capability profiles

Transcription

capability profiles

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Welcome to the fourth edition of Hazmat Responder World. We have an
international line up of articles for you this issue, with contributions from
Finland, Israel, Singapore, the UK and US. The Bhopal article from Efraim
Laor, as well as the article from Greg Noll on the issue of fracking, raises
valuable points on the issues of proprietary chemicals. Part of the problem in
Bhopal, 1984, was the official denial, misinformation and general lack of cooperation between industry, local government, responders and the public. As
Greg Noll points out, fracking is likely to increase, not only in the US where,
by and large, there is a regulatory framework and a highly-competent
response mechanism, but in other parts of the world where the risk is just as
high but the response less competent, which poses an enormous risk. The
lesson learned out of Bhopal, in terms of chemical identification and
toxicology, is that simple medical countermeasures could have been taken
were it not for a commercial reluctance to admit to certain leaked elements
(such as hydrogen cyanide). Could we see this happening with fracking?
There is a real concern that this could be the case. Bulk amounts of chemical
are needed and transported for reserves such as the Marcellus shale in the US, and the US transport infrastructure
is not to be sniffed at (no pun intended!). In the developing world a tanker roll could present local hazmat teams,
and more importantly the local population, with a very significant health hazard.
This leads quite nicely to our end piece by Chris Hawley and Bob Royall, which emphasises the claim that ‘hope is
not a plan’ and that hope is the one element you can’t afford in a response. There have been many complaints from
hazmat crews that fracking companies wrongly identify bulk cargo containers due to proprietary concerns, and that
if hazmat crews lack the necessary detectors (or more likely the library), then their choices of PPE and mitigation
scenario could well be compromised. Equally, if a level of suspicion and doubt creeps in it might well be that
hazmat crews hold back, which, to quote Chief Eversole, is not the best strategy: “If you are standing around
‘hoping’ that the shit will go away”, as he candidly put it, “or that it will take care of itself, then you are setting
yourself up for failure.”
Elsewhere, we have an engaging article from Tiina Santonen and Peter Bos, from Finland and the Netherlands
respectively, which points out some of the problems attendant on the use and misuse of different acute exposure
reference values. They take seven of these values and point out the discrepancies between them, which is an
important lesson to be learned by all hazmat responders. Understanding their differences will ensure that you
understand what the warnings refer to (don’t get your AEGLs and TEELs mixed up!).
Also in this issue is a great feature from the Singapore Civil Defence Force on their capability, which was recently
tested in a major fire on the Jurong Island industrial complex, which goes to prove that not all the best hazmat
solutions and response efforts originate in the US!
What the articles here prove is that, despite the draw down in fire budgets (especially in relation to hazmat), the
requirement remains, and in the face of terrorist and natural challenges only gets higher. Currently, we have three
forces volunteering for our vignettes in Dublin: the UK’s Great Western Ambulance Service HART Team, the Paris
Fire Brigade and also an Irish multi-agency team, all of which will be demonstrating how to deal with some of the
complex catastrophes that hazmat teams face. To ensure that you don’t miss it, book your place at
www.cbrneworld.com/AllHazardsResponse2013
Your Editor,
Gwyn Winfield
Autumn 2012
HazMat Responder World
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Contents
Advertiser Index
All Hazard Response
Bertin Technologies
Biofire
Bruker Detection
CBRNe World Directory
CoBra Software
Firstline Technology
Georgetown University
Proengin
Thermo Detection
Thermo Radiation
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21
IFC
21
31
13
15
13
9
IBC
OBC
Legal Niceties: Reproduction in whole, or part,
of any content of HazMat Responder World,
without prior permission, is strictly prohibited.
Any correspondence should be addressed to
The Editor, HazMat Responder World.
We acknowledge the assistance and hard work
of many individuals, associations and
organisations who have contributed to this
magazine. The information published in this
magazine has been published in good faith and
the opinions contained in the article are those
of the author and not Falcon Communication
Ltd. Photos are credited individually, non
attributed articles are from the HazMat
Responder World archive.
©Falcon Communication Ltd 2012
Front cover picture ©CBRNe World
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Autumn 2012
Contents
4 News
All the latest HazMat news
6 Hazmat MVP & Editorial Panel
Meet the team that makes HazMat Responder World possible
Singapore Hazmat
Lessons Learned – Bhopal
32 Northstar Rising
8 Responding to the Bhopal Disaster
Pt.2
What elements of the response are still relevant?
Lt. Col. Seet and Maj. Yung, from the SCDF, on their full
spectrum emergency capability
Escondido Bomb Factory
37 The House that Jack(ubec) Built
Where AEGLs Dare
Nick Vent tells Steve Johnson about the find of a lifetime!
17 Tried and Tested
What harmonisation is needed in acute exposure levels?
Making sense of it all
40 CLP ‘round the ear
Frack that!
The new hazmat labelling and what it means to you
23 Changing Faces
Greg Noll on what fracking means to the hazmat responder
42 The Interoperable Man
Roy Wilsher tells Andy Johnston about UK interoperability
Concentrate on this
Back Pages
25 On the vapour trail
Dan Kaszeta on the challenges of low volatility agents
44 Capability Profiles
28 Providing an ACE response
46 Endpiece
Callan and Gill on the new Airgas Container
Emergency program
Chris Hawley and Bob Royall Jnr on why you need something
better than hope
Published by Falcon Communications Limited
Editor
Gwyn Winfield
Sub Editor
Jesse Garrick
Business Development
Director
David Levitt
Correspondents
Laura Cochrane
Dan Kaszeta
Art Director
Tony Denton
European Outreach
Manager
Andy Johnston
Executive Editor
Kevin Miller
Deputy Editor
Steve Johnson
Business Development
Executives
Sophie Pym
Andrea Schinzel
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Web: www.hazmatresponderworld.com
Autumn 2012
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Falcon Communications US
LLC
205 East Main Street,
Westminster,
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3
News
Meth watch
A rapidly growing staple of the hazmat responder, the meth
incident, continues to fill the roster of call outs. Since our May
issue, we’ve noted at least 54 incidents in the USA with particular
modus operandi including:
U-Haul mobile labs: seizures in North Carolina, Florida and Arkansas
Arkansas’s largest find is believed to have comprised several
hundreds of pounds of Meth, incurring clean up costs of $4000
and sheriff costs of $15,000.
s
Chemical suicides
There has been no real reduction in the number of attempted
chemical suicides, with recent incidents in San Marcos, CA, New
Jersey and Roswell. The Roswell incident involved a woman trying
to commit suicide within her apartment, rather than in a car,
which is more typical. Although two police officers were able to
rescue her and her daughter from the apartment before they died,
both the officers and the victims had to be admitted to hospital
for treatment.
Pepper with that?
A bank robber in Houston opted for non-lethal force to make his
getaway, spraying employees with a pepper spray despite being
armed with a gun.
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Motel labs: incidents affected Nevada, Florida, Atlanta,
Michigan and Pensylvania
And, of course, plenty of one-pot cooking incidents. Nothing
unusual about one-pot cooks of course, but Missouri had a
particularly strange case this month: in a St Louis County
Walmart, staff waylaid a customer whom they suspected of
shoplifting. On opening her hand bag they discovered that the
customer was cooking meth in a soda bottle as she shoplifted.
How’s that for multi-tasking!
Whole load of Hazmat going on
This year alone in the US, 8,640 hazmat incidents were reported to
the federal authorities, incurring $46,585,905 of damages.
Fatalities remained low (five) as did injuries (85). Over 50% of
incidents occurred when unloading hazardous materials and, of
these, 1,311 cases were due to human error, which continues to be
the major cause of these incidents. 7950 of the reports were
classified as spills and 242 involved gas dispersions.
s
Threat Watch
a decontamination tent, four emergency service unit officers
forced him into a wheel chair, wheeled him into a tent, stripped
and decontaminated him. While a relatively minor incident, it does
demonstrate a difficulty that responders often face when
conducting decontamination activity, namely the issue of
compliance for public and personal health issues.
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HazMat
Responder
World News
Jumping decontamination
Jersey City Police had to resort to force in order to decontaminate
a man from a flea-infested house. After repeated refusals to enter
White house issues US bio-threat detection plan
Addressing years of criticism from the Government Accountability
Office, the White House has released a US biological threat
detection plan. President Obama described the document as one
component of his National Security Strategy, and noted the latest
plan's aim to "Provide the critical information and ongoing
situational awareness that enables better decision-making at all
levels." The US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
No need to make a circus out of it!" Jersey had to deal with a novel level of contamination ©The Jersey Journal
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Autumn 2012
News
Product Watch
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Argon bonanza
Argon Electronics, manufacturer of CBRN simulation instruments
and software, has delivered an advanced CBRN simulation system
to the Irish Defence Forces. The new order included Argon’s
PlumeSIM system, the RDS100-SIM beta, gamma and alpha
simulation probes, plus the RDS200 survey simulator, GPM11-SIM
simulator probes and the EPD-Mk2-SIM. The order also included a
number of Argon’s new LCD3.3-SIM chemical warfare detector
simulators. A spokesman for the Irish Defence Forces explained:
“We purchased the systems from Argon because they will enable
the Irish Defence forces to implement live-agent training without
the need to use live agents or radiological sources”. This adds to a
bumper month in which Argon also completed sales to the UK
MoD. In July, Argon was accredited to environmental management
system standard, ISO 14001:2004.
The HazMatID Elite released by Smiths Detection
Smiths Detection has launched HazMatID Elite – an explosives,
chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals and narcotics
identifier certified to the strictest military standard for use in the
most extreme climates. The Elite is the next generation of Smiths
Detection’s HazMatID, the widely used field-portable, FT-IR, solid
and liquid identifier.
s
Smiths and Mirion partner
Smiths Detection today announced a partnership with Mirion
Technologies, that will soon see it offering a full radiation
detection and identification product line to US customers. Its
technology suite will now meet all the needs of multiple security
markets, including military/defence, homeland security, ports and
borders, aviation and emergency response. Lance Roncalli, Smiths
Detection’s VP of US Sales, said: “This exciting partnership will
ensure our customers can access the full range of radiation
technologies available in the marketplace today. Such
developments support all our customers as they develop a
comprehensive and layered security approach to protect critical
infrastructure and secure the free flow of trade.” Smiths Detection,
which already markets the RadSeeker, a handheld radiation
detector and identifier, will be able to offer a wide range of Mirion
products including a dosimeter (DMC-3000), a detector (RDS-31)
and a search and radionuclide identifier (PDS 100 G/GN ID).
Thermo tackle synthetic drugs
Thermo Fisher Scientific has announced the release of TruNarc – a
new, handheld narcotics analyser. The core technology behind
TruNarc – Raman spectroscopy – effectively puts a laboratory
analyser in the hands of local law enforcement, providing more
accurate and reliable field testing that expedites prosecution.
Users will also be able to identify new threats, such as the
synthetic cathinones found in bath salts, as the reference library in
their analyser can be updated to include new substances.
s
Always check under the sofa first
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, responsible for
disciplining companies for breaches of radiological safety, admitted
an embarrassing faux pas when they mislaid some training CS137
sources in a lesson on hiding and finding sources. While the
sources were not that significant, it didn’t demonstrate the level of
inventory management that the CNSC expects of others.
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No slow down in powder letters
Since May, 2012, at least 91 powder scares have occurred across
the United States. As you might expect, none of them have been
real, though they have all had a disrupting and occasionally costly
effect. Over 26 states were affected by white powder incidents in
the same period.
Cobham keeps watch
Cobham has been awarded an eight-year contract from Oil Spill
Response (OSRL) to provide oil pollution detection and surveillance
around the coast of the UK. As part of the deal, Cobham will
operate a specially-modified Dornier 228 aircraft from
Bournemouth International Airport. The contract incorporates an
existing interim contract which has been in operation since
January, 2012.
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Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism continues to assert
that an attack is likely by the end of 2013, which has increased
the urgency with which the threat must be gripped, incurring
billions of US dollars in cost.
New style hybrid system from Dräger
Dräger has announced the release of the DHS 7000 hybrid system,
beginning June 11th, 2012. The Dräger DHS 7000 system can be
used in three modes of operation with the air purifying respirator
(APR), powered air purifying respirator (PAPR) or self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA). The mask works either in positive
pressure mode as a SCBA or in negative pressure mode as an APR
or PAPR. Modifications have also been made to remove distracting
or non-tactical lights from the system.
Whole load of Hazmat going on ©National Hazmat Fusion Centre
Autumn 2012
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Hazmat MVP
Hazmat MVP
This is a new section of the magazine, in which the Hazmat
Responder World Editorial Committee chooses a most valued
player (MVP) that has either recently or historically made a
difference to both their community and colleagues.
This issue’s MVP is: Deputy Chief James G. Yvorra
Jim Yvorra dedicated his life's work to the fire and emergency
medical services. After graduating from Indiana State University
(Pennsylvania) with a degree in English and Journalism, he began
his career in 1974 as the EMS training co-ordinator for
Lycoming, Tioga and Sullivan counties in Pennsylvania. In 1976
he moved on to the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute where he
was a senior EMS instructor. His leadership style and personal
commitment to his profession helped many young men and
women begin successful careers as an EMT and paramedic – at a
time when the profession was only just developing.
In 1978, Jim combined his talents in journalism and emergency
services by joining the Robert J. Brady Company as editor of fire
and EMS publications. While there, he was responsible for
producing an impressive list of publications, including Emergency
Care (3rd Edition), First Responder, Trench Rescue and
Investigating the Fire Scene.
After six successful years with the Brady Company, he formed
Peake Productions in 1983 to focus on speciality topics. In just
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Autumn 2012
five years, his company produced Alan Brunacini's Fireground
Command for the National Fire Protection Association, and Fire
Protection Publication’s Hazardous Materials: Managing the
Incident, which he co-authored.
Despite his academic background, Jim Yvorra was a hands-on
kind of guy. He served as an active volunteer with the Berwyn
Heights (Maryland) Fire Department and Rescue Squad for 11
years, holding every rank through deputy chief and president. He
was also a founding member of the Prince Georges County
(Maryland) Hazardous Materials Response Team and held the
position of shift officer.
Jim was a serious student of management and leadership, and
was firmly of the belief that individuals can make a difference.
His personal accomplishments set an example for others to
follow. After Jim’s untimely death in 1988, his family and friends
established the Yvorra Leadership Development Foundation in his
honour and to continue his life’s work. Since its inception, the
foundation has awarded $118,000 to more than 60 recipients.
The Yvorra Leadership Development Foundation is one of the
nominated charities for the 2012 CBRNE Convergence mask
auction. For more information, visit:
http://www.cbrneworld.com/news/charity_auction
To learn more about the Yvorra Leadership Foundation, or to
obtain an award application, visit www.yld.org.
Editorial Panel
The Hazmat Responder
World Editorial Panel
Eight experts covering the Hazmat challenges that face responders across the world
Chief Robert Ingram - FDNY
Eric Yap – SCDF
Robert Ingram is a Battalion Chief in
the Fire Department, City of New York.
He has 25 years of Hazardous Material
Operations assignments and is now
assigned to the Center for Terrorism and
Disaster Preparedness as the WMD
Branch Chief. Chief Ingram is a national
instructor in hazardous materials and
worked on Bio and Radiological
planning at the national level.
Commissioner Eric Yap joined the
Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) in
1993. He graduated in 1993 from the
University of Ulster. He was awarded
an MA in Management & Organisation
Communication from Emerson College.
He has held several key appointments,
including Commander of First Division
SCDF and Director of Operations
Department, SCDF HQ.
Chief Christophe Libeau – Paris Fire and
Rescue Brigade
Dr Michael Logan – Queensland Fire
Battalion Chief Christophe Libeau, Director of the HazMat &
CBRN Training Center of the Fire Rescue Brigade of Paris
(FRBoP). In 2008, he became chief of
the HazMat & CBRN Training Center
of the FRBoP and the Deputy CBRN
Technical Advisor of the Major
General of FRBoP. He participated in,
or piloted, several working groups,
including: “Yellow Plan”, the Parisian
fire service battle plan against CBRN
terrorist attack.
Bruce Raymond – Ottawa Fire
Bruce Raymond is a District Fire Chief in
the busy downtown core of Canada’s
capital city, Ottawa. He was a member
of Ottawa’s original Joint NBC
Committee and became Chair of the
HazMat/CBRNe Advisory Committee in
2007. The Ottawa program is now
recognized as a leader in the Haz
Mat/CBRNe field across North America.
Kevin Miller – West Midlands Fire, UK
Kevin Miller has been involved in the hazardous materials field for
eighteen years and is currently a regional Scientific Advisor for
West Midlands Fire Service. In this role he advises on hazardous
materials and CBRN incidents for both
the fire and police services. Prior to this,
he ran the operations of the United
Kingdom’s National Chemical Emergency
Centre and was also the hazardous
materials and emergency response
advisor for a large multinational
petrochemical company. Kevin is also
actively involved in delivering specialised
hazmat and CBRN courses.
Dr Logan is the Director of the Queensland Fire and Rescue
Service (QFRS) Scientific Branch. In his current role as Director of
the Branch he has provided advice to
about 1,000 incidents. He provides
expert advice across a range of areas
including emergency risk management
–assessment and risk control measures,
detection, mitigation approaches,
sampling and hazard prediction within
these groups.
Col. (res.) Dr Efraim Laor –
UNDAC
Dr Laor ended his spell in the IDF as
Director of Operational Planning during
the Gulf War of 1990-1991, following
this he became a Senior Staff Member
within the Prime Minister’s Office
responsible for national planning, as
well as being a Scientific Advisor/Board
Member for other National authorities.
Until 2007 he was Chairman, Government of Israel National
Steering Committee for Disaster Reduction.
Chris Hawley – International Association of
Fire Chiefs
Chris is a Deputy Project Manager with Computer Sciences
Corporation (CSC) with responsibility for WMD and
Counterproliferation courses within the
DOD International Counter-proliferation
Program (ICP). Prior to this position Chris
was the Special Operations Coordinator
for the Baltimore County, MD Fire
Department and has been a firefighter
for 24 years and a HazMat responder for
19 years. He is the author of several
HazMat and Terrorism response texts.
Autumn 2012
7
In the second part of the
article Dr Efraim Laor looks
at patterns in the Indian
and international response
during and after the
Bhopal disaster of 1984.
Lessons
from the
Bhopal
Disaster:
Part II
Any analysis of the response to the Bhopal tragedy will be sharpened
by an equal examination of Operation Faith, which followed the initial
disaster and aimed to detoxify the remaining 15 tons of
methylisocyanate (MIC) still stored at the Union Carbide (UCC) plant.
There are some fundamental differences between these two aspects of
the tragedy – the former entailed an unplanned reaction to a disaster
whereas the latter entailed the prevention of further damage – yet
there are some common aspects that enable a retrospective
comparison, such as the scene, the principal actors and the close
timing of the events, which took place less than a fortnight apart. The
relatively organised and successful performance of Operation Faith
highlights many of the deficiencies that characterised the initial
disaster response.
Policies
Once the Indian authorities, UCC and their Indian subsidiary
recognised the scale of the Bhopal disaster, they were faced with two
major decisions: what to do with the remaining MIC and how to
minimise the damage that resulted from the accident. The challenge
posed by the first issue was clear and relatively simple to meet: they
had to choose between (a) neutralising the MIC through the scrubber
by pushing little bursts of it through caustic soda solution, (b)
repacking the MIC into smaller containers and shipping it back to
Danbury, and (c) converting it into pesticide by using the existing
facilities. How to deal with the results of the accident required a much
more complex decision. Both the Indian government and Union
Carbide (UCC) formally declared the need for damage minimisation,
but they left the question of who or what to protect unanswered, e.g.,
the political system (barely three weeks before a general election), the
public, Union Carbide, or key individuals within the establishment such
as Arjun Singh and UCC/UCIL management?. The possibilities, it later
transpired, were mutually exclusive: saving their own political skins
precluded officials from saving the public and vice versa.
8
Autumn 2012
It is the personal opinion of the author that the Indian
authorities and Union Carbide were not only grossly negligent
before the disaster, but equally callous during their response to it.
As will be demonstrated below, the major parties involved chose an
objective which deviated from the one expected of responsible
actors in charge of a response to an LSSD. Both their actions and
inactions, aimed at advancing their own interests, contributed to
the subversion of the primary objective of such a response, which
is to save as many lives as possible and reduce damage to the
public’s health.
Policy for responding to the accident
Following the tragedy everyone who could conceivably be connected
to the Bhopal tragedy asserted, to varying degrees, that they as
individuals and as organisations were outraged, but that the fault
was not theirs and someone else was culpable. Although the events
in Bhopal were catastrophic in every sense of the word, many
officials viewed the episode, for all practical purposes, as over. The
official impression was that the administrative response had been
adequate, the damage had been less serious than was originally
feared and all that remained to be done was to resolve the legal
issues arising from the accident. In other words, officials attempted
to both play down the effects and play down the causes. The probusiness government of India found itself in a delicate position,
having to confront an American-owned multinational during an
election year.. The goal of UCC was consistent (except during the
first hours) and that was to protect their own assets at any cost. In
practical terms, this meant failing to discover what really happened
at Bhopal, justifying the reopening of the MIC plant in West Virginia
and deflecting responsibility for the disaster to its Indian subsidiary.
The reaction of the US chemical industry ran along similar lines, and
was not significantly different from that of the nuclear industry
following the Chernobyl accident.
The strategy
There was a qualitative difference between
the strategy of response to the tragedy and
the subsequent strategy employed during
Operation Faith. Whereas the accident itself
had not been preceded by pre-disaster
preparations, resulting in a calamity,
Operation Faith was relatively organised and
eventually achieved the desired results. It is
clear that the Indian central government did
not have a systematic, objective-oriented
strategy for saving people's lives. Officials
were shocked, disoriented and paralysed.
Ongoing activities were characterised by
indecision, discord, highly-motivated but
ineffective actions, and poor performance.
The military and medical communities
seemed to be the only official arms that
functioned with some degree of efficiency.
Technically, it was feasible to begin the
relief operation at roughly 00:30 or even
earlier, which would have significantly
reduced the health hazard to the local
population. The authorities could have
prevented a great deal of suffering just by
alerting the public to the accident,
instructing them to escape perpendicular to
the wind, cover themselves with whatever
was available, breathe through wet cloth and
keep still rather than moving around. They
could have organised mobile teams to
evacuate the sick and injured to hospitals
and clinics. Even if they were underresourced, they could have targeted efforts
at children, the elderly and pregnant women
– all of whom were put at particular risk. In
short, they could have performed simple acts
which would have had important, lifepreserving effects. Yet, nothing of the sort
was done until roughly 06:00 the next
morning. Although 15 tons of MIC remained
stored in the plant, the parent company
steadfastly refused to provide details of what
might have gone wrong at Bhopal. Their
strategy was unsound from the very start:
they insisted there was no leak, failed to
sound the public alarm, withheld vital
information on treatment for the toxic
effects of MIC and other substances, and
lastly used a media campaign to deflect the
blame onto local workers.
The main objective of Operation Faith was
to minimise exposure time, and the best way
to avoid intensive human exposure to the
poison was either by moving people away
from its path or getting rid of its source. Dr.
Vardharajan, a prominent Indian scientist,
was appointed head of the operation. After
consulting UCC representatives and
Jagannath Mukund, the plant foreman, he
decided that the safest option would be to
convert the remaining MIC into pesticides.
The Chief Minister, Arjun Singh, insisted that
every precaution would be taken: the task
would be performed only during daylight
hours, a helicopter hovering overhead would
spray water to dissolve any escaping gas and
10
families would be allowed to evacuate to the
city's schools. And, indeed, a number of
precautions and actions were taken, aimed at
increasing public safety. In addition, nine
camps were set up in schools and colleges in
the city for those wanting to leave their
homes, dedicated buses shuttled residents
from colonies to camp sites, people in the
camps were fed two meals a day and
received medical treatment, and the
government closed all local schools until the
end of the detoxification process.
Despite these precautions, the secrecy
that surrounded operations at the plant
intensified the existing tension in the city.
The people of Bhopal were not convinced
and felt that they were not being evacuated
far enough away from the poisonous gas.
Most locals locked their homes and shops,
organised bundles of clothes and food and
left the city autonomously, congesting the
Autumn 2012
railways and bus stations. Nearly 400,000
fled Bhopal under their own steam whilst
official buses transported people, their
household goods and even animals. Four
hundred buses that had arrived for standby
use were quickly packed with families
seeking to get away. On the night of Singh's
announcement, more than 5,000 people
jammed the city's railway station. One man
was killed when the rushing crowd pushed
him into the path of a train. Fleeing
residents sat on the top of the buses because
there was no space inside. The operation
lasted seven days (16-22 December) and
reached a successful conclusion.
Administration
Indian authorities lacked an organisation
specifically responsible for coping with
peacetime disasters. They had neither
contingency plans, an administrative
There was a great deal of public anger after the disaster, but it was not just Dow
that was to blame ©Greenpeace
16 – 17 April 2013, CityWest Hotel, Dublin
www.cbrneworld.com/events
Taking specialist skills into disasters: developing, training and
qualifying response. International participants from such fields as
CBRNE, Hazmat, disaster medicine and emergency management,
will gather for a two day conference and exhibition to understand
how they can broaden their skills and knowledge into other fields.
With four one hour long training vignettes, ‘All Hazard Response’
will provide a hands on, learning experience.
ALL HAZARD RESPONSE
16 – 17 April 2013
CityWest Hotel, Dublin, Ireland
www.cbrneworld.com/events
The exact death toll from Bhopal will never be known ©Greenpeace
apparatus nor a standing capability to cope
with such a situation. In practice, the
majority of the activities were improvised: at
03:30, barely three hours after the plant's
evacuation and with hundreds of dead
citizens, the health minister, Rewanath
Choubey, informed Arjun Singh of the leak
from the Union Carbide plant. Singh and his
aides were evidently stunned and did not
know how to cope with the emergency. At
05:00 the police announced that the gas leak
had ended and Singh drove to the affected
areas. When Ragiv Gandhi visited the scene,
en route to a campaign tour of Madhya
Pradesh, Singh dropped his other duties to
join the prime minister.
Local authorities did not set up a crisismanagement centre. The army was alerted by
retired Brigadier M.L. Garg, who asked for
the help of the area sub-commander,
Brigadier N. K. Mayne. The Additional District
Magistrate, H. L. Prajaphati, said that he had
spoken to Mukund, the factory foreman at
his home and given him news of the disaster.
Mukund's first reaction was reportedly one
of incredulity. Before ordering the UCC
foreman to go to the plant, Prajapathi asked
him about possible medical treatments. The
advice he gave was to splash water in the
eyes and wipe the faces and mouths of those
contaminated with a wet cloth. Prajapathi
12
recalled Mukund saying, "it is not known to
kill". The police chief asked the plant's
security officer to identify the gas and its
antidote. The man said he did not know. In
sum, during the first critical hours, the
official response was characterised by
incredulity, indecision and inaction. It was
not until the next day that civil authorities
made concrete attempts to re-establish order
and launch a co-ordinated rescue operation.
All schools, colleges and other
establishments were closed. Teams of doctors
and paramedical personnel were rushed to
the scene from other parts of India. Military
personnel, ambulances and army trucks were
pressed into service. The army opened its
hospital to the civilian population. The local
police aided in the search efforts.
Medical services
The medical problems raised by the accident
were the most complex and consequently the
most urgent to tackle. The challenge entailed
discovering which kinds of poisonous
materials had been released, finding suitable
antidotes, treating enormous numbers of
patients at a time, finding places to
hospitalise masses of victims, minimising the
danger of an epidemic and mobilising the
necessary medical resources. It rapidly
became clear that the state of Madhya
Autumn 2012
Pradesh was incapable of coping with the
situation without external involvement. Local
medical services collapsed, under masses of
casualties, before dawn. On the morning of
3rd December, the state government sent out
appeals for medical help and drugs to
surrounding cities. Messages began to flow
between Bhopal and Delhi, among them from
Singh to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In my
view, the Indian authorities could have
responded much better by requesting
international assistance without delay.
The symptoms
The initial human symptoms following the
leak were eye irritation and coughing, which
developed into vomiting, eventually leading
to blindness and death. Most of the victims
suffered severe damage to mucous
membranes and inflammation of the
respiratory tract. The chemical action within
the lungs caused them to secrete fluids, and
in acute cases the fluids caused asphyxiation
and death. People who had run great
distances, breathed deeply and inhaled large
quantities of gas suffered severe lung
damage. Many women had peculiar
gynecological problems. Exposure to MIC
generated intense heat within the body,
followed by dehydration. Besides the lungs
and eyes, the exposure damaged the liver,
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kidneys and gastrointestinal tract, as well as affecting the
immunological, reproductive and central nervous systems. Within
barely two weeks of the accident, Bhopal faced a jaundice epidemic,
which doctors suspected was chemically induced, rather than viral.
Other delayed effects included intestinal bleeding, pain in the kidneys,
general debility and in some cases paralysis. In fact, most of the
deaths recorded after the third day involved a failure of the central
nervous system. The survivors of the first days fell victim to secondary
infections of the lungs and the respiratory tract. The number of people
reported to be suffering from bronchitis, pneumonia and asthmatic
complaints increased. Tuberculosis patients experienced an
exacerbation of their symptoms. The theory that the gas would not
affect those who inhaled it after 72 hours of the leakage proved
wrong. Even on the ninth day after the accident, new patients applied
to hospitals for treatment.
Diagnosis of the poisons.
The disaster proved that MIC is as lethal as hydrogen cyanide and
phosgene. The fatal effects of MIC took doctors by surprise and for
years the nature of the compound which had been released during the
accident remained an unresolved controversy. There was consensus
about MIC and phosgene, but a bitter dispute about the presence of
cyanide. Some pathological symptoms strongly suggested its presence,
though UCC maintained that isocyanates were unrelated to cyanide,
claiming that there is no known metabolic pathway that converts
isocyanate into cyanide. This argument contradicted the company's
own material safety data on MIC, section 5, which stated that
"thermal decomposition may produce hydrogen cyanide, nitrogen
oxides, carbon monoxide and/or carbon dioxide". When Awashia, UCC’s
health director, was questioned about whether MIC can release
hydrogen cyanide, his initial response was to say no. He was referred
to Carbide's own manual, to which he replied "Yes, at 437 degrees C."
Given the high temperatures generated by the exothermic reaction
between MIC and water, as well as other chemical changes in tank
E610, it is more than likely that a considerable amount of MIC yielded
decomposed products. A confidential report furnished by the Indian
Council of Medical Research (ICMR), stated: "There is evidence of
chronic cyanide poisoning operating as a result of either inhalation of
hydrogenic acid or, more probably, subsequent generation of cyanide
radical from the cyanogen pool in gas afflicted victims." This
controversy lasted long enough to prove that it is unwise to stimulate
a response based on the accumulation of scientific data. This episode
also highlights the drawbacks of previous knowledge, as well as the
problems of recognition and adequate timing, suggesting that optional
benefits can be gained from international co-operation.
Therapy dilemmas.
During the first few hours of the disaster, the medical establishment
knew virtually nothing, from a medical standpoint, about what they
were dealing with. There was very little information on MIC in any
textbook on toxicology and medical staff had insufficient experience
on how to treat victims of exposure to the gas. The only people
expected to have any prior knowledge were the doctors employed at
the UCC plant. They denied that MIC was toxic or had any long-term
effects. A chemical expert team from the WHO said that no specific
antidote to cyanate poisoning was available. The doctors at Hamidia
Hospital resigned themselves to giving symptomatic treatment only,
such that each symptom was dealt with in isolation: eye drops were
prescribed for eye irritation, antibiotics to prevent infections and
antacids for the stomach. There was no attempt to either purge the
blood of the toxin or to treat long-term consequences. Sodium
thiosulphate is considered an effective antidote to cyanide. Yet, when
its usage was proposed, the Union Carbide doctors advised against it.
In February 1985, the ICMR found that treatment by sodium
thiosulphate produced "amelioration of symptoms in a good
proportion of cases." It seems that many lives would have been saved
had the doctors known that cyanide was present.
In the early stages, patients were administered large doses of the
diuretic Lasix to relieve oedema, cortico steroids to contain
inflammation of lungs, as well as bronchodilator and oxygen
inhalation in acute cases. Oxygen inhalation proved ineffective and
the ingestion of Lasix made matters worse. What the victims needed
Simple countermeasures, such as washing the face and mouth, could have made a big difference ©Greenpeace
14
Autumn 2012
most were massive doses of antibiotics and vitamins. But they
were treated with anything at hand: glucose, painkillers, even
stomach pills. A very simple action, useful for non-seriously
injured, was to wash the face with water. A man in Jayaprakash
Nagar ordered other locals to do so and all of them survived,
whilst entire families residing in the same area who didn’t follow
the same procedure, died.
First aid.
The first patient with burning eyes arrived at Hamidia Hospital at
01:15. Within the next two hours, Dr. Sheikh was swamped by two
thousand more. Many citizens and interns rushed to the hospital to
see what had happened, and they were instantly pressed into
service along with nurses, doctors and staff members. By early
morning, the hospitals of Bhopal were overrun by thousands of
patients, who arrived blinded, breathless and dizzy, carrying those
who had collapsed along the way. Rescue teams of the army,
police, local citizens and voluntary organisations went into homes,
pulling out corpses and the injured. They flung the living on
stretchers and vehicles that went to the city's hospitals and clinics.
The dead were sent to the main morgue at Hamidia Hospital or
straight to the Muslim graveyards at Jahangirabad and the Hindu
cremation site at Cholla.
Medical supplies.
On the first day of the disaster there were not enough oxygen
cylinders to go around. Appeals for help went out to private
clinics throughout the city. UCIL flew in cylinders, masks and
stocks of cortisone drops from Calcutta and Delhi. The Indian
government and other centres in Madhya Pradesh, as already
mentioned, air-freighted medicine and personnel. Mobile medical
units of the Indian Red Cross (IRC) distributed medical supplies,
including antibiotics, ophthalmic ointments, other medicines and
vitamins. Unfortunately for the victims, the early medical effort
was soon forgotten and replaced by bureaucratics, politics and
personality clashes.
Mental health problems were a major consequence of the
disaster. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), in New
Delhi, estimated that tens of thousands of victims suffered from
mental disorders, ranging from depression to anxiety and
adjustment reactions. Damage to the central nervous system was
evident among many survivors, especially women under the age
of 45. This was reflected in symptoms of mental deterioration,
including memory loss, personality change, lack of concentration,
insomnia, anorexia, sleep disturbance, gas-phobia and a feeling of
helplessness. Others became victims of ‘compensation neurosis’, a
mental condition in which people exhibit psychosomatic
symptoms and even self-inflicted injuries, in order to acquire
benefits and compensation. Such problems were far from the
minds of the doctors, who were more concerned with saving lives.
It was not until the middle of 1985 that Hamidia Hospital
established a separate psychiatric ward. Until then, mental stress
patients were administered symptomatic drugs. Mentally ill
patients suffered a setback, as they were treated for what were
regarded as physical problems: breathlessness, fatigue and
headache. The threat of contamination and the danger of cholera
increased, as long as animal and human corpses decomposed in
the open air. Rats scurried around the dead bodies, awakening
fears of bubonic plague.
The traditional Hindu ritual of cremation is one body per pyre.
But there were too many dead and not enough firewood. The only
solution was to place the dead, as many as five or six corpses
together, on one pyre. Muslims were also buried in groups. Rescue
workers dug graves six feet long and 15 feet wide, each holding
eleven bodies. When there was no burial ground left, old tombs
were opened and old bones were displaced, in order to make
room for the victims. Thousands of animals were also killed by the
www.
.com
gas. The army and other groups used cranes
to remove the dead animals, toss them into
trucks and dump them at Nishat Pura,
about five kilometres north of the city. This
contributed to the shortage in food supply.
Milk supply to Bhopal city was affected due
to the death of an estimated 4000 cattle.
Several dairies in the worst of the affected
areas were closed down. In addition, the
Bhopal authorities banned the sale of fish,
and advised the population to refrain from
consuming meat and meat products. In the
second week of December 1984, the
government announced the awarding of
free rations to those with ration cards. It
then issued another 21,000 cards to those
who had not procured them earlier.
The relief measures were criticised by
citizen groups on the grounds of corruption.
In practice, it was the more vocal, aggressive
and politically well-connected people who
received relief (money and food) quicker and
in larger quantities than some of the more
needy but powerless. Owners of ration stores
made a lot of money by holding back rations
and selling them on the black market.
Middlemen and local money lenders exploited
illiterate and weak victims by taking
commissions for their services in procuring
relief benefits and even confiscating the
money received. Forgeries of ration cards
were commonplace and people collected
compensation twice by impersonating others.
The prevalent corruption among officials in
charge of the relief effort eroded its efficacy.
Local, public and voluntary agencies played a
vital role throughout the emergency by
providing transportation, cooking and
distributing food, setting up tents and
disposing of the dead. For example, at the
request of the central and state governments,
the Indian Red Cross (IRC) mobilised 100
volunteers to provide aid to 5,000 disaster
victims in five relief camps for a period of 30
days. By 14th December, the IRC had
distributed 12 MT of high protein biscuits, 6.5
MT of skimmed milk, 20000 blankets, 46500
pieces of clothing and 200 tents. Water
supply tests made on the drinking water in
Bhopal a few days after the accident showed
no signs of contamination. On the other hand,
tests conducted in 1990 (six years later) on
the drinking water at the community adjacent
to the former UCIL site in Bhopal revealed
high levels of dichlorobenzene, an extremely
toxic substance. Dichlorobenzenes are
known to damage the liver, kidneys and
respiratory system.
Conclusion
It is the contention of this article that
companies involved in hazardous production
should insist upon locating their plants,
whenever possible, in isolated areas (islands,
the bush, the desert), rather than in
conurbations. Concurrently, the appropriate
authorities have to block the subsequent
development of neighboring shanty towns
such as Jayaprakash Nagar and Cholla. These
measures are necessary to avoid the
emergence of elements 1 and 2 of the
Disaster Triad -- namely the proximity of
large-scale populations to a disaster
agent..The relevant concern in this context is
also whether or not this type of error can
recur elsewhere in the world. The mistakes
One of the most iconic images of Bhopal - but what is its legacy? ©Greenpeace
16
Autumn 2012
are repeatable, with marginal variations. The
main lesson that must be derived from this
case is that major accidents may happen,
despite a wide range of technical and
manual safeguards, and they will happen
more frequently if these safeguards are
disregarded. Given that accidents of this sort
are likely, the desirable course of action
should be to know how to respond to such a
situation. The analysis in this chapter has
revealed that each of the four major
participants in the Bhopal drama - Union
Carbide, UCIL, the government of India and
that of Madhya Pradesh - were jointly
responsible for both the disaster and the
improper relief. Lack of pre-crisis
preparations to face a major accident led to
improvised responses to a complex problem.
In the face of a rapidly escalating crisis and
a speedily deteriorating response, ad hoc
improvisations either failed to meet concrete
needs or led to unsatisfactory reactions to
moments of opportunity. A successful
response to large-scale disasters depends on
a comprehensive, multidimensional and
systematic course of action. That mechanism
neither existed in 1984 in India, nor was it
available to the Indians from abroad.
Lessons learned
The Indian government has established
several agencies such as the "Standing
Central Crisis Group", "Standing State
Crisis Groups", and "Standing District Level
Co-ordination Committees" to co-ordinate
rescue and relief efforts on the national,
state and district levels. The Central Crisis
Group (CCG), set up by the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, comprises senior
officials of the central government and
technical experts. Its goals are to tackle
problems caused by major chemical
accidents, to suggest a course of action
aimed at minimising the effect of the
accident, to co-ordinate the activities of
various agencies and departments, and to
provide expert guidance for handling major
chemical accidents. The Government of
India has also launched a research
program, comprising nine projects (as of
February, 1994), to formulate disaster
management plans in nine out of the 540
most hazardous districts of the country.
Manuals to assist owners of hazardous
chemicals to prepare on-site and off-site
emergency plans have been published, such
as the "Manual on Emergency
Preparedness for Chemical Hazards". The
Government of India expects these
activities to improve its readiness to tackle
future major chemical accidents.. Yet, it
has been observed that preparation of offsite and on-site emergency plans, in
general and all over the country, still
leaves much to be desired. In a number of
cases either the plans do not exist, or even
if prepared, are not comprehensive. HRW
Where AEGLs Dare
Tiina Santonen, PhD,
Finnish Institute of
Occupational Health,
and Peter Bos, MSc,
National Institute for
Public Health and the
Environment, Netherlands
on the use and misuse
of acute exposure
reference values.
Tried &
Tested
Public health management of acute chemical
incidents, including both accidental and
deliberate releases, is based largely on
health-risk information related to shortterm, high-level exposure. Acute exposure
reference values (AERV) are used to predict
the likelihood of adverse health effects
following single exposure to a particular
substance. AERV have been derived for
common industrial chemicals, which may
cause accidents, and which may also pose
potential threats in deliberate-release
scenarios. During chemical incidents, these
values serve as input to template-based,
exposure models, e.g., atmospheric dispersion
models, to rapidly predict effect-areas or to
estimate evacuation distances that,
consequently, enable rapid decisions in
emergency situations.
AERV define exposure levels for different
degrees (often three) of health impairment,
on a spectrum comprising exposure levels
without any expected health effects,
exposure levels with an anticipated degree of
harm and exposure levels that are likely to
be fatal. Consequently, AERVs are predictive
and designate effect levels. There is a clear
distinction between AERVs and inherently
protective, air-level guidelines such as acute
reference concentrations (ARFC), ambient air
quality guidelines (AAQG) and occupational
exposure levels (OEL). The latter are also
designed to prevent adverse health effects
on a target population, but may employ wide
safety margins that generate conservative
estimates. Predictive AERV however, aim to
provide guidance on the relatively precise
concentration at which adverse health
effects may occur.
Europe lacks the harmonised recommendations that the US has ©CBRNe World
Existing acute exposure reference values
The most well-known AERV are Acute
Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL), developed
under the guidance of the US Environmental
Protection Agency, as well as the ‘emergency
response planning guidelines’ (ERPG),
Autumn 2012
17
Where AEGLs Dare
developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association.
In the US, the US Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and
Protective Actions (SCAPA) has published recommendations on the use
of different AERV. According to SCAPA recommendations, AEGL should
be used primarily, and if AEGL are not available then ERPG should be
the second choice. TEEL values (temporary emergency exposure limit),
derived by SCAPA, are recommended in the absence of both. In Europe,
there are no such recommendations, nor any harmonised European
system for AERV. Within the EU 5th framework research project
ACUTEX, or ‘acute exposure threshold level’, a methodology has been
developed and tested but not applied (Wood et al, Journal of
Hazardous Materials 133, 2006, pp. 8-15). There are national values
available in some European countries, for example in the Netherlands
(DIV) and France (VSTAF), but most countries apply US values. Table 1
gives examples of existing AERV together with the different timeframes and severity levels that have been set for them. AEGL have
Table 1: Examples of existing AERVs.
18
Autumn 2012
been set for five different exposure periods and for three different
severity levels. Severity levels of AEGL range from airborne
concentrations above which the general population may experience
reversible effects, such as notable discomfort, irritation or certain
asymptomatic, non-sensory effects (AEGL-1), to levels above which
life-threatening health effects or death (AEGL-3) may arise. Similarly,
ERPG-1 values represent the limit for mild, reversible effects; ERPG-2
for irreversible or other serious health effects, or symptoms that could
impair the ability to take protective actions; and ERPG-3 represents
the limit for life-threatening health effects.
Current risk-assessment standards in Europe during chemical
emergency situations
Within an EU, FP7-funded project known as iNTeg-Risk (Early
Recognition, Monitoring and Integrated Management of Emerging,
New Technology-Related Risks), a survey was performed to evaluate
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Where AEGLs Dare
current assessments of health risks from acute chemical releases in 18
different European countries and to identify the needs for further
information, tools and guidance. AERV were clearly considered to be
important risk-assessment tools in single exposures due to chemical
incidents. In general, AERVs are predominantly used for emergency
planning and public health consequence analyses. Most frequently
used AERVs are ERPGs, AEGLs and IDLHs. IDLH are Immediately
dangerous to life and health limit values established by the U.S.
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). TEEL
were applied by one-third of the respondents and other values applied
included national acute exposure values (see Table 1) and short-term,
occupational exposure limits (STEL) for 15 minutes. The use of
‘immediately dangerous to life’ (IDLH) values and STEL for emergency
purposes is not commensurate with their intended use. IDLH values
were established to determine the concentration from which a worker
might escape without injury or without irreversible health effects in
the event of respiratory protection equipment failure. They were also
established to determine the concentration above which only highlyreliable respirators would be required. STEL values are aimed at
preventing adverse health effects due to peak exposures that will not
be controlled by the application of an eight-hour, time-weighted
average limit at workplaces. They are intended for use in normal work
situations and not for determining measures that protect against
emergency situations.
In addition to the variability in the usage of different values, there
is a variability in practice set for different exposure periods and for
different severity levels. According to the European, FP-7 survey, the
use of the various AEGL set for different exposure periods and severity
levels (see Table 1) were divided evenly among all respondents,
indicating that their intended use was not clear to end-users. There
was an obvious lack of consistency in the use of AEGL values, which
may indicate a need for clearer recommendations that state
appropriate values for particular purposes.
Differences between methodologies to derive AERV
When using different AERV, one should be aware of the basics of the
different methodologies in order to decide on appropriate, riskmanagement measures. Comparison of AERV, derived by different
methodologies, show clear differences in values for single chemicals.
Öberg et al. (Journal of Hazardous Materials, 184, 2010, pp. 439-447)
have demonstrated that AEGL and ERPG values diverge by a factor of
20
Autumn 2012
three or more for almost 40% of the substances. This kind of major
discrepancy may affect the communication and trust between diverse
stakeholders (think tanks, experts, journalists, politicians and
governmental officials), who are engaged in the process of
establishing a legitimate definition of risk. When different values are
used by different countries or bodies, problems may arise in transboundary incidents where different risk-assessment practices might
confuse the public and make risk-communication more difficult.
Within the EU 7th framework project, iNTeg-Risk, the methodology
and consequences of six AERV frameworks were compared. These
frameworks included the AEGL, ERPG, AETL and the national
methodologies from the Netherlands, France and Denmark (the
methodology to derive emergency planning exposure guideline values
[EPEGV] is developed but not active). An important difference concerns
the target population that is meant to be protected by the AERV. All
frameworks, except one, aim to protect the susceptible, general
population. AETL aim to protect the healthy, middle-aged man.
Potential susceptible populations, including the unborn and children,
do not belong to the target population. If a susceptible sub-population
can be identified however, the value can be lowered by dividing it by
an additional assessment factor (see table 2). It is left in the hands of
the end-user whether these factors are applied or not.
Differences in how to address different toxic effects were identified
by iNTeg-Risk. For instance, the frameworks treated the carcinogenic
effects very differently, ranging from not considering carcinogenicity
as relevant for AERV derivation, to taking it into account in either
AERV-2 or AERV-3, or via a separate risk calculation. The approach for
other important effects for single exposures, such as reproductive
toxicity (including effects on foetuses), neurotoxicity, sensory
awareness and sensitisation, were also found to be different. From
these differences it is concluded that AERV are not interchangeable,
although they are often used as such in practice. Use of AERV without
sufficient insight in their level of protection may result in riskmanagement decisions that either increase or overestimate health
risks, as well as hamper risk-communication to the public.
Consequences of using different AERV interchangeably
How will these differences work out in practice? Do they lead to
significantly diverging values and, if yes, how will this affect the risk
management actions to be taken after an incidental release of a
chemical? The values derived by the respective frameworks for six
Where AEGLs Dare
chemicals (hydrogen sulphide, ethylene oxide, styrene, nitrogen
dioxide, nickel tetracarbonyl and chlorine) were compared. Differences
of up to a factor of 20 were observed in the actual values but there
was no consistency in differences between frameworks. The AETL-1
values for hydrogen sulphide, for instance, were approximately 20-fold
higher than the corresponding AEGL, but AEGL-3 values for nickel
tetracarbonyl were up to 20-fold higher than the corresponding AETL.
When a chemical incident occurs, AERV can be used to calculate
effect-areas within which the respective AERV is likely to be
exceeded. This is of the utmost importance in the decision-making
process of risk-management and risk-communication. These
contours determine the areas in which specific actions need to be
taken to protect the population from possible health risks or to
communicate any possible health consequences to the exposed
population. To illustrate the impact of the use of different AERV
values on the dimensions of the area where people are expected to
have an increased risk to health and the number of people
potentially exposed, a fictitious incident scenario for ethylene
oxide was devised. The scenario consisted of an accidental release
of a chemical at the central railway station in a town in the centre
of the Netherlands (Amersfoort). The scenario considered is an
instantaneous release of 50 tonnes of a chemical present as
‘saturated liquid’ in a rail tank.
Striking differences in estimated effect-areas were observed,
which are mainly caused by the fact that ethylene oxide is a
reproductive toxicant. These effects are not considered by some
frameworks (VSTAF), nor addressed by application of an additional
factor to be decided upon by the end-user (AETL).
The distance downwind from the incident location where people
might have been at increased risk was more than 1.5 km larger for
AETL-2+ than when calculated with the SEI, and included a large
residential area. The AETL-2+ value was expected to be exceeded at
twice the distance downwind than for the AETL-2 value. The
difference between the last two contours is the area the end-user
has to decide whether the AETL-2+ needs to be applied to protect
any unborn children in this area. This example underpins the
challenge for the end-user when a decision regarding which AERV
to apply has to be made under stress in a given emergency
situation. Second, the end-user should be aware of the health
effect that underlies the AERV to assure an adequate
communication to the exposed population within the effect area.
It should be noted that even larger differences may occur if
some unsuitable values, such as IDLH and OEL are applied in a
chemical, emergency situation. At least in Europe, the use of IDLH
seems to be very common, which is likely to reflect their long
history and the fact that they are widely known.
Conclusions and recommendations
Large differences exist between the methodologies used to derive
AERV, leading to major discrepancies in values and level of
protection. In addition, a large group of potential AERV users seem
to have problems with the application of the currently available
values. Use of unsuitable AERV or inadequate application of
suitable AERV can result, in the worst case, in inadequate riskmanagement measures and health risks to the exposed population.
Other potential consequences include increased distrust in
authorities and unnecessary public concern if the values used are
too conservative. Synchronous existence of non-consented and
non-harmonised AERV with different levels of protection is
undesirable. There are currently no official European
recommendations on the use of different values, values set for
different time frames or for different severity levels for specific
risk-assessment purposes. In chemical incidents when the decisionmaking process is under particular pressure, there is an urgent
need for international harmonisation on the derivation of AERV. In
addition, guidance on the possible application areas and on how to
apply AERV is urgently needed. HRW
AEGL and AETL are not just important for the responders ©CBRNeWorld
22
Autumn 2012
This study was funded by EU FP7 project iNTeg-Risk (Early Recognition,
Monitoring and Integrated Management of Emerging, New Technology
related, Risks). Full details of the group can be found on
http://www.integrisk.eu-vri.eu/
Frack that!
Changing
Faces
Greg Noll, Senior
Partner, Hildebrand
and Noll Associates,
Inc, on how the US
is keeping up with
rapid changes to its
energy sector
The US is in the midst of revolutionary
changes to its domestic energy programmes
that will ultimately have a significant impact
on the emergency response community.
While oil and gas industries have a long and
mature presence in areas such as the US Gulf
Coast and the province of Alberta in Canada,
petroleum and natural gas exploration and
production operations are now expanding
into many geographical areas where there
has been little, if any, historical footprint. In
many of these areas, local emergency
responders have been given little training or
first-hand experience dealing with oil and
gas industry and incident scenarios.
Although the Bakken Shale formation in
North Dakota and the Marcellus Shale
formations that extend through northern and
western Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia
have received the most public attention, a
number of other formations also exist
throughout the Rocky Mountain, Midwest
and Southwest regions. This article provides a
strategic overview of the changing events
within the North American oil and gas
industry, and their potential impact upon
local and regional risks within the emergency
response community.
Background
Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracking
technologies are rewriting domestic energy
policies and future emergency preparedness
risks in a manner not envisioned just five
years ago. In 2007 for example, the US
Energy Information Administration
estimated US recoverable natural gas
resources to be 1,451 trillion cubic feet
(Tcf); in 2011, that estimate was increased
over 80% to 2,632 Tcf.
Fracking has long been used to extract oil
from depleted wells. Today, it is being used to
tap into previously unreachable oil and
natural gas deposits locked within deep rock
formations. The fracking process can be
summarised as follows:
1) A well is typically bored using directional
drilling, which allows drilling in vertical and
horizontal directions to depths of more than
10,000 ft (3,048 m).
2) A combination of water (90%), sand
(9.5%) and chemical additives (0.5%) are
injected into the well at high pressure,
creating fissures in the rock and shale
formations.
3) Sand then flows into the fissures, keeping
them open so that the oil or natural gas in
the rock formations can flow into the
wellbore and up to the surface.
Drilling and production operations
Drilling activities occur as part of exploration
operations (e.g., finding the oil and gas) and
production operations (e.g., removing the oil
and gas). Drilling hazards can include
flammable, toxic, and/or corrosive, hazardous
materials; rotating or reciprocating
equipment; automatic controls; geophysical
deterioration of the wellsite and surrounding
area; and non-traditional, fire-fighting
requirements. Once a well is drilled and
operational drilling equipment is removed
from the well site, the operational footprint
for production operations is substantially
smaller.
Two types of well incidents can occur: (1)
well control scenarios and (2) incidents
involving surface equipment. Each incidenttype poses different hazards and risks and
present different challenges to emergency
responders. Some basic principles that
emergency responders should consider:
– Incidents involving the wellhead and its
equipment cannot be closed in, extinguished,
or neutralised by first responders. Aggressive,
offensive tactics and a lack of awareness of
this unique category of risk can place first
responders and others at risk from serious
injury or death.
Autumn 2012
23
Frack that!
– Oil and gas wells operate under very high
pressure, and fires will generate significant
radiant heat. Some wells may generate toxic
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas and can present
risks to immediate and downwind exposures,
potentially requiring public protective
actions (e.g., sheltering or evacuation) in
populated areas.
– While emergencies involving surface
equipment are often resolved quickly, well
control emergencies are usually long-term
events involving specialised expertise,
equipment and tactics. Bringing the incident
to a safe outcome requires the assistance of
technical specialists, including the operator
of the well and/or a well control specialist –
often from outside the local community.
– Responsible well operators will have a
‘well control emergency response plan’
(WCERP), which contains valuable
information for the fire incident commander,
emergency management and law
enforcement. Many responders, however, are
not aware of this resource.
Transportation and manufacturing
operations
Regardless of where and how oil and gas
supplies may be produced, the product will
need to be transported from production
locations to gathering, storage,
manufacturing and processing facilities.
Manufacturing facilities can include
petroleum refineries, as well as chemical and
petrochemical facilities.
While robust energy transportation
systems already exist in Alberta, Texas and
Oklahoma, a comparable infrastructure does
not yet exist in the Marcellus Shale regions.
For example, the Bakken, North Dakota
region is already operational and a
significant expansion of the transportation
infrastructure is currently in the design and
construction phase. It is critical that local
and regional emergency preparedness
activities stay abreast of both the changing
hazards and risks created by the changing
energy sector infrastructure. Emergency
responders should be actively engaged in
local planning and preparedness activities
related to the design, construction and
implementation of these storage,
transportation and manufacturing initiatives.
Some general observations that
emergency responders should consider:
– As oil and gas products are produced,
they may go to either local (e.g., gathering
tanks) or regional storage hubs (e.g., large
storage tank farms) to be stored prior to
transportation. Storage hubs will then have
interconnections to rail or pipeline
infrastructure.
– Transportation options are pipelines and
railroad tank cars. While cargo tank trucks
24
may be used for some local product
movements, the largest volume of gas and
oil will move through a complementary
network of pipelines and rail.
– A number of rail-based, crude oil
transportation infrastructure initiatives are
already being planned and implemented in
North Dakota. Using unit trains or tank car
trains dedicated to crude oil, these trains
are already moving product from North
Dakota to the US West Coast, Oklahoma
and Gulf Coast. Rail industry and media
reports state that individual unit trains will
be capable of transporting 50,000 to over
80,000 barrels in each train, where one
barrel is equivalent to 42 US gallons.
– The growth of these domestic oil and
natural gas energy supplies will also
translate into the construction of new, or
the expansion of current, oil, chemical and
petrochemical manufacturing facilities.
Several oil companies with active
operations in the northern tier of the US
have announced refinery expansion
projects, and other companies are publicly
discussing the construction or acquisition
of manufacturing facilities in the
Marcellus Shale region of PA, Ohio and
West Virginia. In addition, the reduced
costs of natural gas supplies are resulting
in electrical generation facilities switching
from coal to natural gas powered
generators.
References and sources for
additional information
CFD Course 002-H2S Alive, Calgary
Fire Department, Alberta, Canada.
National Fire Protection Association,
Hazardous Materials / Weapons of
Mass Destruction Handbook (6th
Edition, 2013).
OSHA NIOSH Hazard Alert – Worker
Exposure to Silica During Hydraulic
Fracking (June 2012). Also available
at
https://www.osha.gov/dts/hazardalerts
/hydraulic_frac_hazard_alert.html
Wellsite Emergency First Responder
Training Program, Pennsylvania State
Fire Academy, Lewistown, PA (October
2010). www.osfc.state.pa.us.
Summary
All emergencies start and end at the local
level. Local and regional emergency
response and preparedness officials must
be active players in both planning and
prevention discussions involving the siting,
design and construction of energy
infrastructure facilities. A risk-based
planning and response approach must be
the foundational element as we move
forward in addressing the energy needs of
the United States and Canada. HRW
About the Author:
GREGORY G. NOLL, CSP, CEM
Greg Noll serves as the Program Manager for
the South Central PA Regional Task Force
(SCTF), one of nine regional task forces
established throughout Pennsylvania. Greg is also a senior partner with Hildebrand and
Noll Associates, a consulting firm specializing in emergency planning, response and
incident management issues. Greg has 41 years of experience in the fire service and
emergency response community, and is the co-author of nine textbooks on hazardous
materials emergency response and management topics. In 2011 he was the recipient of
the John M. Eversole Lifetime Achievement Award by the International Association of Fire
Chiefs (IAFC) for his leadership and contributions to further and enhance the hazardous
materials emergency response profession. He currently serves as Chairperson - NFPA
Technical Committee on Hazardous Materials / WMD Response Personnel (NFPA 472) and
as State/Local Co-Chair for the InterAgency Board (IAB) Training and Exercise SubGroup.
Greg also serves as a member of the Fire Engineering Editorial Advisory Board and the
FDIC Advisory Committee.
Autumn 2012
Concentrate on this
On the vapour trail
Just because there is no vapour detected doesn't mean that it is not chemical ©CBRNeWorld
Dan Kaszeta looks at the options available when identifying
low-volatility chemical hazards
The identification of low-volatility chemical
hazards can pose problems for the first
responder. Much of the research effort and
expenditure in the chemical detection market
has focussed on the military chemical
warfare agent (CWA) threat. Chemical
warfare agents are wide-area lethality or
injury hazards because they pose a
respiratory threat. In order to pose a
respiratory threat, chemical warfare agents
and toxic industrial chemicals generally need
to have a vapour pressure and some
volatility. Even the most persistent of the
CWAs, HD and VX, have some vapour
pressure in normal field conditions. But the
reality is that not every threat, military or
civil, is going to be measureable on an
instrument designed to detect gas and
vapour. Rather a lot of hazardous substances
have low volatility and low vapour pressure.
Numerous commercial and industrial
chemicals of interest exist primarily in liquid
form, with a negligible presence of vapour in
normal conditions. In addition, cold
temperatures may create situations where
substances that might have some vapour
pressure in warm weather have little or none
at cold temperatures.
Having been actively involved in CBRNe
World’s Directory project I’ve cast my eyes
over practically every piece of chemical
identification equipment currently marketed
to responders. During the process it occurred
to me that there are only limited options
available to help identify low-volatility
chemicals. The simplest way of stating the
identification problem is that, in an accident
or incident, a responder needs to get
information from the low-volatility chemical.
Having a gas or vapour coming off the
chemical provides a number of ways to get
information from the substance. When the
problem is in liquid or solid form only, the
responder is effectively robbed of several
useful analytical techniques. The options
available in these circumstances are to get
into close contact with the substance,
interrogate the substance from a distance, or
try to turn the liquid into a gas or vapour. I’ll
deal with these in reverse order.
Many of the analytical techniques
available to the responder are geared around
gas and vapour threats. It is not an approved
technique to shove a powder into a Dräger
tube or suck a liquid into a PID. Actually, you
can do it, it’s good for a laugh at the bar
afterward, but its not a useful analytical
technique (I once chased a responder down
the hall with a broom handle for wrecking a
PID this way). Many situations may be on the
borderline, i.e., there may be some vapour,
just not enough with which to do anything
useful. Placing a bit of the liquid in a plastic
bag or under a bucket for a few minutes (the
latter being the old VX trick from the US
Army’s toxic agent training at the CDTF)
might increase the vapour enough. Also,
some analytical techniques involve collecting
a sample in a thermal desorption tube, so a
responder could theoretically let the sample
pump run for ten or 20 minutes, thus
concentrating what little vapour may be
there. Vapour pressure exists in relation to
temperature, so putting a sample in the sun
or finding a way to warm it might induce
more vapour.
Some techniques allow for interrogation
from afar. In other words, there may be ways
to get the liquid or solid sample to give up
some information without needing to handle
the substance. In practice, this means using
Autumn 2012
25
Concentrate on this
a laser, and the ‘afar’ actually means ‘really
close, but not actually touching’. The
practical devices generally available on the
market for this task are Raman laser devices.
These devices work by shining a laser into
the suspect substance at close range (cm)
and observing what light is scattered back
from the substance. Many compounds
display the ‘Raman scattering effect’ and
have a predictable Raman spectrum that
serves as a relatively unique fingerprint. T he
operative word here is ‘many’ however,
because not every compound of interest will
display the Raman effect. Complex mixtures
of products will result in overlapping Raman
spectra, which will vex most instruments.
Like many technologies, the ability to
identify will be constrained to the identifier’s
library. Finally, a laser-based system will, by
definition, impart energy into the substance
being identified. Although Raman lasers are
low-energy, there is a degree of hazard here,
when potentially energetic or flammable
materials are involved. The danger is
generally with powders than with liquids, as
liquids will diffuse the heat, while a single
grain of powder may receive most of the
laser’s energy. In a nutshell, Raman is useful,
but will not work in every situation.
Other standoff techniques theoretically
exist, most of which involve lasers, but few
have made it into field use. Whilst most of
the laser work has been done in vapor/gas
detection, active neutron interrogation is
theoretically feasible and is used in some
high-end, EOD applications. Bombarding an
unknown chemical with neutrons to see
what happens at its sub-atomic level does
get some interesting information. The
equipment is heavy and expensive however,
and requires a lot of training, safety
precautions and regulatory paperwork. It may
be difficult to discriminate between various
complex hydrocarbons, , where the difference
in one atom in a molecule may make all the
difference between a toxic compound and an
inert one. Active neutron interrogation is a
sledgehammer that won’t always kill the fly.
The most useful options for a responder
involve actually handling the unidentified
substance. Once a responder has a physical
sample collected, the menu of available
techniques multiplies. The techniques most
useful here (which are also progressively
more expensive) are wet chemistry, Fourier
Transform Infrared (FTIR), and gas
chromatography/mass spectrometry
(GC/MS). Wet chemistry techniques in field
use typically rely on some visible colour
change that the responder can see. Such
techniques can vary from quick and cheap
(pH paper and Spilfyter strips for example)
to complicated chemistry sets, such as the
venerable HAZCAT kit. You get what you
pay for with these, i.e., the less expensive
wet chemistry techniques will, at best,
give you a classification rather than a
definitive identification.
26
FTIR is a powerful tool here. Devices such
as the Smiths HAZMATID and the Thermo
(ex-Ahura) Tru Defender are some examples.
There are large libraries with many
thousands of FTIR spectra, and far more
substances are available than for Raman
devices. The key word here is large, not
infinite. Not everything has an IR absorption
spectrum that can be analysed by an FTIR
device. Some substances are also very close
to each other. Mixtures can still present a
challenge, although both operational
techniques and software algorithms give
more capability than in previous years.
Because the available FTIR devices require a
sample of the material, cross-contamination
potential requires vigilance, lest you identify
a bit of yesterday’s sample stuck to the
interface (Don’t laugh… I’ve seen it done).
GC/MS remains the gold standard in this
area. Twenty years ago a GC/MS device was
big, very expensive and lived in a laboratory.
Today, with help from companies such as
Bruker, FLIR, Smiths and Inficon, GC/MS
devices are not so big (still, not very small),
a bit less expensive (but not at all cheap)
and usable by a field-technician. GC/MS
devices are powerful tools that will
bludgeon an answer out of all but the most
stubborn substances, but they are certainly
on the high end of the chart of field
technologies. They do not work as quickly as
many other techniques (but they are faster
than running through a full HAZCAT
routine), so a queue will build up if there are
a lot of samples for analysis. Certainly,
efforts to make GC/MS more compact,
cheaper and easier to use and maintain will
give more responders the option of using
this highly-effective technique.
The real answer to the problem is no
surprise to veteran responders. The skilled
technician will combine techniques and
technologies to find answers. I always
thought that combining Raman and FTIR in a
single device would be a ‘killer app’, but
that’s just my own opinion. Llet’s not forget
that a few basic principles: getting no
response on an instrument is actually very
useful for ruling things out, the fact that a
substance displays no Raman effect or has a
flat line FTIR absorption spectrum rules out
an awful lot of things. We must also avoid
being narrow-minded and focussing
exclusively on the technical means of
identification. I once supervised an exercise
where several responders flailed about for an
hour trying to identify an unknown liquid
leaking from a drum in the back of a truck.
Lots of clever things were done with meters.
A sample was even collected to go to a lab.
Reachback was called. But nobody rolled the
drum over to see the markings. Nobody
talked to the driver, who was being
transported from the scene in an ambulance
but was still conscious, and nobody checked
the cab of the truck for the shipping papers,
which were still there. HRW
Autumn 2012
Concentrate on this
PID and IMS may not be enough for some samples ©CBRNeWorld
Autumn 2012
27
Concentrate on this
Providing an
ACE Response
How would you approach a canister rail car
spill? Would you know what you had got?
Would you know what might be leaking and
what threat it might pose?
This scenario will be immediately
disconcerting to a first responder. It is a
“street smart” manifestation of the
competencies required to meet the NFPA 472:
Standard for competence of responders to
hazardous materials/weapons of mass
destruction incidents. The standard dictates
that, if “given a cylinder” the responder
should be able to identify; the cylinder; the
type of contents and some of the potential
hazards that are in the container. Responders
can do this by inspecting the container’s
markings, its shape and any construction and
valves it may have. To be more efficient, there
is a wealth of knowledge in the hazmat,
private sector that still needs to be translated
into to a useful method to train and assist
28
responders. This is the goal that Airgas
pursues as the company launches its new
training program: ‘Airgas Container
Emergencies’ or ACE.
The ACE program comprises cylinderextensive training, information, resources and
assistance for hazmat responders on the
subject of Airgas containers and products.
The program is free to responders at
www.airgasACE.com and has been developed
along the lines of similar training projects
such as ‘propane emergencies’, ‘pipeline
emergencies’, ‘responding to natural gas
emergencies’ and ‘responding to electrical
emergencies’. These projects are designed
using a team of public sector response
trainers, who work closely with industry
responders to develop training that bridges
the information gap between industry and
public sector emergency response.
The Airgas Container Emergencies (ACE)
Autumn 2012
program is designed to be used on multiple
levels. It can be an online training program
when the user employs the navigation bar
and then follows each webpage consecutively
by clicking ‘next’. It can also be used as a
reference source that allows responder to
look up cylinders, products and other
pertinent information. This information could
relate to cylinder construction, markings, the
design of the valve, the hazards of the
chemical in the container, and ways to
determine how the cylinder will act or behave
in an emergency. The program provides
detailed access to the most common
containers, cylinders, tank trucks, valves and
chemicals that Airgas uses. For each of these,
there are individual reference cards or ‘ACE
Cards’. The website has over 200 web pages,
100 Ace Cards and hotlink access to the
MSDS library of Airgas chemicals as well as
other informational resources.
Concentrate on this
Dr Derek Gill and Michael Callan, on
how a firm knowledge of containers,
gases and properties can keep you
safe at the scene
– Cargo Tank Trucks
– Training
– Assessment
– Scenarios
– ACE Cards
– Airgas Emergency Response Operations
(AERO)
Each of the sections above has its own
hierarchy of components within the
navigation level, for example the ‘cylinder
section’ has several sub levels or
components.
Program sections and navigation bar
The program starts with a video from the two
developers: Dr. Derek Gill, the head of the
Airgas Emergency Response Operations; and
Michael Callan, former Captain of Wallingford
CT Fire Department. The responder is also
offered an opportunity to take a pre-test which
will give them an overview of what they will
learn throughout the program. There are seven
sections on the home page. Each represented
by pictures as well as titles found on the main
navigation bar. For a training session follow the
navigation bar from left to right or start on
slide one and click ‘next’. Using this method you
will go through the entire program and arrive
at the assessment section at the end of the
training. Then if the user chooses they can take
an assessment and, if successful, complete the
training program with a certificate.
The seven main sections are:
– Cylinders
Cylinders
Cylinders are considered to be non-bulk
containers and are broken down into nine
components: high pressure, low pressure,
acetylene, cryogenic pressurised dewar, Y
cylinders, one-ton cylinders, cryogenic
atmospheric dewar, pressure relief devices
and valves. The ACE program makes a
physical difference with dewar and cryogenic
containers. While these cylinders are
classified as cryogenic containers or dewars,
for clarity, the training program makes a
distinction between a pressurised dewar and
a dewar cylinder in terms of their original
design, i.e., to hold only atmospheric,
cryogenic product.
Each of the cylinder components cover
multiple web pages that illustrate an
overview of the cylinder, its markings,
construction and the types of leaks that it
might be subject to. In addition, there are
also two additional components that almost
all of the cylinders possessing one or more
components have: pressure relief devices
(PRD) and valves. The pressure relief devices
discuss the different types of PRD: pressure
relief valve, fusible plugs and rupture discs,
including a combination of temperature and
pressure-activated devices.
The last component of the cylinders
section involves recognising and identifying
the valve on the cylinder. Regardless of
quantity, many cylinders use the same type
of valve for the specific Airgas chemical that
they contain. The valve component pages
begin with an overview of all valves’
nomenclature and operation and are then
followed by several pages to assist
identification using Compressed Gas
Association (CGA) valve designation, the
chemical or a page of pictures illustrating
the most common valves.
An example of a cylinder overview page.
As one rolls over the silhouette of a
cylinder, an actual picture of the container
in use appears. If one clicks on it, a pdf
comprising specific details of that cylinder
will be provided.
When the user clicks on any of the
selection methods they will receive an ACE
‘valve card’ (see next page) filled with specific
information. There is a formal picture of the
valve as well as a picture of the valve in use
along as an interactive picture that allows the
user to view a user operated 360° view of the
specific valve. Finally, the card has an icon to
link each of the chemicals to each of the
Airgas chemicals that use this valve.
Cargo Tank Trucks
The cargo tank truck component addresses
three of the most common ‘over the road’
transportation vehicles in the Airgas fleet: a
compressed-gas tube trailer, a high-pressure
gas tanker and a cryogenic liquid cargo tank.
Each type of ‘over the road’ cargo tank truck
has five elements describing the:
– Container construction
– Markings
– Valves
– PRD
– Type of leaks
There are also additional components
illustrating PRD found on each cargo truck
and the emergency shut-off devices (ESD). In
addition to this information, every cargo
vehicle has a two-page ACE Card with a
more detailed description of the container
attachments, valves and gauges.
Autumn 2012
29
Concentrate on this
Training
The training element is specific to the Airgas
product line. It covers the physical
properties and the chemical hazards of the
gases. There are excellent supporting videos
illustrating these properties, created by
Airgas. The oxidising video, showing the
explosive nature of impacted hydrocarbons,
is especially interesting to responders.
Elsewhere in the training program the
responder can play the Airgas training video
in its entirety.
The final component of the training section
provides a lesson on the General Hazmat
Behavior Model GHBMO by Ludwig Benner.
Benner’s size up process has been taught for
over 25 years to responders and is featured
prominently throughout NFPA 472. Benner
stated that containers can follow a
predictable behavior model in a hazardous
materials event. The ability to predict the
sequence is critical to survival at a hazmat
release. Benner’s process states that a
container will go through several steps or
stages in an emergency.
– Stress –First a container must be stressed
in order to fail.
– Breach – Stress any container it will fail or
beach (open).
– Release – When a container is breached it
will release two things: matter, energy, or
both.
– Engulf – This release will form a pattern or
zone, such as a cloud or a stream.
– Impinge – The zone will impinge or impact
anything within the zone such as people,
environment or property
– Harm – Based on the specific hazmat, a
harm or injury will occur to anyone or
anything in the impinged area
At the end of the Benner lesson there is a
case history and an exercise to recognise the
likely behavior and predict the next stage in
the Benner process the container is
approaching. This will enable responders to
choose an effective course of action.
Scenarios
Upon completion of the training section the
scenario section allows the responder to
evaluate his training by taking one, two or
three scenarios involving Airgas containers
and the product they might carry. The three
scenarios are:
– A man down at a restaurant
– Abandoned cylinders
– Cargo tank truck leaking
The scenarios are interactive, with an online
instructor that provides feedback for correct
and incorrect answers. Scenarios will
identify any knowledge gaps that the
student might have, as well as identify how
the ACE program might increase some of the
responder’s cylinder knowledge.
Assessment
At this point, the responders can evaluate
their learning experience with an
assessment. The examination covers the
elements of the program that are based on
NFPA 472. The evaluation questions go
beyond the multiple-choice format, and they
are designed to give a training officer an
opportunity to recognise the exemplary
student from those that can pass the exam
but haven’t really mastered all the concepts
and information. In all cases, at the end of
the session if the student has acquired
enough correct points they will receive a
certificate of completion.
ACE CARDS
Throughout the Airgas Container Emergency
(ACE) program are opportunities to click and
view ACE cards. These cards are information
PDFs for several major elements of the
system. Ace cards are available for each
element and help the user to navigate the
program. There are ACE Cards for:
– ACE cylinder cards - are based on the
most common Airgas, non-bulk cylinders
– ACE valve card – is based on the CGA
designation i.e. CGA 540 and the chemical
the valve is rated for Compressed Oxygen.
– ACE cargo tank trucks – one each for the
three common types of containers.
– Airgas chemicals cards - based on
emergency information for the most
common chemicals that Airgas produces.
These cards can be accessed through the
program or directly by navigating to the ACE
cards by selecting the card category and
specific card.
The final element is an interactive access
to all the MSDS in the Airgas family of
products. They can be accessed by clicking the
MSDS card and then finding the exact
chemical MSDS directly on the Airgas website.
Airgas emergency response operations
(AERO)
The final section of the program examines
all the resources that Airgas can make
available for responder assistance to
emergencies involving their containers and
products. Airgas has multiple sites with
deployable hazmat teams trained to the
technician levels, with specialised
equipment. AERO can even provide training
by the AERO team members around the
country. There are also two levels of
information that AERO can provide in an
emergency. The first is the public
information when there is an Airgas
container, truck or product involved. This
site has mechanisms that will allow the
AERO team to provide secure information
to the responders at the scene through
the website.
Summary
The ACE program is an extensive training
and information product. It can be used as
an individual training program for
responders from first responder awareness
and operations as well as still inform the
hazmat technician. It can be used as a
reference document. There are documents
and visual information to aid in recognising
and identifying containers that go well
above the line art found in the DOT
Emergency Response Guidebook.
ACE Cards give a more expansive and
detailed illustration of the elements of their
products and containers. Of course it is no
replacement for the AERO team member
that will arrive in a few hours but it will
help in the first minutes when you are on
the scene because it provides training,
knowledge and additional resources that are
always useful in an emergency. These
private and public response programs are
the most successful forms of
communication, co-operation, and coordination in hazardous materials response
over the last several years. HRW
www.airgasACE.com
30
Autumn 2012
CBRNe
2013
WORLD
Directory
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Singapore Hazmat
Northstar Rising
Lt. Col. Daniel Seet, Assistant Director Operations Plans and Projects and Major Kwok
Shun Yung, Senior Staff Officer Current Operations at the Singapore Civil Defence
Force on developing a full spectrum emergency response for Singapore’s industry
Introduction
Singapore is a Southeast Asian city state
with a land area of 704km2 and a
population of over five million. While the
country is fortunate to be free from
earthquakes, tsunamis and other forms of
natural disasters that afflict countries in
32
the region, the challenges it faces are
largely similar to any other metropolis,
such as the consequences of industrial
accidents and other man-made disasters
on population centres, the infrastructure
and the economy. Terrorism also became a
dominant concern after 9/11 in the United
Autumn 2012
States. In fact, shortly after 9/11, local
authorities uncovered a plot by a regional
terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, to
attack several key installations across
Singapore. Over 30 militants were arrested
from 2001 to 2002, and safety and
security agencies have maintained a
Singapore Hazmat
SCDF HIT team entering the site to deal with a chlorine leak ©SCDF
heightened state of vigilance ever since.
To this end, the Singapore Civil Defence
Force (SCDF) is the city state’s national,
emergency-response authority. SCDF
provides 24-hour emergency fire-fighting,
hazmat mitigation, rescue, and ambulance
services. In addition, it formulates,
implements and enforces regulation on fire
safety and civil defence shelter matters.
SCDF also sets policies to govern the
import, storage and transportation of
petroleum and flammable materials (P&FM).
The agency operates on a three-tier
command structure (see figure one overleaf)
with the headquarters at the apex. The
second tier comprises four territorial land
divisions that oversee 16 land fire stations
and 26 fire posts. Four of the land stations
are specialised in hazmat identification,
sampling, containment and mitigation.
Complementing these specialist stations are
personnel in the other 12 stations, who are
trained and equipped as first responders to
perform detection, monitoring and rescue
operations in hazmat environments. SCDF
also runs two marine fire stations under a
newly constituted Civil Defence Marine
Command (CDMC) HQ.
Shell Bukom refinery fire – 28th Sep, 2011
A fire started at roughly 13:20 at a pump house at the Shell Bukom refinery – the largest
Shell refinery in the world in terms of crude distillation capacity – that took 32 hours to
extinguish. Responders faced an unstable situation where fire had engulfed large parts of the
pump house and threatened nearby fuel storage tanks. This was compounded by various types
of fires at different areas of the pump house: pressurised gas fires at one site and liquid pool
fires at another. Ops CE was declared around 18:30 and key agencies (e.g., Singapore Police
Force, Ministry of Health, National Environment Agency and Singapore Armed Forces) were
mobilised to support SCDF. The whole operation lasted more than a week and in total, some
40 fire-fighting appliances and over 100 personnel from Shell’s in-house team, the SCDF and
related agencies were involved to jointly tackle the crisis.
Autumn 2012
33
Singapore Hazmat
Disaster management in Singapore: an
overview
In 1997, SCDF was appointed by the
Ministry of Home Affairs as the Incident
Manager (IM) for civil emergencies. As no
single agency has all the resources to handle
major contingencies alone, the incident
manager not only has to organise and direct
the response of rescue forces, but also lead,
co-ordinate and integrate inter-agency
plans from a whole-of-government approach
to swiftly tackle any disaster. SCDF’s
contingency planning for civil emergencies is
dominated by its urban landscape: structural
fires, collapsed buildings, transport incidents
in the land, sea and air domains, industrial
accidents, toxic industrial chemical release
and terrorist attacks using chemical,
biological and radiological agents. Every
category of civil emergency has a
corresponding plan that spells a plausible
scenario and defines the roles and
responsibilities of every agency involved in
the response. This forms the basis for an
effective and co-ordinated, multi-agency
incident management system under the
framework of Operation Civil Emergency’
(Ops CE). A key part of these national plans
involve a system for SCDF to tap the
expertise and resources of other government
and quasi-government agencies in a disaster.
Through regular networking, ground
exercises and major operations, this triedand-tested relationship between SCDF and
other agencies ensures unity of command
and a flexible incident response at the
strategic, tactical and operational levels.
Northstar: pointing the way forward in
national readiness
To ensure the various Ops CE plans are welloiled, SCDF regularly organises large-scale,
civil contingency exercises codenamed
‘Northstar’ to test and enhance joint
response and incident management
capabilities. This biennial exercise provides a
Exercise Northstar II and birth of the JICP
As Jurong Island witnessed spectacular growth in the late 1980s, it became apparent that a
contingency plan was necessary to cater for worst credible hazmat scenarios. The diverse
range of industries on the island also meant that for the consequences to be managed
effectively, various governmental bodies had to work together to restore normality.
Incidentally, SCDF had begun a drive in 1993 to enhance its hazmat mitigation capabilities
and to develop a national doctrine governing a response to such incidents. This led to the
earliest rendition of the JICP being developed to co-ordinate a multi-agency response to
hazmat incidents on Jurong Island. The plan was tested on 27th Jan 1999 in Northstar II,
which simulated a peacetime fire and hazmat incident at The Polyolefin Company (Singapore)
Pte Ltd, a downstream company of Petrochemical Corporation of Singapore Pte Ltd (PCS) at
Pulau Ayer Merbau (the Merbau cluster today). At that time, such a large-scale, multi-agency
exercise was novel to the industry and it provided stakeholders with an opportunity to
witness a massive deployment of emergency forces and other agencies in tackling an offshore
petrochemical incident. Lessons learnt from the exercise were subsequently incorporated into
the JICP and support plans of the respective agencies. Today, the JICP is a comprehensive,
national plan that covers contingencies such as the release of TICs or flammable materials, a
large storage tank fire, BLEVE involving pressurised hazmat or P&FM containment vessels and
consequences of terrorism. The JICP also clearly specifies the roles of various national
agencies in support of the overall operation.
platform for government agencies to ensure
that their respective plans are consistently
fine-tuned and well-integrated across the
board. First conceived in 1997 as a platform
to prepare for civil disasters, the exercise
has evolved to take on other threat
scenarios: Northstar V (2006) was modeled
after the Madrid and London bombings in
2004 and 2005, and simulated a multiple
bombing attack on Singapore’s
transportation system; Northstar VI (2008)
exercised a major fire emergency, with
suspicious origins aboard a cruise liner; and
Northstar VII (2009) replicated a Mumbaistyled swarm attack scenario at iconic softtargets in Singapore.
Led jointly by the Home and Defence
ministries, Ex NS8 was conducted in two
phases between 10th and 25th Nov, 2011.
Phases 1 and 2a saw a series of attempted
intrusions and trans-boundary attacks
within Singapore’s maritime domain. The
objective was to operationalise the National
Maritime Security System (NMSS), which is
Figure one: organisational structure of SCDF
34
Autumn 2012
a national infrastructure that promotes
information sharing, situation awareness,
decision making and operational coordination to deal with non-conventional,
maritime security threats. Phase 2b,
conducted on the last day, exercised SCDF’s
consequence management of two major
incidents on Jurong Island under the Ops
CE-based Jurong Island Contingency Plan
(JICP), which has been written to address
the worst credible scenarios that may occur
at the hub. Initiating the exercise was a
major chlorine leak at a chemical plant
followed by a multiple car bomb attack at
the security checkpoint leading into the
island. Ex NS8 marked the second time this
exercise was conducted on Jurong Island
(the first being in 1999).
CERT: leveraging industry to build a full
spectrum emergency response
A full-blown industrial incident is usually
preceded by a sequence of initiating
events. Mitigating these factors at the
onset may help avert a major crisis,
especially as it takes time for national
agencies to muster and arrive at site.
Industrial premises such as those on
Jurong Island have Emergency Response
Plans (ERPs) to guide their staff in a crisis.
The ERP provides critical information such
as layout plans, emergency contact persons
and even Safety Data Sheets that are
important in handling the possible
scenarios at site. Given the elevated nature
of risks posed by premises that store bulk
quantities of P&FM, SCDF introduced the
Company Emergency Response Team (CERT)
framework as part of its fire safety
regulations in 2005. This requires a CERT
capability to be established in any
company that is licensed to store or keep
more than five metric tonnes of petroleum
and/or flammable materials at their
premises. CERT is a trained team of in-
Singapore Hazmat
house personnel tasked with managing
emergencies at the incipient stage. Each
team is minimally composed of one site
main controller (SMC), one site incident
controller (SIC) and four trained members
making up a response team (Fig. 2
overleaf).
The SMC is a senior member of the
company, who has overall responsibility for
the initial emergency response. Part of the
SMC’s key responsibility is to link up with
the IM to assist in consequence
management at the policy level. Reporting
to the SMC is the SIC, a mid-management
member of staff who directs the response
team. This system provides a standardised
approach towards incident command and
information sharing across the industry.
There are regulatory levers subjecting
CERTs to stringent annual assessments by
SCDF. This ensures a minimal level of
competency to handle a fire, hazmat
leakage or explosion at the beginning.
When any incident occurs, the CERT
concerned is the first to respond to
undertake all the necessary actions to
mitigate and contain the crisis. CERT will
continue to operate alongside SCDF after
their arrival to ensure that trained
resources with intricate terrain knowledge
are plugged in with the authorities to
restore normality.
The CERT framework was put to the test
at the start of Ex NS8, where a vehicle
collision onto a 60MT chlorine tank at a
chemical plant had led to pipeline ruptures
that released a toxic chlorine plume. The
CERT carried out initial fire-fighting and
rescue of casualties. Mitigation efforts
were soon boosted by personnel from
Jurong Island and Banyan fire stations,
while the CERT switched to a supporting
role. Operational responses aside, a key
aspect that was also being assessed was
the flow of incident details between the
SIC and SCDF for sense-making. At the
same time, the public warning system on
Jurong Island was also sounded. This
signaled companies near the incident site
to conduct in-place protection procedures,
while others further downstream began to
evacuate.
The massive scale of the incident led
SCDF to trigger the Ops CE (JICP) and
mobilise external resources for support. A
security perimeter was established by the
police and army, while the National
Environment Agency (NEA) augmented
SCDF in environmental monitoring
operations. On-site medical treatment
efforts were boosted by doctors and nurses
from the Ministry of Health (MOH), while
public hospitals were placed on alert to
receive priority casualties who were being
rushed over, some by military helicopters.
Even while the first incident unfolded,
exercise planners triggered two vehicle
SCDF are trained and equipped to work in a variety of chemical environments ©SCDF
Autumn 2012
35
Singapore Hazmat
Critical decision-making systems in SCDF
Fire stations conduct operational surveys of commercial and industrial premises as part of
their everyday routine. The visits are facilitated through fire safety officials of the premises
(many of whom double-up as the site incident controller in a crisis) and enable SCDF to
familiarise itself with the terrain and risks present. Details are updated into the ‘Operations
Terrain Mapping’ (OTM) system – a ‘live’ portal that enables responders to recall critical,
premises-related data anytime. SCDF also uses predictive tools and modeling software in
tandem with hazmat detectors on the ground to determine the extent and impact of any
plume that develops.
©SCDF
The public warning system and
in-place protection
Since 1992, SCDF has been operating an island-wide network of over 280 public warning
systems. Covering 98% of the population, this infrastructure is vital, not just in war but also
as a peacetime function to alert the public to take appropriate protective actions (e.g.,
seeking refuge at a hardened shelter or adopting in-place protection in a chemical incident).
In-place protection is a short-term process of seeking shelter indoors against hazardous
chemical vapours that are present in the environment. The rate of change of air is drastically
reduced by closing doors and windows, shutting off ventilation systems and temporarily
sealing a safe room using plastic sheets and tape. Occupants are protected within the room
while allowing the vapour to dissipate outside the building over time.
bombs at the Jurong Island Checkpoint,
causing a temporary closure. This was
deliberately done to test the seaward
evacuation component under the Jurong
Island Evacuation Plan (JIEP), which is a
sub-plan of the JICP. This component of
the JIEP was validated as private ferries
and resources from the Maritime and Port
Authority of Singapore (MPA), Coast Guard
and Navy were mustered according to plan
to transport evacuees to safety. This marks
the first time sea evacuation has been
tested on Jurong Island.
Apart from validating the JICP, as well
as key operational capabilities of the
related agencies, the most encouraging
outcome of Ex NS8 was the support given
by the 27 companies and nearly 500
workers who had voluntarily participated
in in-place protection and sea evacuation.
The key public communication message
behind any Northstar exercise is that the
community’s readiness and response to
deal with contingencies is just as
important as that of the government. The
support by the stakeholders makes Ex NS8
both a public spectacle of the operational
capabilities of Singapore’s Homefront
agencies and also a showcase of a
relevant, responsive and robust publicprivate full-spectrum emergency response.
Figure two: organisational structure of a CERT
36
JIv2.0: The next lap of change
SCDF and other agencies had, post Ex NS8,
reviewed the areas for improvement to
tighten the JICP in the domains of policy,
industry collaboration and operational
deployment. This is especially important
given the dynamic nature of Jurong Island,
which even today is launching its next
phase of evolution under the Jurong Island
version 2.0 (JIv2.0) initiative. The next lap
will see more aggressive integration of
facilities and services to engender greater
efficiency, the emergence of mega projects
such as underground storage facilities, and
Singapore’s first LNG (liquefied natural
gas) terminal. Contingency plans must
keep pace and evolve, and a key priority
for SCDF is to further streamline the JICP
and JIEP. The government will continue to
monitor the threat horizon and collaborate
with industry stakeholders to stay on time
with the worst credible contingencies.
Operationally, SCDF will take its readiness
on Jurong Island to a new level by
converting Banyan Fire Station into a fullfledged hazmat station by early 2013.
SCDF and related government agencies will
also be working closely to further enhance
risk assessment methodologies like
quantitative risk assessments to enable a
more rigorous assessment process without
losing the business-friendly approach that
has come to define Jurong Island.
Conclusion
Disaster reduction and contingency
response work best as a shared
responsibility between the authorities and
the wider community. By focusing on the
human interface and co-ordination from
the onset of a crisis till normalcy is
restored, contingency response can be
Autumn 2012
reduced to its
simplest and most
sustainable of forms,
even as the threat
environment relentlessly
increases in complexity. No
man is an island, especially not
in disaster reduction planning.
SCDF will continue to build
upon the full-spectrum
emergency response, as
witnessed in Ex NS8, with
participation ranging from
individual companies right
through the multi-agency whole
of government level – as a way
forward to realise a highlynetworked and interoperable,
disaster-response ecosystem
that will multiply the
effectiveness of any crisis
management effort. HRW
The house that
Jack(ubec) built
Nick Vent, Supervisor of the San Diego County Hazardous Incident Response
Team talks to Steve Johnson about the surprises that illicit lab search can bring!
It’s not unreasonable to want to ascertain the
hazards attendant on a particular crime scene
or illicit lab before entering it. But whilst it is
not unreasonable, it is sometimes nigh on
impossible. In November, 2010, one particular
situation that faced responders in the City of
Escondido was as close to impossible as you
can imagine when entering a crime scene. It
all started with a gardener who, to his
surprise, was blown up when he stepped on
some gravel in the back of a property he had
been hired to maintain. The property was sat
on a section of unincorporated San Diego
County, surrounded by the city of Escondido,
so from the outset the response was going to
involve cross-jurisdictional co-operation. Oh,
and it was in a residential area with an
outdoor shopping mall 600 yards away... And
it was also a few hundred feet from Interstate
15... And the house contained the single
largest cache of HMTD explosive in US history
(not to mention a cornucopia of material that
couldn’t be catalogued).
The initial response involved the Escondido
Fire department and the San Diego County
Sherriff’s Department. Due to the significant
amount of suspicious and potentially
dangerous chemical substances discovered
during the initial assessment phase, the San
Diego County Sherriff’s Bomb Arson unit and
San Diego County Department of
Environmental Health (DEH) Hazmat team
were dispatched to the worsening incident.
During early assessment, there was a second
explosion near the original detonation, under
the foot of a trained explosives expert. This
secondary detonation occurred despite the use
of extreme caution, highlighting how
dangerous the yard was. It was surmised from
residues obtained from the property that the
tenant had poured partially manufactured
homemade explosives, that were considered to
be bad batches, directly into the drainage
areas and yard around the house – and it was
these that were detonating as the pressure
from feet generated a reaction.
So the yard became a minefield, with the
terrifying prospect that far from having
degraded in UV, as it should, the explosive
residues had been protected by the gravel,
crystallised and were contact-sensitive. The
sheriff’s officers took the house resident,
George Djura Jakubec, then 54, into custody
for questioning, thinking it ought to be
possible to get him to explain the hazards and
threats on the property. This quickly proved
not to be the case. Despite the fact that with
all this obvious evidence his situation could
hardly get worse, evidence of multiple
armoured car robberies quickly came to light
in the property (he had kept the deactivated
trackers as souvenirs) and he was stubbornly
resistant to help the authorities.
A very careful search of the property
turned up six quart-sized jars filled with a
white substance, gallons of concentrated
acids as well as chloroform, hexamine,
acetone and hydrogen peroxide. Officials
searching records on the property, learned
that he had purchased castor plants: ricin
being isolated from castor bean oil. Imagine
knowing all this before re-entering the
property! Explosives and CBRN were already
both on the menu, and with Jakubec not
cooperating almost nothing could be left out.
The San Diego County Hazardous Incident
Response Team became intrinsic to the
investigation at this point. Nick Vent,
Supervisor, and his colleagues took air samples
for biological agents and combustible
compounds, then sent in radiation detectors
with the bomb technicians who searched the
property; while outfitted in both explosion
and hazmat gear. The level of danger meant
that using Raman-based detection units with
delay timers allowed provisional investigation
without risking personnel or opening up
unknown jars. It took a few tries to figure out
how to get sufficient spectra through the
thick glass of the jars, but investigators
eventually identified the jar contents as
hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD),
an explosive compound that is sensitive to
heat, shock and friction.
The making safe of the yard was no easy
matter. On Friday, November 19th, officials
shut down Interstate 15 so that a robot could
pick up the jars one at a time, move them to a
relatively safe location and detonate them.
Autumn 2012
37
Then technicians used a 5% sodium hydroxide
solution to try to neutralise any remaining
explosive residue in the gravel.
Investigators at last entered the house
three days after the start of the incident. “We
assumed that most of the bad stuff was in the
backyard and the house was going to be a
piece of cake,” Nick Vent recalled, chuckling at
how wrong they were. “On the plus side there
were no radioactive items or biological
warfare agents” he continued, “but, wow,
pretty much everything else you could think
of was there.” Inside were thousands of
rounds of ammunition, a hand grenade mould,
homemade grenades, human face moulds and
masks, Escondido Police Department shirts,
more concentrated acids and hydrogen
peroxide, jars of thermite, erythritol
tetranitrate, pentaerythritol tetranitrate
(PETN) and more HMTD, as well as a layer of
white powder all over the hardwood floor that
was too thin to identify.
Adding to the chaos, much of this had
been produced by ‘garage’ chemistry.
Jakubec had bought the acids and hydrogen
peroxide at low concentrations and distilled
them to yield concentrated solutions. Yet he
showed no signs of organisation, safety or
control. The chemicals, ammunition and
grenades co-existed with other household
items in a crowded mess. Not only was it an
orgy of evidence, it was impossible to even
begin to consider how to search and deal
with the house.
“At that point the techs were coming out
of the house saying, ‘This is nuts!’” Vent said.
The house showed evidence of previous
explosions: walls were damaged and Jakubec’s
distillation apparatus was in ruins. Neighbours
attributed the noise to vehicles backfiring on
the Interstate, “One thing was becoming clear
though, we needed to think outside the box to
deal with this scene,”said Vent.
To help them figure out what to do,
officials reached out to other agencies that
deal with explosives, including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, as
well as explosive ordnance disposal specialists
at nearby Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton
and Air Station Miramar [who suggested a
swift application of airdropped munitions!
Ed.]. The dramatic conclusion was that
authorities had to burn down the house.
Picking it apart piece by piece was far too
risky for both responders and the local
community. Planning and controlling a burn
was the best solution to ensure the safety of
emergency personnel and the surrounding
community. As much evidence as possible was
collected by bomb technicians and then the
most incredible plan to deal with an illicit lab
ever was hatched.
The controlled burn would itself pose a lot
of difficult issues. It needed to happen in a
way that dealt definitively with all the
hazards, or the ruins would be an even greater
death trap. There were considerations about
38
downwind hazards and the safety of the
public in the residential area, mall and on the
highway. All the agencies and authorities
needed to co-ordinate as well because, legally
and technically, this had never happened
before. You can imagine the neighbours were
the most nervous!
At its heart this was an environmental
issue and Nick Vent and colleagues talked to
anyone and everyone they could think of,
from federal agencies to academic scientists,
to get some insight into how to do the burn,
ensuring that there would be no surprises and
to minimise effects around the property. The
approach they settled on involved keeping
most of the house shut to ensure that the
temperature was high enough to destroy
whatever was inside and contain any
explosions. The goal was to have everything
burn inside then have the walls come down.
Holes would be made in the roof, thereby
providing ventilation to help achieve the
temperatures needed and keep the burn going.
The neighbouring houses, terraced so that
one was slightly above Jakubec’s and one was
below, faced uncertain futures. At first it was
thought that the house above would likely not
survive the burn. Then an inspired idea was
put forward: a fire wall would be built, similar
to those often found separating a garage from
a house in a typical residence but with double
the drywall and a layer of fire-retardant gel
commonly used to coat homes in wild land
fires. This would protect the neighbouring
house… hopefully.
Modelling of the house started at the
incident’s outset, in case the house caught fire
or exploded during the course of the general
investigation. When planning the burn, similar
atmospheric modelling was used to identify
the correct weather conditions that would
send the smoke and emissions straight up into
the atmosphere to dissipate, rather than blow
over the community. Modelling was also used
to define evacuation and shelter-in-place
areas. This was easier said than done, because
common modelling programs didn’t have the
necessary capabilities. Software developed by
the Environmental Protection Agency and the
National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration, such as ALOHA for example,
can only envisage a static release of one
chemical at a time. Officials needed something
that could handle multiple compounds at once
and account for reactions between the
compounds and their degradation products.
Eventually, access was granted to a classified
program from the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency that catered for the unique situation
the responders were facing.
A sceptical community were presented with
the plan at a town hall meeting on Tuesday,
November 30th, only 12 days from the start
of the incident. This was the tip of a wider
information campaign that put information on
the county website. Sheriff’s officers also
went door-to-door and made calls to
homeowners. “There was no doubt in my mind
Autumn 2012
that we were going to do this and do it
successfully” the local fire chief said. “Our job
at this point was to calm the nerves of so
many people who thought this was going to
be the end of the world as they knew it in
their neighbourhood.” Most people, however,
seemed to leave the meeting convinced that
officials knew what they were doing. Also on
November 30th, the county and state declared
states of emergency, which gave officials the
legal authority they needed to burn the house.
On Thursday, December 9th, the day of the
burn, everything went perfectly. A command
post kept 300 people from 60 agencies
informed as the weather co-operated.
Officials evacuated residents, applied the gel
to the fire wall, shut down the freeway
again, placed igniters to start the fire and set
the house alight. The house burned exactly
as anticipated. As the smoke rose 2,600 feet
in a vertical plume, air monitors networked
around the site showed that emissions never
exceeded exposure limits. The fire wall held
and the only item that appeared to escape
the confines of the house was a single bullet
found 10 feet away. Temperature-sensitive
strips placed in the yard showed that
temperatures there exceeded 250 ºF, ensuring
that any remaining HMTD or other residue
had decomposed. This had been an important
quality assurance part of the plan. After the
burn, contractors removed ash, debris and
soil from the property and tested what was
left over to ensure that no chemical or
heavy-metal residue remained. On December
28th, authorities released the property back
to the owner. From start to finish, the
response cost $1.5 million, Vent said. Despite
its complexity, it had been handled in 41
days. As for Jakubec, he pleaded guilty to
repeated armed bank robbery and is now
serving a 30-year prison sentence. He
declined to say in court why he made the
explosives and investigators could find no
links to terrorist or drug organisations.
The incident provided a lot of useful
lessons learnt. The volume and complexity of
materials was far greater than would normally
be exercised or usually encountered. This
reinforced the need to be aware of the
difficulties of mixed hazards. Multi-agency
collaboration was intrinsic to the success,
which also meant early consultation.
Understanding the limits and capabilities of
equipment and resources was key too.
Selecting the wrong technology could not
only have misidentified the materials but
could have been a hazard to life. Continuing
the attention to detail through to the finish
with constant air monitoring, soil sampling,
weather data and area monitoring for
downwind release was vital to a safely
controlled incident. You aren’t always going to
have all this kit on one team so interoperability training has to include an
understanding of the resources of possible
(and less likely) partner agencies and city,
county, state and federal levels. HRW
Now what have we here? Some of the items found in the Escondido bomb factory ©San Diego County Sheriffs Department
Autumn 2012
39
CLP from a Hazmat
Responder Point of View
By Bill Atkinson, Knowledge Leader at National Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC)
The introduction of the Classification,
Labelling and Packaging of Substances and
Mixtures Regulation (CLP) has some
important implications not only for those
who make and ship these products but
also to those responding to incidents
where hazardous products are involved.
The guidance produced so far concentrates
heavily on what producers need to do to
change their labels and their safety data
sheets (SDS), but what about the hazmat
responder? What are the main changes
and implications of them from their point
of view?
Why is the change occurring?
The established EU labelling regulations
seem to have become generally well
understood both by producers and end-users
of the products, with the familiar mix of the
orange and black symbols on the labels
along with the risk and safety phrasing. So,
why are the regulations changing?
CLP is the European implementation of
the United Nations Globally Harmonised
System of Classification and Labelling of
Chemicals (GHS). GHS aims to set a
standard approach to chemical hazard
evaluation and communication that can be
adopted by countries around the globe. The
EU is going through the process of adopting
GHS now – other countries have either
already completed their implementation
(e.g. South Korea) or are in the early stages
(e.g. USA). The case for change can be seen
when you look at the way the same
substance was classified differently under
the old systems around the world:
It clearly makes sense to have more
consistency in how something is classified as
hazardous and to label it using a common
system, hence the introduction of GHS.
However, GHS is not a formal treaty - it is a
non-legally binding international agreement
– so countries (or Trading Blocks, like the EU)
need to create their own legislation to
implement GHS, and CLP is the European
40
implementation of GHS. It is also the case
that because GHS was constructed as
modules or “building blocks”, countries can
adopt (or omit) whichever parts of it as they
wish. So it is harmonisation but not
uniformity. Confused? You’re not alone.
However, the picture becomes clearer and
easier to explain if we concentrate on Europe
and CLP.
What are the key changes as a result of
CLP?
The main changes from a hazmat responder’s
view are:
– Product labels will have new diagonally
shaped pictograms to replace the orange and
black square symbols
– A single ‘signal’ word (Danger or Warning)
is introduced
– Risk and safety phrases become hazard and
precautionary statements
– Some products may now be classified
differently, so the hazard label might change
as a result
– Manufacturers may alter the formulation
to avoid the change in classification and
therefore alter the label in any case
– The appearance and content of Safety Data
Sheets (SDS) will change to reflect the new
classification and pictograms
– There are further changes to SDS as a
result of REACH (see later)
Oh yes and MSDS are just called SDS now
As the figure shows, there are some new
symbols introduced. The pressurised gases
one is probably the most straightforward to
interpret (although it still reminds me of a
cricket bat). The most controversial changes
are the inclusion of the ‘shot man’ /
‘exploding man’ / ‘radioactive man’ (I’ve
heard it called all of these things depending
on how people view it) to denote certain
Health Hazards. The good news is he - I’m
using ‘he’ although the design of the symbol
itself was apparently modified to make it
appear androgynous - does not indicate the
presence of radiation and the health effects
he is meant to warn of are usually a result
of chronic (ie. long-term and repeated)
exposure. This includes causing cancer, cell
mutations and toxicity to specific internal
organs. Similarly the new ‘exclamation mark’
pictogram refers to less serious health
Autumn 2012
Oxidising gases
Oxidising liquids
Oxidising solids
Compressed gases
Liquefied gases
Refrigerated liquefied gases
Dissolved gases
Corrosive to metals
CLP
CHIP
Health Hazards
Acute toxicity
Very toxic (Fatal)
Toxic
Corrosive (causes severe skin burns
and eye damage)
Serious eye damage
Respiratory sensitiser
Mutagen
Carcinogen
Reproductive toxicity
SpecificTarget Organ Toxicity
Aspiration hazard
Acute toxicity
Harmful
Skin irritation, Serious eye irritation,
Respiratory irritant
Skin sensitiser
Narcotic
CLP
CHIP
Environmental Hazards
Acute hazards to the aquatic
environment
Chronic hazards to the aquatic
environment
Figure 1 –
New GHS (CLP) Pictograms Compared to the
Existing CHIP Symbols
hazards such as skin irritancy or
sensitisation and applies to many
circumstances where the black cross CHIP
symbol is already applied.
Anyone suffering a one-off, short-lived
(acute) exposure to these substances, such
as a hazmat responder, is not likely to
suffer these chronic health effects.
Nevertheless, you should always avoid
direct contact with these substances and
wear suitable personal protective
equipment or PPE (mask, goggles, gloves
etc) to reduce your risk of exposure.
There is also a change to some of the
language used in the process. For example, a
preparation (something that has been mixed
to a formulation by a manufacturer and may
carry a proprietary Tradename) is now called
a mixture. While this shouldn’t affect
hazmat responders directly, it is something
you may notice if you seek advice from a
site chemist. Chemists can be notoriously
bad at not explaining jargon or in using
precise language only they understand the
exact context and meaning of (this is of
course a generalisation and not a universal
axiom). Words like toxic, harmful and indeed
substance and preparation are all good
examples of this. To a formulation chemist
they have a precise meaning when they are
classifying products, one that is not
apparent to the hazmat responder. Partly in
response to this, one innovation in the new
labels is the introduction of a signal word in
bold to be placed underneath the
pictograms. This signal word is either Danger
or Warning and they replace all the old
words used to indicate danger such as
Explosive, Highly Flammable, Toxic,
Corrosive, Irritant etc. The Danger word will
be used to denote a higher hazard, for
example those previously labelled as
Corrosive or Highly Flammable, whereas
Warning will apply to lower hazard warning
such as Irritant or Flammable previously.
For this reason, I would treat products
labelled as Danger with a higher degree of
caution and pay particular attention to the
hazard pictograms shown.
Hazard and Precautionary Phrases
Risk and safety phrases have been replaced
on the label by warning and precautionary
statements. While the phrasing has
changed, the changes are mainly selfexplanatory and are indeed often quite
similar to the existing wording.
Examples of hazard statements include:
H240 - Heating may cause an explosion
H320 - Causes eye irritation
H401 - Toxic to aquatic life
Examples of precautionary statements
include:
P102 - Keep out of reach of children
P271 - Use only outdoors or in wellventilated area
P410 - Protect from sunlight
For mixtures, many such phrases could
apply so it is up to the producer to
rationalise these down to the most
relevant. However, it is still likely that
more phrases will now appear on labels
and on SDS. One point to note is where
PPE is recommended this has to be now
specified in detail, e.g. wear rubber or
nitrile gloves.
An example of a new format CLP label is
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: CLP ‘Supply’ Label for Acetone
Combination Labels
The changes outlined above, apply to
chemical products as supplied for end use, so
called ‘supply’ rules. To reach that point, they
of course have to be transported and are
therefore subject to the regulations
concerning the transport of dangerous goods.
Here too there are some changes that affect
what could be termed ‘combination labels’.
This is where there is no outer and inner
packaging and both ‘transport’ and ‘supply’
labelling is combined. Examples of this
include intermediate bulk containers (IBC)
and 200 litre drums.
As a general rule, where the labelling of
an outer packaging is in principle subject to
both the transport and the CLP rules, the
labelling or marking in accordance with
transport legislation is sufficient, and the
CLP labelling need not appear.
This means that on combination labels,
transport hazard warning symbols
(diamonds) and CLP pictograms of the same
meaning need not both be shown.
Deadlines for changes
The deadline to update labels for pure
substances (ie. not mixtures) to CLP
requirements was December 2010. The only
exception is for products that were already
packaged, labelled and on the market in
December 2010. For these products, the date
is extended to December 2012.
A major change that is still to be
implemented as a result of CLP is the
reclassification and labelling of mixtures. The
deadline for this change is June 2015. Again,
there is extra time available for products
that are already packaged, labelled and on
the market in 2015. For these products, the
date is extended to June 2017.
Safety data sheets
The biggest change to is the inclusion of
the new classification, hazard and
precautionary statements and pictograms.
There have also been further changes to
SDS as a result of REACH (Registration,
Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of
Chemicals). New format European SDS are
still in 16 sections, however sections 2 and
3 have been transposed so that Hazards
now appears in Section 2 and Constituents
shown in section 3. Section 2 also now
contains all the information which was in
Section 15. This means that section 2 has
become a much more useful (and quicker)
source of reference for hazard information
to the responder.
Another main change to SDS that might
be quickly noticed by hazmat responders is
that they have got longer, in some case
much longer! As well as the new phrases,
which may lengthen section 2 in particular,
other sections may now be sub-divided,
requiring more information than in the past.
There is also the issue of exposure
scenarios. These are appended to the back
of the SDS and may be required by the
legislation for certain hazardous substances.
Exposure scenarios are really intended for
those using the product occupationally and
on a regular basis. They are not designed for
the hazmat responder, nor it appears (on
the basis of the ones I have seen) offer any
information of value to a responder. I would
therefore ignore them.
Conclusions
Some familiarity will need to take place to
understand the new pictograms and labels,
although the changes in most cases will be
obvious and clear. While the hazard
warnings are intended for occupational and
chronic use of the products, the warnings
can be of value to hazmat responders
(especially for the physical and chemical
hazards) in assessing the risks to them
during incidents and in completing risk
assessments. Changes to Safety Data
Sheets are also in train, although exposure
scenario information can be ignored by
responders. HRW
Further reading
NCEC Hazchem Guide: http://the-ncec.com/hazchem#ghs
HSE Introduction and Guidance to CLP: www.hse.gov.uk/ghs/implications.htm
CLP Regulations: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/documents/classification/
Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety (CCOHS) Guide to GHS:
www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/chemicals/ghs.html
HSE Guidance to Changes in SDS due to REACH:
www.hse.gov.uk/reach/resources/reachsds.pdf
Autumn 2012
41
Roy Wilsher, Director of
Community Protection &
Chief Fire Officer,
Hertfordshire Fire
and Rescue Service, talks
to Andrew Johnston
about the need
for interoperability
AJ: You have been involved in the
development of interoperability for over
ten years and you are now chair of the
Joint Emergency Services Interoperability
Programme Strategic Board. What does
interoperability mean to you? Are there
differences in the interoperability
requirements of the emergency services in
their day-to-day jobs compared to that of
interoperability during a CBRN event?
RW: Interoperability means different things
to different people. If you talk to some people
about interoperability they will just talk
about communication, airwave radio and so
on, but it is much more than that. It’s about
command structures, operating procedures,
working together, sharing information and
intelligence, and using common decisionmaking models. In terms of day-to-day work,
such as road traffic collisions (RTC) and fires,
interoperability works very well as you might
expect. More complex incidents, such as
terrorist attacks or the release of hazardous
materials, are where we need to do a bit
more work but are already very well
developed. The key difference is in command
structure. The command structures within fire
and rescue are very clear but adaptable. We
use the same command structure for
whatever the incident and we can add bits on
or take things away to suit the event. If you
compare this to the police, then they might
use different structures depending on the
role: public order, fire arms, major crime
investigations, etc. The ambulance service
is also building a common command
structure, so we need to make sure we
understand these differences and can
effectively work together.
The
Interoperable
Man
work together to overcome this difference.
As a fire and rescue service, it’s our job to
rescue as many people as we can, and the
police and ambulance will be involved in that
to an extent. The police will get much more
involved in public order, cordons,
investigations, etc., whilst we’re in there with
the gas-tight suits, the breathing apparatus
and that sort of equipment. Our roles rarely
conflict in any real sense.
AJ: It is sometimes not immediately clear
if an incident is an act of terrorism or an
accident, so how do you define your roles
in these situations with regard to
interoperability?
AJ: How do you deal with conflict or a
divergence of interests among the bluelight services, and does this have an effect
on interoperability?
RW: The official line is that there is never
any conflict among the blue-light services –
we work together perfectly all the time! It is
possible that, at times, there will be a
divergence of interest, say for example at an
incident that is also a crime scene. But we
42
Autumn 2012
RW: It usually works fairly well. The fire
service have years and years of experience
of treating incidents like possible crime
scenes, going right back to the 70’s and 80’s
with the IRA. We also deal with arson often,
so it’s not new to the fire service to treat an
incident as a crime scene. I was in charge of
the Buncefield explosion and among the
first questions raised there was, ‘Is this a
terrorist act?’ We worked very closely with
the police, and fire took the lead when we
concluded that it was an industrial accident.
With a terrorist incident there could be
people to be decontaminated, people to be
rescued and it will be the fire and rescue
service in the cordon doing what they can to
Interoperability is more than just TTPs ©CBRNe World
save lives along with our ambulance
colleagues conducting triage and the police
holding the outer cordon for us. Police also
have the capability to come into the hot
zone if required, so we very much work
together. Also, with CBRN, the concept of
operations, the ways of working and the
command structures are very clear. The
CBRN model is actually one of the examples
that is used as an area of good practice.
There has been so much work on it over the
years at Ryton, so I would say that a major
CBRNE attack is very well planned for.
Factors such as response times, numbers of
casualties and the kind of response, are all
planned for and are part of our training
programme. Consequently, CBRN is possibly
further ahead in planning and development
than many other kinds of incidents.
AJ: Are people aware that CBRN
interoperability is so developed?
RW: CBRN and response to terrorist incidents
are a bit further ahead of the game than
other complex response models in terms of
interoperability. CBRN has been so high on
the nation’s risk register for such a long time
that there’s been a lot of work and resources
poured into this area. Although having said
that, terrorist attacks such as 7/7 will always
present major challenges, certainly for the
first hour or so for any service, no matter
how much training you do.
AJ: What lessons were learnt from 7/7
with regard to interoperability? Whilst you
were not directly involved yourself, did
you see changes to codes of practice post7/7 for the blue-light services working
together?
RW: There are always lessons learnt. In terms
of 7/7, the things we started talking about
were having more joint guidance around the
incident command, having common decisionmaking models across the blue light services,
having common risk-assessment models.
Discussions and the sharing of intelligence
do happen of course, but 7/7 demonstrated a
need to formalise some of those
requirements and that is one of the goals of
the interoperability programme that we are
now developing.
AJ: Does that mean the London Emergency
Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) is being
replaced as a model for interoperability?
RW: LESLP has been around for decades, it is
a protocol for how the services and other
partners work together within the London
Local Resilience Forum. There are similar
documents and organisations across the
country, which will not be replaced but will
be complimented by the InterOps work.
LESLP is not being replaced by the
Interoperability programme in any way.
AJ: So what are the next steps with
regard to CBRN interoperability?
RW: Rather than working in particular
‘silos’, we’ll develop a more generic model
and bring in the specifics that we need. So
we will look to develop over-arching
command structures, over-arching decisionmaking models, forward command and so
on. Then we can plug in specific issues for
each of those requirements. It will be much
easier to attend any type of incident. It’s
very similar to the way the fire service
works now with a single incident command
manual, which we apply to whatever the
incident might be. So no matter what the
incident we use the same model and simply
grow it and add bits to it.
RW: I led an awareness package that has
gone to every commander across the three
services (to be looked at before the
Olympics) to pick up on these issues of
slightly different command structures,
different decision-making models and
slightly different capability, so that’s
happening now. Most of the extra work is
now happening post-Olympics. We’ve been
planning, exercising and building on
existing structures and we didn’t want to
change a lot with such a big event coming
up. We wanted to work with what we knew
for the Olympics and now we’ll look to
modify and improve things post-event.
AJ: How do you think the police will feel
about adopting what might be perceived
as a ‘fire service model’?
RW: The point of the interoperability
programme is that we will be working
together on a model we all can adopt, not
imposing one service on another.
AJ: Despite the overwhelming presence of
the Olympics, have the budget cuts had
any impact on resilience response and the
New Dimensions programme?
RW: In some ways it has. We’ve all been
affected by budget cuts and we all have
less fire fighters and less managers. We
have to tailor some of our responses but so
far it’s not affecting our resilience
responses, though we may have to think of
different ways of doing things in the future.
I’ll be interested to see what happens to the
whole resilience world now we’re post
Olympics, and I’d be very surprised if we’re
not asked to look at ways to save money.
Everyone else has been asked so why
wouldn’t we in terms of resilience? Within
the Fire service we have a new strategic
resilience board and part of its role will be
to look at the risk assessment for the UK
and the capabilities within Fire and Rescue
nationally. We will look at whether they are
still the right capabilities for the current
risk assessments, whether we need new
capabilities or need to provide the old
capabilities in a new way. I think we are
looking at more of a review than a severe
reduction. Considering the global financial
situation we’re in, I think we’ve done
amazingly well. Now we’re past the 9th
September [last day of Paralympics Ed.],
everything will need to move forward. But
whatever happens, it’s an exciting time to
work this closely across a range of areas
with police and ambulance rather than in
just specific areas. There will be a lot more
inclusion of first responders from all the
services for national exercises. That has its
own challenges around releasing people for
training. The ambulance service, in
particular, faces a big challenge because
they receive so many call outs, so releasing
people for training is not easy. We’ve always
worked together, but this is one of the few
times we’ve had generic guidance for all the
services linked into training and exercising.
National training and exercising for major
incidents tended to be police-dominated for
a number of years, understandably, but we
want to make that a much more joint
approach. I am very much looking forward
to the future. HRW
AJ: With these new plans and the
development of the new interoperability
response programme, will CBRN trained
fire fighters see their job roles change
much?
RW: I don’t think that those involved in
CBRN will see their job role changing much
because it’s used as a good practice model
already. What is more likely to happen is
that the learning from CBRN will spread to
other areas, so it is more likely that those
not involved in CBRN will see their working
practices change to more closely match that
of the CBRN model. A lot of the
development work has been done in CBRN
interoperability it’s a very good area of work.
I think the more general areas of work need
to catch up with the CBRNE models.
Ambulance, police and fire all have their
own decision-making models at the moment
and as you might expect with a decisionmaking model, they are not that different.
Gather in the information, assess the risk,
implement the plan, review and gather more
information and so on. There are, of course,
slightly different ways of doing it, but the
interoperability programme will be more
about bringing the models together so we
each understand each other’s requirements.
Fire will be part of a dedicated team from
the new interoperability programme that
will act as programme managers and we’re
linking to the Chief Fire Officers Association
(CFOA), Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO) and the Association for Chief
Executives (AACE) for Ambulance to bring in
the necessary expertise to make sure we can
work together.
AJ: The New Dimensions programme was
a long-term project, but with such a
huge national focus on the Olympics did
it have an influence on the development
of these models?
Autumn 2012
43
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44
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Autumn 2012
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Autumn 2012
45
Endpiece
If ‘hope’ is your
plan, you are in
BIG trouble…..
Chris Hawley and
Bob Royall Jnr on why
you need something
better than hope
46
In previous issues we focussed on training,
technologies and organisational challenges.
This article will combine planning with a
blend of the previous three topics and some
wise advice from the late John Eversole,
former Special Operations Chief for the City
of Chicago Fire Department. Eversole also
served as the Chairman of the IAFC Hazmat
Committee and the NFPA 472 Hazmat
Committee, prior to his death in 2007. Those
who knew the Chief know that he was
always ready to offer a short quip or a piece
of street-smart advice to the hazmat world.
He was said, “Hope is an expensive
commodity; in fact, it’s so expensive you
can’t afford it. If you are standing around
‘hoping’ that the shit will go away, or that it
will take care of itself, then you are setting
yourself up for failure.”
In the last issue, we discussed bread and
butter responses, those operations that we
routinely encounter and should be able to
handle fairly easily. If you are a hazmat
commander or team leader and your fall-back
plan is to just hang on until the other shift
comes in, your personnel may need more
training! Do you have any bread and butter
operations? Have you established plans for
those types of incidents? Transportation
incidents always produce unknowns. By
having some kind of idea about what is
moving around and through your jurisdiction,
you might have a head start on dealing with
these. There really isn’t any excuse for failing
to plan for incidents that might occur at one
of your chemical facilities. You should
especially seek information on the
transportation and routing of Extremely
Hazardous Substances (EHS) in your area. If
there is a release it should be handled safely,
quickly and efficiently.
Does your hazmat team know what EHS
is and where they might encounter them?
Here are some probing questions to ask
about your team’s capabilities. How long
does it take for your team to get dressed in
fully-encapsulated, chemical protective
Autumn 2012
clothing? Can your team simultaneously get
dressed, warm up and ready their meters,
establish some form of decontamination and
formulate a plan of action? These are all
standard functions of any hazmat response
program and should take just a matter of
minutes to complete. While we can’t point
to a specific target time for completing
such activities, a hazmat team should be
prepared to pick up the pace, particularly
when saving a few minutes might make a
difference, as Chief Eversole always said,
“Don’t learn the tricks of the trade; learn
the trade.” When lives are at stake, response
teams should be able to recognise a sense
of urgency and act appropriately to quickly
gain control of the incident.
If you find yourself in an uncomfortable
position after answering the above questions,
or if these concepts seem foreign to you,
then maybe you should focus on ways to
correct the problem. Luckily, there is
guidance available to assist you. NFPA 472,
Standard for Competence of Responders to
Hazardous Materials/WMD Incidents, is an
excellent guide for developing an effective
hazmat training programme. Establishing a
refresher (or re-training) programme to cover
the various competencies is a great idea and
a regulatory requirement in the United
States. Working with surrounding
jurisdictions, transportation companies and
chemical facilities are excellent ways to coordinate regional and co-operative training.
Co-operative, industrial training builds
relationships in advance of an incident. The
more comfortable your crews become with
facility personnel, the better the response
and the safer the community will be.
If your team is already ready to go and all
you want to do is hone their skills and
shorten the amount of time it takes to get
into the hot zone, then maybe you can
institute some skills drills. Don’t start out by
trying to build a three-ring circus act all at
once. Focus on one task at a time, such as
getting dressed a little bit quicker. During the
Endpiece
If you are not sure what your procedures are when this light comes on
then hope is not an option...' ©CBRNe World
Autumn 2012
47
Endpiece
second month, work on starting up and readying your detection
devices. In the third month, you might focus on establishing a
decontamination method. After you normalise those skills, try
combining all three and see if you or your hazmat officer can become
a ring master of a well-organised, three-ring act. When you think you
are ready, add a scenario aimed at streamlining your entire process.
Time may not always be of the essence in some hazmat scenarios,
particularly where there is no life hazard involved. But if there is a tank
truck of anhydrous ammonia overturned and leaking near a vulnerable
population, then your team will need to act quickly to mitigate the
problem. They should be trained to play a mental movie in their head
and know how to choose the correct PPE, the right detection devices to
deploy, the type of decon to use, isolation measures to take, and what
specialised tactics to employ. These decisions don’t have to be
memorised – you can also develop ‘cheat sheets’ or job aids to assist
you – but no matter what approach you use, choosing the appropriate
tactics should become second nature. While anhydrous ammonia can
travel considerable distances and it is slightly lighter than air, highhumidity situations and lower ambient temperatures may cause the
material to stay low to the ground and reach unprotected persons.
That’s why we have chosen it as an example. The response to an
ammonia release requires quick action to manage risk and remove the
hazard as quickly as possible. The question is, can your team handle
this type of bread and butter event?
As far as professionalism goes, we can point to another quote by
the Chief. He often said, “Our department takes 1,120 calls every day.
Do you know how many of the calls the public expects perfection on?
1,120. Nobody calls the fire department and says, ‘send me two dumbass firemen in a pickup truck’. In three minutes they want five brainsurgeon, decathlon champions to come and solve all their problems.”
If you have trouble handling the straight-forward bread and butter
type operations how do you think you will do on the more complex
ones? If the incident is a ‘once in a career’, CNN-level event, how do
you think you are going to make out? Will your training, preparation
and equipment make you or break you? A few years back, Chief
Eversole and a group of noted hazmat instructors dropped by to visit a
regional hazmat team during one of the hazmat responder
conferences. They were provided with a tour of the brand new hazmat
response vehicle and noticed that it was a little light on chemical
protective clothing. The Chief asked about the lack of variety and was
told “We only need one type of suit. In this city it’s level A all the way.
There is no level B in [City deleted by request Ed.].”
Needless to say, that team’s PPE decision tree was pretty limited.
While there are some differences between US and European styles of
chemical protective clothing, there are still different levels available to
choose from. Many factors must be considered when choosing the
proper protection. If you think that the type of chemical is the only
factor to be weighed when selecting chemical protective clothing, you
are mistaken. Other factors (in random order) include: risk category
(fire, corrosive, toxic or radioactive), state of matter, size and location
of container, task to be performed, environmental conditions,
protection for mechanical injury, chemical compatibility, psychological
impact, heat stress, fire and flash potential, potential stress on
garment and extremely cold materials. In terms of your bread and
butter operations, most of these factors are known and the remaining
ones can be quickly determined upon arrival. Even for incidents
outside the norm, it is still possible to make quick decisions. But don’t
fall into the trap of thinking that the level A (type 1a) encapsulated
suit is the solution for every situation.
The 800-pound elephant in the room begs the question, are you
fielding a competent hazmat response team? Some would argue that
low and slow is an appropriate approach for hazmat response. While
that approach might be perfect for cooking pulled pork or BBQ brisket,
it’s not exactly the way you want to handle a dangerous situation that
could seriously impact your community. At this point we must say that
we are not advocating quick, irresponsible actions that would put
responders at risk.
48
Autumn 2012
In emergency response we often hear the phrase, “Eventually all fires
go out, and all bleeding stops”. But in hazmat, all leaks don’t
eventually stop. Often they just relocate to somebody else’s postal/zip
code. If you are standing around ‘hoping’ that the problem will go
away, you might as well ‘hope’ that it doesn’t spontaneously and
dynamically relocate over your head. There is no substitute for a
proper risk assessment and risk management, and it must be done
efficiently. Another piece of solid advice offered by Chief Eversole was,
“Be careful what you are willing to give up. If you don’t take care of
the customer somebody else will. If you are waiting for someone else
to come take care of your problem you are setting yourself up for
failure.”
If your team’s performance is like a one-ring circus and it takes
hours to make an initial entry into the hot zone, trust and confidence
in your team will be called into question. If your elected officials
receive phone calls about a circus out on the highway and the length
of time it took to resolve an incident, they are going to want some
answers. In today’s world of tight budgets and agency down-sizing, we
need to be as effective as possible and deliver the best possible
customer service. Hazmat teams, especially those in urban areas, have
benefited from an abundance of grant money to purchase considerable
amounts of equipment, sophisticated detection devices and the latest
in chemical protective clothing. All of that stuff is usually carried in a
large, shiny, hazmat response vehicle. The hazmat truck may look good
in the station but how is it utilised? When it arrives on scene, will the
team inside make things better or stand around and ‘hope’ that the
problem will go away? So is your team just an illusion, a bunch of
smoke and mirrors, or are they well-trained, drilled and ready to make
a difference? As the Chief said, “Hope is an expensive commodity; in
fact, it’s so expensive you can’t afford it.” HRW
Hoping you have the right suit is no solution ©CBRNe World
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