The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account

The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account
Author(s): Javier Auyero
Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2000), pp. 55-81
Published by: The Latin American Studies Association
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THE LOGIC OF CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA:
An Ethnographic
Account*
Javier
Auyero
StateUniversity
ofNew York,StonyBrook
in a shantytown
in theoutskirts
Basedonethnographic
of
Abstract:
fieldwork
studies
theworkings
clientelism"
Buenos
thisarticle
Aires,
ofPeronist
"political
thewebofrelations
thatsomeslum-dwellers
amongtheurbanpoor.Itanalyzes
toobtainmedicine,
to
withlocalpolitical
brokers
establish
food,andsolutions
themainfunctions
Thearticlealso explores
ofthe
othereveryday
concerns.
which
areresource
control
andinformation
hoard"problem-solving
networks,"
toan underexplored
oftheoperaing,andpaysparticular
attention
dimension
tionofclientelism:
clients'
ownviewsonthenetwork.
Thirty-four-year
old Normalivesina sluminthecityofCospito,in
theConurbanoBonaerense.1
Shehasno stablejob,andherhusbandhasrelosthisas a construction
worker.
cently
Theyhavea handicappedbabygirl
and a teenageboy who droppedout of the neighborhood
publichigh
school.In September
storein thefront
partof
1996,theyopeneda grocery
theirhouse.Normatoldme in ourinterview,
"Youknow,thingswerenot
office
working
verywell,so I decidedtoopenan unidadbasica(a grassroots
of thePeronistparty)and see whathappens!"Theirdecisioncoincided
withtheascendingcareerofGustavoPedele,a Peronist
councilman
trying
tomakeinroadsintotheslumtolaunchhis1998mayoralcampaign.Pedele
*Thisresearch
was fundedby a grantfromtheJoint
Committee
on LatinAmericanand
CaribbeanStudiesof theSocial ScienceResearchCounciland theAmericanCouncilof
LearnedSocieties
withfundsprovidedbytheFordFoundation.
I wouldliketothankCharles
Tilly,
DeborahPoole,RobertGay,and SteveLevitsky
fortheircritical
comments
on earlier
versions.
Draftswerepresented
attheColloquiumonArgentine
PoliticalCultureattheUniversity
ofIllinois,Urbana,and theSeminario
Generalat theCasa de AltosEstudiosand the
inArgentina.
Fundaci6n
BancoPatricios
I wouldliketothankTulioHalperin,
JoseNun,and
theparticipants
in thoseforums
fortheirinsightful
criticisms
and encouragement.
Partsof
and Culthisessay were adapted frommyforthcoming
book, ThePoliticsofSurvival:Networks
tureamongtheArgentine
UrbanPoor(to be published by Duke UniversityPress).
1.TheConurbano
is theareacomprising
thenineteen
intheArgentine
Bonaerense
districts
industrial
heartland
surrounding
theFederalCapitalofthecountry.
Namesoflocations
and
personshavebeenchangedtoensureanonymity.
LatinAmerican
Research
Reviewvolume35 number3 ? 2000
55
LatinAmericanResearchReview
nowpaysNorma'sutility
billsandprovidesherfamily
withsmallamounts
ofcash.Normais nowPedele'sbroker(hispuntera)
and Pedeleis Norma's
politicalpatron(herreferente).
Everyweek,Norma'sunidad basica (UB) distributes
powdered
milkfrom
thePrograma
Materno-Infantil
(a nutritional
fundedby
program
thenationalwelfare
andfoodfromthelocalmunicipality
tomore
ministry)
thanfifty
slum-dwellers.
Normaexplained,"Everymonth,at theparty
meetings,
themayorinforms
us [thebrokers
ofthe140UBswhousuallyattendthemeeting]
ofthedatewhentheyaregoingto giveoutfoodat the
BecauseNormais "juststarting
municipality...We telltheneighbors."
withthispartything,"heraccessto stateresourcesis forthetimebeing
restricted.
ButNormaadmitted
thatshe "compensates"
forthislimitedaccess
suchas organizing
shorttripsfortheslum-dwellers
"withotherthings,"
and otherrecreational
activities.
CouncilmanPedeleprovidesherwitha
bus ortwoandwithbreadandmeatsausages.Oncea month,
shetakesapchildrenfromtheslumto a nearbybeachresortor a
proximately
thirty
park."Theyarereallyhappy,"shetoldme.I replied,"Theysurelyare,but
isn'tita lotofwork,to getthebusesand thefoodand to takecareofthe
kids?"Normarespondedconfidently,
"It'snotso difficult
toobtaingoods.
Youhavetoknowhowtopulltherightstrings,
knockattherightdoor.The
mostimportant
thingis toknowtherightperson."Forthepresent,
Norma
knowstherightperson,andifCouncilman
Pedeleadvancesinthelocalpoliticalfield,shewillsurelyobtainaccesstomoreresources.
Ifsheis ableto
"mobilizepeople"forherpoliticalpatron(mobilization
meansattending
Peronist
ralliesand votingininternal
shewillhavemoregoods
elections),
andmoreinformation.
Whathappenedtoherawhilebackwouldnotoccur
again:"Youknow.. ., I missedthePlanVida [fooddistribution
program],
butI havethePrograma
Materno."2
2. ThePlanVida (LifePlan)was inspiredbytheChileanPlan de Alimentaci6n
Complementaria
and thefunctioning
oftheCubanComitesde Defensade la Revoluci6n.
ThePlan
Vidais thelargestfood-distribution
program
ofthe
currently
operatedbythegovernment
Provincia
de BuenosAires.As a petproject
ofthegovernor's
wife("Chiche"Duhalde),itwas
inoneofthepoorestdistricts
launchedfirst
oftheConurbano
inNovember
Bonaerense
1994.
According
to official
figures
releasedin November1996,thePlanVidareachesthirty-eight
in BuenosAiresthatcontain644poorneighborhoods
districts
and slums.The programis
fundedbystateresources
fromtheConsejoProvincial
de la Familiay DesarrolloHumano,
whichis presidedoverby"Chiche"Duhalde.Sheis alsothepresident
oftheRamaFeminina
(Women'sBranch)ofthePeronist
party.
ThePlanVidadistributes
milk,cereal,and eggsto
almosthalfa millionpreschool
children
andtopregnant
women.Theyliveinneighborhoods
thattheofficial
"Mapa de la Pobreza"definedas areaswith"unmetbasicneeds."Thedaily
distribution
ofmilkandtheweeklydistribution
ofcerealand eggsarecarriedoutby"block
delegates,"who are known as manzaneras(blocks in Buenos Aires are called manzanas).The
manzaneras
receiveno monetary
remuneration
fortheirworkexcepta half-liter
ofmilkper
dayandtheweeklyallowanceofeggsandcerealsallottedtoallbeneficiaries
oftheprogram.
56
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
ofPresDuringthesummerof1989,Normaattendedthelaunching
campaigninMardel Plata,themainbeach
identCarlosMenem'selectoral
timethatNormasaw theocean:
resortin BuenosAires.Thatwas thefirst
party)paid forherbus
(thePeronist
"It'sso nice."ThePartidoJusticialista
Union'shotelwhere,Normarelated,
fare,and shestayedat theTransport
"Jwe
evenhad hotwater."
poofPeronist
Norma'sstoryis a typicalexampleoftheworkings
mateofextreme
In contexts
Argentina.
incontemporary
liticalclientelism
operatesas a
destitution,
la redperonista
and sociocultural
rialdeprivation
reand symbolic
a webofmaterial
thatinstitutes
network
problem-solving
a safety
Itfunctions
as a sourceofgoodsand services,
sourcedistribution.
life,one ofthefewremaining
againsttherisksofeveryday
netprotecting
thatstandsin oppoand a solidaristic
community
pathsofsocialmobility,
sitiontothehardship
andexclusionvisitedonthoselivinginpooranddesand depends
(monopolizes)information
tituteareas.Thisnetconcentrates
My goal in thisarticleis toprovidean
toa greatextenton stateresources.
netproblem-solving
oftherelevanceofthePeronist
description
empirical
in BuenosAiresand to analyzeits
workwithinenclavesofurbanpoverty
tensions,
and resources.
functions,
forms,
ofrehas been definedas 'the distribution
"Politicalclientelism"
holdersorpoliticalcandidatesin
sources(orpromiseof)bypoliticaloffice
not exclusively-in
exchangeforpoliticalsupport,primarily-although
hasbeena recurrent
theformofthevote"(Gay1990,648).Suchclientelism
thelinksbetweenthepoormassesand politicalelitesin
themeinstudying
LatinAmerica(De la Torre1992;Stein1980;MenendezCarrion1986)and
institutions
(O'Donnell1996a;
ofdemocratic
inanalyzingtheshortcomings
has been
and Puhle1996).Clientelism
Diamandouros,
Fox 1994;Gunther,
betweenpoliticalpartiesand
examinedas oneofthepossiblerelationships
madebypopularororganizedpopulargroups,witha focuson theefforts
ofpoliticalco-optation"
mechanisms
ganizedgroupsto"bypasstraditional
(Cardoso1992,292; see also Escobar1994;Velez-Ibafiez1983).Political
and fragmenclientelism
has also beenexaminedas a formofatomization
tationof the electorateor "thepopularsector"(Rock 1975;O'Donnell
1992).3
Specialistson LatinAmericaand studentsofpoliticalprocessesin
imagesofa "captiveclientelist
withthestereotypical
arefamiliar
Argentina
has beendeelectorate"
conveyedbythemassmedia.Thisphenomenon
as in BeatrizGuido'swell-known
by novelists,
pictedwithmoresubtlety
ofthe1930sinFindefiesta
ofa politicalboss in theArgentina
description
or themorerecentobliqueportrayalofthelifeofa Mexicancacique in
ina squatter
settlement
networks
analysisofclientelist
3. Gerrit
Burgwald'sethnographic
resultin
do notinevitably
and atomization
in Quito,Ecuador,showedthatfragmentation
clientelism"
(Burgwald1996).
casesof"collective
57
Review
Research
LatinAmerican
politicshave also been
la vida.4Clientelist
Arrancame
AngelesMastretta's
butoutlikeAlcidesGrecainthelittle-known
byquasiinsiders,
portrayed
delComite'.
Cuentos
standing
at the
theactualoperationof clientelism
Despitesuch attention,
To date,underinArgentina.
levelsremainslargelyunexplored
grassroots
based on politicalsubordiofthis"relationship
standingoftheworkings
rewards"(Fox1994,153)hasbeenderived
nationinexchangeformaterial
morefrompopularimagerythanfromseriousresearch.No strongevidenceexistsofa quidproquo exchange.Is itpossibletodetectempirically
on clientelism
porvotos"thatmuchoftheliterature
theexchangeof"favores
knowthatvotesand loyaltycome
How do researchers
takesforgranted?
a soThecaseanalyzedhereis Peronism,
as a resultofgoodsand services?
thathasbeeninand outofstatepowerforthe
cialand politicalmovement
and has genyears,has beena majorpoliticalactorinArgentina,
lastfifty
amongpopulargroups.In thiscase,
identities
sociopolitical
eratedresilient
still.Can analystssingleoutan occasion
thequestionis moreproblematic
on whichclientsvotedfora givenpatronbecauseofthefavorsperformed
byhimorher,and notbecauseoftheirgeneralloyaltyto oridentification
withPeronism?
a formof socialand political
is undoubtedly
Politicalclientelism
(Fox1994;Bodeman1988;Mouzelis1985;Guasti1977)as wellas a
control
1992;see also Scott1977).
(Scheper-Hughes
formofculturaldomination
overtime,
takesformand reproduces
how clientelism
Butto understand
mechanisms.
logicand itsintricate
analystsmustexamineitssociocultural
is to resistreA necessary
firststepin a rigoroussociologyofclientelism
the
of
exchangeof
images
and
to
the
stigmatizing
prefabricated
sorting
itsleastknown
mustbe approachedthrough
votesforfavors.Clientelism
the
side:theeverydaydealingsofpoliticalbrokers,
and leastspectacular
the
problem-solving
and
clients,
of
so-called
and
perspectives
practices
and politicalpatrons.
brokers,
thatlinks"clients,"
network
body
tothegrowing
Thelargeraimsofthisarticlearetocontribute
1994,1995;
clientelism
(Gay
forms
of
political
on contemporary
ofresearch
1997;Fox 1994;Velez-Ibanfez
Burgwald1996;Escobar1994,1997;Shefner
poland clientelist
of
1983)and toshedlighton theconvergence Peronism
its
in
providing
of
this
convergence
itics.Theunidadesbasicasarethesites
institutions
these
enough,
support.Curiously
mostcrucialorganizational
Peroninmoststudiesofcontemporary
ofpopularlifehavebeenneglected
much
ofthe
that
permeates
view ofpoliticalaction
ism.The constricting
unthis
overlooked
hasconsistently
ofpoliticsinArgentina
understanding
of
most
cited
studies
None
the
of
and somehowhiddenrealm.
spectacular
refield
haveconductedprimary
Peronism(ormenemismo)
contemporary
caciques,andothermanifestations
ofbrokers,
representations
4.Fora reviewoftheliterary
see Nason(1973).
literature,
ofbossisminLatinAmerican
58
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
theplaceswherepoor
searchintheareasofhighestsupportforPeronism,
bythetoppeoplelive.5As a result,
mostofthestudiesarestilldominated
to
down view thatpermeatedmuchof the researchon the transitions
orientation
ofcurrent
politicalstuddemocracy.6
Giventhestate-centered
itis no surprise
thateveryday
forms
of
iesbeingdoneon andinArgentina,
overlooked.Thisarticleconsticlientelist
problemsolvingare habitually
tutesa first
attempt
toredressthisone-sidedperspective.
thisarticlecenterson therelaBased on ethnographic
fieldwork,
in Villa
partyand slum-dwellers
tionshipbetweenbrokers
ofthePeronist
Paraiso.The slumis locatedin thecityofCospito,in thesouthern
partof
the ConurbanoBonaerensebordering
theFederalCapitalof Argentina.
VillaParaisois one oftheoldestand largestslumsin BuenosAires,with
tothelastpopulationcensus
somefifteen
thousandinhabitants
according
(INDEC 1993a).The articledrawson materialsgatheredduringa yearof
in theslum,in theunidadesbasicasthere,and in theSecretaria
fieldwork
thefocuscenters
ofCospito.Although
de AccionSocialofthemunicipality
thatthevalidityofthe
inoneslum,I am confident
on fivepoliticalbrokers
Recentresearchundertaken
by
analysesextendsbeyondthemonograph.
thefindings
here.
otherscholars(Levitsky
reported
1996,1997)confirms
Fieldworkwas carriedout fromDecember1995to February1996
observation
andfrom
1997.Itwas basedonparticipant
July1996toJanuary
inVillaParaiso.I participated
inmanyralliesofthePeronist
attended
party,
localbrokers,
and interviewed
partyactivists,
publicoffipartymeetings,
I conducted
activists.
morethanforty
andcommunity
cials,socialworkers,
lifestoriesfromresidentsof Villa
in-depthinterviews,
collectedfifteen
randomsampleofthree
Paraiso,and tooka surveybased on a stratified
hundredcases.Thesurvey,
interviews,
and lifestoriesfocusedon various
I interviewed
aspectsofindividualand collective
problemsolving.Finally,
food-distribution
all theblockdelegatesof thelargeststate-funded
proin VillaParaiso,thePlanVida.Thisarticlealso drawson
gramoperating
Nadata providedbytheInstituto
secondaryresourcessuchas statistical
cionalde Estadisticas
y Censo(INDEC) andmyreadinga year'sissues(for
themainlocalnewspaperofthesouthoftheConurbano
1996)ofLa Union,
Bonaerense.
5. See, forexample,Bor6net al. (1995),Palermoand Novaro(1996),and Sidicaroand
see Martuccelli
view,see Munck(1997).Foran exception,
Mayer(1995).Fora sympathetic
hasincreased
duringthe1990s,according
"electoral
volatility"
andSvampa(1997).Although
on theanti-Peronist
sideof
has occurred
almostexclusively
to Levitsky,
"such'de-freezing'
electorate,
bothintermsofitssizeand
cleavage.... [T]hePeronist
thePeronist-anti-Peronist
oftheArgenstable"(Levitsky
1997,4). A majority
relatively
itscomposition,
has remained
tinepoorcontinue
tovotePeronist.
have givenlittle
noted,manyofthetheoriesofdemocratization
6. As Tillyperceptively
maneuvers
instead"instrumental
place to popularcollectiveactionand have accentuated
andbargainsamongelites"(1994,4).
59
LatinAmericanResearchReview
toassesstheexclusion
indicators
First,
I willprovidea fewempirical
of VillaParaisoand describethe
and hardshipfacedby theinhabitants
ofsurvivalandpolitical
networks
overlapofinformal
processofincreasing
netproblem-solving
intheslum.ThenI willanalyzethePeronist
networks
establishwith
thatsomeneighbors
workin theslum,theweb ofrelations
local politicalbrokersto obtainfood,medicine,and solutionsto other
concerns.
everyday
of
thetwomainfunctions
The secondpartofthearticleillustrates
networkin VillaParaiso:resourcecontroland infortheproblem-solving
a
network
havehelpedmakethePeronist
Bothpractices
mationhoarding.
Thethirdpartofthearticlefocusesontheclients'pernetwork.
domination
in
elements
research
central
and outlinesforfuture
ceptionsofthenetwork
ofclientelism.
ofthelegitimacy
construction
theeveryday
willpresent
thereader
Thisanalysisofthesociallogicofclientelism
witha paradox.7At a timewhenpublicdiscourseis dominatedby neoofthestatefrommarkets,
thatstressesthesalutaryretreat
liberalrhetoric
one ofthewaysin whichpolitics(and personal
myarticlewill illustrate
In fact,a
forgainingaccessto resources.
important
ties)are increasingly
canbe madeoutofthisparadox:clientelist
argument
strongfunctionalist
thatthe
thefunctions
becausetheyfulfill
precisely
networks
areimportant
stateis abandoning.8
SURVIVING
IN THE SLUM:
HYPER-UNEMPLOYMENT
andmisery,
joblessness
persistent
material
deprivation,
Widespread
neighborhoods
economicpressurein the working-class
and unmerciful
the
offactors:
havebeencausedbya combination
and slumsofArgentina
blue-collar
of
the
casualization
economy;
of
the
wage-labor
languishing
1996;CEB 1995;Lozanoand Feletti1996;Murjobs (Cieza and Beyreuther
commisand Feldman1996;Beccariaand Lopez 1996);and theparticular
structural
adjustby
state
provoked
neglect
and
binationofmalign benign
and
mentpolicies(Golbert1996;Lo Vuoloand Barbeito1993;Cetrangolo
unWidespread
1997).
Golbert1995;PrevotSchapira1996;Lloyd-Sherlock
of
Villa
Paraiso.
characteristic
defining
is themostsignificant
employment
unemactivepopulationare currently
Sixtypercentof its economically
and
basic
needs, about
50percent
haveunmet
ployedandunderemployed,
line.9
poverty
70percent
haveincomesbelowtheofficial
LARRreviewer.
ofoneanonymous
inthecomments
7. Thisparadoxwas highlighted
analysisofU.S. political
in hispathbreaking
8. RobertMertonmadethesameargument
machines(Merton1949).
ranmysurveybasedona stratified
INDEC (1993a,1993b)andfrom
9.Thedatacomefrom
and OctoberinVillaParaiso.
domsample(threehundredcases),carriedoutinSeptember
60
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
howdo neighbors
deproletarianization,10
ofoutright
In thiscontext
managetoobtain
withlittleorno incomeand no pensionorotherbenefits
or
Arethereanyinstitutions
foodand medicine?
themeansofsubsistence:
personswithintheslumtowhomtheycanturntoobtainhelp?WhatconWhohas contactsdo theyestablishtoobtainthesemeansofsubsistence?
tactswithwhom?
helpaboundin poor
ofreciprocal
It is hardlynewsthatnetworks
LatinAmerica.Enzo Minand throughout
in Argentina
neighborhoods
by which he means "the combinagione coined the termpopulareconomy,
inandforlowmonetary
fordirectsubsistence
undertaken
tionofactivities
includeraising
come"(Mingione1991,87).In VillaParaiso,theseactivities
self-help
repairsandbuildings,
foodstalls,undertaking
animals,operating
chains.Familyand neighin subcontracting
home-working
and industrial
"havealwaysmadeitpossibleforthesevariousactiviborhoodnetworks
wayoflife"(Mingione
tiesto coagulateintoa poorbutsociallyprotected
1991,87).LarissaLomnitzshowedin herstudyofa Mexicanshantytown
as a surrogate
andkinshipfunction
basedonresidence
thatsocialnetworks
(1975,
forindividualsurvivalamongtheresidents
systemofsocialsecurity
ofrecinetworks
1988).WhatFriedmanand Salguerocalled "proximate
elements
and kin"(1988,11)arethuswell-studied
withneighbors
procity
thechallengeofsurvivaland
how individualsconfront
in understanding
netthekindsof relationstheyestablishin theprocess.Thoseinformal
examinedin LatinAmerica,oftenas the
workshave been thoroughly
developedby theurbanand ruralpoor
sourceofthesurvivalstrategies
havealso beenstud(Lomnitz1975,1988;Hintze1989).Politicalnetworks
1981;Burgwald1996;
ied in LatinAmericaand all overtheworld(Conniff
1987;Katznelson1981;Knoke1990).ButthereKornblum
1974;Guterbock
helpandpoliticalnetnetworks
ofreciprocal
betweeninformal
lationships
workshavebeenunderexplored.
in theConurIn VillaParaisoand manyotherpoorneighborhoods
innetworks
ofsurvivaland politicalnetworks
informal
banoBonaerense,
and stateoverlap.Theretheunidadesbasicas,politicalbrokers,
creasingly
inthe
thatcirculate
havebecomethesourcesofresources
fundedprograms
and inawayofpaid formal
ofsurvival.Thewithering
networks
informal
had losttheirjobsdurwork(mostofthosecurrently
unemployed
formal
acintheConurbanoin 1995was 22.6oftheeconomically
10.Therateofunemployment
amountedto33.8
andunderemployment
tivepopulation(843,840
persons).Unemployment
percentof thepopulation.In the 1990s,theConurbanoBonaerenselost 5,508industrial
jobs(CEB
200,000
eliminated
industry
plants;andbetween1991and1995,themanufacturing
and
betweenunemployment
1995;Lozanoand Feletti1996).Due to thestrongcorrelation
thisgrowth
haveaccompanied
andinequality
andFeldman1993),poverty
(Murmis
poverty
line"in
ofthehouseholdslivedbelow'thepoverty
In 1980,11.5percent
inunemployment.
GreaterBuenosAires.In 1994,20.4percentofthehouseholdswerebelowtheline,and in
1996).
(Golbert
1995,25.8fellintothiscategory
61
LatinAmericanResearchReview
ingtheprevioustwoyearsand had notbeen able to findnew ones) has
drainedtheslumeconomy,
causinginformal
networks
reciprocal
tobleed
to death.The formerly
employed,once able to supporttheirrelatives,
friends,
orkinwhoweretemporarily
jobless,arenowunemployed
themselves.Slum-dwellers
resorttothelocalstateorthenearestPeronist
committeeorbroker(whichalmostamountsto thesamething)toobtainfood
or medicine.In otherwords,VillaParaisosurvivalstrategies
are increasinglyembeddedinpoliticalnetworks.11
Theexpandingrelevanceofpoliticalnetworks
does notmeanthat
ofreciprocal
networks
helphave disappeared,however.In VillaParaiso,
theseproximate
networks
remaincentralin thesurvivalstrategies
ofthe
slum-dwellers.
Twenty-three
percentofthoseconsultedin a surveybased
on a stratified
randomsampleofthreehundredcasesmentioned
theirrelativesas sourcesofhelpwhentheyneedmedicine.
ofthose
Thirty
percent
interviewed
reliedon kinand friendswhenevertheyran shortof food.
Thusreciprocal
favorsaboundin theslumeconomy,
muchas theydo in
otherpoorneighborhoods
acrosstheAmericas(Stack1974;Edinand Lein
1997;Lomnitz1975).Butwiththeescalationofunemployment
and underand thegeneralized
reduction
ofincome,thesenetworks
employment
are
beingprogressively
Theavenuesthatformerly
emptiedoftheirresources.
linkedtheslumeconomytooutsidewageworkarenowdisrupted,
andthe
moneythatused to comeintotheslumas thelifebloodofthosereciprocal
Whenrejection
networks
hasbecomea trickle.
from
thelabormarket
ceases
tobe temporary
and incomereduction
affects
everyjob thattheunskilled
residents
ofVillaParaisocanobtain,12
thesocialeconomyoftheslumloses
itstraditional
function
as a buffer
thathelpscushiontheimpactsofeconomichardship.
oftheslumpopulationreceivefoodforthemselves
or
Fortypercent
theirchildren
fromone ormorestate-funded
assistanceprograms
serving
VillaParaiso.Theseprogramsdistribute
milk,eggs,noodles,and cereals
fromthePlanVida;powderedmilkfromtheProgramaMaterno-Infantil;
noodles,cornoil,polenta,yerbamate,lentils,and thelikefromthePlan
Asoma; and cheese,vegetables,noodles,cornoil, polenta,and several
otherproductsfromthePlan Pro-Bienestar.
In addition,someresidents
11.My usage ofpoliticalnetworks
followsKnoke (1990) and Granovetter(1973): a set ofreg-
ularcontacts
orsimilarsocialconnections
amongindividuals
orgroupsinwhichatleastone
ofthoseis a member
ofa politicalpartyoran official
ofthestate.Survivalstrategies
arethus
embeddedina politicalproblem-solving
network
becausetheyareexpressedintheinteractionsbetweenpartyagentsorlocalofficials
and slum-dwellers.
12.Jobsindomestic
serviceandtheconstruction
sectorwerethepredominant
occupations
inthesesectors
amongwomenandmenintheslum.Workers
havebeenparticularly
hurtby
whatKessler(1996)called"theepidemicdisease"ofhyper-unemployment.
Thesetwocate13.9percent
goriesrepresent
oftheemployedpopulation
inBuenosAiresand 19.8oftheunemployed(Murmisand Feldman1996).
62
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
de Accion
wheretwicea monththeSecretaria
go tothemunicipal
building,
noodles,
eightitemsoffoodperperson(sugar,rice,flour,
Socialdistributes
polenta,lentils,cornoil,and yerbamate).Nearlyhalfthepopulationof
carriedoutin
knowaboutthisfooddistribution
VillaParaiso(46 percent)
themunicipalbuilding.Thirtypercentof thosehave gone to obtainthe
almosta third
kilos"at leastonceduringthelastyear.Formedicine,
11nine
Thosewhoare
ofVillaParaisorelyonrelatives
(31percent).
oftheresidents
relatedto
employed(30 percent)relyon theirobrasocial(socialsecurity
thelocalpublichealth
job).Othersresortto themunicipality,
theirformal
or Peronist
broker
committee
or a Peronistgrassroots
center(28 percent),
(11percent).
of the
in livingconditions
Evidenceof thedramaticdeterioration
bytheCatholicChurch.
slumpopulationis theopeningofa soup kitchen
and womennoweattheirlunchthereeveryweekNearlyninetychildren
to note,however,thatthissoup kitchenis funded
day.It is important
wheremanylocal
ofthemunicipality,
mostlyby thewelfaredepartment
of theCatholic
Peronistbrokerswork.Caritas,the charityorganization
Everymonth,Caritasassists
its activities.13
Church,is also multiplying
withfoodand clothes,and italso sellsdonated
abouta hundredfamilies
clothesat low prices.Mariano,thelocal priest,and Nora,thewomanin
chargeofCaritas,agreedthatduringthepreviousyear,demandforfood
"In Cariincreased.Marianocommented,
and medicinehad substantially
forlimitedperiodsoftime,let'ssayfor
tas,we used tohelpsomefamilies
inwhich
situation
threemonthsuntiltheywereabletoresolvethedifficult
as whentheywerelaid off.Butnowwe don'tstop
theyfoundthemselves,
helpingthem,and thereare morepeople coming,and we are overwhelmed."
AlthoughMarianoand Nora did notfullyacknowledgetheirintheyadmittedthattheirown recreasingdependenceon stateresources,
BothconcededthattheCatholicChurchis notkeepsourcesaredecreasing.
demandforaid, and theypointto thelocal
ingpace withtheincreasing
for
(UBs)as thesourceofpossiblesolutions
Peronist
grassroots
committees
enduredbytheslum-dwellers.
scarcity
theextreme
in theConurbano
In VillaParaiso,as in manypoorneighborhoods
thepoor'sbasic
one ofthemostreliablemeansofsatisfying
Bonaerense,
thepoliticalpartythathas direct
needsforfoodand healthcareis through
accessto thestate'sresources-thePeronistparty.As Levitskyobserved,
is linkedto
at thebase level.... Peronism
thisparty"is deeplyentrenched
and soccer
tradeunions,neighborhood
associations,
itsmassbase through
tothediitsactivities
According
rapidly.
13.Atthenationallevel,Caritasis alsoenlarging
has
fedbyCaritasin itssoup kitchen
RafaelRey,thenumberofchildren
Monsenior
rector,
thousandin 1993to fourhundredthousandin 1996.See ClarinDigital,19
soaredfromfifty
Nov.1996.
63
Review
Research
LatinAmerican
clubs.The partyis also linkedto working-and lower-classsocietyby
bosses,who serveas
tiesto localand neighborhood
meansofclientelistic
and
Peronistgovernments
betweenthemunicipaland provincial
brokers
1996,20).
themassbase" (Levitsky
andslums,
squatter
settlements,
neighborhoods,
Inpoverty-stricken
a keyplacewherebasicneedscanbe met,
theunidadesbasicasconstitute
canbe solved.TheseUBsprovideincredible
whichbasicproblems
through
1998)and arethe
forthePeronist
party(Levitsky
strength
organizational
brokers
siteswherePeronist
operate.
BROKERS
AND THEIR
NETWORKS
Villa Paraiso countsfivePeronistbrokers(knownas punteros):
usuallydo favorssuch
Matilde,Juan,Cholo,Andrea,and Norma.Brokers
foodand medicinefortheirpotentialvotersand others.14
as distributing
Theyare notalone in theirwork,however,becausetheyalmostalways
ofhis
A brokeris relatedtothemembers
havean innercircleoffollowers.
parentage,
tiesoflong-lasting
friendship,
strong
orherinnercirclethrough
localleadBothMatildeandJuan(thetwomostpowerful
orfictive
kinship.
network
aroundthem,individualswith
thiskindofeffective
ers)maintain
and intensely.
regularly
whomtheyinteract
Matildehas a circleofmenand womenwhovisitheron a weekly
Luciaused tobe Matilde'scleaning
basis.Forexample,forty-five-year-old
de
andMatilde(thentheSecretaria
lady.Twoyearsago,Luciahada stroke,
AccionSocialofCospito),obtaineda pensionof110dollarsa monthforher.
Lucia now receivesdaily medicineforher highblood pressurefrom
Centro
at theneighborhood's
Matilde.She spendsalmosteveryafternoon
in thefront
Cultural(whereMatilde'sson Paco servesas thepresident),
fromtheUB. ThereLuciamakespuppartofMatilde'shouse,a half-block
sells
or gives away on special occasions
that
the
Cultural
Center
pets
the
slum.
Adolfo
(Matilde'shusbandandtheUnderthe
children
of
among
husband
a jobat themunicipality.
Lucia's
ofPublicWorks)got
Secretary
witha sewingmafashion
puppets
Antonia
Luciaand hercomadre
ten
chinebelonging
tothePlanPais.Launchedalmost yearsago,thisstatein
organization"
community
fundedprogramis intended"to strengthen
of
throughthesubsidizeddevelopment productive
poorneighborhoods
In Cospitothebrokers
capturedpartofthefundsofthe
micro-enterprises.
thusacquiringan extrasourcefortheirinnercircles.Matildeobprogram,
tainedoneofthesubsidiesand organizeda groupofwomentoworkwith
(and for)herat theCulturalCenter.Lucia considersherselfa friendof
figas centralarticulating
existson theroleofbrokers
14.An extensive
classicalliterature
systems.
See theseminalanalysesofEricWolf(1977),Sydel
ofclientelist
uresintheoperation
(1977),andJohnDuncanPowell(1977).
Silverman
64
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
Matilde:"Shealwayslendsyou a hand."Lucia has knownMatildesince
Plan Vida.
(blockdelegate)of thestate-funded
1984and is a manzanera
Matildealso providesherwithfood.
hastakenLucia'splaceas Matilde'scleaninglady.Sheis also
Brigitte
themedicineand
whereshedistributes
oftheCulturalCenter,
thesecretary
is also a
Brigitte
foodpackagesthatMatildebringsfromthemunicipality.
a heart
suffered
recently
manzaneraofthePlanVida.15Her grandmother
expensivebut
and Matildeprovidesherwithpartoftheextremely
attack,
toldmethatshehopedthatMatildewould
mother
Brigitte's
vitalmedicine.
Thehopeofa jobserves
forherdaughter.
soongeta jobatthemunicipality
glue withintheinnercircle.Althoughnoteveryoneis emas important
contract
thefactthatsomeonegetsa fixed-term
ployedatthemunicipality,
Iftheothersinthe
effect.
demonstration
ora part-time
jobhasan important
accordingto
circleare diligentand "knowhow to wait" (saberesperar,
a
sooneror latertheywillbe rewardedwithposts.Alfonsina,
Brigitte),
memberofJuan'sinnercircle,gotherjob as a cleaningwomanat a public
"Whenthere
Shetoldmeinourinterview:
hisintervention.
schoolthrough
in anywaypossible....
is a rally,we (thepeopleoftheparty)collaborate
butyouhavetobe patient....Yes,I was
So maybeyoucangeta jobthere,
and withpatienceI gotit...."
patient,
Matilde'scirclehas othercircleswithinit,like Cholo's network.
whatI
Cholo explainedthathe "worksforMatilde.... She coordinates
havetodo...." MatildeprovidesCholo'sUB withfoodpackagesandmedareaoftheslum.Matilde
among"hispeople"inanother
icinestodistribute
a
calla nioqui,
hispoliticalpatron.Cholois whatArgentines
is hisreferente,
partyactivistwhocollectsa paycheckas a ghostemployeeat themunicicontract
job thatmustbe renewed
palityofCospito.He holdsa fixed-term
She also providedhim
with
of
Matilde.
months
the
approval
every,three
withpipestobuildthesewagesystemin "hisarea."
withMatilde,shetoldme
"WhenI startedworking
Choloreported,
thattheUB shouldbe openeverydayoftheyear."Matildegavehima key
shemanagedto
atthemunicipality,
resource
tostart.Throughhercontacts
installthefirstpublicpay phonein thearea in his UB. Residentsgo to
Cholo'sUB to use thephone,to getpowderedmilkfromthePrograma
orpainreliever.
ortoaskforsomeantibiotic
Materno-Infantil,
ofthegroup."He is
Cholois whatMatildeterms"a keycomponent
knownin thearea nearhisUB and has beenpraisedby someas theone
whohasdonethemosttoimprovetheslum.Choloalso worksforthePlan
thePlanVida's
(exceptSundays),Choloaccompanies
Vida.Everymorning
ofthe
emphasize"thepoliticalimpartiality"
constantly
officials
15.See note2. Although
twenty
fromthecommunity,
emerge"naturally"
PlanVidaandthefactthatthemanzaneras
partybroker.
bya Peronist
manzanerasin VillaParaisowererecruited
outoftwenty-three
wereheldatMatilde'sUB.
oftheprogram
Mostmeetings
65
LatinAmerican
Research
Review
truckon itsroutethrough
theslumand otherpoorneighborhoods
ofthe
areaadjacenttoVillaParaiso.He andtwoothermendistribute
themilk,cereal,and eggsto theblockdelegatesof thePlan Vida. He spreadsnews
abouttheplan(suchas a forthcoming
inwhich
rallytolaunchtheprogram
thegovernor
orthegovernor's
wifewillbe present).
Choloalso distributes
theprogram's
newspaperand providesnewsrelatedtothePeronist
party
(thetimeofthemeeting
fora rally,
an invitation
toa barbecue,
elasadoperonista).Choloreports
anyproblema manzaneramighthave(a newmember
oftheprogram,
a dropout,a complaint
abouta shortageoffood)toMimi,
Matilde'sdaughter-in-law,
whois theareacoordinator
oftheprogram.
For
doingthisjob,he earnsfifty
pesosa week.16
In structuralterms,Juan Pisutti'sinner circleis identicalto
Matilde's.Yetthenumberof personswho have closerelationships
with
Juanis smaller,
makinghisinnercirclesmaller.
His family
does notparticipateinhisactivities
as Matilde'sfamily
does inhers.Alfonsina
gotherjob
at a publicschoolthrough
theintervention
ofPisutti,
Rosa receivesmedicine forher hemoplegyfromhim,and Carlitosgetspackagesof food
As in Matilde'sinnercircle,theseprobthrough
Juan'stimelymediation.
lemholdersprovideproblemsolverslikeJuanPisuttiwithsomeservicesin
return.
Theinnercirclehelpsthebrokertosolvetheeveryday
of
problems
slum-dwellers.
at thebroker'sunidadbasica
Theyrunthesoup kitchens
and arenormally
in chargeofopening,cleaning,and maintaining
thelocale.Membersoftheinnercircleusuallyannouncewhenthebrokerwillbe
availableat theUB to theoutercircleand spreadthenewswhenfoodis
beingdistributed
attheUB orthemunicipal
building.UnlikeMatilde,Juan
Pisuttidoes nothaveanotherUB workingforhim.His areaofinfluence
is
muchmorelimitedthanMatilde's,coveringonlythefourblocksthatsurroundhisUB.
Membersoftheoutercircle(thepotentialbeneficiaries
ofthebrokers'distributive
capacities)
arerelatedtobrokers
ties.17
byweak
Theycontactthebrokerwhenproblemsariseor whena specialfavoris needed(a
foodpackage,somemedicine,
a driver'slicense,thewatertruck,
a friend
in
orfictive
jail).Butthoseintheoutercircledo notdeveloptiesoffriendship
kinshipwithbrokers.
Although
theymayattendsomeralliesorgatherings
Her
16.Matilde'snuclearandextendedfamilies
participate
fullyinherpoliticalactivities.
twodaughters-in-law
aretheregionalcoordinators
ofthelargestfood-distribution
program
in thearea. Her husbandis theUnder-Secretary
of PublicWorksin themunicipality
of
oftheneighborhood
C6spito.One ofhersonsis thepresident
culturalcenter(whicheffectivelyoperatesas another
UB),andherothersonservesas herhusband'sprivatesecretary
at
themunicipality.
InPeronist
thispattern
isa commonphenomenon.
Further
research
politics,
is neededontheoverlapbetweenfamily
kinship
andpoliticalnetworks-andtheprominent,
although
subordinated,
roleofwomenwithinthem.
17. On thedifference
betweenstrongand weakties(in termsofthetime,intimacy,
and
emotional
intensity
involvedintherelationships),
see Granovetter
(1973).
66
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
organizedbythebrokerorevenvoteforhimorherinan internal
election,
withthebroker.
While
theydo nothavean everyday
intimate
relationship
thebrokers'
tiestotheirinnercirclesaredenseand intense,
theirtiestothe
outercirclesaremoresparseand intermittent.
The bases forthisstrongrelationship
are multiple.
Thosewho are
partofthebrokers'innercirclehaveknowntheirbrokersfora longtime
(usuallymorethanfouror fiveyears),and thebrokershave "lentthema
I
hand"in a timeof extreme
hardship.In thelifestoriesand interviews
recorded,
mostmembers
ofan innercirclehighlighted
a foundational
favor
thatinaugurated
thislong-lasting
and "veryuseful"relationship.
Brokers
areportrayed
as "comingto rescue"themwithoutulterior
motives.That
foundational
favorestablishes
a relationship
ofmutualhelp.The foundationaltransactions
cluster
intoties,whichinturnconcatenate
intonetworks.
Resources
andInformation
Domination
Networks:
Controlling
One standardEnglish-Spanish
definesnetwork
as red,
dictionary
is "net,
reticulo.
inEnglish.Thefirst
hasseveralmeanings
malla,
Red,inturn,
for fishingand fowling,"but anothermeaninggiven is
particularly
"snare./18
networks
areneither
frozen
timeless
structures
nor
Problem-solving
theintendedoutcomeofa politician's
calculatedorcynicalaction.Theyresultfrom
long-term
regularinteractions
that,although
usuallyinaugurated
mustbe continuously
and practiced.
Much
bya founding
favor,
cultivated
likea university
intheUnitedStates,JuanPisuttiholdshisoffice
professor
hoursattheUB twicea week.He spendsmostWednesday
afternoons
and
thestreamofpersonswhoshowup athisUB.
Saturday
mornings
assisting
His innercircleis usuallythere,preparingmate,distributing
powdered
milk,catchingup on recentnews.Juancito
takestimeto listento every
dwellerwhocomesto hisUB. Althoughmostcometo ask himforsomethingthatis outofhisreach(likejobs),he givesthemsomekindofuseful
foodat themunicipality,
information:
a tipforfinding
or theprecisedate
whenfoodwillbe distributed
at themunicipalbuildingand how to proceedtoobtainthe"ninekilosofmerchandise."
Juanalso useshiscontacts
atthelocalpublichospitalorhisownhealthinsurance
toobtainmedicine
inan emergency.
Withinthe Peronistproblem-solving
network,Peronistbrokers
function
as gatekeepers,
betweentheflowofgoods
actingas go-betweens
andservices
branchofthemunicipal
comingfromtheexecutive
power(the
mayor)and theflowofsupportand votescomingfromtheclients.As in
and geographical
is'themost
manyotherhistorical
settings,
gatekeeping
function
important
ofPeronist
brokers.
As CarlosandAndersonobserved,
18.See NewRevised
andEnglish
Veldzquez
Spanish
Dictionary.
67
LatinAmericanResearchReview
"a politicalbrokercan eitherobstructor facilitatetheflowof demands, favors,goods and servicesto or fromsome constituency"(1981,172-73).Yet
stemfrom
emergeamong brokers.These differences
differences
significant
theircontrolof resourcesfromabove (goods and services),which in turn
determinesthe amount of resourcesfrombelow (human beings) theycan
"control."
Resources (food and medicine) move fromthe municipalityto the
power to do what
unidades basicas, wherethebrokershave discretionary
theywant with the resources.The informationconcerningfood distribution at the municipalbuilding also circulatesthroughthe UBs, as thebrokerNorma explained.Employmentat themunicipalityand membershipin
the Peronistpartyprovidebrokerswiththe access to knowledgeabout resource distribution.Althoughneighborsknow in general about the food
distributionat the municipality,they do not know the precise date on
which the distributionwill be carried out. Nor do they know the everchangingproceduresto obtainthe"ninekilos."Brokersknowthedates and
have the speciallydesigned cards requiredto obtainthefood. These cards
are small ticketswith a number on them,indicatingthe date when the
holdercan go to themunicipalbuilding.Whetherthegeneralpopulation's
ignoranceis "deliberatelycreated"or "justhappens" (Erickson1996)I cannot know.The followingepisode fromone of my firstjournalentriesillustratesthat on occasion, brokersintentionallyconfuse individuals to set
between the slum and
themselvesup as the only channelsof information
themunicipality.
of
Atthebeginning
ofAugust1996,JuanPisuttigotintouchwiththecoordinator
inthelocalCatholicChurch,
a womennamedNora.He
thesoupkitchen
operating
who "is able to obtaindairyproducts
himself
as a municipalofficial
introduced
TheSecretary
ofSoforthebetter
ofthesoupkitchen."
functioning
andvegetables
cial Welfare
does notprovidethesoup kitchenwithmilk,cheese,or vegetables.
ofSoattheSecretary
NoratoldhimthatsheusuallyasksGraciela(a socialworker
Forwhatever
ifand whenthesoupkitchen
problems
needsanything.
cialWelfare)
NoratellsPisutti,"we getin touchwithGraciela."
theyhaveat thesoup kitchen,
Pisuttireplies,"it'sexactlythesamething.You can contactme or Graciela."The
aboutthisepisode.Shebelievesthatthereis a lotof
socialworkerwas indignant
the"place"eachone (sheand Pisutti)shouldoccupy.
"confusion"
concerning
This episode depictsthe typicalmovementof Peronistpunterosor
referentespursuing the core of brokerage:settingthemselvesup as the
(only) channels that facilitatetransactionsor resourceflows (Gould and
Fernaindez1989,91).19It also illustratestheobstaclesthattheyhave to conandthe
mostlinksbetweenthecommunity
toacquireand control
19.Thisconstant
effort
As Corneliusdeof othertypesofpoliticalbrokers.
is a majorcharacteristic
government
scribedtheMexicanurbancacique,he "seekstomonopolizeall linksbetweenthecommuenvironment"
intheexternal
structures
andpoliticalandbureaucratic
nityunderhiscontrol
(Cornelius1977,347).
68
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
agents,
organization
nongovernmental
frontin thistask.Social workers,
activists
areusuallythemostoutspokenopponents
and othercommunity
brokers.20
ofPeronist
createdorjusthappens,itis
Whether
theignoranceis deliberately
nowalmostdevoidofsocialorgainduced.In neighborhoods
structurally
isolatedfromeach other,indiwheredwellersare increasingly
nizations,
Brokersand their
forobtaininginformation.
vidualshave fewnetworks
evenvitalinformation.
haveaccesstohelpful,
incontrast,
innercircles,
dependon thebrokerforinTo theextentthatmanyslum-dwellers
itcanbe asserted
resources
notavailableelsewhere,
andmaterial
formation
and thus "positionalpower"
thatbrokersenjoy"positionalcentrality"
locationsimilartoa largebank(Knoke1990,10).Theyoccupya structural
positioncan imposeits
thatfromitsmonopolistic
ingor creditinstitution
exercredit.In thisway,brokers
forgranting
owntermsinitsowninterest
byvirtueofa positionofmonopcisewhatWeberwouldcall"domination
pursuetheirownpoliticalcareersand trytoaccumulateas
oly."'21Brokers
andhoard
muchpoliticalpoweras theycan.Todo so,theygatherresources
vitalto solvingproblems:theybecome"problemsolvers."
information
theactionsofpoorpeoplewhomustsolve
Theydo notcommanddirectly
byvirtueof
pressingsurvivalneeds(whatWeberwouldcall "domination
i.e.,powertocommandanddutytoobey").Yetonlyan approach
authority,
failsto perceivethestructhanrelations
thatfocuseson individualsrather
Inpursuing
their
brokers.
inthepositionofPeronist
effects
turaldomination
own interests
(ascendingto higherpositionsin thelocal politicalfield),
In so doing,theyininsolvingproblems.
somebecomequasi monopolists
ofproblemholders.
thepossibilities
creasetheircapacitytoconstrain
inner
The relationships
thatbrokersestablishwiththeirrespective
ofthewayinwhichdomination
qualification
circlescomposean intriguing
and goods thatappeal to their
is carriedout. By supplyinginformation
complianceis securedat low cost.
voluntary
self-interest,
closefollowers'
ofa larger
Yettheexpectation
In thissense,brokers'poweris economical.
ofauthority.
benefit
(likea publicpost)is also presentin thisrelationship
politicsand local
thissame tensionbetweenclientelist
20. Cardoso(1992)documented
in thecase ofGuadalajara,see
groupsin Sao Paulo.Fora similarargument
neighborhood
(1997).
Shefner
derivedexis "baseduponinfluence
thistypeofdomination
toMaxWeber,
21.According
insomewayandactskillsguaranteed
thepossessionofgoodsormarketable
clusively
from
freeandaremotiformally
however,
whoremain,
ingupontheconductofthosedominated,
iftheyreally
debtors,
vatedsimplybythepursuitoftheirowninterests....Thepotential
and mustevenguarsubmitto theseconditions
mustin theirowninterest
needthecredit,
Thecreditbanks. . . simplypursue
security.
collateral
bysupplying
anteethissubmission
persons,actingwithformal
and realizethembestwhenthedominated
theirown interests
ciras theyareforceduponthembyobjective
pursuetheirowninterests
freedom,
rationally
cumstances"
(Weber1968,943).
69
LatinAmericanResearchReview
In thelattersense,Peronist
problem-solving
networks
resemble
theclassic
on
ofdomination,
partymachinesinU.S. cities.Bothare "systems
relying
in line"(Knoke
bothrewardsand punishments
to keeptheirentourages
1990,4).Togettheirproblems
solved,problem
holdersbecomeincreasingly
ensnaredwithinthePeronistweb.Thatis to say,brokers'powerderives
fromtheirpositionwithinthenetworkand fromthepositionofthenetinthelargersocialstructure
workitself
oftheslum.ThePeronist
problemsolvingnetwork
keepsexpandingitsinfluence,
spreadingwithintheslum
likean oil slickthatdispersesgraduallyinthewater.
THE CLIENTS'
PERSPECTIVE
On delvingintotheintricacies
ofgrassroots
clientelism,
onecandetectcertainregularities
thatforma pyramidalstructure
of relationsin
which"clients,"
and patronsinteract.
Buttounderstand
brokers,
fullythe
logicofclientelist
interactions
(andtheconundrum
oftheirresiliency),
one
mustfocuson theobjectivemeaningofpractices
butalso investigate
the
inthe
subjective
purposesoftheactionsoftheactorsinvolved("ensnared")
web.Oncetheempirical
focusoftheanalysisis notonlyrelations
butexperiences,it can be seen thatclientelist
problemsolvinginvolvesconand a prostructing
personalized
ties,an imaginedsolidaristic
community,
tectiveand predictable
of
network
thatbuffers
theharsheveryday
reality
theslum.The lastsectionofthisarticlewilloutlinekeyelementsofthis
side ofclientelism
on thebeliefsand evaluations
"subjective"
byfocusing
ofthemembersofbrokers'innercircles,elementsthatrequirefurther
research.
Niceand HelpfulFriends
Relationsofclientelist
existin practiceas relations
domination
that
areusefulfrom
theclients'perspective
forsolvingproblems,
obtaining
protection
withsomeone
againsttherisksofeveryday
life,andmakingfriends
innercircles,
are
who"reallycares."Tothemembers
ofthebrokers'
brokers
nottheunscrupulous
and corruptpoliticians
talk
whommostneighbors
and "sacrificing"
about.Theyare"helpful"
and "goodpeople"withwhom
sometimesdescribedas
problemholdershave a personalrelationship
butalwaysas worthkeeping.
"friendship"
BothJuanPisuttiand Matildeare viewedby manyneighborsas
who "playtheir
"usingthepeople"andthus"bad and corrupt"
politicians
own game."Theyare sometimesblamedforthelimitedamountof resourcesthatsocialassistanceprograms
intheneighborhood
bedistribute
cause"theyalwayskeepthegoodsforthemselves."
Brokers
arealwaysaccusedof"deceiving
thepeople."
70
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
thatheldby thosewho solve mostof their
Thisview contradicts
Rosa pointedout
a broker'sintervention.
lifeproblemsthrough
everyday
person"JuanPisuttiis: "thewayhetakescareofpeople,
whatan "excellent
becausethosewhogo there
humanbeing.... He suffers
heis an exceptional
He has a solua solutiontotheirproblems.
[totheUB] neverleavewithout
Manypeopleaskhimfor
adviseseveryone.
He willingly
tionforeveryone.
He nevertellsthemthathe doesn't
money... ,and heuseshisownmoney.
haveanymoney."
himself
forthepeopleof
sacrifices
Accordingto Carlos,"Juancito
appliedto
arealso characterizations
theslum."Helpfuland self-sacrificing
happens.""Sheis so good."
Matilde:"Sheis alwaystherewhensomething
toeverysingledetail."
"Matildepaysattention
ofinnercirclesabout
amongmembers
Themainpointofagreement
forthedistriburesponsible
arepersonally
is thatthebrokers
theirbrokers
a job,orgives
thatgrantsa pension,offers
tionofthings.
Theorganization
ornationalgovoutmedicineora foodpackageis notthelocal,provincial,
butMatildeorJuan.Theyaretheoneswhoreallycare,who feel
ernment
forothers,who are theirfriendsand are alwaysavailable.Hundredsof
tooneessentialfact:it
and fieldnotestestify
transcripts
pagesofinterview
agencybutMatildeor
is notthestatethatis perceivedas thedistributing
Andbecausetheyaretheoneswho distribute
Juanor someotherbroker.
at all todo so. Theydo
thegoods,theyareviewedas havingno obligation
for
itbecausetheyreallywantto,becausetheycare,becausethey"sacrifice
summarized
thisbelief:"PeopartofMatilde'scircle,
thepeople."Roberto,
She
andit'snotan obligation.
togiveoutthings,
plethinkitsherobligation
Whois she?Is sheyour
doesitbecauseshewantsto.What'sherobligation?
and itseemslikeit
Peoplegetconfuseda lot.Youdo thema favor,
mother?
And it is a favor."And becauseMatildeis theone who
is an obligation.
whatsoever
todo
havinganyobligation
darestodeliverthegoodswithout
cannotinvokeanyrightto thethinggivenor thefavor
it,thebeneficiary
Thereis no thirdpartytowhichonecanresortinordertoenforce
granted.
a right(see Tilly1994).Butin a perone'sclaim,or whatmightconstitute
outofwhichnothingcan be obtained,no problem
sonalizedrelationship
canbe solved.
PracticalActivity
as an Everyday
Brokerage
whendemands
Someslum-dwellers
believein "a timeofelections"
becausepoliticians
can be satisfied
quicklyand goodsobtainedpromptly
Arare eagerto win theirvotes.As in manyothersettingsthroughout
that
is
"the
time
for
seen
as
and
Latin
something
politics"
America,
gentina
thatbreaksup theroutineofeveryday
occursoncein a while,something
1984and Heredia1996).
lifeintheslum(see Hirschman
71
LatinAmericanResearchReview
told
associations,
ofoneofthefewneighborhood
Rogelio,president
whenthereareelecme:"Matildeshowsup whenit'sthetimeforpolitics,
ofone of
showup... ." Horacio,president
tions.Thatis whenpoliticians
[like
themanysoccerclubsinthearea,agreed:"Ifwe wanttogetsomething
Atthattime,we
we willhaveto waitfortheelections.
a sewagesystem],
... ; we provideso many[votes]thatwe mightget
candemandsomething
to
in return."
Thebeliefthatelectoraltimesarean opportunity
something
BothRogelioand Hois anchoredinpersonalexperiences.
solveproblems
beforethepasttwo
shortly
organizations
raciogotaid fortheirrespective
we gota plotoflandforthe
elections.
Horaciorelated,"Throughpolitics,
club.... Now we needthebricks,so I willhaveto waitforthenextelecto electoraltimesorlimitedtothemultiplerally
restricted
tion."Whether
activity.
Politicsarealso seen
days,politicsareviewedas a discontinuous
to get
as "dirty"and "corrupt":"a lucrativebusiness,""an opportunity
and manipulative."
thatis "deceitful
ahead,"an activity
neigharehardlynew.Butin thesamedestitute
Suchobservations
evaluationsof politicscoexist.Almost
contradictory
borhood,strikingly
"I don'tdo"-by implisharestheidea thatpoliticsis something
everyone
a unithat"othersdo." All agreethatpoliticsconstitute
cation,something
versewithitsownrulesand mightservetoimproveone'sownlot,regardcertain
aspects
highlight
lessofthecommongood.Yetsomeslum-dwellers
ofpoliticsas worthexploring.
do
andthemunicipality
Someresidents
praisetheworkthatbrokers
of food,sheetsof
fortheneighborhood,
especiallywiththedistribution
"Thereis a lotofhelp
elaborated,
As oneinterviewee
metal,andmattresses.
..., themunicipality
alwayshas an answer,notonlywiththefood.Ifyou
needa metalsheet,they'llgiveittoyou.... In a UB,theyusedtogivemilk
witha pieceofbread.Here,thereis a lotofhelp,anyonewhosaysthereis
no helpis lying.... Whathappensis thatyou haveto go thereand wait.
has itsowntime."
Everything
ofthebrokersof
Consonantwiththeperceivedsteadyaccessibility
theaid coming
not
believe
that
do
someslum-dwellers
thePeronist
party,
is an
"assistance"
increases
duringelectionperiods,rather,
frompoliticians
I
of
everydaypersonalizedissue.When inquired,"Some yourneighbors
replied,
toldmethattheaid comesquickerduringelectiontime?"Victoria
"No,I don'tthinkso." Adela added,"Frommypointofview,it'salways
thesame."
Problemsolvingbecomespersonalizedand partof the habitual
ofbrokers'innercircles.Thosewhoreceivethings
knowledgeofmembers
Theyarepart
knowthattheyhaveto go ralliesand supporttheirbrokers.
as the
favorsimplysomeexpectedreturn
ofa universein whicheveryday
in practice"
ruleofthegame,a ruleunderstoodas a "schemeimmanent
(Bourdieu1977,38),as a mandatethatexistsin a practicalstate.Relations
betweenproblemholdersand problemsolversare "practical"insofaras
72
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
thedistribthrough
keptup,and cultivated"
"practised,
theyareroutinely
offavors(Bourdieu1977,38).Attendance
utionofthingsand thegranting
knowledge.
ata rallyis partofthestockofpractical
I askedCoca, "So whenMatildegetsthemedicineyou need,does
shecomeand tellyou,'Youhavetocomewithmetotherally'?"Coca explained,"No, I knowthatI haveto go withherinsteadofwithsomeone
orsomemilk,ora packetofyerbaor
else.Becauseshegavememedicine,
myobligation
sugar,I knowthatI havetogo toherrallyin ordertofulfill
thenwhen
BecauseifI do notgo toherrally,
toher,toshowmygratitude.
shewon'tgiveittome.[Shewouldsay,]'Go asktheperI needsomething
sonwhowenttotherallywithyou."'
hasshownthattrust
on politicalclientelism
Theextensive
literature
"hopesforthefuture"(Ayata1994),familistic
(Roniger1990),solidarity,
(Gouldner1977;Scott
orientations
(TellisNovak 1983),and reciprocity
brokers,
established
amongpatrons,
1977)indeedexistintherelationships
and feelings
areverbalizedbybothclients
and clients.Theseexperiences
ontimeandagain
whenaskedaboutthem.Theyareremarked
andbrokers
theirgatepartypresent
ofthePeronist
inbrokers'
publicspeeches.Brokers
withthepoor,a relationship
as a specialrelationship
keepingfunction
specialcareforthem,"thelove
couchedin termsofdebtand obligation,
indifference
is tobe elimtheyfeelforthem"tothepointthatbureaucratic
traPeronist
and enactinga persistent
inated(Auyero1999a).Embodying
dition-thatofEva Peronas the"bridgeoflove"betweenJuanPeronand
theirpoliticalworknotas a job
brokers
thepoormasses-Peronist
present
tothepoint
butas "a passionforthepeople."Theirworkis "all sacrifice"
in thepost.Thebrokers
insist,"Wecareaboutthem."Some
ofexhaustion
careaboutus." Thoseoutsidethenetworks
oftheclientssay,"Thebrokers
careonlycareaboutthemselves."
say,"Thebrokers
caring,
and
reciprocity,
solidarity,
Thisdiscursive
emphasisontrust,
services,
andprotection
Insofar
as thesolutions,
effects.
hopehasparticular
providedby brokers(inseparablematerialand symbolicexchanges,in
is communicated)
and something
whicha thingis given,a favorgranted,
thatis an unequalbala de factostateofaffairs
areinclinedto legitimate
theycanbe describedas ideologianceofpower(a domination
network),
cal machines(following
Bourdieu).Theactofgiving,thecaringactionsof
(or atand thetrusting
responseoftheirinnercirclestransform
brokers,
(helpingsomeonewho
a contingent
socialrelationship
tempttotransform)
We
as lasting)relationship:
is in need) intoa recognized(acknowledged
solveourproblem,
and by theway,we recognizeMatildeor Juanas our
politunderliesproblemsolvingthrough
problemsolver.Thisrecognition
companionIn an ideologicalenvironment
ofcooperation,
icalmediation.
balanceof
thatfreezea particular
tiesareconstructed
ship,and solidarity,
forces.
on theworld
Theacceptance
thatmembers
oftheinnercircleconfer
73
LatinAmericanResearchReview
constitutes
of problemsolvingthroughpoliticalmediationundoubtedly
oftheir
itis theexpression
position.Ultimately,
ofthebrokers'
thestrength
a majorweakYetatthesametime,suchacceptancerepresents
legitimacy.
bondbetweenprobis producedbya closeeveryday
ness.Thislegitimacy
upheld,
lemholderand problemsolver,a relationthatmustbe constantly
exercised.Keepingup therelationship
and directly
practiced,
personally
ofthistie,
dependson thecapacityofthebrokerto maintainthestrength
on hisor hercapacityto deliver.As itturns
largelycontingent
something
A brokercanget
and dependenton otherfactors.
out,thiscapacityis finite
favors,
and assistsomeoneas ifhe or
do "essential"
jobs,delivermedicine,
numberof
butonlyfora restricted
family,
shewerepartoftherecipient's
brokerintheslum,Matilde,has no morethan
persons.Themostpowerful
a hundredindividualsboundto herthroughstrongties,out ofa voting
ofmorethanseventhousand.Thebroker'scapacitytomaintain
population
becauseitdependson thebroker'srelationship
eachtieis also contingent
toa thirdparty(inthiscase,themayorofCospito),whoprovidesthebrokerwiththegoodstobe distributed.
capacitiesbeliethepresumably
Thescopeand limitsofthebrokers'
politics.The image of an extended
characterof clientelist
all-powerful
bythemedia,and
portrayed
(stereotypically
electorate
"captive"clientelist
byscholars)is in thissenseempirically
adoptedunreflectively
sometimes
can scarcely
althoughsignificant,
shaky.The size ofbrokers'innercircles,
accountforthe"conquestofthevote"and the"buildingofelectoralcondoesnotmean
Yetthisconclusion
toclientelism.
sensus"usuallyattributed
Thistypeofnetpoliticalclientelism.
thatscholarsshouldstopstudying
and guaranteesa somewhat
and inequality
domination
workreproduces
voterswho mightprovedecisivein internal
stablenumberof hard-core
elections.
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
is variedand extenon politicalclientelism
Althoughtheliterature
atthe
networks
of
clientelist
the
actual
workings
about
sive,littleis known
nothIn
almost
America.
Argentina
Latin
in
level contemporary
grassroots
The
of
poverty.22
in
areas
high
networks
Peronist
ing is knownabout
Peronism
between
contemporary
unidadesbasicas,thesitesofconvergence
By focusing
and clientelist
politics,have neverbeen seriouslystudied.23
22. Levitsky'srecentresearch(1996, 1998) may be the only exceptionto thislack of firsthand knowledge.
23. Bianchiand Sanchis's (1988) studyofthewomen's branchofthePeronistpartyis, to my
knowledge, the only serious researchthatincludes some referenceto the unidades basicas
duringthe firstand second Peronistgovernments(1946-1955).
74
CLIENTELISM
IN ARGENTINA
resources,
and dynamicsofthePeronistproblemfunctions,
on theform,
I havesoughttoprovidean initialanalysisofthepractices
solvingnetwork,
partof
clients.Thefirst
ofreal-life
brokersand theexperiences
ofreal-life
hoardingand resourcecontrolas two
thearticleexaminedinformation
networks.
ofclientelist
inthefunctioning
practices
equallyimportant
The articlealso exploredthe "subjectivedimension"of Peronist
ofclientelism
provedtobe a decisiveelement
Theexperience
clientelism.
relations
Clientelist
socialarrangement.
ofthishierarchical
intheworkings
habitual,and takenforgrantedby a small
as legitimate,
are experienced
thoseclientswithstrongand everydayties
portionofbrokers'followers,
Thusthestudyhas shownthatthescopeof
localpoliticians.
withPeronist
itappearsthatotherkinds
Consequently,
is limited.
network
theclientelist
with"clientelist
politics"intheconinconjunction
ofpoliticsareoperating
vote.
questofthePeronist
reinnetworks
in Peronistproblem-solving
Engagedparticipation
The
identities
as muchas itprovidesgoodsandfavors.
forces
sociopolitical
innercircles,
andstateofficials
clients,
amongbrokers,
structure
ofrelations
arethebasesfor
as wellas thelocationofindividualactorsinthenetwork
netProblem-solving
and attitudes.
perceptions,
theirbehaviors,
exploring
politicalculsupportsoftheheterogeneous
worksareoneoftherelational
is neededon threeissues:theperresearch
turesoftheurbanpoor.Further
ceptual and behavioralconsequencesthat the locationwithinthese
(and therelationsbetweenpositions)engendersforagentsinnetworks
and reconfigtoreproduce
volvedin them;thecapacityofthesenetworks
ofthis
identity";
and theeffectiveness
urean alwaysambiguous"Peronist
mobilization.
ofelectoral
as a mechanism
arrangement
typeofclientelist
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