NSDD 322—U.S. Interests and Policy in Chad

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SYSTEM II
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MEMORANDUM F9i- '.l'HE VIC& fJt&SIDENT
~
TD SECRETARY OF STATS
THE SBCMTARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT:
(S)
The President has approved
Decision Directive on U.S.
(5)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Colin L. Powell
Attachment
NSDD-322
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National Archives
1988
NATIONAL SECURITY OfCIS
OlRECTlVE NUMBER. . 322
(S)
Principal U.S. long tera goals in central Africa are regional
stability, promotion of _government& and institutions favorable to
U.S. and Western interests, and containment/reversal of Libyan
and Soviet influence. Achievement of these goals requires
continuation of traditional e
c and political development
policies, assistance to pe
ly states to defend
themselves from regional
onal aggression, and
encouragement of peaceful
disputes. At present,
the principal challenges
are Libyan territorial
expansionism and subversio
the opportunities Libyan
success would create for
Soviet presence and
activity in the region.
cognize, and be prepared
to address, the intern
ve historically plagued
Chad -- North-South pol
c disparity and
tribal/religious factio
er real threat tu Chad's
integrity.
(S)
Despite a resumption of dip _
lations between Tripoli and
Ndjamena and Qadhafi's promise o terminate his support to
Chadian dissidents, it is unlikely that the status quo will
undergo any significant aodification in the near term. Although
Libya bas declared its readiness for reconciliation with Chad,
Libya continues to claim the Aozou strip and to occupy parts of
it. Efforts to resolve the fundamental iasues between the two
countries have every ch
. foundering on Libyan
intraq_aig~.
In the
a'• significant military
-rrea<Mll'"cea -- including
emical warfare
ca~ility~. -__ and its ·
_
ked aggress.ion
agaid"~ Chad constitut~
Chad and its
neighbors. More br-oadly,
diplomatic "charm
of fenai9e• in Africa and e
ya continues to support
terror! . . to further its
objectives, although it
may be relying aore hea
a. We seek to counter
the Libyan threat by
assistance efforts to
those made by France, -~
reducing its troop
presence in Chad. Addit
ability to aount credible
operations a9ainst Libya
conduct offensive
a
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join Chad .ln a sincere
tbe OAU or other parties,
ace process and accept
(S)
France's leading security
l Africa series U.S.
goals of regional stabil
minance of Western
influence. The nature
• relations with Chad
must be consonant with
nship with France and
not displace France i~ . 1
s principal security
partner. The United llJ.at
ire to take en the burden
now carried by the French.
government ~ be made
aware of this liaitation; u.
actions must be tempered by
it. Recogniti~ of France'a leading security role in central
Africa does not~- however, liait U.S. options in countering
terrorism by opposing its state sponsors ··1.n Libya. CS>
In pursuit of these goals and interests, O.S. policy is:
to help the Chadians deter Libyan aggression;
to work with the
to ensure that t
necessary to res
operations again
administer its .s
to promote
other friendly governments
vernment has the resources
gression, conduct
ces, and hold and
itory;
conciliation in Chad;
to .encourage
development.
ion and economic
To implement this policy,
shall:
consult closely with the Chadian, French, and key
African Governments on the Libyan threat to Chad and
cooperate with them to thwart Qadbafi in Chad;
carefully consider French requests for military
cooperation, includi , ~se involving capabilities or
assets not readily
le to France;
reinforce #ren · .
available to us,
both the rrench
measures to str
government that
o .Chad with various aeans
·t'ftisbing intelligence to
ernments, and taking
elements of the French
ing Libyan designs
against"~ Chad;
uae 'oth:'t ostf ·
Chad asaistanc
seize the opport
~~~ intelli9ence
on
to provide
Reproduced at the National Archives
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SICQT
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funding permittin
Chad'• normal se
defense against
encourage other
security needs;
adequate U.S. funds for
ance needs, emphasizing
plement French support;
contribute to Chad's
hadian military
when appropriate to
extension;
on a continuin
prospects and
guard against
discouraqe any
Libyan efforts
other governments with
Chad's sovereignty;
consult periodically with friendly neighboring states
to allay any suspicion that the USG supports any
possible Chadian intentions to pose a military threat;
support the GOC in taking advantage of opportunities
for peaceful resolution of the dispute with Libya;
encourage GOC poli
political reconci
strengthen internal
provide economic
SECBET
encourage intern
engage fully in
ial institutions to
uction and development;
use appropriat
active U.S. su
defense against
hannels to communicate
legitimate territorial
incursions.
(5)
SECRET