Bahrain`s Internet Ecosystem

Transcription

The Internet Intelligence Authority
Bahrain's Internet Ecosystem
James Cowie, CTO
ITS 2009
Manama, Bahrain
Overview
•
The Study and its Goals
–
–
•
Primary Conclusions
–
–
–
–
•
•
Who is Renesys?
Terminology and Methodology
Sizing the Bahrain Internet Ecosystem
Evolving Relationships Among Participants
Vulnerabilities and Remediation
Factors Affecting Future Growth
Provider Historical Details
Conclusions
© 2009 Renesys Corporation
ITS 2009 Manama, Bahrain
2
Goals of The Study
•
•
•
Provide a comprehensive overview of the
evolving relationships between Bahrain's
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the
international telecommunications carriers
serving the Region.
Identify key strengths and potential
weaknesses of Bahrain's Internet connectivity
Provide historical context to help the reader
understand the present state of the market.
3
About Renesys
•
•
•
Since 2000, Renesys has specialized in
objective third-party analysis of Internet
markets and their evolution over time.
Renesys provides enterprises, regulators, and
Internet service providers with both realtime
and historical perspectives on the Internet
connectivity of critical counterparties
Applications include situational awareness,
information assurance, security and business
intelligence
4
Impact Analysis for Operators, Regulators
Realtime routing
changes
support
assessment of
impacts from
events such as
storms, power
outages,
physical
infrastructure
failures.
5
Ecosystem Analysis Exposes Internet's
Structure, Critical Networks
Few operators,
and fewer
enterprises, have
transparency into
the Internet
connectivity of
their partners,
providers,
customers, and
competitors.
6
One-Slide Review of Internet Routing
•
•
•
Network Prefix: a block of contiguous
address space (example: 128.36.0.0/16)
Autonomous System: a registered
organization that speaks BGP with other
autonomous systems (example: Batelco, ASN
5416)
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP): allows
ASNs to advertise their available network
prefixes, starting from the originating autonomous
system, and spreading throughout the planet
within 30s, creating the global routing table
7
Renesys Infrastructure
8
Renesys collects routing perspectives
•
•
Renesys actively seeks out new locations
from which to study the Internet
Service providers can meet us from anywhere
in the world via multihop BGP, or directly at:
–
–
–
–
–
–
NAP of the Americas (Miami)
PAIX (San Francisco)
One Wilshire LAX (Los Angeles)
London Internet Exchange
Amsterdam Internet Exchange
Equinix Tokyo
9
Determining Relationships
•
•
•
Each data partner's “perspective” provides a
distinct autonomous system path from that
ISP to each network in Bahrain
Each path provides supporting evidence that
adjacencies exist (or don't exist) between
pairs of provider autonomous systems
We classify those relationships as transit or
peering and sum over all networks, all
providers to understand a given market.
10
Example: A Single Route, Interpreted
•
In June, Renesys partner X had this route:
79.171.240.0/24 :: X 7473 8966 35019 39273 30882
•
“To get to this network from X, go to
Singapore Telecom (7473), on to Emirates
(8966), and then to the BIX (35019), and then to
Lightspeed (39273) and finally Benefit
Company (30882), who owns the network”
11
Strengths and Limitations
•
Analysis of Internet topology is based solely
on observation of BGP route changes,
active measurement from outside, and other
public data sources
•
Renesys did not have access to or visibility
into network traffic in any form, nor did we
have visibility into provider-internal routing
or most private peering arrangements
12
Data Used in the Study
•
•
•
Primary data sources were drawn from the
global BGP routing table, summarizing many
independent perspectives
Renesys receives a realtime picture of 300+
ISPs' favored routes to all of the network
prefixes in Bahrain
This network topology dataset has been
recording changes in global routing for all
network prefixes on earth, with 1 second
granularity, continuously since 2002.
13
Methodology
•
•
We examined global routes (and, in some
cases, performed traceroutes to specific
prefixes) to understand the Kingdom's
externally visible connectivity
Study conclusions are independent
observations or inferences drawn by Renesys
from external routing data and active
measurement, without the participation of the
operators or the TRA.
14
Disclaimers
•
•
•
This study was commissioned by the TRA, but
Renesys was encouraged to make an entirely
independent assessment based on our own
data and observations of the market.
In cases where the data do not support a firm
conclusion, I shall attempt to clearly
distinguish inference from fact.
The opinions presented here are entirely my
own, and not those of the TRA, nor those of
the Government of Bahrain.
15
Primary Conclusions of the Study
16
Bahrain Internet Ecosystem (Aug 2009)
17
1. In regional terms, Bahrain is still a
relatively small Internet market.
Bahrain
Kuwait
Lebanon
Qatar
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Iran
Oman
Egypt
Syria
Iraq
Yemen
Source: Renesys Market Intelligence August 2009
18
But Bahrain's Internet Ecosystem is one
of the richest in the region, for its size.
Country ASNs Per Capita
Networks
ASNs
2008 GDP
Population
Bahrain
1
7
8
12
13
Kuwait
Lebanon
Qatar
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
UAE
Iran
Oman
Egypt
Syria
2
3
4
6
7
5
8
9
10
12
5
4
9
8
2
6
3
12
1
11
5
3
10
7
2
6
1
12
3
11
5
10
6
13
1
3
2
9
4
8
10
9
12
7
4
8
2
11
1
6
19
Clear Evidence of Domestic Competition
•
•
•
Steady growth of the number of fixed-line,
wireless, and mobile service providers who
participate in the Bahrain ecosystem
At the start of 2003, there was one
autonomous system originating Bahrain
prefixes – Batelco. Today there are 18, not
counting US NSA Bahrain.
Autonomous Systems are the golden standard
of a diverse ecosystem – they can diversify
their Internet transit to include multiple
providers.
20
2. Bahrain's Internet Connectivity is
adequate but should be more diverse
•
188 networks, 18 autonomous systems, 3
international carriers, 3 physical paths
–
•
King Fahd causeway west, FLAG/FOG north
Arguably insufficient provider diversity:
–
–
–
–
–
Batelco purchases from Flag and Tata.
Zain and BIX purchase from Emirates and Tata.
Lightspeed purchases Flag indirectly via Batelco.
Mena and 2Connect purchase from Tata and BIX.
The other 12 autonomous systems buy from BIX.
21
TRA's pressure to further open FLAG to
competition makes sense in this context.
•
•
•
•
Competing providers do not have
infrastructure to perform direct connections to
the international market
In that sense, they are not operating fully
independently as competing players
A true carrier-neutral exchange facility would
be the best solution
Second-best solution might be for BIX to
purchase access to FLAG transit
22
3. Batelco does not offer domestic
peering.
•
•
•
•
Batelco is seen to peer with regional providers
outside Bahrain, including Qtel (AS8781) and
Emirates (AS8966)
This allows regional traffic to be exchanged
without incurring the high cost of international
transit outside the Gulf Region
Batelco does not peer domestically with the
BIX, nor with any of the operators hosted
there
Why is this significant?
23
Domestic Traffic, Routed Internationally
•
If a Batelco customer wishes to exchange
traffic with a customer of another domestic
operator, packets would very likely pass:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
From the Batelco customer
Over Batelco's fixed infrastructure
Out of the country to KSA, UAE or even London
Through one or more foreign routers
Back to Bahrain via Tata, FLAG, or Emirates
Into the BIX
Back out over Batelco's fixed infrastructure
(leased wholesale to the competing operator)
Down to the competing operator's customer.
24
Domestic Traffic, Routed Internationally
•
This would seem to provide significant
disincentive to purchase competing service!
–
–
–
•
•
Increased latency (at a guess, 50-250ms)
Increased jitter and packet loss
Both sides incur higher international transit costs
Bahrain has had a functional Internet
Exchange for more than five years, in order to
avoid situations like this.
Domestic operators should exchange traffic
settlement-free in order to promote the growth
of domestic content and security/stability of
domestic Internet traffic.
25
4. Batelco's customers lack transit
alternatives.
•
•
•
•
•
Autonomous systems can purchase transit
from multiple providers, and the Internet will
use BGP to pick the best inbound path
This is the standard way for an enterprise or
provider to route around single-provider failure
Nearly 40,000 autonomous systems
worldwide
Zero autonomous systems receive IP transit
from Batelco (AS5416).
Why not? Is this unusual?
26
National Providers Have ASN Customers
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Armenian Telephone Company has 10
Cameroon Telecom has 5
Kyrgyz Telecom has 5
New Caledonia PTT has 3
Saudi Arabia STC has 29
Iran DCI has 51
…
Batelco has none
27
Multiple interpretations of the data
•
•
•
All of Batelco's IP transit customers are
entirely satisfied and do not wish to pay the
extra price to retain an autonomous system
number and a second service provider
Batelco does not sell IP transit to autonomous
systems who are likely to buy from its
domestic or international competitors, only
wholesale connectivity
Either is possible.
28
4. Evolving role of the BIX is unclear.
•
•
•
BIX is not a place where all domestic traffic
gets exchanged settlement-free (Batelco,
Zain, Lightspeed are absent)
BIX is not a carrier-neutral facility where
domestic providers can meet directly with
international carriers who compete for their
business
BIX is basically a reseller for a few hundred
megabits of Tata/Emirates transit, and cannot
change the basic dynamics of competitive
access to international transit resources
29
This is not the BIX's fault.
•
The BIX has satisfied its original mandates:
–
–
–
•
•
Provide a home for domestic peering
Make it easier for new ASNs to secure
international transit (if only indirectly)
Satisfy monitoring requirements and lawful
intercept capabilities
Wholesale connectivity continues to hobble
BIX effectiveness.
Providers such as 2Connect and Zain have
either left the BIX, or diversified away from the
BIX with direct purchase of int'l transit.
30
5. Inference of Capacity Constraints in
Last Mile to Operators
•
•
•
Many BIX participants colocate in the same
building (presumably to avoid purchasing
wholesale fixed line capacity)
Active traceroute studies of BIX members'
networks indicate that 95th percentile latencies
are significantly higher for nonresident
members
We interpret this as capacity constraints and
network congestion in the last mile between
BIX and the operators.
31
ASN
provider
ASN customer
5416 Batelco
30882 Benefit Co
31452 Zain
35019 BIX
35313 2Connect
35443 Kalaam
35457 Etisalcom BH
35546 Northstar
35568 Nuetel
35729 Viacloud
39015 Mena
39273 Lightspeed
41110 BCN
41303 Ascentech
42931 RTS
44167 iCOLPLUS
47380 Kulacom
35019
BIX
5384
Emirates
28.6
154.85
85.25
19.73
991.65
4.38
19.13
33.87
31
17.03
7.28
16.02
188.65
12.79
4.68
15412
Flag
6453
Tata
202.77
326.64
th
These are 95358.44
340.34
367.89
percentile worst-case
latencies.
Generally higher worst332.87
case latencies
measured in the 95th
percentile window are
strongly suggestive of
congestion and delay
between BIX and the
provider in question.
6. Facility Carrier Neutrality is Desirable
•
•
•
•
In a carrier-neutral facility, participants
purchase bandwidth directly from carriers
The exchange is responsible for space,
power, ports, but not international transit
Transit prices kept low through open
competition
In the long run, this should be a primary
goal for the TRA, the BIX, and interested
operators
33
Will BIX evolve to a more carrier-neutral
facility model?
•
•
•
Seems unlikely given current mandate and
operational model, and limitations on physical
capacity
Gateway Gulf came online as the study results
were being prepared
GG and BIX face many of the same
challenges:
–
–
–
–
Painful physical connectivity challenges
Lack of direct access to international carriers
Limited size of the domestic content market
Significant international traffic asymmetries
34
7. Start measuring domestic traffic
•
•
•
Renesys recommends that TRA work with
operators to measure the total volume of
Internet traffic that originates and terminates
within the Kingdom, and within the Gulf region
This is a key metric that reflects the evolution
of the domestic and regional market (content
and ICT services)
Capture ICT investment in domestic market,
rather than encouraging flight to offshore
information markets, reliance on int'l transit
35
8. Promote investment in domestic
content and services
•
•
•
•
Most Internet content consumed in Bahrain
comes from the US or Europe
This creates highly asymmetric traffic ratios
More domestic content (and better local
caching) will reduce reliance on international
transit, improve operators' bargaining power
with peers elsewhere in the world
Local streaming media, e-commerce, payment
processing, … would all help to improve
balance over time
36
Top 100 Websites Accessed by Bahrain Internet Consumers, August 2009
Source: Alexa.com
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Site
http://google.com.bh
http://live.com
http://youtube.com
http://google.com
http://yahoo.com
http://facebook.com
http://msn.com
http://maktoob.com
http://kooora.com
http://travian.ae
http://bahrainforums.com
http://blogger.com
http://tagged.com
http://microsoft.com
http://wikipedia.org
http://4shared.com
http://gamezer.com
Primary IP
74.125.77.104
207.46.30.34
64.15.120.233
74.125.45.100
209.191.93.53
69.63.176.140
207.68.172.246
74.54.154.48
216.93.181.137
92.51.158.104
207.210.66.170
74.124.127.191
67.221.174.30
207.46.232.182
208.80.152.2
208.88.227.170
208.43.29.244
Country
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
DE
US
CA
US
US
US
VG
US
Rank
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
http://flickr.com
http://alwasatnews.com
http://mozook.com
http://indiatimes.com
http://bp.blogspot.com
http://bramjnet.com
http://te3p.com
http://3roos.com
68.142.214.24
74.53.119.169
208.43.69.74
203.199.93.69
unknown
208.64.26.42
208.43.69.85
72.35.81.133
US
US
US
IN
unknown
US
US
US
68
26
http://inetmail.com.bh
193.188.97.108
BH
76
FR
SA
US
US
AT
US
US
unknown
US
SA
US
CA
US
CA
DE
US
US
US
US
CA
US
US
US
US
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
http://dailymotion.com
http://bdr130.net
http://wordpress.com
http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com
http://artyria.ae
http://imdb.com
http://graaam.com
http://jro7i.com
http://metacafe.com
http://hawaaworld.com
http://mexat.com
http://0zz0.com
http://brg8.com
http://clicksor.com
http://rapidshare.com
http://ask.com
http://orkut.com
http://g9g.com
http://friendster.com
http://6rb.com
http://alayam.com
http://conduit.com
http://rediff.com
http://mediafire.com
195.8.215.136
89.144.99.81
76.74.254.126
64.226.254.55
83.137.113.99
207.171.166.140
208.43.81.104
unknown
72.32.120.222
212.162.151.65
208.115.42.250
64.15.129.80
72.46.153.178
66.48.81.155
195.122.131.14
66.235.120.101
74.125.65.85
75.126.212.102
209.11.168.112
67.205.81.115
66.132.220.36
98.142.106.40
204.2.177.43
38.114.196.10
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
Site
http://gulf-daily-news.com
http://jeddahbikers.com
http://shiavoice.com
http://photobucket.com
http://doubleclick.com
http://jsoftj.com
http://imageshack.us
http://google.co.in
http://zshare.net
http://bing.com
http://jeeran.com
http://bahrainevents.com
http://alwaqt.com
http://m5zn.com
http://classesinternational.com
http://6rbtop.com
http://arabseyes.com
Primary IP
64.226.254.35
67.225.167.166
87.96.162.44
209.17.70.11
216.73.93.8
208.43.78.207
208.94.2.98
74.125.127.104
216.155.135.202
64.4.8.147
70.98.189.92
174.133.64.106
209.51.158.162
67.220.200.226
67.217.100.249
72.55.191.190
72.46.153.146
http://anonymous.com.bh
193.188.112.44
BH
http://amazon.com
http://netlog.com
http://z5x.net
http://bbc.co.uk
http://vmn.net
http://myegy.com
http://bitefight.org
72.21.207.65
194.60.206.60
212.187.241.144
212.58.224.138
69.50.138.195
92.241.168.97
87.106.180.118
US
BE
GB
GB
US
RU
DE
http://fsupport.gov.bh
89.31.192.194
BH
66.48.78.201
216.39.57.106
208.64.28.98
75.126.128.130
208.96.49.204
98.129.138.249
72.52.250.71
174.132.118.28
74.86.48.18
97.74.26.1
192.150.18.117
66.96.248.165
66.135.205.13
70.84.164.202
208.43.247.190
69.5.88.231
64.151.87.249
64.38.59.221
32.107.37.84
72.32.84.240
87.233.147.140
174.37.120.248
216.239.59.104
209.85.229.104
CA
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
SK
US
NL
US
US
US
http://paypopup.com
http://xtendmedia.com
http://bahrain2day.com
http://kaznova.com
http://hihi2.com
http://goal.com
http://hodood.com
http://lakii.com
http://onemanga.com
http://adsbychannel.com
http://adobe.com
http://umm.biz
http://ebay.com
http://maktoobblog.com
http://bo7.net
http://megaupload.com
http://startimes2.com
http://alamuae.com
http://mbc.net
http://zain.com
http://mininova.org
http://b4bh.com
http://google.ae
http://google.co.uk
Country
US
US
SE
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
CA
US
9. Significant physical vulnerabilities persist.
•
•
•
Physical infrastructure failures continue to
threaten international connectivity
Such problems can be routed around with
difficulty but the alternative paths experience
significant congestion.
We shall examine three classes of physical
failures that affect Bahrain's international
transit, and show how their impact is observed
in the routing table.
38
Sea Cable
Corridor
(Fog and
Falcon)
Causeway
(SFO)
Source: TRA
39
9.1. Causeway failures
•
29 June 2009: King Fahd Causeway
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Bahrain loses connectivity to Riyadh
BIX and all downstream lose Tata transit
All traffic diverts to Emirates over FOG cable
Significant congestion results
For reasons unknown, no operator other than
Batelco chose to purchase FLAG transit as an
alternative route
Batelco experiences 4 minutes of instability, and
then fails over to its alternative paths to Tata
Restoration 8 hours later
40
Causeway Cut: Visible in Routing
41
Causeway Cut: Visible in Routing
42
9.2. FOG (Fiber Optic Gulf) Cable Failure
•
February 2009: FOG Cable Cut
–
–
–
–
–
–
Zain, BIX and all downstream lose Emirates
transit
Traffic diverts westbound to Tata over
Causeway
Significant congestion results
BIX has more westbound capacity, not as
severe
But impact lasted for nearly two weeks
Batelco not as significantly affected by the
outage; transit preferences through FLAG
unaffected
43
FOG Cut: BIX shifts to 100% Tata for a week
44
FOG Cut: Zain shifts to 100% Tata for a week
45
FOG Cut: 2Connect prefers direct Tata, avoids
congested BIX for a week
46
FOG Cut: Batelco has FLAG, is largely
unaffected
47
Percentage unstable across providers
Vertical stacking
shows correlated
failure modes that
reveal common
physical layer
dependencies.
Emirates
connections are
more unstable
through
Spring/Summer
2009 (FOG cuts)
48
Worst-case events for key BH providers
Worst-case hours
(out of 5,000)
indicate correlation
among rare
events. BIX and
Zain are more
exposed than
Batelco because
they lack FLAG
transit for
redundant UAE
connectivity.
49
FOG Cable seems particularly vulnerable
•
•
More than 30 days of reduced capacity
apparent in first half of 2009
Event signatures in routing data suggest that
similar impacts were felt
–
–
–
–
•
Jan 24 – Feb 2, 2009
Feb 12-24, 2009
Mar 30 – Apr 6, 2009
Apr 13-18, 2009
Need to supplement FOG in order to
guarantee connectivity to UAE (and SMW3/4
transit)
50
Emirates Telecom (AS8966)
51
9.3. FLAG/Falcon, SMW3/4 cables
•
•
•
•
•
•
Falcon and/or Sea-Me-We cables are
obviously critical for long-distance global
interconnection to Europe, Asia
SMW4 cut 30 Jan 2008
Flag cut 30 Jan and 2 Feb 2008
Same thing happened again 19 Dec 2008
Under these circumstances, one can only wait
for restoration
Eastbound BH connectivity was retained
52
Sea-Me-We-4/FLAG Cuts on 30 Jan 2008
53
SMW4/Flag Cuts 30 Jan 2008
Other countries were even
more badly affected because of
lack of provider diversity
Bahrain suffered 10% outage
and significant congestion,
lasting for weeks
54
Countries impacted, December 2008
55
Individual Provider Histories
56
Batelco (AS5416)
•
Jan 2001: Already buying from Teleglobe (Tata, AS8297 and AS6453)
and Savvis (AS3561) when Renesys historical routing data coverage
begins.
•
•
Aug 2002: Turn down AS8297 as Teleglobe retired the ASN
Oct 2003: Briefly add transit to FLAG (AS15412) before dropping them
again in December 2003
Jan 2004: Add transit via Softbank IDC (AS4694; aka Japan Telecom
IDC, aka Cable and Wireless IDC) as a heavily prepended (7x) backup
route.
Feb 2004: Add Cable and Wireless (AS1273).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Jun 2004: Drop Savvis (AS3561).
Mar 2006: Add transit via FLAG (AS15412).
Jul 2006: Drop Softbank IDC (AS4694).
May 2007: Drop Cable and Wireless (AS1273).
Jul 2009: Continuing transit relationships via Tata (AS6453) and FLAG
(AS15412).
57
Batelco (AS5416)
58
Batelco (AS5416)
59
Bahrain Internet Exchange (AS35019)
•
•
Mar 2004: Internet exchange license granted by TRA.
Jun 2005: BIX comes online, single-homed to Tata (AS6453).
•
Jul 2005: Kalaam Telecom (AS35443) and 2Connect (AS35313) join.
(2Connect will also buy a limited amount of backup transit direct to Tata;
see below.)
•
•
Sep 2005: Etisalcom Bahrain (AS35457) and Northstar (AS35546) join.
Dec 2005: Viacloud (AS35729) and Mena Broadband (AS39015) join.
(Mena will also get transit to Tata; see below.)
Jan 2006: Lightspeed Telecom (AS39273) joins.
Feb 2006: Nuetel(Amwaj, AS35568) joins. Nuetel also gets occasional
satellite transit from IABG Teleport (AS29259) from April 2006 through
November 2006.
Jul 2006: Ascentech (AS41303) joins.
•
Sep 2006: BCN (AS41110) joins.
•
•
•
60
•
Jul 2007: RTS (AS42931) joins.
•
•
•
Dec 2007: BIX adds second transit to the EMIX (AS8960). 2Connect
stops using the BIX for transit.
May 2008: Kulacom (AS47380) and iCOLPLUS (AS44167) join. MTCVodafone (Zain) also stops using the BIX for transit.
Jul 2008: 2Connect resumes using the BIX for transit.
Oct 2008: Bahrain Central Informatics (AS48109) joins.
•
•
May 2009: BIX adds additional transit from Emirates (AS8966).
June 2009: BIX drops first EMIX transit (AS8960).
•
August 2009: Lightspeed Telecom (AS39273) stops transiting the BIX,
and Gateway Gulf (AS44876) joins.
•
61
62
Zain (AS31452)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Aug 2003: MTC-Vodafone licensed to provide Internet services.
Jun 2004: MTC (AS31452) joins the Internet with satellite transit via
Transfer, Ltd (aka Horizon Satellite Services, AS30729).
Dec 2004: Add second, terrestrial transit connection to Emirates
(AS8961).
Mar 2005: Add third transit connection via Horizon Satellite Services
(AS30981), drop Transfer, Ltd
May 2006: Join the BIX (AS35019) and begin transiting some traffic
through them.
Oct 2006: Drop Emirates (AS8961) as a transit provider.
Sep 2007: Add Tata (AS6453) as a transit provider.
May 2008: Stop transiting the BIX entirely, relying on Tata and Horizon for
all connectivity.
Sep 2008: Turn off Horizon Satellite Services. Start advertising
62.209.16.0/20 (WiMax) on 8 September.
Jan 2009: Restore transit via Emirates (AS8961).
63
Zain (AS31452)
64
Mena (AS39015)
•
•
•
Nov 2004: Mena licensed to provide Internet services.
Dec 2005: Join the BIX (AS35019).
Nov 2008: Add second transit connection to Tata (AS6453).
Today about 80% of Mena's prefixes are advertised
only through Tata, and the remaining 20% are
advertised through BIX. It's rare to see prefixes
available through both paths.
65
Mena (AS39015)
66
2Connect (AS35313)
•
•
•
•
•
Sep 2004: Licensed to provide Internet services.
Jul 2005: Joined the BIX (AS35019).
Feb 2006: Added a limited amount of direct transit to Tata
(AS6453).
Dec 2007: Dropped BIX transit, but still present at the BIX.
Jul 2008: Restored BIX transit.
67
2Connect (AS35313)
68
Lightspeed Communications (AS39273)
•
•
•
Jan 2006: Lightspeed comes online at the BIX.
Mar 2009: Start providing transit to The Benefit Company
(AS30882)
Aug 2009: Leave the BIX, start buying FLAG transit (via
Batelco), and start originating The Benefit Company's
address space directly.
Transit diversity has decreased substantially; Lightspeed
should consider acquiring a second connection to Tata
for maximum east-west diversity, replicating Batelco's
own transit strategy.
69
Emirates Telecom (AS8966)
70
Conclusions
71
Bahrain is well-positioned for the future.
•
•
•
Increased domestic competition has laid the
groundwork for a rich, resilient Internet
ecosystem
There are still significant concerns about
physical diversity, last-mile connectivity, and
open access to international carriers
Batelco and the BIX, in particular, must
continue to evolve in order to maximize the
growth potential of the ICT sector over the
next decade.
72
Thank You!
http://www.renesys.com
73

Bahrain`s Internet Ecosystem

Transcription

Similar documents

Pg36-37 Listings.qxd:GW Master

Naqsh Short Films

Al Areen Newsletter March

Ahlan Wa Sahlan II 3 - Rotary Club of Manama

Froggy Drawing handout2 - Mid Mon Valley Transit Authority

GHC Talk NL - Gulf Holding Company

Fastfrate Roadfrate SS.indd

Project Description: In 2008 Hoyne Savings Bank realized that their

Ringside view - News of Bahrain