"Two Cold War Empires: Imposition vs. Multilateralism" (Gaddis, Part 1)

226
Major Problems in American Foreign Relations
conflicts and local or regional politics. Instead, he attributed nearly every
matic crisis or civil war-in Germany, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and czechoslovaki
to Soviet machination and insisted that the Russians had broken every
quic\,
and were bent on "world conquest." To determine his response he was
Ger
reach for an analogy, usually the failure of the Western powers to reslst
to the
and Japan in the 1930s, and to conclude that henceforth he would speak
This s
sians in the only language that he thought they understood: "divisions."
of leadership and diplomacy closed off both advocates and prospects for more
tiently r"goiiut"d and more nuanced or creative courses of action. ' . .
o{
In conclusion, it seems clear that despite Truman's pride in his knowledge
not
often could
past, he lacked insight into the history unfolding around him. He
seemed oblirr
he
and
alternatives,
visualize
or
decision
immediate
teyond his
narrowed n
not
he
than
often
More
or
actions.
words
his
of
to ihe implications
the enri
than brofoened the options that he presented to the American citizenry,
po
war
cold
which
through
channels
the
and
politics,
ment of American
flowed. Throughout his presidency, Truman remained a parochial nationalist
d6tenta
lacked the leadership to move America away from conflict and toward
that
bec:
confrontation
Cold
War
of
politics
and
an
ideology
stead, he promoted
for the
the modus operandi of successor administrations and the United States
two generations
TWo Cold War EmPires:
Imposition vs. Multilateralism
,]OHN LEWIS GADDIS
u
Leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union would have bristled
Bu
1945.
after
doing
were
they
what
to
"imperial"
affixed
ing the appellation
eq
need not send out ships, seize territories, and hoist flags to construct an
..informal" empires are considerably older than, and continued to exist alon
"formal" ones Europeans imposed on so much of the rest of the
the more
lrom the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries. During the Cold War I
Washington and Moscow took on much of the character, if never quite the ch
of old imperial capitals like London, Paris, and vienna. And surely American
Soviet influence, throughout most of the second half of the twentieth centuryseen.
at least as ubiquitous as that of any earlier empire the world had ever
fact pror
that
and
though,
authority,
Ubiquity never ensured unchallenged
For
history'
to
ColdWar
analogy
imperial
yet another reason for applying an
i:
of
flow
a
two-way
involved
always
have
io popolar impressions, empires
I
imperialized
the
imperialized;
the
upon
Inr-perializers have never simply acted
IlI'a
Cold
The
imperializers.
the
over
atso naa a surprising amount of influence
hor
no exception io this pattern, and an awareness of it too will help us to see
did.
it
way
that
the
in
ended
rivalry emerged, evolved, and eventually
-r*.
c"ra war Empires: Imposition vs. Multilateralism" from John-Lewis 9:dllt,L" Y:.
@ by Joha
Rethinking cold wai History lNew york: oxford universiry Press, 1997), pp. 27-39.
Gaddis. Riprinted by permission of Oxford University Press'
' et us begin with the structu
ri..
much more than the Amer
:n addition to having had ar
r hich he proceeded to impk
.i
influential builder of em
;uch striking results, on the
-: x'as, of course, a matter of
movement that had sor
.rf imperialism throughout
:- irough, and throughout his
*r:l* ing how a revolution and
-u:aerialists, Stalin acknou let
ai.
&
subject, made
inApril l9l
ron-Russian nationalities
found Stalin's n
=inorities
rater that year, however- a
:.ced was a disintegration o
Soviet Union after commu
i.:lether because of Lenin-s,
of Soviet Russia's rrealr
Pt'rles, and Moldavians s't
rans. Belorussians, Cauca
.*r-' Stalin proposed incorpo
ur.. the Russian republic. on.
iendation and establish tb
died and Stalin took I
c. tounding principles the I
:rnction as an updated ia
;nin
Russian tsars.
--.-.in and Stalin differed rD
rrt on the legitimacy of (
'-el rvaroed with characterit
: chauvinist," and of th
-Russian filth, like flies in r
::s of revolution spreadin
:: Lenin's invective-q'as
r
:r-ansplanted nationals can
of all countries are avidl
:;rsr of Russia, its past. the p
-
1930, shortly after cons<
.-annot but instill!) in th
'. :lational pride, capable oI
"Stalin constitution" ol
: nationalities to secede
,nd an offrcially sanctior
I:e
r:nrinent feature of Stahn-s
-d
set out to validate tus
The Origins of the Cold
ributed nearly every
Let us begin with the structure of the soviet empire,
for
d
broken every
response he was quict
rpowers to resist
he would speak to the
nd: "divisions." This
rnd prospects for more
ofaction....
ide in his knowledge of
fm. He often could not
and he seemed oblir.i
'han
not he narrowed
ican citizenry, the envi
which Cold War noli
parochial nationalist
ict and toward d6tenteconfrontation that
rr
tinued to exist alongsi&t of the rest of the worl
ring the Cold War ye-
if never quite the chart
\nd surely American d
twentieth century
rr
seen.
and that fact prorido
IWarhistory. Forconqr
(>way flow of influere.
ed; the imperialized har
lizers. The Cold War rr
ll help us 1o *"" 6es7 rln
,that it did.
F,
.cwis Caddis,
We Now Knrc.D. pp . 27 -39 . @ by Johr
Iri
a
matter of some awkwardness that Starin came out of
a revo_
leader constructed his own
m=c. though, and throughout his career he devoted
a surprising amount of attention
I -irowing how a revolution and an empire might coexist. Bolsheviks could never
I :nperialists, Stalin acknowledged in one of his earliest public pronouncements
r iiis subject, made in April 7911 .Batsurely in a revolutionary Russia nine_tenths
r ie non-Russian nationalities would ,'ot want their independ;;;.
F"., among
ls< minorities found Stalin's reasoning persuasive after the Bolsheviks
did
seize
rqer
later that year, however, and one of the first problems
Lenin,s new govern_
faced was a disintegration of the ord Russian empire
not unlike what happened
-r Soviet Union after communist authority finaily corapsed
u
=e
in 1991.
\\hether because of I enin,s own opposition to
imperiaiism or, just as plausibly,
E:.use of Soviet Russia's weakness at the time, Finns, Estonians,
Latvians, Lithua_
trirc-;. pels', and Moldavians were allowed to
depart. others who tried to do so_
-k-ainians. Belorussians, caucasians, central Asians-were not so fortunate,
'-922
tI
rould have bristled ar hr
doing after 1945. But c
s to construct an empir
ld had ever
It was, of course,
Erlnary movement that had vowed to smash, not just tsarist
imperiarism, but all
imrs of imperialism throughout the world. The Soviet
s
lism
he
227
simpre reason that
t r-rs. much more than the American, deliberatery designed. the
It
has long been crear
*'r in addition to having had an authoritarian vision,
stalin also had an imperial
=- *'hich he proceeded to implement in at least as single-minded a way. No com_
rribly influential builder of empire came crose to wielding power for so long,
or
r:c such striking results, on the Western side.
ece, and
united States for the
War
and
stalin proposed incorporating these remaining (and reacquirJ)
nationali_
into the Russian republic, only to have Lenin as one
of his last acts override this
E:rrrunendation and establish the murti-ethnic union
of Soviet sociarist nef;;;;.
\-sr Lenin died and Stalin took his place it quickly became
trrougrr, that what_
irs founding principres the USSR was to be no
"r"*,of
federation
='€r
Rather, it
r:uid function as an updated form of empire even more
"quitr.
tightly centralized
than that
r
=e
Russian tsars.
Lenin and Starin differed most significantly, not
over
or even
r-x. but on the legitimacy of Great Russian nationalism. authoritarianism
The founder of Bolshe_
mn had warned with characteristic pungency of "that truly
Russian man, the Great_
Lrsiian chauvinist," and of the dangeis oi sinking
into a ..sea of chauvinistic
frret-Russian filth, rike flies in milk." Such temptations,
he insisted, might ruin the
r:rpects of revolution spreading ersewhere in the worrd. But
Starin-the implied
r:rt of Lenin's invective-was himself a Great Russian nationarist,
with all the in_
EE:n'transplanted nationals can sometimes attain. ,.The
leaders of the revolutionary
r-riiers of all countries are avidly studying the most
instructive history of the work_
ry ;lass of Russia, its past, the past of Russia," he would write in a revealing private
t=rr in 1930, shortry after consolidating his position as Lenin,s
.All this
rclls (cannot but instillr) in the hearts of the Russian workers asuccessor.
feering of revolu_
L-r-r,.'national pride, capable of moving mountains
and working miru"Lr.,'
The "Stalin consriturion" of 1936, which formalry
specifiJd the right of non_
il's:ian nationalities to secede from the soviet Union,
coincided with the great
rr:es and an officiaily sanctioned upsurge in Russian nationalism
would persist
r r orominent feature of Stalin's regime until his death. It was as if that
the great authori_
r-n had set out to varidate his own flawed prediction of rgri uy
a set
".""uting
of
228
Maior Problems in American Foreign Relations
circumstances in which non-Russian nationalities would not everl think of
even though the hypothetical authority to do so remained. The patterr resembled
of the purge trials themselves: one maintained a framework of legality-even,
the non-Russian republics, a toleration of local languages and cultures consl
greater than under the tsars. But Stalin then went to extraordinary lengths to de
anyone from exercising these rights or promoting those cultures in such a way as
challenge his own rule. He appears to have concluded, from his own study of
Russian past, that it was not "reactionaly" to seek territorial expansion. His princi
ideological innovation may well have been to impose the ambitions of the old prir
of Muscovy, especially their determination to "gather in" and dominate all of
lands that surrounded them, upon the anti-imperial spirit of proletarian i
ism that had emanated from, if not actually inspired, the Bolshevik Revolution.
Stalin's fusion of Marxist internationalism with tsarist imperialism could
reinforce his tendency, in place well before World War II, to equate the advance
world revolution with the expanding influence of the Soviet state. He applied d
linkage quite impartially: a major benefit of the 1939 pact with Hitler had been
It regainea territories lost as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution and the \\
war I settlement. But stalin's conflation of imperialism with ideology also
plains the importance he attached, following the German attack in 1941, to havi
hi. ,"* Anglo-American allies confirm these arrangeinents. He had similar go
in East Asia when he insisted on bringing the Soviet Union back to the
Russia had occupied in Manchuria prior to the Russo-Japanese War: this he
achieved at the 1945 Yalta Conference in return for promising to enter the
against Japan. "My task as minister of foreign affairs was to expand the borders
our Fatheiland," Molotov recalled proudly many years later. 'And it seems d
Stalin and I coped with this task quite well."
From the west's standpoint, the critical question was how far Moscow's
fluence would extend beyond whatever Soviet frontiers turned out to be at the
of the war. Stalin had suggested to Milovan Djilas that the Soviet Union wouldi
pose its own social system as far as its armies could reach, but he was also
cautious. Keenly aware of the military power the United States and its allies
accumulated, Stalin was determined to do nothing that might involve the USSR.
another devastating war until it had recovered sufficiently to be certain of winri
it. .,I do not wish to begin the Third World War over the Trieste question," he
plained to disappointed Yugoslavs, whom he ordered to eYacuate that territory
June 1945. Five years later, he would justify his decision not to intervene in I
Korean War on the grounds that "the Second World War ended not long ago, I
we are not ready for the Third world war." Just how far the expansion of Soviet
fluence would proceed depended, therefore, upon a careful balancing of
..[w]e were on the offensive," Molotov acknowledged:
ties against risks.
<
Ub
or what was it, 6q
ics he thought it necesrr
q
expansion cease only r
within those
states, so &at
firrlt
was ill-prepared for ir?
Sulin had been very prEci
much less so on hr I
on having "friendlf r
to specify how many E
frr dismembering Gern
so: that country wouldbt
in June 1945, and th€y
He never gave up on
t
fui
b result-as his comtr
emanatingfromtbS
recalled. "the miqri
of the Soviet state- Od;r
could ensure us er
But Stalin provided no id
rapidly, or under wh* ci
inly prepared to stop in
to challenge the Ami
clear. Churchill acknort
ages" agreement cd
have revealed Stalin'r
never allow their lineso
SrcHy backed down ufu
in Iran in the spfr
t
b
bases in the TurkiSh
S
&
up in the purges of
Germany became too gr
and the Korean *L
great caution after prord
What all of this suggesf, t
b had no timetable for d
ideology stands for
this combination of aqr
would have happened H
partial responsibility f
ofr
has argued, that
respc
They [presumably the West] certainly hardened their line against us, but we had to
soliOaG our conquests. We made our own socialist Germany out of our part of
many, and restored order in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, andYugoslavia,
the situations were fluid. To squeeze out capitalist order. This was the cold war.
Yhere Western resistm
attempt to replicate ' - t
Authority extended oot
whose officials had becr
..of course,,, Molotov added, "you had to know when to stop. I believe in
respect Stalin kept well within the limits."
countries through tb
intellectuals, even f
But,
The Origins of the
Vnk of
n resembled
Iy--even, n
Ies consi
lengths to
nrch a way
Pn study
r
d
n. His nri
f the old mi
rinate all of
n internati
evolutionIism could
the
ile applied
rhad
beea
ad
the
ology also
941- to
who or what was it, though,
that
set the limits?
he thought it necessary to
dominate?
luatries
:rsisrance
i
;;il ffi;::i?,"i::::i111:: Y1s
mJdexpans,,,;"*:.,",fiHT::#;[T!fi
ffi
;:Jlil?;:.:1"1"i,#".
uauu,"",
.i'r"a
res also
its altix
rtte L
rr;;;j;;,#:fi"nffi,:?
.,[iior
;; *r;;ilj]u"#Ji,_n,,."n
;1.,:,":::fi:,:*"r,1":-ry
; ffi ;;& #,ff;#,7#;iff#";;3
irt of the Soviet srate. x:1":.:.1
ffiiH"::,]*"lT
onty mititary,*;;il;r;;"il;;:?#;:x;11T,t;,,1;
Sovier Union itself.
j""r'"causehehimselrdidnotknow-or
rolv orenarerr rn crnn ,- _?:lT:,":ces,
rpr d
drrie.
lrr
f,E-
this process would take place.
He was
j:3"._"1*,,:1*""r,o_tr,"il;,,1i,5fi ;,T,X;:
ng ro challenge the Americans
#r,"T:il:.":",i:.r^:
or
hi,"r";;;;iri";;J;i:r"#.:H:X;:*:
,;;;;,Iu,'uo*,",",ce to the famous
_*f;"?,:.j:1jf:l"jr"d
1e44
nrases" asreemenr confirming
B.itiil"";";ty ,I'[#J""Tffi:jiii
,r,"f ,r,""u,i*o srares and c,eat
t Erttau
EId :,#",;:T1f::lili:"ITr,g.
dritain
neyer alrow their rines of commirrrcation
i, the Mediterranean
iitr,
#:X
ions 1,r?:,T1,0:#,.
:j-": or
::l*:F
in Iran in the spring
Da6,
a,gr o _american
to u" u.otenl
obj ecti ons
'.ilffi,'ffiff.,lxx
to hi s
;;;;u,." rolrowed"ii"Tffi:[,x:
by retreat had
ri :ffi
up in the
ll":i:*:y.il:*:Jn,,
lil,":stuitn;rffi;;#;'J"7,.#1*x1
purges of rhe 1930s, ,r,i.r,
*i"*, ",Jli',"*ra reappear with the Berlin
ade and the Korean War,
fffrilr,ff":T:^j:".j:"1:,
borh ,itrutton,
t, ffi;;""il;r"iffirrff *:lli;
r'aiv'
rin- h
rrrw i
qt.!s.
dsbi
il
*
nH
bring abour its reunifica_
his:1"":*:"i:li:ia':;;;;;;i#o.ro,"uor,tion,butheexpected
comments to the Germans
Lof ril
I
;;;; the Soviel
b{Fie#
;"rh;;;;tualry
y:#,":-,ffi
to result-as
cnter thc
in wmlti
",,,,"
. -*,H,T;#H. ?iJli,,?!XLl}t,ll
or ir was denying thar he had
[:":,il:T::,r".Ji::,::lT1y
so: that counrry would be
ever
temporarily divided, n" ffiiJ#;;:1",::::lffil
in June 7945' andthev themserr"r
b,t
?#,:il':.n1",'.'s:iffi l*:l11i
Ifoscoc-r
1[g 31 rhr
1#:,,,1,"J?:*iT"".:Hffij
wai' at
g,.l":l.iill?*:T:3/
b the
ttis he
seems
Did Starin have a fixed rist
of
he prepared to stop in
the race
.as much tess ,"
:rorders could ensure us
a supelpower role.,,
it
229
stalin had been verv precise
about where he wanted Soviet
boundaries changed;
f*
M;r;;;;;"rni"r" of influence was ro extend.
"i l:y
;*,"oin" periphery or the USSR, bur He
fticd to specirv ho."
:",,.,.*;
he
-u,v wourd have
h
I similar
tte
CotdWar
Rhat
;T:ffii:i
a, of :,l,
3i::"Hi: : l'. f "
this:T:
sussesrs..tho"ugh.
can spo se
-n g A
:l ;ili;"&,r;ff;,HffiifffiX.
r
m
e
ri
re
n
"r,,
,T.51"1",:::T:i::"::::"*"il;:ri","i""*o",rectiveryconnrmedthis:
ideology stands for offe
j",!**ruxl"l,fl,'#:;tr1fJ;,ffi
#i
!r *'outd
.Tff i*ji1,:::-11'rl
have happened had the west
trieJco;;;;#;"r#1;:f;::X1#iffl
tars partial responsibility to:,.1"
coming of ttre cold war, the
;ir;;,
r*_i,iti, r"iiure to do just that.
Blere Sl"*,T1,:sponsibiliry
westem resistance
T;::
was unlikely,
vojtech
,,,"riJ.l"#;::,i",in
would in
",
side
the
:n.]Tilfl
S ovi et
Authority
:.::",::*1,:,T.
l:r,-t
le
extended
T r-'- n g,""* ul r"#ffiH:rffi:.r,ff :il,:l
_.l
rrao. arreaay estabri shed
in
ro, tr,"i, oi,"o,"n"",
LtffiI#?l::,i:.0,i:j:T:t"a
s throu gh tn" ,"u, ug"-"nt
ffi #;",";
tes e c ountrie
,nons, inrenecruars, even family-"reruu.rriipr.
then down within each
::H""H
X.l#H i:l
il;;#ilffi;#lfiio,,"
*o
23O
Major problems in Americdn Foreign Relations
private spheres that exists in most
societies disappeared as all aspects
of rife
ro, the interests of the soviet union
as
Srarin
self had determined them. Those
who could not or would not go along
encou
rerror, anJurtimatery even purges,
show
ion,
l*':T,1:^n-:e*1c;:,f
and
executions that his 11,i1idi
real and imagined
ing the 1930s. "starin's understandiig
of friendship with other countrie, ,u,
,rJ
Soviet Union would lead and they r"Juta
rolor," Khrushchev.""urr"a.-,.rI"r
of the people th"re in ,r," ,"_" ,,v
wa! tr,ut
utdL r,"
tt'
the Soviet Union. He had:"emies
one demand:
l_r+,ho
were subjected to it. Wit
Central Europe, groups long
d
3::l:,:*:-1lTi.:rb**ared
t
;";;r* ;-;;;;;ffiffi"'rhrougt
l|; ::::,:,:i:1,:i:T
e
ti_eht controls; that he
anticip
eous support. Why did
rr" pu
with which ne maintatned it, and in the os
"o"."io,
anti-imperial justifications
he put forward in support of it. It is
a testimony rJ
abte to achieve so many of his imperialr
rrperti
if,*,","t#j1._rj11l]1,1?1,,1*n:,yur
bitions at a time when the tid-es of history
were running against the idea of im
in r ondon, pu.i,, Lisuin, u,a rr," HuguJ
fi nding out-and
"T,"."_.1.^T1,:*ces
when tris own country
hisrory.
that Statin wis able to n*p'onano ro
l1l,I,:_':::::l:":.d."d
1"a
when
others were contracting andJr,9
while the Soviet Union was as weak as it
quires explanation. Why did opposition
to this process, within and outside.
take so long to develop?
one reason was that the colossar sacrifices
the soviet Union had made
the war against the Axis.had, in effect, ..pu.ifi"a,,
its reputation: the USSR
leader had "earned" the right-to throw
th#,.igrr, around, or so it seemed. wr
governments found it difficurt to
switch quickry from viewing tt. sori"t
uor
a glorious wartime ally to portraying
it u, u r".'
his futurl Secretury or"ra
Stare Dean Acheson_r
:: TuTulinand
of them sympathetic
the slightert to
or the ooubt weriinto the early posrwar
era. A sir
:i:_::r,::.yl]:1,,T
9,"Trit
pattern
developed within
the united states occupation zone in
Germany,
General Lucius D. Ctay worked out
a cooperative retationship with
his Soviet
terparts and resisted demands to "get
tough" with the Russians,
urr".
become commonplace in Washingion.
"r",
Resistance to Stalin,s imperialism also
developed slowly because
at rherime had such widespread
upp"uf.
It is difficutt now to re
3":r,:l revolutionaries ourside
admiration
ttre soviei uni.;
it well. .,[Communism] was the mosr rational
and most inroxica
all-embracing ideorogy for me and for
those in my disunited and desperate
ranJ
or sravery anJ backward;,
o
;:"];:'fX,t^:
1Y^1,?Y"",turies
itself," Djilas recalled, in a comment thar
*rtd
,.third
t-o be calted the
world; e"""rr"
,",ri""r*,
had overcome one empire and had
made a
of condemning ott
il
"ur"",
who were struggling
".r,
to overthrow British, French,
or Portugues" .oronrurirm,;
he prr
the communists would win
d
One has the impression that
Stalir
::_:Y:::lll"nll.:f
*:IT:::l
*ll^T:l
; ;;;;il;;ffi
only gradually. The Kremlin
;":;"r#T::
Ol^g"i?rrr;ffi;
"o-m,irir;_;^"#;fiH:Fff
i;;;;d;ffiffi;i,i[
ume seeing to
predominance was such
thar irt
:an recoverv. Its ideology
commlr
*'hen he arrived on the
Contineu
ul1l"1i,
s rs_no rably trre yugoslavs_s
aw this much ea
ff
"orn1yni
buti,:].::j
even to most of them
it had not U"", uppu."nt at the end of the
war.
explanation for rhe initial lack of resisrance
to Soviet
,^_ L,]rr.lro^rher
ons. The Versailles Treaty
feU
h;;;;;;;;;""d",ir**
;"
*",
;;;;;""?;ffi.ffi;:TJ#1il;lTJri#
i;;"ffi;;##;::,r:
r:
u1g an empire were in place
lo
of its leaders to do so. Even
tL
rrate,_something that could
never q
fbe United States had been poiscd
L hs military forces played
a decisir
;;;;;rru,,
3T"*:*:j:lf:tl:
it that his allies in
ires. With the Unired Sarcs.
ir
:,ii:r:9",
lYL:]-:t:
iry
administrative incompetence
n has poinred out that .{dl
,ru"roi;il;i
*rriJ
a
many branches of the gigatrd
." But it is also possible,
at lea
"ur"rr,"
then, was one of imperial
expansion and consolidation
,-_ from
il1ri,:.Olicy,
ing
that of earlier empires onry in the determination
with
who
remembered the 1930s.
ro exposure once again
to inten
and bust. Nor did Moscow
e League of Nations followed
t-or an international order
thu,
u
rl
closdr
** a
le of theAmerican constitutim
seemed receptive to an
expansioo o
lmericans themselves, however.
tu
p
b
;hrp in the League reflected
the
peace-keeping responsibilities-
egriculrural groups traU ln
seekng o,
aost Americans saw few benefiJo
t
The Origins of the
Ets of hf.
in as Sr:lm
bng
e
p
ColdWar
231
rr- ri'ho were subjected to it.
with regimes on the left taking power in
Eastern
deniei advancement could now expect
it. For
::H:"1":::f:S:;.1:Tg
ti:'r who remembered the 1930i autarchyrviila Soviet ur"r""rrj'rlH
iL[?:
Ilges- sho\r
po€ thrcuet
lries ua-i rtrr
.ote ro exposure once again
to international capitalism, with
its periodic cycles of
and bust. Nor did Moscow impose
harsh controls everywhere at the
same time.
Ia-:le administrative
tr:qr
it
lod -[He]
m::rianhaspointeJJi,"tT'::,:;,ili1:ll*11HTTHJ::ffi
ray thar hE
gigantic stainist state in nurt",o
eu.ope were enor_
:::: f:ll_i:T:1"::1,,1,"
*L!'
Bur it is also possible, ai reast in
some u.."^;;1it;ilr1il1""HilJ,";
f
testrmonr
tr
his imperrd
ridea of
Ite Hagrr
of the rncc
rydhr:
no serious
;.:,*,
: ::T:I;,*:1.1;,
supporr. Why didfl-,,_"ip*"g
"h,l;;;-;;o* i",nur. "u"n
he promise free
-r'jneous
hu:ht the communists would win them.
')ne has the impression that statin and the Eastem
Europeans got to know one
Kremtin leader was stow to recognize
::t.,",::r.t:i:T],Irhar Soviet au_
ln"
:' would not be welcomed-everywhere
beyond Soviet borders; but as
he did
more. derennined to impose it
;::*::"".1:::T:-1r."e
.':r Europeans
were slow to recognize rro.,,
"*.yrr,",". 1,.
election;;;,ilh;#il;iff:
j
"*n"irir;"*";;'#'i,rt*n
only by withhofdin;,"r,
to
establishitselr by means other than relc10n.
:::$::::::1v^-."":]I".T:ds
coercion.
:'s efflorts to consolidate his empire thererore
made it at once more repressive
"""1,_:r,:* vision of postwar Europe ,u,
I :e
,;;rr##:;ii:#l:
nd made
d
:::H5:#::xnilo
other grear empire rhar esrabtish"a
ttseriin trri;;#w;fi
sccfiErl.
- :-tred States,
Soviet L
r:e
dr-enan
s tended ro
lera- -{
and this too gave Stalin grounds for
concern.
flust point worth noting,
,t
I*liji,::,:5:r,rwersal
emnire-preceded by some years
rhe
fi':::tri:l;:
ul.loT" and then"orditi;;;';ffi#
defeat Nazi c"._*v,.rr,l"
*::"""":L':1lii:tXr
,n"
: ::me seeing to it that his
anies in thar
5_1s
enterprise did not thwafilis i;;g_tem
",
it was the other way around: the conditions
ons tor
tbr
:.]r?"W"i;h^3:,-r^1,:O
:L:shing
an empire were in place 10ng
trlns€ l
to recaptG
nq befcre
g":, goi:ea r",;r;;'Lsemony
*iii:1.::::::"n:l
played a decisive
Ij:. Tl,l*r.forces
-r" t, i.i,gr",g;;'i
':crrc predominance was such
6tm
D b1'pa-<s
rursb(xr
ir
Freoch.
Sorg
b much
rtr.
rrcl e
liarelr
u"t*. in"..
was any clear intention on
rh"
uulred
- "- *u,r"n,,"
i:rate,: something that could
u,
--rtrp,ual
: ; never
:.1 quite thev
1e
be taken for granted.
;:,: l:'jni3,i',
f
j
t-
:l'l
il;
;,pp;;i
at rhe end or worrd
"ffiff;"";:ffil:
that it courd control both the
manner and the rate of
Its ideology commanded enofinous
respect, as Woodrow Wilson
rhen he arrived on the Continenr
late i, lSf g; a series of rapturous
public
r-rDS.
versqiltao .ru^d+-. r^rr ^- I
='irr,S. The Versailles Treaty fell well
,torroi#lfrl^;r
rrrr"*rir,i:tJJ:::
o',ign, p..;,di;-;; ;^;;icit legar
X*Xs;:# ),T::n::'"Y11.:'-Yt ll' o*n
dr"r;,;;;;ffiffi;
.r?:#
itr"t
rtn"r" was ever apoint ar "*,
which the
"'nstiturion
:3:"":i:Tli:.1:1,
; semed
s : rr an intemational order
that was to have
dks
19 as
Srates,
)an recovery.
peaae Lod
"i".ging
ffi};ffi:?
ti"e-".i"u, empire to its soviet
"n
in the "orip*i,g
sequence"of events. Sralin,s determinarion
to
-Errnao\his Sorier
:o after tbn
der:
a
u'.th"y did come to see this they became
alr rhe
::::3Y:":::j""^'::.i:
letermined to resisr ir, T,toT
even if
rak a-r ir
lqtside
USSR
..T,",,i;
.
nlidatioo
ict he
in the
he
ffi
receptive to an expansion of United
States influence, this was it.
Laericans themselves, t
,"r:.1:, r-eceprive. The Senate,s rejection of
ns^hin
rhe League
r ""^,,^ reflected
;tup in the
"^j:y_:i-11
the public's
dirtin";i;"k;;;ffi;#;"*l":l
g-rcultural
,Ti::,[:::l:1"".1::l1,iles.
groups had in seeking
Despite the interests certain business,labor,
or".r"u, _u.t"r,
"rd;;;;;;;'*;;lffil
:'rst Americans saw few benefits
to be derived trom integrating their
economy
232
Major Problems in American Foreign Relations
with that of the rest of the world. Efforts to rehabilitate Europe during the
therefore, could only take the form ofprivate initiatives, quietly coordinated
.
R
government. Protective tariffs hung on well into the 1930s-having acrueh
creased with the onset of the Great Depression-and exports as a percentage ;r
national product remained 1ow in comparison to other nations, averaging on1.. :
cent between 192L and 1940. Investments abroad had doubled between li.
1919 while foreign investment in the United States had been cut in halfr but
was hardly sufficient to overcome old instincts within the majority of the pu:r
held no investments at all that it was better to stand apart from, rather than rc
to dominate, international politics outside of the Western hemisphere.
This isolationist consensus broke down only as Americans began rt
that a potentially hostile power was once again threatening Europe: even th:r
hemisphere, it appeared, might not escape the consequences this time arour:
ter september 1939, the Roosevelt administration moved as quickly as pub-r,:
Congressional opinion would allow to aid Great Britain and France by mea:,
of war; it also chose to challenge the Japanese over their occupation of chlater French Indochina, thereby setting in motion a sequence of events tha:
lead to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Historians ever since have puzzled or=
why, after two decades of relative inactivity on the world scene, did the
States suddenly become hyperactive? Might the administration have realiz=
would never generate public support for the empire American elites had ,.
sired without a clear and present danger to national security, and did ii ::c
proceed to generate one? Can one not understand the origins and evolutic:
Cold War in similar terms?
There are several problems with such interpretations, one of which is rlr
confuse contingency with conspiracy. Even if Roosevelt had hoped to manelr
Japanese into "firing the first shot," he could not have known that Hitler wou.:
this opportunity to declare war and thereby make possible American militarl.
vention in Europe. The Pacific, where the United States would have deplor e:
of its strength in the absence of Hitler's declaration, would hardty have t*e=
platform from which to mount a bid for global hegemony. These explanatio:i
allow little room for the autonomy of others: they assume that Hitler and th< .i
nese militarists acted only in response to what the lJnited States did, and tha: :
possible motives for their behavior-personal, bureaucratic, cultural, ideolr
geopd)ticd-were instgnificant. F)nd)y, these arguments fail to meet the rproximate versus distant causation. The historian Marc Bloch once pointed ou:
one could, in principle, account for a climber's fall from a precipice by inrt
physics and geology: had it not been for the law ofgravity and the existence r.:
mountain, the accidents surely could not have occurred. But would it follow th,z
who ascend mountains must plummet from them? Just because Roosevelt r.,:
the United States to enter the war and to become a world power afterwards doe.
mean that his actions made these things happen.
A better explanation for the collapse ofisolationism is a simpler one: it L
do with a resurgence of authoritarianism. Americans had begun to suspect. ;:r
the nineteenth century, that the internal behavior of states determined their e.r:
behavior; certainly it is easy to see how the actions of Germany, Italy, and -r
during the 1930s could have caused this view to surface once again, much a: :-
-!
E
n'
i
E
IIi
EI
t,;0
luE
The origins of the Cold
War
233
I. Once
:elations with tsarist Russia and imperial Germany during world war
.:happened,theAmericans,notgiventomakingsubtledistinctions,begantoop.3 authoritarianism everywhere, and that could account for their sudden willing-
+- i
__
-
.. to take on several authoritarians at once irt 1941 . But that interpretation, too, is
:ntirely adequate. It fails to explain how the United States could have coexisted
past-especially inLatin
-cmforiably as it did with authoritarianism in the
:rica-and as it would continue to do for some time to come' It certainly does
1,
-
5u
----
embrace, as an ally, the
:r-CoU[t for the American willingness during the war to
_-
:iest authoritarian of this century, Stalin himself'
and the rise of the AmeriThe best explanation for the decline of isolationism
tended to makeAmericans
a
distinction
with
do
, empire, I suspect, has to
'-.rps they were more subtle than one might think-between what we might
of Somoza in
benign-and malignant authoritarianism' Regimes like those
but they fell
unsavory,
be
might
Republic
.:ragui or Trujillo in the Dominican
_-l-
rhebenigncategorybecausetheyposednoseriousthreattoUnitedStatesin.
Ger:.is afld in some cases even promoted them. Regimes like those of Nazi
- .randimperialJapan,becauseoftheirmilitarycapabilities'werequiteanother
to that of
. :er. Stalin's authoritarianism had appeared malignant when linked
it could
Hitler,
against
directed
when
1941;but
:r. as it was between 1939 and
debeen
had
Germany
once
like
look
it
would
-:3 to appear quite benign. What
_:p-_i-
:
L.
-
-
',,-
- :d remained to be seen.
\\,ith all this, the possibility that even malignant authoritarianism might harm
' Jnited States remained hypothetical until 7 December 1941, when it suddenly
.:IIe Yef} real. America,,s are onty now, after more than half a century, getting
.: the shock: they became so accustomed to a Pearl Harbor mentality-to the
'.thattherereallyaredeadlyenemiesoutthere-thattheyfinditaStrangenew
-.d.insteadofanoldfamiliarone,nowthattherearenot.PearlHarborwas,
.,. the defining event for the American empire, because it was only at this point
becoming and
rhe most plausible potential justification for the United States
enconcerned-an
were
people
:.ining a giobal power as far as the American
right
thrived
had
Isolationism
one.
;ereJnational security-became an actual
-.
leave the
this moment; but once it became apparent that isolationism could
.]nopentomilitaryattack,itsufferedablowfromwhichitneverrecovered.
. -'ritical date was not 1945, or 1941 , but 1941'
inherit the
It did not automatically follow, though, that the Soviet Union would
of vulner,.first
A
sense
defeated.
been
had
enemy" once Germany and Japan
. .rf
. .rY preceded the identification of a source of threat in the thinking of American
bombers' the prospect of
-,:girts: innovations in military technology-long-range
pearl
Harbors before it had
future
of
.:. ionger_range missiles_created visions
in the military nor the
Neither
come.
_ rme clear from where such an attack might
the war was there
during
.:ical-economic planning that went on in washington
The threat, rather,
adYersafy.
future
:istent concern with the uSsR as a potential
likely candimost
the
. -:ared
it,
and
cause
to arise from war itself, whoever might
3: were thought to be resurgent enemies from World War
The prefened solution
*u,
II'
to maintain preponderant power for the United
'.:s,whichmeantasubstantialpeacetimemilitaryestablishmentandastringof
.:s around the world from which to resist aggression if it should ever occur' But
234
Major Problems in American Foreign Relations
equally important, a revived international community would seek to remove the
fundamental causes of war through the United Nations, a less ambitious version of
Wilson's League, and through new economic instituti.ons like the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, whose task it would be to prevent anoth€r
global depression and thereby ensure prosperity. The Americans and the British
assumed that the Soviet Union would want to participate in these multilateral
efforts to achieve military and economic security. The Cold War developed when ir
became clear that Stalin either could not or would not accept this framework.
Did the Americans attempt to impose their vision of the postwar world upon th
USSR? No doubt it looked that way from Moscow: both the Roosevelt and Truma
administrations stressed political self-determination and economic integratin
with sufficient persistence to arouse Stalin's suspicions-easily aroused, in ary
event-as to their ultimate intentions. But what the Soviet leader saw as a chal'
lenge to his hegemony the Americans meant as an effort to salvage multilateralisn
At no point prior to L941 did the United States and its Western European alli6;
abandon the hope that the Russians might eventually come around; and indeel
negotiations aimed at bringing them around would continue at the foreign minis.
ters' level, without much hope of success, through the end of that year. The American attitude was less that of expecting to impose a system than one of puzzlemol
as to why its merits were not universally self-evident. It differed significantly,
therefore, from Stalin's point of view, which allowed for the possibility that soci*
ists in other countries might come to see the advantages of Marxism-Leninism I
practiced in the Soviet Union, but never capitalists. They were there, in the end- r
be overthrown, not convinced.
The emergence of an opposing great power bloc posed serious difficulties
the principle of multilateralism, based as it had been on the expectation of cooper>
tion with Moscow. But with a good deal of ingenuity the Americans managed
merge their original vision of a single intemational order built around corlmon socurity with a second and more hastily improvised concept that sought to counter
expanding power and influence of the Soviet Union. That concept was, of
containment, and its chief instrument was the Marshall Plan.
The idea of containment proceeded from the proposition that if there was not
be one world, then there must not be another world war either. It would be
to keep the peace while preserving the balance of power: the gap that had
during the 1930s between the perceived requirements of peace and power was nor
happen again. If geopolitical stability could be restored in Europe, time would
against the Soviet Union and in favor of the Western democracies.
need not be the "wave of the future"; sooner or later even Kremlin authoritari
would realize this fact and change their policies. "[T]he Soviet leaders are
to recognize situations, if not arguments," George F. Kennan wrote in 1948.
therefore, situations can be created in which it is clearly not to the advantage of
power to emphasize the elements of conflict in their relations with the
world, then their actions, and even the tenor of their propaganda to their own
canbe modified."
This idea of time being on the side of the West came-at least as far as
was concerned-from studying the history of empires. Edward Gibbon had
rn The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that "there is nothing more
!D narure
than the anem
f:unan ever read made
:irJed during the earlv
d
u :he months after the s.
,E to construct in EasEr
fu Soviet Unionhad oh:
indr because of the resisrz
ccions and because of
tb
u rhe rest of the world- _
&. bears within it the sc
sr all Cold War texts,
his a
\n let Conduct.,' He artrte
_ .{il of this would do t
xtret presence in their m
hed. The dangerhere ca
al occupy the rest of the r
rrl exhausted inhabitans
r
llr \Ioscow's bidding. The
rr
rus
and economic aid
to G
Marshall ptan_took
I
nrangible reassurance
as Er
leppen in order for intimi&
= r+..
the efforr. bur, equal
Fil'ent
such acquiescence
ir
mmidated. The initiatir.es,
Some historians have
a
- economic
'fr"r
recovery oo t
FaDS themselves were net
them out to be. Other:
n -{merican economy thal c
emns- lacked the dollars
ro
r:de
I
fre Marshall plan was
the n
Ir erseas the mutually_benefi
lcnt
they had worked out
at
scdel for the rest of the
*r
!!own out of American corpo
r minimum they have forced
-T",
social, and historical
c
..npire had its
own distinctirr
Esnse to the Soviet exterual
c
rhe same time, thougfr
_ ,I have developed_with
conld
t
ro contain. One need
1{|urg
uf European demoralization-
r
r
haa existed;
T_d"Tr"l:e
ls
the critical difference.
ofcoun
Dosphere of vulnerability
Arrr