Denuclearizing North Korea: Exploring Multilateral Approaches to

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For over thirty years, the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, Inc. (IFPA), has conducted studies, workshops,
and conferences on national security and foreign policy
issues and produced innovative reports, briefings, and
publications. IFPA’s products and services help government
policymakers, military and industry leaders, and the broader
public policy communities make informed decisions in a
complex and dynamic global environment. With core staff in
offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C.,
the Institute maintains a global network of research advisors
and consultants. The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis:
innovative strategies for new security challenges.
Denuclearizing North Korea
Exploring Multilateral Approaches to
Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building
September 2011
Report by
Mr. Weston S. Konishi, Associate Director of Asia Pacific Studies
Project Principal Directors:
Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice-President
Dr. Charles M. Perry, Vice-President and Director of Studies
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
A publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
CONTENTS
Executive Summary and Key Points
vii
Introduction1
Peace, Denuclearization, and the Growing North Korea Problem
4
Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula
Trilateral Consensus Building
9
12
Implications for the Six-Party Talks and Other Regional Security Mechanisms
15
Harmonizing Trilateral Approaches to North Korea
18
Korean Peninsula Peace Regime
Characteristics of a Peace Regime
Developing a Peace Regime Consensus: Themes and Perspectives
Korean Peace Regime Consensus Building in Support of Denuclearization
The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor and Regional Considerations
21
25
29
37
38
Conclusion41
List of Acronyms
44
References46
Appendices50
Concise Chronology of the Events on the Korean Peninsula app:1
Trail of Documents Related to Korean Peace Regime Development
app:11
North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange (Basic Agreement), 1991
app:13
Agenda from January, 2011 Workshop
app:16
Participants from January, 2011 Workshop
app:19
v
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY AND
KEY POINTS
W
ith support from the Carnegie Corporation a brief summary of the workshop and subsequent
of New York, the Institute for Foreign Policy research findings:1
Analysis (IFPA) collaborated with the Institute of • North Korean provocations over the past year
Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) and
have had a considerable impact on the strategic
the US Institute of Peace (USIP) to organize a trienvironment in Northeast Asia, negatively affectlateral Track 1.5 dialogue in Seoul, South Korea
ing a range of bilateral ties. For instance, strains
on January 19, 2011 entitled “Risk Reduction and
have deepened between South and North Korea,
Confidence-Building on the Korean Peninsula:
South Korea and China, and China and the UnitChallenges, Opportunities, and Implications for
ed States. At the same time, the region is once
Regional Stability.” The dialogue brought togethagain polarizing into two main camps (U.S.-ROKer approximately 50 prominent policymakers and
Japan versus PRC-DPRK).
experts from the United States, China (People’s • The leadership succession process in North Korea
Republic of China, or PRC) and the Republic of
appears to be promoting more defiant and aggresKorea (ROK, or South Korea) for in-depth discussive behavior by the regime and adds further
sions focusing on the current security situation on
unpredictability to the already tense regional
and surrounding the Korean Peninsula and prossecurity environment.
pects for greater cooperation among the three • The nature of deterrence on and surrounding
nations represented at the workshop. The event built
the Korean Peninsula may be shifting, with the
on earlier workshops that IFPA has organized with
North seemingly emboldened to act out with
Carnegie Corporation support to examine a variety
impunity and the South declaring a new policy
of regional security challenges in Northeast Asia,
of “proactive deterrence” in response to further
including the likely impact of nuclear and ballistic
provocations.
missile proliferation trends, the potential value of • South Korean anxieties about the reliability of
multilateral risk reduction and confidence-building
the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent have been
measures on the Korean Peninsula, and the prosheightened by the North’s provocations and by
pects for developing over time a Korean Peninsula
peace regime (KPPR) based in part on the denu- 1 Note that this summary does not represent the
opinions of all workshop participants or their organizaclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of
tions. It is not a consensus document, nor has it been
reviewed by the participants prior to publication. IFPA
Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). The following is
has drawn its own conclusions from this exercise.
Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building vii
•
•
•
•
•
proposed policy changes outlined in the Obama
administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR). Washington should continue to reassure
South Korea and other regional allies about the
U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.
In the absence of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S.ROK-China strategic triangle has become an
increasingly salient mechanism for managing
regional crises in the short term and for shaping
a future security structure in Northeast Asia over
the long term. Enhanced cooperation and coordination among these three nations can lead to
a more effective diplomatic approach to negotiating the denuclearization of North Korea.
The three countries have diverging priorities,
with the United States and South Korea emphasizing denuclearization and China emphasizing
peace and stability on the peninsula. Harmonizing these priorities is a fundamental requisite for
adopting a common approach to the North Korean problem, including achieving a denuclearized
Korean Peninsula.
China’s deepening economic engagement with
North Korea is frustrating U.S. and South Korean attempts to isolate and pressure the regime.
As this engagement continues, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to sanction North Korea
without impinging on Chinese commercial and
economic interests.
Washington and Seoul should explore ways to
persuade Beijing to join initiatives to curb North
Korean provocations and nuclear development in
return for clearer assurances about allied intentions on the Korean Peninsula over the longer run,
especially in the context of a reunified peninsula
under the leadership of the South.
The United States, South Korea, and China
should improve trilateral security coordination
and cooperation through enhanced CBMs and
other risk-reduction measures. Opportunities to
cooperate with China in deterring North Korean
provocations and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) development should be pursued whenever possible.
viii Denuclearizing North Korea
• Over time, regional CBMs and risk-reduction
mechanisms can lead to a new regional security
architecture and/or a potential peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula.
• There is an ongoing debate over whether a KPPR
would be an end-state, such as an updated version of the 1953 armistice, with a formal end to
the war and a framework for reconciliation, or
a process leading to some form of North-South
reconciliation and, possibly, a Korean confederation. Regardless of the scenario, denuclearization of the peninsula should be a prerequisite for
the formation of a peace regime.
• The development of a KPPR should not in any way
impede or detract from the U.S.-ROK alliance,
which will remain a critical element of regional
security for the foreseeable future.
INTRODUCTION
A
fter a turbulent 2010, the security situation on
the Korean Peninsula has settled into a relatively stable—although still tense and tenuous—stasis
among the relevant regional players. This is a somewhat welcome development, given the alarming
series of events of 2010, when North Korea mounted deadly conventional attacks on South Korea
while revealing significant progress on its nuclear weapons program. In March 2010, North Korea
torpedoed the ROK navy corvette Cheonan, killing forty-six South Korean sailors.2 In November,
the DPRK launched an artillery attack on civilianpopulated Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South
Korean marines and two civilians. Both incidents
were among the most violent and deadly actions by
the DPRK since the end of the Korean War. Adding
to the already tense security environment, North
Korea disclosed in late November 2010 the existence of a new uranium enrichment program (EUP)
and a light-water reactor, signifying substantial
advancements in the country’s nuclear development.
These actions occurred against the backdrop of
the DPRK’s leadership succession process, from
Kim Jong-il to his young son and heir-apparent, Kim
Jong-un. At a conference of the Workers’ Party of
Korea (WPK) in September 2010, Kim Jong-un was
2 Pyongyang denies responsibility for the sinking of the Cheonan
and refutes the results of a ROK-led multinational investigation
that found evidence of North Korean torpedo parts linked to
the attack. China, which was not a member of the multinational
investigation, has raised doubts about the accuracy of the investigation and has refused to blame North Korea for the attack.
made a four-star general and given several senior
party posts, necessary steps in building his legitimacy as the country’s next leader. Kim Jong-un’s
profile has subsequently become more prominent
and the regime appears increasingly prepared to
make him the nation’s figurehead at some future
date. The delicate, and largely opaque, succession process likely played some part in the North’s
provocations in 2010 and has added yet another
unpredictable variable to the lingering tensions on
and surrounding the peninsula (Kim Jin-Ha 2010).
Taken together, the developments on the Korean
Peninsula since the first half of 2010 have had a
significant impact on the regional security environment, including heightened tensions across a
series of bilateral state-to-state relations. In addition to the increasing acrimony between North
and South Korea, the past year has also seen U.S.China, China-ROK, and China-Japan relations
suffer (although the latter rift between Beijing and
Tokyo is mainly a result of a bilateral spat over the
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands). The collapse
of the Six-Party Talks, after North Korea’s abrupt
withdrawal from them in April 2009, has also left
the region without a functioning multilateral mechanism for managing the ongoing crisis through
diplomatic means.
Through the summer of 2011, preliminary
attempts were made to restart the Six-Party Talks,3
3 In July 2011, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho met ROK
chief nuclear negotiator Wi Sung-lac on the sidelines of the
Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building 1
but the prolonged breakdown of the talks over the
past few years has cast renewed doubts about the
feasibility of a new regional security architecture
that might emerge from the six-party process—a
prospect that was much discussed in the middle
part of the decade when the talks reached a peak
of activity. At that time, the notion of a Korean
Peninsula peace regime was also raised as a potential mechanism for “directly related parties” to
address the many unresolved political, diplomatic,
and national security issues in Korea that contribute to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. After all,
North and South Korea are still technically at war
with one another, and the armistice agreement that
has governed the cease-fire for over fifty-five years
was never intended as a long-term resolution of the
Korean War.
Yet despite the obvious importance of a potential Korean Peninsula peace regime the idea has
never been fully fleshed out and at least as many
interpretations of its meaning remain as there are
“directly related parties.” A peace regime has alternately been described as “a mechanism to create
peace;” “a framework for ameliorating the mutual distrust and the hostile relationships… [and] a
foundation for peaceful coexistence and mutual
prosperity between the two Koreas”; “an institutional device for legal termination and prevention
of wars and maintenance of peace”; and “a process
of building peace, not the ultimate state of peace”
(O 2007; Lee Sanghee 2007; Lee In Ho 2008; Cho
2007). Each of the parties sees the peace regime in
light of its own strategic interests, often with competing goals, objectives, and purposes vis-à-vis the
other regional players.
In order to shed further light on the conceptual
parameters of a Korean Peninsula peace regime, the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), working with partners in South Korea, the United States,
and China, embarked on a multi-year project (from
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting
in Bali the possibility of resuming the Six-Party Talks. A follow-up meeting between DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kim
Kye Gwan and U.S. counterparts in New York later that month
did not produce a breakthrough on restarting the talks.
2 Denuclearizing North Korea
2008 to 2011) exploring peace regime building on
the Peninsula in ways that support and facilitate the
denuclearization objectives of the Six-Party Talks.
The project, formally titled Peace Regime Building
for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Korea, was funded by a major three-year grant from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York. Our aim was to combine research and dialogue in a mixed academic/
policy (track 1.5) environment among the relevant
parties to explore the linkages mentioned above,
and to develop a broader consensus regarding the
potential synergies between armistice management,
peace regime building and denuclearization.The
series of workshops conducted by IFPA and its partners have yielded some of the most comprehensive
and far-reaching work that has yet been done on the
subject of a Korean Peninsula peace regime. Over
the course of this undertaking, we have mapped
out the many definitional and conceptual aspects of
such a regime, providing a much clearer picture of a
peace regime for the consideration of policy makers
from all relevant nations. Areas of convergence and
divergence have also been illuminated by workshop
discussions, leading to further understanding of the
complex geostrategic dynamics affecting peninsular
and regional security.
Yet, paradoxically, as our research has produced
a clearer picture of what a Korean Peninsula peace
regime might look like, events on the peninsula
over the past year have made the prospect of a peace
regime appear all the more distant and out of reach.
Instead of progress toward peace talks on the peninsula, the region has seen a troubling escalation of
tension and a heightened level of brinkmanship on
the part of the North. Rather than moving toward a
revitalized six-party process, the parties have splintered in the wake of the North Korean regime’s
provocative actions. And, as these trends continue,
positions have polarized among the key strategic
actors shaping the regional security environment.
Indeed, perhaps the most dangerous aspect of
this unwelcome development is the divergent reactions by the United States and South Korea on the
one hand, and China on the other. The ROK and
In many ways, China
over the past few years
has become part of the
problem rather than
part of the solution to the
many security concerns
on and surrounding the
Korean Peninsula.
because of Beijing’s wariness regarding the longterm implications of pressing harder for substantial
change on the peninsula. As the stakes get higher,
the main players are moving in opposite directions,
even if recent rhetoric from Beijing highlights the
concerns it shares with the allies over North Korea.
Given the growing role of the US-ROK-China
dynamic in managing the North Korean crisis, IFPA
dedicated more focused attention to the trilateral
relationship in the last phase of our peace regime
project. Recognizing that the three countries have not
engaged in a comprehensive dialogue that focuses on
managing near-term nuclear and deterrence challenges and developing a shared vision for the future of the
Korean Peninsula, the project came to address this
deficiency in the context of broader implications for
peace-regime building. A track 1.5 project workshop
held in Seoul in January 2011 primarily included highlevel representatives from all three nations, yielding
important trilateral dialogue on common approaches
to confidence building, denuclearization, and regional security mechanisms leading to a potential peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula.
The following report is a summary of key findings and points of discussion over the course of our
workshop meetings, beginning with a review of our
most recent workshop, held in Seoul in January
2011, and its focus on the trilateral U.S.-ROK-China
dynamic. The report then turns to the conceptual
dimensions of a Korean Peninsula peace regime and
how such a regime might facilitate the denuclearization of North Korea and the creation of a new
regional security architecture.5
Some may question the relevance of studying a
peace regime at a time when tensions in the regional
security environment remain relatively high despite
a recent push to restart the six-party process. Yet,
as out of reach as such a regime may appear at the
moment, recent events on the peninsula should not
distract from long-term thinking about how to get
to an eventual peace process and a denuclearized
United States have maintained diplomatic pressure
on Pyongyang in response to its recent provocations.
Beijing, however, has shifted from sanctioning
North Korea for its nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009
to accommodating and even enabling the regime’s
development and proliferation of nuclear technology. China has also refrained from openly
criticizing Pyongyang for its role in the Cheonan and
Yeonpyeong incidents, further straining Beijing’s
ties with Seoul and Washington. In many ways,
China over the past few years has become part of
the problem rather than part of the solution to the
many security concerns on and surrounding the
Korean Peninsula.
It is evident that the primary cause of the divergence in the US-ROK-China triangular dynamic is a
widening gap in priorities among the three powers
in relation to the North Korean problem. While the
United States and the ROK emphasize the importance of denuclearizing the peninsula, China has
increasingly come to emphasize maintaining stability within the North Korean regime in order to,
among other objectives, preserve a buffer from perceived allied encroachment along its border.4 In
particular, China is underestimating near-term risks
5 James L. Schoff, Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at
from proliferation and conflict escalation, in part
IFPA, contributed substantially to this report before
4 For a thorough analysis of China’s priorities vis-à-vis
the DPRK, see International Crisis Group (2006).
his secondment to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense as Special Advisor for East Asia Policy.
North Korea. Further, if the past pattern of behavior is any indication of the future, tensions on the
Korean Peninsula have a tendency to diffuse just as
suddenly as they flare up—sometimes leading to
unexpected opportunities for engagement and dialogue on the diplomatic front. After a year or more
of heightened anxiety in the region, a swing back in
the direction of peace building is in due order, barring any further escalation of tension—perhaps one
reason why there is renewed interest in restarting
the Six-Party Talks. Even in the darkest of times,
it behooves policy makers and intellectual leaders
to stay ahead of the curve so as not to lose sight of
long-term goal of a stable, peaceful, and denuclearized Korean Peninsula.
Indeed, however intractable problems on the
Korean Peninsula appear to be, they are not static. The prospects for lasting peace in Korea will rise
and fall, and policy makers must be ready to take at
least one step forward each time they rise. Just as
in building a house, even in winter one can begin
to design, seek approvals, and prepare for logisti-
cal challenges long before hitting the first nail with
a hammer in the spring. Like any negotiation filled
with complexity and historical significance, solving the security dilemmas surrounding the Korean
Peninsula requires time, patience, and a clear view
of the promises and perils that lie in the road ahead.
This report is intended to be a contribution to the
latter endeavor.
Peace, Denuclearization, and the
Growing North Korea Problem
The pendulum swing between peace building and
potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula has
occurred many times since the armistice agreement
was signed in 1953. An initial round of talks aimed
at “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question”
broke down in 1954. In 1972, allusions to a final
Korean political settlement resurfaced with the
release of the North-South Joint Communiqué, but
North Korea circumvented the ROK just two years
later by appealing directly to the Americans for
North Korea’s Major Naval Bases and
Artillery Deployments in the Yellow Sea
Yellow Sea
(West Sea)
NORTH
KOREA
Northern Limit Line (NLL)
Yeonpyeong Island
76mm, 130mm artillery
North Korean artillery barrage
Nov. 23, 2010
Silkworm, Samlet missiles
SOUTH
KOREA
peace talks. Hope for moving past the armistice was
renewed in 1991, when top officials from Seoul and
Pyongyang signed the South-North Joint Agreement
on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation
and Exchange (the so-called Basic Agreement), but
largely as a consequence of North Korea’s ambivalence regarding implementation, that agreement has
remained an unfulfilled promise.
Throughout the late 1990s and the 2000s, other
attempts have been made to officially end the
Korean War and to introduce various confidencebuilding measures, but the few gains achieved have
eroded significantly in recent years to leave just the
joint industrial zone at Gaesong and a handful of
cultural exchanges. Most recently, North Korea’s
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010
pushed inter-Korean relations as close to war as
they have been in at least seventeen years. Since
the shelling, both sides have taken steps to avoid
further armed conflict but they continue to trade
harsh rhetoric back and forth across the DMZ and
a general sense of anxiety persists in the region.
The current situation, moreover, is potentially more
dangerous than past periods of tension and hostility for three main reasons.
First, North Korea continues to develop and
improve its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, and when combined with its stockpiles of other
WMD and North Korea’s deteriorating conventional military assets, the potential for WMD use and
horrendous casualties in a conflict on the Korean
Peninsula is unacceptably high. North Korea’s programs are expanding, and much remains to be
uncovered. For example, a recently leaked report
of the so-called UN Panel of Experts monitoring
compliance with UN sanctions against North Korea
highlighted not only the regime’s advancements in
nuclear and missile development, but also its ability to circumvent international efforts to control its
proliferation of WMD-related technology.6
There is also an increased risk of a wider conflict involving the mainland United States, as the
6 The Panel of Experts’ report has not been officially released yet, reportedly thanks to China’s efforts to
block its publication. See Charbonneau (2011a).
U.S. government now estimates that at its current
pace of nuclear and ballistic missile development,
North Korea could become a direct threat to the
United States within five years, with the implication
that Washington must take more concerted steps to
address this threat (Dombey 2011). Comments by
Chinese participants at the IFPA trilateral workshop
in January 2011, however, indicate a more fatalistic
and to some extent cavalier view from Beijing, with
one attendee from China actually suggesting that “a
weapon leaves an arsenal only when it is replaced
by another weapon…such as the aircraft carrier
replacing the battleship.” For North Korea now, this
participant went on to argue, the only acceptable
“replacement” for their nuclear weapons is probably
U.S.-North Korea normalization, which is why he
believed that dialogue and attempts at reconciliation with North Korea would be more productive
than girding for a fight. Other Chinese attendees
offered variants of this advice.
The second worrisome trend is that the process
of leadership transition in North Korea may lead to
more aggressive or at least even more unpredictable
behavior on the part of the North Korean leadership and especially the military, as evidenced by
the attacks on the ROK navy corvette Cheonan and
Yeonpyeong Island, revelations about the North’s
covert UEP facility, and recent reports of an increase
in public executions and stricter border controls in
the DPRK (Chosun Ilbo 2010). North Korean demonstrations of strength and control might seek to
contradict incipient internal or external doubts
regarding the new regime’s ability to govern and
protect the country, but in the short term this
approach is also undermining the regime’s ability to reform the economy and make use of outside
investment. This, in turn, is a problem at two levels:
first, the North’s provocative behavior could spark
an escalation of conflict that neither side can readily
predict or control, and second, the DPRK’s deteriorating economy could lead to a genuine political
and humanitarian crisis in the North, or it could be
weakened enough to tempt conservative ROK policy
makers into thinking that they can push the North
over the edge through their own form of brinkmanship. Either way, both China and the United States
would have much at stake in the outcome.
Indeed, whether it is an economic breakdown of
the North’s own making or one prompted by outside pressure, the tenuous nature of North Korea’s
economic and political viability over the mid- to
long term is a source of potential conflict between
the allies and China, as each seeks to manage the
situation and promote its own interests. The North
Korean reality today is that the ruling regime’s predictions just a short time ago that it would establish
a “great, prosperous and powerful country” by 2012
have already given way to a ten-year plan “to rank
among the advanced countries by 2020” (Kyodo
News 2011). North Korea is struggling to feed its
…whether it is an economic
breakdown of the North’s
own making or one
prompted by outside
pressure, the tenuous
nature of North Korea’s
economic and political
viability over the mid- to
long term is a source of
potential conflict between
the allies and China, as
each seeks to manage the
situation and promote
its own interests.
Public Opinion Comparison between
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents
This chart shows the percentage of people who
responded positively regarding the
administration’s change of attitude towards
military retaliation after the two incidents
report to
UN Security
Council
75
79.9
58.5
economic
sanctions
58
suspend
North-South
relations
limited
military
retaliation
45.2
42.5
28.2
poll taken 4/24/2010
68.6
poll taken 11/27/2010
Data source: East Asia Institute
people and boost productivity, and a significant failure on this front could seriously undermine the new
regime. The World Food Program (WFP) indicated
that North Korea is heading for a new, “chronic” food crisis in 2011, with a need to import over
860,000 tons of cereals to help serve an estimated five million people facing food shortages (World
Food Program 2010). North Korea has requested
food aid from all three countries,7 and it is seeking
additional economic investment as well.
Faced with these trends, could China, the United
States, and the ROK ever agree on common strategies to provide humanitarian or economic assistance
to North Korea? Should a crisis erupt, can they avoid
challenging each other as they seek to influence
7
The Obama administration sent a fact-finding mission to North
Korea in May 2011 to assess the regime’s food situation. At this
writing, the administration is weighing whether or not to provide food aid over objections from the Lee government in Seoul.
Percentage of South Koreans National Security Concerns Since 2000
100
Yeongpyeong island incident
11/2010
80
DPRK withdraws from NPT
08/2003
60
40
20
DPRK’s first nuclear test
12/2006
George W. Bush
innauguration
06/2001
08/2002
IAEA inspectors expelled
DPRK’s second
nuclear test
06/2009
04/2010
Cheonan incident
07/2004
2nd and 3rd rounds
of Six-Party Talks
09/2000
1st inter-Korean Summit
12/2007
2nd inter-Korean
summit
03/2009
prior to DPRK missile test
0
events? Are there steps they could take together before any potential crisis to reduce the impact
and speed recovery? Could progress on one policy
front open the door to wider trilateral collaboration on Korean security on other fronts, including
cooperative threat reduction in the nuclear arena?
More importantly, might the three countries learn
in this way to coordinate their various sticks and
carrots to achieve a common purpose with regard to
Pyongyang? Whatever the answers, further North
Korean aggression and North Korean collapse are
two quite plausible scenarios during the political
transition now unfolding in the North, which is
why there is now an added degree of uncertainty on
the peninsula and increased anxiety with regard to
its future trajectory.
The third reason that the security situation on
the peninsula is more volatile is that ROK public
attitudes toward the North are changing, and there
is increased political pressure on the ROK government to be tough in its response to North Korean
aggression or even its “charm offensive” tactics.
After the Yeonpyeong Island shelling in late 2010,
nearly 70 percent of South Koreans supported limited military action in response, compared to less
than 30 percent after the Cheonan sinking, and pub-
lic concerns about security in general are at their
highest level in fifteen years (with a quadruple
increase in South Koreans being “very concerned”
or “slightly concerned” about security, up from 19
percent in 1999) (Lee and Jeong 2010). South Korea
is now looking to divert defense funds to strengthen a new West Sea command, and the stakes over
the controversial Northern Limit Line (NLL) have
risen (Chosun Ilbo 2011b). Where just a few years
ago, under President Roh Moo-hyun, Seoul demonstrated flexibility regarding the NLL’s status as
a de facto maritime border, the ROK government
now appears willing to risk war over nearly any
encroachment of this demarcation.
The predominant South Korean perspective in
the wake of recent events is, quite understandably,
that restraint has only encouraged the North to continue its provocations, and that a firm response to
the next attack will be necessary to enhance deterrence for the longer term. President Lee Myung-bak
has called this a “proactive deterrence” approach8,
and the ROK military is backing it up with invest8
In response to the Cheonan incident, ROK President Lee
Myung-bak announced on May 24, 2010, “From now on, the
Republic of Korea will not tolerate any provocative act by the
North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence.
If our territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated, we
will immediately exercise our right of self-defense” (2010).
ROK Public Opinion on Aid and
Long-Term Policies with DPRK
South Korean Public Opinion on
Military Responses and Government
Response to Yeonpyeong Island
minimize/abolish
Aid to DPRK
maintain/increase
positive assessment of government response
agree with
strong military
response
24.3
30.9
64.3
58.3
disagree with
strong military
response
negative assessment of government response
01/2010
05/2010
Cheonan
incident
Long-Term Policies
with DPRK
05/2010
Cheonan incident
11/2010
Yeonpyeong
incident
reconciliation/cooperation
hardline policy
11/2010
Yeonpyeong incident
ments in Joint Direct Attack Munition missiles
(JDAMs) and more concerted efforts to relax range
and payload limits on its ground-based missile
force.9 No one really knows whether Pyongyang
will perceive these measures as credible steps by
9
South Korea is looking to develop missiles with ranges up to one
thousand kilometers, more than three times the range allowed
under a current U.S.-ROK bilateral pact. The two countries are in the
process of discussing options at this time. See JoongAng Daily (2011).
Seoul to respond to and deter future North Korean
military action, so the allies will be tempted to (and
must) prepare for further retaliations. Unfortunately,
such preparations could also lead North Korea to
believe that a larger-scale attack was being planned,
perhaps leading to a miscalculation on Pyongyang’s
part. In this regard, China and the United States
share the risk that they can potentially be drawn
into a conflict of someone else’s making.
Indeed, even if a broader conflict is avoided,
recent developments on the peninsula have also
made China increasingly nervous about its security interests in the region. Chinese participants
at the January 2011 workshop acknowledged the
severity of North Korea’s provocations and said that
these acts, along with the regime’s nuclear development, pose a serious dilemma for Chinese security
interests as well. As one Chinese participant pointed out, “We are all in the same boat” regarding
North Korea’s potential to destabilize the region.
The DPRK’s provocations, it was admitted, serve
to undermine Chinese security interests by, among
other things, driving Japan, the United States, and
South Korea closer together, increasing interest in
all three countries in missile defenses that may
degrade China’s ballistic missile capabilities, and
raising the overall prospect of the very instability
within the region that China hopes to prevent.10
10 As Zhu Feng writes, “China worries that North Korean
actions will lead to deeper defense and security cooperation among South Korea, Japan and the US. Perceptions that
China “protects” North Korea could lead to the emergence of
a powerful Washington-Tokyo-Seoul axis directed, not only
against North Korea, but also implicitly at China” (2010).
DETERRENCE
ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
T
he events of 2010 have, indeed, raised new
questions about the nature of deterrence on
the Korean Peninsula, and what the appropriate allied response should be toward the North.
Workshop participants from South Korea and the
United States argued that a robust allied response
to North Korea’s recent provocations was called for
and was necessary to deter further aggressive acts
by the regime. South Korean experts argued that
President Lee’s “proactive deterrence” policy is necessary to ensure that further provocations from the
North will not be tolerated indefinitely. They added
that the policy is meant to send three messages to
the North: 1) that South Korea will retaliate proportionately to another attack; 2) that although the
South does not want war it will not avoid one if it
is inevitable; and 3) that South Korea will continue to strengthen the alliance with the United States
beyond the 2015 deadline for transferring wartime
operational control from the U.S. to ROK command.
Still, not all participants at the IFPA workshop
agreed with Seoul’s new “proactive deterrence” policy. An American participant argued that the new
policy is dangerous for several reasons. Among
them, he said, is that President Lee may be held
politically hostage to future provocations from the
North by being forced to retaliate or else risk losing
his credibility. This situation also binds U.S. policy makers to any actions that President Lee would
take in response to another attack, without taking
a more coordinated, alliance-oriented approach to
the next provocation. The potential for an escalation of hostilities is all the higher in the context
of the DPRK’s succession process, which makes
Pyongyang less willing to back down in a contest of
wills with Seoul. The North, meanwhile, is likely to
continue attacks as part of its own deterrence strat-
ROK Public Opinion on the Future
of the R.O.K-U.S. Alliance
independent foreign policy
maintain current levels
reinforcement of alliance
1/2010
7/2010
11/2010
egy, which is to demonstrate that it is not afraid of
conflict with outside powers.
Chinese participants said that Beijing’s behindthe-scenes diplomatic efforts have successfully kept
North Korea from making any further provocations
since the Yeonpyeong incident—somewhat contradicting their claims throughout the day that China
has less leverage over North Korea than is commonly assumed. An American participant conceded that
the reduction of tensions on the peninsula through
the winter of 2010–11 may have been a result of
behind-the-scenes measures by China or U.S.-ROK
demonstrations of deterrence but wondered whether the current state of relative calm is sustainable
over time.
Nonetheless, the debate over deterrence on the
peninsula has intensified in South Korea of late,
spurred not just by the DPRK’s provocations and the
debate over the appropriate means of responding to
them but also by anxieties over the Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The
NPR outlines five key objectives for U.S. nuclear
weapons policy and posture: 1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 2) reducing
the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national
security strategy; 3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 5) sustaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal (U.S. Dept. of
Defense 2010). Some South Korean scholars and
policy makers, however, worry that the proposed
changes in the U.S. nuclear posture may negatively
affect South Korean security interests and undermine deterrence toward the North.
In particular, South Korean critics point to two
elements of the 2010 NPR that are of potential concern.11 First is the question of whether the planned
reduction of the overall U.S. nuclear arsenal might,
in effect, reduce the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent over South Korea. A second
concern relates to the so-called negative securi11 See, for instance, Cheon (2010).
ty assurance (NSA) as outlined in the new NPR.
Under this clause, the United States pledges not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states that have joined the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are in compliance with those treaty obligations. South Korean
analysts worry that this could create a loophole for
the DPRK to attack the ROK with chemical, biological, or conventional weapons without fear of nuclear
retaliation from the United States, even though the
NPR lists North Korea and Iran as current exceptions to the NSA policy (Cheon 2010).
Concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent have triggered calls in some
South Korean circles for the United States to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons into South Korea
or for the ROK to develop its own nuclear weapons capability (Cheon 2010). The United States
has reportedly not deployed nuclear weapons on
the peninsula since 1991, when former President
Concerns about the
reliability of the U.S.
extended nuclear deterrent
have triggered calls in
some South Korean circles
for the United States
to reintroduce tactical
nuclear weapons into
South Korea or for the ROK
to develop its own nuclear
weapons capability
George H.W. Bush ordered the withdrawal of overseas tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Some
South Korean experts advocate the reintroduction
of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons as a way to extract
North Korean concessions on denuclearization and
to deter further acts of aggression from the North.
The reintroduction of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons, these experts argue, could also put pressure
on China to rein in the North’s belligerent behavior and induce the regime to return to negotiations
over denuclearization.
However, many U.S. experts argue that
reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula would not produce the positive outcomes
that South Korean advocates predict. To the contrary, U.S. experts warn that reintroducing nuclear
weapons would likely feed into DPRK propaganda
claims that the United States is adopting a “hostile”
policy toward the regime—perhaps then leading Pyongyang to accelerate its nuclear weapons
development (Cossa 2011). Further, the pursuit of
indigenous South Korean nuclear capabilities would
constitute a major departure from the ROK’s nonnuclear posture, with significant repercussions for
South Korea’s international prestige and for regional security in general (Cossa 2011).
In light of the ongoing debate over extended
deterrence, the need for the United States to reassure South Korea (and other regional allies such as
Japan) about its continued strategic commitments
remains a top priority. Indeed, one of the central
tenets of the 2010 NPR is to strengthen regional deterrence while reassuring allies and partners
as the U.S. nuclear posture evolves. The Obama
administration consulted closely with Seoul and
Tokyo during the nuclear review process and both
allies were, of course, included in the follow-up
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in 2010. President
Obama reinforced the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence in a joint statement with President
Lee Myun-bak in 2009, stating, “We will maintain
a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ security interests.
As the United States and
its allies seek to bolster
deterrence on the Korean
Peninsula they should
also engage China in
order to reduce risks and
explore opportunities to
enhance regional strategic
dialogue and cooperation
The continuing commitment of extended deterrence,
including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this
assurance (U.S. White House 2009).” The U.S.-ROK
Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC)
was subsequently formed in December 2010 in
order to coordinate bilateral deterrence policies visà-vis the DPRK (Yonhap News Agency 2011a).
Last year’s provocations by North Korea, however, highlight the complex challenges facing allied
deterrence strategies in Asia, including the dilemma
of how to deter conventional attacks from the North.
Pyongyang’s brazen acts of aggression in 2010 were
apparently based on a calculation that allied retaliation would not eventually lead to the use of nuclear
weapons. Indeed, in the case of limited conventional conflicts, the use of nuclear weapons is out of the
question, given the moral hazards that that would
create. Thus, the U.S. nuclear deterrent did not prevent the two conventional attacks by the DPRK,
and may fail to do so again in the future. At the
same time, however, the potential use of nuclear
weapons may have kept all sides from allowing a
conflict to escalate into all-out war. This has created a so-called stability-instability paradox on the
The divergent policies
taken by China on
the one hand, and the
United States and South
Korea on the other, may
continue to magnify
current dangers if not
more squarely addressed
Korean Peninsula whereby mutual deterrence prevents an escalation of conflict but does not prevent
the outbreak of low-intensity hostilities such as the
Yeonpyeong Island incident (Jimbo 2011).
For the time being, there is little recourse in the
face of the North’s aggressions other than to seek
stronger United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions condemning North Korean behavior and
bolstering allied defense coordination, primarily by
conducting joint U.S.-ROK military exercises and
enhancing U.S.-ROK-Japan defense cooperation.
The United States, in particular, must demonstrate
to friends and foes alike that improvements in conventional capabilities can offset a reduced role for
nuclear weapons while maintaining credible deterrence levels, as outlined in the 2010 NPR (Bunn and
Manzo 2011).
As the United States and its allies seek to bolster
deterrence on the Korean Peninsula they should
also engage China in order to reduce risks and
explore opportunities to enhance regional strategic
dialogue and cooperation. A nuclear dialogue with
China, for instance, could address common concerns about North Korean WMD development and
proliferation as well as mutual concerns about each
other’s long-term nuclear strategies (Bush 2011).
A strategic dialogue with Beijing along these lines
could enhance trust in the region and potentially
lead to unexpected avenues for joint defense cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea.12 China’s participation
could also be incorporated into a broader deterrence strategy, as Ken Jimbo writes: “China also has
the capacity to augment deterrence. North Korean
fear of abandonment from China continues to grow
as indicated by the frequent visits by Kim Jong-il
and other high-ranking officials to China. Given
the stability-instability paradox, the role played by
China in terms of deterring low-intensity aggression and supporting escalation control seems
pivotal. China’s unusually active, intense and public
degree of engagement after the Yeonpyeong incident
showed how alarmed Beijing was by crisis escalation” (Jimbo 2011).
Trilateral Consensus Building
In some ways, the North Korea problem underscores the common security concerns among the
regional players, at times serving as an impetus for enhanced security cooperation among the
United States, South Korea, and China.13 Yet, while
the three countries may all be “in the same boat”
regarding North Korea, they may be “rowing in different directions,” as an American participant at
the workshop pointed out. The divergent policies
taken by China on the one hand, and the United
States and South Korea on the other, may continue to magnify current dangers if not more squarely
addressed. The allies remain concerned that China’s
stance allows the first problem of North Korea’s
nuclear and missile programs to persist, provides
political space for the more destabilizing aspects of
12 For instance, one Chinese scholar, Shen Dengli, has outlined how
China could potentially join allied military exercises: “To prevent China from viewing U.S.-ROK naval drills as provocative,
the U.S. and South Korea could invite China to join. Forging a
China-U.S.-ROK trilateral naval exercise would carry great political symbolism and expand the international coalition to deter the
aggression that has led to recent regional instability” (2011, 2).
13 Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun write: “The evolution of
regional approaches to North Korea ironically reveals North
Korea as the primary source of insecurity and as a catalyst for enhanced security cooperation among Northeast
Asian players over the past two decades” (2011, 62).
political transition in the North, and exacerbates in
the process the third problem of a more confrontational political atmosphere in the South.
For its part, China believes that the allies’ more
aggressive stance in the wake of Yeonpyeong has
actually made each of these problems harder to
resolve. “North Korea wants to change its external relationships to support transition,” said one
Chinese participant in IFPA’s January 2011 trilateral,
“but we need to facilitate this in a peaceful manner.
If we get too confrontational, it will be more difficult.” Moreover, China continues to decry what it
sees as the “strengthening of the Cold War structure in East Asia,” stimulated by various US-ROK
and US-ROK-Japan initiatives to coordinate and
bolster their deterrent capabilities.
Indeed, Chinese participants criticized the U.S.led alliance system in Asia as “moving backward” in
the direction of a Cold War security structure that
Beijing and Pyongyang perceive as threatening and
counterproductive. According to one Chinese par-
ticipant, Beijing’s attempts to transcend the Cold
War security paradigm have been repeatedly set
back by allied responses to events on the Korean
Peninsula, which have stressed joint military cooperation and strategic solidarity. Moves to strengthen
U.S.-ROK-Japan defense ties following the Cheonan
and Yeonpyeong incidents only deepen the sense of
insecurity in North Korea and raise Chinese concerns about strategic encroachment by the allies
(Zhu 2010, 1). This also feeds into the perception in
Beijing that the United States and its allies are creating a regional security structure that is balancing
against China rather than seeking ways to incorporate China’s legitimate security interests into a
broader regional architecture.
It is important to keep in mind, moreover, that
China is not simply providing North Korea with
political and diplomatic cover, it is investing heavily
in North Korea’s future in the hopes of promoting economic development and enough political
confidence in the North to allow Pyongyang, so
China’s Merchandise Trade with the DPR
($ in millions)
3000
2500
2000
China’s Exports
1500
China’s Imports
1000
500
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Data source: Congressional Research Service
the Chinese argue, to take steps to smooth tense
relations with its neighbors and the United States.
Some of these measures are directed from Beijing,
but many are being carried out at the provincial and
private levels. As a result, North Korea’s trade with
China has increased more than 500 percent since
2000, and China now accounts for over 70 percent
of North Korea’s overall trade (Nishimura 2011).
And this does not even account for the black market
economy that has grown as UNSC sanctions force
North Korean vendors to lean on more sophisticated
Chinese trading companies to complete illicit transactions. As one U.S. workshop participant noted,
not only are China’s and the allies’ strategies at
odds, but it is becoming more difficult, given the
complex intertwining of Chinese and North Korean
patterns of trade and investment, to “surgically cut
out” criminal DPRK elements without “touching
Chinese nerves.”
As a result, while the United States becomes
increasingly aggressive in its pursuit of DPRK proliferation networks, pressures on the U.S.-China
relationship are almost certain to intensify, as
Chinese trafficking channels are more regularly and
precisely targeted. In some ways, then, rather than
creating opportunities to push Pyongyang toward
reform and accommodation, China’s effort to gain
greater leverage over North Korea via greater trade
and investment may end up simply widening the
gap between Washington and Beijing, as the United
States seeks to clamp down on illicit trafficking to
and from North Korea and China feels compelled to
protect its increased investment in the North.
Discord at the United Nations on North Korea
issues is yet another manifestation of the problem, as unanimous votes sanctioning North Korea
for nuclear weapons development have given
way to blocked votes and weak statements about
Pyongyang’s aggressive behavior and nuclear program advances. At the IFPA trilateral dialogue in
Seoul, Chinese participants complained that China
was excluded by South Korea from participating
in the Cheonan investigation, and they have argued
that China should be included in IAEA or six-party survey teams when inspections of North Korea’s
nuclear programs occur (if they ever do). In addition, China has consistently blocked the submission
of reports by the UN Command (UNC) in South
Korea since 2010, including both special investigation and annual reports.14 From the Chinese
perspective, the UNC is an outdated vestige of the
Korean War and cannot escape its legacy as a “warring party.” These are all examples, it is said, of the
United States, South Korea, and the “old” UN system trying to investigate and adjudicate activities on
the Korean Peninsula without significant Chinese
involvement, but with U.S. and ROK expectations
that China will sign onto their policy choices and
North Korean punishments.
14 And, as mentioned earlier, Beijing has apparently tried to block the release of the 2011 UN Panel of Experts
report that implicitly blames China for aiding North
Korean efforts to sidestep international sanctions.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE SIX-PARTY
TALKS AND OTHER
REGIONAL SECURITY
MECHANISMS
D
ivergent priorities have also changed how the
three countries now perceive the main goals
of the Six-Party Talks, which have not resumed
since North Korea withdrew from the talks in April
2009. As Beijing has shifted away from an emphasis on denuclearization, it has repeatedly called on
a resumption of the six-party process in order to
manage tensions arising from the North’s recent
provocations. China therefore appears to see
the talks as a crisis management mechanism as
opposed to a mechanism that focuses first and foremost on denuclearization issues. On the other hand,
Washington and Seoul continue to see the talks
as a means for negotiating the denuclearization of
North Korea and have balked at Beijing’s calls to
resume the talks in the aftermath of the Cheonan
and Yeonpyeong incidents. The breakdown of the
six-party process over the past several years has cast
doubt on whether the talks can be a viable regional
security mechanism.15
15 This also has implications for broader regional security cooperation. As Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun write: “The failure to make
practical progress in implementing the goal of denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula has impeded the advancement, coordina-
Experts at the January 2011 workshop took different positions on the usefulness of the Six-Party
Talks at this stage of the crisis. Chinese participants argued that the Six-Party Talks could still be
effective but they urged the U.S. to be more flexible and to consider normalizing ties with North
Korea in exchange for denuclearization (members
of the Chinese delegation, in contrast to their more
pessimistic American counterparts, stressed the
possibility that the right package of inducements
could persuade the North to give up its nuclear program). Another suggestion offered by a Chinese
participant was to broaden the scope of the SixParty Talks, essentially focusing on softer issues
such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and
other matters before tackling harder issues such as
denuclearization.
South Korean participants reiterated their government’s position that some form of apology from
the North over the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island
incidents, however pro forma, should be a precontion, and integration of the six party mechanism within the broader
process of regional community building in East Asia” (2011, 61).
dition for resuming the Six-Party Talks.16 One
Korean expert said that the Six-Party Talks must
be resumed in order to find a solution to the North
Korean nuclear problem. He suggested two different approaches to compel North Korea and China
to change their positions: 1) a hard-line approach
that would use enhanced allied security cooperation and deterrence capabilities to impel China to
more seriously consider denuclearization as a policy priority; and 2) a soft-line approach that would
provide the North with assurances about its leadership succession process in exchange for concessions
on nuclear weapons. This latter approach, in other
words, would use the succession process as a bargaining chip, although the expert conceded that he
was not sure about how that might be implemented
as an actual policy.
In lieu of the Six-Party Talks, one American
expert proposed the creation of a five-party
Northeast Asia security dialogue that would promote cooperation on disaster relief, humanitarian
assistance, cross-border health issues, and other
common challenges confronting the region. The
advantage of this approach, the expert argued, is
that the dialogue would not be held hostage to
North Korean participation (or lack thereof) and
could be used initially to tackle less contentious
issues before, over time, taking on larger strategic
issues such as denuclearization, missile reduction,
and contingency planning on the Korean Peninsula.
Workshop participants considered other options
for enhancing regional cooperation through confidence-building measures and other risk-reduction
measures. One suggestion was for the United States
and China to collaborate on controlling North
Korean proliferation networks, including proliferation networks that the North has developed within
China. Another idea, suggested by U.S. participants,
was to include China in the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI). This would bring China into the
fold of international counter-proliferation efforts
toward North Korea. The participant stressed
16 South Korea has called for an apology as a precondition for
inter-Korean talks, although media reports in late June 2011 suggested that Seoul may drop this demand (Chosun Ilbo 2011a).
the voluntary nature of the PSI and the fact that
Beijing could determine on its own what it would
be prepared to contribute to the initiative. However,
Chinese participants, mirroring their government’s
position, did not appear receptive to the idea of
joining the PSI. Instead, one Chinese expert suggested that the United States and South Korea could
invite China as an observer in joint naval exercises
in less strategically sensitive areas (the Yellow—or
West– Sea, for example) as a mutual trust-building
measure. This would, according to the expert, give
China the opportunity to prove to the international
community that it is a “responsible stakeholder” in
the region.
Divergent priorities have
also changed how the three
countries now perceive
the main goals of the SixParty Talks, which have
not resumed since North
Korea withdrew from
the talks in April 2009
Although the notion of creating a peace regime
on the Korean Peninsula seemed remote in the
immediate wake of the DPRK’s provocations
in 2010, participants at the IFPA workshop
recognized some merit in discussing how such
a regime should be approached in the future.
One U.S. participant, in particular, argued that
a peace regime should not necessarily be linked
to a peace treaty with North Korea. According to
this participant, a peace treaty is a “non-starter”
absent a major breakthrough with Pyongyang on
denuclearization issues. He added, however, that
the absence of a breakthrough on denuclearization
should not hamper efforts to conceptualize what
a peace regime might look like in the future and
how a broad range of CBMs and tension-reduction
measures in the midterm might lead to a potential
peace regime over the long term.
HARMONIZING
TRILATERAL
APPROACHES TO
NORTH KOREA
T
he ongoing North Korean problem presents
unique challenges, not just for the prospects
of future regional security architectures but, perhaps more fundamentally, for trilateral cooperation
among the United States, China, and South Korea.17
Getting all three countries to “row in the same
direction” again will depend on harmonizing their
priorities over the near to long term. One U.S. participant pointed out that there may be more of a
convergence of priorities than meets the eye, as
denuclearization and stability are not mutually
exclusive and are, in fact, inextricably linked. As
U.S. and ROK participants contended, “We can’t
have peace and stability without denuclearization.” Indeed, based on the workshop discussions,
it would appear that trilateral collaboration has
the best chance of success if it is focused first on
harmonizing U.S., Chinese, and ROK priorities
and strategies on the three broad issue areas: 1)
near-term stability and crisis management; 2) denuclearization and nuclear security; and 3) the shape
of long-term peace on the peninsula.
17 Bonnie S. Glaser and Scott Snyder write, “Absent coordination
of an effective response to spillover effects from possible instability in North Korea, the actors most directly involved, namely
China, South Korea . . . and the United States, are unlikely to build
the mutual understanding necessary to stabilize the region and
lay the basis for cooperative security over the long term” (2010).
Recent events on the Korean Peninsula could
have had the potential to drive Seoul, Beijing, and
Washington closer together, but it is clear that large
gaps still remain on this front. In many cases, these
gaps stem from a lack of Chinese confidence in the
region’s ability to manage instability in North Korea
and from China’s anxiety over the ultimate shape of
The ongoing North
Korean problem presents
unique challenges, not
just for the prospects of
future regional security
architectures but, perhaps
more fundamentally, for
trilateral cooperation
among the United States,
China, and South Korea
a long-term peace regime. In this sense, while the
U.S. participant mentioned above chose to focus on
the nexus of the first two issues (stability and denuclearization), China tends to see the challenge more
broadly, with the ultimate peace structure and supporting security system of paramount importance.
Therefore, if serious progress is to be made toward
harmonization, trilateral cooperation must deal
with all three issue areas simultaneously.
Looking ahead, so-called front-end dialogue
about the entry point for renewed six-party negotiations is, of course, necessary, but it may not allow
for sustainable progress, because the barriers to
coordinated action have as much to do with the
three countries’ discordant visions for the future as
they do regarding the present. For this reason alone,
trilateral dialogue over the next few years could be
far more productive if it were focused on a number
of near- to midterm crisis management issues in a
way that illustrates to China how all three countries can work together to cope with instabilities
(including a cross-border disaster or humanitarian
crisis), while at the same time exploring the longerterm requirements of a Korean peace regime and
regional security system that accounts for China’s
needs. This could potentially include the following
points:
• U.S. assurances to Beijing that potential postunification allied force structures would not be
aimed at containing China or checking its strategic interests. This could include promises not to
forward-deploy U.S. bases near the border with
China and a discussion of possible reductions of
U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula under certain security conditions.
• Reassurances that Chinese economic and commercial interests would be maintained in postunified Korea and that China would continue to
have a major stake in the future economic development of the peninsula.
• More concrete proposals for a Korean Peninsula
peace regime or post-unification regional security structure that would take into account China’s
strategic interests and would give Beijing a key
role in deciding the direction of this new security arrangement.
If the allies can begin to reassure China in this
way, it might be possible to enlist more effective
Chinese cooperation on counter-proliferation priorities and the containment (and eventual rollback) of
North Korea’s nuclear programs. Viewed from this
angle, solving the North Korea nuclear problem has
more to do at present with “getting China right,”
Although virtually all
of the relevant parties
in the region have made
references to a peace
regime at various points
in the past, there remains
little consensus on what a
KPPR would look like or
how it could be developed
given the often divergent
strategic interests of the
key regional players
than with trying to engage and/or seek negotiated
terms with Pyongyang. And while strengthening the
US-ROK alliance and the US-ROK-Japan strategic
triangle is an important way to bolster deterrence
in the short run, it will not provide a full or lasting
solution to the long-term problems posed by North
Korea. China should be part of that solution, and
there is a long way to go to develop a policy framework that all three countries can support and that
will lead to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and a
more stable regional security environment.
Achieving that goal will likely involve the future
creation of some form of peace regime or multilateral framework for managing the transition toward
a more peaceful peninsula. Although virtually all
of the relevant parties in the region have made
references to a peace regime at various points in
the past, there remains little consensus on what
a KPPR would look like or how it could be developed given the often divergent strategic interests of
the key regional players. North Korea’s provocative
actions, not just in 2010 but throughout the past
decade, have also set back progress in developing a
common vision for a peace regime. Drawing on the
results of IFPA’s ongoing research, the next section
of this report examines the conceptual contours of
a Korean Peninsula peace regime and the necessary
steps that the various parties must take before it
can be realized.
KOREAN PENINSULA
PEACE REGIME
T
he term “peace regime” officially made its SixParty Talks debut in the September 2005 joint
statement from the fourth round of those negotiations, as the participating nations emphasized their
commitment to build a lasting peace in Northeast
Asia by pledging to initiate a separate negotiation for a “permanent peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula” at an appropriate time.18 Although the
Six-Party Talks have been primarily focused on
denuclearizing North Korea, the mention of a separate peace regime dialogue by “the directly related
parties” acknowledged the many unresolved political, diplomatic, and national security issues in Korea
that contribute to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
After all, North and South Korea are still technically at war with one another, and the armistice
agreement that has governed the cease-fire for over
fifty-five years was never intended as a long-term
solution to the Korean War.19
Despite this acknowledgement of the ultimate
importance of establishing a Korean Peninsula
18 The six-party talks consist of delegations sent by
China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and
the United States. For a detailed discussion about
the Six-Party Talks, see Schoff et al (2008).
19 Balbina Y. Hwang writes, “Despite the fact that the Korean armistice has been remarkably successful in preventing the resumption
of full-scale military conflict between the two Koreas for nearly 60 years, it has largely been dismissed as a potentially useful
basis for developing a permanent peace arrangement and more
often than not considered an impediment to overcome” (2011, 2).
peace regime, no KPPR talks have occurred and no
one can identify a probable start date or even a likely agenda for those negotiations. Notwithstanding
the recent moves to restart the Six-Party Talks,
these have been stalled for the past several years,
and with the aftershocks of the DPRK’s hostile acts
in 2010 still affecting regional dynamics, the prospects for true peace in Korea seem dimmer than
they have been in more than a decade. A brief overview of the historical origins of the KPPR, however,
shows that this is not unprecedented and that, in
fact, peace-regime building has ebbed and flowed
ever since the Korean War ended over a half-century ago.
In 1943, the United States, Britain, and China
stated in the Cairo Declaration that “in due course,
Korea shall become free and independent,” but that
had not come to pass by the time North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th parallel in 1950 (Oberdorfer
2001, 5). On July 7, 1950, shortly after the war
began, the newly established United Nations passed
Security Council resolution UNSC 84, which called
for the establishment of the U.S.-led United Nations
Command (UNC) to help South Korea defend itself.
One year into the conflict, in July 1951, the
Soviet delegation to the UN approached the UNC
to initiate negotiations for ending the war. Although
the parties agreed in principle that the 38th paral-
lel should serve as a guide for a demarcation line,
talks continued for two years as disagreements
intensified over prisoner exchanges and the final
demarcation line. Finally, the UNC commander, the commander of Chinese “volunteer” forces
(Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, or CPV), and
North Korea’s supreme commander signed the
Korean War Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953.
Although the agreement was relatively effective at
institutionalizing a cease-fire, the signatories never
meant for it to serve as a political settlement. It
is instead a military document signed by military
leaders, containing mechanisms to help the parties
keep the cease-fire. “In fact,” as Balbina Y. Hwang
asserts, “the Korean armistice is a uniquely exceptional agreement in that it is a purely military
document since technically no nation is a signatory
to the agreement, only the representatives of armed
forces” (2011, 5).
For example, the armistice established the
Military Demarcation Line (MDL) along the 38th
parallel, a line separating North and South. The
armistice also created a two-kilometer buffer on
either side of the MDL known as the demilitarized
zone, or DMZ. In addition, it established committees and commissions to provide multilateral
oversight of the terms of the cease-fire.
The armistice contains many limitations despite
its continued utility. First, the armistice failed to
construct an effective means by which to adjudicate
armistice violations. For instance, the UNC claims
that North Korea has violated the terms of the armistice 430,000 times while North Korea recognizes
approximately 3. Conversely, North Korea accuses
the South of 830,000 violations when the number
of violations is probably closer to 16 (Lee Sanghee
2007). Second, North Korea rejects the West Sea
demarcation line. Soon after the armistice was
signed, the UNC determined that the West (Yellow)
Sea islands of Pak Yong Do, Dae Cheong Do, So
Cheong Do, Yun Pyung Do, and Woo Do would fall
under UNC control and established the Northern
Limit Line (NLL) three nautical miles to the north
of those islands. Pyongyang often expressed its
desire to see the NLL pushed farther south, and at
a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting
in 1973 the North declared that it would not recognize the NLL.
As one IFPA workshop participant noted, “The
armistice’s objective of a complete cessation of
hostilities was temporary in nature, until a final
peaceful settlement would be achieved.” The parties designed the armistice to segue from a military
settlement to a political one, and they scheduled
a meeting for within three months of signing the
armistice to plan for that transition. In what would
emerge as a pattern with inter-Korean negotiations,
however, those talks were delayed by nearly a year
and were eventually abandoned.
Allusions to a final Korean political settlement
did not resurface until 1972 with the release of
the North-South Joint Communiqué. In that document, the two Koreas agreed in principle to
threat-reduction and confidence-building measures
and recognized their mutual desire for reunification and a peaceful conclusion to the Korean War.
It reads, “Firstly, reunification should be achieved
independently, without reliance upon outside force
or its interference; secondly, reunification should
be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse
to the use of arms against the other side” (see
Appendix B for a list of KPPR-related documents).
What prompted Pyongyang to seek talks with Seoul
in 1972 on these issues? The answer is not clear
(and is probably multifaceted), but one important
factor might have been Washington’s new China
policy and President Nixon’s visit to Beijing earlier that year. It is hard to know, however, if North
Korea sensed potential U.S. weakness (its former
enemy embracing its ally), or if it was more concerned with possible Chinese abandonment (its
former ally embracing its enemy).
Although the 1972 joint communiqué offered
a degree of optimism, North Korea circumvented
the South Koreans just two years later by appealing
directly to the Americans for peace talks.
The DPRK government sent a letter to the
U.S. Congress in which it proposed direct bilater-
al negotiations in order to create “the prerequisites
to the removal of tension on Korea and the acceleration of the country’s independent and peaceful
reunification.” The letter continued, “It is becoming increasingly evident that as long as the U.S.
troops remain in south [sic] Korea it is impossible
to remove tension and consolidate peace in Korea”
(DPRK government 1974). North Korea did not
recognize South Korea as a sovereign and legitimate state, and for Pyongyang, the presence of U.S.
troops on the peninsula constituted the main issue
that required resolution.20
The 1974 DPRK peace proposal sought the dissolution of the UNC and the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Korea. Needless to say, the United
States and South Korea were opposed to such terms,
and North Korea’s proposal was not acted upon.
Hope for introducing a KPPR was renewed in 1991
when top officials from Seoul and Pyongyang signed
the North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation,
Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange
(the Basic Agreement—see Appendix C). This was a
comprehensive document in which the two parties
pledged to “exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful
unification,” including various CBMs such as the
establishment of a South-North liaison office at
Panmunjom and plans to reconnect certain railways,
roads, and many Korean families separated since
the war. Important points to note about this document include that the two parties described their
relationship not as one between states, but instead
as a “special interim relationship stemming from
the process toward unification.”
In addition, the agreement pledged recognition
and respect for each other’s system of government,
non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, no
slander or vilification, and no actions of sabotage or
attempts to overthrow the opposing regime. A former ROK official emphasized at the workshop, “The
North Koreans are really obsessed with these prin20 For its part, the ROK constitution enacted in 1987 states in
article 3 that “the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.” For the
English version, see Constitutional Court of Korea (1987, 2).
ciples… and they will insist they be included in any
agreement you try to negotiate with them.”
The Basic Agreement was followed by the 1992
North-South declaration of the denuclearization of
the peninsula, which, interestingly, directly connected the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
to helping “to create conditions and an environment
favorable for peace and peaceful unification.” This
agreement also suggested establishing a SouthNorth joint nuclear control commission (JNCC) to
aid in verification, but the two sides could never
agree on how to launch that organization.
Pyongyang’s apparent lack of interest in actually implementing these two agreements with any
vigor again raises the question of why the North
agreed to their terms in the first place. As during
1972, external factors might have been critical, as
Pyongyang watched Germany reunify in late 1990
and the Soviet Union collapse at the end of 1991.
Kim Il-sung might have viewed reaching out to
South Korea as a useful strategy to provide his country some diplomatic space and political breathing
room as it contemplated the possible ramifications
of these tumultuous geopolitical events.
In 1993, amidst DPRK-IAEA wrangling over
nuclear-related inspections, the United States and
North Korea met for “policy-level” talks in New
York and later issued a brief joint statement that,
among other items, agreed to the familiar principles of assurances against the threat and use of
force (including nuclear weapons), mutual respect
for each other’s sovereignty, non-interference in
each other’s internal affairs, and support for peaceful reunification of Korea. A series of inter-Korean
talks began around this time as well (Poneman,
Wit, and Gallucci 2004). But as one veteran Korean
negotiator reminded workshop participants, “Any
optimism with the North turned out to be a frustration and a disappointment, and any good agreement
rarely lasted more than two years.” In this case, the
momentum for peace that began building in 1991
lasted only slightly more than two years, as the first
North Korean nuclear crisis heated up in 1994.
What little progress had been made during those
years regarding possible U.S.-DPRK normalization,
limiting U.S.-ROK military exercises, and exchanging North-South special envoys was gone, and the
spotlight was back on denuclearization. Still, the
1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework that came
out of this crisis offered a new (albeit fragile) diplomatic path to support reconciliation efforts. The
framework did focus more on the nuclear issue
than on peace-regime building, but it also led to
an unprecedented level of economic and diplomatic
engagement, including planning for the construction
of two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea
by a multinational consortium, KEDO (the Korean
Peninsula Economic Development Organization).
Moreover, the Agreed Framework paved the way
for other initiatives, such as a four-party meeting
proposed by presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill
Clinton in 1996, involving North and South Korea,
The United States
clearly sees substantial
(if not nearly complete)
DPRK denuclearization
as a prerequisite for
diplomatic normalization
and signing some sort of
declaration ending the
war, even if planning
for a peace regime and
implementing CBMs
might begin beforehand
the United States, and China to discuss replacing the
armistice with a political settlement. Even though
the Four-Party Talks failed to achieve their objectives, one Korean workshop participant involved in
those talks noted that “It provided an important
venue for bilateral discussions to happen simultaneously in the four-party context. These meetings
were an important ice-breaking moment, in terms
of our ability to talk very frankly with each other
about our concerns, and to begin an initial exploration of some basic concepts regarding what we are
now calling a peace regime.” The United States also
opened bilateral talks with the North on missiles,
the recovery of U.S. soldiers missing in action from
the Korean War, and future denuclearization logistics (such as fuel-rod removal).
The next key milestone came amid ROK
President Kim Dae-jung’s so-called sunshine policy
toward the North, specifically the first-ever interKorean leadership summit in June 2000. Although
the resulting joint declaration was short on specifics, the endorsement by top leaders for promoting
exchanges and economic development led to several
inter-Korean projects including the joint industrial
zone at Gaesong and a tourism zone at Mt. Kumgang,
as well as a series of family and cultural exchanges. At the summit, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il
also “agreed that there is a common element in the
South’s concept of a confederation and the North’s
formula for a loose form of federation.” For a brief
time after the summit meeting, it seemed as if the
spirit of the Basic Agreement of 1991 (which had
hardly been implemented throughout the 1990s),
had been revived, and that the political environment
was finally favorable for carrying out the ambitious
agenda described in that document.
In the “two steps forward, two steps back” dance
of negotiating with North Korea, however, many
of these achievements were rolled back over the
next nine years. A change in administration in the
United States and new evidence regarding a possible North Korean UEP contributed to the collapse
of the Agreed Framework and the second North
Korean nuclear crisis, in 2002. North Korea then
withdrew from the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in January 2003, a move that later prompted
a multilateral approach to pursuing denuclearization in the form of the Six-Party Talks.
The Six-Party Talks have a mixed record in terms
of stopping North Korea’s nuclear program, and they
have contributed only slightly to the future development of a KPPR. Still, the talks on denuclearization
have been closely intertwined with formally ending the Korean War and normalizing U.S.-DPRK
relations, even if the parties have not agreed on
which step comes first. The United States clearly sees substantial (if not nearly complete) DPRK
denuclearization as a prerequisite for diplomatic
normalization and signing some sort of declaration
ending the war, even if planning for a peace regime
and implementing CBMs might begin beforehand.
After North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, for example, White House spokesperson Tony Snow stated,
“If the North Koreans dismantle their nuclear programs and renounced further nuclear ambitions, we
are willing to do a whole series of things, including
declaration of the end of the Korean War.”
Conversely, North Korea prefers to hold onto its
nuclear devices until after normalization and related
KPPR steps, as a way to maintain deterrence until
it is convinced that America has ended its “hostile
policy” toward the North. A North Korean Ministry
of Foreign Affairs statement, for example, released
on July 22, 2007, explained, “The establishment of
the peace regime on the Korean peninsula is one
of processes to the goal of denuclearization.” This
is a fundamental challenge going forward, though
it is perhaps an area where discussing a KPPR can
be useful, since, depending on how it is structured,
it could include incremental steps that might provide political cover for both sides so that it does not
appear that one has capitulated to the other.
The final historical milestone worth mentioning is the second inter-Korean leadership summit
in October 2007. The resulting Declaration on the
Advancement of South-North Korean Relations,
Peace and Prosperity further emphasized the “need
to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime…[and] of having the leaders
of the three or four parties directly concerned to
convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the
war.”
This question about the number of directly concerned parties (three or four) is discussed in more
detail below, but the statement is noteworthy in that
Pyongyang seemed to acknowledge the multilateral nature of the problem. In the past, even though
North Korea participated in the Four-Party Talks, it
never truly accepted the legitimacy of South Korea’s
right to participate, as Pyongyang only wanted to
negotiate directly with the United States. After a
decade of negotiating with liberal governments in
Seoul, Pyongyang seemed to recognize at the 2007
summit that South Korea deserves an official seat
at the peace table. Whether or not this would ever
mean that the North would sign a peace treaty
directly with the South, however, is still an open
question.
Characteristics of a Peace Regime
Although the 2005 joint statement may have officially linked a peace regime to the Six-Party Talks, few
experts can adequately define the KPPR concept, let
alone specify its components. As one participant at
the IFPA-organized workshop confessed, “I’m not
sure what the organizers mean when they say ‘peace
regime.’ In fact, I’m not sure what I mean when I
say ‘peace regime.’ And I’m pretty convinced that
the people in 2005 who wrote ‘peace regime’ into
the joint declaration didn’t have a clue what they
meant when they said ‘peace regime.’” This point
was echoed by others at the workshop, and from a
U.S.-ROK alliance perspective, this lack of clarity
can lead to misunderstandings and a misalignment
of expectations. Defining the concept of a KPPR
and its implementation is critically important to
the alliance and the success of future negotiations.
As one participant offered, “If at the end of the day
we can come up with a common definition of what
we all mean by ‘peace regime,’ we will have probably already made a major contribution to this effort.”
Academics and policy makers often think of
regimes as sets of norms, rules, patterns, and principles of behavior guiding the pursuit of interests,
around which actors converge (Krasner 1983).
Regimes usually are not as formal as institutions
(with a specific address, staff, or letterhead), and
they can often be quite expansive (such as the
nuclear non-proliferation regime based on bilateral
and multilateral treaties and involving international
organizations and supplemental supplier initiatives). Although many scholars have been studying
and writing about various KPPR schemes for years,
there is still no clear consensus about what approach
is best.
There are two principal debates regarding the
nature of a KPPR, and they are interconnected.
The first revolves around what a peace regime is
supposed to produce (that is, how we describe its
purpose and the desired end state). At its most basic
level, the KPPR could be an updated version of the
1953 armistice, with an added political agreement
to end the war and endorse a framework for reconciliation along the lines of the Basic Agreement
signed in 1991; this would be only a slight change
from the status quo based on hope for improved
North-South relations over time. A more ambitious
view links a KPPR directly to the process of reconciliation and confederation, to settling tough issues
like the West Sea Northern Limit Line (NLL), to
facilitating cross-border traffic, trade, and communication, and to meaningful military CBMs that
reduce military forces along the DMZ. Related to
this, the second debate focuses on whether a peace
regime is primarily a process (or even just the trigger for a process) that eventually leads to a desired
end state, or instead more of a destination that will
codify or institutionalize a particular outcome.
Participants at the IFPA-organized workshop
shared varying interpretations of peace regime
and peace-regime building as well. Many of the
participants agreed with some of their academic
counterparts that a peace regime refers to a process
and not just an outcome. One Korean participant
argued that a “peace regime is something bigger
than peace agreement. It should involve reconciliation among the parties and confidence-building
measures among the parties.” An American participant concurred that a peace regime is a “process,
not just an end state, and that the process codifies
mutual actions and it provides for the requisite confidence-building measures.”
Several participants focused on replacing the
armistice with a permanent political settlement. An
American government official commented, “The
peace regime is a grouping of international agreements that specifically constitute a framework for
ending the Korean War and establishing an enduring peace on the peninsula.” Another participant
agreed: “The Korean War Armistice Agreement
should be replaced by a peace treaty with a final
peaceful settlement as it is stipulated in the preamble of this agreement.” According to one Korean
participant, the current South Korean administration views peace-regime building as a mechanism
to replace the armistice. The participant said, “The
KPPR as we know it and we view it means a political and legal state where the Korean War has been
officially terminated and where a permanent peace
has replaced the current regime on the peninsula.”
Yet for one Korean participant, the armistice
though outdated has provided a relative peace quite
successfully. He explained, “I am living in Korea
with the peace regime of the armistice agreement.
Actually we maintain peace relatively well since
1953.” He suggested that a peace regime should build
upon the armistice and focus on other issues that
the armistice fails to deal with, such as the process
of unification or confederation. This might seem a
bit like splitting hairs—whether or not the armistice
is “replaced” or “built upon”—but it should at least
prompt analysts and policy makers to consider the
specific day-to-day (and extraordinary) responsibilities of the current armistice infrastructure so that
key duties are addressed and capabilities maintained
Roadmap for Building the New Peace Structure
stage
laying the groundwork
institutionalizing
establishing
denuclearization
phase
• completion of
nuclear disablement
and declaration
• nuclear disarmament talks
• nuclear disarmament
• accepting IAEA safeguards
• completion of nuclear
dismantlement (including
nuclear materials
and weapons)
• North Korea’s return
to the NPT
• terminate the armistice
agreement
• conclude a peace
treaty and international
assurances
• operate an inter-Korean
peace governing body
Korean Peninsula • conduct a Peace Forum
Peace Regime
• adopt a joint statement
on the peace regime road
map at the Peace Forum
• hold regular SouthNorth dialogue
Northeast Asia
peace regime
Korean-U.S.
alliance
• conduct Six-Party
ministerial talks
• conduct Northeast
Asian Security
Cooperation Dialogue
• adopt a vision for KoreaU.S. strategic alliance
• take initial steps of
the peace regime
• organize a South-NorthU.S. peace governing body
• hold inter-Korean
arms control talks
• carry out a functional
shift of the United Nations
Command (UNC)
• conduct negotiations to
organize Northeast Asian
Security Cooperation
• advance to Korea-U.S.
comprehensive alliance
• revise role and size of U.S.
Forces Korea (USFK)
• establish Northeast Asian
Security Cooperation
• restore wartime
operational control
to Korea
• dissolve the UNC
This table represents one notional approach to creating a Korean Peninsular Peace Regime according to the
Korea Institute for National Unification.
or enhanced. For the sake of security and peace, it is
important to strike the right balance between building confidence and maintaining deterrence.
There is also an overarching question of whether
the KPPR ends up facilitating Korean reconciliation
and unification, or if in fact it serves to solidify the division of Korea by allowing North Korea
to strengthen its economy through more normalized external relations while its leadership remains
focused on maintaining internal control and trying to improve its ability to dictate terms for future
reunification. In other words, is a prerequisite for
a KPPR essentially a North Korean political decision to seek unification on terms acceptable to the
South, or can a KPPR be realized even if North
Korea just wants to be left alone? As one participant
put it, “The peace regime process should be seen
as changing the game in North Korea, not locking
it in place. That means it should lead to changes
in Pyongyang…maybe not a change in regime, but
changes in behavior, and changes in the way the
regime operates.”
When considering the various benchmarks or
preconditions that would most likely comprise any
peace-regime process for the Korean Peninsula, it
is possible to foresee major roadblocks that will
emerge during negotiations. For instance, the
United States has made it clear that peace cannot
occur without denuclearization, effectively making
denuclearization a precondition for normalization,
peace with South Korea, or even legally ending the
Korean War. For the North Koreans the sequence is
reversed. One participant said it best: “I can’t imagine a peace regime or any type of peace agreement
being actualized before denuclearization. I also have
never met a North Korean who could imagine denuclearization before there was a peace agreement or a
peace treaty or some similar arrangement. Therein
I think lies the rub and one of the reasons why we
find this so difficult.”
If we choose to define
a peace regime as a
destination, then the
final settlement should
amount to a package
deal addressing the
outstanding issues
plaguing negotiations
and considering the
demands and preferred
timing for implementation
by each party
However, there is much more to it than just the
nuclear issue. Washington and Seoul can begin by
defining what they consider to be the conditions
necessary for peace on the peninsula, each by itself,
and as an alliance. As they do this, it is likely that
they will end up describing a peace regime more as
a destination than as a process. In other words, the
conditions acceptable to the allies are not something
that North Korea is likely to agree to in advance,
in such areas as verifiable denuclearization, reducing the forward-deployed disposition of the DPRK
forces along the DMZ, or scaling back the DPRK’s
missile programs. Similarly, the allies are probably
not yet ready to meet North Korea’s likely early conditions for shaping a peaceful environment, such
as limiting U.S.-ROK military exercises, cutting
U.S. forces or military investment on the peninsula, avoiding any sanction or criticism of DPRK illicit
activity or human rights violations, and many other
possible conditions. A peace regime cannot be fully
implemented until both sides are no longer suspicious or fearful. The regime itself does not alleviate
suspicion or fear. A participant offered, “We’ll probably only be able to implement a peace regime when
we don’t really need one anymore.”
If we choose to define a peace regime as a destination, then the final settlement should amount
to a package deal addressing the outstanding issues
plaguing negotiations and considering the demands
and preferred timing for implementation by each
party. A near simultaneous exchange presents the
best chance of success. One former U.S. official at
our workshop stated, “I look at a peace regime or
peace arrangements as made up of different components. It’s not a single document. And I think it’s
sort of a deal where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed on this. It’s got to be a package…
if you don’t do that, you don’t have the possibility
of developing something that’ll hold.” By executing
such a complex diplomatic maneuver, the preferred
timing of each party can be satisfied. The United
States achieves denuclearization prior to normalization and the DPRK obtains normalization
before denuclearization. This suggests a very long
and drawn-out negotiating process that focuses on
building mutual confidence. To be successful, all
sides must commit at some level to this process.
Viewing a KPPR as a far-off destination does not
absolve the interested parties from their responsibility to work toward that goal, however indirectly
or incrementally, even if they are convinced that no
progress is possible in the near term (for example,
because one party considers a counterpart’s ruling
regime or administration to be completely hostile
to its own core requirements). A policy of throwing up one’s hands and claiming that nothing can
be done is not an acceptable option for policy makers, even in the short term. Some productive work
can always be carried out, either in an alliance context, a trilateral ROK-U.S.-China context, or by
engaging North Korea in the simplest of confidencebuilding measures related to armistice maintenance
and armistice modernization. Official and unofficial dialogue on armistice and KPPR issues amongst
the parties and the UN (and UN-related organizations) will pay dividends in the future if the parties
can begin to lay a baseline for common agreement
on KPPR development.21 Some non-governmental
interaction (such as medical assistance or education
and cultural exchanges) might also be useful in the
interim, to keep channels of communication open
and to try to improve mutual understanding.
a good way to strike this balance. Regular military
exercises are required to complete this transition
confidently, and the U.S. support role (and nuclear umbrella) will remain in place indefinitely. These
are not negotiable in a peace regime, but there are
ways to begin to address each side’s legitimate security concerns (such as through traditional CBMs
and certain security assurances), as long as North
Korea is truly interested in enhancing transparency
and military-to-military (mil-to-mil) communicaDeveloping a Peace Regime
tion and exchanges.
Consensus: Themes and Perspectives
Since 2004, South Korea has been taking over a
A long journey begins with a single step, and number of missions directly associated with mainalthough there have been many false starts in the taining the armistice, including security of the DMZ
past, it is possible that North-South or U.S.-DPRK and counter-fire command and control, among othbilateral meetings in the future could begin again to ers (Bell and Finley 2007). In addition, the alliance
outline ways to develop the conditions necessary for is planning to transfer wartime operational control
peace on the peninsula. If the next attempt at peace (OPCON) of ROK forces from the combined forcbuilding is to have any substance, however, greater es commander, a U.S. general, to the ROK military
mutual understanding and solidarity on key issues leadership—a change that was originally scheduled
among South Korea, the United States, and China to take effect in 2012, although it is now postponed
will be necessary to move North Korea into a poten- until December 2015 in light of the DPRK’s hostially more flexible position under a new regime in tilities last year. According to the OPCON transfer
the future. This will likely require some compro- plans, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should become
mise by the allies and by China as well.
U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM), after which
First, Do No Harm: Armistice
and Operational Control
Any roadmap for a KPPR or U.S.-DPRK normalization dialogue must allow for the delicate balance
between fostering a peaceful atmosphere and reassuring South Korea of the U.S. security commitment.
Any U.S.-DPRK rapprochement that causes Seoul to
lose confidence in the alliance and seek such things
as new longer-range missiles or nuclear reprocessing
capabilities will do nothing to help create conditions
necessary for peace, and it could in fact undermine
stability. China understands this, too, and the slow
and steady plan underway to transfer wartime leadership for South Korea’s defense to ROK forces is
21 Indeed, according to Hwang, “Only by reinvigorating and revitalizing the functions of the armistice can it serve as an effective
institutional basis for a permanent peace arrangement while ensuring the prevention of further conflict in the interim” (2011, 6).
Any roadmap for a
KPPR or U.S.-DPRK
normalization dialogue
must allow for the
delicate balance between
fostering a peaceful
atmosphere and reassuring
South Korea of the U.S.
security commitment
KORCOM and ROK Joint Forces Command will
become “complementary, independent commands
in a supporting-to-supported relationship” (Bell
and Finley 2007). In other words, the ROK commander will indicate what U.S. support he needs,
and KORCOM will be responsible for carrying out
those activities. Of course, any campaign will be
closely coordinated and planned together.
OPCON transfer has the potential to be an
important factor in the KPPR debate. Discussions
about armistice maintenance will increasingly be
inter-Korean matters, and although this might not
please Pyongyang, it is altogether appropriate and
will eventually leave North Korea with no choice
but to engage with the South on security matters.
This should also please Beijing in the long run, as
it could lead to a less prominent U.S. military role
on the peninsula in the future. Putting the leadership for South Korea’s defense in the hands of
South Korea is a potential point of consensus for
the United States, ROK, and China, which would
put additional pressure on North Korea to change
its outdated perspective on the regional security
landscape.
The United Nations Command (UNC) will
also step back into a supporting role with OPCON
transfer, and under a peace regime it could eventually transform into a neutral forum to assist with
monitoring and dispute resolution (though it would
have to undergo some change to accommodate certain DPRK objections). This is also consistent with
thinking among many policy specialists in China
that while the UN could have an important role to
play in a KPPR, the legacy of the UN in Korea is
that of a warring party, and the roots of that legacy should be essentially ripped out in order to allow
for a new, untainted UN role. This new role, in the
words of one Chinese scholar, would take advantage
of the UN’s contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding expertise, and it would also “reflect better
the current balance of power within the UNSC.”
For the longer term, Beijing is looking for more
substantive changes to the fundamental role of the
U.S.-ROK alliance than the allies are willing to
consider at the moment. Although China does not
anticipate (or push for) a weaker U.S.-ROK alliance
in the same way as North Korea (which is seeking
de facto U.S. political neutrality on the peninsula),
some Chinese scholars have pointed out that Beijing
would expect a “reclassification or redefinition” of
alliance roles and missions as part of a KPPR in a
way that dilutes the U.S. presence, commensurate
with North Korean tension reduction steps. From
the allies’ point of view, while they have stated an
interest in pursuing reciprocal threat reduction policies and CBMs with the North, the core of their
mutual security commitments contribute significantly to peace on the peninsula and is not up for
negotiation. Whether or not a “redefinition” of certain alliance roles and missions can be reconciled
with threat reduction and CBMs to yield a result
that can satisfy the “interested parties” is something that will take them many years to sort out
and will require more mutual confidence than currently exists.
Basic Agreement as a Foundation
It is widely agreed that the 1991 Basic Agreement
remains the most promising document in terms of
establishing concrete measures and mechanisms to
improve conditions for peace-regime building, and
this is probably still the case despite North Korea’s
unilateral repudiation in January 2009 of all past
inter-Korean political and military accords. Many
experts have argued that the Basic Agreement could
serve as the basis for a future political settlement.
One Korean participant at the IFPA workshop urged
the new administration in Washington to “reconfirm the value of the Basic Agreement.” A second
participant from the United States reiterated his
Korean colleague’s point and said that even though
the failure to implement the measures set forth by
the Basic Agreement would make it difficult to use
the agreement as the key political agreement to
transition from the armistice, the agreement “does
offer an internationally recognized, legally sufficient
foundation upon which to build a peace regime.”
The Basic Agreement, as mentioned earlier, outlines several CBMs and other gestures to foster
goodwill and build the trust necessary to make
real progress on a KPPR. These go beyond mere
pledges to refrain from aggression or interfering in
each other’s internal affairs. The Basic Agreement
authorizes the establishment of a Korean joint military committee to oversee the implementation of
CBMs including, among other measures, notification of troop movements, exchange of military
personnel and information, phased and verifiable
arms reductions, and direct telephone links. It also
paves the way for various economic, social, and cultural exchanges, also managed by different joint
committees.
The Basic Agreement is a template for improving inter-Korean relations and a way to help bring
about the conditions necessary for peace. It is also
an agreement that Pyongyang consented to at one
point in its history. “It is really necessary to think
about the conditions that will enable a peace regime
to establish real peace,” one participant said, “and
it seems to me that as a starting point that begins
with threat reduction. And that begins with the
implementation of the basic agreements. I think
this is absolutely fundamental as a starting point.”
President Lee Myung-bak supports the idea of using
the Basic Agreement as a foundation for peaceregime building. In March 2008, Lee declared that
previous agreements should act as a basis for making progress with North Korea and that the Basic
Agreement outweighed any other in significance
(Kang 2008).
ences of opinion, caveats, and qualifications begin
to emerge. Fortunately for the U.S.-ROK alliance,
there is unanimous agreement that a KPPR is first
and foremost a Korean (that is, inter-Korean) initiative. Pyongyang professes to agree, judging from
the language it has approved in North-South documents dating back to 1972. The first principle
The Basic Agreement is
a template for improving
inter-Korean relations
and a way to help bring
about the conditions
necessary for peace
for reunification in the 1972 North-South Joint
Communiqué, for example, is that it “should be
achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference.” This point, conveyed
with slightly different wording, has been reiterated in every important inter-Korean agreement since.
DPRK leaders, however, seem to view ending
the Korean War and working toward unification as
two separate endeavors, because in many ways they
always saw themselves as legitimately representing all of Korea and the war as one of self-defense
against the Americans (and their “traitorous puppet lackeys” in the South). Over the years, North
Korea has persistently tried to isolate South Korea
Parties to a Peace Regime
at multilateral talks, and to seek direct bilaterAt first glance, identifying the “directly related paral negotiations with the United States regarding a
ties” to a KPPR seems quite obvious, namely the peace treaty. A Korean participant expressed his
two Koreas, the United States, and China (given worry that at some point Washington might oblige
their central involvement in the Korean War and Pyongyang, if only to try to move the diplomatic
the precedent of the Four-Party Talks). Scratch process along. “There is concern in Korea that in
the surface, however, and some important differ- the end, it might just be the U.S. and the DPRK in
the process,” he said, “and this would perhaps unintentionally accept the longstanding North Korean
argument that Washington and Pyongyang were
the major players, or parties of the Korean War.”
The participant continued, “Doing so would also
mistake Washington support for the North Korean
logic that the U.S. initiated the Korean War, and
recognize North Korea as the only legitimate political entity on the Korean Peninsula.”
Participants at the IFPA-organized workshop
offered four major reasons behind North Korea’s
strategy to engage directly with the Americans for
ending the war. First, North Korea views the United
States, not South Korea, as the central obstacle to
peace, symbolized by the U.S. military presence on
the peninsula. An American official pointed out
One participant answered
fears concerning the ROK’s
potential isolation by
stating, “A peace regime
must, at its core, have
a Korean agreement
and be seen by others
as a Korean solution.”
that “the main reason the North Koreans participated in the Four-Party Talks was because the U.S.
agreed that one agenda item could be the possible
withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula and
establishment of a separate peace treaty between
the U.S. and North Korea.” Second, Pyongyang
sees peace with the United States as a more effective guarantor of regime survival. One participant
observed, “The North wants to preserve its regime
by changing the situation from an armistice to a
peace regime, not with South Korea, but with the
United States. That’s the only way of regime survival in their mindset.” Third, North Korea suggests
that technically speaking, South Korea should not
participate in peace-regime building, since only the
UNC commander, a Chinese representative, and a
North Korean representative signed the armistice.
If a peace regime intends to replace the armistice,
North Korea argues, only the signatories of the
armistice should sit as parties to a peace regime.
Fourth, North Korea seeks to buttress its belief that
Pyongyang is the sole legitimate leadership in Korea.
U.S. officials, however, have consistently supported the idea that South Korea should be a party
to any agreement involving resolution of the war.
They often counter North Korea’s arguments by
pointing out that the United States was not a signatory to the armistice either; rather, it was the UNC
commander who signed on behalf of all UNC members (including the Republic of Korea). Moreover,
when the armistice was signed, the Korean People’s
Army (KPA) and CPV commanders made a point of
confirming this fact, because they wanted to make
sure that ROK forces would be required to abide by
the terms of the agreement (United Nations 1995,
6). So, if North Korea and China were satisfied in
1953 that the armistice was binding on ROK forces,
they cannot now claim that Seoul was never a party
to that agreement.
ROK leaders have made some progress over the
years in making their argument that Seoul will be a
key player in KPPR dialogue and that it should be a
party to ending the war. One participant answered
fears concerning the ROK’s potential isolation by
stating, “A peace regime must, at its core, have
a Korean agreement and be seen by others as a
Korean solution.” Since the introduction of the term
“peace regime” in the Six-Party Talks in 2005, Seoul
and Pyongyang did manage to agree that there were
“three or four parties directly concerned,” when
President Roh Moo-hyun met with Kim Jong-il
in October 2007. The three they referred to were
apparently the two Koreas plus the United States,
and China might be the fourth. But given the vagueness of what KPPR actually means, this still does
not clarify that the North would accept South Korea
as a signatory to a formal peace treaty to end the
war. Pyongyang instead might view a KPPR as a collection of agreements and arrangements, including
a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty.
Another reason why North Korea might be
reluctant to include the South in formal peace treaty talks is because of all the potential claims this
could open up from Seoul. For example, a Korean
workshop participant listed a few points (from a
ROK perspective) not often mentioned during discussions of peace regime. He said, “First, we need
to hold war criminals accountable in the historic
context. Second, there has to be some discussion
of reparations for the damages incurred during the
Korean War.” There are also many in the South who
believe that the North is still holding hundreds, if
not thousands, of prisoners of war in their country.
The North makes similar claims against the South.
Getting into these disputes would open up a large
number of intractable issues that could easily derail
peace talks before they ever got started. Koreans are
going to have to think hard about whether or not
they are willing (and able) to formally end the war
without solving these problems. There might be a
way to end the war and establish a joint committee to explore and resolve these claims as part of
peace-regime building, but the parties must also be
careful not to sweep too much under the rug in the
early stages, lest the peace collapse and confidence
be further undermined for the future.
Even though a key component of peace-regime
building is a sincere inter-Korean dialogue, which
appears quite elusive in the near term, tension
between the two has sometimes facilitated an interKorean effort to institute certain threat-reduction
measures without the assistance of the international
community. The mechanisms may prove imperfect
yet they demonstrate a capacity for the two states to
work bilaterally at times.
For example, following a series of skirmishes
over fishing areas in the West Sea that peaked in
1997 and 1999, North and South Korea initiated
working-level engagements in 2001 to find a diplomatic solution to the fishing controversy and other
maritime issues surrounding the disputed NLL. The
effort accelerated after the 2002 naval clash that left
dozens of sailors killed or injured. Finally, following
a general-level military meeting in 2004, the two
sides signed the Inter-Korean Maritime Agreement
and Subsequent Exchange on June 14, 2004. The
agreement encouraged the establishment of a military hotline, along with the use of the same radio
frequencies so as to avoid future miscommunication, as well as to stop propaganda along the DMZ
(Sang-min 2004). The 2004 agreement served as
a foundation from which the two sides continued
to issue further threat-reduction measures in the
maritime domain. More recently, both sides held
colonel-level talks in February 2011 to diffuse tensions in the wake of the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong
Island incidents, although the talks broke down
after the North Korean delegation refused to take
responsibility for the provocations.22
Workshop participants also considered the
inclusion of China as a party to KPPR negotiations, not least in consideration of its growing
clout as a regional and global leader. Participants
unanimously agreed that China should be included in KPPR discussions and that in many ways
the United States and China could act as endorsers or guarantors of what would primarily be an
inter-Korean agreement.23 In some cases the roles
for the United States and China in the KPPR might
mirror or complement each other, perhaps including some involvement in dispute resolution, where
Washington would need to coordinate its objectives
22 North Korea later revealed that secret talks were held with
South Korean officials in May 2010 in an attempt to lay the
groundwork for an inter-Korean summit. The secret talks
broke down under similar circumstances to the February colonel-level meetings. See Christine Kim and Ser Myo-ja (2011),
23 Ren Xiao writes, “In the creation of a permanent peace mechanism,
if the U.S. is an indispensible power, China is an equally important player in the region that cannot be left out” (2011, 144).
and modalities with Beijing. One participant offered,
“At the end of the day, the key track that emerges is
between the U.S. and China. Because whatever we
want to do on the Korean Peninsula, the management of the U.S.-China relationship will be the key
pillar, and we have to plan in advance.”
The main qualitative difference in Chinese and
American involvement is, of course, the fact that U.S.
troops are forward deployed on ROK soil and operate in a joint command (and there are no Chinese
forces in North Korea), and it seems that this point
was instrumental behind the mention of “three or
four parties” at the second inter-Korean summit.
The suggestion is that there are some military CBM
issues that only need to be discussed amongst the
two Koreas and the United States, since only their
troops would be involved. It remains to be seen
whether or not Pyongyang’s distinction of “three or
four” also applies to other possible components of
a KPPR.
In addition to individual states, the United
Nations is also a directly related party to some
degree, and its involvement could prove useful
when the other parties seek international legitimacy and external support in the form of monitoring
and development assistance. The UN authorization
for the UNC is still in force, and the UNC will still
exist even after the transfer of operational control
in 2012. UN members that still maintain a liaison
(or stronger) presence in the UNC include Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France,
Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. An American official commented, “I would argue that while a UN
role specifically is not required, either legally or
practically, it is likely prudent nonetheless in order
to ensure international legitimacy of this process.”
Yet despite the UN’s lack of direct involvement, a
participant from the United Nations explained that
although the UN would welcome an opportunity
to be part of a solution to the Korean dilemma, it
does not necessarily see a need for it as an institu-
tion to take the lead or get directly involved at this
time. The UN considers the North Korean nuclear issue and peace-regime building as a contained
issue already being handled by responsible parties in a multilateral fashion. Time will tell if this
assessment continues.
Five Tracks
As IFPA workshop participants considered the
potential contours of a peace regime, they identified
five principal tracks as core elements of any process
to develop a viable peace regime:
1. ROK-DPRK. As discussed, the inter-Korean
dialogue remains the central focus of any peace
regime. The ROK-DPRK track addresses the need
for a Korean solution to a Korean problem. An
inter-Korean agreement to build a peace regime
is a prerequisite for KPPR development.
2. U.S.-DPRK. The United States will also play a
key role in peace-regime building, in part because
of its commitments to the U.S.-ROK alliance and
in part because of North Korea’s desire for normalized bilateral relations with Washington. The
United States, through a U.S.-DPRK track within a wider framework, can offer North Korea several important diplomatic carrots that may help
convince North Korea to pursue denuclearization and feel more comfortable compromising
with the South.
3. Quadrilateral. In addition to these two bilateral tracks, a quadrilateral track reminiscent of the
Four-Party Talks will be critical, since it is this
group that will most likely be responsible for formally ending the armistice and endorsing the successor arrangement.
4. Loose multilateral. A wider and looser track
consisting of other parties such as Russia and
Japan, and perhaps multilateral or intergovernmental institutions, in order to ensure that a
peace regime accounts for their interests and to
harness any support they can provide for the process. Those involved in building a KPPR should
also examine the possibility of using or creating
intergovernmental institutions based upon the
various European models, allowing for the creation, if needed, of additional mechanisms for
regional support for a peace regime. The Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism envisioned in the Six-Party Talks is related to this
broad track.
5. Six-Party. Any peace regime arrangement must
include complete and verifiable denuclearization.
This is, in essence, the main Six-Party track. In
fact, some qualify denuclearization as an entirely separate process, even if it remains in reality a component of a final peace regime. As one
participant familiar with current South Korean
thinking as it relates to the new U.S. administration’s diplomatic strategies towards the North
said, “An important strategy of the [South] Korean government is to create a new peace structure,
what we call structure, on the Korean Peninsula. This structure can be based on two pillars,
first, the denuclearization of North Korea, and
the second is the establishment of a peace regime
on the peninsula.”
The Six-Party/KPPR Linkage
The notion of peace-regime building entered the
Six-Party Talks slowly but surely. The Chinese delegation proposed a draft of a joint statement in 2005
that included language referring to a final peace
settlement, and experts speculated that the United
States, South Korea, North Korea, and China would
meet in follow-up engagements following the SixParty Talks to discuss a final peace settlement (Jin
2005). The result was the September 19, 2005, joint
statement, which, as mentioned earlier, formally
introduced the term “peace regime” to the denuclearization negotiation. The statement, however,
stipulated that reaching a peace regime would constitute a separate track from the Six-Party Talks.
The South Korean offer, made in 2005, of an economic and security package in return for nuclear
dismantlement was a step toward recognizing
that denuclearization required a comprehensive
approach. And with the mention of peace regime in
what was otherwise a denuclearization negotiation,
the linkage between denuclearization and peace
regime was established.
Ever since North Korea stepped up its nuclear program in the 1980s, however, U.S. policy has
been to make verifiable denuclearization a sine qua
non of any discussion about formally ending the
Korean War. For U.S. policy makers, it is a fundamental component of the “conditions necessary for
peace” that have been embraced by successive U.S.
administrations. As President George W. Bush stated in September 2007, “We look forward to the day
when we can end the Korean War. That will happen
when Kim Jong-il verifiably gets rid of his weapons programs and his weapons” (Chosun Ilbo 2007).
President Barack Obama’s special representative for
North Korea Policy, Stephen Bosworth, made this
point to DPRK officials in late 2009 during a trip
to Pyongyang, where he explained that peace treaty negotiations could not even begin until there was
concrete progress on denuclearization in the SixParty Talks (Bosworth 2009).
South Korea’s position on this issue has been
more flexible over the years, most dramatically
under the liberal Roh administration, which promoted the idea of declaring an end to the war first,
and then working toward denuclearization. The
conservative Lee Myung-bak government, however, sees denuclearization more similarly to how
the United States currently views it, and Seoul has
insisted that the nuclear issue be on the agenda of
any North-South summit involving President Lee.
So, even if Seoul sees these as separate issues, they
are certainly complementary components of peace
on the peninsula.
Much to the chagrin of allied negotiators, however, North Korea continuously interweaves
denuclearization with U.S. troop withdrawal from
the peninsula and places it after a peace agreement.
North Korean officials emphasize that Pyongyang
seeks the “the complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula,” which they describe as the
elimination of the threat posed by U.S. troops
on the peninsula and its alliance with the South
(Bosworth 2009). For North Korea, a peace treaty with the United States to end the Korean War
comes first, followed by an inter-Korean dialogue
on peace-regime development. When the U.S.
threat is gone, Pyongyang will consider denuclearization. Although the Chinese government does not
agree with sequencing denuclearization so late in
the process, it generally concurs that Washington
and Seoul must give due consideration to North
Korea’s security concerns, and it is reluctant to push
a settlement that requires too much up front from
the North (You 2011). Such differing perspectives
on what denuclearization would entail (and when)
cloud the peace-regime building process by making
denuclearization an endless cycle of trying to build
a bridge that is too short to reach both sides.
The near-term challenge is to develop a consensus regarding the linkage between the Six-Party
Talks and companion peace negotiations, even if the
initial consensus is only among the United States,
South Korea, and China. It is a classic “chickenand-egg” question in the sense that some believe
The near-term challenge
is to develop a consensus
regarding the linkage
between the Six-Party
Talks and companion
peace negotiations, even if
the initial consensus is only
among the United States,
South Korea, and China
peace talks can stimulate constructive denuclearization negotiations, while others think that the only
way peace talks can be productive is if they are preceded by some success at denuclearization. As one
Chinese former diplomat put it, “Denuclearization
and a peace regime are two sides of the same coin.
Take away one side, and there is no coin.” A South
Korean former government official countered, “The
peace issue is not a way to solve the nuclear issue.
Nuclear weapons are part of the overall Korean
problem. We should focus on improving the conditions necessary for peace over the long term, and
the 2005 Six-Party agreement is the best way forward on this front.”
It is possible to carry on these two tracks of dialogue and negotiation simultaneously, of course,
but practically speaking one track must take precedence or be weighted more heavily than the other
(that is, at some point the chicken must either hatch
or lay an egg). The general consensus at the IFPAorganized workshop was that the Six-Party Talks
should first be resumed and then, based on progress in the talks, Seoul and Washington should be
willing to participate in peace talks. The question
is, how much progress in the Six-Party Talks is necessary to begin a KPPR discussion? Most would
respond “a little,” “some,” or “picking up where we
left off in December 2008,” but others emphasize
that “significant” progress is needed, or else hopeless peace negotiations could doom the Six-Party
Talks. Negotiators could do more damage if they
try too early and fail on this issue. Moreover, rather than queuing peace talks behind a resumption of
the six-party process, some suggested it might be
better to link peace talks more closely with a NorthSouth summit meeting or some other progress in
the inter-Korean dialogue.
A separate argument in favor of starting peace
talks earlier rather than later, however, takes into
consideration North Korea’s leadership transition
from Kim Jong-il to, presumably, Kim Jung-un.
Regardless of who succeeds Kim, that leader will
inherit an isolated and economically weak country
amidst potential domestic competition for power.
The DPRK military will be very influential and
could end up running the country, while the new
leader will not likely be in a strong enough political
position to initiate peace talks from scratch, given
the military’s traditional hard line. It might be easier for him, however, to “resume” negotiations that
were already started (and sanctioned) by Kim Jongil himself, if the new ruler ever decides to pursue a
new course for the sake of his nation and his regime.
There could be some value, therefore, in setting a
precedent for peace talks. North Korea has offered
to begin peace talks “in the framework of the SixParty Talks,” so this could possibly be a way to
facilitate de-escalation and develop common terms
of reference for peace building, if Pyongyang does
not attach too many conditions to its offer and if the
talks ever resume.
Korean Peace Regime
Consensus Building in Support
of Denuclearization
There are some points on which South Korea, the
United States, and China appear to agree regarding
the development of a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula. First, the core of a KPPR is a NorthSouth peace agreement (be it a treaty reaffirming
the Basic Agreement, or something else). Neither
China nor the United States will interfere with a
North-South agreement. Second, the United States
and China should be involved in KPPR development, and they will likely play a role of endorser
and/or guarantor of some kind. The U.S.-DPRK
dialogue is another important component, so this
would be essentially a four-party discussion with
North-South and U.S.-DPRK components. Third,
verifiable North Korean denuclearization is another core component of a KPPR, and it is appropriate
to link peace talks to denuclearization at some level.
The three parties might disagree regarding how
early or how much to link a KPPR to the Six-Party
Talks, but they recognize that an effort will be
required to try to address North Korean concerns
on this front. Finally, all seem to agree that, at the
moment, North Korea is not sincere when it says
that it wants to negotiate a peace treaty or peace
regime to end the war, at least not in the sense that
it would approach such talks with any flexibility or
seriously consider what it knows are non-negotiable positions of the United States and South Korea.
At this point, the onus is on North Korea to prove
South Korea, China, and the United States wrong.
The three also disagree in some areas, including
the aforementioned question about when to begin
peace negotiations. In addition, although they agree
to some extent that North Korea has its own security concerns, they disagree about the true depth of
those concerns and their legitimacy. South Korea
in particular is worried that the three could inadvertently consent to North Korea’s longstanding
assertion that U.S. “hostile policy” and military
postures caused the North’s nuclear development,
and some believe that this could unintentionally
signal acceptance of North Korea’s argument that
it and the United States were the main parties in
the Korean War. In addition, as earlier discussions
have already noted, China has an interest in a downgraded U.S.-ROK alliance as an incentive to change
North Korean behavior and support KPPR development, as well as a desire to uproot the UNC and the
legacy of UN involvement on the peninsula.
Thus, despite some encouraging signs of agreement (at least among South Korea, the United
States, and China), it seems clear that the timing is
not right for serious KPPR negotiations. The prospects for progress are too remote and the danger
of further disrupting the six-party process and the
U.S.-ROK alliance is too great. The best that can be
done is to initiate KPPR “preliminary discussions”
or pre-negotiation consultations of some kind, in
parallel to renewed Six-Party Talks (assuming they
restart). These could address overall parameters of
future KPPR negotiations, expected outcomes or
potential key milestones, options for dispute resolution, or development of agreed-upon terms of
South Korea and the
United States should
work proactively with
China and regional
partners in the region to
envision a framework
for building a KPPR,
which in turn may help
improve the conditions
for peace-regime building
and denuclearization
reference so that the parties can clarify the precise meaning of terms such as “interested parties,”
“denuclearization,” “hostile policy,” and “confidence
building.” The allies should enter these talks sincerely and with an open mind, but they should also
go in with low expectations. Until North Korea truly
accepts the South as its primary partner for peace,
there can be little progress except for some forging
of a consensus among the other three nations.
Even if it seems that a peace regime is not possible without the collapse of the North Korean
political system, this cannot be the only policy
approach—that is, to simply wait for North Korea
to collapse or for some kind of external change.
South Korea and the United States should work
proactively with China and regional partners in the
region to envision a framework for building a KPPR,
which in turn may help improve the conditions for
peace-regime building and denuclearization. Even
negotiating with the North Korean regime in its
current form can be beneficial in terms of keep-
ing open lines of communication and sustaining
the dialogue, which might yield at least smoother implementation of the armistice arrangements.
“Eliciting Pyongyang’s cooperation will always
present obstacles,” writes Balbina Y. Hwang, “but
ultimately it is in North Korea’s interests to ensure
that the armistice is not abrogated; after all, it has
served as effective a deterrent in keeping ROK and
U.S. military forces south of the DMZ as it has in
keeping large-scale DPRK forces from crossing into
the South” (2011, 6). If North Korea is unresponsive,
however, it will only compound its isolation. For the
United States and South Korea, being flexible without abandoning their friends or their principles is
the only way forward.
The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor
and Regional Considerations
As policymakers move forward and begin to understand what characterizes a peace regime and how
best to approach peace-regime building, they must
also examine the endeavor from the perspective of
the U.S.-ROK alliance, along with looking closely at
other regional considerations. History demonstrates
that improperly coordinated diplomacy frustrates
any hope of negotiating with North Korea effectively and satisfactorily from an alliance standpoint.
For years North Korea has pursued a negotiating strategy of trying to split and weaken the
alliance by moving each bilateral dialogue forward at different speeds. The overarching feature of
North Korean diplomacy remains its attempt to isolate South Korea by repeatedly probing the United
States to test Washington’s receptiveness to bilateral negotiations. When the United States displays
a willingness to explore the possibility of conducting bilateral talks with North Korea, South Korea
begins to fear isolation or abandonment. Many
South Korean experts worry that North Korea may
in fact manage to manipulate the United States into
engaging in a bilateral track to the detriment of the
alliance and South Korean national interests. A par-
ticipant warned, “The end result would be a North
Korean victory in political, ideological, psychological warfare and political embarrassment for our
government and the South Korean people. It would
also lead to the decline of the U.S.-ROK alliance and
ultimately may lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces
from the peninsula. Maybe that is the end result of
such a U.S.-DPRK peace-regime building process.”
The alliance must approach negotiations with
a clear, mutual understanding of national and alliance interests, short-, medium-, and long-term
objectives, other regional influences such as China
and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and diplomatic strategies. One participant remarked, “I believe it is
essential for our two countries to closely cooperate
as allies throughout the whole process of relevant
negotiations.” Only a unified and coordinated diplomatic front can thwart and deter North Korean
efforts to destabilize the alliance and derail multilateral negotiations.
The alliance can begin the process of coordinating its diplomatic strategies by first clarifying
certain points that may help improve conditions on
the ground and guide future negotiations, such as
the outlook for continued U.S. military presence
on the peninsula and the importance of achieving
denuclearization. A participant stressed the importance of gaining a “common understanding on
prospective agendas including measures to reduce
military tensions and the relationship between the
KPPR and the U.S.-ROK relationship.”
Participants offered their opinions about how
the United States and South Korea could improve
the coordination of negotiating strategies and maintain open lines of communication. One participant
highlighted the appeal of the good-cop-bad-cop scenario in which one country offers carrots while the
other threatens to use sticks of some kind, thus
maximizing incentives. In reality, this scenario has
not always played out well. A Korean participant
recalled his experience trying to execute the goodcop-bad-cop tactic with the Bush administration.
At the time, U.S. officials urged their ROK coun-
terparts to play the bad cop, in order to make U.S.
“carrot” offers look more attractive. Seoul pondered
this, only to find out in subsequent discussions with
others in the administration that the U.S. commitment to providing carrots was tenuous at best. The
participant lamented, “How could I guarantee that
my side would be a bad and tough cop, when the
other side cannot be counted on to be a reliably
good cop?”
An American participant recalled that U.S. and
ROK negotiators have often undermined each other
by not properly coordinating their carrot-and-stick
approach toward North Korea. This is perhaps one
reason why Seoul is reportedly nervous about the
Obama administration’s consideration of food aid
to North Korea—a move that the Lee administration believes will take the pressure off of Pyongyang
(Yonhap News Agency 2011b). Washington, however, has a tradition of “de-linking” humanitarian aid
and assistance from political goals and objectives.
As Scott Snyder points out: “Even if Americans
operate by the Reagan-era maxim that ‘a hungry
child knows no politics,’ North Korean counterparts do not (nor have South Korean counterparts, a
circumstance which opens the possibility for misunderstanding within the U.S.-ROK alliance)” (2011).
Thus, here again is an example of the complexities of the good-cop-bad-cop dynamic that must be
carefully managed by the United States and South
Korea as they cope with the North Korean problem.
A Korean participant echoed calls for coordination and remarked that the United States and South
Korea, even trilaterally with China, should begin to
prioritize objectives, agree upon future steps, and
identify the timing and sequencing of events. He
suggested that a committed track 2 channel may
best fulfill the need to initiate such coordination.
The participant said, “And such common ground
should be further expanded through quiet, but substantive discussions like this very forum.”
Although the alliance needs to better coordinate
its strategies vis-à-vis North Korea and appear united in its effort to denuclearize the peninsula and
build a peace regime, South Korea must ultimately
lead peace-regime building. Despite the many layers
of the Korean dilemma, the inter-Korean relationship remains the core issue, and ultimately a peace
regime must emerge from an inter-Korean dialogue.
A participant said, “Regardless of how you define
Although the alliance
needs to better coordinate
its strategies vis-à-vis North
Korea and appear united
in its effort to denuclearize
the peninsula and build a
peace regime, South Korea
must ultimately lead
peace-regime building
peace regime, the South Koreans have to take the
lead.” Yet the possibility of North Korea accepting
South Korea as a major, if not the main, player in
this conversation appears to have grown more distant in the past year. The participant added, “And
the prospects of North Korea cooperating with
the South in that regard, at least today, seem fairly
slim.” In order for peace-regime building to progress,
North Korea must recognize that the road to reconciliation and normalization runs through Seoul and
not exclusively through Washington. North Korea
cannot continue to insist on pursuing alternative
negotiations bilaterally with the United States—at
the expense of the multilateral process—and bilaterally with South Korea.
The alliance must also consider other regional
influences and partners as it develops a coordinat-
ed strategy to pursue peace-regime building. The
inclusion of multiple regional actors is further
complicated by considering the importance of the
U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan’s legitimate interests
in the resolution of the Korean War and the outcome
of peace-regime building. Japan’s grievances against
North Korea include the unknown whereabouts
of Japanese abductees and the threat of a nuclear
North Korea armed with ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japanese shores. Notwithstanding
Tokyo’s disagreements and fears regarding North
Korea, Japan could play an important role in the
process. One participant recommended approaching Japan first and then China. He said, “The next
step should be to involve Japan in the trilateral
mechanism. That way we can increase our package
of incentives and disincentives. And then we have
to go to China to explain our plan, so that they are
also onboard. The sequence of consultation is very
important.”
In sum, U.S. policy makers should review carefully the sordid history of Korean peace efforts
before considering substantive bilateral negotiations with the North, even if those talks occur
ostensibly within the framework of the Six-Party
Talks. It is clear that Korean history, peacemaking,
and denuclearization are all tightly intertwined, and
Washington must understand how gestures in one
area might impact inter-Korean relations and the
U.S.-ROK alliance more generally. The best way to
do this is to work closely with Seoul to combine
historic review with forward-looking policy making in a way that takes into consideration these
interconnections, and with other key regional players they can begin to chart a practical course for
peace-regime development. Ultimately, neither the
alliance nor North Korea can determine on its own
what constitutes the conditions necessary for peace
or how to achieve them. This can only be accomplished through dialogue involving all three nations
(and including China), and it will no doubt be a long
journey.
CONCLUSION
V
olatility on the Korean Peninsula over the past
year has set back momentum toward a peace
regime and produced aftereffects that continue to
reverberate in the regional security environment.
If anything positive has come from the events of
2010, it is the deepened strategic ties and solidarity between the United States and its allies in the
region following North Korea’s provocations. Not
only did the United States and ROK, among other
measures, launch a series of joint military exercises
aimed at sending a strong signal to Pyongyang, but
trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan strategic relations deepened as a result of actions taken by North Korea
in 2010. The robust allied response to the Cheonan
and Yeonpyeong incidents may well have deterred
Pyongyang from committing further acts of aggression last year, and played some role in compelling
China to rein in North Korean behavior behind the
scenes.24 Anything less than that kind of response
from the United States and its allies would have cast
doubt on the regional U.S. security guarantee and
invited further provocations from the North, along
24 Certainly, many Chinese intellectuals give Beijing credit for
playing some role in ensuring that there were no followup acts of aggression by North Korea in late 2010, although
they remain vague about how that was achieved. As You
Ji writes: “… if one analysed the softening of the North’s
provocations vis-à-vis the ROK, such as making no military move against the latters’ retaliatory artillery drill in the
Yeonyeong Island, one could detect the Chinese influence,
although it is not clear what concrete measures Beijing had
used to pressure Pyongyang in December 2010” (2011,32).
with a dangerous escalation of tensions. In the
absence of any subsequent acts of aggression by the
DPRK, it is possible to infer that allied deterrence
has played some role in limiting further hostilities
on the peninsula for the time being.25
Yet while the allies may be able to claim some
measure of success in that regard, a long-term solution to the North Korean problem remains elusive.
North Korea continues to make advancements
in its nuclear weapons program and to engage in
the dangerous proliferation of WMD technologies
despite allied pressure and international sanctions.
Recent reports also highlight further North Korean
advancements in missile production and delivery
systems (Korea Herald 2011). In other words, allied
cooperation and deterrence may limit North Korean
provocations in the short term, but deterrence alone
will not likely provide a long-term solution to some
of the more intractable security problems posed by
the North Korean regime and its increasing military
capabilities.26
25 That is not to say that further provocations from the North are
out of the question. According to Julian Borger, “Government
officials in Seoul, speaking off the record, agreed that they were
braced for a North Korean ‘provocation’, because Pyongyang’s
peace overtures of the past few months have failed to persuade Seoul, Washington or Tokyo to enter a dialogue” (2011).
26 Critics such as U.S. Senator John Kerry charge,“Our current approach of strong sanctions and intense coordination
with South Korea and Japan does not provide sufficient leverage to stabilize the situation, much less bring about a change
in North Korean behavior. Left unchecked, Pyongyang will
That goal will require a broader international
effort beyond the strict parameters of allied cooperation in pressuring and isolating the North. The
long-term problems of denuclearization and counter-proliferation of WMDs can be more effectively
addressed if China is enlisted as a more reliable
partner of the United States and its allies. As the
leaked 2011 report of the UN Panel of Experts is
…allied cooperation and
deterrence may limit
North Korean provocations
in the short term, but
deterrence alone will
not likely provide a longterm solution to some
of the more intractable
security problems posed
by the North Korean
regime and its increasing
military capabilities
said to point out, collusion by third-party states has
allowed North Korea to sidestep many of the U.N.
sanctions aimed at limiting its nuclear development
and weapons proliferation (Charbonneau 2011b).
Although not explicitly named in the report, China
is widely blamed by the United States and many in
the international community for enabling the DPRK
build more nuclear weapons, test them and develop missiles
that could directly threaten the United States” (Kerry 2011).
to dodge U.N. sanctions and to continue its illicit
trade networks.27
As stated earlier, “getting China right” is therefore in many ways the key component in finding a
long-term solution to the North Korean problem.
Since 2009, Beijing has taken an approach that prioritizes peace and stability over denuclearization of
the peninsula, putting it at odds with the United
States, South Korea, and Japan. China’s subsequent policies and official rhetoric suggest that that
course of action is not likely to change any time
soon. However, Chinese scholars themselves admit
to a growing debate within China about the wisdom
of its North Korea policies and the inherent pitfalls
of an approach that turns a blind eye to Pyongyang’s
more egregious provocations and nuclear ambitions.
Thus, persuading China to modify its approach to
North Korea and to work more closely with the
United States, South Korea, and other partners in
the region is not necessarily an act of futility.28 It
will, however, require steadfast diplomacy, close
consultation and coordination among the allies, and
some degree of flexibility in assuring Beijing that
enhanced efforts to denuclearize North Korea do
not represent a net loss for Chinese security interests—if anything, they can reinforce China’s stated
goals of preserving peace and stability in the region.
Getting China, South Korea, and the United
States to converge again on basic priorities vis-à-vis
the North can potentially pave the way for greater
cooperation in other areas, not least of which could
be restarting the six-party process (a somewhat
higher possibility of late). Some form of progress
27 A memorandum by the Congressional Research Service
states, “Clearly, China holds the key to implementing sanctions on the DPRK, and it arguably could devote more
resources to detecting and stopping North Korean violations
of U.N. Security Council Resolutions” (Nikitin et al 2010).
28 As Zhu Feng writes, “There are signs that Chinese thinking
toward North Korea is becoming increasingly pluralistic. But
the North Korean question remains the single most divisive
foreign policy issue in China. There are powerful reasons why
China shouldn’t ‘abandon’ North Korea; historical ties, geographical proximity, fears of a refugee influx, and uncertainty
surrounding the security implications of sudden regime collapse all make China’s calculations vis-à-vis North Korea very
complex. Many of China’s fears and concerns, however, could
be addressed through international collaboration” (2011, 1).
on the talks could, in turn, lead to further trilateral initiatives and CBMs, such as cooperation in
HA/DR operations, border security, counter-proliferation, and other joint measures. Over time, more
concrete dialogue between the United States, China,
and South Korea could be conducted on revamping or reconfiguring the armistice, developing
regional security architectures, and laying the foundations for a potential peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
.
CBM
Confidence-building measures
CPV
Chinese People’s Volunteer Army
DMZ
demilitarized zone
DPRK
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
GO
general officer
IFANS
Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (ROK)
IFPA
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (U.S.)
JNCC
joint nuclear control commission (DPRK-ROK)
JSA
Joint Security Area
KEDO
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KORCOM
KORUS FTA
U.S. Korea Command (to be established in 2012)
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
KPA
Korean People’s Army
KPA/CPV MAC
Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Military
Armistice Commission
KPPR
Korean Peninsula peace regime
MAC
Military Armistice Commission
MDL
military demarcation line
NLL
Northern Limit Line
NNSC
Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
NSS
NPT
NSA
Nuclear Security Summit
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
Negative security assurance
OPCON
PSI
operational control
Proliferation Security Initiative
ROK
Republic of Korea (South Korea)
UEP
uranium enrichment program
UN
United Nations
UNC
United Nations Command
UNCMAC
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission
USFK
U.S. Forces Korea
USIP
U.S. Institute for Peace
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
CONCISE CHRONOLOGY
OF THE EVENTS ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA
FROM JANUARY 2009 TO JUNE 2011
(Main sources: Comparative Connections, vol. 11 (2009) and vol. 12 (2010), Pacific Forum, CSIS; and Vantage
Point: Developments in North Korea, vol. 34 (2011), Yonhap News Agency; articles from the Korea JoongAng
Daily, the Dong-A Libo, the Chosun Ilbo, the Yonhap News Agency, the Korea Times, the Korean Central News
Agency, the Interfax Information Service, the Xinhua News Agency, and the New York Times).
January. 17, 2009: Foreign Ministry of North Korea
announces that the country will maintain its “status as a nuclear weapons state” as long as it perceives a nuclear threat from the United States.
February. 24, 2009: DPRK announces that it is
preparing to launch an “experimental communications satellite.”
March 9-20, 2009: Annual U.S.-South Korea joint
military exercise Key Resolve/Foal Eagle is held.
According to the USFK, this year’s drill involves
26,000 troops and a nuclear-powered carrier to
test the ability to quickly deploy forces in the case
of a North Korean invasion.
March 17, 2009: Two U.S. journalists who work
for former U.S. Vice President Al Gore’s online
news outlet are detained by North Korean guards
near the border between China and North Korea.
March 17-21, 2009: DPRK Premier Kim Yong-il
makes a five-day visit to China where he tours
Shandong Province and meets senior officials
in Beijing, including Premier Wen Jiabao, NPC
Standing Committee Chairman Wu Banguo, and
President Hu Jintao.
March 24, 2009: A North Korean Foreign Ministry official warns that if the United States pushes
for UN sanctions in response to its planned rocket launch, the DPRK will quit the already stalled
Six-Party Talks and restart a nuclear plant making weapons-grade plutonium.
March 29, 2009: Secretary of Defense Robert M.
Gates says that the United States has no plans
Exploring Multilateral Approaches to Risk Reduction and Peace Regime Building app:1
for military action to pre-empt the launching of
a long-range missile by North Korea and would
act only if the missile or its parts appeared to be
headed toward U.S. territory.
April 3, 2009: President Obama tells Chinese President Hu Jintao that the United States would consider a DPRK missile launch to be provocative and
that the United States would seek punishment at
the UN in response.
April 5, 2009: North Korea launches a rocket,
which ends up in the waters about 1,984 miles
from the launch site, about double the range compared to the 1998 launch.
April 8, 2009: Chosun Ilbo reports that the DPRK
notified the United States, China, and Russia in
advance of its plan to launch the long-range rocket.
April 13, 2009: The UNSC unanimously adopts a
nonbinding President’s Statement on the DPRK
rocket launch, condemning the action as a violation of a resolution banning the country from
all missile activity and demanding no further
launches.
May 26, 2009: South Korea announces that it will
fully participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
May 26, 2009: U.S. President Obama tells ROK
President Lee in a telephone conversation that
“U.S. military strength and nuclear umbrella are
expansive enough to protect South Korea.”
May 27, 2009: Panmunjom office of the KPA
declares the 1953 armistice “nullified” by this
“declaration of war against us.” It threatens a military strike if South Korea tries to interdict any
of its ships, and warns it can no longer guarantee the safety of U.S. and ROK military or private
vessels in waters west of the peninsula.
June 1, 2009: Sources in Seoul claim that on May
25, just after North Korea’s nuclear test, key
DPRK institutions were formally notified that
Kim Jong-il has designated his third son, Kim
Jong-un, as his successor.
June 12, 2009: UNSC unanimously passes Resolution 1874, which calls on UN members to inspect
cargo vessels and airplanes suspected of carrying military materials into or out of North Korea.
April 14, 2009: In reaction to the UNSC statement,
the Foreign Ministry says the DPRK will “never”
again attend the Six-Party Talks, and will restore
its nuclear facilities to strengthen its deterrent.
June 12, 2009: DPRK Foreign Ministry denounces
UNSC Resolution 1874 and says that North Korea
will “weaponize” its existing plutonium stockpiles and begin a program to enrich uranium.
April 29, 2009: Pyongyang’s Foreign Ministry says
that unless the UNSC apologizes for its criticisms
of the DPRK, it will conduct further nuclear and
missile tests, start building a light-water reactor,
and produce nuclear fuel.
Jun. 15, 2009: President Lee and President Obama
hold a summit in Washington. They adopt a statement on a “joint vision for the Korea-U.S. alliance.”
May 12, 2009: U.S. special representative for DPRK
policy, Stephen Bosworth, says he will consider
visiting Pyongyang to revive stalled talks on dismantling the DPRK’s nuclear program.
May 25, 2009: North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test near Kilju in the northeast.
ROK President Lee calls this “truly disappointing.” North Korea also fires three short-range
missiles toward the Sea of Japan.
app:2 Denuclearizing North Korea
Jun. 15, 2009: Meeting with President Lee, Secretary of Defense Gates says the United States will
use all means necessary, including nuclear arms,
to defend the ROK against military threats from
the DPRK.
June 17, 2009: In Washington, President Lee vows
to break with the old pattern of compensating
the North following provocations by the DPRK.
President Obama concurs.
July 2, 2009: The DPRK test-fires four short-range
KN-01 surface-to-ship missiles, with a range of
120-160 kilometers, from a base at Sinsang-ri
north of the port of Wonsan.
July 3, 2009: President Barack Obama says that
the United States is trying to “keep a door open”
for North Korea to return to international nuclear disarmament talks, even as Washington pursues sanctions against the DPRK.
July 4, 2009: North Korea fires seven ballistic missiles—two mid-range Nodongs and five shorterrange Scuds —into the East Sea/Sea of Japan
from its Kitdaeryong base near Wonsan. This
is its largest one-day barrage since a long-range
Taepodong-2 and six smaller missiles were fired
in July 2006.
July 6, 2009: ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myunghwan says his ministry will be in charge of persuading the United States to allow the ROK to
pursue a broader commercial nuclear program
including the “recycling” of spent fuel.
July 7, 2009: President Obama says that he doesn’t
think a war “is imminent” with the DPRK. He
also says, “I think they understand that they
would be overwhelmed in a serious military conflict with the United States.”
July 7, 2009: ROK Defense Ministry official says
that the United States is open to talks on the possibility of South Korea developing ballistic missiles capable of striking all of North Korea.
July 13, 2009: U.S. Ambassador to ROK Kathleen Stephens says that the nuclear agreement
between the United States and the ROK should
be changed based on the understanding that
peaceful nuclear development is important to
the ROK.
July 14, 2009: The commander of USFK, Gen.
Walter Sharp, says that the United States has no
immediate plans to allow South Korea to develop longer-range missiles to counter North Korea’s
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
July 25, 2009: DPRK Ambassador to the UN Sin
Son-ho says that Pyongyang is “not against dialogue” with Washington. He also says “the SixParty Talks are gone forever.”
August 4, 2009: Ex-U.S. President Clinton visits
the DPRK. After three hours of talks and dinner
with Kim Jong-il, he departs with two U.S. journalists, who were arrested and sentenced for illicitly entering the DPRK from China.
August 8, 2009: Rodong Sinmun, daily paper of the
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), says that “the
improvement and development of North-South
relations is a prerequisite to settling the problems
of the Korean nation.” But the paper blames current tensions on Seoul’s “confrontational policy.”
August 17–27, 2009: The U.S. and South Korea
conduct Ulchi Freedom Guardian, an annual joint
military exercise involving about 56,000 ROK
troops and 10,000 U.S. troops.
August 19, 2009: KCNA says that a Northern delegation led by WPK secretary Kim Ki-nam will
visit Seoul to mourn former President Kim Daejung.
August 22, 2009: WPK director Kim Yang-gon and
ROK Unification Minister Hyun In-taek hold the
first high-level inter-Korean talks in nearly two
years, in Seoul. Hyun also hosts a dinner for the
entire six-person Northern delegation that evening.
August 23, 2009: Having extended their stay in
Seoul, visiting DPRK delegates meet President
Lee at the Blue House and deliver a verbal message from Kim Jong-il.
September 1, 2009: DPRK leader Kim Jong-il says
in a commentary carried on Pyongyang Radio, “We
can ease tensions and remove the danger of war
on the peninsula when the U.S. abandons its hostile policy and signs a peace treaty with us.”
September 14, 2009: MOFAT spokesman says
Seoul does not oppose the idea of bilateral U.S.DPRK talks, provided these expedite the six-party process rather than replacing it.
September 15, 2009: President Lee attributes
recent DPRK gestures to the impact of UNSC
sanctions, but says it “is still not showing any
sincerity or signs that it will give up its nuclear ambitions.”
September 16–18, 2009: A Chinese delegation led
by State Councilor Dai Bingguo visits Pyongyang
and meets top legislator Kim Yong-nam and Vice
Foreign Ministers Kang Sok-ju and Kim Yong-il.
Dai delivers a letter from President Hu to Kim
Jong-il.
September 21, 2009: Visiting the United States,
President Lee proposes a “grand bargain” to
resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, including economic-political incentives and a security guarantee.
September 22, 2009: State Department spokesman
Ian Kelly reiterates that the U.S. will provide a
package of incentives to the DPRK if it takes irreversible steps toward its denuclearization.
September 22, 2009: An ROK official at the Ministry of National Defense says the ROK has no
plan to participate in the U.S.-led global ballistic missile defense (BMD) network.
September 30, 2009: President Lee says Seoul
should take the lead in resolving global issues
as well as those involving the DPRK. Regarding the North, he adds: “We’ve lacked our own
voice in simply following proposals from Washington and Beijing.”
September 30, 2009: KCNA rejects Lee Myungbak’s “grand bargain” idea unless the ROK first
discards confrontational policies.
October 1, 2009: On ROK Armed Forces Day, President Lee Myung-bak says: “South-North dialogue and peace will progress when we have a
strong military with firm readiness.”
October 6, 2009: Xinhua reports that DPRK leader Kim Jong-il told Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
that the DPRK “is willing to attend multilateral
talks, including the Six-Party Talks, depending on
the progress in its talks with the United States.”
October 7, 2009: Gen. Walter Sharp, commander
of US forces in Korea says the US will transfer
wartime control of ROK troops in 2012 despite
concerns over a nuclear-armed DPRK.
October 12, 2009: North Korea test-fires five
KN-02 short-range missiles in the East Sea/Sea
of Japan. Officials in Seoul say this violates UNSC
Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1874.
October 13, 2009: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton says the US has absolutely no intention
of relaxing sanctions against the DPRK before
denuclearization.
October 14, 2009: Rodong Shinmun says “a peace
accord should be concluded between the DPRK
and the United States if the nuclear issue on the
peninsula is to be settled.” U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell says that the United States is ready for an “initial interaction” with
the DPRK “that would lead rapidly to a six-party
resumption of talks.”
October 20, 2009: DPRK Vice Foreign Minister
Kim Kye-gwan says, “We are committing our
own efforts for the good result and for the good
future of relations between our two nations and
for successful talks with the United States and
to defend the peace, which is the common goal
of our two nations, the Americans and the people of the DPRK, to live as friends.”
October 24, 2009: U.S. Special Envoy for Disarmament Talks Sung Kim meets DPRK envoy Ri Gun
to convey the US position on denuclearization.
November 1, 2009: An official in Seoul says that
the United States and ROK have finalized Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5029, which specifies
joint responses to possible DPRK contingencies,
including regime collapse.
November 3, 2009: KCNA says that the DPRK has
“successfully completed the reprocessing of 8,000
spent fuel rods,” with “noticeable successes…in
turning the extracted plutonium weapon-grade
for the purpose of bolstering up the nuclear deterrent.”
November 10, 2009: A DPRK patrol boat enters
Southern waters and responds to a warning shot
with fifty rounds of live fire. The ROK navy fires
two hundred rounds and seriously damages the
boat.
November 16, 2009: Rodong Sinmun demands that
the United States must pull its troops out of the
ROK as early as possible.
November 17, 2009: Rodong Sinmun vows that
North Korea “will continue to make active efforts
for the improvement of North-South relations.”
November 19, 2009: President Obama pledges in
Seoul that the U.S. commitment to peace and
stability in Korea “will never waver.”
December 8-10, 2009: Ambassador Bosworth visits Pyongyang and says that the United States
has reached a “common understanding” with the
DPRK on the need to resume the Six-Party Talks
and implement the principles outlined in 2005.
December 9, 2009: Rodong Sinmun says the DPRK
nuclear issue resulted from the hostile policy
of the United States, is “totally bilateral,” and
“would be solved spontaneously” after the United States drops its anti-DPRK policy, eradicates
the military threat against Pyongyang, and stops
its nuclear war provocation.
January 10, 2010: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry proposes discussions on a peace treaty, either
within the Six-Party Talks framework or at an
independent meeting of signatories of the 1953
armistice (that is, China, the US and DPRK, but
not the ROK). Washington and Seoul call for
Pyongyang to first return to the Six-Party Talks.
January 27, 2010: U.S. President Barack Obama,
in the State of the Union Address, calls on the
DPRK and Iran to abandon their nuclear ambitions, warning of stronger sanctions if they continue to pursue atomic weapons.
January 27, 2010: The KPA fires about thirty artillery rounds near, but on its side of, the Northern
Limit Line. The ROK Navy ripostes with about
100 warning shots. Pyongyang says this is an
annual drill, which will continue. It does, firing
a total of about 350 rounds through January 29.
February 8, 2010: In an interview with CNN, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says the Obama
administration will continue engaging the DPRK
to convince it to return to the Six-Party Talks.
March 11, 2010: Gen. Sharp says that U.S. troops
who would be tasked with eliminating the
DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction in the event
of armed conflict are participating in the current
Key Resolve-Foal Eagle U.S.-ROK military exercise (from March 8–18).
March 26, 2010: The twelve-hundred-ton ROK
navy corvette Cheonan sinks off Baengnyeong,
South Korea’s northwestern island, close to the
Northern coast and near the NLL, which the
DPRK disputes.
April 11, 2010: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
announces that the U.S. will leave “all options
… on the table” vis-à-vis North Korea, including
the use of nuclear weapons.
May 3–7, 2010: Sources in Seoul report that Kim
Jong-il has begun a nominally secret visit to
China, his first since 2006. He returns home on
May 7, apparently a day earlier than planned and
possibly in high dudgeon.
May 20, 2010: South Korea’s Joint Investigation
Group (JIG) publishes its findings that Cheonan
was sunk by a DPRK torpedo. The United States,
Japan, and other Western allies offer support and
condemn North Korea.
May 27, 2010: South Korea launches an anti-submarine drill off its west coast.
June 4, 2010: ROK formally refers the Cheonan sinking to the UNSC. North Korea threatens “the
toughest retaliation” should the world body discuss punishing the DPRK.
June 16, 2010: President Obama announces that
the United States will extend its current sanctions regime on North Korea by one more year,
arguing that the “existence and the risk of proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the
Korean Peninsula continue to pose an unusual
and extraordinary threat” to the United States.
June 26, 2010: Presidents Lee and Obama decide to
delay Seoul’s scheduled takeover of wartime operational control of its troops (OPCON) to December 1, 2015.
July 8, 2010: China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman
Qin Gang says that China “resolutely opposes”
joint naval exercises that South Korea and the
United States plan to conduct in the Yellow Sea.
July 9, 2010: The UNSC adopts a Presidential Statement on the Cheonan, which avoids directly condemning North Korea.
July 25–28, 2010: The United States and South
Korea conduct a large-scale naval exercise codenamed Invincible Spirit in the Sea of Japan that
includes the aircraft carrier USS George Washington and twenty other ships and submarines, one
hundred aircraft, and eight thousand personnel
from the U.S. and ROK armed services.
August 5, 2010: Following joint US-ROK exercises
in the East Sea, South Korea holds its own fiveday naval maneuvers in the West (Yellow) Sea.
September 16, 2010: Assistant secretary of state
for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Kurt Campbell,
testifies before the Senate Armed Services Committee, making it clear that the State Department
won’t get ahead of Seoul in engaging North Korea.
September 27, 2010: South Korea and the United
States launch joint anti-submarine military exercises in the Yellow Sea.
September 28, 2010: Kim Jong-un is named vice
chairman of the Central Military Commission
of the WPK.
October 1, 2010: The Koreas hold their first direct
military talks (colonel level) in two years. The
South insists on an apology, while the North still
demands to send its own inspectors to examine
the Cheonan wreckage.
August 9, 2010: DPRK fires some 130 rounds of
artillery into the Yellow Sea near its border with
the South.
October 8, 2010: U.S. Secretary of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and ROK Defense Minister
Kim Tae-young say that both allies are fully ready
for “all situations that could occur.”
August 16–26, 2010: South Korea and the United
States conduct the annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise, a computer-based simulation
involving about fifty-six thousand ROK and thirty thousand US troops.
October 10, 2010: In his second major public
appearance, Kim Jong-un joins his father (and
a senior Chinese delegation) on the saluting
stand for a large-scale military parade marking
the WPK’s sixty-fifth anniversary.
August 25–27, 2010: Former president Carter visits Pyongyang and wins the release of an American humanitarian activist.
October 12, 2010: North Korea’s lead Six-Party
Talks negotiator Kim Gye-Gwan meets China’s
vice foreign minister and chief negotiator at the
Six-Party Talks, Wu Dawei, in Beijing.
August 26–30, 2010: Kim Jong-il makes a sudden
trip to China, his second in four months. He visits several cities in the northeast, meeting President Hu Jintao in Changchun.
August 30, 2010: President Obama signs an executive order mandating new financial sanctions
on North Korea.
September 1, 2010: China starts a four-day artillery exercise in waters off Qingdao.
September 12, 2010: U.S. special representative
for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, and
U.S. special envoy for the Six-Party Talks, Sung
Kim, arrive in Seoul to meet with Shin Kak-soo,
the acting foreign minister, and Wi Sung-lac, the
ROK’s chief nuclear envoy.
October 13-14, 2010: South Korea hosts a PSI maritime exercise off the coast of Pusan.
October 25, 2010: The Pentagon announces it will
postpone planned joint naval drills in the Yellow
Sea with the ROK, but adds that China had nothing to do with the decision.
October 28, 2010: In a speech given in Honolulu,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to the
U.S.-Korea alliance as a “lynchpin” of peace and
security in the region.
October 29, 2010: North Korea fires two rounds
toward South Korea and South Korean troops
return fire.
November 9, 2010: U.S. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Adm. Mike Mullen reiterates the U.S. pledge to send an aircraft carrier
into the Yellow Sea for joint drills with the ROK
in the near future.
November 11, 2010: Presidents Obama and Lee
meet on the sidelines of the G20 in Seoul to discuss the KORUS FTA, North Korea, and resumption of the Six-Party Talks.
November 20, 2010: The New York Times reports
that earlier this month Siegried Hecker, the former head of Los Alamos National Laboratory,
was shown a hitherto unsuspected ultra-modern uranium enrichment (UE) facility containing some two thousand centrifuges at Yongbyon.
On November 22 Hecker publishes a full report
of his visit.
November 22, 2010: U.S. special representative
for North Korea policy, Stephen Bosworth, dispatched to Asia in the wake of Hecker’s UE revelations, says that this news is disappointing and
provocative, but “not a crisis.”
November 22, 2010: ROK begins its annual largescale Hoguk military exercise.
November 22, 2010: Kim Jong-il and Kim Jongun visit the DPRK’s southwest coast, to inspect
fish farms.
November 23, 2010: The KPA fires some 170 artillery shells at the ROK’s Yeonpyeong Island, close
to the DPRK west coast. ROK forces fire about
80 rounds back. The KPA claims Seoul started
this, by firing shells into its territorial waters.
President Lee calls the North’s act “an invasion
of South Korean territory.”
November 24, 2010: The State Department urges
China to influence North Korea to reduce tensions.
November 25, 2010: Secretary Clinton reassures
the ROK of the U.S. commitment to the alliance.
November 26, 2010: Chinese Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi expresses Beijing’s concern over the
upcoming U.S.-ROK joint exercises in the Yellow Sea.
November 27, 2010: Chinese State Counselor Dai
Bingguo makes a sudden visit to Seoul to meet
President Lee.
November 28, 2010: China proposes emergency consultations with members of the Six-Party Talks.
November 28–December 1, 2010: The United
States and the ROK hold large-scale joint naval
drills off the west coast of the peninsula, including the ninety-seven-thousand-ton aircraft carrier USS George Washington.
November 29, 2010: In a televised address, ROK
President Lee pledges strong retaliation to any
future provocations. He says Seoul has given up
hope that dialogue will make Pyongyang abandon
brinkmanship and nuclear weapons. He rejects
China’s proposal for convening an emergency
meeting of the Six-Party Talks.
December 6, 2010: According to the White House,
President Obama asks President Hu Jintao “to
send a clear message to North Korea that its provocations are unacceptable.”
December 9, 2010: Kim Jong-il meets Chinese
State Counselor Dai Bingguo in Pyongyang.
December 13, 2010: The United States and the
ROK form the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, a joint committee to make decisions about
the alliance’s nuclear and extended deterrence
policies.
December 14, 2010: Beijing says Pyongyang has
agreed to an emergency meeting of chief envoys
to the Six-Party Talks. Seoul and its allies are less
than keen, to put it mildly.
December 15, 2010: Deputy Secretary of State
James Steinberg leads a delegation to Beijing to
discuss Northeast Asian security and developments on the Korean Peninsula.
December 16, 2010: North Korea’s Foreign Ministry states that the DPRK “supports all proposals for dialogue including the Six-Party Talks…
to prevent a war and realize denuclearization on
the Korean Peninsula.”
December 16, 2010: Chosun Ilbo reports that Kim
Jong-il said during a meeting with State Counselor Dai Bingguo that he was willing to consider
allowing IAEA inspections into the DPRK.
December 16–19, 2010: New Mexico Gov. Bill
Richardson visits Pyongyang for an unofficial diplomatic mission at the invitation of DPRK negotiator Kim Gye-gwan.
December 18, 2010: China expresses its opposition to South Korea’s upcoming drills.
December 20, 2010: An emergency session of the
UN Security Council fails to agree on a statement on defusing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China reportedly threatens to veto any
phrase condemning the DPRK for its November
23 artillery attack on Yeonpyeong.
December 20, 2010: South Korea conducts a ninety-minute live-fire drill on Yeonpyeong, firing
about fifteen hundred rounds. North does not
respond.
December 22, 2010: North Korea and the United
States restore their New York dialogue channel.
December 23, 2010: South Korea stages massive
firing drills involving missiles, artillery, and fighter jets near the border with North Korea.
December 30, 2010: ROK 2010 Defense White Paper
labels the DPRK an “enemy.” While harsher than
the phrase “direct military threat” in the last
White Paper, this is not as strong as “main enemy”
which was used from 1995–2004, which some
now wished to restore.
January 3, 2011: In his New Year’s address, ROK
President Lee says, “I remind the North that the
path toward peace is yet open. The door for dialogue is still open.” He adds that “nuclear weapons and military adventurism must be discarded.”
January 26, 2011: DPRK Foreign Ministry releases a
statement reiterating North Korea’s commitment
to the denuclearization of the “entire Korean Peninsula” and also warns Seoul against setting “unilateral preconditions” for the cross-border talks.
February 8–9, 2011: Preliminary military talks
between South and North Korea break down
as the North refuses to apologize and admit its
responsibility for deadly provocations in 2010.
February 25, 2011: ROK Prime Minister Kim
Hwang-sik says absorption-based reunification
is not an option despite protracted military tensions between South and North Koreas.
February 28–March 31, 2011: The United States
and South Korea begin to conduct the annual Key
Resolve-Foal Eagle military exercise. This year’s
drill involves thirteen thousand U.S. troops and
more than two hundred thousand0 ROK troops,
including a U.S. Navy carrier strike group led by
the USS Ronald Reagan.
March 25–29, 2011: North Korean diplomats
including Ri Gun, director-general in charge of
U.S. affairs meet with ex-U.S. officials including Joel Wit and Richard Allen in the closeddoor forum in Germany arranged by the Aspen
Institute.
April 14, 2011: A Pentagon official tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United
States and South Korea signed an agreement for
cooperation in developing a future BMD program
against North Korea.
April 18, 2011: U.S. Department of State urges
North Korea to improve ties with South Korea
before moving to another round of the Six-Party Talks.
April 26–28, 2011: Former president Carter visits
Pyongyang with other former world leaders. Carter has a meeting with Chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam
and Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun.
May 9, 2011: ROK President Lee says he will invite
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to the second
nuclear summit in Seoul in March 2012 if he
makes a firm commitment to scrapping his nuclear weapons program.
May 17, 2011: DPRK leader Kim Jong-il meets with
a Russian delegation headed by M. Y. Fradkov,
director of the External Intelligence Bureau of
Russia, and discusses the nuclear and humanitarian aid issues.
May 20–26, 2011: Kim Jong-il unofficially visits
China and meets with PRC President Fu, Premier Wen, and Vice President Xi Jinping. This is
his second-longest visit to China since becoming
general secretary of the WPK. KCNA says both
sides recognize that “the adherence to the goal of
denuclearization on the whole Korean Peninsula,
peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue
including the resumption of the Six-Party Talks
and the elimination of obstructive elements conform to the overall interests of Northeast Asia.”
May 21–22, 2011: Chinese Premier Wen attends
the PRC-ROK-Japan trilateral summit in Tokyo
and explains to his counterparts about Kim Jongil’s visit to China. It is a rare case for China to
explain the visit to foreign leaders before Kim
has left China.
May 24-28, 2011: Robert King, U.S. special envoy
for North Korean human rights, travels to North
Korea to assess the severity of North Korean food
shortages.
June 1, 2011: KCNA says that representatives of
the two Koreas met secretly in Beijing more than
once starting May 9, and ROK officials offered
an envelope full of cash for inter-Korean summits to be held in late-June, August 2011, and
March 2012. ROK MOU official admits the meetings but denies any bribes or dates for summits
were offered.
June 6, 2011: DPRK decides to set up the Hwanggumphyong and Wihwa Islands Economic Zone
in the middle of the Yalu River in order to boost
the DPRK-China friendship and expand and
develop bilateral economic relations. Construction will begin on June 8.
June 9, 2011: Chosun Ilbo reports that North Korea
test-fired one KN-06 short-range surface-to-air
missile from a coastal area of North Pyongan
Province to in the West (Yellow) Sea during the
previous week.
June 9, 2011: Another Sino-DPRK joint economic
development project of the Rason Economic and
Trade Zone begins construction.
June 13, 2011: Kim Jong-il meets with the Chinese delegation headed by Li Yuanchao, a head
of the CPC Organization Department. Xinhua
news agency reports that DPRK leader Kim says,
“The DPRK would like to join hands with China
to enhance high-level contacts, maintain close
coordination, boost practical cooperation, expand
cultural exchange and safeguard regional peace
and stability.” The Chinese delegation arrived on
June 10 and held a strategic dialogue with North
Korean counterparts.
June 16, 2011: South Korea sets up a new military command to defend five frontline islands
near the Yellow Sea border from possible North
Korean attacks.
June 17, 2011: South Korea deploys several precision-guided land missiles, known as the Army
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), capable of
striking Pyongyang.
June 19, 2011: Yonhap News Agency reports ROK
official says South Korea will distinguish the
DPRK nuclear issue from the apology request
to North Korea on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong
island incidents in order to promote the recovery of the Six-Party Talks process.
June 23, 2011: ROK President Lee says to parliamentary members that China clearly warned
North Korea that South Korea would retaliate
if North Korea carries out another provocation.
June 27, 2011: Chosun Ilbo reports that ROK official
says there is no pre-condition to the inter-Korean talks for denuclearization.
June 28, 2011: Korea JoongAng Daily reports that the
United States wants Seoul to do more on its part
to improve inter-Korean relations, despite reaffirming that inter-Korean talks should precede
the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.
June 30, 2011: Korea JoongAng Daily reports that a
summit between Kim Jong-il and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Vladivostok appears
to have been cancelled, reportedly scheduled on
June 30 or July 1.
discussed the potential resumption of the SixParty Talks.
July 22, 2011: Chief negotiators from South and
North Korea meet for the first time since 2008
on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations regional forum in Bali. Wi Sunglac of South Korea and Ri Yong-ho of North Korea
July 28, 2011: North Korean first vice minister Kim
Kye-Gwan meets U.S. special envoy on North
Korea Stephen Bosworth at the U.S. mission to
the United Nations for “exploratory” discussions
on further denuclearization talks
Appendix B
TRAIL OF DOCUMENTS
RELATED TO KOREAN
PEACE REGIME
DEVELOPMENT
Date
7/27/1953
Title
The Korean War Armistice
Agreement
7/4/1972
North-South Joint
Communiqué
12/13/1991
Agreement on
Reconciliation,
Nonaggression, and
Exchanges and
Cooperation between the
South and the North (Basic
Agreement)
Joint Declaration of the
Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula
North Korea
South Korea
Created foundation for future discussions regarding peaceful reconciliation
Detailed several CBMs
North Korea
South Korea
Agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, possess, store,
deploy, or use nuclear weapons
Agreed not to possess uranium enrichment facilities
Joint Statement of the
DPRK and the United
States
Agreed Framework
between the United States
and the DPRK
North Korea
United States
Recognized each country’s sovereignty
Pledged non-interference in domestic affairs
North Korea
United States
First official mention of moving toward “full normalization” of
U.S.-DPRK relations
U.S. assurances against the threat or use of nukes against the
North
6/15/2000
South-North
Joint Statement
North Korea
South Korea
9/19/2005
Joint Statement of the
Fourth Round of the SixParty Talks
China
Japan
North Korea
Russia
South Korea
United States
Sought common ground between the South’s concept of
confederation and the North’s formula for loose federation
Promoted balanced development of the national economy
DPRK committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and programs, and U.S. affirmed no-attack pledge
Agreed that the “directly related parties will negotiate a
permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an
appropriate separate forum.”
1/20/1992
6/11/1993
10/21/1994
Parties
Chinese People’s
Volunteers
Korean People’s
Army
United Nations
Command
North Korea
South Korea
Highlights
Codified the ceasefire
Established 38th parallel as Military Demarcation Line
Instituted special commissions to oversee terms
The first official joint statement agreeing to principles of
independent and peaceful reconciliation
11/17/2005
2/13/2007
10/4/2007
Joint Declaration on the
ROK-U.S. Alliance and
Peace on the Korean
Peninsula
The Initial Actions for the
Implementation of the
Joint Statement
Declaration on the
Advancement of SouthNorth Korean Relations,
Peace and Prosperity
South Korea
United States
China
Japan
North Korea
Russia
South Korea
United States
North Korea
South Korea
The “two leaders shared a common understanding that the
process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will provide an important basis to build a durable peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula.”
Established five working groups to deal with core issues
including U.S.-DPRK normalization and NE Asian regional
security
Reiterated plan for directly related parties to negotiate a
KPPR
Reaffirmed principles in the June 15 Joint Declaration
Recognized the need to end the armistice and build a permanent peace regime
Agreed to work together to have the “leaders of the three or
four parties directly concerned” to declare an end to the war
Appendix C
NORTH-SOUTH JOINT
AGREEMENT ON
RECONCILIATION,
NONAGGRESSION, AND
COOPERATION AND
EXCHANGE (BASIC
AGREEMENT), 1991
Adopted at the third-day session of the fifth north-south high-level talks in Seoul on December 13, 1991
Pursuant to the will of all the fellow countrymen desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country, reaffirming the three principles of national reunification laid down in the July 4th North-South Joint
Statement;
Pledging themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconciliation, for the prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of detente
and for the guarantee of peace;
To realize many-sized cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the nation; and
To make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the
sides is not the one between countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing
towards reunification, the north and the south have agreed as follows:
1. North-South Reconciliation
Article 1. The north and the south shall recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side.
Article 2. The north and the south shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.
Article 3. The north and the south shall cease to abuse and slander the other side.
Article 4. The north and the south shall refrain from all acts aimed at destroying and overthrowing the
other side.
Article 5. The north and the south shall make concerted efforts to convert the present armistice into a
durable peace between the north and the south and observe the present Military Armistice Agreement
until such peace has been achieved.
Article 6. The north and the south shall discontinue confrontation and competition, cooperate with each
other and make concerted efforts for national dignity and interests in the international arena.
Article 7. The north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south liaison office at Panmunjom
within three months after the effectuation of this agreement in order to ensure close contacts and prompt
consultation with each other.
Article 8. The north and the south shall form a north-south political subcommittee within the framework
of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement in order to discuss concrete
measures for implementing and observing the agreement on north-south reconciliation.
2. North-South Nonaggression
Article 9. The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side, nor shall they invade the
other by force of arms.
Article 10. The north and the south shall settle differences and disputes between them peacefully through
dialogue and negotiation.
Article 11. The north and the south shall designate as the demarcation line and zone of nonaggression the
Military Demarcation Line which was laid down in the agreement on the military armistice dated July 27,
1953 and the area which has so far been within the jurisdiction of the sides.
Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonaggression the north and the south shall set up
and operate a north-south joint military committee within three months after the effectuation of this
agreement.
The north-south joint military committee shall discuss and promote the realization of military confidencebuilding and disarmament, such as notification of and control over the transfer of large units and military
exercises, use of the Demilitarized Zone for peaceful purposes, exchange of military personnel and information, the realization of phased arms cutdown including the removal of mass destruction weapons and
offensive capability and their verification.
Article 13. The north and the south shall install and operate direct telephone links between the military
authorities of the sides in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed conflicts.
Article 14. The north and the south shall form a north-south military sub-committee within the framework of the full-dressed talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement and discuss concrete
measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on nonaggression and the removal of
military confrontation.
3. North-South Cooperation and Exchange
Article 15. The north and the south shall effect economic cooperation and exchange, such as joint development of resources and the exchange of goods in the form of exchange within the nation and joint
investment for the coordinated and balanced development of the national economy and for the promotion
of the well-being of the whole nation.
Article 16. The north and the south shall effect cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as
science, technology, education, literature and art, public health, sports, environment and mass media
including newspapers, radio, TV and publications.
Article 17. The north and the south shall effect free travels and contacts between members of the nation.
Article 18. The north and the south shall effect free correspondence, travels, meetings and visits between
the separated families and relatives and their reunion based on their free will and take measures regarding other problems awaiting humanitarian solution.
Article 19. The north and the south shall connect severed railways and roads and open sea and air routes.
Article 20. The north and the south shall install and connect the facilities necessary for the exchange of
post and telecommunication and ensure secrecy in this sphere of exchange.
Article 21. The north and the south shall cooperate with each other in economic, cultural and many other
fields in the international arena and jointly conduct external activities.
Article 22. For the implementation of the agreement on effecting cooperation and exchange in various
fields, such as economy and culture, the north and the south shall form a north-south joint economic cooperation and exchange committee and other departmental joint committees within three months after the
effectuation of this agreement.
Article 23. In order to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement
on cooperation and exchange between the north and the south, the two parts shall establish a north-south
cooperation and exchange subcommittee within the framework of the full-dressed talks in one month after
the effectuation of the agreement.
4. Amendments and Effectuation
Article 24. This agreement can be amended and supplemented by mutual consent.
Article 25. This agreement shall become effective as from the date when the north and the south exchange
its text after they go through necessary formalities.
Inked December 13, 1991 by,
Yon Hyong Muk
Premier, DPRK Administration Council, Head
of the north side’s chief delegate of the delegation to the N-S high-level talks
Chong Won Sik
Prime Minister, ROK Chief delegate
of the south side’s delegation to the S-N high-level talks
Appendix D
AGENDA FROM JANUARY,
2011 WORKSHOP
Risk Reduction & Confidence-Building
on the Korean Peninsula:
Challenges, Opportunities &
Implications for Regional Stability
January 19, 2011
Seoul, Republic of Korea
Organized by: Supported by:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS),
South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT)
U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)
The Carnegie Corporation of New York
January 19, 2011
9:00-9:15 Welcome and Introduction
Amb. Lee Joon-gyu, IFANS
Dr. Charles Perry, IFPA
Session I: The Post-Cheonan and Post-Yeonpyeong Security Environment
9:15-10:45
This session will address such questions as:
•
How has the peninsular and regional security environment changed almost one year after the Cheonan incident? Are there
new perceived threats to regional stability and have calculations of deterrence been altered since the incident? To what
extent is this reflected in the November 2010 tensions? Is there a need for improved crisis management capabilities?
•
What is the impact, if any, of the North Korean succession process on regional security calculations? On the prospects for effective dialogue and threat reduction efforts? What might be done to make the most of the changes?
•
How have critical bilateral relations among the key players (i.e., US-PRC, ROK-DPRK, ROK-PRC, Japan-PRC, etc.) changed,
and how are these ties likely to evolve over the long-term? What is their likely impact on broader regional relations?
•
What lessons can we learn from the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, and how can we move beyond
them in order to avoid similar crises and take advantages of opportunities to reduce tensions? Is the prospect of new North Korean leadership an opportunity or only another complication?
Moderator: Dr. Charles Perry, IFPA
Lead US Discussant: Mr. Ralph Cossa, PacificForum CSIS
Lead China Discussant: Dr. Shen Dingli, Fudan University
Lead ROK Discussant: Dr. Shin Beom Chul, KIDA
Session II: Toward a Revamped Crisis Management
and Risk Reduction Framework
11:00-12:30
•
What adjustments could be made to bolster near-term risk management and address ongoing concerns about proliferation threats (and their interconnections) on the Peninsula?
•
How can existing non- and counter-proliferation mechanisms be applied more effectively to North Korean challenges, thereby promoting and supporting regional stability?
•
How can additional Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) support the Armistice and reduce future risks and tensions in the region?
•
What can the relevant parties do to support implementation of the inter-Korean Basic Agreement and Joint Declaration?
•
What is the proper division of labor between various bilateral measures and multilateral measures to reduce tensions and support stability on and around the Peninsula?
•
How can a revamped Armistice build toward long-term stability and set conditions for an eventual peace regime on the Peninsula?
Moderator: Dr. Jacquelyn Davis, IFPA
Lead China Discussant: Dr. Teng Jianqun, CIIS
Lead US Discussant: RADM Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), CNA
Lead ROK Discussant: Dr. Cheon Seongwhun, KINU
12:30-14:00
Keynote Luncheon Address
Session III: Envisioning a New Peninsular and Regional Security Structure
14:00-15:30
The Honorable Hwang Jin Ha (Ret. Lieutenant General, ROK Army), Member, ROK National Assembly; Foreign Affairs, Trade,
and Unification Committee
•
How can the five parties work together beyond the six-party-talks structure to stabilize the Korean Peninsula and reduce tensions over the long-term? What additional parties (e.g., Australia, the ARF, etc.) and global institutions (i.e., the UN and its affiliated agencies) should be involved in the process?
•
What additional risk reduction measures can the five parties and global institutions undertake to address North Korea’s WMD-related programs and the risks they pose?
•
What would an ideal regional security structure look like without the baggage of legacy issues (i.e.,
past conflicts and disputes over history, territory, etc.)? What would be the priorities of that new
framework, and how would regional players cooperate to achieve those objectives?
•
Can a new regional security structure evolve into a peace regime over time? Is there already a peace
regime strategy in place among the key players? If so, what are the goals and objectives?
•
How can the key players work together to realize a peace regime, and how can they cooperate to make
it effective and sustainable? What can be done to implement elements of a peace regime now?
•
How can we work over the short term and long term to bring about positive change in North Korea and with respect to North Korea’s regional role?
Moderator: RADM Eric McVadon, USN (Ret.), IFPA
Lead Korea Discussant: Prof. Kim Young-ho, KNDU
Lead China Discussant: Prof. Zhu Feng, CISS, Peking University
Lead US Discussant: Amb. Jack Pritchard, KEI
Session IV:
15:45-17:00
Workshop Discussion Wrap-up and Possible Next Steps
Based on the previous sessions, what are specific “take away” points that could be followed up by participants from each nation? How can we best coordinate bilateral, trilateral, and broader multilateral efforts to promote the ideas covered in today’s
workshop? Do the security dialogues and risk reduction efforts of other regions in transition – such as post-Cold War Europe
– hold useful lessons for setting in place a new peace and security regime in Northeast Asia? What specifically should future
Track 1.5 dialogues focus on to support key objectives identified during the workshop discussions?
Moderator: Mr. Weston Konishi, IFPA
Lead US Discussant: Mr. Scott Snyder, Asia Foundation
Lead China Discussant: Prof. Zhuang Jianzhong, CNSS, Jiaotong University
Lead Korea Discussant: Prof. Choi Kang, IFANS
18:00-20:00 Closing dinner
Hosted by The Honorable Hyun In-taek, Minister of Unification, Republic of Korea
Appendix E
PARTICIPANTS FROM
JANUARY, 2011 WORKSHOP
(In alphabetical order by country/affiliation)
CHINA
Dr. JIN Canrong
Mr. YANG Xiyu
Professor & Associate Dean
School of International Studies,
Renmin University
Senior Fellow
China Institute of International Studies and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. LI Jun
Professor ZHU Feng
Associate Research Professor
Korean Peninsular Studies Division,
China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
Deputy Director
Center for International and Strategic Studies,
Peking University
Dr. SHEN Dingli
Professor ZHUANG Jianzhong
Director, Center for American Studies and
Vice Dean, Institute of International Affairs, Fudan
University
Deputy Director
Center for National Security Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong
University
Dr. TENG Jianqun
Director and Research Fellow
Center for Arms Control,
China Institute of International Studies
UNITED STATES
Mr. Ralph A. COSSA
Dr. Patricia FALCONE
President
Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS)
Senior Policy Analyst on Extended Deterrence
Office of Science & Technology Policy,
The White House
Dr. Jacquelyn K. DAVIS
Captain John M. FIGUERRES, USN
Executive Vice President
IFPA
Director, DPRK Strategic Focus Group,
U.S. Pacific Command
Ms. Dorothy Anne (“Deidi”) DELAHANTY
Mr. L. Gordon FLAKE
Political Military Counselor
U.S. Embassy, Seoul
Executive Director
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Mr. Philip A. (“Tony”) FOLEY
Director, Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
U.S. Department of State
Mr. Ken GAUSE
Senior Research Analyst
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
Dr. Robert H. GROMOLL
Director, Office of Regional Affairs
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
Mr. Thomas JUNG
Policy Planning Staff
Mr. Michael H. KEIFER
Chief, Advanced Concepts Division,
Advanced Systems and Concepts Office,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Mr. Weston S. KONISHI
Center for Conflict Management,
Dr. Charles M. PERRY
Vice President and Director of Studies
IFPA
Mr. Bryan PORT
Senior Analyst & Deputy Director, Strategy
Assistant Chief of Staff, J-5, United Nations Command,
Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces
Korea
Ambassador Charles L. (“Jack”) PRITCHARD
President
Korea Economic Institute (KEI)
Mr. James L. SCHOFF
Special Advisor for East Asia Policy
Office of the Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Department of Defense
Mr. Scott SNYDER
Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies,
IFPA
Director
Center for U.S.-Korea Policy,
The Asia Foundation
Colonel Kevin W. MADDEN, USA
Dr. Paul B. STARES
Defense and Army Attaché
U.S. Embassy, Seoul
Dr. Mark E. MANYIN
Specialist in Asian Affairs
U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS)
Rear Admiral Michael McDEVITT, USN (Ret.)
Vice-President and Director,
Center for Strategic Studies,
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
Rear Admiral Eric A. McVADON, USN (Ret.)
Sr. Advisor & Director Emeritus
Asia-Pacific Studies
IFPA
Colonel Frank L. MILLER, Jr., USA (Ret.)
Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Mr. Derek MITCHELL
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs
U.S. Department of Defense
Dr. John S. PARK
Senior Research Associate & Director, Northeast Asia
Director and General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow
Center for Preventive Action,
Council on Foreign Relations
Mr. William H. TOBEY
Senior Fellow
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University
Brigadier General Martin WHELAN, USAF
Deputy Associate Director, Operations
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Dr. Abiodun WILLIAMS
Vice President
Center for Conflict Management,
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Dr. BAE Geung-chan
Ambassador KIM Hong-kyun
Dean of Research
IFANS, MOFAT
Director-General, Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT)
Dr. CHEON Seongwhun
Dr. KIM Hyun-Wook
Senior Research Fellow
Center for North Korean Studies,
Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)
Professor
Department of American Studies, IFANS, MOFAT
Dr. CHO Jung-hyun
Professor
Department of International Relations, Catholic University
Visiting Professor
IFANS, MOFAT
Dr. KIM Jae Cheol
Mr. KIM Jung Ro (“J.R.”)
Dr. CHOI Kang
Director, Division of Policy Cooperation
Ministry of Unification (MOU)
Director-General and Professor
Department of American Studies,
IFANS, MOFAT
Ms. KIM Minsung
Researcher
Department of American Studies, IFANS, MOFAT
Dr. CHOI Wooseon
Professor
Department of National Security and Unification Studies,
IFANS, MOFAT
Mr. CHOO Won Hoon
First Secretary, Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Division
Dr. HA Jung-yul
Head of Security and Strategy
Korea Research Institute for Strategy (KRIS)
Dr. HAN Sukhee
Associate Dean and Professor
Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei
University
Colonel HONG Jaeki, ROK Air Force
Director, C-WMD/Non-Proliferation Division
Ministry of National Defense
Mr. HONG Seok-in
Director, Korean Peninsula Peace Regime Division
Dr. JUN Bong-Geun
Professor
Department of National Security and Unification Studies,
IFANS, MOFAT
Mr. KANG Byung-jo
First Secretary, Korean Peace Regime Division
Dr. KIM Sung-han
Professor
Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University
Dr. KIM Young Ho
Chair and Professor
Department of International Relations,
Korea National Defense University (KNDU)
Mr. KOH Young Kul
Second Secretary, Division of Planning and Research
IFANS, MOFAT
Lt. Col. LEE Chung
Combined Forces Command
Mr. LEE Dohoon
Deputy Secretary to the President for National Security
Strategy
Blue House
Dr. LEE Dong Hwi
Professor
Department of International Economy and Trade Studies,
IFANS, MOFAT
Dr. LEE Ji-yong
Visiting Professor
Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security
(IFANS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT)
Ambassador LEE Joon-gyu
Chancellor
IFANS, MOFAT
Brig. Gen. LEE Sangchul, ROK Army
Deputy Director-General of Arms Control
Policy Planning Bureau,
Ms. PARK Ji-hyun
Director, Division of Planning and Research
IFANS, MOFAT
Dr. PARK Won Gon
Director, Office of External Cooperation
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)
Dr. SHIN Beomchul
Director, North Korean Military Studies Division
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)
Ambassador SHIN Jung-seung
Director, Center for Chinese Studies
IFANS, MOFAT
Mr. YANG Chang Seok
Director-General, Bureau of Intelligence & Analysis
Ministry of Unification (MOU)
Brig. Gen. YANG Young Mo, ROK Army (Ret.)
Director, Korea Arms Verification Agency (KAVA)
Brig. Gen. YEOM Wongyun, ROK Army
Director, U.S. Policy Division
Major Gen. YOO Jeh Seung, ROK Army
Director-General, Policy Planning Bureau
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
Cambridge, MA
675 Massachusetts Avenue
10th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02139-3309
Telephone: (617) 492-2116
Fax: (617) 492-8242
Washington, DC
1725 DeSales Street, NW
Suite 402
Washington, DC 20036 -4406
Telephone: (202) 463-7942
Fax: (202) 785-2785
[email protected]
http://www.ifpa.org
Copyright © 2011 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

Denuclearizing North Korea: Exploring Multilateral Approaches to

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