Proliferation of Advanced Air Defence Systems

air power in Australia
Proliferation of
Advanced Air
Defence Systems
Dr Carlo Kopp
Since the end of the Cold War the technology
of Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS) has
evolved considerably. More importantly, many
advanced technologies are now proliferating
widely in a globalised market where the highest
bid often determines who can procure what.
The shift to commercial rather than Cold War
era military strategic imperatives, especially for
Russian and Chinese industry, has completely
changed the proliferation dynamic in the
globalised 21st Century world.
While Western nations remain strongly wedded
to Cold War era controls on weapons exports,
to ensure that problem regimes do not procure
advanced weapons technology, Russian and
Chinese industries and those of many former Soviet
republics operate without such constraints, as long
as their national governments do not object to the
sale on other grounds.
The problem is multi-dimensional and presents
risks to all players. When Russian forces clashed
with the Georgian military over the disputed
territory of South Ossetia in late 2008 the results
were a surprise to all, including the Russians.
Confident that Georgian air defences were an easy
target, the Russian Air Force flew a large number
of sorties into Georgian airspace to bomb Georgian
ground forces. The result was the loss of at least
three Su-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft
and one Tu-22M3 Backfire C heavy bomber, plus
two Su-24 Fencers claimed. Russian Electronic
Warfare Self Protection (EWSP) systems proved
largely ineffective in defending the aircraft from
Georgian SAMs. Unbeknown to the Russians,
the Georgians contracted Ukrainian industry to
perform covertly a series of technology-insertion
upgrades on the Georgian inventory of Soviet-built
SAM systems and supporting radars. With EWSP
systems programmed to defeat baseline Russian
waveforms, the systems were unable to cope.
Western nations have not confronted any modern
state-of-the-art air defence equipment since
the early 1970’s air war in Vietnam. Saddam’s
extensive and dense IADS was crushed in 1991, but
it comprised a mix of export variants of 1970s’ and
1980s’ built Soviet and French equipment. Many
key systems were by then completely compromised
to Western technical intelligence. In 1999,
Yugoslavia’s air defences were equally antiquated,
further impaired by a long running embargo that
denied access to spare parts, overhauls of time
expired missile rounds and upgrades. While NATO
forces prevailed, disproportionate numbers of
defence suppression sorties needed to be flown,
and most of the Serbian SA-6 Gainful force survived
the air war. One F-117A stealth fighter was lost.
The air campaign against the Taliban in late 2001
was effectively uncontested, as was the invasion
of Iraq in 2003.
The complacency, which cost the Russians so
dearly in Georgia, is even more pervasive and
pronounced in the West. The ability to fly into hostile
air defences without hindrance is simply assumed
to be an immutable fact, into which the material
reality of advanced technology proliferation never
intrudes. Public statements by officialdom and
manufacturers largely ignore opposing capabilities,
or portray these as legacy Soviet-era or early 1990s
systems. This rejection of reality is likely to persist
until large numbers of Western combat aircraft
are actually shot down during operations, upon
which the resulting public embarrassment will
produce a change in thinking and funding priorities.
At present, technical intelligence collection and
especially hard analysis of new IADS components
is not a priority in any Western nation. Complaining
about this problem is not a ‘career enhancing’
move for any senior air force officer in the West
at this time.
Newa SC upgrade for the legacy SA-3 Goa SAM system.
The SA-20 Gargoyle has been widely exported.
40V6M masts are available to extend low altitude
coverage in SA-10/20 and SA-21 systems.
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Proliferation of New Technology
Threat Systems
SA-20 missile launch. Late build SA-20B systems
share technology extensively with the later SA-21,
this including almost identical 54K6E2 and 55K6E
command post vehicles, and 5P85TE2 and 5P85TM
towed TELs, using identical BZKT 6 x 6 high
mobility tractors.
When the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact
disintegrated two decades ago these entities
and their Third World satellites and surrogates
possessed the largest global inventory of SAM
systems, SAM warstocks and supporting radars
in the world. The economic crisis that ensued
resulted in the collapse of state funded cashflow
for manufacturing and maintenance of military
systems. The result was a fire sale on the global
stage of all manner of equipment and component
warstocks. Nations that were previously denied
access to top end Soviet equipment suddenly found
themselves being offered whatever they could
afford, and more.
China was a major beneficiary, and has since
procured the world’s largest force of advanced
SAM systems, including the self-propelled Russian
Almaz S-300PMU / SA-10B(C) Grumble, the Almaz
S-300PMU1 / SA-20A Gargoyle, and the AlmazAntey S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20B Gargoyle. The
Russians also licenced the technology in the SA-10
to China’s industry, enabling it to develop and
manufacture the HQ-9, now being exported as the
FD-2000, or equipped with anti-radiation seeker
fitted SAM rounds, as the FT-2000.
These systems compare in basic technology to
the US MIM-104 Patriot SAM system and its
MPQ-53/65 phased array radar system. Unlike the
Patriot, which has numerous design compromises
in its radar to accommodate target search and
acquisition, the Russian Flap Lid and Tomb Stone
radar designs have a much better antenna system
design, built for jam resistance. Russian SAMs
have much better mobility, with a battery capable
of deploying or stowing inside five minutes for
‘hide, shoot and scoot’ operations. As a result, this
family of SAM systems is widely acknowledged
to be not only the most lethal in the market
but also the most survivable when subjected to
attack by defence suppression aircraft. Semimobile variants, in which radars are equipped
with the Ukrainian designed NKMZ 40V6M/MD
masts are also available, providing much increased
low altitude coverage against cruise missiles and
aircraft. Like the Patriot, all S-300PM variant
systems use radio networking to connect battery
components.
China is now the largest single user of late-model
S-300P SAM system variants. As of 2008, the
FD-2000 and FT-2000 export configurations of
the HQ-9 have been displayed and offered at
international arms shows.
Until recently, former Soviet republics including
Russia and two former Warsaw Pact nations,
were the principal users of S-300P variants.
The first export variant was exported only to
China. The more advanced S-300PMU1 / SA-20A
was exported to China, but also to Cyprus, later
transferred to Greece.
This variant was also sold to Iran, and after much
public controversy it appears the systems are to
be soon delivered to the Teheran regime, which
intends to use them to protect nuclear sites.
The most successful of the variants is also the
most lethal – the S-300PMU2 Favorit / SA-20B.
Eight batteries of this system have been exported
to China, ten to Kazakhstan, two to Vietnam, while
Libya has ordered four batteries and Algeria eight.
Each battery comprises a radar package and
multiple four round 5P85SE/TE TEL vehicles.
The S-400 is currently used to defend Moscow,
and was recently cleared for export to Belarus,
providing the capability to deny use of much of
Poland’s airspace due to the prodigious 250 km /
400 km range of the SAM rounds when launched
on ballistic midcourse trajectories. S-400 sales
are currently being negotiated with Saudi Arabia,
and reports suggest that Turkey, Kazakhstan and
Venezuela are interested in procuring it.
The Chinese have yet to disclose interest in the
FD-2000/FT-2000 system, although reports have
emerged that Iran would be a likely first client if the
Russian SA-20A deal collapses.
Medium range SAM systems such as the 9K317
Buk M2 / SA-17 Grizzly have been much less
successful in the export market, compared to their
larger and smaller siblings.
State of the art point defence SAM and SPAAGM
systems have also been intensively marketed, with
considerable success. Russian reports suggest
that the production lines for 9K331 Tor M1/M2 /
SA-15 Gauntlet, 2K22M1 Tunguska / SA-19 Grison
and 96K6 Pantsir S1 / SA-22 are running to full
capacity. Recent variants of all three systems have
been re-engineered with digital technology and are
optimized to engage and destroy cruise missiles,
anti-radiation missiles like the HARM, and smart
bombs during their terminal flight phase. Deployed
to protect key IADS assets like SA-10/20/21
batteries or supporting radars, these redesigned
systems significantly improve the survivability of
a modern IADS. China, Iran and Syria are amongst
users of these systems.
Another important technology now being
aggressively marketed are VHF band radars,
designed for ‘counter-stealth’ applications. Five
designs have been offered for export. The self
propelled Nebo SVU is a solid state digital AESA
with many capabilities comparable to the SPY-1
Aegis radar. The self-propelled Vostok D/E is a
digital solid state radar, which can stow/deploy in
less than six minutes. Both are highly jam resistant
and use sophisticated digital signal and data
processing techniques, hosted on COTS computing
platforms.
SA-21 SAM system components.
Chinese HQ-9 / FD-2000 SAM system components. Batteries are supported by modern Type 120, Type 305A and Type 305B high mobility radars on licenced Mercedes-Benz trucks.
The Type 305A phased array is modelled on the new Thales Groundmaster.
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air power in Australia
SA-15B Gauntlet exported to China.
SA-22 system exported to the UAE. Like the SA-15D, it is intended primarily for defeat of the
HARM/AARGM, JASSM and smart bombs during terminal flight.
The Booming Legacy System Upgrade
Market
Advanced self-propelled VHF radars are potent
additions to SAM batteries, as they can deny
surprise and cue fire control radars into very small
acquisition boxes, putting an exceptionally high
premium on top end stealth capabilities and fighter
speed/altitude performance.
Export sales of the Nebo SVU have yet to be
disclosed, but it is known that at least one export
client has procured the Vostok E radar.
Modern digital AESA radars operating in the
decimetric L-band are also now on offer. Another
advanced technology now appearing in the export
market are sensor track fusion systems, akin to
the recently deployed US Navy CEC (Cooperative
Engagement Capability) system. This technology
has been offered in the Salyut Poima system,
and is part of the new NNIIRT Nebo-M multi-band
counter-stealth radar system.
The marketing of new generation SAMs, SPAAGMs
and radars has been paralleled by a very active
market for active radar seduction decoys, and for
integrated EWSP packages for radars and SAM
batteries. These products are designed to degrade
the accuracy of Western emitter locating systems,
but also to frustrate the terminal guidance of smart
weapons. This in turn drives up the number of
smart munitions needed to kill the radar or SAM
battery to economically unsustainable levels in
combat.
While sales of new technology systems have been
robust they have not matched the level of activity
in technology insertion upgrades into Soviet-era
radars and SAMs. These were exported in vast
numbers during the Cold War, and remain widely
used. Many operators bolstered their inventories
during the 1990s, as former Warsaw Pact nations
and Soviet republics dumped inventory onto the
global marketplace.
Typical insertion upgrades involve replacement
of most and sometimes all Soviet era electronics
in the system. New solid-state digital hardware,
usually based on COTS technology, is retrofitted.
The upgrades are more than often enhancements,
as the new radars tend to be jam resistant
automatic frequency hopping designs, and control
laws for missile guidance are usually replaced,
resulting in missile range and accuracy/lethality
improvements.
Upgraded Soviet-era systems will typically have
greater missile kinematic engagement ranges,
expanding the lethal footprint of the system, but
are also much more difficult to jam, which is a
major problem given that most Western combat
aircraft are fitted with legacy EWSP systems, or
evolutions of late Cold War EWSP systems. Many
such EWSP systems lack sophisticated DRFM
exciter technology and are no match for new
technology frequency agile radars. Newer DRFM
jammers will still be challenged by more powerful
frequency agile threats, and their effective footprint
will be strongly reduced.
The S-125 / SA-3 Goa has been a popular target
for upgrades, with packages on offer by AlmazAntey in Russia, the joint Russian-Belarus Defence
Systems corporation, and Belarus based Tetraedr.
Poland’s Cenrex are also offering a full digital
package, but have encountered active Russian
government interference in marketing the product.
Decoys and EWSP packages are typically supplied
with the upgrade.
Importantly, most of these upgrades include
rehosting of the legacy semi-mobile hardware
on vehicles, transforming the systems into selfpropelled or mobile designs, making the system
much more difficult to kill in combat. Egypt is
a reported customer for the Defense Systems
upgrade.
Another popular upgrade target has been the
2K12E Kvadrat, the export variant of the SA-6
Gainful ramjet area defence SAM. Russian industry
is offering two basic digital technology insertion
upgrades for the 1S91 Straight Flush radar
system and 2P25 launchers. Czech and Hungarian
contractors developed unique upgrades, which are
also on offer, but only to NATO friendly clients.
Much more interesting are the advanced upgrades
on offer for the SA-6. These include the second
stage Tikhomirov NIIP upgrade which replaces the
legacy 2P25 TELs with the 9M310-M1-2 TELAR
from the late model 9K37M1-2 Buk M1-2 / SA-11
Gadfly system and the 3M9 series SAM with the
9M317 / SA-17 Grizzly SAM. The result is a defacto
hybrid between the SA-6, SA-11 and SA-17 SAM
systems, with the jam resistant seeker and agile
airframe of the 9M317 / SA-17 Grizzly missile
round. Egypt is a reported customer.
Rezonans NE VHF counter-stealth radar.
Nebo SVU VHF counter-stealth AESA radar.
Vostok E VHF counter-stealth radar.
Late model SA-15D Gauntlet on hardened MZKT-6922
chassis. The SA-15D is intended primarily for defeat
of the HARM/AARGM, JASSM and smart bombs during
terminal flight.
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Tetraedr Osa 1T / SA-8 Gecko upgrade on MZKT-6922.
Upgrades are available for the widely proliferated 250
km range SA-5 Gammon.
Agat, designers of the active radar missile seeker
for the R-77 / RVV-AE/SD ‘AMRAAM-ski’ are
also offering an enlarged digital variant of this
seeker, the 9B-1103M-350 as a replacement
retrofit seeker for legacy semi-active homing
1SB4M seekers in the 3M9/9M9 (SA-6) missile
and 9E47M/9E50/9E420 in the 9M38 (SA-11/17)
missiles. Such a retrofit significantly increases the
lethality of missile and its jam resistance.
The 9K33 Osa/Romb / SA-8 Gecko and 9K35
/ SA-13 Gopher short range SAMs have also
been popular targets for modern upgrades. While
these mostly involve comprehensive electronics
replacement and addition of thermal imaging
passive trackers, two upgrades go further. Tetraedr
in Belarus are also rehosting the SA-8 system
on the new build high mobility hardened 6 x 6
MZKT-6922 chassis, developed for the Tor M2E
system. As of early 2009 Tetraedr had 80 orders
for SA-8 rebuilds, mostly including the new MZKT6922 vehicle. The other interesting item is the
9K35A Gyurza 9A34M3/9A35M3 SA-13 TELAR
upgrade, which adds a dorsal Azov L-136 MAK-F
hemispherical infrared search / track sensor for
passive detection of aircraft.
Both Tetraedr and Almaz-Antey are offering digital
rebuilds of the massive 250 km range S-200VE
Vega / SA-5 Gammon SAM system, primarily
involving the 5N62 Square Pair fire control radar
and 5G24 missile seeker. A hybridisation upgrade,
which slaves the Square Pair to an SA-20A/B Tomb
Stone engagement radar is also on offer.
A hybridisation upgrade of the Chinese HQ-2E/F /
SA-2 Guideline SAM may also be available, using
the new H-200 phased array radar developed
for the KS-1A/HQ-12 SAM. To accommodate the
SA-2 missile round the system merely needs to
generate compatible command link waveforms,
and be equipped with suitable software for missile
guidance.
In conclusion, the proliferation of advanced
IADS technology is a direct consequence of the
commercially oriented focus of non-Western
defence industries and a globalised market for
advanced weapons. Over the coming decade
this will completely transform the air defence
landscape Western aircraft must penetrate. The
‘permissive’ legacy Soviet-era systems, around
which all contemporary fighters other than the
US F-22A Raptor have been designed, will largely
vanish from existence, leaving Western nations
with potentially non-viable combat fleets.
The Chinese H-200 radar is likely used in a
hybridization upgrade of the SA-2 Guideline.
Pechora 2M SA-3 Goa upgrade.
Defence
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