la proximité), enshrined in
the Act on démocratie de proximité6 – sort of localism – in order to enlist
citizens and raise local communities’ interest in immediate and downto-earth stakes so that local politics become a daily routine (Lefebvre,
Nonjon, 2003). It remains to be seen whether it is no more than a new
widely used fashionable word though without any particular meaning or,
on the contrary, it signals that a powerful groundswell is changing the way
political legitimacy and magnitude are developing across French society.
If we agree that it is a notion, it expresses a break into the symbolic inheritance of the French political philosophy, which has for centuries insisted
on indexing legitimacy on distance and separation: ‘the general public’s
interest is different from a collection of private interests; the State is separated from civil society, good and rational bureaucracy is untouched by
face to face relationships’ (Le Bart, 2007). Since it is all about ‘getting
together’ the notion is deemed to help reviving local democracy and to
reinforce its legitimacy.
Whatever its merits are, ‘close democracy’ as a legal mechanism comprises at least two limits: one is often quoted as the NIMBY phenomena: individually represented private or vested interests prevent the community
from trying any kind of collective solution. The second limit is that it may
discourage or make people feel guilty because they are facing a problem
that exceeds their local authority’s area and power while they are not given the means to call upon other tiers of government authorities (ADELS,
2004).
6
Loi n° 2002–276 du 27 février 2002 relative à la démocratie de proximité.
citizens’ juries, participative budgets and public proceedings (assises, forums citoyens, conseil communal de concertation, conférences de consensus,
ateliers urbains de proximité ...) – contemporary local politics and policies
are required to use them as mandatory steps within the decision-making
processes of the time for both management and democracy reasons. The
politics of citizens’ participation is supposed to give a larger number of
laymen access to public information from and negotiation with those ‘in
charge and who know about’ on the one hand, and to guarantee easier
acceptance and more efficient implementation of public intervention on
the other (Blondiaux, Sintomer, 2002).
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As a short conclusion on the state of the art of participative democracy in
France, one can insist on the fact that these tools have not been created to
be efficient. The Parliament carefully handled them in the view of making
them non-binding for local authorities showing its definite distrust in participation processes (Feldmann, Guiselin, 2011). Local referenda, consultations, and petitions remain optional for local councils. The creation and
functioning of area committees, citizens’ forums, local assemblies, etc. is
left in the hands and at the good will of local councillors.
For example, only in bigger cities – over 80,000 inhabitants – conseils de
quartier must be created. In smaller communes – 20,000 inhabitants or
more – the establishment, functioning, chairmanship, and design of their
area-basis are left to the municipal council’s decision. They may be completely informal in towns under 20,000. Interestingly, the management
of contracted or in-house local services (water, garbage collection, transportation, etc.) is now under a rather restrictive scrutiny of consultative
committees (commissions consultatives des services publics locaux) that gather
appointed councillors and representatives of the voluntary sector in all
three tiers of local government (regions, départements and communes over
10,000 inhabitants): the Commissions will only be consulted for new contracted or in-house services.
That is to say that these structures can do no harm! The reason why the
Parliament decided about non-binding mechanisms for participative democracy lies in the system of accumulation of mandates (Paoletti, 1998).
French local councillors, mayors, presidents of regional or provincial
councils can also be members of the Senate or of the Assemblée nationale.7
They refuse to undergo what they see as a limitation to representative
democracy and thus have limited, as much as possible, citizens’ capability
to express their views directly. They want to keep for themselves their decision-making powers and allow for means of direct expression only when
they decide so within their local councils.
7
After the 2012 general elections, 476 out of 577 members of the National Assembly
(82 per cent) and 267 out of 348 senators (77 per cent) hold at least one local mandate on
top of their national mandate.
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365
3. An Immature Representative Local
Democracy in Crisis
Even if the mayor is indirectly elected by the municipal council on its first
meeting following the election day, most of the time, though not always,
he/she is the first name on the winning list. Given the voting system that
provides a real bonus to the winning list, there is no excitement about the
name of the ‘mayor to be’… unless the leader of the winning list decides
not to stand for the mayoral election and to let another name become the
mayor instead. That is to say that incidentally citizens who voted for the
winning list may not be represented by the declared candidate!
Moreover, the French ‘disease’ of accumulation of national and local mandates (as an MP or Senator and simultaneously as a mayor or president
of a regional or second-tier council – le Département) has been gradually
cured. The 2014 Act definitively forbids MEPs, MPs, and Senators from
holding executive powers in local government but it will not be implemented until the 2017 general elections.
Two more reforms were imposed in the 2014 local ballots to improve the
representativeness of local authorities: gender equality and direct elections of councils for joint inter-communal bodies.
8
There are 3,732 communes with less than 1,000 inhabitants, which together have
2.7 million inhabitants.
First of all, one needs to bear in mind that within the local authority’s
executive power the French mayor holds the most prestigious seat and
more importantly, the largest share of power due to his/her own personal
responsibilities as the embodied executive power and also as the representative officer of the central government for registration, election roll
and organisation, immigration police, etc. As we will explain further on,
the voting system of blocked lists mixes the pluri-nominal majority vote
in two rounds with some proportional representation. Since the 2014 municipal elections, this system has been extended to all communes over
1,000 inhabitants8 whereas ‘panachage’ and individual candidacy has
been the rule in small communities under 3,500 inhabitants. The 2013
local government reform act definitively reassesses the strong position of
the mayor as a ‘local monarch’ (Mabileau, 1993) and silences the opposition party groups: the winning list is granted 50 per cent of the total seats;
the remaining seats are distributed among the lists that gained at least 5
per cent of the votes cast including the winning list.
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In order to ensure gender equality, the lists of candidates must contain
an equal number of women and men, alternately ranking (one man, one
woman or conversely), in the 6,550 communes over 1,000 inhabitants so
that the number of women in politics should increase by about 16,000.
Regarding direct election of inter-communal councils, for the first time in
the 2014 local elections, citizens directly elected their representatives in
the municipal and inter-communal joint councils by one ballot: from the
blocked lists the first names in the elected lists were also to become members of the related inter-communal council. The government prided itself
that the 2013 reform act also provided for the first ever direct election of
these joint bodies through municipal elections. In fact, the same provision
was incorporated in the 2010 reform act under the Fillon Government as
President Sarkozy elaborated it. The 2010 Act had been abolished after
the swing in the 2012 presidential and general elections. In small communes, fewer than 1,000 inter-communal councillors are members of the
municipal councils according to the classical order (mayor, first and second deputy-mayors). In fact, as citizens have no choice when choosing
members of the inter-communal councils, both the new system and the
previous one, which has been in existence since the end of the 19th century, end up with practically the same result.
Can we expect the developing inter-communal system to become really
democratic at a time when it is transferred more and more responsibilities and financial means from its member-communes? The question must
be asked since the system has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of
legitimacy and transparency (Caillosse et al., 2001; Desage, Guéranger,
2010). It is sufficient to explain that since the end of the 1990s Parliamentary reports, debates, and academic research for local government
associations and political lobbies have endlessly pointed at the same failure to deliver democratically controlled policies while chairmanship and
executive powers for such councils have never accounted for the calculation of accumulated mandates. The reason is that mayors, whether they
are presidents or vice-presidents of inter-communal bodies or not, do not
want them to be fully regarded as local authorities and endowed with a
status that could impinge on communal sovereignty.
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4. Further Questions to Be Raised Rather
Than Clear Answers to Be Given
Representative democracy and the control over councils’ work: how much are
elected councillors answerable? Local government responsibilities and functions seem to be definitely entangled due to the implementation of the
principle of freedom of administration which is allocated to all three local authority categories, the commune, the département, and the region,
but not to joint bodies (établissement public de cooperation intercommunale,
EPCI) which have only delegated powers. Functions and, consequently,
human resources tend to be multiplied and duplicated not only among
local councils but also between local and central government. Institutions
are literally pilled as a result of institutional reform-policies that have created more structures on top of one another “without ever abolishing, clarifying or re-organizing” (quoted from the report for the Local Government
Reform Bill, 2009). Moreover, the territorial structure of communes as
well as of EPCIs is crumbling, despite recent reforms that tend to control
and rationalize the number of joint bodies. Finally, most of these organisations lack legitimacy and direct accountability before citizens since their
councils mainly end up in coalition governments as defined behind closed
doors. Indeed, French and foreign academics as much as parliamentary
reports (Balladur 2008 Commission Report to the President and Mauroy
2000 Commission Report to the Prime Minister; 2009 Senate Report)
have repeatedly expressed their concern about the deepening crisis of the
French local government system which is traditionally based on a mixed
machinery of three-tiered local authorities and numerous bodies with no
local authority legal status in between.
A research project studying 344 legal actions against local authorities at
the Administrative Court in Lille from September 2008 to September
2009 showed that only 36 (10.5 per cent) were raised by the prefect, while
215 (63 per cent) were initiated by individuals and 44 (13 per cent) by
companies (Contamin, 2011). Beyond the rule of the game, the prefects’
restrained room for manoeuvre in the field of legal control over local au-
To sum up our critical review of local democracy in France, we will analyse both representative and participative aspects under two dimensions.
First, we will deal with the issue of representative through democratic
control over councillors and councils’ work, then we will assess the real
part played by participative democracy within the local government machinery.
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thorities (and reduced number of qualified staff!) seems to reduce the
importance of formal scrutiny, which is, nevertheless, one of their main
raisons d’être. Since political control over local government remains largely impossible in France due to the voting system as explained above on the
one hand, and to the constitutionally expressed libertés communales that
protect local authorities and their personnel on the other, it is a paradox
that political control seems to develop in France through legal action. The
decentralisation reform has evolved within a presidential style and regime
for local authorities that provide citizens with few means to influence local policies politically. As we have already seen, citizens’ involvement and
participation in local affairs remain at the good will of the council, especially of the mayor.
As a whole, the ‘municipal presidentialism’ model as it has developed
since the last quarter of the 19th century under the Third Republic, only
expanded into councils of regions and départements through transferred
executive powers and resources to the council presidents personally. It
was a simple implementation of the devolution of powers to the President
of the Republic under the 1958 Constitution: the mayor and presidents
are not answerable to their local councils which mainly play the role of
ratifying their decisions. Thus, political control is restricted to recurring
election process not forgetting the impact of the ‘nationalisation’ rule of
local elections.
Participative democracy: Participation without democracy? Participation
against democracy? What are the aims of using semi-direct democracy
tools? What use is being made of them? Is there any risk of splitting the
society into two opposed groups over sensitive issues? For sure, since the
decentralisation reform, a wider number of local politicians have been
called upon and intervened. Nevertheless, we have explained that participation has been established on ad hoc basis and it still depends on the
good will of mayors, as the case of local referenda shows (Paoletti, 2007).
For that reason, new decentralisation reform bills have been passed at
top speed since the end of 2012 as parts of President Hollande’s electoral
manifesto. The trouble is that they have often been against the Senate’s
advice, although the upper chamber is constitutionally designed as the
representative body for local authorities and local interests in the French
Parliament.
First, it was about abolishing the 2010 Act on the creation of conseillers
territoriaux (local councillors accumulating responsibilities for both regional and provincial councils and meeting for both tiers of local govern-
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 357–372
369
Nice area is the only métropole that was created as early as 1st January
2012. On the 17th November 2011, while a member of the Fillon Government (2007-2012), Christian Estrosi, the mayor for Nice city council and
president of Nice-Communauté urbaine was granted the first ever status
as Métropole Nice Côte d’Azur by the Minister of the Interior according to
the 2010 local government reform Act which was abolished in 2013. This
status remains to be revised to conform with the new provisions of the
2014 Maptam Act.
More controversial and much more resented, even by members of the
Left majority group in the French Parliament is the reform of the regions
in continental France. Finally, despite lengthy consultations and negotiations, 13 enlarged regions will replace the 21 of those that dated back to
the 1970s. The final decision was President Hollande’s, who announced
the late restructuring into a still smaller number after the Government Bill
had announced the establishment of 14 regions at the beginning of 2014.
Facing solid inertia in the structure and devolution processes of local
responsibilities and powers, tools for participative democracy have only
brought cosmetic change so far. The traditional division of labour among
9
Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles (loi Maptam), 27th January 2014. By-laws signed up by the Minister of the Interior delineate each métropole.
10
Décret en Conseil des ministres, 17th December, 2014. Métropole de Lyon.
ment). Then there was a need to clarify the distribution of responsibilities between each type of local authority and between central and local
government. The Government has decided to create new local authorities (métropoles) as a sort of unitary councils for major urban areas over
400,000 inhabitants that could become autonomous enclaves detached
from their département and region areas in the long run.9 From 1st January 2015, the inter-communal bodies (communautés urbaines) around
Bordeaux, Brest, Grenoble, Lille, Montpellier, Nantes, Rennes, Rouen,
Strasbourg, and Toulouse have become metropolises with larger responsibilities, voluntarily or not delegated from communes and from central
government. On the same day, Lyon Métropole urban area was established
as a new local authority that endorses delegated responsibilities from the
Rhône Département on top of the tasks devolved from its member-communes.10 The Maptam Act has created two other new métropoles with a
special status: Grand Paris and Aix-Marseille to start on 1st January 2016.
Smaller urban areas can be turned into pôles métropolitains.
370
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 357–372
local politicians is not questioned in-depth and participative democracy
can still be set against representative democracy at the local level in France (Lefebvre, 2012).
References
Adels (2004) Conseils de quartier. Modes d’emploi, 2nd ed. Paris: Adels
Bacqué, M.-H., M. Mechmache (2013) Pour une réforme radicale de la politique
de la ville. Ça ne se fera plus sans nous. Citoyenneté et pouvoir d’agir dans
les quartiers populaires. Rapport au ministre délégué chargé de la Ville, July
2013.
Bacqué, M.-H., Y. Sintomer (eds.) (2009) La démocratie participative inachevée.
Genèses, adaptations et diffusions. Paris: Adels/Yves Michel
Blondiaux, L. (2008) Le nouvel esprit de la démocratie. Actualité de la démocratie participative. Paris: Ed. du Seuil
Blondiaux, L., Y. Sintomer (2002) L’impératif déliberatif. Politix 15(57): 17–35
Caillosse, J., P. Le Lidec, R. Le Saout (2001) Le procès en légitimité démocratique des EPCI. Pouvoirs locaux 48(2001): 91–97
Contamin, J.-G. (2011) Les voies détournées du contrôle des collectivités territoriales en France: entre contrôle administratif, juridique et politique. EstEuropa 2(2011): 287–306
Desage, F., D. Guéranger (2010) La démocratisation de l’intercommunalité
n’aura pas lieu. Savoir/Agir 11(2010): 19–27
Feldman, J.-F., E. Guiselin (2011) Les mutations de la démocratie locale – Elections et statut des élus. Paris: L’Harmattan INSEE (2011) Le nouveau zonage des aires urbaines en 2010. Premières n°1374
(October)
Le Bart, C., P. Bacot (2007) Dire la démocratie aujourd’hui. Mots 83(2007)
(March)
Lefebvre, R., M. Nonjon (2003) La démocratie locale en France: ressorts et
usages. Sciences de la société 60(2003) (October)
Lefebvre, R. (2012) La démocratie participative absorbée par le système politique
local. Métropolitiques, 29 October 2012, http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Lademocratie-participative.html
Mabileau, A. (1993) A la recherche de la démocratie locale. Le représentant et
le citoyen. In: La démocratie locale. Représentation, participation et espace
public. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France
Paoletti, M. (1998) La démocratie locale française. Spécificité et alignement. In:
La démocratie locale. Représentation, participation et espace public. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France
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Paoletti, M. (2007) Le référendum local en France: un état des lieux. In: Hamon,
F. (ed) Le référendum local en France. Paris: La Documentation française
Sénat (2009) Faire confiance à l’intelligence territorial. Rapport d’information n°
471 (2008–2009)
de M. Yves Krattinger et Mme Jacqueline Gourault, fait au nom de la mission
commune d’information, JORF, 17 June 2009
LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE:
IMPROVEMENTS AND SHILLY-SHALLYING
The paper presents an up to date analysis of the French local government system
and its potential for realisation of local democracy. It is structured into three
sections in which the pros and cons, the improvements and shilly-shallying delineate local democracy in France. First, through the restricted French vision
that participative democracy only supplements, not enriches representative democracy. Second, the structural and organisational crisis of representative local
democracy will be examined against the context of continuing process of decentralisation. Finally, the paper concludes that the way local democracy is being
defined and operated in France today raises more questions than it provides
answers. Whichever the point of view is taken, several questions need answers. To
which degree are representatives answerable? Can participative democracy end
up into no democracy?
Key words: local government – France, local democracy, participative and representative democracy
Summary
372
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 357–372
LOKALNA DEMOKRACIJA U FRANCUSKOJ:
POBOLJŠANJA I NEODLUČNOST
Sažetak
Analiziraju se suvremeni razvoj francuskog sustava lokalne samouprave i njegov
potencijal za ostvarenje lokalne demokracije. U tri poglavlja prikazuju se dobre
i loše strane te poboljšanja i neodlučnost u razvoju francuske lokalne demokracije. Najprije se razmatra ograničeno francusko shvaćanje da participativna
demokracija samo nadopunjava, a ne obogaćuje predstavničku demokraciju. U
drugom se poglavlju razmatra strukturalna i organizacijska kriza lokalne predstavničke demokracije u kontekstu stalnog procesa decentralizacije. Način na
koji se danas definira i upravlja lokalnom demokracijom u Francuskoj postavlja
mnogo više pitanja no što daje odgovora. Koje god stajalište se zauzme, postavljaju se bar dva važna pitanja: do koje su mjere odgovorni lokalni politički predstavnici; je li moguće da participativna demokracija završi tako da demokracije
više ne bude?
Ključne riječi: lokalna samouprava – Francuska, lokalna demokracija, participativna i predstavnička demokracija
Participatory Budgeting in Poland:
Dawid Sześciło*
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a global phenomenon exemplifying a shift towards collaborative and participatory
governance. This umbrella term embraces a huge variety
of mechanisms of public participation in the budgetary
process: from advanced consultation to a specific type of
direct democracy. This article presents the results of an extensive analysis of the Polish model of PB applied in nine
municipalities of different size. It demonstrates that the
model disseminated in Poland is based on quasi-referendum that guarantees the citizens direct impact on local
budgets. However, participation is limited to a minor part
of local budgets and it is not accompanied by public deliberation over strategic issues. Therefore, the Polish model
of PB does not offer a genuine shift towards participatory
local governance.
Key words: participatory budgeting, governance, New Public Governance, Poland, local government
*
Dawid Sześciło, PhD, Assistant Professor, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Law and
Administration, Public Administration Research Group, Poland (doc. dr. sc. Dawid Szcescilo,
Fakultet za pravo i upravu, Sveučilište u Varšavi, Poljska, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
336.14:352(438)
342.573:352/353(438)
374
Sześciło, Dawid (2015) Participatory Budgeting in Poland ...
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1. Introduction
The expansion of participatory budgeting (PB) appears to be the most
remarkable phenomenon in local governance in Poland in recent years.
Increasing popularity of this method of the formulation of local budgets is
a result of its global dissemination and specific trends in the Polish local
government. Internationally, PB might be perceived as one of the practical consequences of the paradigm shift from New Public Management
(NPM) towards New Public Governance (Osborne, 2006, 2009), New
Public Service (Denhardt, Denhardt, 2011), good governance (Commission of the European Communities, 2001; Rondinelli, 2007) or collaborative governance (Ansell, Gash, 2007; Emerson et al., 2012). NPM as a
hybrid of neoliberal economy and managerialism (Christensen, Laegreid,
2002) revealed in practice numerous adverse effects in terms of access
and quality of public services, addressing the challenges of social welfare
or environmental protection. The rhetoric of privatization, deregulation,
and ‘rolling back the state’ also ignored democratic values such as citizens’ participation in policy planning and implementation. In the NPM
world, ‘we are all customers now’ (Pierre, 2009), not partners of public
administration or co-producers of public services. Focusing solely on outcomes and efficiency in public management collided with extensive public
participation that creates transaction costs and delays the decision-making process. Citizens as customers should let public administration serve
them properly, without direct impact on how to do this.
New Public Governance (NPG) and related concepts discover the significance of processes leading to policy decisions and emphasize the pluralist
nature of the modern state, where policy issues are addressed by networks of governmental and non-governmental actors. PB exemplifies this
new approach in the process of performing one of the core functions of
governments – planning public expenditure. For Löffler (2005), broader
and active participation of community representatives in resource management is one of the pillars of transformation from hierarchical local
government towards local governance based on networking. Other factors
fostering the expansion of PB and other forms of citizens’ participation
in governance include: crisis of representative democracy, declining trust
in its mechanisms and its failure in translating public wishes into action
(Peters, 2010; Krenjova, Raudla, 2013) as well as the dissemination of the
concept of deliberative democracy (Sintomer et al., 2008; Bassoli, 2012).
The promotion of PB is also a consequence of the global movement towards enhancing community engagement and strengthening connections
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375
between governments and citizens, both individuals and organized interests groups (Demediuk, 2010; Demediuk et al., 2012). It is not questioned that community participation is one of the conditions for developing effective policy responses to social justice and social inclusion issues
(Mannarini, Taló, 2013).
The ‘invasion’ of PB is one of the first symptoms of the growing need
for evolution towards greater community engagement in local governance
and increasing willingness of formal and informal groups of citizens to
participate in formulation and implementation of local policies. It should
be noted that the first PB in Poland was implemented only in 2011 in
Sopot (Sześciło, 2012). Previously, in the Polish municipalities there were
no experiences with direct participation of citizens in decision-making on
local budgets.
This article is a result of a critical review of the model of PB disseminated in Poland. It considers that the dominant approach applied in Polish municipalities fails to fulfil the major promises of PB – meaningful
citizens’ participation in budget formulation and the unique opportunity for enhancing community engagement. This hypothesis is verified by
the analysis of PB procedures in nine Polish municipalities representing
three groups: (i) municipalities below 50,000 inhabitants; (ii) municipalities between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants; and (iii) municipalities over
100,000 inhabitants. This sample represents more than 10% of municipalities that have implemented some form of PB so far (September 2014).1
1
There is no institution gathering detailed information on the number of municipalities applying PB. According to data collected by the author, more than 80 municipalities used this method in the budget process for 2014. What is particularly interesting and
In Poland, the growing interest in public participation in the budgetary
process is also motivated by the consolidation of local self-government
restored in 1990 (first wave of local government reform), reshaped and
strengthened in 1998 (second wave of local government reform). The
third wave of reforms is expected, primarily with the aim to develop tools
for public participation in decision-making and public services delivery at
the local level (Kulesza, Sześciło, 2012). This approach is not only inspired
by the global paradigm shift towards NPG, but also expresses the need for
change in citizens’ perception of local self-government. At the initial stage
of its development, local government was primarily perceived as a public
authority and an extension of central government, not the self-governing
community of citizens (Piasecki, 2009).
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2. Forms of Participatory Budgeting
There is no single and widely accepted definition of PB. For Wampler
(2007) it is ‘a decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources’. Similarly,
Cabannes (2004) identifies this mechanism as an opportunity for the
population to ‘decide on, or contribute to decisions made on, the destination of all or part of the available public resources’. Allegretti and Herzberg (2004) present a more detailed and technical approach and argue
that participatory budgeting means:
‘(...) experiments to involve citizens in the construction of spending
priorities for the local administrations through the organisation of
annual cycles of public meetings (open but regulated) and the predisposition of other tools for supporting the gradual improvement of
co-shared choices to be officially inserted in planning documents.’
All above-cited definitions are broad enough to cover a wide variety of
institutional and technical measures aimed at public participation in the
budgetary process, including public hearings, citizen surveys, advisory
boards, forums, workshops, voting (budget referenda), citizen panels, and
focus groups (Zhang, Liao, 2011; Kim, Schachter, 2013). Tools of PB
might be applicable at three levels (stages) of the process of determination and distribution of public funds:
– Budget formulation – planning the public expenditure for appropriate budgeting period
– Expenditure monitoring – ‘citizens’ audit’ of consistency between
allocation and expenditure
– Monitoring public service delivery – evaluating the quality of publicly funded services (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008)
PB is not ex definitione reserved only to local (municipal) budgets. However, both theoretical discourse and the practice of PB implementation
focus on local government, including cities of all sizes, from small municipalities (below 20,000 inhabitants) to mega-cities (Cabannes, 2004).
There are only few examples from higher level of government considered
in the literature, including the state of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil (Golddemonstrates the scale of progress is that in 2012 (formulating budgets for 2013) only five
municipalities developed and applied PB (Kębłowski, 2013).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 373–388
377
frank, Schneider, 2006) or in the provinces of Chucampas, Celendín or
Moropon Chulucanas, Peru (Cabannes, 2004).
Based upon extensive comparative research, Sintomer et al. (2008) distinguished six models of PB, reflecting a great variety of concepts and
approaches:
– Porto Alegre model adapted for Europe – citizens have de facto
(co)decision-making powers, discussion focuses on concrete projects and investments rather than strategic priorities;
– Participation of organized interests – NGOs, unions and other
organized groups are the main actors and discussion is more oriented to general political guidelines rather than specific projects;
– Community funds at the local and city level – small fund for investment projects is distributed by citizens;
– The public/private negotiating table – it is similar to community
fund, yet business may play a major role in funding and subsequently deciding on distribution of the fund;
The above-listed models differ in terms of design of the budgetary process, type of instruments of participation applied, and powers granted to
citizens. From this perspective, the Porto Alegre model can be perceived
as an example of the most direct impact of citizens on final decisions.
Although their recommendations are not formally binding, there is strong
pressure to include them, without modifications, into budgets adopted by
appropriate local government bodies (Souza, 2001; Novy, Leubolt, 2005).
In contrast, proximity participation or consultation on public finances
keep the full, unrestricted decision-making capacity of local authorities.
Citizens’ participation is limited to advanced and in-depth consultation
(Sintomer et al., 2008).
The lack of consistent and homogenous international theory and practice of PB makes it extremely challenging to explore national models
and compare them with the experiences of other countries. Forms of PB
vary from the upgraded model of traditional consultation (have your say)
with strong steering and decision-making responsibilities of elected representatives, to a less formalized version of direct democracy. All models
aim at enabling citizens to influence the allocation of public resources
and educating them, enhancing transparency and accountability (Shah,
– Proximity participation and consultation on public finances – they
are both merely consultative processes differing only in terms of
origins.
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378
2007). However, only in the case of Porto Alegre and related models can
we announce a significant shift towards collaborative governance as they
provide for direct citizens’ participation in decision-making, not merely
consultation (Ansell, Gash, 2007). For the purposes of further research,
the notion of PB will be restricted to the process of municipal budget
formulation, where citizens and their groups enjoy the right to influence
public spending via extensive and multi-form consultation or direct (co)
decision-making.
3. Polish Model of Participatory Budgeting
Statutory legislation in Poland does not impose a participatory model of
local budget formulation. The mayor (executive) has exclusive responsibility for setting up the budgetary proposal whereas the legislature has the
final power to adopt it. Details of the budgetary process are regulated by
the Municipal Self-Government Act (1990) and the Public Finance Act
(2009) that do not require any public participation in planning public
spending, both in a one-year perspective (annual budgets) and long-term
planning (multi-year financial prognosis). The lack of statutory regulation
might be compensated by local legislation. According to the Municipal
Self-Government Act, public consultation may be carried out among inhabitants in ‘all matters of importance for municipality’. Legislature of
each municipality is obliged to establish the list of issues requiring consultation and specify its rules and forms. It has to be noted that municipal
councils enjoy extensive autonomy in determining the scope and forms
of consultation. The Supreme Administrative Court underlined only that
participation in consultation is restricted solely to inhabitants of the municipality where this process is conducted.2 Another recommendation is
that this process cannot be perceived as a ‘substitute for local referendum’. Therefore, results of the consultation are by definition non-binding:
they do not interfere with statutory powers of the executive and legislature and do not limit their decision-making capacity.3
It should be noted that a binding decision on the allocation of budgetary resources might be taken by citizens in a local referendum held in
accordance with the Local Referendum Act (2000). Such a referendum
2
Judgment of 8 December 2011, case no. II OSK 1562/11.
3
Judgment of 1 February 2001, case no. II SA 2817/00.
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379
Taking into account the above-presented legislative framework, all the
procedures for PB applied in Polish municipalities are interpreted as a
specific form of public consultation mentioned in the Municipal Self-Government Act. Therefore, the results of the PB process cannot be formally binding, even if local authorities declare that they will follow citizens’
recommendations on the allocation of public resources. In other aspects
of the process, i.e. scope and forms of participation, each municipality
may develop its own model, deriving from a wide palette of international
practices. Details of the procedure applied have to be described in the
local legislation – the appropriate resolution of municipal council and/or
additional implementing acts adopted by the executive.
In the table below, the models of PB applied in nine Polish municipalities are presented. The selection is based on a preliminary review
of all municipalities developing PB procedures and aims at including
municipalities differentiated in size (small, medium, large) and situated
in various regions (every municipality described represents a different
voivodeship).4 For each municipality two aspects of the PB procedure
were considered:
– Scope of participatory budgeting, i.e. what part of the planned spending is distributed under public participation. This issue is not
considered in most of the studies on PB. However, preliminary
research on the Polish model has proved that its differentia specifica is guaranteeing participation only with respect to a minor part
of the budget.
4
Sixteen voivodeships (regions, provinces) have been the regional level of self-government in Poland since the administrative reform of 1999.
may concern previously specified investment projects. Referendum on
the whole budget is not allowed, as the exclusive power to adopt it is
restricted to the municipal council. This tool of direct democracy has
only a theoretical significance in the Polish local government, as budget
referenda are not practiced. The basic reason for the absence of budget
referenda is the highly formalized procedure for initiating and conducting referenda. What is more, the turnout must reach 30% of inhabitants
of the municipality to make its result binding. Considering the generally
low level of citizens’ participation in elections, this requirement effectively discourages using this instrument of direct participation in budget
formulation.
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380
– Forms of participation. This includes three major methods: (i) consultation (debates, citizens’ panels, public hearings, workshops,
and forums), (ii) the right to submit proposals for projects to be
included into PB; and (iii) the right to participate in non-binding
vote for shortlisted proposals (quasi-referendum).
Information presented in the table was collected via doctrinal research
of the local legislation regulating budget process in each municipality involved. The legal approach is justified in this matter, as all procedures for
participation in the budget process need to be set up in local legislative
acts. The presented data refer to budgets for 2014. However, the share of
the budget subject to the PB mechanism was calculated with reference to
budgets for 2013. This approach results from the fact that in all cases the
overall amount designated for PB had been established before the budget
proposal for 2014 was announced.
Table 1: Participatory budgeting in nine Polish municipalites.
SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION
> 100,000
Vote (quasireferendum)
50,000
– 100,000
Submitting
projects
< 50,000
Consultation
Size of
Name of
municipality municipality
FORMS OF
PARTICIPATION
Sopot
1.29
Not mandatory
-
+
+
Krosno
Odrzańskie
0.70
Not mandatory
-
+
+
Milicz
1.25
Not mandatory / at the
discretion of the mayor or
municipal council
-
+
+
Puławy
0.55
Not mandatory
-
+
+
Jaworzno
0.53
Not mandatory
-
+
+
Stargard
Szczeciński
0.52
Not mandatory
-
+
+
Łódź
0.05
Mandatory consultation
in forms selected by the
mayor
+
+
+
Białystok
0.60
Not mandatory
-
+
+
0.20
Not mandatory / at the
discretion of the mayor
+
+
+
Olsztyn
Share of the
budget allocated
in PB mechanism
(%)
Participation in
distribution of the
remainder
of the budget
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381
1. Direct participation in distribution of a minor part of planned expenditure. Special procedures explicitly named ‘civic budget’5 in all cases considered (also in municipalities not presented in the table above), appears
to be a symbolic gesture towards citizens, deprived of meaningful impact
on the allocation of public resources. This approach might be justified by
the experimental character of PB processes conducted in 2013. Among
municipalities included into this study, only Sopot was not a ‘greenhorn’
at PB. Sopot pioneered civic budgeting in Poland and in 2013 carried out
this process for the third time. This may explain why the share of expenditure allocated within PB is the highest in this municipality, although still
minor. It should also be emphasized that no municipality has a long-term
strategy that would envisage extending the scope of PB in the coming
years, in particular the systematic increase of budgetary resources allocated in this procedure. On the other hand, selected municipalities provided
for a mechanism of review of the 2013 experiment. In Łódź, continuous
monitoring and annual evaluation of PB is mandatory, according to the
Regulation of the Mayor on the rules for the civic budget. However, the
Regulation does not specify the methods and expected results of this evaluation. We may only presume that it should also concern the need for
increasing the share of the budget distributed within PB.
2. Public participation in the allocation of the overwhelming majority of
local expenditure is not mandatory. Although the Local Self-Government
Act obliges the municipal council to establish the list of issues subject
to mandatory consultation, only the municipal council of Łódź included
the budget proposal into this catalogue. Regulations on public consultation adopted by the Municipal Council of Łódź require the Mayor to
carry out consultation at the stage of formulation of the budget proposal.
Three forms of consultation are specified: (i) open meetings with citizens
allowing them to express their views and expectations in oral and written
form; (ii) workshops for citizens aimed at raising citizens’ awareness and
knowledge about the issue considered; (iii) collecting written opinions and
5
In Polish practice the notion of participatory budgeting is replaced with civic
budget, primarily to underline the democratic character of the process and avoid the complicated jargon of participation and participatory decision-making.
The comparative analysis of PB mechanisms applied in selected municipalities illustrates a clear and uniformed model for public participation
in budget formulation in the Polish municipalities. It is characterized by
four major features:
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proposals, including online consultation. According to these regulations,
in 2013, consultation on the budget proposal was carried out within two
parallel schemes. Consultation on the whole budget had the form of an
open meeting and gathering written proposals and remarks, particularly
via the online form. Proposals considered within the civic budget process
were explicitly excluded from consultation in this process. Public participation in allocation of PB was regulated by a separate document and
included the right to submit projects and ideas, open meetings regarding
the procedure of PB and subsequently the debate on the projects submitted, and finally, the vote on shortlisted proposals. In other municipalities,
local legislation does not impose explicit obligations to guarantee public
participation and deliberation on the full budget proposal. Consultation
is allowed, yet there is no guarantee that it is actually carried out. Local
legislation in selected cases leaves the decision in this matter to the mayor
who may initiate consultation. However, the mayor’s decision is not determined by any criteria specified in the municipal council’s act and it is
fully discretionary. Citizens or their organized groups are not legitimated
to effectively demand for consultation, even if such a motion is submitted
or supported by a meaningful number of inhabitants.
3. The range of methods applied in PB procedures is limited and uniformed in the analysed municipalities. The procedural framework for the
civic budget is based on a template developed in Sopot in 2011. The process is initiated with a resolution of the municipal council or the mayor specifying the amount to be allocated within the PB mechanism, key
phases of the process and timetable. During the first stage, citizens may
submit their proposals and ideas using special forms. The applicant has
to describe the project briefly, justify the need for its inclusion into the
budget proposal, and estimate the cost of its implementation. In the next
step, the projects are reviewed by a special committee and the legal and
budgetary services of the municipality. Their major task is a formal review
of the projects submitted and shortlisting proposals for the vote. Reducing
the number of projects for the purposes of the vote is necessary as their
number may reach hundreds or even around 1,000. In Łódź, more than
900 projects were proposed during the first stage, in Białystok – around
200 and in Olsztyn – 160. In Łódź more than 750 proposals went through
verification, in Olsztyn – a half of the projects submitted, and in Białystok
only a quarter of them. The different approach to this stage of the PB
process also related to the composition of the bodies responsible for the
review of the projects. Three models can be distinguished:
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383
– Ad hoc committee of the municipal council consisting of the
members of the council (Sopot, Łódź, Puławy). The work of the
committee is supported on the technical side by legal and budgetary services of the municipality.
– Committee of mixed composition appointed by the mayor guaranteeing participation of the representatives of civil society, e.g.
local NGOs (Jaworzno).
The vast majority of municipalities skipped the phase of open deliberation on the individual projects. All municipalities put great emphasis on
providing citizens with information on the procedural aspects of PB, i.e.
how to submit projects and how to vote. Information campaigns include
open meetings to present the details of the procedure, special websites,
infomercials, press and billboard advertising. However, the need for an
organized and carefully moderated public debate at least on selected projects or funding priorities appears to be ignored by PB designers. Only the
regulations adopted in Łódź and Olsztyn require open meetings to discuss
feasibility and need for realization of the projects submitted for vote.
4. The construction of the PB procedures creates an impression of direct
and binding impact of citizens on the allocation of local expenditure. In
all municipalities examined within this study the culmination of the civic
budget process is a popular vote on the selection of projects from the list
prepared upon citizens’ proposals. The voting procedure is less formalized
compared to a local referendum, e.g. postal and online voting is available
(via email or interactive form), minimum voting age is lower than in a
referendum (16 instead of 18). The most important difference from the
voters’ perspective is withdrawal from the principle of secret ballot. Each
inhabitant has to provide personal data, including name and family name,
place of residence and their unique identification number PESEL. Thanks
to this information, it is possible to mitigate the risk of multiple voting or
participation of persons who do not reside in the given municipality.
The resolutions and other acts regulating PB procedures do not contain
any information about the non-binding and merely consultative character
– Internal services of the municipality (Krosno Odrzańskie, Milicz,
Stargard Szczeciński, Olsztyn, Białystok). Their work might be
subject to review or assistance of an additional body ensuring
representation of various stakeholders. In Olsztyn the municipal services are obliged to cooperate with a special coordination
committee for the civic budget, also including representatives of
civil society organisations.
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of the vote. What is more, a review of the provisions regarding the effects
of the vote illustrates various attempts to present the suggestions of citizens as binding to some extent. For instance, in Puławy and Jaworzno, the
municipal council’s resolution on PB, despite ambiguous wording, seems
to oblige the mayor to include the projects recommended in the popular
vote into the budget proposal. Nevertheless, such interpretation violates
the mayor’s exclusive legislative right with respect to the budget proposal.
The municipal council cannot limit this right via its resolutions. In Milicz,
the PB process was designed in the ordinance of the mayor. In this document, the mayor expressis verbis has committed to include the projects
selected in the PB process into budget proposals. This approach might
be more effective on the legal side. However, the municipal council is
not bound by the budget proposal and may reject or modify the proposed
allocation. Resolutions of the municipal councils of Białystok and Sopot
state generally that proposals that have received the highest number of
votes shall be included until the limit of funding for the civic budget is
reached. This is an extremely confusing formula, as it does not specify
which body (executive or legislative) must introduce projects indicated by
voters to the budget proposal. Łódź’s regulations use the phrase ‘projects
recommended for implementation’. It is not clear, however, what is the
procedure for transforming those ‘recommendations’ into elements of the
budget.
Generally, the approach illustrated in the documents regulating the PB
process in all municipalities focuses on concealing or at least not expressing its merely consultative character. On the one hand, this is a rational
strategy, as the underlying non-binding nature of the PB process would
certainly discourage citizens from engagement. On the other hand, local authorities creating a climate of co-deciding and direct participation
around PB should be aware of the consequences of this approach. As
LeDuc (2003: 37) noticed: ‘Governments in a modern democracy will
generally hesitate to ignore a formal vote of their citizens on an important
public issue, whether that vote is considered binding on them in a legal
sense or not.’ Therefore, withdrawal from the projects chosen in a formally
non-binding vote or even introducing slight modifications might trigger
strong civic resistance.
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385
5. Conclusion
In her famous Ladder of Participation Arnstein (1969) argued that ‘participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process
for the powerless. It allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were
considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit.’
The expansion of PB in Polish municipalities is accompanied with rhetoric on the breakthrough towards empowering citizens to directly decide
on public resources allocation. This study has shown that the true look
of the Polish PB model is much trickier. Participation is restricted to a
minor part of the local budget (less than 2% of planned expenditure).
The illusion of citizens’ decision-making powers is created by making the
PB procedures resemble local referendum. Finally, a very poor range of
deliberation tools has been developed to engage citizens in a dialogue
on the local budget. All those factors seriously undermine the potential
of public budgeting for enhancing collaborative governance. In the longterm perspective, this approach may also result in growing frustration and
disappointment among citizens realizing that their impact on budget formulation is limited compared to the climate of revolution in public governance created around PB.
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388
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PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN POLAND:
QUASI-REFERENDUM INSTEAD OF DELIBERATION
Summary
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a global phenomenon exemplifying a shift towards collaborative and participatory governance. This umbrella term embraces
a huge variety of mechanisms of public participation in the budgetary process:
from advanced consultation to a specific type of direct democracy. This article
presents the results of an extensive analysis of the Polish model of PB applied in
nine municipalities of different size. It demonstrates that the model disseminated in Poland is based on quasi-referendum that guarantees the citizens direct
impact on local budgets. However, participation is limited to a minor part of
local budgets and it is not accompanied by public deliberation over strategic
issues. Therefore, the Polish model of PB does not offer a genuine shift towards
participatory local governance.
Key words: participatory budgeting, governance, New Public Governance, Poland, local government
PARTICIPATIVNO BUDŽETIRANJE U POLJSKOJ:
KVAZI-REFERENDUM UMJESTO PREDSTAVNIČKOG
ODLUČIVANJA
Sažetak
Priprema proračuna uz sudjelovanje građana globalna je pojava koja pokazuje
pomak prema kolaborativnoj i participativnoj vladavini. Ovaj krovni termin
obuhvaća veliki broj različitih mehanizama sudjelovanja javnosti u procesu
usvajanja proračuna: od naprednih konzultacija do posebnog tipa izravne
demokracije. U radu se prikazuju rezultati opsežne analize poljskog modela
participativnog budžetiranja primjenjenog u devet lokalnih jedinica različite
veličine. Pokazuje se da je model raširen u Poljskoj temeljen na kvazi-referendumu koji jamči građanima izravan utjecaj na lokalne proračune. Međutim,
participacija je ograničena na manji dio lokalnih proračuna i nije popraćena
javnim odlučivanjem o strateškim pitanjima. Stoga poljski model usvajanja proračuna uz sudjelovanje građana ne nudi istinski pomak prema participativnoj
lokalnoj vladavini.
Ključne riječi: usvajanje proračuna, vladavina, nova javna vladavina, Poljska,
lokalna samouprava
New Developments in Local Democracy
in Croatia
Ivan Koprić *
Mirko Klarić**
The paper analyses traditional and new forms of citizen
participation at the local level in comparative perspective,
but with special focus on the Croatian situation. The traditional forms of citizen participation are referendum, citizens’ initiative, deliberative assemblies, sub-municipal governance, and occasional consultative meetings. The main
new forms are introduction of the direct election of mayors
and recall referendum, strengthening the role of local mayors, and independent actors in local politics. Five modes of
fostering local democracy in Croatia are analysed: minori-
*
Professor Ivan Koprić, Full Professor and Head of the Chair of Administrative Science at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia, and president of the Institute of
Public Administration (redoviti profesor i predstojnik Katedre za upravnu znanost Pravnog
fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, predsjednik Instituta za javnu upravu iz Zagreba, e-mail:
[email protected])
**
Mirko Klarić, PhD, Associate Professor of Administrative Science, Vice-dean of the
Faculty of Law, University of Split, Croatia (izvanredni profesor upravne znanosti i prodekan Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Splitu, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
352/353: 321.7(497.5)
35.072.1: 321.7(497.5)
390
Koprić, I., M. Klarić (2015) New Developments in Local Democracy in Croatia
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
ty representation, classic forms of direct democracy, direct
election of mayors and recall procedure, youth councils,
and independent local political actors. Special attention is
devoted to sub-municipal governments.
Key words: local democracy – Croatia, local politics, submunicipal governments, referendum, directly elected
mayors, independent local political actors, citizens’ initiative
1. Introduction
The paper focuses on the traditional and new forms of citizen participation at the local level.1 Special attention has been devoted to the forms of
improving local democracy in Croatia during the post-socialist period. According to our systematisation, the traditional forms of citizen participation are referendum, citizens’ initiative, deliberative assemblies, sub-municipal governance, and occasional consultative meetings. The main new
instruments for improving the legitimacy of local politics are introduction
of direct election of mayors and recall referendum, strengthening the role
of local mayors, independent actors in local politics, and some others.
The situation in Croatia is a bit specific, because of the historical and
current particularities. Low level of decentralization and rather weak political legitimacy are the main obstacles for the development of strong
local governments that are harmonized with the expectations from international and European documents. We have analysed five modes of
fostering local democracy: minority representation, classic forms of direct
democracy, direct election of mayors and recall procedure, youth councils, and independent local political actors. Our analysis is supported by
data collected during several researches, with the newest conducted in the
spring of 2014.
We pay particular attention to sub-municipal governments, considering
them as an appropriate but, unfortunately, somewhat neglected form of
strengthening local governance.
1
The paper was presented at the IPSA/AISP XXIII World Congress of Political Science Challenges of Contemporary Governance, Montreal, 19–24 July 2014, Research Committee RC05 Comparative Studies on Local Government and Politics, Panel: Contemporary
Tools for Healing Local Democracy.
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391
2. Traditional and New Forms of Citizens’
Participation at the Local Level
2.1. Traditional forms of citizen participation
There are several traditional forms of citizen participation in decision-making at the local level. They were not equally characteristic for different European countries, although some of them have been quite widespread. A
well-known classic instrument of direct local democracy is the referendum,
which is more characteristic of some European countries with Switzerland
as the best-known example – average citizen has around ten opportunities
per year to participate in the local referenda (Ladner, 2011: 205-206).2
Deliberative assemblies of all inhabitants used to be more important than
today, especially in some countries. Again, there is an interesting but
rare contemporary example: in Switzerland, such assemblies and town
meetings are still the main forum of local decision-making in the vast
majority of municipalities. In almost 90 per cent of more than 2,700
municipalities, citizens’ assemblies meet at least once a year and decide
on local by-laws and other local affairs, adopt local budget, and elect
and recall local functionaries (Ladner, 2005; 2011; Koprić, Manojlović,
2013: 17–18).
In addition, there are the forms of sub-municipal governance, such as parishes, neighbourhoods, or city districts, as well as occasional consultative
meetings of citizens at the level of the whole municipality or – more frequently – at the level of sub-municipal units or parts of the municipality.
Sub-municipal units are sometimes relicts of the old territorial organization preserved during territorial consolidation reforms. There are interest-
2
However, local referendum is known in other European countries such as the
Czech Republic, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands or Slovenia. Koprić, Manojlović, 2013:
18–20
3
Details in: Koprić, Manojlović, 2013: 21–22
Citizens’ initiative as a legally regulated initiative supported by the signatures of a part of local constituency that has legal effects in local decision-making is another instrument. Legal prerequisite for citizens’ initiative is support by the previously established number of voters: between 2
per cent (Finland) and 20 per cent (certain Länder in Germany); the prerequisite can be defined by the number of citizens (for example, 10,000
in certain Austrian Länder).3
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ing examples of Portugal, Greece and England. There are slightly more
than 300 municipalities in Portugal, but old parishes (freguesias), about
3,100 of them (since the 2013 reform; there used to be about 4,260 parishes), still have certain role in governance of local affairs. During the
consolidation of territorial organization in 2011, Greece preserved its
old municipalities, 1,034 of them, as sub-municipal communities for the
representation of interests and consultation of small parts of 325 newly
established municipalities. There were 10,479 civil parishes in England
in 2010, covering the area with about 35% of inhabitants (there are no
civil parishes in all local units). They have served as sub-municipal units
since the end of the 19th century. In some cases, sub-municipal governments are part of urban governance structures of large cities, especially
of capitals (comp. Bäck et al., 2005). Finally, in some countries sub-municipal units have been established in order to stimulate participation of
local communities in public decision-making (more in: Koprić, Manojlović, 2013: 22–24).
In Europe, sub-municipal governments usually have their own bodies and
their territory is clearly determined. In contrast, in some US cities, neighbourhoods are more informal. European sub-municipal governments may
have different roles in managing local affairs, from consultation to decision-making and performing some of them, in their respective parts of a
municipality. With regard to financing sub-municipal governments, they
may have their own resources or simply function under the local budgets,
depending on legal regulation in a particular country.
Almost all of the mentioned traditional channels of participation are
known and legally regulated in the countries of the region (South Eastern
Europe, Western Balkans, countries on the former Yugoslav territory).4
4
The Western Balkans consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo – UN 1244, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The SEE
space encompasses a narrower circle of southern Slavic nations (Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians,
Montenegrins, Serbs, Macedonians, and Bulgarians), as well as Greeks, Albanians, and Romanians. Turkey can be considered as a part of the SEE region because of the territorial
and historical circumstances. One subgroup of Albanians (so-called Kosovars) who do not
belong to the Slavic group of nations was part of both the first and second Yugoslavia. While
most of the countries in the Region embraced the socialist experiment in the second part of
the 20th century, the Greeks and the Turks had a different development path. Within the circle of former socialist countries, there is a narrower group of countries on the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. Cultural and historical ties are especially visible between the countries
on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but links and interdependences are wider. Certain
cultural and governance commonalities can be identified in the whole SEE region. More in:
Koprić, 2012; Horváth, Hajdú, 2011
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393
Some of them, such as consultative meetings and sub-municipal government units are firmly rooted in tradition, while others, such as referendum, citizens’ initiatives, and public consultation procedures, although
regulated in the respective legislations, are not frequently used in local
practice. Deliberative assemblies following the Swiss example do not exist
and have not been part of democratic tradition in the region at all.
2.2. New forms of citizen participation
The introduction of the direct election of mayors is a common reform measure aimed at strengthening political legitimacy, and producing strong local managers and political heroes from among the people who are able to
enter political contests, not only at the local, but also at the state level. It
is an answer to one of the hottest problems in contemporary governance
systems – legitimacy crisis (Haque, 1998). The majority of countries on
the territory of the former Yugoslavia have introduced direct elections
of mayors. Slovenia led group in 1994, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), Kosovo (2007), Macedonia (1996), Montenegro (2003),
and Croatia (2009). Serbia and Montenegro introduced direct elections,
but then turned back to the ‘old’ type of mayors elected in the local representative bodies (more details in: Koprić, 2009a).5 Direct election of
mayors is a popular way of promoting political participation in the whole
Europe. Despite many possible negative consequences (more in: Koprić,
5
Direct elections in Serbia were regulated by the Law on Local Elections of 2002
and held in September 2004. However, the Serbian Constitution of 2006 reintroduced a
parliamentary-like local political and governance system. New constitutional principles are
further regulated by the new Serbian Law on Local Self-Government passed at the very
end of 2007. New regulations have been in effect since local elections held in May 2008.
In Montenegro, direct election of presidents of municipalities had been held for only two
mandates, after which a parliamentary-like local system was reintroduced.
Among the new instruments for improving local legitimacy, we can mention a) introduction of direct election of mayors, b) strengthening the
leadership role of mayors and other local executives, c) introduction of
recall referendum, and d) mushrooming of independent local political actors. Certain new channels of citizens’ participation (like public consultations, open space conferences, quotas for minorities, youth councils, etc.)
are legally regulated and more frequently used in local governance (more
in: Kersting, 2007; Bützer, 2005).
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2009b: 337–339), there are serious reasons for the introduction of the
direct election of mayors: managerial efficiency and political democracy
are the main arguments.
Recall referendum is a new institution, firmly connected with the direct
election of mayors (Germany, Romania, etc.). It ensures citizens’ influence on way mayors lead their municipalities. If citizens are not satisfied
they can, under the conditions previously regulated by law, initiate a procedure and vote for the mayor’s recall. In some countries, like in Poland,
citizens can recall not only mayors but also local representative bodies. It
is interesting to note that recall procedures are frequently used: in Poland
on 15 cases of referenda there are 85 recall procedures, and their number
has been increasing: in the period 2002–2006 there were 92 recall procedures, 12 of them successful (Swianiewicz, 2011: 493; Piasceski, 2011;
Koprić, Manojlović, 2013: 20–21).
Independent local political actors can be local lists and individual candidates fighting for seats in local representative bodies or for mayoral positions. They are nominated by a group of voters not by a political party, be
it national, regional, or local party. Their popularity differs between the
countries. Poland is again the best example of the country with an almost
non-partisan local political system. As many as 72 per cent of local councilors elected in 2006 were independent; they got 59 per cent of votes.
The share of independents is high in Germany (the get about 35 per cent
of votes in local elections in average), significant in the Netherlands (24
per cent of votes in 2006), Slovenia, Croatia and Estonia (about 20 per
cent of votes), Austria (15 per cent, average in the 1985-2009 period),
and low in Spain (6-8 per cent), Sweden (5-6 per cent), etc. (Koprić,
2011: 90).
The story about independents as a type of innovation in local political
systems has to be taken cum grano salis. There are data that show how
support for independents is constantly decreasing parallel with maturity
and stability of political systems. The example of Estonia is illustrative.
Support to independent local actors was 65 per cent in 1993, 59 per cent
in 1996, 50 per cent in 1999, 19 per cent in 2002 and 20 per cent in 2005
(Petai et al., 2008: 90). However, the results are not conclusive and it is
not clear which factors are responsible for changes in support to independents. In the Netherlands, for example, support to independents was
19 per cent in 1974. After that, it had been constantly decreasing to 12
per cent in 1986, when it started to increase, to 13 per cent in 1990 and
to 26 per cent in 2002.
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395
3. Ways and Instruments for Strengthening
Local Legitimacy in Croatia
Following a long discussion about the low-level legitimacy of local governments, several new institutions have been developed and utilized, aimed
at healing blighted local democracy. Only those connected exclusively
to the local governance will be mentioned here. Instruments for raising
transparency, such as the right to open access to information, budgetary
transparency instruments, application of modern information and communication technology in local policy-making, policy implementation and
overall functioning of local bodies are not taken into account. They have
cross-sectoral impacts, i.e. impacts on the whole public sector, not only
on the local governance.
A new system of minority representation at the local level consists of representatives of national minorities in the local representative bodies, special
minority councils and minority representatives. They all have consultative and general supervisory competences in relation to local councils and
mayors. The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities of
2002 provides for the presence of national minorities’ representatives in
each local and regional unit where certain national minority has a minimum 5 per cent share of inhabitants. If the share is between 5 and 15 per
cent, the Law requires at least one national minority representative. If the
share is above 15 per cent, there has to be just the proportional share of
national minority representatives in the local representative body.6 If a
minority is underrepresented after elections, the number of local representative body members rises for the necessary number and new members
enter the representative body from the competing local lists, according
to the election success. If that solution cannot resolve the problem of
6
The Serb minority is the biggest national minority in Croatia, but there are Italian,
Hungarian, and Chech minorities, as well as Romanies, Bosnian, Albanian, and Slovenian
minorities in certain areas.
The main new instruments aimed at boosting local democracy in Croatia
in the last few decades have been a) a new system of minority representation at the local level, b) classic ways of strengthening direct democracy
(referendum, citizens’ initiative, citizens’ consultative meetings), c) introduction of the direct election of mayors, including a possibility of their
recall by citizens, d) youth councils, and e) independent local political
actors.
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representation, additional elections will be held. Every local and regional
unit is allowed to autonomously increase the number of national minority
representatives above the mentioned share, but only if it is not the unit in
which a national minority has the majority share of population. National
minority representation has to be ensured in local executive and administrative bodies as well.
The same Law has provided for the whole network of separate, special national minority councils and representatives. A national minority council
can be established by those minorities whose share in local population exceeds 1.5 per cent, or which have at least 200 national minority members
in a local unit, or 500 members in a regional unit. National minority councils consist of 10 members in the communes, 15 members in the towns
and 25 members in the counties. In the local and regional units that do
not have the mentioned preconditions for the establishment of national
minority councils, any national minority with at least 100 members can
elect its own individual representative. The mandate of the councils and
representatives lasts four years. The main role of both national minority
councils and representatives is to participate in local governance. They
can participate through proposals, information sharing, consultations, supervision, etc. The legal status of these councils is the status of non-profit
legal entities. The main sources of finances for national minority councils
and representatives are local, regional, and state budgets. Additionally, at
least two national minority councils can establish a coordination of national minority councils and make their position much stronger through
such networking.
In such a way, so-called passive representation is ensured in its entirety,
but there is still the question of active7 and effective representation of
minorities’ interest. There were, for example, elections for 308 special minority councils and 228 minority representatives in 2007. However, the
turnout was very low, between 8 and 18 per cent. Besides the low turnout,
the problems in practice are: minorities do not utilize electoral possibilities and vote in the general part of local elections, there are significant
problems with the financing of this system, there is a lack of information and education about national minorities’ rights, and others (more in:
Tatalović et al., 2011: 72–73). The fourth elections for national minority
councils (314 of them with 4,950 members) and representatives (235)
7
About the difference between active and passive representation of minorities see:
Meier, O’Toole, 2006: 71.
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397
were held in 2015. The turnout remains rather low (13.5 per cent), and
other problems persist. Because of that, certain authors dispute the very
need for such a complex and expensive, yet inefficient system of national
minority representation at the local level (Petričušić, 2015).
Citizens’ initiative is rarely used, too. This year’s research has shown that,
in the period after 1993, there have been only 11 initiatives in 11 out of
349 local units (3.2 per cent) that answered our questionnaire. If more
than 10 per cent of voters sign a petition, local representative body has to
decide on it within three-month deadline. There is no obligation for the
local council to accept the initiative.
Consultative meetings may be organized, according to the Croatian legislation, only at the level of sub-municipal unit or for a part of such a unit.
In Croatian local governance, such meetings are indeed an occasional
form of participation. Within the mentioned research, it has been reported that 284 consultative meetings were held in only 80 local units (out of
349). That stands for 23 per cent of units. It seems that in the majority
of 77 per cent of the remaining local units consultative meetings are not
used at all.
Direct election of mayors was introduced and the first such elections were
held in Croatia on 17 May 2009. The second were held in May 2013. Croatia was among the most cautious countries on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia with regard to direct election of mayors (Koprić, 2009a). The
discussion about direct election was long and started at the beginning
of the 2000s. The Law on Direct Elections was passed in the autumn of
2007. The new Law on Local Elections, which regulates both mayoral
Classic ways of strengthening direct democracy (referendum, citizens’ initiative, and citizens’ consultative meetings) are all regulated by the Croatian Law on Local and Regional Self-Government of 2001. Referendum is
facultative, meaning that practically all of the issues that fall within local
scope can be decided by the voters. Their decision is obligatory, except in
the case when referendum is about territorial corrections and changes – in
that case, decision is only consultative. Referendum is an extremely rarely
used way of decision-making at the local level. In 382 researched local
units, we were able to find only 15 referenda with obligatory decisions,
which were – in the vast majority of cases – negative. For a positive decision, the turnout has to be more than 50 per cent, and more than 50 per
cent of participating voters have to be in favour of the proposed decision.
The actual number of referenda can be slightly higher, because reliable (or
official) registers on referenda do not exist.
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and election for councils was adopted at the end of 2012. In the previous
period (1993–2009), each local unit had two executive bodies: the mayor
(općinski načelnik; gradonačelnik) and the executive board (poglavarstvo),8
along with the council (vijeće) as a representative body. Each county also
had two similar executive bodies, the county governor (župan) and the executive board (poglavarstvo). The relationship between the representative
and executive bodies was more parliamentary-like.
After the 2009 local elections, mayors with four-year mandate took over
the vast majority of competences previously designated to the executive
boards and certain new ones, but are obliged by law to submit reports
to the councils twice a year. Two vice-mayors are also directly elected,
sharing election results with the candidate mayor.9 Candidates for mayors
must obtain more than 50 per cent of votes, either in the first or second
election round. Only two candidates with best results in the first round
may compete in the second round. In the period 2009-2013, there was a
significant possibility for mayors to overrule councils and dominate local
governance. That was one of the main reasons for legislative changes at
the end of 2012. A better balance between mayors and councils has been
established in the current electoral period (2013–2017).
In the period 2009–2013, recall procedure was mainly in the hands of the
councils, although citizens could initiate it as well. However, there were
so many legal impediments that it was completely ineffective. Citizens
are in a much better position to instigate a recall procedure in the current
electoral period (2013–2017). If there is a request of 20 per cent of voters, recall procedure shall be approved by the council. Recall procedure is
not possible in the first 12 months of the mayor’s mandate and in 2017,
at the end of mandate. Moreover, the period between two recall procedures has to be at least 12 months. Because of that, there are only three
possible terms for instigating a recall. Recall procedure is legally valid
if at least a third of the total number of voters in the municipality has
voted for recall and if, at the same time, the majority of voters that have
8
The executive board had usual competences to prepare, propose, and implement
local by-laws and public policies, to manage and supervise local administrative bodies, to
take care of the revenues, spending, budget, and local assets, to appoint local administrative
heads on the basis of public competition. The mayor had an autonomous role in supervising
the legality of by-laws in the first instance.
9
It is a kind of list with three names, the name of the candidate for mayor and two
names of his or her deputies. In the municipalities and towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants, there is only one vice-mayor.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
399
actually participated in the recall procedure have voted for recall of the
mayor. There has not been any recall procedure in the current mandate
(started in 2013).
The data show that independent lists attract about 20 per cent of voters’
support but win only about 10 per cent of seats in local councils. In the
2009 elections, independent candidates for mayors won in 8.3 per cent
of self-government units. Independent lists (for councils) and candidates
(for mayors) are less successful in towns than in communes and the least
successful at the county level. Nevertheless, some of them managed to
win in large towns. The biggest success was that of the city mayor of Zagreb, who won the 2013 election. His list got a significant share of seats
in the City Assembly, too. During the previous mandate (2009–2013), independent mayors won elections in Split (the second largest city), Varaždin and some other important local units. There are certain regional differences with regard to support to independents: the whole coastal area
offers better chances for independents, as well as Zagreb and some parts
10
A recent research in Croatia has shown that only 56 per cent of the young (secondary school) generation sees democratic political system as a desirable solution (Vujčić,
2006). It seems somewhat disturbing and requires designing an appropriate democratic education for young generations. Including young people into local politics could be a practical
aspect of such education.
The Law on Youth Councils of 2007 and the new Law of 2014 regulate local consultative mechanism for young people. Local representative bodies
are expected to establish youth councils as a kind of consultative bodies to
local councils, whose actual purpose is to attract young people to participate in local public life.10 Individuals between 15 and 30 years of age are
considered to be young people. The number of youth council members
could vary between 5 and 15 (until 2014), and between 5 and 21 (according to the new Law of 2014); it depends on the size of local population and should be odd-numbered. The mandate of youth representatives
lasted for two years, but the new Law has stipulated three-year mandate
(from 2014 onwards). Finances and premises for youth councils should
be ensured by local and regional units. In 2010, the competent ministry
collected data, but only 414 local units (72 per cent) answered the questionnaire. In the period 2007–2010, youth councils were established in 83
per cent of counties, 74 per cent of towns and only 28 per cent of municipalities. On the basis of such data, it was assessed that there were about
200 youth councils with about 2,000 members in all local units in Croatia
(more in: Koprić, 2011a).
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of Slavonia (eastern part of Croatia). There is no legal obligation that
the same independent mayoral candidate has to offer his/her list for local
council, like in Greece (Hlepas, 2011: 81).
However, data show that independent lists led by the candidates for mayors and governors were more successful than other independent lists.
Firstly, in the 2009 elections there was a difference in success ratio between the two: as many as 78.3 per cent of independent lists led by independent candidates were successful, while the share of successful lists
among others was 64.7 per cent. Furthermore, successful lists with independent candidates as leaders were able to get 2.7 seats on average in
relation to 2.4 seats on average for other lists.
Similarly, 203 out of 218 independent candidates that were not simultaneously leaders of independent lists were completely unsuccessful and
ended unrepresented in the 2009 elections, even in local councils (93 per
cent). At the same time, 186 independent candidates (out of 217) that
were simultaneously led independent lists lost elections for mayoral positions (86 percent of them). Among 48 winners of mayoral election, 33
(69 per cent) simultaneously led independent lists competing for seats in
the local councils.
It seems that competition on both election tracks, for executive positions
and for seats in representative bodies, makes independent actors more
active, dynamic, visible, and attractive. There is a positive correlation of
simultaneous engagement in direct election of mayors and elections of
local councillors.
Apart from these new instruments, we feel that a traditional institution such
as sub-municipal self-government, although legally possible and firmly rooted in tradition, has not been fully utilized for improving local democratic
governance in Croatia so far. That was our hypothesis in the preliminary
research we conducted in 13 out of 20 Croatian counties in the spring of
2014. The research was explorative, which means that we intended to find
out the basic information about the use of participatory channels provided for by the Croatian legislation. We have collected the answers from
349 out of 382 municipalities and towns in 13 counties. Basic data about
sub-municipal self-government in the City of Zagreb has been taken into
account, too.
Only seven counties were not covered in the first research phase. Only
the basic information from the questionnaire is presented here, while additional information will be analysed in further publications. It has to be
mentioned that this research is supported by the Institute of Public Ad-
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
401
ministration (Zagreb). It will be continued by covering a broader circle of
issues connected with the organization and functioning of sub-municipal
governments in Croatia, by researching the remaining municipalities and
towns in Croatia, and by in-depth analysis of governance in large towns,
particularly in Zagreb.
4. Sub-Municipal Governments
In Europe, sub-municipal governments usually have their own bodies
and their territory is clearly determined. In contrast, in some US cities,
neighbourhoods are more informal. European sub-municipal governments may have different roles in managing local affairs, from consultation to decision-making and performing some of them, in their respective parts of the municipality. With regard to financing sub-municipal
governments, it can be noted that they may have their own resources or
function under the local budgets. It depends on the legal regulation in a
particular country.
This can be an important observation: it seems that sub-municipal government is a flexible tool for fostering democracy whose use is contingent
and supplementary. Firstly, it may be used in different forms, with different competences and roles in different areas, be they urban versus rural,
or small versus big. Comparative experiences show that their roles can
be significantly wider in large cities than in small rural municipalities. If
they exist in rural areas organized in numerous tiny municipalities, their
role can be only consultative, although the Croatian experience shows
that can be questioned, too. Namely, in small units, the relation between
the mayor and councillors on the one hand, and citizens on the other is
closer, more familiar and less formal. There is no need for sub-municipal
Sub-municipal governments are a widespread form of citizen participation
and influence on local issues. They are well-known especially in large cities. The examples vary from Stadtbezirk in German municipalities to city
districts and neighbourhoods in US big cities. However, such forms of
citizen participation exist, under different names, in Austria, the Czech
Republic, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey, the US, etc. The example of
American big cities such as Washington, Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and others, as well as examples of European cities such as Berlin,
Paris, London, Moscow, Sankt Petersburg, and others are interesting and
instructive (see Appendix 1).
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government as a mediator – they can be considered an unnecessary agent
between citizens and their local bodies. In contrast, such forms are quite
valuable in big Croatian cities.
There is a long tradition of sub-municipal governments in Croatia and
neighbouring countries. During the dynamic pre-socialist development
of territorial organization of Croatia, in the period after the 1880s when
the modern self-government was established, there existed small local
communities under different names and with different roles. So-called
territorial community (mjesna zajednica) from the socialist Yugoslavia is
a particularly interesting example, because it had a significant role in
decision-making, influence over managing local affairs at the level of municipalities, and its own resources and financial capacity that allowed
even infrastructural works, important social interventions, etc. The use
of citizens’ meetings in these communities was rather frequent, but, unfortunately, they were not part of a democratic political system. However, they indicated a strong local orientation of the system in the former
socialist Yugoslavia. They were cancelled in the reform of 1993. After
that, a new system of sub-municipal governments was designed, but its
functioning is still not very effective. Certain measures can be implemented within the announced territorial and decentralisation reform that
may ensure them a more significant role in fostering local democracy in
Croatia.
In the period before the 1993 reform, there were 3,950 territorial communities, inherited from the socialist period, with average of 1,150 inhabitants. They had legal personality, their own property and financial sources,
as well as separate bodies and tasks. After 1993, new forms of sub-municipal governments were established. There is no legal obligation for municipalities and towns to establish them, but – according to our data – they
do exist in the majority of local units. There are 2,452 of them in 349 local
units which answered our questionnaire in the spring of 2014 (seven per
local unit). The City of Zagreb has two-tier sub-municipal organization
with 17 city quarters and 218 territorial communities (235 sub-municipal
governments in sum).
Based on these data, it can be assessed that there are about 4,300 such
sub-municipal governments in Croatia. A significant number of local
units that answered our questionnaire (117 or 33.5 per cent), have not
established sub-municipal governments. The most plausible hypothesis is
that small local units do not need them. It has to be noted that 393 out
of 556 local units in Croatia (71 per cent) have up to 5,000 inhabitants,
and that, within this group, there is a group of units with less than 3,000
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
403
inhabitants – 282 of them (51 per cent of the total number of local units
in Croatia).
Each sub-municipal government has its own council. The researched units
have reported that there are 11,141 councillors in 2,452 sub-municipal
governments. Thus, we can assess that there are about 21,000 members
of sub-municipal councils in Croatia.11
Contemporary sub-municipal governments play several important roles,
not only in Croatia. They:
– Serve as the consultation and communication mechanism within
local units;
– Preserve identities of small communities or support the creation
of new territorial identities within large cities;
– Serve as an element in urban governance (planning, prioritizing,
decision-making, initiating, etc.);
– Supplement the city government in managing public tasks;
– Ensure solidarity and self-help.
One of the important roles of sub-municipal units is to preserve identities of
small communities within big cities. That role is especially important for
those small communities that used to be separate settlements in previous
times, before the growing cities spread over them. However, identities
are important for new communities, too. Within large and fast growing
cities, sub-municipal governments may support the development of new
territorial identities.
In larger urban units, sub-municipal governments play additional roles in
urban governance and management of public tasks. In Zagreb, for example,
city quarters and territorial communities are supported by the City Office
for Sub-Municipal Government and are the focal points for various actors
through which they can exert influence on local affairs. In that capacity,
sub-municipal governments can formulate initiatives concerning all local
issues, spatial plans, public services, investments into local infrastructure,
11
In the City of Zagreb, there are 283 councilors in the city quarters and 1,419
councilors in the territorial communities.
The main task of sub-municipal governments is to serve as the consultation and communication mechanism within local units, allowing alternative
representation of small communities’ interest, parallel with local councils
(compare also: Kristinsson, 2005).
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etc. Along with that, sub-municipal governments take over the responsibility for the so-called small communal actions, such as reconstruction
and improvement of playgrounds, parks, small streets, sports facilities,
small parts of infrastructure for energy and water supply, etc. City quarters and territorial communities have their elected councils that decide on
priorities and plan small communal actions. For that purpose, all sub-municipal governments have three to five per cent share in the city budget.
Sub-municipal governments have a similar role in other large urban units
(Split, Rijeka, Osijek, Zadar, Pula, etc.).
Special attention can be devoted to the role of sub-municipal governments in solidarity and self-help within small communities. Self-help can
be equally important in large urban and in small rural units. In the circumstances of retreating social state, self-help as a spontaneous form can
replace, to a degree, institutional forms of solidarity.12 Institutional forms
have been under attack, particularly during the past few decades, under
the guise of designing a new policy with regard to the services of general
interest. The European Union, as the promoter of this particular policy, pushes towards liberalization, privatization, and commercialization in
public services. One of the mechanisms for making a new social balance
is the EU’s focus on subsidiarity, which means greater role of the lowest
forms of territorial organization. Small local units have ensured solidarity
and self-help since pre-modern times and this role seems to be increasingly important again. We can speculate that it is particularly characteristic
of less urbanized countries, like Croatia, where the level of urbanization
is about 54 per cent.
All these five roles of sub-municipal governments have to be taken into
account especially while planning, designing, and implementing territorial reorganizations and consolidation reforms, like in Croatia. At least
two factors play an important role in thinking about a changed, more
significant role of sub-municipal governments in the possible new territorial organization. Small local communities had a prominent role during
the development of modern local self-government after the large administrative and institutional reforms of the 1880s. The role of sub-municipal
government has diminished in the past several decades in smaller local
units, probably because of their size. In the same period, they have played
certain role in urban and larger units. In Croatia, like in the neighbouring
12
Other situations in which self-help in small local communities becomes important
include war, terrorist attack, natural disasters, and the like.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
405
countries, there is a tradition of relying on small sub-municipal governments. For that, they are recognized by the people as the ever-existing
element of the institutional milieu. In one of the possible scenarios of
the territorial reform, sub-municipal governments may be used as an important element of the new structure (for possible scenarios see: Koprić,
2014). However, their role can be upgraded and these traditional firmly
rooted institutions can be better used even if the current organization
were not changed.
From data collected in the 2014 research, we can conclude that citizens’
initiative, referendum, and consultative meetings are not frequently used
participatory mechanisms in Croatia. Sub-municipal governments have
not been established in one third of local units, indicating their smallness
and – probably – the low level of decentralization in Croatia. Having in
mind that total local government’s share in public budgets is between 12
and 15 per cent, it can be concluded that the level of decentralization is
not very high. In such a centralized system, citizens are more interested
in the central than in the local government, because the central government provides the majority of public and administrative services. There
are other indicators of citizens’ low interest in local politics, such as the
low turnout at local elections, a low share of public servants employed
by the local government in comparison with the central government, etc.
However, if the announcements and political promises of decentralisation
and territorial consolidation were realized, the role of local politics, citizen
participation and sub-municipal governments would be greater.
Although somewhat neglected in scholarly literature, sub-municipal
government is a flexible tool for fostering local democracy whose use is
contingent and supplementary. First of all, it may be used in different
forms, with different competences and roles in different areas, be they
urban versus rural, or small versus big. Comparative experiences show
that their roles can be significantly wider in large cities than in small rural municipalities. If they exist in rural areas organized in numerous tiny
municipalities, their role can be only consultative, although the Croatian
experience shows that can be questioned, too. Namely, in small units,
relation between the mayor and councillors on the one hand, and citizens
on the other is closer, more familiar and more informal. There is no need
5. Conclusion
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
for sub-municipal government as a mediator – they can be considered an
unnecessary agent between citizens and their local bodies. In contrast,
such forms are quite valuable in big cities.
There is a long tradition of sub-municipal governments in Croatia and
neighbouring countries. So-called territorial community (mjesna zajednica) from the socialist Yugoslavia is a particularly interesting example,
because it had a significant role in decision-making, influence over managing local affairs at the level of municipalities, its own resources and financial capacity that allowed even infrastructural works, important social
interventions, etc. The use of citizens’ meetings in these communities was
rather frequent, but, unfortunately, they were not part of a democratic
political system. However, they indicated a strong local orientation of the
system in the former Yugoslavia. In Croatia, territorial communities were
cancelled in the reform of 1993. After that, a new system of sub-municipal
governments was designed, but its functioning is still not very effective.
Certain measures can be implemented within the announced territorial
and decentralisation reform that may ensure them a more significant role
in fostering local democracy in Croatia.
There are several directions for further research of institutions, ways, and
mechanisms for improving local democracy in Croatia and in the neighbouring countries. The main among them are:
– Identifying and researching the most important forms of improving local democracy in the region, taking into account empirical
data, not only legal regulation;
– Researching several interesting cases, like the so-called plena
(plenum) in Bosnia and Herzegovina;13
– The rest of Croatian municipalities and towns will be taken into
account;
– Urban governance and the role of sub-municipal governments
and citizen participation in large towns and cities will be additionally analysed.
By conducting such a research, we will be better able to explain current
situation and to offer new solutions to decision-makers, thus helping them
design evidence-based decentralization policy.
13
Plena sparkled in all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the violent burst of the
citizens’ dissatisfaction in February 2014. Four cantonal governments resigned during the
protests. Soon, citizens started with self-organization in the form of plena as the channel of
direct democracy (Kazaz et al., 2014).
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407
Appendix 1: Brief Comparative Overview of
Sub-Municipal Governments in Some Countries
In Austria, a district, Bezirk, normally includes several municipalities.
However, in State Vienna, which is also a municipality, there are 23 city
districts, which have different functions than in other parts of the country. Magistratisches Bezirksamt is a local office with local civil servants.
Local representative body (Bezirksräte) represent citizens at district level.
They elect head of the city district, Bezirksvorsteher (Diem et al., 2002).16
These representative bodies need to create contacts for the locals on the
political and administrative level. In practice, they have certain competences, for example, concerning traffic.
In bigger German cities, there is Stadtbezirk as a form of city district.
It is characteristic of bigger cities, which have more than 150,000 residents, such as Berlin, Hamburg, or Munich. In other parts of Germany,
for example in Hessen and in Rhineland-Palatinate, there is Ortsbezirk.
Political bodies of Ortbezirk are the council (Ortsbereit) and the mayor
14
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/lucds/cdstart.shtml
15
http://dc.about.com/od/neigborhoodprofiles/u/Neighborhoods.htm#s1. Today Washing
ton D. C. consists of almost 30 urban, suburban, and rural neighborhoods
16
See also http://www.wien.gv.at/bezirke/
In major U.S. cities, sub-municipal level is organized as the network of
city districts or neighbourhoods. Los Angeles is divided in 195 neighbourhoods or city districts, and New York has five boroughs (Bronx, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island).14 Those boroughs are divided
into 59 community districts, established in 1975. Those districts have
populations from 35,000 to more than 200,000 people. The City of Chicago is organized in 77 community areas, which were proposed by the
researchers from the University of Chicago in the late 1920s. Originally,
75 community areas were created. In the 1950s, annexations of O’Hare
airport was made, and the last change was the creation of 77th unit in the
1980s. Today, Chicago has a stable and constant number of community
areas. These areas do not correspond with the neighbourhoods in the city,
whose areas are informal, so one community area can have several neighbourhoods. In Washington D.C. neighbourhoods are also informal, and
do not have clear territorial borders. Washington consists of different areas, from urban communities and family friendly suburban communities
to quiet urban areas with plenty of green space.15
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
408
(Ortsvorsteher) (Borchmann et al., 2006: 157–158). In Berlin, which is
also established as a federal unit (Land Berlin), there are 12 city districts
(Stadtbezirke).17 These city districts were established during the 2001
reform. According to the Constitution of Federal Land of Berlin, city
districts have their own tasks and autonomy. Each of the city districts in
Berlin has a district mayor (Bezirksbürgermeister) as chief administrative officer (Kommunalpolitik, 2010: 12–18). This officer is elected within
council. The district mayor and four district alderman together create the
executive body (Bezirksamt) in each of Berlin’s 12 city districts.18
In Russia and in some post-Soviet countries, city districts are called raion.
In Russia, raion is type of administrative unit used for division on sub
national entity and division of city. Many major cities in Russia (except
federal cities Moscow and Sankt Petersburg) are divided into city districts. The city district is usually an administrative division of the city that
cannot be a separate municipal formation with complete administrative
autonomy. In Russia, there is also a division into administrative districts
at the federal level. Formerly, they were established in the 1920s to reduce the number of territorial divisions inherited from the Russian Empire. Furthermore, Moscow is divided in a different manner than other
parts of Russia. Moscow is divided into twelve administrative boroughs
(okrug), which are subdivided into districts (raions). Administrative boroughs (okrug) are subdivision of state administration districts and have
the status of local self-government units. The federal city of Saint Petersburg is organised into 18 city districts called raions, which are subdivided
into municipal boroughs (okrug), municipal towns, and municipal settlements.19
In the Czech Republic, the capital city of Prague is divided into 57
self-governing municipal districts (Czech mestske časti). The districts are
responsible for the parks, volunteer firefighters, some cultural and sports
activities, some social programs, some health activities and eldercare. In
2001, 22 administrative districts (Czech spravni obvody) were established
17
Mitte, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Pankow, Charlottenburg-Wilmersdorf, Spandau, Steiglitz-Zehlendorf, Tempelhof-Schöneberg, Neukölln, Treptow-Köpenick, MarzahnHellersdorf, Lichtenberg and Reinickendorf. http://gesetze.berlin.de/Default.aspx?vpath=
bibdata/ges/blnbzvwg/cont/blnbzvwg.p1.htm&pos=0&hlwords=berlin%C3%90bezirke%C3
%90+berlin%2cbezirke+%C3%90+berlin+%C3%90+bezirk+#xhlhit.
18
http://gesetze.berlin.de/default.aspx?vpath=bibdata%2Fges%2FBlnBzVwG%2Fco
nt%2FBlnBzVwG.inh.htm., downloaded 5.5.2014.
19
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raion.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
409
for national government’s purpose. One municipal district in each administrative district is responsible for providing certain public services for the
whole administrative district, for example, for issuing identity cards and
passports. The municipal district performing those tasks shares the name
with the administrative district it serves. The entire city and municipal
districts have elected councils and mayors. The mayor of the capital city is
a known as the primator.20
In Turkey, mahalle are a form of neighbourhood self-government. They
are established for certain parts of the local government, they have official
status, without administrative powers. Mahalle have the council as the
representative body. The council head is called the mukhtar, and there are
four council members. They are elected from among the citizens of the
area they represent. The council acts as the administrator of the leaders
of local governments, and solves problems and needs related to the local
community they represent. The Mukhtar has a position in the City Council and is the organizer and coordinator of all activities and tasks of local
government administration (Klarić, 2011: 878).
References
Borchmann, M., D. Breithapt, G. Kaiser (2006) Kommunalrecht in Hessen.
Stuttgart: Deutscher Gemeindeverlag GmbH and Verlag V. Kohlhammer
20
http://www.prague.fm/48162/administration-structure-city-prague/
In Serbia, the territorial community is a form of local self-government established in certain areas, or for some neighborhoods, streets, or parts of
a street. It is a territorial and functional unit. Its purpose is to satisfy the
needs and interests of direct importance to citizens. Local communities
have a legal personality and bank account. They are established and repealed by a decision of the municipal assembly. The tasks carried out by
local communities include childcare, eldercare and care for the persons
with special needs, protection and improvement of the environment, development and maintenance of green areas and resorts, consumer protection, municipal infrastructure, maintenance of cultural and sport events,
as well as activities related to recreation of the elderly, housing, fire protection, etc. Local community is governed by the local community council
as the representative body of the local residents.
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Bützer, M. (2005) Continuity of Innovation? Citizen Involvement and Institutional Reforms in Swiss Cities. In: H. Reynaert, K. Steyvers, P. Delwit, J.-B. Pilet
(eds.) Revolution or Renovation? Reforming Local Politics in Europe. Brugge:
Vanden Broele Publishers
Diem, P., M. Göbl, E. Saibel (2002) Die Wiener Bezirke. Ihre Geschichte, ihre
Persönlichkeit, ihre Wappen. Wien: Perlen Reihe Verlag
Haque, M. S. (1998). Legitimation Crisis: A Challenge for Public Service in the
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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN LOCAL DEMOCRACY
IN CROATIA
Summary
Key words: local democracy – Croatia, local politics, sub-municipal governments, referendum, directly elected mayors, independent local political actors,
citizens’ initiative
The paper analyses traditional and new forms of citizen participation at the local level. The traditional forms of citizen participation are referendum, citizens’
initiative, deliberative assemblies, sub-municipal governance, and occasional
consultative meetings. The main new forms are introduction of the direct election
of mayors and recall referendum, strengthening the role of local mayors, and
independent actors in local politics. Special attention is devoted to comparative
situation with sub-municipal governments. Five modes of fostering local democracy in Croatia are analysed: minority representation, classic forms of direct
democracy, direct election of mayors and recall procedure, youth councils, and
independent local political actors. Data from 2014 research show that citizens’
initiative, referendum, and consultative meetings are not frequently used participatory mechanisms in Croatia. Sub-municipal governments have not been
established in one third of local units, indicating their smallness and – probably
– the low level of decentralization in Croatia.
414
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 389–414
NOVIJI RAZVOJ LOKALNE DEMOKRACIJE
U HRVATSKOJ
Sažetak
Analiziraju se tradicionalne i nove forme sudjelovanja građana na lokalnoj
razini. Tradicionalne forme participacije su referendum, građanska inicijativa, skupština svih građana, oblici submunicipalne samouprave i konzultativni
zborovi građana. Važnije nove forme su neposredno biranje načelnika, njihov
opoziv, jačanje lokalnog vodstva i nezavisni lokalni politički akteri. U radu
se posebno analizira mjesna samouprava u komparativnoj perspektivi. Analizira se pet načina jačanja lokalne demokracije u Hrvatskoj: predstavništvo
nacionalnih manjina, klasične forme direktne demokracije, neposredni izbor i
opoziv načelnika, savjeti mladih i nezavisni lokalni politički akteri. Podaci iz
istraživanja provedenog 2014. pokazuju da se u Hrvatskoj građanska inicijativa, lokalni referendum i mjesni zbor ne koriste često. Oblici mjesne samouprave
nisu osnovani u jednoj trećini jedinica lokalne samouprave, vjerojatno zbog toga
što su same te jedinice male, a razina decentralizacije niska.
Ključne riječi: lokalna demokracija – Hrvatska, lokalna politika, sub-municipalna samouprava, referendum, neposredni izbor načelnika, nezavisni lokalni
politički akteri, građanska inicijativa
Transparency and Openness in Local
Governance: A Case of Croatian Cities
Anamarija Musa*
Domagoj Bebić**
Petra Đurman***
Transparency and openness are a key concern in contemporary democracies, at both the national and subnational
level. Dissemination of public information is a prerequisite
for citizens to exercise their individual and political rights.
Transparency is also a prerequisite for accountability. The
openness of public authorities to a dialogue with the citizenry has become a key ingredient of the democratic process. Citizens are able to take part in a shared responsibility
*
Anamarija Musa, PhD, Assistant Professor of Administrative Science, Faculty of
Law, University of Zagreb and Public Information Commissioner of the Republic of Croatia
(doc. dr. sc. Anamarija Musa, docentica upravne znanosti Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u
Zagrebu i Povjerenica za informiranje Republike Hrvatske, e-mail: [email protected])
**
Domagoj Bebić, PhD, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University
of Zagreb, Croatia (doc. dr. sc. Domagoj Bebić, Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u
Zagrebu, e-mail: [email protected])
***
Petra Đurman, Assistant at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law,
University of Zagreb, Croatia (asistentica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
342.721:353(497.5)
Musa, A., D. Bebić, P. Đurman (2015) Transparency and Openness in Local Governance ...
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
416
for the decisions of public authorities. The paper presents
an evaluation of the websites of 16 Croatian cities. The
Transparency and Openness Index, composed of four dimensions, and further developed through 13 components,
has shown that cities still do not comply with transparency standards, even when those standards are legally prescribed. They are inclined to disclose ‘light’ information,
which is not politically loaded and has no direct connection
to the accountability mechanism. It is possible, however,
to detect innovative leaders, who promote transparency
and employ their websites accordingly.
Key words: transparency, openness, local governance, city
websites, Croatia
1. Introduction
Transparency and openness are promoted as the core ingredients of good
governance by many international and supranational organisations to the
level of determining a certain degree of transparency as a prerequisite for
economic cooperation, financial aid or membership in certain organisations (see Kim et al., 2005).1 For example, included in the first conceptualisation of good governance2 are the nine principles defined in 1997
by the UNDP: participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness,
consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability
and strategic vision (Kettani, Moulin, 2008). Consequently, the level of
transparency and openness has been measured by international organisations and NGOs so as to indicate the quality of government, trust in
government, and regulatory quality or governance capacity.3
1
The first version of this paper was presented at the IPSA 2014 World Congress
Challenges of Contemporary Governance, 19–24 July 2014, Montréal, Canada. The authors
are grateful to the participants of the RC05 Comparative Studies on Local Government and
Politics and two anonymous reviewers for their recommendations and remarks.
2
The concept of good governance was used by the World Bank in the context of a
requirement at the national level, which would enable and facilitate the success of economic
development reforms (Haldenwang, 2004: 419, cited by Kettani, Moulin, 2008: 5).
3
There are various indices, such as the Governance Index, Regulatory Index, Doing
Business Index, Quality of Life Index, etc.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
417
It has been argued that without transparency a government’s capacity
to reach economic, political and societal goals would be seriously undermined, and in this way it holds strong instrumental value (Heald, 2006a;
Brikinshaw, 2006; Piotrowski, 2010). In other words, without transparency many political, economic and societal problems of contemporary
societies would be impossible to solve. Government transparency allows
citizens to monitor its activities and decisions and to hold the government
accountable. It helps to develop a more effective government by infusing
information to government activities and thus rendering it more responsive, limiting corruption and other negative practices in public administration and promoting integrity and ethics in government. In other words,
transparency cures information asymmetries and gives greater (informational) power to citizens, leading to equality and building the legitimacy
of government decisions. Trust in the government is possible only if it acts
openly and without secrets vis-á-vis the citizens. At the individual level,
without a transparent and open government it would be impossible for
citizens to protect their individual interests – clear, accurate and easily accessible information is necessary to exercise rights and to consume public
services. However, transparency is rarely understood as a maximum and
complete disclosure of information – there are legally grounded reasons
to restrict the dissemination of information for the purpose of protecting
personal data, national security or other important social purposes (see
Birkinshaw, 2006).
However, there are claims that transparency is overrated and that it loses
its value when the enormous costs of the implementation of transparency
initiatives and regulations are taken into account, or if it is compared to
other legitimate interests, such as a strong state, effectiveness, or protec-
The idea of transparency is supported by several key societal developments (Brown, 2005). First, globalisation has expanded the area for information gathering and dissemination, and augmented the number of communication channels and density of networks, but it has also increased
the pressure of economic actors to receive reliable governmental information. Secondly, the development of information and communication
technology (ICT) has reduced the timeframes for processing and dispersing information and lessened the formalised procedures. Thirdly, general
democratisation worldwide has increased citizens’ expectations and their
awareness of their rights, as well as the role of government as a service for
the citizens. In addition, the idea of transparency has become not only a
condition for effective public governance, but also a part of the corporate
governance agenda in the private sector.
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tion of personal or secret information (Heald, 2006a; Brikinshaw, 2006;
Piotrowski 2010; Piotrowski, Van Ryzin, 2007). For example, Etzioni
(2010: 389) argues that, based upon current research, ‘transparency cannot fulfil the functions its advocates assign to it, although it can play a
limited role in their service’. In other words, the value of transparency is
only instrumental to the extent it serves to achieve other important goals.4
Aside from many other arguments, Etzioni (2010) also emphasizes the
problem of processing the information provided to the public, as well as
the costs of collecting and processing the information, which in many
cases exceed the gains it should provide (ibid., 395). He challenges the
notion that ‘more details means more honesty’, emphasizing the problem
of the quality of information, usability of information and the competence
of intermediary actors which are expected to ‘translate’ the information
for the general public (e.g. the media) but are often not regulated themselves, although there is a widespread public trust assigned to their ‘translations’. In this way, despite a great value that information technology
has created for the dissemination of information, it has also helped the
creation of an information overload and the illusion of communication
(Heald, 2006; Birkinshaw, 2006; O’Neil, 2006). In addition, as the digital
divide concept describes (Norris, 2001), when it comes to disclosing public information, communicating with the government or participating in
decision-making processes, there is a widespread problem of the inclusion
of those less competent, less educated or skilled.
Local governments nowadays face a great challenge in providing fast and
user-oriented services to their citizens and in responding to the complex
demands of social and economic development of their local communities. The global trend of decentralisation as a means of achieving greater
democratisation and effectiveness of the public sector has additionally
strengthened that pressure. For example, a research study by OECD
(Bach et al., 2009) has shown that the average expenditure share of local
governments from 1995 to 2005 across OECD countries amounted to 33
per cent, with individual states varying from 70 per cent in Canada to 6
per cent in Greece, and three countries exceeding 50 per cent. In addition, in a given period there was a constant increase in local expenditure
by 2 per cent. Consequently, given their scope of affairs and the importance of providing services to citizens, the role of local governments with
4
In other words, Etzioni (2010: 392) emphasizes the instrumental value of transparency – it is ‘rather weak’ meaning that ‘it relies on other forms of guidance and can supplement regulation but not serve as a main form of guidance’.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
419
regard to the citizens has significantly expanded. In addition, political
democratisation poses new demands towards local governments, which
have to act openly, transparently and inclusively in order to meet citizen
demands and to justify their decisions, thus ensuring legitimacy. The development of ICT has made this task easier, but has also exerted pressure
on governments to change their traditional way of doing things and to use
ICT as an effective means of communication and information.
2. Transparency and Openness in Local
Governments
2.1. Conceptualising Transparency and Openness
The literature on government transparency is becoming a distinct subfield
of public administration research, but remains closely linked to e-government research, citizen engagement and participation research, and
research on trust in government. Government transparency is also discussed in legal literature in the fields of administrative and constitutional
law. Given the different research perspectives, there are different meanings and conceptualisations of transparency, which in the broadest sense
may be defined as ‘the ability to find out what is going on inside the government’ (Piotrowski, Van Ryzin, 2007: 306). In addition, transparency is
often used along with concepts of openness and responsiveness, usually
with no clear demarcation.
There are different conceptualisations of transparency. Based on three
types of criteria Heald (2006) differentiates between (a) event and process transparency, where event transparency relates to the objects – inputs, outputs or outcomes, and process transparency on procedures and
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the transparency and openness of
local governments by analysing website content in Croatian cities. Besides
assessing the level of transparency and openness, the analysis will serve as
a first step in designing an indicator of transparency of local governments.
The paper proceeds as follows: in chapter 2 the concept of transparency and selected research is discussed. In chapter 3 the Croatian case is
presented, including a short overview of Croatian local governance, an
overview of the current research, and a presentation of the methodology
employed in this study. The final chapter summarises the findings and
discusses some general observations along with policy proposals.
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operations (rules, regulations); (b) transparency in retrospect, in the sense
of ex-post reporting, and transparency in real time, as continuous supervision; (c) nominal and effective transparency, based upon differentiation
between the content that is revealed or presented to the public, and the
content that is processed and understood by the user (which relates to the
problem of the illusion of transparency and information overload).
Discussing citizen engagement, the OECD (2001) differentiates, albeit
not consistently,5 between (a) information, when ‘the government disseminates information on policy-making on its own initiative – or citizens access information upon their demand’, where the information flow
is one-directional, from government to citizens; (b) consultation, where
‘the government asks for and receives citizen feedback on policymaking’,
where key information is that received by the government from the citizen; and (c) active participation, where ‘citizens actively engage in decision-making and policy-making’.
From the political viewpoint, transparency is often used as a part of the
concept of the openness of political processes and decision-making and
the precondition for exercising political control. Without transparency
there is neither inclusion nor participation, and also no accountability at
all. In a strict sense, in order to be open and to allow and ensure the inclusion of societal actors in political processes, the government has to be
transparent. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper the differentiation
between transparency and openness is made based on the criteria of information direction and instruments. The conceptualisation is presented
in Figure 1.
Transparency usually means that data held by the government and information about its activities are exposed to the public eye and, depending
on the character of the data, can be disclosed upon request of the citizen
or another entity (company, civil society organisation, etc). Citizens are
presented with the results of the government activity, but their position
is relatively passive (see Héritier, 2003). Openness, on the other hand, is
closely related to the concept of responsiveness – the government is open
to the information and feedback given by citizens, engages in a dialogue
with them, and takes into account suggestions when designing and implementing public policies (OECD, 2001; Bannister, Connolly, 2010).
5
The differentiation between consultation and active participation is not clear, so
both can be considered openess indicators.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
421
In summary, while openness is based on the political decision to open
up to the citizens by communicating and presenting policy options and
choices, transparency is legally defined and ensured as a necessary tool
for citizens to control the government. In other words, while openness
means that governments ‘listen to citizens and businesses, and take their
suggestions into account when designing and implementing public policies’, transparency means that ‘reliable, relevant and timely information
about the activities of the government is available to the public’ (OECD,
2002: 7). A transparent government is active and a citizen is a recipient
of information, while an open government is not only transparent but
also receptive to the information provided by the active citizen, based on
two-way communication and interaction. In this way, transparency can
be understood as a prerequisite or key element of openness – the government is only open if it is capable and willing to present public information
to the citizens, being visible enough to allow the citizens to develop and
introduce their own opinion.
In the legal sense, transparency is explored through the legal concept of
‘the right to information which is qualified by exemptions and subject
to independent adjudication by a third party’ (Birkinshaw, cited by McDonald, 2006). From this perspective, transparency is considered to be
achieved by means of access to information legislation, which allows citizens to access public information by request and which forces the government to proactively disclose certain information. Openness is achieved by
means of regulating the obligation of the government to engage citizens
in decision-making, as well as by means of public consultation and participation in decision-making processes.
Consequently, while transparency relates to the output of government
activities, openness relates to the consultation and participation practices
and is focused on the input side of government work. Openness and communication are more closely related to policy formulation and evaluation,
and in this way to political power. They are about presenting information,
reaching, explaining and justifying decisions and results of the political
process. On the contrary, transparency is usually legally ensured by ‘the
right and ability of the citizens to access government information and
information about the government’ (UNPAN, 1999, cited by Bannister
and Connolly, 2010).
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Figure 1: Transparency and Openness
Type
of access
Direction
Government
presenting
information
to citizens (output)
Transparency
G2C
Instruments
a) Communication
Informed citizen.
Websites, brochures, policy/
communication campaigns,
public(media) relations, strategic
communication, openness of
meetings, public events, reports
Protection of
rights and
fulfilling of
obligations.
b) Access to public information –
Disclosure upon request –
right to information /
freedom of information laws
Openness
Consequences
Citizens influencing
government by
Consultation, hearings, dialogue,
providing
discussion (political bodies,
information (input) policy-making bodies)
C2G
Controlling the
government.
Participation.
Responsiveness.
Partnership.
Source: Héritier, 2003; Musa et al., 2011.
2.2. Measuring Transparency and Openness in Local
Government
Transparency research is often connected to e-government research. If
e-government is understood as the use of ICT to provide services to citizens and to inform the public, to communicate with citizens and to engage citizens in decision-making, than it is understandable that exploring
transparency and openness is an inevitable part of e-government.
For the last 20 years measuring and benchmarking e-government has been
in focus of international organisations and consultancy firms,6 which view
e-government as an instrument to achieve generally greater accountability
and effectiveness of government, but also as a convenient means for comparison of countries which would stimulate investments into ICT-supported administration.7 For these reasons, there is a vast literature deal6
As Bannister (2004: 1) notes: ‘Benchmarking of egovernment has become a small
industry.’
7
Offering a well-grounded differentiation between the bureaucratic model and the
e-government model of public administration, Ho (2002) emphasizes that ‘explosive growth
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
423
The reasons why transparency (and openness) research closely relates to
e-government research lies in the fact that lower levels of development of
e-government (see Layne, Lee, 2001) correspond directly to the use of the
Internet as a means of providing information and simple communication
between public authorities and citizens (online presence, presentation of
information, downloadable forms, access and small-scale interaction). For
example, different conceptualisations of the scales developed by international organisations, states or corporations, can usually be reduced to
four main phases: (1) the information stage, where the web only serves
as a billboard for presenting government information to the public, which
is predominantly passive; (2) a one-way interaction stage, where government web sites offer downloadable forms or documents, with a significant
amount of presented information, including relevant data on policy processes; (3) two-way interaction, including the notion of the active citizen,
who can actively engage in a relationship with the state by completing
procedures online (upload forms, e-mail or forum discussions, etc.); and
(4) fully interactive and comprehensive government portals with a wide
range of information, one-stop transactions and 24/7 services enhancing
the lives of the citizens and the economy. In short, positioning the state
in Internet usage and rapid development of e-commerce in the private sector have put growing pressure on the public sector to serve citizens electronically, which is often known as the
‘e-government’ initiative. The initiative is to provide public services and to empower citizens
and communities through information technology, especially through the Internet’.
8
http://www.unpan.org/egovkb/global_reports/08report.htm
9
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/digital-economy-and-society-index-desi
ing with the winners and losers in the e-government race, or, in other
words, of the countries ranking best or worst in e-government scales. For
example, the UN E-Government Survey measures the extent to which
national governments use information technology to provide citizens with
services in a timesaving manner (see UNPADM and UNDESA, 2014).8
The EU and the European Commission approach e-government by applying an open method of coordination, i.e. setting standards, action plans
and measuring achievement according to benchmarks. For these purposes, the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) has been developed,
measuring connectivity, human capital, use of the Internet, integration of
digital technology and digital public services.9 At first seen as a means of
enhancing transparency and the delivery of public services, e-government
is now promoted as ‘a tool to achieve better government’ (OECD, 2003;
West, 2000; cited by Pina et al., 2010).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
424
in e‑government assessments should signal its dedication towards democracy, its accountability to citizens and, in consequence, provide the basis
for trust in the government. Such a conceptualisation indicates that transparency and openness relate mainly to the first two phases and partially to
the third phase of e-government development, whilst the fourth phase is
concerned with a full-service function exercised by means of ICT.
Scientific research has also focused on different aspects of transparency and e-government – transparency in a narrow sense, e-participation,
e-democracy and e-services. A vast body of scientific research examines
the functionality and presence of different content on the Internet. As
Kuk (2003) notes: ‘Much of the research in e-government has focused on
the standards for evaluating web-enabled services. Website usability and
navigability remain the key factors in determining e-government readiness
and maturity. Research in e-commerce and technology adoption suggests
that a user-friendly website with rich, interesting, and searchable contents
will ultimately win customers’ approval, encouraging use and return visits.’ For example, the pioneering work of Moon (1999) examines information provision (content, type) vs. communication channels at that time
(e-mails, chat rooms, etc.). Another pioneering research study devising
instruments with practical value to detect best practice and to tailor recommendations, often used as a starting point of next-generation research,
was conducted by West (2000), the researchers of the Oxford Internet
Institute,10 and also by the Cyberspace Public Research Group. The latter
group (La Porte et al., 2001) developed the WAES, Web Attribute Evaluation System, measuring two dimensions of federal websites in the United
States – transparency and interactivity, with transparency corresponding
to the first and second stage of e-government, while interactivity relates
to the higher levels. The instrument was applied on approximately 2,000
national-level agencies in 120 countries over a four-year period. The main
conclusions of their research are that ‘the role of the Internet in transforming government administration – the nuts and bolts of government
– is no less significant for the ultimate success of any reform’ (La Porte et
al., 2001: 63–64). In addition, most countries were ‘not making extensive
use of Web’ and they are not making their best efforts to do so – the global
average score in 1999 was less than half of a possible 21 for transparency
and less than a quarter of a possible 18.
10
http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/; see Dunleavy et al., 2006.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
425
A significant amount of local government websites are concerned with
e-democracy and participation. Piotrowski and van Ryzin (2007) have
analysed citizen attitudes toward transparency in local government by
using data from a national online survey of more than 1,800 respondents, measuring citizens’ demand for transparency at the local level and
exploring its correlates. Thomas and Streib (2003) explored to what extent citizens use websites and forms, while Scott (2006) analysed to what
extent US municipal websites facilitate public involvement by measuring
the presence or absence of more than 100 information or communication
services provided at the sites. The results indicate that local government
websites have the potential to enhance and inform local public involvement initiatives, and that this potential might be ‘underappreciated and
understudied.’
A large-scale assessment instrument of local government websites has
been devised by a Rutgers University research group led by Holzer
and Manoharan (2011–12). The Digital Governance in Municipalities
Worldwide Survey is based on the indicator of digital governance in
large municipalities (cities), assessing 104 measures through five dimensions.11 Starting from 2003, the survey was continuously replicated with
the last one conducted in 2011. It evaluated the websites of 92 cities
worldwide on the dimension of delivery of public services and e-democracy. The instrument measures website content on five dimensions: se-
11
For the Holzer and Manoharan study (2011–12) and earlier studies see http://
spaa.newark.rutgers.edu/egov-publications
Among the literature, the focus on analysing websites of local governments is remarkable, often for the sake of comparison and the possibility to draw more argumented conclusions. Moon’s (2002) research on
e-government in municipalities has shown that municipal governments at
the time the study was conducted were ‘in the first stage simply posting
and disseminating information over the web or providing online channels
for two-way communication, particularly for public service requests’ (ibid.
431). Similarly, Musso et al. (2000) examined the extent to which ICT
has the potential to support local government reform, by assessing web
sites of 270 local governments in 1997 on the dimension of information,
interactivity and general design and emphasis. Their conclusions indicate
that local governments are failing to exploit the possibilities that the Internet offers to improve communications, mostly stuck at the first stage of
development, serving as billboards and phone books.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
426
curity/privacy, usability, content, service and citizen engagement, with
weighted scores included.12 The average score for digital governance in
the cities is 33.76, while the average score for municipalities in OECD
countries is 45.45.
Another widely cited research group, based at the University of Zaragoza,
Spain, assessed municipal websites in Europe. In one study Pina, Torres
and Royo (2010) have analysed to what extent websites of public bodies
enhance financial accountability, by assessing the budgetary and performance information dissemination on the websites of 75 EU cities.13 The
research showed that the websites do not promote financial accountability beyond the level that is legally required and that the Internet is an
underused additional tool.14
In an earlier study of the same research group (Torres et al., 2005) the
focus of the measurement was on Service Maturity (70 per cent) and
Delivery Maturity (30 per cent), as components of Overall Website Maturity. Service Maturity was measured on two dimensions: Service Maturity
Breadth (SMB), as the number of services offered via the Internet from
the 67 services identified, and Service Maturity Depth (SMD), which classifies services according to the level of interactivity or the possibility of
transaction (classified by three levels: publish – interact – transact). Delivery Maturity relates to website sophistication (simplicity of filling out
forms, e-mail addresses, additional languages, e-democracy, etc.). Based
on these indicators, cities can be grouped as Innovative Leaders, Visionary Followers and Steady Achievers (Torres et al., 2005).
12
For each of these five components, 18 to 26 measures were applied, each coded
on a scale of four points (0, 1, 2, 3), or a dichotomy of two points (0, 3 or 0, 1). The overall
score was weighted to avoid skewing the research in favor of a particular category. In order
to ensure reliability, each municipal website was assessed in the native language by two
evaluators.
13
The study used four internal factors –city size, city wealth, website maturity, and
the presence of information audited by a private firm on the city council website. Besides
these internal variables, three external variables were assessed – public administration style,
Internet penetration, and level of corruption.
14
Similarly, the financial dimension was also assessed by Zavattaro (2013) who analyses the use of budget documents as marketing and public relations (PR) tools.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
427
Finally, an emerging area of research concerns the use of web 2.0 and
especially social media15 on local government websites.16 Bonsóna et al.
(2012) assessed 75 local government websites in the EU in order to determine whether local governments are using new technologies to increase
e-participation and to open a dialogue with society, but also to identify
factors which promote the use of these tools. Their Web 2.0 and social
media Sophistication Index (SI)17 measures the presence and level of activity of each local government on social media platforms. The findings
indicate that approximately half the local governments have no active
presence on any social network. Although in most of the cities the conversation and activity initiated by citizens on social media platforms is at
a promising level, the use of Web 2.0 to promote e-participation is ‘still in
its infancy’, at least at the local level.
3. Transparency and Openness of Local
Government in Croatia
How to achieve the standards of a transparent and open government has
been a highly discussed issue in Croatian civil society, media and academia. A transparent and open government should help prevent corrup-
15
As indicated by Bonsóna et al. (2012) ‘the term Web 2.0 was coined by Tim
O’Reilly (2005) to refer to a second generation Web based on the use of novel technologies,
such as RSS (Really Simple Syndication of Web contents), podcasting (syndication of audio
content), mashups (combination of pre-existing applications), folksonomies (popular labeling or categorizing), widgets (Web tools embedded in other sites to perform a particular
function) and sharing facilities (options for redistributing the contents of Websites to other
users). Additionally, thanks to this technological base, the so-called social media have been
developed. These are applications that offer services to communities of online users: blogs,
social bookmarking, wikis, media sharing and social networks that promote collaboration,
joint learning and the speedy exchange of information between users.’
16
For analyis of the research on social media as a means of citizen empowerment
over a period of five years see Magro, 2012.
17
SI is based on 8 items whose presence was measured by a binary variable (0: no
presence; 1: presence): 1. Podcasts from the management; 2. RSS or Atom; 3. Vodcast from
the management; 4. Real time webcast of municipal events, 5. Widgets, 6. Blogs, 7. Links
to official YouTube videos, 8. Social network for the users of the local government website.
In the second part of the research the social media platforms were assessed (number of
followers, number of conversations, groups etc.).
3.1. Transparency and Openness in Croatia
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
428
tion, eliminate irregularities, and enable citizens to have more and better
services – the critical points of the Croatian administrative system. As in
other transition countries, institution building and democratic renewal
were highly dependent on embracing new political concepts and administrative practice, with transparency being one of the main prerequisites
for greater accountability and more effective administration. The right
to access to information, which is considered to be a legal version of the
political concept of transparency, was legally regulated in 2003 but problems with the implementation of the law did not prevent obscurities and
force the government to act much more transparently. In the process of
EU accession transparency regulation was determined to be a prerequisite for EU membership approval by the European Commission, as it was
considered to be a main tool for fighting corruption. In the meantime,
the public consultation procedure was introduced in 2009 and significant
steps forward have been taken in public involvement. In 2010 the right to
information became a constitutional right, and in 2013 a new law18 and
a new institution for the protection of this right (the Information Commissioner post) were introduced. In addition, Croatian e-government is
slowly moving forward with a greater number of e-services and greater
interconnectivity of government, although there is a significant lag behind
other EU member states.19
The Law on Access to Information (FOI law) requires all public bodies
at all levels of government and types of functions (government, judiciary,
legislature, public services, etc.) to (a) proactively publish information,
(b) enable publicity of sessions of public bodies; (c) conduct public consultations when issuing new regulation; and (d) disclose information upon
the request of citizens.
Research on transparency and openness with regard to websites or research on e-government in general in Croatia is scarce (see Bebić, Vučković, 2011). The most comprehensive research on transparency in local
government was conducted in 2009 and 2011–12 by non-governmental
18
The Law on the Right to Access to Information, OG 25/13.
19
The e-government benchmark shows that Croatia scores low on all four measured
indicators – the e-government level is mostly moderate (transparency) or, at best, fair (user
centricity), but in the aspects of key enablers and cross-border mobility mostly insufficient.
See http://www.capgemini.com/resources/egovernment-benchmark-country-factsheets-croatia Similarly, the DESI index for 2014 ranks Croatia as 21st among the 28 EU member
states, with an overall score of 0.37 (EU score average 0.44), see http://ec.europa.eu/digitalagenda/en/scoreboard/croatia
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
429
3.2. Assessing the Websites of Croatian Cities:
Do They Promote Transparency and Openness?
The research design. The purpose of the research was twofold: to analyse
transparency and openness of Croatian local governments, and to construct a measurement tool which could be further employed not only nationally but also internationally. An analysis of city websites was chosen
as the method of assessment, with the help of an instrument developed
for the purpose.
20
GONG is one of the most active Croatian NGOs engaged in promoting human
and citizen rights, and active citizens’ participation in decision-making processes. The third
round of the project is currently being implemented.
21
http://gong.hr/hr/dobra-vladavina/pristup-informacijama/tko-je-najtransparentnijirezultati-istrazivanja-l/.
Among highly ranked cities are Rijeka (1st), Samobor (2nd), Pula (3rd), Slavonski Brod
(7th), Osijek (10th), Čakovec (10th).
22
For the research results see http://gong.hr/media/uploads/lotus_2011_-_istrazivacki_izvjestaj.pdf. For comparison of 2011/2012 results of research with results from 2009 see
http://gong.hr/hr/dobra-vladavina/lokalne-vlasti/predstavljeni-prvi-nalazi-istrazivanja-lotus/.
organisations (GONG20 in cooperation with the Association of Croatian
Cities), as part of the LOTUS project (Accountable and Transparent Local Government and Self-Government). The research included all Croatian local units (127 cities and 429 municipalities) and focused on five
dimensions of transparency in local self-government: 1) transparency of
local council meetings, 2) transparency of decisions, 3) cooperation with
the civil society, 4) complying with the Law on the Access to Information, and 5) organisation of submunicipal self-government. The local units
scored highest in the category ‘transparency of local council meetings’,
while the lowest scores were in the ‘complying with the FOI law’ category.
The second round of research conducted during 2011–2012 also covered
the regional units (20 counties). Although the 2011–12 results show an
increase in the level of transparency in relation to the 2009 results, 70 per
cent of local and regional units were assessed as non-transparent, while
only 6 per cent of them scored as remarkably transparent. The highest
level of transparency was demonstrated by cities and the lowest level by
municipalities, while the counties turned out to be mostly transparent.21
The results also indicated an insufficient use of the Internet in informing
and consulting citizens.22
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430
The current system of Croatian local self-government was established
in 1993. Based upon the constitutional provisions on the right to local
self-government, the system is regulated by the Law on Local and Regional Self-Government.23 The system is two-tiered, comprising a local (first
tier) with 428 municipalities and 128 cities, and a regional (second tier)
with 20 counties and the capital City of Zagreb, which has a special status
and performs city and county tasks and transferred central state functions
(functions in other counties performed by state administration offices).
In 2005 the law introduced a special category of big cities with more than
35,000 inhabitants with a somewhat broader scope of affairs compared to
‘regular’ cities. Local representative bodies are municipal and city councils at the local level, and county assemblies at the regional level. In 2009
local collegial executives were replaced by directly elected municipal and
city mayors and county governors. There are great differences in the size
and population in the category of municipalities and cities, as well as between counties, which indicates the problem of an unbalanced structure
of local units. A highly fragmented system of local self-government with
too many local units brings about the problem of financial capacities and
performance of local responsibilities. Therefore, the unbalanced structure
of local units, together with its complex structure which points at a still
rather centralistic mode of governance, as well as poor decentralisation,
can be singled out as the main deficiencies in the system of local self-government (Koprić, 2010b: 372–383; see also Koprić, 2010a, 2011, 2013).
Since this is a first-stage research study, which is meant to give an insight
into the different aspects of transparency and openness of local government, the decision was made to assess the websites of a smaller group
of local governments. The original intention was to analyse the websites
of the 20 largest cities according to the 2001 census; however, since we
considered the scope of affairs to be an important variable, we also had to
consider the legal category of ‘big cities’ – those which are legally defined
as large cities (cities with a population above 35,000 and cities which are
county seats). Bearing in mind population and legal status, we sorted out
our list of 24 cities in a way that those two indicators overlap (more than
35,000 inhabitants and the status of a large city). From the list of 24 cities
we excluded the capital, Zagreb, which legally has county status and thus
a greater scope of affairs, but would also skew our data because of the
23
OG 19/13 (includes the 2001 Law with further amendments)
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
431
budget and population size. We also excluded three cities24 which qualify
for the list of the 20 biggest cities in terms of population, but their scope
of affairs is not the same as that of big cities (since they are ‘regular’ cities). However, since the group of ‘big cities’ legally encompasses not only
those cities with a population of over 35,000, but also county seats, we
excluded 4 cities25 which have a population below 35,000. Finally, the list
ended up with 16 cities which are legally defined as ‘big cities’ and have
more than 35,000 inhabitants (see Table 1).
The 16 cities represent 12.4 per cent of all cities and less than 3 per cent of
all municipalities in Croatia, but their combined population corresponds
to 25 per cent of the total Croatian population (1.06 mil.). The average
number of inhabitants is 66,326, the Median is 178,102, and St.dev. is
35.312. The cities are located in 14 out of a total of 20 counties (70 per
cent of counties), with two counties represented by 2 cities each, and 12
counties represented by one city. According to regional division in the
geographical sense, the eastern and southern region is represented by 4
cities, the central and northern region each by 3 cities, and the western
region by 2 cities. The total budget of the 16 cities is slightly above 616.5
mil €,27 ranging from 13.36 mil up to 7 times as much – 95.62 mil.; with an
average budget of 38.5 mil €, Median of 28.6 mil €, and St.dev. of 25.07
mil. The total number of employees in city administrations of the 16 cities
is 2,773, ranging from 68 to 465, with the average number of 173, Median
of 127.5 and St.dev. of 123.59.
24
Koprivnica, Đakovo and Vukovar.
25
Krapina and Gospić have cca 10,000, Pazin cca 7,500, and Čakovec slightly more
than 22,000 inhabitants.
26
Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics, www.dzs.hr
27
For the sake of comparison, and argumenting the exclusion of Zagreb from the
analysis, the budget of the capital City of Zagreb is 868 mil €.
The websites were assessed by the authors in June 2014, in the way that
two authors assessed each website, in order to minimise errors in assessment. The assessment was carried out using search engines and a thorough
examination of the webpage (the site map and a simple search of the webpage). To determine other variables relevant for this research additional
data was collected: data on city size according to population in the 2011
census,26 data on wealth measured by the budget for 2014 as indicated on
the websites of the respective cities, and the number of employees in the
city administration, according to the data found on the Internet.
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The data was then used to calculate the financial workload capacity measure (FWC) and service workload capacity (SWC) measure. The financial
workload capacity (FWC) measure is calculated by dividing the amount
of budget resources (in .000.000 €) by the number of employees, indicating their workload in spending the city budget. The service workload
capacity (SWC) is calculated by dividing the population by the number of
employees, indicating the number of citizens one employee has to serve.
The table indicates that the average FWC is 227, with a minimum of 151
and maximum of 317. The average SWC is 420, ranging from 190 to 657,
with the Median of 425 and St.dev. of 106. The dispersion is indicative for
policy makers considering the reform of local government.
SWC
FWC
City
employees
Population
(2011)
Budget
2014 (€)
Region
Web site
County
Table 1: Croatian Cities included in research
City
The next step was to determine the set of criteria that would be used to
rank the various cities and to determine their transparency and openness.
As described in previous sections, the measures of transparency and openness are differently conceptualised, based on the purpose of research. In
this research the Transparency and Openness Index (TOI) is conceptualised
based on the legal requirement for all public bodies in Croatia to proactively publish relevant information on their websites. This legal obligation
is imposed on all selected local governments to the same extent and it
is sufficiently clear and applicable. In this way their discretion to decide
what kind of information will be published is limited, what adds additional
value to the measure. In addition, the legal requirements correspond to
the international, and particularly European, standards of proactive dissemination, which would make the instrument applicable in other countries, but also at other levels of government.
Split
Splitskodalmatinska
www.
split.hr
Southern
95,622,538
178,102
465
205.7
383.02
Rijeka
Primorskogoranska
www.
rijeka.hr
Western
92,069,474
128,624
459
200.6
280.23
Osijek
Osječkobaranjska
www.
osijek.hr
Eastern
53,452,936
108,048
236
226.5
457.83
Zadar
Zadarska
www.
grad-zadar.hr
Southern
45,812,560
75,062
178
257.4
421.70
Velika
Gorica
Zagrebačka
www.
gorica.hr
Central
38,404,424
63,517
148
259.5
429.17
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
Slavonski
Brod
Brodskoposavska
www.
slavonskibrod.hr
Eastern
21,268,749
59,141
90
236.3
657.12
Pula
Istarska
www
pula.hr
Western
42,548,071
57,460
186
228.8
308.92
Karlovac
Karlovačka
www.
karlovac.hr
Central
27,346,046
55,705
137
199.6
406.61
Sisak
Sisačkomoslavačka
www.
sisak.hr
Central
25,020,017
47,768
118
212.1
404.81
Varaždin
Varaždinska
www.
varazdin.hr
Northern
29,962,229
46,946
103
290.9
455.79
Šibenik
Šibenskokninska
www.
sibenik.hr
Eastern
25,162,763
46,332
100
251.6
463.32
Dubrovnik
Dubrovačko- www.
neretvanska
dubrovnik.hr
Southern
53,130,000
42,615
224
237.2
190.25
Bjelovar
Bjelovarskobilogorska
www.
bjelovar.hr
Northern
15,465,822
40,276
84
184.1
479.48
Kaštela
Splitskodalmatinska
www.
kastela.hr
Southern
16,358,684
38,667
89
183.8
434.46
Samobor
Zagrebačka
www.
samobor.hr
Eastern
21,593,572
37,633
68
317.8
553.43
Vinkovci
Vukovarskosrijemska
www.
vinkovci.hr
Northern
13,361,465
35,312
88
151.8
401.27
Total
616,579,349
1,061,208
2,773
Average
38,536,209
66,326
173
227.73
420
Median
28,654,138
51,737
127.5
227.65
425.43
St.Dev
25,076,609
39,457
123.59
42.098293
106.21931
Min
13,361,465
35,312
68
151.8
190.25
Max
95,622,538
178,102
465
317.8
657.12
Consequently, in order to evaluate the websites with the help of the
Transparency and Openness Index (TOI), we first determined the legal
requirements for publication as 13 distinctive measures. Each of these
dimensions has the transparency element, but most of them also include
the openness element, as it enables citizens to give feedback to the government. The distinction between these two elements was been conceptualised at this stage of the research. In addition, the service dimension was
not analysed in this phase of research.
The dimensions and indicators were then grouped according to the typology developed by the authors (for similar typologies see Piotrowski,
van Ryzin, 2007; Leith, Morison, 2004). The typology starts with the
assumption that the information is used for various purposes. First, as
transparency literature suggests, government transparency and openness
are necessary for citizens to be able to control decision-making and to actively engage in decision-making in their communities (local, state, etc.).
433
434
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
This dimension is called Decision-making and Participation Transparency.
Second, transparency allows the control of government spending and
their financing of various activities, and enables citizens to hold their local
governments to account. This dimension is called Financial Transparency.
Third, in order to exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations, citizens
should be familiar with the activities of their local governments, such as
planned activities and projects, regulation which applies to their individual rights, and public calls which enable them to exercise their rights,
obtain benefits or to enter into a contractual relationship with the government (to do business or to acquire some benefits). They also need to
be familiar with the structure of the government to be able to exercise
their rights and to hold the government accountable (e.g. they need to be
familiar with the officials, heads of units, etc.). This dimension is called
Operational Transparency. Finally, citizens have to be able to communicate
with their governments and officials and to receive information they need,
but also to re-use the data governments collect to create additional value.
This dimension is named Communication Transparency. Each dimension
consists of three or four components or subdimensions (see Table 2).
As the next step, 13 components (subdimensions) were analysed in detail to determine which information has to be presented on the website.
Three websites (Rijeka, Pula, Varaždin) underwent a preliminary analysis
to detect possible information which corresponds to the content of each
dimension. In this way the minimum content (MC) was determined, but
since the websites also held additional information, the group of additional content (AC) was determined for each (sub)dimension. Each type of
information was given a score of 1 or 2, if it was assessed as a significant
step to greater transparency. The total score related to minimum content
is 66, but the number is not absolute, because it is possible that the website contains more information than is legally required. In addition, the
scores are not weighted at this stage of the research. The review of indicators for each dimension is presented in Table 2.
The instrument was then applied to the websites of 16 cities. The measurement concerned only the presence of information while the content or
the quality was measured only if it was envisaged in the instrument itself
(e.g. official journal vs. searchable official journal, document format, etc.).
The instrument generally does not take into account the accuracy of information, the quality of content, the navigability, the design or user-friendliness of the website, but it focuses on the presence of certain content.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
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Table 2: Transparency and Openness Index (TOI) for Croatian Cities
transparency type DECISION-MAKING AND PARtransparency type /
16
/ total score
TICIPATION TRANSPARENCY
total score
REGULATION
Legal
Minimum
requirement (Art. content (MC)
10-12 FOI)
General acts
and decisions
affecting the
interests of the
citizens with
the justification
for adoption
dimension /
score
The minutes
and conclusions
of the official
sessions of
public
bodies and official documents
adopted at the
sessions, and
information on
the operation
of formal
working bodies
within
their competence
dimension /
score
Draft general
acts and
strategies with
consultation
procedure
dimension /
score
REGULATION AND RIGHTS
Additional
content (AC)
Legal requirement (Art. 10-12
FOI)
Minimum content
(MC)
Text of the stat- Searchable
ute and general official journal
acts – 1
of the local
Official journal government
of the local gov- + + 1
Laws and
other regulations
regulating their
scope of affairs
Information on
the laws and other
regulation – 1 some,
2 – extensive
ernment – 2
Justification
of the act
– 1 some, 2
extensive
5
cleansed
version of
legal text and
decisions +1
statistical information (party
structure, socio-demographcouncil meetic distribution)
ings – minutes
and conclusions - + 1
–1
video/audio
council working - +2
6
Summary of the
procedure for
exercising rights
or fulfilling the
obligations – 1 main
steps, 2 – detail
dimension /
score
councillors’
questions and
answers of the
mayor + 1
council meetings – official
documents – 1
Additional
content
(AC)
Legal texts – 1some, 2 – extensive
DECISION-MAKING
council meetings – agenda
– 1, with documents + 1
15
Annual and
other program
documents,
strategies, instructions, work
reports,
6
PLANNING AND REPORTING
strategy - 1
annual work
plan - 1
interactive
urban plan
+1
urban planning
document – 1,
other documents projects - 1
related to the lo- other program
cal government
document – 1
activities
5
bodies – 1
attendance - 1
dimension /
score
PARTICIPATION
draft general
acts / strategies
–1
analyses,
graphs, opinion
survey + 1
Information on
public calls and
competitions,
and relevant
documents
justification – 1
consultation
procedure – 1
documentation
of the consultation procedure
(comments,
opinion,
feedback, justification) – 1
plan of regulatory activities
-1
home page
visible icon + 1
COMPETITIONS
employment - 1
competition for
funds – 1
final decision + 1
5
housing and offices
–1
public areas – 1
culture, sports,
other – 1
final regulation
+1
5
dimension /
score
Information on
internal organisation, names
and contacts of
the officials and
heads of units
INTERNAL ORGANISATION
AND FUNCTIONING
general information
on the structure – 1
public services – 1
names and contact
of the officials - 1
contacts of
employees
– +1 some,
+2 all
info on public services
names and contact
with details
of heads of units – 1 and links
- +2
organisational structure +1
4
dimension /
score
OPERATIONAL
TRANSPARENCY
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
transparency
type / total
score
FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY
dimension /
score
FISCAL
Legal requirement (Art.
10-12 FOI)
Information
on financial
resource,
annual budget
and execution
of the budget,
financial
reports
Minimum
content (MC)
simplified
budget explanation for citizens
+1
annual budget
for previous
three years – 1
other financial
information + 1
transparency
type / total score
COMMUNICATION TRANSPARENCY
dimension /
score
Additional
content (AC)
financial
resources - 1
annual budget
–1
budget execution report – 1
16
Legal requirement (Art. 10-12
FOI)
5
Registers and
databases, or
information on
the procedure
of accessing
registers and
databases
14
OPEN DATA
Minimum content
(MC)
registers and
databases – 1 some,
1 extensive
Additional
content
(AC)
interactive
or searchable + 2
information on the
procedure of access
to registers and
databases – 1
3
other financial
reports - 1
dimension /
score
Information on
granted financial aid, grants
or donations,
including a list
of beneficiaries and the
amounts
dimension /
score
Information on
public procurement procedures, tender
documents, and
execution of
the contract;
dimension /
score
DONATIONS
total amount
-1
criteria for
allocation + 1
specified
amount (per
type/group of
user) – 1 some,
2 extensive
5
list of beneficiaries -1 some,
2 extensive
dimension /
score
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
annual public
procurement
plan – 1
link to national
public procurement portal + 2
Other
information
(FAQ, news,
press releases,
information on
activities)
public procurement procedure
-1 simple, 2 in
detail
reports on the
execution of
the contracts
–1
conflict of
interest declaration – 1
information on
right of access to
information – 1
name and contact
of the officer – 1
forms – 1
fees – 1
annual
reports + 1
link to IC
webpage
+1
5
OTHER INFORMATION
frequently asked
information / questions – 1
forms + 1, if
searchable
+1
news – 1
search
engine- 1
press releases – 1
news archive - 1
contacts info – 1
6
web form
+1
home page visible
icon + 1
information on
activities (projects,
events, etc.) – 1
list of public
procurement
contracts - 1
contracts and
annexes – 1
information
on how to
exercise the
right to access
to information,
and reuse information with the
contact of information officer;
fees for access
to information
and re-use of
information,
according to predefined criteria
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
calendar of
events - 1
multimedia– 1
social media
–1
forums – 1
online
surveys – 1
bilingual
web page –
1 for each
language,
incorporating universal
design
(accessible
to people
with disabilities) -1
6
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
437
The findings. As the purpose of the research is to assess the website content of selected cities in order to determine to what extent they promote
transparency and openness and to construct a measurement instrument
which could be further used and developed, it is possible to present and
to draw conclusions related only to summary statistics. The findings of
the research are presented in Table 3 (scores), Table 4 (percentages) and
Table 5 (ranks), in the Appendix.
When transparency types are analysed, there is a difference between two
groups – the selected cities score lower on decision-making and participation (61 per cent, average score 9.81 out of 16) and financial transparency
(60 per cent, average 9.75 out of 16), in comparison to operational transparency (76 per cent, average 15.25 out of 20) and communication (76
per cent, 10.69 out of 14). These results, although not statistically tested,
indicate that the control of local governments in their decision-making
and financial activities might be questioned, along with the role of citizens in the decision-making and participation in the political process and
financial control.
If the TOI levels of individual cities are analysed, it is possible to detect
that only one city scores higher than the minimum content score which
is 66 (Rijeka, score 75, 113 per cent of the content). Data for Rijeka
also show that the financial dimension score (87 per cent) is lower than
for other dimensions (112-115 per cent for the other three dimensions).
There is also a group of four cities which are close to the minimum score
with 80 per cent and more content on their websites (Pula – 86 per cent,
Slavonski Brod – 84 per cent, Osijek and Bjelovar – 80 per cent each). On
the other hand, there are three cities whose score is very low: Sisak – 45
per cent, Vinkovci – 53 per cent, and in particular Velika Gorica with only
16 per cent content on the website and the decision-making transparency
especially critical (only 6 per cent of the content). In addition, looking
The first question is to what extent Croatian cities are transparent and
open when measured by their website content, and which information are
they most inclined to present to their constituencies. By looking at the
TOI scores table (3) and percentages table (4) it is possible to conclude
that, generally, Croatian cities present less than three quarters of the minimum content required by law (69 per cent) – out of a possible total of 66
points, together they score an average of 45.5 (Median 46, St.Dev 14.03).
Given the fact that the law has been in force for more than a year and
that previous regulation also required that most of the analysed content
be accessible on the website, the problem seems even more significant.
438
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
at the ranks (Table 5), the highest number of first ranks, if we count 13
dimensions and 4 types belongs to Rijeka (13), followed by Kaštela (4),
Osijek (3), Varaždin (3) and Bjelovar (3).
Figure 2: TOI Scores
Source: created by authors
When specific types of information are analysed, Table 3 indicates some
interesting findings. First, 16 cities score the lowest in the participation
subdimension (average score 1.5, other scores ranging from 2.625 to
5.313) – nine cities do not display any information on the consultation
procedure or other types of participation in decision-making.28 Further
low scores are achieved in the following subdimensions: open data –
2.125; donations – average 2.625 or 55 per cent, and regulation and rights
– 2.688 or 44 per cent). The data indicate that there is a lack of open data
(registers, databases) offered by cities to their citizens, who could make
use of these data by creating additional value (e.g. a smart phone application), controlling their activities or researching. There is also a problem
with transparency in spending public money – the information on donations, aids and grants is not visible enough, and clear criteria are rarely
displayed (none of the cities scores above the minimum content). These
findings, however, are not surprising, since Croatia also scores highly on
28
The FOI law requires that the consultation procedure is conducted on any general
act or document which affects the interest of the citizens. The information on the public
discussion related to urban planning was not taken into account because it is regulated by a
special law which has been in force for some time.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
439
A slightly positive outlook is provided by the operational transparency and
communication transparency scores. The average is 76 per cent (15.25
out of 20); three cities scored more than 100 per cent on operational
transparency (Rijeka – 110 per cent, Bjelovar – 105 per cent, Pula 100 per
cent), while 12 cities scored 60 per cent and above. Only Velika Gorica,
as in other dimensions, achieved a low score (25 per cent), but this is still
the best result of this city when types are concerned. However, these data
should not be viewed too enthusiastically – operational transparency contains two ‘easy’ dimensions, which do not have political weight – planning
and reporting – neither yet considered too seriously by either local governments or citizens, and internal organisation – the data on the structure,
officials, and administrators, with their contacts, which is the second best
score in total (4,875, or 120 per cent above minimum 5 points). Similarly, communication transparency is well developed, with a total score of
10.69 out of 14 (76 per cent) and the best score on the other information
dimension – 5.13 out of 6 (85.5 per cent), which includes the displaying
of news, contacts, social media, search engine and similar communication
tools and instruments. Rijeka again scores significantly higher than the
minimum required content – 233 per cent, while 10 cities score below 6,
but still above 70 per cent (except Velika Gorica, with 33 per cent). However, the use of communication tools to engage in a dialogue with citizens
is still not widespread among the selected cities.
Our second concern was to try to determine a possible connection between the TOI score and other variables, such as population, budget size
and capacity (FWC and SWC). However, given the size of the sample and
the data, the Kendall Tau measure of association did not show significant
association between the TOI total score and the budget size, population
size and capacity measures, although the result of Kendall Tau for the
relationship between the TOI score and population was the closest to the
29
Croatia ranks 61 among 175 countries in the 2014 Corruption Perception Index of
Transprency International (with Denmark ranking first as the least corrupt). Some positions
are occupied by more than one country. See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
the corruption perception index.29 In addition, insufficient transparency
when it comes to displaying information on the scope of affairs of city
governments, legal documents, and summaries of procedures and rights
indicate the obstacles or at least insufficient help given to citizens when
they wish to exercise their rights or to obtain certain services. Fiscal data
is generally not problematic, although two cities score very low on this
dimension (Zadar and Sisak with 1 point).
440
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
level in which the null hypotheses could have been rejected. By looking at
the largest cities, with more than 100,000 inhabitants, the data shows that
the second largest city ranks second, while first and third rank sixth and
fourth. It is not possible to draw firm conclusions on the relation between
these variables.
In sum, there is enough evidence to conclude that selected Croatian cities
have still not achieved the minimum level of transparency and openness
required by the law. The cities score better on the dimensions of operational transparency and communication transprency than on the decision-making and participation transparency and financial transparency
dimensions, which indicates that they are more inclined to display information that does not carry political weight or might set in motion the accountability mechanism, such as information on their activities or simple
tweeting or news displaying. There are examples of cities which can be
considered leaders in the development of transparency and openness (Rijeka), but there also laggards which not only completely ignore their legal
obligations, but also omit the chance to use their websites as information
and communication tools with their citizens (Velika Gorica).
4. Conclusion
The importance of transparency for local government goes beyond pure
and intrinsic value, because it has significant instrumental value. It is considered to be an essential element of good local government and accountability. It may also serve as an indicator of the quality of governance at
the local level. A transparent and open local government uses different
means to provide citizens with information, to help citizens understand
and participate in decision-making, and to control the implementation of
decisions and policies, while effectively communicating with the public on
a regular basis in order to be able to respond to citizen demands.
Drawing on the current literature, the research presented in this article
aims to assess transparency at the local level in local government and to
devise an instrument which could be used or further developed in more
comprehensive research, as well as to assess its feasibility. The websites
of 16 cities in Croatia were analysed by applying the Transparency and
Openness Index (TOI) comprised of 13 subdimensions, grouped in four
dimensions of transparency and openness: decision-making and participation, financial transparency, operational transparency and communication.
441
Website analysis was chosen as convenient to assess the level of transparency, given the fact that the Internet is nowadays the most important
channel of communication. The limitation of the research relates to the
fact that the TOI does not reflect the differences in the quality of information (format, accuracy, and update frequency), website navigability,
design or user-friendliness; it focuses instead on the presence of certain
content, as a first step in e-government development. In addition, the
development of an instrument to assess website content may serve as a
good basis for continuing research and improvement of the instrument,
thus forming a composite measure together with the indices for other elements of website quality (e.g. design, format, etc.). However, since ICT
is constantly evolving, the moment the evaluation instrument has been
devised it becomes partially obsolete, since new technological solutions
are constantly raising the bar a bit higher. The application of the measurement instrument has additional practical value – it might be used by
practitioners as a basis for improving their websites. Additionally, from
a practical standpoint, but with possible significant impact on the level
of transparency, website analysis opens the door to the detection of best
practices and omissions, as well as to a learning process among peers benchmarking as determining performance standards among the group
of similar units, allows for detection of the best and the worst in the class,
the leaders, the followers, and the reluctants. The shaming and praising
might prove more effective than any formal pressure.
The research findings indicate that Croatian cities are failing to achieve
transparency and openness set internationally and defined in Croatian
legislation, achieving only 69 per cent of the defined standards. In addition, they are more inclined to disclose ‘light’ information that is not
loaded with political relevancy (service information and news), and which
cannot be ‘used against them’. So, they score highly on presenting content which concerns their everyday operations and activities (76 per cent)
and communicate with citizens via social media, often in languages other
than Croatian (76 per cent). However, they still resist involving citizens in
their decision-making by presenting relevant information and opening up
the channels of participation, such as public consultation (61 per cent).
They also show a reluctance to display information that concerns financial
arrangements and spending of public resources (60 per cent). The connection between variables such as population, budget size or capacity of
local government could not be established, given the small sample. The
problem of the size of local units may affect their use of ICT, both in the
sense of the capacity to develop and maintain websites and with regard to
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
442
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
the scope of affairs they perform (similar to Kaylor et al., 2001: 295). This
could also indicate the importance of the capacity of local units for good
governance and political accountability.
The research has also shown that the relationship between transparency
(as one-way communication) and openness (as two-way communication)
is not always clear. If transparency is considered to be a prerequisite for
openness, than it is to be expected that transparency is achieved prior to
openness, or to a greater extent. However, our research, at least at this
stage, shows that openness may occur without transparency. It actually
indicates that it is not so much about ways or channels of communication;
they may make communication easier or more user-friendly, and they
may reach more people or communicate more information. It is actually
about the content that is communicated and the consequences of that
communication – whether it allows for political and social engagement or
is used for the purpose of pursuing individual goals, pure entertainment
or political marketing.
Although the general research findings show that the websites of Croatian
cities do not display a satisfactory level of information, it is in line with the
conclusion (more than a decade old) that most analyses indicate that “[g]
overnment websites are not making full use of available technology, and
there are problems in terms of access and democratic outreach (West, cited by Kaylor et al., 2001: 295). However, 15 years later many cities worldwide use their websites as an effective tool for citizen engagement and
control mechanism, as well as a source of information which allows for a
creation of additional social and economic value (e.g. the reuse of public
sector information, or open data). In addition, the 16 cities investigated
might be considered to be among the highest achievers, since smaller
cities could have more problems in regularly updating their websites and
allowing access to information. Thus, even lower scores might be expected in future research which would encompass a greater number of local
units. Consequently, stricter monitoring of the implementation of the law
is advisable, together with raising awareness among citizens with regard
to what they should expect to be displayed on their local units’ websites,
in order to enable them to effectively exercise their citizen powers. The
local governments’ full implementation of website content as defined by
law could lead to a regained trust on the part of citizens.
In the second stage of the research, besides the assessment of quality of
information and e-services, the inclusion of a greater number of cities and
the introduction of additional variables, such as political party affiliation of
local officials, regional distribution, strength of economic activity or civil
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
443
society organisations, might shed light on the incentives for greater transparency and openness, or factors that impede the development of transparency, and thus accountability and good governance at the local level.
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TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS
IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE:
A CASE OF CROATIAN CITIES
Summary
Transparency and openness are a key concern in contemporary democracies,
at both the national and subnational level. Dissemination of public information is a prerequisite for citizens to exercise their individual and political rights.
Transparency is also a prerequisite for accountability. The openness of public
authorities to a dialogue with the citizenry has become a key ingredient of the
democratic process. Citizens are able to take part in a shared responsibility for
the decisions of public authorities. The paper presents an evaluation of the websites of 16 Croatian cities. The Transparency and Openness index, composed of
four dimensions, and further developed through 13 components, has shown that
cities still do not comply with transparency standards, even when those standards
are legally prescribed. They are inclined to disclose ‘light’ information, which is
not politically loaded and has no direct connection to the accountability mechanism. It is possible, however, to detect innovative leaders, who promote transparency and employ their websites accordingly.
Key words: transparency, openness, local governance, city websites, Croatia
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
447
TRANSPARENTNOST I OTVORENOST
LOKALNOG JAVNOG UPRAVLJANJA:
SLUČAJ HRVATSKIH GRADOVA
Sažetak
Transparentnost i otvorenost je glavna briga suvremenih demokracija, podjednako na nacionalnoj i subnacionalnoj razini. Širenje javnih informacija je
preduvjet da bi građani mogli ostvariti svoja pojedinačna i politička prava.
Transparentnost je također preduvjet za odgovornost. Otvorenost javnih vlasti dijalogu s građanima postala je ključni sastojak demokratskog procesa.
Građani postaju sposobni preuzeti dio odgovornosti za odluke javnih vlasti. U
radu se evaluiraju internetske stranice 16 hrvatskih gradova. Indeks transparentnosti i otvorenosti koji se sastoji od četiri dimenzije i 13 komponenti pokazuje
da gradovi još nisu dosegli standarde transparentnosti čak i kad su ovi pravno
propisani. Gradovi su skloni objavljivati manje važne informacije, koje nemaju
političku težinu ni direktnu vezu s mehanizmom političke odgovornosti. Ipak,
moguće je pronaći inovativne lokalne vođe koje promoviraju transparentnost i
koriste gradske internetske stranice u tu svrhu.
Ključne riječi: transparentnost, otvorenost, lokalno javno upravljanje, gradske
internetske stranice, Hrvatska
448
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
Appendix
Table 3: TOI scores in Croatian cities
TRANSPARENCY TYPE
Score
DECISION-MAKING AND PARTICIPATION
FINANCIAL
OPERATIONAL
COMMUNICATION
16
16
20
14
5
6
5
66
Plan & report
Internal org
6
Public calls
5
Reg & rights
3
Public procur
4
Donations
5
Fiscal
5
Participation
6
∑
Split
4
5
3
12
3
1
5
9
4
4
4
6
18
2
4
6
12
51
Rijeka
5
7
6
18
6
3
5
14
4
5
5
8
22
4
3
14
21
75
Osijek
5
5
4
14
4
5
2
11
4
4
4
4
16
2
5
5
12
53
Zadar
4
5
0
9
1
1
5
7
3
4
3
4
14
2
3
4
9
39
Velika Gorica
1
0
0
1
0
1
2
3
1
1
1
2
5
0
0
2
2
11
Slavonski
Brod
3
6
4
13
5
5
5
15
2
5
3
5
15
3
5
5
13
56
Pula
3
6
2
11
5
3
5
13
4
5
5
6
20
3
2
8
13
57
Karlovac
2
3
0
5
3
3
5
11
1
4
3
6
14
2
4
5
11
41
Sisak
3
4
0
7
1
1
4
6
1
4
3
2
10
2
1
4
7
30
Varaždin
5
4
4
13
3
5
3
11
3
5
5
4
17
2
2
7
11
52
Šibenik
4
6
0
10
3
3
0
6
3
3
4
6
16
1
6
4
11
43
Dubrovnik
4
5
0
9
3
2
4
9
3
3
4
6
16
2
1
4
7
41
Bjelovar
5
5
0
10
3
4
3
10
3
6
5
7
21
3
4
5
12
53
Kaštela
4
5
0
9
4
5
6
15
4
2
4
4
14
3
4
4
11
49
Samobor
3
5
1
9
4
0
5
9
1
4
4
5
14
1
4
5
10
42
Vinkovci
4
3
0
7
3
0
4
7
2
3
4
3
12
2
4
3
9
35
Mean
Median
St.Dev
3.688 4.625
4
5
1.5
0
∑
∑ ∑
Open
data
Access
to info
Other
info
/ TOI
dimension
∑
6
Decision
making
5
Regulation
City
5
∑
9.813 3.188 2.625 3.938 9.75 2.688 3.875 3.813 4.875 15.25 2.125 3.25 5.313 10.69 45.5
9.5
3
3
4,5
9.5
3
4
4
5
15.5
2
4
5
11
46
1.138 1.627 2.033 3.92 1.558 1.821 1.569 3.454 1.195 1.258 1.047 1.707 4.187 0.957 1.653 2.725 3.928 14.03
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
449
Level of TO
score
Decision-making &
participation
Financial
Operational
Communication
Total
16
16
20
14
66
total Croatia
(16 cities)
0.61
0.60
0.76
0.76
0.69
Split
0.75
0.56
0.9
0.85
0.77
Rijeka
1.12
0.87
1.1
1.5
1.13
Osijek
0.87
0.68
0.8
0.85
0.8
Zadar
0.56
0.43
0.7
0.64
0.59
Velika Gorica
0.06
0.18
0.25
0.14
0.16
Slavonski Brod
0.81
0.93
0.75
0.92
0.84
Pula
0.68
0.81
1.00
0.92
0.86
Karlovac
0.31
0.68
0.7
0.78
0.62
Sisak
0.43
0.37
0.5
0.5
0.45
Varaždin
0.81
0.68
0.85
0.78
0.78
Šibenik
0.62
0.37
0.8
0.78
0.65
Dubrovnik
0.56
0.56
0.8
0.5
0.62
Bjelovar
0.62
0.62
1.05
0.85
0.8
Kaštela
0.56
0.93
0.7
0.78
0.74
Samobor
0.56
0.56
0.7
0.71
0.63
Vinkovci
0.43
0.43
0.6
0.64
0.53
∑
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Table 4: TOI scores – Percentages
450
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 415–450
Operational transparency - rank
reg/rights
activities - competitions
planning and reporting
internal organisation
Communication transparency rank
open data
4
5
5
5
6
7
11
2
4
1
6
5
3
3
6
4
4
1
1
1
1
2
1
6
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
10
1
Osijek
3
3
9
5
4
2
1
5
2
4
4
1
14
6
1
6
5
10
3
6
2
5
Zadar
5
4
4
9
11 7
5
5
8
7
14 11
2
8
6
6
12 10
6
6
10 10
Velika Gorica
7
5
3
8
14 10 16 16
8
9
16 11 14 11 13 16 16 15
8
16 16 16
Slavonski Brod
13
6
7
1
3
3 11
2
2
1
2
1
2
7
11
2
12
8
2
2
2
5
Pula
6
7
8
14
2
5 11
2
6
3
2
6
2
3
1
2
1
3
2
2
12
2
Karlovac
9
8
13 10 10 9 15 14
8
4
7
6
2
8
13
6
12
3
4
6
4
5
Sisak
11
9
10 11 13 8 11 12
8
8
14 11
9
10 13
6
12 15
7
6
14 10
TOI rank
SWC rank
FWC rank
Population rank
Budget rank
other info
public proc
6
1
access to info
donations
11 13
12 15
Financial transparency - rank
1
2
Participation
1
2
Decision-making
Split
Rijeka
city
Regulation
financial
Decision-making and participation rank
Table 5: TOI scores – Ranks
Varaždin
8
10
2
6
5
3
1
12
2
4
7
1
12
5
6
2
1
10
4
6
12
3
Šibenik
10 11
5
4
8
6
5
2
8
8
7
6
16
6
6
12
5
3
4
14
1
10
Dubrovnik
4
6
16 10 7
5
5
8
6
7
10
9
6
6
12
5
3
7
6
14 10
Bjelovar
15 13 14
3
6
1
5
8
5
7
5
12
2
6
1
1
2
3
2
4
5
12
4
Kaštela
14 14 15
7
7
7
5
5
8
1
4
1
1
8
1
15
5
10
4
2
4
10
Samobor
12 15
2
9
7 11
5
7
6
4
15
2
8
13
6
5
8
5
14
4
5
Vinkovci
16 16 16 12 12 8
14
8
7
7
15
9
9
11 12
5
14
6
6
4
15
1
5
E-Democracy and E-Participation
in Slovenian Local Self-Government
Simona Kukovič*
Marjan Brezovšek**
The paper analyses the usage of e-participation tools in
Slovenian municipalities. The paper originates from the
theory of e-democracy in connection with information
and communication technology (ICT). ICT allows citizen participation and inclusiveness in the processes of
decision-making by use of various e-participation tools
(e-contact, e-forum, e-survey, e-petition, etc.). An emphasis is placed on local democracy and its various forms, i.e.
representative, market, network and (most importantly for
this paper) participatory democracy, one of the increasing
elements of which is also e-participation. We analysed the
official web pages of all 211 Slovenian municipalities and
*
Simona Kukovič, PhD, Research and Teaching Assistant, Faculty of Social Sciences,
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia (dr. sc. Simona Kukovič, asistentica Fakulteta društvenih
znanosti, Sveučilište u Ljubljani, Slovenija, e-mail: [email protected])
**
Marjan Brezovšek, PhD, Full Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of
Ljubljana, Slovenia (prof. dr. sc. Marjan Brezovšek, Fakultet društvenih znanosti, Sveučilište
u Ljubljani, Slovenija, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
342.721:353(497.4)
353:004.7(497.4)
452
Kukovič, S., M. Brezovšek (2015) E-Democracy and E-Participation in Slovenia ...
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
found that while all municipalities offer e-access and various forms of e-consultations to its citizens, other e-participation tools can rarely be found. In addition, a comparative analysis of survey results from 2006 and 2009 shows
that the number of municipalities which offer diverse tools
of e-participation is slowly decreasing.
Key words: participatory democracy, ICT, e-democracy,
e-participation, municipalities, Slovenia
1. Introduction: the Role of E-Participation
in E-Democracy
In the last decade there has been much talk of apathy, a democratic deficit, people turning away from politics, declining voter turnout and decreasing membership of political parties. However, there is also real evidence that people can be mobilised to participate even in this ‘apathetic’
age by using new information communication technologies (ICT). ICT
can be used to provide input, bring political processes closer to the citizens and serve as a tool to actively follow events and issues. The inevitable
interaction between society and technology is known as e-democracy. At
least the following three aspects of e-democracy should be examined: 1)
the importance of an active civil society for democratic action, 2) the development of information-communication capabilities that support this
kind of action in the operational civil sphere, and 3) the knowledge of
the role of ICT as a key driving force of the new information society era
(Pičman Štefančič, 2008: 19). A clear correlation of these factors is crucial
when we consider the future of e-democracy, in order to offer the civil
society new opportunities for communication, information and participation, and for social organizations to contribute to the development of new
processes, relationships and attitudes. The introduction of new technologies in democratic processes has a minimum of four effects: improving the
condition of being informed about society; providing transparent functioning of the authorities; expanding citizens’ participatory performance
and increasing the deliberative performances in the civil sphere (Pičman
Štefančič, 2008: 24).
Before we delve deeper into the analysis of one of these four effects – i.e.
the expansion of participatory performance for citizens – we must first
453
explain the concept of e-democracy. Oblak (2003: 135) claims that there
is no clear and unambiguous answer to the question what e-democracy
is. Furthermore, this term cannot be described by a single unanimous
and undisputed definition. Clift (2006) observes that in an e-democracy, the Internet can enhance the existing democratic processes and increase possibilities for interaction between groups and individuals with
decision-makers. Furthermore, the Internet enables the decision-makers
to obtain more information and data about the requirements and preferences of the citizens. Therefore, Clift sees the Internet as a tool in the
context of e-democracy that offers new opportunities for both communication and participation between citizens and the state (Clift, in Riley,
Riley, 2003: 11). According to Clift, e-democracy represents the use of
ICT and strategies within the political and governmental processes at the
international, national and local levels by democratic agents, such as citizens and voters, political organizations, elected officials, the government
and the media. E-democracy allows greater active participation of citizens
in direct forms of involvement (Clift, 2004). Hacker and van Dijk (2000)
define e-democracy as the implementation of democratic practices without time and space restrictions or any other physical limitations through
ICT and computer communication. These new democratic practices are
thus an addition or an upgrade to existing democratic practices. Oblak
(2003: 135) notes that e-democracy is not a project that would compete
with existing democratic systems, but rather that it is compatible with a
variety of existing institutions; in practice, however, e-democracy is often
portrayed as a project trying to correct the deficiencies of institutions.
Therefore, e-democracy is not a new type or form of democracy, but simply an adaptation of existing forms to new circumstances.
However, e-democracy is not only access to public information on the
websites of government and public institutions, nor is it merely the ability
of citizens to communicate with their political representatives via e-mail.
E-democracy is a set of electronic tools that affords citizens the possibility
of shaping opinions – in other words, citizens become co-designers of the
opinions published on the websites of political decision-makers and are,
therefore, public. E-democracy’s ability to enable a greater democratisation of political life rests upon a minimum of three assumptions (Oblak,
2003: 28–31):
1. Simplicity, accessibility and interactivity of the technology: this is primarily
a phenomenon of modern society, which presents a problem of spatial,
temporal and physical barriers that become irrelevant when using ICT.
Information technology is simple and universally accessible.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
454
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
2. Revitalisation of the role of a citizen: the principle refers to the need to
redefine the role of a citizen. It is necessary to find new ways in which we
could encourage citizens to perform public actions, for which ICT offers
a simple solution.
3. Entry of citizens in decision-making processes: the active involvement of
citizens, where political institutions also play an important role, which
enables citizen participation.
An essential element of e-democracy is the construction of new contemporary participatory channels. Over the last few years, participation has
become a highly political issue, and e-participation is seen as a major
factor in this development. Some see e-participation as a solution to many
democratic challenges, while others see it as a threat, particularly because
of digital divide challenges. There are also some who see it as largely irrelevant (European E-Participation Summary Report, 2009: 5). The reality
is probably a mixture of all three, so the task is to steer a careful path to
ensure that the benefits realised outweigh all else.
E-participation is the central core of e-democracy because in this sphere
the democratic contribution of ICT is most direct – new technologies
bring to the decision-making processes opportunities for collaboration,
participation and co-decision-making of citizens. E-participation refers to
all forms of active civic involvement and technology-based communications, whether it be just giving views and opinions, interactive participation in the preparation of proposals or even equal (co)-deciding (Pičman
Štefančič, 2008: 43). E-participation is seen by so many political agents
as a solution to the increasingly significant issue of the democratic deficit
at all levels of the political system. Nevertheless, the reality of e-participation is somewhat different, because it is not a definitive solution to
the low political participation of citizens. Participation possibilities are
also dependent on the willingness of citizens to use the opportunities that
ICT offers for their active participation and to become more informed
voters and actors in social life. Certainly, e-participation as one of the
(most) important aspects of e-democracy can help in tackling some of the
key problems of the democratic deficit in representative democracies (see
Oblak, 2000: 121).
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has developed a three-stage model of e-participation or involvement of citizens
in political decision-making (Coleman, Gøtze, 2001: 13):
1. Information: a one-way relationship between the state and its citizens,
in which they actively and passively acquire information, which is a basis
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
455
and a prerequisite for political participation (for example, the official
website).
2. Consultation: a two-way relationship between the state and its citizens,
in which the state obtains feedback in the form of citizen opinions. The
state defines the problem and wants people’s opinions (e.g. online consultations on legislative proposals).
The foundation of democracy is the active participation of citizens in public life at both the national and local level. Local authorities are, in fact,
one of the main pillars of any democratic regime (Haček, 2010: 43); furthermore, the right of citizens to participate in public affairs is one of the
fundamental principles of democracy. A low level of participation in the
democratic process is both a concern and an obstacle to the functioning
of local democracy. More important forms of direct participation of citizens in local democracy exist in democratically elected local government
bodies. It is therefore necessary to create systems of local democracy in
which citizens have the greatest opportunity to participate. The use of
e-participation is an important step in this direction.
In this paper we analyse the usage of e-democracy and tools of e-participation in Slovenian municipalities in a comparative perspective to previous comparable research studies, and identify which types of local communities are most open to e-participation. We also analyse the views of
Slovenian mayors with respect to e-participation and the involvement of
citizens in local issues in order to explain the results of the primary analysis. At the same time, based on the theoretical assumptions, we will verify
if opportunities for citizen e-participation are indeed increasing in terms
of the diversity of e-participation tools, and the number of municipalities
that offer their citizens such tools.
3. Active participation: a partnership between the state and its citizens,
where citizens are actively involved in shaping public policy and decision-making about such policies, although the final decision is always taken by the state; a citizen in this relationship is recognised as a major player in the field of initiating, designing and making decisions about public
policies (e.g. a referendum). 456
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
2. Different Concepts of Local Democracy:
Participatory Democracy and E-Participation
New opportunities for civic political action have emerged in the contemporary societal transformation process that is often considered to lead
towards a post-modern information society (Keskinen, 1999). The rapid
development and diffusion of new ICT provides various political agencies
with new tools, channels and methods which can be utilised in order to
transform closed representative democracy systems into more open and
communicative ones, and to facilitate new forms of authentic civic political action (Malina, 2003; Hoff et al., 2000). Therefore ICT has an important role in the process of redefining and reformulating modern liberal
democracies (Hoff et al., 2000: 1; Bellamy, 2000: 33; Häyhtiö, Keskinen,
2005). ICT means that whole new sets of concepts and practical solutions
can be articulated when different types of e-participation are manifested
in modernised societies (Coleman, Gøtze, 2001). The common notion
for inclusive political governance is that citizens must be connected to the
political regime (OECD, 2008).
E-participation has a considerable potential to change broader interactions
between citizens and (local) government, and it can also improve the overall quality of engagement and decision-making whilst widening the involvement of all citizens. In recent years the existing concepts of local democracy
and governance have been transformed (Frissen et al., 2007) and the pressures and expectations regarding modern methods of efficiency, effectiveness and involvement of citizens began to increase – i.e. local government
should be more open to democratic accountability and broad participation.
ICT could reengineer representative democracy and replace it with more
direct forms. The discussion about democratic local governance has its
roots in early theories about participatory democracy.1
1
Consideration of the literature, which is both conceptual and reflects on actual
attempts to give local government/governance an institutional shape, should help to identify
the different concepts of local democracy. In an international comparative perspective, Naschold (1996: 298–300) suggested a distinction of four types: representative, industrial, user
and direct. These four types stand for different dimensions of participation, which according
to his empirical observations, serve as guiding principles in current local government reforms
– most often in specific combinations. A broader view has been proposed by Stoker (1991:
261–268), who took the well-known distinctions between hierarchy, market and network as
guiding principles for institutional transformation. Haus and Sweeting (2006) have combined both typologies and redefined the respective categories in a broader and more open
way. They proposed the following four categories of local democracy: representative, user,
network and participatory democracy.
457
Participatory democracy can be defined abstractly as a regime in which
adult citizens assemble to deliberate and vote on the most important political matters. Barber (1984: 117) states that participatory democracy
becomes possible through policy-making institutions and a high level of
education, which binds citizens to pursue the common good. However,
Barber (1984: 234) specifies that strong participatory democracy will not
develop through civic education and knowledge, but rather will arise when
people are given political power and channels of influence. Having attained these, they will perceive that it is necessary to acquire knowledge
in order to be able to make political decisions. Municipal websites must
provide citizens with both channels of political influence and information about political matters, so that those who participate can educate
themselves and formulate reasonable political arguments. Furthermore,
according to Pateman (1970: 42–43), public participation in community decision-making stabilises the community. A decision-making process
that allows public participation develops from the very start as a process
that perpetuates itself due to the effect of political participation. Participatory political processes have an impact upon the development of the
social and political capacities of citizens, and this positively influences the
act of participation which follows. Participation has an integrative effect
especially upon those citizens who take part in political activity, and thus
makes the acceptance of collective decisions easier.
According to the modern theory of participatory democracy, people’s political participation and deliberation are characterised by an aim to acquire
information and knowledge about political matters, so that political opinions or decisions can be argued competently. Knowledge is not usually
the starting point when opinions or decisions are formulated; information
about political issues is, by nature, contingent on the situation. The citizens who participate in political deliberations are assumed to possess the
ability to select relevant information which they can use to support their
arguments. Among the most basic principles of participatory democracy
is the idea that people learn through an opportunity to participate and by
utilising and judging the relevance of different types of information. Political information and knowledge are therefore given a certain utility value
in political argumentation; administrative information and knowledge of
societal matters are presented as having significant descriptive power regarding the circumstances. And ICT, with its various tools, definitely has
the potential to make (local) government more democratic and participatory through new channels for democratic involvement.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
3. E-Participation Tools
The introduction of ICT in democratic processes opens up new opportunities for civic participation. ICT enables e-democracy to offer a range
of different models of e-tools that allow either more or less active citizen
involvement in the democratic functioning of the government. According to their own interests, citizens can freely choose the desired form of
cooperation, whether it relates to the use of new technologies to easily
communicate initiatives, complaints and complements; convey criticism
and comments; express opinions, interests and points of view; gain online
access to earlier suggestions and the course of proceedings in connection
with those suggestions; launch petitions and collect signatures; file requests for information on topics in an open forum or just communicate
with decision-makers. The potential of e-tools is limited only by technological capabilities and the creativity of their creators; the final success of
e-tools depends primarily on the activities and the willingness of citizens
to use them.
The most frequently used tool is a classification based on the direct input of the participants.2 With the aim of creating a legitimate and rational categorisation, an alternative systematization of e-tools is proposed,
which considers both the nature of the activities of co-participants as well
as their contribution to openness and democratic decision-making structures:
1. Information e-tools: refer to both the dissemination and consummation
of information, whether the authors of such tools are citizens, civic groups
or rulers. Conceptually, such behaviour defines a rule in which one portion of the participants remain inactive. This group therefore comprises
various forms of e-access (e-mail alerts, e-browsers).
2. Communication e-tools: active participation of both the government as
well as civil society is present, while the latter is not an equal participant in
the decision-making processes. This category of e-tools refers to the group
of activities that require participant activation, but it does not predict
a direct correlation between this operation and the final decision. This
2
See also the classification of the Organization for Economic Integration and Development (OECD, 2003), which highlights three groups of e-tools, i.e. information, consultation and active participatory; similar classification of the features and content of power sites
can be found in Norris (2004: 21), who divides e-tools into information, communication
and action tools, as well as at the United Nations (United Nations, 2005: 20), which divide
participatory e-tools into e-information, e-consultation and e-decision making.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
459
category comprises e-forums (both those which connect with the level of
civil society and those engaging citizens and government representatives),
e-surveys and e-petitions.
3. Participative e-tools: this category represents a cluster of all those interactions between civil society and the state or decision-makers, which
require active involvement of the participants and expect a response from
the authorities. Furthermore, the latter can escalate from mere compulsory treatment of results of communication in decision-making structures
and the definition of given opinions to unconditional commitment to the
will expressed. According to written criteria, this group comprises formally regulated forms of e-consultation, e-election or e-referendum (Pičman
Štefančič, 2008: 57).
1. E-access is a fundamental and inevitable point of continuing e-democratic functioning; it represents the basis of transmission and acquisition
of relevant information to enable citizens to have equal and informed
access to the public sphere, participation in deliberative processes and active participation in the democratic functioning of modern societies. The
aim of this tool is to increase and improve citizen opportunities to access,
review and monitor all public information available online as well as the
results of their representatives’ actions and decisions in various bodies and
institutions at the national and local level. E-access is a strictly passive
tool, but nevertheless it is, in practice, the dominant e-tool (Trechsel et
al., 2003: 5).
2. E-surveys enable citizens to express their opinions on public affairs that
are pre-determined by the government. E-surveys can be checked for
opinions and possible public reactions to decisions made by the authorities. The aim of this tool is to determine the public pulse; with this tool, a
citizen can actively express his views, but to a limited extent (for example,
pre-modelled possible answers).
3. E-petitions allow citizens to become catalysts of political action – firstly,
to initiate a petition in response to a public issue, and secondly, to support
this initiative by signing it.
4. An e-forum is a tool that allows citizens to exchange views and opinions
about a public matter. The aim of this tool is to strengthen the process
There is no doubt that e-participation tools are one of the most prominent
attributes of e-democracy – whether it be applications that allow citizens
to passively extract relevant information or (inter) active applications.
E-participation can thus be implemented through a variety of tools:
460
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
of creating civic views through a deliberative confrontation, which can
take place before, after or independently of the political decision-making
process. On their websites, institutions of public authority can utilise this
tool to provide the opportunity for the exchange of interested citizens’
opinions and views.
5. E-consultation is an interactive technique that involves reverse communication between citizens and public authorities. This tool is used for integrating members of the public, experts and/or stakeholders, NGOs and
other public and political agents who have the option of commenting on
individual topics about which decisions are made in certain policy areas.
The aim of this tool is to cultivate a participatory/collaborative culture by
encouraging the general public, stakeholders and experts to participate in
the decision-making process.
6. An e-referendum allows citizens to participate directly in the decision-making process; their majority decision is binding for the public authority. The aim of this tool is to give citizens the opportunity to be clear
on specific procurement solutions that should be adopted.
7. E-voting is the digitalisation of the electoral process. It is intended to
enable citizens to vote for officers or representatives of public authorities.
This tool also includes additional mechanisms for online voter registration
and other operations that are necessary for democratically elected representatives. The aim of this tool is to increase the participation of citizens
in the electoral process.
8. Blogs contribute to strengthening political participation and expanding
the space for political freedom through communication, solicitation and
education (see Pičman Štefančič, 2008: 59–89; Kvas, 2005).
4. E-Participation in Slovenian Municipalities
Slovenia has clearly entered the path of the information society, which
provides an excellent basis for the introduction of technological developments in the democratic sphere at the state and local level. However, despite the defined strategic objectives and a clear commitment to
e-democracy or the participation and co-decision-making of citizens in
decision-making processes, the situation regarding the implementation
of strategies and achieving the objectives of general civic/citizen participation in decision-making processes is rather poor. As Delakorda notes
461
(2008: 2), it is alarming that Slovenia is lagging behind in the global implementation of e-participation tools; in 2004 it was in 41st place among
192 countries in the world, but in 2005 it was in 46th place. It is worth
noting that according to a common index of e-government in a UN study
conducted in 2008, Slovenia is ranked relatively well, coming in at 26th
place among 192 countries (which is the same place it was ranked in the
study in 2005). Delakorda (2008: 4) attributes this discrepancy between
the general level of development of e-government and the relative stagnation and backwardness of Slovenia in the field of e-democracy and
e-participation to the relatively late classification of e-democracy at the
strategic level of the development of e-government strategies in the Republic of Slovenia. From the UN report on the state of e-government,
which among other measures includes an index of electronic participation, it is clear that the situation in Slovenia in 2011 deteriorated in terms
of the quality and usability of government information, the services for
citizen participation in the design of public policies and in promoting citizen consultation and participation in decision-making. In the UN report
for the year 2009, the index had a value of 0.5143, and it ranked as the
20th place in the world. In the report for 2011, however, the ranking was
significantly worse as the index value was 0.2105, ensuring that it fell to
the 72nd place on the scale (along with Bolivia, China, Indonesia, Senegal, Grenada, Latvia, Georgia and the Philippines), or 24th place in the
indexed value. On the other hand, Slovenia has been awarded the UN
Excellence in Public Administration award (UNPSA 2012), Information
support for preparation of processing rules (IPP), in the category of improving participation in the field of decision-making and using new mechanisms (Institute for Electronic Participation, 2012). Both pieces of news
– even though they are conflicting – illuminate the current state of citizen
participation in the democratic processes and regulation in the context of
e-government, and they call for further reflection on the current challenges of e-participation in Slovenia. Based on these data, it can be said that
Slovenia’s e-government lacks a conceptual shift towards citizen-oriented
e-participation rooted in civil society.
The Slovenian government adopted a strategy for the implementation of
e-commerce in local communities (e-municipality) in 2003. The strategy
defines the guidelines for the introduction of e-commerce in local communities, and addresses problems, vision, success factors, objectives, institutional aspects and plans for the development of e-commerce communities. E-democracy is examined in the fifth chapter of the strategy, and
the e-services that municipalities have to provide to their citizens are also
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
462
listed (such as forums, chats, surveys, etc.). The strategy also proposes
regular weekly communication between citizens and the municipal administration. Municipalities must provide their citizens with the opportunity to participate, which includes sending proposals, questions, ideas and
opinions. According to the strategy, municipal employees must provide
at least one (written) response to every question, opinion or initiative;
they also have to argue whether or not the proposals, suggestions and
opinions of citizens were taken into account. In addition, the strategy
requires municipal employees to publish an online survey on their official
website before any major decision to verify the responses of citizens and
respond to the question regarding whether a particular decision or plan
is supported by citizens or not (Ministry of Information Society, 2003).
As we were interested in the actual state of e-democracy and e-participation in Slovenian municipalities, we analysed the official websites of
municipalities and conducted a review of the e-tools that individual municipalities offer to their citizens.3 First, we checked whether the municipality has an official website or not and, if it does, whether it allows for the
public to comment on published news. We then determined which e-participation tools are available to individuals. We were particularly attentive
to whether the municipalities have one of the most widely used e-tools:
i.e. e-access, e-survey, e-forum and e-mail.4
We found that all Slovenian municipalities, i.e. 211 (100 per cent), have
an official website which provides e-access to various official publications,
such as local regulations, tenders, contests, events, strategies, forecasts,
various reports, convocation of meetings of municipal councils (some-
3
The research project E-democracy and E-Participation in Slovenian Municipalities was
carried out at the Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes and Institutions in the second half of March and in the beginning of April 2013. The data show the
current state of e-tools for Slovenian municipalities, and thus their accuracy and relevance
are of limited duration.
4
In reviewing and analysing e-participation tools in Slovenian municipalities, we
found that they appear on portals, such as ‘e-občina.si’ or ‘savinjska-informative social portal’, where they have the option of publishing local news, as well as e-tools (for example,
an e-survey). There is also a portal called ‘MojaObcina.si’ which was created by a private
company and allows the associated municipalities (currently consisting of 31 municipalities;
12 of which are from the Central Slovenia statistical region) to publish local news and events
that registered users can comment on. Since one of the goals of this paper is comparability
with previous research on e-tools in Slovenian municipalities, we offer a similar methodology: we analysed only the official websites of the municipalities, and therefore we did not
include e-tools that appear in other portals in the analysis.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
463
times even minutes of meetings), applications, forms and more.5 If this
finding is compared with the results of previously conducted research
studies,6 we can see that the percentage of Slovenian municipalities with
an official website has increased, from 86.8 per cent in 2006 to 99.1 per
cent in 2009, and to the present 100 per cent. The same trend can be seen
with e-access; it was offered by 174 municipalities in 2006, which represents 84.9 per cent, while in 2009, there were 184 municipalities offering
e-mail access, or 87.6 per cent.
The next e-tool is the e-survey.8 We found that currently only 38 Slovenian
municipalities (18 per cent) have published an e-survey on their official
website.9 If we have seen an increase in the percentage of e-access compared to the previous research studies, the opposite trend is detected for
this e-tool. In 2006, 31.2 per cent of the municipalities used the e-survey
as a tool for e-participation; in 2009, the number fell to 19.5 per cent of
the municipalities. Even when using an e-forum, we found a reduction of
the number of municipalities that allow this type of e-participation tool.
In 2006, 12.7 per cent of the municipalities offered an e-forum to its cit5
We have detected that some municipalities have created a special application to
access public content, namely ‘e-commerce’ or ‘e-democracy’.
6
The source of data for the year 2006 (see Kvas, 2006) and for the year 2009 (see
Maček et al., 2009).
7
For example, applications designed as forms whereby citizens submit proposals,
opinions, questions, suggestions and others; municipalities have different names for such
applications, e.g. service of citizens, Kr.povej, Citizens Initiative, Review of citizens, Ask the Mayor, Contact Us, Citizens’ questions, Ask us, Questions, suggestions and criticisms of citizens, You
ask, the Mayor answers, E-initiatives and others.
8
Here we mention a few suggestions for designing surveys: the e-survey should concern the current events in the community and hot topics; the question should be clear; the
answers should be multifaceted and there should always be the option of a neutral response.
The time of survey questions varies depending on the topic or issue and relevance. The results are shown in figures, percentage and graphical form, and male and female responses
should be presented separately, as the answers often vary significantly between the sexes.
9
We took into account the presence of this e-tool on the official website of municipalities, even if at the time of measurement no survey was being carried out.
We were also interested in how municipalities provide opportunities for
citizens to contact or consult with the mayor and the municipal administration. We found that all Slovenian municipalities have a publicly available
e-mail address (either a general one, by sections or even by individual civil servants). Although the methods and applications of e-consultations vary
amongst municipalities,7 it can be said that all of the Slovenian municipalities allow citizens the opportunity to establish electronic communication.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
464
izens; data from 2009 already indicate a reduction in the use of e-forums
(6.7 per cent of municipalities); currently, there are only eight municipalities with an e-forum, which is 3.8 per cent.
When analysing the official websites of municipalities, we found that the
vast majority regularly updated their website with the publication of news
and (upcoming) events. We also noticed that quite a few municipalities
offer a subscription to an e-newsletter, which registered users receive in
their inbox. The interesting part is that only three (1.4 per cent) of the
211 municipalities enable commenting on posts.10
ordinary
urban
total
e-tools
number of
municipalities
municipalities
Table 1: E-tools in Slovenian municipalities
website
200
200
200
32
6
200
3
(100 %)
(100 %)
(100 %)
(16 %)
(3 %)
(100 %)
(1.5 %)
11
11
11
6
2
11
(100 %)
(100 %)
commenting
on
e-access e-survey e-forum
e-mail
news/posts
(100 %) (54.5 %) (18.2 %) (100 %)
0
(0 %)
211
211
211
38
8
211
3
(100 %)
(100 %)
(100 %)
(18 %)
(3.8 %)
(100 %)
(1.4 %)
Source: Research project E-demokracija in e-participacija v slovenskih občinah (E-democracy
and e-participation in Slovenian municipalities, 2013)
If we analyse the urban municipalities separately, we see that six (56 per
cent) out of a total of 11 urban municipalities in Slovenia are using e-surveys as a tool for e-participation; only two urban municipalities (18 per
cent) have an active forum on its official website. Out of these two urban
municipalities, only one (Municipality of Nova Gorica) offers an e-survey, and so it is the only municipality in Slovenia that offers its citizens
four e-participation tools (e-access, e-survey or consultation, e-forum and
e-mail). None of the urban municipalities allow commenting on public
announcements and news.11 Given the greater organisational and finan10
Seen in comparison with the year 2009; none of the contemporary Slovenian municipalities offer the option of entering comments below the post.
11
Seen in comparison with non-urban/ordinary municipalities; 32 (16 per cent) of
a total of 200 municipalities provide an e-survey to their citizens, six (3 per cent) have an
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
465
In the following analysis of e-tools in Slovenian municipalities, we
merged the collected data in groups of municipalities according to their
size in terms of population.12 When comparing the groups of municipalities in terms of size of population (see Table 2), we find that in the group
of municipalities with up to 3,000 inhabitants, only eight municipalities
out of 58 (13.8 per cent) use e-surveys or e-consultation. Even in the
group of municipalities with between 3,001 to 5,000 inhabitants, there
are only eight (out of 53) that use e-surveys, which amounts to 15.1 per
cent. In the next group (municipalities with between 5,001 and 10,000
inhabitants), nine of the 47 municipalities use e-surveys and e-consultation, which amounts to 19.1 per cent. In the group of municipalities with
between 10,001 and 15,000 inhabitants, there are 19 municipalities, out
of which six (31.6 per cent) use e-surveys and e-consultation. In the next
group (municipalities with between 15,001 to 20,000 inhabitants), only
two (11.8 per cent) of the 17 municipalities offer e-surveys or e-consultation; in the group of municipalities with between 20,001 and 30,000
inhabitants (eight municipalities), there is only one that uses such e-tools
(12.5 per cent). In the last two groups – i.e. the largest municipalities in
terms of population – there are nine municipalities. Out of seven municipalities in the group of between 30,001 and 100,000 inhabitants, three
(42.9 per cent) offer this type of e-tool; just one (50 per cent) of the two
largest Slovenian municipalities (over 100,000 inhabitants) uses e-surveys.
If we analyse these figures with reference to the total number of Slovenian
municipalities (38) that offer their citizens an e-survey, we find that 25
municipalities belong to the first three groups of municipalities (with up
to 10,000 inhabitants, a total of 158 municipalities), with the relative proportion of municipalities with an e-survey at 15.8 per cent. There are 13
municipalities in the group of municipalities with over 10,000 inhabitants
e-forum and three municipalities (1.5 per cent) allow visitors to comment on public announcements and news.
12
The municipalities were divided into the following eight groups: (1) municipalities
up to 3,000 inhabitants; (2) municipalities of 3,001 to 5,000 inhabitants; (3) municipalities of 5,001 to 10,000 inhabitants; (4) municipalities of 10,001 to 15,000 inhabitants; (5)
municipalities of 15,001 to 20,000 inhabitants; (6) municipalities of 20,001 to 30,000 inhabitants; (7) municipalities of 30,001 to 100,000 inhabitants and (8) municipalities of over
100,000 inhabitants (see Haček, 2011).
cial capabilities of the urban municipalities in comparison with the vast
majority of ordinary municipalities, a somewhat greater engagement and
willingness to facilitate the e-participation of citizens would be expected,
thereby strengthening e-democracy.
466
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
(a total of 53 municipalities) offering e-surveys, the relative proportion
being 24.5 per cent. We find similar results regarding the use of e-forums.
Out of the eight municipalities that use this e-tool, six of them are smaller municipalities of up to 10,000 inhabitants (a relative share of 3.8 per
cent), and two are larger municipalities with a population over 10,000 (a
relative share of 3.8 per cent). According to the collected data, it can be
said that citizens in larger municipalities tend to use e-surveys and e-forums for e-participation (in addition to e-access and e-mail) more often
than in smaller ones.
Table 2: E-tools in Slovenian municipalities – list of municipalities according to municipality size in terms of population
Group of
municipalities
number of
website
municipalities
e-tools
e-access e-survey e-forum
58
58
(100 %)
(100 %) (100 %) (13.8 %)
(17.8
%)
Municipalities of 3,001
to 5,000 inhabitants
53
53
2
(100 %)
(100 %) (100 %) (15.1 %) (3.8 %)
(100 %)
Municipalities of 5,001
47
47
47
(100 %)
(100 %) (100 %) (19.1 %) (2.1 %)
(100 %)
Municipalities of 10,001 19
(100 %)
19
19
(100 %) (100 %) (31.6 %) (0 %)
(100 %)
(100 %)
17
17
(100 %) (100 %) (11.8 %) (0 %)
(100 %)
(100 %)
8
8
(100 %) (100 %) (12.5 %) (0 %)
(100 %)
(100 %)
7
7
53
47
19
17
8
7
8
3
Municipalities up to
3,000 inhabitants
Municipalities over
100,000 inhabitants
58
e-mail
8
9
6
2
1
3
1
0
0
0
2
58
(100 %)
53
(100 %) (100 %) (42.9 %) (28.6 %) (100 %)
2
2
(100 %)
(100 %) (100 %) (50 %)
2
1
0
2
(0 %)
(100 %)
Source: Research project E-demokracija in e-participacija v slovenskih občinah (E-democracy
and e-participation in Slovenian municipalities, 2013).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
467
At this point, we will address the position of Slovenian mayors regarding
the participation and involvement of citizens.13 We asked mayors to indicate how important for local democracy they feel the listed requirements
are (from 1, ‘of little importance’ to 5, ‘very important’). As can be seen in
Table 3, the mayors assessed all statements as relatively important (all ratings are above the average value, which is 2.50). It can be concluded that
Slovenian mayors are in favour of citizens’ active and direct participation
in local issues; citizens must have the opportunity to express their views
before important decisions are made by municipal councillors, and furthermore, citizens must be actively involved in policy-making processes.
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Residents should participate actively and directly in making
important local decisions.
3.65
1.091
Residents should have the opportunity to make their
viewsknown before important local decisions are made
by elected representatives.
3.60
1.086
Council decisions should reflect a majority opinion
among residents.
4.17
0.911
Political representatives should make what they think are
the right decisions, independent of the current views of
local people.
3.28
1.301
Urban leaders should try to generate consensus and shared
valuesamong local citizens/groups.
4.42
0.824
The results of local elections should be mostly decisive for
determining municipal policies.
3.19
1.219
Source: Research project Styles of local political leadership (2014).
There are many ways of communicating with local people and allowing
people to let local politicians know what they think. We asked the mayors
which of the listed sources, instruments and methods of communication
are useful and effective to gain insight into what citizens think (Table 4).
13
The research project Stili lokalnega političnega vodenja (Styles of local political leadership) was conducted at the Centre for the Analysis of Administrative-Political Processes
and Institutions in spring 2014. The survey response rates were very good, as 130 out of 211
mayors (62 per cent) of Slovenian municipalities responded to the survey.
Table 3: Importance of local democratic requirements
468
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
Table 4: Methods of effective communication
Not
effective
Only effective
in special
circumstances
Effective
Citizens’ letters via the Internet
3.9
55.0
41.1
Citizens’ letters in the local press
9.3
48.8
41.9
Formalised complaints or suggestions
2.3
33.3
64.3
Petitions
18.8
62.5
18.8
Information on citizens’ position gathered
by the councillors
5.4
50.0
44.6
Information on citizens’ position gathered by
people working in local administration
2.3
41.5
56.2
Information on citizens’ position gathered by
the local parties
33.1
56.2
10.8
Public debates and meetings
0.8
27.1
72.1
Satisfaction surveys
11.7
56.3
32.0
Neighbourhood panels or forums
6.2
57.7
36.2
Forums via the Internet
30.0
56.9
13.1
Focus groups
24.0
63.6
12.4
Self-organised citizen initiatives
7.7
57.7
34.6
Referenda
19.2
60.0
20.8
0
4.6
95.4
Methods
Personal meetings in the town-hall
Source: Research project Styles of local political leadership (2014).
As can be seen, 30 per cent of mayors assessed forums via the Internet
as the most ineffective method of communication, 56.9 per cent assessed
them as only effective in special circumstances and only 13.1 per cent
assessed them as effective. This result can be connected with the fact that
the proportion of municipalities that offer e-surveys and e-forums to their
citizens has been decreasing since 2006. More than half of the mayors
assessed citizens’ letters via the Internet (55 per cent), petitions (62.5 per
cent), satisfaction surveys (56.3 per cent), focus groups (63.6 per cent)
and referenda (60 per cent) as only effective in special circumstances.
Mayors viewed personal meetings in the town hall (95.4 per cent), public
debates and meetings (72.1 per cent), and formalised complaints or suggestions (64.3 per cent) as the most effective methods. The results show
that mayors are still in favour of personal meetings with citizens: on average, they spend 6.3 hours per week in meetings with citizens; 3.1 per cent
of mayors communicate with citizens 1–3 times a month, 7.7 per cent of
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
469
mayors do so once a week, 14.6 per cent of mayors do so 2–4 times a week
and 74.6 per cent of the mayors in the survey communicate daily with the
citizens. We can conclude that Slovenian mayors support citizens’ active
inclusion in local public issues and processes, but they are still rather sceptical about the new technologies and tools of e-participation.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we were interested in the prevalence of e-democracy in
Slovenian municipalities in connection with the issue of the provision of
e-participation tools for citizens. We analysed the usage of e-participation
tools in Slovenian municipalities, and found that all municipalities (211)
have basic e-tools, i.e. an official website, e-access and e-mail, or allow
some form of e-consultations for citizens. However, as far as other e-tools
are concerned, we find that e-surveys are provided by 38 municipalities
out of 211 (18 per cent), whereas e-forums are only provided by eight municipalities out of 211 (3.8 per cent). If we compare the results with earlier
surveys from 2006 and 2009, we see that the number of municipalities
that have an official website and allow e-access and e-mail has increased,
while the proportion of municipalities that offer e-surveys and e-forums
to its citizens has decreased. We can also confirm that municipalities with
10,000 or more inhabitants are slightly more likely to choose (in addition
to e-access and e-mail) e-surveys and e-forums to encourage the e-participation of citizens.
According to our analysis, we can say that our initial assumption – i.e.
the increased number of municipalities that offer citizens e-participation
tools, and that the diversity of e-participation tools increases with the
expansion of ICT –is only partially true in the case of Slovenian municipalities. With the expansion of ICT, the number of municipalities that
have their official website and e-access, e-mail or any other form of e-con-
The expansion of e-democracy and e-participation tools along with it enhances the involvement of citizens in the decision-shaping processes to
involve the widest possible audience. E-democracy is not only important
at a national level, but also at a local level, underscoring the strategy of
the introduction of e-commerce in local communities (e-municipalities)
adopted in 2003. Although the strategy is intended to foresee exactly how
to introduce e-democracy in the functioning of municipalities, our analysis shows that it remains only a faint approximation of reality.
470
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
sultation (the minimum requirement of the Strategy, 2003) increased. At
the same time, the number of municipalities that offered e-surveys and
e-forums in previous years decreased. It is also notable that the number
of municipalities that offered its citizens a variety of e-tools decreased.
We were also interested in the opinions of mayors regarding local democracy; results show that mayors are in favour of citizen inclusion in
local public issues and processes, but prefer personal meetings instead of
e-participation tools. According to their opinions, new technologies are
seen as a good solution for informing citizens, but not as a useful form of
political participation or a useful tool for communication about key local
problems and issues.
Given that e-democracy is certainly one way into the future, and has
been hailed in many respects as the solution to the participation deficit
problems faced by modern developed democracies, Slovenia still requires
some work in this field. Slovenian e-government needs a conceptual shift
towards citizen-oriented and established e-participation by civil society
– the latter strengthens the capability of a democratic and legal state,
ensuring a high degree of social cohesion and justice, when eliminating
the causes of the financial and economic crisis. On the other hand, one
must be aware that e-participation tools do not guarantee success. When
setting up e-democracy and e-participation tools, the involvement of both
sides is necessary – i.e. institutions that will want to enable e-participation
and citizens who will want to participate.
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(ed.) Vregov zbornik. Ljubljana: European Institute for Communication and
Culture and Faculty of Social Sciences
Oblak, Tanja (2003) Izzivi e-demokracije (Challenges of E-Democracy). Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences
OECD (2003) Promise and Problems of E-democracy: Challenges of Online
Citizen Engagements. http://www.oecd.org/governance/public-innovation/
35176328.pdf
OECD (2008) Focus on Citizens: Public Engagement for Better Policy and Services. http://www.oecd.org/gov/focusoncitizenspublicengagementforbetterpolicyandservices.htm
Pateman, Carole (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Pičman Štefančič, Polona (2008) E-demokracija (E-Democracy). Ljubljana:
Uradni list Republike Slovenije
Riley, Thomas B., Cathia Gilbert Riley (2003) E-Governance to E-Democracy:
Examining the Evolution. http://www.electronicgov.net/pubs/research_papers/tracking03/IntlTrackRptJune03no5.pdf
Stoker, Gerry (1991) The Politics of Local Government. Basingstoke: Macmillan
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473
Trechsel, Alexander H., Kies Raphael, Mendez Fernando, Phillippe C. Schmitter
(2003) Evaluation of the Use of New Technologies in Order to facilitate Democracy in Europe: E-Democratizing the Parliaments and Parties of Europe.
http://www.erepresentative.org/docs/6_Main_Report_eDemocracy-inEurope-2004.pdf
United Nations (2005) United Nations Global E-Government Readiness Report
2005: From E-Government to E-Inclusion. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/
groups/public/documents/un/unp an021888.pdf
E-DEMOCRACY AND E-PARTICIPATION IN
SLOVENINAN LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
The paper analyses the usage of e-participation tools in Slovenian municipalities. The paper originates from the theory of e-democracy in connection with
information and communication technology (ICT). ICT allows citizen participation and inclusiveness in the processes of decision-making by use of various
e-participation tools (e-contact, e-forum, e-survey, e-petition, etc.). An emphasis
was placed on local democracy and its various forms, i.e. representative, market,
network and (most importantly for this paper) participative democracy, one of
the increasing elements of which is also e-participation. We analysed official web
pages of all 211 Slovenian municipalities and found that while all municipalities offer e-access and various forms of e-consultations to its citizens, other e-participation tools can only rarely be found. In addition, a comparative analysis of
the survey results from 2006 and 2009 shows that the number of municipalities
which offer diverse tools of e-participation is slowly decreasing.
Key words: participatory democracy, ICT, e-democracy, e-participation, municipalities, Slovenia
Summary
474
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 451–474
E-DEMOKRACIJA I E-PARTICIPACIJA U
SLOVENSKOJ LOKALNOJ SAMOUPRAVI
Sažetak
Analizira se upotreba instrumenata e-participacije u slovenskim lokalnim
samoupravnim jedinicama. Rad se temelji na teoriji e-demokracije u vezi sa
spoznajama o informacijsko-komunikacijskoj tehnologiji (IKT). IKT omogućuje sudjelovanje i uključivanje građana u procese donošenja odluka upotrebom
različitih instrumenata e-participacije (e-kontakt, e-forum, e-anketa, e-peticija,
itd.). Naglasak je stavljen na lokalnu demokraciju i njezine različite oblike,
tj. predstavničku, tržišnu, mrežnu i (najvažniju za ovaj rad) participativnu
demokraciju, čiji je jedan od rastućih elemenata također e-participacija. Analizirali smo službene internetske stranice svih 211 slovenskih jedinica lokalne
samouprave i našli da sve nude e-pristup i različite forme e-konzultacija, ali da
ostali instrumenti e-participacije postoje samo u rijetkim slučajevima. Dodatno, usporedna analiza rezultata anketa iz 2006. i 2009. pokazuje da se broj
jedinica lokalne samouprave koje nude raznovrsne instrumente e-participacije
sporo smanjuje.
Ključne riječi: participativna demokracija, IKT, e-demokracija, e-participacija, jedinice lokalne samouprave, Slovenija
LOKALNA DEMOKRACIJA
475
County Elections in Croatia:
On the Path to Genuine Regional Politics
Ivan Koprić *
Daria Dubajić**
Tijana Vukojičić Tomić***
Croatian counties were tailored with little consideration
for historical, natural, economic, social, and professional
criteria. They are rather small in size and population and
there are considerable differences between them. Subnational electoral system with proportional representation,
blocked lists and five per cent threshold causes deperso-
*
Professor Ivan Koprić, Full Professor and Head of the Chair of Administrative Science at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia, and president of the Institute of
Public Administration (redoviti profesor i predstojnik Katedre za upravnu znanost Pravnog
fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, predsjednik Instituta za javnu upravu iz Zagreba, e-mail:
[email protected])
**
Daria Dubajić, Assistant at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law,
University of Zagreb, Croatia (asistentica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, e-mail: [email protected])
***
Tijana Vukojičić Tomić, Lecturer at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty
of Law, University of Zagreb, Croatia (predavačica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog
fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, e-mail: [email protected])
UDK
352.075.31(497.5)
342.84:352(497.5)
476
Koprić, I., D. Dubajić, T. Vukojičić Tomić (2015) County Elections in Croatia ...
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
nalisation of local politics. In addition, only few political
parties and their political agendas could be identified as
regional. Political arena in the counties is still dominated
by national parties and their organizational branches while county elections are highly “nationalized” and subordinated to national elections. The analysis of congruence
between county and national governments, turnout rates
and electoral supply shows “second-orderness” of county
elections resulting in voters’ orientation towards national
elections and statewide parties. Counties are politically autonomous, but fiscally depend on the central state, which
in turn has a decisive influence on county voters’ political
behaviour at the county level – they turn to statewide parties just as counties turn to the state. The abolishment of
counties and introduction of true regions with broader autonomous scope of affairs in the Croatian territorial organization could contribute to a positive feedback of regional
electorate towards genuine regional politics.
Key words: counties, Croatia, electoral system, national
elections, county elections, county assembly, regional political parties, regional politics
1. Introduction
The territorial self-government in the Republic of Croatia is two-tiered,
with municipalities (općina) and towns (grad) at the municipal level and
counties (županija) at the second level.1 Between 1992 and 2001, counties were supposed to serve as the middle tier of government and were
1
The first draft of this paper was presented at XXII IPSA World Congress of Political Science Reshaping Power, Shifting Boundaries in Madrid, July 8–12, 2012, within panel
Regionalization of Regional Elections: Beyond Mid-Term and Second-Order Elections. The second draft of the paper was presented at Council for European Studies, Columbia University’s 20th International Conference of Europeanists Crisis and Contingency: States of Instability,
University of Amsterdam 2013, 25–27 June within Panel 087. Territoriality in the National
and Regional Vote in Central and Eastern Europe. Both panels were chaired and discussed
by Arjan H. Schakel, Assistant Professor in Research Methods at Maastricht University
and Régis Dandoy, Research Associate at the University of Brussels and the University of
Louvain, who conceptualized and coordinated a research project on regional elections in
Central and Eastern European countries. This paper is only partially following the research
framework proposed by Schakel.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
477
The paper’s theoretical framework is second-order election effects theory
in the Croatian county elections, which assumes that county elections are
subordinate to national elections. In its first chapter, the paper gives an
overview of the territorial self-government in Croatia, i.e. developments
and current trends in the territorial structure, the scope of local affairs,
and the political system. In subsequent chapter factors of regional distinctiveness – institutional (electoral system and electoral calendar), ideological, geographical, economic and political – are analysed. The third chapter analyses second-order election effects and thus the status of county
elections in respect to national elections by measuring the congruence
between national and county government, analysing turnout rates and
electoral supply (political parties’ participation at the county level, electoral coalitions and party volatility).
2. Constitutional and Legal Settings of the
Croatian Territorial Self-Government System
2.1. Territorial Structure and Scope of Local Affairs
Before gaining independence at the beginning of 1991, Croatia was one
of six republics in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
During that period, the official ideology was very much inclined to Marxist form of strong local communes, so that self-management in municipalities became a widespread practice – the whole system was strongly
local-oriented.2 Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, Croatia had a very
2
More on the history of the Croatian local self-government in Koprić, 2003: 183–187.
intended to have a limited autonomous scope, but their first and more important role was to be the units of deconcentrated state administration. In
2001, counties became solely units of regional self-government: they lost
all the competences with regard to deconcentrated state administration
and obtained a wider autonomous scope. However, a rather weak self-government capacity of the counties limits the possibility for strengthening
the genuine regional political processes. Subnational politics still lacks the
influence of regional parties that would have regional problem-oriented
approach and political programs for economic and social development of
the region. Therefore, county elections are identified as second-order in
comparison to national elections.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
478
strong municipal level of government consisting of 101 large communes
and a relatively weak state level,3 in terms of competences, finances, civil
servants, etc. The first multiparty elections were held in May 1990, at both
local (municipalities) and central levels within the frame of old, socialist
institutions (three-chamber representative bodies). The new Constitution
adopted at the end of 1990 granted the right to local self-government.
The Homeland War, which lasted between 1991 and 1995, slowed down
the process of transition to market economy and full multi-party system,
financially exhausting the country and detrimentally affecting new democracy.
At the very end of 1992, after a two-year delay, Croatia started to develop a new local governance system. The first local elections under new
circumstances were held on 7th February 1993. The radical territorial reform of 1992/93 introduced the so-called system of local self-government
and administration, with two tiers of self-government units, municipalities
(općina) and towns (grad) at the local level,4 and counties (županija) at
the regional level. The City of Zagreb as the capital and the largest unit
enjoyed a special legal position having competences of both a city and a
county.5 In comparison to the socialist period, municipalities lost many
of their competences, revenues, and a significant part of local governments’ property. Strict central control over local self-government units
was implemented. Besides strong centralization, the system was highly
politicized. The counties played a particularly important role in strong
central supervision and had a rather narrow autonomy. They were centralization instruments in the hands of central government and president of
the Republic. The institution of county governor was especially criticized
in that regard. He/she was elected by the county assembly, but had to be
confirmed by the President, on the Government’s proposal. While being
highly influenced by the ministries in performing a broad range of state
administrative affairs, counties’ self-government scope of affairs was limited to co-ordination and supervision over the activities of municipalities
and towns (more in: Koprić, 2003: 187–200).
3
There was no mid-tier level in Croatia at that time. Previous form of intermunicipal arrangement named communities of municipalities (zajednice općina) was dissolved by the
Amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia of 25th July 1990 (Art. 3).
4
A new category of large towns was introduced in 2005. They have somewhat broader scope of affairs than towns and may perform the county affairs on their territory.
5
It also performs numerous state administration tasks on its territory and is the largest and the most prosperous city.
479
It was only after the 2000 parliamentary and presidential election and
subsequent formation of a left-wing coalition government that the process
of decentralization began in 2001. A major change in the local self-government scope of competences was a result of decentralisation process
that started with the Amendments to the Constitution at the end of 2000.
The number of counties and their territorial organization remained mostly the same since their establishment in 1993, but the very concept and
role of counties was redefined in the 2001 reforms. The concept of local
self-government, together with the principle of subsidiarity and solidarity,
was accepted in that reform (Koprić, 2003: 200–204; Koprić, 2009; Koprić, 2010: 111–112). The new Law on Local and Regional Self-Government, adopted in 2001, introduced the general clause according to which
the self-government scope of affairs of municipalities, towns, and counties
includes all public affairs that are not explicitly excluded by law.6 Until
2001, counties were intended to be both units of state administration and
autonomous units, but in reality, they merely served as units of deconcentrated state administration. The status of the counties was changed
in 2001 when they became units of ‘territorial (regional) self-government’
and, at the same time, lost almost all their competences with regard to deconcentrated state administration. According to the 2001 Law, counties
perform affairs of regional significance, in particular related to education,
health services, spatial and urban planning, economic development, traffic and traffic infrastructure, planning and development of networks of
educational, social, cultural and health institutions, issuing location and
construction licenses and other urban planning documents outside large
towns, and maintenance of public roads outside large towns.
When looking at the data on unemployment rates and income, some
counties are quite homogenous; others face substantial internal disparities. There are significant differences among the counties and although
county revenues7 play a role in reducing regional income inequalities in
Croatia, they are unable to prevent inequalities despite various meas-
6
In contrast, the previous Law of 1992 had prescribed enumeration for municipalities and counties, in which case only those public affairs that were allocated specifically to
local self-government units were considered as local affairs. However, the method of general
clause was applied to towns even at that time.
7
The Law on Financing Local and Regional Self-Government Units stipulates four
county taxes: inheritance and gifts tax, motor vehicles tax, boats tax and slot machines tax.
However, counties may decide to transfer the income from these taxes to towns and municipalities within their boundaries. Other sources of county income come from its assets,
central state grants, misdemeanour fines, etc. but they are rather insignificant.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
ures for disadvantaged units. The City of Zagreb and three counties (Istarska, Primorsko-Goranska, Zagrebačka) have above-average income
and low unemployment rates, whereas the majority of underdeveloped
counties are situated mostly in Eastern Croatia (Brodsko-Posavska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska, Virovitičko-Podravska, Sisačko-Moslavačka, Osječko- -Baranjska) (Puljiz, Maleković, 2007: 10, 17). In those counties,
as well as in Ličko-Senjska County, depopulation processes are also noticeable.
In 2005, Croatia registered four statistical units – Central Croatia (comprising five counties), Zagreb Region (City of Zagreb and Zagrebačka
County), Adriatic Croatia (seven counties) and Eastern Croatia (seven
counties) (Koprić, 2010: 674–675). Later, in 2007, three NUTS II units
or statistical regions (North-West Croatia, Central and Eastern Croatia,
and Adriatic Croatia) were introduced, according to the NUTS classification.8 This was a result of political processes at the time and it was neither
responsive to the development needs nor to the optimal utilisation of EU
funds (Đulabić, 2013: 189). For that reason, in 2012 Croatia introduced
two NUTS II regions: Adriatic Croatia that comprises seven coastal counties and Continental Croatia that comprises thirteen counties and the
City of Zagreb. According to Đulabić (2013: 192), new statistical classification enables utilization of EU funds under the most favourable conditions, with the highest rate of project co-financing from the EU. Counties
are classified as NUTS III units and represent a basis for the formation of
broader statistical regions. This fact hinders the functioning of counties as
proper regional development actors with sufficient financial, professional,
and other capacities. It can be concluded that the Croatian counties are
not large enough to be considered as real regions in European context
(Blažević, 2010: 189). Moreover, a historically and geographically rooted
sense of regional identities exists, but counties are much smaller than
such entities.
Croatian counties had quite a vivid history of serving daily political needs
and interests of the central government rather than interest of their citizens. Aggregation and articulation of regional specific interests was one
8
NUTS refers to the classification of the territorial units for statistical purposes introduced by EUROSTAT. NUTS classification consists of three categories of regional units
differing in terms of number of inhabitants. NUTS I units represent areas that encompass
between min. 3 and max. 7 million inhabitants, NUTS II between min. 800 thousand and
max. 3 million inhabitants and NUTS III between min. 150 thousand and max. 800 thousand inhabitants.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
481
The role of the counties has shifted from executing state administrative
tasks towards the autonomous, enabling, and supportive tasks, i.e. coordination and support of weak municipalities, administration of “decentralized” social services (education, health, social care), and a slight push
towards economic development. Considerable regional differences still
to a large extent affect the limited economic and fiscal capacities of the
majority of counties, making them incapable of initiating and supporting
regional development (Koprić, 2013: 12). The counties were tailored with
little consideration for historical, natural, economic, social and professional criteria for establishment of natural self-governing entities (Ivanišević
2003: 28; Koprić, 2010: 115–116). Furthermore, frequent change of subnational electoral system has caused a dynamic history of local and regional political processes in Croatia.
2.2. Local and County Political System
Local and regional units have the same governance structure based on the
principle of separation of powers. Representative bodies are the munici-
9
Both times the HDZ won the majority of seats (58.7 per cent in 1993; 65.1 per cent
in 1997) whereas the strongest regionalist party, IDS in Istarska County won only 4.8 per
cent resp. 3.2 per cent of the seat share (Kasapović, 1997: 102).
10
Candidates could be residents of a county different from the county in which they
were competing.
of the proclaimed reasons for establishing a bicameral parliamentary system that existed in Croatia in the period 1990–2001. At the time, the
Croatian Parliament consisted of the House of Representatives and the
House of Counties. The latter served as a deliberative and consultative
chamber. Members of the House of Counties were elected in special elections held in 1993 and 1997, in 21 three-mandate electoral districts by
the principle of proportional representation.9 The very nature and role of
the second chamber were contested (see infra 3.4.). Only a smaller number of counties coincided with the areas of specific historical and cultural
identity (Istarska, Međimurska, Zadarska, Krapinsko-zagorska). Historical regions (Dalmatia, Slavonia, north-western Croatia) are divided into
several counties. Considering the nature of such a representative base,
second chamber was not a representative body of regional, but of “administrative-bureaucratic interests articulating in particular territorial units”
and “colonisation of political parties” (Kasapović, 1997: 97).10
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
482
pal or town council (vijeće) and county assembly (županijska skupština).
Since the 2009 subnational elections, executive bodies are the municipal
or town mayor (općinski načelnik, gradonačelnik) and the county governor
(župan). The number of seats in the local and regional representative bodies depends on the number of inhabitants in the local unit.11 The size of
the local council ranges from 7 to 15 members in municipalities and from
13 to 35 members in towns, while county assemblies have 31 to 51 members.12 Among other things, these ranges have shown that citizen’s vote
is worth less in urban than in rural communities (Koprić, 2009: 9). Local
and county councillors have four-year non-imperative mandates. After
the 1990 elections, general local elections were held six times (in 1993,
1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and 2013). The electoral system was changed
four times. Only last four general local elections were held according
to the same rules – full application of the proportional representation
principle.
The system of absolute majority was used only in the 1990 elections.
Local elections of 1993 were held with the usage of fragmented or mixed
proportional and majority electoral system.13 One half of the councillors
was elected by proportional representation from either political parties or
independent lists,14 while the other half was elected in election districts
by one-round relative majority system.15 They were held simultaneously
with the elections for the House of Counties. Fragmented system was
applied in the 1992 and 1995 national elections. Fragmented system
was applied also in the 1997 general local elections (3/4 share of pro11
In the elections for county assembly, members of national minorities that participate with more than 5% in total county population have the right to proportional representation in the county assembly. If the proportion is not accomplished in regular local elections,
additional elections will be held and under certain conditions, the number of county assembly representatives may be even.
12
Since 2001, the City of Zagreb Assembly has had 51 members.
13
The fragmented electoral system is widely used in the East European post-communist states as a result of political compromise between the ruling party and opposition.
Kasapović uses the term segmented or ‘entrenched’ electoral systems (die Grabensysteme)
because of the differences between the proportional and majority systems (Kasapović, 1995:
173).
14
The threshold was 5 per cent of votes. More about independents in: Koprić, 2007;
Koprić, 2011.
15
In the majority system, the local unit is divided into as many electoral districts
as there are members to be elected – one member is elected in each electoral district. In
the proportional system, the entire territory of the county or the municipality becomes an
electoral unit.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
483
The full implementation of proportional representation with blocked lists
was introduced in the 2001 general local elections; the following elections
of 2005, 2009, and 2013 were held applying the same electoral procedure.
This system provides for competition of party and independent lists, without competition of individual candidates. Only the lists that gain more
than 5 per cent of votes can divide the seats in representative bodies (5 per
cent threshold). The number of seats for each list is calculated by using
D’Hondt’s method. Although the proportional system is theoretically in
favour of small parties and independents, the relatively high threshold
and small number of voters in the majority of Croatian municipalities has
produced somewhat different results.16 However, proportionality system
allows certain number of small actors into local representative bodies,
which can cause frequent political conflicts and inefficiency of local decision-making. Moreover, blocked lists cause depersonalisation of local politics – this is inadequate for local communities in which voters may identify themselves with certain candidates and their political programmes. In
addition, local elections often serve as a ‘laboratory’ to experiment with
new institutional and political solutions before they are applied in national elections (Kasapović, 2004: 65). However, the situation in Croatia is
quite the opposite – proportional electoral system was first applied in the
2000 national elections and only after that in the 2001 local elections.
Due to fact that voters usually express their attitude toward political parties at the national level when voting in their municipalities and counties,
local politics is under strong influence of political parties and their national political programmes.
Interrelations between local bodies have fairly changed after the introduction of the direct election of mayors and county governors in 2009.17
16
Independents won more than 20 per cent of votes and got about 10 per cent of
seats in the 2009 local elections (more in: Koprić, 2011: 92).
17
Prior to introduction of directly elected mayors and county governors, each local
self-government unit had two executive bodies: an individual executive functionary and a
collegial executive body. From 1993 to 2005, mayors and county governors were appointed
by the local representative bodies. The same procedure was applied regarding members of
the executive body but they were proposed by the previously appointed executive function-
portional representation). The use of this rather hybrid system assumes
that no “interdependence between the proportional and the majority
part” exists, because members of representative bodies are elected through two separate electoral systems (Kasapović, 1995: 173–175; Omejec,
2003: 270).
484
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
Previous parliamentary-like relationship between representative and
executive bodies is now more presidential-like, although representative
bodies are entitled to some control mechanisms over executive functionaries. Strong position and political influence of the local executive
functionary has been extended further. The mayor has taken over all
the competences previously belonging to the collective executive bodies. The mayor can exert significantly influence the council’s decisions.
Initial expectations from the introduction of directly elected of mayors,
such as “higher rate of voters’ turnout” and “decrease of party politicisation, reinforcement of ethical standards, and more managerial-like
behaviour of mayors” have not been realized (Koprić, Vukojičić Tomić,
2013: 164-183). Since 1st January 2013, local executives’ power has
been somewhat weakened by a new institute of simultaneous dissolution
of the council and dismissal of the mayor by the Government in cases
of delay in budget voting, since this crises have often occurred in local
units where executive functionaries come from different political party
than the majority of the councillors.18
3. Contextual Factors of Regional Distinctiveness
In order to explore second-order election effects in county elections in
the fourth chapter, a selected set of factors that might contribute to understanding the distinctiveness across counties ought to be analysed first.
The difference in voters’ behaviour and strategies of the political parties
participating in county elections over time may be understood by institutional, ideological, geographical, economic, and political factors.
ary. Beside authority to assemble and govern the executive body, the executive functionary
also had other competences with regard to local representative bodies and in relations between municipalities and central state bodies, which confirmed their power even when they
were elected in such an indirect way. It is therefore possible to say that such a system had
strong elements of monocracy and (quasi) hierarchy (more on the characteristics of different
types of local executive bodies see in Ivanišević, 2008).
18
The main arguments for the introduction of the new institute of simultaneous
dissolution of the local representative and executive bodies are slow and ineffective decision-making processes, mutual obstructions and blockades, and dissolution of local representative bodies.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
485
3.1. Institutional Framework
3.1.1. Electoral System
County elections are elections for the county assembly and, since 2009,
for the county governor (county executive body) and his two deputies.
The elections are direct, free and candidates are elected by secret ballot.
The most important aspects of the overall Croatian electoral system can
be seen in the Table 1.
County
elections
Local
elections
Absolute majority in the 1st
1990 round; relative majority in
the 2nd round.
__
__
Fragmented system with 50:50
% ratio of the majority* and
proportional systems; 64
uninominal electoral districts
applying the principle of
1992
one-round relative majority1
and 60 proportional lists for the
national level (3%
electoral threshold for the
list mandates).
__
__
Year
1993
National
elections
__
Fragmented system
with 50:50% ratio
of (one-round) relative
majority and
proportional system
(5% threshold for
the lists).
Fragmented system
with 50:50% ratio
majority and
proportional system
(5% threshold for
the lists).
*
Four uninominal electoral districts were only for representatives of ethnic and national communities or minorities whose share in population was lower than 8 per cent, i.e. for
representatives of the Hungarian, Italian, Czech, Slovakian, Russian, Ukrainian, German,
and Austrian national minorities. In the Parliament, 14 MPs were elected subsequently, 13
thereof as representatives of national and/or ethnic minorities whose share in population
is larger than 8 per cent (Serbian national minority) and one MP as the representative of
those minorities whose share is lower than 8 per cent (State Electoral Commission, www.
izbori.hr).
Table 1: Important features of the national, county and local electoral
systems over time
486
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
Fragmented system with 25:75
% ratio of the majority and
proportional systems; 32
uninominal electoral districts
applying principle of one-round
relative majority** and 80
1995 proportional lists for national
level (5% threshold for one
party or independent list, 8%
threshold for two-party list,
11% threshold for electoral
alliance of three of more
parties).
1997
___
Proportional system; 10
plurinominal electoral units
+ 1 special electoral unit for
non-resident Croatian citizens
(diaspora) + 1 special electoral
2000
unit for national minorities;
single vote, closed blocked
lists, 5% threshold, D’Hondt’s
method of mandate
calculation.
2001
___
__
Fragmented system
with 25:75% ratio of
(one-round) relative
majority and
proportional system
(5% threshold for
the lists).
___
Proportional system;
closed blocked lists,
single vote, size of
constituency
determined by the
counties’ statutes, 5%
threshold, D’Hondt’s
method of mandate
calculation.
__
Fragmented system
with 25:75% ratio
majority and
proportional system
(5% threshold for
the lists).
___
constituency
determined by the
threshold, D’Hondt
method of mandate
calculation.
**
Four uninominal electoral districts were created for voters of the Hungarian,
Italian, Czech, Slovakian, Russian, Ukrainian, German, and Austrian national minorities.
Majority segment included one special three-mandate electoral district for the representatives of Serbian national minority, while proportional segment included one special twelvemandate electoral district for voters who are non-resident Croatian citizens (State Electoral
Commission, www.izbori.hr).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
2005
__
2007
single vote, closed blocked
lists, 5% threshold, D’Hondt’s
method of mandate
calculation.
2009
___
2011
single vote, closed blocked lists,
5% threshold, D’Hondt’s
method of mandate
calculation.
___
constituency
determined by the
method of mandate
calculation.
___
___
constituency
determined by the
method of mandate
calculation.
___
constituency
determined by the
method of mandate
calculation.
constituency
determined by the
method of mandate
calculation.
County governor
elections: county
governor is elected
in two rounds.
Town mayor/
municipality mayor is
elected in two rounds.
____
___
2003
single vote, closed blocked lists,
5% threshold, D’Hondt’s
method of mandate
calculation.
487
488
2013
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
___
constituency determined by the counties’
statutes, 5% threshold,
D’Hondt’s method of
mandate calculation.
County governor
elections: county
governor is elected
in two rounds.
constituency
determined by the
method of mandate
calculation.
Town mayor/
municipality mayor is
elected in two rounds.
Source: Kasapović, 2004: 84, adapted by the authors
Subnational (local and regional) electoral model is fully harmonized with
national one, with only difference regarding the size of the constituency.
At the national level, the model is determined by the Law on Electoral
Units for Elections of Representatives in the Croatian Parliament, while
at both local and county levels it is determined by the statutes of local
units.
Regarding the size of the constituencies, until 2000 and introduction
of the exclusively proportional system, each electoral cycle had a different number of electoral units for both national and local elections. The
changing boundaries of the electoral units caused constant volatility of
voters’ number therein. This type of gerrymandering strategy was used
by the leading party (HDZ) and operationalized by two main steps: the
first one was decreasing the size of “electoral strongholds” (see below)
and shifting the redundant votes (those exceeding 50 per cent+1 of total
votes) for HDZ to electoral units in those areas where votes were needed
more; the second one was creating several large electoral units in the
areas where HDZ had less chance for success and where voters and votes
cast for rival parties would have been as clustered as possible (Kasapović,
1995a: 20).
3.1.2. Electoral Calendar
Electoral calendar is determined by the Law on Local Elections. Elections
for the county assemblies and the City of Zagreb Assembly (since 2009,
also for the county governors and the mayor of the City of Zagreb) are
called by the Government every four years and held at the same time in
each county (horizontal simultaneity). County elections are held simulta-
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
489
neously with elections for the mayors and municipal and town councils,
and take place in the middle of the national election cycle.
Table 2: County elections as mid-term elections
County elections
Days after previous national elections
February 7th 1993
189
April 13th 1997
532
May 20 2001
503
May 15th 2005
539
May 17th 2009
539
May 19 2013
532
th
th
Since 2001, elections for the municipal and town councils, county assemblies and the City of Zagreb Assembly have been held on the third Sunday in May. Both county councillors and county governors have four-year
mandates. A member of the local representative body may not perform
the same function in another local unit, civil service in his local unit, or
a state function. If a member of the local representative body accepts a
duty considered incompatible with his/her mandate, the latter will stand
still during the performance of incompatible duty, with a deputy substituting him/her in the local representative body. Furthermore, an MP may
not perform the function of the county governor or mayor of the City of
Zagreb. However, the two laws say nothing about the possibility of cumulating the functions of the MP and local councillor or about those of the
MP and town/municipal mayor. Hence, the two possibilities for cumul des
mandats are open and in many cases practiced, as approximately 16 per
cent of the national parliament representatives simultaneously perform
the function of the town or municipal mayor.19
19
MPs from the governing coalition have better chance to lobby for local projects
in those local units where they perform the function of the town or municipal mayor. There
are several initiatives of civil society organizations proposing to ban the accumulation of MP
and mayoral functions by the law.
Source: Authors
490
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3.2. Ideological Cleavages
After the fall of self-management socialism in SFR Yugoslavia in 1991,
Croatian society has been influenced by ideological conflicts more than
any other CEE country in transition. The polarisation of the electorate in
those countries may be better explained by socioeconomic conflicts. Empirical researches on voters’ political attitudes and behaviour have shown
that Croatian political arena can be divided into left wing, right wing,
and centre, with regionalist parties mostly floating between left wing and
centre. Furthermore, Croatian electorate may be divided into modernistic-liberal pole (voters of the SDP, IDS, HNS, and HSLS) and conservative-catholic-nationalistic pole (voters of the HDZ and HSP). HSS voters
are somewhere in the middle of this continuum, representing traditional
values, although with moderate nationalistic sentiments. Regionalist parties are not deeply rooted in the ideological basis as their political platform concerns representation of regional interests.20
The configuration of political parties and the political polarization of voters
in Croatia can be further explained by certain structural cleavages.21 The
oldest and most important one is the territorial-cultural cleavage, which
is a difference between the centre and the periphery. This one is partly
overlapping with ideological-cultural cleavage, which comprises various
elements of the “religiousness-secularization” conflict (Zakošek, 1998:
47–48). In conjunction with segmented electoral system, these cleavages shaped the Croatian partisan and political system during the 1990s.22
The territorial-cultural cleavage (centre-periphery) comprises voters’ attitudes towards Croatian sovereignty and joining EU integrations, national
and ethnic minorities in Croatia, and the relationships between central
state and local autonomy. After gaining independence in 1991, territori-
20
Since the 1990s, ethnicity, religion and to some extent urban/rural provenance as
well as the level of education have been the most important factors influencing party polarization (Zakošek, 1998: 32; differently on the effect of religiousness on party polarization see
in Kasapović, 1994: 178–179).
21
In the 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan identified cleavage structures arising from three
historical processes: formation of the national state (centre-periphery), secularization, and
development of industry and market economy, which is a suitable framework for the research of post-socialist systems (Zakošek, 1998: 16–19).
22
Regional distinct voting patterns could be explained using territorial cleavage
approach that “starts from a sociological standpoint and predicts that areas with distinct
territorial identities – history, ethnicity, religion, language, economy will display dissimilar
election results” (Caramani, 2004 & Rokkan, Urwin, 1983, in Schakel, 2011: 5).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
491
The Croatian political system has been bipolarized since 1990 and the
formation of the first nationalist-unionist polarization axis. After the first
elections in 1990, the dissolution of the left-wing bloc with the SDP23 as
its main exponent occurred. Serbian political movement was the first to
abandon the left bloc (either establishing ethnic parties or falling into
oblivion), followed by the dissidence of “periphery” opposition movements that formed new regional parties. Meanwhile, a massive Croatian
national, anti-communist movement amalgamated in a single, right-wing
conservative party, the HDZ that profiled itself as ideologically and politically the strongest, hegemonic political party with a wide membership.
Still, the HDZ had not managed to absorb liberal, demochristian, and
popular political parties. It had not succeeded in swallowing the newly re-established peasant party and some of the right-wing movements
(Kasapović, 1994: 179–180). On the one hand, there are supporters of the
Croatian national “centre” with conservative political and social attitudes
(voters of the HDZ and HSP) and, on the other, supporters of the Croatian “periphery”, advocating decentralization and/or cosmopolitan social
attitudes (SDP, HNS, HSLS, small centre, left-wing, and regionalist par-
23
In 1990, the SDP still had the extension SKH – Croatian Communist Alliance.
al oppositions are found in the peripheral, ethnic, regional, and cultural
communities (Kasapović, 1994: 177). The centre-periphery cleavages are
found not only among the Serbian ethnic communities aggregated in the
SDSS but also in regionalist parties who advocate decentralization of the
country (IDS, PGS, ARS, HDSSB, ZDS). The most expressive territorial
opposition to the centre has been established in the multicultural Istarska
County, but the processes of regional identification are also noticeable in
other parts of the country as a result of centralized governance system and
of cultural and social discrepancies (ibid.). Furthermore, territorial-cultural cleavage is observable in the attitude of voters of statewide parties regarding territorial organization and level of centralization of the country.
The results of a survey conducted by Zakošek before subnational elections
in 1997 showed that more than one third of right-wing parties’ voters
(HDZ and HSP) were in favour of a strong centre, whereas voters of the
left-wing SDP and centre-oriented HSLS were predominantly in favour of
a balanced relationship between the centre and the regions (above 80 per
cent), and below average for centralism (5.2 per cent resp. 7.6 per cent).
Closer to the latter attitude were the voters of the HSS and other smaller
centre and left-wing parties (Zakošek, 1998: 40).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
492
ties).24 It is obvious that the territorial-cultural and ideological-cultural
cleavages coincide (Zakošek, 1998: 47–48). Classical western-types of
structural conflict: church vs. state and/or urban vs. rural areas have not
significantly shaped the Croatian partisan system. The Catholic Church
in Croatia, which is considered as a traditional bastion of Christianity, has
mostly had a good relationship with the state, considering it as a “political
framework of spiritual emancipation” (Kasapović, 1994: 179). Urban-rural polarization has a strong conflict potential, although is still rather silent and in the shade of the political left-right polarization. This type of
polarization is to be found more on the regional level, namely peasant
political parties have mostly regional character as they are competing in
(mostly rural) North-Western and North-Eastern parts of Croatia (counties in Zagorje, Međimurje, Podravina and Slavonia).25 Regional parties
in coastal parts of Croatia are competing in mostly urban or more developed areas (IDS in Istarska County, PGS in Primorsko-Goranska County, DA in Splitsko-Dalmatinska County). Furthermore, this cleavage has
further implications on higher vote and seat shares for independent lists
in the counties along the Adriatic coast, especially in local units in Istarska, Splitsko-Dalmatinska, Šibensko-Kninska, Primorsko-Goranska and
Dubrovačko-Neretvanska counties, but also in the City of Zagreb and
Osječko-Baranjska County (Koprić, 2011: 96–97).
It seems that the majority of political parties in Croatia still reproduce historical territorial and ideological cleavages, which in turn affects political
behaviour of the new generation of voters (similar: Zakošek, 1998: 48).
However, around 30 new political parties were established after the the
2009 elections and many of them competed in the 2011 elections for the
Croatian parliament reflecting in their political platform socioeconomic
conflicts that are on the rise throughout Croatia.26 Nevertheless, these
conflicts, which especially concern the redistribution of resources in the
conditions of privatization and market liberalization, in the environment
of the global economic crisis, did not have a decisive effect on reshaping
24
The HDSSB as a regionalist party advocates decentralization, but its right-wing
orientation attracts mainly conservative electorate. The case is similar with the ZDS and
other regionalist parties in northern Croatia.
25
This includes the HSS as the largest peasant party, but partly also regionalist parties
HDSSB (Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja), PSS (Posavsko-Slavonska
Party), Zagorje Democratic Party (ZDS), Party of Međimurje (MS), Slavonsko-Baranjska
Croatian Party (SBHS), etc.
26
Names of these new parties are indicative: Croatian Laburists – Labour Party;
Action for Better Croatia; Voice of Reason; Alliance for Change, etc.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
493
the existing partisan system and did not lead to higher mobilization of the
electorate in the Croatian subnational elections in May 2013.
Croatia has five geographic and historical regions: Istria with Primorje (including Gorski kotar), Dalmatia, Slavonia, Zagreb, and Central
(Northwest) Croatia. Instead of taking into account the regions’ geographic and historical boundaries in designing administrative-territorial
division of Croatia in 1992/1993, emphasis had been put on the political
criteria instead of introducing a more functional and development-oriented regionalization. Thus, counties were established as niches for bureaucratization and accumulation of politicized administrative personnel
(Koprić, 2010: 115; Blažević, 2010: 187). As a direct consequence of this
process, counties vary in terms of their size, number of inhabitants and
settlements, number of towns and municipalities within their territory and
the level of economic development. Although the average county size is
2.798 km2 and 174.887 inhabitants,27 the numbers hide some important
disparities. Ličko-Senjska is territorially the largest county (5,353 km2)
whereas Međimurska is the smallest, 729 km2 (1:7.3 ratio). The county
with the smallest population is Ličko-Senjska with 51.022 inhabitants,
whereas Splitsko-Dalmatinska is the most populated with 455.242 inhabitants (1:8.9 ratio).28 The highest average GDP per capita in 2008 was recorded in the City of Zagreb (€18,554) and Istarska County, and the lowest (€6.183) in Brodsko-Posavska County (Koprić, 2013: 12). Differences
in development rate between counties are obvious and growing, which
has resulted in migration from underdeveloped to more developed ones,
followed by decrease in the number of professional staff and economic resources, population aging, depopulation, etc. (cf. Šimunović, 2007:
172). Furthermore, in comparison to towns and municipalities, counties
are collecting smallest revenues (only 19.76 per cent of all local revenues,
27
The National Census of 2011 (State Statistics Office) showed a decrease in the average number of county inhabitants in all counties compared to the 2001 National Census.
28
Territory of Splitsko-Dalmatinska County comprises 55 local units (16 municipalities and 39 towns) whereas Ličko-Senjska County comprises 12 local units (4 towns and
8 municipalities). Zagrebačka County has 697 settlements whereas Vukovarsko-Srijemska
County only 84 (more in: Šimovć et al., 2010: 231, Koprić, 2013: 11).
3.3. Geographic and Economic Factors
494
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
Šimović et al., 2010: 245); which is in sharp contrast with their legally
defined competences (see supra).
3.4. “Regionalization” of County Elections
Regionalization of Croatia was a delicate political and social issue during
the 1990s as it was considered, in official public discourse, as a separatist
tendency, if not a subversive threat to national integrity (Blažević, 2010:
176). Only after 2000 did this topic obtain political attention free of ideological fallacies. Croatia ratified the European Charter on Local Self-Government in 1997, and the remaining Charter’s principles were ratified in
2008. The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation
between Territorial Communities or Authorities was ratified in 2003. In
that way, the country has committed itself to further implementation of
the subsidiarity principle. All those legal changes intend to strengthen
local and regional autonomy vis-a-vis central state. Furthermore, Croatia
has been strongly influenced by Europeanization since the mid-2000s,
first as an EU candidate country and since 1st July 2013 as a new Member State. Adoption and design of legal and institutional framework for
regional development policy in Croatia is a result of strong EU regional
policy. This can lead to functional regionalization which conceptualizes
the regional level of government as an important policy actor in the field
of general social and economic development. However, the role of counties in that regard is only minor, and the new regionalisation is under
examination and design.
The HDZ as the largest national right-wing party traditionally wins the
majority of vote and seat shares in underdeveloped and rural areas (this
includes Ličko-Senjska, Sisačko-Moslavačka, and Krapinsko-Zagorska
counties), as well as in the areas adversely affected and impoverished by war
(including Vukovarsko-Srijemska, Osječko-Baranjska, Brodsko-Posavska,
Šibensko-Kninska and parts of Zadarska and Dubrovačko-Neretvanska
counties). The SDP as the largest national left-wing party wins majority of
seats in the Zagreb area, Primorsko-Goranska County, and Međimurska
County, whose economy is the most developed (Kasapović, 1995a: 20).
However, certain regional right-wing parties, like the HDSSB in Slavonia,
have begun to take over voters in their respective areas.
The widespread viewpoint on political behaviour of the county electorate
is that it is mostly determined by “partisan identification, as a long-term
stabilized coherence of an individual towards political parties, rather in-
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
495
As seen from above, counties were designed to fulfil volatile political interests rather than to reflect geographic, social, cultural, and other specifics and distinct identities within regional boundaries. Current organisation of small counties with weak self-government capacities also limits the
possibility for strengthening the genuine regional political processes and
overall democratic potential in counties and in wider regions. By furthering the decentralization process, Croatia needs to consider the (re-)establishment of regions, which would have not only a broader policy scope
and wider financial autonomy, but would also be established according
to the NUTS II criteria in order to become leading actors in genuine
regional policy that initiate and support regional development processes (Koprić, 2012: 10). Since 2001 and the abolishment of bicameralism
(see supra 2.1.), there is no institutionalised political representation of the
regions or different parts of Croatia in the national Parliament, which,
consequently, strengthens further centralization of the country. By organizing the national elections in five regions, the Parliament could obtain
(clear) regional representativeness. Regions could then obtain a role in
the national political system, simultaneously figuring as electoral units for
national elections, instead of the existing ten electoral units.29 By performing this additional role, regions would become effective political channels
for conveying regionally specific interests into the national political arena
(Kasapović, 2011: 28; Koprić, 2013: 45–46).
29
Ten electoral units for general (national) elections were established in the period of bicameral Croatian Parliament, consisting of the House of Representatives and the
House of Counties, with the latter having the task of representing political interests of different parts of the country. The Constitutional amendments of 2001 abolished the House of
Counties, which was hugely overrepresented by party members of the then dominant rightwing national political party – HDZ. Nevertheless, the ten electoral units still exist, although
gerrymandered, and dividing the country’s territory into illogical parts. The constituency of
each electoral unit elects 14 MPs, and the number of voters in each unit must not exceed the
difference of +/-5 per cent. If the regions were to become electoral units, the number of MPs
elected from each region could be twice as high, the same or lower. Nevertheless, it should
be related to the size of the region’s constituency and thereby differ not more than +/-5 per
cent (see also: Koprić, 2013: 46).
dependent of concrete political events and, what is the most important,
of concrete social context in which this coherence is expressed” (Omejec, 2002: 150). The results of subnational elections, as a political test
of voters’ support to national government, are thus proving second-order
election effects.
496
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
4. County Elections – Framework of Analysis
The dominant theoretical framework used for studying regional elections
is the second-order election model. It claims that national elections are
first-order elections, while other elections, such as European and subnational have “less at stake” and are thus subordinate, i.e. of second-order
nature to national elections (Omejec, 2002: 117 calls them low-stimulus
elections). According to Reif and Schmitt (1980), in second-order elections voters’ turnout is lower, and those who do participate cast their vote
to punish government parties (in: Schakel, 2011: 5). This leads to three
predictions with regard to regional election results:
1. Government parties lose votes.
2. Turnout in regional elections is lower than in national elections.
3. Small, new and opposition parties gain votes.
Voters are inclined to behave in these ways following a cyclical logic; they
are most likely to do so at the mid-point between national elections and
less likely to do so soon after, or in the run-up to national elections (Reif
and Schmitt, in: Schakel, Jeffery, 2013: 326).
In order to examine whether second-order election theory can be confirmed in county elections in Croatia, Prediction 1 and 2 are examined in
subchapters Government Congruence Pattern and Turnout Rates, while
Prediction 3 is examined in subchapter Electoral Supply.
4.1. Government Congruence Pattern
Studies on regional elections in Western European countries show that
regional elections differ from national elections according to their structural, procedural, and substantial features, as well as their political and social importance and effects. Hierarchical subordination of regional elections to national elections is usually confirmed by their general status, and
by data on electoral participation and electoral competition in regional
elections. Voters pay less attention to subnational elections and local political institutions because they consider them as irrelevant for the national
decision-making processes (Kasapović, 2004: 61–62; Schakel, 2011: 2).
County elections in Croatia are highly nationalized, i.e. they reflect national political institutions, processes and patterns of political behaviour.
Furthermore, on the hierarchy scale, they might even be considered as
third-order elections, standing behind national and local elections. The
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
497
almost absolute domination of one party (HDZ) in both national and
county elections throughout the 1990s30 and partly in the 2000s can be
explained by the fact the role of the “constructor of the national state”
was ascribed to the HDZ, presided by the first Croatian president, Franjo
Tuđman (Kasapović, 1994: 176–177; Zakošek, 1998: 47). His authoritarian leadership in conjunction with successes in liberation of the occupied
territory led to a strong mobilization of the electorate. In the 1993 county
elections, the HDZ won absolute or relative majority of the vote share in
all counties except in Istarska County, where the IDS won almost 90 per
cent of votes, and in Varaždinska County, where the majority was won
by the coalition of left-wing parties. In 1997, the HDZ won the national
elections, and formed regional government in as many as 19 counties.31
Another characteristic of county elections showing “nationalizing” effect
on the local political system is that, especially since 2000 and the introduction of the proportional system, national political parties (sometimes
together with regional parties) often form different pre-electoral coalitions and in that formation usually win the county elections. In 2000,
centre and left-wing coalition (SDP, HSLS, HSS, HNS, IDS, and LS)
won national elections, which initiated an avalanche of party coalitions
in subsequent subnational elections. Most coalitions at the county level
are formed by left wing (SDP, HNS) or centrist (HSS) parties, with somewhat smaller parties (HSU), whereas the HDZ usually forms coalitions with right or far-right (HSP, HKDU, HČSP) or centrist (DC) parties,
but to a lesser extent. The 2001 local elections were a clear example of
“barometer” elections – the HDZ as an opposition party in the Croatian
30
With a steady exception in Istarska and Primorsko-Goranska counties, higher
average dissimilarity scores are also shown in Ličko-Senjska and Međimurska counties as
opposition parties received many votes at the county level.
31
The HDZ formed a coalition with right wing parties the HKDU, HSP and KDM
(later merged with HKDU) in Međimurska County, and with HKDS and HSP in Varaždinska County.
32
In 1992 national elections, the HDZ obtained +16.9 per cent and in 1995 +13.9
per cent seats. The second strongest party, the HSLS, was underrepresented with -8.3 per
cent of seats (Kasapović, 1995: 180).
Majoritarian effects of the segmented election system can be observed in
high overrepresentation of HDZ in national and subnational governments
after two general and two subnational elections in the 1990s. HDZ “remained, figuratively speaking, isolated on the political stage” (Kasapović,
1995: 185).32
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
Parliament managed to win the majority of votes in 14 counties and form
county governments (alone or in a coalition) in 12 counties. In the 2003
parliamentary elections, the HDZ won a relative majority and formed a
smaller coalition with the HSS, HSLS, DC, and SDSS, so the 2005 local
elections were again a “coalition parade” – only Ličko-Senjska County had
no coalition government (HDZ obtained 57.77 per cent seat share). The
HDZ formed government in 10 counties (sometimes again in unusual coalitions, such as with the HNS and HSS in Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska County
and with the HNS in Međimurska County). In eight counties, the SDP
formed government with the HNS, HSS and smaller parties (with SDA in
Sisačko-Moslavačka County), while Istra remained electoral stronghold
of the IDS. The HNS, HSLS and SHUS (the Croatian Alliance of Retired and Senior Citizens) formed government in Varaždinska County. In
Osječko-Baranjska County, independent list of Branimir Glavaš formed a
post-electoral coalition with the HSP. In the 2007 national elections, the
HDZ again formed a smaller coalition with the HSS, HSLS, SDSS and
SDA. The 2009 local elections and electoral results were marked by preand post-electoral coalitions. The IDS formed a coalition with the HNS
in Istarska County; the HDZ formed coalitions in 12 counties, usually
with the HSS, HSLS, HSU, and/or HSP, and with independent lists in
Splitsko-Dalmatinska and Šibensko-Kninska counties. The SDP formed
government mostly with the HNS, HSU, and regional parties (PGS in
Primorsko-Goranska County and ZDS in Krapinsko-Zagorska County) in
eight counties. Finally, the 2013 local elections again show characteristics
of barometer elections, quite similar to the 2001 elections, as the HDZ
won the majority of votes in most counties. A further problem is that
many parties that receive a relative majority of votes form ad hoc and volatile post-electoral coalitions, sometimes even with parties on the opposite
side of the ideological pole (e.g. HDZ and HNS in Međimurska County
in 2005). There are numerous cases of pre- and post-electoral coalitions
falling apart after the election, taking-up seats in county assemblies, and
resulting in new party negotiations and coalitions or even in new elections.33
33
For example, after the 1997 county elections, the share of two party coalitions in
the County Assembly in Primorsko-Goranska County was equal (HDZ/HSLS/HSS – 20;
SDP/PGS/HNS – 20). The Assembly was dissolved because it did not manage to elect the
county governor and the executive body. The early elections were held on 30 November
1997 (Ivanišević et al., 2001: 195).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
499
a) If one party alone obtained the absolute majority (50 per cent
+1) of seat share in the county assembly and also the absolute
majority (50 per cent +1) of seat share in the national parliament
in preceding national elections, absolute value of that party’s seat
share (in per cent) obtained in county elections is subtracted by
absolute value of the party’s seat share (in per cent) obtained by
that party in the national parliament. The difference per party is
then divided by two. In case that in the time of county elections
the party is in opposition in the national parliament, the absolute
value subtracted from the party’s county assembly seat share is 0
(in %) and divided by two.
b) If a pre-electoral party coalition obtained absolute majority (50
per cent +1) of seats in the county assembly, first the share of
each party to the coalition is calculated. For example, in the 2001
county elections in the City of Zagreb county coalition of the
SDP and HNS won the majority of seats in the county assembly
(32 out of 51), with SDP bringing in 20 seats (62.5 per cent of
32) and HNS bringing in 12 seats (37.5 per cent of 32). Then the
seat share of each of that party in the national parliament is looked at. In the above example, at the time of county elections in
2001, the SDP and HNS (together with four other parties) were
34
The dissimilarity index, which compares vote shares of the same party participating in different elections, was developed by Jefferey and Hough, 2009; Johnston, 1980; Pallares and Keating, 2003, in: Schakel, 2011: 3–4. The authors have applied the dissimilarity
index to calculate the government congruence between elections for the county assembly
and preceding elections for the national parliament, as suggested by Schakel and Dandoy.
The government congruence pattern explains to which extent a regional
(county) voter responds to national or regional (county) government, i.e.
the national government is compared to the regional (county) government.
Government congruence is measured by using the dissimilarity index,34
comparing the county political party (or coalition of parties) that has won
the majority of county assembly seats to the national (or statewide) political party (or coalition of parties) that has won the majority of seats in the
national parliament in the previous national elections. This means taking
the absolute difference per party, dividing it by two, and summing up the
absolute differences. Scores obtained can range from complete congruence or similarity (0%) to complete incongruence or dissimilarity (100%)
(Schakel, 2011: 3). Government congruence is calculated depending on
the following possibilities:
500
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
also forming a governing coalition in the national parliament,
winning 46 out of total 151 seats. The SDP brought in 44 seats
(47.31 per cent of the share in coalition) and the HNS brought
in 2 seats (2.15 per cent of the share in coalition) taking the absolute difference per party, dividing by two and summing the absolute differences. Now, the share of SDP in the county assembly
governing coalition (62.5 per cent) is subtracted from its share
in the governing coalition in the national parliament (47.31 per
cent) and divided by two (equalling 7.60 per cent). HNS’s share
of 37.15 per cent in the county assembly governing coalition is
subtracted by its 2.15 per cent share in the governing coalition in
the national parliament and divided by two (equalling 17.68 per
cent). The absolute differences are then added up for both parties
(7.60 +17.68) and hence the government congruence between
county and national government is 25.26 per cent. In case one
or both parties were in opposition in the national parliament, the
absolute value subtracted from the party’s county assembly seat
share is zero (0) (in per cent), divided by two, and added up.
In Table 3, county elections held in 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009, and
2013 are compared to the preceding national elections both per county
election and per county over time. Bolded figures represent the highest
government congruence score (in Virovitičko-Podravska County in the
1997 county elections (0.26 per cent), the lowest government congruence score (in Varaždinska County in the 1993 county elections 79.62 per
cent), the highest to the lowest average government congruence score
per county election (11.15 per cent in the 1997 county elections to 49.89
per cent in the 2013 county elections) as well as the highest and the
lowest average government congruence score per county over time (17.61
per cent in Požeško-Slavonska County and 44.17 per cent in Međimurska County). However, none of the Croatian counties has ever reached
the maximum value of dissimilarity or incongruence between county and
national governments, while in very rare cases the dissimilarity index
exceeds 50 per cent. In addition, as observed in Table 3, the variance in
government congruence between counties over time shows a rather low
dissimilarity index, which indicates a constant trend of nationalization of
county elections, i.e. voters’ orientation towards statewide parties.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
501
Table 3: Congruence between county and national governments over time
(in %)
1993
1997
2001
BjelovarskoBilogorska (BJB)
50.00
20.48
32.70 45.84 45.16
41.01
Brodsko-Posavska
(BRP)
3.73
5.48
37.10 20.38 50.00
49.99
City of Zagreb (GZ)
4.13
5.53
25.26 42.36 48.24
45.55
DubrovačkoNeretvanska (DUN)
2.05
4.60
40.86 49.99 26.59
47.74
43.75
32.50
31.99 50.00 50.00
52.96
43.53
Karlovačka (KAR)
4.21
0.96
40.86 13.30 11.21
54.53
20.85
KoprivničkoKriževačka (KOK)
36.35
3.28
40.86 44.12 46.00
49.98
Krapinsko-Zagorska
(KRZ)
9.21
20.47
28.37 49.49 49.35
57.07
Ličko-Senjska (LIS)
12.96
8.25
40.87
9.93 15.30
50.00
22.89
Međimurska
(MEĐ)
25.00
49.99
26.88 57.00 46.00
60.16
44.17
Osječko-Baranjska
(OSB)
1.71
1.75
40.98 47.60 50.00
50.00
32.01
Požeško-Slavonska
(POS)
2.13
2.18
31.81 14.65
9.87
45.00
17.61
27.50
52.17
34.66 45.16 49.50
23.14
38.69
Šibensko-Kninska
(ŠIK)
5.22
1.73
26.82 11.17 13.10
50.00
18.01
Sisačko-Moslavačka
(SIM)
5.91
0.26
49.99 40.60 48.00
75.22
36.66
SplitskoDalmatinska (SPD)
3.30
0.78
28.43 19.13 46.50
51.84
25.00
Varaždinska (VAR)
79.62
0.78
29.64 26.82 28.04
46.20
35.18
VirovitičkoPodravska (VIP)
4.92
0.26
40.78 39.47 40.50
50.03
29.33
VukovarskoSrijemska (VUS)
13.41
0.48
46.99 26.18 42.34
50.00
29.90
Zadarska (ZAD)
0.46
1.73
46.23 20.40 21.82
47.40
23.01
Zagrebačka (ZAG)
5.80
20.48
30.60 42.34 43.16
49.99
32.06
Average per county
election
16.26
11.15
35.85 34.09 37.18
49.90
30.74
Primorsko-Goranska
(PRG)
Source: Authors’ calculation
2009
2013
39.20
27.78
28.51
28.64
36.77
35.66
Istarska (IST)
2005
Average per
county over time
Name of the county
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
502
4.2. Turnout Rates
High average turnout rates may be observed in the 1990 national elections (84.5 per cent), in 1992 (75.60 per cent), in 1995 (68.80 per cent)
and in the “critical” 2000 national elections (76.44 per cent). Average
turnout rates for county elections were also rather high: 66 per cent in
1993 and 71 per cent in the 1997 elections; but in the following elections,
a steady decline in turnout is perceived (average 48 per cent turnout in
2001; 42 per cent in 2005; 47 per cent in 2009 and 48 per cent in 2013).
In the 2009 and 2013 elections for county governors (now the sole county
executive body), turnout in the first round was in most cases identical to
turnout for county assemblies. In the counties where two electoral rounds
for the county governor had to take place, turnout in the second round
was 5–20 per cent lower than in the first round in 2009, while in the 2013
county elections turnout in the second round was 1–10 per cent lower
than in the first round.
Table 4a: Highest and lowest turnout rates for county elections over time
(in %)
1993
1997
2001
2005
2009
2013
Highest/
Lowest
Highest/
Lowest
Highest/
Lowest
Highest/
Lowest
Highest/
Lowest
Highest/
Lowest
VIP
ZAD
VUS
SIM
POS
CoZ
County
DUN
CoZ
VAR
CoZ
DUN PRG
and VAR
80.30 30.87 83.59 62.92 55.47 39.79 51.78
35.94 57.69 41.69 56.73
41.33
Table 4b: Highest and lowest turnout rates for national elections (in counties) over time (in %)
Elections
County
2000
2003
2007
2011
Highest/Lowest
Highest/Lowest
Highest/Lowest
Highest/Lowest
1992 1995
–
–
VAR
VUS
VAR
VUS
VAR
VUS
VAR
ZAD
81.44
66.25
70.19
55.90
70.54
56.40
65.88
55.23
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
503
For comparison, turnout in elections for the Croatian President has also
been in systematic decline, with an exception of the 2000 presidential
election, when the turnout rate was 67.5 per cent in the first round and 63
per cent in the second round (Kasapović, 2011: 10).
Table 4c: Turnout rates in presidential elections over time (in %)
1992
1997
2000
2005
2009/2010
Election
1st
round
2nd
round
1st
round
2nd
round
1st
round
2nd
round
1st
round
2nd
round
1st
round
(2009)
2nd
round
(2010)
Turnout
74.90
/
54.62
/
62.98
60.88
50.57
51.04
44
50.13
Electoral participation in Croatia has been in steady decline since 1990,
with the exception of the 2000 national elections, which were marked by
strong psychological and political mobilization of the Croatian voters resulting in termination of the right-wing HDZ domination on the Croatian
national and subnational political scene and victory of the left-wing coalition (SDP, HSLS, HSS, HNS, IDS, and LS). The decline in participation
in that period can be explained by structural factors, such as frequency of
the elections, strong incumbent party and candidate, limited resources for
electoral campaign, as well as by the empirically proven attitude of the vast
majority of Croatian voters that their participation makes no difference as
they have no influence on the national and local governments (Grdešić,
1998: 18).35 More recently, institutional arrangements in which elections
are conducted serve as an explanatory variable (Kasapović, 2011: 8). Political participation and transparency of the electoral procedure continued
to decline in the 2000s due to the extended practice of forming pre-electoral coalitions in the framework of the proportional electoral system.
Voters abstain because of their dissatisfaction with the composition of
the coalition, since pre- and post-electoral coalitions are formed following
the “everybody-with-everybody” principle, which means that even large
and ideologically opposite national parties sometimes make an alliance to
win both national and subnational elections. An additional problem may
arise in post-electoral government formation when weaker political par-
35
A survey conducted before the 1997 local elections on a random sample of 1,000
voters in seven Croatian cities showed that only 55 per cent of them knew who the county
governor was (Grdešić, 1998: 13).
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
ties abandon their stronger coalition partners if they fail to occupy certain
political positions in the county or to “push through” certain policy issues
on the county assembly’s political agenda.
4.3. Electoral Supply
From 1990 to 2013, approximately 150 political parties, associations, and
movements were founded in Croatia. Majority of them have participated
in national and subnational elections for over two decades now. Approximately a quarter never manage to reach the electoral threshold. There
are fifty three parties competing in one county only. Thirty nine parties
compete in several (two to five) counties, ten parties (DC; HDZ; HNS;
HSLS; HSP; HSS; HKDU; HSU; SDP; LS) or compete or have competed in all counties. One party was competing at the national level only,36
87 parties compete at the county and local levels, and 26 parties compete
at all government levels.
Eighteen political parties in Croatia can be considered as parties with
at least partially regional political agenda and thus conditionally referred
to as regional parties. They are believed to represent specific interests of
one or more neighbouring counties situated within the boundaries of the
Croatian geographic and historic regions (Istria with Primorje, Slavonia,
Dalmatia, Northwest Croatia, and Zagreb). However, they are not rooted
in a particular ideological basis, as their political platform concerns representing “interests of a certain region reflecting all the heterogeneity of its
population which means that they … have features of populist parties”.
(Šiber, 1993: 126). Some of them are more or less successful in county
elections (IDS, HDSSB, PGS, ZDS), while others have a marginal influence on voters’ preferences (AM, ARS, DA, IDF, MS, PS, SBHS, etc.).
Seven regional parties participate in county and local elections in one
county;37 five of them have participated in county and local elections in
36
LIBRA, Party of Liberal Democrats, participated in the 2003 national elections
and obtained three seats, but it merged with the HNS in 2005.
37
AM – Youth Action; ARS – Autonomous Regional Party of Croatian Primorje, Gorski kotar, Rijeka and the Islands, LRI – List for Rijeka participated in the Primorsko-Goranska County elections; MDS – Democratic Alliance of Međimurje and MS – Party
of Međimurje competed in Međimurska County; PS – Party of Podravina competed in Koprivničko-Križevačka County; PSS – Posavsko-Slavonska Party competed in Vukovarsko-Srijemska County.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
505
When looking at the political parties’ participation in the county executive
body in a single county, in several counties, and in both the county executive body and the national government, the Primorsko-Goranska Alliance
(PGS), Zagorje Democratic Party (ZDS), Croatian Pure Party of Rights
(HČSP), Croatian Dalmatian Home (HDD), Posavsko-Slavonska Party
(PSS), and the Autonomous Regional Party (ARS) were the parties that
participated in a single county’s executive body. Five of them can be referred to as regional parties: the PGS and ARS in Primorsko-Goranska
County, the HDD in Splitsko-Dalmatinska County, the PSS in Vukovarsko-Srijemska County, and the ZDS in Krapinsko-Zagorska County. The
HČSP as a statewide party participated only in the executive body of
Šibensko-Kninska County. Parties participating in several (two to five)
county executive bodies were the IDS (Istarska and Primorsko-Goranska counties), HDSSB (Osječko-Baranjska and Požeško-Slavonska counties), SDSS (Sisačko-Moslavačka and Vukovarsko-Srijemska counties),
and HKDU (Varaždinska, Sisačko-Moslavačka and Splitsko-Dalmatinska
counties). Two of them are regional parties, the IDS and HDSSB, while
one is an ethnic party (SDSS). The HKDU is a statewide party, although
during 2000 it lost all of its influence. Finally, there are eleven political
parties participating in both national governments and county executive
bodies: HDZ, SDP, HSLS, HSS, HNS, LS,40 IDS, DC, SDSS, HSU, and
SDA Croatia.41
38
DPZS, Democratic Party of Prigorje and Zagreb competed in the City of Zagreb,
Zagrebačka, and Karlovačka counties; DSSR, Democratic Party of Slavonian Plain competed in Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska, and Brodsko-Posavska counties; HDD, Croatian Dalmatian Home, IDF, Istrian Democratic Forum competed in Primorsko-Goranska
and Istarska counties; ZS, Party of Zagorje, competed in the City of Zagreb, Zagrebačka,
and Krapinsko-Zagorska counties).
39
DA, Dalmatian Action competed in several counties of Dalmatia; HDSSB, Croatian Democratic Party of Slavonia and Baranja competed in five counties of Slavonia; IDS,
Istrian Democratic Assembly competed in Istarska and Primorsko-Goranska counties; PGS
(ex RDS, Rijeka Democratic Alliance) competed in Primorsko-Goranska County, SBHS,
Croatian Party of Slavonia and Baranja competed in three counties of Slavonia; and ZDS,
Zagorje Democratic Party competed in the City of Zagreb and Krapinsko-Zagorska County.
40
It joined the HSLS in 2006.
41
SDA was founded in 1990 as a Bosniac party whose basic goal is to protect the national identity and political representation of the Bosniac community in all former Yugoslav
countries. It has a Croatian branch called SDA Croatia.
several (2-5) counties;38 and six of them have competed in both county
and national elections.39
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
506
The Serbian minority is the largest national minority in Croatia with interests politically aggregated in parties competing in elections. The share of
Serbian minority in the population is the highest in Vukovarsko-Srijemska
County (15.5 per cent). Its presence in other counties is as follows: 11.7
per cent in Sisačko-Moslavačka County, 11.5 per cent in Ličko-Senjska
County, 11 per cent in Karlovačka County, 9.1 per cent in Šibensko-Kninska County, 8.7 per cent in Osječko-Baranjska County, 7.1 per cent in
Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska and in Virovitičko-Podravska Counties, and 6.5
per cent in Požeško-Slavonska County (Koprić, 2007: 343). There are
four ethnic parties representing Serbian national minority (SDSS, SNS,
NSS, DPS). The SDSS as the strongest Serbian party competes at the
national level and in ten counties where Serbian minority has a share in
total population (those counties mostly overlap with counties affected by
the war).42 Bosnian ethnic community is represented by the SDA, which
competes at the local and county levels in Primorsko-Goranska, Šibensko-Kninska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska and Zadarska counties, as well as at
the national level.43
The most powerful statewide political parties are the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Social-Democratic Party (SDP), the Croatian
Popular Party (HNS), the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), the Croatian
Party of Rights (HSP), the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), and the
Retired Citizens’ Party (HSU). Some of those parties have a large and
dense hierarchical organizational system of their county and local branches. The HDZ has 21 county branches, as well as the HNS. Moreover, the
HNS has five regional alliances (Northwest Croatia, Slavonia and Baranja, Central Croatia, Dalmatia, and one for Istra, Primorje, Gorski kotar,
Lika, and Senj).44 The SDP has 16, HSS 20, and HSP 7 county branches.
42
These are the following: Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska, Karlovačka, Ličko-Senjska Osječko-Baranjska, Primorsko-Goranska, Sisačko-Moslavačka, Šibensko-Kninska, Virovitičko-Podravska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska, and Zadarska counties.
43
The political interests of the Roma ethnic community have been aggregated in two
extremely marginal political parties, the SRH and HRDS. The SRH competed in Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska and Međimurska counties in the 1993 and 2005 elections. The HRDS was
founded in 2007.
44
The statute of the HNS does not recognize the interconnection between regional
identities and present administrative-territorial division (20 counties + the City of Zagreb).
Rather, it envisages the tasks of the party’s regional alliances: “... acknowledging geographic,
historical, cultural, and other particularities of the Croatian regions as units existing and recognized regardless of the present territorial-administrative organization of the Republic of
Croatia, resp. administrative division into 20 counties and the City of Zagreb and taking into
account the achieved level of institutionalization of its organization in Croatian regions, the
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
507
The branches usually have a rather differentiated internal structure usually consisting of the assembly, the executive body, the presidency, the
secretary, the treasurer, and the court of honour. They also have coordination units and certain types of interest branches (e.g. youth club, women’s
club, etc.). The tasks of county branches do not differ from party tasks
at the state level, such as implementation of the partisan politics at the
county level, information collection and reporting to the headquarters, information sharing, supervision of local (town and municipal) branches on
the county territory, recruitment of new party members, mobilization of
voters, etc. These tasks have a “nationalizing” effect on the local political
system. Due to the similarity of local and national political systems, there
is little chance for local policy, local parties, and local problems to influence voters’ preferences at the subnational level (cf. Kasapović, 2004: 91).
In the 2013 county elections, party coalitions won the majority of vote share
in all counties. Two new regional parties participated in Dubrovačko-Neretvanska County (MOST and DDS), each obtaining four seats in the
county assembly.45 Two regionalist parties, the IDS (alone) and the
HDSSB (in coalition with the Green Party) won the majority of votes
in the assemblies of Istarska and Osječko-Baranjska County respectively.
Nine regional parties obtained vote share in county elections in 11 counties, out of which six regional parties in electoral alliance with statewide
HNS establishes its regional organization so that it connects partisan county organizations
in a particular region, i.e. that it allies close regions or subregions into one regional alliance
of HNS ... specific function of a regional alliance is harmonization of county organizations’
viewpoints in a particular region on the issues interfering specific economic, social, cultural
and other interests of regions, as well as representation of regional viewpoints in the central
bodies of HNS …”
45
Although the statue of MOST mentions decentralisation of state functions to the
units of local and regional self-government, neither of those two parties have promotion of
specific regional interests as a separate goal in their statutes. The statute of MOST: http://
most-nl.com/o-mostu/nas-statut/; the statute of DDS: http://dubrovackidemokratskisabor.
hr/images/Statut_stranke.pdf. DDS mentions in its general provisions “... safeguarding and
promoting particularities and values of political, economic, and cultural heritage and tradition of the Republic of Croatia and broader Dubrovnik region ...” but later states that ”...
the broader Dubrovnik region … in the time of enacting this Statute ‘covers’ the area of
Dubrovačko-Neretvanska County”.
The IDS as the most important regional party has a large organizational
network consisting of nine branch associations of all over Istria and in part
of Primorsko-Goranska County, with each community consisting of several town and municipal branches. The HDSSB has spread its parliamentary influence and has its branches in a large part of Slavonia and Baranja.
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
parties (in nine thereof one regional party was in coalition, in two counties
more than one regional party was in coalition). The majority of county
assembly seats in eight counties were obtained by regional parties. No
regional party out of electoral alliance obtained the absolute majority of
votes, except the IDS in Istarska County. Statewide government parties
won a relative majority of vote share in electoral alliance in five counties,
and absolute majority of vote share in a coalition in one county. Statewide
opposition parties won a relative majority of votes in coalition in ten counties, and absolute majority of votes in three counties, which proves the
second-order election effects in county elections as a trend.
5. Conclusion
Hesitating attempts of political regionalization in conjunction with weak
fiscal capacities provoke counties’ political and economic dependence on
the central state, which in turn has a decisive influence on voters’ political
behaviour at the county level – they might turn to statewide parties just
as counties depend on and turn to the state. Where this is not the case,
namely where historic, social, economic, and cultural environment allows
for the development of distinctive regional identities and interests, powerful regional political sentiments arise. Istarska County and the IDS are
the best example. However, the majority of county political scene is still
strongly dominated by national actors, political parties, and processes.46
When talking about county and local political parties, this mostly refers
to county and local organizational branches of the most powerful national parties that are considered as “regional” because they have an “electoral stronghold” in the counties where they were founded (Kasapović,
2004: 85). Ličko-Senjska, Vukovarsko-Srijemska, Splitsko-Dalmatinska,
Brodsko-Posavska, Zadarska, Karlovačka, and to some extent Šibensko-Kninska, Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska Virovitičko-Podravska and Karlovačka counties are electoral strongholds of the HDZ. Regarding the SDP, this is mostly the case in Primorsko-Goranska County and in
the City of Zagreb while and the HNS is strong in Međimurska County.
“True” regional parties, the IDS and HDSSB, continuously obtain seats in
46
This can also be concluded by looking at the names of the political parties that
form both national and subnational government, as they have the adjective ‘Croatian’ in
their name, with the exception of the SDP and IDS, both of which are currently in the governing parliament coalition of left-wing parties (SDP, HNS, IDS, and HSU).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
509
Since 2001, an ongoing but hesitant process of decentralization and proliferation of new, small parties can be noticed. However, they achieve
rather poor, almost insignificant results in regional elections. On the other
hand, independent lists are progressively on the rise regarding their number and success since the 2001 subnational elections. They gain about 20
per cent of votes, but only 10 per cent of seats. The same figure is true for
independent candidates for executive functions in the 2009 subnational
elections. In the 2013 county elections, 20 independent lists competed
for the county assembly, 8 of them obtained above 5 per cent of votes
(11.24 per cent of vote share on average). Nine independent candidates
competed for the position of county governor, one of them won (City
of Zagreb) and one of them entered the second election round, but lost
them (Splitsko-Dalmatinska County).
Second-order election (or rather, third-order election) effects are rather
strong in Croatian counties. National political parties dominate the regional political scene, depriving regional politics from independent development adjusted to the specific regional context and resulting in voters’
orientation towards statewide parties and formation of electoral coalitions
modelled after national patterns. Nevertheless, there are arguments that
the Croatian subnational electoral system has some elements that may be
pointing at a certain regional logic. Turnout is lower than in national elections (which is a standard element of second-order election effects) but
electoral results show rise of votes cast for independent lists and decline
of votes cast for national parties (both government and opposition). What
could change the nature of regional elections is the transformation of subnational electoral system towards more local problem-oriented approach
and preferential voting for the candidates. Institutional mechanisms
should enable more personalized elections: majority system, preferential
lists, and/or better promotion of independent candidates (Omejec, 2002:
150–151; Kasapović, 2004: 92).
their respective counties. The IDS formed the majority in Istarska County
Assembly in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2013 alone, in 2005 in coalition with
the left-wing SDP, and in 2009 in coalition with the left-wing HNS. The
IDS (also in coalition with the SDP and some regional parties) won county elections in Primorsko-Goranska County. Since 2009, the HDSSB has
obtained assembly seats in five Slavonian counties (Brodsko-Posavska,
Osječko-Baranjska, Požeško-Slavonska; Virovitičko-Podravska, and Vukovarsko-Srijemska) and it had the majority in Osječko-Baranjska County
Assembly in 2009 and 2013, both times in coalition with the Green Party.
In 2009, the HDSSB’s candidate won the county governor election.
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
In addition, the processes of territorial reorganization and further decentralization could contribute to representativeness and legitimacy of the
regional electoral system. Current electoral units in Croatia should follow
natural and historical regional framework. This could be possible if the
current illogical structure of 21 counties (more in: Koprić, 2001) were
transformed into five regions that could also serve as electoral units for
national elections.47 In this way, regional dimension in electoral competition and political representation could be strengthened (Kasapović, 2011:
28). Although society is politically, economically, culturally, regionally,
religiously, and ethnically heterogeneous, the Croatian governance system is still highly centralized (Koprić, 2010: 137; Kasapović, 2011: 26).
It is obvious that the more regionalized and decentralized the state, the
more importance and independence will be gained by regional communities, regional political actors, and elections. This will probably have a
positive feedback on political culture of the regional electorate. However,
the desired changes are still under consideration as the political and social consent for transformation of the current stabilized, but dysfunctional
electoral and territorial system has still not been given.
At the moment, a new regional concept with five historical regions is undergoing a serious professional and political debate. If Croatia had five
regions with significant financial capacity and autonomy for performing
a wide scope of public affairs, including regional economic and social development, the importance of regional elections would certainly be increased, maybe even to the level of national elections.
References
Blažević, Robert (2010) Hrvatske regije i županije u povijesnom ključu (Historical
View on the Croatian Regions and Counties). In: Jakša Barbić (ed.) Nova
hrvatska lokalna i regionalna samouprava (New Croatian Local and Regional
Self-Government). Zagreb: HAZU, pp. 175–198
Đulabić, Vedran (2013) Položaj županija u statističkoj i političkoj regionalizaciji
Hrvatske (The Status of Counties in Statistical and Political Regionalization
of Croatia). In: Ivan Koprić, Vedran Đulabić (ed.) Dvadeset godina lokalne
47
In the same vein, Albania reformed its national electoral system by turning regions
into electoral units in 2008, which enabled rationalization of the territorial-administrative
structure and is a form of “recognizing the regions as an integrative part of the politico-administrative system” (Škarica, 2012: 383).
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 475–516
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samouprave u Hrvatskoj (Twenty Years of Local Self-Government in Croatia). Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu, pp. 184–193
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COUNTY ELECTIONS IN CROATIA:
ON THE PATH TO GENUINE REGIONAL POLITICS
Current second-tier organization in Croatia is based on twenty counties and
the City of Zagreb with the county status. The counties are relatively small and
have a rather low financial capacity and developmental role. In the period
1993–2001, counties were predominantly units responsible for deconcentrated
state administration, with rather narrow autonomy. That is why county elections were of third order, after national and local elections. After 2001, counties were rearranged as autonomous units without any state administrative tasks
and with a widened self-government scope. County elections became second-order, subordinated to national elections, which is demonstrated in this analysis.
Relatively low government congruence score between county and national governments over time confirms that government parties lose votes in county elections and opposition parties gain votes. The turnout rate shows that voters cast
ballots in county elections more rarely than in national elections. The counties
political arena is still dominated by national parties and their organizational
branches. County elections are highly ‘nationalized’ since they reflect national
political institutions, processes, and patterns of political behaviour. At the moment, a new regional concept with only five historical regions is under serious
professional and political debate. In the near future, the introduction of new,
genuine regional organization instead of present counties is likely. If those five
new regions with broad autonomous scope of affairs are established, including
regional development and strong regional policy, regional elections may become
less subordinated to national elections and more oriented to specific interest of
particular regions. The importance of regional elections depends mainly on the
significance of the regional scope of public affairs and the financial capacity of
regional units.
Key words: counties, Croatia, electoral system, national elections, county elections, county assembly, regional political parties, regional politics
Summary
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ŽUPANIJSKI IZBORI U HRVATSKOJ:
NA PUTU PREMA STVARNOJ REGIONALNOJ POLITICI
Sažetak
Sadašnja organizacija druge razine lokalne samouprave u Hrvatskoj temelji se
na dvadeset županija i Gradu Zagrebu, koji ima ovlasti grada i županije. Županije se relativno male i imaju slabe financijske kapacitete i nedovoljnu razvojnu ulogu. U razdoblju 1993.–2001. županije su prije svega bile odgovorne za
obavljanje poslova dekoncentrirane državne uprave s vrlo uskom autonomijom.
Zato su županijski izbori bili po važnosti izbori trećega reda, iza parlamentarnih i lokalnih izbora. Nakon 2001. županije su reorganizirane kao autonomne
jedinice koje više ne obavljaju poslove državne uprave, a samoupravni djelokrug
im je proširen. Županijski izbori postali su izbori drugog reda, kako se vidi iz
analize. Relativno niski indeks podudaranja županijskih i nacionalne vlasti u
vremenskoj perspektivi potvrđuje da vladine stranke gube glasove u županijskim
izborima, dok oporbene stranke glasove dobivaju. Stopa izlaznosti pokazuje da
glasači rjeđe izlaze na županijske nego na nacionalne izbore. Županijska politička arena je još uvijek u rukama nacionalnih političkih stranaka i njihovih županijskih ogranaka. Županijski su izbori visoko nacionalizirani jer odražavaju
nacionalne političke institucije, procese i načine političkog ponašanja. Trenutno
se vode ozbiljne stručne i političke rasprave o novom regionalnom konceptu s pet
povijesnih regija. Postoji vjerojatnost uvođenja istinske regionalne organizacije
u budućnosti, umjesto postojeće županijske organizacije. Ako bi se uspostavilo
pet regija sa širokim samoupravnim djelokrugom, uključujući regionalni razvoj
i snažne regionalne politike, regionalni bi izbori mogli postati manje podređeni
nacionalnima i više orijentirani na posebne interese pojedinih regija. Značenje
regionalnih izbora uglavnom ovisi o važnosti kruga regionalnih poslova i financijskom kapacitetu regionalnih jedinica.
Ključne riječi: županije, Hrvatska, izborni sustav, nacionalni izbori, županijski izbori, županijska skupština, regionalne političke stranke, regionalna politika
COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE –
SUDSKA I UPRAVNA PRAKSA
517
Županijski sud u Zagrebu
UDK
347.992(497.5 Zagreb)(094.8
ODGOVORNOST DRŽAVE ZA ŠTETU KOJU
POLICIJSKI SLUŽBENIK POČINI TREĆIM
OSOBAMA
Čl. 127. Zakona o policiji, NN 129/00, 41/081
Republika Hrvatska odgovara za štetu koju policijski službenik Ministarstva počini trećim osobama, osim ako dokaže da je policijski službenik
postupao sukladno propisima o načinu obavljanja policijskih poslova
»Predmet spora je zahtjev za naknadu štete od Republike Hrvatske zbog
nezakonitog rada policijskog službenika.
Nije sporno da je policijski službenik ... pravomoćnom presudom Disciplinskog suda ... Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske
(dalje: MUP), ... proglašen krivim što je početkom travnja ... koristeći se
informacijskim sustavom MUP-a pribavio osobne podatke vlasnika stana
u Zagrebu te pribavljene podatke dao na korištenje ..., zbog čega mu je
izrečena najstroža disciplinska mjera: prestanak radnog odnosa.
Tužbeni zahtjev utemeljen je na tvrdnji da je zaposlenik tužene ..., po
zvanju policajac na radu u tijelima MUP-a, koristeći se položajem policijskog službenika neovlašteno pribavio iz informacijskog sustava MUP-a,
..., osobne podatke stvarnog vlasnika stana u Zagrebu, ..., i neovlašteno ih
proslijedio osobi pod imenom ..., a ti su podaci iskorišteni za izradu kri-
1
U važećem Zakonu o policiji, NN 34/11, 130/12, 89/14, 151/14, odgovornost države za štetu koju počini policijski službenik regulirana je čl. 115. koji glasi: »Za štetu koju
policijski službenik počini trećim osobama u službi ili u svezi sa službom odgovara Republika
Hrvatska, osim ako dokaže da je šteta posljedica zakonite primjene policijskih ovlasti.«
Iz obrazloženja:
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SUDSKA I UPRAVNA PRAKSA / Županijski sud u Zagrebu
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 517–519
votvorene osobne iskaznice na ime osobe ... s umetnutom slikom ..., koja
je iskorištena za prodaju tog stana tužiteljici i njezinom sada pokojnom
suprugu za iznos od ... kn.
Na temelju provedenih dokaza sud prvog stupnja je utvrdio da je policijski službenik ... neovlaštenim i nezakonitim pribavljanjem zaštićenih
podataka iz informacijskog sustava MUP-a i nezakonitim prosljeđivanjem
takvih podataka neovlaštenim osobama, članovima kriminalne skupine
... omogućio izradu krivotvorene osobne iskaznice i prijevaru tužiteljice i
njezinog sada pokojnog supruga prodajom tuđeg stana, čime je tužiteljici
učinjena materijalna šteta u visini plaćene kupoprodajne cijene.
Odgovornost tužene Republike Hrvatske sud prvog stupnja temelji na
odredbi čl. 127. Zakona o policije (dalje: ZP) kojom je propisano da Republika Hrvatska odgovara za štetu koju policijski službenik počini trećim
osobama, osim ako dokaže da je policijski službenik postupao sukladno
propisima o načinu obavljanja policijskih poslova.
Žalbenim navodima tužena nije dovela u sumnju pravilnost pobijane presude ukazujući na ‘nedostatak protupravnosti na strani tužene’. To stoga
što tužena u smislu čl. 127. ZP-a odgovara za nezakonit rad svog službenika, a nedvojbeno je utvrđeno da je ... postupio protivno propisima
o načinu obavljanja policijskih poslova, što je utvrđeno i pravomoćnom
disciplinskom presudom.
Neosnovano tužena u žalbi ističe da presuda disciplinskog suda MUP-a
ne predstavlja temelj za utvrđivanje građanskopravne odgovornosti ...
Naime, protupravno postupanje ... nedvojbeno je utvrđeno, ne samo na
temelju presude disciplinskog suda već i na temelju ostalih dokaza, zapis
nika o iskazima sudionika prijevare pred policijom i kaznenim sudom te
njihovih iskaza u ovom postupku, a kojih je sud pravilno utvrdio da je
... na traženje ... nezakonito i neovlašteno pribavljao sporne podatke,
te ih proslijedio ... upozorivši ga da ‘paze jer čovjek ima izvađenu novu
osobnu iskaznicu’, što upućuje na to da je ... znao da će proslijeđeni tajni
osobni podaci biti upotrijebljeni u nedopuštene svrhe. Također, suprotno navodima žalbe tužene, sud nije bio dužan prekinuti ovaj parnični
postupak do pravomoćnog okončanja kaznenog postupka, a to stoga što
je građanskopravna odgovornost šira od kaznenopravne odgovornosti,
i što je u ovom parničnom postupku s potpunom izvjesnošću utvrđeno
protupravno postupanje (...) radi ostvarivanja prijevare. Pritom valja naglasiti da iz provedenog dokaznog postupka proizlazi da to (...) nije bio
jedini slučaj neovlaštenog pribavljanja i prosljeđivanja tajnih podataka u
iste ili slične svrhe.
SUDSKA I UPRAVNA PRAKSA / Županijski sud u Zagrebu
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 517–519
519
Glede žalbenog navoda o nedostatku uzročne veze, valja reći da je u konkretnom slučaju i po ocjeni ovog suda riječ o pravnorelevantno uzročnoj
vezi, odnosno o takvom neprekinutom lancu uzroka i posljedica u kojem
su sve počinjene protupravne radnje po redovnom tijeku stvari dovele do
predmetne štetne posljedice.«
Presuda od 9. prosinca 2014.
*
Dr. sc. Damir Juras, policijski savjetnik, Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike
Hrvatske, Split (civil servant-adviser, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia,
Split, e-mail: [email protected])
Damir Juras*
Upravni sud u Osijeku
UDK
347.998.85(497.5 Osijek)(094.8)
ZAŠTITA SLUŽBENIH PODATAKA
Čl. 35. Zakona o policiji, NN 34/11, 130/12, 89/14, 151/14
Policijski službenik dužan je čuvati podatke koje je saznao u obavljanju
posla ili povodom obavljanja posla.
»Prema odredbi čl. 1/1. Zakona o zaštiti osobnih podataka tim Zakonom
uređuje se zaštita osobnih podataka o fizičkim osobama te nadzor nad
prikupljanjem, obradom i korištenjem osobnih podataka u Republici Hrvatskoj. St. 2. propisuje da je svrha zaštite osobnih podataka zaštita privatnog života i ostalih ljudskih prava i temeljnih sloboda u prikupljanju, obradi i korištenju osobnih podataka. Zaštita osobnih podataka u Republici
Hrvatskoj osigurana je svakoj fizičkoj osobi bez obzira na državljanstvo i
prebivalište te neovisno o rasi, boji kože, spolu, jeziku, vjeri, političkom ili
drugom uvjerenju, nacionalnom ili socijalnom podrijetlu, imovini, rođenju, naobrazbi, društvenom položaju ili drugim osobinama (st. 3.)
Dakle, tijekom postupka je nesporno da je tužitelj na navedenoj adresi
(u privatnom domu) imao u posjedu izliste iz Informacijskog sustava Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova (dalje: MUP) za navedene fizičke osobe sa
njihovim osobnim podacima, dok je zaštita osobnih podataka u Republici
Hrvatskoj osigurana svakoj fizičkoj osobi. Stoga je, prema ocjeni Suda,
nesporno da tužitelj nije čuvao sigurnost i dostupnost osobnih podataka
fizičkih osoba, čime je postupio protivno odredbi čl. 35. Zakona o policiji,
bez obzira na tužiteljeve tvrdnje da se izlistima nije poslužio nitko osim
tužitelja u svezi s obavljanjem službe.
Činjenicom što je tužitelj na radnom stolu na adresi u (...), u privatnom
domu, imao u posjedu izliste iz Informacijskog sustava Ministarstva unu-
Iz obrazloženja:
522
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 521–522
tarnjih poslova za fizičke osobe s njihovim osobnim podacima, stajalište je
Suda da time nije čuvao sigurnost i dostupnost takvih podataka povjerljive
prirode posebno štićenih vrijednosti jer su podaci iz IS MUP-a označeni određenim stupnjem tajnosti, s obzirom na stupanj ugroze zaštićenih
vrijednosti, te je time što ih je držao na radnom stolu na privatnoj adresi
izvan prostorija MUP-a postupio protivno odredbi čl. 35. Zakona o policiji jer nije na adekvatan način čuvao podatke koje je saznao u obavljanju
posla ili povodom obavljanja posla čineći ih dostupnima drugim osobama,
bez obzira na to na to što tijekom postupka nije dokazano da je tužitelj
nekome neovlašteno priopćio i omogućio korištenje spornim podacima.
Naime, protupravnost u smislu navedene odredbe ne postoji samo pri
otkrivanju podataka, već i nečuvanjem podataka s mogućnošću činjenja
dostupnih ih drugim osobama.
Slijedom navedenog, ne mogu se prihvatiti niti navodi tužitelja da se u
konkretnom slučaju radi eventualno o neurednosti tužitelja u postupanju
sa službenim aktom, a ne o zlouporabi ili prekoračenju položaja ili ovlasti,
odnosno o lakšoj povredi službene dužnosti opisanoj kao nepravilno ili
neuredno postupanje sa sredstvima za rad i službenim aktima iz odredbe
čl. 95/1. t. 3. Zakona o policiji, dok prigovore u pogledu zastare pokretanja disciplinskog postupka zbog lakše povrede službene dužnosti Sud nije
niti razmatrao jer smatra da je tijekom postupka dokazano da je tužitelj
počinio težu povredu službene dužnosti – zlouporabu položaja u službi
ili izvan službe ili prekoračenje ovlasti u službi opisanu u čl. 96/1. t. 3.
Zakona o policiji.
Dakle, u dijelu utvrđenog činjeničnog stanja i zaključka tuženika i prvostupanjskog tijela da je tužitelj počinio težu povredu službene dužnosti
koja mu se stavlja na teret, Sud osporavana rješenja ocjenjuje zakonitima.«
Presuda od 16. veljače 2015.
Damir Juras*
*
Odbor za državnu službu
UDK35.08:349.2(497.5)(094.77)
IMENOVANJE NAČELNIKA POLICIJSKE POSTAJE
Rang-listu kandidata koji su se javili na interni oglas za popunu slobodnog
radnog mjesta načelnika policijske postaje, nakon provedenog testiranja,
utvrđuje povjerenstvo koje imenuje čelnik državnog tijela. Načelnika policijske postaje, na prijedlog načelnika policijske uprave, imenuje glavni
ravnatelj policije. Donositelj rješenja dužan je obrazložiti razloge kojima
se rukovodio prilikom izbora kandidata u konkretnom predmetu.
Iz obrazloženja:
»Rješenjem Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova, ... imenuje se s danom 15.
listopada 2012. na radno mjesto načelnik policijske postaje u Policijskoj
upravi ..., Postaja ... na razdoblje od pet godina.
Protiv navedenog rješenja ... pravodobno je izjavio žalbu u kojoj u bitnom
navodi da je ostvario uvjerljivo najbolji rezultat od svih protukandidata,
dok je izabrani kandidat deveti na rang-listi od ukupno četrnaest prijavljenih kandidata. Smatra da je svrha natječaja da se izabere najbolji ili jedan
od najboljih kandidata sukladno rezultatima postupka.
Hrvatski sabor na sjednici 15. srpnja 2014. dao je vjerodostojno tumačenje čl.126/1., u svezi s čl. 60., 62. i 63. Zakona o policiji, koje je objavljeno
u Narodnim novinama 89/14 od 24. srpnja 2014. prema kojem je svrha
i opstojnost odredbe čl. 126. navedenog Zakona da osigurava stabilnost
i nesmetano obavljanje poslova zatečenih policijskih službenika od dana
stupanja na snagu Zakona o policiji do okončanja postupka izbora, imenovanja odnosno rasporeda u skladu s novim, sa Zakonom usklađenim,
Čl. 60. i 61. Zakona o policiji, NN 34/11, 130/12, 89/14, 151/14; čl.
98. Zakona o općem upravnom postupku, NN 47/09; čl. 15. Uredbe
o raspisivanju i provedbi javnog natječaja i internog oglasa u državnoj
službi, NN 74/10, 142/11, 53/12
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Pravilnikom o unutarnjem redu Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova. Navedena odredba primjenjuje se tako da se za sva rukovodeće radna mjesta propisana Uredbom o klasifikaciji radnih mjesta policijskih službenika (NN
129/11, 82/12, 140/13) provode postupci internog oglašavanja nakon kojih se provodi izbor između onih policijskih službenika koji su se javili na
interni oglas i koji ispunjavaju sve propisane uvjete, odnosno navedena
odredba istodobno znači da su sva rukovodeća radna mjesta propisana
Uredbom o klasifikaciji radnih mjesta policijskih službenika slobodna za
popunu putem internog oglasa, i to od trenutka stupanja na snagu Zakona
o policiji, te se na njih policijski službenici imenuju, odnosno raspoređuju
nakon provedenog postupka internog oglašavanja sukladno odredbama čl.
60. i 62. Zakona o policiji.
S obzirom na naknadno donijeto vjerodostojno tumačenje odredbe čl.
126/1., a u svezi s člancima 60., 62. i 63. Zakona o policiji to je tijelo
prvog stupnja moglo izvršiti odabir kandidata radi popune predmetnog
radnog mjesta.
Pobijano rješenje doneseno je u provedbi postupka internog oglasa objavljenog na web-stranicama Ministarstva uprave dana ... 2012., nakon donošenja novog odnosno drugog po redu Pravilnika o unutarnjem redu Ministarstva unutarnjih poslova 28. srpnja 2012., a radi potrebe imenovanja
većeg broja rukovodećih policijskih službenika Ministarstva unutarnjih
poslova u Policijskoj upravi ..., između ostalog i radi popune slobodnog
radnog mjesta načelnika policijske postaje u Postaji ...
Uvidom u dostavljeni spis, posebno prijavu na interni oglas izabranog
kandidata utvrđeno je da ispunjava oglasom tražene uvjete predmetnog
radnog mjesta .... Nadalje uvidom u prijavu na interni oglas žalitelja utvrđeno je da također ispunjava oglasom tražene uvjete predmetnog radnog
mjesta ...
Također je utvrđeno da je žalitelj u provedenom postupku ostvario bolje
rezultate od izabranog kandidata, i to ukupno 17,36 bodova, od čega iz
pisanog dijela testiranja 8,8 bodova te iz razgovora 8,56 bodova, koji je na
rang-listi zauzeo prvo mjesto, dok je izabrani kandidat ostvario ukupno
15,68 bodova, od čega iz pisanog dijela testiranja 7,2 boda te iz razgovora
8,48 bodova i na rang-listi nalazi se na devetom mjestu.
Tijelo prvog stupnja razloge odabira kandidata koji je zauzeo deveto mjest o
na rang-listi i koji je ostvario slabije rezultate od žalitelja obrazlaže općenitom rečenicom da je on tijekom dugogodišnjeg rada na različitim policijskim poslovima ocjenjivan visokim radnim ocjenama, pri čemu je pokazao
iznimne organizacijske sposobnosti, jasno određene profesionalne ciljeve
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i spremnost za donošenje odluka za razinu odgovornosti načelnika policijske postaje.
Stoga je, s obzirom na utvrđeno činjenično stanje, ocijenjeno da čelnik
tijela prvog stupnja nije valjano obrazložio razloge kojima se rukovodio
prilikom izbora kandidata u konkretnom predmetu.
Slijedom iznesenog, proizlazi da je tijelo prvog stupnja pogrešno i nepotpuno utvrdilo činjenično stanje i time počinilo povredu koja može utjecati
na donošenje drukčije odluke pa je valjalo u skladu s odredbom čl. 117/2.
Zakona o općem upravnom postupku pobijano rješenje poništiti i predmet vratiti tijelu prvog stupnja na ponovno rješavanje u kojem će temeljem potpuno i točno utvrđenog činjeničnog stanja izvršiti izbor kandidata
na radno mjesto načelnika policijske postaje te odlučne razloge izbora
navesti u obrazloženju rješenja sukladno odredbi čl. 98/5. istog Zakona.«
Rješenje od 11. veljače 2015.
Odredbom čl. 98. Zakona o općem upravnom postupku propisani su sas
tavni dijelovi rješenja, pa je tako u st. 1. istoga članka propisano da rješenje, između ostaloga, sadržava uputu o pravnom lijeku, dok je u st. 5.
istoga članka Zakona propisano da obrazloženje, uz ostalo, sadržava utvrđeno činjenično stanje, razloge koji su bili odlučujući pri ocjeni pojedinih
dokaza, kao i propise na temelju kojih je riješena upravna stvar. Naime,
obrazloženje je obvezni sastavni dio rješenja. Bit obrazloženja jest u tome
da iz činjeničnog dijela obrazloženja bude vidljivo sve što se odnosi na
utvrđivanje činjenica koje su relevantne i koje su poslužile za primjenu
odgovarajućih materijalnopravnih propisa. Uz navođenje primijenjenih
materijalnopravnih propisa, potrebno je obrazložiti kako su oni protumačeni prilikom primjene. Određeno, jasno i potpuno obrazloženje rješenja
je uvjet bez kojega se ne može osigurati ostvarenje zakonom zajamčenog
prava na žalbu. Naime, žalitelju kojemu nisu poznati razlozi na kojima se
temelji akt kojim je nezadovoljan onemogućuje se podnošenje učinkovite
žalbe. Također, pravilno argumentirano obrazloženje nužan je preduvjet
za učinkovitu provedbu nadzora zakonitosti i pravilnosti predmetnog rješenja.
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ČLANOVI KOMISIJE ZA PROVEDBU INTERNOG
OGLASA U DRŽAVNOJ SLUŽBI
Čl. 8/3. Uredbe o raspisivanju i provedbi javnog natječaja i internog
oglasa u državnoj službi, NN 74/10, 142/11, 53/12
Članovi komisije iz reda službenika moraju imati potrebno obrazovanje i
znanje u svezi s poslovima radnog mjesta koje se popunjava.
Iz obrazloženja:
»Uvidom u dostavljeni spis, posebno prijavu na interni oglas izabranog
kandidata, utvrđeno je da on ispunjava oglasom tražene uvjete predmetnog radnog mjesta, odnosno da ima stečenu visoku stručnu spremu i ...
policijsko zvanje policijskogi savjetnika. Nadalje, uvidom u prijavu na interni oglas podnositelja žalbe utvrđeno je da i on ispunjava oglasom tražene uvjete predmetnog radnog mjesta odnosno da ima stečenu visoku
stručnu spremu i ... policijsko zvanje policijskog savjetnika. ...
Nadalje, prema odredbi čl.8/1., 2. i 3. Uredbe, Komisiju za provedbu
javnog natječaja imenuje čelnik tijela. Komisija ima najmanje tri člana,
u njezinu sastavu mora biti predstavnik središnjeg tijela državne uprave
nadležnog za službeničke odnose, kojeg odredi čelnik tog tijela, dok se
ostali članovi komisije imenuju iz reda službenika koji imaju potrebno obrazovanje i znanje u svezi s poslovima radnog mjesta koje se popunjava,
sadržajem testiranja i provjerom posebnih znanja, sposobnosti i vještina.
Vezano za žalbene navode glede kompetentnosti i meritornosti komisije
za ispitivanje i ocjenjivanje kandidata, utvrđeno je, uvidom u zapisnike
o radu Komisije za provedbu internog oglasa, između ostalog i za radno
mjesto zamjenika načelnika policijske uprave u ..., kako je Komisija bila
sastavljena od predsjednika Komisije ... i članova ... i ..., predstavnika Ureda državne uprave u ... županiji. Iz rješenja prvostupanjskog tijela broj ...
od 25. studenoga 2011. proizlazi da je ... preveden u zvanje policijskog
savjetnika, a ... rješenjem prvostupanjskog tijela broj ... od 25. studenoga
2011. preveden je u zvanje višeg policijskog inspektora.
Iz spisa predmeta proizlazi da je za radno mjesto zamjenika načelnika
policijske uprave uvjet zvanje policijskog savjetnika, dok član Komisije ...
imenovan iz reda policijskih službenika ima niže osobno zvanje od zvanja
koje je uvjet za radno mjesto koje se popunjava, odnosno on se ne bi mogao kandidirati na oglašeno radno mjesto.
Budući da odredba čl. 8/3. Uredbe izričito propisuje da se članovi Komisije imenuju iz reda službenika koji imaju potrebno obrazovanje i zvanje
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u svezi s poslovima radnog mjesta koje se popunjava, utvrđeno je da Komisija nije bila sastavljena u skladu s navedenom odredbom Uredbe, jer
članovi Komisije nemaju najmanje propisano osobno zvanje za oglašeno
radno mjesto. Naime, osobno zvanje kod policijskih službenika pretpos
tavlja odgovarajuće radno iskustvo na poslovima određene složenosti, pa
tako u konkretnom slučaju članovi Komisije nemaju potrebno znanje u
svezi s poslovima radnog mjesta koje se popunjava.«
Rješenje od 19. veljače 2015.
*
Damir Juras*
NEWS AND INFORMATION – VIJESTI
529
Conference
Decentralisation Policies: Reshuffling
the Scene
UDK352.01(4)(047)
The conference was organized by the Institute of Public Administration,
Croatia, under the auspices of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), and with the support from the IPSA Research Committee
(RC) 5 Comparative Studies on Local Government and Politics and RC
32 Public Policy and Administration. The conference was also supported
by the Study Centre for Public Administration and Public Finance, Faculty of Law in Zagreb, Croatia.
Research goals of the Conference were to explore values, triggers, components, and challenges of recently undertaken decentralisation policies
in a number of countries, their short- and long-term effects, as well as to
discuss general and country specific prerequisites for and expectations
of decentralisation processes. Research topics were mostly related to the
territorial restructuring, functional and fiscal reforms of local and regional self-government in multi-level governance settings, legitimacy and
efficiency of decentralisation as a democratisation tool, and evaluation of
decentralisation reforms.
The Conference started on May 7, with PhD school. Eight papers with
outline of doctoral students’ respective PhD theses were presented. Pro-
International scientific conference Decentralisation Policies: Reshuffling the
Scene took place in the Centre for Advanced Academic Studies (CAAS)
of the University of Zagreb in Dubrovnik, Croatia from 7 to 10 May 2015.
More than 40 participants – professors and academic researchers from 19
countries (including the USA, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and
many European countries) presented 35 papers.
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fessors Colin Copus and Fred A. Lazin served as discussants. During the
next three days, twelve sessions were held. At the opening session, introduced by Professor Ivan Koprić and assistant professor Vedran Đulabić,
Croatian Minister of Public Administration Arsen Bauk gave a speech
in which he addressed the importance of the decentralisation reforms in
Croatia.
In the first panel, Decentralization Policies and Processes, the presenters
were professor Jeffrey Sellers (University of South Karolina, USA), who
explained the role of civic organizations in decentralized governance; professor Roberto Moreno Espinosa (International Academy of Politico-Administrative Studies & Future Studies, IAPAS, Mexico), who emphasized
the urgent need for municipal reform in Mexico as an inevitable means of
true democratisation of the country; as well as Dr Zoltán Grünhut and Dr
Ákos Bodor (Institute for Regional Studies, CERS HAS, Pécs, Hungary),
who presented their empirical research on values that can be derived from
political elites’ rhetoric regarding local self-government.
Second panel Decentralisation as Democratisation introduced papers from
the UK, South Africa and Croatia. Professor Colin Copus (De Montfort University, Leicester, UK) addressed the current debate of pros and
cons for change of the constitutional status of English local government
towards (maximum) devolution. Professor Robert Cameron (University
of Cape Town, South Africa) pointed out that South Africa may have
administrative decentralisation (deconcentration) and fiscal decentralisation but falls short on political decentralisation (devolution). Dr Jasmina Džinić (Faculty of Law, Zagreb) analysed citizen participation in the
creation of local budgets and the potential of participatory budgeting to
improve public governance in Croatian local self-government units.
Panel 3 Decentralisation and Quality of Public Services started with a presentation by professor Mauricio Covarrubias (National Autonomous
University of Mexico) on fragmentation of the educational system in
Mexico, problems of coordination between actions of the different levels
of government and ways in which decentralization advantages can be undermined by shortcomings in their design and implementation. Professors
Aleksandra Maksimovska and Aleksandar Stojkov (Law Faculty Iustinianus Primus, University Ss. Ciryl and Metodij, Skopje, FYR Macedonia)
presented the concept of social responsiveness of local governments, aiming to explore and explain the openness of local governments to the
needs of diverse social groups, particularly to different ethnicities. Dr Romea Manojlović (Faculty of Law, Zagreb) presented her empirical rese-
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arch on whether the size of Croatian local units (number of civil servants
and budget) affects performance and quality measurement.
During Panel 5 Local Capacities and Decentralisation, associate professor
Gordana Marčetić (Faculty of Law, Zagreb) presented her longitudinal
analysis of the number of local servants in local administrative bodies in
Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as on training programs for local servants conducted so far in Croatia, pointing out
low personal capacities and proposing the establishment of an independent agency for HPD for subnational government level in Croatia. Associate professor Mirko Klarić (Faculty of Law, University of Split, Croatia)
explained the current capacity of sub-municipal government in Croatia
for overtaking some municipal public tasks, which is very weak, but it
could be improved should there be a larger political and fiscal decentralization preceded by territorial reorganization of local self-government.
Panel 6 named Regionalism in South Europe was opened by Dr Čepo,
presenting the second part of the joint paper with Vedran Đulabić, concerning comparative analysis of subregional representations in Scotland,
Wales and Poland, with reference to Croatia, where a new institutional
framework of subregional representation was proposed, as to preserve
subregional identities of specific subregions (currently counties), and to
pave the way for their amalgamation in a larger region. By analysing historical and current trends in territorial governance in Hungary, professor
Illona Palne Kovacs (Institute for Regional Studies CERS HAS, Pécs,
Panel 4 named Territorial Restructuring Policies began with the research of
Dr Daniel Bochsler (NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich, Switzerland), explaining political preferences of the citizens on ethno-political
issues based on structural and institutional variables (socio-economic
context, ethnic structure of the population, decentralisation, territorial
autonomy) and how preferences are translated into cooperation or conflict. Dr Mihovil Škarica (Faculty of Law, Zagreb) underlined trends, potentials, and problems of inter-municipal cooperation of local units, and
a concept of integrated model of inter-municipal cooperation as a means
of achieving a consolidated system of territorial (local) self-government.
Professor Đulabić presented the first half of his joint paper with Dr Dario
Čepo (Faculty of Law, Zagreb) regarding the debate on the introduction
of five regions and the position of 20 counties in Croatia. The paper dealt
with the question of how to ensure preservation of the existing county
identities and their not being absorbed by the wider regions that should
replace the counties.
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Hungary) pointed out the fact of strong and expanding central state and
local government system as an “almost empty bottle” due to strong veto
players against decentralisation (parties, central bureaucracy, even the
local elite). Dr. Anka Kekez Koštro (Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb)
and Enes Ćerimagić (NGO Green Action, Zagreb) presented their joint paper prepared with Tomislav Domes and Tomislav Tomašević. Their
analysis showed that functional and fiscal decentralization of the Croatian water services is not as present in practice as it is in documents, and
water services are primarily managed via hierarchy and bureaucratic management complemented by private concessions on wastewater treatment
service.
Panel 7 Urban Areas and Decentralisation began by the presentation of
dr. Michele Breuillard (University of Lille, France) on (im)possibilites of
the French local government rationalization due to intricate structure of
powers at the local level, and large discrepancies in the size and population density in communes and departments. Possibilities lie in shifting
trends from communal to regional power as the basis of local government
system and balance: mandatory metropolitan councils in 14 bigger urban
areas since 2014 and the introduction of 13 instead of 22 regions since
January 2016. Assistant professor Dejan Vučetić (Faculty of Law, University of Niš, Serbia) examined how to achieve equal development of all city
units for effective city governance – by expanding city units’ autonomy or
by strengthening cooperation mechanisms. Focusing on the legal position
of inner city units in Central European cities, he provided a comprehensive analysis of administration and competences of city units in Serbian
cities, whose legal nature and position are not sufficiently defined either
in the Serbian legal theory or in local government regulations.
Within Panel 8, Decentralisation in Times of Austerity, assistant professor
Katarzyna Szmigiel-Rawska (Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies,
University of Warsaw, Poland) presented results of the research on intermunicipal cooperation in Poland: scale of financial transfers in relation
to the size of budgets and the subject of financial transfers concerning
cooperation between budgets of local governments. The role of financial
transfers is only 2.3% of total budget expenditures but it is systematically
increasing, with largest share related to the transport services (local public
transport and roads), social assistance and education. Associate professor
Primož Pevcin (Faculty of Administration, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia) portrayed the effects of the current economic and fiscal crisis on the
public sector in Slovenia. Austerity measures have shown evidence of double-loop learning feedback mechanism in subnational governments that
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Panel 9 Central-Local Relations Dr Koenraad De Ceuninck presented the
paper written with Professor Herwig Reynaert (Centre for Local Politics,
Ghent University, Belgium) focusing on the enlargement of the administrative scale of Flemish municipalities, which is explicitly put forward
as a major priority of the current Flemish policy and discussing some foreign examples of recent scale reforms. Flemish policy on amalgamations is now linked to decentralization towards the local authorities, but
strengthening of their administrative power can be done only through a
multiple approach to legal framework in which local governments operate, their funding, their (political) composition, and their geographical
location. Professor Pekka Kettunen (Abo Akademi University, Finland)
discussed the balance between centralization and decentralization on an
example of healthcare services in Scandinavian countries. Pros and cons
of decentralization are often filtered through politics, zealots, elections,
and private interests. A researcher has to try to be objective and consider
the issue from a number of angles, but scientific means to find evidencebased solutions are scarce. Furthermore, local governments are not the
same; urban centres have much better chances to take the responsibility than small rural municipalities. Healthcare services are not merely a
professional issue; they have a political nature, too. Healthcare reform
seems to pave the way for a territorial reform in general. Assistant professor Friederike Bundschuh-Rieseneder (Institute for Public Law, State
and Administrative Science, University of Innsbruck, Austria) discussed
some contrary tendencies of decentralization and centralization in the federal state of Austria. Public administration reform in Austria, which has
recently taken place, reflects the transition from a welfare state to a lean
state, although the decentralisation of public task fulfilment focuses on
citizens’ needs and on motivating public administration. A fair balance
between decentralisation, which should guarantee the best performance
delivery, and central co-operation and coherence must be found.
The summary panel was introduced by Dr Carlo Panara (Liverpool John
Moores University, UK) who accentuated multi-level governance (MLG)
as a key feature of all Western democracies. It is an important issue on the
EU agenda promoting legitimate governance, both at the national and
EU levels, as it is a correct implementation of EU policy and appropriate
involvement of the subnational authorities. Professor Jill L. Tao (Global
have learned to cooperate more intensively in order to survive the crisis.
Public-sector employment decreased due to the cutback measures, and
the average wage in the public sector decreased, leading to wage compression. Further consolidation measures are still needed.
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College of Law, Commerce and Public Affairs, Incheon National University, South Korea) examined attempts at decentralizing the implementation of environmental policies within two culturally different contexts: the
northeast sector of the People’s Republic of China and the heavy industrial bases in South Korea. Although both countries have histories of highly
centralized decision-making and somewhat brutal suppression of local
attempts to exercise autonomy of any kind, these countries have moved
toward more decentralized processes for implementing certain kinds of
policies. The hypothesis that Chinese local officials are far more likely to
see other local officials as sources of information as to how decentralization should take place than their Korean counterparts is tested. Professor
Ivan Koprić analysed local “muddled” governance in SEE countries (Western Balkans) which experience unclear governance ideas, with rather
slow governance improvements. The biggest issues are territorial fragmentation, timid administrative modernisation and hesitating decentralisation
in a politicized and authoritarian culture. In search of a new legitimacy of
local government, new forms of citizen participation should be encouraged and clear roles of local government should be determined. He advocated for more “regionalism”, urban units as drivers of development, as well
as for more professionalism in local administration.
The Conference was concluded by professors Fred A. Lazin and Ivan
Koprić who thanked all the presenters and the Conference Organizing
Committee for their effort and welcomed the Conference presenters with
the opportunity to submit the final versions of their papers for publication
in the international scientific journal Croatian and Comparative Public
Administration, published quarterly by the Institute for Public Administration.
Daria Dubajić*
*
Daria Dubajić, Assistant at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law,
University of Zagreb (asistentica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, e-mail: [email protected])
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535
Conference
European Local Government at a Glance
The 4th general COST-LocRef Action meeting was held in Dubrovnik on
5-6 May 2015. Loc-Ref is an action within COST (European Cooperation
in Science and Technology which is the European Union project that supports trans-national cooperation among researchers, engineers and scholars across Europe) aimed to provide a platform for establishing a new set
of comparative knowledge on local public sector reforms, integrate the
fragmented research activities in this neglected area of investigation, and
enhance the scope of the conceptual foundations as well as the methodological rigor of comparative public administration. The theme of the
Conference was European Local Government at a Glance and it gathered
more than 70 prominent European public administration, local politics,
and local government researchers.
The Conference was opened by welcome speeches of the Action’s chair
professor Sabine Kuhlmann (University of Potsdam) and its local organizer professor Ivan Koprić (University of Zagreb). The joint introductory
session consisted of key note speech given by professor Koprić on Experiences, Problems and Prospects of Local Government in the Western Balkan Region, information of Boris Milošević, an assistant to the minister of public
administration, on the state of the Croatian local self-government system,
and presentation of professor Hubert Heinelt (University of Darmstadt)
on The European Mayor and Local Public Sector Reforms. After that, parallel
sessions of four working groups began
The sessions comprised debates on new theoretical frameworks and research methods in the field of local government and public administration, discussions on joint projects and upcoming publications as well as
presentation of papers related to reforms in local government system. The
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activity of the first group, WGI External (Post) NPM, was primarily focused on the development of provision of public utilities and local social
services in European countries. The second group, WGII Internal (Post)
NPM, dealt with to major internal managerial changes that occurred in
the European local governments as a consequence of post-New Public
Management reform processes. In the third group, WGIII Territorial/Functional Re-Scaling, members were occupied with the territorial and functional reforms in Europe understood within the theoretical framework
of action-centred institutionalism. The fourth group, WGIV Democratic
Renewal, discussed political structures and processes related to representative and direct democracy and civic and public engagement and developments in participative democracy.
Parallel with the working groups, a meeting related to factors that determine the scope of local autonomy called Local Autonomy Index Meeting
chaired by Andreas Ladner (University of Lausanne) and a meeting of the
members of POLLEADER (Political Leaders in European Cities) project
chaired by professor Hubert Heinelt and professor Annick Magnier (University of Florence) took place. The first day was concluded by a closed
meeting of COST Management Committee.
The second day of the Conference started with two parallel sessions:
Re-scaling local governance: Amalgamation, cooperation, territorial consolidation, chaired by professor Sabine Kuhlmann, and Managerial reforms: From
Weberian bureaucracy to performance management? Chaired, by professor
Geert Bouckaert (University of Leuven). These sessions were followed by
new group of sessions: Re-organizing local service delivery: From government
to governance? chaired by Filipe Teles (University of Aveiro) and Local participatory reforms, political leaders, and citizens chaired by Daniel Klimovský
(University of Bratislava). More than 20 papers that were presented during these sessions are available at COST Loc-Ref website (http://www.
uni-potsdam.de/cost-locref/). After the sessions, the four working groups
continued with their activities from the day before.
The closing plenary session was chaired by assistant professor Vedran
Đulabić (University of Zagreb). Professors Bas Denters (University of
Twente), Geert Bouckaert, Angelika Vetter (University of Stuttgart), Carmen Navarro (universities of Madrid and Bristol) and Ivan Koprić discussed the theme Contested Future of Local Government? Main Challenges
for Cities and for Comparative Local Government Research. After a fruitful
discussion on role of local government in European countries, professor
Riccardo Mussari (University of Siena) summed up the impressions on
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COST PhD School held in Sienna in September 2014, while professor
Nikos Hlepas (University of Athens) announced a new COST PhD workshop that will be held in Spetses, Greece, both noting the importance
of including young generations in scientific discourse in public administration, particularly local self-government. Professor Yüksel Demirkaja (Marmara University, Istanbul) invited all COST members to join tje
COST meeting in Turkey in October 2015 while Professor Reto Steiner
(University of Bern) presented the programme of the COST meeting in
Bern in spring 2016.
The Conference was closed by organizers, professors Kuhlmann and Koprić, who thanked all the participants for contributing to the very inspiring
COST Loc-Ref Action meeting and expressed their wish for continuing
successful cooperation in scientific deliberation on local self-government.
*
Iva Lopižić, Assistant at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb (asistentica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u
Zagrebu, e-mail: [email protected])
Iva Lopižić*
538
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Konferencija
Insourcing and/or outsourcing: How do They
Contribute to Public Administration Reform?
UDK349.2:331.533(047)
331.533:35.08(047)
U organizaciji Mreže instituta i škola iz područja javne uprave u srednjoj i
istočnoj Europi (The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe – NISPAcee) i Kavkaskog sveučilišta, od
21. do 23. svibnja 2015. u Tbilisiju je održana 23. godišnja konferencija
NISPAcee. Glavna tema ovogodišnje konferencije bila je Insourcing and/or
outsourcing: How do they contribute to public administration reform?
Na konferenciji je sudjelovalo više od 300 članova akademske zajednice i
praktičara iz 28 zemalja srednje i istočne Europe, devet zemalja zapadne
Europe te Australije, Južnoafričke Republike i SAD-a.
Dan prije službenog otvorenja konferencije održano je nekoliko radionica
Odjela Ujedinjenih naroda za ekonomske i društvene poslove (UNDESA-a)
i Programa Ujedinjenih naroda za razvoj (UNDP-a) posvećenih kolaborativnom upravljanju i uključivanju građana te doktorska radionica.
Tijekom konferencije izlaganja su održana u okviru deset radnih skupina
posvećenih lokalnoj samoupravi, e-upravi, integritetu u javnom upravljanju, regionalnom razvoju i međuregionalnoj suradnji, upravnim reformama u zemljama srednje i istočne Europe, javnim financijama, analizi javnih
politika, upravnom obrazovanju, lokalnim javnim politikama te tranziciji,
promjeni i nesigurnosti. Pored toga, održano je nekoliko posebnih panela
na temu reforme zdravstvenih sustava, unaprjeđenja kvalitete programa
obrazovanja za javnu upravu u zemljama kavkaske regije, europeizacije u
reformi javne uprave te pružanja javnih usluga u vrijeme kooprodukcije.
Na konferenciji je dodijeljena nagrada za izvrsnost u nastavi i doprinos
razvoju upravnog obrazovanja (Alena Brunovska Award), nagrada za naj-
VIJESTI
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539
bolju doktorsku disertaciju u području javne uprave i javnih politika u
srednjoj i istočnoj Europi (Mzia Mikeladze Award), nagrada za najbolji
rad doktorskog studenta i nagrada za najbolji komparativni rad. Dobitnica
ovogodišnje nagrade za najbolju doktorsku disertaciju je dr. sc. Jasmina
Džinić, viša asistentica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta
u Zagrebu.
Na kraju je doc. dr. sc. Goranka Lalić Novak najavila 24. godišnju konferenciju NISPAcee koja će se održati od 19. do 21. svibnja 2016. u suradnji
s Pravnim fakultetom Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
*
Dr. sc. Jasmina Džinić, viša asistentica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (senior assistant at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, e-mail: [email protected])
Jasmina Džinić*
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540
Znanstveni skup
Izazovi funkciniranja hrvatskog javnog
sektora u Europskoj uniji
UDK 35.071(497.5:4EU)(047)
Akademija pravnih znanosti Hrvatske u suradnji s Pravnim fakultetom
Sveučilišta Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku organizirala je dvodnevni
znanstveni skup koju se održao u Osijeku 18. i 19. lipnja 2015. U izlaganjima je rezimirano dvogodišnje iskustvo članstva u Europskoj uniji te su
ocrtani glavni izazovi s kojima se različite organizacije javnog sektora na
državnoj i lokalnoj razini u tom kontekstu suočavaju. Ukupno 22 izlaganja
podnijelo je 33 autora s četiri najveća hrvatska sveučilišta.
Izlaganja su bila podijeljena u pet tematskih cjelina. U prvom su panelu
(Prema novoj hrvatskoj javnoj upravi u Europskoj uniji) izlagali: prof. dr. sc.
Ivan Koprić s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, ujedno i predsjednik znanstvenog vijeća Akademije, Tijana Vukojičić Tomić, Petra Đurman, doc. dr. sc. Goranka Lalić Novak, dr. sc. Jasmina Džinić i dr. sc.
Teo Giljević, svi s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Govorilo se u
upravnom pojednostavljenju – pružanju upravnih usluga na jednom mjestu (one-stop shop), konceptu reprezentativne uprave, otvorenosti uprave
te politici pametne (smart) regulacije.
U drugom su panelu (Hrvatska lokalna samouprava u Europskoj uniji) izlagali: dr. sc. Mihovil Škarica, dr. sc. Romea Manojlović, Daria Dubajić, izv.
prof. dr. sc. Gordana Marčetić i Iva Lopižić s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, dr. sc. Dana Dobrić, dr. sc. Dejan Bodul i Stjepan Gadžo s
Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci te prof. dr. sc. Srećko Jelinić s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Osijeku. Obuhvaćene su teme suvremenog
europskog upravljanja gradovima, utjecaja decentralizacije na personalne
VIJESTI
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541
kapacitete lokalne samouprave, ‘bankrota’ lokalnih jedinica te gospodarskih lokalnih službi.
U drugom su panelu (Europeizacija javnih službi u Hrvatskoj) izlagali: doc.
dr. sc. Vedran Đulabić i doc. dr. sc. Frane Staničić s Pravnog fakulteta
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, izv. prof. dr. sc. Boris Bakota, dr. sc. Jelena Dujmović s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Osijeku, dr. sc. Nikola Popović
iz Hrvatske regulatorne agencija za mrežne djelatnosti, izv. prof. dr. sc.
Mirko Klarić, prof. dr. sc. Duško Lozina i doc. dr. sc. Bosiljka Britvić
Vetma s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Splitu. Govorilo se o potrebi za
strateškim pristupom u regulaciji javnih službi, razvoju mrežnih odnosa
u sustavu visokog obrazovanja, usklađivanju ovlasti regulacijskih agencija
s pravnom stečevinom EU, gospodarenju komunalnim otpadom te energetskom sektoru.
U posljednjem su panelu skupa (Hrvatski javni sektor u Europskoj uniji –
opća pitanja, konkretni problemi) sudjelovali: prof. dr. sc. emeritus Zvonimir Lauc s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Osijeku, prof. dr. sc. Robert
Blažević s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, izv. prof. dr. sc. Boris
Ljubanović, Ana Đanić te doc. dr. sc. Zvonimir Jelinić s Pravnog fakulteta
Sveučilišta u Osijeku. Bilo je riječi o općim odrednicama razvoja hrvatskog javnog sektora u europskom kontekstu, pružanju učinkovite pravne
zaštite od upravnog sudstva te o troškovima u upravnim postupcima i
sporovima.
Između panela razvijala se živa i zanimljiva rasprava u koju su se uključivali svi sudionici.
Temeljne ideje skupa na kraju je rezimirao i zaključke uobličio prof. dr. sc.
Ivan Koprić. Okupivši znanstvenike koji se bave različitim, a opet srodnim i komplementarnim disciplinama, skup je uspio iznjedriti cjelovitu
znanstvenu analizu procesa i institucija hrvatskog javnog sektora u svjetlu
zahtjeva i mogućnosti koje nosi članstvo u Europskoj uniji. Iz takvog je
Drugog dana održavanja skupa održana su tri panela. U prvom (Hrvatske
porezne institucije i Europska unija) izlagali su: prof. dr. sc. Hrvoje Arbutina s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, prof. dr. sc. Renata Perić
s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Osijeku, izv. prof. dr. sc. Nataša Žunić
Kovačević s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci te dr. sc. Jasna Bogovac i doc. dr. sc. Tereza Rogić Lugarić s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u
Zagrebu. Bilo je riječi o suradnji poreznih administracija, pravnoj sigurnosti poreznih obveznika i učinkovitosti oporezivanja, utjecaju istraga o
nezakonitim državnim potporama u EU na hrvatsku Poreznu upravu te o
upravljanju rizikom kao novoj strategiji poreznih tijela u Europskoj uniji.
542
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ambijenta proistekla ideja o pripremi dokumenta koji bi obuhvatio najznačajnije ideje o cjelovitoj reformi javne uprave iznesene na skupu, koje
bi mogle biti temelj za poboljšanje Strategije razvoja javne uprave (2014.–
2020.). Održani znanstveni skup potvrdio je snažan društveni angažman
Akademije pravnih znanosti Hrvatske u formuliranju rješenja za aktualne
i buduće probleme hrvatskog pravnog sustava i javnog sektora u cjelini.
Mihovil Škarica*
*
Dr. sc. Mihovil Škarica, viši asistent na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (senior assistant at the Chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of
Law, University of Zagreb, e-mail: [email protected])
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543
Predstavljanje knjige
Europeizacija hrvatske javne uprave
Dana 15. lipnja 2015. na Pravnom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu održana je promocija knjige Europeizacija hrvatske javne uprave u izdanju Studijskog centra za javnu upravu i javne financije Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta
u Zagrebu. Urednik knjige je prof. dr. sc. Ivan Koprić s Pravnog fakulteta
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, a knjiga okuplja 26 radova koje je napisalo ukupno
25 različitih autora, znanstvenika i praktičara s područja javne uprave.
Knjiga je nastala kao rezultat rada na znanstvenoistraživačkom projektu
Europeizacija hrvatske javne uprave: utjecaj na razvoj i nacionalni identitet
koji je financiralo Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i sporta, a čiji je voditelj bio profesor Koprić.
Knjigu su predstavili prof. dr. sc. Damir Boras, rektor Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, prof. dr. sc. Hrvoje Sikirić, dekan Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Arsen Bauk, ministar uprave, recenzenti knjige prof. dr. sc. Gorazd
Trpin s Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Ljubljani i prof. dr. sc. Zdravko
Petak s Fakulteta političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu te urednik i
priređivač knjige prof. dr. sc. Ivan Koprić. U uvodnom govoru rektor je
istaknuo velik doprinos knjige unapređenju discipline javne uprave, kao
i njezin praktični doprinos u modernizacijskim procesima hrvatske javne
uprave. Prof. dr. sc. Hrvoje Sikirić upozorio je na velik broj znanstvenois
traživačkih projekata na Pravnom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu te često
rezultiraju znanstvenim publikacijama. Urednička knjiga Europeizacija
hrvatske javne uprave proizašla je upravo iz jednoga takvog projekta, a njezina vrijednost nije samo u velikom doprinosu znanosti već i korisnosti
budućim generacijama studenata koji će se nome koristiti kao literaturom. Ministar uprave posebno je istaknuo praktičnu vrijednost knjige te
se osvrnuo na korisnost knjige za obrazovanje i osposobljavanje upravnih
službenika. Prof. dr. sc. Gorazd Trpin naglasio je da u javnom diskursu još
UDK35.07(497.5:4EU)(048.1)
544
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uvijek ne postoji razumijevanje o tome što je zapravo reforma javne uprave
i na što se odnosi proces europeizacije te u tom pogledu knjiga predstavlja
važan doprinos. Pitanje odnosa uprave i građana, djelovanja ljudi u upravi
i funkcioniranja javnih službi tri su bitna područja europeizacije koja se
obrađuju i problematiziraju u pojedinim poglavljima. Prof. dr. sc. Zdravko
Petak posebno se osvrnuo na prvo poglavlje knjige o procesu prilagodbe standardima Europske unije koje daje sintezu ostalih poglavlja koja se
podrobnije bave pojedinim aspektima europeizacijskih procesa. Dijelovi
knjige u kojima je riječ o upravnom obrazovanju i upravnom pravu, po
njegovu mišljenju, popunjavaju praznine unutar postojeće literature o europeizaciji. Naglasio je tri važna područja koja se obrađuju unutar knjige,
a odnose se na pitanje kako proces europeizacije utječe na oblikovanje
domaćih politika. Riječ je o funkcioniranju fondova Europske unije koji
korigiraju djelovanje tržišta, prilagodbi javnih službi i regulaciji tržišta te
o utjecaju mehanizama mekog prava (soft law) na oblikovanje europskih
politika. Glavne doprinose knjige profesor Petak vidi na tri razine: upravljanje upravnim sustavom (koje obuhvaća pitanje strateškog planiranja,
koordinaciju, oblikovanje politika temeljeno na dokazima i sudjelovanje
zainteresirane javnosti), implementacija javnih politika i reformski potencijal javne uprave. Naposljetku, prof. dr. sc. Ivan Koprić dao je nekoliko
informacija o samom projektu iz kojega je knjiga proizašla kao rezultat.
Istaknuo je da su na projektu sudjelovale dvije katedre Pravnog fakulteta
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (Katedra za upravnu znanost i Katedra za upravno
pravo), ukupno je trajao sedam godina (od 2007. do kraja 2014.), uključuje 25 autora (ne samo zaposlenika Fakulteta nego i upravnih stručnjaka
iz prakse). Posebno je naglasio važnost znanstvenog doprinosa nekoliko
teorijskih radova. Nakon promocije knjige održan je prigodni domjenak, a
prisutni su imali mogućnost kupiti knjigu po promotivnoj cijeni.
Petra Đurman*
*
Petra Đurman, asistentica na Katedri za upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu (assistant at the chair of Administrative Science, Faculty of Law, University
of Zagreb, Croatia, e-mail: [email protected])
IN FOCUS – AKTUALNA TEMA
545
Otvorena pitanja rješavanja problema
povrata imovine ili naknade za imovinu
bivših zemljišnih zajednica
Ivan Koprić*
UDK
338.246.025.88(497.5)
347.232.1(497.5)
Već gotovo dva i pol desetljeća postoje nastojanja da se u sklopu restitucije, odnosno povrata imovine ili obeštećenja za imovinu oduzetu od strane države u doba socijalizma, izvrši i povrat imovine ili davanje naknade
za imovinu bivših zemljišnih zajednica. Premda je Zakon o naknadi za
imovinu oduzetu za vrijeme jugoslavenske komunističke vladavine donesen 1996. (NN 92/96, 39/99, 42/99, 92/99, 43/00, 131/00, 27/01, 65/01,
118/01, 80/02 i 81/02 – ispravak), njime se nije obuhvatilo i bivše zemljišne zajednice.
Odbor za Ustav, Poslovnik i politički sustav Hrvatskog sabora osnovao
je 19. veljače 2014. Radnu skupinu za pripremu prijedloga zakona koji
će urediti pitanje zemljišnih zajednica. Po tekstu Odluke, tim se zakonom mora urediti pitanje povrata oduzete imovine zemljišnim zajednicama i obnove i ponovnog osnivanja zemljišnih zajednica. U radnu skupinu
imenovana su četiri saborska zastupnika, tri predstavnika državne izvršne
vlasti i dva predstavnika akademske zajednice, među kojima i autor ovog
teksta.
*
Prof. dr. sc. Ivan Koprić, redoviti profesor u trajnom zvanju i predstojnik Katedre za
upravnu znanost Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu te predsjednik Instituta za javnu
upravu (full professor and Head of the Chair of Administrative Science at the Faculty of
Law, University of Zagreb, and president of the Institute of Public Administration, e-mail:
[email protected])
I. Uvod
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Koprić, Ivan (2015) Otvorena pitanja rješavanja problema povrata imovine ...
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 545–557
Radna skupina održala je četiri sjednice, a početkom srpnja 2014. za tu
sam skupinu napisao ovaj tekst. Radna je skupina tada zatražila mišljenje
od Odbora za Ustav, Poslovnik i politički sustav Hrvatskog sabora o pos
tojanju čvrstog ustavnopravnog temelja za donošenje zakona o ponovnoj
uspostavi i povratu imovine zemljišnim zajednicama. Odbor se izjasnio na
posredan način, i to negativno, te u studenome 2014. Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske uputio Poticaj za utvrđivanje izvješća Hrvatskom saboru
povodom pitanja ustavnosti uspostave i povrata imovine bivših zemljišnih
zajednica. Negativno mišljenje Odbora vidi se iz teksta Poticaja, na koji
Ustavni sud još nije reagirao.
Iako Radna skupina nije rasformirana, takav je rasplet privremeno odgodio rad na pripremi zakona radi kojeg je osnovana. Nije sasvim jasno zašto
je Odbor za Ustav, Poslovnik i politički sustav Radnu skupinu formirao,
sa zadatkom pripreme zakona, a onda ipak promijenio stajalište. Moguće
i zbog ovog mojeg teksta. Također, ako mu je stajalište negativno, nije jas
no zašto radnu skupinu nije rasformirao, nego je uputio navedeni poticaj
Ustavnom sudu. Vjerojatno je riječ o političkom taktiziranju, sasvim normalnom u parlamentarnoj praksi, ali i – čini se – o nesigurnosti u pogledu
pravne prirode zemljišnih zajednica, ustavnog temelja za njihovu ponovnu
uspostavu i povrat imovine zemljišnim zajednicama.
U ovome se tekstu nastoje sistematizirati i ukratko analizirati glavna otvorena pitanja rješavanja problema povrata imovine ili naknade za imovinu
bivših zemljišnih zajednica prvi put jedinstveno reguliranih zakonom iz
1894. te ukinutih 1947. godine. Svrha je teksta omogućiti izradu plana
daljnjih aktivnosti i informiranu raspravu o elementima nužnim da bi se
pristupilo pisanju zakona koji bi uredio ta pitanja. Otvorena pitanja slijede
iz prirode zemljišnih zajednica u Hrvatskoj, pri čemu su one samo djelomično usporedive s javnim i zajedničkim dobrima i sličnim kategorijama
u drugim zemljama, zbog čega je vrijednost usporedne analize pravne regulacije u drugim zemljama ograničene vrijednosti za daljnji rad Radne
skupine.
II. Nastanak, vrste i pravna regulacija te ostala
temeljna pitanja zemljišnih zajednica
Zajednički pravni okvir sve vrste zemljišnih zajednica dobivaju u Zakonu
o uređenju zemljišnih zajednica od 25. travnja 1894., uz naputak od 19.
rujna 1897. Prema tom Zakonu, svaka skupina ili zajednica ovlaštenika
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547
Zemljišne su zajednice na građanskom području Hrvatske (različitom od
Vojne krajine) obuhvaćale šume i pašnjake segregirane od vlastelinskih
šuma i pašnjaka (urbarske zemljišne zajednice), kao i tzv. stare zemljišne
zajednice, a na krajiškom području pašnjake naslijeđene od krajiških mjes
nih općina (mjesna općina je poput današnje mjesne samouprave; 1871.
osnovane su u procesu razvojačenja i političke općine na području bivše
Vojne krajine, kao npr. današnje jedinice lokalne samouprave). Imovina
krajiških mjesnih općina bila je početkom 1870-ih razdijeljena na zemljišne
zajednice (pašnjaci) te na krajiške imovne općine (šume). Treća vrsta, tzv.
stare zemljišne zajednice, pojavljivala se na građanskom području, u pravilu, u tri podvrste, i to u formi plemićkih (plemenitaških, plemenskih) općina (zajednica seljaka-plemića), zatim privilegiranih (poveljiranih) općina
egzempcionalista (koji nisu bili ni kmetovi ni seljaci-plemići, nego slobodnjaci itd.) te na kraju nekih urbarskih općina s kmetovima koji su uspjeli
očuvati pravo uživanja na nekom zemljištu odvojenom od vlastelinskog.
Bitna karakteristika zemljišnih zajednica je njihova vlastita pravna osobnost te skupno (dakle ne razdijeljeno) uživanje njihove imovine od strane
njihovih ovlaštenika, ali po alikvotnom načelu. Prava zajedničara bila su
nalik pravu upotrebe i plodouživanja, ali su se nasljeđivala, što ih razlikuje
od stvarnih prava u okviru prava vlasništva. Mogla su se i otuđiti, uz pravo
prvokupa ostalih zajedničara. Pored pravne osobnosti njezinih ovlaštenika, sama zemljišna zajednica imala je vlastitu, od njih odijeljenu pravnu
osobnost, što je specifična i pomalo neuobičajena pravna konstrukcija,
koja je u pravnoj doktrini izazivala dosta pažnje, a može imati i značajne
učinke u praksi. Slična je pravna konstrukcija koja je bila karakteristična
za zemljišne zajednice postojala i kod hrvatske kućne zadruge prema zakonu iz 1889.
Zemljišnim zajednicama po zakonu iz 1894. upravljaju svi ovlaštenici prema posebnom pravilniku koji donose sami na svojoj skupštini koja se inače
kojima pripada skupno uživanje određenih zemljišta treba biti uređena
i upisana u gruntovnici kao zemljišna zajednica. Iznimke od toga pravila
bila su zemljišta u vlasništvu gradova i upravnih općina, šume krajiških
općina, nesegregirane šume kojima se zajednički koriste vlastela i bivši
podložnici, komposesorati iz razdoblja do 1848., građanske zajednice
vlastnosti te zemljišta crkvenih korporacija i zadruga. Posebno je uređena plemenitaška općina Turopoljska (comunitas nobilium campi Turopolje)
posebnim zakonom od 1. svibnja 1895., s tim da je njezin pravni režim
ipak bio gotovo istovjetan s ostalim zemljišnim zajednicama – taj je kratki
Zakon imao uglavnom simboličko značenje.
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održava svake godine, a pravilnik potvrđuje vlada. Skupština može odlučiti o diobi, pri čemu diobu šuma dopušta vlada. Diobom se dijeli cijela
imovina ili dio na ovlaštenike prema njihovu alikvotnom udjelu. Skupština
može odlučiti i o razgodbi, kad se jedan dio imovine podijeli dijelu ovlaštenika, dok ostali ovlaštenici i dalje ostaju u zemljišnoj zajednici, odnosno njezinu ostatku. Podaci govore da je bilo 2.835 zemljišnih zajednica,
s tim da neki izvori navode da ih je bilo blizu 3.000 ako se uračunaju neke
vrlo male zemljišne zajednice koje su tada postojale.
Određene sličnosti zemljišne zajednice postoje s institutom zadruge, proistekle iz prethodnog feudalnog uređenja, te pogotovo s institutom krajiške imovne općine. Zadruge su bile regulirane u provincijalu (građanskoj,
banskoj Hrvatskoj) zakonima iz 1870., 1874. i 1889. s novelom iz 1902.
U Krajini (Vojna krajina) temeljnim zakonom iz 1850. zemljišni su posjedi pravno pretvoreni u krajiške zadruge, a poslije regulirani zakonima iz
1876. i 1880. godine.
Krajiške imovne općine osnovane su zakonom iz 1873. koji je noveliran
1881. Bilo ih je jedanaest, kao i prijašnjih krajiških pukovnija. Krajišnici
su još po Temeljnom zakonu iz 1850. imali pravo na građevno i ogrjevno
drvo za kućne potrebe koje se ostvarivalo u krajiškim šumama. Temeljem
zakona iz 1871. (razvojačenje Krajine) izlučena je polovica krajiških šuma
koje su pripale krajiškim općinama, dok je druga polovica prešla u državno
vlasništvo. Dobitak od prodaje drva služi za namirenje obveza krajiške općine. Pravoužitnici su mjesne, crkvene i školske općine te krajiške obitelji
koje su do 8. lipnja 1871. živjele u zadrugama, kao i one koje nisu bile u
zadrugama, ali su davale vojnike. Osim prava na drvo (građevno i ogrjevno), pravoužitnici su imali pravo na pašu i žirenje.
Iz svega proizlazi zaključak o složenosti situacije sa zemljišnim zajednicama kao jednim od oblika društvenog dobra, dobra u zajedničkoj upotrebi.
Ona je faktično složena, ali je složena i pravno, jer se na njih primjenjivao
niz različitih pravila, nerijetko donašanih u formi podzakonskih (upravnih) propisa. Određen red trebao je donijeti Zakon iz 1894. Zaista, on je
donio određeni red, ali valja ipak znati da je prije njegova donošenja, pa i
poslije, bilo raznih primjera zloupotreba, prisvajanja, lošeg gospodarenja i
sličnih pojava u vezi sa zemljišnim zajednicama.
Pretežna individualistička kultura i sve snažniji individualno-kapitalistički
sustav nisu davali pogodni okvir za razvoj zemljišnih zajednica kao kombinacije zajedničkog vlasništva i pojedinačnog sudjelovanja u upotrebi,
korištenju i plodouživanju, nego su – naprotiv – stvarali pritisak prema
njihovu rastakanju.
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549
U kasnijem razvoju došlo je do mnogobrojnih promjena u pogledu zem
ljišnih zajednica, koje su prouzročile smanjivanje njihova broja i imovine.
Od početnih gotovo 3.000 broj im se 1932. smanjio na 2.360, a pred ukidanje 1947. bilo ih je svega 1.225. U literaturi se spominju određene metode kojima je državna vlast i uprava Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca
te Kraljevine Jugoslavije preuzimala upravljanje nad njihovom imovinom
te nametala obveze plaćanja javnih davanja i plaća službenika, na taj način
destimulirajući njihov razvoj i nastojeći im oduzeti značenje. Pritom su te
mjere bile diskriminirajuće i nisu se odnosile na slične zajednice u Srbiji i
Crnoj Gori (Bičanić). No, i u doba I. svjetskog rata nametane su im obveze koje su im nanijele veliku financijsku štetu.
Naposljetku, nakon II. svjetskog rata, Zakonom o proglašenju imovine
zemljišnih i njima sličnih zajednica te krajiških imovnih općina općenarodnom imovinom iz 1947. s dopunama iz 1958. i 1987. zemljišne su
zajednice rasformirane, a njihova je imovina postala općenarodnom. Istodobno, ozakonile su se uzurpacije učinjene prije 6. travnja 1941., koje također predstavljaju nepravedna jednostrana faktična prisvajanja imovine
zemljišnih zajednica.
1. Ekonomska vrijednost koja bi bila zahvaćena
regulacijom novog zakona
Podaci iz 1895. godine govore da su zemljišne zajednice obuhvaćale
983.031 jutara zemlje na području tadašnje Hrvatske i Slavonije, što je
bilo oko 13,3% ukupnog teritorija. Od toga je bilo 493.933 jutara pašnjaka, livada i oranica, 344.429 jutara šuma i 144.699 jutara neplodnog tla
(Ivšić).
Oko 1935. spominje se 747.000 jutara zemljišta kojima raspolažu »imovne općine«, od toga navodno preko 600.000 jutara šuma. Govori se o
150.000 seljačkih domova s oko 1,2 milijuna ljudi. Drvo na panju procjenjivalo se na 6-8 milijardi tadašnjih dinara. Spominje se da su imale
i ušteđevinu, od oko 787 milijuna dinara, koja je međutim zbog pritiska
austrougarskih vlasti za vrijeme I. svjetskog rata bila uložena u ratne i državne vrijednosne papire i izgubljena (Bičanić).
Godine 1947. spominje se da »zemljišne zajednice, imovne općine i njima slične imovne skupine« raspolažu s 579.000 jutara pašnjaka i 40.500
jutara šuma.
III. Otvorena pitanja
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Današnju vrijednost imovine zemljišnih zajednica tek bi valjalo procijeniti,
pri čemu valja očekivati brojne faktične probleme.
2. Organizacijska i upravna pitanja koja bi trebalo
razriješiti u pripremi i u provedbi novog zakona
Kad bi se sva druga pitanja uspješno riješila, bilo bi potrebno osigurati
organizacijske i personalne pretpostavke efikasne provedbe zakona. Valjalo bi osigurati službenike koji bi vodili postupke u prvom stupnju te
povodom žalbi, efikasnu suradnju katastra i gruntovnice, jasno praćenje i
usmjeravanje čitavog procesa provedbe, evaluaciju rezultata i predlaganje
mjera za poboljšanje uspješnosti provedbe. Provedba koja je dugotrajna
i neefikasna ne ispravlja nepravde, nego donosi nove. Ako bi se moglo
računati na oko 400.000 ovlaštenika, koliko ih se ponegdje u dostupnom
materijalu procjenjuje, što nije sasvim pouzdano i ovisi o eventualnim
odlukama zakonodavca o nekim prethodnim pitanjima, uz ogroman rad
na rekonstrukciji zemljišnih zajednica, uspostavi njihova upravljanja, evidenciji imovine, utvrđivanju katastarskog i gruntovnog stanja, jasno je da
se očekuje novi dodatni posao za državnu upravu u narednom periodu
od kakvih pet do deset godina. Javni proračuni doživjeli bi novi dodatni financijski teret ne samo u smislu plaćanja materijalnih, personalnih
i organizacijskih troškova nego i troškova naknada, ako se imovina ne bi
restituirala u naturi. Kako je dio imovine bivših zemljišnih i sličnih zajednica postao općenarodna imovina, kasnije društveno vlasništvo, pa državno vlasništvo Republike Hrvatske koje je dodijeljeno npr. Hrvatskim
šumama ili dijelom i drugim trgovačkim društvima u državnom vlasništvu
(vlasništvu Republike Hrvatske te općina, gradova i županija), postavlja se
pitanje knjigovodstvenih, organizacijsko-upravljačkih i drugih promjena u
tim trgovačkim društvima koja bi ostala bez dijela imovine. Postavlja se
i pitanje pouzdanosti i mogućnosti rekonstrukcije svih povijesnih tragova imovine zemljišnih zajednica, povijesnog slijeda ovlaštenika i njihovih
nasljednika, itd. U svakom slučaju valja računati na veliko dodatno opterećenje državne uprave, a moguće i lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave i drugih javnopravnih tijela i osoba organizacijskim, financijskim,
personalnim i funkcionalnim teretima, koji – svi zajedno i na kraju – imaju
svoj financijski izraz. To nije razlog protiv donošenja ovakvog zakona, ali
je okolnost koju valja imati na umu, pa i – ako i kad dođe do pripreme
teksta zakona – opisati u obrazloženju te pokušati kvantificirati u okviru
procjene učinaka tog zakona.
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3.
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Identifikacija zemljišnih zajednica, ovlaštenika
povrata i njihovih prava – pravni i praktični problemi
Drugo od pravnih pitanja u vezi s ovlaštenicima slijedi iz okolnosti da
prava pojedinaca u zemljišnoj zajednici nisu bila njihova osobna prava,
nego su bila vezana uz njihovu osobnu nekretninu (ta se naziva ovlaštena nekretnina, a zapravo je riječ o starim kmetskim selišnim posjedima).
Takvo je pravno stajalište zauzeo Zakon iz 1894., premda su neki autori
smatrali da bi bilo korisnije da je Zakon zauzeo suprotno stajalište. To je
stajalište donekle razumljivo s obzirom na feudalno porijeklo zemljišnih
zajednica, ali je ipak bio u neskladu s prirodom tržišnih odnosa i kapitalističkim uređenjem koje se u načelu zasniva na liberalizmu i individualizmu. Opravdano se ističe (Krbek) da je to neka vrsta ostatka prijašnjeg,
tradicionalnog, feudalnog načina razmišljanja, koji je usprkos određenim
kolebanjima u stajalištima doktrine i upravne prakse na kraju prevagnuo
na razini zemaljske vlade. Upravo zbog takve koncepcije Zakona iz 1894.
užitnička prava nisu utrnjivala smrću ovlaštenika, nego su se naslijeđivala
zajedno s glavnim nekretninama s kojima su bila vezana.
Ako se kao polazna osnova za izradu eventualnog zakona o povratu imovine zemljišnim zajednicama u pravno-konceptualnom smislu uzme Zakon
iz 1894., a nema druge, budući da je upravo njime izvršena kodifikacija
pravila o zemljišnim zajednicama i provedena njihova pravna evidencija,
takvu konstrukciju valja uzeti kao mjerodavnu, bez obzira na to što se
ona kosi i s današnjim shvaćanjima o prirodi tržišnih odnosa. No, valja
biti svjestan da smo danas 120 godina odmakli od donošenja Zakona iz
1894. i da će (2) prihvaćanje njegove koncepcije o vezanosti ovlašteničkih
Ponajprije se postavljaju dva važna pravna pitanja. Prvo je pitanje (1) tko
je ovlaštenik povrata, zemljišna zajednica ili pojedini ovlaštenici koji su
imali užitnička prava spram imovine zemljišne zajednice. S obzirom na
već obrazloženu kombiniranu pravnu prirodu, po kojoj je zemljišna zajednica imala pravnu osobnost, ali su postojali i pojedinačni ovlaštenici s
alikvotnim udjelom u pravima koja su se zemljišnim zajednicama pridavala, vjerojatno bi bilo pravno najkorektnije najprije ponovo uspostaviti
pravnu osobnost zemljišnih zajednica, izvršiti povrat a onda osigurati i
mogućnost realizacije prava pojedinačnih ovlaštenika za svaku od njih.
Zemljišne zajednice nisu bile suvlasništvo u pravnom smislu, koliko je god
zakon iz 1894. krenuo u tom smjeru, pa je s te strane potreban oprez da
se previše pojednostavljenim, »poprečnim« rješenjima ne proizvedu neželjene posljedice.
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prava uz glavnu nekretninu proizvesti neka nerazumijevanja i poteškoće u
shvaćanju i provedbi zakona.
No, jedna okolnost olakšava ovu pravnu tenziju. Naime, u feudalizmu
seljak je imao načelno (pravno) jednake ovlasti u odnosu prema imovini
zemljišne zajednice, bez obzira na veličinu svojeg kmetskog selišta. Faktično, seljak s većim selištem i većim brojem stoke, primjerice, više se
koristio zajedničkom imovinom i uživao je od siromašnijeg seljaka. U tom
je smjeru išla praksa urbarskih zemljišnih zajednica (u građanskom dijelu
zemlje), a poslije je zakonskom regulacijom iz 1894. protegnuta (potpuno
neopravdano s obzirom na njihovu prirodu) i na ostale vrste zemljišnih
zajednica. U upravljanju zemljišnom zajednicom svaki je ovlaštenik sudjelovao proporcionalno veličini svojeg ovlašteničkog prava. Time se zajedničarska logika naslijeđena iz feudalnog perioda rekonceptualizirala u korist
individualnovlasničke koncepcije kakva je karakteristična, primjerice, za
običnu privatnopravnu suvlasničku zajednicu, u kojoj udjeli suvlasnika
mogu biti vrlo različiti.
Zaključiti je da je zakon iz 1894. bio nedosljedan, jer je s jedne strane vezivao ovlaštenička prava uz glavnu nekretninu, a ne uz vlasnika te nekretnine, a s druge je strane uveo kvantificiranje ovlašteničkih prava u pravilu
prema veličini glavne nekretnine, premda je inače trebao zadržati jednaka
prava svakoga ovlaštenika.
Nastavno na to slijedi još jedna pravna komplikacija, u vezi s pitanjem
temeljem čega se određivao udio ovlašteničkih prava u zemljišnim zajednicama. Situacija nije bila jednaka u svakoj od vrsta tih zajednica. U urbarskim zajednicama taj se udio određivao u načelu prema veličini glavne
nekretnine u vlasništvu ovlaštenika. No, u drugim tipovima zajednica situacija je kompleksnija. Tako se u plemićkim općinama udio određivao
prema dvornom mjestu kako je ono uneseno u gruntovnicu prilikom prvog sastavljanja gruntovnice (dalje se dijelilo ako se pri nasljeđivanju dijelilo dvorno mjesto na više ovlaštenika). U tzv. starim zajednicama, koje
su nastale prije feudalizma i neovisno o njegovu rastakanju, u kojima je
svatko od ovlaštenika imao jednako ovlašteničko pravo, Zakon iz 1894.
najednom unosi nejednakost prema bogatstvu – tko je u međuvremenu
stekao veću privatnu imovinu, taj je i u zajednici dobio veći udio, što je
bilo potpuno u neskladu s prirodom tih starih zemljišnih zajednica. Slično,
u krajiškim zemljišnim zajednicama priroda stvari govorila je da bi broj
ovlaštenika trebao slijediti demografske promjene, jer su osobe imale krajiške dužnosti (a ne nekretnine), ali se i tu Zakon iz 1894. opredijelio za
veličinu njihova privatnog posjeda, što je bilo potpuno nelogično i duboko
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553
nepravedno s obzirom na prirodu i starih zemljišnih zajednica i krajiških
zemljišnih zajednica.
S današnjeg stajališta, u pripremi tog Zakona, to utvrđenje (nejednakih)
ovlašteničkih prava okolnost je koja olakšava, barem načelno i psihološki
(članovima naše Radne skupine, a možda i drugima koji će sudjelovati u
postupku pripreme zakona), jer više odgovara današnjem poznavanju i
raširenom shvaćanju ovlaštenja na nekretninama. No, valja biti svjestan
da se time kod eventualnog povrata ne ispravljaju nepravde, nego samo
ponovo oživljavaju one koje su počinjene kodifikacijom iz 1894. godine.
U ondašnjem vremenu, kad se postupno, prema ondašnjim povijesnim,
društveno-ekonomskim, socijalnim i političko-državnim okolnostima, ras
takao feudalizam i gradilo neko novo uređenje, situacija je bila sasvim
drugačija, i to bi trebalo u nekoj razumnoj mjeri poštovati, to više što, za
razliku od privatnog interesa svakog ovlaštenika, interes zemljišne zajednice kao cjeline, kao posebne pravne osobe, nema tko efikasno zastupati
i štititi.
Jedna od pravnih teškoća bit će i (4) rekonstrukcija pravne osobnosti zem
ljišnih zajednica, pri čemu se osobito postavlja (5) pitanje koje će zemljišne zajednice biti pravno rekonstruirane i koji će se vremenski trenutak
uzeti kao mjerodavan, da li 1894. odnosno evidencija koja je napravljena
temeljem Zakona iz 1894. ili npr. 1947. kad su preostale zemljišne zajednice ukinute i pretvorene u općenarodnu imovinu. Kako će se provesti
postupak ponovnog osnivanja zemljišnih zajednica i tko će njima upravljati? Koliko će dugo one postojati, tko će i kako odlučivati o njihovu prestanku i diobi imovine? Tko će i s kojim ovlastima nadzirati te postupke?
Kao važno i pravno i faktično pitanje postavlja se (6) pitanje načina identifikacije imovine zemljišnih zajednica koje će se rekonstruirati. Ako i pođemo od pretpostavke da je stanje u gruntovnici u nekom odabranom vremenskom trenutku (1894., 1947. itd.) poznato (a kako se vidi iz Lučićeva
pokušaja sistematizacije i rekonstrukcije, to nije tako), postavlja se pitanje
kasnijih promjena i mogućnosti pouzdanog utvrđivanja vremenskog slijeda. Danas je ta imovina u nečijem vlasništvu pa se i tu postavlja pitanje
kako obeštetiti onoga tko je tu imovinu imao u vlasništvu. Itd.
Pitanje je i (7) je li današnja namjena nekretnina ista kao što je bila u
nekom mjerodavnom trenutku ili su npr. pašnjaci postali oranice, a šume
Svakako, jasno je iz navedenog, da će (3) u pripremi zakona trebati odlučiti što s veličinom udjela, a u provedbi valjat će utvrditi veličinu svih tih
ovlašteničkih udjela svih zainteresiranih nasljednika nekadašnjih ovlaštenika.
554
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 545–557
livade. Što ako se namjena promijenila, a moguća je naturalna restitucija?
I slično.
Postavlja se i faktično (8) pitanje kako utvrditi ovlaštenike užitničkih prava, s obzirom na to da su u 120 godina nastale značajne demografske
promjene i praćenje osobnih nasljednih linija neće biti lako. U literaturi
se nalazi procjena o oko 400.000 potencijalnih ovlaštenika. Je li to točna
brojka i kako se do nje došlo? Valjalo bi tu okolnost dodatno istražiti, makar na nekom uzorku, da se pokušamo približiti pouzdanijoj procjeni, koja
je jako važna radi kalibracije organizacije povrata, pripreme sredstava za
povrat i naknadu, itd.
Pitanje (9) identifikacije veličine prava pojedinih ovlaštenika, tj. njihova
udjela, s obzirom na to da se ono 1894. određivalo na točno određeni
način, a zatim nasljeđivalo po određenim pravilima do ukidanja zemljišnih
zajednica, jedno je od važnih koja treba prethodno riješiti.
Na kraju, (10) što sa zemljišnim zajednicama ako ih se rekonstruira? Treba li im omogućiti daljnje djelovanje ili ih samo privremeno obnoviti za
jednokratno podnošenje zahtjeva za povrat imovine te donošenje odluke
o diobi imovine ovlaštenicima (po kojim će se pravilima takva odluka donijeti, nadzirati, provoditi)?
4. Povrat ili naknada
Posebno je zanimljivo pitanje bi li se na kraju, kad bi se uspješno riješili
svi prethodno navedeni problemi, izvršio povrat imovine ili bi se odredila
naknada, ili bi se obje metode kombinirale. Je li povrat moguć i jesu li
iste površine još iste namjene kao 1947. odnosno 1894.? U slučaju da se
odredi naknada, tko bi je isplaćivao, državni proračun ili proračuni jedinica lokalne ili možda jedinica područne (regionalne) samouprave? Što je
s terećenjem trgovačkih društava, javnih ustanova i drugih javnopravnih
osoba koje su se koristile tom imovinom, hoće li one snositi teret povrata
ili će za njih to učiniti njihov osnivač? Bi li se isplaćivala cjelokupna naknada ili dio, kojim tempom, kojom tehnikom, u novcu ili u vrijednosnim
papirima (obveznicama)? Itd.
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 545–557
555
IV. Moguća rješenja povrata imovine bivših
zemljišnih zajednica
Zbog velike složenosti opisanih otvorenih pitanja nije lako zauzeti interesnu i pravno-tehničku liniju njihova rješavanja. Pokušat ću samo blago
naznačiti neke mogućnosti.
I u tom bi se slučaju (naknada nasljednicima ovlaštenika iz 1947. godine)
moglo pitati je li naknada korektna jer je tada jedan oblik kolektivnog vlas
ništva zamijenjen drugim, koji je – doduše – zahvaćao puno širi i nedefiniran krug uživatelja. Tko bi mogao utvrditi razliku koju je neki ovlaštenik
užitničkih prava izgubio imajući u vidu da je nešto koristi i za njega i za
njegove potomke temeljem te imovine, tada općenarodne, i priskrbljeno
(nije mu dakle sve uzeto)?
Po mojem mišljenju, slijedi zaključak o potrebi obnove zemljišnih zajednica. No, znači li to i omogućavanje formiranja novih zemljišnih zajednica, koje 1947., ili prije, sve do 1894. nisu postojale? Ne nužno, ali možda ipak. Zbog čega, s kojom svrhom, kojim ustavnim temeljem? Valja se
usmjeriti na hrvatski Ustav, analizirati što su njegova temeljna stajališta,
dok komparativna iskustva možemo uzeti u obzir kao opću inspiraciju, a
ne kao instrukciju. Pritom je pozivanje na ustavnu garanciju prava vlasništva po mojem mišljenju samo jedan od mogućih ulaza u analizu, ali ne i
najbolji, jer – kako sam pokazao – ovdje nije riječ o klasičnom pravu vlas
ništva, nego o kategoriji koja je između dobra u općoj upotrebi i imovine
u privatnom vlasništvu.
Ako se razriješi prvi korak, oko ponovne uspostave zemljišnih zajednica,
treba razmisliti da li i kako izvršiti povrat njihove imovine odnosno kako
utvrditi i isplatiti naknadu za imovinu koja im je oduzeta. Također, valja
riješiti i sva druga pitanja toga povrata odnosno naknade, posebnim zakonom, a ne pozivom i u okviru zakona o restituciji iz 1996., koji je već
Možda je prvi korak pri rješavanju pitanja zemljišnih zajednica omogućavanje njihova ponovnog osnivanja, a tek nakon toga stvaranje zakonske
osnove za restituciju njihove imovine. Povrat osobama koje ne postoje
nije pravno logičan, zato treba te specifične pravne osobe ponovo vratiti
u pravni život. Naime, povrat imovine zemljišnih zajednica onima koji su
imali neke ovlasti koje su bile mješovitog karaktera (nasljednici nekadašnjih ovlaštenika) nije pravno korektan – spram njih bi se, ako se ne riješi
status zemljišnih zajednica, eventualno moglo govoriti o konstituiranju
prava na naknadu štete koju su pretrpjeli Zakonom iz 1947.
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HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 545–557
praktično konzumiran, a i tiče se zapravo i u pravilu klasičnih vlasničkih
odnosa, što kod zemljišnih zajednica nije slučaj.
Napose treba riješiti niz ekonomsko-financijskih pitanja (na čiji teret, u
kojem opsegu, kojim tempom, kako), kao i organizacijsko-upravnih pitanja (koje službe, koji službenici, postoje li pouzdane evidencije, katastar i
zemljišne knjige, tko će ih i kako rekonstruirati, itd.).
Za početak, prije pripreme bilo kakvog teksta propisa, smatram da treba
raspraviti, provjeriti, analizirati i odlučiti o:
– ustavnom temelju za daljnje aktivnosti,
– ekonomsko-financijskim reperkusijama,
– organizacijsko-upravnim pretpostavkama.
Za to predlažem da se provedu tri analize, pri čemu bi prvu mogla pripremiti naša Radna skupina, ali bi trebalo tražiti provjeru Ministarstva pravosuđa i Odbora za Ustav, Poslovnik i politički sustav Hrvatskog sabora.
Drugu bi valjalo zatražiti od Ministarstva financija, a treću od Ministarstva uprave u suradnji s Ministarstvom pravosuđa i Državnom geodetskom upravom. Također, valjalo bi provjeriti postoje li određeni podaci u
Hrvatskom državnom arhivu. Ne bi naime bilo dobro da se donese zakon
za koji nisu unaprijed osigurane pretpostavke njegove provedbe.
Nakon toga trebalo bi odlučiti, ali – smatram – ne na razini naše Radne
skupine, nego na razini Odbora za Ustav, Poslovnik i politički sustav te
na razini čitavog Hrvatskog sabora, uz konzultiranje Vlade Republike Hrvatske, daju li te analize dovoljno čvrst temelj za daljnji rad. Ako daju, treba prići strukturiranju zakonskog teksta: odrediti glavna pitanja i barem
osnovne odgovore na njih, koji će se onda na kraju uobličiti u konkretne
pravne norme.
V. Zaključak
Polazeći od geneze zemljišnih zajednica i Zakona iz 1894. kojim su kodificirana pravna pravila zemljišnih zajednica, kao i od razmatranja njihove
naravi, dolazi se do niza pitanja koja moraju biti razriješena prije nego se
pristupi izradi eventualnog zakonskog teksta ili više njih. Ponajprije valja
imati na umu pitanje ustavnopravnog temelja za njihovo donošenje, koje
se ne može naći samo u klasičnom pravu vlasništva.
Drugo, valja imati na umu da je riječ o razmjerno velikoj imovini koja ima
svoju vrijednost i cijenu, pri čemu povrat ili naknada znači financijski teret
HKJU – CCPA 15(2): 545–557
557
za javne proračune. Treće, ovlaštenici užitničkih prava nisu suvlasnici, pa
se problem ne bi smio rješavati polazeći od te premise, kako se ponekad
ističe u dostupnom materijalu. Četvrto, ako je svrha čitave ove aktivnos
ti razrješavanje nepravdi koje su nastale u doba socijalizma, postavlja se
pitanje za koliko su točno oštećeni današnji nasljednici nekadašnjih ovlaš
tenika te hoće li se taj problem rješavati nekim tehničkim putem (vještačenjem) ili zakonskim presumpcijama. Kako uopće izračunati ta različita
prava ovlaštenika? Koje točno nepravde ispravljati, one iz 1947. ili i one iz
ranijih razdoblja?
Nadalje, postavlja se niz pitanja organizacijske, personalne i upravne prirode, od pitanja koje će državne upravne organizacije i koji službenici
raditi na povratu do pitanja o dostupnosti i pouzdanosti javnih evidencija
nužnih za korektno provođenje povrata odnosno naknade.
Također, identificirano je dodatnih desetak pravnih i praktičnih pitanja u
vezi s identifikacijom zemljišnih zajednica, ovlaštenika povrata i njihovih
prava. Sva ona zahtijevaju pažljivo razmatranje i zauzimanje određenih
stajališta koja opredjeljuju daljnji rad.
Literatura
Bičanić, Rudolf (1938/1995) Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja i drugi radovi.
Zagreb: Pravni fakultet i Organizator
Ivšić, Milan (1938/2011) Seljačka politika. Preštampano u: Zdravko Lučić: K povratu imovine zemljišnim zajednicama Hrvatske. Velika Gorica: Domek turopolski
Krbek, Ivo (1948/2011) Pojam, podrijetlo i upravnopravno uređenje zemljišnih
zajednica. Preštampano u: Zdravko Lučić: K povratu imovine zemljišnim zajednicama Hrvatske. Velika Gorica: Domek turopolski
Lučić, Zdravko (2011) K povratu imovine zemljišnim zajednicama Hrvatske. Velika Gorica: Domek turopolski
Žigrović-Pretočki, Ivan (1917) Upravna nauka i hrvatsko upravno pravo u kratkim
crtama. Zagreb: Knjižara L. Hartmana
Na kraju je predloženo da se pripreme tri analize koje bi provele nadležna ministarstva. Tek nakon toga i nakon donošenja informirane političke
odluke Hrvatskog sabora i konzultiranja Vlade Republike Hrvatske te dodatnih rasprava moglo bi se pristupiti pisanju samog zakona.
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References:
Book: Peters, B. Guy (2001) The Politics of Bureaucracy. London and New York: Rutledge.
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In: Ivan Koprić (ed.) Modernisation of the Croatian public administration. Zagreb: Social
Sciences Polytechnic
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Article presented at a conference/round table: Rusch, Wolfgang (2009) Administrative
Procedures in EU Member States. Paper presented at the Conference on Public Administration Reform and European Integration, OECD-Sigma, Budva, 26–27 March
Document: OECD-Sigma (2010) Administrative Procedures in Transition Countries, www.
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VRSTE RADOVA
Časopis objavljuje recenzirane radove, informacije i druge tekstove koji s različitih aspekata
osvjetljavaju pitanja i probleme javne uprave.
U časopisu se objavljuju:
1. Recenzirani radovi – radovi podliježu recenzijskom postupku te se mogu kategorizirati kao
• izvorni znanstveni rad
• pregledni znanstveni rad
• prethodno znanstveno priopćenje
• stručni rad. Prilikom objave radovi se razvrstavaju u odgovarajuće rubrike časopisa. O razvrstavanju odlučuje Uredništvo časopisa na prijedlog glavnog urednika. Recenzijski se postupak odvija
po pravilima dvostruko slijepe recenzije koja jamči anonimnost autora spram recenzenata,
i obrnuto.
2. Prikazi knjiga i časopisa iz interdisciplinarnog područja javne uprave – ne podliježu recenzijskom postupku.
3. Sudska i upravna praksa – uključuje analize, prikaze i prijevode relevantnih presuda i
rješenja hrvatskih i europskih sudova i upravnih tijela koji ne podliježu recenzijskom
postupku.
4. Vijesti o održanim konferencijama te prikazi znanstvenih i stručnih skupova – služe informiranju čitatelja o najnovijim događanjima u području javne uprave i javnog sektora u
Hrvatskoj i svijetu. Ova kategorija ne podliježe recenzijskom postupku.
5. Pojmovnici – služe kratkom objašnjenju najvažnijih pojmova u interdisciplinarnom području javne uprave. Ne podliježu recenzijskom postupku.
Radovi se objavljuju na hrvatskom ili engleskom jeziku, a iznimno i na drugim stranim jezicima (slovenski, njemački, francuski, talijanski, španjolski, portugalski). Uredništvo će osigurati da značajni dio radova i drugih tekstova bude na hrvatskom jeziku, odnosno da se
osiguraju prijevodi ili duži sažeci radova na hrvatskom jeziku. Prije objave radovi prolaze
postupak lekture tijekom kojeg može doći do izmjena teksta.
RECENZIJSKI POSTUPAK
Recenzijski postupak provodi se prema pravilima o dvostrukoj anonimnoj recenziji. Barem
jedna od dvije predviđene recenzije mora biti inozemna.
Recenzenti su domaći i inozemni znanstvenici i sveučilišni nastavnici, najmanje sa znanstvenim stupnjem doktora znanosti iz odgovarajućeg područja. Inozemni recenzenti u pravilu
nisu iz zemalja s područja bivše Jugoslavije, koliko to dopušta jezik na kojemu je rad pisan
i/ili jezična kompetencija recenzenta (ako je rad napisan na engleskom ili nekom drugom
svjetskom jeziku, odnosno ako inozemni recenzent čita hrvatski). Ako nije moguće naći
recenzenta izvan područja bivše Jugoslavije, angažira se recenzent koji čita hrvatski jezik.
Recenzijski postupak je pisani te recenzenti predlažu kategorizaciju rada.
Konačnu odluku o prihvaćanju ili odbijanju rada te konačnu odluku o kategorizaciji rada donosi Uredništvo časopisa na sjednicama koje se održavaju prije izlaska svakog broja časopisa
na temelju prijedloga glavnog urednika i temeljem uvida svih članova Uredništva u radove
o kojima se odlučuje. Ako prva recenzija sugerira da je rad stručni, a s time se slažu i glavni
urednik, pomoćnik glavnog urednika i izvršni urednik, ne traži se druga recenzija.
U slučaju proturječnih recenzija rad se šalje na treću, a po potrebni i na četvrtu nadrecenziju.
Provodi se i nadzor pravilnosti citiranja radi otklanjanja mogućnosti plagijata.
UVJETI ZA PREDAJU RADOVA
1. Uredništvo prima isključivo neobjavljene radove ne starije od jedne godine.
Ne smatra se da je rad bio objavljen ako je objavljen samo na internetskoj stranici neke institucije. Objava u internetskom časopisu smatra se jednakopravnom objavi rada u tiskanom
časopisu. Rad koji se temelji na nekom drugom, prethodno već objavljenom radu, mora
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Prilikom predaje rada autor je dužan potpisati izjavu o autorstvu koju mu nakon slanja rada
dostavlja Uredništvo časopisa. Potpisom izjave autor potvrđuje da je podneseni rad njegovo
autorsko djelo te da nije prethodno objavljen ili podnesen na objavu u drugi časopis ili kakvu
drugu publikaciju. U slučaju koautorstva izjavu potpisuje svaki od koautora. Recenzijski postupak može otpočeti tek nakon što Uredništvo primi potpisanu izjavu (izjave) o autorstvu.
Uredništvo će na internetskoj stranici objaviti ako je našlo da neki podneseni rad krši etičke
standarde, s kraćim obrazloženjem u čemu se kršenje sastoji.
2. Radovi se dostavljaju u obliku word dokumenta. U samom tekstu rada ne smiju se
nalaziti podaci o autoru.
Podaci o autoru dostavljaju se u posebnom dokumentu, u kojem je potrebno navesti ime i
prezime autora, njegov stručni naziv ili znanstveni stupanj, zanimanje, naziv radnog mjesta i
organizacije u kojoj je zaposlen, e-mail adresu, web stranicu.
Ako se u radu citira samog autora/autore rada ili navode njegovi/njihovi radovi i druga djela,
taj se dio citata i poziva na prethodne radove mora izdvojiti iz rada u poseban dokument, a
ime autora se na svim mjestima za potrebe recenzije briše.
3. Rad mora biti pisan sukladno Uputama za oblikovanje radova.
4. Prilikom slanja radova potrebno je poštovati ograničenja u pogledu opsega radova.
Opseg radova koji se šalju na recenzijski postupak ograničen je, u pravilu, do maksimalno
60 000 znakova, uključujući i praznine. Uredništvo u opravdanim slučajevima može dopusiti
odstupanje od navedenog ograničenja.
Prikazi sudske i upravne prakse te pojmovnici ograničeni su, u pravilu, do maksimalno 30 000
znakova, uključujući i praznine. Konačni opseg ovih priloga određuje glavni urednik.
Vijesti, prikazi stručnih i znanstvenih skupova i prikazi knjiga ograničeni su, u pravilu, do
maksimalno 15 000 znakova, uključujući i praznine. Prema potrebi glavni urednik zadržava
pravo na skraćivanje ovih priloga.
5. Radovi koji podliježu recenzijskom postupku moraju biti opremljeni kraćim apstraktom, sažetkom i ključnim riječima.
Apstrakt dolazi na početku rada (iza naslova) i opsega je do 150 riječi, sažetkak dolazi na
kraj rada i opsega je do 300 riječi (sažetak rada prevodi se na engleski jezik, a prijevod osigurava Uredništvo ili po želji sam autor). Popis ključnih riječi navodi se ispod apstrakta (do
7 ključnih riječi). Apstrakt i sažetak pišu se u trećem licu jednine, u pasivu (analizira se ...,
istraživalo se ...), a u njima se na skraćeni način predstavlja sadržaj rada.
Naslov rada mora biti koncizan i istodobno informativan.
UPUTE ZA OBLIKOVANJE RADOVA
1. U časopisu Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava – Croatian and Comparative Public Administration koristi se citiranje u tekstu rada, dok se fusnote koriste za dodatna pojašnjenja
(APA standard citiranja, www.apastyle.org).
Taj način citiranja sastoji se u navođenju prezimena autora, godine izdanja rada te stranice
citiranog ili korištenog rada u samome tekstu rada.
Primjer: »U skandinavskim zemljama ta doktrina nije imala ozbiljnijeg negativnog utjecaja
na lokalnu samoupravu (Koprić, 2006a: 151), dok je u Njemačkoj, na primjer, glavni sektor
primjene novog javnog menadžmenta predstavljala upravo lokalna samouprava, ali ne na isti
način i s is tim učincima kao u anglosaksonskim zemljama (Wollmann, 2000c; Wollmann,
2003; Pusić, 2002: 92–93; Reisert, 2006: 162).«
2. Na kraju rada navodi se kompletni popis literature. U popis literature uvrštavaju se samo
jedinice koje je autor koristio u tekstu rada (ne jedinice koje se spominju posredovanjem).
Popis literature sastavlja se abecednim redom.
Način navođenja literature:
Knjiga:
Pusić, Eugen (2002) Upravljanje u suvremenoj državi. Zagreb: Društveno veleučilište
Rad u knjizi / zborniku:
Wollmann, Hellmut (2003) Suvremene upravne reforme u Njemačkoj. U: Ivan Koprić (prir.)
Modernizacija hrvatske uprave. Zagreb: Društveno veleučilište
Rad u časopisu:
Koprić, Ivan (2011) Administrative Technology and General Administrative Procedure:
Challenges and Changes in South-Eastern Europe. Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava –
Croatian and Comparative Public Administration 11(2): 435–454
Rad predstavljen na skupu/konferenciji:
Ivanišević, Stjepan (2010) Teritorijalna organizacija lokalne samouprave u europskim zemljama i njihove teritorijalne promjene. Rad predstavljen na znanstvenom skupu HAZU
Nova hrvatska lokalna i regionalna samouprava, Zagreb, 23. i 24. ožujka 2010.
Dokument:
OECD-Sigma (2010) Administrative Procedures in Transition Countries, www.sigmaweb.
org
Propis:
Zakon o općem upravnom postupku, NN 47/09
Radu se mogu dodati i drugi tekstovi, internetske stranice, itd.
Kad se citira dokument s određene web stranice, nije potrebno navoditi datum posjete toj
stranici.
3. Radovi se dostavljaju u obliku Word dokumenta, pisani fontom Times New Roman, veličina 12, prored 1,5.
Tablice i grafikovi se uključuju u tekst rada na odgovarajuće mjesto.
Referiranje/Indexing and abstracting:
Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, Public
Affairs Information Service – PAIS International (ProQuest), Political Science Complete, Public
Administration Abstracts (EBSCO Publishing, Inc., Ipswich, Massachusetts, SAD), Public
Administration Database for Accessing Publications in European Languages – PA@BABEL
(European Group for Public Administration), International Political Science Abstracts –
Documentation Politique Internationale (Paris)
Do broja 4/2010 Hrvatska i komparativna javna uprava izdavala se pod imenom Hrvatska
javna uprava (ISSN 1331-6443) / Until no 4/2010 Croatian and Comprative Public
Administration was published as Croatian Public Administration
Naslovnica: Pictoris, Zagreb
Lektura i korektura: Branka Römer, prof.
Lektura i prijevodi engleskih tekstova: Irena Habeš Koprić, prof., Vedrana Vojković Estatiev, prof.
Grafička priprema: ArTresor naklada, Zagreb
Tisak: Tiskara Zelina d.d., Sv. Ivan Zelina
Pretplata/Subscription:
Godišnja pretplata za Hrvatsku iznosi 750,00 kn i uplaćuje se na račun Instituta za javnu
upravu, IBAN: HR7923600001101452669, Institut za javnu upravu, Ćirilmetodska 4,
Zagreb, model HR00, poziv na broj: OIB. Godišnja pretplata za inozemstvo iznosi 150 €
i uplaćuje se na devizni žiroračun Instituta za javnu upravu broj 1500250590 Zagrebačka
banka d.d., Zagreb, swift adresa: ZABAHR2X, model HR00, poziv na broj: OIB.
Annual subscription for abroad is 150 € paid on the account of The Institute of Public
Administration (Institut za javnu upravu), No. 1500250590 at Zagrebačka banka d.d.
Zagreb, swift code: ZABAHR2X, model HR00, reference number: personal tax number.
HRVATSKA I KOMPARATIVNA JAVNA UPRAVA
ISSN 1848-0357
9 7 7 1 8 4 8 0 3 5 0 0 4

i komparativna Hrvatska

Transcription

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