Cátedra Rafael Escolá de Ética Profesional Lección Inaugural

Transcription

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DONOSTIA-SAN SEBASTIÁN, MAYO-MAY 2004 Nº 1
Universidad
de Navarra
Nafarroako
Unibertsitatea
Escuela Superior
de Ingenieros
Ingeniarien Goi
Mailako Eskola
CAMPUS TECNOLÓGICO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE NAVARRA • NAFARROAKO UNIBERTSITATEKO CAMPUS TEKNOLOGIKOA
Cátedra Rafael Escolá
de Ética Profesional
Lección Inaugural
Presentación de la Cátedra
Rafael Escolá y del profesor Pfeffer
Semblanza de Rafael Escolá
How Economic Language and
Assumptions Undermine Ethics:
Rediscovering Human Values
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JOURNAL / Nº1 / MAYO 2004
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Índice
3
Prof. Alejo Sison
Director de la Cátedra Rafael Escolá de Ética Profesional
Presentación de la Cátedra Rafael
Escolá y del profesor Pfeffer
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Dr. Felipe Prósper
Dr. Ingeniero Industrial, Presidente de IDOM,
Presidente de la Fundación Rafael Escolá
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Prof. Jeffrey Pfeffer
Thomas D. Dee II Professor of Organizational Behavior
in the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University
Rediscovering Human Values
JOURNAL -
Mayo 2004
Dirección: Servicio de Comunicación TECNUN
Diseño y Maquetación: Sonia Uribe Garteiz
Fotografía: Archivo fotográfico de TECNUN
Impresión: Grupo Igara
Edita: TECNUN (Escuela Superior de Ingenieros
de la Universidad de Navarra).
Pº Manuel de Lardizabal, 13
20018 San Sebastián (Gipuzkoa)
Tel. 943 219 877 - Fax. 943 311 442
[email protected] - www.tecnun.es
Delegado de Graduados: Gustavo Pego
[email protected]
D.P.: SS-610/04
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Presentación de la Cátedra Rafael Escolá
y del profesor Pfeffer
Prof. Alejo J. Sison
Director de la Cátedra Rafael Escolá de Ética Profesional
A mediados del 2002 se firmó un convenio entre
la Fundación Rafael Escolá y la Escuela Superior
de Ingenieros de la Universidad de Navarra
(TECNUN), en el que se acordó la creación de la
Cátedra Rafael Escolá de Ética Profesional en el
seno de la misma Escuela. Esta cátedra tiene
como fin promover la excelencia profesional integral de los ingenieros tanto en su vertiente técnica como en la ética.
Desde su inicio, la Cátedra ha servido de marco
privilegiado para impulsar todo tipo de actividades de formación y de investigación en el campo
de la ingeniería. Se contempla brindar un apoyo
inestimable a la enseñanza de la ética profesional en las Escuelas de Ingenieros y prestar servicios de asesoramiento ético a las empresas que
lo requieran.
PROF. ALEJO SISON
La celebración esta mañana de la primera Lección Magistral Rafael Escolá representa un hito
importante en la trayectoria, aún corta pero ya
fructífera, de la Cátedra. Otro motivo de alegría
es que la inaugure el profesor Jeffrey Pfeffer,
catedrático de Comportamiento Humano en las
Organizaciones de la Universidad de Stanford.
mantelar los obstáculos psicológicos e institucionales a la implantación de prácticas que denotan
un alto grado de compromiso de las personas
con la empresa en la que trabajan. Sus escritos
se centran en el gobierno de las personas en la
organización, en el recto uso del poder y en el
valor de un liderazgo ejemplar.
Aparte de varias docenas de artículos y casos,
que se cuentan entre los más citados de la especialidad, el profesor Pfeffer es también autor de
algunos libros que han sentado las bases actuales para la dirección de personas en la empresa:
Competitive Advantage Through People (1994),
The Human Equation: Building Profits by Putting
People First (1998), Hidden Value: How Great
Companies Achieve Extraordinary Results with
Ordinary People (2000) y The Knowing-Doing
Gap: How Smart Companies Turn Knowledge
into Action (2002). Los mismos títulos de las
obras ya indican un par de verdades axiomáticas: que las personas somos las únicas que
realmente creamos valor y riqueza con nuestro
trabajo, y que el principal reto de la dirección
consiste en organizar ese trabajo para que aflore lo mejor de nosotros mismos, tanto profesional como humanamente. En concreto, el profesor Pfeffer se ha preocupado por estudiar y des-
Es díficil, por tanto, encontrar a un ponente que
tenga una mayor afinidad con las ideas y los
valores que enseñó y vivió Rafael Escolá en el
ejercicio de su profesión que el profesor Jeffrey
Pfeffer. Por esta razón, nos reporta una gran
satisfacción y un inmenso honor tenerle entre
nosotros para dictar esta conferencia inaugural.
En nombre de la Cátedra Rafael Escolá de Ética
Profesional, de la Fundación Rafael Escolá y de
la Escuela Superior de Ingenieros de la Universidad de Navarra, bienvenido y muchas gracias,
profesor Pfeffer, por aceptar nuestra invitación.
PROF. JEFFREY PFEFFER
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Dr. Felipe Prósper
Presidente de IDOM, Presidente de la Fundación Rafael Escolá
Introducción
Ilustrísimas autoridades académicas, queridos profesores y alumnos,
amigos:
Es para mí un motivo de alegría
estar de nuevo en esta Escuela
donde, hace un año, tuve el honor,
y el entrañable placer, de ejercer
como padrino de la XL Promoción
de Ingenieros Industriales y de la I
de Telecomunicaciones. Pero, he de
confesarles, que hoy completa mi
felicidad el motivo que nos reúne: la
inauguración de la Cátedra de Ética
Profesional Rafael Escolá –Rafa,
para quienes le tratamos de cerca–.
Agradezco a la Universidad de
Navarra y a TECNUN que hayan
distinguido a Rafa con la entrañable
tradición universitaria de designar a
determinadas cátedras con el nombre de profesores que han dejado
especial huella. En este caso, se
trata de un homenaje de perennidad
tributado a una persona que, en
vida, nunca quiso recibir homenajes, nunca quiso aparecer y, mucho
menos, aparentar.
Sólo por darles una referencia de la
verdad de mis palabras, les diré que
a los 60 años de edad, pletórico de
facultades físicas e intelectuales y
en la cumbre de su carrera y prestigio profesional, Rafa quiso ceder la
Presidencia de Idom, fundada por él
22 años antes, para dar paso a los
que éramos más jóvenes, quedando él en la empresa como un ingeniero más. Lo cierto es que la calidad y dignidad de ese gesto nos
impresionó tanto a todos, que no
hizo sino agrandar todavía más la
autoridad moral y el peso de Rafa
en la Firma.
En mi relación de agradecimientos
debería referirme hoy a la Divina
Providencia, por todo el bien que
me dispensó al poner en mi camino
a una persona como Rafa. Le conocí el lunes de Pascua de 1961, siendo yo un estudiante de Ingeniería de
la Escuela de Industriales de
Madrid, y puedo asegurar que,
desde aquel día, mi vida tomó un
rumbo que me ha hecho muy feliz
durante más de cuarenta años de
ejercicio profesional, rumbo que, sin
ninguna duda, volvería a elegir si
tuviera de nuevo la oportunidad de
hacerlo –y lo digo con la certeza de
quien ve su carrera ya muy cumplida, desde esos planos finales que
tanto ayudan a ir haciendo balance
y a disponer de una visión más global de la vida–.
Estoy seguro que todos ustedes
comprenderán que, dados estos
antecedentes, la semblanza de
Rafa que voy a realizar no va a ser
precisamente una fría relación de
hechos históricos, sino más bien el
testimonio de un alumno, respetuoso y asombrado, y de un amigo
muy agradecido. Trataré, sin
embargo, de ajustarme con precisión y objetividad a los datos biográficos, como a Rafa le hubiera
gustado, aún siendo consciente de
la imposibilidad de condensar su
rica personalidad en una charla de
pocos minutos.
La formación de Rafa
Rafael Escolá Gil nació en Barcelona el 16 de abril de 1919; fue el
sexto hijo de una familia de clase
media; su padre, industrial y comercial de material eléctrico, legó probablemente a Rafa su gran afición
por resolver problemas técnicos y
su vocación por la Ingeniería. Otras
características de los padres de
Rafa que, sin duda, tuvieron también proyección en su personalidad
fueron la austeridad, el trato educado, amable y nada autoritario, y la
capacidad para encontrar en cualquier acontecimiento sencillo un
pretexto para celebrar la amistad,
para crear en torno a sí un clima de
cariño.
Rafa, según dicen sus hermanos,
destacaba por su optimismo, además de por sus buenas calificaciones. Al terminar el bachillerato, los
hermanos del colegio de la Salle, de
Bonanova, le recomendaron estudiar ingeniería; y en el curso 193536, con diecisiete años, Rafa apro-
RAFAEL ESCOLÁ
bó el primer examen de ingreso en
la Escuela Superior de Ingenieros
Industriales de Barcelona.
Se disponía a comenzar las vacaciones de verano cuando, en julio
de1936, estalló la Guerra Civil española y –por negarse a injuriar a la
religión católica– fue encarcelado
bajo la acusación de connivencia
con el enemigo. Estuvo prisionero
casi tres años, hasta el verano de
1939, en que logró escapar junto
con su hermano Manolo.
Viendo el lado positivo de las cosas,
como a él le gustaba, se puede
decir que el periodo de Guerra fue
para Rafa un crisol donde cristalizaron muchas de las cualidades que
posteriormente le hicieron destacar
en el trabajo: serenidad y sentido
positivo ante las dificultades, capacidad para suplir con imaginación la
carencia de medios, optimismo y
fortaleza.
Diez meses después de terminar la
guerra pudo proseguir sus estudios.
Tenía 20 años y, a mediados de
1940, ya había terminado el segundo año de Ingreso cuya preparación
había realizado en la academia
Humet. Allí conoció a Rafael Termes
con quien cursó estudios, a partir
de abril de 1940, en la Escuela de
Ingenieros. Termes dio a conocer el
Opus Dei a Rafael Escolá, y éste
decidió orientar su vida cristiana en
el seno de esta institución católica
como miembro Numerario. Siempre
se sintió seguro y feliz con la decisión tomada y, por eso, pudo escribir en 1994, un año antes de su
fallecimiento: "Llevo casi 50 años de
felicidad en el Opus Dei, y tengo la
clara convicción de que es el camino que Dios tenía reservado para
mí".
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Primeros años
de profesión
Rafa finalizó la carrera de ingeniero
industrial en Barcelona en 1945,
año en el que se trasladó a vivir a
Madrid para trabajar como jefe de
obras en una empresa, Edificios y
Obras, S.A. (EOSA), dedicada principalmente a la construcción y reforma de inmuebles. A partir de 1949
se ocupó del departamento de
estudios de dicha empresa y, en
1952, de la gerencia. Eran tiempos
de escasez y no había recursos
para hacer obras de gran calidad,
por lo que Rafa tuvo que lidiar con
muchos problemas financieros y de
suministro y, aunque aquello no era
propiamente un trabajo de ingeniería –por la que él sentía verdadera
vocación-–, lo hizo a gusto porque
en ese momento se dio cuenta de
que era lo que tenía que hacer.
Paralelamente, desde comienzos
de los años 50, colaboró con la
academia INAR (acrónimo de Ingeniería y Arquitectura), donde se preparaba a futuros ingenieros para las
pruebas de ingreso en las Escuelas
Superiores. Rafa se entregó a la formación de aquellos jóvenes, llevando la responsabilidad del centro y la
coordinación de las clases. Uno de
los alumnos, Joaquín Aguinaga –ya
fallecido–, que posteriormente fue
Director de la Escuela de Ingenieros
de Bilbao, recuerda a Rafa como un
joven –son sus palabras–: "de talante muy atrayente y, por otra parte,
polémico. Locuaz, muy participativo, enormemente fácil para el diálogo, siempre con unos enfoques
peculiares. Sabía, sin faltar a la
seriedad, encontrar el aspecto
divertido de las situaciones difíciles." Otro de aquellos jóvenes profesores y estudiantes fue Joaquín
Casellas, posteriormente Director
de esta Escuela, y persona muy
querida por todos sus alumnos,
pues ejerció con carisma, entre
otras, la docencia de la Mecánica
Racional, junto al Excmo. Sr. Rector
de la Universidad, Profesor Bastero,
aquí presente.
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La madurez profesional
sus servicios. Entonces, constituyó
una sociedad según un tipo legal
que se llamaba "Profesional en el
libre ejercicio de la profesión", lo
cual le permitió tener a su cargo a
las personas que necesitaba para el
desarrollo de los trabajos que se le
encomendaban.
Un encargo de la Junta de Obras
del Puerto de Bilbao llevó a Rafa a
realizar frecuentes viajes a la capital
vizcaína. Estos viajes le permitieron
relacionarse con la industria del
Señorío y, en verano de 1957, Fernando Gondra, consejero delegado
A la edad de 38 años, Rafa comende La Basconia, le encargó dirigir el
montaje de "Laminación en banzó el periodo profesional más fecundo de su vida, pues a los cuatro
das", un importante proyecto industrial. La misión de Rafa consistía no
años de fundar Idom, -entonces
sólo en dirigir el
DOM (Dirección
de Obras y Monmontaje de la
industria sino en
tajes)-, en 1963,
lograrlo también
la empresa había
con el menor
realizado ya singulares trabajos
coste y la mayor
calidad posible.
y contaba con
Rafa llevó a cabo
más
de
20
ese trabajo en
empleados.
En una decisión
calidad de "trabajador autónomo"
que tiene pocos
(en terminología
precedentes en
actual), convirtiénla historia de la
dose así en uno
empresa reciende los pioneros de
te, Rafa decidió
la consultoría en
entonces repartir
ingeniería
en
el valor patrimoEspaña, de un
nial de IDOM
modo más espeentre los ingeniecífico, de la Direcros que trabajan
ción Integrada de
en la Firma: no
DR. FELIPE PRÓSPER
Proyectos.
quería
tener
empleados sino
Al comenzar el
socios en el tratrabajo de La Basconia, Rafa conbajo y en la propiedad. A partir de
trató como ayudante a Luis Olaor1965 extendió este reparto a todas
túa; como muchos de ustedes
las personas que trabajan en IDOM,
saben, Luis fue su más íntimo colasin distinguir titulación académica o
borador, a lo largo de su vida profefunción. Estas decisiones nos dan
sional, y el segundo presidente de
una medida de la calidad humana
IDOM. Luis falleció el año pasado, el
de Rafa, de la amplitud de su visión
26 de Julio de 2003, y a él quiero
del trabajo y de la generosidad con
dedicar estas palabras, que él
sus colaboradores.
debiera haber pronunciado, y, en
estos momentos, un entrañable y
Innovador y creador de
cariñoso recuerdo.
oportunidades
Les puedo asegurar que muchas
En 1959, al terminar el encargo de
personas que conocieron a Rafa
la Basconia, la fama de Rafa como
guardan una clara imagen de su pridirector de proyectos se había
mer encuentro. Yo, desde luego,
extendido por Bilbao, por lo que
varias empresas –"Eduardo K.
soy uno de ellos. Le conocí cuando
Earle", "Babcok Wilcok" y "Altos
tenía 21 años, y recuerdo que me
Hornos de Vizcaya"–, solicitaron
recibió en su casa, dándome un
trato que hizo sentirme una persona
importante. Fue rápido, agudo, incisivo y, sin perder un minuto, se interesó por mis inquietudes: qué hacía
y qué quería hacer. Aunque yo era
sólo un estudiante, me ofreció la
inmediata oportunidad de empezar
a trabajar, de aprovechar un poco
más el tiempo, de aprender; aquel
verano ya estuve en IDOM haciendo
unas “prácticas”.
Al hilo de estos recuerdos, podría
hablarles de multitud de virtudes,
profesionales y humanas, que
aprendí junto a Rafa en el ejercicio
de la ingeniería: de su capacidad
para trabajar mucho y bien; de su
desvelo por los compañeros y por el
bienestar de todos durante el trabajo; de su audacia a la hora de proyectar las mejores soluciones para
el Cliente; y de su espíritu abierto a
la colaboración con todos: compañeros, competidores, clientes y
contratistas.
La imaginación de Rafa para aportar permanentemente ideas originales ante cualquier situación, su
visión amplia del trabajo y de la relación profesional y muchas de sus
cualidades despertaron mi confianza y la ilusión por trabajar junto a él.
Durante muchos años tuve como
meta profesional estar cerca de
Rafa para aprender. Casi todo lo
que sé de ingeniería lo he aprendido
de él; también la mayor parte de mis
conocimientos de empresa se los
debo a Rafa.
En el arte de la dirección empresarial Rafa fue un autodidacta genial.
Su modo de hacer, su estilo de
gobernar y de trabajar en equipo
estaba fundamentado en unos profundos principios humanos con los
que fue siempre coherente. Uno de
esos principios era la sinceridad en
las relaciones humanas. Tenía una
confianza ilimitada en las personas
y daba por supuesto que las personas la tenían en él. Este juego de
certidumbres recíprocas producía
un efecto de gran cohesión en la
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organización, haciéndola así más
competitiva. Disfrutaba relacionándose con quienes le rodeaban.
Ahora que se habla tanto del sentido de pertenencia e inclusión en la
empresa es oportuno recordar
cómo, la sencillez de Rafa en el
trato a todos, lograba generar una
sensación, casi natural, de que lo
que podíamos aportar a la empresa
era realmente importante.
Fue imaginativo, con una exuberancia
prodigiosa para innovar las relaciones
humanas y asociativas dentro del
mundo empresarial, IDOM es un caso
particular y singular de esta característica, donde las personas participan
en el valor, resultados, gestión y vida
de la empresa, el propio Rafa fue perfilando y definiendo soluciones originales con asombrosa facilidad, como
si fueran cuestiones lógicas y naturales; y en cierta medida lo son… como
todas las ideas geniales, una vez que
han sido realizadas.
De su coherente humanismo aprendí lo que en la práctica significan
expresiones como "la persona es el
todo de la empresa", "lo primero es
satisfacer las necesidades reales del
Cliente", "es preciso ser verdaderos
amigos de los proveedores y clientes", "estamos aquí para servir a la
sociedad", y un largo etc. Creía en
las personas, y a ellas se daba
constantemente en el trabajo.
Su realidad fue el resultado de una
naturaleza alegre y generosa forjada
por el amor, la disponibilidad y la
entrega a todos los demás. Pienso
que realmente fue un hombre irrepetible.
Su espíritu armonizador le llevó no
sólo a fundar y repartir su empresa
sino también, a poner las bases
para la creación de la Asociación
Vasca de Empresas de Ingeniería y
Consultoría (AVIC), a crear en 1974
la Asociación Española de Consultores de Ingeniería (ASINCE), y a
integrar dicha organización, en
1977, en la Federación Internacional
de Ingeniería y Consultoría (FIDIC).
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Puesto que, como he dicho, resulta
imposible ilustrar en unos pocos
minutos todas las dimensiones de la
fecunda y polifacética personalidad
de Rafa, voy a limitarme a dar algunos retazos sobre una de las más
significativas: su preocupación por
la formación y el desarrollo de las
personas.
Pasión por la educación
Al llegar a Bilbao, Rafa comienza a
dar clases en la Escuela de Ingenieros y lo hace durante cinco años, de
1959 a 1964. Enseñó una disciplina
en la que era autoridad indiscutida:
"Instalaciones complementarias de
fábricas". El interés de Rafa por el
crecimiento intelectual y humano de
los jóvenes, era enorme: en aquellos
años de intensa actividad profesional no se contentó con sacar adelante importantes encargos de
clientes y con dar los primeros
pasos para la creación de una
empresa de ingeniería, sino que
todavía tuvo energía para "liarse la
manta a la cabeza" y ponerse a dar
clase.
Pero no sólo eso sino que, cuando
en 1964, por un cambio de los planes de estudio, tuvo que dejar la
Escuela, decidió comenzar en Idom
lo que más adelante se llamaría la
"Escuela de Posgraduados". Rafa
ayudó a muchos alumnos a que
aprovecharan el tiempo, a que iniciaran su actividad profesional, a
que hicieran unas prácticas hasta
encontrar un trabajo formalizado y,
mientras tanto, siguieran aprendiendo y formándose. Les ofrecía su
tutoría y asesoramiento y un lugar
en las oficinas de Idom y, en algunos casos, les sugería y ayudaba a
que hicieran el proyecto fin de carrera. Por dicha Escuela pasaron más
de 400 personas, muchos de los
cuales trabajan hoy en Idom.
Rafa colaboró, además, en un original proyecto de enseñanza media,
puesto en marcha por el Colegio
Gaztelueta (Getxo) en el curso
1957-58, en una época en la que la
RAFAEL ESCOLÁ
expansión industrial y las necesidades económicas de las familias vizcaínas motivaron que muchos jóvenes se incorporasen al trabajo sin
haber podido realizar estudios profesionales o de Bachillerato. Por la
tarde-noche, cuando los escolares
ordinarios abandonaban Gaztelueta, Rafa y otros profesionales ofrecían gratuitamente sus conocimientos: desde la primera alfabetización
hasta el Bachillerato Superior,
pasando por la Maestría Industrial o
la Delineación.
Además de ser profesor "nocturno"
de aquellos chicos durante la semana laboral, Rafa les dedicaba gran
parte de su fin de semana, organizando salidas a los montes del
entorno, y actividades de formación
humana y cristiana. En los primeros
años, las reuniones tuvieron que
hacerse al aire libre, o en algún esta-
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8
blecimiento público. Con el tiempo,
la familia de uno de los alumnos
cedió un piso donde, junto a otros
amigos, Rafael fundó el club juvenil
"Eretza", en Barakaldo.
La elegancia profesional
Por último, desde 1984 hasta 1992,
Rafa impartió, en estas mismas
aulas, lecciones de deontología que
estaban fundamentadas en su dilatada experiencia profesional. Especialmente dotado para el análisis de
las relaciones humanas, Rafa meditó largamente sobre las disyuntivas
éticas que le salieron al paso en su
vida laboral. Anécdotas relativas al
secreto profesional, a los proyectos
innecesarios, a los dictámenes interesados, a los cambios de empresa,
a la filtración de datos, a la apropiación de ideas, a los cálculos no
veraces, y a muchos otros asuntos,
fueron objeto de su personal reflexión y enseñanza.
Me gustaría destacar dos características del magisterio de Rafa que
pienso deberían tenerse en cuenta
en la dinámica de la Cátedra Rafael
Escolá de Ética Profesional. La primera es que Rafa no era un profesional de la ética o de la filosofía,
sino un ingeniero experimentado y
profundamente responsable que
reflexionaba sobre sus propias
vivencias. Creo que en esto radicó el
éxito de sus lecciones y su fama
como profesor, en que había ejercido con competencia la ingeniería
durante muchos años, a lo largo de
los cuales fue reflexionando sobre
ese ejercicio desde una perspectiva
ética para, finalmente, condensar
toda esa experiencia en esa nutrida
colección de "casos" que le han
hecho famoso y que se encuentran
en el libro de "Deontología para
Ingenieros", publicado por primera
vez en 1987.
La segunda característica reseñable
del magisterio de Rafa era el principio inspirador de su deontología: lo
que él mismo llamó "la ética de la
elegancia". Para Rafa, la solución de
un dilema ético no era sólo el resultado de la aplicación de un conjunto
de principios abstractos, más o
menos rígidos, más o menos jerarquizados, sino que, con frecuencia,
era suficiente y mucho más simple
aplicar un principio guía positivo: el
de actuar con elegancia profesional.
Rafa salvaba las situaciones comprometidas con suavidad, sin faltar a
la independencia profesional y a la
honestidad, pero sin dar "lecciones
de comportamiento", dejando mal a
las personas. Hacía compatible la
más cabal honradez con la más
extrema amabilidad.
La persona a la que hoy rendimos
homenaje colaboró con el mundo
universitario a lo largo de toda su
vida, hasta el momento final. Por
eso pienso que es especialmente
oportuna la distinción que hoy le tributa la Universidad de Navarra. Su
último viaje a Sudamérica fue precisamente a una Universidad, la de
"La Sabana", en Colombia, donde
estuvo trabajando todo el mes de
julio de 1995, en un estado muy
avanzado de la enfermedad terminal
que padecía desde hacía más de un
año. Regresó a España el día 1 de
agosto, y pocos días después tuvo
que ser ingresado por última vez en
la Clínica Universitaria de Navarra,
donde murió, el 2 de septiembre, a
los 76 años de edad.
Epílogo
Rafa fue un hombre que yo me atrevería a calificar de "genial". Marcó
tendencias y creó estilo en el ejercicio libre de la profesión. Se anticipó
a los tiempos y acertó. Pero sobre
todo, la vida de Rafa se entiende
cuando se considera su compromiso con las personas, su generosidad
y su capacidad de trabajo. Sentó las
bases que hicieron posible la felicidad y la realización de muchos. Y
por eso, todos nosotros le estamos
muy agradecidos.
Muchas gracias.
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9
Rediscovering Human Values*
Prof. Jeffrey Pfeffer
Thomas D. Dee II Professor of Organizational Behavior in the
Graduate School of Business at Stanford University
ABSTRACT
The recent spate of financial
scandals begs for explanation and
remediation. Evaluating actions
primarily in terms of their
consequences, often narrowly
defined in terms of efficiency,
productivity, or profit, is one source
of the problem. And, current
conceptions of economics
emphasize the importance of
outcomes above all and the
primacy of outcomes to
shareholders in evaluating results.
Therefore, a case can be made
that it is consequentialist logic and
thinking, produced in part by
economic language and
assumptions, that have helped
create the current situation.
Remedying the problem will entail
exposing students to alternative
models of behavior and
emphasizing, in both school and
organizations, doing the right
things, not simply doing things for
the presumably right reasons. In
following this path of emphasizing
values as well as consequences,
there is hope for the
professionalization of management.
We have learned a lot in the last
several years. We have learned that
the use of equity incentives, such
as stock options, for CEOs does
not ensure that companies will be
well managed or that shareholders
will benefit from the supposed
alignment of their interests with
senior executives (e.g., Blasi and
Kruse, 2004; Dalton, et al., 2003).
On the contrary, many people now
believe that options encouraged
highly risky behavior and the
various corporate scandals that
occurred (e.g., Pfeffer, 1998;
Morgenson, 2002). We have
learned that the unfettered, singleminded pursuit of shareholder
value is not necessarily good for
companies, their employees, or
maybe even for the shareholders
(Jacobs, 1991). This lesson, which
has both a theoretical and
empirical foundation (Aoki, 1988),
seems to be repeatedly forgotten.
We have learned that CEO tenure
is declining (Blumenthal, 2003;
Martin, 2000; Radler, 2003), even
as CEO pay continues to rise—
both absolutely and relative to the
pay of others in the organization—
and that CEO compensation
seems to have only a weak
relationship to company
performance (e.g., Crystal, 1991;
Jensen and Murphy, 1990). We
have learned that senior leaders of
business organizations, at least in
the United States, are now among
the least respected people in public
opinion surveys (Carroll, 2003), and
that the capital markets and
business face a crisis of legitimacy
that stands in sharp contrast to the
situation of a few years ago.
What we have yet to do is to put
these various observations together
and to figure out how and why this
all came about and what might be
done about it. In this paper, I want
to offer my perspective on what
has gone on and why, a
perspective informed both by data
and by social science theory, and
to use this diagnosis to come up
with some ideas to make the future
both different from and better than
the past.
The argument proceeds as follows.
One root cause of the wave of
corporate scandals and financial
misconduct is not simply the
primacy of shareholder value as the
objective for companies and their
leaders, but something even more
fundamental: the dominance of a
logic that says that organizations
and their leaders undertake, and
should undertake, actions mostly if
not solely for intended
consequences defined almost
exclusively in economic or
efficiency terms. The idea that
actions are to be evaluated by their
consequences is so commonplace
as to be almost unexceptionable,
being an important premise of
behaviorism in social psychology
(Skinner, 1969; Luthans and
Kreitner, 1985) as well as an
assumption of economics, where
utility maximization is a basic
foundation of the theory (e.g.,
Kuttner, 1996: 41). But, this
consequentialist logic almost
necessarily leads to unethical
behavior on the part of business
school students and corporate
*Paper prepared for and presented at the Inaugural Lecture of the Rafael Escola Chair of Ethics at the School of Engineering of the University of Navarra in San Sebastian,
Spain, on Friday, April 30, 2004. The ideas in this paper are, in part, based on research and writing I have done with Fabrizio Ferraro, Christina T. Fong, and Robert I. Sutton.
I am grateful for their collaboration, wisdom, and intellectual stimulation. Needless to say, I bear full responsibility for the conclusions and recommendations of this paper.
The comments of Beth Benjamin, Charles O’Reilly, and Alejo Sison on earlier drafts of this manuscript are gratefully acknowledged.
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10
leaders. That is so for some simple
reasons. It is almost always
possible to construct a rationale for
doing almost anything if the only
metric to be applied to the action is
the potential positive consequence
for something like shareholder
value in the case of corporate
leaders or academic success, as
measured by graduation or higher
grades, in the case of students,
and if other concerns such as the
appropriateness or moral
dimension of the behavior in
question are ignored.
Consider two examples to help see
the plausibility of the argument.
Robert Jaedicke is a former
accounting professor and the
former associate dean and dean of
the Stanford business school. He
was also the chairman of the audit
committee of Enron and served on
the Enron board since the mid1980s. The question posed by
those who know Jaedicke well is
how could this ethical, honest, and
decent man have been caught up
in such a massive financial fraud?
There are many possible and
plausible answers, including a) the
complexity of the transactions that
ultimately brought the demise of
Enron, b) Jaedicke’s long
association with the company and
its CEO, Ken Lay, that may have
made him complacent and
reluctant to challenge a long-time
colleague, and c) the fact that
responsibility can become diffused
when many people are present and
observing an action (e.g., Latane
and Darley, 1968), in that no single
individual may feel particularly
responsible or comfortable with
disagreeing with the others. But
there is another possibility as well.
Suppose Enron, with its high stock
price, needed to show growing
earnings or earnings of a certain
amount as expected by analysts in
order to maintain and even
increase that share price. A
transaction is presented with the
following possible outcomes:
approve the possibly questionable
deal and permit the company to
continue to report favorable
financial results and maintain the
stock price, or refuse to approve it
and potentially face a calamitous
decline in shareholder value. If
maintaining shareholder value is the
only thing that matters—if it is only
the short-term results that count—it
is clear that there will be enormous
pressures to approve the deal and,
in fact, doing so is probably the
logical thing to do.
Or consider another example. If
students attend school solely to get
a better job when they graduate,
then what matters is getting in and
getting out of the program, not
necessarily what they learn or what
they do while they are there. With a
logic that says school is a means
to an end, cheating or otherwise
cutting corners will appear more
acceptable, compared to a
situation where students are in
school because of their interest in
the subject and their desire to
master the material, or to learn a
set of values and behaviors that will
form a foundation for subsequent
conduct. In these latter cases,
cutting corners or cheating will be
almost inconceivable, since doing
so would diminish the students’
enjoyment of and engagement in
the material in the first instance and
result in their learning the wrong
lesson and bad behavior in the
second.
This potential downside of doing
everything "in order to…" raises an
additional question: Where did we
learn that the only thing that
mattered is outcomes or results,
often narrowly conceived in
economic or efficiency terms, with
less concern for how they are
produced or what effects actions
may have on other stakeholders?
One source, albeit not the only one,
for this idea is economic theory
with its associated language and
assumptions that have come to
dominate modern discourse and
thinking. So, the argument is that
economic language and
assumptions produce an emphasis
on outcomes narrowly defined, and
in turn, this emphasis on
consequences creates an
environment in which cutting
corners, cheating, and unethical
behavior—because the ends justify
what means are required—
becomes more likely. Because
business schools are increasingly
dominated by economics, the
education of business school
students may be as much a part of
the problem as the solution. And
because modern management has
adopted both the language and the
principles of economics to the
exclusion of alternative
perspectives, management is
hampered in becoming a true
profession, where
professionalization is defined, in
part, by the requirement to act in
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the best interests of others, such
as clients, not solely for one’s own
gain (Khurana, Nohria, and Penrice,
2004).
This line of argument has
implications for how we educate
students and for how we think
about the management process.
The most important implication is
an idea that is not new—that
values matter, not just for abstract
discussions of philosophy and
education, but for the management
of organizations as well. Only if and
when we become comfortable and
committed to building organizations
anchored in fundamental human
values will the potential ill effects of
consequentialist thinking be
diminished.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH
THINKING JUST IN TERMS OF
CONSEQUENCES
Perhaps the best place to describe
what the logic of consequences is
and what’s wrong with it is to look
at one reaction to some of my own
writing. Some years ago I wrote a
11
book entitled The Human Equation:
Building Profits by Putting People
First (Pfeffer, 1998). In that book, I
made the argument that there were
a set of high performance or high
commitment work practices that
were both good for profits and
good for people—that the interests
of people (or labor) and the
interests of companies (or capital)
were not inexorably or inevitably in
opposition, as various labor
process theories had maintained
(e.g., Parker and Slaughter, 1988;
Graham, 1995; Marchington and
Grugulis, 2000). For instance,
providing people with information
about the company and its
operations and strategy—open
book management (e.g., Davis,
1997; Case, 1995; Stack, 1994)—
and letting people make decisions
using that information in a
decentralized structure, was good
for people as it encouraged them
to learn and develop new
competencies and also permitted
them to actually use their gifts and
skills in their work life, thereby
becoming more self-actualized on
the job. These practices of
information sharing and
decentralization were also good for
companies (e.g., Levine and Tyson,
1990). Decentralized decision
making and information sharing
enlisted discretionary effort on the
part of people who were more likely
to feel engaged in and committed
to an enterprise where they had
some say in what occurred and
were trusted with data and treated
like responsible adults, and also
permitted the organization to
access and use the knowledge of
front-line employees who frequently
accumulated vast amounts of tacit
knowledge from their years of
experience.
One of the companies that actually
practiced a very decentralized style
of management with lots of
information sharing was the large
independent power produced AES
(O’Reilly and Pfeffer, 2000: Ch. 7).
The CEO at the time, Dennis
Bakke, came to Stanford and
talked about the company and its
operations and values. Although
Dennis agreed with many of the
points about the connections
between management practices
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12
and economic results, he did not
like the subtitle of the book,
"Building Profits by Putting People
First," at all, because he objected
to the link it made between people
management and company
profitability. His argument was as
follows: There are some things that
ought to be done not because of
their consequences, but because
they are simply the right thing to
do, regardless of their economic
consequences. Because people
spent so much of their life at work,
had their identities to some extent
tied up with their organizational
role, and depended for their
livelihood on their employer, what
happened to them at work was
really important. Therefore, treating
people with respect and dignity,
letting them develop all of their
potential and capabilities, providing
an environment where they could
make decisions, and basing their
compensation on the economic
success of the organization so they
could fully share in that success
represented not just some
management practices to induce
higher productivity, but rather some
fundamental principles that should
form the basis of people’s
relationship with their employers.
Bakke argued that if you did
something, like encouraging people
to learn and make decisions, in
order to accomplish some business
or financial objective, the behavior
or management approach would
necessarily be contingent or
conditional on the ability to
demonstrate, and to continue to be
able to demonstrate, the
connection between that behavior
and its business results. Once that
connection was no longer evident
or came into question, the
implementation of a management
approach that was so beneficial for
people would be in peril.
What Bakke was addressing and
critiquing in my writing was the
fundamental issue of
consequentialist thinking and what
he was advocating, at least in
some circumstances, is its
opposite: the idea that there are
basic duties, rights, and
obligations—fundamental moral
principles—that need to be
followed regardless of their
consequences (see Bakke,
2005). The idea that there are
fundamental rights, duties, and
obligations that transcend
consequences such as economic
efficiency seems to me to be
under attack and very much
suspect in the contemporary
environment. In our schools,
particularly business schools, the
place that I know best, and
particularly in the United States,
the country I know best, we are
in both subtle and less subtle
ways encouraging people to
focus on outcomes and results—
consequences—and to believe,
as a result, that the ends—most
frequently economic ends of
efficiency and productivity—justify
the means.
As one example, consider the
case of collective bargaining and
unionization in the United States.
The proportion of the labor force
covered by collective
representation has declined from
about one-third of the labor force in
the 1950s to about 10 percent
today (Adams, 1995). Unionization
or its opposite, remaining
nonunion, is almost invariably
discussed in terms of the effects of
unions on profits, productivity, and
competitiveness, for instance, as
affected by union impacts on wage
rates (e.g., Freeman and Medoff,
1984). Opposition to unionization,
when it does not rest on ideological
grounds, is resisted by managers
who believe that unionization
delimits their discretion in
organizing and managing
enterprises which must respond
quickly to changing competitive
conditions (Kochan, Katz, and
McKersie, 1986).
What is somehow lost in the
debate about union effects on
economic efficiency and allocative
outcomes is the fact that the right
to bargain collectively and the
associated right of freedom of
association has, for literally
decades, been considered to be a
fundamental human right (e.g.,
Adams, 2002). The International
Labor Organization, an agency of
the United Nations, again in 1998
reiterated something first stated in
the 1940s: the responsibility of
member states to respect and
promote five fundamental human
rights. These rights are freedom of
association, effective recognition of
the right to collective bargaining,
the elimination of all forms of forced
or compulsory labor (slavery), the
abolition of child labor, and the
elimination of discrimination in
employment (Adams, 2001: 524). If
freedom of association and the
right to bargain collectively is a
fundamental human right, then as
such, it takes primacy over
considerations such as whether
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collective bargaining is efficient, or
its effects on productivity, or even
its effects on national
competitiveness (Adams, 1999). In
the discussions of the
consequences of unions on
economic outcomes, we see the
reprise of debates about whether
child labor and health and safety in
the workplace, for instance, should
be regulated by the government
because of the "costs" of those
regulations on employment and
competitiveness.
The problems with an approach
that emphasizes consequences
over rights and social values are
many. The likelihood of dishonest
behavior is increased, as evidence
to be discussed below suggests.
But there are other costs as well.
As the large literature on intrinsic
motivation and insufficient
justification argues (e.g., Deci,
1975; Lepper and Greene, 1975),
when people do things to achieve
some reward or avoid some
punishment—when their actions
are primarily motivated, in other
words, by the anticipation of future
extrinsic consequences—intrinsic
task motivation and interest goes
down. Moreover, there is evidence
that at least some people seek
meaning and spiritual fulfillment in
their work and organizational
affiliations (Ashmos and Duchon,
2000; Mitroff and Denton, 1999).
To the extent that the ability to
achieve fulfillment of these spiritual
goals in the work setting get
compromised by the demands for
achieving specific economic results
regardless of the process, the
consequence is what we currently
observe—less employee loyalty,
more turnover, and more efforts to
find meaning in other, nonwork
aspects of people’s lives.
METRICS FOR ASSESSING
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE
There was a time when a
stakeholder model (e.g., Freeman,
13
1984; Jones and Wicks, 1999) of
the business corporation was more
accepted. The idea was that
companies had numerous
stakeholder groups, including
employees, customers, creditors,
and shareholders, and it was the
task of senior management to
balance the demands of each of
these groups. This point of view
was not just a normative position
on how things should be, it was
(and is) also descriptively accurate.
Without customers, there is no
company. Without employees a
company would not be able to
provide goods and services to its
customers. And, companies need
capital, in the form of debt and
equity, so investors and creditors
are also stakeholders with interests
in the well being of the firm.
Furthermore, as legal entities
chartered by government, many
believed that business firms also
had a social responsibility to serve,
or at least not harm, the larger
social and physical environment in
which they existed. Organizations
require social legitimacy to survive
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 193202), and therefore need to engage
in activities and adopt structures
and practices that ensure this
legitimacy.
Over time, for numerous reasons
that need not concern us here (but
see Kuttner, 1996, among others,
for a discussion), the stakeholder
model has fallen into disfavor and
has been replaced by a conception
of the business organization in
which shareholders are preeminent.
Although this movement clearly
began in the United States, this
idea of shareholder (as contrasted
with stakeholder) capitalism is
spreading, first to Europe and
particularly the United Kingdom,
and even to Japan. One argument
for the normative goal of
maximizing stock price
is that this goal serves
much like that of profit
maximization in other
economic models,
such that pursuing this
goal is consistent with
maximizing efficiency
(see Kuttner, 1996 for
a description of the
economic model of
maximization and its
assumptions).
However, as Aoki
(1988) has shown, this
argument is not
invariably true and under some
conditions, management decisions
that take into account the interests
of employees as well as
shareholders actually produce
better results.
Empirically documenting the shift in
the standards and criteria by which
corporations are judged and
assessing these standards on a
comparative, as well as an
historical basis, is an important
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14
task (see, for instance, Abegglen
and Stalk, 1985, for a comparison
of priorities in Japanese and U.S.
corporations). For the present, we
rely on one reasonable proxy, a
study that examined what criteria
were employed in management
studies where some form of
performance was the dependent
variable. Walsh, Weber, and
Margolis’s (2003) empirical study of
management research found that
interest in some measure of human
welfare as an outcome of
managerial action peaked in the
late 1970s, but that recently very
little management research
considers anything other than
economic performance or some
variant of that as a dependent
variable. They concluded that "the
public interest…holds a tenuous
place in management scholarship"
(Walsh, et al, 2003: 860), and it
seems reasonable to argue that
this emphasis in management
scholarship reflects broader trends
in the larger society.
THE RESULTS OF
CONSEQUENTIALIST LOGIC
for an MBA degree" (Bruce and
Edgington, 2003: 12).
As I have argued, if the only thing
that matters is results, then almost
any method undertaken to produce
those results will be acceptable.
We can trace the consequences of
this logic in action most clearly if
we explore the norms and culture
of business school students.
One interesting question is how
much of these differences are the
result of self-selection—students
planning to enter business are
different from other students even
before they start their education—
and how much of the difference is
a consequence of what the
schools teach students once they
are enrolled. This question is not
likely to be an either-or proposition,
as both effects may be important.
There is, however, little doubt that
what business schools teach their
students does have an effect on
their values. For instance, the
Aspen Institute has conducted a
longitudinal study in which
business school students were
surveyed at various times as they
progressed through their (in this
case graduate) business education.
The results of those surveys
indicate that, over their time in the
program, students rated
shareholder value as a more
important criterion for companies
and rated criteria such as fulfilling
customer needs and product
quality less important (Aspen
Institute, 2001).
Extensive data demonstrate three
facts. First, business school
students are the most instrumental
in their orientation toward their
education, viewing getting a degree
in business mostly in terms of what
it can do to enhance their salaries
and job-finding prospects. So,
Rynes, Trank, Lawson, and Ilies
(2003: 270) noted that "research
has shown that business students
are more likely than almost any
others…to view education primarily
as a stepping stone to lucrative
careers." McCabe and Trevino
(1995: 211) reported that business
school students placed "the least
importance on knowledge and
understanding, economic and
racial justice, and the significance
of developing a meaningful
philosophy of life" compared to
other students. And, their study
found that "students planning to
enter business rated being well-off
financially as a significantly more
important life goal than any other
occupational group" (McCabe and
Trevino, 1995: 211). Moreover,
similar results hold for students
outside of the United States as
well. A report from the United
Kingdom stated that "over 90% of
students take MBAs to improve
their career opportunities" (Council
for Excellence in Management and
Leadership, 2002: 18). The idea
that business school students are
more "in it for the money" than
students pursuing other
occupations has developed a
taken-for-granted aspect: "Any
examination…of graduate
management education must
consider the return on investment
Second, a more instrumental
orientation toward education
results, not surprisingly, in more
cheating in school. McCabe and
Trevino (1996) found that students
who were attending school
primarily in order to obtain a
credential to get a better job were
more willing to cut corners and
cheat than students with a stronger
intrinsic interest in the subject. And,
McCabe and Trevino (1995)
reported that the more importance
their survey respondents placed on
financial success, the more likely
the respondents were to report
cheating.
If business school students are
more instrumentally oriented
toward school, and an instrumental
orientation is associated with
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15
that such thinking is characterized
by people with business school
backgrounds, can induce less than
honest and ethical behavior. One
study of organizational citations for
violating occupational safety and
health regulations found that the
relationship between organizational
size and number of citations was
moderated by the MBA
composition of the top
management team (Williams,
Barret, and Brabston, 2000).
Specifically, "the link between firm
size and corporate illegal activity
becomes stronger as the
percentage of TMT [top
management team] members
possessing an MBA degree…rises"
(Williams, et al., 2000: 706).
cutting corners and cheating, then
the inference would be that
business school students are more
likely to cheat and would be less
likely to sanction academic
dishonesty. And that is precisely
what the data show. Research by
Don McCabe and his colleagues
shows that undergraduate
business school students are more
likely to self-report cheating in their
classes than other students such
as those in programs related to
law, medicine, or the sciences
(McCabe, 2001; McCabe,
Dukerich, and Dutton, 1991; 1992).
The intention to go into business as
a career is also a predictor of
cheating (McCabe, 2001). As an
example of the data on cheating
that have been collected, McCabe
and Trevino (1995: 210), in a survey
of almost 16,000 undergraduates
at 31 colleges and universities,
found that "business majors report
almost 50% more [cheating]
violations than any of their peer
groups and almost twice as many
violations as the average student in
our study." As another piece of
evidence, Hendershott, Drinan, and
Cross (2000) reported that 66% of
undergraduate business majors at
a private, Catholic university had
observed cheating on exams, as
opposed to only 32.1% in law and
17.6% in nursing (cited in Brown
and Choong, 2003: 30).
Students in business, concerned
more just with outcomes and less
attuned to the processes and
values implied by those processes,
are also less likely to try and do
anything about cheating when they
observe it than students in other
fields. Hendershot, Drinan, and
Cross (2000) reported that 11.3%
of the law students, 3.2% of the
nursing students, but 0% of the
business students would report
cheating to authorities if they
observed it occurring (cited in
Brown and Choong, 2003: 30).
Although there is obviously less
opportunity to formally study how
an emphasis on economic
consequences plays itself out in the
world of business and
organizations more generally, there
is certainly some evidence
consistent with the argument that
thinking primarily in terms of
outcomes, at least to the extent
Another strand of literature relevant
to the effects of emphasizing
consequences on behavior are
studies that explore the effects of
incentives on conduct. If we accept
the argument that financial
incentives given for achieving some
result in an organization are likely to
cause people to focus more on
obtaining that result and less on
anything other than this end
consequence, then the evidence
on incentive effects is relevant for
our discussion of how an emphasis
on consequences can distort
behavior. So, for example, incentive
pay for garbage truck drivers in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, where
the drivers get to go home at full
pay as soon as they finish their
routes, resulted in more traffic
accidents and more drivers going
to the dump with their trucks filled
to over the legal limit (Associated
Press, 2004). The recent scandal of
overbooking oil reserves at Shell Oil
Company may have its roots in the
incentive to maintain the
company’s stock price. "In a 2001
report, Houston consultants Rose
and Associates noted the pressure
on managers at publicly traded
energy companies to ‘push the
envelope of credibility in effort to
buoy investor confidence and thus
increase stock value’’’ (Cummins, et
al., 2004). And, a study of teacher
cheating in the Chicago public
schools to artificially inflate
students’ scores on standardized
tests concluded that the observed
frequency of cheating responded
strongly to fairly minor changes in
incentives (Jacob and Levitt, 2002).
This evidence, then, is also
consistent with the idea that an
emphasis on consequences,
created through incentives,
provides an impetus to unethical
and illegal behavior.
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16
THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS
AND ITS LANGUAGE AND
ASSUMPTIONS IN THE
PRODUCTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALIST THINKING
The next part of the argument
concerns where this emphasis on
consequences above all else
comes from. I argue that the
emphasis on consequences, and
mostly consequences measured in
a reasonably circumscribed
fashion, is in part the result of the
ascendancy of economics and
economic language. Economics
has become the dominant social
science. Fourcade-Gourinchas
(2002) noted that nearly every
country now offers economics
classes in the higher education
system. Citation patterns in
academia show the growing
importance of economics in
political science (Green and
Shapiro, 1994), law (Posner, 2003),
and organization science (Pfeffer,
1997). Economics is cited more by
other social sciences even as
economics cites those other social
sciences much less frequently
(Pieters and Baumgartner, 2002:
Baron and Hannan, 1994), which
provides evidence of the status
advantage enjoyed by economics.
Economics influences management
practice and social policy through
its language and assumptions,
which become realized in
institutional arrangements, norms
of appropriate behavior, and by
making some aspects of social life
more or less salient through what
gets talked about and the
vocabulary that is used (Ferraro,
Pfeffer, and Sutton, in press).
Economics emphasizes
consequences—the fundamental
axioms begin with the assumption
of utility maximization—and
concepts such as productivity,
efficiency, and, obviously, economic
outcomes. Because people are
assumed to be pursuing their own,
individual utility maximization, the
norm of self-interest is presumed to
be powerful and both normative
(people should behave according
to the dictates of self-interest) and
descriptive (people do behave
following self-interest). Economics
as a discipline is virtually value free,
apart from the values of individual
choice, rationality, and a belief in
competitive markets. As Jost, et.
al. (2003: 84) noted, "economists
are usually careful not to claim that
there is anything inherently fair, just,
or morally legitimate about market
procedures and outcomes," and
Sen (1985) has also commented
on the absence of moral
considerations in discussing
economic allocative systems.
If economics education produces
more of a focus on consequences
in equilibrium—where the idea of
equilibrium end state is another
important part of much of
economic analysis—and less focus
on the processes that produce
these equilibria, and if
consequentialist thinking does, as
we argued above, tend to produce
more opportunistic and unethical
behavior, then the logical inference
is that those with economics
training should act differently than
those without such training. And a
growing body of evidence suggests
that this difference in behavior
does, in fact, occur.
Marwell and Ames (1981: 306307), in a series of twelve
experiments, found that people
voluntarily contributed a substantial
proportion of their resources to
provision of a public good in
contravention of the idea of freeriding, with one exception:
economic graduate students were
far more likely to free ride than any
other group, contributing only
about 20 percent of their resources
to the group, compared to the 42
percent contributed by noneconomists. In an experiment using
a threshold game, Cadsby and
Maynes (1998) found that
economics and business students,
compared to nurses, tended to
move toward an inefficient freeriding equilibrium more frequently.
Using an ultimatum game (e.g.,
Thaler, 1988), Carter and Irons
(1991) observed that student
subjects who were majoring in
economics tended to keep more
resources for themselves than
students who had declared a major
other than economics and were not
enrolled in an economics course.
Frank and Schulze (2000) provided
evidence that economics students
were more corruptible than others.
In an experiment, students in a
German university were asked to
recommend a plumber for a film
club from a set of offers that varied
both by the price charged and by
the amount the recommender
would receive if the plumber they
recommended were selected.
Economics students were more
likely than others to recommend a
plumber that charged a higher
price when they personally received
more money for doing so. Frank,
Gilovich, and Regan (1993)
reported that economists defected
more often in a prisoner’s dilemma
game and that economics
professors were less likely than
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those from other disciplines to
donate to charity.
As in the review of the studies of
business school student cheating,
the issue arises as to whether
these results, and those of other,
similar studies, reflect the
consequence of self-selection or if
it is the actual learning of
economics and its principles,
assumptions, and language that
creates these behaviors. Both
processes, of course, may be
operating and they are not mutually
exclusive. The typical study tries to
resolve this issue by comparing
populations at an early stage in
their education when they have
decided on a major but not yet had
extensive exposure to coursework,
with populations some portion of
which have had a number of
courses in economics. Carter and
Irons (1991) concluded that
economists are born, rather than
being made through coursework,
while Frank, Gilovich, and Regan
(1993) provided evidence that more
exposure to economics inhibited
cooperation on a prisoner’s
dilemma task, suggesting that selfinterested behavior was learned.
Resolving this issue is not
straightforward, because of the
idea of anticipatory socialization.
17
People may, once choosing to
enter an organization, occupation,
or profession, come to identify with
their chosen career destination
even before they enter, and
conform to what they believe the
norms and values of their target are
perceived to be. So, if economics
majors believe that economics
teaches the norm of self-interest,
they may adopt that norm and
associated behaviors even before
they are exposed to the courses, in
anticipation of joining the
economics community.
ALTERNATIVE FRAMES FOR
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIOR
We have seen that training in
economics seems to be associated
with less cooperative (in prisoner’s
dilemma situations, for instance),
more corrupt behavior
characterized by more free riding. It
is also the case that economic
language and assumptions and the
evaluation of decision outcomes
solely in economic efficiency or
productivity dimensions is
consistent with, if not causal of, an
emphasis on the logic of
consequences, narrowly construed.
And this consequentialist logic has
its own pernicious effects on
behavior. Moreover, it is not the
case that economic language,
assumptions, and theory dominate
because there are not plausible
rival alternative perspectives on
organizations. In fact, there are
several such perspectives that may
offer a better lens through which to
understand organizations and also
to provide a theoretical foundation
for understanding and building
ethical, cooperative behavior. I
briefly outline a few of these
alternative perspectives below.
It is important at the outset to
recognize that although an
economic model of behavior with
its associated language and
assumptions has come to
dominate both policy making and
thinking and has assumed an
almost taken-for-granted aspect,
this dominance is not based on the
economic model’s ability to more
accurately explain or predict
behavior, nor is it premised on the
approach’s value as a guide to
public or social policy. Kuttner
(1996) has presented examples
where reliance solely on market
mechanisms and price signals
leads to policy prescriptions that
are logically problematic and
empirically false in their
implications. Bazerman (in press)
has argued that many of the
predictions of the economic model
have been shown to be false, for
instance, by the work in behavioral
decision theory that has challenged
many of the assumptions of
individual rationality.
If economic theory is not so
successful in understanding
behavior, how does its acceptance
and indeed dominance persist?
One answer is that theories and
their associated language and
assumptions matter and are not
solely of academic interest because
those theories, once widely
accepted and believed, come to
affect the norms that govern
behavior and become true because
they are believed, even if they were
initially false. As Robert Frank
(1988: 237) noted, "Views about
human nature have important
practical consequences….[O]ur
beliefs about human nature help
shape human nature itself….Our
ideas about the limits of human
potential model what we aspire to
become."
Dale Miller’s (1999) analysis of the
norm of self-interest shows how
this process can work. Ratner and
Miller (2001), for instance, found
that because people believed in the
norm of self-interest, people
believed they would be negatively
evaluated if they acted on behalf of
a cause in which they lacked
vested interest or acted again their
own apparent interest. Miller (1999:
1053) argued that people acted on
the basis of self-interest not
because they necessarily were selfinterested but because they
believed that, both descriptively
and normatively, that was what
other people did and what they
should do, so that people act and
speak as if the theory of selfinterested behavior were true
"because they believe to do
otherwise is to violate a powerful
descriptive and prescriptive
expectation." By acting as if the
theory of self-interest were true, of
course, people made the theory
true, transforming "image into
reality" (Miller, 1999: 1053).
If the image of people propounded
by economic models—
individualistic, self-interested, freeriders prone to shirking and
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opportunism—can become selffulfilling prophecies, so, too, could
other conceptions of people. One
such alternative perspective is a
social model of behavior. As Blau
(1977: 1) stated, "The fundamental
fact of social life is precisely that it
is social—that human beings do
not live in isolation but associate
with other human beings." People
value these social relationships, in
that studies of job satisfaction
show that coworker satisfaction is
an important component of
people’s affective reaction to their
work environment. People seek to
join and remain in organizations
where they can work with others
they like and respect. Social
relationships help individuals
resolve uncertainty (Festinger,
1954). We rely on others to help us
make sense of our world, to
confirm our attitudes and beliefs,
and to help us decide what to do
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). Social
influence is both pervasive and
important.
The importance of social ties and
social relationships means that
beliefs and practices, not just
products or innovations, diffuse
through social networks, so that
network structure and the content
18
of what is passed through the
network are both important. We
learn from others—directly and by
watching what happens to them,
so-called vicarious learning.
Unfortunately what we have
learned recently is that there is little
social opprobrium for violating laws
and regulations. Notoriety seems to
be more important than what that
notoriety is based on—witness the
case of Donald Trump, whose
businesses are failing but whose
appearance on a television
program, The Apprentice, has
made him someone who is a
presumed expert on management
and business.
If social relations are important,
then several things logically follow.
First, it is unproductive to try and
understand behavior by looking at
social units in isolation, considering
only preferences or payoffs from
the point of view of the focal
individual or organization. Instead,
behavior is best understood by
considering the social environment
in which it occurs, and what that
environment makes both salient
and attractive. Second, we have an
explanation for why people are less
prone to free-riding, opportunism,
and defecting in mixed-motive
situations than some economic
models predict: people value social
relationships and are willing to
forgo immediate self-interest to do
things to maintain social ties with
important others and to keep their
reputations as reliable and
trustworthy partners. Absent
instruction that tells people that
cooperation is counternormative
and inappropriate, actions such as
collaboration and cooperation that
maintain social ties are the most
likely behaviors that people will
undertake.
Strong culture organizations do
things to strengthen the importance
and strength of social bonds
among people, in the process
diminishing individualistic, selfinterested behavior and
strengthening a sense of
collective responsibility and
obligation. Southwest Airlines,
for instance, the only airline in
the U.S. that has been profitable
each of the past 30 years, does
not prohibit employees who are
related or married to each other
from working for the company,
although they obviously can not
supervise each other. The Men’s
Wearhouse, a $1.3 billion (sales)
retailer of tailored men’s clothing
with about a 20% share of the
men’s suit market in the U.S.,
encourages employees to
socialize with each other outside
of work. It holds elaborate
Christmas parties throughout the
U.S. and provides a budget to
store managers to sponsor social
events that involve its people.
Southwest Airlines and the Men’s
Wearhouse both have values that
put employees first, ahead of even
customers and well ahead of
shareholders. It would be
interesting to empirically assess the
extent to which strong
organizational cultures with values
of social obligation and mutual trust
and respect score higher on
dimensions of ethical behavior. The
theoretical expectation is obviously
that they would. In contrast,
companies such as Enron and
Tyco were not just places that
defrauded investors, they were also
nasty places to work with
competitive, cut-throat cultures
(see, for instance, McLean and
Elkind, 2003: Ch. 5 for a
description of the Enron
environment). And they were also
organizations that did not do well
for and by their customers, such as
the state of California that was
overcharged for electricity.
Yet another model of human
behavior has been proposed by
Etzioni (1988), who noted that
people pursue two goals in their
actions: pleasure (or utility) and
morality. Means, not just ends, are
important to people, and an
individual obtains "a sense of
affirmation…when a person abides
by his or her moral commitments"
(Etzioni, 1988: 36). Etzioni reviewed
extensive evidence that suggested
that people did not act in solely
self-interested ways but often
exhibited altruistic behavior, even in
such individualistic acts as voting.
He interpreted these data as
showing that people were
concerned with what they did, not
just the benefits or costs of their
actions. Frank (1988; 1990) also
argued that individuals forgo selfinterest not simply to help their
reputation and facilitate subsequent
transactions, but because
individuals are interested in
engaging in commitments that
strengthened their likelihood of
behaving in ways they felt were
right and appropriate. He wrote,
"The motive is not to avoid the
possibility of being caught, but to
maintain and strengthen the
predisposition to behave honestly"
(Frank, 1988: 95).
At the organizational as contrasted
with the individual level of analysis,
the institutional theory of
organizations also has a strong
normative component. As Scott
(1995: 37) noted, "emphasis…is
placed on normative rules that
introduce a prescriptive, evaluative
and obligatory dimension to social
life. And rules, norms, and duties
are argued to be important by
March and Olsen (1989) in their
analysis of political institutions.
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Except from the perspective of
neoclassical economics, the idea
that organizations and individuals
are governed by rules and norms
and care about means as well as
ends—the path as well as the
objective—seems obvious. But the
question remains as to where the
particular rules and norms that
govern behavior originate and how
they become institutionalized and
how they change over time. It
seems clear that norms and rules
are problematic, in that their
content is contested and their
maintenance requires constant
vigilance and sanctioning. After all,
a norm that is violated and not
sanctioned will, over time, no
longer be a norm at all. In that
sense, the moral dimension of
behavior is also self-reinforcing, in
that if rules and norms are
maintained by the collectivity,
people come to see such rules and
norms as part of the environment
and take them for granted. By the
same token, if rules and norms are
left unenforced and untransmitted,
people will behave accordingly and
there will be a breakdown in the
moral, rule-based foundation for
behavior.
So, the normative or moral model
of behavior, much like the social
19
model, directs our attention to the
production and reproduction of
rules, attitudes, and norms as
people interact. Self-interest can be
assumed or taken for granted, but
the rules that govern individual and
organizational behavior must be
created and maintained. This is one
of the crucial tasks of
organizational leadership. This
creation and maintenance of the
social order can scarcely be left
just to markets, which are, by their
very definition, arenas in which the
self-interested behaviors of
numerous autonomous actors get
worked out.
SOME IMPLICATIONS
There are several implications that
follow from the preceding analysis
and data. The first is what should
be at least a portion of the content
of education in professional
schools such as schools of
business and engineering.
Business schools, facing a crisis of
legitimacy in the 1950s, have
increasingly become social science
departments in an effort to gain
respect. As Grey (2001: S27)
noted, business schools "fear…the
scorn of other, more traditional
academic subjects." To some
extent for campus legitimacy and
other reasons, engineering schools
have also turned increasingly to
their scientific roots. Curricula have,
as a consequence, become
ostensibly value free and places to
learn the mastery of subject matter
and technique. Although Harvard
Business School has recently put
material on leadership, ethics, and
values into a required core course,
this effort is the exception rather
than the rule. A more typical
scenario is adding elective courses
on ethics and values when
scandals occur, but enrollments are
often limited and such courses fall
off the schedule when the public
attention to organizational
misconduct wanes.
There is, of course, nothing wrong
with science and social science,
and certainly theory and academic
scholarship should and does form
a critical foundation for education in
management and related
disciplines. But if we look at law
and medicine, it is clear that
understanding techniques, data,
and methods is not enough. Phil
Larson, formerly head of the
anesthesiology department at
Stanford and a former student in
the Sloan program, once told me
that to be a good and successful
doctor, individuals not only required
a mastery of both the knowledge
and techniques and skills of
medicine, but they had to be
doctors, to identify with the role, to
comport themselves in a certain
way, to talk a certain way, and, in
other words, to be fully identified
with the physician role. Doctors
take the Hippocratic oath as a way
of publicly asserting certain
professional obligations. In a similar
fashion, lawyers are officers of the
court, admission to the bar requires
passing an examination on legal
ethics, and ethics and values are a
more prominent part of the
curricula in law school than in the
typical business school.
What this implies is that rather than
being an optional elective to be
added or deleted as corporate
scandals wax and wane,
considerations of values and ethics
must be more centrally integrated
into the curricula of business
schools and, for that matter,
schools of engineering and
universities as a whole. As
Khurana, et al. (2004) noted, the
professionalization of management
is very much unfinished business.
Professions are characterized by a
common body of knowledge, a
system for certifying individuals are
fit to practice the profession, a
commitment to use knowledge for
the benefit of clients and the
general public and to place the
practitioner’s interests first, and a
code of ethics with provisions for
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monitoring and sanctioning
violations (Khurana, et al., 2004: 3).
The absence of ethical codes of
conduct and professional norms of
public service—almost impossible
following the implications of
consequential, economistic logic—
stands in the way of management
being a profession. Thus, the
introduction of values into
management education and
development would seem to be an
essential first step toward
increasing the professionalization of
management.
Some will complain that values and
ethics have only a limited place in
academic institutions, which need
to emphasize the scientific and
objective bases of knowledge and
practice. But, contemporary
education is not value free now. By
emphasizing the consequences of
choices rather than the values
underlying the choices and
decisions themselves, and focusing
on those consequences primarily
through a relatively narrow, focused
lens of efficiency and
competitiveness, our curricula and
discourse already influences how
20
students come to see the world.
Moreover, an effort to imbue ethical
behavior and thinking requires
exposing students to other,
alternative conceptions, language,
and frameworks for apprehending
behavior besides economics, and
possibly even building those
frameworks into numerous courses
where students can see the
implications of following one or
another line of analysis.
The implications for organizations
are, in many ways, parallel to those
for educational organizations. It is
nice to have ombudsmen and
internal auditors and chief ethics
officers, and it is nice to have
CEOs attest to the honesty of the
financial statements their
companies publish, something now
required by the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislative reforms. But none of this
will make much substantial
difference, as formal rules and
regulations can be avoided or even
fought until they disappear, just as
many executives are currently
fighting the accounting proposal to
require that stock options be
expensed on corporate income
statements. People inside
organizations learn what really
matters in numerous ways—by
what is talked about, by what
questions get asked, by who gets
rewarded, by who and what gets
recognized and applauded. Unless
and until companies become more
concerned about processes and
behaviors in their own right, as well
as their consequences, and unless
and until some groups other than
those who once supplied equity
capital—shareholders—receive
attention in the focus and
substance of organizational
decisions, not much will change.
Here there is, possibly, some hope
for there is evidence that
organizations can do well by doing
good. O’Reilly and Pfeffer (2000)
reviewed both case examples and
statistical studies that showed that
the implementation of high
commitment work practices,
founded on a set of assumptions
about people, organizations, and
management, could produce
sustained success over a long
period of time. They posed the
question as to what the barriers to
imitation were, why companies did
not easily or quickly imitate
Southwest Airlines or Toyota, for
example. Their answer was the
primary role and importance of
values:
…money by itself isn’t sufficient for
motivating really long-term high
performance. As David Russo has
noted, a raise is only a raise for
thirty days; after that, it’s just your
salary….values...act as a
gyroscope for the organization,
keeping it focused on its core
capabilities….values provide a
cornerstone for the design of a
selection process that helps attract
the right types of people….The
result is that these organizations
are able to capture more of the
skills and talents of their employees
than their competitors (p. 235236).
But perhaps the most fundamental
implication of the foregoing analysis
is simply this: what is required for
different conduct—and different
outcomes—is a different way of
thinking. As Kathryn Clubb, former
partner in charge of partner
development for Accenture, so
nicely put it, in order to have
different results, you have to do
different things. But in order to do
different things, at least on a
consistent and long-lasting basis,
you must actually think differently.
Economics is not just a theory but
a language and set of assumptions
that can, over time, become
normative guidelines to behavior.
Challenging the rise of
consequentialist logic and its
potentially pernicious effects
requires confronting assumptions,
language, and implicit norms and
values in a substantive debate that
then becomes implemented in
what is taught in universities, in
corporate executive programs, and
in other domains where information
and values are transmitted.
Building social values into the fabric
of organizations requires not just
posting values on wall plaques or
cards carried in wallets or purses,
but in infusing these values—values
of social connection and moral
behavior—into the very fabric of
organizational practices and
decisions. It is only by debating
and discussing the deep
consequences of the values implicit
and embedded in our models of
human behavior, and making
conscious choices about what
values we will choose to live by
and inculcate in our schools and
work organizations, that
institutional reform can possibly be
achieved and the future be both
different from and possibly even
better than the past.
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Cátedra Rafael Escolá
de Ética Profesional
Universidad de Navarra
Nafarroako Unibertsitatea
Escuela Superior de Ingenieros
Ingeniarien Goi Mailako Eskola
Paseo de Manuel Lardizábal, 13. 20018 Donostia-San Sebastián.
Tel. 943 219 877 Fax 943 311 442
www.tecnun.es [email protected]

Cátedra Rafael Escolá de Ética Profesional Lección Inaugural

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