Use of Communications EW in a NCW Environment

Use of Communications EW in a
Network Centric Warfare
Environment
TTCP EWS AG5 Brief to the
2008 AOC International Exhibition and
Symposium
Ian Coat
EWRD, DSTO
Release and Distribution
This document contains Information authorised under the
auspices of The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP)
for unlimited release and distribution.
The Technical Cooperation Program is defined under a
Memorandum of Understanding among the Minister of
Defence on behalf of the Department of Defence of
Australia, the Department of National Defence of Canada,
the New Zealand Defence Force, the Secretary of State
for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and the Secretary of Defense on behalf
of the Department of Defense of the United States of
America.
©
©
©
©
©
Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, Canada, 2007.
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), United Kingdom, 2007.
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), Australia, 2007.
Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), United States of America, 2007.
Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), United States of America, 2007.
2
Outline
ƒ
Overview of TTCP, EWS, AG5
ƒ
Role for CEW in Network Protection
ƒ
ƒ
CEW Functions and Capabilities
ƒ
Radio Spectrum Awareness
ƒ
The Emitter Map
ƒ
Concepts for CEW in a Network Centric Warfare
Environment
TTCP Workshop on the Robustness and
Vulnerability of NCW
The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP)
The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is
an international organisation that collaborates in
defence scientific and technical information
exchange; program harmonisation and
alignment; and shared research activities for the
five nations (Australia , Canada, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom, and the United States).
Public Website: http://www.dtic.mil/ttcp/
Groups within TTCP
AER
Aerospace Systems Group
C3I
Command, Control, Communications and
Information Systems Group
CBD
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
Defence Group
EWS
Electronic Warfare Systems Group
HUM
Human Resources and Performance Group
JSA
LND
MAR
Joint Systems and Analysis Group
MAT
Materials and Processing Technology
Group
SEN
Sensors Group
WPN
Conventional Weapons Technology Group
Land Systems Group
Maritime Systems Group
Each Group is comprised of several Technical Panels
and Action Groups.
TTCP EWS AG5
ƒ The Electronic Warfare Systems (EWS) group
is responsible for science and technology
collaboration in EW.
ƒ Action Group 5 (AG5) is tasked with studying
new concepts for Electronic Warfare and
Network Centric Operations.
ƒ Part of the AG5 study is to investigate how
Communication Electronic Warfare (CEW) can
assist in protecting the radio-link portion of
communications networks in a Network Centric
Warfare (NCW) force.
The Role of CEW in
Network Protection
In the 20th century, radar and
Radar Electronic Warfare evolved to
provide situational awareness and
platform protection.
In the 21st century, Communication EW
will evolve to provide radio spectrum
awareness and network protection for
the Network Centric Warfare force.
Communications Electronic Warfare
ƒ CEW is comprised of three related disciplines:
ƒ Communication Electronic Support (signal interception,
emitter locating, analysis)
ƒ Communication Electronic Attack (jamming, deception)
ƒ Communication Electronic Protection (anti-jam radios)
ƒ Communication Electronic Support (CES) provides:
ƒ Surveillance of the radio spectrum
ƒ Identification of radio signals and spectrum usage
ƒ Recovery of message content
ƒ Geolocation and tracking of emitters
Radio Spectrum Monitoring by a
CEW sensor
Detect all signals in
range of sensor
Identify signal types
and spectral usage
Direction-Find and
geo-locate emitters
Intercept signals of
interest
The CEW Emitter Map
Associate radio
signals to emitters
over time for area of
interest
CES
CES
Geo-location and
tracking of emitters
Classify emitters
Identify network
structure of emitters
CES
CES
Detect usage of
the radio spectrum,
locate emitters,
determine identity,
track which sets of
emitters are using
what parts of the
radio spectrum, by
region, over time.
Radio Frequency
Shared Radio Spectrum Awareness for NCW
- the RF Common Operating Picture
Ar e
Unknown
Hostile
ao
f in
te re
Neutral
st
Friendly
Detection of Network Jamming
CES systems may
locate the source of interference
using network information
and spectral surveillance
Hostile
Jammer
Jamming disrupts
RF Link
between forces
Shared
RF COP
Network
Management
Radio Spectrum Awareness
ƒ Need Input from the “network”
ƒ Blue Force Tracking (who, where, when)
ƒ Wireless networks and spectrum usage
ƒ Reports of outages and interference of wireless links
ƒ Need to know the RF environment
ƒ Map local, civilian use of the spectrum
ƒ Model radio propagation environment
ƒ Detect and track changes in spectrum usage
ƒ Need sufficient CES capability
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
Quantity of sensors required to cover area of interest
Continuous frequency coverage over all comms bands
Ability to identify all types of radio signals
Geo-location of emitters
TTCP Workshop on the Robustness and
Vulnerability of Network Centric Warfare
Workshop Objectives:
ƒ
Identify vulnerabilities of NCW systems to attack;
ƒ
Identify means to defend NCW systems from attack;
ƒ
Identify the technology and procedural gaps that may
present vulnerabilities to NCW systems, including those
unique to coalition operations; and
ƒ
Identify future research activities to address the
vulnerabilities of NCW systems.
Hosted by DRDC Ottawa in May 2007
ƒ
Involved 33 scientists from US, UK, AUS, and CA.
ƒ
Contained 26 presentations on vulnerabilities, robustness
and research in NCW systems.
Coalition Networks
Theatre
Command
National
Command
Dismounted
Soldiers
UAV
Tactical
HQ
Urban
Littoral
Different protocols
Rural
Network Centric Warfare Systems
The following are examples of Network Centric
Warfare Systems and capabilities that could be
targeted by hostile actions against the network:
• HQ Command, Control and Communications (C3)
• Situation Awareness (SA)
• Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance
• Air Defence, Artillery, and Network-Controlled Weapons
• Logistics and Supply
• Vehicle and Dismounted Infantry C3/SA
NCW Vulnerabilities Considered
ƒ Electronic Warfare
ƒ Networks and Communications
ƒ Network-Enabled Systems
ƒ Human Factors
NCW Workshop Summary
ƒ There are potential vulnerabilities to Network
Centric Warfare and network-enabled systems.
ƒ Detailed understanding of all potential
vulnerabilities, including technological,
organisational, and human-related, is essential to
developing and operating NCW systems that are
robust, reliable, and effective.
ƒ This is particularly important to address
asymmetric attacks against the network.
ƒ Significant research is required to properly
investigate the vulnerabilities of NCW systems
and assess levels of robustness.
Questions?