1 The Vietnam Archive Oral History Project Interview with Lt. Gen

ATTENTION: © Copyright The Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University. "Fair use" criteria
of Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 must be followed. The following materials can be
used for educational and other noncommercial purposes without the written permission of the
Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University. These materials are not to be used for resale or
commercial purposes without written authorization from the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
University. All materials cited must be attributed to the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
University.
The Vietnam Archive Oral History Project Interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey Conducted by Laura M. Calkins, Ph.D. and Kelly Crager, Ph.D. September 19, 20, 26, 2005; October 26, 2005; November 8, 2005; December 8, 22, 2005; January 13, 2006; February 6, 2006; March 10, 24; June 5; July 10, 14, 20, 2006; June 24, 2010 Transcribed by Laura Darden, Mindy Moser, and Cecily Darwin 1
Laura Calkins: This is Dr. Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University initiating an oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey of the
3
United States Marine Corps. Today’s date is the nineteenth of September 2005. I am on
4
the campus of Texas Tech University in Lubbock and the general is speaking by
5
telephone from his home also in Texas. Good morning, sir.
6
Richard Carey: Good morning, Laura.
7
LC: Thank you very much for your time. I just want to confirm with you that this
8
oral history is one that you’re prepared to allow to be made public for research, including
9
your own research purposes.
10
RC: Yes, that’s quite all right.
11
LC: Thank you, sir. If we could, let’s just start with some basic biographical
12
data. Where are you from, sir? Where were you born?
13
RC: I was born in Columbus, Ohio, home of the Ohio State Buckeyes.
14
LC: I was going to say—(both laugh) well, as a Michigan girl, we’ll move right
15
quickly past that. No, I’m just kidding you, sir. Were your parents affiliated with the
16
university at all or with the state government? I know that’s the capitol, as well.
17
RC: No, no. My mother and father were divorced at an early age, when I was
18
nine years old and I lived with my father. My father was a schoolteacher and his health
19
broke. He was a World War I veteran, combat veteran. His health broke as a result of
1
1
gassing and wounds. So he had to back off teaching school and wound up going into the
2
contracting business.
3
4
5
LC: Can you tell me anything about your father’s service, where exactly was he,
sir?
RC: He was in the 4th Army Division. He was a corporal in the infantry. He was
6
in all the battles of the—he was at Chateau Thierry. He was at the Meuse-Argonne
7
where he was gassed and wounded.
8
LC: Was this mustard gas? Do you know?
9
RC: Yes, I think it was. I think he got both. I think he got both the mustard gas
10
and the lung debilitating because the lung problems developed later on in his life.
11
LC: Was he hurt in other ways by the gas, do you know at all?
12
RC: No, no. Excuse me, not to my knowledge, at least he never talked a lot
13
about it, as many of those people of that era did. He wouldn’t discuss it with us and, of
14
course, I was pretty young. But he was hospitalized permanently when I was seventeen,
15
which was part of the reason why I went into the service. I had aspirations to become a
16
medical doctor, several things. At one time, I wanted to be a coach because I was in
17
athletics. Then I changed that to wanting to become a medical doctor and I needed help.
18
So with the end of the war, I graduated in 1945, in June of ’45. With the end of the war
19
coming up, of course, I said, “Well, I still want to go into the service.” So I enlisted in the
20
V-5 Program.
21
LC: Can you describe a little bit about that program?
22
RC: The V-5 Program was an aviation cadet program, Naval Aviation Cadet. I
23
wanted to be a Marine pilot. If I were in the service, I wanted to be a pilot and I wanted
24
to be a Marine.
25
LC: What was it about the Marines?
26
RC: Well, I guess I always thought of the Marines as the elite, even in those days.
27
I know it is now.
28
LC: Yes, sir.
29
RC: Excuse me, but in those days, I thought of it as the elite service. I had a
30
couple friends whose brothers were in the Marine Corps and one of which I met in early
2
1
1945. Well, not early, in about April, May of 1945 who had been in several battles,
2
including the Battle of Iwo Jima.
3
LC: Really?
4
RC: I was hurt in 1945, early 1945. I was a captain of the wrestling team, tore a
5
kidney which later impacted upon my life. I was in the hospital for about four weeks
6
with a torn kidney. During that time that I was in the hospital was when the Battle of Iwo
7
Jima was going on.
8
LC: Now this would be your final year in high school?
9
RC: This is my final year in high school. So I listened all day long to newscasts
10
and so on about the Battle of Iwo Jima. I think that had a lot to do with swaying me
11
towards the Marine Corps, also. I just looked upon them as, well, they were kind of my
12
heroes. So that’s what made me decide to go that way and I always was enamored, as
13
most young people are, with flying. So I said, “Well, I want to be a Marine and I want to
14
be a Marine pilot.”
15
16
LC: Now let me just clarify a couple of points. What high school did you
graduate from in 1945?
17
RC: West High School in Columbus.
18
LC: Okay. Did you think at all about going to Ohio State?
19
RC: Oh, yes, yes, I did. One of the schools that was my favorite, however, was
20
Miami University in Ohio.
21
LC: Yes, sir, very good school.
22
RC: I made several trips down there. I was also on the track team and we ran
23
some relays and so on down there. I was quite enamored with that school and was
24
offered, as a matter of fact, was offered a scholarship in that school for track. So I was
25
thinking about that, but my other passion overwhelmed me and the passion to go into the
26
service, plus the fact that when my father took sick, he went into the hospital permanently
27
in 1945. I said, “Well, I’m certainly going to have to make my own way.” The service,
28
of course, was offering the GI Bill at that time and I said, “Well, here I go. This is the
29
way to do it.”
30
LC: Right. That looks pretty good, yeah.
31
RC: So I enlisted in the V-5 Program and it subsequently, they shut it down.
3
1
LC: Was it almost immediately after you enrolled in it?
2
RC: Yes, it was, almost immediately. They shut it down and they offered me a
3
program in the—well, they started shutting it down in November of 1945 and they
4
immediately offered me a program to go into the V-6 Program, which was for officers,
5
naval officers. I said, “No, I don’t want to be a naval officer, I want to be a Marine.”
6
LC: You were pretty clear on that point.
7
RC: Yes, very definitely. I said, “I want to be a Marine,” and they said, “Well,
8
we can give you a discharge then.” I said, “I’ll take it.” So I took the discharge and I
9
stuck around for a little while and in 1946, seven of us from my high school all enlisted
10
in the Marine Corps.
11
LC: All together?
12
RC: All together.
13
LC: How did you guys come to this decision?
14
RC: Well, I kind of was the driving force on it. I wanted to be a Marine and
15
these were all my buddies from the various teams from the football team, from the
16
wrestling team, from the track team, from the baseball team. So we all just decided we’d
17
go in together. It was just kind of a spontaneous type thing. I’d been talking about the
18
Marine Corps for a long time. So we all got together and said, “Let’s go.”
19
LC: Had you been working?
20
RC: Yes, I had.
21
LC: What kind of job were you able to find?
22
RC: Well, believe it or not, I was driving a truck and trucking freight on a
23
railroad.
24
LC: Really?
25
RC: Yeah, I was a pretty strong kid. I thought I was. So I said, “Well, I’ll get a
26
job where I can stay in shape,” and that’s where I wound up. I wound up on a moving
27
van and driving a moving van and also trucking freight. I did two jobs.
28
LC: Did you move out of Columbus much or just around in the town?
29
RC: No, that was in the town. It was in the town. At that time, since my father,
30
of course, as I said before, my mother and father had divorced. I went with my father and
31
when my father went in the hospital, I was kind of left out in the lurch.
4
1
LC: Yes, on your own, it sounds like.
2
RC: So I moved in with a friend of mine, who is still a dear friend, who lives in
3
Columbus. He invited me to come over and stay at his home, which I did. I stayed at his
4
home and worked from there. He went in the Marine Corps with me, as a matter of fact.
5
LC: He’s one of the guys?
6
RC: He’s one of the guys.
7
LC: Well, would you mind, sir, recapping the names of any of those seven that
8
9
you went in with?
RC: Oh, I think I can think of all of them.
10
LC: Okay.
11
RC: Let’s see, there was Jim Price, Ralph Dennis, who was my very good friend;
12
he’s the one that I went to live with. Herman Goldenbagen.
13
LC: How do you spell that? Do you have any idea?
14
RC: Yeah, G-O-L-D-E-N, just like it sounds, B-A-G-E-N, Herman Goldenbagen.
15
Bud Dean, Darryl Hall, let’s see, I’ve got to keep thinking. How many have I got?
16
LC: You’ve got about five.
17
RC: I’ve got Price, Dennis, Darryl Hall, I’ve got one more haven’t I, including
18
myself? Herman Goldenbagen, Darryl Hall—I had them all in my mind.
19
LC: Well, it might come back to you.
20
RC: It will. It will. I’ll write it down here.
21
LC: This is like the Columbus Seven who were going to, sounds like, take over
22
23
24
the Marine Corps.
RC: Well, I’m the only one that stayed in the Marine Corps and that was kind of
strange.
25
LC: Is that right?
26
RC: Yeah, it’s kind of strange because we went to Columbus and went down
27
to—we enlisted in Columbus and they sent us down to Cincinnati for our physicals. I
28
was the only one that flunked the physical.
29
LC: Because of your kidney?
30
RC: No, no. They said I had tonsillitis, said I had a bad throat and needed my
31
tonsils out. I said, “I’ve never had a sore throat.” They said I had tonsillitis. Well, I think
5
1
what it was, at the time, I think they had their quota. So I said, “Well, I want to go in and
2
I want to go with these guys.” He said, “Well, I’ll give you a little tip. Get up to
3
Indianapolis, their quota’s open.”
4
LC: Got it.
5
RC: So I got on a train and rode up to Indianapolis and enlisted.
6
LC: No problems with your throat?
7
RC: No problems. No problems.
8
LC: Well, of course this, as I’m sure you were aware at the time, was the period
9
10
of drawing down forces and the demobilizations.
RC: That’s right, that’s right. I’m sure that was all of it. It was kind of strange
11
because I wound up getting down to Parris Island. I went to Parris Island, South
12
Carolina. You’ve probably heard of that.
13
LC: Yes, sir.
14
RC: I went to Parris Island and I recall, one of the first things they do, they take
15
you over to the hygienic unit and they shave your head. Well, I came out of the hygienic
16
unit still in civilian clothes, of course. I came out of the hygienic unit and there was
17
another platoon standing there. These guys were all, of course, bald headed and I looked
18
at several of them and I said, “Gosh, I know those guys.” They were my friends, but
19
without hair. It was hard to distinguish who they were, you know. Believe it or not, I
20
never saw any of them again until I went back to Columbus after they had all gotten out
21
and I saw them, but our paths never crossed.
22
LC: Isn’t that funny?
23
RC: It’s strange. It’s strange. I went into—they all went various ways. Most of
24
them went into the infantry and went to Parris Island, not to Parris Island, but to Camp
25
Lejeune or Camp Pendleton. I was selected to go to Sea School, which was kind of a
26
nice thing. It was kind of a choice billet to go to.
27
LC: And did you go there after basic or after boot?
28
RC: Right after recruit training. I went directly out to San Diego to recruit, I
29
mean to Sea School.
6
1
LC: Now, General, can you tell me, and those who will be listening in the future,
2
what was special about Sea School and how you might’ve been selected for it? Was
3
there a testing procedure or do you not know?
4
RC: Well, yes, I don’t know the full particulars, but I do know they usually took
5
the top recruits out of the platoons and selected them for Sea School. They had to have a
6
good appearance and be at the top of their group.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
LC: Now before going to Sea School and discussing that, if you would, can you
tell me how you did at Parris Island during the training?
RC: Well, I was a squad leader in Parris Island, which is one of the reasons I
think I was selected for Sea School. I did well. I did as well as anybody else, I think.
LC: I mean, the reputation, of course, as you know, sir, is this is the toughest
training there is to enter the Marine Corps and not everybody makes it.
RC: Well, I loved it, but I think really having been raised from an early age by
14
my father and him being sick off and on, we didn’t have very much and times were really
15
tough in those days for us. So I had kind of a tough childhood. So boot camp was not
16
terribly tough for me. It didn’t bother me too much.
17
LC: Your threshold was a little different, maybe, from that of other people.
18
RC: That’s right. That’s right, yeah. I wasn’t coddled very much and I wasn’t a
19
mama’s boy.
20
LC: No, sir.
21
RC: So I was able to weather it pretty well.
22
LC: Well, on that score, did you have continuing responsibilities around your
23
father and his being hospitalized? Did you need to be back and forth to see him at all?
24
Did that tug at you or were you—?
25
26
RC: Oh, yes, absolutely. As a matter of fact, I picked up his business. At that
time, he’d kind of zeroed in on paint contracting. So I picked up that business.
27
LC: So you had been trying to do that as well?
28
RC: I’d been trying to do that as well. I quit my job with the trucking and took
29
over that and formed my own business for a few months and had about five people
30
working for me. That was pretty good. I was seventeen years old.
31
LC: Yes, sir. That’ll also teach you a few lessons, too.
7
1
2
RC: Well, that’s right. Yeah, it surely does. My father and I were very close. It
was very difficult for me.
3
LC: Was he hospitalized in Columbus?
4
RC: No, he was hospitalized, he went to several places. He went over to Indiana
5
first and then he went to the Veterans Administration. He wound up in the Veterans
6
Administration home in Dayton, Ohio.
7
LC: He was having trouble, his principle difficulty was his lungs?
8
RC: Yes, well, his lungs, his heart, he was just totally coming apart.
9
LC: Right, wow. Did you ever have any contact again with your mom?
10
RC: Yes, off and on.
11
LC: Okay. So you knew where she was.
12
RC: Oh, yeah, off and on. I’d see her about once a year.
13
LC: You know, sir, the other thing I didn’t clarify was whether you had brothers
14
15
16
and sisters.
RC: I have one older sister with whom I’m very close. She was kind of my
surrogate mom, really.
17
LC: How much older is she than you?
18
RC: Five years older than I am. She’s still alive and living in Columbus.
19
LC: Good for her.
20
RC: As a matter of fact, I’m going up to see her shortly, next week.
21
LC: I don’t know, is it a home game that weekend?
22
RC: No, unfortunately that weekend they’re going to—I’m going up for my high
23
school reunion.
24
LC: Right, I remember you telling me that.
25
RC: Yeah, I have to give the invocation and the opening remarks. I’m kind of
26
the featured guy. I made the high school hall of fame.
27
LC: You were kind of the big cheese of the class.
28
RC: Well, not really, not really. I wasn’t a class officer because when I went
29
30
through, I was the youngest one in the class.
LC: Yes, at seventeen is when you graduated. That’s quite young.
8
1
RC: I skipped the third grade, the full third grade and my father didn’t want to do
2
it having been a schoolteacher. He didn’t want me to do it, but I prevailed and the school
3
prevailed. Then they wanted to skip me again a couple of years later and he definitely
4
said, “No,” that time, which I’m glad he did.
5
LC: Why are you glad?
6
RC: Well, it was kind of tough in school. I was in kind of a—West High School
7
at that time was kind of an upper-class type school. I wanted to go there, I guess, because
8
of that. I was kind of a little bit of a stepchild in the school. I was one of the poorer kids
9
in the school, but I was also one of the smarter ones. So they didn’t, at least my grades
10
indicated that, but I didn’t feel like I was accepted as well as the rest of the kids were.
11
LC: But you kind of made your way through with athletics and kind of paying
12
13
14
attention to the books and so on.
RC: That’s right, that’s right. I wasn’t really a bookworm. I really didn’t have to
study that much. It was easy.
15
LC: It kind of came easy to you.
16
RC: It was easy. School was easy for me and I loved it. I loved school.
17
LC: Did you have a favorite subject?
18
RC: Oh, yes. I loved physics.
19
LC: Really?
20
RC: Yeah, I loved physics and I loved math, of all types of math and history, of
21
all things.
22
LC: There you go.
23
RC: I mean, they don’t go together, but I loved history.
24
LC: Did you have a particular teacher or a coach that you remember especially?
25
RC: Oh, yes. The one coach I remember is a coach by the name of Rufus Glass.
26
LC: Now what did Rufus teach? What did he coach?
27
RC: Well, he teached, he taught primarily track at the start and he wound up as
28
the football coach. But he was, I remember, he was out of the University of Illinois and
29
was quite an athlete himself. He took to me. He liked me a lot. So he kind of
30
shepherded me along and kind of helped me. I wound up as the captain of the track team
31
and the captain of the cross-country team and the captain of the wrestling team, didn’t
9
1
make it in football. They pulled me out of football for cross-country because they were
2
afraid, the coach said he was afraid I’d get hurt.
3
LC: Were you a slight, slightly-built guy?
4
RC: Yeah, I was kind of small.
5
LC: Better off not to play football probably.
6
RC: Well, I weighed 170 pounds.
7
LC: Well, that’s a good lead.
8
RC: It was at that time, ‘til I got hurt in wrestling.
9
LC: Yeah. Well, wrestling is a dangerous business and hard work. Many people
10
don’t realize that. Was it important, was it something formative for you, the wrestling
11
involvement?
12
RC: Well, I wrestled. I’d always liked to wrestle, as a lot of boys do, you know.
13
Because of the work that I’d been doing all my life, I went to work at a very young age
14
and the type of work I was doing, I was pretty strong.
15
LC: You were pretty built up.
16
RC: Pretty built up, yeah. I’m only about 5’10” and I weighed 173 pounds in
17
high school. So I was 173 pounds of muscle.
18
LC: Yes, sir.
19
RC: I didn’t have any fat on me, you know. So I was kind of designed for
20
wrestling really and some of the times, I’d go down to the YMCA (Young Men’s
21
Christian Association) in downtown Columbus. There I met up with a gentleman and I
22
can’t remember his name, I wish I could, but he took second in the 1936 Olympics in
23
wrestling.
24
LC: Really?
25
RC: Yeah. I used to wrestle with him and he said, “You’ve got to stick with it.”
26
He said, “You’ve got a lot of potential.” So I used to wrestle with him and it helped a lot
27
because I swept right through all the matches that I had because principally, I think, due
28
to him because he took me under his wing. But later on it backfired on me.
29
LC: How’s that?
30
RC: Because in the championship match, which I won, but we didn’t have a ring.
31
We just had mats on a gymnasium floor, which is pretty standard. He got a body lock on
10
1
me and we went off the mat and he had a body lock around my kidneys. We both fell on
2
top of me with the body lock, you know, a body lock, you know what that is.
3
LC: Yeah, go head and describe it.
4
RC: Well, you cross your hands in the middle of the back, right in the kidney
5
area.
6
LC: Right, right around, yeah.
7
RC: Lock your hands or your arms around him, the individual and then you try to
8
control them there. Well, we both went off the mat and fell on me and unbeknownst to
9
me, that ruptured a kidney. I won that match and we were progressing on. That was the
10
school championship and we were progressing on to the district. I remember I was dating
11
this girl in Columbus and I went over to her house one evening, was going home, and I
12
passed out on the way home. Came to and went on home and went to bed and I woke up
13
several hours later and I was very ill. I started into my dad’s bedroom to wake him up
14
and passed out again and he heard me hit the floor. So I wound up in the hospital. At
15
that time, they wanted to take the kidney. My dad said, my dad and I, he talked to me
16
and he said, “Now, son, if they take the kidney, it’s going to have a significant effect on
17
you the rest of your life,” because at that time, they didn’t have such a thing as kidney
18
transplants.
19
LC: No, they did not. That’s right.
20
RC: So he said, “That’s going to effect you a lot the rest of your life, what do you
21
want to do?” I said, “I want to take a chance.”
22
LC: Did he leave it up to you?
23
RC: Yeah.
24
LC: You were, of course, hoping that things would heal on their own.
25
RC: Exactly, exactly, which they did.
26
LC: Yeah, seventeen year old, I probably would’ve done the same thing.
27
RC: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, later on it had an impact on me because later on I
28
was kind of in the running for—this was after I had become an officer and a pilot, if I can
29
move ahead and show you what effect it’s had on me.
30
LC: Of course, of course.
11
1
RC: They had the notice come out that people that were interested in the
2
astronaut program to make application. I made application and John Glenn and I were
3
the finalists. Then you had to write all your medical history and I was eliminated because
4
of that kidney.
5
LC: Did they tell you that’s what it was?
6
RC: Yeah, yeah.
7
LC: That’s kind of heartbreaking.
8
RC: Well, yes, but the good Lord didn’t mean it to happen.
9
LC: You certainly had other fish to fry, that’s for sure.
10
RC: I went the other way and the world treated me pretty well.
11
LC: Yes, you did very well.
12
RC: Treated me pretty well. So anyway, that was kind of my wrestling career. I
13
had aspirations also, I had some inquiries from people due to my coach. I don’t know
14
whether you’ve heard of Wheaton or not?
15
LC: Wheaton College?
16
RC: Uh-huh.
17
LC: Sure.
18
RC: Wheaton College is the premiere wrestling school kind of in the world. I
19
didn’t know that you knew that or not.
20
LC: I didn’t know that. I only have heard of their good academics.
21
RC: But they were making inquiries about me because he said, “I’ve got
22
somebody that’s got an awful lot of potential.” He said, “You need to kind of follow up
23
on this.” So I was looking at possibilities early on of Wheaton or Miami. I liked both the
24
schools.
25
LC: Well, it’s real interesting because you had so many different things kind of in
26
front of you that you were actively considering as paths forward, following the athletics,
27
thinking about going to a university, maybe to medical school, thinking about military
28
service. It sounds like you were a pretty driven kid, is that fair? You had some ambition
29
going?
30
RC: Yeah, I wanted to be something.
31
LC: Where did that come from?
12
1
RC: Oh, I think primarily from my father and my sister. My sister was kind of a
2
driving force. She’s eighty-two years old and she’s a dynamo. She’s still a dynamo. She
3
was kind of the driving force. Then, of course, I had other half-sisters and brothers, my
4
mother remarried.
5
LC: Oh, okay. Did you know them?
6
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah. I got to know them and two twin brothers from that and
7
four more sisters.
8
LC: Did you consider them your family as time went on?
9
RC: As time went on and I still do, we meet. As a matter of fact, we’re thinking
10
about taking a cruise together.
11
LC: Well, that would be cool.
12
RC: Yeah, yeah. We’re close and one of my twin brothers, he went in the Marine
13
Corps because of me.
14
LC: Oh, is that right? Is that right?
15
RC: Uh-huh..
16
LC: He looked up to you it sounds like.
17
RC: Right.
18
LC: Interesting. How much younger is he than you?
19
RC: Gosh, he’s ten years.
20
LC: Right.
21
RC: Over ten years, about fifteen years younger than me.
22
LC: Did he decide to stay with it as a career?
23
RC: No, he got out. He got out. He’s a very fine young man. He’s not young
24
25
now. He’s in his sixties, but he’s a fine individual. I’m very proud of him.
LC: Sir, let me ask you about Sea School. You had mentioned that you were
26
selected for that and that it was something of an honor. It was certainly a good billet to
27
be chosen for coming out of Parris Island. You went out to San Diego. Do you
28
remember that trip?
29
RC: Yes, I do. Yes, I do. We went on kind of a—there was a car full of us, a
30
sleeping car. They put us all in one car and took about, in those days it took about two
31
and a half days to get out there. We stopped.
13
1
LC: Would this have been your first time out that far west?
2
RC: I had never been out of Ohio until I enlisted in the Marine Corps.
3
LC: Yes, sir. So this must’ve been some trip?
4
RC: It was for me.
5
LC: I’ll bet, yeah.
6
RC: It was for me.
7
LC: Yeah, very exciting.
8
RC: It was quite an adventure. Well, Parris Island was an adventure for me, too,
9
10
11
12
13
of course, but now here I was going out to the West Coast, which was quite a thing. I felt
very good about it, I really did.
LC: Were you going to Camp Pendleton or what we now know as Camp
Pendleton?
RC: No, no, San Diego. The Sea School was at San Diego, separate and apart. It
14
was on the Recruit Depot at San Diego, but they had a special section called, well, it was
15
the Sea School Administration, Sea School Complex.
16
LC: It’s a special area on the reserve.
17
RC: Special area set aside.
18
LC: Tell me about, if you can, tell me about arriving there and what you saw and
19
20
how you fit in, what was the routine?
RC: Well, the routine was pretty demanding. We had to wash all of our own
21
clothes, including our uniforms. We had to wash and starch them. It was, of course, in
22
California and we were in khakis, khakis with the long sleeves in those days and with
23
what we called field scarves, which was a necktie, but it wasn’t like a civilian necktie. It
24
was strictly khaki material, very hard to tie. I remember, and we had to wear what we
25
called boondockers, which was our field shoes, field boots.
26
LC: And you had to wear those all the time?
27
RC: Yes, but they had to be shined. They were rough side out. In other words,
28
29
the rough side of the leather was out.
LC: Right. You had to make those look good.
14
1
RC: You had to make them look good. Well, I had one incident, which was kind
2
of strange. I kind of worked a little harder than anybody else there because my sister had
3
taught me how to shine shoes in particular.
4
LC: Had she?
5
RC: Yeah.
6
LC: Why was that?
7
RC: Well, she ran a shoe store downtown in a place called Jarman’s, Jarman’s
8
Shoe Store. She came back and was living with my father and I. She originally went
9
with my mother.
10
LC: Okay, but she came back?
11
RC: When my mother left. So she taught me how to spit-shine shoes.
12
LC: That was useful.
13
RC: That was very useful, but I shined my boondockers so well that we fell out
14
for inspection one morning and the DI said, the drill instructor, took me up to the CO’s
15
(commanding officer) office and said, “Colonel, this man,” and I think he did this
16
purposely, he said, “This man is wearing unauthorized shoes.” He said, “Why is that?”
17
He said, “Well,” he said, “Nobody can shine shoes like that.” So I told him the story
18
about my sister. He gave me a good pat on the back and he said, “I’m going to see that
19
you go to one of the best ships that we can find.”
20
LC: The colonel said this?
21
RC: Yeah, yeah. So I wound up on the—when I graduated from there, I wound
22
up on the USS Boxer. But the thing about the Sea School, also, was you had to wash and
23
starch all of your clothes. I starched mine so heavily, I couldn’t hardly get them on. I
24
had a tendency to overdo everything. If they told you to do it, by God, you were going to
25
do it.
26
27
RC: That’s right. That’s right. But it was a lot of fun. I wound up as a platoon
sergeant out at Sea School. They gave me a platoon.
28
LC: Now tell me about the training, the curriculum. How much time were you
29
on your duff in a classroom and how much time were you out learning skills out in the
30
field?
15
1
RC: As most Marines do, we had reveille at 5:30 and we went to chow. We
2
marched to chow, of course, fell out, formed, and marched to chow, came back, did
3
calisthenics. We had an hour of physical training. Then we drilled and then we went in
4
classroom. We were in classroom probably about five, six hours a day.
5
LC: Really? Wow.
6
RC: Then that night, we did more physical training. We had an inspection every
7
day, complete inspection. They inspected our quarters. We usually went to evening
8
chow about 5:30, got out of that and then came back and went to class again. About eight
9
o’clock, we were released on our own and then we had Taps at 9:30.
10
LC: Taps at 9:30, is that essentially lights out?
11
RC: Lights out, everything.
12
LC: I bet you were about ready for it, too.
13
RC: That’s right, yeah. Yeah, but they did give us eight hours of sleep, which
14
was contrary to boot camp. You didn’t get eight hours of sleep in boot camp.
15
LC: How many were you averaging there?
16
RC: Oh, probably about four or five a night.
17
LC: Wow. Well, that’s why they have young men do this.
18
RC: Well, and now, they have a thing called the crucible in the Marine Corps.
19
LC: What’s this?
20
RC: The crucible is they take them out on an extended ninety-six hours without
21
any rest and they have all kind of tests and all kind of problems that they go through,
22
leadership problems and marches. Well, they give them—I won’t say they don’t get any
23
sleep, they give them about two or three hours of sleep a night, but they wake them up
24
and then they start another problem.
25
LC: When was that introduced, do you know?
26
RC: Under Charlie Krulak’s regime, which was when he was the commandant.
27
That was, let’s see, that was about eight years ago.
28
LC: Now this is Victor Krulak’s son who became the commandant.
29
RC: That’s right, Charles Krulak.
30
LC: Okay. I don’t know whether you ever met Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak.
31
RC: Oh, yeah. I knew Victor.
16
1
LC: We’ll have to talk about him at some point if you—
2
RC: Yeah, I know Victor.
3
LC: Okay. Of course, an extremely important figure in the Vietnam era.
4
RC: Yes.
5
LC: As well as afterwards.
6
RC: Yes.
7
LC: The curriculum, you described spending a lot of time in the classroom both
8
during the day and then after your chow at night. What kinds of things were you
9
absorbing then? Was it map reading skills? Was it problem solving? What kind of
10
11
things?
RC: No, it was principally naval things, a lot of naval history, duties aboard ship,
12
types of weaponry aboard ship. The Marines and the seagoing Marines always manned
13
guns. As a matter of fact, in the history of the Marine Corps, I don’t know whether you
14
know it or not, but in the original, the Marine Corps started out aboard ship. That’s
15
where they were. They were on the ships principally to keep order among the sailors and
16
because of their shooting skills, they were up in the riggings when they’d attack
17
somebody and they were in essence snipers. One of the reasons that we have the cross on
18
the officer’s hat is to designate—you’ve seen the Marine officer’s hat?
19
LC: Yes, sir.
20
RC: The main reason that’s on there is to keep the snipers from shooting their
21
own officers.
22
LC: So they could distinguish them.
23
RC: Distinguish who they were. But they taught us all the guns, the 5-inchers,
24
the 40 millimeters, the 20 millimeters. Generally weaponry aboard ship, duties that we
25
had aboard ship with the Navy and so on. It put me in good stead and I did pretty well in
26
the school because when I went aboard ship, I had about four jobs almost immediately.
27
28
29
LC: I was going to ask, did they give you a particular specialty that you were
aiming toward?
RC: No, you were a member of the detachment. Once you got into the
30
detachment, they assigned you to various things to do.
31
LC: You had to pick it up from there?
17
1
RC: Take it up from there. I wound up as an admiral’s orderly, a captain’s
2
orderly, an admiral’s orderly. I had a 20 millimeter gun tub, which had four guns in it
3
that I was in charge of. I was still a private. I ran the storeroom, also.
4
LC: The storeroom for the Marines?
5
RC: For the Marine uniforms and so on and for our weapons and so on.
6
LC: So for all the Marines on ship, you were the—?
7
RC: All the Marines on ship.
8
LC: Okay. This is on the USS Boxer?
9
RC: USS Boxer and I was the guidon, I was the detachment guidon, which is
10
directly behind the commanding officer when they have the formations and so on. You
11
know what a guidon is?
12
LC: No. Can you explain it?
13
RC: A guidon is kind of a flagstaff, a wooden flagstaff about seven feet long with
14
a Marine Corps designation on it, the Marine Corps, not a Marine Corps flag, but a
15
USMC (United States Marine Corps) on it.
16
LC: Okay. So it has a seal?
17
RC: It has a seal on it. Then you dip it. When you salute, the guidon is dipped.
18
It’s kind of an honorary thing and I was selected for that.
19
LC: Okay, when protocol demands it.
20
RC: That’s right. As a result of doing that, I met the king and queen of Greece
21
on one of my tours later on.
22
LC: Did you really?
23
RC: Yeah, yeah.
24
LC: Was that still on the Boxer?
25
RC: I was still on the Boxer.
26
LC: When did you join the Boxer and I’ll ask you about the king and queen in a
27
28
29
minute?
RC: Oh, I’m sorry. That wasn’t on the Boxer. I was on the Newport News. I’m
sorry. That was when I was a lieutenant.
30
LC: Okay. Well, when did you join the Boxer?
31
RC: I joined the Boxer in 1946.
18
1
LC: At San Diego?
2
RC: At San Diego.
3
LC: So this is your first, essentially your first posting out of Sea School?
4
RC: That’s right.
5
LC: Was the colonel good to his word? Did he put you on one of the best ships?
6
RC: I thought it was and everybody else did.
7
LC: What was the buzz? What was the chatter?
8
RC: Well, it was the aircraft carrier.
9
LC: Why was it one of the best?
10
11
RC: Well, because your quarters are better and you’ve got more going on, you
get to see more things. Also, the flag is there. In other words, the admiral is on that ship.
12
LC: Who was the admiral on the ship at the time?
13
RC: Let me think, Admiral—there’s a little story about him, Stanhope C. Ring.
14
LC: How do you spell his last name?
15
RC: R-I-N-G.
16
LC: Okay. What do we know about him?
17
RC: Well, of course, he had the carrier group, carrier air group. He had that
18
group of ships.
19
LC: Of which the Boxer was the flagship.
20
RC: Yeah, it usually consisted of two or three carriers. One of the other carriers
21
was the Antietam, I remember. Let’s see, did we have the Valley Forge? I can’t
22
remember that, but we had the Augusta. I went aboard the Augusta for a while to
23
augment their detachment. They sent me over there on a special thing.
24
LC: What was that for, to get their manpower up for a little bit?
25
RC: Just to get their manpower up a little bit. I selected to do that. Then I came
26
back on the Boxer and became the orderly for Admiral Ring for a while.
27
LC: Now was the Boxer and its associated ships part of a task force or a fleet?
28
RC: Yes.
29
LC: Which one? Do you know?
30
RC: No, I don’t. Of course, they were in the Pacific Fleet.
31
LC: Sure. We’ll have somebody look that up.
19
1
RC: Yeah.
2
LC: Did you get out of San Diego much on a cruise or anything?
3
RC: We left San Diego and we went to Alameda. Alameda was our home port.
4
We operated quite a bit out of Alameda. We went to Hawaii.
5
LC: When was that? Do you remember?
6
RC: Oh, gosh, probably ’47.
7
LC: That would’ve been your first time out in Hawaii?
8
RC: Yes.
9
LC: Excuse me. What was that like?
10
RC: Well, it was a lot of fun.
11
LC: I’ll bet.
12
RC: I loved Hawaii, yes, very much so. Went to the rifle range out there, we
13
qualified every year with the rifle, which Marines do. So that was the opportunity that
14
we had there. They gave us some liberty. We had some nice liberty. I almost got a
15
tattoo there, but I didn’t succumb.
16
LC: It was close.
17
RC: A lot of the other guys did, most of the other guys did, I didn’t. I’m glad I
18
didn’t. But I said, “No, no, I’m not going to do that.”
19
LC: You’ve never done it since then?
20
RC: Never had a tattoo.
21
LC: You’d be one of the few Marines, probably.
22
RC: That’s right, that’s right, but I wanted to be a little bit different.
23
LC: Okay. Well, I think you got that part down.
24
RC: Yeah, yeah.
25
LC: Well, sir, during these years that you were on the Boxer, did you have an
26
escalation in your own responsibilities? You began with these four jobs that you’ve
27
outlined.
28
RC: Well, I didn’t begin with those. I worked up to those.
29
LC: Okay. So you started off—
30
RC: I started off as a common detachment guy, brig sentry standing watch on the
31
gangway, on the quarterdeck. One day the first sergeant came out to the detachment or
20
1
one of our musters, we had a muster every day. At one of our musters, he said,
2
“Anybody in here that can type?” I raised my hand because in elementary school or in
3
junior high school, I thought that typing would—I was advised by a teacher to take typing
4
because it would help me later on. So I was one of the few boys that took typing, but I
5
took it and I liked it. So I raised my hand and as a result of that, I became very close with
6
the first sergeant who ran the detachment. We had a major as the CO and a lieutenant
7
executive officer, the detachment.
8
LC: How big was the detachment?
9
RC: I think we had about, I believe, sixty to seventy men.
10
11
12
LC: Okay. The sergeant that took a shine to you, did he give you opportunities
as time went on?
RC: Oh, yes. Yeah, he said that, well, the first thing, I was one of the few guys
13
that when we’d go into port—he lived off the base, Redwood City, lived in Redwood
14
City. Sometimes he’d take me home with him on the weekend. He had a nice home and
15
family. So I got away from the humdrum of San Francisco and Alameda, get out into the
16
hinterlands, which was kind of nice.
17
LC: Sure. Yeah, it’s beautiful there.
18
RC: I remember one incident that I can tell you about is I remember when I made
19
PFC (private first class).
20
LC: Tell me all about it.
21
RC: I had a friend, Bill Simpson, who was quite an interesting guy. He had been
22
studying to become a priest. He was in the seminary and he got almost up to the point
23
where he was to be ordained and he quit.
24
LC: Really?
25
RC: And enlisted in the Marine Corps.
26
LC: Did he explain that to you or talk to you about it?
27
RC: No. He never really told me why he did it.
28
LC: That’s interesting, though.
29
RC: Yeah. So he and I became close friends. As a matter of fact, he knew so
30
much about the Mass and so on. At that time, I was a Lutheran. He used to take me to
31
church with him. We had a Catholic chaplain aboard, so he’d take me to church with him
21
1
and I’d help him a little bit with the Mass. I was always kind of dedicated to the Church
2
and dedicated to God. I went to church all the time and I liked it. As a matter of fact,
3
one of my nicknames when I was a youngster was Preach.
4
LC: Really?
5
RC: Because I carried a Bible, I always carried a Bible and I read the Bible a lot
6
and I’d start preaching to everybody. So my uncle had a nickname for everybody and I
7
was “the Preacher.”
8
LC: Did that stay with you all during your service?
9
RC: Oh, yes.
10
LC: And still now, sir?
11
RC: Yes, still now, especially now.
12
LC: Go head, sir. We were talking about the importance that religion had played
13
14
for you early on and that continued.
RC: Well, it was a very important part of my life and always has been an
15
important part of my life. I think a lot of that was because of my early childhood. My
16
father was a religious man. As a matter of fact, in our background, when I look up the
17
history of the family, the family was basically one of two things. I didn’t realize this
18
until I got to studying some of our genealogy. Well, they were either priests or they were
19
military men.
20
LC: That’s interesting.
21
RC: And that’s strange.
22
LC: Yeah, very, very.
23
RC: Kind of a little bit of conflict there.
24
LC: Now Carey is a good Irish name.
25
RC: That’s right.
26
LC: As is Calkins, and I just wonder, as you’ve done your research finding out
27
28
about Catholic background into your family or not?
RC: Not a lot, not a lot. I haven’t pursued it too much. I basically knew where I
29
came from, where the family came from. They basically come from Cork and I made a
30
point of going over there, as a matter of fact.
31
LC: When was that?
22
1
RC: One of my sons was on the staff at NATO’s (North Atlantic Treaty
2
Organization) staff, air staff, he’s in the Navy, was in the Navy then. I went over to visit
3
him and I took a little soiree over into Ireland and that was—I don’t recall the exact date,
4
but it’s been about six, seven years now.
5
LC: It’s a pretty country, isn’t it?
6
RC: Beautiful, absolutely gorgeous. Have you been there?
7
LC: Yes. Yes, sir.
8
RC: Did you go around the Ring of Kerry?
9
LC: Yeah, the Ring of Kerry, exactly.
10
RC: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
11
LC: Yes, it’s a beautiful country and certainly provided a lot of immigrants to the
12
13
United States under less-than-wonderful conditions, but nonetheless a beautiful country.
RC: I was absolutely flabbergasted at the friendliness of the Irish people. I had
14
met a lady in Cork who was Irish and she was eighty-some years old. I was walking
15
down the street and I asked her if she knew where the train station was because I was
16
going up to Dublin. She told me and we got into a conversation and I found out she was
17
on her second round the world trip as a backpacker, eighty years old.
18
LC: That just shows you.
19
RC: I said, “What’s a good place to stay in Dublin?” She said, “Stay at the youth
20
hostel.” I said, “I can’t stay at the youth hostel, my golly. I’m seventy-some years old.”
21
LC: What’d she say?
22
RC: She said, “I stayed there last night.” She said, “You’ll enjoy it.” So I went
23
to Dublin and I stayed in a youth hostel. It was quite an experience, it really was. Those
24
kids treated me like a grandfather.
25
LC: They probably thought that was the coolest thing that you were there.
26
RC: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, it was. It was a lot of fun. It really was. I want to go
27
back. I want to take my wife back there because she, you know, if you haven’t been to
28
Ireland, I don’t think you’ve lived. I think you have to go there and go to some of the
29
pubs and go watch some of the Irish dancing.
30
LC: It’s really something, isn’t it?
31
RC: Did you go to Trinity?
23
1
LC: To the college?
2
RC: Yes.
3
LC: I visited the college, yes.
4
RC: Yeah, good.
5
LC: Yeah, it’s gorgeous.
6
RC: It is gorgeous. Well, I got off track, I’m sorry.
7
LC: Well, that’s okay. It’s worth sometimes going off on a tangent because you
8
find out very interesting things, like the lieutenant general who stayed at the youth hostel.
9
I think that’s pretty good.
10
11
12
RC: Because of my upbringing, I think basically I’m not prestigious. I don’t
have to have all the niceties of life.
LC: Well, sometimes it’s fun to just kind of go and see what happens rather than
13
already knowing someone will open the door for you and turn your pillow over and down
14
and put a mint on it.
15
RC: Put a little chocolate on it or something like that.
16
LC: That’s right. It kind of gets to all of us.
17
RC: That’s right.
18
LC: Well, sir, I wanted to ask a little bit more about your time on the Boxer. You
19
were there a couple of years, it sounds like, with that ship. This is, of course, during the
20
late 1940s and it’s an extraordinarily important time. Did you pay a lot of attention to
21
world affairs and, for example, the Berlin airlift, other points of conflict that were
22
developing?
23
24
RC: Yes, as much as I could, as much as I could stay abreast. It was kind of
difficult aboard ship. We had a daily newspaper, of course.
25
LC: On the ship?
26
RC: On the ship, I’d always read that. Of course, we didn’t have television, but
27
we had radio and so on. When we were in port, because I was a private most of the time
28
and didn’t have a lot of money, and one of my liberties would usually consist of going
29
someplace and having a meal in a restaurant and going to a movie. That usually is what
30
our entertainment was, what mine was, anyway.
24
1
2
LC: Were you one of the Marines who was hopeful that the U.S. would give the
Soviet Union kind of a bloody nose somewhere?
3
RC: Oh, absolutely.
4
LC: What was the thinking at the time? I mean, what was your feeling about it?
5
RC: Well, basically anger more than anything else, feeling that the Soviet Union
6
took advantage of the United States because of all of the help that we gave them.
7
LC: During World War II.
8
RC: During World War II. Then they kind of turn on us and attack us and, in
9
10
11
12
essence, become our number one enemy. So anger more than anything, I think, probably
categorized it.
LC: Did you have any sense of where a conflict might erupt? Were you kind of
following that?
13
RC: Yeah. We always thought in the Far East.
14
LC: Why was that?
15
RC: Well, basically because of their late entry into the war out there that they
16
really had aspirations in the Far East. They were kind of up against a stone wall, so to
17
speak, i.e. The Berlin Wall and that area in Europe, but it was kind of wide open for them
18
in the Far East. The way I knew how they’d gone into Korea and into kind of went as far
19
south as they could.
20
LC: As quickly as they could.
21
RC: As quickly as they could. So I always kind of thought it would erupt in the
22
Far East.
23
LC: Had you studied some of this in Sea School in the curriculum there?
24
RC: As I recall, we did have some, but I don’t recall to what degree. It wasn’t
25
that much. It was kind of superfluous, kind of glossed over it. But it was brought up, it
26
was brought up, the world potential of trouble spots.
27
28
LC: Yeah, I can’t imagine being around during that time and not having
awareness of—I mean, it was in the paper every day.
29
RC: And even at the lower levels like I was, everybody thought about it.
30
LC: Yeah.
31
RC: We always thought now is the time to do it before they become too strong.
25
1
LC: Did you really think that?
2
RC: I thought that.
3
LC: When did you actually leave the Boxer for your next posting?
4
RC: I left in 1948.
5
LC: Okay.
6
RC: I’d made sergeant by that time.
7
LC: Okay. Oh, you were going to tell about being promoted.
8
RC: Oh, I was promoted to PFC. Bill Simpson and I went ashore. In those days,
9
we were wearing, for our liberty’s uniform, instead of wearing dress blues, we still didn’t
10
have the dress blues. We had greens and they had the Eisenhower jacket, if you
11
remember that. It’s the short jacket. We both made PFC the same day. We took our
12
stripes and went ashore and found a tailor. We didn’t want the shipboard tailor to do it.
13
We wanted to do it ashore. But the first thing we wanted, after we got it done, the first
14
thing we wanted to do was parade around San Francisco with our new stripes.
15
LC: Absolutely.
16
RC: So we spent all day walking the streets, just showing off our stripes.
17
LC: Letting people notice. Anybody try to buy you a beer or anything?
18
RC: Oh, yes.
19
LC: I’ll bet they did.
20
RC: Yeah, they did. Basically when we said we just made PFC, they thought that
21
was great and so did we. We had a good time. We had a good time. The simple things
22
was all we needed in those days. Like I say, our liberties, usually if we spent five dollars
23
on liberty, that was a big liberty. I didn’t get much more than that because I saved all my
24
pay except I allocated myself about fifteen dollars a month to spend.
25
26
27
LC: What was driving that? Was that a habit that you had already acquired,
saving money?
RC: Well, I think I never had anything and I wanted to get something. I think I
28
felt like I was going to go to school and I would need money in school. So I was going to
29
save all I could.
30
LC: So thinking ahead.
31
RC: I was trying to.
26
1
2
3
4
LC: Because, and I know this is true of folks, I know from my own family, folks
that grew up during the Depression, they had that sense that you needed to save money.
RC: Well, that’s right, that’s right. I’m still frugal, very frugal. Who’s the great
curmudgeon that is so cheap?
5
LC: Oh, from Dickens?
6
RC: Yeah. You know who I’m talking about.
7
LC: Yes, I do.
8
RC: Right now, I can’t think of him.
9
LC: It’s going to come to us.
10
RC: Periodically, my wife calls me that.
11
LC: Scrooge.
12
RC: Scrooge, that’s it! Scrooge.
13
LC: Well, she’s stuck with you this long.
14
RC: That’s right.
15
LC: It must not bother her too much.
16
RC: That’s right.
17
LC: Well, as you left the USS Boxer, what was your next assignment?
18
RC: Well, what happened is, again, I kind of worked my way up in the
19
detachment. I had so many jobs and the first sergeant got to know me and the CO got to
20
know me. One day he came in and he said, “Carey,” he said, “You ought to be an
21
officer.” I said, “I don’t think so, sir.” I said, “I’ve got plans. I want to go to school. I
22
want to go to”—and now I had kind of zeroed in on Ohio State.
23
LC: I wonder why.
24
RC: Well, I think because it was a bigger school and I knew something about
25
their medical school.
26
LC: And it’s a good school.
27
RC: Then, of course, football, you know.
28
LC: Yup, there’s that.
29
RC: Being a guy that liked all that sort of thing, I had always followed Ohio State
30
football. That was kind of my favorite. As a matter of fact, I worked at the stadium
31
when I was just about twelve years old at Ohio State.
27
1
LC: At the same—now is that the same stadium that they plan in now?
2
RC: Oh, yeah.
3
LC: I think the Horseshoe, yeah?
4
RC: The Horseshoe. Oh, yeah, yeah.
5
LC: What did you do there?
6
RC: I helped at the Coke dispenser. The man that my mother married, I became
7
acquainted with him and he worked for Coca-Cola. So he got me a job where when they
8
had a game, I would go and help. I had to hustle the empty Cokes and that sort of thing,
9
you know, go pick them up and stack them.
10
LC: Pick up the bottles.
11
RC: Pick up the bottles. So I got to the point where I could watch the games, too,
12
so I became very interested in Ohio State football.
13
LC: What fun.
14
RC: Yeah.
15
LC: That’s a wonderful memory to have.
16
RC: That’s right, that’s right, it was.
17
LC: Well, someone was trying to get—
18
RC: But anyway—
19
LC: Yeah, somebody was trying to get you to become an officer right away.
20
RC: That’s right, my CO was and I told him that I was interested in going to
21
school and he said, “Well, now think about this. Here’s what you can do.” He said, “The
22
world’s situation is not real stable,” and he brought it up. He said, “We’ve got this thing
23
with Russia going on and there’s a possibility that we may have another war and if you
24
went to war, would you rather go as an officer or as a grunt?” A grunt being a young
25
snuffy, you know.
26
LC: Yes, sir.
27
RC: And I said, “I’d rather be an officer.” And he said, “Well, and you plan on—
28
you say you want to go to medical school, now think about this, you can go into the
29
Reserves and you’ll have an income supplement, you’ll get paid for it. And if we have a
30
war, you’ll come back as an officer.” And I said, “Well how much time will that cost
31
me?” He said, “About four years.” And I said, “Well, that’s not bad, I’m only twenty,
28
1
that’s pretty good, so I’d be twenty-four.” I was running the calculator then and I said, “I
2
think that’s a good idea.” So I put in for it and made it and I went back to Quantico and
3
went to the Basic School, which was the Basic Officer School.
4
LC: And how many months was that program?
5
RC: That was nine months. Well, they had three months of pre-basic and then
6
nine months of Basic School.
7
LC: So a total of a year.
8
RC: Total of a year.
9
LC: How did you get on there, I mean, was it exciting, was it interesting to you,
10
11
was it kind of a walk through, not so tough?
RC: Well, it wasn’t tough, I didn’t think it was that tough, I liked it, I enjoyed it
12
and they graded you, they graded you in various things. I came out in second in
13
leadership and sixth academic, I think.
14
LC: What kinds of course material did they put before you?
15
RC: What kind of course material? Well, I can recall very well, we had fifty-two
16
different subjects.
17
LC: One a week?
18
RC: No.
19
LC: Nothing like that, nothing easy.
20
RC: No, they were mixed up and thrown at you and it was very intense as far as
21
the curriculum was concerned.
22
LC: It sounds like it, fifty-two subjects.
23
RC: Fifty-two subjects.
24
LC: Give us a sense of the range, if you can.
25
RC: Map reading to being a regimental commander, everything. Administration,
26
medical, artillery, mountain climbing, animal husbandry, the works. You had everything.
27
LC: I mean, that sounds astounding.
28
RC: Well, in those days it was, they really put you—when you came out of there,
29
you were a general officer. When I say general officer, you were able or capable of
30
starting out in any field in the Marine Corps.
31
LC: And that was the point of it, right?
29
1
RC: That was the point of it. Now you would go if, let’s say they decided to
2
assign you to an artillery regiment, you would go to an artillery school to specialize, but
3
you had a basic knowledge before you ever went there.
4
LC: Right, and you could presumably step in somewhere else if need be.
5
RC: That’s right, and that’s why they called it the Basic School.
6
LC: Actually, that sounds, for somebody like you interested in so many different
7
things and—
8
RC: Oh, I ate it up.
9
LC: I’ll bet.
10
RC: I thought it was fun.
11
LC: I’ll bet.
12
RC: I thought it was a lot of fun.
13
LC: Now did you get off base very much?
14
RC: Not a lot, on weekends we usually, they let us off on weekends. We worked
15
16
17
18
19
five days a week, five very intensive days.
LC: Did you feel the need for a break over the weekend or did you spend a good
bit of that time studying and brushing up and all the rest?
RC: No, I usually, I had a friend, a couple of friends, one friend in particular who
later became a pilot and is now deceased. He got shot down in Vietnam.
20
LC: What was his name?
21
RC: Bob Smith. Robert Norman Smith.
22
LC: And he was kind of your buddy there?
23
RC: He was probably my best buddy, yeah.
24
LC: Just in case we don’t come to this again, General, can you recall the
25
26
circumstances, where he was flying in Vietnam and what actually happened?
RC: Yeah, he was flying an F-4 I believe, yeah F-4 and he was up around the
27
DMZ (demilitarized zone) and they were climbing up, I think they were going down
28
through an overcast and, well, I don’t know all the circumstances, so it’s best I don’t say,
29
everything I have is hearsay.
30
LC: Do you know when this happened, when he was lost?
31
RC: Yeah, it was in, as I recall, it was in ’68.
30
1
LC: Okay. Oh, really? Okay.
2
RC: Yeah, in ’68 and, as a matter of fact, the day he was shot down, he was
3
promoted.
4
LC: Oh, really.
5
RC: Which was one of the significance things about it is. His wife Jane, she was
6
Miss Washington, D.C., I remember. It was kind of a funny little incident, little part, that
7
we were looking at the paper one, oh, it was one Saturday, I think, Bob and I were, the
8
Washington paper and it had the picture of the candidates for Miss Washington, D.C. and
9
he looked at this girl and he said, “Wow.” He said, “I’m going to marry her.”
10
LC: He did.
11
RC: And he did.
12
LC: I’ll be darned. (Laughing)
13
RC: I’m kind of choking it up, sorry.
14
LC: That’s all right, sir, it’s a good story and a good way to remember him.
15
RC: He was quite an athlete. He was a Naval Academy graduate. Our class at
16
Basic School consisted of Naval Academy, ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps), and
17
what we called Meritorious NCOs, which is what I was.
18
LC: How many Meritorious NCOs as proportion?
19
RC: Out of our class? Probably the largest number in Marine Corps history.
20
LC: Really?
21
RC: Yeah, we were the first big class post-World War II.
22
LC: Yeah, this would’ve been the what, the class of ’48?
23
RC: ’48.
24
LC: Okay, ’47, ’48.
25
RC: Right.
26
LC: Okay.
27
RC: And we were called the 5th Basic Class. I don’t know where they get the
28
numbers, but that’s what we were called. And we had three hundred and some in the
29
class to start, I think about, I don’t know the exact numbers, but somewhere around three
30
twenty, three thirty. We graduated about two hundred and something, about two twenty.
31
We had quite a bit of attrition.
31
1
LC: I was going to ask about the washout factor.
2
RC: Quite a bit of attrition. It was pretty high.
3
LC: What was it, was it the intensity, the breadth, the—?
4
RC: Oh, I think, yeah, I think the intensity. They graded you on everything,
5
everything you did was graded.
6
LC: So there was a lot of pressure there, too.
7
RC: A lot of pressure, yeah. They graded you on the way you made your rack,
8
your bed; they inspected your locker every day. You had a personnel inspection
9
everyday. Your classroom work was graded.
10
LC: Were you still operating as you had done earlier with, I don’t want to say
11
overachiever, but you were paying clear attention to all of those items as well as the
12
school work?
13
RC: Well, actually, I was a little bit apprehensive because I was competing with,
14
you know, a lot of the people I was competing with, I was, I think, the second youngest in
15
the class.
16
LC: Wow.
17
RC: One friend of mine who was younger.
18
LC: And as you say, some of these were Naval Academy graduates?
19
RC: Oh, Naval Academy, college graduates. So it was tough, it was tough and I
20
was a little bit apprehensive about that part of it. So I paid a lot of attention in that. And
21
in your earlier question, yeah, I did my share of homework there.
22
LC: I can believe it.
23
RC: Yeah.
24
LC: Yeah. Were there any of the subjects that came up that you had more
25
difficulty with? I’m not asking to, you know, cite your weaknesses, but were there some
26
that were more challenging than others or were there some that you found especially
27
exciting? You were still interested, I’m sure, in becoming an aviator; I know that—
28
RC: We didn’t have a lot of aviation subjects.
29
LC: That wasn’t part of it.
30
RC: No, that really wasn’t part of it.
31
LC: Okay.
32
1
RC: I was interested in the infantry side of it. That kind of fascinated me.
2
LC: Were you studying tactics, infantry tactics?
3
RC: Yes, oh, yes. Oh yes, a lot. And we went out on field problems all the time
4
and you performed every job. For example, in a company, a rifle company, you
5
performed every job from company commander on down.
6
7
8
9
10
LC: And for someone who wouldn’t understand why they wouldn’t just single
train you, what was the purpose behind that?
RC: Well, I think to make, again, remember the title of the school, Basic, so they
made you a basic officer and that you knew all the parts and parcels to being an officer
over troops, doing all types of jobs.
11
LC: And so you could step in as—
12
RC: So you could step in, it’s the old adage, if you really want to be a good
13
leader, you need to know what the people are doing that you’re leading, I mean, what
14
their problems are and the best way to do that is to actually do the job. So that’s what
15
they had us do, they had us perform every mission. And they graded you. You always
16
had a grade, you got a grade on every performance that you did.
17
LC: Were there any instructors there who particularly stood out, either for their
18
experiences that they were bringing to the table that they might have taught you about or
19
for their interest in you particularly?
20
21
RC: Yeah I think so, I think that there was—of course, we had some of the
legends of World War II.
22
LC: I suspected that was the case.
23
RC: We had Ed Snedeker, we had the Masters brothers that both wound up as
24
generals. Most of our, many of our instructors, not most, but many of our instructors
25
became general officers. They were specially selected, obviously.
26
LC: Yeah, to be instructors at the school was a big deal.
27
RC: The CO of the Basic School almost without exception made general, almost
28
without exception. He was specially selected for that and the instructors were specially
29
selected. And I guess my company commander was special and right now I’ve lost on
30
his name, I know that you’re going to ask me that, but he became a general officer.
33
1
2
LC: Did they talk to you, not only in the course of the class but maybe outside of
class, as well, informally about—?
3
RC: No, they didn’t talk to you informally.
4
LC: Okay.
5
RC: Usually what they’d do, they’d call you into their office and talk to you.
6
LC: Okay.
7
RC: They called me in a couple of times.
8
LC: For good reasons?
9
RC: Yeah, yeah.
10
LC: And do you remember any of those exchanges?
11
RC: One with the company commander who called me in and said, “What are
12
your aspirations? What would you particularly like to do?” And at that time, I said,
13
“Well, for now, when I get out of Basic School, I think that I’m pretty well trained to be
14
an infantry officer and that’s what I’d like to do.” And he said, “That’s unusual.” And I
15
said, “Why is that?” And he said, “Well, most guys want to go into something like
16
artillery or mortar transport supply, et cetera. Why do you want to be an infantry
17
officer?” And I said, “That’s where the Marine Corps is and that’s what I want to be.” At
18
that time, that’s what I wanted to do. So I went to Camp Lejeune from there.
19
LC: And how long were you down there?
20
RC: I was there, let’s see, I got there in ’49 and I left in ’50, so I was only there
21
about a year, a little over a year.
22
23
LC: And this was the period during which you became specialized as an infantry
officer?
24
RC: I was an infantry officer the whole time. I wound up from there—of course,
25
the Korean War broke out while I was there. My battalion took a Mediterranean cruise.
26
At that time, they had a battalion what they called a float in the Mediterranean aboard
27
ships.
28
LC: How long did that last?
29
RC: That was six months.
30
LC: Okay. And what was the idea, what was the purpose of that?
34
1
2
RC: Well the purpose, it was a landing force in case of problems, military
problems in the Mediterranean.
3
LC: So you were a ready force, essentially?
4
RC: A ready force, right. We had what they called a battalion landing team,
5
which is a reinforced battalion.
6
LC: Reinforced with—?
7
RC: With tanks and artillery.
8
LC: Okay, so mechanized—
9
RC: It’s really still infantry, but we had a platoon of tanks, so we had just enough
10
to give us some support.
11
LC: Okay.
12
RC: Because your capability is rather limited with a battalion, you couldn’t go in
13
14
15
and take a country.
LC: Right, a battalion then numbering, a Marine battalion then numbering about
how many guys?
16
RC: A thousand.
17
LC: Okay. And what were the ships that were involved in the float?
18
RC: Well, we had an aircraft carrier, we had a couple of cruisers, we had some
19
LSTs (landing ship, tank), we had some cargo ships, destroyers, a couple of submarines.
20
We kind of had the mix.
21
22
LC: Okay. And during this six-month period, this is probably what, during late
’49, early ’50?
23
RC: This is late ’49, yeah, it started in ’49 and we got off in June of ’50.
24
LC: Okay, wow.
25
RC: That’s another story.
26
LC: Right. June of ’50 being a critical moment.
27
RC: June 26th.
28
LC: Yes, sir. Let me ask about what your work was on the ship that you were on.
29
RC: I was a rifle platoon commander.
30
LC: And how did you keep your guys sharp during—?
31
RC: We made landings.
35
1
LC: Okay.
2
RC: We made landings, practice landings and obviously we trained every day all
3
day long on the ship. We’d start out with physical training to sharpen guys up physically
4
and then we’d go right into the classroom, we’d teach tactics, weapons over and over
5
again, different aspects.
6
LC: And you were doing this instruction yourself?
7
RC: Yes. Each rifle platoon leader was responsible for his own platoon.
8
LC: Okay. And how many men in the platoon?
9
RC: Forty-three.
10
LC: Okay. And were your forty-three guys good guys?
11
RC: Oh, yeah. (Laughing) They were very good guys. I was very fortunate, I had
12
a very good—of course, this was my first command.
13
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
14
RC: And yet I was very fortunate in having an outstanding platoon sergeant.
15
Unfortunately, he later got killed in Korea.
16
LC: How experienced was he?
17
RC: He was about seven years, seven, eight years in the Marine Corps.
18
LC: What was his name?
19
RC: Jerry Tillman.
20
LC: And just to follow up, what happened to Jerry in Korea, were you together?
21
RC: At Hellfire, Hellfire Valley, which is coming up to the reservoir, I was
22
forward, I was up with the battalion up at Hagaru and they were coming from Majon-ni
23
to Hagaru, which is coming north. And they got into an ambush, a very intense ambush
24
by the Chinese. And later on you may get into this, I don’t know, but he got shot
25
working with the platoon.
26
LC: Okay. Yeah, I do hope to ask you in some detail about your experiences in
27
Korea. Let me ask a little bit more about the end of your float. Did you go back to the
28
States, then? Did the whole task force go back to the States?
29
RC: Yes, the whole task force went back, we got back in I think the latter, either
30
the latter part of May or the first part of June. Okay, now I had my two years, which was
31
a requirement, you had to serve active duty for two years after you’re commissioned and
36
1
then if you wanted to get out, you could put in a letter and go into the Reserve and fill
2
another four-year obligation.
3
LC: Okay.
4
RC: So that was my intent. So I wrote my letter to resign and go into the resign
5
active duty and go into the Reserves and I was going to go to school that fall. And I was
6
walking up to the—this is kind of an incident—but I was walking up to the battalion
7
headquarters with my papers and one of my buddies, another platoon leader, stopped me
8
and said, “Hey, Dick, did you hear what just happened?” I said, “No, what?” He says,
9
“The North Koreans just crossed the 38th Parallel and are invading South Korea.” I tore
10
up my papers right there.
11
LC: Didn’t even finish the walk up to the building?
12
RC: No, no, no, no, I wouldn’t dare do that.
13
LC: Wow.
14
RC: (Laughing) No, no, not when that had happened.
15
LC: You were clear immediately, then, that the United States would reply?
16
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. there was no doubt.
17
LC: That’s interesting.
18
RC: There was no doubt that we’d be one of the first.
19
LC: I mean, thinking about that, why do you think you reacted so quickly the
20
way you did? Was it all your training? Was it what you’d been waiting for?
21
RC: I think so, yeah. I was all Marine at that time.
22
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
23
RC: And I wouldn’t let my people down, I knew that we’d probably, our chances
24
were almost a hundred percent that we’d go and I wasn’t going to let my people down.
25
And let’s face it, all Marine, so fight, I’m ready. (Laughing) That’s the way I felt.
26
LC: What happened next?
27
RC: Well, it was kind of funny. I had been working with a group from out of
28
Chicago with a gentleman by the name of Ray Davis, and I’m sure that name is familiar
29
with you if you’re in history.
30
31
LC: Yes, sir, but why don’t you give a little framework for someone who might
not catch that reference.
37
1
RC: Okay, Ray Davis was a gentleman, at that time was the I&I, which is
2
Inspector and Instructor for the 4th Infantry Battalion out of Chicago. They were at Camp
3
Lejeune for their summer two-week training. They came to our battalion. Our battalion
4
was the host battalion. I was designated as the liaison to then-Colonel Davis, Lieutenant
5
Colonel Davis. So I helped him as much as I could and was working with him for a
6
couple weeks there.
7
LC: Doing what? What kinds of things were you up to?
8
RC: Well, anything that they needed in the way of support, it was my job to be
9
certain that they got it.
10
LC: So were you running interference for them?
11
RC: Yes. In essence, that’s what I was doing.
12
LC: Okay. This is during a period of—
13
RC: This is just before, several weeks before, so it had to be when we got off
14
ship. Again, the dates, I don’t have the exact dates, but I was with them a couple of
15
weeks, almost two weeks when this happened.
16
17
LC: So you were right there with Lt. Col. Davis when the news from Korea
came.
18
RC: Yes.
19
LC: How did that affect things as you went forward?
20
RC: Well, for them?
21
LC: Well, or for you, either one.
22
RC: Well, they immediately called me back because they mobilized them.
23
LC: Okay, so the 4th Infantry Battalion?
24
RC: Yes. Unfortunately, a lot of them never made it back home because they
25
dispersed them and they became mostly 7th Marines, which were the ones that got cut up
26
so badly at the reservoir.
27
LC: The 7th Marines was essentially, was it reactivated or recreated at this point?
28
RC: That’s right. At that time, within the various divisions in ’48, we were
29
highly reduced in the Marine Corps. We only had seventy some thousand. Every
30
organization, for example, in the companies, we only had two rifle platoons instead of
31
three, two regiments within the divisions instead of three.
38
1
LC: Right, so under-strength.
2
RC: Under-strength. Everybody was under-strength.
3
LC: At every level, yeah.
4
RV: At every level. So we had to call everybody back in, all the Reserves in to
5
bring them up and the 4th became part of the 7th Marines. Obviously, in those days the
6
Reserves were not as well trained as they are now. We learned a lot of lessons.
7
8
9
10
LC: Why was that? Because they weren’t getting together as often or they had
fewer demands?
RC: They had a smaller cadre. They really didn’t have full units. Even the
Reserves didn’t have full units.
11
LC: So their ability to do mission training—
12
RC: Was not up to par.
13
LC: I see, okay.
14
RC: Yeah. So I was immediately called back to the battalion and told to report
15
to—we’ve started, our battalion started immediately to “mount out,” what we called
16
“mount out,” we stared packing all of our equipment because we were immediately
17
designated to augment the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton.
18
LC: What was your battalion?
19
RC: 1st Battalion, 6th Marines.
20
LC: 1st of the 6th, okay. You were essentially getting ready to go.
21
RC: Getting ready to go.
22
LC: How long did you have to get ready?
23
RC: We left about ten days.
24
LC: Yeah. It’s amazing now to think how quickly U.S. forces were not only
25
mobilized but transported and actually put on the ground in Korea.
26
RC: Yeah.
27
LC: It was real fast.
28
RC: Yeah, it was fast. It was fast. It was important to do it. It was good that
29
they did it that way because it worked out to our advantage. But I was designated, told to
30
report up to the battalion office. I went to the battalion office and they said, “Carey,
31
you’ve been designated to take a train to Camp Pendleton with some of the division
39
1
equipment.” I said, “Oh? What do I do?” He said, “Well, go up to division headquarters
2
and report to the comptroller and then go to the G-3 and they’ll tell you what you’re
3
supposed to do.” So I went to the comptroller and he gave me, as I recall, about thirty-
4
five hundred, between three and four thousand dollars. He said, “This is to feed your
5
troops on the way.” I said, “Okay.”
6
LC: That’s a lot of money.
7
RC: Well, it was in those days. Then what we had to do is we—I went to the G-3
8
and I said, “Okay, what is my mission?” He said, “Well, tomorrow morning you draw
9
ammunition and you report down to the railhead and there’ll be a train there and it has
10
about”—I don’t remember how many cars, but about seventy cars, I think, loaded with
11
equipment. “It has a sleeping car on it and you’re to take your platoon and you are to
12
guard that train all the way to the West Coast. If you find anybody that comes on the
13
train, you immediately apprehend them and call the FBI (Federal Bureau of
14
Investigation), the local FBI.”
15
LC: Really?
16
RC: Yup. “Okay, and what else?” “When you get to Camp Pendleton, the train
17
will stop at the railhead. Call this number and they’ll tell you what you’re supposed to
18
do.” That was my orders.
19
LC: That all sounds kind of mysterious and a little cloak-and-dagger.
20
RC: Well, for a second lieutenant, I mean, what else can they tell you? You’re
21
going to leave. You’re to protect the train. If you have to apprehend anybody, obviously
22
most of them would probably be civilians. Maybe people trying to steal equipment,
23
damage equipment, stop the train, whatever, apprehend them and call the FBI and let
24
them take care of it. But you proceed on with the train because we’ve got a schedule.
25
LC: These supplies need to be at—
26
RC: These are part of the division, the new division, the 1st Marine Division’s
27
augmentation so that they can gear up to become a full division to make an invasion.
28
LC: Tell me about the train ride.
29
RC: Interesting.
30
LC: Yeah. I’ll bet. I’ll bet.
40
1
2
RC: We went from Camp Lejeune to Kentucky to Florida to Georgia to
Arkansas, and then across.
3
LC: Okay. What was going on with that?
4
RC: That’s just the way they routed us and I don’t know. It took us, I think, as I
5
recall seven days.
6
LC: Were you taking on supplies at any of the places?
7
RC: No, no.
8
LC: It was a through trip.
9
RC: It was straight through and they didn’t tell me how I was to feed my troops
10
11
12
or anything.
LC: So you guys had seven days of riding on a train with—did you have
adequate provision for your guys?
13
RC: Yeah, what I did—and that’s where the money came in.
14
LC: That’s where the three thousand dollars—
15
RC: What I did is, in those days, and I don’t remember the exact name, there
16
used to be on the trains and I’m sure this is before your time, Dr. Laura, but on the trains
17
they had a catering service. I remember these ladies had special uniforms. I may think of
18
it along the way, but they had special uniforms and they would come aboard trains and
19
would bring meals for those people that didn’t have money for the dining cars and so on.
20
LC: Okay. So would they essentially walk down the center and—?
21
RC: Yeah, yeah.
22
LC: And have something they could serve you for—?
23
RC: Well, that was what they did for the passenger trains, but for us, what I did is
24
I would go back, and we had a caboose on this train. I would go back to the caboose, the
25
sleeping car was right next to the caboose, so I just stepped over the coupling and went to
26
the caboose and would tell them that at the next stop, at the next weigh station, whatever
27
it may be, to have so many meals for us ready. What they would do is they would, you
28
know, these little arms that hang out the side?
29
LC: Next to the train?
30
RC: Next to the train.
31
LC: Sure.
41
1
RC: They put a message on that and then that would be telegraphed ahead, the
2
train would pull up to this particular stop, just stop long enough for us to take our food
3
aboard and away we’d go again. So that’s the way I fed them all the way across. That’s
4
part and parcel to why it took us so long, too.
5
LC: But also the route was certainly not a direct path.
6
RC: No, it wasn’t, it wasn’t. I didn’t have anything to do with that.
7
LC: Oh, sure. I know, yeah. You were going wherever the train was going.
8
RC: I was a young second “balloon” is all I was, so I was just trying to keep my
9
10
people alive and well. So we did capture two gentlemen in Little Rock, Arkansas, I
remember.
11
LC: What happened with them? What were they trying to do?
12
RC: We don’t know because I gave them to the FBI. I don’t know what they
13
were trying to do, but we got them.
14
LC: How did you find them?
15
RC: Well, I had a watch on top of the train.
16
LC: So you had somebody like riding on top of the train?
17
RC: Oh, yeah, all the time.
18
LC: Wow.
19
RC: I had about three watches up there because being a freight train, a lot of
20
times it would go slow and if somebody wanted to come aboard, they could come aboard.
21
LC: They could just jump on.
22
RC: They could jump on. So you had to know. So you had to have somebody up
23
there all the time. So they reported to me that they saw a couple of these gents coming on
24
the train. So I went up on top and we chased them and caught them and apprehended
25
them and held them in our sleeping car and went back to the caboose and had them
26
telegraph ahead and call the FBI. At the next major stop, the FBI came and took them
27
off.
28
LC: Was it your sense, General, that they were—
29
RC: Hoboes.
30
LC: Hoboes just jumping a ride?
31
RC: Yeah, yeah, I think that’s all it was. That’s what they looked like, anyway.
42
1
LC: Nothing more sinister than that.
2
RC: No, I didn’t think so. I didn’t think so.
3
LC: So you’ve got your guys on watch and you’re trying to get them fed on a
4
5
more or less regular basis.
RC: We got out to San Diego, when we arrived at San Diego, they said we
6
would—I made the call and they said, “We want you to take a train to San Diego,” I
7
mean, to Camp Pendleton. I arrived at Camp Pendleton, they said, “We want you to take
8
the train to San Diego to the naval base there.” So I took a train down to San Diego and
9
when we got it there, I turned it over. They gave me a number and I called that and they
10
came and took the train and I called for trucks. They trucked us up to Camp Pendleton to
11
our battalion.
12
LC: Was the 1st Battalion there?
13
RC: The 1st Battalion was there. Well, it was there by that time because they
14
went direct.
15
LC: Yeah, in the meantime they had gone directly across.
16
RC: They went directly across because I was involved in this, what do they call
17
it? The slow road to China or something.
18
LC: Yeah, you were on the slow boat.
19
RC: Slow boat to China. So anyway, when we got up there, the first thing they
20
did is they started to form—we immediately went into very intense training there.
21
LC: How was it different?
22
RC: Well, the terrain was a lot different. Camp Pendleton, as you know, is on the
23
foothills of the mountains out there. So you’ve got a lot of very high hills, which they
24
also have in Korea, which was a godsend because we got into different kind of physical
25
conditions than we’d been before.
26
LC: Because of the altitude?
27
RC: Yeah. It was hot. Korea, this was in July now, by July. It was hot. So it
28
was tough training, but we trained about eighteen hours a day.
29
LC: Wow. Most of it physical training as you’re describing?
30
RC: Right, right.
31
LC: To really get everybody essentially acclimated?
43
1
2
RC: Toughened up, right, yeah, really toughened up. So they split up my
platoon. They took a squad out of my platoon, one of my better squads, unfortunately.
3
LC: To do what, do you know?
4
RC: To become a part of the 7th Marines.
5
LC: Oh, really?
6
RC: Yeah.
7
LC: Okay. So they were—
8
RC: They were gone and they gave me Reserves.
9
LC: Okay. So they were essentially for more immediate deployment?
10
RC: That’s right.
11
LC: Okay, because the 7th—right.
12
RC: They gave me some Reserves and unfortunately, some of the Reserves I got
13
were World War II veterans. I had a couple of them that were from Iwo and some of the
14
other battles. So I was very fortunate in getting them. Because my troops, the ones that I
15
had, with the exception of Tillman and my platoon guide and one of my other squad
16
leaders, I didn’t have any combat experience.
17
LC: Just to give people a sense of this, what difference would it make both to you
18
as a commander and to other guys in the unit who had no combat experience to have men
19
there who had actually fought the Japanese? I mean, how did it level things out or how
20
did it—?
21
RC: Well, it was kind of reassuring, so to speak.
22
LC: Sure, okay.
23
RC: In other words, you have somebody that’s been there and done that.
24
LC: And lived through it.
25
RC: And lived through it. So they can give you tips that you don’t get out of a
26
book.
27
LC: Yeah, yeah.
28
RC: So that was a godsend to us, really.
29
LC: How many of the World War II guys did you actually get during this?
30
RC: I wound up with about four.
31
LC: Okay. So that’s a good number.
44
1
RC: That’s a good number. So I’d say probably fifteen percent of my platoon
2
now had combat experience, but the rest of them, I was very fortunate because I’d had
3
this platoon, remember, for over a year. So they were pretty well trained, still hadn’t
4
been shot at.
5
LC: You were pretty clear on kind of who they were.
6
RC: Oh, absolutely. Oh, yeah. The Marine Corps’s breakup of the people, we
7
believe in leadership at the lowest level. The very foundation of the Marine Corps
8
throughout its time, really, has been the lower ranks because the Marines try to develop
9
their leadership as early as they possibly can. Our very makeup in a rifle platoon, for
10
example, we’re divided up into fire teams, which is a group of four men with a leader.
11
So that particular individual is supposed to be a corporal, but often he’s even a private,
12
but he’s selected because of his leadership capabilities.
13
LC: So even at the level of just a handful of men—
14
RC: They have leadership.
15
LC: Right, and cohesion. Unit cohesion.
16
RC: Cohesion, and they work together all the time. I having had these
17
youngsters for a whole year under my particular tutelage with having had a couple of
18
exceptional other Marines, sergeants, particularly Jerry Tillman, I had a pretty good
19
platoon. As it turned out in Korea, we were generally selected for the toughest
20
assignments, my platoon was.
21
22
23
LC: Tell me if you will, General, the platoon number and the company and so on
just so that we—
RC: Okay, in a platoon, you have forty some men, forty-three plus a platoon
24
leader. Then you have three platoons to a company. Also in the company you have a
25
machinegun platoon, which has six machineguns.
26
LC: With how many men per gun?
27
RC: Three men.
28
LC: What are the tasks of those three men? Does one carry the gun and two
29
carry ammunition?
30
RC: One’s a gunner, one’s an assistant gunner, one’s an ammo.
31
LC: Okay, one’s an ammo carrier.
45
1
RC: Yeah. Then you have a mortar platoon. In the mortar platoon, you have,
2
let’s see, you have three mortars, as I recall now. You have a mortar man, an assistant
3
mortar man, a gunner, what you call a gunner, an assistant gunner. Then you have the
4
ammo carriers and you have about four ammo carriers.
5
LC: Okay, right, because the shells obviously are bigger.
6
RC: Right. You also have a company headquarters.
7
LC: With a staff?
8
RC: Very small staff, really. He has a first sergeant. He has a couple of clerks.
9
He has a corpsman, a couple of corpsmen and he has a couple of radiomen and a jeep, a
10
jeep driver. In the rifle platoons, I also made up—we got augmented and got a sniper
11
also with us.
12
LC: How many companies, then, in the battalion?
13
RC: Three companies. The Marine Corps works three, three, three, three all the
14
way through.
15
16
17
18
LC: Okay. Did you have a number? For example, you were the Company One
or—?
RC: No. I was in Korea, I was in G Company. They start at the top in those
days. They’re a little different now.
19
LC: Right, it is different.
20
RC: In those days, in 1st Battalion, you had A, B, C. 2nd Battalion, you had D, E,
21
F. 3rd Battalion, you had G, H, I. Okay?
22
LC: Okay. So you’re in G Company?
23
RC: I was in G Company, which was the first company, and I was in the 1st
24
Platoon, I had the 1st Platoon.
25
LC: 1st Rifle Platoon.
26
RC: So I was G Company. 1st Platoon, G Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines.
27
We were the 3rd Battalion.
28
LC: But, as you say, the first company within the 3rd Battalion, G Company.
29
RC: G Company, right.
30
LC: Sir, let’s take a break there.
31
RC: Okay.
46
Interview with Richard Carey Session [2] of [16] September 20, 2005 1
Laura Calkins: This is Dr. Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey. Today
3
is the twentieth of September 2005. I’m on the campus of Texas Tech and the general is
4
speaking by telephone from his home, which is also here in Texas. Good morning again,
5
sir.
6
Richard Carey: Good morning.
7
LC: Thank you for taking this additional time to contribute to the Oral History
8
9
10
Project. It’s extremely important to us.
RC: I’m honored.
LC: Well, sir, it’s an honor to work with you. I’m sure those listening will get a
11
better sense of why I say that as we go through the events that happened to you in 1950 in
12
your service with the Marine Corps. Sir, last time when we talked yesterday, we were
13
talking about your having gotten the train full of materiel out to Camp Pendleton, actually
14
to San Diego I think and then to the naval base there successfully. Your beginning very
15
intensive training with the 1st Battalion at Camp Pendleton during July of 1950.
16
RC: That was the 3rd Battalion.
17
LC: I beg your pardon, 3rd Battalion. Third Battalion of the 1st Marines is what I
18
meant to say, I’m sorry. Can you take us through the remainder of your time there? How
19
long did you actually stay at Camp Pendleton?
20
RC: We were there about ten days is all. During that time, of course, we had
21
very intensive training. They split our battalion up, took probably at least a third of our
22
battalion and several of the other battalions to start forming the 7th Marines, which were
23
augmented by people from all over the United States. They drew down Marines from all
24
over the United States. They drew down recruiting commands. They brought in
25
Reserves. They did everything they could to—of course, at that time we were very, very
26
small in comparison to the job that we had, we only had seventy-some thousand Marines
27
total. A division as you probably know is up around in excess of fifteen thousand.
28
LC: At full strength.
47
1
RC: At full strength. So it meant to drawing people from all over. So they took
2
about a third of our outfit and they took one of my rifle squads, which I really regretted
3
losing, but I got some very good replacements in on top of that. After we were there
4
about eight days, I was called again to the battalion office and told that I was going to go
5
down and load the ships down in San Diego, which I did. I took my platoon down and
6
we loaded ships right at the dock in downtown San Diego where we had some of our
7
ships and some of the ships at the naval base.
8
LC: What did that involve for you?
9
RC: Well, it involved putting people where they were needed on the various
10
decks of the ships to place gear in the position and to plan some of the loading of the
11
ships. In other words, what goes on what ships and so on.
12
LC: Okay. Were you there with inventory lists and trying to manage how many
13
people needed to be where at each time as inventory was moved on to the different
14
vessels?
15
RC: Yes, yes, exactly. I was just kind of controlling my part of that.
16
LC: Your platoon was working to—?
17
RC: My platoon was working in total doing that.
18
LC: They were actually hefting equipment around?
19
RC: Right.
20
LC: Wow.
21
RC: Exactly. So following that, we loaded out and my organization, our
22
battalion went aboard a MSTS (Military Sea Transport Service) ship, Military Sea
23
Transport ship, Simon B. Buckner was the name of it. We spent the next—I think it took
24
us about thirteen, fourteen days to get to Japan. When we got to Japan, we offloaded and
25
went to Camp Otsu, which was an old Army camp, kind of up in the mountains outside
26
of, south of Yokosuka. We again concentrated a lot at nighttime there, a lot of nighttime
27
training. It was now up into September. If you look at the time schedule, we had weeks
28
moving out to Pendleton a couple of weeks there, and then a couple of weeks going over
29
and so on. So we’re now approaching the first part of September. We’re being briefed
30
that we are going to make an invasion, and we’re going to invade. We were brought up
31
to speed on it, the officers in particular were brought up to speed. It was at Inchon
48
1
Harbor and when we studied that, it seemed like almost an impossible task because they
2
had twenty-six foot tides there. Tides have a great deal of effect, as you probably know
3
on amphibious landings.
4
LC: Oh, yeah. You have to hit it just right.
5
RC: This was General MacArthur’s idea.
6
LC: Yes, sir.
7
RC: To be well behind the North Korean lines because they had already moved
8
down within the, almost down to Pusan, which is down in the southeast corner of Korea.
9
Now the 5th Marines, which was consisted of—became the 1st Marine Brigade
10
Reinforced, the 5th Marines Reinforced became the 1st Marine Brigade, had been moved
11
over on a hurry-up basis and they got there in mid-August and did a great deal to help
12
hold the Pusan Perimeter. I think that’s all well documented in history.
13
LC: I believe so.
14
RC: Yes, and they did a great job. The first part of September, they were told
15
they were going to move out of that area and rejoin the 1st Marine Division. So they went
16
aboard ships and rejoined the 1st Marine Division. We were still in Japan, the 1st and 7th
17
Marines. Part of the 7th Marines were still en route from—one battalion was en route
18
from the Mediterranean. So it was quite a complex operation, bringing them all together.
19
20
21
LC: Sure, and with speed. They were trying to obviously achieve this under a
deadline.
RC: That’s right. It was decided that the fifteenth of September was the date to
22
go. Backing up a little bit, on the first part of September, I was again called where I
23
started. I was getting called up to the battalion office and told that I was going to go
24
down and load ships again. I think they thought I was an expert by now.
25
LC: You must’ve done it pretty well the first time.
26
RC: Well, anyway, a little vignette that happened while I was down there. I’m
27
certain you’ve heard of Chesty Puller.
28
LC: Yes, sir.
29
RC: Chesty Puller had the 1st Marines, which was the regiment that I was in. I
30
was aboard one of the cargo ships and I was very diligently loading, planning. I had an
31
overlay of, what do you call it, ship’s plan of this particular ship and the way you do that,
49
1
the transport quartermasters, they called them, they had little templates that are scaled to
2
the size of equipment that goes aboard the ships. You have the deck outline and you
3
place the various vehicles and equipment and so on in just like you’re playing with a
4
crossword puzzle.
5
LC: Right, pieces on a board.
6
RC: Pieces on the board. I was down on my hands and knees very diligently
7
doing this and somebody tapped me on the shoulder. I said, “Just a moment, I’m busy.”
8
Tapped me a little harder again and I looked up and guess what? Chesty Puller, the
9
regimental commander. I jumped up, snapped to attention and said, “Yes, sir.” He said,
10
“Well, what are you doing, Lieutenant?” I said, “Well, sir, I’m trying to get this ship
11
loaded.” He got a big smile on his face and in his usual way, he said, “Well, if you throw
12
away the F-ing paper dolls and just get the ship loaded, we can get on with it.” He had a
13
strange sense of humor. But anyway, he congratulated me and said we needed to get
14
done because we’re going to sail in just a day or so, which we did. My platoon, we went
15
aboard in LST. We had a big pontoon on the side of the LST, I remember. It kind of
16
made us a little bit lopsided. As it happened, lo and behold, the same thing is happening
17
in the States right now, we had to try to outrun a typhoon. There was a typhoon brewing
18
out in the Sea of Japan.
19
LC: Now when did that news filter down to you guys?
20
RC: Which news?
21
LC: The news about there being a typhoon and that was kind of—?
22
RC: After we were aboard the ship.
23
LC: Good choice.
24
RC: Yeah, yeah, after we were aboard and underway. I can recall—of course, I’d
25
spent a lot of time aboard a ship being a seagoing Marine and also various kinds of ships
26
and usually in a Med cruise when I was out there, my platoon was selected to go aboard
27
the destroyers and make night landings, reconnaissance landings and so on. So I had
28
been aboard all types of ships in all kinds of weather. We got into a corner of the
29
typhoon and it was very, very rough seas. Of course, an LST, you’re familiar with them.
30
They’re not very large and we were lopsided to start with. I remember everybody on the
31
ship was sick, got seasick. I didn’t get seasick and I don’t know why. I wound up on the
50
1
bridge with the captain and he wasn’t seasick. So the two of us were the only two, I
2
think, that were within sight that weren’t sick. I know all my people were. We had about
3
two days where nobody ate anything because they were quite ill.
4
5
LC: Oh, yeah. Had they given you guys something to calm the stomachs,
Dramamine or something like that, did they have that?
6
RC: I don’t think that existed then, I don’t know. No, the answer is no.
7
LC: So everybody was just—
8
RC: We just kind of gutted it out with the group.
9
LC: Had you ever been seasick before?
10
RC: No, I’d never been seasick. I’ve never been seasick.
11
LC: That’s amazing.
12
RC: Of course, I think that’s one of the beauties of being an aviator, winding up
13
as an aviator, you have to have good inner ear balance. So I think that’s one of the main
14
reasons. Fortunately, it was a gift of God that I was able to weather the storm.
15
LC: Now you’re up on the bridge with the commander, with the vessel
16
commander.
17
RC: Yes, with the ship’s commander.
18
LC: What was the mood? How bad was the storm? Was he in anyway flustered
19
or concerned?
20
RC: Well, obviously, he was because of the pontoon in particular in the side of
21
the ship, it was just down one side. It was all the way down the side of the ship, it was
22
that large. Because of that, he was obviously concerned because we were in heavy seas.
23
LC: What was its purpose?
24
RC: What? The pontoon?
25
LC: Sure.
26
RC: Well, the pontoon, of course, whenever you make an amphibious landing,
27
you carry pontoons. You do that for the purpose of pulling larger ships up to—you build
28
docks, so to speak, and you pull ships up and offload ships that way.
29
LC: This was part of the equipment that would be needed?
30
RC: Ongoing cargo that you’ll need later on in the operation. We landed on
31
September the fifteenth and the 5th Marines went into a little place called Wolmi-Do,
51
1
which was a little island in the mouth of the Inchon Harbor. They went in early in the
2
morning and took the island and held it. The rest of the operation, which was to go into
3
Red and Blue Beaches, which was the main operation consisting of the 1st and 7th
4
Marines, they waited until nighttime. We made our landing. We crossed our line of
5
departure at about 5:30 in the evening. My particular platoon, we were designated to take
6
a place called Radio Hill, which was well behind the beaches and pretty isolated, but it
7
was a commanding terrain feature. I was reinforced, my platoon was reinforced with
8
machineguns and mortars. I was given the task of moving, when I hit the beach, moving
9
out very rapidly and taking the hill. The landing itself for my platoon was almost
10
uneventful. When we moved in, we were supposed to go over a seawall. As it turned
11
out, because of the confusion on the beaches and all the smoke, there was a lot of smoke.
12
Our LVT (landing vehicle tracked) section got somewhat disoriented and we wound up
13
going in a creek bed, which was down at the end of the seawall. We got bogged down
14
and we had to exit and come out and they had put concertina wire, the North Koreans had
15
put concertina wire in this creek bed. I remember, we got out and we were trying to cut
16
through the wire, trying to get through the wire and we were getting sniper fire, not a lot
17
of intense fire, but we were getting a lot of sniper fire. The man beside me, everybody
18
didn’t have wire cutters, but the man beside me was cutting wire. He took a round
19
through the forehead. I grabbed his wire cutters and started cutting myself through the
20
wire. Then I had a 536 radio on my shoulder and the next shot, they shot the 536 off my
21
shoulder. So I no longer had communications, but it stimulated me quite a bit. Next to
22
me was my sniper and he saw where this round came from and he took out the sniper, the
23
other sniper. So we got through the wire okay and advanced through town. I lost a
24
couple of men in the advance through the town. This was the port of Inchon. We moved
25
almost immediately to Radio Hill. Once we got on Radio Hill, we started receiving shell
26
fire and I lost a couple of more men and found out it was, I couldn’t call and find out who
27
it was because my radio was shot off my shoulder. Later on I found out it was our own
28
armored amtraks, an Army Amtrak unit that was assigned to the 1st Marine Division
29
started shelling the hill on their own. They shelled us and got a couple of my guys. Well,
30
I was a little bit perturbed, but that’s war.
52
1
2
LC: Did you find out what they were thinking, obviously that you weren’t there
yet?
3
4
RC: They saw us up there. They saw movement up there and they thought it was
North Koreans.
5
LC: I see. Were you ahead of schedule?
6
RC: Yes. Yes, we moved out pretty well.
7
LC: Sir, you’re commanding forces, when this happened, of course, you did not
8
know that it was friendly fire. You were assuming that you were taking enemy fire, I’m
9
sure.
10
RC: That’s right.
11
LC: Were you trying to locate the source of fire or were you—?
12
RC: Absolutely, absolutely. Of course, I didn’t see any to the front, but there was
13
a lot of fire all over. The Navy was firing their naval gunfire. So there was a lot of
14
confusion, a lot of confusion. So, they finally got it ceased. I guess somebody in the
15
LVT recognized that or was told very quickly that they were firing on friendly troops.
16
LC: How long did you go without radio communications?
17
RC: That evening.
18
LC: Okay. So am I right in thinking there was only just the one radio for the
19
platoon?
20
RC: No, no. We had another radio, but it was with the mortar section.
21
LC: I see, okay.
22
RC: The mortar section—I wasn’t without it. As I say, I got radio
23
communications that evening, but it wasn’t directly with me. At the time, we were
24
fighting our way through the streets and so on and I was just trying to reach the objective
25
as quickly as possible.
26
LC: How much difficulty did you actually encounter in the town?
27
RC: Not a lot, not a lot at all; some machinegun fire, which we knocked out. I
28
lost one of my favorite troops there, a man by the name of Murphy to the machineguns.
29
He crossed a road when he shouldn’t have and then he got killed.
30
31
LC: Was there any way for him to have—was he taking a chance or was there
anyway it could’ve been avoided?
53
1
RC: If he would’ve listened to orders, it would’ve been avoided.
2
LC: Oh, okay. So you had not instructed him to—
3
RC: No, no, no. Huh-uh. We were going to knock out the guns before anybody
4
crossed and, of course, I think he was trying to be a hero and it didn’t pay off for him.
5
LC: I see.
6
RC: But we held that night, held the hill. The next day, we took off in the attack
7
towards Seoul. The objective was Seoul. My platoon, we were sent out forward again. I
8
don’t know what it was, but I was always kind of the chosen one. I was sent out ahead
9
kind of as a point for the battalion. Advancing up this road and came upon a platoon of
10
North Koreans who took us under fire. So we executed a classic maneuver there, as
11
classic as you can get at the platoon level, had a base of fire and two enveloping units. I
12
went with one of the enveloping units and I had my platoon guy go with the other one
13
and my platoon sergeant with the base of fire. The funny thing about it is, we went
14
around to each flank and the flank I went around, I came upon the platoon leader of the
15
North Korean platoon directly.
16
LC: Face to face?
17
RC: Face to face. I had my .45 out and I pointed it at him and he threw up his
18
hands and surrendered. Well, and this is kind of a funny one, I was obviously very
19
nervous. He threw up his hands and I tried to tell him to drop his ammunition belt
20
because I didn’t know whether he had a second weapon or not. He reached down and
21
reaction, I fired and I shot his ammunition belt off.
22
LC: Well, that’s a pretty good shot.
23
RC: Well, it was just a random thing, frankly. I thought to myself at that time, I
24
said, “Oh, my God. I’ve shot and killed a guy who was trying to surrender.” I remember
25
I instantly, remorse, but he kind of looked up at me and started muttering some things.
26
So I knew that I hadn’t drawn any blood, so I was quite relieved.
27
LC: Now how did you take him in hand? What happened with—?
28
RC: Okay, I took the platoon, this platoon and formed them up and sent a fire
29
team back to the battalion with them.
54
1
LC: What position had they taken? Can you describe their emplacement? You
2
said that you did an enveloping movement on left and right flanks. How were they
3
positioned, on a road or in some brush or do you know?
4
RC: Well, it was kind of on a hill beside a trail. We were going up a trail through
5
rice paddies, working our way through ride paddies and there was a little couple of
6
houses in that area. They were amongst the houses and on this little hill looking down on
7
the trail.
8
LC: So they had a pretty good position.
9
RC: They had a good position. Yes. Oh, yes. Absolutely.
10
LC: But it sounds like they wanted to surrender.
11
RC: Well, I don’t know whether they wanted to surrender or they just knew that
12
the time was up for them. Fortunately, my platoon executed the thing very, very well. I
13
was very proud of them. They just knew they were overwhelmed.
14
LC: Did they take casualties during this?
15
RC: Oh, yes, yes.
16
LC: Any sense of how many?
17
RC: I think about a half a dozen is all they took. There were only about twenty
18
of them. So we wound up sending back about fifteen prisoners.
19
LC: With a guard of how many of your own men?
20
RC: Four.
21
LC: Wow. Did those men, how far back—what was the plan for dealing with
22
captured prisoners? How far back did you have to take them? Did your men have to take
23
them?
24
RC: Back down the same trail that we came from because the main battalion was
25
advancing up the road and we were off to the flank. We were off the flank. So my
26
people knew exactly where to go. They took them back to the trail and then over to the
27
road and then down the road.
28
LC: Then how quickly were those men able to rejoin you?
29
RC: They rejoined me later on that afternoon.
30
LC: Okay. So this is less than a day it took them to—?
55
1
2
3
4
RC: Yeah. Oh, yeah, yeah. We weren’t that far out on the flank. We were
probably maybe a thousand yards.
LC: Of course, this would’ve been important from an intelligence point of view
to get a platoon commander and men.
5
RC: Yes.
6
LC: Do you know what the protocols were or what would’ve happened to them
7
as they were brought into the American division headquarters?
8
RC: Well, of course later on, I became the battalion intelligence officer.
9
LC: Yes, sir.
10
RC: I was a battalion intelligence officer during the daytime at Hagaru.
11
LC: Yes, I’ve read about that and we’ll talk about that.
12
RC: Yeah.
13
LC: So you probably would know what likely would’ve happened to them.
14
Would an interrogation have begun immediately?
15
RC: A very quick interrogation there.
16
LC: Looking for what kind of data?
17
RC: Tactical data, location of enemy.
18
LC: And numbers and—?
19
RC: And numbers and so on.
20
LC: Okay, I see, okay.
21
RC: That’s the main thing that you would look for then and then they would be
22
sent back to division. You try to get as much out of them very quickly as you could, but
23
the idea was to try to drain them as much information as you could initially because of
24
their shock of being taken prisoner and not knowing what was going to happen to them.
25
They’re more likely to talk and then they start clamming up as they get back to the
26
division, but the people at the division are more highly trained intelligence specialists,
27
most of the battalion people. The rank of the battalion intelligence officer is supposed to
28
be a captain. So he’s supposed to be a fairly seasoned officer.
29
LC: With specialized skills in interrogation.
30
RC: Also specialized. When I was an intelligence officer, I was just reaching
31
back on my training from the Basic School, really.
56
1
LC: Of course, time is of the essence with tactical data.
2
RC: Absolutely.
3
LC: Yeah. That sounds like a pretty good first encounter actually, face to face
4
with enemy forces.
5
RC: Yes.
6
LC: Did you form an opinion at all about the strengths or weaknesses of the
7
North Koreans from that encounter that you used later on?
8
RC: Well, yeah. The North Koreans at that particular point, because they
9
surrendered so quickly without a real intense resistance, I figured they were either not
10
seasoned troops or they really didn’t have a strong will to fight. That was my opinion.
11
LC: Did it turn out to be the case?
12
RC: Yes, with the Koreans, basically. We took casualties. We had some
13
firefights with Koreans, but we really didn’t get into heavy, heavy fighting, what you call
14
intense fighting, until we met with the Chinese.
15
LC: Yeah. That was a different story.
16
RC: Yeah, yeah.
17
LC: Well, sir, can you continue us on this path, on this trail that your platoon was
18
moving up?
19
RC: Well, we moved to rendezvous that night with the battalion. We
20
rendezvoused back with the battalion. Set up a perimeter and then launched off the next
21
day. The next day we rode tanks. My platoon was aboard tanks and we were in the
22
advanced element of the battalion again. I was so lucky. I was always out on the point
23
for some reason or other.
24
25
LC: You were the first one to the fray it sounds like. Now riding the tanks, can
you just explain why an infantry, a rifle platoon would be doing that?
26
RC: Well, obviously they have to move on foot and they try to, if you will, to feel
27
out the—we call it feeling out the enemy and trying to see what strength they are. So it’s
28
kind of a probing action. It goes ahead of the battalion, kind of the lead element of the
29
battalion to kind of prepare them for bigger things if it should happen.
30
31
LC: How important is it to have infantry located with tanks, collocated with
them?
57
1
2
3
4
5
RC: Well, the infantry really moves where the tanks can’t move and the tanks
support the infantry with immediate fire, heavy fire.
LC: If in case you did make contact with a larger concentration of troops, for
example?
RC: No, we didn’t. The only major thing we had that next day was we were
6
traveling up the road and I remember we pulled up. We stopped in this little town,
7
probably half a dozen houses or so. I looked over to my left at one of the buildings and
8
there was a tank gun sticking out of the building. It was a T-34, a North Korean tank. I
9
yelled, “Tank!” down to the, the tank commander had his hatch open. He immediately
10
swung his gun around and fired and swept some of my Marines right off the tank, as a
11
matter of fact.
12
LC: As the turret turned around?
13
RC: As the turret turned around, he did it so quickly.
14
LC: Wow. Any idea why that T-34 didn’t fire?
15
RC: No, I don’t know. I don’t know other than the fact they may not have seen
16
us. Because we had just moved up, we moved up to this point and stopped. We were on
17
the move, moved up and stopped.
18
LC: That’s pretty scary.
19
RC: It was pretty close. It was pretty close. Then we took off from there and
20
moved up the road and we came to this bend in the road and, lo and behold, around the
21
road, around the bend of the road came a motorcycle with a sidecar on it. In the
22
motorcycle was a North Korean officer. My troops took him under fire and,
23
unfortunately for him, it was all over for him in just an instant.
24
LC: Just like that?
25
RC: Just like that, yeah.
26
LC: Your men were obviously walking with their weapons up and—?
27
RC: Yeah. Some of them were and some of them were on the tanks.
28
LC: What rank was he? Do you know? Do you remember?
29
RC: The officer?
30
LC: Yes.
31
RC: I believe he was equivalent to a captain.
58
1
LC: Okay.
2
RC: So he obviously was trying to find some of his troops.
3
LC: Right. There’s someone else nearby that—
4
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
5
LC: That’s certainly true. Could you determine from either the direction or any
6
material that he had with him, where he was going or what was happening?
7
RC: No, no. He just had his driver and himself.
8
LC: He was in the wrong place, though, at the wrong time.
9
RC: Wrong place at the wrong time, unfortunately for him.
10
LC: Was a search made? I mean, in an instance like that, it would be interesting
11
to know whether your orders included searching him for documents, searching the
12
vehicle?
13
RC: Oh, well, you always do. You always do. That’s part of your training.
14
LC: What would happen with those documents? Would they be sent back?
15
RC: You’d send them back to battalion immediately.
16
LC: Okay, or a map or whatever he might have had.
17
RC: That’s right.
18
LC: Do you remember if he had anything with him, General?
19
RC: He had nothing. He had a map. He had a map. Unfortunately, the map was
20
so deteriorated and decimated, it was covered with bullet holes and blood, so you
21
couldn’t tell much from it.
22
LC: Did your company, then, level on him with rifles or with machineguns?
23
RC: Rifles mainly, yeah.
24
LC: It sounds like everybody had a shot.
25
RC: Everybody, you know, it was a reaction.
26
LC: Sure. I mean, he’s coming around the corner.
27
RC: The poor guy, he took a lot more than he deserved, really.
28
LC: Yeah, and the driver, as well, I’m sure.
29
RC: That’s right. Well, we moved on up the road. We got probably another
30
couple of miles. We were still in the lead. There was a big hill in front of us, not a big
31
hill, but a pretty high hill, a couple hundred meters. We took a lot of fire from that. So I
59
1
got my men off the tanks and we were taking cover and devising a plan to take the hill,
2
exchanging fire with them. All of a sudden I was behind this building. My sergeant said,
3
“Lieutenant, look what’s coming up the road.” I look back down the road and guess
4
what?
5
LC: No idea.
6
RC: Douglas MacArthur.
7
LC: Himself?
8
RC: Himself.
9
LC: I mean, capital H, Himself?
10
RC: Himself, walking up the road.
11
LC: Walking?
12
RC: Walking up the road.
13
LC: Okay. You guys are taking fire?
14
RC: We’re taking fire. He’s walking right up the middle of the road. His staff is
15
ducking in and out behind buildings and he is almost immortal, you know. He had his
16
hat, his sunglasses, his pipe.
17
LC: So he was unmistakable.
18
RC: Unmistakable. He was unmistakable to me because I’d seen a lot of pictures
19
of him. I knew who he was.
20
LC: Yes, sir.
21
RC: He walked right up beside my position. This is a little vignette that is a true
22
story.
23
LC: Yes, sir.
24
RC: Walked right up beside my position, I ran out to the road, grabbed him and
25
pulled him in behind the building and in the process he fell down. He got up, brushed
26
himself off and he said, “Lieutenant, what the hell do you think you’re doing?”
27
Obviously perturbed because I got him dirty. That’s what I thought, anyway.
28
LC: Did you reply?
29
RC: I said, “Sir, I’m trying to keep you from getting your ass killed.” That’s
30
exactly what I said to him. He says, “Well, I appreciate that lieutenant. Now tell me
31
what you’re going to do about all this action that’s going on here.” So I told him what
60
1
my plan was and he said, “Sounds like a good plan. Go get ‘em.” That’s the last I saw of
2
him until I got in Seoul. We went ahead and executed, drove them off the hill and
3
proceeded on.
4
5
LC: What was your plan? What did you tell the general that drew his approval?
You had to come up with something pretty good.
6
7
RC: Well, I still had the tanks and obviously I was going to hit them with the
tanks.
8
LC: Yes.
9
RC: I was directing tank fire on them, where the main concentration of fire was
10
coming from, and then another envelopment, base of fire envelopment. That was our
11
basic tactic.
12
LC: For someone who might not understand that maneuver, can you just describe
13
very quickly how you would arrange that, how many men would you send out on each
14
flank?
15
RC: Well, again, it depends on what the intensity and the size of the resistance.
16
But in this particular case, my plan was to, because of the road and the visibility that they
17
had down the road. That was a no-no to go that way. So I had to go through the built up
18
area where we had some cover and where they couldn’t see us. So what I did in that case
19
is I took two squads and did the envelopment. One squad was the base of fire with the
20
tanks. My sergeant was with the tanks directing the base of fire and I took the
21
envelopment.
22
LC: Which side did you go on?
23
RC: Right.
24
LC: What did you see as you’re moving to the flank of where you knew the
25
enemy was located? When did you actually make visual contact with them, if at all?
26
RC: I never saw them because they obviously spotted us coming.
27
LC: Saw the tanks.
28
RC: Saw the tanks and started taking fire and they retreated. They disappeared.
29
So when we got to the hill, it was clean.
30
LC: So it was yours. You’d taken the hill, essentially.
31
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
61
1
2
LC: So let me just ask you one more thing about meeting the general there. He
wasn’t ticked off too much?
3
RC: Other than the fact that I think he was really joshing with me.
4
LC: Sounds like it.
5
RC: Yeah, I think he was—he kind of had a grin on his face, you know.
6
LC: Did you guys kind of, did you tell the other guys in the platoon what had
7
happened, that you’d just seen MacArthur walking around?
8
RC: Well, it got around very quickly.
9
LC: I’ll bet.
10
11
RC: It got around very quickly. As a matter of fact, everybody that night knew
about it, including the battalion commander.
12
LC: Who was the battalion commander at this point?
13
RC: Let’s see, Ridge, Thomas L. Ridge.
14
LC: Okay. He remained in that position with you all the way up to—?
15
RC: Oh, he was, no, he was—oh, you mean as the battalion commander?
16
LC: Yeah.
17
RC: Yes.
18
LC: All the way through up to Chosin?
19
RC: Yes, yes. He was a battalion commander up at Chosin Reservoir, also.
20
LC: Okay, okay. So I bet everybody kind of had a chuckle about this encounter
21
with the general.
22
RC: Yeah, yeah.
23
LC: I mean, what kind of a figure did he cut? You say you knew him instantly, I
24
mean—?
25
RC: Well, he was immaculate. We were in utilities.
26
LC: Sure, sure.
27
RC: Covered with dirt and mud and some blood and a few things like that. Here
28
was a guy just strolling down the road with a khaki shirt and khaki trousers and a gold-
29
braided hat, sunglasses, a pipe. He had his staff with him, a little walking staff.
30
LC: You said he was practically immortal.
31
RC: Yeah.
62
1
2
LC: I mean, was he just exuding, was this a command strategy, do you think, or
was this just him?
3
RC: I think it was him. I think it was him. Well, he did make one remark. He
4
did make one remark. I said, “I’m trying to keep you from getting killed.” The classic
5
remark he made, which kind of can be taken many ways. He said, “Lieutenant, the bullet
6
isn’t made that can kill me.”
7
LC: That’s amazing.
8
RC: That was him.
9
LC: That’s just amazing.
10
RC: That’s the word that he—that’s what he said to me directly. That’s etched in
11
my memory very strongly, obviously, the type of individual that he was. Frankly, it kind
12
of bolstered my courage.
13
LC: What about the other men? I mean, was that—?
14
RC: Oh, well, imagine, here comes a five-star general walking up the road, his
15
staff is dodging all over the place and he’s walking right down the middle of the road and
16
you’re under fire.
17
18
19
20
21
22
LC: I can only imagine that everybody there would think, “Well, you know, by
God, I’m going to get on with it.” I mean, that it would—
RC: That’s right. That’s right. That’s exactly right. That was his purpose, I’m
sure. Same with many leaders. Chesty Puller was that type of leader.
LC: Yeah. He’s, of course, famous for a number of kind of smart ass comments
that he made.
23
RC: Yeah, well, that’s right. I told you the one about the ship.
24
LC: Yeah.
25
RC: And another one I’ll tell you a little later.
26
LC: Okay, good enough, good enough. Well, it sounds like that day that you
27
took that hill went fairly well for your troops. You didn’t lose anyone that day?
28
RC: No, no, I didn’t.
29
LC: So, I mean, that day was a good one, it sounds like.
30
RC: That was a good day.
31
LC: You made advances and you—
63
1
RC: Made advances and we did very well.
2
LC: Yeah. How far inland were you by the time you took that hill?
3
RC: Oh, probably ten miles, I think.
4
LC: Okay. Were you, as a lieutenant, did you have information about, any kind
5
of information about the distribution of troops to the side of you or behind you? I know
6
you were out in front, it felt like, or you were told that you were in front.
7
RC: No, not really, not really. I knew where our battalion was most basically. I
8
knew where our companies and our battalion was. But as a lieutenant, you don’t know
9
much more than that.
10
11
LC: Okay. Sir, did you have the capability to call on air support? Were there
any American flyovers or planes operating near you?
12
RC: Not at that time.
13
LC: Okay. You mentioned the naval guns supporting the landing and so forth
14
15
and I just wondered if there was any aerial cover at all?
RC: Oh, yeah. There was aerial cover, but I didn’t have occasion to call it.
16
Usually, in order to call in air, you have to have your forward air controller, who is an
17
aviator who’s attached to the battalion and he’s usually with the battalion staff.
18
LC: He’s essentially in a light aircraft or—?
19
RC: No, he’s on the ground.
20
LC: He’s on the ground, okay.
21
RC: That’s why they call him a forward air controller.
22
LC: Oh, I’m sorry, okay.
23
RC: He’s walking and when you get to the point where you really come up
24
against something that’s so solid that you can’t move it and you start to rely on air, then
25
the word is passed down and he comes forward and calls in the air and controls the air
26
strike because he knows the capabilities of the aircraft and everything else.
27
LC: And the ordnance and what they can deliver.
28
RC: Right, exactly, and what is most effective of that particular situation. So
29
that’s one of the things that the Marines have that makes them so potent is the combined
30
arms that the Marine has.
31
LC: Yes, yes.
64
1
RC: That’s what makes our service so potent in combat much more so. It shows
2
up in many, many incidences, both in Vietnam and Korea where our air saved our butts,
3
to be real truthful with you.
4
LC: I completely believe it.
5
RC: Yeah.
6
LC: I completely believe it. At this point though, you weren’t facing any
7
8
9
concentrations of troops, you hadn’t run into a dense concentration?
RC: Not really, not really. We really didn’t have—most of it was—they were
retreating and most of the things that they were doing is they were covering their forces,
10
pulling back. We didn’t hit any real main line of resistance until we got up to Yong
11
Dong Po.
12
LC: Let’s see, that’s what, maybe thirty miles inland or maybe more?
13
RC: Yeah, about thirty miles. That’s across from Seoul.
14
LC: How long did it take you to—did you continue to advance? Can you tell us
15
16
17
more about the walk?
RC: Well, we continued to advance. Our company was sent out a couple of times
on flanking, trying to find the enemy.
18
LC: Now this is still G Company.
19
RC: Still G Company. We went on some long patrols. One day we went out and
20
we must’ve walked thirty miles. We walked all day long up and down hills. It was still
21
hot and we had a lot of fatigue. We finally wound up getting into a bivouac or into a
22
position after dark. The whole battalion was already in position except for our company.
23
I was on the point for our company again. (Editor’s note: Information removed at
24
interviewee’s request.)
25
LC: So during this—
26
RC: Movement.
27
LC: Yeah, during this movement and the patrol, the long patrol, did you make
28
29
any contact?
RC: Yes, sporadic contact. My particular company, we had probably a half a
30
dozen KIAs (killed in action) on the movement up I would say, one of which was a good
31
friend of mine, lieutenant.
65
1
LC: Who was that, if you can say?
2
RC: Spencer Jarnagin.
3
LC: What happened?
4
RC: On the dikes approaching Yong Dong Po, he just came upon some
5
entrenched enemy. He was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
6
LC: They apparently shot him before he even knew they were there?
7
RC: Well, in the fight that ensued. Yeah, I don’t know the particulars because I
8
9
wasn’t with his platoon. I did know that he got killed.
LC: In situations like this, how were those who had been killed, American
10
Marines, moved? How were their bodies moved? I mean, how much attention did you
11
have to pay to getting them out of there?
12
13
14
15
RC: Well, we got them out as quickly as we could. We took them back to the
battalion and from there I don’t know what happened to them.
LC: Okay. But you were operating on a principle that you weren’t going to leave
them in the field.
16
RC: Oh, no.
17
LC: Right.
18
RC: No, no. We never left anybody.
19
LC: Right. Tell me about getting to Yong Dong Po and what happened there.
20
RC: Well, Yong Dong Po, as I say, we were moving up right through the city,
21
into the city. We started meeting heavier resistance there because they obviously were
22
going to defend Seoul. We moved up to the dikes that were close to the river. My
23
particular platoon, I know we had to cross an open field, an open rice paddy. We were
24
taking pretty heavy fire there. There I wrote my platoon sergeant up for a Silver Star,
25
which he got.
26
LC: Can you tell me about the action?
27
RC: Well, they were in some houses at one end of the rice paddy. I did the
28
classic thing again with an envelopment. He led the envelopment and so I wrote him up
29
for an award and he got a Silver Star.
30
31
LC: Did he face an unusually difficult or recalcitrant opponent in those guys that
were dug in there?
66
1
2
RC: Yeah, yeah, they were fighting. Some of them obviously turned and ran, but
we came upon twenty or so bodies.
3
4
LC: What had been effective in breaking that nest? Was it rifle fire, machinegun
fire, mortars?
5
RC: Combination.
6
LC: Okay. Grenades as well?
7
RC: You bet.
8
LC: Yeah.
9
RC: You always throw a grenade into—if they’re in the house, you throw a
10
grenade in and then you go in after them.
11
LC: Okay. Hopefully there’s not a lot of fire coming back at you after that.
12
RC: That’s right.
13
LC: When did you have time to write up his commendation or a report that led to
14
his commendation?
15
16
RC: After we got through Seoul and got into an area where we rested for a day or
so.
17
LC: Did it come to your mind right away, sir, that that was the right thing to do?
18
RC: Absolutely.
19
LC: How do you know the difference between a regular operation that you expect
20
your men to do and an operation that someone needs to receive a special commendation
21
for?
22
RC: Well, where they really exhibit exceptional leadership and exceptional—
23
they put themselves more at risk than they really should have to. That’s really the way
24
you judge, I think. The Marines were pretty tough on that.
25
LC: Yes, yes.
26
RC: They’re tougher than the Army is. I don’t say that maliciously, it’s just a
27
fact.
28
LC: Meaning that it’s not a shoe in.
29
RC: That’s right. That’s right. It has to be pretty well substantiated. You can’t
30
just draw it off, just give a guy a commendation because he’s doing a good job.
67
1
2
3
4
LC: Did you have to file, in addition to your own report, some supporting
affidavits or something like that from other men involved?
RC: I didn’t have to, but they go back, when they go back to the battalion, the
battalion awards officer inquires.
5
LC: I see. So there’s a protocol—
6
RC: Oh, absolutely.
7
LC: And a person assigned to this.
8
RC: Yeah, absolutely.
9
LC: Okay. I think that’s something that probably people aren’t aware of that—
10
RC: Yeah. They are very well screened, really.
11
LC: Okay, and that there’s a system in place.
12
RC: There is definitely a system. I know in the Marine Corps and I’m sure there
13
14
15
is in the Army.
LC: Yong Dong Po is, if I’m right, on the from your perspective, on the near side
of the river. On the other side of the river was Seoul.
16
RC: Exactly.
17
LC: How did you get across the river?
18
RC: Went across in LVTs at night.
19
LC: Can you explain what an LVT is?
20
RC: It’s a landing vehicle, tracked.
21
LC: What does it look like?
22
RC: Looks like a big tank without a turret, has tracks on it. It’s amphibious. It
23
goes in the water.
24
LC: Does it have open space for troops?
25
RC: Yes. It’s like a big box, really.
26
LC: Is it what you might think of as what might be used on a beach for a beach
27
landing?
28
RC: That’s what it is. We used those all the way through, the Marines do.
29
LC: How do they get them up there? Do they just drive them?
30
RC: Drive up. They drove up the road.
31
LC: Okay, so no kind of airlifting those or anything?
68
1
2
RC: No, no, no. They’re big and they’re heavy. No, they have to be road
transportable.
3
LC: Was the river where you crossed defended?
4
RC: It was defended up to the point where we started to cross, which is one thing
5
that happened at Yong Dong Po with my platoon. We were on one side of a road that
6
was on kind of a built up road. The North Koreans were on the other side of the road and
7
we were exchanging—throughout the night, we’d exchange grenades back and forth. We
8
finally ran out of grenades, but we had some C-2, which was an explosive.
9
LC: A plastic explosive, like—?
10
RC: Plastic explosive. We wrapped nails around it. We were in a city. So we
11
found some nails and we wrapped nails around it, put a little tape on it and put a fuse in it
12
and threw those, kind of makeshift type things.
13
LC: Yep, pretty nasty when it exploded.
14
RC: Yeah, it is, kind of a terrorist type weapon.
15
LC: Yeah, yeah. Did you notice that it had, that where it landed was the right
16
place for it to land? Were you able to assess its effectiveness?
17
RC: Well, yeah, because eventually the fire stopped from their side. Now I don’t
18
know whether—we did find bodies on the other side and we did—and I’m sure that they
19
disappeared, a lot of them disappeared.
20
LC: They’re withdrawing.
21
RC: They’re withdrawing because we were a pretty overwhelming force at that
22
23
24
25
time.
LC: Yeah. Tell me about as you and your unit were deploying towards Seoul,
where did you come in and how did that occur?
RC: Well, we came in up on a street called Mapo Boulevard, which was Maple
26
Street in English. One of the main roads in the middle of Seoul, that’s where our
27
battalion was.
28
LC: Were you out in front again?
29
RC: Yup, unfortunately.
30
LC: Okay.
69
1
2
RC: Yeah. We advanced up the street. We had fire that we were taking and it
was kind of not intense house-to-house, but we had to clear some houses.
3
LC: Now when you say “not intense house-to-house,” so don’t—?
4
RC: Well, in other words, they hadn’t set up what you would call a main line of
5
6
7
resistance.
LC: Right. So don’t think Berlin, that kind of—every single building you had to
fight because they were—
8
RC: No, no, that’s right, not like Fallujah or something like that.
9
LC: Right, okay. Not a lot of in the way of pre-planted nests or—?
10
RC: No, no.
11
LC: Okay. But instead, individual snipers?
12
RC: Snipers. Until we got down to a school, which is pretty much into the
13
middle of the city.
14
LC: A large school complex.
15
RC: Large school. Now we were taking—we did a flanking maneuver, our
16
particular company. The rest of the battalion—one company was on the right side of the
17
main road, the other one was on the road and we now were on the left side of the road.
18
We moved up to behind this schoolhouse, as I recall, there was quite a few hills. We met
19
a pretty heavy resistance there. We had a pretty intense firefight.
20
LC: What kind of positions did you take? How could you shield yourselves?
21
RC: Well, we were still in the city.
22
LC: Okay, so you’re using—?
23
RC: Buildings.
24
LC: Okay, buildings, walls, whatever.
25
RC: Buildings, walls, vacant lots or some vacant lots. I carried one of our
26
gunnery sergeants, a platoon sergeant, off of the hill. I was covered with blood. I carried
27
him down and I was covered with blood. I went back to the CP (command post) to take
28
him back there so that he could be evacuated further. The company commander was
29
there and he said, “Where you hit?” I said, “I’m not hit.” “Where’d all the blood come
30
from?” I said, “Came from Daniels, Gunnery Sergeant Daniels.” I don’t know whatever
31
happened to Daniels. He was evacuated, pretty badly wounded.
70
1
LC: Where had he been shot?
2
RC: Stomach.
3
LC: How far back were medical support teams? I mean, obviously you had
4
corpsmen who were closer to you, I’m sure.
5
RC: Right at the battalion, they had an aid station.
6
LC: Okay. So he would’ve been seen to right there.
7
RC: Yeah. From the battalion, he keeps going to the rear. They bring
8
ambulances up and take him from there.
9
LC: So how far did you have to carry him, sir?
10
11
RC: I carried him probably a couple hundred yards. He was a big man, pretty
heavy.
12
LC: Obviously you’re a target while all this is happening.
13
RC: Well, yes, but not like the guys who were up—
14
LC: Further up.
15
RC: Further up.
16
LC: Okay. How did the school building actually and that complex actually get
17
cleared?
18
RC: Well, we didn’t go into the school building that day. We stopped there.
19
That night, we had a counterattack and they came right down the main street with tanks
20
and with infantry. We knocked out four tanks, about four tanks I think it was, and a
21
bunch of infantry. That was the last major firefight that we had there. That lasted all
22
night.
23
LC: How many infantry did they have with them, any guess?
24
RC: Oh, I’d say at least a battalion.
25
LC: How many did you have? Did you have your entire battalion up?
26
RC: Right. We were all up on line.
27
LC: Anything that you remember about that night’s exchanges that you can add
28
29
30
31
to the record?
RC: Well, I do know that my platoon guide personally knocked out two tanks
with a rocket launcher.
LC: Was this a shoulder-held?
71
1
RC: Shoulder-held rocket launcher.
2
LC: That’s pretty good shooting.
3
RC: I know that he did that. I was surprised because he’s a pretty quiet guy and
4
kind of laid back. But in the moment of truth, the best of him came out.
5
LC: Wow. Were you next to him when either or both of these kill shots were—?
6
RC: No, no. I was on a hill. My platoon was spread out and I was on a hill. I
7
was close to the company CP. The company CP took a round from a tank, one of the T-
8
34s that came up the road fired into the building where the company CP was. The
9
company CP was kind of sitting up on a hill where they could see what was happening.
10
LC: How much damage did that cause?
11
RC: Well, it killed the company commander’s radio operator. The round was an
12
armor-piercing round. It went right through him, right through his radio and everything.
13
LC: How effective or vulnerable were those T-34s and the T-38s compared to
14
what the United States had, compared to our tanks at that time?
15
RC: Our tanks were better. We had 26s, M-26s.
16
LC: What, in terms of armor or in terms of firepower, were they better, ours were
17
better?
18
RC: A combination.
19
LC: Both were better?
20
RC: Yeah, combination. I did lose my eardrums there from one of our tanks.
21
One of my eardrums was bursted.
22
LC: What happened?
23
RC: Well, it was in the daytime and we were taking fire. I pulled the tank up
24
with the idea of taking the enemy under fire. He let go with a—they had a 95-millimeter
25
on it. I was standing right beside it and got a lot of back blast. It ruptured my eardrum.
26
LC: I mean, how painful was that?
27
RC: Pretty painful.
28
LC: I’m sure it was.
29
RC: It knocked me down.
30
LC: Yes, uh-huh.
31
RC: I couldn’t hear for a long time. I’ve still got scars on my eardrums.
72
1
LC: But as far as you found out later, only one was actually broken?
2
RC: Right, the one that was facing, the one that was next to the gun.
3
LC: Sure, right there, took the full impact, it sounds like. That didn’t stop you
4
obviously later from—
5
RC: No, I never even went to the aid station on that.
6
LC: Right, but later on in your career it didn’t impede you from becoming an
7
aviator or that kind of thing.
8
RC: No, no, no, it didn’t. Until now, I now have ninety percent loss in that ear.
9
LC: Yeah, I don’t see how it could be any other way.
10
RC: Yeah.
11
LC: Yeah. After that night battle when the tanks were in the main streets and that
12
battle that took place, how badly were the North Koreans beaten in downtown Seoul?
13
Did they back away and pull out of—?
14
RC: Oh, the battle continued the next day. Our battalion was pulled back.
15
LC: Why?
16
RC: Just to rest.
17
LC: Okay, because you had been out so long?
18
RC: Yeah, I think so. Our company in particular was pulled back and our
19
battalion was pulled back to the number, to the supporting—usually they have two
20
battalions to the front and one to the rear.
21
LC: So it was your turn to go to the rear.
22
RC: Right, right.
23
LC: How long were you back there?
24
RC: A couple of days.
25
LC: Did it help in terms of resting and—?
26
RC: Oh, of course, yeah. We were able to clean up a little bit, still didn’t have
27
showers or anything, but we were able to clean up a little bit, shave and brush our teeth
28
and get some food.
29
LC: Did you get a hot meal?
30
RC: No.
31
LC: No.
73
1
RC: No, no hot meal.
2
LC: What kind of rations were they keeping you on?
3
RC: C-rations, we had C-rations.
4
LC: Like in World War II?
5
RC: Uh-huh.
6
LC: Just the same type of deal.
7
RC: Yup.
8
LC: Nothing special.
9
RC: Nothing special.
10
LC: But anyway, a chance to sleep.
11
RC: Yeah, a chance to rest. That was the big thing more than anything else and
12
to kind of gather ourselves together. That’s where I first wrote up Tillman.
13
LC: Okay. Did you also have the duty of writing any letters to family members?
14
RC: Oh, yes. Uh-huh.
15
LC: So you spent some time doing that, I’m sure.
16
RC: Right. Whenever you had a break, you did that.
17
LC: How did you keep track of who you had to write about or was it just in your
18
head and there was no need to keep notes or anything?
19
20
RC: No. We kept notes. We kept casualty lists. I wound up losing mine when I
got hit.
21
LC: Up at the reservoir or later?
22
RC: No, no, later on.
23
LC: Oh, okay. Did you have a format for those letters or did you try to make—?
24
RC: Well, they’re all pretty much the same. Gosh, I’d spend, let’s see, it’s been
25
fifty-five years now. So I have trouble remembering exactly what we said, but there was
26
a format, which was part of our training. It’s part of that training that we got way back
27
there at Basic School. Obviously when you’re getting ready to go into combat like on a
28
landing and so on, you have more intensive training and things like that. Here’s what
29
you’re supposed to do and when you’re supposed to do it, et cetera, et cetera.
30
31
LC: Right. So again, there are rules and you’re just trying to kind of implement
what the rules are for the situation.
74
1
RC: Absolutely, yeah.
2
LC: Okay. Let’s take a break there. Sir, you were telling that you had been in
3
the rear area with your platoon and the entire company in fact resting?
4
RC: Yes.
5
LC: Okay. When did your new orders come to get moving again?
6
RC: I think we rested there about two days. We had gotten into Seoul on the
7
twenty-fifth of September.
8
LC: Okay, good.
9
RC: We fought on the twenty-fifth and we were pulled back, I think, on the
10
twenty-seventh.
11
LC: Okay. So it’s right at the end of the month then that you—
12
RC: Right. We landed on the fifteenth. It took us—we actually got into Seoul
13
itself on the twenty-fifth.
14
LC: What orders did you have to move forward?
15
RC: We started out again—while we were still in Seoul there was one thing that
16
happened.
17
LC: Oh, yes, please.
18
RC: One thing that happened, I saw General MacArthur again.
19
LC: Yeah, you mentioned that you had seen him again in Seoul. I just wasn’t
20
21
sure when that happened.
RC: Yeah. We were called up after the city was officially declared in our hands.
22
Syngman Rhee, who was the president, went to the palace. My platoon, we did spend a
23
night in the palace.
24
LC: Is that right?
25
RC: Yeah, we did spend a night there.
26
LC: Now this was before President Rhee got there?
27
RC: Right. But he came up, I don’t remember the exact date, but he came—I
28
don’t know where he’d been, probably down at Pusan. He came back to Seoul.
29
MacArthur came into Seoul to meet with him. MacArthur came, I remember his green
30
Sedan. We were on a roadblock. We put up roadblocks to be certain that we didn’t have
75
1
any enemy attacks or anything while they were there. He came by our roadblock and
2
waved at me.
3
LC: Do you think he recognized you?
4
RC: I don’t know. To this day, I don’t know. But he smiled and kind of nodded
5
his head and waved.
6
LC: Well, that was kind of nice.
7
RC: Yeah, that was. Obviously he was on a time schedule. So he didn’t stop.
8
LC: Oh, sure, yeah. Right, he’s got big fish to fry.
9
RC: Yeah. I was pretty messy at that time. We still hadn’t gotten back to getting
10
cleaned up. I had a week or so growth of beard and dirty. Uniform looked like the devil,
11
still had all the blood on it and everything. So I was a mess. We did find as we started to
12
move out, we found a group of civilians, including women and children that had been
13
massacred.
14
LC: Where was this?
15
RC: In Seoul, northern part of Seoul.
16
LC: Was it in a building or in a courtyard?
17
RC: No, out in a field. We found them in a field.
18
LC: Can you just give us a survey of the scene? What did it look like?
19
RC: Well, it was pretty gruesome, really. Bodies were scattered throughout this
20
building or throughout this lot. They had been shot in the back of the head.
21
LC: Every one of them?
22
RC: Uh-huh.
23
LC: Including children?
24
RC: Including children.
25
LC: Any guesses to the total number of people there?
26
RC: No, I’m sorry I can’t. I’m sorry I can’t. I was pretty distraught.
27
LC: Yes. Well, I can’t even imagine.
28
RC: So I reported it immediately to the battalion and then we moved on.
29
LC: Did it appear to you, sir, as you think back that this had been a series of
30
assassinations, that it had occurred in some kind of order? Were people chased down?
31
Do you have any sense of that?
76
1
RC: No, I don’t. The only thing that I could say, they looked like ordinary
2
people, which was—if it had been officials, it’d been different, but these looked like
3
ordinary people. The women still had on their native dress and the children were native
4
dressed and so on.
5
6
LC: Was it near any kind of complex, any kind of school or anything such that
you could figure out what might have happened?
7
RC: No. Again, we were on the move.
8
LC: Yes, okay.
9
RC: I didn’t look that closely. I just reported it.
10
LC: And kept going?
11
RC: Kept going.
12
LC: Yeah. Well, it sounds horrendous.
13
RC: Yeah, it was pretty bad.
14
LC: Were your men upset?
15
RC: Yes, very much so.
16
LC: What do you do in a situation like that? I mean, obviously you’re upset and
17
so are they. I mean, you’re trying to keep them focused on the mission. What kinds of
18
things can you say to them?
19
RC: Well, the only thing that you can try to do is try to say that you don’t know
20
why. There must be a reason why it occurred. We don’t know. We may never know,
21
but a lot of very bad things happen in wars and you have to accept it and continue on.
22
You just have to put it in the back of your mind. You’ll always remember it, but you put
23
it in the back of your mind for now and you have to get on with it.
24
25
LC: How did your guys, how did your men respond? Were they able to go on
ahead and keep moving?
26
RC: Yes, yup.
27
LC: Well, that’s a tribute to you. That must be an extremely difficult position.
28
RC: Well, I was fortunate. Most of these men I’d had, as I told you, over a year.
29
LC: Right, they knew you.
30
RC: Yeah, we knew each other.
31
LC: Yes, yes.
77
1
2
RC: That was to my advantage. Later on, a lot of the units or many of the units
in particular in the 7th Marines, they didn’t have that benefit. It was pretty tough on them.
3
LC: When they came under fire later?
4
RC: Right, right.
5
LC: Under intense—well, when they became face to face with the—
6
RC: Well, they moved, they carried through on it, but I can imagine it was
7
8
9
tougher on them than it was on us.
LC: I’m just trying to make sure that people understand what reference you’re
making, it was because you guys on some level understood each other.
10
RC: Yes.
11
LC: Just having spent so much time together.
12
RC: That’s right.
13
LC: You’d been through action together as well at this point.
14
RC: Well, it bonds you. It causes a bond that you don’t get any other place.
15
When your friends die and you’re in that kind of a situation, it bonds you to friendships
16
that never die.
17
LC: Where was your unit on the way to? Did you have a destination or were you
18
supposed to be moving forward?
19
RC: 38th Parallel.
20
LC: Had you been told that’s where you were going?
21
RC: We’re going to cross the 38th Parallel. That’s what was down to my level.
22
LC: Okay.
23
RC: That’s what I knew.
24
LC: Did you know where you were supposed to go across?
25
RC: No, not really, not really. We changed directions quite frequently. Of
26
course, that obviously was a part of the big picture, which we didn’t have at that level.
27
LC: Right, and you’re just implementing what you’re being told to do.
28
RC: Exactly.
29
LC: Okay. Was all of this marching or did you have tank accompanying?
30
RC: No, we were marching.
31
LC: Okay. This is a long way.
78
1
RC: Yeah, we walked a lot. I lost thirty-five pounds.
2
LC: Over the course of how long?
3
RC: Over the course from the time that I made the landing until I went back to
4
the hospital, I was thirty-five pounds lighter.
5
LC: Well, that certainly gives some idea.
6
RC: Yeah, it’s pretty intense.
7
LC: Yeah. What was the weather like at this point, at the end of September?
8
RC: Now it’s up into October and it’s fairly pleasant, not really that bad.
9
LC: Like a New England day here?
10
RC: Well, no, I wouldn’t say that.
11
LC: Not that pleasant.
12
RC: Not that pleasant, probably Texas in October.
13
LC: Okay, so still warm.
14
RC: Still warm, but not unbearable.
15
LC: Okay. And at night?
16
RC: At night, still probably in the sixties I’d say, not bad at all.
17
LC: Did you have encounters with any more resistance forces as you were
18
making your way more or less north?
19
RC: Yes, but very sporadic.
20
LC: Which told you guys what?
21
RC: That they were on the run.
22
LC: And they were like getting out of there.
23
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
24
LC: What orders did you have? Were you out in front again?
25
RC: No. No. There was a general advance all across. By now, the units had
26
caught up that were down in—the Army units were caught up, had caught up with us.
27
We were more or less advancing all along the front.
28
29
LC: Right. The breakout had already occurred and they were pretty close to
Seoul.
30
RC: That’s right. That’s right. We were already through Seoul.
31
LC: Right, and all moving north.
79
1
RC: Right.
2
LC: What happened next for you?
3
RC: Well, we moved forward. We crossed the 38th. We kept going.
4
LC: Did you know you had crossed the 38th?
5
RC: Well, I’m moving ahead because as I said, the events after Seoul, it was
6
continuing to move north.
7
LC: Was there any kind of marker at the parallel that—?
8
RC: No.
9
LC: It was just more territory you walk across.
10
11
RC: Yeah. We had maps, but they weren’t very good. They were Japanese maps
that we had.
12
LC: Really?
13
RC: Uh-huh, and our 1x50s were awfully hard to read since we didn’t read
14
Japanese. We got most of the terrain. We kind of tried to keep track and the major cities
15
were marked on them, of course. So we kept track of approximately how far we moved
16
and we could identify hills and so on by the terrain features on the map. So we had
17
moved north, I know we had moved north of the 38th Parallel because we moved north of
18
the Imjin River, which is north. We stopped, I think, on about somewhere around the
19
first couple of weeks in October, a week or so in October, my outfit did. We were
20
ordered to the rear, back to Inchon.
21
LC: Why was that?
22
RC: Well, we were then told that we were going to form up and make another
23
invasion at Wan San.
24
LC: So you guys had to essentially walk all the way back to Inchon?
25
RC: No, no.
26
LC: What happened?
27
RC: They brought us up on trucks.
28
LC: Oh, okay.
29
RC: They got motor transport going and I remember I had my entire platoon on
30
two trucks. We were pretty crowded, pretty dirty, pretty tired, worn out. This is kind of
31
a vignette. I’ll tell you another vignette.
80
1
LC: Okay.
2
RC: We were moving back towards Seoul, crossing the Imjin. They had built
3
pontoon bridges. These pontoon bridges, they had boats in the water and they have
4
soldiers here, there, and everywhere were in them. The soldiers coming up from the rear
5
were passing through, were going to relieve us, going to relieve the 1st Marine Division.
6
It was the 1st Cavalry Division, and I knew it was the 1st Cav because they had their big
7
patches on their shoulders.
8
LC: Yes, sir.
9
RC: They were all nice and clean and they had jeeps, nice jeeps. We were all
10
packed into these trucks. There’d be maybe two soldiers in a jeep going forward passing
11
us as we’re going to the rear. We’re passing over the Imjin, over the river, and one of the
12
soldiers yelled out and he said, “Oh, it’s the raggedy ass Marines.” One guy in one of the
13
trucks, I don’t know who it was, threw a grenade down there, didn’t have the pen, he
14
didn’t pull the pen. He just threw the grenade down into the pontoon and the soldier dove
15
over the side into the water.
16
LC: Scared the hell out of him.
17
RC: Scared the hell out of him, he thought he was going to get blown up right
18
there. But our Marine said, “Here’s your raggedy ass Marines,” and threw this grenade
19
over. I heard him yell that. So I still suspect it was one of my guys. I never dug into it.
20
LC: No, I think that was a very good command decision. Well, it was no doubt,
21
even though you guys were kind of crammed in there and tired and filthy, it was good
22
that you were at least riding, you know.
23
RC: That’s right. That’s right. We rode all the way back to Inchon and the first
24
place we went is they had a hot meal for us. We had a hot meal on trays, metal trays.
25
They took us down to the showers. They directed us to the showers and we got new
26
uniforms.
27
LC: Really?
28
RC: Unfortunately, they were Army uniforms.
29
LC: But you had to take what you could get.
81
1
RC: Yeah. We had to take what we could get, but we were clean. We got to
2
shave and shower and everything. So our company was designated to go aboard an LVT
3
again. This one was a Japanese LVT.
4
LC: Something that the United States would have.
5
RC: Had leased from Japan.
6
LC: Okay.
7
RC: They were just merely transporting us up to the invasion area.
8
LC: Who was the skipper, American skipper, I’m sure?
9
RC: No, it wasn’t.
10
LC: Was it not?
11
RC: A Japanese skipper. My company commander called me in and he said,
12
“Carey, you are responsible for providing for equipping the ship and feeding our troops
13
on the way up to our new destination.” So I said, “Well, what do I feed them?” He said,
14
“Well, there’s an Army supply center,” over at such-and-such a place and directed me to
15
it, “and you’ll get your supplies there.” So I said, “Okay,” and went over to the supply
16
center. Well, first I went down to the end of the ship, in the bowels of the ship. I went
17
down to the reefer—a reefer is a refrigeration area—and the only thing that was in the
18
reefer was a great big catfish hanging there.
19
LC: Like how big?
20
RC: Like about five feet long.
21
LC: So like a hundred pounds or something.
22
RC: Oh, yeah, at least, and a bunch of seaweed hanging in there and that’s all that
23
was there. So I said, “Hmm, I don’t think we’re going to eat that.” So I went over to
24
the—got the company commander’s jeep and trailer and went over and got our supplies.
25
The only thing they gave us, they gave us corned beef hash with potatoes in it and canned
26
cherries in great big cans. What are they, number ten cans they call them?
27
LC: Right, like restaurant size.
28
RC: Restaurant sized cans, that’s what they gave us. I said, “Well, where’s the
29
30
rest of it?” They said, “That’s all we’ve got right now.”
LC: That was it?
82
1
RC: That was it. So I said, “Well, I’m not going to put our troops through this.”
2
So they had a staging area with also some American LSTs there. I saw the LST that we
3
had come in and made the Inchon landing on.
4
LC: And you knew it because of the—?
5
RC: The number.
6
LC: The number.
7
RC: Right.
8
LC: Right.
9
RC: So I went aboard and the skipper was there whom I’d spent some time with
10
up on the bridge. I laid out my story to him about our plight. He sent the word down to
11
his supply officer and said, “Give them all the meat and eggs and stuff that they need.”
12
So we stocked up on steaks and pork chops and bacon and eggs and American canned
13
vegetables and stuff like that. So we were pretty good. The only thing we didn’t have,
14
and I knew enough about bread that you needed baking powder. They didn’t have any
15
baking powder. I said, “Well, we’ve got to make some bread.” So I had a runner,
16
another vignette, by the name of Wasselcek. Don’t ask me to spell it.
17
LC: I won’t, I won’t. (Both laugh) I already decided not to.
18
RC: But “Was” was probably the best procurer of anybody, any Marine I’ve ever
19
seen.
20
LC: He had the knack.
21
RC: He had the knack. I mean, he could turn up with steaks when it was
22
impossible, fresh meat. When the only thing we’d had for days was C-rations, he’d go
23
find an Army unit some place and find fresh meat and things like that.
24
LC: You got to love these guys.
25
RC: Oh, he was great.
26
LC: Yeah.
27
RC: He was great. He said, “What’s the problem, lieutenant?” I said, “Was, we
28
don’t have any baking powder.” He says, “Not to worry,” and he disappeared and he
29
came back with two cases.
30
LC: That’s amazing.
31
RC: I never asked him where he got it.
83
1
LC: Or how.
2
RC: Or how. Later on, he did another thing that was pretty amazing, but in that
3
regard.
4
LC: Okay. Well, you can tell us about that one when it comes time.
5
RC: Yeah.
6
LC: Where was he from, do you remember?
7
RC: He was from New York.
8
LC: There you go, yeah.
9
RC: He’s a New York Polish guy.
10
LC: He was a dealmaker.
11
RC: Dealmaker, yeah, he was. He had the slang and the dialect and everything.
12
LC: Sounds great.
13
RC: Yeah, he was a great Marine. I later heard after I’d left the platoon, I later
14
heard that he went berserk and that they had to take him to the rear and I never heard
15
anymore from him. I tried to locate him and couldn’t locate him.
16
17
18
19
LC: Meaning battle stress or what they used to call in World War I in your dad’s
day, battle fatigue.
RC: Battle fatigue is what they used to call it. Now they call it PSD, PostTraumatic Stress Disorder.
20
LC: Do you know where this happened? Was he up forward at the reservoir?
21
RC: It happened sometime post-reservoir, I’m sure.
22
LC: Okay. Well, he got you and the men the needed—
23
RC: Yeah. We went aboard the ship and reequipped everything, our galley. I
24
picked up a couple guys who had worked as cooks out in civilian life before they came in
25
the Marine Corps.
26
LC: Good job, excellent.
27
RC: So we wound up having our own kitchen staff, valet staff.
28
LC: Now did you guys and your platoon stay with the LVT while you were in
29
Inchon waiting for embarkation?
30
RC: Yes, oh, yeah, yeah. We went aboard the LVT, or LST, rather.
31
LC: LST, I’m sorry. How long did you stay with the ship before it embarked?
84
1
RC: A couple of days, two or three days.
2
LC: So those were probably pretty good days.
3
RC: They were. Yeah, we enjoyed those. We enjoyed those. We did get some
4
fresh bread during that time and, as a matter of fact, we got some beer.
5
LC: Now that was quite something. Was Was responsible for that, too?
6
RC: No, no, that came down from above.
7
LC: That was a ration?
8
RC: Yeah, that was a ration.
9
LC: Okay. Well, yeah, those sound like pretty good days.
10
RC: Yeah, they were good days. We took off from there and we went up toward
11
Wansan, but we got to Wan San and they had mined the harbor. So they had to sweep
12
the harbor before we went in.
13
LC: How long did you have to stay out while the sweepers were working?
14
RC: We were at sea ten days. We had rations for ten days. As a matter of fact,
15
the last rations that we were using was the morning that we made the landing up there, I
16
was down in the galley helping cook pancakes. We had pancakes for our last meal before
17
we made the landing at Wansan, which was kind of interesting because the landing was
18
unopposed and when we got ashore, Bob Hope was at the airfield having a tour, giving
19
entertainment.
20
LC: Now were you able to get out there?
21
RC: No.
22
LC: But you heard that he was there?
23
RC: We heard that he was there.
24
LC: Yeah, I’ve read that he was there.
25
RC: He was there.
26
LC: With a troop, he wasn’t alone obviously. He had, I think, Marilyn Maxwell
27
28
was with him.
RC: Oh, yeah, he had his whole troop there, one of his tours, you know, which
29
was kind of embarrassing. We were all loaded for combat, going to make an amphibious
30
landing, an assault amphibious landing and Bob Hope was having a show on the shore.
85
1
LC: Something wasn’t right. (Both laugh) Well, I bet your guys were in some
2
way though relieved that they were going to have an unopposed amphibious landing.
3
RC: Oh, absolutely, of course. They were a little bit distraught because they
4
didn’t get to see Bob Hope, but that was the breaks of the game.
5
LC: Were you guys getting mail regularly at this point?
6
RC: We got some mail when we got there a couple of days after we got there.
7
Then we got some mail when we went back to Inchon. We got some mail in Seoul.
8
LC: So it was getting through, but in dribs and drabs.
9
RC: Yeah.
10
11
12
13
LC: Okay. Once you were ashore, what deployments did you have to make and
where were you bivouacked?
RC: Well, we started west out of Wansan and we went to, our battalion went to a
place called Majon-ni, M-A-J-O-N N-I, Majon-ni, dash-N-I, Majon-ni.
14
LC: Which is quite a ways inland.
15
RC: Quite a ways inland. There we wound up, we found out when we went
16
there, I remember, we moved out there at night up this mountain road. It was up on a
17
plateau and we went up this mountain road. My platoon was escorting a bulldozer. We
18
were taking a bulldozer because we were going to make an airstrip. It’s going to cut an
19
airstrip out of the terrain. We were the last ones to go up. I know that I was quite
20
apprehensive about it because we were going up the road at night with our lights on and
21
we were in enemy territory, but fortunately nothing happened. So we wound up getting
22
to Majon-ni and then we started making runs back. We sat there and did patrols reaching
23
out in all directions trying to locate the enemy. Every few days, we’d send a platoon
24
back to Wansan for supplies for the battalion. I took the first two or three, I guess, about
25
three, without incident. The company commander and I had been making a lot of patrols
26
in between and so on and the company commander finally felt sorry for me. He said,
27
“Carey, I’m going to give you a rest on this one. You don’t have to take this patrol, I’m
28
going to give it to Beeler,” to Jim Beeler, who was another good friend of mine, another
29
lieutenant.
30
LC: And also platoon leader.
31
RC: Also platoon leader.
86
1
LC: Within your company?
2
RC: Within our company. Jim, he said, “Well, that’s great.” He said, “I got a
3
Purple Heart here and I want to mail it home.” So he went back and on the road back,
4
they were ambushed and Jim was killed. The platoon fought its way through and they
5
left him there. We went back. We went on another patrol and went back to retrieve him,
6
which we did. They had, very sad thing, they had rammed his spoon through this throat,
7
through his neck and had his Purple Heart stuck in his teeth. So that’s another example
8
of brutality.
9
10
11
LC: Again, sending, trying to send some kind of message?
RC: Some kind of message that how vicious the people were, they were fighting,
don’t get caught.
12
LC: Was it your sense that he was already dead when this happened?
13
RC: Oh, yes, yes. I’m sure he was.
14
LC: Was Lieutenant Beeler the only one who was killed in the ambush?
15
RC: No, there were a couple of others, a couple of others that were killed.
16
LC: Were they similarly—?
17
RC: No, he was the only one. So they knew he was an officer.
18
LC: Right, right. These were clearly North Korean troops that had done this.
19
RC: We had thought they were. We didn’t know for sure.
20
LC: Okay. This would’ve been, are we talking—?
21
RC: We didn’t have those kind of incidents with the Chinese.
22
LC: Did you not?
23
RC: The Chinese were, well, in the encounters that we had with them while I was
24
with the division, they were pretty much straightforward. They fought kind of according
25
to the rules. The North Koreans really didn’t.
26
LC: That’s interesting that the North Koreans would go out of their way to do—
27
RC: Well, you see it a couple of times in my little adventures with them. I’m
28
sure there were others along the way. Those are the incidents that we had with them.
29
That hit me pretty hard because Jim had told me before, when we were getting ready to
30
go into Inchon, why he said, “Dick, I’m not going to make it.” I said, “What do you
31
mean you’re not going to make it? That’s not a very good attitude.” He said, “No,” he
87
1
said, “I just feel I’m just not going to make it.” I said, “If anybody will make it, you
2
will,” because he was a very fine officer, Naval Academy, played football in the Naval
3
Academy team and just an all around very gentleman, real wonderful guy.
4
LC: Smart guy.
5
RC: Very smart, sharp.
6
LC: Did he have all the skills that, for example, you had?
7
RC: I think so. I think so. I felt he did. We had some very competent platoon
8
leaders. Spence Jarnagin was very good. I’d known him since Basic School. Jim was
9
not in my Basic class. My Basic class was—most of the division lieutenants was out of
10
my Basic class, which is another story. There’s another story connected to that with one
11
of our generals.
12
LC: Well, go ahead and tell us that while we’re thinking about it.
13
RC: What, about the—?
14
LC: Yeah, about the class and—
15
RC: Oh, about the class. Oh, yeah. Well, at the culmination of your training
16
right toward the end of the training, you have a three-day war. You go out into the field
17
and you fight for three days, you fight each other and again, you’re graded on all the
18
principles and so on.
19
20
LC: Now do you have like one’s the green team and one’s the red team or
something like that?
21
RC: Well, yes.
22
LC: Maybe not red, but—
23
RC: Uh, yeah.
24
LC: Blue
25
RC: You have base troops that also act as the enemy.
26
LC: Sure.
27
RC: But anyway, we had this war. The commander of Quantico, which is where
28
the Basic School is, came to watch the war. The last night, everybody was totally
29
exhausted, and I suspect were sleeping in their foxholes because we had an attack and we
30
were ordered to fire the final protective fire, which is where all your machineguns and all
31
your riflemen and so on fire and fire at targets and so on. At that night, I was designated
88
1
as a messenger. So I was on the field phone and I got the word, “Fire the final protective
2
fire,” so I passed it to the sergeant, the designated sergeant, another lieutenant. He passed
3
the word along the line and the final protective fire was pop, pop, pop, here, there, and
4
everywhere, but not really final protective fire. In other words, most of the lieutenants
5
were asleep. So the next day, our general came out and he had us all in a big circle. He
6
was briefing us and he made the statement, he said, “If I had my way, I would take this
7
school, this Basic School, and I’d start you all over and run you through the complete
8
course again.” He said, “This is probably one of the sorriest demonstrations I’ve ever
9
seen.”
10
LC: Ouch.
11
RC: Ouch, right. Well, I’m having a senior moment. His name slips me now, I’ll
12
think of it in a minute.
13
LC: Did he command in Korea? Did he have a command?
14
RC: He was the Fleet Marine Force commander. In other words, he had
15
everything out in the Pacific.
16
LC: Was his.
17
RC: Was his.
18
LC: I’m blanking.
19
RC: I’m blanking right now.
20
LC: That’s all right.
21
RC: I’ll think of it in just a second.
22
LC: That’s all right. But he let you know pretty clearly.
23
RC: He let us know pretty clearly and everybody was pretty distraught about it,
24
but we put it behind us because we graduated. He had to graduate us because the Marine
25
Corps had to have us. I think he was really, you know, the rest of the problems went well
26
and so on. He probably was kind of understanding.
27
28
LC: Well, he was probably taking the opportunity to chew you guys out a little
bit, too.
29
RC: Yeah, that’s right, kind of give us both sides of the picture that generals can
30
be tough, too. Anyway, later on as we were coming off the hill, coming off the reservoir
31
hill down the mountain, I had been on the track team and had gone out for the football
89
1
team and was drafted over to the track team again. We won a lot of awards. We won the
2
All-Service Championship and beat a bunch of universities and that sort of thing. So he
3
knew us and he knew me. As I came off the hill, I was with a column of Marines. He
4
was standing at the side greeting Marines as they came down off the hill. He’d come in
5
from Hawaii to do that specifically. He saw me and he said, “Lieutenant Carey, you’re
6
Lieutenant Carey aren’t you?” I said, “Yes, sir,” standing at attention and he said,
7
“You’re out of the 5th Basic?” I said, “Yes, sir.” He said, “Well, let me tell you
8
something and you pass it on to all your cohorts and all your fellow officers out of the 5th
9
Basic.” He said, “This is the finest group of lieutenants that I’ve ever seen.” I’m choked
10
up.
11
LC: I understand. He remembered what had happened, what he had said.
12
RC: Yeah, yeah, he remembered it.
13
LC: And he wanted you to know.
14
RC: He wanted us to know that in reality he thought an awful lot of us because he
15
knew about the lieutenants in the reservoir and the jobs that they did. So he personally
16
made a trip all the way from Hawaii and was standing at the bottom of the pass when we
17
came out and greeting us.
18
19
20
21
LC: We’ll remember who that was or figure out who that was as time comes
around.
RC: I’m absolutely flabbergasted that I can’t remember, I’m just absolutely
drawing a blank like I did yesterday when I told you about those seven people.
22
LC: Yeah.
23
RC: Dick Gubsch.
24
LC: Oh, there you go.
25
RC: G-U-B-S-C-H.
26
LC: So you rounded that one out. Well, we’ll round this one out, too.
27
RC: Yeah, I’ll have it in a minute. I’ll have it in just a minute because he
28
eventually became commandant of the Marine Corps. I admired him so much. He was
29
probably one of the finest officers I’ve ever seen. He was a Medal of Honor winner in
30
World War I, became the commandant of the Marine Corps, just an absolute stellar
31
officer. Doggone it.
90
1
LC: It’ll come to us.
2
RC: Yeah, yeah.
3
LC: Actually, with all the information that you’ve given, we’ll figure it out if we
4
don’t remember. We’ll figure it out.
5
RC: Yeah. Well, anyway, we’re back to Majon-ni, if you recall.
6
LC: Yes, sir. You’ve received the news about Lieutenant Beeler and that’s got to
7
be a low point, I’m sure.
8
RC: That was. That was.
9
LC: You’re, of course, trying to regroup because you, I’m sure, know that you’re
10
11
going to be going further north.
RC: Yes, that’s right. That’s right. One incident that happened there that
12
demonstrates something else about Koreans. The South Koreans, we had a company of
13
South Korean Marines attached to our battalion at that time, outstanding fighters they
14
were. I remember, it was now starting to get cold up into November now. It’s starting to
15
get cold and the foxholes, if they had any water in them, they were freezing and so on. I
16
remember one morning, this Korean Marine company was beside me. They got up every
17
morning, took off their tops, the top of their uniform, and did calisthenics. Banzai, not
18
banzai, but they call it banzai or whatever their—I forget what their terminology was, the
19
sun, to wake their troops up. They had a sergeant and there was an officer there.
20
Something happened that the officer, that the sergeant said something to the officer and
21
the officer shot him right there.
22
LC: Wow, really?
23
RC: Yup, that was his discipline. He shot him. So they had ironclad discipline,
24
there was absolutely no questioning of anything that the officer said.
25
LC: I guess not.
26
RC: Yeah, pretty rugged, pretty rugged. Later on in Vietnam, the Korean Marine
27
area was always the safest area to be in because they were absolutely unforgiving of any
28
violation of their orders, any violation for anybody, civilians or anybody else.
29
LC: Yeah, and it won’t surprise you to know that in other interviews I’ve come
30
across that comment from lots of different American service personnel that when the
31
ROKs (Republic of Korea troops) were around, you felt pretty good.
91
1
2
3
4
RC: Yup, they were tenacious fighters, particularly the Marines. The ROK
Marines were really tough. They were really a tough group.
LC: It sounds like it. Well, that’s actually on some levels a really frightening
story. Did this happen in front of the other troops?
5
RC: Yes.
6
LC: That would be the point.
7
RC: That’s right. That was the whole point. That’s the ironclad discipline.
8
LC: Wow. I wonder, was it David Shoup that you were talking about?
9
RC: No, it wasn’t Shoup.
10
LC: Was it—?
11
RC: Following Shoup.
12
LC: Greene?
13
RC: No, no.
14
LC: Chapman?
15
RC: Nope.
16
LC: Cushman?
17
RC: Nope, go back further.
18
LC: Go back further. Randolph Pate?
19
RC: No, no, just come up.
20
LC: Oh, come closer to us?
21
RC: Yeah.
22
LC: Louis Wilson?
23
RC: No.
24
LC: Kelly, Paul Kelly.
25
RC: No. Am I mistaken? Did he not become—I know he became—?
26
LC: I don’t know. Actually, I’m just looking at a list of the commandants of the
27
Marine Corps and I started with David Shoup because he came in 1960.
28
RC: No, he was before Shoup.
29
LC: So Randolph Pate was in ’56 to ’59 and Shepherd was in—
30
RC: Shepherd, there you go, Lemuel Shepherd.
31
LC: Lemuel Shepherd.
92
1
RC: Doggone it, I didn’t think I’d ever forget him.
2
LC: Well, mystery solved.
3
RC: Lemuel Shepherd, an absolutely superb individual, absolutely top dollar.
4
LC: Well, and I think he wanted you guys to know he thought the same of you.
5
RC: Yeah, top dollar guy. He really was.
6
LC: Wow. He was Medal of Honor from World War I.
7
RC: Medal of Honor, yeah.
8
LC: That’s incredible. That’s incredible.
9
RC: The only guy that was more attentive, well, I don’t even think he was even
10
more attentive than Lemuel Shepherd was, was MacArthur was very aware of his
11
appearance, but so was Shepherd. Shepherd was another one of those guys that he was
12
absolutely always completely, totally immaculate.
13
LC: Even when he was essentially waiting, greeting that column of guys?
14
RC: Even when he was waiting for us, he stood out. There was like a spotlight
15
on him. He’s just one of those guys.
16
LC: That’s incredible.
17
RC: Yeah.
18
LC: Wow.
19
RC: Wonderful guy.
20
LC: Yeah. Well, and to think that you had conservations with him and that he
21
picked you out, he remembered you.
22
RC: Yeah, he remembered me.
23
LC: That really says quite—
24
RC: Did you ever hear of Lou Walt?
25
LC: I have not, no. Who is he?
26
RC: Lou Walt was another Marine hero that was on Peleliu was quite a hero. He
27
28
29
became the assistant commandant later on.
LC: Well, I see that—I’m just looking through the Marine Corps history that I
happen to have on my desk and I see he takes up a lot of ink.
30
RC: He does.
31
LC: Yeah, Lewis W. Walt.
93
1
RC: Good friend of mine, he made me an honorary Marine Raider.
2
LC: That’s a reference to the raid in Vietnam?
3
RC: Makin Island.
4
LC: Oh, okay.
5
RC: He was regimental commander. He put me in hack one time. Do you know
6
what hack is?
7
LC: No.
8
RC: You don’t know what hack is?
9
LC: No. H-A-C?
10
RC: H-A-C-K.
11
LC: What is it?
12
RC: It’s a disciplinary form for officers. It’s kind of like going to jail.
13
LC: Okay. No, I don’t think I’ve ever talked to an officer who admitted that
14
happened. What happened?
15
16
RC: Well, I’ll tell you one that you could—I know of an officer, a naval officer
that was court-martialed twice.
17
LC: Twice?
18
RC: And became a CINC (commander in chief).
19
LC: Who was that? You’ll have to tell me about it.
20
RC: I’ll tell you about that later.
21
LC: Okay, all right, all right, later on.
22
RC: Yeah.
23
LC: Well, tell me about how you were put in hack, what does that entail?
24
RC: I told you, I was on the track team at Quantico and we won all these awards.
25
LC: Yes, sir.
26
RC: One of the guys that was on the track team with me out of our class, they
27
used to draft you onto the track team at Quantico because we had such a great track team
28
and great athletic program, really. So Bob Smith, remember me telling you about Bob
29
Smith?
30
LC: Sure.
94
1
RC: He was one of those. Bob Smith, Benny Moore, Dick Ambrogie and myself
2
were drafted to the track team and we won, our track team won just about everything we
3
participated in. So we were called into, again to General Shepherd’s office. General
4
Shepherd, this was after Basic School. We had been assigned to the PLC Regiment,
5
platoon leaders class regiment, which is training officers out of colleges, potential Marine
6
officers out of colleges. They’d come to camp during the summertime, come to
7
Quantico. They have a thing they call the platoon leaders regiment.
8
LC: Which is a training program for them.
9
RC: A training program for them and I was one of the lieutenants that was held
10
back after graduation from Basic School to help train them. We were called in one day
11
out of the field to General Shepherd’s office to receive special awards. He gave us
12
jackets and gave us trophies and patted us on the back about what a stellar operation we
13
had and everything. Then he said, “We’re going to have, you gentleman are going to”—
14
we were the only lieutenants that were there and he says, “We’re going to have a banquet
15
tonight and I assume you all will be at the banquet.” I spoke up and I said, “General,
16
we’ve got a field problem with Colonel Walt tonight. We’re platoon leaders in the
17
regiment and I don’t think he’d like for us to be absent.” He turned to his chief of staff
18
and he said, “You’ll take care of that, won’t you?” He said, “Yes, sir, I’ll call.” So he
19
said, “You gentleman just stay in here and we’ll see you at the banquet.” So we went to
20
the banquet and we had a ball, a lot of fun and everything. I remember I had a ’38
21
Chevrolet.
22
LC: Yeah, how wonderful.
23
RC: Yeah, I drove out, back out to our camp, we were out in the boondocks. I
24
drove back out there and I’d had a couple of beers. I ran through the boondocks a little
25
bit, dented my car, a few things like that. But either way, I got back to quarters, went to
26
asleep and the next morning at five-thirty in the morning, there was a knock on the door.
27
It was the regimental adjutant and he says, “Lieutenants Carey, Ambrogie, Smith, and
28
Moore, you’re due at Colonel Walt’s office at 0600.” So we went up there and he read us
29
the riot act. He said, “Do you gentleman realize that last night we had four platoons that
30
were without platoon leaders?” I spoke up again and I said, “Well, Colonel, the chief of
31
staff was supposed to have called you.” He said, “I did not get a call.” He said, “I’m not
95
1
going to ruin your careers, but for the next ten days, you are in hack except for meals and
2
work with your troops,” which means you can’t do anything or go anyplace except you
3
go with your troops, you eat a meal and you go back to your quarters and you’re in
4
essence in jail.
5
LC: Like house arrest kind of thing.
6
RC: House arrest, that’s it.
7
LC: Wow, wow.
8
RC: So that’s my contact with Shepherd and Walt and later on, Colonel Walt,
9
now general, now four-star general, remembered me, of course when, I was now the CG
10
(commanding general) of Quantico and the Raiders had their annual reunion at Quantico
11
every year. He invited me to the reunion and they made me an honorary Raider.
12
LC: So was all forgiven?
13
RC: Everything was forgiven.
14
LC: He had to give you a little hell, though.
15
RC: Yeah. He gave us a lot of hell, but he was a wonderful man also.
16
LC: Yeah, it sounds like it. It sounds like it.
17
RC: Quite a warrior. Now where were we?
18
LC: Well, we were—
19
RC: Are you tired?
20
LC: No. We were pleasantly diverted by that story about Quantico, but actually
21
22
we had left you up where it was getting cold up at Majon-ni.
RC: Yeah, at Majon-ni. Now we were ordered back and the battalion of the
23
regiment fought its way through with not really serious encounters up to Majon-ni or up
24
to the top of the pass so that we could make our way out. So we went back down to
25
Wansan and there we went into bivouac.
26
27
LC: Did you have any idea? How much information did you have about what
was happening up further north?
28
RC: We had rumors only. That’s all we had.
29
LC: How accurate, I mean, how good was the grapevine generally?
30
RC: Very good.
31
LC: Yeah.
96
1
RC: Very good. It didn’t take long for word to get around. You often wonder
2
how it covered such distances, but it always did, but we had heard rumors. But it was
3
now Thanksgiving and we had our Thanksgiving meal, which was a great meal, I
4
remember that. We had turkey and everything.
5
LC: Really, at Wansan?
6
RC: At Wansan. There I came across Chesty Puller again.
7
LC: His position was still—
8
RC: Regimental commander of the 1st Marines.
9
LC: Of the 1st Marines, right. So he’s essentially, through the chain of command,
10
your commanding officer.
11
RC: That’s right, senior, very senior.
12
LC: Yeah, top of the pole.
13
RC: Yeah. So since we were in rest and filling up our ranks from casualties and
14
so on, he took that opportunity to present awards and I got an award there.
15
LC: Which award did you get?
16
RC: I got the Bronze Star there.
17
LC: For which action?
18
RC: That first action there when I captured that platoon.
19
LC: So right off the bat, your first encounter.
20
RC: Yeah.
21
LC: Who had written you up, did you find out?
22
RC: I think my company commander wrote me up. I’m not sure. I never really
23
looked into it.
24
LC: So your company commander.
25
RC: Uh-huh.
26
LC: Who was at that time—?
27
RC: Wait a minute, George, George, George, George Westover, George
28
Westover. We were all in ranks. There was a line of us, about ten of us. All of them
29
were enlisted except for me. I was the only officer.
30
LC: Who were receiving awards?
97
1
RC: Awards. Chesty Puller loved his troops. He was kind of difficult, kind of
2
hard on his officers. I was the first one in the rank and he came up to me and he said,
3
“What the hell are you doing here?”
4
LC: I bet you wondered the same thing.
5
RC: I kind of shrugged my shoulders, you know, “I don’t know, Colonel.” He
6
was a colonel then, but that was his style. That was his style. That was just a little
7
vignette there.
8
9
10
LC: So I’m just going to try to draw this out a little for people who are listening
and interested in Puller. He went ahead and of course, I would gather, pinned you.
RC: Oh, yes, yes, yes. And talked to me after the formation and said, “You’re
11
the lieutenant that was aboard ship that time, aren’t you?” I said, “Yes, sir, I am.” He just
12
kind of patted me on the shoulder and said, “You’re doing a great job, keep it up.”
13
LC: That was the kind of stuff, that’s just invaluable I’m sure.
14
RC: Yeah.
15
LC: I mean, there’s so many examples you’ve given of the ways in which the
16
senior commanders really kind of reached down and not only took notice of the men, but
17
encouraged them, each in their own way.
18
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah.
19
LC: It’s a really interesting—
20
RC: That’s real leadership.
21
LC: Yes, it is. Yeah, it is.
22
RC: That’s real leadership.
23
LC: You feel it when you’re the person down there closer to the bottom and
24
somebody takes note of you and remembers you.
25
RC: Well, that’s right.
26
LC: Yeah.
27
RC: That’s right.
28
LC: I’m sure that he must’ve made this a special occasion for those enlisted men,
29
as well.
30
RC: Oh, yes.
31
LC: Did he stop and speak with each one of them?
98
1
RC: Oh, absolutely. He spoke and talked to each one of them. Yeah, absolutely.
2
He was very much a troop leader, very much.
3
LC: The guys loved him, didn’t they?
4
RC: Well, that’s why.
5
LC: Yeah, I can believe it. I can believe it. Was he one of these men who in
6
addition to having that kind of common touch that we talk about that’s so rare, was he
7
also a charismatic figure? I mean, were people drawn to him?
8
RC: Oh, yes, yes, yes. You know, he wasn’t a big guy.
9
LC: Was he not?
10
RC: No, he’s not a big guy at all. He’s probably about 5’8” and he was kind of a
11
little bit—he did have a great big chest.
12
LC: Yeah, kind of broad.
13
RC: Broad. He wasn’t really a picture of a model Marine. He wasn’t ramrod
14
straight and tall and thin and wiry. He was not that at all. He smoked a pipe, had a little
15
tiny pipe that he always carried. He really was not that impressive in his walk or
16
anything, but he just had a—when he spoke to you, you just kind of felt like you’re kind
17
of special.
18
LC: Was it his voice, his eyes?
19
RC: His eyes and he always looked you directly in the eye. He never missed
20
looking directly in the eye. He’d stare right through you.
21
LC: Wow. Well, this must’ve been—
22
RC: MacArthur was that way, too.
23
LC: Look right at you?
24
RC: Yeah, look right at you. I mean, it kind of sent chills through you, really.
25
You kind of felt like he was going to jump on you.
26
LC: Did he have those piercing—?
27
RC: Uh-huh.
28
LC: I guess he had blue eyes, did he not?
29
RC: Yes, he did.
30
LC: Yeah.
31
RC: Yeah, he did.
99
1
LC: What about Colonel Puller?
2
RC: As I recall, he had real bright green eyes, as I recall.
3
LC: Really?
4
RC: Yeah. It just kind of strikes me that way.
5
LC: But penetrating.
6
RC: Penetrating, you know how penetrating those colored eyes are, green and
7
8
9
blue.
LC: Yeah, that’s amazing. What a moment it must’ve been for you to stand there
in that line.
10
RC: Yeah.
11
LC: Quite something. Had you any forewarning at all that you were going to be
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
decorated?
RC: No, no. No, just called me one day and said, “Report up to the battalion.”
“What for?” “Well, you’re going to get a medal.” That’s about what they tell you.
LC: What did you think of it? Did you think, “Damn, I did a good job,” or did
you think, “This was just standard operating. I did what I had to do”?
RC: That’s just part of the job, just doing my job that’s all. That’s what I was
trained to do.
19
LC: Did it change you at all?
20
RC: No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so. You feel kind of humble about it, you
21
22
know? “Why me?”
LC: Right. When, of course, you’ve seen so many other actions, both great
23
actions and unfortunate things that happened. Yeah, I can image feeling kind of split
24
about it.
25
RC: Yeah.
26
LC: Yeah. Sir, let’s take a break there for a minute.
27
28
29
30
31
100
Interview with Richard Carey Session [3] of [16] September 26, 2005 1
Laura Calkins: This is Dr. Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey. Today
3
is the twenty-sixth of September 2005. I’m on the campus of Texas Tech and the general
4
is speaking by telephone from his home, which is also here in Texas. General, I was just
5
reviewing with you where we had come to in our last session.
6
Richard Carey: Yes.
7
LC: We had spoken about Thanksgiving 1950 and where you were and the medal
8
ceremony of which you were a part with Colonel Puller there and giving medals both to
9
yourself and to some enlisted men, I think.
10
RC: Yes.
11
LC: What were the next important events for you?
12
RC: Well, the next thing I did is I got transferred out of my rifle company. My
13
battalion commander said that I’d had enough frontline, directly frontline duty and been
14
exposed enough. We had lost two of the three platoon leaders and he said, “Your time
15
will be next. So I don’t want that to happen to you, so I’m going to give you a job.
16
You’re going to become the battalion intelligence officer.” So yes, so I—
17
LC: So I just want to review this with you, the 3rd Battalion S-2, is that right?
18
RC: 3rd battalion, 1st Marines.
19
LC: Okay, and you were the S-2?
20
RC: S-2, that’s right.
21
LC: What did you make of those orders? Were you pleased or did you—?
22
RC: I was very disappointed.
23
LC: I thought maybe.
24
RC: Because I wanted to remain with my troops, but you’ve got to go where they
25
tell you to go. So I went dragging my feet, of course. But they immediately gave me a
26
very interesting little assignment. The 5th and 7th Marines had moved up the pass to the
27
reservoir, up toward the reservoir, up as far as a place called Hagaru and Udam-ni.
28
You’ve probably heard of both of them.
101
1
2
3
4
LC: Both of them are very famous. Hagaru was on one side of the reservoir
essentially, is this accurate?
RC: No, they’re both on the same side, but Hagaru is right at the foot of the
reservoir and Udam-ni is up the western, or yes, up the western side.
5
LC: Up the far side.
6
RC: Right. The 31st Regiment, 31st RCT (Regimental Combat Team) of the 7th
7
Division, 7th Army Division was moving up the right side of the reservoir. They had the
8
5th and 7th Marines going up the left side. The rear echelon of the 7th Marines was at
9
Hagaru. I was told by the battalion commander to go to Hagaru and to touch base with
10
the regimental commander and to look over the area and get briefed on it and find out
11
what was going on because the battalion, our battalion was slated to move forward. So
12
they scattered our regiment out in three elements. One element was at the bottom of the
13
pass and the second element was halfway up to the reservoir at the top of the pass. Our
14
battalion was to go forward to Hagaru and we were to relieve the 7th Marines in those
15
positions. I went forward and took a jeep and a driver and one of my S-2 men and we
16
drove to Hagaru. I later found out that I had passed through at least a division of
17
Chinese. I went through at night, came all the way back at night, went up in the daytime
18
and came back at night. I went up and back the same day. It was about forty miles one
19
way from where we were. So I came back and briefed the battalion commander. Then
20
he sent me on forward again. I went forward and joined up with the 7th Marines’ S-2 and
21
waited on the battalion. Now the battalion came up with only two rifle companies, I
22
Company and Hal Company. My old company, G Company, was left behind to clean up
23
the bivouac area that we were in and so on.
24
LC: At Hagaru?
25
RC: No. This was down south.
26
LC: Oh, okay.
27
RC: In the area of Wansan.
28
LC: Okay, so they had not—the whole company, you had been completely
29
separated from them with your new assignment.
30
RC: Yes. That’s right.
31
LC: They were remaining down at Wansan.
102
1
RC: That’s right. Now that company, my rifle company, was the company that
2
went up through Hellfire Valley later on and I’ll get to that, but the two companies of the
3
battalion moved up and got up there about the twenty-seventh of November.
4
LC: Yup, that sounds right.
5
RC: About the twenty-seventh of November and we immediately moved into
6
position. We had an element headquarters on a little area or a big area actually called
7
East Hill, which was on the eastern side of Hagaru. That was a very important terrain
8
feature, the commanding terrain feature of the crossroads. Crossroads was there. One
9
part of the crossroads went north to Udam-ni and the other crossroad went up the eastern
10
side of the reservoir to where the 31st Regimental Combat Team, Army was.
11
LC: Was Hagaru located just west of that crossroads or do you remember—?
12
RC: Yes, Hagaru was west of that crossroad. You probably have a map.
13
LC: Well, I do actually have a map and I think most anyone who will listen to
14
this interview will probably be sitting very—
15
RC: Can you detail, have you located East Hill?
16
LC: Yes, I can see it on this map.
17
RC: The big hill, it’s a commanding terrain feature.
18
LC: This is where, if I’m correct, the pass goes what, just to the south of—?
19
RC: That’s right. That’s right. So we moved into that position and immediately I
20
had, as a battalion S-2, I’d been getting my bearings as to what I had. I had a group of
21
what we called counterintelligence agents. They were Koreans, not in the military, that
22
were assigned to us for interpreting purposes and also to go out into the hinterlands and
23
do some scouting for us. There’s an interesting story involved in them. I sent them out
24
as soon as I got there, I sent them out into the hinterlands to reconnoiter and see what
25
they could find out.
26
27
LC: Now did you have any relationship with them before this happened? Had
you ever even laid eyes on them?
28
RC: No, I had not. I did not know who they were or anything. I just got as well
29
acquainted as quickly as I could with them and sent them out into the hinterlands. They
30
came back on the evening of the twenty-eighth and told me the locations, they had
103
1
located Chinese. We were more or less surrounded by Chinese. Unbeknownst to myself,
2
the 31st RCT was getting pretty badly cut up right now.
3
LC: That evening, that night.
4
RC: That night, right. Also there was attacks on the 5th and 7th Marines. They
5
were deeply engaged.
6
LC: They were further—?
7
RC: They were up on the west side of the reservoir all the way up to Udam-ni.
8
9
Do you see Udam-ni on your map?
LC: Yes, yes.
10
RC: They were up to Udam-ni.
11
LC: Did you have any kind of accurate information about even whether they
12
were under fire, let alone what—?
13
RC: Yes. We knew that they were being attacked. We did know that.
14
LC: Okay, but you didn’t have any sense of the numbers that they were facing?
15
RC: No, we did not. We did not. We knew that they were having heavy
16
engagement.
17
LC: Okay.
18
RC: But that night, when my counterintelligence men came in, they told me that
19
they were going to have an attack that night. The Chinese were going to attack Hagaru.
20
LC: Did they tell you how they found that out?
21
RC: No, they didn’t. I have to surmise that they went out and mingled with them
22
as much as they could, being Korean. They weren’t in uniform.
23
LC: They could probably actually get into camp or—?
24
RC: Yeah, I’m sure got into the camps and so on. As I later found out, one of
25
them was a double agent.
26
LC: How’d you find that out?
27
RC: Well, we killed him later on.
28
LC: Oh, okay. I don’t want to go forward too much, but how long did it take to
29
figure that out?
30
RC: On our way out, actually, about the fourth of December.
31
LC: Okay. Well, I’ll make sure to ask you about that.
104
1
RC: He was in a Chinese uniform at that time, same man.
2
LC: No kidding?
3
RC: Yeah.
4
LC: Yeah, I’ll have to ask you about the details of that. Do you want to tell me
5
now, sir? Do you want to go ahead with the—?
6
RC: Well, I could.
7
LC: Sure, if you want to, it might be a good idea just while we’re talking about it.
8
RC: Well, when we withdrew from Hagaru, we started withdrawing about the
9
fourth. The dates, I’m a little hazy on the exact dates.
10
LC: That’s okay.
11
RC: But it was sometime around, either it was the fourth or shortly thereafter. It
12
might’ve been the fifth or even the sixth, I don’t know, but I think it was the fourth. I
13
was with the rear element of the withdrawing force. The 5th Marines and 7th Marines had
14
withdrawn, had gone ahead and the 1st Marines was taking up the rear. Our battalion was
15
the rear guard, so to speak.
16
LC: Yes.
17
RC: I was almost at the rear.
18
LC: One of the last guys there.
19
RC: One of the last out of Hagaru. The Chinese, they mingled with civilians that
20
were trying to come out with us, North Koreans. They took us under fire. The civilians,
21
of course, took cover as quick as they could because we started shooting back. We saw
22
these people and, of course, being an S-2, I wanted to see if I could get any maps or
23
anything like that with some of the dead Chinese. I came up to this counterintelligence
24
agent who had worked for me. He was now in a Chinese uniform.
25
LC: He had been killed in the fire?
26
RC: In the firefight, yes.
27
LC: Did he have anything on him?
28
RC: No, he did not.
29
LC: But you knew it was him?
30
RC: I knew it was him. I recognized him.
31
LC: Wow.
105
1
RC: Yeah, I recognized him. But that is that story.
2
LC: Yes, okay.
3
RC: That night, I calculated, I got approximate locations from these
4
counterintelligence agents as to where the Chinese were. They said they were going to
5
attack as soon as they could cross their line of departures and so on. In battle, you have
6
line of departures where you start your attack and so on. So I calculated, I knew they
7
were all on foot and calculated approximately where they would come in. I briefed the
8
staff that afternoon, including the division commander. The division had also moved
9
forward at that time. The forward headquarters of the division was in Hagaru, also. They
10
had moved forward with us and I briefed the battalion. The battalion said, “Take this
11
over to the division.” So I went over to the division commander and briefed him, General
12
Smith.
13
14
15
16
LC: And essentially what you were getting across was that the plan was that the
Chinese would go anytime now.
RC: Well, I told him where they were located, where my counterintelligence
agents had told me they were located, that we would have our attack at about 9:30.
17
LC: Did you have a strength estimate from what they had been able to tell you?
18
RC: Yes, yes. We estimated at least one regiment, probably two regiments,
19
maybe more. As it turned out, I think it was the 59th Division.
20
LC: Yes, at least one division, right.
21
RC: Yeah, it was at least one division that hit us that night. We went on a
22
hundred percent alert at sundown because we knew they were going to attack at night.
23
So we went on a hundred percent alert. The attack didn’t come until 10:30 and the joke
24
was Carey missed his estimate. Of course, I told the battalion commander, “Well, they
25
were on daylight savings time.”
26
LC: That’s a pretty good comeback.
27
RC: So they’re an hour later than I had estimated.
28
LC: Just can I stop you there for a minute, General, and just ask how you could
29
be as confident as you were in the men that you sent out and the information that you had
30
to hand? Did it fit with the picture that you were kind of developing in your head?
106
1
RC: Yes, yes. From what I’d been briefed from all the intelligence that was
2
flowing and the intelligence was flowing pretty well. All the intelligence that was
3
flowing, I surmised that—I was pretty confident that it was going to be. After all, we
4
knew that the 5th and 7th Marines were under attack. It was general attack and we knew
5
that the 8th Army was in full retreat.
6
LC: Right. So this would’ve been a prime moment.
7
RC: This would’ve been a prime moment. So we were pretty confident that what
8
we got was accurate.
9
LC: Okay. Did it make any difference as you look back on it now or maybe at
10
the time, did it make any difference that one of those two reconnaissance men that you
11
sent out was in fact actually acting as a double agent?
12
RC: I don’t think it did. I don’t recall exactly. We screened them out and they
13
all talked. So I don’t recall that much detail now after all this time what he had actually
14
told me.
15
LC: Sure, interesting, interesting, though you were off by an hour.
16
RC: Yeah.
17
LC: But essentially, because of this—
18
RC: Well, we put them on a hundred percent alert, so we were—
19
LC: Right, they were ready.
20
RC: We were ready.
21
LC: Yeah. What would a hundred percent alert look like? Would you pull your
22
patrols in? What would it actually look like?
23
RC: Everybody was in. Patrols were all in. We had outposts out, of course.
24
LC: Okay. Listening posts, LPs?
25
RC: Listening posts, right. We had those out and they withdrew as soon as the
26
Chinese started. They saw mass movements of Chinese.
27
LC: Right, okay.
28
RC: So they moved in and we were, in essence, if we had not been on a hundred
29
percent alert, they’re very good night fighters. They were very good night fighters. They
30
moved quietly and did well until they got up to the point and the first time you knew they
31
were there is when they sounded the bugles usually.
107
1
LC: They sounded a bugle?
2
RC: Yeah, they always had bugles.
3
LC: That’s almost unimaginable now.
4
RC: Well, it is now and as it turns out, we could tell exactly what they were
5
doing by their bugle calls because they sounded a bugle and then they’d sound a whistle,
6
a police type whistle for retreat, for pullback.
7
LC: So you figured out, I mean their communications were open.
8
RC: We figured out what they were doing.
9
LC: Right. Evidentially, it sounds like they weren’t relying very much on radio
10
11
traffic or anything like that.
RC: No, I don’t think so. A whole company surrendered to us at one of our
12
roadblocks the next day. They didn’t have radios. So it was a whole company and they
13
were pretty well equipped. All the Chinese that we’d seen up to that time were pretty
14
poorly equipped as far as cold weather is concerned. It turned out that those prisoners
15
that we did take were in very, very bad physical shape, frozen ears, frozen noses, frozen
16
feet, hands. They wore just rubber shoes with no socks.
17
LC: I just can’t imagine.
18
RC: Yeah. They all had a food bandolier around them. It looked like dog food,
19
really. Hard dog food is what they were eating. We did find, after one of the attacks
20
after we searched some of the bodies and so on, we did find drugs. So they were
21
drugged.
22
LC: Of what kind, did you know?
23
RC: Opium. We did find drugs and we did determine, too, in their attacks, they
24
used human wave attacks. The advanced element of the Chinese would have rifles and
25
some automatic weapons, not very many. But directly behind them would be another
26
element with burp guns. Anybody that turned their tail and run, they would shoot them.
27
LC: Did you actually watch this happen?
28
RC: Yes.
29
LC: Was it that night that you saw some of this or the next couple of days?
30
RC: It was that night because that’s the night that I was down in the, one of the
31
nights that I was down in the rice paddies. If you look at your map of Hagaru, you can
108
1
see from the intersection of that road there, to the west of that we had an artillery battery
2
that was on the frontlines. They had part of the perimeter. We had a roadblock there.
3
Then we had an artillery battery. Then we had Hal Company. Then we had I Company
4
and then we went around to Headquarters Company and then some of the division
5
headquarters and then a potpourri of whatever kind of troops we could put out. Let’s see,
6
where was I? I lost my train of thought.
7
8
9
LC: Well, you were letting me know that all of the troops were on one hundred
percent alert, which means—
RC: Yes, yes, and we had the attack. We had the heavy attack.
10
LC: Where did it come from?
11
RC: It principally came that night. It principally came across the rice paddies.
12
They unfortunately didn’t do their homework well. They took an awful lot of casualties
13
because their principle attack was directly across the level ground.
14
LC: Open ground.
15
RC: Open ground. We had lots and lots and lots of Chinese bodies the next day
16
in that area because we pretty well prepared for them. We had our machinegun set up
17
and our artillery was pretty well set up. We put out gasoline booby traps. We’d take a
18
grenade or a C-2, a block of C-2. Then we’d put a five-gallon can of gasoline over it.
19
Then when they came within that range, well, we’d blow the C-2, or we had the grenades
20
with wire to them. We’d pull the wire and pull up the booby trap. So it lit up the
21
battlefield, also. That’s how you could see them, what they were doing. Plus we had
22
some flares.
23
24
25
LC: So when, for example, a flare would go off, did you have a kind of
panoramic view such that from your location you could see?
RC: Well, the reason I, and that’s what I was getting to, the reason I knew about
26
it is the SAC, the Supporting Arms Center, Ed Simmons, later General Simmons, was the
27
weapons company commander. I worked directly with him in the CP. The battalion
28
commander was there and he was there, the S-3 was there, and I was there. He wanted to
29
know what was going on and how the companies were making out, how they were doing.
30
They had reported penetration in I Company or in Hal Company. As it later turned out,
31
they almost wiped out one of the platoons of Hal Company.
109
1
LC: By getting through the line or—?
2
RC: By just killing all the Marines that were there.
3
LC: By just overwhelming them?
4
RC: Overwhelming, just overwhelming numbers. So I was given a group. I was
5
told to go over to the division, get all the cooks and bakers and whatever I could put
6
together and form up a blocking platoon to go out and block the alleged penetration.
7
LC: How did that go?
8
RC: Well, we closed the gap.
9
LC: How many men were you able to find?
10
RC: I think about seventy men, about sixty to seventy.
11
LC: That’s a good number.
12
RC: Pretty good number.
13
LC: They all had weapons they could get to quickly?
14
RC: Well, everybody had weapons.
15
LC: Okay, even the cooks and all?
16
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah. Every Marine’s a rifleman.
17
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
18
RC: So they all had weapons.
19
LC: How did you know where to place them, sir?
20
RC: Well, that was, what I did is I went down the road to the artillery battery,
21
went to the artillery battery and then started moving west.
22
23
24
25
LC: So you’re just observing how the line is holding as you’re moving your
men?
RC: Well, I moved the men back into a covered position until I found out where
the breakthrough was.
26
LC: Yes, sir.
27
RC: I moved them into a position cover and went to the artillery battery and then
28
moved along the lines. The lines partially included the airfield, the airstrip. You knew
29
we were building an airstrip?
30
31
LC: Yes. You mentioned that last time that there was an airstrip under
construction.
110
1
2
RC: There was an airstrip under construction. So I moved down there. I finally
made my way to Hal Company CP.
3
LC: Yes. What did you see when you got there?
4
RC: Well, I saw the company exec and I asked him what was going on. He says,
5
“We’re in a hellacious firefight and we’re holding, but we’re about to get breached.” As
6
it turned out, they were not breached, but were about to get breached in, I believe it was
7
the 1st Platoon. They had taken a lot of casualties and I said, “Where’s the company
8
commander?” He said, “He’s back at the aid station. He got wounded in the arm and he
9
went back to stop the bleeding,” and so on. That was Clarence Corley.
10
LC: Who was the XO (executive officer)?
11
RC: You know, I’m trying to—Johnson, that was his name, First Lieutenant
12
Johnson. I remember he was pretty shook up. He had taken a round through his helmet.
13
LC: Wow.
14
RC: There was a hole completely through his helmet, but it didn’t hit him.
15
LC: Well, that would do it. I was going to ask how he was fairing.
16
RC: He was doing well. He was coherent, but he was kind of shook up.
17
LC: Yes, sir.
18
RC: But he was coherent. I said, “Where’s your flank of your lines? I want to
19
make my way—I’ve got my men back in position at such and such a place.” He said,
20
“Perfect. I know where they are, leave them there, leave them there.”
21
LC: Okay. Did that sound right to you?
22
RC: Yes, yes. So I went and I said, “I’m going to check with I Company and see
23
how they’re doing.” So I went along the lines—
24
LC: And again, you’re just running along?
25
RC: Yup, yup. I ran across the airstrip.
26
LC: I mean, that had to be pretty exposed.
27
RC: Well, it was—did you know they had lights on?
28
LC: No, I didn’t know that. They had the lights on?
29
RC: They had the lights on and, believe this or not, the engineers were still
30
31
working on the airstrip in the attack.
LC: I had not read that.
111
1
RC: You didn’t know that?
2
LC: I did not know that. Yikes.
3
RC: I ran into, on the way across, I ran into a Chinaman.
4
LC: Yeah, I was going to say, they would probably go right toward that.
5
RC: See, they made their way and the problem was they broke through at parts of
6
the line, but they didn’t know what to do when they broke through.
7
LC: They didn’t have a plan for—
8
RC: They didn’t have a plan.
9
LC: That’s interesting.
10
RC: Their orders were to break through, to annihilate the enemy. That was their
11
orders. Every time I got a Chinese prisoner, that’s what I got. “We’re here to annihilate
12
the 1st Marine Division.”
13
LC: Right. They even knew who you were.
14
RC: They knew we were the 1st Marine Division, that’s right.
15
LC: That’s interesting.
16
RC: One officer I got said, told me, he said, “If we can annihilate the 1st Marine
17
18
19
Division, the war is over because America will pull out.”
LC: Well, that tells you something about the respect with which, in which they
held the Marines.
20
RC: Yeah, that’s right. That’s right.
21
LC: And rightly so. So you would find individual Chinese soldiers kind of
22
wandering with—?
23
RC: Yes, yes, that’s right.
24
LC: What happened with this fellow that you saw as you were moving across the
25
airstrip area?
26
RC: Well, he took off running. I didn’t shoot him in the back.
27
LC: Okay. So you let him go, basically.
28
RC: Yeah. I couldn’t, I didn’t want to shoot him in the back.
29
LC: The engineers, how were they reacting to the fact that clearly there’s a major
30
31
battle raging?
RC: They’re doing their job.
112
1
LC: No doubt they had a deadline that they had to get that thing done by?
2
RC: That’s right, that’s right. Well, the key to our survival was the airstrip.
3
Everybody felt that way. That’s the way we were evacuating casualties and supplies
4
were coming in. So the airstrip was critical. They recognized that and been told that. So
5
they continued to march.
6
7
LC: Now they must’ve had some kind of defensive perimeter up around their
operation?
8
RC: Yes, yes, of their own people.
9
LC: Of their own people, yeah. How was that holding up?
10
RC: That was holding up good.
11
LC: Okay.
12
RC: As I say, the Chinese, once they got through the infantry, they didn’t know
13
what to do. So they milled around and we took prisoners and closed the lines. We were
14
secure once we closed the lines.
15
LC: If you can, sir, how cold was it? Can you describe the conditions that night
16
if you remember them particularly?
17
RC: It was extremely cold.
18
LC: How much wind were you dealing with or was it a quiet—?
19
RC: No, it wasn’t quiet. It was a lot of wind and there was some snow. I would
20
say probably twenty, twenty-five knots, pretty stiff wind.
21
LC: I guess so.
22
RC: Pretty stiff wind.
23
LC: How well outfitted were—?
24
RC: Were we?
25
LC: Were the 1st Marines? Yeah. How well set up for fighting in these
26
27
conditions?
RC: Well, our basic problem was we had shoepacks, which were inadequate.
28
They had felt liners on these—the insoles were felt. If you walked a lot or ran or crossed
29
anything and got them wet, they had a tendency to freeze, the felt liners froze. So you’re
30
walking on ice, basically, and that’s what happened with a lot of the people. They got
31
frostbite. But anyway, that night, I continued on across the airstrip and got to I Company.
113
1
LC: Yes, sir.
2
RC: As I approached the CP, there was still a lot of fighting going on. One of the
3
Chinese, one of the gooks saw me and opened up with a burp gun. I was just going
4
around a building when he opened it up. He hit the building, the corner of the building
5
and blew, it was kind of one of the mud huts with some rock, maybe some rock and so
6
on, but he let go enough bursts that it hit enough, knocked enough of the building off, that
7
it hit me in the back and knocked me down and completely knocked the wind out of me.
8
I was like a football player that’d been hit real hard, you know?
9
LC: Yeah, yeah. You took a pretty good shot.
10
RC: Took a pretty good shot. So the guys in the CP saw it. They ran out and
11
picked me up and took me in. They started examining me. One of them said, “Where
12
you hit?” I said, “I don’t know.” They examined me and they said, “Well, there’s no
13
blood, so you got through scot-free.”
14
LC: Oh, jeez. Were you breathing better by this point?
15
RC: Oh, yeah.
16
LC: Did you have a chuckle?
17
RC: Oh, yeah. I got through it okay. I wanted to see the mortar platoon
18
commander because he was a friend of mine, a fellow by the name of Charlie Maddox.
19
LC: M-A-D-D-O-X?
20
RC: Right. Charlie was probably the smartest man I’ve ever known. He had an
21
eighth grade education. He was a Basic School classmate of mine and he had gotten his
22
GMST (general military subjects test) or his general military—what do you call them?
23
You get your high school diploma.
24
LC: GED (general equivalency diploma) I think they call them now, but—
25
RC: What do they call them?
26
LC: GED, General Education Equivalent or something like that.
27
RC: Yeah, right, right. GED, that’s right. So he was in a foxhole and I asked
28
him, I said, “The reason I wanted to find out is I wanted to find out the effectiveness of
29
our 60-millimeter mortars with flares.”
30
LC: What did he have to say?
114
1
RC: Well, he said, “I don’t have any flares. All I’ve got is regular ammo.” So I
2
said, “Okay, I’ll check one of the other units and see.” I left him and I got just back to
3
the CP and a mortar round lit in his foxhole and killed him.
4
LC: Did you actually see that happen?
5
RC: I did not see it happen. I heard about it.
6
LC: Did you hear about it right away or was it sometime later?
7
RC: No, I didn’t hear about it until the next morning.
8
LC: I was going to ask whether the Chinese attack included, in addition to the
9
10
11
12
human wave assaults that you’ve described, anything more powerful in the way of
mortars.
RC: The only thing they had, really, was mortars, mortars and some
machineguns.
13
LC: So that was probably—
14
RC: They didn’t have any artillery.
15
LC: Right. This was just a lucky, from their point of view, a lucky shot, just a
16
random shot.
17
RC: That’s right.
18
LC: Which is what mortars do.
19
RC: Wiped out one fine officer, though.
20
LC: Where was he from? Do you remember?
21
RC: I think he was from South Carolina.
22
LC: South Carolina.
23
RC: He had been a master sergeant when he was commissioned. He was older.
24
LC: You said he was really bright.
25
RC: He was really a bright individual.
26
LC: What kinds of things did he know that made you kind of identify him? “God,
27
28
I wish, you know, I knew the stuff he knows.”
RC: Well, from the Basic School, he was always ahead of everybody else as far
29
as when questions were asked. I guess I was impressed because he knew everything
30
about the Marine Corps.
31
LC: He covered it all.
115
1
2
RC: He covered it all. That’s what made me think he was so intelligent. I think
it’s because he just answered all the questions.
3
LC: How was he doing? What was his demeanor when you last talked to him?
4
RC: Oh, he was upbeat. He was quite upbeat.
5
LC: He thought you guys were going to hand it to them.
6
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah. Everybody was upbeat.
7
LC: That’s interesting. It’s one of the things that isn’t in the documents that
8
doesn’t come through in the quote/unquote, “historical record,” and that we can only get
9
from someone who was there is what were the attitudes like? What were guys doing?
10
Were they hangdog or were they ready to just give it right back?
11
RC: Yeah, they were giving it everything they had.
12
LC: Did everyone recognize that you were in a fight with the Chinese
13
communists rather than the North Koreans?
14
RC: Oh, yes.
15
LC: Everyone was aware of that?
16
RC: Yes, everybody knew that.
17
LC: Wow.
18
RC: Everybody knew that.
19
LC: Did it make a difference because they were in North Korea as were you? Did
20
21
22
it make a difference that they had come over the line?
RC: Well, I think that we felt that we had a big fight coming. We had been told
up to this time that we were going to be out by Christmas. MacArthur put that word out.
23
LC: Yeah, I read that.
24
RC: We said, “No way now.” They’re hoards. We saw so many of them
25
attacking us there. When a whole company surrenders and they’re pretty well outfitted
26
and everything, good equipment and everything—an interesting point about that, I
27
interviewed the company commander very quickly. He told me, he said, “If you feed us,
28
we will fight for you.”
29
LC: Really?
30
RC: Yup. He told me that.
116
1
2
LC: What was his physical stature? Was he a small guy? Was he in better shape
than the others?
3
RC: Yeah, he was a small individual.
4
LC: Was he in better shape than the other enlisted men?
5
RC: No, I don’t think he was. As I say, they were pretty well equipped, but we
6
come to find out that they were all conscripts, including him. He wasn’t really what
7
you’d call a trained soldier. They were kind of thrown in.
8
LC: Not a committed communist, guerilla.
9
RC: No, no. They were kind of thrown into the hopper. I feel quite certain that
10
most of them at that time were, you know.
11
LC: Yet, they were pretty good at night maneuvers. They could—
12
RC: Well, I think the reason that we thought they were good at night maneuvers
13
because at that time, in those days, we didn’t do a lot of night movement. We usually
14
fought in the daytime and at nighttime we stopped and dug in and waited ‘til daylight the
15
next day and then leaped off again. They were fighting at night and principally because
16
of our supporting arms. They didn’t want to tangle with the air and, of course, you can’t
17
see as well at night, so our artillery was not as effective. So it kind of put them on a more
18
even basis.
19
LC: Yeah, leveled the playing field.
20
RC: And leveled the playing field, exactly.
21
LC: I’ve got you.
22
RC: Good words.
23
LC: You were describing having come back after you got hit in the back and after
24
you’d been out to, was it Sergeant Maddox, what was it—?
25
RC: No, lieutenant.
26
LC: Lieutenant, first lieutenant.
27
RC: Yeah, he was a Basic School classmate of mine.
28
LC: I’m sorry.
29
RC: He was commissioned at the same time I was.
30
LC: You had been to his position. Where did you go next?
117
1
RC: I went back to the company and there I saw the company commander, Bull
2
Fisher. You probably have heard of him.
3
LC: Is this I Company yet?
4
RC: I Company.
5
LC: Yes, I have.
6
RC: This was Bull Fisher. Bull was a real warrior, a real warrior. To my mind,
7
he was the best company commander we had and a very, very fine Marine officer,
8
extremely talented and just absolutely fearless.
9
10
11
LC: Was he—?
RC: And very innovative. He was the one that put out most of the booby traps,
his company.
12
LC: Had he more or less taught them how to do it?
13
RC: Oh, yes. It was his idea.
14
LC: Right. So he’s like, “Get these gas cans, distribute them.”
15
RC: Yeah, he’s a very innovative guy.
16
LC: How was he set up in the command post? What was his position? In other
17
words, how was he oriented toward where most of the action was?
18
RC: Well, he was pretty close to the front lines.
19
LC: Okay.
20
RC: Very close. As I say, I was moving along the front lines. I came around a
21
building and they ran out of the CP. Some of the troops ran out of the CP and got me.
22
LC: So they were very close.
23
RC: They were very close. That was his style.
24
LC: He wanted to be near the—
25
RC: Yeah. Later on I had another engagement with him the day I was wounded,
26
but I was in a different position at that time. I stayed there and then sent the word back to
27
the CP, the battalion CP, that the lines were, that they had closed the gaps and the lines
28
were intact. They were holding and that the attack was still underway, but it was dying
29
off because it was now—see, this is over the course of about three or four hours.
30
LC: Right. So you’re well into the night now.
118
1
RC: Well into the night and it’s starting to get close to daylight. So I stayed there
2
until daylight, well, until it started getting daylight. Then I started back down along the
3
lines because my people, I had left a master gunnery sergeant in charge of the troops that
4
I had out there. They obviously, they were just in position, they actually did not move up
5
into the lines, didn’t have to.
6
LC: But they spent the rest of that night in position?
7
RC: They spent the rest of the night there.
8
LC: Did you have to essentially collect them and move them back?
9
RC: Yeah, we moved them back. I moved them back. I went down to the Hal
10
Company where the breakthrough had been and did a little talking to the people down
11
there and so on.
12
LC: Kind of bucking them up?
13
RC: Yes. At that point, when another friend of mine, a fellow by the name of
14
Mitchell, lieutenant, made the mistake of going out on the battlefield out forward of the
15
lines, wasn’t too smart at that time because there was still a lot of Chinese out there and
16
they got him. They killed him.
17
LC: With rifle fire or—
18
RC: Rifle fire, yes, I think. I think that’s what they got him with. It might’ve
19
been a sniper that got him.
20
(Editor’s note: Information removed per interviewee’s request.)
21
LC: Well, you mentioned that at some point during this day, this new day that’s
22
dawned, that an entire company surrendered. Where did that happen?
23
RC: That happened at one of the roadblocks. They came right down the road and
24
came right up with a flag, came right up to the roadblock. They called me and I went out
25
to the roadblock with one of my interpreters and started interrogating them.
26
LC: Were they actually marching along with hands up?
27
RC: No, no, no. They came in with kind of a vanguard with a white flag.
28
LC: With a white flag?
29
RC: Yeah.
30
LC: Wow. So you did your interrogation very briefly.
119
1
RC: A real cursory interrogation right there. Then I sent them back to—we had a
2
holding place in the division, kind of a POW holding place. I sent them back under guard
3
to that and notified the G2 of the division who then would take them under very detailed
4
interrogation.
5
LC: Right, at greater lengths, probably somewhere else.
6
RC: Right.
7
LC: What was the rest of that day like? Were you preparing for—?
8
RC: For attacks.
9
LC: Yeah, more or the same.
10
RC: Right.
11
LC: How would you go about that? I mean, not just you, but how would the
12
13
division go about trying to get your lines mended and your perimeters at all established?
RC: Well, they would obviously, obviously every company commander would
14
go out and check all these positions and check how many men he’d lost and where he
15
needed to tighten up and get new ammo out and set out new booby traps and dig in a little
16
bit more.
17
LC: Right. Did you have enough supplies?
18
RC: Yes, we did. We were in pretty good shape there because they had been
19
dropping supplies to us.
20
LC: Okay. So during the day they were making those drops?
21
RC: Right, right. We were in pretty good shape.
22
LC: Okay. How about morale?
23
RC: Morale was pretty high. Morale was pretty high. This kind of sounds self
24
serving. You really have to beat Marines down, especially in that kind of a situation.
25
They’re kind of itching for a fight.
26
27
LC: Yeah, I think that’s pretty widely known that the Marines are just about
bringing it on.
28
RC: Yeah, that’s right. They were that way.
29
LC: What about the enemy dispositions? Did you have any improved or new
30
intelligence during the course of the day as to how badly they had been hit in the course
31
of this offensive?
120
1
RC: Well, I sent the CI (counterintelligence) aids out again.
2
LC: Okay, and same guys?
3
RC: Yes. That’s all I had.
4
LC: How did they do this time?
5
RC: They came back and said that there had been a lot of casualties, but the
6
attack would continue, but they didn’t bring anything—they said that there would be a
7
concentration they thought from what they gathered, from the information they gathered
8
and the way the Chinese were moving, that there’d be a concentration on East Hill. They
9
would try to get on East Hill because recognizing that that was a commanding terrain
10
feature and that they could cut off the division there, it was very important that they get
11
it.
12
LC: Yes, right, right. It would cut you off.
13
RC: Yeah. With that in mind, the battalion commander organized again basically
14
mostly Weapons Company and Headquarters Company because we were still getting
15
sporadic fire. We didn’t want to move any of the rifle companies out and G Company
16
was not there yet. They were on their way, our 3rd Company.
17
LC: So he organized the Weapons and Headquarters companies.
18
RC: To make an attack on East Hill, to take East Hill. There were some Chinese
19
on the hill. They had the hill at that time, but not in great numbers, but enough numbers
20
that we took significant casualties. In that attack, they moved about halfway up the hill.
21
They got about halfway up the hill and Reggie Myers, who was our battalion exec, was
22
the one who led the attack.
23
LC: First of all, how did he do and how did the troops do?
24
RC: The troops did well considering how they were equipped. They were not
25
infantry. They were kind of a hodgepodge.
26
LC: Right.
27
RC: They kind of had to have individual leadership. Myers did an exceptional
28
29
30
job. He got a Medal of Honor for it.
LC: Can you describe anything about that action? I know that the citation will be
around, but do you know anything about the—?
121
1
RC: Not a lot. Not a lot, Dr. Laura, I really don’t. I was busy throughout the rest
2
of the compound while that was going on.
3
LC: What were you doing?
4
RC: Trying to gather as much intelligence as I could, visiting the G-2 and
5
discussing problems with our S-3, our operations officer and our supporting arms
6
coordinator and talking to my people.
7
LC: And trying to make sure that you had strength where you needed it?
8
RC: That’s right.
9
LC: Okay. How complicated was the maneuvering for those who were not going
10
up the East Hill feature, but who were trying to stay in support of those troops? Were
11
you moving companies around or even platoons?
12
RC: No, we didn’t have—we were stretched very thin.
13
LC: You were it.
14
RC: Yeah. We were stretched very thin. Remember, we only had two rifle
15
companies out of the battalion. The rest of the people—and we had an artillery battery.
16
The rest of the people were—we had some motor transport people. We had some
17
headquarters battalion, division headquarters battalion people, communicators, supply
18
people. Everybody was on the lines that wasn’t performing a function in the
19
headquarters.
20
21
22
23
LC: Do you have a guess as to how many men you had out there with rifle in
hand?
RC: Probably. Well, battalion reinforced with—I would say probably a
thousand to fifteen hundred.
24
LC: Does this number sound right? I’ve read that when Reginald Myers led that
25
counterattack, essentially that there were at least four thousand Chinese on the hill. Does
26
that sound about right to you?
27
28
RC: I would say that’s pretty close. That really came out of my estimate, out of
my shop.
29
LC: Is that right?
30
RC: Mm-hmm.
31
LC: Okay, okay. Well, yes, because you’re the S-2.
122
1
RC: S2.
2
LC: Right. So that reflects numbers that you guys were building up probably
3
over the course of that day.
4
RC: Right.
5
LC: Now am I right in thinking that napalm was used during this attack at some
6
point?
7
RC: Yes.
8
LC: Do you remember anything about that?
9
RC: Yes, yes. We had a forward air controller with us and he was calling it in. It
10
was used in that attack. We used it throughout, really, not just there.
11
LC: Now was that especially—one of the things that’s kind of in the literature
12
and I just want to check this against your own memory and experience, that one of the
13
great utilities of that weapon was against a massed attack, like a human wave attack that
14
the Chinese were using because it spread out, that weapon spreads out. It can take out a
15
lot of people who are maybe advancing on a certain position. Does that sound right?
16
RC: It’s very effective. It’s kind of a terrorizing weapon, really.
17
LC: Yeah. Well, I think it would be pretty frightening just to see it.
18
RC: Yeah, yeah. It’s very much so.
19
LC: Let alone have it coming at you.
20
RC: Right.
21
LC: Yeah. But did those kinds of things, the support from the air and the re-
22
supply that you had during the day, did all of that feed into getting the men ready for that
23
second night?
24
RC: Oh, yes, yes. Everything was moving. I mean, we were going in so many
25
different directions that we just tried to stay up with it. That’s basically—because we had
26
to move people around. Of course, that attack had really drained us down.
27
LC: The attack on the hill?
28
RC: The attack on the hill.
29
LC: Can you tell for those who don’t know much about this battle how that attack
30
played out and whether you were successful in gaining the hill?
123
1
RC: We didn’t gain the hill in that attack. We got part of the way up the hill. We
2
never truly got totally to the top of the hill because I wound up on that hill the next night,
3
two nights later rather.
4
LC: Okay. Well, take us through then if you will from the time of Myers attack,
5
then I gather some men under his command set up a defensive perimeter partway up the
6
hill. Is that right?
7
RC: Yes, that’s right.
8
LC: Okay. Then can you take us forward through the rest of the—?
9
RC: Okay. Now what was happening now that had great influence on that was
10
there was movement out of Majon-ni, not Majon-ni.
11
LC: Koto-ri?
12
RC: Koto-ri.
13
LC: Yeah, Koto-ri.
14
15
RC: Koto-ri, moving out of Koto-ri, which was where Chesty Puller was with the
nd
2 Battalion.
16
LC: They were coming up or—?
17
RC: No. There was an Army company, a company of Royal Marines, 41st Royal
18
Commando, and G Company, my old rifle company. They took off out of Koto-ri and
19
were ambushed. They had to fight all the way. Now they got so badly cut up that what
20
happened was the Army company surrendered. The 41st, and unfortunately a good friend
21
of mine, then-Colonel McLaughlin was with the Army company.
22
LC: Marine colonel.
23
RC: Marine colonel. He was the division G-4, I believe, which is logistics.
24
LC: Yes, sir. He happened to be with—?
25
RC: He happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. The Army
26
company surrendered. The Royal Marines broke up into small groups and continued on.
27
They took to the hills and continued on toward Hagaru. The Marine company fought its
28
way through, my company.
29
LC: General, can you tell me anything about the—?
30
RC: That’s called, and you probably have heard this, Hellfire Valley.
31
LC: Yeah, yes. Can you describe what G Company went through?
124
1
RC: What they went through?
2
LC: Yes, sir.
3
RC: Well, they went through just one continuous ambush. They were in a
4
constant firefight.
5
LC: As they are moving.
6
RC: As they’re moving.
7
LC: Did they have vehicles with them?
8
RC: Yes, they did. One of my friends, Rocky Gillis, who was our first sergeant,
9
was manning a .50-caliber on one of the trucks. A Chinese rose up out of the ditch right
10
beside the road and hit him in the stomach with a .45 Thompson submachine gun, five
11
rounds. He lived and later became a captain in the Marine Corps.
12
LC: That’s just unbelievable.
13
RC: Yeah.
14
LC: I mean, really it is that he lived.
15
RC: Yeah. Well, there’s a story with that, too. He was down at the—I found out
16
that he had been hit. Of course, I had been with him way back in Camp Lejeune back on
17
the East Coast. He was in the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines and he came out with us. So he
18
was an old friend. So I went down to the aid station down at the hospital. We had a
19
hospital set up in Hagaru as much as we could and asked if they had him. They said,
20
“Yes. He’s over there, but he’s gone.” So I went over to where he was and I saw just a
21
little wisp of vapor coming out of his nose and I said, “He’s not dead,” and he wasn’t. So
22
they did what they could for him more at that time. Casualties were so heavy and there
23
was so much going on.
24
LC: They were moving so fast.
25
RC: They were moving so fast. But he was quite a warrior. He’s still alive.
26
LC: Is he really?
27
RC: Yeah. He’s a man that you should talk to.
28
LC: Absolutely. If you could help me with that later on, that would be great.
29
RC: Yeah. Zullo, what’d I say, Gillis? That was my old first sergeant when I
30
was an enlisted man. Rocco Zullo.
31
LC: Rocco is his—?
125
1
RC: R-O-C-C-O, Zullo.
2
LC: Zullo?
3
RC: Z-U-L-L-O.
4
LC: With a name like that, he—
5
RC: He was a rock.
6
LC: Yeah. He couldn’t very well die just from—
7
RC: He’s a big guy.
8
LC: Five shots in the stomach.
9
RC: Yeah, big guy and very, very tough.
10
LC: He sounds tough.
11
RC: He was tough.
12
LC: He sounds tough and he sounds fortunate.
13
RC: Yeah, very tough.
14
LC: As I’m sure, you know, all these guys were. They were fighting their way
15
through what has been described as one of the absolute worst ambush situations that the
16
Marines have ever encountered. That any of them survived is an amazing credit to their
17
training and to them personally, of course.
18
RC: Well, of course, the thing about it was the commandos kind of did the thing
19
that they do. They’re kind of small-group fighters. They kind of broke up and went
20
through it by small units.
21
LC: Almost as if they became kind of guerilla units themselves.
22
RC: Yes, exactly.
23
LC: Sure.
24
RC: A commando training. The Marines stuck together and went through it as a
25
unit.
26
LC: Wow. Did you hear about this while it was happening?
27
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.
28
LC: So were you actually listening during their—?
29
RC: I wasn’t personally listening.
30
LC: But you knew it was going on?
31
RC: But we got feedback all the time.
126
1
LC: Yeah. So you were—
2
RC: In the CP. So we knew what was happening.
3
LC: Did you have a sense, sir, that they might not get through at all?
4
RC: Well, if anybody was going to get through, we knew they’d get through.
5
LC: Well, you knew them very well.
6
RC: Yeah, I knew that they’d get through.
7
LC: Wow. That must’ve been some very difficult moments for you, I’m sure.
8
RC: It was, it was. I was kind of beside myself, really. I wanted to go out and
9
try to help them, but that was a no-no.
10
LC: Right. You had, of course, your own duties.
11
RC: Yes, that’s right.
12
LC: Where you were. General, let me ask, when they got through, did they come
13
to the battalion command or where did they go?
14
15
RC: They came right—they stopped once they got inside our lines and were sent
immediately up to East Hill.
16
LC: In order to reinforce—?
17
RC: Take the hill.
18
LC: Okay. How did that battle play out or how did their arrival affect the
19
situation?
20
RC: Well, their arrival was a great boost to everybody’s morale because we had
21
heard that the—see, it was supposedly a reinforcing unit, had been very, badly, badly cut
22
up. So when they got through, when the company got through, we thought that’s all there
23
was. Now the Royal Commandos kept coming in all through the next day, little units
24
would come through. But that was an intact unit, a fighting unit. We felt very good
25
about it. It really bolstered our morale. Of course, we felt bad that the Army didn’t get
26
through, but we didn’t know why they didn’t get through.
27
28
LC: Sure. Did G Company bring tanks with them or have any surviving tanks at
all?
29
RC: Yes. There were some tanks.
30
LC: Okay. Did that make a difference over at the hill?
31
RC: Well, it helped, obviously, it helped.
127
1
LC: Sure. But again, the Chinese were pretty well entrenched apparently.
2
RC: That’s right.
3
LC: Okay. Let me know if you remember anything else about G Company
4
coming through, if you remember any of those guys or if you spoke to them. Did you
5
actually go out and see any of them?
6
RC: Well, I went to see them after they got on the hill.
7
LC: Okay. So that would be—?
8
RC: The next night I was on the hill with them.
9
LC: Right. Can you tell me how that came about, how it was that you came to be
10
up there?
11
RC: Well, the company commander asked for me.
12
LC: Under what circumstances did he want you to come up there?
13
RC: Well, they were having a hard time holding the hill. My old rifle platoon,
14
the platoon commander lost it. He kind of became a battle casualty, psychologically.
15
LC: The platoon commander of your platoon?
16
RC: Of my platoon.
17
LC: Okay. So the company commander obviously knew you were in the area.
18
RC: He knew exactly where I was. He called the battalion commander and he
19
said, “I want Carey.”
20
LC: Okay. So what did you do after you received that notification?
21
RC: I said, “Hoorah! I’m back to my unit.”
22
LC: No more of this S-2 stuff, huh?
23
RC: No more of this garbage. But the battalion commander said, “Nighttime
24
only. Daytime you’re here.”
25
LC: Jeez, okay. So tell me about going up there at night.
26
RC: Well, the night that I went up there, the first night that I went up there, it was
27
on the thirtieth. Well, I was up there for a while on the twenty-ninth to see everybody
28
and he asked for me on the thirtieth. The thirtieth was the concentration of the Chinese to
29
take the hill. That’s when they really decided they were going to take the hill completely.
30
LC: We’re talking about them massing at least a division and maybe more?
31
RC: That’s right and drive us off.
128
1
LC: Yes.
2
RC: So again, I gathered— remember the reinforcing units that I talked about
3
that went back to the division—
4
LC: Yes.
5
RC: I gathered them up again.
6
LC: Okay. This is your group of about seventy guys or so?
7
RC: That’s right. We’re back to East Hill. They needed ammunition. They had
8
9
10
11
a lot of close combat, close contact. They were charging and so on.
LC: The Chinese were.
RC: Chinese. So they needed ammunition. So we each carried at least a box of
ammunition with us. I carried a box of grenades, I remember.
12
LC: What other arms did you have with you? Did you have a sidearm?
13
RC: By now, I had an M-1 rifle. My TO (table of organization) weapon was a
14
.45. When I was a platoon leader, it was a carbine. Then when I went back to battalion,
15
it was a .45 and I didn’t trust either one of them. Forty-five didn’t have any range and the
16
M-1 Carbine wouldn’t knock somebody down with one round a lot of times unless you
17
hit them exactly right. So I carried an M-1.
18
LC: Where had you been able to pick that up? Do you remember?
19
RC: I picked it up from one of the companies, one of the casualties.
20
LC: You felt pretty good having that with you, I’m sure.
21
RC: Well, it’d knock somebody down.
22
LC: Yeah. Yes, sir.
23
RC: So anyway, I organized these guys. Everybody took at least a box of
24
ammunition and we went up the hill. On the way up, it was a very steep hill and icy and
25
everything. So it was a real test of your endurance. I got winded so we stopped. I
26
wasn’t the only one winded.
27
LC: Well, I’m sure, yes.
28
RC: But I stopped and I sat down on the box to try to catch my breath and a
29
sniper hit the box and blew the corner off the box and I said, “Well, I guess I better get
30
moving,” because it was nighttime and it was snowing, didn’t know where he was. So
129
1
we started again. We started out again and I got up to the CP and reported to Carl Sitter.
2
You heard of Carl?
3
LC: Yes, he was the—
4
RC: He was G Company commander.
5
LC: The commander, yes.
6
RC: Also awarded a Medal of Honor.
7
LC: For actions on this evening or was it—?
8
RC: Well, I think a combination of Hellfire Valley and this evening. So I told
9
him what I had and he said, “Good,” and he got his acting first sergeant, who I don’t
10
know who it was at that time, to take the men to the various positions. I said, “Where do
11
you want me?” and he said, “I want you at the apex of the hill. I want you up at the
12
foxhole right at the corner of 1st and 2nd Platoons.” We now had some Royal
13
Commandos up there, too. The Royal Commandos were in where my platoon was and
14
the 2nd Platoon was stretched across. We were almost at the crest and I was right at the
15
corner foxhole. Unfortunately, I was where the ridgeline came down right into that
16
corner. So I spent the night throwing grenades. When I first arrived up there, Jack
17
Devoch was a sergeant that was in a foxhole where the company commander wanted me
18
to be. He had got some shrapnel from a grenade, I think. He was having trouble keeping
19
it—it was bleeding and he was having trouble keeping the blood out of his eyes. So
20
when we first got there, and I’ve got an account by him that’s kind of interesting.
21
LC: That he wrote or—?
22
RC: That he wrote. He’s deceased.
23
LC: Okay. So he wrote his own memories of this.
24
RC: He wrote his own memories of it.
25
LC: Did he publish that, sir, or did he just give you—?
26
RC: No, he didn’t publish it. We called him the “Old Soldier.” He was from
27
Georgia, wasn’t too well educated, but what he wrote was his actions and his actions that
28
night.
29
30
31
LC: Well, it sure would be interesting to let students of this battle study that at
some point.
RC: Yeah, I’ve got it. I’ve got it.
130
1
LC: Okay. Would he mind, do you think, having it placed—?
2
RC: He’s deceased. I’m sure he wouldn’t mind.
3
LC: He wouldn’t have minded?
4
RC: No, no.
5
LC: Well, maybe we can talk about that.
6
RC: Yeah.
7
LC: Yeah, okay.
8
RC: When he first got there, he said—there were a bunch of people milling
9
around on the top of the ridge and I said, “Who are those people?” He said, “Those are
10
Chinese.” I said, “Why aren’t you taking them under fire?” and he says, “I can’t see
11
them. I can’t see well enough to shoot.”
12
LC: Because he’s got blood coming into his eyes.
13
RC: Yeah. So I took them under fire.
14
LC: You and your guys?
15
RC: Me.
16
LC: You yourself personally?
17
RC: Yeah. I’m sure the guys were, too.
18
LC: I believe it.
19
RC: I wasn’t the only one.
20
LC: I believe it.
21
RC: I wasn’t the only one.
22
LC: If you can, sir, can you just describe what you saw as he said, “I can’t see
23
this.” So you had to look and you had to see. Of course, you did take them under fire,
24
but can you tell us what you saw?
25
RC: I saw—they were looking like they were looking for Marines.
26
LC: For targets?
27
RC: Targets.
28
LC: Yup. How many Chinese did you see?
29
RC: Oh, probably a half a dozen to a dozen. I’d say at least a squad.
30
LC: Okay. You thought to yourself “I better get busy,” probably.
31
RC: Better get busy if I wanted to see tomorrow.
131
1
2
LC: Can you take me through the next couple of minutes? What did you actually
do?
3
RC: I took them under fire.
4
LC: With the M-1?
5
RC: Uh-huh.
6
LC: And you were also throwing grenades?
7
RC: Well, I wasn’t throwing grenades while I was shooting the M-1.
8
LC: Okay, no, not at the same time.
9
RC: We took care of that group. Then we hunkered down and waited. Then the
10
bugles started for the rest of the night, the bugles and the whistles. Every time the bugles
11
came and they came charging down that ridgeline, I was throwing grenades and Jack
12
Devoch was peeling them out of their cartons, taking them out of the boxes. I threw three
13
major boxes of grenades that night.
14
LC: So you would hear the bugling and knew what was coming.
15
RC: Knew what was coming. Throw the grenades, it was snowing and dark,
16
17
18
black, pitch black.
LC: Did you have any sense of how close they were getting to you? I mean,
could you—?
19
RC: I know they were in grenade range.
20
LC: I mean, can you hear them breathing? Can you hear them talking? Could
21
you hear them yelling, screaming?
22
RC: You could hear them yelling.
23
LC: Okay, yelling at each other?
24
RC: Well, somebody was yelling. I don’t know who was yelling, but somebody
25
26
27
28
29
was. Every time we’d hear yelling, why, I’d toss grenades.
LC: Okay. Did you have any kind of plan or did you just throw it at whatever
you heard?
RC: What I heard. Of course, what I heard was on the ridgeline. I was throwing
them all in the same place pretty much.
30
LC: Yeah, because they were all coming through the same area.
31
RC: All trying to come down the ridgeline.
132
1
LC: Yes, exactly.
2
RC: That was the best route for them to get into our lines.
3
LC: You were sitting right on the point.
4
RC: I was sitting on the point.
5
LC: Just you and Jack, was there anyone else around?
6
RC: Well, there were other foxholes, other Marines.
7
LC: About how close were the foxholes?
8
RC: Well, they weren’t too close. They were pretty well spread out, probably
9
fifteen, twenty yards.
10
LC: One history of this night that I’ve read and that is one of the standard
11
histories, talks about Captain Sitter moving from foxhole to foxhole trying to make sure
12
not only that everyone was, you know, encouraged to keep fighting, obviously, but also
13
to check and see where he might need reinforcements. Does that sound right to you?
14
RC: That’s what I’m told. I didn’t see him. He didn’t come to my foxhole.
15
LC: Yeah, it sounds like you were kind of alone up there.
16
RC: Yeah, we were. (Laughs) Yeah, we were alone.
17
LC: Although I do see in this same history that I’m looking at, which was written
18
by Robert Moskin, I do see your name prominently mentioned. I can review the sentence
19
if you like? It says that, “As the large numbers of Chinese were pouring down East Hill,
20
Marine howitzers, tanks, a group of headquarters personnel under Second Lieutenant
21
Carey and the 41st Commando helped to repulse the attack and restore the lines before the
22
remaining personnel from G Company were considered safe.” It had said earlier that G
23
Company took very heavy casualties during this night.
24
RC: Yes, we did.
25
LC: Like half.
26
RC: My old platoon, they had brought some reinforcements in that day because
27
the company had been pretty badly shot up coming up Hellfire Valley.
28
LC: Yes. They had already had losses, of course.
29
RC: So they poured people in. I know that in my platoon, now I didn’t—you’ve
30
31
got a Marine and you just put him in a hole.
LC: Yes, sir.
133
1
RC: You put him in a hole. You didn’t really know that much about him. I got
2
seven that night, I think, and the next day I only had two left that were new. So that’s
3
pretty heavy casualties, really.
4
LC: Yes, it is.
5
RC: Of that number.
6
LC: Yes, it is. Did you have any more close calls that night? Did the Chinese
7
figure out where the grenades were coming from?
8
RC: Well, if they didn’t, they were pretty doggone stupid.
9
LC: That’s kind of why I asked because you were, as they say, putting the hurt on
10
11
12
them. Yet, you continued to be able to do so.
RC: Well, I think it was just a matter of luck. I think, again, it was pitch black.
We were not right on the ridgeline. We were kind of what you call in defilade.
13
LC: Can you explain that term?
14
RC: On the reverse slope of the ridge.
15
LC: Yes, okay.
16
RC: On the reverse slope. Okay, you understand that?
17
LC: Yes, absolutely.
18
RC: So if they’re coming down the ridgeline, they don’t see you.
19
LC: Yeah. They’re going to miss you.
20
RC: They’re going to miss you and that was the advantage that we had. We had
21
that advantage. They couldn’t take us under direct fire unless they actually saw you. In
22
other words, they couldn’t do area fire and wipe you out.
23
LC: Right, yeah. That wouldn’t do it.
24
RC: They had to see you.
25
LC: You weren’t on any kind of linear trajectory from them.
26
RC: No, that’s right. That’s right.
27
LC: You mentioned that Jack had been bleeding. He had taken some shrapnel or
28
he had somehow been wounded.
29
RC: Right.
30
LC: Was he suffering as the night went on with his loss of blood and so on?
31
RC: No, at least he didn’t say anything about it.
134
1
LC: Okay. He was able to keep going.
2
RC: You know, he didn’t get a Purple Heart until later. I got it for him.
3
LC: Well, it sounds as if it’s a good thing some—
4
RC: A couple of years ago I got it for him.
5
LC: It’s a good thing someone did.
6
RC: Yeah. His original platoon leader, which is also another reason why I was
7
called up, his original platoon leader had been wounded and evacuated. His original
8
platoon leader got a Silver Star, Jack got nothing. I got him a Purple Heart.
9
LC: You got that to him before—
10
RC: Before he died, I got it to him, yeah.
11
LC: Okay, okay. That’s what I wanted to make sure.
12
RC: I sure did.
13
LC: Sounds like you were at least continued to pay attention, but that’s how it
14
15
16
goes, isn’t it? I mean—
RC: Oh, yes, of course, of course. You know, there’s a lot of people that do a lot
of things that don’t even get recognized.
17
LC: Yes, sir. A lot of people do things that get recognized that maybe oughtn’d.
18
RC: That’s right, maybe they shouldn’t get as much as they got, but that’s—
19
LC: That’s another discussion.
20
RC: That’s war. That’s the way it goes.
21
LC: That’s right. How did things go for you as the dawn started to come and
22
perhaps the attacks by the Chinese—?
23
RC: Well, they stopped.
24
LC: Just wore off.
25
RC: They wore off. I think they had to take a lot of casualties.
26
LC: Did you have any way to assess that when you got out of that foxhole where
27
28
29
30
31
you were?
RC: No. There were a lot of bodies, but we didn’t move too close to them
because that’s a pretty dangerous thing to do.
LC: Sure is, yes, absolutely. Right. How did you and the rest of your platoon
kind of get out of the position you were in or did you stay there?
135
1
RC: I stayed there until later on in the morning.
2
LC: Because I know you’re supposed to be back at the battalion.
3
RC: Yeah, the battalion called and said, “Get Carey back down here.”
4
LC: Right, exactly.
5
RC: So I went back to my job.
6
LC: Your day job.
7
RC: My day job.
8
LC: I mean, you’ve got to be exhausted.
9
RC: Well, I think everybody was.
10
LC: Yeah, but also the adrenaline issue, probably.
11
RC: That keeps you going.
12
LC: Yeah. Were you getting anything to eat?
13
RC: No. That was another thing that was kind of bad. You’ve heard of the
14
Tootsie Rolls?
15
LC: Yes, sir.
16
RC: Well, I ate a lot of Tootsie Rolls. As a matter of fact, I’ve still got some here
17
in the house.
18
LC: Just in case.
19
RC: I’ve got a whole jar of them just in case I need them.
20
LC: Well, once a Marine, always a Marine, I suppose.
21
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
22
LC: But the men were probably starting to—they’re running on empty.
23
RC: They’re running on empty. That’s right.
24
LC: How would you get rations distributed? I know that wasn’t your job as S-2,
25
26
but that was somebody’s job. Did it happen at all during this time period?
RC: Oh, yes, yes, they got rations. The problem was they were all frozen.
27
Everything was frozen solid, so you couldn’t really eat it. That’s why we kind of lived
28
on candy. Now down in the battalion, in the division headquarters, remember, I said they
29
had cooks and bakers.
30
LC: Yes, sir.
136
1
RC: They got some food. They at least got C-rations that were thawed. The
2
troops on the hills during the daytime would build fires and try to thaw things out. So
3
they probably, as a group, would eat half-frozen food.
4
LC: What about water?
5
RC: Water was a problem, very definitely.
6
LC: I’m sure.
7
RC: Snow mostly.
8
LC: Is that what you guys did?
9
RC: Yeah, mostly snow.
10
LC: Yeah, I would think because—
11
RC: Water was very definitely a very, very serious problem.
12
LC: Were there people do you think who—well, let me also ask about removing
13
the injured, people who needed medical attention more than what a corpsman could give
14
them or their buddies could give them. I mean, how were—?
15
RC: Well, we did have a hospital. Remember, I told you we had—when the
16
division headquarters moved forward, they moved forward. The division surgeon and
17
some of his people and he established a hospital. So they did have a hospital per se.
18
Now the airstrip was working and they were evacuating them, but with the old Gooney
19
Birds.
20
21
LC: What would you do if as a platoon leader, would you just assign say a couple
of guys to get someone—
22
RC: A couple of guys carry them out, that’s the way you had to do it.
23
LC: Yeah, yeah. You didn’t have a lot of manpower to spare, that’s for sure.
24
RC: No, that’s right.
25
LC: Were there people who if the conditions had been less horrendous, I mean, if
26
the cold had been less, if you know, that—?
27
RC: Would’ve survived?
28
LC: Yeah, do you think so?
29
RC: Oh, yes, yes, of course. That’s the beauty of today’s medical capability. I
30
mean, they’ve got things now that in those days people wouldn’t have survived with the
31
wounds that they had. A lot of people died, you know, bled to death.
137
1
LC: Oh, yeah. I’m sure they must have.
2
RC: Yeah.
3
LC: Even in the horrendous cold.
4
RC: That’s right.
5
LC: And, of course, go into shock and arrest.
6
RC: Shock. There was heavy casualties, very heavy casualties. Of course, the
7
worst cold, the worst casualties we had, I mean, the greatest number, really, were from
8
frostbite.
9
LC: Did you have problems with that, you yourself?
10
RC: I had frostbite, yes.
11
LC: Is it from this period? Is it from these days?
12
RC: Mm-hmm, yes. Probably a couple of those nights that I was out, that’s when
13
I got it.
14
LC: Yeah. How does it affect you now?
15
RC: You have insensitivity in your feet. I wake up at night with pain.
16
LC: Is it phantom pain or is it real pain? In other words, does it feel like it’s
17
actually in your foot?
18
RC: Oh, yes, in my toes.
19
LC: Really? Yeah, I think sometimes people don’t really understand.
20
RC: Well, I’ve had quite a few, I’ve had surgeries on my feet.
21
LC: Because of this?
22
RC: Yes, the effects, the after effects of it, the side effects of it. I’ve had four
23
surgeries on each foot.
24
LC: But you get around pretty well now, sir, isn’t that right?
25
RC: Always have.
26
LC: That’s what I thought.
27
RC: I used to be a runner, you know, and I still, I don’t run anymore, but the
28
29
30
31
doctor told me I can’t run, but I do ride bikes.
LC: There you go. Well, I think it’s important that people understand that
frostbite is not a nothing. You know, that it can be very serious.
RC: No, it can affect you in quite a few ways.
138
1
LC: Yes. You mentioned on a couple of different occasions that there were
2
individuals who, for lack of a better word, they just kind of lost their way during the
3
battle.
4
RC: Yes.
5
LC: They had battle shock or whatever. The cold may have played some role in
6
that, too.
7
RC: Oh, quite a bit, quite a bit I’m sure.
8
LC: People have different sensitivities to that, too.
9
RC: Yeah, yeah.
10
11
12
13
LC: Well, sir, as an S-2 during the day, during that next day, tell me what your
activities were and what you knew about the broader battle.
RC: Well, from that time on, I was concentrating because now we were told we
were going to move out.
14
LC: You were going to move south?
15
RC: We were going to move south.
16
LC: Okay.
17
RC: So from that time on, I was trying to gather as much intelligence
18
information. My main focus now was on what we were facing on the way out.
19
LC: And how to organize?
20
RC: And how to organize.
21
LC: Now what did you, if you can remember, what was it that you knew about
22
the enemy numbers and disposition as you started to plan this?
23
RC: Well, by this time, we knew that we had saw a Chinese.
24
LC: You knew these were main force people?
25
RC: Main force Chinese. Yes, we had identified some divisions by this time,
26
59th, I can’t remember the numbers. We knew that we had, from division and various
27
regimental G-2s and in from Corps, we knew that we were somewhere in the
28
neighborhood between seven and ten divisions around us, a division being ten thousand,
29
approximately ten thousand Chinese.
30
31
LC: I mean, I can’t imagine anything more daunting, really. I’m sure other
positions you’ve been in, sir, were at least as daunting, but that’s right up there. How
139
1
much of that information would go beyond you as the S-2 battalion level? Would it go
2
any further down to—?
3
RC: Company commanders.
4
LC: And beyond that at all?
5
RC: And the company commanders would brief their platoon leaders and the
6
platoon leaders would brief their men.
7
LC: So everyone would know basically—
8
RC: Everybody pretty much knew that it was going to be a tough fight.
9
LC: Okay. So that no one would not be prepared and wanted everyone prepared.
10
RC: Yeah, you try to let everybody know as much as you can about what they’re
11
facing. That’s important. That’s very important for them to know.
12
13
LC: Well, it’s interesting because it’s an important command decision that isn’t
made in—well, let’s say other branches of the service don’t necessarily operate that way.
14
15
RC: Well, Marines do. They try to keep their people informed. The Marines,
well, the Marines work on individual leadership.
16
LC: Yes, sir.
17
RC: In other words, I had PFCs (privates first class) that took over rifle squads.
18
LC: And had to be ready to do that.
19
RC: And did a good job and were ready for it. And sergeants that—when you
20
looked at some of the units coming out, in some cases, maybe a corporal would have a
21
platoon. It deteriorated at that point. So the Marines concentrated on leadership at all
22
levels.
23
24
LC: Of course that means, what that plays out in a battle like this is that people
are ready to step up and step in when they need to.
25
RC: Exactly.
26
LC: Yes, sir.
27
RC: That’s right.
28
LC: And this is one of the times, I think, that really demonstrates the—
29
RC: Well, the Ray Davis is a good example on that.
30
LC: If you can, tell me a little bit about him and what you knew about him.
140
1
2
RC: Well, I think I told you that I served with him at Camp Lejeune when he first
came down there.
3
LC: Yes, you did mention that, yes.
4
RC: And then I knew that he was a key figure in the breakout at Udam-ni. I knew
5
that.
6
LC: Right.
7
RC: That he actually took off across the hills and led his battalion right through a
8
9
major group of Chinese into where Fox Company was.
LC: Now was this the 7th Marines?
10
RC: 7th Marines, right.
11
LC: Okay.
12
RC: Fox Company, I know you’ve heard of them.
13
LC: Yes. But for someone who doesn’t have as much background as I might and
14
listening to this, can you just frame out his actions and what Fox Company went through?
15
RC: Well, he was trying to, if you will, to lead his regiment out—
16
LC: From—?
17
RC: From Udam-ni.
18
LC: Yeah.
19
RC: And also in the process to provide relief for Fox Company, which was at the
20
top of one of the passes leading back to Hagaru. And it was important, the keys to all of
21
it, of course, it was totally important that they hold all the way from the bottom of the
22
pass at Chinhung-ni all the way up to Koto-ri and up to Hagaru and up to Udam-ni, it was
23
important to hold them and to make an orderly withdraw because the 31st Regiment did
24
not make an orderly withdraw, they came apart.
25
LC: And what was their location when they begin to withdraw?
26
RC: They were on the east side, northeast of Hagaru.
27
LC: Okay.
28
RC: And we actually had units, we actually went out on the ice and pulled
29
30
31
soldiers off the ice who were crawling wounded, trying to get back to us.
LC: And I don’t want to put too much emphasis on this, but had there essentially
been some breakdown while they were withdrawing?
141
1
RC: Well yes, their battalion, their commander was killed and most of their
2
officers were killed and they were overwhelmed and they didn’t have the same discipline
3
that we had, to be real truthful with you.
4
LC: Sure.
5
RC: They came back, I mean, they came back individually, whatever way they
6
could, it was kind of like, “Well, the word the Marine had was, ‘Every man for himself.’”
7
LC: And that’s what it looked like?
8
RC: And that’s not the way you fight, you know.
9
LC: Yes, sir.
10
11
RC: That’s not the way you fight. Olin Beal, I’m sure you’ve heard his name.
You heard his name?
12
LC: I don’t know that I have, no, who was he?
13
RC: He was the CO of the motor transport battalion, 2nd Motor Transport, 1st
14
Motor Transport Battalion.
15
LC: Spelled B-E-A-L. Two Ls? Beall. Olin?
16
RC: Olin, O-L-E, O-L-I-N, I think it is.
17
LC: Yeah, yeah, I think you’re right.
18
RC: Olin Beal. He personally took trucks on the ice and rescued Army soldiers
19
20
while all the fight was going on.
LC: Yeah, I was going to say, I do actually remember this, I didn’t associate his
21
name with that action, but they were taking Chinese fire while driving around on the
22
reservoir trying to pick up wounded men.
23
RC: Right.
24
LC: And they did get, I haven’t seen numbers, but something like three hundred
25
or something?
26
RC: Yeah, that’s right. There weren’t a lot of survivors out of that operation.
27
LC: Well, no.
28
RC: And we integrated those soldiers, incidentally, into our units.
29
LC: Really?
30
RC: We moved them in with Marines.
31
LC: Okay.
142
1
2
RC: We didn’t put them on their own. There was one unit that they organized
and put them on the base of East Hill.
3
LC: And how did they do with you guys, with the Marines?
4
RC: Well, not bad.
5
LC: For Army guys? (Laughing)
6
RC: (Chuckle) Not bad. They weren’t Marines, but they didn’t do badly. What
7
they needed was, they needed to know that somebody was looking out for them, that’s
8
what they needed. They needed some direction, some leadership.
9
LC: Some structure.
10
RC: That’s right, structure is what they needed. And they got structure when
11
they came back to us because, as I say, we integrated them and it worked real well.
12
They’re Americans, you know, and they did okay.
13
14
LC: Yes, sir. Well, you know, and they had been through quite a bit on their
own.
15
RC: Yeah they had, they had. They were not ready for what they met and they
16
had some very unfortunate casualties and they lost their leadership and it really tore them
17
apart.
18
LC: Well, I mean, that they were involved in this great, in this huge offensive
19
operation in which they’re trying to hold the line and with all of those things against
20
them, that was a very difficult for any young men to be in. I can’t imagine. But those
21
who were well enough, who were uninjured, you guys integrated them and got them
22
essentially into the field, which is where they should’ve been.
23
RC: That’s right.
24
LC: Now, General, talk to me if you will a little bit about organizing what
25
essentially was a withdrawal, but you’re trying to move back down those, what would
26
have been the line of supply now becomes the sort of line of maneuver.
27
RC: MSR.
28
LC: Yes.
29
RC: Yeah, we had to move right down the only road that was back off the
30
mountain, really.
143
1
2
LC: And what was the plan, how far were you going to go, all the way to
Hungnam or—?
3
RC: Oh, yes.
4
LC: Okay, so that was the plan.
5
RC: That was the plan.
6
LC: Okay. And what—?
7
RC: And that was brought about, I think you’ve probably have gotten this in your
8
research, that that was brought about by the fact that we were out there all by ourselves.
9
LC: Well, as it turned out, yes, sir, you were.
10
RC: The 8th Army was in full retreat.
11
LC: Yes, sir, long gone, actually, by this point.
12
RC: They were long gone, they were well behind us, which was one of the things
13
that I know that you’ve heard this, but General Smith said he was ordered to attack by
14
General Almond and he said that, “I’m spread out over seventy miles now and it’d be
15
disastrous to attack and I will not attack at this time.” Well, as it turned out, he would’ve
16
been attacking the whole Chinese Army because the 8th Army was gone. So it was a very
17
wise decision. He probably saved the division right there.
18
LC: You know, I would agree with you because not only the Chinese troops that
19
had already been committed to the battle were involved, as you say seven to ten
20
divisions, but there were, of course, many more divisions.
21
RC: Multi-divisions on the other side.
22
LC: Right, yes, sir.
23
RC: And we would’ve walked right into them. So we would’ve been hanging out
24
with, you know—
25
LC: I’m afraid we might not have been doing this interview, actually.
26
RC: That’s right.
27
LC: So I think it was all the way around a wise decision.
28
RC: Yeah, and it was General Smith that did that.
29
LC: Yes, sir, Major General Smith, yes, sir. Your role as battalion S-2 and
30
getting enough information to make a good plan for maneuver, how did you discharge
31
that?
144
1
RC: Well, now things were pretty fragmented.
2
LC: Okay.
3
RC: We had to depend upon things coming down to us because we were all apart
4
of a large group. As I say, now the 7th Marines, the 5th Marines, and the 1st Marines were
5
on their way out, so we were going out as a division now. So our intelligence came down
6
from the top. Now we did have, obviously we had flanking patrols and things like that
7
out, but they usually were heavily engaged, so it was a running gun battle all the way out
8
from here on.
9
LC: Okay, and this is about December 1st or so?
10
RC: As I recall, around the 4th.
11
LC: Oh, okay. I’m sorry.
12
RC: Yeah, around the 4th is when we really started to move out because we got
13
back to—it took us about four days to get back to—my particular battalion got back
14
about the 8th or 9th I think it was.
15
LC: Okay.
16
RC: That’s hazy. I don’t know exactly.
17
LC: And as you said, you were among the last ones out.
18
RC: That’s right.
19
LC: You were doing covering.
20
RC: That’s right.
21
LC: Covering fire, covering positions.
22
RC: Yeah.
23
LC: Tell me about the Chinese reaction to the pullback. What could you
24
observe?
25
RC: Well, they were obviously trying to wipe us out.
26
LC: Right, just by—
27
RC: So they were constantly attacking.
28
LC: Continually rolling at you.
29
RC: Yeah, right.
30
LC: In large numbers.
145
1
RC: Large numbers. Of course, the terrain was such they couldn’t concentrate
2
too much, a lot of mountains and passes. They blew up a bridge. Have you seen Charles
3
Waterhouse’s Band of Brothers painting?
4
LC: Yes, I have, yes.
5
RC: A little aside on that, I’m having a five-foot-by-eight foot reproduction, I
6
talked to Chuck Waterhouse and he loaned me his, what do you call those things that you
7
make the photographs from, but he loaned us that and said, “Make it whatever size you
8
want, but just send me some pictures and show me when it’s up,” and so on for his
9
museum. He has a museum up in Pennsylvania.
10
LC: Yes, yes, sir.
11
RC: Very nice gentleman, very accommodating. And of course, we have a place
12
where we all meet, our local Marines meet at a restaurant, a Marine’s restaurant and we
13
meet and they have a large mural of the Iwo Jima flag raising there, five feet by eight
14
feet.
15
LC: Wow, that sounds impressive.
16
RC: Yeah. And I’m having a five-foot-by-eight feet reproduction made of the
17
Band of Brothers that’s going beside it.
18
LC: In the restaurant?
19
RC: In the restaurant.
20
LC: Now just for clarification, I know what you’re talking about, but this is the
21
Consultative Committee of the Metroplex Marines, or what is it called exactly?
22
RC: Coordinating.
23
LC: Coordinating.
24
RC: Marine Coordinating Committee.
25
LC: I’m sorry, that’s right. And you also, General, are part of a group there in the
26
Dallas/Ft. Worth area of Marines who—
27
RC: North Texas Chapter of the Chosin Few.
28
LC: North Texas Chapter, okay.
29
RC: We had a fish fry Saturday.
30
LC: Did you really? (Laughing)
146
1
2
RC: Yeah. (Laughing) One of our corpsman lives up on Lake Texoma and he’s
a great fisherman and every year we have a fish fry up at his place.
3
LC: Good for you, that sounds good, that sounds like a great thing to do together.
4
When you go to those meetings, maybe on some level someone might think that it’s kind
5
of routine to go to those, basically they’re reunion group meetings and stuff, but do you
6
guys feel that way or do you feel like it’s really special that you get to still see them and
7
connect with them over the shared experiences?
8
RC: Oh, it’s very special. As a matter of fact, we meet more than once, we meet
9
about every other month now.
10
LC: Now this is the—
11
RC: The North Texas Chapter.
12
LC: Oh, do you really?
13
RC: Yeah, we’re very tight.
14
LC: We’ll have to come and visit with some of those guys.
15
RC: You’re quite welcome, there’s quite a few—one of my youngsters out of my
16
rifle platoon is there.
17
LC: No kidding?
18
RC: Morris Edwards.
19
LC: No kidding?
20
RC: He can tell you some of the things that they went through.
21
LC: Yeah, I’ll have to talk to him and I’ll get the real story from him.
22
RC: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
23
LC: He’ll tell me all about Carey this and—(Laughing)
24
RC: I welcome that.
25
LC: Okay.
26
RC: He’s a very nice gentleman.
27
LC: Oh, I’m sure. I’m sure. And all these guys, you know—
28
RC: Yeah, we’ve got people from the 5th Marines, the 7th Marines, 1st Marines;
29
I’ve got them all, artillery, the whole works.
30
LC: I hope that as time goes on, you’ll help us make contact with them.
31
RC: I will. I’ll be happy to.
147
1
LC: Because I know that as a lieutenant general at retirement, a lot of people will
2
certainly contact you, but some of those guys who didn’t stay in the Corps or whose
3
careers didn’t reach quite the heights that yours did, they need to be remembered and
4
honored as well.
5
RC: They’ve got some good stories.
6
LC: Oh, I’m sure.
7
RC: Yeah, they have.
8
LC: I’m sure they must. Well, General, if you can, tell me how the, what’s called
9
10
11
12
the second breakout by some historians, actually occurred. How did you get out of the
Hagaru perimeter with your lives, essentially?
RC: Well, just by force of will, really. The Chinese kind of backed off when we
got the entire division together.
13
LC: Do you attribute that to the fact that you were concentrating strength and—?
14
RC: Yes, yes. And the fact that—and the weather cleared up a little bit, so we
15
had more air, the air did help us.
16
LC: Now how did it change? How did the weather change?
17
RC: Well, it cleared up a little bit, we didn’t have the constant snow and overcast.
18
I recall when we got back to Koto-ri one night, we did have, and they attacked us pretty
19
heavily there. I had one of my youngsters out of my rifle platoon that wound up losing
20
both of his hands.
21
LC: How did that come about if you can tell us?
22
RC: He had a BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), he was a BAR man and I had to
23
take his gloves off, his BAR froze up and he was on a path in the perimeter that was,
24
again, one of the entry points, one of the chosen routes to attack and he took off his
25
gloves to throw grenades and he threw grenades during the night and lost his—he got
26
frostbite so bad that he lost his hand.
27
LC: He couldn’t feel well enough to—?
28
RC: No. Well, when you’re in that kind of position.
29
LC: I can’t even imagine. Is he still alive, sir?
30
RC: I don’t know.
31
LC: Do you remember his name?
148
1
RC: I can get it.
2
LC: That’s okay. I just wondered if it came to your mind.
3
RC: I can’t remember his name, no. No, I think it was Crowell, but I’m not sure
4
it was Crowell.
5
LC: But I think that gives a sense to people who might be listening of what you
6
guys were going through. What was your position at Koto-ri when that attack took place,
7
how were you deployed?
8
RC: I was with the battalion CP.
9
LC: Okay.
10
RC: I was not with the rifle company
11
LC: And how did they do, was it another essentially what we’ve called a wave
12
attack?
13
RC: No, no, it was more probing, but it was pretty heavy probing.
14
LC: And for the Chinese, what did that mean, are we talking about a company
15
size or—?
16
RC: Well, a company or less.
17
LC: A little less than that maybe?
18
RC: Probably a platoon, here, there, and everywhere.
19
LC: Okay, well, yeah, a lot of them.
20
RC: Right.
21
LC: Okay. And did the Marines take more casualties then?
22
RC: Not particularly heavy.
23
LC: Were you in a good position? Were you in good positions?
24
RC: Yes, yes. We were fortunate, the 2nd Battalion had gotten down there and
25
the regimental headquarters was there and they had time to expand and dig in before the
26
real cold weather came. We had problems at Hagaru when we were up at Hagaru
27
because the ground was frozen down to about eighteen inches.
28
LC: Yeah, to dig was not an easy process.
29
RC: We had to use C-2 to crack the permafrost.
30
LC: No kidding, really?
149
1
RC: Yeah, we had to use C-2 to do that and then once you got through the top
2
layer, then you could dig.
3
LC: Wow.
4
RC: It was frozen pretty deep.
5
LC: Yes, it sounds like it. Well, I mean, those kinds of facts really make a little
6
clearer to people, even at this remove in time, what you guys were actually confronting.
7
RC: Yeah, well, you didn’t really have deep foxholes, you couldn’t go that deep,
8
you couldn’t get through the top layer and everybody didn’t have the C-2. Some of the
9
guys were doing the best they could with their entrenching tools and so on.
10
LC: Right, but it was hard going.
11
RC: Tough going, very tough.
12
LC: And exhausting on top of that.
13
RC: Very, very difficult, very difficult.
14
LC: But as your folks were arriving, and again, you’re among the last to come
15
through, the positions were essentially established such that you had a good defensive
16
perimeter upon moving into Koto-ri?
17
RC: Pretty good, and again, the Chinese respected the numbers now. They knew
18
they weren’t up against a company or a reduced battalion, they were up against regiments
19
and they had tangled with these guys before and they weren’t too anxious. They wanted
20
us out and so what they tried to do is they tried to impede us. Down where the Band of
21
Brothers was made, that was made at the pass where there was a big ravine and they had
22
to put treadway sections across, which were dropped by C-130s. I’m sure you’ve heard
23
of that.
24
LC: Now I’m just going to try to—this is the pass that was south of Koto-ri?
25
RC: Right.
26
LC: It’s like Funchilin Pass or something like that.
27
RC: Yes, that’s right.
28
LC: Okay.
29
RC: That’s where the picture was made.
30
LC: Yes, sir.
150
1
2
RC: And that’s what they did, they tried to stop us in any way they could, split us
up.
3
LC: So that they could then swamp you?
4
RC: So that they could beat us in piecemeal.
5
LC: Yes, right, right.
6
RC: Standard military tactic.
7
LC: Yes, sir, yes sir. And they had some experience with that, too.
8
RC: That’s right.
9
LC: Fighting the Nationalists. I wonder how much—well what role do you think
10
air cover, not necessarily air supply or evac, but air cover offensive weapons deployed by
11
the U.S. from the air actually played during the—?
12
RC: Well, it helped a lot.
13
LC: Okay.
14
RC: The hardest times we had is when we didn’t have it, when the weather was
15
16
17
such that we couldn’t use it.
LC: There were Marines flight squadrons flying sorties. I don’t know how close
they were to you.
18
RC: Yes, there were. The Checkerboards were there, we knew, 312.
19
LC: Yes, sir.
20
RC: And we did have once incident where we had an Air Force A-26 that
21
bombed us by mistake.
22
LC: Oops. How serious were the consequences of that?
23
RC: Five-hundred pounders didn’t, we didn’t take a casualty.
24
LC: Not a single one?
25
RC: Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge.
26
LC: You know, in one way that’s very good. (Laughing)
27
RC: Yeah. (Laughing) But they came in our FAC (forward air controller), well
28
29
30
31
let me think of his name. I know his name and I can’t think of it right now.
LC: Was this the same fellow who had been up on the hill with you with Myers
group and so on who had called in—?
RC: Yeah.
151
1
LC: Same fellow.
2
RC: Same guy, same guy, yeah. And he called the planes that dropped the
3
bombs and said, “Aircraft, Air Force—” and he knew they were Air Force aircraft
4
because we didn’t have any A-26s.
5
LC: Yes, sir.
6
RC: And he said, “Air Force aircraft that’s dropping bombs, if you drop one
7
more bomb, I’ve got Corsairs up and we’re going to shoot you down.”
8
LC: I think that was probably just about on target, don’t you?
9
RC: Yup, that stopped it right there.
10
11
LC: Can you describe what it’s like to be anywhere near a five-hundred-pound
bomb going off?
12
RC: It’s very disconcerting, I can tell you that. (Laughing)
13
LC: (Laughing) Yes, sir.
14
RC: It’s awfully noisy. And there’s a lot of shockwaves. It’s overpowering. It’s
15
overwhelming.
16
LC: Yeah, one of those was enough, I’m sure.
17
RC: I think it had to—when we dropped them in the A Shau Valley in Vietnam
18
when the B-52s came over and dropped seven-hundred-and-fifty-pound bombs, each
19
aircraft carrying about seventy of those things, can you imagine?
20
LC: No.
21
RC: If you were down there receiving that?
22
LC: No, no. I mean, I’ve interviewed a couple of guys who have talked about
23
those strikes and, I mean, it just chills you beyond belief and I’m sure that it did have
24
psychological effects if nothing else.
25
RC: Oh absolutely, absolutely.
26
LC: But you know, well, it’s a testament to, you know, the kind of ordnance that
27
the United States can bring to bear on a problem. It doesn’t always solve the problem
28
though, that’s one thing we’ve learned, I suppose.
29
30
31
RC: That’s right, that’s right. You still have to go in with the old infantry to take
the land.
LC: Yes sir, yes, sir.
152
1
RC: That’s what wins the battle.
2
LC: That’s right. And I would agree with you completely and it’s an interesting
3
problem how that has been discussed and debated all throughout the Vietnam Era, which
4
is maybe something you and I can talk about when we come to that.
5
RC: Right.
6
LC: Sir, I don’t actually know when it was that you were wounded. Can you tell
7
me when that happened?
8
RC: That happened in March.
9
LC: Okay, so a great deal later than this.
10
11
12
13
RC: Yeah, after we jumped off in our offensive after we got back to the
evacuation, out of Hungnam and headed back down to Pusan and refurbished and—
LC: Well, maybe we could, if you don’t mind, I’ll ask you about that maybe on
our next time.
14
RC: Okay, sure.
15
LC: But just to wind up for today, can you tell me how the troops did as they
16
were moving together now down toward Hungnam? Were there raiding attacks that
17
continued by the Chinese or did they pretty much leave you alone after the first two or
18
three days?
19
20
RC: They set up strong points on the way out that took us under fire and we
would have to clear those.
21
LC: And what would you use to do that?
22
RC: Infantry.
23
LC: Okay.
24
RC: And supported by tanks and we didn’t have artillery set up at that time.
25
LC: So if you came across—
26
RC: Mortars, we’d use mortars and tanks if we had a tank around. I remember
27
watching the 41st Royal Commandos. We had a ringside seat to them taking a hill,
28
beautiful. They did everything exactly right.
29
LC: A textbook.
30
RC: A textbook attack.
31
LC: What was the outline?
153
1
2
RC: Well, they did the base of fire and flanking, what I had talked to you about
before.
3
LC: Right.
4
RC: I was enamored with them, I said, “Boy, there’s some more guys that know
5
how to fight.”
6
LC: They know what they’re doing.
7
RC: They know what they’re doing. They were very good. The 41st Royal
8
Commandos were a wonderful group of people. I had one little incident that I need to tell
9
you about.
10
LC: Yes, sir.
11
RC: Colonel Drysdale, who was the CO of the 41st Royal Commandos, when I
12
was ordered up onto East Hill, I was leaving the CP and he said, “You’re going like
13
that?” And I said, “Yes, sir. That’s all I’ve got.” I had a field jacket. I didn’t have a parka.
14
LC: Okay.
15
RC: And he said, “I want you to have proper gear. You take my parka.” So he
16
gave me his parka. Well right after that, and I didn’t tell you this, I forgot about it until
17
just now, I’ve just recalled.
18
LC: That’s fine.
19
RC: Right after that man hit the edge of that ammo box, I moved up the hill and
20
before I got to the foxhole I was going to go to, I took another round that hit me in the
21
stomach, but I had a cartridge belt on and it went around the cartridge, it went through
22
his—I had the cartridge belt underneath the parka and it went through his parka, around
23
the cartridge belt and out the back. And when I got back down to the CP, the next day I
24
gave him back his parka and he looked at it and it had two holes in it. And he said,
25
“Where’s the blood?” And I told him the story then and he said, “Well, you’re a lucky
26
lad, aren’t you? You’re a lucky lad.” I said, “More than you know. More than you know,
27
Colonel.” (Laughing)
28
LC: (Laughing)
29
RC: But that was Drysdale and unfortunately the gentleman is dead now, but he
30
31
was a wonderful, wonderful man, wonderful officer.
LC: It sounds as if he was.
154
1
RC: Yeah, he was.
2
LC: Okay, let’s take a break there, General.
3
RC: All right.
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
155
Interview with Richard Carey Session [4] of [16] October 26, 2005 1
Laura Calkins: This is Dr. Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey of the
3
U.S. Marine Corps. Today is the twenty-sixth of October 2005. I am in the Special
4
Collections Building on the campus of Texas Tech in Lubbock. The general is speaking
5
by telephone from his home elsewhere in Texas. General, thank you again for making
6
some time for us.
7
Richard Carey: Oh, it’s my honor.
8
LC: We are so grateful for your participation. It makes such a huge difference
9
and will to people who will listen to this in the future, I know that. Last time we were
10
talking about the beginning of the—
11
RC: Withdrawal.
12
LC: Yeah, the withdrawal of the Marines from the Chosin Reservoir area toward
13
Hungnam. If you could, beginning with the first night of that operation, could you
14
describe where your unit was in the column and what went on?
15
RC: Well, first off, let me clarify one thing. It wasn’t really a withdrawal. It was
16
an attack in another direction, as we like to refer. Our unit, 3/1 was at the tail end of the
17
column or very near the tail end of the column. Of course, not being no more than a
18
second lieutenant at that time, I wasn’t totally aware of the disposition of all the troops,
19
but I know that we were toward the tail end because the tank, we had several tanks back
20
with us that helped keep the civilians back from mingling with our troops. Of course, the
21
Chinese were mingling in with the civilians for cover. So the tanks kind of held them off,
22
if you will, and that’s where we had discovered the body of the counterintelligence agent.
23
LC: I see.
24
RC: But at any rate, we moved on to Koto-ri. It took a full day for us to get
25
down to Koto-ri and that was a short distance, I believe about ten miles is about all, ten or
26
eleven miles. But there was quite a bit of fighting on the flanks all the way through
27
because the Chinese obviously tried to defeat us in detail by cutting off units from the
28
rear or wherever they could by breaking through the column and then trying to isolate
156
1
that group and concentrating on those that were left behind. But we were successful in
2
repelling all of those.
3
4
5
LC: Can you estimate numbers or did you see any of those actions by the
Chinese?
RC: Oh, yes, I saw a couple of them. One in which I was very, very impressed
6
by the 41st Royal Commandos, which as I told you before, were attached to our rifle
7
company. They were sent up one specific hill and to watch them in their maneuvers and
8
taking the hill was textbook. They were just absolutely first rate. They were a very, very
9
well-disciplined, a well-trained organization, even though they had been reconstituted
10
after they came through to Hagaru.
11
LC: Because of their losses?
12
RC: Because of their losses, they were reconstituted, but they performed
13
14
remarkably well in that particular engagement. I was very, very impressed with them.
LC: Can you describe, just again, in general terms what you remember about the
15
operation? You say it was textbook and I think it would be fascinating for people to
16
know—
17
RC: Well, they obviously, the textbook for any military organization small unit
18
textbook is to have a base of fire and then an enveloping unit. That’s exactly what they
19
did. They had a base of fire and they moved the base of fire forward. With a series of
20
envelopments, they moved up the hill. Not just one envelopment, but they went one and
21
they’d move up to that point and then they’d start all over again. So as I say, it was
22
absolutely textbook the way they did it. They took it in a matter of about an hour.
23
LC: Wow.
24
RC: And with minimal casualties on their side.
25
LC: And what about the Chinese?
26
RC: A lot of casualties.
27
LC: Were they continuing to use these, what we’ve called “human wave” attacks
28
29
on the points?
RC: Yes, they used some of those, but I think they had started to learn their
30
lesson because they had taken so many heavy casualties that they did it with a series of
31
probes. They didn’t use human waves throughout the entire column but just at various
157
1
points. Their tactics were simply charge and they didn’t really have a base of fire. The
2
only major thing they had was mortars. They didn’t have any artillery to throw at us.
3
LC: Sure.
4
RC: Of course, they had to be very careful because most of our movement was
5
during the day. The reason for that, of course, was that the Chinese fought mostly at
6
night because of the air cover when we had it. They had to take advantage of the
7
concealment that they got at night. So at night, what we did is we usually stopped and set
8
up perimeters and set up our defense and let them attack as they would and probe. In the
9
daytime we moved. We attacked as we had to along the hills because they had dug in
10
along the hills, the road that we exited on was in a valley, of course. On both sides of the
11
highway, I say highway, it wasn’t much of a highway. It was a dirt road, really. They
12
took the predominantly high ground on either side of that and harassed us and
13
periodically would make probing attacks, but their major efforts were at night. We had a
14
major effort when we were in Koto-ri. I had now moved back down to my battalion
15
headquarters and was operating out of there because the defenses were conducted strictly
16
by groups of companies. Most companies were pretty heavily decimated. So one
17
company would not be enough to really set up a perimeter. My rifle company was down
18
to less than, well, we’d started out obviously with two hundred men and we were down to
19
about a hundred men at that time. So we had pretty heavy casualties.
20
LC: Yes.
21
RC: A lot of the casualties, of course, as I told you before were from frostbite.
22
They were evacuating people for that because some of their feet were frozen, hands were
23
frozen. I had one BAR man, Browning Automatic Rifle man that had both of his hands
24
frozen. He had been, at Koto-ri he had been placed atop a hill on a path that was leading
25
up to the top of the hill. The Chinese concentrated on coming up that path. His BAR
26
froze up and he took his gloves off and was throwing grenades to repel them. He got
27
both of his hands very severely frozen. I’ve been told that later on he lost part of his
28
hands, lost some of his fingers as a result of that.
29
LC: Because he couldn’t feel what he was doing anymore?
30
RC: That’s right. Yeah. That’s right. My previous one, I was very fortunate that
31
that didn’t happen to me because it’s pretty hard to throw grenades with your gloves on,
158
1
like the gloves we had. So we generally took them off so we’d get a feel, like a baseball,
2
and throwing the grenades. They had some pretty heavy attacks at Koto-ri, which were
3
repelled. Then we launched off the next day out of Koto-ri going down the pass. Now
4
while we were going down the pass, one of our battalions was fighting up the pass, up the
5
hills beside the road.
6
LC: This was a battalion?
7
RC: A battalion, right. The company commander of that battalion was Bob
8
Barrow, who later became commandant of the Marine Corps, a good friend of mine. He
9
was very good. Several of the platoon leaders had been out of my Basic School class,
10
Jack Swords who might be somebody that you in the future would want to contact.
11
LC: Yes, sir. Mm-hmm.
12
RC: Because they were also involved in the retaking of Seoul, which was an
13
interesting thing.
14
LC: Now, yes, I will ask you about him later.
15
RC: Okay. His battalion or his company, Barrow was a company commander at
16
that time. I’m sorry. Did I say battalion commander? He wasn’t a battalion commander
17
yet.
18
LC: Yeah. You said he was a company commander.
19
RC: Okay. Well, he was a company commander and he had Able Company, 1st
20
Battalion, 1st Marines. They attacked up a hill, one of the last high mountains, actually,
21
that was beside our road and were successful in taking that, which had a lot to do with
22
our getting out without being decimated.
23
LC: From behind?
24
RC: From behind, that’s right.
25
LC: Now is it fair to describe what Bob Barrow was doing as a blocking action,
26
blocking the advance of a main force?
27
RC: Yes. Well, obviously as I said, what the Chinese tactics were was to take the
28
high ground on either side of the road and then harass us as much as they could and try to
29
penetrate and divide the column when they’d see a weak, what would appear to them to
30
be a weak part of the column, then they would attack at that point. His action obviously
31
was at one of the key terrain features, which was the last one, which meant that if they
159
1
were really going to cut us up and divide us and then thus try to annihilate us, that they
2
would hold that ground. So that was a key terrain feature just as East Hill and Hagaru
3
had been. It was that key.
4
LC: Do you know if, I guess would Barrow have been a captain at that point?
5
RC: Yes, he was a captain.
6
LC: Did he receive any medals for his actions?
7
RC: I don’t know whether he did specifically for that. Barrow was a highly-
8
decorated Marine from World War II. He had been in China during the war and had been
9
kind of behind the lines agent fighting in China. So he was very heavily, very highly
10
decorated and a very knowledgeable infantry officer, very knowledgeable.
11
LC: Wow. The right man in the right place, it sounds like.
12
RC: That’s right. Well, we had a lot of that. Fortunately we had a lot of it. A lot
13
of it was because of the good fortune we had in having a lot of veterans of World War II.
14
We had a lot of veterans that were infantry and had been in some pretty heavy combat
15
and knew what they were doing. So that helped. It helped my platoon, I know.
16
17
LC: Your platoon was where in relation to Barrow’s company as they were
fighting on the hill?
18
RC: Well, we were down with the column.
19
LC: Moving south?
20
RC: Moving south.
21
LC: Essentially south.
22
RC: Right, right, moving down toward Chinhung-ni, which was at the bottom of
23
the pass. That was kind of key to getting there because there it was open ground and we
24
could use artillery and all types of supporting arms to protect us. Whereas in the, while
25
we were in the pass going down, we were pretty much in the defile, I’d say. We were
26
pretty much limited as to what we could use in supporting arms. The major thing we had
27
there to help us was air in the daytime. Then as I said, we didn’t really move that much
28
at night. We tried to stop and set up defenses at night because then we didn’t have our
29
supporting arms and they had overwhelming numbers on us. So that was the best way to
30
operate.
160
1
LC: General, when you were setting up the defensive perimeters at night, what
2
did you have with you that was useful in the way of—I mean, did you have foo gas? Did
3
you have mines? What all did you have?
4
5
RC: No. We didn’t set up any mines to my knowledge. I know we didn’t. We
used basically mortars and machineguns, set up defensive fires.
6
LC: Yeah. That’s a little worrying.
7
RC: Yeah. It is, it is. We were very fortunate. I think in reality, the Chinese had
8
been so decimated at that time that it kind of appeared to us that they really wanted to let
9
us get out of there because they were taking so many heavy casualties. Historically, I
10
believe that we decimated in excess of three divisions of Chinese and made a couple of
11
others non-combat, or combat ineffective.
12
LC: So they didn’t really have at this point the punch left to—
13
RC: That’s my opinion. That’s my opinion that they kind of said, “Let these
14
guys get out of here. We’ve had enough,” you know?
15
LC: When your forces reached Chinhung-ni that changed the calculus even more.
16
RC: That’s right, because from there, the Army had sent a division forward that
17
were in force at that point. So that helped us. We kind of folded right into their
18
perimeter. I know that the group that I was with, they put us on a train and took us down
19
to Hungnam.
20
LC: Now would this be your whole platoon?
21
RC: Yeah, I wasn’t—now I was with the battalion headquarters.
22
LC: Oh, I’m sorry. Yes, you had mentioned that.
23
RC: Yes, yes.
24
LC: So the battalion headquarters personnel—
25
RC: Right, right. We went on down to a rest camp. They had set up kind of a
26
bivouac area, if you will, that’s set up for the whole division. Everybody went in there
27
and we were so exhausted. I remember I slept for eighteen hours. They say that when I
28
woke up, I hardly knew my name. I remember that I was so groggy and so punchy. I
29
wasn’t alone. Everybody was pretty much in the same state.
30
LC: Yes, sir. Did they get you some food?
161
1
2
3
4
RC: Oh, yes, yes. We had a couple of hot meals. There we regrouped to put
what equipment we had on the ships and to start loading on ships.
LC: Now can you describe something of this operation? This is in Hungnam
Harbor?
5
RC: Uh-huh.
6
LC: Can you visualize the harbor now as we’re talking from—?
7
RC: Pretty much I can. We went on LVTs out to—the particular ship I went on
8
was the Simon B. Buckner. I remember that. It was the same ship that I’d come over on.
9
It was an MSTS ship, Military Sea Transport Service ship. It was being used by the
10
military to ferry people to Korea and in this case, to carry us down to Pusan where once
11
we loaded aboard the ship and went down to Pusan. I remember aboard the ship that
12
there were so many on the ship, so many Marines and Army on the ship, mostly Marines,
13
that they didn’t have enough bunks for the people that embarked. So you slept in relays.
14
You got eight hours in the bunk. If you wanted to eat, you had to get up and somebody
15
else would move into your bunk because they had continuous chow lines, food lines that
16
never stopped feeding.
17
LC: Right. Would you say the operation of getting the men onto the ship and
18
presumably as much equipment as possible onto the ship, was this a really rushed
19
exercise? Was it, you know, headlong?
20
RC: Oh, yes, yes it was. It was pretty intense, very intense. A little vignette that
21
happened to me was while I was operating as the S-2, the intelligence officer at the
22
battalion, at Hagaru, this man came in with a vehicle. He was in uniform, in utilities, in
23
Army utilities. He claimed that he was a civilian engineer. Now I can’t give you his
24
name, but we might be able to trace it, I don’t know.
25
LC: Okay.
26
RC: But anyway, he claimed he was a civilian engineer and I tried to check
27
through the division and, of course, things were so chaotic at that time, they kind of
28
sidelined that event.
29
LC: Yes. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm
30
RC: So we put him in the column and he came out with us with the vehicle.
31
When we went to the beach, up comes this Army colonel and says, “That is my vehicle.”
162
1
Now this young man had since gone aboard ship because allegedly he was a civilian. So
2
the vehicle we had and this Army colonel said it was his vehicle. As it turns out, the man
3
who had claimed to be a civilian engineer was in fact the colonel’s driver. He had taken
4
off from the colonel and left the colonel high and dry. Apparently, the colonel flew out
5
of Hagaru, subsequently flew out of Hagaru. The Army, I think he was probably a
6
private. He really pulled a coup on us there. That was a pretty fancy operation.
7
LC: I guess so.
8
RC: He was quite a talker.
9
LC: I guess so.
10
RC: He convinced us all that he was an engineer and we tried to track it down
11
and couldn’t, didn’t get any information back on him. He was evacuated and we wound
12
up with his vehicle.
13
LC: Smooth talkers, these privates.
14
RC: Oh, yeah, he was a pretty slick guy.
15
LC: I guess so.
16
RC: He really was.
17
LC: Maybe they should’ve given him another job.
18
RC: Yeah. I don’t know what ever happened to him. I’m sure they finally got
19
him.
20
LC: Oh, undoubtedly.
21
RC: Yeah, but it was quite humorous, really.
22
LC: Well, yeah.
23
RC: Because he pulled the wool over all of our eyes. He really was a smooth
24
25
26
27
28
talker.
LC: The operation of moving onto the ships had to be a complicated one. Do you
have a sense of how crowded the harbor was when you were there?
RC: Well, obviously I don’t know the exact numbers, but I’ve been told that
there were an excess of a hundred thousand Vietnamese that were evacuated.
29
LC: Koreans.
30
RC: I mean Koreans, right.
31
LC: Sure, right. Yes. So we’re talking a huge operation.
163
1
2
RC: That’s right. It was quite complex and the Army had set up a perimeter
around the port area.
3
LC: Yes, uh-huh.
4
RC: They were in the process of destroying their ammunition dumps and so on
5
6
7
while we evacuated. They put the Marines right aboard ship.
LC: Did you have Marines who might’ve been diverted to a hospital ship once
you got down there?
8
RC: Oh, yes, of course, yeah, yeah.
9
LC: Do you remember the hospital ship being there? I think at least one of them
10
was the Consolation.
11
RC: Yeah. I think one of them was the Haven.
12
LC: I think you’re right.
13
RC: Yeah. Yes, they were there also. So they were picking up those people that
14
15
16
17
still needed to get treatment, immediate treatment.
LC: How was your platoon faring at this point? Do you know? Because I realize
you were with the battalion headquarters, do you know?
RC: Well, they got aboard the same ship with us. I remember that I chose not to
18
go into a stateroom. I went down to the—I slept on the boiler plates of the engine room
19
because it was warm. I just slept on the deck, steel deck.
20
LC: Did you have company? I’ll bet you did.
21
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah, a lot of the folks did that. Yeah, I wasn’t alone.
22
LC: Yeah, I bet it felt good, too.
23
RC: You bet, you bet. It was kind of like the thawing out process, you know.
24
The trip down to Pusan was rather uneventful, except it was a period where you were
25
exhausted and you just kind of went to eat when you felt like it. As I recall, it took us
26
about three days to get down there.
27
LC: What happened on arrival?
28
RC: Well, upon arrival, they took us out to a place we called the “Bean Patch,”
29
which was outside of Masan. At Masan, we set up a battalion, our battalion and all the
30
other battalions were doing the same thing, set up a battalion area. They gave us tents
31
and we all lived in big squad tents, large tents, not the little pyramidals, but the large
164
1
tents. Reconstituted, we got replacements in and we started getting equipment in. Now
2
the Marines came out with a lot of the Army equipment. We had a lot of equipment that
3
the Army had abandoned and we picked up and brought out with us.
4
LC: Like what kinds of things?
5
RC: Well, like howitzers, we brought some howitzers out, 105 howitzers.
6
LC: Right.
7
RC: Trucks, jeeps. As I say, we brought out the colonel’s jeep. When we got
8
9
down to Masan, most of those vehicles were repainted and made Marine.
LC: Really?
10
RC: Yeah.
11
LC: Finders keepers, I guess.
12
RC: Finders keepers, that’s right.
13
LC: Now these vehicles and large guns were abandoned by Army units as they
14
themselves were withdrawing.
15
RC: Yes.
16
LC: Okay. So they just left their stuff and—?
17
RC: Yeah, and bugged out, what we call bug out.
18
LC: Yes, sir. You guys were smart enough to just—
19
RC: We picked it up, as much as we could.
20
LC: Well, I mean, this is useful stuff and presumably one wouldn’t want it to fall
21
22
into the hands of the enemy anyway.
RC: That’s right. That’s right. The Army, of course, when they got down to
23
Hamhung, they were very, very regulated and methodical about taking care of their
24
equipment down there. They tried to reclaim some of the equipment and some of it I
25
think probably successfully, but most of it we kept. They were destroying, there were
26
large ammunition dumps, for example, in that area. They were systematically blowing
27
those up.
28
LC: How long did you stay at Masan or the Bean Patch?
29
RC: Well, we got in there in December and we stayed there until we launched out
30
in the attack again. As I recall, it was either the latter, I think the latter part of February is
31
when we—so we stayed there over a month, about a month, maybe five weeks.
165
1
2
3
4
LC: Now can you tell me about the weather and living conditions while you were
there? You’ve mentioned the tents, but was it as cold down there as it had been?
RC: Oh, gosh, no, no. It was almost like summertime in comparison. No, it was
much better.
5
LC: Okay.
6
RC: Much better. I had a couple of little things happen to me while I was there.
7
I was now totally back into the battalion as the S-2, but my company commander called
8
me, my old company commander called me and asked me if I would help him out and go
9
over to Pusan. Now Masan, you probably have a map. So you know the approximate
10
locations.
11
LC: Yes, they’re not—well, I mean, there is some distance between them.
12
RC: Yes, yes, you have to travel by road.
13
LC: Sure, what, sixty miles or maybe a little more?
14
RC: Something like that, fifty, sixty miles. But anyway, he asked me if I would
15
go get his company some beer for the troops because the Army had depots there and the
16
Marines didn’t have any. So I said, “Gladly, I’ll be glad to do it.” So I got my old
17
runner, I think I told you—did I tell you about Wasselcek?
18
LC: Yes, I think so.
19
RC: Okay.
20
LC: He was the jack of all trades.
21
RC: Yeah. So I took Wasselcek with me. I took the company commander’s
22
trailer and his jeep and took off for Masan. I got in Masan and I got there around
23
noontime. No, it was later than that, really, because I was not able to get over to—I was
24
trying to locate where the dumps were and so on. So I went first to the—finally located
25
one dump and went to it. The Army guy that was there said I ordered a beer and you had
26
to pay for it. I ordered a trailer load of beer and the Army guy said, “That’s a Marine
27
vehicle. Are you a Marine?” I said, “Yes, I am.” He said, “Well, we’re not authorized
28
to supply you Marines.” So I said, “Oh, okay.” So I left and was trying to figure out,
29
trying to get some Army clothes so that I could go back to the dump and claim to be a
30
soldier. I talked to Wasselcek about this and he got me, he very graciously went out and
31
found me a cap and a jacket, a utility type jacket. I don’t know where he got it, I never
166
1
asked him. I put that on, and by now, it was late. So I said, “We’ll go over to this”—
2
they had some LSTs there, American LSTs that they’d set up as temporary hotels, if you
3
will, or places for people. They had a lot of incoming replacements and so on. So they
4
put them all up there. So we got a place on the LSTs, went to bed and went to sleep that
5
night. The next morning, well, I got up and I contacted Wasselcek and I said, “Go get the
6
jeep and the trailer.” He came back and he says, “Lieutenant,” he says, “I hate to tell you
7
this, but somebody’s stolen our jeep and our trailer.” I said, “Woe is me. What do I do?”
8
Wasselcek says, “Lieutenant, don’t worry about it.” He said, “I’ll be back.” He came
9
back with, what do you call these mid-sized vehicles that are equal now, oh, I can’t
10
remember what we called them then, but they were equal to what your current Humvee.
11
He came back with an Army vehicle. I now had an Army vehicle and an Army hat and
12
he also got me a great big silver, someplace, silver first lieutenant’s bars. I was still a
13
second lieutenant. The Army wore large bars. Marines wore the small ones. So he got
14
me those and I went back to the same supply dump, fortunately a different guy was there
15
and represented myself as a member of the Army and loaded the vehicle up with beer and
16
went back to Masan. Thanks to Wasselcek.
17
LC: He was a mover and a shaker.
18
RC: He was. He was. That is a true story.
19
LC: That’s amazing.
20
RC: It sounds like something that I made up, but it is a true story.
21
LC: Never got in trouble for the missing jeep?
22
RC: No.
23
LC: Since you came back with something bigger.
24
RC: No, no.
25
LC: Upgrade.
26
RC: The company commander upgraded to the larger vehicle. Oh, yes, my
27
grandfather was a farmer who made his own wine and beer. He sent me a bottle of wine,
28
I remember, which I was treasuring. I was going to have a little party with some of my
29
friends and so on. When I came back, I had left it on my bunk in our tent at Masan.
30
When I came back, it was gone. I tracked that down and I found out that the battalion
31
chaplain, a Lutheran, had taken my wine and held communion with it.
167
1
LC: And didn’t tell you?
2
RC: Didn’t tell me until I got back. So I guess it was okay. I guess the good
3
Lord forgave him for that because he gave communion, even though he had conducted
4
communion with stolen wine.
5
LC: There’s a major moral dilemma there.
6
RC: Yeah, that’s right.
7
LC: We’ll let others ponder the true meaning of that.
8
RC: Yeah. Well, it’s interesting because little things like that happened that
9
10
always stick in your mind.
LC: Well, sure, oh yeah, yeah. Well, when you, I should’ve asked this before,
11
when you came back with the beer in essentially the Humvee, the big rig, I bet the guys
12
were happy.
13
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yeah. Well, this was right around New Years.
14
LC: Oh, really? Oh yeah, it would’ve been then.
15
RC: Yeah, it was Christmas/New Years time because we’d already gotten our
16
Christmas packages. They’d been holding those. That’s one of the packages that my
17
wine was in. So I brought the beer back and it was the company commander’s intent
18
obviously to have a little New Year’s party. That’s what they did. So they had their little
19
get together with the beer that we had gotten.
20
21
LC: Aside from that party, in general, what was the mood up there among the
Marines?
22
RC: Well, they were ready to go again.
23
LC: As usual?
24
RC: Yeah. They wanted to get back with it. They were quite perturbed because
25
it was touted as a retreat. The Marines didn’t like that and they were ready to get back to
26
war. But of course, when we first got there, we obviously weren’t in any condition to go
27
into active attack. We were pretty well worn out, if you will, or decimated. We got a lot
28
of replacements and reequipped, got rifles, those that had lost any weapons or anything,
29
picked up other weapons. So we in essence reformed.
30
31
LC: Was there any hard going between the guys who had actually been up at
Koto-ri and the reservoir and the replacements who were coming in?
168
1
RC: No, no, no, gosh no. I’m glad to get them. Obviously the replacements,
2
unfortunately, the replacements that we’d received up at the reservoir, we lost many of
3
them right away as I told you once before. But, no, they were welcomed.
4
LC: Was part of what the rehabilitation period that you had here was part of what
5
you wanted to do was to get across to these guys what it was they were likely to face so
6
that they would have better information?
7
8
9
10
11
RC: Oh, obviously yes, yeah. That’s all part of their training process. You’re
preparing for them for what was to come.
LC: Was that actually organized or does it happen on an ad hoc basis in a
situation like this?
RC: No, it was organized. It was organized. Yeah, it was organized. The
12
companies immediately went back into—as soon as they got the replacements and got
13
their equipment together, they went back into training.
14
LC: Wow, I mean, that’s tough.
15
RC: Yeah, it was. It was, but you have to do it because we didn’t know whether
16
the situation was going to deteriorate into another Pusan perimeter. So we had to get
17
ready as quickly as possible. So there wasn’t much time for just relaxing.
18
19
LC: Of course, I mean, the situation is that you’re at the bottom of the peninsula,
essentially.
20
RC: Right.
21
LC: The enemy personnel have crossed the 38th Parallel, obviously.
22
RC: That’s right. The Army on the western side had withdrawn down as far, I
23
24
25
think probably well south of Seoul.
LC: This is, I mean, essentially in strategic terms a dangerous position to be in on
the end of the peninsula.
26
RC: Absolutely. It’s a replay of the start of the war back in August.
27
LC: Yeah, yeah. Everyone must have known that a march back up the peninsula
28
29
30
was going to be on the cards.
RC: That’s right and probably be much more difficult than it had been previously
because we were now facing hordes of Chinese and we knew that. The North Koreans
169
1
were kind of discounted at this time. We didn’t even know if they had an army. We
2
were facing a major power. We were facing China now.
3
4
LC: Yeah. As too, were you trying to participate in getting a sense of the order
of battle?
5
RC: Oh, obviously, yes, yes.
6
LC: What kinds of things were you involved in during this period, you personally
7
8
9
10
as S-2?
RC: Well, what I was doing obviously is, I got a couple of replacements in my S2 section. I was trying to get myself up to speed, if you will, on the total activity
throughout Korea where we stood. That was part of my job.
11
LC: Right.
12
RC: I’m trying to, right now, I’m trying to remember the name of the general
13
who took over the 8th Army. He was a paratrooper.
14
LC: Ridgway?
15
RC: Ridgway, Matthew Ridgway.
16
LC: Yes, sir.
17
RC: We, as I said, my particular job was to try to get orders of battle and troop
18
displacements and so on together. We were getting ready to launch out in the attack. We
19
were designated to attack up toward, up the middle of Korea. We were no longer on the
20
east or west coast. We’re kind of in the middle. I was putting, a little vignette, I was
21
putting this map together. I was working on a map in the tent we’d set up just before we
22
were ready to go, battalion headquarters. Somebody tapped me on the shoulder and I
23
turned around and it was General Ridgway. He asked me to brief him from what I knew
24
about it and I briefed him. I was quite impressed with him. He was quite a soldier. He
25
was a good looking guy. He had two grenades hung on him and a sharp uniform, very
26
down-to-earth type guy.
27
28
LC: Now this was sort of completely extemporaneous? I mean, you had no idea
this was coming up?
29
RC: I had no idea he was even in the area.
30
LC: Wow. So he must’ve just—
31
RC: He overwhelmed me.
170
1
LC: Yes, sir. Well, these things happen to you.
2
RC: Yeah. That was kind of my career. I was kind of in the wrong place or right
3
place at the wrong time or vice versa.
4
5
LC: Well, you said that General Ridgway was an impressive figure. How much
time did you spend with him?
6
RC: Oh, probably fifteen minutes, twenty minutes is all.
7
LC: Can you remember the kinds of key data points that you wanted to get across
8
to him?
9
RC: Well, I wanted to get across what the Marines were scheduled to do and he
10
was very interested in that. I’m sure he already knew, being the Army commander. So
11
I’m certain he already knew what we were supposed to do, but he was kind of, if you
12
will, just talking to the troops. I was one of his troops. So he very graciously listened to
13
what I had to say and asked me a couple of questions. That impressed me, of course, that
14
a man of his position would take that much time with a lowly second lieutenant. So
15
that’s what impressed me more than anything else, I think, because he was doing what a
16
true leader is supposed to do.
17
LC: Get out there and show the flag and—
18
RC: Show the flag and instill some confidence in us.
19
LC: Yes, sir.
20
RC: So that was my meeting with him. We launched off the next day in the
21
attack. We moved pretty rapidly. About three days into the attack, I was reassigned. I
22
had been trying to get out of the battalion headquarters ever since I’d been in it. They
23
reassigned me, they said, “Well, you’re not going back to a rifle platoon, but we’re going
24
to put you in Weapons Company.” Weapons Company was an old friend of mine who
25
had been the supporting arms coordinator up at Hagaru, Major Simmons, Edwin
26
Simmons. You’ve probably heard of him.
27
LC: Yes, I’ve heard of his name, yeah.
28
RC: He was the historian for the—he’s quite a historian, written quite a few
29
30
books.
LC: Yes, sir.
171
1
RC: Ed Simmons wanted me, he knew me from being in the battalion
2
headquarters up at Hagaru and in fact had suggested that I take a couple of the blocking
3
exits and the counterattacks that we had at Hagaru, as I told you. So he wanted me as his
4
machinegun platoon leader in Weapons Company. He was now, well, he was still
5
Weapons Company commander. So I was reassigned to the machinegun platoon, heavy
6
machinegun platoon.
7
LC: What kind of guns are we talking about?
8
RC: Six, we had six M-19, 1917, A-4 heavy machineguns, water-cooled.
9
LC: Water-cooled, okay. So if you can, for someone who doesn’t know what it
10
takes to operate one or what it took at that time to operate one of these guns, how many
11
men were needed per gun?
12
13
RC: Well, you had a gunner, an assistant gunner and I believe it was, if I recall,
about four ammo carriers.
14
LC: The ammo carriers are assigned to, what, they have cans?
15
RC: They have cans of ammo that they carried.
16
LC: Okay. That weighed about how much, any idea?
17
RC: Twenty-five, thirty pounds. They carried two of them.
18
LC: Right, wow. I mean, this is hard work carrying, dragging these around.
19
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah, and particularly in the hills of Korea it was hard work.
20
LC: Yes, sir, up and down and up and down. As you say, it was a water-cooled
21
22
gun.
RC: Yeah, we had three sections of these, two guns per section. So that’s a total
23
of six guns in my platoon. What we did with those is the water-cools were basically
24
designed for long-range fire and also for defense. When you set up a final protective line,
25
you position these guns so that they crisscross across your front.
26
LC: So that their fields of fire intersect.
27
RC: That’s right. They intersect and in essence, you have a wall of machinegun
28
fire in front of your unit.
29
LC: Any idea how many rounds a minute these would shoot?
30
RC: Oh, I don’t remember now.
31
LC: A lot.
172
1
RC: A lot, yeah. I don’t really remember. This was one of the things that we
2
studied in our basic school when we went through our primary training. That was by
3
now a couple of years old for me.
4
LC: Right, you had learned a lot.
5
RC: Yeah. I had learned a lot in between.
6
LC: A lot of on the job training since then.
7
RC: Yeah, that’s right. That’s right. They were quite heavy in fire. I know at
8
Hagaru, the heavies, they had to fire them every few minutes to keep them from freezing
9
up because water-cooled. So they heated the guns. As a matter of fact, they wore out
10
quite a few barrels up there from firing them so much. Obviously with the way the
11
Chinese attacked all the time, they were constantly firing all during the night.
12
13
LC: Well, and these would be invaluable when you’re meeting the number of
enemy that we’re talking about.
14
RC: Absolutely. Yeah, that’s right, that’s right.
15
LC: So there would be one weapons company per battalion, is that accurate?
16
RC: One weapons company per battalion, that’s right.
17
LC: Okay. What did you think about this assignment? Was this something that
18
19
you could get your teeth into?
RC: Oh, yes. I liked it. I was a little disappointed that I didn’t get back to the
20
rifle platoon and particularly my own platoon, but of course, I had lost a lot of my
21
original people, including my platoon sergeant, Jerry Tillman.
22
LC: Yes, yes.
23
RC: That was quite a blow to me, but I did want to get back to my company at
24
least. But the Weapons Company was second best and I grew to like the men there.
25
They were Marines and they performed quite well. We proceeded, continued in the
26
attack. Of course, what we usually did in the attack is we assigned a section to each of
27
the three rifle companies, a section of heavies because in setting up their bases of fire, a
28
lot of times if you had a company attack, the company commander would utilize the
29
heavies in the base of fire because they provided high sustained rate of fire and they were
30
a good long distance. Their tripod was such that you could pretty well zero in on targets
31
and provide a lot of fire. So they were very valuable weapons in the attack.
173
1
LC: So as commander, your men might be spread out across quite an area.
2
RC: That’s right. They’d be spread out across the battalion area. I usually went
3
with, I had a platoon sergeant, obviously, and a guide. I would assign one of them to a
4
section and I would go with one section usually.
5
LC: Did you rotate?
6
RC: Oh, yes. On the day that I was wounded, I had assigned myself to the Item
7
Company. I think, I don’t know whether I told you about, I know I did, I told you about
8
Item Company where I went out and saw this good friend of mine who was killed in the
9
foxhole with the mortar.
10
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
11
RC: An Item Company commander was a Marine called—his nickname was
12
Bull, Bull Fisher. He was a highly decorated Navy Cross Marine, a blood-and-guts type
13
guy. The day that I was wounded was on a high hill. As I recall, it was 550, Hill 550 or
14
thereabouts. My machinegun section was assigned to that company. We had a
15
machinegun section assigned to them, of course, but they were in the attack. They got
16
into a heavy firefight on top of the hill. They got that hill and they were trying to
17
advance to the next ridgeline. The Chinese had dug in pretty well on that ridgeline. So it
18
was a heavy firefight back and forth. My machineguns were instrumental and successful
19
in that attack because of their high sustained rate and long range. I had some pretty good
20
guys, pretty highly experienced. So we were moving, in the process of the attack, we
21
were moving to the top of the hill when I was moving with two of my men to reconnoiter
22
our position where I put my guns when we were hit, a mortar landed right among us, a
23
mortar round, blew me off of the ridge that I was on and killed the other two men.
24
LC: How far away had you been from them?
25
RC: Well, probably five, ten yards.
26
LC: Okay. Sir, you were seriously wounded, is that right?
27
RC: No, I wasn’t seriously wounded. I wouldn’t call it seriously. I was
28
wounded. I did have one thing that really hurt more than anything else, I had shrapnel
29
pretty much all over. But the major thing was, when it blew me off the hill, my left wrist,
30
it temporarily knocked me unconscious, of course. I don’t remember flying through the
31
air, but I did because I lit down the hill. When I came to, I was down the hill and my left
174
1
arm was paining quite a bit. I looked down and my hand was bent all the way back to my
2
elbow. In other words, it was broken. My wrist was broken. I had taken shrapnel
3
through the wrist. That in essence was what caused me to have a rehabilitation, be
4
evacuated and rehabilitation because they couldn’t fix it there, they had to send me back
5
to the States to get it fixed.
6
LC: How did you—?
7
RC: After that—I’m kind of second guessing what your next question is—but I
8
got up and moved up to my section and set my section in position, stayed with the
9
section. We continued in the attack until we ran the Chinese off the next hill and then
10
Bull told me to get back to the aid station. So I walked back to the aid station and was
11
evacuated that night.
12
13
LC: So let me just clarify, did you bind up your wrist somehow or try to
immobilize it or—?
14
RC: Yeah. Well, I couldn’t immobilize it. It was already immobilized.
15
LC: Stuff it in your shirt or I don’t know how you would—
16
RC: Well, I think I had a handkerchief in my pocket and I just tied it around—I
17
had one of the guys tie it around my wrist. We stayed there until we neutralized the
18
Chinese on the other hill with our machineguns because, unfortunately, they were calling
19
in mortars, but the main thing that did it I was later told was our machineguns.
20
21
LC: Of course, you had been responsible for their emplacement and selecting the
sight from which they would fire. So you then that night had to walk back?
22
RC: Then that late afternoon, I walked back to the aid station.
23
LC: About how far, any idea?
24
RC: Oh, probably five hundred, a thousand yards, off the top of the hill and down
25
the valleys. I remember, I was a little concerned that there might be some straggling
26
enemy and I was by myself.
27
LC: Which hand are we talking about that was injured?
28
RC: Left hand.
29
LC: Left hand.
30
RC: I still had my right hand. So I was okay.
31
LC: What did you have in the way of weaponry?
175
1
RC: I had a .45 and I also had a Carbine at that time.
2
LC: Okay. So you could still fire.
3
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah. I was still ready to protect myself.
4
LC: Okay. Did you come across any sign of enemy stragglers?
5
RC: No, no, fortunately I didn’t.
6
LC: Okay. What was the aid station like? Can you describe it? I mean, was
7
there just one physician there or just corpsmen or—?
8
9
10
RC: Yeah. No, there were a couple of doctors there, a couple of doctors and
there were corpsmen that were attending and then some Marines from the medical
battalion. We have a medical battalion.
11
LC: Yes, sir. What’d they have to say about your hand?
12
RC: Well, I said, “How can you fix it, Doc?” and he says, “We can’t fix that here
13
and we can’t fix it. You’re going back to the States.”
14
LC: Sir, how did that make you feel?
15
RC: Disappointed.
16
LC: You wanted to stay in, obviously.
17
RC: Well, I think all Marines do. I had my troops to be concerned about and that
18
was my job. So what do you do?
19
20
LC: What about your other shrapnel wounds? Were they able to address those
there?
21
RC: Yes, yes, those were fine.
22
LC: Okay. So they cleaned you up, it sounds like.
23
RC: Cleaned me up and that night, put me on an ambulance and we drove back to
24
Masan. There I went aboard a hospital ship.
25
LC: Which one, do you know?
26
RC: I think it was the Haven. I’m not sure. That’s foggy.
27
LC: Okay. Were they giving you stuff for the pain or—?
28
RC: Yes, oh, yes.
29
LC: Yeah, okay.
30
RC: Yeah, quite a bit. It was pretty bad pain by this time because the wrist was
31
still bent back. Aboard the hospital ship, they were able to straighten the wrist out, but
176
1
they weren’t able to fix everything. The shrapnel went through the thing on your arm
2
called the snuff box and wiped out some of my bones there. They did an amazing job of
3
fixing me up because I play a fair game of golf now and that takes a left hand.
4
LC: That’s incredible.
5
RC: Yeah. They did a good job. But you know, if you were to go down to—
6
now, if you were to go down, for example, to Brooke Medical Center and see some of the
7
miracles that they’re performing down there, absolutely amazing what they can do
8
medically to fix you.
9
LC: You mean the technology?
10
RC: The technology and it’s come such a long way since those days.
11
LC: Sounds like, though, those guys on the ship who did the initial operation set
12
you up pretty well.
13
RC: They were pretty good.
14
LC: Yeah.
15
RC: They really were.
16
LC: How long were you on the ship? Do you know?
17
RC: About a week. Then they took me to Yokosuka.
18
LC: Now did the Haven go to Yokosuka, the entire ship or were you placed on
19
another ship?
20
RC: I’ll tell you the truth, I don’t really remember.
21
LC: Okay. But there you are at Yokosuka and obviously there’s a hospital
22
23
facility there.
RC: Yeah, I stayed there. They tried to rehab me there because they were trying
24
to put as many people back into the campaign as they could. They tried to rehab me
25
there, but they couldn’t do it. So they sent me home.
26
LC: Were they explaining to you what the situation was in terms of the damage
27
that had been done? I mean, now of course, when you go in and see a doctor, you want
28
and expect them to tell you everything that’s happening. The patient wants information.
29
RC: No, they didn’t tell me much.
30
LC: This was a different era.
177
1
2
3
4
5
RC: Yeah, they didn’t tell me much. No. You were kind of with the system,
whatever the system produced, why that’s what you got.
LC: So, of course, I’m sure finding out that you had to go back to the U.S. for
more treatment must’ve again been an upsetting thing.
RC: Well, that’s true because I was now out of the fight for who knew how long
6
at that time. So they sent me to Mare Island. There they operated on me a couple of
7
times and got me finally into a long-term cast. I wore a cast for about two months. Then
8
they sent me from Mare Island back to Great Lakes. Their policy was to send you as
9
close to your home as you could. At that time, my home was in Columbus, Ohio.
10
LC: So they got you to Chicago.
11
RC: So they got me to Great Lakes. From Great Lakes, they worked on you
12
there and gave you rehabilitation. Then they gave you a thirty-day leave.
13
LC: So you went home?
14
RC: I went home.
15
LC: How were things at home, had the family been notified about what was
16
17
18
going on?
RC: Oh, yes, about being wounded and so on. Yeah. So I spent thirty days at
home. I did pick up, when I left Mare Island, did I tell you about my car?
19
LC: Yes, you did. You told me that you had a car that you had left there.
20
RC: Okay. Well, I drove the car across to Columbus.
21
LC: No kidding?
22
RC: Yeah, one armed. It had an automatic transmission, so I was okay.
23
LC: You were in good shape there.
24
RC: Yeah.
25
LC: Sir, how much difficulty, if any, did you have with kind of coping with this
26
injury? I mean, this, although not as severe of course as some men and certainly I know
27
you’re aware of that, but this was a pretty serious injury. Did you have any difficulty
28
coping with the long rehab?
29
30
RC: No. The doctors I think did a good job. They said, “We’ll fix you up and
you’ll be as good as new.” So that was good enough for me.
178
1
2
LC: So after the thirty-day leave, which I presume you used to put a few more
miles on the car.
3
4
RC: Yeah. Yeah, then I was reassigned. I was reassigned to Parris Island.
You’re familiar with Parris Island.
5
LC: Yes, the huge—
6
RC: Where boot camp is.
7
LC: Yeah, the huge training facility on the East Coast.
8
RC: Right.
9
LC: What was your position going to be there?
10
11
RC: I was what they called at that time a platoon commander. Really I had a
company. I was assigned as a company officer. I had a company of recruits.
12
LC: You were meant to get them into shape?
13
RC: Well, supervise the DIs basically is what the officers did. The drill
14
instructors were the people that actually did the hard work. Our assignment was to be
15
certain that the drill instructors didn’t get out of hand with the training.
16
17
LC: By getting out of hand, meaning going over, like over the top beyond what
they should have?
18
RC: That’s right. That’s right. Marines have a tendency to do that.
19
LC: Did you have particularly enthusiastic DIs down there that you needed to
20
keep an eye on?
21
22
RC: Well, I hadn’t ever come across a DI that wasn’t enthusiastic, to tell you the
truth.
23
LC: Yes, sir.
24
RC: I didn’t know of any that were lethargic about their duties. They were pretty
25
serious guys. I think I probably mentioned to you, if my drill instructor walked into the
26
room now and I saw him, I would stand at attention, I think, to this day.
27
LC: Yes, sir.
28
RC: Yeah, yeah.
29
LC: They apparently do have an impact.
30
RC: They have quite an impact. They’re the heroes of the Marine Corps, to tell
31
you the truth.
179
1
2
LC: Were there, on a more serious note, were there recruits who simply could not
make the grade and—?
3
RC: Oh, yes, yes.
4
LC: What happens to those guys?
5
RC: They’re discharged. They discharge them. Some of them, those that are
6
discharged because of attitude problems, they’re kind of—well, they’re handled, but
7
they’re not handled as well as the people that can’t make it physically. There are people
8
that just can’t cut it getting through physically. There are those that have bad attitudes. I
9
don’t know what they’re doing now, but in those days, they didn’t treat those that had bad
10
attitudes very well.
11
LC: Now by bad attitudes, do you mean not accepting the discipline and—?
12
RC: Not accepting it.
13
LC: Okay.
14
RC: There are those that just couldn’t accept it. Not very many, but there were
15
some, there were some. So they just gave up if you will.
16
LC: Yes.
17
RC: I don’t want to be a Marine.
18
LC: I’m sure that it can cut two different ways. You can get either resistance and
19
recalcitrance or people who just kind of fold up.
20
RC: That’s right. That’s right. You sure can.
21
LC: You perhaps don’t want either of those in the Marines.
22
RC: No, you don’t. You don’t. They weed them out. They do a good job. Now
23
as compared to those days, in those days, they didn’t have what they call the fat man
24
platoon.
25
LC: Which is—? What does that mean?
26
RC: Fat man are those individuals that are not able to physically cut the program
27
because of their weight or their strength. They put them in a fat man platoon and try to
28
rehabilitate them, try to work them, thin them out and make them stronger so that they
29
can make it through the normal training. They’re special units.
30
31
LC: Now were you saying that that happens now or that doesn’t happen
anymore?
180
1
RC: It happens now.
2
LC: Oh, okay. But back in 1951, that—
3
RC: No, ‘40s, ’46.
4
LC: Right, but when you were at—
5
RC: Oh, ’51, yeah, okay.
6
LC: Yeah, when you were at Parris Island. That was not happening.
7
RC: That’s right.
8
LC: They would just be gone. Okay. Did the work there, did it satisfy you or did
9
you have other things in mind?
10
RC: Well, it was a job. I was a Marine.
11
LC: Yes, sir. That’s what they needed you for, that right there.
12
RC: Yeah. I wasn’t particularly happy with it because in essence, I did not have
13
direct contact with the troops. All I had was the DIs. Most of them were highly
14
experienced Marines.
15
LC: Some of them maybe had Korean experience?
16
RC: Oh, yeah, Korean, World War II.
17
LC: Sure.
18
RC: Yeah, yeah. Most of them did, as a matter of fact.
19
LC: During this time, sir, did you find out about having been awarded another
20
medal for your actions in Korea?
21
RC: No. I didn’t find out about that until I went to flight training.
22
LC: Okay, so a little bit later.
23
RC: Yeah.
24
LC: Okay. This position at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, which is I assume
25
where you were at Parris Island, did you have an opportunity to kind of make plans about
26
your future assignments or to talk with people about what might be available?
27
RC: Well, I was still hoping. I had put in for flight training just prior to the time
28
we went up to the reservoir. Obviously that feeling was reinforced while I was up at the
29
reservoir because I’d see these guys come in and fly the airplanes and then they’d go
30
back to Japan that night. I said, “Boy, that’s a pretty nice life.” I’m exposed to combat
181
1
for a couple of hours and then I’m back in to nice digs and good chow and everything
2
that night, which is a good deal.
3
LC: Had you been much interested in flight training before that?
4
RC: Oh, yes, yes. I think I told you—
5
LC: You told me a little bit about it, yeah.
6
RC: Well, when I first went into the service back in ’45, I went into the V-5
7
Program. So I wanted to be a Marine aviator. So I put in for that, let’s see, this is ’51
8
now, so six years before that. So I was always interested in aviation. I was interested
9
while I was at Parris Island as to what the status of my application was to get into flight
10
training.
11
LC: How did you follow it up?
12
RC: Well, I made several calls to headquarters. They had a board up there that
13
they selected people for it. They said, “Your case is in consideration now.” So when I
14
received the orders, I was quite elated. I was very happy with it.
15
LC: I bet you were.
16
RC: Yeah, I was.
17
LC: Had you been concerned that the injuries that you had sustained might keep
18
19
you out?
RC: Yes I was because I had been, when I went into the V-5 Program, I think I—
20
this will come out subsequently I guess—when I went in the V-5 Program, I was
21
concerned that I was going to make it physically because I’d been injured on the
22
wrestling team at my high school.
23
LC: Yes.
24
RC: And had injured a kidney.
25
LC: Yeah, you’ve mentioned that, yeah.
26
RC: I was concerned that they would bring that up. But they gave me a pretty
27
thorough physical. They gave me a thumbs up. So I was quite happy with that. So I was
28
concerned, yes.
29
LC: Were you concerned about the wrist issue?
30
RC: No. By this time, I was pretty well able to handle it. It was some eight
31
months later.
182
1
LC: You had good movement and feeling?
2
RC: I had good movement and I didn’t have as much strength in that hand and
3
still don’t, but it was mobile. So I wasn’t that concerned about that. As a matter of fact, I
4
talked as little as I could about it.
5
LC: I’ll bet that—
6
RC: I didn’t complain with it.
7
LC: That was probably a good strategy.
8
RC: Yeah, I didn’t complain with it.
9
LC: Well, when did those orders for flight training come through?
10
RC: As I recall, in November.
11
LC: Of 1951. That would have you reporting where to start off?
12
RC: Pensacola. Pensacola, Florida.
13
LC: So you would’ve gone there in early 1952, does that sound right?
14
RC: No, ’51. Wait a minute—yeah, I was only at Parris Island about two
15
months.
16
LC: Oh, is that right?
17
RC: Yeah, just a short time.
18
LC: Oh, I see, okay, rather than the full, okay so—
19
RC: No, I didn’t make a full tour.
20
LC: I understand. So the end of 1951, you were in Pensacola and, sir, if you can,
21
give me a brief overview of what the flight training program involved. What did they
22
take you through in the way of curriculum?
23
RC: Well, the first part of it was called preflight. In preflight, everybody went
24
into, all the candidates to become aviators, everybody went into the classroom. They
25
taught us subjects that were appropriate for aviation. They taught us navigation, weather,
26
flight, oh, what do you call it, requirements for flight and such things as flight
27
engineering. I recall, we had exams in each course. If you passed the exam in
28
navigation, navigation was kind of the key. You had to pass them all, but navigation was
29
the last one that they gave you. That was at the end of five weeks. If you failed that one,
30
then you were sent back to a fourteen week course.
31
LC: So that was kind of the make or break?
183
1
2
RC: That was the make or break. I had two friends, two good friends, one of
which was Hank Commiskey. Hank was the 1st Marine Medal of Honor winner in Korea.
3
LC: Yes, sir.
4
RC: The other was “E Square,” Ed Smith, E.E. Smith. We called him E Square.
5
We were in the class together. We had all been together in Korea. I passed it and they
6
didn’t. So that’s where we separated. I passed the five-week course.
7
LC: But for them, that meant they had to take the longer, more expanded course.
8
RC: They had to go back, they had to go back to a fourteen-week course. I went
9
10
on to flight training, to the actual—from there, I went out to flight training at, wait a
minute, let me think of the name of the field. Pace Field, I think it was.
11
LC: Was it still in Florida?
12
RC: Yeah, it’s still in Florida. I’ll think of it. But anyway, you would go out
13
there with your primary flight training, that’s where you got introduced to flying.
14
LC: Now what aircraft were they using?
15
RC: They were using the SNJ at that time.
16
LC: Can you describe it briefly for someone who might not know much about
17
that aircraft?
18
RC: Have you heard of a T-6 trainer?
19
LC: Yes.
20
RC: That’s what it is.
21
LC: Okay, it’s the—
22
RC: SNJ is a monoplane, lowing monoplane with a Pratt & Whitney engine on it,
23
two-place with a pilot in the front and the copilot in the back behind you like the old
24
World War I fighters, except it had a canopy on it. That’s what you soloed in.
25
LC: This is for you to get your initial sense of being airborne and you have—
26
RC: Well, you either made it there or you washed out. You were tested all the
27
way. At the end of A-6, I believe it was, you were tested. A-13 and the A-18 was your
28
solo.
29
LC: Did you have a single instructor in the plane with you the whole time?
30
RC: Yes, yes.
31
LC: Just one person?
184
1
RC: Yes.
2
LC: The same person the whole time?
3
RC: Same person.
4
LC: Who worked with you, sir?
5
RC: A Navy lieutenant. I had been selected for captain and made captain at that
6
time.
7
LC: Okay, wow.
8
RC: The sad thing about it was, this Navy lieutenant didn’t like Marines.
9
LC: That’s no good.
10
RC: No, he didn’t like Marines.
11
LC: So how did he make that clear to you?
12
RC: Well, he told me when he first started, and this might’ve been part of his
13
psychology, I don’t know, but he said, “I have never given a Marine an up.”
14
LC: By that he meant an approval?
15
RC: An approval. On these various stages that you went through, you had to
16
have a flight check.
17
LC: Yes, sir.
18
RC: He said he’d never given them and I was one of his students. See, I think he
19
20
had two or three students and I was the only Marine.
LC: Now when somebody says something like that to you, of course, you know,
21
you can have a number of reactions. One can have a number of reactions including, “Oh,
22
my God, I’m not going to be able to do this. There’s no way no matter what I do.”
23
RC: “I’ll show you.”
24
LC: Or yes, the other option.
25
RC: “I’ll show you,” that’s what I said.
26
LC: That’s where you come from, I’m sure.
27
RC: That’s right.
28
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
29
RC: He had to give me one. He did give me an up.
30
LC: Yes, sir. This, of course, takes place over many months as you’ve—
185
1
RC: No, actually, only as I said, in the various flights up to A-18 and then you go
2
on from there. The preliminary flights that you have, you have up to eighteen flights
3
before they declare you safe for solo. You fly with the instructor all the time up to then
4
and he’s giving you all the basics, take offs and landings and so on. Then on your
5
eighteenth flight, he takes you out to Pace, no Mile Square. Mile Square it is. It’s a big
6
field that’s a one mile square, no runways, just a grass field. You fly into there and you
7
land and then he climbs out and he says, “Take her around.” So you’re by yourself and
8
you go up and you come in and land and that’s your solo. From that time on, you’re
9
authorized to fly by yourself.
10
11
LC: Did you have to—well, let me ask you about your solo day. How did you
do?
12
RC: I did okay.
13
LC: Any problems?
14
RC: No problems, no problems. He tried to give me a down for crosswinds, but I
15
had become friends with a couple of other instructors, one of whom was a Navy guy and
16
I told him about my instructor. They went to the head man and they reassigned me to
17
anther instructor after my solo.
18
LC: Did that make life a little bit easier?
19
RC: Oh, yes, definitely. I didn’t have any—I wanted to strangle that guy about
20
half the time.
21
22
LC: I’ll bet you did. Sitting in the backseat, you probably had the opportunity,
but maybe not.
23
RC: No, I would be in the front once you soloed, he put you in the front.
24
LC: Okay, yeah, after solo.
25
RC: Yeah.
26
LC: Anyway, this kind of surly Navy lieutenant was out of your life after you
27
soloed.
28
RC: Thank goodness.
29
LC: Who would you work with then?
30
RC: A new instructor, they assigned you with a new instructor.
31
LC: Now was this fellow a Marine?
186
1
RC: No, he was Navy and he was good.
2
LC: Would you at this point, I mean, at what point would you start flying other
3
aircraft?
4
RC: Oh, not until you finished at Pensacola in those days. At Pensacola, you had
5
preliminary flight, which was up to solo and then you had formation flight. Then you had
6
instrument flight. Then you had tactics.
7
LC: Now can you quickly describe what formation flight was?
8
RC: Well, what they’d do is they take you up in a group of aircraft, initially just
9
two of you and you’d learn wing position. You’d fly wing on somebody and they’d fly
10
wing on you. You’d fly the lead and then you’d fly the number two and you’d cross
11
over. In those days at that stage, it’s precarious flying.
12
LC: I can only imagine.
13
RC: You’re kind of dangerous, you know.
14
LC: I can only imagine.
15
RC: The instructors would get, they were quite edgy at that point. But you had
16
all the way through flight training, you always had checks where’d you get an up or a
17
down. If you got two downs, then you’d go before a board. The board would decide
18
whether you were fit for aviation or not, interview you and go over your records and each
19
flight was graded.
20
LC: Wow.
21
RC: Every flight was graded. So they took your entire record and decided. I
22
never had to appear before a board.
23
LC: You got through with fewer than two downs.
24
RC: Oh, yeah.
25
LC: But you know, I’m certain that there must’ve been guys who—
26
RC: I got one down. I got a down in crosswind landing.
27
LC: Okay. How do you rectify that? Do you just work on it?
28
RC: Well, they give you a down and then they give you a recheck with another
29
30
instructor.
LC: I see. How did that recheck go for you?
187
1
RC: Good. Yeah, the instructor said, “You don’t have any trouble with
2
crosswind landings.” I must’ve got a guy on a bad—my instructor must’ve had a bad
3
day.
4
LC: Right, he was kind of taking it out on you.
5
RC: Yeah, yeah.
6
LC: What about instrument flight?
7
RC: No problem.
8
LC: Now this is essentially flying using only your—
9
RC: Instruments.
10
LC: Your guidance instruments.
11
RC: What they do, they put you under a hood, which is the bad part, really.
12
You’re in the front seat, but you’re under a hood. You have to fly down to a landing.
13
You have to make approaches. You fly a route, et cetera. It’s kind of—if you have any
14
tendency for claustrophobia, that’s when you get it.
15
LC: I’ll bet, among other things.
16
RC: Yeah, yeah.
17
LC: I mean, that’s got to be a little scary.
18
RC: Yeah.
19
LC: When you would fly, when you would do the instrument flying exercises,
20
would you have someone in the backseat?
21
RC: Oh, yes, your instructor was there. Well, you had to have because—
22
LC: He’s there in case there’s a problem.
23
RC: Well, not only that, but you’re occupying a portion of the sky. If there’s
24
anybody else that wants that portion, you’re going to collide. You know?
25
LC: So he’s looking out for those issues.
26
RC: So he’s looking out for other aircraft and so on, right.
27
LC: Okay. What about tactics training? Can you tell me what it was they were
28
trying to get across to you there?
29
RC: Well, basically rendezvous, you did rendezvous and you’re getting ready to
30
go aboard ship for your carrier qualifications. You did all types of maneuvers. You did
31
wingovers, Immelmanns, all types of combat maneuvers, Lufbery circles. They taught
188
1
you the basics of that. But one of the primary things that you were starting to concentrate
2
on was rendezvous and navigation for aboard ship because you had a board that you
3
carried that you would—and the ship would be moving when you’d take off from it and
4
you’d go out and fly and then you’d have to compute where, what headings and so on to
5
fly to re-rendezvous with the ship because you’d get out of sight of the ship. So there’s
6
kind of like a plotting board, if you will, we called it that you carried. That was part of
7
the tactics, too. So you’re really getting ready to go aboard ship and then you flew
8
aboard a carrier in your aircraft, in the SNJ at carrier qualifications.
9
LC: You would actually work off a carrier at some point?
10
11
RC: Oh, yeah, you took off. You had to have so many landings and takeoffs
from the carrier in order to get through. That was your final check in basic.
12
LC: Yeah, I would guess.
13
RC: Yeah, that was your final check. A lot of people wash out there. That’s
14
where a lot of them do because it’s kind of scary.
15
LC: Can you describe why it’s scary for some and why it might not have been so
16
scary for you? I mean, obviously you had confidence at this point, no question about
17
that.
18
RC: Yeah.
19
LC: But still scary.
20
RC: The main thing is that people just are not precise enough in their tactics that
21
they’re going to make it aboard ship. They don’t react quick enough because you have a
22
landing signal officer, a paddle, if you will, that’s on the deck.
23
LC: Yes, yeah.
24
RC: That tells you to add power, that you’re low, that you’re high, that you’re
25
angling and so on. If you don’t answer all those calls, you have the opportunity of
26
crashing into the fantail of the ship or of overshooting and going off the bow. It’s pretty
27
precise. You have to be very precise and you have to—the thing about carrier landings
28
that make it more frightening than anything else and particularly in your early stages of
29
your training is, in essence, you’re what we call “hanging on the prop.” You’re only
30
about two or three knots above stall speed. You’re very slow, extremely slow and cocked
189
1
up. That’s a very uncomfortable thing, position to be in. If you don’t react quick
2
enough, why, you’re dead.
3
LC: Right, the engine can cut.
4
RC: Well, no, the engine’s holding you up. What you do is you stall and you
5
spin in and you crash.
6
LC: The aircraft will just—you’ll lose control and it’ll just go right into the deck.
7
RC: That’s exactly right. That’s exactly right.
8
LC: Okay, okay.
9
RC: So the basic thing is there’s slow speed and at those slow speeds, you have
10
11
to be smooth and you have to do things right or you’re in trouble.
LC: Now just as a general question, did you take to this whole set of training
12
objectives that you had to meet, did you take to this kind of like a duck to water? You
13
were right there and it came to you easily?
14
15
16
RC: Being an aviator was very easy for me. I don’t know why. I was just
adapted to it I’m sure.
LC: Every time I interview a flyer, I ask him this because they talk about all of
17
these incredible, you know, pretty much incredible specific standards that you need to
18
meet. For some people, it just seems to come naturally. I wanted to see whether you
19
thought that’s where you were, it just kind of came to you?
20
RC: Well, I was because I can go back to the very time when I enlisted in the V-5
21
Program. I was just out of high school. I was seventeen years old and you had to pass at
22
that time a test, a written test called a college equivalency. I took the test with a student, I
23
remember, he was from either Cincinnati University or Louisville. I can’t remember
24
which one. I took it the same day he did and he was a senior. He failed the test and I
25
passed it.
26
LC: So he’d been through four years of college?
27
RC: Yeah, yeah, and I passed it. Then, of course, in flight training, as I went
28
through, I just didn’t have any trouble. Then in preflight, several of the guys that went
29
through navigation that failed the navigation had taken college courses in flying and so
30
on. They flunked it and I didn’t. So it was relatively easy for me, in other words.
190
1
2
LC: Yeah, it sounds like it was on both the abstract level and then the actual
flight training, but both of those you conquered it sounds like pretty swimmingly.
3
RC: Later on, oh, speaking of swimmingly, that was an interesting one. You had
4
to pass a test in flight training, in your early flight training where you swam with all your
5
flight suit and your boots and harness. You had to swim in the water and you had to
6
swim a mile.
7
LC: We’re talking about real heavy equipment.
8
RC: Yeah, not real heavy, but it’s not like being in a bathing suit. You had boots
9
on.
10
LC: Did they actually take you out in the ocean and drop you?
11
RC: No, no, you did this in a pool.
12
LC: Oh, okay. I was going to say—
13
RC: No, no, no, no. They didn’t take those kind of chances. They had you in a
14
pool and they had a lot of lifeguards there.
15
LC: Really?
16
RC: Yeah. They had another thing that they called a Dilbert Dunker.
17
LC: What was that? I’m afraid to ask.
18
RC: Yeah. Well, the Dilbert Dunker was you were up on a ramp above a pool, a
19
high ramp, about twenty-five, thirty feet high. You sat in a cockpit. They took you down
20
this ramp and as soon as you hit the water, you were strapped in just like you are in a
21
cockpit. You went down this ramp at a relatively high speed and hit the water. As soon
22
as you hit the water, the cockpit turned upside down. So you’re strapped in into this
23
contraption. You’re all strapped in and you have to get yourself out of the straps and
24
come to the surface.
25
LC: Upside down?
26
RC: Upside down. Well, a lot of people got disoriented and went the wrong way.
27
LC: Yeah.
28
RC: They had to pull them out and that’s one of the downs you got, you got a
29
down or an up in that because that was critical.
30
LC: Well, and that’s pretty scary.
31
RC: It is. It is. There were some people that washed out in that phase.
191
1
LC: Yes, I’ll bet there were.
2
RC: People that quit after that. They said, “I don’t want to do this.” But that’s
3
what happens when you go aboard ship, if you crash in the ship, usually the aircraft
4
will—as soon as you submerge, it’ll go down headfirst and you’re upside down. You
5
wind up being upside down. If you’re going to live, you have to get out of the cockpit
6
and that’s what they’re teaching you there.
7
LC: The seat, was it essentially—?
8
RC: Just like a cockpit.
9
LC: Just like a cockpit.
10
RC: Yeah, it was tight.
11
LC: Yeah, right.
12
RC: Confining and you had all the restraining straps and everything else and a
13
14
15
parachute. You had to get out of all those and come to the surface or you drowned.
LC: About how long would it take to get out of all that if you were moving well
and not injured?
16
RC: It took me about three seconds, I think.
17
LC: You were motivated.
18
RC: I think you are. I know I took longer than that, but that’s what it felt like.
19
LC: Sir, when did you get your designation as a naval aviator?
20
RC: Well, after you do your carrier quals in preflight, then you go to—in those
21
days, you went to Corpus Christi. You’re assigned to Corpus Christi and you’re assigned
22
to a tactical type aircraft.
23
LC: Which would in that day have been what aircraft?
24
RC: Well, in those days, they had phased out the Corsairs by now. So I was
25
assigned to ADs. The Marines didn’t have any ADs. They assigned you by service. In
26
other words, if you were going to be a Marine, they assigned you to aircraft that you
27
would fly in the Marine Corps, which makes sense.
28
LC: Sure.
29
RC: So I was assigned to ADs, which is an attack aircraft, a large attack aircraft
30
31
that was a successor to the Corsair.
LC: How much time did you spend with that aircraft?
192
1
RC: I got about 150 hours. That was all advanced type stuff. You did formation
2
flying. You did instrument flying. You didn’t do much instrument flying in that because
3
it was a single-seater. You couldn’t go under the hood.
4
LC: Okay.
5
RC: They gave you instrument flying in a different type aircraft there where you
6
had two people in the aircraft in what’s it called, an SNB.
7
LC: What did that stand for? Do you know? I can’t remember.
8
RC: SNB is, B is the Bomber and S (N) is Navy and S is the maker of the
9
aircraft, Sikorsky. So anyway, you fly, in that phase, you have about fifty hours that you
10
fly.
11
LC: Instrument training.
12
RC: Instrument training. That’s pretty important.
13
LC: Yes, sir.
14
RC: So you do all kinds—it’s total instrument, from takeoff on. You do
15
everything under a hood. The guy that’s sitting in the right seat is visual, of course, for
16
the same reasons, to look out for other aircraft and make certain you don’t crash. But the
17
rest of the program is done in your assigned aircraft. I was in ADs, which is a dive-
18
bomber. I had a strange incident in that, in seventy-degree bombing. We did forty-
19
degree bombing and seventy-degree bombing where you go into a forty-degree dive and
20
a seventy-degree dive. You have mini bombs and you bomb on a target. I made the
21
mistake one day. ADs had a large speed brake.
22
LC: What is that?
23
RC: That’s a big door that comes out on the bottom of the aircraft when you do a
24
high angle dive, a seventy-degree dive for instance. You have that there so you don’t get
25
too fast and exceed the limits of the aircraft.
26
LC: Okay. So it’s essentially kind of a brake.
27
RC: A brake, exactly what it is, it’s a speed brake. That’s the name of it. So it
28
keeps your speed down. You get up about 380 knots in the dive.
29
LC: From what height?
30
RC: We started at as I recall at eight thousand, I think, at a seventy-degree dive.
31
LC: Wow, wow.
193
1
RC: Yeah. You had to start your pullout at twenty-three hundred, as I remember,
2
with the speed brake. Well, the speed brake also gives you lift, if you will, because it’s
3
slowing you down. It is exactly what you say a speed brake and if you pull your brake at
4
the wrong time, your aircraft loses lift and it’s harder to pull out of the dive. In other
5
words, you scoop out of the dive.
6
LC: In other words, it takes longer to get out of the dive—
7
RC: Exactly, exactly.
8
LC: Therefore you need more room to get out of the dive, right?
9
RC: Exactly. I went out on one of our final checks on the seventy-degree dive
10
and I was the top bomber in the flight. I was going to be certain I got a bull’s-eye. So I
11
held it a little longer than I should and I pulled my speed brake too early. I went down
12
below the trees and they thought I crashed. When I got back, they had to in essence
13
strike the aircraft for anymore further flights until it went through a full check because I
14
popped rivets on the flight, on the aircraft and in essence, almost pulled the wings off.
15
16
LC: Could you tell this as you were coming up out of the trees that not only
would’ve been a close call, but that the aircraft—?
17
RC: Oh, I was blacked out.
18
LC: You blacked out?
19
RC: I was still functioning, but I couldn’t see.
20
LC: Okay, wow.
21
RC: That’s the first thing that happens to you, you black out. When you pull
22
excess Gs, you black out. You can’t see. You’re still functioning, but you can’t see. If
23
you continue to pull them, you’ll go unconscious because your brain drains its blood. I
24
know you understand with your education, you understand what a G means. If you pull
25
ten Gs, you’re pulling ten times your body weight.
26
LC: Right, and the gravity on that weight.
27
RC: And the gravity on down. What happens is your heart won’t pump blood to
28
your brain and you black out first. Then as it gets on up to—if you sustain it, then your
29
brain is depleted of enough oxygen to function and you go unconscious.
30
31
LC: Had they put you through—well, there’s several questions that come up.
Had they put you through excess G training?
194
1
RC: Yes, yes.
2
LC: Like putting you on that spinning—?
3
RC: Yeah, yeah, you have that.
4
LC: I can’t even remember the name of it now.
5
RC: Centrifuge.
6
LC: That’s it, sir, yes, exactly, centrifuge.
7
RC: Yeah, practiced on a centrifuge.
8
LC: So you had done that?
9
RC: Yes, yes, they do that.
10
LC: Okay, and what about—?
11
RC: I had a very high tolerance.
12
LC: Thank goodness.
13
RC: Well, that’s one of the things that—if you will notice, now like I’m 5’10”,
14
okay. If you’re say 6’5”, you have very low G tolerance as compared to somebody
15
shorter. The shorter you are, the less distance your heart has to pump blood to your brain.
16
So you can stand more Gs.
17
LC: This is just a function of biomechanics.
18
RC: Biomechanics, that’s right. So they never put a tall individual in those days
19
20
21
22
into fighters or into bombers. They put them in transports.
LC: What about the suit that you were wearing? Was it designed to keep blood
in the upper half of your body essentially?
RC: Right, right, the G-suit. Your G-suit was from your waist on down and it
23
tightened. It had bladders that inflated that put pressure on your internal circulatory
24
system to keep the blood from flowing down to your feet, which is where it goes.
25
LC: Right. Of course what you want is for it to be forced up.
26
RC: Forced up. Well, in essence, you block the flow from your lower body and it
27
stays in your upper body. So you have more G tolerance. That’s basically what it
28
amounts to.
29
30
LC: How much work in AD aircraft did you have to do with your feet and legs?
How much pedal work, anything?
195
1
RC: Oh, yes. ADs were very—they had a thirteen-foot prop, which was very
2
large for a prop. When you added power to take off, you had to have what you called
3
rudder trim, which you put trim into your flight controls even before you take off to help
4
you control the aircraft. Because if you don’t, I remember one incident with Hank
5
Commiskey out in Korea, we subsequently went back out to Korea as aviators. We were
6
doing carrier quals to go aboard an aircraft carrier in the AD. He cranked in the wrong
7
rudder pedal, and Hank was a guy about 6’4” and was very strong. He was from
8
Mississippi. He’s the guy that was the Medal of Honor winner.
9
LC: Yes, sir. Yes.
10
RC: He cranked in the wrong rudder trim and when he added power, he sat in one
11
position going around in circles because he couldn’t control it. Now there was a lot of
12
rudder requirement in the AD.
13
14
LC: Okay. So you couldn’t, I mean, obviously it would be important to maintain
feeling and control in your legs.
15
RC: Oh, yeah.
16
LC: That was where I was going.
17
RC: Absolutely
18
LC: So this was a delicate balance to try to get the suit right such that it would
19
sustain you in a high G episode, but also allow you to do what you needed to do.
20
RC: Well, that’s up to the engineers. The engineers do all that.
21
LC: Yeah, complicated work.
22
RC: It is.
23
LC: But an interesting feature of what it was that the fliers had to put up with,
24
too.
25
26
RC: That’s right, that’s right. Well, it was very important that you always
observed the rules. You always kept your flight suit on, your G-suit plugged in.
27
28
29
LC: Yes, sir. At Corpus Christi, you were there for how long working with the
ADs?
RC: Well, let’s see. I got my wings in ’53. No, I got my wings—I went through
30
flight training in thirteen months. So I went there in November and I got them in
31
December of ’52.
196
1
LC: So your wings came in December ’52.
2
RC: Right. Normal time to go through flight training is eighteen months.
3
LC: How did you scoot through so quickly?
4
RC: Well, I didn’t get any downs and didn’t have any re-flies or anything like
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
that.
LC: So you were, let’s say, above average in terms of how quickly you were
moving through basically because you didn’t have to repeat a lot of the stuff.
RC: No, I didn’t have to repeat—I actually didn’t have to repeat anything. One
flight is all.
LC: What kind of ceremony was there when you received your wings? Do you
remember much about that?
RC: You went to the commanding officer’s office and they pinned your wings on
13
you. In those days, you probably have heard the services, when you went back to your
14
unit, the guys in your flight would put you another set of wings on and would hit your
15
chest. You had little clips that—you had a post and then a clip that went over the post.
16
They’d usually hit the wings and they’d penetrate your skin. That was so you’d
17
remember. They quit that. The Marines did that to a point where the mommas
18
complained so much about their little boys getting hurt that they had to quit that, they had
19
to put a restriction on it.
20
LC: About when was that, do you know?
21
RC: Gosh, that’s been, as I recall, about ten years ago.
22
LC: Yeah, not too long.
23
RC: No, it hasn’t been that long.
24
LC: Yeah. Did you have a feeling that that was kind of overkill or unnecessary?
25
RC: No, absolutely not. No, I thought it was an honor.
26
LC: I meant kind of the complaints and the upset around that?
27
RC: Oh, yes, yes. Yeah, that was totally uncalled for by people that have no
28
business being, they really don’t have any business getting involved.
29
LC: Yes, sir, you know—
30
RC: Because it’s a psychological thing for the individual. It’s kind of an
31
accomplishment.
197
1
LC: And it’s a Marine Corps tradition, essentially.
2
RC: Yeah, that’s right, that’s right.
3
LC: So something that I would gather you were probably sorry to see go on some
4
5
6
level.
RC: I was. I was a little bit incensed at it, as a matter of fact. What are they
doing getting into our business?
7
LC: Yes, sir. I can believe it.
8
RC: That’s basically the way I felt about it. It really came up with the
9
10
Reconnaissance Marines. That’s where it came up and they’re really a breed apart.
They’re equivalent to the SEALs (Sea, Air, Land) in the Navy.
11
LC: But obviously airborne.
12
RC: Well, the Reconnaissance Marines do quite a bit. Most of them go through
13
Ranger, Army Ranger School. Then they go through Army Jump School at Ft. Bragg.
14
Then they go with the SEALs for swimming and then they’re designated as—they go
15
through a training in the Marine Corps. Then they’re designated as Reconnaissance
16
Marines and get a Reconnaissance insignia.
17
LC: Might some of those guys also go through flight training or is that unlikely?
18
RC: Kind of unlikely because most of them, they’re true grunts.
19
LC: They’re on the ground.
20
RC: Yeah. That’s what they want to do. They have to be highly motivated.
21
LC: Yes, sir.
22
RC: Yeah, later on in my career, I was—well, we may get to this, I don’t know,
23
but later on, I told the division commander, I was on a cross training tour after I became
24
an aviator, during the Dominican Republic thing, as you recall that.
25
LC: Yes, sir.
26
RC: I was given orders to go back to aviation. Because I was assigned to the 2nd
27
Marine Division, I was given orders to go back to aviation after a year. The division
28
commander was a very fine gentleman. He called me in and said, “Well, I understand
29
you’re going to leave us. What do I have to do to get you to stay?” I said, “Give me the
30
reconnaissance battalion.” He said, “Well, I might consider that.” I said, “No, sir, I’ve
31
got to get back to aviation because I’m an aviator.”
198
1
LC: So you did have that discussion, though?
2
RC: Oh, yeah, that was a true discussion.
3
LC: Yes, sir, I’ll bet it was. But you wanted aviation?
4
RC: I wanted to—well, I knew that I was going to get a squadron. I was up to the
5
point where I was eligible for squadron command and that was important to me.
6
LC: Yes, sir.
7
RC: More important than just, I won’t say just being a Reconnaissance Marine
8
because that’s quite an honor, but aviation came first. That was really—I was a Marine
9
aviator.
10
LC: Yes, sir. Well, sir, let’s take a break there.
11
RC: Okay.
199
Interview with Richard Carey Session [5] of [16] November 8, 2005 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey of the
3
U.S. Marine Corps. Today is the eighth of November 2005. I am on the campus of Texas
4
Tech in the Special Collections Building. The general is speaking by telephone from his
5
home, which is also here in Texas. General, last time we spoke, you described the details
6
leading up to and culminating in your receipt of your flight wings, I think in December
7
1952 you mentioned.
8
Richard Carey: Yes.
9
LC: Could you tell us what your assignment, your first assignments were as a
10
naval aviator?
11
RC: Well, the first place I went was to, I was transferred out to El Toro,
12
California, to the Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, California, and assigned to the 3rd
13
Marine Aircraft Wing and assigned to an organization that was a training organization for
14
people going over, for pilots and crewman to go over to Korea. So I was assigned there
15
and was taken back through the syllabus to prepare us for combat in Korea.
16
LC: To prepare yourself or—?
17
RC: Well, to prepare myself first, to learn the syllabus that people went through
18
and then they were going to keep me there as an instructor.
19
LC: I see. What did the syllabus look like? Were there specific elements that—?
20
RC: Yes, mostly dive-bombing. Close air support, principally, because the
21
Marines were primarily dedicated, except for those that were assigned to Air Force units,
22
some of them were assigned to Air Force units, which were in jets. We were assigned to
23
prop aircraft. Our particular squadron that we were in had Corsairs and the AD-
24
Skyraider. So we were taken though that syllabus, which as I said, consisted mostly of
25
close air support tactics. You worked constantly on your bombing capability and the
26
tactics that you use in providing close air support.
27
28
LC: Now of the two aircraft that you mentioned, I assume that you probably flew
both the Corsairs and the Skyraiders.
200
1
RC: No, the Corsairs, they were phasing them out and I didn’t fly the Corsair. I
2
flew the Skyraider. They were phasing them out just as I got there. They still had some
3
in Korea. They still had some Corsairs. They had one squadron that had them and I was
4
later assigned to that squadron, as a matter of fact.
5
LC: Oh, is that right?
6
RC: Yes. But anyway, I flew principally the AD-Skyraider. I did fly some jets.
7
8
9
10
11
I did fly some F-9 jets.
LC: Well, let me ask you about the actual flight capabilities and what you liked
about the different aircraft and what you may have disliked about them. Tell me first
about the Skyraider.
RC: Well, the Skyraider, basically they used those all the way up through, “they”
12
being the Vietnamese used them, all the way up through the end of the war in Vietnam.
13
So they were the workhorse of close air support for many, many, many years. The
14
beautiful thing about the Skyraider is it was a very accurate bombing platform. You
15
could do very well with it. It carried its own weight in bombs, which is unusual.
16
LC: Really? I didn’t know that.
17
RC: Yes, yeah, carried its own weight in bombs. So it was really a workhorse
18
and “they” being the Marines and the Navy transitioned to the Skyraiders because they
19
were so much better for close air support than were the Corsairs. The Corsairs were a
20
World War II fighter.
21
LC: Sure. But what were the advantages of the Skyraider? Was it faster?
22
RC: No. The primary advantage of the Skyraider was that it was, as I said, it
23
carried its own weight, which the Corsair couldn’t do.
24
LC: So essentially, if you want, its productivity and bombing was greater.
25
RC: Exactly, exactly. It was as accurate or more accurate than the Corsair in the
26
dive-bombing. It also had a special capability. It was designed originally as a dive-
27
bomber. It had speed brakes, which would enable you to do seventy-degree dives. As
28
I’ve told you before, I did a seventy-degree dive. You couldn’t do that in Corsairs. You
29
could, but you probably wouldn’t ever get out of the dive.
30
LC: You wouldn’t have enough time to get up and out.
201
1
RC: No, you wouldn’t have enough time. You’d have to release so high that
2
you’d be inaccurate. So it was designed principally as a dive-bomber. So that was the
3
beauty of it. For close air support, it was by far the best aircraft.
4
LC: Was it fun to fly?
5
RC: A lot of fun. It had a big prop, big prop. The prop was thirteen feet in
6
diameter.
7
LC: Oh, wow.
8
RC: So that’s a great big prop. It had a Wright 3350 Engine, which was a huge
9
10
engine also. Whereas, the Corsairs had the 2800. So you can see there was seven
hundred more horsepower.
11
LC: Just the power difference alone.
12
RC: The power difference alone. Plus, the wings were larger. It was just a
13
bigger bomber.
14
LC: Was it maneuverable? Could you other than—?
15
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. It was quite maneuverable. We would fight. There was
16
an Air Force base close by us and we’d go up and pick fights with them, air-to-air fights
17
with—they had Mustangs, which as you know, was one of the best fighters in World War
18
II.
19
LC: Yes, sir.
20
RC: So we would fight with them and could hold our own with them.
21
LC: Now was that kind of what—
22
RC: That was part of the syllabus also.
23
LC: It was. Okay, I was going to say, was that sort of pick up a game or—?
24
RC: Yeah, actually, principally defensive because the Koreans did have MiGs.
25
They had the MiG-15s at that time. They did have fighters that they initially ventured
26
down into our area out of North Korea and eventually quit it because they were getting
27
the worst of it.
28
LC: What did you know or what were you told in the briefings and so on about
29
the North Korean and Chinese air capabilities using the MiGs or/and other aircraft or
30
something?
31
RC: Well, we were told initially that they did have some Russian pilots.
202
1
LC: You were told that?
2
RC: Yes.
3
LC: Okay.
4
RC: They couldn’t prove it, but they were strongly suspicious of it because there
5
were Soviet advisors in North Korea, we knew that. They were Soviet advisors in North
6
Korea and some of the pilots were very good. The Air Force, when they started going
7
north all the time trying to wipe out the North Korean Air Force, which they eventually
8
did, initially, they met some pretty good fighters, some pretty good pilots, but eventually
9
attrition took care of that. Apparently the Soviets quit flying with them I think probably
10
when the Chinese came into the war. I think that’s when they really kind of backed off.
11
They could’ve had, but we don’t even know that, I don’t know it anyway, but they
12
could’ve had some Chinese pilots. They were fairly good fighter pilots, not as good as
13
the Americans, but they were fairly good.
14
15
LC: So were you given to understand that you needed to respect the fact that they
had air assets?
16
RC: Absolutely.
17
LC: Okay.
18
RC: Yeah, we were always on the lookout. Wherever we went, we flew in
19
tactical formations so that we were ready to defend ourselves. Everything was tactical.
20
So we were ready. We were trained to fight them if they came after us with their fighters.
21
The main thing we had to contend with was anti-aircraft, of course, anti-aircraft fire.
22
23
24
25
LC: What did you know about the capabilities and accuracies of their air
defenses?
RC: Their air defenses weren’t that good. Not nearly as good as they were in
Vietnam later on, the Vietnamese were.
26
LC: Did you know where their emplacements were and that kind of thing?
27
RC: No, no, because our fight, again, what I was with was principally squadrons
28
that were dedicated to close air support, so it was a moving situation. It was changing all
29
the time. The most that we usually got was machineguns and small anti-aircraft,
30
probably 23 millimeters and that sort of thing.
203
1
LC: Just for somebody who might not get the distinction between close air
2
support and what I was talking about, which were stationary air defenses, close air
3
support is supporting—
4
RC: Supporting ground troops.
5
LC: Supporting units on the battlefield.
6
RC: On the battlefield, right. Close-in air support where you actually bomb
7
immediately in front of the frontlines if necessary.
8
9
LC: Right. The kinds of targets you might be hitting then might be what,
General?
10
11
RC: Well, it could be tanks. It could be artillery positions or it could be ground
troops.
12
LC: Mass troops.
13
RC: Infantry, massed troops.
14
LC: Okay. What were your thoughts about the F-9 Jet? Do you remember your
15
16
17
first chance to fly one of those?
RC: Oh, I loved it. I loved the jets, yes. I was principally, I think I was
principally born to be a fighter pilot.
18
LC: Yes, sir.
19
RC: So I loved it and I wanted to get into the jets, but of course, the Marines
20
didn’t get jets in Korea. Well, they got some jets in there later on. By the time I got over
21
there the second time, they had jets there, but I was trained now in propeller aircraft. So I
22
was never able to wrangle my way into a jet training unit.
23
LC: How many times did you have an opportunity, then, while you were at El
24
Toro for example to fly those F-9s?
25
RC: Not very often.
26
LC: Not often enough.
27
RC: No, not often enough. Well, they didn’t have a lot of them and they were
28
29
dedicated principally to training the people that were going to be in jets.
LC: Oh, sure, absolutely.
204
1
RC: I was an assistant operations officer in the squadron. I had been promoted to
2
captain. I was assistant operations officer in the squadron. So they weren’t going to let
3
me go.
4
LC: Yeah, too bad you were too valuable.
5
RC: Well, I don’t know whether I was too valuable or not, but I couldn’t work it
6
7
out. So I tried, but I couldn’t do it.
LC: What particularly did you get out of flying a jet, an F-9 at that time that you
8
couldn’t get when you were flying the Skyraiders? I mean, in terms of your own
9
personal thrill or the capabilities, what was it that grabbed you? Was it the speed?
10
RC: The speed, I think, and they were much smoother at takeoffs and landings
11
and the fact that you could go to high altitude. You were principally a fighter whereas
12
the ADs were principally attack.
13
LC: You really wanted to be—
14
RC: A fighter.
15
LC: A fighter.
16
RC: Yeah.
17
LC: Why?
18
RC: Well, I think you have a better opportunity to prove yourself there, I think
19
it’s more of a one-on-one situation.
20
LC: It’s pretty edgy.
21
RC: Right. You get to see who you’re fighting. When you’re doing close air
22
support, you’re dropping on a piece of ground or dropping on a specific target and it’s not
23
like boxing, for example. I used to do a lot of boxing and you like the thrill of the
24
individual combat.
25
LC: The one on one.
26
RC: The one on one, right.
27
LC: Mono a mono thing.
28
RC: Right, right. I was a wrestler and a boxer both. I wrestled in school, as I
29
told you I think. So one on one was kind of my thing. I was more attuned to that than I
30
was dropping on a plot of ground or on a pillbox or something like that.
205
1
LC: When you would, and this is in training again, but when you would go
2
through an exercise where you had to flame a target with a bomb load, did you feel a
3
sense of accomplishment when you would make the hit accurately?
4
RC: Oh, absolutely. You always got the feedback.
5
LC: Okay. How did that work?
6
RC: Well, you had forward air controllers that controlled you. That’s the idea of
7
close air support. In other words, you’re just not assigned a target way behind the line
8
someplace and navigate to that and drop your bombs and hope you hit the target. You
9
actually have somebody on the ground that can tell you whether you hit the target or not.
10
LC: So you’ve got a FAC (forward air controller) down there calling you in.
11
RC: A forward air controller’s calling you in. Actually, a lot of times or most of
12
the time, they would also mark your targets. Plus you get the feeling when you’re
13
supporting troops in the attack, for example, or in a defense where they are one on one
14
with the enemy. You’re helping them directly and you get good feedback from them.
15
LC: Yeah, they need you.
16
RC: Right. Having been in that position, it gives you a much greater appreciation
17
of it.
18
LC: Yes, sir.
19
RC: It’s one of the things that convinced me that I needed to put in for flight
20
training quicker and get up in the air when I was an infantry officer.
21
LC: Was how important the air assists had been.
22
RC: Absolutely. The Marine Corps, of course, were pros at that. They were
23
definitely the pros at it.
24
LC: Oh, sure, yeah.
25
RC: There’s a closeness there that you don’t have with the Air Force and the
26
27
28
Army.
LC: Now, General, can you tell me what an assistant operations officer would be
responsible for in an aircraft wing in the Marines at this time?
29
RC: Well, assistant operations officer at that time, I was in a squadron.
30
LC: I’m sorry, okay.
206
1
RC: Yeah. Well, I was responsible for monitoring the flights that people went on
2
and I went out with them on a periodic basis, different aviators to see how they were
3
doing. We tallied their bomb scores. When you went out and you bombed on a bombing
4
target, it was always marked. You knew exactly how well they were doing. You’d get a
5
bulls-eye or fifty feet at six o’clock or twelve o’clock or something like that. You tallied
6
all that to see how they were coming along. Once they were qualified, they had to
7
actually qualify before they were considered combat ready.
8
9
10
LC: Would you actually see them through the final phases of training and to their
deployment or to Korea?
RC: Oh, yes, yes. From the time they joined the squadron until they were sent
11
overseas, we monitored every aviator. The same thing was going on outside in the
12
training of the ground crewmen. We had people that were assigned to the maintenance
13
departments. They would monitor the enlisted men and how they were doing. As the
14
enlisted men progressed, they would move up in their position to where eventually they
15
led a group of mechanics, for example, and training them. Then they were considered
16
ready to go overseas and we sent them overseas.
17
LC: Did you ever have any mixed feelings about a group who might be leaving,
18
going to Korea? I mean, you knew at least what it had been like for you over there on the
19
ground, not necessarily in the air, but did you think, well, anything like, we need to go
20
over there and get some back, and go ahead guys and knock them out and stuff like that?
21
RC: Oh, yeah.
22
LC: Did you have any undertow as well about being concerned for them?
23
RC: Absolutely, absolutely. You’re always concerned about sending people into
24
combat. That always bothers you. But on the other hand, they’re all anxious to go.
25
LC: Oh, yes, sir, I’m sure they were.
26
RC: So you try to get them as well trained as you can so they have a better
27
chance of survival, always. So you feel quite a responsibility to being certain that they’re
28
ready. That’s the big thing. Ready not only mentally and physically, but psychologically
29
ready to go.
207
1
LC: How would you monitor that? I mean, you can monitor bombing scores, but
2
how would you monitor how they were inside, how they were handling or might likely be
3
able to handle the pressures of the battlefield?
4
RC: Well, it’s kind of a difficult unknown. There’s no specific things you can
5
do. You have to watch them closely, watch their reactions to things. You watch how
6
they, first you watch how they perform. Then in any emergency situations, which we had
7
emergency situations where you had something go wrong with the aircraft and they had
8
to come in on emergency landing and that sort of thing. You watch and see how they
9
handle all those situations. Then, of course, you do a lot of talking to them, a lot of one-
10
on-one and just kind of feeling them out. Most of the, well, all the people that were
11
assigned in the squadron in training positions had been there. They had been to Korea.
12
LC: Right. So you were the old men, in a way?
13
RC: Yeah. That’s right. We were the vets, so to speak.
14
LC: Would the guys, would the younger guys ask you?
15
RC: Oh, yes.
16
LC: “Hey, Captain, what’s”—
17
RC: Oh, absolutely. They’re always probing and how do the grunts feel about
18
this. We also had aviators, experienced aviators from World War II. So we also had
19
them in there. Our squadron commander was a World War II vet and our squadron exec
20
was a World War II vet. The operations officer was a World War II vet and I was
21
assistant operations officer, along with another, a friend of mine who was also a grunt
22
and went into aviation.
23
LC: Who was the operations officer for the unit while you were there?
24
RC: Oh, gosh. I can’t remember who it was now.
25
LC: Oh, okay.
26
RC: I know that my partner, a ground officer who went through was Phil Shutler,
27
Gen. Phil Shutler. He became a general, also.
28
LC: What can you tell me about him? His job was what?
29
RC: He was also an assistant operations officer. He was a year senior to me. So
30
he became the operations officer. Our operations officer, and I’ve got it someplace, but
31
I’m sorry I can’t remember it.
208
1
LC: Oh, that’s okay. Don’t worry.
2
RC: He got killed while we were there.
3
LC: Under what circumstances?
4
RC: Instrument flying. He got vertigo and crashed.
5
LC: That’s pretty hard on everybody, I’m sure.
6
RC: Oh, yes, absolutely, absolutely.
7
LC: Not least you.
8
RC: Well, of course, as one of the assistant operations officer, I was assigned as
9
part of the board to investigate the crash, investigate what caused the crash and so on. It
10
was a simple case of vertigo.
11
LC: How did you establish that that was true, by ruling everything else out or—?
12
RC: Yeah, basically that. We ruled out—he was talking to people when he
13
crashed.
14
LC: I see, okay.
15
RC: He in fact admitted that he was having trouble realizing what was
16
happening, which is vertigo. He was on an approach. It was bad weather and he was on
17
an approach and he just simply flew into the ground, which is not an uncommon thing in
18
aviation and particularly in those days because we didn’t have all the gadgets, all the
19
good things that they have now to make instrument approaches. We had a simple thing
20
called an ARC-5 (automated radio communication), which was a radio that you tuned in.
21
There were signals on the ground where they Morse Code, they gave out a signal. Where
22
the two signals crossed, they’d have one giving an A and one giving an N. An A is “dit
23
da” and an N is “da dit.” So where the two combined, you got a solid “daaa,” like that.
24
So then you knew you were on that particular azimuth and that’s what you flew in on. So
25
it wasn’t easy. Now you’ve got needles and you’ve got all kinds of—you’ve got radar
26
and everything else to help you. We didn’t have all that.
27
LC: So you would fly by listening to the—
28
RC: Listening to the signals.
29
LC: The dot-dash signals until they lined up, essentially.
30
RC: You’d have a template on your kneeboard, which showed the particular
31
station you were coming in on and they’d have you come in on a certain azimuth. When
209
1
you got on that, you’d orient yourself by doing a series of maneuvers to where you knew
2
in conjunction with your compass, you knew whether you were heading into or away
3
from the station. When you got on that particular azimuth, you’d have four of those, you
4
see. You’d have four long lines. You would have to determine that you were on the right
5
one headed inbound and you did that with a series of maneuvers. It’s kind of complex.
6
LC: Well, you know, you drew a comparison with some of the now very high
7
technology stuff that the flyers use to do instrument flying. I’m sure that some of the
8
guys that are flying now probably think back to what you and your cohort flew and
9
wonder how you did it, really literally, how did you do it.
10
11
12
RC: It is kind of amazing. It is kind of amazing when you see what they’ve got
now.
LC: Well, and I wonder how you view what they have now, just in general terms,
13
not any particular aircraft or any particular year, but you have a general idea of what a
14
cockpit looks like now. Do you wonder how they do it? I mean, there’s a lot of
15
information. They have tons of information, maybe even too much. I wonder, how do
16
you feel about what they have to do now?
17
RC: Well, I think that really ours was, we consider it relatively simple.
18
LC: Really? Wow.
19
RC: Ours was because we had that one system to get us in and they have multiple
20
systems. They have to learn them all.
21
LC: They’ve got to keep them all. They all have to be right simultaneously.
22
RC: Yeah. They all have to be right and they have to know which one they’re
23
working at the time. So in my opinion, it’s more complex for them.
24
LC: Wow.
25
RC: But it’s much safer than it was for us.
26
LC: Yes, sir. I’m sure they think—
27
RC: Because we had one chance and they’ve got two or three things that they can
28
29
crosscheck with. We didn’t have that.
LC: Sure. My guess is they think you guys are pretty amazing.
210
1
RC: Well, yes, I think they probably do. I harkened back to—well, of course, I
2
was still flying on what they had in World War II. Now what really amazes me is how
3
the guys did it in World War I.
4
LC: Which part, the fact that they had no, I mean, basically no electronics?
5
RC: They didn’t have anything. They just took off and landed and they did their
6
thing. They found that went up the frontlines and had to keep themselves oriented. Of
7
course, all of it was very close in those days. They didn’t have long ranges that they
8
flew. We flew, well, now for example, well, even in Vietnam and as recently as in
9
Kuwait and sometimes in Iraq, the guys are flying hundreds and hundreds, literally
10
hundreds of miles to a target.
11
LC: Yeah, their base is so far away.
12
RC: The bases are so far away, but ours, in World War I, they were right behind
13
the frontlines.
14
LC: That’s right. That’s right.
15
RC: So they didn’t have far to go, but they still had to know where everybody
16
was so they wouldn’t bomb their own people.
17
LC: Yeah. Don’t hit the wrong trench. Don’t hit the wrong one.
18
RC: That’s right.
19
LC: The trenches, of course, as you note were just maybe a hundred yards or
20
21
22
23
24
more apart, not a lot more than that, though, in some cases.
RC: That’s right. That’s right. So they didn’t do a lot of close air support in
World War I. They did mostly bombing behind the lines.
LC: Have you made a study of this, General, or did you ever have a chance to
talk with aviators who flew either in World War I or around that period?
25
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Yes, I did.
26
LC: Did you really?
27
RC: Uh-huh.
28
LC: Can you share anything about those conversations?
29
RC: Well, they were basically very aggressive type individuals. They were
30
extremely aggressive. But they were also envious of us in the equipment that we had just
31
as I’m a little bit envious of what the equipment the guys have now, same thing.
211
1
LC: Right. Boy, I could’ve done wonders if I’d had that.
2
RC: That’s right. That’s exactly what they said.
3
LC: I believe it.
4
RC: That’s exactly what I say. If I had that, boy I’d—well, of course, you look at
5
what happens now and for example, in Iraq, they’re dropping five hundred pound bombs
6
on buildings.
7
LC: Single buildings.
8
RC: Single buildings.
9
LC: Right down the chute.
10
RC: Right down the chimney, so to speak. That is just, I mean, that’s amazing.
11
LC: It really is.
12
RC: It’s absolutely amazing.
13
LC: It really is.
14
RC: Yeah. Where a squad will go out or a fire team even, a four-man fire team
15
will go out. They’ll call in an aircraft and drop a five hundred pound bomb on a sniper.
16
LC: That’s some huge, you want accuracy.
17
RC: That’s unheard of. We were scattering bombs all over creation trying to stop
18
them. In A Shau Valley in Vietnam, the B-52s came over and were dropping, I mean,
19
flights of B-52s were dropping hundreds of 750 pound bombs on the jungles out in the A
20
Shau Valley. We’ve subsequently have talked to people that, I mean, North Vietnamese
21
that were in the A Shau Valley. They said, “I got a hell of a headache, but nothing
22
happened to me,” because it was carpet bombing. They did the same thing in World War
23
II in Europe. They just carpet bombed. They just flattened everything. That was the
24
only way they could fight. Well, now you can selectively go out and drop a bomb
25
literally in a guy’s back pocket if you want to. So it’s the—
26
LC: It’s the technology changes that are so advanced—
27
RC: Technology is absolutely astounding, absolutely astounding, it really is. It’s
28
mind boggling to somebody that has been in my position or a World War II guy and you
29
can imagine what the World War I guys thought. They just couldn’t believe it that you
30
could do that.
212
1
LC: Well, do you, just speaking again of maybe one or two World War I-era
2
flyers that you might’ve had a chance to speak to, General, because this will be of
3
interest, of course, we can’t interview them and that’s a very sad, but true fact. Do you
4
remember under what circumstances you met those guys? Was it at Marine functions?
5
RC: Marine functions, yeah, yeah.
6
LC: Do you have any idea how many Marine flyers there were during the World
7
War I era?
8
RC: No, I know they had a squadron.
9
LC: Yes, it was just maybe—
10
RC: A squadron that were supporting. Principally, see, the Marines were
11
assigned to the 4th, no, wait a minute, no, the 2nd Army Division. The Marines were in
12
two brigades. They were in the 6th Marine Brigade and the 4th Marine Brigade.
13
LC: Okay. Were they actually in France or Belgium or—?
14
RC: Oh, yes, yes, yes, yes. As a matter of fact, I’ve got some quotes that I ran off
15
yesterday, as a matter of fact, one that General Pershing, you’ve heard of Blackjack
16
Pershing.
17
LC: Yes, sir.
18
RC: He said, “I don’t understand it. If the Marines can do it, why in the hell
19
can’t my soldiers fight like the Marines do?”
20
LC: That’s useful. Where are you going to be sending that quote to I wonder?
21
RC: Oh, I’ve got quite a few. I’ve got quite a few quotes, as a matter of fact, that
22
I use for various speeches, like on the Marine Corps birthday.
23
LC: Oh, sure, yeah, yeah, that’s coming up.
24
RC: You kind of hit on the other services.
25
LC: Well, General Pershing gave you some pretty good ammo right there, I
26
guess.
27
RC: Well, so did MacArthur. I told you about MacArthur, a couple of things.
28
LC: Well, yes, that you actually—
29
RC: MacArthur said, “I’ve just been visiting the front. I’ve been visiting the
30
finest soldiers in the world, the U.S. Marines.” That was MacArthur. That’s hard for an
31
Army general who’s in charge to say, but—
213
1
LC: Mr. West Point.
2
RC: Mr. West Point, but he said it.
3
LC: Well, sir, as I remember, I think you pulled his bacon out of the fire on that
4
one.
5
RC: That’s right, that’s right.
6
LC: That one day.
7
RC: Well, I think he was appreciative of Marines.
8
LC: Yes, sir, I think so too, yeah.
9
RC: Very much so.
10
LC: Yeah.
11
RC: Of course, Schwarzkopf did too, you know.
12
LC: Did he have something to say that you recall?
13
RC: I’m looking for that little piece of paper right now and I’ll read it. It’s
14
documented. So it’s not out of my head.
15
LC: Well, no.
16
RC: No, it’s documented. It’s his.
17
LC: Well, if you do come across it there, that would be great. Equally if you
18
send me a copy of it, we’ll put it in the collection here.
19
RC: We’ll see. Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
20
LC: He’s a pretty good authority.
21
RC: “I am convinced that there is no smarter, handier, or more adaptable body of
22
troops in the world.”
23
LC: Speaking of the U.S. Marine Corps?
24
RC: The U.S. Marine Corps. Here’s another one from Blackjack Pershing. “The
25
deadliest weapon in the world is a Marine and his rifle.”
26
LC: That’s pretty good stuff.
27
RC: Yeah.
28
LC: Your sources are quite good. I have to say. These aren’t just fly-by-night
29
nobodies.
30
RC: Adm. William Halsey.
31
LC: Yes, sir.
214
1
2
RC: “The Marine Corps has just been called by the New York Times the elite of
this country. I think it is the elite of the world.”
3
LC: While we are on this topic, and it’s something I hope you and I will come
4
back to, but what are your feelings about General Pace now being the chairman of the
5
Joint Chief of Staff?
6
RC: I think it’s a smart move.
7
LC: And maybe overdue?
8
RC: Long overdue, long overdue, yes.
9
LC: I thought you might think so.
10
11
RC: We’ve had a lot of Marines that could’ve done us a lot of good at certain
times.
12
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
13
RC: They have a much broader perspective believe, it or not. When you hear me
14
talk, you can’t imagine me thinking about a broad perspective. I’m terribly green, but the
15
point is is that I think when they fight, we have every capability. We’re the only service
16
in the world that really has that.
17
LC: Well, and your own career I think goes quite a long way towards
18
demonstrating exactly what you’re talking about, your ability to serve with the distinction
19
that you did as a infantryman and then transition to naval aviation and then because of
20
your successful management of your different assignments—and I’m not buttering you
21
up, sir, this is a matter of record—rise into command level and essentially tactical
22
planning for major air operations in different theatres. It’s a testament to exactly the kind
23
of flexibility and training in the round that you’re talking about. General Pace, I saw him
24
actually speak yesterday I think on Meet the Press or something like that. He certainly is
25
an impressive fellow, gives a good account of himself.
26
27
RC: Yes, he’s a very sharp young man. You know him when you meet him,
when they’re young.
28
LC: When did you meet him, sir? Do you remember?
29
RC: Oh, gosh, years, and years, and years ago when he was a lieutenant.
30
LC: Under what circumstances, do you recall?
215
1
RC: Well, just in passing, just in passing. I met him at a briefing, I think it was.
2
I don’t recall whether it was in Washington or whether it was in Camp Lejeune, but he
3
just was an outspoken, very bright and just kind of jumped out at you.
4
LC: You saw him and you thought, “Mm hmm.”
5
RC: Yeah. Well, we had one here who’s now—I just saw, as a matter of fact,
6
we’ve got another one here at our Joint Reserve Training base running our fighter
7
squadrons down here, our Reserve fighter squadrons. This guy was born in Germany and
8
we call him Baron Lucas. His call sign, I think, is Red Baron.
9
LC: Yeah, really could be anything else, really.
10
RC: Yeah, but he’s coming, he’s coming. He’s going to be a general someday.
11
LC: What’s his rank at this time?
12
RC: He’s a colonel. We had one here, John Goodman, who is now the
13
commanding general of the Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific. He was here about four years
14
ago. He was a colonel and he’s a lieutenant general now.
15
LC: When you say “here”—
16
RC: I’m talking about here at Dallas, at the Joint Reserve Training base here.
17
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Well, and you’re in a good position to see these up and
18
coming guys and make an evaluation. Wow. Well, it’s fun to think that you have seen
19
these folks as they have come along during their careers and identified their capabilities
20
early on. Of course, that’s what other people in the Marine Corps are doing, as well, is
21
looking for the sharp young servicemen who have something to offer. Well, let me ask
22
you, how long were you at El Toro?
23
RC: One year.
24
LC: Mostly you were in the role both of sharpening your own skills in the
25
Skyraider, but also in the training.
26
RC: Absolutely, yes.
27
LC: Okay. During that time, if my history doesn’t fail me, the armistice was
28
signed in Korea. Did that have an impact on your own thinking about your career, the
29
fact that the fighting in Korea was essentially over?
30
31
RC: No. I wasn’t worried about my career. I was just worried about getting that
thing done out there.
216
1
LC: Were you satisfied with the arrangement? I mean, obviously you had to
2
accept it, but I just wonder, a lot of guys have paid the ultimate price to protect South
3
Korea. Were you satisfied that South Korea remained but that North Korea did, too, at
4
the end of the negotiation?
5
RC: Well, that’s—obviously you always want to win.
6
LC: Did you feel like we had won?
7
RC: No. I did not feel like we won. I felt like we had compromised.
8
LC: Okay. Was it a compromise that you felt was a fair one or just—?
9
RC: Well, I think it was a political compromise. I don’t always go along with the
10
politicians.
11
LC: I see. Yes, sir.
12
RC: So as a military man, I thought we should’ve—we had opportunities to go all
13
14
the way north. We didn’t. We did it on a political basis.
LC: When speaking of politics, one of the most important developments on the
15
political side during the war was, of course, the dismissal of General MacArthur by
16
President Truman in the spring of 1951, I think April.
17
RC: Well, I think that was purely political.
18
LC: How’d that sit with you and other guys?
19
RC: Well, disappointed. I think most people were disappointed. A lot of people
20
didn’t like, a lot of military guys didn’t like MacArthur.
21
LC: Because he was what?
22
RC: Well, I think principally because he was a showman.
23
LC: Yeah, sure.
24
RC: And a braggart. He bragged a lot on himself.
25
LC: He was pretty high on himself.
26
RC: Yeah, and had a lot of ego. But you have to give the man his due. He was
27
one hell of a general. He devised that. He was the guy that actually thought about that
28
Inchon landing.
29
LC: Yes, sir.
30
RC: That was brilliant. It really was. Even the Marines resisted it, a lot of the
31
upper echelon Marines said, “That’ll never work.”
217
1
LC: Death trap.
2
RC: It’s a death trap.
3
LC: Yeah. Yes, sir.
4
RC: But he said, “We’re going to do it anyway.” So you got to admire him. He
5
stuck his neck out a lot.
6
LC: Well, and he wanted to take this war to the Chinese communists.
7
RC: That’s right.
8
LC: That was why essentially, I mean, that underlay anyway his dismissal. Did
9
you think at the time, I just wonder what your view is or was it the time or now, did you
10
think that that was the time to go ahead and try to overturn the communist regime in
11
China?
12
RC: I would like to have seen it.
13
LC: Really? Uh-huh.
14
RC: Because it’s not far off, that we’re going to have to—all wars are basically
15
economic in nature. China is taking us over economically, they really are. With the
16
massive labor they have, cheap labor, they can produce things. We’re giving them things
17
to produce. Our businesses are sending their products over to China to be produced
18
because they can be produced cheaper and they can sell them cheaper and make more
19
money.
20
LC: They’re using the money to buy up our debt.
21
RC: That’s right. That’s right. We’re going to be forced eventually to confront
22
China or they’re going to confront us. I don’t think it’s too far off. I think it’s
23
probably—they’re building aircraft carriers, they’re doing all the things to bring
24
themselves up to our level. I think once they get up to that level, then they’re going to
25
challenge us. I think it’s just that simple. There is one underlying thing about all this.
26
LC: Yes, sir.
27
RC: I don’t know how it’s really going to work out and I’m sure you’ve thought
28
of this, too and people that think about this sort of thing consider it. There is a possibility
29
within China with them going into much more entrepreneurship in individual businesses
30
and large businesses, also, the profit motive begins to take over. The way the
31
government controls things, they could have their own little problems.
218
1
LC: Internally?
2
RC: Internally. That people are going to say, “Hey, what’s going on here? We’re
3
working for zero wages practically and the people in the United States are getting the
4
benefit of our wages.” Not realizing, of course that their government’s really getting the
5
benefit of it.
6
LC: Right. But when you’re the worker, that’s not how it looks.
7
RC: That’s exactly right. We went through it. We went through it.
8
LC: Yes, sir.
9
RC: I think we’ve discussed this once before, the number one shoemaker in the
10
world back in the 17th, 18th Century was the United States because of the cheap labor and
11
look where we are now.
12
LC: Well, I know my shoes were made in China.
13
RC: That’s right.
14
LC: I’m looking at the label right now.
15
RC: That’s right. That’s exactly right.
16
LC: Vietnam as well is following this same path with the communist government
17
18
19
and the sort of push down, the clamp down on civil liberties and personal freedoms.
RC: That’s right. They keep the people under control so that they can benefit
from it. Eventually the people could rebel against that and probably will.
20
LC: Well, civil war, civil conflict in China is—
21
RC: Historic.
22
LC: Yes, it is. Yes, sir. It hasn’t been quite a little more than half a century since
23
they did have that major civil war. It went on for years, over twenty years. That kind of
24
instability is also problematic for other powers in the area. One thinks of China and its
25
long borders with Russia, for example, and India. Of course, they share borders with
26
Pakistan. Once you start thinking about internal divisions inside China, it starts to
27
become very upsetting both regionally and on a global scale.
28
RC: That’s exactly right. Then you got to think about India, too.
29
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
30
RC: Anyways, India’s another one.
31
LC: That’s right.
219
1
RC: But proportionally, they’re a little more democratic than China is.
2
LC: They inherited that, of course, from the British occupation.
3
RC: From the British, yes. That’s right.
4
LC: Have you been to India, sir?
5
RC: No, that’s one place I haven’t been.
6
LC: I haven’t either.
7
RC: I want to go. I want to go. I definitely want to go there.
8
LC: Yeah, I think it would be a very useful, very informative thing. I’d like to g,
9
10
too. Well, let me ask you how you came to move away from El Toro and to a new
posting.
11
RC: Well, my assignment out of El Toro was to Korea, back to Korea.
12
LC: Okay. How did you get out there? Did you stop in Japan on the way or did
13
14
15
you go directly to Korea?
RC: Stopped in Japan, stopped in Japan. Everything funneled through Japan in
those days.
16
LC: Right. Where did you go in Japan as a stop off? Do you remember?
17
RC: I believe it was Kobe.
18
LC: How long were you there, just for a bit?
19
RC: Just a few days. I was on a draft. There were several of us that went. Some
20
of the guys that had been in the infantry with me, one of which was Hank Commiskey,
21
the first Medal of Honor winner, the first Marine Medal of Honor winner in Korea.
22
LC: Yes, sir. You mentioned him earlier.
23
RC: Hank went with me and Ed Smith, a guy that I was his best man at his
24
wedding. He was also a former infantry. The three of us were all in the same draft and
25
we all went to the same squadron.
26
LC: Which was which one?
27
RC: VMA 212 (Marine attack squadron).
28
LC: Where were you based?
29
RC: We were based at a little airfield south of Seoul called Pyeongtaek, P-Y-O-
30
31
N-G-T-A-E-K, Pyeongtaek.
LC: Can you describe the base there? You said it was not big.
220
1
2
RC: No, it wasn’t big. We initially had had simply a Marston matting strip and
then they built a concrete runway there.
3
4
LC: Can you describe the strip and what it was made of, what were the assembly
pieces?
5
RC: Well, are you talking about the Marston matting?
6
LC: Yes, sir, before the concrete.
7
RC: Marston matting, it’s pieces of steel with large perforations in it, large holes
8
and it’s kind of ridged so that you don’t slip and slide on it, aircraft doesn’t slip and slide.
9
Each piece is probably twelve feet long by three feet wide and weighs several hundred
10
pounds.
11
LC: These essentially—
12
RC: They interlock. They interlock so you can make it as long or as wide as you
13
want. You have to level the ground and they usually put some sort of a stabilizer
14
underneath, sand or something that’ll kind of help hold the Marston matting in place and
15
then they just lay it simply on top of the ground. It’s a World War II innovation.
16
LC: Right. So they could set up an airstrip very quickly.
17
RC: Very quickly, yeah. They’d just go in with their engineers and they can have
18
it in in almost a day really. Once they level the ground, it’s just a matter of laying the
19
stuff down and then you’re ready to go.
20
LC: That’s incredible.
21
RC: Yeah.
22
LC: I mean, wow.
23
RC: Yeah, it’s quite innovative, but they did use it all during World War, not all
24
during World War II, in the latter stages, particularly they used it in the Pacific mainly.
25
LC: Yes, sir. So that was what you found when you arrived?
26
RC: Right. We had one of those, but that was now inactive. That had been put
27
in—see, we’re now talking about 1954.
28
LC: Yes, sir.
29
RC: So that was no longer active. They had since put in an airstrip, which was
30
31
six thousand feet long.
LC: I was going to ask how long it was. Why would it be so long?
221
1
RC: Well, they had some jets there. They had three squadrons of ADs. Our
2
squadrons still had some Corsairs. They were given, the Corsairs were given to the
3
French in Indochina because that was in process now. This is 1954. The French were
4
fighting in Indochina.
5
LC: Yes, sir, and having a hard time of it.
6
RC: Having a hard time. So they took our Corsairs.
7
LC: These came from within the 212 squadron?
8
RC: From 212.
9
LC: Okay. Do you know when those, I mean—?
10
RC: That was in, like I say, that was in 1954, the last part of 1954. I can’t
11
remember the exact month or not. They were flown up to the—the French came in and
12
flew them up to Indochina.
13
LC: So French pilots actually came?
14
RC: Yeah.
15
LC: Do you remember that?
16
RC: Yeah.
17
LC: Did you have a chance to talk with them or did you hear any scuttlebutt
18
19
about them or see them at the O-club or anything?
RC: No, they came in. They were kind of aloof. Not too many of them came in.
20
Some of our pilots who had been flying the Corsairs also flew them up there. So it was
21
kind of a joint thing.
22
LC: They were kind of aloof?
23
RC: Yeah. They were kind of kept apart from us, really.
24
LC: Oh, is that right?
25
RC: We think intentionally, but we didn’t know. I was only a captain. I wasn’t
26
in the big decision-making process.
27
LC: Right, you weren’t on the inside loop or the e-ring or anything.
28
RC: No, no, I wasn’t at that time, absolutely not.
29
LC: How closely were you guys or you yourself, sir, are following what was
30
happening in Indochina?
222
1
RC: Well, not too closely, not too closely. Really, we were more concerned with
2
where we were because we were still—this was just right after the signing of the
3
armistice in Korea. So we were still flying combat patrols along the DMZ (demilitarized
4
zone). We’re still flying combat patrols day and night up there. That was basically one
5
of our missions, that and providing close air support and training. We even had a
6
bombing range there. We kept our skills up because we didn’t know when it was going
7
to break out again because again, it wasn’t a surrender. It was an armistice.
8
9
10
11
12
LC: Was there then an active line of thinking that at anytime the North Koreans
might decide to do as they had done in 1950 and come over the agreed lines separating
North and South?
RC: Well, they did. As a matter of fact, we had an aircraft we called “Bed Check
Charlie.”
13
LC: Bed Check?
14
RC: Bed Check Charlie.
15
LC: Why was he called that?
16
RC: Because he flew over every night and dropped mortar shells, tried to drop
17
them on our airfield.
18
LC: So this is a North Korean aircraft or a Soviet aircraft?
19
RC: Well, I hope it was. I hope it wasn’t one of our guys.
20
LC: Yeah, that’s a little too close for comfort.
21
RC: Yeah, yeah, but he didn’t hit anything.
22
LC: So he would drop a mortar shell or two out of the plane?
23
RC: Yeah, out of the plane.
24
LC: How close would he get?
25
RC: Oh, we could hear them. They were in the fields around—we had rice
26
paddies all around our airfield. So when a mortar shell hits a rice paddy, it doesn’t make
27
a lot of noise. It’s kind of swallowed up by the water and mud and so on. But you can
28
hear it, you can hear it. It’s kind of a (makes karumph sound) type thing.
29
30
31
LC: Well, was this do you think part of some kind of game or some kind of
nerve-wracking thing they were trying to do?
RC: I think so. I think so because we were patrolling the DMZ night and day.
223
1
LC: And Pyeongtaek was about how far from the DMZ?
2
RC: Oh, we were about, I guess about sixty miles.
3
LC: So that’s a pretty good way.
4
RC: Yeah, yeah.
5
LC: So this wasn’t a mistake that he just accidentally kind of—
6
RC: No, and he was able to navigate to us. Obviously what he was doing was
7
flying. He might’ve been using our beacons, as a matter of fact. We had a radio set up
8
there, too. We now had ARC-6s, which is you have a signal that goes out. In the aircraft,
9
you have an arrow that points directly to it so you can fly directly to the beacon that way
10
and then take a heading off the beacon.
11
LC: It’s on a certain frequency presumably?
12
RC: It’s on a frequency and you dial it in and it comes up. So he was probably
13
using that. They probably had that technology, also.
14
LC: Was there ever as far, as you know, an attempt to bring him down?
15
RC: Yeah, we launched—the unfortunate part of it was that he came, he flew in,
16
dropped and left. He didn’t hang around.
17
LC: I wouldn’t either.
18
RC: No, he didn’t hang around. The only thing we had and he did it at night.
19
The only thing we had to combat him was our what we called F-3D, which was a night
20
fighter. We had a squadron of night fighters there, 513, which I later became the CO of.
21
LC: These are jets?
22
RC: These were night fighter jets, right. They had their own radar intercept
23
system, but by the time they launched usually, again, recall that we didn’t have air
24
defense radar. So the first time we knew he was there is when you hear the (makes
25
karumph sound). So by the time we’d launch something after him, why he was gone, he
26
was long gone. He obviously flew out at a low altitude. The jets in those days, their
27
intercept gear wasn’t really that great.
28
LC: Would you say there was a serious effort to try to get him or not?
29
RC: Oh, I really don’t know. I really don’t know. As I said, I wasn’t in on that
30
part. I’m sure there was. He was harassment more than anything else and it would’ve
31
been quite a victory to have gotten him, but they never got him. He quit.
224
1
LC: He quit?
2
RC: He quit. He didn’t do it for a long period of time. He did it for probably a
3
month, two months.
4
LC: That was pretty risky, I would’ve thought, to do that for a month.
5
RC: For him.
6
LC: Yes, sir.
7
RC: Yeah, yeah. I’m sure that his tour was up probably and he couldn’t get
8
anybody else to volunteer for it.
9
LC: No, that wouldn’t be good duty. That would not be good duty. Just for
10
someone who might not understand, why would the airfield not have an air defense, a
11
ground based air defense system at all?
12
RC: Well, we didn’t have that many at that time.
13
LC: Okay.
14
RC: The war was over.
15
LC: Would, for example, the city of Seoul have had air defense?
16
RC: Yes, yes.
17
LC: Okay, but not a small airfield such as the one—
18
RC: We were a small, considered not a very prime target. We only had a group
19
there.
20
LC: Only Bed Check Charlie thought you were a prime target.
21
RC: Yeah, Bed Check Charlie, I think he had a particular vendetta against us or
22
something.
23
LC: Yeah, something was motivating this, unsure what.
24
RC: Yeah, that’s right.
25
LC: But at least he gave up eventually.
26
RC: That’s right.
27
LC: How was it for you personally to be back in Korea? How did you feel about
28
29
30
31
being back there and view your new role obviously as an aviator?
RC: Well, obviously I was—we’re now in what you would call occupation duty,
I guess. It was boring, rather boring.
LC: Yes, sir.
225
1
RC: We were kind of indirectly kind of hoping that something would happen so
2
we’d have something to do that was significant. Whereas all we were really doing was
3
continuing to train and we were continuing to provide close air support for the Marines in
4
particular. We did some for the Army, also.
5
6
LC: Did you get out of Pyeongtaek much to visit other areas or did you stay on
the airfield pretty much?
7
RC: Pretty much on the airfield. The only place that we flew and all of our
8
entertainment was at the airfield. We had an officer’s club and Hank Commiskey was
9
kind of a wild man.
10
LC: He kept things happening.
11
RC: He kind of kept things stirred up. I lived in the same hut with Hank. Hank
12
had a super hog leg. He had a great big long pistol, a magnum. His favorite past time at
13
night was to make bullets for that magnum.
14
LC: He would make his own bullets?
15
RC: Make his own bullets.
16
LC: What caliber gun was it? Do you know?
17
RC: It was a .45.
18
LC: Okay. So he’s sitting there with a little molten lead thing or something like
19
20
21
that?
RC: Yeah, yeah. He had the machine where you put the powder in and put the
slug on the end and then you clamp it. He made his own bullets.
22
LC: At this time, sir—
23
RC: I’ll tell you a little vignette about him, which is kind of interesting.
24
LC: Yes. Yes, please.
25
RC: We went up to the O-club one night and Hank had a couple too many drinks
26
and he whipped out his hog leg and started trying to shoot the bottles off the bar.
27
LC: How’d he do?
28
RC: He did pretty well, but he only got a couple off because Smitty and I went up
29
and grabbed him and we wrestled him. He was a big guy and very strong. We finally
30
wrestled him outside the club, got him out on the patio. We had a patio and kept fighting
31
him. He kept trying to get back in and we kept trying to get him disarmed. We had him
226
1
pretty well held down, but we all went over the side down the hill. At the bottom of the
2
hill, there’s concertina. So we all three wound up in the concertina.
3
LC: Ouch.
4
RC: But we finally got him calmed down and we got him disarmed and took him
5
back to the hut and put him to bed.
6
LC: Who got the worst of the interaction with the wire?
7
RC: Hank did.
8
LC: Did he?
9
RC: Yeah, he got the worst of it. Hank and Ed. I only got torn a couple of places
10
11
12
because I was on top.
LC: Oh, that was good. Good planning, I don’t know if it was planned, but good
planning.
13
RC: Yeah. (Laughing)
14
LC: At this point, had he been awarded the Medal of Honor yet?
15
RC: Yes. He was awarded the Medal of Honor when we went through flight
16
training.
17
LC: Okay, I was not sure when the—
18
RC: Yeah, while we were at flight training.
19
LC: When the award had taken place.
20
RC: Yeah, he got the Medal of Honor there. That was part of Hank’s problem.
21
Hank was called out because while we were there, the war was still going on and
22
obviously they were taking him out on tours and so on.
23
LC: Making a big deal of him?
24
RC: Recruiting tours and everything.
25
LC: Sure, sure. (Information removed per interviewee’s request.) When did he
26
decide to leave aviation and as an aviator, anyway? What was the rest of his career like?
27
RC: He quit right after Korea, I believe.
28
LC: He left the active service?
29
RC: No. He gave his wings up.
30
LC: Okay. Did he—?
31
RC: Then he became an ordnance officer.
227
1
LC: Did you keep in touch with him or—?
2
RC: I didn’t see him again.
3
LC: Really?
4
RC: No, I never saw him again. We were always at other ends of the assignment.
5
I was very disappointed. Well, very saddened, really. Hank eventually committed
6
suicide.
7
LC: When did that happen, sir? Do you know?
8
RC: Yeah, that happened at—he was assigned at Quantico. He was a base
9
ordnance officer there and he developed brain cancer.
10
LC: Would this have been in the ’70s or—?
11
RC: Yeah.
12
LC: Or a little later?
13
RC: Yeah, I think in the ’70s.
14
LC: That’s very sad.
15
RC: Yeah, it is sad because he was a great officer and a great man, but he decided
16
that he wasn’t going to—or else he was in such pain, I don’t know which, but he
17
eventually shot himself.
18
19
LC: As you think back on that, do you think it might’ve been to his own personal
advantage that he not have been awarded the Medal of Honor?
20
RC: Absolutely, absolutely.
21
LC: Yes, it sort of sounds like it.
22
RC: I’ve known quite a few Medal of Honor winners.
23
LC: Yes, sir.
24
RC: I’ve served with a bunch of them, a couple of friends. My company
25
commander got the Medal of Honor in Korea.
26
LC: What kind of burden is it for those guys?
27
RC: Well, it’s a lot. They’re called—I’m working right now with a gentleman.
28
29
They’ve got an organization called the Legion of Honor. Have you heard of that?
LC: I have, yes.
228
1
RC: Okay. There’s a friend of mine who holds the Army Distinguished Service
2
Medal, Distinguished Service Cross. He’s heading up—we’re trying to raise a million
3
and a half dollars for our local Fisher House at the veterans’ hospital.
4
LC: Yes, sir, right there in the DFW (Dallas/Fort Worth) area.
5
RC: Right.
6
LC: In the Metroplex, yeah.
7
RC: Dick is, he’s constantly—as a matter of fact, he’s going up I think next week
8
or the week after next to West Point. They’ve called him up to West Point to give a
9
speech and he’s going all the time and those guys are.
10
LC: Yeah, they constantly are getting—
11
RC: They’re constantly being called upon to speak and to make appearances and
12
13
so on. It’s a real kind of a burden, heavy burden that they carry.
LC: Yeah. I would think so. They’re also, of course, looked upon, not only are
14
they called upon, but they’re also looked upon with such admiration by especially the
15
young servicemen.
16
RC: Exactly.
17
LC: That’s quite a lot to haul around, I would think.
18
RC: It’s a lot of—used more as recruiting than anything else. I’ve known, as I
19
say, quite a few of them. They usually wind up with some sort of personal, with some
20
sort of personal problems. Alcoholics or some suicides. You know, there’s too much
21
pressure, just too much pressure.
22
LC: It certainly would seem to me a lot to bear.
23
RC: Yeah, yeah.
24
LC: Not everybody who—not everybody is set up to handle that kind of thing.
25
RC: That’s right. That’s exactly right.
26
LC: It doesn’t come in graduated stages. It comes kind of all at once.
27
RC: Comes all at once and they never can get away from it because as long as
28
29
they wear it, why, they’ve got the responsibility.
LC: Yes, sir. Well, I want to ask if I can a little bit more about Korea and your
30
work there. You were flying combat patrols and some of these were up along the DMZ,
31
is that accurate?
229
1
RC: All the combat patrols were on the DMZ, day and night.
2
LC: Day and night?
3
RC: Mm-hmm.
4
LC: Sir, did you ever encounter anything even slightly unusual or did it just get
5
to be really routine?
6
RC: It was very routine.
7
LC: Nothing out of the ordinary?
8
RC: Nothing out of the ordinary that I went on.
9
LC: Okay. Not to say that you were hoping for something out of the ordinary,
10
but—
11
RC: We were very alert to it, obviously.
12
LC: Sure.
13
RC: Ready for it.
14
LC: Because you must certainly have been aware that this was, although an
15
armistice had been signed, this was a hair-trigger area where—
16
RC: Absolutely.
17
LC: Literally anything could happen pretty much.
18
RC: Absolutely. Yeah, we watched very carefully and as I say, day and night, we
19
watched any movements or anything unusual. That was our purpose.
20
LC: Were you always fully loaded with ordnance?
21
RC: Yes, always ready.
22
LC: Okay.
23
RC: We were always in contact. By now, they had set up control features,
24
control stations throughout Korea that we talked to. So we’d report into them at every
25
checkpoint.
26
LC: Okay. So that they could make sure that you were continuing on your route.
27
RC: So they knew where we were and so they could locate us instantly, you
28
know, instantaneously so they could react if necessary.
29
LC: Did you get any R&R (rest and recuperation) away from this routine?
30
RC: Yeah. We went on one R&R.
31
LC: Okay. Where’d you go?
230
1
RC: I was there fourteen months. We went on one R&R to Japan. I went with
2
Hank Commiskey and Ed Smith. The three of us went because we all reported in at the
3
same time.
4
LC: Ya’ll had R&R at the same time.
5
RC: We all had R&R at the same time.
6
LC: How long did it last, a week or so?
7
RC: Well, one week, yeah, five days I think we had.
8
LC: How much trouble did you guys get into?
9
RC: Oh, not a lot, not a lot.
10
LC: Not too much? Okay, I’m glad to hear that.
11
RC: Yeah. I know that I was a little bit, I guess, startled. They put us in a
12
barracks. They put us up in a barracks. When you went in to take a shower, well, the
13
mama-sans came in the shower and was cleaning the shower at the same time.
14
LC: While you were in there cleaning up?
15
RC: While you’re in there, yeah, yeah. So that’s the first time that had ever
16
happened to me.
17
LC: Yeah, that can rattle your cage a little.
18
RC: Yeah, yeah. But we just kind of went around and we did a lot of sightseeing
19
and so on.
20
LC: Sure. Did you then go into Tokyo and so on?
21
RC: No, no.
22
LC: Where did you go?
23
RC: We just went into Kobe. Then we went in and we finally went in and left the
24
barracks and went in and rented, each of us rented a place in a hotel there in Kobe and not
25
much to tell you.
26
LC: Did you encounter any, while you were in Japan either at this time or earlier
27
on, had you encountered or seen any kind of anti-American feeling or did you get
28
anything on the edge of a remark or a look from people that let you know that this had
29
just been an occupied country for six years?
231
1
RC: No, no. As a matter of fact, I think my contact with the Japanese on
2
subways, on trains, on the streets, in restaurants and so on, they were all pretty pleasant,
3
really.
4
LC: You would’ve been in uniform almost all the time?
5
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah, we were always in uniform, but they were pretty pleasant
6
people. The Japanese didn’t, and particularly the men, they didn’t have anything to do
7
with us, so to speak, because we didn’t speak the same language. Most of them were,
8
very few of them at that time spoke English.
9
LC: Yes.
10
RC: Now you go to Japan, everybody speaks English.
11
LC: Everybody does, yes.
12
RC: Yeah. But no, I would say they were pretty, how could you say it?
13
LC: They were accepting, essentially.
14
RC: They accepted us. They accepted us.
15
LC: You didn’t get any feelings or sense of resentment or lingering?
16
RC: No, I didn’t. No, I didn’t.
17
LC: Lingering upset over the war.
18
RC: No.
19
LC: Yeah, that’s very interesting even at this point in 1954, ’55.
20
RC: Yeah.
21
LC: Really interesting.
22
RC: Particularly at that time because it’s well, it’s you know, it’s nine years after
23
the war.
24
LC: Right, and of course, they’ve been occupied.
25
RC: Still a lot of the old timers around.
26
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
27
RC: But they kind of, you never really had any encounters. I never really had
28
one encounter with them of any kind that I can remember.
29
LC: Nothing sustained, anyway.
30
RC: Unh-unh.
232
1
2
3
4
LC: Yeah. Well, when did your orders come through for another assignment that
took you out of Korea and away from—?
RC: Well, it came through, let’s see. I left in ’55 and I went to Hawaii. Our
squadron, they pulled our squadron out of Korea.
5
LC: So this is the 212th?
6
RC: 212. They sent us to Hawaii. Most of the people in the squadron were
7
reassigned to Stateside.
8
LC: What about you?
9
RC: I was assigned to take the unit equipment. Again, you probably recall from
10
my previous time, I was always the guy that had to do the dirty work, so to speak.
11
LC: The clean up.
12
RC: Yeah, yeah. So anyway, I took all the equipment and the aircraft went
13
aboard carriers. They were transported back to Hawaii to Kaneohe. So I took them back
14
there and we reformed the squadron. I was only there about two months.
15
LC: Where did you go from there?
16
RC: From there I went to Miami.
17
LC: To the naval air station or—?
18
RC: To the Marine Corps air station.
19
LC: Oh, Marine Corps air station.
20
RC: Yeah, in Miami. I was an assistant airfield operations officer, which I
21
wasn’t too happy with.
22
LC: Why not?
23
RC: Well, it wasn’t in a combat unit and we did mainly taking care of
24
25
administrative stuff on the airfield.
LC: Were you—I mean, obviously you’re still committed to the Corps. You’re
26
still committed to naval aviation, but this assignment wasn’t, you know, the nice fruit
27
from the big tree that you wanted. Did you just decide to go with it because you knew it
28
would only last for a certain amount of time?
29
RC: Yeah, it was part of my job. So I accepted it.
30
LC: Okay. Did you have—?
31
RC: I made the most of it.
233
1
LC: How did you do that?
2
RC: Well, we had a couple of things that were happening down there that I got
3
involved in.
4
LC: Like?
5
RC: Well, at the air station, they had some residual aircraft from Korea and
6
World War II. They had the F-7F, which was a two-engine night fighter and we had F-
7
2H Banshees, which was a jet fighter. We had ADs and we had SNBs. We had C-47s.
8
The one thing that they had that nobody else had is we had an F-7U, which was an
9
aircraft that had been sent there specifically to do a mission and I got involved in it. I
10
was one of two pilots who got involved in it, volunteered, nobody else volunteered.
11
LC: Okay. Did you know what the mission was when you volunteered?
12
RC: Yeah.
13
LC: What was it?
14
RC: Well, we were running a test program on dropping atomic mines.
15
LC: These would be mines, for example, to mine a harbor?
16
RC: To mine a harbor. They were atomic. We were developing tactics to drop
17
them, to put them in place. The idea was to do it, to get in and get out as quickly as
18
possible. The one reason they wanted to use the F-7U was it was a fighter with an
19
afterburner, one of the first fighters with an afterburner.
20
21
LC: Now pretty much everybody would be able to visualize an afterburner, but
what impact does it have in the actual flight?
22
RC: Well, it gives you an extra kick, a lot of extra power.
23
LC: In other words, it’s like putting a pedal right straight down—
24
RC: So put the pedal to the metal and you can go fast, go real fast. As a matter of
25
fact, the tactic was, and we would carry a dummy bomb, same configuration, made the
26
same way as the real thing.
27
LC: So the same weight and everything?
28
RC: Everything. We’d carry that and we’d carry it at high speed. What I would
29
do is I would take off in afterburner. Actually I had to have an afterburner to take off
30
with that weight. Took off with afterburner and left it at afterburner after I got altitude,
234
1
left it at afterburner for the entire flight into the brake. I came into the brake at five
2
hundred knots. It was all above five hundred knots.
3
4
LC: Can you translate that to MPH (miles per hour) roughly without your slide
rule?
5
RC: Well, let’s see, seven and—it’s about six hundred.
6
LC: Okay, and that’s, I mean, this is huge for 1955.
7
RC: Yeah. Yeah, it was.
8
LC: Okay. You would need that kind of, the capability to reach that speed, you
9
10
would need that power at takeoff because of the weight?
RC: Yeah. Then you tried to maintain your speed. You’ve climbed as high as
11
you could because you’re fighting a fuel problem now. The afterburner burns a lot of
12
fuel. So your flight was very short, flight was only about twenty minutes before you
13
were out of fuel. So I’d fly five hundred knots and calculated to save enough fuel so that
14
when you hit the brake, you had enough for one landing, one go around and one landing.
15
LC: And that’s it.
16
RC: That’s it.
17
LC: Was the thought that these flights would be carrier-based?
18
RC: Probably, yes, yes, probably, because of the short range.
19
LC: Now you said that only a couple of you volunteered. Who was offered the
20
chance to work on this project, everybody who was at Miami at that time?
21
RC: Everybody that was in the—
22
LC: All the qualified flyers?
23
RC: That were in the airfield, the guys out of the squadrons. They didn’t ask
24
them to do it. They wanted people that were out of the station because it was being run
25
by the station. It wasn’t a wing project.
26
LC: Okay. What was the distinction between a project run by the station?
27
RC: Oh, nothing really, except they didn’t want to take any of the so-called
28
tactical pilots out of the tactical units.
29
LC: Right, because of course they were already assigned with other missions.
30
RC: Right. So they took experienced pilots out of the station and asked all them.
31
LC: About how many people are we talking about?
235
1
2
RC: Oh, gosh, I guess experienced people in the station at that time? Probably
twenty-five.
3
LC: They got two people to bite.
4
RC: Yeah.
5
LC: You and who else?
6
RC: A guy by the name of Jim Harrington.
7
LC: Did you and Jim have particular briefings on the weapon and the aircraft and
8
so on?
9
RC: Yeah, we did, we did. We went to the Naval Mine Depot, which was up the
10
road a little bit in Florida from Miami. We went there and we got a few briefings. Then,
11
of course, we knew how to fly the airplane, which was quite interesting. In these days,
12
we have airplanes that you have simulators that you go in.
13
LC: Yes, the simulators on the ground.
14
RC: But we didn’t have simulators in those days.
15
LC: Right. You had to do the real deal.
16
RC: So I remember, they handed me the handbook and said, “Here it is.” They
17
didn’t even have a test for the handbook. I just read the handbook and went out and flew
18
it.
19
LC: Had you ever been in an F-7 before?
20
RC: (Phone makes dialing sounds) Sorry.
21
LC: I’m sorry, that—
22
RC: Was that you?
23
LC: No, that was probably someone else calling in on your line. Let’s see if it
24
happens again. I can cut this out, don’t worry, General. Nope, looks like they’re gone.
25
RC: Okay.
26
LC: You were saying that you read the handbook. I wondered if you had been in
27
28
an F-7 before?
RC: No, no. As a matter of fact, to my knowledge, Jim and I are the only two
29
Marine pilots that ever flew one.
30
LC: No kidding?
31
RC: Yeah, it was called the “Ensign Killer.”
236
1
LC: I bet we can all guess why.
2
RC: Well, because they took them aboard ship and they had so many accidents
3
with them and generally of less experienced pilots, they had a lot of casualties. It was
4
nicknamed the “Ensign Killer,” I don’t know how many.
5
LC: Yikes. Well, it gives you an idea.
6
RC: The problem with the aircraft is it had an exceptionally long—it had all the
7
new gadgets on it. It was a Chance Vought aircraft made here in Dallas. It had ailerons
8
that worked to control your turns and also controlled the whole aircraft. In other words,
9
you didn’t have a tail empennage on it.
10
LC: Okay.
11
RC: So it had all types of new gadgets. When you put your flaps down, why, a
12
whole bunch of things would happen that doesn’t happen in other aircraft. So because of
13
the way the aircraft was built, the angle of attack you had to have for takeoff in particular,
14
you had to have a high angle, very high angle of attack. So you had a long nose strut. A
15
nose strut was thirteen feet long. So you were sitting way up in the air. As a matter of
16
fact, you were sitting at such an angle that you had to crank the seat forward in order to
17
land, to see the land, to see the ground. Otherwise you’re looking purely at sky. So to
18
line yourself up for your landing and so on, you had to crank your seat forward. I
19
remember the first time I went out—well, it wasn’t the first time, maybe a couple of
20
times later. I forgot to crank my seat down and when you come in and you brake and
21
come into land and you put your flaps and everything down, all of a sudden all I saw was
22
sky. You know?
23
LC: Well, that’s worrying.
24
RC: Yeah, a couple of anxious moments there.
25
LC: I’ll bet you.
26
RC: A couple of deep breaths.
27
LC: I’ll bet you.
28
RC: Yeah.
29
LC: How’d you recover that?
30
RC: Oh, you just—
31
LC: Scooch forward or—?
237
1
2
3
4
RC: No. You very quickly hit your power, push your nose down and then adjust
your seat so that you know what you’re doing the next time.
LC: Well, yes, you learn that lesson, I’m sure, but you’re also belted back to the
seat I would imagine.
5
RC: Yeah, your seat’s way back.
6
LC: Right. You are belted to it.
7
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah, you’ve got a shoulder harness on.
8
LC: Yeah.
9
RC: So you can’t lean forward.
10
11
LC: How many Gs would you be likely to pull in an F-7 in one of the dive runs
that you would do?
12
RC: No, I didn’t do any dive runs.
13
LC: Oh, okay, just drop. So you’d just be dropping at a high altitude?
14
RC: Yeah. I had to pull a lot of Gs when I came into the brake because you came
15
into the brake fast. So in order to keep from being ten miles away, you had to pull a lot
16
of Gs to get around to your 180 position.
17
LC: Any estimate of how many?
18
RC: Oh, not too many, probably four or five, four or five Gs.
19
LC: Now to drop the actual ordnance—
20
RC: We didn’t drop ordnance. We just carried it.
21
LC: You just carried it, but you were planning—
22
RC: The main thing that they were worried about was what was the flight
23
characteristics and what was the effect on the weapon.
24
LC: Okay.
25
RC: So they were checked each time after each flight. I think I made about forty
26
27
28
flights like that.
LC: Okay. So the point of these flights was to evaluate impact on the aircraft and
impact on the actual weapon itself.
29
RC: Right.
30
LC: Of traveling at these speeds.
31
RC: Right.
238
1
LC: Were you briefed on what they learned?
2
RC: No. No, I was not.
3
LC: You were just told to—
4
RC: I was just simply the guy that flew the aircraft.
5
LC: Do the exercise and we’ll take it from there.
6
RC: Right. They did all the checking and I don’t really know what they were
7
looking for. The main thing that they said was, “We want you to take this out, go as fast
8
as you can for as long as you can for as many times as you can because we need to
9
evaluate this. We’ll do all the research.”
10
11
LC: Okay. What did the dummy, the dummy ordnance piece look like? Did it
hang off the bottom of the aircraft?
12
RC: Yes. It was hung just like a bomb.
13
LC: Like a tube looking type thing?
14
RC: Well, it’s just like a big bomb is what it looked like.
15
LC: Did it have fins and everything on it?
16
RC: Uh-huh.
17
LC: Okay. So that would be used, if it were dropped, that would be used for
18
19
20
direction.
RC: Yeah, I think so. I don’t know whether it had any guidance system on it or
not, to tell you the truth. I didn’t inquire because it wasn’t—
21
LC: That wasn’t your bailiwick.
22
RC: It was a secret type thing at that time.
23
LC: Oh, sure. Oh, sure. Absolutely it would’ve been. It would’ve been. You
24
said that the weight of this thing was just enormous.
25
RC: No, it wasn’t enormous I don’t think because really the aircraft, in those
26
days you know, that’s kind of the early days in the development of jets. They really
27
didn’t have many afterburner aircraft. The only one that they had at that time, I think,
28
was the F-7U. So I think really it was—what am I wanting to say? It was pretty routine
29
for me and all I was doing was flying and the development of the thing was up to other
30
people. The only aircraft they had that could do it at that time was the F-7U. It had
239
1
enough power to get up to speed and hold the speed. Now, and they could’ve put it on
2
another aircraft, but they couldn’t have gotten it that fast.
3
LC: I see.
4
RC: And held it for that long.
5
LC: That’s part of what they were testing, the parameters, probably.
6
RC: That’s right. It had a lot of effect—the F-7U probably was the forerunner of
7
a lot of your modern jets. They had a lot of trouble with it, as I say, because of its
8
configuration. It’s more difficult to fly than conventional jets.
9
LC: Did you have fun flying these flights?
10
RC: I loved it.
11
LC: I bet you did.
12
RC: Yes, I loved it. I will say this, the aircraft really was kind of a flying junk
13
heap because it broke all the time. It broke after practically every flight. Now and these
14
flights, I said I had forty of them and that was stretched out probably over a year because
15
the aircraft would go down and they’d have to work on it and get it back up again.
16
That’d take three or four days usually because the way it was configured, I remember it
17
had, I think it had nine hydraulic pumps on it. If a hydraulic pump went out, they had to
18
pull the engine to replace the hydraulic pump. It was a maintenance man’s nightmare. It
19
really was.
20
LC: Yes, or job security.
21
RC: That’s right.
22
LC: Either one.
23
RC: Right. That’s exactly right.
24
LC: Now, General, did you get to fly the other aircraft that were at the station
25
while you were there?
26
RC: I flew them all.
27
LC: You flew C-47s?
28
RC: Yeah. SNBs, F-7Fs. F-7Fs.
29
LC: You mentioned the Banshees.
30
RC: ADs, F-2Hs.
240
1
2
LC: I mean, in some ways, as you say, you did make the most out of this because
it gave you some experience in all these different aircraft.
3
RC: Well, you got to remember now, when I went into flight training, I was a
4
captain. So I was way behind the power curve as far as experience, flight experience.
5
My main objective was to build up time and experience as quickly as I could.
6
LC: Make up for—
7
RC: So I flew a lot. I volunteered for every kind of flight and every aircraft that I
8
could to catch up and eventually caught up and passed everybody.
9
LC: In terms of hours?
10
RC: In terms of hours, yeah.
11
LC: Also, I would guess you’re essentially grabbing at the experience of flying,
12
all these different kind of aircrafts.
13
RC: Oh, I loved it. It’s fun to fly. I took a Banshee up to over fifty thousand
14
feet. I didn’t know of anybody that had gone that high up to that time. So I wanted to do
15
that.
16
LC: Was that another volunteer mission?
17
RC: Yeah.
18
LC: Can you describe that day?
19
RC: Well, it just was kind of scary when you got—oh, it wasn’t really scary, but
20
it was just kind of different.
21
LC: Well, sure.
22
RC: When you got up that high with that aircraft because it really didn’t have the
23
power to get up that high, you know. It had two engines, but—
24
LC: It wasn’t designed for that.
25
RC: It was not designed for very high altitude flight. It didn’t have afterburners
26
and you couldn’t get out of trouble—if you got into trouble where you got too slow, why,
27
the only way you could get your speed up was to go down.
28
LC: How long would you say you were up on the ceiling up there?
29
RC: Oh, I was up there probably fifteen minutes is all.
30
LC: What does it look like up there?
31
RC: No different, kind of awesome just to know that you’re that high.
241
1
LC: Oh, yes, sir.
2
RC: But a lot of people, you know, the people that flew the reconnaissance
3
aircraft later on went a lot higher than that.
4
LC: Yes. They were routinely up above seventy, I guess.
5
RC: You got your friend John Glenn who did the orbit of the earth and so on, that
6
was pretty high.
7
LC: Yes, sir. Fifty was pretty good height.
8
RC: In those days, fifty was out of the envelope, well out of the envelope.
9
LC: Now what did they kit you out with in order to make this flight possible,
10
anything special?
11
RC: Nothing, nothing.
12
LC: Oxygen?
13
RC: I just told them—oh, yeah. You’re on oxygen all the time above eighteen
14
thousand feet.
15
LC: Okay, and that’s it?
16
RC: Yeah.
17
LC: Special suit?
18
RC: No.
19
LC: You just—
20
RC: I just went.
21
LC: You just went and winged it.
22
RC: Yup, that’s right.
23
LC: Okay. It sounds like you had a blast doing it.
24
RC: I did. I did.
25
LC: Was this a planned flight such that they were trying to evaluate something
26
27
28
about the aircraft?
RC: No, no, no. As a matter of fact, they didn’t really know I was going to do it.
I told them after I did it.
29
LC: What’d they say?
30
RC: They were a little amazed and they said, “Don’t do it again.”
31
LC: Yeah. “What’re you thinking Carey?”
242
1
RC: Yeah. “What are you trying to do?”
2
LC: General, if you would, tell me a little bit about the C-47 and how you got
3
along with that aircraft. What did you think of it?
4
RC: I liked the C-47. You know, that’s the Gooney Bird.
5
LC: Yes, sir.
6
RC: I have quite a few hours in that. I volunteered for all the—we did the
7
support. Miami did the support for all the missile chain down through the Caribbean.
8
LC: Yes.
9
RC: We used to fly equipment and supplies down to them. I volunteered for all
10
those missions. I did as much as I could in that regard.
11
LC: So you got a lot of hours that way.
12
RC: Made a lot of hours that way and I volunteered for any special project they
13
had, any special flights.
14
LC: The C-47—
15
RC: Gooney Bird.
16
LC: Yeah. Can you just describe it in terms of its power and its principle
17
18
functions were—?
RC: Well, its principle function initially, of course, was a transport. What we
19
used it for was that. We did use it for transport. We transported people. But principally,
20
we transported supplies. The main reason we had them was for the support of the missile
21
chain. We had two of them.
22
LC: So it’s a lot slower aircraft than what we’ve been talking about.
23
RC: Oh, yeah, it’s only 115, 120 knots. Well, you could get it up to 140.
24
LC: If you worked hard.
25
RC: Well, we—well, no, we cruised about 140, as I recall.
26
LC: Did you? Okay.
27
RC: Maybe a little bit slower than that. It didn’t go very high. It was kind of a
28
little bit tricky in crosswinds. I had one flight with a friend of mine that we got caught in
29
the edge of a thunderstorm, which eventually developed into a tornado. I recall we went
30
up to about twenty-five thousand feet and we couldn’t control it. In other words, I had
31
everything down, I had the flaps down, the gear down, all the power off and it was still
243
1
going up. Then when I got to the other side of it, the opposite had happened. So I had to
2
go full power to stop my descent, finally got it stopped.
3
4
LC: In a situation like that, General, did you have to kind of fly by feel? Did you
have to kind of figure out what to do because this is not a training situation?
5
RC: Yeah, that’s right. Just react.
6
LC: Yes, and that’s based—
7
RC: That’s where your experience comes in more than anything else. It’s more
8
9
10
seat-of-the-pants type thing than anything else.
LC: Yes, sir. You’re just kind of processing and thinking about what you’ve
already learned and how this aircraft typically handles.
11
RC: Sure, sure.
12
LC: You were in Miami for how long?
13
RC: Let’s see. I was there about three years.
14
LC: Three years. So would it be fair to say ’55 to ’58, something like that?
15
RC: Right, right.
16
LC: Did you ever get down to Cuba?
17
RC: Yeah.
18
LC: Like go to Havana for the weekend or something like that?
19
RC: I’d pass through Havana. No, I didn’t—we stopped there. Well, I take it
20
back. We spent a night there on one of our supply missions. I landed in Havana. I did
21
go out and went to a restaurant and looked the town over, but we had a late arrival and an
22
early depart. So I didn’t get to spend much time there.
23
LC: So not much time on that visit or anytime?
24
RC: Well, on that visit. Later on I got into Guantanamo and flew out of
25
Guantanamo quite a bit. As a matter of fact, I flew on the—when we had the Cuban
26
Missile Crisis, I flew a couple of missions on that.
27
LC: Okay. Well, I’ll ask you about that maybe next time.
28
RC: Okay.
29
LC: Okay. Let’s take a break there.
244
Interview with Richard Carey Session [6] of [16] December 8, 2005 1
Laura Calkins: This is Dr. Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Gen. Richard E. Carey. Today is
3
the eighth of December 2005. I am in Lubbock and the General is speaking by telephone
4
from the Fort Worth area. Am I right, sir?
5
Richard Carey: Yes.
6
LC: I think you live in the—
7
RC: In Dallas/Fort Worth.
8
LC: In God’s country over there.
9
RC: Yes.
10
LC: Sir, last time we spoke at some length about your assignment in the late
11
1950s in Miami at the Marine Corps air station there. You talked a little bit about some
12
of the aircraft that you had a chance to fly while you were there and that this was a good
13
assignment because you did have those opportunities and you flew down to the different
14
Caribbean sites. We spoke about that at some length. I wonder, how did you find out
15
that you were going to depart from Miami and get a new posting? Where did you end up
16
going?
17
RC: Well, actually I was working all the time. As an aviator, I wanted to get
18
back to tactical units instead of support units. The air station is considered to be a
19
support unit.
20
LC: Now why were you so keen for this, sir?
21
RC: Well, I’m a Marine and I’m a fighter. I like to be where the action is and
22
there’s more action in the tactical units potentially. So I was always working, calling
23
headquarters and writing letters and so on, trying to get transferred over to the tactical
24
units that were stationed there at Miami. I eventually succeeded and was transferred into
25
the group at Miami and was transferred to a squadron, was transferred to VMFA, Marine
26
Fighter Attack Squadron 251, VMF then it was, Marine Fighter Squadron 251. They
27
were flying F-J3s, F-J3, which was an offshoot of the Saber Jet. You’ve probably heard
28
of those.
245
1
LC: It was a modification-updated version, essentially?
2
RC: Yes, yes.
3
LC: Was it a higher-powered version?
4
RC: Oh, yes, higher powered, much better performance than a Saber Jet. So I
5
went into that squadron, into the VMF-251. There I was flying missions. We went down
6
to—we did training missions, principally, and we did a couple of tours down to Cuba,
7
down to the base in Cuba at Guantanamo Bay.
8
LC: Now what year are we talking about when you joined 251?
9
RC: Let’s see. Gosh, that had to be 1954, ’55. Am I thinking right? No.
10
LC: A little later?
11
RC: A little later than that, maybe 1958, maybe 1958.
12
LC: When you would go down to Guantanamo Bay, the base down there, what
13
14
were your missions to be accomplished?
RC: Well, principally training missions because at that time, the United States
15
and Cuba were in fairly good relations. Of course, Castro was now, no, no, no, no, not in
16
those days. Who preceded Castro? I’m trying to think.
17
LC: Um, hmm, good one.
18
RC: Yeah, oh, gosh, memories, memories, memories.
19
LC: He was a friend of the United States, though.
20
RC: That’s right. He was a friend of the United States. Oh dear, dear, dear, dear.
21
LC: Well, it’s early in the morning.
22
RC: We’ll think about it. We’ll think about it.
23
LC: It’ll come to us.
24
RC: Yeah. But anyway, we were down there principally to occupy the base.
25
They tried to keep tactical units in their training because it was a good training area,
26
particularly for fighters.
27
LC: Why do you say that?
28
RC: Well, you had a lot of airspace. It was unimpeded with commercial flights
29
and that sort of thing. You had the entire ocean south of Cuba there to operate in. So it
30
was a good place to do tactics and things such as that. So that’s the primary reason that
31
we went down.
246
1
LC: Now when you’re talking about training for tactical missions, can you
2
describe some—I mean, are we talking about specific types of maneuvers that you might
3
take the aircraft through—?
4
RC: Oh, yes.
5
LC: In an engagement with an enemy and you’re practicing those?
6
RC: Well, what’d you do is you’d have an enemy and a friend out of the same
7
squadron and one would play the enemy and one would be the friend. They would go out
8
as if they were coming into attack the enemy, designated enemy where would go out and
9
approach Guantanamo as if they were coming to attack the base. Then we would engage
10
them to defend the base.
11
LC: Wow.
12
RC: So then you’d have air-to-air combat with cameras and try to prove who shot
13
down who and so on. So you kind of tried to prove yourself as a fighter pilot then. So
14
that was a principle thing that we did there. Obviously you do some other basic things
15
like instrument flying, instrument training, which wasn’t too good in Guantanamo
16
because the weather’s usually pretty good down there except during the hurricane season.
17
So we did some of that and we did special formation type flights. Often times we’d join
18
new pilots and we’d check them out in the aircraft down there and so on. But we would
19
deploy down there for a month at a time. During that time, we’d have very intensive
20
flight operations. So it was an enjoyable period. We couldn’t go off the base. You
21
weren’t allowed to go off the base. But we did have some good times.
22
LC: I’m sure you did. This sounds like work that you wanted to do.
23
RC: That’s right. That’s right. So learning our trade basically is what you’d say.
24
LC: Can you explain the role of the cameras in the air-to-air combat that you
25
26
would be practicing?
RC: Well, all they would do is they would basically look through your gun sight
27
and you would obviously—in those days, we didn’t have the missiles. I’ve got the date
28
pinned down now. It was in ’54. We didn’t have the missiles, so you’d look through
29
your guns sight and obviously you’d make a gun run on an enemy, opposing aircraft.
30
Then it would record whether you were accurate or not.
247
1
2
LC: So your principle weapon at this point if you were in an armed situation
would’ve been what, a .50-cal?
3
RC: No, a 20 millimeter.
4
LC: Twenty millimeter. Okay, wow.
5
RC: Yeah.
6
LC: You had to be pretty precise then.
7
RC: That’s right. That’s right. We did air-to-air gunnery while we were down
8
there too where one of the aircraft is a tow aircraft and you tow a sleeve, which is a long
9
banner. They go up to altitude, usually twenty thousand feet, some of them to thirty, but
10
mostly twenty thousand feet because that’s where probably an attacking force would
11
come in at a lower level. So you’d probably go up to about twenty and then make your
12
attack. But you’d have painted rounds in your guns. You’d go out and make—the
13
banner would be towed in a straight line and you’d make runs on the banner to hit the
14
banner.
15
LC: Of course, he’s going at speed.
16
RC: Yeah, he’s going at speed. So it’s just like you would do in a combat
17
situation, but principally designed to get the pilot, to train the pilot to take the proper lead
18
and so on.
19
20
LC: Now who or what kind of pilots would be the ones in the unlucky position of
towing the sleeve?
21
RC: Well, we took turns.
22
LC: Did you have to do that?
23
RC: Oh, yes.
24
LC: Was it frightening?
25
RC: No, no.
26
LC: Not at all?
27
RC: No, no. No, the only part of it that would be frightening is if you had
28
somebody that’s got a little bit in trail, too far in trail, got sucked we used to call it, got
29
sucked behind the banner and then he’d fire up your tailpipe. As a matter of fact, we had
30
one, in a later version of a different aircraft on a different deployment down there, who
31
got shot down, a friend of mine.
248
1
LC: Because of this exact kind of mistake?
2
RC: Because they flew up his tailpipe and shot him down.
3
LC: Was he able to eject?
4
RC: Oh, yes. He was able to eject.
5
LC: When did this happen, roughly?
6
RC: Oh, this happened after, at the next tour when I went down to Guantanamo.
7
The next tour was in F-8, Crusader jets.
8
LC: Were you still based in Miami?
9
RC: No, no, that was up at Beaufort, South Carolina. That’s when Castro came
10
11
12
13
14
in. That’s why I was pinning down the date.
LC: Oh, sure, okay. Well, this towing the banner thing sounds a little hairy for
somebody who has never flown.
RC: Well, through the uninitiated, yes, it would be, it would. But there were
safety procedures built in. Most of the pilots knew when they should stop firing.
15
LC: Of course, these exercises must’ve been planned pretty carefully in advance.
16
RC: Oh, yes.
17
LC: Would you have a briefing session before you would go on an exercise?
18
RC: Oh, absolutely, briefing and debriefing both, on each end of the flight.
19
LC: Now on the debriefing end, what kinds of things would you be asked about?
20
Would you be asked about aircraft performance, your own performance, other pilots, or
21
everything?
22
RC: Well, your own performance was measured in that particular instance,
23
before, it was measured by a camera, which showed whether you were able to get into
24
position to shoot the other aircraft down. The other is that you had your bullets, your
25
projectiles were painted so that when you hit the sleeve, you had different colors of paint,
26
whoever hit the sleeve.
27
LC: Oh, yeah?
28
RC: Yeah. So you could tell who hit the sleeve. Of course, the object, we had
29
different levels. You had what was called an E, you could win an E, which is for
30
excellent. You had to have a certain percentage of your hits on the banner. That was
31
done during what they called a COMPEX, which is a competitive exercise. They
249
1
wouldn’t do that on a daily basis, but you would be able to see if you hit the banner on a
2
daily basis, but then you would have, before you left, you’d have a final test. You’d have
3
the competitive exercise where’d you go up in different flights and each one would have
4
their banner marked. I mean, each one of them would have different color projectiles.
5
Then the individual would know whether he had earned an E or not, which was then
6
subsequently painted onto an aircraft which had his name on it and an E.
7
LC: Is that what happened with you, sir?
8
RC: Oh, I had an E. I always got an E.
9
LC: That’s what I figured.
10
RC: I was lucky.
11
LC: You were lucky, huh?
12
RC: Yeah, I was lucky.
13
LC: How many hours would you spend over the course of a month actually in
14
flight time during this period when you’re posted down there?
15
RC: Oh, in a month you would usually get anywhere from forty to fifty hours.
16
LC: Okay. Then of course, there are many, many hours spent in both the
17
briefing, the debriefing—
18
RC: Oh, yes, yes.
19
LC: And probably practices.
20
RC: And other duties in the squadron, we all had our duties. In that particular
21
squadron, I was the maintenance officer.
22
LC: What did that entail?
23
RC: I was responsible for the upkeep of the aircraft and maintenance of them and
24
all the maintenance crews came under me. I would have to supervise them and make
25
certain that they did the proper maintenance on the aircraft, all the periodic checks. If an
26
aircraft went down for some particular purpose, that it was properly prepared and put
27
back into an up status before it flew again.
28
LC: During this time period, did you have any experience with not being able to
29
obtain or your crews, your maintenance crews, not being able to obtain parts or any
30
difficulties like that in the supply line, on the supply side?
250
1
2
RC: Well, obviously when you’re deployed out of the United States, the supply is
a little bit less—
3
LC: Assured and—
4
RC: Right, mature or reactive. It doesn’t react as quickly as you need it a lot of
5
times. But on the other hand, we took a lot of parts with us when we went. We would
6
get ourselves pretty well prepared to go on the flights, to go on these training missions.
7
When we took off to go down there, every aircraft we took was up. Then it was just a
8
matter of maintaining them in an up status. So yes, we had delays because of supply
9
problems, they weren’t as good as they were in the United States, but just because of the
10
transit time and so on, but not too bad.
11
LC: So it wasn’t an inhibition to training. You didn’t see it as a—?
12
RC: No, no, no, no.
13
LC: It wasn’t that serious. Were you anticipating the next generation of fighter
14
aircraft at this point?
15
RC: Oh, you always do.
16
LC: I’ll bet.
17
RC: Yeah, you always know that there’s a better model coming out, a better
18
aircraft. Incidentally, while I was in 251, we also went to Roosevelt Roads down in
19
Puerto Rico.
20
LC: Oh, is that right?
21
RC: Yeah.
22
LC: Tell me a little bit about that.
23
RC: Oh, Roosevelt Roads in those days was a very active naval air station. It’s
24
since closed as part of the BRAC (base realignment and closure). But we trained there
25
and were able to go over to, fly over to Vieques and to fly in the Roosevelt Roads area.
26
They also had an Air Force base down at the end of the island, the other end of the island.
27
We would go up and we would work with them, the Air Force, also.
28
LC: By working with them, do you mean you’d have—?
29
RC: Down there, they had a bomber activity. In those days, I believe they had
30
the B-47s. They had the bomber activity. We would make runs on the bombers
31
simulating shooting them down and that sort of training.
251
1
2
3
4
LC: What was the Air Force, the fighter aircraft they were using at this time
primarily?
RC: Let’s see. They were flying probably in those days, the F-100s were just
coming in.
5
LC: Did you ever fly one of those?
6
RC: No, no, never flew one. The only Air Force aircraft that is actually actively
7
assigned to the Air Force that I flew was the F-15.
8
LC: That was later, that’s much later, yeah.
9
RC: That was later. Yeah, I flew that quite a bit later.
10
LC: Okay. Did you think that your F-J3s were better aircraft, the Marines?
11
RC: Well, we thought that they were—we considered those the top of the line at
12
that time. We were looking forward to the F-J4s and the follow-on to that which is the F-
13
8 Crusader. I eventually wound up in the F-8 Crusader.
14
LC: Was that when you were based in South Carolina?
15
RC: In South Carolina.
16
LC: Well, let me ask a little bit more about Puerto Rico. Were you able to get off
17
base when you were down there?
18
RC: Oh, yes, yes. We had a lot of fun.
19
LC: I’ll bet.
20
RC: Yeah, we went into San Juan. I had a little incident happen to me there.
21
LC: (Both laugh) Are you going to tell us what happened or—?
22
RC: Well, I can, I can tell you. I guess it would be kind of humorous.
23
LC: Then give us a certain version of it anyway.
24
RC: It was kind of humorous. My squadron CO and the XO, we all, and the, I
25
guess it was just the three of us. We might’ve had the ops officer with us, too, but we
26
went to San Juan. We wound up in this little bar in San Juan. We had a nice hotel suite
27
with two bedrooms and it was really nice. So we went down to the bar and we saw these
28
young ladies. So we had a few drinks with them. Then we invited them up to our suite
29
and they came up to the suite and nothing out of the ordinary. We just wanted to show
30
them our suite and so on because it was still early in the evening. Unbeknownst to us, the
31
hotel had rules that you couldn’t bring ladies to your hotel suite. So we brought them and
252
1
the house detective came and arrested us. So they took us to the pokey. Finally after,
2
well, in the morning, oh, I guess along about four o’clock in the morning, we finally
3
objected enough and finally got to somebody who listened to us and told them that our
4
intentions were very honorable. There was no full intent of hanky panky and so they let
5
us out. The squadron commander and the exec and myself were incarcerated for a few
6
hours.
7
LC: Well, at least the commander was there with you so that—
8
RC: That’s right. That helped.
9
LC: That was good cover.
10
RC: Yeah, that helped. I was kind of—they were very quiet, but I was a young,
11
kind of spunky captain. I think the main reason we might’ve got locked up is because I
12
was a little bit more vocal than anybody else. I think I kind of might’ve antagonized the
13
hotel detective. So he called the police and they came and hauled us away for a few
14
hours.
15
16
LC: What was the jail like? Do you remember it? Was it anything like what you
would see as a modern facility or not?
17
RC: No, it was pretty ragged, really.
18
LC: Pretty ramshackle?
19
RC: Yeah, pretty ramshackle. It wasn’t up to normal standards.
20
LC: Not anywhere you’d want to stay very long.
21
RC: That’s right. We were very anxious to get out of there.
22
LC: I’ll bet. I’ll bet you were.
23
RC: We chuckle about that whenever we see each other about that particular
24
incident. It would’ve been pretty dangerous for the CO in particular if the word had
25
gotten out and that never got back to the main headquarters back in the United States.
26
LC: That’s a good thing.
27
RC: Yeah, yeah. We kept it pretty quiet.
28
LC: Yeah. Well, let me ask about your move to South Carolina. How did that
29
30
31
come about?
RC: Well, I was in, as I said, VMF-251. They decided that they would close
down Miami and give it back to the civilian aviation authorities down there.
253
1
LC: So the, I’m sorry, Marine—
2
RC: So the Marines moved out of Miami. They had the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
3
was there, and an aircraft group, Marine Aircraft Group 31, I believe it was. No. Yes, 31.
4
They moved them to El Toro, California.
5
LC: Now both the 3rd and the 31st group?
6
RC: Yeah. Then they moved us, our squadron, I was transferred over to VMF-
7
333, which was also an F-J3 squadron. That squadron went to Beaufort, South Carolina,
8
to join MAG-32 (Military Air Group) up there.
9
LC: How many guys from VMF-251 went with you?
10
RC: Oh, probably half a dozen pilots and some of the maintenance people.
11
LC: Now at Beaufort, was that a Marine Corps air station or a naval air station?
12
RC: That was a Marine Corps air station, right, right. There they had, when we
13
moved in, they had all F-J3s and one squadron of F-8s.
14
LC: Did you get into the F-8 as quick—?
15
RC: Well, I did later. That’s part of the story, I guess, because when I first went
16
up to Beaufort, I went up as the operations officer of 333.
17
LC: What was the duty as the operations officer?
18
RC: Well, the duty of the operations officer is to conduct all the, plan and be
19
responsible for the conduct of all your operations in the unit, all your operations, which
20
include providing aircraft to the pilots for training and to participating in exercises and
21
whatever they were designated to do. So he’s the guy that kind of pulls the strings.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
LC: You would be doing forward planning for operations training exercises and
all the rest?
RC: That’s right. That’s right. You’re the man responsible to the commanding
officer and to the executive officer for that.
LC: Okay. Was that good duty? I mean, that sounds like something that would
be quite appealing, yeah.
RC: Oh, I loved it. Of course, I loved it. You’re kind of one of the big dogs in
29
the squadron. I was still a captain and I made major while I was there, which kind of
30
changed things a little bit. As soon as I made major, they transferred me out of the
31
squadron over to the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron because I’d had some
254
1
maintenance experience. I had operational experience, also. So they transferred me over
2
as executive officer of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 32.
3
4
5
6
LC: Just for someone who doesn’t sort of follow the architecture of the squadrons
and how they relate to each other, would you still have been part of VMF-333?
RC: No, no, no, no. I was transferred out of VMF-333 and took a completely
new assignment into Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 32.
7
LC: Still based at Beaufort though?
8
RC: Still based at Beaufort. See, Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron is
9
kind of the—in other words, I was moving up the chain, so to speak. Because the
10
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron has overall responsibility for the entire group.
11
The group at that time had three fighter squadrons in it.
12
13
LC: Let me just ask a little bit, sir, if I can about your time as the operations
officer and then we’ll follow up with your moving up the food chain.
14
RC: Okay.
15
LC: While you were the operations officer, were you also getting all of your
16
flight time as per usual as you had been earlier with the F-J3?
17
RC: As much as I could, yes.
18
LC: Did it detract from your ability to spend time in the cockpit to have these
19
20
other responsibilities?
RC: I didn’t get quite as much time as I did when I was a maintenance officer,
21
because also as a maintenance officer, I took most of the test tops. In other words,
22
whenever you run an aircraft through a maintenance check where you change the engine
23
and do major maintenance work to it, you usually take it out on a test flight before you
24
put it in the operational line.
25
LC: That’s called a test top?
26
RC: Test top.
27
LC: Okay.
28
RC: I did most of those when I was the maintenance officer.
29
LC: Now was that by choice or is that—?
30
RC: Well, both. Usually the maintenance officer is supposedly pretty
31
knowledgeable of the aircraft.
255
1
LC: Yes.
2
RC: He’s available more so to do maintenance type things. So the maintenance
3
officer usually would fly the test tops.
4
LC: It sounds like it was probably fun, too, because—
5
RC: Oh, yeah, absolutely, absolutely.
6
LC: You’re putting the, I would imagine, putting the aircraft right up against the
7
8
9
10
11
edge of the envelope, as we say now.
RC: Yeah, that’s right. That’s right. That’s the whole purpose of a test top.
Exactly, you try to be certain that it’s ready and combat ready and ready for operations
completely in all regards. That’s what a test pilot does.
LC: Right. You wouldn’t necessarily just go up and circle around a couple of
12
times, “Oh, everything looks good.”
13
RC: No, no, no, no.
14
LC: You’d put it right up to the wall.
15
RC: Usually you did, yes, depending upon what the test was for, what it had
16
done. Now if you change an engine, absolutely, you put it right up to its limits, check
17
everything out, make certain it’s not going to come unglued with another pilot.
18
LC: You know, you mentioned that effectively you were test piloting these
19
aircraft after major maintenance. Did you have a thought in anywhere in here, this is the
20
mid-1950s, that you might actually like to be a test pilot for new aircraft?
21
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes, absolutely. That’s kind of a choice assignment. However,
22
the one thing that I was interested in was the operations, operations of the aircraft. In
23
order to become a test pilot, you had to go to advanced training. You had to go to an
24
upper echelon maintenance and test program, which is usually held away. The test pilot
25
training and so on was done out in California. It’s almost a year course. So that kind of
26
takes you out of the operational chain.
27
LC: So you’d be stepping off the—
28
RC: Stepping off the operational tactical things, which is what I wanted to do.
29
Plus, I wanted to get as much experience as I could because as you remember, I came
30
into aviation supposedly late.
31
LC: Yeah, quote unquote, “late.” Right, right.
256
1
RC: Right, because I had been a ground officer before. So when I came into
2
aviation as a captain, most of the aviators that went in originally as an aviator were a
3
thousand hours ahead of me.
4
LC: So you had time to make up in a way.
5
RC: So I had to make up time.
6
LC: Yeah, yeah.
7
RC: I did. I did very rapidly. By the time I was a major, I was right up with the
8
rest of them. So, you have to work at it, in other words, Dr. Laura.
9
LC: Well, yes, you have to figure out which track you want to commit to.
10
RC: Exactly, exactly. No, I loved the test aspect. Later on I used to go over to
11
Patuxent River and that’s where I first flew the F-18 and also flew some gliders over
12
there and a few things like that. So, I did that after I made general.
13
LC: So that you could—well, why would a general be out doing that?
14
RC: Well, you have to understand, really, as a general, my concept of being a
15
good general was to understand and hopefully have experience in all facets of the
16
organizations that you command. In other words, the more broad based you are in your
17
experience, in your knowledge, the better you’re going to be at your position. So I tried,
18
for example, when I was commanding general of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing in Cherry
19
Point later on in my career, I flew every aircraft in the wing and was qualified in every
20
aircraft. That’s kind of hard to do.
21
22
LC: Well, I would imagine because what lies behind that statement is a lot of
hours, a lot of studying.
23
24
RC: A lot of hours, a lot of studying, a lot of personal dedication to what you’re
doing.
25
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I think that’s what helps folks who will be listening to
26
these interviews to understand the depth not only of your career but also of the Marine
27
aviation.
28
RC: Right. When you want to go and you want to be a good commander, in
29
essence, as you move up to the top of the ladder, you want to be as good as you can be
30
and know as much as everybody that works for you.
31
LC: Know what they’re doing, what they’re experiencing.
257
1
2
3
RC: What their experience, what their trials are, you have to understand that to be
a good commander.
LC: Well, let’s take you back to this time when you were still a captain, I
4
suppose, a captain and an operations officer, which is for a whole squadron, which is
5
pretty unique as you pointed out. Most of the folks who would’ve had that position
6
would’ve well been a major before that assignment.
7
RC: That’s right.
8
LC: Now while you were an operations officer, is that the time, during that time
9
period when Castro took over in Cuba?
10
RC: No, that came a little bit later. Well, it came within months or so after that
11
because when he actually took over, I was in Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.
12
LC: So you had already received your promotion and had been moved up a level.
13
RC: Yeah. I was promoted while I was the operations officer.
14
LC: Okay. Well, can you tell me what you remember about the response in the
15
United States and particularly with the Marine aviators with whom you were working to
16
this change of government in Cuba?
17
RC: Yeah. Well, one of the things that obviously that we knew now, now they
18
were certain that they always had aircraft at Guantanamo. So they deployed, they always
19
had a couple of squadrons, at least one squadron deployed there obviously because of
20
Castro and they were concerned about him coming in, wanting to take the base over, even
21
though we had a long term lease.
22
LC: Now the Marines would always maintain a squadron there?
23
RC: The Marines always had a squadron there and the Navy would have,
24
periodically would have squadrons there, also. As a matter of fact, later on in one of my
25
later tours, we had a couple of fun times with the Navy squadron that were deployed
26
down there.
27
LC: Okay. Well, I’ll ask you about those.
28
RC: Yeah. (Both laugh) But yes, and we deployed down to Guantanamo and did
29
the same thing that we did in 251 from Miami and did pretty intensive training in the
30
United States. Beaufort was a good place to train because there we had, again, we had
31
the open waters. We had to get out on the airline, beyond the airways. The airways went
258
1
up and down the coast, as you know. So we would go farther out to sea and do our air-to-
2
air gunnery and that sort of thing. But we’re doing the same thing basically that we did at
3
Miami in 333.
4
5
6
LC: Were you called to a particular duty at Guantanamo because of the
revolution, as it were, in Cuba?
RC: No, not until later, our squadron wasn’t. They did deploy some squadrons
7
down there. They didn’t participate any way in the revolution. When they did the, what
8
did they call that where they—?
9
LC: Bay of Pigs?
10
RC: Bay of Pigs, yeah, the Bay of Pigs. When they did the Bay of Pigs, we were
11
alerted for that, but we never deployed. I think that that’s a known fact nationally that the
12
United States backed off at the last minute.
13
LC: Right, right. President Kennedy took a lot of heat for that.
14
RC: He took a lot of flak over it. He sure did, yeah.
15
LC: It seems like that experience, which occurred very early in his presidency
16
probably had a big impact on his thinking later on.
17
RC: Yeah. That’s right, that’s right.
18
LC: Were you happy at Beaufort including with the promotion and the change to
19
the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron?
20
RC: Yes, it was a lot of fun. It was a lot of fun. Beaufort was a fighter. We
21
called it “Fighter Town” because it was principally dedicated to fighter type aircraft.
22
23
24
LC: So the tactical work, it was tactical work primarily rather than support
missions going on.
RC: That’s right, all tactical type work. We would deploy in support of the 2nd
25
Marine Division and things like that. When they do their landing exercises, we would
26
support them.
27
LC: Now in the late 1950s, while you were there, I imagine, there were some
28
crises to which the United States did have military response in the Caribbean, in the
29
Dominican Republic and other places. Did any of those effect you?
30
31
RC: Oh, yes, yes. If you recall, now this came at a later time, of course, from
Beaufort when they had the Cuban Missile Crisis.
259
1
LC: Yeah, I really want to ask you about that because—
2
RC: But that’s later.
3
LC: Yes.
4
RC: That’s later. But we did deploy—well, of course, when they had the
5
Dominican Republic thing, I was in a different status then and I was involved in that
6
somewhat.
7
LC: By a different status, what do you mean, sir?
8
RC: Well, at that time, I was assigned to the 2nd Marine Division. I was doing a
9
lot of the coordination for the movement of the 2nd Marine Division units from the
10
Dominican Republic back to the United States and in support of them while they’re down
11
there.
12
LC: So that’s actually a little bit later than—
13
RC: That’s later on.
14
LC: Okay.
15
RC: Yeah.
16
LC: Well, I’ll come back to that and I’ll make a note that I should.
17
RC: Okay.
18
LC: At the maintenance squadron, as the—I think you said you were the XO.
19
RC: Initially I was the executive officer. The job there, of course, is to assist the
20
commander in the operation of the squadron, running of the squadron. What a
21
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron does, you’re responsible for the group
22
activities. You’re responsible for maintaining the group headquarters, which includes
23
obviously the group commander and the group exec and the group operations. The group
24
operations does the same thing at a group level, a group having three or more squadrons
25
as they do at the squadron level. But the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron is
26
responsible for maintaining their support, okay, and also for doing major maintenance for
27
all the aircraft in the group. In other words, if the group, if a squadron comes up with a
28
problem with a particular aircraft that they can’t solve, it goes to Headquarters and
29
Maintenance Squadron. The Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron is also responsible
30
for providing all the supplies and parts for the maintenance of the aircraft in the entire
31
group.
260
1
LC: Your group, was it three squadrons?
2
RC: Our group had, let’s see, at that time, we had one, two, three, four squadrons.
3
LC: Wow.
4
RC: Four squadrons, plus we had a Marine airbase squadron. Marine airbase
5
6
7
squadron again is responsible for the housekeeping things.
LC: So you in effect had, it’s fair to say, five squadrons for which you had
responsibility in terms of the overall maintenance issues.
8
RC: And support.
9
LC: And support.
10
RC: Right.
11
LC: Was this a period when all of those squadrons would have been supplied
12
13
with the same aircraft? Were they all F-J3s at this time?
RC: No, one squadron, VMFA, A standing for attack, VMFA squadron had
14
transitioned into the FAU-1 Crusader jet. That was an afterburner aircraft. That was the
15
top aircraft in the Marine Corps at the time, 1st Squadron.
16
17
LC: Now that kind of complicates things because you have more than one aircraft
type that you were—
18
RC: Exactly, exactly. So you have to plead up for that support.
19
LC: Now I would assume, sir, from what you’ve said about your interest in flying
20
every aircraft and that’s kind of a hallmark of your career from the time you were a
21
captain on up into the time you were a general. Did you try to get into one of those F-8s
22
as fast as you could?
23
RC: You bet.
24
LC: Tell me what that was like if you remember.
25
RC: Well, what it was like is I started pulling all the strings I could to get
26
assigned to 122.
27
LC: Which was the VMFA?
28
RC: Which was the VMFA, which had the F-8s. But in the meantime, I had my
29
job at Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.
30
LC: Right. How long did it take you to pull the right string to—?
31
RC: Not too long.
261
1
LC: I’ll bet.
2
RC: Not too long, not too long. I went off to 122, but before I went to 122, I
3
became the commanding officer of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.
4
LC: So you moved up from XO—
5
RC: Yeah, up from XO to CO.
6
LC: Well, let me ask you first about that aircraft flight if I can, and then I’ll ask
7
you about how things changed for you when you became CO. What was that F-8
8
afterburner like to fly?
9
RC: Oh, it was a real joy. To me, the F-8 was the most fun aircraft that I flew.
10
LC: Wow. Because of its acceleration or handling?
11
RC: It was a single seat. You didn’t have a RIO, a radar intercept officer as the
12
F-4s did, which we later flew. It was kind of a top of the line aircraft. Well, it was the
13
top of the line aircraft at that time.
14
LC: The newest, latest and greatest.
15
RC: Greatest and fastest, 1.8 Mach. So it was a very, very fine aircraft. The only
16
thing it did have—and it had missiles.
17
LC: That’s a whole new game, isn’t it?
18
RC: That’s a whole new game, that’s right.
19
LC: Go ahead, sir.
20
RC: It had the infrared missile that it fired. It had the 20-millimeter guns, of
21
course. When you’d fly it, and remember, I told you about competitive exercises, this
22
aircraft, you now moved up principally to thirty thousand feet and did most of your
23
operations up at that level. You even did air-to-air gunnery at that level. So it was more
24
of a challenge. You had a lot better platform to perform in. To me, it was the last of the
25
true fighter aircraft.
26
LC: Why do you say that?
27
RC: Well, because the true fighter aircraft has a pilot, doesn’t have anybody else
28
that’s responsible for the performance of the aircraft. It was very maneuverable, very fast
29
and very responsive aircraft. So the F-4, for example, which later on was kind of a—it
30
had great big engines and went very fast, but it wasn’t as maneuverable. It just flat
31
wasn’t as much fun to fly as the F-8 was.
262
1
LC: As you mentioned, you had to have a second man.
2
RC: You had to have a second man to assist you in a lot of things. The F-8,
3
4
5
6
everything was up to you. So it’s kind of a personal challenge.
LC: Let me ask about the transition from XO to CO. Was that something you
saw coming?
RC: No, it happened very rapidly. The CO was a good friend of mine by the
7
name of Vince Gottschalk was kind of a historic Marine. He was transferred up to the
8
wing, which was a step ahead of the group. He was transferred up to the wing and they
9
transferred me up. I just made major and transferred me up to be a CO. So I was the
10
only major CO in the group.
11
LC: So they just, boom, popped you right up into—
12
RC: They popped me right up, yeah.
13
LC: What changed for you once you became CO?
14
RC: Well, whenever you’re the CO, it’s kind of like the president said, “The buck
15
stops here.” So you’re responsible. You’re the ultimate man responsible, that you have
16
to make the major decisions all the way down the line. Sometimes it’s kind of hard and it
17
was for me because there were a couple of guys in the squadron that were senior to me. I
18
was a major CO. So it weren’t easy.
19
LC: Yeah, a little friction there sometimes?
20
RC: No, not really, not really. They adjusted to it very rapidly. Then of course, I
21
had to be careful about how I told them things and how I ordered them, so to speak. But
22
it worked out fine.
23
LC: You found a way to—
24
RC: Didn’t really have much trouble with them and they were good officers.
25
They recognized that I was a pilot. The maintenance officer was quite a bit senior to me,
26
but he was a very, very fine Marine.
27
28
29
30
31
LC: Might that often be the case, sir, in a maintenance squadron that the chief
maintenance officer might not be a senior?
RC: No, that was kind of—to my knowledge, that’s the only time I’ve ever heard
of it happening.
LC: Is that right?
263
1
RC: Yeah. You usually have a colonel in there, in that position. It was just the
2
luck of the draw, I think. I was in a position and they just moved me up. The group CO,
3
I guess, liked me. Later on, he had a little influence in my career, quite an influence in
4
my career.
5
LC: Now would you be able to share his name?
6
RC: No, right now I can’t.
7
LC: Okay.
8
RC: I will later on as we talk through this.
9
LC: Okay. But he’s someone who reoccurs for you later on?
10
RC: He became a general later on.
11
LC: Okay. He was your direct—?
12
RC: He was the group commander at that time.
13
LC: So he was your superior in terms of the chain of command.
14
RC: Yes, yes, yes. Well, now, and I’ve just thought of his name.
15
LC: Okay.
16
RC: Doug Bangert.
17
LC: How do you spell his last name? Do you remember?
18
RC: B-A-N-G-E-R-T, Bangert.
19
LC: Where was he from?
20
RC: Carolinas, I believe, North Carolina.
21
LC: So, he was down south for him at Beaufort.
22
RC: Yeah, yeah. But he was an amazing man, Doug was. He never forgot a
23
name.
24
LC: Well, he has us beat then.
25
RC: Yeah, he certainly has me beat, I’ll tell you that, but he never forgot a name.
26
I’ve never seen a man like him. My wife’s name is Maudeen and he said, “That’s a hard
27
name to remember.” He says, “I can call you Maureen, Corinne or anything else. So
28
why don’t we just take the last few letters of your name, of your real name and call you
29
Dena?” So that stuck with her ever since, Dena, D-E-N-A.
30
LC: Is that what folks call her now?
31
RC: Yeah, that’s even on her insurance card.
264
1
LC: No kidding?
2
RC: Yes. He never forgot a name. He’s one of the most amazing men that I’ve
3
met in that regard.
4
LC: I’ll be darned.
5
RC: Yeah, he’s since deceased. He was a fine gentleman.
6
LC: Now had he been over in Korea? Did you know about his background?
7
RC: Oh, yes, he’d been to Korea.
8
LC: A flyer then, I assume.
9
RC: Uh-huh. Oh, yeah. The group commander is always in an aviation group is
10
11
12
13
always an aviator.
LC: But I was thinking that while he was in Korea, unlike you who had been on
the ground, he was probably in the air.
RC: That’s right, yeah. I guess I was kind of a little bit different than most of
14
them because I had caught up with a lot of them, caught up with many of them already
15
and there hadn’t been in aviation that long. So it did give me a certain amount of respect,
16
I think. I think that helped.
17
18
19
LC: I’m sure that’s true. You could also speak about the perspective of the guys
on the ground in a way that they couldn’t—
RC: Well, and it so happened that as I preceded through my career, that
20
whenever they had to have a position, like when I did the evacuation of Saigon, the
21
reason I became the commanding general of the evacuation was that I had been a ground
22
officer. I understood the ground side and I was an aviator that flew all the aircraft and
23
that I fit, you know. I just fit. So that’s how I was assigned then. It was pretty much of a
24
plum that was thrown my way because of that. So it proved to be beneficial to me from a
25
professional standpoint.
26
27
LC: Yeah, it served, I mean, it served you well not only in terms of career, but
also in terms of what you could bring to a situation.
28
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
29
LC: And when other people were depending on the decisions you made.
30
RC: That’s right. It helpes. It always helps. That goes back to the old statement
31
that I said that when you can be a good commander, you have to understand all aspects of
265
1
your command. It’s better if you have experience at it. So I was one of those guys that
2
fit the latter. I had experience in just about everything that they required.
3
LC: Well, sir, was it in this period when you were the maintenance squadron’s
4
CO that you were called in to help coordinate some of the movements of the 2nd Marine
5
Division?
6
RC: No, no, that came later.
7
LC: That was yet later.
8
RC: That came much later. That came during the Dominican Republic crisis.
9
LC: Oh, okay. So that’s in the mid-’60s.
10
RC: Yeah, that’s right. One thing that I was interested in doing when I was the
11
commanding officer of the squadron of the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron is
12
that I was able to form a team, a gunnery team. I challenged all the other squadrons in
13
the group to gunnery. We beat them. We won. Of course, we had some experienced
14
pilots, a little more experienced than some of the pilots in the fighter squadrons.
15
LC: Now when you’re talking about gunnery, are we talking about air-to-air?
16
RC: Air-to-air gunnery. Yeah, we did our own little COMPEX and then we
17
compared results with the fighter squadrons and we topped them. That kind of ticked
18
them off, so to speak.
19
LC: Well, I can imagine that it probably did.
20
RC: Yeah.
21
LC: Set the bar a little bit higher for them, too.
22
RC: Well, that’s right. That’s the whole purpose. Competition improves
23
capability, you know. So that was the whole purpose of it, just a little contribution to
24
make them a little better fighter pilots.
25
LC: Well, I can imagine that they appreciated that little kick in the butt.
26
RC: Well, they do, they do. I got a lot of heat out of it.
27
LC: Oh, I’m sure.
28
RC: At the local social events.
29
LC: But you withstood that with your problem.
30
RC: Yeah, it was fun. It was fun. In essence, it’s fun to rub their noses in it, so
31
to speak.
266
1
LC: Did you encounter any difficulties with managing the introduction of the
2
new F-8s while you were still also trying to handle the supply and maintenance demands
3
for the F-J3s?
4
RC: No, not really. I had some good officers. Transitioning to new aircraft
5
always has its problems, but you have to address each one of them. Nothing’s impossible
6
if you really set your mind to it. So it was challenging, but it was also worthwhile. It
7
was fun. You felt good when you came around a difficult obstacle. So it was a
8
challenge. That’s all.
9
LC: Tell me about the missile dimension of the F-8. What kind of maintenance
10
and supply issues did that introduce that was different from the Saber Jets that had the 20-
11
millimeter guns only?
12
13
RC: Well, the missile requirement was that obviously you have more systems
that you have to monitor.
14
LC: Like what?
15
RC: Well, you have your radar systems that they use to home in. The F-8 carried
16
both the Sparrow missile and—the Sparrow was the missile that used strictly radar and
17
the—oh, what do you call it? The IR (infrared) missile was strictly homed on the heat of
18
your enemy’s tailpipe, that’s basically what infrared does.
19
LC: Heat signature.
20
RC: Heat signature, right. But the Sparrow missile used radar. It would home in
21
on the radar. If you lock your radar onto an enemy aircraft, then the missile system
22
locked onto that signature and flew to the target.
23
LC: So it’s essentially radar guided.
24
RC: Radar guided whereas the other is IR guided. All you have to do is get a
25
tone that the missile is locked onto the heat, whereas with the Sparrow, the missile locks
26
onto the radar signature.
27
28
29
30
31
LC: Now having flown the aircraft and, I’m sure, fired a few of these, which did
you think was the more reliable?
RC: Well, obviously, what did they call that IR missile? It has a nickname and it
slipped by me right now. I’ll think of it in a minute.
LC: That’s okay.
267
1
2
RC: But the difference being that the IR missile, of course, you had to be on his
tail, so to speak.
3
LC: You had to be above and behind?
4
RC: No. You had to be someplace where you were getting signature from the
5
heat of his tailpipe. In other words, in the aft end of your target.
6
LC: Okay, somewhere behind him.
7
RC: Somewhere behind him. Whereas with the Sparrow, you can be anyplace as
8
long as you can acquire him. You can be above him, underneath him, ahead of him,
9
behind him. So it’s an all-aspects missile whereas the IR missile is simply a rear-end
10
type capability. You have to be picking up his heat signature.
11
LC: Let me ask about the—
12
RC: Oh, the missiles, the IR missile is called the Sidewinder.
13
LC: There you go.
14
RC: Yeah, I just thought of it.
15
LC: Thank you. I want to ask about the information that you had about the
16
enemy aircraft that you might be facing and particularly the Russian aircraft, the MiGs.
17
At this point, do you remember whether they had the 360-degree capability with radar?
18
RC: No, at that time, all our potential enemy had was IR.
19
LC: Wow. So if effective, the Sparrow missile would win every time, basically.
20
RC: Oh, yeah, absolutely. We had the odds up. Well, fortunately, that’s where
21
the United States usually stands. That’s where our superiority usually comes in is
22
because of our technology. You have to recognize that there was some awfully good
23
individuals in some of the potential enemy. There were Russian pilots that had a lot of
24
experience, a lot of combat, air combat experience, probably more than a lot of our pilots
25
from fighting the Germans. But the fact is that our technology usually closed the gap and
26
gave us the edge. That’s the secret of our success and it must be in the future. Therein
27
lies the problem that we’re going to have with China. You and I have discussed China
28
before and therein lies the problem with China is because China is very, very rapidly
29
catching up. They’re doing everything they can do to catch up and every system that our
30
manufacturers sell to the Chinese will come back to haunt us eventually. So we have to
31
watch what we’re doing. From the other standpoint, our capability in our being
268
1
innovative, being capable of designing and producing technical weaponry is rapidly
2
moving over to the Chinese side because of their educational process now. They have
3
more engineers in the training, in China than we’ve—they probably have ten times as
4
many people going to engineering school as we do.
5
6
LC: Yes. They used to send in the ’80s and ’90s a lot of those students over here
to the United States.
7
RC: Now they do it themselves and they still—
8
LC: They do still send a lot.
9
RC: They still send a lot to try to get the edge on our up-and-coming technology.
10
LC: Do you think, sir, that it’s a problem that we have foreign students over here
11
doing cutting-edge research at U.S. universities and then they go back to serve their own
12
countries?
13
RC: Yes, I do.
14
LC: Yeah.
15
RC: Yes, I do. Unfortunately, I think—it’s a fine line that you have to walk
16
because there’s a diplomatic side to it where you have to maintain good relations with
17
even potential enemies as long as you can, but I think you always must be certain that
18
you maintain the edge because therein lies the secret to success. If we don’t maintain the
19
edge in our technology, we’re lost because they will overwhelm us with numbers.
20
LC: You mention, too, the trend very clear in the last five to ten years of U.S., the
21
United States and western European countries, too, being willing to sell high
22
technology—
23
RC: Absolutely.
24
LC: elements to the People’s Republic of China. You know, back in the 1950s, I
25
know you know this: the United States had very strict export controls on high technology
26
items and certain kinds of strategic materials to both the Soviet Union and China. Can
27
you see that as, I mean, would you see that as something that maybe ought to be
28
reintroduced?
29
30
RC: Absolutely. I think that a lot of the loosening of the restrictions was political
in nature. I’m afraid that we had, in essence, we were kind of sold down the river in
269
1
some aspects because one of the worst things I think we ever did was give up the Panama
2
Canal.
3
LC: Why do you say that?
4
RC: Well, it’s the exit and entrance to and from the oceans. No matter what you
5
say, we’re going to have to remain a sea power, the ultimate sea power because the seas
6
are nine tenths of the earth’s surface. So if we don’t maintain that edge, we’re down the
7
tubes. They can attack us at will. We have to be able to move our fleets and to move our
8
commerce to and from each ocean. We can’t be restricted the way we’ve become.
9
Whether people know it or not, the Chinese have moved in in significant amounts, into
10
significant potential and control in the Panama Canal. So we’ve in essence sold
11
ourselves right down the river. I’m afraid that President Carter did that.
12
LC: Well, and he’s a Navy man.
13
RC: Yeah. He should’ve understood it. He should’ve understood it, but he
14
15
didn’t.
LC: You know what? The discussion puts me in mind of another canal that in the
16
1950s, in the period that we’re talking about, was also taken out of Western control and
17
that’s the Suez Canal.
18
RC: Suez, yes, you bet.
19
LC: Yeah, that happened in 1956. Were you aware of that crisis?
20
RC: Absolutely, absolutely, yes.
21
LC: Yeah. Of course, the British were trying to protect their ability to move
22
fleets into Asian waters.
23
RC: Absolutely.
24
LC: And to India, not least of all. Many historians, you know, now, historians of
25
20th Century international strategy really focusing on that.
26
RC: Oh, absolutely. That is the entrance from Europe into the Far East.
27
LC: Yes.
28
RC: That’s the primary entrance. Otherwise, you’ve got to go way down around
29
30
31
the cape and the horn.
LC: From the moment the British lost control of that waterway, they lost
essentially control of their—
270
1
RC: Empire.
2
LC: Of their empire in the Far East including Singapore, Malaysia.
3
RC: That’s exactly right. So goes the United States. We lose the Panama Canal.
4
We lose the Panama Canal. We lose the capability to move rapidly from ocean to ocean,
5
to move force from ocean to ocean, to move commerce from ocean to ocean. We lose
6
control.
7
8
LC: You mentioned that China had expanded its presence in Panama. Can you
say anything more about that? Do you remember what you’ve read or heard about that?
9
10
RC: Well, the primary people that are conducting support operations in the
Panama area are Chinese, are Chinese companies.
11
12
13
LC: So they have companies over there that have contracts for maintenance and
so on?
RC: Yes, yes, yes. They’re also moving into the United States where the—what
14
is the name of the port just north of Los Angeles, not just north, just south of Los
15
Angeles, between San Diego and Los Angeles?
16
LC: Long Beach?
17
RC: No, not Long Beach.
18
LC: I guess that’s north of LA.
19
RC: Yeah. Oh, gosh, I wish I had my map.
20
LC: Yeah, I don’t have one, either.
21
RC: I wish I had my map.
22
LC: We’re not very well prepared, are we? (Laughs)
23
RC: No, we’re not. No, we’re not. I’ve got one, but I don’t have the detail of the
24
United States. I’ve got a world map.
25
LC: But you’re thinking about Chinese presence at this American port?
26
RC: Oh, yes.
27
LC: In terms of—?
28
RC: And the Navy has moved out of there. Just a moment, let me look at my
29
little globe here.
30
LC: Sure, okay good.
31
RC: It is Long Beach.
271
1
LC: It is?
2
RC: Yeah, it is Long Beach.
3
LC: Okay, okay.
4
RC: There was a naval station there and a Chinese company, export and import
5
company has moved in there significantly and taken over.
6
LC: Into the facilities that were built for the naval air station?
7
RC: Yes, yes. Not naval air.
8
LC: Sorry.
9
RC: Naval sea.
10
LC: Oh, the port facilities.
11
RC: Yes, the port facilities, yeah.
12
LC: Hmm. So Chinese companies are taking big chunks.
13
RC: Big chunks.
14
LC: Yes.
15
RC: Santa Barbara, no, that’s not it. I’m sure it’s Long Beach because it’s
16
between Los Angeles and San Diego.
17
LC: Well, Long Beach is a big, huge shipping zone.
18
RC: Yeah.
19
LC: You know, this points back to your experience as one of the people who has
20
actually faced Chinese forces on the ground.
21
RC: Right.
22
LC: I’m thinking in the back of my mind that you must be recalling to some
23
24
extent your own experience and what it was like to face Chinese ground forces.
RC: Well, you know, it is so—their numbers are so overwhelming. Look at the
25
Chinese nation. I mean, we’re not talking about two hundred million. We’re talking
26
about billions of people. I mean, it’s kind of like when we fought our way out of the
27
Chosin Reservoir. It was ten to one.
28
LC: That’s about what we’re talking about?
29
RC: That’s what we’re talking about. We’re talking about ten to one and the
30
capabilities that they have are just, I mean, they’re mind boggling. They’re absolutely
31
mind-boggling. The problem is is the only thing that separates us now is technology and
272
1
they’re rapidly catching up. They’re doing everything they can to equal and surpass us,
2
doing absolutely everything they can. So as you and I’ve discussed, it’s only a matter of
3
time. It’s only a matter of time because, again, what rules the seas is the economy. It’s
4
all about money.
5
LC: Well, I mean, from that perspective, people might look back on the 1950s
6
and 1960s when the United States did not have any truck with the People’s Republic of
7
China at all, no trade. They completely isolated them and they were going through their
8
own internal political upheavals, but the United States policy was to absolutely isolate
9
them economically. People now might look back on that as, in fact, in some ways the
10
good old days even though at the time it must’ve been quite difficult to sustain that
11
because of pressure from our allies and also frightening to some extent because we
12
certainly thought in Vietnam one of the potential difficulties there was that the Chinese
13
might get militarily involved. But you know, it’s a very difficult problem. Sir, let me ask
14
a little bit more about your time at Beaufort. Were there any moments during your
15
assignment there that the squadron and, more broadly, the squadron’s for which you had
16
responsibility in terms of maintenance, were alerted? Did you have to go on alert?
17
18
RC: Not while I was at headquarters squadron, but again, I told you I managed to
wrangle my way into 122.
19
LC: Now this is VMF-122?
20
RC: Right.
21
LC: What was your position there?
22
RC: I was a maintenance officer.
23
LC: Okay. For the squadron?
24
RC: Later became the operations officer. So what we did while we were there,
25
26
27
the Cuban Missile Crisis came up.
LC: Why don’t you tell me what you recall about that event? First of all, how
did you find out that there was something called the Crisis?
28
RC: Well, we—
29
LC: Paying attention to the news or—?
30
RC: No, we received briefings, intelligence briefings. We were kept up to date
31
on what was happening all the time.
273
1
2
LC: Including would you have seen or known that there was photographic
evidence of the emplacement of ground-to-ground missiles or surface-launch missiles?
3
RC: Yes.
4
LC: Do you remember any of those briefings or what the mood was? What was
5
6
7
8
9
the feeling?
RC: Well, the feeling obviously is we’ve got to do something about it. We’ve
got to do something about it. Listen, can I take a one-minute break?
LC: Oh, sure. Sir, I wanted to ask about VMF-122. Do you know when you
actually joined the squadron?
10
RC: Oh, let’s see. I’m trying to—it had to be in ’60, about ’60.
11
LC: Okay. Was President Eisenhower still in office when you joined them?
12
RC: Who was president during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
13
LC: President Kennedy.
14
RC: It was Kennedy.
15
LC: He was elected in 1960, but—
16
RC: Yeah, I think Kennedy came in while I was in 122.
17
LC: Okay. So you probably were there from some point in 1960 on.
18
RC: Right.
19
LC: You started off as the maintenance officer for the squadron.
20
RC: I started off as the maintenance officer. Again, same thing the maintenance
21
officers do, I did a lot of flying because the Crusader was a lot of fun to fly. Every
22
chance I had I hopped into a bird and went. We had a lot of competitive exercises. We
23
had what they call COMPEXs. Well, I told you that before.
24
LC: Sure.
25
RC: But we had the air-to-air COMPEX where you fought other aircraft. We had
26
missile shoots where we did that. Then we had the twenty thousand and thirty thousand-
27
foot gunnery. Everything you did, you were graded in. They had their ways to grade you
28
with the cameras and results of your scores and so on. I was fortunate. I got an E. I was
29
able to garner an E in everything. So that was fun. I had my own aircraft. My aircraft
30
had number three on it and it had my name on it with my Es on it. That was a matter of
31
great pride to me.
274
1
LC: What is the status that’s conveyed by having an aircraft that has your name
2
on it? I mean, what does it mean to you as a flyer and what does it mean to other people
3
who see that?
4
RC: Well, obviously it means to you, and it’s a way that you can show some of
5
your accomplishments. It’s a pride thing, I think, more than anything else. Everybody
6
likes to be recognized in one way or another. It’s kind of a subtle way of saying, “Hey,
7
look how good I am,” and still trying to maintain a certain amount of humility because
8
humility is the trademark of greatness, I think.
9
10
LC: I would think that as a maintenance officer that would be something that you
would see reinforced or you would feel it reinforced.
11
12
RC: Yeah. You have the enlisted guys, the guys that are really doing the hard
work.
13
LC: Yes, sir.
14
RC: They take a lot of pride in their boss. So that’s, probably more than anything
15
else, that’s with my major purpose. I think that you’ve got to give the troops something
16
that they can look to and work for.
17
LC: Something that they own, in a way.
18
RC: Exactly.
19
LC: Yeah. I would imagine that for the maintenance guys who work their back
20
ends off to keep these aircraft going that you as the pilot are aware of them and recognize
21
them must mean a great deal as does having the aircraft fly the way it’s supposed to.
22
RC: Well, the problem with being a maintenance officer and particularly in an up
23
and coming squadron where you’ve got a new aircraft and everything, it requires an
24
awful lot of time and dedication. My workday usually started about five in the morning
25
and ended at nine or ten or eleven o’clock at night. So that was kind of at least a six-day-
26
a-week effort. Then on Sunday, you did some work, too, usually. It requires a lot of
27
work and you try to be certain that you don’t overwork your enlisted guys, your
28
mechanics and so on, because they get fatigued and they start making mistakes. So you
29
have to be certain they get the proper amount of attention and rest and training and so on.
30
LC: Yeah. It’s a delicate balance.
31
RC: It is. It is. It really is. But they respond to it quite well, they really do.
275
1
LC: I would imagine, sir, also, you learn about how to achieve that balance more
2
effectively as you go through your different assignments. I mean, you knew more about
3
how to manage that in 1960 than you did five years previously.
4
RC: Absolutely. You learn as you go and the more experience you get, the better
5
you become at your job. It’s just that simple. That’s true in anything and certainly true
6
in a technical field such as that, certainly true there.
7
LC: And a big organization.
8
RC: And a large organization with many facets to it. You have, in a maintenance
9
department, you’ve got radar men. You’ve got flight line personnel. You’ve got
10
armorers. You’ve got engine people. You’ve got hydraulics people. Every possible
11
trade in aviation you’ve got right in the squadron.
12
13
14
LC: As you pointed out, too, sir, and particularly with regard to your experience
on the ground in Korea, these are all Marines as well.
RC: Exactly, exactly. They all know how to man a rifle when they have to.
15
They all know how to do that and have done it, many of them before, you know. We had
16
aviation personnel in Korea that manned the rifles with us.
17
18
19
LC: That’s right. I remember you saying that you had to get the cooks and
everybody from the headquarters.
RC: That’s basically the secret to, one of the primary reasons that the Marine
20
Corps does so well in combat actions is because everybody understands that. They know
21
what their basic purpose is. When the time comes, if they’re called upon to do it, they’re
22
able to do it.
23
LC: And willing, too, I think.
24
RC: And willing.
25
LC: Ready to.
26
RC: Ready and willing.
27
LC: Yeah. They can’t wait, in fact.
28
RC: That’s right.
29
LC: Ask me, sir.
30
RC: Yeah. You’ve got it.
31
LC: That’s what I hear from them anyway.
276
1
RC: That’s right.
2
LC: Now VMF-122 had a home station. Was it Beaufort or where was it?
3
RC: It was Beaufort, right, right.
4
LC: Okay. While you were there, you transitioned onto operations officer?
5
RC: Yeah. I became the operations officer.
6
LC: Did that entail moving away from the maintenance responsibilities or did
7
8
9
they double-team you?
RC: No. I moved up into operations strictly. They moved another individual
into maintenance. I always maintained contact there, though, because I had two or
10
three—and we were all divided up into flights. There were flights of four. I had in my
11
particular flight when I first went there, I had a man that worked in operations and a man
12
that worked in maintenance and a man that worked in materiel in my flight. So I covered
13
the waterfront, so to speak. The only thing that I didn’t have was somebody from
14
administration, but most of those people were ground people, anyway, because you had a
15
mix of ground people in the aviation squadrons. They weren’t all pilots.
16
LC: Sure. Well, in fact, pilots were, I would’ve thought, very highly prized.
17
RC: Right. If they had to go off on a mission and be gone, the function still
18
continued within the squadron. So you had backups. But I was fortunate. I was able to
19
maintain contact throughout the squadron just with my flight because I had a very good
20
flight. We had a unique call sign, which was mine, which was Slug.
21
LC: That was your call sign, as well?
22
RC: I was the Slugger, yeah. They called it Slug. Later on called it Eagle Flight,
23
and then they called it Slug Eagle because I had very good eyesight and was able to pick
24
up aircraft quite a ways off. Unfortunately, that’s leaving me now. As I get older, my
25
eyes are starting to fail a little bit, but I have fun on the golf course because the particular
26
group of guys I play with, I play with my Sunday school class. They’re all older guys
27
like myself. I usually am able to always spot the balls because still my eyesight. They
28
say, “Where’d it go, Dick? Where’d the ball go?”
29
LC: And there you are—
30
RC: A lot of times I say, “Yeah, I got it. I got it. Where is it?” “I forgot.”
31
LC: I bet you never have a mulligan, either, because—
277
1
RC: That’s right.
2
LC: They don’t know where your ball is, either.
3
RC: Exactly.
4
LC: Good man.
5
RC: But anyway, within the squadron, the movement up to operations was
6
interesting because there I had more access to—in the day-to-day activity, I had more
7
access to what was going on in Cuba, for example. That was the highlight at that
8
particular time.
9
10
LC: Well, tell me what kind of access would you have had.
RC: Well, I was able to read all of the messages where as in maintenance, you
11
read principally messages on maintenance, but in the operations, you read maintenance
12
and operations messages. Many—
13
LC: Now we’re talking about—go ahead, sir.
14
RC: Many of which contained information about the Cuban situation and what
15
16
17
18
was happening within the Corps and so on.
LC: Now when you say reading messages, just for someone who might not
understand that, is this cable traffic that might come to the squadron?
RC: Yes. Yes, a lot of it’s information just to keep you updated, but you had
19
much of it classified, also, which you didn’t bother with in the maintenance. Most of the
20
maintenance was unclassified information, but a lot of the information in the operations
21
was classified. So you were better informed. Let’s say it that way.
22
LC: Okay, sure. Take me through, if you would, the couple of weeks there that
23
most of us think of as the Cuban Missile Crisis. When did you recognize that this was
24
more than, going to be more than just your usual alert?
25
RC: When they started building up, saying that there were Russian ships that
26
were on the way to Cuba, we knew something was afoot. So then they started prepping
27
us on deployment to the Cuban area. We were, as fighters, we were prepped principally
28
to go to Key West, which is as you know, is right off Cuba.
29
LC: Sure.
30
RC: We were to go down there and stand strip alerts because now we were
31
informed and now, of course, it’s open information. But now we’re informed that they
278
1
were moving missiles and that they were taking photographs, high altitude photographs.
2
We were to go down and to respond to any attacks on the aerial surveillance aircraft, the
3
planes that were taking photographs. We were kind of their protection, so to speak.
4
LC: Were you actually to fly cover missions for them?
5
RC: That’s right, exactly.
6
LC: Okay.
7
RC: I was scrambled on one and chased a MiG back to his home base.
8
LC: Wow. Well, can you tell me about that? First of all, how did the day begin
9
10
or was it at night?
RC: Well, it was a daytime mission because the photo planes were up. The photo
11
planes were coming in on their run. The radar picked up a MiG that was taking off from
12
one of the stations, one of the air stations. It was on the western end of Cuba. I can’t
13
remember the name of the station, but it was down in the Havana area, which is well
14
within the range of the Key West radar. So they saw the MiGs scrambling and they
15
scrambled us.
16
LC: So you were on the ground?
17
RC: I was on the ground on strip alert, what they called strip alert.
18
LC: Which means?
19
RC: You’re on a five-minute call. In other words, you’re strapped in the cockpit
20
ready to go. All you have to do is start your aircraft and go. You’re loaded and
21
everything.
22
23
LC: So you would be doing this in shifts where you would be sitting in the
aircraft—?
24
RC: Right. Uh-huh.
25
LC: Okay. A strip alert means you are already sitting in the aircraft—?
26
RC: You’re in the aircraft.
27
LC: And all you’ve got to do is turn it on?
28
RC: Yup.
29
LC: And fire it up, as it were.
30
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
31
LC: So the radar indicates a MiG has taken off?
279
1
RC: Right. What they did is they put X number of aircraft, four to six aircraft on
2
strip alert and a couple of them, a section would be in the cockpit. The other four would
3
be on the ground. The ones that were in the cockpit were within minutes, less than five
4
minutes, usually about two minutes, maybe one minute to scramble. The others would
5
then, as soon as they scrambled us, the others would immediately, as soon as they started
6
us to scramble, the others would immediately get in their cockpit.
7
LC: They might be a couple of minutes behind you.
8
RC: Within a few minutes, you could have up to six aircraft or eight or whatever
9
10
you had on strip alert, would be ready to go. I happened to be in the first relay, so to
speak.
11
LC: What was your fly time to Cuba?
12
RC: Oh, probably, well, of course, we went in burner. So it didn’t take us very
13
long. It’s probably across at that point where the aircraft were coming in probably forty
14
miles or so is all, fifty.
15
LC: So you’d be there in three minutes or six minutes?
16
RC: Five minutes probably, five, six minutes into position where you could do
17
18
19
something.
LC: Did you also have enough data to know the position of all the U.S. aircraft in
the air over all the reconnaissance aircraft?
20
RC: Yes. They were transmitting to us.
21
LC: Sure. So you would be able to fly—
22
RC: They didn’t tell us their exact location or our exact location for
23
counterintelligence purposes. Obviously they said, “They’re at your two o’clock at thirty
24
miles,” or something like that.
25
LC: Yes, okay.
26
RC: Angels plus, which means they’re above you. So that’s all they’d give. Of
27
course, the MiGs were approaching the surveillance aircraft, the camera aircraft. They
28
scrambled us to intercept the MiGs, which we did.
29
LC: What was the rules of engagement that you—?
30
RC: Okay. That’s what I was going to tell you next. I locked in on one. I
31
scrambled. I maneuvered and got on his tail and had him on my Sidewinder. I said,
280
1
“Instructions, shall I shoot?” They said, “Negative, hold, hold, hold.” So he knew I was
2
on his tail. So he hightailed it for home. When he hightailed it for home, they apparently
3
knew we weren’t going to shoot. They were probably listening to us, but he went on
4
home and I chased him down and watched him ‘til he landed.
5
LC: You chased him to the air station?
6
RC: Yeah. I chased him to his airstrip. I stayed out at sea, far enough away. The
7
airstrip was close to the—let’s see, I did cross over Cuba. I think I did cross over Cuba.
8
He was someplace down close to the Isle of what they called, the Isle of Pines. He was
9
obviously making either intentionally going to shoot down or take action against the
10
surveillance aircraft, against the camera aircraft.
11
LC: You knew this by his position relative to the aircraft?
12
RC: Yeah, yeah, what he was doing.
13
LC: Which was what? Can you describe it?
14
RC: Well, he was approaching, the aircraft was approaching the island,
15
approaching the island going from west to east, as I recall. We were scrambled from Key
16
West directly south to intercept him and then turning either way. We almost intercepted
17
him head-on and maneuvered back to his tail. Then he knew he was a gonner if he didn’t
18
do something. So he played chicken and went home.
19
LC: In other words, he broke off his—
20
RC: He broke off as quickly as he could. He went max speed and made for
21
home.
22
LC: That was probably a pretty thrilling encounter.
23
RC: Yeah, I was hoping. I was hoping. But, they wouldn’t let me.
24
LC: Did you feel a sense of disappointment?
25
RC: Absolutely. Fighter pilot, you know?
26
LC: Yes, sir.
27
RC: Here’s my first chance to prove myself, you know, as a fighter pilot.
28
LC: Were you the only U.S. Marine aircraft that had been dispatched or were the
29
others right behind you?
30
RC: My section man was with me. My wingman was with me.
31
LC: Did he lock on as well?
281
1
RC: Oh, I’m certain he did. He said he was. He said he was locked on.
2
LC: So the two of you had him for sure.
3
RC: We had him.
4
LC: You had a kill. There’s no question.
5
RC: Had a kill. When you get the Sidewinder, your Sidewinder’s only good
6
within a couple of miles behind him. So you’re right behind him and you’re moving in
7
on him. You’ve got the speed advantage. I had the speed advantage.
8
LC: So you were—?
9
RC: He was in a MiG-17 and I was in the F-8 and we were far better performance
10
than they were.
11
LC: So he was being hunted down. There’s no question about that.
12
RC: Yeah, he knew it. He knew it. Obviously his radar people were telling him
13
that he’d better take evasive action and get out of there. Probably when they heard us,
14
I’m sure they were listening to us, too, probably when they heard us say, “Hold, hold, do
15
not fire, do not fire,” well, he took that as the opportunity to get the hell out of there and
16
get home, which is what he did.
17
LC: Now did your wingman also follow you?
18
RC: Oh, he was following with me. He was on my wing.
19
LC: Okay. So both of you guys were flying, basically flying, escorting him back,
20
if you will, to his station.
21
RC: Yes, that’s right. That’s a good way to say it.
22
LC: And seeing him down to the runway.
23
RC: Yes, yes. We watched him land.
24
LC: Now did you fly directly back to Key West or what was your next
25
26
maneuver?
RC: Well, then we were relieved because we had expended quite a bit of fuel.
27
We were relieved by the other sections to continue with the protection, whatever
28
protection was needed.
29
LC: I see. Do you recall now at what point during the crisis this took place? It
30
would’ve been after, apparently after President Kennedy displayed the photographs on
282
1
television. Those who have studied this conflict in some depth are very interested in how
2
it all unfolded, each piece every day. I just wonder if you remember roughly when—?
3
RC: Well, obviously, I think this is when the ships were actually coming in.
4
LC: Before they had been turned around?
5
RC: Exactly.
6
LC: So the quarantine was in place.
7
RC: That’s right. The quarantine was in place and we were enforcing the
8
quarantine, so to speak. The aircraft that were doing the camera, obviously we did a lot
9
of camera runs. I don’t know how many. I wasn’t in on that side of it, but obviously,
10
probably on a daily basis, I would imagine.
11
LC: Oh, absolutely. Do you know whether these were Air Force aircraft or not?
12
RC: Which ones?
13
LC: The reconnaissance aircraft?
14
RC: Oh, yes, they were Air Force.
15
LC: U.S. Air Force, okay.
16
RC: I believe. I believe it could very well had been—I don’t know whether U-2
17
was out then or not?
18
LC: Yes, sir. It was.
19
RC: I think it might’ve been the U-2.
20
LC: Wow.
21
RC: We didn’t know what type of aircraft. They didn’t brief us on that. They
22
just told us that this is your mission.
23
LC: Your mission is to get this guy off of him.
24
RC: Keep the Cubans out of the act.
25
LC: Now let me ask about the briefings that you would’ve been receiving during
26
this time period. Obviously you’re the operations officer. So you know quite a bit about
27
the background.
28
RC: Yes ma’am. My wife asked me if I was on the phone.
29
LC: Oh, okay. Well, she—
30
RC: No, that’s all right. Go ahead.
283
1
2
LC: I was just wondering about the briefings. Did you actually deliver briefings
as the operations officer?
3
RC: Oh, yes, yes, yes. I had to brief on the intelligence aspect and what we had
4
in store for us and what the enemy was actually allegedly going to do or was doing. So
5
yes, it was pretty detailed.
6
7
LC: Who would have been delivering the briefings on rules of engagement
issues?
8
RC: Well, we got those from higher headquarters by dispatch, by message.
9
LC: Okay. So would you talk to a room full of pilots about that or would
10
11
someone else do it?
RC: Right. Well, the pilots—we did it when we first went down, we had a
12
complete briefing. That was done by higher headquarters. They brought it down the
13
chain, of course. Then from a local level, we really took it from a squadron standpoint,
14
what we as individuals would be doing, individual pilots, what our mission was. So the
15
great big picture usually came from higher headquarters. Then it worked its way down
16
the chain. When it got down to the squadron level, why, it was more on the scene, on the
17
site in the action type thing where you’re actually performing the mission of the escort or
18
the mission of destroying the enemy.
19
LC: Did you remain at Key West for a little bit longer?
20
RC: Oh, I think I was down there two weeks. Then we were relieved. They’d
21
keep us down there because we did a lot of strip alert.
22
LC: Yeah. That’s got to be nerve-racking.
23
RC: Yeah. We did a lot of that.
24
LC: How long would you sit and say you were one of those who was on alert?
25
How long would you be in the cockpit waiting?
26
RC: Oh, usually about two hours and then one of the other teams would relieve
27
you and then another team would relieve you and you’d be out there six to eight hours.
28
LC: Wow. That’s a lot of adrenaline.
29
RC: Yeah, it is. Yeah, it is. You had a port-a-potty out there. That’s about all
30
you had and you usually took a sandwich or something with you. So it was you stand
31
around and talk and try to stay as ready as you could. It’s just that simple.
284
1
2
3
LC: Wow. Did you feel, sir, that indeed war was imminent even if it wasn’t
going to be declared a war, that some kind of exchange was imminent?
RC: Yeah. I personally thought this could be the start of the big one because
4
obviously we now knew that the Russians were involved. Of course, this was the Cold
5
War now.
6
LC: That’s right.
7
RC: Of course, Cuba was making all their innuendos and we thought that this
8
9
10
11
could be the real, real big one.
LC: Did you make special arrangements or preparations for Dena at this point? I
mean, how did you stay in touch with her?
RC: Well, you don’t get a lot of communications, telephone calls. That sort of
12
thing is about it. Yeah, when you’re an aviator, you try to stay because day to day, that’s
13
why you get flight pay.
14
LC: Right, anything can happen.
15
RC: Anything could happen. So you have to be ready at all times.
16
LC: Yes, sir.
17
RC: So when you deploy on something like that, you just try to maintain contact
18
either whatever way you can. The kids in Iraq now are pretty lucky. You got cell phones
19
and you got phone cards and constant communications. In those days, we didn’t have
20
that. So you did the best you could.
21
LC: Well, it must’ve been kind of tough on her, too.
22
RC: Yeah, yeah.
23
LC: Well, and all the wives and family members who had men serving under
24
25
26
27
these conditions?
RC: That’s right. They’re the true heroes. They’ve got the big responsibilities at
home, taking care of the kids and so on.
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Well, if she’s all mind to, I’d like to talk to her about it at
28
some point. We’ll see if she might be interested because I think that’s part of the story
29
that doesn’t get told is the family members who are very concerned for their guys and
30
don’t know what’s going on. This period, is it one that you’ve thought about or read
31
about subsequently and given thought to, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or not so much?
285
1
RC: Well, I’ve read the stories about it. I haven’t really researched it that much.
2
I was interested in the Bay of Pigs operation because being a former ground officer I was
3
a little bit incensed about how those guys were left out there. I felt air-wise we handled
4
the situation quite adequately. I think we were ready. I think we could’ve handled it
5
very, very well. I think we could’ve taken care of the Cuban Air Force quickly, but I was
6
concerned about the ground side and particularly those Cuban guys that made the landing
7
and then didn’t get any support.
8
LC: No air cover.
9
RC: No air cover.
10
LC: Did you think it should have happened?
11
RC: Yes.
12
LC: And gotten rid of Castro at that point?
13
RC: I sure did.
14
LC: Did you fault President Kennedy for that decision?
15
RC: Well, yes. I would say, yes, I did.
16
LC: What about his decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
17
RC: Well, I think that overall, now that in retrospect, everything that he did was
18
well executed. I think he made the Russians back off, the Soviets back off. That was the
19
key to getting them to back off because Cuba could’ve triggered some disastrous results.
20
If they had cranked off a missile, then we’d really had a big brouhaha. We really
21
would’ve.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
LC: Right, oh, yes, sir. Interestingly, it’s the Navy and the Marines to which he
turned. Of course, he was a Navy guy.
RC: But I think he did an admirable job in making them back down. I think it
was very definitely a diplomatic coup.
LC: Do you think it changed how the Soviet Union viewed the United States in
subsequent years?
RC: Yes, I do. I do. They had a period though until Reagan came along when
they got pretty brave about things.
LC: During the 1970s.
286
1
2
RC: Right. They got pretty aggressive, but Reagan handled it quite well. He
didn’t play pussyfoot with them.
3
LC: No, that’s right. That’s right.
4
RC: That was certainly to his credit for the welfare of the world, thank goodness,
5
he was there and did it the way he did because it eventually led them to back down and
6
eventually to their demise. The economic game he played with them was brilliant,
7
absolutely brilliant. They got into kind of an arms race with us. We were able to sustain
8
it long enough that they went bankrupt. It’s just that simple.
9
LC: Yeah, they couldn’t afford—
10
RC: That was the beginning of the end for them.
11
LC: Yeah. They could not afford it.
12
RC: They couldn’t afford it. Their whole economy was dedicated to the military.
13
That doesn’t work. That doesn’t work. When you dedicate everything to the military,
14
then how about the poor guy on the street that needs clothes and needs an automobile and
15
needs a house and so on? When all the government money is going for one purpose and
16
if you don’t use it, why do you do it?
17
LC: Yes, yes.
18
RC: Bleed you dry.
19
LC: They had a huge public morale problem.
20
RC: Exactly, exactly.
21
LC: Well, sir, let’s take a break there.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
287
Interview with Richard Carey Session [7] of [16] December 22, 2005 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey of the
3
U.S. Marine Corps. Today is the twenty-second of December 2005. I am in Lubbock
4
and the general is speaking from his home in Texas. Sir, good morning.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning.
6
LC: Thank you very much for your time again today. It’s always a pleasure to
7
speak with you.
8
RC: Well, thank you.
9
LC: General, last time we were able to speak, we talked about your assignments
10
in South Carolina. You wrapped up the session with a very interesting story about your
11
own participation during the Cuban Missile Crisis in flying cover for some of the slower
12
reconnaissance aircraft that the United States had over Cuba. I think at this time you
13
were also or were soon to become the 122nd operations officer. Were you already the
14
operations officer at this point?
15
RC: No. I was the maintenance officer at that time.
16
LC: Okay. When did you become the operations officer?
17
RC: After we got back from the Cuban affair. I wasn’t that operations officer
18
19
20
21
very long until I was reassigned up to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.
LC: Now how did that assignment come about and what did it mean for you?
What did that tell you about your career that you were selected for that?
RC: Well, it’s really—of course, I was progressing along with others in career
22
and that’s part of the career pattern that some time along at that stage in your time in the
23
service, the Marine Corps has a program where they send you through a series of schools
24
as you progress in rank, obviously, and trying to improve your capabilities. This was just
25
an assignment that I was very pleased with it because the Naval War College was
26
considered kind of a choice plum.
27
LC: Mm-hmm. I’ll bet.
288
1
2
RC: So there was, I think at that time, there were about four of us that were
assigned out of the Marine Corps.
3
LC: Wow. Well, that’s getting pretty—
4
RC: Well, it’s pretty selective.
5
LC: I guess so, yeah.
6
RC: But I was quite pleased with it. Of course, the Naval War College, being in
7
the Marine Corps as part of the Navy department, so it’s kind of a career enhancer versus
8
going to—and the Marine Corps selects, and all services do, but they select a number of
9
people to each of the war colleges. They have the Army War College, the Air Force, and
10
the Navy. Now the Marine Corps has one. The Marine Corps has a war college.
11
LC: Where is that?
12
RC: That’s at Quantico. They have an accredited university there now. The
13
Marine Corps University is an accredited university.
14
LC: They’re concentrating most of those kinds of facilities at Quantico now, I
15
guess, the Marine Corps is. The Marine Corps Historical Association, I think, is moving
16
there.
17
RC: That’s right. That’s right. They’ve got the new Marine Corps Museum
18
that’s there that’s going to be quite a showplace. It’s going to have all the history of the
19
Marine Corps. It’s a very, very elite type of museum.
20
LC: Yes, sir.
21
RC: Just south of Washington. Hopefully one day you’ll get to see it.
22
LC: I will. I plan to.
23
RC: Yeah, I think you’ll really enjoy it.
24
LC: I think it’s in my future, yeah.
25
RC: Yeah. They have all the schools, that’s your education command for the
26
Marine Corps. Later on in my career, I was head of that.
27
LC: I’m going to ask you about that, too.
28
RC: Right.
29
LC: Sir, let me know a little bit, if you can, about the curriculum at the Naval
30
War College.
289
1
RC: Well, basically it’s more of a joint curriculum. In other words, you study a
2
lot of history. You do writing. You have certain writings that you have to do. I took up
3
the writing, the writing that I took up at that time—I made my specific paper on Fidel
4
Castro because at that time, they hadn’t said that he had communist leanings. So my
5
paper was to prove that he was a communist. It was interesting, the research I had to do
6
on it. Of course, his brother, Raul, as you probably know some of the history of him, his
7
brother Raul was in Columbia. He was an avowed communist and really did kind of had
8
a terrorist organization. They did away with quite a few of the democratic leaders in
9
Columbia. So I tied it all together.
10
LC: Now was this kind of a yearlong project that you were working on?
11
RC: Yes.
12
LC: In addition to the readings?
13
RC: In addition to the regular curriculum that we had, this was something you
14
15
16
17
had to turn in prior to graduation.
LC: Now why did you decide to work on this? Was it because of your
experience during the Cuban Missile Crisis?
RC: I think so, yes. It was my interest in that part of the world. Of course,
18
you’re getting close to home and the USSR had put the missiles in Cuba and were taking
19
the missiles to Cuba. So it was pretty easy to prove, really.
20
LC: Very topical.
21
RC: Very topical type of paper.
22
LC: What evaluation did you receive on it? Do you remember?
23
RC: It wasn’t spectacular, I think. There were some pretty good, pretty well
24
educated people. I wasn’t that well educated at that time. I had, and I’m still not that
25
well educated. I don’t mean to imply that I’m well educated now, but it was part of the
26
growing process. There were a lot of good papers that were put in, a lot of high-ranking
27
officers there. I was one of the junior officers that was there.
28
LC: What was your rank at this time?
29
RC: Major.
30
LC: What year were you there? What curricular year, do you remember?
31
RC: Let’s see, that would’ve had to been ’62, ’62.
290
1
LC: Okay. Sir, can you tell me anything about the other folks that were going
2
through the program at the same time you were? Were there any standouts that you
3
remember or another question that comes to mind is were there any foreign students
4
going through this program at the same time you were?
5
RC: Yes. There were foreign students and there were quite a few other
6
individuals I remember. I can’t recall his name right now, but I could get it. He later
7
became the commandant of the Coast Guard. We had some Coast Guard officers. We
8
had naval officers, Army, Air Force, all services, plus a few foreign services. One of the
9
individuals that went through that I became quite close with was a gentleman by the
10
name of Hassan Nymuck. Hassan was a submariner in the Turkish Navy. He later
11
became an admiral, but the significance of Hassan was, and how I became so well
12
acquainted with him is I used to work out quite a bit. He was always over at the
13
swimming pool. He would swim for a minimum of one hour straight a day. I said,
14
“Hassan, why do you swim so long?” and then he told me the story. Prior to the time of
15
being assigned to the—I don’t know whether you remember—well, you’re probably too
16
young to remember, but in the history there was a submarine, a Turkish submarine that
17
was in the straits there that goes in from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean Sea.
18
LC: Yup. It’s the Dardanelles.
19
RC: Yes, uh-huh. Well, is it the Dardanelles? I guess it is. I can’t really recall
20
my geography quite that well. But anyway, he was a skipper of this submarine. The
21
submarine collided with a freighter going through. The submarine sunk. There were
22
only one or two survivors and he was one of the survivors. He wound up in the straits
23
there and apparently the current is so strong, because it’s a fairly narrow strait, and the
24
current is so strong that he couldn’t make it to shore. So he swam for something like
25
seven or eight hours. They finally, somebody, one of the boats saw him, one of the ships
26
passing by saw him and recovered him, rescued him, but he kept swimming. That’s the
27
only way he survived. So his ritual was a daily ritual to go over and swim, swim all the
28
time to try to maintain that expertise that he had developed.
29
30
LC: Well, it had already paid off. So I would think that was probably a pretty
good practice for him.
291
1
RC: Yeah. It was kind of funny. He was a Muslim and he told me one day, he
2
said, “You know, I could secure my place in paradise by murdering you, by killing you.”
3
I said to him very jokingly, of course, I said, “Don’t try it, Hassan,” but we were very
4
good friends. We really became good friends. I didn’t maintain contact with him
5
because, obviously, his English wasn’t that good and my Turkish wasn’t that good. I
6
learned to count and say “hello” and a few things like that. We never maintained contact,
7
but I later found out that he had made admiral in the Turkish Navy. So I was proud of
8
him for that. He became very high. I think he was probably the number one or two in the
9
Turkish Navy.
10
LC: Well, it’s real interesting that our allies were sending clearly their best
11
people to attend the U.S. service universities, the mid-career people who were on their
12
way somewhere. It was quite a plum for them to get this assignment and no doubt very
13
good for U.S. relations. I think that’s part of why—
14
15
RC: Well, they were especially chosen because almost to a man, they were very
outgoing and friendly and excellent students.
16
LC: Did you come across any Asians there that you remember?
17
RC: No, none that particularly struck me. I was most impressed with Hassan. Of
18
course, I think that one of the major reasons that we became such good friends is we
19
worked out quite a bit at the gym and so on. So that kind of developed the friendship
20
more than anything else.
21
22
23
LC: Was this a useful experience for you, as you look back now, do you think it
was a good experience, one that helped you along?
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes, definitely. The war colleges, you get a better perspective
24
on the other services and what they do and their value. You gain a lot of respect for them
25
as with the foreign services. As I say, the people that go to those universities, it’s a select
26
group. So you get a higher quality individual and obviously you learn from them. You
27
learn a lot. So yes, it was very advantageous to me. I felt in some of my subsequent
28
assignments on the various CINC staffs, I was on both the Commander-in-Chief Pacific
29
and Commander-in-Chief Atlantic staff, which is kind of unusual, but I wound up in my
30
career doing both of those. There, of course, you deal with foreign services. So certainly
31
that lays a great foundation for it. No, it was very beneficial, highly beneficial. Aside
292
1
from the fact that it’s one of the check marks that you need to have if you’re going to
2
progress in your career and I just said, “Well, this is good for me and hopefully good for
3
the Marine Corps.” Hopefully I can contribute a little bit more by having done this. So it
4
was very beneficial, I felt.
5
6
LC: Well, sir, where did the Marine Corps send you after this year at the Naval
War College? What was your next assignment?
7
RC: My next assignment was in Japan.
8
LC: Tell me a little bit about that.
9
RC: Well, I was assigned as an assistant operations officer of the 1st Marine
10
11
Aircraft Wing.
LC: Now for someone who is not all that familiar with the structure of Marine
12
Corps aviation, can you talk a little bit about the difference between a squadron and a
13
wing and how they fit together?
14
RC: Well, in the Marine Corps, it’s kind of designed organically like the ground
15
component. A squadron is equivalent to a battalion in concept. Then the next level in the
16
Marine Corps is a group, a little different in the Air Force. The Air Force, their
17
nomenclature’s just the opposite. They start with a squadron and they go to a wing and
18
then to a group, but the Marine Corps goes from a squadron to a group and a group is like
19
a regiment. They’ll usually have three or four, well, usually three tactical squadrons, a
20
headquarters and maintenance squadron, which we’ve discussed before, I think.
21
LC: Yes.
22
RC: And a Marine airbase squadron, which is responsible for the physical
23
facilities that you work in. Then you have a—a lot of times, in some groups, you have a
24
tactical air control squadron. Now it’s organized a little differently. The modern day
25
Marine Corps, well, at a higher level it is. Then you go up to the wing level, after the
26
group. You go up to the wing level and in the wing, at that time, they had at least two
27
tactical, well, three tactical groups. The Marine Corps believes in organizing in threes.
28
Remember, I told you about the rifle battalion.
29
LC: Yes, sir.
30
RC: They had three rifle companies.
31
LC: This is similarly organized except for aircraft.
293
1
RC: Similarly structured, right.
2
LC: So three tactical groups and a wing?
3
RC: And three tactical groups and a wing and then you have a support wing, a
4
support group.
5
LC: What would the support group be composed of?
6
RC: It’d have a maintenance squadron and a supply squadron, a support
7
squadron, and a headquarters squadron.
8
9
LC: Now the headquarters squadron, I just want to pull one of these out and look
at it from—
10
RC: The headquarters squadron was responsible really for setting up the wing
11
headquarters and the various components of that. You have functional capabilities within
12
the headquarters squadron of G-1, which I’m sure you’re familiar with these, G-1, 2, 3,
13
and 4.
14
LC: Yes, that would be, what, logistics—
15
RC: Logistic. Well, 1 is administration, 2 is intelligence, 3 is operations, and 4 is
16
logistics.
17
LC: Logistics, okay.
18
RC: Right. That’s true in all the units. The other services pretty much used that
19
20
21
same basic structure also, 1, 2, 3, and 4.
LC: Now, the wing that you were assigned to as an assistant operations officer,
where were you based?
22
RC: Iwakuni, Japan.
23
LC: Tell me a little bit about arriving there and what your impressions were.
24
RC: Well, Iwakuni was a former Japanese military, Japanese airbase. It was
25
located close to Hiroshima, right down the road from Hiroshima, as a matter of fact.
26
Later on, I became acquainted with some of the Japanese admirals there, interesting story
27
when we get to that level.
28
LC: Okay, good. Okay.
29
RC: But when I first arrived, I was assigned along with—in the operations
30
section there, there were, let’s see, one, two, three, four majors and support enlisted for
294
1
us. My particular category in operations, I was kind of a general gofer type guy. I was
2
the junior guy.
3
LC: You were the gofer, huh?
4
RC: Yeah, was what they called a gofer. You know what that is.
5
LC: Yes, I do. I think everybody does.
6
RC: Okay.
7
LC: Everybody’s been one somewhere, sometime.
8
RC: That’s right. That’s right. Because I was, and I think the main reason that I
9
was the gofer is because there was a lot of liaison that you had to do with the ground
10
forces. Because I’d been a ground officer before, they kind of used me as the individual
11
that did a lot of work with the ground forces that coordinated with the ground forces
12
LC: Now were the ground forces faced nearby?
13
RC: No, they were in Okinawa.
14
LC: Okay, so wow. Did you have to go back and forth quite a bit?
15
RC: Right. I’d go back and forth to Okinawa. The wing had three groups. They
16
had a group at Iwakuni. That group was fighter attack. They had a group at Atsugi,
17
which is up by Tokyo, Atsugi Airbase. That’s up by Tokyo. I’d go up there, also. Then
18
they had a group on Okinawa that was a helicopter group. Then they had—well, they
19
actually had two groups at Iwakuni because the headquarters group was there, also.
20
21
LC: Okay. That’s where you were assigned, in the headquarters group? Is that
accurate?
22
RC: Right.
23
LC: General, let me ask if I can a little bit about the liaison work. Of what did
24
that consist? Were you trying to coordinate exercises or—?
25
RC: Exercises and, of course, if you went into combat, if you had people
26
assigned to an operation, a combat operation, then it was my responsibility to coordinate
27
the air support that they receive, which I became involved in because that was at that time
28
was when we first put people into Vietnam.
29
30
31
LC: I’m going to go out on a limb and say you were there maybe early 1965 at
least.
RC: No, I was there in ’63.
295
1
LC: You were there in ’63.
2
RC: Right, right, because I went to Vietnam the first time in ’63.
3
LC: Wow. Okay. Did you go as part of this work that you’ve been discussing?
4
RC: Right, exactly.
5
LC: Okay.
6
RC: One of the things that I did and I might be getting a little bit ahead, but it
7
happened while I was there.
8
LC: Sure.
9
RC: I was assigned along with two other officers to go to Vietnam because we
10
had a squadron, a helicopter squadron in Vietnam. The helicopter squadron’s purpose
11
was to provide support and training to the, well, support to the Special Forces that were
12
assigned there, Army Special Forces, and also to provide training and support for
13
Vietnamese forces.
14
LC: Now the helicopter squadron, what kind of aircraft were they flying?
15
RC: At that time, they were flying HRSs (helicopter transport Sikorsky).
16
LC: Can you tell me a little bit about that aircraft?
17
RC: Yeah. It was a single-engine helicopter, limited lift capability. I think twelve
18
to fourteen troops.
19
LC: So a lot lighter than what most people would think of as—
20
RC: Well, it was the beginning. It was all they had at the time.
21
LC: Right.
22
RC: They developed the CH-46 and the C-47 helicopter transports later, I’m sure
23
you’re familiar with those names, the Chinook and the CH-46 Marine.
24
25
26
LC: Those are the ones that are kind of classically associated with the Vietnam
War.
RC: Exactly, exactly. They didn’t have the 46s at that time. They later phased
27
them in, but at that time, they had the HRS, which was rather limited lift capability.
28
That’s what they were. That’s what they were saddled with.
29
LC: How many helicopters would be in a squadron?
30
RC: Well, normally about twelve, twelve helicopters. I think that, as I recall,
31
they were kind of augmented down there, they had a few more than that, though.
296
1
LC: Okay. So they had a slightly enlarged, if you want, squadron.
2
RC: Right, right. They had a group down there and the gentleman that headed
3
the group had the same name as me, John Carey. He was a colonel, though.
4
LC: Well, you were chasing him pretty good.
5
RC: (Both laugh) Yeah.
6
LC: Now what was his background? He was an aviator, as well?
7
RC: Oh, yes, yes. That was an aviation element down there. That’s all they had
8
down there. They did have some support people with them out of their group, the support
9
people they had with them was part of the Marine airbase people and the Marine
10
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron people. In other words, they sent a beefed up
11
tactical unit down there.
12
LC: How long were you there on your own visit?
13
RC: Relatively a short time, only about two weeks.
14
LC: Were you—well, let me ask where the helicopter squadron itself was based.
15
Were they based in—?
16
RC: It was based down in the Delta.
17
LC: Okay, not at Saigon?
18
RC: No, no, not at Saigon.
19
LC: Like Can Tho or somewhere like that?
20
RC: I want to say Soc Trang, but I’m not sure.
21
LC: That could be.
22
RC: I think it was Soc Trang. I’m reaching way back in my memory.
23
LC: Oh, I know, I know.
24
RC: I’m reaching forty years ago. So it’s kind of hard.
25
LC: Everybody forgives you for that.
26
RC: Yeah, but I think it was Soc Trang. Yeah.
27
LC: Now what kind of a guy was John Carey?
28
RC: Oh, he was a go-getter.
29
LC: Yeah?
30
RC: Go-getter, yeah, a very highly respected group commander.
297
1
LC: You and the two other majors that you traveled with, what were you
2
supposed to achieve? Were you supposed to get the lay of the land and what the
3
operations were that the U.S. Marine Corps was involved in?
4
RC: That’s the first thing. That was the first thing. Then the second thing, a
5
secondary task we had was to reconnoiter Vietnam for potential future locations for
6
airfields.
7
8
LC: Now how did they brief you for this? I mean, how did they tell you what to
look for or were you meant to—?
9
RC: Well, we pretty much knew what to look for because we were—
10
LC: Drawing on your own experiences?
11
RC: Based upon our own experience, we knew that you had to have a site that
12
first off, that you could operate from and it was relatively secure, could be made secure
13
terrain-wise and defensively. It would be reasonable to support it, supplies and so on.
14
LC: So you had to have some access to it, relatively good access—
15
RC: That’s right, relatively good access and relatively defensible and
16
operationally attractive. So we spent quite a bit of time at that time we were there going
17
to various locations.
18
LC: Now were you flying in the helicopters?
19
RC: No, no, we took—I was qualified in a C-47, Gooney Bird. We called them
20
R-4D at the time; the Navy/Marine designation was R-4D. That stands for
21
Reconnaissance Supply 4th Version by Douglas. That’s what that R-4D stands by, stands
22
for.
23
LC: Reconnaissance Supply—what was it?
24
RC: And a fourth model of Douglas Aircraft. It’s the old DC-3. It’s a version, a
25
beefed up improved version of the DC-3. So I had, during my career had become
26
qualified in that. I tried to get qualified in all the aircraft that I could. I was a plane
27
commander. So they gave me a plane and said, “Go to South Vietnam.”
28
LC: Now did they do the same with the other two majors? Were they also—?
29
RC: Well, they were copilot qualified. So the three of us flew it.
30
LC: Okay. So they would hang around with you, but you were—
31
RC: Right, we all worked together.
298
1
2
3
4
LC: Okay. You’re flying in and out. Can you name some of the places that you
flew to to evaluate?
RC: Right. Well, of course, we started at Saigon. Then we flew down to Soc
Trang where the helicopters were located.
5
LC: Sure.
6
RC: We flew to Da Nang. We flew to—what’s the name? It slips me right now,
7
the big airbase between Da Nang and Saigon.
8
LC: Nha Trang?
9
RC: No.
10
LC: Bien Hoa?
11
RC: No. Well, we went to Bien Hoa. We went to Nha Trang.
12
LC: I’m thinking, is it on the coast, one of the ones on the coast?
13
RC: Yeah, it’s a big one. Oh, gosh.
14
LC: Cam Ranh Bay?
15
RC: There you go.
16
LC: Okay.
17
RC: Cam Ranh Bay. I couldn’t think of it.
18
LC: That’s okay.
19
RC: Yeah. We went into Quang Tri.
20
LC: Yes.
21
RC: We went to Hue-Phu Bai. We went into Khe Sanh.
22
LC: So you went to Khe Sanh at this time?
23
RC: Yeah.
24
LC: Wow. Well, can you give me a sense of, first of all, what your impressions
25
were of the country? I know you were looking at it from a military point of view, but you
26
know, you’re also a guy who’s going to Vietnam for the first time and I’m just wondering
27
what your impressions were.
28
RC: Well, I thought, “This is going to be a tough fight.”
29
LC: Why did you think that?
30
RC: Well, because it was summertime and very hot and a lot of thunderstorms.
31
So it would be operationally—and a lot of jungles and a lot of open rice paddies and
299
1
having fought, fought as a grunt in Korea, rice paddies were something that you didn’t
2
really like to have to fight in.
3
LC: No, sir.
4
RC: The mountains, of course, and there were a lot of jungles and a lot of strange
5
animals. I had an inordinate fear of snakes. I never wanted to be shot down anyplace and
6
that was one of the driving factors of my career, as a matter of fact, in Vietnam. I said,
7
“They’re not going to take me prisoner. I’m not going to be shot down if I can help it,”
8
because I always had that idea that I’d land in a jungle and a big old python or something
9
would grab me, you know.
10
LC: So that was a motivator for you?
11
RC: That was a motivator.
12
LC: I’m staying in the air.
13
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
14
LC: Good for you, whatever it takes.
15
RC: Yeah. I really got the impression that it was going to be a bad place to have
16
to fight. I really did. It was a beautiful country as far as—the Highlands were beautiful
17
and to fly over it was gorgeous, you know.
18
LC: Sure, yeah.
19
RC: But down on the ground—
20
LC: You were kind of feeling it from the point of view of having been an infantry
21
guy, it sounds like.
22
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
23
LC: Yeah. The variety of the terrain would complicate things.
24
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah. Obviously when you trained to go someplace, you try to
25
equip and to train for that particular environment, in that particular terrain, well
26
environment, I guess, is probably the best word, but you know, if you’re in the
27
mountains, why you need certain equipment. If you’re in the desert, you need certain
28
equipment and so on. So Vietnam kind of had a mixture of all of those.
29
LC: So you could see that just from the supply aspect—
30
RC: It wasn’t going to be easy.
31
LC: Yeah. The guys on the ground probably were going to go through a lot.
300
1
2
RC: That’s right. That’s right. It was something that you wouldn’t relish having
to do.
3
LC: Yes, sir.
4
RC: I wouldn’t have relished being an infantryman there.
5
LC: General, do you remember your landing out at Khe Sanh?
6
RC: Mm-hmm.
7
LC: What was the strip like and was there any kind of fortifications up there at
8
9
that point?
RC: Not many.
10
LC: I would think, yeah.
11
RC: Not many. It was dirt.
12
LC: A dirt strip.
13
RC: Right.
14
LC: Yup.
15
RC: Because later on they had to put in the Marsden matting. I think I talked to
16
you about Marsden matting before.
17
LC: Yes. Yes, you did. You explained what it is and how important it was.
18
RC: That’s what they put in up at Khe Sanh.
19
LC: Yeah, not for quite a while yet, though.
20
RC: Right.
21
LC: A couple of years. But at this point, when you were up there, it was just a
22
dirt strip.
23
RC: That’s right.
24
LC: Now why were you going up there? I mean, most of the other places that
25
you visited are pretty self explanatory with regard to their positions on waterways and so
26
on, but Khe Sanh is inland. Why were you up there?
27
RC: Well, it’s in Vietnam.
28
LC: Yes.
29
RC: You had to look at it from a standpoint of the entire country.
30
LC: Was there a sense already that that might be a critical place if the North
31
Vietnamese decided either to invade—?
301
1
2
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah, because you have Laos, which is right next door, right
across the border.
3
LC: Yes, sir.
4
RC: Later on in my career, it did me a lot of good to have done that because I was
5
familiar with it. I had come up with a couple of operations that in the Khe Sanh defense,
6
in the Khe Sanh Siege that were pretty important.
7
LC: Yes, sir. I know that you did. I’ve looked into that a little bit and I want to
8
ask you about that. That’s why I think it’s important if you can recall anything else about
9
your visit up there because for listeners, this area becomes really important for you later
10
on in ’68.
11
RC: Well, of course, you know that they did have Special Forces in there.
12
LC: Okay. So there were U.S. Special Forces up there?
13
RC: Yeah, there were Special Forces that were looking at all this. They were
14
moving around the country. So that’s part of the importance of it. We knew that from a
15
strategic standpoint, it was important because you did have from North Vietnam—of
16
course, at that time we weren’t familiar with the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but right across the
17
border, you had Laos, which was, and incidentally, while I was at the War College,
18
backtracking just a little bit—
19
LC: Sure.
20
RC: While I was at the War College, they told me that I was going to be
21
reassigned to Laos.
22
LC: Really?
23
RC: As an advisor. I don’t recall exactly the political situation at that time. As I
24
recall, that’s when they moved all the people out of Laos, the advisors. So originally, I
25
was going to be assigned in there.
26
LC: But then that came unraveled somehow?
27
RC: That became unraveled, yes.
28
LC: Oh, okay.
29
RC: That’s when they reassigned me to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and I went
30
over in the assignment we’re talking about now.
302
1
2
LC: Sure, sure. Well, that’s interesting. You came that close to being sent to
Laos.
3
RC: Right, right. So I was interested in that. I was quite interested in that area.
4
LC: Well, General, what did you make of, for example, Cam Ranh Bay? What
5
6
were the facilities there that you saw in 1963?
RC: As I recall, again, I don’t remember a lot about that because I kind of erased
7
it from my memory because the Marines never went there. As I recall, it didn’t have a lot
8
either. The Americans built that up.
9
10
11
LC: Yes, right. The French hadn’t done all that much there.
RC: No. The French hadn’t done that much there. The French concentrated
more on Da Nang.
12
LC: As did the Marines.
13
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
14
LC: Right, with good reason.
15
RC: Of course, we went to Chu Lai, also. Do you remember the name Chu Lai?
16
LC: I do. You flew in there?
17
RC: My next tour there, I wound up being first assigned to Chu Lai.
18
LC: What do you remember about it from 1963?
19
RC: Same as the others, mostly, principally a small strip, concrete, which was
20
later expanded when the Marines went in. We expanded up to a eight-thousand-foot
21
strip. It was only about three, three to four thousand feet when we went in. That was one
22
of the reasons we went in in the Gooney Bird, in the R-4D.
23
LC: Go ahead and say why just for people who don’t know.
24
RC: Well, because it was relatively, you were capable, particularly when it
25
wasn’t loaded, which it wasn’t, we had an empty R-4D. You could do, operate from
26
relatively short strips, land and take off. Three to four thousand feet was adequate.
27
LC: Was plenty?
28
RC: Yeah.
29
LC: Up at Khe Sanh, did they have three or four thousand feet?
30
RC: Yes, uh-huh.
31
LC: Okay. But again, all dirt as you mentioned.
303
1
RC: That’s right.
2
LC: What was it at Da Nang when you first were there in ’63? Was it gravel
3
or—?
4
RC: No, no. They had some concrete.
5
LC: They had concrete, okay. But as you say, later on the U.S. obviously hugely
6
upgraded this.
7
RC: Yeah. The U.S. really, really made it into a first class operation.
8
LC: Now did you get out of the plane much?
9
RC: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. We got out every place. We didn’t do much looking at
10
Khe Sanh because there wasn’t that much to look at.
11
LC: Yeah. I’m sure that’s right.
12
RC: You know, it was pretty primitive.
13
LC: What about in Hue?
14
RC: Oh, that was interesting. Now Hue had a concrete strip. I remember, we
15
went into Hue and a lot of these places, of course, we’d call, we had radio contact
16
supposedly, but most of the places that we called would never answer us.
17
LC: No kidding?
18
RC: So we just landed.
19
LC: Nobody was in the tower, if there was a tower?
20
RC: Yeah. At Hue, they were in the tower, and I landed at Hue, but I remember
21
we taxied up to the terminal, per se, that they had at that time, which was a small,
22
relatively small building and we couldn’t find anybody.
23
LC: Nobody was there.
24
RC: Nobody was there. It was very eerie, really was. Really, we didn’t know
25
what was going to happen. So we didn’t stay overnight. We stayed overnight usually in
26
the northern provinces, we’d land at Da Nang and we stayed at Da Nang.
27
LC: So you would kind of base out of there?
28
RC: We based out of Da Nang in the north and we based out of Saigon in the
29
south. So that’s kind of the way we did it.
30
LC: Now did you get into the town of Hue or did you just kind of—?
31
RC: No, we did not.
304
1
LC: It sounds a little weird that—
2
RC: Yeah, we didn’t have any support. In other words, the airfield was not in the
3
city itself.
4
LC: Sure.
5
RC: So we were kind of out in the country. So if we’d have gone in, and we
6
didn’t, we were in what we considered to be Indian country.
7
LC: Yes, sir.
8
RC: So we didn’t really have any major support.
9
LC: Were you flying with sidearms? What did you have on you?
10
RC: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah, we had sidearms.
11
LC: But that was about it?
12
RC: That was it, yeah.
13
LC: Right, well, that wouldn’t—
14
RC: That’s not conducive to combat operation.
15
LC: No, sir. No, sir.
16
RC: That’s kind of a last ditch thing.
17
LC: Yeah. That leaves you a little thin if something bad were to happen.
18
RC: That’s right. So we didn’t go in there, but the thing that impressed me was
19
the lack of seeing anybody. We didn’t see anybody at all on the ground. They just
20
disappeared. That could’ve been because obviously the VC (Viet Cong) had good
21
intelligence. They had better intelligence than we had because they had people right in
22
the population, you know. So I’m certain that they knew why we were there or had an
23
inkling of why we were there. So they didn’t—even though that was allegedly friendly
24
territory, they didn’t want to have anything to do with us.
25
26
LC: Well, it sounds like a place you needed to probably go on ahead and get out
of.
27
RC: Yeah. We did. (Laughs) We did.
28
LC: Okay. Now did you have to file some kind of evaluation report on your trip?
29
RC: Yes, yes. Well, we wrote it up when we got back to Iwakuni.
305
1
LC: Well, actually before I ask you about your return to Japan, General, it might
2
be of interest if you can recall anything that you learned about the operations of this kind
3
of beefed up squadron down at Soc Trang. What were they involved in? Do you recall?
4
RC: Well, they did a lot of inserts. In other words, they were taking Special
5
Forces to various points that they wanted to go to. The Vietnamese were operating and
6
they would lift them into operational areas, also. They were lifting units.
7
8
9
10
11
LC: Now were they actually coming under, was it potentially the case that they
might come under enemy fire?
RC: Oh, yes. I’m certain they were, yes, yes.
LC: Did you have a chance to talk with those guys about how it was going and
what they were observing?
12
RC: Sure, of course. That was part of it, to give kind of an on-the-spot report of
13
how things were going for them other than their daily after action reports, to actually get
14
in and talk to some of the people, some of the pilots and the operators, the people in
15
operations and so on. They were doing well. The main struggle they had was in re-
16
supply, getting parts down to them and keeping their aircraft going, but they were making
17
it fine. They were doing a pretty doggone good job. So that’s kind of the report we took
18
back that they were keeping their head above water and they were performing their
19
assignments, they were performing their mission quite well.
20
LC: Did you glean anything about the enemy that they were facing, for example,
21
what kind of arms the enemy was using or any details like that?
22
RC: Well, basically pretty primitive at that time.
23
LC: Sure.
24
RC: They didn’t have—they weren’t using—on our helicopters at that time, they
25
weren’t trying to shoot them down, except small arms, principally small arms. They
26
didn’t actually get into the point—I think what they were hoping, basically, is that we
27
wouldn’t come in.
28
LC: That this would be it, maybe these few helicopters—
29
RC: That’s right. So they really didn’t—I think from a tactical standpoint, what
30
they were trying to impress us with is that the enemy was not that strong. So therefore
306
1
the Vietnamese could handle it. The American forces didn’t need to come in. I think
2
that’s basically what they were—they were thinking ahead.
3
LC: Right. They didn’t want to do something that—
4
RC: That would trigger a major response.
5
LC: Were you at the time and was, for example, Colonel Carey at the time savvy
6
to this? I mean, could you figure out that that’s what they were doing, holding back a
7
little?
8
9
RC: Oh, yes, yes. Yeah. That was obviously kind of counterintelligence, if you
will, that they were performing on us. It’s a good tactic.
10
LC: Sure.
11
RC: Good tactic. They were pretty smart fighters. They’d been fighting the
12
French for a long time. So they knew how to manipulate. I presume that you are familiar
13
with the French operation in there.
14
LC: Yes, sir. Actually that’s an area of special interest of mine, yeah.
15
RC: You’re familiar with Dien Bien Phu, obviously?
16
LC: Yes. Were you starting to think more about those French encounters and the
17
fact that the French had actually met with sustained main force—?
18
RC: Oh, yes, yes, yes, absolutely.
19
LC: Adversaries. I mean, the VC were in the south, a very different military
20
organization than they had been in the north, but you yourself obviously had already kind
21
of updated yourself on—
22
RC: As much as was available at that time. Obviously later on, I had the
23
opportunity to even meet and talk with a general, a French general who later was
24
president of the French Parliament, Bigeard. Are you familiar with the name?
25
LC: How do you spell that?
26
RC: B-I-G-E-A-R-D, I believe it is.
27
LC: He was one of the, was he an Army commander?
28
RC: He was one of the paratroopers at Dien Bien Phu.
29
LC: Where did you meet him, sir?
307
1
RC: I met him at the War College in, not at the war college, at my assignment. I
2
didn’t meet him at that time. It was later, but I met him. He came into when I was
3
assigned to CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic. I was now a brigadier.
4
LC: What year was that roughly? Do you remember?
5
RC: Oh, ’70—
6
LC: In the ’70s?
7
RC: ’77, ’78.
8
LC: Okay.
9
RC: ’78.
10
LC: Well, while we’re on the subject, I think it’s interesting, if you can tell us
11
what he told you about Dien Bien Phu, about the Vietnamese as fighters. What did he
12
sort of relay to you?
13
RC: Well, he relayed to me that the French made a lot of mistakes. They made a
14
very, very, very bad tactical mistake at Dien Bien Phu because it was really, it was Khe
15
Sanh all over again.
16
LC: Yes, sir, only in reverse because, of course, that happened—
17
RC: Only in reverse because the French, it was down in a hole, so to speak.
18
LC: Yes, sir.
19
RC: It was surrounded by hills, high hills that the Viet Minh were able to occupy
20
and were shooting right down their throats. So it was really, they were relying upon
21
French aviation to be able to support them. They weren’t able to do it. So it was an
22
absolute military disaster.
23
24
LC: Did he tell you how long he was there, when he jumped in to Dien Bien Phu
and how long—?
25
RC: Oh, he didn’t jump in. He was in on the original group that went in.
26
LC: Oh, really? Wow, that’s incredible.
27
RC: Yeah. He was captured, subsequently escaped and made his way back to
28
safety.
29
LC: Did he tell you, did he walk out of, what, out of northern Laos or—?
30
RC: Yeah. He wrote a book that he gave me. Unfortunately, it’s in French. So I
31
never was able to completely read it. One day I will.
308
1
LC: Okay.
2
RC: I still have it.
3
LC: Do you know what the title of it is?
4
RC: No, no, I don’t.
5
LC: Oh, okay. Well, we can have somebody look it up.
6
RC: But it’s Bigeard, General Bigeard. I can’t remember his first name, either
7
Henri or Marcel. I think it was one of those two. Very interesting individual, and as I
8
say, he later went into the French Parliament. I believe, my sources told me, he became
9
the president of the French Parliament.
10
LC: That’s really something.
11
RC: Yeah, quite a warrior, quite a warrior.
12
LC: Yeah. Did he have experience during World War II? Did he tell you
13
anything about that?
14
RC: He was in the French Foreign Legion.
15
LC: Oh, really?
16
RC: Yeah. He started out in the French Foreign Legion. Then he became a
17
regular Army officer and became a paratrooper. He was a typical paratrooper, big,
18
boisterous, tough guy. You know?
19
LC: Oh, I’ll bet.
20
RC: Yeah.
21
LC: I bet he was one tough hombre.
22
RC: Yeah. A very, very fine gentleman to me, relatively short relationship, just a
23
couple of days, he spent a couple of days, spent a night there, came over to my quarters
24
for dinner and gave me his book.
25
26
LC: Did the two of you kind of compare notes about Dien Bien Phu and Khe
Sanh?
27
RC: Yeah. We talked a little bit about that. Of course, Khe Sanh was now over.
28
LC: Over, sure.
29
RC: I told him that I was able to become involved in an operation that was quite
30
similar to his operation that he was in. So we did discuss it and there were quite a few
31
similarities.
309
1
2
LC: Yes. I mean, that’s something that’s come under study recently. It’s very
interesting that the two of you got to meet and discuss this.
3
RC: Yeah.
4
LC: Did you both decide, I mean, did you have some kind of judgment that you,
5
you know, two old war horses basically, I don’t want to insult you, sir, but—?
6
RC: Well, yeah, one of the things that he said, one of the tactical errors that they
7
made is they pulled off of some of the hills that surrounded Dien Bien Phu. They pulled
8
off some and were driven off some. As a result, they wound up down in the valley with
9
no commanding terrain. The Viet Minh moved their artillery and everything onto the
10
hills and really, their counter-artillery was so badly exposed that it didn’t take them long
11
to wipe them out.
12
LC: Did he talk about the placement of Viet Minh artillery? Did he talk about
13
the fact that, well, it seems to be a fact that the French command wasn’t really aware that
14
the Viet Minh had artillery that they could’ve gotten up into those hills without air
15
support?
16
RC: That’s right. Well, the French didn’t think they could get them up because
17
to move an artillery piece up some of those mountains is quite an operation, but they
18
proved and the VC did the same thing because at Khe Sanh, when we fought at Khe Sanh
19
and we’ll cover this later, but it’s related, they moved them into the caves over across the
20
Laotian border. They had a longer range than our artillery had. So we had to come up
21
with a way of combating them because they were knocking the devil out of us in Khe
22
Sanh with those long-range artillery pieces. We eventually neutralized them with the first
23
use of guided missiles.
24
25
LC: Now what artillery were they using? Was it 120s or what was it at Khe
Sanh? I’ll come back and ask you about this later, sir.
26
RC: Yeah, I’ll have to look into that because—
27
LC: Or 122s, I can’t remember.
28
RC: I think it was 122s because their range, they had us outranged.
29
LC: Yeah. That’s really something.
30
RC: They had us outranged there. That was really—and the only way we could
31
combat them was with air, which we did.
310
1
LC: Which you did, yes, sir.
2
RC: Yeah, which we did.
3
LC: Well, back to the conversation about Dien Bien Phu, did it come up that
4
there were questions about not only the French decision to kind of place themselves in
5
the valley, but also the broader plan of which Dien Bien Phu was a part, did he talk about
6
that at all?
7
8
9
RC: Yeah, they thought that—see, they knew that the Vietnamese were getting
support from outside the country.
LC: Meaning China?
10
RC: Right.
11
LC: Yes, sir.
12
RC: They knew that they were getting support. So Dien Bien Phu was kind of
13
a—the French thought by controlling Dien Bien Phu, they would cut off that support and
14
that was the same concept at Khe Sanh, same thing, because it was right at the head or the
15
tail as it will, if you will, of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
16
LC: Of the main supply route.
17
RC: The main supply route. So if you controlled that, you would control the flow
18
19
20
of supplies to support the enemy. So that was kind of their concept.
LC: Did he say anything to you about the generalship on the Vietnamese side
about, for example, General Giap?
21
RC: No. The only thing that I recall that we both surmised was that Giap was a
22
pretty brilliant guy. He planned well ahead strategically and he was successful. He did
23
have certain political support. The politicians kind of interfered, if you will.
24
LC: How did you—?
25
RC: Well, this is later on. He didn’t really discuss it that much, to tell you the
26
truth, as I recall. This is what I surmised from knowing about Dien Bien Phu and about
27
the similarities of that with Khe Sanh.
28
LC: The politicians on both sides or—?
29
RC: Well, really what we couldn’t do is we couldn’t get at the source.
30
LC: You couldn’t go into Laos.
311
1
RC: That’s right. We couldn’t get at the source. In order to shut the operation
2
down, you had to cut off resupply because they were putting in monstrous amounts of
3
supply and on certain advisors at that time and later on in Khe Sanh, of course, that was
4
their principle route for their forces came down, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So control of
5
that was vital to the success of the operation long term.
6
LC: Sir, if you’ll allow me just to foreshadow this, would you have thought that a
7
kind of—the suggestion had been made that U.S. forces might do a block-and-hold
8
operation across Laos at a higher point north of Khe Sanh to stop that flow of supplies.
9
RC: Oh, absolutely.
10
LC: That that might’ve been the thing to do.
11
RC: Yes, absolutely.
12
LC: I mean, from a military point of view.
13
RC: Right, and it was just the same thing later on. You have to intersect the
14
capability, not at the point of conflict, but you have to cut them off, if you will. We did
15
the same thing in Vietnam. We had plans to—well, to actually, the Marines wanted to go
16
into Hanoi and shortage, absent that to go into Vinh, which was halfway up the peninsula
17
between Hanoi and the DMZ.
18
LC: Yes, sir.
19
RC: That if we had been allowed to do that, we could’ve cut off those major
20
forces that came in later on.
21
LC: So cut off the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) movement.
22
RC: Right, right. I know that you’re familiar with what happened in the final fall
23
of Vietnam. How they built highways right into the, almost up to the capital and were
24
able to do that because, God bless him, Henry Kissinger gave away the store.
25
LC: In the peace negotiations.
26
RC: In the Peace Accords, absolutely.
27
LC: By not, and I’m just going to paraphrase here and guess and correct me if
28
I’m wrong, what you’re saying is by not forcing North Vietnamese troops to leave the
29
territory of South Vietnam.
30
31
RC: Absolutely, absolutely. They should’ve been forced out. We were being
forced out. Why not them? That’s, in essence, giving it away.
312
1
LC: Well, that’s something that, with your permission, we will explore, you and I
2
together in these interviews because it’s so important. Your involvement in that period
3
was something essentially forced upon you by these decisions that essentially forced U.S.
4
personnel and our allies to have to get out of Saigon and get out of South Vietnam as
5
quickly as possible.
6
RC: That’s right. We had to leave because it was untenable.
7
LC: It was untenable. Well, sir, let’s take a break there.
8
RC: Okay.
313
Interview with Richard Carey Session [8] of [16] January 13, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Richard E.
3
Carey. Today is the thirteenth of January 2006. I am in Lubbock and the general is
4
speaking from his home here in Texas in the Fort Worth area. Good morning, sir.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
6
LC: Thank you again for your time, General, and I want to pick up where we left
7
off, which was in 1963. You were based at Iwakuni Airbase in Japan. I wonder if you
8
can talk a little bit about the mission of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
9
RC: Well, basically we were kind of the, if you will, the presence in the Far East,
10
the major presence in the Far East. There was a wing and most of a division, the wing
11
was mostly based at Iwakuni and up at Atsugi Base. Atsugi is right outside of Tokyo.
12
LC: Yes.
13
RC: We had a group at Atsugi, a fighter group, which did a lot of fighter training
14
because there was more operating area up there. We had a TAC (Tactical Air Command)
15
group, a TAC in the headquarters group down at Iwakuni, which is where the wing
16
headquarters was and which I was assigned to. Then we had a large helicopter group on
17
Okinawa. The Okinawa group, the helicopter group was designed to give basic support
18
for training and deployments for the division units that were based there. There was a
19
better part of the division. Two regiments were based down at Okinawa. So they and we
20
out of Atsugi and Iwakuni would make training sorties. One of the primary places we
21
deployed to for the training was to Taiwan. Of course, Taiwan was as you know, was
22
kind of opposing, not opposing, but it separated itself from China.
23
LC: Yes, sir.
24
RC: So the Chinese, when we went down there, the Chinese watched what we
25
were doing a great deal. We did training out of there. Some of the training obviously
26
would fly close to China. They would have on occasion, they would put up some air
27
defense things, but never any real confrontations. They never really confronted us that
28
much, but they watched us very closely obviously.
314
1
LC: I’ll bet they did, yes.
2
RC: Yes. We deployed, we always had a unit at sea, what we termed a Marine
3
amphibious unit, which consisted of a battalion with supporting air that was deployed on
4
amphibious ships. They would tour throughout the Far East, kind of a presence, if you
5
will, a reactionary presence. Later on, those units, that unit would become the, if you
6
will, kind of the nucleus for the evacuation of Cambodia and the beginning nucleus for
7
the evacuation of Saigon. So we had that presence from about ’63 on, ’62, ’63 on. We
8
also deployed down to the Philippines. We did a lot of training in the Philippines, both
9
fixed-wing air and helicopters in support of the ground units. The ground units would go
10
down to the Philippines and go to the various islands and make amphibious landings and
11
have a presence in the Philippines. So between the Philippines and Taiwan, those were
12
the primary deployment sites we had with those units.
13
14
LC: Now, sir, did you get to all of those bases over the course of your
assignment?
15
RC: Yes, yes. Yes, and that was part of my job. I was one of several officers
16
that were in the G-3, the operation section of the wing. We would go, we would make
17
trips to Taiwan, to the Philippines. We did have a presence as I told you, we did have a
18
presence with a helicopter, a makeshift helicopter group down in Vietnam. That
19
makeshift helicopter group was designed to support, basically to support the Army
20
Special Forces and some more administrative, it was termed administrative support of the
21
Vietnamese forces, the South Vietnamese forces in their fight at that time because the
22
war was just starting to crank up.
23
LC: Yes, sir.
24
RC: So we were kind of in at the beginning on that. I talked to you before about
25
making the trip down there.
26
LC: Yes, sir.
27
RC: That was one of my tasks. So I kind of made all the rounds of all that in the
28
Far East.
29
LC: It sure sounds like it.
30
RC: Yeah. I was not the only one, but I was kind of the junior man. So they sent
31
me on most of the long soirees.
315
1
LC: So you had your backend in a plane quite a bit?
2
RC: That’s right.
3
LC: Just getting back and forth.
4
RC: That’s right. I did a lot of movement and did a lot of flying around and a lot
5
6
of liaisons and so on.
LC: Now if you can, General, I think it would be useful for listeners to get a
7
sense of what you thought our allies in this part of the world were doing in terms of their
8
performance level. Were they—let’s talk about the Chinese first on Taiwan. Were they
9
quick studies? Were we giving them equipment such that they could do their own
10
11
training?
RC: Yes, yes. We were helping them with their training. That was a part of it.
12
They participated in—when we would make an amphibious landing, they would
13
participate with us, along with us.
14
LC: So they would actually have troops?
15
RC: Small units, yes. Mostly observers and trying to learn the best way to do it.
16
So they hooked onto us a lot and watched us very carefully. Obviously we were
17
stationed at their bases. So they were able to—
18
LC: Yes, in Taiwan.
19
RC: In Taiwan. I also forgot that we also did work with the Koreans.
20
LC: Okay, the South Koreans.
21
RC: South Koreans, right.
22
LC: Sure.
23
RC: Of course, I was sent down there more than anybody else because of my
24
experience in Korea. So they kind of thought, well, here’s a guy that knows the lay of the
25
land down there, so we’ll send him. So yeah, I did a lot of traveling during that tour.
26
LC: But your home base, let’s say, was Iwakuni.
27
RC: Iwakuni, that’s right.
28
LC: Okay. Was your family there?
29
RC: No, no.
30
LC: Okay, they were in the States?
31
RC: That’s right.
316
1
LC: Okay.
2
RC: Yes. That was a one-year tour.
3
LC: It sounds like an interesting tour because you were all over the place and
4
5
probably learning quite a lot.
RC: Well, that’s true, that’s true. It was very beneficial to me from a career
6
standpoint because I got to know the Far East very well. Of course, my major exposure
7
to it, the Far East up to that time was kind of sketchy, you know, but I made the rounds
8
that time and got to know it very well.
9
LC: Was it at all a kind of, I don’t know, deeper experience for you to go to
10
Korea than to these other places because, of course, not only of your own service there,
11
but your memories of your men and so on?
12
RC: Oh, absolutely, yes, yes. Korea was the most interesting to me. Most of the
13
time, we would deploy to Korea. We would do training with the South Koreans. They
14
definitely joined in.
15
LC: Rather than being observers so much?
16
RC: Yeah. They joined in with units and they were trying to learn the trade.
17
LC: So there was a greater integration?
18
RC: Absolutely, absolutely. Of course, the South Vietnamese and the South
19
Korean Marine Corps really hooked on to us and got most of their training almost
20
exclusively from us, from Marines, which is natural of course. They were Marines. So
21
they wanted to learn. Even their uniforms were patterned after ours.
22
LC: Is that right?
23
RC: Yes. Oh, yes. So they were in essence Marines in their own Korean and
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Vietnamese country. They were patterned a great deal like us.
LC: Would you say the institution of their Marine Corps had a similar position to
that of the U.S. Marine Corps within our armed services?
RC: Yes, yes, I think so. They were considered to be kind of, if you will, the
elite of their services, too. They really were and were very highly thought of.
LC: Now did this start with who they selected and then continued through their
training process? I mean, they weren’t taking conscripts I would imagine.
317
1
RC: No, no, they weren’t. They opted—well, they did like we did in the latter
2
part of the Korean War is their draft. The troop would make a choice whether they
3
wanted to be in the Army or the Marine Corps. So it was more of a voluntary service
4
than any of the others.
5
LC: But they also then had to make the grade.
6
RC: That’s right. That’s right. They were trained under Marine fashions because
7
they sent liaisons to the United States to learn how we train Marines here from the
8
beginning. So they fashioned their training after the Marine Corps, right down to
9
including their recruit training.
10
LC: Thinking about 1963 and this tour and the different countries that were allied
11
with the United States during this time, which would you say was most effective
12
militarily?
13
RC: Most effected by—?
14
LC: Most effective.
15
RC: Most effective?
16
LC: In other words, best trained, best equipped, ready to go if there was an
17
emergency.
18
RC: Probably the Koreans. The Koreans are very intense. So they really went
19
after it. I have a couple of Korean friends that have since migrated to the United States
20
that were Marines. They were very definitely—one of them as a matter of fact, a
21
gentleman by the name of Peter Oh, is a very close friend of mine. He was in the Korean
22
Army. I don’t know—well, I’m sure you know the history of when the Koreans had the
23
coup, the attempted coup. It was put down by the then government.
24
LC: Yes, sir.
25
RC: He was in the Army and was very familiar with that. He’s very interesting
26
because he was also a line crosser at the start of the Korean War. If you recall from the
27
Korean War they drafted, if you would, a group of young high school students and sent
28
them back into North Korea to be spies, if you will. Peter was captured as a spy and was
29
tortured and eventually escaped and got back to the south, joined the Army, spent time in
30
the Army and up to the coup and then got out of the Army and went into the Korean
31
Marine Corps. So he’s quite a history case himself.
318
1
LC: Well, he sure sounds like it.
2
RC: Yeah. He’s a very fine gentleman and speaks good English. He’s just a
3
very good friend. I’m supposed to play golf with him today, as a matter of fact, and I
4
cancelled it.
5
6
LC: Well, let me ask you about that maybe after we’ve stopped the interview.
I’ll ask you a little more about him.
7
RC: Certainly.
8
LC: But it’s interesting that your observation was that the South Koreans were
9
really ready to go. What was the relationship between the Marines on the different bases
10
in Japan and the Japanese themselves? Did you ever see basically good relations with
11
civilian Japanese or were there kind of a few ruffles?
12
RC: No. I think they were very good.
13
LC: Were they?
14
RC: I really do. The Japanese treated us very well. The only place we had
15
problems in the Orient in that regard was on Okinawa. As you know, Okinawa was never
16
really Japanese.
17
LC: Right. They’re ethnically different.
18
RC: That’s right. That’s right. The Okinawans, the only place that we really had
19
any problems was on Okinawa. Now, of course, the difference there, too, is that you had
20
a lot more Marines and you had infantry Marines and a lot more junior Marines than you
21
had in Japan because all of the forces in Japan were aviation forces. There’s a little bit of
22
a difference. They’re a little bit more Marine, if you will, they’re a little bit wilder.
23
LC: Yeah. Well, they’re younger guys.
24
RC: Younger guys and not as well, don’t have the technical training that the
25
aviation people did, which kind of makes a person think a little bit differently at times.
26
LC: Right.
27
RC: But I think basically the Okinawans really wanted to get out from under,
28
their long-term goal I think is to get out from under the Japanese empire, the Japanese
29
nation.
30
LC: Well, they haven’t been treated all that well over time.
31
RC: That’s exactly right.
319
1
LC: It’s not a big surprise.
2
RC: That’s right. But the Japanese in Japan where I was stationed for a good part
3
of that tour were very good to us. Later on in the next tour that I had—did I tell you
4
about my relationship with a former kamikaze pilot?
5
LC: No, sir, but I want to hear about that.
6
RC: I’ll tell you about that. I’ll tell you about that later.
7
LC: Okay. Generally you think there was pretty good relationships between the
8
Americans in Japan certainly?
9
RC: Yes, I think so. I think that the Japanese were, if you will, more tolerant of
10
our presence than they were in Okinawa, than the Okinawans were. They accepted our
11
presence there. Actually, the people that worked on the base and we would go out on
12
liberty and so on. We were never mistreated. We were never looked down upon in
13
anyway. As a matter of fact, more looked up to than anything else.
14
LC: Is that right?
15
RC: Yeah. So, no, the Japanese were very good to us, I thought.
16
LC: You had obviously been there briefly back when you were an infantry guy,
17
18
did you notice any differences in how Americans were treated from the early 1950s?
RC: Well, yeah, I think that the Japanese, when we first went there, they were
19
very standoffish, when I was first there in the ’50. They were very standoffish to us and
20
then the next time I went there was in this period. They were more conversant with us.
21
They’d associate with us, more ready to become friends with us, I think. They were very
22
standoffish the first time. That was close to the end of the war, of course, and I think
23
that’s part of it.
24
LC: General, this question has some contemporary resonance because we are
25
now in the middle of a long-term deployment of military forces into a country with a
26
changing governmental system there in the Middle East. You know the United States
27
had occupied Japan after World War II for, I don’t know, seven years or something, six
28
years. What are your observations on the job that was done by American forces and
29
civilian administrators in Japan after World War II as you think about Japan’s
30
development?
320
1
2
RC: Well, that’s an interesting question and it kind of refocuses a little bit, if you
would, on General MacArthur.
3
LC: Yes, sir.
4
RC: General MacArthur was more of a—he was, if you will, very, I don’t know
5
what the proper word would be, a little bit pompous, a little bit like an emperor.
6
LC: A little imperious.
7
RC: Well, that’s a good word, yes, very much. That’s why you have a doctor’s
8
9
10
11
degree and I don’t.
LC: You have a few things I don’t have, though, sir. That’s why I’m
interviewing you and not the other way around. (Both laugh)
RC: But anyway, I think that he had a great effect on them because he kind of
12
took on the role of a quasi-emperor, if you will. They respected that. The Japanese
13
respected that because that was their way of life.
14
LC: Right.
15
RC: They had always been that way and he didn’t change it too much. As
16
opposed to now in Iraq, I think we’re kind of disjointed in Iraq. We were kind of
17
disjointed from the beginning. We didn’t assert ourselves the way we should. We tried
18
to be too democratic, if you will. I think when you go in and you take over, if you will,
19
saying take over, but actually that’s what we did. We kind of took over the government.
20
We took over the government in Iraq and we weren’t strong enough, I think, in Iraq from
21
the beginning. We made some pretty serious mistakes.
22
LC: By not coming in and sort of establishing a—
23
RC: A strong presence—
24
LC: A strong presence—
25
RC: A strong presence and really taking over and not trying to integrate ourselves
26
into their government. We should’ve been the government when we first took over.
27
LC: Which is exactly what MacArthur did.
28
RC: That’s exactly right.
29
LC: From the first day, basically.
321
1
RC: That’s right. That’s right. He was smart and it worked. The Japanese have
2
a great deal of respect. They’re our friends now. I think if there’s one nation we could
3
depend upon in the Orient, it would be Japan.
4
LC: I think that’s true, yes.
5
RC: The South Koreans are starting to waffle quite a bit now.
6
LC: Why do you think that is?
7
RC: Well, I’ve talked this over with Peter and he said that obviously what has
8
happened is the old breed has died off, if you will. The memory of the war is a thing of
9
the past, if you will. Unfortunately they’re a lot like us. They don’t teach the history as
10
much as they should, which is one thing that I admire about what you all are doing.
11
You’re trying to perpetuate the memory.
12
LC: Yes, sir. It’s crucial, I think.
13
RC: Very crucial, it certainly is. In our schools these days, people don’t know,
14
the youngsters don’t know. I’ve talked to a couple of some young people and they hardly
15
even know about the Korean War, for example, very little and even a lot about the
16
Vietnamese War now. That’s dying off and that’s what happened in Korea. You have
17
more of a let’s get the Korean nation back together in spite of what we have to do to get it
18
back. In other words, we’ll compromise a lot of our principles in order to reunite, which
19
I think is good and bad. I think it’s both good and bad, but I think that you need to be
20
careful about some of the things that you’re doing in Korea.
21
LC: Well, some of the compromises—
22
RC: You know, some of the compromises are not good, are not good. It’s not
23
good for us and our presence in the Orient. So I don’t know what the solution is now. Of
24
course, Peter says that part of the problem is the education system. They have not
25
concentrated on what has happened to them in the past. They’re only looking to what
26
they can get in the future. Then there has to be a compromise there, obviously.
27
LC: Yeah. The balance is always going to be difficult to strike. Well, it’s
28
certainly something that you as one of the guys who lived through and contributed so to
29
the events of the second half of the twentieth century in the Far East know their
30
importance. So it’s truly important that we get your views on these issues.
322
1
RC: Well, that’s correct. We’re trying to do it in various ways. The World War
2
II Veterans Committee, I think I talked to you, I told you about what they’re trying to do.
3
They put out a series on Iwo Jima.
4
LC: Sure.
5
RC: We’re trying to do it for the Korean War and the Chosin Reservoir, some of
6
the major things that happened so that the kids coming along will understand and that
7
will give them a little bit of a different outlook.
8
LC: Well, maybe if we’re lucky, we can bring you up here to Lubbock and let
9
you talk to some classes of students up here that are interested. I mean, certainly there
10
are young people at universities who are choosing to study this. This is certainly
11
happening here at Tech. You can hardly get into these classes they’re so full.
12
RC: Well, that’s right. That’s right, and that’s good. That’s exactly the counter
13
balance, if you would, to the more liberal interpretation. You’ve got to have some
14
conservatives in there.
15
LC: Well, and you also need to actually know what has gone on.
16
RC: Exactly.
17
LC: Rather than simply trying to interpret. I mean, you ought to start basically I
18
think with some empirical knowledge, what actually occurred. Then you can say whether
19
it was right or wrong.
20
RC: That’s right. Then you can make your own choice.
21
LC: Sure.
22
RC: Exactly.
23
LC: The students are smart enough to do that.
24
RC: Yes.
25
LC: But you need to, I think we all need to as educators and as veterans, you all
26
in the veteran community can help us do that, get to them the material so they know what
27
in fact has occurred.
28
29
RC: We do that some here in Dallas with some of our military organizations.
The unfortunate part is we haven’t gotten into the high schools too much.
30
LC: Is that right?
31
RC: Mostly into the elementary schools. It’s good, though.
323
1
2
LC: Well, I’ll tell you what—well, it is good. The high schools, though, I think
are important as I’m sure you do, sir.
3
RC: Right, right.
4
LC: Well, maybe we can cook something up.
5
RC: Well, I would hope so.
6
LC: I think that would be great. Texas Tech is a place where you and the other
7
guys that you know down there will always be welcome. We’ll do what we can to
8
facilitate—
9
RC: Well, some of the fellows in the Chosin Few, they’re very anxious to get up
10
there. You know, I’ve talked to them about it. We have one, Larry Ellwell, who is a
11
retired college professor. As a matter of fact, I got him putting together this outline or
12
this study guide on the Chosin Reservoir.
13
LC: Excellent.
14
RC: Yeah, he’s working on that right now.
15
LC: Well, maybe I can offer him some information about what we’re doing up
16
here and see whether he might like to come up and visit.
17
RC: Well, he said that he wanted to come up and visit.
18
LC: I think that would be terrific.
19
RC: Yeah, and I thought we would bring him along with us.
20
LC: Yeah, I think that’d be great.
21
RC: Then that would be a good introduction.
22
LC: Well, let me ask you just a couple of more questions about 1963, sir, if you
23
don’t mind.
24
RC: Right.
25
LC: Going down to the Philippines, what kind of feeling did you get about our
26
allies there? How developed was the observer-training element of our cooperation with
27
them?
28
29
30
RC: Well, the Philippines were a little bit different. In essence, I think they,
overall, I would say they kind of resented our presence.
LC: Is that right?
324
1
2
RC: Yeah. I kind of felt that way. We weren’t as well accepted in the
population.
3
LC: Any idea what that was based on?
4
RC: No, no, except for I think probably the only thing that they saw was military,
5
if you will, occupation forces. In other words, they kind of felt like we were occupation
6
forces, if you will. We weren’t, we weren’t really. What we were there for was to use
7
their facilities as a training ground more than anything else. It was a plus for us. A loss
8
of our capability to go into the Philippines I think has hurt our training in the Far East,
9
very definitely.
10
LC: Well, they occupy such a crucial crossroads.
11
RC: Exactly, exactly. It’s very important that we maintain good relations with
12
them there because the bases that we had there, Subic Bay and the airfields and so on
13
were so important to us, moving about the Far East. I mean, it was a staging area, if you
14
will.
15
LC: Absolutely, yeah.
16
RC: It was a staging area for our return down to Vietnam.
17
LC: Sure. A great deal of what moved to Vietnam in the way of materiel—
18
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah. We did a lot of training in the Philippines. We did a lot of
19
training. The Philippine armed forces did go on some maneuvers with us.
20
LC: Did they have a Marine element?
21
RC: No.
22
LC: So would this have been their armed forces, their army essentially?
23
RC: Yes, yes. They had a small contingent that acted like Marines, but they did
24
not, at least I never came in contact with them. I never really came in contact with a
25
Philippine Marine Corps.
26
27
28
29
30
31
LC: What about the transfer of U.S. aircraft to these allied countries? Were they
getting a good deal of aircraft from us?
RC: Well, the Taiwanese certainly were. So were—well, yes. The answer is yes,
all of them were.
LC: Do you remember what aircraft models they would’ve been getting, for
example, a fighter aircraft?
325
1
RC: They were always a step behind us.
2
LC: One step or a couple?
3
RC: Depending upon the country.
4
LC: I see. Okay, it varied.
5
RC: Yeah, it varied. The Koreans were getting one step down and the Filipinos
6
were not getting the very best. They were a couple of steps behind. In other words, we
7
didn’t them treat as well as we treated the Koreans. I think that the reason for that was
8
that we were concerned about the North Koreans and at that time, the guerillas in the
9
Philippines were not as active as they are now. So we really didn’t consider the
10
Philippines a problem. We considered the Koreans a problem, that we needed to keep
11
them as well prepared as we could, whereas we had more of a presence in the Philippines.
12
See, we had our fleet bases there and we also had training bases there, Marine training
13
bases.
14
LC: Where were they?
15
RC: They were located right there at Cubi Point in the Philippines. We had a
16
battalion area that we trained. We had somebody down there all the time training. There
17
was a constant presence there.
18
LC: I don’t know if you would’ve known this then or if you can guess it now, but
19
overall strength of the Marines in the Far East during this period, over a division, I mean,
20
infantry strength?
21
RC: No, we had less than a division. As I said, we had two regiments.
22
LC: Yeah, at Okinawa.
23
RC: The other regiment that was a part of the 3rd Marine Division was in Hawaii.
24
LC: Oh, okay.
25
RC: We kept a regiment back there. Part of that was because of the need to
26
maintain a presence in Hawaii and to maintain some of the training facilities we had
27
there, plus the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, the primary defense of the Hawaiian
28
Islands is Marines.
29
LC: Yes, sir.
30
RC: So we kept a presence there. Plus it was a matter of having the room in
31
Okinawa. We didn’t hardly have enough room for a full division there.
326
1
LC: Do you mean base area on the island?
2
RC: Right, right, exactly. We’d have had to move in to more areas in Okinawa.
3
The Okinawan situation, as we’ve just discussed a few minutes, ago was a little bit, you
4
had to be careful what kind of a presence you had in there.
5
LC: Politically it was a little—
6
RC: Politically, it was kind of a sensitive area. So two regiments were—aside
7
from the training of a full division down there, it was politically, it would’ve been a little
8
bit more hazardous to put more Marines on the island, I think.
9
10
LC: As an operations officer, did you have to spend part of your time working on
plans for potential engagements?
11
RC: Oh, absolutely. Yeah, that was—
12
LC: That was the bread and butter.
13
RC: That was the bread and butter. That’s part of the reason, if you will, that I
14
made the trip down to Vietnam. That was the planning for the expansion in Vietnam and
15
the planning in going to Korea and the planning going down to the Philippines and going
16
to Taiwan.
17
LC: Now the thinking, I’m sure, involved the People’s Republic of China and
18
perhaps aggressive moves they might make anywhere, really, in the Far East, Southeast
19
Asia.
20
RC: Right, right.
21
LC: Did you have to do some study on what their capabilities were at this time?
22
RC: Oh, we knew. Oh, yes.
23
LC: Can you talk a little bit about that, sir? Because this is actually 1963, before
24
the People’s Republic had demonstrated a nuclear capability. That came in 1964. I don’t
25
know if you remember that, but what kinds of factors did you pull into your analysis of
26
what it was they might be capable of doing?
27
RC: Well, the main thing that we were concerned about, obviously, was Korea
28
and Taiwan. The main thing that we thought in Taiwan more than anything else would
29
be aircraft harassment because they had some MiGs. Also their amphibious capability
30
was not enough to really make a concerted or really a concerted and successful invasion
31
of Taiwan at that time. We watched that. That was probably the most important because
327
1
obviously we were considering ourselves friends of the Taiwanese. We wanted to
2
maintain the status quo there. So we watched the buildup or the development of their
3
amphibious capability more than anything else at that time, we as Marines.
4
LC: Sure.
5
RC: That was kind of our bread and butter.
6
LC: What about watching Chinese moves on the many tiny little islands that are
7
in the Taiwan Strait, the Formosa Strait?
8
9
10
RC: Yeah, yeah. Well, we obviously were concerned about that because that
gave them staging areas closer to Taiwan. So we watched that very carefully. The Navy
was watching it, as you know, very carefully.
11
LC: Would it have been the 7th Fleet up there?
12
RC: Yes, the 7th Fleet, spent a lot of time down in that area and a lot of presence.
13
They kept a lot of presence there to kind of, if you will, to say, “Here we are. So don’t
14
get too feisty,” you know.
15
LC: Right. Did you see at any time their MiGs in the air?
16
RC: No, I did not. No, I did not. When I went down to Taiwan, I actually didn’t
17
fly with their units, but they did have some incursions from the very beginning. They had
18
some incursions, but I never really myself personally never came close to being in an
19
engagement with them or anything.
20
21
LC: Oh, sure. Did you or did the people in G-2 or elsewhere know what model
of MiGs the Chinese had?
22
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.
23
LC: You had all that data?
24
RC: Oh, yes, yes, yes. Our intelligence was pretty good. We kept up with it very
25
carefully. We got a lot of intelligence from the Taiwanese, too, obviously.
26
LC: Yes.
27
RC: They were head to head with them. So they knew.
28
LC: How much faith did you have in what the nationalist government on Taiwan
29
would tell the United States and its armed services about the Chinese mainland
30
government? I mean, they’re obviously in a very inferior position in terms of their size
31
and—
328
1
2
RC: Well, I think that they probably overdid it, really, as far as the capability of
the Chinese—
3
LC: That’s what I think, too. Yeah, exactly.
4
RC: Because they wanted our support. They wanted us to be there as much as
5
they could.
6
LC: So you would listen carefully?
7
RC: That’s right. That’s right. You had to be selective in what they were telling
8
9
10
11
12
you. Absolutely.
LC: Now, General, were you living on the economy, as they say, when you were
at Iwakuni?
RC: No, no, no. We had regular, all of the military, the U.S. military there had to
live on the bases.
13
LC: You were all on the bases?
14
RC: Yes, yes.
15
LC: Was that the result of some regulation?
16
RC: No, no. Well, I can’t really tell you that. I don’t really know. The only
17
people that were on the base, there were some people, some of the educators. As you
18
know, we had schools.
19
LC: Yes, sir.
20
RC: Some of the permanent personnel there that for example, that operated a
21
base at Iwakuni, the people that were the base personnel had their families there.
22
LC: I see.
23
RC: The operational people, the wing people, which I was a part of did not have
24
their families. But the families all had quarters. But for example, the schoolteachers
25
lived off base. They had quarters off base.
26
LC: But presumably, they were civilian personnel.
27
RC: That’s exactly right, yeah.
28
LC: Okay. Sir, what kind of aircraft did you get to fly while you were out there?
29
RC: Oh, well, I flew A-4s and F-8s. We had F-8s.
30
LC: Wow.
31
RC: I obviously flew the old Gooney Bird.
329
1
LC: Yeah.
2
RC: Because that was something that I could contribute to the support. So I flew
3
that and I flew some—well, we had A-4s, F-8s. I got down to Okinawa and when I was
4
down at Okinawa, I did fly some helicopters down there, too.
5
LC: Now was that the first time that you had flown helicopters?
6
RC: Yes.
7
LC: Because I was just trying to think back whether we had talked about that at
8
all.
9
10
RC: No, I started flying helicopters down there. I think that was the first time
that I’d actually flown them.
11
LC: How long did it take you to pick it up?
12
RC: Not very long.
13
LC: That’s what I figured.
14
RC: Not very long. It was an airplane of sorts. So it just was a little bit different
15
coordination. You had to be able to, as I said before, rub your stomach and pat your head
16
at the same time. Yeah, a little bit of a different deal. Later on, we found that
17
transitioning to helicopters, we really discovered this more than anything else in the
18
Harriers, when we got the Harriers.
19
LC: Yes, the jump jet.
20
RC: The jump from being a pure fighter pilot over to being a helicopter, partial
21
fighter and partial helicopter, which is what requires in the STOL (short takeoff and
22
landing) type aircraft. You have to understand and recognize the difference between the
23
two. So we later transitioned, when we transition people, we made certain that they did
24
some helicopter flying, too.
25
LC: At this point, let’s just pick up the story. You had already been to Vietnam.
26
You knew that down in Soc Trang, for example, were using helicopters to insert Special
27
Forces, U.S. Special Forces into ground ops that were already going on and also lifting
28
ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) troops into hot spots, you had told us about
29
that.
30
RC: Yes.
330
1
2
LC: Could you really see at that point how important the helicopter might
become if that conflict in Vietnam widened or became more serious?
3
RC: Oh, absolutely. Oh, absolutely. Because the only way, with the terrain and
4
the communications capability in Vietnam, they didn’t have the roads into the remote
5
areas, the highways that you could take forces in, in a hurry. So the quickest way was the
6
use of helicopters. So helicopters were key.
7
LC: You knew that was likely to be true.
8
RC: Oh, yes, absolutely.
9
LC: Of course, the French had relied on paratroopers.
10
RC: Yeah, yeah, well—
11
LC: We know how that came out, right?
12
RC: That wasn’t successful.
13
LC: No, no, it wasn’t.
14
RC: Yeah. The thing that you do, fools learn by experience and wise men learn
15
by the experience of others.
16
LC: Yes, sir.
17
RC: Mr. Bismarck said that. So that was always a tenant that I kind of kept in the
18
back of my mind. You don’t try to repeat the errors. You try to learn by the errors.
19
20
LC: Well and, of course, the terrain in Vietnam being so varied certainly would
make paratroop drops difficult.
21
22
RC: I don’t know how they came to that conclusion that they could handle it with
paratroops.
23
24
25
26
LC: Yeah, possibly because that’s all they had. I can’t really think of anything
else.
RC: Yeah. General Bigeard said that, too. He told me that. He said that was a
futile effort.
27
LC: Futile?
28
RC: Yes, futile effort.
29
LC: Wow. Well, General, let me ask you where you went from your one-year
30
assignment at Iwakuni? What was the next assignment?
331
1
RC: The next assignment was back to, I went back to Hawaii. We were closing
2
out some of the units. Now wait a minute, let me get my facts straight. Sixty-three, I
3
went back to, oh, I went back to Dallas, to Dallas, Texas. At Dallas, Texas, I was an
4
operations officer again. My task there was to convert—we had Reserves there. We had
5
two fighter squadrons and a helicopter squadron and a control squadron and part of a
6
Marine airbase squadron there. In other words, we had a group at Dallas. My job,
7
because of my past experience as an F-8 pilot, the Reserves were going from FJ aircraft
8
were transitioning over to F-8s and F-8s were the first afterburner aircraft.
9
LC: So helping the Reserve units get up to speed.
10
RC: Well, I was actually tasked with transitioning them. I wound up doing an
11
awful lot of flying. The wing commander of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, which was
12
Reserve aircraft wing, which the group at Dallas was a part of it. He told me that it was
13
my responsibility to develop a program to transition them, including making certain that
14
they didn’t have any accidents, et cetera, et cetera. You know how that goes.
15
LC: Yes.
16
RC: The boss says, “Do a good job and don’t break anything.”
17
LC: Don’t let anything go—
18
RC: “Don’t let anything go wrong.”
19
LC: Right.
20
RC: So I wound up putting together a program to transition the Reserves and as it
21
happened, I wound up transitioning the entire 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. They brought
22
people in from Andrews Air Force Base, which was going to have an F-8 squadron and
23
from Atlanta, which was going to have an F-8 squadron and transitioned them at Dallas.
24
LC: All of them under the program that you were running?
25
RC: All of them under the program that I was running. So it was my
26
responsibility. I put the—what I did is these Reserves would go on active duty for two
27
weeks. I would give them the ground school on the aircraft and the tests and take them
28
out and fly them and get them through their familiarization stage, if you will, which
29
consisted of five flights. So I did a lot of flying and a lot of teaching during that time.
30
LC: It sounds very hectic because you’re—
31
RC: It was. I went for about six months and never had a day off.
332
1
LC: I’ll bet ya’.
2
RC: Yeah. So that’s kind of the way it went.
3
LC: That sounds right because you—just to clarify and if I’m wrong, please
4
correct me, the Reserve units would have these two weeks active duty a year, essentially.
5
RC: That’s right.
6
LC: So all of the work that you were trying to accomplish had to be stuffed into
7
the two weeks that they were on active duty.
8
RC: Right. Well, I didn’t do the whole squadron at once.
9
LC: No. Of course this is chopped up.
10
11
RC: I did an individual at a time. I was flying, maybe two or three of them
would come on active duty at the same time.
12
LC: Right. So they’re—
13
RC: I would give them all their ground school and then I would fly them at
14
various parts of the day.
15
LC: Gosh. So this was just constantly—
16
RC: Yeah. So I did a lot of flying. I flew—the way I devised the program is,
17
because the F-8 was different, I flew their first five flights on their wing including every
18
landing that they made.
19
LC: You personally flew those?
20
RC: I flew them, yes.
21
LC: Oh, my goodness.
22
RC: So I flew a lot of flights.
23
LC: I guess you did.
24
RC: I garnered over in my short time at Beaufort and my time at Dallas, I flew
25
well over a thousand hours in the F-8. So did a lot of work, it was a lot of work, it really
26
was. It was daylight ‘til dark. Then of course I did some night flying with them, too. So
27
it wasn’t always when sunset went that I was through. I flew at night, too. I didn’t see
28
much of the family.
29
LC: No. It sounds like you didn’t.
30
RC: No, I didn’t.
31
LC: It sounds like you saw a lot of the cockpit and not so much of anything else.
333
1
RC: That’s right. That’s right. Of course, as a flyer, I enjoyed that.
2
LC: Oh, yeah.
3
RC: That was fun.
4
LC: You know, General, right now there’s a new wave of criticism of the
5
Reserves. I’m sure you’ve seen some discussion to this effect, because of problems that
6
have cropped up in the performance of Reserve troops over in Iraq. I just wonder, was
7
your feeling at the time that you were doing this that the Reserves would be ready to go if
8
there was a problem given their training level and how much time they could spend in
9
these aircraft?
10
RC: Well, now the thing that was different in the Reserve squadrons at that time
11
was that most of the pilots I had were experienced aviators. They were good. I’ll tell you
12
a little story. We took a—I deployed. Once I got all these guys transitioned, I took the
13
Dallas squadron to Beaufort on a two-week deployment the next year. We, the Reserve
14
squadron 112, VMFA-112, was the only squadron that flew constantly on a regular base,
15
which in other words, we outdid the Regulars.
16
LC: No kidding?
17
RC: In our flying. Yeah, we outdid the Regulars. We really did. But I had, and
18
those guys that I had, they were all former Regular officers on active duty.
19
LC: Who had been on to the Reserves.
20
RC: Most of them were with the airlines.
21
LC: So they were flying—
22
RC: So they were flying constantly. So they were very good. They were very
23
good. I had a couple of former test pilots. Almost without exception, I was not
24
concerned about, for example, flying on their wing because they listened to what I
25
explained to them about the aircraft, about the idiosyncrasies and the hazards in flying
26
that particular aircraft.
27
LC: Yes.
28
RC: They listened and were able to adapt to it very rapidly.
29
LC: But as you’ve said, these were working pilots.
30
RC: They were working pilots. They were very good. Now on the other hand,
31
the squadron could not have deployed as a squadron because the enlisted people were not
334
1
trained. In other words, you can’t learn how to maintain an aircraft in two weeks. So
2
even though we sent a lot of the enlisted people off to various schools and so on, we
3
couldn’t send them all because they couldn’t get off their work assignments, many of
4
them. So if we would’ve deployed as a squadron, we would’ve had to augment that unit
5
with regular aviation maintenance people and so on, probably seventy-five percent, but
6
the pilots, any one of them could’ve gone on active duty.
7
8
LC: That really points to how important the continuous training of those
specialized maintenance folks—
9
RC: Oh, absolutely, absolutely. Now contrary to that, nowadays, they
10
concentrate and they’ve moved a lot of training equipment into various Reserve units,
11
aviation units so that they can train their enlisted crews. They spend a lot of time, when
12
enlisted crew goes on active duty, they usually go to a school.
13
LC: So they get the intensive work, as well.
14
RC: They get intensive work.
15
LC: I see.
16
RC: So they’d still have to be augmented, but not to the same degree as at that
17
18
time.
LC: Yeah. But you also point out the interesting problem, every time the aircraft
19
is upgraded, not only do the pilots have new things that they need to learn and be aware
20
of, but also there’s the knock on effect all the way through the support—
21
RC: Oh, absolutely. Yeah, well, for example, when you have an aviation
22
squadron, you have periodic maintenance checks that you have to take where you take
23
the engine out of the aircraft. You’ve got new engines. You’re working with a new
24
engine. So all the systems are different. So it’s a complete revamp of training that you
25
have to have, you have to train them on a whole new model of aircraft. That takes time.
26
That takes time. Whereas the pilot’s job was really much simpler. All they had to do
27
was learn the radar systems and the gun systems and so on. The basic flying of the
28
aircraft is pretty much the same.
29
LC: Stays more or less the same.
335
1
RC: More or less the same. You did have an afterburner and you did have a
2
different type of wing and that sort of thing. But basically their transition was much
3
easier than the enlisted transition was.
4
LC: Well, sir, you were at Dallas for what, did you say six months?
5
RC: No, no, I was at Dallas, stayed at Dallas from—got there after I came back
6
from the Far East in ’63 to ’65. I was there two years. So in that time, I was able to
7
transition the entire squadron there. Well, we created one big squadron, one squadron out
8
of two. When I first went there, they had two squadrons, 111 and 112. When I left, they
9
had 112 there and HMH-777, which was the helicopter squadron. They had the same
10
11
12
aircraft. The helicopter squadron wasn’t a problem.
LC: Right. What model aircraft were they using in the helicopter squadron? Do
you know?
13
RC: They had the CH-46.
14
LC: Did that have a nickname?
15
RC: Well, what is the nickname? I can’t even remember now.
16
LC: I don’t know, so I can’t—it’s not the Loach (LOH or light observation
17
helicopter), is it?
18
RC: No, no. No, the Loach is a—I’ll think about it.
19
LC: Okay.
20
RC: But no, the Loach is an observation aircraft.
21
LC: And CH-46 is a heavier—?
22
RC: CH-46 is a troop transport.
23
LC: Troop transport, yeah.
24
RC: Yeah. I’ll think of it, but gosh, I spent quite a lot of time in it and I can’t—
25
LC: That’s okay.
26
RC: Yeah.
27
LC: Well, let me ask what happened after this time at Dallas. I mean, you clearly
28
were aware that things were ramping up in Vietnam during this time.
29
RC: Oh, yes, yes.
30
LC: Were you anxious to get over there?
31
RC: To Vietnam?
336
1
LC: Yeah.
2
RC: Absolutely.
3
LC: I would’ve thought.
4
RC: Yeah, absolutely. But of course, I was in Reserves and my next assignment
5
took me even farther away from Vietnam.
6
LC: Where was this?
7
RC: I went to the 2nd Marine Division.
8
LC: Based where?
9
RC: In Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
10
LC: Oh, boy.
11
RC: Yeah, you know, down by Wilmington.
12
LC: Yes, sir.
13
RC: I was the aviation representative to the division, if you will.
14
LC: Does that mean that you were a liaison?
15
RC: Yeah, I was a liaison. I was the aviation expert assigned to the division.
16
LC: What did your work there entail?
17
RC: Well, they put me in the G-4 division. You’re familiar with G-4, logistics.
18
LC: Sure, yes.
19
RC: What I basically did is my primary purpose there was to coordinate, if you
20
will, the support requirements for attached aviation units that the division was responsible
21
for. Okay? In other words, if we deployed someplace, if a division unit deployed
22
someplace, they would come to me and say, “What do we need to do in the division to
23
support attached aviation units?” Okay?
24
25
LC: What did the TOE (table of organization and equipment) tell you the
attached aviation units would consist of?
26
RC: Well, I would have to devise them on the spot.
27
LC: I see. Okay, wow.
28
RC: Yeah. An interesting thing that happened while I was there, the Dom Rep
29
30
31
situation developed. Do you remember that, the Dominican Republic?
LC: Well, I do, but there may be people who don’t know quite so much about it.
Can you just say a few words about what happened?
337
1
RC: Well, what they did is they had to put American units into the Dominican
2
Republic to stabilize the government because they were, in essence, were rebelling. It
3
was tearing up the Caribbean, if you will.
4
LC: Right, and creating the potential for—
5
RC: Creating the potential for—
6
LC: Regional upset.
7
RC: Regional problems. So we put people into the Dominican Republic to
8
9
10
11
12
stabilize it.
LC: Now was it only Marines who were deployed to the Dominican Republic or
were there other units from other branches, too?
RC: I think they had some units. I’m not really that familiar with that. I’m
familiar with the Marine component.
13
LC: Sure.
14
RC: That was a little bit above my pay grade, if you will.
15
LC: How did it look for the 2nd Marine Division in terms of what they were
16
17
called on to do?
RC: They deployed a pretty good force down there. They had a regiment and we
18
had—they planned to deploy a division down there. One of the things that I had to do
19
while I was there was to develop a plan for the deployment, the air deployment of the
20
division, of an entire division down there, which I did.
21
22
LC: Now when you say you had to develop these plans, sir, how much staff did
you have to help you?
23
RC: Me.
24
LC: Really?
25
RC: Yeah, that was me.
26
LC: Oh, boy.
27
RC: Yeah. So I did it, I accomplished it. I developed a full plan for the
28
29
30
deployment, air deployment of the division, what we’d have to deploy.
LC: How long would it take you to develop a full plan as you’ve described it for
a division-level deployment?
338
1
RC: Well, when I finally completed it, it took me almost a year to do it, to do the
2
complete thing. The reason that they wanted this is in case of future problems in the
3
Dominican Republic or anyplace down there, Cuba included.
4
LC: Yes.
5
RC: How they would deploy a Marine division quickly, elements, necessary
6
7
8
9
10
elements and to address the problem and that was my task.
LC: So if you can, would you just run through the list or a shortened list of what
was in your plans, in other words, aircraft maintenance, support units?
RC: Well, no. I actually had to consider what it would take to deploy ground
units also, not just aviation.
11
LC: Oh, okay. So this was—
12
RC: In other words, my task was again, to deploy the fighting elements, as much
13
of the fighting elements as we could to address a problem of a division in the Caribbean.
14
LC: Ground and air.
15
RC: Ground and air, that’s right. So I had to do a lot of coordination. Now, if
16
you will, I had to talk to all of the division people also, particularly the people in the G-3
17
division. I had to coordinate with them what units they would deploy. Then I had to say,
18
“Okay, now if you’re going to deploy a regiment of infantry, how many aircraft will it
19
take and what type of aircraft?” So that was coordination also with the Air Force because
20
the Marines obviously, all we had was a squadron of C-130s. That wasn’t enough to
21
deploy all of the heavy units and so on. So we had to impose upon the Air Force what
22
they would contribute in such a move.
23
24
25
LC: What about the Navy? How did you coordinate with them? Was there much
of a role to be played by them, I would think?
RC: Yes. There was quite a bit of a role because we obviously would transport
26
some of the aircraft, possibly on carriers, but most of the aircraft that we had if we would
27
deploy to a base, for example, we would initially nonstop with in-flight refueling.
28
LC: Right.
29
RC: So that was coordination with the Air Force also because all the units that we
30
would have to send down there, we wouldn’t have enough in-flight re-fuelers to send
31
them if we sent them all at once. So there was coordination there. In other words, I did
339
1
it, if you will, in stages. If we deployed only a squadron or something like that, the
2
Marines could handle, but if we had a massive deploy division, I mean a group, we’d
3
probably have to tap into the Air Force resources. So that was a lot of coordination.
4
5
6
7
LC: Yeah, a lot of liaison with aircraft or Air Force folks. Where would you do
this? Did you go to Washington or did you go to a base?
RC: Well, we started at Washington. We started at Washington and then we
worked—most of our coordination was out of the Carolinas.
8
LC: So different Air Force bases.
9
RC: Different Air Force bases, Myrtle Beach and Langley, some at Langley.
10
11
LC: Did you yourself have an opportunity to go down to the Dominican Republic
and survey the situation?
12
RC: No, I did not, which I wanted to do.
13
LC: I’ll bet.
14
RC: But my connection with the—where they really decided that I was going to
15
have to develop this plan was as a result of the Dominican Republic. So I did coordinate
16
the movement, the air movement back to Camp Lejeune of the units from the Dominican
17
Republic. So I coordinated that, also, at the same time that I was developing the plan for
18
the future deployment into the Caribbean.
19
20
21
22
LC: So you’re putting together this plan essentially for contingencies that might
arise in the next whatever foreseeable future.
RC: Exactly, right, in the future, in the future. Plus I did coordinate the
movement out of the Dominican, the air movement out of the Dominican Republic.
23
LC: How complicated was that?
24
RC: It was pretty tough.
25
LC: Did you have time constraints? You had to get people out of there?
26
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. So there was a lot of midnight oil burned there.
27
LC: I’m sure there was.
28
RC: So I went from Dallas, I went from the frying pan into the fire. That seemed
29
to be my career. I don’t know. That’s the way it kind of worked for me.
340
1
LC: Well, some higher ups had clearly identified, it sounds to me, listening to
2
this, that you could put together a complex picture and could get cooperation. I mean,
3
those things together are really important if you’re in G-3, G-4 area.
4
RC: Yeah, that’s right. That’s right.
5
LC: So did you get time to fly much while you were at Lejeune?
6
RC: Not a lot, not a lot. I did make a couple of trips up to Cherry Point, which is
7
not, as you know, you know the geography, I’m sure.
8
LC: Sure, yes.
9
RC: They’re not too far apart.
10
LC: No.
11
RC: So I would go up to Cherry Point and would fly fixed wing aircraft up there.
12
I did fly some helicopters at New River, which was right next to Camp Lejeune. New
13
River was the airbase right next to Camp Lejeune.
14
LC: But you were kind of doing this—
15
RC: When I could find the time.
16
LC: When you could squeeze it in, yes.
17
RC: That’s right. I didn’t get a lot of flight time.
18
LC: General—go ahead, sir.
19
RC: Go ahead.
20
LC: I was going to ask one more question. In early 19—well, let me ask this.
21
During late 1964, this is while you were at Camp Lejeune, of course the Tonkin Gulf
22
crisis occurred. Did you pay much attention to it? I’m sure you were very busy, but did
23
you realize or recognize that this probably was going to mean a greater U.S. investment
24
out in South Vietnam?
25
RC: Oh, absolutely, absolutely, yes. I watched all of that, of course. I was a
26
career Marine. So you look at all that and I spent a lot of time talking to—well, not a lot
27
of time, but time talking to the G-2 and to the G-3 as to what their opinions were and how
28
we would become involved. Yes, absolutely. We were aware of that and were looking
29
ahead to that, even down to and including the point of a possible commitment of the
30
division out of Lejeune. That could’ve happened.
31
LC: Was there anyone as far as you know developing plans for that contingency?
341
1
RC: Oh, yes, yes. That goes on continuously. In other words, you don’t sit back
2
and rest on your laurels. When something like that comes up and you see your potential
3
involvement, you start cranking the gears.
4
5
LC: So just like there was a Richard Carey working on deployments to the
Caribbean, there was someone working—
6
RC: Absolutely.
7
LC: An analogous situation for Vietnam.
8
RC: Always, yes.
9
LC: When the Marines were actually sent ashore in Vietnam in, I think, March of
10
11
12
1965, were you still at Camp Lejeune?
RC: Yes, yes. I left Lejeune in June of ’65. I have a friend here that made that
landing down at Da Nang, not Da Nang, but Chu Lai. They went in the Chu Lai area.
13
LC: Yes, that’s right. You know someone who was there?
14
RC: Yeah, yeah, a local fellow.
15
LC: Well, I’m going to ask you about that, too. Well, let’s take a break for today.
16
RC: All right.
342
Interview with Richard Carey Session [9] of [16] February 6, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey. Today
3
is the sixth of February 2006. I am in Lubbock and the general is speaking from his
4
home in the Fort Worth area. Good morning, sir.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
6
LC: Thank you so much again for your time.
7
RC: I’m honored.
8
LC: Sir, the honor is all ours. I want you to know that your contributions are so
9
important to us because they’re really filling in a lot of background detail about what the
10
Marine Corps was involved in. Like, for example, last time we talked about the
11
Dominican Crisis in the early ’60s. I wonder if you can continue the story today by
12
telling us about the assignment that followed on from your posting at Camp Lejeune in
13
1965.
14
RC: Well, it came time for—I’d been there about a year. The division
15
commander came in, or he called me into this office. He asked me would I like to
16
extend. I said, “Well,” because it’s normally just a one year tour for aviators in that type
17
of a billet, and I said, “Well, I would extend, sir, but I don’t want to extend in the job I’m
18
in. I think I’ve learned everything I need to know in that or as much as I want to learn in
19
that particular field. I’m anxious to get back to my primary occupation, which is being an
20
aviator.”
21
LC: Mm-hmm, yes.
22
RC: He said, “Well, what could I do to get you to stay?” I said, “Well, you could
23
give me the reconnaissance battalion.” He had promoted me to lieutenant colonel. So he
24
said, “Well, let me take a look at that.” He said, “I’m prepared to give you that if you
25
really want it and we’ll talk about it some more.” I said, “Well, let me check and see
26
what’s in store for me on the aviation side.” Well, I checked with headquarters and they
27
had planned to send me back to Cherry Point, which was just north of there. I think
28
you’re probably familiar with it.
343
1
LC: Yes. Yes, sir.
2
RC: There I would probably have a very good chance of getting a fighter
3
squadron and that’s my primary MOS. So I went back to the division commander and
4
declined to stay on. He very graciously said, “Good luck.” So away I went to Cherry
5
Point. At Cherry Point, the first assignment that I had was as the operations officer of the
6
Marine Aircraft Group 24, which was there at Cherry Point. It consisted of two fighter
7
squadrons and a TAC squadron and a headquarters and maintenance squadron. Being the
8
operations officer, I got pretty familiar with what was going on and worked my way
9
around to lining myself up to take over command of VMFA-513 and “Flying
10
Nightmares,” they called them.
11
LC: They were based at Cherry Point?
12
RC: They were based at Cherry Point. They were in the group that I was the
13
operations officer in. So I was able to wangle my way in as CO of that group. That was
14
very interesting because our primary mission was to train people to go to Vietnam
15
because they weren’t rotating units in and out. It was individual rotations, which is not a
16
good thing.
17
LC: Well, I was going to just ask you, what did you think about that policy, sir?
18
RC: I think that’s a terrible policy.
19
LC: How come?
20
RC: Because what happens is when people go, depending upon what’s vacant at
21
the time in Vietnam, when they finally go over to Vietnam, if they’ve got a slot, then a lot
22
of times they’ll slide them into that slot and they may not even have the necessary or
23
adequate training in that particular slot. As soon as they get in that slot, then they work
24
the bolt to get out of to get into something that they’re trained it. So you’ve got a lot of
25
confusion and a lot of movement.
26
LC: A lot of chopping and changing.
27
RC: Chopping and changing. You really don’t get the most out of an
28
organization that way, obviously. I’m sure everybody recognizes that.
29
LC: I would think so, yes.
30
RC: Excuse me. So anyway, I was able to take over the squadron and
31
concentrated a great deal on the training, getting the pilots and the RIOs, the radar
344
1
intercept officers who rode in the back of the F-4s, the radar intercept officers and the
2
maintenance people maximum training. I’m kind of a tough taskmaster when it came to
3
that. So we worked a lot of long hours. We made a couple of deployments. Excuse me,
4
I’ve got a frog in my throat. But we made a couple of deployments to Yuma, which was
5
the best place for us to train because it was wide open, had a lot of ranges, a lot of
6
airspace that we could do our radar intercept, that we could do our intercepts, did a lot of
7
bombing ranges. We could do a lot of bombing practices and so on.
8
LC: Now this is all out in Arizona?
9
RC: That’s in Yuma, Arizona. The other squadron that was there, it was kind of
10
interesting, was 530, VMFA-531, which is kind of a, just turned around from 513.
11
LC: Yeah.
12
RC: But 531 was commanded by Lt. Col. Roy Sever who was a good friend of
13
mine. It became quite a competition between the two of us as to who could produce the
14
most and who could get the most flight time, et cetera, et cetera. We had a couple of
15
deployments. My first deployment out to Yuma, we set all the records for F-4
16
deployments up to that time in flight hours and in accomplishments, training of our
17
people and so on.
18
LC: So you were pushing those guys pretty hard?
19
RC: Pushing them very hard. He made a deployment after that and beat me. So I
20
made a deployment after that and completely wiped out all the records and they still
21
stand. You got fifteen hundred hours in F-4s in a period of about twenty days, which was
22
a lot of time. We flew around the clock.
23
LC: It sounds like it.
24
RC: We flew around the clock and my task, of course, was to try to—I flew as
25
much as anybody else did in the F-4s. I was able to take a—remember, I talked to you
26
about a Gooney Bird before. I was able to take a Gooney Bird out with us and I used
27
that. I would fly after hours, normal hours, after normal working hours and would fly to
28
San Diego and up to San Francisco and all around the West Coast getting parts for my
29
aircraft so that we could keep them going.
30
LC: So you’d be ready to keep the birds in the air, essentially.
345
1
2
3
4
RC: That’s right. That’s exactly what we were doing. We beat the highest time
by thirty percent in that period of time. Nobody’s ever broken that.
LC: That’s incredible. This is in, would this have been in late ’65, early ’66, that
kind of time period?
5
RC: This was in, yes, 1966.
6
LC: Okay. Tell me a little bit about the tactics that you guys were training in
7
terms of the bombing runs. What is an F-4 capable or what was an F-4 capable of doing
8
and how were you using the aircraft?
9
RC: Well, each flight, I had them program it. I had quite a bit of time in F-4s and
10
had considerable experience in fighter tactics and so on as did my operations. I had a
11
pretty good cadre of people to train for trainers. So we tailored each flight so that the
12
first part of the flight was radar tactics, fighter tactics where we would go up and do radar
13
intercepts and then we would do air-to-air combat. Then the last part of the flight, the
14
last thirty minutes of the flight, we would devote to air-to-ground bombing.
15
LC: Close in?
16
RC: Yes, we carried many bombs. The F-4, of course, was quite a versatile
17
aircraft. We carried many bombs on the radar hops, too. So as I say, the first part was
18
devoted to the air-to-air fighter mission and the second part was devoted for our air-to-
19
ground mission. So we did bombing, low-level bombing and medium-level bombing,
20
rolling in from, say, eight thousand feet and doing dive bombing on targets to improve
21
your proficiency. Then we did a lot of low-level navigation, also, for map reading so that
22
the pilots would get good on map reading. So the flights were structured so that they’d
23
have three to four missions on every flight to conduct.
24
LC: Wow. So that was not only a lot of hours, but very intensive.
25
RC: Exactly. That’s right. That’s right. So we turned out more than any other
26
unit ever turned out, sending them overseas. I might say they were well trained. That
27
was what we were interested in.
28
LC: Absolutely.
29
RC: Of course, the maintenance people were, they were really, their fannies were
30
really dragging by the time we got through because it was around, as I said, around the
31
clock operation. They were working twelve hours a day. We’d split them in two and
346
1
they worked twelve hours each way. So it was not an easy deployment, but we finished
2
up the deployment with a big bash. We had a bash in a motel there in Yuma, a dining-in
3
type thing. We had everybody come to that and we had a squadron party. Then we went
4
home and we sent the folks off to Vietnam. That’s what we would do each time.
5
6
7
LC: Sir, did you follow their progress? Were you able to keep tabs on where
your men were being sent and where they were flying from and so on?
RC: Well, not too much because once they got overseas again, as I said, it was
8
individual rotation. Unfortunately—and like I would send, you know, I would send
9
probably fifteen to twenty pilots at a time and fifteen to twenty RIOs and maybe fifty
10
ground maintenance people. In Vietnam at that time, we had two fighter squadrons, one
11
fighter squadron, rather, at Da Nang and four fighter squadrons at Chu Lai. So they were
12
split between five squadrons, plus two headquarters and maintenance squadrons, so it was
13
pretty hard to keep track of them. Once they got out to the first wing, why, they all went
14
in different directions. So no, I was not able—although I did hear from principally the
15
pilots and the RIOs.
16
LC: What did you hear back about what was going on in Vietnam?
17
RC: Well, it was pretty intense. They were doing a lot of flying, a lot of support
18
missions and pretty enjoyable for them.
19
LC: Because why? Why were they having a good time?
20
RC: Well, they felt like they were doing their jobs pretty well. The support was
21
good that they were providing to the ground forces, getting a lot of good comments back
22
about the Marine close air support was outstanding.
23
LC: Making a difference for them.
24
RC: Making a difference for the ground troops.
25
LC: Yeah. What was, if you can say, General, the read on the war in Vietnam
26
27
and how it was going at this point?
RC: Well, at that time, of course, now this is ’67 and ’68 as well as ’66, of
28
course, but things had built up pretty well. ’67, ’68 was the height of the number of
29
people that we had out there. The buildup was almost complete to that point. So they felt
30
that, the aviators felt, of course, they weren’t in on the total picture.
31
LC: Sure, right, but in their area—
347
1
RC: In their area, they felt like things were going our way. Things were pretty
2
well under control. Well, as you know, we were reaching kind of a stalemate at that time.
3
There really wasn’t a lot of progress. There was a lot of search-and-destroy missions and
4
that sort of thing, but there were no major engagements, which you could say the tide had
5
really turned. The South Vietnamese basically owned the populated areas and the VC
6
owned the countryside. It was just that simple. So you were okay as long as you were in
7
the city, basically, but once you traveled out then you were free game for the VC and the
8
NVA. So most of them said that they felt that things were under control and that—not
9
too many of them really analyzed it, but they said, “If we stick with it, we’re eventually
10
going to win.” That was kind of the feeling.
11
LC: Sir, what was your feeling?
12
RC: Well, I of course, I’m a little more aggressive and had a little bit more of the
13
big picture. I wanted to go north and get them and end it and quit monkeying around,
14
taking all of our time and all of our people and all of our resources in a long war of
15
attrition. That was not the way to win it. The way to win it was to go into Hanoi and go
16
into the cities and take over and stop it. Of course, once we had Tet, everything changed.
17
18
LC: Now where were you during the Tet Offensive, sir? Were you at Cherry
Point or Yuma, back and forth during that time?
19
RC: No, no, no, no. I went over in June of ’67.
20
LC: Okay. Tell me about that and how your orders came up and where you were
21
stationed.
22
RC: Well, I of course, was the CO of the unit, of 513.
23
LC: 513, yes.
24
RC: The funny thing about that, at that same time, I got an offer from United
25
Airlines if I would come and be their training officer.
26
LC: No kidding?
27
RC: Yeah. I turned it down because I wanted to—I couldn’t send all those
28
people over to Vietnam, all my boys over to Vietnam and then me get out. So when I got
29
orders to Vietnam, when I knew that orders were coming, would be coming to Vietnam, I
30
just turned it down and said, “No, I’m going to stay until this thing is through.”
348
1
2
3
LC: Now how did the airline company identify you? Were they going through
and finding folks with your kind of flying experience?
RC: I think that’s probably it. That’s probably it. I knew a couple of people,
4
become acquainted with a couple of people, senior pilots and so on. They passed,
5
obviously passed the word along. I got a phone call one day and asked if I would be
6
interested in interviewing for the position and I declined.
7
8
9
10
11
12
LC: Sir, I don’t think that’s going to come as a big surprise to anybody, but can
you talk a little bit about your calculus at that time?
RC: In what regard?
LC: With regard to thinking about leaving the Marine Corps and moving into
civilian life at this point.
RC: Well, of course, I was now, let’s see, ’65. I had my twenty years in. I was a
13
lieutenant colonel. I had the opportunity to move on to bigger and better things on the
14
outside world, but I had an obligation.
15
LC: Understood. The country was at war.
16
RC: That’s right. I was trained.
17
LC: Yes, sir.
18
RC: So it was not the time to abandon, abandon my basic purpose in life.
19
LC: Understood. Now when you went over to Vietnam, did you go as the
20
commanding officer of the 513?
21
RC: No, no, 513 remained behind. Remember, I said—
22
LC: Oh, it was a training—yes, sir.
23
RC: It was a training unit. All the units in the United States were training units.
24
LC: Yes, sir. So your move to Vietnam was in what capacity then?
25
RC: Well, I went on an individual rotation, interesting story there. I was going
26
through, just to show you how things were starting to change. I was going through, I
27
flew out to San Francisco and was going to fly out of March Air Force Base to
28
WESTPAC (Western Pacific). I stayed in, flew into San Francisco into the commercial
29
airport there and went into Frisco. My flight to the Far East was not until the next day.
30
So I got a room at the Marine Memorial Club in San Francisco.
31
LC: Wow.
349
1
RC: That evening, I went out to get something to eat, I walked down the street
2
and I was in uniform. Of course, we didn’t take any civilian clothes with us. I was in
3
uniform and went to this restaurant. I noticed this little old lady was really giving me the
4
bad eye. She was really almost belligerent toward me in her look.
5
LC: Wow.
6
RC: I didn’t pay much attention to it. Then I got up to leave and she got up, I got
7
up to pay my check and I went up and paid that and she stood right behind me, well, she
8
was a little bit ahead of me, now that I remember. She walked out and I walked out and
9
when I walked out, she said, “Here comes that baby killer.” She started following me
10
down the street yelling obscenities and calling me a baby killer. There was a policeman
11
on the corner and I walked up to him and I said, “Officer, I wish you’d get this lady off
12
my back because I don’t appreciate what she’s calling me. I don’t want to say anything
13
or do anything that would be detrimental to my image as a Marine, you know.”
14
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
15
RC: So he took care of it. He took her away.
16
LC: How old was she?
17
RC: She was probably, let’s see, I was relatively a young man then, ’67. I was
18
forty, thirty-nine. She was probably in her mid-fifties.
19
LC: No kidding?
20
RC: Yeah. It surprised me.
21
LC: Very interesting.
22
RC: But she followed me down the street calling me a baby killer and so on. But
23
anyway, that was that.
24
LC: Well, yeah, that’s a little disturbing.
25
RC: That was typical of that time because the anti-war effort was just starting to
26
develop.
27
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, especially in that area.
28
RC: She was obviously going to be a part of it, a big part of it. So I went on to
29
Vietnam, flew into Vietnam and was assigned down to Chu Lai, to Marine Aircraft
30
Group 13. I had high expectations because I had a very good reputation in the F-4
31
community. I figured, well, I’m going to walk right into an F-4 squadron. But I didn’t.
350
1
The first assignment they gave me was a Marine airbase squadron commander, relieving
2
a good friend of mine who is since deceased. He heard that I was coming in. He knew I
3
was coming in, of course. He wanted to go to a fighter squadron. So he worked his bolt
4
before I got there to get a fighter squadron, VMFA-115 to set me up to become his relief
5
as a MABS commander. It’s kind of strange. The story will go on. He and I were
6
involved three times, two times in two different changes of command there. He was
7
responsible for me getting his relief later on at the fighter squadron when he went up to
8
the wing operations officer. When he was leaving, he named me as the candidate to take
9
his job as the wing operations officer. So I relieved him as the MABS commander, as a
10
VMFA-115 commander and as the wing operations officer.
11
12
13
LC: Sounds like you guys, I mean, did you end up getting along with him all
right?
RC: Oh, yeah. He’s a good friend of mine. We used to play golf together and
14
everything. So I’ve known him for a long time. His name was Kenny Palmer and he
15
signed everything with a green pen with a P. So I called him the Green Pea. But I took
16
over the MABS squadron. The purpose of the MABS squadron of course was to provide
17
all the support for the base. Chu Lai was a fairly large airbase. It was divided into—we
18
had two Marine aircraft groups, Marine Aircraft Group 13, which 115 was a part of with
19
four fighter squadrons and MAG-12, which was on the other side of the field, which had
20
all the A-4 squadrons. They had three A-4 squadrons. Then the Americal Division
21
headquarters was also there and a couple of battalions in the Americal Division were in
22
that area. They did a lot of operating in that area, as you know, I’m sure.
23
LC: They sure did. Yes, yes, absolutely.
24
RC: That’s where My Lai took place down in that area, too. So anyway, because
25
I was one of the qualifications, they immediately relieved a gentleman of the obligation,
26
responsibility of the base security and gave it to me because I was a former grunt.
27
Another time because I was an infantryman, former infantryman, it kind of channeled me.
28
LC: Into these kinds of assignments.
29
RC: In these kind of assignments.
30
LC: Yes, sir.
31
RC: Right.
351
1
LC: Now what did that entail for you?
2
RC: Well, basically entailed—we had an infantry unit assigned there, a company.
3
We also had certain people out of the aircraft groups that were assigned. They would
4
provide, they had a complete perimeter set up around the airfield. We had wire,
5
concertina. We had flares and we had bunkers and foxholes and so on. We patrolled that
6
mostly—in the daytime, we patrolled it mostly by vehicle with some of the people in the
7
bunkers and in the watchtowers. At night, it was pretty well manned.
8
9
LC: Now were your men responsible for just your part of the Chu Lai base and
therefore they had to kind of share perimeter responsibilities with others?
10
RC: Yes, yes.
11
LC: Who might be deployed elsewhere around Chu Lai?
12
RC: That’s right. That’s right. The entire perimeter was not mine.
13
LC: Yes, right.
14
RC: The perimeter that was mine was the Marine Aircraft Group 13 area.
15
LC: Which was about how big? I mean, can you give us a sense of that?
16
RC: Oh, yeah. We had a, I forget what the, I think our strip was ten thousand
17
feet, as I recall, our side. We had most of the airstrip, a couple miles, a couple miles of
18
the perimeter is what I was responsible for.
19
LC: At night, you said that the patrolling during the day was primarily vehicle.
20
At night, what could you do and what could you expect in the way of kind of harassment
21
from enemy forces?
22
RC: Well, the primary thing, we didn’t get too much until—it really developed
23
during Tet. Fortunately not too much happened while I was there. We did have one case
24
where some sappers came in and tried to destroy some aircraft.
25
LC: How did they fair?
26
RC: They didn’t make it. They didn’t make it. They didn’t make it through the
27
wire.
28
LC: Okay. So they weren’t taken prisoner either?
29
RC: No.
30
LC: I see. But they were clearly trying to get to the bunkers—
352
1
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. Yeah, they had demolitions and they were commando
2
type sappers. Their objective, obviously, their assignment was to get on our flight line
3
and destroy as many aircraft as they could. So it was not a major attack. It was more of a
4
probing attack with the intent of destroying aircraft.
5
LC: But very stealthy.
6
RC: Absolutely. Oh, yeah.
7
LC: Yeah. It would’ve been pretty bad if they had succeeded, certainly for our
8
9
guys. Did you take any kind of mortar or rocket fire on occasion?
RC: We had occasional rocket fire. Yes, yes. Not very effective there. It was
10
more effective after I moved up to Da Nang. Especially during Tet, it was pretty intense
11
during Tet.
12
13
LC: Yes, sir. Let me ask you about that in just a second. What do you think the
point of the rocket fire there at Chu Lai was for the VC or NVA who were firing?
14
RC: Well, it was obviously—their whole object was to destroy aircraft, interrupt
15
operations. That’s really—because they didn’t have the strength. We had the capability
16
there to fend them off with what they had in the area. They didn’t have the capability to
17
really get too much into the wire.
18
19
LC: How were your infantry guys in terms of their morale and so on, the guys
that reported to you who were responsible for perimeter security?
20
RC: Well, that’s not a very choice type billet.
21
LC: No, sir.
22
RC: They weren’t too well satisfied with that. As a matter of fact, they rotated
23
them in and out quite frequently.
24
LC: Okay. So they wouldn’t be there for an entire tour?
25
RC: No, no, no. They couldn’t do that. They would’ve become, well, in essence,
26
27
28
become ineffective, something like that.
LC: Yes. So these guys would be posting in and out from other locations, other
Marine units.
29
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
30
LC: Now what about your fliers? I mean, were you able to do any flying at this
31
point yourself?
353
1
2
RC: Oh, absolutely. I flew all the time as the MABS commander. I tried to fly at
least one hop a day to maintain my proficiency.
3
LC: Yes, sir.
4
RC: In the F-4. Then I flew, I also flew the Gooney Birds. We had Gooney
5
Birds there that we did night flare drops with those.
6
LC: That was combat support?
7
RC: That’s right.
8
LC: Yes.
9
RC: Yeah, we’d do flare drops for the infantry and then the F-4s and the A-4s
10
would come in and do night bombing. That’s the way we worked that. Then we also, I
11
also flew in the—they had TA-4s there. I also flew in the TA-4s in providing airborne
12
FAC, airborne FAC missions, forward air control missions.
13
LC: Yes. Did you fly those yourself?
14
RC: Uh-huh. Yeah, I flew some of those.
15
LC: Wow. Where were the primary sights that you were flying to? I mean, I’m
16
sure they were all up in MR-1 (military region)—
17
RC: Most of them were north of Da Nang. Did some in the A Shau Valley,
18
probably twenty-five percent of them in the A Shau Valley, but primarily over fifty
19
percent of them were up around from Da Nang northward, really. Most of them
20
concentrated along the DMZ.
21
22
LC: Speaking of that, sir, you and I talked kind of off the record a little bit about
Secretary McNamara’s idea of blockading the DMZ.
23
RC: The McNamara Line?
24
LC: Yeah, with the McNamara Line. Do you care to say anything about that
25
26
idea?
RC: Well, I think in context, it would’ve been good if you could’ve monitored
27
the whole thing, but they placed sensors out where they could attempt to monitor
28
infiltration off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. That wasn’t effective at all because you didn’t
29
have enough forces to place out there to really react quickly. In essence, it just was a
30
waste of time and money, frankly. It really was. In concept, maybe, I don’t know. I
354
1
don’t know whether it ever worked. You know, you had the Maginot Line and that didn’t
2
work.
3
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
4
RC: This is a type of thing that I don’t think is practical.
5
LC: Well, most of the infiltration wasn’t coming across the DMZ in any event. It
6
was coming through Laos, isn’t that right?
7
RC: That’s right. That’s where it was coming. Of course, you had Khe Sanh,
8
which is right at the tail or the head, whichever way you want to talk. It was actually the
9
tail. The head was up in North Vietnam. But they came in down there in the vicinity of
10
Khe Sanh. That was one of the purposes of Khe Sanh was to try to close that trail. But
11
again, the area is so—they can still go into Laos and we weren’t going over into Laos,
12
only were there.
13
LC: Yes. Were the units at—were the Marine Corps units involved in that at all?
14
RC: At Khe Sanh?
15
LC: No, with the hitting the Laotian trails with air.
16
RC: With air, oh, yes, yes. I had missions over there. I did a few missions there,
17
18
too.
LC: Did that feel like more effective? Not in terms of supporting our ground
19
troops who obviously who weren’t there, but in terms of actually taking it to the enemy?
20
Did that seem to you a more aggressive—?
21
22
23
RC: Well, that was a more plausible solution to the re-supply problem and the
infiltration problem was to close off the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
LC: As you know, sir, I’m sure, it subsequently and probably at the time was
24
discussed, but certainly subsequently has been discussed that might’ve been effective for
25
the United States to place forces across the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This would’ve been
26
inside Laos and just do a block-and-hold action.
27
RC: Absolutely.
28
LC: Does that sound right to you?
29
RC: Oh, yes. Absolutely. But of course, as you know, we weren’t making
30
ground incursions. We did have some Special Forces that were observing in Laos.
31
LC: Sure, sure.
355
1
2
RC: We had cases where we put reconnaissance units over there, but we didn’t
really go after it, you know.
3
LC: Yes. That was the political decision—
4
RC: Absolutely. That’s another political decision by McNamara, not to cut them
5
off. Then of course, later on, with the peace negotiations, we really blew it there when
6
we didn’t determine that there would be no enemy forces in South Vietnam. We allowed
7
the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese Army to remain in there.
8
9
LC: In fact, to grab more, I think they grabbed more space while the discussions
were going on or just thereafter.
10
RC: Absolutely, absolutely.
11
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Well, when did you move up to Da Nang?
12
RC: I moved up to Da Nang in—I had an R&R in December.
13
LC: Where’d you go?
14
RC: Went to Hawaii. Then when I came back from R&R, Kenny Palmer had
15
wangled his way up to, well, to Da Nang out of a fighter squadron and named me as his
16
probable successor. So the group commander asked me if I wanted a fighter—wait a
17
minute. I was already in the fighter squadron. They wanted to know if I wanted to go to
18
Da Nang. I said, “No, I do not want to go to Da Nang,” but that didn’t have much effect.
19
I went anyway.
20
LC: In what capacity, what was your command there?
21
RC: At Da Nang?
22
LC: Yes, sir.
23
RC: I was the wing operations officer.
24
LC: Now this is a different level of responsibility.
25
RC: Absolutely, yes.
26
LC: Were you promoted in this period, sir?
27
RC: No, no. I was still a lieutenant colonel.
28
LC: Okay. The Wing Operations Center, can you tell someone—?
29
RC: Well, what we had, what the Wing Operations Center had is we had all of
30
the airfields and all the Marine air responsibility in MR-1. We had a helicopter group
31
over there. We had a place called Marble Mountain.
356
1
LC: Yes, sir.
2
RC: We had helicopters at Phu Bai. We had helicopters at Quang Tri. We had
3
helicopters at Chu Lai. We had some helicopters at Da Nang. Now fighters and attack
4
were all based at Chu Lai and Da Nang. All of the, my responsibility as the wing
5
operations officer was to schedule and control, coordinate and control all air operations in
6
MR-1, Marine air operations.
7
LC: How do you do a job like that, sir? I mean, what does that look like—?
8
RC: Very carefully.
9
LC: Yes, sir. What does that look like on a daily basis? I mean, where do you
10
11
actually do this work? Was there a set of offices?
RC: Well, we had a Wing Operations Center with a Combat Information Center,
12
Combat Operations Center, COC, that were at the old French headquarters buildings
13
there in Da Nang, at Da Nang Airbase. My desk was right outside the operations center.
14
I spent a lot of time in the operations center, of course, but I had a staff of about ten
15
officers to help me. We scheduled, we coordinated, what we’d find out is what the daily
16
air support requirements were from the divisions. Remember, we had the 1st Marine
17
Division and part of the 3rd Marine Division in MR-1.
18
LC: Yes, sir. Your old division was there, yes.
19
RC: That’s right. Then we had the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was a very, very
20
large organization because we had so many groups.
21
LC: How many were over there?
22
RC: We had one, two, three, four.
23
LC: Okay, wow. Four groups with three or four squadrons each?
24
RC: Yeah, yeah.
25
LC: Wow.
26
RC: Yeah. So a lot of aircraft.
27
LC: Yes, sir.
28
RC: And a lot of heavy operations, a lot of requirements for air support.
29
LC: This is twenty-four hour demand.
30
RC: Oh, absolutely.
357
1
2
LC: So how did you manage that? How many hours a day would you be in
there?
3
RC: It depended upon the tempo of operations. During Tet, I slept at my desk.
4
LC: Yes, sir.
5
RC: I didn’t go to my room except if we’d have a slack period during the day, I
6
tried, I still tried to fly and I did some flying.
7
LC: I was going to ask you about that. You did get a few hours in?
8
RC: Yeah, but most of them were at night. So most of my flying—because
9
during the day, we’d get our requests, air support requests in during the night.
10
LC: Okay, from the divisions for the next—
11
RC: From the divisions. So the daytime, all the daytime operations were spent
12
trying to schedule and get things lined up. Then at nighttime, the operations as far as we
13
were concerned, was mostly coordination. I had a full operations center that I was
14
responsible for. So they did most of the coordination. I oversaw that.
15
16
LC: Well, sir, that actually brings up an interesting point. Can you tell me about
your staff? You said you had ten officers.
17
RC: I don’t remember exactly, but I’d say approximately ten.
18
LC: Yeah, sure. Their duties, how were they split out?
19
RC: Well, we had, quote, “experts” in each field. In other words, we had
20
helicopter people and we had different types of helicopters. We had Hueys, we had
21
Cobras, we had CH-53s and CH-46s.
22
LC: All with different mission capabilities.
23
RC: All with different mission capabilities. So I had about four helicopter
24
experts. Then we had fighter aircraft. I had a couple of people help me with that. Then
25
we had attack aircraft and I had a couple of people help me with that.
26
LC: Now let me ask about the fighters first. Principally, these are—
27
RC: F-4s.
28
LC: F-4s. They are prepared for air-to-air combat.
29
RC: Right.
30
LC: Did your flyers ever come into contact with MiGs that you remember?
31
RC: No. The only one that came close was me.
358
1
LC: Oh, is that right?
2
RC: Yeah. On one flight, on one flight, I was up in the DMZ and there was a
3
MiG that was reported that was coming in from the north. I had just finished a mission, a
4
close-air support mission. So my radar officer picked him up and I went after him. This
5
is after Tet. The air bombing of the north had been cut off, as you know.
6
LC: Yes, sir.
7
RC: Lyndon Johnson cut it off.
8
LC: Yes, sir.
9
RC: Big mistake. I started after him and I went over the DMZ. Of course, the air
10
control people called me and I said, “I’ve got him. I’ve got him. I request permission to
11
fire,” and they said, “Negative.” So they turned me south again, back across the DMZ
12
and the MiG went home.
13
LC: But you had him locked in?
14
RC: I had him. I had him.
15
LC: Sir, if you remember that night, can you tell me how you got him in your
16
sights? I mean, what was the relationship between the two of you?
17
RC: Well, we had two types of, well, actually three types of weaponry. We had
18
the Sparrow missile, which is your long-range radar missile, air-to-air. Then we had the
19
Sidewinders, which is your infrared air-to-air, limited range, about a mile and a half.
20
Then you have your 20 millimeters.
21
LC: Your guns, basically.
22
RC: Your guns. So you have three different capabilities to shoot down.
23
LC: How were you ready to take him, sir?
24
RC: With the Sparrow.
25
LC: Okay, about how far away then were you?
26
RC: Oh, probably about four miles.
27
LC: That’s not very far when you’re going as fast as you’re flying.
28
RC: No, no, it wasn’t. I was doing probably about Mach 1.2 or so, 1.1.
29
LC: Sir, can you compare the F-4 to the MiGs that you were facing? I don’t
30
31
know what generation they would’ve been.
RC: 23s.
359
1
LC: 23, okay.
2
RC: Basically. We were better.
3
LC: Faster?
4
RC: Faster.
5
LC: Better armed?
6
RC: Better armed.
7
LC: What about the radar capabilities in locating—?
8
RC: Oh, yeah, yeah, much better.
9
LC: Okay. So you had the superior aircraft.
10
RC: Oh, absolutely. Yeah, absolutely.
11
LC: See, I was going to put this down to your good flying that you got up behind
12
13
14
15
him and behind his tail.
RC: Well, no, I don’t think so. I think I just had a superior aircraft. That’s
basically it in that case.
LC: Now what do you think, have you given any thought to what he was actually
16
doing? I mean, it sounds like he was doing a touch-and-go on the DMZ? Does that
17
sound right to you?
18
RC: I think he’s more reconnaissance than anything else.
19
LC: I see, okay.
20
RC: I think he would’ve taken on some helicopters if he would’ve found them.
21
LC: So opportunity target.
22
RC: Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I’m sure he would’ve done that because some of
23
them are just as aggressive as we were, I’m sure.
24
LC: Well, I’m sure that’s right. I’m sure that’s right.
25
RC: But they knew that they were out-gunned and out-manned. So they didn’t
26
27
28
challenge us too much.
LC: Well, sir, I have a feeling I know kind of what you’re going to say, but can
you tell me what it was like to hear air control say “negative” to you?
29
RC: Ultra, ultra, ultra disappointment. That’s all I can say.
30
LC: Yes, sir. I understand. At wing operations, did your guys come back and
31
tell you some of these certain things that happened to them as well, that they were—?
360
1
RC: Oh, we had a debrief. Every mission was debriefed.
2
LC: Yes, sir.
3
RC: Every mission is briefed and debriefed. They didn’t personally come into
4
the operations center. I would see them periodically maybe at—if I went to a meal, I’d
5
meet them at meals and ask them things and so on and they’d tell me some stories. But
6
basically, we relied more on the debriefs.
7
8
9
LC: Now who would be conducting the debriefs? Would it be other senior pilots
or intel?
RC: The briefs and debriefs were usually done at the group level.
10
LC: Okay, so the staff of a group?
11
RC: The staff of a group of the operations section of the group would do the brief
12
and debrief. Each flight that you had, if they were available, you picked up photographs
13
and so on, photo intelligence.
14
LC: Right. That all went—
15
RC: Of sights and so on. Unfortunately at that time, most of it was old and was
16
not really that pertinent, I found.
17
LC: Meaning it didn’t have immediate tactical use?
18
RC: No, no, not really, not really. In very few instances did we really benefit
19
from it, not so now. Now we’ve come a long way in that regard, with the type of aircraft
20
we have—we have the pilotless, the drones and so on that go over and get up-to-date
21
imagery and you have imagery in your aircraft that you’re able to pick up.
22
LC: In real time, basically.
23
RC: Real time. We didn’t have that advantage.
24
LC: No, sir. No.
25
RC: We didn’t have the missiles, the type of missiles for air-to-ground. It would
26
basically depend upon the pilot’s capability and how good he was as to whether or not he
27
really wiped out the target, except for things like the B-52, which was basically carpet
28
bombing, you know.
29
LC: Yes, sir, flying real high.
30
RC: Flying real high. The basic rule was that when you got below four thousand
31
feet, you’re in small arms range and the 20 millimeters and so on. So when you flew to
361
1
and from the targets, you were above four thousand feet. The only time you really got
2
below four thousand feet was if you were having trouble picking out a target. You would
3
get down, it would depend upon the pilot again, and identify your target and then go up to
4
your bombing range and then make dive bombing runs. Of course, in your bombing runs,
5
you went below four thousand feet.
6
LC: How far down would you go?
7
RC: Oh, sometimes it’d depend upon whether you’re doing low-level bombing.
8
LC: Right on the carpet though, you might be—
9
RC: Doing low level bombing, you release at a couple hundred feet.
10
11
12
LC: Would you feel that, sir, when you would release, and of course, you’re
continuing at your speed away from the target?
RC: Well, of course you’ve got high-drag bombs. When you do low-level
13
bombing, excuse me, in those days, you had a bomb. When it came off the aircraft, you
14
had fins like dive brakes that came out on it and slowed the fall of the bomb so that you
15
were able to get away from the blast. That was the whole purpose of it.
16
17
18
LC: Yes. Would you feel it though? Would it rock, I mean, could it rock the
aircraft a little as you were getting away?
RC: Oh, yes. Not a lot, but you could feel it. You could feel it, yes, but not a lot.
19
They were pretty effective, really. That was really the most fun and the most rewarding
20
because you knew that you could really hit the target because you’re eyeball to eyeball
21
with it. It wasn’t like doing a high-angle dive-bombing run, a forty-degree run where you
22
release about twenty-eight hundred, two thousand, twenty-two hundred feet or so. Then
23
you’ve got about a thousand feet to pull out.
24
LC: Right, and you do that immediately.
25
RC: You do that immediately, as soon as you pickle your bombs, you start your
26
27
28
29
30
pull out. So the low-level bombing is much more effective.
LC: You mention that on this particular night when you had this encounter with
the MiG that you had been on a close-air support mission. Can you tell me about that?
RC: Oh, as I recall—oh, wait a minute. Yeah, that was one. That was post—no
pre-Tet. That was pre-Tet. Let me get that because—no, that’s a different mission. No, I
362
1
can’t remember exactly that particular mission, what I was doing. I was in support of a
2
Marine ground unit. I know that.
3
4
5
LC: Okay. Did you have a different mission in your mind just now that maybe
you could recount for us and it really isn’t—?
RC: Yeah. That was one where I was sent north of the DMZ to an area where
6
they were a supply point for the North Vietnamese. They sent me up there with special
7
bombs. I can’t remember what you called them now, doggone it. It was the bombs
8
where you put out a bomb and it has little bomblets that scatter all over the place.
9
10
LC: The flechettes.
RC: Yeah, right. There you go. There you go. I went up with another pilot.
11
That particular mission he was the lead. What we’d do a lot of times, we’d go in
12
sections. That was basically for protection and for the ability to continue to make runs on
13
the target.
14
LC: Yes, sir, in case something happened to one?
15
RC: Right.
16
LC: Okay, yes.
17
RC: Right. So I went up with him and he couldn’t locate the target. So I took
18
over the flight and located the target. He went right down on the deck, practically, trying
19
to locate the target.
20
LC: Is this nighttime?
21
RC: Daytime.
22
LC: Daytime. Okay, good.
23
RC: And a lot of anti-aircraft fire.
24
LC: I’ll bet.
25
RC: Finally, I was a senior to him. I took over the flight and found the target and
26
completed the mission. When I got back, I chewed him out pretty good because, number
27
one, you don’t really gain any effectiveness by grinding around trying to locate a point
28
target at very low altitudes in that terrain up there. There was a lot of jungle. Unless you
29
fly directly over it, you ain’t ever going to see it. Plus, you’re down in heavy anti-aircraft
30
fire and your chances of getting shot down are—
31
LC: Pretty good.
363
1
RC: Pretty good.
2
LC: Yes, sir.
3
RC: So I chewed him out pretty well with that one. We did eradicate the target,
4
got a lot of explosions from our bombing. We wiped it out. So it was an effective
5
mission, but I gave him a little bit of hell about that.
6
7
LC: What kind of anti-aircraft—all they had to use was machineguns and their
small arms?
8
9
RC: Yeah. They had some 57s and I got quite a few holes in the aircraft on that
one.
10
LC: Really?
11
RC: Yeah. So did he.
12
LC: Enough to affect the performance of the aircraft?
13
RC: No, no.
14
LC: Okay. So that was a good thing.
15
RC: My good friend Kenny Palmer had gone after the same target about two or
16
three days prior to that. He got shot down.
17
LC: What happened?
18
RC: Well, he went out to sea and was picked up by a Jolly Green, fortunately.
19
He made it out to sea. The target was fairly close, it was down, it was close to the coast.
20
This was North Vietnam and they were bringing their stuff down at night, obviously, to
21
this supply point. It was one of the major supply points for the attack across the DMZ.
22
So it was a pretty important target.
23
LC: Now if you can, sir, it would be very interesting to know what your protocols
24
were in the event that you were hit and unable to return to the base. Can you tell us what
25
the briefing was?
26
RC: Well, if you were close to the coast, you tried to bail out or crash or bail out
27
over the water. The idea there, of course, was everything outside the cities was Indian
28
country, basically.
29
LC: Yes, sir.
30
RC: So your chances of getting picked up were less, probability of success if you
31
were over land, a lot of hazards for the people picking you up. If you were out at sea,
364
1
why, you didn’t have to worry about the enemy. All you had to worry about was them
2
finding you and generally they had radar in that area. So they knew pretty well where
3
you were. So that was really—the protocol was to try to make it out to the beach area or
4
at sea where you could be easily spotted and better supported.
5
6
LC: Had you had any E&E (escape and evacuation) updates, any kind of
additional training like that?
7
RC: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah.
8
LC: I actually didn’t ask you that before your deployment to Vietnam and I just
9
10
wonder what most recently had you had in the way of E&E training.
RC: Well, part of the training that they send you to was a school out in California
11
that you went to before you deployed overseas. There they—well, it’s okay now to tell
12
you, but they taught you certain things, if you could correspond or get any letters or any
13
way to correspond that you could tell them where you were and what was going on.
14
LC: Through some kind of—?
15
RC: Code.
16
LC: So that was part of your training?
17
RC: That’s part of the training.
18
LC: What about survival—?
19
RC: Well, of course, you went through, and I didn’t get to go to Stead out in
20
Nevada, but they did send a lot of the—we did send a lot of the people out there where
21
you got E&E training, teach you to eat snakes and things like that.
22
23
24
25
LC: Yeah. Sir, were you mentally prepared for do you think the possibility of
being shot down and taken as a prisoner?
RC: I was mentally prepared they weren’t going to take me. That was my
attitude.
26
LC: That wasn’t going to happen.
27
RC: That was not going to happen. Besides that, I don’t like snakes and I didn’t.
28
LC: That’s right. You’ve said that before.
29
RC: I didn’t want to wind up in the jungle fighting snakes.
30
LC: Understood, understood. Well, sir, let’s take a break there.
365
Interview with Richard Carey Session [10] of [16] March 10, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Dr. Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey, U.S.
3
Marine Corps. Today is the tenth of March 2006. I’m in Lubbock and the general is
4
speaking from his home, which is also here in Texas. Good morning, sir.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
6
LC: Thank you. I’d like to ask you first if you would to tell me about what time
7
8
9
10
you moved to the Wing Operations Center at Da Nang. Do you remember?
RC: Yes, I do. I had come back from R&R in Hawaii at the end of December.
As a matter of fact, I took off and went back to Vietnam on the first of January. I
immediately moved up to Da Nang, up to the headquarters at Da Nang.
11
LC: So this would be in December, or I’m sorry, the first of January 1968?
12
RC: I didn’t get there ‘til about the second or third, but I immediately went up to
13
Da Nang and started work. My job, of course, was to—I was the operations officer for
14
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which at that time was pretty large. We had two, well,
15
three groups, three fixed-wing groups and a very, very large helicopter group and another
16
part of a group, a helicopter group at Marble Mountain. Then we had a very large
17
contingent up at Quang Tri and at Hue, at Phu Bai, also. So my responsibilities were
18
spread out over the entire Military One Region. We supported ground operations
19
throughout MR-1.
20
LC: Now that would include both fighter and attack aircraft?
21
RC: Fighter and attack aircraft and also helicopter operations.
22
LC: Would the helicopter operations be both offensive and did they also include
23
24
any evac or—?
RC: Oh, yes, yes. Generally, we help coordinate in conjunction with the—the
25
Air Force also had an operations center. We coordinated with them on their Jolly Green
26
rescue missions and so on. We usually provided air support for all of the rescue
27
operations. In one case, out in the A Shau Valley where the 101st Division and the 1st
28
Cav Division had quite a few helicopters shot down. We provided continuous support of
366
1
that one. I think they had within a matter of about five minutes, they had about seventeen
2
helicopters shot down.
3
LC: Was this during Tet or before?
4
RC: This was at the tail end of Tet.
5
LC: Oh, okay.
6
RC: Tail end of Tet. But the operations, of course, were quite intensive, as you
7
know. The operations at Khe Sanh started on, the heavy operations, the attacks started on
8
about the twenty-first of January and that was part of Giap’s strategy, obviously, to try to
9
pull more troops into Khe Sanh and out of the cities in preparation for the Tet Offensive
10
because he had been planning the Tet Offensive since 1967. This was all part and parcel
11
to the game. He wanted to bait us to make us think that we were having another Dien
12
Bien Phu at Khe Sanh.
13
14
15
LC: Do you think that that was part of what he wanted to create or was it a ruse
or was it both?
RC: Well, I think both. I think that he felt that we would pull our troops, a lot of
16
troops out of the important key locations in the cities and so on. His intent was to take
17
the cities with a purpose of fomenting revolution among the South Vietnamese. That was
18
all part of his strategy in the Tet Offensive. The Tet Offensive, that particular thing was
19
found out that that was a long time in planning. Obviously, Khe Sanh was one of the
20
keys to it. It didn’t work, fortunately, because the Marines that they had on hand were
21
able to handle the situation. They didn’t put large groups of troops, pull them out of the
22
cities and so on to put them in there. We had a regiment at Khe Sanh, about five
23
thousand Marines, regiment reinforced. So they were able to hold the line.
24
Consequently, when he did launch his offensive, as you know, he launched his offensive,
25
the Tet Offensive in the cities, mainly in the cities and hamlets with the purpose, again, of
26
fomenting revolution among the South Vietnamese. Also as they pulled out of the cities,
27
they destroyed the cities and the South Vietnamese in retaking the cities held in their
28
destruction. So it put a lot of South Vietnamese in a refugee status out of these hamlets
29
and so on.
30
LC: Sure enough, yes.
367
1
RC: They estimate somewhere well over half a million refugees as a result of the
2
Tet Offensive. So that was all part and parcel to the strategy that he had, but fortunately
3
it did not work. The revolution didn’t materialize, but there was a lot of destruction and a
4
lot of casualties out of it.
5
LC: General, earlier when we talked in another session about Khe Sanh just very
6
briefly, you noted that it was really a crucial point because of its location on both in terms
7
of the terrain and on the communications.
8
RC: Ho Chi Minh Trail.
9
LC: Yeah, the communications and supply routes that we call the Ho Chi Minh
10
Trail.
11
RC: That’s right.
12
LC: Can you describe a little bit about its terrain and had you ever been there
13
14
before 1968?
RC: Yes. I had been to Khe Sanh and it is surrounded. It sits down in, it’s pretty
15
much like Dien Bien Phu. That’s why the concentration on it and the making of, the
16
similarity of the terrain that you had at Dien Bien Phu and also the similarity of the
17
strategic importance of it, or the tactical importance I should say, of the city. It wasn’t
18
much of a city, but it’s location at the tail of the Ho Chi Minh Trail made it very, very
19
important for us to maintain because we could attempt to interrupt the flow of supplies
20
that were coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It was a known fact that that’s the way
21
they were resupplying their forces in South Vietnam, right down that trail. So it was
22
extremely important for us to hold it and it was symbolically important from the
23
standpoint of Dien Bien Phu, similarities of that.
24
LC: You mentioned that the Marines had a reinforced regiment up there. Was
25
that the case before the Tet uprisings started? Were those Marines already in place?
26
RC: Yes. Fortunately we had them in place. As you know in the history of
27
Vietnam, they were fighting for all the hill positions to make Khe Sanh a tenable place to
28
hold. It’s surrounded by many hills. Retaking all those hills—Dien Bien Phu, I mean
29
Khe Sanh—even I’m saying it.
30
LC: That’s okay because they’re very similar.
368
1
RC: Yeah, but Khe Sanh had been kind of a focal point, if you will, of operations
2
continuously since the early ’60s. They were first the Army. They had Special Forces in
3
there and finally they called the Marines in to come in in early ’67. They spent the entire
4
year of ’67 consolidating its position there at Khe Sanh. We had various regiments that
5
fought there. We had the 5th Regiment and the 1st Regiment that fought there and we
6
finally wound up putting the 26th Regiment in there, the 26th Marines, to hold it. Once
7
the hill positions were consolidated, then we put a full regiment in there to hold it.
8
9
10
11
LC: Now when you say they needed to consolidate the hill positions, for
someone who doesn’t speak the lingo, what exactly does that mean, to deny the North
Vietnamese Army the overlooking hills?
RC: That’s right, deny them access to a commanding terrain because if they held
12
the commanding—see, that was the way Dien Bien Phu fell. When the Viet Minh took
13
all the major hill positions around Dien Bien Phu and were able to move their artillery
14
and have direct fire artillery, even, on the French in Dien Bien Phu made the position
15
totally untenable. They just couldn’t hold it.
16
LC: Even with massive air resupply.
17
RC: Well, they didn’t—yes, they had air resupply but not enough. Even with
18
that, you’re right, even with that, you’re not able to knock out the artillery positions and
19
so on that they had.
20
21
LC: That’s right. Also the Viet Minh had some anti-aircraft weapons as well,
which made it—
22
RC: Absolutely, absolutely. Well, they had them at Khe Sanh, too. I lost one of
23
my, from my former squadron, 115, I lost one of the, what I thought was one of the best
24
pilots that I’d ever known. He was shot down by anti-aircraft.
25
LC: Was he lost, sir?
26
RC: We lost him, yes.
27
LC: You said that the 26th Regiment had the duty, essentially, of holding Khe
28
Sanh during this period?
29
RC: Yes.
369
1
LC: Sir, can you tell me how the Tet Offensive unraveled, how you began to
2
recognize the signs that this was more than just your normal—and I hate to even say
3
that—North Vietnamese Army offensive, there was more going on?
4
RC: Well, of course it was a massive attack in all points on the 31st. We had
5
been in constant contact in Khe Sanh since the 21st. That’s when they really started
6
hitting Khe Sanh hard. Again, part of the tactics they had as a strategy that Giap had to
7
pull troops, additional troops over there. But they were not reinforced, but on the night of
8
the 31st all hell broke loose. They attacked the embassy in Saigon. That was a small
9
group, small group of Vietnamese commandos. I think they pinned it down to some
10
nineteen commandos was all it was. They made some serious inroads into the embassy
11
and the Marines finally drove them out and killed all of them. So that was one and then,
12
of course, Hue was immediately taken under attack as well as throughout Vietnam. I
13
forget the numbers right now, but it’s upwards to over a hundred hamlets were all
14
attacked simultaneously. So it didn’t take an Einstein to figure out that this was a major
15
offensive throughout South Vietnam. I mean, Quang Tri was taken and all along the
16
DMZ, the attacks were intensified at Khe Sanh. Pleiku was attacked. Bien Hoa was
17
attacked. All the major concentrations of forces were attacked simultaneously.
18
LC: At your operations center near Da Nang, did your compound take fire?
19
RC: Yes. We took some rocket fire and that was unusual. We took rocket fire at
20
that time also and throughout everyplace. The call for air support quadrupled during that
21
time. So as I say, you didn’t have to be much of a tactician to figure out that you were
22
really, this was a big one. Of course, it all fit because it was at a time when our troops
23
were all standing down. So you know the Tet historically had been a period of truce. So
24
when everything broke out at once, we knew that this was a big one.
25
26
27
LC: Now, sir, tell me about the calls for air support and how you and your staff
managed this, what must have been a crisis. I mean, it had to have been a crisis.
RC: Well, actually on a daily basis, the way the operations normally, the routine
28
operations, let’s say—you can’t have routine in war—but the routine procedure was units
29
would come in the night before for air support requests for the projected operations for
30
the next day. Those were what we call fragged.
31
LC: What does that mean?
370
1
RC: It means that the air support, the fragmentation of your forces, the
2
fragmentation of your air support. In other words, you gave so much to this one, so much
3
to that unit, so much to that unit. So the common term was we fragged all of our forces,
4
all of the available forces we had on a daily basis. Well, for Tet, of course, the only thing
5
that you had fragged was reconnaissance and surveillance where you were watching out
6
for enemy movements and so on. On the day before Tet took off, you had literally no
7
requests for air support because it was a stand down. Then all of a sudden you had
8
emergency calls for air support starting on the night of the thirty-first. So we had to
9
immediately muster our forces and get them in the air. We went, as I say, we quadrupled
10
our requirements during Tet, our normal requirements. The 7th Air Force had come in
11
and said the 7th Air Force was trying to impose a single management of all air support.
12
The 7th Air Force was based out of Nakhon Phanom. General Momyer was the
13
commanding general of the 7th Air Force. He wanted to have full control of all air
14
support.
15
LC: For all air assets throughout the theatre?
16
RC: For all air assets in Vietnam.
17
LC: Oh, wow, okay.
18
RC: He tried to impose that on—well, he did impose it on all units. He was
19
trying to impose a daily sortie rate of about 1.5 sorties per aircraft. Well, during Tet, we
20
escalated up to in excess of four per aircraft. I personally had a call from the 7th Air
21
Force headquarters from General Momyer himself. I don’t know whether I told you that
22
story or not.
23
LC: No, you haven’t.
24
RC: He got on the phone to my operations center and it was late at night and he
25
said, “Colonel,” I was a lieutenant colonel at the time, he says, “Colonel, what are you all
26
doing? You’ve far exceeded our sortie rate.” I said, “General, we’re answering calls for
27
assistance, calls for air help and we’ll continue to do that.” He said, “Well, you’re
28
supposed to maintain the sortie rate.” I said, “Sir, until my wing commander tells me to
29
cut back, I’m not going to cut back. You’ll have to talk to him.” That was kind of a
30
tough one.
31
LC: Well, yes, as a lieutenant colonel. Yeah, that’s—
371
1
RC: That was a tough one, but I had my boss behind me.
2
LC: Now, I mean, can you fill in a little bit, sir, why would he be concerned
3
about the fact that your aircraft were making something on the order of four sorties per
4
day?
5
RC: Well, I think his major concern was continuous effort, in other words, that
6
we would—in his defense, he’s sitting back in a major headquarters and getting briefings
7
from staff about support requirements and the capability to maintain a tempo. He
8
probably thought, I’m sure if I had been sitting in his position I would’ve considered this,
9
that if you go at that intensive tempo, eventually you’re going to fall on your face and
10
you’re not going to be able to do anything. So I think he was trying to be certain that we
11
didn’t run completely out of steam. I think that’s what his concern was. But our concern,
12
of course, was this is for real and this is a real requirement and we’ve got to provide the
13
support or we’re going to lose all we’ve got. So from his standpoint, I’m sure that was
14
his consideration and from our standpoint, that was our consideration. So it was kind of a
15
little bit of a head-knocking thing. We weren’t fond of single management. The Marines
16
were not fond of single management because we’ve always had our, as you know, the
17
difference in the services. The Marines provide their own air support. They’re an
18
integrated force with their own air, artillery, and all supporting arms. The Army gets
19
their air support, their primary air support from the Air Force. So never the twain shall
20
meet, as far as we were concerned. We wanted to be able to support our Marines to the
21
necessary requirements. What they requested, we wanted to give them, every bit of it.
22
So it’s a difference in philosophy.
23
LC: Sure, sure.
24
RC: It’s a difference in philosophy and I think ours is best. I think that the Army
25
at times probably regrets having lost their air forces. As a result, they’ve developed a
26
little Air Force of their own with their helicopters, you know.
27
LC: Yes, yeah, especially in Vietnam.
28
RC: Yeah, they had their own little air force. Oftentimes, we provided an awful
29
30
lot of support to Army units, the Marines did.
LC: Mm-hmm, yes.
372
1
RC: There was, of course, in our MR-1, we had the 1st Cav and the 101st up there.
2
We provided a lot of air support to them and particularly, as an example, when I told you
3
about the operation in the A Shau Valley, the Marines pulled them out of there.
4
LC: Now those were the Army aircraft that were lost, the Army helicopters?
5
RC: Right, right. It was quite a gaggle, quite an operation. They apparently
6
landed right on top of a North Vietnamese regiment that had anti-aircraft. They made
7
mincemeat out of them for a little while. They lost quite a few helicopters there. It was
8
quite an operation getting them out. The air operations were very, very intense. Of
9
course, we had the Arc Lights that were going on in the A Shau Valley to try to close that
10
off because that’s where much of their staging and their operations were against Khe
11
Sanh. So that was absolutely essential for the defense of Khe Sanh.
12
13
LC: Now can you describe for someone who doesn’t know what an Arc Light
strike was, can you tell them what it was?
14
RC: Well, the Arc Light strikes were the B-52s that carried the 750-pound
15
bombs. They did saturation bombing, so to speak, in the A Shau Valley. They take off in
16
flights, most of which were based out of Guam. They would fly from Guam and be on
17
station at set times, at coordinated times, generally at night, to conduct the strikes on
18
staging Vietnamese, North Vietnamese forces in the A Shau Valley. They used that
19
primarily for the staging area for attacks against Khe Sanh and points further South. So it
20
was very important to try to keep them neutralized as much as we could. That’s the way
21
we did it, with the Arc Lights.
22
LC: Now this is a question of who had responsibility for this, with the 7th Air
23
Force sitting over at NKP (Nakhon Phanom), were they involved in the Arc Light strikes
24
or was that Strategic Air Command or was it someone else?
25
RC: Well, I don’t know exactly the real specifics of that. I do know that we were
26
always aware and informed of the B-52 strikes because between the B-52 strikes, we had
27
our own little thing that we called Pen Lights.
28
LC: Okay. What were those, sir?
29
RC: We did those with A-6 aircraft that have radar bombing. So we were much
30
more accurate than the B-52s were. The B-52s were more saturation bombings, as I said.
31
Our Pen Lights, we were capable of hitting pinpoint targets with radar bombing.
373
1
LC: Now the B-52s would be up at thirty thousand feet or maybe more.
2
RC: Right.
3
LC: Where would the A-6s be?
4
RC: Well, they’d be out of, the A-6s would be out of small arms fire, small arms
5
range. They’d be at lower altitudes, generally above four thousand feet so that they were
6
out of the light anti-aircraft fire. Of course, they wanted to be as low as they could
7
because their radar was more sensitive that way and they could pinpoint targets better that
8
way. It was very beneficial to Khe Sanh, the defense of Khe Sanh, the Pen Lights were
9
because the North Vietnamese became accustomed to the B-52s. I don’t know how
10
accustomed you can come to being bombed by 750-pound bombs all the time, but they
11
knew, it was kind of done in a pattern, if you will. So we had to fill in the gaps with our
12
Pen Lights. That’s what we did. Fortunately, they kept a lot of forces off of us at Khe
13
Sanh and further south. They were very effective, very effective.
14
LC: When was this tactic of using the A-6s at staggered times that weren’t
15
predictable, which of course made them different in another way from the Arc Light
16
strikes, when was that developed? Did you put that together, sir?
17
RC: Yes. Yes, I did.
18
LC: Did it have any other kind of operational name besides Pen Light?
19
RC: No, that was the name that we gave it. Actually, the people at Khe Sanh
20
were requesting, the forces of Khe Sanh were requesting around-the-clock surveillance or
21
attack capability, night attack capability, in particular, against specific targets. That’s
22
what we fragged the Pen Lights to do to hit those times. We also put a certain amount of
23
them on call. In other words, if a target developed that they didn’t specifically know
24
about ahead of time, that’s when we’d also send in the Pen Light. So that was the
25
advantage of those. Whereas the B-52s were programmed in a specific area to bomb,
26
with their saturation bombings, ours were on call and could hit specific areas when the B-
27
52s weren’t there. Ours was more of a reaction force, if you will.
28
LC: Exactly, yes. Obviously as you’ve mentioned, the B-52s had to take off
29
from Guam. So they’re in the air a long time before they reached the target and it really
30
doesn’t matter too much to them what’s happening on the ground when they reach the
31
target they need to release the bombs.
374
1
RC: That’s exactly right. It was almost like it was strategic air. They had a
2
specific mission and come hell or high water, they would go head and perform it, you
3
know, irregardless of what was happening on the ground, but of course, you’ve got to
4
understand that the North Vietnamese forces, they had intelligence, too. They would
5
know when the B-52s were coming. Obviously, their troops would go underground as
6
much as they could for protection. So how effective they were, we don’t know.
7
Casualty-wise of the North Vietnamese, they certainly didn’t run them out of the A Shau.
8
They certainly didn’t stop the operations there because the North Vietnamese would
9
simply dig in as deep as they could for their own protection during the strikes and then
10
11
12
they’d come out and go into action again after the strike.
LC: Was that also true around Khe Sanh where the NVA dug into complexes that
were to some degree, offered them a safe haven from bombings?
13
RC: Oh, absolutely, absolutely.
14
LC: How much did you guys know about that at the time? Do you remember?
15
RC: Well, of course, we had some patrols that would go out and would attempt to
16
give us as much intelligence as we could. Now the North Vietnamese artillery, you know
17
that they got as many as a thousand rounds of artillery a day in Khe Sanh.
18
LC: Which is, I mean, can you put that into perspective for someone who might
19
not really have a clue what that would really mean, what that would look like taking that
20
kind of fire?
21
RC: Well, it means that you’d have a hard time walking to the grocery store
22
without taking probably ten or twenty 155-millimeter rounds exploding around you. So
23
that’s kind of the comparison.
24
25
LC: Now the A-6s would be trying to obviously hit either troop concentrations if
you could locate those or the 122-millimeter guns.
26
RC: Right.
27
LC: Where were the guns? Were they dug in, as well?
28
RC: Yes. As a matter of fact, there was one little operation that we put into
29
effect. It was kind of a reactionary operation and you’ve probably heard about it in your
30
history, but in the caves, they had artillery in caves across the border in Laos. They
31
would fire, they’d roll the guns out of the caves and fire. Then when air came, our
375
1
counter-air came on station to try to hit them, they’d roll them back into the caves. So
2
they were protected in that regard. Their guns, our guns, our counter battery, we didn’t
3
have guns that would reach them. So we had to try to neutralize them with air. In other
4
words, they had superior artillery to ours in the area of Khe Sanh.
5
LC: Now these were their 122-millimeter guns?
6
RC: That’s right.
7
LC: What was the United States using?
8
RC: We had 105s.
9
LC: The range was—?
10
RC: And some 155s. We fell about three thousand yards short of hitting those
11
caves with our guns, but their guns were longer range than ours. So they were more or
12
less protected, contrary to Dien Bien Phu, where they didn’t have to worry about that
13
where they had direct fire and had fire superiority. Our superiority was in our air there.
14
LC: And particularly in Marine aircraft.
15
RC: And almost completely in Marine aircraft.
16
LC: Yes, sir.
17
RC: What we did is eventually we had some people that were trained in
18
Bullpups.
19
LC: In what, sir?
20
RC: Bullpups.
21
LC: Can you tell me what that is?
22
RC: A Bullpup is a wire-guided five-hundred pound bomb. The aircraft that
23
could fire the Bullpups were the A-4 aircraft, which were based at Chu Lai. What we did
24
is we had a couple of people—as a matter of fact, there’s one gentleman you might want
25
to talk to on this.
26
LC: Sure.
27
RC: Lee Barton, Col. Lee Barton. He’s a friend of mine. I don’t have his phone
28
29
number right now, but I’ll get it the next time.
LC: Good enough. I’ll ask you for it later.
376
1
RC: But Lee Barton was kind of the coordinator of this at the group down at
2
MAG-12, Marine Aircraft Group 12 at Chu Lai. We put them on station and they ran the
3
Bullpups into the caves.
4
5
LC: Now, General, can you tell how a wire-guided missile actually works. Can
you talk about the wire and what difference it makes?
6
RC: Well, I think you’ll get a little better picture of that from Lee.
7
LC: Okay. I’ll ask him about it.
8
RC: I haven’t actually flown a Bullpup. I only know about it from my own
9
research and from talking to pilots that worked with it. But basically what it does, it’s
10
guided by—the bomb is guided with fins, moveable fins, like an aircraft. The wire
11
controls those movements. The pilot has an instrument in the cockpit where he can see
12
the bomb and he can direct the bomb with a joystick, so to speak, to where he wants it to
13
hit.
14
15
LC: So after he fires this missile, there’s a wire that trails along from the aircraft
carrying a signal?
16
RC: Yes, that’s right.
17
LC: That makes it possible to actually change its course?
18
RC: Exactly.
19
LC: And shoot it right down the hole, basically?
20
RC: Right, right.
21
LC: Okay. Wow.
22
RC: Lee can give you more specifics on that, but that’s the basic principle of it.
23
So we did that. They withdrew from firing those, but they still—we didn’t completely
24
neutralize them, but we gave them an awful headache, I know that. A thousand rounds of
25
artillery a day, the casualties that we suffered at Khe Sanh were artillery casualties.
26
There were, I believe some 250 Marines were killed there by artillery. We had about, I
27
think upwards to fifteen hundred wounded.
28
LC: Now were the helicopters of the wing that you were commanding, were they
29
trying to get in there in order to get wounded out or was there an air evac operation like
30
that, a medevac operation?
377
1
RC: No. The Jolly Greens, the Air Force, the HH-53s were basically designed to
2
recover aircrews. We did our own evacuation with our CH-46s off of the hill positions
3
and out of Khe Sanh. That in itself was kind of the requirement, not just the casualties,
4
but the resupply became a problem.
5
LC: Absolutely, yes.
6
RC: Became quite a problem because Khe Sanh was surrounded. The roads were
7
cut. So all resupply and casualty evacuation had to be done by air.
8
LC: You ran almost all of that through the 46s, the CH-46?
9
RC: Through the 46s, right. We did that.
10
LC: For re-supply, how did you arrange this, sir?
11
RC: Well, as I said, the major problems we had with resupply was with the hill
12
positions. At Khe Sanh base itself, we ran C-130s. The Air Force came in on this. We
13
ran C130s in and we developed a program whereby they would fly in at treetop level,
14
right down the runway and with the Drogue chute, would extract the supplies out of the
15
tail end of the C-130.
16
LC: So the C-130 would maybe not even touch down?
17
RC: Oh, no, wouldn’t touch down. It was just right off the ground and all the
18
supplies would exit the aircraft right out the back end of the aircraft. As you know,
19
there’s a big door back there.
20
LC: Sure, yeah.
21
RC: That’s the way we resupplied them principally.
22
LC: They’d be on—let’s see, the supplies might be on pallets or something?
23
RC: On pallets, that’s right, on special pallets.
24
LC: Sure.
25
RC: Of course, part of the hazard there, whenever we did that, retrieving those
26
supplies called for enemy artillery because they knew when we were doing this. So
27
therein also created a lot of casualties, but you’ve got to do what you’ve got to do, you
28
know. Now on the hills themselves, the basic resupply was done with helicopters—
29
resupply and casualty evacuation was done with the CH-46s and we were getting quite a
30
few of those hit and shot down. We’d lose helicopters every day doing that. We finally,
31
well, not finally, but very quickly had to develop a counter to these losses. So that’s
378
1
where we came in. My wing commander came to me and he said, “Develop a way that
2
we can protect our helicopters so that we can get the job done.”
3
LC: Who was your wing commander?
4
RC: Norm Anderson. Norman Anderson.
5
LC: He came to you and said—?
6
RC: Well, he came to me via my boss.
7
LC: Okay. You had to figure it out?
8
RC: Yup, right.
9
LC: Okay. What did you do, sir? Can you tell us?
10
RC: Yeah, what we did is we developed a thing called the Super Gaggle, and I
11
think you probably have heard of this.
12
LC: I have, yes. I have.
13
RC: The Super Gaggle was a combined mission for fixed wing and helicopters.
14
What we would do is I put together packages of fixed-wing aircraft, principally A-4
15
aircraft, which were controlled by a TA-4, which has an airborne controller in it. He
16
would coordinate the movement of the aircraft. At the same time that we were preparing
17
fixed-wing aircraft at Chu Lai, we would be preparing helicopters at Quang Tri with
18
external lifts. In other words, large nets of supplies that were carried externally in large
19
groups of helicopters, twelve to sixteen helicopters. The fixed-wing aircraft were
20
equipped with various types of ordnance with a special purpose for that ordnance. Some
21
of the aircraft were equipped with gun pods, which were high-intensity guns.
22
LC: Rapid-fire you mean?
23
RC: Rapid-fire, right, 20-millimeter. Some aircraft were equipped with napalm.
24
Some aircraft were equipped with rockets for pinpoint shooting. Some aircraft were
25
equipped with low-drag five-hundred pound bombs.
26
LC: Now what’s low-drag mean?
27
RC: It means that the aircraft can go in and drop at fifty feet without getting hit
28
by its own blast. What happens is these bombs have special fins on them that as soon as
29
they depart the aircraft, the fins extend and slow the flight of the bomb down.
30
LC: So the aircraft has time to get away?
379
1
RC: Right. You’re doing about four hundred knots when you drop the bomb. So
2
it doesn’t take you long to get away from it. But if you don’t have low-drag, you can’t
3
get away from it.
4
LC: It’s not soon enough.
5
RC: The bomb blast will get you. The low-drag, the fins would come out—plus
6
you could get pinpoint accuracy with these five-hundred pounders that way.
7
LC: You’d be dropping these from fifty feet?
8
RC: Well, you never went below fifty feet.
9
LC: Okay. So that would be the minimum?
10
11
12
13
14
RC: Yeah. That’d be the minimum, probably about two hundred feet is where
you dropped them.
LC: Jeez. Well, I mean, I’m thinking of both the pilot flying that fast that low
and over—
RC: Well, I’ve dropped a lot of them and you don’t really—you know it works.
15
So you’re not that concerned about it. The only thing you’re concerned about, if you get
16
too low, you’re going to have a dud. The bomb won’t have time to arm. If you get too
17
high, then you lose your accuracy.
18
LC: So you’ve got a pretty thin slice there that you need to—
19
RC: You’ve got a pretty thin slice. You start picking your target out very
20
definitely pinpoint target at five hundred feet. That’s where you normally tried to drop
21
from five hundred to three hundred feet. Back to the aircraft and loads of the aircraft, the
22
final thing that we put on them was CS gas containers. Now CS gas, we knew that the
23
North Vietnamese did not have gas masks. Well, the CS gas, of course, is a tear gas
24
basically, very powerful tear gas. The Marines were the only ones that had it over there.
25
Again, back to that thing that I told you about a complete force?
26
LC: Yes, right. You had everything you needed.
27
RC: We had everything we needed. So what we would do is, and this was a
28
highly coordinated operation where we would take the helicopters off timing-wise so that
29
they would arrive in the Khe Sanh area at the same time that the fixed-wing aircraft did
30
so that they’d have minimum time that they were exposed. It was necessary oftentimes to
380
1
let down through an overcast. As you know, this was during the monsoon seasons. So
2
there’s a lot of bad weather.
3
LC: Absolutely, yeah.
4
RC: So it compounded the problem, which was also to the advantage of the
5
enemy because it would, in their opinion, would restrict the air operations, but it didn’t
6
restrict them for us. So what we would do is we would oftentimes have to let down. We
7
fortunately had a homer at Khe Sanh, which we had put in ahead of time also.
8
LC: Now what’s that, sir?
9
RC: A homer is a radio beacon where the helicopters and the fixed-wing aircraft
10
could let down through the overcast on a set heading so they’d avoid the mountains and
11
the hills to get below the overcast so they could perform the mission.
12
LC: So they could pick up a signal from this stationary beacon—
13
RC: And let down through an overcast—
14
LC: Knowing that they weren’t about to bump off of the bottom or something.
15
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
16
LC: Okay. All the aircraft would pick up, had the capability to pick up this
17
signal?
18
RC: Yes, yes.
19
LC: At what point had that beacon been installed, do you know?
20
RC: Early in December.
21
LC: Who thought to put it in? Do you remember?
22
RC: No, I don’t know.
23
LC: Was it a general thing that these were being installed at Marine bases that
24
had landing strips?
25
RC: Yes. Yes, we had beacons at every strip.
26
LC: You were darn glad for this one.
27
RC: That’s right. That’s right. It was very, very versatile and very, gave us the
28
capability to get the job done, to perform our mission. We wouldn’t have been able to do
29
it without it.
30
31
LC: Now, General, may I ask about the arrangement of the aircraft? Who was it
who decided how many in any Super Gaggle package, how many of the aircraft from Phu
381
1
Bai might be coming and with what ordnance or was it the same, essentially? Did you
2
just pick a distribution, five of these, three of those, eight of those?
3
RC: Well, initially when we put the package together, I had a friend that helped
4
me work this out. He was a, it was Lt. Gen. Bill White. Bill helped me with this Super
5
Gaggle thing.
6
LC: Now what was his rank and position at this time?
7
RC: He was a lieutenant colonel.
8
LC: Like you?
9
RC: Yeah. He was in charge of the VMO (Marine observation squadron)
10
squadron, the observation squadron. He was there at the headquarters with me and we
11
did a lot of talking on this and we put it together. Me principally because I was a fixed-
12
wing guy, he was a helicopter pilot. So he kind of schooled me, if you will. I wasn’t
13
flying helicopters at that time except what I could pick up on a mission now and then. I
14
liked to fly everything. So I picked up a helicopter mission and wasn’t qualified, fully
15
qualified in them, but I’d ride in the left seat and go out on missions so I’d know what
16
was going on.
17
LC: Yeah. So you had a very good sense of their capabilities.
18
RC: Right. I had a good sense, but he kind of pinned it down for me. So he was
19
kind of the helicopter advisor, if you will. I did the principle overall coordination and
20
also decided what ordnance they would have on the initial strikes. Then, of course, we
21
tailored that as we went along.
22
23
LC: Okay. So you would decide based on what data, what you would send out
on the next round.
24
RC: Well, if you will, the amount of return fire that we would get.
25
LC: Okay, reported by the pilots or guys on the ground?
26
RC: Reported by the pilots and by the ground both, what type of fire they would
27
get. Basically, we didn’t have to change it too much. We really didn’t. The order that
28
we’d send them in, we’d send them in obviously with bombs to try to neutralize the area.
29
Then we’d try to pinpoint them with guns and rockets. Then just before the actual run-in,
30
we’d hit them with napes, napalm. Then finally just as they were going in, we would hit
31
them with CS gas.
382
1
2
3
LC: And then the helicopters would come in and make their supplies and
pickups.
RC: The helicopters would then come into the hill positions. Now we would
4
bring helicopters in, if you will, in a sanitized lane. That was the whole purpose of it. In
5
other words, we would neutralize a lane over the ground so the helicopters could make
6
their descent that way so that they wouldn’t receive ground fire, direct ground fire
7
because that’s what was the main thing that was shooting down helicopters. A man with
8
a rifle can shoot down a helicopter.
9
10
11
12
13
LC: Yes, sir. Yeah, yes, sir.
RC: The object was to neutralize the ground over which they flew. Nothing
would be able to return fire from that ground and it worked.
LC: Would then the helicopter—I mean, this may seem obvious, but the
helicopter then would fly out the same way.
14
RC: That’s right.
15
LC: Okay, following essentially this swath that had been cut by the weapons that
16
17
you’ve already described.
RC: That’s right. This was all coordinated, the actual swath, the best place to do
18
was coordinated by this gentleman that was up in the TA-4. He would reconnoiter the
19
ground, talk to the ground commander on the hill, where they were getting the
20
concentration of action and try to go in an area that was safe to fly in, in other words, hill-
21
wise and obstacle-wise and natural obstacles to fly in in a corridor, if you will. Then he
22
would determine how they would go in and how they would come out and how the
23
aircraft would attack, so big job.
24
LC: Yeah, and who was doing that job?
25
RC: Well, different pilots, different pilots.
26
LC: Very senior pilots, I would think.
27
RC: Right.
28
LC: Do you remember some of those guys?
29
RC: No, I didn’t actually get into that. That’s down at the group level. Probably
30
Lee Barton might be able to help you with that because he was the group XO.
383
1
2
LC: Now the T-4, would it be the case that it would be at a high altitude and
essentially circling over—?
3
4
RC: Well, as high as it could get safely, but he would invariably be in ground fire
range.
5
LC: Oh, is that right?
6
RC: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. He had to be down low enough that he could see what
7
was going on.
8
LC: So he’s vulnerable as well?
9
RC: Absolutely.
10
LC: What kind of package did he have onboard?
11
RC: Himself and the pilot.
12
LC: That’s what I thought, nothing.
13
RC: It’s a tandem aircraft. It’s got a front seat and a backseat. The pilot was up
14
front and the controller was in the back.
15
LC: Sir, did you lose any of these T-4 flyers?
16
RC: No, we didn’t lose any TA-4s.
17
LC: Is that right?
18
RC: No.
19
LC: Well, that’s some pretty incredible flying.
20
RC: Yeah, yeah.
21
LC: The reason that you had to put together this very complex project that goes
22
by the name, Super Gaggle, was essentially because there was this extended siege, in
23
effect, of the Marines, both at Khe Sanh in the surrounding hill positions. Is that the
24
case?
25
RC: Siege did you say?
26
LC: Yes, yes.
27
RC: Oh, yes, yes.
28
LC: How long did it last?
29
RC: Well, the siege lasted—they didn’t actually get out of Khe Sanh until, I
30
31
believe it was the latter part of March, April.
LC: Were there—I’m sorry, go ahead, sir.
384
1
RC: Of course, the siege was going on all that time.
2
LC: Yeah. Were there any—one of the things the French did at Dien Bien Phu
3
was in order to make up their manpower losses was to drop in paratroopers. They were
4
able to do this not at the end, but in the earlier parts of the siege.
5
RC: Right.
6
LC: You know, February and March of 1954. Was there ever consideration to
7
8
9
dropping new manpower into the Khe Sanh area by air?
RC: No. We didn’t need additional manpower. We didn’t really need additional
manpower. We had enough people there to hold it. We were confident the Marines
10
would hold it. Now obviously if we would’ve had to have done it, we could’ve mustered
11
the forces very rapidly. We would’ve put them in in helicopters. Ours would’ve gone in
12
in helicopters. We could’ve reinforced wherever we had to reinforce that way.
13
LC: Why was that not done?
14
RC: We didn’t really have a requirement to do it. We held the hill positions. We
15
didn’t lose anything. As long as you’re winning, why try to fix what ain’t broke? And
16
we were deeply involved elsewhere. That was one of the factors, one of the
17
considerations. That was again, if you recall, when we first started talking about Khe
18
Sanh, that was one of Giap’s intentions was to draw additional reinforcements away from
19
tactical points to Khe Sanh, to defend Khe Sanh.
20
LC: Like, for example, from Hue or somewhere like that.
21
RC: From Hue, right, or from Quang Tri or from some of the Army bases that
22
were up there. But that didn’t happen, fortunately, because the 26th Marines were able to
23
hold. The hill positions, they were fought for constantly. It was a pretty constant fight, a
24
lot of attempts at infiltration, some direct attacks. It was not just simply sitting in a hole
25
and waiting. There was a lot of action going on and comparatively high casualty rate for
26
the forces that were there. Remember, I said we had about a total of about fifteen
27
hundred casualties, dead and wounded. That’s out of a force of about five thousand. So
28
that’s a pretty good casualty rate.
29
30
31
LC: Well, did you develop a sense of how many North Vietnamese troops were
committed in this battle?
RC: Yeah. We figured about forty thousand.
385
1
LC: Wow. That’s quite incredible.
2
RC: Yeah, about forty thousand there.
3
LC: Any sense of how great their losses were? I know this would’ve been an
4
estimate, but when it was said and done, did an estimate develop that you remember?
5
RC: Yeah. We estimated that they had, well, in the total Tet Offensive the North
6
Vietnamese lost about forty-five thousand killed. At Khe Sanh, Khe Sanh, they had well
7
in excess of five thousand killed and untold number of wounded.
8
9
10
11
12
LC: As you say, this battle went on for weeks and weeks, but what was finally
the point at which contact essentially was broken off? What happened such that the siege
did not continue? Was it the overland reinforcements or—?
RC: That’s right. That’s right. When they opened the road, then the actual siege
as we know it that started the Tet in essence died down.
13
LC: Right, because now there was an overland LOC between the two.
14
RC: Right. That’s right.
15
LC: Now, sir, I’ve talked to some Army guys who state very clearly that they
16
were the ones who opened the road to Khe Sanh and who liberated the Marines up there.
17
Is that what you heard?
18
19
RC: Well, they had a part in it, but it wasn’t strictly an Army operation. They
like to take credit for things, like we all do, I think.
20
LC: Sure.
21
RC: That’s a natural thing.
22
LC: I think you shook hands. I think you probably did shake hands with a couple
23
of Marines.
24
RC: Yeah, that’s right.
25
LC: But in essence, which Marine force, if you remember, was responsible for
26
moving up the highway and trying to get to Khe Sanh?
27
RC: I don’t remember, to tell you the truth, Dr. Laura. I really don’t. I don’t
28
remember. It was a unit out of the 3rd Division, probably the 5th Marines, but I’m not
29
sure. I’m really not sure.
386
1
LC: At some point, you stopped the Super Gaggle operation. Was that around
2
the time that the road was opened or was it before that? I mean, in other words, did you
3
keep this up for the entire length of what we think of as the siege?
4
RC: We used it whenever we had to and, yes, the answer was the entire length of
5
the siege. It didn’t—now at the most intensive part of the siege up until, probably up
6
until March—well, no, longer than that, probably up until April we did the Super Gaggle.
7
8
9
10
LC: Sir, how many aircraft losses did you have and crew loses? Do you
remember?
RC: No, I don’t. No, I don’t. We didn’t lose a lot of fixed-wing aircraft. We
lost a few. I don’t remember exactly those. I didn’t get in on that itself.
11
LC: Right.
12
RC: That’s done more at the lower level.
13
LC: But there were a few fixed-wing—
14
RC: Oh, yes, we lost fixed-wing. Yes, we definitely did. Like I say, one of my
15
top guns got hit there.
16
LC: Right.
17
RC: But helicopter losses, we were able to recover our helicopters, our helicopter
18
crews. We did it with the help in some cases of the Jolly Greens. A comparison just to
19
give you an idea and I think what you’re fishing for is the effectiveness of the Super
20
Gaggle.
21
LC: Sure, yes.
22
RC: It was extremely effective in this regard. Prior to the development of the
23
Super Gaggle, we lost at least one helicopter everyday, at least one, sometimes more than
24
that. After the Super Gaggle, we lost none.
25
LC: Well, that’s about all you need to know really, isn’t it?
26
RC: Yeah, yeah. That’s a good comparison for you. It was a very effective thing
27
and the Pen Lights were good and the Bullpup operation was good. We have to say that
28
the B-52s certainly helped. They certainly helped. They kept a lot of activity down that
29
we would’ve had otherwise without them. They may have even been able to muster
30
enough forces to overwhelm us, I don’t know. So we can’t negate the effectiveness of
31
the B-52s.
387
1
LC: Well, there’s also the effect, in terms of talking about effectiveness, there’s
2
also the effect on morale that these combined operations must’ve had for the men up
3
there who knew that they were surrounded at one point. They weren’t left alone. They
4
saw the Marine aircraft for sure every day.
5
RC: Well, you know, speaking of morale, I’ll give you a little vignette about the
6
morale. One thing that our wing commander, and this he did come to me directly,
7
particularly after he saw the effectiveness of the Super Gaggle, he came to me and he
8
complimented me on that. He said, we were just talking and he said, “You know, those
9
troops up there on those hill positions and at Khe Sanh, they’re taking a hell of a beating.
10
We need to do something to bolster their morale. Now you’re a former grunt, what do
11
you think they need?” I said, “Well, sir, the first thing they probably need is they
12
probably would like to have a beer.” But at that time, we had an organization back in the
13
States of women that decided that the troops didn’t have to be drinking beer. So there
14
was kind of a push not to provide people on the frontlines with any beer. The next thing
15
was something that we were able and our supplies were able to get them such things as
16
bread in and so on. I remember when I was a grunt that one of the best things that I ever
17
got was a loaf of hot bread in Korea. I really relished that. Of course in Korea, we got
18
some beer.
19
LC: Yeah, that didn’t hurt, right?
20
RC: That didn’t hurt. That helped a lot. That helped the morale a lot. So I said,
21
“Well, you know, even with everything that’s going on, it gets pretty miserable and hot
22
during the day, dusty and so on. So, General, one thing we’ve got here in Vietnam is
23
we’ve got one of the best ice cream plants in the world right here at China Beach.” Have
24
you heard about the ice cream plant at China Beach?
25
LC: No.
26
RC: Well, the Navy had an ice cream plant there that was just, they made their
27
ice cream with—they put a lot of, I don’t know how much, I don’t know what the
28
formula was, but they put some coconut milk in it. That was some of the tastiest ice
29
cream I’ve ever eaten. So I said, “General, those troops would really, I’m sure they’d
30
really like to have some ice cream. That would be kind of like a Christmas to them.”
31
LC: Heck, yeah.
388
1
RC: He said, “Okay, do it.” Well, that was easier said than done, but that’s what
2
you do with a sergeant. When you want to get something difficult done, you just turn to
3
him and say, “Sergeant, I need this done. Do it,” and they do it.
4
LC: How did they get it done? Do you know?
5
RC: Well, anyway, I sent up to Japan, I sent a C-130 up to Japan and we got
6
some dry ice. I contacted the ice cream plant and asked them to put up gallons of ice
7
cream. I contacted the helicopters and I contacted my Super Gaggle people, of course.
8
We put together packages with ice cream in them, a resupply of ice cream. Then we
9
called that Operation Cool It. We had the same procedure to get it done—
10
LC: So it was flown in by Super Gaggle methods?
11
RC: Super Gaggle mass methods. They took the ice cream in. So one of their
12
resupply missions was ice cream and that was Operation Cool It.
13
LC: Well, I think that is pretty awesome.
14
RC: I have guys who still, when they find out who I am and where I was, they
15
talk about Operation Cool It.
16
LC: I bet they do.
17
RC: It was a pretty good morale boost, I think.
18
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Let’s take a break there for a minute.
389
Interview with Richard Carey Session [11] of [16] March 24, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey. Today
3
is the twenty-fourth of March 2006. I am in Lubbock on the campus of Texas Tech and
4
the general is speaking from his home, which is also here in Texas. Good morning, sir.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
6
LC: Sir, I want to ask you a little bit, if I can, about events at Hue in 1968. Can
7
you tell me about your responsibilities, involvement and observation of aviation issues
8
there?
9
RC: Well, the basic thing that I was responsible for there was the air support that
10
they had. The air support was principally because of the closeness of the fighting and in
11
those days, we didn’t have the same weapons that they have nowadays with the extreme
12
accuracy of the guided missiles and so on and all aircraft equipped with guided missile
13
capability. So most of the air support was done with helicopters, believe it or not. Long-
14
range support behind the frontlines, so to speak, was done with fixed-wing. The close in
15
close air support was done with helicopters, principally the Cobra helicopters.
16
LC: Using what kind of gunnery?
17
RC: Principally they had 20 millimeters and rockets. Of course, that’s the more
18
realistic in the type of fighting they were doing in Hue. Hue was a house-to-house
19
fighting. It was close in, close quarters fighting, nose-to-nose. It wasn’t any long-range
20
stuff. They were engaging hand-to-hand almost.
21
LC: Now this was primarily Marine units on the ground?
22
RC: That’s right. There were two regiments of Marines that were involved in the
23
retaking of Hue. What had happened in Hue, and I’m sure you know this and I’m sure
24
that you have it recorded, but the NVA put in about ten battalions into Hue. They did it,
25
of course, right at the beginning of Tet when everybody else was standing down. There
26
were no American forces in Hue because it was the ancient capitol and the South
27
Vietnamese, that was kind of an agreement between the forces that the South Vietnamese
390
1
would take care of Hue and the American forces were around Hue city, but were not in
2
Hue itself.
3
LC: Because essentially of its symbolic nature?
4
RC: Symbolic nature, that’s correct. So the way they took it is they infiltrated
5
and they’ve infiltrated up to ten battalions. They just completely overwhelmed the South
6
Vietnamese very quickly and occupied the city.
7
LC: Did you have a sense of the South Vietnamese strength at this time? Of
8
course, it’s during Tet when there was an expectation that there would be a stand down.
9
RC: Well, they were—the South Vietnamese or the North Vietnamese?
10
LC: South Vietnamese in the defense of—
11
RC: Yeah. They had a division headquarters there in Hue City. So we figured
12
that they had enough elements of a division in there that they’d be able to hold it quite
13
well. Apparently they did not have that many. I don’t know. I didn’t get down to the
14
specifics of it.
15
LC: Understood. Yes, sir.
16
RC: But anyway, the city was taken very quickly. They capitulated very quickly.
17
They never took the division headquarters. They took the rest of the city, but the division
18
headquarters to my understanding remained in place. So they apparently fought the
19
people off. The NVA let them stay there because they figured they’d just starve them
20
out, I guess. So anyway, when the Americans were called in, they came in from
21
principally south of the Perfume River. The Perfume River runs directly through Hue,
22
Hue city. On the opposite side, on the northern side of the Perfume River is the Citadel.
23
The Citadel was the old city.
24
LC: Now had you been in Hue, sir? You had, hadn’t you?
25
RC: I had been in Hue.
26
LC: Yeah. So you had a pretty good mental map of—
27
RC: I had an idea, yes. It had been some time since I’d been there. It had been
28
about, oh, gosh, about five years.
29
LC: Yeah, since your 1963 visit.
30
RC: Right. So I knew fairly well what it was like. There was a lot of fighting up
31
to the time that they got to the Perfume River.
391
1
LC: A lot of U.S. engagements?
2
RC: U.S. engagements with the NVA. Of course, the NVA had a lot of casualties
3
there. They had, I think it’s estimated somewhere around at least five thousand killed.
4
LC: Now that’s NVA main force units?
5
RC: NVA main force units.
6
LC: Sir, let me ask you about the other question which is one that often arises as
7
around the battle at Hue and that is about civilian casualties, not caused by the U.S. but
8
caused by the NVA. In fact, assertions have been made that civilians were just
9
summarily shot.
10
11
RC: Oh, yes. They found mass graves. They found one grave that had three
thousand bodies in it. I think you’re probably aware of that one.
12
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I just wondered if that had come to your ears, also.
13
RC: Yes, yes. We did know, we did know about that, but there was pretty much
14
wholesale killing. There was one incident that occurred there. I don’t know whether I
15
told you about this or not, but the incident was, when the Marines came up into the
16
Citadel that they found a lot of bodies. They covered them with their ponchos because
17
they were deteriorating. They covered them with their ponchos and an American news
18
media took them to be Marine casualties and photographed them for TV. It got back into
19
the States. Now, I don’t know whether you knew about this or not.
20
LC: I believe I’ve seen the photograph, but—
21
RC: Right. Those were not Marine casualties. They had Marine ponchos on
22
them. Of course, with all that was going on in the country, anti-war protests were
23
starting.
24
LC: Back here in the States.
25
RC: Right, back in the States, right. The anti-war protests were starting and this
26
had quite an effect on—I’m certain it had quite an effect on the president and his
27
decisions because as you know, that right after Hue, he announced that he was not going
28
to run for reelection.
29
LC: Yes, sir. I remember it, actually.
30
RC: He also stopped the bombing of the north, which was quite a significant
31
event as far as fighting the war was concerned.
392
1
LC: What was your view of it, sir, at the time of that change?
2
RC: Well, we couldn’t understand the rationale because we were prepared. We
3
were pretty much winning in just about everywhere now because Tet was a military
4
success for us, but it was a moral failure for the United States.
5
LC: Now many people will have heard a kind of similar synopsis, but can you
6
say a little bit more about the ways in which you believe it was a military victory for the
7
United States?
8
9
RC: Well, for one thing, they were unable to turn the tide of the civilian populace
because the intent, the true intent of Tet was to cause civilian, if you will, civilian
10
capitulation over to the NVA side. That was really the primary focus of Tet. All the
11
provinces were retaken, including Saigon, was taken fairly rapidly. They were still
12
fighting in areas of Saigon, but it was taken back fairly rapidly and most of the provinces
13
and everything were taken quite quickly. So the civilian uprising didn’t materialize. So
14
from that standpoint, it was a military failure. Plus the fact that they had so many
15
casualties. It’s estimated they had forty-five thousand killed in the Tet Offensive.
16
LC: Yes, I think easily.
17
RC: That’s compared to—of course, the unfortunate part of Vietnam is it
18
eventually evolved into a body count thing. That’s not the way you determine victories is
19
with body count.
20
LC: Yeah, we talked a little bit about this before, General. I just wonder whether
21
your thinking was that the United States should do what I think Creighton Abrams later
22
tried to bring in, although it was at a much later stage in the war, which was to actually
23
seize and hold territory rather than the kind of search-and-destroy approach. The search-
24
and-destroy was based on attrition, killing as many of the enemy as possible.
25
RC: Exactly, right.
26
LC: So it made sense to kind of—
27
RC: You determine victories by body count. That’s the way they determined it
28
with search-and-destroy.
29
LC: As far as you’re concerned, is that your view of how to determine a victory?
30
RC: Wars are fought by occupying the ground. It goes right back to the basic
31
principle, well, the Marine Corps’s basic principle was that you’ve got to occupy the
393
1
ground in order to win a war. You don’t go in and beat them up and then pull out and
2
expect to have won the victory because they’ll just move right back into the area and hold
3
it and have the same position they had before. So you have to physically occupy. The
4
Marine Corps’s motto is everything is dedicated to the support of the ground trooper, all
5
air support, artillery, everything is support for him. He’s the guy that wins the war. So
6
you have to go in and occupy the territory.
7
LC: Essentially, that’s what happened at Hue, isn’t it?
8
RC: That’s right. That’s right. We had to run them completely out.
9
LC: Using a couple of Marine regiments.
10
RC: Two regiments, the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments went in and did the job. It
11
was a slugfest, a definite slugfest. There were a lot of casualties, disproportionally
12
casualties, of course, with the NVA versus the Marines. Marines had upwards, I think, of
13
about fifteen hundred casualties. The NVA had five thousand killed and they don’t know
14
how many wounded because they pulled their wounded out. So it was disproportionate
15
from that standpoint, but it was a slugfest of wall-to-wall fighting face to face.
16
17
18
19
20
LC: Now your contribution was to provide, as you said at the outset, close air
support for these men.
RC: That’s right, as much close-air support and casualty evacuation. Casualty
evacuation was very important.
LC: Okay, so both of those things. Well, maybe we could talk about them each
21
in turn. The close-air support, you mentioned the Cobras. Did you have at hand and
22
deployable to this battle enough Cobras with sufficient equipment?
23
24
RC: Well, we had to rely more—no, the answer is no. We didn’t have enough,
but we made up with it with Hueys, armed Hueys.
25
LC: Okay. Where did those come from, do you know?
26
RC: They all came from up at Quang Tri and—well, at Quang Tri because
27
everything had been moved out of Hue.
28
LC: Now would these be Army assault helicopter companies or what—
29
RC: No, those were Marine.
30
LC: Okay, they were Marines.
394
1
RC: We had some help from the Army, a lot of helicopter help. As a matter of
2
fact, a lot of our casualties were evacuated by the Army helicopters. Particularly when
3
the weather got real bad, the Army helicopters would come right in at treetop level and
4
evacuate. We had a ceiling that we said we didn’t want to operate under, of two hundred
5
feet, but the Army helicopters continued to come in. So they did a little better job of
6
evacuation than we did in Hue. That’s hard to admit, but they did it.
7
LC: They’d be interested to hear you say that, sir.
8
RC: Yeah, they did it. They did it. I was sitting in the command center and I can
9
tell you that I personally gave them a Bravo Zulu for what they were doing for us.
10
11
LC: Now you were sitting at the command center at Phu Bai or where were you,
sir?
12
RC: No, at Da Nang.
13
LC: Oh, at Da Nang, okay. Your role during this time was perhaps similar to
14
15
what you had been doing for Khe Sanh. That is, you’re the operations officer.
RC: Yes, I was the operations officer and I had to be certain that enough air
16
support was fragged and air support was provided for, well, all across our zone of action,
17
principally Hue and Khe Sanh, of course. But we had attacks at other places.
18
LC: Which you also had to manage, I would imagine.
19
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
20
LC: What were some of the most significant ones or areas where you sent the
21
most assets to? Do you remember?
22
RC: Well, yes. We just talked about them, Hue and Phu Bai.
23
LC: Okay. Those are the main ones.
24
RC: Yeah. We had some at the Rockpile and along the DMZ, up around—we
25
also had some up around Quang Tri. We had some considerable action up there, but that
26
was right close to home where the helicopters were.
27
LC: Yeah, not too far.
28
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
29
LC: About how many runs a day were some of the ships making?
30
RC: Oh, four to five.
31
LC: So they weren’t even cooling off, really?
395
1
2
RC: No, no, as fast as they could turn around, they were going, same with the
fixed-wing.
3
LC: Yes, I’m sure that’s—
4
RC: If you recall, I don’t know whether I told you this or not, but the Air Force
5
was, the 7th Air Force was trying to institute single management.
6
LC: Yeah, I believe you mentioned that.
7
RC: That was something that we really—I can say it now, we didn’t abide by it.
8
We were taking the task for not doing it, but we continued to support at the same level.
9
We didn’t cut back.
10
LC: No. Well, and of course, this is happening in the middle of—
11
RC: Right in the middle of the offensive.
12
LC: Which is a nationwide offensive.
13
RC: That’s right.
14
LC: It’s not one front.
15
RC: That’s right.
16
LC: Well, can you tell me how you, or actually whether you knew much about
17
how the Tet Offensive was being perceived back at home? What were your main sources
18
of information about the status back in the States?
19
20
RC: Well, we didn’t get much. We didn’t get a lot, except for what we could get
from Armed Forces Radio.
21
LC: Oh, I see.
22
RC: That’s about all we got. They didn’t report that in intelligence because it
23
was principally a media circus.
24
LC: Understood.
25
RC: So our intelligence sources didn’t report it down to us. We got smatterings
26
of news from Armed Forces Radio and from our Armed Forces newspaper, but that’s
27
about it.
28
LC: Did you have any VIPs or either press or political people come up to Da
29
Nang at perhaps not at the height of the fighting, but afterwards to kind of do a visual
30
recon at all? Do you remember anything like that?
396
1
RC: I don’t remember. They kind of protected me. That was done, I’m certain,
2
at a higher level. I was the guy that was—I was too busy with operations. So they kind
3
of protected me.
4
5
LC: Well, how long would your days be, General, when the Tet Offensive was
taking place?
6
RC: Twenty-four hours.
7
LC: Yeah, for how long at a time? As long as it took, I would guess.
8
RC: As long as it took. I basically slept at my desk, I’d catch catnaps and ate at
9
my desk. Somebody would go get me some food and I’d stay right there. Now as it
10
slowed down, of course, as it slowed down, I tried to get into the act myself because I
11
was an aviator and I wanted to participate. When things were pretty much like at
12
midnight or thereabouts, I would go out and fly missions, also. So I flew some missions
13
myself.
14
LC: In which aircraft, sir?
15
RC: I flew in the F-4. I flew in the C-117 doing flare drops for night bombing. I
16
flew in helicopters for casualty evacuations.
17
LC: You flew a couple of evac flights?
18
RC: Right.
19
LC: Sir, do you remember those? Can you remember one of those or two of
20
21
them, some detail about what actually went on?
RC: Well, there wasn’t much you could see because they were basically done at
22
night. We would generally go into a landing zone that was hopefully pre-prepped. So
23
that we wouldn’t take fire or get shot down doing the evacuation. The details, it’s just
24
like any other helicopter insert or extraction. You’re always at risk from small arms fire
25
in particular. We took some small arms fire, but we got the job done. That’s about as
26
much as I can say, really.
27
28
29
LC: Who did you have in the crew with you? What would the crew of those
flights look like, how many men?
RC: You would have myself and then you’d have the pilot, I was a copilot. The
30
helicopters we did them in were the Hueys. You had a pilot and copilot and you had a
31
door gunner and a crew chief. So you had four, a total of four.
397
1
LC: Was there anything special as far as you for flying and evacuation of
2
wounded guys out of the field? I mean, did you feel anything particular or was this just
3
another piece of your mission that you had to get done?
4
5
RC: Well, obviously I wanted to participate and help in whatever way I could and
know what was going on and the best way to do that is to go out and do it.
6
7
LC: Yes, sir. Did anybody try to stop you and say, “No, we need you here at the
ops desk. Don’t go out and fly.”
8
9
10
RC: No, the wing commander and my boss knew how I felt, so they let me go
when things slowed down. I had assistants and when it was slow enough, why, I could
go.
11
LC: They could handle it while you—
12
RC: They could handle it while I was gone. So I did have a—I don’t know
13
whether I told you about the doctor, our flight surgeon.
14
LC: I don’t think so. I don’t think so.
15
RC: That’s kind of a nice little vignette.
16
LC: Okay. Why don’t you lay that on us?
17
RC: You’re going to ask me his name and I’m going to be embarrassed because I
18
can’t remember his name.
19
LC: That’s all right. Maybe it’ll come to you later.
20
RC: But he was the wing flight surgeon and he was a very dedicated individual.
21
He had come in out of civilian practice. He was a colonel, I mean, a captain, Navy
22
captain, equivalent to a Marine colonel. He wanted to participate. So a lot of times, I
23
went out on a couple of missions, night close-air support missions. You’d have a
24
backseat, usually an NFO (naval flight officer), but I put him in the backseat on a couple
25
of the missions and told him how to do it, on the run, to call my altitude so I’d know
26
when to start pulling out. At night, this is pretty critical because you don’t really—
27
LC: Yeah, no mistakes.
28
RC: No mistakes, but he was pretty good and he enjoyed it. He wanted to do it.
29
So the wing commander came to me after one of these missions and he said, “Carey,” he
30
said, “I don’t want you to take my flight surgeon out again. There’s more Marines that
31
can take your place, but I only have one major flight surgeon.” So that flight surgeon
398
1
was very disappointed because I was the one that was flying him all the time and there
2
wasn’t anybody else up there that was volunteering to take him out.
3
LC: Right. He wanted to go.
4
RC: He wanted to go. So he came to me, the flight surgeon, and said, “I would
5
like to do something. Can I go on some medevacs?” Now when we had a medevac, I did
6
miss this, they usually took a corpsman.
7
LC: Yes, right. Of course, sure.
8
RC: They took a corpsman with them, so that would be the fifth. He replaced a
9
10
corpsman. He went out and replaced a corpsman. As it happened, you’ve heard of
Chesty Puller?
11
LC: Yes, sir. In fact, you’ve told me about him.
12
RC: Okay. His son was a very serious casualty.
13
LC: Yes, I understood that. Yeah.
14
RC: It just so happened that on the medevac, that he was pulled out, that he was
15
evac’ed on, our doctor was aboard.
16
LC: Were you flying or was it a different flight?
17
RC: No, no, I wasn’t there, no. As you recall, he lost an arm and a hand and a
18
leg. He was very, very seriously wounded, would not have survived had not that doctor
19
been there because a corpsman just wouldn’t have had the medical expertise to have
20
pulled him through. So it was kind of a look of fate really that that doctor was aboard
21
when this particular individual was evacuated, the son of a very famous Marine.
22
23
LC: Well, two very brave men that we’re talking about, as well as the flyers and
the other guys on that crew.
24
RC: That’s right. That’s exactly right. That’s exactly right.
25
LC: So that’s a very interesting story. I had heard that Chesty Puller’s son had
26
27
28
29
30
31
been very, very seriously wounded.
RC: Well, the doctor was aboard the aircraft and that’s the lead up and why he
was aboard the aircraft. So again, God works in mysterious ways, doesn’t he?
LC: Right. Richard Carey made an argument and got into a little trouble and
somebody got their life saved. There you go.
RC: Well, that’s the way it works.
399
1
LC: Yes, sir. I think so.
2
RC: That’s the way it works.
3
LC: I’ve been listening all this time. I think that is the way it works.
4
RC: It really does. But that’s one thing that happened during that time.
5
LC: Well, people like that who go outside of their kind of duty area to take a risk,
6
they leave an impression I’m sure, like this doctor. I mean, he was taking a risk certainly
7
he didn’t have to take by going into the field.
8
RC: That’s right.
9
LC: As a consequence, it sounds like there was some kind of divine intervention
10
there.
11
RC: Well, and there’s, you know, so many brave acts of people in just complete
12
disregard for their own safety that occur in combat like that. We had a young man here
13
that was a Medal of Honor winner, a man by the name of Clausen, C-L-A-U-S-E-N. It
14
just so happens that the pilot that was flying this particular mission later was one of my
15
squadron commanders when I had a group at Kaneohe in Hawaii, Walt Ledbetter was his
16
name. He won the Navy Cross for this particular mission, but they landed, a Marine
17
platoon got trapped in a minefield and were taking very, very serious casualties, about
18
five KIAs and a whole bunch of wounded. Walt landed in the minefield and Clausen got
19
out of the minefield, walking in the minefield now, and picked up the Marines that were
20
wounded and killed and put them in the helicopter. He won the Medal of Honor for that.
21
So that’s the kind of dedication that you have. Clausen was kind of a, in Marine terms, a
22
screw up.
23
LC: How do you mean?
24
RC: He was a guy that was kind of not too well regimented and got into a lot of
25
personal trouble, you know, little things.
26
LC: Living outside the lines.
27
RC: Living outside the line. As a matter of fact, he came here to Dallas. I went
28
down to see him. I called Walt on the phone and talked to him about it. Anyway, he
29
came here and he died from liver failure because he was a heavy drinker, but he was just
30
one of those types of guys. There at the moment of truth, he went out time and time and
31
time again walking through a minefield picking up wounded and dead Marines.
400
1
LC: Well, it’s just absolutely remarkable.
2
RC: Yeah.
3
LC: Now you said he died some years ago.
4
RC: No, he died this year. Clausen did.
5
LC: It was just this year?
6
RC: Yeah.
7
LC: In Dallas?
8
RC: Well, in 2005.
9
LC: In Dallas?
10
11
RC: No. He went back home. He was in Texas, but he was at the Dallas VA
(Veterans Administration) here undergoing some treatment.
12
LC: Did you say that you had a chance to speak with him?
13
RC: Oh, yeah. I went down and visited him.
14
LC: He was, I’m sure, very sick at that time, he was very sick, but what did you
15
talk to him about?
16
RC: Well, I talked to him about how much we admired what he had done for the
17
Marine Corps and how he was a good example of a fighting Marine and that we were
18
very proud of him, that we wanted to do everything we possibly could to get him through
19
this, his problem. He stayed in rehab down there for, oh, probably four or five weeks.
20
LC: Is that right?
21
RC: Yeah, yeah. Then he subsequently went back home and eventually died of
22
liver failure.
23
LC: Now, General, is this kind of thing going and visiting with Marines who
24
have earned a distinction in some way, I mean, obviously a Medal of Honor winner is
25
something very special, but is this something that you do regularly now?
26
RC: Yeah. I visit the Brooke Army Medical Center where the casualties from
27
Afghanistan and Iraq are, the serious casualties as you probably know. I’m sure you
28
know.
29
LC: Yes, sir.
30
RC: They have a major task down there of taking care of—they take care of most
31
of the amputees. That’s their specialty and the very seriously wounded. Not just
401
1
Marines, but soldiers. We visit them all. We take them out and we brought them up
2
here. They’ve attended hockey matches and basketball games.
3
4
5
6
LC: This is something that you’re doing on an ongoing basis is seeing these
young men and young women, I presume, too.
RC: Well, we had some women, also. So yes, the answer is yes. We’re working
to help out in whatever way we can.
7
LC: Yes, sir.
8
RC: We have a gentleman that donated a large amount of money to the Marine
9
10
Corps League down in San Antonio to help take care of these folks. Like they take them
out for dinner down at the River Walk. Have you been to the River Walk?
11
LC: I have. It’s beautiful, absolutely beautiful.
12
RC: Yeah, take them to dinner at the River Walk and take them to various
13
functions, you know.
14
LC: So let them not have to spend all their time in a hospital, essentially.
15
RC: That’s right. That’s right. I’ve put in for United Services Automobile
16
Association to donate a vehicle for their transportation down there because now it’s done
17
strictly on a voluntary basis. They take them places and usually it’s volunteer veterans
18
that take them.
19
LC: Absolutely. Well, that’s part of what the Marine Corps does.
20
RC: That’s what we try to do.
21
LC: It’s part of what makes the Marine Corps special, isn’t it?
22
RC: Yes. That’s right. That’s exactly right. Yeah, we’ve got a couple of people
23
24
25
26
27
here. They’re retired and they dedicate twenty-four hours a day to doing that.
LC: Well, working together, it makes it all a little bit easier for those young men
and women who served the country. They’re serving right now.
RC: Well, we have a thing called the Fisher House where the families of these
wounded people come and stay.
28
LC: Now that’s where they can stay?
29
RC: That’s where they can stay.
30
LC: Without having to run up hotel bills and so on?
402
1
RC: Some of them charge ten dollars a night and some of them—and of course,
2
for the Iraqi Freedom, I mean, and for Afghanistan, those veterans’ families don’t pay
3
anything.
4
LC: Now who is Fisher? Who is this establishment?
5
RC: Zachary Fisher was the son of an immigrant out of New York that became
6
very wealthy in construction. He decided, he and his wife decided to give back to the
7
country and give back particularly to the military.
8
LC: Very good.
9
RC: So they started building houses at all the major military hospitals and
10
they’ve got houses at seven VA medical centers.
11
LC: Wow, that’s incredible.
12
RC: They’ve got thirty-three houses in the country.
13
LC: A total of thirty-three?
14
RC: Thirty-three houses and they have serviced over two and a half million
15
families, two and a half million days they’ve taken care of families.
16
LC: That’s absolutely remarkable.
17
RC: Sixty-five million dollars they estimate that they’ve saved them. Last year it
18
was eight million dollars.
19
LC: When did the Fisher family start doing this?
20
RC: 1990 they started.
21
LC: That’s quite remarkable.
22
RC: They provide matching funds now, in order to make the program even
23
larger. We’re building one, I’m trying to raise money right now.
24
LC: Yes, sir.
25
RC: In the Dallas area, I’m a member of a group that’s trying to raise money so
26
that we can build one here. We’re going to build a twenty-one room, twenty-one suite
27
house. These houses are—we call them a home away from home.
28
LC: These are for the families.
29
RC: The families of veterans that are in the hospital, staying at the hospital for
30
31
treatment.
LC: For long periods of time.
403
1
RC: Long periods of time, right. The Iraqi and Afghanistan veterans’ families
2
are averaging forty-five to sixty days stay.
3
LC: Oh, gosh, is that right?
4
RC: Yeah. Grocery stores like Sam’s in particular donate groceries. So the
5
families don’t have to pay for—some of the families don’t pay for anything because the
6
transportation is provided for them and the groceries are provided for them. The Fisher
7
Family gave a ten-thousand dollar donation to families that are destitute. They give them
8
a ten-thousand dollar donation. There’s one woman, I think they advertised—she went
9
back to nurses’ training.
10
LC: Good for her, wow.
11
RC: Yeah, her husband was killed and so she started nurses’ training and is
12
becoming a nurse so she can take care of her family.
13
LC: Well, that’s actually quite remarkable.
14
RC: Yeah. That’s down from the Fisher Family, Zachary Fisher.
15
LC: How do you spell Fisher?
16
RC: F-I-S-H-E-R.
17
LC: Just the simple way, okay.
18
RC: Yeah, Zachary Fisher. It’s absolutely a wonderful program because they
19
save so much money and take care of so many people, you know.
20
LC: At exactly the time when they most need it.
21
RC: Right, exactly.
22
LC: It sounds incredible. I’m glad we had a chance to include that in the record.
23
Sir, let’s take a break there.
404
Interview with Richard Carey Session [12] of [16] June 5, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University. Luckily I have an opportunity to continue the oral history interview with Lt.
3
Gen. Richard Carey this morning. Today is the fifth of June 2006. I am in Lubbock and
4
the general is speaking from his home, which is also here in Texas. Good morning, sir.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
6
LC: I want to continue our interview, sir, with a discussion of the last few
7
months, I believe, of your tour in Vietnam between 1967 and ’68.
8
RC: Yes. Well, of course, toward the end of March Tet was slowing down and
9
things were getting more stabilized. We in the fighting part of Vietnam decided that we
10
had made plans to invade the North. We thought that now was the proper time because
11
we pretty much had decimated the VC and the lines of communication for the North
12
Vietnamese were not that well developed at that time. So this would be a good time to
13
strike out north. However, that was nixed as you know. We were called off on bombing.
14
We were told we could not go north. We had some restrictions also as to the amount of
15
air that we could use because of the single management that had been imposed on
16
everybody by the 7th Air Force, which was not too good a thing. So we had to cut back
17
on some of the air support. So things slowed down considerably.
18
LC: General, can I ask you a question about the development of the plans that
19
might’ve gone forward at this point following the Tet Offensive and the obvious defeat
20
that was suffered by the Communist forces in the South? Where were those plans
21
developed? Had those been contingency plans in progress for some time?
22
RC: Yes, they had. Yes, they had. Of course, they were tweaked as the Tet
23
Offensive slowed down. We tweaked them with the hopes that we’d be given the go
24
ahead to go ahead and finish it off.
25
LC: Were you part of the planning and the process?
26
RC: In my own small way, yes.
27
LC: Can you say anything about that, sir?
405
1
2
RC: Not a lot. Not a lot, Dr. Laura, right now. I don’t know what the—I’m
certain the classification has been declassified, but I don’t know how far.
3
LC: Understood, yes, sir.
4
RC: So I’d better not say too much.
5
LC: Understood. You were still working from your base at Chu Lai, is that right?
6
RC: No, no. At this time I had moved north to Da Nang, which was the wing
7
headquarters. When I was at Chu Lai I was a squadron commander. Then I was relieved
8
in the squadron and sent up to Da Nang to the wing headquarters to become the wing
9
operations officer. So I was still at Da Nang and remained there until I went home in
10
July.
11
LC: I’m sorry about that. I missed out.
12
RC: That’s quite all right.
13
LC: I think it’s quite helpful to review that, though, for anyone who might be
14
15
picking up just at this part of the interview. Go ahead, sir.
RC: So from April into July it was more or less consolidation and getting our
16
forces back in line where they had been prior to Tet. Everybody was moving back into
17
position defending the populated areas and along the DMZ. So things were stabilized
18
once again. Khe Sanh, of course was winding down. So things were trying to get as
19
much back to normal as you could under the circumstances with the hope that we’d be
20
given the go ahead to go north, to continue on and finish the job, but we were held back,
21
of course, at the national level by that.
22
LC: You mentioned the single management of the 7th Air Force. For someone
23
who doesn’t understand that reference can you talk a little bit about their—they were
24
based in Thailand, if I remember correctly.
25
26
RC: Yes, the 7th Air Force was in Nakhon Phanom in Thailand. They were in
charge of the air in South Vietnam, American air, in charge of that.
27
LC: At what point did that headquarters take full charge of their operation?
28
RC: During Tet, which was a very bad time to do it. As a matter of fact, I don’t
29
know whether I told you before about my wing commander telling me to—well, he
30
talked to General Momeyer, who was 7th Air Force commander and told him that we
31
could not let up, we could not abide by the single management. We were going to
406
1
provide all the support necessary for the Marines and for the troops in the MR-1, which
2
we did. We never really cut back until after Tet. Then after things slowed down then we
3
kind of fell in line and tried to abide by it as much as we could. But I still had the go
4
ahead that should we get into another brouhaha that I had the permission to go ahead and
5
provide the air as necessary.
6
LC: That’s rather a complicated command situation to be in.
7
RC: Well, yes it is. It’s very complicated. We had to submit frags of our
8
proposed schedule down through Saigon to Nakhon Phanom. They looked at it every
9
day, but we didn’t really, truthfully, the Marines didn’t abide by it. We went ahead and
10
did what we had to do.
11
LC: I think that’s pretty well understood that that did happen.
12
RC: Yeah. The problem, of course, was for the people not in MR-1 up where the
13
Marines were providing the principal means of support. Of course, the Army did get air
14
from Thailand, they did get some air from Thailand in their support. We can’t deny that.
15
Well, they got quite a bit, as a matter of fact, but they were augmented by Marine air
16
almost invariably because they weren’t getting enough from the Air Force. That’s kind
17
of a bad situation.
18
19
LC: They weren’t getting enough in terms of close-air support or high-level
support?
20
RC: Close-air support was what they needed. In the final analysis they did get
21
enough because the Marines filled in for them. It wasn’t a matter of that they couldn’t
22
get enough, it was the timeliness of it. You see, when you schedule, when you don’t
23
have scrambled aircraft available coming all the way from Thailand it takes time. When
24
you’re in kind of a bad situation at times, like in the A Shau Valley—if they went into the
25
A Shau Valley like the 101st went into the A Shau Valley and lost a lot of airplanes and
26
lost a lot of helicopters. They landed on top of a brigade of the enemy. They had a great
27
number of aircraft shot down. They, of course needed air support. That’s when you need
28
quick reaction. So the Marines provided a lot of that. Most of it, as a matter of fact.
29
LC: Flying from Da Nang?
30
RC: Flying from Da Nang and Chu Lai both.
407
1
2
LC: Just looking at a map, NKP is substantially north of Da Nang and Hue and
that whole area. What would be the estimated flight time down there, General?
3
RC: Oh, probably counting scramble and everything and getting the crews—they
4
didn’t stand strip alerts, I don’t believe. I’m not sure so I’m not speaking factually on
5
that, but in other words we were kind of at a slowed down pace. We were not at an
6
emergency pace like we were in Tet. We fell back from having strip alerts and that sort
7
of thing. So it would take probably an hour or so to react, to get planes over on station,
8
even more than that depending upon what the requirement was and what the ordnance
9
was requiring. But the Marines were right close as you know, just a matter of minutes
10
away. So it didn’t take that long for us to provide the support and we were able to do
11
that. It was particularly important in the A Shau Valley because when they were planted
12
right on top of—I think they lost something like seventeen aircraft in a matter of about
13
five or ten minutes. They just had helicopters shot down all over the place.
14
LC: Was this during the sort of April, May period?
15
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
16
LC: This was the 101st Airborne.
17
RC: Right.
18
LC: An hour is a long time to wait for men on the ground.
19
RC: Absolutely. You can’t wait that long because you’ve got casualties that
20
you’ve got to evacuate. So you have to have the air support to keep the bad guys’ heads
21
down and get your medevacs in and get your wounded out and then go through the
22
process of trying to salvage the aircraft, too, trying to get the aircraft out if you can.
23
LC: Yeah, the whole tactical situation, not to mention the wounded, but the
24
whole tactical situation can completely change in an hour.
25
RC: Oh, absolutely. It can change in a matter of minutes, really.
26
LC: That’s right on many occasions.
27
RC: So you have to have a quick reaction to that sort of thing. So we did provide
28
a lot of support for them
29
30
LC: Now as the operations officer would you be the one on the phone or on the
telex?
408
1
2
3
4
RC: I would be the one that was executing and fulfilling the request, setting it in
motion.
LC: Who would be in contact with the 7th Air Force saying, “We’re going to take
this one?”
5
RC: My command center would be. A lot of times, as a matter of fact, they,
6
recognizing the time crunch, would ask us to help them, which we did. They would
7
come to us and say, “We need X number of aircraft in the A Shau Valley to support so
8
and so and report to so and so,” et cetera. Then we would report in. Of course, we had a
9
DASC (direct air support center). Do you know what a DASC is?
10
LC: I do, but for those who don’t, could you explain it?
11
RC: Direct air support center. There was an Air Force DASC up there in South
12
Vietnam up close to the DMZ. The Marines had one up there, too. So we worked in
13
conjunction with the Air Force DASC to help them whenever they needed help.
14
LC: Were these two centers co-located or where were they?
15
RC: They weren’t co-located. We had a DASC at Khe Sanh and we had a DASC
16
17
18
and Quang Tri and the Air Force’s was down toward Hue.
LC: Okay. What was the function of that kind of office? Can you say a little bit
about that in relation, for example, to your operation center?
19
RC: Well, DASC is kind of the, if you will, the traffic control point for tactical
20
air, for all tactical air. In other words, for the people that are requiring air support, they
21
go to the DASC. The DASC then goes to the command center of the various operational
22
command to task them.
23
LC: So the request from the field would go to the DASC?
24
RC: It would go to the DASC. The DASC, of course, when the aircraft would
25
report in from their operating base they report in to the DASC and thence they’re shuttled
26
off to the various air controllers, on-the-scene air controllers. They’re handed off to
27
them. So it’s a pretty good system because you have pretty good control. You know
28
where everybody is that way. That’s important, particularly when you have to have
29
coordinated fires, which is something that was a little bit different between the Army and
30
the Marine Corps. The Army have their DASC with their troops, also, but they do it a
31
little bit differently. They don’t coordinate supporting fires like we do. In other words,
409
1
when we have aircraft coming in—they didn’t there, but when you have aircraft coming
2
in to a target area you have to lift certain fires for fear of shooting down your own aircraft
3
with your friendly fire.
4
LC: Meaning like artillery fire?
5
RC: Like artillery, exactly. The Army—and this is not something that I can
6
document right now, but the Army lost quite a few helicopters in areas where there
7
wasn’t known enemy. We surmised that they were flying through their own artillery
8
concentrations because they didn’t usually lift their concentrations, which we did. We
9
would lift our concentrations, go in with the air and then go back with the artillery
10
concentrations.
11
LC: That would be coordinated at the DASC level?
12
RC: At the DASC. The DASC would do all of that, yes. That’s the whole
13
purpose of the DASC is to do that. I think probably one of the major factors of that, and
14
this is a little bit—I don’t know the exact word to use, but the Marine Corps is as you
15
know is the only service that really has all supporting arms. The Army has a little
16
difficulty at times with their coordination, with their air and their ground support because
17
they’re two different services. I mean, they do their best, but I don’t think the system is
18
as good as ours. At times I think the Army probably—I’m certain they recognize it,
19
particularly the old timers who knew it in the old days like in Korea or in World War II.
20
LC: Sure, before everything was integrated.
21
RC: Before everything was split off, right. They had the Air Force separated
22
from the Army. The Air Forces separated from the Army and became a separate service.
23
Coordination is very, very critical in combat, extremely critical. That is one of the very
24
definite pluses of the Marine system because we have control over all of our own forces,
25
whereas the Army doesn’t. The Army doesn’t have control over their air, their fixed-
26
wing air.
27
LC: That’s right. Especially in battle situations.
28
RC: Exactly, and close-in combat and that sort of thing. It’s a marked difference.
29
30
31
It really is.
LC: You would need to have some pretty spot-on people at the DASC managing
this for the Marines. You would have to have some really good people.
410
1
RC: Absolutely. Well, they’re usually experienced aviators and artillerymen.
2
It’s a combination. So they’re highly experienced. They usually go there in the second
3
part of their tour, frankly. Our tour usually ran twelve to thirteen months. The first six
4
months they’d been in maybe a front-line unit or in flying aviation or flying aircraft and
5
that sort of thing. The second half they’d send them to the DASC.
6
7
8
9
LC: What would be the utility of having them there on the second half of their
tour?
RC: Well, they have the experience, of course. Of course, the Marine Corps
trains have air control squadrons specifically. That is their training. They train in the
10
DASC and the tactical air control center. They practice that all the time. Those are
11
invariably former aviators and artillerymen that go into that. Now we’ve changed a bit
12
and instead of shuffling them back and forth now we have people that are constantly
13
trained in that. That’s their job. That’s their primary MOS, military occupational
14
specialty.
15
LC: No kidding. From the ground up that’s what they’re doing.
16
RC: That’s right. That’s what they’re trained to do and they do it. They become
17
18
19
20
very, very expert at it.
LC: I can imagine. I can only imagine the computer backup to all of this. It must
be extraordinarily complicated.
RC: Not to shortchange the Air Force. The Air Force has tactical air squadrons
21
also now, but the problem is they’re all aviators. You do have a problem with people
22
with a basic knowledge of infantry and artillery tactics and so on that are not in their
23
units. So they’re strictly air oriented. It’s kind of a thing that the Marines are really
24
proud of that we’re able to do that. Of course, you can’t shortchange the guys too much
25
in the Air Force because they’re proud of what they do, too.
26
LC: Sure. But this is interesting because it does point out some of the outcomes
27
of organizational differences.
28
RC: Exactly.
29
LC: One can evaluate those on the basis of performance. It’s not just about the
30
31
people. It’s very much also about the system as you’re pointing out.
RC: That’s right.
411
1
LC: There are good people in all of our branches. We all agree with that, but
2
organizationally there are these distinctions. Certainly in some cases, such as the now
3
historical example that you’re pointing to, the integration that the Marine Corps achieved
4
and has always had has played a very particular role in helping the American forces on
5
the ground defeat the enemy at the A Shau Valley.
6
RC: That’s exactly right.
7
LC: I can’t even—it’s hard to even portray the situation that those men found
8
9
themselves in.
RC: Well, you see what it’s really necessitated the Army to do. The Army has
10
had to develop very heavily armed helicopters like the AH-64. You’re familiar with
11
them, I’m sure.
12
LC: Yes. Can you say a little bit about them?
13
RC: Well, they’re capable of carrying a lot of ordnance and really conducting
14
15
16
17
close-air support with helicopters.
LC: This was something that was under development certainly during the
Vietnam War.
RC: Well, it started. It started there, of course, but it really got big and more
18
sophisticated after the Vietnam War. Of course, they used them in the subsequent war
19
over in Kuwait. They used our AH-64s over there. But that’s kind of a fill-in, if you
20
will, because of the lack of tactical air support. Not the lack of but the fact that you need
21
it right now so the Army has solved the problem by developing much more capable
22
helicopters that can do a lot of close-in support. Of course, the problem with that is
23
they’re more vulnerable than a fixed-wing aircraft. They’re much more vulnerable. So if
24
you get into a highly concentrated area where they have a lot of anti-aircraft capability
25
you’re going to lose a lot of helicopters.
26
LC: Right. We’ve actually seen that here in the last couple of years.
27
RC: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.
28
LC: Just with a single shoulder-mounted weapon.
29
RC: The whole thing has really reached back to bite us a little bit. By giving the
30
Air Force control over the air and charging them with close air support for the Army, it’s
31
cost us to do that, but I don’t think you’ll ever break it apart now.
412
1
LC: Probably not.
2
RC: No, I don’t think so. I don’t think you’ll ever change it now.
3
LC: But I think what it looks like or sounds like the Army is doing is in some
4
sense trying to do what the Marines did sixty years ago and more.
5
RC: Well, we Marines will always say the Army always copies us anyway.
6
LC: Fair enough. I think in this interview I better let you go ahead and say that.
7
I’ll be talking to an Army guy this afternoon. He’ll probably have something else to say
8
about it. That’s all right. That’s all right. Sir, your last couple of months there, how
9
would you characterize your feelings about the war? Certainly the opportunity to take the
10
war to the North had been limited.
11
RC: Well, of course I was like all the people on the ground and all the people that
12
were directly involved in the fighting. Frustration with the fact that we had them back on
13
their heels and now was the time to finish it off. Of course, I think that they felt that they
14
could win it by the attrition thing. That was the wrong way to go. You need to go in and
15
occupy the ground and run the people out. It’s just that simple. Later on, of course, it
16
caught up with us. The peace treaties, when we didn’t make the enemy evacuate South
17
Vietnam, we let the enemy remain there. Whoever heard of signing a peace treaty and
18
leaving the enemy occupying your territory? I’ve never heard of that, but that’s what we
19
did. It’s exactly what we did. We just compromised everything right there. There was
20
no way that we could’ve won that war with just the Vietnamese and their capability by
21
letting the enemy stay in that area as the result of a peace treaty. It’s crazy. It’s
22
craziness.
23
LC: How much of that could you kind of foresee in the spring of 1968? Was it
24
clear to you that we had passed a point where the United States might have defeated the
25
communist regime and decided on a political basis not to do that and so the ultimate
26
outcome would likely be—
27
28
29
RC: Well, no, because really the peace treaty wasn’t developed, as you know,
until ’72 or ’73, really.
LC: Yeah, it was signed in early ’73. That’s right. Would you have been able to
30
see in 1968 that basically what the United States was playing for here was kind of a
31
stalemate, a Korea-type resolution?
413
1
RC: That’s right. Yes, of course. I felt definitely, personally—of course, I was a
2
small fry, but personally I felt that it was a no-win situation. It was not the way to handle
3
the situation at all. We needed to cut off the enemy’s supplies and get in his own
4
territory and make him come back and defend his homeland. That’s really what we
5
needed to do. It was frustration for all of us, for the Marines in particular because our
6
plans were that we were to make the invasion. So it was a very frustrating time and
7
obviously it was, “Well, how long can it go on? How long can we take this attrition?
8
When are the American people going to start rebelling?” which they did.
9
LC: General, let me ask about the president’s personal and political decisions at
10
this time at the end of March, as you know, after the Tet Offensive had in most places
11
wound down, President Johnson announced that he would not running for office again
12
and he appointed the new secretary of defense soon thereafter. Clark Clifford came in.
13
How did that read to you while you were still in Vietnam?
14
RC: Well, of course, again I was not that well-versed in politics at that time. I
15
was a relatively young officer, lieutenant colonel, but I could foresee disaster from it
16
because to me the way we were going to fight it, in other words, we put up if you recall
17
the line, the defense line that we put up, the electronic line?
18
LC: Yes, sir. The McNamara Line.
19
RC: The McNamara Line, that was a joke, an absolute joke, militarily.
20
LC: Can you say why, sir?
21
RC: Pardon?
22
LC: Could you say a little bit about why?
23
RC: Well, there’s no way that you can cover that amount of area with just
24
electronic surveillance. You don’t win wars totally by electronics and by sophisticated
25
weaponry. The winner still has to go in and occupy the ground. That is a basic tenant of
26
war. You don’t win until you’re in the enemy’s territory and that’s exactly what
27
happened with North Vietnam. They were in our territory and remained there. They in
28
essence had already won with the peace treaty. It was just a matter of time. But the
29
McNamara Line, obviously the whole concept was new at that time. It was untried. It
30
was unreliable. It couldn’t be properly surveilled so it was a no-win situation.
414
1
2
LC: Now the McNamara Line consisted of—what types of electronic
surveillance was it?
3
RC: On the ground.
4
LC: Okay. Like acoustic monitors and that sort of thing?
5
RC: Yes, as far as I know. I don’t know that much about it, to tell you to the
6
truth, to really discuss it intelligently.
7
LC: Okay, but it was an attempt to try to—
8
RC: Head them off. In other words to build a wall, if you will, an electronic wall,
9
so that infiltrators could be seen coming in. The technology was new. The terrain was
10
extremely difficult. If they did come in you had to react to it because you couldn’t
11
physically cover all the ground, every bit of the ground. You had to be able to react to it.
12
The Ho Chi Minh Trail, for example, by golly, that’s cut through the jungle.
13
14
15
16
LC: Right. It didn’t go through the—it’s main route was certainly not across the
DMZ. They were through Laos.
RC: That’s right. That’s right. They still could—all they had to do was go
around it.
17
LC: Go around it, exactly.
18
RC: That’s exactly what they did.
19
LC: Sort of like the Maginot line and Germany. Just go around it.
20
RC: You just go around it. You just bypass it. It means nothing. So it was
21
pretty much of a joke. We were just very disappointed. I went home kind of, “Well, I
22
don’t know, I’ll probably be back.”
23
LC: Really?
24
RC: Yeah. I felt that I’ll be back in a year or so or less.
25
LC: That’s pretty much what happened, too, isn’t it?
26
RC: Well, not with me really. I was kind of fortunate. I went back to
27
Headquarters, Marine Corps and at Headquarters, Marine Corps I had the good fortune of
28
being able to—I spent about a year there or less and then was able to talk my boss into
29
sending me back to school and finishing up my degree. I finally was at a point where I
30
could finish my degree. So they gave me a year sabbatical and I went to George
31
Washington University in Washington there. While I was taking my finals at George
415
1
Washington University I made colonel. I was selected for colonel and immediately got a
2
call from Headquarters and asked me if I’d like to go out to Kaneohe in Hawaii and take
3
over a MAG-24 and I said, “Throw me in a briar patch.” I went to Hawaii.
4
LC: Yeah. I know you feel quite badly about having that assignment.
5
RC: Oh, that was terrible.
6
LC: Yes, I can feel your pain. Let me ask you just a couple of questions about
7
the transition period of maybe a couple of years after you left Vietnam. While you were
8
at Headquarters, Marine Corps can you tell me a little bit about your work there? What
9
were you doing?
10
RC: While I was at Headquarters, Marine Corps that time I was the aviation
11
logistics officer. Our DCSAIR, Deputy Chief of Staff Aviation, and it was my task to
12
attempt to keep the re-supply lines going for all of aviation. That was my job.
13
LC: Worldwide?
14
RC: Yes, for all of Marine aviation. It was a pretty intense job. I worked pretty
15
hard at that. It was a lot of midnight oil because, obviously, we were still at war. So
16
things had to keep moving. We had to keep munitions moving and parts and that sort of
17
thing. For a fighter it was kind of—for a fighter, for a guy who was used to combat it
18
was kind of a letdown, but it was quite challenging, really.
19
20
21
22
23
LC: I’m sure on some intellectual level you knew how important what you were
doing was. It was critical in keeping the birds in the air.
RC: Absolutely. Right. Somebody had to do it and I felt like I could probably do
a pretty good job at it because I had the experience, knew what they needed and so on.
LC: Sure. Were there any, I don’t know, what we might call chokepoints or
24
bottlenecks in the supply? Were there critical pieces that didn’t come as quickly as they
25
ought to have or any problems like that?
26
RC: Well, it was constant.
27
LC: Is that right?
28
RC: It was constant, yes. It was a constant battle.
29
LC: How much of that had to do with funding and how much of that had to do
30
with procurement?
416
1
RC: Well, funding wasn’t a big problem. It wasn’t a real big problem. The
2
biggest problem was just getting the procurement through the process that people have,
3
the bidding processes and so on, which a lot of it is obviously politically motivated. So it
4
was not an easy job. It was at times rewarding and sometimes very, very frustrating,
5
obviously. You just hade to make the best of it and do the best you could.
6
LC: During this time, 1968 and ’69, or certainly the last half of ’68 and early ’69,
7
the anti-war movement in the United States really started to go mainstream. It kind of
8
came off the campuses where it had been and started to become a little bit more broadly
9
seeded, even in the middle class. Could you see some of that? Did you observe any of
10
that?
11
RC: Oh, absolutely. Yes.
12
LC: Where did you see it? Just on the news or were there people out at
13
Quantico?
14
RC: No, I was stationed in Washington itself at the time. Principally the news,
15
yes, because I was kind of isolated, really. My day usually consisted of going to work at
16
six o’clock in the morning and coming home at eight o’clock at night with two briefcases
17
full.
18
LC: To keep you busy for the rest of the evening.
19
RC: It was weekends, too. I worked weekends, also. So it was a seven-day-a-
20
week job. I didn’t see much of my family. It was kind of a bad job as far as family was
21
concerned.
22
LC: I’m sure that’s true, yeah.
23
RC: I was at the point, I had my twenty years in at the time. I felt like I was kind
24
of at a dead end. So I was in the process of trying to decide whether or not I would retire.
25
LC: Really?
26
RC: I don’t think I really would have done it, but I kind of threw it around a little
27
bit and my boss heard about it, the general. He said, “You’re not going to retire.” I said,
28
“Yes, sir, I think I might.” He says, “Why?” I said, “Well, I think I’m at a dead end. I
29
don’t have a degree and my chances of making colonel are pretty doggone slim without a
30
degree. So I think that I need to get that and I might come back. I don’t know, but I
31
think I need to do this.” He said, “Well, put in for Boot Strap.” I said, “I already have
417
1
and was turned down.” He said, “You put it in again. You’ll go to Boot Strap.” So put it
2
in again and I went to Boot Strap.
3
4
LC: Now, General, for many people Boot Strap will be an unfamiliar term. Can
you tell a little bit about that program?
5
RC: Well, the program is when you get enough credits and you have a limited
6
time to finish to get your degree the service will send you to a university and will pay.
7
You’ll get full pay while you’re there. You have to pay your tuition and everything, but
8
in other words, you’re getting a sabbatical leave basically, but you’re getting paid. So
9
you put yourself through to finish up your degree. In my particular, I wanted to finish up
10
and obviously I thought if I finished my degree I’d go back to Headquarters. So I just
11
selected George Washington University in Washington, D.C. So I finished it there.
12
LC: Go ahead, sir.
13
RC: Boot Strap is basically a very advantageous thing for an officer that doesn’t
14
have his degree. The military is very, very good about that sort of thing, really. They do
15
limit you. You’re supposed to go long before I did. In other words, I went as a very
16
senior lieutenant colonel. You’re supposed to have done this sometime down in the
17
captain/major rank. I had put it for it before, but I was in situations where I was in
18
combat and that sort of thing was delayed and delayed and delayed. Here I grew in
19
experience and time and I thought, “Well, I’m out of it.”
20
LC: You thought it was too late?
21
RC: Too late. So he told me to put in for it again, which I did, and I got it.
22
While I was taking my finals I got word that I had made colonel and I had an opportunity
23
to go to Hawaii. So away I went.
24
25
LC: Well, as we’ve said, that was heartbreaking news for you, I’m sure, that you
had to go to Hawaii. This would’ve been, am I right in saying 1971?
26
RC: Yes, that’s right.
27
LC: General, certainly the war was still going on and you knew that some of
28
what you would have to do would be related to air operations in Vietnam. Did they look
29
different to you after having been in the States for a couple of years?
30
31
RC: Yes, things looked a lot differently. Of course, the group I had, and this is
why I make that statement, the group I had was a fighter group, Marine Aircraft Group 24
418
1
at Kaneohe in Hawaii. It was a fighter group. My basic task was to train, which it had
2
been as a lieutenant colonel before in Cherry Point when I had a squadron there, was to
3
train pilots to go over on replacements and so on. But, of course, shortly thereafter they
4
moved all the aviation units out of Vietnam, but things started getting hot in Vietnam.
5
They decided they were going to have to send aircraft into Thailand to support ground
6
forces in Vietnam because all the ground forces weren’t out yet. Okay?
7
LC: Yes, I’m with you.
8
RC: So I prepared a squadron to go to Vietnam.
9
LC: To be based in Thailand?
10
RC: To be based in Thailand.
11
LC: Were they going to be based at NKP or elsewhere?
12
RC: They were elsewhere.
13
LC: Udorn?
14
RC: No, I’m trying to think of the name of the place now. I’ll think of it, but I
15
can’t think. It was kind of a makeshift place. They continued to provide last minute
16
support there. They stayed over there until they decided to withdraw our forces and the
17
peace treaty was signed. They stayed there. In the meantime, of course, when they
18
started to withdraw they pulled all of the helicopters out of Vietnam and guess where
19
they came? They came to Kaneohe.
20
LC: I was going to say, that would be Hawaii.
21
RC: That’s right. They came to Kaneohe. So I suddenly was thrown right into
22
the mix of having two CH-46 helicopter squadrons, a CH-53 helicopter squadron. I had
23
OV-10s, observation aircraft, which are for front line, close-air support. I had Cobras. I
24
had Hueys. I had the full gamut of Marine helicopters. So I had to learn how to fly
25
helicopters because I was a group commander. So I became a helicopter pilot, also.
26
LC: This is very interesting because one of the things that I neglected to ask you
27
was about your flying hours and keeping all of that up while you were based in
28
Washington and then while you were on sabbatical. Did you keep your hours up?
29
RC: Yes, I did.
30
LC: I thought that might have been a priority for you.
419
1
RC: It was. It sure was, because I wanted to go back now. I was back in the mix
2
and I figured that I had a few more years that I could contribute. Of course, loving to fly,
3
you stay with it. I was very, very happy with the helicopters. They were fun.
4
LC: Now had you not flown helicopters a little bit earlier?
5
RC: Yes, I flew some in Vietnam. I did fly some missions out there in Vietnam,
6
but I was not a fully qualified helicopter pilot, which I became when I took over the
7
group.
8
LC: As the commander.
9
RC: That’s right.
10
11
LC: Did you go through the paces with the younger guys or did you kind of do it
on your own? How did you do it?
12
RC: Absolutely. No, no. I had them assign me instructor pilots. I went through
13
the whole show and was designated helicopter pilot, secondary MOS. I did have kind of
14
an interesting thing. We did have qualifications on helicopter carrier. When we had
15
helicopter qualifications they brought a carrier in so our people could stay abreast.
16
They’re supposed to stay qualified. So I qualified day and night in all the helicopters in
17
one day. I’ve qualified in the 53, the Cobra, the Huey, the CH-46 all in one day, day and
18
night. I don’t know how many—you had to have eight landings in each one day and
19
night. So I had all those landings day and night on the helicopter carrier.
20
LC: You may be the only person who’s ever done that. I don’t know.
21
RC: Well, I think I probably am. They did write a big article about it. There was
22
a big article written about it.
23
LC: Where did that appear? Do you know?
24
RC: In Hawaii.
25
LC: In the Marine Corps—
26
RC: In the base paper.
27
LC: In the base paper?
28
RC: Yeah, they had a big article on it. That kind of news was not big news
29
30
outside, but it was big news in the Corps.
LC: Well, sure. I’ll bet it was.
420
1
RC: Yeah, it was fun. So I remained, if you will, connected with the war because
2
all the pilots that came out of Vietnam were all combat pilots. They came to my group.
3
It was kind of fun because we would meet on our Friday nights. We still had happy
4
hours in those days. We’d meet on our Friday nights and I had, in essence, a full group
5
of helicopters and a full group of fighters. Never the twain shall meet, supposedly. So it
6
was my job to kind of, if you will, pull them all together. We had some very good times,
7
some very good times. We really did. We became a very fascinating group. We won
8
just about every award in the Marine Corps in that group in that year. The best helicopter
9
squadron, aviator of the year, et cetera, et cetera. We went on and on and on with it. I
10
11
was very fortunate to be able to command that unit.
LC: Sir, as you say, some of those men, in fact a good number of them, I’m sure,
12
had flown in combat in Vietnam.
13
RC: Oh, yes, absolutely.
14
LC: Those guys just had to be some of the best, the absolute best.
15
RC: They were outstanding. They really were. We had a gentleman by the name
16
of Walt Ledbetter who became the aviator of the year. Walt had flown the helicopter into
17
a minefield where a group of Marines had wandered into a minefield. Many of them
18
were wounded and he couldn’t move out. He landed the helicopter in the minefield and
19
one of these troopers, a young Marine by the name of Clausen was one of the crewmen in
20
the helicopter. He continued to go out of the helicopter. He was ordered not to. Walt
21
said, “Don’t move until we get somebody in here that knows something about these
22
mines,” but he went ahead and went against orders and went out and moved wounded
23
troops into the helicopter and fortunately never blew up. So he was awarded the Medal
24
of Honor.
25
LC: I think you mentioned he died just a couple of years ago or last year.
26
RC: That’s right. Last year he died.
27
LC: Yeah. That’s an extraordinary story. That’s just unbelievable. He was with
28
29
you there in Hawaii?
RC: Walt was with us in Hawaii. When the CH-53s came in, a little vignette that
30
I’ll tell you, the CH-53s came in on a carrier. We went over to—and I was now intent
31
upon learning to fly and so on and had flown the 53 somewhat. So I went over to Pearl
421
1
Harbor to help pick up one of the 53s and it just so happened that I flew with the pilot
2
who was the squadron commander by the name of Red Edwards. Red Edwards, we
3
started the 53 up and we could only get one engine started. I said, “What do we do,
4
Red?” He said, “Well, I can fly it off. It’s kind of against the rules, but this aircraft will
5
fly on a single engine.” He said, “Do you want to do it?” I said, “Sure, I’ll do it.” So we
6
flew single engine and we broke a lot of rules on that one, but we flew it over to Kaneohe
7
and retrieved the aircraft over there. It was kind of fun. During the transition period with
8
all these helicopters and so on I’d fly, one day I’d fly three and four helicopters a day. So
9
I kind of concentrated for a month or so on just flying, really. I had run my group after
10
hours more or less. It was a very, very rewarding tour. Of course, eventually they moved
11
many of the helicopters out of there, but they retained helicopter squadrons there for
12
some time. Later they moved the fighters out and it became a helicopter group.
13
LC: Oh, is that right?
14
RC: Not while I was there.
15
LC: Oh, that was some years—was it a couple of years after you left?
16
RC: Yes, several years after I left.
17
LC: But you did the impossible by bringing the helicopter guys together with the
18
fighter pilots.
19
RC: Well, not impossible, but it’s still difficult.
20
LC: Did that have something to do, do you think, with the fact that you were
21
both? You were a fighter pilot certainly.
22
RC: Well, I was “the Marine,” they called. The called me “the Marine” because
23
I’d been a grunt and done all the grunt things and then I flew all types of aircraft. I flew
24
transports, also. So they kind of looked upon me as a guy that did just about everything.
25
I guess I had some of the respect.
26
LC: I think that’s probably true. Sir, while we’re on that topic, and I’ll just ask
27
you for your view on this, how important do you think it was to the men to have someone
28
like you around? If you think of some of the great commanders that you’ve had and I
29
know you’re a modest guy, but what do you think it meant to some of those flyers for you
30
to go up and fly a CH-53 with one engine, that kind of thing? They knew that you were
31
doing this sort of stuff. What do you think it meant to them? These guys had been in
422
1
combat. They had flown some pretty hairy missions, I’m sure many of them under fire
2
and into hot LZs and medevacs and all that kind of stuff. You were taking risks, too,
3
even though there you were in Hawaii. What kind of impact do you think that has on
4
younger men to be able to look up to their commander and see he’s still flying?
5
RC: The only thing that I can say is I had a few commanders myself like that. I
6
always admired and respected them and tried to emulate them. It’s just that simple. I had
7
guys like Chesty Puller and O.P. Smith and people like that that kind of led the way.
8
That’s what leadership is. You have to be able to mix in with the troops and take
9
everything that they take. You have to let them know that you’re not protected. You’re
10
not sheltered and you’ll do everything that they’ll do. You’ll lead in the front, in other
11
words.
12
LC: Well, during the time that you were at Kaneohe, the war on the ground in
13
South Vietnam changed substantially. You’ve noted already that the United States pulled
14
out all of its ground troops and made agreements to withdraw all air support from South
15
Vietnam. While you were watching that happen, particularly in 1972, can you talk about
16
what your thinking was, both about the politics of it and how that might work out on the
17
ground for the South Vietnamese?
18
RC: Well, obviously I don’t want to say that I predicted that it would end in
19
failure because it really hadn’t progressed to the point where we had really started cutting
20
off a lot of aid yet. Had I known that then I would have very definitely have said it was a
21
losing situation. We’re going to lose.
22
LC: But the idea was that because we were training the South Vietnamese and as
23
you note, very importantly providing them with equipment and supplies and aircraft and
24
gasoline and everything, their aviation fuel, and everything they would need, at least we
25
were in 1972. Did you have a sense that maybe with the advising effort that President
26
Nixon’s idea of pulling out American troops and leaving strong South Vietnamese forces
27
in their place was a viable idea?
28
RC: Yes. Yes, at that time I did. I did think it was. I thought that—I had seen
29
the South Vietnamese fight. They weren’t—a lot of times they picture the South
30
Vietnamese forces, particularly toward the end they pictured them as people that would
31
just pick up and run, but they didn’t. If you look at the casualties that they had in war, for
423
1
example, they had four times as many of the ratio of casualties as us. Four times. So
2
they definitely were not cowards. They definitely were not slackers. They were pretty
3
well trained. We trained them pretty well. They got much better as they went along.
4
Obviously combat conditions you very quickly. You either learn or you don’t make it.
5
So no, I thought it was a viable solution. There were things we needed to do. We needed
6
to kick them out of South Vietnam. Unfortunately, eventually when we moved out that
7
was the thing that bothered me more than anything else. I said, “Maybe they can get
8
them out. If they can get them out we’ve won.”
9
LC: Meaning the North Vietnamese troops.
10
RC: That’s right. If the peace treaty had been written so that they’d withdraw
11
and get out of the country, South Vietnam could’ve held their own. They definitely could
12
have held their own. The whole secret to the loss was number one, in my mind, was
13
allowing them to remain in South Vietnam. You shouldn’t sign a peace treaty like that.
14
You should not sign it and it was just that simple. I was very angry about it, as a matter
15
of fact.
16
LC: Were you angry at the time?
17
RC: No, I didn’t know that much about it, to tell you the truth, but I’m angry now
18
in retrospect because it was a total waste, a total waste. It was all made upon that
19
decision.
20
LC: What do you put it down to? Do you put it down to—it’s been called a lot of
21
things, “chicken diplomacy,” other things, too. For example, the United States
22
government and the president were very fixated, and the public, very fixated on securing
23
the release of American POWs (prisoners of war) and they wanted that done as quickly as
24
possible.
25
RC: I think it’s a combination. I don’t think we can pin it down to one thing,
26
frankly. I think it’s a real combination of all of the above that you’ve talked about. One
27
of the principle things, though, that really, really drove it was the American populace
28
itself, the American public and the press. Unfortunately, the press did a number and they
29
continue to do a number. They’re trying to do a number right now on the Marines.
30
They’re trying to recreate My Lai. They’re definitely trying to do that. They’ve been
31
trying to recreate Vietnam ever since Iraq started. It really makes me extremely angry, to
424
1
tell you the truth, at the press because I think they have a goal of selling newspapers. Not
2
all press is bad. Don’t get me wrong. Basically they’re oriented towards relating it so
3
much to Vietnam and it is not a Vietnam-type war. It is not a Vietnam-type war.
4
LC: The situation in Iraq and Afghanistan?
5
RC: No, absolutely not.
6
LC: You know, sir, this is of terrific interest. It’s certainly one of the things that
7
is bandied about very loosely, in my opinion and probably in yours as well by the press
8
and even by academics. Can you talk a little bit about why Iraq is not Vietnam rerun or
9
mini-Vietnam? What are some of the differences that you see?
10
11
RC: I think the basic difference, frankly, the basic difference is, and it’s probably
a forbidden thing to say in our society, in our politically correct society—
12
LC: Not here.
13
RC: I think we’re in a religious war. The Iraqis are fighting it like a religious
14
war. Look at who they’re wiping out now. They’re wiping out their own people and it’s
15
Sunnis versus Shiites. That’s basically what it is. Iran, of course, is rearing its ugly head
16
as a Shiite nation. You’ve got the old Sunni regime that had orchestrated all of this. This
17
was all, I think, pretty well planned. They orchestrated all of this. You don’t have a
18
revolution. You have a war of religious factions. Of course the real bad guy is us.
19
We’re the real bad guys, but we’ve kind of been a little bit smarter than normal in
20
protecting ourselves a little better than they thought we could.
21
LC: In what sense?
22
RC: In the sense that they figured that we’d have so many mass casualties from
23
their IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and so on that the American people would say,
24
“You’ve got to pull out.” But fortunately we’re not winning it, but we’re holding our
25
own on that. We’re not losing it the way they pictured it. I think they figured that
26
America has a fixation on Vietnam and let’s work it as much as we can and let’s run the
27
American casualties up to the point where the American press and the American public
28
are going to say, “You’ve got to get out. You’ve got to get out now.” The fight between
29
the Iraqis themselves, I don’t know how that’s going to come out, to tell you the truth.
30
Hopefully, if we are able to develop their government and if their government is able to
31
develop enough to where it will be able to take over their own security then it’s possible
425
1
that it can win. I think that slowly but surely we’re winning and if you talk to the people
2
that have been there we are winning it, and not talk to the press itself, purely press. But
3
talk to the people on the ground and the higher-level officers that are seeing what’s going
4
on and seeing the progress they’re making. We’re winning it. We have a Marine here,
5
Jim Williams, who is a very sharp, intelligent Marine. He’s a black Marine, just selected
6
for major general. He was the mayor of Fallujah. I don’t think I’ve mentioned this
7
before, have I?
8
LC: No, no, you haven’t. No.
9
RC: He gave us a talk. He gave the Marines a talk and he was very interesting.
10
He actually met with terrorists. The senior officers are meeting with terrorists and trying
11
to negotiate what they want and what we can do to get them to back off. They are trying
12
to work that side. So they’re doing all manner of things to try to get the thing under
13
control.
14
LC: Did General Williams give you a sense of what the people he met with in
15
these meetings that you’re talking about wanted? What are they after besides U.S.
16
withdrawal? I think we all know that.
17
RC: Well, that’s the primary thing they’re after. The primary thing is the U.S.
18
withdrawal and then, of course, they don’t feel like the Sunnis are being properly
19
represented in control of the country. So that’s the big fight. That is the big fight. It’s
20
relegated down to a Sunni versus Shiite type thing. Fortunately, the Kurds are far enough
21
north that they haven’t been that involved.
22
23
LC: But Sunni versus Shiite is what Iraq was before the United States sent forces
in, as well.
24
RC: That’s right.
25
LC: It’s interesting to think about the parallels with Vietnam, where they are and
26
where they aren’t. Religion was not the driving force. It was certainly a subsidiary
27
element of upset within South Vietnam, but it wasn’t the driving force of the war. I
28
wonder if you think that ideology, that communism, whatever that really is, was what
29
was really the driving force in Vietnam or was it something else? Was it nationalism?
30
Was it, “We want the Americans out?”
426
1
RC: No, I think it was desire, if you will, to unite the country. I think that both
2
sides wanted to unite the country. Eventually if South Vietnam had held I think you
3
eventually would have had war between the South and Vietnam. Direct war, in other
4
words you wouldn’t have had the VC involved. It would have been South Vietnam
5
against North Vietnam, which eventually when the war finished in Vietnam that’s what it
6
was. It was South Vietnam against North Vietnam. It was organized military forces
7
against organized military forces. The VC were no longer a real factor at all.
8
LC: Not after Tet, that’s right.
9
RC: No, no. That’s what I was so frustrating about it. We had in essence won
10
that war. That war in essence, the VC were totally neutralized. Now what we had to do
11
is we had to take care of North Vietnam. Well, how do you take care of North Vietnam?
12
You go to North Vietnam and take care of them. They’ll have to retreat and take care of
13
their country. Instead we pulled back and let them remain in South Vietnam and said,
14
“Okay, South Vietnam, you take care of them and kick them out of your country.”
15
LC: Right, like the one-third or more of the territory that they occupied.
16
RC: Sure, exactly.
17
LC: It was a good-sized footprint they had.
18
RC: Excellent footprint. The sad thing about it is leaving them there and taking
19
the air power out and then cutting their supply so that they couldn’t interdict and do what
20
they had to do. It was a recipe for disaster. There was no other way it could wind up.
21
There was no other way it could end. We gave it to them, in other words. We gave it to
22
them. We gave it to them at the peace table, frankly. That’s my opinion.
23
LC: General, did you have any concern in thinking about the possibility that an
24
invasion might be arranged, that Marines would spearhead that invasion of North
25
Vietnam, that the Chinese government would react in a way similar to 1950 when there
26
you were on the ground going north toward the border with China and the Chinese sent
27
troops in? You’re one of the few guys who can remember that, who knows exactly what
28
that looks like. Did you have concerns in 1968 that the Chinese might do the same thing,
29
only in North Vietnam?
30
31
RC: That was a definite possibility. That was a definite possibility and in my
opinion it might have been one of the behind the scenes factors that people considered.
427
1
LC: I’m sure it had to have been.
2
RC: Sure, and very definitely could have been a factor. Of course, you could’ve
3
determined that fairly easily, I think. With proper analysis and intelligence I think you
4
could’ve determined whether or not it was worth the risk.
5
LC: And how much of a risk it really was.
6
RC: That’s right.
7
LC: In 1968 things were a little out of control inside China. So it’s not really—
8
RC: Exactly. If you really look back on it I think we could’ve made the invasion
9
without a reaction, frankly. I really do, but that’s only my opinion.
10
LC: Well, your opinion is well worth considering. As I say, you’re one of the
11
guys who knows what the commitment of Chinese forces looks like and what that can
12
mean. So it’s well worth at least exploring your thoughts on it.
13
14
RC: Of course, we must be very careful now because China is a much more
potent force.
15
LC: Yes, sir.
16
RC: China is very, very capable and could really give us a very hard time with
17
the manpower they have it’d be devastating. It really would. I think we have to look and
18
see. You and I have talked before. China is one of our major problems in the future.
19
LC: Absolutely.
20
RC: If not the major problem.
21
LC: Well, interestingly just as we’re talking and just to put our conversation sort
22
of in context, I believe the Secretary of Defense has just been in Hanoi. I think Donald
23
Rumsfeld is in Hanoi or has just come back. The wheel does turn and that, of course, has
24
to do in part with our relationship with Vietnam but also certainly our relationship with
25
China.
26
27
28
29
RC: Absolutely. You have to keep it in track. You have to stay with it. You
can’t relax on it at all.
LC: Well, General, let me ask if you don’t mind a couple of additional questions
about your time in Hawaii. First of all, as the commander, where were you housed?
30
RC: On base. I had a nice set of quarters on base.
31
LC: And you had your family with you?
428
1
2
RC: I had my family with me. Of course, the older parts of the family were
leaving.
3
LC: The kids.
4
RC: The kids were leaving. I had two boys now at home. The two girls were at
5
home. My youngest daughter, Melody, was just starting in grade school. My daughter
6
Tamara was in the third grade. They went to the school on the base. The two boys that
7
were left, we sent them to a school off base. We sent them to a school over in Honolulu,
8
itself, to a Baptist academy, where they got an excellent education. They really did. As a
9
matter of fact, one boy, his education was so good that he graduated from high school a
10
whole year early.
11
LC: Oh, is that right?
12
RC: Yeah, they said, “You don’t need it. You’ve already got it.”
13
LC: Now just as a footnote, can you say did any of your children determine for
14
themselves that they might like to serve in the military?
15
RC: All my boys went in.
16
LC: That’s what I thought.
17
RC: Yeah. All the boys went in. They didn’t stay.
18
LC: Not as career guys.
19
RC: Not as career, no. I have one that’s fairly close to it. He’s a career
20
Reservist.
21
LC: Oh, is that right?
22
RC: He’s a Navy man. He went in out of high school and spent four years in the
23
Navy and got out and went to college and started his own business. He graduated from
24
North Carolina, started his own business. I talked him into going back into the Reserves.
25
He went back into the Reserves. He worked up to Second Class while he was in the
26
Navy on active duty and then he went into the Reserves. He had to go in as a seaman and
27
he’s now a lieutenant JG (junior grade). He worked his way back up to master chief.
28
Then I told him, “You ought to put in for limited duty officer.” He put in for limited duty
29
officer and was selected for that. He’s now a JG and he has a, let’s see. He has a total of
30
about sixteen or eighteen years in now in the Reserves.
31
LC: That’s incredible. That’s great.
429
1
RC: Yeah. So he’s still very active. His civilian employment is he works in
2
intelligence. He’s civil service intelligence and he’s intelligence in the Navy. So he’s
3
pretty much in demand.
4
LC: I’m sure that he is.
5
RC: Yeah. He’s pretty well trained.
6
LC: How did the kids do growing up in Hawaii or at least spending some of their
7
8
younger years there? Do they all have an affinity for it, for the islands?
RC: Yes. They all liked Hawaii. They all liked Hawaii and did very well there.
9
I have one boy that kind of got astray. He got on some drugs for a while. He didn’t do
10
that well. He didn’t do that well, but we got him through it eventually, but it is a very
11
difficult environment. Not very difficult but it is a difficult environment for what we
12
called “haole.” Do you know what a haole is?
13
LC: A non-Hawaiian.
14
RC: That’s it.
15
LC: An Anglo.
16
RC: Yeah. It’s kind of hard for them in the public schools, which is one reason
17
we sent the boys to private school.
18
LC: Now the girls were on base.
19
RC: They were on base.
20
LC: That’s a different kettle of a fish.
21
RC: Oh, yeah, of course. Of course. They liked it and they did very well at it,
22
but when you go to an off-base public school in Hawaii it was very difficult for them.
23
LC: Was it particularly difficult because they were military background?
24
RC: No, I don’t think. I think it was just being an Anglo. I think that’s all it was.
25
26
They didn’t single them out as military.
LC: Let me ask about the political climate in Hawaii generally with so many
27
American military bases there and so many personnel stationed there. Was there much in
28
the way of an anti-war feeling in Hawaii?
29
30
31
RC: No, I didn’t feel it. After I finished at the group I was at the group—I was
sent over there after I made—well, no, before I made general.
LC: Yes, uh-huh. You were a colonel as you were coming in.
430
1
RC: As a colonel I was sent to CINCPAC. Are you familiar with CINCPAC?
2
LC: That stands for Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
3
RC: I was sent over there as a battle staff chief.
4
LC: What does that mean actually?
5
RC: Well, what we did is we controlled the war. In other words, the major
6
command outside of Washington was CINCPAC. All the other commands, right on
7
down through 7th Air Force, 7th Fleet, Vietnam, all of them came under CINCPAC. As
8
battle staff chief I had a mix. I had Air Force, Navy, Army and Marines, a team. We
9
stood watches in the command center and gave the orders for the various operations and
10
commands that the operational commands were supposed to execute. So we were kind of
11
the kingpins, if you will, of the war. We stood watches. Our watches varied from eight
12
to twelve hours, ungodly hours a lot of times. A funny thing, our CINC (commander-in-
13
chief) at that time was John McCain, Senator McCain’s dad. We called him “the Little
14
King.”
15
LC: Is that right?
16
RC: Yeah. He was a real tiny man and it was kind of funny. I lived over on the
17
Kaneohe side and continued to live over there while I was working at CINCPAC. I used
18
to see him going to work in the morning at different hours and so on. He’d be sitting in
19
the back seat of his sedan and all you could see was his cigar sticking up. He smoked a
20
big cigar. He was a very, very tough little guy. He really was. He relieved consistently
21
battle staff chiefs because they didn’t do things the way he thought they should be done.
22
When mistakes were made they were usually relieved, bad mistakes. So he was tough,
23
tough to work for.
24
LC: What kind of mistakes?
25
RC: Well, where you didn’t monitor operations closely enough and have enough
26
information for him. He’s very demanding about all the information. So you really had
27
to have your nose to the grindstone as to what was going on and what actions were being
28
taken.
29
LC: So as battle staff chief you couldn’t just rely on your briefer to handle it.
30
RC: You briefed.
31
LC: You did it.
431
1
2
RC: You briefed the CINC. I briefed the CINC every time I had the watch. I
was one battle staff chief that was not relieved. I kind of was proud of that.
3
LC: Yes, sir.
4
RC: He was a tough individual. While battle staff chief, one thing—I’ll give you
5
an example of some things we do. We had when we were doing the bombing of North
6
Vietnam, the bombing that’s restarted.
7
LC: Is this the Christmas bombing or are we talking about October?
8
RC: I think it was probably October bombing. We lost a B-52. We lost a B-52
9
in the water. It was down. They landed in a typhoon. They were in a typhoon, okay?
10
LC: Yikes, uh-huh. Wow.
11
RC: Our job was to try to figure out a way to rescue them. Fortunately, as luck
12
would have it, the good Lord had put a submarine in fairly close proximity to where they
13
went down. We were able to direct the submarine to them and were able to rescue the B-
14
52 crew.
15
LC: They made the pickup?
16
RC: Yes. Yes, they made the pickup.
17
LC: Was the crew intact or had some men been lost?
18
RC: No, we got them all. We got them all. That was one. Then the other one, I
19
was on duty when they did the prisoner evacuation. So from the CINC’s standpoint I was
20
the coordinator of that. The POW, remember when the POWs came out of North
21
Vietnam?
22
LC: Yes, sir.
23
RC: That one I had.
24
LC: You coordinated that?
25
RC: Right, right.
26
LC: I’ll tell you what, let’s take a break there, sir.
27
RC: All right.
432
Interview with Richard Carey Session [13] of [16] July 10, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University. I’m continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey.
3
Today is the tenth of July 2006. I am in Lubbock and the general is speaking from his
4
home in Texas by telephone. Good morning, sir.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
6
LC: Thank you again for your time, sir. I want to just take you back, if I can, to
7
the period when you served in the CINCPAC command in Hawaii, 1971 and ’72. This is
8
an extension of our earlier discussion. Sir, I want to ask, if you can, please outline
9
something about the organization of the CINCPAC command and where you were
10
11
located within that command.
RC: Well, within CINCPAC, of course, you have—that is Commander-In-Chief,
12
Pacific and that literally extends from the Mississippi River westward all the way over
13
into the Middle East. CINC Atlantic takes over from there going the other way. All the
14
services, operational services, operational forces, including Navy, Air Force, Army, and
15
Marine are under their control, the operational forces are. So each of the operational
16
commanders of the various services, like Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
17
Commander-in-Chief of the Army or Commanding General of the Army forces,
18
Commanding General Marine Forces Pacific and so on, and Air Forces all report to
19
CINCPAC in the Pacific in this case. So he controls the forces. The way he
20
operationally controls them is through this battle staff. The battle staff basically consists
21
of four different segments, a service segment, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine segment
22
with a colonel in charge of those battle staffs. The battle staffs each have representatives.
23
The battle staff segments each have representatives from each service so that they can
24
provide the expertise for that particular service. So when the Commander-in-Chief,
25
Pacific makes a decision, for example, later on I wasn’t at CINCPAC then. I was then
26
transferred back over to the Marine Forces in a different position. We’ll talk about that in
27
the future, I’m certain, but they mined a harbor in Haiphong. That decision was handled
28
through all the battle staff chiefs. CINC decided obviously from the national command
433
1
authority, the Pentagon, he would put out the order through the battle staff as to how to
2
do it. So that’s kind of the way it works, if that’s definitive enough.
3
LC: That sounds very good. Within that you were one of the battle staff chiefs.
4
RC: That’s right. That’s right. I was one of the four. The way it worked was
5
each battle staff stood a watch, so to speak, usually a twelve-hour watch. It could be
6
different than that depending upon how intense the operations were. When the operation
7
became very intense they’d cut it down so that you wouldn’t have so long under pressure
8
because as a battle staff chief you were literally in charge of that part of the world from a
9
military standpoint. It’s quite a responsibility and pretty doggone stressful. So they
10
would rotate you and you’d stand your watch and then you’d pass on and as any normal
11
watch you’d pass on to your relief all the things that were underway and what actions you
12
have ongoing and what you had done during your watch. Then he’d start with his and so
13
on. That’s the way it worked. Each morning, or whenever you had something really
14
going strong the CINC could call a briefing. You would have to go and brief him as to
15
what was happening and what actions were being taken, et cetera. So that’s the way the
16
battle staff worked.
17
LC: So you might, if you were on watch at the time that the commander-in-chief
18
came in and he was interested in having a briefing you might be the one who would go in
19
and speak with him and give him an outline of not only what’s going on but what
20
American forces were involved?
21
RC: That’s right. That’s right. You had the helm, so to speak. You were
22
responsible to him to give him all the facts. He’d ask some tough questions at times and
23
if you didn’t have them you’d better get them pretty quickly because he wanted them
24
now, obviously.
25
LC: You mentioned that the responsibility of this command extended all the way
26
to the Middle East. Can I just clarify and ask whether the Soviet Union, the Soviet Far
27
East was part of your responsibility as well?
28
29
RC: It would’ve been, yes. We didn’t have any actions up there during the time
that I was there.
30
LC: Let me ask about China. During this time period obviously its international
31
orientation was beginning to change. The United States president made a determination
434
1
that an overture needed to be made to them and I’m sure you remember “ping pong
2
diplomacy” and Dr. Kissinger’s trips and so on, followed later by the president himself.
3
Did any of that impact what was happening in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam?
4
RC: Well, at that time when the president, I remember when the president went I
5
was still over at Kaneohe. If you look at the dates I was the group commander at
6
Kaneohe.
7
LC: Okay. That sounds right, yes.
8
RC: Yeah. So I really wasn’t aware of any major effect throughout our
9
10
11
12
13
14
command. It didn’t affect my command that much at Kaneohe, although during that time
I believe—didn’t I talk to you about sending squadrons back over to Vietnam?
LC: I’m not sure. Can you go over it just real quick and maybe I’ll recall? I’m
looking at my notes.
RC: After the United States had pulled out of Vietnam, it’s ground forces, after
they’d pulled their ground forces out?
15
LC: No, we haven’t talked about that yet.
16
RC: Okay, all right.
17
LC: This would be a fine time to mention it though, if you’d like.
18
RC: Well, what we did is the group itself, my aircraft group, we sent squadrons
19
over to Thailand to operate out of Thailand to support the forces that were still in
20
Vietnam. We did some support after the ground forces were pulled out.
21
LC: This would be from, am I right, from the 7th Air Force Headquarters?
22
RC: That’s right. They would be through them, USAF-7th. They would get a
23
request and then they’d send the support in. But our ground forces were out at that time.
24
LC: So that would be early 1973.
25
RC: That’s right.
26
LC: General, let me ask about the kinds of work that might come your way and
27
whether there were other instances beyond those you’ve already mentioned of making
28
arrangements for a downed flier and so on while you were a battle chief that particularly
29
stand out in your mind.
435
1
RC: I’m having trouble recalling because the major thing that happened, and that
2
happened after I left the battle staff, was the mining of Haiphong Harbor. That was a
3
major one.
4
LC: That would be at the end of 1972?
5
RC: I don’t recall the exact date, Doctor. I really don’t.
6
LC: That’s okay. What about the Christmas bombing? Where were you when
7
that was ramped up? This would be the bombing of the Hanoi area by B-52s.
8
RC: That was what year now?
9
LC: That would be right at the end of 1972 when President Nixon made the
10
decision to get the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table and get a deal which
11
he was absolutely committed to getting.
12
RC: Oh, yes, yes, yes. I do recall that now.
13
LC: Yeah. This is right before the prisoners were released.
14
RC: That’s right. Yes, I do recall that. Obviously there was a lot of activity. We
15
basically passed the orders down to the Air Force on that. Then once we passed them
16
down all we did was monitor. We didn’t actually control
17
LC: Do you recall whether, and I don’t actually know the answer to this, I’m not
18
a specialist on this, whether there were Naval air assets involved as well or was this
19
principally an Air Force operation?
20
RC: Most of the bombings I don’t recall, to tell you the truth, having any specific
21
dispatch because once the order went down what we did is we did have fleet forces in
22
that area, in the Haiphong area. So we did have fleet forces and I’m certain that they
23
integrated into the attack.
24
LC: It would make sense.
25
RC: Yes, I’m certain that they did, too, because the object obviously was to
26
27
restart the wheels of the negotiations.
LC: Well, and it worked. It did work. As you have said earlier, General, some
28
long time previously it might’ve worked, but it certainly worked in 1972 and ’73. An
29
agreement was reached. It wasn’t an optimal agreement and you’ve pointed out some of
30
its flaws including that it enabled the North Vietnamese to leave their troops in position
31
inside South Vietnam. It did have as one of its consequences the release of American
436
1
POWs who were being held in the Hanoi area and some who had been held in the border
2
area up by China. I don’t really know whether you were still battle chief or not when that
3
happened. This would be February, March, and April of 1973. Were you still in Hawaii
4
with the CINCPAC at that time?
5
RC: I’m trying to get my numbers. I think I was just in the process of leaving, as
6
I recall, because I went from there right downstairs to the operations officer, the
7
operational commander at Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific.
8
LC: It was somewhere right in this timeframe that that happened.
9
RC: Yes. Shortly thereafter, and I don’t recall the exact dates of the mining of
10
11
12
13
the harbor.
LC: Yeah. It’s in probably December of 1972 kind of alongside the Christmas
bombing.
RC: Well, because I remember when we did the mining of the harbor there was
14
some decisions that had to be made at Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific because they used
15
principally Marine aircraft doing that.
16
LC: Can you talk a little bit about the decisions and also—?
17
RC: Yeah. What we had to do is we had to decide what types of aircraft would
18
be capable of doing the mining. We had concerns about the helicopters. We did it with
19
helicopters, principally. We had to be concerned about the North Vietnamese sending
20
fighters out to shoot down our helicopters. So it was a highly integrated operation where
21
you had a lot of cover while the helicopters were positioning the mines. There was a lot
22
of dispatches, messages going back and forth in the coordination efforts. The 7th Air
23
Force obviously put up cover. The fleet put up cover and the carriers went in with
24
helicopters to lay the mines. So it was highly coordinated, but again when you get into
25
that level down there what we did is we were the major decision makers. That is, we’re
26
going to mine Haiphong Harbor. When I was the operations officer, the G-3 basically, I
27
think you know what that means.
28
LC: Yes, sir.
29
RC: I was the G-3 of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific. So I had to be certain that the
30
proper helicopters and its proper numbers were out there and were on the fleet, within the
31
fleet, to do the mission because they had to fly off of those Navy ships, of course. The
437
1
ships obviously had to have cover, fighter cover. So they were coordinating that. We
2
didn’t coordinate that. All I had to do from my standpoint was to be certain we had the
3
proper Marine forces there.
4
5
6
LC: Which included the helicopters and everything that would be needed for
their operation. Would that include ordnance?
RC: Oh, yes. But now the mines themselves, they came through the supply
7
system and they came through the fleet. So CINCPAC fleet would’ve done the
8
coordination on that. Now we’re getting down to the mechanics.
9
10
LC: That’s right. That’s actually really interesting.
RC: Yeah, that’s the way it works. It all flows downhill, so to speak. Each one
11
of the commanders of that particular segment of the operation was responsible to provide
12
the resources. By getting the resources to him came from outside sources, too, and that’s
13
where my Marine portion came of getting the helicopters available for it. So that’s the
14
way that worked.
15
LC: General, can you say something about the scale of this operation in terms of
16
the number of helicopters and the number of flight crews and pilots and all that you had
17
to line up? Can you convey a sense of that?
18
RC: I don’t recall exact numbers.
19
LC: Yeah, I wouldn’t either, I’m sure.
20
RC: As I kind of recall we had about two squadrons, which would’ve consisted
21
of about twenty-five helicopters.
22
LC: What kind of helicopters were they?
23
RC: CH-53s and some 46s also, some 46s. So it was a fairly large force.
24
LC: Did you have a timeframe within which you had to accomplish the mission?
25
RC: Yeah. Well, there obviously are time critical points that you had to have
26
because it was all massively coordinated. The actual operation itself hinges upon the
27
decisions of the local commander. In other words you wouldn’t dare try to command all
28
of that from such a distance as CINCPAC. So you gave the overall order and then the
29
individual commanders, the local commanders would put together their plans and decide
30
when they actually could conduct it, what day and what time they could actually start the
31
operation and when they would have it completed. Then they would feed that back to us
438
1
and then we’d pass it on to Washington, obviously, because it really started as a political
2
decision. So it all emanates from there. It comes from Washington and then it flows
3
through the various commands. Our command was the next down from Washington. So
4
then we would pass it on to the fleet and the Air Force and to the Marine forces and so
5
on. So that’s kind of the way it works. It’s kind of hard to actually pin down times and
6
dates.
7
LC: Well, to get it all together in the same place and the same time—
8
RC: It’s quite an operation.
9
LC: It really is. It’s mind boggling, to be honest.
10
11
12
RC: A considerable coordination because you’re pulling upon all the services to
all pull together.
LC: General, who would have been, if you remember, some of the local Marine
13
commanders that the orders would’ve flowed from your office down to or out to, I should
14
say, really, because they were out in Southeast Asia. Do you remember who the Marine
15
guys were under you who were doing some of the on the ground implementation?
16
RC: Oh, boy. No, I don’t, to tell you the truth. Not right now. I’d have to look in
17
some of my papers, but I really don’t. From the FMFPAC, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific,
18
standpoint our orders would file down to the commanding general of 3-MAF, Marine
19
Amphibious Forces which was in Okinawa. Ours would flow down to him and then his
20
would flow down to the commanding general of the division, the 3rd Marine Division,
21
and the commanding general of the 1st Marine Air Wing, which are the operational forces
22
and Marine operational forces in that area. The Navy would work the same way. It
23
would flow down from ourselves,, from CINCPAC to CINCPAC Fleet. CINCPAC Fleet
24
would go down to 7th Fleet, which is in the Pacific. The Air Forces would flow from us
25
to the Air Forces Pacific down to USAF 7th, U.S. Forces 7th Air Force in the Pacific. The
26
Army would flow down to—gosh, I don’t know what the title of the Army commands
27
were, to tell you the truth.
28
LC: You’re doing great, though. This is actually very, very helpful for someone
29
who’s trying to unfold how this happens and how an operation like this takes place. For
30
example, a research historian would want to look at the papers generated by each of these
31
commands. So it’s really pretty helpful.
439
1
2
RC: Well, what it would be, if a person doing that—obviously what they would
need would be the chain of command. That’s what we’re talking about.
3
LC: That’s exactly right.
4
RC: Is the chain of command and it flows all the way down from Washington to
5
the overall area command, which is Fleet or Pacific or Atlantic, and then down to the
6
various fleet commands or Air Force commands or Army commands in that particular
7
area level.
8
9
10
LC: Yeah. It’s very, very important that people get the sense of how big the
coordination effort is.
RC: It takes time. It doesn’t happen with the blink of an eye, which a lot of
11
people, Americans in particular, are very impatient. They think that once the President
12
makes a decision it’s going to happen immediately. Word has to be passed and plans
13
have to be made. It has to pass down through the commands who all analyze it and plan
14
and look at all the pitfalls and so on before they pass it on. It is a very complex
15
operation. It’s a complex way of getting things done, extremely complex.
16
LC: General, one of the questions that seems to fire off of the remarks you just
17
made is that in some cases, not in all cases, there’s an effort by the different military
18
commands to make contingency plans to try to organize big operations that have the
19
potential to actually be ordered in advance. So they’re developing plans as they go along.
20
RC: Always, yes.
21
LC: Would that have been true in the case of, for example, the mining of the
22
harbor?
23
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.
24
LC: So there was some kind of skeleton plan that you could work from?
25
RC: That’s right. That’s right. Then in case things went wrong you’d have a
26
contingency plan that you’d fall back on. In advance you’re always analyzing an area of
27
operation and the potentials of what can happen. You try to put together special
28
contingency plans should that particular event occur to change everything.
29
LC: That’s just so that you don’t have a lot of free time.
30
RC: You don’t have any free time, believe me.
440
1
2
LC: Right. That’s what I was thinking. You’re either actually doing it or
planning to actually do it.
3
4
RC: That’s exactly right. Those plans are always changing and they change with
events.
5
LC: They would have to, yes.
6
RC: A certain thing will happen and it all flows out from there and everything
7
starts changing again. Every time this event just happens you have a complete change of
8
plans. I know that in particular where I really, really experienced that was in the
9
evacuation of Saigon. My golly, the plans were changing continuously. You’d just get
10
one where you thought you had it under control and in would come another change. So it
11
was just constant change and that’s the nature of warfare. That’s the nature of warfare.
12
There’s always change and you’ll never have everything totally organized the way it
13
turns out. You can be almost complete and something will happen and you have to
14
change everything again. It’s literally—well, I guess one of the best words to describe it
15
is war is chaos and it is chaotic.
16
17
18
LC: All the variables may all be changing, not necessarily do, but may all be
changing at the same time. You have to be on top of that.
RC: Unfortunately some people get caught and can’t react in time to it and the
19
blame is placed on them when in reality they may not have had any control of it. That’s
20
the unfortunate part of it. There are many good commanders that are relieved and so on
21
due to events that took place that they had no control over but they’re responsible for.
22
LC: On the Haiphong Harbor operation there was the operation to lay down the
23
mines themselves. Can you talk a little bit about how the operation itself actually
24
unfolded? Were there unexpected events that happened or did it go relatively smoothly?
25
RC: It went relatively smoothly, as I recall. Of course, I was way back, so to
26
speak. I was way back from the front so I’m certain there were a lot of things. The best
27
person to ask something like that would be the man on the spot. The 7th Fleet would be a
28
good place to start with that.
29
LC: I’d like to find that guy and ask him. Maybe we can do that. Maybe
30
together we can find out who that was and see if he’ll contribute to the record. General,
31
there was also the flip side of this. Part of the negotiated settlement was that the United
441
1
States would also remove those mines. Can you talk about that operation? Did you have
2
a hand in that as well?
3
RC: No. That occurred after I had gone—no, wait a minute. I was at FMFPAC
4
at that time. The helicopters—in other words, there wouldn’t be any Marine forces
5
basically involved in that.
6
LC: Because why? The mines would be removed how?
7
RC: By sweepers. By minesweepers themselves, which is strictly a Navy
8
operation. So there wouldn’t be any Marines involved in that.
9
LC: Having spoken to you now these many times, I’m sure that you kind of
10
itched to be one of the pilots in the helicopters laying those mines, but it must be a very
11
specific skill, very different, for example, doing medevacs or assault helicopter runs or
12
the other kinds of flying that helicopters do, the other services that they provide for
13
military forces. What is entailed in helicopter mine laying exercises?
14
RC: Well, unfortunately I don’t have the expertise to give you a definitive answer
15
on that. That had to be done at the local level. The Marines had done it so seldom that in
16
that particular instance I never really found out.
17
18
LC: It would be really interesting to know. I don’t know anything about the
tactics of that or anything.
19
20
RC: I’m certain what they had to do is they had to take them out as external
loads.
21
LC: So under the belly?
22
RC: Under the belly. They wouldn’t drop them out of the helicopter itself
23
because it would be very—
24
LC: Dangerous.
25
RC: Very dangerous, number one, and secondly they’d have to be certain that
26
they absolutely knew the spot where they dropped it. I’m certain just as a qualified
27
helicopter pilot what you would have to do is you’d have to take it to a spot, which would
28
have to be monitored by a ship’s radar so that they could plot it exactly.
29
30
31
LC: My guess is there would be an electronics package on each mine that would
let you know.
RC: I think so. They probably had some sort of a—
442
1
LC: Transmitter or something?
2
RC: Transmitter to transmit a signal. Plus, they monitored it by radar. Today
3
when you have all your measuring equipment and so on with your satellite systems, but
4
we didn’t have that then.
5
LC: Right. It was a different game.
6
RC: Well, everything was done mechanically. Now you can do everything by
7
satellite and electronically. With the advance of technology it would be a real simple
8
operation now, but in those days it had to be a lot of handwork, a lot of individual effort.
9
LC: These were some brave guys doing this. There’s no question about that. I
10
can’t think of—well, I can, but this would be a pretty hairy operation, if you’ll excuse the
11
expression, pretty hairy.
12
13
14
15
RC: That’s right. It would be pretty hairy and requiring a lot of coordination
because again, the North Vietnamese obviously knew what was going on.
LC: Was there, to your knowledge, any scramble of fighters or any fire taken by
the guys who were actually laying the mines?
16
RC: I can’t answer that, Dr. Laura. That wasn’t reported back.
17
LC: Understood. Understood. You mentioned, speaking of reporting, CINCPAC
18
and probably also Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, they had to make reports probably on an
19
hourly if not even more frequently basis during this operation back to Washington. Is
20
that accurate?
21
RC: Yes, but progress reports, so to speak, as to how things were going. Those
22
all came through in message form and dispatch form. They knew how far the operation
23
had commenced, like were twenty-five percent complete, were fifty percent complete, et
24
cetera. Those were status reports, so to speak. Those went in on a daily basis.
25
LC: Sir, do you recall much about the evacuation of the American prisoners from
26
Hanoi? I don’t suppose it’s something that you had a direct role in, but can you talk
27
about what you knew about it at the time and how you felt about it?
28
29
30
RC: Well, the only thing that I knew—in other words, we told them that there
was clearance to go into Hanoi at such-and-such a time.
LC: This would be U.S. Air Force aircraft.
443
1
RC: Air Force aircraft, right, to go in at such-and-such a time. They would fly
2
them down to Clark in the Philippines. They should arrive back there at such-and-such a
3
time. I recall that we did receive back through the system when the first Air Force plane
4
had landed and when it had taken off loaded with former POWs and when they landed in
5
the Philippines. That’s about as much as we got. Then the local coordination was done
6
to take care of the POWs and so on from there. They didn’t come through CINCPAC
7
from that point on.
8
LC: They went directly to the West Coast.
9
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
10
LC: Sir, can you talk about how you felt about it?
11
RC: Well, elation obviously because here we knew from when Hanoi Jane went
12
in and so on, they knew how angry we were at that and also what those fellows were
13
going through. It’s kind of like when somebody has been badly hurt and help arrives.
14
You have a feeling of relief, a feeling of elation, of, “Thank God it’s done.”
15
LC: I remember something. I’m old enough to remember, for example, the
16
release of the hostages held in Tehran in early 1980, or actually, I’m sorry, 1981 just after
17
President Reagan took office and that kind of feeling of, “Thank God it’s over,” and that
18
sort of thing.
19
RC: Right, right, yeah. That’s the way you felt there. Of course, with the
20
number of times I’d been to Vietnam and having known throughout my career former
21
POWs it’s a wonderful feeling to know that those people are finally going back home.
22
That’s a great feeling.
23
LC: General, just since you mentioned her and I think I and most listeners would
24
probably get a sense of how you feel about Jane Fonda’s decision to go to North Vietnam
25
and then what she actually did while she was there as far as we know. It’s probably not
26
good, but do you know anything about or can you guess anything about the logistics of
27
her travel to Hanoi? How did she get there? Do you have any idea?
28
29
30
RC: I don’t know. I don’t have any idea. The only thing that we knew is she was
there. That had to be done clandestinely because it wasn’t done on a military basis at all.
LC: Undoubtedly not.
444
1
2
RC: The plane would’ve been shot down by our own forces if it had been done
that way, believe me. I would’ve probably ordered it.
3
LC: Yes, sir.
4
RC: I might have been fired, but I would have probably ordered it.
5
LC: Yes, sir. As you think about it now, and I’m sure you’ve heard her very few
6
public statements on this. She has not talked about it very much subsequent to 1973
7
certainly. Well, I’ll take that back, subsequent to 1975, but as you think about it now
8
what do you think she should do? What do you think would be the right thing for her to
9
do?
10
RC: Well, obviously I think she’s semi-apologized.
11
LC: I believe so, yes.
12
RC: I think she’s tried to mend fences, so to speak, but the unfortunate thing is
13
she’s kind of gone off on a tangent again in Iraq. The words that we have or that I have
14
unofficially—I really haven’t followed it that closely because—
15
LC: You’ve got other things to do.
16
RC: I’ve got other things and more important things to do than to worry about
17
Jane Fonda, but I understand that she’s making some inroads about how Iraq is similar to
18
Vietnam, et cetera. So what we perceive, former military, we perceive that here she goes
19
again. Eventually she’s going to show up on the enemy’s side again.
20
LC: That’s pretty intolerable.
21
RC: It is. It’s intolerable. I recall one instance and just a little vignette I might
22
give you, when I later went back on a subsequent tour—as a matter of fact, I’d gone back
23
to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing after the evacuation. They had a theater at the air station
24
in there at Iwakuni. I was in Iwakuni, Japan.
25
LC: Now this is a visit that you made?
26
RC: No, I was the CG, assistant wing commander. We had a movie that came in
27
with Hanoi—with Jane Fonda. I called a friend of mine, a classmate of mine, as a matter
28
of fact. He was the CO of a—no, that was Ed Murphy. It wasn’t a classmate. He was
29
junior to me now. I was assistant and he was a colonel. I told him, I called him on the
30
phone and I said, “I see that you have a movie tonight with Jane Fonda in it.” He said,
445
1
“Yes, we do.” I said, “Take it off. We will not show any Jane Fonda movies on this
2
base.” So we didn’t show that movie. We got a replacement movie.
3
LC: Or shadow puppets really, either one.
4
RC: That’s right. We will not show any of those to our people on this base.
5
LC: Yes, sir. Certainly other Americans besides Jane Fonda went to North
6
Vietnam as private citizens, which is essentially what she did. They didn’t have the
7
notoriety.
8
RC: Well, that’s right. Because she was a celebrity she got the notoriety.
9
LC: Right, and the North Vietnamese played that. They were quite skillful at
10
that, as well.
11
RC: Oh, absolutely.
12
LC: Do you think that the other folks, some of the, for example, the religious, I
13
won’t say leaders but some of the people with a religious background who went to North
14
Vietnam, there were over sixty people who were allowed by Hanoi to come in and they
15
went on these tours and blah, blah. Do you think all of those folks need to do some of
16
what Miss Fonda has done, which is make some kind of public statement about what their
17
intentions were and how they feel about it now?
18
19
RC: Of course, not knowing who they are and what their purpose was in going
there I’d be a little bit—
20
LC: Reluctant.
21
RC: Reckless to make a statement.
22
LC: I see, okay. That’s fair enough.
23
RC: But I think that unbeknownst to many of them they were playing into the
24
enemy’s hands because, as you pointed out, the North Vietnamese were very clever in the
25
way they, if you will, manipulated American society, which they did through the press.
26
Through the press they were able to do that and that changed the whole tide of the war.
27
LC: Last time we talked about some of the distinctions between the conflict in
28
Vietnam and the American current engagement in Iraq. I wonder whether you see the
29
press as having at this time with regard to Iraq some of the same falling down moments
30
that it certainly had during the Vietnam conflict.
446
1
2
RC: Oh, yes. Yes. I think you’ll talk to many citizens and to many former
military.
3
LC: Absolutely veterans, yeah.
4
RC: They’re really sensitive to this. For example, my friends will all say, “I
5
won’t even turn on CNN. I only watch Fox.” That’s the attitude. Now Fox, obviously,
6
is not pure, but they’re more conservative than CNN. Most of the people perceive the
7
press as being extremely ultra-liberal and perceive them as kind of, if you will, playing
8
into the enemy’s hands always.
9
LC: Is the problem would you say more with the television media or is it the
10
Washington Post and the New York Times, who certainly were giving President Nixon
11
headaches in the time period that we’re talking about now with the release of the
12
Pentagon Papers and so on. All of that happened during this time period that we’re
13
talking about.
14
RC: I think it basically starts with a few powerful leading media, a few of the
15
powerful leading media, among whom you’ve mentioned two of them, particularly the
16
New York Times. The Washington Post falls right in directly behind them.
17
LC: And there are others.
18
RC: There are others. Those are two of the best known. Unfortunately a lot of
19
the television media feed off of them. They actually kind of, if you will, set the tone, I
20
think.
21
LC: I think you’re probably right.
22
RC: The television media and you’ll take a major media spokesman, a
23
newscaster. He or she will take an approach and a lot of the satellite TVs will pick up on
24
that. It all emanates from just a few sources. The rest of them kind of feed on that and
25
that’s atypical of what I tried to do when I did the evacuations. I limited and was very
26
careful about who went in, from the press standpoint, who went in with us. As a matter
27
of fact, I pooled all the rest of them. The newspaper stories were fed back to them
28
through a very small nucleus of newspaper people that were allowed to go in.
29
LC: Some of that very tactic has been used. It was used in the first Gulf War in
30
’90, ’91 and has been used in Iraq, as well, the idea that we’ll take two or three pool
31
reporters. They can then release what they observed to their counterparts who then feed
447
1
it on, but to restrict what we now call the embedding of journalists with operational
2
forces.
3
RC: The unfortunate part of it is that a lot of the people that they send in,
4
obviously they don’t have the knowledge of the military and how the military operates.
5
So they approach it strictly from a media standpoint.
6
LC: Right. They also don’t know anything about Iraq.
7
RC: They don’t know anything about Iraq. That’s right. They’re like an
8
unguided missile. They just go every way. That’s what we call them. We call them
9
unguided missiles.
10
LC: I didn’t know. (Both laugh)
11
RC: They wreak havoc without any direction.
12
LC: Well, one of the people who really took it on the chops from that particular
13
group, from the Fifth Estate, or the press, if you want, is President Nixon. Just to take us
14
back to the war for a minute, General, thinking back did President Nixon run the Vietnam
15
Conflict? Of course he had a commitment to Vietnamization and we’re all aware of that
16
and getting American forces out and getting South Vietnamese forces in a position to
17
defend their own country. Did he run the war very different from President Johnson?
18
Could you see that from your vantage point?
19
RC: Yes, yes. I think he definitely did. President Johnson, he was kind of a
20
person, I think, that operated on polls. Presidents a lot of times operate on polls, some
21
presidents.
22
LC: Public opinion.
23
RC: Public opinion rather than having the experts who are there. That’s the
24
nature of politics. Public opinion is very important.
25
LC: Sure, that’s part of the system. Right.
26
RC: You’re not going to get reelected if everybody hates you.
27
LC: Johnson figured that out.
28
RC: Yeah. Yeah. You’re not going to get reelected. So, yes, I think he did. I
29
think that Johnson kind of divorced himself and he went off on tangents. Of course, he
30
had kind of a crazy secretary of defense who really, to my mind, was really seeking peace
31
at any price.
448
1
2
LC: When McNamara actually left office and was replaced by Clark Clifford, I
don’t know if you recall that, but did you see that as—
3
RC: We cheered.
4
LC: Okay. That’s what I wanted to know.
5
RC: We cheered, “Get that dummy out of here,” from a military standpoint. He
6
knew nothing about military tactics, absolutely nothing.
7
LC: He’s another of these people who having lived these interim years between
8
Vietnam and current day has begun to sing a completely different tune. He hasn’t really
9
come out and said, “I’m sorry,” but he has said, “I made mistakes.” I don’t know if
10
you’ve seen his film The Fog of War or read any of his apologias. He’s published a
11
couple of them now.
12
RC: Yeah, I read some. I didn’t see the film.
13
LC: You should see it. It’s really very, very interesting.
14
RC: What’s the name of it?
15
LC: It’s called The Fog of War.
16
RC: I’ll have to see if I can get that.
17
LC: Yeah, it’s quite useful. He actually goes back to his days with Strategic
18
Bombing Command at the end of World War II and discusses how he was so driven by
19
the ambience in the Strategic Bombing Command that carried all the way through into
20
Vietnam and his thinking about how to win a war. It’s useful, even if you want to just
21
throw darts whenever he shows up on the screen.
22
RC: Well, you know how he’s thinking anyway.
23
LC: Yes, sir. It does give some insight. But again he is one of the few people
24
who have lived long enough to actually make these kinds of comments. But President
25
Nixon picked a completely different team. He had very different objectives. I wonder
26
how you feel about President Nixon’s management of the war.
27
28
RC: I thought that he was pretty objective really. Well, obviously he was much
more objective than Johnson was.
29
LC: Was he a good president?
30
RC: In my mind, yes.
449
LC: Of course, he’s seen as one of the great sort of scoundrels of the 20th
1
2
Century.
3
RC: Again, I think that’s the media. I really do. I think they played on it. I think
4
they fed on it. I think that obviously with, what do you call it, water? What is it? His
5
big—
6
LC: Watergate?
7
RC: Watergate, yeah. That was something unfortunate that he let get out of hand.
8
LC: But some of that was driven by the press. He was very concerned about
9
leaks to the New York Times. It was kind of the beginning of it.
10
RC: Exactly, exactly. At times unfortunately the press is our worst enemy. He
11
was very, very sensitive to that. He just overreacted or some of his people overreacted.
12
It kind of got out of hand.
13
LC: General, this is something that I can ask someone like you and you may not
14
care to comment on it, but the reason I say I can ask you is because you were so tuned in
15
to international events throughout your career. You certainly remember the time when
16
President Johnson, I beg your pardon, President Kennedy was running for president
17
against Richard Nixon in 1960. To many, President Kennedy is the one who made
18
commitments to a corrupt government in South Vietnam that probably we shouldn’t have
19
made. I wonder if you think things would have been completely different in Southeast
20
Asia if President Nixon had won. It was a very, very close election in 1960.
21
22
RC: I wish I were smart enough to really answer that objectively, but my own
opinion is yes.
23
LC: Just your personal opinion, you think things would’ve gone differently?
24
RC: I think so. I think the whole drift and, again, being a military man I’m very
25
conservative in my approach to things, particularly in events like that. So I think a whole
26
different tack would’ve been taken, a stronger, more conservative approach to things, a,
27
“Let’s win this. Let’s don’t appease it,” type of approach. I think that things would have
28
been different.
29
LC: Nixon kind of grew up, if you want, as vice-president under General
30
Eisenhower, President Eisenhower. If you kind of feed that into the mix, who was he
31
watching? He was to some degree mentoring him. There are questions about the
450
1
relationship between Eisenhower and Nixon, but this is who he was watching. It’s a
2
question that kind of haunts me sometimes. I just wondered if you ever—
3
RC: Well, Nixon, of course, he made the first trip to China.
4
LC: He did, yes, and to the Soviet Union, as well.
5
RC: He had a broad picture. I think he was pretty doggone smart myself.
6
LC: I agree. I think he was, too.
7
RC: The unfortunate thing is, like all of us, he made some mistakes and they
8
caught up with him. It’s unfortunate because I think, yes, the answer to your original
9
question, in my opinion things would’ve been different.
10
LC: Because of those domestic difficulties he was not in the seat in the Oval
11
Office during Operation Frequent Wind, which is a topic I hope you and I will talk about
12
later on this week.
13
RC: Okay.
14
LC: Okay. So, let’s take a break there, sir.
15
RC: All right.
451
Interview with Richard Carey Session [14] of [16] July 14, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University, continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard Carey. Today is
3
the fourteenth of July 2006. I am in Lubbock and the general is speaking by phone from
4
Texas, another part of Texas. Hello, sir.
5
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
6
LC: General, if you could, I’d like to ask you to put us in the know about your
7
assignment to the 1st Marine Air Wing. This would involve, I think, your move from
8
Hawaii out to Iwakuni, Japan.
9
RC: Yes, uh-huh. Well, first off, the new position I had was that of a brigadier
10
general. I was now a colonel. My promotion came in for me and a very dear friend of
11
mine, since deceased, Gen. Lou Wilson, who was the commanding general of Fleet
12
Marine Forces, Pacific, a Medal of Honor winner and also later became the next
13
commandant of the Marine Corps. He promoted me and told me, he said, “You’ve got a
14
choice assignment. You’re being assigned out to WESTPAC as the assistant wing
15
commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing stationed at Iwakuni, Japan.” So he
16
promoted me and off I went.
17
LC: How long had you known him, General?
18
RC: Oh, gosh, I’ve known General Wilson for twenty years.
19
LC: Really?
20
RC: Yes, yes, wonderful man. He was kind of humorous in a way. While I was
21
his—I don’t know whether I told you this previously or not, but I was his G-3, his
22
operations officer of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific. He would call me in the office and
23
then he would get the general on the phone. Of course, he had the 1st Marine Division
24
stationed in Camp Pendleton and the 3rd Marine Division stationed in Okinawa and the 1st
25
Marine Aircraft Wing stationed in Iwakuni, Japan, or in Japan, not just Iwakuni, and the
26
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing stationed in El Toro, California. He would get one of those
27
generals on the phone invariably. He’d have something that he was really tasking them
28
with and he’d kind of in a manner where he was almost chewing them out he would give
452
1
them orders. Then he’d hang up and smile at me with this big grin on his face and say, “I
2
guess I got their attention, didn’t I?” It was kind of embarrassing for me because at that
3
time I was still a colonel. I said, “Whew!” Here he is. He’s giving these generals a hard
4
time and I’m listening to it.
5
LC: Yeah, what do you do? What do you say?
6
RC: What do you say? “Yes, sir.” What else do you say?
7
LC: I know this is probably generally available in the public record, but it might
8
be interesting to know what you knew about his Medal of Honor and how it had been
9
awarded.
10
RC: Well, he was quite heroic. He was awarded the Medal of Honor in the Battle
11
of Guam and he was company commander, at that time a young captain. He led a combat
12
patrol in a heavily infested area. He had a great many casualties, quite a few casualties.
13
He got out in front of his company and led them in to charge, so to speak. That’s very
14
unusual for a captain to do, but he did it. As a result they won the day. He had quite a
15
few casualties and so on, but they won the day and continued on into battle and
16
eventually Guam fell, as you know.
17
LC: Yes, and it’s such a crucial, crucial turning point.
18
RC: It was a very crucial turning point. That’s where he got it and then he was in
19
several other battles later on.
20
LC: Now did he become an aviator, as well?
21
RC: No, no. He was a ground officer.
22
LC: Always a ground officer?
23
RC: Yeah. That was what was kind of unusual. Being an aviator, being an
24
operations officer of the Fleet Marine Forces of the Pacific was kind of unusual. They
25
always had a ground officer. As it turned out throughout my career because of my early
26
days as a young officer, enlisted man and a young officer they considered me. I was
27
called in many circles as “the Flying Grunt.”
28
LC: Is that what they called you?
29
RC: Yeah, the Flying Grunt. They still considered me—in military occupational
30
specialties infantry in the Marine Corps is called an 03. Aviators are 7000s, what they
31
call 7000s. They always listed me as an 03, 7000. That was very unusual. That’s the
453
1
way I was listed even at Headquarters Marine Corps. So I was always the duty grunt in
2
aviation, so to speak. That caught up with me several times as I told you before when I
3
first went out, not first, but when I went out to Vietnam as a major. They sent me on that
4
trip around looking for future bases and air bases. That normally is done by an infantry
5
officer, but they sent me because it was convenient because I took my own airplane. I
6
could go wherever I wanted to go and still look at it from an infantry officer’s standpoint.
7
LC: Yeah, the cross-capabilities.
8
RC: The cross-capabilities. Even when I went on several tours at Headquarters
9
10
Marine Corps they always consulted me both ways. I was consulted as a grunt in the
aviation circles and consulted as an aviator in the grunt circles.
11
LC: So they were calling you the Flying Grunt, huh?
12
RC: The Flying Grunt.
13
LC: That’s actually kind of cool.
14
RC: Well, when I retired, as a matter of fact I’ve got a rifle, an M-16 rifle
15
skeleton, not the whole rifle. They took the firing pin out and so on. A plaque and on it
16
it says, “Thirty-eight years a rifleman.”
17
LC: Well, that’s very high praise, especially from aviators.
18
RC: Well, this is all grunts that gave it to me.
19
LC: Yeah, that’s something else. That’s something to be proud of, that’s for
20
sure.
21
RC: That’s right. I’m very proud of it.
22
LC: I believe it.
23
RC: So anyway, I went on to Japan.
24
LC: Now, General Wilson had told you this was a plum assignment. How did
25
26
you interpret that?
RC: Obviously, it was my first assignment as a general officer. We also had a
27
very favorite type of commanding general of that wing, a very good friend of mine by the
28
name of Norm Gorley. So he considered it a plum assignment because I was getting
29
assigned under a top-notch general and into a flying command. He knew that I liked to
30
fly all the time. I was always sneaking off trying to fly. So that’s why he said it was a
31
plum assignment. Plus things were kind of starting to act up. They knew that eventually
454
1
they were probably going to have to do an evacuation out of Vietnam. We were, while I
2
was still the operations officer at the Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, we were still planning
3
and kept a unit in the Gulf of Thailand, a Marine unit ready to do an evacuation. So we
4
were constantly upgrading our evacuation plans. We’ve talked about future planning and
5
that’s what we were constantly doing. I think he knew in his mind, a plum assignment,
6
that if and when they had to do it that I would be picked to be the person to be in charge
7
of the evacuation because of my cross-training, so to speak.
8
9
LC: Let me just clarify what year you actually went out to Iwakuni so that people
can keep track.
10
RC: I went out there in 1974.
11
LC: Do you remember what part of the year?
12
RC: Yes. As I recall, it was in August, August of 1974.
13
LC: I’m sure that General Wilson was well aware, as many were, that things
14
were deteriorating in 1974 in South Vietnam. So all of that makes sense. General, you
15
mentioned the unit that was in the Gulf of Thailand. Was that a detachment from the 1st
16
Marine Air Wing?
17
RC: Well, they had a detachment on there, but it was basically what they called at
18
that time a MAU, a Marine Amphibious Unit, which consisted of an infantry battalion
19
with supporting arms with it, a battery of artillery and some tanks and aviation squadron.
20
LC: Helicopters?
21
RC: Helicopters went along with it. At that time we didn’t have the Harriers or
22
we would’ve had Harriers on that, too. You’re probably familiar with the Harrier, aren’t
23
you?
24
LC: This is in general what many people call the jump jet?
25
RC: That’s right.
26
LC: Okay, but this is a vertical take-off and landing aircraft?
27
RC: Vertical take-off and landing. The later MAUs, the later Marine
28
Amphibious Units, had Harriers assigned to them so that they would have integrated right
29
into their unit the Marine Air-Ground team, which would include not only helicopters but
30
also capability for overhead protection and air-to-ground bombing.
455
1
2
LC: Now let me just ask you—this is kind of a sidelight but an interesting one.
The Harrier was, as you say, capable of bombing. Was it a close-support aircraft as well?
3
RC: It’s considered a close-air support aircraft with a good fighter capability.
4
LC: Really? So it had both?
5
RC: Yes. It was capable of doing both, as was the F-4, of course. The F-4 was
6
designed originally as a fighter and was also used as an air-to-ground, close-air support
7
aircraft. The same is true of the Harrier.
8
LC: But the Harrier had the vertical take-off capability.
9
RC: That’s correct.
10
LC: Which is amazing, really. Technically it seems still quite astounding.
11
General, you mentioned that in later stages the Marine Amphibious Units would have the
12
Harrier jets attached to them. About what year was that introduction made?
RC: Oh, let me think. I was at the 2nd Wing where I learned to fly the Harrier in
13
14
1977. Shortly thereafter we were still transitioning pilots into the Harrier. I had some
15
tiffs with the press, if you will. We’ll probably get into that later I imagine. I’ll describe
16
that more fully. I would say right around the ’80s we started integrating them, the early
17
’80s.
18
LC: You learned to fly them as early as ’77 or ’78?
19
RC: Yes, uh-huh.
20
LC: Can you tell me a little bit about that?
21
RC: Well, it’s an interesting evolution. As a result of my having the aircraft
22
group both in Kaneohe and being the operations officer earlier on in the wing, I had
23
learned to fly helicopters. I was basically a fighter pilot who could also fly helicopters
24
and also attack pilot. It’s easier for that type of an individual who’s had both experiences
25
to fly the Harrier because you transition from the helicopter environment to a fixed-wing
26
environment all in the same flight. So you have to be able to, so to speak, rub your nose
27
and pat your head at the same time. Rub your belly and pat your head, I should say. So it
28
is kind of interesting. When I had the 2nd Wing a friend of mine out in El Toro who had
29
the 3rd Wing, he transitioned about the same time that I did. He transitioned from hover
30
flight to fixed-wing flight too quickly and crashed the aircraft. I always held that over
31
him. He was another good friend of mine by the name of Andy O’Donnell.
456
1
LC: You gave him a hard time about it, though?
2
RC: I gave him a hard time about it, about flying. He’s also a great big guy.
3
He’s about 6’6”.
4
LC: Wow. For a pilot that’s big.
5
RC: And particularly for the Harrier.
6
LC: Is that right?
7
RC: That might have had a little bit to do with what happened to him because
8
most of the Harrier pilots, we liked to select the average sized guys.
9
LC: Meaning under 6’?
10
RC: Yeah, under 6’ because the cockpit was so tight, very tight. They’ve
11
changed some of that now. It’s a better cockpit now, but as you know the Harrier was a
12
British aircraft. I guess they picked their pilots the same way.
13
14
LC: If you look around in England there aren’t a bunch of guys who are over
6’2”.
15
RC: Yeah, most of them are not as big as the Americans overall.
16
LC: That’s basically true.
17
RC: Their cockpits were designed to be small because the aircraft itself was
18
designed to fly vertically so therefore to be able to fly off of ships in tight spaces. It had
19
to be a small aircraft, relatively speaking. That’s why the cockpit was small. Everything
20
about it was small.
21
LC: Everything was kind of minimized if possible.
22
RC: It’s really an amazing aircraft to take off, make one pass around the field and
23
come across doing five hundred knots.
24
LC: That sounds thrilling.
25
RC: It is a thrilling aircraft. It’s a little bit hairy on your first flight. You really
26
don’t know what’s going to happen.
27
LC: Where was your first flight, sir?
28
RC: At Cherry Point.
29
LC: Oh, really? Okay, back at Cherry Point.
30
RC: Back at Cherry Point when I was wing commander. It is an interesting
31
aircraft.
457
1
LC: I can imagine. Well, let me shift back to asking you about the preplanning
2
for a potential evacuation. As the commander, if I’m correct, of the 1st Marine Air
3
Wing—
4
RC: No, I wasn’t the commander. I was assistant wing commander.
5
LC: Assistant wing commander, okay.
6
RC: They had a two-star in charge and a brigadier as his assistant.
7
LC: Okay. So you were number two. You mentioned the name of the guy that
8
9
10
11
you reported to.
RC: Norm Gorely.
LC: As the assistant wing commander would you be seeing intelligence from or
about the military situation in Southeast Asia?
12
RC: Oh, yes, every day.
13
LC: Everyday?
14
RC: Constant. Yes, constant. Every message that went back regarding that, in
15
other words, in the Gulf of Thailand they were looking at Cambodia, at the evacuation of
16
Cambodia. That’s what they were concerned about at that time. Cambodia was really in
17
turmoil.
18
LC: Yes, with the Khmer Rouge.
19
RC: With the Khmer Rouge, right. That was the primary emphasis there. But at
20
the same time we were planning Vietnam, also. The actual forces that would conduct the
21
operation were on station in the Gulf of Thailand, gosh, from I would say late 1973 we
22
had them there. We kept an amphibious unit there all that time. They would live on
23
station. Those troops were generally out of Okinawa out of the 3rd Marine Division there
24
on Okinawa. With the units out of our 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which was
25
headquartered in Japan. The helicopter units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were all
26
stationed on Okinawa.
27
LC: So they would not be on station continuously?
28
RC: Oh, yes. In other words, there was a group, an aircraft group, a helicopter
29
group on Okinawa. They would take a squadron in detachments of 53s. They’d have
30
CH-53s, CH-46s, Hueys, UH-1Es and AH-1Js, Cobras, in this make-up of this Marine
31
Amphibious Unit. As is always the case when the Marines would deploy they would
458
1
have a total capability with them. They’d have air-to-ground. Up to the Harrier time the
2
air-to-ground was principally provided by the Cobras. You’re familiar with the Cobra
3
aircraft?
4
5
LC: Yes, I am. This is the aircraft, just for listeners who might not understand,
that is equipped with what kinds of armament?
6
RC: Well, it would carry a gun pod, 20-millimeter gun pod. It has the capability
7
to carry rockets and small bombs, a 250-pounder. Usually the way it was used, however,
8
was with air-to-ground rockets.
9
LC: Right, which would be side-mounted, radar guided?
10
RC: No, they’re just inertial guided, is all.
11
LC: Okay. So free shooting?
12
RC: Free shooting, that’s right, depending upon the accuracy of the pilot.
13
LC: But people will have seen, probably, this aircraft portrayed in films as the
14
one that has the sort of spread of rockets on the side and shooting those out.
15
RC: That’s right.
16
LC: Where was the 20-millimeter gun mounted?
17
RC: It would be mounted on a carrier on the side of the aircraft.
18
LC: So that an internally placed gunman would operate that?
19
RC: Yeah. They also had guns. They also had 20-millimeter guns. No
20
internally placed gunman, no. The pilot would fire everything.
21
LC: Okay. So he could fire everything from the cockpit?
22
RC: That’s right. A gun pod is externally mounted. It’s totally integrated into a
23
pod that is hung on the aircraft and it fires 20 millimeters at a high velocity.
24
LC: Right, and a lot of them. Rapid fire.
25
RC: Rapid fire. It didn’t last very long because it fired so quickly, but it was a
26
very effective gun.
27
LC: Would a Cobra have two pilots generally?
28
RC: Yes, front and rear. It would have an observer who could also fire, but he
29
generally helped locate targets and was able to take over the aircraft should the pilot be
30
hit. That was the purpose of that. Plus you’re right on the ground, you know, when
459
1
you’re doing your close-air support with a helicopter. You’re right next to them. You’re
2
right among them.
3
LC: Right. Treetop level or so?
4
RC: Treetop level. So your chances of getting hit or shot down are pretty good. I
5
was just talking to a friend of mine this last week. We went to an outing for Wounded
6
Warriors/Fallen Heroes on the Fourth of July over at a local area. A friend of mine,
7
Chuck Pitman, who was a helicopter pilot, a pure helicopter pilot in Vietnam, was shot
8
down seven times.
9
10
11
12
LC: Wow. Well, I’d love to speak with him about that if he felt he could, but it’s
pretty traumatic stuff.
RC: Well, Chuck likes the limelight so I’m certain he’d speak to you. In the
future if you take note of it I’ll get in touch with him. He’s here in the local area.
13
LC: His last name was—
14
RC: Pitman, P-I-T-M-A-N. Charles Pitman. He’s a lieutenant general now and
15
retired and works for a tactical unit. He’s still training SWAT officers and things like
16
that. When he retired he went into police work.
17
LC: Okay, but he retired as a lieutenant general?
18
RC: That’s right. He’s kind of famous. I’ll let him tell you, but he’s quite an
19
20
21
activist.
LC: Well, I’ll tell you what. You and I can talk about that maybe off the record,
but he sounds like—
22
RC: He’s an interesting character.
23
LC: And an American hero. You don’t get shot down seven times because
24
25
26
you’re hanging around at the officers’ club.
RC: Well, and another thing in his history, also, you remember the raid into Iran
when they tried to rescue the—
27
LC: I do, yes.
28
RC: He was on that.
29
LC: He flew in that?
30
RC: Yeah.
31
LC: Oh, boy. Okay. Well, I’ll talk with you about him maybe in a few minutes.
460
1
RC: Okay. As a matter of fact, most of the pilots that were in that were pilots
2
that had been in my brigade. Most of the Marine pilots and some of the Air Force pilots
3
when I did the evacuation of Saigon. They picked the cream of the crop, so to speak.
4
They were all highly trained and had experience in a heavy combat environment and as is
5
the case in the evacuation of Saigon it was kind of a different and very demanding type of
6
flying.
7
LC: Well, I have to tell you that’s probably who I would’ve wanted if they were
8
still in the service. Even if they weren’t I would have brought out my magic wand and
9
said, “Okay, you’re magically back in the service and would you please take care of
10
this?” That was an extraordinarily dangerous operation, the attempted rescue mission
11
into Iran. I just can’t hardly imagine anything more difficult.
12
13
14
RC: If and when you talk to General Pitman he’s given quite a few talks on that
and he knows the entire operation. He’s a good source.
LC: I will follow up with him with your help, but let me ask about the
15
intelligence flow. You said that pretty much everything that was coming out of the
16
sources that Americans had in Southeast Asia would come to your desk as well as
17
probably going through the whole CINCPAC.
18
19
RC: Yes. We would all get info. So we were constantly kept up to what was
happening. Constantly apprised.
20
LC: Did the 1st Marine Air Wing have a G-2 function with it?
21
RC: Oh, yeah.
22
LC: Who was working on that?
23
RC: Oh, gosh, I can’t remember the name now.
24
LC: Oh, that’s all right.
25
RC: Every major command has a G-1, 2, 3 and 4, 1, personnel—I think you
26
know, personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics.
27
LC: Yes. Would it be the work of that unit and that office, I should say, to—
28
RC: To keep us totally apprised to what was going on.
29
LC: Right. Keep everybody up to date.
461
1
RC: They would provide briefings. Generally we’d have a meeting every day, a
2
staff meeting basically for the purpose of updating us on what was happening. We were
3
going to be the primary people to conduct the operations.
4
LC: You were definitely going to be first in line.
5
RC: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.
6
LC: Did you have or did the 1st Marine Air Wing have any direct contacts with
7
South Vietnamese officials during this period? Did you have anybody from the Air Force
8
of South Vietnam come up and meet with you?
9
RC: No. No, we didn’t. Not while I was there. Of course, I left—well, no, I was
10
there in ’74. So I was there, oh gosh, six months or seven months before the evacuation
11
actually took place. We did both evacuations of Cambodia and Vietnam.
12
LC: Talking about Cambodia, can you just sort of reprise what you saw in terms
13
of the deterioration of the recognized government and its military position in Cambodia?
14
RC: As we observed it we knew that it was only a matter of time before the
15
American embassy had to be evacuated because they kept everybody apprised of what
16
situation was developing. The government itself was just crumbling and they were
17
totally ineffective against the Khmer Rouge, totally.
18
LC: Even though the United States at this point—well, at this point was the
19
United States able to do, under Congressional restrictions, which I think most people
20
know will have been introduced in 1973, was the American military able to do much in
21
the way of assisting?
22
RC: No, no, we weren’t. We weren’t doing much, at least the Marines weren’t.
23
We were simply on station. Of course, we had representatives in the embassy, but we
24
weren’t providing any troops or any advising.
25
LC: The Marines had observers or there was a military attaché’s office?
26
RC: There was a military attaché there. Obviously periodically we’d put an
27
observer in or we’d contact them very closely. We had to stay up with what was
28
transpiring and what the embassy plans were. They had to be well coordinated because
29
where we were going to make the pick up and so on, we had to know exactly how they
30
were going to muster all their people to make the evacuations.
31
LC: Was reconnaissance photography of use at this time or satellite photography?
462
1
RC: Satellite photography was nil. I recall in the days back in trying to conduct
2
operations we would get aerial photographs. They would be so outdated that they were
3
practically useless by the time they worked through the system. Now, of course, it’s
4
different with the satellites. With satellites they can beam it right into the headquarters
5
and reproduce photos and everything.
6
LC: Practically in real time now.
7
RC: In real time almost. In those days they were weeks old, a lot of them. We
8
didn’t pay much attention to them because we knew that in a battle situation things move
9
so rapidly and change is constant. You almost have to have real time in order to have any
10
11
effectiveness from aerial photography.
LC: Were there missions nonetheless maybe launching from NKP or somewhere
12
else in Thailand that were trying to keep track of the Khmer Rouge troop movements?
13
Do you know? Which would be pretty hard to spot actually from the air, but I just don’t
14
know if the effort was made or not.
15
RC: I couldn’t answer that, Dr. Laura, because I wasn’t in that chain. Our
16
mission, the Marines’ mission, at this point was to be able to retrieve the Americans, to
17
bring the Americans out and bring the Cambodians that were so designated.
18
LC: Did you have lists of how many Cambodians and who they would be?
19
RC: No. We didn’t have by name at our level.
20
LC: Did you have an estimate of how many?
21
RC: Yes, we did. Based upon that, that was the basis of our planning. As the
22
time came up and drew near when we knew it was going to happen we had to beef up our
23
forces considerably because as in any operation such as that you have the last minute
24
panic when you have people that are coming in out of the woodwork and trying to get
25
evacuated. So the numbers grow.
26
LC: Very quickly.
27
RC: Very quickly, which they did in Saigon. We had to beef up the Cambodian
28
forces on the very last day, practically. I had to make a decision and we’ll get into that
29
when we talk about the evacuation. I had to make a decision off of Vung Tau in talking
30
to Admiral Whitmire as to one of our helicopter squadron’s combat readiness. This
31
squadron was pulled out. It was a CH-53 squadron pulled out of Hawaii and rapidly
463
1
moved out to WESTPAC and into the Gulf of Thailand to help with the evacuation, some
2
twelve CH-53s, which is a significant boost in the forces we had to conduct the operation.
3
We had one 53 squadron down there at that time. At the very last day, on the day that we
4
were going to conduct it I had to certify to the amphibious commander that this squadron
5
was combat ready. He said, “Well, I don’t know whether we’re going to use these or not.
6
Are these guys ready? They came all the way from Hawaii?” I said, “Admiral, I will
7
certify that they are combat ready. Use them. We’ve got to have them. We’ve got to use
8
them and they’re okay. They’re well-trained.”
9
LC: That’s a pretty stiff cocktail.
10
RC: It was.
11
LC: You’ve got to be certain.
12
RC: It was. I knew the unit. Of course, I knew what training they had having
13
been at Kaneohe myself previously. So I knew the capability of that unit. So we used
14
them.
15
LC: Well, I’ll ask you a bit more detail about that maybe next time. One
16
question though that I think might be useful to clarify, as you were in the later planning
17
stages and as things were militarily deteriorating for the recognized governments in South
18
Vietnam and also in Cambodia, who was going to pull the chain? Who was the one who
19
was going to say, “Now is the time to evacuate?” Would that have been the ambassador
20
or would it have been a military decision?
21
RC: No. In Saigon that comes from Washington. When we did the evacuation of
22
Saigon, the actual decision, the ambassador said, “We have to get out now.” At that time
23
it was the secretary of state and obviously he was talking to the president who said,
24
“Conduct Eagle Pull,” or Frequent Wind or whatever you have, whatever the name of the
25
operation is. That’s when you kick it off. The ambassador actually requests—the
26
secretary of defense is responsible to have everything in position. Obviously the
27
secretary of defense and the secretary of state and the president are all talking. The chain
28
it comes down from in our case when I was there, when I did the evacuation, I got my
29
word through the chain and it came from the secretary of state.
30
LC: So in this case Dr. Kissinger.
31
RC: Henry Kissinger, sure did.
464
1
LC: He was the one.
2
RC: Yeah.
3
LC: Okay. Well, let’s take a break there, sir.
465
Interview with Richard Carey Session [15] of [16] July 20, 2006 1
Laura Calkins: This is Laura Calkins of the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech
2
University. I’m continuing the oral history interview with Lt. Gen. Richard E. Carey.
3
Today is the twentieth of July 2006. I am in the interview room of the Special
4
Collections building here in Lubbock on the campus of Texas Tech. The general is
5
speaking by telephone from his home, which is also here in Texas. Good morning, sir.
6
Richard Carey: Good morning, Dr. Laura.
7
LC: Sir, first of all, if you could I think it would be helpful for listeners to
8
understand how in the spring of 1975 your responsibilities evolved such that you had
9
some input into the management of the evacuation of Americans from Cambodia and I
10
11
think if you want we’ll turn to discuss Vietnam.
RC: Yes, that’ll be fine. That’ll be fine. My involvement in the Cambodian
12
evacuation was actually providing forces that were earmarked for my brigade. There was
13
a squadron that was coming on a fast track in from Hawaii, a CH-53 squadron. They
14
already had on station a Marine expeditionary unit in the Gulf of Thailand that had been
15
there for months in preparation for doing the evacuation. As the evacuation requirements
16
built up they knew that they didn’t have enough aviation assets on station in the Gulf of
17
Thailand. So they very quickly tasked the Marine Corps to provide another unit to bring
18
them up to snuff. They consulted with my staff and myself on this and already had them
19
underway. Our task was to see that they got to the Gulf of Thailand and that they were
20
integrated into the plans that were already in place for the evacuation out of Phnom Penh.
21
LC: Sir, how were the helicopters moved out there? Were they aboard ship?
22
RC: Yes. They were aboard an aircraft carrier, aboard the USS Hancock, as I
23
recall. They made a speed run from Hawaii all the way out to the Gulf of Thailand.
24
They flew off of that carrier because they had to have a home base. They flew off of that
25
into Phnom Penh. The trip into Phnom Penh was quite a distance. They had to have
26
internal fuel tanks in the helicopters. They were also concerned obviously about ground-
27
to-air missiles. So they had taken various precautions with the aircraft, including putting
28
in special IR paint, infrared paint, on the helicopters and equipping them with flares. The
466
1
only thing that you have with the helicopters is when you think you’re going to get an
2
inbound ground-to-air missile, infrared homing missile that would home in on the
3
exhaust of the helicopter engines. You throw flares out of the helicopter and the missiles
4
would home in on the flares because they’re very hot, high-intensity heat.
5
LC: Now this is essentially functioning like chaff?
6
RC: Well, it performs the same basic mission as chaff. In other words it’s
7
providing a different and better target, so to speak, for the incoming missiles.
8
LC: To attract the missile away from the helicopter.
9
RC: Attract the missile away from the helicopter. That’s the only anti-missile
10
thing we had, plus the IR paint on the helicopters to cut down the infrared signature of the
11
helicopter. There was some concern about the qualifications of the crew in doing this
12
type of evacuation. So the amphibious group that was in the Gulf of Thailand came
13
under the amphibious task force commander. He was concerned that the group coming in
14
from Hawaii had not been appropriately trained for this type of mission.
15
LC: Now was this Admiral Whitmire?
16
RC: Yes, Admiral Whitmire. He and I met in the command center aboard his
17
flagship on the Blue Ridge, which was now off of Vung Tau. We were cruising off of
18
Vung Tau trying to get everything firmed up for the potential evacuation of Saigon. So
19
his responsibility was still with that task force that was in the Gulf of Thailand. Of
20
course, the chain of command was and is always that the amphibious group commander
21
on scene is overall command until the Marines embark ashore and then they’re their own
22
command. That’s the way the system works.
23
LC: Yes, sir.
24
RC: So he was very much concerned about the readiness of the group. I
25
informed him—as a matter of fact, I wrote him a message to cover his tracks, so to speak,
26
in which I said that the Marines were fully combat ready and capable of performing the
27
mission, the squadron that was coming in from Hawaii.
28
29
LC: In other words, to satisfy his demands as the commander you had to make
this certification and you made it in writing?
467
1
RC: That’s right. I wrote a message from my command to his command. I wrote
2
him a message stating the fact that they were fully combat capable of combat, ready, and
3
capable of performing that specific mission.
4
LC: General, how did you get out to his ship from Hawaii?
5
RC: No, I wasn’t in Hawaii.
6
LC: Yeah. How did you get out to Vung Tau to the area offshore there?
7
RC: Well, I sailed down with the Blue Ridge. I was on the Blue Ridge and I
8
sailed down with them. So I was with the command center there, so to speak.
9
LC: About when would you say you left Hawaii?
RC: No, I didn’t leave Hawaii myself. I was in Japan as the 1st Marine Aircraft
10
11
Wing Assistant Wing Commander. I was appointed the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
12
Commander in early March. So I immediately started conducting plans. Flew down to
13
the Philippines and down to Subic Bay, flew into Cubi Point. There I met the amphibious
14
task force commander and got aboard his ship and stayed aboard his ship from that time
15
on.
16
LC: His ship left from Subic?
17
RC: From Subic down to Vietnam and moved off of Vung Tau where we were
18
conducting all of our planning. The planning, of course, consisted of trips into the
19
embassy and into Vietnam.
20
LC: For you yourself?
21
RC: Yes, yes, I went in. I went in and met the ambassador and met the people
22
from Air America and met the people at the place they called “the Alamo,” which was
23
the defense attaché that was there. At the defense attaché office was Maj. Gen. Homer
24
Smith, U.S. Army. There was a special group that was in this place called the Alamo that
25
was doing planning for the evacuation. Incidentally, while we were en route they did the
26
evacuation up north. They did some evacuations out of Da Nang. That was done by the
27
1st Battalion, 4th Marines.
28
LC: Were your plans utilized in that operation?
29
RC: No, that was a makeshift operation that was very quickly put together.
30
LC: It was quite a crisis.
468
1
2
RC: It was quite a crisis so they got that one put together very, very quickly.
They fortunately had the 1st Battalion 4th Marines which was available to do that.
3
LC: What was their normal duty station at this time?
4
RC: Their normal duty station was in the Philippines. Well, the fulltime duty
5
station, obviously, was at Okinawa. That’s where the 3rd Marine Division was. They
6
deployed them. As you probably know we had a training area in the Philippines where
7
battalions would deploy down there and get jungle training and specialized training away
8
from Okinawa because the Okinawa training sites were somewhat limited.
9
LC: What was the name of that area?
10
RC: I knew that you were going to ask me that.
11
LC: I’m sorry. It might come up later.
12
RC: It’ll come up later.
13
LC: Sure. No problem.
14
RC: We used that quite frequently. We also used Camp Fuji, which was up on
15
Japan itself. At Fuji we had the mountain training and so on. Of course, they had the
16
whole mountain to train on. They had a camp at both places, down in the Philippines and
17
one up in Japan.
18
LC: Right, for the different terrain.
19
RC: For the different terrain. They did different things at those particular sites.
20
They were pretty well trained all the way around. Of course, they did training also at
21
Okinawa. They had a training area, the northern training area, they called it there in
22
Okinawa where they could handle a battalion or so up there, also. And they also
23
deployed to Korea. So we got some cold weather training over in Korea. The Marines
24
were trained in all aspects. They were trained in the jungle warfare. They got the jungle
25
training in the Philippines and in Okinawa. They got the beach training in Korea and also
26
cold weather training and they got the mountain training at Camp Fuji. So they were
27
trained in all aspects.
28
LC: The 1st Battalion, 4th Marines that were trying to do the best they could to
29
manage the real critical situation at Da Nang, they were reporting to whom, do you
30
know? Who was putting that together?
469
1
RC: That was done, again, under the amphibious task forces. They had a Marine
2
amphibious unit, which is a battalion that provided the Marine command structure for
3
that.
4
LC: Okay. They were operating to ships offshore as well?
5
RC: Yes. Yes, uh-huh.
6
LC: Sir, let me ask while that was happening, and we’re talking about late March
7
probably of 1975. You mentioned that you were making some trips into Saigon. You
8
mentioned, for example, General Smith, U.S. Army. Did you meet, for example, Colonel
9
LeGro who was in charge of the G-2 office in DAO (defense attaché office)?
10
11
RC: Yes. I met most of the people that were there. We also met the gentleman
that wrote the book. Oh, gosh. Do you know which one?
12
LC: Stuart Harrington?
13
RC: No, I know Harrington, also. I met all of those. I met all of those
14
gentlemen. I met the Air Force brigadier general that was sent out of country by the
15
ambassador. The ambassador didn’t want him there. You know about that, I’m sure.
16
LC: A little bit, yes. Only what I read, though.
17
RC: I met all of those gentlemen. The most important people that I met from the
18
standpoint of my planning were the people in the DAO compound because that’s where
19
we were supposed to do the total evacuation. So all the planning was directed to that.
20
Looking at potential problems, if you will, as you always need to do in warfare. You can
21
never put together a plan and have it go off right by the book. You have to be able to
22
react to different situations. I made plans, also, to do some evacuation from the embassy,
23
fortunately. That was a fortunate thing that we did because the most critical part or the
24
most difficult part of the evacuation of Saigon was at the embassy. The defense attaché
25
office down at Tan Son Nhut, that went more or less smooth as silk because that’s where
26
we had most of the Marine function. The Marines were running that. At the embassy the
27
ambassador was running it and it was, in a word, screwed up. We fought the problem for
28
the many hours in there because of the fact that we weren’t totally in charge of that
29
particular portion.
30
LC: Right. You were down the line from the ambassador.
31
RC: That’s right, unfortunately.
470
1
LC: General, as you were making some of those trips from offshore on the Blue
2
Ridge into Saigon and meeting with different folks, you did meet with the ambassador
3
and this would be before the very critical last days, a little bit earlier than that?
4
5
RC: Yes, I didn’t meet with the ambassador. I didn’t actually get to meet with
him until April.
6
LC: Is that right? What was your impression of him at that point? Can you say?
7
RC: I felt like I was an unwanted visitor, frankly, because Mr. Graham, Graham
8
Martin, was intent upon staying there and he didn’t want anybody to get the impression
9
that we were going to leave. He was afraid that the word would get out that the planners
10
for the evacuation were getting very busy, were getting in. He wanted us to be very,
11
very, very low-key.
12
LC: Did he tell you that directly?
13
RC: No, not directly. As I recall, he didn’t actually say that because he knew that
14
in the moment of truth if it had to be done it had to be somewhat planned and he was
15
relying upon us to get it done.
16
LC: So he was not really going to be involved in much of this planning effort.
17
RC: No. He personally didn’t want to be that involved in it. As a matter of fact,
18
and I think as you do more research into this you’ll find, and you probably already have
19
I’m sure, you’ll find that many of the folks that were in the embassy that were in there on
20
an assignment, permanent assignment basis were planning clandestinely, so to speak.
21
That was the group that was in the Alamo basically driven by a Marine, Pat Howard, Col.
22
Pat Howard who is since deceased, but he was driving the plans for movement of
23
evacuees in Saigon down to Tan Son Nhut. He had to do it and he was going to use also
24
Air America assets. Now the ambassador knew there was some planning going on, but
25
he didn’t know to what degree, I don’t think.
26
LC: Probably right.
27
RC: Because he would’ve probably slowed it down because the word was
28
obviously getting out. They had all the evacuations off the rooftops and so on. People
29
that had those sites obviously would talk to other Vietnamese. The word would get out.
30
Any type of intelligence you would know. We would have a pretty good idea of how it
31
was going to happen. We had to take that into consideration, a part of our planning.
471
1
2
LC: Ambassador Martin was very reluctant, would you say, to have any planning
be done for evacuation from the embassy building itself?
3
RC: Oh, absolutely. As a matter of fact, and this will come up later I’m certain,
4
we weren’t allowed—there was a big tree, I think they call it a tamerac tree or a tamarind
5
tree.
6
LC: Tamarind tree.
7
RC: Tamarind tree that was in the courtyard of the embassy that absolutely had to
8
come down. I wanted to take that down in early April and I didn’t get the okay to take it
9
down until the morning the evacuation started.
10
LC: So at the very, very end, April twenty-ninth?
11
RC: At the very, very ending was when he finally consented to let us take it
12
13
14
15
down.
LC: Just to ask you about that for a second, who did you have who could do that
and what equipment did they need?
RC: Oh, obviously there was within the staff, the defense attaché staff, had chain
16
saws and things like that. They had engineer equipment. The actual taking down, I
17
believe, was done by the Marines. It was done by the Marines that were in the embassy.
18
LC: That brings me to another question. Every American embassy has a Marine
19
guard attachment to it. I would imagine they have their own channel for reporting and
20
command and control. How was that group to be integrated into the evacuation plan?
21
RC: Well, the only way in the overall plan for the total evacuation, Frequent
22
Wind, the only way they were integrated was to escort the ambassador down to the
23
defense attaché office in the plans, in the official plans. There was a small group that was
24
to be left behind. In other words, everybody was to move out over the road to the DAO.
25
LC: That was the plan?
26
RC: That was the plan.
27
LC: For the embassy personnel?
28
RC: For the embassy personnel. The ambassador, obviously, when he finally
29
consented to come down to the DAO, was to have a Marine security detachment with
30
him, a small group of Marines that would probably ride, you know, as you do for any
472
1
high-ranking official, ride in a couple of cars and take him down there. That was the
2
plan. We had no official plans to evacuate from the embassy.
3
LC: But you had made some preliminary—
4
RC: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. Unwritten, unavailable, not
5
available to the ambassador in any way. That was all kind of a clandestine thing. The
6
people in the Alamo were aware of this, also.
7
LC: You would have to have made them aware of it, I’m sure.
8
RC: That’s right. Everybody was aware of what we had to do in the last
9
moments. It was a very startling thing. Everything was going fairly smoothly until about
10
five o’clock in the evening on the day of the evacuation. We were going to have to do
11
evacuations from the embassy. We were still moving them over the roads. Then the
12
decision was made to evacuate by helicopter. Because the roads became kind of
13
untenable. We had a group that came in on busses that were stopped by South
14
Vietnamese forces. They were stopped and were not permitted to come to the DAO by
15
the Vietnamese. I demanded that we go onsite. I’ll have to dig it out, but I can’t recall
16
his name right now. He was a captain then. He called on his radio to me. I was now in
17
the DAO. I’m getting ahead of your questions a little bit, but I was in the DAO and he
18
said, “We’ve been stopped. Our busloads have been stopped.” He had a small convoy of
19
evacuees in buses. He said, “We’ve been stopped at a South Vietnamese roadblock and
20
they won’t let us through.” I had aircraft on site, fixed-wing aircraft.
21
LC: At Tan Son Nhut?
22
RC: No, over Saigon. That was part of the evacuation security that we had
23
established ahead of time. These were aircraft from the Navy carriers offshore and also
24
Air Force aircraft from—oh, gosh, I’m trying to think of the name of the field that’s out
25
in Thailand.
26
LC: Udorn or somewhere like that?
27
RC: Some from Udorn and there was another one.
28
LC: NKP?
29
RC: Yeah, NKP. There were some from there onsite. I sent the word via the
30
Airborne Command Center, which was also in Air Force. We also had a Marine C-130
31
up to relay to a group of fighters to make low passes on the roadblock and to tell the
473
1
Vietnamese commander that, “We’re making dry passes, but if you don’t let our people
2
through we’re going to shoot our way through.” He let them through.
3
LC: Without the American aircraft having to fire?
4
RC: Yes.
5
LC: Without a shooting incident, I mean, is all.
6
RC: In other words, I threatened them. I said, “We’re coming through and if we
7
have to fight our way through the aircraft will be the first ones to take you on.”
8
LC: Do you know who the South Vietnamese commander was?
9
RC: Oh, no, I have no idea.
10
LC: Or even if there really was anyone in charge.
11
RC: There may not have been at that time. I wasn’t on scene. I’ll have to get
12
that—Tony Woods. He was Tony Woods.
13
LC: He was with the buses?
14
RC: He was on the buses. He’s the one that was talking to the Vietnamese at the
15
roadblock.
16
LC: That had to be a pretty hairy exchange there.
17
RC: I’m sure it was. I unfortunately wasn’t there.
18
LC: Well, no, I think you were in the right place, actually.
19
RC: I would’ve liked to have been there.
20
LC: I know you would have.
21
RC: That was the last group that came over the road into the DAO compound.
22
They were people that were coming, that originally were intended to come to the DAO
23
and had they not gotten through they would have had to have turned around and gone
24
back to the embassy, but we got them through.
25
LC: Do you know, sir, whether American fighter aircraft actually did have to
26
come down and make the dry pass as you described it in order to get the South
27
Vietnamese to let the buses go?
28
29
30
31
RC: I know from just being told. I didn’t see it, but I was told that, yes, they did
make several passes and with that they let them through.
LC: Okay. But those aircraft had orders that if the situation didn’t resolve by
their kind of drive-by then they would be allowed to shoot?
474
1
RC: Yes.
2
LC: Was it you who could give that order, sir, or had that already been locked in,
3
that kind of authority?
4
RC: I took the initiative. Okay?
5
LC: Yes, sir.
6
RC: I had no permission to do that. I just took the initiative because it was
7
critical at that time to get those people through and my orders were to conduct the
8
evacuation and that’s what I did.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
LC: Yes, sir. The number of folks getting through on those buses—any idea how
many?
RC: Well, the buses were loaded and there was a small convoy. I don’t know
exactly how many. We’d have to talk to Tony on that. He’d have the words.
LC: You mentioned that this was really the last group, though, that was able to
get through over land to Tan Son Nhut.
RC: Yes. Yes. I have to assume that that’s really what made the ambassador
16
decide to call through because shortly thereafter we got word from the embassy that they
17
needed more Marines that they were going to have to conduct the evacuation from the
18
embassy. That’s when I had to start diverting aircraft into there, into the embassy.
19
LC: This would’ve been later?
20
RC: This was late in the evening, probably five o’clock or five-thirty or
21
somewhere around there.
22
LC: Did you speak with the ambassador at any time during this period?
23
RC: Yes. At that time I did. As a matter of fact, he got on the phone and my aide
24
says, “The ambassador’s on the phone.” I picked up the phone and I said, “When are you
25
coming? When are you coming down here?” I didn’t say send anything. He said,
26
“We’re not coming. We’re going to have to evacuate from here.” I said, “What?”
27
LC: “Let me just ask you to repeat that, Ambassador.” Right.
28
RC: Anyway, at that time he said, “We need more Marines.” So we sent another
29
group of Marines over to the embassy.
30
LC: Where were those Marines coming from?
31
RC: They were out of my group that was at the DAO.
475
1
LC: How did they get over to the complex?
2
RC: Helicopter.
3
LC: How many aircraft did you have available at Tan Son Nhut to move your
4
5
6
Marine contingent around?
RC: Well, I had a constant flow at this time into the DAO. In other words, the
whole force was moving.
7
LC: Everybody was shuttling?
8
RC: Everybody was shuttling now that the wheels had been set in motion. We
9
10
11
12
13
set them in motion about 1500. Then we really got with it. They were coming in as fast
as we could turn them around.
LC: Who was doing air control and where was that being run from, air traffic
control?
RC: We had air traffic control. We had various segments of it. The departure
14
point was aboard the aircraft carrier Midway. They were controlling the aircraft over the
15
amphibious task force. Then they would come in via pre-planned routes. I guess you
16
could understand why I put this, one of which was called Ohio and one was called
17
Michigan.
18
LC: Yes, sir. I didn’t know that.
19
RC: Inbound was Ohio and outbound was Michigan. Retreating was Michigan
20
and on the offensive was Ohio.
21
LC: Yes, I think that’s a football reference.
22
RC: That’s right. You got it. You got it. But once they took off then they
23
reported in. The overall coordinator for air operations, which included the fighter aircraft
24
that were on station to help us should we need it, were under control of an airborne
25
command post out of 7th Air Force. We had a backup Marine C-130 command post.
26
Now that’s called ABCCC.
27
LC: Can you describe or define that designation?
28
RC: Airborne Command and Control Center.
29
LC: Okay, ABCCC.
476
1
RC: That’s a complete—I believe we had a 135 that was basically configured on
2
station. They have all types of communication equipment. They’re the interface between
3
the forces on the ground and in the air and the fleet. That’s basically their mission.
4
5
LC: Now the principle airborne command operation was in the hands of the Air
Force.
6
RC: That’s right.
7
LC: But the Marine aircraft acted as the backup in case something happened.
8
RC: That’s right. The unfortunate thing about it is we talked to the Marine
9
command post as much as we did the major command post because we also had—again, I
10
put together contingencies all the way, backups. I also had the group commander up,
11
“Flac Mac” McKlinnen, had him up in a Huey helicopter in the Saigon area itself,
12
directly in the vicinity of the DAO.
13
LC: And his mission?
14
RC: His mission was to coordinate helicopter operations at the site, including if
15
we had a helicopter that went down for some reason, either shot down or due to
16
mechanical failure, then he would immediately proceed to that point and would take
17
charge of evacuation and handling the situation there, whatever had to be done. I also
18
had an airborne unit that was designed to pick up the survivors or people from any
19
downed helicopter, which included security Marines who would put up a perimeter
20
defense and including helicopters to do medevacs if necessary.
21
22
LC: Where was this unit based or what were they doing in these last hours?
Where were they?
23
RC: They were airborne.
24
LC: Okay. So they were circling?
25
RC: They were circling. We had them ready. We also had Cobra aircraft that
26
would provide close-in, close-air support, particularly at night because we didn’t know
27
how long the operation would take. Basically we thought we’d be through in about four
28
hours, but as it turned out with the problems that we had—well, eight hours. Four hours
29
hopefully and eight hours max is what we kind of planned on. It wound up being some
30
eighteen to twenty hours because of the embassy.
477
1
2
3
LC: Let me ask a little more about the contingency plans. What do you do for
refueling when you’ve got this many aircraft on station?
RC: Oh, the Air Force had refuelers on station. The Marine helicopters, of
4
course, they just had enough fuel to get in and get out. On the ones, now, at Cambodia
5
because of the distance that they had to travel they had internal fuel tanks.
6
7
8
9
10
LC: That was a special rigging for those aircraft to get all the way into Phnom
Penh and back.
RC: Yes, they had to have internal bladders put inside of the aircraft in the
passenger compartment, so to speak.
LC: Was any of that kind of special equipment for extending the flying time for
11
aircraft, for helicopters, for example the Cobras or McKlinnen’s aircraft where he had to
12
be up in the air much longer than you anticipated.
13
RC: No. What we would do is we would cycle them. In other words, he’d go
14
back and his exec or designated person would relieve him on station until he could go
15
back and refuel and come back out.
16
LC: So the aircraft might be moved in and out?
17
RC: Oh, yes. Oh, yes, very definitely. We had literally hundreds and hundreds
18
of sorties.
19
LC: Did you ever get a final count?
20
RC: Of the numbers of sorties?
21
LC: Yeah.
22
RC: Oh, yes. I have it. I don’t have it at my fingertips, but I can give you that.
23
LC: Okay, that would be great at some later point.
24
RC: I’ve got the final count of the numbers of sorties. It’s up into almost a
25
26
27
28
29
30
thousand sorties.
LC: That sounds right, yes. General, you were out at the DAO compound there
at Tan Son Nhut until what time?
RC: I had to leave—I left at, gee whiz, at about ten-thirty or eleven o’clock at
night. The reason I left is the helicopter sorties stopped coming in from the ships.
LC: That was due to—
478
1
2
RC: A decision by Admiral Whitmire that the helicopter crews were beyond safe
time in the air, in other words time of operation like the airlines.
3
LC: Yes, they’ve flown too many hours.
4
RC: They’ve flown too many hours. Well, that caused a lot of problems all the
5
way up and down the chain. I tried to get to personally voice-to-voice back to the ship
6
and I couldn’t. I couldn’t get linked.
7
LC: So the comms were down for that?
8
RC: The comms were down at that time. Why? I don’t know, but I couldn’t get
9
to him. So I said, “Well, the only way I’m going to get this resolved is to go back
10
myself.” The evacuation actually at the DAO compound, we were complete except
11
extracting the Marines. We had all of the evacuees out.
12
LC: Did that include all the DAO personnel who had been there?
13
RC: Yes, the DAO personnel were all gone. The only people that were left were
14
the Marines. We put Marines in to provide perimeter security in our zones. Those were
15
the people that were still there.
16
LC: About how many guys there with you?
17
RC: We had at that point about eight hundred, I guess.
18
LC: So that’s quite a few to try to get out of there.
19
RC: Well, not really.
20
LC: Not really?
21
RC: No, not really. Not the way our 53s were moving. They were moving very
22
rapidly despite the weather conditions and we were receiving some harassing fire, too.
23
LC: Did you know the origin of the harassment fire?
24
RC: In several cases we did.
25
LC: Was it NVA?
26
RC: Unknown for sure. Suspect it was not all NVA.
27
LC: Got it. Sir, let me just ask you about getting out yourself and flying out to
28
the Blue Ridge.
29
RC: That unfortunately was a bad scene because I got on a ship. We had started
30
to evacuate some of our people, some of the Marines from the DAO. I got on one of the
31
helicopters because Gen. Al Gray was still there, then Col. Al Gray who was a regimental
479
1
commander. I brought him in with me to handle the ground portion at the DAO, to
2
handle the security portion. I flew in on a Huey myself, as did he, but he had command
3
and control people there. This is back to the command and control thing, too. There was
4
a command and control unit in the DAO on the ground that was actually physically
5
controlling the helicopters. They would come in to a rendezvous point short of the
6
approach to the DAO. From there they were picked up by the units on the ground to
7
actually send them in to the various pickup points that we had.
8
LC: Sure, and that was being done by DAO personnel?
9
RC: No, that was being done by my Marines.
10
LC: Your Marines were doing it from the DAO compound?
11
RC: That’s right.
12
LC: I see.
13
RC: All the DAO did, the people from the DAO, was sit and wait to be evacuated
14
because when I landed I was in charge.
15
LC: I believe that.
16
RC: All of my Marines, we handled it from there. As a matter of fact, I just told
17
General Smith, I just said, “Take a seat, General, and relax and we’ll tell you when you
18
can go out.” He was happy with that. He was a good man.
19
LC: So you had the assistance of Colonel Gray?
20
RC: Colonel Gray and I had, gosh, I had people that were air controllers. I had
21
people that were—I had an EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) man and you talked to
22
him. East?
23
LC: This would be Bill East, William East.
24
RC: Yeah, Bill East. A warrant officer was with him. I had radio operators,
25
communicators. I had people that were capable of preparing sites, which they had to do.
26
They had to take down the ball field. They had to take down the screens and so on
27
around the ball field. There was a lot of pre-evacuation preparations that went on.
28
LC: Including demolitions of some kinds?
29
RC: Right, that I sent in ahead of time that were preparing the DAO.
30
LC: Did you also have a plan for destroying DAO as you left?
480
1
RC: Absolutely. That’s what East did. Yeah, that was all within the plans. We
2
had a little bit of a problem there because I think you probably heard about the dollars
3
that we were responsible for destroying.
4
5
LC: Well, I’ve heard it from another source, but could you just briefly explain
here for people who might not know about that?
6
RC: Well, there was money that was under the charge of the defense attaché.
7
LC: Cash?
8
RC: Cash, greenbacks, several million. I don’t know exactly how much, but
9
there was a DAO person there with East and this warrant officer that destroyed that.
10
LC: How did they do that?
11
RC: Burn it.
12
LC: It takes a while to burn a few million.
13
RC: Yeah. But when you’ve got white phosphorous grenades and things like that
14
it doesn’t take long. It doesn’t take long. Let’s see, where are we? We still haven’t
15
totally covered the Cambodian situation.
16
17
LC: No, we have not. Do you want say something else about that at this point?
It might be a good idea.
18
RC: Well, the basic problem with the Cambodian operation was the distance that
19
had to be traveled to get in there. Consequently the helicopters had to navigate over land
20
into an area that they had not been to before right into the embassy, the embassy grounds
21
adjacent to the embassy where the evacuation was conducted.
22
23
LC: General, what could helicopter pilots use for navigation to make sure they
were on the right course? What aids did they have available to them?
24
RC: (Laughs) Maps.
25
LC: Okay, a knee map sitting right on their lap.
26
RC: Knee map. It was basically pretty doggone inadequate.
27
LC: Rough, a little rough. I would think so.
28
RC: Very rough. I can recall in Korea, for example, as a ground officer using
29
maps that were from the Japanese Army that still had the Japanese symbols on them. We
30
couldn’t read them, but that’s what we had.
31
LC: That’s what you used?
481
1
RC: That’s what we used to fight the war.
2
LC: That’s all there was.
3
RC: That’s all there was, yeah. That’s all there was. I think I told you that one
4
time about my company commander who got lost. I told him he was lost and he said in
5
essence, “Sit down and shut up,” until later on and then he relied upon me to get the
6
company back to where we were supposed to be.
7
LC: Get him out of where he had gotten you.
8
RC: That’s right. But that’s because of the charts. The maps were very
9
inadequate. Of course, we did have helicopters that flew higher and aircraft that flew
10
higher that kind of gave them, “You’re on the right track. You’re going properly.”
11
LC: So you would have at higher altitude kind of, not really air control, but
12
they’re more or less stationary and monitoring the flight paths?
13
RC: That’s right. They can see the helicopters and they could get high enough.
14
The ships, of course, have homers on them. You put a fixed wing aircraft up at altitude
15
and he could pretty much tell you what track you’re on. So he can tell you if you’re on
16
the right track. The basic problem that they had in Cambodia was the distance and the
17
navigation to and from the fleet. They did an outstanding job. Oh, gosh. There’s my
18
phone.
19
LC: Go ahead.
20
RC: The thing that was so good about this is these pilots and these squadrons
21
were pretty exceptional pilots. As a matter of fact, later on, most of these pilots are the
22
Marine input into the evacuation of Iran. Remember that?
23
LC: Yes, sir, 1979?
24
RC: Yeah. Most of my guys that were still in the Corps were picked for that
25
because of their experience, basically. They were good at navigation. They were good at
26
performing difficult missions.
27
LC: And they were ready to.
28
RC: And they were ready to.
29
LC: They wanted to do it.
30
RC: They wanted to do it, absolutely.
482
1
2
LC: The situation in Phnom Penh as far as your information was that, if I’m
correct, the number of people who needed to be evacuated was growing exponentially?
3
RC: Exactly. Same as it happened at Saigon. Basically at the last minute
4
everybody wanted to get out of there. The basic problem was control, control the
5
numbers.
6
LC: What was the plan, as far as you know, for evacuating folks? Was it from
7
the principal airfield at Phnom Penh? Was the embassy building going to be involved at
8
all?
9
RC: No, they didn’t evacuate from the embassy building. They went into an
10
adjacent area, which was part of the airfield. It was close by. So it was easy to find,
11
relatively easy to find once you got in there. That particular evacuation was well-
12
controlled from Phnom Penh.
13
LC: Not as chaotic as what occurred—?
14
RC: No, not at all. They moved their people to the pick-up points and the
15
Marines went in and picked up and it was done. It was done, in essence.
16
LC: Did the flyers have to make multiple trips back out?
17
RC: No, we had enough aircraft to do it in one shot. That’s why we did it with
18
two squadrons.
19
LC: So that you could do it, get in, get out.
20
RC: Right. Right.
21
LC: Do you know—?
22
RC: Numbers, no. I don’t.
23
LC: Anything about the extent to which the aircraft might have come under fire
24
from the Khmer Rouge while entering Phnom Penh?
25
RC: No, you’d have to talk to the pilots on that.
26
LC: Will do. If I can find one of those guys, I will.
27
RC: Oh, I can find you some.
28
LC: Okay, terrific. Excellent. Excellent.
29
RC: I can find you some. As a matter of fact we’ve got a squadron commander
30
that I stay in touch with every once in a while. I can put you in touch with him. He will
31
know. He will be able to give you a complete rundown on it.
483
1
2
LC: Okay, great. Sir, were you trying to keep tabs in the midst of everything that
was happening at Tan Son Nhut?
3
RC: As much as I could. Communications—there was quite a distance.
4
LC: Did you have an uplink to Phnom Penh or to the ship?
5
RC: No, I did not.
6
LC: So most of your communications were coming from—
7
RC: By a message.
8
LC: And mostly through the Blue Ridge, for example?
9
RC: That’s right. Everything that I knew was off the Blue Ridge, which was
10
absolutely totally inundated with communications. My golly, on the morning of the
11
evacuation from Saigon, the actual execute order got tied up in the message center and
12
didn’t get to us for some time.
13
LC: This was the message from Washington?
14
RC: Uh-huh, right.
15
LC: Any idea how long the delay was?
16
RC: I didn’t get it until something like 11:30 and I believe it was sent out at
17
something like ten o’clock, flash. But the communications, I mean, there was so much.
18
The traffic was absolutely unbelievable, the amount of traffic we had. In the planning
19
itself, from a personal standpoint, there was so much traffic coming in that what sleep I
20
got I got at my desk. I didn’t hit the bunk. I didn’t hit the sack. I slept at my desk for
21
quite a few days. The admiral’s cabin was right next to mine so that’s where I ate. If the
22
communications came in, why, you were readily available.
23
24
LC: To use a basketball analogy, you were the point man for how much of this
traffic, sir, how much of what was coming onto the ship? All of it?
25
RC: Yes.
26
LC: Is that fair? I’m not trying to put words in your mouth.
27
RC: In other words, I was the final action guy, the point man, so to speak.
28
Obviously, everything came to the amphibious task force, then down to the task force
29
group, then down to me. Then I had to go out to my people, the actual executors. The
30
problem was the people were constantly wanting to change things.
31
LC: Something that had already been decided?
484
1
RC: We had decided and then change would come in and we’d fix that and
2
before we’d get it fixed another change would come in. It was just constant. It was
3
mind-boggling and very irritating, as a matter of fact. Everybody was putting in and
4
providing their input. I had so many people in the chain of command. My golly, the
5
chain came from Washington to CINCPAC down to USAF down to 7th Fleet down
6
through my Marine command and down through my amphibious command and then
7
down to me. So I had all these people providing input to me. It was pretty mind-
8
boggling.
9
LC: Sir, were you also getting updates on—
10
RC: Intelligence?
11
LC: Yes, and troop movements on the ground?
12
RC: Yes, that was all part of it. We had to try to keep up with what was
13
happening there, also.
14
LC: Tell me about your staff. Who was helping you manage this flow?
15
RC: Well, I had a chief of staff and I had an operations officer.
16
LC: So just as one would expect.
17
RC: I had a full staff, a regular 1, 2, 3 and 4.
18
LC: Was it your feeling that for efficiency’s sake the best thing to do was for you
19
to see it all and manage it all from one place, sort of through one conduit and that would
20
be you?
21
RC: Kind of the buck stops here. I had to be pretty well informed.
22
LC: Yeah, you couldn’t deputize a lot of this.
23
RC: No, no. I did have a lot of help from the actual planning and execution from
24
the Marine standpoint. That was pretty solid. I had Al Gray, who was a very competent
25
ground commander. I had Mac McKlinnen who was a very competent air commander. I
26
had a logistics support group commander who was very confident in that area. I had a
27
very, very fine intelligence officer. So my staff was pretty solid. I felt pretty good about
28
them and obviously they did the job properly because the operation was, in essence,
29
highly successful. It’s because of them.
30
31
LC: You mentioned the rapid rate of changes to the plans and to the agreements
that you had made with various people or the understandings that you had with them.
485
1
Was much of that being driven by the pace, essentially, of the collapse of South
2
Vietnamese forces?
3
4
RC: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. You can imagine it was kind of like a
blitzkrieg, really, if you will.
5
LC: Yes, sir. Yes, I think that’s fair.
6
RC: Things were changing so rapidly. There was no idea that things would
7
8
9
collapse so quickly.
LC: Were you aware also or did you take note of points where South Vietnamese
troops, ARVN troops were holding?
10
RC: Oh, yes.
11
LC: Do you remember some of that?
12
RC: Yeah. Well, of course, I remember when—I followed it very, very closely
13
all the way through. Where the demise actually started taking place was when Thieu
14
decided to move most of his elite units out of MR-1, which is up on the DMZ. That very
15
quickly caused a collapse and the evacuation out of Da Nang. That was the panic that hit
16
there. Then of course Pleiku, the problem that they had down at Pleiku and Kontum and
17
all those and then the mass movement out of there and the collapse of the South
18
Vietnamese forces there and then—
19
LC: While they were essentially moving towards the sea on Route 9.
20
RC: They just got absolutely decimated, just totally wiped out.
21
LC: Route 19, I’m sorry.
22
RC: Route 19, right? So I was watching that and then, of course, around Bien
23
Hoa and those places. I watched—what’s the name of the big seaport up there?
24
LC: Nha Trang?
25
RC: No, not Nha Trang.
26
LC: Further north?
27
RC: I wish I had my map.
28
LC: Oh, Cam Ranh Bay?
29
RC: Cam Ranh Bay, yeah. I watched what was happening there. Then, of
30
course, when we finally cut off Saigon by taking Vung Tau, that was—see, I had various
31
options for the evacuation. There were basically, as I recall, four options that we had and
486
1
one of the major options we had and one of the reasons we had so many ground forces in
2
my task force and my particular brigade was that one of the heaviest evacuations we
3
planned was out of Vung Tau. Of course, that fell. They took Vung Tau. So we then cut
4
off and then of course we also had a plan to evacuate from the docks there in Saigon
5
itself.
6
LC: Actually having ships up the river?
7
RC: Bring ships up the river and evacuate from there. We had a full plan for that.
8
That was one of our plans. Then at the beginning, of course, we planned massive air
9
evacuations. The commercial type evacuations stopped fairly early on. Then we had the
10
evacuations with the large aircraft and the baby lift downing kind of stopped that. Then
11
we went down to the C-130s and were evacuating those. Then on the final morning there
12
when the C-130s were hit by rockets and we burned up the C-130 that stopped that
13
evacuation. So the only thing left after that was the helicopter evacuation and that’s
14
when the ambassador informed Washington that we were stopping the C-130 and that we
15
needed to start this helicopter evacuation. That went to Washington early in the morning
16
and Washington made the decision and came back to conduct the helicopter operations.
17
That came down through the chain and got hung up, from my personal standpoint, within
18
the ship communications capability on the Blue Ridge and I didn’t get it until 11:30.
19
Immediately after the evacuation, that was one of the major questions that they had.
20
Washington in their infinite wisdom decided to conduct another investigation. So they
21
sent the investigation team out and hammered at me and my staff. We were in the midst
22
of that when we got the word at about Koh Tang. You’re familiar with that, the Koh
23
Tang and the Mayaguez?
24
25
LC: I am, but could you just say just a few words to contextualize it for people
who might not get that?
26
RC: In the process, as I said, of the investigation here comes Koh Tang and the
27
Mayaguez. I get a call from the secretary of defense to reconstitute my brigade to
28
proceed to go out and rescue the Mayaguez.
29
30
31
LC: Just as they were investigating you for having, quote unquote, “screwed up,”
a little?
RC: That’s right.
487
1
2
LC: Well, there you go. That shows how serious the, “screw up,” quote, unquote
was because they needed you right away again.
3
RC: Yeah. “You screwed up, but come take this on, pal.”
4
LC: “By the way.”
5
RC: “By the way, get this done.”
6
LC: “We’ve got this ELINT (electronic intelligence gathering) ship that we need
7
back real quick.” Well, I will ask you about that. Let me though ask one question that I
8
think probably many listeners will like to have your take on and that is before the real
9
final crazy couple of days in Saigon, but certainly as part of the earlier elements of the
10
evacuation there had been, the attempt to get some of the Saigon area orphanages
11
emptied and get some of those children out and the crash of that aircraft. Other people
12
I’ve talked to who were on the ground when that happened obviously were completely
13
devastated by this, not just the loss of the children, but also there were a number of
14
American female service personnel and other personnel.
15
RC: All volunteers to go with it.
16
LC: Sure. You mentioned that as one of the things that drove your planning
17
away from the large-scale fixed-wing aircraft evacuation.
18
RC: That’s right.
19
LC: Can you tell you what you remember about that aircraft coming down? Was
20
21
it a mechanical failure?
RC: Yes, it was a mechanical failure. I don’t know all the details and I wouldn’t
22
want to comment too much about it. Everything I got was more or less by message
23
traffic and post talking with—one of the gentlemen that probably knows a lot about that
24
is Homer Smith because he was still in the DAO and they were still kind of running the
25
civilian evacuations and so on from there at that time. So he probably knows more about
26
that than I do. Of course, my reaction to it is obviously horror that it happened and how
27
could it happen? It was a mechanical failure on the part of the aircraft. The back ramp
28
apparently came open and caused control problems and the aircraft actually trying to
29
make it back crashed in the process.
30
31
LC: How close was it to Tan Son Nhut? I, too, have read or have learned that the
pilot was turning to come back, knew there was a problem, turning to come back to Tan
488
1
Son Nhut, but now far was it from the active areas of the airfield that you were using just
2
a few days later to manage the evacuation?
3
4
RC: I can’t really tell you that, Dr. Laura. I don’t know, but it was relatively
close. I know that.
5
LC: Okay. Well, I tell you what. Let’s take a break there, sir.
6
RC: All right.
489
Interview with Richard Carey Session [16] of [16] June 24, 2010 1
Kelly Crager: This is Kelly Crager continuing an oral history interview with Gen.
2
Richard Carey. Today is 24 June 2010. I am in Lubbock, Texas on the campus of Texas
3
Tech University and General Carey is joining me by telephone from his home in Plano,
4
Texas. General Carey, when you last left off back in 2006 with the interview with Dr.
5
Calkins, you were beginning to discuss the evacuation of Saigon and, of course, you play
6
an absolutely critical role in the air evacuation of Saigon. What I would like to do today
7
is focus on that aspect your career and of your experiences. If you can, take me through
8
the entire process in as much detail as you can remember. What I would like to do is just
9
maybe to start it off, can you give me your impression or your opinion of the situation in
10
Saigon as you found it in April of 1975, the political and military situation as you found
11
it.
12
Richard Carey: Well, it was, in one word it was chaotic. What they were trying
13
to do, the unfortunate thing about the evacuation, what made it difficult from our
14
standpoint and made it difficult to really do the type of planning that we should’ve been
15
able to do was the fact that the ambassador, Graham Martin, did not want to do the
16
evacuation. He didn’t want to give the South Vietnamese government the impression that
17
we were going to evacuate. As you probably know from your history, he had made a trip
18
back to Washington to appeal to the government, to the federal government, to the
19
Congress and so on to continue to support the South Vietnamese, but that was
20
unsuccessful and they were ramped up to go ahead and pull out completely and do the
21
evacuation, they being Washington. But he was still, Ambassador Martin was still very
22
much in favor of holding out as long as he could. He made it kind of difficult for us. We
23
wound up having kind of a clandestine planning group in a place called the Alamo. That
24
consisted of Marines and Army folks, principally Marines, that were trying to put
25
together the evacuation moving South Vietnamese to evacuation points without, really
26
without the ambassador knowing about it. It was kind of a sneaky operation, if you will.
27
KC: Let me ask you this—
490
1
RC: They did a very good job of putting together movement of selected
2
Vietnamese. Vietnamese had been designated to be certain to get them out because if
3
they weren’t gotten out they would’ve probably wound up many of them killed. Many of
4
those that did not get out, as you know, spent years and years in repatriation camps, many
5
years. One lady in particular escaped some four times and finally they just let her go.
6
She got out of Vietnam on her own. People spent a lot of time in repatriation camps after
7
the fall of Saigon, there was a lot of folks there. We were very interested in getting out
8
all those that were designated. Then, of course, there was a lot of spillage over into that,
9
people coming over the walls at the embassy and people that paid their way into the buses
10
that came down to the DAO compound. A lot of people came out that weren’t originally
11
designated to come out. We would’ve liked to have taken out, we would’ve liked to
12
continued on in the evacuation well long after we were allowed to because of the number
13
of people that were really clambering to get out. I know that you have seen pictures of
14
them trying to get over the walls at the embassy and everything else. It was chaotic. It
15
was difficult planning, very difficult and principally because of the lock down that the
16
ambassador was trying to pose. He didn’t want to let it out that we were planning like
17
that. We were kind of playing a game of hide-and-seek with him.
18
KC: Let me ask you this, General. At what point did you determine and those
19
with you whether they were Army or Air Force or Navy and obviously the Marines. At
20
what point did you determine that the situation there was untenable? That in your
21
opinion the ambassador was not correct in his decision to hold out like he was.
22
RC: When the Vietnamese actually got into Saigon, the North Vietnamese, they
23
were fighting in Saigon and also something even more pronounced than that was when
24
they started rocketing the air field, the DAO at Tan Son Nhut. Then we knew that they
25
were there. Of course, during the evacuation itself the tanks pulled in, North Vietnamese
26
tanks pulled into the palace, which was right next to the embassy. We could see the
27
North Vietnamese. So that makes it pretty sure particularly when some of the outlying
28
bases had already fallen had capitulated to the North Vietnamese. So we knew that the
29
battle was lost. Now as far as the planning was concerned, along about mid-April is
30
when it really appeared that they were going to have to go forward. We had to shift
31
really into high gear at that time. Of course, as you know we did the evacuation of
491
1
Phnom Penh on the thirteenth of April. That was kind of a precursor to the evacuation of
2
Saigon.
3
KC: Now when you—
4
RC: I had to in that case—well, go ahead with your question.
5
KC: No, no please go back. Please go ahead.
6
RC: Well, the evacuation of Phnom Penh was kind of testy because the Navy
7
commander, the Navy amphibious commander, didn’t think that the Marines—we had a
8
unit that was coming in from Hawaii, heavy helicopter squadron, to bolster our numbers.
9
He didn’t think that we were ready to do the evacuation out of Phnom Penh. I had to
10
meet with him personally and assure him almost in writing that the Marines were ready
11
and that we were going to do it. That was kind of the moment of truth there. We had to
12
do a lot of things to our helicopters to try to make them as safe as we could as far as air-
13
to-ground missiles and that sort of thing. You had special paint. We had to paint some of
14
the helicopters with the paint that would turn away IR signatures and so on. It was pretty
15
frantic from about—well, about mid-April on in getting things ready.
16
17
KC: But your success, I guess, at Phnom Penh and obviously your location,
proximity you were the natural person to choose to help lead the evacuation of Saigon.
18
RC: Yes, uh-huh.
19
KC: Now you were—I believe you met with the defense attaché Homer Smith,
20
General Smith, shortly upon arriving. You began to put together some sort of plan for the
21
evacuation. Do you remember that meeting with General Smith and how this plan came
22
together and how you were going to approach it?
23
RC: Well, yes. General Smith was actually the individual that started the Alamo
24
operation and that was his way of doing it. That was before the Phnom Penh thing. That
25
was early April, probably the first week in April. What he had put together, the thing that
26
he had started to do, it was still in the initial planning phrases except for the group at the
27
Alamo. They were working with Air America. Air America had a detachment, a large
28
detachment of helicopters at Tan Son Nhut. They were tasked. They were planned by
29
this Alamo group to go out to various parts of Saigon and outside of Saigon even and
30
pick up special people and take them directly out. Initially, they were going to take them
31
to the piers there in Saigon. The evacuation was planned in different ways. Initially it
492
1
was thought we might be able to do the evacuation via ship from the piers in Saigon. We
2
had a plan for that in which we would go in there—they’d fly these Air America
3
helicopters into the piers and then they would board these ships. That, because the
4
proximity of the North Vietnamese and the fact that some of them—they even had units
5
already in Saigon or right at the outside of Saigon. That was kind of trashed. That
6
operation was kind of trashed. At the last moment we knew that the only way we were
7
going to make it successful was to do the evacuation strictly by helicopters directly from
8
Tan Son Nhut to our ships at sea right off the bay there at Saigon. It was pretty frantic.
9
Again, we wanted to—it would’ve been much better and we could’ve gotten a lot more
10
people out if we had been able to use the port and get people out by ship. We wound up
11
having to ferry them out to our ships out at sea. That made it much more complex and,
12
well, more difficult and required a lot more planning, a lot more planning.
13
14
15
KC: Sure. At one point the plan was to use the DAO, the defense attaché’s
office, as an evacuation point.
RC: Well, that originally was, that was decided to use—again, we had different
16
options. One option was to take them out from the port right at the mouth of the river
17
down on the beach. That was trashed. Then we had another one to take them out, as I
18
said, at the piers in Saigon itself on the river there. The third option, the final option, the
19
one that we had to opt for was out of the DAO.
20
21
KC: Now why was the DAO chosen? Was it because of its location? Because the
organization there? Why the DAO?
22
RC: Well, because it was the largest place and we had a place where we could—
23
we had landing sites. I had to put teams into the DAO. See, we were preparing all these
24
sites all the time when we first got down during early April. Then the DAO, that’s where
25
the Pentagon East was, or Pentagon West, I guess you would call it, or East, but anyway
26
it was the large military complex there and a large airfield. Initially we were flying Air
27
Force aircraft out of there. So it was kind of set up to handle large groups of evacuees. It
28
was the most convenient place. Obviously, we started out doing evacuations by fixed air,
29
by the C-5s. You’re familiar with the crash of the C-5 with all the infants aren’t you?
30
KC: Yes. Yes, I am.
493
1
RC: Yeah. Well, see that was all part of it and then at the last part we were
2
evacuating by C-130s. On the morning of the twenty-ninth of April we had the C-130 that
3
was hit by a rocket. That’s when it was decided that we had to go to strictly to helicopter
4
evacuation.
5
6
KC: Right, right. How closely did you work, personally, work with the Air
America personnel there who played such an important role in bringing these people out?
7
RC: You’re kind of weak, say again.
8
KC: I’m sorry. What kind of relationship did you have or how closely did you
9
10
work with the Air America personnel who were involved in evacuating the city?
RC: Well, they were a part of the team. They checked in with us when I first
11
went in, the first time I went in. Al Gray, General Gray, then Colonel Gray, we went into
12
Saigon and met with the ambassador. During the same trip we went over to Air America
13
and spent a lot of time with them. Then they had been working, as I said, more with the
14
Alamo group. The Alamo group was integrated into our planning group. So we used
15
them. Actually, we worked very closely. They were one of our organizations, so to
16
speak. They did a great job of going out and picking people up all over the place and
17
bringing them back to Tan Son Nhut initially. That’s where we were supposed to do all
18
the helicopter evacuations, as you probably know from reading these stories. The
19
ambassador caused us to have to go out of the embassy. What we were supposed to do,
20
the plan for the DAO was to move people via bus from different locations in Saigon to
21
Tan Son Nhut. There they would be mustered and counted and prepared for helicopter
22
evacuation. I had sites prepared at Tan Son Nhut. I forget how many now. I think I’d
23
have to break out my papers, but four or five sites that were large enough for CH-53
24
helicopters. That is what we wanted to use because they were able to carry more people.
25
We put up to seventy people on those helicopters, on those 53s. We also had some Air
26
Force Jolly Green Giant helicopters, one squadron of them. I had two squadrons, two
27
heavy helicopter squadrons. I had a squadron of CH-46, which is a medium helicopter
28
squadron. Then I had Cobras, gunships. I had UH-1Es which are your, as you know,
29
they’re small helicopter that carries about four people. Air America brought evacuees
30
into Tan Son Nhut, basically. Some of them from the environs from farther out took the
494
1
helicopters directly to the ships. But Air America was integrated pretty heavily into the
2
plan. They did a very good job for us.
3
KC: You mentioned the Cobra gunships. Did any of the American helicopters or
4
American personnel come under any sort of enemy fire while this was taking place? I
5
mean, direct enemy fire directed at the helicopters as they were trying to evacuate people.
6
RC: They tried to say that we didn’t, but on some of the helicopters as they flew
7
out they did take fire. We did take some fire right at Tan Son Nhut. What I had, I put
8
machine guns on the top of the buildings there at Tan Son Nhut. They did a little firing,
9
engaging, some of the enemy fire. Several of the helicopters reported taking fire on the
10
way out. What I had them do is I had them stay above four thousand feet going in. At
11
one point that became very difficult because we had bad weather. The idea in going up to
12
four thousand feet is that that takes you out of small arms range.
13
KC: So most of the fire they were receiving would have been small arms then.
14
RC: That’s right.
15
KC: Okay.
16
RC: I would say that even some of the fire we received was from disgruntled
17
South Vietnamese, you know, because they felt like we were abandoning them.
18
KC: That’s a good point.
19
RC: Yep.
20
KC: I would’ve guessed there would’ve been maybe no concerted effort by any
21
sort of particular battery or group of NVA soldiers but maybe just sporadic in nature.
22
RC: That’s right. That’s right.
23
KC: Take me through what you remember about the evacuation of the embassy.
24
This is a very, very difficult part of the process with the high-ranking individuals who
25
were there, of course. The foremost among them is Ambassador Martin. Tom Polgar is
26
there. They’re holding out to the very, very end.
27
RC: That’s right.
28
KC: Take me through what you remember about the evacuation.
29
RC: Well, I would have to tell you that it is quite a lengthy story.
30
KC: I’ve got time.
495
1
RC: Okay. Well, things were proceeding and let me lead up to that, I have got to
2
condition you to this so you understand what happened. The evacuation at Tan Son Nhut
3
was very smooth except for the fact that we did have fires, fires in Saigon. We had bad
4
weather. You had to muster the CH-53s coming in and so on. So that was kind of
5
difficult. But other than that it went pretty much like clockwork. We were doing real
6
well there. I called—see, the ambassador was never, there was never supposed to be any
7
helicopter evacuation from the embassy. The plan was simply when we did have—we
8
did take special precautions in case that would fall through because in wartime plans are
9
plans. They’re constantly changing. You have to prepare for the worst. At the embassy
10
the only thing that it was indicative of maybe having to evacuate from the embassy was
11
the fact that we had to cut down a tamarind tree around noon time, around eleven o’clock
12
in the morning. That would make it so that we could get a ’53 into the courtyard of the
13
embassy. The only thing you could get into the embassy otherwise was CH-46s on the
14
roof of the embassy. We did have the capability once we cut down the tamarind tree to
15
land a single CH-53 in the embassy. That was used later, okay?
16
KC: Okay.
17
RC: Now the plan again was the ambassador was to come down to DAO via
18
land, via vehicle. That’s the way he was to come down and all the people would’ve come
19
down there. Okay, along about five o’clock things were progressing pretty good at the
20
DAO. Everything was moving pretty fast. I called the ambassador and said, “When are
21
you coming down to the DAO?” He said, “I’m not.” I said, “What?” He said, “No,” he
22
said, “We’ve got people that have to be evacuated from here.” That was a real bad thing
23
and he was talking to his superiors who had given him the okay to evacuate from the
24
embassy. That really threw a monkey wrench into our plans. It really did.
25
KC: It would’ve stretched out the time, as well, I would think.
26
RC: Oh, absolutely.
27
KC: What kind of effect does that have on the planning, having this time
28
29
stretched out? You had planned on it being more tight.
RC: Again, we had everybody that was supposed to go out of the DAO except for
30
the Marines that had been put in for security—I put a reinforced company into the DAO.
31
I put in more than that, but we were down to a reinforced company left in the DAO at
496
1
about 9:30 at night. We were through, in essence, at 9:30. Well, the evacuation went on
2
until eight o’clock the next morning. It would’ve continued on had we not received the
3
word from Washington long about 2:30 in the morning. Again there’s a lot of things
4
leading up to this. I received a word talking directly from Washington that we had X
5
number of helicopters left that we could use. In other words, I called the ambassador and
6
said, “How many more people have you got to be evacuated?” He said, “We still have
7
eight hundred people.” Now this was 2:30 in the morning.
8
KC: Wow.
9
RC: We were, you know, things were getting pretty testy because the North
10
Vietnamese were right next door. Anyway, they asked me how many helicopters would
11
that take. I said, “Well, we can do it with twenty helicopters, twenty flights, about twenty
12
flights.” He said, “Okay, twenty more flights is all you’re authorized.” So we flew
13
those, evacuated X number of people, but there were still people in the embassy and they
14
wouldn’t let us evacuate anymore. We had to close down the internal part of the embassy
15
and move the Marines, what Marines were left. We had taken most of the Marines out
16
because I put in an additional fifty Marines early in the evening when the ambassador
17
told me that he was not going to evacuate from there. He was not going to travel down
18
by car. We still had to do helicopter evacuations. That’s basically what happened.
19
Another thing that really messed things up for us was the admiral in charge of the Navy
20
part and the Air Force colonel had had the squadron both stop their people from flying
21
because of too much time in the air.
22
KC: Now would this have been Admiral Whitmire?
23
RC: Admiral Whitmire.
24
KC: Who was the Air Force colonel? Do you remember his name?
25
RC: No, I don’t. I’m sorry. I’ve got it written down in some boxes, but I don’t
26
have it with me now. He was a lieutenant colonel.
27
KC: Okay. It will be in the documents somewhere.
28
RC: Yes, that’s right. But that is what caused me to go out to leave the DAO. I
29
left the DAO along about eleven o’clock at night. I flew out with a major part of Hal
30
Company on the 2nd Battalion 4th Marines who were most of my security people at the
31
DAO. I flew out on a 53 with them.
497
1
KC: Where did you fly out to? Was it to Blue Ridge?
2
RC: I landed unfortunately on the Midway.
3
KC: On the Midway, okay.
4
RC: Right. I had a hard getting from the Midway, not a hard time, but it took me
5
time to get over to Blue Ridge. The main reason I was going to Blue Ridge I didn’t get
6
over to the Blue Ridge until about 1:30 or so in the morning. I got into Blue Ridge. I had
7
been calling from Tan Son Nhut out to the ship when the helicopters stopped, the
8
helicopters stopped coming in. I couldn’t get through to the ship on communications
9
even though we had a control plane overhead, an Air Force control plane. I was trying to
10
go through them and I couldn’t talk to the admiral on the ship. When I got aboard the
11
ship by this time when I got to the Blue Ridge by this time I was really pretty hog i.e. I
12
walked into the COC, the combat operations center, and I said, “Who”—I won’t tell you
13
the language I used, but I said—well, I will. I said, “Who in the hell stopped my
14
helicopters?” The admiral said, “I did.” I said, “You don’t have authority to stop my
15
helicopters.” I said, “Why did you do it?” He said, “For safety purposes. The pilots
16
have been flying too long.” I said this, “Marines don’t get tired when it comes to
17
something like this.” I couldn’t say that for the Air Force because they were attached to
18
me and they were not actually under my command. They were under my operational
19
control, but I couldn’t order them to fly, but I did put the Marines back in the air.
20
21
22
KC: Very interesting. What was the admiral’s reaction to your discussion of
this?
RC: I think he was a little bit shocked. Fortunately, there was another admiral
23
there, Admiral Steele was there who was the 7th Fleet commander. He backed me up
24
fully. But Don Whitmire was a little bit shocked because he was, you know, in the
25
pecking order I think he was a little senior to me. My boss, Lou Wilson, who was the CG
26
(commanding general) of FMFPAC (Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific) and you probably have
27
this in your historical file, had heard about this and he was really angry. He said, “Any
28
Marine, I will personally see that any Marine that doesn’t fly to continue to finish this
29
operation will be court martialed.” He didn’t have to say that because I was already
30
saying it. I assured him, I talked to him and I said, “Admiral,” I mean, “General, don’t
31
worry about it. I’m going to take care of it.” He came through in no uncertain terms,
498
1
also. Of course, he was there with Admiral Gayler, Noel Gayler. I had worked with
2
Admiral Gayler before. I knew him too. I worked for him at CINCPAC before I went
3
out to 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as the assistant wing commander.
4
5
KC: So you’re on the Blue Ridge, you let the admiral know that the Marines are
going to keep flying regardless of this order.
6
RC: That’s right.
7
KC: Where do you go from there? Do you back to the DAO?
8
RC: No. The DAO, we were finishing at the DAO. I sent word to them to
9
evacuate the DAO because we didn’t have any more transportation coming in because the
10
enemy was right next door. The buses were shut down. We did have an incident. I think
11
I probably told that to Dr. Laura. I think I probably told her that about Tony Wood and
12
he was bringing the bus through to Tan Son Nhut.
13
KC: Oh, yes. I believe you did.
14
RC: You remember that incident?
15
KC: I believe you did, yes.
16
RC: Yeah, that was kind of an interesting one. Anyway, from that point on it was
17
a matter of getting them out. Of course, the ambassador was still at the embassy. Now, I
18
would’ve gone to the embassy. I wanted to go to the embassy, but my better judgment
19
said first thing I have to do is get the airplanes back in the air.
20
KC: Right.
21
RC: Then while I was—right after I got the airplanes flowing again is when I got
22
the word from Washington that we only had twenty planes left that we could fly in. So I
23
stayed there to be certain that that was done. Things were pretty chaotic both places,
24
obviously. They had settled down pretty well within the COC. At the embassy they were
25
pretty drastic.
26
KC: Of course, it’s not until the next morning, like you said, by the time the
27
embassy has cleared out.
28
RC: That’s right.
29
KC: By the time Ambassador Martin leaves the embassy along with the
30
personnel.
499
1
2
RC: Did I tell—did you have the incident with Ambassador Martin and the pilot
Jerry Berry, getting him out?
3
KC: I don’t believe so. Tell me about that.
4
RC: Well, the ambassador was still wanting to stay there. He wanted to stay until
5
the very last. Washington sent word to us at the COC, said you must get the ambassador
6
out now. Admiral Steele took that call. He was the 7th Fleet commander and he took that
7
call. He turned to me and he said, “How are we going to get the ambassador out? He
8
says he doesn’t want to come out.” I said, “We put a Marine on either side of him and we
9
carry him out if we have to.” Well, when he—then I relayed to Captain Berry that he was
10
to personally go down and tell the ambassador that he had orders from the president to
11
take him out, to bring him out. The ambassador came out then. That was kind of an
12
interesting little tidbit.
13
KC: Right. Did you see the ambassador after he was evacuated?
14
RC: I didn’t personally talk to him. I saw him when he came aboard ship.
15
KC: On the Blue Ridge.
16
RC: Yes.
17
KC: What did he look like?
18
RC: What did the ambassador look like?
19
KC: Yeah, what had all of this, I would assume, the stress and the strain of all of
20
21
these days—
RC: Yeah, he was pretty disheveled. He was—you know one of the reasons we
22
found out and I found this out from several people, talked to Homer Smith about it and it
23
has come out in interviews since that time. His son was killed in Vietnam. He felt a real
24
connection. He just did not want to give up. That’s part of—that’s one of the reasons I
25
haven’t said much about it up to now because now the ambassador has passed away.
26
You can talk about some things without hurting his feelings, the destructive feeling that
27
would have on him. He was very disheveled when he finally came aboard. He really
28
was—really looked like he had been through the ringer, very tired, very emotional.
29
30
31
KC: Right. Correct me if I’m wrong here, but weren’t your Marines also involved
in the evacuation of the consulate there at Can Tho, as well, or am I off base there?
RC: Yes.
500
1
KC: They were?
2
RC: Yes.
3
KC: Okay. Can you tell me about that, as well?
4
RC: I can’t tell you too much about it because I was still aboard ship. I didn’t go,
5
but they took a ship down, a group down. At Can Tho they had a hard time getting out of
6
there because they had to come out eventually by boat, as you probably know. They
7
came to the ship and I don’t—you’d do better by talking to the individual that did that. I
8
know that it was kind of a testy thing.
9
KC: Right. What about the shipboard conditions? What was it like for the
10
American ships and the thousands of Vietnamese refugees who were on these ships?
11
What was that scene like for you?
12
RC: Well, as you probably know part of my command was the security
13
detachments on the MSTS ships and so on. We had approximately a platoon of Marines
14
and a corpsman on each of the ships. They had a very testy time on some of them. There
15
were several ships—what we did in the evacuation and we did this certainly at the
16
embassy and at Tan Son Nhut. We searched everybody so that they wouldn’t take
17
weapons. Well, on some of the evacuation ships and particularly MST, well, especially
18
the MSTS ships they had to boat people that came out to the ships directly. They came
19
aboard and there just wasn’t, I mean, they scrambled aboard. There just wasn’t the
20
capability to search each and every one of them. Some of them got aboard with weapons
21
and there were several incidents of gunfire where the Marines had to overcome some of
22
the people who were potentially evacuated. Obviously, they could’ve been VC. There
23
were incidents, one or two incidents where they delivered, the corpsmen delivered babies.
24
They had up to, as you know from the history, they had as many as five thousand people
25
on one ship. They were so crowded there was standing room only in the holds where
26
they put them. Those evacuation security Marines, they had a hell of a job to keep the
27
peace and to take care of those people. As you know, they went all the way back—they
28
went back to the Philippines initially and then some of them went on to Guam. That was
29
not an easy assignment.
30
31
KC: Absolutely. When all of this is over, post-evacuation of Saigon, this time
period, there was some sort of investigation I believe that you mentioned to Laura the last
501
1
time that you all spoke. You were personally being investigated for problems in the
2
evacuation of Saigon. Tell me about this investigation. Where did it come from? Who
3
was involved? What were the findings? Tell me about that investigation.
4
RC: Well, it came from Washington, as usual. There was an Army two-star
5
general. He had a team of about, oh, I think about a half a dozen people. One thing that
6
they were concerned about was the fact that we could get—well, there were some
7
Koreans left there. Some people had been hired—well, some of the Korean embassy
8
didn’t get out that wanted to get out. The firefighting people, the Vietnamese firefighting
9
people they didn’t get out. Then they wanted to, investigated it also about McMann and
10
Judge. They were the two Marines that were killed early that morning in the rocket
11
attack. Were you aware of that?
12
KC: Yes, I was.
13
RC: Okay. So they were looking into that and they were looking into difficulties
14
that we had in the evacuation. The reason, the major thing that they were concerned
15
about was the embassy, the fact that the embassy we had to evacuate from the—we were
16
evacuating from the embassy. Of course, I made it very clear that it was intended right
17
from the very beginning not to evacuate from the embassy because it was not suited for
18
that. It was not a landing center. There was not a landing zone there. Fortunately, we
19
cut down the tree, the big tree or that would’ve been a total disaster. We were able to get
20
quite a few people out of the embassy. We had over eight hundred people, over a
21
thousand people that came out of the embassy.
22
KC: Which is a staggering figure, all things considered.
23
RC: Absolutely.
24
KC: But because of, I guess, the chaos and those third-nation individuals who
25
were left behind like you said the Koreans and just the overall nature of this mess that
26
was what Saigon was by late April 1975. You would probably predict that someone was
27
going to look into an investigation for one reason or another.
28
RC: Oh, absolutely.
29
KC: What did they find, General, with this investigation?
502
1
RC: Well, they found out as far as I know they cleared me and said, “Damn good
2
job.” As far as I know we satisfied their concerns. The fact that—really, the thing that
3
messed it up more than anything else was evacuating from the embassy.
4
5
KC: Which, of course, was completely against your plans from the very
beginning.
6
RC: Absolutely.
7
KC: Right, right.
8
RC: Had they followed the rules and followed our plan we’d have gotten more
9
people out, I’m certain. They stayed there and that was the ambassador’s decision. I
10
know it was very difficult for him. He was letting people in that weren’t planned to go.
11
We had been told since that time and subsequent to the evacuation itself that he was
12
letting people in through the back entrances of the embassy and everything else, people to
13
be evacuated, people that were not programmed to be evacuated. But again, you’ve got
14
to look at his side of it, how he felt about it, but he was kind of breaking the rules. You
15
can’t be too hard on him.
16
KC: Let me ask you about that. I know it’s a very controversial thing and he
17
played a very controversial role in this, but from your perspective how would you sum up
18
the ambassador’s role in this and why he did what he did? What is your opinion
19
historically of this?
20
RC: Well, I think he was totally wrong. I think that things could’ve gone much
21
smoother had we followed the plan. I hadn’t been able to follow the plan as we laid them
22
out. I think that he was a little bit—he was very cantankerous with us. He didn’t really
23
want us around to do the planning. So a lot of the planning, as I told you, had to be kind
24
of done on the sly in order to make the thing work. I convinced him right at the last hour
25
that we were going to cut down that tree come hell or high water because we had to have
26
an emergency capability. You had to have that. It was not planned to use it, but we had a
27
contingency that should everything come unglued, and which they did, that we would
28
have a way to do it. It’s the best thing that we did really was to cut down that dad-gum
29
tree.
30
KC: How do you think history will treat the ambassador for his role here?
503
1
RC: Well, in the evacuation itself? I think they’ll place part of the blame on him
2
for not being able to get out to some people that maybe should have come out, some of
3
those people that subsequently spent years in prison camps and so on. On the other hand,
4
I think that they’ll logically say he was very dedicated to South Vietnam for personal
5
reasons and for the fact that he had been there. He loved the people and he wanted to
6
hold on as long as he could. He just kind of lost his reasoning, though, at the last. They
7
may give him a heavy hit on that one. Probably rightfully so because he was one of the
8
kingpins and he should not have taken the approach that he did.
9
KC: I will kind of be going backward with this next question a little bit. To some
10
degree I think that his handling of the evacuation was symbolic of his overall
11
determination to stay in Vietnam as well as he did. What was your opinion of the
12
ambassador’s handling of the political crisis as things were beginning to fall down around
13
him there in April of 1975?
14
RC: Of course, I wasn’t in the embassy with him, but in my opinion, of course,
15
you can’t tell a foreign government who they can have as their leader. I don’t know how
16
he didn’t know that Thieu was going to abandon the post at the eleventh hour and was
17
taking out all of the goodies that he took out. You know he took out millions of dollars.
18
I’m sure you’re aware of that. The ambassador, of course, again, how much can you tell
19
a foreign government if you’re an ambassador? I think that he could’ve controlled it a
20
little bit more. Certainly when we evacuated the people in the helicopters they didn’t
21
take out weapons. They didn’t take out money. They didn’t take out, you know, huge
22
sums of money and that sort of thing. They weren’t carrying money out like the former
23
president was. I think he probably looked the other way on a lot of things. I really do. A
24
little better control would’ve helped.
25
KC: Right. What is your opinion of the way the Vietnam War ended? I’m not
26
necessarily talking about the Peace Accords of ’73, but of the way the North Vietnamese
27
and South Vietnamese war ended there in 1975 and with so many Vietnamese being left
28
behind. Give me your general impression of your mindset at that time of finally the end
29
of this war in the chaotic and tragic way that it ended.
30
31
RC: Well, of course, you’re asking a guy that, I spent three periods there, three
very critical periods. I was there and I told Dr. Laura I was there at the, kind of at the
504
1
beginning of the committed American involvement in ’63. Then I was there at the
2
highlight of it in ’67 and ’68 during Tet. I saw what the Vietnamese, how they were
3
struggling and how they were taking this thing on, the problem on and then, of course, at
4
the last. All I can say is evacuation time to me was the saddest part of my life. I
5
certainly thought the South Vietnamese as a nation was struggling to survive. They were
6
left high and dry by our government. It was very, very—to me I was ashamed, frankly,
7
to have to come in at the last minute and pull people out. Then certainly there were a lot
8
of people that were left behind and shouldn’t have been left behind and again a
9
government decision, a higher government decision. To me it was a black eye on the
10
11
12
13
United States government. It really was.
KC: Why do think that it just didn’t work out? Why do you think that the
experiment of South Vietnam didn’t last?
RC: Well, I think it didn’t last—again, I think I’ve already said, we abandoned
14
them. We set them up for what happened to them. We built them up. We trained them.
15
They were doing pretty well. The 18th Division, just a little vignette, the 18th Division in
16
the last days, South Vietnamese division, I mean, they fought as well as any organization
17
has ever fought. They fought until they ran out of ammunition. The thing about it is we
18
just quit supplying them with anything. We built them up and we kept them going and
19
we put all of our effort into it and then all of a sudden we walked out on them. I think—it
20
was political more than anything else. Unfortunately, the media had a big say in that, the
21
way they constantly played the bad side of the operation, always playing the bad side,
22
never the good things that were coming out of it. The media is still at it, Kelly, you know
23
that. They’re not our friends. They’re really not. They certainly had a lot to do with the
24
fall of South Vietnam. It was a sad, sad day for the United States, I think. History won’t
25
treat us very well for that as time goes on as to how we really abandoned people that we
26
encouraged them to form as a nation and to do the things that they did and then all of a
27
sudden right when they needed us most we let them down. That to me was wrong. Are
28
you still there?
29
KC: Yes, sir.
30
RC: Okay.
505
1
KC: I’ve got another question for you and it is shifting gears a little bit. But
2
shortly after the evacuation of Saigon in the middle of May, I believe, May 12th of 1975,
3
the Khmer Rouge capture an American ship, they capture the Mayaguez.
4
RC: Mayaguez. Yeah, I was involved in that.
5
KC: And you were involved in that?
6
RC: Yeah.
7
KC: If you can take me through the Mayaguez incident from what you remember
8
9
from start to finish.
RC: Well, of course, I wasn’t directly at where the Mayaguez was and I wasn’t
10
involved in the actual combat there, but I was involved in what was going to be a rescue
11
effort, what was planned as a rescue effort follow on to the initial part of it. As you recall
12
the Mayaguez was taken and was taken to an island. The ship was taken to an island and
13
the crew was taken off of it. We put together, we, the United States, put together a very
14
quick makeshift operation in which a battalion of Marines was to be flown into I forget
15
the—right now I can’t remember the name of the island.
16
KC: Was it Koh Tang?
17
RC: Koh Tang, yeah, okay. Flown into Koh Tang. Now what they did, and that
18
was kind of an abortive mission because they took troops out of Thailand and were flying
19
them into an area where they would muster and go to Koh Tang. Then one of the
20
helicopters went down, as I recall. We lost a whole load of—in that particular part of it I
21
believe it was Air Force, Air Force MPs (military police). We lost a whole group of
22
them. Then they subsequently put together an operation where they flew into Koh Tang
23
again principally with Air Force helicopters because we had all the major heavy lift
24
helicopters tied up on my operation. They flew them into Koh Tang. It was really a
25
mess, really a mess. The helicopters and again I wasn’t there I got most of this second
26
hand and from listening to the operation which I was doing en route. The helicopters that
27
were supposed to go in at the primary landing zone diverted because of heavy ground
28
fire, heavy fire from the ground. It took the battalion commander into an area far away
29
from where his troops were and deposited him. He had to make his way to his unit to try
30
to salvage it, to try to put it together. We lost quite a few Marines there because of it. It
31
was very, very poorly done, very poorly done from the standpoint of the Air Force. Now
506
1
we were—this happened while I was still or just finished I guess, I’m trying to recall
2
exactly the investigation. Remember you talking about the investigation?
3
KC: Right.
4
RC: I got word, I got a call from Defense Department that we were to put
5
together a group and to take them to help the troops that were engaged at Koh Tang,
6
okay?
7
KC: Okay.
8
RC: Now this was—we were delayed by the Hancock was having some kind of
9
trouble, some kind of mechanical trouble. So we were delayed. The original concept of
10
the operation was we were to arrive at about the same time as this air unit was. We were
11
delayed by problems with the ship. We took off—we left port probably, oh, gosh, I think
12
a whole day almost later than we were supposed to.
13
KC: What port were you at?
14
RC: Pardon?
15
KC: Where were you?
16
RC: We were in Cubi point.
17
KC: Okay. Okay.
18
RC: Okay. Now, en route this fiasco was taking place at Koh Tang. They were
19
trying to figure out how they would get helicopters in to evacuate the Marines that were
20
on the ground there. They were receiving fire. They had OV-10s, Air Force OV-10s
21
there, but they couldn’t coordinate their air to ground because the OV-10s said they
22
couldn’t talk to the ground. I said, “Well, you’ve got HF (high frequency) radio, talk to
23
them that way. The Marines have HF radio.” Well, they were able to talk and finally they
24
got it. That’s the only part that I really had in it.
25
26
KC: How long had they gone without communication with the Marines on the
ground?
27
RC: Probably half a day.
28
KC: Really?
29
RC: Yeah.
30
KC: And no one thought to change frequencies?
31
RC: No.
507
1
KC: Wow.
2
RC: Maybe not that long. I’d say quite a few hours, enough that it was really
3
chaotic and they weren’t—and they were taking casualties, heavy firefight. So it was
4
very bad. Now we were preparing as we were going down there we were preparing to
5
make amphibious landings if necessary. Also the helicopters that we had aboard, I had a
6
squadron of helicopters aboard the Hancock and enough Marines that we could’ve
7
handled the situation.
8
KC: What kind of helicopters were these, the 53s?
9
RC: Yes.
10
KC: Okay.
11
RC: I had some Cobras and things like that, too. That Koh Tang, that Mayaguez
12
13
thing was a mess. It really was.
KC: Let me ask you this, General. Why do you think it was such a mess? Was it
14
because it was so ad hoc? Do you think that it was poorly planned? Do you think that
15
there was no one tried to say, “Wait, let’s wait a day before we start to do something and
16
think this through?” Why do you think it was?
17
RC: I think it was—you hit the nail on the head. I think that it was poorly
18
planned because it was pushed rapidly. They just didn’t think it out. They did not think
19
it out. They tried to—they integrated services. They should’ve waited on the Marines to
20
do it. That’s our expertise. They put together an ad hoc type exercise and group. They
21
fell on their keister doing it. I hate to say it, but if the Marines had handled it, it wouldn’t
22
have happened the way it did, believe me.
23
24
KC: Do you think that those who put it together thought that we can’t get the
Marines here in time so we’re going to have to use the Air Force?
25
RC: I think that was it. I think they were concerned, and probably rightfully so,
26
that they needed to get down there as rapidly as possible because you had a rogue outfit
27
in Thailand, Cambodia, that was killing everybody. They probably sensed we’ve got to
28
rescue these guys as quickly as we can. They put it together too quickly without really
29
thinking it out. It was a disaster.
30
31
KC: Of course, it comes right on the heels of the evacuation of Saigon. So
American power and prestige are certainly in question.
508
1
RC: That’s right. That’s right. I’m certain that had a lot to do with decision. The
2
decision for coming down from on high pretty rapidly in those days, as you know. I have
3
always said this, going back to Vietnam and, of course, the Vietnam fiasco influenced the
4
Cambodian situation, too. That gave them a little bit of idea that they could get away
5
with a lot of things, you know. The worst mistake in Vietnam was the peace treaty or the
6
ceasefire that Mr. Kissinger negotiated. To this day I don’t have any respect for that
7
man. Letting those troops stay in Vietnam and enemies—you don’t invite your enemy to
8
stay in a non-conquered land. You don’t invite that. You kick them out. That has to be
9
part of the peace. Anyway, they were building roads right down to Saigon right up to the
10
time that Saigon fell. That’s because they were allowed in there. Well, you’re familiar
11
with that.
12
KC: Yeah, that’s a good point. Let’s take it back a few years back to 1973 and
13
let me ask you about the way or what your perceptions were of the Paris Accords that
14
ended American involvement for most intents and purposes.
15
RC: I think, as I said, very quickly I think that we had our head up our rear end
16
when we came to the final negotiations on that. We compromised too much. The major
17
compromise was allowing the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese, to remain in South
18
Vietnam, period. I think that was it pure and simple. It wouldn’t have happened, I doubt
19
very seriously that Vietnam would’ve actually fallen had that been thought out a little
20
better and not been compromised just for the sake of getting it done in a hurry. We
21
really, really, really let the South Vietnamese down. We violated all kind of principles in
22
arriving at those accords. To this day I can’t figure out what they were thinking of in
23
doing that.
24
KC: If someone—to play devil’s advocate here—were to play devil’s advocate
25
here someone would say, “Well, because of the lack of support of the United States it was
26
really a foregone conclusion that the U.S. had to get out and that we just simply had to
27
accept the reality of the North Vietnamese living, being, continuing to reside in South
28
Vietnam.” How would you respond to that?
29
RC: Boloney. (Laughs)
30
KC: I thought that might be your answer. (Laughs)
509
1
RC: No, really, I think it’s—you know there comes a time when the government
2
has to stand up for what is right. We were violating a lot of our constitutional gifts now
3
and the government for political reasons. Those accords were executed strictly on a
4
political basis, for political purposes. They didn’t—you know, if we’d have done
5
something like that during World War II we would all be wearing swastikas now.
6
You’ve got to stand up for what is right, you have to. It was not right to do—to violate
7
all the principles of warfare and of a nation. I mean, they imposed that those accords
8
imposed penalties on the South Vietnamese people that I don’t know why they didn’t
9
object to it more and say, “No, we can’t live with this.” I don’t know why they didn’t do
10
that, but again you had Thieu in there and that was a big part of the problem. He was
11
raking in the dough. I’m certain he had his plans right from the beginning. It was
12
unfortunately a political mess, the whole operation.
13
KC: As you have said you’ve seen this from the beginning to end. You were
14
there at three critical times throughout the history of the American phase of the Vietnam
15
conflict. So your perspective is especially valuable, I think, about this whole thing
16
having seen it develop over the years and being in the positions that you were as you
17
watched it develop over the years.
18
RC: Yes, it was very sad, Kelly. It really was. Like I say I really when I meet
19
with some of the South Vietnamese veterans. We’ve got a pretty good contingent in the
20
Dallas area. I’ve met them several times and I really—they ask me to talk and that sort of
21
thing. I really, I’m uncomfortable with it because I feel like I don’t have the right to say
22
too many things to them because we let them down so much.
23
KC: That’s very interesting you should say that after all of these years.
24
RC: Well, I still feel that way.
25
KC: Knowing the mistakes that were made that was out of your hands, obviously,
26
27
in the larger since. It’s interesting that you would still feel that way.
RC: A lot of very fine Vietnamese people. I went back to my hometown up in
28
Columbus, Ohio, to my high school one year. They wanted me—they had a National
29
Honor Society. I was a member of the National Honor Society and the principal said,
30
“Would you speak to our National Honor Society? We are having a dinner for them
31
tonight.” I said, “Yes, I would be honored to do it.” So I went in there and out of a class
510
1
of about three hundred they had about twenty-five National Honor students. Okay?
2
Eighteen of them were South Vietnamese. I know South Vietnamese, as a matter of fact,
3
I just fell and broke my hip the first of January, broke my leg. Frank might’ve told you
4
about that, but the doctor that I had at Baylor was a South Vietnamese doctor whom I had
5
evacuated.
6
KC: No kidding.
7
RC: Yep.
8
KC: Did he remember you or you him?
9
RC: No, he didn’t. He didn’t know me. He was a youngster.
10
KC: Too young?
11
RC: I think he was nine years old.
12
KC: How did you find this out about him?
13
RC: Just talking to him. He came in and I talked to him and I said, “You’re
14
South Vietnamese, aren’t you?” “Yes, I am.” Then I queried him a little bit and found
15
out that he was—I said, “Were you born in South Vietnam?” “Yes, I was.” “When did
16
you come to the United States?” “1975.” “How did you come?” “Came with my parents
17
on a ship.” So one thing led to another and so I found out. You know, it kind of tugs at
18
your heart strings when you—I have never gone back. People have said, “Have you gone
19
back to Vietnam?” I said, “No, I haven’t gone back. I’m almost ashamed to go back.”
20
KC: Did you tell this doctor what role you played in his evacuation?
21
RC: Yes, I did.
22
KC: What was his reaction?
23
RC: “Thank you, thank you very much. I am very grateful for being able to live
24
25
in this great country.”
KC: You know, General, as you have said you have a lot of regret and feel very
26
badly about the way the United States had left the South Vietnamese, but in a different
27
way you can look at these kinds of things, whether it was the National Honor Society
28
with the eighteen out of the twenty-five students who were from South Vietnam or
29
parents were from South Vietnam and meeting this gentleman, this physician, who did
30
the work on you and see his appreciation and his success, I would think that in another
31
way that would make you extremely proud. Has that been the case?
511
1
RC: Well, yes, for that group, but how many are still back there that—and how
2
many spent as much as ten years in a prison, repatriation, you know, that should’ve been
3
evacuated.
4
KC: Right.
5
RC: From that stand point it was not successful. I’m not proud of it. From the
6
other stand point I am proud of it and I am proud of the Vietnamese that came here. I try
7
to tell them that. They’re part of the backbone of this country. That’s what this country
8
is made of. It’s made of people that want to come here or come here and become
9
successful and are great contributors to the country. That’s good. That part of it’s good,
10
very good. It’s an emotional thing for me, Kelly, it really is.
11
KC: Very complex, too.
12
RC: Yes, it is. Yes, it is. There are some wonderful Vietnamese, very good
13
14
people.
KC: General, if you can over the rest of the course of this session here today
15
before we wrap up, could you take me through the rest of your career in the Marine
16
Corps? You stay on. You become a two-star, a three-star general before it’s done. You
17
retire as a lieutenant general. You had just a fantastic career from this point. Take me
18
through your career briefly from 1975 forward.
19
RC: Well, when I came back I was assigned to Washington as the deputy chief of
20
staff for aviation, for Marine aviation. I spent a time there. I spent about a year there.
21
Then I was assigned to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing as the commanding general of the
22
2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, which was a great tour. It was the largest wing in the Marine
23
Corps. I was able to do a lot of good flying and had a lot of good people. We were able
24
to win a lot of awards. My people were very good. I was blessed with great people. I
25
spent two years there and then I went up to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic where I was
26
the operations and training officer, an operations and training and planning officer. There
27
met some very fine people one of whom was an Admiral Ike Kidd. I don’t know if you
28
ever heard of him or not?
29
KC: No, I’m not familiar with him.
30
RC: They called him in Washington, they called him “the Professor.” He was a
31
brilliant individual. His father was the first flag officer that was killed in World War II.
512
1
He was on the Arizona. His father had commanded the Arizona. But Ike was a real good
2
guy. I was able to work with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and worked
3
some with the Israelis. I worked with a lot of Navy units, Marine and Army units.
4
CINCLANT, of course, what that signifies is Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. Our
5
territory included from the eastern shore of the Mississippi River over to the Middle East.
6
That’s what we were basically responsible for overall. That was an interesting time.
7
Then from there I was assigned down to Quantico, Marine Corps Development
8
Command at Quantico and commanded that and made three stars and went down there
9
and finished my career there.
10
KC: You retired in ’83, I believe it was.
11
RC: 1983.
12
KC: 1983.
13
RC: Mm-hmm, sure did. When I finished there I went to Ohio back to my
14
hometown and wound up working on the governor’s staff there. A good friend of mine
15
introduced me to the governor. Dave Thomas was a very close friend of mine. He was
16
the founder of Wendy’s.
17
KC: Right, right, right.
18
RC: I went up to an Ohio State-Michigan game and met the governor and the
19
governor said—he said, “What are you doing?” I said, “Well, I think I’m going to—my
20
wife wants—so I went ahead and wound up retiring. I was going to go to Headquarters
21
but—they wanted me to go to Headquarters and I said, “No, I am not going back to
22
Washington, D.C.” I did not like Washington duty. I went back to Ohio and worked on
23
the governor’s cabinet and wound up running the airport, also, at Columbus International
24
Airport. Then one day my wife said, “I am going to go to Texas.” She got tired of the
25
weather in Ohio. She’s a Texas girl. “I’m going back to Texas. You want to come
26
along?” I said, “Yep.” So we came back to Texas. When I came down here I was kind
27
of retired and a friend of mine who was a former commissioner at Dallas County, Chris
28
Seamus, I met him at a Marine function and he said, “We need your help.” He said,
29
“Would you consider it?” I found out that he wanted me run all the courts in the Dallas
30
area. I said, “Well, I’ll do it for a year or so to help out,” and I did that. I wound up
31
staying five years. Then I retired from there in 1990, ’95.
513
1
KC: There’s retirement and then there’s retirement, I guess.
2
RC: That’s right. That’s right. So that’s kind of it.
3
KC: Let me ask you just a few more questions if I could here, General. You
4
were in a position having been someone who was in the military at the end of World War
5
II, or at the very tail end. You served in Korea very honorably, very bravely in Korea.
6
You served through the inter-war years. You served again in Vietnam. How did—and
7
obviously in the years following Vietnam, tell me what it was like to view the evolution
8
of the U.S. military. If you want to keep it to Marines that’s great, too. How did the
9
Corps evolve, or the U.S. military in general, evolve throughout the course of all of those
10
11
years, those generations really?
RC: Well, when I first went in, of course, World War II was just ending. They
12
were scaling back very rapidly. As a matter of fact, when I finally, I got commissioned in
13
’48 and we only had sixty-seven thousand Marines in the Marine Corps coming down
14
from five hundred thousand. We didn’t have—I remember I went through Quantico and
15
became an officer after a couple of years in the Marine Corps. I had enlisted originally in
16
the V-5 program. They shut that down when the war ended. So then I went into the
17
Marine Corps as an enlisted man and got commissioned after a couple of years. When I
18
went to my 1st Platoon in Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, 2nd Marine Division as a rifle
19
platoon leader. We used to have to walk out to the training areas and we didn’t even
20
have blanks. We used to have to say “bang, bang” when we played war. So it was quite
21
a deterioration. It really was. It was kind of I’d say a real challenge. The youngsters that
22
we got were pretty dedicated, pretty dedicated youngsters, but they didn’t have that many
23
of them. I know in my rifle platoon I had some very, very good people, but then along
24
came the Korean War. The Korean War we didn’t have all the equipment that we
25
needed. So it was a bad deterioration of the military services up until the Korean War.
26
Then, of course, we built up fairly quickly. Then the age of technology started hitting. I
27
wound up becoming an aviator after I got wounded. I said I’m going to be an aviator and
28
went through flight training and initially when I went in, again, was right at the tail end of
29
the Korean War. We didn’t have—we had old World War II airplanes. It didn’t take
30
long at all until we had jets. The next time I went out I was flying a first class jet. The
31
military kept building up and then along came Vietnam. In Vietnam we had—when I
514
1
first went over there we were still building quite a bit. We still had the old HRS
2
helicopters. It didn’t take long and we had 46s then 53s. So the military has really—the
3
American military has led the way in the world for progress. I’ve seen it. I saw the
4
progress that we had in the days of the—in the bad days of the drug wars, not the drug
5
wars, but the ’60s when we had the long-haired guys and the people with all of their new
6
ways and smoking pot and all of that. I’ve seen that happen and I saw it invade the
7
military some in Vietnam, not so much in the Marine Corps. We didn’t have that much
8
trouble with it. I was able to start a program in Quantico, anti-drug program which
9
eventually wound me up on the governor’s cabinet up in Ohio. I have seen a great
10
progress in the military. Now the one thing that has bothered me some is the military is
11
much more political than it was in those days. It became very political, probably the
12
main reason that I got out.
13
14
15
KC: Why do think this turn toward politics took place? Why do you think it
happened?
RC: I think for selfish reasons. I think that a lot of the senior officers as they
16
progressed they saw that this was the way to move ahead. Really, I think it’s a letdown
17
of the morals of the country. Don’t get me wrong. Most of the military, and particularly
18
now with the professional military that you have, is pretty high-integrity outfit, pretty
19
high integrity. For the most part they’re disgusted, somewhat disgusted with some of the
20
politics that they have to go through to get things done, but you have that small group that
21
really caters so much to the political side. Of course, you have to as you progress up
22
rank. You have to be able to play some politics. That goes with the territory.
23
KC: All right. Well, just a couple of more questions here for you, General. Look
24
back on the Korean War, which you fought, as you look back on it today what do you
25
believe is the legacy of the Korean War? Then I want to ask you the same thing about
26
Vietnam, but for right now what was the legacy of the Korean War?
27
RC: Well, I think that the Korean War, the Korean people developed a nation, the
28
South Korean nation, and made remarkable progress, absolutely remarkable progress.
29
The basic problem, though, that has come out of that for the South Koreans and I have a
30
lot of Koreans friends—as a matter of fact, I am going to be on a radio show on the
31
Fourth of July with a former Korean Marine and Army both—he was in both—that was a
515
1
line crosser. He was fourteen and fifteen years old when the war started. They drafted
2
some three thousand young people out of their high schools and sent them north as spies.
3
He was one of them. Then of that three thousand there’s only about three hundred of
4
them left. He tells me and I get most of my feeling from him is that the young people in
5
South Korea now, obviously they’re not that motivated to unite their country or they’d
6
like to unite the country for financial reasons, but they don’t know too much about the
7
Korean War. They’ve become a capitalistic nation that has made a lot of progress, a lot
8
of wealth, done some very good things. Their legacy has been one of moving from an
9
absolute poverty, which they were in certainly while they were under the Japanese rule.
10
The Japanese for example took down all their trees and everything else to a country that
11
is capitalistic in nature and a lot of opportunity there, a lot of opportunity. Again, they’re
12
making some mistakes in their education system where they’re not building on why they
13
are where they are. So there’s not a lot of gratitude for what they’ve got. The legacy has
14
been, for them, has been one of moving abject poverty into a fairly hearty and healthy
15
nation and wealthy nation. The North on the other hand, the North Koreans they’ve got a
16
very poor situation. They really have. Those in the North that make any progress are in
17
the military. That’s their life. Otherwise they’re fighting for survival. They’re fighting
18
for survival. The legacy they have is one of hoping in some way that they can garner
19
some of that wealth from the South. In order to do that they probably eventually will
20
have to invade the South and try to take over and try to grab some of that wealth. Their
21
legacy is one of struggle and trying to survive. The legacy of the South Koreans is one of
22
a good possibility of a good future for everybody. That’s kind of it. Oversimplified, but
23
to me that’s the way I feel.
24
25
26
KC: Sure. What about the legacy of the Vietnam War for both the Vietnamese
and for the United States?
RC: Well, the Vietnam War the only thing that I really know about Vietnam now
27
is what I’ve read about and I’ve seen it on some videos and that sort of thing. It has
28
become a relatively prosperous nation, but I think it’s still a nation of haves and have
29
nots. It’s a legacy if you join the team you’re going to get ahead. If you don’t, if you try
30
to be an individual you’re not going to go anyplace you’re going to struggle. To me it’s
31
communism versus a republic. Your legacy is one of—if you’re Vietnamese your legacy
516
1
is you do what the government says and you’ll get ahead. Otherwise you’re going to
2
struggle. There’s a lot of poor people in South Vietnam still on certain people out in
3
the—just like there is in China and in Russia. Again, I think you have to—people have to
4
be very careful about how they judge what the government can do for them. You have to
5
be very careful. Unfortunately, a lot of them are sold a bill of goods and the politicians in
6
our country now, I guess you from the way I talk you know how I feel.
7
KC: Yes, sir. I do.
8
RC: You know how I feel. I am very definitely an old timer when it comes to
9
such things as our constitution. I just don’t think you can—the only thing that our
10
forefathers kind of neglected to think ahead enough was that they didn’t put term limits
11
on politicians. If they’d have done that we would probably still be a very, very thriving
12
and our future would be very bright, very bright. Not that it isn’t. You know, not that we
13
are done, but we have to be careful.
14
KC: Right. What do you think the legacy of the Vietnam War is for this country?
15
RC: Well, I don’t think we have anything that we have created over there now. I
16
don’t think we’re going to get too much benefit out of it. I think they’d be very careful.
17
Of course, they sell us things you can buy clothing that is made in Vietnam. You can do
18
that sort of thing, but our legacy from (dog barks)—you probably heard my dog. But our
19
legacy from Vietnam is kind of blank, I think. We’re really not going to get much of it.
20
The legacy that we have from the individuals that were involved in it I think that is pretty
21
well known. Most of the, or many of the Vietnam veterans are really sad and really feel
22
that a lot of their life was wasted because, again, what did we do? We abandoned them.
23
We abandoned them and a lot of sacrifice and a lot of blood and a lot of love is gone and
24
was lost for what purpose? For what purpose? The Vietnamese legacy for America is not
25
very good, not very good. The legacy of Korea, unfortunately, from a veteran’s
26
standpoint, a Korean veteran’s standpoint you know it’s called “the Forgotten War.” The
27
basic reason I think that was because it came on the tail of a war that we were victorious.
28
In Vietnam, I mean in Korea we’re still there. It never ended. But the legacy in Vietnam,
29
again, going back to that is not very good. It’s a legacy of failure. It’s a legacy of lost
30
time and lost opportunity, lost lives. It’s not something that we can be proud of.
517
1
2
KC: Well, I don’t want to end the interview on a down note like that, General. Is
there anything else that you’d like to add to the interview before we close it up today?
3
RC: No, Kelly, I really appreciate your taking the time to do this.
4
KC: It was my pleasure, believe me.
5
RC: I’d like to probably recover some of this. It’s been a few years since I
6
started it. I don’t have all my background papers. I was thinking today, “Now, what if he
7
asked me who the squadron commander was in such and such a squadron?”
518