Rigging, Alternate Method Zodiac From the Beginning By Malcolm C

Rigging, Alternate Method Zodiac
From the Beginning
By
Malcolm C. Hassler
CMSgt, USAF Retired
April, 2009
(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sergeant Ruby Zarzyczny)
Jeffrey Y. Jones died on 11 April 1983. Staff Sergeant Jones was presumed
drowned after parachuting into the Pacific Ocean to rescue two US Navy aviators
who had ejected from their aircraft. Staff Sergeant Jones’ death, coupled with
the subsequent accident investigation, was the spark that led to the concept and
invention of the Rigging, Alternate Method Zodiac (RAMZ).
This is the history of RAMZ concept development, design work, hardware
procurement, testing, and fielding of the system. This history is based on
documents that I retained during my work as Military Airlift Command (MAC) Test
Director; Chief, Pararescue/Recovery Branch while assigned to the 1550th
Aircrew Training and Test Wing, Kirltand AFB, NM from October 1981 to October
1983, and the Special Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Hurlburt
Field, FL from October 1983 to 28 October 1987.
All who have parachuted into the open sea understand the associated risks. As
a career field, we were both good and lucky not to have had more fatalities at
sea. This accident could have happened to any one of us. The following is an
unclassified account of the events that led to SSgt Jones’ death.
1
JEFFREY Y. JONES
? - 1983
Pararescue from:
1981 - 1983
“On 11 April 1983, SSgt Jones was aboard an HC-130 aircraft out of
McClellan AFB, CA. The mission was to provide precautionary search and
rescue coverage for a transoceanic flight of two US Navy TA-4J Skyhawks.
When one of the fighters apparently caught fire over the Pacific Ocean
approximately 900 miles East Northeast of Honolulu, Hawaii, the pilots
bailed out and the HC-130 crew immediately went to their aid. They soon
arrived on-scene, located the downed pilots, and determined one pilot’s
injuries required the assistance of the pararescue specialists aboard the
HC-130. After airdropping an MA-1 Kit, consisting of two seven-man life
rafts, food, water, radios, signaling devices, and survival equipment, to the
most seriously injured pilot, the two Pararescuemen were deployed by
parachute at 1513 hours local victor time. Both were observed with good
parachutes and making a normal descent toward the MA-1 Kit position.
SSgt Rodman, the other pararescue specialist, and one of the downed
pilots, later confirmed that SSgt Jones had descended without any
apparent difficulty and was using normal parachute procedures.
Being the first out of the HC-130, and therefore the lower of the two, SSgt
Rodman entered the water first where he immediately lost sight of his
teammate. The HC-130 crew reported both entered the water on either side
of the injured pilot’s position. The pre-briefed plan was to jettison the
parachute canopy upon entry, jettison the reserve chutes and scuba tanks,
and inflate their single-man life rafts. Using the rafts to support them and
their equipment, they would fin to the MA-1 Kit rafts and proceed to link-up
with the injured pilot. SSgt Rodman had steered to within approximately 50
2
yards of the MA-1 Kit, but due to high sea states and inability to see the
rafts, it took him approximately 30 minutes to reach the MA-1 Kit. The kit
had drifted close to, but had missed the injured pilot’s single man raft.
SSgt Rodman caught the seven-man raft, and though nearly exhausted,
deployed the sea anchor to slow the raft’s drift to assist the injured pilot
and SSgt Jones in overtaking the kit’s position. He also gave himself an
injection to counter sea sickness and checked in on radio with the HC-130.
Shortly thereafter, when SSgt Jones had failed to check in, the HC-130
made several passes to observe his position, descending on each pass to
get a better view.
SSgt Jones’ parachute canopy was observed but no movement or activity
could be seen. Another MA-1 Kit was deployed and its rafts, flotation
bundles and several hundred feet of rope lanyard quickly formed a Vshaped pattern around SSgt Jones’ parachute. This would indicate SSgt
Jones had grabbed the line or it had snagged on his equipment. A marker
beacon was dropped to further mark his position. Still no word or contact
was made with SSgt Jones. Individual debriefs by HC-130 crewmembers
now verify that SSgt Jones was still attached to his submerged canopy
along with scuba and other equipment. Since the canopy should have
been released immediately upon entry into the water, the assumption has
to be made that something happened to SSgt Jones to prevent him from
doing this. Parachute float tests have verified that once the canopy is
released it will sink almost immediately from the weight of the risers and
attachment hardware. However, if the canopy remains attached to the
jumper, his buoyancy could keep it float for a short period of time. This is
a significant fact since the chute did float one hour and thirty minutes
before the MA-1Kit reached his position. The MA-1 Kit then helped support
the sinking canopy and equipment. This evidence eliminates the
possibility that SSgt Jones had departed the parachute (it would have sunk
immediately) and became lost trying to swim to SSgt Rodman’s or the
injured pilot’s position. SSgt Rodman and the two pilots were recovered by
a commercial ship. SSgt Jones was lost at sea.”
Col Waters, the 1550 Aircrew Training and Test Wing Vice-Commander (1550th
ATTW/CV), was appointed accident investigation board president. He returned
to work at Kirltand AFB, NM in late April 1983 after the board completed its
investigation. He stopped by my office as soon as he returned (the test division
office was next to his office) to discuss the board’s findings. At the end of our
discussion, he asked a question that he said had bothered him throughout the
investigation: “why do PJs (Pararescuemen) not have a means to move across
the surface of the water other than by swimming?” I had no answer. He then
ordered me to find the answer and develop a concept and capability to meet that
need. He said that since the wing owned the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery
Service (ARRS) combat rescue test function, he expected results soon.
3
I started the project that day. I had been assigned to the wing’s test division
since October 1981. The test division was managed jointly by the 1550 ATTW
and Headquarters Military Airlift Command Test Directorate (HQ MAC/XPT). My
expectation was for a completed test and fielding of a system within a year.
However, test funding priorities delayed the test.
My first step was to involve the three test pilots in the office in a brainstorming
session to determine what would work within the constraints of an HC-130 with
two Benson auxiliary fuel tanks installed. A quick walk to an HC-130 on the flight
line made it clear that any inflatable boat system had to be packaged so that the
system’s footprint was as small as possible and compatible with the remaining
space on the cargo floor. Also, this system could not interfere with other HC-130
airdrop operations. Over the next few days, I realized that an inflatable rubber
boat had to be stacked on top of an engine already mounted to the boat’s
transom. My goal was to have the system hit the water mission ready with no
assembly required. I made many drawings which were scrutinized by the other
testers; they continued to send me back to the drawing table until I had
something that we all agreed was a good starting point.
The selected drawing showed an inflatable boat accordion folded over an engine
secured to the boat’s transom, with the engine fitted into a box that was secured
to a platform. No dimensions were included because I didn’t have a test article to
measure. I knew that a fuel tank was required and it had to be in the package,
but I didn’t know yet how to include it. I had the same issue with the inflation
system; I knew it had to be connected to the boat for automatic inflation, but we
all agreed that this issue, like the fuel tank, couldn’t be addressed until we had a
test article. We also agreed that the entire system had to be packaged for
airdrop, but how to do that at this stage of planning was an unknown. In the last
drawing, I showed a cable that ran from an inflation bottle and connected to
parachute hardware. This cable would inflate the boat in the air soon after the
parachute opened so the boat would land on the water inflated. The test pilots
pointed out that an inflated boat would be aerodynamic and any wind would
make the descent rate and direction unpredictable. We agreed that the inflation
bottle should be activated manually after swimmers reached the system on the
surface of the water. I erased the cable. I went with this system as a first design.
The next step was to author a MAC test request IAW Air Force Regulation (AFR)
55-43 and MAC Regulation (MACR) 55-80. Test requests were detailed
documents containing the test’s background, purpose, and method of
accomplishment. The test request is used to draft the test plan after the test
request is approved and a test order is published. It’s important to note that
public law and Department of Defense (DOD) regulations prohibit funding of
DOD tests that do not directly enhance “combat capability”. I include this
information because I have heard on many occasions that RAMZ development
was driven by National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
requirements. That is incorrect. I developed the RAMZ concept and capability to
4
meet DOD combat requirements. The MAC test request contained no reference
to NASA except as related to one of the seven Aerospace Rescue and Recovery
Service (ARRS) mission areas of responsibility. The NASA connection will be
explained later in the history. The MAC test request, and the subsequent test
plan, contained the following under Background and Purpose.
“The requirement to airdrop inflatable boats to conduct combat rescue is
supported by current concepts of operation. Pararescuemen (PJs) require
this capability to infiltrate/exfiltrate and to effectively conduct operations in
an objective area. As an integral part of the rescue force, PJs conduct
operations on the surface as an extension of rescue aircraft capabilities. In
the surface role, PJ teams search for, contact, authenticate, secure,
medically treat, move, and exfiltrate personnel. They require the capability
to penetrate coastal areas and cross or operate on waterways when
conducting surface operations. They also require the capability to deploy
from fixed or rotary wing aircraft and move across the surface of the ocean
to collect, medically treat, and prepare multiple survivors for recovery.”
I completed the MAC test request in June 1983 and submitted it to HQ MAC/XPT
for coordination and publication. HQ MAC/XPT forwarded the test request to HQ
ARRS and 23rd Air Force (23 AF) for coordination. HQ ARRS completed their
coordination in July 1983 and 23AF completed their coordination in August 1983.
The MAC Test Order was published in December 1983 as MAC Test Project 380-85, Airdrop of Inflatable Motorized Watercraft for Rescue Operations.
Concerned about the funding priority, I followed the test request with an Air Force
Suggestion, AF Form 1000, Kirtland Suggestion 83-0711, Airdroppable of
Motorized Watercraft for Rescue Operations
(see attached Word doc). My hope was to
accelerate test funding. At the time, MAC funded
only ten tests per year, and my test was
competing with major airlift aircraft tests.
C:\Documents and
Settings\Chuck Hassle Unfortunately, the suggestion had no impact on
the funding line, and MAC Test Project 3-80-85
was not funded until January 1987.
The suggestion remained active until June 1987
when it appeared that I would conduct testing on
my own suggestion. To avoid a conflict of
interest, I requested that the suggestion be
C:\Documents and cancelled (see attached Word doc). The Kirtland
NM suggestion office cancelled the
Settings\Chuck Hassle AFB,
suggestion immediately. MSgt (CMSgt retired)
Bruce Hickson was the suggestion evaluator at
HQ MAC. He attempted to reactivate the suggestion in the early 1990s.
5
Although time limits prevented reactivating the suggestion, his efforts are
appreciated.
I began looking for test components as soon as the test request was submitted.
My goal was to use only items that were federally stocklisted to prevent
competition from every component manufacturer who wanted a piece of the DOD
budget. The component search was put on hold in October 1983 when the
1550th ATTW test function was moved from Kirtland AFB, NM to the Special
Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center (SMOTEC), Hurlburt Field, FL.
I arrived at Hurlburt Field in early Oct, 1983 to help stand up SMOTEC. I
continued in the same job that I held at Kirtland, MAC Test Director; Chief,
Pararescue/Recovery Branch. Special Operations history shows the following for
SMOTEC.
“The SMOTEC was activated in October 1983 as a direct reporting unit of
Headquarters MAC. The center was formed through the consolidation of
the test and evaluation function previously assigned to the 1550th Aircrew
Training and Test Wing located at Kirtland Air Force Base, N. M., which was
responsible for combat rescue related tests, and the informal test and
evaluation staffs of both the 2nd Air Division and the 1st Special
Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, FL.
SMOTEC filled a unique role by exploring new frontiers in special
operations capabilities and developed better equipment and tactics to
support Air Force Rescue and Special Operations forces located
throughout the world. It provided Rescue/Special Operations with the
centralized expertise needed for development and operational testing of
new systems and tactics, proposed changes in doctrine, and
recommended new requirements.”
The move to SMOTEC proved to be a blessing for the component search. In
January 1984, I called the US Navy Costal Systems Center (now the Naval
Surface Warfare Center) in Panama City, FL to see if they were testing rubber
boat systems. The Systems Center provided research, development, test and
evaluation and in-service support for amphibious warfare, diving, maritime
special operations, mine warfare (mines and mine countermeasures), and other
Naval missions that take place in coastal regions. I tracked down system
engineers who said they were testing a system called the “Military Amphibious
Reconnaissance System (MARS)” for the Navy Seals and Marine Recon.
They were eager to help and invited me to take a look at their system. This
sounded like a system pararescue could use.
6
I visited the US Navy Coastal Systems Center in February 1984 to look at the
MARS. What they had was encouraging. The MARS already had an Operator’s
Maintenance Manual, TM-02473 B14/1, published in June, 1981. The
inflatable boat was 14.5 feet long by
6.8 feet wide and weighed 225
pounds and had a load capacity of
2,500 pounds. The boat could be
inflated with either a CO-2 cylinder or
by hand pump. A keelson was laced
into the inflatable floor from bow to
stern for rigidity. The MARS had an
OMC 35 HP outboard engine modified
with a dewatering valve. Fuel was
delivered from either a 6- gallon or 18gallon flexible fuel tank. The MARS
engine could be sunk to a depth of
400 feet for 30 days and brought to
the surface and started. However,
there was a downside to the system.
According to the Coastal Systems
Center engineers, the MARS boats
were junk. They recommended I look
for a suitable substitute. They were
testing rubber boats and got caught
in a low bidder fiasco with three companies. The MARS boats were very heavy
and none of the companies could meet contract specifications for weight, and the
seams leaked. I also didn’t care for the keelson since it had to be assembled
and laced into the floor after the boat was on the water. The Coastal Systems
Center agreed to loan a complete MARS for our testing. I think they were trying
to get rid of the boats. (Their wish came true during an early test deployment in
1988 when a complete MARS was destroyed. The Zodiac F-470 was then
introduced into the test as the boat component. After the Zodiac boat replaced
the MARS boat, the test’s name was changed from “MARS” to “RAMZ”. Same
test, different boat component. The terms “MARS” and “RAMZ” are
interchangeable as they relate to this history.)
Now that I had a test system, I started drafting the test plan, Tactics
Development and Evaluation (TD&E), Airdrop of the Military Amphibious
Reconnaissance System, MAC Project 11-17-77-4. This was a tactics test, not
a product test. All components were federally stocklisted. The test had still not
hit the MAC funding line, so the draft test plan was written between other
operational test and evaluation efforts that I managed. One of those tests led to
NASA’s interest in the MARS.
7
The NASA connection took place when I was TDY from SMOTEC to Patrick
AFB, FL in the early spring of 1986 to do testing of the Helicopter Emergency Air
Delivery System (HEADS) for Helicopter Crew Members. MSgt Tony McFarr, the
NCOIC of the Pararescue team at Patrick AFB, arranged a meeting with project
officers from the Department of Defense Manned Space Flight Support Office
(DDMS) and NASA planners to discuss astronaut recovery. DDMS coordinates
all DOD contingency support to our nation's manned space flight programs.
The 28 January 1986 Challenger Space Shuttle disaster
had forced NASA to modify the shuttle fleet to allow
astronauts to escape by parachute. NASA plans now
called for astronaut recovery at sea, but they had no
plan or concept for a long-range open-sea recovery
capability. I explained the MARS concept of operation
for recovering combat crewmembers, and suggested
that the concept could be applied to the astronaut
recovery mission. NASA embraced the concept and
agreed to fund a portion of the approved HQ MAC
MARS TD&E. DDMS assigned a project officer who
coordinated NASA requirements and inputs with HQ
MAC/XPT and SMOTEC. HQ MAC and NASA shared
costs for equipment, and MAC paid for TDY costs and
provided the flying hours. The NASA application of this
capability was a spin-off of the combat capability for
which the MARS/RAMZ was designed and tested.
NASA drafted a recovery plan to meet the new long
range, open sea recovery requirement. I added four
paragraphs of NASA’s recovery plan to my October
1987 TD&E test plan's System Operational Concept to cover the NASA
requirement. The System Operational Concept read as follows.
“The 23 AF has a wartime and peacetime operational requirement to
conduct open sea, coastal, and inland waterway rescue and recovery
operations. When these operations are supported by fixed wing aircraft,
the aircraft provides a platform for deploying pararescuemen (PJs) by
parachute to the survivors/mission objective(s). An MA-1 kit, containing
two 7-man life rafts, or an MA-2 kit containing two 20-man life rafts is often
deployed to support recovery efforts. The kits also contain radios,
signaling devices, food and water, and assorted survival equipment.
If the rescue or recovery operation involves two or more survivors either
some distance apart or in a high sea state, making swimming impractical, a
MARS will be deployed to augment MA-1 or MA-2 kits. Once the PJ team
reaches the survivor(s) the MARS will be used to access and transport
survivor(s) to a life raft.
8
Recovery is accomplished by helicopter, if available, or by surface vessel.
When these operations are supported by helicopter, the helicopter
provides the PJ insertion method (i.e. helocasting, rescue hoist, rope
ladder) and the method of extraction. The MARS would provide the PJ
team with the capability to move rapidly across the surface of the water
between multiple survivors and MA-1/2 kits and would enhance safety
during ship recoveries at sea.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has a
requirement for search and rescue support for space shuttle recovery in
the event of astronaut bailout. Immediate response is required for the area
200 miles down range from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) with the
capability to provide hands-on assistance within three hours of bailout.
This water scenario requires PJ teams on both HC-130 and HH-3E aircraft.
The HC-130 concept of astronaut recovery uses two aircraft, one on orbit
approximately 200 miles down range and one on cockpit alert near KSC.
Each aircraft would have three 3-man PJ teams on board with appropriate
personnel and parachute equipment for deployment into the open sea.
Each team would have a MARS. Two MA-2 Sea Rescue Kits would be
onboard to supplement the recovery mission. A PJ team would deploy on
each end of the bailout impact area (KSC estimate is 6 miles) with first
consideration to deploy to injured astronauts. Using the MARS, the PJ
teams would work toward the middle of the impact area recovering
astronauts along the way. One HC-130 would also deploy an MA-2 kit to
the astronaut nearest the center of the impact area. The MA-2 kit would
then serve as a platform for rendering medical and survival care until
recovery by helicopter or surface vessel. The other PJ teams would remain
in the HC-130s to provide emergency backup if any of the teams on the
surface were unable to perform their portion of the mission, or if the bailout
area exceeded 6 miles.
Timely response is also required for coverage in the area beyond 200 miles
down range from KSC to provide hands-on assistance within 24 hours after
bailout. In addition, immediate response is required for three Transoceanic
Abort Landing Sites (TALS) to provide hands-on assistance within 3 hours
after bailout for the area within 50 miles of the TALS, and 24 hours recovery
for bailout beyond 50 miles from the TALS.
The HH-3E concept for astronaut recovery uses two primary aircraft and
two spares, all on cockpit alert at KSC. Two aircraft would have a PJ team
onboard with one MARS. The first aircraft would have a 3-man PJ team and
the second a 4-man PJ team. The total of seven PJs provides one PJ for
each astronaut. Deployment of PJs would be by helocast to the astronauts
with recovery by hoist. The MARS would be available if required.”
9
In October 1986, HQ MAC/XPT informed SMOTEC/CC that MAC Project 11-1777-4 had made the MAC test funding line for the following year, and that a test
order was in draft. The test was funded and the test order published in January
1987 with emergency and special programs (ESP) funding code 7T. The
estimated cost of the test was $43,200. The next step was to refine the critical
operational issues, test objectives, and the method of accomplishment. I
narrowed the scope of the TD&E to five critical operational issues and four test
objectives.
Critical Operational Issues.
Issue 1. Can the MARS be packaged and rigged for deployment with the engine
installed on the transom, the boat deflated, the fuel tank secured in the boat, and
the inflation bottle installed?
Issue 2. Can the packaged and rigged MARS be effectively and safely
parachute deployed from fixed wing aircraft?
Issue 3. Can the packaged and rigged MARS be effectively and safely free-fall
deployed from rotary wing aircraft?
Issue 4. Can parachutists effectively and safely deploy from the ramp of fixed
wing aircraft with the MARS using static line and high altitude low opening
(HALO) parachute procedures and equipment?
Issue 5. What training is required to package and deploy the MARS?
Test Objectives.
Objective 1. Develop the MARS packaging and rigging procedures.
Objective 2. Develop procedures to airdrop the MARS in conjunction with
deployment of PJs.
Objective 3. Identify any special training requirements to package, rig, and
deploy the MARS.
Objective 4. Evaluate the MARS procedures developed by SMOTEC.
The method of accomplishment is a detailed approach to testing and is quite long
(the complete test plan is attached in the next paragraph for reference). In
summary, the method called for a “minimum” of six MARS deployments with
static line jumpers; six MARS deployments with HALO jumpers; and four MARS
helicopter freefall deployments with helocast jumpers. Data would be collected
after each event and analyzed. MARS packing procedures and MARS and
jumper deployment procedures would be refined and documented after each
10
event. The final MARS packing procedures, MARS and jumper deployment
procedures, and training requirements would be documented in the DT&E Final
Report.
I completed the Test Plan in July 1987 and ran the product through the SMOTEC
“Murder Board”. (See Word doc below, Tactics Development and Evaluation
(TD&E), Airdrop of the Military Amphibious Reconnaissance System, MAC
Project 11-17-77-4). The Murder Board was composed of six SMOTEC test
directors not involved with the project, plus the author. The senior test director
was the board president. This was an editing
board designed to ensure the best written product
possible was produced. The board president had
final decision authority over any controversy.
C:\Documents and While this process was an uncomfortable event
Settings\Chuck Hassle for the author, and any pride of authorship had to
be left at the door, the process worked. This
experience also improved the writing skills of the
test director cadre. After the Murder Board’s recommended corrections were
made to the test plan, the test plan was sent to HQ MAC/XPT for approval. The
test plan was approved and published on 1 October 1987.
At this point I felt that the test was ready to begin. The test plan was off for
publication and most of the test components were on-hand or identified. I was
fortunate to have assigned to SMOTEC an airdrop qualified loadmaster, SMSgt
Mike Polek. Mike was so valuable that I insisted on putting his name on the test
plan with mine as a test director. Mike convinced me that the MARS delivery
system had to be built around a standard container delivery system (CDS)
bundle using an A-22 container with a G-12 or T-10 cargo chute and the FXC
hydraulic automatic cargo release. I had already designed the plywood engine
box and base and, fortunately, the box and base dimensions were compatible
with the standard CDS bundle. Unfortunately, I wouldn’t be around for the start
of the test or to observe what I’m sure were Mike’s ongoing contributions to the
test’s management and the success of the effort.
I received a call in July 1987 from the Pararescue Chiefs who were having a
meeting at the assignments section at the Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph
AFB, TX. They said my choices were Korea or the Philippines with a 31 October
1987 report date. To expect more than six years in the test business would be
pushing my luck. I picked Korea. With the assignment to Korea came the job of
finding a replacement for my SMOTEC position. The SMOTEC commander
directed me to find the right person, and to select him from the team stationed at
Eglin AFB, FL to avoid permanent change of station costs. I wanted someone
who had the experience and drive to complete the MARS test and get the system
in the field. The MARS test would require good writing skills, documentation
skills, a thorough knowledge of static line and high altitude/low opening (HALO)
parachute procedures, and a familiarity with cargo delivery operations. Above
11
all, I wanted a PJ with proven situational and safety awareness. The only name I
offered to the SMOTEC Commander was MSgt (CMSgt retired) Bob Holler.
Bob was the perfect candidate. He had extensive static line and freefall
parachute experience, great management and writing skills, and the drive to
excel at anything he attempted. Bob and I thoroughly reviewed the test project
and continuity folder prior to my departure for Korea. The continuity folder
contained several copies of MAC Test Plan 11-17-77-4; names and phone
numbers for the US Navy Costal Systems Center personnel who agreed to
provide the MARS test assembly; DDMS and NASA contact information; a copy
of TM-02473 B-14/1, Operator’s Maintenance Manual, Military Amphibious
Reconnaissance System, (MARS), June 1981; detailed plans for the engine
box with contact information for the 834th Civil Engineering Squadron to support
fabrication of the engine box; contact information for the 834th Equipment
Maintenance Squadron to support rigging fabrication requirements; a written
description and illustration to secure the boat to the transom and to accordionfold the boat over the engine and box; and a parts list.
The parts list included all of the MARS components, the A-22 cargo bag, the G12 and T-10B parachutes, and the FXC automatic cargo parachute release.
SMSgt Polek had recommended the FXC release and, in July 1987, procured
two FXC releases of different capacities for use during the test. The FXC
releases were given to Bob with the continuity folder. The parts list did not
include rigging items such as link assemblies, cords, flotation devices,
honeycomb energy dissipating pads, or other items necessary to build the
system. These items were identified during testing to satisfy Test Objective 1,
Develop the MARS packaging and rigging procedures.
Bob began work at SMOTEC on 1 November 1987, three days after I left for
Korea on 28 October 1987. Bob managed an exceptional test. He successfully
answered the test’s critical operational issue and met the test objectives. This
was a difficult test plan to run. Great credit goes to Bob and others who spent
the very long hours to assemble and deploy the test system and collect the test
data. They dealt with successes and failures and made adjustments. In the end,
they produced an operationally effective and suitable system that now provides
PJs the capability to move across the surface of the water by a means other than
swimming, and that was the goal. The RAMZ was fielded shortly after the final
report was published in the summer of 1988 and it is still in use today.
There were others who made major contributions that led to the success of this
test. SMSgt Trelawny Bruce at HQ MAC championed the project and pushed the
need for this capability at command level. As command leadership and staff
officers moved on, newly assigned leadership and staff officers were unaware of
the approved 1984 MARS TD&E project and its importance. SMSgt Bruce
provided the education necessary to keep leadership on board. MSgt John
“Smitty” Smith was Bob’s assistant test director. John worked long hours along
12
side Bob and made major contributions to the success of this effort. He
remained fully engaged during the entire test period. John also coordinated with
US Army technical writers to produce the final technical data, Technical Order
13C7-51-21, Rigging, Zodiac F470U Boat in A-22 Cargo Bag. TSgt “Marco”
Mahoney, a United States Parachute Association certified rigger, provided the
rigging expertise. Other Pararescuemen making contributions were Mike Harlow,
Brian Douglas, Dirk Winrick, Bill Sine, and Mike Grey.
Bob Holler and John Smith with a RAMZ System
Photograph courtesy of John Smith
Starting in the spring of 1989, Bob and I were stationed together at the 1730th
Pararescue Squadron’s operating location in Okinawa, Japan. We had many
talks about the RAMZ system and the test program. He told me that he followed
the test plan step by step. He especially appreciated the hard work of John
Smith, his and-picked assistant test director. Between Bob and John, all of the
test plan’s critical operational issues and test objectives were satisfied.
John Smith told me the story about the destruction of the MARS during an early
test deployment. An M-1 cargo parachute release was used for the failed
deployment instead of the FXC automatic cargo parachute release. The MARS
system separated from the parachutes shortly after exiting the aircraft, free fell to
the water, and disintegrated on impact. The remains are still at the bottom of
Santa Rosa Sound. It was at this point that Bob switched the boat component
13
from a MARS boat to a Zodiac F470, and the FXC release that SMSgt Polek
recommended and procured was used for the remainder of the test program and
fielding of the RAMZ system. All other MARS components, including the 35 hp
MARS engine, were retained and are still in use today. After the addition of the
Zodiac F470, Bob changed the test’s name on the final report from “MARS” to
“RAMZ”. One document that I don't have is Bob's final report. The final report
was used for a few years as a technical guide to pack the RAMZ. If anyone has
a copy, please send it to me, preferably in electronic form, so that the final report
is included in this history. This is an important document that reflects Bob's hard
work, as well as the hard work of John Smith and others.
The RAMZ has been used on many operational rescue missions since it was
fielded in 1988. In the end, Col Waters got what he wanted, a means for PJs to
move across the surface of the water other than by swimming. And, you can bet
that Jeff Jones would be proud to know that his unfortunate death produced this
important capability.
I would like those of you who have used the RAMZ operationally to write what
you believe is an accurate mission report. Some missions with the RAMZ were
flawless, some were not. I'd like to see the RAMZ history accurately reflect the
system's operational effectiveness and suitability, as well as the heroic actions of
our PJ force. If you send a mission report, please include Bob LaPointe on your
submission.
Very Respectfully,
Chuck Hassler
14
About the Author
Chief Master Sergeant (Retired) Malcolm C. (Chuck) Hassler entered the Air
Force on 9 February 1965 and volunteered for the Pararescue (PJ) career field
during basic training. He graduated from PJ School with his class on 15
February 1966. His first assignment was to Udorn AB, Thailand where he flew
combat search and rescue during the Viet Nam War. During that assignment, he
was selected as an Air Force Airman of the Year for 1967 and, as an Airman
Second Class (E-3), represented the Military Airlift Command at the Air Force
Association National Convention
in San Francisco, CA.
His next assignment was as a PJ
HH-3E helicopter instructor/flight
examiner at Eglin AFB, FL where
he trained PJ aircrew members
for combat search and rescue
operations. During that
assignment, he deployed for six
months to the Republic of Korea
in response to the North Korean
capture of the USS Pueblo and
its crew.
http://www.espionageinfo.com/Pr
-Re/Pueblo-Incident.html
He then spent six years as the
senior PJ Air Reserve Technician
at Homestead AFB, FL. As that
assignment came to a close, he
was asked to be part of the PJ
School’s newly formed medical
training staff. He spent the next
four years at Kirtland AFB, NM
teaching and managing the
medical training program.
He returned to his position at Homestead AFB in October 1979, but then returned
to Kirltand AFB in Oct 1981 to fill the position of MAC Test Director, Chief,
Pararescue/Recovery Branch at the 1550 Aircrew Training and Test Wing. It
was during this assignment that he began work to invent and develop a
motorized inflatable watercraft for PJ combat operations. That work continued
after the test division was moved in Oct 1983 from Kirtland AFB to the Special
15
Missions Operational Test and Evaluation Center located at Hulburt Field, FL.
During his six years in test and evaluation, no test that he managed was more
important to him than his efforts to find a way for PJs to move across the water
other than by swimming. Based on his work, the Rigging, Alternate Method
Zodiac (RAMZ) was fielded in 1988.
He returned to the operational field in Oct, 1987 when he was assigned as
Detachment Chief, Operating Location B (OL-B), 1730 Pararescue Squadron
(1730 PRS), Osan AB, Korea, were he commanded the unit for two tours. From
Korea, he was assigned as Detachment Chief, OL-A, 1730 PRS, Kadena AB,
Japan, and commanded OL-A until the deactivation of the 1730 PRS in 1990.
He was then assigned as the PJ Superintendent, 71 Air Rescue Squadron,
Patrick AFB, FL from 1990 to 1993.
In Oct 1993, Chief Hassler was assigned to the Combat Rescue School, Nellis
AFB, NV. During that assignment, he authored a “White Paper” that
recommended the addition of aerial gunners to the HH-60 helicopter crew
complement to free PJs from scanner and aerial gunner tasks and allow PJs to
concentrate on Career Field Education and Training Plan core tasks. Rescue
leadership at HQ Air Combat Command (HQ ACC) non-concurred, even though
HQ Pacific Air Force (HQ PACAF) fully concurred and was eager to proceed.
Based on these events, Chief Hassler sought out and received an assignment to
HQ ACC, Langley AFB, VA to push the gunner agenda.
Chief Hassler held the position of Pararescue Functional Manager, HQ ACC,
from June 1995 to March 1998. During that time, he prepared a staff summary
sheet (SSS) that outlined the merits of adding aerial gunners to the HH-60 crew
complement. The Commander, Air Combat Command, approved the initiative
and the aerial gunners were added in 1997. The addition of the aerial gunners,
coupled with Chief Hassler’s SSS that moved PJ evaluations from the aircrew
evaluation system to the on-the-job training evaluation system, increased PJ
training time by 54% with a corresponding increase in training quality and
effectiveness.
Military courses he graduated from include: U.S. Army Airborne, Military Freefall
Parachutist, Jumpmaster, US Navy SCUBA, Ranger Mountain, USAF
Pararescue, Pararescue Advanced Casualty Care, Pararescue Advanced
Mountaineering, Pararescue Boat Master, Flight and Ground Instructor,
Pararescue Flight Evaluator, Aircrew Survival, Jungle Survival, Pararescue
Qualification, NCO Academy, and Senior NCO Academy.
Chief Hassler flew as a crewmember on the following aircraft: HH-43, HH-3, HH34, HH-53, HH-60, HU-16, HC-97, and HC-130. He accumulated 2,200 flight
hours and over 700 military parachute jumps.
16
Chief Hassler retired from HQ ACC, Langley AFB, VA in March 1998 after 33
years and 26 days in uniform, all in Pararescue.. His retirement ceremony was
graciously sponsored by his PJ contemporaries at Moody AFB, GA. He now
lives with his wife, Becky, in Yorktown, VA.
*******************************************************************************************
Additional Photographs
RAMZ Engine Protection Box and skid board.
17
F470U Zodiac prepared for accordion fold.
Boat accordion folded over engine and engine box.
18
RAMZ systems rigged for deployment.
19