ECSN-BRICSAM consolidated National Consultations report

Empowering Civil Society Networks in an
Unequal Multi-Polar World
Cross-country consolidated report on National Consultations
November 2013
This programme is
funded by the
European Union
This programme is
implemented by Oxfam
and its partners
This publication has been produced with the assistance of the European Union. The contents of this publication
are the sole responsibility of Oxfam and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
Acknowledgements
First and foremost we would like to thank representatives from the seven civil society networks with which Oxfam partners for this
programme. The contributions of Martina Borghi, Cynthia Arredondo, Subrat Das, Sugeng Bahagijo, Beka Hapsara, Simon Vilakazi,
Rev. Malcolm Dammon, Graciela Rodriguez, Ekaterina Lycheva and Dr. Zhang Lanying have all been invaluable to the national
consultation processes upon which this report is based.
In addition we would like to thank the following colleagues at Oxfam: Raul Ortiz, Aniruddha Brahmachari, Supriya Roychoudhury,
Lucy Dubochet, Tista Dutta, Lucy Jiang, Yurong Li, Kevin Mei, Roysepta Abimanyu, Victoria Stetsko, Mthandazo Ndlovu, Destelia
Ngwenya, Anne Bufardi, Carlos Aguilar, Mirella Vieira, Rocio Stevens. Your support, insights and patience are always appreciated.
Many thanks also to Moritz Hennicke, master´s candidate in economics at the Université Catholique de Louvain, who worked
tirelessly on the network analysis section.
This report was co-authored by Mariano De Donatis and Thomas Dunmore Rodriguez at the Global Programme Unit for ECSNBRICSAM.
Preliminary Note
It is important to mention that it was not possible to implement exactly the same questions and methodologies in the national
consultation processes in each of the countries. Whilst general guidelines for the national consultations were provided, these were
adapted in each country, to fit the context. For instance, whilst in some countries, electronic surveys were used extensively, in others
interviews and focus groups discussions were preferred. Some combined both. In most countries regional workshops, and one national
workshop has been held, and many of the findings have emerged from these. For some countries the national consultation is still work
in progress, and specific surveys, interviews and workshops are planned over the next month or so. As such, these findings should be
regarded as preliminary, and completely open to discussion. Due to time constraints, there was no opportunity to share this first
version of the document, but we look forward to your comments and discussion of the findings presented here. Where findings from
specific countries have been used, with little or no comparison to other countries, the intention was not to single out a particular
network, but simply because comparable data was not available. Where possible we have tried to present general findings which we
hope will aide us in moving forward with the programme, across all seven CSO networks.
Glossary
BRICSAM
CBGA
Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa and Mexico
Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability
CSO
Civil Society Organisation
CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility
ECSN-BRICSAM
EJN
GCAP
GPU
INFID
NGO
PBI
REBRIP
SANI
WNTA
Empowering Civil Society Networks in the BRICSAM
(acronym adopted for the name of the programme)
Economic Justice Network
Global Call to Action Against Poverty
Global Programme Unit
International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
Non-Governmental Organisation
People´s Budget Initiative
Rede Brasileira Pela Integração dos Povos
South African Network on Inequality
Wada Na Todo Abhiyan
Introduction
“Global problems call for global players (…) The increasing interconnectedness of the world — through trade, communications,
travel, information, and finance - has made possible the rapid economic growth that has helped reduce poverty and open
opportunities for the developing world. But that same interconnectedness also magnifies the potential impact of these global risks and
complicates their management.”1
The World Bank regards global civil society as a key agent in the international community, alongside the global media, cooperation
organisations, international financial institutions, global standard setters, regulators, international courts, global media, and the global
scientific community. More often than not however, global civil society has not been truly global. The spaces for civil society
participation at global fora that do exist have all too often been dominated by actors from the North. In part this may have been due to
the very fact that such spaces are limited, and civil society actors from the North have had preference in accessing them. Such spaces
may also reflect the nature of international institutions and fora, themselves often dominated by governments and interests from the
North. However, this exclusion is also perhaps a reflection of a lack of capacity and links between civil society actors from the South
in order to engage meaningfully in such spaces. Yet issues such as climate change, conflict, financial crises, poverty, and inequality do
not respect national borders. They are global issues, which call for global responses, particularly from organisations representing
people most directly affected by these same problems.
The Empowering Civil Society Networks in an Unequal Multi-Polar World programme (ECSN-BRICSAM) aims to ensure that
policy-making processes in global institutions are influenced by civil society networks of emerging economies to take account of the
needs of poor and marginalised people. The programme aims to integrate civil society perspectives from the BRICSAM countries
into global policy-making processes in three key ways, influencing: i) global governance structures by expanding the presence and
formal role of civil society; ii) agenda setting (at national and global levels) by influencing the issues under discussion to include
development and inequality; and iii) policy commitments made by these institutions.
This report consolidates findings from a common consultation approach which was undertaken with the CSO networks in each of the
seven BRICSAM countries in the first 6 months of ECSN-BRICSAM (April to October 2013). The objective of these consultations
was to assess civil society priorities and capacity across the BRICSAM networks. The process assessed network member perceptions
about the role of civil society in national and global policy processes, and helps identify key influencing opportunities and thematic
priorities. It will enable the global program unit to map issue expertise and advocacy and organisational capacities across the
BRICSAM network. It also highlights the challenges related to the contexts in which civil society is operating in each of the countries
– some are common to all seven countries, others are more specific to one or two. The information from this first consultation will
provide the foundation for all subsequent work: mechanisms for member engagement, topics for knowledge exchange and capacity
building sessions, foci for new research, and policy recommendations to be fed into global dialogues. It will enable individual CSO
networks to better tailor their internal activities and advocacy, and will guide the global strategy of the ECSN-BRICSAM ´network of
networks´. A second comprehensive consultation at the end of the project will help individual networks to plan post-project advocacy
strategies, and also pave the way forward for continued joint initiatives at the global level. Both consultations will feed directly into
the baseline and final evaluations to allow us to assess changes in network capacity, linkages and levels of influence over time.
1
World Bank (2013), World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity—Managing Risk for Development, Washington DC, World Bank
Context for Civil Society Organisations in BRICSAM countries
This section presents the main findings with regard to the national contexts in which the CSO networks involved in the programme,
but also CSOs in general, are operating in the BRICSAM countries. The context shapes the ways in which policy processes work, the
degree of participation of civil society in these processes, the level of dialogue with government and other actors, as well as the nature
of national government´s involvement in regional and global fora, and the possibility for civil society to influence their government´s
discourse in such fora.
Inequality and government controls undermine democratic freedoms
Most of the BRICSAM countries are now generally considered functioning electoral democracies, with perhaps the exceptions of
Russia and China. The period of rapid economic growth that BRICSAM countries have experienced over recent years is often closely
linked to an opening up and liberalisation of, not only the economic models, but also of the democratic space. However, there are
differences in how freely people and their organisations, including CSOs and the media, are able to operate in each of them. Indeed,
the very presence of high rates of inequality, in all its forms, can be viewed as a major obstacle to meaningful democracy for many of
the people living in BRICSAM countries.
Whilst in most of the BRICSAM countries, there has been a trend towards increased democratisation, there are exceptions, even when
defining democracy in a more traditional sense of regular elections; a context where the rule of law prevails; where freedoms of
expression, association, and belief are upheld, and respect for the rights of minorities and women is guaranteed. In fact, at present,
only four of the countries - Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa - are considered ´free´ by the independent watchdog,
Freedom House.2 Russia and China are still considered not to be free, and in the case of Russia, recent government initiatives such as
measures to restrict unauthorised demonstrations and to oversee the funding of civil society groups suggest a turn for the worse in
relation to democratic freedoms. Mexico is now only considered ´Partly Free´ which may well be a reflection of two factors: the
continued insecurity caused by conflict between federal forces and drug cartels, and the associated human rights violations,
particularly those suffered by human rights
defenders and journalists. This is also perhaps a
reflection of a growing trend in Latin America and
other parts of the world, whereby heightened
security measures including controls on financial
flows intend to curtail criminal activity, and also
curb the space in which civil society organisations
operate. In most cases this would seem to be more
than an unintended secondary consequence. In
fact, recent years have seen a tightening of rules in
many countries, including at least two of the
BRICSAM, requiring civil society organizations
with foreign funding to register as foreign agents,
or at least to declare all their income and donors in
detail.
The CIVICUS Civil Society Enabling Environment Index ranks 109 countries against governance indicators such as: the legal and
regulatory environment for CSOs; the degree to which governments and politicians recognise civil society as a legitimate social and
political actor; the systematic opportunities for state and civil society institutions to work together; and the ease with which all people
2
Freedom House (2013), Freedom in the World Report 2013, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013> accessed
20 November 2013
can participate in civil society. It also considers socio-economic indicators such as gender inequality, economic inequality, and
education levels, and finally also incorporates aspects of the socio-cultural environment such as propensity to participate, tolerance,
volunteering and trust. Both Russia and China fall within the bottom third of the overall ranking, alongside countries such as
Rwanda, Honduras and Liberia. In fact, in terms of governance environment for civil society, China falls to third from bottom in the
list. 3
Indeed in the national consultation in China, 43% of GCAP members that were surveyed reported that they sometimes face some kind
of intervention or intimidation. They also report that in general the situation has improved in more recent years, and that CSOs are
seen as less of a threat by the government than previously, unless they are specifically working on human rights law, or working with
particularly marginalised groups such as LGBT people, sex workers and migrants from a human rights perspective. That said 59% of
respondents still feel that trust of CSOs by the government is low, and needs to be built in order for civil society to play a greater part
in policy decision-making. In Russia, similar cases of intimidation are reported particularly by organisations that are critical towards
the authorities, such as those that attempt to fight corruption and abuses of power. According to the findings of the national
consultation, this intimidation, interference and even ´black-listing´ by the government is linked to concerted efforts to cut foreign
funding of CSOs, and thus take greater control of the sector. It is not only in Russia and China where such restrictions occur. In
Mexico, in the states in which El Barzon is present, the national consultation showed that the majority of local leaders of the network
report having been threatened or attacked as a result of their activities. In fact, there are cases where activists working with El Barzon
have even been killed. Impunity is a big problem, and such crimes often go unreported, or fail to be investigated properly. It is rarely
clear who the perpetrators were, and the line between organised criminal gangs, and state actors can become blurred. Even in some of
the countries ranked as ´free´ by Freedom House, threats and intimidation towards CSOs still occur. The national consultation in
Indonesia showed that 15.4% of INFID members state that they cannot freely conduct their activities without being under threat, and
over three quarters of members surveyed stated that that the legislative framework limits the ability of CSOs to conduct their activities
as they would wish.
Despite poor indicators related to the democratic space available for CSOs to operate independently, both Russia and China score
much higher if solely looking at socio-economic indicators. Other BRICSAM countries score higher in terms of governance and
socio-cultural environment, but lower in terms of socio-economic aspects.4 This suggests that an opening up of the democratic space,
and more active civil society engagement does not necessarily lead to a toppling of the obstacle that is socio-economic inequality. The
development model, and policies and programmes adopted by the State remain crucial for that.
Declining funding yet unexplored options remain
The BRICSAM countries all fall under the middle-income or high-income classifications. As such, they have seen financing from
overseas development cooperation decline rapidly over recent years. In fact, most of the governments of the BRICSAM countries are
in the process of setting up, institutionalising and expanding their own overseas aid programmes, through dedicated international aid
agencies.5 Conversely, CSOs in these same countries are struggling to survive financially, and to remain relevant in a rapidly changing
context. Almost invariably, across the seven national consultations, members of the networks referred to lack of funding as a
major obstacle to participating more actively in their respective networks, and joint activities. There seems to be an unmet
challenge. The withdrawal of overseas aid has gone hand-in-hand with an assumption that civil society in middle and upper income
countries would gain access to domestic sources of funding, whether these be governmental, from the private sector or donations from
the general public. Whilst there are no doubt many cases of good practice in this regard, the findings of the national consultations
suggest that for the majority of the members of the CSO networks, and for the network structures themselves, these new sources of
funding have yet to materialise.
There are different reasons for this. In terms of governmental funding, the cases of India and Russia in particular highlight that this
tends to be through contracts for the delivery of services and specific projects, rather than core funding of CSOs, and certainly not to
3
CIVICUS (2013), Enabling Environment Index, <http://civicus.org/eei/downloads/Civicus_EEI%20REPORT%202013_WEB_FINAL.pdf>
accessed 20 November 2013
4
Ibid.
5
See D. Ukhova writing in ´From Poverty to Power´ blog < http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=15852> accessed 20 November 2013
fund advocacy activities. In some cases there is an understandable reluctance on the part of CSOs to accept such funding, as it could
undermine, or be seen to undermine, the independence of their voice and the sense of playing a watchdog role on government. As for
private sector funding or fundraising from the general public, these appear to be largely unchartered territories even though these
would appear to be two of the key areas in which civil society must begin to seek inroads within the BRICSAM countries.
In relation to private sector funding, it seems that in most cases there is little funding available for longer term projects led by CSOs,
particularly research, campaigning or advocacy. Private foundations may fund small one-off initiatives, but more strategic partnerships
between the private sector and CSOs are yet to develop. Clearly this has as much to do with the position of the CSOs themselves, as it
does with the position of private sector companies. Historically, the two sectors have been in opposition, with CSOs criticising private
sector operations on social and environmental terms. To consider partnership is seen as a significant risk to position and reputations of
CSOs.
Finally as regards fundraising from the general public, it seems that few inroads have been made by the partner CSO networks
involved in ECSN-BRICSAM. This raises the important issue of an expanding middle-class across the BRICSAM countries.
Whilst the term middle class can be debated, the general sense is that coupled to the rapid economic growth in the BRICSAM, there
has also been an increase in the number of households with an income that allows them to own a house, go on holiday once or twice a
year, to send their children to university, to make decisions on where to shop based on personal preference rather than just necessity,
and generally to lead a relatively comfortable life, although with the recent economic crisis, perhaps less so than before. McKinsey,
the global management consulting firm defines ´middle class´ as those households that spend less than 50% of their income on
necessities.6 It is this sector of the population that has grown very rapidly in all the BRICSAM countries in the past decade.
Since the turn of the century Mexico's middle class has grown, with close to 17% of the population joining its ranks between 2000 and
2010. In Brazil, the middle class growth of over 40% is the fastest in Latin America.7 Other countries in the BRICSAM have seen
similar or even faster increases in the sizes of their middle-class.8 Even in India, where the size of the middle-class is strongly
disputed, even more conservative estimates still put this sector as constituting some 10% of the total population. 9 This is a sector of the
population with disposable income, and as such constitutes a prime fundraising target. Some estimates are that the number of middleclass people globally will grow by 165% by 2030, with their spending power set to grow by 161% over the same period. 70% of this
growth is forecast to occur outside Europe and North America, the traditional centres for fundraising. If the world’s middle classes
were to donate 0.4% of their spending to charity, which matches current giving rates in the UK, this would contribute US$224 billion
to civil society per year.10 Clearly, there is potential, but in general the national consultations give no indication that the CSO
networks have been able to tap into this possible funding source as yet. In fact, it has also been suggested that at present, CSOs in
emerging economies need to focus their attention on ensuring that governments put policies in place to remove barriers to
philanthropy and engender a culture of giving. 11 Again, up until now, it seems that this is not an agenda that has been pursued
energetically by civil society in the BRICSAM, nor given the difficulties in relations between government and civil society detailed
above, is there any suggestion that BRICSAM governments would necessarily back the counterparts in civil society in this regard.
Furthermore, the middle classes have not been the constituency of the CSO networks with which we work in the programme. In
general terms they have tended to side with the poor and marginalised. The middle-class has not generally been regarded as an ally,
and less so a potential funder.
6
D. Barton, Y. Chen, A. Jin (2013) ´Mapping China’s middle class´,
<http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/consumer_and_retail/mapping_chinas_middle_class> accessed 25 November 2013
7
Ferreira, Francisco H. G., J. Messina, J. Rigolini, L. López-Calva, M. A. Lugo, and R. Vakis (2013) ´Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin
American Middle Class´, Washington DC, World Bank
8
´Indonesia´s Middle Class: Missing BRIC in the Wall´ <http://www.economist.com/node/18989153> accessed 25 November 2013
9
C. Meyer and N. Birdsall (2012) ´New Estimates of India´s Middle Class´, Washington DC, Center for Global Development
10
´Future World Giving: Unlocking the Potential of Global Philanthropy´, London, Charities Aid Foundation, accessed online on 25 November 2013
< https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/Future_World_Giving_Report_250212.pdf>
11
Ibid.
Fragile Networking and increased competition between CSOs
Aside from the funding scenario, in some countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, India and to some extent Indonesia and South Africa, civil
society can be seen to be at a particularly fragile time. In Brazil, for instance, the powerful networks of social movements and NGOs
related to the Workers´ Party (PT) that saw Lula come to power a decade ago, have since weakened. In part this was due to a decline
in international funding, but also as they have in some cases struggled to re-position themselves in relation to the left-wing
government. In fact many activists from civil society took up posts within the PT government, rather than maintain their external
position within civil society. Broad coalitions of CSOs are, with few exceptions, now struggling to mobilise, as individual CSOs fight
for survival, and thus lack capacity to engage in activities beyond their own direct remit. The battle for funding has also led to
increased competition between individual CSOs, and between thematic sectors. This further undermines networking and the
tackling of issues together, whether at a local, national or global level. The case of South Africa clearly showed that those coalitions
that do still exist tend to focus on single issues, and particular processes or moments in time. Similarly in India, specific issues of HIV,
water and sanitation, education, and health were specific issues around which networks have developed, although these same networks
are described as irregular and weak in nature. Whilst the context for civil society has perhaps not changed so dramatically in other
BRICSAM countries as it has in Brazil in the past decade, issues of declining funding, co-optation by government actors,
fragmentation and weak networking are common traits across all seven countries. In Russia the national consultation highlighted that
it is not always easy to ascertain whether civil society organisations are independent from the authorities and, in fact, in order to fund
civil society, the government often prefers to set up its own CSO partners, rather than fund existing organisations, hence a further
destabilising factor.
Outsourcing of service provisions through CSOs
Whilst perhaps not as extreme as governments setting up their own NGOs, or co-opting those that already exist, there is another
tendency which emerges from the national consultations which also poses a challenge to civil society in the BRICSAM countries. As
described above, governments are increasingly funding CSOs by sub-contracting them to implement services for which they
perhaps have particular expertise, or for which they have access to particularly hard-to-reach populations. The national
consultation in India findings show that the Indian government actively encourages civil society ´to take up responsibility for the
development and welfare functions which the State now wants to shed´. This is linked to the liberalisation agenda which has guided
the economic development of India in recent years. In fact, in India, the government has emerged as one of the primary sources of
funding for CSOs, however very little of this funding is destined for campaigns or advocacy work, which could in the end be critical
or target the government itself. In Russia, there is a similar situation. A 2011 Governmental Decree declared support, including
funding, for ´socially oriented´ NGOs, meaning those that provide social services for particular groups of the population, such as
orphans, the elderly, people with disabilities or those that undertake recreational and cultural activities. Many CSOs working on
environmental issues, or from a human rights perspective did not meet the government criteria, and continue to be marginalised and
endure greater scrutiny and even intimidation. It has led to a situation where many CSOs now prefer to live within the security of
receiving government funding, even if it limits their advocacy voice, rather than look for alternative sources of funding, which apart
from being scarce, also open up the possibility of much greater scrutiny from government. Therein lies the central challenge, by
accessing government funding, what space does civil society leave itself to hold government to account?
From Civil Society to Direct Citizen Action?
Linked to both the issue of domestic fundraising and the relationship between civil society and government is the consideration of how
CSOs are perceived socially in their societies. One aspect which emerged from the consultations in certain countries was a certain
questioning of the democratic credentials of CSOs. The general public is not always clear whose interests they represent. Furthermore,
and perhaps linked to the issue of government co-optation and general apathy towards the formal political system, the agendas of
CSOs are often seen to be distant from the interests of the everyday person on the street. Of course, this is not the case,
particularly for the members of social movements and membership organisations, for whom this channel of representation is one of
their only ways of having the voice heard within political decision-making. However, it would seem that it is a different scenario for
those sectors of the population with whom CSOs have not worked with so directly in the past, again the middle-class, for
instance. Here there seem to be two trends worth noting. On one hand, and again related to the issue of fundraising, it would seem that
there is much more openness amongst the general public to support the cause of CSOs working on single issues of charity or welfare,
like immediate disaster relief, and support for vulnerable people such as orphans, homeless people, people with disabilities or the
elderly. Advocating and campaigning on issues seen as being more political, such as inequality, is much more challenging for CSOs to
gain broad support for. Environmental campaigning may be one exception to this. A second trend is for more direct citizen action,
rather than through CSOs. Recent protests in Brazil are a good example, where sectors not traditionally represented directly by
CSOs engaged in relatively spontaneous mobilisations to voice their grievances. Many of these grievances were not only those of
the most marginalised – issues of access to land, water, food, for instance – but rather concerns about the quality and price of services
– health, education and public transport. In some countries, there would appear to be more space for this type of direct social
mobilisation than through more formal civil society. In China and Russia for instance, social media has become a key channel for
expression of protest and opposition, as it has perhaps to a slightly lesser extent in other BRICSAM countries. Some of the national
consultations pointed to the fact that whilst formal civil society has weakened in recent years, particularly in terms of joint, networked
activities, there has simultaneously been a noticeable rise in civil activity of individual citizens, networked through social media or
otherwise. Such actions do not necessarily rely on external funding. Some of the CSO networks surveyed members on their
willingness to engage in more social media campaigns and knowledge sharing, and it would seem that this would have some traction
in countries like Mexico and China, and no doubt in other countries too. In Mexico, this clearly forms part of the CSO network’s
strategy to reach out to new constituencies, particularly the younger generations in urban areas.
Influence on policy decision-making - some professionalism, more informality
The perception of members of CSO networks across the BRICSAM countries varies significantly as regards the level of influence of
civil society on policy-making at a national level. In Indonesia 73% of INFID members feel that CSOs play a strong role in the
formulation of government policies, yet over 92% of respondents still feel that the aspirations of Indonesia´s marginalised and
minority groups are overlooked in political life. Meanwhile, in China, 24% of surveyed members of GCAP China felt that policymakers had no trust in CSOs and did not want them to participate in decision-making over public policies. The national consultations
showed that in other countries, like South Africa, India and Brazil, steps have been taken to institutionalise the participation of
civil society in policy-making, with public consultations and ongoing fora which include CSOs, as well as representatives from other
sectors such as labour, business and community-level organisations, as well as government officials. Nevertheless, questions regarding
who the CSOs that are invited to participate actually represent, and also the difficulty of CSOs taking joint positions to these
fora, were stated as obstacles for achieving real influence. Furthermore, even where democratic structures which encourage
participation of civil society exist, it seems that political connections, for instance with ruling parties count for a lot, and influence can
be achieved more easily through informal relationships with decision-makers within political parties. This relates directly to the issue
of economic inequality. In more the one country, the point was made that those who wield political power through such informal
relationships are the wealthy.
There were also differences in perspectives as to the approach that CSOs should take in order to influence policy. In some countries,
the real added value of CSOs was seen to be the fact that they directly represented the voices of the most marginalised sectors of the
population. In other countries, this assumption was called into question. In fact, the low level of influence on policy-making was
attributed to the fact often CSOs could not legitimately claim to represent the most marginalised, as they were in fact more technical,
professional organisations with paid staff. This raises another issue which is that with a pressure to demonstrate results, to meet
targets, to deliver on contracts, to engage in ‘high-level’ discussions of policy, there has been an increased ´professionalisation´ of
CSOs. There is pressure to recruit a skilled technical person, rather than an activist, and unfortunately a lack of resources to build the
capacity of the grassroots constituency in terms of the skills needed for these domains. In some cases this has led to increased
distance between CSO leadership and their grassroots constituency. Not in all cases though, in Mexico where the partner CSO
network is largely grassroots in nature, members interviewed noted that poor capacity and lack of professionalism on the part of
CSOs had also meant that they were not taken seriously in policy-making spaces. They said that this lack of capacity also lends
itself to co-optation by political parties, with leaders of CSOs taking advantage of the channels to mobilise communities provided by
CSOs, for their own political gain. With regard to the ECSN-BRICSAM programme itself, this issue has already been raised in
relation to the research component. Several of the networks, particularly those which largely have a grassroots constituency, such as
Mexico, South Africa and to some extent, Russia, have very little previous research experience, and as such it is difficult for them to
lead on such activities at the current time. The approach they prefer to take is to contract an external consultant to lead these pieces.
This would suggest a certain paradox, on one hand mechanisms and processes for engagement with government policy-making are
easier to access for professional advocates and researchers, than for grassroots constituencies. Yet there also appears, at least in some
of the countries, a wish from policy-makers to hear the voices of the most marginalised communities, rather than the ‘usual suspects’
from well-connected CSOs.
One other aspect which was left largely unexplored in the national consultations as regards influence on policy-making was
again the role of the rapidly expanding middle class. Not only does this sector of the population hold potential in terms of
fundraising for civil society, it also holds political clout in terms of influencing politics and policy-making. Some see the emerging
middle class as an indispensable force for a more accountable and transparent government. 12 Only two of the networks, El Barzon in
Mexico, and EJN in South Africa, through the newly formed South African Network on Inequality, explicitly stated an interest in
reaching out to mobilise new sectors of the population, such as the urban middle-class. No doubt there is potential here in
terms of engaging a much wider segment of the population in campaigning, and particularly the middle class, a sector which is
increasingly influential in the political game. However, there are also risks. The middle class is not the traditional constituency of
many of the CSOs involved in the ECSN-BRICSAM programme. The growing middle classes of all the BRICSAM countries are
often attributed with being one of the main drivers of recent economic growth, yet along the same lines, it could also be stated that the
middle classes have also grown to be on the fortunate side of increasing socio-economic divides – buying cars, moving to the cities,
sending their children to private schools, purchasing private health insurance, hiring maids, and so forth. From an ideological
perspective, it remains to be seen to what extent CSOs in the BRICSAM are able to engage with this growing sector of the population
to further build support for their aims.
The Gender Gap
The national consultation processes sought the perceptions of network
members on the role of women within the respective CSO networks, but
also in broader society, and particularly in terms of involvement in
political decision-making. Since 2006, the World Economic Forum has
compiled the Global Gender Gap Index, which scores countries based on a
variety of indicators related to health, education, economics and politics. 13
It bases the score on the relative gaps between women and men in these
domains. It considers the ratio of women to men in minister-level
positions and parliamentary posts. It also measures the gap between
women and men in terms of years served as prime minister or president
for the last 50 years. It includes an indicator the ratio of women to men
among legislators, senior officials and managers, and the ratio of women
to men among technical and professional workers. One drawback is that it
does not consider the similar gap which may exist in local government,
nor civil society. In terms of scores it is clear that all of the BRICSAM
countries have seen a positive trend since 2006, with perhaps the
exception of Indonesia which has remained almost stable in this period,
and Russia which has reduced slightly in the last two or three years.
However, when we examine the global rankings of the countries over this same period, there is a mixed picture (see graph below).
Only Mexico and Brazil show very slight improvements in relation to other countries in the world. The other five countries show
either a drop in their ranking or stability at best. South Africa is the only BRICSAM country within the top 20 countries in the
world, according to the Gender Gap Index, and it has remained within this group fairly consistently over the past seven years. That
said, the national consultation from South Africa showed that economic inequality in the country is exacerbated by significant and
persistent gender inequality. Indeed, when looking at the detail behind the Gender Gap Index, it becomes clear that South Africa
scores very highly in terms of political empowerment, however for other indicators it does not fare so well. For the gender gap in
12
13
N. Birdsall (2010), ´The (Indispensable) Middle Class in Developing Countries´, Washington DC, Center for Global Development
See <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2013.pdf> accessed 27 November 2013
educational attainment, it is ranked number 54 in 2013, for economic participation and opportunity it is ranked at 78, and for the
gender gap in health indicators, it falls to 102 in the global ranking.
The national consultations provided mixed perceptions of the issue of
gender both within the networks themselves, and more broadly in society in
general. In Mexico, 86% of the men surveyed believe that women and men
have the same opportunities in economic, social and political terms. What is
striking is that 94% of the women surveyed also responded in the same way.
That said, when asked whether men or women should primarily be
responsible for political participation, and for being the main breadwinner,
there was a clear perception both amongst men and women that both these
domains related more to men than women. Interestingly, the very
characteristics of the network in Mexico – 75% of the leaders of El Barzon
are men – seem also to suggest that political participation continues to be
dominated by men, even within civil society, or at least within this particular
network.
Unfortunately there is no directly comparable data for the networks in the
other countries, but based on the trends we see in the Gender Gap Index, one
could presume that at least for China, Indonesia and India, the tendency in
civil society may well be similar to Mexico. In Indonesia, over 95% of
network members surveyed agree that women´s participation in political life remains low. In Russia, it was noted that large-scale
organisations with a feminist perspective simply do not exist in the country, and in fact in recent years there have been very regressive
messages from high-level political leaders reinforcing the traditional role of women as wives and mothers. Along the same lines, the
consultation noted that a law drafted in 2003 which would guarantee equal rights, freedoms and opportunities for men and women in
the country was never passed, and in fact it has been actively opposed by a social movement which sees the proposed law as
potentially damaging to Russia´s social fabric. In China, it was noted that gender inequality was a focus for several members of
GCAP, including work on issues of gender-based violence and harassment, mass media gender stereotypes and discrimination against
women, and discrimination faced by LGBT people.
International Engagement - ´Diplomats don’t do log-frames´
When reflecting on the restructuring of aid ministries in Australia and Canada and their takeover by foreign ministries, Oxfam´s
strategic advisor reflects on the fact that foreign ministries, unlike government aid agencies, don’t guide their work by the parameters
of log-frames, value for money and results agendas. He states that they understand the importance of relationships and seizing
opportunity.14 Whether as part of international cooperation projects, or indeed national government programmes, it would seem that
CSOs have become used to the notion of reporting and being assessed on their ability to fulfil activities, outputs, and outcomes.
However, to engage with actors who are influential in the global policy-making arena requires a new set of skills and the construction
of new types of relationships. As part of the national consultations, questions were asked regarding perceptions on the degree of
influence of international forces on national policy-making, and the degree of influence of respective national governments in the
international sphere. Some countries appear to offer clear windows of opportunity. In Indonesia, 92% of respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that international agreements or treaties can exert influence over national policy-making processes. 73% also felt that
the Indonesian government was in a position to take policy issues from the national level to the international level, particularly on
themes on which there has been good levels of debate with civil society, for instance environmental degradation, social welfare and
poverty.
This relates to the central objective of ECSN-BRICSAM, which is for the seven CSO networks to engage and influence global policymaking fora. In order to do this, most if not all of the CSO networks will need to develop their understanding of how their
14
See D. Green writing in ´From Poverty to Power´ blog <http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=16730> accessed 27 November 2013
respective governments engage in such fora, and the opportunities that exist to influence their positions, both from the outsidein, that is to say global discussions that may influence their own government´s positions or policies, but also from the inside-out, in
other words the agenda that their own government takes to global debates. The networks in South Africa, Indonesia, India and Brazil
all have international experience. In the cases of REBRIP and INFID, engagement in the international sphere is in fact their raisond’être. Accordingly, these four networks would appear to have a clearer understanding of which government actors need to be
engaged in order to influence discussions at a global level. For instance, in Indonesia in recent months, INFID has co-organised a
series of roundtable discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about Indonesia´s role in the world, and specific processes, such
as the G20. In India, WNTA led the Post-2015 consultation amongst civil society organisations, and organised debates with civil
society and government representatives as part of the UN Special Event on MDGs at the 68th General Assembly at the UN.
In other countries, despite the networks not necessarily having previous international advocacy experience, there also appear to be
opportunities to engage at this level. For instance, in Russia, whilst the government is highly restrictive in terms of allowing civil
society to engage in debates on domestic policy-making, it would seem that when it comes to the international arena, there may be
greater possibilities, perhaps because of a sense that the attention is not so focused on the socio-economic and political situation closer
to home. Whilst it didn´t emerge from the national consultation, in Mexico it would appear that the government is keen to assume ever
more leadership at the global level in many different fora related to international development, like the Open Government Initiative of
which it is currently co-chair, and the forthcoming High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation which it will host. Both provide opportunities for civil society participation. China is the one country of the seven
BRICSAM where the potential for greater civil society participation in discussions with government about global processes is less
clear. In terms of dialogue with the Chinese government in relation to its global role, the national consultation identified two
departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which are highly influential in such debates: the Department of International
Economic Affairs, and the International Department. Neither have any formal mechanisms for the participations of CSOs, nor are they
regarded as having any openness to opening up a dialogue.
Apart from the issue of dialogue with government, some of the CSO networks within ECSN-BRICSAM already participate in other
global civil society networks. These include the Tax Justice Network, the Global Campaign for Education, Leave No One Behind, and
the International Forum of National NGO Platforms. The consultations did not give a sense of the strengths and weaknesses of these
coalitions specifically, but similar to the points made above in relation to national-level networking, there is also a sense that the
activities of such networks at the global level are also quite disjointed, and revolve around particular events or projects. One example
of the challenges of this type of global networking is GCAP itself. Whilst three national GCAP networks form are part of ECSNBRICSAM, India, China and Russia, it would seem that there are no existing relationships between these three networks. They each
have a relationship with the GCAP international secretariat, but not with each other.
Uncertainty about building relationships with the private sector
The private sector in the BRICSAM countries is the key driver of the economic growth that these countries have seen in recent years.
Foreign investment has been attracted, many domestic companies have become very successful, and increasingly companies from the
BRICSAM countries are seeking to expand their operations to other countries, the most well-known examples being Chinese and
Brazilian companies investing in Africa, but there are many other examples, particularly cross-BRICSAM. There is also increasing
acknowledgement that governments and businesses can work together to promote development goals through private-sector models
such as social enterprise, impact investment, inclusive business approaches, and even legally enforced corporate social responsibility
initiatives, such as in India where companies over a certain size are expected t contribute at least 2% of profits to CSR initiatives. That
said, for many CSOs, private companies continue to be viewed as opponents rather than allies, and in many cases with good
reason. As previously stated, most of the BRICSAM countries have achieved rapid economic growth through an economic
liberalisation agenda, promoting foreign investment particularly in sectors such as agribusiness and extractive industries. It is difficult
to disagree with the argument that the attraction of investment, development of infrastructure and creation of jobs is vital for
development, however some of the CSO networks criticise this economic development model, arguing that despite huge socioenvironmental costs, it creates relatively few jobs and the wealth that it does generate is concentrated in the hands of a few. It is
perhaps little coincidence that the number of so-called ultra high net worth individuals is growing in all the BRICSAM countries, with
perhaps the exceptions of China and Brazil, where the number remains more stable.15
There was very little reference to private companies in the national consultations. In South Africa, in relation to the issue of food
security, it was suggested that procurement policies for both public and private sectors need to be strengthened in favour of small
producers. In relation to issues related to the current economic development model in South Africa, the common practices of private
companies double listing in different countries, and avoiding tax through transfer pricing were referred to as particularly damaging,
but also issues of poor labour regulation, and exploitative wages and working conditions were raised. Some concrete areas of work for
CSOs to engage on in this regard were suggested such as public education on ethical consumerism, and limiting the ratio between the
lowest and highest earners in an organisation. In Mexico, the issue of oligopolies controlling the food sector in the country emerges as
a key focus related to food security and inequality. The link between this concentration of economic power and unjust political
influencing also emerges. That said, when network members were asked what the most influential external stakeholders were for the
network´s aims, only 4% of respondents classified the private sector as such. Government actors were regarded as the priority at 65%,
other civil society actors at 19%, and the media at 8%. Another interesting finding in Mexico was that when asked what individual
members would prioritise in terms of improving their own socio-economic condition, both funding for productive projects and for the
development of micro-enterprises together emerged as priorities for 50% of respondents. This suggests that when asked about the
private sector, people tend to think about huge companies, and the political influence they have, yet of course the private sector is
much broader than that. In Indonesia, whilst INFID aims to facilitate dialogue between CSOs and the private sector in Indonesia, there
appeared uncertainty on concrete ways in which this has been or could be achieved. In China, one case of CSOs working in
partnership with CSOs in Switzerland to boycott products from a jewellery manufacturer from Hong Kong with very poor labour
practices was mentioned, as an example of previous experience of working at an international level.
A particular area that emerged as problematic, in the view of CSOs, is the emergence of private charitable foundations across
BRICSAM countries, based on national and international corporations increasingly seeing the need to develop CSR initiatives. It was
outlined that in many countries, corporations and rich individuals are choosing to create their own private foundations which deliver
programmes directly, instead of supporting CSOs with relevant expertise and trajectory. It was also highlighted that most of
these programmes are service delivery oriented and in most cases not related to advocacy activities. In many countries, notably China,
India and Brazil participants highlighted that such private foundations are crowding out CSOs, as they are also starting to compete for
funding, for partnerships with government departments and also position themselves with the general public as the main actors of civil
society. Although this issue would require further analysis, it was clear from the national consultations that local philanthropy does not
tend to support advocacy agendas and therefore to look at philanthropy as the potential donor to replace more traditional donors is
perhaps a non-starter.
Clearly for the seven CSO networks there are many unexplored areas of work in relation to the private sector. That said, it is a
complicated path, particularly given the historical trajectories of many of the civil society actors involved in the networks. Many
members of the networks work directly with or directly represent population groups and communities who have suffered from the
exploitative practices of private companies in the past, for instance indigenous people, landless, migrant workers, women and so forth.
Nevertheless, as companies from the BRICSAM become increasingly influential not only in their own countries but around the world,
the onus for CSOs in the BRICSAM to engage in the debate, even if this continues to be from a critical standpoint is vital. In order to
have a meaningful debate with policy-makers on the role of the private sector, CSOs will also need to engage with the fact that
revenue generated by taxation on the private sector has contributed significantly to the social investment by governments in
BRICSAM countries in recent years.
Global Influence at a time when CSOs face fragility and complexity closer to home
The context for CSOs in the BRICSAM is complex. The funding scenario, the links between inequality and concentration of political
power and the resulting difficulty for CSO networks to engage in political processes of their own country, means that the question
as to what opportunities ECSN-BRICSAM programme offers is crucial. In many cases the programme asks CSO networks to engage
15
See Wealth X World Ultra Wealth Report 2013 < http://www.wealthx.com/wealthxubswealthreport/> accessed27 November 2013
with actors, particularly government actors, with whom they have not previously related, such as Foreign Ministries, Summit sherpas
and so forth. It also opens up possibilities to engage, collectively, in international fora like the G20, BRICS and WTO. These fora may
or may not be more open to civil society participation than the policy-making processes in their own countries. The programme also
challenges CSO networks to engage directly with a rapidly changing world order, and the emergence of actors from the BRICSAM
countries as key players on the global stage. In a sense, there is potential for the networks to re-establish themselves. Rather than
focus largely on domestic issues, there is recognition that their voice, their experience and their positions has the potential to influence
the path of the BRICSAM governments at a global level, placing issues of sustainable and equitable development as key priorities. In
most cases, this will mean developing a new kind of communication with their constituencies, and developing the ability to link local
issues to the regional and global sphere, and vice versa. As yet, the traditional constituencies of civil society networks in the
BRICSAM have largely been concerned with a domestic agenda. Indeed given that many issues related to poverty and particularly
inequality remain unresolved in the BRICSAM countries themselves, this is likely to continue to be the case. However, in order for the
CSO networks to be sustainable – both financially and politically – they will need to be successful in moving beyond this local,
domestic thinking, and just as their respective governments have become key actors at a global level, they too will need to become
global players. Undoubtedly, it is an opportunity to re-invent themselves, with renewed relevance in a changing world and indeed to
access new sources of funding, rather than traditional Northern donors. It remains to be seen whether all will rise to this challenge.
Network structure and capacity analysis
What does a strong network look like?
Hearn and Mendizabal define a network as a group of actors which differs from hierarchical institutions or finite projects. They
consider networks that form around specific issues or a general set of values and a specific purpose around these issues, rather than
around a location or specific event. They also acknowledge that most networks are catalysed or facilitated by a supporting entity, such
as a steering group, secretariat or coordinator.16 The supporting entity itself may be confused with the network. The supporting entity
is often part of a hierarchical organisation – such as the Global Programme Unit (GPU) of the ECSN-BRICSAM programme, which is
part of Oxfam. The aims of the GPU, for instance, can be seen within the bounds of a project, with work plans, budgets, etc. The
network of networks which the GPU aims to support is defined by the group of organisations and people, and the interactions and
relationships between them. Within ECSN-BRICSAM we are looking to facilitate the links between seven existing national CSO
networks, and thus build a cross-BRICSAM ´network of networks´. This is particularly challenging given that there are very few
existing relationships between these seven networks, and as such we must seek to foster these links where potential is identified in
terms of common advocacy aims, exchange of learning and capacities, and joint thematic priorities. As such, the network which we
aim to facilitate through ECSN-BRICSAM is both a support network, in that capacities will be developed amongst individual network
members to engage in global policy-making processes on the issue of inequality, but also an agency network, in that the aim is for the
seven networks to act together through research and advocacy, to influence global policy-making. This is a further challenge because
the two different roles of ECSN-BRICSAM suggest two different ways of working as a network. One could easily imagine that for
joint advocacy initiatives at a global level, strong ties will need to be developed between the seven networks. For other aspects, such
as capacity building or knowledge sharing, looser structures are still likely to be effective.
The seven CSO networks in ECSN-BRICSAM are diverse in their nature. The national consultations aimed to contribute to a better
understanding of the structure and capacity of each of the CSO networks involved in the project. Consequently this helps us identify
particular strengths and areas of expertise within each of them, particularly in relation to advocacy, as well as identifying areas which
require strengthening. The table below aims to show the key characteristics of each network based on information compiled through
the national consultations and information available on their respective websites. No doubt there are omissions and information that
needs to be updated, but the idea is to provide a clear overview of each of the networks.
16
Hearn, S. and Mendizabal, E. (2011) ´ODI Background Note: Not Everything That Connects is a Network´, London, Overseas Development
Institute,
Country
Network name, Date
founded and website
Staff/Governance/
Leadership
Funding for Network
(not individual members)
Size
Advocacy Capacity
Thematic focus
What do
members see as
added value of
the network?
Brazil
REBRIP
Founded 1998
http://www.rebrip.org.br/
National assembly (convenes no
less than every 2 years, last held
Nov 2013). Assembly elects
steering committee, 10 orgs. and
Executive Secretary. No
permanent staff, all are seconded
from member organisations.
Thematic Working groups, each
with own coordinating org.
ECSN-BRICSAM fits with
international economic
architecture WG
Declining - REBRIP relies
on funding from INGOs
67 orgs
Strong - REBRIP was set up
as an advocacy network, for
Brazilian CSOs to influence
regional integration and
trade negotiation processes,
and more recently as a
watchdog on Brazil´s role in
the world (government and
private sector). Part of the
regional network Alianza
Social Continental
International trade,
investment, financial
regulation, regional
integration
International
voice, joint
advocacy
Russia
GCAP Russia
Founded 2006
http://www.protivbed.ru/
National assembly (convenes no
less than every 2 years, last held
2012). Assembly elects
chairperson and members of
steering committee. Strong
informal leadership
No funding specifically for
network as a whole, except 2
Oxfam projects which are
channelled through specific
members
40 orgs
Weak – GCAP Russia is
largely composed of CSOs
that work in the provision of
services.
Poverty, access to
health and social
services
Funding through
specific projects
India
Wada Na Todo Abhiyan
Founded 2004
http://www.wadanatodo.net
150 organisations form
Coordination Group of WNTA.
Campaign Steering Group of 25
people elected from the
coordination group. Small
secretariat of 6 staff. CBGA
serves on Steering Group of
WNTA and as the Secretariat of
PBI. Most members of PBI are
also members of WNTA
Unclear
Approx.
3500
orgs. or
subnetworks
in
WNTA,
Approx.
200 orgs
in PBI
Unclear
Livelihoods,
education, health,
social exclusion
Unclear
Council of management (board)
composed of 6(?) representatives
from CSOs. Group of permanent
Unclear
71 orgs
Strong international
experience as this has been
the focus. Weaker influence
Human rights,
Poverty &
Inequality, Post-
International
voice, joint
advocacy
(Peoples Budget Initiative
Founded 2006
http://www.pbiindia.net )
Indonesia
INFID
Founded 1985
http://www.infid.org/
staff based in Jakarta.
at national level including
capacity to mobilise
constituents. Part of
International Forum for
National NGO Platforms and
Beyond 2015
Weak – GCAP China has
conducted few joint
advocacy initiatives with
exception of shadow report
on MDGs, research on
migrant worker work and
living conditions, and Post2015 consultation. Some
individual members have
stronger capacity but access
to political decision-makers
is low.
2015, regulation/
accountability of
CSOs
towards
government,
exchange
between CSOs
Access to services,
social exclusion,
gender, economic
inequality and
employment, ruralurban divide
Ability to
mobilise broad
range of
constituents,
information
exchange on
common issues,
develop
advocacy
capacity
China
GCAP China
Founded 2005
http://www.whiteband.org/e
n/asia-china
Strong informal leadership
through advisory group, small
secretariat staff. Diverse and
disperse network. Some
members have no legal
registration as NGOs, so GCAP
also has very informal structure.
Very few joint activities
Declining -7 INGOS set up
GCAP China, and some have
continued funding including
Oxfam HK, also receives EC
funding as sub-partner in
national project
Approx.
40 orgs
South
Africa
Economic Justice Network
(hosting South African
Network on Inequality)
http://www.ejn.org.za/
EJN forms part of the
Fellowship of Christian Councils
in East and Southern Africa.
FOCCISA Executive
Committee presides over
the EJN Steering Committee,
which entrusts its work to
the EJN Director and staff.
SANI recently formed with EJN
as chair.
Largely funded by European
Ecumenical agencies,
Oxfam, and 1 or 2 South
African foundations
26 orgs
part of
SANI
Unclear- varied levels of
advocacy experience within
the newly formed SANI
network. EJN has
considerable international
experience. It is part of
Ecumenical Advocacy
Alliance, and chairs the Food
Strategy Group of this global
network.
Debt, finance, trade,
tax, food security,
land, social
protection
Ability to
mobilise broad
range of
constituents,
regional
(Southern Africa)
approach to
advocacy
Mexico
El Barzon
http://elbarzon.mx/
President (highly influential),
and national staff based in
Mexico City, State and
Municipal leaders, although role
of latter in question. Elections at
national and local assemblies
Significant government
funding for rural projects.
Each State mobilises funds
autonomously. Membership
fee but not consistently
applied. Limited
international financing for
national office.
Chapters
in 26 of
32 states
Strong at national level with
regard to focus issues, good
political connections. Weak
at international level, very
little experience.
Rural livelihoods,
food security,
sustainable energy,
climate change
Funding, as El
Barzon channels
some government
funding to small
producer groups.
Protection as
regards debt
repayment terms
Network Vibrancy
One key question is whether all the networks are active. This varies, and can be viewed from different perspectives. All the networks,
with the exception of GCAP in Russia, have secretariats formed of paid staff. Only Brazil and Russia share the fact that they have no
staff working directly for the network. Member organisations of the steering committees are expected to dedicate staff time to network
activities. In fact, in the case of GCAP Russia, Oxfam actually dedicates staff time to help directly coordinate the network, and
members described Oxfam as the ´engine´ behind the coalition´s work. The other five networks all have at least 1 staff member,
although most have considerably more, normally between 5 or 10 staff members. Those networks with permanent staff are likely to be
able to maintain more continuous activities than those which rely on the engagement of member organisations to operate. However,
perhaps rotating the coordination between members is a more sustainable model. Indeed in South Africa it was noted that other CSO
networks had crumbled because they had been unable to maintain high costs of running a national secretariat. Another aspect related
to how active the networks are is the issue of project funding. Very few of the networks have core funding to cover ongoing
operational and salary costs. Generally these need to be found within project funding, adding to the instability. As far as the national
consultations showed, only one of the networks charges a membership fee, although this is not collected systematically. Project
funding is generally channelled through a particular member organisation of the network, as is the case in Russia, India and Brazil. In
South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico and, soon to be, GCAP China, funding for ECSN-BRICSAM is channelled directly to the secretariat
of the network. Also related to how active each network is the issue of the level of engagement of individual members. It is clear that
the number of members for each network in the table above does not give the whole picture. For most of the networks, it would be
more realistic to speak of perhaps 20 to 30 members at most, who are regularly active. Clearly the level of activity varies depending
on particular moments in time – national assemblies, key influencing moments, compilation of reports, campaigns, or even the recent
processes of national consultation.
Internal communication and transparency
The national consultation also examined the level of internal communication within the network, and whether members felt
democratically represented by their network´s leadership, and also whether they felt involved in decision-making within the network.
One first characteristic to note is the power of informal relationships even within the networks themselves. It is clear that in at least
three of the networks specific individuals, often founders or close allies of the network continue to play an influential role in decisionmaking, in defining the strategic direction, and even in representation of the network, despite, in some cases, no longer having a
formal role within the network itself or even within a member organisation. This is not necessarily seen negatively by other network
members, who value the institutional memory, the political connections, and the expertise that such individuals bring. Some data
collected suggests that there continues to be a need to strengthen each of the network´s own communication with its constituency. In
Indonesia only 50% of surveyed members felt that INFID consistently engages members in decision-making processes, and 15% felt
that they were not encouraged to participate. Fewer than 35% of respondents felt that INFID consistently engages its members in
reviewing finances. In Russia, it appears that members are involved in decision-making on the network´s strategy during the national
assemblies, but not on a more regular basis, unless they are involved in specific projects. This reflects the nature of funding for GCAP
Russia which is entirely project-driven. As such, members also have no idea of funding channelled to GCAP, unless they are directly
involved in the project themselves. In Russia, network members felt that communication within the network was insufficient,
inefficient, and sometimes irrelevant. Others felt left out of certain initiatives, as very little information was circulated. In Mexico, it is
interesting to note that individual members – El Barzon has both organisational and individual members – felt that communication
was better with the national coordination team, the State leaders, and the president of the network, than with their local leaders. The
reasons for this are not provided, but may relate to the fact that local leaders have little influence within the network, and so are not
seen as so important to communicate with. Indeed, when evaluating the internal actors with most influence within the network El
Barzon members ranked the president as having most, more than themselves as the network constituency, in fact.
Network Value Proposition
A final aspect of the network capacity assessment which is important to highlight here is the added value that members see in being
part of each network. This relates to the issue of whether networks are primarily support networks (capacity building, knowledge
sharing) or agency networks (joint research, campaigns, advocacy), or both. It would appear that in relation to the two networks with
perhaps most international experience, REBRIP and INFID, members value the fact that the network provides a channel to take their
voice to the global level. In China and South Africa, the ability of the network to bring together a wide variety of constituents would
seem to be important for members. In China, GCAP members also see being part of the network as an opportunity to build their
advocacy capacity. Finally accessing funding through the network was an added value noted in both Mexico and in Russia.
Network analysis
This section introduces a more systematic, quantitative analysis of the structure of the CSO networks. A view is taken on the CSO
networks, which are part of ECSN-BRICSAM, as a web of complex social, political, professional and functional interactions of
connected actors. From the visualisation of the represented national spheres of civil society in the form of networks, fresh new insights
can be gained, from the micro-relationships in between the individual actors, the interdependencies and formation of groups and
circles, to the bird's eye view on the multidimensional structure of the web.
As part of the national consultations in Russia, China, India, Mexico and South Africa data was collected from individual members
about which other organisations they relate to on a regular basis, and how close and collaborative that relationship is. An attempt was
made to standardize and unify a conceptual approach across the countries to facilitate a tentative cross-country comparison across the
nationally framed civil society networks. The conceptual perspective of this network analysis places the focus on the organisational
level. Information was gathered at the unit of an organisation with the interest to collect data on inter-organisational relations in
various ways. Data was collected through online surveys and telephone interviews with representatives of the organisational actors.
The relationships identified by the individual organisations were interwoven with each other to connect organisations that work
together.
A crucial concern for a network analysis in general is to define the boundaries the network. Since the formality and degree of
organisation of individual organisations under the roof of the coordinating bodies in the BRICSAM countries differs, a clear-cut,
comparable definition of the boundaries has proven to be difficult. Therefore, a more fluid and pragmatic two-folded approach is taken
here in the analysis: The inner network focuses on the organisations that provided information (mostly members of the CSO networks
and denoted with grey dots) and the outreach network that includes further organisations, which did not provide information directly
(coloured nodes). The representativeness of the network data could not be robustly assessed up to this point, which is the major caveat
of this section. However, keeping the bias in mind produced by the inner network of organisations (data reporting organisations), there
are still valuable insights to be gained.
The mappings of the organisations were produced with the following cross-cutting ideas to enable comparisons across countries in the
light of the highly diverse nature of each CSO network. A statistical centrality measure was used to adjust the size of the nodes, which
is supposed to convey a feeling of central importance for the network. 17 Special interest is laid upon the vertical structures of the
nature of the connections, the geographical scope of organisational inter-activity. Light green coloured edges show international
interactions, dark green represents national level and yellow-green the grassroots level. Groupings and simplifications were used for
the wider ´outreach´ network. Blue nodes show connections to further civil society organisations, red symbolizes academic institutions
and yellow, state actors (ministries, political offices, embassies etc.). Labels were attached to all organisations that were interviewed o
responded to surveys. As such we can assume that these are members of their respective networks. Furthermore, labels of
organisations with obvious international agendas were attached subjectively. The graphical program uses a layout algorithm, which
simulates a gravitational force between different organisations such that the most intense interactions of well connected organisations
are positioned more central.
As mentioned previously, there are limitations to the data that was collected, so it may appear that there are important omissions or
distortions to how the network is in reality. Unfortunately it was not possible to produce visualisations for Brazil, Indonesia and
Russia in time for this first version of the report. The narrative notes accompanying each visualisation are based solely on the
visualisation itself. These visualisations simply present a mapping faithful to the data that was collected, and if nothing else may
suggest the need to collect more comprehensive data from all network members in future in order to be able to draw more accurate
conclusions.
17
Betweeness Centrality used in this case assigns a value to a network node representing the number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others
that pass through that node.
South African Network on Inequality
Key statistics
Only 8 responses were obtained
Financial links: 16% reported joint fundraising activities, 13% were in
direct financial connections, circa 58% reported no links
Joint activities of organisations were mostly mass mobilizations (24%),
Research (22% ) and direct joint lobbying (18%)
On other resources being shared, 10% reported joint transportation and 7%
mutual staff across organisations
Observations
EJN a central actor, and connected to many other actors who may or may
not be members of SANI
Oxfam acts as a ‘bridger’ according to the visualisation, as do the
Department of Social Development and the Commission for Gender
Equality, but do they really provide this link in reality, or was it simply
that 2other actors named them as a key relationship?
Less than half of SANI members responded so the visualisation is
incomplete
GCAP Russia
Key Statistics
Organisations with most of the reported volunteers ´Nochlezkha´
(200), Social Initiatives Support Foundation (150) and with most
of the employees ´Nochlezkha´ (20), Inter-regional Public
Foundation Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Canter (11)
35% no communication on financial matters, 28% donor-recipient
relationship, 18% is joint fundraising
Observations
Oxfam is the connecting point of many GCAP Russia members.
Oxfam initiates and funds projects that GCAP Russia members
participate in.
The scheme largely reflects the connections within GCAP Russia,
and demonstrates the lack of shared connections external to the
network
Some of the potential influencing targets and strategic partners
have not been shown on the scheme due to the lack of shared
connections
India – People´s Budget Initiative
Key Statistics
36 organisations from PBI gave information on their
networks
Networking topics were, descending in their relevance,
Education, Livelihood, Health, Child Protection, Social
Exclusion, Budget Taxation, Sustainable Development,
Inequality
Circa 65% indicated that they receive international
funding, 75% receive national Indian grants with
approximately 60% receiving (national) governmental
contributions, 20% count on some private financing
Observations
Impression of a relatively disperse network. Many
members are not connected to one another, nor in fact do
they name PBI as one of their key relationships
PBI secretariat appears as a central actor, but others such
as the Right to Food campaign, Life Education &
Development Support, and National Centre for Advocacy
Studies are also central
INGOs such as Oxfam, UNICEF and Action Aid appear to
play a bridging role, bringing outliers into the network,
rather than a central role themselves.
GCAP China
Key Statistics
21 organisations responded
Financial basis of links: 54% no links, 20% of the edges can be
considered as funding flows, 10% of the links had joint
fundraising activities as the central aspect of their relationship
Joint advocacy activities: 57% ´mass mobilization´, 14% public
speaking, 9% research
Networking topics in descending relevance: Labour rights (15%),
gender, disabled people, anti-discrimination, inequality, Post
2015, local governance, female workers, HIV, education on
human rights
Other resources: Mutual staff is shared by 5% of the organisations
17% of the links between organisations related to loose
communication. Only 46% of the organisations reported to
coordinate their activities, and 34% spoke of real collaboration
Observations
Centrality of GCAP secretariat, but also many established links
between actors. Seems less hierarchical in structure than other
networks
Oxfam Hong Kong not a member but named as key relationship
by at least 3 of the network members
Mix of state actors, academic institutions and other CSOs
identified as external actors with which members have links
Mexico – El Barzon
Due to the centralistic structure of Barzon, with the national office in Mexico
DF at the centre of the network, a slightly different approach is being taken in
the visualisation below as was also the case in the data collection. The state
level entities of El Barzon are perceived as single actors (green nodes). The
colours of the edges characterize whether a specific group of actors (CSO,
university, local government) is either influencing the Barzon network in its
decisions (yellow), if the actor is perceived as an ally (green), or if the actor is
opposed to Barzon’s activities (red). The width of the edges relates to how
many different ties the El Barzon entity has to other actors, for instance,
different CSOs outside El Barzon.
Observations
Highly centralised with national coordination, very few links between state-level
chapters
State chapters of the network tend have relationships with external actors at a statelevel only
Government actors seen as both allies and opponents, depending on who responded
Understanding of inequality and definition of a common global agenda
As part of the national consultation there was a section specifically
oriented towards the analysis of the network´s understanding of
inequality, the identification of the most prominent forms of inequality
at the national level and the current level of work on inequality in the
network and its members. As inequality is addressed as a cross-cutting
issue in the ECSN-BRICSAM programme, it is important to shed some
light over the different understanding that networks have on the issue
and the different trends regarding inequality across the seven countries.
As the graph to the right shows, along with most other countries in the
G20, income inequality is increasing in all of the BRICSAM countries,
with the exception of Mexico and Brazil which have shown slight
reductions in their Gini co-efficient since 2000.18 Nevertheless both
Mexico and Brazil still remain among the more unequal countries in
the grouping, with the richest 10% of the population controlling over
40% of the national income.
The following section is based primarily on the national consultation
reports and also the information shared by the networks during the
ECSN-BRICSAM Steering Committee calls. 19 We start with a
summary on the current perspectives of each of the CSO networks on
inequality, and then move to more general comments. This section is not definitive and requires further discussion. It is also by no
means representative of general opinions at the national level, instead it helps us understand each of the networks´ approach. As such,
it is important to notice that perceptions might be biased by the expertise of each network, their main constituency, and recent social
events which have influenced key policy priorities. The need remains to correlate consultations findings with research evidence.
El Barzon - Mexico
From the national report it emerges that El Barzon does not use inequality as a main narrative for its advocacy efforts and that its
constituency does not address inequality as a central issue, but rather they attach greater importance to tackle differences in access to
income through productive projects. Members surveyed through the national consultation expressed some understanding of how
inequality relates to the issues they identified as their own priorities, however there was no clear link established between structural
causes of inequality and El Barzon’s advocacy and service delivery agenda.
The most significant forms of inequality that were identified by network members were:
Gender inequality: women as a group have fewer opportunities in terms of income and political participation, and require specific
policies to guarantee their access to social, political and cultural rights. Even within the network it was signalled that the lack of
women in leadership positions is an issue.
Discrimination against indigenous communities: it was noted that indigenous people often lack political capital and capacity to be
heard and considered as an important stakeholder in public policies and governance issues. This is considered a major cause of their
vulnerable social situation.
18
Graph compiled by Oxfam using data sourced from F. Solt (2010) ´The Standardized World Income Inequality Database´ in Oxfam Briefing Paper
157: ´Left Behind by the G20´
19
The ECSN-BRICSAM steering committee is composed of one representative from each of the seven CSO networks in the programme, and is
facilitated by the GPU
Citizen insecurity and violence: insecurity is a challenge that obstructs social and economic development, and has become a
sensitive issue as even leaders within the network have been targeted. The causes of this insecurity were not explained. Insecurity was
largely portrayed more as a contextual circumstance rather than a specific social dynamic.
Unequal access to justice: this issue ranked the highest as a priority when focussing on inequality. There seems to be a perception
that vulnerable groups are in a particularly disadvantaged position when accessing the justice system, as the level of income would
appear to play a crucial role.
Unequal opportunities: Notably, access to education was identified as problematic when participants analysed the opportunities for
social mobility. An individual´s social and ethnic background still determines to a considerable degree the years of formal education
that they will achieve in their life time. Unequal economic opportunities were perceived as important factors that prevent people from
accessing public education. 32% of the survey respondents stated that they had dropped out of school due to the need to pursue an
income for their households. Unequal access to public services was also identified as a cause and consequence of inequality. It is
important to highlight that ‘differentiated access to opportunities’ was identified as one of the most notorious manifestations of
inequality.
Although unequal access to opportunities emerged as important, there was not conceptualization or discussion on what the structural
issues or policies that generate this unequal access to opportunities are. Informal employment was mentioned as a very sensitive issue
in Mexico. 59% of the active population is considered to be employed informally. 20 Whilst this issue was mentioned, it did not come
up strongly as a driver of unequal access to opportunities. While not explicitly identified as a major issue, geographical inequalities in
terms of unequal public resources and social services, and differences in quality across regions was also mentioned in several parts of
the report on the national consultation.
In line with the most significant forms of inequality, the dimensions of inequality that respondents identified as potential priorities for
El Barzon were: 1. Access to Justice; 2. Gender; 3. Opportunities to develop capacities; 4. Income distribution; and 5. Inequality in the
way indigenous people are treated. When asked to identified which priorities should be addressed at the global level, respondents
identified: Food security; farmers productivity; job generation; climate change and its impact on producers; biodiversity protection;
income distribution; commercialization of agricultural products; and new global economic policy as the most important issues.
Although not further developed in the national consultation, national leaders at El Barzon consider that unequal access to markets, at
the national and global level is a key determinant of the unequal income distribution in Mexico and a structural source of inequality.
Even though El Barzon has been focused on the immediate causes at the local level that limit its producers’ socio-economic
development, they identify the need to influence, at the global level, the dynamics that condition the producers at the local level.
However, it was indicated clearly in the national consultation that the network’s constituency lacks a proper understanding of global
processes and fora around these issues.
Economic Justice Network - South Africa
„The trends in inequality suggest that one of the world‟s most unequal societies has quite possibly become the most unequal’, Bhorat
and Van Der Westhuizen, 2012.21
From the National consultation it becomes clear that there is strong sense among CSOs leaders that inequality is still one of the most
important social issues in South Africa and that the apartheid legacy in terms of unequal social participation is difficult to overcome
and requires better policies, even after two decades of democracy and sustained economic growth. The most notorious statement in the
report is that South Africa remains one of, if not the most unequal society in the world with a Gini coefficient of 0.70 based on data
from the Income and Expenditure Survey, with the average income of the richest 10% of the population 94 times that of the poorest
20
21
‘Panorama Laboral 2012’, Lima, ILO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean
Bhorat, H. and Van Der Westhuizen, C.(2012) ‘WP 12/151 - Poverty, Inequality and the Nature of Economic Growth in South Africa’, Cape
Town, University of Cape Town
10%. The overall perception it that the persistent high levels of inequality in South Africa are exacerbated by issues of race, gender,
income and education. The national consultation identified the following issues as structural forms of inequality:
Race and gender: inequality between black and the white people still remains a major issue. Women continue to be subordinated to
men, who enjoy more institutional and social power and more access to many types of resources. Gender remains a significant form of
inequality in the South African society. Although the South African constitution advocates for equality, other factors of differences in
income and roles in households between men and women affect the upward mobility of each group.
Income distribution: The current dynamics of the labour market were identified as the main contributors to income inequality.
Despite the fact that absolute, relative and income poverty have decreased in the 2000s, income inequality has actually increased22.
There is a big difference between the lowest and the highest paid members of the South African society – 94 times between the lowest
and highest percentile.
Education: The level of education achieved determines the quality of live individuals achieve to a significant extent, and access to
education is still highly unequal, notably for secondary education, thus perpetuating historical differences along lines of gender and
race.
Unequal opportunities and services: Access to opportunities and services is still determined by income and social position. Access
to opportunities was identified as an important predictor of inequality, as there was consensus that access to quality basic services such
as education, health care, essential infrastructure and early childhood development provides an individual, irrespective of background,
the opportunity to advance and reach his or her human potential.
Spatial inequality: although not explicitly mentioned in the report, spatial differentiation was referred to several times in terms of
access to opportunities and income. This form of inequality will require further analysis in order to determine the causes of the
regional disparities and their correlation with the other variables (race, gender, education level, etc.). Another aspect highlighted was
the unprecedented pressure on service delivery around the metropolitan areas that are perceived to offer better opportunities for jobs,
education and healthcare.
The need for a network specifically focused on inequality:
A key part of the national consultation was the reflection upon the current capacity and level of understanding among CSOs in relation
to inequality. Participants identified the need to deepen the level of understanding on inequality, analysing trends, undertaking a
process of better understanding where and at whom public policies should be targeted, developing strategy analysis on key stakeholder
and power structures, research and knowledge generation and the need to unpack a policy framework. Among participants in the
consultation, there was consensus over the need to convene a multi-stakeholder and multi-thematic network of CSOs working on
inequality. This has now been established, partly as a result of the national consultation process, and will be called South African
Network on Inequality. It aims to a campaign against inequality at both national and global levels. Particular issues that came up as a
potential agenda for this new network were: social policy and social protection, including aspects such as access to decent housing,
right to health, right to education; Land Reform and agrarian transformation: access to land, food security and sovereignty, and
livelihoods; and Tax and Fiscal Justice related to income inequality.
GCAP China
In China, the national consultation involved participants from the academic sector and CSOs, some of which were GCAP members
and others that were not. It is important to understand that the political context determines the approach that CSO can have when
approaching emerging social issues, notably from restrictions on public campaigns and political rights. An interesting finding is that
there is some recognition among respondents that positive measures- in law and policies - to promote the participation of marginalised
groups and allow their voices to be heard has taken place in recent years. Whilst several respondents pointed out that there are
22
Sharma, S. (2012) Rising inequality in South Africa: Drivers, trends and policy responses. Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Finance and
Economy Unit
problems in the implementation of state policies, it was pointed out that there is will from the government to address inequality as a
central issue, and that there are concrete efforts from the state to hear social demands. However, as detailed above, the government
maintains tight restrictions on public demonstrations over social demands and on any signs of demands for more political space.
The following are dimensions of inequality that GCAP China members regard as priorities:
Gender inequality: discrimination against women and LGBT people persists as an important source of inequality. It is clear that in
relation to several of the other dimensions of inequality, gender is named as the main cause of unequal access to education and
income. Violence towards women, both in the private and public spheres, was also identified as an important issue.
Inequality in access to education: unequal opportunities to access education based on gender and social status - notably migrant
workers - and the unsatisfactory provision of education for people with disabilities, even though it is considered a right.
Income inequality: unequal income of women and migrant workers was mentioned as a central issue. The plight of migrant workers
and their unequal access to social protection and economic opportunities was raised. China had 262 million migrant workers by the
end of 2012, up 3.9% year on year, according to the latest official data. The minimum wage is considered to be too low, and thus
contributing to inequality. Unequal access to employment was perceived as major driver to income inequality.
Inequality in access to health services: through discrimination or the restrictions imposed by social medical insurances on certain
diseases.
Unequal impact of environmental degradation: the health consequences of environmental degradation were identified as drivers of
inequality, as vulnerable groups are more prone to suffer the consequences of problems such as contaminated water, exposure to
pollution and so on. These same groups also often lack proper access to health services. This dimension of inequality was also related
to food security in the responses.
Land ownership: land ownership concentration and real estate speculation were considered drivers of inequality, given the increased
marginalisation they cause.
Regional Inequalities: As a consequence of high regional inequalities millions of people are forced to migrate to more vibrant
economic centres. It was highlighted that the rural areas are far less developed and also enjoy relatively less resources for public
services provision. As such, vulnerable groups in disadvantaged areas face tougher social conditions which hinder their social mobility
possibilities even further. The wealthiest zones are the coastal regions that were specifically targeted by economic development
models, as the first to be developed.
Social Security Inequality: This was shown to be mainly faced by rural migrant workers, for whom there is an unequal access to
public services. Respondents also mentioned the need to unify the pension insurance system and harmonize access to social security
system. Although not explicitly named in the report, the Chinese HuKo system (the way people are registered in the social security
system and the rights they get depending on their status) institutionalises discrimination and emerges as a major structural cause of
inequality.
Although CSOs in China do not work around inequality as their main agenda when approaching social issues, it is interesting to note
that there is a high level of awareness around the increasing level of inequality in Chinese society and the risks that this implies.
Concerns over social and political instability as a result of economic polarisation have motivated the Chinese government to
implement and endorse programs that aim to alleviate inequality, for example the income distribution reform addressed by
government in their 12th five year plan 2011-2015. Nevertheless, concerns over political instability might well limit the use of
inequality as focus for civil society advocacy in China.
People´s Budget Initiative/ Wada Nah Todo Abhiyan - India
Before moving into the main findings, it is important to take note that India´s national consultation has been divided into two phases.
During this first phase, members of the People´s Budget Initiative were consulted and during the second phase, the consultation will
target the more extensive network of WNTA. The current findings came out of a survey in which 150 organizations participated.
Out of 150 CSOs surveyed, 89% of the organizations reported to work on inequality issues. The main thematic areas they focus on
were: health inequality, gender inequality and inequalities of access to resources. However it is important to note that due to the
wide range of understandings of inequality, we can infer that most people referred to the fact that the issues they work on have close
linkages with inequality. This does not necessarily mean that their work takes an explicit inequality perspective. In fact only 16
organisations stated that they have a concrete programme focused on inequality per se. 89% of PBI members reported to be engaged in
discussion with government departments on policies and programmes that address inequality, such as the National Health Mission, the
National Rural Health Mission, Forest Right Act, Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission and Tribal Development
Program.
Understanding on issues of inequality: Among CSOs the main focus related to inequality are issues of health, education and gender,
and for a smaller number, the issue of political inequality. In terms of capacities, the main issues that hindered CSOs’ effort to work
on inequality were seen to be financial budget constraints and human resources capacities. The national consultation found that Indian
CSOs haven’t been able to express enough thought on how the issue of inequality manifests itself through their work with
communities, and how they could engage in specific advocacy activities on inequality. Both PBI secretariat and CSOs concluded in
agreement that there is a deficiency in systematically addressing inequality within their programmes, a shift from their current
approach of addressing the absolute issues like poverty, education, health, gender etc. Conversely, the consultation showed that there
is more familiarity among CSOs on MDG and poverty reduction issues; 76% have worked around the Post-2015 agenda for instance.
When assessing the level of understanding on issues related inequality, there was a high level of agreement between respondents that
CSOs have a significant role to play in addressing inequality, that the existence of inequality is an urgent social issue, and that
government policies should address issues of inequality. Members also believed that BRICSAM countries can play a significant role
in addressing inequality through international instruments, although these instruments were not specified. Furthermore, it was stated
that the current tax structure in India is driving or augmenting income inequality.
GCAP Russia
From the GCAP Russia national consultation it emerged that the network members focus almost exclusively on the issue of access to
health services as their main advocacy agenda. This is not from an inequality perspective but rather awareness raising among users
and addressing the issue of quality of service. That said, respondents considered inequality as a very important issue that encompasses
many different social dimensions and causes which need to be understood more profoundly, particularly those aspects which are not
familiar to them. The national consultation identified unequal access to income and unequal access to public services as the most
prominent forms of inequality in Russia according to network members.
Unequal access to public services: GCAP members stated that the unequal access to public services – notably health services – is
due to discrimination, mainly gender and ethnic discrimination, and differentiated resource allocation between regions. The ruralurban divide in terms of public resource allocation was identified as a major cause of unequal provision of public services, which
replicates and exacerbates structural conditions for inequality. Perhaps slightly surprisingly therefore, budget monitoring was not
identified as a priority for GCAP.
Income inequality: Level of income was identified as a key determinant of the level of access to health services, as neglected public
services are considered to be mainly for the disadvantaged groups, whilst well-off citizens access their services through private
provision, for which quality is in direct relation to the level of income and ability to pay. The constant diminishing quality of social
services seems to worsen the unequal social participation of disadvantaged groups as well as sectors of the population who were not
previously considered vulnerable groups. For example, an internal survey conducted by GCAP in 2009 showed that more than 60% of
the Russian population is challenged to access quality healthcare.
In regard to the role of CSOs which are members of GCAP Russia, an interesting trend is that they themselves foresee the possibility
of working with the government in the implementation of social programmes and provision of services. Although not explicit given
the political context, members of GCAP Russia see themselves as the link between service users and state agencies, improving the
provision of services rather than challenging power structures or monitoring resources.
Gender: During the consultation, gender was mentioned as a prominent form of inequality. There was a sense of a worsening trend in
terms of the position of women in comparison to men. However, as mentioned above, the lack of organisations working with strong
gender perspectives could be limiting the emergence of gender as an important factor related to levels of inequality in Russia.
GCAP Russia has not previously worked on the issue of inequality and the implications of using the term would appear to be very
sensitive given the political context in Russia. The issues of tax justice, public resource distribution or income distribution which
might be considered as key elements in addressing to reduce inequality have all been highlighted as sensitive issues, which need to be
worked on very carefully at the national level. There was no clear indication on how work on inequality at a global perspective could
be taken forward by Russian CSOs, although there is willingness to explore the relation between ongoing work on access to health
services, other public services and global advocacy efforts.
REBRIP Brazil
Unfortunately, at the time of writing the national consultation report for Brazil was not available, therefore this analysis is based on
the preliminary reports shared by REBRIP and on the initial ECSN-BRICSAM Steering Committee calls.
Approach to Inequality: Inequality is not regarded by REBRIP as part of its main narrative for advocacy efforts. REBRIP uses social
justice as the concept that encompasses inequality, that is to say defending people´s rights over private interest. The network works to
challenge the systemic global structures that generate the conditions that limit people´s development, with a clear propositional
message over the need to construct an alternative development model. REBRIP has a clear strategy based on engaging with the issue
of regional integration and it pursues an alternative hemispheric integration opposed to the logic of the prevailing trade and financial
liberalization, on which current economic agreements are based.
In its efforts to advance social justice REBRIP entertains a regional approach, focusing on the global trade processes and their
consequences in terms social impact towards vulnerable groups in Brazil, in Latin America and beyond. In the current context, with
the growing role of Brazil as an actor in international politics, and especially in global financial and economic governance, REBRIP
has been tasked by its members with developing a greater understanding of the changes in the world. As such, the network has focused
on the global financial crisis and the urgent need for regulation of the financial system, as well as greater coordination of civil society
in the country to demand accountable foreign policy of the Brazilian government. The network has a clear orientation towards
influencing Brazilian external politics and the government´s agendas in the G20, the international financial institutions, and the
BRICS, and it believes that contrary to the situation of other countries, particularly those in the Global North, in Brazil there is real
openness to establishing this dialogue between government and civil society.
REBRIP promotes human rights, the democratization of global governance, financial regulation for a sustainable productive model,
food security and sovereignty, gender equity, and social and environmental justice. The network has the following thematic working
groups which give a more detailed sense of its areas of focus, and how these may relate to inequality:
Gender: This group follows trade negotiations and regional integration processes from a gender perspective and to strengthen
women's participation in these debates. It aims to develop the understanding that the effects of economic and trade policies have not
been neutral in terms of gender.
International Financial Architecture: In the current context of Brazil´s growing role as an actor of international politics, especially
in the global financial and economic governance, REBRIP aims to influence Brazil´s position as a critical voice against the current
financial de-regulation model and as an actor that proposes an alternative development model at the global level. It seeks to build
South-South alliances, by advancing dialogue with the social movements of other countries that make up the block of emerging
countries as well as with other countries in the South, in order to consolidate perspectives and mobilizations from the South towards
re-defining the new global governance.
Commerce and Environment: This group aims to include CSOs in the struggle to obtain international trade agreements that take
into consideration social and environmental impacts. It covers areas such as intellectual property rights, impact of tariffs on industrial
goods on jobs, large development projects in the Amazon, amongst others.
Agriculture: focuses on WTO and agricultural agreements with the EU and other international blocks, aiming to take into account the
perspectives of rural communities that could be negatively affected by such negotiations. It also examines issues of subsidies and antidumping. The group seeks a broad transformation of the traditional production model anchored in the export of raw materials and
natural resources.
Overall it is clear that a common approach can be identified between the different groups. That is that REBRIP approaches inequality
from a systemic point of view, striving to address the underlying causes. In terms of inequality, REBRIP defines its work in terms of
defending the rights and interests of ´people´, which means the majority of people, the 99% poorest, not the richest 1% which it sees
as having undue influence over the current economic development model. REBRIP understands the inequality that people experience
to be the consequence of systems and rules that are determined at the global level.
REBRIP sees ECSN-BRICSAM as an opportunity to integrate various work streams underway related to engaging with emerging
global governance structures. It believes it will need to strengthen the national agenda in order to do this, and dialogue with the
Brazilian government remains a REBRIP priority. At the same time it will be necessary to expand its articulations with other CSO
networks in BRICS countries and other allies, either by means of networks with which they are already engaged such as Our World is
Not for Sale, People´s Agenda for Alternative Regionalisms, Alianza Social Continental, and Basic South Initiative, as well as direct
links with CSOS in other BRICSAM countries. There is a strong sense that no country can face the current global crises on their own.
General Considerations
1.
Given the diversity of approaches taken in the national consultations towards inequality, it is impossible to draw general
conclusions in a systematic and empirical manner, however we have identified emerging issues that should be consider for further
discussion and analysis:
2.
The need to develop a common framework to build the understanding of inequality on empirical data based on common metrics,
in order to better understand the nature and trends in inequality and in order to approach this issue in a more systematic manner.
During the consultations, the structural causes and symptoms of inequality came up in a mixed way, and when entertaining
discussions there was a lack of understanding of which variables have a greater determinant effect over the individuals’ life
trajectories, for example does gender play a greater role than level of education?
3.
Gender emerged as a strong cross cutting issue, notably as a structural cause of inequality. However, in the proposed advocacy
agenda, gender is not present and this issue needs to be analysed further and discussed, in order to better determine how to
incorporate this dimension to the global thematic advocacy agenda.
4.
Education emerged strongly as a cause and consequence of structural inequality, together with the notion that there has been
progress in terms of access across the BRICSAM countries. Secondary education came up as the most problematic stage when
accessing education, due to problems in public provision but also over the capacities of certain groups to make use of public
services. For instance, in Mexico people dropped out of school due to the need to pursue work to complete the household income.
5.
Unequal access to health also emerged as a strong cause of structural inequality. The quality of these services also came up as a
problematic dimension of public provision, and the differentiated use of services by different social groups also emerged as
problematic – basically better-off groups can afford to use private services, others cannot. Once more, it will be necessary to
determine the drivers of an unequal access to health, for example, budget constraints for specific services, regional disparities, etc.
6.
Redistributive income policies and taxation is surprisingly not coming out from the perspectives of CSOs as a major cause of
inequality in BRICSAM countries. This is not in line with some recent initiatives in the north to push for better and more
progressive taxation. The role of redistributive policies probably needs to be further discussed and explored.
7.
The political domain of inequality is surprisingly not emerging in a strong manner either. Political inequalities are the result of
structures that create unfairness in representation and participation, perpetuating disparities, as the lack of participation in decision
making, and this has a knock on effect over the resource allocation for certain groups and services.
8.
The need to further develop analysis over the issues that prevent specific groups from accessing ´equal opportunities´. Unequal
access to opportunities was signalled as a major determinant of inequality, however what determines people capacities to take
opportunities needs further exploration, for instance free public provision does not guarantee capacity to access. Further research
on intersecting inequalities is needed, as it is clear that inequalities in one domain increase the likelihood of inequalities in others.
Intersecting inequalities are not just a simple sum of the various dimensions of exclusion, but rather their relationship and the
determinant factors need to be further explored.
9.
The lack of command over hard indicators on inequality during the discussions shows the need for more research and evidence
based analysis within networks, notably on structural causes and relationships between variables.
10. Wealth concentration at the global level did not emerged as a cause or as a perceived strong inequality trend, although one of the
major trends of income and wealth concentration is taking place at the global level, as the richest 1% has 43% of the global
wealth. This trend is even higher at the global level than at a national level. 23 The absence of this issue in the consultations might
show the complexity of capturing global trends when working on national agendas.
11. Lack of clarity over what added value there would be to work on inequality issues at a global level was clear from the
consultations. One of the reasons might be the lack of identification of global dynamics with local impact over inequality. This
also might relate to the fact that most of the networks did not relate local trends of inequalities with global dynamics that need to
be influenced upon – with the exception of REBRIP. Most networks are not familiar with global processes or forums that are
related to inequality and therefore did not make explicit links between their advocacy agendas and global agendas.
12. None of the networks use inequality as their main advocacy narrative or have a particularly sophisticated approach to inequality
as part of their programmatic work.
13. Spatial inequalities come up strongly but not explicitly. There seems to be evidence that certain regions and social groups are
impacted differently by the current economic and social dynamics, however the spatial dimension of inequality needs to be further
studied.
14. The general perception among the CSO networks is that social inequality is worsening, either through increasing disparities in
income, wealth or unequal access to essential services as health or education. Furthermore, there is a sense that under the current
economic development model these disparities will increase if specific policies are not put in place. A clear message coming out
of the consultations is that national economic growth is not enough.
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Addressing Inequalities, Synthesis Report of Global Public Consultation (2013) Co-led by UNICEF and UN Women. Accessed 28 November
2013 http://www.worldwewant2015.org/node/299198
15. Several networks addressed the issue that their governments have passed policies that aim to tackle inequality explicitly, for
example the cases of India, China and South Africa. However they also noted that there were implementation challenges,
highlighting the need for systematic research and analysis on the strengths and weaknesses of the policies, the degree to which
they effective or ineffective in practice, whilst also identifying the challenges that affect the policies implementation, for instance
lack of citizen participation, social accountability gaps.
16. No clear goals over inequality – notably on wealth and income inequality – came out during the consultations. In most cases
inequality is approached in its more extreme expressions, like the lack of access to essential services or when neglecting rights,
however there is a tier of work to be developed over the negative consequences of inequality to the overall society, not only
looking at its effects on the poorest, but also the middle class, for instance.
17. The link between the emerging global advocacy themes and the causes of inequality that were identified needs to be further
developed and discussed. The three global advocacy themes that have emerged so far during the steering committee calls have
been:
a)
Economic policy and development models
b) Access & quality of public services and social protection
c)
Food security
The following diagram provides an overview of how these three common themes were arrived at, based on the thematic priorities
related to inequality of the seven CSO networks.