CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE ACEH`S SULTANAHS

Transcription

CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE ACEH’S SULTANAHS
Understanding Relation between Islam
and Female Leadership
Saiful Umam
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta - Indonesia
Abstract: The history of Aceh Sultanate in 1641-1699
might be an exception of the Islamic history in general.
While the history of Islam is generally male-dominated,
Aceh which had strong Islamic credentials was once ruled
by four female rulers consecutively during the period of six
decades. How did Muslim women become rulers of an
Islamic kingdom despite Islamic teaching “prohibiting”
them from taking a leadership position? How did people
react to this fact? How did the queens rule the kingdom
and survive despite opposition? Despite notions of some
historians that the queens’ periods were the weakening time
of the sultanate, the existence of female rulers is a proof of
the continuing position of women in the public sphere
even in an Islamic state. The presence of influential
aristocrats, the division of Aceh into three powerful sagis,
and the support of ùlama>’ are main contributing factors to
the rise and establishment of female rulers in Aceh. The
administrative structure of the sultanate and its Islamic
character suggest the development of moderate Islam that
made women leadership in Aceh possible. The opposition
to female rulers in Aceh which the succession of rulers was
hereditary was more politically and economically-motivated
than religious.
Keywords: The Aceh’s Sultanahs, al-Raniri, women
leadership.
Introduction
The history of Islam in the world is equal to the history Muslim
men and very few cases that it notes the role of Muslim women
(Muslimah). This may be because Islamic teaching is male-oriented as
Journal of Indonesian Islam; ISSN1978-6301
Published by the Institute for the Study of Religion and Society (LSAS) and the Postgraduate Program (PPs), the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Sunan Ampel Surabaya - Indonesia
Saiful Umam
indicated by the Qur’an and the Prophet’s tradition. Although some
strong women emerged and were noted in the history, very rarely did
they become the ruler of Islamic kingdoms. This means that Muslim
women becoming rulers of Islamic states can be categorized as an
exception in history. Among the exceptions is the history of Aceh
Sultanate in which four women were enthroned consecutively as rulers
from 1641 to 1699. Other cases are Pattani in 1584-1688,1 Pasai in the
second half of fourteenth and early fifteenth century2 and Bone, South
Sulawesi.3
There are not many articles, let alone books, discussing specifically
the reign of women rulers in the Muslim world, so that their role in the
Islamic history is hardly known. This scarcity is mainly due to lack of
historical sources that make possible for scholars doing research on the
issue. However, this topic is interesting to discuss, especially with the
rising concern in gender issues. Therefore, this paper will discuss the
Aceh sultanate during the reign of women rulers. How did Muslim
women become rulers of an Islamic kingdom despite Islamic teaching
“prohibiting” them from taking a leadership position? How did people
react to this fact? How did the queens rule the kingdom and survive
despite opposition?
The Sultanate of Aceh emerged in the early sixteenth century and
became very powerful in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries. The most powerful and well known ruler was Sultan
Iskandar Muda (1607-1636). The power of the kingdom during his rule
was unquestioned, but after his reign Aceh gradually declined in power.
During the reign of Sultan Iskandar Thani (1636-1641), who was
Iskandar Muda’s son-in-law, the Orang Kaya started again to dominate
the government after being dominated by Iskandar Muda. The
enthronement of the first queen, Sultanah Taj al-Alam Safiyat al-Din
(1641-1675), was the result of a compromise among them. Afterwards,
all queens did not ascend without support from the Orang Kaya. This
means that the governing power was not fully held by the queens.
Ibrahim Syukri, History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (Athens: Center for International
Studies, Ohio University, 1985), pp. 22-38.
1
T. Ibrahim Alfian, Wanita Utama Nusantara dalam Lintasan Sejarah (Jakarta: Jayakarta
Agung, 1994), pp. 1-25.
2
Anthony Reid, “Female Roles in Pre-colonial Southeast Asia,” Modern Asian Studies,
22 (1988), p. 640.
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JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM
Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013
Islam and Female Leadership
Therefore, many historians attributed the queens’ periods as the
weakening time of the sultanate.4
As a part of Southeast Asian region, the period of women rulers is
a proof of the continuing significant position of Southeast Asian
women in the public sphere even during an Islamic state. Leonard
Andaya, for example, shows that the first female ruler, Sultanah Safiyat
al-Din, was in fact a powerful ruler. It is true that the style of
administration changed, but this was mainly due to the external
challenges, especially from the Dutch, which forced her to act in a
more subtle and reconciliatory fashion. Several factors may contribute
to the rise and establishment of women rulers in Aceh in the latter half
of the 17th century. The presence of influential aristocrats, the division
of Aceh into three powerful sagis, and the support of ‘ùlama>’ are main
factors.5 Having examined the administrative structure of the sultanate
and its Islamic character, I argue that it was the development of
moderate Islam that contributed to the rise of women leadership in the
Islamic state of Aceh. Moreover, this paper contends that opposition
to female rulers was more politically-and economically-motivated than
religious.
The Establishment of the Aceh Sultanate and Its Significant
Rulers
There are many versions and differences on the early history of
Aceh. Chronicles and notes of Europeans differed from one to the
other as discussed in detail by Hoesein Djajadiningrat.6 However, most
scholars agree that Aceh was established in the early sixteenth century.
They also agree, based on al-Raniri’s Bustan al-Salatin, that Sultan Ali
Mughayat Syah was the founder of the Sultanate of Aceh.7 Although
Anthony Reid, “Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh. c. 1550-1700,” in
Anthony Reid and Lance Castles (eds), Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia (Kuala
Lumpur: MBRAS, 1975): pp. 52-54.
4
Amirul Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra: a Study of Seventeenth-century Aceh (Leiden: Brill,
2004), pp. 86-87.
5
Raden Hoesein Djajadiningrat, Kesultanan Aceh: Suatu Pembahasan tentang Sejarah
Kesultanan Aceh Berdasarkan Bahan-bahan yang Terdapat dalam Karya Melayu (Daerah
Istimewa Aceh: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1983), pp. 9-20.
6
Nuruddin Al-Raniri, Bustan al-Salatin, Siti Hawa Haji Salleh (ed.) (Kuala Lumpur:
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992), p. 1.
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Takeshi Ito8 states that Sultan Syamsu Syah, the father of Sultan Ali
Mughayat Syah, was the one who had established the Dar al-Salam
sultanate by uniting Mahkota Alam and Dar-Kamal. He similarly
argues that it was Sultan Ali Mughayat Syah who was the real founder
as he successfully expanded the kingdom by conquering Daya, Pidie
and Pasai in the 1520s. The success of Mughayat Syah was apparently
due to his strategic call to unite all forces in order to confront a foreign
intruder, the Portuguese.9 Since then, the sultanate existed as an
independent polity and the anti-foreigner rallying cry became the longlasting pretext brought forward by its rulers for centuries in
maintaining the unity of the kingdom.
Aceh was fortunate to have a number of powerful rulers after its
establishment, although they did not always rule consecutively. The
next significant ruler recorded in the history was Sultan Ala al-Din
Riayat Syah al-Kahhar (1539-1571). During his reign, Aceh emerged as
the strongest Muslim state on the Melaka straits.10 Al-Kahhar was
known as the ruler who had challenged the Portuguese power in
Melaka. His army reportedly defeated the Portugese fleet which came
to Aceh and launched several attacks on Melaka, though they were all
unsuccessful.11 Al-Kahhar also built a strong economic, political and
military relationship with the Ottoman Caliphate, one of the strongest
kingdoms in the world at the time. Under his rule, Aceh succeeded in
establishing suzerainty over the pepper-producing centers on the west
coast of Sumatra, as well as the rice-producing regions on the east
coast.12
Another important ruler was Sultan Ala al-Din Riayat Syah alMukammil (1589-1604). Prior to his rule, the Orang Kaya were a
dominant force and could enthrone and dethrone rulers at will. It was
reported that about three rulers were enthroned and subsequently
dethroned by these Orang Kaya in one year in 1579. Al-Mukammil’s
accession as ruler was not exempt from their intervention. However,
soon after al-Mukammil secured his position, he broke the power of
Takeshi Ito, “The World of the Adat Aceh: a Historical Study of the Sultanate of
Aceh,” (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Australian National University, 1984), p. 12.
8
9
Reid, “Trade and the Problem of Royal Power”, p. 46.
10
Ito, “The World of the Adat Aceh”, pp. 12-13.
11
Djajadiningrat, Kesultanan Aceh, pp. 23-24.
12
Ito, “The World of the Adat Aceh”, p. 13.
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the Orang Kaya (merchant class, which were the elite class of Aceh) by
killing many of them, stripping their monopoly over economy, and
keeping them under his control.13 According to Anthony Reid, alMukammil was the first ruler of Aceh to centralize the power, which
then continued under Iskandar Muda.14
The reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) was categorized by
many scholars as the golden age of Aceh, despite his uncompromising
cruel attitudes toward his political “enemies.” During his reign, the
domain of the Sultanate was extended far to the south on the west and
east coasts of Sumatra. In addition, he also conquered several states in
the Malay Peninsula and brought them under Aceh’s suzerainty. He
also resumed the war against the Portuguese. In 1629 he launched an
attack against Melaka with a large fleet under his own command.
However he was defeated by the Portuguese. According to Ito this was
“the watershed between the glorious days of the Sultanate and its
gradual decline.”15
The greatness of Iskandar Muda might also be inferred from the
life of the Dalam (royal enclosure) noted by Europeans. Quoting
Beaulieu, Ito mentions that there were about 3,000 female servants,
around 500 eunuchs and some 1,500 slave guards living in the Dalam.
The greatness of the sultanate was also accompanied by, and may be
the result of, the autocratic nature of Iskandar Muda. Ito argues that
the power was centered at the court and that he was a tyrannical
ruler.16 “It was a state in which the sovereign was identical both
conceptually and institutionally with the state and thus the ruler’s will
was the supreme law of the realm… the royal enclosure was not
merely a residence but at the same time the seat of the administration
of the state, and even senior administrative officials were, like the
servants of the royal household, the ruler’s servants in the broad
sense”
Because Iskandar Muda’s son and crown prince was killed, a
Prince of Pahang, who had been taken to Aceh as a prisoner and
subsequently married Iskandar Muda’s daughter, was enthroned with
Merle C. Riclefs, A History of Modern Indonesia (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2008),
p. 35.
14 Reid, “Trade and the Problem of Royal Power”, pp. 48-9.
13
15
16
Ibid., p. 29.
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the title of Sultan Iskandar Thani, after the death of Iskandar Muda.
Although his reign was brief, 1636-1341, it was important due to
several developments. Ito,17 for example, notes that internal
“disintegration of royal power and the gradual aggrandizement of the
Orang Kaya” began during his time. In addition, relations with Johor
also worsened because of the Johor’s invasion of Pahang and its
alliance with the Dutch during the conquest of Melaka in 1641. Aceh’s
refusal to make an alliance with the Dutch enabled the latter to make
inroads into the pepper trade and damage the trade of Aceh. Overall,
Ito argues that the reign of Iskandar Thani was a transition from an
autocratic to a weakened royal authority. His death also marked the
beginning of a period of women rulers for almost 60 years.18
The Period of Female Rulers
As already mentioned, the Orang Kaya increased their power during
Sultan Iskandar Thani’s reign. His death at a relatively young age and
without an heir gave the Orang Kaya increased power in selecting his
successor. The compromise that they reached was to enthrone
Iskandar Thani’s widow, who was also Iskandar Muda’s daughter, Taj
al-Alam Safiyat al-Din Syah. There are no clear records on how they
agreed upon this decision. This has led to speculation among historians
in explaining this situation. Reid, for example, argues that the Orang
Kaya did not want to have a strong ruler such as Iskandar Muda, who
had suppressed them and had restricted their access to economic and
political resources.19
The ascension of Safiyat al-Din was the first experience that the
Acehnese had of rule by a queen. As an Islamic kingdom and its
people were accustomed to male dominated teachings of Islam, it is
therefore not surprising that this new phenomenon shocked religious
people and resulted in their opposing this decision. There was no
report on how the Sultanah responded to this challenge. But many
scholars argue that it was Nur al-Din al-Raniri (d. 1658) who had a
strong role in defending her accession.20 As the Shaykh al-Islam and a
17
Ibid., p. 17.
18
Ibid., p. 18.
19
Reid, “Female Roles in Pre-colonial”, p. 641.
Cheah Boon Kheng, “Power behind the Throne: the Role of Queens and Court
Ladies in Malay History,” JMBRAS 66 (1993), p. 11.
20
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highly respected religious man, he favored Safiyat al-Din and did not
question her authority.
Sultanah Safiyat al-Din showed that, to some extent, she was not
as weak as perceived by many scholars.21 Andaya describes her style of
leadership as different from her predecessors, such as having regular
audiences at the court and letting the ministers join the audiences as
well as relying on sida-sida (eunuchs).22 However, all these were due to
her following Islamic scripture that made her change the governing
style. As the Muslim woman, she was not supposed to have a direct
contact with non-relative men, so that she let the ministers join the
meeting. She nevertheless successfully kept the independent and
autonomous nature of the Sultanate despite the Dutch’s continuous
pressure on Aceh especially after it successfully defeated the
Portuguese in Melaka, in 1641. 23
The next ruler was Sultanah Nur al-Alam Naqiyat al-Din Inayat
Syah (1675-1677). In contrast to Sultanah Safiyat al-Din whose lineage
was known for sure, it is not clear who Sultanah Naqiyat al-Din’s royal
lineage was and how she ascended to the ruling position. A local
historian argues that Naqiyat al-Din as well as the other two
subsequent women rulers were prepared by Sultanah Safiyat al-Din by
providing them with courses and tutorials from knowledgeable people,
including Europeans, so that they would not be shocked when they
came to power.24 This argument is not supported by any historical
evidence and is of doubtful validity. Others contend that having
enjoyed their position during the women ruler, the Orang Kaya
appointed another woman as the ruler. This opinion seems to be more
acceptable among historians, although, as mentioned earlier, this view
also lacks historical documentation.
Sultanah Naqiyat al-Din ruled for only a short period of two years.
However, during her rule there were two important cases mentioned
21
Leonard Y. Andaya, “‘A Very Good-natured but Awe-inspiring Government’ The
Reign of a Successful Queen in Seventeenth-century Aceh,” in Elsbeth LocherScholten and Peter Rietbergen (eds), Hof en Hande: Aziatische Vorsten en de VOC 16201720 (Leiden: KITLV Uitgerverij, 2004), pp. 65-75.
22
Denys Lombard, Kerajaan Aceh Jaman Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) (Jakarta: Balai
Pustaka, 1986), p. 131, p. 186, and p. 200.
23
A. Hasjmy, 59 Tahun Aceh Merdeka di bawah Pemerintahan Ratu (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang,
1977).
24
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by historians: the emergence of the political power of Panglima Sagis
and the destruction by fire of the court and the Bayt al-Rahman
mosque. Historians state that the Sagi as a socio-political unit was
introduced during the first queen and there were three sagis known
from the number of Mukim under its administration. It seems that
Sultanah Naqiyat al-Din formalized the structure with the Panglima
Sagi heading political power in order to counter-balance the power of
the Orang Kaya at the center. It is reported that from this time Panglima
Sagis were among those who had right to enthrone and dethrone
Aceh’s rulers.25
Opposition or challenge to her authority came from one of the
Panglima Sagi, Panglima Polem, who was the half brother of the
former queen. He was a son of Iskandar Muda but from a different
mother from the former Sultanah. As the Panglima Sagi, he appointed
those who supported him. There is little information on this
opposition and how the Sultanah responded to the challenge. Her
short reign may be the reason that so little is known about this
opposition. However, it seems reasonable to argue that the increasing
political power of the Panglima Sagis, which was decreed by the
Sultanah, was a response to questions regarding her authority.
The next ruler was Sultanah Inayat Syah Zakiyat al-Din (16771688). During her rule, English envoys as well as those from Mecca
visited Aceh and had an audience with her. The British envoy
requested permission from the queen to build a business center with a
fortress. The queen responded that a business center might be built
but without the fortress. With regard to the Arab messengers, it is
explained that initially they came to Moghul, India, but the Moghul
ruler was not willing to receive them, and so they continued their
journey to Aceh. The queen welcomed her guests and even requested
them that they stay longer, so that she could prepare a gift to bring
back to Mecca and present to the Syarif of Mecca.26
During the reign of Zakiyat al-Din, an opposing movement to her
leadership emerged. A local historian notes that those who opposed
the ruler persuaded two of the four Arab messengers to stay in Aceh
with the promise that if they successfully overthrew the queen, they
would raise to become the new ruler. Such story may have been told to
25
Djajadiningrat, Kesultanan Aceh, p. 58.
26
Ibid., p. 59.
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account for the fact that when the last female ruler of Aceh was
deposed, she was replaced by someone of Arab descent.
When Sultanah Zakiyat al-Din died in 1688 she was succeeded by
Sultanah Kamalat al-Din Syah, the last female ruler in Acehnese
history. She ruled the sultanate for about eleven years until she was
forced to step down in 1699 by those who opposed to a woman ruling
a Muslim kingdom. Historians argue that the death of Abd al-Rauf alSingkili in 1693 was a major blow for the rule of queens. No
authoritative ùlama>’ could replace him as the strong defender of the
idea that a woman could be a ruler. In addition, Meccan ùlama>’ issued
a fatwa, which was apparently a response to a request from those who
opposed the ruler, which supposedly state that it is unlawful for a
woman to rule a sultanate.
This section shows that there were always opposition movements
toward the ascension of women as rulers in the sultanate. Islam could
have been a source for those who opposed the female rulers as the
case in the first and the fourth Sultanahs. However, the opposition was
not simply to replace a woman with a man. They also wanted to
enthrone their man instead of the best available at the time. Therefore,
political power may have been a stronger reason for their challenging
women leadership. Before discussing further debates on this issue, it is
worth firs discussing administrative structure of the sultanate and then
its Islamic nature. The administrative structure will show the power
relations among the ruling elites, while the discussion of Islamic
character of the state will illuminate the extent of the Islamic presence
in the state and hence its role in the opposition movements.
Administrative Structure
It seems that from Aceh’s establishment, political power was a
source of contention between the ruler and the Orang Kaya. In his
article, Reid divides the Aceh sultanate during 1550-1700 into three
stages. The first stage was dominated by the Orang Kaya and lasted until
1589, when al-Mukammil ascended the throne. The second stage,
which Reid categorizes as an era of royal absolutism, continued until
the death of Iskandar Muda in 1636. The last stage is characterized as
the era of the decline of royal power under the four sultanahs.
Although the categorization seems to be arbitrary—how he explains
the “absolutist” ruler al-Mukammil was forced to step down by his son
and the first female ruler was in fact a powerful ruler—the article
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shows that, in addition to the rulers, there were others who had access
in dominating power in the sultanate.
Andaya identifies that, there were four persons who were very
powerful in the Sultanate. They were Leube Kita Kali (or Kadi Malik
al-Adil, the principal judge of religious and secular law); Orang Kaya
Maharaja Sri Maharaja (chief minister of state affairs); Orang Kaya
Laksamana Perdana Menteri (police commander); and Panglima
Bandara (chief officer of ports). While during powerful sultans, like
Iskandar Muda, these officials had no decisive power in the
administration, they enjoyed greater power under the weak Sultans or
Sultanas.27
Andaya also argues that the listing of Kali (or Kadi) as the first
minister shows that the Aceh Sultanate place Islam as the most
important aspect of life. As discussed further in the next section, Kadi
Malik al-Adil was the most trusted advisor of the ruler not only on
religious matter but also on other administrative issues including
diplomatic affairs. Kadi often joined a meeting with foreign envoys
discussing a proposed agreement. During court ceremonies, such as ‘Id>
al-Fit}r and ‘I>d al-Ad}a festivals, Kadi always sat just beside the ruler,
symbolizing his high status in the ruling system.
In addition to the ruling class mentioned earlier, the Sultanate of
Aceh also recognized socio-political entities which governed daily lives
at lower levels. Ito describes that there were three socio-political
elements of the sultanate: Mukim, Nanggro, and Sagi (sagoe).
Although he mentions the gampong (or Kampung in Malay) as the
smallest unit, it seems that Mukim was the smallest recognizable unit,
which Ito identifies as equal to district or township. It is not clear what
the leader of this unit was called. He only mentions that this term, as
the Arabic word muqi>m indicates, refer to the prescribed number of
adult Muslims living in an area as a condition for a necessity of
conducting a Friday congregational prayer. The next level is Nanggroe
(negeri in Malay word) which comprised a number of Mukim and was
administered by Uleebalang. The next level is the Sagi (Sagoe, means
angle or corner), a confederation of Nanggroe. The leader of Sagi was
called Panglima Sagi.
Leonard Y. Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness,” Achipel, 61
(2001), pp. 52-53.
27
10
Ito acknowledges that his description on the socio-political unit
was sketchy due to the lack of historical records. It is unclear,
therefore, when these institutions were initially developed, became
effective and for how long their effectiveness. Neither is their relation
with the four Orang Kaya mentioned earlier. However it can be
assumed that until the ascension of the second female ruler, Sultanah
Naqiyat al-Din Syah, the Orang Kaya or the elite class was dominant in
the ruling authority. Afterward, the ruling power was shared with, and
possibly contested by, the Panglima Sagis.
Sagi as a socio-political unit seems to be established during the
reign of Sultanah Safiyat al-Din. There were three Sagis known from
the number of Mukim in its territory: Sagi XXII, Sagi XXV, and Sagi
XXVI. The establishment of Sagi, Ito argues, had political as well as
economic purposes. Politically, it counter-balanced increasing political
power of the Orang Kaya, while economically it was the result of the
rising significance of interior contribution to the wealth of the
sultanate.28 During the queens’ period, the source of revenues did not
only come from port areas but also from interiors as agricultural
products increased. The increasing power of Panglima Sagi, therefore,
signified the tension between them and the Orang Kaya in controlling
economic sources as well as political power.
The power of Panglima Sagis seems to be more powerful after the
reign of Sultanah Naqiyat al-Din as she decreed the Panglimas as
people who had rights to enthrone and dethrone the ruler of Aceh. 29
Panglimas Sagis, therefore, reportedly weakened the power the Orang
Kaya. In Ito’s words, that the development of the three Panglima Sagi
“put an end to the role played by the Uleebalang in relation to the
Acehnese rulers and set up a new framework of the political life of the
Sultanate from the last quarter of the 17th century for the centuries
following.”30
The opinion that Panglima Sagi had power in electing the ruler has
resulted in differences among historians in regard to who really
28
Ito, “The World of the Adat Aceh”, pp. 72-73.
According to Hasjmy there were four people who have right in enthroning and
dethroning the ruler, i.e. three Panglima Sagi and Kadi Malik al-Adil. See A. Hasjmy,
59 Tahun Aceh Merdeka, p. 189. Djajadiningrat, however, only mentions that the
enthronement of new ruler was subject to the approval of Panglima Sagis. See
Djajadiningrat, Kesultanan Aceh, p. 58.
29
30
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opposed the leadership of women in the sultanate. As discussed later
on, some scholars argues that those who disagree with the women
rulers were Sagi leaders, pointing out to Panglima Polem, while others
mentioned the Orang Kaya as the ones who were behind the movement
to overthrow queens’ political power.
Islamic Character of Aceh
As mentioned slightly before, Islam was a very important factor
signifying the Sultanate of Aceh from the rest of kingdoms at the time.
Andaya argues that “Islam provided Aceh with an advantage over all
contenders for leadership in the Malay world.”31 Pasai and north
Sumatra, he argues, were the earliest to embrace Islam while Malaka
converted to the religion sometime in the middle of the fifteenth
century. Pasai “remained the most prestigious Islamic centre in the
archipelago,” and its reputation was transferred to Aceh when Pasai
was absorbed into Aceh in the early sixteenth century. Islam, then,
formed the underpinning of society in Aceh. Andaya argues further
that Malay identity, which is inseparable from Islam, came from the
period of Aceh Sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth century.
The nature of Islamic character seems to be the effect of
influential ùlama>’ in the court. It is noted that almost all Acehnese
rulers gave royal patronage to the leading Muslim scholars and
appointed them as whether Shaykh al-Islam or Kadi Malik al-Adil.32
During the reign of Iskandar Muda, for example, Shams al-Din alSumatrani (d. 1630) was appointed as the Shaykh al-Islam. Shams alDin had very powerful influence over the ruler as noted by many
European contemporaries. After Shams al-Din and Iskandar Muda
died and Iskandar Thani ascended to the power, Nur al-Din al-Raniri
enjoyed his position as Shaykh al-Islam. Then, Abd al-Rauf al-Singkili
held the office of Kadi Malik al-Adil during the period of four queens.
31
Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution, p. 38.
Shaykh al-Islam represents a highest authority in Islam. This term also epitomizes
the unity of state and religion. Shaykh al-Islam is not a part of state officials but
functions as the advisor or chief-councilor. Shaykh al-Islam might issue a fatwa, a nonbinding legal opinion. However, a fatwa might be implemented fully and effectively
due to the closeness of Shaykh with a ruler. Kadi Malik al-Adil, on the other hand, is a
supreme judge or the highest authority of the court. Kadi (Qadi) is a part of state
officials and a decision made by kadi is binding, since the court is a legal institution to
settle disputes or punish those who break the laws. For further discussion on Shaykh
al-Islam and Kadi. See Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra, pp. 148-166.
32
12
It is the ùlama>’ through their influence on the rulers that Islamic
notion widely spread in the sultanate. In Ito’s words, the ùlama>’ played
roles as advisors to the ruler and undoubtedly much influenced the
social and spiritual life of the Acehnese.”33
The Islamic character of Aceh was also well represented in literary
works produced during the sultanate. Using Malay language, the
literary production paid greater emphasis on Islamic themes so that it
made distinctive from the rest of other Malay literary works. In
discussing the Islamic scholarship in the Malay-Indonesian world in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Peter Riddell mainly discuss
works of those three ùlama>’s from Aceh as representing the MalayIndonesian Islamic literature. This shows the importance of Aceh in
development of Islamic scholarly debates during this period.
Therefore, it is worth discussing in brief their biography and roles.34
Very little is known about the life of Shams al-Din al-Sumatrani.
His date of birth was not known but some scholars assume he was
born before 1575.35 He seems to assume central position in the
sultanate before the accession of Iskandar Muda to power in 1607.
However, it is during Iskandar Muda’s reign that his influence to the
ruler and, in turn, to Acehnese was highly notified. Through his literary
works, the most important of which was Mir’a>t al-Mu’mini>n, he
expounds theosophical doctrines toward the Acehnese. He extends
and strengthens monistic teaching which was initially introduced to
Aceh by Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1590). He also introduces a concept of
seven grades of being, which represent the different structures of sufi’s
consciousness or pathways. The ultimate goal of the pathways is to
attain the union between Creator and creature. This is more popularly
known as the wuju>di>yah teaching which was later condemned by alRaniri.36
Shams al-Din also reportedly initiated Iskandar Muda into the
Naqshbandiyah order.37 This implied that, to a certain degree, Iskandar
33
Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001).
34
35
Ibid., p. 110.
36
Ibid., pp. 112-115.
37
Ibid., p. 111.
13
Saiful Umam
Muda was his disciple in the Sufi order.38 It is not surprising, therefore,
that Shams al-Din had very strong influence on Iskandar Muda, not
only on religious matters, but also on other administrative affairs. He
often joined the Sultan’s address to foreign guests as well as in
negotiations with them dealing with a treaty of commerce. He seems to
be the most trusted advisor of Iskandar Muda until his death in 1630.
On his overall roles, Ito concludes that “the reign of Sultan Iskandar
Muda was, in many respects, Syams al-Din’s day, particularly in
Acehnese religious life.”39
When Iskandar Muda died and Iskandar Thani ascended to the
power, Nur al-Din al-Raniri was the most prominent ùlama>’ in the
court. Born in Ranir (Randir), an old harbor on the Gujarat coast,
around the end of the sixteenth century, al-Raniri was believed to
spend some time in Pahang so that he familiarized with the royal
family, one of whose descendant was now the ruler of Aceh. This
explains why after his coming to Aceh in 1637, he was soon appointed
as Shaykh al-Islam by Sultan Iskandar Thani, a Prince of Pahang. 40
Contradictory to his predecessor, Shams al-Din al-Sumatrani, Nur alDin al-Raniri was an orthodox ùlama>’. Therefore, during his officiant,
one of his concerns was to “purify” Islamic understanding of
Acehnese. This was done through a number of his literary works, one
of which was H{ujjat al-s}iddi>q li daf’ al-zindi>q (the truth reasons to refute
heresy).
As indicated by its title, this book refutes the monistic teaching and
claims it as un-Islamic.41 After having a firm foothold in the court, al38
39
Ibid., p. 252.
There is a difference among scholars toward the exact position of Nur al-Din alRaniri. Some, like Azra and Hadi mention that he hold a position as Shaykh al-Islam.
Ito, on the other hand, argues the only Shaykh al-Islam in Aceh was Shams al-Din alSumatrani. This implies that Nur al-Din was Kadi Malik al-Adil, as argued by Riddell
that he was the Chief Judge. See, Azyumardi Azra, The Origin of Islamic Reformism in
Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern ùlama>‘‘in the Seventeenth and
Eihgteen Centuries (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), p. 59; Hadi, Islam and
State in Sumatra, p. 153; Ito, “The World of the Adat Aceh”, pp. 259-261; Riddell, Islam
and the Malay-Indonesian World, p. 118.
40
Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas, Raniri and the Wujudiyah of 17th Century Acheh
(Singapore: MBRAS, 1966); Idem, A Commentary on the Hujjat al-Siddiq of Nur al-Din alRaniri (Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture, Malaysia, 1986).
41
14
Raniri launched attack on wuju>di>yah teaching. Based on his fatwa many
people were killed when they refused to dismantle their beliefs and
practices of wuju>di>yah.42 This shows the great influence of al-Raniri not
only on the ruler but also on the shift of religious life as well as Islamic
teaching which developed in Aceh.
Al-Raniri’s another important, if not the most important, literary
work was the voluminous Bustan al-Salatin. These seven books reflect
his interest in the field of history. The first two books present the
history of world, and chapter 13 of the second volume deals
specifically with the history of the Aceh Sultanate. This is one of few
local written sources that many scholars refer to in describing some
details of the sultanate’s history.
Al-Raniri continued serving this position during early years of
Sultanah Safiyat al-Din. He was forced to leave Aceh in 1645 following
his debate with Sayf al-Rijal, the defender of the wuju>di>yah teachings.
Acknowledging that the Sutlanah had no capacity in settling in the
debate, she sent this matter to the ruling elites who apparently
preferred to support Sayf al-Rijal. Sayf al-Rijal was then appointed to
replace al-Raniri’s position, while the latter was expelled from Aceh.43
It is not recorded in the history the role of Sayf al-Rijal in his new
office and how far his influence was on the Sultanah. The discussion
of the great ùlama>’ having strong influence on the ruler then goes to
Abd al-Rauf al-Sinkili who assumed his office in the early 1660s. Abd
al-Rauf was born in Sinkel, the southwestern coastal region of Aceh, in
1615. He left Aceh for Arabia in 1642 and spent around 19 years
seeking knowledge from one place to another in Arabia. After he came
back to Aceh in 1661, Sultanah Safiyat al-Din appointed him as Kadi
Malik al-Adil.44
Until his death in 1693, al-Singkili held this position and he
enjoyed royal patronage from the women rulers. It is understandable
that scholars categorize him as the most influential ùlama>’ in
defending the authority of female rulers. His acceptance to the position
42
Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World, pp. 119-123.
Takeshi Ito, “Why did Nuruddin ar-Raniri Leave Aceh in 1054 AH?,” BKI, 134
(1978): pp. 489-491.
43
Azra, The Origin of Islamic Reformism, pp. 70-78; Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian
World, pp. 125-126.
44
15
Saiful Umam
and his dedication to the rulers as recorded in his books are enough
bases to argue that statement.
During his life, al-Singkili authored a number of books on different
issues, ranging from Qur’anic exegesis, the Prophetic tradition, fiqh,
theology, and mysticism. One of the most important books is Mir’a>t alT}ulla>b which discusses many topics of Muslim life in the perspective of
Islamic jurisprudence. This book was written during and
commissioned by the Sultanah Safiyat al-Din. Other books which were
requested by another ruler, Sultanah Zakiyat al-Din, were Risalah adab
murid akan syakh, which deals with proper relation and conduct of a
student toward a teacher, and a commentary upon the compilation of
40 hadiths by Nawawi.45
To some extent, al-Singkili was similar to al-Raniri in terms that
both are orthodox ùlama>’. However, he differed from al-Raniri in his
attitudes toward the wuju>di>yah followers. Although he also claimed the
wuju>di>yah teaching as incorrect, al-Singkili did not regard its followers as
ka>fir (non-believer) and subject to be fought. He even criticized alRaniri’s conduct as wasting time and reminded people for not accusing
other Muslims as ka>fir since this was improper.46
The Islamic understanding of al-Singkili, therefore, might be said
as moderate. He seems to go in between Shams al-Din and Nur al-Din.
In Azra’s words, al-Singkili’s main concern was the reconciliation
between the shari>‘ah and tas}awwuf, or between z}a>hir (outer) and ba>t}in
(inner) sciences. His moderate position was also found in his
acceptance to the authority of women as rulers.47 In his 22 books, he
never questioned the leadership quality of sultanahs; this implies that
he accepted their leadership. Royal patronage that he enjoyed during
his whole life is another indication of his position. As a great scholar
and influential Sufi teacher—he was authorized by a murshid of
Syatariyah order in Mecca to spread the order in the Malay world—alSingkili’s position must be a major cause for the failure of opposition
movements toward women rulers. As will be addressed in the later part
of the paper, the success of toppling down the female ruler was taking
place only after his death.
Azra, The Origin of Islamic Reformism, pp. 79-82; Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian
World, p. 129.
45
46
Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World, p. 128.
47
Azra, The Origin of Islamic Reformism, p. 79.
16
The discussion of three ùlama>’ mentioned above shows the
reciprocal relation between the sultans or sultanahs and Muslim
scholars. The scholars enjoyed royal patronage extended by the rulers
while the rulers were maintained their image as pious Muslims and
guarded from oppositional challenges. This part also confirms that the
type of Islam that spread in Aceh is sufistic Islam. All three great
scholars were sufi masters of different orders: Shams al-Din affiliated
with Naqshabandiyah, al-Raniri with Rifaiyah, and al-Singkili with
Shatariyah. It still needs further studies whether there is causative
relation between following a certain sufi order and types of religious
thought of the follower. As it is known, while Shams al-Din stresses on
theosophical or monistic teachings, al-Raniri emphasizes the shari’ah
aspect, which was the opposite of the earlier. Al-Singkili, on the other
hand, tried to reconcile both, though he kept shariah as an aspect that
must not be neglected. One thing which is clear, however, is that by
following Sufism, one does not necessarily mean neglecting orthodoxy
of Islam, as shown by al-Raniri and al-Singkili.
The shift between one dominant “school” to another during
different rulers indicate the fluidity of society in receipting religious
ideas. It is, therefore, not arguable that Andaya classifies Aceh at the
time as “Islamic cosmopolitanism,” with indication that its people
adhered to “the latest religious and secular fashions from the Islamic
world.” This means that despite Islam being the strong character of
Aceh, it is the moderate teaching which developed in Aceh; Islam
which is open to new ideas and views, including female leadership.48
The latter is not something totally new for the Acehnese as a part
of Austronesian societies. As Reid argues that the societies “have been
more inclined than perhaps any other major population group to place
high-born women on the throne.” This also explains why Pasai in the
early fifteenth century and Patani in the late sixteenth had been ruled
by queens. As an Islamic kingdom, the Aceh sultanate would not likely
have the women rulers, had Islam developed in the region been a
strong shari>‘ah-oriented or strict orthodox one. In other words, the
idea of women rulers does not come from, and even contradicts with,
Islamic teachings. It comes from the regional culture. However, the
48
Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution”, p. 38.
17
Saiful Umam
implementation of the idea in the Aceh sultanate was made possible
only by moderate understanding of Islam.49
Women Rulers in Debates
Different from the ascension to power of Iskandar Muda and
Iskandar Thani who were reportedly assigned by the dying rulers,50 all
women rulers ascended to the power as the result of a compromise
among the ruling elites. None of them was designated by the previous
ruler. As the position of the ruler was a highly political issue, it is hard
to imagine that many people were satisfied with one conclusion. It is,
therefore, not surprising that disagreement was noted on every single
female ruler. Let alone, this issue is contradictory to the mainstream of
Islamic tenets, so that people easily use Islam as the reason to oppose
the female ruler.
It is understandable, therefore, that from early beginning of the
women rulers’ period, questions on their authority were always present.
However, it is hard to define who really opposed to the women rulers,
since available historical records only mentions sketchily from one case
to another. The only thing which is sure is that people involved in
opposing the ruler were different from one time to another. During
the first female ruler, Sultanah Safiyat al-Din, the opposition might
come from Islamic oriented figures who were shocked with a new
phenomenon, having a woman as the ruler, as this had never been the
case in Aceh. It might be argued, then, that the first opposition
movement was more spontaneous and religious and less political. The
fact that after a while no opposition was noted in foreign notes as well
as in local documents indicates that the opposition was relatively
overcome. For this matter, the favor and support of al-Raniri must be
an important factor in addition to the Sultanah’s good leadership when
ruling the sultanate.51
Having position as Shaykh al-Islam and being a highly respected
ùlama>’, al-Raniri did not have any objection on the enthronement of a
woman as a ruler. Although he also did not legalize explicitly the
authority of female leadership, in Bustan al-Salatin, he did praise Safiyat
al-Din as the just, generous, loving and caring ruler. When describing
49
Reid, “Female Roles in Pre-colonial”, p. 639.
50
Al-Raniri, Bustan al-Salatin, pp. 18-19; Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra, pp. 87-88.
51
Kheng, “Power behind the Throne”, p. 11.
18
her death, he also praised her as the ruler who had successfully
maintained the implementation of Islamic law, increased state
prosperity, and humble before God.52 This indicates that he was on her
side and in support on her enthronement. It might be argued,
therefore, that Islamic-driven opposition toward a female ruler was not
strong and it could be swept away by attitudes of the respected
religious scholar.
During the second female ruler, Sultanah Naqiyat al-Din, the
opposition to her reign came from a member of royal family, Teuku
Itam, known also as Panglima Polem. This challenge seems to be more
political than religious, as he was reported to be assigned as the next
ruler after the death of Safiyat al-Din. Panglima Polem was the son of
Iskandar Muda from non gahara wife so that he was a half-brother of
Safiyat al-Din. The ascension of Naqiyat al-Din had understandably
disappointed him and this led him to challenge the ruler. Although
Islamic reason was used to support his action and he was backed by
some Muslims as he was also the Panglima of Sagi XXII, this
movement was clearly a political one because the ultimate aim was to
take oer the power, and not just against the female leader.53
It is not clear how the opposition movement came to an end.
There is possibility that the Sultanah Naqiyat al-Din responded the
challenge by granting more power to Sagi. As mentioned before that
during her reign, the three Panglima Sagis were among those who had
right to enthrone and dethrone the ruler. Whether Panglima Polem
then accepted this scheme or not it is hardly known. However, there
was no report afterward about his opposition movement.
During the third and fourth female rulers, opposition against the
rulers was also present. Different from the second female ruler, this
time the group who challenged Sultanah Zakiyat al-Din and Sultanah
Kamalat al-Din was unclear. The speculation was addressed to some
Orang Kaya or elite groups in the center of power. This is based on the
development that during Naqiyat al-Din, the power of three Panglima
Sagis was more powerful. They not only had right to enthrone and
dethrone the ruler but also had more autonomous power in
administering their respective Sagis. This might made the Orang Kaya
52
Al-Raniri, Bustan al-Salatin, pp. 42-63.
Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra, p. 82; Ito, “The World of the Adat Aceh”, pp. 69-72;
53
19
Saiful Umam
loose some control on economic sources. As also mentioned, since the
reign of Sultanah Safiyat al-Din, the ports were no longer dominant
sources of wealth for Aceh as a result of intensive intervention of the
Dutch in international trade.
Local historians argue that during the reign of Zakiyat al-Din two
of four delegates from Mecca were persuaded by some ruling elites not
to return to Mecca but live in Aceh instead. The two men were Sharif
Hashim and Sharif Ibrahim. The elites who opposed the ruler were
apparently trying to seek assistance from them as they use Islamic
reasons in order to depose the women ruler. Local historians even
argue further that the opposing group promised to enthrone one of the
two if they succeeded in dethroning the ruler. This was approved later
that Sharif Hashim was enthroned as the ruler after Sultanah Kamalat
al-Din was successfully deposed in 1699 following the arrival of a fatwa>
from the Haramayn ùlama>’.54
Why the opposition movement succeeded in dethroning the
women ruler only in 1699? The arrival of Meccan delegation was noted
in 1683, so that there was a time lag of about 16 years. If we assume
that it was a process needed to a fatwa to come to Aceh, then it is
certainly too long, because transportation between Malay and Mecca
was very frequent, either for trade or pilgrimage purposes. This
brought to argue the significant role of a respected ùlama>’ at this time,
Abd al-Rauf al-Singkili.
As mentioned earlier, al-Singkili had royal patronage with four
women rulers and he held position as the Kadi Malik al-Adil. He was
in favor of the rulers and never questioned, implicitly or explicitly, the
authority of women as rulers. He also praised their leadership as
appeared in his works. Sultanah Zakiyat al-Din even commissioned
him to write two books.55 It is safe to argue, therefore, that al-Singkili’s
respected status as a scholar of Islamic sciences held sway the issue of
opposing the women ruler.
The presence of two leading ùlama>’, al-Raniri and al-Singkili,
during the four women rulers and their support to female leadership
brought to conclude that opposition movement against their ruling
power was less religious than political or economic. Islam does provide
references that might be used to oppose the female ruler, but this is
54
Hasjmy, 59 Tahun Aceh Merdeka, p. 59; Azra, The Origin of Islamic Reformism, pp. 78-79.
55
Hadi, Islam and State in Sumatra, pp. 84-86.
20
highly depended on people’s interpretation and motivation behind it.
The fact that no opposition movement using religious reason
succeeded in ending the women rulers during these two ùlama>’s
presence is sufficient to argue that female leadership might be
accommodated in Islamic teaching.
Conclusion
The overall discussion makes clear that the rise and establishment
of women rulers in Aceh for almost six decades was because of several
factors. The presence of influential ruling elites, the division of Aceh
into three sagis, and supports of ùlama>’ are all among the significant
factors that made women possibly ruled the sultanate. The Southeast
Asian culture which place women in relatively higher position than
those in other regions is also another factor. The last, and probably the
most important thing, is the moderate Islamic understanding among
the Acehnese.
The role of ùlama>’ who were also mystics, especially Nur al-Din
al-Raniri and Abd al-Rauf al-Singkili, is certainly pivotal during the era
of female rulers. Besides, mystical persuasion of Islam is far less
orthodox than legalistic approach. On the one hand, they kept and
strengthened an Islamic character of Aceh, while on the other hand,
they maintained moderate teaching of Islam by which female
leadership was not perceived as contradictory to Islam. Sufism seems
to be the key aspect in understanding their role and religious
understanding.
Having examined all mentioned aspects of the history of women
rulers in the Aceh sultanate, there is no doubt that the opposition to
the female ruler was more a politically and economically motivatedambition than religious one. []
References
Books and Articles
Al-Attas, Muhammad Naguib. Raniri and the Wujudiyah of 17th Century
Acheh. Singapore: MBRAS, 1966.
----------. A Commentary on the Hujjat al-Siddiq of Nur al-Din al-Raniri.
Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Culture, Malaysia, 1986.
21
Saiful Umam
Alfian, T. Ibrahim. Wanita Utama Nusantara dalam Lintasan Sejarah.
Jakarta: Jayakarta Agung, 1994.
Andaya, Leonard Y. “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness.”
Achipel, 61 (2001): pp. 29-68.
----------. “‘A Very Good-natured but Awe-inspiring Government’ The
Reign of a Successful Queen in Seventeenth-century Aceh.” in
Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Peter Rietbergen (eds). Hof en
Hande: Aziatische Vorsten en de VOC 1620-1720, 59-84. Leiden:
KITLV Uitgerverij, 2004.
Azra, Azyumardi. The Origin of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia:
Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern ùlama>‘‘in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 2004.
Djajadiningrat, Raden Hoesein. Kesultanan Aceh: Suatu Pembahasan
tentang Sejarah Kesultanan Aceh Berdasarkan Bahan-bahan yang
Terdapat dalam Karya Melayu. Daerah Istimewa Aceh:
Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1983.
Hadi, Amirul. Islam and State in Sumatra: a Study of Seventeenth-century
Aceh. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
Hasjmy, A. 59 Tahun Aceh Merdeka di bawah Pemerintahan Ratu. Jakarta:
Bulan Bintang, 1977.
Ito, Takeshi. “Why did Nuruddin ar-Raniri Leave Aceh in 1054 AH?.”
BKI 134 (1978): pp. 489-491.
----------. “The World of the Adat Aceh: a Historical Study of the
Sultanate of Aceh.” Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Australian
National University, 1984.
Kheng, Cheah Boon. “Power behind the Throne: the Role of Queens
and Court Ladies in Malay History.” JMBRAS, 66 (1993): pp. 121.
Lombard, Denys. Kerajaan Aceh Jaman Sultan Iskandar Muda (16071636). Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1986.
Al-Raniri, Nuruddin. Bustan al-Salatin. Siti Hawa Haji Salleh (ed.). Kuala
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992.
Reid, Anthony. “Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh. c.
1550-1700.” in Anthony Reid and Lance Castles (eds). Pre-
22
Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia, 45-55. Kuala Lumpur:
MBRAS, 1975.
----------. “Female Roles in Pre-colonial Southeast Asia.” Modern Asian
Studies, 22 (1988): pp. 629-645.
Ricklefs, Merle C. A History of Modern Indonesia. New York: Palgrave
McMillan, 2008.
Riddell, Peter. Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and
Responses. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.
Syukri, Ibrahim. History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani. Athens: Center
for International Studies, Ohio University, 1985.
23
WHITHER INDONESIA’S ISLAMIC MODERATISM?
A Reexamination on the Moderate Vision of
Muhammadiyah and NU1
Masdar Hilmy
IAIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya - Indonesia
Abstract: This paper seeks to analyze the moderate
ideology of Muhammadiyah dan NU, popularly known as
the champion of Indonesia’s moderate Islam. Questions to
be investigated are: to what extent that NU and Muhammadiyah theologically represent moderatism? Is there any such
thing as “moderate Islam” in Indonesia? How can a blueprint of moderate Islam be formulated in the context of
Indonesian Islam? The underpinning theoretical assumption upon which this paper is based is that the theological
formulation of Islamic moderatism developed by NU and
Muhammadiyah can no longer accommodate the latest
challenges and demands of the era. In the context of Indonesian Islam, therefore, a representative formulation of
how moderate Islam can be constructed is badly needed.
What NU and Muhammadiyah have demonstrated so far in
the landscape of Indonesian Islam, nevertheless, can serve
as a stepping stone towards building a more liable formulation of an Indonesian Islam in the future.
Keywords: Islamic moderatism, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), radical Islamism.
Introduction
At the 33rd annual conference held by the Association of Muslim
Social Scientists (AMSS) on September 24-26, 2004 at George Mason
University Law School in Arlington, Virginia, US, with the theme:
“Revisioning Modernity: Challenges and Possibilities for Islam”, some
The earlier draft was delivered at the International Seminar on Islamic Studies held
by the Director Forum of Postgraduate Programs of Indonesia’s Islamic Higher
Education at STAIN Jember, 20-21 April 2012.
1
Moderate Vision of Muhammadiyah and NU
papers were delivered to criticize and reformulate what and who
moderate Muslim is. One of the papers was entitled: “Moderate Islam,
Progressive Muslims, Democracy, and Post-Islamism”,2 underlining
that “moderate” Muslims are those who disagree with the use of
violence in their ideology and strategy. In the context of the US and
the West in general, the concept and praxis of Islamic moderatism may
be different from the same concept held by Indonesian Muslims. In
the US, the concept of moderatism gives more emphasis on religious
mentality and mindset which is self-critical and reflective, prodemocracy and human rights, as well as supportive of secularism as an
ideology. The last characteristic of moderatism is undoubtedly
problematic if it is viewed in the context of Indonesian Islam.
This paper tries to unravel the “myth” of Indonesia’s moderate
Islam by analyzing two mainstream religious organizations which have
enjoyed their reputation as the champion of moderate Islam: Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. The questions that are going to be
developed throughout are: is it the case that the religious worldviews
of the two organizations are moderate in nature? Is there any such
thing as typically Indonesian moderate Islam? And, how to construct a
viable and workable blue-print of Indonesia’s moderate Islam?
In responding tothe above questions, this paper is divided into
three parts as follows: (1) discussing the conceptual hurdles of Islamic
moderatism; (2) examining the extent to which Muhammadiyah and
NU can be classified as “moderate” organizations in the landscape of
Indonesian Islam, and; (3) proposing a more established blue-print of
moderate vision of Indonesian Islam.
Conceptual Hurdles
It must be admitted from the outset that the word “moderate” and
“moderatism” represents a conceptual nomenclature which is not easy
to define. This is partly because its meaning is highly contested among
different religious groups and scholars, contingent upon who and
where it is defined.3 Instead of giving a clear and distinct conceptual
Kamran A. Bokhari, “Moderate Islam, Progressive Muslims, Democracy, and PostIslamism”, paper delivered at the 33rd Annual Conference of the Association of
Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), 24-26 September 2004 at George Mason University
Law School, Arlington, Virginia, US.
2
John L. Esposito, “Moderate Muslims: A Mainstream of Modernists, Islamists,
Conservatives, and Traditionalists,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22,
No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 12.
3
25
Masdar Hilmy
boundary, the concept of moderatism serves as a hurdle that appeals
public debate among Muslims. As a result, while some feel comfortable with the use and attribution of the word, some others do notand
even show a strong objection to it as the paper shall demonstrate later.
It is a matter of fact , that the term “moderatism” is not wellacknowledged in the discourse of classical Islamic thought. Its
connotation, however, refers to the use of several Arabic words such
as al-wasat} or tawassut} (moderation), al-qist} (justice), al-tawa>zun (fairness),
al-i‘tida>l (harmony), tasa>muh} (tolerance). Those words are employed by
Muslims to mean a non-violent mode of religiosity in the Islamic
tradition. Since the word “moderatism” is understood subjectively by
many, it always invites controversies and subjective biases. More
importantly, it has never been neutral from the intervention of political
and economic interests. As a result, this semantic hurdle results in the
difficulty in arriving at a conclusive meaning of what the word
“moderate” refers to and who moderate Muslims comprise of.
Based on the explanation above, it is fairly understandable that the
question of who moderate Muslims are is not easy to answer. If one
refers to the definition of the word “moderate” as provided in an
English dictionary, it is found that the term means: 1) average in
amount, intensity, quality, etc; not extreme; 2) of or having (political)
opinions that are not extreme; 3) keeping or kept within limits that are
not excessive.4
Within the landscape of Islamic thought and practices, the degree
of moderatism is understood differently according to different people,
contexts and localities. Despite the fact that the concept of
moderatismis generally more-or-less similar in meaning, it is a highly
contested concept. In general, it means a middle-path, a choice
between the two extreme poles of religious thought. In the tradition of
religious thought, those two extreme poles are usually described as alghuluww –Yusuf al-Qardhawi names it as al-mutat}arrif—and the concept
of moderatism usually refers to al-wasat} or tawassut}, whose meaning is
middle-path, middle-way or middle-ground.5
It is within the above context that a numerous definitions of
moderatism can be found. The concept of moderatism in a Muslim
4
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 798.
Al-Wast} is translated by Hans Wehr as middle-path. See, Hans Wehr, Modern Written
Arabic (Gӧttingen: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1979), p. 1248.
5
26
majority country such as Indonesia may take different shape from the
same concept in a minority-Muslim country such as the US and other
Western countries. In Indonesia, the concept of moderatism is used to
indicate a particular religious thought or practice that adopts neither
two poles of Islamic thought; the typically-Western liberal thought and
radical Islamism thought. Outside of the two poles lies the bulk
majority of Muslims where everybody would be happily identified as
moderate Muslims.
The middle-path mode of religiosity, nevertheless, has been
criticized as having an ambiguous position where an authentic religious
standing and identity is at stake. This ambiguous position is equivalent
to the position of “neither-nor” (la-wa-la, Ar.), a term that points to
“no-where” position: neither West nor East, neither right extreme nor
left one, neither literalist nor liberalist, and so forth. This ambiguous
standing can be interpreted as the absence of theological conviction in
one’s religious mind and heart. Due to this reason, some rejects this
term on the ground of ambiguity in meaning. A trivial question is; if
conceptually speaking the concept of Islamic moderatism refers to
neither West nor East, neither liberal nor literal, how can the real
picture of Islamic moderatism take shape?
The rejection of some to this term is also based on the argument
that moderate Islam does not reflect the whole-heartedness in religion
(ka>ffah)6. On the contrary, they assume that moderatism reflects halfheartedness in observing Islamic tenets. They further maintain that
moderate Islam is a kind of downgraded or reduced version of Islam
from the presumably authentic Islam. In their opinion, moderate Islam
does not reflect an authentic Islam. Simply put, it represents less Islam.
This type of group usually rejects any type of adjective to be attributed
to this religion, such as radical, liberal or even moderate. Such an
attribution is regarded as allowing Islam to lapse into a fragmented
entity. They argue against this position by maintaining that Islam
comprises only one entity; neither liberal nor literal, neither liberal nor
radical, neither extreme nor moderate.7
Another argument rejecting the use of moderatism is that this
word is typically Western founded. In other words, it was invented by
M.A. Muqtedar Khan, “Islamic Democracy and Moderate Muslims: The Straight
Path Runs through the Middle,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 3
(Summer 2005), p. 40.
6
7
Ibid.
27
Masdar Hilmy
the West without intended consequences. In their mind, in inventing
this concept, the West may want to undermine the strength and
solidity of Muslims by injecting whatever terms and words that are
considered theologically inauthentic and are, therefore, not in line with
the spirit of Islam. Such a rejection reminds us to the same rejection
among the Islamists to other concepts which are construed as not
authentically Islamic simply because they do not find any word in
Arabic that is equivalent in meaning to those terms such as democracy,
human rights, pluralism and multiculturalism, and the like.8 In their
view, all of these words do not have any sound and strong basis in the
Qur’a>n and H{adi>th, the most pristine sources in Islam.
Regardless the above controversy, the concept of moderatism in
the context of Indonesian Islam has at least the following
characteristics; 1) non-violent ideology in propagating Islam; 2)
adopting the modern way of life with its all derivatives, including
science and technology, democracy, human rights and the like; 3) the
use of rational way of thinking; 4) contextual approach in
understanding Islam, and; 5) the use of ijtiha>d (intellectual exercises to
make a legal opinion in case of the absence of explicit justification
from the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th). Those characteristics are, however, can
be expanded into several more characteristics such as tolerance,
harmony and cooperation among different religious groups.
In the context of the US, however, moderatism sometimes
contains ideological-political-economical biases which are in line with
the contemporary condition of the country. The meaning of
moderatism is understood from the context of post-September 11
tragedy that destroyed the World Trade Center, the economic icon of
the US. The attack of al-Qaeda to the center of civilization and power
of the US has been considered as the turning point from where a
paradigm shift in understanding the concept of moderatism occurred.
Prior to September 11, the concept of moderatism was understood as
a non-violent religious variant. After that tragedy, however, the
concept has been twisted too far as a result of the contestation of
religious ideologies to identify the demarcation lines which
differentiate those who side with the West from those who stand for
those Islamists.
Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore:
ISEAS, 2010), pp. 165-169.
8
28
It is within the ideological contestation that the concept of
moderatism is understood in an overlapping manner as those who
support democracy, human rights, secularism, the US policy of war on
terror, and the like. In the US press, the moderate Muslims are
identified as those who side with the West in political vision or those
who are self-critical in their religious thought.9 Meanwhile, the term
moderate Islam is pejoratively deployed as those whose religious vision
is secular and normatively “less Islam.” In the US, moderate Muslims
are those who adopt the soft version of Islam—such as the John
Esposito’s, Irshad Manji’s and Karen Armstrong’s version of Islam—
who wish to coexist and live together with the non-Muslims and feel
convenient with typically Western values such as liberal democracy and
the ideology of separation of religion and the state.10
The context of global politics is also another determinant aspect in
understanding the concept of Islamic moderatism.11 The group of
Muslims who do not react fervently to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
for instance, can be regarded as moderate. Or, in the context of multinational occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, moderate Muslims are
those who do not oppose this occupation, or even support this
occupation on the ground of democratization. In short, moderate
Muslim group comprises those who do not react overwhelmingly to
the international conflicts involving majority Muslim countries on one
side, and the West on the other side.
Despite the fact that the term moderate or moderatism is not easy
to define, there are common features that characterize the moderate
mode of religiosity among Indonesian Muslims. Among the five
features of the moderate Islam as mentioned above, it is non-violent
ideology that brings all segments of the moderate Muslims within one
enclave of Islamic moderatism. The other four features are, however,
essentially contested among them. It is within this stream that NU and
Muhammadiyah stand as the two exemplary models of Islamic
moderatism in Indonesia.
9
Khan, “Islamic Democracy and Moderate Muslims,” p. 40.
10
Ibid.
Graham E. Fuller, “Freedom and Security: Necessary Conditions for Moderation,”
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 21-28.
11
29
Masdar Hilmy
Moderate Islam of Muhammadiyah and NU
In the Indonesian context, the question would be: what and how
does Islamic moderatism look like? Who are individuals and groups of
Muslim who can be called moderate; Is it Muhammadiyah, NU, or
other organizations? It is indeed a simple question but hard to answer,
particularly when one points to the heterogeneity of religious modes in
the spectrum of Indonesian Islam. In this case, one cannot deny the
fact that Indonesian Islam comprises a vast array of ideology, thought,
as well as practice of Muslim community ranging from one extreme to
another extreme.
Before one identifies what, who and how moderate Islam is
defined in an Indonesian context, a conceptual framework based upon
which the definition of moderatism is established is needed. It has to
be acknowledged that a conceptual framework of moderatism in the
context of Indonesian Islam may take a different shape from that of
other Muslim world, wherein Islam as majority or minority religion.
Different context of each country does contribute to the
distinctiveness of moderatism. Furthermore, the evolution of meaning
contained in whatever concept within a particular society will depend
on the development of that society.12 This means that the meaning of
moderatism may evolve according to the development of social and
political context of a particular community. It can cover various
meanings stretching from one pole to the other one within particular
spectrum of moderatism.
The moderate group, in general, occupies the middle-ground
within the spectrum of Islamic thought. But if one examines this issue
more closely, there are at least the other three layers under this
spectrum, ranging from radical-moderatism, middle-ground moderatism, to soft-moderatisme. Radical-moderatism can be characterized as
a salafist-minded ideology, thought or movement which suggests the
authentic version of religiosity through direct reference to the pristine
sources of Islam: the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th. They tend to reject the mode
of religiosity that accommodates too much the classical Islamic
thought.13 They also reject the civilization of the West with its all
William R. Roff (ed.), Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning (London & New York:
Routledge, 1987).
12
John Obert Voll, Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1994), p. 111.
13
30
derivatives such as democracy, human rights, civil society, and the like,
through peaceful means, and not through violence.
In the context of identity and ideological boundaries of
moderatism, Erich Kolig and Greg Fealy, through their respected
research project maintain that the concept Islamic moderatism does
not constitute clear-cut and black-and-white boundaries.14 This is
partly because Islamic moderatism is not supported by an authentic
and solid theological argument that forms a unified color of moderate
Islam. Claims of moderatism tend to be based on the absence of
extremity in responding particular religious issues. The majority of
moderate Muslims, in my theoretical assumption, have been occupied
by the so-called “floating mass” which is not supported by a
complicated theological and philosophical “thick description”.15
This “floating mass” comprises some group of Muslims that tend
not to fully care about the basic argument in their religious
understanding and attitude.16 The reference in their religiosity is merely
based on sociological factors that can lead to the process of decision
making commonly undertaken by the majority group. This means that
the tendency of their religious attitude depends very much on
pragmatic-sociological considerations, not on a deep and reflective
theological argumentation or religious narrative. As a result, their
religious attitude and thinking tend to go along with current streams;
they are readily to change their religious attitude contingent upon
religious practices popularly observed in the society. Simply put, such a
religious manifestation can be considered as banal religious practices
or—in fiqh terminology is called as—taqli>d, that is, the most common
layer of Muslims which occupies the lowest stratum of religious
community. They are characterized by the uncritical consumption of
whatever produced by religious elites.
The same case occurs in the discussion of radical and liberal Islam.
The group of moderate Muslims occupies the middle-ground between
the two extreme poles that give them more rooms of movement.
Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?,” Southeast
Asian Affairs 2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 104-121;
Erich Kolig, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in Central Java,
Indonesia,” European Journal of East Asian Studies, 4, No. 1 (2005), p. 57.
14
15
Masdar Hilmy, “Moderatisme Islam Indonesia,” Kompas, 22 October 2011, p. 6.
In a typically-Indonesian sociological language, this “floating mass” may overlap
with abangan (nominal) Islam or nationalist Islam.
16
31
Masdar Hilmy
Ideologically speaking, radical Islamist thinking can easily exercise
influence over, or even further take sympathies from, that “floating
mass” moderate Muslims. This means that it is the moderate Muslims
as the closest party that can easily be infected by the ideology and
thinking of radical Islamism, and not the liberal Muslim group. On the
contrary, this “floating mass” moderate Muslims cannot easily move to
the side of liberal pole, because intellectually speaking these liberal
Muslims are deeply-learned in Islamic sciences, while the “floating
mass” moderate Muslims are not. It has to be admitted that the bulk
majority of liberal Muslims comprises the moderate Islam, but not
from the wing of the above “floating mass”.
Some of the students of Indonesian Islam studies are consistent in
arguing that Islam in this country comprises the moderate version of
Islam.17 This moderate position is represented, for instance, by the
largest two religious organizations in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU)—popularly known as traditionalist—and Muhammadiyah—
popularly known as modernist. The two organizations can be classified
into moderate Islam due to their non-violent theological standpoint.
These two organizations, in addition, agree with the idea of Unified
State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI, Negara Kesatuan Republik
Indonesia), one of the most latent issues propagated by Muslim hardliners in the country. For both of them, the form of Unified State of
the Republic of Indonesia, with Pancasila as its ideological basis, UUD
1945 as its constitution basis, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as its slogan, are
considered to be able to accommodate the substantive elements of
moderate Islam, the theological vision of which is blessing for all
universe (rah}matan li al-‘a>lami>n).
In terms of modern values, both organizations by and large do not
show resistance to democracy and human rights, two most paramount
values of modernity.18 Democracy, they argue, is seen not only as the
universal value that is workable in developed Western countries, but it
can also be pulled out from the pristine sources of Islam, i.e. the
Qur’a>n and H{adi>th. In their argument, Islam is, by definition, in line
Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context (Jakarta:
Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 60-64.
17
Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy
(Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer & Co. KG, 1997). See also, Robert W. Hefner, Civil
Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000).
18
32
with the modern values of democracy and human rights, the two most
supreme pillars for the existence of humanity and nations.19 Islam is in
itself democratic and, therefore, no point of refuting this proposition.
There are a lot of cultural aspects of tradition in Islam which are later
on subject to change and reform. It is a matter of fact that Islam
proves to be able to leave its black history of slavery in the past.
In addition to the acceptance of modern values, Indonesian
Islam—with particular reference to the above two organizations—has
received its high-profile image as a home to the tradition of religious
pluralism and tolerance.20 Genealogically speaking, Indonesian Islam
has been championing its reputation for being tolerant version of
Islam since its very first inception in the country. Indonesia itself has a
long tradition of religious tolerance, far before Islam came to the
Archipelago and became the majority religion in this country.
Indonesian Islam has an interconnected link to the tradition of tolerance of the Hindu-Buddhist era, in which a great number of Hindu
and Buddhist temples stood side by side within a particular historic
site.21
The question would be, is it the case that all members and
followers of NU as well as Muhammadiyah can be guaranteed to have
a moderate ideology as explained above? Following the thinking
spectrum sketched above, the writer tends to argue that not all
members and followers of the two organizations have a moderate
mode of religious thinking. If it is explained in a more detailed, the
typology of members and followers of the two organizations can be
sketched into three main clusters as follows: 1) radical-moderate, 2)
middle-ground-moderate, and 3) soft-moderate.
The first cluster refers to a group of individuals whose ideological
and religious vision is puritan in nature. This cluster has a closer
emotional and ideological link to hard-line ideology. Some of them
have even metamorphosed ideologically into a hard-line movement
and have been part of the rank-and-files in such religious movements
as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI),
See, for instance, Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam
and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), p. 187.
19
Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance
(London & New York: Routledge, 1995).
20
M.C. Ricklefs, “Six Centuries of Islamization in Java,” Nehemia Levtzion (ed.),
Conversion to Islam (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 100-128.
21
33
Masdar Hilmy
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s-led Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), and the like.
Those hard-line groups make the members of NU-Muhammadiyah as
their prime target in da`wah (propagating) activities. In this context, it is
not exaggerating that in some parts of East Java, there are some NU
elites who are identified as the spokesman of HTI.22
On the other hand, the group of soft-moderatism refers to the
bulk segment of Muhammadiyah and NU mostly occupied by the
“floating mass”—or non-devout—Muslims with limited knowledge
about religion. This second group occupies the lion-share of the two
organizations. Since their religious understanding and attitude is due to
sociological-pragmatic factors, they are the most vulnerable to be
potential recruits of hard-line movement. This is so particularly when
they meet a particular hard-line cleric (murabbi>) and they get tempted by
the theological arguments of the murabbi> that usually lead to internal
conversion among them. It is this kind of theological encounter that
can explain the phenomenon of internal conversion among
Muhammadiyah and NU communities from moderate to radical
ideology.
The third moderate cluster consists of those who are usually
deeply-learned in religious sciences and or affiliated to pesantrens. So
far, they have crucial position among their communities and play a key
role in the process of social transformation within their respected
environments. In terms of religious trends, they serve as the makers,
producers or trendsetters of religiosity for the common people. They
are mostly Muslim scholars (kyai) or pesantren alumni, both from
traditional as well as modernist pesantrens, who are deeply-versed in
classical and modern Islamic sciences. This cluster represents the
important makers of Islamic moderatism projects in Indonesia who are
responsible for transforming the religious awareness among millions of
members and followers of the two organizations.
Quantitatively speaking, this cluster perhaps represents a small
number of the segment of moderate Muslims—perhaps far less than
the two earlier clusters. This cluster nevertheless occupies the most
important social class within the structure of moderate Muslims in
This is based on research findings by Rubaidi, a doctorate student of the
Postgraduate Program of IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya. See, Rubaidi, “Pergeseran
Kelas Menengah NU: Studi tentang Pergeseran Ideologi dari Moderat ke Islamisme
dan Post-Islamisme di Jawa Timur” (Surabaya: IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya,
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2012).
22
34
Indonesia that is in turn able to inspire millions of followers by means
of powerful moderate ideas. It is this last cluster that has been much
expected in mainstreaming and producing a well-established and
workable blue-print of Indonesia’s Islamic moderatism in the future.
In addition to the positive record about the acceptance of the two
mainstream organizations to the NKRI, Pancasila, UUD 1945,
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, as well as modern values, there is another
characteristic of Islamic moderatism which is commonly accepted in
the Western perspective but rejected by the two: secularism. Almost
all—not to say all—Indonesia’s moderate Islam reject the idea of
secularism on the grounds that it consists typically-Western bounded
moderatism which is not applicable in the context of Indonesian Islam.
The rejection of the majority toward secularism, indeed, needs
robust empirical data which justifies further investigation. As far as
Indonesian Islam is concerned, secularism is not a familiar term for the
majority of Indonesian Muslims despite the fact that in practice
secularism has been an unstated part of their daily life.23 This is simply
because most of the Indonesian Muslims do not feel comfortable with
the idea of separation between religion and the state. The classical
nomenclature of Islamic thinking only acknowledges the doctrine of
Islam as religion (di>n) and state (dawlah).24 In other words, secularism
has been perceived by many as an “alien” in the landscape of
Indonesian Muslims’ thinking and practice.
The degree of Indonesia’s Islamic moderatism is frequently
determined by how Muslims approach and understand the sacred texts
(the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th). Those who rely heavily on context in
understanding the texts have been referred to as moderate Muslims.
On the other side, the Muslim group who tend to employ literal
approach to those texts has been considered as radicals.25 The use of
In Abdurrahman Wahid’s formulation, the type of secularism adopted within the
context of Indonesian Islam is soft or mild secularism. See, Abdurrahman Wahid,
“Indonesia’s Mild Secularism,” SAIS Review 21, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 25-27.
23
For further information on doctrine of indivisibility religion from politics in Islam,
see, among others, Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1996); See also, James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of
Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); cf. Nazih Ayubi, Political
Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London & New York: Routledge, 1991).
24
See, for instance, Firman Noor, “Comparison of the Political Perceptions between
Radical Islam and Moderate Islam in Indonesia in the Reform Era,” Jurnal Penelitian
Politik, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2005): pp. 13-33.
25
35
Masdar Hilmy
these two approaches can be seen, for instance, in understanding the
form of ideal State in Islam. Regarding this issue, the moderate
Muslims tend to employ modern reference in building their arguments
on the ideal form of state in Islam. Such methodological reference
usually leads to the conclusion that Islam does not provide a
prescriptive and conclusive clue of what an ideal form of the state in
Islam constitutes. The radicals, however, tend to pull some keywords
out of the sacred texts in literal sense to be treated as the ideological
basis for an Islamic state. This can be seen, among others, in the case
of Caliphate doctrine as propagated by HTI as a translation of the
word khila>fah in the Qur’a>n.26
Be that as it may, drawing a firm line between the radical Muslims
from moderate ones can be theoretically misleading. This is because
each group does not apply its methodological approach strictly and
consistently. The most current condition of Indonesian Islam has been
characterized by the tendency of mutual exchange in methodology
between the two poles. There are times when the radicals are
convenient with contextual approach in understanding a particular
religious doctrine. On the contrary, there are times when the
moderates feel comfortable with literal approach. This can be seen, for
instance, from the fact that a great number of radicals are no longer
bothered with the use of modern technology, whereas their fellow
moderates can be quite conservative in accepting modern technology.
In Search for Indonesia’s Islamic Moderatism
Theological system which is in itself sufficient to support the
conceptual framework and praxis of religious mode of moderatism
would be sine qua non within the landscape of Indonesia’s Islamic
moderatism. It must emanate the country’s public sphere if it wishes to
provide a moderate vision of Islam. So far the concept of Islamic
moderatism has been juxtaposed with external modalities such as
cultural-spiritual heritage of the nation’s predecessors pulled out from
non-Islamic elements. It is time now that an authentic version of
Islamic moderatism must be drawn from within the internal sources of
Islam in order to formulate a blue-pint for Indonesia’s Islamic
moderatism, that is, an internal modalities-based version of religious
moderatism.
26
36
See, for instance, Hilmy, Islamism and democracy in Indonesia, pp. 160-63.
Nuhammadiyah and NU must be acknowledged as religious
organizations that pioneered the making of moderate mode of
religiosity regardless the complexity to put this mode into practice. The
formulation of such a blue-print is inspired directly by normative
values in Islam on the one side. This formulation, however, suffers
from the lack of “thick theological description” which guides the
pattern of Islamic moderatism in a more thoughtful but practical
manner. In spite of this shortcoming, this formulation can be seen as a
“local genius” of actualization of religious doctrines which may not be
found in any part of the Muslim world. In a more or less similar
formation, Malaysia has the formulation of “Hadhari Islam”, a nomenclature of Islamic thinking specifically designed to accommodate an
ideological battle between the dimension of al-as}a>lah (authenticity) and
the dimension of al-h}ad}a>rah (modern contemporary civilization) in
religion.27
Almost similar to the formulation of Hadhari Islam in Malaysia,
this country has also witnessed a religious articulation called “masyarakat madani” (simply translated as civil society).28 The interesting thing
about “masyarakat madani” is that although the term does not carry
religious connotation, its connotation has been much religious because
it is directly inspired by normative Islam. Initiated by a group of
modernist Muslim intellectuals-scholars in early 1990s, “masyarakat
madani” has become a nomenclature of Islamic politics praised by
many to represent the model of Indonesia’s Islamic civility. ”Masyarakat madani” represents an overwhelming sprout of Muslim middleclass on the stage of national politics, where they had been
marginalized by the state in the Old Order and early New Order era.
More importantly, “masyarakat madani” represents the version of
moderate Islam that combines dimension of modernity and dimension
of primordial religious identity.
Viewed from its long historical journey since the acceptance of
Pancasila as the only ideological foundation of the state in the 1984
Situbondo Congress—lately popularly known as The Return to the
1926 Khittah—NU has shown the pendulum movement of its
Terence Chong, “The Emerging Politics of Islam Hadhari,” in Saw Swee-Hock & K.
Kesavapany (eds), Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 26-46.
27
M. Dawam Rahardjo, Masyarakat Madani: Agama, Kelas Menengah, dan Perubahan Sosial
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999).
28
37
Masdar Hilmy
religiosity into the middle-ground moderatism. The historical journey
of Nahdliyin (the followers of NU) has shown a fairly extreme degree
of intensity and ups-and-downs as well as diverse internal dynamic. In
its latest development, NU has even received ideological challenges
from hard-liner Muslims to question the normative foundation of
Islamic moderatism.
In order to support the foundation of Islamic moderatism, some
outstanding NU founding scholars (kyais)—such as KH. Achmad
Siddiq, KH. Ali Maksum, KH. As’ad Syamsul Arifin and others—have
formulated a road-map to the doctrine of Islamic moderatism which is
called as the theology of ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama>’ah (frequently
abbreviated as Aswaja).29 The literal meaning of aswaja is the holder of
the Prophet’s pathway and communion which is a kind of code of
piety shown by the Prophet, his Companions and pious predecessors
(al-salaf al-s}a>lih}) expected to guarantee the purest form of religion.30
The theological construct of NU’s moderatism is bolstered by the
doctrinal “trilogy” as follows: al-tawassut} (moderation or middleground), i‘tida>l (straight-path, neither left nor right leaning), and altawa>zun (equilibrium, fairness in treating the worldly affairs and the
hereafter).31 The concept of al-tawassut} is derived from a verse of the
Qur’a>n (2: 143), i‘tida>l is from, 5: 8), and al-tawa>zun is from QS alH{adi>d: 25. The manifestation of the thee principles and characteristics
mentioned above, according to some NU kyais, must be explicitly
exposed in all key aspects of Islam such as faith (àqi>dah), Islamic law
(shari>‘ah), tas}awwuf (Sufi) and akhla>q (social ethics), mu’a>s}arah (social
conduct), in the field of nation-state, culture and civilization, Islamic
propagation (da`wah), and some other sectors.32
As a modality, the formulation of Aswaja serves only as an embryo
for the making of the blue-print, and not the blue-print itself. It is not
an ideal formulation that accommodates all new tendencies in far more
Djohan Effendi, Pembaruan tanpa Membongkar Tradisi: Wacana Keagamaan di Kalangan
Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010),
p. 263.
29
KH. Achmad Siddiq, Khittah Nahdliyyah (Surabaya: Khalista in collaboration with
LTN-NU Jawa Timur, 2006), p. 27.
30
KH. Abdul Muchith Muzadi, NU dalam Perspektif Sejarah & Ajaran (Refleksi 65 Th.
Ikut NU) (Surabaya: Khalista, 2007), pp. 69-71.
31
32
38
Ibid., pp. 72-73.
complex and challenging religious life. In accompaniment of the
religious formulation of NU and pesantren is the use of some other
methodological apparatus to approach Islam through the two pristine
sources: the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th. The methodological approach
comprises us}ul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) and other methodological apparatus such as mas}lahah (public good), istih}san (utility),
istih}sab (recommended norms), qawl s}ah}a>bi> (legal opinions of the
Prophet’s Companions), shadd al-dhara>’i‘ (closing the direction to sins),
and so forth.33
The use of the above methodological apparatus in the stream of
religious thought in NU circles can be analogized as a double-edged
sword. On the one side it tends to eternalize religious orthodoxy as a
result of indirect referencing system towards the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th.
Such an indirect referencing system, however, can generate the room
of experimentation and articulation of thinking that can, in turn, lead
to the making of creativeness and freedom of thinking by utilizing the
methodological apparatus particularly during the Islamic law making
process (istinba>t}). It has to be admitted that the intellectual tradition of
NU is created due to the habitual rehearsals of these intellectual
exercises in responding and solving some contemporary issues. This, in
turn, leads to the making of intellectual tradition among the younger
generation of NU that produce groundbreaking approaches that enrich
the old paradigm in the horizon of intellectual methodology among the
older generation of NU. The tendency of progressive, or even liberal,
intellectual tradition among the younger Nahdliyin (the followers of
NU) represents the functioning of the methodological apparatus in the
dialectics of contemporary Islamic thought in Indonesia.34
There is an intellectual tradition of NU in approaching and solving contemporary
issues called Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il, in which three methodological approaches used by
the kyais in the new law making process: 1) qawli> (result) approach; 2) ilh}a>qi> (analogy)
approach, and; 3) manha>ji> (methodology) approach. For further information about this,
see, Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il 1926-1999
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), p. 170.
33
Laode Ida, NU Muda: Kaum Progresif dan Sekuler Baru (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga,
2004); See also, Shonhadji Sholeh, Arus Baru NU: Perubahan Pemikiran Kaum Muda NU
dari Tradisionalisme ke Post-tradisionalisme (Surabaya: JP Books, 2004). See also, Hairus
Salim H.S. and Muhammad Ridwan (ed.), Kultur Hibrida: Anak Muda NU di Jalur
Kultural (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999).
34
39
Masdar Hilmy
On the other side, the appreciation towards the use of
methodological apparatus and the tradition of Islamic thinking as
much developed by the younger generation of NU have received less
attention among the followers and members of Muhammadiyah, due
to the deep institutionalization of the slogan ”the return to the Qur’a>n
and H{adi>th” (al-ruju>’ ila> al-Qur’a>n wa al-H{adi>th).35 This does not
necessarily mean that the younger generation of Muhammadiyah do
not arise the same awareness as that of the younger generation of NU
in revitalizing the spirit of revivalism (tajdi>d). In responding to the
stagnation of reform movement, some concerned younger generation
of the Muhammadiyah founded a similar association as NU younger
generation’s Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network), called
Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah, abbreviated as JIMM,
(Network of Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals). Founded by some
progressive young generation of Muhammadiyah such as Zuly Qadir,
Abd Rahim Ghozali, Hilman Latief, and others on 9 October 2003,
JIMM wishes to bring the revivalist spirit back home to
Muhammadiyah.36
Interestingly, in the context of Indonesian Islam, the use of
methodological apparatus in the process of reform actually had been
introduced for the first time by Muhammadiyah, not NU.37 The
founding of Muhammadyah was inspired by the misery of some
Muslim elites in response to the backwardness of the Muslim
community as a whole. It is this misery that in turn inspired the
embryo of the reform movement of Islamic thought (tajdi>d and ijtiha>d),
where in NU circle it had been considered closed since the third
Hijriyah century.38 Without the pioneering movement undertaken by
Muhammadiyah, it is impossible to see the moderate face of Islam as
can be seen today. Thanks to this organization, the idea of reform has
become a familiar vocabulary for Indonesian Muslims. Due to its real
Moenawar Chalil, Kembali kepada Al-Qur’an dan as-Sunnah (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang,
1956).
35
Suaidi Asyari, Nalar Politik NU & Muhammadiyah: Over Crossing Java Sentris
(Yogyakarta: LKiS in collaboration with Center for the Study of Contemporary
Indonesian Islam and Society, 2009), p. 262.
36
Ahmad Jainuri, Ideologi Kaum Reformis: Melacak Pandangan Keagamaan Muhammadiyah
Periode Awal (Surabaya: Lembaga Pengkajian Agama dan Masyarakat [LPAM], 2002), p.
105.
37
38
40
Ibid., p. 107.
contribution, it is not exaggerating that Muhammadiyah was attributed
as a modernist organization in the country.39
The attribution of Muhammadiyah as a modernist organization is
due to its positive vision toward modernity. Through its methodological apparatus, i.e. tajdi>d, Muhammadiyah started to launch a series of
reform movement within the body of Indonesian Islam. Despite
strong resistence from the traditionalist Muslims, the Muhammadiyah’s
reform has been at the point of no return, and later proved to appeal
the sympathy and membership from the traditionalist Muslims. One of
the examples of the Muhammadiyah reform movement that was
rejected by the traditionalists but now becomes commonplace is the
change of sermon language of Friday prayers and two Ied prayers from
Arabic—as had been commonplace among traditionalists—into local
and national languages.40
In addition to functioning as a stepping stone for reform movement, the slogan “the return to the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th,” however, may
function as a factor that causes stagnation for Muhammadiyah reform
movement.41 Like a double-edged sword, this slogan has played two
roles at once. On the one side, this slogan has played its function well
as the pioneer of reform movement in Indonesia. But when the
reformed version of Islam has been instituted, this slogan can lead to
the establishment of religious orthodoxy and make Muhammadiyah
puritan in nature.42 This is one of the most salient characteristics of
epistemological traps derived from the slogan “the return to the
Qur’a>n and H{adi>th.” The stagnation of reform has been the critical
issue directed to Muhammadiyah, especially when its younger
generation unified in JIMM who wish to reinvigorate the spirit of tajdid>
Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia: 1900-1942 (Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1973).
39
W. Sairin, Gerakan Pembaruan Muhammdiyah (Jakarta: Pustaka sinar Harapan, 1995).
See also, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kiai Ahmad Dahlan: Jejak Pembaruan Sosial dan
Kemaanusiaan, Kado Satu Abad (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), p. 236.
40
Suaidi Asy’ari, “A Real Threat from Within: Muhammadiyah’s Identity
Metamorphosis and the Dilemma of Democracy,” Journal of Indonesian Islam, Vol. 01,
No. 01 (June 2007): pp. 18-41.
41
This reminds us to what Peacock has found out in his book that Muhammadiyah
constitutes a puritanical Muslim organization. See, James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans:
Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley and California: University of
California Press, 1978).
42
41
Masdar Hilmy
has been resisted and marginalized by the older generation of this
reformist organization.43
In contrast to what Muhammadiyah has undergone, the
employment of methodological apparatus among the young Nahdliyyin
does not give credits to NU as a reformist or modernist organization,
albeit some epistemological leap in the use of methodological means
among the young Nahdliyyin thanking to their mobilization in tertiary
formal education. Furthermore, NU’s traditional identity is caused by
the overwhelming appreciation toward the horizon of classical thought
of Muslim scholars as contained in yellow books (kitab kuning) of the
pesantren.44 It is due to this reason that the Nahdliyyin have been
criticized as being traditional in the way they approach and understand
Islam and the world.
Regardless its association to the traditional stigmatization, the
overwhelming reliance on the use of classical Muslim scholars’ horizon
can serve as a stepping stone toward the epistemological leap in
Islamic thinking methodology. This is because everything sometimes
can function in two contradictory ways; on the one hand it can
function in a negative way, on the other hand it can function as a
positive and productive way. On the one hand it can lead to regression
buton the other hand it can be the modality toward the progression.
This is the analogy of double-edged sword function in explaining both
the progressive movement and the regressive one within
Muhammadiyah and NU. In relation to the Nahdliyyin’s appreciation to
tradition of classical Islamic thought, their reliance on such a classical
tradition can mean a lot to the making of renewal and reform
movement among the young Nahdliyyin.45
Apart from what the above two moderate organizations have
achieved, the search for Islamic moderatism in Indonesia needs a more
expansive, deeper and more thorough perspective on moderatism
This resistance has resulted in, among others, the victimization of young progressive
thinkers, such as Muhammad Shofan, who had been fired as a lecturer from
Muhammadiyah University of Gresik, East Java.
43
Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, pesantren, dan tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di
Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1995); See also, Idem, “Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic
Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 146
(1990), pp. 226-269.
44
Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru
45
42
which is derived from internal values of classical Islam. It has to be
admitted that the concept of Islamic moderatism has not been
developed from a strong and detailed theological basis. The concept of
Islamic moderatism relies heavily on external aspects of Indonesian
culture and society. The externality has dominated the theological
construct of Islamic moderatism in Indonesia. The immediate
impression from Islamic moderatism in Indonesia, however, is that, it
is Indonesian [culture] factor, and not Islam one, that contributes to
the making of Islamic moderatism. The fact is that Indonesia has
enjoyed its reputation for its abundant tradition of tolerance, respect
and harmony. In this context, Islam has come into such an established
web of tradition as an outsider that flourishes the local tradition of
tolerance.
The attempts at formulating the concept of Islamic moderatism in
the end are determined by the way Muslims approach and understand
the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th. The return to both sources is epistemologically
problematic and deserves due consideration if Muslims wish to achieve
an authentic concept of Islamic moderatism. Nevertheless, there are
times when Muslims do not have many choices except returning back
to the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th as an ethical basis in developing a more
workable concept of Islamic moderatism. It is noteworthy that both
radical and moderate Muslims equally treat both of them in a supreme
position as the normative basis for developing an appropriate code of
conduct. The term “normative basis,” however, can mean differently
for each of them; starting from the direct reference in literal sense to
merely as a source of inspiration. In terms of ethics, there are a lot of
things that need a direct referencing to both sources and, therefore,
can be accepted as they are; but there are other things that need to be
taken in spirit, not in literal sense. It is within this context that the
degree of Islamic moderatism will be at stake.
From the above explanation, it can be said that the concept of
Islamic moderatism in Indonesia has been developed centripetally.
Now, it is the time that the concept must be developed centrifugally in
order to maximize the internal sources of Islam as the first reference in
producing a blue-print of Islamic moderatism. If the first mode relies
on the flexibility of Islam as an outsider to adapt itself to the local
condition of the country, the second mode relies on Islam as internal
modality to develop a more established blue-print of Islamic
moderatism in order to draw its relevance to local condition of
43
Masdar Hilmy
Indonesia. It is within this context that what Fazlur Rahman has called
as “double-movement” approach is worth referencing through backand-forth consultation in terms of reconciling between modernity and
traditionalism in the spectrum of Islamic thought.46
Conclusion
To sum up, Indonesian Islam has a high-profile of moderatism
through Muhammadiyah and NU, the two exemplary models of
moderatism. The moderate theology of both organizations, however, is
no longer sufficient in accommodating the changes and challenges of
this modern era. As this article has explained, there are a lot of ways to
achieve a more detailed but workable blue-print of Indonesia’s Islamic
moderatism. It is the time for Indonesian Muslims to prove the world
that they have an authentic version of Islamic moderatism which is
internally driven. They have to prove that the concept of Islamic
moderatism is not a myth, but a down-to-earth reality. In this context,
the phenomenon of “internal conversion” occurred among the
followers of moderate Islam into radical Islam must be understood as a
serious “strike” for the moderate Muslims who are not aware of
formulating a more established but workable blue-print of Islamic
moderatism. What Muhammadiyah and NU have done so far is a
pioneering attempt at the making of Islamic moderatism in Indonesia.
Nevertheless, their formulation of moderatism is due to the internal
demand of Muslims to create a theological system that fits in with the
local condition of Indonesia.
For Muhammadiyah, it is imperative that the followers and or
members of this organization must revive the spirit of reform (tajdi>d)
as its branding image since the beginning in order to formulate a
theologically more firmed basis for Islamic moderatism. It must be
acknowledged that this organization has done a lot for initiating the
mode of Islamic moderatism though a series of reform movement in
early 1920s. But the overwhelming reliance on the slogan of the return
to the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th can kill the inner capacity of this
organization to develop a more sustainable project on Islamic
moderatism from within.
For NU, likewise, the formulation of such key-terms as tawassut,}
tawa>zun, i’tida>l and tasa>muh} has to be appreciated as an initial stage in
Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1984), p. 7.
46
44
developing a more established blue-print of Islamic moderatism. This
formulation, however, is perceived by some radical Muslims as a
“neither-nor” formulation which stands in no-where position within
the spectrum of Islamic thought. Some even consider that formulation
as less or downgraded version of Islam and, therefore, needs further
elaboration and “objectivication” at practical level. In short, the
moderation principle developed by NU tends to create less committed
character in religiosity. This formulation is likewise not sufficient if NU
wishes to contribute to the betterment of the nation. The good
principle of moderation should reflect a rigorous commitment to
upholding the normative values of Islam without necessarily losing the
very characteristic of its civility.
The Islamic moderatism project, above all, should start “from
within.” It is a matter of fact that such common denominators as
Pancasila, UUD 1945, NKRI, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika—better known
as four pillars—are cultural emblems that convey the message of
moderation. These cultural emblems, however, have been developed
“from without” that lack a sense of being authentic in terms of
religious identity. On the contrary, the formulation of Islamic
moderatism “from within” will guarantee the sense of authenticity
among the Muslim community. By doing so, the foundation of Islamic
moderatism in Indonesia will engender a more sustainable Islamic
moderatism since it stands on a firm theological ground. []
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48
THE NATURE OF RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS
IN SOLO
Muhammad Wildan
UIN Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta - Indonesia
Abstract: Radical Islamism is a challenging new phenomenon in the modern world, including Indonesia. Solo
presents an especially interesting case because of the
disproportionate nature of the radical Islamic groups that
have emerged here especially that of the Front Pemuda
Islam Surakarta (FPIS) as well as other vigilante groups in
the city. This paper will explore and map out the nature of
Islam in Solo and asks what triggers the the emergence of
the radical groups here. Dramatic changes at the national
level have made Solo more politically conducive for radical
Islamic groups, but this is not the only reason why they
have flourished. In addition, historical and sociological
factors may help such groups to emerge. Hence, the
dominance of the abangan group (the nominal Muslims) and
the intensity of dakwah (preaching) conducted by some
Islamic groups has given rise to the ‘instant’ Muslims who
see Islam as the ultimate solution to their problems. The
call for jihād and the application of sharī‘ah laws are among
the contentious political style that the groups propagated. It
is these issues that the paper is interested to investigate.
Keywords: Radical Islam, jiha>d, Ngruki, abangan.
Introduction
Bali blast on October 12, 2002 has put Pondok Ngruki in
particular and Solo in general in a global spotlight. The involvement
some of Pondok Ngruki’s graduates and its networks in Solo in the
bombings has drawn many people’s attention to this specific area.
Previously Solo is identical the royal Mataram kingdoms, the heartland
of Javanese culture, graciousness and well-mannered ladies, and
Muhammad Wildan
gorgeous batiks.1 Currently, to talk about the Solo city, we could not
avoid to discuss the existence of Pondok Ngruki and its related radical
Islamic movements such as Usrah (1980s), Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI,
1993), KOMPAK2 of DDII (1998), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
(MMI, 2000), and Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT, 2008). In fact, the
phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in Solo is also characterized by the
existence of some vigilante groups such as Front Pemuda Islam
Surakarta (FPIS), Laskar Hizbullah, and Laskar Jundullah. All above
assure my assumption that Solo is a fertile land for religious radicalism.
The existence of these radical Islamic groups is interesting to study
especially to reveal the real problem behind these phenomena.
Radical Islamic groups are not arising from a single factor, but
many different ones. Some factors intertwined each other which finally
gave to the rise of such radical groups. However, while Indonesian
Muslims generally undergo the same global and national phenomena,
some local factors may also play a significant role in this occurrence. In
the global context, the heightening of religious consciousness among
Indonesian Muslims is due partly to the modernization and
globalization processes. While in the national context, the political
conduciveness plays a significant role in the rising of Islamic radical
groups in many different parts of Indonesia. This paper will observe
the phenomena of radical Islamic groups in Solo not only from the
above perspectives, but also from some local characteristics of Solo.
the distinct character of Solo culture such as ethnicity, economics, and
religion are the central factors to the rise of Islamic radical groups. As
far as the nature of Islam in Solo is concerned, I should pay attention
to the domain of religion, especially to the Islamization process of the
lower-class of the abangan, who being deprived socially, economically,
and politically, tend to resort to Islam as their way out from their
problem. It is this kind of ‘instant’ re-Islamization that finally led them
to the fold of Islamic radicalism.
The Framework of Radical Islamism
In the perspective of social movement, the phenomenon of
Islamic fundamentalism can be viewed as a symptom of social
resistance, rather than to see Islam as the source of violence.
1
Batik refers to a generic wax-resist dyeing technique used on textile.
KOMPAK stands for Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Action Committee for
Crisis Response).
2
50
Radical Islamic Groups in Solo
According relative deprivation theory, a social movement could
emerge due to social changes which influence the social structure of a
society. Unwanted cultural changes forced some communities to shift
the direction of the changes to meet their necessities. In the context of
Solo, social and cultural changes are influenced by modernization and
globalization, political conduciveness, and local cultures of Solo.
Globalized-world as a result of modern technology has shrunk the
world into a global village. The rapid mainstream of information and
technology has marginalized the role of religion in the society,
especially Muslims. In Islamic fundamentalism perspectives, modernization is viewed as an immense threat for Muslims since it is not only a
concept but it is a social process which produces social products.
Traditional Islamic values is marginalized, swept out, and even
replaced by Western values. Conventional Islamic preaching no longer
could restrain the mainstream of modernization from the West.
Among the influence of modernization and globalization is the widely
spread of secularism as a part of ghazw al-fikr (intellectual infiltration).
The inabilities of some Muslims’ groups to follow the beat of
modernity have given the rise of such Islamic revivalist groups as a way
to counter to modernization. The demand of sharī‘ah in many Muslim
countries is one of the ways of Muslims to counter Westernmodernization. However, since the mainstream is led by Western
countries, the encounter of modernization and globalization is also
filled with the sentiment of anti-Western countries. The hegemonic
power of some Western countries toward Muslim countries to some
extend also heightened the situation. The emergence of Jama’ah
Islamiyah (JI) in Ngruki may be taken as a case point.
On the political sphere, on the other hand, the dramatic political
change in Indonesia is such a conducive atmosphere for the emergence
of radical Islamic groups. Political pressure of the Old and New Order
to some extend has deprived the society, especially Muslims from
participating in the political life.. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the
downfall of Suharto regime in 1998 was marked by the emergence of
some radical Islamic groups as part of the halted Islamic revivalism
since the early 1980s. Despite some disappointment among Muslims
during the New Order era, Islamic religious life was blossoming
especially in the last ten years.3 The Islamic resurgence was featured by
Azyumardi Azra, “Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse: Contemporary
Religio-Intellectual Connections between Indonesia and The Middle East,” in Johan
3
51
Muhammad Wildan
the increasing of religious sermons in urban areas, the establishment of
some Islamic institutions, the more intensive usage of Muslims’ formal
dress, and finally the uprising phenomenon of the formalization of
sharī‘ah Islam.4 Eventually, the ongoing process of “santrinization”5
marked the beginning of Indonesian Muslim society era. The dramatic
changes of the politics to the Reformation Era have escalated the
Islamic resurgence in general. On the other hand, the political tension
was followed by some ethnic conflicts in some regions, especially
religious conflicts such as in Poso and Ambon. Not only was the
current climate support the steadily religious resurgence from the New
Order,6 but it also gave the rise of some radical Islamic groups.
Tantamount to that, the local social culture of Solo plays a
significant role in the dissemination of the ideals of Islamic resurgence
in the form of radicalism. The Solonese especially Muslims have a
distinctive characteristic culture which is shaped by many factors such
as ethnicity, economics, politics, and religion. The characteristics of
society in the form of uniformities and regularities create such kind of
system or structure in which the society lives together.7 Therefore, the
above factors not only affected to the behaviour and social structure of
the society, but also gave significant impact toward the distinct culture
of the Solonese. In this respect, Brenkman asserts that “culture is a site
of reciprocal relationships and mutual understandings” including social
domination, exploitation, and power pervasive.8 Historical
backgrounds of the Solonese since the early years of its formation
Meuleman, Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim attitude towards modernity and identity
(London: Routledge-Curzon, 2002).
4
Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the Sate in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003).
“Santrinization” is from the term santri (boarding school pupils), but in general it to
refer to devout Muslims. The term santrinisasi is an abundant shifting from abangan to
devout Muslim.
5
According to the survey conducted by the Centre for Islamic and Social Studies
(Pusat Pengkajian Islam & Masyarakat, PPIM) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, there are
significant increasing percentage of Muslims who agree to the implementation of
Islamic sharī‘ah from 58% in 2001 to 67% in 2002. That it should be the government
that reinforce the implementation of Islamic sharī‘ah from 61,4% in 2001 to 71% in
2002. Further on this account see “Makin Saleh, Makin Curiga,” Tempo, December 30,
2001, pp.48-49; “Makin Agamis di Tahun Kemudian,” Tempo, December 29, 2002, p.
87.
6
7
E.E. Evans Pritchard, Social Anthropology (London: Cohen & West Ltd, 1969), p. 23.
8
John Brenkman, Culture and Domination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. vii.
52
resulted in the majority of abangan in Solo. History records that the
lower level abangan Javanese has been undergoing such social,
economics, and political deprivations. On the other hand, the failure of
religious and cultural leaders to bond the society has fragmented them
into such loose society. In turn, it was within such loose abangan
society that any social revivalism is flourishing. Many religious leaders
are successful in framing the current social, political, and global
situation with Islamic issues and finally lead them into a certain social
movement. It is such Islamic doctrines as shari>‘ah which they believe
could solve their current problems fast and precisely. Such ‘instant
convert’ from abangan to pious Muslims, finally, leads them to radical
Islamism.
Radical Islamism has become one of the phenomena of social
radicalism in Solo. Apart from the current radical Islamism, history
records that social radicalism in Solo ranges from “left” to “right”
wings. Not only did radicalism flourish prior to the Indonesian
independence, it also blossom after the Indonesian independence
during both the Old and New Order political system. While such
radicalism is not quite significant in other cities, many people believe
that there should be some local culture which partially takes part in
such radical activities. Therefore, the history of radicalism in Solo is
significant to see this phenomena comprehensively, especially why
such activities continuously happened during the current the
Reformation Era.
Obviously, social radicalism should be distinguished from Islamic
radicalism in Solo. Prior to the Indonesian independence, the
development of the Sarekat Islam (1912) in Solo eventually had given
rise to social radicalism. That is the reason why Shiraishi9 asserts that
the social movements in Solo gave much influence to the emergence
of social movements in other parts of Indonesia. In Solo itself, the SI
became a vehicle for the grass-root to protest against the government
at the time, the Dutch government as well as the kingdoms. In
addition to the central role of the Solonese in the Javanese culture,
John Pemberton and Stephen Headley focus their attention to
Takashi Siraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912-1926 (Itacha, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1990).
9
53
Muhammad Wildan
Surakarta as the heartland of the Javanese culture.10 To add another
social radicalism in Solo, anti-Chinese riot broke up in this region in
1980 followed by the same riots in other regions in Central Java. The
emergence of Mega-Bintang coined by Mudrick M. Sangidoe of Solo
prior to the election of 1997 was also a radical phenomenon of the
alliance between the enormous followers of the Partai Demokrasi
Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struge, PDI-P)
and the tiny mass of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United
Development Party, PPP).11 Finally, the social riots prior and after the
downfall of Suharto regime were also significant phenomena to include
to the radical characteristics of the Solonese. Although Solo was far
from the central government of Indonesia, the riots in the city was as
worse as those in Jakarta. Undeniably, therefore, several social
observers state that Solo is a barometer of national stability.
Turning to the Islamic radicalism sphere during the New Order,
Pondok Ngruki was the only phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in the
region. The oppositions of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
to the government in the late 1970s were in the form of their rejection
to be involved in the election and also to the Pancasila. Their
involvement in the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) of Adjengan
Masduki was finally followed the case of Komando Jihad in the region,
i.e, the assassination of Purwanto, vice rector of the Universitas
Sebelas Maret, UNS (1979), and also Lampung Berdarah (1989).12 The
detention of Sungkar and Ba’asyir on the accusation of undermining
the government in the early 1980s even did not stop them. After being
released 1984, they were involved again in another Islamic movement
John Pemberton, On the Subject of ‘Java’ (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press,
1994); Stephen C. Headly, Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion and Community in Central
Javanese Islam (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004).
10
The slogan of Mega-Bintang was enormously responded by their constituents in
many big cities such as Surabaya, Pasuruan, Madura, and Banjarmasin. Along with the
eruption of this ‘social movement’, the PPP of Solo was engaged in putihisasi
(‘whitening’) campaign to counteract of kuningisasi (‘yellowing’) of Golkar cadres who
were painting the town to match the party colour. Further, see John T. Sidel, Riots,
Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 2006), p. 64.
11
Known also as Talangsari incident or the Terror of Warsidi. Further see Abdul
Syukur, Gerakan Usrah di Indonesia: Peristiwa Lampung 1989 (Yogyakarta: Penerbit
Ombak, 2003).
12
54
known as Usrah,13 a movement to recruit more members of the NII.
Finally, the harsh political attitude of the government to them and
Muslims in general in the 1980s forced them to exile to Malaysia. Not
only was they kept contact with their networks and devotees in
Indonesia, they even broadened their networks internationally. It was
in 1993 when they established an independence clandestine Islamic
movement known later as the Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI). The broad
networks of this underground organization are not only covered
Southeast Asia, but also to Afghanistan. This organization was not well
known yet until they return to Indonesia and discovered that it was the
responsible for some devastating bombs in 2000 and also the Bali
bombings in 2002.
The dramatic political changes in Indonesia were partly responsible
for the emergence and re-emergence of some radical Islamic groups.
These groups emerged in many forms either formal organization such
as the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Mujahidin,
MMI), clandestine organizations such as the Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI), or
in the form of vigilante forces (laskar) such as the Laskar Jihad and the
Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front, FPI). This new era is
also marked by the increasing demand of implementation of sharī‘ah in
many parts of Indonesia. Along with the emergence of the radical
Islamic groups, the demand of the application of sharī‘ah laws emerges
in some cities in Indonesia. In the context of Solo, the phenomenon of
Pondok Ngruki (networks) re-emerged along with the JI. Although the
demand of the application of sharī‘ah laws is not quite significant in
Solo, some vigilante forces also emerged tremendously especially
during the early years of post-Soeharto era which were more engaged
on anti-immoral (ma`s}iyah) activities. The Pondok Ngruki in its relation
with the JI and the FPIS14 will represent the radical groups in this
discussion.
Usrah literally means nuclear family. This is such an organic term used by several
Islamic movements to name their Islamic teachings’ activities. Due to the stigma of
Usrah, several Islamic movements employed the word halaqah (literally mean circle) at
the end of 1980s, and finally they employ tarbiyah (literally mean education) since the
end of 1990s until recently.
13
Some other vigilante forces are Laskar Jundullah (the soldier of Allah), Laskar
Hizbullah Sunan Bonang, Hawariyyun (the disciples), Brigade Hizbullah (the party of Allah
Brigade), Barisan Bismillah (the Path of Bismillah), and Al-Ishlah (the reform). While
some branch-level vigilante forces are the Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah (the Ka’bah Youth
Movement, GPK) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender Front).
14
55
Muhammad Wildan
Some violent events during the post-Suharto era were allegedly
committed by Ba’asyir (Pondok Ngruki). The involvement of some
Ngruki graduates in the Bali bombings, and the revealed JI’s
responsibility for some devastated bombings convinced the authorities
that Ba’asyir was the spiritual leader of the JI as the successor of
Abdullah Sungkar. Finally, the authorities arrested him in October
2002 and began to bring him into trials. Undeniably, based on the all
the above many people assumed that Pondok Ngruki is the centre for
radical Islamism in sense of violence in Indonesia. Although some
people are may objected to this accusation, the facts has proved on the
other way around. In addition, the existence of several other Ngrukilike pesantrens co-founded by Ngruki graduates in the outer regions of
Solo, as Dār al-Shahadah in Boyolali and Ma’had Aly Al-Nūr in
Sukoharjo, convinced people to the accusation. Although the
authorities could not prove the involvement of Ba’asyir in the JI, the
existence of JI is undeniable. Moreover, that the region of Solo is quite
central for JI underlined my suspicious that the region is prolific of
such radical Islamism.
Similar to the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) of Habieb Rizieq in
Jakarta, the existence of the Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (FPIS) as a
vigilante force is significant in Solo.15 As a local Islamic group,
however, the FPIS is not only concerned with local issues in Solo but
also in some national and international issues. Flock of people on the
streets protesting some government’s policies as well as US policies on
Muslim world were among the activities of this organization. Similar to
some other vigilante forces in Indonesia, the FPIS is concerned mostly
with anti-ma‘s}iyah (anti-immorality) actions. Although the FPIS knows
exactly that Indonesia is not an Islamic state, this organization demand
to reinforce the existing regulations concerning to moral issues.
Therefore, the FPIS sweep some places such as prostitutions, gambling
centres, cafes, and hotels which it regards as violating God’s law. The
most bizarre thing is its “sweeping” of foreigners especially Americans
living in hotels in Solo. This action was conducted as its concern and
sympathy to some Middle Eastern Muslim counties, especially to Iraq
which was ‘invaded’ by the US. Interestingly, the FPIS is not a new
Not to be misunderstood with the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front, FPI)
of Habieb Rizieq in Jakarta. The FPIS has nothing to do with the FPI, although the
FPI has also its branch in Solo. Many times, some journalists wrongly wrote the FPIS
as Front Pembela Islam Surakarta.
15
56
phenomenon in Solo since it is only such a mean for another radical
Islamic group well known as Jama’ah Gumuk. Finally, the existence of
the FPIS among other vigilante forces and also Jama’ah Gumuk
convinced me that Solo is prolific for radical Islamic groups. One
significant feature of this radical Islamism is that most of its members
are from lower level abangan communities at the periphery or suburb
areas of Solo.
Islamization and Abangan: the Fragmentation of Religious
Authority
The phenomenon of abangan as a majority in Solo marks the failure
of Islamization in the region. Unlike other regions of Java in which
Islamization was conducted by independent ‘ulama>’s such as Wali
Songo, the process of Islamization in Solo was monopolized by the
Mataram kingdom which was known as the centre of Javanese culture.
Not only was that Islam was featured by Javanese syncretism, but the
Islamization itself only covered a small number of people. Inevitably, ,
polarization of Muslims in Solo is very significant beside the fact of the
fragmentation of religious authority. This phenomenon could also be
seen from the fact that no mainstreaming school of Islam in Solo such
as the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). In the same way,
some ‘local’ Islamic organization is mainstreaming in the region.
Finally, the polarization of the Solonese and the fragmentation of
religious authorities in Solo is featured by vast abangan community.
Since the mid of the 18th century, Islam was a significant
phenomenon in Surakarta kingdom. Historical account traces that
Islam in Solo developed well since the reign of Susuhunan
Pakubuwono II (1726-1749). The emergence of some royal poets such
as Raden Ngabehi Ranggawarsita and their abundant works signed the
dominant interpretation of Islam which was mixed with Javanese
values, syncretism. The development of Islam in Solo was carried on
by Susuhunan Pakubuwana IV (1788-1820) and Pakubuwana X (1893–
1939). With their authorities, the pesantren of Jamsaren (1800s) and
Madrasah Mamba‘ al-‘Ulūm (1905) were established in Solo
respectively. The control of the kingdoms and also the Dutch
government, however, limited the independence of the institutions not
only in interpreting Islam but also in disseminating it. Consequently, ,
Islam only spread on the higher level community and abangan Muslims
is still majority in Solo. For this reason Ricklefs asserts that the
57
Muhammad Wildan
strength of Javanism (Kejawen, Jw) is not a hindrance for Javanese to be
a radical or fundamentalist Muslims.16
To discuss the development of Islam in Solo, it is worthwhile to
describe some villages which were known as pious Muslim majority
such as Kauman, Pasar Kliwon and Laweyan. The distinctiveness of
these villages could be categorized as enclaves within the society. The
division of communities to such enclaves was also intentionally
designed for the role they have to carry out, such as Kauman for the
aristocrats and Pasar Kliwon for Arabs. On the other hand, the
arrangement was to distinguish their social statuses such as Kauman
for santris (devout Muslims), and the rest regions are for abangan
(nominal Muslims), including Pasar Kliwon and Laweyan. Although it
seems that these three villages were well known as the centre of devout
Muslims, history records that they did not have enough role in the
process of Islamization in Solo. Although there were some devout
Muslims, Haji Misbach as the propagator of Communism Islam prior
to the independence of Indonesia is also from Kauman. In the same
way, Laweyan was even the centre of red-Sarekat Islam (communism
SI) although H. Samanhudi, the founder of the SI, is from this village.
Finally, Arabs who resided at Pasar Kliwon also did not play any
significant role in the development of Islam in the region. On this
account, van den Berg states that only few colonies of Arabs were
interested in Islamic preaching, but mostly in business. Moreover, he
assert that most Arabs were reluctant to interact much with Javanese as
they consider themselves had higher degree of social status.17 In the
same way, indigenous ‘ulama>’s did not like to cooperate with Arabs. All
this means that the role of Arabs in developing Islam in Solo was
insignificant. The fact that the majority of Javanese residing at Pasar
Kliwon sub-district are abangan is another evidence.
Finally, the mass majority of abangan in Solo is also represented by
the existence of Javanese mysticism (aliran kebatinan) in region. Not
only is Solo the most widely spread of some Javanese mysticisms, it
also the place of the establishment of several of them. Among various
Javanese mysticisms, Sangkan Paran, Pangestu, Sumarah, Sapto
For this issue see M.C. Rickelfs, “Islam and the Reign of Pakubuwono II, 17261749,” in Peter G. Riddell and Tony Street, Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Society:
A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 238-252.
16
Further on this account, see L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di
Nusantara (Jakarta: INIS, 1989), pp. 103-104.
17
58
Darmo, and Subud are widely accepted in Solo. The first two even
founded in Solo, although in their later development they take other
cities as their centres. Solo is among several important branch of
Sangkan Paran, an oldest sect in Java.18 Although Sumarah is not
centred in Solo, the region has an important role in this Javanese
mysticisms. Due to the dynamic development of this sect in term of its
‘worships’, the Sumarah of Solo is becoming the gate for Westerners to
follow this Javanese mysticisms. Hence, Paul Stange asserts that
Sumarah has many things in common with Islam rather than their
similarity on the meaning of their names.19 Further, he states that such
Javanese mysticisms as Sumarah could also be seen as part of the
process of Islamization.20 In my view, however, the abangan majority of
the Solonese and the existence of some Javanese mysticism reflect the
discontinued process of Islamization in Solo. Along with the limited
range of Islamization, on the other hand, Christianization is also
significant phenomenon since the Dutch colonialism.
In the early years of the New Order, the Christianization among
the abangan majority had given to the rise of Islamic revivalism in Solo.
The role of M. Natsir and Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia
(Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, DDII) was quite significant
to the process of re-Islamization in the region. For this purpose, the
DDII branch of Solo was founded along with the DDII of Central
Java in Semarang. On a speech prior to the establishment of the DDII
in Solo, Natsir strongly recommended the Solonese Muslims to
establish more pesantrens and hospitals to counter the escalating
efforts of Christianization in Solo. Eventually, the leader of the DDII
of Solo, Abdullah Sungkar established a pesantren at the abangan
majority community, Ngruki. Ahmad Khusnan, former leader of the
DDII branch of Solo, acknowledges that Kustati and Yayasan Rumah
Sakit Islam (Yarsis) Islamic hospitals were also established due to the
financial assistance of the DDII as parts of the DDII’s efforts to
encounter Christianization in the region. In general, I tend to conclude
that radical Islamism arising from Solo in the end of 1970s and early
Andrew Beatty, Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account (UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 188.
18
The term ‘Sumarah’ essentially means submission in Javanese what ‘Islam’ means in
Arabic.
19
Paul Stange, The Innner of Islamization of Java (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis at Murdoch
University, 1980), p. 7.
20
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Muhammad Wildan
1980s was due partly to the escalation of Christianization in Solo,
beside the fact that the pressure of the government.
As far as Islam in Solo is concerned, no single school of Islam is
flourishing in Solo. Since the early of the ‘age of motion’, the abangan
Solonese had been captured by the Sarekat Islam (SI). The ‘tension’
between Muhammadiyah and NU in Solo ended up with the Congress
of ‘Ulama>’s at Pasar Kliwon in 1926. Ultimately, neither
Muhammadiyah nor NU could be mainstream Islam in the region,
even more at the ex-residency of Surakarta at large. The development
of Islam in the region during the Old and New Order period was
mostly influenced by ‘local’ schools of Islam. Since there is no single
Islamic organization or ‘Ulama>’ having authority on Islam, Muslims in
Solo are fragmented and diverge in many different schools of Islam.
Finally, current development of Islam was fully characterized by local
Islamic organizations which among them are radical.
Social and Political Deprivation
Along with the nominal characteristic of the Solonese, social and
political deprivation played a significant role in the fragmentation of
the society. In fact, the social deprivation is preceded by the ethnic
problems in the city. The failure of indigenization of several other
ethnics rather than Javanese in Solo brought about economic
deprivation of the society. The fact that religious leaders do not play a
significant role in Solo is also supported by the reality that neither
traditional nor modern Solo municipality leaders do not pay their
attentions to the society. History records that the patron-client system
was not maintained well especially during the Dutch occupation.
Finally, the political deprivation has given to the destruction of social
system. The emergence of such radical Islamic groups as Sarekat Islam
or Jama’ah Islamiyah is only a symptom of this fragmentation.
Solo is characterized by its plural society since the beginning of its
existence. There are many ethnic populations living in Solo such as
Javanese, Arabs, and Chinese.21 Like other plural cities in Indonesia,
ethnicity has been becoming a sensitive issue. The difficulties and
inability of ethnics especially Chinese to immerse to the Javanese
society is one of the reason of the disparity between Chinese and
In fact, there are many other ethnics in the city, i.e. Banjarese and Maduranese.
However, since their numbers are not quite significant, their existence is not quite
significant in Solo in many respects.
21
60
Javanese. The diverse communities in Solo have been heightened by
the diverse religions as a touchy entity. Conversely, Arabs who have
the same religion and to some extend cultures could easily submerge
with Java Solonese. The Arabs’ acculturation was also supported by the
fact that many Arabs married with Javanese women.22 In fact, this
social situation is among the legacy of Dutch colonial government.
Regardless of some complex and uneasiness of the Chinese in
Indonesia during that period in general,23 the Chinese had such kind of
privileges from the government. Their status as the second class, the
same as Arabs, is completely different from the third class Javanese.
The ability of Chinese to adapt to new social changes and play in it
made them capable of surviving in new situation.24 All above
privileges, social status, residential situation and opportunities or
political access have led to such kind of social gap between Chinese in
the one hand and Javanese on the other.
Since the beginning of the Solonese history, the lower level of
abangan Javanese majority has been deprived socially as well as
economically. The social stratification during the Dutch occupation
had put the abangan Javanese into the lowest level after the Dutch and
Javanese priyayi (high level class) at the top level, while Arabs and
Chinese on the second level.25 This privilege of the Dutch gave also
possibilities not only for Chinese to live at urban areas, but also other
business conveniences. Eventually, the lower level of abangan Javanese
were marginalized not only socially, but also economically. Such social
and economic situation did not change significantly until recently.
According to van den Berg, only few Arab-born women stayed for long period in
Indonesia. That is among the reason why most Arabs married with Indonesian
women. Most Arabs in Indonesia the 20th century were born in Indonesia. The
existence of sayyid as the descendants of Prophet Muhammad is among the exception.
See L.W.C. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara. Jakarta: INIS, 1989
(the original book was in Dutch and published in 1887).
22
On this account, see Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and
China: A Study of Perceptions and Policies (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic,
2005); Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (Leiden: KITLV,
2006).
23
Further see M.C. Ricklefs, Yogyakarta di Bawah Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: Sejarah
Pembagian Jawa (Yogyakarta: Matabangsa, 2002).
24
On the account of Arabs in Java see Sumit K. Mandal, Finding Their Place: A History of
Arabs in Java under Dutch Rule, 1800-1924 (Unpublished PhD thesis at Columbia
University, 1994).
25
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Muhammad Wildan
Although many of the lower level Javanese today are living at the
periphery of urban areas, they are constantly marginalized
economically. Current success of Chinese in business is another social
jealousy which adds another social gap with the lower level Javanese.
In turn, recurring anti-Chinese riot has become long-lasting crucial
issue in Solo. Interestingly enough, most riots caused by any social
problems would finally lead to the destruction of Chinese properties.26
The absence of such social cohesion among the Solonese is also
another major factor to the social fragmentation. The hegemonic
power of the Solo kingdoms during the Dutch occupation is another
deprivation of the abangan). The aristocrats of the Kasunanan and
Mangkunegaran kingdoms have not been playing a significant role in
the society. Since the very beginning of the history of Solo (Surakarta)
in the 18th century, politics was becoming a dominant issues among the
aristocrats which finally split the Mataram kingdom into several
kingdoms. The inability of the aristocrats to handle all social problems
had drawn the involvement of Dutch business company (VOC) in
both internally or externally social problems. The rise of the Sarekat
Islam in the early 20th century as the peak of social protest to the
hegemony of the authoritarian Dutch government was not responded
positively by the aristocrats. This ignorance was supported by the
disharmonic relationship between the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran
kingdoms which is lasting until recently. The social gap between the
aristocrats and kawula27 (lower class people) was not well mediated by
the priyayi (upper class people). Upon the emergence of the Sarekat
Islam, Kuntowijoyo asserts that it was as a result of collectively subconscious culture due to the failure of the priyayis mediate between raja
and kawula. Until the independence of Indonesia in 1945, the
kingdoms let alone Kasunanan reluctantly acknowledged the new state
and still accepted the return of Dutch government in 1948. The
detachment of the Kasunanan to the lower class people was responded
by the reluctant of the people to the planning of Indonesian
On this issue, see Jemma Purdey “The ‘other’ May riots: anti-Chinese violence in
Solo, May 1998,” in Charles A. Coppel, Violent conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis,
Representation, Resolution (New York: Routledge, 2006).
26
For the case of social class during that time, I tend to employ Kuntowijoyo’s
category: raja-priyayi-kawulo (king-upper class-lower class). Further on this account, see
on his work, Raja, Priyayi & Kawulo: Surakarta 1900-1915 (Yogyakarta: Penerbit
Ombak, 2004), p. 9.
27
62
government to give the Kasunanan a special autonomous region in
1946. The social actions in the name of anti-Swapraja (anti-autonomous
government) were supported by majority of the Solonese.28 the failure
of the kingdoms to be the pillar of such social cohesion for the society,
to some extend, have split the unity of the society. This historical
accounts show the seemingly less awareness of current authorities of
the Solo municipality to this socio-cultural problems. These latent
problems will continuously laying within this community unless there
are such well-planned schemas to overcome the root of the problems
properly.
Finally, the emergence of such radical Islamic groups could not be
detached from the tension between the state and Muslims especially
during the New Order. As argued by many, the Iranian revolution, the
successful struggle against Soviet in Afghanistan, and the gains made
by Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt have given to the rise of some
Islamic revivalism in many Southeast Asian countries, including
Indonesia. The emergence of such Islamic revivalism in Indonesia in
the early of 1980s was responded negatively by the government. The
government even considered Muslims as one of the obstacle of
Indonesian development. This harsh relationship, finally, led to several
conflicts between the state and Muslims in many different forms.
Although this situation improved during the last ten years of the New
Order regime, such situation to some extend has deprived Muslims.
Globalized-Islam and Radical Islamism in Solo
The phenomenon of radical Islamism in Solo would be best
described as a resistant movement. In other words, the emergence of
some radical Islamic groups could be seen as social movements which
resist social changes that mostly do not accommodate their need. In
some cases, social movements often serve to gradualize the process of
social changes. In the case of Solo, however, some radical Islamic
groups even want to alter the changes to support their necessities. The
majority of lower level abangan society in Solo has been deprived not
only in economics, but also social and political life. . Economic, social,
and political developments in Solo in particular and in Indonesia in
general do not accommodate their necessities, but even discontent
them. In this respects, they see Islam as an alternative to solve their
Soedarmono and Muh. Amin, Solusi Konflik Pribumi dan non-Pribumi di Kota Solo
(Laporan Penelitian Dosen Muda at UNS, 2002), p. 1.
28
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Muhammad Wildan
problems. Islamic teachings which they find not merely as religion but
as a complete social system is the ultimate solution for all their
problems. Therefore, it could be said that it is such an instant process
of Islamization since they just ‘leap’ from abangan to Islam without
undergoing necessary processes. Similar to what happened during the
“age of motion”, it may also possible that they do not really undergo
such a process of Islamization; they just take a certain aspects of Islam
(i.e., Sarekat Islam) to elevate them from their hopeless situation.
Therefore, the involvement of such prominent Islamic organizations as
Muhammadiyah and NU is very urgent to the Islamization process of
the abangan society. Otherwise, such radical Islamic groups would
consistently emerge from this society.
Globalization and modernization as the mainstream of the current
world has drastically changed the world. Not only was globalization
has shrunk the world, but it also brought about cultural fragmentation
on regional levels.29 Further Tibi, who share views with Geertz on
culture, looks at cultures as a framework for social production of
meaning and then determine it on local situation. Accordingly, it was
due to globalization that political Islam arises in most Muslim
countries in the world. In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in
1979, religious fanaticism and revivalism are arising in these countries,
including Indonesia. The rapid mainstream of information and
technology has marginalized the role of religion in the society.
Conventional Islamic preaching, therefore, could no longer restrain the
mainstream of modernization from the West. Inevitably, some
communities felt that their culture and identities were in severe
conditions; some of them may lose their social exchange, in economics
for instance. The unavailability of a communication space for the
community with the government has led them to such kind of social
tension. In such plural society as Solo, a certain policy which does not
accommodate to all parts of society will always be a seed of dispute.
In the perspective of some Islamic fundamentalism, modernization
is viewed as an immense threat for Muslims since it is not only a
concept but it is a social process which produces social products. One
of significant consequent of modernity is the institutional differentiation of religious and secular spheres which was accompanied by the
Basam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder
(England: University of California Press, 2002), p. xvii.
29
64
privatization of religion as well as its marginalization.30 Moaddel,
however, tends to see the phenomenon of radical Islamic groups
because of the ideological contentions in the Islamic world.31 For that
reason, some ‘ulama>’s frame globalization and modernization as a part
of ghazw al-fikr. In addition, the hegemonic power of the West allows
Westerners to introduce any regulations which would enable them to
gain much benefit for themselves such as the invasion of Palestine and
Iraq in the name of war on terrorism. In this point, Hart asserts that
radical Islamism in Indonesia as well as in several other parts of
Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippine are
among the phenomena of Muslims’ solidarity.32 Conclusively, the
overwhelmingly emergence of Islamic political parties, radical Islamism
groups, and vigilante forces in many parts of Indonesia are among the
outcomes of globalization and modernization.
On the other hand, massive demographic changes as a result of
modernization are also another factor to the rise of radical Islamism.
Oliver Roy argues that Islamist movements in some secular nationalist
government are among the result of unprecedented demographic
change.33 Modernization in the form of economic development which
is mostly take place in urban areas has attracted more rural families to
come to the cities. The inability of the government to grasp all
unemployment people has given to the rise of jobless at the periphery
of the cities. Eventually, such this discontent society is easily mobilized
by any social movements. In the context of Solo, this demographic
shift has fuelled Islamism. Aside from the escalating social problems in
this slum community, many of them are engaged with Islamic activities
which to some extend offer them such instant remedy to their current
problems. Undeniably, many activists of radical Islamism in Solo are
from this lower level community.
R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (New
York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 3.
30
Mansour Muaddel and Kamran Talattof, “Contemporary debates in Islam: modernism vs fundamentalism: an anthology of Islamic thought,” in Mansour Muaddel and
Kamran Talattof (eds), Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: a Reader (New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 3.
31
Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert Analysis, Myopia and
Fantasy” in The Pacific Review, vol. 18 No (3 September 2005): pp. 314-315.
32
Further see, Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1996).
33
65
Muhammad Wildan
Finally, the dramatic political shift to Reformation Era is the
trigger of the emergence radical Islamism. Most social discontents
which were forcefully suppressed by the New Order finally emerge
following the decline of the regime. Social conflicts are becoming the
most common phenomena of horizontal precariousness. Horizontal
tensions in the forms of religious conflicts such as in Ambon and Poso
are escalating during this period. The inability of the authorities to
address the religious problems properly is such a ‘political opportunity
structure’ which gave a chance for social actors to establish social
movements. In the Solo context, this political opportunity has also
given rise to the Islamic radical groups, or the resurgence of old radical
Islamic groups. On the other hand, it was also due partly to the failure
of the local government to grasp social figures and give them
meaningful access to political institutions34 which led to the emergence
of some radical Islamic groups. The re-emergence of Pondok Ngruki
and jama’ah Gumuk in the form of the JI and FPIS respectively, and
the establishment of some vigilante forces such as Laskar Jundullah
and Laskar Hisbullah are among the result of this political
conduciveness.
Some of the lower level abangan Solonese perceived the emergence
of Islamic revivalism as an opportunity to resolve their social
problems. Therefore, it could be clearly seen that most members of the
above Islamic radical groups, including the vigilante forces, are mostly
from abangan deprived-community at the periphery of Solo. Some
Islamic terms have been used by these groups to attract more people
to be involved in their own communities. Along with the convictions
that Islam is the ultimate solution of the world disorder, shari>‘ah and
anti-West are among the most prolific issues to incite people to be
involved in such radical Islamism groups. Nevertheless, different from
some other radical Islamic groups such as in Banten, Garut,
Tasikmalaya, and Bulukumba which fervently demand the implementtation of shari>‘ah as regional regulation (perda), the Islamic groups in
Solo are not strong enough to demand such regulation. Although there
are many abangan deprived-socially “converted” and involved in these
religious radical groups, their number are not as significant compared
to those who are not “provoked” and remains as ordinary abangan.
Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in Islamic World
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. xv.
34
66
Conclusion
Solo is prolific for radical Islamic groups. The existence of the
Pondok Ngruki, jama’ah Gumuk, and some Islamic vigilante forces in
the city verify this assumption. The above phenomena also confirm
that Pondok Ngruki and its related Islamic radical movements are not
the single phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in Solo. However, it
should be noted here that the Islamic vigilante groups hardly be
categorized as radical since they concern more on moral issues and not
on fundamental issues such as shari>‘ah or Islamic state. Moreover, these
organizations do not have obvious views on Islamic values as other
groups. However, I deliberately do not use rigid category in this case
since there are many possibilities that these vigilante forces would turn
into social movements due to favourable socio-political and cultural
condition. Since in many cases these vigilante forces were involved in
some radical violence, these groups could be categorized as radical in a
broader term. Although some radical Islamic groups emerge in Solo,
the demand for the implementation of shari>‘ah is not as in other
regions such as Garut, Banten and Bulumkumba. In fact, the radical
Islamism in Solo has not mainstreaming yet.
The phenomenon of radical Islamism in Solo is as a result of many
socio-cultural and political factors. Social discontent economically and
politically since the beginning of the 20th century is among the most
fundamental factors to the rise social deprivation. The lack of religious
and traditional leaders in Solo society also led them to be such kind of
loosely abangan society. It was globalization and political conduciveness
which finally incite such moveable society into certain social
movements. The involvement of some people in some radical Islamic
groups is among their choice to resolve their socio-cultural problems
they have undergone so far. In other words, radical Islamic activism is
among some other social radicalism activisms which could happen in
this society. In my view, the socio-cultural problems are still laying
beneath the social structure of the Solonese which may explode if
some political opportunities happened as the trigger to the emergence
of a social movement. Compared to the mass support to the SI during
the ‘age of motion’, to borrow Shiraishi’s term, some present radical
Islamic groups’ offers to resolve some social problems are not
touching the hearth of the loosely abangan society yet. In other words,
although there are some radical Islamic groups in the region, these
67
Muhammad Wildan
groups are not mainstreaming in Solo. This situation is due mostly to
the success of some da`wah activities among these communities.
Finally, the role of some moderate Islamic organizations is very
urgent to reduce such radical Islamism in Solo. In other words, they
should intensify their da`wah activities to touch the vast abangan
majority in the region. Although such big Islamic organizations as
Muhammadiyah and NU are not widely spread in Solo, it does not
mean that the Solonese reject these organizations. Their previous
failure of da`wah could lead them to change their methods of da`wah. In
addition, such coordinative agendas should be made between all
moderate organizations to involve the society into their mainstream
accordingly. As in other parts of Indonesia that NU is accepted well
among the suburb areas, this organization could play in this level
which is still abangan majority. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah and also the
Majelis Tafsir Alquran (MTA) which already has some networks
among abangan in urban areas could broaden their networks within the
areas. In addition, the role of some students’ Islamic organizations
such as the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Muslim
Student Action Union, KAMMI), Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah
(Muhammadiyah Student Union, IMM), and Himpunan Mahasiswa
Islam (Muslim Student Association, HMI) are absolutely needed to
broaden their da`wah activities not only among university students but
also among the society, especially the abangan. The role of authorities
to diverge all agendas of this huge process of santrinisasi (reIslamization) is also necessary, beside their main task to give some
religious leaders in Solo some political access. Such comprehensive
approach should be employed to reduce abangan majority and include
them in the current mainstream of moderate Islam in Indonesia. []
References
Books and Articles
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Reconsiliation. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.
Azra, Azyumardi. “Globalization of Indonesian Muslim Discourse:
Contemporary Religio-Intellectual Connections Between
Indonesia and The Middle East.” in Johan Meuleman. Islam in
the Era of Globalization: Muslim attitude towards modernity and identity.
London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.
68
Beatty, Andrew. Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account.
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Brenkman, John. Culture and Domination. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987.
Coppel, Charles A. Violent conflicts in Indonesia: Analysis, Representation,
Resolution. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS,
2003.
Hafez, Mohammed M. Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in
Islamic World. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
Hamilton-Hart, Natasha. “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: expert analysis,
myopia and fantasy.” in The Pacific Review, vol. 18 No. 3
September 2005.
Headly, Stephen C. Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion and Community
in Central Javanese Islam. Singapore: ISEAS, 2004.
Kuntowijoyo. Raja, Priyayi & Kawulo: Surakarta 1900-1915. Yogyakarta:
Penerbit Ombak, 2004.
Mandal, Sumit K. Finding Their Place: A History of Arabs in Java under
Dutch rule, 1800-1924. Unpublished Ph.D thesis at Columbia
University, 1994.
Muaddel, Mansour and Kamran Talattof. “Contemporary Debates in
Islam: Modernism vs Fundamentalism: an Anthology of Islamic
Thought.” in Mansour Muaddel and Kamran Talattof (eds).
Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: a Reader. New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2002.
Pemberton, John. On the Subject of ‘Java’. Ithaca & London: Cornel
University Press, 1994.
Pritchard, E.E. Evans. Social Anthropology. London: Cohen & West Ltd,
1969.
Purdey, Jemma. Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999. Leiden:
KITLV, 2006.
Rickelfs, M.C. “Islam and the Reign of Pakubuwono II, 1726-1749.” in
Peter G. Riddell and Tony Street. Islam: Essays on Scripture,
Thought and Society: A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns.
Leiden: Brill, 1997.
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Muhammad Wildan
Roy, Olivier. The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge: Harvard
Sidel, John T. Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia. Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 2006.
Siraishi, Takashi. An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912-1926.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Stange, Paul. The Innner of Islamization of Java. Unpublished PhD Thesis
at Murdoch University, 1980.
Suryadinata, Leo. Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China: A
Study of Perceptions and Policies. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish
Academic, 2005.
Tibi, Basam. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New
World Disorder. England: University of California Press, 2002.
van den Berg, L.W.C.. Hadramaut dan Koloni Arab di Nusantara. Jakarta:
INIS, 1989.
70
RADICALIZING INDONESIAN MODERATE ISLAM
FROM WITHIN
The NU-FPI Relationship in Bangkalan, Madura
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
Abstract: This article tries to present the most current
phenomenon of how moderate Islam can live side by side
with radical Islam. By focusing its analysis on the dynamics
of political life in Bangkalan, Madura, the paper argues that
the encounter between these two different ideological
streams is possible under particular circumstances. First,
there is a specific political situation where the moderate
Islam is able to control the political posts. Second, there is
a forum where they can articulate Islamic ideas in terms of
classical and modern political movements. This study has
also found out that the binary perspective applied in the
analysis of Islamic movement is not always relevant. The
fact, as in the case of Bangkalan, is far more complex, in
which NU and Islamic Defender Front (FPI) can merge.
This is so because at the beginning, FPI’s management in
the city is led by kyais or/and prominent local NU leaders.
Keywords: Radicalization, de-radicalization, moderate
Islam, radical Islam.
Introduction
A discussion on the topic of contemporary Islamic movements is
filled with various reviews about radical Islam. As news, academic
work also has its own actual considerations. The September 11th
incident seems to be a “productive” momentum to tap a new academic
debate which was previously conducted only by a few people who
were really making Islam and its socio-political life as an academic
project. Islamism, in its violence and atrocity, then became a popular
theme that filled almost all the scientific discussion that took ideology
and contemporary Islamic movements as a main topic. This
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
multiplication theme was reinforced by the project of “War on Terror”
that was designed to define a scheme of new relationship between
Islam and the West.
It is nothing new that any political project that involves a
relationship between two civilizations is often accompanied by various
academic projects. Orientalism, for instance, apart from the development and critical attitude that come from within, is the academic
project that is directly linked to imperialism at first.1 In fact,
anthropology is not immune from these imperialistic “sins.”2
To mark the study of radical Islam as a trending topic today,
constantly emerging perspective is the use of binary oppositions:
moderate versus radical,3 puritan versus pluralism,4 democrat versus
Islamist,5 liberal versus conservative,6 and some other binary
Edward Said’s writings remain the most representative sources in viewing the
relationship between Orientalism and imperialism. Orientalism, at least, at the
beginning of its age, was a way of how the West looked at the East-Islam which was
characterized by superior-inferior, civilized-uncivilized, high-low. See Edward Said,
Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979).
1
2
Koentjaraningrat, Pengantar Ilmu Antropologi (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 2009), pp. 3-4.
Stephen Sulaiman Schwartz, Dua Wajah Islam: Moderatisme vs Fundamentalisme dalam
Wacana Global, translated by Hodri Ariev (Jakarta: Libforall, Blantika, The Wahid
Institute, Center for Islamic Pluralism, 2007).
3
Khaled Abou El Fadl, Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam: Puritanisme versus Pluralisme,
translated by Heru Prasetia (Bandung: Throne, 2003). This book is actually a collection
of papers written by Khaled Abou el-Fadl and many other intellectuals who respond
the latter’s ideas. Its contents speak about the two currents of Islamic thought and
movement in viewing tolerance and relationship between Islam and the West. This
book was originally entitled The Place of Tolerance in Islam, which later changed its title
into Indonesian language as above because it reflects the dispute between the
puritanists and the pluralists.
4
Robert W. Hefner, “Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto
Indonesia,” in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation,
Democratization (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005).
5
Caryle Murphy, Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: The Egyptian Experience
(New York: Scribner, 2002); Virginia Hooker, “Developing Islamic Arguments for
Changing through Liberal Islam,” in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds), Islamic
Perspectives on the New Millenium (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004); Leonard Binder, Islam Liberal:
Kritik Terhadap Ideologi-Ideologi Pembangunan, translated by Imam Muttaqin (Yogyakarta:
Pustaka Pelajar, 2001); Rumadi, Post Tradisionalisme Islam: Wacana Intelektualisme dalam
Komunitas NU (Jakarta: DEPAG RI, 2007).
6
72
NU-FPI Relationship in Bangkalan
categories.7 In such a frame of mind, Islam is seen as blocks of
community, school of thought, method of movement, and isolative
school of teaching.
This is not to say that scientific analysis should not be doing
categorization. However, the category that originated from an
academic research to see variations in the community is often treated
as real spaces where occupants are isolated from each other.8 What is
going to dealt with in this paper is to open a new perspective that is no
longer strictly burdened by binary category of moderate Islam versus
radical Islam. There are meeting rooms between the two, which may
not be permanent, but there are also moments of tension in certain
cases. All these phenomena become so complex that it is not likely
enough to be portrayed with too tight and stiff approach employing a
binary category.
Reductive risk of way of thinking in terms of binary opposition
and absolute categories of moderate Islam versus radical Islam in
contemporary Indonesia may be easily seen when we are dealing with a
case of the following: on February 22nd, 2011, PWNU (Pengurus
Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama/Provincial Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama) of
East Java held a seminar at Hotel Bumi Surabaya in commemoration of
See, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur
Tengah ke Indonesia (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005); Norani Othman (ed.), Muslim Women and
The Challenge of Islamic Extremism (Selangor: Sister in Islam, 2005); Thoha Hamim, Islam
& NU di Bawah Tekanan Problematika Kontemporer (Surabaya: Diantama, 2004), within
the sub-title: “Islam Militan versus Islam Moderat: Perilaku Politik Kaum Islam Militan
di Masa Pemerintahan Presiden KH Abdurrahman Wahid”; some other works discuss
the radical Islam movement, which is explicitly in opposition to the moderate Islam.
Read Itzchak Weismann, “Sa’id Hawwa: The Making of Radical Muslim Thinker in
Modern Syria,” in Syafiq Mughni (ed.), An Anthology of Contemporary Middle Eastern
History (Montreal: Indonesia-Canada Islamic Higher Education Project, n.d.); Jamhari
and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo
Persada, 2004).
7
Critics of this reasoning are advanced by Beatty on categorization made by Geertz on
Javanese Islamic character. According to him, Geetz’s theoretical framework in making
such category as santri, abangan, and priayi is being outrageous and exaggerated when he
delineated and treated it as tight spaces and unbridgeable distance among the three. As
if, a category was the iron prison which was not possible for each category to negotiate
and interpenetrate with the equal degree of activity and consciousness. See Andrew
Beatty, Variasi Agama di Jawa: Suatu Pendekatan Antropologi, translated by Achmad
Fedyani Saefuddin (Jakarta: Murai Kencana, 2001); See also Harsya W. Bachtiar, “The
Religion of Java: A Commentary Review,” in Clifford Geertz, Abangan, Santri, Priyayi
(Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1983).
8
73
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
the 88th birthday of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama).9 It was nothing special as
the anniversary of NU is yearly celebrated. That seemed unusual was
the presence of the leading leaders of FPI (Front Pembela
Islam/Islamic Defender Front), Rizieq Shihab and Munarman. The
attendance of Rizieq was special because he was invited to be a guest
speaker at the seminar. Rizieq was not only honored as a guest, but
also recognized as part of NU as stated by Hasyim Muzadi in his
speech that “Habib Rizieq is NU and he often said that he was NU.”
In fact, Muzadi provided a defense in order that FPI was not
dissolved.10
NU is known as a moderate Islamic organization, where its
moderation is often contrasted with the usual violence carried out by
radical Islamic groups. Meanwhile, FPI is commonly known as the
Islamist group who likes to do violence. Such a definition of
moderation is often stated by NU leaders who look FPI differently
from NU. NU represents moderate Islam, while FPI is radical Islam.
But at the time, the number one person of FPI was invited as a guest
speaker to discuss the vision of his Islam and was recognized as part of
NU.
It was indeed a very strange scene. The moderation of NU seemed
to melt and fuse into the FPI’s violent face. There was no longer
restriction or at least, it became increasingly blurred. If everyone was
so easy to hear the difference between the moderation of NU and the
radicalism of FPI from NU leaders previously, the forum seemed to
erase the distinction. FPI has now become a part of NU. At least, one
might have thought that the violent character of FPI can also be a part
of the Islamic movement of NU, or, the moderateness of NU could
become part of the radical movement of FPI.
This phenomenon, of course, has spawned a lot of confusion and
questions. This is reflected in the writing of an activist of NU in
Yogyakarta who has been proud of NU’s moderation for being able to
be a barrier to the dissemination of radical Islamist movements. He
wrote that:
...apparently, FPI and NU now start to meet. Some time
ago, FPI’s chairman, Rizieq Sihab was invited/present in
gathering with KH. Hasyim Muzadi (as well as the other
9
http://www.tempointeraktif.com, accessed on March 22nd, 2011.
10
74
http://nasional.vivanews.com, accessed on March 23rd, 2011.
speakers) in the harlah of NU at PWNU East Java. Even, in
the forum, the moderator called Rizieq as the representation
of radical NU. What the indication is this …?11
The book Ilusi Negara Islam (Illusion of an Islamic State) sees this
phenomenon as the Islamist infiltration into the institutions or
organizations that Islam is known as a moderate character. Both of
NU and Muhammadiyah are surely the target of such infiltration.
Extremists do not only infiltrate into NU and Muhammadiyah, but
also “take over” the mosques and schools, even they go to pesantrens
(Islamic boarding schools).12
However, the presence of Rizieq Shihab in an important event of
PWNU East Java did not confirm the existence of these intrusions.
Infiltration presumes an unequal position, with one is active and
another one is passive. However, what happened in that event did not
indicate the passivity of one of the parties, unless NU looked so
“stupid” that falls into the trap set by such a shrewd one like Shihab.
This paper highlights the latest development of the Islamic
movement in Indonesia. As stated by Bubalo and Fealy,13 a growth of
radical Islamic movements in Indonesia is largely derived from the
outside, but Indonesia itself is a ground for seeding dawn every
doctrine and Islamic movements. Whatever sticks planted on the
ground, it would become a fruitful tree. This means that Indonesian
Islam provides a very open and a very broad opportunity for any
doctrine to come and influence each other. In this dialectical situation,
the discrete concept of moderate versus radical Islam needs to be
tested again.
The encounter between NU and FPI is not unknowingly presented
because they directly represent the two concepts: moderate versus
radical Islam. NU is known as a moderate Islamic organization. NU’s
moderation was born from the Islamic thought typical to the
traditionalists. One of the basic characters of NU is its tolerance to
various local traditions, a fundamentally different attitude to the
Posted by Ahmad Shidqi, [email protected], accessed on
February 27th, 2011.
11
Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di
Indonesia (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Maarif
Institute, 2009).
12
Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and
Indonesia (Alexandria: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005).
13
75
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
puritan who is very obsessive with pure Islam, which make him lose an
appreciation and tolerance of the local culture. Appreciation to the
tradition, either classical or local, could be called the inner spirit of the
organization founded by Hasyim Asy’ari in Surabaya in 1926.14
Bangkalan, Madura is chosen as the region to see the new direction
of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Lifting Madura in the
discussion of NU is like sorting the sugar out of its sweetness. The
identity of NU-Madura is an Islamic society itself. Some experts
associate this phenomenon with pesantrens that have been the main
base of NU. As a typical of Islamic educational institutions, Islamic
boarding schools are very closely tied to the culture of Java and
Madura. As a result, one should not be surprised if they grow and
thrive in this region. That is why NU becomes a religio-cultural
identity of the Madurese in general.15
Bangkalan and NU
Bangkalan is one of the four districts in Madura. This district is the
westernmost and connecting Surabaya to Madura island. Before the
opening of the longest bridge, Suramadu, in 2009, Kamal, one of the
sub-districts in Bangkalan, was a dock where ferries were crossing
from Surabaya to Madura or vice versa.
As historical cities in Java began to exist at about the early of the
Islamic kingdom of Java, the historiography of Bangkalan also began
to be written in this era. Historical records of Bangkalan began in the
mid of the 16th century (1531 AD), which was known as “age of
Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds.), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A
Contemporary Sourcebook (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p. 40.
14
Laode Ida, NU Muda: Kaum Progresif dan Sekularisme Baru (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2004), p.
2; The cultural specificities appear such as in obedience, submission, and their
surrender hierarchically to the four major figures in their life, moreover in religious
praxis: Buppa, Babbu, Guru, and Rato (father, mother, teacher, and leader of the
government). To the four major figures, the Madurese’s hierarchical compliance shows
its form in the social life of their culture. The use and mention of the term Guru refers
and emphases on understanding and attention of Kyai-pesantren to religious
development in Islamic boarding house. Kyai is the most influential figure for the
Madurese. Teacher (kiai) is an assurance of morality issues and problems of hereafter.
It is understandable that the Madurese’s obedience to kyai or teacher is based on those
reasons. See A. Latief Wiyata, Carok Konflik Kekerasan dan Harga Diri Orang Madura
15
76
sainthood”. Inevitably, the history of Bangkalan was closely associated
with the history of Islam in Madura island.16
In the context of the establishment and development of NU,
Bangkalan occupies a key position. The founder of NU, Kyai Hasyim
Asy’ari, was the pupil of Kyai Cholil Bangkalan.17 When Abdul Wahab
Hasbullah proposed his wish to Hasyim Asy’ari to establish an
organization that was later called NU, the latter did not confirm until
he got a spiritual endorsement from Kyai Cholil Bangkalan. After
getting permission from Bangkalan, Hasyim finally made a decision,
“Allah has allowed us to establish an organization”.18
Up to now, the descendants of Kyai Cholil Bangkalan become kyai
who are highly respected by the Muslim community there. They are
the role model for Muslims in Bangkalan, even in Madura in general.
Pesantren of Syaichona Cholil Bangkalan can be regarded as the site of
Islamic reference for Muslims in Madura. This pesantren occupies an
important position in the whole movements of Muslim communities in
the district. It can be said that this pesantren has been the axis of all
Muslims in Bangkalan, the majority of which is NU. All religious,
political, and cultural movements that enter into Bangkalan require
legitimacy from Kyai Cholil’s families if they wish to be accepted by the
community there.
FPI Bangkalan: The Melting of Moderatism and Radicalism
FPI (Islamic Defender Front) was born on August 17th, 1998 by
the chairperson Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. After it was established in
Jakarta, FPI established branches in West Java, Lampung, Palembang,
North Sumatra, East Java, Sulawesi, Ambon, Maluku, Tual, and
Borneo. It now exists in almost all the provinces of the country.
The history of FPI in Bangkalan, Madura, began in 2004, when
Rizieq Shihab gave religious lecture in the sub-district Blega,
Bangkalan.19 His coming to this district was made possible by the
16
http://www.bangkalankab.go.id, accessed on February 3rd, 2011.
Lathiful Khuluq, “K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari: “Profil Pejuang dari Jombang,” in Jajat
Burhanudin and Ahmad Baedowi (eds), Transformasi Otoritas Keagamaan: Pengalaman
Islam Indonesia (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2003), p. 48.
17
See, Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NU (Surabaya: Duta Aksara Mulia,
2010).
18
See, Mohammad Tikno Muyono, Dakwah Front Pembela Islam (FPI) di Kabupaten
Bangkalan; Studi Kualitatif tentang Gerakan Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar (Unpublished
thesis, Dakwah Faculty, IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2009).
19
77
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
student of KH. Abdul Munif Pamekasan who was captivated by the
views of Rizieq. When he invited Rizieq in Blega, he deliberately
invited a great deal of religious and community leaders of Bangkalan.
One of those invited was Nasir Zaini, a prominent businessman
who was also influential figure within the local organizations, the
Association of Madura Family (IKAMRA) and Madura United Forum
(FORMABES). At that moment, there was an informal agreement to
establish FPI in Bangkalan. Rizieq asked Nasir Zaini to become the
interim coordinator.
Nasir Zaini began to recruit members and approached the
community leaders and kyais in that region. One of the important
figures who successfully approached was the pesantren’s caregiver
Syaichona Cholil I, KH Abdullah Schal, tweet of Kyai Cholil Bangkalan.
Finally, on September 3rd, 2005, when the pesantren held h}aflat} alimtih}a>n wa al-ikhtiba>r, Rizieq Shihab was invited as a speaker, and it was
also attended by some influential kyais in Bangkalan. At that time, it
was then performed a limited discussion to formulate the
establishment of Regional Leadership Board of the Islamic Defender
Front (FPI) in Bangkalan.
H}aflat al-imtih}a>n is very crucial for the existence of FPI in
Bangkalan in the future. Although the September 5th, 2005 is
considered as the date of the establishment of the FPI Bangkalan, but
h}aflat al-imtih}a>n event can be considered as an open declaration of the
establishment of FPI in Bangkalan.
At the early time of FPI’s management in Bangkalan, the big
families of pesantren Syaichona Cholil had occupied a key position. It
could be said that the Kademangan family, another term for the
descendants of Kyai Cholil, was the controller of FPI Bangkalan. The
chairman of the Shura Council was held by K.H. Abdullah Schal, while
the chairman of Tanfidz was K.H. Fahrillah Aschal. FPI Bangkalan
domiciled and headquartered in the city of Bangkalan, precisely at
pesantren of Syaichona Cholil I in Kademangan, Bangkalan.
In this initial period, FPI immediately performed some strikes.
Many people claimed that FPI Bangkalan under Fachrillah Aschal had
become a highly respected organization as its assertiveness and
prowess in combating immorality issues. The presence of FPI in
78
Bangkalan was considered to be able to act as a motor in eradicating
disobedience.20
Pesantren’s and NU’s Response
On June 1st, 2008, AKKBB (National Alliance for Freedom of
Religion and Belief) held a rally in Monas Jakarta to commemorate the
anniversary of Pancasila. The alliance was made up of various
institutions and figures that had been concentrated on advocating the
right to freedom of religion and belief. The rally, which was designed
as a peaceful activity was going to call for Indonesia’s bhinneka tunggal
ika under Pancasila which was critically endangered by forces that
impose their will and did not appreciate diversity.
Such a friendship nuanced activity since involved family members
(husband/wife and children) suddenly turned into chaos when the
Islamic Army Command (the main element of FPI paramilitary force)
attacked and beat up participants of rally. This was one of the open
violence committed by FPI to pro-democracy groups.
Immediately, FPI’s assault got harsh reactions from various parties.
Almost all people condemned the FPI’s anarchy. As response to this
anarchy, Ansor, youth organization under NU, called on its paramilitary
forces (Banser) to fight the FPI’s tyranny.21 The call was apparently
effective. Ansor with its Banser was being part of a wave of protest
everywhere condemning and demanding the dissolution of FPI, not
least in East Java.
In Banyuwangi, the local Shura Council of FPI, KH Samsul
Ma’arif, officially retired from management after pressed by Ansor. In
Probolinggo, dozens of mass called as “Defender of Gus Dur”
reached the local chairman of FPI, Habib Lutfi. Not just at the eastern
of East Java FPI received pressure to be disbanded, in Blitar, a local
FPI was also urged to be disbanded by the mass called Defender Front
of National Awakening (FPKB).22
Under the pressure to be disbanded, FPI branch Madura refused
to disperse.23 The FPI’s coordinator of Madura region, Bahri Asrawi
said: “FPI in Madura has good relation with Banser and Garda Bangsa
Interview with Deputy Secretary of PCNU Bangkalan, HM Toyyib Muslim Fawwaz,
March 5th, 2011.
20
21
Banser (Barisan Ansor Serbaguna) is a paramilitary force that is under Ansor.
22
http://www.nuonline.com, Jun 5th, 2008, accessed on February 3rd, 2011.
23
http://www.detikSurabaya, Jun 4th, 2008, accessed on February 3rd, 2011.
79
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
(security forces of National Awakening Party), although in other places
experiencing tension.24
The story of the tension between FPI and NU in 2008 as well as
FPI's insistence in Madura not to disband by the reason of a good
relationship with NU, tells us something about FPI in Madura. What
stated above by Bahri Asrawi is not something ridiculous. The history
of FPI’s establishment in Bangkalan confirms the truth of the
confession. Since its inception, FPI Bangkalan has been handled by
pesantren’s leaders who are also the prominent leaders of NU. Even in
2008 there was an open tension between the institutions affiliated to
NU with FPI, but this was not able to deny the closeness in
relationship between NU and FPI.
This closeness can also be seen in the case of the mid-2008. The
case stemmed from the report that Bindara Ali, chairman of Istigha>thah
Dhikrulla>h Qotbul Ghaiz, had issued by stating “it is not the sin of
fornication, the existence of heaven and hell is a lie, and God is as
created beings.” These issues came to Islamic Defender Front (FPI),
which was then forwarded to the Council of Indonesian Ùlama>’ and
NU. Following that, the dialogue was held in the office of PCNU
Bangkalan which involved MUI, NU, FPI, Laskar Jihad, Kesbang
Bangkalan, Bangkalan police, prosecutors, Muspika Klampis, and head
village of Bator to clarify the news to Bindara Ali. The parties who
presented then concluded that what was said by Bindara Ali was
misguided.25
The people did not look at the relationship between NU
Bangkalan and FPI. In general, the views of NU leaders towards FPI
are relatively positive. They cannot surely accept the FPI violence, but
they can accept rigorous propaganda and implementation of al-amr bi
al-ma‘ru>f wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (commanding good and forbidding
wrong) because it is considered as an accurate way to eliminate
immorality in society. NU’s figures greatly respect FPI’s firmness in
implementing the concept of al-amr bi al-ma‘ru>f wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar,
something they said could not be done by NU so far.
If they then join the FPI’s movement, it means that they do not
perform any betrayals of the NU’s principles because NU, as an
http://www.nuonline.com, Jun 5th, 2008, accessed on February 3rd, 2011;
http://www.seputarjatim.com, Jun 4th, 2004, accessed on February 3rd, 2011.
24
25
80
http://www.tabloidposmo.com, August 10th, 2006, accessed on February 3rd, 2011.
Islamic organization, believes that it should do an Islamic propagation
(da’wah Isla>mi>yah). Da‘wah al-Isla>miyyah in the sense of al-amr bi al-ma‘ru>f
wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar is also the teaching embraced by NU. So that,
principally, no conflict between NU and FPI. Therefore, al-amr bi alma‘ru>f wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar implemented by FPI can be accepted by
NU. What distinguishes is about the method of implementation of the
concept. In this case, NU explicitly rejects violent methods commonly
performed by FPI, for example, raiding over cafes, nightclubs and
other amusement centre, destroying places of worship of other groups,
and attacking groups indicated defaming Islam.
This was in line with the statement made by Deputy Secretary of
PCNU Bangkalan, M. Fawwaz Toyyib Muslim:
As a member of NU, I do not agree with anarchy or
violence on the name of Islam which frequently committed
by those groups. I do not mention who those groups are.
But anyway, I do not agree with violence on the name of
Islam because Islam is rah}matan li al-‘a>lami>n. So, if violence is
chosen as a way, which one is called Islam as rah}matan li al‘a>lami>n? Besides, our country is democracy, so any problem
occurs is at the hand of the authorities to settle. We are not
allowed to do or judge someone whose thinking is
different.26
Reason of preventing violence in preaching is also the the reason
why NU leaders want to get involved in, even to be a leader of, FPI
Bangkalan. NU leaders cannot accept violence on the name of Islam as
was done by FPI. So, when FPI entered into Bangkalan, the options
were to decline or to domesticate it. Apparently, the latter option was
taken. Kyai Fahrillah Aschal agreed to be the chairman of FPI
Bangkalan by the reason for not providing opportunities for FPI to do
violence in Bangkalan.
Once I asked Kyai Fahri, “Kyai, why do you agree to be the
chairman of FPI?” Kyai Fahri said: “If it is not me who hold
FPI, this organization will be joined by others who might
not be kyais. And it might be held by thugs. If it is they
holding the FPI, it might always confront to kyais. So, when
it is held by me, I do not think that FPI is radical.” He
added: “The reason why I (Kyai Fahri) agree to become the
26
Interview with Toyyib Fawwaz Muslim, March 5th, 2011.
81
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
Chairman of FPI is due to the consideration not to give an
opportunity to FPI applying violence in Madura. Thus,
when FPI is held by me, there is nothing violent in
Bangkalan, because we are favoring more onto dialogue.”
Well, because the community asked Kyai Fahri to become
the Chairman of NU, he released his position in FPI, and it
was then handed over to Kyai Khon Tobroni in 2007.27
From the above explanation it is obvious that the strategy which is
taken by the NU leaders is de-radicalization from within. By looking at
the influence of Kyai Fahrillah Aschal, FPI Bangkalan has to think
twice in committing violence as happens elsewhere. If such a very
influential kyai is willing to do violence, the impact can be highly
counterproductive since he has so many adherents. The moderate
vision of the two kyais leads to a very minimal use of violence by FPI
Bangkalan. In fact, since it was held by Kyai Khon Tobroni, FPI
Bangkalan has been idle in terms of its movement.
However, to say that FPI Bangkalan never employs violence is also
incorrect. The testimony of several people suggested that FPI
Bangkalan has done few sweeping to amusement places, particularly
when FPI was under the leadership of Kyai Fahrillah Aschal. T. F.
Muslim’s statements below illustrate the behavior of FPI under the
control of NU’s figures.
Well, that’s no coincidence that IPNU has commissariat in
almost all Islamic boarding schools. So, if there are any
actions, they will automatically attend, like sweepings...
Because he (Kyai Fahrillah Aschal, The first Chairman of
FPI Bangkalan) is a very influential and also has many
students and followers. Under his control, FPI was ever
large and often appeared to make sweeping in illicit places,
such as cafes, nightclubs in the square, and the back of the
stadium.28
27
Interview with Toyyib Fawwaz Muslim, March 5th, 2011.
Interview with the Branch Chairman of IPNU Bangkalan, M. Wahid, Maret 5th,
2011; “Ra Fahrillah, before he became the head of NU, had also been the head of FPI.
FPI under the leadership of Ra Fahrillah experienced rapid development, it never
performed demonstrations, once moral call was heard by the House of representative
in Bangkalan in the public hearing,” Said Sonhaji, the Branch Chairman of PMII
Bangkalan (Interview, March 4th, 2011).
28
82
It can be stated here that FPI Bangkalan under the leadership of
Kyai Fahrillah Aschal had made several sweepings as the cases of FPI
elsewhere. Nevertheless, it was just very controlled action, so they did
not do any damaging violence. The absence of an open clash could
also be understood since Kyai Fahrillah Aschal had a lot of followers
and a very wide influence. Consequently, his movement and action
received approval from NU and Muslims in Bangkalan in general.
If one thinks that a positive attitude towards FPI is only among the
older generation, he or she could be wrong. The younger generations
of NU Bangkalan also have a good assessment of the existence of FPI
in Bangkalan. Below is a view of the figures of PMII (Indonesian
Islamic Students Movement) Bangkalan, a student organization which
is theologically affiliated to NU, and that of the figures of IPNU (NU
Student Association), who are directly under NU.
I think FPI Bangkalan is very well so far, and its existence is
highly accepted by the community because the majority of
people in Bangkalan are the pesantren’s students (santri). FPI
is very nice and helpful in Bangkalan because it serves as
moral control in Bangkalan. In addition, the majority of
FPI’s figures in Bangkalan are also from the figures of NU
like Kyai Badrus Sholeh, the current FPI’s Chairman. He is
also a prominent leader of NU.... An average Madurese also
agree with the FPI’s presence here, they are a moral
community control.29
...I do not agree with violence, but I agree with the presence
of FPI here. It is because there must be a stringent Islamic
organization like FPI so that people do not violate the rules
but they follow the rules.... I personally accept FPI but it
should not run an anarchic way. Even, there should be a
group and community who support the existence of an
organization like FPI. That is not to cause casualties,
particularly those who are not guilty. The case of people’s
misguided belief is their own problem and they should be
responsible for themselves. So, FPI should be more
dialogical. Meaning, by running dialogue, FPI will not be
considered as an anarchist. And the point is that there
29
Interview with the Branch Chairman of PMII Bangkalan, Sonhaji, March 4th, 2011.
83
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
should be FPI in Indonesia because no one dares to do like
that.30
Taking those statements above into account, what we can see from
the background of FPI’s coming and growth in Bangkalan is a story of
an encounter of the two entities that had been considered impossible
to meet. Since the beginning, FPI was very closely hand in hand with
local leaders of NU. Holding local figures of NU is an accurate strategy
that cannot be ignored if FPI wants to exist and thrive in Bangkalan.
This strategy proves to have succeeded so far.
The entire terrace leaders of FPI Bangkalan are very influential
kyais of NU Bangkalan. They are the leaders of pesantren (Islamic
boarding school) that have hundreds, even thousands of students as
well as the devout followers in community. Not surprisingly, it can be
said that the FPI’s members are the students and the people who have
claimed themselves as NU followers and who have great obedience to
kyais. Most of the people accept and view positively the existence of
FPI. Moderate Islam and radical Islam thus have met. As quoted at the
beginning of this paper, a progressive youth of NU amazed and
murmured, “What sign is this?”
The Encounter between Islamists and Traditional Islam: A
Theoretical Reflection
By looking at this phenomenon, we need to re-question the
segregation of radical Islam and moderate Islam. Nowadays, radical
Islam and moderate Islam are deemed as two separate entities.
Integrating both is assumed to be impossible. Assumption like this is
denying the sociological fact that the two groups live in the same social
environment that can lead them to establish contact which influence
each other. At least, the connectedness of the two groups could be
caused by two things: a conservative attitude of the two groups in
treating political and social situation in which they live.
Conservative character of traditional Islam can be seen from the
figures or sometimes also referred to as the traditional Islamic scholars.
The kyai is known for a very high commitment to the heritage of
classical Islamic scholarship which was formulated by the scholars in
the formative era of Islamic sciences. With moral and scientific
Interview with M. Wahid, the Branch Chairman of IPNU Bangkalan, period 20092011, March 5th, 2011.
30
84
qualifications they have, these scholars become the axis for the
understanding of Islam and the movement among traditional Islam.
These scholars were educated Muslims from the traditional Islamic
educational institutions, which in Indonesia is often referred to as
pesantren. They are experts in the field of classical Islamic sciences.
Therefore, they assume themselves as the most authoritative one to
speak on behalf of Islam. One of the characteristics of the scholars is a
very strong determination to preserve the legacy of the classical Islamic
scholarship.31
Muhammad Qasim Zaman exemplifies the scholar’s attitude of
this kind to the case of a Muslim scholar in Pakistan, Mawlana
Muhammad Taqi ‘Uthmani. He asserts that the meaning of jihad
includes aggression against non-Muslim nations. This answer is likely
to be the radical understanding of Islam among Muslims. But, this
assumption is completely wrong because these scholars only want to
preserve the meaning of jihad as embodied in the books of classical
Islamic heritage of great scholars of Islam in the past.32
Here, it can be said that the traditional Muslim scholar is a
conservative in terms of doctrine. However, he is not radical in the
sense of radical Islamism because he did not commit any violence in
his movement.
On the other hand, Islamists are people or groups who treat Islam
as an ideology of social and political movement. Some of them are
educated from modern educational institutions, not from Islamic
institutions. They have a strong commitment to implement Islamic law
literally. For this group, Islam is believed to have provided technical
guidelines for all aspects of life. Islamic commitment and literal
understanding of the doctrine of Islam bring them into Muslim religiopolitical activists who seek to build a society and an Islamic state in the
modern era according to what the Prophet practiced in the past. The
group is also called fundamentalist, revivalist, or radical Islamist, in
which the latter is loaded with nuance of violence.
In many cases, the relationship between Islamists and Muslim
traditionalists is complex and contradictory. The Islamists accuse
traditional Muslim scholars as the people who do not know the
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Pluralism, Democracy, and the Ulama,” in Robert W.
Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democaratization (Princeton
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 69.
31
32
Ibid., pp. 68-69.
85
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
problems of modern life. Knowledge of the classical scholars is
deemed having no connection with the problems of society and is
unable to resolve the problems of the people. On the other hand, the
traditional Muslim scholars accuse the Islamists as not qualified to
interpret Islamic teachings so that they are not qualified to speak on
behalf of Islam.
Activism, in socio-political issues, is a substance to distinguish
between the Muslim scholars and the Islamists. The Islamists tend to
be an activist who attempt to implement Islamic law as it is spelled out
in the classical Islamic books. Whereas, Muslim scholars just treat it as
a classical Islamic heritage that must be preserved. This attitude is
frequently called as “theoretical defense.”
Even so, there is a chance where the two groups come closer and
work together. As mentioned above, both Muslim scholars and
Islamists are essentially conservative. Both put liberal Muslims as their
common enemy. The presence of liberal Islamic movement is
considered endangering the basic principles of Islam. No wonder if
one of the issues that unites conservative from the two groups is the
limit of human’s reason in understanding Islam. According to Muslim
scholars and Islamists, the human’s reason is only allowed to operate
outside of what has been revealed by God. “And on this, the Islamists
and ùlama>’ are in complete agreement,” said Zaman.33
Not surprisingly, if a youth of NU sees Islam in the perspective of
rational approach based on modern values it will contrast to those of
NU’s older generations. This is what we can see in Aliman Harish’s
figure, a youth of NU graduated from IAIN (State Institute for Islamic
Studies) and was the former activist of PMII Surabaya, and he is now
active in a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in the framework
of strengthening democracy in society.
He could not accept the fact that NU could be hand in hand with
the FPI. He also could not accept the state intervention in the religious
affairs of the people, an attitude which is clearly in contrast to NU.
This attitude seems to be at odds with the strong endorsement of NU
towards the FPI in Bangkalan. The argument used in looking at the
issues of function of the state and religious freedom is also very
different from those used by the NU’s management.
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 172.
33
86
I also wonder why the kyais in Madura are so close to FPI,
so I guess that it is a must or for granted since the elderly
kyais here learn from the classical books of the classical
Muslim scholars in which they also teach what is
championed by the FPI. The kyais in Madura are childish. I
truly do not agree with the violent ways as practiced because
our country is based on constitution. No right for everyone
to judge someone who is considered to be different from
his. In East Java, in general, the government or the
Governor, Soekarwo, shows that they are in a depressed
position and lose from the violent groups. As the
publication of Governor’s regulation (East Java Governor
Decree on the prohibition of the Ahmadiyya’s activities in
East Java), I think that this is precisely the government’s
attempt to legalize violence. I do not agree with the violent
methods used by the FPI as a whole because our country is
a constitutional state and does not justify any violence in the
name of anything. It is only because Ahamadiyah is
considered a misguided sect then its followers are not
allowed to live in Indonesia? MUI’s fatwa (legal opinion) said
that Governor Decree was forgetting the other sides, such
as brotherhood and so on...34
Thus, conservatism is what makes the traditional ùlama>’ (Muslim
scholars) and Islamists unite and fight against liberal Muslims who are
considered endangering Islam. Without realizing it, the excessive
exposure of Islamic thought developed by liberal Islam has an impact
on the fusion of the Islamists and the traditional Muslim scholars.
Merging the two would generate thought and Islamic movement to be
complementary to each other. The Islamists will gain theological
legitimacy of the Muslim scholars, on the contrary the, Muslim
scholars will support the Islamists’ ideas.
The unity of both bring the Muslim scholars begin to enter the
modern issues that have been the concentration among the Islamists,
such as the resistance to Western values, secular rationalism that are
deemed hostile to Islamic norms, the implementation of shari>’ah as a
positive law, and so on. They oppose the promises offered by secular
ideologies, such as liberalism, nationalism and socialism which are
considered just nonsense. They perceive liberal Muslims as an agent of
Interview with Aliman Harish, the Branch Chairman of ANSOR Bangkalan and
Director of Leksdam (Board of Social Studies and Democracy), March 4th, 2011.
34
87
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
all these secular ideologies. They also struggled to start Islamizing the
country by offering shari>‘ah as the solution to all problems inflicting the
nation.35
The weakness of legitimacy and political control of the
government is another factor that encourages Muslim scholars
(ùlama>’) to be more active in politics. Green’s studies on attitudes and
political behavior of the Muslim scholars in Tunisia concluded that one
of the important variables that determined political behavior of the
Muslim scholars was the government’s control. If the government has
effective and strong control over society, Muslim scholars will tend to
be passive. On the contrary, if the government does not have effective
control, the leadership of the society will be taken over by scholars.36
Thus, the involvement of scholars into practical politics depends on
the strength or weakness of government’s control and legitimacy over
the society.
The fusion between the Muslim scholars and Islamists in Pakistan
and Indonesia confirms such a matter. After Pakistan was formed, the
government was still unstable. The first issue that arose was the place
of Islam in Pakistan and non-Muslims status. Secular and liberal
Muslims preferred to make Pakistan a secular state by making the UK
as a model, while the Muslim scholars and Islamists wanted Islam as
the ideology of state. Traditional ùlama>’ and Islamists wanted a
theocracy, in which the state of Pakistan should be run based on the
principles of Islam as political theory of Islam as set out in the classical
works.37
In Indonesia, the convergence between traditional Muslims and
Islamists occurred in two periods. The first period was after its
independence when the traditional Muslim scholars were working with
Masyumi to make Islam as the ideology of the state. The second period
was after the fall of Soeharto. Making Indonesia comes closer to Islam
is one of the issues offered by the traditional Muslims and Islamists on
35
Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, pp. 171-172.
Arnold H. Green, “Political Attitudes and Activities of the Ulama in the Liberal Age:
Tunisia as an Exceptional Case,” in Abubaker A. Bagader (ed.), The Ulama in the Modern
Muslim Nation-State (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1983), p.
172.
36
Ahmad Aziz, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964 (London, Bombay,
Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 238-241.
37
88
the grounds that the secular Indonesia has failed to provide the public
goods for its people.
In both cases, government’s control and legitimacy are weak since
they were being in their transition period. This situation provides an
opportunity for Muslim scholars entering the field of practical politics
as a form of the sense of responsibility to guide the people. And when
the kyais entered into the arena of practical politics, they have been
hailed by the Islamists. Consequently, these two groups fuse with the
mutual doctrine and movement reinforcing to one another.
Radicalization-De-radicalization: The Price of an Encounter
As stated before, the encounter between moderate Islam and
radical Islam is possible because of the same view. Both make classical
Islamic discourse as an Islamic ideal to be realized at this time if we
want to build an ideal Muslim society. It is merely the ideal classical
Islam which was originally a moral appeal among the traditional ùlama’>
that could turn into a blue print in political movements. The traditional
ùlama>’ that were apolitical turned to be active politically by performing
missionary movements that used political instruments.
The changes in this movement occur when two prerequisites are
met. First, the specific political situation in which traditional Islamic
force has been able to control the political posts. Second, there is an
encounter with Islamic force which is able to articulate Islamic ideals in
terms of classical and modern political movements.
In Bangkalan, the two prerequisites are fulfilled. Currently, both
legislative and executive bodies are controlled by politicians from NU.
Meanwhile, FPI has entered into Bangkalan and has closely linked
since the beginning, even indistinguishable, with NU. Both have
brought traditional ùlama>’ shifting their preaching activity from a
politically inactive moral appeal to a more political missionary
movement.
This phenomenon actually represents the mainstream Islamic
political view that sees Islam as di>n (religion) and dawlah (state). Political
view that puts Islam as a primary reference is not able to avoid
separating between Muslim citizens and non-Muslim citizens, where
the latter is treated as the second class. This principle is diametrically in
contrast with the principles of democratic governance, in which all
citizens have the same status and are treated equally. Law is built on
89
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
the common grounds, and is not based on arguments of religious
belief.38
The principle of democracy is seen as an instance of secularism
which is strongly opposed by both traditional Muslims and radical
Islamists. On the other hand, the liberal Muslims view that the state
should be managed according to the principles of modern democracy
because it is only by democracy any form of discrimination can be
avoided. Liberal Muslims also try to interpret Islam on the perspective
of human rights. Likewise, they maintain that freedom of religion is the
most fundamental right that must be recognized, including here is the
right to convert, a view that is not accepted by the traditional and the
radical Muslims alike who base their understanding on the formulation
of the classical Islamic jurisprudence that applies capital punishment
for those who leave Islam.
If the traditional ùlama>’ can still meet with radical Islamic groups
as bounded by the same Islamic and political views, so that between
the traditional ùlama>’ and liberal Muslim scholars do not have any
association except for the spirit of nonviolence. This is what we see
today when the radical Islamic forces advanced, Islamic movements
that promote democracy and human rights find themselves a minority.
When the radical Muslims have joined with the traditional Muslims,
they have turned into a majority Muslim force. Under these
circumstances, it is no longer relevant to assume that radical Islam is a
minority.
On the other hand, the attitude of the view that the relationship
between radical Islam and moderate Islam is a unidirectional
relationship in which the latter merely simplifies the complexity of the
Masdar Hilmy discussed the problem of the relationship between political theory of
Islam and democracy by dividing it into three categories: Huwaydian (a concept
developed by Fahmi Huwaydi, who put Islam as compatible with democratic
principles), Mawdudian (a concept developed by Mawdudi, who accepted democracy,
but put Islam as the main reference), and Qutbian (a concept developed by Sayyid
Qutb, who completely rejected the concept of democracy as it was considered as
contrary to Islamic infidels). See Masdar Hilmy, “Muslims’ Approaches to Democracy:
Islam and Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia,” Journal of Indonesian Islam, vol. 01,
no.01 (June 2007), pp. 56-68; the same problem was also discussed by Bahtiar Effendy.
He divided it into two groups: textual approaches to Islam which regard democracy as
incompatible with Islam, and substantial approach that sees Islam and Muslims based
on a basic concept in accordance with the principles of modern democracy. Bahtiar
Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), chapter I.
38
90
object appears to be the case. The opposite view does not give any
help in explaining this phenomenon. It is simply questionable to
assume that since the moderate Islam is the majority, the closeness
between the two would make the radical Islam idle.
Every meeting of two similar groups will always bear a mutual
relationship and mutual influence. The greatness of NU has no
significant value in the encounter among FPI’s, NU’s, and the
pesantren’s leaders in Bangkalan. This encounter is more determined by
the bargaining power of each character that occurs not because of a
formal collaboration among NU, FPI, and pesantren. Moreover, the
reality also shows that most of the NU members are passive and silent
majority, while the FPI members are very active. As a result, to
consider that NU will dominate the encounter with FPI should be
questioned seriously.
In the context of this meeting, it is clear that FPI leaders cannot be
underestimated, both in terms of their knowledge of Islam and their
insights on the existing socio-political situation. Figures gathered in
Bangkalan could be said to have the same degree of scientific
qualifications. On the other hands, Rizieq Shihab’s capability in the
field of classical Islamic scholarship represents a pride among the
traditional Muslims that cannot be ignored.
Rizieq Shihab is clearly less charismatic than Fahrillah Aschal in
the eyes of Bangkalan Muslims. Precisely because of Fahrillah Aschal’s
charisma, so that Rizieq approaches him to establish FPI in Bangkalan.
Nevertheless, Rizieq obviously has other advantages, namely network,
experience in organizing movement, access to politicians and media.39
In this case, Rizieq will be able to put himself as a mentor in the
movement.
Conclusion
By looking at various things, then the encounter between NU and
FPI in Bangkalan will take effect in both directions. In less balanced
degrees, NU becomes both the subject and object, so does FPI. NU
As previously predicted by Liddle, the scriptural Muslims would have huge political
resources after the fall of Suharto. This prediction was based on the fact that they had
access to the alliance and, in addition, were supported by politicians, media, and
organizations. See R. William Liddle, “Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Satu Bentuk
Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam Masa OrdeBaru,” translated by Ahmad Sahal and
Saiful Mujani, in R. William Liddle, Islam, Politik dan Modernisasi (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar
Harapan, 1997), p. 126.
39
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Ahmad Zainul Hamdi
cannot completely change FPI into NU in other cloth. In contrast, FPI
cannot freely push NU to apply its agendas.
For those who want NU remains moderate, they may be
disappointed. The reality shows that the inclusion of FPI into NU’s
community brings about increased radicalization within NU. As data
has suggested, since the existence of FPI in Bangkalan, there have been
several sweepings on illicit places. The flag used is FPI, but mostly the
perpetrators are kyais with their students.
On the other hand, for those who want NU shifts to be as radical
as FPI, so that there will be no difference between both of them, they
will also be disappointed. Since the beginning, Fahrillah stated that he
would hold FPI in Bangkalan precisely to reduce the potential of
violence and would not allow it to be face-to-face with NU and
pesantren. Despite several time sweepings, the FPI’s movement was
away from radical, if its radicalism is measured and identified with
violence, as FPI has done so far elsewhere.
What can be stated here is that the proximity of FPI and NU in
Bangkalan bears de-radicalization and radicalization. The deradicalization happens in the body of FPI when compared to the FPI’s
basic character as radical Islam to act violence everywhere. Meanwhile,
radicalization occurs in the body of NU when compared to the NU’s
basic character as a moderate Islamic organization which is away from
violence in preaching Islam. Perhaps, this is the price to be paid in
every encounter. []
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Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS,
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http://www.seputarjatim.com
95
ISLAM, POLITICS AND IDENTITY IN WEST SUMATRA
Delmus Puneri Salim
STAIN Manado - Indonesia
Abstract: Since Indonesia has undergone a decentralisation
phase, its regions have searched for their local identities. In
West Sumatra, for instance, Islam is dominant. Consequently, there has been a constant attempt to infuse Islamic
values into social, political and economic aspects. The
paper seeks to contextualise the key phases in the history of
West Sumatra in the broader history of the archipelago and
the Malay world, and to show how key events in West
Sumatra and at the national level set the parameters for
later debates about Islam and identity in the region. The
paper argues that now, as in the past, the relationship
between Islam, a global religion, and Minangkabau culture
was, and is, simultaneously contested. It is also found that
Islam as an ideology was subordinated after Independence
days, and again under the New Order. The strong
association between Islam and regional identity only
solidified in the post-Suharto. Now, regional governments
has been utilising claims that local customs are based on
Islam and Islam is based on the Qur’an.
Keywords: Sufism, orthodoxy, Minangkabau, Malay world.
Introduction
Before the arrival of Islam, The Minangkabau people believed a
South Indian version of Hindu-Buddhism brought to the region by
Indian merchants in the third and fourth centuries.1They are also a
matrilineal society in which ancestral property such as land and houses
arepassed down from mothers to daughters. Kinship is also based
around the female line.
I. Manan, “A Short History of Minangkabau,” in A. Summerfield and J. Summerfield
(eds), Walk in Splendor: Ceremonial Dress and the Minangkabau (Los Angeles: UCLA
Fowler Museum of Cultural History, 1999), p. 50.
1
Published by the Institute for the Study of Religion and Society (LSAS)and the Postgraduate Program (PPs), the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Sunan Ampel Surabaya - Indonesia
Islam, Politics and Identity in West Sumatra
In the seventh century, Sumatra was very much part of the Malay
world (Alam Melayu). That world was based around the powerful and
prosperous Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of Srivijaya, based in Bukit
Seguntang in Palembang, and Melayu, which was associated with the
Batang Hari River in Jambi.2 In the eleventh century, after the collapse
of Srivijaya, and in a period when international trade between India
and China through the Straits of Malacca came to be dominated by the
Cholas of India, the term Melayu referred to interior areas in Jambi.3 In
the fourteenth century, Melayu appeared in Javanese literature, where it
referred to an area that extended to other territories such as Lampung,
Pattani in modern Thailand, Kelantan in Malaysia and the
Minangkabau region of West Sumatra.4 In that same century, Malacca,
a region made prosperous by its position at the centre of key trading
routes, emerged as the new centre of the Malay world. Because of the
establishment of the kingdom of Malacca, the name Melayu and its
defining characteristics such as dress, language and religion became
associated with Malacca Malays.5 When Malacca became a powerful
Muslim state in the same century, Islam came to be identified with
Malay culture. This connection then began the association of Islam
with the Malay people.6 While a Hindu-Buddhist Minangkabau
kingdom was established in 1347 by Adityawarman, a prince from the
post-Srivijaya kingdom of Dharmasyraya who was raised in the
Javanese kingdom of Majapahit,7 those living in the coastal areas of
West Sumatra identified themselves as Malays rather than Minangkabau, as a result of the influence of the Malaccan Malays.8
L.Y. Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness,” Archipel, 61 no. 1
(2001), p. 31.
2
3
Ibid.
A. Reid, “Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities,”
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 32 (2001): pp. 295-313.
4
5
Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness,” p. 33
E. Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class in the Indonesian Social and Political
Struggles,” Social Compass, 31 no. 1 (1984), p. 31.
6
F. Colombijn, Paco-paco (kota) Padang: Sejarah Sebuah Kota di Indonesia pada abad ke 20
dan Penggunaan Ruang Kota (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Ombak, 2006), p. 55.
7
J. Drakard, A. Malay Frontier: Unity and Duality in A Sumatran Kingdom (New York:
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990), p. 11.
8
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Delmus Puneri Salim
Scholars have proposed a number of theories to explain the
conversion of the Malay world to Islam. Al-Attas argues that Islam was
introduced directly by Arabs to Malay Sumatra in the seventh century,
citing a Chinese report of the existence of an Arab settlement in East
Sumatra in 674, the earliest known record of probable Muslim
settlement in Malay Sumatra. Others argue that Islam came to the
Malay world from India in the twelfth century, citing the existence of
international maritime trade routes, the commonality of schools of
jurisprudence and the similarity of gravestones and literary styles and
themes between India and the Malay world as evidence for this theory.
Others say that Islam came from India to Sumatra at the end of the
thirteenth century through the kingdoms of Pasai and Perlak.9 What is
clear is that in the fourteenth century, the laws of Malacca (Undangundang Melaka) used the term ‘Kanun’ (Arabic qanun) meaning
administrative law, as used in the Ottoman Empire, and the Pasai
chronicle of Aceh also frequently invokes both the terms ‘adat’ (from
the Arabic ‘a>dah), meaning customs, and ‘Kanun’.10
Importantly also, merchant Arabs from the Hadramaut (now
Yemen and Oman), who had visited and settled in Malay Sumatra
before the seventeenth century, settled in the Straits of Malacca and
what is now called South Sumatra, from the late seventeenth century.11
Many reformist Muslims in the Malay world, such as Nuruddin AlRaniri and Sayyid Abd Al-Samad Palimbani, were of Hadramaut
descent.12 This contact continued into the early twentieth century,
when Ahmad Surkati taught Islam at various schools in Batavia
(Jakarta). By the early twentieth century, there were more than twenty
thousand Hadramauti Arabs in the archipelago.13
9
Andaya, “Aceh’s Contribution to Standards of Malayness,” p. 36.
A.C. Milner, “Islam and Malay Kingship,” Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, 113 (1981),
p. 47.
10
W. Roff. The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964),
p. 81.
11
Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Global dan Lokal: Islam Nusantara (Bandung: Mizan, 2002),
p. 139.
12
A. Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of Sumatra (Singapore:
Singapore University Press, 2005), p. 230.
13
98
The Arrival of Sufism
Sufism, which came to Malay Sumatra via the trading routes
between various parts of Asia and the Middle East, was an important
element in the introduction of Islam to the Malay world. Sufi Islam
emphasised the belief that it is possible to have direct experience of
God or direct communication with God under the guidance of
charismatic leaders.14 The mystical expression of the Islamic faith has
both an intellectual dimension, consisting of Sufi teaching, and an
organisational dimension called t}ari>qah (tarekat in Indonesian), or
brotherhood.15
Sufi traders used Islam as a means of establishing cooperation with
local chiefs and the merchant class. Because of the dominance of trade
in the region, the centres of religious power were at the same time
centres of economic power.16 As Utrecht points out, Islam took hold
fastest among the trader class.17 Wealthy merchants had the means to
fund the education of their children and to fulfil the religious
obligation to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca, which consequently
brought them into closer contact with Islam.18 Sufism was, however,
subsequently transmitted through other channels, as Sufi teachers
married the daughters of Malay Indonesian nobility, which mean that
their children had royal blood and therefore were well-placed to spread
Islam.19
14
1
J.S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.
J. Voll, “Foreword.” in Trimingham, The Sufi Orders, vii; Howell argues that the
term Sufi has many different meanings. It can be associated with devotional practices
and religious concepts that are quite separate from Sufism’s common association with
mysticism. See J.D. Howell, “Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival,” The Journal of
Asian Studies, 60 no. 3 (2001): pp. 701-729.
15
Kahane, among others, has pointed out that economic interests, not purely religious
motives, enhanced the spread of Islam into the Malay archipelago. See, R. Kahane,
“Religious Diffusion and Modernisation: A Preliminary Reflection on The Spread of
Islam in Indonesia and Its Impact on Social Change,” European Journal of Sociology, 21
no. 1 (1980): pp. 116-137.
16
17
Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class,” p. 33.
H.M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (New
York: Ithaca Cornell University, 1970), p. 7.
18
H. Johns, “Sufism as A Category in Indonesian Literature and History,” Journal of
Southeast Asian History, 2, no. 2 (1961), p. 17.
19
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Delmus Puneri Salim
The nature of Sufism played an important role in the acceptance of
Islam in Malay Sumatra. Johns argues that the Sufis who preached
Islam in the region ‘were prepared to preserve continuity with the past
and to use the terms and elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamic
context’.20 As Sufi Islam did not challenge local animist beliefs, it could
penetrate the Malay world in a peaceful way. At the same time,
however, some scholars argue that Sufi Islam created a new identity in
the Malay world,21 serving as ‘a liberation creed’ against the feudalism
of the Hindu society and caste system imported from India and
institutionalised under the Hindu kingdoms.22 Islam also provided local
rulers with a consensual basis upon which to engage with Muslim
merchants in coastal towns.23 According to Woodward,24 the majority
of the population, notably the lower classes in urban centres, were
eager to liberate themselves from the caste system, quickly embracing
the idea of equality before God and Sufism’s emphasis on merit
instead of inherited status. However, as other scholars have pointed
out, the ruling classes did not only convert to Islam themselves, but
also encouraged the general populace to do so as well.25
Sufi Muslim merchants from Gujarat and Persia began visiting
West Sumatra in the thirteenth century, establishing trade links
through the gold industry. Gold traders from both the west and east
coasts of Sumatra carried Sufi Islam with them to the Minangkabau
highlands and the centres of the gold trade became the first to be
converted to Islam.26 Three centuries later, one of the Minangkabau
kings converted to Islam.27 Conversion took place on a large scale in
the seventeenth century, when a Sufi centre was established in Ulakan
20
Ibid., p. 15.
Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class,”; M. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety
and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989).
21
22
Utrecht, “The Muslim Merchant Class,” p. 30.
23
Kahane, “Religious Diffusion and Modernisation,” p. 130.
24
Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety.
25
Johns, “Sufism as A Category”.
C. Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784-184
(London: Curzon Press, 1983), p. 119.
26
27
J. Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs (London: Cornell University Press, 2008b), p. 977.
100
in the district of present-day Padang Pariaman.28 Syaikh Burhanuddin,
known as the Tuanku (religious leader) of Ulakan, was the first Sufi
teacher of the tarekat organisation, Syattariyah, in Ulakan.29
The Influence of Orthodoxy
The hold of Sufism in West Sumatra was not to go unchallenged.
Changes in the wider Islamic world and their continuing impact on
Malay Muslims gradually affected the form of Islam in the region. The
modern reform movement only became influential in the nineteenth
century, but orthodox Islam began infiltrating Sumatra as early as the
seventeenth century. The first orthodox Muslim preacher in Malay
Sumatra was Nuruddin al-Raniri, from Randir in Gujarat, who had
studied Islam in Mecca before travelling to Aceh in 1637.30 Raniri
favoured the orthodoxy that he had learned in the Middle East over
the Sufi mysticism that had its roots in India, and he set about
spreading the teachings of a more shari’a-oriented Islam.31
According to van Dijck,32 the introduction of orthodox Islam into
the Malay world marked the beginning of a new chapter in the
relationship between Islam and the state, in which Islam became a
considerable source of social tension, ranging from dissatisfaction with
indigenous symbols, rebellion against local rulers, to all-out war. The
most important of these conflicts in West Sumatra was the Paderi war,
which took place between 1803 and 1837. It was initiated by West
Sumatran pilgrims returning from Mecca, who sought to implement
J. Hadler, “A Historiography of Violence and the Secular State in Indonesia: Tuanku
Imam Bondjol and the Uses of History,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 67 no. 3 (2008a),
p. 977.
28
Taufik Abdullah, “Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau,”
Indonesia 2, no. 1 (1966): pp. 1-24. There is some disagreement on this. According alAttas, the Acehnese Syaikh Abdullah Arif, Sheikh Burhanuddin’s teacher, introduced
Islam into Padang Pariaman in West Sumatra in the seventeenth century. See, S.M.N.
Al-Attas, Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of the Islamization of The Malay-Indonesian
Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka. 1969).
29
Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of MalayIndonesian and Middle Eastern ‘Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2004).
30
31
Ibid., p. 63
C. van Dijck, “Islam and Socio-Political Conflicts in Indonesian History,” Social
Compass, 31, no. 1 (1984), p. 8.
32
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Delmus Puneri Salim
the principles of Wahhabism they had encountered in Saudi Arabia
over the way Islam was practised their homeland. The term itself was
derived from Pedir or Pidie, the part of Aceh where Malays set out on
and returned from the pilgrimage.33
According to Dobbin,34 the Paderi war exploited changing
economic and social relations among the Minangkabau. The collapse
of the existing cash economy, which had been based on gold mining,
led to the emergence of a new system based on the cultivation of
coffee, which transformed economic and political relationships
between and within villages. The wealthy were thrown into turmoil by
the collapse of the gold industry at precisely the same time that it
became possible for those at the bottom of the economic ladder to
cultivate coffee in the hills on common village lands without the need
for large investments. This gave rise to a group of ‘new rich’ farmers
eager to challenge the economic order.35 Before the Paderi war, an
emerging leader of this group, Tuanku Nan Tuo, had taken steps to
secure trading routes by promoting Islamic regulations and
confronting those responsible for robberies and other forms of
misconduct.36 According to Dobbin,37 the introduction of Islamic
regulations also made it possible for leaders such as Tuanku Nan Tuo
to claim the land necessary for coffee cultivation from traditional
landholders, thus further cementing the new economic order.
The Paderi movement emerged in these newly rich coffee villages.
It sought to challenge the entrenched positions of wealthy traditional
leaders, aiming to replace what its followers perceived to be a corrupt
traditional order with the laws of Islam.38 The movement’s most
prominent leader was Peto Syarif, who became better known as
Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Establishing a fortress in Bonjol, the Paderi
movement flourished for thirty-five years, before the Dutch, acting in
support of the traditional order, finally took full control of the
Minangkabau heartlands in 1837. The Paderi leaders were subsequently
33
Ibid., p. 10.
34
Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy.
35
van Dijck, “Islam and Socio-Political Conflicts,” p. 9.
36
Ibid., p. 10.
37
Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy, pp. 127-8.
38
102
captured and exiled,39 bringing the Paderi movement to an end.
However, some Paderi leaders joined the tarekat Naqsabandiyah,
which later attacked the Sufi tarekat, Syatariyah.40
By attacking the authority of traditional leaders, the Paderi
movement also attacked an interpretation of Islam, since customary
law (adat) and Islam had influenced one another for centuries, and
both had come to incorporate elements of the other.41 West Sumatra’s
adat leaders were also Muslims, albeit superficial and heterodox in the
eyes of the Paderi movement. Indeed, the complexities of the Paderi
war point to the fact that adat and Islam may be interpreted differently,
and each may be used for political or economic gain.42
Islamic Politics under the Dutch
The Dutch, who had an interest in gaining control over the coffee
trade, sided with traditional adat leaders against the Paderi
movement.43 They continued to favour the adat leaders, promising
them taxation concessions in the 1833 Long Declaration (Plakat
Panjang), which abolished a cultivation system in favour of a direct
tax.44 This enabled the Paderi movement to identify adat leaders as
friends of the enemy. Indeed, the term ‘Adat Basandi Syarak’ (local
customs are based on Syari’a), among the Minangkabau of West
Sumatra, was coined by Tuanku Imam Bonjol during the Paderi war
specifically in response to the Dutch positioning of adat as a superior
source of authority over Islam.45
39
Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy, pp. 193-206.
TaufikAbdullah, “Modernisation in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the
Early Decades of the Twentieth Century,” in C. Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p.203.
40
41
R. Biezeveld, “The Many Roles of Adat in West Sumatra,” in J.S. Davidsonand D.
Henley, The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: the Deployment of Adat from Colonialism
to Indigenism (London, New York: Routledge, 2007).
42
43
Ibid., p. 208.
A. Kahin, Rebellion to Integration: West Sumatra and the Indonesian Polity (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 1999), p. 25.
44
Hadler, “A Historiography of Violence,” p. 986. ‘Adat basandi Syarak, Syarak
basandi Adat’ was widely accepted as a form of compromise between Islamic and adat
leaders by 1837. See Hadler, Muslims and Matriarchs, p. 29.
45
103
Delmus Puneri Salim
In 1847, the Dutch appointed adat leaders in West Sumatra as
colonial agents charged with collecting the coffee harvest through
forced cultivation, in order to improve the collection and delivery of
this crop. At that time, the new position of ‘traditional leader
responsible for forced labour’ (panghulu suku rodi) was created to
implement the government’s coffee policies in many nagari, with the
salaries attached to the positions being a percentage of the coffee
production of their areas.46 When the Dutch introduced the Ethical
Policy at the end of the nineteenth century, local Muslims interpreted it
as not only being linked to the Dutch support for adat, but also as part
of the effort to undermine Islam and strengthen the position of
Christian missionaries.47
In 1914, the Nagari Ordinance was passed with the aim of reestablishing West Sumatra’s autonomous village communities and
recognising the right of adat leaders to hold authority in the nagari. 48
The Dutch also attempted to codify adat in 1929, using information
gathered from native customary law tribunals, the opinions of chiefs
and elders who were consulted by van Vollenhoven and other adat
scholars.49 The key issues at stake were those of marriage, divorce, and
inheritance, issues over which there was a real competition between
adat and Islamic law.
In the early twentieth century, attacks on traditionalist Islam in
West Sumatra were coming from the proponents of both secular
modernity and modernist Islam. In 1906, Datuk Sutan Maharaja
established a movement that promoted education for women on the
basis of their status in Minangkabau culture. In order to improve their
position, he established twelve schools for women and a feminist
newspaper, Sunting Melayu (Malay Ornament), which was edited by his
daughter, Ratna Djuita and later by Rohana Kudus, the ‘Kartini of
46
Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 26.
H.J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation
(The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 339.
47
48
M.A. Jaspan, “In Quest of New Law: The Perplexity of Legal Syncretism in
Indonesia,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 7 no. 3 (1965), p. 252.
49
104
West Sumatra’.50 In 1910, he went on to establish the Minangkabau
Union (Minangkabausche Bond) to unite all Minangkabau people
living in the darek and the rantau including Aceh and Negeri Sembilan.
At the same time, reformists Muslim led by those who had been
students of Syaikh Achmad Khatib in Mecca, such as Djamil Djambek
in Bukittinggi, Haji Abdullah Ahmad in Padang, Haji Rasul in Padang
Panjang, and Taib Umar in Batu Sangkar, among others, not only
challenged the adat-oriented interpretation of progress favoured by
Datuk Sutan Maharaja, but also attacked the heterodoxy of the Sufi
orders and the Minangkabau matrilineal inheritance system, arguing
that the former two ideas were heretical and the later was an
infringement of Sharia.51 Reformist Muslim ideas had spread in
Indonesia after the opening of Suez Canal in the nineteenth century,
which saw an increasing number of pilgrims travelling from the
archipelago to Mecca and Egypt. As Laffan has demonstrated, these
connections were crucial to the Indonesian nationalist movement
because they provided an alternative model to Europe for modernising
intellectuals.52
Influenced by the Young Turks movement in the Ottoman
Empire, a group of reformist Minangkabau Muslims called the Kaum
Muda (Group of the Young), set themselves up in opposition to the
Kaum Tua (Group of the Elders), a term they used to refer to the Sufi
orders.53 As in other parts of the Malay world, the reformists attacked
Sufi heterodoxy, urging a return to the Qur’a>n and the H{adi>th. They
also denounced Islamic practices which they saw as heterodox, for
example the way in which the Prophet’s birthday was celebrated. In the
case of the matrilineal system, however, the Kaum Muda compromised
Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: the Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (19271933) (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1971), p.
12.
50
Taufik Abdullah, “Islam, History, and Social Change in Minangkabau’, in L.L.
Thomas and F.V. Benda-Beckmann, Change and Continuity in Minangkabau: Local, regional
and Historical Perspectives on West Sumatra (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Centre for
International Studies, 1985), p. 141.
51
M. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds
(London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); See also, Azra, The Origins of Islamic
Reformism in Southeast Asia.
52
53
Abdullah, Schools and Politics, p. 16.
105
Delmus Puneri Salim
by suggesting that inheritance be divided into two categories, ‘high
inheritance’ (pusaka tinggi) or ‘ancestral inheritance’ (harto pusako) and
‘low inheritance’ (pusaka rendah)or ‘individual inheritance’ (harta
pencaharian). The first category would continue to be distributed
according to the matrilineal line, while the second category was to be
transferred in accordance with Islamic inheritance law.54 The division
in the inheritance system shows how firmly Islam had become part of
Minangkabau identity.
Nationalism of West Sumatran Muslim
In the early twentieth century, an anti-Dutch rebellion broke out in
Minangkabau after the 1908 introduction of direct taxation by the
Dutch, a policy that disregarded the promises made to adat leaders in
the Long Declaration. Uprisings ensued in many parts of West
Sumatra, led by both Islamic and adat leaders. Cooperation between
the Islamic and adat leaders marked the genesis of nationalism in the
struggle against the Dutch in West Sumatra. 55
Meanwhile, tensions between the Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua were
initially reduced with the emergence of the nationalist movement. The
vehicle for reconciliation was the establishment of a branch of Sarekat
Islam in Padang in 1915 by two Kaum Tua leaders, Haji Achmad, a
local Muslim merchant, and Syaikh Chatib Ali, a Kaum Tua leader. A
number of Kaum Muda followers joined the organisation,56 but the
truce did not last long. Five months later, the Padang branch of
Sarekat Islam split into two opposing groups, the White Card (Kartu
Putih) faction established by the Kaum Muda and the Red Card (Kartu
Merah) faction aligned with the Kaum Tua. The more left-wing Red
Card faction was recognised by Sarekat Islam in Java because of its
opposition to Dutch colonialism while the White Card faction had the
approval of the Dutch.57
54
Abdullah, “Islam, History, and Social Change,” p. 143.
55
56
Abdullah, Schools and Politics,pp. 24-6.
Datuk Sutan Maharaja responded to the establishment of the West Sumatran Sarekat
Islam by forming a Minangkabau Adat party called the Adat Association of the
Minangkabau World (Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau, SAAM) in September 1916.
Most of the party’s members were local panghulu and their adat staff. Datuk Sutan
Maharaja not only cooperated with the Dutch but also formulated his own
57
106
Muhammadiyah also came to play an important role in the Kaum
Muda movement. Muhammadiyah was introduced to West Sumatra in
1925 by Abdul Karim Amrullah, also known as Haji Rasul, a strident
opponent of communism who had spent time in Java. By 1927, onefifth of the whole population of his nagari of Sungai Batang, Maninjau,
around 2,440 people, had joined the organisation.58 From Maninjau,
Muhammadiyah subsequently established branches in Padang Panjang
in 1926, Bukittinggi in 1927, Padang and Batusangkar in 1928, where it
provided a base for West Sumatrans who sought to distance
themselves from the revolutionary communists who dominated the
local branch of Sarekat Islam.59
Islam and the Rise of Political Parties
From the 1920s to the1940s, a range of political parties emerged in
Indonesia as the level of political activism increased.the Kaum Muda
established a politically-oriented socio-economic organisation, the
Association of Indonesian Muslims (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia,
Permi) in 1930, which became a political party in 1932.60 The Kaum
Tua established the Association of Islamic Schools (Persatuan
Tarbiyah Islamiyah, PTI) in the same year.61 A local branch of the PSII
was established in 1930, while a local branch of the PNI was
established in 1932.62 In 1932, Permi proclaimed itself as a revolutionary and non-cooperative party by refusing to hoist the Dutch flag
during religious celebrations.63 In 1933, Kaum Tua, Kaum Muda,
explanations for the relationship between adat and religion, in which adat was
positioned as being in line with Sufi Islam, and tasauf (a personal approach to God).
His rejection of the idea that adat should be directly based on Islamic laws, as was
claimed by Kaum Muda movement, led him to cooperate with the Kaum Tua. See
Abdullah, “Modernisation in the Minangkabau World,” p. 230 and p. 232.
58
Abdullah, Schools and Politics,p. 78.
Ibid., p. 71, and pp. 84-90. Kahin argues that West Sumatran society at this time was
plural and the categorisation of society into adat, Islamic and communist blocs is
unhelpful. See Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 84.
59
Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 50.
60
61
Abdullah, Schools and Politics, p. 135.
62
Ibid., p. 110 and p. 183
63
Ibid., p. 176.
107
Delmus Puneri Salim
Muhammadiyah and the local branch of PSII also began to adopt a
revolutionary stance.64 In response, in 1933 the Dutch imprisoned the
leaders of Permi and the PSII, including Rasuna Said, Rasimah Ismail,
Datuk Singo Mangkuto and Djamaluddin.65 In 1938, the colonial
authorities established the Minangkabau Council (Dewan
Minangkabau) in an attempt to control increasingly radical local
political organisations.66
Islamic Politics and the Japanese Occupation
The arrival of the Japanese in 1942 increased enthusiasm for the
cause of independence. The Japanese not only put an end to Dutch
power but also promoted nationalist and anti-Western sentiments in
the country.67 Japanese troops arrived in Padang in March 1942 and
the local Dutch commander surrendered ten days later.68 West Sumatra
was then managed by the Department of Military Administration
(Gunseibu) of the 25th Army in Singapore, one of three Japanese
military commands in Indonesia; other two being the 16th Army in Java
and the Navy in the eastern islands and Kalimantan.69 A year later, the
25th Army headquarters moved to Bukittinggi, from where it
administered the whole of Sumatra.70
In West Sumatra, the Japanese established a People’s Committee
(Komite Rakyat) to succeed the Dutch Minangkabau Council, along
with an organisation called Greater Japan Youth (Pemuda Nippon
Raja) led by Chatib Sulaiman. However, after the Japanese
consolidated their authority in the region in late 1942, all organisations
were banned from political activities.71 After suppressing political
Divisions between Islamic organisations also emerged. For example, Permi accused
Muhammadiyah of being too close to the Dutch while Muhammadiyah accused Permi
activists of not being motivated by Islam. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 264.
64
65
66
Ibid., p. 90.
A. Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005), pp. 86-7.
67
68
69
Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia, p. 88.
70
71
Ibid., pp. 79-80.
108
organisations, the Japanese authorities sought to play a role both
within adat and Islam. At the supra-village level, they favoured Islam,
for example, by sending Islamic leaders from West Sumatra to a Malay
Islamic conference in Singapore and establishing the Minangkabau
Supreme Islamic Council (Majlis Islam Tinggi Minangkabau) in 1943.72
At the village level, on the other hand, local adat leaders were given
power through the maintenance of the Dutch administrative
apparatus.73
Islamic Politics after Independence
West Sumatra was deeply involved in national politics, and in the
politics of Islam, during the Sukarno years as a consequence of the
engagement of Minangkabau figures like Haji Agus Salim from the
PSII, Hatta and Sjahrir in the nationalist movement, and their
subsequent rise to power within the Republican ranks. The province
itself was also a site of Republican activity. In an attempt to shore up
support for a return to colonial status, the Dutch promoted the
concept of a Minangkabau state (Negara Minangkabau) through local
adat leaders, introducing a form of regional government called General
Unity (Persatuan Umum), which had a military arm called the
Association of Black Cats (Serikat Kucing Hitam) in 1946. This
initiative, which attracted adat leaders who had been officials during
the Dutch colonial period, served to increase the polarisation between
these local leaders and Islamic groups.74
As part of its campaign against the Republicans, in 1947, the
Dutch introduced the Special Autonomous Region of West Sumatra
(Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat, DISBA) in Padang, as a step
towards the planned establishment of the Negara Minangkabau in
1949.75 Ultimately, however, this initiative failed, and, as noted above,
Bukittinggi became the seat of the Emergency Government of the
Oki, A. Social Change in the West Sumatran Village: 1908-1945. 1978. Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10086/16895, accessed on 12 February 2010.
72
73
74
Ibid., pp. 110-1.
75
Ibid., p. 152.
109
Delmus Puneri Salim
Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indonesia,
PDRI) after the Dutch attack on Yogyakarta in 1948.76
Relations between the Republic and local Muslim politicians began
to sour with the signing of the Linggajati Agreement in 1947. Islamic
groups such as Masyumi and Muhammadiyah and religious militia such
as Hizbullah, Sabilillah and Lasjmi accused the regional Republican and
military leaders of continuing to maintain close ties to the Dutch and
proceeded to stage an attempted coup in March 1947. Kahin77 argues
that the attempted coup was prompted not only by suspicions of the
regional Republican government’s close relationship with the Dutch
but also because Islamic political parties were not represented in the
village administration and in the regional Republican government.
They also resented the fact that local Islamic militias were not given
arms. Islamic groups, according to Kahin, considered higher-ranking
military officers to be adopting luxurious and immoral lifestyles that
were inconsistent with Islamic principles.78 Attempts were made to
bring Islamic militia groups under the control of the regular army after
the formation of the Banteng Division in 1947. The fusion of the
militias and the regular forces was not particularly successful, as some
militia commanders refused to forfeit their independence and some
military units remained loyal to their militia commanders and to
various political parties.
The West Sumatran division of Masyumi joined a movement
created by veterans of the Banteng Division over the issue of
regionalism in 1956. Together they formed the Banteng Council and
declared the Banteng Charter, demanding greater regional autonomy,
especially in matters of defence and finance. The Banteng council was
opposed by the local branch of the PKI, which prompted the
A. Kahin, “Some Preliminary Observation on West Sumatra during the Revolution,”
Indonesia, 18 (1974): pp. 76-117.
76
77
The tension between Islam and the Republican government in West Sumatra also
affected the relationship with communists in the region. During the March 1947 coup
the Army commander was Colonel Ismael Lengah, who had a secular education and
was considered by Islamic groups to be a socialist and a follower of Tan Malaka.
Lengah refused to return weapons of the Islamic militia even though Muhammad
Natsir and the Vice President Mohammad Hatta at that time asked him to do so. See,
Ibid., pp. 125-7
78
110
formation of a local network called the Joint Movement against
Communism (Gerakan Bersama Anti Komunisme, GEBAK) on 4
September 1957. Led by Colonel Dahlan Djambek, GEBAK accused
communist groups of accepting funds from foreign Chinese, also
suggesting that communism had caused the split between Sukarno and
Hatta. Among the propaganda used by GEBAK was the statement
that West Sumatra was considered as Islamic and national government
was communist.79 Mansoer Sani, the new military head of Sawah Lunto
Sijunjung district removed all communists, mostly immigrants from
Java, from civilian and military positions and arrested their leaders in
1957.
The PRRI movement in West Sumatra was headed by Syafruddin
Prawiranegara and Muhammad Natsir. According to Leirissa,80 the
rebellion was caused by four factors. First, there had been a significant
Javanisation of the outer islands from 1955, which local powerbrokers
feared would enable the national government to easily control Central
Sumatra. Second, the national economy was in crisis, and poverty was
rampant not only among civilians but among lower level military units
in the region. Third, there had been a history of local and national
coup attempts by communists, including the local attempt on 3 March
1947 in West Sumatra. Finally, fragmentation in the local and national
armed military made a regional uprising possible. Kahin,81 however,
suggests that the PRRI was made possible because of US support as
part of attempts to encourage a national front against communism.
The national government sent military forces to the province and
PRRI leaders were captured and killed in 1961.82 Following the
rebellion, control over the regional army was put in the hands of
communist groups within the Diponegoro Division, who proceeded to
entrench their power in the local military.83 Civilians who supported
Kahin argues that Djambek’s accusations should be contextualised in the fact that he
had been forced to resign from the Indonesian military in Jakarta after being charged
with corruption, and was seeking opportunities for influence on his return to Padang.
See, Ibid., pp. 202-4.
79
R.Z. Leirissa, PRRI Permesta: Strategi Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis (Jakarta:
Pustaka Utama Grafitti, 1991).
80
81
Kahin, Rebellion to Integration, p. 198, and p. 207.
82
Ibid., p. 226.
83
Ibid., p. 236.
111
Delmus Puneri Salim
the rebellion were also detained in jails or kept under house arrest.84
The political repression that followed the PRRI prompted many
Minangkabau to migrate to other regions, including Jakarta, and also to
Malaysia.
The involvement of Masyumi leaders in the PRRI and Darul Islam
rebellions led Sukarno to ban the party and imprison a number of its
leaders, including Syafruddin and Natsir. The same fate befell the
Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI) and its
leaders, including Sukarno’s long-time nemesis, the West Sumatran
Sutan Sjahrir.85 In West Sumatra, the banning of Masyumi meant that
Muslims voters were forced to support the traditionalist Perti, which
had rejected support for the Banteng Council and the PRRI movement
and agreed with Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.86 It was in this political
context that Haji Abdul Malik bin Abdul Karim Amrullah, better
known as Hamka, the son of the founder of Muhammadiyah’s West
Sumatra branch, Haji Rasul, began criticising Sukarno from Jakarta.
Hamka had worked in the Ministry of Religion in Jakarta from 1951 to
1960, also serving as a Masyumi member of the Indonesian
Constituent Assembly representing Central Java from 1955 to 1960.
Hamka challenged Sukarno’s personal and political behaviour,
including his polygamous tendencies and his close association with
communism, a view widely shared in West Sumatra. Sukarno
responded by having Hamka arrested in 1964 under the Subversion
Law.
After the failure of the alleged communist coup in Jakarta in 1965,
the national government held trials for regional communist leaders in
Padang, including Major Djohan Rivai, Leitenant Colonel Bainal and
Sukirno as well as PKI members such Djajusman.87 Tens of thousands
of communists were jailed without trial, and although no exact figures
are available on the number of those killed,88 it is clear that the
numbers were significant. In addition, communist officials who had
been dominant in the administrative structure of West Sumatra after
84
Ibid., p. 228.
85
Ibid., p. 236.
86
Ibid., p. 246.
87
Ibid., p. 240.
88
Ibid., p. 248.
112
the PRRI were replaced by anti-communist military officers in 1966.89
The regional army under Colonel Poniman also isolated traditional
adat and religious associations that had been associated with
communism, such as the Supreme Consultative Council of the Adat of
the Minangkabau World (Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam
Minangkabau, MTKAAM) and the Islamic Educational Movement
Party (Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Perti).90 In their place, a
new adat organisation, the Minangkabau Adat Consultative Body
(Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, LKAAM) and a group
called the Contact Body for the Struggle of the Islamic Community
(Badan Kontak Perjuangan Umat Islam, BKPUI) were established in
1966.91
Islam and Politics in Suharto’s Indonesia
In an attempt to mend bridges in West Sumatra, on coming to
power, the Suharto regime appointed Harun Zain, a Minangkabau
born in Jakarta but then a teacher at Andalas University in Padang, as
governor of the province in 1967. Harun was eager to show West
Sumatrans that they would benefit by working with the New Order,
working hard to develop agricultural and communication infrastructure
in the province. In 1969, as part of the lead-up to the 1971 election,
the military officer Saafroedin Bahar was appointed head of the local
Golkar branch. He subsequently led the campaign to convince West
Sumatra’s people that support for Golkar was crucial for the
continuance of regional development (Interview with Saafroedin
Bahar, 3 November 2010). In West Sumatra, Golkar ultimately
bettered its national average, winning 63 per cent of the votes in that
election.
Harun also sought to re-establish an understanding of
Minangkabau heritage and regional identity that did not emphasise
Islam, for example by promoting the use of traditional architecture in
official buildings. As part of this push, Islamic leaders were sidelined in
Harun’s regional development program. Supporters of Masyumi, for
89
Ibid., p. 235.
90
Ibid., pp. 245-6.
91
Interview with Saafroedin Bahar, 3 November 2010.
113
Delmus Puneri Salim
example, were asked to distance themselves from political Islam in the
interests of regional development.
Azwar Anas, a military officer, replaced Harun Zain as Governor
of West Sumatra in 1977. The greatest challenge he faced during his
term in office was that of implementing Law No. 5/1979 on Village
Governance, which determined the basis on which funding was to be
allocated to each province. Although Azwar succeeded in establishing
a way of identifying villages (based on the Javanese concept of the desa)
that did not disadvantage the province in terms of funding (Kahin
1999: 258), the implementation of this law undermined the status of
the nagari, which not only linked rural society to land, inheritance and
rice cultivation but also to social and cultural relationships, including
those based on kinship and cultural Islam.
In an attempt to retain some traditional authority, Azwar
established a Village Adat Council (Kerapatan Adat Nagari, KAN)
within each desa in 1983.92 However, local dissatisfaction with the
division of nagari into several desa continued to grow. After Hasan
Basri Durin was appointed governor in 1987, he overturned Azwar’s
policy, regrouping some of the smallest desa in 1988.93 He also
encouraged cooperation between traditional rural leaders, Islamic
scholars, intellectuals and government officials, establishing the
Manunggal Sakato program in 1990. In the following year he
established Village Development Discussion Bodies (Musyawarah
Pembangunan Nagari, MPN), which were made up of both nagari
leaders and government officials.
Muchlis Ibrahim replaced Durin as governor in 1997 but he
stepped down two years later when his recommendation for the
position of Deputy Governor was rejected by the central government.
Ibrahim had supported Nurmawan, a bureaucrat in the provincial
office. However, Syarwan Hamid, the Minister for Internal Affairs,
appointed Zainal Bakar, the candidate backed by the regional
parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). The tension
between the governor and the DPRD marked the beginning of a new
era in West Sumatran local politics, in which Islam once more became
92
93
Between 1987 and 1996, the number of desa decreased by 1,000. See Ibid., p. 261.
114
a pivotal factor after many years in the wilderness under the New
Order.
Conclusion
The paper has demonstrated the relationship between Islam and
Minangkabau culture was simultaneously accommodating and
contested, and that the strong association between Islam and regional
identity only solidified in the post-Suharto era. The
Minangkabaus’connection with the Malay world increased the
acceptance of orthodox Islam, first introduced by reformist Muslims
coming back from Mecca in the 17th century. Gradually, orthodoxy,
and later Wahabism, largely replaced the Sufi form first adopted, which
was more accommodating of local beliefs. However, as also shown
here, Islam as an ideology was subordinated after Independence days,
and again under the New Order, this time to a largely secular
formulation of national identity.
Indeed, it has only been in the post-Suharto period that Islam has
assumed a hegemonic position in Minangkabau identity discourse. In
contemporary West Sumatra, regional governments has been utilising
claims that local customs are based on Islam and Islam is based on the
Qur’a>n (Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah, ABS-SBK). This
assertion is ubiquitous, appearing as justification for almost every
political decision made at the provincial level and below. Moreover,
every disaster, from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to natural disasters
such as floods, landslides and earthquakes, has been attributed to the
community’s failure to meet its religious obligations. For example, after
the 2004 tsunami, large billboards were displayed throughout the city
of Padang proclaiming ‘religiosity must be practised in order to prevent
a tsunami’. []
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SOCIO-STRUCTURAL INNOVATIONS IN
INDONESIA’S URBAN SUFISM
The Case Study of the Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat
Nurul Mustafa
Arif Zamhari
UIN Maulana Malik Ibrahim, Malang - Indonesia
Abstract: Sufi tradition has grown significantly in the
modern Muslim world, including Indonesia. Currently,
Sufism has been not only practiced by villagers, peasants,
and non-educated people, but also practiced by urbanites,
national elites, and educated people. Moreover, it has
experienced significant innovation in terms of its practices
and organization. This article takes an in-depth look at the
innovationof Sufi tradition socially and structurally in
Indonesia. It argues that majelis dzikir and shalawat in
Indonesia, like Nurul Mustafa, has represented a new Sufi
group that arises out of tarekat group, a group that has been
considered as ‘official institution’ in implementing Sufism.
The Majelis Nurul Mustafa has strong basis in urban
society, rises from urban majelis taklim, introduces Sufi
teaching to its jamāàh that mostly urban teenagers and
youths uses popular methods to attract the interest of those
groups to attend its ritual as the complementary of its
activity.
Keywords: Urban Sufism, majelis dzikir, majelis shalawat,
majelis taklim.
Introduction
Social scientists and Islamists have predicted that the Sufi tradition
as well as its proponents will diminish in the Muslim world following
the development of Muslim society toward shari>‘ah oriented
community.1 Moreover, according to them, Sufi traditions will become
Julia Day Howell, “Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival,” The Journal of Asian
Studies, 60, 3 (2001), pp.701-729.
1
Arif Zamhari
the remnant of Muslim history when Muslim has adopted the values of
modern society socially and economically and when modern
reformation of Islamic society has taken place. In the course of the
history of Sufism in Indonesian, Sufi traditions have also experienced
marginalization among modernist Muslims for several decades2.
However, the prediction has proved to be flawed. Even though Sufi
tradition has been strongly challenged by modernist Muslim in the last
few decades, it has grown significantly in the Muslim world including
Indonesia, the most populous Muslim majority country in the world.
Sufism has been not only practiced by villagers, peasants, and
uneducated people, but also has been practiced by urbanites, national
elites, and educated people. Even, modernist Muslims, who once were
strongly opposed to Sufi traditions due to its heretical elements, have
practiced Sufism and joined tarekat group.
Moreover, during the last few decades Sufi tradition in both
Indonesian urban and rural area has experienced significant innovation
in terms of its practices and organization3. Previously, Sufism only can
be practiced through numerous organized Sufi groups (tarekat), for
now in order to practice Sufi ritual, Indonesian Muslims need not join
a particular structured Sufi order (tarekat) formally with its complicated
rules. People can practice dzikir ritual as widely practiced in the tarekat
groups without necessarily being members of the tarekat. New majelis
dzikir and majelis shalawat have been emerging in urban and rural areas.
Instead of tarekat, these new groups serve as an alternative venue for
Muslims to improve their spiritual lives.
Majelis dzikir and shalawat have proliferated over the last few
decades not only in urban areas but also in rural areas. Without a
doubt, the locus of the majelis dzikir and majelis shalawat activities
especially in the rural areas has been pesantren (Islamic boarding
schools). Pesantren have played a pivotal role not just in Islamic
education generally, but also in maintaining Sufi tradition in Indonesia.
The pesantren through their leaders and alumni networks have been
disseminating majelis dzikir and shalawat throughout Indonesia. Recently
Julia Day Howell, “Modernity and Islamic Spirituality in Indonesia’s new Sufi
Networks,” in Martin Van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell, (eds). Sufism and ‘The
Modern’ in Islam (New York and London: IB Tauris, 2007), p. 217.
2
Arif Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic Spirituality: A Study of Majelis Dhikr Groups in East Java
(Canberra: ANU E-press, 2010).
3
120
Indonesia’s Urban Sufism
they have spread to urban areas, which is the focus of our current
research project.
In urban areas another institution has been important in facilitating
the proliferation of majelis dzikir and shalawat is the majelis taklim. The
majelis taklim also grew out of the pesantren, but have sprung up
independently both in rural and urban areas. They now play an
important role in preaching and teaching Islam to urbanites. In the last
ten years the majelis taklim in urban areas functioned not only as centres
for lectures on Islam (pengajian umum) but also as centers for activities
known as majelis dzikir and shalawat, ritual practices commonly
conducted by Sufi groups especially the tarekat or Sufi orders. This
study examines the emergence of majelis taklim as a locus for dzikir and
shalawat activities as well as a centre for Islamic preaching (da`wah
Isla>mi>yah) among urbanites.
Despite the importance of majelis taklim in urban areas, there has
been scant attention to the study of the contemporary practices of
dzikir and shalawat conducted by majelis taklim in urban areas.
Moreover, in the study of urban Sufism, little attention has been given
to the proliferation of dzikir and shalawat practices among urbanites as
part of the development of neo Sufi tradition in Indonesia. In addition,
as widely held among Indonesian Muslims, the popular practices of
dzikir and shalawat proliferated in the last few decades cannot be
regarded as part of Sufi practices that has been practised by tarekat
groups. I spent almost nine months among majelis dzikir and shalawat
groups in Jakarta, following from one of dzikir and shalawat ritual to
another ritual held by the group, recording its teachings and
ceremonies, collecting its literature and interviewing the member of the
majelis from the leader (kyai and h}abi>b), teachers (al-asa>ti>dh) to the
followers of the majelis.
It is hoped that this study will contribute to the understanding of
spiritual life of urbanites. In urban areas which have been known for
their secular orientation, majelis taklim have provided space for people
to deeply experience a new way of encountering in Sufi tradition.
Documenting the recent growth of majelis dzikir and shalawat in urban
and rural areas will broaden our perspective on the innovation that has
been made in the Sufi tradition in Indonesian Islam. In the following
article, specially, we focus on ritual activity of best known urban majelis
dzikir and shalawat group, the Majelis Nurul Mustafa led by H{abi>b
H{asan bin Ja’far Assegaf in Jakarta. Both majelis dzikir and shalawat
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Arif Zamhari
groups have exemplified structural and organizational innovation of
Sufi tradition in Indonesia. The Majelis Nurul Mustafa was established
by a h}abi>b, a title to name a descendent of the Prophet Muh}ammad,
Hasan bin Ja’far bin Assegaf (b. 1977). Among people of Jakarta, the
h}abi>b has been widely known as a leader of the majelis dzikir and
shalawat group whose participants are mostly teenagers and youths. He
is regarded as an Islamic preacher who has been responsible for
introducing dzikir and reciting shalawat followed with musical
instrument (marawis) among urbanites of Jakarta. His picture and the
name of his majelis can be easily seen in big posters located along the
street of the city before his group conducts dzikir and shalawat ritual.
The ritual of the majelis which is involved thousands of participants is
usually conducted once a week (Saturday night).
The Majelis Nurul Mustafa began its activity from small Islamic
lecture circles (h}alaqah) in the form of majelis taklim under the direction
of H{abi>b H{asan in Ciganjur, South Jakarta. After graduated from
Pesantren Daruttauhid, Malang, East Java in 1996, he began his career
as a wandering preacher in some regions in Jakarta. He held his majelis
dzikir in several communities’ houses as a venue of dzikir and shalawat
ritual attended by ten to twenty participants. In the majelis, he invited
several youths from the vicinity of the venue to practice dzikir ritual by
reciting Ra>tib al-Àt}t}a>s, dzikir litanies which has been widely popular
among H{ad}rami> family in Indonesia. As the number of jamāàh was
growing, he united several majelis at several houses to one majelis held
on Saturday night. He then asked the respected ‘ulamā , H{abi>b Anis
from Solo to give a name for his majelis dzikir. H{abi>b Anis named
H{abi>b Hasan’s majelis with Nurul Mustofa. Currently, Nurul Mustafa
has developed as one of the biggest majelis dzikir and shalawat groups in
Jakarta attended by thousands participants in its weekly ritual on
Saturday night4. Prior to the ritual, usually the jamāàh are gathered by
the coordinator of the majelis according to their regions. They meet in
some meeting points and rally to the venue with motors, mini buses
and rental cars handling the majelis flags and banner.
Anonymous. “Menebar Dakwah Dengan Mahabbah.” Majalah Kisah Islami Al-Kisah
(2011), p.51.
4
122
Understanding Majelis Dzikir, Majelis Shalawat and Tarekat
Within Indonesian Islam
For the purpose of this study, it is important to explain particular
terms such as majelis shalawat, majelis dzikir, and tarekat (Sufi groups)
which have been widely used in the study of Indonesian Islamic
spirituality for the last two decades. This explanation is necessary
particularly to understand the phenomenon of the proliferation of
various Islamic spiritual groups within the Indonesian urban Muslim
society and the development of studies about Islamic spiritual groups
and Sufi traditions in Indonesia.
In urban areas the term majelis dzikir and majelis shalawat are
sometimes used together to name a single type group (lit. majelis) that
practices Islamic devotional acts to remember God (dhikr Allāh). These
recitations include the repetition of the names of God (al-asmā’ alh}usna>) and phrases derived from H{adi>th and Quranic verses of
supplications but also the recitation of request for blessing for the
Prophet. If the majelis categorizes itself as majelis dzikir and majelis
shalawat, it always practices the recitation of shalawat to remember and
praise the Prophet Muh}ammad.
Along with the recitation of dzikir, shalawat takes the form of the
recitation of eulogy books of the Prophet such as Barzanji>,5 Diba>’,6 and
Simt} al-Durar7 which contain long phrases of blessings of the Prophet
and the history of the Prophet. Indonesian Muslim usually called those
books as mawlid texts. In the Islamic knowledge, these books can be
categorised as Islamic literature works which are known in the classical
Islamic nomenclature as al-mada>’ih} al-nabawīyah (eulogy of the prophet,
sastra pujian kepada Nabi Muhammad). In Indonesia, these books are not
only read by majelis dzikir and shalawat but they are also widely popular
among other Indonesian Muslims. These books are popularly recited
by Indonesian Muslim particularly on the occasion of the
The author of Barzanji is Syaikh Ja’far al-Barzanjy bin Husein bin Abdul Karim born
in Madinah 1690-1766. The title of the book is ‘Iqd al-Jawahir but among Indonesian
Muslim it is popularly known as Barzanjy which is taken from his name.
5
The book is written by Al-Imam al-Hafidz al-Muhaddith Abdurrahman bin Ali bin
Muhammad al-Syaibani al-Diba’i al-Yamani. The book is widely known among
Indonesian Muslim as Mawlid al-Diba>’i>.
6
The book is written by Al-Imam Ali bin Muhammad bin Husayn al-Habshi. This
book is widely popular among Indonesian Hadrami Muslim.
7
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Arif Zamhari
commemoration of the birthday of the Prophet Muh}ammad (Mawlid
al-Nabi>), h}awl8 of the prominent h}abi>b or kyai of pesantren, and lifecycle celebrations such as the seventh month of pregnancy, the
seventh day of the new born babies, circumcisions, and marriage.
However, Indonesian urban Muslims cannot distinguish between the
reciting of shalawat and the tradition of reciting mada>’ih}. As a result, all
of these books are regarded by Indonesian urban Muslim as part of
shalawat.
The mada>’ih} books are mostly written in Arabic in a very beautiful
and delicate style. Part of the books is chanted in a group in melodious
manner, often under the direction of a leader, with reading alternating
between soloist and group. This chanting is accompanied by musical
instruments consisted of membranophones such as tambourines and
drums. In Jakarta and its vicinity, this instrument is called marawis, but
in Central and East Java the instrument is called hadrah and in West
Javanese Muslims called qasidahan. The chanting of mada>’ih} usually
occupies more than half of the ritual of the group. An example of this
kind of majelis dzikir and majelis shalawat is the Majelis Rasulullah led by
H{abi>b Munzir al-Musawwa in Jakarta and the Majelis Nurul Mustafa
led by H{abi>b H{asan bin Ja’far Assegaf in Jakarta, Majelis Ahbaburrasul
in Solo led by H{abi>b Syeich (Central Java). On the other hand, if the
group calls itself as majelis dzikir, it only practices the reciting of dzikir
formulas, the repetition of the Names of God (al-‘asmā’ al-h}usna>) and
supplications taken from H{adi>th and the Qur’a>n as commonly
practiced by tarekat in order to achieve spiritual perfection and
closeness to God. However, these majelis have no structural connection
to any tarekat (Sufi order). A well-known example of this kind of majelis
dzikir is the Majelis Dzikir Al-Dzikira of Arifin Ilham in Jakarta. This
majelis dzikir only focuses on reciting dzikir in unison led by the leader
without reciting al-mada>’ih} al-nabawīyah.
The majelis dzhikir and s}alawat in urban area are generally initiated
by majelis taklim, a non-formal institution initially established as centers
of Islamic learning for the community. For the last two decades, majelis
taklim have been instrumental in the proliferation of majelis s}alawat and
majelis dzikir especially in urban area. Such majelis taklim functions are
H{aul literary mean circuit. This term is usually used to name the annual commemoration of the death of respected ‘ulamā, kyai, or h}abi>b.
8
124
not only as an Islamic learning institution but also as a centre of majelis
s}alawat and majelis dzikir practices. However, not all majelis taklim also
provide majelis s}alawat and majelis dzikir for their participants. There are
some majelis taklim that focus only on Islamic learning activities for the
community such as Majelis Taklim Kwitang, Jakarta established by
H{abi>b Ali bin Abdurrahman al Habsyi (1870-1968), a Hadrami
descendent. Not only is The Majelis Taklim Kwitang regarded as the
oldest majelis taklim in Jakarta but also it has been considered
responsible for the emergence of majelis taklim tradition in Jakarta.
H{abi>b Ali’s student Kyai Abdullah Syafii established the well-known
Majelis Taklim Assyafi’iyah and Kyai Tohir Ramli established Majelis
Taklim Attahiriyah. Many other majelis taklim in urban areas are
established especially for female participants (jamāah) under the
direction of usta>dzah (female teacher). Some of these majelis taklim are
regularly invited to fill an Islamic lecture program broadcasted live by
private and public television stations.9
Another term which is important in the study of Sufi tradition in
Indonesian Islam is tarekat (from the Arabic word t}arīqah). Tarekat is
considered the oldest Sufi organizations in Indonesian Islam. This
term is widely used in Indonesian Islam to refer to the centres where
people practice communal rituals under the guidance of murshid
(teacher) In the pesantren tradition, tarekat can be divided into two
categories: first, tarekat àmmah (general way), that is, orders that
encourage the continuous performance of pious acts with good
intentions; and second, tarekat khashshah (specific way), that is orders
that conduct certain ritual of dzikir under the guidance of murshid (the
leader, spiritual teacher). The murshid must be linked through a spiritual
genealogy to past murshid in a chain of authorization going back to the
Prophet Muh}ammad. This form of tarekat has some formal conditions:
First, in order to become a member of particular tarekat, a disciple
must vow of allegiance (bayàh) to the master of tarekat10. The bayàh is
Most of private TV stations in Indonesia provide a special program for Islamic
lecture with different formats. Usually the program is held in the early morning
starting from 5:00 am to 6:00 am. Some of these stations provide a particular space for
female preachers with their female jamāah. Female preachers such as Ustadzah Dede
Rosyidah Syarifuddin or well known as Mama Dede (Indosiar TV and ANTV),
Ustadzah Umi Qurrotu A’yun (MNC TV), Ustadzah Tan Mei Hwa (JTV Surabaya and
TV One) are current star among female Indonesian Muslim viewers.
9
10
Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic Spirituality.
125
Arif Zamhari
an important requirement of tarekat, since it is considered to bestow
the validity on the spiritual journey of the disciples. It is widely held in
the tarekat world that following tasawuf path without the guidance of a
murshid is like following the path under the guidance of Satan.
Furthermore, some tarekat associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU) organization promote the concept of tarekat mu’tabarah
(recognized and legitimate orders). This description applies especially
to tarekat under the supervision of the NU. The meaning of this
concept is that particular groups of tarekat can be considered as
mu’tabarah as long as the teaching of the group must conform with the
Islamic Law and the wird or dzikir practiced by the group must have a
spiritual genealogy going back to the Prophet. As a result of this
concept, any groups of tarekat that do not meet the requirements
cannot be considered as mu’tabarah and should not be joined with NU
organization. The reason to introduce this concept is not only to give
strong legitimacy for the tarekat groups and to strengthen the
member’s faith in their rituals and teachings, but also to make a clearcut distinction between their ritual and other group ritual that NU
considers incompatible with Islamic law.
Even though tarekat, majelis dzikir and s}alawat have a similar
objective, which is to purify the self in order to approach God, they
differ in some practices. For example, majelis Dzikir and s}alawat do not
require their followers to take an oath to the leader of these groups. In
other words, people are able to join and practice their s}alawat and
Dzikir without taking committing themselves exclusively to the leaders.
As a result, people can join one particular majelis s}alawat and Dzikir
group, while at the same time also become a member of another majelis
s}alawat and Dzikir group, something which is generally not possible for
members of tarekat in Java.
Tarekat, majelis Dzikir and shalawat also differ in the Dzikir recited
in the ritual. The Dzikir text recited in majelis dzikir and s}alawat is
generally created by their leader or taken from dzikir formula taught by
the Prophet or widely used by prominent ‘ulamā . In contrast, dzikir
formula recited in the tarekat group are believed to have been
transmitted from the teacher’s teacher and so on through a series of
unbroken links back to and the Prophet. The followers of tarekat are
obliged to recite dzikir formula every day, usually after the five
obligatory daily times prayer. Unlike tarekat, the members of majelis
s}alawat and dzikir are allowed to practice the group’s dzikir
126
intermittently without any sanction, even though the leader of the
groups recommended that their followers practice the chosen dzikir
continually.
Distinguishing those terms clearly will give a clear sense of the
variations in Islamic ritual groups that have developed within
Indonesian Muslim society over the last few decades. In addition,
distinctions will help people understand the innovations that have been
made in the Sufi practices and organizations in Indonesia of late.
General Features of Majelis Taklim
Even though scholars have different view on the origin of
pesantren in Indonesia, they have agreed that pesantren is the oldest
system of Islamic learning and education in Indonesia. With the
emergence of a modern Islamic education schools recently, pesantren
has survived and maintained its tradition and at the same time it has
accommodated some modern education system. In this regards,
pesantren should compete with modern secular education institution.
In Indonesia, we can find a various pesantren which generally function
as a centre of learning Islam as well as a centre of Sufism and majelis
Dzikir. Likewise, scholars cannot exactly know when majelis taklim term
was initially introduced in Indonesian Muslim community. The majelis
taklim is a term to denote an institution in which a group of Indonesian
Muslim communities not only conduct learning of Islam and Islamic
preaching activities but also conduct majelis dzikir and s}alawat. In the
last ten years majelis taklim with its variety has proliferated particularly
in urban area.
The basic elements of majelis taklim are the venue for activities
(Arabic, majelis), the leader (can be a kyai, ustad, or h}abi>b), and the
participants (jamāàh). Majelis taklim does not provide a dormitory for
the participants (jamāah) of the majelis because they only attend the
program of majelis taklim and return to their home when the program
concludes. However, a few majelis taklim such as the Majelis Rasūlullah
and the Majelis Nurul Mustafa located in Jakarta provide a simple
house as a residence for their technical staffs and a mushalla (a small
praying venue) which is used for praying, teaching activity and the
ritual of dzikir and shalawat. In some cases senior staffs live in the
house which also functions as the office of the majelis. One of the
rooms in the house is usually provided for the leader which is used as
his private room and office. Even though the leader of the majelis has a
family private house, he usually lives in the house everyday together
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Arif Zamhari
with his staffs and only visits his family twice a month. The residence
is usually owned by the leader or is rented by the leader for the center
for the activities of the majelis.
Similar to pesantren, a mosque is the centre of Islamic rituals and
activities for majelis taklim. However, unlike pesantren, majelis taklim do
not establish their own mosque as the centre of their activities. The
majelis taklim often make use of a community’s mosque as the venue of
their regular activities. Even, similar to pesantren, some big majelis
taklim in Jakarta originate from those mosques. The reason of using a
community’s mosque as the venue of majelis taklim activities is that it is
difficult to find big venues in urban area that can contain thousands of
jamāah (participants).11 Such large majelis taklim occasionally make use
of a city park or football stadium as a venue of big event which
involves participants from many regions. However, to make use of a
football stadium and city park, the majelis taklim has to pay a rental fee
to the city administration, while to make use of mosques, the majelis
taklim do not have to pay a rental fee. Therefore, every majelis taklim
makes use of particular mosque in urban area as important venue for
its regular activities. Each majelis taklim in urban area, for instance,
usually makes use of four of five mosques and conducts its ritual in
those mosques weekly. However, some majelis taklim in Jakarta
establish their own building as the venue of the majelis’ activity such as
a big hall which is usually located close to the residence of the leader.
In terms of learning process, majelis taklim conduct Islamic learning
for community by referring to classical Islamic books (kitab kuning).
Majelis taklim do not use any specific Islamic books or books
categorized as mu’tabarah. Majelis taklim use any Islamic books, either
classical ones or modern ones, as long as they are relevant to the
objective of the majelis and the interest of the leader of majelis. For
instance, in the formative period of Majelis Dzikir and s}alawat Majelis
Rasullullah in Jakarta, the leader of this majelis taught Islamic
Jurisprudence (fikih) to his participants. When the leader thought that
the participants were not enthusiastic and no longer needed Islamic
Jurisprudence subjects, he then changed the subject to the ethics of the
prophet taken from prominent H{adi>th books such as Bukhari
Muslim.12 On the other hand, the leader of Majelis Nurul Mustofa
Interview with the deputy of leader of Majelis Rasulullah, Habib Ahmad on June,
2011
11
12
Interview with the Deputy of Majelis on June 2011
128
prefers to teach the story of Muslim saints of Hadramaut (hagiography
books), Yemen, and the book on Khas}a>’is} Ummat Rasu>l Alla>h (The
Distinctiveness of the Followers of the Prophet) , to his followers. The
reason of the leader teaches the story of Muslim saints is to introduce
his jamāah to those saints of God who have been able to obtain a
highest spiritual stage in their life. In addition, it is expected that those
saints of God (awliya>’ Alla>h) who are the descendants of the prophet
can be used as a means for the jamāàh (followers) to know the
Prophet, whose example is the most important guidance to correct
conduct and the achievement of states of grace.13
The participants of the majelis taklim are called jamāàh (followers).
In order to be a follower or participants of majelis taklim, one does not
need to register formally and pay membership fee. There is no
membership in a majelis taklim. People can be regarded as the followers
of majelis taklim as long as they attend dzikir and shalawat ritual of
majelis taklim and participate in the activity of the majelis regularly.
Moreover, people can voluntary join one majelis taklim while also
joining another majelis taklim. People from different age are able to join
the group regardless of their gender. However, recently some majelis
taklim have been established especially for female participants, while
other majelis taklim still include both female and male participants.
In term of schedule, majelis taklim conduct its activities in the
flexible time. Majelis taklim conduct its activity any time according to
the consent of the followers and the availability of the leaders.
Sometimes, the activity of dzikir and shalawat is held in the morning
and evening. However, most of majelis taklim in urban areas conduct its
dzikir and shalawat ritual in the evening after ìsha>’ prayer until
midnight.
The leader is important element both in pesantren and majelis
taklim. The leader of majelis taklim can be an independent kyai, or h}abi>b.
In the past, the title of kyai was commonly inherited, especially kyai
who runs pesantren. However, currently the concept of kyai in Java
has changed. The title of kyai is no longer inherited genealogically. One
can be a kyai as long as the member of society recognize him as a kyai
by virtue of his mastering higher Islamic knowledge and his influential
role in Islamic preaching among community. Therefore, it is not
Interview with Ustad Riziq, a preacher of the Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat Nurul
Mustafa on September 2011
13
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Arif Zamhari
unusual that some prominent kyai in Java do not come from a kyai
family and they do not run a pesantren. An example of this kyai is the
late Kyai Zainuddin MZ, a famous Indonesian preacher well known as
Dai Sejuta Ummat (preacher of millions people). The title of kyai is not
similar to that of priest, monk and cleric as in Christian or in Buddhist
tradition. There is no a particular Muslim institution in Indonesia that
approves and authorize kyai. Similarly, there is no Muslim organization
that can remove kyai from his position. Currently, it is not unusual for
big pesantren to have more than one kyai.
In contrast to the term kyai, h}abi>b is a title given only to Hadrami
people who are considered to be a descendant of the Prophet. In fact,
the term h}abi>b is a name of social stratum to denote the social
stratification system in Hadramawt society in Yemen. The saada or
h}abi>b14 (pl. h}aba>’ib), sayyid15 or syed are the descendants of the Prophet
Muh}ammad and the top social strata among Hadramawt society.
Although they lack of military power, the sa>dah are highly respected as
arbitrators in tribal conflict and in charge of religious education. The
sa>dah is followed by masya>yi>kh, descendants of respected religious
scholars and it is followed by qabail which is lower than masya>yi>kh but
still to be viewed as part of the second strata because most of them
have common descent with the masya>yi>kh. The lowest in the
Hadramawt society is masa>ki>n, consisting of different group of artisans,
servants and peasants. At the bottom of social rank is the àbd, the
slaves.16 Despite complicated strata among Hadrami, Indonesian
Muslim usually call h}abi>b to any Indonesian Hadrami descendents
regardless of their social strata as long as they are equipped with higher
Islamic knowledge and also are active in the preaching of Islam among
community.
The Majelis Dzikir and S{alawat Nurul Mustafa
In addition to pesantren, another institution which can also be
considered as another venue that can maintain Islamic tradition among
urbanites has been majelis taklim. A part from tarekat, pesantren also
14
H{abi>b means ‘beloved’ in Arabic.
15
Sayyid means ‘lord in Arabic.
Frode F. Jacobsen, Hadrami Arabs in Present-day Indonesia: An Indonesia-oriented group
with an Arab signature (London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group,
2009), p.8.
16
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becomes the home for majelis dzikir and majelis shalawat. Likewise, majelis
taklim in urban area has provided a venue to conduct majelis shalawat and
majelis dzikir. The following paragraphs will describe the comparison
between the Majelis Shalawat Wahidiyah which is initiated by
Pesantren Kedunglo, Kediri and the Majelis Nurul Mustafa which
arises from majelis taklim located in Jakarta.
The Organization
Gilsenan, in his classical work on Saints and Sufi in Modern Egypt,
used term organization and association to describe the structure of Sufi
orders (tarekat). An organization emphasizes ‘a high degree of
stratification on the basis of differential expertise and/or efficiency.’
An organization is also characterized by ‘greater structural recognition
of functional inequality and formal control based on hierarchy of
authority statuses. In contrast, an association is characterized by
‘looseness of structure with minimal development of a status hierarchy.
Individual commitment in an association is also voluntary and
egalitarian. Moreover, the appointment of officials is based on
administrative convenience. He concluded that the majority of Sufi
orders in Egypt could be placed on a continuum between organization
and association.17
However, Gilsenan’s typology cannot be easily applied to describe
the structure of majelis dzikir and shalawat in Indonesia. Unlike Sufi
orders in Indonesia which have hierarchical positions such as master
(murshid), vice master (khali>fah), and disciples (muri>d), in majelis dzikir
both in pesantren and majelis taklim, these positions are not recognized.
Both groups only recognize a single position of leader who is regarded
as a central figure in both majelis. The figure of kyai and h}abi>b is
instrumental in the organization’s structure of the majelis.
Unlike other Sufi groups in Indonesia, the Majelis Nurul Mustafa
does not have local branches. In order to run its activities, the majelis
does not establish hierarchical organization from the higher level of
organization of the capital city to the lower level of organization in
villages. Instead, the leader of majelis simply chooses several staffs and
technical assistants responsible for particular tasks in the central office
of the majelis. The selection of staff and technical assistants is believed
to be based on spiritual vision of the leader. The leader is believed to
Michael Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 65-66.
17
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Arif Zamhari
have a spiritual power to choose who the right person to be his staff is.
These elected assistants and officials are instrumental in preparing
activities of the majelis under the instruction of the leader of the majelis.
They are monthly paid by the majelis taken from treasury of the majelis.
A residence is provided by the leader for particular staffs and technical
assistants. This residence functioned not only as a central headquarter
of the majelis but also as a venue for the ritual and learning of Islam for
small number of the followers. Instead of living with his family, the
leader of the majelis mostly lives in the residence together with his staffs
and teachers. To organize a big ritual event in the city, the staffs are
helped with coordinators (kordinator lapangan) located in every region of
the city. The number of coordinators is more than hundreds in all
regions of Jakarta. These coordinators voluntarily help the majelis to
organize followers of the majelis in their areas to attend and prepare any
major events held by the majelis in the city. In order to hold a ritual
event outside Jakarta, local committee will be responsible for the
preparation of the event with supervision of the majelis.
Nurul Mustafa is established in the form of yayasan (foundation)
and it is registered in the Ministry of Law of the Republic of Indonesia.
With this format, Nurul Mustafa must abide by the law of foundation
stipulated by Indonesian government. As a yayasan, Nurul Mustafa has
bureaucratic structure such as the head of yayasan, the deputy of
yayasan, and treasurer. However, the majelis does not have departments
or divisions which are responsible to implement organizational tasks. It
seems that this foundation can be categorized as a family foundation,
because most of the boards members of the foundation are the
relatives of the leader of the majelis. Like in the leadership of tarekat, the
concept of waki>l, na>’ib (deputy) is also known in the Majelis Nurul
Mustafa. The wakil of leader is needed in the majelis particularly when
the leader cannot lead dzikir service for particular reason. Usually,
H{abi>b H{asan, the leader of the majelis, asks his brother to replace
himself if he is absent on the dzikir and shalawat ritual.
The Rituals
Majelis Dzikir and shalawat of majelis taklim focus on reciting ritual
of particular dzikir and shalawat. The Majelis Shalawat and Dzikir Nurul
Mustafa focuses their activity on reciting shalawat and dzikir ritual.
However, the shalawat which is taken from books categorized as almada>’ih al-nabawi>yah or ‘mawlid’ book is recited in the form of musical
style accompanied by traditional music called marawis. This group
132
recites one of al-mada>’ih al-nabawi>yah books called Simt} al-Durar. The
recitation of these books occupies the whole ritual of this group. Even
though there is no particular courtesy during the ritual, one of teachers
of this group stresses the importance of good intention and
comprehension of every single text of the book so that people are able
to achieve blessing (barakah). After setting good intention, then people
should recite the opening chapter of the Qur’a>n (al-Fa>tih}ah) conveyed
to the author of the book and our parents so that we can feel the
blessing of reciting the book. The group prefers to use Simt} al-Durar as
part of the ritual due to the fact that the author of this book is one of
the descendants of the Prophet, while many other books are written by
non- descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. In addition, the group
also recites dzikir formula of Ra>tib al-H{adda>d written by the famous
Muslim scholars from Hadramaut, al-H{abi>b Àbdullah bin Àlawi alHaddad (1044-1132 H)18 as well as Ra>tib al-Àt}t}a>s. The leader of the
majelis does not recommend his followers to follow particular courtesy
prior to the ritual of reciting shalawat. However, during the recitation of
the salawa, the Prophet is believed to be present in the ritual. As a
result, the followers of the majelis are strongly urged to stand up to
respect the Prophet. As happened in most mawlid ritual in the Hadrami
family in Indonesia, the ritual of reciting dzikir and shalawat in the
majelis is accompanied with burning aromatic incense which release
fragrant smoke. The incense burning place is put in front of the majelis
close to the leader of the ritual. The aroma of incense as believed by
one of teachers of the majelis will be the witness for those who practice
in the shalawat and dzikir ritual in the hereafter.
The ritual of Nurul Mustafa is conducted on the basis of a set of
weekly schedule. The ritual of this majelis conducted in different places
in Jakarta is led directly by the leader of this group, H{abi>b H{asan bin
Ja’far Assegaf and his three other brothers, H{abi>b Abdullah bin Ja’far
Assegaf, H{abi>b Mustafa bin Ja’far Assegaf, H{abi>b Qasim Sami bin
Ja’far Assegaf. H{abi>b Hasan bin Ja’far Assegaf, the leader of the majelis,
usually leads the a big ritual of this majelis conducted on Saturday night
in different places in Jakarta as well as a ritual held in the central office
of the majelis,19 while other rituals held in other days are respectively
Yunus Ali Al-Muhdhor, Mengenal Lebih Dekat al-Habib Abdullah bin Alawi al-Haddad:
Kisah Hidup, Tutur Katanya dan Tarekatnya (Surabaya: Cahaya Ilmu Publisher, 2010), p.2.
18
19
Usually the followers and staffs of the majelis called their office as istana (the palace).
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Arif Zamhari
under the direction of his three brothers. H{abi>b H{asan, the leader,
divides location of the majelis ritual in Jakarta into three areas: West
Jakarta is led by H{abi>b Mustafah bin Ja’far, East Jakarta is under the
direction of H{abi>b Qasim Sami, and South Jakarta led by H{abi>b
Abdullah bin Ja’far. These three areas will gather collectively in the
majelis ritual on Saturday night.
The leader of the groups usually delivers Islamic lecture on
particular themes during the ritual held by the majelis. The topic of the
Islamic lecture is chosen by the leader. The theme of the lecture in the
Nurul Mustafa includes the stories of Muslim saints (awliya>’), the story
about the life of the Prophet, the importance of loving the Prophet
and his family and the character of the Prophet. In the ritual held every
Saturday night, the leader of Majelis Nurul Mustofa invites several
Muslim scholars (‘ulamā’) to deliver a small speech after reciting dzikir
and shalawat.
The relationship between the leader of Nurul Mustafa and the
followers either during the ritual or outside the ritual is of important
aspect of those groups. The relationship is not like the strong masterdisciple (murshid-muri>d) relationship in many Sufi orders. The
relationship is based on common relations practiced in teacher-student
relations in the Islamic learning tradition, while the relationship
between muri>d and murshid in Sufi orders is strongly based on a
complex set of adab (comportment) as well as sanctions. The late Kyai
Usman Ishaqi, the murshid of Qadiriyah wa Naqshabandiyah order from
Surabaya, mentioned the adab by which the muri>d should completely
respect their murshid. He puts it this way:
You should respect your syaikh and believe outwardly (z}a>hir)
and inwardly (ba>t}in), without the help of the syaikh, your
objective will never be obtained. You should not complain
about what the shaykh has done, even though the shaykh
may have done something which is unlawful in appereance.
Instead, avoiding negative prejudice against the shaykh,
people should be convinced that what the shaykh done is
clearly based on God’s orders. If you still do not understand
this, you should think that this is because of your lack of
your knowledge in understanding the essence of the
matter…In all your life matters either in their totality or in
their details, in devotional aspect or cultural aspects, you
should abandon your own choice because your shaykh has
chosen for you…You should not talk in front of your
134
shaykh. When he asks you, instead of answering too long,
you must answer the question precisely. This partly because
speaking too much in front of the shaykh will eliminate his
veneration. Therefore, the excellent adab of a muri>d toward
his shaykh is that you should be silent, quiet, and pay
attention to what the shaykh says and do that which
contribute to welfare.20
This adab (comportment) is relevant to the famous expression in
the Sufi tradition, Be with your shaykh like the corpse in the hands of
the washer; he turns it over as he wishes and it is obedient.21 This long
adab is extremely stressed in a Sufi tradition, either by murshid or his
khali>fah, especially on the occasion of initiation. In contrast, even
though the jamāàh of the majelis do not follows such as adab, they still
pay respect to their leader and consider their leader as the person who
is able to guide them spiritually.
Financial Support
In order to run and support activities of the majelis, Nurul Mustafa
seeks and draws funding resources such as cooperatives, shops,
financial government assistance as well as financial assistance from
followers. The Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat Nurul Mustafa draws
funding from the followers through conventional mechanism. For
instance, the majelis collect funds from the jamāàh during the ritual by
providing collection boxes. These boxes are distributed with the crews
of the majelis among followers who attend the ritual. They are strongly
recommended to give some money for the jamāah. Furthermore, the
majelis also seeks funds resources from selling merchandise of the
majelis such as the picture of the h}abi>b, the majelis’ jacket uniform and
DVD’s on the ritual of the majelis, charging parking fees, and charging
electricity fees for street traders during the ritual, renting sound system,
lights, and a stage. Sometimes the Majelis Nurul Mustafa is invited by
the jamā`àh to conduct dzikir and shalawat ritual in their region. If this
is the case, the jamāàh must cover all expenses of the ritual including
sound system rental, lights, and a stage catered by the majelis’
Muhammad Usman Al-Ishaqi, Al-Khulashah al-Wafiyyah Fi al-Adab wa Kayfiyat alDhikir ‘Inda al-Sadat al-Qadiriyyah wa al-Naqshabandiyah (Surabaya: Al-Fitrah, n.d), pp. 56.
20
J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press,
1973), p. 187.
21
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Arif Zamhari
appliances. Moreover, the majelis also conducts annual program of
visiting the sacred tombs of awliya>’ throughout Jawa led by the leader
of the majelis. In order to join this program, the jamāàh should pay
particular amount of money for a bus ticket rented by the majelis. All of
these funds are being channeled for the activity of the majelis.
Memberships
As happened in many other Sufi groups, the exact number of
members (jamā`àh) and their social background are not easy to
establish because the Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat Nurul Mustafa keeps
no official records and the recruitment of new followers is not
officially recorded. The member of these groups includes not only
elderly men and women but also younger people and children.
However, the number of teenager exceeds the number of other group
of age.
To become participants of those majelis dzikir and shalawat groups,
people do not need to take an oath or initiation (bayàh) to the leader
or his representative as in the case of member of tarekat. In other
words, the mode of entry is voluntary, so people can practice the ritual
and recite the dzikir and shalawat without asking direct permission to
the leader. Moreover, those groups do not ask an exclusive
commitment on the part of their members. Therefore, people can
voluntarily take part in the activities of those groups while also being
participants in other groups. As argued by Abdurrahman, coordinator
of the Majelis Nurul Mustafa, the jamāàh of the majelis are allowed to
participate with other majelis to fulfill the obedience of seeking
knowledge as Muslims. Seeking Islamic religious knowledge for him
can be obtained from different sources and different majelis as long as
they are relevant to the teaching of Islam. However, Abdurahaman, the
coordinator of the Majelis, pointed out that people must find a single
spiritual teacher who is able to guide them in this world and in the
hereafter. In other words, the jamāah of the Majelis Nurul Mustafa are
not allowed to choose more than one spiritual teacher for their
spiritual life. In this sense, if they have decided to choose the h}abi>b of
Nurul Mustafa as their spiritual teacher, they are not permitted to
follow other h}aba>ìb as their spiritual teacher. He says as follows:
‘People can join the Majelis Nurul Mustafa and practice the
ritual of other majelis. They have a freedom to join other
majelis as part of their obedience to seek Islamic knowledge
136
from any various resources. However if they seek a spiritual
master for themselves they have to choose only one
particular spiritual master.’ 22
It is interesting to note here that the Majelis Nurul Mustafa allows
non-Muslim to participate in the ritual without requiring them to
convert to Islam. In contrast to majelis dzikir and shalawat, the Sufi
orders (tarekat) ask their member to take avow of allegiance to their
shaykh or murshid, before they can recite a special dzikir and more
ah}za>b, a special wird created by Sufi or Muslim scholars.23 Even, Sufi
groups such as Hamidiyah Shadiliya24 and Tijaniyah Sufi groups have
demanded an exclusive commitment from their member. For instance,
people who join Tijaniyah are expected to abandon their commitment
to other Sufi groups.
The Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat Nurul Mustafa also does not
require a particular mode of recruitment. People can be regarded as
part of jamāah of the majelis, if they would attend and participate in the
ritual of the majelis regularly. In this respect, the continuity (istiqa>mah)
of attending and participating is extremely stressed in the majelis. For
instance, in every dzikir ritual held by the jamāàh, the leader of the
group continuously stresses the importance of attending and practicing
the dzikir and shalawat ritual for his jamāàh. For the leader of Nurul
Mustafa, continuity is extremely important because it will generate a lot
of blessings of God for the improvement of peoples’ spiritual life.
Quoting a popular proverb in Sufi tradition, he pointed out that
continuity is much better than a thousand of miracles (kara>mah).
In order to keep the jamāàh involve on the practice of dzikir and
shalawat held by the majelis on regular basis, the leader of this group
tries to find particular ways to increase their interest of attending the
majelis ritual. One of the ways is by introducing and creating new
melodies in the reciting of shalawat accompanied by entertainingly
musical instruments as well as creating new songs for the ritual.
According to Ustadz Jamal, who is a vocalist of the majelis, songs
which he usually sings during the ritual are written by the leader of the
majelis. He and the leader of the majelis regularly discuss the text of the
22
Interview with Abdurrahman, the coordinator of the ritual, November 2011.
23
Trimingham, The Sufi Orders, p. 187.
24
Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt, p. 94.
137
Arif Zamhari
song and make its melody. The shalawat song is effective to attract the
interest of the jamāàh which is mostly dominated by teenagers and
youngster to attend the ritual. In addition, in order to attract the jamāah
to attend the majelis, the majelis also invites celebrities, TV stars, and
public figures to attend the ritual and give them the opportunity to
make a short talk before the ritual of dzikir and shalawat begin. Internet
and SMS from mobile phone are another important means to keep the
jamāàh informed and involved in the activity of the majelis. The majelis
sets up a website of the majelis (http://nurulmusthofa.org) and
facebook which mainly contain the activity of the majelis, a weekly
schedule of the ritual, stream video live taken from the weekly ritual,
pictures of the h}aba>’ib and the transcript of the leader’s speech in the
ritual of the majelis.
Moreover, to attract the jamāàh attending to the majelis, after
Dzikir ritual held by the group in headquarter of the majelis, the h}abi>b
also provides simple dinner. The majelis distributes a big plate with full
of rice and meat accompanied by a cup of mineral water. One big plate
is usually provided for three or four jamāàh. Another salient strategy
of this majelis to attract new participants is by introducing the leader of
this jamāàh as the descendent of the Prophet. This strategy is proven
to be effective to improve the authority of the majelis among other
majelis and the interest of jamāàh to join the majelis. As a result, they
become interested in keeping involved in the jamāàh on regular basis
because of the figure of the h}abi>b. One of the jamāàh explained why he
is interested in joining the group:
‘I joined and practice the ritual of dzikir and shalawat of
Nurul Mustafa because of the figure of the majelis’ leader. He
is a h}abi>b, the great grandson of the Prophet. Even though I
have never met directly to the Prophet, of course I am not
able to meet the Prophet by myself, at least I can meet His
great grandson (cucu). For me, this is the same. I am not able
to love the Prophet, but I am able to love the h}abi>b. I hope
the way I love the h}abi>b, the Prophet’s grandson, is similar to
the way the h}abi>b loves his grandfather.’ 25
25
Interview with Faiz, the follower of the majelis on July 2011.
138
The Authority of the Leader
The head of the group is important in the Majelis Dzikir and
Shalawat Nurul Mustafa. The head of the group has important role not
only in developing the majelis but also in attracting the followers of the
majelis. In this respect, authority of the leader is significant in the
establishment of the majelis dzikir or shalawat. Most of majelis dzikir and
shalawat are established on the basis of charisma of the leader. The
authority of the head of the Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat of Nurul
Mustafa is built on the basis of the leadership of h}abi>b figure. H{abi>b is a
title given to those who are considered as male descendent of the
Prophet Muh}ammad, while shari>fah is a title given to female
descendents of the Prophet. The concept of the h}abi>b and shari>fah has
been well preserved particularly in the Indonesian Hadrami families.
The Hadrami family categorized as sayyid usually has the line of family
tree (silsilah) which is traced back to the Prophet. In order to preserve
the purity of their Arab family, they only get married with those from
Arab family.
Like many other Hadrami families in Indonesia, the leader of the
Majelis Nurul Mustafa put his genealogical family tree in his mushalla (a
small venue for praying) so that the jamāàh can clearly read and see his
descendant up to the Prophet. Currently, among Indonesian Muslims,
the title of h}abi>b is given only to those Indonesian Arab families who
are not only the descendent of the Prophet but also those who are
equipped with the higher Islamic knowledge and the highest station of
Sufi practices. The h}abi>b believes that as h}aba>’ib are the descendents of
the Prophet, they have a potential of spiritual power (bashi>rah) derived
from their grandfather (jadd)26 (the Prophet Muh}ammad), which is
easily used to improve their consciousness to God.27
Therefore, with his privilege, as the leader of majelis dzikir and
shalawat, he regard himself responsible to introduce Muslim to the
Prophet, as he is part of the family of the Prophet who has
genealogical connection with those who have previously achieved the
highest station of Sufi practices. In this regard, tawassul (seeking a
means) through these renowned h}aba>’ib (sing. h}abi>b) and awliya>’ (the
saints of God) is extremely stressed in the majelis. H{abi>b H{asan
26‘Jid’
meaning grandfather, is an Arabic work which is usually used by Indonesian
habaib to call the Prophet Muhammad as their grandfather.
27
Interview with H{abi>b H{asan bin Jakfar Assegaf, November 2011.
139
Arif Zamhari
explains the importance of tawassul as follows, ‘Love of awliya>’ cannot
only help us in the hereafter but also lead to love the Prophet and
God.’ On the weekly ritual, he also says, ‘We must give respect to the
family of the Prophet Muh}ammad (dhurri>yat al-rasu>l) and the Saints of
God. Our heart must not forget the Prophet. Respect His grandsons,
in order to make them happy.’ The special status of the ahl al-bayt is
found in two verses in the Qur’a>n. The first verse is 33:33: ‘God only
whishes to remove all filth from you, people of the house (ahl al-bayt),
and to purify you completely.’ Another verse commanding Muslim to
respect love the Prophet’s family (ahl al-bayt) is 42:23: ‘I do not ask you
for reward (for delivering the revelation), except the love of those who
are near of kin.’ There are numerous H{adi>th (Prophet tradition) which
extol the status of ahl al-bayt and command Muslims to love them. The
example of the H{adi>th is ‘whoever prays a prayer in which he does not
bless me and my family, it will not be accepted.’ Another H{adi>th is ‘the
people of my house are like the Ark of Noah, whoever rides is saved,
and whoever stays behind is shaken by hellfire.’ Even though there are
several verses and H{adi>th commanding to love ahl al-bayt, the h}abi>b
never cited during his speech. He just stressed the importance of
respect the Prophet’s families and extol the status of them.
Moreover, the authority of the leader of the majelis is also based on
the connection of the h}abi>b with that of h}aba>’ib or ‘ulamā in
Hadramawt, especially in the region of Tarim. Historically, Hadramawt
has been considered as one of the origin of Islam in Malay-Indonesian
Archipelago.28 The role of the Hadrami in the process of Islamization
in the region has probably been substantial. With this historical
position it is no doubt that Hadrami has been important among
Indonesian Muslims religiously. Even, it is widely held among
Indonesian h}aba>’ib that most of the Nine Saints (Wali Songo), the
preachers of Islam, in the history of Islamization in the archipelago are
Hadrami or have Hadrami descendants.
Among h}aba>’ib in Indonesia in particular and Indonesian Muslims
in general the region of Tarim has been well known as a place where
most of renowned h}aba>’ib and the saints of God live and a lot of
shrines of awliya>’ become the object visitation of Muslims from
Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan ‘Ulamā Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII
dan XVIII (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), p.28.
28
140
different places in the world. In addition to Haramain, Hadramawt is
another destination for Indonesian Muslims who seek Islamic
knowledge, visit the sacred sites and the centre for Sufi heritage.
Therefore, with this important position of Hadramut religiously, the
h}aba>’ib of Indonesia try to link their connection with the h}aba>’ib and the
sacred places in Hadramawt. For instance, the leader of the majelis
makes regular visit to Tarim and meet its h}aba>’ib and ‘ulamā’ which are
believed to be the saints of God. In addition, the majelis also invites the
‘ulamā’ and h}aba>’ib from Hadramawt (Tarim) to attend and lead the
annual ritual of the majelis. Inviting the h}aba>’ib and ‘ulamā’ of Tarim
without doubt can increase not only the authority of the majelis but also
the leader of the majelis. The presence of the ‘ulamā from Tarim also
makes the jamāàh believe that the ritual they practice is closely
connected to the similar tradition widely held by ‘ulamā’ in Tarim to
whom their leader has continuously told the story about their life,
virtues and their Sufi practices. The importance of Tarim for this
majelis has been told by one of the teachers of the majelis as is follows:
‘Without Tarim, Indonesia may be still in the age of dark.
Tarim is a place where most saints of God grow. All the
Nine Saints are from the descendent of Prophet of
Tarim…Tarim can be described as the centre of electricity
which illuminates to different places of the world. I have
studied at Tarim for four and half years because of the h}abi>b
asked me to study there. When I studied there I felt that the
h}abi>b was presence. For me, although the h}abi>b never studied
in Hadramawt, he has obtained the secret of Hadramawt’s
‘ulamā’. I have met many respected ‘ulamā and studied
Islamic knowledge from them. I have tested Tarim’s salt. All
of them have the same virtues as the H{abi>b H{asan. One day
I felt very sad, because a lot of problems that I faced such as
the delay of pocket money from my parent and homesick.
One day I visited one of ‘ulamā’ of Tarim and he just
rubbed my head and prayed for me then suddenly I felt
happy.’29
Conclusion
Sufi tradition in Indonesia has been experiencing innovations
socially and structurally since the last two decades. These innovations
29
Interview with Ustad Rizq, January 2012.
141
Arif Zamhari
are well exemplified by some majelis dzikir and shalawat groups in
Indonesia, like Nurul Mustafa. This group has represented a new Sufi
group that arises out of tarekat group, a group that has been
considered as ‘official institution’ in implementing Sufism. As I argued
elsewhere, even though the group cannot be categorized as tarekat, it
strongly emphasizes the dzikir and shalawat rituals and the teaching of
Sufism which are also stressed in the tarekat traditions in Indonesia.
As a majelis dzikir and shalawat, the group has introduced Sufi
teachings in their rituals. However, unlike a tarekat group, the Majelis
Nurul Mustafa differs on their emphasizing on Sufism. The Majelis
Nurul Mustafa which has its strong basis in urban society and arises
from urban majelis taklim introduces Sufi teaching to its jamāàh as the
complementary of its activity. For instance, Sufi themes are given by
this majelis as part of other themes including ethics (akhla>q), Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh), the hagiography of saints of God, the story of the
prophet (al-si>rah al-nabawīyah), and the virtues of h}aba>’ib. In addition,
the Majelis Nurul Mustafa selectively uses Sufi teachings and texts of
dzikir and shalawat only from sources which are mostly taken from the
tradition of Sufism practiced by H{ad}rami> ‘ulamā’ or h}aba>ìb.
The Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat Nurul Mustafa whose jamāàh are
mostly urban teenagers and youths uses popular methods to attract the
interest of those groups to attend its ritual. The example of this
popular method is by introducing membranophones or rebana music
following the reciting of shalawat. New melodies which are familiar to
the ear of teenagers are also introduced in the recitation of shalawat.
The method is proven to be effective to attract the interest of youth
and teenagers attending the majelis.
The Majelis Dzikir and Shalawat Nurul Mustafa has contributed to
the development of pluralism idea among Indonesian Muslim. This
can be seen from the fact that the majelis allows non-Muslims to
practice and join the ritual without asking them to convert to Islam. It
is undoubted that not all Muslims agree with this idea. furthermore,
several Muslim groups considered pluralism as a non-Islamic teaching
that can be categorized bid’ah. In fact, the ideas of pluralism are
necessarily needed for improving a peaceful life in Indonesia with its
pluralistic culture and religions. Introducing the teaching of pluralism
in the religious ritual will help to create a civilized society. In addition,
this group also play important role in denounce the idea of radicalism
which have proliferated in urban area after the reformation era. Sufism
142
with its tolerant and ethics introduced by these groups is able to
counter the radical teachings promoted by the so called radical Islam
groups. []
References
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Islami Al-Kisah, 2011: pp. 49-55.
Al-Muhdhor, Yunus Ali. Mengenal Lebih Dekat al-Habib Abdullah bin
Alawi al-Haddad: Kisah Hidup, Tutur Katanya dan Tarekatnya.
Surabaya: Cahaya Ilmu Publisher,2010.
Azra, Azyumardi. Jaringan ‘ulamā Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara
Abad XVII dan XVIII. Bandung: Mizan, 1999.
Böttcher, Annabelle. “Religious Authority in Transnational Sufi
Networks: Syaikh Nazhim Al-Qubrusi Al-Haqqani alNaqsahbandi.” in Gudrun Kramer and Sabine Schimidtke (eds.).
Speaking for Islam: Religious Authority in Muslim Societies. Leiden:
Brill, 2006.
Dhofier, Zamakhsari. The Pesantren Tradition; The Role of the Kyai in the
Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java. Arizona: Program for
Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1999.
Jacobsen, Frode F. Hadrami Arabs in Present-day Indonesia: An Indonesiaoriented group with an Arab signature. London and New York:
Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2009.
Howell, Julia Day. “Modernity and Islamic Spirituality in Indonesia’s
new Sufi Networks.” Martin Van Bruinessen and Julia Day
Howell (eds). Sufism and ‘The Modern’ in Islam. New York and
London: IB Tauris, 2007.
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Asian Studies, 60, 3 (2001): pp.701-729.
Howell, Julia Day, M.A. Subandi, and Peter L. Nelson. “New Faces of
Indonesian Sufism: A Demographic Profile of Tarekat
Qadiriyah-Naqshabandiah, Pesantren Suralaya in 1990s.” Review
of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 35, 2 (2001): pp.33-60.
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Al-Ishaqi, Muhammad Usman. Al-Khulashah al-Wafiyyah Fi al-Adab wa
Kayfiyat al-Dzikir ‘Inda al-Sadat al-Qadiriyyah wa al-Naqshabandiyah.
Surabaya: Al-Fitrah, n.d.
Gilsenan, Michael. Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology
of Religion. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973.
Trimingham, J, Spencer. The Sufi Orders in Islam. New York: Oxford
Zamhari, Arif. Rituals of Islamic Spirituality: A Study of Majelis Dhikr
Groups in East Java. Canberra: ANU E-press, 2010.
144
THE SUNNI<-SHI<>‘AH CONFLICT
AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN INDONESIA
Said Agil Siradj
The National Board of Nahdlatul Ulama, Jakarta - Indonesia
Abstract: This article attempts to scrutinize the
phenomenon of theological contestation in Indonesia, as
represented by the Sunnite and Shi>’ite conflict in the region
of Sampang, East Java. The conflict has occurred due to
Muslims’ inability to withstand the differences among
them, so that violence is considered a way of final
settlement. In this paper, the author will try, therefore, to
analyze theological problems between the Sunnite and the
Shi>’ite in the region. It has been widely known that the
Sunnite and the Shi>’ite came out of the basis of similar
truth, and, in fact, they share the same spirit of glorifying
Islam around the world. In this way, all Muslim
communities in the world, including the Sunnite and the
Shi>’ite, should be able to put their theological differences as
God’s graces and the blessing of life, not as the point of
conflict and disharmony.
Keywords: Sunnite, Shi>‘ite, theological contestation.
Introduction
Theological problems will always attract attention of religious
adherents regardless of their religion and faith. This is because such
problems closely relate to their belief in the Hereafter life. People who
believe in “another” eternal life after the worldly life will put their great
attention to the theological discourses.
Today, Muslims are often faced with a variety of theological
statements which claim that a certain group is considered disbelievers
while another is the only right and pious. The facts have even shown
that there has been a lot of violence in the name of theology or religion
that burst in several regions of Indonesia. Such acts can be seen as a
form of “mistaken love” as a result of “blind faith” held by certain
Said Agil Siradj
religious adherents. People who did such misconduct have been
actually trapped onto textual meaning of the religious texts, which in
turn results in many biases that lead to violent and other destructive
actions.
Some people tend to be more oriented to the belief that the
afterlife is more promising than the worldly life. The reason is that in
the Hereafter humans are promised a lot of luxury and happiness. It is
in this context that some religious believers do violent actions for the
sake of “a special reward” from God for their “jiha>d” during their life.
However, the problem lays , whether or not the religion revealed by
God through His messengers encourages people to commit crimes and
conduct violent actions, while the teaching of all religions in the world
puts great emphasis on non-violent actions? It is certainly Man who
distorts either individually or collectively religious teachings for their
own interests.1 This is because when violent actions are re-tracked
based on a few incidents of violence in the name of faith, many other
factors that influence such violent actions are found. In other words, it
is not merely religious teaching which causes the violence. This is,
however, not to deny that the issue of religious fanaticism often leads
to the violent conflicts. These wrong deeds, nonetheless, do not come
out of religious doctrines, but rather result from people’s
misinterpretation in understanding religious texts in the holy books.
Islam, as the religion of the majority of Indonesian people,
extremely rejects all forms of violence. It has been revealed as a
religion of mercy and peace to the world as stated in the Qur'a>n (alAnbiya>’ verse 107): “And We sent thee (Muh}ammad) not but as a
mercy for all creatures.”2 The Prophet Muh}ammad also stated: “Surely
I was sent to perfect good character” (a H{adi>th narrated by alBukha>ri>). These two religious texts prove that Islam strongly
encourages its followers in order to spread love to others, and avoid all
forms of violence.
Wim Beuken and Karl-Josef Kuschel (et.al), Agama sebagai Sumber Kekerasan?
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003), p. ix.
1
Nur Syam asserts that Isla>m has been revealed as a grace for all human and other
creatures of Alla>h (rah}mah li al-‘a>lami>n), not only for Muslims (rah}mah li al-Muslimi>n).
Therefore, respect and love are among the main teaching in Isla>m. See Nur Syam,
Tantangan Multikulturalisme Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2009), p. 60.
2
146
The Sunni>-Shi>‘ah Conflict
Recent phenomena of violent acts committed by a certain group of
Indonesian Muslims, including the case of Sunni>-Shi>‘ah conflict in
Sampang, East Java, present a contradictory picture. Muslims seem to
fail to deal with the differences among them, so that violence is
considered as a sole way of settlement. Therefore, in this paper the
author will try to analyze the theological problems faced by the Sunni>
group and the Shi>‘ah community in Sampang. The author tends to
argue that based on historical facts these two groups can actually look
for common ground in an attempt to reconciliation, for they share the
same root, tawh}i>d.
Sunni> and Shi>‘ah in Conflict
The term of Sunni> usually refers to Ahl al-Sunnah group.3 This
group verily loves sunnah (traditions) taught by the Prophet
Muh}ammad. The spirit of Sunni> teachings has actually existed since the
Prophet’s life-time, but it was firmly established as a school of Islamic
theology after the life-times of Abu> H{asan al-Ash‘ari> and Abu> Mans}u>r
al-Ma>tu>ridi>. Abu> H{asan al-Ash‘ari> was initially one of the Mu‘tazilah
disciples, but due to his dissatisfaction to its doctrines of theology he
left the Mu’tazilah.4 Once out, he subsequently founded a new school
of theology that is identified according to his name, namely Ash‘ari>ah.
In addition to al-Ash‘ari>> there was also al-Ima>m Abu> Mans}u>r alMa>turidi>. Al-Ma>turidi> was one of the leaders of Sunni theology who
base his theological views on the sunna of the Prophet.5 The very basic
principle of the teachings of Sunni theology lays on the basis of
teachings which have been performed by the Prophet Muh}ammad.
Theological views held by this group of Islamic theology are, therefore,
very moderate and they also put great respect to ethical views in
dealing with differences.
Shi>‘ah arose from political factions, especially in the postarbitration between ‘Ali> bin Abi> T{a>lib together with his followers and
Mu'a>wiyah bin Abi> Sufya>n along with his proponents. Those who were
very fanatical about 'Ali> were subsequently called the Shi>‘at ‘Ali> (Group
Mus}tafa> al-Shak‘ah, Islam bila> Madha>hib, 14th edition (Cairo: al-Da>r al-Mis}ri>ya alLubna>ni>ya, 2000), p. 409.
3
Harun Nasution, Teologi Islam: Aliran-Aliran Sejarah Analisa Perbandingan (Jakarta: UI
Press, 1986), p. 67.
4
5
Ibid., p. 76.
147
Said Agil Siradj
of 'Ali>), whereas those who were very fanatical about Mu'a> wiyah were
then commonly called as the Shi> 'at Mu'a> wiyah (Group of Mu'a>wiyah).
But over time, the use of the term is more synonymous with the
followers of 'Ali> ibn Abi> T{a>lib.6 This theological stream confirms that
ima>mah is an important part of religious teachings.7 They truly love the
ahl al-bayt (the descendants of ‘Ali>). They believe that the ahl al-bayt is
more important in holding the reins of power after the Prophet, which
is in this case 'Ali> is the most proper Muslim leader.8 It was such love
which has made the Shi> 'ite group so apathetic with other Islamic
groups.
There are two schools of theology in the Shi>‘ah Twelve (Shi>’ah
Ithnay ‘Ashari>ya), namely Us}u>li>yah and Akhba>ri>yah. The term us}u>li>yah is
derived from us}u>l (the plural form of the word as}l, which means basic,
fundamental, principle or source. In the tradition of Shi>’ah’s fiqh
thought, the Us}u>liyyah group is very rationalist by placing reason as a
principle or source of Islamic law, so that on this basis they are known
as Us}uli>. Among the Us}u>li> scholars were people who were strongly
influenced by the fiqh thought of al-Ima>m al-Sha>fi'i>, one of great
Sunni’s scholars in the field of Islamic jurisprudent (fiqh).9 While the
term Akhba>ri>yah is derived from the word akhba>r (the plural form of
the word khabar), which means news or information. In the science of
Mus}t}alah} al-H}adi>th, the term khabar is used for another term of H{adi>th
of the Prophet. In the context of Shi>'ah’s tradition, the term khabar
does not merely refer to H{adi>th of the Prophet, but it also refers to the
H{adi>th of Shi>'ah’s imams. Therefore, to a certain extent, the Akhba>ri>
6
Al-Shak‘ah, Islam bila> Madha>hib, p. 171.
Al-Shaykh Muh}ammad H}usain al-Faqi>h, Lima>dha> Ana> Shi’i>?, 3rd edition (Beirut: AlGhadi>r li al-Dira>sa>t wa al-Nashr, 1996), pp. 31-6.
7
8
Fadil Su’ud Ja’fari, Islam Syiah (Malang: UIN-Maliki Press, 2010), p. 25.
They see ijtiha>d as an important matter, since it is considered a mere way to discover
laws from their original sources. However, the scholars of Shi>'ah do not recognize
analogy (qiya>s) as a source of law, as the majority of Sunni> scholars are unanimous to
recognizes qiya>s as a means of ijtiha>d. To Shi>’ah there are four sources of Islamic laws,
namely the Qur'a>n, the Sunnah, ijma>’, and reason instead of qiya>s. In addition, Shi>’ah
argues that reason serves as a means to excavate and understand shari>’ah as far as it
does not violate the Qur'a>n and the Sunnah. See Abdul Rouf, “Melacak Akar
Pemikiran Fikih Ja’fari” in Al-Huda, No. 13, Volume V (2007), pp. 30-1.
9
148
people are parallel to Ahl al-H}adi>th in the perspective of Sunni> fiqh,
which is very conservative.10
In the history of the Islamic caliphate, there were rulers who stated
their “theo-political” views which considered the Shi>‘ite as having gone
astray. This is because the Shi>‘ite preferred opposition against the
government.11 Being the opponents against the ruling group was, at
that time, closely related to the past history experienced by the Shi>'ah
community. Experiencing a great lose in the past caused them suffer
from a psychological burden and, therefore, they were eager to take a
revenge. A historical account has even shown that on one occasion,
during the Seljuk Dynasty, it was Taghrul Bek, the first king who
issued the policy to burn all libraries of Shi>‘ah in Baghdad, Iraq. The
libraries were both storehouses of valuable classical works and centers
of works of many Shi>‘ah’s scholars in various disciplines of science,
including theology and humanities.12 However, due to the arrogance
and blind fanaticism, these monumental works were burnt and
destroyed.
In short, the Sunni>-Shi>'ah conflict was mainly rooted in political
matters. The issue was then shifted, however, into theological sphere
as an effort to strengthen each group’s movement. When political
issues are mixed with theological problems, the politics—as a means of
grasping power—has increasingly found its legitimacy. As a result, the
conflict tends to be fiery. When this occurs, the disputes among
Muslims would be difficult to reconcile. Muslims need to be more
open, therefore, to differences, for Islamic teachings they held are
equally derived from two same main sources, namely the Qur'a>n and
the H{adi>th. Moreover, the differences in interpretation should be seen
as a given nature of human and a blessing of God.
The Akhba>riya severely limits the role of the clergy. It sees that the principles of
Islamic shari>’ah must be totally based on the application of tradition, not solely on the
fatwa of the scholars. What is meant by the tradition here is the necessity to return to
the tradition of the previous Ima>ms of Shi>‘ah. The Akhba>riya employs, de jure, the
principles of Ash’ari> theology, in which they also acknowledge the existence of kashf
(rational intuition) to solve certain problem. See Cyril Glasse, “Akhba>ri,>” Ensiklopedia
Islam Ringkas (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, n.d.), p. 17.
10
11
Musthafa Rafi’i, Islam Kita: Titik Temu Sunni-Syi’ah (Jakarta: Milestone, 2013), p. 23.
12
Ibid., p. 23.
149
Said Agil Siradj
The difference between Sunni> and Shi>'ah must be understood as a
must-phenomenon of life. This implies that Muslims should accept
and respect each other in order to maintain harmony among them. It
has been obviously known that Shi>'ah is different from Sunni> in terms
of the concept of ima>mah (leadership). Unlike Sunni>, which views
ima>mah only as a sunnah matter, Shi>'ah regards ima>mah as one of
fundamental teachings of Islam. To Shi>’ah, in order to be “a true
follower” of Shi>’ah a person must believe in ima>mah. In other words,
belief in ima>mah is a fard} 'ayn (an obligatory matter). Moreover, ima>mah
is a functional position of an ima>m (a priest) who serves as a religiopolitical leader for the whole Muslim community and for the sake of
carrying out God’s commands (al-amr bi al-ma'ru>f wa al-nahy ‘an almunkar, inviting to the goodness, and forbidding the evil).13
The aforementioned doctrine has caused many internal conflicts
between the Sunni> and Shi>'ah communities. The dispute has been
sharpened due to a doctrine held by a group of the Shi>’ah people who
idolize ‘Ali> and consider him as a sacred figure. The group even
regards three other companions, Abu> Bakr, ‘Umar, and Uthma>n, as
infidels. These people argue that the three companions wrested power,
which in fact belongs to 'Ali>. The Sunni> group, on the contrary, has
different view from that of Shi>’ah. According to the Sunni> people, the
three companions were also among the closest companions of the
Prophet whose integrity of their Islamic faith is unquestionable.
Therefore, the Sunni> group is very cynical against the Shi>’ah people
who hold such a view and regard them as too outrageous in their
claim. However, not all the Shi>’ah followers hold such a view. There
are groups of Shi>’ah followers which hold a “moderate” view about the
three companions. It is the Shi>'ah Zaydiya who recognizes Abu> Bakr,
‘Umar, and ‘Uthma>n as the caliphs after the Prophet Muh}ammad.
Unlike the previous group, the Zaydi> members believe that the
appointment of the three companions as the leaders of the Muslims
were in order to maintain mas}lah}ah (the common good). The Zaydi>
argue that there were victims of war, waged by ‘Ali>, who really
Bernard Lewis, Bahasa Politik Islam, transl. by Ihsan Ali Fauzi (Jakarta: Gramedia,
1994), pp. 44-5.
13
150
intended to take revenge against him.14 For the sake of mas}lah}ah the
three companions were, therefore, appointed and chosen as the caliphs
in advance to preserve the unity of ummah. It is necessary to note,
however, that to the Zaydi> people, ‘Ali> remains a more important
figure than the three other companions.
The Sunni>-Shi>‘ah Conflict in Indonesia
Being the two largest schools of theology in Islam has often caused
Sunni> and Shi>‘ah get involved in dispute. Truth claims of each group
often led to conflict and violence. The conflict between Sunni> and
Shi>’ah has not occurred only in the Middle East countries, but it has
also widely spread around the world, including Indonesia as a home to
the world largest Muslim communities. The deadly conflict between
these two groups in the Sampang Region in East Java on August 26,
201215 was an obvious evidence on how vulnerable actually the two
different communities, who live in Indonesia, are to conflict.
Escalation of the conflict has even increased. The case of Sunni>-Shi>’ah
conflict in Sampang was, actually, a matter of internal violence among
Indonesian Muslim communities.
The Lingkaran Survei Indonesia (LSI) conducted a research on
“religious discomfort in Indonesia” from 1 to 18 October 2012. The
research has involved 1,200 respondents, and found that 41.8 percent
of Indonesian “mainstream” Muslims feel uncomfortable to
coexistence with Shi>'ah people, while 46.6 percent of the respondents
feel uncomfortable to live side by side with the Ahmadiya group. In
addition to these findings, 15.1 percent of the respondents feel
uncomfortable to live side by side with neighbors of different
religions.16
Muh}ammad Ibra>hi>m al-Fayyu>mi>, Ta>ri>kh al-Firaq al-Isla>mi>yya al-Siya>si> al-Di>ni>L al-Shi>‘a
al-‘Arabi>yya wa al-Zaydi>ya (Cairo: Da>r al-Fikr al-‘Arabi>, 2002), p. 308. See also AlShak‘ah, Isla>m bila> Madhha>hib, pp. 223-24.
14
“Menteri Agama Kutuk Kekerasan Agama Sampang,” Republika. Available at
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/12/08/27/m9e6y5-menteriagama-kutuk-tindak-kekerasan-Shi>‘a-sampang. Accessed on Monday, August 27, 2012.
15
“Kekerasan atas Nama Agama Meningkat,” Waspada Online, Available at
http://www.waspada.co.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26475
4:kekerasan-atas-nama-agama-meningkat&catid=77:fokusutama&Itemid=131. Accessed on Sunday, October 21, 2012.
16
151
Said Agil Siradj
The aforementioned results of the LSI’s survey show that
Indonesian Muslims’ resentment against Shi>’ah group is still very high.
41.8 percent of Indonesian Muslims feel uncomfortable coexistence
with Shi>'ah people. To firmly state, the haters are dominated by Sunni>
people, indeed. This is because the vast majority of Indonesian
Muslims adhere Sunni> as their “official” theological school.
Muhammad Husain Fadlullah argues that a Muslim’s affiliation to
his school is nowadays greater than to Islam as religion. A Muslim who
adheres to Sunni> as his theological school would be likely very
apathetic against other groups, as he was continuously “intoxicated”
with the doctrines of Sunni> since his childhood. They live in the
shadow of creed and imagination, which are contained by the
exclusivity of history and blind fanaticism of viewing other groups.17
The same is true with Shi>'ah group as they live in doctrines, which
impede their free movement, so that when they face and are
confronted against different people they often regard them as
hypocrite people and unbelievers whose blood is h}ala>l. It is a
regrettable matter, indeed, for Islam promotes and emphasizes the
message of peace as its main doctrine.
One’s affiliation to a certain sect or school has been increasingly
driven by the accumulation of hard psychological problems,
uncontrolled emotions, and the peculiarities of everyday life.18 This
encourages them to make the school they adhere to a "new religion",
which opposes other people of different schools. They tend to claim as
if “the truth” is revealed only for themselves, and they, therefore,
neglect other groups’ truth and rights.
As a result of this fanaticism, Sunni> followers and Shi>'ah members
are continuously involved within psychological and physical dispute
and hostility. Each group’s memories are crowded with various
doctrines and traditions that have long been attached. T Diversity, in
addition, is a common matter, which is also considered sunnat Alla>h.
Plurality is, therefore, an absolute and undeniable matter. It is a reality,
which has been deliberately created by God. Mah}mu>d H{amdi> Zaqzu>q
asserts that Islam greatly appreciates all kinds of human community as
a reality, which should not be an obstacle to the realization of unity,
togetherness, and the ethos of mutual help among the human race.
17
Muhammad Husain Fadlullah, “Kata Pengantar,” Musthafa Rafi’i, Islam Kita, p. xvi.
18
Rafi’i, Islam Kita, p. xvi.
152
Plurality of thought should be addressed as a potential that can pave
the way for unity.19
Nurcholish Madjid states that diversity or plurality of the human
race is the will of God. The scriptures have also informed that human
are created into different nation-states and tribes in order to them to
know and respect each other. The plurality is subsequently evolved
into forms of pluralism, a system of value in which diversity and
pluralities are seen as a positive factor for the creation of common
shared-values.20
The act of blind fanaticism, which has been shown by Sunni> and
Shi>'ah followers, should be viewed, therefore, as a form of selfishness
due to their incomprehensive understanding of Islamic teachings as
well as the limitedness of knowledge they posses. The ignorance has
further caused the emergence of various issues, which led to suspicion,
hatred, conflict, and violence among Muslims.. Sunni> and Shi>’i>
Muslims should, above all, realize that they are brothers who used to
live in peace and mutual respect. The history of harmony they had
shared in the past should be prioritized instead of the memory of
hatred and suspicion.
The Intersection between Sunni> and Shi>‘ah
The fact that Sunni> and Shi>'ah are different does not mean that
they do not posses common values to share with. They can still find a
common ground to play, not in the sense of “school unification”,21 but
rather in the same realm of sources, the Qur'a>n and H{adi>th. Muslims
should, therefore, keep their minds open and their souls conscious by
realizing that every person has difference in terms of his/her ability of
thinking and of socio-cultural conditions. By doing so, Muslims can
cultivate the sense of brotherhood and perpetuate mutual dialogues
and coexistence among them. This is an important mission to
accomplish in the midst of growing fanaticism, which threatens
integration of the nation.
Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq, Reposisi Islam di Era Globalisasi, translated by Abdullah
Hakam Syah (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2004), p. 122.
19
Nurcholish Madjid, “Kata Pengantar,” Islam Doktrin dan Pradaban (Jakarta:
Paramadina, 1992), p. xxv.
20
21
Rafi’i, Islam Kita, p. 61.
153
Said Agil Siradj
The four schools of Sunni>, Ma>liki>yah, H{anafi>yah, Sha>fi’i>yah, and
H{ana>bilah along with the two major schools of Shi>'ah (the Shi>'ah Ithna>
‘Ashari>yah and the Zaydi>yah) have, in fact, common agreement on the
very basic terms and principles of religion (us}u>l). The term us}u>l refers to
the five pillars of Islam (Arka>n al-Isla>m) and the six pillars of faith
(Arka>n al-I<ma>n), emphasizing that there is no religion after Islam; no
prophets after the Prophet Muh}ammad; entire messages in the Qur'a>n
are true, the whole words of the Prophet in his H{adi>th are true; death
and life after it are true, the Day of Resurrection and Judgment,
rewards, punishments, heaven and hell are also true.22 In these main
dimensions both the Sunni> and the Shi>’i> Muslims share common views
although they may differ from each other in terms of interpretations.
The differences of interpretation are a necessary matter amid the
diversity of society. The differences also mark a dynamic of thought of
a certain community.
Fanaticism is not a help in realizing peace among Muslim fellows
and even between Muslims and non-Muslim fellows. The differences
among schools in the furu>'i> (non-basic) matters should be understood,
therefore, as a matter of responses and the dynamics of thought of
scholars of each school. This is why the differences among Muslims
should not be an excuse for blaming each other and viewing other
Muslims as infidels.
None of the six schools neither denies certain religious principles
nor adds things to them. The followers of these schools are, in fact,
working together to build unity and to cooperate in order to achieve
happiness and leave the various threats that surround them.23 The
differences between Sunni> and Shi>’ah are limited merely on a matter of
different perspectives in viewing the validity of argument (dali>l) they
employ. This is in line with the differences among the followers of the
fiqh schools of Sunni>. The Sunni> and the Shi>'i> Muslims are, actually,
very closely linked. The fact that the followers of al-Sha>fi'i>yah are just
like the followers of the Shi>'ah Ima>mi>yah24 is just an example.
22
Ibid., pp. 61-2.
23
Ibid., p. 62.
The Official Board of Shaykh of al-Azhar in Cairo has issued a fatwa>, which has been
signed by the Grand Shaykh of Al-Azhar, Shaykh Mah}mu>d Shaltu>t. The fatwa> states: 1.
Islam does not oblige Muslims to follow any particular sect or school. Every Muslim
has the right to attend any school that is authoritative and fatwa>s that have been
24
154
‘Ali> ibn Abi> T{a>lib himself provided a good example of how to
appreciate the differences in Isla>m. Musthafa Rafi'i has even said that
‘Ali> was the first person who established the foundation of unity.
When Abu> Bakr was opted as the Caliph the squabbles between the
proponents of Abu> Bakr and those of ‘Ali> had almost occurred.
However, due to ‘Ali>’s strong commitment to maintain the unity of
Muslim ummah, he gave great and full support to Abu> Bakr, while
saying: “We do not doubt about the goodness and righteousness of
God that have been bestowed upon you. In this case, we see no
problem that only you can handle it, not others. We do not deny your
honor.”25
The same was true with the ima>ms of the Sunni> schools as they
provided a good example in dealing with differences. Their actions
obviously reflect the magnanimity light as great scholars. For example,
when the Caliph al-Makmu>n was about to make the book Al-Muwat}t}a'
as the official school of the country, al-Ima>m Ma>lik refused it. Ma>lik
said: “O Ami>r al-Mu'mini>n, let people choose the views that are
relevant to them”. Al-Ima>m Abu> H{ani>fah, as another good instance,
once said: “It has also been my opinion, and this is certainly the best
view I could produce. Whoever is able to present a better view, his
view should be prioritized as a paramount truth, then.”
Al-Ima>m al-Sha>fi'i> once told: “O Ibrahim, follow no every view I
have stated. You ought to have your own views; and that is religion.”
On one occasion al-Ima>m Ah}mad ibn H{anbal also said: “Follow
neither me, nor Ma>lik, nor Awza‘i>, nor Abu> H{ani>fah, and nor others.
Define the law based on the sources they use, namely the Qur’a>n and
the Sunnah.” The good examples have also been shown by the
scholars of the Shi>‘ah Ima>mi>yah and the Zaydi> as they never picked up
and followed entire religious laws of their ima>ms except those of what
they have understood according to the Qur'a>n and the Sunna.
codified in form of books. Those who follow certain school and moves to another
school, it is not a problem for him to do so. 2. Ja’fari> school as known as Shi>’ah
Ima>miyah (the Shi>’ah Twelve) is a school that is allowed to be used as a source of law
like other schools of Sunni>.
25
Rafi’i, Islam Kita, p. 63-4.
155
Said Agil Siradj
Plurality as an Inevitable Matter
Differences in many aspects of life are part of life itself. This is
because human are born within different time and space in as much as
various social, political, and cultural conditions. The fact that people in
the world adhere to more than one religion or one religious sect is just
a logical consequence.
Religious matters often lead to plurality. Thus, it would be
unrealistic if one imagines that there would be only one religion.26
Diversity and plurality are undeniable realities, which have existed
since long time ago. Moreover, the so-called a “village of globe” is an
interesting concept where a person or a nation cannot live separately
from the other.27.
Muslims should respond wisely to such a reality. Alla>h has asserted
in the Qur’a>n (Al-Ma>ida verse 48): “And if Alla>h had enforced His will,
He would have made you all one people, but He wishes to try you by
that which He has given you. Vie, then, with one another in good
deeds. To Alla>h shall you all return; then will He inform you of that
wherein you differed.” It can be clearly observed through this verse
that plurality is a necessity, which has been intentionally created by
God in order to examine the level of human’s faith. High tolerance
and respect are needed in this case. This is because when Muslims
reject the existence of plurality of thought, this means they reject the
will of God, deliberately creating differences among humans.
Alla>h in the Qur’a>n (al-H{ujara>t verse 13) also says: “O mankind
verily We created you from a male and a female and We have made
you into tribes and nations that you may recognize one another. Verily,
the noblest among you, in the sight of God, is he who is the most
righteous among you. Surely, Alla>h is All-Knowing, All-Aware.”28 The
verse gives an overview of how people should manage the differences
26
Syahrin Harahap, Teologi Kerukunan (Jakarta: Prenada, 2011), p. 3.
Jamal A. Badawi, Hubungan Antaragama: Sebuah Perspektif Islam dalam Equality and
Plurality dalam Konteks Hubungan Antaragama (Yogyakarta: CRSD, 2008), p. 43.
27
Mustafa Ceric, a Great Mufti> of Bosnia-Herzegovina, condemns Muslim groups
who do not respect plurality. This is beacuse, according to him, there many Qur’anic
verses, which state this matter. This statement is cited by John L. Esposito in Masa
Depan Islam: Antara Tantangan Kemajemukan dan Benturan dengan Barat (Bandung: Mizan,
2010), p. 170. See also Mustafa Ceric, “State of The Statebof Bosnia-Herzegovina,” a
lecture presented in Muslim Community Association in San Jose, CA in November 3,
1997. Available at http://www.sunnah.org/event/ceric/dr.htm.
28
156
wisely. The differences among Muslims should be, therefore, seen as a
necessity in order for them not to be trapped in blind fanaticism,
which potentially harms themselves. Once they could respond wisely
to the diversities, Muslims could bring about a peaceful manner and
respect among them.
Islam highly respects plurality of thought29 as an inevitable matter
for human. The following verse (Hu>d verse 118-119) is important to
be contemplated, as Alla>h says: “And if thy Lord had willed, He would
have surely made mankind one people; but they would not cease to
differ. Except those on whom thy Lord has had mercy, and for this
has He created them.” Through this verse, according to Mah}mu>d
H{amdi> Zaqzu>q, Islam actually appreciates all kinds of communities as
a reality, which should not turn to be an obstacle to the creation of
unity, togetherness, and the ethos of mutual help between people.
Plurality should be addressed as a potential that can pave the way for
unity.30
Pluralism has become a widely-discussed issue in public debates
nowadays.31 In the 21st century humans are hardly faced with
continuous diversities, which might lead to clashes. To avoid
unnecessary clashes the idea of pluralism is then presented as a
concept that invites people to be able to appreciate any differences. It
seems that the idea of pluralism invites people to enjoy the feast of
peace with their fellows.32
The Oxford English Dictionary defines pluralism as a character to be plural, and in the
political world it is defined as: (1) A theory against the monolithic power of the state
and even advocated for increased devolution and autonomy of the main organizations
that represent a person's involvement in the community; also that the power should be
divided among the existed political parties. (2) The presence of tolerant diversity of
ethnic groups and cultures within a society or country, the diversity of beliefs, or
attitudes that exist in an agency or institution, and so on. See J. A. Simpson and E. S.
C. Weiner, The Oxford English Dictinory, Vol. XI, the 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), p. lxxv.
29
30
Zaqzuq, Reposisi Islam di Era Globalisasi, p. 122.
The paradigm of Western society about religion has been much changed from their
predecessors. The idea thinking has influenced the Eastern societies that also assess
the importance of pluralism. It is now, then, the time to produce a progressive
interpretation of the text for the sake of Islamic world and its civilization. See Harold
Coward, Pluralisme Tantangan bagi Agama-agama (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1989), p. 77.
31
Abdul Aziz Sachedina, Kesetaraan Kaum Beriman: Akar Pluralisme Demokratis dalam
Islam , transl. Satrio Wahono (Jakarta: Serambi, 2002), p. 48.
32
157
Said Agil Siradj
The desire for peace is a basic instinct of human. Human, as the
best creature of God, are always keen on peace and harmony with their
human fellows. It has also been emphasized in the Qur’a>n (al-Baqarah
verse 213), as Alla>h says:
Mankind were one community, then they differed
among themselves, so Alla>h sent Prophets as bearers of
glad tidings and as warners, and sent down with them
the Books containing the truth that He might judge
between the people wherein they differed. But now
they began to differ about the Book, and none differed
about it except those to whom it was given, after clear
signs had come to them, out of envy towards one
another. Now has Alla>h, by His command, guided the
believers to the truth in regard to which they (the
unbelievers) differed; and Alla>h guides whomsoever He
pleases to the right path.
The principle of unity of humankind is the main foundation and
the very root of pluralism.33 Although people are different in terms of
beliefs or religions they adhere to from one to another, they are still
the same creature of God. Therefore, the attitude of respect and
acceptance in addressing the diverse plurality should be continuously
emphasized. It is pivotal to note that the Prophet Muh}ammad was the
best instance in terms of his noble attitude towards plurality and
diversity. He never compelled people to adhere to Islam. The main
point of morality is, therefore, recognition and respect toward plurality
and diversity as a necessary phenomenon of life created by God.
Differences in Theology and the Search of Peace
The word theology literally means the science of divinity. The
word is derived from Theos, which means God, and logos, which means
science.34 The science of God deals with the existence, nature, and
power of God, God’s relationship with human, and human’s
relationship with God, and the relationships among human that are
based on the values of deity.35 The discussion about the context of
Man’s relationship with God is also part of theological realm..
33
Ibid., p. 51.
See A. W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexeion (Cambridge-England: The Islamic Society
Trust, Format, 1984).
34
35
Harahap, Teologi Kerukunan, p. 15.
158
Islam highly emphasizes the values of peace. There is no link, in
fact, between violence and religion. Violence is a mere socio-political
phenomenon.36 On the contrary, religion exhorts people to maintain
peace and harmony with others as a way of life to achieve happiness.
Violence often arises from socio-political issues, which are then shifted
into the theological realm. The past instances show how the conflicts
between Sunni> and Shi>'ah have been caused, above all, by power
struggle and political dispute.
The Sunni>-Shi>'ah conflict that occurred in Sampang, likewise, was
not caused by a theological issue, in fact. Instead, it was a domestic
issue between Tajul Muluk and Rois, his sibling.37 Both have followers.
As a leader in their respective village, their followers have high
empathy; an empathy, which has resulted in a blind fanaticism and led
to violent conflict and murder. It is somehow ironic, for religions—as
the creators of peace—are often misused by irresponsible parties to
gain and sustain their personal or communal interests.
Islam itself means peace. It has taught noble values of peace.
Moreover, it has been rapidly spread across the world due to its strong
commitment to the enforcement of the principles of peace. Islamic
warfare in the past should be viewed as a sole form of defense and
survival. It should not, in addition, be regarded as an aggression and a
way to attack other people due to their different beliefs. If Islam uses
war as a way to spread its teachings, as some people argue, its rapid
grow and existence would have never been inconceivable. There is no
religion that can thrive through bloodshed and terror, indeed.38 That is
why da’wah (religious calls) in Islam is conducted in a peaceful and
polite manner.
The advent of Islam is evidently obvious. Many Quranic verses
also emphasize that the Prophet Muh}ammad was sent to be a blessing
Asghar Ali Engineer, Liberalisasi Teologi Islam: Membangun Teologi Damai dalam Islam
(Yogyakarta: Alinea, 2004), p. 183.
36
See Koran Jurnal Nasional (28 august 2012). The Minister of Religious Affairs,
Suryadharma Ali, has confirmed that the violent conflict Nangkernang, Sampang, East
Java was not a conflict between Sunni> and Shi>’ah. The outbreaks of sectarian violence
in Sampang ascertained due to family conflict between two siblings, namely Muluk and
Rois.
37
Empirical reality in the history of Islam has shown that Islam was not spread by
sword. Instead, it was brought by Sufi leaders through peaceful means that emphasize
love and peace. See Engineer, Liberasi, p. 191.
38
159
Said Agil Siradj
to all human.39 As a religion of grace, Islam strongly condemns violent
behaviors. On the contrary, Islam teaches its adherents to promote a
peaceful means of dialogue in resolving any issues. It is obviously
incorrect when Islam, as a religion of mercy, is understood as teaching
its followers destructive actions such as killing and violent acts. Any
forms of religious violence are, therefore, a mere guise to legitimize the
vested interests of certain irresponsible group and people.40
The Prophet Muh}ammad himself was not sent but to improve and
perfect the morals of human.41 The improvement of human’s character
means a big dream to make the earth as a place where human share
love, affection, peace and living together in harmony. Love and
affection are among the noble concepts of Islam that emphasize
mutual respect and spreading of peace.
The Qur’a>n has stressed the importance of mutual respect amid
the differences among human. Alla>h in the Qur’a>n (al-‘Ankabu>t verse
46) says: “And argue not with the People of the Book except with
what is best; but argue not at all with such of them as are unjust. And
say, ‘We believe in that which has been revealed to us and that which
has been revealed to you; and our God and your God is one; and to
Him we submit.” The verse emphasizes the attitude of respect toward
the People of the Book. Muslims, as such, should respect their Muslim
fellows. In other words, when Muslims, Sunni> or Shi>'ah, fail to share
common roots, they contradict to this verse.
Islamic commitment to peace is, above all, high. In another
Qur’anic verse (A<li ‘Imra>n verse 110) Alla>h says: “You are the best
people, born for all mankind; you enjoin what is good and forbid evil
and believe in Alla>h.” This verse suggests that Islam invites all
mankind to do good and forbid evil deeds. Violence is one of the
unjust actions that should be shunned by Muslims.
In addition, there are verses in the Qur'a>n as a comparison in
viewing the Sunni>-Shi>'ah conflict. Alla>h (A<li-‘Imra>n verse 67) says:
“Abraham was neither a Jew nor he was a Christian, but he was ever
inclined to God and obedient to Him, and he was not of those who
associate gods with God.” Husein Muh}ammad asserts that the verse
39
See sura Al-Anbiya>’ verse 107 mentioned above.
40
Engineer, Liberalisasi, p. 193.
41
See the aforementioned h}adi>th of this matter.
160
implies that religious identity and the name of a religion are not among
important matters. Recognition of the oneness of God and surrender
solely to Him, as the very paramount matters of religious teaching,
become the emphasized concern of the verse.42 In the context of the
Sunni>-Shi>'ah conflict, the verse illustrates that the difference in schools
of Islamic thought should not be regarded as an important matter. The
most important things are Muslims’ recognition of the oneness of
Alla>h and total submission to Him along with their actions to create
mutual respect and helpfulness as well to spread peace. The attitudes
that Muslims must reject are attitudes, outlooks, and practices, which
equate God with His creatures.
Therefore, both the Sunni> and Shi>’i> Muslims should be able to
appreciate the differences in schools of Islamic thought and to wisely
respond to them. The reason is that both Sunni> and Shi>'ah can still
find a common ground in many ways. Thus, there is no reason for the
followers of each school of Islamic thought to blame each other, to
view each other as infidels, and even to kill each other. Islam strictly
prohibits these actions and really condemns them.43 The followers of
Sunni> and Shi>’ah should let themselves together with people of
different religions live in peace. By creating harmony in life, they can
help each other for the sake of common goods and the advancement
of Muslim communities at large in the future.
Conclusion
Both the Sunni> and Shi>'i> Muslims are basically brothers who were
born in the spirit of truth to maintain peace and harmony not only
among them but also among human and other creatures in general.
The differences among them should be seen merely as a result of
different social and political conditions, not that of theological
reasoning. Muslims should, therefore, view the differences among
them as the good graces and blessings of life bestowed by God. Mutual
Husein Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme kepada Mahaguru Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan,
2011), p. 8.
42
Humans should, actually, respect to each other. One must not impose his will in
belief. Moreover, one should not disdain those of different beliefs, since it is a life
choice that should not be forced. It is a taboo to insult other people of different
beliefs. See Burhanuddin Daya, Agama Dialogis: Merenda Dialektika Idealita dan Realita
Agama Hubungan Antaragama (Yogyakarta: Mataram-Minang Lintas Budaya, 2004), p.
23.
43
161
Said Agil Siradj
respect is necessary to promote positive attitude in dealing with
differences.
Islam posits itself as a religion of mercy, compassion, and peace
spreader for all human races. Emphasizing mutual respect, as a way for
the creation of a prosperous life as well as peaceful and civilized
society, is a necessity. Moreover, Islam is a religion that strongly
condemns any kinds of violent actions. Truth claim has often become
the initial phase of violent acts. As the truth belongs merely to Alla>h
Himself, no one person or group can claim the truth as their own
exclusively. Claiming truth means acting like God, and this is
considered shirk in theological sense, that is the biggest sin in which
God will not forgive it forever. Above all, Muslims should be able to
act wisely in responding to and in dealing with religious plurality and
other sort of differences. []
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164
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KNOWLEDGE
Shari>àh and Saudi Scholarship in Indonesia1
Jajang Jahroni
UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta - Indonesia
Abstract: This article investigates how the Saudi regime
uses sponsorship to support its educational system in
Indonesia. The article focuses its analysis on LIPIA
(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, Institute for the
Knowledge of Islam and Arab). LIPIA is an Islamic
institution consistent using traditional Islamic scholarship
especially those of the Hanbalite schools of thought. This is
reflected in the entire curriculum the LIPIA has for its
students. The writer argues that the relationship between
the sponsor, i.e. the Saudi state, and the sponsorship
beneficiaries, i.e. students, is patron-client. Nevertheless, it
involves a wide range of actors thereby allowing the
diversity of knowledge reproduction. Over the last three
decades, it has made a big investment on the field of
education by building Islamic schools and institutes,
distributing scholarship for Indonesian students, and
channeling aid for Muslim organizations. It is becoming
obvious that Saudi uses education as a political strategy to
maintain its influences over Indonesia.
Keywords: Shari>‘a, scholarship, Saudi Arabia, salafism.
Introduction
Until recently only a few studies have been proposed to account
the relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Most of them are
The earlier version of this paper was presented at The 12th Annual International
Conference on Islamic Studies (AICIS), held by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and
the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Sunan Ampel, Surabaya, 5-8 November
2012.
1
Jajang Jahroni
dealing with pre-modern era.2 While this lack of initiatives in some
parts can be attributed to the authoritarian nature of the Saudi regime,
most of the studies have entertained the idea that the relations are
static and that most of the Saudi education projects are largely directed
to support state ideology.3 This assumption does not have strong
evidence. Many things have changed over the last decades. Throughout
this article I argue that, on the one hand, it is becoming more obvious
that these relations have been characterized by patron-client relations.
On the other hand, it involves a wide range of actors thereby allowing
the diversity of knowledge reproduction.
This article deals with LIPIA, a Saudi education project and its
network with Indonesian graduates. These returning graduates are
currently serving in various positions such as teachers and preachers.
In the course of time they have maintained relations with Saudi, from
which they obtain financial supports. It focuses on students who
studied in Saudi in recent periods precisely in the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s. Their understandings of shari>àh have changed over the time
depending on its contexts.
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country. It has played an
important role in shaping the politics of regional and global Muslim
world. This fact attracts Saudi Arabia, which has attempted to become
the dominant player in Muslim politics. Over the last three decades, it
has made a big investment on the field of education by building
Islamic schools and institutes, distributing scholarship for Indonesian
students, and channeling aid for Muslim organizations. It is becoming
Azyumardi Azra, The Origin of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Network of MalayIndonesia and Middle East Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Honolulu: Allen
and Unwin in cooperation with University of Hawai’i Press, 2004); Basri, “Indonesian
Ulama in the Haramayn and the Transmission of Reformist Islam in Indonesia (18001900)” (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, University of Arkansas, 2008); Michael
Francis Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia, The Umma below the Wind
(London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Abdurrahman Mas’ud, “The
Pesantren Architects and Their Socio-Religious Teachings” (Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, UCLA, 1997).
2
Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi Sate: Islamic Voices from a New Generation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gwenn Okruhlik, “Making
Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia,” in Quintan
Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004).
3
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Shari>àh and Saudi Scholarship in Indonesia
obvious that Saudi uses education as a political strategy to maintain its
influences over Indonesia.
Saudi Arabia as an Islamic State
More than any other country in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia is
identified with Islam. Islam is the religion of the state, its source of
political legitimacy, shaping state policies, and serving as the moral
code of society. The formation of the state of Saudi Arabia is a result
of the political leadership of Muhammad ibn Saud (1702-1765), the
founder of Saudi Arabia, and the puritan religious group led by
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792).
Despite that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, its daily politics,
economics and governance is secular. Saudi is one of the Muslim states
which has long allied with the Western countries to guarantee its
survival. It is a rent-seeking state which invites Western companies to
explore its natural resources. Contrary to this, the ulama have played
an important role particularly in shaping public policies on education
and women’s affairs.4
Articulate Islamic movements in Saudi did not emerge until the
1970s. The rise of young educated Saudi generation, many of whom
studied in the West, the availability of technology and communication
system, the growing fragmentation of authority, perpetuated the
movements. These movements were aggravated by the two-week
occupation of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979. This occupation,
led by Juhaiman al-Utaibi and Mohammad al-Qaht}ani, had a great
impact on its further development. Radical Islamist groups accused the
regime of having deviated from the straight path of Islam, being
subjugated to the power of the infidels, resorting to crimes, corruption,
and violation against the Muslim believers. The rebel can be easily
oppressed, but clearly revealed the idea that the regime was so
vulnerable.5
In response to this, King Fahd sought Islamic legitimacy by
changing his title from “His Majesty,” to “Custodian of the Holy
Cities” in 1986. This was followed by his deliberation to tighten up
4
Ibid.
Okruhlik, “Making Conversation Permissible; Idem, “Empowering Civility through
Nationalism: Reformist Islam and Belonging in Saudi Arabia,” in Robert W. Hefner
(ed), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).
5
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Jajang Jahroni
public polices and social life. Gender segregation was more profound,
and the mutawwa (Shari>‘a police) were given more leeway to inspect and
arrest the dissents. Furthermore, he also proposed major reforms in
Saudi education system. New campuses and world-class universities
were built across the country, more scholarship given to students,
religious shrines refurbished and renovated, and exchange programs
with Muslim countries including Indonesia set up. All these things
were made up to bolster the image that Saudi Arabia was center of
Islamic learning.
Education Beyond Border
At the beginning of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia sought to promote its
education system beyond its borders. Universities and institutes
specializing on shari>‘ah were erected at home and abroad. These
institutions were made to accommodate the ‘ulama>’ who become state
notables. This period also witnessed the channeling of Saudi funds to
other Muslim countries through formal and informal institutions. Most
of the funds were distributed through Islamic philanthropist
organizations and humanitarian flags. But since the roles of ‘ulama’>
were significant, this project has been affected by a particular religious
spirit called Salafism.
LIPIA (Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic) is the first and
the largest Saudi project in Indonesia. It was founded in 1980 in
Jakarta. This institute is extremely important since it shapes the
subsequent transmission of Salafism to Indonesia. This can be seen in
the fact that most of the Indonesian Salafi leaders previously studied at
this institute. They are credited of transforming Islamic movements of
the 1970s and 1980s and linking them to transnational and global
organizations.
The foundation of the LIPIA is an uneasy step. It is made possible
by a number of factors. It goes back to the 1970s when Suharto
approached depolitization of Islam. Some Islamic organizations in the
country approached Saudi Arabia. In response to this, Syeikh Abd alAziz Abdullah al-Ammar, a prominent student of Syeikh Abdullah bin
Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, made a short visit to Jakarta. Mohammad Natsir,
a prominent Indonesian Muslim figure, welcomed him. He fully
supported the idea to build an Islamic institute. Natsir was the founder
of Masyumi (the largest Islamic party during Sukarno’s era and the chief
executive of the DDII (Indonesian Muslim Promulgation
168
Commission). He approached Indonesian officials, most of whom
were the high-rank officials of the Department of Religious Affairs.
Daoed Joesoef, Ministry of Education and Culture and a secularistnationalist, refused to give permission to this idea. Alamsjah, Ministry
for Religious Affairs, who supported the idea, came to Joesoep asked
the matter. The latter responded that Muslims were already fanatics. If
they studied at an Islamic institute, they would become even more
fanatical. Alamsyah slammed Joesoep. This brawl eventually led to
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was
charged with the operation of the institute.6
Located in a rent building in Salemba Central Jakarta, still called
LPBA (Institute for Arabic Teaching), the institute began its mission in
1980. The class was held in the afternoon, to give the opportunity for
other students who had activities in the morning. For the first time in
the Indonesian history, Arabic was introduced to public in highly
sophisticated manner. All the teachers were natives. They were Arabs
(Saudi, Egyptian, Sudanese, Yemeni, etc).
With two-rent buildings located in South Jakarta, LIPIA has now
more than 2500 students, around 25 percent of them female. It has
nowadays become one of the main destinations for study. The
availability of scholarship is really appealing especially for poor
students. It is obvious that Saudi uses scholarship as a means of
disseminating its ideology beyond its territorial borders. Whereas
experiencing various problems at the beginning and gains less attention
from most Muslim groups, in its further development the LIPIA
successfully creates network with Muslim organizations. It gradually
recruits students particularly of the modernist backgrounds such as
DDII, Persis, al-Irshad, and Muhammadiyah. It is obvious that, having
the same spirit of puritanism, the modernists are involved in such an
intensely religious engagement. The traditionalist Muslim group such
NU is not really involved in such an undertaking.
As far as the LIPIA is concerned, there are two things necessary to
be highlighted here. First, it has become the Saudi most important
institution in Indonesia. Its graduates have played an important role in
transmitting and disseminating a model of Islam called Salafism by
creating various foundations working on education and social
programs all over the country. Second, its graduates have good access
Mujiburrahman, Fealing Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relation in Indonesia’s New Order
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
6
169
Jajang Jahroni
to state or semi-state relief organizations and individual philanthropists
in the Middle East and, as a result, bring home new financial sources.
LIPIA is a form of state accommodation toward ‘ulama>’. This can
be seen in the prestigious position of ‘ulama>’ in its structure. They are
given high salaries, apartment, car, living cost, and tickets for home
holidays. The professors of shari>àh are given the highest positions.
They are charged with the teaching of fiqh, H{adi>th, and us}u>l al-di>n.
Besides shari>‘ah, Arabic is extremely important. This institute is created
to promote Arabic as the language of Islam and an international
language. Thanks to LIPIA, Arabic has been widely used especially by
Muslim scholars. All the subjects are given in Arabic, and all students
being required to take Arabic. The Saudis are very dominant within the
institute. Non-Saudi Arabs such as Egyptians, Sudanese, Yemenis, are
also important due to their language skills. However, they are paid less.
Indonesians are at the bottom of the hierarchy. They are paid the least.
Figure 1: The Salaries of the LIPIA Professors and Staffs (in Saudi
Riyal)
Degree/position
Doctor
Magister
Undergraduate
Staff
Saudi
15000-25000
13.000-18.000
Non-Saudi
6000-9000
3000-4000
-
Indonesia
6000-8000
3000-4000
2500
800-1000
The wide gap between the Saudis and non-Saudis, the Arabs and
non-Arab, frequently leads to conflict. One of the conflicts which
raises public attention, at least to some, is the case of Muhammad
Zaini, a staff working with the institute for more than fifteen years.
The conflict began when Zaini, a Banjarese, demanded the institute
raised his salary. At that time he was only paid 800 riyal per month.
The institute asked him to be patient as the government planned to
make a new policy. After some time, he found out nothing happened.
Once again, the institute asked him to be patient a little more. He
waited for the second time. However, after some times, nothing
happened. This made him resigned from his position. The bitterest
experience is that the Saudis never showed respect for others. In his
protest to the director, he said that only stupid person and a donkey
who worked in this institute.
Zaini’s case may reflect a broader picture of the LIPIA
management. In spite of its modern technology, it is poorly managed.
170
The recruitment of teachers and students involve personal and
informal ties. This also happens in salary system. According to Zaini,
the institute does not have a standard for salary payment. Instead it
depends on negotiation between professors and the institute. The
highest salary an Indonesian professor has ever obtained is that of
Salim Segaf al-Jufri, which is 8000 riyal per month. Al-Jufri is one of
the Indonesian who successfully create links with Saudi. He previously
studied at Islamic University of Medina and assumed key positions in
WAMY (World Association Muslim Youth) and International Saudi
Relief. He has been credited of creating link between Islamic
organizations particularly founded by the Saudi graduates with donor
institutions in the Middle East.
LIPIA has consistently applied the curriculum which orients
students to acquire a complete knowledge of Islamic traditional
scholarship. This results in the rigid nature of their religious practices
e.g. gender segregation, women’s seclusion, and the stress on outward
disciplines such as having long beards (lih}yah), Arab-style flowering
robes (jalabiyah), and shortening pants right up ankles (isba>l), and
women’s wearing a form of enveloping black veil (burqah).
Furthermore the institute teaches traditional Islamic scholarship
especially those of the Hanbali school. A collection of Hanbali books
are found in the library. Students are required to take all courses related
to this school. Despite other Sunni scholarship are available, the
collections are limited. Neither the works of al-Ghazali, a Sunni
theologian and philosopher (d. in 1111), nor those of Ibn Arabi, a
Muslim mystic (d. 1240), are available. The only classical book available
and widely used in the institute is Bida>yatal-Mujtahid, composed by Ibn
Rushd (d. in 1198). Modern Islamic works by the Salafi ‘ulama>’ are
available. The works of Syeikh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, died
in 1999, and Syeikh Abdullah al-Uthaimin, died in 2001, are abundant.
The institute also emphasizes on the importance of the memorization
of the Koran and the H{adi>th. Some scholarship are given to students
memorizing the H{}adi>th at most.
Figure 2: List of the Textbooks in the Faculty of Shari>àh and Takmi>li>
of LIPIA Jakarta
Subject
Books
The Qur’an
8 chapter
Author
Madhhab
171
Jajang Jahroni
Subject
Books
Author
Madhhab
Fiqh
Bida>yat al-Mujtahid
wa Niha>yat alMuqtas}id
Ibnu Rusyd
Maliki
Mukhtashar Abi>
Shuja’ Matan
Gha>yah Taqrib in
Fiqh Syafii
Abu Syuja’
Syafii
H{adi>th
Subu>l al-Sala>m
Sharh} Bulu>gh alMara>m
Al-San’ani
Previously Zaidi
moved to Zahiri
Musthalah H{adi>th
Taysir Must}alah} alH{adi>th
Tafsi>r
Fath al-Qadi>r alJa>mi bayna Fanni
Riwa>yah wa Dira>yah
Al-Shawkani
Previously Zaidi
moved to Salafi
Nah}wu
Sharh} Ibn Aqi>l li
Alfiyah ibn Ma>lik
Ibn Qudamah
Hanbali
Awd}a>h}ul Masa>lik li
Alfiyah ibn Ma>lik
Ushu>l
Fiqh/Qawa‘id
Fiqhiyah
Tauh}i>d
172
Raudhat al-Nadhi>r
Wa Jannat alMunadhir
Al-Mumta‘a fi alQawa>‘id al-Fiqhiyah
Muslim bin
Muhammad bin
Majid al-Dawsi
Al-Qaul al-Mufi>d
‘ala> Kit>ab al-Tauh}i>d
Muhammad bin
Salih al-Uthaimin
Sharh} al-Aqi>dah alThaha>wiyah
Ibn Abd –Uzz alDimasqi
Al-‘Aqi>dah
Shalih bin Fauzan
Ali Fauzan
Subject
Books
Author
Mawa>ris
Al-tah}qi>qa>t alMardhiyah fi alMaba>his alFardhiyah
Shalih bin Fauzan
ali Fauzan
Tsaqafah alIsla>miyah
Al-Kutub alMukhtalifah
Rashid al-Rijal
Masha>dir alBah>thi
Al-Kutub alMutkhtalifah
Rashid al-Rijal
Madhhab
As I argued earlier, the Saudi uses scholarship as a means to
promote its education system. In relation to LIPIA, all students are
given scholarship (muka>fa’ah) for 200 riyal every month. They are also
given all textbooks for free. This scholarship is really important
especially for poor students who cannot afford high education due to
financial problems. Apart from this, the Saudi also provides financial
supports distributed through its international organizations for Salafi
organizations in Indonesia. A Wahdah preacher in Makassar South
Sulawesi admits that he had been financially supported by the Saudi in
the mid 1990s. It is heard that a number of prominent Saudi graduates
have been given kafalah (social security). Saudi Islamic Relief (Hay’at
Iga>thah al-Isla>miyah al-Sa‘u>diyah) and Saudi Religious Affairs (Mulh}aq
Di>ni) are central in distributing funds to Salafi communities in
Indonesia. This does not include funds provided by Middle East
individual philanthropists whose names can be found in the
inscriptions on the walls of Salafi mosques across the country.
Creating Salafi Identity
Identity is extremely important for the Salafists. It is created
through several ways, formal and informal. The formal ways consist of
training in which new cadres are introduced to the Salafi teachings.
Informal ways consist of all forms of social life. Identity is maintained
and reproduced through physical appearance, formal and informal
socialization.
Gender is highly enforced in all forms of social life. This fact is
one of the most striking features of the Salafists. In LIPIA, female and
male students use the library on every other day. Female students are
taught by female teachers, male students by male teachers. Most of the
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Jajang Jahroni
female students are covering up their bodies (burqah). Some have
veiling (niqa>b). Dating is prohibited, marriage recommended. If male
and female students like each other, they could go to seniors or
teachers to arrange marriage. It should be registered and with the
notification of parents.
The ideology of Salafism is further disseminated among others
through prayer. Prayer is the most important ritual in Islam, and
mosque serves the locus where identity making is taking place. Despite
prayer can be performed individually, it is better to perform it
collectively. By performing collective prayers, students are involved in
face-to-face communication with others. Conversation, expressions,
shaking hand, kissing, hugging and patting are quite common and
ritualized. Performing collective prayer will give deep impact and raise
strong in-group feelings on each member of the believers.
Collective prayer, highly recommended, is strategized in such a way
to directly contribute to identity-making process. Ideally there is only
one collective prayer for one community in each prayer time. The
second, the third, the fourth prayer, would only be justified if there are
reasons to do so. To make all the believers aware of and to give them
chance to come to the mosque, the intervals between prayer call and
prayer are made longer. While in non-Salafi mosques, it is around five
to ten minutes, in Salafi mosques, however, it takes fifteen to thirty
minutes.
The numerous collective prayers has been discussed in many Salafi
publication as to whether it is justified to perform collective prayer in
one mosque for more than once. To this question, there are several
answers. First, the second, the third, the fourth collective prayers are
justified if the capacity of mosque is limited. Second, the second, the
third, the fourth collective prayers are justified if there is no regular
imam. Third, it is unlawful if there is a regular imam and the mosque
can accommodate all the congregants. It is easy to understand this rule.
By making only one collective prayer, all the members of the
community are seeing each other thereby contributing to the
strengthening of their identities.
The Diversity of Knowledge
The Saudi education projects involve such a wide range of actors
as students, teachers, religious scholars, activists. All of them are
having different interests that make the reproduction of knowledge
multi-faceted, complex, and ever-changing phenomenon. This is a
174
result that actors have different backgrounds and live in largely
overlapping social settings. The LIPIA itself has gradually changed to
adjust to the existing conditions. This can be seen in the fact that it
begins to get involved in such public discourses as pluralism and civil
rights.
Throughout this article, I will use the term Salafism to denote the
process of the reproduction of knowledge taking place within LIPIA
and other Saudi-funded institutions in Indonesia. Salafism is a form of
Islam which calls on the Muslim people to return to the pristine
sources of Islam. This term has historical precedence that goes back as
early as the first century of Islamic history. It is also evidently safer and
more fruitful during my interviews with professor and students.
Despite that the Salafi groups have different understanding on
Salafism, they agree on the extent to which Salafism is defined such as
the primacy of the religious resources such as the Qur’a>n and the
Sunnah over rational approaches towards religion.
In regard to religious innovation (bid‘ah), which becomes one of
the most salient features of Salafism, there have been different ideas.
Many groups are quite flexible, while others are extremely strict. Some
Salafi groups use bid ‘ah as a weapon to attack other Muslim groups to
gain sympathy and popularity. They publish various books on the
danger of bid‘ah. This strategy seems to have attracted particular
Muslim groups to join Salafism and become its members. Other Salafi
groups prefer to take low profile approaches to promote its ideas and
programs. The controversy of bid‘ah has recently reemerged after the
rise of Salafim. In the previous times, it divided the modernist and
traditionalist Muslim groups and brought a deep impact on social and
political life. The former accused the latter of creating various bid‘ah in
their religious practices. The latter argued that not all the bid‘ah were
forbidden. Good bid‘ah (bid‘ah h}asanah) was permissible.
In the previous times, debates on bid‘ah took place in mosques or
madrasah. Thus the opposing groups deliberately defended their
arguments in public spheres attended by ordinary Muslim population.
Recent debates, however, are taking place impersonally thanks to the
advancement of technology. The Salafists use internet, CD, radio,
books, to advocate their ideas. As a result there is no physical contact
between both groups. As far as I am concerned there has been no
physical violence between the Salafists and non-Salafists taking place in
the country.
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Jajang Jahroni
Whether or not the Salafi are interested in such contemporary
issues as civil right and democracy. This question is crucial since there
has been suspicion among other Muslim groups against the Salafists
that the latter might not support civil right and democracy. While these
issues have never been so intensely discussed, there is a growing
concern among the Salafists to get engage more seriously in such
public discourses. In the aftermath of the 9/11, many Islamist groups
began to discuss, with a varying degree of acceptance, on democracy
and civil right. This indicates that there has been a constant change on
the reproduction of knowledge among the Salafists. Nowadays, it is
hardly surprising that the LIPIA holds seminar in cooperation with
Indonesian police in an attempt to combat terrorism and radicalism
that sparks upon the country over a decade. This development brought
about a deep impact on other Salafi groups.
Based on my interviews, the Salafists oppose the term democracy.
This term, they believe, is a Western concept alien to Islam. Instead
they propose the term ahl al-h}all wa al-‘aqd, literally meaning the
commission having the right to legislate and abrogate the laws, a
concept quite similar to ‘indirect democracy’ in the Western sense. The
Salafists oppose ‘direct democracy’ since it likens a learned person
having the knowledge of God, with a layman. Distancing themselves
from real politics, the Salafi do not vote during the general election. It
is hardly ever found that they vote for particular candidates. Despite
the Salafis prevent formal politics, they argue that it is important for
Muslim to give advice to the rulers. This is the most common Salafi
political attitude. Other Salafi groups such as Wah}dah Isla>miyah of
Makassar consider politics as something important to improve the
quality of public life. Politics is a means by which leaders are selected
based on their capacities. This can be seen, for instance, it supports
Ilham Arif Sirajuddin, the incumbent mayor of Makassar to go for
gubernatorial election to be held in 2013.
It is becoming clear that the reproduction of knowledge among the
Salafists widely vary depending upon their understanding on Islamic
teachings, backgrounds and social settings. The assumption that
Salafism is a form of Saudi propaganda is obviously mistaken. This
assumption simplifies the fact that Salafism has historical precedence
and always bears the spirit of reform as its salient feature. Moreover,
the idea that Salafists promote radicalism and extremism on the one
hand and absolute quietism in another, as reflected in bitterly contested
176
terms such as jihadist versus non-jihadist, do really depict its entirety.
The entire picture is that it covers up issues ranging from religious
reform, education, economy, social, and culture. This is not to say that
Salafism is free from patronage, political propaganda, and its fusion
with other ideologies. As I said earlier, before reaching Indonesian
coastlines, Salafism has constantly evolved absorbing locally
established ideologies.
The Multiplicity of Shari>àh
In the aftermath of 9/11, LIPIA began to get involve in discussing
such discourses as democracy and civil society. It was a part of
campaign against terrorism. Many Islamic organizations were
encouraged to get engage in this campaign. This period witnessed the
rise of public awareness of the danger of terrorism and radicalism.
Programs and research on terrorism had been made. It was for the first
time a large number of Islamic organizations discussed more seriously
such issues. Before that these issues had never been given enough
attention especially by the Islamists. LIPIA was frequently invited by
authorities such as Contra-terrorism National Office (BNPT) to
discuss the effective ways to combat radicalism and terrorism.
It is very likely that LIPIA is concerned with the fact that some
people have been suspicious towards the institute as it might have
promoted radicalism and extremism in the country. It therefore holds
seminar and conference to explain to the public that it has nothing to
do with terrorism and radicalism. It also made several roadshows to
Islamic high schools and pesantren to recruit students. These attempts
are positive and reassure the public that the institute is not charged
with those allegations.
Most of the LIPIA students oppose liberalism promoted young
Muslim intellectuals associated with Islamic Liberal Network (JIL).
This issue is particularly emotional as its main figure, Ulil Abshar
Abdallah, previously studied at LIPIA. Having a traditionalist NU
background, Ulil continued his education at LIPIA but dropped out
before he finished it. This opposition is found in their personal blogs,
facebook, and twitter. Some students even publish books to oppose
the danger of liberal Islam. The controversy of Ulil does not only
attract LIPIA students, it also divided Muslim groups into two
opposing camps. The opponent camp even issued a fatwa of
murdering Ulil.
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Jajang Jahroni
A number of student organizations such as Hizb al-Tahrir,
KAMMI (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union), HMI
(Indonesian Student Association) are found within the LIPIA.
KAMMI is the largest student organization which has link with
Welfare and Justice Party (PKS), an Islamic political party which
produce important politicians and bureaucrats. It is obvious that most
of the students support Islamism, that Islam becoming the alternative
system for the ummah. However, support for Islamism has recently
eroded, as more people believe in democracy and civil rights. Despite
LIPIA still play an important role in transmitting Islamism and
Salafism, its influence is particularly limited within a relatively small
group of Muslim communities. Its position is really marginal in term of
reproducing Islamic knowledge within larger Muslim audiences. Most
of the Muslim people still regard the prominence of state Islamic
universities in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.
LIPIA has played an important role in creating Salafi schools in the
country. There have been dozens of Salafi schools built in the country
over the last two decades. These schools are linked to LIPIA in one
way or another. Most of them are found in Java. Looking at their
bases, it is obvious that the Salafists have been successful in creating its
network in non-traditionalist NU strongholds. In West Java, they
created network in Bandung, Tasikmalaya, Garut, Ciamis, Sukabumi,
and Bogor. In Central Java, they created network in Yogyakarta,
Surakarta, Magelang and Salatiga.
In the aftermath of Aceh Tsunami in 2005, the Salafi created
network in Sumatra especially in Banda Aceh. Working with various
Islamic reliefs, they bought lands and built mosque, schools, and
boarding schools. It is clear that the Salafi joined the humanitarian
project together with other Islamic organizations and this project
linked them to broader international financial sources. In Sulawesi, the
Salafi network is found in Makassar. This network is made, among
others, by Wahdah Islamiyah, a leading Salafi organization in the
region. From Makassar, the network is further developed to
Kalimantan, Maluku, and Papua. It is important to say that Wahdah is
founded by the LIPIA graduates and has the largest network in eastern
Indonesia.
It is becoming clear that the Salafists have successfully created
network in province, city, town, and district. This success cannot be
separated from two modernist organizations, Muhammadiyah and
178
Persis. In the grass root level, the Salafists gain strong support from
these organizations. They pave the way for the Salafists to advocate
their ideologies. This may not be surprising if one recalls that both
Muhammadiyah and Persis have the same spirit of reform. At
organizational level, the Salafism, Muhammadiyah and Persis have
made joint project on education. The agreement is that, while the
Salafists provide fund for building schools, mosques, and dorms, the
Muhammadiyah and Persis provide lands. This project has been going
on in several campuses.
It is found that the Salafists survive due to strong support of
campus. The Salafists are in fact students previously studied at various
campuses in the city. They converted to Salafism for several reason. In
most cases, they converted due to willingness to seek for true Islam. In
some cases they converted due to friendship, family ties and marriage.
This fact also reveals the idea that Salafism links to student movements
of the 1980s. This period witnessed a shift of paradigm after the
student movements being crushed by the New Order regime. Many
Salafi members I talked with in this region were former students of
Gajah Mada University, the main campus in the city. They are now
becoming active members of Salafi communities. This is the reason
why Salafi enclaves are found around the city such as Piyungan,
Banguntapan, and Kaliurang. The same pattern can be found in
Surakarta, about fifty kilometers from Yogyakarta to the north. In this
city, a relatively big Salafi enclave is found. They establish schools,
Islamic boarding schools, etc. Many of them are former students of
various campuses in this city such as State University of Surakarta
(UNS).
The Salafi communities consist of well-educated persons, mostly
of biology, physics, chemistry, and math backgrounds. They are now
serving as doctor, paramedic, engineer, and scientist. These persons are
working together with those who have religious knowledge popularly
called usta>dh (teacher in Arabic). They previously studied at various
universities in Saudi Arabia. While the first group uses their knowledge
and skills to develop the movement further, the second gives
legitimacy to the movement attracting wider Muslim audiences. This is
the reason why Salafi movements are so extensive and have farreaching consequences.
In the following sections, I want to briefly discuss the joint project
between the Salafists and the modernist Muhammadiyah and Persis.
179
Jajang Jahroni
This is one of the largest Salafi network in the country that shapes
many aspects of Muslim communities. As I said earlier, the LIPIA
graduates link local Indonesian organizations to wider financial
resources. Thanks to them, many relief organizations create their local
branches in Jakarta and make humanitarian programs. These programs
include education, health, social and economic programs, the
construction of mosque and madrasa, the distribution of the Koran
and Islamic books, the distribution of sacrificed animal, and the
donation of food during Ramadhan.
Muhammadiyah and Persis are the main modernist organizations
in Indonesia which have been active so far. Founded in 1912,
Muhammadiyah has been active on education and social projects.
Persis was founded in 1923. It had the same concerns with those of
Muhammadiyah. While Muhammadiyah has been successful in
establishing schools and universities, Persis had been stuck due to its
rigidity. It had been focusing on eradicating bid‘ah and given little
attention to social and education program. Both organizations are
seen as having abandoned reform issues which previously became the
main important agenda. This fact made the leaders of both
organizations really concerned. It is frequently heard both organizations did not have good prayer leaders (ima>m), their Qur’anic
recitations really bad. It is also heard that it is really difficult to find a
preacher for Friday sermon.
Muhammadiyah and Persis made cooperations with Middle East
charity organizations to build Qur’anic schools across the country.
These schools are largely to train religious functionaries (prayer leaders,
preachers, Qur’anic teachers, religious teachers). In less than a decade,
there have been a number of institutes specializing on Islamic studies
and memorizing of the Qur’a>n. They are built in Jakarta, Bandung,
Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Makassar, Malang, Medan, Palembang, Batam, Mataram, Palu, Lampung, etc. After completing their
training, students are to be sent to areas for religious promulgation.
Excellent students are given scholarship to continue their advanced
studies in Saudi Arabia.
The fact that Muhammadiyah and Persis revitalized tajdi>d (reform)
demonstrates that this is the most salient feature of Salafi organizations. This is totally in opposition to the arguments proposed by many
scholars that Salafism is form of Saudi global politics. While political
patronage between Saudi Arabia and Indonesian Salafi organizations is
180
obvious, this is by no means that they do not have their own agenda.
To some extent, they enjoy a great deal of independence so that they
can create their own agenda. Equally important is that Saudi financial
supports and other Middle East countries are limited. They are usually
given for initial steps mostly for mosque and school constructions.
Once the projects are completed, local organizations should be looking
for other resources for survival. In the following sections, I want to
briefly describe the backgrounds of LIPIA students to determine its
role in the current Indonesian Salafi Islam.
LIPIA has become the main destination for Muslim youths
especially with rural backgrounds. It gives stipend for 200 Saudi riyals
every month for entire students. It also gives all the textbooks for the
students for free. This offer means a lot for those who could not
afford high education in public and private universities. Some
requirements are applicable for applicants. They should at least
memorize three chapters of the Holy Koran (the entire Koran
consisting of thirty chapters) by the time they register. In each
semester students should add one more chapter. H{ifdh al-Qur’a>n
(Memorization of the Qur’a>n) is one the traditional methods in Muslim
communities available until nowadays. Some students claim that they
also memorize the Sunnah of the Prophet Muh}ammad. The applicants
are also required to submit a recommendation (tazkiyah) either by
persons or institutions which have good reputations. Hand-written
recommendations are preferable. Recommendation should be personal
and informal. Since the institute creates networks based on personal or
informal connections, recommendations made by LIPIA alumnae or
Saudi-link institutions are highly considered.
Figure 3: The Statistics of LIPIA Students (Total 2350 in 2012)
School of Origin
Islamic Islamic
high
boarding
school school
45 %
39%
public
school
Economic Background
peasant small
businessman
labor
teacher
other
Place of origin
rural urban
Sex
Male
88 %
16%
30%
7%
5%
21%
75%
Female
12%
37%
25%
Conclusion
It is obvious that the foundation of LIPIA has political elements.
From Indonesian side, it is an attempt to support Islamic movements
after Islam politics being blocked by Suharto. From Saudi side, it is a
181
Jajang Jahroni
form of political accommodation of the state toward the ‘ulama>’.
Through LIPIA, the Saudi state can provide more opportunities for
the ‘ulama>’ to flourish who in turn provide legitimacy for the state.
LIPIA is an Islamic institution consistent using traditional Islamic
scholarship especially those of the Hanbalite schools of thought. This
is reflected in the entire curriculum the LIPIA has for its students.
Despite other Sunni madhhab are taught, they are limited to literature
which are considered relevant for the transmission of knowledge the
LIPIA promotes. Notwithstanding this, the diversity of knowledge is
taking place as the institute has a limitation to control students. This
enables them to create interactions with other groups who have
different knowledge which in turn affect theirs. Politization of
knowledge takes place due to the fact that actors have different social
and historical backgrounds. Actors create knowledge for their own
benefits. Moreover, the different social and economic status between
actors also contributes to this diversity.
The discussion about Salafism frequently stems from a monolithic
perspective which asserts that this Sunni sect is religiously puritan,
unchanged, and opposes any possibility of differentiating knowledge.
While this judgment is baseless, my ethnographic project shows that
Wahdah Islamiyah has successfully bypassed its critical juncture and
moved itself to a wider spectrum of knowledge. It is necessary to note
that the Salafists are not in opposition against modernization. What
becomes their concerns is that modernity should be based on Islamic
ethics. At this point what is more interesting and more relevant to
discuss is that the Salafists seek to push the Islamic traditions and
practices to the center and challenge modernity.
The assumption that Salafi groups are dependent on Saudi funds is
not supported by empirical bases. This relates to the nature of
donation itself. It is true that charities are distributed to the Salafi
groups. But they are limited and are only used at the initial step.
Moreover, the Saudi philanthropists define religious charity in a very
strict manner. They would only give donation for religious
construction as the Prophet Muh}ammad said so. Most of the funds are
largely used for mosque and school construction, others for orphans,
fasting meals, the distribution of the Holy Qur’a>n and religious books.
This means that once the Salafi have had their own infrastructures,
they have to be self-reliant, which means that they have to pay for the
establishment. Based on my observations, one of the strategies the
182
Salafi makes to resolve this problem is by inviting and involving their
member to take parts on organizational responsibilities. []
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186
‫التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية بإندونيسيا‬
‫أفكار صالح دارات و أحمد دحالن و هاشم أشعري‬
‫علي مسعود‬
‫ سورابايا‬- ‫جامعة سونان أمبيل اإلسالمية الحكومية‬
Abstract: This paper deals with Saleh Darat’s particularity
of Islamic orthodoxy who advocated the purification of
Sufism from any un-Islamic contaminations. Saleh Darat is
a Javanese Muslim scholar born in Semarang, Central Java,
but trained in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, to master classical
knowledge of Islam. He is very particular at his time,
known as an ardent advocate for Sufism on the one hand,
and very critical towards the local Javanese Islamic tradition
on the other hand. This specific standpoint has influenced
his two students; Hasyim Asy’ari and Ahmad Dahlan.
Interestingly, the influence has come with relatively
different attitudes and beliefs. Despite his criticism, Hasyim
Asy’ari who was later known as a founder of traditionalist
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) still accepted and even
acknowledged the tradition as a part of Islam. Meanwhile,
from modern persuasion of Muhammadiyah, Ahmad
Dahlan’s criticism results from his belief that the tradition
is bid‘ah (innovation) and khura>fah (superstition).
Keywords: Saleh Darat, Hasyim Asy’ari, Ahmad Dahlan,
local Islamic tradition, bid‘ah, khura>fah.
‫تمهيد‬
‫دور الشيخ صالح دارات الهام الذي لعبه بحسبانه عالما من العلماء البارزين‬
‫ لم يمسسها أيدي البحوث‬، ‫بجاوى في القرن التاسع عشر من الميالد من المؤسف‬
‫ خاصة لدي البحثة المتخصصين في مجاالت‬، ‫التاريخية االجتماعية اإلسالمية‬
‫‪Ali Mas’ud‬‬
‫التفكير التاريخي و اإلسالمي ‪ .1‬ألن الدراسات المتعمقة التي قد ظهرت على‬
‫السطح في األونة األخيرة تتمحور غالبا ما حول أفكار أو تفكير المثقفين أو‬
‫العلماء المسلمين في القرن العشرين من الميالد كأمثال الشيخ أحمد دحالن و‬
‫جر ‪ .‬لو كانت أفكار و آراء هؤالء المثقفين‬
‫هاشم أشعري و أحمد حسن و هلم ا‬
‫اإلسالمية اتخذت ميدانا لألبحاث المتعمقة و لو لم تكن على نحو شامل لظهر‬
‫تأثرهم على السطح بالجيل الذي قد سبقهم و من الارجح أن أحمد دحالن و هاشم‬
‫أشعري متأث ارن بصالح دارات على احتمال قوي ‪.‬‬
‫ُعرف صالح دارات بأنه واحد من المثقفين المسلمين من غير أن يكون له‬
‫نظير و ال مثيل في تميزه في هذا الوطن إلى يومنا الحالي ‪ ،‬وكان في مقدمة‬
‫الذائدين عن كيان الصوفية خاصة بجاوى في عهده و لكنه في الوقت نفسه كان‬
‫من أشد الناس مقاومة للتقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية التي لم تكن على انفصال من‬
‫الحياة الدينية لدى المسلمين في األرجاء المعمورة من هذا الوطن والسيما بجاوى ‪،‬‬
‫و الالفت لالنتباه أن طبيعته المزدوجة قد تم تدوينها بشكل منتظم و مبوب في‬
‫مؤلفاته التي كتبها ال باللغة العربية و لكن باللغة الجاوية المكتوبة باألحرف العربية‬
‫(تدعى ب ‪ .2 )Pegon‬وال يقل عن تميزه أنه أصبح موئل الشباب المسلم الجاوي‬
‫‪1‬‬
‫تاريخ الفكرة يمثل جزءا هاما في التاريخ االجتماعي الذي يقابله تاريخ الثفافة أو التاريخ الفكري ‪،‬‬
‫و بالبساطة أن تاريخ الفكرة يرمز إلى د ارسة عن دور الفكرة في عملية و حادثة تاريخية معينة‪،‬‬
‫غالبا ما اتجه تاريخ الفكرة إلى تتبع و العثور على مؤلفات الزعماء والرواد سواء أكانت ثقافية أم‬
‫دينية في المجتمع المعين ‪ ،‬و خرج من ذلك أن تاريخ الفكرة يسعى إلى فهم عالقة بين فكرة‬
‫معينة في جانب من الجوانب و نزعة في جانب آخر وأهمية و عوامل غير ثقافية بشكل عام في‬
‫علم االجتماع المتعلق باألفراد و المجتمع ‪ .‬جوكو صوريا ‪Sejarah Sosial Intelektual Islam, ،‬‬
‫‪Catatan Pengantar”,‬في نورهدى‪Islam Nusantara, Sejarah Sosial Intelektual Islam di ،‬‬
‫‪ ، Indonesia‬يوغياكرتا‪91 ، 7002 Ar-Ruzz Media .‬‬
‫‪2‬‬
‫عدد من مؤلفات صالح المكتوبة باللغة الجاوية (‪ )Pegon‬و المكتوبة باألحرف العربية يمكن‬
‫الرجوع إليها من بينها ‪ :‬صالح دارات ‪ ،‬ترجمة سبيل العبيد على جوهرة التوحيد ‪( ،‬سمارانج ‪ :‬طه‬
‫‪JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM‬‬
‫‪Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013‬‬
‫‪188‬‬
‫>‪Afka>r S{alih} Da>rat wa Ah}mad Dah}la>n wa Ha>shim Ash‘ari‬‬
‫ليتتلمذوا عنده ‪ ،‬و كان هناك مثقفان و عالمان بارزان في هذا الوطن قد نهال من‬
‫منهله الصافي و تتلمذا في معهده اإلسالمي الذي قام برئاسته و هما الشيخ أحمد‬
‫دحالن و الشيخ هاشم أشعري ‪ ،‬فال غرابة إذا ما ظه ار على السطح أنهما قد‬
‫توارثا من أفكار صالح الدينية اإلسالمية و لو على درجات متفاوتة‪ ،‬وهذا التوارث‬
‫قد تجسد على موقفهما الناقد تجاه التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية المتفشية و النامية‬
‫بجاوى ‪ ،‬غير أن الشيخ أحمد دحالن قد رفض التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية المذكورة‬
‫رفضا شديدا و بالمقابل كان الشيخ هاشم أشعري قد فتح باب قبول هذه التقاليد‬
‫بمصراعيه مع تقديم وجهات أنظاره المليئة بالنقد و التمحيص ‪.‬‬
‫إلقليمية‬
‫صالح دارات و التقاليد اإلسالمية ا‬
‫ّ‬
‫التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية بمختلف تنوعاتها قبل أن تكون مجاال للدراسات‬
‫اإلسالمية المثيرة للجدل الجاد في أوساط العلماء والمثقفين المعاصرين هي في‬
‫الحقيقة قد حظيت باهتمام الشيخ صالح دارات على نحو جدي ‪ ،‬و بإمكاننا‬
‫الكشف عن ذلك من خالل كتابيه ‪ :‬مجموعة الشريعة الكافية للعوام ‪3‬و منهاج‬
‫بوت ار ‪ ،‬مجهول السنة) صالح دارات ‪ ،‬فصالتان (سورابايا ‪ :‬مطبعة سالم نبهان ‪ 9111 ،‬م )‪ ،‬صالح‬
‫دارات‪،‬لطائف الطهارة و أسرار الصالة في كيفية صالة العابدين و العارفين (سمارانج ‪ :‬طه بوت ار ‪،‬‬
‫مجهول السنة )‪،‬صالح دارات ‪ ،‬مناسك الحج و العمرة و آداب الزيارة لسيد المرسلين (بومباى‬
‫‪:‬مطبعة الكريمي ‪ ،‬مجهول السنة)‪،‬صالح دارات ‪،‬المرشد الوجيز في علم القرآن (سينجابو ار ‪:‬الحاج‬
‫محمد أمين ‪ 9191 ،‬هـ ) ‪ ،‬صالح دارات ‪،‬فيض الرحمان في ترجمة الكالم ملك الديان ‪ ،‬المجلد‬
‫األول و المجلد الثاني ( سينجابو ار ‪ :‬الحاج محمد أمين ‪ 9191 ،‬هـ)‪ ،‬صالح دارات‪ ،‬كتاب المنجيات‬
‫متيك ساكينج إحياء علوم الدين الغزالي ( سمارانج ‪ :‬طه بوت ار ‪ ،‬مجهول السنة ) ‪ ،‬صالح دارات ‪،‬‬
‫متن الحكم ( سمارانج ‪ :‬طه بوت ار ‪ ،‬مجهول السنة )‬
‫‪3‬‬
‫و لوكان كتاب " مجموعة " يعد ناد ار فإنه كان قد اشتهر كأحد أكثر الكتب شعبية بجاوى ‪ ،‬و‬
‫يمكن تتبع شعبية الكتاب في كثير من دور النشر التى التزمت بطبعه و نشره على نحو واسع في‬
‫سنوات عدة متفاوتة ‪ ،‬بل كانت بعض دور النشر قامت بطبعه عدة مرات ‪،‬و في المرة األولى قام‬
‫الحاج محمد صديق بسينجابو ار بطبع كتاب " مجموعة " سنة ‪ 9117‬م بعد أن حرره و حققه س‪،‬م‬
‫‪189‬‬
‫األتقياء في شرح معرفة األتقياء إلى طريق األولياء‪ .4‬وتقديم القربان يمثل شكال من‬
‫أشكال العبادات بجزيرة جاوى الذي يتمتع بعناية أكثر من قبل صالح‪ .‬في كتابه‬
‫يحي السماراني ‪ ،‬لقد أعادت المطبعة نفسها طبع كتاب " مجموعة" سنة ‪ 9111‬م بعد أن قام‬
‫بمراجعته س‪،‬م يحي السماراني و الحاج محمد سراج بن الحاج صالح الرمباني في سنة ‪11/9111‬‬
‫م من قبل المطبعة نفسها ‪ ،‬في سنة ‪ 11/9111‬قامت مطبعة الكريمي بومباي بنشر كتاب "‬
‫مجموعة " و أعادت طبعه عدة مرات سنة ‪ 9191‬م ‪ ،‬و قبل هذه السنة و بالتحديد سنة ‪9101‬م‬
‫قامت مطبعة إسماعيل بن س ‪ .‬بافضل سينجابو ار بنشر كتاب " مجموعة" ‪ ،‬أما في إندونيسيا‬
‫فألول مرة قامت المصرية أو مكتبة مصر بشربون سنة ‪ 9111‬م بنشر الكتاب ‪Sugahara Yumi,‬‬
‫‪“The Publication of Vernacular Islamic Texbooks and Islamization in Southeast Asia”,‬‬
‫‪The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, No. 27 (2009), p. 30.‬‬
‫كتاب " مجموعة" هو كتاب يبحث في المجاالت الفقهية ال في غيرها ‪ ،‬صرح بذلك سالم قائال ‪:‬‬
‫كتاب مجموعة من الراجح أنه كتاب فقهي ألنه يتناول مسائل فقهية مزودة باألدلة الشرعية من‬
‫القرآن و السنة و أقوال الصحابة والعلماء ‪ ،‬الذي ال يمكن إنكاره أن كتاب " مجموعة " يمكن‬
‫إدراجه من ضمن الكتب الفقهية البسيطة ألن مضمونه و هدفه موجهان لعامة الناس ‪ ،‬و للكتاب‬
‫ميزة يمتاز بها و هي مزودة باألدلة و بالمباحث التي تتعلق باألعراف اإلقليمية و لو لم تكن كثيرة‬
‫‪ ،‬حسب الخطوط الرئيسية في الكتاب تت فرع األبواب الفقهية فيه إلى ثالثة محاور رئيسية العبادة و‬
‫المعاملة و المناكحة و لكل محور شرح مفصل من قبل صالح دارات باللغة الجاوية التي يفهمها‬
‫عامة المسلمين بالسهولة‪ .‬عبد اهلل سالم ‪،‬المجموعة الشرعية الكافية للعوام ‪،‬تأليف الشيخ صالح‬
‫دارات ‪ ،‬دراسة نحو كتاب الفقه باللغة الجاوية في آخر القرن ‪ 91‬م ( جاكرتا ‪:‬أطروحة الدراسات‬
‫العليا بجامعة شريف هداية اهلل اإلسالمية ‪21 ،) 9111 ،‬‬
‫‪4‬‬
‫الكتاب عبارة عن ترجمة و تعليق على كتاب نظم هداية األتقياء إلى طريق األولياء تأليف زين‬
‫الدين المليباري ‪ ،‬كغيره من الكتب ‪ ،‬لقد كتب صالح دارات هذا الكتاب باللغة الجاوية‪ .‬لقد قام‬
‫بنشركتاب المنهاج عدد من دور النشر خارج البالد ‪ .‬ألول مرة قامت مطبعة كريمي بومباي سنة‬
‫‪ 9111‬م‪ 9197/‬هـ بنشره و أعادت المطبعة نفسها طبعه عدة مرات سنة ‪ 9112‬م ‪ ،‬ثم أعيد نشر‬
‫الكتاب سنة ‪ 9109‬م‪ 9170 /‬هـ بسينجابو ار من غير ذكر اسم الناشر‪ ،‬الناشر إسماعيل بن س بدل‬
‫قام بنشر المنهاج أيضا سنة ‪ 9101‬م‪ . M. Yumi, “The Publication”, 11‬حسب الخطوط‬
‫الرئيسية يحتوي كتاب المنهاج على المادة الهامة في مجال التصوف السني ‪ ،‬و يرمز إلى هذا‬
‫بحث عميق عن دعائم اإلسالم الثالث التي يجب على كل مسلم مباشرتها تزامنا ‪ ،‬و هي‬
‫االشريعة و الطريقة و الحقيقة و العناصر الثالثة هي كيان متشابك غير منفصل ‪ ،‬لقد شبهت‬
‫‪190‬‬
‫"مجموعة " ربط صالح شعيرة تقديم القرابين باالرتداد (الخروج عن اإلسالم) أو‬
‫بعبارة أكثر دقة االرتداد عن األعمال‪ 5.‬بمقتضى رأيه أن حكم تقديم القرابين كحكم‬
‫عبادة األصنام و لذا يعد فاعلها مرتدا لفعلها ‪ .‬و كانت صفة االرتداد الصقة لمقدم‬
‫تلك القرابين عندما خطر بباله احترام أو رجاء مصلحة أو دفع مضرات على نحو‬
‫شامل من قبل الذات التى قُدمت لها هذه القرابين ‪ ،‬وأتى بمثال تقديم القرابين‬
‫لألرواح المتربعة في مكان معين ‪ ،‬حسب رأيه أن تقديم القرابين لألرواح متمثلة في‬
‫طعام من المطبخ أو المزرعة أو مكان ما مقترنا معه اإلحساس باالحترام و رجاء‬
‫مصلحة أو دفع مضرة فهو قد وقع في االرتداد ‪ 6.‬و قد أكد صالح بصراحة ‪:‬‬
‫‪Lan wernane murtad kang kaping telune iku bongso penggawe lan‬‬
‫‪penganggo kaya lamun sujud maring berhala utowo memule maring‬‬
‫‪danyang merkayangan kelawan nejani panganan ono ing pawon utowo‬‬
‫‪ono ing sawah-sawah utowo ono ing endi-endi panggonan den nyono‬‬
‫‪ono jine nuli den sejani supoyo aweh manfaat utowo nolak madharat‬‬
‫‪iku kabeh dadi kufur.7‬‬
‫الشريعة بالسفينة و الطريقة بالبحر و الحقيقة بالجوهرة الدفينة قي قعر البحر ‪ .‬السفينة وظيفتها‬
‫وسيلة يتوصل بها المسلم إلى هدفه السرمدي و هو( الجوهرة الدفينة في قعر البحر) أما الطريقة‬
‫فشبهت بالبحر الزاخر بالغموض و تمثل مكانا للتقرب إلى اهلل بالمعرفة و المحبة ‪ ،‬أما الحقيقة‬
‫فهي تشبه كن از دفينا في قعر البحر يستخرج بالسفينة التي تبحر في البحر المذكور ‪ ،‬غزالي منير‪،‬‬
‫‪Warisan Intelektual Islam Jawa dalam Pemikiran Kalam Muhammad Shaleh Darat al‬‬‫‪ (Samarani‬التراث اإلسالمي الجاوي في فكر كالم محمد صالح دارات السماراني ) (سمارانج ‪:‬‬
‫مطبعة ولي سونجو ‪11 - 12 )7001 ،‬‬
‫‪5‬‬
‫من األهمية بمكان هنا أن صالح قسم االرتداد الذي قد يحصل في نفس مسلم في وقت ما إلى‬
‫ثالثة ضروب ‪ ،‬األول االرتد اد المرتبط باعتقاد شخص ما كاعتقاده أن الصلوات الخمس في يوم و‬
‫ليلة حكمها عير واجب ‪ ،‬الثاني االرتداد بالقول كقول شخص إن محمدا ليس بنبي و رسول الثالث‬
‫االرتداد بالفعل كسجود مسلم إلى الصنم أو ارتداء لباس كما يرتديه كافر‪ ،‬سالم ‪ ،‬المجموعة ‪10 ،‬‬
‫‪6‬‬
‫سالم ‪ ،‬المجموعة ‪919 ،‬‬
‫‪7‬‬
‫ر مجهول السنة ) ‪71 - 71‬‬
‫صالح دارات ‪،‬مجموعة الشريعة الكافية للعوام ( سمارنج ‪ :‬طه بوت ا‬
‫‪191‬‬
‫و في القسم الثالث من االرتداد الفعل و ارتداء اللباس كالسجود إلى األصنام‬
‫أو تقديم القرابين لألرواح كتقديم األطعمة في المطبخ أو في المزرعة أو في مكان‬
‫ما مع اعتقاد وجود عفريت من العفاريت مع رجاء مصلحة منه أو دفع مضرة و‬
‫هذه األفعال كلها كفر‪.‬‬
‫و يترتب على ما سلف من الكالم أن صالح قد وضع خطا غليظا على‬
‫ممارسة التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية و هي"التصدق على األرض " و قد اُعتبر‬
‫ممارسها من المرتدين بل من الكافرين لمن مارس هذه الطقوس بحجة مماثلة لما‬
‫ذكر من تقديم القرابين ‪ ،‬التصدق على األرض بتقديم القرابين لحراس القرية مع‬
‫اعتقاد أنهم سيأتون بمصالح لسكانها و لحراسة مزارعهم و حقولهم فقد كفر من‬
‫مارسها‬
‫‪8‬‬
‫‪Utawi kufur ya wong ahli pedesaan iku podo gawe sodaqoh bumi nejo‬‬
‫‪hurmat danyange deso kono iku haram balik lamun olehe neqodaken‬‬
‫‪olehe hurmat maring dayang kerono iku dayang ingkang ngrekso deso‬‬
‫‪kene lan kang aweh manfaat maring wong deso kene lan kang‬‬
‫‪bahurekso sawah-sawah utowo liyane maka lamun mengkono I’tiqade‬‬
‫‪maka kufur.9‬‬
‫‪8‬‬
‫سالم ‪ ،‬المجموعة ‪911 ،‬‬
‫‪ 9‬صالح دارات ‪ ،‬مجموعات ‪ ، 71 ،‬قول صالح إن تقديم القرابين في شعيرة التصدق على األرض‬
‫هو من أفعال الكفر ‪ ،‬وهذا بالطبع الفت للنظر ‪ ،‬إن هذا التصريح يتسم باالنفعاالت عند مشاهدة‬
‫ممارسة شعيرة التصدق على األرض التى حدثت في البيئة التى تحيط به و التي قد خرقت حدود‬
‫الشريعة اإلسالمية ‪ .‬و حجته في ذلك تنهض بأنه في إحدى مؤلفاته األخرى عنوانها ‪ :‬ترجمة‬
‫سبيل العبيد على جوهرة التوحيد لم يتطرق بالحديث إلى قضية التصدق على األرض و تقديم‬
‫القرابين بأنها من ضروب الكفر ‪ .‬و بالعكس ‪ ،‬أنه قد ذكر ستة أنواع فقط حين وصف ضروب‬
‫الكفر‪ ،‬األول كافر دهري و هو يعني أن كل واحد من الناس يعتقد بأن العالم قديم و أن األجرام‬
‫السماوية هي التي تنشىء العالم اآلخر و هذا يعنى أن وجودها ال يحتاج إلى الخالق‪ ،‬و الثاني‬
‫الكافر الملحد و هو الشخص الذي يحرف المفردات في القرآن و من هذاالتحريف أنه يعتقد بأن‬
‫للشريعة معنى باطن ا ال يدركه علماء الظاهر كصيام السنة جاء تأويله الحفاظ على األسرار ‪ ،‬و‬
‫تأويل الصالة بمعنى الدعاء لإلمام و التقرب إليه و تأويل الحج بمعنى زيارة اإلمام و تأويل‬
‫‪192‬‬
‫يعتبر من الكفر من الذي هو من سكان القرية تصدق على األرض لقصد‬
‫احترام عفريت من حراس القرية فحكمه كفر ‪ ،‬بل إذا كان معه اعتقاد الحترامه‬
‫لح ارسته القرية و لنفعه سكان القرية و هيمنته على المزارع و مكان ما ‪ ،‬إذا ما‬
‫حصل ذلك فقد كفر‪.‬‬
‫إن وجهة أنظاره الصريحة تجاه ممارسة هذه الشعائر كالتصدق على األرض‬
‫أو كتقديم القرابين تنبنى على المعتقدات التيولوجية بأن كل شيئ خيره و شره و‬
‫السيادة على حياة الناس يعود إلى اهلل تعالى وحده ‪ ،‬و بالمقابل أن احترام حارس‬
‫القرية العفريت فهو يعني إحاللها محل اإلله المعبود بالحق ‪ ،‬والعقيدة تقول ‪:‬‬
‫‪Wajib atas wong mukallaf neqodaken setuhune makhluk kabeh jin‬‬
‫‪menungso syaithan malaikat iblis lan kabeh hayawan-hayawan iku‬‬
‫‪podo apes ora biso gawe opo-opo yen ora kelawan qudrah iradate‬‬
‫‪Allah lamun jin syaithan danyang biso gawe madharat maring‬‬
‫‪menungso yekni ora keliwatan menungso den pateni kabeh kareno‬‬
‫‪menungso itu satrune syaithan lan iblis semono ugo jin kufur iyo dadi‬‬
‫‪satrune menungso.10‬‬
‫الوضوء بمعنى التوبة عن اآلثام الظواهر و ال يجب عليه العمل الظاهر و ما إلى ذلك ‪ ،‬و الثالث‬
‫كافر الحرمية وهو كما فعل العبادية العتقادهم بجواز أداء ما أراده عقله و نفسه ‪ .‬و الرابع كفر‬
‫الحلولية و هو كل شخص يعتقد بأن اهلل من ضمن ا لحوادث ‪ ،‬وكذلك من يقول بأن عيسى هو اهلل‬
‫و اهلل هو عيسى أو أن محمدا هو اهلل و اهلل هو محمد و الخامس كفر التناسخية و هو اعتقاد بعدم‬
‫وجود يوم البعث و الحساب و المحشر ألن كل إنسان إذا مات فإن روحه سوف تتناسخ على‬
‫مولود جديد من حفيده و السادس كفر اليهودية و هو كل شخص يعتقد بأن التوراة ال ينسخها‬
‫اإلنجيل و ال القرآن و كذلك من يعتقد بأنه ال نبي بعد موسى حتى ال يؤمن بعيسى و ال يؤمن‬
‫بمحمد ‪ ،‬غزالي منير‪Pemikiran Kalam Muhammad Shaleh Darat al-Samarani (1820-،‬‬
‫)‪ 1903‬أي فكر كالم صالح دارات السماراني ( ‪ ( ) 9101 – 9170‬يوغجاكرتا‪ :‬أطروحة برنامج‬
‫الدراسات العليا بجامعة سونان كاليجاغا اإلسالمية ‪771 - 771 ) 7002 ،‬‬
‫‪10‬‬
‫‪193‬‬
‫صالح دارات ‪ ،‬مجموعة ‪71 ،‬‬
‫يجب على المكلف أن يعتقد بأن سائر المخلوقات الجني و اإلنسي‬
‫و‬
‫الشيطان و الملك و إبليس و سائر الحيوانات ال حول و ال قوة لهم إال باهلل‬
‫العلي العظيم ‪.‬‬
‫االعتقاد بخيراأليام و شرها التي تستخدم لتحديد أيام الزواج و الختان و بناء‬
‫البيت وما إلى ذلك قد القى نقدا الذعا من قبل صالح دارات ‪ ،‬بموجب رأيه إن‬
‫كان أي مسلم إذا ما ذهب إلى الكهنة يسألهم عما حسن و ساء من األيام على‬
‫أساس دوران النجوم أو األيام المعينة فقد ارتكب إثما عظيما ‪ ،‬و السيما إذا آمن و‬
‫صدق بما أتاه الكاهن من األيام المعينة أو المفضلة فاعتُبر من المرتدين و‬
‫الكافرين ‪.‬‬
‫‪Lan maleh haram ingatase wong Islam ametungaken awake maring‬‬
‫‪dukun ahli nujum utowo dukun ahli kahanah supoyo weruh bejane‬‬
‫‪awake utowo cilakane lan tolake cilakane maka lamun ono wongkang‬‬
‫‪mengkono-mengkono iku gugu ngandel unine dukun iku maka dadi‬‬
‫‪kufur sak hal maka lamun teko maring dukun ahli nujum utowo ahli‬‬
‫‪ahli kahin ing hale orang ngandel lan ora percoyo maring unine duku‬‬
‫‪maka iyo ora den trimo taubate lan ibadahe patang puluh dino.11‬‬
‫و يحرم على كل مسلم أن يأتي منجما يتنبأ على نفسه عن حسن حظه و‬
‫سوئه و دفع بالئه إذا ما فعل ذلك و صدق بما قاله الكاهن فقد كفر ‪ ،‬إذا ما أتى‬
‫كاهنا و لم يصدق بما قاله الكاهن فلم تُقبل عبادته أربعين سنة ‪.‬‬
‫و من التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية األخرى التي ال تقل شعبيتها تعلم الحصانة‬
‫الجسمية و القوة الخارقة ‪ ،‬و لصالح دارات وجهة نظره الخاصة بها تجاه تعلم‬
‫الحصانة الجسمية أو تعلم عدم جرح البشرة الجلدية فحكم تعلم ذلك حرام ‪ ،‬ألن‬
‫تعلمه ال يعود بالجدوى في الدارين الدنيا و اآلخرة ‪.‬و بالمقابل أنه يأتي بالخسارة‬
‫في الحياة الدنيا و اآلخرة ألن متعلمها سوف ينخرط في المعاصي الكبيرة ‪.‬‬
‫‪11‬‬
‫‪12‬‬
‫‪12‬‬
‫صالح دارات ‪ ،‬مجموعة ‪71 ،‬‬
‫صالح دارات ‪ ،‬مجموعة ‪17 - 19 ،‬‬
‫‪194‬‬
‫و فوق ذلك أن التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية األكثر شعبية كإقامة شعيرة االدعية‬
‫على األموات لم تخل من انتقادات صالح دارات ‪ ،‬كل أشكال شعائر األدعية على‬
‫األموات سواء كانت ذكرى اليوم األول أو اليوم الثاني أو اليوم السابع فصاعدا هي‬
‫من البدع المنكرة و حكم ممارستها حرام ‪.‬‬
‫‪13‬‬
‫مثل هذه الظاهرة التى زاولها‬
‫التقليديون من المسلمين عند حلول مصائب الوفيات قد استرعت اهتماما جديا من‬
‫قبل صالح‪.‬‬
‫‪Kaya mangan ono ing kuburan kerono dadi ora eleng maring patine awake‬‬
‫‪lan gawe mangan ono ing sandinge jenazah lan gawe mangan tha’am al‬‬‫‪mayyit tegese mangan suguhane wong kang kepaten nalikane ngelawat‬‬
‫‪maka iku makruh lamun ora ono yatime lamun ono yatime hale durung den‬‬
‫‪dum tirkah al-mayyit maka haram mangan suguhane mayit kerono haqq‬‬
‫‪al-yatim lan kasebut ingdalem kitab thariqah al-Muhammadiyah makruh‬‬
‫‪mangan ono ing pasar lan ono dalan lan ono kuburan lan ono sandinge‬‬
‫‪janazah lan mangan tha’am al-mayit yen ora ono tinggal yatim lan makruh‬‬
‫‪gawe shodaqohan nyawur tanah lan telung dino lan pitung dino sak wuse‬‬
‫‪matine mayit kerono ora ono asale kelakuhane poro sholihin balik lamun‬‬
‫‪mal al-yatim maka haram.14‬‬
‫كتناول األطعمة في المقابر فهو يؤدي إلى غفلة عن موته أو تناول األطعمة بالقرب‬
‫من جثة الميت و تقديم األطعمة للمعزين في الموتى و حكم ذلك كله مكروه طالما ال‬
‫يوجد يتيم تركه الميت ‪ ،‬ولكن عند وجود يتيم و لم توزع له المواريث فحكمه حرام ألن‬
‫فيه أحقية لليتيم‪ ،‬وقد بين ذلك في كتابه الموسوم ب " الطريقة المحمدية" يكره من يأكل‬
‫في سوق و في شارع و في مقبرة و في مقربة من الجنازة و كذلك من يأكل أطعمة‬
‫مقدمة عند التعزية في حالة عدم وجود يتيم تركه ميت ‪ ،‬ويكره أيضا من تصدق بأطعمة‬
‫لغرض إحياء ذكرى ميت من الموتى في اليوم األول و في اليوم الثالث و في اليوم‬
‫‪13‬‬
‫سالم ‪ ،‬مجموعة ‪912 ،‬‬
‫‪14‬‬
‫صالح دارات ‪ ،‬منهاج األتقياء في شرح معرفة األذكياء إلى طريق األولياء ‪ ( ،‬بومباي ‪ :‬مطبعة‬
‫محمدي ‪ ،‬مجهول السنة ) ‪179‬‬
‫‪195‬‬
‫السابع بعد موتهم لعدم نهوض دليل من قبل العلماء الصالحين‪ ،‬و يحرم في حالة وجود‬
‫يتيم للميت‪.‬‬
‫و من الالفت للنظر أن رفض صالح دارات تجاه التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية ال‬
‫يعول على فكرة ابن تيمية و أتباعه و لكن يعول على مؤلفات الغزالي كمرجع رئيسي‪ ،‬و‬
‫خرج من ذلك أنه قد تفانى في الدفاع عن أفكار المسلمين الموالين لالتجاهات التقليدية‬
‫كتمذهب بأحد المذاهب الفقهية الشهيرة (المالكية و األحناف والشافعية و الحنابلة) و‬
‫كذلك الدفاع عن المبادئ العقائدية من األشاعرة ‪ ،‬مع أن المفروض أن فكرته الرافضة‬
‫لممارسة الشعائر اإلسالمية اإلقليمية هذه تستوجب أن يصطحب معه الصبغة التصوفية‬
‫الموازية لفكرته و لكنه أتى بما يغايره من االتجاهات السنية في التصوف التي يتصدرها‬
‫رائدها األول اإلمام الغزالي (المتوفى ‪ 101‬هـ ‪ 9999 /‬م) ‪ ،‬ألن االتجاهات الصوفية‬
‫الرافضة لممارسة الشعائر اإلسالمية اإلقليمية لصيقة بابن تيمية و أشياعه على خالف‬
‫الغزالي الذي اشتهر باتجاهاته الصوفية األرثوذكسية ‪ ،‬كما اشتهر صالح أيضا بنقده تجاه‬
‫بعض النواحي لالتجاهات الصوفية الفلسفية مع اعترافه بأن التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية‬
‫جزء ال يتج أز من اإلسالم‪.‬‬
‫أفكار صالح دارات و هاشم أشعري و أحمد دحالن‬
‫كما تقدم ذكره أن الشيخ هاشم أشعري ( المتوفى ‪ 9111‬هـ ‪ 9112 /‬م ) والشيخ‬
‫أحمد دحالن ( المتوفى ‪ 9171‬م ) قد تتلمذا كالهما عند الشيخ صالح دارات‪ .‬و كانت‬
‫العالقات التربوية بين الشيخ و تلميذيه قد اعترف بها صفوة من البحثة الجامعيين الذين‬
‫لفتوا أنظارهم بشكل جدي إلى دراسة أفكار صالح دارات الدينية اإلسالمية ‪15.‬بالرغم من‬
‫‪ 15‬سالم ‪ ،‬المجموعة ‪ ،11 – 11 ،‬منير ‪ ، 21 – 27 ،Warisan ،‬منير ‪11 – 11 ، Pemikiran ،‬‬
‫‪ ،‬مخير هـ س ‪ ،‬الشيخ الحاج محمد صالح دارات السماراني ‪ ،‬بحث في تفسير فائض الرحمن في‬
‫ترجمة تفسير كالم مالك الديان ‪ ( ،‬يوغجاكرتا ‪ :‬أطروحة برنامج الدراسات العليا بجامعة سونان‬
‫كاليجوغو ‪ ، 19 – 10 ،) 7000،‬علي مسعود ‪Dinamika Sufisme Jawa, Studi tentang ،‬‬
‫‪ Pemikiran Tasawuf KH. Shaleh Darat Semarang dalam Kitab Minhaj al-Atqiya‬أي (‬
‫‪196‬‬
‫عدم العثور على وثيقة تاريخية صريحة تبين اعتراف هاشم أشعري و أحمد دحالن‬
‫بأنهما قد تتلمذا عنده‪.‬‬
‫العالقة بين الشيخ و تلميذيه قد كشفت اللثام ‪ -‬على سبيل االحتمال ‪ -‬عن تأثير‬
‫فكر صالح دارات في نفسي هاشم و دحالن و لو بشكل غير مباشر ووثيق‬
‫بالموضوعات المشابهة ‪ ،‬و يمكن تقصي تأثير صالح دارات في نفسي هاشم ودحالن‬
‫من خالل مواقفهما و اتجاهاتهما الناقدة تجاه التقاليد اإلسالمية التي رمى إليها المسلمون‬
‫المعاصرون تهمتهم بأن هذه التقاليد ليس لها مرجع رئيسي من القرآن والحديث بصرف‬
‫النظر عن اتجاهاتهما الناقدة التى تأثرت بالمشايخ اآلخرين ذوي أفكار مشابهة و وآراء‬
‫دينية مماثلة لصالح دارات ‪.‬‬
‫فمثال هاشم أشعري قد أعار اهتمامه البالغ تجاه التقاليد اإلسالمية وهي إحياء ذكرى‬
‫المولد النبوي ‪ ،‬لقد صاغ آ راءه على نحو دقيق في كتابه " التنبيهات الواجبات لمن‬
‫يصنع المولد بالمنكرات" ‪ ،‬ويومىء عنوان هذا الكتاب إلى عدم سخاء هاشم للدفاع عن‬
‫ممارسة أحد الطقوس الدينية المذكورة و بالعكس أنه منذ أول وهلة قد وجه انتقادات‬
‫الذعة نحوالمسلمين الذين مارسوا هذه الطقوس الدينية‪.‬‬
‫و كان هاشم في رسالته المتقدم ذكرها لم يقم من ناحية من النواحي بدحض إحياء‬
‫ذكرى المولد النبوي و لكن إحياءه جائز في اإلسالم أو مستحب لممارسته بل حكمه‬
‫واجب على المسلمين ‪ ،‬و رأيه المعاكس هذا ال يبديه أمام العلماء المعاصرين فقط بل‬
‫أمام العلماء التقليديين أيضا ‪،‬و قد بنى رأيه على رأي قاضي العياد في كتابه الموسوم ب‬
‫دينامية الصوفية الجاوية ‪ ،‬بحث في الفكر التصوفي للشيخ صالح دارات السماراني في كتاب‬
‫منهاج األتقياء ‪ (،‬سورابايا ‪ :‬أطروحة برنامج الدراسات العليا بجامعة سونان أمبيل ‪991 ، ) 7099 ،‬‬
‫‪197‬‬
‫" الشفاء هاشم في حقوق المصطفى" حيث قال ‪ :‬اعلم أن احترام النبي صلى اهلل عليه‬
‫و سلم عقب وفاته كرفع درجته و تعظيمه حكمه واجب كما كان حيا ‪.‬‬
‫‪16‬‬
‫و لم يغفل هاشم في أثناء بسط آرائه الناقدة عن إدراج وجهات أنظاره الناقدة تجاه‬
‫فعاليات إحياء ذكرى المولد النبوي بجزيرة جاوى التي عكرت صفو تلك الذكرى ‪ ،‬و إحياء‬
‫ذكرى المولد له معنى اإلحساس بمحبة الرسول ( ص ) و هو التعظيم و رفع درجته في‬
‫قلوب المسلمين الذين قاموا بإحياء الذكرى و الشكر على اهلل على بعثة محمد نبيا و‬
‫رسوال و رحمة للعالمين ‪.‬‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫و المؤسف بشدة هنا أن إحياء ذكرى المولد النبوي بجاوى قد حط من شأن‬
‫المولد و أهميته بالبرهنة على أن فعالية الطقوس الدينية غالبا ما تأتي بالتصرفات‬
‫المحرمة كما قام زهري بتحليل ذلك حيث رأى أن هناك حقيقتين اجتماعيتين‬
‫تعكّران قدسية ذكرى المولد النبوي ‪ ،‬ذكرى المولد النبوي في بعض المعاهد‬
‫اإلسالمية و في أوساط عامة الناس أفضت إلى تحريف معنى الذكرى فأصبحت‬
‫محرمة‪ ،‬و بمالحظته المباشرة قد عثر على حادثة تسترعي األسف الشديد في‬
‫إحدى فعاليات ذكرى المولد النبوي ‪ ،‬كما أكده زهري ‪ ،‬أن هاشم وصف في كتابه‬
‫" التبيان " أن تلك الحادثة قد حدثت في يوم اإلثنين ليال في تاريخ ‪ 71‬من شهر‬
‫ربيع األول عام ‪ 9111‬هـ ‪ ،‬في تلك الليلة ‪ ،‬الطالب الذين يأتون من مختلف‬
‫المعاهد اإلسالمية تجمعوا إلحياء ذكرى المولد النبوي‪ ،‬و الالفت للنظر في هذ‬
‫المحفل أنهم اصطحبوا معهم األدوات و األلعاب و قلما يقرؤون القرآن و األحاديث‬
‫والسنن النبوية التي تتحدث عن بداية بعثته صلى اهلل عليه و سلم و إرهاصاته‬
‫التي تسبق مولده و سيرته الزاخرة بالبركة عقب مولده‪ ،‬وبالتزامن هؤالء لم يكثروا‬
‫‪16‬‬
‫هاشم أشعري ‪ ،‬التبيان الواجبات لمن يصنع المولد النبوي ‪ ،‬في حاذق (محرر) إرشاد الساري في‬
‫جميع مصنفات الشيخ هاشم أشعري ( جومبانج ‪ :‬مكتبة التراث اإلسالمي ‪71 - 71 ،) 7002 ،‬‬
‫‪17‬‬
‫هاشم أشعري ‪ ،‬التبيان ‪97 ،‬‬
‫‪198‬‬
‫التالوة التي لم تزل زهيدة للغاية و لكنهم كانوا يمارسون األلعاب التي لها روائح‬
‫منكرة ‪ ،‬كفن الدفاع عن النفس و المالكمة وضرب الدفوف ‪ ،‬و كل ضروب هذه‬
‫األالعاب المنكرة كانت معروضة أمام األجنبيات عيانا و على مقربة منهن ‪ ،‬فضال‬
‫عن كونهم يعزفون اآلالت الموسيقية و يمثلون المسرحية و األلعاب الشبيهة‬
‫بالقمار و الميسر و التف المتفرجون و المتفرجات في مكان واحد و كانوا مغرقين‬
‫بالرقصات المليئة باللهو و األضحوكة و القهقهات الصاخبة في المسجد و فيما‬
‫حوله ‪.‬‬
‫‪18‬‬
‫إضافة إلى ذكرى المولد النبوي بجومبانج المتقدم ذكرها ‪ ،‬رأى هاشم أيضا‬
‫ظاهرة مشابهة بماديون في ممارسة هذه الطقوس ‪ ،‬المحفل المقام بماديون هذا‬
‫على حد سواء من حيث جوهره بما حصل في جومبانج و هو أن ذكرى المولد‬
‫النبوي قد ُشوهت بألوان من األفعال البشعة المنكرة ‪ ،‬و قد وصف الظاهرة بما يلي‬
‫‪:‬‬
‫حدثني شخص موثوق به أنه قد قامت ذكرى المولد النبوى التى اكتظت‬
‫بالمعاصي و المنكرات قي قرية من القرى تدعى باسم سيووالن تقع ببلدية ماديون‬
‫‪ ،‬في هذه الذكرى قد التف الرجال و النساء التفافا و أقيمت ألعاب كان الفتيان فيها‬
‫يرتدون أزياء نسائية‪ ،‬و تلك األلعاب‬
‫قد أثارت ألوانا من الفتن في أوساط‬
‫المتفرجين رجاال و نساء و أفضت إلى المضرات كثي ار كثرة مفرطة كما أفضت إلى‬
‫حصول الطالق بين الزوجين بسبب إحياء هذه الذكرى ‪ ،‬و هذا بدون أدنى ريب‬
‫ُينشىء أضعافا من المضرات الشوهاء من جراء إحياء ذكرى المولد النبوى التي‬
‫‪19‬‬
‫يشوبها شائبة من أفعال منكرة ‪.‬‬
‫‪18‬‬
‫محبين زهري ‪ Pandangan Hasyim Asy’ari tentang Ahlusunnah wal Jama’ah،‬أي نظرة‬
‫هاشم أشعري تجاه أهل السنة و الجماعة ( أطروحة بجامعة سونان أمبيل اإلسالمية سورابايا ‪:‬‬
‫‪919 - 910 ،) 7001‬‬
‫‪ 19‬زهري ‪ Pandangan Hasyim Asy’ari ،‬أي ( نظرة هاشم أشعري) ‪919 ،‬‬
‫‪199‬‬
‫الظاهرتان المتقدم ذكرهما أصبحتا محط أنظار هاشم لتغيير حكم إحياء ذكرى‬
‫المولد النبوي من الواجب إلى المحظور ‪ ،‬حكم الحظر قد بني على القاعدة " إن‬
‫الطاعة إذا جلبت مضرة أعظم من وجه مصلحتها فيستوجب تركها " بحجة أن كل‬
‫عمل من األعمال إذا أتى بمضرة فهو مضر ‪ ،‬على أساس هذه القاعدة فإن إقامة‬
‫ذكرى المولد النبوي إذا أتت بمضرة أعظم كالمنكرات فهي محظورة وجب تركها و‬
‫حكم إقامتها حرام ‪.‬‬
‫‪20‬‬
‫وجهة نظر هاشم السالف ذكرها ال تعنى أن تقاليد ذكرى المولد النبوى محرمة‬
‫إلى األبد ‪ ،‬حكم السنة عاد إلى الوجوب طالما أن الذكرى ما انفكت متمسكة‬
‫بتعاليم اإلسالم ‪ ،‬فهو ال يرفض إذا كان إحياء تلك الذكرى سوف يستقطب حشدا‬
‫كبي ار من المسلمين و لكن هذا الحشد البد من توجيهه إلى أنشطة إيجابية كتالوة‬
‫ما تيسر من آي من الذكر الحكيم التي يمكن حفظها بسهولة أو سرد األحاديث‬
‫النبوية التى تتحدث عن الطور األول من أطوار حياة النبي منذ ترعرعه في بطن‬
‫أمه ثم ميالده ثم نشأته إلى نبوته في أداء رسالته سواء في السراء أم في‬
‫الضراء‪ .‬من األنشطة اإليجابية األخرى التى قام هاشم أشعري بتشجيعها تقديم‬
‫األطعمة لتناولها بشكل جماعي وأما إذا ما توافرت الفرص السانحة فمن السائغ‬
‫ضرب الدفوف على شريطة الحفاظ على الخلق الكريم ومراعاته ‪.‬‬
‫إن موقف هاشم الناقد مهما كان مصحوبا بقبوله كامال وكذالك يبدو موقفه‬
‫فيما يرتبط بالطريقة بحيث أن كثي ار من الناس قد انخرطوا في خطإ بل في انحراف‬
‫أساسي السيما ذلك االنحراف الذي يمت بصلة إلى دور المرشد الكبير‪ .‬هاشم‬
‫أشعري بين ذلك في كتابه الموسوم ب " الدرر المنتشرة في مسائل التسعة عشرة "‬
‫أن الطريقة عند تطبيقها قد منحت السلطة للمرشد أكبر مما ينبغي منحها ألولياء‬
‫‪20‬‬
‫زهري ‪ ،‬نظرة هاشم أشعري ‪919 ،‬‬
‫‪200‬‬
‫اهلل‪ ،‬إن منح السلطة المبالغ فيها سوف ُينزل المرشد منزلة اإلمام الخائن ‪،‬‬
‫خرج من ذلك أنه وجه انتقاده تجاه المرشد الذي يعد نفسه وليا من أولياء اهلل ألنه‬
‫‪21‬‬
‫و‬
‫لم يعض الشريعة بالنواجذ ‪ .‬حسب رأي هاشم و لو كان المرشد قد وصل إلى‬
‫منزلة ولي اهلل و هو خليفة اهلل المحترم و ال يعنى ذلك جواز عدم االلتزام بالشريعة‬
‫‪.‬‬
‫‪22‬‬
‫بل بمقتضى رأي هاشم أشعري أيضا أن تلقيب المرشد بولي من أولياء اهلل‬
‫من قبل المريد أم من ادعاء المرشد نفسه فهو كذب ‪ ،‬كما أكد زهري بذلك ‪ ،‬لقد‬
‫حذر ذلك هاشم بأن الذي يدعى بولي سوف ال يترائى بنفسه و لو أُلح بإحراق‬
‫نفسه مثال ‪ ،‬و من أراد أن يكون رجال ذا شخصية معروفة فال يكون من ضمن أية‬
‫طائفة صوفية ما ‪ ،‬و من بين المحن أو الفتن التي أفسدت العباد بشكل عام‬
‫االدعاء بأنه مرشد أم أنه ولي بل هناك من يدعي بأنه ولي القطب كما أن هناك‬
‫أيضا من يدعي بأنه اإلمام المهدي ‪ ،‬و من يدعي بأنه ولي و لكنه ال يتبع سنة‬
‫الرسول فهو كذاب و مفتعل باهلل سبحانه و تعالى ‪ ،‬ومن قال عن نفسه بأنه ولي‬
‫من أولياء اهلل فهو ليس بولي بما للكلمة من معنى بل هو مد ٍع أو مزور وهو في‬
‫خطإ بواح ألنه قد تكلم عن أسرار الخصوصيات وادعى كذبا باسم اهلل سبحانه و‬
‫تعالى ‪.‬‬
‫‪23‬‬
‫‪21‬‬
‫خلق ‪ Fajar Kebangunan Ulama, Biografi KH. Hasyim Asy’ari،‬أي ( فجر نهضة‬
‫العلماء‪ ،‬ترجمة الشيخ هاشم أشعري) ‪ ( ،‬يوغجاكرتا ‪ ، 12 – 11 )7000 ، LKiS :‬رفاعي ‪KH‬‬
‫‪Hasyim Asy’ari, Biografi Singkat 1871 -1947‬أي ( الشيخ الحاج هاشم أشعري‪ ،‬ترجمة وجيزة‬
‫‪) )9112 – 9129‬يوغجاكرتا ‪:‬الروز ميديا ‪17 ، ) 7001 ،‬‬
‫‪22‬‬
‫مسعود ‪ ( Dari Haramain Ke Nusantara, Jejak Intelektual Arsitek Pesantren ،‬جاكرتا‪:‬‬
‫كنجانا ‪711 ) 7001 ،‬‬
‫‪23‬‬
‫‪201‬‬
‫زهري ‪ ( Pandangan Hasyim Asy’ari ،‬أي فكرة هاشم أشعري) ‪911 ،‬‬
‫موقف هاشم الناقد تجاه التصوف بل الطريقة ال يعمد إلى دحض األعمال‬
‫الصوفية التي قد تفشت في أوساط المسلمين باألرجاء المعمورة من هذه البالد‬
‫وخاصة بجاوى ‪ ،‬لقد رأى هاشم أن التصوف أو الطريقة لهما دور هام جدا في‬
‫نفوس المسلمين ‪ ،‬و من بين أهميات التصوف مثال رفع الخلق الكريم لدى‬
‫المتصوفين و تحفيزهم نحو التقوى و التقشف ‪24‬غير أن استقرار التصوف بما لديه‬
‫من األدوار اإليجابية البد من االلتزام بتوافقه و تناغمه مع الشريعة اإلسالمية ‪.‬‬
‫إذا كان هاشم قد استلم الطقوس اإلسالمية كجزء ال يتج أز من أصالة اإلسالم‬
‫‪ ،‬بخالف دخالن الذى له نزعة قوية إلى رفضها ‪ ،‬ومن التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية‬
‫التي رفضها دخالن رفضا حاسما الشعيرة الرمضانية و هي التقاليد الجاوية‬
‫اإلقليمية بالقصر المنعقدة للتعبير عن الشكر بعد أداء الصيام في شهر رمضان ‪.‬‬
‫وكان رفضه للتقاليد اإلقليمية هذه مبنيا على أن تحديد يوم العيد يتم بالطريقة‬
‫الحسابية الجاوية التى تدعى ب " ‪ Aboge‬الناجمة من الموروثات الجاوية القديمة‬
‫بأكملها‪.‬‬
‫‪25‬‬
‫كما ال يخفى علينا جميعا أن نظام الحساب ‪ Aboge‬هو نظام الحساب‬
‫المبني على المعاني التي تتواجد في هذااللفظ ‪ ،‬فلفظ ‪ Aboge‬يتركب من ‪ A‬ثم‬
‫‪ Bo‬ثم ‪ Ge‬و هي منحوتة من حرف األلف التي تمثل أول أسماء السنة الجاوية‬
‫‪ ،‬و يجدر بالذكر هنا أن التقويم الجاوي يسير على نظام الحسابات السنوية‬
‫المعروفة بوندو (‪ )Windu‬و هي تعني ثماني سنوات ‪ .‬في وندو (‪)Windu‬‬
‫سنوات ثمان متتالية مرتبة كما يلي ‪Alif, Ehe, Jimawal, Je, Dal, Be, Wawu,‬‬
‫‪Jimakir‬‬
‫و لهذا تمثل سنة األلف نظام التقويم الجاوي المعمول لدى المجتمع‬
‫‪24‬‬
‫خلق ‪ Fajar Kebangunan Ulama،‬أي ( فجر نهضة العلماء ) ‪12 ،‬‬
‫‪25‬‬
‫م ت ‪ .‬عارفين ‪ ، Gerakan Pembaharuan Muhammadiyah ،‬أي ( حركة التجديد للجمعية‬
‫المحمدية ) ( جاكرتا‪ :‬بوستاكا جايا ‪19 ، ) 9112 ،‬‬
‫‪202‬‬
‫الجاوي و يعد من أول السنة من ترتيبات نظام وندو‪ ،‬ويترتب على هذا أن تكون‬
‫هذه السنة قاعدة أساسية لحسابات التقويم و األوقات مستقبال‪.‬‬
‫‪26‬‬
‫أما ‪ Bo‬التي تتواجد في النحت ‪ Aboge‬و هي محتزلة من لفظ ‪ Rebo‬أي‬
‫األربعاء اسم يوم من أيام األسبوع ‪ ،‬أما ‪ Ge‬فهي محتزلة من لفظ ‪ Wage‬و هو‬
‫اسم أحد األيام حسب النظام الخماسي الذي يدعى ب ‪ ،Pancawara‬حساب األيام‬
‫التابع للنظام الخماسي هذا يمثل أحد النظامين الخاصين لحساب دوران األوقات‬
‫في األيام المعروفة لدى المجتمع الجاوي إلى جانب نظام األسبوع المتداول ‪ ،‬و‬
‫نظام األسبوع يشير إلى دوران أيام األسبوع التي تتكون من األحد و األثنين و‬
‫الثالثاء و األربعاء و الخميس و الجمعة والسبت ‪ ،‬أما نظام األيام الخماسي فهو‬
‫يصف دوران األيام الخمسة التي تشمل ‪Legi, Pahing, Pon, Wage, Kliwon. :‬‬
‫و نخلص من هذا إلى أن لفظ ‪ Boge‬يرمز إلى يوم األربعاء و يوافق بيوم ‪Wage‬‬
‫من نظام األيام الخماسي المعروف لدى الجاويين ‪.‬‬
‫‪27‬‬
‫حسب النظام المتبع فيما سلف ذكره أن تحديد يوم عيد الفطر في كل سنة‬
‫ينبني على قاعدة الحساب أن يوم العيد يبدأ من سنة األلف و من جراء ذلك يقع‬
‫يوم العيد في يوم األربعاء الموافق ب ‪ ، Wage‬ونظام ‪ Aboge‬هذا ينطلق من‬
‫معتقدات الجاويين بوجود اليوم الشر في كل سنة ‪ ،‬و هذا يعنى أن أول يوم من‬
‫كل سنة هو يوم شر ال ينبغي أن يتعطل فيه أي عمل ‪ .‬لدى المجتمع الجاوي أن‬
‫الشر يبدأ من سنة األلف ‪ 9112‬إلى سنة جيماكير‪ 9111‬حيث يجري الحساب وفقا‬
‫لسنة األلف يوم الثالثاء الموافق ب ‪ Pon‬و يوجد هناك ‪ 1‬أيام الشر ‪ ،‬و خالصة‬
‫ويناتا سائرين ‪ Gerakan Pembaharuan Muhammadiyah،‬أي ( حركة التجديد للجمعية‬
‫‪26‬‬
‫المحمدية) (جاكرتا‪ :‬بوستاكا سينار هارابان‪) 9111 ،‬‬
‫‪27‬‬
‫سائرين ‪ Gerakan Pembaharuan،‬أي ( حركة التجديد ) ‪12 ،‬‬
‫‪203‬‬
‫الحساب أن اليوم الشر من سنة األلف يقع دائما في يوم األربعاء الموافق ب‬
‫‪. Wage‬‬
‫‪28‬‬
‫نظام الحساب الذي ينحدر من محض التقاليد الجاوية هذا لم يكن مقبوال ولم‬
‫يكن قابال للمسؤولية و ال أساس له من المراجع من القرآن و األحاديث‪ .‬وبالمقابل‬
‫كان دحالن يرى أن تحديد يوم العيد البد أن يكون مبنيا على علم الحساب و‬
‫النتيجة من الحساب سوف تقرر أن يوم العيد سيكون حتما في أول يوم من الشوال‬
‫بالتزامن مع بزوغ هالل عند الغروب ‪.‬فمن نتائج ذلك أن تحديد يوم العيد ال يكون‬
‫بالنظر في أي يوم سيكون العيد ‪ ،‬بل متى يكون الحساب مقر ار لحلول يوم العيد‬
‫فهناك عيد يجب على المسلمين احتفاؤه و الترحيب به ‪ ،‬و لعدم موافقته على نظام‬
‫تحديد يوم العيد وفقا للتقاليد الجاوية المذكورة ‪ ،‬قام دخالن بمقابلة السلطان برفقة‬
‫خليل القاضي لعرض رفضه له ‪ ،‬و كان السلطان في نهاية الحديث أبدى له‬
‫موافقته على ذلك و قرر أن تحديد يوم العيد سيكون باستخدام نظام الحساب الحقا‬
‫‪.‬‬
‫‪29‬‬
‫إضافة إلى ذلك أن دحالن بشكل عام قد رفض التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية‬
‫التى اكتظت بالبدع و الخرافات ‪،‬‬
‫‪30‬‬
‫فهناك التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية السبعة التي‬
‫‪ 28‬سائرين ‪ Gerakan Pembaharuan،‬أي ( حركة التجديد ) ‪12 ،‬‬
‫‪ 29‬سائرين ‪ Gerakan Pembaharuan،‬أي ( حركة التجديد ) ‪ ، 11 – 12 ،‬يسران عارفين ‪Kyai ،‬‬
‫‪ Haji Ahmad Dahlan, Pemikiran dan Kepemimpinannya‬أي ( الشيخ الحاج أحمد دحالن‬
‫قكرته و رئاسته ) ( يوغجاكارتا ‪ :‬يغجاكارتا أفسيت ‪19،) 9111 ،‬‬
‫‪30‬‬
‫بمقتضى رأي ملكان ‪ ،‬أن دحالن يمثل رائدا في القضاء على انتشار البدعة و الخرافات ‪ ،‬و‬
‫بمقتضى رأي ملكان أنها عند الجمعية المحمدية أن الخرافة اعتقاد بوجود روح لها تأثير في حياة‬
‫الناس كوجود عفريت من حراس القرية يتسسب في فشل الحصاد أو انتشار األوبئة الفاتكة في‬
‫القرى و هذا االعتقاد ليس من اإلسالم و لكنه ُيعتقد أنه من اإلسالم و لذلك أطلق عليه لسم‬
‫الخرافة ‪ ،‬أما البدعة عند الجمعية المحمدية فهي تشير إلى االعمل المعتقد أنه من العبادة و لكنه لم‬
‫‪204‬‬
‫انتقدها دحالن انتقادا عنيفا ‪ ،‬و في الوقت نفسه رفضها أيضا ‪ ،‬أوال – إحياء‬
‫ذكرى الموتى كذكرى مرور اليوم األول إلى السابع أو ذكرى مرور اليوم األربعين‬
‫و اليوم المئوي و اليوم السنوي و اليوم السنتيني أو اليوم األلفي ثانيا – وليمة‬
‫الحمل إذا بلغت سن الحمل سبعة أشهر ‪ ,‬ثالثا – وليمة الوالدة رابعا – تقديس‬
‫قبور الصالحين بزيارة ضريحه متوسال بروحه و من ضمنه أيضا تقديس بعض‬
‫األحياء من األولياء و الصالحين و السيما في جزيرة جاوى‪ .‬خامسا – قراءة‬
‫التهليل و التلقين لألموات ‪ ،‬و التلقين الذي رفضه دحالن هو عبارة عن األدعية‬
‫باللغة العربية و المواعظ لألموات عقب دفنهم‪ ،‬و من مضامين المواعظ تذكير‬
‫الميت على مواجهة الملك في قبره الذي سيقدم له أسئلة لكي يجيبها بأن اهلل ربي‬
‫و محمدا نبيي و اإلسالم ديني و الكعبة قبلتي و القرآن إيماني والمسلمين إخوتي ‪،‬‬
‫أماالتهليل فهو عبارة عن قراءة األدعية و األذكار جماعيا يؤمها إمام من المشايخ‬
‫أو من اللذين يعدون ذوي الخبرة و المعرفة لطريقة أداءه و غالبا ما ُيعقد في يوم‬
‫الخميس من ليلة الجمعة ‪ .‬سادسا‪ -‬االعتقاد بالتعاويذ و الطالسم كما حصل ذلك‬
‫بالقصر العتقاده بوجود القوة الخارقة لبعض موروثات القصر‪.‬‬
‫‪31‬‬
‫حسب رأي دحالن أن الطقوس الدينية في التقاليد اإلسالمية الجاوية السالفة‬
‫الذكر كلها من البدع و الخرافات ‪ ،‬و البدعة عند دحالن تعني عدم الخالف بما‬
‫شاع مفهومه عند العامة و هي أعمال و أقوال محدثة بعد النبوة‬
‫لم يفعلها‬
‫الصحابة و ليس لها أساس من القرآن و السنة النبوية ‪ ،‬أما الخرافات هي اعتقاد‬
‫بأن الطقوس اإلسالمية اإلقليمية المذكورة أعاله ليست معقولة و منطقية أو األمور‬
‫يفعله رسول اهلل محمد ‪ ،‬منير ملكان ‪ Moral Politik Santri،‬أي ( من أخالق السياسة لدى‬
‫المسلم ) ( جاكرتا ‪ ،‬إيرالنجا ‪101 ،) 7001 ،‬‬
‫‪ 31‬سائرين ‪ Gerakan Pembaharuan ،‬أي( حركة التجديد ) ‪ ، 11 – 11 ،‬يسران ‪Kyai Haji ،‬‬
‫‪Ahmad Dahlan‬أي ( الشيخ أحمد دحالن )‪ ، 11 ،‬عارفين ‪ Gerakan Pembaharuan،‬أي (حركة‬
‫التجديد ) ‪901 ،‬‬
‫‪205‬‬
‫التي ال يمكن الوصول إليها بصدقها و صحتها و تارة هناك تناقض فيما بينها و‬
‫هي لم تكن من التعاليم اإلسالمية البتة‪.‬‬
‫‪32‬‬
‫السطور السابقة تقدم لهذاالبحث معطيات هامة و السيما فيما يتعلق بالتقاليد‬
‫التي ليس لها أساس من األدلة الشرعية كالطريقة و ذكرى المولد النبوي و ما إلى‬
‫ذلك‪ ،‬و هناك نقطة من المبادىء التي يشترك هاشم و دحالن في عضها بالنواجذ‬
‫هي أن جل التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية أال تكون مقبولة بال نقد بل البد من‬
‫التمحيص و التحقيق ‪ ،‬و لكن االتجاه الناقد الذي بحوزة العالمين البارزين في هذا‬
‫الوطن ينتهي بهما المطاف إلى قبول شيئين متناقضين في موضوع التقاليد‬
‫اإلسالمية ‪ .‬و لو كان هاشم شديد النقد و لكنه رحب باعتراف وقبول التقاليد‬
‫اإلقليمية أو التقاليداإلسالمية التي يعد أنها ال أساس لها من الصحة من المصادر‬
‫الشرعية المباشرة وكجزء من اإلسالم ‪ .‬و بخالف دحالن إلى جانب نقده تجاه‬
‫التقاليد المذكورة و هو في الوقت نفسه قد رفض انتماءها إلى اإلسالم كجزء منه ‪،‬‬
‫بل ليست هذه التقاليد اإلسالمية إال البدع و الخرافات ‪.‬‬
‫النقطة المشتركة و النقطة المختلفة‬
‫باختصار ‪ ،‬أن صالح دارات أقرب إلى الحداثة اإلسالمية الستجابته ألوانا من‬
‫التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية أو الطقوس اإلسالمية التي اعتبرها ال أساس لها من‬
‫المراجع من القرآن و الحديث ‪ ،‬و لكن عند التصدي لدراسته المتعمقة يبدو أن‬
‫صالح أقرب إلى التقليديين ‪ ،‬غير أنه ‪ -‬كما كان هاشم مثل ذلك – شديد‬
‫التمحيص و النقد تجاه التقاليد اإلسالمية المذكورة ‪ ،‬و لم تكن هذه الفكرة إال‬
‫لغرض الحفاظ على التقاليد اإلسالمية في أحضان القرآن و السنة‪.‬‬
‫‪ 32‬سائرين ‪ Gerakan Pembaharuan،‬أي ( حركة التجديد ) ‪11 ،‬‬
‫‪206‬‬
‫نظرة صالح الناقدة للحفاظ على أصالة التقاليد اإلسالمية هذه ‪ ،‬إذا نظرناها‬
‫بإمعان ليست شيئا مدهشا ‪ ،‬ألن له فكرة مشابهة عند تسليط األضواء على‬
‫تطورات الممارسات الصوفية بجاوى في زمانه و تحديدا في النصف األخير من‬
‫القرن ‪ 91‬م‪ ،‬و نظرته الناقدة هذه ال تعني أنه يرفض ألوانا من التصوف بل أنه‬
‫يسعى بجهوده إلى إرشاد المسلمين بجاوى و توعيتهم لمواءمة الصوفية بالقرآن و‬
‫السنة و االلتزام بالشريعة اإلسالمية ‪.‬‬
‫‪33‬‬
‫و عليه ‪ ،‬يتسم صالح بشدة النقد و‬
‫التمحيص كما أنه يتسم أيضا برفضه القوي التصوف الفلسفي الشائع بجاوى‪.‬‬
‫‪34‬‬
‫وانطالقا من هنا ‪ ،‬فإن تأثير صالح في نفس هاشم يبدو على العيان كوضح‬
‫النهار كما أبناها سلفا ‪،‬ويظهر أنموذج صالح في نفس هاشم على السطح عند‬
‫قبوله التقاليد اإلسالمية كذكرى المولد النبوى و الطريقة و ال سيما فيما يتعلق‬
‫بالعالقات بين الشيخ و مريده ‪ ،‬و الالفت لالنتباه أن تأثير صالح ما زال لصيقا‬
‫‪33‬‬
‫في كتابه المنهاج ردد صالح بالصراحة أن القرآن و السنة البد من إنزالهما مرجعا رئيسيا‬
‫للتصوف ‪ ،‬و لذالك من خالل المرجعين األصيلين المذكورين ينبغي أن ينتج منهما أفكار و تعاليم‬
‫التصوف ‪ ،‬هناك أحد أقوال صالح الالفتة لالنتباه أن ‪andene madzhab ingsun iku manut kaliyan kitab‬‬
‫‪al-Qur’a>n lan hadith al-Nabi SAW andene thariq kabeh iku buntung anging ingatase wongkang manut‬‬
‫‪lakune gusti Rasul SAW lan sopo-sopo wonge ora weruh isine Qur’a>n lan ora nulis hadits tegese ora weruh‬‬
‫‪ ، hadith maka ora wenang den enut ingdalem kelakuhane kabeh”.‬صالح دارات ‪ ،‬المنهاج ‪ ، 997 ،‬أما ثباته‬
‫في الحفاظ على الشريعة التي هي جزء ال يتج أز من فكر التصوف يظهر كالتالي بقوله ‪“Sopo-sopo wonge :‬‬
‫‪ningali wong suwiji hale ngaku duwe pangkat ‘indallah lan duwe maqam ingkang metu sangking anggerane‬‬
‫‪ilmu al-syari’ah maka ojo parek siro ing wong iku kerono iku al-syaithan al-insi...andene manut syrai’at iku‬‬
‫‪ ، dadi majibaken sa’adah al-darain pomo-pomo wedihi siro yen kasi metu saking da’irah al-syari’ah”.‬صالح‬
‫دارات ‪ ،‬المنهاج ‪997 ،‬‬
‫‪34‬‬
‫نظرته الناقدة تجاه التصوف الفلسفي ‪ ،‬قال في معرض كتابه " ترجمة سبيل العبيد ‪ ،‬أن كل‬
‫مسلم يعتقد بالحلول فهو كافر ‪ ،‬ألنه يعتقد بوحدة الوجود بين العبد وربه ‪ ،‬المراد من الحلول هو‬
‫حلول اهلل في األشياء العارضة ‪ ،‬و كذلك نبه بأن المسلم أو المتصوف الذي يعتقد بوجود الحلول‬
‫فهو بمثابة النصراني الذي يقول عيسى هو اهلل و اهلل هو عيسى أو محمد هو اهلل و اهلل هو محمد‬
‫‪ ،‬صالح دارات ‪ ،‬ترجمة ساني العبيد ‪11 ،‬‬
‫‪207‬‬
‫في نفوسه و لوكان قد خاض في غمرات أفكار الحداثة اإلسالمية و السيما‬
‫مؤلفات محمد عبده التى قد درسها بصورة جدية حين درس بمكة المكرمة ‪.‬‬
‫‪35‬‬
‫وعندما صار هاشم ذا صيت حيث يعد من مشاهير المحدثين في هذاالوطن كان‬
‫لم يبرح على نظرته و لم يعدل موقفه تجاه التقاليد اإلسالمية ‪.‬‬
‫هذا على عكس دحالن الذي قد تعدى صالح بقبوله التقاليد اإلسالمية‬
‫المذكورة ‪ ،‬كأمثال العلماء المعاصرين بأرض الوطن في عهده ‪ ،‬اشتهر دحالن‬
‫بشدة رفضه و اعترافه بأن التقاليد اإلسالمية ليست جزءا من اإلسالم العريق ‪ ،‬بل‬
‫تمثل ألوانا من البدع و الخرافات ‪ .‬من الصعوبة بمكان أن نحدد العلماء سواء في‬
‫الشرق األوسط أم في أرض الوطن الذين لهم تأثير مباشر في فكر دحالن ‪،‬‬
‫ولكن من المحتمل أن نظرته الدينية التي ترفض‬
‫التقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية‬
‫تأثرت عقب دراسته بمكة المكرمة للمرة الثانية سنة ‪ 9111‬م‪ ،‬وكان قد تتلمذ لدي‬
‫الشيخ خطيب و أخذ يتعمق على نحو جدي في دراسة مؤلفات ابن تيمية و محمد‬
‫عبده و عدد من العلماء المعاصرين في الشرق األوسط ‪36‬و فوق ذلك أنه قد تأثر‬
‫بصورة جدية بأفكار التجديد من قبل رجال التجديد و اإلصالح بأرض الوطن‬
‫‪35‬‬
‫أخذ هاشم يتعرف على مؤلفات عبده حين تتلمذ بمكة عند الشيخ خطيب مينانجكابو كأحد‬
‫تالميذه ‪ ،‬كما سجله مسعود أن خطيب عرف معظم تالميذه بمؤلفات محمد عبده ( ‪9101 – 9111‬‬
‫) من جانب أنه شديد التقدير على مؤلفات محمد عبده في التفسير و في مجموع مقاالته ألنها‬
‫تشجع على صحوة المسلمين و لكن فكرة عبده لالنعتاق من المذهبية قد رفضها خطيب و هاشم‬
‫رفضا عنيفا ‪ ،‬مسعود ‪ Dari Haramayn ke Nusantara, ،‬أي ( من الحرمين إلى األرخبيل)‪11 ،‬‬
‫‪ 36‬عبد المنير ملكان ‪Pemikiran KH. Ahmad Dahlan dan Muhammadiyah Dalam ،‬‬
‫‪ Perspektif Perubahan Sosial‬أي ( فكر الشيخ أحمد دحالن و الجمعية المحمدية من منظور‬
‫ر ‪1 - 2 ، )9110 ،‬‬
‫التغيرات االجتماعية ) ( باندونج ‪ :‬بومي أسكا ا‬
‫‪208‬‬
‫وأحدهم الشيخ شركاتي أحد العلماء البارز الذي من المحتمل له دور هام في‬
‫صياغة فكرة دحالن الذي قد تعدى فكرة صالح ‪.‬‬
‫‪37‬‬
‫خاتمة‬
‫من غير إنكار وجود االختالفات في األفكار بين صالح دارات و بين هاشم‬
‫أشعري و أحمد دحالن نتوصل إلى االعتراف بأن هناك التشابك في أفكارهؤالء‬
‫الثالثة و في وجهات أنظارهم الدينية المتعلقة بالتقاليد اإلسالمية اإلقليمية أو‬
‫التقاليد اإلسالمية األخرى التي قيل إنها ال تستند إلى القرآن و الحديث‬
‫النبوي‪.‬والثالثة يعتمدون على أساس واحد و هو أن قبول التقاليد البد من‬
‫التمحيص و النقد ‪ ،‬ال من ناحية تعاليمها فحسب و لكن من ناحية انشطتها‬
‫الفعلية‪ ،‬غير أن موقف صالح دارات و هاشم أشعري ينتهي بهما المطاف إلى‬
‫قبول التقاليد على خالف دحالن الذي تنصب نطرته في تفنيد هذه التقاليد ‪[].‬‬
‫المراجع‬
‫‪Affandi, Bisri. Syeikh Ahmad Syurkati, Pembaharu dan Pemurni Islam di‬‬
‫‪Indonesia. Jakarta: Penerbit Al-Kautsar, 1999.‬‬
‫‪37‬‬
‫عرف دحالن بأنه قريب من سوركاتي ال من ناحية شخصية فحسب و لكن من ناحية الفكر‬
‫الديني ‪ ،‬من الناحية الشخصية أن مصاحبة دحالن و سوركاتي ألول مرة حدثت بالصدفة حينما‬
‫هما على رحلة القطار إل سورابايا ‪ ،‬في ذلك الوقت كان سوركاتي معجبا بدحالن الذي كان‬
‫مغ رقا بقراءة مجلة المنار التي أصدرها بصورة دورية محمد عبده و رشيد رضا ‪ ،‬منذ ذلك الحين‬
‫أصبح االتصال بين دحالن و سوركاتي يجري بصورة مكثفة ‪ ،‬ثم أتيحت لهما فرصة سانحة‬
‫لمناقشة اإلجراءات اإلدارية لتأسيس الجمعية المحمدية ‪ ،‬و الدليل على ذلك وجود الخطابات‬
‫الرسمية لل رئاسة المركزية للجمعية المحمدية المتضمنة على االستفتاءات عن الدين و الدنيا و سبيل‬
‫اهلل و القياس ‪ ،‬بصري أفندي ‪Syeikh Ahmad Syurkati, Pembaharu dan Pemurni Islam di ،‬‬
‫‪ Indonesia‬أي ( الشيخ أحمد سوركاتى ‪ ،‬المجدد و المصلح اإلسالمي بإندونيسيا ) ‪ (،‬جاكرتا ‪:‬‬
‫الناشر الكوثر‪72 ،) 9111،‬‬
‫‪209‬‬
Ali Mas’ud
Arifin, MT. Gerakan Pembaharuan Muhammadiyah. Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya,
1987.
Arifin, Yusron. Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, Pemikiran dan Kepemimpinannya.
Yogyakarta: Yogyakarta Offset, 1983.
Asy’ari, Hasyim. “al-Tibya>n al-Wa>jiba>t li Man Yasna’ al-Mawlid alNabi.” Hadziq (ed.). Irsha>d al-Sari fi Jam’i Mushannafati al-Syeikh
Hasyim Asy’ari. Jombang: Maktabah al-Turats al-Islami, 2007.
Darat, Shaleh. al-Murshi>d al-Waji>z fi Ilm al-Qur’a>n. Singapura: Haji
Muhammad Amin, 1318 H.
----------. Fasalatan. Surabaya: Mat}ba’ah Salim Nabhan, 9133 M.
----------. Fayd} al-Rahma>n fi> Tarjamah al-Kala>m Ma>lik al-Dayya>n, Vol. I dan
II. Singapura: Haji Muhammad Amin, 1314 H.
----------. Kita>b Munjiya>t Met}ik Saking Ihya>’ Ulumuddin al-Ghazali>.
Semarang: Toha Putra, n.d.
----------. Lat}a>’if al-T}aha>rah wa Asra>r al-S}ala>h fi Kaifiyah al-S}ala>h al-‘Abidi>n
wa al-‘Arifin. Semarang: Thoha Putra, n.d.
----------. Majmu>’ah al-Shari>’ah al-Ka>fiyah li al-Awwa>m. Semarang: Toha
Putra, n.d.
----------. Mana>sik al-Hajj wa al-Umrah wa Adab al-Ziya>rah li al-Sayyid alMursalin. Bombay: Mat}ba’ah al-Karimi, n.d.
----------. Matan al-Hikam. Semarang: Toha Putra, n.d.
----------. Minha>j al-Atqiya>’ fi Sharh Ma’rifah al-Adhkiya>’ ila T}ari>q alAuliya>’. Bombay: Mat}ba’ah Muhammadi>, n.d.
----------. Tarjamah Sabi>l al-Abi>d ‘ala Jawharah al-Tauhi>d. Semarang: Toha
Putra, n.d.
HS, Muchoyyar. “KH. Muhammad Shaleh Darat al-Samarani, Studi
Tafsir Faidz al-Rahman fi Tarjamah Tafsir Kalam Malik alDayyan.” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Postgraduate
Program, IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2000.
Khuluq. Fajar Kebangunan Ulama, Biografi KH Hasyim Asy’ari.
Mas’ud, Ali. “Dinamika Sufisme Jawa, Studi tentang Pemikiran
Tasawuf KH. Shaleh Darat Semarang dalam Kitab Minhaj al-
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Afka>r S{alih} Da>rat wa Ah}mad Dah}la>n wa Ha>shim Ash‘ari>
Atqiya.” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Postgraduate
Program, IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2011.
Mas’ud. Dari Haramain Ke Nusantara, Jejak Intelektual Arsitek Pesantren.
Jakarta: Kencana, 2006.
Mulkhan, Abdul Munir. Pemikiran KH. Ahmad Dahlan dan
Muhammadiyah Dalam Perspektif Perubahan Sosial. Bandung: Bumi
Aksara, 1980.
----------. Moral Politik Santri. Jakarta: Erlangga, 2003.
Munir, Ghazali. “Pemikiran Kalam Muhammad Saleh Darat alSamarani (1820-1903).” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation,
Postgraduate Program, IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2007.
Munir, Ghazali. Warisan Intelektual Islam Jawa dalam Pemikiran Kalam
Muhammad Shalih Darat al-Samarani. Semarang: Wali Songo
Press, 2008.
Rifai. KH Hasyim Asy’ari, Biografi Singkat 1871-1947. Yogyakarta: Arruz
Media, 2009.
Sairin, Weinata. Gerakan Pembaharuan Muhammadiyah. Jakarta: Pustaka
Sinar Harapan, 1995.
Salim, Abdullah. “Al-Majmu>’ah al-Shari>’ah al-Ka>fiyah li al-Awwa>m
Karya KH. Saleh Darat, Suatu Kajian terhadap Kitab Fikih
Berbahasa Jawa Akhir Abad 19 M.” Unpublished Ph.D
Dissertation, Postgraduate Program, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah,
Jakarta, 1995.
Suryo, Djoko. “Sejarah Sosial Intelektual Islam, Catatan Pengantar.”
Noor Huda, Islam Nusantara, Sejarah Sosial Intelektual Islam di
Indonesia. Yogjakarta: Ar-Ruzz Media, 2007.
Yumi, Sugahara. “The Publication of Vernacular Islamic Textbooks
and Islamization in Southeast Asia.” The Journal of South East
Asian Studies, No. 27 (2009).
Zuhri, Muchibbin. “Pandangan Hasyim Asy’ari tentang Ahlusunnah
wal Jama’ah.” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Postgraduate
Program, IAIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya, 2009.
211
Book Review
FROM “SUFI ORDER RITUAL” TO INDONESIAN ISLAM
Sulanam
Book Title: Nur Syam, Tarekat Petani; Fenomena Tarekat
Syattariyah Lokal (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2013), xvi + 236;
Achmad Chodjim, Sunan Kalijaga, New Edition (Jakarta:
Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2013), 371; Muzamil Qomar, Fajar
Baru Islam Indonesia? (Bandung: Mizan 2012), xiii + 286
Indonesia—geographically stretches from Sabang to Merauke—
has a quite old and rich religious tradition. Before the Hindu-Buddhist
inheritance such as Borobudur temple which then became one of the
Seven Wonders of the World, Indonesia has many other traditions.
Those traditions are manifestation of people’s need in the form of
local religion.
Furthermore, this local religion gives Javanese people a medium in
attaining an impressive “divinity”. It is called impressive because
without revelation, the society, for example in Java, is able to recognize
God; they called it as Sang Hyang Tunggal or Sang Hyang Wenang (The
One, The Ruler of the Universe). Therefore, the coming of Hinduism
and Buddhism in Indonesia can be interpreted as a mere complement
to a “divine sense” which had been found by the society called as the
One or the Ruler of jagad alit (micro cosmos) and the large universe
(macro cosmos). This condition naturally goes the same with the
coming of Islam in the archipelago. It must be noted that with those
backgrounds, Islam comes to Indonesia not as pure religion but a mix
with the local religion.
This is the case and also the background, why Indonesian Islam,
particularly in Java, is very different from Islam in the Middle East
such as in Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Moreover, Islam in Indonesia did
“Sufi Order Ritual”
not come directly from the Middle East but from Persia and India
which are famous for their accommodation towards cultures. It is why;
Muslims in Indonesia can easily bind with local culture. These
adaptation and acculturation patterns can be seen in some of the
preachers in Java who are called Wali Sanga (Nine Saints), one of them
was Sunan Kalijaga, whose method in spreading Islam was different
from other preachers.
Sunan Kalijaga, who is known by many people for having
supernatural power, is also known for his tolerant approach toward his
dakwah on people as well as promoting social values than individual
ones. The Methods used by Sunan Kalijaga were interesting and attract
more people than any other Wali Sanga. One of the methods can be
seen in the use of Javanese Puppet (Wayang Kulit) which was an icon
for Hindhu-Budhist tradition. In addition, Sunan Kalijaga were also
very smart in composing lyrics, for instance the tradition song Gundul
Pacul and Lir ilir which are sung by many people until now (Chodjim,
183-203).
Those facts naturally raise a question, why Sunan Kalijaga did not
fight against those Hindu-Buddhist cultures. Instead of eliminating unIslamic practices like other preachers did, Sunan Kalijaga was keen to
preserve the local tradition while also on the other hand spreading
Islam in Java. It looks like the method he was used based on his
awareness that the people already have an embedded religious
tradition.
Other than that, it is also a matter of fact that Javanese traditions
have many rituals which resembled Islamic ones. It can be seen, for
example, from the ascetic practices (bertapa) which are similar to i'tikaf
where people seclude themselves in the mosque for worship and
devotion. Furthermore, there is a concept in Javanese tradition which
was called as laku, the practice is materialized in the form of discipline
and religious performance in order to be close to God. Naturally, this
concept shares the same ideas with Islam which is called as tas}awwuf
(Sufism). Both of them tend to make close relation to God with the
intention to get His blessing and mercy.
It should be emphasize here, that the way to get God’s blessing
and mercy is certainly not simple and single. That is why in the
development of Sufism and Mysticism there are always differences in
the form of religious denomination. In Islam, Sufism has even become
a specific study. The foundation of Sufism is specifically based on the
213
Sulanam
quality of religiosity. The focus is on achieving quality rather than
religious formality. This doctrine is emphasized on special ritual and
practice. Usually we can see it through thikr ritual under a guidance of a
murshid or teacher. This particular ritual is adapted to achieving
enlightenment and wisdom in a method that promotes totality and
humbleness (khushu>‘). The latter practice, create an opportunity in the
mystical dimension of Sufism.
This mystical practice is only a medium, because to understand
something “beyond reality”, noumena, or something behind the
phenomenon, needs a reduction process in order to find and achieve
pure consciousness. Regarding this concept, there are at least three
practices or rituals with the purpose of achieving the supra reality.
They are Phenomenological Reduction (belief in the existence of what
we call “real” or “not real”), Eidetic reduction (belief in acquiring
quality for human) and transcendental reduction (belief in pure subject
as the cause of the universe). Those three achievements are the ones
aim to be found by people who practice mystical rituals, because the
goals are invisible (Chodjim, 33-34).
Regardless the pros and cons on mystical problem, the
development of mysticism in Indonesia is in conjunction with the birth
of Islam, i.e. when the Prophet Muh}ammad received the revelation.
The history shows that when Muh}ammad became a prophet he
repeatedly secluded himself in a cave to make him close to God. This
habit, as we know, is very much similar with tapa tradition among
Javanese people to get sign or enlightenment.
In addition to that, the contemplation of the Prophet in the cave is
a process of seclusion from people of Mecca who is lost in the worldly
things. The principal aim of this isolation activity is a religious method
to approach the transcendent God. In that way, it can be said that the
meditation of the Prophet Muh}ammad is a process to communicate
with God, to get peace of mind and probity against the ignorance
(ja>hili>yah) of the Arab World at that time.
The expert of Islamic mysticism said, the khalwah or solitary retreat
done by the Prophet is in the line with the ritual of Islamic mysticism.
It is must be noted that what the prophet had done in the past is the
embryo of Sufism which was then taught by Àli> bin Abi> Ta>lib. From
this point onward, Ali educated his family and friends until AbdulQadir Gilani who is known as the founder of Qadiriyah Sufi order.
214
“Sufi Order Ritual”
The Development of Sufi Order and the Islam of Rahmatan lil
Alamin
After Sayyidina Ali, the Sufi order has developed into several
branches or orders. However, there are at least six Sufi orders which
have been developed in Indonesia. There are: Qadiriyah, Shadhiliyyah,
Naqshbandiyah, Khalwatiyah, Sammaniyah and Shatariyah Sufi orders.
The name of Qadiriyah Sufi order was taken from its founder AbdulQadir Gilani, this Sufi order position is important especially in the
history of Islamic mysticism. This condition happens not only because
the Qadiriyah is the first Sufi order in Islam but also because this order
is the embryo for other Sufi orders.
Shadhiliyyah was founded by Abul Hasan Ali ash-Shadhili. This
order mostly practiced in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, and Syria. Some of
the teachings do not suggest its followers to leave the worldly business
and to practice Islamic law. The definition of zuhud or ascetics in this
order does not mean to entirely leave the worldly things because the
origin of zuhud is to empty the heart except for God.
Other than Shadhiliyyah, we can also find some other Sufi orders
in Indonesia such as Naqshbandiyah. This order was founded by
Muhammad Bah al-Din al-Uwaisi al-Bukhari Naqsyabandi. Basically,
this order originated from Abu Ya’qub Yusuf al-Hamdani, a Sufi who
lived in the same era with Abdul-Qadir Gilani. This order spread to
some countries mostly in Central Asia, Turkey, India, the Middle East
and Indonesia. This Sufi order has its own ritual, one of them is hush
dar dam (awareness of breathing). This is a concentration practice
where someone must keep him/herself from any mistake while
breathing. So it is about inhaling and exhaling while at the same time
doing remembrance of God. You can also find a ritual called safar dar
watan (travelling in the homeland). It is a ritual where you have to have
a spiritual travel, detached yourself from imperfectness and traveling
from failure to praiseworthy qualities
Another Sufi order developed in Indonesia is the Khalwatiyah. The
name was taken from a Sufi follower from Makasar, Yusuf Abul
Mahasin Tajul Khalwati al-Maqassariy. This order spread among
Makasar people and some Bugis people. Some of its rituals are Yaqza
(awakening), awareness that he/she is nothing upon God, muh}a>sabah or
self-introspection, ina>bah, the willing to return to God, and tafakkur,
think deeply about God.
215
Sulanam
The next Sufi order is Sammaniyah. The founder was Muh}ammad
bin Àbd al-Kari>m al-Madani> al-Sha>fi’i> al-Samma>n. According to
Snouck Hurgronje, Sammaniyah Sufi order developed rapidly
especially in Aceh as well as South Borneo. In the latter, this Sufi order
exists until now. It has several rituals for instance particular thikr
(saman) which has many mystical elements.
The last one is the Shatariyah. The founder was Syaikh Abd Allah
al-Syathary. Some historians noted that this order firstly developed in
Bagdad through Ahmad Syathary then was improved by Ahmad
Qusyasyi. Some people relate this order to Transoxiana tradition, it is so
because it has chained to Abu Yazid al-Isyqi, which then connect to
Abu yazid al-Bustami and Imam Ja’far Shadiq. It is not surprising that
this order is known as Isyqiyyah in Iran, or Turkey.
Around the fifth century, Shatariyah was very popular in Central
Asia. The followers implement ascetic way of life. To do this, the
followers must reach perfectness level which is called as akhyar (the
chosen one) and abrar (the best one). This Sufi order was spread in
Indonesia through Abdurrauf al-Sinkili in Aceh. From there it is
expanded to Java through Banten then went to Central Java, East Java
and Kuanyar where some of its rituals blend into daily live such as in
farming activities (Syam, 72-117).
The concept of Sufism in Kuanyar is very interesting because in
this place Sufism and worldly live is mixed together in people daily live.
To become followers in a Sufi order do not mean their daily lives are
limited in thikr and religious rituals. They still can work as other people
do. In this place the working concept is the same as worshipping God.
There is no boundary between following Sufi order with the obligation
to provide food to the family. Importantly, religious rituals are not
always related with some formalistic activities as usually we have seen
in the mosque.
Thus, the teaching of Sufi order is merged with daily live. This
condition naturally shows the level of religious maturity. This can be
said as the melting point of taking care of the relationship between
humans and God (h}abl min Alla>h) and taking care of the relationship
between fellow humans (h}abl min al-na>s). By doing the Sufi order rituals
people or followers are able to accommodate these two-dimensional
relations (with God as well as with fellow humans), then they can
achieve the intrinsic level of happiness. []
216

CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING THE ACEH`S SULTANAHS

Transcription

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