Reducing Traffic Congestion in Bogotá Through Bus Rapid Transit

Transcription

Reducing Traffic Congestion in Bogotá Through Bus Rapid Transit
TRANSPORT
Reducing Traffic Congestion in
Bogotá Through Bus Rapid Transit
and Non-Motorized Transport
STEERING CLEAR OF
CONGESTION
Rapid transit and routes for human-powered
transportation are key to addressing traffic
congestion in Bogotá, Colombia
Bogotá’s bus rapid transit system and network of non-motorized transport
infrastructure has become the exemplar for nations grappling with congested
roadways, growing urban populations, and rising transport-related greenhouse
gas emissions. Centered around the TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit, the city’s
multimodal transit system and innovative policies have made inroads in reducing
traffic congestion, accidents, crime, and air pollution. For example, before
TransMilenio, commutes averaged 1.5 hours in each direction, with private vehicles
accounting for less than one-fifth of trips yet occupying 95 percent of roads.1
Now, average commute times in Bogotá have been cut by 20 minutes, air quality
has improved by 40 percent, and accidents have decreased by 79 percent. 2,3
While problems still exist, such as crime and traffic congestion, Bogotá remains a
commonly cited success story of comprehensive transportation planning.
In the early 1990’s, Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus initiated a Citizen Culture
campaign with the intention of changing public behavior towards community
and civility. Using unorthodox techniques such as mimes, Mockus was able alter
how residents viewed the relationship between motor vehicles and pedestrians,
thereby laying the foundation for investment in a pioneering public transport
system. The subsequent administration, led by Mayor Enrique Peñalosa, responded
to the transit crisis with a Mobility Strategy that prioritized public transit and
non-motorized transport modes, reduced private vehicle use, and induced a
behavioral shift towards the
TransMilenio Station and Express Lanes
use of alternative transport
options. The national
government has since built
upon Bogotá’s success by
expanding comprehensively
planned transit systems
to eight other cities.
Colombia is also considering
implementing a Sustainable
Urban Development
Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Action (NAMA) to
focus real estate development
2
around high-quality transit systems supported by pedestrian-accessible land use.
The NAMA would create a framework to overcome financial and procedural barriers
to transit-oriented development with pilot launches in two Colombian cities and
national policy and capacity-building to expand sustainable urban development in
cities across Colombia.
HUMAN POWERED AND CAR-FREE
Bogotá implemented four notable projects to promote non-motorized mobility.
The city built a 344 km city-wide network of bicycle routes for daily commuting.
On Sundays and holidays, the government also closes 121 km of roads to create
temporary bike paths for recreational use from 7 am to 2 pm. A citizen ballot
consultation on vehicle use lead to the establishment of an annual Car Free Day
the first Thursday of every February, during which private vehicle use is prohibited
across the city. Walking is an important mode of transportation for many—especially
the urban poor —thus the city created a 17 km pedestrian corridor that connects
low-income neighborhoods with commercial and business districts.
To reduce the use of private vehicles, Bogotá created a roadway restriction based
on license plate numbers. Vehicles with license plates ending in odd numbers are
prohibited from using roadways on odd-numbered days, and those with plates
ending in even numbers are prohibited from using roadways on even-numbered days.
The restriction is in effect during morning and evening weekday commuting hours.4
The keystone of Bogotá’s Mobility Strategy is the TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit
system. The TransMilenio operates 87 km of trunk corridors that receive passengers
from an integrated feeder system. The system increased efficiency through preboarding automated fare collection, free transfers, raised platforms for quick
boarding and exiting, high occupancy vehicles (160 to 260 passengers), segregated
bus lanes, and express routes. A single fare cross-subsidizes the poor, who often
live on the city periphery. All buses comply with Euro II emission standards and
are equipped with GPS that allows a centralized management system to respond
in real-time to contingencies and re-route buses to meet demand. Pedestrian and
bike pathways are integrated into the system, with free bike parking available at
many terminals.
TransMilenio is a public-private partnership. The government entity TransMilenio S.A.
is comprised of technical experts and was created specifically to plan, manage, and
control the Bus Rapid Transit system. A consolidated management structure allows
companies to compete through an open bidding process for concessions to supply
and operate the bus fleet and the fare collection and validation system. Infrastructure
costs are paid for by the city and national government, and operational costs are
assumed by the private sector. The government retains control over the operation
schedule, thereby shifting demand risk to the private sector.
Phase I of the TransMilenio became operational in 2001. Phase II came on-line
in 2006, and became the first transportation project to receive approval as a
Clean Development Mechanism. To meet monitoring, reporting and verification
requirements, a special unit under the supervision of TransMilenio S.A. collects,
reports, and stores all data. Passenger surveys supply information on prior transport
mode, fuel type, and fuel efficiency to determine emissions abatement through
modal shifts.
Ultimately, Bogotá expects to build a total of 388 km of corridors at a cost of
USD 5 million per km.5 Phase I and II are complete and Phase III, which will extend
the corridors an additional 36 km, is currently under construction. Phase I of the
TransMilenio cost USD 240 million (USD 5.9 million per km) and was financed
3
through local fuel taxes (46 percent), national government grants (20 percent),
a World Bank loan (6 percent) and other local funds (28 percent).6 Phase II cost
USD 545 million (USD 13 million per km) and was financed through the national
government (66 percent) and a local fuel surcharge (34 percent).7 Unlike many
public transport systems, the TransMilenio does not receive any operational
subsidies. Bogotá is also moving forward with its first metro rail system; funding has
been approved by the World Bank and detailed engineering studies have begun.
Finally, Bogotá implemented an education campaign to generate awareness and
demand for the new system. Partially funded by a private bank, the city held
community and business meetings, advertisements and events, and offered three
weeks of free service on the TransMilenio.
EASING THE COMMUTE, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GASES
The Mobility Strategy has successfully shifted residents to non-motorized and public
transportation. At a cost of USD 147,000 per km, the bicycle routes are utilized
by 200,000 to 285,000 people per day, quadrupling bike ridership since their
inception.8,9 In addition, over one million riders are estimated to use the temporary
bike paths each weekend.10 Car restrictions coupled with easy access to transport
alternatives have caused 9 percent of car owners to shift to public transport. Before
the TransMilenio, buses traveled at average speeds of 17 km per hour, with some
corridors below five km per hour. Bogotá’s policies increased average bus speed to
26 km per hour, reducing the average commute time by 32 percent (20 minutes). Of
Bogotá’s 8.5 million residents, the TransMilenio moves 47,000 passengers per hour
per direction, or over 1.5 million riders each day.11,12
One of the most significant challenges in implementing the Bus Rapid Transit
system was resistance from existing bus operators who feared loss of business
and hesitated to use new processes such as awarding concessions through open
bidding. They were also concerned about financial risks from investments in a new
fleet and government capacity to build planned infrastructure and eliminate current
operators. These challenges were overcome by prioritizing existing operators in the
bidding process, establishing a fund to offset negative impacts to the operators,
and including these companies in a dialogue with the city during the planning and
implementation phases.13
Temporary Weekend Bike Paths
4
The TransMilenio’s impact on emissions has been significant: from 2001 to 2010,
the Bus Rapid Transit system abated 1.9 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent, with
an annual average of 144,000 tons under Phase I alone (2001-2005) and 236,000
tons under Phases I and II combined (2006-2010).14 This greenhouse gas estimate
is likely conservative due to multiplier effects from transit-oriented development
that enhance non-motorized transport and reduce trip lengths.15 Moving forward,
Colombia is pursuing a national sustainable urban development policy and NAMA to
further amplify these benefits.
Figure 1: Benefits Achieved by Bogotá’s Mobility Strategy
BENEFITS ACHIEVED BY BOGOTÁ’S MOBILITY STRATEGY
• Commute times reduced by 32%
• Bus driver work days shortened by 6 hours
• Air quality improved by 40%
• GHGs reduced by 2 million tonnes CO2-equivalent
• Bus fuel use reduced by 59%
• Collisions along trunk lines decreased by 79%
• Fatalities along trunk lines decreased by 92%
• Injuries along trunk lines decreased by 75%
• Robberies at traffic stops decreased by 83%
• Property values along trunk lines increased by 15-20%
• Improved health outcomes from reduced pollution and exercise
• Overall improved quality of life for residents
Source: Adapted from the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank,
and the City Government of Bogotá, Colombia.
By 2009, Bogotá was able to decommission 7,000 small private buses from its
roads, reducing the use of bus fuel by more than 59 percent.16 According to the
United Nations Development Program, the system has reduced air pollutants by 40
percent; and decreased fatalities by 92 percent, injuries by 75 percent, and collisions
by 79 percent along its trunk lines.17 Robberies at traffic stops have also been
reduced by 83 percent.18 The Bus Rapid Transit system has successfully formalized
a portion of the transport sector by awarding contracts for the operation of the
TransMilenio fleet and related services to select, legal companies; and integrating bus
operators and drivers from the informal sector into the new system. This has resulted
in shorter work days for bus drivers, from 14 to 8 hours; the provision of social
security benefits for employees; and securing tax contributions from bus operators.19
Other co-benefits include temporary jobs created by infrastructure development, a
15 to 20 percent increase in property values along the main trunk route, improved
health outcomes from clean air and exercise, and overall improved quality of life.
REFERENCES
Hidalgo, Dario and Graftieaux, Pierre. “A Critical Look
at Major Bus Improvements in Latin America and Asia:
Case Study TransMilenio, Bogotá, Colombia.” World Bank.
Web. August 2012. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTURBANTRANSPORT/Resources/Hidalgo-GraftieauxBOGOTA.pdf>
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ). May 2007. “The CDM in the Transport Sector —
Sustainable Transport: A Sourcebook for Policy-makers in
Developing Cities.” Web. August 2012. <https://www.giz.de/
Themen/en/SID-9DEECDB1-4ECE4077/dokumente/en-cdmtransport-sector-2007.pdf>
Center for Clean Air Policy. January 2012. “Case Study:
Colombia’s Bus Rapid Transit Development and Expansion.”
Web. August 2012. <http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources/
1080/Colombia-case%20study-final.pdf>
Pico y Placa website. <http://www.movilidadbogota.gov.co/
?sec=410>
TransMilenio website. <http://www.transmilenio.gov.co/
WebSite/Default.aspx>
5
ENDNOTES
1
2
Martinez, Astrid. “Energy Efficiency in Massive Public
Transport Systems ­— Transmilenio: A Study Case.”
Presentation at the UN Forum on Energy Efficiency and
Energy Security, December 18, 2007. Web. August 2012.
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/forum_
dec07/presentations/S51_ortiz.pdf>
Center for Clean Air Policy. January 2012. “Case Study:
Colombia’s Bus Rapid Transit Development and Expansion.”
Web. August 2012. <http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources/
1080/Colombia-case%20study-final.pdf>
3
United Nations Development Program. “Bogotá, Colombia
Bus Rapid Transit Project —TransMilenio Case Study.” Web.
August 2012. <http://www.ncppp.org/undp/bogota.html>
4
City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. Pico y Placa website.
Web. July 25, 2012. <http://www.movilidadbogota.gov.
co/?sec=410>
5
6
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
October 3, 2012. “Clean Development Mechanism Project
Design Document— Bogotá, Colombia: TransMilenio Phase
II to IV v5.4.” Web. October 2012. <http://cdm.unfccc.int/
Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1159192623.07/view >
U.S. Department of Transportation. 2006. “Applicability of
Bogotá’s TransMilenio BRT System to the United States.”
Web. October 2012. <http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/
Bogota_Report_Final_Report_May_2006.pdf>
7
Ibid.
8
NYC Global Partners. May 4, 2011. “Best Practice: Largest
Bicycle Path Network.” Web. September 2012. <http://
www.nyc.gov/html/unccp/gprb/downloads/pdf/Bogota_
CycleRoute.pdf>
9
City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. Web. July 30, 2012.
<http://www.movilidadbogota.gov.co/?sec=71>
10
City Government of Bogotá. Web. July 26, 2012. <http://
www.bogota.gov.co/portel/libreria/php/frame_detalle_scv.
php?h_id=24777>
750 First Street, NE, Suite 940
Washington, DC 20002
11
Penalosa, Enrique. “Equity and Mobility.” New Statesman.
February 23, 2012. Web. August 2012. <http://www.
newstatesman.com/transport/2012/02/mobility-cars-citybus-cities>
12
City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. Transmilenio
website. Web. July 26, 2012. <http://www.transmilenio.
gov.co/WebSite/Contenido.aspx?ID=TransmilenioSA_
TransmilenioEnCifras_EstadisticasGenerales>
13
Center for Clean Air Policy, 2012, op cit.
14
TransMilenio, S.A. February 2012. “Informe de Gestión
2011.” Web. August 2012. <http://www.transmilenio.gov.co/
AdmContenidoUpload/administrador.contenido/Documents/
Informe%20de%20Gesti%C3%B3n%202011.pdf>
15
Center for Clean Air Policy. January 14, 2010. “Transportation
NAMAs: A Proposed Framework.” Web. August 2012. <http://
ccap.org/docs/resources/924/CCAP_Transport_NAMA.pdf>
16
Rosenthal, Elisabeth. “Buses May Aid Climate Battle in
Poor Cities.” New York Times, July 9, 2009. Web. August
2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/
americas/10degrees.html?_r=2>
17
United Nations Development Program, op cit.
18
Ibid.
19
The World Bank. 2010. “From Chaos to Order: Implementing
High-Capacity Urban Transport Systems in Colombia.” Web.
August 2012. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/
Resources/Colombia_mass_transit_4-23-10.pdf>
Figure References
Figure 1: Benefits Achieved by Bogotá’s Mobility Strategy
Adapted from the United Nations Development Program, the
World Bank, and the City Government of Bogotá, Colombia.
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