The Proposed US Missile Defense in Europe: Technological Issues

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MIT
Science, Technology, and
Global Security Working Group
The Proposed US Missile Defense in Europe:
Technological Issues Relevant to Policy
Theodore A. Postol
Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Voice: 617 253-8077; e-mail: [email protected]
George N. Lewis
Associate Director, Peace Studies Program, Cornell University
Voice: 607 255-8914; e-mail: [email protected]
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Washington, DC
August 28, 2007
Major Questions that Need to Be Addressed
Major Issues
• What Are the Benefits Versus the Costs Associated with
the Current Plan to Deploy a Missile Defense in Europe?
• Could This Deployment Cause an Avoidable Major
Policy Confrontation with Russia at a Time When
Russian-US Cooperation is Critical?
• Will the System Provide the Promised Performance
Benefits?
• Are Their Alternative System Configurations that Could
“Do the Job” that would Not Be Perceived as a Threat
by the Russians?
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Summary of the Technological Issues Relevant to Policy
(1 of 2)
• Aegis system interceptors are kinematically able to provide intercept coverage for a missile
defense of Europe.
• There are as yet unresolved questions about whether the Aegis interceptor Kill Vehicle has
adequate acquisition and divert capabilities to reliably find and maneuver to hit Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) warheads.
• However, the Missile Defense Agency has made statements that the Aegis can do the job.
• Two-Stage Ground-Based Interceptors sited in Poland are kinematically able to provide intercept
coverage for most, but not all, of Europe.
• The Two-Stage Ground-Based Interceptors are also capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs
launched towards targets on the East Coast of the United States.
• Missile Defense Agency claims that such intercepts are not possible are inaccurate.
• There are still many unresolved engineering and technical problems associated with both the
two-stage and three-stage Ground-Based Interceptors.
• It is not clear that the unresolved performance uncertainties associated with the Ground-Based
Interceptor are less than those that confront Aegis.
• Thus, from the perspective of performance uncertainties, Aegis interceptors appear to be as
viable a choice for policy makers as Ground-Based Interceptors.
Summary of the Technological Issues Relevant to Policy
(2 of 2)
• The planned radar support for the European missile defense is woefully inadequate.
X-band radars are fundamentally not suited for the role of acquisition and surveillance. Lower
frequency radars operating at VHF, UHF, or L-Band are all far more suitable for this mission.
• The radar acquisition and surveillance problem could probably be solved by using multiple
Forward-Based X-Band radars placed strategically between Iran and Europe.
These radars would probably only be able to acquire and track cone-shaped ballistic missile warheads
at ranges less than 1000 km range. They would, however, be able to track the upper rocket stage
that deploys the warhead at greater range. This may make it possible for the radar to cue on upper
rocket stages as part of a process aimed at acquiring and tracking the warhead.
• The radar acquisition and surveillance problem could also be solved by using the Russian
Voronezh Class VHF Early Warning Radar in Armavir, Russia.
• Even if the funding for the Missile Defense Program were expanded to a substantial part of the
entire Department of Defense budget, the resulting missile defense system would still be
fundamentally unreliable, unless it can be demonstrated that the system can tell the differences
between simple decoys and warheads.
• There is overwhelming evidence that exoatmospheric Missile Defenses are fundamentally
vulnerable to exoatmospheric decoys. This near-certain vulnerability has far ranging
implications for the viability of exoatmospheric missile defenses and the nation’s security.
Congress should consider investigating this serious and fundamental vulnerability.
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Proposed Elements Of A European Missile
Defense
• Up to 10 silo-based long-range interceptors
located in Eastern Europe (2011-2013)
• Re-location of a narrow-beam, midcourse
tracking radar currently used in our Pacific test
range to central Europe (2011)
• Field an acquisition radar focused on the Iranian
threat from a forward position to provide detection,
cueing, and tracking information (2010-2011)
Poland
Czech Republic
Europe
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
18
Locations of Physical Assets Relevant to an Assessment of the Policy Issues
New Russian
EW Radar
Vypolzovo
Interceptors
EMR
Armavir
Gabala
FBX?
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Ballistic Missile Trajectories from Iran and
Tatischevo, Dombarovskiy, and Vypolzovo, Russia to Washington
Washington
Ballistic Missile
Trajectories from Iran
and Tatischevo, Russia
to Washington
New Russian
EW Radar
Vypolzovo
Interceptors
Dombarovskiy
Tatischevo
EMR
Armavir
Gabala
FBX?
Precision Cueing Role Played by the EMR in the Czech Republic?
An Integrated Approach To
Ballistic Missile Defense
Combining different sensors with different weapons
expands detection and engagement capabilities
DSP
In-Flight
Updates
Ground-Based
Interceptor
Land-Based
Radar
Track
Track
Track
Sea-Based
Radar
C2BMC
Approved for Public Release
06-MDA-1439 (16 FEB 06)
Precision Cueing Role Played by
the EMR in the Czech Republic?
Interceptor
Site
ms-108017A / 021606
8
Reported Demonstrations of How Simple Radar Cueing Information
Can Substantially Improve a Missile Defense’s Theoretical Capabilities
“With cuing from an Aegis ship and three ships with the Block 1A capability, we can in
fact defend our ally Japan and the U.S. forces there. Additionally, if we station a ship off
the Hawaiian Islands with a ship forward, we can in fact defend Hawaii. Likewise, we
can defend Guam by moving the detection ship forward. We have run many of these
scenarios.”
Rear Admiral Brad A. Hicks
Program Director,
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
December 19, 2005 in a talk at the Marshall Institute
Full talk is available at:
http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=363
Why Cueing from the European Midcourse Radar (EMR)
Could be of Concern to Russian Military Analysts
Reported by several publications:
On August 19, 2004, Army Col. Charles Dreissnack, THAAD’s program manager, said at
a conference that recent tests of the THAAD’s radar have shown that THAAD will have a
“residual” capability against ICBMs.
He said: “We weren’t planning to have the ICBM capability,” but the radar is
“outperforming what we thought it supposed to do.”
He also said that although deployment won’t begin until FY 2009, test assets could be
ready to defend Hawaii years earlier.
From
Marc Selinger, “THAAD displaying ‘residual’ capability against ICBMs,”
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 20, 2004.
Note: This description implies that THAAD’s NMD capabilities are limited by the radar, not
the interceptor. See "Highly Capable Theater Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty"
in Arms Control Today, April 1994. Available on the Web at:
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/theater-missile-defense-the-abm-treaty.html
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Interceptors are Modified Ground-Based Interceptors
2 Stage Instead of 3 Stage
30,450 lbs versus 31,500 lbs
47 Feet Long versus 51 Feet
The interceptors planned for
Poland are nearly identical to the
EKV
three-stage interceptors based
in the U.S. except that they are
a two-stage variant that is quicker, lighter, and better suited for
the engagement ranges and
timelines for Europe. The silos that house the ground-based interceptors have substantially smaller dimensions (e.g., diameter and length)
than those used for offensive missiles, such as the U.S. Minuteman III
ICBM. Any modification would require extensive, lengthy, and costly
changes that would be clearly visible to any observer.
The ground-based interceptors are comprised of a booster vehicle
and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). Upon launch, the booster flies to a projected intercept point and releases the EKV which
then uses on-board sensors (with assistance from ground-based assets) to acquire the target ballistic missile. The EKV performs final
discrimination and steers itself to collide with the enemy warhead,
destroying it by the sheer kinetic force of impact.
Future European Missile Site – Size Comparison
4
Relative Sizes and Weights of Candidate European Missile Defense Interceptors
60
Burnout Speed
≈ 8.5 km/sec
50
Burnout Speed
≈ 7.7 km/sec
40
Length (ft)
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30
Burnout Speed
≈ 4.5 km/sec
20
10
0
2-Stage
GBI
3-Stage
GBI
Navy
SM-3
~30,450 lbs ~31,500 lbs ~3,100 lbs
L
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Relative Sizes and Weights of Missile Defense Interceptors
60
Burnout Speed
≈ 8.5 km/sec
Burnout Speed
≈ 7.7 km/sec
Nuclear
Armed
50
Length (ft)
40
30
Burnout Speed
≈ 4.5 km/sec
Nuclear
Armed
20
10
0
Iraqi
Al-Husayn
15,000 lbs
Spartan
Sprint
25,000 - 29,000 lbs
7,500 lbs
2-Stage
GBI
3-Stage
GBI
Medium Range Marinized
Navy
SM-2
Lower Tier
THAAD
Navy
SM-3
~30,450 lbs ~30,500 lbs ~3,100 lbs
---
1,380 lbs
2,000 lb
THAAD
Patriot
PAC-3
Patriot
PAC-2
~950 lbs
695 lbs
2,000 lbs
Location of US 2-Stage and 3-Stage Ground-Based Interceptor Variants
at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight
GBI Powered Flight Profile
500
Locations Every 5 Seconds
Altitude (km)
400
300
200
Burnout
(143 sec)
Third Stage
Ignition
I t
t
8.3 – 8.5
km/sec
100
Burnout
(103 sec)
0
800
Second Stage
Ignition
I t
t
7.7 km/sec
700
600
500
400
Range (km)
300
Second Stage
Ignition
I t
t
200
100
0
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In March, Director of Missile Defense Agency Tells European Leaders that
the Proposed US System Cannot Counter Russian Offensive Missiles
Missile Defense For U.S. Allies And Friends
Why Poland And The Czech Republic?
• U.S. missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California
do not provide protection for Europe
• Technical analysis shows that Poland and the Czech
Republic are the optimal locations for fielding U.S. missile
defense assets in Europe
- Maximizes defensive coverage of Europe from ballistic
missiles launched from the Middle East
- Provides redundant coverage for the U.S. against
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles
Distribution Statement A:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
• Placing the interceptor field in Poland and the radar in the
Czech Republic maximizes the defensive coverage of Europe
March 2007
Lt Gen Trey Obering, USAF
Director
Missile Defense Agency
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
U.S. System Cannot Counter
Russian Offensive Missiles
ms-109395A / 030707 17
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles
• U.S. missile defense system deployments are directed against rogue
nation threats, not advanced Russian missiles
To
Wa s
h in g
800 sec
ton D
C
• A European interceptor site (up to 10 interceptors) would be no match
for Russia’s strategic offensive missile force - would be easily
overwhelmed
600 sec
400 sec
• European interceptor site has no capability to defend U.S. from Russian
launches
- Not geographically situated in European for this purpose
Russian
ICBM
- Too close Russian launch site to be able to engage intercontinental
missiles headed for U.S.
- Would result in “tail chase” for interceptors launched from a
European site
Interceptor
• No plan to expand the number of interceptors in Europe - not in our
five year budget
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability
• Standing invitation to the Russians to visit U.S. missile defense sites for
transparency purposes
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
21
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
22
Concerns Expressed by the Russians
Engagement With Russia
• March 17, 2006 (Washington): Bilateral Defense Commission Meeting. Under Secretary of
Defense Edelman and General Mazurkevich, Chief of the Main Directorate for International
Cooperation
• April 3, 2006 (Moscow): Briefing of Russian officials by U.S. Embassy (Moscow) on DOD
decision to resume consultations with Poland regarding the site of U.S. missile defense assets
• November 3, 2006 (Moscow): Dr. Cambone, Lt Gen Obering, DASD Green, Russian Minister
of Defense Ivanov, Chief of General Staff Gen-Col Baluevskiy, Gen-Col Mazurkevich
- Russians did not acknowledge Iran emerging threat as a rationale for deployment of U.S.
missile defense assets
- Believe Russia is real target
- Russians “portrayed” lack of understanding and confusion on technical aspects of a
deployed missile program and proposed architecture. U.S. committed to following-up
with technical discussions to Russian counterparts
• January 29, 2007 (Moscow): Strategic Dialogue Meeting. Under Secretaries Joseph and Deputy
Foreign Minister Kislyak
- Ambassador re-committed that U.S. will follow-up with technical briefings/explanations
regarding U.S. missile deployment
• February 9, 2007 (Seville): Secretary Gates and Minister of Defense Ivanov during NATORussia Council Ministerial meeting
U.S. Has Offered Future Event Establishing Technical Experts Meeting (Spring 2007)
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Can the Europe-Based Missile Defense
Engage Russian ICBMs
and if so
Why Does that Matter?
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Search Coverage of the X-Band Radar Using Electronic Scanning
Radar Located
in Azerbaijan
120° Azimuth
Search
90° Azimuth
Search
Search Coverage of the X-Band Radar Using Electronic Scanning
Radar Located in
Czech Republic
120° Azimuth
Search
90° Azimuth
Search
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General Obering’s Original Slide
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles
800 sec
600 sec
400 sec
Russian
Russian
ICBM
Interceptor
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
22
Obering’s Slide With MDA Labels Removed
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles
800 sec
600 sec
400 sec
Russian
ICBM
Vypolzovo
18 SS-25s
Moscow
Interceptor
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
22
Location of SS-25 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight
SS-25 Powered Flight Profile
500
Locations Every 5 Seconds
400
Altitude (km)
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300
Burnout
(170 sec)
200
Third Stage
Ignition
I t
t
100
0
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
Second Stage
Ignition
I t
t
100
0
Range (km)
Obering’s Slide – Distances and Speeds Wrong
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles
5 to 3.75 km/sec
same ratio as
6.4 to 8.5km/sec
800 sec
600 sec
1500 km in 400 sec,
3.75 km/sec ballistic
target?
Ballistic Missile to DC should
take 280 sec, not 400 sec to
cover this distance!
400 sec
Russian
ICBM
Vypolzovo
18 SS-25s
Moscow
1000 km in 200 sec
5 km/sec Interceptor?
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
22
Page 13
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Actual Timelines for an Engagement
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles
800 SEC
600 SEC
SS-25
Trajectory
1 min
5 min
5 min
400 SEC
4 min
3 min
4 min
2 min
3 min
Co
ast
t
as
Co
GBI
Interceptor
Russian
ICBM
1 min
0 min
Pow
2 min
ere
d
re
we
Po
0 min
t
Vypolzovo
18 SS-25s
Moscow
ht
lig
dF
Timelines for
2-Stage GBI
Interceptor
Flig
h
Tatischevo
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM
LaunchDombarovskiy
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
This statement is wrong
ms-109395A / 030707
22
Engagement Event Timeline for Engagement of SS-25 from Vypolzovo
with 2-Stage Missile Defense Interceptor
T=500 sec
Interceptor and
warhead Collide
INTERCEPT!
T=5 minutes
5 minutes
4 minutes
T=4 minutes
T=1 minutes
T=3 minutes
T=2 minutes
T=0 minutes
Interceptor Launch
T=170 sec
End of SS-25 Powered Flight,
Also
Point of Radar Acquisition
3 minutes
2 minutes
T=1.7 minutes
Interceptor Burnout
T=0 minutes
Interceptor Launch
T=50 sec
Infrared Satellite Detection
C
l t
T=0 sec
Launch Transient Detection?
C
l t
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Misleading MDA Slide Indicating Interceptors Cannot Engage Russian ICBMs
Misleading MDA Slide Indicating Interceptors Cannot Engage Russian ICBMs
5
4
4
3
2
3
1
0
2
0 0 min
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Misleading MDA Slide that Indicates Interceptors Could Never
Intercept
Russian
ICBMs
Misleading MDA Slide that
Indicates Interceptors
Could Never
Intercept Russian ICBMs
Slide Overstates
Exaggerates the
ICBMs
by 15%
and Understates
the Speed
Interceptors
by more thanby30%
Slide
theSpeed
Speedofof
ICBMs
by 15%
and Understates
theofSpeed
of Interceptors
more than 30%
Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles
3500 km
• Interceptor launched ≈ 250-300 sec after threat
1,200 sec
3500 km
800 sec
Errors in This MDA Chart
ICBM
Apogee
1,000 sec
Interceptor Speed from Slide ≈ 5.4 km/sec
Actual Interceptor Speed ≈ 7.7 - 8.3 km/sec
ICBM
Burnout
600 sec
ICBM Ground Travel from Slide ≈ 5.8 km/sec
Actual Ground Travel of ICBM ≈ 5.1 km/sec
400 sec
5
4
4
3
2
1
3
0
2
3250 km
Moscow
0 0 min
3250 km
= 5.4 km/s??
600 sec
Interceptor
Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch
U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2623 (13 JUN 07)
ms-109673B / 061407
27
Location of SS-18/19 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight
SS-18/19 Powered Flight Profile
500
Burnout
(340sec)
Locations Every 5 Seconds
Altitude (km)
400
300
200
Second Stage
Ignition
I t
t
100
0
800
700
600
500
400
Range (km)
300
200
100
0
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Timelines and Events for Intercepts with Two-Stage Variant of the GBI
6
5
5
4
4
Beginning of
Radar Tracking
3
2
3
3
1
2
2
0
2 0
Vypolzovo
1
End of
Powered Flight
End of
Powered Flight
0
Dombarovskiy
Tatischevo
Earliest
Intercept
Beginning of Czech
Radar Tracking
Engagement Event Timeline for Engagement of SS-18/19 from Tatischevo
with 2-Stage Missile Defense Interceptor
INTERCEPT!
T=4.8 minutes
T=4 minutes
T=3 minutes
T=2 minutes
T=1 minutes
T=5
minutes
T=4
minutes
0 minutes
T=320 sec
End of SS-18 Powered Flight,
Also
Point of Radar Acquisition
T=3
minutes
T=0 sec
Launch Transient
Detection?
T=2 minutes
Tatischevo
T=1.7 minutes
Interceptor Burnout
T=0 minutes
Interceptor Launch
T=50 sec
Infrared
Satellite
Detection
Engagement Event Timeline for Engagement of SS-18/19 from Dombarovskiy
with 2-Stage Missile Defense Interceptor
INTERCEPT!
T=7
minutes
T=7
minutes
T=6
minutes
T=6 minutes
T=5 minutes
T=4 minutes
T=3 minutes
T=2 minutes
T=1 minutes
0 minutes
T=410 sec
Point of Radar Acquisition
T=5
minutes
T=4
minutes
T=320 sec
End of SS-18/19
Powered Flight,
T=3
minutes
T=2 minutes
T=0 sec
Launch Transient
Detection?
Dombarovskiy
T=1.7 minutes
Interceptor Burnout
T=50 sec
Infrared
Satellite
Detection
T=0 minutes
Interceptor Launch
Presidential National Security Directive 23 (PNSD-23)
Presidential National Security Directive 23 (PNSD-23)
Signed by President Bush on December 6, 2002.
•PNSD-23 reaffirmed the policy of the Bush administration “to develop and deploy,
at the earliest possible date, ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best
technologies available.”
•The Directive also states that the United States would begin to deploy missile
defenses in 2004 “as a starting point for fielding improved and expanded missile
defenses later [emphasis added].”
•And that the ultimate goal was missile defenses “not only capable of protecting
the United States and our deployed forces, but also friends and allies.”
•PNSD-23 was preceded in January 2002 by a memorandum from then Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The Rumsfeld memo directs the Missile Defense
Agency to develop defense systems by first using whatever technology is
"available," even if the capabilities produced are limited relative to what the
defense must ultimately be able to do.
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Observation
PNSD-23 Appears to be a Mandate for Continued and
Unbounded Expansion and Modernization of the Missile
Defense System in Europe and Elsewhere.
If this is True, PNSD-23 Would Indicate to the Russians
that the Current Defense Deployment in Europe is only
the Leading Edge of a Much Larger and More Capable
Future Deployment.
Major Question that Needs to Be Addressed
Major Foreign Policy Issue
US May Need to Explain to the Russians Why US Interceptors
Cannot Engage Russian ICBMs
Page 19
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US May Need to Explain to the Russians Why US Interceptors
Cannot Engage Russian ICBMs
Engagement With Russia
• March 17, 2006 (Washington): Bilateral Defense Commission Meeting. Under Secretary of
Defense Edelman and General Mazurkevich, Chief of the Main Directorate for International
Cooperation
• April 3, 2006 (Moscow): Briefing of Russian officials by U.S. Embassy (Moscow) on DOD
decision to resume consultations with Poland regarding the site of U.S. missile defense assets
• November 3, 2006 (Moscow): Dr. Cambone, Lt Gen Obering, DASD Green, Russian Minister of
Defense Ivanov, Chief of General Staff Gen-Col Baluevskiy, Gen-Col Mazurkevich
- Russians did not acknowledge Iran emerging threat as a rationale for deployment of U.S.
missile defense assets
- Believe Russia is real target
- Russians “portrayed” lack of understanding and confusion on technical aspects of a
deployed missile program and proposed architecture. U.S. committed to following-up with
technical discussions to Russian counterparts
• January 29, 2007 (Moscow): Strategic Dialogue Meeting. Under Secretaries Joseph and Deputy
Foreign Minister Kislyak
- Ambassador re-committed that U.S. will follow-up with technical briefings/explanations
regarding U.S. missile deployment
• February 9, 2007 (Seville): Secretary Gates and Minister of Defense Ivanov during NATORussia Council Ministerial meeting
U.S. Has Offered Future Event Establishing Technical Experts Meeting (Spring 2007)
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
Major Question
Major Issue
Is There Another Option to Base
Interceptors so they
Do Not Pose a Perceived
Threat to Russian ICBMs?
An alternative way of asking this question is:
Could the Aegis System “Do the Job”?
23
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Emergency Engagement Capability
USS LAKE ERIE
First
FirstSM-3
SM-3Block
BlockIA
IAEncanned
Encanned
2 Rounds Delivered By 31 AUG 06
2 Rounds Delivered By 31 AUG 06
First
FirstSM-3
SM-3Block
BlockI’s
I’s
“Ready
For
Issue”
– November
2004
“Ready
ForFleet
Fleet
Issue”
November
11 Rounds
Delivered
By –August
2006 2004
11 Rounds Delivered By August 2006
USS PORT ROYAL
Intercept
FTM-10
FTM-10
If Directed, Capability Available
Approved for Public Release
06-MDA-1922 (13 SEP 06)
ms-108727 / 091406
6
Aegis BMD SM-3 Evolution Plan
Block II
Block IIA
High Divert
Variant
• 21" 3rd
High Velocity
Variant
Stage
• 1-Color Seeker
• Pulsed DACS
• 2- Color Seeker
- Increased IR
Acquisition
- Improved
Discrimination
• Block IB Seeker
• 21" Propulsion
- 2nd & 3rd Stage
- Increased Missile
Vbo = xx
• TDACS
- Increased Divert
- Lowers AUR
Cost
Block 2004
Approved for Public Release
06-MDA-1922 (13 SEP 06)
• 21" Nosecone
• MK 41 VLS
Compatible
• 21" 2nd Stage
ock 2004
Bl
Block
• Large Diameter
KW
- Advanced
Discrimination
Seeker
- High Divert
DACS
• 21" Propulsion
- 2nd & 3rd Stage
- Increased Missile
Vbo = yy
• All-Reflective
Optics (ARO)
• 21" Nosecone
• Advanced Signal
Processor (ASP)
• MK 41 VLS
Compatible
Block 2008
Funded Since PB06
Block 2010 / 2012
Capability Change
From Previous Block
• 21" 3rd
Stage
Block IB
• 21" 2nd Stage
Block IA
Block 2012 / 2014
ms-108727 / 091406
10
Basic Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components
Basic Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components
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Aegis Engagement Timelines for Defense of UK from the Baltic Sea
3
Minutes
3
4
4
5
5
6
7
5
4
3
2
Interceptor
Launched
1
0
Aegis Engagement Timelines for Defense of UK from the Mediterranean Sea
6
5
4
3
5
4
3
Interceptor
Launched
2
1
0
Conclusions with Regard to Interceptor Capabilities
Assuming systems work as MDA claims:
• The current proposed system could engage Russian ICBMs.
• Russian ICBMs will be observable by the EMR in the Czech Republic during
their bussing operations, allowing for warheads and decoys to be tracked as
they are deployed and providing potentially very valuable cueing information to
missile defense units in the continental United States.
• There are many other alternative deployments that could easily meet the US
stated objective of defending against postulated Iranian ICBMs.
• Aegis system interceptors are kinematically able to provide intercept coverage
for a missile defense of Europe.
• Two-Stage Ground-Based Interceptors sited in Poland are kinematically able to
provide intercept coverage for most, but not all, of Europe.
• The Missile Defense Agency has made statements that the Aegis can do the job,
but there are as yet unresolved questions about whether the Aegis interceptor
Kill Vehicle has adequate acquisition and divert capabilities to reliably find and
maneuver to hit Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) warheads.
• There are also many unresolved engineering and technical issues associated with
the Two and Three Stage Ground-Based Interceptors and the EKV.
• Thus, from the perspective of performance uncertainties, Aegis interceptors
appear to be as viable a choice for policy makers as Ground-Based Interceptors.
Can the System “Do the Job”?
The Complementary Role of
Acquisition and Tracking Radars
in the Europeand Missile Defense
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What Has Happened to the Acquisition Radars the US Missile Defense Program?
Original System Plans Required that the UEWRs be Used for Acquisition
and X-Band Radars be Used for Discrimination!
Basic Physics Determining Radar Capabilities
Capability of Radar Determined by Average Power Radiated from Antenna
Size of the Antenna
Radar Cross Section (RCS) of Targets to be Engaged
Radar Cross section Reduction
This is why Stealth can be effective against previously capable radars
RCS of Combat Aircraft ~ 10 m2
RCS ≈ 0.01 – 0.001 m2
2
RCS of Warhead at X-Band ~ 0.01 m
Difference is factor of 10,000!
Power
Area
RCS ≈ 1 – 10 m2
Radar Cross Section of Large Round-Nose Warhead
Radar Cross Section of Generic Aircraft
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Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS)
UHF Radar Being Used in National Missile Defense System
The size of the FBX and its limited average power make it considerably less capably than large lower frequencies radars like the US UEWR and the
Russian Voronezh VHF radars for acquiring and and tracking naturally stealthy ballistic missile warheads at long-range.
UEWR
GreenPine
FBX
Russian Voronezh Class Third Generation Upgraded VHF Early Warning Radar
that is Potentially Usable in a “Light” National Missile Defense System
The size of the FBX and its limited average power make it considerably less capably than large lower frequencies radars like the US UEWR and the
Russian Voronezh VHF radars for acquiring and and tracking naturally stealthy ballistic missile warheads at long-range.
Russian Voronezh
VHF Early Warning
Radar
Arrow GreenPine
Missile Defense
Radar
Forward-Based
X-Band Radar
(FBX)
Cobra Dane L-Band Phased Array Intelligence Radar
Being Used in National Missile Defense System
GreenPine
FBX
National Missile Defense Ground-Based Radar Prototype (NMD-GBR-P)
X-Band Radar to be Used in National Missile Defense System
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The Forward-Based X-Band Radar (FMX) Has Limited Acquisition Abilities
Against 0.01 m2 Cone-Shaped Warheads at Ranges Greater Than 1000 km
1000 km Range – Dwell Time =0.05 sec; Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 20, Area Searched at Distance = 4.3 km x 10.3 km
1500 km Range – Dwell Time =0.25 sec; Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 20, Area Searched at Distance = 6.5 km x 15.5 km
The Israeli Green Pine L-Band Missile Defense Radar (1 – 2 GHz)
can Acquire and Track a 2 m2 Target at 500 km and a 0.02 m2 Target at 50 km
Practical Ranges at Which the FBX Radar can Acquire and Track
a 0.01 m2 Cone-Shaped Warhead
Practical Ranges at Which the FBX Radar can Acquire and Track
a 0.01 m2 Cone-Shaped Warhead
3
4
3
Minutes
5
6
4
6
7
5
FBX
6
6
5
7
4
3
2
1
0
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Armavir Acquisition Capability for an FBX Radar in Romania
Against a Cone-Shaped Warhead with a 0.01 m2 Radar Cross Section at X-Band
3
4
5
6
6
7
5
FBX
Armavir
Radar
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Operating Frequencies of Early Warning and Missile Defense Radars
Radar Cross Section of Rounded-Back Cones
The operating frequency of Russia’s Early Warning Radars was chosen so that the radar reflectivity of warheads approaching Russia would be as large
as possible, thereby making it easier for the radars to detect the approaching warheads at very long range. However, a serious drawback associated
with radars operating at these frequencies is that they highly vulnerable to blackout effects from high-altitude nuclear explosions.
0
0
10
10
2
Radar Cross Section (m )
-1
10
-1
2
Radar Cross Section (m )
10
-2
10
-2
10
-3
10
-3
10
-4
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
10
0
1
2
3
Frequency (MHz)
Russian Hen House
and
Large Phased Arrays
US
PAVE-PAWS and BMEWS
Early Warning / Missile Defense
Radars
US
Upgraded
Early Warning / Missile Defense
Radars
4
5
6
Frequency (GHz)
7
8
9
10
US
Ground-Based
X-Band Radar
Findings of the Technical Analysis (1 of 2)
The Radar Support Requirements for the System are Woefully Inadequate
• The planned radar support for the European missile defense is woefully inadequate.
X-band radars are fundamentally not suited for the role of acquisition and surveillance. Lower
frequency radars operating at VHF, UHF, or L-Band are all far more suitable for this mission.
• The radar acquisition and surveillance problem could probably be solved by using multiple
Forward-Based X-Band radars placed strategically between Iran and Europe.
These radars would probably only be able to acquire and track cone-shaped ballistic missile
warheads at ranges less than 1000 km range. They would, however, be able to track the upper
rocket stage that deploys the warhead at greater range. This may make it possible for the radar to
cue on upper rocket stages as part of a process aimed at acquiring and tracking the warhead.
• The radar acquisition and surveillance problem could also be solved by using the Russian
Voronezh Class VHF Early Warning Radar in Armavir, Russia.
Findings of the Technical Analysis (2 of 2)
Assuming systems work as MDA claims:
• The current proposed system could engage Russian ICBMs.
• Russian ICBMs will be observed during their bussing operations, allowing for
warheads and decoys to be tracked as they are deployed.
• There are many other alternative deployments that could easily meet the US
stated objective of defending against postulated Iranian ICBMs.
• The Russian proposal to instead use radars (Russian and US) in Azerbaijan would
allow the US to meet its stated objective of defending against postulated Iranian
ICBMs without posing a threat to Russian ICBM forces.
• A system of equal or greater capability than the one currently being proposed
by the US could use radars in Azerbaijan and/or Turkey, with interceptors
placed in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, or Turkey
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Fundamental Issues that Needs to be Addressed
Fundamental Issue that Needs to Be Addressed
• Even if the funding for the Missile Defense Program were expanded to a substantial part of the
entire Department of Defense budget, the resulting missile defense system would still be
fundamentally unreliable, unless it can be demonstrated that the system can tell the
differences between simple decoys and warheads.
• There is overwhelming evidence that exoatmospheric Missile Defenses are fundamentally
vulnerable to exoatmospheric decoys. This near-certain vulnerability has far ranging
implications for the viability of exoatmospheric missile defenses and the nation’s security.
Congress should consider investigating this serious and fundamental vulnerability.
Some Photos of Objects that Could Appear Like Warheads
Large Balloon
With Reflecting Coating
Light Rigid Replica Decoy
2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon
With Black Coating
Minuteman Inflatable Decoy
Balloon With White Coating
Minuteman Warhead
Conclusions
From a Purely Technical Perspective:
• There appears to be no credible technical reason that the stated US objective to
defend against postulated future Iranian ICBMs could not be fulfilled by other
types of deployment configurations.
• Recent statements made by the MDA, and numerous past technically
misleading and inaccurate statements made by the MDA, would likely cause
skepticism and suspicion among Russian military analysts who advise their
political leadership.
• It is therefore understandable that Russian military analysts might suspect that
US motivations are different from those that have been stated.
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1983-93 (NIE 11-3/8-83)
Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict, 1983-93 (NIE 11-3/8-83)
Formerly Top Secret
Key Judgments of US Intelligence
Community in 1983
We have major uncertainties about how well a
Soviet ABM system would function, and the degree
of protection that future ABM deployments would
afford the USSR. Despite our uncertainties about
its potential effectiveness, such a deployment
would have an important effect on the perceptions,
and perhaps the reality, of the US-Soviet strategic
nuclear relationship.
●●●
widespread Soviet defenses, even if US evaluations
indicated they could be overcome by an attacking
force, would complicate US attack planning and
create major uncertainties about the potential
effectiveness of a US strike.
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Appendix A
Radar Range Resolution
Capabilities of Different Radars that Might Be Used
in Missile Defense Systems
Radar Range-Resolution of the Different Missile-Defense Radars
1.5 ~ 2 meter
Warhead
UHF Radar
Range-Resolution
Enhanced L-Band
Range-Resolution
X-Band
Range-Resolution
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Radars Used for Ballistic Missile Defense
Radar Type
Designation
Frequency
Wavelength
Bandwidth
Range Resolution
Russian Early
Warning Radar
VHF
150
2.0 meters
~10 MHz
~10 – 15 meters
US Upgraded
Early Warnings
UHF
430 MHz
0.66 meters
~30 MHz
~4 - 5 meters
Cobra Dane
L-Band
1,000 MHz
0.30 meters
~200 MHz
~0.75 meters
Ground-Based
Radar
X-Band
10,000 MHz 0.03 meters ~1,000 MHz
Number of Elements perUnit Area ∼
Power per Unit Area ~ 5000
Radar CrossSection ∼
W/m2
1
λ2
~0.15 meters
1
λ2
1
Radar with Comparable Search Capability ∼ 4
4
λ
⎛ 0.66 ⎞
UHF vs X-Band ∼ ⎜
234,000
=
⎟
⎝ 0.03 ⎠
Examples of Radar Signals from Warheads
C-Band (5Ghz) Radar Signal
Against 1.5 Meter Long Warhead
0.0
1.5
3.0
X-Band (10GHz) Radar Signal
Against 1.5 Meter Long Warhead
0.0
1.5
3.0
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Appendix B
X-Band Radar Technology and Radar Performance
Estimates Relevant to Assessing
Missile Defense System Capabilities
Forward Based X-Band Radar
Japan
Approved for Public Release
07-MDA-2332 (9 MAR 07)
ms-109395A / 030707
32
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Phased-Array X-Band Radars
X-Band Modules
• Radar modules are based on GaAs monolithic microwave integrated
circuits (MMICs).
• Such modules typically produce long pulses with high duty cycles.
• X-band radars thus use linear-frequency-modulation pulse
compression to get range resolution.
• Bandwidth of 1 GHZ, corresponding to 15 cm resolution usually
assumed.
• Duty cycle appears to be about 0.2.
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X-Band Module
X-Band Module
2.66 inches
1.05 in
X-Band Module
• About 70,000 first-generation (6-8 w peak power, 1.2-1.6 w average
power) modules went to THAAD Dem/Val, 2 THAAD UOES, and the
GBR-P radars. THAAD Dem/Val was dismantled for the modules for
the GBR-P.
• About 60,000 second-generation (10 watt) modules were made and
were used for SBX.
• Current third-generation (16 watt?) are used in THAAD EMD, THAAD
Production, and FBX.
• X-band modules are apparently expensive and in short supply.
X-Band Modules per Radar
• GBR-P:
• THAAD/FBX:
• SBX:
• GBR:
• EMR (Czech):
16,896
25,344
45,264
69,632
~ 22,000 ???
• Current rate of deployment suggests about enough modules are being
made each year to deploy one THAAD/FBX.
• If so, this may explain why EMR won’t be available until 2011.
• Modules are expensive, ~$1,000+ each.
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X-Band Radars
The new X-band radars can be divided into two groups:
–
–
THAAD/FBX (which are the same): transportable, multipurpose
(surveillance, tracking) radars
-SBX, GBR-P,GBR, EMR. Large, specialized tracking radars.
These all have highly “thinned” antennas. Their antennas all can be
rotated.
Thinned Array Radars
• To get a narrow beam, want largest possible antenna.
• But filling an antenna the size of GBR-P would require 291,000
modules.
• Instead, spread modules much further apart, so only ~17,000 are
needed.
• This gets a narrow beam, but radar is much less powerful than it
superficially might appear.
• In particular, P-A is not appropriate figure of merit.
Capabilities of Different Phased Array Radars
Comparison of Target Acquisition Capabilities of Phased Array Radars
Adjusted P-A (w/m2)
• GBR-P
• EMR
• THAAD/FBX
• SBX
• GBR
• FPS-85
• Cobra Dane
105
1.2 x
5.4 x 105
7.0 x 105
1.5 x 106
3.5 x 106
6.9 x 108
2.9 x 108
Sensitivity
74
380
37
2,100
7,700
100,000
100,000
Sensitivity = S/N at 1,000 km for 1 m2 target with 1 msec pulse
Adjusted P-A = P * A * Thinning Ratio (0.065 for SBX, GBR)
Radar Data and Calculations Courtesy of George Nelson Lewis, Peace Studies Program, Cornell University
EMR vs Iran Warhead to West Coast of U.S.
• If EMR sensitivity is 380, then a 1 millisecond dwell time, gives
a S/N of 0.025 for a 0.01 m2 target at 3,500 km.
• Thus to get S/N =20, would require about 4.0 seconds of dwell
time.
• An ICBM would move several beam widths in this time.
• Beam width = 0.03 / 12.5 × 3,500 = 8.4 km
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Distance of Japan-Based FBX from Postulated ICBM Launch Site
1000 km
Technical Characteristics of
THAAD X-Band Mobile Ground-Based Radar
FBX
Radar