Ipsoa - Beneficiario effettivo e treaty shopping di Valente Piergiorgio

Transcription

Titolo del capitolo
Capitolo 1II
IL CONTRASTO AL TREATY SHOPPING
NEI RECENTI ORIENTAMENTI OCSE1
1
A cura di Piergiorgio Valente.
© IPSOA – Wolters Kluwer Italia S.r.l.
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Titolo del libro
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© IPSOA – Wolters Kluwer Italia S.r.l.
III Treaty shopping: recenti orientamenti OCSE
III IL CONTRASTO AL TREATY SHOPPING NEI RECENTI
ORIENTAMENTI OCSE
Sommario: 3.1 Premessa 3.2 Le previsioni del Discussion Draft in materia di treaty abuse 3.3. Le
cd. “LOB Provisions” secondo il Discussion Draft dell’OCSE 3.4 Ulteriori casi di abuso dei trattati
secondo il Discussion Draft dell’OCSE 3.5 L’utilizzo dei trattati ai fini della doppia non imposizione 3.6 Le raccomandazioni dell’OCSE del 16 settembre 2014 e del 5 ottobre 2015 3.7
Abstract 3.8 Riferimenti
3.1 PREMESSA
La complessità dei network convenzionali internazionali, così come la diversità tra
Stati nell’approccio alla disciplina fiscale delle operazioni internazionali, può dare luogo a fenomeni di abuso dei trattati (cd. “treaty abuse”).
Uno degli interventi identificati dall’Action Plan dell’OCSE (Action 6) concerne
proprio l’abuso dei trattati contro le doppie imposizioni, consistente nell’“illegittimo
utilizzo” delle suddette convenzioni al fine di ottenere un beneficio fiscale1.
Il treaty abuse si manifesta di norma mediante lo sfruttamento delle differenze nei
trattati stipulati tra i vari Stati o mediante l’interposizione di un soggetto residente in
uno Stato terzo nel flusso reddituale Stato della fonte-Stato del beneficiario effettivo2.
1 Il cd. Rapporto BEPS e il relativo Action Plan intendono contrastare i fenomeni di erosione della base
imponibile e di doppia non imposizione derivanti principalmente dal mancato coordinamento dei diversi
ordinamenti nazionali e dal fatto che le attuali disposizioni di fiscalità internazionale non risultano essere
coerenti con il mutato contesto economico. Per approfondimenti cfr. Valente P., Elusione Fiscale Internazionale,
IPSOA, 2014, p. 1895 ss..
2 Il fenomeno fa riferimento a quelle situazioni nelle quali una persona fisica o una persona giuridica “that is not
eligible for the benefits of a tax treaty uses an intermediary entity that is eligible for such benefits to obtain these benefits indirectly.
More precisely, treaty shopping may occur in circumstances such as the following: An individual or a company, who is a resident of
country 1, establishes an intermediary entity in country 2 to operate a business and earn a type of income, such as dividends, interest,
royalties, and capital gains, in country 3. Countries 2 and 3 have a tax treaty that reduces taxes on the type of income earned in
country 3 while countries 1 and 3 do not have such a treaty. Countries 1 and 2 also have a favorable tax treaty. The intermediary
entity claims the application of the tax treaty between countries 2 and 3 to obtain tax reductions in country 3. However, the
intermediary entity is owned or controlled by a resident of country 1 who is not entitled to the tax treaty benefits. Furthermore, the
intermediary entity pays no or low taxes in country 2 on the type of income earned in country 3. The intermediary entity carries on
no substantial business in country 2. In these circumstances, in country 3, a tax authority may be able to apply a general anti-abuse
rule and impose a penalty on the resident of country 1 for tax avoidance (…)” (Hong S., “Strategic Treaty Shopping”, in
Social Science Research Network, maggio 2014).
Per ulteriori approfondimenti sul tema del treaty shopping, cfr. Brindusa Cruceru L., Treaty Shopping and the Abuse of
Income Tax Conventions, McGill University (Canada), 2005; Couture J.P., The Minister’s Past, Present and Future
Strategies Against Treaty Shopping, HEC Montréal, 2008; Langer M., “Outbound treaty shopping offers advantages
for US multinationals”, in Intertax, n. 8-9/1989, pag. 333; Panayi C.H.J.I., Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, TreatyShopping And The European Community, Kluwer Law International, 2007; Renger S., Treaty Shopping, Books on
Demand, 2008; Scholz J., Anti-Treaty-Shopping-Regelungen: § 50d Abs. 3 EStG im internationalen Vergleich, Books on
Demand, 2011; van Weeghel S., The Improper Use of Tax Treaties, Kluwer Law International, 1998, pag. 117;
Weyzig F., Tax treaty shopping: structural determinants of Foreign Direct Investment routed through the Netherlands, Springer
Science+Business Media, LLC 2012; Becker (Rechtsanwalt.) H., Treaty shopping: an emerging tax issue and its present
status in various countries, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1988; Arnold B.J., McIntyre M.J., International Tax
Primer, Kluwer Law International, 1 gennaio, 2002; Reinhold R., “What is Tax Treaty Abuse (Is Treaty
Shopping an Outdated Concept)”, in 53 Tax Lawyer, 1999/2000; Baker P., Wurm F.J., “An emerging tax issue
and its present status in various countries”, in Treaty shopping, Deloitte, Haskins & Sells International (a cura
(segue)
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Beneficiario effettivo e treaty shopping
Generalmente, le pratiche di treaty abuse vengono realizzate abusando delle
clausole previste dalle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni che disciplinano la
tassazione transfrontaliera di royalties, interessi, dividendi, la nozione di residenza e stabile organizzazione e la concessione di crediti d’imposta.
Al fine di dare attuazione alla citata Action 63, in data 14 marzo 2014, l’OCSE ha
pubblicato il documento “BEPS Action 6: preventing the granting of treaty benefits in
inappropriate circumstances” (di seguito, “Discussion Draft”) il quale rappresenta il risultato
dei lavori svolti in ambito OCSE con specifico riferimento alle seguenti tre aree di
azione:
 introduzione di specifiche disposizioni nelle convenzioni contro la doppia
imposizione e pubblicazione di specifiche raccomandazioni concernenti
l’elaborazione di norme nazionali che impediscano l’estensione di benefici
derivanti dai trattati a soggetti che non avrebbero diritto ad usufruire dei
medesimi;
 elaborazione di chiarimenti con riferimento alla considerazione secondo cui
“tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation”;
 identificazione delle cd. “tax policy considerations” delle quali, in linea generale, gli
Stati dovrebbero tenere conto prima di procedere alla conclusione di una
convenzione bilaterale in materia fiscale.
Il Discussion Draft evidenzia la necessità di includere, nel preambolo delle
convenzioni bilaterali, un chiaro riferimento alla volontà degli Stati contraenti di
prevenire e contrastare i fenomeni di elusione fiscale, e, in particolare, di evitare di
favorire i cd. fenomeni di treaty shopping4.
Esso raccomanda altresì l’inclusione nelle convenzioni di una specifica “anti-abuse
rule based on the limitation-on-benefits provisions”5, sulla base delle clausole incluse in trattati
della), Deventer, 1988, pagg. 1-8; von Thülen Rhoades R., Langer M.J., Income taxation of foreign related transactions,
New York, 1992 e 1993, 12A/3-12A/41; IBFD (a cura dell’), International tax avoidance and evasion,
Amsterdam, 1981; OECD, «International tax avoidance and evasion – four related studies», in Issues of
international taxation, No. 1, Parigi, 1987; Pistone P., “L’abuso delle convenzioni internazionali in materia fiscal”,
in Corso di Diritto Tributario Internazionale a cura di Uckmar, Padova, 1999, pag. 483 ss; Uckmar V., “General
Report, Tax Avoidance/Tax Evasion”, in Cahiers de droit fiscal international, vol. LXVIIIa, 1983, pag. 15 ss.;
Valente P., «Profili fiscali delle International Holding Companies», in Dir. prat. trib., 1997, III, pag. 20 ss.; Wurm
F.J., “Treaty Shopping in the 1992 OECD Model Convention”, in Intertax, n. 12/1992, pag. 658 ss.; Adonnino
P., “Riflessioni in tema di pianificazione fiscale internazionale”, in Studi in onore di Victor Uckmar, Padova, 1997,
pag. 16 ss.. Cfr. inoltre, Valente P., Elusione Fiscale Internazionale, IPSOA, 2014, p. 2393 ss..
3 “Action 6 Prevent treaty abuse
“Develop model treaty provisions and recommendations regarding the design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty
benefits in inappropriate circumstances. Work will also be done to clarify that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate
double non-taxation and to identify the tax policy considerations that, in general, countries should consider before deciding to enter
into a tax treaty with another country. The work will be co-ordinated with the work on hybrids”.
4 Per approfondimenti sul treaty shopping cfr. Valente P., Elusione Fiscale Internazionale, IPSOA, 2014, p. 2393 ss..
5 Per ulteriori approfondimenti in materia, cfr. Valente P., Convenzioni internazionali contro le doppie imposizioni,
Milano, IPSOA, 2016, Commento all’art. 1; Weyzig F.; “Tax treaty shopping: structural determinants of Foreign
Direct Investment routed through the Netherlands”, in International Tax and Public Finance, 20(6), 2013, pagg.
910-937; Schwarz J., Tax Treaties, Kluwer Law International, 2013; Vega Borrego F.A., Limitation on Benefits
Clauses in Double Taxation Conventions, Kluwer Law International, 2006; Huber M.F., Blum M.S., “Limitation on
Benefits Under Article 22 of The Switzerland-U.S. Tax Treaty”, in Tax Notes International, Volume 39, Number
6, August 8, 2005; Hansson L., The Compatibility of Limitation on Benefits provisions in Tax Treaties with EC law,
(segue)
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conclusi tra Stati Uniti e alcuni altri Paesi, finalizzata a contrastare un ampio numero
di fenomeni di cd. treaty shopping, attraverso la definizione puntuale dei requisiti
necessari per l’inserimento nella categoria delle cd. “qualified persons”, quali l’effettiva
connessione del redditio di fonte estera all’attività svolta nello Stato di residenza.
Il Discussion Draft suggerisce inoltre di includere nei trattati una clausola antiabuso generale, la quale costituisca espressione del principio secondo cui i benefici
derivanti da una convenzione fiscale non dovrebbero essere usufruiti nel caso in cui
uno degli obiettivi fondamentali della transazione posta in essere sia quello di trarre
vantaggio da una data disposizione convenzionale, in contrato con lo scopo del trattato medesimo6.
3.2 LE PREVISIONI DEL DISCUSSION DRAFT IN MATERIA DI TREATY
ABUSE
Al fine di identificare le misure necessarie per garantire che i benefici derivanti
dall’applicazione di una convenzione contro le doppie imposizioni siano “goduti”
legittimamente, è necessario distinguere due diverse tipologie di situazioni:
 i casi in cui un soggetto elude le limitazioni previste dal trattato;
Spring 2006; de Lignie M., “Limitation on Benefits: Recently signed US Treaties Compared to the 1992 USNetherlands Treaty”, in Bulletin, n. 2/1995, pag. 71; Valente P., Davidson J., Oster L., “Usa-Paesi Bassi: una
convenzione contro il «treaty shopping»“, in Commercio Internazionale, n. 8/1994, pag. 458; Van Brunschot F.,
Van Weeghel S., “Netherlands-United States: The New Tax Convention”, in European Taxation, June/July 1993;
cfr. inoltre Valente P., Elusione Fiscale Internazionale, IPSOA, 2014, p. 2505 ss..
6 Nel mese di marzo 2014, l’HMRC ha pubblicato il Rapporto “Tackling aggressive tax planning in the global economy:
UK priorities for the G20-OECD project for countering Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”, il quale illustra le priorità
individuate dall’Amministrazione finanziaria britannica nell’attività di contrasto al fenomeno dell’erosione della
base imponibile mediante il profit shifting.
Con riferimento all’Action 6 in commento, l’HMRC ha precisato che “The UK has around 120 bilateral Double
Taxation Agreements with other countries and territories. Their intention is to secure that, as far as possible, residents of each
country may trade or invest in the other country without the deterrent of unrelieved double taxation. At the same time, it is
important to ensure that taxpayers do not exploit the terms of the agreements and differing tax systems in each country for tax
avoidance purposes. For this reason, the purpose of tax treaties explicitly includes the prevention of «fiscal evasion», a phrase that
has been interpreted broadly by the OECD and the UK courts as encompassing the avoidance of taxation.
(…) A common example of this abuse of tax treaties is «treaty shopping» where a resident of a country, that is not a party to a
treaty, attempts to access the benefits it provides by the use of artificial or contrived transactions. For example, a resident of a low
tax jurisdiction that does not have a tax treaty with the UK may attempt to limit the tax that the UK levies at source on interest by
setting up a subsidiary in a country with which the UK does have a tax treaty and routing the loan through that subsidiary.
The UK fully supports the objective of preventing treaty abuse and has, for some time now, included in its tax treaties provisions
aimed at denying benefits where persons have a main purpose of taking advantage of a treaty’s provisions (see for example the UK’s
tax treaties with Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia). Other countries also already take measures in their treaties
to prevent them being abused; some taking a similar approach to the UK while others prefer a «limitation on benefits (LoB)»
approach. The UK has LoB provisions in its tax treaties with Japan and the USA.
(…)
« Prevent treaty abuse
Tax treaties are intended to prevent double taxation by dividing taxing rights between countries, but these can sometimes be
exploited by the use of artificial or contrived transactions. The UK fully supports the objective of preventing treaty abuse and includes
provisions in its treaties to deny benefits to persons whose main purpose is to access tax benefits through those treaties. The OECD
is examining the most effective way of preventing treaty abuse and has published draft recommendations”.
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 i casi in cui un soggetto elude le disposizioni fiscali nazionali utilizzando le
previsioni della convenzione contro la doppia imposizione7.
Con riferimento alla prima categoria, è opportuno sottolineare che un requisito
necessario per beneficiare delle disposizioni di una convenzione contro le doppie imposizioni è essere residente di uno dei due Stati contraenti, ai sensi dell’art. 4 del Modello di Convenzione OCSE. Tuttavia vi sono situazioni in cui un soggetto non residente in alcuno dei due Stati contraenti tenta di usufruire dei benefici previsti dal
trattato: è il caso, ad esempio, del treaty shopping8, tecnica mediante la quale un soggetto
residente in uno Stato terzo accede indirettamente ai benefici previsti dalle disposizioni convenzionali9.
I Paesi utilizzano differenti approcci per contrastare il fenomeno del treaty shopping:
attraverso l’esame di vantaggi e limiti di tali approcci, l’OCSE ha identificato e suggerito
l’adozione del seguente:
 inclusione nel preambolo delle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni di una
dichiarazione attestante l’impegno da parte degli Stati contraenti di prevenire e
contrastare l’elusione fiscale, ed in particolare il fenomeno del treaty shopping;
7 “Since the first category of cases involve situations where a person seeks to circumvent rules that are specific to tax treaties, it is
unlikely that these cases will be addressed by specific anti-abuse rules found in domestic law. Although a domestic general anti-abuse
rule could prevent the granting of treaty benefits in these cases, a more direct approach involves the drafting of anti-abuse rules to be
included in treaties. The situation is different in the second category of cases: since these cases involve the avoidance of domestic law,
they cannot be addressed exclusively through treaty provisions and require domestic antiabuse rules, which raises the issue of the
interaction between tax treaties and these domestic rules” (OCSE, Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 6: preventing the
granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances, 14 marzo 2014).
8 Per approfondimenti in tema di treaty shopping nel diritto internazionale e comparato, cfr. Valente P., Elusione
Fiscale Internazionale, IPSOA, 2014, p. 2471 ss..
9 Nel Discussion Draft in commento, l’OCSE ha evidenziato le situazioni e i differenti contesti in cui è stata
affrontata la tematica del treaty shopping:
“the concept of «beneficial owner» was introduced in the Model in 1977 in order to deal with simple treaty shopping situations where
income is paid to an intermediary resident of a treaty country who is not treated as the owner of that income for tax purposes (such as an
agent or nominee). At the same time, a short new section on «Improper Use of the Convention» (which included two examples of treaty
shopping) was added to the Commentary on Art. 1 and the Committee indicated that it intended «to make an in-depth study of such
problems and of other ways of dealing with them».
That in-depth study resulted in the 1986 reports on Double Taxation and the Use of Base companies and Double Taxation and the
Use of Conduit Companies,4 the issue of treaty shopping being primarily dealt with in the latter.
In 1992, as a result of the report on Double Taxation and the Use of Conduit Companies, various examples of provisions dealing
with different aspects of treaty shopping were added to the section on «Improper Use of the Convention» in the Commentary on Art. 1.
These included the alternative provisions currently found in paragraphs 13-19 of the Commentary on Article 1 under the heading
«Conduit company cases».
In 2003, as a result of the report Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits5 (which was prepared as a follow-up to the 1998
Report Harmful Tax Competition: an Emerging Global Issue)6, new paragraphs intended to clarify the meaning of «beneficial owner»
in some conduit situations were added to the Commentary on Art. 10, 11 and 12 and the section on «Improper Use of the Convention»
was substantially extended to include additional examples of anti-abuse rules, including a comprehensive limitation-on-benefits provision
based on the provision found in the 1996 US Model7 as well as a purpose-based anti-abuse provision based on UK practice and
applicable to Art. 10, 11, 12 and 21.8.
Finally, the on-going work on the clarification of the «beneficial owner» concept has allowed the OECD to examine the limits of using
that concept as a tool to address various treaty shopping situations. As indicated in proposed paragraph 12.5 of the Commentary on
Art. 10, which was included in the latest discussion draft on the meaning of «beneficial owner»: «[w]hilst the concept of beneficial owner
deals with some forms of tax avoidance (i.e. those involving the interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the dividend to
someone else), it does not deal with other cases of treaty shopping and must not, therefore, be considered as restricting in any way the
application of other approaches to addressing such cases»”.
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 inclusione nei trattati fiscali di una specifica disposizione anti-abuso basata sulle
cd. “LOB Provisions” utilizzate principalmente nelle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni stipulate dagli Stati Uniti10;
 inclusione nei trattati fiscali di una disposizione anti-abuso generale in grado di
contrastare le situazioni di treaty shopping non “coperte” dalle specifiche disposizioni anti-abuso previste nel punto precedente11.
10 Per approfondimenti sulla cd. LOB clause contenuta nei trattati stipulati dagli Stati Uniti cfr. Valente P., Elusione
Fiscale Internazionale, IPSOA, 2014, p. 2529 ss.; cfr. inoltre il Cap. 2 del presente Volume.
11 Nei commenti presentati al Discussion Draft sull’abuso dei trattati, BIAC ha evidenziato come questo triplice
approccio possa risultare particolarmente gravoso:
“We believe that the three-pronged approach will be unnecessarily burdensome. The layers of rules that need to be assessed; the complexity of
those rules; potential interpretations and different applications by States in practice, give rise to an increased administrative burden, and
uncertainty. We do understand and support the idea that abuse of Treaty provisions should be prevented, in order to secure the benefit of
Treaties more broadly. However, we feel that the Model Convention should provide that either a LoB, or a General Anti-Abuse Rule
approach should be adopted, and not both. If they are well constructed and appropriately targeted against artificial structures, then they should
in principle address the same scenarios, whilst not denying treaty benefits for genuine commercial arrangements. Adopting both in the same
Treaty would almost certainly add complexity and uncertainty whilst not providing any additional protection against «treaty shopping»”
(BIAC, OECD Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 6: preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances, 9 aprile
2014).
Dello stesso avviso risulta essere anche Businesseurope secondo cui “as currently drafted, both the proposed LOB provision and
the MPT would be contrary to the purpose of tax treaties and undermine their effect as a tool to facilitate enhanced cross border trade and
investments. Instead, we believe that countries should put significantly more effort and focus on the policy considerations proposed in section C of
the Draft. Should the OECD include an Anti-Abuse provision in the OECD Model Convention, we believe that either a redrafted LOB
provision or a redrafted MPT should be inserted. It would simply not be reasonable to include both a LOB and a MPT. From a business
perspective, and as an overriding principle, the objective should be to design a targeted provision that does not affect genuine business activities.
A vague and unclear General Anti-Abuse provision would certainly be harmful. It would be extremely difficult for businesses to be certain
whether treaty benefits will be granted. Likewise, it would be difficult for governments to fully understand the scope of the tax treaty that is
being negotiated. Such uncertainty would undermine the very purpose of tax treaties and result in an increasing number of double taxation
cases. The effect would be very negative on investment, jobs and growth. This in turn would risk undermining sustainable tax revenue
collection. The lack of an impact assessment on private sector activities, administrative costs and revenue allocation between countries is
deplorable and unacceptable. Each proposal should be analysed carefully and its consequences should be presented to policy makers”
(Businesseurope, Businesseurope Comments on OECD Discussion Draft “BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits
in Inappropriate Circumstances” 14 March 2014 – 9 April 2014, 9 aprile 2014).
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Tavola 1 – Il Discussion Draft dell’OCSE in materia di treaty abuse
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3.3 LE CD. “LOB PROVISIONS” SECONDO IL DISCUSSION DRAFT
DELL’OCSE
Nel Discussion Draft in commento, l’OCSE ha previsto una specifica limitation-onbenefits provision che ripropone quella esistente nei trattati stipulati dagli Stati Uniti12 ed
anche in alcune convenzioni sottoscritte dal Giappone13 e dall’India.
Tavola 2 – La LOB clause prevista dall’OCSE nel Discussion Draft in materia di treaty abuse
ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS
1. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
Convention otherwise accorded to residents of a Contracting State unless such resident is a “qualified person” as defined
in paragraph 2.
2. A resident of a Contracting State shall be a qualified person for a taxable year if the resident is:
a) an individual;
b) a Contracting State, or a political subdivision or local authority thereof, or a statutory body, agency or instrumentality
of such State, political subdivision or local authority;
c) a company, if:
i) the principal class of its shares (and any disproportionate class of shares) is regularly traded on one or more
recognized stock exchanges, and either:
A) its principal class of shares is primarily traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges located in the
Cfr. McDaniel P.R., Ault H. J., Repetti J.R., Introduction to United States International Taxation, Kluwer Law
International, 1 gennaio 2005; Levine H.J., Miller M.J., U.S. Income Tax Treaties – the Limitation on Benefits Article,
Tax Management Incorporated, 2006; Eicke R., Tax Planning with Holding Companies – Repatriation of US Profits
from Europe: Concepts, Strategies, Structures, Kluwer Law International, 2009; Dooley B., International Taxation in
America, 2011 Edition, AuthorHouse, 2011.
13 La Convenzione contro le doppie imposizioni Stati Uniti-Giappone è stata sottoscritta nel 2003. La LOB
clause è contenuta all’art. 22:
“The United States views an income tax treaty as a vehicle for providing treaty benefits to residents of the two Contracting States.
The proper operation of a treaty requires that it apply to those that are bona fide residents of one of the Contracting States for the
purpose of being granted treaty benefits. This principal has long been recognized. For example, the Commentaries to the OECD
Model authorize a tax authority to deny treaty benefits, under substance-over-form principles, to a nominee in one Contracting State
deriving income from the other on behalf of a third-country resident. In addition, although the text of the OECD Model does not
contain express anti-abuse provisions, the Commentary to Article 1 contains an extensive discussion regarding the appropriateness
of such provisions in tax treaties in order to limit the ability of third state residents to obtain treaty benefits. The United States
holds strongly to the view that tax treaties should include provisions that specifically prevent misuse of treaties by residents of third
countries. Consequently, all recent U.S. income tax treaties contain comprehensive Limitation on Benefits provisions.
A treaty that provides treaty benefits to any resident of a Contracting State permits “treaty shopping”: the use, by residents of third
states, of legal entities established in a Contracting State with a principal purpose to obtain the benefits of a tax treaty between the
United States and the other Contracting State. Treaty shopping does not encompass every case in which a third state resident
establishes an entity in a U.S. treaty partner, and that entity enjoys treaty benefits to which the third state resident would not itself
be entitled. If the third country resident had substantial reasons for establishing the structure that were unrelated to obtaining treaty
benefits, the use of the entity in the U.S. treaty partner would not fall within this concept of treaty shopping.
An anti-treaty shopping approach that required the tax authority to investigate the taxpayer’s motives in establishing an entity in a
particular country would be difficult to administer. In order to avoid the necessity of making such a subjective determination, Article
22 sets forth a series of objective tests. The assumption underlying each of these tests is that a taxpayer that satisfies the
requirements of the test likely has a real business purpose for the structure it has adopted, or has a sufficiently strong nexus to the
other Contracting State (e.g., a resident individual) to warrant benefits even in the absence of a business connection, and that this
business purpose or connection is sufficient to justify the conclusion that obtaining the benefits of the treaty is not a principal purpose
of establishing or maintaining residence in that other Contracting State.
(…)”.
(cfr. il Technical Explanation della Convenzione Stati Uniti-Giappone).
Per approfondimenti cfr. Valente P., Elusione Fiscale Internazionale, IPSOA, 2014, p. 2529 ss..
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Contracting State of which the company is a resident; or
B) the company’s primary place of management and control is in the Contracting State of which it is a resident;
or
ii) at least 50 percent of the aggregate voting power and value of the shares (and at least 50 percent of any
disproportionate class of shares) in the company is owned directly or indirectly by five or fewer companies
entitled to benefits under subdivision i) of this subparagraph, provided that, in the case of indirect ownership,
each intermediate owner is a resident of either Contracting State;
d) a person, other than an individual, that
i) was constituted and is operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, artistic, cultural, or educational
purposes,
ii) was constituted and is operated exclusively to administer or provide pension or other similar benefits, provided that
more than 50 per cent of the beneficial interests in that person are owned by individuals resident in either
Contracting State, or
iii) was constituted and is operated to invest funds for the benefit of persons referred to in subdivision ii), provided
that substantially all the income of that person is derived from investments made for the benefit of these persons.
e) a person other than an individual, if:
i) on at least half the days of the taxable year, persons who are residents of that Contracting State and that are
entitled to the benefits of this Convention under subparagraph a), subparagraph b), subdivision i) of
subparagraph c), or subparagraph d) of this paragraph own, directly or indirectly, shares or other beneficial
interests representing at least 50 percent of the aggregate voting power and value (and at least 50 percent of any
disproportionate class of shares) of the person, provided that, in the case of indirect ownership, each intermediate
owner is a resident of that Contracting State, and
ii) less than 50 percent of the person’s gross income for the taxable year, as determined in the person’s Contracting
State of residence, is paid or accrued, directly or indirectly, to persons who are not residents of either Contracting
State entitled to the benefits of this Convention under subparagraph a), subparagraph b), subdivision i) of
subparagraph c), or subparagraph d) of this paragraph in the form of payments that are deductible for purposes
of the taxes covered by this Convention in the person’s Contracting State of residence (but not including arm’s
length payments in the ordinary course of business for services or tangible property).
3. a) A resident of a Contracting State will be entitled to benefits of this Convention with respect to an item of income
derived from the other Contracting State, regardless of whether the resident is a qualified person, if the resident is
engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in the first-mentioned Contracting State (other than the business
of making or managing investments for the resident’s own account, unless these activities are banking, insurance or
securities activities carried on by a bank, insurance company or registered securities dealer respectively), and the
income derived from the other Contracting State is derived in connection with, or is incidental to, that trade or
business.
b) If a resident of a Contracting State derives an item of income from a trade or business activity conducted by that
resident in the other Contracting State, or derives an item of income arising in the other Contracting State from an
associated enterprise, the conditions described in subparagraph a) shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to
such item only if the trade or business activity carried on by the resident in the first-mentioned Contracting State is
substantial in relation to the trade or business activity carried on by the resident or associated enterprise in the other
Contracting State. Whether a trade or business activity is substantial for the purposes of this paragraph will be
determined based on all the facts and circumstances.
c) For purposes of applying this paragraph, activities conducted by persons connected to a person shall be deemed to be
conducted by such person. A person shall be connected to another if one possesses at least 50 percent of the beneficial
interest in the other (or, in the case of a company, at least 50 percent of the aggregate vote and value of the company’s
shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) or another person possesses at least 50 percent of the
beneficial interest (or, in the case of a company, at least 50 percent of the aggregate voting power and value of the
company’s shares or of the beneficial equity interest in the company) in each person. In any case, a person shall be
considered to be connected to another if, based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, one has control of the other
or both are under the control of the same person or persons.
4. If a resident of a Contracting State is neither a qualified person pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 nor entitled to
benefits with respect to an item of income under paragraph 3 of this Article, the competent authority of the other
Contracting State shall nevertheless treat that resident as being entitled to the benefits of this Convention, or benefits with
respect to a specific item of income, if such competent authority determines that the establishment, acquisition or
maintenance of such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as one of its principal purposes the obtaining of
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benefits under this Convention.
5. For purposes of the preceding provision of this Article:
a) the term “recognized stock exchange” means:
i) the ________Stock Exchange (of Contracting State A);
ii) the _______ Stock Exchange (of Contracting State B); and
iii) any other stock exchange agreed upon by the competent authorities of the Contracting States;
b) the term “principal class of shares” means the ordinary or common shares of the company, provided that such class of
shares represents the majority of the voting power and value of the company. If no single class of ordinary or common
shares represents the majority of the aggregate voting power and value of the company, the “principal class of shares”
are those classes that in the aggregate represent a majority of the aggregate voting power and value of the company;
c) the term “disproportionate class of shares” means any class of shares of a company resident in one of the Contracting
States that entitles the shareholder to disproportionately higher participation, through dividends, redemption payments
or otherwise, in the earnings generated in the other Contracting State by particular assets or activities of the company;
and
d) a company’s “primary place of management and control” will be in the Contracting State of which it is a resident only
if executive officers and senior management employees exercise day-to-day responsibility for more of the strategic,
financial and operational policy decision making for the company (including its direct and indirect subsidiaries) in
that Contracting State than in any other state and the staff of such persons conduct more of the day-to-day activities
necessary for preparing and making those decisions in that Contracting State than in any other state.
Il Discussion Draft raccomanda l’adozione di un commentario dettagliato volto a
chiarire la portata applicativa della suddetta disposizione14.
Inoltre, l’OCSE suggerisce di adottare una disposizione secondo cui uno Stato
contraente potrebbe “negare” l’ottenimento dei benefici garantiti dal trattato nel caso in
cui, date le specifiche circostanze del caso, è ragionevole affermare che il principale
obiettivo di un determinato arrangement sia quello di beneficiare delle più favorevoli disposizioni del trattato15.
La disposizione mira a garantire che il trattato sia applicato coerentemente allo
spirito per cui è stato stipulato, “in respect of bona fide exchanges of goods and services, and
movements of capital and persons as opposed to arrangements whose main objective is to secure a more
favourable tax treatment”.
Tuttavia si rende necessario comprendere quando un arrangement sia posto in essere al fine di ottenere benefici fiscali indebiti: secondo quanto indicato dall’OCSE non
è necessario (i) fornire una definizione di cosa comporterà la non applicazione del trattato, oppure (ii) ottenere una prova circa l’intento “elusivo” del contribuente che ha posto in essere un accordo/transazione. La suindicata valutazione dipenderà da
un’oggettiva analisi dei fatti e delle circostanze del caso di specie.
14 Ad esempio, dovrebbe essere chiarito il significato dell’espressione “shall nevertheless treat that resident as being
entitled to the benefits of this Convention”, rinvenibile nel paragrafo 4.
Essa, in particolare, potrebbe intendersi nel senso che un residente al quale verrebbe negata l’applicazione dei
benefici convenzionali, può tuttavia usufruirne ma soltanto nei limiti in cui “the conditions applicable to the relevant
benefits are satisfied (e.g. that person will also need to be the beneficial owner, as opposed to a mere nominee or agent, of dividends,
interest or royalties received from the other State)”.
15 “6. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a benefit under this Convention shall not be granted in respect of an
item of income if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was
one of the main purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established
that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of this
Convention”.
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Allo stesso modo, sarà sufficiente che tale obiettivo sia uno degli intenti dei soggetti che hanno posto in essere l’arrangement e non “the sole or dominant purpose”16.
3.4 ULTERIORI CASI DI ABUSO DEI TRATTATI SECONDO IL
DISCUSSION DRAFT DELL’OCSE
Oltre alla residenza in uno degli Stati contraenti, al fine di poter beneficiare delle
disposizioni previste dalle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni, è necessario
soddisfare ulteriori requisiti.
In alcuni casi, i contribuenti pongono in essere specifiche transazioni al solo fine
di “creare le condizioni” per soddisfare determinati requisiti richiesti.
A tal proposito, nonostante una norma anti-abuso generale possa essere uno
strumento valido per contrastare tali situazioni, secondo l’OCSE, sarebbe opportuno
elaborare specifiche disposizioni anti-abuso con riferimento a determinati casi17, con
l’obiettivo di fornire un maggior grado di certezza sia ai contribuenti sia alle Amministrazioni finanziarie.
Esempi di situazioni per le quali sarebbe opportuno prevedere specifiche disposizioni antiabuso possono essere le seguenti:
 “splitting-up of contracts”: il paragrafo 3 dell’art. 5 del Modello OCSE prevede
espressamente che un cantiere (“building site or construction or installation project”)
configura una stabile organizzazione solo nei casi in cui permanga per almeno
dodici mesi.
Secondo quanto previsto dal paragrafo 18 del Commentario all’art. 5 del Modello OCSE tale limite può determinare comportamenti abusivi da parte delle imprese che “suddividono” i contratti in diverse parti al fine di “coprire” un periodo
inferiore ai dodici mesi e non configurare la stabile organizzazione nel territorio18; è necessario pertanto che gli Stati contraenti prevedano una specifica nor“For example, a person may sell a property for various reasons, but before the sale, that person becomes a resident of one of the
Contracting States and one of main purposes for doing so is to obtain a benefit under a tax convention, paragraph 6 could apply
notwithstanding the fact that there may also be other main purposes for changing the residence, such as facilitating the sale of the
property of the re-investment of the proceeds of the alienation”.
17 “Such rules are already Such rules are already found in some Articles of the Model Tax Convention (see, for example, Art.
13(4) and 17(2)). In addition, the Commentary suggests the inclusion of other anti-abuse provisions in certain circumstances (see,
for example, paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Commentary on Art. 10). Other anti-abuse provisions are found in bilateral treaties
concluded by OECD and non-OECD countries” (OCSE, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of
Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, 14 marzo 2014).
18 Commentario all’art. 5 del Modello OCSE, paragrafo 18:
“The twelve month test applies to each individual site or project. In determining how long the site or project has existed, no account
should be taken of the time previously spent by the contractor concerned on other sites or projects which are totally unconnected with
it. A building site should be regarded as a single unit, even if it is based on several contracts, provided that it forms a coherent whole
commercially and geographically. Subject to this proviso, a building site forms a single unit even if the orders have been placed by
several persons (e.g. for a row of houses). The twelve month threshold has given rise to abuses; it has sometimes been found that
enterprises (mainly contractors or subcontractors working on the continental shelf or engaged in activities connected with the
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf) divided their contracts up into several parts, each covering a period less than
twelve months and attributed to a different company which was, however, owned by the same group. Apart from the fact that such
abuses may, depending on the circumstances, fall under the application of legislative or judicial anti-avoidance rules, countries
concerned with this issue can adopt solutions in the framework of bilateral negotiations”.
16
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ma anti-abuso sul tema, tenendo conto di tale problematica anche nell’ambito
dell’Action 7, avente ad oggetto la rivisitazione della definizione di stabile organizzazione19;
 “hiring out-of labour cases”20: attraverso tali schemi, il contribuente tenta di ottenere
indebitamente l’esenzione dalla tassazione alla fonte prevista dal paragrafo 2
dell’art. 15 del Modello OCSE; a tal proposito, il paragrafo 8.3 del Commentario
al Modello OCSE fornisce un’adeguata modalità di contrasto a tale abuso21;
 “transactions intended to avoid dividend characterization”: in alcuni casi, vengono poste in essere transazioni al solo fine di “aggirare” le disposizioni domestiche che
caratterizzano un determinato reddito quale dividendo, beneficiando invece
della non tassazione alla fonte derivante dalla caratterizzazione di tale reddito
come capital gain; si rende pertanto necessario, coerentemente con quanto previsto dal Discussion Draft sugli hybrid mismatch arrangements22, rivedere la definizione di dividendo prevista nei trattati fiscali al fine di garantire la corretta e
legittima applicazione delle disposizioni nazionali;
 “dividend transfer transactions”: alcuni trattati contro le doppie imposizioni prevedono una bassa (o in alcuni casi assente) tassazione dei dividendi al verificarsi
di determinate circostanze, legate principalmente alla detenzione di una specifica quota di partecipazione per un determinato periodo di tempo.
Secondo quanto affermato dall’OCSE nel Discussion Draft, sarebbe opportuno
includere ulteriori disposizioni anti-abuso con l’obiettivo di contrastare i fenomeni di costituzione di intermediary entities in un determinato Stato al solo fine di beneficiare della ridotta tassazione alla fonte prevista nei trattati fiscali
stipulati da tali Stati23;
Per ulteriori approfondimenti in materia cfr. Valente P., Vinciguerra L., Stabile organizzazione occulta: profili
applicativi nelle verifiche, Milano, IPSOA, 2013.
20 Per ulteriori approfondimenti in materia, cfr. Valente P., Mattia S., Salazar P., Lavoratori all’estero: disciplina
fiscale, giuslavoristica e previdenziale, Milano, IPSOA, 2014.
21 Commentario all’art. 15 del Modello OCSE, paragrafo 8.3:
“8.3 If States where this is the case are concerned that such approach could result in granting the benefits of the exception provided
for in paragraph 2 in unintended situations (e.g. in so-called «hiring-out of labour» cases), they are free to adopt bilaterally a
provision drafted along the following lines:
Paragraph 2 of this Article shall not apply to remuneration derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment
exercised in the other Contracting State and paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of that other State if:
a) the recipient renders services in the course of that employment to a person other than the employer and that person, directly or
indirectly, supervises, directs or controls the manner in which those services are performed; and
b) those services constitute an integral part of the business activities carried on by that person”.
22 Per approfondimenti sugli studi dell’OCSE in materia di strumenti ibridi, cfr. Valente P., Elusione Fiscale
Internazionale, IPSOA, 2014, p. 2025 ss..
23 “45. For example, paragraph 67.4 of the Commentary on Article 10 includes an alternative provision that may be included to
prevent access to:
the 5% rate in the case of dividends paid by a domestic REIT to a non-resident portfolio investor, and
both the 5% and the 15% rates in the case of dividends paid by a domestic REIT to a nonresident investor who holds directly or
indirectly more than 10% of the REIT’s capital.
46. Another example, found in U.S. treaty practice, is a provision that denies the 5% rate in the case of dividends paid to a nonresident company by a U.S. Regulated Investment Company (RIC) even if that non-resident company holds more than 10% of the
shares of the RIC. As shown by that example, a specific anti-abuse rule might be drafted to address situations where a non-resident
19
(segue)
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 “transactions that circumvent the application of art. 13 (4)”: il paragrafo 4 dell’art. 13
del Modello OCSE consente allo Stato contraente in cui è situata la cd.
“immovable property” di tassare i capital gains realizzati da un soggetto residente
nell’altro Stato contraente derivanti dall’alienazione di azioni il cui valore è
direttamente o indirettamente determinato per più del 50% da proprietà
immobiliari situate nell’altro Stato contraente.
Il paragrafo 4 alloca il primary right to tax sullo Stato dove è situato l’immobile
alla condizione che il valore delle azioni derivi, direttamente od
indirettamente, per più della metà, da proprietà immobiliari.
Sarebbe opportuno modificare quanto previsto dal paragrafo 4 dell’art. 13 del
Modello OCSE al fine di “coprire” tutte le possibili situazioni di abuso derivanti
dallo sfruttamento della cd. “immovable property”;
 “tie-breaker rule for determining the treaty residence of dual-resident persons other than
individuals”: come specificato nel paragrafo precedente, una delle condizioni
necessarie per poter beneficiare delle disposizioni previste dai trattati fiscali, è
quella di essere residente di uno degli Stati contraenti, ai sensi dell’art. 4 del
Modello OCSE. Tuttavia, l’applicazione di tale articolo, rinviando alle discipline
nazionali della residenza fiscale, può far sorgere situazioni di cd. “dual residence”,
secondo cui il contribuente potrebbe essere considerato, dal punto di vista
fiscale, residente in entrambi gli Stati contraenti.
Ciò avviene, ad esempio, quando in uno Stato si attribuisca rilievo al luogo d registrazione della società (criterio formale), mentre, nel contempo, la disciplina di
altro Stato faccia riferimento, diversamente, al territorio di ubicazione della sede
amministrativa (criterio effettivo).
Al fine di individuare a quale criterio accordare la preferenza, in sede OCSE non
è stato ritenuto opportuno attribuire importanza ad un criterio formale, quale il
luogo di costituzione. Di conseguenza, il criterio applicato è quello del luogo
dove la società è effettivamente gestita e la “sede di direzione effettiva” è stata adottata quale criterio preferenziale per i soggetti diversi dalle persone fisiche24.
Come indicato nel Discussion Draft dell’OCSE, sarebbe opportuno rivedere quanto previsto dal paragrafo 3 dell’art. 4 del Modello OCSE, prevedendo ad esempio che:
company makes indirect portfolio investments into domestic companies through a domestic investment company that is not taxed on
dividends it receives from such other domestic companies”.
24 La sede di direzione effettiva (o place of effective management) è il luogo dove sono sostanzialmente adottate le
decisioni principali relative alla gestione della società, nonché quelle necessarie per l’esercizio della sua attività
d’impresa. La «sede di direzione effettiva» è, di regola, il luogo in cui la persona o il gruppo di persone che esercitano le
funzioni di rango più elevato (i.e., il CdA) adottano ufficialmente le decisioni; il luogo in cui si delibera in merito alla
società nel suo complesso. L’“effective management” coincide con il luogo dove il top management effettivamente esercita
i poteri mediante i quali influenza il corso normale dell’attività di business. Il “place of effective management” non è da
rinvenirsi nel luogo in cui le decisioni relative al day-to-day management sono adottate. A tal fine, risulta decisivo non
tanto il luogo dove le direttive manageriali sono eseguite, quanto piuttosto quello in cui esse sono impartite.
Per ulteriori approfondimenti, cfr. Valente P., Esterovestizione e Residenza, op. cit., pag. 138 ss.; Valente P., Cardone
D.M., Esterovestizione: profili probatori e metodologie di difesa nelle verifiche, IPSOA, 2015, p. 155 ss..
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“Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1 a person other than an individual is a
resident of both Contracting States the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall
endeavor to determine by mutual agreement, the place where it is incorporated or otherwise
constituted and any other relevant factors. In the absence of such agreement, such person shall
not be entitled to any relief or exemption from tax provided by this Convention except to the
extent and in such manner as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the
Contracting State”.
Pertanto, si propone di ricorrere ad un mutual agreement (secondo quanto previsto
dall’art. 25 del Modello OCSE) al fine di individuare il place of effective management
della società, e conseguentemente la residenza fiscale della stessa.
A tal proposito, si rende altresì necessario rivedere quanto previsto dal
Commentario al Modello OCSE al fine di definire nel dettaglio la locuzione
“place of effective management”25;
“Competent authorities having to apply paragraph 3 such a provision to determine the residence of a legal person for purposes of the
Convention would be expected to take account of various factors, such as where the meetings of the person’s its board of directors or
equivalent body are usually held, where the chief executive officer and other senior executives usually carry on their activities, where the
senior day-to-day management of the person is carried on, where the person’s headquarters are located, which country’s laws govern the
legal status of the person, where its accounting records are kept, whether determining that the legal person is a resident of one of the
Contracting States but not of the other for the purpose of the Convention would carry the risk of an improper use of the provisions of the
Convention etc. Countries that consider that the competent authorities should not be given the discretion to solve such cases of dual
residence without an indication of the factors to be used for that purpose may want to supplement the provision to refer to these or other
factors that they consider relevant. Also, since the application of the provision would normally be requested by the person concerned
through the mechanism provided for under paragraph 1 of Article 25, the request should be made within three years from the first
notification to that person that its taxation is not in accordance with the Convention since it is considered to be a resident of both
Contracting States. Since the facts on which a decision will be based may change over time, the competent authorities that reach a decision
under that provision should clarify which period of time is covered by that decision” (OCSE, Public Discussion Draft “BEPS
Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances”, 14 marzo 2014).
25
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Tavola 3 – Necessità di prevedere disposizioni anti-abuso nel Modello OCSE
128
 “antiabuse rule for permanent establishment in third States”: alcuni paragrafi del
Commentario al Modello OCSE26 fanno riferimento ai potenziali abusi quali
ad esempio il trasferimento di azioni, debt-claims, property, ecc., a stabili organizzazioni costituite in Stati che prevedono un trattamento fiscale “privilegiato” per
tali categorie di transazioni; nel caso in cui lo Stato di residenza preveda
un’esenzione o una ridotta imposizione dei profitti delle suindicate stabili organizzazioni situate in Stati terzi, il trattato fiscale dovrebbe assicurare che lo
Stato della fonte non conceda benefici fiscali con riferimento ai suddetti redditi.
Il Discussion Draft in commento prevede una specifica disposizione anti-abuso per
contrastare i casi di attribuzione di profitti ad una stabile organizzazione situata
in uno Stato caratterizzato da una fiscalità vantaggiosa, facendo riferimento ad alcune
disposizioni presenti in trattati stipulati dagli Stati Uniti27.
Paragrafo 32 del Commentario all’art. 10 del Modello OCSE:
“32. It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of shares to permanent establishments set
up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to dividend income. Apart from the fact that such abusive
transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only
constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, as explained below, that the requirement that a
shareholding be “effectively connected” to such a location requires more than merely recording the shareholding in the books of the
permanent establishment for accounting purposes”.
“It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of loans to permanent establishments set up
solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to interest income. Apart from the fact that such abusive
transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only
constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, as explained below, that the requirement that a debtclaim be «effectively connected» to such a location requires more than merely recording the debt-claim in the books of the permanent
establishment for accounting purposes”.
“It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of rights or property to permanent
establishments set up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to royalty income. Apart from the fact that
such abusive transactions might trigger the application of domestic antiabuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location
can only constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, as explained below, that the requirement that
a right or property be “effectively connected” to such a location requires more than merely recording the right or property in the books
of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes”.
27 “Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, where an enterprise of a Contracting State derives income from the
other Contracting State and that income is attributable to a permanent establishment of that enterprise that is situated in a third
State, the tax benefits that would otherwise apply under the other provisions of this Convention will not apply to that income if the
profits of that permanent establishment are subject to a combined aggregate effective rate of tax in the first-mentioned Contracting
State and third State that is less than 60 percent of the general rate of company tax applicable in the first-mentioned Contracting
State. Any dividends, interest or royalties to which the provisions of this paragraph apply shall remain taxable in the other
Contracting State at a rate that shall not exceed 15 percent of the gross amount thereof. Any other income to which the provisions of
this paragraph apply shall remain taxable according to the laws of the other Contracting State notwithstanding any other provision
of this Convention. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply if:
a) in the case of royalties, the royalties are received as compensation for the use of, or the right to use, intangible property produced or
developed by the enterprise through the permanent establishment; or
b) in the case of any other income, the income derived from the other Contracting State is derived in connection with, or is incidental
to, the active conduct of a trade or business carried on in the third State through the permanent establishment (other than the
business of making, managing or simply holding investments for the enterprise’ s own account, unless these activities are banking or
securities activities carried on by a ban or registered securities dealer)”.
26
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3.5 L’UTILIZZO DEI TRATTATI AI FINI DELLA DOPPIA NON
IMPOSIZIONE
Un ulteriore obiettivo che l’OCSE intende raggiungere mediante l’attuazione
dell’Action 6 concerne la necessità di specificare che i trattati fiscali non sono diretti a
generare situazioni di doppia non imposizione.
Difatti, il principale obiettivo dei trattati è quello di prevenire ed eliminare i casi di
doppia imposizione, così come si evince anche dal titolo proposto nei primi Modelli di
convenzione contro le doppie imposizioni redatti dall’OCSE “1963 Draft Double
Taxation Convention on Income and Capital” e “1977 Model Double Taxation Convention on
Income and Capital”.
Nel 1977, il Commentario all’art. 1 del Modello di convenzione dell’OCSE è stato
modificato proprio allo scopo di specificare come lo stesso non intenda incoraggiare
l’evasione e/o l’elusione fiscale:
“The purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double taxation, exchanges of goods
and services, and the movement of capital and persons; they should not, however, help tax avoidance or evasion”.
Nel 2003, il Commentario è stato nuovamente modificato al fine di rafforzare
quanto sopra detto, specificando che
“The principal purpose of double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double taxation, exchanges
of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons. It is also a purpose of tax conventions to prevent tax
avoidance and evasion”.
Nel Discussion Draft pubblicato dall’OCSE, si evidenzia la volontà di affermare
chiaramente, nel title28 del Modello di Convenzione OCSE, come la prevenzione
dell’elusione e dell’evasione fiscale rappresenti uno degli obiettivi dei trattati fiscali.
Inoltre, sarebbe opportuno inserire un preambolo29 nel quale si specifica espressamente che gli Stati contraenti si pongono l’obiettivo di eliminare i casi di doppia imposizione senza tuttavia creare opportunità per lo sviluppo di situazioni di evasione
ed elusione fiscale.
A tal proposito, date le problematiche di treaty shopping avutesi nel corso degli ultimi anni, è stato deciso di fare un espresso riferimento a tali arrangements come esempio di schema elusivo che i trattati fiscali non intendono favorire.
28 “Convention between (State A) and (State B) for the elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on
capital and the prevention of tax evasion and avoidance”.
29 Di seguito, si riporta l’esempio di preambolo al Modello di Convenzione OCSE fornito dall’OCSE:
“Preamble to the Convention
(State A) and (State B),
Desiring to further develop their economic relationship and to enhance their cooperation in tax matters,
Intending to conclude a Convention for the elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income and on capital without
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including through treaty shopping
arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this Convention for the indirect benefit of residents of third States)
Have agreed as follows: (…)”.
130
L’inserimento di tali riferimenti nel titolo e nel preambolo è particolarmente rilevante, tenendo conto di quanto indicato all’art. 31 della Convenzione di Vienna30 in
merito all’interpretazione e all’applicazione dei trattati:
“1. Un trattato deve essere interpretato in buona fede in base al senso comune da attribuire ai termini del trattato nel loro
contesto ed alla luce dei suo oggetto e del suo scopo.
2. Ai fini dell’interpretazione di un trattato, il contesto comprende, oltre al testo, preambolo e allegati inclusi:
a)ogni accordo relativo al trattato e che sia intervenuto tra tutte le parti in occasione della sua conclusione;
b) ogni strumento disposto da una o più parti in occasione della conclusione del trattato ed accettato dalle altre parti in
quanto strumento relativo al trattato”.
L’interpretazione delle convenzioni contro le doppie imposizioni deve essere infatti collocata nella più ampia
tematica di diritto internazionale relativa alla interpretazione dei Trattati, la cui disciplina si rinviene nella
Convenzione di Vienna sul diritto dei Trattati.
L’interpretazione dei trattati internazionali è l’esito di un’attività complessa, che, accanto all’esegesi delle
disposizioni contenute nel testo, richiede il coordinamento sistematico di una pluralità di fonti, soprattutto
quelle del diritto internazionale pubblico, sia nella forma del diritto internazionale consuetudinario, sia in
particolare in quella parte di queste ultime recepite nella Convenzione di Vienna negli artt. 31, 32 e 33, validi per
ogni tipo di trattato, anche in materia fiscale.
La Convenzione di Vienna, nel regolare l’interpretazione dei trattati nei citati artt. 31-33 (Parte III – sez. 3),
accoglie il cd. metodo ermeneutico obiettivistico, affermatosi dopo una lunga disputa nel confronto con la opposta
tesi del metodo cd. subiettivistico, secondo cui il testo deve essere considerato espressione della interpretazione
autentica della volontà delle parti.
La dottrina riconosce che la Convenzione di Vienna è applicabile ai trattati contro le doppie imposizioni, in
quanto le convenzioni internazionali, come s’è detto, sono trattati internazionali e ad esse sono applicabili le
norme del diritto comune sui trattati.
La Convenzione di Vienna sul diritto dei trattati è stata ratificata in Italia con la Legge 12 febbraio 1974, n. 112
ed è entrata in vigore il 27 gennaio 1980.
Per ulteriori approfondimenti in materia, cfr. Valente P., Convenzioni internazionali contro le doppie imposizioni, op. cit.,
Parte I.
30
131
Tavola 4 – Principio anti-abuso
132
3.6 LE RACCOMANDAZIONI DELL’OCSE DEL 16 SETTEMBRE 2014
E DEL 5 OTTOBRE 2015
La necessità di contrastare i fenomeni di treaty shopping e di treaty abuse è stata ribadita dall’OCSE nel documento “Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate
Circumstances”, pubblicato il 16 settembre 2014, con il quale la medesima organizzazione fornisce agli Stati precise raccomandazioni in materia.
Secondo il citato documento, tre diversi approcci possono essere adottati al fine
di combattere i fenomeni di treaty shopping:
 un primo approccio prevede l’inclusione, nel titolo e nel preambolo di ciascuna
convenzione contro le doppie imposizioni, di una chiara statuizione secondo
cui gli Stati contraenti, nella stipula dell’accordo, “intend to avoid creating
opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance,
including through treaty shopping arrangements”;
 un secondo approccio suggerisce di inserire nelle convenzioni contro le doppie
imposizioni una disposizione antiabuso specifica sul modello delle LOB clauses
contemplate nei trattati sottoscritti dagli Stati Uniti. Tale disposizione avrebbe
l’obiettivo di contrastare “a large number of treaty shopping situations based on the
legal nature, ownership in, and general activities of, residents of a Contracting State”;
 in terzo luogo, con l’obiettivo di combattere ogni altra forma di abuso, incluse
quelle forme le quali non rientrano nell’ambito di applicazione delle LOB
clauses, si rende opportuno prevedere, in ciascuna convenzione contro le
doppie imposizioni, una norma anti-abuso generale basata sul “principal purposes
of transactions or arrangements” (cd. “principal purposes test”).
Ciascuna disposizione proposta presenta vantaggi e svantaggi e potrebbe risultare
poco appropriata nel contesto di alcuni ordinamenti giuridici. Inoltre, le disposizioni
proposte dovrebbero essere differentemente adattate al fine di tenere conto di
eventuali “constitutional or EU law restrictions”31.
In generale, quale requisito minimo, si può ritenere che gli Stati debbano
raggiungere un accordo diretto ad includere nei trattati bilaterali una dichiarazione
espressa secondo la quale è loro comune intenzione eliminare “double taxation without
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance,
including through treaty shopping arrangements”. Essi inoltre dovrebbero espressamente
dichiarare che intendono attuare la suindicata proposizione attraverso un approccio
“combinato” o mediante l’adozione di una disposizione che preveda il cd. “principal
purposes test” o di una LOB clause, eventualmente supportata da una misura in grado di
contrastare i cd. “conduit arrangements” non altrimenti previsti nella convenzione
medesima.
Nei limiti in cui vengano adottate, da parte di ciascun Paese, efficaci misure antiabuso, una certa flessibilità
può essere senz’altro riconosciuta nella fase di implementazione delle suindicate raccomandazioni OCSE.
31
133
Tavola 5 – Gli approcci di contrasto ai fenomeni di treaty shopping
134
La LOB clause suggerita dall’OCSE restringe l’ambito di applicazione delle
disposizioni convenzionali, le quali generalmente interessano i soggetti residenti di uno
Stato contraente. In particolare, il par. 1 della LOB clause prevede che un residente di
uno Stato contraente “shall not be entitled to the benefits of the Convention unless it constitutes a
«qualified person»”, secondo la definizione fornita nel paragrafo 2, a meno che i benefici
convenzionali non siano applicati in virtù dei restanti paragrafi della LOB clause
medesima.
La definizione di “qualified person” viene fornita facendo riferimento “to the nature or
attributes” delle diverse categorie di persone. In tal modo, beneficeranno delle
disposizioni convenzionali tutti i soggetti i quali ricadranno nell’ambito di applicazione
del suindicato paragrafo 2.
Una persona può godere dei benefici convenzionali – con riferimento ad una data
categoria di reddito – nonostante non si caratterizzi quale “qualified person” nei limiti in
cui il suindicato reddito “is derived in connection with the active conduct of a trade or business in
that person’s State of residence”.
Rilevante è altresì la cd. “derivative benefits provision”, la quale consente a determinate
entità possedute da residenti di altri Stati di godere dei medesimi benefici convenzionali che questi ultimi avrebbero potuto ricevere se avessero investito direttamente nei
Paesi interessati.
Rimane ferma la possibilità per ciascuno Stato contraente di concedere comunque
i benefici convenzionali qualora l’applicazione delle disposizioni della LOB clause portasse ad un loro diniego.
La disposizione sul cd. “principal purposes test” si ispira ai principi già delineati nel
Commentario all’art. 1 del Modello OCSE. Essa individua “a more general way” di contrastare i casi di abuso dei trattati, incluse quelle situazioni di treaty shopping che non
rientrano nell’ambito di applicazione della LOB clause (tra le quali l’OCSE individua i
cd. “conduit financing arrangements”)32.
La suindicata disposizione potrebbe avere il seguente tenore:
“Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a benefit under this Convention shall not be granted in respect of
an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that
obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly
in that benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object
and purpose of the relevant provisions of this Convention”33.
Il documento include raccomandazioni relative a disposizioni antiabuso convenzionali specifiche “that seek to
address strategies, other than treaty shopping, aimed at satisfying treaty requirements with a view to obtain inappropriately the
benefit of certain provisions of tax treaties. These targeted rules, which are supplemented by the PPT rule described above, address
(1) certain dividend transfer transactions; (2) transactions that circumvent the application of the treaty rule that allows source
taxation of shares of companies that derive their value primarily from immovable property; (3) situations where an entity is resident
of two Contracting States, and (4) situations where the State of residence exempts the income of permanent establishments situated
in third States and where shares, debt-claims, rights or property are transferred to permanent establishments set up in countries that
do not tax such income or offer preferential treatment to that income” (cfr. OCSE, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in
Inappropriate Circumstances, 16 settembre 2014, p. 13).
33 “9. The terms «arrangement or transaction» should be interpreted broadly and include any agreement, understanding, scheme,
transaction or series of transactions, whether or not they are legally enforceable. In particular they include the creation, assignment,
acquisition or transfer of the income itself, or of the property or right in respect of which the income accrues. These terms also
encompass arrangements concerning the establishment, acquisition or maintenance of a person who derives the income, including the
32
(segue)
135
L’OCSE raccomanda di prevedere, nelle convenzioni bilaterali, una disposizione
che statuisca che “tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation”. Tale
statuizione implica una riformulazione del titolo e del preambolo del Modello di Convenzione contro le doppie imposizioni dell’OCSE, diretta a dichiarare che l’intento
comune delle parti contraenti è quello di eliminare i fenomeni di doppia imposizione
senza tuttavia creare le condizioni per agevolare situazioni di evasione ed elusione fiscale.
Tavola 6 – La determinazione dei cd. “principal purposes”34
“10. To determine whether or not one of the principal purposes of any person concerned with an arrangement or transaction
is to obtain benefits under the Convention, it is important to undertake an objective analysis of the aims and objects of all
persons involved in putting that arrangement or transaction in place or being a party to it. What are the purposes of an
arrangement or transaction is a question of fact which can only be answered by considering all circumstances surrounding the
arrangement or event on a case by case basis. It is not necessary to find conclusive proof of the intent of a person concerned
with an arrangement or transaction, but it must be reasonable to conclude, after an objective analysis of the relevant facts and
circumstances, that one of the principal purposes of the arrangement or transaction was to obtain the benefits of the tax
convention. It should not be lightly assumed, however, that obtaining a benefit under a tax treaty was one of the principal
purposes of an arrangement or transaction and merely reviewing the effects of an arrangement will not usually enable a
conclusion to be drawn about its purposes. Where, however, an arrangement can only be reasonably explained by a benefit
that arises under a treaty, it may be concluded that one of the principal purposes of that arrangement was to obtain the
benefit”.
In considerazione della notevole preoccupazione che i treaty shopping arrangements
suscitano negli Stati, tali schemi dovrebbero essere espressamente menzionati quali
esempi di comportamenti elusivi i quali dovrebbero essere contrastati dalle norme
convenzionali.
Siffatta chiara disposizione sul comune intento delle parti potrebbe assumere una
significativa rilevanza ai fini dell’interpretazione e dell’applicazione di tutte le restanti
disposizioni convenzionali.
Con riferimento all’interazione tra disposizioni convenzionali e norme antiabuso
domestiche, l’OCSE raccomanda agli Stati:
 in primo luogo, di adottare una disposizione convenzionale la quale si fondi sulla
cd. “saving clause”, tipica delle convenzioni sottoscritte dagli Stati Uniti;
 in secondo luogo, di precisare che i trattati non escludono l’applicazione delle cd.
“departure or exit taxes”35.
qualification of that person as a resident of one of the Contracting States, and include steps that persons may take themselves in
order to establish residence. An example of an “arrangement” would be where steps are taken to ensure that meetings of the board
of directors of a company are held in a different country in order to claim that the company has changed its residence. One
transaction alone may result in a benefit, or it may operate in conjunction with a more elaborate series of transactions that together
result in the benefit. In both cases the provisions of paragraph 7 may apply” (cfr. OCSE, Preventing the Granting of Treaty
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, 16 settembre 2014, p. 69).
34 OCSE, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, 16 settembre 2014, p. 70.
35 “The report also addresses two specific issues related to the interaction between treaties and specific domestic anti-abuse rules. The
first issue relates to the application of tax treaties to restrict a Contracting State’s right to tax its own residents. The report
recommends that the principle that treaties do not restrict a State’s right to tax its own residents (subject to certain exceptions)
should be expressly recognized through the addition of a new treaty provision based on the so-called «saving clause» already found in
United States tax treaties. The second issue deals with so-called «departure» or «exit» taxes, under which liability to tax on some
(segue)
136
Va da sé che una efficace azione anti-treaty shopping può essere svolta dagli Stati, se
viene da questi adottata una politica diretta a limitare fortemente la negoziazione e stipula di accordi contro le doppie imposizioni con Paesi a fiscalità privilegiata e/o non
cooperativi36.
I principi sopra delineati sono stati ribaditi dall’OCSE nel documento “Preventing
the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 – 2015 Final Report”,
pubblicato in data 5 ottobre 2015.
L’approccio per un efficace contrasto ai fenomeni di treaty shopping prevede, secondo i più recenti orientamenti OCSE, tre distinti interventi. In primo luogo, gli Stati
sono invitati ad introdurre nei trattati fiscali una dichiarazione espressa, contenente
l’impegno ad impedire che possano essere messi in atto treaty shopping arrangements. In
secondo luogo, è intenzione dell’OCSE inserire nel Modello di Convenzione contro le
doppie imposizioni una specifica LOB clause, diretta a riconoscere i benefici convenzionali soltanto alle entità che presentano determinati requisiti. Infine, sempre nel Modello OCSE di Convenzione contro le doppie imposizioni, verrà inserita una disposizione anti-abuso generale, in grado di contrastare tutte quelle situazioni di abuso che
non rientrano espressamente nell’ambito di applicazione della LOB clause.
types of income that has accrued for the benefit of a resident (whether an individual or a legal person) is triggered in the event that the
resident ceases to be a resident of that State. The report recommends changes to the Commentary included in the Model Tax
Convention in order to clarify that treaties do not prevent the application of these taxes” (cfr. OCSE, Preventing the Granting of
Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, 16 settembre 2014, p. 15).
36 L’Action 6 del BEPS Action Plan prevede la necessità di identificare “the tax policy considerations that, in general,
countries should consider before deciding to enter into a tax treaty with another country”. The policy considerations (…) should help
countries explain their decisions not to enter into tax treaties with certain low or no-tax jurisdictions; these policy considerations will
also be relevant for countries that need to consider whether they should modify (or, ultimately, terminate) a treaty previously
concluded in the event that a change of circumstances (such as changes to the domestic law of a treaty partner) raises BEPS concerns
related to that treaty. It is recognised, however, that there are many non-tax factors that can lead to the conclusion, amendment or
termination of a tax treaty and that each country has a sovereign right to decide whether it should do so” (cfr. OCSE, Preventing
the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, 16 settembre 2014, p. 18).
137
Tavola 7 – Il concetto di treaty abuse nei trattati bilaterali
138
Tavola 8 – La disposizione sul cd. “principal purposes test”
139
3.7 ABSTRACT
One of the actions identified by the Action Plan of the OECD (Action 6) concerns
the abuse of treaties against double taxation (so-called “treaty abuse”) consisting in an
“unlawful use” in order to obtain tax benefits.
The treaty abuse stems from the need to reduce the fiscal burden through the use
of the existing gaps in the allocation of income through treaties against double
taxation between Member States or, in case of lack of bilateral agreements between
the country of the “investor and of the investment”, therefore choosing a more convenient
treaty, in order to keep – to levels considered (subjectively) sustainable – the tax
burden of cross-border income flows.
There have been several provisions and techniques used by States to eliminate
such an abuse. One of the most common techniques is the so-called LOB.
Limitation on benefits (LOB) refers to a number of restrictive provisions
predetermined to deny treaty benefits to companies that have certain characteristics,
or that do not “qualify” on the basis of specific tests provided in the anti-treaty
shopping rule.
The objective of the LOB is to restrict the use, for companies not belonging to
one of the two contracting States, of the provisions of the Agreement, thus reserving
their use only to residents in the signatory States. The LOB results in particularly
complex provisions, generally structured in the so-called tests, which place the burden
of proof on the taxpayer, who is entitled to rely on the treaty benefits only if able to
show that he can pass at least one such tests.
In order to implement the above-mentioned Action 6, on 14 March 2014, the
OECD published the document “BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in
inappropriate Circumstances” (“Discussion Draft”) which is the result of the work
undertaken by the OECD, with specific reference to the following three areas of
action:
 introduction of specific provisions in the conventions against double taxation
and publication of specific recommendations relating to the development of
national standards that prevent the extension of benefits arising from treaties
to entities that are not entitled to enjoy the same benefits;
 elaboration of clarifications with regard to the considerations according to
which “tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate double non-taxation”;
 identification of “tax policy considerations” that, in general, Member States should
take into account before the conclusion of a bilateral convention on tax
matters.
The Discussion Draft highlights the need to include in the preamble of bilateral
agreements, a clear reference to the request of the Contracting States to prevent and
combat the phenomenon of tax avoidance, and, in particular, to avoid favoring the
phenomenon of treaty shopping.
It also recommends the inclusion in the conventions, of a specific “anti-abuse rule
based on the limitation-on-benefits provisions”, based on the clauses included in treaties
concluded between the United States and certain other countries, aimed at countering
140
a large number of phenomena of treaty shopping, through the precise definition of
the necessary requirements for inclusion in the category of “qualified entities”, such as
the actual connection of the foreign source of income activity performed in the State
of residence.
The Discussion Draft also suggests the inclusion of a general anti-abuse clause in
the treaties, which constitutes an expression of the principle according to which tax
treaty benefits should not be given in the event that one of the fundamental objectives
of the transaction is to take advantage of a given treaty provision.
The above measures are also suggested by the OECD in the more recent
document “Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 2015 Final Report”, 5 October 2015.
141
Table 9 – Approaches to Counter Treaty Shopping
Treaty shopping
and treaty abuse

Each provision entails some advantages and
disadvantages and might eventually be inappropriate
within the context of certain legal systems.

Proposed provisions should be adapted differently in
order to take into account any possible “constitutional or
EU law restrictions”.
“Preventing the Granting of
Treaty Benefits in
Inappropriate
Circumstances”
OECD,
16 September 2014
Report Content
Pursuant to the
document, three
different
approaches may
be adopted in
order to counter
treaty shopping
phenomena.
142
•
a first approach sets forth that the title and the preamble of each
Treaty Against Double Taxation must include a clear legal
provision pursuant to which contracting States “intend to avoid
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax
evasion or avoidance”;
•
a second approach suggests that Tax Treaties should include a
special anti-abuse provision based on the LOB clause contained
in Treaties signed by the United States.
•
in the third place, with the aim of counteracting any other form of
abuse, it would be appropriate to include, in each Tax Treaty, a
general anti-abuse rule based on the “principal purposes of
transactions or arrangements”.
3.8 RIFERIMENTI
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Ipsoa - Beneficiario effettivo e treaty shopping di Valente Piergiorgio

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