LAND 400

Transcription

LAND 400

Uncontrolled if Printed
Current Version as at 1 December 2011
UNCLASSIFIED
LAND 400
LAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
PROJECT DESTRIER
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DOCUMENTATION AND APPROVALS
Document Location
The master soft copy of this document is held in the following location:
Original paper copy is held on file by:
Revision History
Revision Date
30 Mar 11
1.9
Jun 11
Nov 11
2.0
3.0 UNRESTRICTED
Date of this revision:
Version
Date of Next revision:
Endorsement
This document was endorsed by:
J.G. CALIGARI
Major General
Head Military Strategic Planning - Army
Nov 11
POC: COL A.R. Meacham
DDG CAFS / Director Land 400
R1-03-B143
PO Box 7901
CANBERRA ACT 2600
0419219523
[email protected]
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Summary of Changes
Initial working draft for
consideration by ACMC
Draft Restricted version
Modified for public release
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Documentation And Approvals ......................................................................... 2
Table Of Contents ............................................................................................... 3
Glossary ................................................................................................................ 4
Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 8
References: ......................................................................................................... 10
Introduction ....................................................................................................... 10
Situation ............................................................................................................. 11
Strategic Guidance ............................................................................................ 11
Operational Guidance ....................................................................................... 12
Land 400 Guidance ........................................................................................... 14
AOF Operating Context ................................................................................... 14
Land 400 Capability Context ........................................................................... 18
Land 400 Description ........................................................................................ 18
Operational Construct ...................................................................................... 22
Lcvs Operational Use Overview....................................................................... 22
Mission ................................................................................................................ 23
Intent ................................................................................................................... 23
Scheme Of Manoeuvre ...................................................................................... 23
Supporting Battlespace Operating System (BOS) Concepts ........................ 27
Other Supporting Concepts.............................................................................. 28
Annexes: ............................................................................................................. 29
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GLOSSARY
Battlegroup
A combined arms grouping based on a manoeuvre unit
headquarters
Battlespace
The area of influence and the area of interest. It includes
the traditional domains of land, air and sea, space, the
electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. Note: Also
embraces the social, political and temporal contexts in
which conflict is waged.
Battlespace Operating System
Battlespace operating systems represent the combination
of personnel, collective training, major systems,
supplies, facilities and command and control, organised,
supported and employed to perform a designated
function as part of a whole.
Combined Arms Fighting System
The Combined Arms Fighting System (CAFS) includes
those force elements, systems and platforms, that are
necessary to work together to realise Australia’s Task
Organisation principles. CAFS will deliver integrated
combined arms teams (CAT) capable of conducting
Close Combat and of enabling Joint Land Combat by
2030. The CAFS Project Management Steering
Group is the authority that guides this realisation of
combined arms and CAFS.
Cavalry
Cavalry is a multi-role combat capability that combines
integral firepower, mobility, protection and network
communications to achieve effects on the battlefield.
Cavalry fights as an integral element of a combined
arms team.
Close Combat – Dismounted
Combat carried out with direct fire weapons, against
identifiable individuals, supported by indirect fire, airdelivered fires and non-lethal engagement means by
soldiers on foot
Close Combat – Mounted
Combat carried out with direct fire weapons, against
identifiable individuals, supported by indirect fire, airdelivered fires and non-lethal engagement means
(doctrine) by soldiers mounted in mobility platforms
during the assault and subsequently dismounted at a
specified point from the objective in order to fight.
Close Combat, High Survivable lift The capacity to manoeuvre within the range of direct
fire weapons while operating in complex terrain that
includes complicated obstacles and ambush weapons
systems.
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Close Combat Reconnaissance
The capacity to find and identify threat capabilities in
complex terrain while under direct and indirect fire.
Combat Team
A combined-arms grouping based upon a manoeuvre
sub-unit headquarters.
Combined Arms Team
A case-by-case mix of combat, combat support, combat
service support and command support elements selected
on the basis of a specific combination of task, terrain
and threat.
Common Operational Picture
A single identical display of relevant information shared
by more than one command. A common operational
picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all
echelons to achieve situational awareness.
Core Land Integration
Primary Systems (CLIPS)
An AOF concept derived and evolved from the BOS
approach but designed to reflect the core systems of an
army and the way they need to integrate.
Decisive Manoeuvre
The conduct of synchronised operations, using assets
from and within any or all environments, to defeat the
adversary by positioning in time and space the most
appropriate force to threaten or attack critical
vulnerabilities, thereby, unhinging the centre of gravity
and obtaining maximum leverage.
Intimate and Direct Fire Support
The capacity to effectively and precisely engage
adversary personnel, vehicle and fortifications with
integral direct fire weapon systems by day and night and
in extreme weather conditions; and
Land Vehicle Combat System
(LCVS)
The LCVS will provide the mounted close combat
capability within the Combined Arms Fighting System
(CAFS) . The LCVS will be able to be employed across
the full spectrum of conflict in all environments up to
and including close combat as part of the combined
arms team (CAT). LCVS will be capable of integration
with legacy and new equipments in order to contribute
to the overall commanders’ situational awareness and
combat power as part of a networked capability. LCVS
will be characterised by precision lethality, land combat
survivability, situational awareness and combat
capability integration to deliver a system that enables the
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successful conduct of sustained close combat against
emerging and future threats.
LCVS Operational Tasks
The LCVS operational tasks are those functional tasks
that are required to execute close combat operations.
Each of these tasks has a discreet set of characteristics
and requirements. LCVS vehicles/platforms will be
development to perform either an individual task or a
collection of tasks. The aggregation of tasks that an
LCVS vehicle/platform may be required to perform is
largely guided by the commonality of characteristics.
Further definition can be found at annex B.
Littoral
That area defined by the close proximity of the land,
sea and air, where the operational effects of land, sea
and aerospace power would overlap. It encompasses
areas on land that can be influenced by JTF elements
operating at or from the sea and those areas of sea that
can be influenced by JTF elements operating on or from
the land. The distances involved will be determined by
technology, but the littoral currently spans 200
kilometres offshore to 200 kilometres inland.
Mobility – Tactical
A quality or capability of military forces which permits
them to move from place to place while retaining the
ability to fulfil their primary mission.
Military Of The Self (MOTS)
Military Off The Shelf equipment is equipment that is
already established in-service with the armed force of
another country or Australia; is sourced from an
established production facility (not just a Military Off
The Shelf design); and has at most minor modifications
to deliver interoperability with existing ADF
and/or allied assets.
Reconnaissance – Dismounted
An enabling activity undertaken to obtain, by visual
observation or other detection methods, information
about the activities and resources of an enemy or
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area by a soldier on foot.
Reconnaissance – Mounted
An enabling activity undertaken to obtain, by visual
observation or other detection methods, information
about the activities and resources of an enemy or
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic
characteristics of a particular area by soldiers mounted
in mobility platforms.
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Survivability
All aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and
supplies, including frequent movement, while
simultaneously deceiving the enemy.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.
The Land 400 Land Combat Vehicle System (LCVS) will be acquired to fulfil an
identified strategic capability need for a mounted close combat system for future warfighting.
The broad capability need, IAW strategic guidance, is set out in the User Requirement.
Fidelity in the user requirements for the LCVS will be developed as this Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) is tested through wargaming and experimentation of the planned
future mounted close combat system and increased definition of the enabling capability
solutions.
2.
The conceptual way in which the LCVS will be operated is set out under the Adaptive
Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC) and other core concepts. The
LCVS CONOPS is responsive to the specific sub-concepts of joint land combat as part of the
future mounted close combat system of Army Objective Force (AOF) 2030.
3.
The LCVS will be required to operate across the full spectrum of threats and
environments which may be encountered by the AOF. This will include hybrid enemy
capabilities. The LCVS will be capable of defeating comparable enemy combat systems. The
AOF operating context necessitates a combat force capable of amphibious and expeditionary
operations. The LCVS must be capable of being projected for sustained operations against an
adaptive enemy in complex terrain.
The LCVS will be part of the wider Combined Arms Fighting System (CAFS), which
4.
will include legacy, parallel and future capabilities. These will include: the M1A1 Main
Battle Tank; Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter; the communications and battle management
systems; Land 121 Field Vehicles, Modules and Trailers; the Land 125 soldier combat
system, offensive fire support systems; and ADF strategic and tactical lift assets. CAFS will
deliver integration of legacy and new equipments. The LCVS will allow the close combat
force elements to develop clear situational awareness of the battlespace by drawing from, and
connecting with, the future CAFS network architecture. The close combat force elements will
be able to use the sensors and systems of the LCVS to target enemy personnel, platforms,
weapon systems and installations with either the integral weaponry or by real time integration
with other offensive fire support (sea, land and air based weapon systems). The LCVS may
operate with both manned and unmanned sensor systems that can be deployed to extend the
knowledge and strike range of the Combined Arms Team.
Land 400 is to equip the mounted close combat force and those CS and CSS assets
5.
that are required to provide direct support within the close combat zone. The size and
structure of these force elements will be determined by Army under the AOF and Army
Funded Force (AFF). LCVS will be introduced into service during the period from 2025,
spanning the current AFF and AOF planning periods. IAW PLAN BEERSHEBA the LCVS
will equip designated manoeuvre forces and be used in the functional tasks of close combat
reconnaissance, intimate and direct fire support in combined arms offensive and defensive
operations and close combat high survivable lift. Land 400 will also include the required
Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) land mobility platforms for close
combat that will close the gap with legacy and parallel capabilities. These in addition to
rotary wing assets will support the required close combat CS and CSS tasks in the direct fire
zone, whilst seeking the greatest commonality and interoperability to make sustainment,
transportability and support practical and affordable.
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6.
The LCVS will enable the combat functions and battlespace effects through the
system components, and will be characterised by precision lethality, survivability, integration
and sustainability to enable an effective combined arms close combat capability. Specific
characteristics for LCVS components will be defined as the User Requirement is further
developed. The LCVS will be able to be flexibly configured based on threat, environment
and mission profile.
7.
The Scheme of Manoeuvre sets out specific examples of how an AFF/AOF combat
force might be organised when equipped with the LCVS. This is supported by Annexes
containing mission profiles, scenarios and vignettes to further develop a framework for how
the future close fight utilising the LCVS may occur. The Battlespace Operating System
(BOS) and other concepts and operational risks are set out in support of the exemplar scheme
of manoeuvre and broader LCVS CONOPS. The development of this section of the
CONOPS is currently constrained by the parallel development of the future force under
PLAN BEERSHEBA and the AOF, which means that fundamental changes being considered
for force structures under the manoeuvre brigades are yet to be confirmed or supported by
doctrine.
8.
The desired Land 400 LCVS endstate will be a future professional, multi-purpose
combat force equipped with a LCVS integrated into the CAFS providing enhanced land
combat lethality, survivability, situational awareness, close combat mobility and combat
power in order to win the land battle over time.
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LAND 400 – LAND COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM (LCVS)
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
References:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Land 400 LCVS User Requirement dated 30 Mar 11
PLAN BEERSHEBA
The Army Objective Force 2030, 10 Nov 11
Australia’s Amphibious Concept, Version 5 dated 9 Mar 10
Adaptive Campaigning AFLOC-C
Defence White Paper, Force 2030
Army Simulation Plan, 10 Nov 11
INTRODUCTION
1.
The Land 400 LCVS will provide a mounted close combat system that enables an
effective close combat capability for the Army Funded Force (AFF) and the Army Objective
Force (AOF) combat system. The LCVS represents both a generational replacement of the
Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV), Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and
Armoured Personnel Carrier (M113) fleets; and filling the current mounted close combat
capability gap, for the future combat system. The LCVS is to be able to defeat developing
threat capabilities during future complex warfighting that cannot be defeated utilising current
vehicle variants. The LCVS will enhance existing capability, or remove current and future
close combat gaps, through the employment of precision lethality, survivability, integration,
mobility and sustainability.
This Concept of Operations (CONOPS) outlines strategic and operational guidance,
2.
operating contexts, system description, operational construct and the anticipated use and
necessary support of the LCVS as part of the future combined arms capability of the
Australian Army. The purpose of the CONOPS is to align the LCVS with future Army
planning, and define the way the LCVS will be used on future operations. The CONOPS will
also inform the LCVS capability acquisition process and inter-dependant capabilities.
3.
The LCVS will be an enabler for the future wider Combined Arms Fighting System
(CAFS). The CAFS is yet to be defined by Army, but is anticipated to be characterised by the
integration of legacy and new equipments in order to contribute to the overall commanders’
situational awareness and the flexible and precise application of combat power as part of a
networked capability.
4.
The LCVS will be acquired and introduced into service to meet the endorsed User
Requirement (Ref A), including the approved Basis of Provisioning (BOP). The LCVS will
be operated within the force structures established by PLAN BEERSHEBA and the AOF (Ref
B and C). These plans have been determined in response to strategic guidance, Adaptive
Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept (AC-FLOC), the environment, the emerging
threat and other key factors in the operating context. These References, in combination with
current and emerging concepts and doctrine, specify the way the Army will organise and fight
utilising the LCVS as part of the future combat system.
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SITUATION
STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
5.
Defence White Paper. The Defence White Paper 09, (DWP09) determined that
Australia needed a force that will meet the requirement for self-reliance for our direct defence
and our unique strategic interests, with a capacity to selectively do more in relation to our
wider strategic interests1. The DWP09 followed the force structure review which examined
plausible defence planning contingencies, the capabilities required for successful operations in
those contingencies, and the systems and equipment that would deliver the necessary
capabilities. The DWP09 specified the basis for pursuing the future development of the ADF
in a strategic manner to create the future force and remediate the most important gaps and
deficiencies in the current and projected force2. Part of the future development identified by
the DWP09 was the requirement for a new LCVS of approximately 1100 deployable
protected vehicles in response to the increasing complexity and lethality of land operations3.
6.
The DWP09 also specified a requirement for tailored operations avoiding high rates of
attrition and mass casualties among our forces. To achieve this, battle on unfavourable terms
is to be avoided, force is to be applied in a precise manner, in a way that the adversary is not
expecting, and overmatch at decisive points in battle is to be sought4. The DWP09 specified a
requirement for the Army to be able to combine its combat and combat support units to
generate 10 battalion-sized battlegroups (BG) tailored for a wide range of operations5.
7.
To guide the development of Force 2030, the Government identified a number of force
attributes and capability development principles relevant to the LCVS, which are described
below6:
a.
Precise Force Application. Achieve precise effects, especially in the
discriminate application of kinetic and non-kinetic force with enhanced precision
targeting and discrimination assisted by technologies, systems and processes.
b.
Networked Capability. Achieve information technology to link sensors,
weapons systems and commanders and their personnel in a networked
environment with common battlespace awareness and information superiority
over an adversary.
c.
Operational Flexibility. Achieve operational flexibility and multirole
employment in the ADF's systems, platforms and organisations. This might
involve achieving greater platform flexibility by way of inter-changeable modular
design and construction techniques.
d.
Fully Developed Capability. While mission-specific capability enhancements
will be applied where necessary, as a capability development principle the ADF
will acquire fully developed capabilities, which are fully deployable and effective
within readiness warning times.
1
DWP09, 8.4
Ibid, 8.2 – 8.3
3
Ibid, 9.38
4
Ibid, 7.5
5
Ibid, 9.3. Note, in the Australian context, a BG is defined as combined arms grouping based on a manoeuvre
unit headquarters. (LWD 3-0-2 Battlegroup Tactics, 1.1)
6
DWP09, 8.58
2
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e.
Capability Advantage. The ADF will acquire the most capable platforms and
systems we can afford within our policy settings, in order to offset the relatively
small size of our forces and give them a war-winning edge. Exploiting and
applying new advanced technologies will be crucial to achieve this.
f.
Survivable and Robust Capability. Achieve protection against the range of
existing and evolving threats including investments in lower signatures and stealth
for our capabilities and systems, force protection, countermeasures, protective
security and systems redundancy.
g.
Interoperable Capability. Sensible and cost-effective capabilities and systems
should be designed to be interoperable from conception.
h.
Cost-Effective Capability. Defence will continue to drive down the costs of
ownership of military capability. This will include greater use of simulation, a
more active role for ADF Reserves, smarter maintenance and leaner logistics
systems, improved information management and, where appropriate, a bias
towards military- and commercial-off-the shelf capabilities.
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE
AC-FLOC. AC-FLOC establishes the core land warfighting concept of ‘adaptive
8.
campaigning’ which comprises five mutually supporting and interdependent lines of operation
(LOO); joint land combat, population protection, information actions, population support, and
indigenous capacity-building. These LOO relate to the generic concepts considered during
the planning campaigns for war amongst the people and are prosecuted in a Whole of
Government (WoG) and joint framework, often as part of a coalition.
9.
The AOF 2030 is optimised for the LOO joint land combat, although it has the capacity
to contribute to each of the other LOO as required. This recognises that joint land combat is a
prerequisite for the conduct of the other LOO. Within the joint land combat LOO there are
six sub-concepts; distributed manoeuvre, dynamic sensor-shooter coupling, isolation of the
battlespace, dominant response, focused understanding and mission oriented force protection.
The LCVS CONOPS is responsive to these specific sub-concepts of joint land combat as part
of the future combat system of AOF 2030.
10.
Core Combat System Concepts. The AOF core combat system concepts are7:
a.
Combined Arms. The AOF will deal with a complex environment through the
employment of Combined Arms Teams (CAT)8. These are credible, professional
multi-purpose forces with flexible combat power. AOF elements need to foster
habitual relationships between the elements contributing to the CAT both within,
and external to, the manoeuvre brigades.
b.
Network Enabled Warfare. The use of networking to link all elements of the
AOF to enable automated information sharing to support situational awareness
and decision superiority. The system is supported by the right levels of human
AOF 2030 Handbook Version 2.0, 6.10 outlines the core concepts, sub-paras a – c(4)
DWP09, 8.20 states ‘…forces which are able to operate as combined-arms teams and undertake combat in our
littoral environment and territory, are necessary to secure offshore territories and facilities, defeat incursions onto
Australian territory and potentially deny adversaries access to staging bases from which they could attack us.
7
8
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cognition in order to operate during uncertainty and when network functionality is
degraded. This is envisaged to occur under CAFS9, supported by AOF force
structures. Better communications allow commanders to pass on decisions more
efficiently, enabling smaller, dispersed forces to operate to a disproportionately
greater effect. Increased connectivity underpins the ADF’s goal for networkcentric warfare. The dividend sought is highly responsive and tailored effects
within the framework of the commander's intent to facilitate network-enabled
operations10.
c.
Manoeuvre Warfare. The philosophy that underpins the way in which the
combat system will fight by destroying the enemy’s will to fight11. At the tactical
level, to shatter enemy physical cohesion, this will include:
(1)
Tactical Manoeuvre. The purpose of tactical manoeuvre is to destroy the
enemy's cohesion and cause their capitulation by the coordinated use of
speed, shock action and lethal force. It requires the integration of joint and
coalition force elements and the effects they generate with land force CAT.
Tactical manoeuvre will usually be conducted within the framework of
operational manoeuvre to position forces for decisive engagement. This is
done in order to reinforce the potential disruption or dislocation of the
enemy's centre of gravity (COG) achieved through operational manoeuvre12.
(2)
Littoral13 Manoeuvre. To achieve a disproportionate effect through the
employment of scalable, flexible and agile forces from over the horizon
directly to objectives inland. This will require all combat elements to
possess sufficient combat power to conduct immediate surface manoeuvre,
including riverine and estuarine operations.
(3)
Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM). STOM emphasises focus on the
projection of force by both surface and air means directly to the objective
from the sea, to dislocate the adversary in time and space. STOM balances
high impact with a smaller footprint and offers freedom of manoeuvre to
achieve surprise and maintain tempo. The commander is provided with
agility in timing and force application to sustain a range of concurrent tasks
and avoid an implied loss of tempo and initiative when establishing a
traditional beachhead. The Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment
(ADAS) STOM concept is for the insertion of two company groups by air in
two waves and concurrent insertion of another two company groups by
surface means in multiple waves. Embarked aviation offers quick, flexible
insertion and extraction of combat forces with air deployable fire support,
vehicles and logistics. Landing craft provide the capability to insert and
9
For CAFS definition see glossary
LWD 3-0 Operations, Para 27
11
LWD 3-0-3 Land Tactics, 1.13
12
LWD 3-0-1 Formation Tactics, 1.25
13
The littoral environment is defined as ‘ ..that area defined by the close proximity of the land,
sea and air, where the operational effects of land, sea and aerospace power would overlap. It encompasses areas
on land that can be influenced by JTF elements operating at or from the sea and those areas of sea that can be
influenced by JTF elements operating on or from the land. The distances involved will be determined by
technology, but the littoral currently spans 200 kilometres offshore to 200 kilometres inland. LWD 3-0-0
Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment, 1.18
10
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extract the heavy elements of the landing force14. STOM is characterised by
the speed and agility of air and surface manoeuvre to achieve surprise,
increase tempo and employ discrimination in target selection. The AOF
requires STOM capabilities that are both marine capable15 and air portable,
and that possess sufficient firepower and protection to enable an effective
‘first wave’ to secure its objectives. Combat elements involved in STOM
need to retain sufficient mobility and firepower to manoeuvre once
deployed.
(4)
Distributed Manoeuvre16. In order to achieve a persistent, pervasive and
proportionate presence in complex terrain, the AOF may need to employ
large numbers of small CAT in distributed manoeuvre. These CAT will
close with and destroy the enemy without presenting a targetable mass. The
AOF needs to generate modular, robust CAT capable of ‘burrowing’ into
complex terrain and conducting semi-independent operations17.
11. Other Core Warfighting Concepts. Joint Land Combat will encompass campaigns
planned under emerging operational concepts that will impact on operations undertaken
utilising the LCVS, including Decisive Manoeuvre18.
LAND 400 GUIDANCE
12. Australia’s Military Strategy includes operating across the full spectrum of threats in
complex terrain, both on land and within the littoral environment. The future LCVS must be
able of operating in the combined arms team as part of amphibious operations and be capable
of insertion by strategic sea and air lift assets. The LCVS is to be developed as an integrated
combat capable system and is to include the use of simulation. The LCVS BOP is to address
both preparedness and concurrency requirements. The BOP should enable the WP09
requirements and remain consistent with the 10 x BG design. This includes enabling
Command and Control (C2), Combat Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS) and
Raise, Train and Sustain (RTS) functions.
AOF OPERATING CONTEXT
13. The strategic guidance, together with AC-FLOC, the environment, technology, the
enemy, legacy capability, the human dimension, and joint and inter-agency partners shapes
the context of the AOF 203019. The AOF describes the way Army operates and thus should
provide the context against which all future land-focused capability development activities
can be conducted20. The operating context defined by AOF 2030 is outlined below:
14
ADDP 3-2 Amphibious Operations, 1.23
Army has specified that the LCVS was not to have the capability to swim (directed by DGDP-A at L400 IPT
meeting Oct 10 (date TBC)) but requires review in light of the development of this CONOPS.
16
AC-FLOC 2009, 5.45
17
Land Warfare Studies Centre 134, Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics
18
Decisive Manoeuvre is defined as the conduct of synchronised operations using assets from and within any or
all environments to defeat the adversary by positioning in time and space the most appropriate force to threaten
or attack critical vulnerabilities thereby unhinging the centre of gravity and obtaining maximum leverage.
Australian warfighting concepts to guide campaign planning, Chap 3
19
AOF 2030 Handbook Version 2.0
20
Ibid, Para 2
15
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a.
Environment. Australia’s Primary Operating Environment (POE) is illustrated in
Figure 2 below. The POE is focused on the Asia-Pacific region characterised by
complex physical, human and information terrain.
(1)
Physical Terrain. The physical terrain of the POE is largely littoral, with a
combination of jungle, mountain and urban terrain. It is likely to experience
further urbanisation and to continue to have poor infrastructure21. Almost
all strategic infrastructure and population centres are located within 25
kilometres of the coast22.
(2)
Human Terrain. The human terrain is a mix of cultures, ethnicity,
religions and political views, both between and within nations. An extreme
range of population densities occur within POE.
(3)
Information Terrain. The information terrain will continue to be
influenced by language barriers and cultural norms at the micro level. The
information terrain is being modified by the influx of communications
technologies and media influences. This modification is more prevalent in
urban areas.
21
Doctrine on operations in specific environments is contained in LWD 3-0-0 Manoeuvre Operations in the
Littoral Environment and LWD 3-9-1 Operations in Specific Environments.
22
AOF 2030 Handbook Version Version 2.0
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Figure 1: Primary Operating Environment
b.
c.
23
The POE environment will not be dissimilar to the global environment, becoming
increasingly complex and interconnected over time. Land operations in the
complex terrain of the POE will be characterised by23;
(1)
their manpower-intensive nature,
(2)
the degraded performance of stand-off sensors and communications,
(3)
reduced detection and engagement ranges,
(4)
restricted mobility, and
(5)
the attenuation of weapon effects.
Land operations beyond the Australian mainland will be reliant on strategic airsea force projection assets. Operations are likely in the littoral environment and
this, in combination with jungle, mountain and urban terrain, will impact on future
operations utilising the LCVS.
AOF 2030 Handbook Version 2.0, 2.12
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14. Technology and Future Trends. AOF 2030 outlines 15 key areas of technology
development of relevance to future force design.24 However, it was assessed that the scope of
future enhancements are unlikely to drive a fundamental change to the way the AOF operates.
Legacy capabilities will also exist within the AOF. For the LCVS, there will be a requirement
to accept the development of emerging technologies during LOT and to operate effectively
with legacy capabilities including the M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT), Land 200 Battle
Management System and Land 121 Field Vehicles, Trailers and Modules (FVT&M).
15. Threat. The AOF 2030 broadly adheres to the concepts of hybrid threats and
unrestricted warfare in undertaking force design25.
a.
Enemy force structures. Potential adversaries can range from a major power to a
collection of ad-hoc and irregular forces. It should be expected that an enemy can
and will operate within populations and below the detection threshold, negating
much of the AOF’s technological advantage. Complete or partial enemy force
elements may deliberately merge with local populations to avoid identification,
exploit the potential for civilian casualties and deliberately engage ADF on
ground of their choosing. Enemy forces should be expected to range from a
sophisticated, intelligent and lethal force through to elements that are rudimentary
utilising legacy systems. However, enemy elements across the capability spectrum
will be capable of achieving operational and/or tactical superiority for periods of
time.
b.
Enemy force technical capabilities. LCVS operational test and evaluation
(OT&E) will be evaluated against a range of enemies of differing capabilities
likely to be encountered in the future context.
16. Identified impacts of enemy and terrain for the combat system of the AOF26 will require
the AOF to:
a.
conduct close combat within range of enemy threat systems as ISTAR
effectiveness can be degraded by terrain and an adaptive enemy.
b.
continue to fight for and collect information in close contact with the enemy and
civilian population.
c.
win the close fight which will require mobility, lethality and protection to close
with and defeat the enemy in the POE.
d.
be able to manoeuvre to a position of advantage, both strategically and tactically,
while avoiding or overcoming enemy denial capabilities.
e.
be capable of conducting area security operations over broad swathes of terrain in
order to deny the enemy sanctuary and to protect civilian populations, friendly
forces, installations, routes, borders and friendly actions such as reconstruction.
24
AOF 2030 Handbook, Version 2.0, 2.17
Ibid, 2.23
26
Ibid, 6.9
25
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f.
provide security to local populations in order to set the conditions for
reconstruction and transition to indigenous control.
17. The AOF 2030 operating context necessitates a combat force capable of amphibious,
expeditionary operations. The LCVS will be utilised within this context and must be capable
of being projected for sustained operations against an adaptive enemy in complex terrain.
Future land operations will require modular, highly educated and skilled forces with a
capacity for network-enabled operations, optimised for close combat in CAT.
LAND 400 CAPABILITY CONTEXT
18. Land 400 is the project that will introduce the LCVS as a capability. The LCVS is the
platform that will form the centre piece of the mounted close combat capability. There will be
key interfaces and development friction between the LCVS and other capabilities. Land 400
will aim to deliver a system that is functionally integrated with legacy systems, is, or makes
provision for, integration with CAFS27 equipments and has capacity to absorb technological
change within Life of Type (LOT).
19. An initial scan of legacy and parallel equipment acquisitions shows that there are some
key limitations and constraints that may impact upon the capability solutions considered in
order to place Land 400 within the CAFS, these include:
a.
The requirement to operate with the key legacy systems including M1A1 MBT,
ARH, Land 121 FVT&M fleets, communications and battle management systems
(L200/JP2072), Land 125 Soldier Combat System, Land 146 Combat
Identification and Land 19 Ph 7 Ground-based Air and Munitions Defence
(GBAMD).
b.
The ability to achieve transition between mission profiles and tasks.
c.
Compatibility with strategic lift assets. Ref D, Australia’s Amphibious Concept
(AAC) states ‘the force projection capabilities (utilising air and surface
manoeuvre) of available amphibious platforms will shape the Landing Force (LF)
scheme of manoeuvre.’ This will impact the numbers, weight and size of the
LCVS platforms in relation to overall carrying capacity and the ship to shore
connectors. Air 8000 Ph 2 will impact the type and number of available strategic
air lift platforms.
d.
Key technology development timeframes (especially integration, power packs,
scalable armour and modularised components).
LAND 400 DESCRIPTION
20. Land 400 Land Combat Vehicle System. The LCVS will provide the mounted close
combat capability within the CAFS. The LCVS will be able to be employed across the full
spectrum of conflict in all environments up to and including close combat as part of the CAT.
LCVS will be capable of integration with legacy and new equipments in order to contribute to
the overall commanders’ situational awareness and combat power as part of a networked
capability. LCVS will be characterised by precision lethality, land combat survivability,
27
As defined in the Glossary
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situational awareness and combat capability integration to deliver a system that enables the
successful conduct of sustained close combat against emerging and future threats.
21. Functional Roles. The LCVS will be introduced into service within the future MMB.
The LCVS will enable each of the brigades to perform the following roles:
a.
Close Combat Reconnaissance – the capacity to find and identify threat
capabilities in complex terrain while under direct and indirect fire;
b.
Intimate and Direct Fire Support in combined arms offensive and defensive
operations - the capacity to effectively and precisely engage adversary personnel,
vehicle and fortifications with integral direct fire weapon systems by day and
night and in extreme weather conditions; and
c.
Close Combat, High Survivable lift – the capacity to manoeuvre within the
range of direct fire weapons while operating in complex terrain that includes
complicated obstacles and ambush weapons systems.
22. Land 400 will also equip CS and CSS elements within the three regular manoeuvre
brigades, specifically:
a.
Mounted Joint Fires Team (JFT) capability to support all mounted Combat Teams
within the Manoeuvre Brigades.
b.
A mobility and survivability capability.
c.
A repair, recovery and evacuation capability to support all mounted Combat
Teams within the Manoeuvre Brigades.
23. Future Combat System. The LCVS will be deployed in the battlespace28 as part of the
future combat system29 as defined for the AOF. The future combat system is to be optimised
to detect and defeat the adversary in complex terrain and support the central soldier system.
LCVS will provide options for the future combat system to balance firepower, mobility and
protection in order to maximise mounted close combat capability in the direct fire zone. The
CS and CSS core systems are the future combat system enablers.
24. Combat Functions. The future combat system, equipped with LCVS, is pivotal to
three of the six combat functions that are derived directly from combat; ‘know’, ‘strike’ and
‘shield’. The future combat system will also contribute to the other combat functions;
‘shape’, ‘adapt’ and ‘sustain’. The land force will require a LCVS as part of the CAFS to
perform these functions for the close combatant in future complex warfighting.
a.
Know. The AOF requires the combat system to fight for information as a unique
contribution to the ‘know’ function as a product of reconnaissance. The ACR
multi-role sub-units, as part of a combined arms grouping, will conduct this task
utilising the LCVS. The LCVS will use integral systems and sensors in
combination with the networked and integrated CAFS to predict, detect,
28
The battlespace encompasses the area of influence and the area of interest. It includes the traditional domains
of land, air and sea, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. Note: Also embraces the social,
political and temporal contexts in which conflict is waged. LWD 3-0-3 Land Tactics, Glossary
29
A Core Land Integration Primary System (CLIPS) as defined in AOF 2030 Handbook Version 1.3, Para 63
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recognise, understand and determine strengths, vulnerabilities and opportunities
within the battlespace. The exploitation of knowledge, as a part of decision
superiority, provides forces with a distinct advantage over the enemy. The LCVS
will be able to share information as part of CAFS.
b.
Strike. The conduct of close combat will contribute to the ‘strike’ function. The
LCVS will enable the close combatant to orient, organise, move and apply
appropriate levels of combat power through mounted close combat and intimate
support to the CAT. Manoeuvre elements equipped with LCVS will be able to
strike through integral direct fire and to integrate offensive support indirect fire
effects.
c.
Shield. The combat system will contribute to the ‘shield’ function through a
variable combination of close combat, reconnaissance and security operations.
The LCVS will enable this through integration as part of CAFS and survivability
measures, shown at Figure 2. The LCVS survivability measures will comprise
networked resources and sensors, signature management, electronic countermeasures, active protection, armour, tactical mobility and system redundancy.
The priorities for shielding are30;
(1)
survivability of combat system personnel,
(2)
survivability of the LCVS, and
(3)
survivability of the CAT.
Figure 2: Survivability
30
ACND Ground Fighting Mobility Draft, undated, Para 25
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25. LCVS Components. Whilst the capability solution is yet to be determined, the LCVS
components are expected to comprise:
a.
Mounted close combat platforms fitted with:
(1)
A range of firepower effects achieving precision overmatch of a
technologically advanced near peer enemy within complex terrain. This
may include main armament direct fire weapon systems capable of precision
and varied ammunition effects.
(2)
Active and passive defensive aid suites, survivability systems and scalable
armour.
(3)
Networking and a range of fitted and deployable sensors that are integrated
within the CAFS.
(4)
Non-kinetic threat defences such as stealth, counter Electronic Attack and
Improvised Explosive Devices measures.
(5)
Redundancy within, and between, sub-systems.
(6)
Support equipment for the soldier system.
(7)
CS and CSS variants as within the LCVS, or more broadly funded by Land
400 within legacy combat platforms, including specialised equipments
required for CS and CSS tasks.
(8)
A sustainment and support system based on the principles of commonality,
predictive and diagnostic analysis, modularity and operational durability.
(9)
A simulation environment within the Defence Simulation Network capable
of experimentation, development and dispersed individual and collective
training.
26. The LCVS will be an adaptable equipment solution, with design capable of ready
upgrades to key components such as battle management systems and defensive aid suites
during Life of Type (LOT). This will maintain a buffer against obsolescence and support the
integration of technologies with a shorter life span than the hulls and major systems.
27. LCVS Variant Characteristics. Generic variant characteristics and attributes in
cascading priorities and sub-priorities will be refined by subsequent versions of the User
Requirement. Integration and networking remains as a fixed requirement across the LCVS to
enable the CAFS effect.
28.
The LCVS will not replace the MBT, nor will it have the ability to swim31.
29. Battlespace Effects. The LCVS, as part of the CAT within the future CAFS will
enable the battlespace effects of suppression, neutralisation and destruction of the enemy; and
the seizure and retention of ground in all seasons, weather and terrain32.
31
Army has specified that the LCVS was not to have the ability to swim (directed by DGDP-A at L400 IPT
meeting Oct 10 (date TBC)) but requires review in light of the development of this CONOPS.
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30. Characteristics. The LCVS will enhance the characteristics of the manoeuvre brigade
as part of the future combat system through the following characteristics in the direct fight:
a.
Firepower. The LCVS firepower will either be synchronised with manoeuvre,
where CAT elements can either fire on the move, or in mutual support of other
manoeuvre elements. This gives balance to the CAT weapon systems and allows
each to be employed to its best effect while providing time for manoeuvre. Or
LCVS firepower will be used in shaping and strike, where weapon systems are
used to destroy, neutralise or suppress specific targets and limit the enemy’s
ability to manoeuvre. Enemy forces are delayed, disrupted and engaged in depth
or while uncommitted to the close battle. The aim of employing firepower in this
way is to limit the time spent in close combat or to shape the enemy prior to the
close fight.
b.
Mobility. LCVS will be the means of concentrating combat force at the decisive
point to achieve surprise, shock action, physical momentum and dominance as
part of ground manoeuvre. Mobility will be used to gain positional advantage in
either the battlespace or time. The LCVS will be able to be synchronised with air
manoeuvre as part of CAFS.
c.
Protection. The LCVS will provide part of the networking, reconnaissance and
sensors required to enable early detection, fixing and destruction of the enemy
before it can attack effectively. The LCVS will also provide physical hardening
through platform material and defensive aid suite solutions.
OPERATIONAL CONSTRUCT
LCVS Operational Use Overview
31. The LCVS will maximise the most advance proven technologies available in both the
combat system and the network enabled warfare capability for the close combat force. It
provides an enhanced platform for the traditional cavalry roles; it provides protected close
combat support for the Land 125 equipped infantry soldier and lightens the soldier’s load. It
will also provide platforms for those CS and CSS elements required to prosecute the close
fight.
32. The LCVS will allow the close combat force elements to develop clear situational
awareness of the battlespace by drawing from, and connecting with, the future CAFS network
architecture. The close combat force elements will be able use the sensors and systems of the
LCVS to target enemy personnel, platforms, weapon systems and installations with either the
integral weapons or by real time integration with other offensive fire support (sea, land and air
based weapon systems). The LCVS will also use integral systems to increase survivability by
seeing and striking first, avoiding detection, avoiding acquisition, avoiding the hit, avoiding
penetration and surviving the hit. The LCVS may incorporate both manned and unmanned
sensors systems that can be deployed to extend the knowledge and strike range of the CAT.
The LCVS will be capable of defeating comparable future enemy close combat systems.
33. The LCVS will be able to be flexibly configured based on risk and mission profile.
This includes the use of scalable armour solutions to vary survivability profiles. The LCVS
32
LWD 3-0-1 Formation Tactics, 1.20
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will include variants that support the required roles and tasks, whilst seeking greatest
commonality and interoperability to make sustainment, transportability and support practical
and affordable.
34. Annex B provides a detailed description of the LCVS roles and tasks, outlining how it
will generate, organise and fight given likely scenarios and mission profiles. To support
understanding and consideration of function requirements, these scenarios and mission
profiles are set within a strategic campaigning framework. Importantly, this allows
consideration of force generation and concurrency implications.
MISSION
35. Land 400 LCVS Mission. The Mission of Land 400 LCVS is to provide enhanced
land combat survivability and lethality to the combined arms team through the provision of an
integrated combat vehicle system with superior mobility, firepower, protection, situational
awareness and command and control which can fight and win sustained close combat
engagements in open and complex terrain.
INTENT
36. Purpose. The purpose of the Land 400 LCVS is to provide a mounted close combat
system for the future combat force in order to win the land battle.
37.
Method. Land 400 seeks to deliver this requirement by:
a.
Providing a LCVS that is capable of employment on multi-role tasking,
encompassing modularity, scalability, and versatile and agile configuration and
employment options for the commander IAW Army’s capability requirement.
b.
Introducing the LCVS into service and integrating the LCVS into the CAFS.
c.
Supporting the force generation of the future combat system, equipped with
LCVS, to meet future threats.
d.
Supporting the adaption and sustainment of the future combat system, including
development of the LCVS during LOT, to maintain flexibility and the capability
advantage over time.
38. Endstate. The future combat force will be equipped with a LCVS integrated into the
CAFS providing enhanced land combat survivability, situational awareness, close combat
mobility and combat power in order to win the land battle over time.
Scheme of Manoeuvre
39. Force Generation (FORGEN). PLAN BEERSHEBA is the Raise, Train and Sustain
(RTS) structure that will be equipped with LCVS. The focus for the employment of LCVS
will be in the Multi-role Manoeuvre Brigades (MMB). The MMB RTS structure contains
Combat, CS and CSS force elements (FE). The Combat FE consists of an ACR and two
infantry battalions; CS consists of Offensive Support (OS), Mobility and Survivability (MS)
and C2; CSS is based on the Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB). The LCVS will
equip the ACR of each of the MMB. The focus of the PLAN BEERSHEBA RTS structure is
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the FORGEN of all force elements of the MMB that will be grouped with FE from the
Supporting Brigades IOT form the tailored BG and Taskforce (TF) required to meet
operational and strategic needs.
40. Operational Employment. The LCVS will fight as part of the CAFS. In this future
system integration will be achieved between the dismounted close combatant and the mounted
close combatant. LCVS will also integrate with all elements of CS and CSS. LCVS will be
the network node around which mounted and dismounted combatants will operate in close
combat. This will enable close combat33 in complex terrain by mounted and dismounted
forces with the ability to fight for information and close with, and defeat, a lethal threat. It
will have a high degree of individual platform-soldier networked integration allowing the
coordination effects at the lowest level to enable fire and movement in the contested direct
fire zone.
41. Current and evolving threats have reduced the utility of unprotected and lightly
protected close combat mobility and have led to an increase in reliance on detection,
recognition and identification systems in the CAT. LCVS will enable the concentration of
combat effects to achieve a Main Effort (in time and space) without compromising Supporting
Effort actions and survivability. This demands increased terrain accessibility by LCVS and
will enhance the combatant’s ability to manoeuvre to points of advantage. This will mitigate
shaping by threat fires, obstacles and complex terrain. The increased soldier-platform
integration, freedom of manoeuvre and access to networked effects (sensor-shooter) will
generate combat force multipliers within the direct fire zone.
42. Within the direct fire zone, there will be the combatants and enablers required to win the
close battle. Both the close combatant and the enabler systems will need to operate within the
direct fire zone but their role and task will determine the level of firepower, mobility and
protection that they require. For those forces that are part of the future combat system
required to survive and fight consistently in the direct fire zone, the LCVS will be the close
combat platform. Those enablers that transit the direct fire zone will be mounted in protected
mobility platforms provided by L121 and legacy fleets34. Figure 4 shows the relationship
between LCVS (close combatant) and protected mobility (enablers).
Close Combat is defined as – combat carried out with direct fire weapons, supported by indirect fire, air
delivered fires and non-lethal engagements. Close combat focuses on the defeat or destruction of enemy forces.
34
M113, ASLAV and PMV
33
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CAFS
Combat enablers
MOUNTED CLOSE
COMBAT
AO /
Battlespace
LCVS
DISMOUNTED
CLOSE COMBAT
Direct fire/
Close
Combat
Zone
Combat
Zone
Legacy Fleets
Figure 3. The elements of the CAFS that operate within the direct fire zone.
43. There will be an increased reliance on L121, legacy fleet protected mobility and rotary
wing assets to transport dismounted systems (e.g. personnel, weapons, sensors) to support
LCVS based Schemes of Manoeuvre. Without this supporting mobility it will not be possible
to achieve synchronised effects at the BG and TF level. It will also impact on the ability to
sustain combat power in the direct fire zone, with protected CS and CSS assets capable of
supporting dismounted and mounted combat elements in contact.
44. Task Organisation. The RTS MMB can be organised into a number of groupings that
can be tailored to suit specific operational needs. These groups are built from the available
FE to achieve specific effects over a specified period of time. At the higher level they will
include organic and non organic effects. This is shown in Figure 4.
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Grouped BG
and Joint
effects
Grouped Cb Teams
t
and TF effect
s
Combined Arms
Tea
m
Combined
Arms
Team
Smallest
Ta F
c E
TF
B
G
Cbt Team
Pl/ Tp
Bricks
Coord Coalition and Joint Effects with
BG for the duration of the operation
Coor effects of the TF and Cb Teams.
d
t effects
Grouped to achieve operational
Min self sustaining FE. Inc Cbt/CS/CS .
S
Grouped for specific msn and
tasks
Min Ta grouping. Inc Cb / CS.
c
t and
Grouped
for specific msn
tasks
Basic teams grouped to achieve
specific
tasks.
Figure 4: Groupings for Task Organisation
45. At the highest level, the MMB HQ will combine with other specialised Command,
Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) capabilities to create a TF HQ. This HQ will be designed to be able to command and
integrate all FE allocated for an operation. There will be elements of the Support Brigades
grouped to this TF HQ. TF HQ will also be the tactical level that interfaces with joint and
coalition effects and enablers. These effects may be allocated to the BG of the TF or
coordinated at TG HQ level.
46. From within each MMB there is the potential to generate three BG HQ and 10 Combat
Team (CT) HQ. Using this construct the ACR and one infantry battalion HQ will each form a
Mounted BG HQ based on respective HQ staff. The ACR will provide the LCVS required for
the TAC HQ of both BG HQ. HQ Main and Rear will operate from other protected mobility
platforms.
47. A CT is a tactical grouping of combined arms and services. This will include FE from
the ACR, each of the battalions and other CS and CSS FE as required. The groupings at this
level will be dependent on the specific mission and task of the CT. The CT is the smallest
self contained tactical unit within a TF. It can be tasked as an independent organisation for
extended periods with the ability to access enabling effects. The duration of tasking will be
limited to a specific tactical mission and series of tasks.
48. The smallest CAT is the platoon/troop. Each CAT is a grouping of combat bricks taken
from the CT and is the lowest level with appropriate C2 to coordinate the effects. Task
organisation can occur at this level through the combination of a series of combat bricks, but
each brick can not be broken down. Each brick is the smallest tactical element for a specific
element of the force. As an example, four dismounted combatants is the minimum combat
brick for the effective tactical employment of infantry.
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49. Main Effort. The Main Effort for the LCVS is the successful conduct of Close
Combat.
SUPPORTING BATTLESPACE OPERATING SYSTEM (BOS) CONCEPTS
50. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). The LCVS will contribute to
the C4ISR situational awareness function by being capable of gathering, using and
distributing information as part of an integrated network. Land 400 will form part of the
Army Future Network (AFN) and the Network After Next (NAN).
51. Offensive Support. The LCVS will be capable of operating within the integrated fire
effects of offensive support capabilities in the combined arms and joint environment. It will
employ effects from manned and unmanned fire systems, and ISTAR platforms including
ARH and Shadow 200 as part of dynamic sensor-shooting coupling. LCVS precision and
responsiveness will be enhanced under the CAFS to enable target identification, target
clearance, targeting precision, and target acquisition in real, or near real, time. The JFT will
be mounted in LCVS for compatible combat mobility and protection.
52. Mobility and Survivability (MS). The Combat Engineer (CE) FE will be equipped
with engineer platforms in order to provide protected mobility, counter mobility, survivability
and sustainability support to the MMB. These MS effects will enable the future combat
system to conduct full-spectrum complex warfighting operations. The CE platforms
supporting the combat system will provide protected assault gap crossing, obstacle breaching
and route clearance capability with a commensurate level of protection and combat mobility.
Subject to acquisition strategy for the LCVS, and the most appropriate means of deploying
specialised MS equipments, some, or all, of the CE may, or may not, be mounted in LCVS
variants.
53. CSS. The MMBs will have integral CSS FE equipped with task specific variants of
LCVS (repair and recovery, evacuation) to provide CSS effects to the close combat force.
Only those CSS elements required to be grouped at CT level and below will be equipped with
LCVS. All other CSS FE will be in L121 fleets. During distributed manoeuvre this will
necessitate semi-independent supply operations over a sustained period. CSS variants will
interface with L121 Field Vehicles, Trailers and Modules (FVT&M). The FVT&M will
utilise the Integrated Load Handling System (ILHS) including for modules such as bulk fuel.
The ILHS will enable greater speed in sustainment activities.
54. C3. HQ (TAC) will be equipped with LCVS for compatible close combat capability and
visual uniformity. All LCVS variants will be fitted for access to the CAFS Common
Operational Picture (COP) and will be able to maintain a Local Operational Picture (LOP)
internal to the appropriate C2 level (CT, BG, TF). As part of the CAFS, the LCVS will be
able to deploy and access manned and unmanned sensor systems to maintain the
commanders’ situational awareness. BG HQ (MAIN) will be equipped with L121 or legacy
fleet command and liaison variants35. The LCVS will operate with communications and
battle management equipments acquired under L200/JP 2072.
Ibid, Para 114 states that ‘Land 400 may introduce additional variants but this is not yet determined’. The IPT
of 15 Mar 11 directed that Army conduct a gap analysis of Land 400 and Land 121 to ensure that no operational
gaps occur.
35
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55. Key Timings. Development of the LCVS is to be in parallel with the progress of
PLAN BEERSHEBA. Delivery of the LCVS is to be matched to the Army Force Generation
Cycle. The following are key dates:
a.
Initial Operational Capability (IOC). IOC is defined as one MMB equipped
with LCVS – 2025; and
b.
Final Operational Capability (FOC). FOC is defined as three MMB equipped
with LCVS ready to enable CAFS - 2032.
OTHER SUPPORTING CONCEPTS
56. Force Generation Cycle (FGC). The LCVS introduction into service and BOP will
need to support the FGC. FORGEN involves the preparation of land force capabilities against
a series of requirements that Army is tasked to be prepared to respond to on specified warning
times (preparing for ‘a war’). FORGEN is conducted by Forces Command. In contrast,
Operations Generation (OPGEN) prepares forces for a specific directed operation that they
have been tasked to conduct. OPGEN is conducted by Headquarters 1st Division based on
the force assignment of capability to Joint Operations Command (preparing for ‘the war’).
57. The FORGEN of land force capabilities to be ready for the widest range of
contingencies possible enables Army to provide land forces on a minimum of OPGEN time.
The maintenance of this readiness requires a FGC to be implemented, allowing capabilities to
cycle through (at minimum) a Reset, Readying and Ready phase.
58. FORGEN is therefore to be the key force structure determinant36 for all of Army’s
capabilities. The changes to force structure under the AFF and AOF will be based on the
FGC and will ensure that land force reforms are prepared with the most efficient management
and expenditure of the resources provided by Government for that task. The FGC is shown at
figure 5.
36
A force structure determinant is those tasks or activities for the conduct of which a force element (FE) is
structured. Force Elements are also able to conduct other tasks and activities given their structure, but they are
not provided resources on the basis of those alternate tasks. At the highest level, the Army is structured for
warfighting, but can conduct “lower intensity” tasks such as peace keeping and aid to the civil community.
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Force
Preparation
• BRIGADE
BASED TASK
FORCE
• ONE
DEPLOYABLE
MAJOR JTF
FE
• FOUR
DEPLOYABLE
MINOR JTF
AB INITIO
FE
Enabling
Formations &
Commands
• THREE LIKE
DEPLOYABLE
MANOEUVRE
BRIGADES
FE
• SPECIAL
FORCES TASK
GROUPS
IET / ROBC
SKILLS AND CAREER
FE
• SPECIALIST
BRIGADES AND
COMMANDS
Training
Formations
Like Manoeuvre
Formations
Figure 5: Force Generation as the Key Force Structure Determinant
59. Simulation and Training. Individual and collective training is to maximise the use of
simulation (including immersive and virtual training areas) and decentralised training. Land
400 is to develop the future mounted close combat simulation system for LCVS. This
simulation system is to be the foundation of future CAFS simulation requirements. LCVS
integration and training is to be tested and enhanced through the use of simulation. The
simulation solution is to operate within the Defence Simulation Network being established by
JP3028. LCVS platforms should also be able to operate directly with the synthetic
environment to allow in-field, pre-deployment, planning and mission rehearsal training to
occur. Potential for simulated collective training with allies is to be considered.
60. Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Army has a large array of concepts
and doctrine that support the conduct of training (both individual and collective) and
ultimately standardise the way Army units conduct operations. The simplification of the
MMB will mean that doctrine related to the specifics of each particular capability will be
simplified and easier to review and update, whilst more effort will be required to provide
doctrine in support of battle grouping and the way combined arms force generate and operate
together utilising LCVS.
61. Further Wargaming and Experimentation. This CONOPS will be further refined by
PLAN BEERSHEBA wargaming/experimentation and capability solution experimentation
and rapid prototype demonstrations.
ANNEXES:
A.
B.
C.
Multi-Role Manoeuvre Brigade CONOPS on a page
Operational Concepts
Support Concept
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Shape / Shield / Know/
Strike
Integrated joint force &
enabling capabilities
Shape / Shield / Know/ Strike
Networked and ISR capable
Cavalry BG with an expanded
footprint and close combat
survivability conducts economy
of force operations
(Guard/Screen/Escort/Limited
Offensive Action) to enhance
security and SA across the AOR
Multi-role Manoeuvre Brigade - Task Force
Future Threats:
Hybrid/Near Peer forces
that seek to engage
simultaneously across the
spectrum of conflict
Sustain / Adapt
Adaptive C2 with networked
capability and reach back;
robust Log systems to sustain
TF across concurrent lines of
operation
X
Adaptive Campaigning
Joint Land Combat
Population Protection
Information Actions
Population Support
Capacity Building
Shape / Know
Cavalry CT conducts recon
of threat defensive
dispositions IOT inform
COMD’s SOM
ANNEX A
LCVS CONOPS
DATED JUN 11
Shape / Shield / Know
BG with protected mobility
conducts supported by LCVS,
Population Protection/Spt, Info
Actions and Capacity Building
in the population centres
Strike
BG with Close Cbt Mobility,
Intimate Fire Spt and
breaching assets prepares to
conduct sustained close
combat
ANNEX B
LCVS CONOPS
DATED NOV 11
LCVS Operational Concepts
Overview
1.
Introduction. This annex provides a detailed description of the LCVS roles and tasks against a
range of strategic, operational and tactical considerations. Each of the operational tasks required to
conduct close combat are defined. LCVS force elements are indicatively task-organised into combined
arms, combat teams and battle groups within a range of strategic, operational and tactical contexts.
This part includes an overarching campaigning framework, with a number of force generation and
manoeuvre scenarios and mission profiles.
2.
Roles and Tasks. The roles and tasks that will be required to be performed by the LCVS are as
follows:
a. Close Combat – Command and Control (CC-C2). This task needs a decision support
system, providing near real-time situational awareness and collaborative tools for tactical
decision making, planning, mission rehearsals, and execution management for commanders
at Battlegroup and Combat Team Tactical HQ. This task requires associated FE to operate
in the direct fire zone.
b. Close Combat – Communications (CC-COMMS). This task involves the transfer of
information between various network services— including Coalition partners. It will
provide a hub for the support and exploitation of wireless communications to dismounted
force elements. This task supports operations that are conducted in the direct fire zone and
within complex human and physical terrain, including urban intra-space, subsurface and
close terrain.
c. Close Combat – Ground Manoeuvre Reconnaissance (CC-GMR). This task requires the
ability to fight for information in a contested, lethal and complex environment. It allows
mounted Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and
manoeuvre operations to be conducted across a wide area and in the presence of a capable
threat.
d. Close Combat – Protected Mobility (CC-PM). This task involves enhanced mobility and
protection for dismounted close combatants. LCVS will remain intimate in most situations,
enabling sustained fighting in the direct fire zone and capability to close and survive against
a highly lethal threat.
e. Close Combat – Direct Fire (CC-DF). This task involves agile, protected, intimate fire
support within the direct fire zone to dismounted and mounted force elements as part of a
CAFS operating in contested, lethal and complex environments. Direct Fire also includes
Overwatch (OW). This task provides commanders with an organic capability to destroy a
range of threats (including armoured, non-armoured and point targets) at long range.
f. Close Combat – Joint Fires Control (CC-JFC). This task co-ordinates the provision of
Joint Fires; provides dedicated Line of Sight observation; and supports the effective
engagement of targeting intelligence throughout the spectrum of conflict. It must be capable
of operating in the direct fire zone, intimately with manoeuvre forces.
g. Close Combat – Manoeuvre Support Reconnaissance (CC-MSR). This task allows the
manoeuvre force elements to gain timely, accurate and relevant information about threat
engineering activities and terrain.
h. Close Combat – Manoeuvre Support (MS). Task involves combat engineers providing
close engineer support to manoeuvre force elements. It includes explosive hazard reduction,
broader counter explosive hazard tasking, limited earthmoving, reconnaissance, general
mobility, counter-mobility and survivability support. It will support engineer actions in the
direct fire zone.
i. Close Combat – Recovery (CC-REC). This task is based on the principles of forward
recovery. It must be capable of supporting and recovering equipment other than LCVS.
j. Close Combat – Ambulance (CC-AMB). This task enables the timely and effective
recovery of combat casualties from the direct fire zone. This allows the provision of a level
of medical care as close to Australian peacetime standards as is practicable on the
battlefield. This will be conducted while manoeuvre forces are operating in the direct fire
zone.
k. Command and Control (C2). This task must serve as a decision support system, providing
near real-time situational awareness and collaborative tools for tactical decision making,
planning, mission rehearsals, and execution management for commanders and staff at
battlegroup and Brigade/Task Force Headquarters. It occurs outside the direct fire zone.
l. Communications (COMMS). This task allows the manipulation of information amongst
and between various networks— including those of Coalition partners. The system will
form an essential part of the core battlespace Communications and Information System
network infrastructure and the provision of Information Communication Services. It will
provide a hub for the support and exploitation of wireless communications to dismounted
force elements. Communications may be into and out of the direct fire zone.
m. Ground Based Surveillance (GBS). This task provides the essential day/night, all weather,
long-range surveillance overwatch role. It is an enhanced surveillance capability to
complement LCVS manoeuvre functions.
n. Repair (REP). This task will continue to be based on the principles of forward repair,
repair in echelons and sustainability. It must be capable of supporting equipment other than
LCVS, particularly equipment that does not have its own dedicated equipment support
package.
3.
Indicative Platform Types/Variants by Force Element. It is recognised that LCVS will seek
to deploy platforms that are capable of performing multiple roles and tasks thereby reducing the
number of vehicle platforms and or variants required.
Campaigning Framework
4.
The LCVS CONOPS campaigning framework provides a strategic and operational construct
that interprets strategic requirements and guidance into an operational framework. It is nested to the
AOF Campaign Narrative1. The narrative provides sufficient information to allow a tangible link and
association between scenarios and mission profiles, ensuring traceability against strategic requirements
as well as providing a central reference for the development of the CAFS capability and the integration
of systems. It should be used to inform the operational analysis and framework that derives and
1
AOF v3.1, Campaign Narrative, Chapter 3, pg31
validates user, functional and system requirements, as part of the Capability Definition Documentation,
specifically the Operational Concept Document.
5.
Operational Context. The LCVS campaigning framework is based on an enduring
deployment of a JTF, initially as an Australian independent JTF and subsequently as an Australian Led
JIATF. It includes a range of scenarios that allow an appropriate mix of operational variables, ensuring
a wide range of mission, threats and terrain are considered. It covers the full spectrum of conflict and
follows the generic campaign phases of the AOF narrative: Shaping and Preliminary Operations; Entry
Operations, including Amphibious Operations by the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG); Joint Land
Combat; Stabilisation and Transition Operations. The threat is predominately hybrid in nature allowing
multiple and different layers, relationships and capabilities to be considered at different phases of the
campaign. The allocation of force elements follows an initial deployment of a deployable BG, as part
of the ARG, increasing to a JTF of three BGs.
6.
LCVS Scenarios and Mission Profiles. To understand and describe the conduct of operations
and employment of the LCVS, a series of scenarios and associated mission profiles have been
developed, within the campaigning framework. The scenarios provide more refined contextual
information, with the mission profiles articulating the indicative task-organisation of LCVS force
elements with other combat force elements of the Land Force. The scenarios are directly nested to the
campaign framework, and thereby are consistent with military strategic guidance. This allows
understanding of how the LCVS will operate in different and likely tasks, threat and terrain.
7.
Assumption. The scenarios and mission profiles are set in the 2020-2030 timeframe. It is
recognised that further development of supporting threat profiles is needed to increase the precision of
the scenarios and allow more thorough use during force structure modelling, war gaming and
validation activities2.
8.
Framework. Within the framework the scenarios are constructed within the following
operational phases:
a. Entry Operations. Entry operations comprise those operations necessary to deploy the
force into the AO. The initial conduct of entry operations and deployment of force
elements will be as part of an amphibious task group3. CATs will be lodged by air and sea.
All variants will need to be lifted as part of the entry force. Subject to the threat and
securing of an air point of disembarkation (APOD), additional FE may air-land during this
phase. Amphibious lodgement requires flexible forces as well as forces capable of decisive
manoeuvre to follow-on from the entry. Follow-on FE will be deployed with organic
LCVS. However, the LCVS is not likely to be capable of swimming ashore and must be
landed. It may however have the need to ford to breach archipelagic obstacles as part of
landing operations. As soon as it is on land, all vehicle systems should be operational. This
phase of campaigning will be examined as part of LCVS Scenario 1A, appendix three. It
includes the following mission profiles:
(1) LCVS CT: STOM: Move and Seize APOD (amphibious operations)
(2) LCVS CT STOM: Maintain Lines of Communications (sustainment operations)
b. Joint Land Combat. Encompasses those actions designed to defeat all resistance and
secure the environment in order to set and sustain the conditions required for other LOOs.
2
Liaison and cooperation between the L400 IPT and DIO is ongoing and threat profiles will be updated as assessments are
made available. The current primary source for assessment is IAW DIO Land Battle Space 2035. It is anticipated that future
assessments will include input from relevant DIO country desk officers.
3
Doctrine on manoeuvre operations is described in LWD 3-0-0, Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment, 2004
These actions represent the decisive phase of the operations and may include offensive,
defensive and enabling operations such as reconnaissance and passage of lines. The LCVS
will be employed by the CAT in the full range of roles required to prosecute close combat.
This phase of campaigning will also be examined as part of LCVS Scenario 1B, appendix
three. It includes the following mission profiles:
(1) LCVS BG: Isolate (reconnaissance and economy of force ops)
(2) LCVS BG: Urban Attack to Destroy/Defeat (decisive operations)
c. Security as a Prerequisite for Stabilisation. The creation of a secure environment to all
WoG elements to establish longer term stability. The LCVS will be used during decreasing
efforts under Joint Land Combat, and contributing to other LOO through physical presence,
security operations, reconnaissance, surveillance, sensing and networking. This phase of
campaigning will be examined as part of LCVS Scenario Two, appendix four. It will
include the following mission profiles:
(1) LCVS CT: Convoy Protection/Defeat IED (force protection operations)
(2) LCVS BG: Close country attack to destroy (decisive operations)
Appendices
1.
2.
3.
4.
General Situation - UNRESTRICTED
Scenario One: Entry Operations - RESTRICTED
Scenario Two: Joint Land Combat - RESTRICTED
Scenario Three: Security Operations - RESTRICTED
APPENDIX 1
ANNEX B
GENERAL SITUATION
Road to War
1.
Island ‘F’ is located IVO of Country ‘G’. Island ‘F’ is comprised of both Australian Territory
and Country ‘G’ territory. There is increasing tension with Country ‘G’ regarding disputed natural
resource rights. The majority of natural resources are found along the disputed boarder. Country ‘G’ is
linked to support for a breakaway militia and insurgent activities on Island ‘F’. Natural resource finds
in the disputed region along the boarder have led to a fledgling primary industry mainly funded and
operated by western resource companies based in both Australian and Country ‘G’ territory. Facilities
are being developed within the region to support industry.
2.
In recent months there has been a significant increase of insurgent-style attacks against Western
interests, throughout the region. These were initially against the local industry security forces but,
increasingly, are targeting western primary industry workers. There is also a significant likelihood that
insurgent elements will overrun areas of Island ‘F’. Road communication links back to the Island ‘F’
coast are vulnerable to insurgent attack and the dirt airstrips have been subjected to mining. Australian
response is to send military forces to Island ‘F’ to deter further aggression from Country ‘G’. This will
be achieved by the projection of a Bde/TF into Island ‘F’. On re-establishing normalcy on Island ‘F’,
the Bde/TF is then tasked to establish a FOB within the disputed boarder region IOT deter further
aggression and prevent interdiction of regional SLOC.
Scenario Assumption/Pre-Conditions
3.
The deployed JTF/JIATF has been appropriately prepared, equipped, trained and certified for
the operation and tasks. The FORGEN and OPGEN requirements will be detailed in Scenario 3.
4.
The Amphibious Task Force (ATF) has been able to effectively conducted preliminary
operations (shaping and advance force) in order to establish joint operational conditions and allow
Amphibious Operations by the Australian Amphibious forces. The force is now postured to allow the
Landing Force to conduct Ship to Objective Manoeuvre (STOM) operations.
5.
The subsequent JLC phases assumes the successful conduct of entry operations, including the
build up of force through established SPODs and APODs using military and contracted air and sea
strategic lift assets.
Situation
6.
Terrain. Island ‘F’ is a tropical Island with low coastal areas interspersed with 3-4 major
littoral rivers with steep cliffs limiting amphibious landing points. Major river deltas present complex
littoral terrain. Inland terrain rises to highlands (restricted mobility) at approx 1000m. TAOR extends
approx 150 km inland. The vegetation is mostly tropical bush with areas of savannah and cultivation.
a.
Rural: 95%. Tropical bush interspersed with areas of open savannah grassland and
cultivated fields close to rural communities. Rural settlements (popn 500+) spread 10km +.
b.
Urban: 5%. Capital is a seaport (popn 50,000). 3-4 regional towns (popn 10,000). Centres
of urban areas consist of old colonial buildings with the urban fringes consisting of poorly
built single storey buildings and shanty towns. Some light industrial areas.
7.
c.
Infrastructure: Dirt/gravel track roads in rural areas between major population centres
otherwise bush tracks. Poorly maintained hard roads in urban areas. Short dirt airstrips in
rural areas mainly to serve natural resource exploration areas.
d.
Key Considerations:
(1)
The complex human terrain within urban areas will increase the threat detection
threshold and require the forces equipped with LCVS to conduct reconnaissance. ISR
force elements must be grouped to allow continuous access to protected mobility and
precision fires.
(2)
Whoever has gained the support of the local population will have greater freedom of
action in urban areas. This combined with the complex physical terrain in the major
population centres will give further advantage to the force that is conducting
defensive operations. Precise fires will be required when conducting close combat in
these areas.
(3)
Rapid mobility to secure key terrain will be required in order to limit enemy
defensive manoeuvre. Key terrain will include key river/road crossing points,
movement corridors along approaches to threat locations, either in urban or isolated
strongpoints and support bases. Urban infrastructure, institutions and government
facilities will be key terrain throughout the operation, and securing these will be
support ongoing stability operations.
(4)
Major road systems will need to be cleared and where possible secured to allow
uninterrupted line of communications to be maintained.
(5)
Communications infrastructure is limited and LCVS will be required to provide
communication nodes to support an uninterrupted network.
Threat
a.
Militia. Country ‘G’ can employ hybrid militia-style forces up to 1000 strong across the
island, which can operate up to platoon - company level (30-120 people) using
conventional and asymmetric attack (including suicide bombers). They are capable of
executing small, complex attacks. These forces are lightly equipped: SA, MMG, RPG,
mines & IED. Some ‘technical’ 4x4s with mounted HMG. Underpinning the more overt
militia is a network of terror cells (3-4 personnel) operating covertly in urban areas
throughout the Country ‘G’ (on principle routes between coast and inland areas) but will
tend to focus on mine / IED laying and soft target ambushes.
b.
Conventional. Country ‘G’ has reinforced the number of forces and combat ratios of its
standard garrison in anticipation of a military response. Regular Bde: 1xMech Bn
(BMP1/2), 1xTk Sqn (T80), 1xRecon Sqn (BRDM), 2xBn Motorised (Truck) Infantry with
AD, IDF and ATGM elements. Reserve Bn: light infantry (some trucks, 4x4s with HMG
etc).
c.
Key Considerations:
(1)
Militia threat forces are likely to be used to support information gathering and
intelligence networks, reducing LCVS capacity for stealth in urban and rural areas.
LCVS reconnaissance of threat forces in urban and rural areas will need to be overt
and aggressive. In restricted non-urban and rural terrain areas Land Force elements
may be largely dismounted allowing increased use of stealth and discreet movement,
when time permits.
(2)
Militia threat forces are likely to employ guerrilla style attacks and disrupt LCVS
movement on established road networks. LCVS will need to maintain high levels of
protection during advance operations and logistic support movement, until support of
the population can be achieved. Once threat forces have been identified, LCVS will
need to move rapidly to isolate and contain militia forces. LCVS cross country
mobility and accessibility will allow non-routine movement, and enhance freedom of
action.
(3)
Conventional threat forces, given the operational conditions set, will need to ensure
they remain undetected or well protected until a decisive opportunity exists, in order
to prevent deep targeting.
(a)
The threat may seek protection in urban/rural areas. Precision fires will be
needed. To achieve decisive effects against these threat forces, the LCVS will
need to remain flexible and agile to quickly re-organise, conduct offensive
manoeuvre and achieve a decisive outcome. Access to joint fires and high
operational mobility are critical. Aggressive ground reconnaissance will be
required to ensure that, once detected, threat forces are able to be fixed,
ensuring time for re-organisation and deliberate action. This will allow
increased coordination and reduced collateral damage during close combat.
(b)
The threat may seek protection through stand-off, and reduce detection by
masking in close/marginal terrain. Persistent surveillance and wide area
reconnaissance will be needed to ensure Target Areas of Interest are
appropriately covered in order to trigger manoeuvre of LCVS to conduct block
and strike actions. Precision and urban manoeuvre by these threat forces is
likely to be limited until decisively engaged. The preferred method of
engagement is through wide area ISR combined with robust senor-shooter
links, utilising the network and access to joint fires. LCVS conducting
reconnaissance actions will need to maintain high levels of protection, lethality,
mobility and connectivity.
(4)
Following decisive action against conventional forces, the LCVS must be able to
support the JTF transition rapidly to stability operations, requiring the force to
operate with other and non Government agencies, conduct engagement of leadership
and civilian organisations, provide support the restoration of essential services,
conduct population protection and support tasks. Concurrently, the LCVS must
support JTF active targeting of hostile and threat force elements that may remain
covert.
(5)
To allow sustainment of operations, combat and protected logistics is needed. Access
to secure Line of Communications will be needed. Given the terrain limitations,
access to mobility support will be critical. Stocks on wheels will be high, allowing a
minimal footprint and ability for a rapid withdrawal, if required.
UNRESTRICTED
ANNEX C
LCVS CONOPS
DATED NOV 11
LAND 400 SUPPORT CONCEPT
Introduction
1.
The LAND 400 Support System is to support the mission systems of Army’s
LCVS Capability. The support system will directly effect how the Land Force
generates and sustains a deployed capability and will impact how the Land Force
fights.
2.
The support system must generate the required quantity of LCVS and the
essential/enabling items in the required location and condition, and at the appropriate
time. It must sustain the LCVS capability at the operational level when deployed.
Background
3.
The capability solutions delivered may present opportunities for Army to reshape the conduct of future Combat Service Support in the operating environment. At
an operational and strategic level, Land 400 will seek to maximise the ADF’s logistic
capabilities; particularly in the areas of engineering, maintenance, warehousing and
distribution. Where individual capability support systems do not directly utilise the
ADF logistic capabilities, interfaces with support arrangement will be developed to
ensure cost efficient, effective and focused support outcomes are achieved. This may
involve initiatives such as costed spares packages that will be implemented to ensure a
sustainable capability throughout Life-of-Type.
Given the size and scope of project Land400, LCVS will allow the exploration of new
strategies for capability enhancement. This may include use of increased attrition,
training and maintenance pools; and whole of fleet management. The Land 400
capability solution will deliver vehicles and associated equipment that will be capable
of deployment utilising future ADF Strategic Lift Assets. Domestically, management
of Defence fuels and State/Territory road, sea and air movement requirements will be
coordinated to maximise the Raise/Train/Sustain effects and deliver flexibility for a
deployable fleet of capabilities.
Principles of Support
4.
The LCVS support system needs to achieve the following:
a.
Be aligned with Army operational needs and geared to support the Force
Generation (FORGEN) and Operations Generation (OPGEN) cycles. For
planning purposes this is represented by the extant FORCOMD FORGEN
business rules and the LCVS CONOPS campaign narrative.
b.
It needs to enable integration across legacy and future support systems,
maximising commonality and responding to opportunities for resource
sharing.
c.
Explore options for whole of fleet management for training, maintenance
and strategic storage.
UNRESTRICTED
2
d.
Components of the LCVS support system will need to be deployable and
relevant to the deployment force package. (This will be further informed
by the specific support system option design)
e.
Seek to optimise the logistic chain by utilising all available support
including OEM, support contractors and ADF organic resources, allowing
more rapid adaptation.
f.
Seek continuous improvement of the support system based on extant
knowledge and emerging opportunities to maximise capabilities and to
maintain efficiencies through the life of type.
Army Force Generation Cycle
5.
The LCVS support system is to be aligned with the Army’s FORGEN, thus
ensuring the needs as articulated through the FORCOMD FORGEN Business Rules
are enabled. The support system must remain responsive to strategic requirements,
and when necessary have the capacity to increase output to meet contingency.
6.
This approach will allow for enhanced Fleet Management as each stage will
rotate priorities of effort and allow for planning of system usage. If we begin to look
at the force in terms of the Ready Force we can build in a high degree of system
readiness levels as the contingency force. The Readying Force will be primarily
training focused with the Reset Force in a state of low availability undergoing deep
maintenance and equipment storage, cross levelling, and pooling. Managing the
priorities and availability of LCVS in conjunction with the FORGEN should occur
routinely, minimising disruption to force deployment preparation and training.
a.
Ready Force- HIGH Readiness levels. The Ready Force will be
deployment ready and LCVS will need to be kept at high states of
readiness during the year in rotation. This may include access to
operational fleets.
b.
Readying Force- MEDIUM Readiness levels. The Readying force will
be conducting increased levels and scales of collective training.
Progressively through this cycle forces will require access to increased
vehicle numbers and high states of readiness, including recent technology
refreshes to ensure transition to Ready. This may include access to
national training fleets and operational fleets for contingency.
c.
Reset Force- LOW Readiness levels. The Reset Force will provide
opportunity for a true resetting of equipment with deep maintenance and
strategic storage as the focus. It will take advantage of long term planning
to seek cost saving and life extension approaches for the capabilities as
follows:
(1)
The Reset Force becomes the entry point for all new modernisations.
This will allow for the least amount of disruptions and will give the
force an entire year in the “Readying” phase to train on the new
system prior to become the Ready force.
UNRESTRICTED
UNRESTRICTED
(2)
3
It will allow for major cost savings initiatives such as deep
maintenance and storage for the Reset Force.
7.
Operational Generation: The distinction between FORGEN and OPGEN
cycles must be recognised by all LCVS support system providers. Importantly, the
LCVS support system will need to remain flexible to respond to developing and
changing OPGEN needs. This will require coordination at the force, divisional and
formation levels ensuring force preparation, mission rehearsals and changing
operational availability needs are met.
Supportability
8.
The LCVS campaigning framework outlines an indicative strategic and
operational context, and should inform rate and level of effort required by the LCVS
support system. Generally, the support system must ensure that all FORGEN needs
are met concurrently with the deployment of up to two Joint Task Forces abroad. The
specific size, construct and duration of JTF requirements will vary depending on the
specific operational context. The aspiration is that the support system should not be a
constraint to commitment and deployment of force to meet strategic requirement. The
table in appendix 1outlines indicative minimum levels of LCVS needed during the
FORGEN and OPGEN. An indicative support schedule is at Appendix 1
9.
Interoperability. Interoperability remains an important consideration and the
extent will be largely dependent on the capability solution. Areas of interoperability
may include but are not limited to the following:
a.
Joint. LCVS will need to synchronise support arrangements and key
integration functions with other key ADF systems and services.
b.
Strategic Lift. LCVS requires the ability to project nationally and
internationally using various civilian, coalition and military sea, air, rail
and road assets.
c.
Coalition/Allied. Considerations for coalition and/or allied
interoperability are as follows:
(1)
What coalition supply chains are able to be accessed?
(2)
Will Australia be expected to provide lead nation support?
(3)
Will LCVS be capable of being deployed by Allied movement
assets?
(4)
Can coalition supply chain for bulk fuel be accessed?
(5)
Will coalition contractual arrangement be easily accessed?
10. Transition of capability. The introduction of LCVS and transition of capability
will require a surge of legacy and new support systems. This increased effort will
require robust management procedures such as: effective LCVS configuration
UNRESTRICTED
UNRESTRICTED
4
management, adaptive operational support concepts and defined operational viability
periods for supply class three, five seven and nine.
Maintainability
11. The LCVS support system will maximise operational availability through the
use of predictive technology, interchangeable systems, and reduce administrative
downtime. This may include the following:
a.
Increased commonality across fleets to allow increased flexibility and
agility.
b.
Reduced administrative down-time through optimisation of the supply
chain and implementation of provisioning guidance.
c.
Enhanced fourth line support and ADF maintenance capacity, through
initiatives such as the Defence Logistics Transformation Project.
d.
Fleet health monitoring maximise predictive maintenance, autonomic
logistics, diagnostics, pre-nostics.
Whole of Fleet Management
12. The LCVS support system must consider Whole of Fleet Management (WFM)
strategies to contribute to the overall enhancement of capability. Within the construct
of FORGEN, WFM strategies will allow improved through life upgrade, technology
refresh and configuration management, reduce the impact on the support system when
meeting contingency operations, and facilitate efficient measures to be undertaken.
The UK ‘BATUS’ and Singapore RSF models provide examples of WFM concepts.
Supply Chain
13. Logistics is a key close combat enabler and the ability of integral and close CSS
organisations to sustain the LCVS fleet during close combat operations is essential.
Integration between LCVS and L121 systems in the conduct of CSS operations needs
in order to ensure the seamless transfer of supplies and services. There remains
opportunity for mutual support to broaden sustainment effects. The supply chain
needs to be flexible to adapt to battle grouping on operations, during exercises and in
barracks. Provisioning lead times from inventory controllers to end user will be
achieved through the use of adaptive logistic information systems. Further supply
chain considerations include the following
a.
Modernisation Initiatives such as the Defence Logistics Transformation
Project.
b.
Doctrinal Concepts and Procedure, specifically LWD 4-0, Combat Service
Support.
c.
IIS and capability provided through L121.
d.
Facilities including storage and mounting area requirements and
constraints.
UNRESTRICTED
UNRESTRICTED
5
e.
Modular load, asset identification and tracking considerations.
Training
14. LAND 400 will require a training system to support the force generation and
sustainment of the LCVS capability. The training system for LAND 400 will focus
upon the requirements of individual and crew collective training in order to operate
and support the vehicle. The training system will form a major pillar of the overall
support system for LAND 400.
15.
16.
17.
Training Scope. The scope for LAND 400 training will include:
a.
conversion training during introduction into service; and
b.
steady state training – to meet the trained manpower requirements to crew
and support LCVS.
Training Audience. The training audience for LCVS is as follows:
a.
The vehicle commanders, gunners/operators, and drivers of all LCVS
variants;
b.
LCVS troop commanders;
c.
LCVS dismounted close combatants within the Multi-role Manoeuvre
Brigade (MMB);
d.
LCVS Mounted Joint Fire Teams (JFT);
e.
LCVS Mounted Combat Engineers;
f.
LCVS instructors conducting training for the audience listed above; and
g.
Education through the Army Training Continuum on the tactical
capabilities and employment of LCVS.
Training Tasks. The Army will have two broad training tasks as follows:
a.
Individual Training. The Army will need to conduct training for
individual crew members to become qualified to operate LCVS.
Individual training will also cover those soldiers responsible for the
conduct of maintenance on the vehicle, as well as training for officers (as
listed above in paragraph 4h).
b.
Team Training. The Army will need the ability to conduct team training.
Specifically this refers to the training of a team to act as a crew of an
LCVS, up to the team training of those crews that constitute a troop of
LCVS.
18. Training Methodologies. During the Offer Definition Activity (ODA) each of
the competing tenderers will undertake a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) in order to
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UNRESTRICTED
6
identify costed training options to meet the requirement. During the conduct of the
TNA consideration must be given to the use and modification of existing facilities,
such as desk top trainers and the School of Armour’s Configurable Driver Trainer.
The TNA should also consider the use and impact of the following items:
a.
The employment of computer based training;
b.
The employment of high fidelity crew procedural trainers (virtual
simulation). This should include the networking of the simulators to
conduct exercises up to troop level, or for the troop leaders of a subunit to
be exercised simultaneously by the subunit commander;
c.
The employment of sub-calibre devices to reduce the requirement for
firing full bore ammunition from LCVS weapon systems;
d.
The provision of live firing range targetry matched to LCVS surveillance
and target acquisition systems;
e.
The requirement for live firing range modifications required to fire LCVS
weapon systems;
f.
The ability to participate in Army Live simulation;
g.
The ability to conduct mission rehearsal training, both in transit to an
operational theatre (by sea deployment), as well as in theatre; and
h.
The ability to interface with other support systems ensuring a total
training view.
19. Training Integration. The LCVS training system will also be required to
integrate with some existing training capabilities, such as Live Simulation. The
elements it will be required to integrate with will be included in the Army’s
mandatory requirements (to be defined by Army Simulation Group).
20. Training Environment. In order to conduct training the user will have specific
needs to enable exercise building in both a constructive and virtual environment, and
exercise monitoring and trainee assessment.
21. Exercise Building - in both a Constructive and Virtual Environment. In
order to build an exercise in a constructive or virtual environment the instructor will
require the following elements:
a.
Terrain Databases. A variety of terrain databases will be required as
specified by Army’s mandatory requirements (to be defined by Army
Simulation Group). The set of terrain databases is likely to include the
littoral environment of the Principle Operating Environment (POE), as
well as training areas within Australia. Terrain databases would also
include specific training databases for individual training, such as an
amphibious assault ship database in order to train drivers in driving on and
off the ship.
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b.
7
Vehicle Models. Vehicle models will be required to build scenarios with
friendly force vehicles (including selected coalition vehicles) and vehicles
representing the enemy force. In addition there is the requirement for
civilian vehicles to assist in generating representation of the complex
operating environment, asymmetric threat, as well as creating a pattern of
life (POL), as a backdrop for an asymmetric exercise. This will enable
soldiers to be exercised in making decisions on the legitimacy of targets.
c.
Dismounted Models. Models of people will be required to replicate own
forces (including coalition forces) and a conventional regular enemy
force. In addition an asymmetric force and civilians will be required.
d.
Relocatable Models. The training system will require the ability to insert
inanimate objects onto the terrain database in order to build an exercise.
The relocatable models would include, but not be limited to:
(1)
trenches;
(2)
bunkers;
(3)
obstacles (such as a ditch or barbed wire);
(4)
bridges (with a user defined bridge classification and length);
(5)
minefields;
(6)
improvised explosive devices (command and victim initiated); and
(7)
fences.
h.
Mapping. The mapping of the terrain databases will be required to be
loaded either onto in service Battle Management Systems (BMS) or BMS
emulations, if the real system is not used. There will also be a requirement
to generate paper maps of the terrain databases in order to conduct
exercise planning.
i.
Weapon Effects. In order to conduct training all LCVS specific
simulation systems will be required to replicate all weapon effects during
an exercise. In addition to this during Live simulation the effects of LCVS
weapon system in the battles will need to be replicated, as well as the
effects of weapons upon LCVS.
22. Exercise Monitoring and Trainee Assessment. There is a need for each stage
of progression to be monitored, as well as being able to monitor overall progress
during a training course. At the end of each training activity and exercise the
instructor will have the means to conduct a post training review. There should also be
an electronic record of performance of the individual, crew or troop for future review
or to act as a record of attainment.
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8
Personnel
23. The introduction of the LCVS will impact personnel across Defence and will
require review of the total workforce and development of cross agency management
policies. In due course a Capability Realisation Plan will be developed and detail how
the workforce will be developed and prepared to form a critical component of the
LCVS capability. Areas for consideration of personnel include the following:
a. Maintainers across all lines of support, and impact of predictive
maintenance information systems.
b. DMO fleet management and ILS staff.
c. Military and civilian trainers.
d. Broader modernisation plans and force structure changes, such as Plan
BEERSHEBA.
e. IIS, transition planning and Army’s Master Migration Plan.
f. Human factors studies and understanding the impacts of changing
technology on system operators.
g. Centralised management of support through concepts such as a CAFS
support centre.
Conclusion
24. The LCVS support systems will directly impact the capability effectiveness of
the LCVS and close combat capability. It will provide opportunities for evolving
methods for support to ensure the exploitation of technology to increase availability if
systems and responsiveness to adaptive campaigning. Managers and commander at all
levels must work to continue the development of the support system to ensure it
remains relevant in a changing and ever complex and dangerous operation
environment.
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LAND 400

Transcription

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