The RCAF in WW2 (Part 2) - HIE208-Canadian-Military

HIE 208A Canadian
Military History From
Confederation to the
Present
Week 8: The RCAF in
WW2 (Part 2)
1
•1
RCAF
2
Members of the Royal Canadian Air Force participated in various theatres
throughout the war. At home, they were in charge of the BCATP, coastal defence
and convoy escorts, and participated in US operations in the Arctic against the
fleeing Japanese at Kiska during the summer of 1942. Transport squadrons
served with the British in Burma, and a CANSO recce-squadron served in
Ceylon. Across the Atlantic, Canadian units played a small role in the Battle of
Britain although many BCATP graduates were filtered into RAF units, to
Ottawa’s chagrin. The need to maintain “national” units for morale and political
reasons were as much a part of the RCAF’s mandate as it was for the Army, and
Minister for Air C. G. “Cubby” Power pursued “Canadianization” with fervour.
His efforts, carried out with Ottawa’s support, resulted in the creation of No. 6
Bomber Group (RCAF) in January 1943, initially under the command of G. E.
Brooks; he would later be replaced by the World War One flying ace Air
Commodore C. M. McEwen.
•2
RCAF at Beginning of War
3
On the 1st of September 1939, the Royal Canadian Air Force strength was 4,061 officers and
airmen. They were scattered throughout eight regular squadrons flying a total of 270 aircraft of
twenty different types. 146 of these machines were designated as training or transport aircraft and
only 19 Hurricanes and 10 Battles could be called first line service types.
The Department of National Defence believed the Air Force, on account of its speed and range, was best
suited to counter armed raids against the vast and sparely populated territory of British Columbia. As a
result, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) established Western Air Command (WAC) on March 1st,
1938, and started building facilities to support a Pacific Coast-based air force.
The September 1938 Munich crisis was evidence enough that war in Europe was as serious a threat. To be
ready, the RCAF set up its Eastern Air Command (EAC) on September 15th, 1938, and prepared a new
defence plan that included building bases and deploying squadrons in the Maritimes. Both the western and
eastern commands were placed under the Home War Establishment (HWE).
At the end of 1939, the HWE was comprised of 14 active squadrons, including No 110 (Army Cooperation)
Squadron soon to be detached to serve overseas with the First Infantry Division. Only two of the other
squadrons had the airplanes to carry out their mission: No 1 (Fighter) Squadron with seven Hawker
Hurricanes, and No 11 (Bomber-Reconnaissance) Squadron with ten Lockheed Hudson. A far cry from the
16 squadrons and 574 aircraft allotted to the HWE in the air defence plan.
In the early months of the war, the heavy commitments to Canadian air defence and to the development of
the BCATP meant that only three RCAF squadrons could be spared for overseas service. This number was
steadily increased so that by war's end there were 48 RCAF squadrons serving in the Western European,
Mediterranean and Far Eastern theatres.
In addition to those who served in the RCAF, thousands of young Canadians crossed the Atlantic to join the
Royal Air Force. In Coastal Command, Bomber command, Fighter Command and other units of the RAF,
they took part in all aspects of the air war over Europe. This Canadian contribution was recognized early in
the war when the first all-Canadian unit with the RAF, the 242 (Canadian) Squadron, was set up. The
squadron was in action from the very beginning conducting patrols across the Channel to protect the
evacuation of Dunkirk, and participating in the struggle for the survival of Britain.
•3
BCATP
4
As the focus of a Commonwealth-wide effort to instruct aircrew, Canada made a major contribution to Allied
air superiority during World War II. Called the "Aerodrome of Democracy" by US President Roosevelt,
Canada had an abundance of air training space beyond the range of enemy aircraft, excellent climatic
conditions for flying, immediate access to American industry, and relative proximity to the British Isles via
the North Atlantic. Canada had been the location of a major recruitment and training organization during the
First World War and Britain looked to it again when war began again in 1939. To Prime Minister King, the
scheme had the advantages of keeping large numbers of Canadians at home and avoiding the raising of a
large expeditionary force. Canada agreed to accept most of the plan's costs but insisted that the British agree
that air training would take precedence over other aspects of the Canadian war effort. The British expected
that their Royal Air Force would absorb Canadian air training graduates as in WW I, but King demanded that
distinct Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons be formed.
The contstruction of the training schools was a massive undertaking in itself. On the prairies, farmer's fields
were transformed in a matter of a few months into operational schools. This involved the levelling and
paving of runways, taxiways, and tarmacs: the building of several huge hangars, and dozens of other
buildings for accommodating, teaching, and providing other services to the young airmen: and the
installation of electrical, water, sewage, and other services.
As well, an aircraft construction industry was developed to provide the thousands of aircraft necessary. As
just one example of this , 1832 twin-engined Avro Anson Mk II's were built at factories in Nova Scotia and
Ontario during the war.
At the plan's peak, 94 schools operating at 231 sites across Canada, 10,840 aircraft were involved, and the
ground organization numbered 104,113 men and women, and three thousand trainees graduated each month.
At a cost that reached CAN$ 2,231 million, Canada’s share amounting to CAN$ 1,589 million, 131,553
pilots, navigators, bomb aimers, wireless operators, air gunners, and flight engineers were graduated.
The BCATP ended on March 31st, 1945. It had received 159,340 trainees, among which 131,553 (including
49,507 pilots) successfully completed the course of study. They belonged to the RAF (42,110), the RCAF
(72,835), the Royal Australian Air Force (9,606) and the Royal New Zealand Air Force (7,002). The 72,835
RCAF airmen comprised 25,747 pilots, 12,855 navigators, 6,657 bombers, 12,744 wireless operators /
gunners, 12,917 gunners, and 1,913flight engineers. Newfoundland, Free France, Poland and other nations at
war with Germany also benefited from BCATP training.
•4
Battle of Britain
242 RAF “Canadian Sqn
5
RCAF squadrons were engaged extensively in both fighter and bomber operations. As we have
seen, No. 1 Fighter Squadron, after only a few weeks of training, had joined the Fighter
Command in the Battle of Britain in 1940. Then, as the Luftwaffe was repulsed and the German
invasion prevented, Fighter Command quickly moved to the offensive. Separately, or in
conjunction with Bomber Command, fighters struck into Nazi-occupied France and Belgium to
attack enemy troop movements, ammunition factories, airfields and gun positions.
The RCAF’s No 1 (Fighter) Squadron is the only Canadian squadron that took part in the Battle of
Britain. Transferred overseas in June 1940, the pilots went through intensive training to be up to
the level of their RAF counterparts before being sent to the front. In their Hurricanes, the pilots of
No 1 Squadron had their first encounter with the enemy on August 23rd, 1940, and took part in
the action until October 8th. Three pilots were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC):
Squadron Leader E.A. McNab, Flight Lieutenant G.R. McGregor and Flight Officer B.D. Russel.
While putting together the 1st Infantry Division for service overseas, the Canadian government
also prepared a support squadron, No. 110 (Army Co-operation) under Squadron Leader W.D.
Van Vliet. The squadron was dispatched to Great Britain in February 1940 with its 12 Westland
Lysanders. Pilots and gunners immediately started specialized training at the School of Army Cooperation, near Salisbury, then operational training in Oldham, Hampshire.
On account of their being assigned to the Army Co-operation Command, No 110 airmen did not
take part in the Battle of Britain which was happening under their very eyes from July to October
1940; certainly a frustrating experience for young men eager to fly and fight. It may have been a
good thing, though, as the Luftwaffe Messerschmitts 109 would have ripped through their
outdated Lysanders. The squadron, on the other hand, was getting ready to support VII Army
Corps under Lt Gen McNaughton. Which would be facing the German invasion that seemed
then to be imminent. But the Battle of Britain proved the Luftwaffe unable to take control of the
sky, and Hitler cancelled the invasion, which had been planned for October 12th, 1940.
•5
Canadianization
6
At first the Canadian squadrons flew in formation with the RAF units, but as their
numbers increased, all-Canadian wings formed. Senior RCAF officers were
concerned that no consideration was being given by the RAF as to leadership
development of senior RCAF officers, leadership that would be critical in the
post war. Also, it seemed as if Canadians got posted to less well equipped units.
Therefore, a change in overseas senior officers occurred that promoted
“Canadianization.” Canadianization would require RCAF approval for all
Canadian postings, that Canadians would be concentrated in their own squadrons,
then wings, and finally groups in the key areas of heavy bomber and tactical air
support. By D-Day 1944, there were three RCAF Spitfire wings, a wing flying
dive-bombing Typhoons, and a reconnaissance wing of Spitfires and Mustangs.
On August 19, 1942, eight of the 74 Allied squadrons which gave aerial support
to the raid on Dieppe belonged to the RCAF.
•6
6 Bomber Group
7
In 1940, as hundreds of Nazi bombers ravaged Britain, the RAF had only limited aircraft with which to fight back. The
situation was desperate. However during the winter of 1940-41, the RAF bomber force was reinforced with young fliers
from the air-training schools of Canada and by new aircraft from British and Canadian factories. These aircraft included
the large four-engined bombers - Stirlings, Halifaxes and Lancasters - each capable of carrying from five to seven tons of
bombs.
With Britain unable to take army action against Germany, its only recourse was bombers. Throughout 1941 and 1942 raids
of steadily mounting intensity battered the industrial cities of Germany and struck U-boat bases, docks and railway centres
from Norway to France. By the end of 1942 new radar devices enabled "Pathfinder" bombers with fire bombs and brilliant
flares to guide the heavy bombers to their targets at night. In 1943 "saturation" bombing reached an appalling new level as
German cities were subjected to massive bombing attacks.
Canada's responsibility in bomber operations also expanded dramatically. The first Canadian bomber mission was carried
out on the night of June 12, 1941. A year later 68 RCAF aircraft took part in the first 1000-bomber raid, and by the end of
the war Canadian squadrons were sending out more than 200 heavy bombers in single raids carrying 900 tons of bombs.
At the beginning of 1943, 11 Canadian bomber squadrons were brought together to form an all-Canadian Bomber Group,
No. 6, under the command of Air Vice-Marshal G.E. Brooks, who was succeeded a year later by Air Vice-Marshal C.M.
McEwen. In the beginning No. 6 Group suffered a grim casualty rate. Between March 5 and June 24, 1943, the group lost
100 aircraft, seven per cent of its strength. year, seven more squadrons took to the air, and on 1 January 1943, No. 6 Group
of eight squadrons came into being. Based in Yorkshire, a long distance from their targets, the RCAF Group suffered
serious teething problems. It flew older Wellington bombers; it had bad luck, and it lost more than a hundred aircraft and
crews between March and June 1943; it suffered in consequence from morale problems. Not until the disciplinarian Air
Vice&endash;Marshal 'Black Mike' McEwen took over command in January 1944, and not until Lancasters and Halifaxes
had replaced the Group's Wellingtons, did matters improve. However, by mid-1944 with better equipment and training,
more experience, a reprieve from bombing missions into Germany, and fighter protection up to the targets, the situation
was reversed. At the end of 1944 No. 6 Group could boast the lowest casualties of any group in Bomber Command.
The value of the Bomber offensive against Germany remains bitterly controversial. The aim was to destroy military and
industrial installations and, by destroying the means to war, to force Germany to surrender. However, war production was
only minimally reduced in the bombing raids while thousands of civilians died, and great cultural centres were ruined. This
was a terrible example of total war. Yet, as democracies were fighting for survival, the mass bombing of civilians, rightly
or wrongly, appeared justified.
As well, the death toll in Bomber Command was tragically high. It took a special kind of courage to fly night after night
across enemy territory in the face of German defences. Many of the big planes failed to return. Enemy night fighters and
dense "flak" (anti-aircraft ground-fire) often inflicted heavy losses. When the Allies finally returned to the European
Continent on June 6, 1944, the RCAF was there to provide support. Bombers of No. 6 Group dropped over 870 tons of
bombs on gun positions overlooking the beaches of Normandy, and fighter wings dive-bombed enemy strongholds and
guarded the Allied landings.
The cost was 3,500 dead; another 4,700 RCAF officers and men died in other Bomber Command squadrons. In all, 17,101
members of the RCAF were killed during the war, a number almost exactly equal to the army's combat losses in the
European theatre. In all, the group's aircraft flew 41,000 operations and dropped 126,000 tons of bombs, one-eighth of
Bomber Command's total.
•7
Loss Rates
8
6 Group suffered higher losses on average than the RAF using the Wellington.
Note that these are night operations.
•8
Halifax
Lancaster
9
This improved with the Halifax, but losses could be high in day operations.
Losses were much lower with the Lancaster, but so much depended on the target.
It must be noted that German radar could detect 6 Group sooner than any other
group.
•9
10
On night operations with the Halifax, losses were higher then 4 group in 1943,
but then average about the same. With the Lancaster, losses were higher than the
Halifax, but lower than the RAF.
•10
6 Group
Targets
11
6 Bomber group participated in virtually all RAF heavy bomber raids 1943-5,
including the fire storm raids. This has led to some controversy (The Valour and
the Horror) as to why 6 Group didn’t stand up to the British policy of night time
area bombing. What modern detractors don’t realize that the escalation to
RAF/RCAF/USAAF area bombing was a long process that was not started by the
Allies. Also, no senior officer would stand up and oppose such a policy because
most believe it was the only doctrine that would work. (There was not enough
analytical research to indicate what type of bombing should be done ie precision
or area, night or day. The RAF did know that daytime losses by its less well
defended bombers led to higher losses, and that night bombing meant precision
was difficult.)
•11
Accuracy of Night Bombing
12
Accuracy of night bombing increased as the war went on from 24% to 92% of
bombs falling within 3 miles of the target. The chart illustrates how the
introduction of radio navigation beacons helps, then pathfinders, master bombers
and finally, radio navigation devices on the continent increased accuracy. Note
thought that the trying years of 1943 and 1944, accuracy was only at 50% (within
3 miles of target).
•12
Tonnage of Bombs Dropped in Europe
13
6 Group dropped about 10% of bombs in North west Europe during the strategic
campaign.
•13
6 Group
Minelaying
14
Minelaying operations were carried out by strategic bombers when it was time
for a rest after a gruelling mission or after high losses. This reassured the
survivors and broke in the new crews.
•14
Aerial Mine
15
•15
Eastern Air Command
Catalina aka Canso
Hudson
Liberator
16
At the beginning of the war the RCAF's Home War Establishment had two operational commands. Eastern and Western
Air Commands and seven under strength squadrons equipped with a variety of obsolescing aircraft, with which to defend
the country. The largest threat to Canada and allies at the time were the German U-boats in the North Atlantic so top
priority was given to expanding the facilities and capabilities of the Eastern Air Command. In December 1941 when the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour and later occupied the Aleutian Islands off Alaska and the priorities were reversed with
the focus now on Western Air Command.
Through out 1941 and 1942 the Home War Establishment was to achieve its maximum growth. With squadrons dispersed
as far east as Newfoundland and supporting the Americans in Alaska serious problems arose with in exercising operational
control. To overcome these difficulties, both air-commands were authorized to form operational groups as require. Odd
numbered groups were assigned to Eastern Air Command and even numbered groups to Western Air Command. In
November 1942 the Home War Establishment reached its peak strength with a total of 37 squadrons - 19 in Eastern Air
Command and 18 in Western Air Command. In the East, Eastern Air Command (EAC) was tasked with coordinating air
defence in the Atlantic region. The Dominion of Newfoundland – not yet a part of Canada – was placed under Canadian
military protection so that EAC territory included Eastern Quebec, Labrador, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. EAC headquarters were located in Halifax, next to those of the Royal Canadian Navy
(RCN), since maritime protection entails close cooperation between navy and air force. A network of air force bases
expanded rapidly: Halifax, Dartmouth, Yarmouth, Sydney, Gander, Torbay, Bagotville. Flying boat bases were built in
Gaspé, Shelburne, and Botwood. The Air Force’s role on the East Coast was to be worked out as early as September 1939
when the first transatlantic convoy, HX-1, left Halifax. The Stanraer flying boats of No 5 (Bomber-Reconnaissance)
Squadron patrolled the approaches of Halifax Harbour to locate possible enemy submarines; as the convoy put out to sea,
they ensured aerial protection within a 400-km radius. This was only about one-third of the plane’s actual range but one
had to take into account the trip back to the base and adverse winds. Starting in November 1939, the Dartmouth-based 11
Squadron’s Lockheed Hudson made it possible to extend the range of patrols to 550 km. Bolingbroke and Digby bombers
were also used. During the war’s early years the best performing plane for naval escort duty remained the Consolidated
Catalina flying boat (or Canso under its Canadian version), with an effective range of 960 km. Unfortunately, EAC’s
squadrons did not receive those aircraft before June 1941, as U-boat attacks against Allied convoys got as close as 1000
km off the coats of Newfoundland. Until 1942, RCAF air patrols were no serious threat to U-boats: insufficient training,
lack of experience, inadequate equipment, all those factors prevented Canadian airmen from getting significant results
against German submarines. In Great Britain, Coastal Command aircraft were equipped with radar systems and Torpex
depth charges, set to explode in shallow waters. It would be month before their Canadian counterparts could get such
equipment. The technical progress made by the British finally reached Canada. For instance, RAF-sponsored research
showed that lookout men tended to watch the horizon rather than straight above, simply because it was less tiring. An
aircraft painted white under and dark grey above disappears against the sky’s brightness. It can therefore get much closer to
a U-boat before being detected, drop down on it and launch its depth charges before the submarine can dive. RCAF
Squadron Leader N.E. Small, 113 (BR) Squadron, must be credited for introducing white camouflage and raising flight
altitude from 1,200 to 1,500 metres, a strategy that earned him a kill against U-754.
Despite the presence of RCAF squadrons along the eastern seashore, there remained in the middle of the Atlantic a weak
spot, too far from the shore to be covered by the Canso. The RCAF’s repeated requests for very-long range bombers were
not met before the summer of 1943. No 10 (Bomber-Reconnaissance) Squadron was then provided with four-engine
Lockheed B-24 Liberator bombers modified to be able cross the Atlantic and equipped with U.S.-made ASG radars. 10
Squadron’s Liberators were to play a key role in the September 1943 campaign launched by U-boats against transatlantic
convoys. Allied successes against German submarines in 1943 led to changes in the doctrine on maritime patrols, such as
conducted by Canso and Liberator squadrons. Warned of approaching U-boats by land-based radio-detection stations, by
the decipherment of wireless communications and by British intelligence services, EAC would send out patrols to locate,
and attack them. They were to maintain contact with the EAC at all times, in order to allow the RCAF and RCN enough
time to dispatch a combined force to sustain the offensive effort. Unfortunately, cooperation between the Air Force and the
Navy, although it is essential to the success of anti-submarine operations, was often marred by an ancient and deeply
rooted attitude of distrust among RCAF superior officers, wary that the RCN may take over air operations. This was,
however, the way things worked in Great Britain, where the RAF’s Coastal Command was taking its orders from the
Admiralty. In Canada, the situation did not improve after a first restructuring following the Anglo-American agreement
signed in the fall of 1941 that placed the naval forces in the Atlantic under U.S. command. The RCN followed unwillingly
the orders of the U.S. admiral based at Argentia; the RCAF, for its part, tried to maintain its autonomy by arguing that its
responsibilities extended beyond escort and submarine warfare operations. It is only in the spring of 1943, following
another reorganization of British, U.S, and Canadian forces involved in merchantmen protection, that better
•16
Tactical Air Wing
17
By the spring of 1944, with the Luftwaffe virtually driven from the coastal area, preparations began for the Allied invasion of the continent. The Spitfires became fighterbombers carrying a 500-pound bomb under each wing and, together with a wing of Typhoons, engaged in bombing bridges, railways, radar posts and coastal defences.
The RCAF Reconnaissance Wing, equipped for ground attack as well as for taking photographs, made regular sorties across the Channel.
The RCAF Fighters were also to work in close support of the invading armies when the Allies returned to the Continent. For the invasion of Europe two complete groups
of air support organizations were formed. The fighters, fighter-bombers, and reconnaissance squadrons would keep in touch with the front-line troops and help develop
ground attack. It was hoped that the RCAF would support the Canadian ground forces when the time came to go into battle. In June 1943 No. 83 Group, to which the
RCAF reconnaissance and fighter squadrons were transferred, was assigned to the First Canadian Army. Six home-defence squadrons were also sent overseas to join it.
While No. 83 Group was not an all-Canadian formation, 15 of its 29 squadrons and half its ground establishment of 10,000 were Canadian. The expectation that
Canadian land and air forces would go into battle together came to a disappointing end when on D-Day the highly experienced No. 83 Group was transferred to support
the Second British Army which had been designated to manage the actual landing. The (all RAF) 84 Group was assigned to the Canadians.
During the bitter fighting which followed around Caen, the RCAF gave air support to the Canadian and British forces, and when enemy troops were caught in the Falaise
pocket, Spitfires and Typhoons attacked the long columns of vehicles with deadly machine-gun fire. The RCAF then helped cover the advance of the armies across
northern France and Belgium, into the Netherlands, and finally across the Rhine and into Germany itself.
Outstanding exploits were performed by RCAF pilots as they drove the German Air Force from the sky and prepared the way for advancing armies. The Reconnaissance
Wing carried out photographic and tactical reconnaissance to gather information, first for planning the operation itself and then in aid of the advance. This wing was to
end the war deeper in Germany than any other RCAF unit.
As D-Day was approaching, Fighter Command and Army Co-operation Command squadrons were integrated into the 2nd Tactical Air Force (TAF) and both were
dissolved as such, the latter being replaced by the British Air Defence. In preparation for Operation Overlord, the Allies put together an immense air force by combining
the British 2nd TAF and the U.S. 9th TAF, as well as many squadrons from Coastal Command, Bomber Command and the U.S. 8th Army Air Force.
All RCAF fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons, including the six territorial defence squadrons that were sent overseas in 1943 and 1944, were assigned to the 2nd TAF,
except for No 402, which served with the British Air Defence. Each squadron prepared for the very specific role it was to play. Those that were to ensure air superiority
by attacking enemy aircraft used Spitfires IX or XXI. Fighter-bomber squadrons specialized in ground attacks flew Typhoons. Night fighters were equipped with
Mosquitos or sometimes Beaufighters, obsolete by then. Reconnaissance and photography units were supplied with Mosquitos, Mustangs and non-armed versions of the
Spitfire, their role being to provide the army with data on the terrain and on enemy positions.
On D-Day, June 6th, 1944, when the Allies set foot on the beaches of Normandy, the Luftwaffe put up almost no resistance to the massive invasion. Fighter squadrons
escorted invading troops and attacked enemy ground positions; air superiority was easily established over the bridgehead. Later, as ground forces forged ahead, that
superiority was easily maintained over an area that now reached some 100 km behind enemy lines. Allied ground forces could then move freely while German troops,
whether they used roads or railways, or moved across fields could not do so without being targeted by RAF and RCAF fighters.
Two days after D-Day, maintenance and construction commando squadrons arrived in Normandy to build airstrips. Ground crews of No 144 Wing (including Nos 441,
442 and 443 Squadrons) were deployed near Banville as early as June 9th, 1944. Both air and ground crews had to get used to the dust and lack of comfort of their
temporary facilities. The bases and support personnel of the other Spitfire and Typhoon squadrons were also transferred to Normandy, as the bridgehead became more
solid.
As the campaign unfolded, encounters between RCAF fighters and the Luftwaffe became less and less frequent. Fighter attacks were mostly directed at ground targets:
trucks, tanks, and artillery positions. When German troops in the Falaise Pocket were surrounded, on August 18th, 1944, fighters of all types were thrown into the battle.
On that single day, No 127 Wing (Nos 403, 416 and 421 Squadrons) destroyed or put out of commission over 500 military vehicles, totalling some 290 hours of flight
and firing 30,000 20-mm rounds.
When the Campaign of Normandy was over, fighter units moved up their bases to remain close to the front. Their role did not change much as the Allies moved ahead
slowly through North-Western Europe: support to the ground forces, bomber escort missions, attacking bridges, canals and enemy vehicles, road and rail convoys. The
Luftwaffe, as weakened as it was, put up a bitter resistance as the Allies came closer to Germany. It still had a secret weapon, the Me 262, the first jet-propelled fighter
plane. Much faster than the British Spitfire, it came in too late, the Third Reich was doomed.
•17
The Hump and
Burma
18
In the Far Eastern theatre of war the Dakotas of Nos. 435 and 436 Squadrons did
similar work in vastly different surroundings. Supporting the Fourteenth Army
Operations in Burma they dropped supplies by parachute on DZs (drop zones)
which were usually small clearings in the jungle where from the air appeared to
be no larger than "geranium pots."
In addition to the hazards of the jungle and the storms and diseases of the tropics,
the crews often had to run a gauntlet of intense ground fire from Japanese
positions close to their DZs or landing strips. On one occasion the unarmed
Dakotas were attacked by enemy fighters.
•18
Coastal
Command
19
Canada, like Great Britain, was convinced that the development of the air force should concentrate on strategic bombing and fighter operations. For that reason, the
RCAF’s overseas aeronaval involvement was limited to eight squadrons. Let us not forget that the RCAF was also responsible for protecting maritime traffic along the
coasts of Canada within the framework of the Home War Establishment mandate.
The first RCAF squadrons to serve under the British Coastal Command were formed in Great Britain in 1941. Three squadrons, No 404, No 407, and No 415 took part
in attacks against German ships along the coasts of north-western Europe. Equipped with Bristol Beaufighters in the spring of 1943, No 404 played a role in the
development of a new weapon, the three-inch (7,6 cm) rocket with a 25-pound (11.3 kg) armour-piercing charge, as it hunted down Axis ships off the coasts of Norway.
Anti shipping strikes were carried out by Blenheim and later Beaufighters. Their primary weapons were rockets. Operations were also carried out in Norwegian waters. A
salvo of 8 5 inch rockets was equal to a broadside by a cruiser, more than enough to destroy a merchantman, or even a destroyer. After an initial period where it flew
Blenheim and Hudson light bombers, No 407 Squadron received twin-engine Vickers Wellingtons. Those were improved aircraft that allowed No 407 to attack and sink
more ships than any other squadron of its group. No 415 Squadron, for its part, experienced many frustrations as its planes were poorly suited for their missions, and as it
was frequently forced to relocate. Those problems were solved in 1944 when the squadron was assigned to Bomber Command.
No 413 Squadron was created in the summer of 1941 and equipped with Consolidated Catalina flying boats, then one of the best aircraft for anti-submarine warfare. Less
than a year later, the squadron was transferred to Southeast Asia where the Japanese fleet threatened to annihilate the Royal Navy and invade Bengal. No 413 Squadron’s
first Catalina reached Koggala in Ceylon (today Sri Lanka) on March 28th, 1942. Patrols started a few days later on the morning of April 4th.
In Koggala, an airstrip is being built for No 413 Squadron’s Catalinas, February 10th, 1943. Coolies quarried, crushed and carried all the stone required without any
mechanical help.National Defence Image Library, PL 18412.On his first patrol, after twelve hours of unsuccessful search, Squadron Leader L.J. Birchall and his crew of
eight located the Japanese fleet. They closed in to assess the number of warships but were rapidly spotted by Japanese Zero fighters that were covering the ships. The
Zeros attacked the Catalina that Birchall tried desperately to keep in flight while the wireless operator sent in coordinates of the fleet. The badly damaged plane dived and
Birchall, together with six of his crewmates, managed to get away from the wreck, only to be rescued by a Japanese destroyer and made prisoners of war. Birchall’s call,
however, had warned the Allies that a Japanese attack against the island was imminent and earned him to be known as “the Saviour of Ceylon”,
After the April and May 1942 Japanese attacks, the Southeast Asia theatre grew much quieter and months after months of monotonous patrolling were to be the lot of No
413 Squadron.
Created in 1942, No 422 and No 423 Squadrons flew aboard Short Sunderland flying boats. Those were heavy, four-engine aircraft with less autonomy and range than
Catalinas; they had been originally designed for passenger service. The hull was actually so huge that it could be fitted with two decks. On the lower deck a small kitchen
equipped with an oven provided the crew with a wartime luxury: coffee and hot meals.
Given the defensive nature of their missions, most Coastal Command squadrons had to fly lengthy patrols without even a glimpse of the enemy. Bad weather was
actually a worse threat. Patrols followed one another and men had to fight boredom that would make them less vigilant. Encounters with the enemy may have been rare
but they certainly were not without danger. U-boats were tough targets for planes to fire at, and one had to get really close to get a hit. With its machine-guns and antiaircraft 20-mm guns, a U-boat could certainly fire back in a sustained manner (Type IX U-boats even had an additional 37-mm gun). Risks were high and so were losses
in lives and material.
An average of 2,000 to 3,000 Canadians served with the Coastal Command during the war’s last two years. In April 1944 the aircrews, ground personnel and
administrative support personnel of all RCAF squadrons amounted to 2,065 men; 919 more Canadians were with various RAF units.
As implied in its slogan "Find the enemy; strike the enemy; protect our ships," from September 1939 to May, 1945, was the waging of war against the enemy's U- boats,
warships, and merchant shipping, in close co- operation with the Admiralty and Royal Navy. Coastal's other responsibilities embraced photographic reconnaissance, airsea rescue, meteorological flights and in the early months of the war, minelaying. From an embryo organization of five headquarters and 25 subordinate units at the
beginning of the war the Command developed into a powerful force which at the end of the campaign comprised 10 headquarters and 247 subordinate units.
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Beaufighter
Sunderland
Rocket Strike
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To the cause of keeping Britain's life-lines open and strangling the enemy's commerce, Canada contributed
large numbers of aircrew and ground personnel as well as a small group of civilian and service scientists
familiarly known as "the back-room boys" or "boffins." There was indeed virtually no sphere of endeavour
within Coastal Command in which the RCAF did not participate. At one time or another, while Coastal was
fighting the Battle of the Atlantic and clearing the seas for the invasion of North-West Africa and the
landings in Normandy, seven RCAF squadrons served under its banner. These included three squadrons,
Nos. 404, 407, and 415, equipped with landplanes - Blenheims, Beaufighters, Mosquitos, Hudsons,
Wellingtons, Hampdens, and Albacores; three squadrons, Nos. 413, 422 and 423, equipped with Catalina and
Sunderland flying-boats; and No. 162 squadron on detachment from Eastern Air Command, flying the
amphibious Canso. The war records of the seven Canadian units illustrate the versatility of Coastal
Command's operations.
No. 404 Squadron spent most of the war in northern Scotland and the Shetland Isles. Its career began as a
coastal fighter unit, sending its Blenheims on long reconnaissances and escort missions across the North Sea
to the coast of Norway. Once re-equipped with rocket-firing Beaufighters, it became a strike unit, harrying
Nazi shipping from the fiords of Norway to the ports of southern France. No. 407 Squadron gained fame as
an anti-shipping unit that made daring mast-height attacks on enemy convoys off the Frisian Islands and the
Dutch coast. With a record of 83,000 tons sunk or damaged in a single month, it was acclaimed as the most
successful strike squadron in Coastal Command during the latter part of 1941 and early 1942.
When the Hudson became obsolete for this work No. 407 Squadron was converted to an anti-submarine role,
using Wellingtons equipped with powerful Leigh Lights to illuminate the target for night attacks. Four
definite kills were credited to the crews of this squadron in addition to a number of other U- boats and midget
submarines more or less severely damaged.
After a period of service on Hampden torpedo-bombers attacking enemy shipping, No. 415 Squadron was reequipped with Wellingtons and Albacores and won many successes in night attacks on flagships, motortorpedo-boats and merchant vessels in the North Sea and English Channel before transferring to Bomber
Command in the summer of 1944.
Nos. 422 and 423 (Sunderland) Squadrons were continuously employed in the campaign against the U-boat
escorting convoys and searching the seas from Iceland to Gibraltar. Six submarines were sent to the bottom
by crews of these squadrons. Early in 1944, No. 162 Squadron flew its Cansos from Nova Scotia to Iceland
to join Coastal's forces in the Battle of the Atlantic and its crews killed six U-boats, five of them in a period
of less than a month.
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RCAF Tiger Force
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Three "Very Long Range" (VLR) bomber groups, each consisting of 22
Squadrons, (one RAF, one RCAF, and the third a composite British
Commonwealth formation), were created and code-named "Tiger Force".
By Spring 1945, "Tiger Force" was scaled down to two groups, considerably
smaller than originally proposed.
By 8 May 1945, almost immediately, the RCAF units earmarked for "Tiger
Force" were converted to Canadian built Lancaster Bombers (MK X's) and
returned to Canada for training and reorganization. No. 6614 Wing Greenwood
was created. The plan called for the Wings to commence training for the Pacific
in August, with the first Wing to arrive in the Pacific Theater by December.
The arrival of the new bomber Wing overlapped the phasing out of No. 8 (RCAF)
OTU. The disbandment order for the OTU was to be effective 31 July 1945. By 1
August 1945, No. 664 (Heavy Bomber) Wing and its two squadrons (No. 405 and
408 Squadrons) were officially formed. Training was to commence 24 August
1945.
With the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the subsequent capitulation of
Japan on 14 August 1945, No. 6614 Wing (and Tiger Force) became superfluous.
On 5 September 1945, No. 6614 Wing officially disbanded as part of Tiger
Force.
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RCAF Casualties
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The cost was 3,500 dead in 6 Group; another 4,700 RCAF officers and men died
in other Bomber Command squadrons. In all, 17,101 members of the RCAF were
killed during the war, a number almost exactly equal to the army's combat losses
in the European theatre. In all, the group's aircraft flew 41,000 operations and
dropped 126,000 tons of bombs, one-eighth of Bomber Command's total.
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Leadership (In General)
Crerar
McNaughton Kitching & Simonds Burns
Hoffmeister Vokes
Foulkes
Keller
Murray
McEwen
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Historian Jack Granatstein has noted that nations not only get the politicians they deserve, but also
the generals. Both the senior political and military leadership of Canada played no role in the
higher direction of the war. While Canadian Rear-Admiral Leonard Murray was placed in charge
of the Northwest Atlantic Command in 1943, it was a small theatre of war and the only one with a
Canadian at the head. As we have seen in other conflicts, Canada plays its military part alongside
larger allies who plan the strategic game, and the Second World War was no different. The
struggle to keep units together in all services against other Allied military priorities did remain a
primary and contentious issue for Canadian commanders, especially General A. G. L.
McNaughton. The development of independent RCAF units, particularly No. 6 Group in Bomber
Command, perplexed and upset Canada’s allies who could not see past their own needs for
homogeneity. The RCN, which, more than most, operated with British and American units, was
perhaps the first branch to see that the future lay in closer cooperation with Canada’s southern
neighbour.
While Canada never produced the same calibre of operational thinkers as her allies (there are no
equivalent Pattons, Montgomerys, Zukovs, or Rommels), her senior military leadership had its
merits, and failings. The nationalist McNaughton was loved by his men and saw clearly some of
the future issues with atomic energy. He was also hated by his British superiors, and deemed unfit
for battlefield command. Harry Crerar would be the premier Canadian to command the First
Canadian Army in battle, though Guy Simonds may have been the best tactician and innovator to
lead that army, though not without his own faults. Effective commanders E. L. M Burns and
Charles Foulkes, both former commanders of the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, would find their
skills used to greater effect during the Cold War. For their part, Murray and McEwen were
admirable for the conduct of their respective commands in the difficult and trying early days of
the war for both the RCN and RCAF.
In examining Canada’s participation in the Second World War, keep in mind the importance of
alliances and issues of national sovereignty. These mantras were evident in the First World War,
critical to the Second World War, and would become further entangled in the Cold War when
Canada, for the first time in its history, joined not one but two peacetime alliances. The
composition of those post-war alliances represented another shift in Canada’s position on the
world stage that was fostered by her efforts through six years of war
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Questions
What were the criteria for a successful Canadian
commander in the Second World War?
Was it simply a matter of technological
backwardness that caused the RCN so much trouble
during the initial phase of the war?
Of all the theatres and roles in which RCAF
members served, which was their greatest
contribution to the war effort?
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