Suzuki Bunji and the Yuaikai

The Japanese Labor Movement, 1912-1919: Suzuki Bunji and the Yuaikai
Author(s): Stephen S. Large
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (May, 1970), pp. 559-579
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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The Japanese
LaborMovement,
1912-1919:
SuzukiBunjiandtheYufaikai
STEPHEN
S. LARGE
T
HE historyof the labor movementin earlyTaisho Japanhas not drawn the
attention
of scholarswhichit deserves.In moststudiesof Japaneselaborhistory,
the principallabor organizationof the I9I2-I9
period, the Yiiaikai ("Friendly
Society")has been dismissedas an unspectacular
do-gooders'mutualaid body.However,as the forerunner
of the Nihon Rod5 Sodomei ("JapanGeneralFederationof
Labor"), it was muchmorethanthisinterpretation
would imply.As a legitimatereformmovementin itsown right,theYiiaikai developedintoa viablelabormovement
in spiteof hostility
againstorganizedlabor duringthisperiod.Since Suzuki Bunji
founderof the Yiiaikai,dominatedit in its earlyyears,its growthmay
(I885-I946),
be studiedmainlythroughhis career.The patternof disputeswhichrackedthelabor
movementin the twentiesand thirties
may be firstdiscernedin Suzuki's struggleto
retaincontroloftheYuiaikaiwhenhisleadershipwas challengedfromI9I6 on.
Suzuki Bunji has been largelyneglectedby Japanesehistorians,
suggestsNakamura Katsunori,becausehe was not an heroicfigure.'They have preferred
to study
the more dramaticpersonalities
of the Taisho periodlike Osugi Sakae and Yoshino
Sakuza, who struggled,suffered,
and were persecutedfortheirbeliefs(both served
time in jail; Suzuki did not). Superficially,
Suzuki was quite the oppositeof the
lean,hungry,and anguishedfigurecut by thelikesof Osugi. For a Japanese,he was
unusuallyrotund.As opposedto therevolutionary
apostlesof change,Suzuki looked
morelikea prosperous
businessman.
His detractors,
Osugi amongthem,tookpleasure
in emphasizingSuzuki's softness.Osugi describedhim as a fat and greasylooking
man witha brightred,plump face.2Yoshino Sakuzo, Suzuki's respectedseniorand
view: Suzuki was a man with an easy smile and a
close friend,offereda different
cheerful,
optimisticdisposition,
alwayswell-likedby his teachersin schooland later
by ordinaryworkers.3His immensephysiqueseemedto underlinehis jovialityand
friendliness.
Suzuki, with obvious relish,recountshow he used to have ordinary
workerscome to his house on theirdaysoff,wherehe would servethemrice dumplingsand tellthemabouthorizonstheyhad neverdreamedof.4
Suzuki's vision of the labor movement'sgoals and tactics,indeed,the motives
which governedhis actionsand ultimatelythe courseof the Yuiaikai,were rooted
with an ardent
in his philosophy,which combinedallegianceto social reformism
and its accompanyinghumanitarianthrust.He firstcame into
faithin Christianity
a moderatedoctrineof change,whilea studentat Tokyo
touchwithsocialreformism,
in Historyat
StephenS. Large is an instructor
of Iowa.
theUniversity
1 NakamuraKatsunori,"Suzuki Bunji to Taisho
rodo undo" ["Suzuki Bunji and the Taisho Labor
XXXII, No. I (Jan.
Movement"],Hc5gakukenkyfi,
I959), 43-44.
2 5SUgi
Sakae, Zenshu [Collected Works],VI
(Tokyo, I964), I70.
s Yoshino Sakuzo, "Suzuki Bunji no soby6"
["Rough Sketch of Suzuki Bunji"], Rodo undo
niju7nen [TwentyYears in the Labor Movement]
(Tokyo, I93I), p. 5. Yoshinowas Suzuki's senior
by six years.
4 Suzuki,RodJundo,p. 42.
559
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560
STEPHEN S. LARGE
Imperial University.It was the guiding line of thoughtin the Social Policies
Association(Shakai Seisaku Gakkai), an organizationof scholars,bureaucrats,
and
businessmento whichSuzuki belonged.He was particularly
impressedby Professor
Kuwata Kumazo who,fromhis lectureplatformand in the group,advocateda type
of socialreformism
whichemphasizedthatthe government,
as the strongparty,had
an obligationto help labor,the weak party;thatcapitalistsshould extenda helping
hand to laborersin a spiritof mercy;and thatthe workersshouldestablishunions,
mutualaid organs,and cooperativesto upgradetheirstyleof life.He favoredcomprehensivelegislationwhich would provide basic solutionsto labor problems.5
Kuwata's stresson labor unions and cooperationbetweencapitaland laborbecame
thetwinpillarsofSuzuki'sconvictions
on thelabormovement.
The social reformist
principleof harmonyand cooperationbetweencapital and
laborwas one of Suzuki's main themesin the I9I2-I9 period,althoughas theperiod
progressed,
he graduallyde-emphasizedit. Severalmonthsafterthe foundingof the
Yuiaikaiin August I9I2, he wrotean articlepublishedin the Yiiaikai paper,Yuiai
shimpo, entitled"HarmonyBetweenCapital and Labor." In it he said, "The time
when laborerswere slavesof the capitalistshas passed.Althoughtheyare laborers,
they are men of independence."He reasonedthat productionwas the result of
cooperationbetweenworkersand capitalists;so in the industrialprocessitself,there
existeda basis forcooperationwhich could be extendedto the broad fieldof labor
problems.6In an articleof the same titlein I9I4, he urged the capitaliststo put
themselvesinto the shoes of the laborers.Relationsbetweencapitalistsand laborers should be like thosebetweenhusband and wife.7As will be seen later,when
strikeserupted,Suzuki did his best to restrainthe workersinvolvedbecause he
believedthatprogresscould be gained not by strifebetweencapital and labor but
onlythroughharmony.
Suzuki's socialreformism
was a specialprinciplewhichdefinedhis basic approach
to thelabormovement.It was not,as Osugi Sakae insisted,a systematic
ideologyor
labor theory.8
Suzuki was no theorist;he leftbehind no spate of writingson the
theoryof the labor movementsuch as one findsin Osugi's works.He was rathera
man ofaction,nota definerof ideology.He once wrote,"The Yiiaikai is nota society
of words;it is a bodywhichstressesaction.It is not a collectionof thinkers."9
What
matteredto him was bringingthe workersinto a unifiedmovement:"Unityis ...
strength.
We arein a worldwhereyoucannotdo anything
unlessyouunite.... Unity
is power."'"Possiblybecausehe avoidedany connectionwitha "suspicious"doctrine
like socialismand becausehe devotedhis efforts
in theearlyyearsof theYulaikaito
thebasictaskof buildingup a base fortradeunionismin Japan,Suzuki was able to
escape repressionfromgovernmentand businesscircles.At heart,he was a realist,
actingaccordingto what was possible,given the environment
of hostilitytoward
5 For a studyof the varioustypesof social reformism,
see MatsuoTakayoshi,Taisho demokurashi no kenkyu[Studies of Taishd Democracy]
(Tokyo,I966), pp. I49-52.
6 "Shihon to r6do to no ch6wa" ["Harmony
BetweenCapitaland Labor"], Yu7aishimpo5,Dec. 3,
I9I2, p. I. Some editorialsin this paper are unsignedbutscholarsagreethatSuzuki wrotetheedinamesare cited.
torials,unlessotherwriters'
7"Shihon to r6d6 to no ch6wa" ["Harmony
BetweenCapital and Labor"], Yu7aishimpo,June
I5, I9I4, p. I.
8 (SUgi, pp. I7I-7
2.
9 Suzuki Bunji, "S6ritsu s6kan isshui nen"
of the Foundingof the Yu7ai
["FirstAnniversary
shimpo"], Yu7aishimpo,Nov. I, I9I3, p. I.
10 "Ketsug3 no chikara" ["Power of Unity"],
Yiai shimpo,Oct.I5, I9I3, p. I.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT,
1912-1919
561
organizedlabor.Years later,he became identifiedwith what he termed"realistic
socialism,"but in the yearsbeforeWorld War I, he rejectedsocialismas nothing
morethana packageofunrealizabledreams.
Suzuki'sfaithin socialreformist
ideas and his realismled himto prescribe
moderate tacticsforthe Yiaikai as a means to achievedignityand equalityforlaborers.
His tacticsincluded,first,the creationof a centralizedlabor organizationwith
branchesall overJapanintowhichlaborerswould be recruitedas rapidlyas possible.
Second,throughthis organization,the quality of workers'lives would be raised.
Much of the activityof the earlyYuiaikaicenteredon elevatingthe culturallevel of
the commonworker.Suzuki and otherswrotearticlesencouragingthe workersto
read."Readingis thebreadof themind,"Suzuki loved to say.Otheraspectsof selfcultivationwere not neglected."Take pains to cultivatephysicalstrength.. . . A
healthymind dwells in a sound body."" Other articlesproclaimedthe virtueof
of theworksavingmoney.Behindthiscampaignto sharpenthemind and integrity
as an organizedbody,
ers was the realizationthatin orderforthemto be effective
theywould have to be preparedto take responsibleaction as individuals.Perhaps
Suzuki and his assistantsin the movementwere guiltyof paternalism,
treatingthe
workerslike childrenin a spiritof noblesseoblige.But therecan be no doubt that
Suzuki's concernfor developingthe workeras a whole personwas genuine.He
sensedthatcapitalistslooked down on workersas so much rabble.He idealistically
thoughtthatonce the workersbecamemore refined,the capitalistswould abandon
thisdisrespect.
A thirdaspectof the tacticsprescribedby Suzuki was the developmentof class
as partof a broadconsciousness
amongworkers.He wantedthemto see themselves
based interestgroup.This selfawarenesswas indispensableto any sense of worker
solidarityvis-a-visbusiness.Fourth,Suzuki wished to avoid alienatingthe business
community.
Instead,he wantedto wear down the suspicionstowardorganizedlabor
whosegoal was
and dispelthefearthatorganizedlaborwas a toolof revolutionaries
to reconstruct
societyfromtop to bottom.For thisreason,he opposedstrikes.Fifth,
he wantedto rallysupportfromworkersfora campaignto repealthosesectionsof
thePublic Peace Police Law whichrestricted
laboractivitiesand enacta meaningful
and perhapsundramatic.
FactoryLaw. Taken together,
thesetacticsweregradualistic
But Suzuki thoughttheyrepresented
a realisticprogramwhichwould giveorganized
labora firmfoundation.
contrivedby
The apparentharmlessnessof the earlyYiaikai was intentionally
Suzuki in responseto whathe correctly
saw as a hostileenvironment.
GeorgeTotten
and AyusawaIwao bothmasterfully
describethe fateof the Meiji labor movement,
theformerpointingout thatthegovernment
actuallysuppressedthelabormovement
morevigilantly
thanthe socialistmovement.12
ArticleSeventeenof thePublic Peace
Police Law, which Suzuki criticizedrepeatedly,
furnishedthe governmentwith a
meansto crushlabororganizationsas it saw fit.ArticleThirtyof thesame law provided punishmentsfor violatorsof ArticleSeventeen.Factorylegislationdid exist
(the FactoryAct of I9II), but fromlabor's point of view, it was pure tokenism
" Suzuki Bunzi, "Kai-in shokun ni ichigon"
["A Word to theMembers"],Yuiaishimpo,Feb. i,
12 GeorgeTotten,The Social Democratic
Movementin PrewarJapan(New Haven, i966), p. 6.
19I4, p. 3.
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STEPHEN
562
S. LARGE
of the laborworld.'3The Treason Case
becauseit appliedto onlya minorfragment
and policeagencies
on thepartof government
of I9IO had kindleda hypersensitivity
to changethe statusquo. Suzuki's account
towardany movementwhichthreatened
of thefoundingmeetingof theYiiaikai,whichrelateshow themembershad to come
indicatesthepressures
in thenighttwo by two to avoid policesurveillance,
stealthily
on laborin thelateMeiji,earlyTaisho period.14
thatthe Yiiaikai was designedto
Given thisenvironment,
it is hardlysurprising
circles.The veryname "Friendly
harmlessto businessand government
appearutterly
Society"was suggestedby Suzuki to allay suspicionregardingthe organization's
As one scholaraptlysays,theplatformof theYiiaikai readslike a Sunday
intentions.
Schoolpledge:
witheach otherand endeavorto attainthe objective
i. We will harmonize
ofmutualaid through
unityandcooperation.
to developintelligent
2. We willabidebytheidealsofthepublicand endeavor
arts.
in technical
virtue,
andmakeprogress
cultivate
opinion,
3. We will dependon thepowerof cooperation
and endeavorto improveour
soundmeans.15
statusthrough
Suzuki made it his policyto printthe names and titlesof Yuiaikaiadvisersand
councillorsin each issue of Yuiai shimpo and withgood reason,forthesemen were
withhigh,unimpeachablesocial standing.He regardedtheirassociaall respectable,
tionwiththeYuaikai as a kind of insulationto dispelsuspicionsaboutthe character
of the movementand likenedthesemen to "gold leaf." These men spoke oftenat
the popularlecturemeetingsheld regularlyformembersof the Yuaikai and wrote
articlesforthe Yuiaishimpoand its successorRodo oyobisangyV.'6 Many of them
came fromthe academic world. Besides ProfessorKuwata Kumazo, otherdistinguishedscholarslike Horie Kiichi and Takano Iwasaburowere associatedwiththe
movement.Abe Isoo and Yoshino Sakuzo also acted as councillors.There were
prominentmen frombusinesssuch as Hirano Ry5suke,a factoryowner; Yoshio
Kisei, presidentof Tokyo Electric,who was a scientistwitha Tokyo ImperialUniversitydegree;and Soeda Juichi,presidentof theIndustrialBank of Japan.Kuwata,
Horie, Takano, and Soeda were all membersof the Social Policies Association.
Undoubtedlythe most prominentbusinessmanwhose friendshipand support
meantso much to Suzuki was ShibusawaEiichi. When the two men met,whether
of Shibusawa
Shibusawagave Suzuki and theYuiaikaifunds,and whattheinfluence
But Suzuki's
among scholars.17
was on Suzuki personallyare mattersof controversy
13 An excellent
discussionof the FactoryAct is
by AyusawaIwao, A Historyof Labor in
presented
ModernJapan(Honolulu, I966), pp. io8-ii.
14 Suzuki, Rodo undo, pp. 52-64. When the
foundingmeetingtook place the atmospherein
Tokyo,as elsewherein Japan,was gloomydue to
the deathof EmperorMeiji. The meetingwas held
at the Mita UnitarianChurch. There were electricians,mechanics,lacquerwaremakers,milkmen
and tatami makers among the fifteenwho attended.
15 Ayusawa,
16
p. 99.
Suzuki givessketchesof theseand othermen
associatedwith the Yfiaikaias advisersand councillorsin Rodo undo,pp. 64-87. Biographicaldata
on manyof thesemen can be foundin Totten,Social DemocraticMovement.
17 Matsuo Takayoshi has argued that Suzuki
firstmet Shibusawa sometimein I9I5 and that
while Shibusawa may have contributedsome
moneyto the Yfiaikai,the sum, and any influence
it mighthave carriedwith it, were probablynot
For Matsuo'sdiscussionand a resume
extraordinary.
of otherviewsof the Shibusawa-Suzukirelationship,see Matsuo,pp. I66-67.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT,
1912-1919
563
his successin forgingties with prominent
friendshipwith Shibusawa exemplifies
menoutsidethemovement.
intermoderatereformers
Generallyspeaking,Suzuki's associateswere altruistic,
forsocialchangein thelaborworld.Although
estedin theYuiaikaias an experiment
Matsuo suggeststhat Suzuki consultedthem beforefoundingthe Yiiaikai, there
powerin
is no reasonto disbelieveSuzuki's claim thatthe grouphad no significant
the
reins
Suzuki
held
contrary,
On
the
shaping Yuiaikaiprogramsor policies.18
himselfand consultedtheseassociatesonly when he felttheycould be of use to
him in the movement.The Yfiaikaioccupiedonly a portionof theirtime; Suzuki
had consecratedhis entirebeing to the Yuiaikai.In a I9I3 issue of Yuiai shimpo
he wrote,"The Yiiaikai is my burialground.I live withthe Yuiaikaiand pledge to
die under the Yuiaikai.Members,please dig a burial pit for me. The laborersof
the whole land are my friends,my parents,my children,my brothers.. . I cry,
I laugh, I talk, I eat with them."'9
Severalwritershave emphasizedthe gentle,meek characterof the earlyYfuaikai.
Totten,forinstance,describesit as a do-gooders'mutual aid societyforworkers.20
moreor less
Hyman Kublin calls it a "benevolentassociationof workersfunctioning
Ayusawa stressesits meekness
in the mannerof the Englishmutual-aidsocieties."'21
and likensit to an "innocentlass."22All of these writersadmit that the Yiuaikai
moved into a more militantposturenear the end of World War I but stressthe
in the earlyyears.Nakamura feels that most Japanese
organization'sharmlessness
Judgingfromthe
scholarshave likewiseregardedthe earlyYuiaikaias toothlessYP
platformof theYuiaikai,thisverdictappearsvalid,especiallyin thelightof Suzuki's
point of view which stressedharmony,not conflict,
Christianand social reformist
betweencapital and labor. Indeed, the earlyYuiaikaiwas far frombeing a labor
unionas knownin theWest.
and the Yiiaikai, fromits inception,was a reform
But Suzuki was a reformer
it would be
movement.Ratherthan dwellingon its "mutual-aid-society-character,"
more accurateto underscoreits qualitiesas an incipientlabor union. A more balof the Yiiaikai, even for the earlyyearsup to I9I6, suggests
anced interpretation
thattheYuiaikaiand itsleaderwerenot,in fact,so meek:themovementdid challenge
the statusquo in labor-capitalrelations.The earlyYuiaikaishouldbe evaluatednot
in comparisonwith obviouslymore militantreformmovementssuch as those esto the actual positionof labor
poused by anarchistsor socialists,but with reference
in theearlyTaishl period.
should not be allowed to obscurethe
First,the mild aspectsof social reformism
of
reform.
It
containedrevolutionary
implications
fact that it was a philosophy
The special mixtureof
coupled as it was with a typeof progressiveChristianity.
and ideas of social changecan be foundin manyJapaneseintellectuals
Christianity
in the Taisho period.Katayama Sen, Abe Isoo, Suzuki, Kagawa Toyohiko,Kawakami Hajime, Yoshino Sakuz5, and Osugi Sakae were attractedto Christianideas
18 Suzuki,Rod6 undo,p. 65.
19Suzuki Bunji,"Soritsus6kanisshuinen,"p. x.
20 George Totten, "Labor and AgrarianDisputesin JapanFollowingWorldWar I," Economic
Developmentand CulturalChange,IX, No. i, Part
2 (Oct. I960),
21 Hyman Kublin, Asian Revolutionary:
The
Life of Sen Katayama(Princeton,
I964), p. 223.
22 Ayusawa,p. 133.
23 Nakamura
Katsunori,"Suzuki Bunji," liytu,
XII (i967), II5.
I90-9I.
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564
STEPHEN S. LARGE
at one timeor anotheralthoughsomeof themabandonedtheirChristianorientation
formoreradicalpointsof view.Kitazaki Toyoji,in his studyof Kagawa and Suzuki
as reformers,
pointsout thatKagawa's more militantideas in the labor movement
werefuelledby an action-centered
Christianity;
Kagawa thoughtof thelabormovementas a religiousrevolutionary
movementas much as a socialistmovement.24
In
Suzuki's case, his understanding
of Christianity
embraced,first,a basic compassion
forworkers;second,a desireto see themrecognizedas men,not brutes;and third,
thekeyidea thatto achievethisdesire,changein thestatusquo was morallyimperative.His Christianity
reinforced
his social reformism
at the heartof which lay the
fundamentalcompulsionforchange.He saw the Yiiaikai as the centerof a movementtowardthe goal of labor unionism,a progressive
enterprise
which,hampered
by a hostileenvironment,
would have to move forwardwithextremeprudence,but
forwardnevertheless.
Perhapsthe cuttingedge of social reformism
can bestbe appreciatedby a study
of thedemandsof theYuiaikaivis-'a-vis
theindustrialworld.These demandsare less
piercingthanthedemandsmade laterin thewartimeyearsbuttheydo go farbeyond
the SundaySchool toneof theoriginal1912 platform.
An articlein 19I4, "From the
Laborersto the Capitalists"pled forthesechangesin the labor world: more equal
sharingof theprofitsof productionbetweencapitalistsand workers,equal treatment
for all workers,a factoryemploymentsystemwhich would take into accountthe
characterof the job applicantratherthan any personalconnectionshe mighthave,
a fairsystemof promotionforfactory
workers,an old-agepensionand bonussystem
to rewardworkerswithrecordsof long service,programsto trainworkersin special
skills, and recognitionby capitalistsof the individualityof workers.25Another
demandwhich appearedfrequently
in Yuiaikailiterature
was the demand forlabor
unions.26The very fact that therewas an organizationwilling to expressthese
demandsat all in the earlyTaisho6periodis important.
As Tottenwrites,"Subject
labor remainedalmostcompletelyunorganizeduntilthe
to continuoussuppression,
timeof the FirstWorld War. The one importantexceptionwas the FriendlySociety."27In an intellectualsocietylike the Shakai Seisaku Gakkai, social reformism
remainedan academic principle,isolatedfromany machineryof implementation.
But in the Yuiaikai,social reformism
becamethe guidingprincipleforan apparatus
designedto bringaboutchange,albeitgradually.
Second,theexpansionof theactivitiesof theYuiaikaisuggeststhatthe movement
was potentially
somethingmore than just a do-gooders'group. If the Yuiaikaihad
beenbuilton loftyplatitudesalone,it would neverhave appealedto so manyworkers.
But Watanabe Toru's studyshows that the Yuaikai organizationgrew steadily.28
From an originalmembershipof fifteenin August I912, the membershipclimbed
wereover4,0oo regular
to I,295 in June1913. ByFebruary
and
i9i5, there
members,
by Julyof thatyeartherewere over 7,000. The rateof increasewas to rise sharply
24 Kitazaki Toyoji, "Yuiaikaito r5d5 kumiai26 Suzuki Bunji, "Rod5 jigen" ["Labor Talk"],
shugi" ["The Yfiaikai and Labor Unionism"] Rodo oyobisangyo,MarchI, I9I5, p. 5.
27 Totten,Social Democratic
Movement,
p. 3I.
Taisho demokurashlno shiso [The Thought of
28 WatanabeToru,"Yuiaikaino soshikino jittai"
Taishd Democracy], ed. Sumiya Etsuji, et. al.
of the
["The ActualConditionsof theOrganization
(Tokyo, I966), pp. 245-75.
25 "Rodosha yori shihonka e" ["From the
Yfiaikai"],Jimbungakuhd,XVIII (Oct. I963), ILaborersto the Capitalists"],Yeiai shimpo, May 5, 70.
1914, p. 1.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919
565
in i9i6. Watanabepointsout thatthe numberof associatemembers,while hard to
was alwaysgreaterthan the actual regularmembershipof the organizadetermine,
tionat anygiventime.
The Yuiaikaicenterof operationswas in Tokyo but branchessprangup all over
Japan.29The firstwas establishedat Kawasaki in I9I3 in a plant associatedwith
Tokyo Electricwhose presidenthappenedto be a personalfriendof Suzuki and a
Yfiaikaicouncillor.At the end of 19I3 therewere fivebranches;in I9I4 therewere
where
The brancheswere usuallyformedin districts
sixteen,and in I9I5 fifty-one.30
as an organizationforthe cultivationof
theYulaikaiwas regarded,by management,
deviceon labor.
good habitsamongworkers,as a kind of moderatingor restraining
paid
appearance
harmless
a
This suggeststhatSuzuki's realisticpolicyof cultivating
off;it does not mean, however,thatthe movementwas in facta supporterof the
statusquo.
Watanabe's studyindicatesthat the activitiesof the locals followedthe pattern
set by the headquartersof the Yuiaikai in Tokyo. Before foundingthe Yuiaikai,
Suzuki had launchedseveralprogramsin the Mita UnitarianChurch beamed at
the workers.These programswere to remainan enduringpart of the movement,
both centrallyand regionally.He initiated,forinstance,a seriesof popular lecture
meetingsat whichprominentmen like Abe or Kuwata spoke.He openeda personal
officewherehe advisedworkershow to deal with specificprobaffairsconsultation
lems. He also establishedan athleticand recreationclub and tried to encourage
Attendancewas usuallyimpressive.
workersto bringtheirfamiliesto theseactivities.
He had to removethe chairsfromone largeroomin thechurchand put down mats
to accommodatelargergroupsreachingup to 700 people.
also sponsored
The brancheshad thesetypesof activitiesand, like headquarters,
such organsas a reliefboard to assistdistressedmembersstrickenwith illnessor
offices,
injury,condolenceboardsto aid personswho had lostlovedones,employment
at low prices,and securwhosememberscould buy necessities
consumercooperatives
ity societieswhose memberspooled funds against hard times. These programs
of the workersinvolvedand theydid expose the laborersto
reducedthe insecurity
new ideas,especiallyin lecturemeetingswheremen like Suzuki or Yoshinotravelled
to regionalbranchesand talkedabout labormovementsin Europe or the provisions
of the igii FactoryAct.3' At leastsome workersbegan to see themselvesas partof
was providedby I915
a movementseekinga betterday forlabor.At leasta structure
in which the workerscould be graduallyorganized;in the absenceof thiskind of
of theYuiaikaiin theTaish45period,thisis imporpriorto thedevelopment
structure
provedviableenoughand strongenoughto absorba largeinflux
tant.The structure
of workersin the wartimeyears.By the end of the war, the Yuiaikaiwas, without
labororganizationin Japan.
question,thestrongest
the
third
index
of
A
Yuiaikai'sviabilityas a reformgroupin its earlyyearswas
in
role
Suzuki Bunji's
disputeand strikemediation.Strikesand collectivebargaining
were not legally recognized.Strikeswere more like spontaneousdemonstrations
which usuallylacked coordination.In I9I4, therewere fiftystrikesinvolving7,904
strikes
In I9I6, strikes
In i9i5, thereweresixty-four
involving
7,852persons.
workers.
29 Starting
in I 9I4, Yiiaikaibranchesemergedin
Watanabe,p. 49.
Koreaand Manchuria,
30Watanabe,p. 38.
31 Suzuki wrote a series of articlesexplaining
Factory Law in Yu-as
and criticizingthe I9ii
shimpo.
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STEPHEN
566
S. LARGE
numberedio8, involving8,4I3 workers.In I9I7, thenumbershotup to 398,involving
From August I9I2 to August I9I5, Suzuki mediatedin seventeen
workers.32
57,309
roseto twenty-seven.33
FromAugustI9I5 to MarchI9I7, thefigure
labordisputes.
One scholarpointsout thatSuzuki's actsof mediationweretheresultof his personal
decisionto enterthe disputesand not the resultof any mandatefromthe Yu?aikai
Suzuki was identifiedby all partiesconcerned
Nevertheless,
to enterthe disputes.34
known
the Yuiaikaibecame increasingly
as the head of the Yuaikai; henceforward,
in labor.
Suzuki did not encourageYuaikai membersto startor take partin strikes.His
ideas on harmonybetweencapitaland labor precludedthiskind of militantaction
and his realismregardedstrikesas a cursebecause theygave the businessworld a
pretextforcallingon the police to crushthe strikersand rootout the Yuiaikai.His
main motivein enteringdisputeswas to dispelthe notion,becomingpopularin the
businessworld,thattheYuiaikaiwas behindthestrikesand puttingthematchto dry
wood. On the otherhand, he was hardlya neutralmediator,to say the least. He
wantedto pose as a championforworkers'rightsand he did his bestto reachsettlementsfavorableto the workers.He knew,as AkamatsuKatsumarowrote,thathis
in such strikesas the Tokyo Muslin Company strikesin I9I4 "was
performance
in propagatingto theworkingmassesthefactof theYu?aikai'sexistence.
effective
Once the workersidentifiedthe Yfiaikaias an organizationon theirside, some of
thembeganto flockto itsbanner.
Suzuki's successin mediationstemmedfromhis abilityto bridgethe worldsof
aware of therespectablemen attachedto the
businessand labor.Many businessmen,
to deal with
YfiaikaiacceptedSuzuki as a negotiatorforthe workersand preferred
their
spokesman
as
him
regarded
Workers
him ratherthanwiththeworkersdirectly.
and respectedhis dedicationto theircause.
a potentiallyseriousthreatto the
A fourthreasonwhy the Yfiaikaiconstituted
earlyyears,lies in the change
the
in
statusquo, despiteits apparentinnocuousness
which came over Suzuki himselfin I9I5, when he visitedthe United States.This
by theAmericanFederationofLabor in I9I4 for
tripwas in responseto an invitation
as an expresa representative
of Japaneselaborto attendthe I9I5 AF ofL convention
onlythe
sion of good will betweenthe two countries.AlthoughSuzuki represented
allowed him to go abroadas a represen.
Yuiaikai,themerefactthatthegovernment
concession,amounttativeof laborwas, as Japanesescholarspointout,an important
oftheYuaikai as a labormovement.
ingalmostto tacitrecognition
Suzuki was warmlyreceivedby laborgroupsin theUnitedStatesand had many
in California.He was very
particularly
to addresslabor conferences,
opportunities
impressedby the organizationalstructureand concreteprogramsof the AF ofL,
which included campaignsfor for an 8-hourwork day, abolitionof child labor,
(Tokyo,I967), p. I4I. For a case studyof Suzuki's
mediationactivitiesin strikessee his articleson the
33 Matsuo, p. I79.
strike at the Tokyo Muslin Company, "T6kyo
34 Nakamura, "Suzuki Bunji to Taisho rodo
musurinkaisha ni okerud6mei hiko mondai temmatsu" ["The Facts on the Labor Strike at
und6," H5gaku kenkyu,XXXII, No. 2, 3 (Feb.
Tokyo Muslin Company"],Ytuaishimpo,Sept. i,
I959), 25-26.
35 AkamatsuKatsumaro,
Nihon shakai unddshi, I9I4; Sept.I5, I9I4; Oct. I, I9I4; pp. 3-4.
[The History of Japan's Social Movements]
32 Harada Shuichi,Labor Conditions
in Japan
(New York,I928), p. I77.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919
567
establishment
of labor insurance,and otherprogressive
goals not yet a part of the
publicYfiaikaiprogram."6
Katayama Sen, thenin the United States,was repulsedby Suzuki's appearance
on Americansoil. Suzuki's posing as the spokesmanfor Japaneselabor agitated
Katayama,who fanciedhimselfthe true representative
of Japaneselabor in the
United States.Indeed, Katayama,who had played such a remarkablerole in the
Meiji labormovement,
did represent
theearliermovement;but Suzuki was farmore
significant
in the Taisha labor movement.When Katayama bitterly
denouncedhis
rivalas a "toolof capitalists"and theYuaikai as a "paperunion . . . a mereaggregationof names,"bothhis philosophicaversionto Suzuki's gradualismand his personal
jealousycame to thefore.37
In America,Suzuki actedlike anythingbuta toolof capitalists.
He toldAmerican
audiencesthatJapaneselaborhad muchto learnfromtheAmericanlabormovement.
But a new tone, a sense of urgencyand assertiveness
previouslyundiscernible,
enteredhis public remarks.On one occasion,this apostleof cooperationbetween
capitaland laborstated:"Laborerstheworldoverhave commongoals and common
interests.... We mustadvanceby transcending
problemsofrace,religiousgroupings
and nationalities....For thesake ofour commongoal,letus strugglein harmony...
againsttheoverwhelming
He began to talk morefrequently
powerof capitalism."38
about struggleand conflict;more important,
he explicitlyand publiclyidentified
thecapitalistclassas theenemyagainstwhichlaborshouldwage a contestofstrength.
It would be temptingto regardSuzuki's new enduringemphasison conflictas
the resultof frustration
faced by the Yuiaikaiin Japanin the earlyyears,but this
would not be quite accurate.Suzuki, as a gradualistreformer,
had been willingto
move slowlyand cautiouslyin advancingthe cause of labor.Moreover,the growth
of theYfiaikaihad been steady;therecordof themovement,
giventheconditionsof
the times,was successfuland Suzuki had enjoyedpersonalvictoriesas a mediator
in strikes.His writingsreflect
relativesatisfaction,
not frustration,
withthe progress
of theYfiaikaiin theearlyyears.
It would also be temptingto arguethatSuzuki was pushedintotakinga tougher
line on the labor movementby dissidentelementswithinthe Yfuaikaimovement
who wantedto go at a fasterpace usingmoreradicaltacticsin orderto bringabout
a new day forlaborin Japan.Yet thisalso would be inaccurate.AfterI9I6, suchpressure did exist.But in the periodbeforehis Americansojourns,thereis no evidence
thatSuzuki felthimselfunderpressureto changehis viewson thepace of themovementor its tactics.It was only afterhis tripsto the United Statesthatthe Yflaikai
acquireda new groupof young,militantintellectuals
who were laterto generatea
revisionist
movement
whichchallengedSuzuki and hisideas.
Suzuki's contactwith the AF of L mustbe regardedas a turningpointin him
thinking.Suzuki had always understoodthe realityof conflictin society.In his
he portrayed
lifeas basicallycompetitive:
writings,
a seriesof conflicts
forwhichone
must be prepared-thiswas one of his themesfromthe beginningof the Yulaikai
36 Nakamura,"Suzuki Bunji,"H8gaku kenkyfi, no ki"
["Accountof Attendanceat the American
Feb. I959, p. 36.
Labor Convention"],Rodo oyobi sangyo,No. 53,
37 Kublin,pp. 224-25.
Jan.i, I 9 I 6, pp. 8-9.
38 Suzuki
Bunji, "Beikokurodo taikaishusseki
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568
STEPHEN S. LARGE
movement.89
But thisthemeof conflict
had alwaysbeen subordinatedto the idea of
cooperationwith capitalism.Now, cooperationwith capitalismbecame conditional
on the recognition
of labor'srightto organizeand to strike.When he returnedto
Japanhe instituted
reformsin the Yiiaikai and repeatedlydrummedhome the idea
that"class unityis power."He called upon capitaliststo recognizethe Yuiaikaias a
laborunionmovement,
to recognizetherightof theworkersto organizeand strike.40
The toneof theYuiaikaimovementwas rapidlybecomingmore strident,
moreconfident.To suggest,as some writershave done, thatthe organizationwas propelled
by"forces"intoa moreradicalposition,or thatSuzuki,like a blockof wood floating
on a quickeningtorrent,
was carriedtowardradicalismby othermen against his
will is onlypartlytrue.To a certaindegree,he initiatedand tookpartin theYfiaikai
coursetowarda bolderprogram.
In I9I6, the contextwithinwhichthe labor movementoperatedchangeddue to
theimpactof thewar on Japan.AlthoughSuzuki was movingtowarda moreassertiveattitudetowardcapitalism,
he was to findhimselfoutflanked
bymen who wanted
the Yflaikai to adopt even strongertactics and accelerate its programs for
changeon behalfof theworkers.When strikeseruptedin late I9I6 and I917, Suzuki
foundhimselfcaughtbetweenthesemilitantcolleagueson the one hand and business and government
circleson the other.The militantswantedtheYflaikaito take
advantageof the strikesand use themto exact concessionsfrombusiness.Governmentand businessthreatened
to take suppressiveactionagainsttheYflaikaibecause
it was widelybelievedto be responsiblefor unrestamong the workers.If Suzuki
appeasedthemilitants,
he would temptbusinessand government
to openlystampout
theYuiaikai.But if he appeasedthe forceswhichwere suspiciousof theYuiaikai,he
mightalienatethemoreradicalfactionsin theorganization.The fateof theYuiaikai
was boundup withthechoiceSuzuki was forcedto make.
Betweenhis returnto Japanin JanuaryI9I6 and his nexttripto theUnitedStates
in September,Suzuki worked at a feverishpace. He mediatedsix labor disputes,
gave morethan ioo lectures(about his tripto America) in largeand smallmeetings
all over Japan,and senta trustedaide, Matsuoka Komakichi,into the Kansai area
to organizethemovementthere.One explanationgivenforthisfrenetic
pace is that
Suzuki passionately
desiredto turntheYuiaikaiintoan organizationas strongas the
AF ofL in as shorta timeas possible.41The burstof activity
on Suzuki's part,including severalkey changes he made in the Yuaikai, indicatesthat he had left the
United Statesdeterminedto quicken the growthof the Yuiaikaiand prepareit for
the anticipatedstrugglewith capitalism.First,in an effortto centralizehis control
overthemovement,
he reorganizedthestructure
of Yfiaikaiheadquartersand establisheda women'ssectionwithits own publication,the YuiaiFujin.42Second,he enof numerousregionalassociationsof variousbranches.These
couragedtheformation
associations(rengo5ai) were originallyorganized by Yuiaikai officialssent from
Tokyo,but theywere actuallymanagedby workersin the respectiveregions.They
39For instance see Suzuki's article, "Waga
shinai naru Yfiaikai-inshokun" ["My Beloved
YuiaikaiMembers"],Yfiai shimpo,JulyI5, I9I4,
p. I.
to r5dd
40 Suzuki Bunji,"Nihon no kokuminsei
undo" ["The JapaneseNationalCharacterand the
Labor Movement"],RJdJoyobi sangyo,No. 6o,
Aug. I, I9I6, pp. 2-9.
41 Nakamura,"Suzuki Bunji,"H65gaku
kenkyfi,
Feb. I959, p. 41.
42 Ibid.,p. 40.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919
569
metregularlyand had considerable
autonomyvis-a-vis
headquarters.43
By May I9I7,
therewerereng5kaiin Tokyo,Osaka, Yokohama,and Kobe. Matsuokawas theleading lightin theOsaka reng5kai;it and theKobe reng5ktiwerelaterto spearheadthe
labormovementin theKansai area.Withthecreationofreng5kaiin theKansai area,
the stage was set forthe subsequentKansai-Kanta rivalryin the labor movement.
Throughthereng5kai,theYuiaikaiorganizationachievedan elementof stability
and
in areasfarfromTokyo.
solidarity
the moveAnotherindicationof Suzuki's awarenessof the need to strengthen
mentwas his recruitment
of youngmen who openlyespouseda passionate,idealistic
desireforimprovingthe conditionsof labor.In I9I6, Nozaka Sanzo and Hisatome
K5zo werebroughtintotheTokyo branchof theYuiaikai.Bothwereuniversity
graduateswho impressedSuzuki becauseof their"innerfire."Nozaka was introducedto
Suzuki by ProfessorHorie Kiichi in 9Ig5.At thattime,Nozaka was a studentat
Tokyo ImperialUniversity
eager to writean honorsthesison the Yiiaikai. Suzuki
likedtheyoungman's sincerity.4
HisatomegraduatedfromWaseda in I9I6 and like
intotheYuiaikaiby Suzuki personally.Hisatomelaterproved
Nozaka was recruited
himselfto be an adroitadministrator
and had a hand in buildingup the Kansai
branchof theYtiaikai.45
Nozaka and otheryoungintellectuals
in the movementdespisedthe Shakai Seisaku Gakkai whichstillsuppliedmanyof theadvisersand councillorsof theYiiaikai.
Althoughan intellectual,Nozaka identifiedwith the workersand wanted them,
not the "respectable"men of the Gakkai, to lead the movement.Moreover,these
youngermen stressedthe importanceof "power"in the labor movement,meaning
thepowerthatcould be achievedif the workersunitedin thestruggleagainstcapitalism.They wanted action,not words; theydetestedgradualismand thoughtin
termsof achievingreformsimmediately.
For them,laborwas a vehicleforbringing
about widespreadsocial reformsand eradicatinginjusticesrootedin the capitalist
system.
Besidestheseyoungintellectuals,
Suzuki also made use of theabilitiesof men like
Matsuokawho did not have an educationalbackgroundto speak of but had risen
up throughthe ranksof labor.Fukuda Tatsuo and Hirazawa Keishichi,who were
laterto playa keyrolewithMatsuokain themovement,
enteredtheYiiaikai in I9I6,
too. They formeda Labor ProblemsResearchGroup whichstressedthe experiences
of the ordinaryworkersratherthan any theoriesas the key to planningthe course
of the labormovement.
As will be seen,thecleavagebetweenthe youngintellectuals
and the worker-leaders
became quite distinctin spite of theircommon claim to
identifywith the workingrank and file.46
SeveralJapanesescholarsemphasizethe risingimportanceof democraticideas in
I9I6 as yet anothercrucialchange which influencedthe labor movement.47
They
notethatin I9I6 YoshinoSakuza publishedhis famousessayon democracyin Chu6
k&ronand thatKawakami Hajime's StoryofthePoor (Bimbo monogatari)appeared
Matsuo,p. i8i.
Suzuki,Rodo undo,pp. 85-86.
45 Ibid.,p. 87.
46 Biographical
information
on both the young
intellectuals
and the worker-leaders
can be located
in Totten,Socia DemocraticMovement.
43
44
47Matsuo presentsan analysis of the rising
popularityof democraticideas in Japan during
WorldWar I in his Taisho demokurashi,
pp. I7779. Also, see his article,"The Developmentof
Democracyin Japan,"The DevelopingEconomies,
IV, No. 4 (Dcc. I966).
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570
STEPHEN
S. LARGE
seriallyin the pages of the Osaka Asahi paper.48 One aspectof Yoshino's thought
was his demandforequalitybetweenworkersand capitalists.
Yoshino deploredthe
continuationof old feudal worker-capitalist
relationswhich bound laborersin a
of equalslave-likestatusof inequality.He arguedforthebirthof a new relationship
ityin which workerscould negotiatewith capitalistson a basis of equalityrather
thansubmission.He wantedthemto be allowed to have laborunions.Suzuki welcomedtheseassertions
becausetheytied in withhis own aspirationsforlabor.Other
prominentscholarspubliclyproclaimedtheirsupportfor democraticideas. Ukita
Kazutami and Oyama Ikuo of Waseda wereexamples.Anotherwas Sasaki Soichiof
KyotoUniversity(not to mentionKawakami Hajime himself).Matsuo Takayoshi
ascribesgreatimportanceto the risingpopularityof democraticideas in I9I6. He
writes,"The trendof democracycontainingthesenew elementswas laterto severely
shakethe Meiji Constitutional
structure
in theformof theRice Riotsand to expand
and developtowardnew stages."49Admittedly,
it is difficult
to measureand judge
theinfluenceof ideas on mass movements,
but it seemsplausibleto argue thatfrom
I9I6 on at leastsome of theworkersand theirleadersfoundstrength
and inspiration
in thediffusion
of democratic
ideas in Japan.
The sharpincreaseof strikesfromI9I6 (io8 strikes,involving8,4I3 men) to I9I7
(398 strikes,57,309 participants)has alreadybeen mentioned.The trendcontinued
Most
intoI9I8, when therewere 417 strikesin which63,I37 men were implicated.50
commentators
statethatthesestrikeswere aimed at obtaininghigherwages because
in thewar periodpriceswere climbingrapidlywhile wages remainedstatic,thereby
immensely
reducingthepurchasingpowerof theworkingclass.Accordingto George
Totten,it was not untilI929 thatthe numberof strikes(57I) exceededthe I9I9 figure.51The historyof theYiiaikai fromI9I6 to I9I9 mustbe studiedwithattention
to
this increasedactivityamong the workers.
Watanabe Toru regardsthe last monthsof I9I6 as the beginningof the turning
pointin Yiiaikai historybecausethe Yuiaikai'sinvolvement
in severalstrikesin this
For example,at
periodultimatelyplungedthe organizationinto perilouswaters.52
the Japan Steel plant in Muroran (Hokkaido), 4,000 workersled by the Yuiaikai
local stageda walkout.From his franticefforts
to mediateand end thisand other
strikeswhere the Yfiaikai was directlyinvolved,it can be concludedthat Suzuki
Bunji did not himselfauthorizethem.They appear to have been organizedindedendently
by thebranches.For thefirsttime,Suzuki's controlovertheYuiaikaibegan
to slacken.
The strikesat Muroranand otherplaces broughtthe Yuiaikaiunder increased
suspicionin businessand police circles.The government,
upon seeing the strikes
spreadto arsenalsand munitionsplants,also tendedto blame the Yuiaikaiforagitating theworkers.In I9I7, as the numberof strikesrose,suspicionof theYiiaikai was
translatedinto attemptsto crushit. The Yuiaikaibranchin the JapanSteel Works
in earlyI9I7, setCompanyat Muroranwas ordereddissolvedby companyofficials
new Yfiaikaibranches
tinga precedentforplantsall overJapan.In I9I7, fifty-seven
48 Matsuo,"The Development
of Democracyin
Japan,"p. 626.
p. 6n27.
0 KIbid.,
eds.,Saikinno shakalund,5[ReKyochokai,
15O
centSocial Movements](Tokyo, I929), p. 255.
51 George Totten, "Labor and AgrarianDisputes,"p. 20I.
52
Watanabe, p. I7.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919
571
were establishedbut seventy-four
were dissolved.(For purposesof comparison,the
numberof branchesfoundedin I9I6 was fifty-six,
the numberdissolved,nine).53
Watanabecataloguesa long processionof cases wherethe brancheswereput out of
commissionby the companiesafterstrikes.The incidentat Yokosuka Arsenalwas
typical.Following a strikein which the YuTaikaibranch took part,the managementof the Arsenalrequiredall workersto sign a writtenpledge not to join the
branch; Yulaikaimembersemployedat the Arsenal had to carrywrittenpledges
statingthattheyhad severedconnectionswiththe Yulaikai.Suzuki appealed to the
head of theArsenal,askingfora changeof thispolicybut was told thattheArsenal
was nottryingto smothertheYuiaikai.This was obviouslyuntrueand not long after
thisencounter,
theYiuaikaibranchin theArsenalcloseddown.54
Suzuki's main problem,then,in I9I7 was how to preventthe extinctionof the
Yu[aikaibranches.But just as seriouswas anotherdilemma,the risingchallengeto
his leadershipof the Yuiaikai,which crystallizedin I9I7. Nozaka and Matsuoka
combinedefforts
in I9I7 in an attemptto seize controlof the Yfuaikaipaper,Rodo
oyobisangyo (the successorto Yuiai shimpo). They also triedto seize controlof the
Yuiaikaibudget.55
These were efforts
to curtailSuzuki's controloverthe movement.
It appearsthattheyfailedprincipally
becauseSuzuki's allies objectedto the attempt.
But this was the firstconcretemove against Suzuki's "autocratic"controlof the
movement.It was thefirstsignalthatthe youngmilitantswanteda shareof power
in he Yuiaikai.They were impatientwithSuzuki's gradualismand wantedto push
the Yulaikaiinto the vanguardof the workers'increasingly
assertivedrivefor concessionsfromthecapitalists.
Suzuki had to taketheattitudesof men like Nozaka and Matsuokaintoconsiderationas he formulated
his responseto themountingthreatagainsttheYiiaikai from
businessand government.
Presumablybecausehe thoughtthathe stillhad theupper
hand in themovement,
he decidedto framehis responseto thestrikes,
and thethreat
theycreated,in termswhichwould allay suspicionsthattheYuiaikaiwas behindthe
wave of strikesin Japan.In making this response,Suzuki's chiefconcernwas to
removethe dangerto the Yiiaikai fromits powerfuladversaries.This responsewas
probablyrealistic,fora good case can be made forthe argumentthathad he associatedtheYfiaikaiwiththestrikes,
theYuiaikaimighthavebeensystematically
exterminated.Nonetheless,the responseSuzuki decidedto make also ran the riskof creating a deep fissurewithinthemovementbetweenhimselfand menwho would regard
his strategy
as a selloutto capitalism.
Suzuki went to great,almostfranticlengthsin I9I7 to proclaimthe need for
harmonyand cooperationbetweencapital and labor. In the pages of Rodo oyobi
sangyo, he repeatedly
called upon workersto be patientand refrainfromparticipation in strikes.56
The workerswere,he reasoned,too weak to challengecapitalism
witha showof strength
in strikes."Strikesare pugnaciousand pugnacityis barbaric,"
he asserted.57
He sympathizedwith the workers'demands for higherwages, but
statedthateventuallythesedemandscould be realizedby peacefulmeans.Insteadof
his formerstresson the powerof groupunityamong the workingclass,Suzuki beHe urgedthe
gan to definepoweras basicallytheresultof individualself-cultivation.
53Ibid.,p. 38.
Ibid.,p. 54.
55 Matsuo,p. 20I.
54
56
57
Watanabe,p. 54.
Nakamura,"Suzuki Bunji,"H5gaku kenk4,
Feb. I959, P. 43.
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572
STEPHEN
S. LARGE
on cultivatingthe mind and body.58But his main argument
workersto concentrate
of laborcould crushthe labormovementif theyso desired;
was thatthe adversaries
strikesprovidedthemwith an excuseto do so. When he went to the United States
in contrastto his earlytrips,he did not
in I9I7 to attendthe AF of L convention,
talk about strugglewith capitalists.Instead,he said thatthe YuTaikaihad not come
underthe influenceof Westernideas of class struggle,thatit did not disapproveof
capitalism.He reiterated
the capitalistsystem,and thatit did not wish to overthrow
that the whole purposeof the Yuiaikaiwas to cooperatewith the capitalistworld
in everypossibleway.59
Suzuki did not just mouth thesesoothingwords. He also took action to give
themmeaning.In 19I7, he persuadedthe Yuaikai Conventionto issue a statement
whichwas designedto clearthe air of suspiciontowardtheYuiaikai.The statement
relatedhow the interestsof the workersand capitalistscoincided.Naturally,there
Japan
of opinionbut thesecould be resolvedthroughnegotiations.
were differences
must be strongeconomicallyand this requiredcooperationbetween capital and
of thecountry.The statement
labor.The Yuiaikaicherishedthisgoal, in theinterests
was addressedto thewholenationand carriedSuzuki's signature.60
part of Suzuki's driveto coverthe Yuiaikaiwith an
Perhapsthe most effective
of a "LifttheEmbargoSociety"in August
imageof innocencewas his establishment
the exportof iron and steel materialsto
I9I7. When the United Statesprohibited
Japan,Japanesebusinessreactedby launchinga movementto lift this embargo.
labor'ssupport
Suzuki wantedtheYiiaikai to supportthismovementto demonstrate
plus all of Suzuki's efforts
of businessin a cause forthegood of Japan.This strategy,
to show thattheYuiaikaihad not instigatedthe strikesor encouragedthem,greatly
oppressionwhichthreatenedto engulfit.
relievedthe Yiuaikaifromthe reactionary
abate,of course,but afterAugust,
SuspiciontowardtheYiuaikaidid notimmediately
to rootout Yuiaikailocals slackened.For the moment,the Yuiaikaiappeared
efforts
perhapsencouraged
to have survivedthe severechallengeof 19I7. The government,
"wholesomelabor
not
oppose
that
it
would
later
announced
Suzuki's
campaign,
by
meaningmoderateunions.61
unions,"presumably
Suzuki's reversionto the principleof all-outcooperationwithcapitalismperhaps
in
suggeststhathe was capable of changinghis publicposture,whenevernecessary,
the
developto
up
efforts
speed
orderto safeguardtheYiiaikai. Given his quickened
mentof the Yuiaikaiafterreturningfromthe United Statesin i9i6, it is probable
not out of principle,becausehe
out of necessity,
thathe revertedto collaborationism
realizedthat,forthe timebeing,the survivalof the Yiuaikaidependedupon such a
course.In I9I8 he stilladvocatedtheneed forunionsin Japanand made publica plan
union withYiuaikaimemfortheirrealization.He wantedto forman ironworkers'
bersas a nucleusand to make thisunion a modelforothertradesto follow.He predicted,"The Yuiaikaiheadquarterswill become a General Headquarters,a central
of variousworkerunionsall overthe nation."Indeed,thispredictionwas
federation
in i9i9. But evenin callingforunions,Suzuki wentout ofhisway to indicate
fulfilled
["To my Fellow Members"],Rodo oyobi sangyd,
SuzukiBunji,"Rod6 jigen,"p. 5.
Suzuki Bunji, "Domei higyoto r5d6 dantai" No. 78, Feb. I, I9I8, p. 2I.
Relationsin Post61 SolomonLevine,Indust*ial
["Strikesand Labor Groups"],R6do oyobisangy5,
warJapan(Urbana,I 958), p. 63.
No. 75, Nov. I, 1917, p. 5.
60 Suzuki Bunji, "Kai-in shokun ni tsugu"
58
53
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT,
1912-1919
573
thattheywould be amenableto the stateand thatthroughthem,the workerscould
betterservethestatein a spiritof patriotism.e2
however,wereunwillingto wait forbusiness
His youngrivalsin themovement,
to extendthe rightsthatlabor deserved.Nor were theywillingto
and government
withthestatusquo. Nozaka and Hisatomewantedto exploitthestrikes,
compromise
to blanketoverthefiresof worker
not restrainthem.They detestedSuzuki's efforts
discontent.
They disagreedwith Suzuki over the questionof how the Yuiaikaishould react
to thestrikes.They also clashedwithhim (and the"respectable"advisersand councillorsaroundhim) overtheRussianrevolutionand theRice Riotsof I9I7 and I9I8,
Suzuki had been mostdisapprovingof therevolution.He lamentedthe
respectively.
When
disorderwhich had befallenRussia and dislikedthe Kerenskygovernment.
Lenin came to power,he was similarlydispleasedbecausehe abhorredrevolutionary
Nozaka, however,was elated; he wrotean articlein the Yiuaikaipaper
movements.
fullofpraisefortheeventsin Russia,callingtherevolutiona greatlightfortheworld.
The revolutionalso inspiredyoung men like Tanahashi Kotora and AsO Hisashi,
who enteredthe Yuiaikaiin I9I9. They believedthatJapanstoodon the brinkof a
socialistage and had littlesympathyfor moderateslike Suzuki. They exalted the
role of Russian workersin shapingRussian historyand naturallythoughtthatthe
cause.03
into a revolutionary
Japaneselabor movementshould be transformed
When the Rice Riotsbrokeout in I9I8, Suzuki immediately
proclaimedthatthe
in some
Yiiaikai had nothingto do withthem.When Yiiaikai membersparticipated
he fearedthat the riotswould inflamethe workersand give the
of the outbursts,
policea pretextforsmashingtheYuiaikai.He did his bestto discouragelabor'sparticipationin the riotsforthisreason.' But his youngrivalsin the Yfuaikaisaw the
which the labor movementshould exploit.
riotsas progressive,
as an opportunity
withtheiridealism.
at cross-purposes
Once again,theyfoundhiscautiousness
Thus, by theend of I9I8, thereexisteda wide gap betweenSuzuki and men like
Nozaka, Hisatome,Ash, and Tanahashi. His I9I7 tacticof supportingharmony
but
betweencapitaland labor had preservedthe labor movementfromdestruction
it had also made his leadershipunacceptableto theyoungmilitants.He had reacted
to the eventsof I9I7-I9I8 with hypercautiousness,
justifiedfromhis pointof view
becauseit was aimed at savingtheYuiaikai,but despicablefromtheirpointof view
becauseit made the labor movementinsipid,a tool of capitalism.He remembered
thefateof theMeiji labormovementand had builtup theYiiaikai in a periodwhen
theenvironment
hostileto organizedlabor.It was naturalfor
had becomeextremely
him to reactwiththiscaution.But the youngmilitantsdid not rememberquite so
vividlythefateof theMeiji labormovementor,if theydid,theydid notgiveit much
considerationbecause for them the times were changing.What appeared to be
to theseyoungmen. From theirpoint
threatsto Suzuki appearedas opportunities
of view,Suzuki had forfeited
his leadershipof themovementbecausehe had sold out
to thecapitalists.
62 Suzuki Bunji,"Tekko Kumiai soshikino gi"
Union Organiza["A Proposalforan Ironworkers
tion"], RJdJoyobisangyo,No. 79, Mar. i, I9I8,
pp. 5I-54.
83 As6 Hisashi, Shinshakaiteki
chitsujoe [Toward a New Social Order] (Tokyo, 1922), p. 559.
64Suzuki Bunji,"Kome sod6to Yuiaikai"["The
Rice Riotsand the Yfuaikai"],Rodo oyobisangy5,
No. 86, Oct. i, I9I8, pp. 2-4.
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STEPHEN S. LARGE
574
A movementto expel Suzuki fromthe presidencyof the YuiaikaigatheredmomentumafterI9I7. At theend of 19I7 Hirazawa tookcontrolof theYfuaikaipublicationsand Matsuokatook chargeof the budget.Suzuki's power had restedmainly
on his controlof thebudget,whichin turnhad restedon his abilityto obtainfunds
fromoutsidecontributors
in the early,lean years.Thus Matsuoka'sriseto a position
fromwhich he controlledthe budget marked a considerableloss of power for
Suzuki.65Moreover,a numberof Suzuki's advisersand councillorsseveredconnectionswiththe organization,
principally
becausetheydislikedthe ideas of the young
new leaders.Slowly,Suzuki's originalallies in theYuiaikaieitherleftthe movement
or foundtheirpowerreduced.6'6
In I9I8, the movementto reorganizethe Yuiaikai along more democraticlines
bubbledup in theKansai area where,by thistime,a firmbase had been constructed
for the labor movement.It was significantthat this revisionistmovementfirst
gatheredmomentumin thearea whereSuzuki's control,centeredas it was in Tokyo,
was relativelyloose. The movementwas guided and directedby men who, while
remainingoutwardlydeferential
to Suzuki, actuallycharteda courseof actionquite
on theirown. When Kagawa Toyohikoreturnedto Japanfromthe United States
in I917 and took the reinsof the Kansai sectionof the Yuiaikai,he inheritedthe
handiworkof Matsuoka,who had sincereturnedto Tokyo to take a major post in
theYiiaikai headquarters.
The epicenterof theKansai revisionist
movementwas the
Kobe reng5kai,the leading forceof which was the Kobe local of the Yiiaikai.
Kagawa, as leader of the local, took the initiativein establishingShin Kobe, a
labor paper which emphasizedthe power of labor unity.This paper was reputedly
Kagawa and Hismorepopularin the Kansai regionthantheRodo oyobisangy5.67
atome,who had leftTokyo to help build up the Kansai movement,plunged the
This markedthe entryof the
rengokaiinto the movementfor universalsuffrage.
Taish5 labor movementinto the politicalarena. In March I9I9, Hisatome carried
to Tokyo a petitionfrom2,239 Kansai workers,callingforrepealof ArticleSeventeen of the Public Peace Police Law. The documentwas circulatedin the Kanta
area, whereapproximately
3,000 more workerssignedit.68The petitionmovement
was just one exampleof how the initiativefornew, assertiveprogramswas being
exertednot by the Kanta sectionof the Yuiaikaibut by the Kansai section.Matsuo
about the groundswellof activism
Takayoshimakes severalpertinentobservations
in theKansailabormovement
in I9I9.
First,he pointsout thatthe commonworkersplayeda greaterrole in initiating
theseprogramsthanearlier.Before,theylistenedpassivelyto men like Suzuki or his
advisers;now, theygave the speechesthemselves.Nishio Suehiro,who joined the
Yiiaikai Kansai branchin I9I9, was a good exampleof this tendency-heproved
himselfan able laborleaderfromtheoutset.
Second,the new activismof the Kansai labor movementhad littleto do with
initiativesfromSuzuki and the Tokyo headquartersof the Yuiaikai.In reality,the
withitsown publication,
its own leadersand programswas
Kansai labormovement,
a separatecenter
moremilitanttypeof labormovementwhichconstituted
a different,
of power in the Yuiaikai althoughnominallyunder the Yuiaikai headquartersin
Matsuo, pp. I192-93.
66 Ibid.,pp. 192-93.
65
57
68
Ibid.,p.
209.
Ibid.,pp. 2II-I2.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT,
575
1912-1919
Tokyo.In general,theKansai laborleaderswantedto givetheworkersauthority
over
theirown movement.Inherentin thispolicywas a rejectionof theleadershipof men
like Suzuki Bunji."9
In December I9I8, the Kobe local had led the way in organizingthe powerful
Yiiaikai Kansai Dameikai,whichwas a federation
of reng5kaiin theOsaka-Kyoto
area. The importanceof the Domeikai cannotbe overestimated
because its format
and philosophy,
stressingdemocratization
of the labor movementand a sharingof
power,rejectedSuzuki's one-manleadershipand moderatereformism.
It repudiated
theleadershipof moderateintellectuals
like Suzuki but stoppedshortof condemning
all intellectuals
as uselessin thelabormovement.Men like Hisatomedid notfallinto
thisdespisedcategory.
The changesin the labormovementorganizationmappedout
in theKansai area presagedwhatwas to occurin theKant6 sectionof themovement
in August I9I9. Each reng5kaiwas to elect representatives
to a board of directors
to overseethe coordinatedprogramsof the alliance.The outstandingcharacteristic
of theDomeikai was thatitsleaderswereto be electedfromtheranksof theworkers.
This did notpreventKagawa frombecominghead of the directorate.
Hisatomealso
held a key post on the directorate.
Intellectualslike Kagawa and Hisatome shared
powerwiththe workers'delegatesfarmoreequally than had Suzuki. The directors
also had joint liabilityas a group; the presidentcould not dominatethe directorate
autocratically
and the advisersand councillorsof the various brancheswere not
allowed even to sit in on directoratemeetings.Also the Di6meikaiformallyproclaimedin its foundingstatement
thatitspurposewas to struggleagainstcapitalism.
It was assertedthatonly the workerscould constructa new societyin which their
rightswould be guaranteed.7
Suzuki was fullyaware of theimplicationsof the Domeikai forhis own position
in the movement,and this is perhapsone reason why he plungedinto mediating
activities
involvingstrikeswhereKansai Yulaikaiorganswereconcernedwitha view
to boostingboththemovement'scause and his own image in themindsof his opponents.But mediationwas not likelyto assuagetheresentment
boilingup againsthim
in the Kansai area,even had he managedto settledisputesin favorof the workers,
whichhe was unable to do in mostcases.Kagawa publiclychastisedSuzuki fornot
establishingstrikecommitteesto coordinateactivitiesin seeking settlements.
He
resentedSuzuki's insistenceon handlingthe mediationalone. Many workersleft
Yiiaikai branchesin protestagainstSuzuki's intervention
in thestrikes,
onlyto rejoin
later,hotlydeclaringthat Suzuki must be removedfromthe movement.In I9I9,
feeling against Suzuki and the moderateleadershipat headquartersgained in
in thevariousTokyo area reng5kai.7'
strength
It is doubtfulthatSuzuki could have quietedthe discontent
had he remainedin
Japan,but his trip to Paris in early i9i9 virtuallyassured his ultimateloss of
power in the movement,forit gave his opponentsmore room to conspireagainst
him.Beforetracingtheconspiracy,
it is usefulto relatethechangethatSuzuki underwent in Paris. His traumaticexperiencetheremay partiallyexplainhis later"conversion"to socialism.
Suzuki was summonedto Paris to assist the Japanesedelegatesto the Peace
69Ibid.,pp. 212-13.
Ibid.,p. ZI6.
70
71Ibid.,p.
221.
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576
STEPHEN S. LARGE
Conferenceon laborproblemsmainlybecausethe Japanesegovernment
could think
of no one else qualifiedforthe mission
about going
F2 Suzuki was veryenthusiastic
to Paris and believed,when he leftJapan,that he would have an opportunity
to
advancethecause of laborat theepochalconference.
Being a proudman,he perhaps
overestimated
his potentialrole. At any rate,the Japanesedelegationfailedto use
his talents.He was told to remainon call in his Paris hotel room.Ayusawa,who
knew Suzuki personally,wrote that Suzuki "waited in his hotel room patiently
everyday but he was never called and the Peace Conferencecame to a close."73
Suzuki leftParis forthe United States,wherehe attendedthe AF ofL convention
of I919 in AtlanticCity,withoutdoing anythingto advancethe cause of labor.He
returnedto Japandisappointedand bitterly
resentfulover havingbeen snubbedby
the delegation.He had no doubthoped to repairhis positionin the Japaneselabor
movementby participating
in significant
meetingsat Paris but thisgoal had been
frustrated.
He had gainedfromhis tripknowledgeof theInternational
Labor Organization,in whichhe hoped to playa majorroleas Japan'srepresentative,
butin terms
of his powerpositionin theYuiaikai,he had gainednothingfromhis journeyto the
West.The Japanesedelegation'slack of enthusiasmfortacklinglaborproblemshad
the effectof convincingSuzuki thatthe government
and businessworldswere still
brutallyapathetictowardlaborin Japan.He saw once again thatmoderatecollaborationwithcapitalismwould not bear fruitin the futureany morethan it had in the
past.
Upon arrivalin Japanin JulyI9I9, Suzuki made clearhis negativeattitudetoward
collaborationwith capitalismby rejectinga proposal fromShibusawa Eiichi that
Suzuki participatein the establishmentof the HarmonizationSociety,a body
designedto mediatebetweencapitaland labor.Suzuki laid down strongconditions
beforehe would acceptthe invitation:capitalismmust recognizethe legitimacyof
laborunionsand grantlabortherightto strike.Shibusawasaid thesedemandswere
at thattimeabsolutelyunacceptableand Suzuki informedhis friendthathe would
have no partin the HarmonizationSociety.Afterthat,his relationship
withShibusawa quicklycooled.74
Suzuki's conversionto socialismtookplace afterhe returnedto Japan.Years later
he commented:
I have movedfromsocial reformism
to socialism.At firstI believedin social
reformism
and considered
socialisma bad thingor at leastpractically
impossible.
I feltthat. . . reformism
was practical,
effective
in bringing
out thestrongpoints
of capitalism,
in correcting
its weak points.But whenI came faceto facewith
laborproblems,
thespiritof antagonism
welledup withinme. The capitalists
had
treated
thelaborers
persistently
as slaves.75
Now thathe returnedfromtheUnitedStatesand Europe,Suzuki acceptedthetrend
forreconstruction
in thelabormovementand voicedhis agreement
withtheproposals
in theYiiaikai forstructural
changein themovement.
It is doubtfulthatSuzuki could have respondedotherwiseto therevisionist
movementin the Yiiaikai withoutbringingon his totalousterfromthe movement.His
conversionto socialismmay have been partlya genuineresultof his disillusionment
Ayusawa,p. 120-21.
73Ibid.,p. 121.
72
74 Suzuki,Rodo undo,pp. I86-98.
75 Ibid.,pp. i83-84.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT, 1912-1919
577
in Paris,but it was also a flagof surrenderto opponentswho were determinedto
to
It was thepricehe had to pay forbeingpermitted
expel himfromthepresidency.
remainin themovementhe had founded.
and programs
While he had beenin Paris,thedriveto revisetheYuiaikaistructure
had coalescedinto two camps.Both camps wantedto struggleagainstthe capitalist
betweenthem.The Asa-Tanahashisystem.But therewere importantdifferences
wantedthe labor
Hisatomefaction,who mightbe labeledthe "youngintellectuals,"
movementto become an instrumentfor class warfare.The Matsuoka-Hirazawa
were preparedto undertakemore assertiveprograms
faction,or "worker-leaders,"
in the labor movementbut did not like the overtonesof class warfare.They preferredto consolidatespecificgains forthe workersand the union movementrather
of society.
than to undertakeany grandioseprogramfor the total reconstruction
should controlthe
Matsuoka argued also that the workers,not the intellectuals,
labormovement.
had links with
It shouldbe notedthatthe Asa-Tanahashi faction,in particular,
the Wednesday Society,formedby Aso Hisashi after the Russian Revolution.
towarddocThis Societystudiedsocial problemsand was profoundlysympathetic
change. It took inspirationfromthe Russian revolution.76
trinesof revolutionary
Later,togetherwith Yoshino Sakuz5, Aso and Tanahashi took part in the Dawn
Society.This groupproclaimeddemocracyas thewave ofthefuture.The New Men's
Society(Shinjinkai), foundedby Yoshino,also influencedmanyof the youngmen
in thelabormovement.The link betweenthesesocietiesand theYuiaikairevisionists
drew inspirationfromthese groups.Suzuki
is importantbecause the revisionists
believed,rightly,that Yoshino Sakuzo and his colleaguesin the Shinjinkaihad
in theirquest to turnthe Yuiaikaiinto a more militant
encouragedthe revisionists
organization.77
democratic
and revolutionary,
The two revisionist
factionsclashedalso overthe fateof Suzuki. The Aso-TanaMatsuokawas veryanxious
hashigroupwantedto expelSuzuki fromthepresidency.
to negotiatethe
to avoid any open movementto get rid of Suzuki and preferred
matterbehindthe scenes.He did not want Suzuki smearedin an open campaign,
partlybecause this would tarnishthe image of the Yiiaikai. Afterall, Suzuki did
symbolizethe movement;to denigratethe symbolwould be foolish.In privatetalks
on May 22 with Hisatome and Aso, Matsuoka achieveda compromise.The men
agreedthatSuzuki could remainin the movementas presidentif he agreednot to
It was also agreed that
interfere
with the programsprescribedby the conspirators.
power with the Aso-Tanahashi faction.
Matsuoka would share decision-making
but in a direc.
Thus thereal centerof powerwould be locatednot in the presidency
it was agreedthathe would be removed
torate.If Suzuki resistedthisarrangement,
fromthepresidency.78
Suzuki's fatehad been workedout in Tokyo while he was abroad.The revision.
istscertainly
knew thatthereexistedin thereng5kaiall overJapana growingsentimentin supportof majorpolicychangesin theYuiaikai.Many reng5kaiin boththe
in supportof renovatingtheYuiaikai.79
Kansai and Kanto areasproducedresolutions
76
[Biographyof Aso Hisashi] (Tokyo, I958), pp.
77
126-27.
Totten,Social DemocraticMovement,p. 141.
Suzuki,Rodo undo,p. I85.
78Kawakami J6tar5,ed., Aso Hisashi den
79
p. 226.
Matsuo,
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STEPHEN S. LARGE
578
factions
the compromisebetweenthe two revisionist
It may be possibleto interpret
for a
before
initiative
to
come
to
a
settlement
in Tokyo as an efforton theirpart
had
rivalry
in
the
Kansai-Kant6
Yfiaikai
area.
the
Kansai
power change arose in
order
in
quickly
moved
factions
the
Tokyo
perhaps
accumulatedsubstanceby I9I9;
to dominatethenew Yuaikai ratherthansee the centerof powershiftto the Kansai
area.80
Yfiaikai Convention
I9I9
The changes institutedin the August-September,
reflectedthe ambitionsof the young militantsfor the labor movement.These
changesmarkeda turningpoint in Japaneselabor history.First,the Yiiaikai was
renamedthe FriendlySocietyGreaterJapan General Federationof Labor (Dai
of
Nihon R45daSodomei Yiiaikai). The new name symbolizedthe transformation
Second,theYuiaikaibrancheswerereorgantheYiiaikai intoa truelaborfederation.
theYtiaiized intotradeor industrialunions.Beforebecominga generalfederation,
kai had reallybeen an incipientlabor union withmanybranches.Now its identity
was clarified;it became a federationwhich embracednot only formerYuiaikai
duringthe war. Third,
branchesbut otherunionsthathad organizedindependently
were curtailedand replacedby a moredemothe absolutepowersof the presidency
Among
wieldedpowerin the federation.
craticsystemwherebya board of directors
thedirectors
wereAso Hisashi,Tanahashi,and Hisatomewho had led therevisionist
movement.Thus, Suzuki's personalcontrolover the organizationcame to a formal
end althoughactuallyhis controlhad been reducedearlier.Fourth,the Convention
resolutiondrawn up by Kagawa which in both formand
adopteda twenty-point
of the new organization.The resocontentexpressedthemilitancyand assertiveness
theYfiaikaihad made pre.
lution'sobjectiveswentfarbeyondany public statement
viously.For example,the organizationnow called for freedomof labor unions;
law and workman'scompensaof a minimumwage, laborarbitration
establishment
of the educationalsystem;amendtion system;universalsuffrage;democratization
mentof thePublicPeace Police Law.81
the FriendlySociety
The changesadoptedin the I9I9 Conventiontransformed
in theWest.
patternedaftersimilarorganizations
intoa potentlaborunionfederation
A new groupof men heldpower.New programsand tacticswereemployedin order
to reacha broaderrangeof objectives.The Federationopenlysupportedstrikesas a
legitimatetactic,whichindicatesthatthenew organizationwas infusedwitha militant spiritquite in contrastto the moderationthathad characterizedmost of the
30,000
leadershipunder Suzuki. In termsof numbers,therewere approximately
personsassociatedwiththeFederation.
Suzuki was able to remainin thenew organizationas titularhead partlybecause
the Sodomei and its sweepingresolutionswere reallywhat he had been working
towardeversince I9I2. By I92I, Suzuki had moved well beyondhis moderateposin thelabormovementby
tureofpastyears,butoddlyenough,he was stilloutflanked
likeYamakawa Hitoshi.Next to them,
like Osugi Sakae and communists
syndicalists
he appearedto be a moderatesocialist.He remainedpresidentof theGeneralFederaof theselateryears,because
tionuntil1930, quitean achievement
giventheturbulence
80 The rivalrybetweenthe Kansai and Kanto
branchesof theYuiaikaineedsclosestudy.The sugcongestionin this essaythat Kanto revisionists
to outmasciouslyplannedtheirmoves specifically
is tentative.
neuvertheirKansai counterparts
81 For the completeresolution,
see Suzuki,R6do
undo,pp. I82-83.
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JAPANESE LABOR MOVEMENT,
1912-1919
579
he was able to bend with the winds of controversy
thatsweptinto the labormove.
mentand toreit asunder.
However,Suzuki's role in the So5d5meiafteri9i9 was quite different
fromhis
role in the I9I2-I9I9
periodforalthoughhe remainedpresident,
he no longerruled
themovementwitha freehand. The real issueof theconspiracyagainstSuzuki had
not been the goals he had advocatedforthe movement,fortheyhad foundexpres.
sion in the S6d6meiplatformdrawnup by the men who had plottedagainsthim.
Rather,thereal issuehad been his "autocratic"controloverthemovement.Matsuoka
feltthat Suzuki's intolerantattitudetowardmen who held different
views in the
Yuiaikaiwas objectionable.82
Tanahashiand As6 also deeplyresentedSuzuki's authoritariangrip on the movement.83
One contemporary
writerneatlysummedup the
importanceof the shiftof power fromSuzuki to a directorate:
"In the past,it was
Mr. Suzuki's Yuiaikai; now, it was the Yfiaikai'sMr. Suzuki."84
In conclusion,therewas virtuallyno labor movementin Japanin I9I2 afterthe
in the Meiji period to organize labor. Yet by I9I9, a foundation
failureof efforts
existedin theYuiaikaifortheriseof an assertiveand potentially
effective
labororganization,theFriendlySocietyGreaterJapanGeneralFederationofLabor.
The man mostresponsible
forthecreationof a viablelabormovementin theearly
Taisho periodwas Suzuki Bunji. A moderatereformer
in immoderatetimes,Suzuki
foundhimselfeclipsedin theeventsof I9I9 by men of moremilitantdispositionwho
were impatientwithhis compromising
tacticsand his authoritarian
controloverthe
movement.However,in a real sense,his pragmaticmoderationhad been a major
factorin buildingup theYiiaikai. When the movementwas threatened
withextinctionin I9I7, thesetacticsof compromise
saved theYiiaikai althoughtheydiscredited
Suzuki in theeyesof his rivals.His authoritarian
controloverthemovementwas also
important
in guidingtheYuiaikaithroughdifficult
times.At least,underhisdirection,
theYfiaikaienjoyeda unityand stability
amongitsleadersduringthe1912-l9I9 years
of growthand development.
In igig, afterthebirthof the Federation,the Japanese
labormovementenjoyeda structural
cohesiveness
and strength
it had not knownin
the past. AfterI9I9, preoccupationwith ideologyon the part of the new leaders
opened the door to bittertheoreticaldisputesin the labor movementwhich led to
disintegrative
splitsduringthenexttwo decades.
With the comingof men orientedto revolutionary
ideologyinto the Yuiaikaiin
I9I9, the movement
was labor
was no longerguided by leaderswhose top priority
unionism.Henceforward,
thelabormovementwould become,in thehandsof itsnew
not an end in itself,as it had been forSuzuki,but a meansto a larger
manipulators,
end, the revolutionof the broadersociety.The seeds of futuredisunityin the labor
movementwere sown in the I919 struggleforpowerin theYfiaikai,when concern
forthe promotionof revolutionary
ideas in the ranksof laborand the emergenceof
regionalrivalriesin themovementwerefirstdiscernible.
82 Sodomei Gojiinenshi kank6 i-inkai, eds.,
S6domei gojiinenshi [The FiftyYear Historyof
I] (Tokyo,I965), 63-64.
the GeneralFederation,
83 TokyoNichi-Nichi
Shimbun,eds.,Yuaikaino
soshikito kononaijc [The Organizationand Internal Conditionof the Yfiaikal] (Tokyo, I92I),
p.
10.
84
Ibid.,p. 12.
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