Media as a tool for Reconciliation?

Media as a tool for Reconciliation?
A study on the contribution of media-oriented projects of NGOs
to the reconciliation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Jora Wolterink
October 2006
Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN)
Radboud University Nijmegen
Supervisor: Dr. Lau Schulpen
Contents
1Introduction……………………………………………………………………… 1
2 Theoretical Framework …………………………………………………………. 7
2.1 Contemporary conflict………………………………………………………… 7
2.2 Conflict resolution…………………………………………………………….. 10
2.3 Reconciliation as a concept…………………………………………………… 13
2.4 Media and Peacebuilding……………………………………………………… 19
2.5 Summary……………………………………………………………………... 24
2.6 Methods of data collection…………………………………………………… 25
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, a wasp's nest ………………………………………… 31
3.1 Ottoman Empire 1389-1878………………………………………………….. 31
3.2 Austro-Hungarian rule 1878-1914……………………………………………. 33
3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina during the World Wars…………………………….. 34
3.4 Bosnia under communist rule………………………………………………… 36
3.5 The beginning of the end……………………………………………………… 37
3.6 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina………............................................................. 38
3.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 42
4 Reconciliation in divided Bosnia………………………………………………... 45
4.1 Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years after Dayton.………………… 45
4.1.1 Level one: Top level of Bosnian society……………………………………. 46
4.1.2 Level two: Middle-range level……………………………………………… 49
4.1.3 Level three: Identifying group identities……………………………………. 51
4.2 Reconciliation as concept, perceived by Bosnian citizens……………………. 55
4.2.5 The four elements revised…………………………………………………… 62
4.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 63
5 Media climate Bosnia…………………………………………………………… 65
5.1 Bosnian print media…………………………………………………………… 65
5.2 Bosnian electronic media……………………………………………………… 67
5.3 Professionalism in Bosnian media…………………………………………….. 70
5.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 76
6 Media and Peacebuilding……………………………………………………….. 79
6.1 Type one and two interventions: Conventional journalism development…….. 79
6.2 Type three interventions: Transitional Journalism Development…………….. 83
6.3 Type four interventions: Media-based interventions………………………….. 87
6.4 Type five intended outcome programming…………………………………….89
6.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 91
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7 Videoletters, a type five media initiative………………………………………... 95
7.1 Background of the project…………………………………………………….. 96
7.1.1 Broadcasting………………………………………………………………… 98
7.1.2 Website……………………………………………………………………… 98
7.1.3 Internet counters…………………………………………………………….. 99
7.1.4 Telephone help lines…….…………………………………………………...100
7.1.5 Caravan……………………………………………………………………… 101
7.2 Results Videoletters: the (un) intended outcomes…………………………….. 106
7.2.1. Need for Videoletters………………………………………………………. 107
7.2.2 Reach of Videoletters………………………………………………………...112
7.2.3. Reactions to Videoletters…………………………………………………… 114
7.2.4. Impact as a reconciliation program………………………………………….120
7.3 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….. 123
8 General Conclusions……………………………………………………………. 127
8.1 The long path of reconciliation in Bosnia…………………………………….. 127
8.2 Position of Bosnian media climate…………………………………………… 129
8.3 Five types of media initiatives by NGOs in Bosnia…………………………... 130
8.4 Contribution of a an ‘intended outcome program’ to Bosnian society………... 133
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Tables, Charts, Figures, Boxes
Table 2.1 Media impacts in post conflict phase……………………………………23
Table 4.1 Bosnians about Bosnians……………………………………………….. 52
Table 6.1 Classification media initiatives…………………………………………. 92
Table 7.1 Lost holiday places……………………………………………………... 108
Table 7.2 Reasons for not visiting………………………………………………… 108
Table 7.3 Family members in surrounding countries * Miss those people……….. 109
Table 7.4 Lost contacts……………………………………………………………. 110
Table 7.5 Telephone traffic……………………………………………………….. 111
Table 7.6 Familiarity Videoletters………………………………………………… 113
Table 7.7 Will to receive and record a videoletter………………………………… 121
Chart 7.1 Impressions of Videoletters Episode One………………………………. 115
Chart 7.2 Opinion about message show………………………………………….. 117
Figure 3.1 Ethnical map Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004…………………………. 42
Box 2.1 Research Confusion……………………………………………………… 30
Box 3.1 Sarajevo shortly………………………………………………………….. 38
Box 4.1 Bosnian Coffee…………………………………………………………… 51
Box 4.2 Soccer in Bosnia…………………………………………………………. 54
Box 4.3 ‘All Serbians falsify the truth’…………………………………………… 56
Box 5.1: Threat for a journalist……………………………………………………. 72
Box 6.1 The two participating journalists from Sarajevo………………………… 85
Box 6.2 Goran Bregovic and Davorin Popovic…………………………………… 89
Box 7.1 Non broadcasted episodes by Serbian public broadcaster………………. 97
Box 7.2 Emil and Saša, a Videoletters episode…………………………………… 98
Box 7.3 A projects day……………………………………………………………. 102
Box 7.4 Impressions of a Videoletters crew member…………………………….. 106
Box 7.5 Ivana and Senad. A Videoletters episode…………………………………117
Box 7.6 Mr. Softics’ open letter to Ivana ………………………………………… 118
Box 7.7. Vlada and Ivica. A Videoletters episode…………………………………119
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iv
Preface and Acknowledgments
Good, God, Go!
That is what a friend told me while doing the research in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before
going to Bosnia I could not wait to leave the Netherlands and start the adventure. Once
being there however, I realised it was not always that easy to do live in a different culture,
to build a social life, to try and become one of them while you know you will never be,
and on top of that to try and do some research there. After some time you get used to that
though, you accept the situation and it actually starts being a good time: Go! My stay in
Bosnia and Herzegovina could not possibly have been so nice without the support of
friends from there, from the Netherlands, and my family. I am sure the mailman made
lots of trips extra for me. I would like to thank the organizations and respondents in
Bosnia who provided information for this thesis, in particular the organization of
Videoletters.
The same counts for the process of writing the thesis. I would like to thank my
supervisor Dr. Lau Schulpen for his helpful comments, as well as three persons who have
helped me check the thesis on the English: Marleen van Klingeren, Herman Kleinjan and
Ruth-Grove White. Thank you for the critical view! The pictures in this thesis come from
Angel de la Rubia, a Spanish photographer who became a friend during the time we spent
in Bosnia. At last I would like to thank my friends, family, and the students who, like me,
were present at the university many days a week to work on their theses, in particular
Marjoke who drank many coffees with me. Thank you all for your support.
Jora Wolterink, October 12, 2006
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1 Introduction
In the mountainous area that is locked between the Adriatic Sea and Croatia to the west
and Serbia and Montenegro to the east lays the small country of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As for the surface, it is slightly bigger than the Netherlands, but has a quarter of its
inhabitants. During the past fifteen years the international community has focused its
attention on this small country because of the conflict that took place from 1992 to 1995.
A short overview of articles that were published in Dutch newspapers during the
execution of this research gives us the following news: The two war criminals that are
being sought most intensively by the International Community have not yet been arrested.
The articles state unanimously that this is the fault of the Serbian government; if they
really had the intention of arresting the two criminals, they could have done so a long
time ago. Later that spring, in June 2005, most newspapers reported on the broadcasting
of footage showing Serbian soldiers killing young Muslim men from Srebrenica. A
month later the Dutch press reported on the memorial day of the events in that town, at
the 11th of July, 20051. It can be concluded, after examining such articles, that this
remains a problematic area of Europe with numerous unsolved problems.
In December 1995, the three-year Bosnian war was ended formally when the
Dayton Peace Agreements were signed by the three warring leaders. Ten years later,
many mass graves have yet to be discovered, and many bodies remain missing. The
International Commission on Missing Persons has identified 8335 remnants of bodies so
far, but 22168 persons are still missing2. Although many new houses have been built
since 1995, many villages and towns show the physical scars of the war. Besides these
physical scars on buildings and infrastructure, many people have emotional scars that
may be healing but are still present in the case of many Bosnians. This research deals
with these people and in particular the process in which the damaged relationships
between persons are repaired. Ten years after the end of the war it can be concluded that
the road to peace is long and rocky.
This research discusses the relationship between the media and reconciliation.
The media has seen some big changes in terms of technology and role in the 20th century;
this developed from photographs of the frontlines of World War One into live reports
from the Gulf war in the early nineties through television. Meanwhile the public in other
countries obtained more and more information about the ins and outs of wars, about their
soldiers dying for a lost case and formed opinions about this. The media have proven
themselves to be an influential tool, in several ways. For example in the Vietnam War,
the images on the American television determined to a certain extent the course of the
presence of American troops in Vietnam.
Other proof of the power of the media concerns the way media can be used as a
weapon in wartime. Especially in the recent Balkan wars they have been used as a tool
for propaganda; during the war the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic was in full control
1
By that day it was ten years ago that the killings of the 8000 Muslim men took place in that town,
perpetrated by Bosnian Serbs.
2
These figures are based on information of the ICMP about the so-called ‘tracking charts’ of missing
persons. The numbers date from September 2006.
1
of the television channels in Serbia and as a result could say and broadcast anything he
wanted and which was to his advantage. Radio and television were manipulated to
provoke ethnic and nationalist sentiments and to win the support of certain parties
(Hieber 2001:1). The same thing happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war of
1992-1995: the Bosnian Serbs for example saw on television that the Bosnian Muslims
wanted to turn Bosnia into an Islamic state. This caused suspicious feelings amongst the
Bosnian Serbs who did not want to live in that kind of country. Together with other
factors, this raised the ethnic tensions between the different groups. This is just one
example of rumours the media spread in the beginning of the 1990s in Bosnia. The
feelings of, e.g., the Bosnian Serbs, were not invented by the media but that there has
been media influence in intensifying these feelings is indisputable.
That the media can be used as a weapon of war has been argued and researched
by many persons and it is a conclusion that cannot easily be refuted. However, to see the
other side of this influence is something that has not been done many times so far. If the
media can have such negative influence on a conflict, it sounds logical that they should
be able to make a positive contribution as well. Since the beginning of the 1990s, NGOs
have made efforts in the field of media and reconciliation by trying to reach people in
post-conflict situations through the media. The contribution of the media to the
reconciliation process within such countries has not been scientifically examined. This
has been one motivation for this research; to explore the field of media and post-conflict
reconciliation activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Research goal and questions
The goal of this research has been to collect information about the way NGOs use the
media as a tool for reconciliation.
The main question during this research has been:
In what way do media related projects of NGOs try to contribute to the reconciliation
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and what have been the results of these attempts?
This question has two components. The first part of the question asks for information
about the way NGOs use media for peacebuilding and reconciliation activities3. This
information has been required by examining different kinds of projects of NGOs that
relate to this research subject. These projects have been selected on the basis of the
theoretical model devised by Ross Howard. This associate of the Canadian NGO
IMPACS has developed a model to classify peace and media activities. The model has
been used as a guide during this research and is presented in the theoretical chapter
(chapter two).
The second component asks for a more analytical approach of the subject.
Whereas the first part of the question is largely descriptive, the second is explanatory. On
3
As will turn out in chapter two, the theoretical framework, reconciliation has been determined to be a part of
the peacebuilding process.
2
the basis of the indicators determined in the theoretical chapter, the results of the NGOs
that work in the research field of media and reconciliation will be analysed.
Finding answers to these two parts of the main question requires more detailed contextual
knowledge about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore the research has
been executed on the basis of five sub-questions, which also form the guidelines while
reading this thesis. The sub-questions of this research are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
a. What are dominant perspectives of reconciliation in Bosnian society?
b. How does the reconciliation process proceed, based on these perspectives?
What does the Bosnian media climate look like ten years after Dayton?
In what way do Non Governmental Organizations use the media to make a
contribution to the Bosnian reconciliation process?
What has been the contribution of ‘Videoletters’ to the Bosnian reconciliation
process?
These four research questions can be perceived as a funnel; they argue from a general
level to the specific subject of media and reconciliation. Sub-questions one and two
specify the circumstances in which media-oriented initiatives in Bosnia take place. That
these initiatives cannot be separated from their surroundings became clear during the
research. The media initiatives are to a large extent influenced by the national context and
dominant ideologies. This is the reason to examine the two main areas that affect the
initiative: the reconciliation climate and the media climate (question one and two).
Question three discusses several media initiatives and where possible their contribution to
the Bosnian reconciliation process. The last research question is at the same time the most
analytical. It introduces the workings of a media-oriented initiative, Videoletters, on a
more detailed level and tries to assess the contribution it may have made to reconciliation
in Bosnia.
The focus of the research
After having examined the reconciliation and media climates, the research focuses more
on the specific theme of media and reconciliation. While doing do, several projects of
NGOs are researched with the help of the theory as discussed in Chapter Two. One
project in particular can be regarded as the case study of this research. This is the project
‘Videoletters’. This is named after the documentary series it is based on. Two Dutch
filmmakers took the initiative to film long lost friends and record their video messages.
They exchanged these messages and tried to reconnect some people who had lost contact
because of the Bosnian war. By filming this process the makers recorded material to edit
twenty short documentaries, which have been broadcasted in the whole of former
Yugoslavia. While doing so the message of the filmmakers was explicitly clear:
Reconnect! They wanted to set an example for all those citizens in former Yugoslavia
who for one reason or another were separated and have not found each other again. By
encouraging these people to reconnect and at the same time providing the practical means
3
for them to actually do so, the filmmakers intended to serve a higher goal, to contribute to
the reconciliation process within Bosnian society.
The research was executed mainly in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sarajevo, where I lived during the five months of this research. The research and
conclusion tries to assess these questions through contact with respondents and
informants who were either experts on the subject of the research, or who were familiar
or confronted with a media-related initiative. Respondents were from different
backgrounds; sometimes they were interviewed because of their ethnic identity,
sometimes because of their profession, sometimes because of the fact they were
inhabitants of Sarajevo. In chapter two the choice for the respondents is discussed and
justified, as well as the method of data collection.
Thesis outline
The outline of this thesis is connected to the sub-questions as presented above. After
having discussed the various debates about media and peacebuilding in Chapter Two, as
well as the methods of data collection, Chapter Three will discuss the context and history
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While describing the history of Bosnia, links will be made
with the modern Bosnian context, as it has often been argued that the reasons for the last
Bosnian war can be found in its history. Chapter Four will provide answers to the first
sub-question (as well 1.a as 1.b) and therefore introduce the Bosnian reconciliation
process. Chapter Five will discuss the Bosnian media climate and, like Chapter Four, try
to explain the conditions in which the media initiatives take place. Chapter Six discusses
a range of similar media-related projects, based on the theoretical model presented in
Chapter Two. Chapter Seven focuses on the project Videoletters which is a so-called
‘type five initiative’, according the Ross Howard’s classification criteria. Chapter Eight
will interweave the preceding chapters while using the theory by presenting the
conclusions of the research.
4
The Balkans: Glossary
With the danger of making things even more complicated than they are, this small
glossary is presented to try and clear the fog that covers the ethnic composition of the
Balkans. The terms that are used most in this thesis are explained, all percentage are
based on information of the CIA world Fact book.
Belgrade Capital of Serbia.
BiH Short name for Bosna I Herzegovina, the Bosnian name for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Internationally used in reports.
Bosnia and Herzegovina This name covers the whole country; as well the
Bosnian Serb part as the Federal part of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks.
Mostly the name of the country is abbreviated as Bosnia, meaning the same.
Bosniak. Other name for Bosnian Muslim
Bosnian. An inhabitant of Bosnia and Herzegovina, either of Croat, Serbian of
Muslim distinct. Owner of a Bosnian passport.
Bosnian Serb. A Bosnian of Serbian distinct (37, 1% of population). Often the
orthodox Christian religion is followed.
Bosnian Croat. A Bosnian from Croatian distinct (14, 3% of the population).
Often the Catholic religion is followed.
Bosnian Muslim. A Bosnian who follows the Islamic religion (48% of the
population).
Croat. Inhabitant of Croatia, owner of a Croatian passport.
Croatia. Former Yugoslavian Country located left from Bosnia. Predominantly
inhabited by Croats (89.6%), Serbs (4, 5%).
Federation. The part of Bosnia (51% of territory) which is governed and
predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims.
Kosovo. Rebellious province of Serbia, governed by United Nations since the
ethnic conflict between Serbians and Albanians broke out in 1999.
Macedonia. Formally called the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.
Located under Montenegro. Inhabited by predominantly Macedonians (64,
2%) and Albanians 25, 2%)4
Montenegro. Newest country in Europe (separation of Serbia in June 2006).
Located under Bosnia, inhabited by Montenegrins (43%) and Serbians
(32%).
Republika Srpska (RS). The part of Bosnia (49% of territory) which is governed
and predominantly inhabited by the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian
4
Based on the country-index information of the CIA Fact book.
5
Muslims.
Sarajevo. Capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Srebrenica. Small town in North East Bosnia where biggest genocide after World
War II took place in 1995. Approximately 8000 Muslim men were killed.
Serbia. Country located right from Bosnia. Inhabited predominantly by Serbians.
Serbian. Also named Serb. Inhabitant of Serbia, owner of a Serbian passport.
6
2 Theoretical Framework
Introduction
Every now and then, violent conflicts pass the television screens or appear in the
headlines of newspapers. Often this kind of news is only ‘news’ for a day or two, before
some other conflict arises and the media -circus moves to that new area. However, the
worst atrocities may have been diminished, but this does not mean the threat for the
human lives has faded. Peace negotiations and outside interference are hardly ever based
on morality; it often concerns strategic interests of the interferer. After the official ceasefire and peace negotiations, efforts focused on peacebuilding and reconciliation are
carried out. These efforts are interesting for social research.
These peacebuilding
activities have not been discussed extensively in literature, and only few studies have
been carried out regarding its origins, need and reach. One facet of peacebuilding is
reconciliation. Whereas peace making efforts are rather based on strategic grounds than
on, reconciliation activities should have a moral imperative. Describing the contents of
reconciliation will be the core of this theoretical framework, with a special focus on the
role the media plays within the process of reconciliation. This theoretical framework will
start from the basis (the general level) of contemporary conflicts, and develop to the
specific subject of reconciliation and media.
2.1 Contemporary conflict
The connection between conflicts and the development of a country can be made by
pointing at the fact that a country wrapped in armed conflicts cannot develop itself The
absence of violence is usually a precondition for a country to receive structural
development aid. This requires a relative status of peace, which is not easily
accomplished as many societies nowadays experience conflicts. The events of the 11th of
September 2001 have triggered a new wave of conflicts. Who does not remember the
words of the American president George Bush when he asked the world for help after the
attacks on the World Trade Centre? Bush stated that ‘who is not with us, is against us’.
With these words he introduced a new kind of conflict in the world; he opened the war on
terrorism. Now other nation-states were able to justify the conflicts in their territories and
as a result people now speak of a ‘new world order’ after this magical date.
It is estimated that in 2005, eighteen countries were involved in major armed
conflicts. In total 31 countries were in serious risk of conflict management failure for at
least the next few years. These countries are considered to be at the greatest risk of
neglecting or mismanaging emerging societal crises, meaning that these conflicts may
escalate to serious violence and/or governmental instability. In addition to these 31
countries running potential risk, 51 other countries have a mix of positive and negative
factors. The countries are ranked on the basis of nine indicators; peacebuilding capacity,
armed conflict, human security, self-determination, discrimination, regime type,
durability, societal capacity and neighbourhood (Gurr and Marshall 2005: 10).
7
Several trends can be found in the nature of conflicts, trends that are caused by a
changing world. The most remarkable shift in the nature of conflicts is that the number of
conflicts decreased during the post-Cold War era. Besides, most wars after the fall of the
Berlin Wall can be characterized as mainly intra state conflicts instead of interstate
conflicts. Whereas before raising the iron curtain, conflicts in the world took place
between nation-states, most of them nowadays happen within a country (Lederach,
1996:4). These types of conflicts often have an ethnic character, which will be discussed
in the next section.
Another characteristic of contemporary conflict is that it mainly takes place in
developing countries (Lederach, 1996:6). Armed conflicts were widely spread throughout
the global system in the 1980s and 1990s but since the early years of the 21st century
wars are mainly concentrated in Africa and south central Asia. Related to this
geographical setting of armed conflicts it can be stated that conflicts mainly take place in
Muslim countries, and again mainly in Africa and central Asia (Gurr and Marshall 2005:
13). These shifts in the nature of conflicts cause an emerging number of parties
concerned in the conflict which makes it harder to explain and understand the conflicts.
For example the conflict in Somalia in 1991 counted twelve warring factions, and at least
ten different parties are involved in Liberia’s civil war (Hieber 2001: 9).
Although the nature of conflicts may change, the number of civil casualties
because of war does not decrease (Lederach 1997: 6). In the literature and documents on
conflict and related topics, three categories of armed conflict are used, according to the
model the researchers Wallensteen and Axell developed. At first there is minor armed
conflict, defined as a conflict between armed forces in which fewer than twenty five
people died in a given year, and of which at least one of the parties was a state. The next
category is Intermediate armed conflict, a situation in which at least one thousand deaths
occurred during the course of the conflict, with at least twenty-five deaths occurring in a
particular year. And finally, one speaks about a war when at least one thousands deaths
occurred in a given year (Wallensteen and Axell, in Lederach 1997:4).
In addition to this classification of armed conflicts other possible distinctions can
be made. For example in the background of conflicts: who are the fighting parties and
what are they fighting for. Since especially ethnic conflicts have risen during the latest
two decades, the following section will shed some light on the debates about this kind of
conflict.
Ethnic conflict
According to the scholar Ignatieff, four different conflict stages successively determine
an ethnic war. Firstly, the state collapses, because of a changing regime, or economic
crises, or other reasons. This collapse is followed by collective fear of the inhabitants of
the state. Then there is nationalistic paranoia in which especially propaganda plays a role
in encouraging the frightened population in safeguarding their national interests,
enlarging the ethnical differences. In this phase the population is also mobilized to start a
war; weapons are taken up. The final phase is the actual ethnic war. Nationalism plays a
big role in this process, being the reaction of the population to the collapse of the state;
8
people tend to be nationalists when they have fear, fear that is caused by not being able to
rely on the state anymore (Ignatieff 1998: 57).
These four steps towards ethnic conflict are typical for what happened at the
Balkans and especially Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early nineties of the twentieth
century. Still it may be awkward to use the term ‘ethnic conflict’, relating to Bosnia, as
there are no ethnic differences between the different groups living in the country. What
makes a conflict ‘ethnic’ and what does the term ethnicity actually mean? Eriksen states
that ethnicity is an aspect of a relationship, but not a cultural property of a group. When a
group is on its own, when it is isolated, one can hardly speak of ethnicity since it is only
used in relationship to other groups. It is not about commonalities but about differences
(Eriksen1993: 36). For example culturally a highly relevant ethnic difference between the
Serbs and the Croats in Bosnia seems to exist, whereas they are from the same Slavic
tribe and as a result have the same appearances. They speak the same language, although
the written language is different (Croats use Latin script, Serbs use Cyrillic script). Yet,
there must be something that divides them enough to commit war crimes on their
neighbours. The only difference that outsiders can think of is religion (Croats are
predominantly Catholics, Serbians are predominantly orthodox Christian). But then
again, the Bosnians can not be described as religious (Eriksen 1993: 39). Besides, the
Balkan wars have never been defined as being religious conflicts, but as ethnic conflicts.
A temporary conclusion can be that it is anthropologically incorrect to speak about
Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks as ethnic groups, but since it is common practice in the
literature, referring to the Balkan wars, the same will count for this thesis, bearing the
anthropological argument in mind.
2.2 Conflict resolution
Like Ignatieff stated that within ethnic conflict different stages exist, the same counts for
conflict resolution. The former secretary General of the United Nations (UN), Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, who fulfilled this role also during the Bosnian war, distinguishes in his
‘Agenda for peace’ of 1992 three phases of conflict during which the international
community can intervene.
Firstly there is peacekeeping, which, according to Boutros-Ghali, can
appropriately be called the invention of the United Nations (UN 2005). When a conflict is
still going on, UN-troops are stationed in the countries involved, aiming at conflict
control. This demands a United Nations presence in the field with the consent of the
parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the
control of conflicts. Furthermore they try to realise the peace treaty and to protect the
delivery of humanitarian aid. Since 1948, when the UN were established, the
peacekeeping efforts of the UN have brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of
tension around the world, as sixty peacekeeping operations have taken place all over the
world. Currently, there are eighteen peace keeping operations going on (UN 2005).
The second form of intervention by the international community is peace making.
As the word implies this is about ending the conflict, mediating in the peace negotiations,
but also about military activities contributing to peacemaking like assistance of security.
Unlike peacekeeping, this is not a primary task of the UN. Peace making may also be a
9
task for member-states: the Americans led the Dayton peace agreements that formally
ended the Bosnian war.
Peacebuilding
The third type of conflict resolution that Boutros-Ghali distinguishes in his agenda for
peace is peacebuilding. When a conflict has officially been ended, there is no armed
conflict anymore but this does not mean that the war is over at each front. Nationalistic
feelings which are often the basis of ethnic conflict do not disappear when the peace
agreement has been signed by all warring parties. It takes more than a signature of the
fighting leaders to establish sustainable peace. The UN glossary says that peacebuilding
takes place in the aftermath of conflict, meaning:
Identifying and supporting measures and structures which will solidify peace and
build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict; it often involves elections organized, supervised or conducted by the United
Nations, the rebuilding of civil physical infrastructures and institutions such as
schools and hospitals, and economic reconstruction
UN, 2005
This definition of peacebuilding mentions only UN activities, but peacebuilding can be
practiced by a big number of NGOs, individuals, and governments. This may make it
interesting as a concept but also more difficult to approach. The reconstruction of a postwar society contains different elements; economic rehabilitation, infrastructural
rebuilding of houses as well as other buildings. But there is another aspect that does not
always get the attention it should get: social rehabilitation of the country. Especially
when an ethnic conflict has taken place it is crucial to work on the relations between the
different people in the society; the roots of the conflict should be dealt with to try and
make sure the conflict really ends. This is why the UN- definition of peacebuilding can
be complemented by the one of the scholar Lederach:
Peacebuilding is understood as a comprehensive concept that encompasses,
generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches and stages needed in
transforming conflict towards more sustainable, peaceful relationships.
Lederach 1997
At least three elements in this definition are important to focus on. At first the word
‘sustainable’; peacebuilding is something that may take years; a peaceful society means
sustainable peace. Secondly the word ‘relationships’, which is the basis of a good society;
good relationships promote human security in a society, which is needed if sustainable
peace is to be established. The third term in this definition is ‘process’; peacebuilding is a
process that encompasses several levels in society. The society needs to change, to
improve in order to prevent new conflicts; so peacebuilding activities need to take place
in the whole society.
Particularly the last element is a focus of Lederach; therefore he has divided the
society into three levels at which peacebuilding activities may take place. Before
10
presenting the model, two remarks have to be made. Firstly this is not a formula for
peace; of course it does not work like that because every conflict has its own features. If
human relationships are the core of peacebuilding it is logical that there is no guarantee
for peace because every human relationship is different. Secondly, Lederach thinks that
peace should come through bottom up approach instead of top-down. It is often been
thought that the conflict ends with signing a peace agreement. After the Cold War period
the standard for ending a conflict has become negotiation. The fighting groups all have to
make some sacrifices in order to make the peace agreement work. In the end this leaves
them all with an unsatisfied feeling; nobody wins and the whole conflict has been in vain
(Licklider 2001). A peace agreement is therefore always a second choice and an enforced
peace does not mean a sustainable peace. Also at other levels of society there should be
activities focused on peace.
The levels that Lederach distinguishes and at which peacebuilding activities
should take place are the following. Level one is the ‘top-leadership’ level. It comprises
the key military and political leaders in the conflict. Resulting from their function, they
have more power and influence than ‘common’ civilians and their visibility is high; it is
clear to the population and the world who they are and what they do. Their task in the
peacebuilding process consists of high-level negotiations and emphasizing ceasefires.
The border between activities of these ‘top-leaders’ and activities that come under the
definition of peacemaking has been presented before, and this level of peacebuilding is
quite vague. But because peacemaking is not primarily executed by one institution, it is
logical that an overlap should exist between the two.
The second level is called the ‘middle-range leadership’ level. This is the field
where ethnic/religious leaders, academics, intellectuals and humanitarian leaders work on
peacebuilding. These are leaders that are less visible to the outside world than the leaders
on top-level but they may be more respected leaders in the eyes of the population in the
post-conflict society. They have earned this respect by e.g. their profession or by being
the leader of one of the ethnic groups in society. They have contact with the top-level of
society as well as with the grassroots level and are therefore good mediators.
Peacebuilding activities at this level are e.g. problem solving workshops or conflict
resolution trainings.
The third level is the grassroots leadership; this is the basis of society. The people
who are involved in leadership at this level are people who are involved in local
communities, members of indigenous NGOs, health officials and refugee camp leaders.
The characteristics of this group of people are that there are many of them (the model
should be seen as a pyramid; on top-level there are few people, on grassroots level there
are numerous) and that conflict resolution is not directly the first problem they face. In a
post-conflict society there are many things to be done, e.g. in economical or
infrastructural areas, so peacebuilding activities like workshops and talking about what
happened may not exactly be what they need. Still many interesting initiatives have come
from this level, and the importance of the grassroots leaders should certainly not be
underestimated (Lederach 1997: 51).
So peacebuilding is a broad concept concerning different levels of people and
society and every level needs different approaches. Whereas the UN glossary relates to
physical rehabilitation of a society after conflict, according to Lederach, relations are
11
central to peacebuilding. These relations can either be found among political leaders, and
between political leaders and civilians; actually among all people in society. I believe that
peacebuilding is more than that. It also requires a good infrastructure -whether in a
physical sense like restoring houses and roads, or in an economical or political sense-. If
this infrastructure is not present, the peacebuilding activities will not succeed because
they have no soil to grow on. Therefore a combination of the UN definition and the
definition of Lederach would be perfect. However, the subject of this thesis relates in
particular to reconciliation. Lederach put restoring damaged relationships central when he
relates to peacebuilding. This is why the scholar Lederach will be used as a basis for
research. But factors that influence the peacebuilding process, like the preconditions for a
good infrastructure, will not be neglected.
So far only the people who execute peacebuilding activities have been discussed,
but of course there is a whole group of people that should be included in the pyramid of
Lederach as well; the civilians themselves. Despite all the efforts on top, middle-range or
grassroots levels of official agencies or civil society structures, the assistance of the
population themselves is the most important. This group will be discussed more
intensively in the section about ‘reconciliation’. Because whereas peacebuilding is often
initiated by ‘outsiders’5, reconciliation is something the population need to do
themselves. In addition to this approach of Lederach focusing mainly on the different
levels of society, there are other scholars who have discussed the subject. For example
Loretta Hieber, who emphasizes the fact that peacebuilding programmes are designed to
help change attitudes at a communal level. She argues that ‘if attitudes between ethnic
groups are part of the problem, then they must be part of the solution’ (Hieber 2001: 9)
Multi track diplomacy
Besides the three levels of peacebuilding activities that JP Lederach discussed, another
classification is maintained; the multi-track diplomacy. This diplomacy divides the
peacebuilding activities into nine different ways to approach the population.
At the basis of this theory are three principles. The first principle concerns the
fact that peacebuilding on grassroots level will not directly prevent a new conflict. It is
essential that this should not be forgotten; post-conflict societies are not strong societies
but dangerous, weak ones where new conflicts are bound to take place if situations are
not dealt with carefully. In the social part of the peacebuilding process, the basis is that
dominant perspectives of the population need to be altered; people need to change
attitudes towards each other to be able to live together in the same village or country. But
this process may take years; generations will pass before ideas or feelings in the society
change. This is why the multi track approach focuses at the same time on different levels
of society. The second assumption of the theorists that developed the multi track
approach is that the international community only intervenes in a ‘real’ conflict. Within
many internal conflicts they do not interfere because it is not beneficial for them. The
only reason why they would interfere is because of empathy or maybe fears of spill over
5
The ‘outsiders’ can be anyone who initiates a peacebuilding projects; official agencies, NGOs, local leaders,
etc.
12
effects which may eventually cause strategic problems to them. In the vacuum that arises,
there is room for NGOs to work in and try to build peace. The third principle concerns the
concept that a conflict has many sides, many parties, many interests and therefore needs
to be treated at all these fronts. An extended approach is needed; multi-track diplomacy
can be a way of dealing with peacebuilding.
The idea of working with different ‘tracks’ within conflict resolution has been
introduced by Joseph Montville and elaborated by Louise Diamond and John mc Donald.
The idea originates from the thought that the official, governmental ways that lead to
conflict resolution, and unofficial ways to reach conflict resolution, should be separated.
Montville stated that especially the second type of approaches, also denoted as ‘citizen
diplomacy’ (or track two diplomacy), focus on social peacebuilding because they do not
focus on a governmental level (Ackermann 1994). This does not mean though that
peacebuilding efforts at government level are not needed. The relations among citizens
are central within the track two approaches. When we take the fictitious pyramid of
peacebuilding activities as depicted by Lederach, the comment can be made that the gap
between the first and the second level may be too wide. Leaders should know what
civilians want and likewise, civilians should know what leaders are doing at their ‘higher
level’. Track two diplomacy is closer to the citizen than the track one diplomacy
activities. Besides, within track two activities, relationships are put central. The
improvement of relations between people can serve a higher purpose; peace. (Ackermann
1994)
The model of the Institute of Multi Track Diplomacy (IMTD) that Diamond is
related to consists of nine categories, also denoted as ‘tracks’. The first track is official
conflict resolution, comparable to peace making; practised by governments. The
unofficial conflict resolution approaches can be divided into eight categories. The second
track focuses on professional conflict resolution, e.g. professionals of the UN, negotiators
on behalf of NGOs. In brief: people who are suitable for these jobs like policy-oriented,
well-educated civilians. Track three relates to the business sector, dealing with the
contribution the private business sector can make to the peacebuilding process. The next
track is about the civilians themselves, whether it is about scientific or cultural exchange,
and whether it is about students, or movies. It is a broad, expanded field where
individuals can meet each other. An example of activities in this track is international
work camps where people from different countries and backgrounds can meet each other.
The last track is about activities concerning the media, or ‘peacemaking through
communication’. Track nine is designed to bring large groups of the population in contact
with the ideas, philosophy, habits, and the culture of the party they are in conflict with
(IMTD 2006). This track can also be related to the model of Ross Howard, a scholar
whose ideas will be discussed in section on ‘media and peacebuilding’.
2.3 Reconciliation as a concept
The origins of reconciliation come from psychology, sociology and criminology, but in
essence it is a biblical term. So far the concept of reconciliation has only shortly been
mentioned, either in relation to peacebuilding, or in relation to multi-track approaches. I
have denoted reconciliation to be the ‘social part of peacebuilding’. But to examine the
13
concept more extensively I need the help of experts on this matter. First we need a
definition of reconciliation, which will be given by the scholar Bar-Tal. He, among other
scholars (Ackermann, Longchari) argues that whereas for different conflict resolution
phases as distinguished by Boutros Ghali, a conceptual and theoretical framework exists,
this for reconciliation usually lacks. The definition of reconciliation Bar-Tal adheres to is
the following:
Reconciliation in the psychological framework refers to a societal-cultural process
that encompasses the majority of society members, who form new beliefs about the
former adversaries, about their own society, and about the relationship between the
conflicting groups.
Bar-Tal 2000
Bar-Tal focuses on psychology and on the relationships between people and conflicting
groups. He discusses altering beliefs in the society among former adversaries and within
the society itself. He puts this ‘mind-change’- first, when relating to reconciliation. While
doing so, he touches on an important subject but does not give tools how to change those
minds. Nor does he provide information of where this change should be started. Another
scholar, Lederach, gives more suggestions of how to tackle reconciliation in a war-torn
society, and prepares for research-use. While doing so, he links the concept of
reconciliation to civil society. The definition of reconciliation he gives is:
Reconciliation involves the creation of the social space where both truth and
forgiveness are validated and joined together, rather than being forced into an
encounter in which one must win out of the other or envisioned as fragmented ad
separated parts.
Lederach 1997: 29
In this definition, two elements are focused on; truth and forgiveness. These are two of
the four elements that Lederach considers to be the core of reconciliation. The other two
are justice and peace. The four elements will be discussed more extensively later on in
this theoretical framework. For now it is important to recognize the link with the civil
society as Lederach sees it. According to him, civil society is a web of human
relationships, their networks, organizations and institutions in which social and
communal life is built. This is also shown when he discusses peacebuilding; he is an
advocate of dividing society into three levels on which peacebuilding activities should
take place. In his vision these activities mainly have a social character because they
intend to improve relationships among people. However, from the detached point of
departure that we discussed in the ‘peacebuilding section’6, this time the target group of
the activities is put first, and the things they have to do are included in the reconciliation
process.
Two other scholars who worked on this concept are Gardner Feldman and Smith.
They see reconciliation as a political concept and recognize six ‘ingredients’ of which the
6
Meaning that only the execution of the activities focused on peacebuilding of the society have been
discussed, and not the reception of these efforts among the population.
14
concept is composed: inequality, trust, acceptation of cultural and political differences,
partnerships, active friendships and common interests (Ackermann, 1994). The two
scholars agree that these six ingredients altogether form the basis of a good reconciliation
process. All scholars agree upon the fact that reconciliation is a process, but the scholar
Longchari e.g. claims the six ingredients of Ackermann and Gardner Feldman not to be
sufficient. In stead h he puts more emphasis on time, and on the importance of including
reconciliation in the peace process. This is something that Lederach focuses on as well.
He argues that in traditional conflicts, resolution, especially ‘International Relations’
(also denoted as peace making) plays a big role. He sketches a metaphor of International
Relations as a big strong brother of Reconciliation which is the softer younger sister.
However, he argues, it is about time that this ‘Younger Sister’ grows up and that a shift in
paradigm is made (Lederach 1997: 24). Longchari agrees; there is no future without
reconciliation; there is no society in the world that does not suffer from wounds from the
past. Time does not heal wounds according to Longchari; an active approach is needed to
enlighten the pain. This is why he advocates reconciliation to be a part of the peace
process, and when this is not the case, he says, new conflicts will arise again and again
(Longchari 2002). Former fighting parties should face each other because only in that
case the real reconciliation process can start. How they can do that, is discussed on the
basis of Lederach’s analysis of the concept which will be discussed shortly hereafter.
Before doing that though, some preconditions for a successful course of the reconciliation
as defined by the different scholars will be discussed.
Preconditions for reconciliation
A distinction in approach of the reconciliation concept should be made, on the basis of
the type of conflict that has taken place. When it concerns interstate conflicts, a different
approach to reconciliation is desired than with intra-state conflict. It is clear though that
the establishment of peaceful relations between the opposing parties depends on a
successful reconciliation process, which in turn requires a change of the conflictive ethos
and formation of the alternative peace ethos (Bar-Tal 2000: 352). Particularly when it
concerns complex conflicts, with a long history and much violence, a condition that
should be realised is a psychological infrastructure, which consists of elements like
devotion to society and country, instead of devotion to the ethnic group or nationality.
Other important preconditions are a high motivation to contribute to the process,
readiness for personal sacrifice, unity, solidarity, courage, and maintenance of the
society’s objectives (Bar-Tal 2000).
Another precondition for a successful course of the reconciliation process, as
discussed in the literature, is that the focus of peace building activities should be on
common grounds and interests, instead of the differences. Particularly when it concerns
political interests or economic growth, higher goals than the basic nationalistic ones need
to be established. When the outcomes of the conflict resolution is that the adversary
groups must continue to live in one political system, as is the case in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, common grounds need to be emphasized. An example of a higher goal that
can be focused on for Bosnia is participation of the country as a member state of
internationally related unions or confederations like the European Union or the NATO.
15
But as long as the country is divided, it can not participate as a member state. When the
population is aware of this, and realises that participation is of crucial importance for the
future of their society, it may motivate them to cooperate and thus reconcile. Interests for
Bosnia as a country should play a bigger role than ethnic interests. However, to establish
a successful cooperation among the three groups, mutual trust is essential at all levels in
society. This will be discussed in the next section as well.
The mentioned preconditions are focused on the population, at grassroots level.
At this level relations should improve, this improvement can not be imposed upon from
top-level of society. Arguments of this theoretical framework take this level as a starting
point; it exerts a bottom-up approach with much power for the population to change the
society. But the state should provide certain conditions for the reconciliation process to
start and develop, e.g. the establishments of certain institutions like a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. The state can constitute laws and regulations to protect the
citizens from ethnical harassment. However, some factors influence the society and the
will of the population; these are of a military, political and especially economic character.
If these conditions are not fulfilled, the desire of the population to reconcile is not
likely to be very strong (Bar-Tal 2000: 354). This is confirmed by the fact that the
literature mentions debates on the matter of whether economics or reconciliation is of
more importance for a post-war society.
Implementation of reconciliation: four elements
So far we have found that reconciliation deals with an altering view towards society and
its members. Besides, whereas peace building in general relates to activities carried out
by officials or NGOs, when reconciliation is concerned, the population itself ‘does it’.
This requires a different approach, in which the ideas of Lederach can be used as a guide.
According to Lederach, reconciliation is a dynamic process focused on restoring
the damaged relationship between people. It is neither about political structures that need
to be restored, nor about returning to a former situation, but in the first and foremost
place about building relationships (Lederach 1997: 26). These deal with real-life persons
in real-life situations who need to find a way to live together. Restoring a relationship
takes time and according to Lederach, four elements need to be focused at: truth, mercy,
justice and peace. These elements cannot be discussed or researched separately; they
belong together. The framework that Lederach provides is indeed a framework and the
separate elements are connected. Because of the activeness of the elements, and
particularly the fact that they interrelate, Lederach prefers to call them ‘energies’.
However, within this research I prefer to just call them elements. I do agree upon the fact
that the elements interrelate, and all need to be focused on, but I prefer to call them
elements instead of energies to distance myself from the possible esoteric value of using
the word ‘energy’. The four elements will be discussed one at the time starting of with
‘truth’.
16
Truth
The first element is Truth. This element stems from a ‘driven force by human’ to know
what happened during the armed conflict. Not only on a personal level -finding out what
happened to your beloved ones- but also on a national level; for example who started the
conflict, who committed war crimes, where are certain mass graves to be found. The
victims want to expose things that have been kept secret for a long period of time and
they want to confront the perpetrators with realities from the past. It is not so much about
judicial or legal matters, but rather about the mere fact that everyone wants to know what
really happened in order to go on with their lives. Truth puts an end to ‘wondering why’,
people need to know what happened and why. The way in which the truth can become
transparent is for people to discuss the past.
For example: in Bosnia and Herzegovina the events in Srebrenica and in
particular the fall of this ‘safe area’ and the involvement of the Dutch soldiers7 have been
investigated. The findings of this investigation evoked a storm of attention, and not
everyone was satisfied with the outcome. Women who had lost their fathers, husbands
and/or sons found it difficult to deal with the conclusions. Real termination can only take
place after the beloved ones have been buried; but as long as the remains of the victims
have not been found it is difficult to live with the past and go on. Within ethnical
conflicts it is hard to say which group consists of victims and who the perpetrators are.
Using terms like ‘good guys and bad guys’ is dangerous, although it is easily done. This
may cause whole groups to be punished and ethnic relations may become tense. So it is
important to bear in mind that one should speak of individuals instead of groups; the
work has to be done on micro-level. Different parties need to know each other’s version
of the story, and if necessary, to acknowledge they have not always been right.
Only realities can be found in stead of one version of the truth, and
acknowledgements of these facts by the different groups. Besides, it is more important
for people to talk about the truth than to define one truth, which is impossible in the first
place. The incidents of war should be discussed; either for a personal cause; talking about
war-related events may help reducing the trauma, or for a national cause; according to
Lederach it is important that the war-past is discussed publicly. This includes that
committed war crimes need to be recognized by all parties involved.
Truth is not a passive or static individual experience, and this is why it can not be
bureaucratized. It is about acknowledging in a group that one has made mistakes, and by
doing so, the other party, the victims, are not only seen as objects, but also as a group that
has been hurt. This acknowledgement is linked to admission and should happen publicly
according to Lederach. It is difficult to create a space where different parties admit they
are guilty and mutual acknowledgment of the hurt that has been done can be shared. This
is why ‘truth’ is more than facts; it is only a first step (Lederach 1997: 30).
7
This research was executed by the NIOD (Dutch institute for war documentation) and its appearance was
responsible for the fall of the Dutch Parliament in 2002.
17
Mercy
The second element is mercy. A more active approach is demanded here to find the kind
of social space where things can be said out loud. Additionally, a way has to be found to
integrate the local geography with the perpetrator. This energy is more practical in a way
than the first one because it requires confrontation with the crime-scene, or with the place
where victim and perpetrator lived before the conflict. In the first element the past played
the most important role, whereas now that is the future. The task that ‘mercy’ has as an
element of reconciliation is to discover the deeper impact of personal and social change.
In practice this means that apologies of perpetrators have to be accepted by the victims.
This can take place either on a personal- or a national level. Still, it is an individual act
for which no guidelines can be designed.
Justice
The next element that Lederach distinguishes is Justice. This is an important part of the
reconciliation process, because it converts the element ‘truth’ into a practical approach.
Therefore it would be technically wrong to put Justice on the third place like Lederach
does. After people have discussed and confessed war crimes publicly, depending on the
scale of the crimes, they should be brought to justice. After this, victims may be prepared
to forgive, to show mercy. This may also mean that truth and justice are interwoven
because it is through justice that the truth about the past can be publicly disclosed.
Lederach identifies three principles that should cohere with the ‘element’ of justice. The
first one is attribution: those responsible should take responsibility for their deeds. In
other words, this attribution is the continuation of the ‘driven force by human to know the
truth’, according to the scholar. The second principle behind justice as an element of
reconciliation is compensation. This includes compensation for the incidents that
happened to the victims meaning that not only responsibility should be taken but also
paying off debts. The third principle relates to honesty and equality. Often ethnical
conflict is deeply rooted, for example because of the never-ending inequality fight. A
justice-gap is made if, for example, the shooting is over, but not everyone has access to
the same sources (Lederach 1997).
Justice can be perceived in several ways. It can either take place on a personal
level; this would mean that the victim determines what justice is to him or her. However,
this may imply that people take the law in their own hands and even worse atrocities may
then be committed. Legal justice seems to be a more appropriate way to deal with war
criminals, but it is questionable whether people in war-torn societies will agree. In some
post-conflict countries, war crimes tribunals have been established, either by the country
itself, or by the International Community. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
sought-after war criminals are charged by the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia. Criticism on this kind of tribunals often consists of the fact
that these tribunals are often located far from the criminal’s home country. This means
the population involved feels distant towards the tribunal, which again means that they do
not feel that this kind of justice meets their demands. Other criticism relates to the long
time the lawsuits take and the low punishments the suspects get.
18
Peace-Safety
The fourth element of Lederach is Peace; this is the field where people can be together
and work on peace. The precondition for peace is the absence of violence, as well as
feelings of security of the people living in a certain area. This is why I prefer to call this
element safety, which makes it easier to discuss with the respondents. This safety can be
regarded as an important element for reconciliation as a whole, also because many factors
can influence this element. Safety for a citizen relates among other things to politics;
whether people feel safe and have faith in the government, it relates to the economy; e.g
do people feel financially secure enough to stay in the country?, and it relates to physical
safety. The physical safety can either relate to the physical scars of the war; landmines
and weaponry that still circulate in post-conflict societies. Or it relates to people of other
nationalistic groups, who may be regarded as a physical danger to certain citizens because
the conflict took place between different ethnic groups in essence (Lederach 1997)
These four elements together make the reconciliation process work, according to
Lederach. The four elements seem contradictory because truth relates to the past, mercy
relates to the future, justice to practical business and safety goes back and forth in
between them.
. However, they are all important to reconciliation, although the one
element is more important than the other. In a practical sense, Lederach means that three
social processes need to take place. Firstly the question appeared how we can create
processes where the ones who have been harmed in the past can bear responsibility in
such a way that it satisfies the victim. It will not always be possible, so Lederach says,
but eventually the victim has to have peace of mind about all that has happened. The next
dilemma relates to how ‘spaces’ can be created in society where perpetrators can
assimilate with society again. This differs from society to society; in some African
societies the traditional justice systems make perpetrators assimilate in society again. The
third challenge is how to decrease the use of violence as a tool to achieve certain goals
and at the same time enhance honesty and equality (Lederach, 1997: 30).
These four elements can be used while carrying out a research into reconciliation because
they are systematically ranked. However, the glue that keeps the four elements together is
another ‘element’: Trust. This is something that Lederach does not elaborately discuss in
his theory. It is extremely important though, that Trust is present because in a society
without trust there cannot be truth, justice, mercy or safety. A second point of criticism
relates to the order that Lederach has put the four elements in. For this research this order
has been altered because in my view Justice is a logical consequence of truth; these two
elements have a stronger link than the others.
2.4 Media and peacebuilding
The media is a double edged sword; it can be a frightful weapon of violence when it
propagates messages of intolerance or disinformation that manipulate public
sentiment. However, it can also be an instrument of conflict resolution, when the
19
information it presents is reliable, respects human rights, and represents diverse
views. This is the media that reduces conflict and fosters human security’.
Howard 2003:22
This section will show different views on the concept of using media as conflict
intervention. But before we do so, the term ‘media’ has to be defined.
Speaking of the influence of the media may be too ambitious and may be wrong
as media consist of different elements. As Howard defines it: ‘Media refers to the several
mediums or channels used in an organised fashion to communicate to groups of people’.
Media relates in the first place to news; especially in a post-conflict phase it is extremely
important that the news reporting is objective and impartial. When it concerns peace
building however, media also relates to entertainment, for example through soap operas,
sitcoms, theatre and comic books (Howard, 2003:23).
Media is a generic name for several kinds of medium. In crisis situations which
are logical consequences of a conflict situation, radio reaches more people than other
mediums. Although other types of media, such as television and newspapers, also have
the potential to contribute to peace-building efforts, but it is radio that has been mostly
used’ (Ribeiro, 2004). Radio does not necessarily need electricity and is relatively cheap
which makes it an ideal medium for promoting social change. Besides, it is easy to get
access to the radio: one does not have to be able to read like you do with newspapers.
Especially in rather undeveloped countries the number of illiterate people can be quite
high. In these cases radio can play a big role in providing people with information. It is
estimated that in war-torn societies like Afghanistan and Somalia, 60 % of the population
listens to radio on a regular basis (Hieber 2001: 50).
Throughout the years television has become an important medium and
consequently an interesting way of spreading information. It has been estimated that from
1970 to 1997, television ownership in the developing world increased from 17 to 172 per
1000 households. Although television is not as accessible as radio is in developing
countries, it is supplementing radio in most urban areas (Hieber 2001: 58).
The use of the Internet has become widely spread over the last decade, but the
number of people that have access to it is not that high yet. In countries with an
authoritarian regime, Internet can give a voice to the suppressed people, connecting them
with the rest of the world. Furthermore Internet can be used as a search engine; lost
contacts can be found and restored which makes Internet an accessible tool to reach many
people. Still, of the 360 million people online in the world, 70% are in North America
and Europe, an area inhabited by only 10 % of the total world population (Hieber
2001:61). So Internet can be an interesting field for peace building, but more people need
to get access; and as a stand-alone medium it is not strong enough yet.
Print media is the least attractive medium for peacemaking and peacekeeping
activities. It reaches fewer people than radio, television and internet do. Conflicts often
take place in developing countries (Lederach 1997); with low literacy level so only few
people are able to read the print media. Besides, in overt conflicts it is difficult to
distribute newspapers and magazines. However, when it concerns peace building
activities, print media becomes more interesting because the distribution problem is
smaller and people long for information (Hieber 1998).
20
It should be noted that before media initiatives can be carried out, some requirements
need to be met. In a society where the media infrastructure encounters many problems, it
is more difficult for an NGO to execute his activities. Howard points out that;
It is increasingly clear that journalism development in the absence of a mediasupportive infrastructure can not function very well or likely very long. Media
development initiatives must take account of a larger approach to a state’s
democratization. A media-supportive infrastructure includes a system of legislation,
courts and tribunals that complement, defend and discipline a reliable news media.
Without this, there is no access-to-information legislation to enable a well-informed
journalism, no courts to protect journalists from intimidation and to address media
malfeasance such as libel and slander, and no independent regulators to fairly
allocate publishing and broadcasting rights. It requires a multi-sectoral approach to
enable the media to contribute to a society’s resolution of its conflict.
Howard 2003: 26
This quote shows that the media is not isolated within a society but linked with many
other factors. This can also justify why it does not always develop well for NGOs who
execute activities in this field.
Different views on Media and Peacebuilding
The relationship between the media and conflict has always been tense. Media has
experienced big changes in the 20th century; it developed from pictures of the frontlines
during WW I into live television reports from the Gulf war in the early nineties. This
increased quantity of information strongly influenced views and opinions at home about
wars being fought in far-away-countries. An example of a war in which media played an
important informative role is the Vietnam War. Citizens of the United States of America
saw their fellow citizens dying in Vietnam for a lost cause, which eventually led to the
end of this war.
Journalists in conflict areas have a special role, of which they should be well aware
according to the scholar Johan Galtung. Those journalists can either take the ‘low road or
the high road’ (Galtung 1998). When it concerns ‘low road journalism’, dominant in the
media, conflict is considered to be a battle, with a winning and a losing team, scoring
points in terms of human losses. As shortly mentioned above; media can be used as a
frightful weapon in war-times, and this can also be described as ‘low road journalism’.
‘High road journalism’ considers conflict to be a transformation phase with an
opportunity for human progress. Conflict then does not have the negative connotation as
in the ‘low road-perspective’. Galtung pleads for a different kind of reporters in conflict
situations; instead of war-reporters who usually have the upper hand, more peace
reporters should be cover the news.
According to Galtung, reporting about non-violent outcomes, empathy with all
parties and creativity is more likely to bring peace rather than the traditional warreporting which the world knows only too well. He attributes much power to the
journalists in the field by stating they can also determine the outcomes of the conflict. He
does acknowledge the fact that this kind of reporting would at the one hand not be as
21
spectacular as war reporting, and also that at the other hand peace journalism may have a
too moralistic approach. Galtung introduces formulas that may overcome these problems,
for example the idea that journalists should focus intensively on the peace plan. This kind
of reporting concerns the foreign journalists present in the conflict areas as well as those
at home.
Where Galtung takes a traditional view on the role of journalists in conflicts,
Hieber divides the ‘media intervention in conflict areas’ in two categories: a traditional
one and a more pro-active one. She argues that a combination of entertainment and
‘desire outcome’ programming is most effective for successful communication between
conflicting groups. This communication can have a negative or a positive character, the
positive character being the one Hieber intends to focus on. Within this ‘positive
journalism category’ she distinguishes two types. The first one is the traditional one. This
is the category that Galtung also indicates as a place where peace journalism has a
chance. However, where Galtung makes a clear distinction between peace journalists and
peace workers, Hieber prefers to consider the journalists to be intermediaries between
conflicting parties. By means of their way of reporting they should erase the differences
between the warring parties. This would give the journalists a more active role, but they
still are, first and foremost, journalists. The second category is more active. More than in
the first category the journalists in the conflict areas are interveners, and tend to be peace
workers. That ‘media intervention’ is still in its infancy and is mainly focused on
broadcast media. This is because in many parts of the world conflicts occur in countries
where illiteracy levels are high and newspapers expensive. Newspapers and television
stations are often the first casualties of war, leaving radio as the most effective means of
communication. However, it is often after active conflict has ended that media may be
most effective. During the period of reconciliation, media can help to empower groups
which previously had no say whatsoever. Therefore, Hieber argues that media has an
important role in rebuilding the society (Hieber 1998).
Operational framework for media-initiatives
Hieber uses practical examples of the NGOs Search for Common Grounds (SFCG) and
the Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) to explain her ideas. While
discussing the approach that NGOs can have in media-interventions, she refers to the
theory of Ross Howard. This scholar who is linked to the Canadian NGO IMPACS
developed the first operational framework for media’s involvement in peace. Through
various round table discussions, five ways have been devised in which the media can be
grouped.
This typology is in the first place about the constructive role the media can play
in the post-war society. Peace-building programmes are designed to help change attitudes,
particularly at the community level. In case of an ethnic conflict the attitudes of different
groups towards one another is quite mixed up. This is where media can help provide the
tools for these groups to reach non-violent solutions to their problems (Hieber, 2001: 9).
However, these activities are desirable in all phases of a conflict. The following table
offers a number of indicators that reflect the impacts of conflict on local media in a postconflict phase.
22
Table 2.1 Media impacts in post conflict phase
Warning Signs
Victory/defeat or presence of peacekeepers.
Resumed peace dialogue/negotiations.
Legal framework for free media.
Expanding civil society.
Examples of impacts on media
Possible proliferation and diversity of media
outlets. Underground opposition media
emerges.
Introduction of socially pro-active media.
Media focus on initiatives for potential
reconciliation.
Establishment of independent broadcast
regulations with reference to human rights.
Press councils resume.
Gradual resumption of human rights
monitoring, investigative reporting
Source: Howard, 2003: 28
The five typologies of media interventions as devised by Howard are able to overlap, and
exist primarily to establish a consistent language that can act as a base for future research
endeavours. The first type of intervention is also called rudimentary journalism training
and can be considered to be a conventional approach. It is focused on inadequate,
inaccurate and nationalistic media. In this approach the main activities are to train
journalists’ basic skills. These media have been overruled by the state during the conflict
and have dealt with, or are still dealing with propaganda or government regulation
(Howard 2002:11). A requirement for a successful peace building process is that people
have trust in their country (Lederach 1997). This trust can amongst others be created by
the media
Type two is also called responsible journalism development. Within these kinds
of activities, the focus is also on teaching local journalists, but they go beyond basic
skills. The intention of these kinds of interventions should be to ‘create a media that
serves society as a conflict resolution process and upholds democratic governance’.
Howard calls the third type of intervention ‘transitional journalistic
development’. An active approach is asked of the journalists, their job goes beyond the
journalistic task; now they are peace workers too. Their role changes from so-called
information facilitators into mediators. This type of journalism has also been called
‘peace journalism’ because of the dual nature of the work as journalists with conflict
resolution as one of their recognized values (Howard 2002: 11). This active approach that
is required of the journalists is disputed by other scholars on this subject; Galtung makes
a clear distinction between peace journalism and peace work; he states that the task of
peace journalism is serious, professional reporting, while the task of peace advocacy is
better left to peace workers. This also means he does not agree with the two other types
of media-intervention. Some criticism that relates to the previously mentioned argument,
comes from people who argue that journalists should above all, be objective; this being
the ‘sacred rule’ of journalism, and making them seem more than just journalists would
affect their objectivity. However, as it will turn out, objectivity and peace work do not
necessarily have to be contradicting.
23
The fourth and fifth type are the most relevant to peace building operations because they
focus on how the media can help bridge the gap between peacekeepers and the public.
The fourth type is called media-based-intervention and exists only for a highly selective
audience. They are often the product of foreign NGOs and other peacekeeping
organizations and tend to counteract negative messages and provide receivers of the
messages with information (Howard 2002:11). The fifth type Howard devises is called
‘intended outcome programming’. Like the name implies, these kinds of programs are
made to reach a certain goal. These interventions take place to realise real change. They
are completely different from conventional journalism and are focused on promoting
reconciliation, establishing a transformation of attitudes doctrine and de-intensifying
conflicts. The persons that execute the initiatives are considered to be peacebuilders
(Howard, 2003).
The five typologies can related to the division that Hieber makes as well. The
first category she distinguishes is traditional media intervention in conflict societies, the
type one and two activities can be put here. Type three interventions can be considered to
be transitional between traditional and pro-active approached; the type four and five
activities.
Obstacles in relation to the ‘five types of media-initiatives’.
Hieber acknowledges certain problems that organizations that work with media in conflict
areas have to overcome. The first obstacle concerns the way that inhabitants look upon
the interveners. The organizations have to establish a presence which is not perceived as
cultural imperialism. They have to find partners in the conflict area who are not
considered to be biased by the audience that ought to accept the messages. Audiences will
reject any messages that they feel are being imposed on them by outsiders. Another
obstacle concerns the lack of capacity to measure the effectiveness of media interventions
in war zones. Although evaluation is a crucial element in any project proposal, it is
extremely difficult to do when it concerns media-focused peace building activities. This is
due to a lack of resources, the scarcity of proven research methods, or difficult contacting
scattered audience members (Hieber 1998).
2.5 Summary
This chapter has presented theory and ongoing debates about media and peacebuilding.
The chapter can be considered to be a funnel. First the nature of contemporary conflict
has been described, while doing so it became clear that many armed conflicts of the past
twenty years had an intrastate character. The wars often had an ethnic character and
because of that many parties are concerned. After having described the contents of the
ethnic conflict, the next step was to explain the conflict resolution strategies as executed
by foreign interveners. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros
Ghali devised three strategies in conflict resolution: peacemaking, peacekeeping en
peace-building. Especially the latter one is rather interesting for this theoretical
framework. Different views on the concept of peacebuilding have been presented; special
focus was paid on the social dimension of peacebuilding, also denoted as reconciliation.
24
By means of different scholars the contents of this concept have been clarified. By means
of the scholar Lederach, four elements have been identified as ingredients of a
reconciliation process. These elements are: Truth, Justice, Mercy and Peace. Since these
are four basic themes, reconciliation efforts of NGOs, should focus on these themes.
Different levels at which efforts to reconciliation can be executed have been identified,
but the Civil Society in particular (in contrast to the government) has been discussed in
relation to contributing to the reconciliation process.
The reconciliation process has been connected to media, and particularly in relation to
how media can contribute to improve this process. This is a rather new field within the
reconciliation theory, which is quite new itself. By presenting an operational framework
for media strategies in conflict societies, the efforts of the civil society in the field of
media and reconciliation have been devised. Five different ways have been identified as
media- strategies to influence the reconciliation process. Within these strategies, the role
of the journalist shifted from ‘traditional’ to more ‘active’. The theory about
reconciliation which has been presented in this chapter on the basis of the scholar
Lederach, and the ‘five ways’ are important luggage while reading the rest of this thesis.
By examining different initiatives of NGO, their possible contributions to the
reconciliation process are researched on the basis of the four selected elements of which
this concept consists.
2.6 Methods of data collection
Research strategy
This research focuses on learning about the different ways NGOs use media to contribute
to the reconciliation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The research questions imply
that one case study is not sufficient for this research. This is why different projects which
have been determined as case studies have been examined in this research. According to
Verschuren en Doorewaard (1998: 150), a case study can be characterized by its features
as an in-depth research, executed by detailed observation of the location, interviews and
document research. Different project of NGOs that work with media and reconciliation
have been researched during a period of five months in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of
the so-called case studies is Videoletters, which has been researched more extensively
than the other projects. The reason for doing so is that Videoletters was an ‘intended
outcome approach’, a project with a clear message. The project approached the
population very directly, whereas the other projects worked more indirectly. The research
methods have been based on evaluation research of other organizations that have
executed media-based projects.
Evaluation of media-based programs
It is difficult to pass judgments on the exact effects the media interventions have on peace
operations. But, as said by Wolfsfeld: “It is to be hoped that a growing awareness of the
central role the media play in other political processes will lead to an increased focus on
25
the role they play in attempts to bring peace” (Wolfsfeld 2001:45 thesis Aho (year
unknown). Evaluation tools for media based programs are hard to define. However, a
distinction can be made in certain aspects of evaluation. For a start the reach of the shows
can be measured on the basis of viewing- and listening figures for electronic media, and
circulation numbers when it concerns print media. However, in post-conflict or
undeveloped countries, it is possible that no reliable ratings are available. In this case
there has to be looked for other social research methods, e.g. door-to door surveys.
Measuring reach does not say anything about the actual influence the media initiative may
have had. Therefore it is interesting though difficult to research the impact the show may
have had. In order to execute this, it is fore all important that the project’s over-all
objectives are clarified before launching the project. By means of one-to-one interview
instruments can be measured whether the goals of the project have been reached. Before
launching the project, as well as executing the impact research, the circumstances and
influence of other factors on the project should become clear (Shochat, Hellmich, Scheid
in ECCP: 2003) .
Different methods have been used to answer the different research questions. The
use of interviews has been the most valuable research method for me. However, also a
survey has been designed to collect data about the reach of the project ‘Videoletters’.
Also different types of documents have been used to find answers to the research
questions. These methods will be discussed in the next section.
Research methods
Interview
Most research material has been collected through in-depth interviews, which is also a
characteristic for case studies. The respondents for these interviews have been divided
into three groups; employees of NGOs or official institutes, journalists, and ‘inhabitants
of Sarajevo who were familiar with Videoletters’8.
The first group of respondents consisted out of the people working for NGOs that
either related to reconciliation initiatives or media initiatives. This group of organizations
differed much in the objectives they tried to reach. Particularly in the first phase of the
research these organizations provided information about the basic situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The organizations ranged from the Dutch Embassy to the International
commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) to the Students from Srebrenica and back. Also
the members of the organization Videoletters are part of this group. Mostly the
organizations helped me to get to the next one; this is how a snowball sampling effect
existed. Some of these visits have been interviews, others were random conversations
with a special focus for my research subject, e.g. on press conferences or seminars. A
total number of twenty respondents have been included in this group.
The second group of interviewed people were journalists. They were either
familiar with a media- initiative of an NGO or provided information about their
profession. Six journalists from different media; television, radio, newspapers and news
8
More detailed information about this project can be found in chapter seven.
26
agencies, have been included in this research. They have been selected though snowball
sampling. In this ‘media-world’, people know each other and recommended other
journalists to me.
The third group of respondents consisted out of randomly picked people from
Sarajevo who were confronted with ‘Videoletters’. This would either be through the
broadcasting of the episodes on television, or by contact with the Videoletters tour. If
they were not familiar with the project yet, an episode of Videoletters was shown to them
during the interview. These people were selected on the fact that they were ‘inhabitants
of Sarajevo’. This group of fifteen respondents was relatively young; the average age was
25. Most of the respondents were of Bosniak distinct. Some were of Serbian distinct, and
some were Croatian. This reflects the composition of the Sarajevan population as well, of
which most people are Bosniak.
Most interviews were carried out in the English language, for the people that did
not speak English well enough I hired a translator. He also helped me with the translation
of the 194 surveys into English. All interviews have been recorded on a tape recorder,
transcribed, and analysed with the analytical framework as a starting point. The names of
most respondents are not mentioned in this thesis to safeguard their anonymity. Therefore
they are specified as ‘inhabitant of Sarajevo’ or other towns. Some names of informants,
mostly journalists or employees of NGOs are used.
Videoletters screenings
In the paragraph about ‘interviews’, it has been mentioned shortly already; several
screenings of episodes of Videoletters have been included in this research. Always the
same episode would be shown to the respondents, to make sure no contamination of the
research would take place. This episode was depicted as the makers of Videoletters as
‘neutral’. This meant that an ordinary story about ordinary people was told in the episode.
A story which was symbolic for many families at the Balkans. One time an episode was
shown to a respondent which had more violent contents, about someone who may have
committed war crimes. The reaction of the respondent on this episode was very strong
and determined the course of the interview to such an extent that I decided to choose for
the more ‘neutral’ episode.
Sample Survey
To obtain basic information from the public that watched Videoletters, a sample survey
with twenty questions was designed. The plans to distribute this survey among the
population through schools or newspapers turned out to be not feasible. This is why the
Videoletters network has been used to collect quantitative data about the viewer public.
During the tour that Videoletters made throughout the Balkans, several places
were visited. In each place the organization contacted schools to cooperate in the project.
The questionnaires were distributed among the schoolchildren. They again would
interview people in their surrounding; their father, mother, etc. The result was that in
three towns in Bosnia, Pale, Srebrenica and Višegrad, a total number of 194 respondents
answered the questionnaire. This provided information about their opinion about- and
27
familiarity with Videoletters, as well as information about the need for reconciliation in
these three towns.
Other methods and techniques
Besides the survey and the interviews with screenings, different types of documents have
been used in this research. These were e.g. reports and documents of NGOs. Besides,
newspaper articles have been used as research source. These articles provided reactions
on the examined projects, and they also gave an impression about the circumstances
under which the project took place. Also video tapes were provided by NGOs with
material that was included in a project that was connected to reconciliation. Some
information has been obtained through persons who have wished to stay anonymous.
Obviously this desire has been fulfilled. This also counts for information from secret
reports that have been used; these reports are not publicly available and thus not in the
bibliography.
Research population
This research tries to pass judgments on the working of projects oriented on media and
reconciliation. Therefore different groups of respondents have been included in this
research. This research concerned ‘media’ and its impacts, and the target groups of the
projects consisted therefore out of the ‘Bosnian population’. Obviously not the whole
Bosnian society has been researched, I have marked out this ‘whole society’ by
interviewing people of different ethnic origin and profession. However, selecting
respondents on basis of ethnic identity can be problematic in a divided country as Bosnia
is; some people were reluctant to tell me their ethnic identity. They argued it did not care
to them, and they did not want to profile themselves as a member of an ethnic group, but
first of all as a Bosnian.
The research population can therefore not be characterized to be representative
for the whole society; a respondent was selected on the criterion of whether he or she
could contribute to answering the research questions in the first place. This means a
variety of people has been included in this research, either selected arbitrarily or by
coincidence (in the case of the sample survey which was distributed by Videoletters).
Some of the interviews lasted for half an hour, others for over an hour. Some
went well, others worse. The course of the interviews was influenced by factors of
diverse character. These could be based on miscommunications between me and the
interviewee, technical problems (the tape-recorder did not always function as I desired),
time and place (distractions because of noisy places), circumstances (some respondents
referred to the Dutch soldiers were unable to protect the citizens of Srebrenica, reason for
some respondents to act suspicious towards me as a Dutch researcher).
Reliability
During the collection of the research data and the analysis of those data, I have tried to
maintain the scientific standards as well as possible. This means that I have tried to use
28
different research methods, so-called ‘triangulation’ to examine the same research data. I
have tried to be as objective as possible during this research but I can imagine the
collected data would have been very different had it been executed by another researcher.
I have tried to approach the Bosnian population in an open way; meaning that the conflict
did not involve ‘good or bad guys’. However, after a while I realised it is very difficult to
live in Bosnia without picking sides.
This research is a modest try to pass judgements on the impact of media on reconciliation.
It has been said before that this is a big subject to discuss. Whereas I would have
preferred to judge on the influence of media by measuring change among the population,
quite soon in the research it turned out that this was not feasible. Measurements of
altering attitudes of different ethnic groups towards each other are carried out by
international organizations in Bosnia every half a year. Within this trend analysis, not
many changes can be measured, so how would I, with such limited research possibilities
be able to measure altering attitudes as a result of media influence? My research strategy
had to be adapted and with that the specific research goals. Therefore this research
focuses in particular on the working and outcomes of certain projects of NGOs. The
outcomes of this research are by no means representative for all media-approaches
focused on reconciliation. The conclusions only intend to judge about the results of the
efforts on the basis of the respondents and informants included in this research.
Obstacles
While executing this research, diverse obstacles of diverse character were encountered.
The first obstacle relates to the role as a researcher. This role should be of an objective
character, with a certain distance towards the research population. However, in practice
this was not always the easiest role to play. Bosnia is a country which shows many scars
from the war-past; either in a visible way, by bullet holes in buildings and damage by
grenades and bombs, but also in an invisible way the country suffers from the war. Bad
economics, corrupt politicians, and trauma from war experiences make it difficult to live
in Bosnia. This counts in particular for the Bosnians themselves, but as well for me as a
researcher it was tough now and then to be faced with this situation.
Other obstacles relate to certain plans that were not feasible. From the beginning
of my stay in Bosnia on, it turned out that the research design did not represent the actual
conditions in Bosnia. Some plans from the research proposal could be executed, others
just were not. This asked for much flexibility as a researcher.
Also cultural differences between Bosnians and me caused confusion for the
research. This concerned for example the language, which I did not understand, but also
in relation to promises that are broken, or rumours that are spread. In particular when you
are not one of them it is difficult to disguise what are facts and what are not. Box 2.1
illustrates an encounter of me as a researcher with local people that caused much
confusion.
29
Box 2.1 Research Confusion
A part of the Videoletters project included a series of video messages of mayors of towns with
divided communities. One of these towns was Kosovska Mitrovica, located in the north of Kosovo
and housing a population of ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs. As a result of this ethnical
division, the town also has two mayors; one Albanian and one Serbian. The organization of
Videoletters invited both mayors to cooperate in the series of video messages, only the Albanian
mayor replied positive. After recording this message, the Videoletters team went home. Later that
day, a message from the local Videoletters office in Mitrovica came; the Serbian inhabitants of the
town had heard their mayor was not included in the chain of video messages. They were angry and
had attacked the local office. The organization, including me, was shocked; although we asked the
mayor and he refused, we did contribute to worsening ethnic tensions in the town. However, later
on again it turned out that the local Videoletters employee had made the story up for unknown
reasons. In the meantime the feelings of me as a researcher had fluctuated up and down.
Source: own observations.
Research questions
From the theory, questions resulted who have been answered by means of the above
mentioned research methods. These questions, as also presented in the Introduction, are
the following.
Main research question:
In what way do media related projects of NGOs try to contribute to the reconciliation
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and what have been the results of these attempts?
Sub-questions:
1.
a. What are dominant perspectives of reconciliation in Bosnian society?
b. How does the reconciliation process proceed, based on these
perspectives?
2.
What does the Bosnian media climate look like ten years after Dayton?
3.
In what way do Non Governmental Organizations use the media to make
a contribution to the Bosnian reconciliation process?
4.
What has been the contribution of ‘Videoletters’ to the Bosnian
reconciliation process?
These questions will be answered in the following chapters, but firstly we will go back in
history by describing the context of the Bosnian ethnic division in Chapter Three.
30
3 Context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a wasp’s nest
A Bosnian can be described as a coin with two sides; at one side is the nice and
friendly Bosnian who won’t accept your refusal to come in side the house, have a
cup of coffee, join for dinner or stay for the night if you need it. I don’t know many
people as hospitable as the Bosnians. But the same people have been able to murder
their neighbours, to fight a bloody war. They don’t understand how it could come
this far. The fact that it could happen here means that it can happen anywhere.
Employee Netherlands Embassy Sarajevo, April 2005
This quote introduces a few basic elements which are important when describing Bosnia
and parts of its culture. It introduces an important theme of this thesis, the ethnic war.
When saying ‘the fact that it could happen here means that it can happen anywhere’, the
employee of the Embassy implies that war in Bosnia came unexpected. Interestingly, the
Balkans, and in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina, have often been referred to as a
wasp’s nest, meaning that special conditions are present in this area of Europe which
make war inevitable. There are different points of view on the exact conditions, some
scholars reason that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, is the crossing point between
different cultures and religions. This is the place where west and east would meet, the
inhabitants of Bosnia had always been asked to choose between competing empires and
ideologies, which have invariably been defined by religion (Glenny 1996: 172). Other
scholars prefer to focus on the idea that the last war resulted from historical facts and was
therefore bound to take place. This chapter follows the latter course. This, however, does
not mean there is only one way of explaining the conflict. There are many points of view
on the origins of the war. Even Bosnian inhabitants can not recall how the war
commenced. However, for reasons of clarity this thesis will go down the historical road
when explaining the context of Bosnia.
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the year 2005 is an ethnically divided country. The
Bosnian population is divided into three ethnic groups: 37.1 % is Bosnian Serb, 48% is
Bosniak9 and 14.3 % is Bosnian Croat. The other 0.6 % of the population consists out of
Roma, Jews, and others. The practised religions in Bosnia are in close correspondence
with the ethnic groups: 31 % of the population is Orthodox Christian, 40% follows the
Islam, 15 % is a Roman Catholic and 14 % follows other religion or is a non-believer.
This chapter will discuss some remarkable developments in the Bosnian history which
have caused that ethnical division and have eventually led to the war of 1992-1995. The
chapter will conclude with an attempt to explain the origins of the war.
3.1 Ottoman Empire 1389-1878
The ethnical division in Bosnia was created by events which mostly originated outside of
the country. The Turkish dominance is one of these factors. Bosnia and Herzegovina were
part of the Ottoman Empire for almost five centuries. Before the Turkish invasion, state
9
This is the term for the Bosnian Muslims that is used nowadays to avoid misunderstandings.
31
borders between the countries of former Yugoslavia were vague and the inhabitants of the
region were indicated as ‘Serbians’, and ‘Bosnians’. The religion that was followed in
Bosnia was the one of the so-called ‘Bogomils’. During the Bosnian war of 1992-199510,
the opponents of the Bosniaks (which were the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats)
called them ‘Turks’, this term of abuse comes from the Ottoman period.
On the 28th of June 1389, the Turkish (Ottomans) and the Serbian armies met at the
battlefield of ‘Kosovo Polje’, in the south of Serbia. Legend tells us that the Turks offered
the leader of the Serbians, at the time ‘Prince Lazar’, to choose between fighting to death
and capitulation. Prince Lazar chose the ‘heavenly kingdom’ above capitulation to the
foreign empire and was one of the first to die on the battlefield, also known as the ‘Field
of blackbirds’ (Silber and Little, 1995:71). The Ottoman army had been trying to get a
grip on the Balkans for many years by then. The defeat of the Serbian army, supported by
Bosnian troops, led to a northern expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Although both sides
suffered heavy losses and Serbians and Bosnians fought together against the Ottoman
army, the occasion has become the symbol of Serbian suppression. Something that would
feed the nationalistic feelings of many Serbians in the following ages. During the first
Serbian rising against the Ottoman dominance in the early 1800s, the Serbian leader
Karadjordje would ‘invoke the spirit of Kosovo Polje’, referring to a revenge on the battle
of 1389 (Glenny 1999: 13). So by that time the event had become a myth, and by
choosing for the heavenly kingdom (by fighting and losing, as explained in the literature)
prince Lazar had made the Serbian people ‘the holy people’. Exactly six hundred years
after the defeat, in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic would turn to the events of that memorial
day in a speech for the Serbians in Kosovo11.
Let us return to the historical day in 1389. After the defeat, the Ottomans slowly
took over the Balkans. By 1464 they had reached Sarajevo. The Ottoman dominance had
an economic character: they needed men to fight in the Ottoman army as well as money
to pay for them (Malcolm 1994: 45). Besides that the army would take young Bosnian
boys to Istanbul and provide them with education. The Bosnian Nobel prize winner for
the literature, Ivo Andric, wrote about this habit in his book ‘The bridge over the Drina’:
The chosen boys were taken to the strange world to become circumcised and turned
into Turks. After they had forgotten about their religion and origins they would
serve in the army of the Janissaries12, or some other high service in the Turkish
empire.
Andric 1961:18
Some of them became known servants of the Sultan. Spreading of the Islam or a jihad,
was not what the Turks intended to do. Although they did not actively convert the
population of the occupied areas to become Muslims, the number of Muslims in Bosnia
grew steadily during the Ottoman reign. One of the main reasons to convert to the Islam
was the economic benefit one would have for being a Muslim. Before 1389 most of the
population of Bosnia was either Christian or a member of the Bosnian church, a
10
From now on referred to as ‘the last war’.
More information about the 28th of June 1989 can be found on page 32.
12
A military unit of the Ottoman empire.
11
32
movement also known as the Bogomils. There is not much information available on the
Bogomils, except for the fact that it has seized to be popular religion years before the
Turks arrived. This probably made it easier for its followers to convert to the Islam.
Christians converted to Islam as well, in order to retain their land.
In the registers the Turks were using, they divided the population of Bosnia into
four religious categories: Muslim, Jew, and unbeliever (amongst which the gypsies) and
kristian. A kristian could either be a catholic or a member of the Orthodox Church
(Malcolm, 1994:43). Christians and Jews could practice their religion freely during the
Ottoman period although the extent of their religious freedom depended on the ruling
Sultan. By 1530 the entire population of Sarajevo was Muslim, as well as most of the area
surrounding the Bosnian capital. It was not until later on that century that they were
accompanied by a Christian and a Jewish community. In that time the city was flourishing
and it became an important trade centre between Western Europe and the Far East.
Through the centuries the population of Sarajevo became more and more ethnically
mixed, as is illustrated by the following quote of an eyewitness from the 19th century. He
recalls Sunday afternoons during summer when catholic and orthodox families would
have a picnic on the road to Ilidža13.
Muslim, Christian and Jew went peacefully on their way… enjoying in equal
measure that peaceful, blessed time, and there was no thought on any religious
hatred .
Malcolm 1994: 45
This peaceful period lasted until the 1860s. It was in the years 1871-2 that the first signs
of ethnic hatred showed up (Malcolm1994: 130). By that time the population of Sarajevo
counted approximately 70 000. Meanwhile, the power of the Ottoman empire had seized
during the last century. At the same time, the Austro-Hungarian empire increased, and
gradually took over the south of Europe.
3.2 Austro-Hungarian rule 1878-1914
In the last century before the Austrian-Hungarian dominance that started in 1878, the
Turks had lost influence in Bosnia continually. They tried to regain influence by
reforming rule of law of the country. But the power of the Turks seized and the pressure
of the Austro-Hungarians increased. In august 1878 the Austro-Hungarians reached
Sarajevo and needed only a few days to capture the city. From then on the Turkish days
were gone and a new foreign empire ruled Bosnia. The new rulers followed another
religion than the Turks, namely Catholicism, but they did not impose the new religion on
the Bosnians. The Muslim majority was afraid this would happen but some newly
introduced laws affirmed the goodwill of the Austro-Hungarians, all religious faiths
would be treated equally. The Austro-Hungarians tried to unite the Bosnian people, who
at that time consisted of Serbians and Turks, by referring to them as Bosnians. However,
13
Ilidža is a suburb of Sarajevo, here the river the Bosna springs from its source. This part of the town is still
a popular place for Sarajevans to spend their spare time.
14
The period between the first and the second World War is also specified as the Interbellum.
33
in the neighbouring countries, Croatia and Serbia, nationalistic feelings among the
population increased. This had an influence on the Bosnians as well; they started
organizing themselves according to their ethnic identities (Malcolm, 1994: 150).
In the beginning of the twentieth century the local Bosnian communities set up
various organizations, based on different religious background: the Muslim National
Organization (1906), the Serbian National Organization (1907) and the Croatian National
Organization (1908). Their political influence was limited, the Austro-Hungarian emperor
was the one leading the country. But the mere fact that political parties were designed
based on religious backgrounds can be perceived as a sign on the wall. Meanwhile more
and more young Bosnians resisted the Austro-Hungarian dominance. They organized
themselves into political movements as well. One of these movements was ‘Mlada
Bosna’. This group of young Serbians in Bosnia were trying to realize a ‘Yugoslavia free
of Austro-Hungarians’ (Princip quoted in Judah, 2000:97). One of the members of a
related group, Gavrilo Princip, was willing to follow his ideals to the end. When the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife visited Sarajevo, on the memorable date of the
28th of June 1914 (the same date at which the Serbians lost the battle of Kosovo Polje,
many ages ago), they both got shot by Princip. This shot was not only fatal for the
Archduke and his wife, but for many civilians and soldiers after him: it was the starting
signal for the First World War. The Austro-Hungarian period as a whole can be
characterized as a transition period from the Ottoman time to the First World War; there
was unrest in all of Europe. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed, Bosnia was
left with a great deal of new infrastructure and buildings, as well as a huge number of
Catholics (Malcolm 1994: 144).
3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina during the World Wars.
The time between the first and the second World War14 has been important for the further
development of the three nationalistic groups in Bosnia. A month after Franz Ferdinand
was shot in Sarajevo, the Austro-Hungarians declared war to Serbia, which was the
beginning of a confusing time for the Bosnians. Serbians from Bosnia could be found
fighting against Serbians from Serbia. This also meant that people from the same religion
would fight each other; orthodox Christian people could fight orthodox Christian people.
A parallel can be drawn between the events of those days, and the last war. Also in this
war people of the same religion would meet each other on the battle field.
During the Interbellum the resentment against Serbians increased in Bosnia. This
resentment strengthened their urge to have their own identity: to be a Serbian instead of a
Bosnian. Serbian nationalism increased in these days and for the first time plans for a
‘greater Serbia’ were mentioned (Malcolm 1994: 158).
Meanwhile the power of the Austro-Hungarians was decreasing and by 1918 their
empire collapsed. Plans for a united Yugoslavia were created but could not hold strong
because of incompatible ideas of Croats and Serbs. In 1918, at the end of the First World
War, the ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’ was established. It was led by
centralist-style rule from Belgrade and made Bosnia and Herzegovina into a republic of
the Kingdom. The fact that it was led by Serbians caused friction among the other nations
of the Balkans that were incorporated in the Kingdom. The name ‘Muslims’ does not
34
occur in the official name of the Kingdom, indicating the position of the Muslims in that
time. The different nationalistic groups in Bosnia became more and more divided,
especially in rural areas. Bosnian Croats identified with Croats, Bosnian Serbs identified
with Serbs and the Muslims identified with Muslim Croats or Muslim Serbs (Clancy
2004: 35).
The following quote of the writer Rebecca West pictures life in Sarajevo during
the early thirties of the twentieth century.
There is an air of luxury about the town, of unwavering dedication to pleasure,
which makes it credible that it would hold a festivity on so extensive and costs a
scale. This air is, strictly speaking, a deception, since Sarajevo is stuffed with
poverty of a most denuded kind. The air of luxury in Sarajevo has less to do with
material goods than with the people. They greet delight with unreluctant and sturdy
appreciation, they are even prudent about it, they will let no drop of pleasure run to
waste.
Rebecca West, 1937
While life in Sarajevo continued as it always had, the way West shows in the fragment, in
the rest of Europe there were tensions on different fronts.World War II was bound to take
place. These tensions soon had their impact on the Balkan area and Bosnia when invaded
by the German and Italian army in April 1941. The Yugoslav army capitulated to the
Germans after eleven days. This war led to total chaos in Yugoslavia as it created at least
three wars to be fought in the area. First of all there was the resistance of the Bosnians
against the German/Italian occupation. Secondly, the Croats took their chance to cleanse
Croatia and Bosnia from Serbians. The fascist movement responsible for this policy was
‘Ustaše’, a name that would turn into a term of abuse for the Bosnian Croats during the
Bosnian war of 1992-1995. Finally, there was the war between the Cetniks15, mainly
Serbs, and the Communist Partisans (Malcolm 1994:193). These were the two main
resistance organizations to which the Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia were enlisted.
The leader of the partisans was Josip Broz, a general who had been fighting on
the side of the Austro-Hungarians during the First World War. Later on he would become
known as Marshal Tito. For the Bosnian Croats and Serbs it was not too difficult to pick
sides in the war. The Bosnian Croats would mostly join the Ustaše and the Serbians
would either join the Communists or the Cetniks. For the Bosnian Muslims the choice
was not that easy. At the outset of the war they officially supported the Ustaše regime of
Croatia. The most likely motivation for this choice is found in the aversion of the Bosnian
Muslims against Belgrade, which they had developed during the two decades before
World War II. The alternative, Zagreb, thus seemed the best option. Later on they would
find out that the alliance did not work out. However, the Bosnian Muslims could not
cooperate with the Bosnian Serbs either, there were violent encounters in some areas of
Bosnia. In the end, the Muslims supported the partisans. Most of the Muslim leaders
could reconcile with the idea of living in a communist state since the alternatives were no
better. On the whole the picture of who was fighting who is quite unclear.
15
The name Cetniks would be used in the Bosnian war of 1992-1995 as well, as a term of abuse to denote the
Bosnian Serbs and Serbians.
35
Approximately one million people were killed during World War II in Yugoslavia, most
of who were Muslims. They had been fighting on all sides and had suffered losses
accordingly. The chaos of the three wars made it impossible to distinguish which
casualties belonged to which war. One thing, however, is clear: the majority of the
casualties existed of Yugoslavs killed by Yugoslavs (Malcolm 1994:174).
3.4 Bosnia under communist rule
After the annexation of Bosnia by the Ottoman Empire, the annexation by the Austrian
empire, and the following decades of confusion, the communist Tito was the winner of
the several wars of the 1940s and became the ruler of Yugoslavia. This leader of the
partisans had always been a supporter of Stalin and his policy, although the Russian
leader expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform16 in 1948. Yugoslavia became a
communist country that was, unlike many other countries in Eastern Europe, not a
member state of the Soviet Union. This forced Tito to change into a more open-minded,
independent and liberal socialist, in order to maintain good relations with the West.
Yugoslavia consisted of six federated republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia,
Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, the republic of Serbia
contained two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina. All the republics were
autonomous to a certain extent, their internal problems included. On the whole one could
say that in the early years of the communist time Yugoslavia was flourishing. For the first
time in history there was sufficient employment and a majority of the Yugoslavs was
living under good economic circumstances (Glenny, 1999:574). Going by Western
criteria, life in the big cities (Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo) was good. These cities were
cosmopolitan and produced famous authors, cineastes and theatre plays. However, neither
nationalistic feelings nor scars from World War II had faded.
In Titoist times religion was a sensitive subject, the characteristic that had divided
the different groups living in the region for so many years suddenly did not fit into the
communistic society anymore. At the beginning of the communistic time, when the strict
Stalinist line was still followed, this caused some friction. At that time religion was under
fire. The Catholic Church was treated with special harshness, caused by the collaboration
of the catholic clergy with the Ustaše during World War II.
The Orthodox Church was less damaged, but the Muslims faced some new
challenges. After they had lost a huge number of people, and saw their mosques molested
during the World War II, they were now facing religious suppression again. In 1950 a law
was introduced which forbid women to wear veils and elementary schools where children
could acquire basic knowledge about the Islam were shut down. The number of Muslim
associations was reduced to one. (Malcolm 1994: 195). Beside the religious restrictions,
Tito wanted the Bosnian Muslims to choose to which group they wanted to belong: the
Muslim Croats or the Muslim Serbs. Through the years this policy changed, from 1971
on Bosnian Muslims were allowed to call them selves ‘Muslim, in the sense of a nation’
(Malcolm 1994: 198). By acknowledging a third ethnic group in the country, Tito had to
make sure the equality between the three nationalities was maintained. This meant that
16
The Cominform was the name for the organisation of communistic parties in Europe.
36
the country was based on a ‘three-national parity’. In practice this created situations in
which Tito would imprison a Bosnian Serb and a Bosnian Muslim whenever he had to
imprison a Bosnian Croat , regardless of whether they were actually guilty (Glenny, 1996:
148). Democratic or not, this kind of equality seemed to work for the Bosnians. Bosnia,
and Sarajevo in particular, harboured the highest percentage of people who designated
themselves as Yugoslavs in the national census.
During the last decade of Tito’s reign, the 1970s, Yugoslavia declined; the
economy was not doing as well as before and due to some decentralizing laws the
confusion in the country grew. After Tito’s death in 1980 this trend continued, giving the
suppressed nationalistic feelings in the whole of Yugoslavia the chance to develop. Only
a few years after Sarajevo hosting the Olympic winter games of 1984, the situation would
start to collapse.
3.5 The beginning of the end
Exactly six hundred years after the defeat of the Serbian army at ‘Kosovo Polje in 1389,
Slobodan Milosevic went to the celebration of that day, held at the former battlefield. In
the preceding years the political and economical situation of the Serbian minority in
Kosovo (most inhabitants are Albanian) had deteriorated. When Slobodan Milosevic took
the microphone at that day in June 1989, he spoke to the Serbians in Kosovo and said that
‘they would not be beaten again’, referring to the events of six hundred years ago. These
magic words of the Serbian demagogue leader that are so typical for the symbolism that
has always been involved in the different cultures of the region, have indirectly become
the starting point of a chain of new Balkan wars.
The political federal system that had developed in Yugoslavia during the
communist times still existed in the early 90s. The presidency of Yugoslavia still
consisted of eight members, with a rotating chairmanship. The capital was Belgrade. The
strong leadership of Tito had held the federation together. After he passed away
Yugoslavia was slowly falling apart. The leader of the Serbians, Slobodan Milosevic, a
former communist, used the weak political situation to gain power in some republics of
former Yugoslavia: Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro. There was talk of
Milosevic wanting full control of Yugoslavia, he wanted to become the new Tito.
Meanwhile, leaders Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, republics that were
possibly next on Milosevic’s list, were following the actions of their neighbouring
republic. On June 25, 1991 both Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. Being the
wealthiest republic of former Yugoslavia with the most sources of income, Milosevic did
not want to loose Slovenia. Consequently, the JNA (Yugoslavian National Army) entered
the republic of Slovenia a few days after it had declared independence.
The war between the republic of Slovenia and Yugoslavia lasted for ten days. In
the end, Milosevic withdrew because of another crisis, in the neighbouring country
Croatia. Whereas Slovenia could be dropped from Milosevic’s war-gain-list relatively
easy, things were different for Croatia. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia hosted a big Serbian
minority which resisted against the independence of Croatia. Milosevic supported this
Serbian minority and sent his JNA to Croatia. Slovenia was free of the federal republic of
Yugoslavia, but for Croatia war had just started.
37
During the period before the statement of independence, the Croatian government
introduced a new policy concerning symbols in federal professions. A new national flag
was introduced with a symbol that was used by the Ustaše in the World War II (Malcolm:
1994: 216). These actions of the newly elected leader of the country, Franjo Tudjman,
were strengthening fears of the Serbians living in Croatia of loosing their cultural
identity. The region where most Croatian Serbians lived, the Knin, is on the border with
Bosnia. Being fuelled by Serbian television, owned by Milosevic, scared Serbians
organized themselves into a Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). From 1991 on the leader of
this party is said to have had close connections with the regime in Belgrade (Malcolm
1994:215). This all illustrates that the war in Croatia, which is said to have been a
blueprint for the one following in Bosnia, was a combination of at least two factors. At
one hand there was the changing political climate: the deadlock after Tito of not knowing
how to hang on to the federal system of former Yugoslavia. And at the other hand the
movement from below: frightened people getting organized in political parties. These two
factors, combined with dictatorial tendencies among leaders and other triggering factors,
caused the first Balkan war in fifty years. Croatia was on fire. After the Knin area, other
parts of the country were under attack as well. The Croatian war caused many casualties,
refugees and many destroyed houses and buildings. But it was not over yet, Croatia had
set an example for the neighbouring republic: Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3.6 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Box 3.1 Sarajevo shortly
And of course there is Sarajevo itself. Built along a valley in central Bosnia, Sarajevo
stretches like a long, spindly finger along several miles. The Ottoman architecture
dominates particularly in the Old Town, although the Habsburgs were not idle during
the four decades of rule from Vienna, putting their sub-Wagnerian stamp on municipal
buildings like the post office, to emphasize their commitment to social progress. Tito’s
planners dumped a number of socialist realist buildings in the centre of town but
strangely they do not seem to jar as much as they do in other East European cities. The
most relaxing part of town is Baš-Čaršija, with its bazaar and its unrivalled cevapcici
and burek. Sarajevo used to boast the finest, most sophisticated cuisine in Yugoslavia
before the JNA decided to starve the city out.
Glenny 1996: 163
Before describing the course of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992-1995, one
needs to have a picture of the life in Bosnia in the last years before the war. This is to
clarify the strange situation of an ethnic war in a multicultural country like Bosnia.
Through the history of the Balkans Sarajevo has always been the multicultural
centre of the region. Inhabitants of the capital of Bosnia were characterized as ‘Sarajle’
(inhabitants of Sarajevo), meaning very modern and cosmopolitan. Although the majority
of the city was Muslim, they were the most secular Muslims in the world. Years of
communism had had an influence on the society in Bosnia, by the late 1980s, 30% of the
marriages in urban districts were ‘mixed’ marriages. Being a Muslim in Bosnia was more
38
about tradition and culture than about the belief itself. This meant that people had Muslim
names, boys were circumcised and they would celebrate the end of the Ramadan, as well
as other feasts of the Islam (Malcolm 1994: 222). Hence, the biggest divide in Bosnia was
not between the three different groups. Rather, it was between the rural and the urban
areas where the biggest differences in Bosnia existed. The urban population was not all
that surprised that the war in Bosnia started in the small villages, as the rural population
was most amenable to the ethnical propaganda of either party17.
After the war in Croatia started, the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
deteriorated as well. This country was locked between the two fighting states: Croatia and
Serbia, trying to stay invisible but being too obviously present. Milosevic could not face
loosing Bosnia too, Bosnia was part of the strategic plan of Milosevic of ruling a ‘greater
Serbia’. And also for Bosnia it was not ideal to be independent as it lacked political
capability. However, being annexed by Serbia was not an ideal situation either.
Thus, in 1990 the SDA, the Bosnian Muslim party of democratic action was
founded, with Alija Izetbegović as its leader. In the late 1960s this former lawyer wrote a
treatise, called the ‘Islamic declaration’. Although he did not intend to turn Bosnia into an
Islamic state, not at the time that he wrote the piece, nor in 1990, this treatise has been
used against him in the war of 1992-1995. Serbians would use it in their propaganda
machine to claim that all Serbians would be expelled or converted in the Bosnia that
Izetbegović had in mind. At the national elections of December 1990 the inhabitants of
Bosnia voted according to their religious/ethnic background. To illustrate this: 41 per cent
of the population voted for the Muslim parties, 35 per cent voted for the Serbs, and 20 per
cent voted the Croats. These numbers roughly match those of the population as a whole:
44, 31 and 17 per cent respectively (Malcolm, 1994: 222). Izetbegović , at that time the
leader of this ‘government of national unity’, tried to obtain a neutral status for Bosnia.
This would mean they were still part of Yugoslavia but had a certain measure of
sovereignty.
In the beginning of 1992 it became impossible for Bosnia to remain a neutral
state, the country had three choices, each of them leading to war. They would either be
annexed by Serbia, which would be disastrous for the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. The
second choice was to give in to the plans of Tudjman and Milosevic of dividing the
country between respectively Croatia and Serbia (in March 1991 the two leaders of these
countries had a meeting at which they made plans accordingly). This would leave the
Bosnian Muslims somewhere in the middle: to them an unacceptable plan. The third
option was declaring independence (Glenny 1996: 149). By that time both Germany and
the European Union (EEC at the time) had recognized Croatia and Slovenia as
independent states. Bosnia could no longer sit back and wait. And so it came to a
referendum, asking the population whether ‘they were in favour of a sovereign and
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs,
Croats and others who live in it?’ (Malcolm, 1994: 231). They voted yes.
The referendum was the direct motive for the Serbs to mobilize in Bosnia. After
some incidents in Bosnia in the preceding months, the war had now actually started.
Tanks of the Yugoslavian army (JNA), which transformed into an army with mainly
17
Based on conversations with Sarajevan inhabitants.
39
Serbian troops during the war-years, were stationed in the mountains surrounding
Sarajevo. The inhabitants of the Bosnian capital reacted on this by organizing mass
demonstrations that were presented by people of all nationalities (Malcolm 1994: 252).
Fighting started in the whole of Bosnia. At the beginning of the war this was mostly
initiated by Serbians, from either Serbia, Croatia or Bosnia, who obtained most of the
weaponry. The international community acknowledged Bosnia as a sovereign state in
March 1992 and a full-scale war in Bosnia began. Like in Croatia, the war caused
numerous casualties and started a refugee flow. It was not some journalists were able to
take pictures of detainees in Serb-led detention camps, showing similarities with the
concentration camps of World War II, that the international community reacted on the
events in Bosnia .
In the end of 1992, the negotiators of the UN and the EEC proposed the Vance Owen
Peace Plan (VOPP): a plan to divide Bosnia into a country of autonomous provinces. It
implied that the national government would only have to deal with the national defence
and foreign affairs. The plan would put an end to the war and enable refugees to return to
their houses. This was, however, in contradiction with the situation in Bosnia at the time,
Bosnian Serbs possessed the biggest territory of Bosnia and would surely not give that
up. Moreover, it caused a stronger division between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian
Muslims. After the rejection of the VOPP by the Serbs, the fighting deteriorated, Bosnian
Croats and Bosnian Muslims had become opponents as well.
Like in World War II, Bosnia was in chaos and until March 1994 the international
community did not interfere in the conflict. All this time the Serbs had besieged Sarajevo.
They tried to conquer the city, using medieval tactic of starving the citizens as well as
bombing them. The Sarajevans lived without running water, electricity and food for
almost four years. The only way food could be brought into the city was through the UNtroops who were stationed at the Sarajevan airport. This was not enough. To prevent the
population from starving the Sarajevan inhabitants dug an 800-meter long tunnel under
the airport to the ‘free’ area of Ilidža. Every night 3000 civilians and soldiers would enter
the city this way, bringing food and weaponry. The following quote illustrates how
transport through this tunnel went in practice.
The sounds of the hundreds of people waiting to pass through the tunnel was like the
desperate murmur from some back alley filled with homeless people and junkies.
Thin and pale people stood over small fires waiting for word that the tunnel crossing
was open.
Clancy 2004:139
The citizens of the city tried to continue their lifes as normal as possible. The
cosmopolitan Sarajevans would still organize theatre plays, make music, have coffees,
and walk on the main street to see and to be seen, like they always did. The daily
newspaper ‘Oslobodenje’ did not miss a single day in printing the paper, although it’s
building had been ruined. The Sarajevans even organized a Miss Sarajevo contest in a
dark basement, with awfully thin ladies wearing protest signs against the war.
40
The following quote illustrates the daily life in Sarajevo during the war, written down by
an author who was present at the time.
‘Vlado is the king of Blues of Sarajevo’, Graeme said.
‘Yeah yeah, we will have a gig soon, well, maybe’, Vlado said.
‘You play live music in the city?’ I asked surprised.
‘Yes, well actually I am on a world tour with my band, Don Guido and the
Missionaries. We start of in Sarajevo and after this we’ll travel 10 kilometres to the
edge of town. The last concert is in Sarajevo’.
Bill Carter 2004: 79
In March 1994 a Serbian bomb hit the main market square in Sarajevo. Although it was
not the first time a large number of people had been killed by a mortar attack and it was
not clear who it was the perpetrator (the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Karadžić, claimed
the Bosnian Muslims had done it themselves), this was the moment at which the
international community interfered in the war (Silber and Little, 1995: 311). They forced
the Bosnian Croats and Muslims to cooperate and form an alliance to resist the Serbians.
This was arranged in the Washington Agreement. After Izetbegović and Tudjman had
signed the agreements, the fighting between the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats ended.
Their joint army now had the power to regain the territory they had lost to the Serbs. This
meant a new flow of refugees in the country, this time enabled by the international
community who was encouraging the alliance to recapture land. It still did not stop the
siege of Sarajevo though, that lasted for three years and four months. It was only in July
1995, after the fall of the ‘safe’ UN area Srebrenica18, that the NATO started bombing the
Serbs, which eventually led to the end of the war, by signing the Dayton Peace
Agreements at December 14, 1995.
18
More information about the fall of the safe heaven ‘Srebrenica’ is provided in chapter seven, about
Videoletters. The Dayton agreements and their consequences are discussed more intensively in chapter four,
about reconciliation.
41
The next picture shows how the war of 1992-1995 led to ethnic division in the country.
Figure 3.1 Ethnical map Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004
3.7 Conclusion
Some people say the last war in Bosnia was a continuation of the preceding World War
II, Tito had tried to erase the ‘ethnic hatred’, by forcing communal life. But the feelings
of hate never left the country and its inhabitants. Although the situation in the outside
world had changed immensely during the years in between the two wars, the Bosnians
just continued, took their guns and tried to finish the inter-ethnic wars of fifty years ago
(Glenny, 1996: 148, Malcolm 1996: 252). The war has been characterized by fighting
militias all over the country, Serbian, Croatian or Muslim, using the same tactics. They
were cleansing the areas of the other nationalities, it is in the Balkan wars of the 1990s
42
that the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was used for the first time. In Bosnia and Herzegovina it
implied that 250 000 people were killed, half the population (2.2 million) fled their homes
and about 1.3 million people were internally displaced (CCA: 10). In Sarajevo itself 10
000 civilians, including 1500 children were killed, over 50 000 persons were injured, and
with the total numbers of 1395 days, the siege gained the ‘disputable honour of the
longest besiege in modern history’ (Boom, may 2005).
To use the term ‘ethnic hatred’ in relation to the Bosnian war of 1992-1995
would be dangerous for two reasons. First of all the three warring groups belonged to the
same Slavic tribe, the Muslims are mostly converted Serbians or Croatians (Malcolm
1994: 55). So to say the war had an ethnic character while the three groups are of the
same ethnicity would be academically wrong. However, in the literature this term is often
maintained. Secondly it is dangerous to say that these feelings belong to the Balkan
people, to say that they are born with it. This would mean that the situation can never
change because the wasp’s nest would stay a wasp’s nest forever. Moreover, it would
imply that external factors did not influence this war at all, while events described in this
chapter have demonstrated that influences from outside Bosnia did indeed cause internal
division. The chapter focused mainly on historical events, while there have been other
explanations for the conflict as well. However, it is still very difficult to understand how
people have been able to kill their neighbours or school friends in the most horrible ways.
43
Potocari, April 2005
44
4 Reconciliation in divided Bosnia
Introduction
After all the atrocities committed during the Bosnian war by all three parties, it is difficult
for the Bosnians to find some common ground to live on. This was the case both during
the war, and ten years after it still is. Many initiatives have been launched by the
international community to rebuild the country and its society, ranging from actual
building of bridges to crossing emotional ones. Despite the efforts of organizations that
carry out these initiatives, Bosnian society is still highly divided. This chapter will show
how three ethnic groups live in a relatively small area, but not together. Besides, it will
discuss how this ethnic division has been accomplished and how it is being maintained.
The ethnic division of the country can be considered to be a characteristic of the
reconciliation process. This chapter will focus on this subject by answering the following
questions:
a. What are dominant perspectives of reconciliation in Bosnian society?
b. How does the reconciliation process proceed, based on these perspectives?
By analyzing the contents of reconciliation for the Bosnian respondents, a start will be
made with outlining the reconciliation climate. Since this is a central concept of the
research it needs to be made clear by respondents and informants what it is about. After
defining the concept of reconciliation, we can proceed with describing the reconciliation
climate of Bosnia. The reason for doing so is to describe under which circumstances the
initiatives discussed in chapter six and seven of the thesis take place.
The first section of this chapter will describe the Bosnian ethnic division. Factors
that influence this division will be discussed, mainly from the point of view of the citizen.
While describing Bosnian society, a distinction will be made between the three levels
within a society: the top-level, the middle-range level and the grassroots level.19 Every
level faces its own problems and factors that contribute to an increased division in the
country. The second section will describe the meaning of reconciliation to the Bosnian
respondents. While doing so, four elements that the concept consists of will be discussed:
truth, justice, mercy and peace.
4.1 Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years after Dayton
The hope that the Bosnians felt right after the end of the war has faded gradually during
the past ten years. After the war, hopes were high for the future, most Bosnians were
happy about the fact the besieger had left, wanted to rebuild their houses and lives; the
will to work on a shared future was high. During the years after the war this hope has
‘diminished or faded’ (as a young man from Sarajevo said). The disappearance of that
19
These are the three levels that the scholar JP Lederach distinguishes. His theory is explained in chapter
two, the theoretical chapter.
45
hope will be described in this section, on the basis of the Bosnian situation as it is
nowadays. From the point of view of Bosnian citizens, three levels of the society, as
distinguished by the scholar Lederach will be described, with a focus on the factors that
influence the reconciliation climate within these three levels.
4.1.1 Level one: Top level of Bosnian society
The Dayton Peace Agreements (DPA) that were signed by the warring parties in 1994 did
not only stop the fighting, they also implied that the country stayed ethnically divided for
the coming years. The agreements were welcomed by the Bosnian population at first, in
particular because a cease fire had been reached. But the initial reception changed into
deception during the years that followed. In this section, the influence of the DPA on the
governmental structure of Bosnia, as well as opinions about the presence of the
International Community in Bosnia will be described. It can be argued that the DPA has
had its influence on many other factors of the Bosnian society but these two are the ones
that are considered to be most disturbing and influential by my respondents. Besides, they
have partially caused Bosnia’s ethnic division.
Consequences of the Dayton Peace Agreements for the ethnic composition of Bosnia
The clearest outcome of the DPA is the geographical division of the country; Bosnia
consists out of two parts: Republika Srpska (49 % of the country, inhabited by
predominantly Bosnian Serbs) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51% of
the country, inhabited by predominantly Bosnian Croats and Muslims). The border that
separates the two entities runs transversely through Bosnia. According to criticizers of the
DPA, the division between the two entities is unnatural; the whole of Bosnia and
Herzegovina used to be multi ethnic, the borders are only invented by the International
Community. The division is based on equal ethnic representation in the two parts of
Bosnia. However, by some Bosnians this division has been interpreted as a representation
for the war gains and ethnic cleansing, because the division does not match the
percentage of the particular group in the society. In other words: 49% of Bosnia is
Serbian territory but less then 49% of the population is Serbian (UNDP 2005a). Another
criticism on the ethnic division has a juridical character; the imaginary construction of
three ethnic groups that have their own rights and who can make their own rules is
legally incorrect; so argues the scholar Belloni20. This construction violates human rights
because it forces people to choose sides.
Some areas of Bosnia have been ethnically cleansed, although not all towns and
cities are ethnically homogenous. This is safeguarded by the DPA because of the fact that
everyone has the right to return to his/her former home. As a result of the war, many
people have been internally displaced. This signifies that many returnees find other
20
This is argued by Cox, he describes the following situation. For example, the Bosnian constitutional
framework provides that each ethnic group is entitled to elect five members to the house of Peoples. All five
members elected from the RS must be Serbs, even if the pre-war population was only 53% Serb in that area.
If a significant number of refugees and displaced persons return, this provision would lead to a major human
rights violation (Cox, 1998 in Belloni, 2001:3).
46
people living in their houses now. Since 1996 when the General Framework Agreement
for Peace (GFAP, part of the Dayton Peace Agreements) was implemented, a total
number of 454797 refugees21 have returned to their place of origin, their pre-conflict
municipalities. The total number of Internally Displaced Persons amounted to 309 000
persons22 in 2003. The right to return to one’s former home causes tensions because
people of different ethnic origins have to live and cooperate together on a relatively small
territory. One example of life in mixed town relates to the different schooling systems for
children of different ethnic groups. This is why at 56 schools in the Federation, a socalled ‘two schools-under-one roof’ –policy exists (UNBiH 2004). This construction
means that children from different ethnic backgrounds use the school building at different
times. The town Vitez is an example of this construction; the conflict existed between
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats here. Nowadays the Croatian children use the
school building in the morning while the Bosniak children use it in the afternoon (Nansen
Dialogue Centre 2005). Besides this practical division, the children also follow different
education programs. Certain subjects are the same, but some subjects like history or
Bosnian are related to ethnicity.23
The opinions among the Bosnian respondents about the divided country are sceptical, but
they differ, depending on the ethnic identity of the person in question These opinions are
linked to the question whether people are proud of being a citizen of Bosnia. From public
opinion polls stems that people in Bosniak majority areas are considerably more likely to
feel pride in being citizens of Bosnia than people in the other two areas. Fewer than
twenty percent of people in Republika Srpska now feel such pride (UNDP 2005b: 33). A
young Bosnian Serb said it like this:
‘We fought to live our way. We started this war because we were together, what
does the international community want now? They want to mix us? To live in peace
together? I think we should be a little smart country, where we can live our way,
what we fought for’
22 year old inhabitant from Pale, June 1, 2005
It should be commented though, that these opinions can mostly be found among the
Serbian population in the villages, Serbians in big towns have more moderate opinions
about it. They, like many Bosniaks, are more likely to think that it is a doubtful
construction to have two entities in one state, two governments (apart from all the policies
of the cantons and municipalities). This is confirmed by figures from Psy-ops24: urban
Serbs show a higher level of ethnic tolerance than rural Serbs. However; the division
between the two entities seems to work; people are not fighting anymore these days; like
a girl from Sarajevo said: ‘As long as we do not have to die because of it, I am fine with
it’.
21
This number is based on statistics of the UNHCR department in Bosnia.
This number is based on statistics of the Human Development Report Bosnia of 2003.
23
This information is based on an interview with an employee of the Nansen Dialogue Center Sarajevo.
24
Psychological Operations, the research branch of EUFOR.
22
47
Despite the criticism of the ethnic division of the country, many Bosnians seem to resign
themselves to the situation. They can not imagine how the situation could be different
without having a new civil war, so they adjust to the situation. That this ethnic division is
not the ideal situation will also be illustrated in the next section.
Consequences of the Dayton Peace Agreements for the governance structure of Bosnia.
Besides the geographical border that has been drawn, the DPA implied a set of rules and
laws that caused a complex administrative structure. These rules influence the lives of
every Bosnian citizen though, and mean a continuation of a deeply divided society. For a
start on a political level; according to the United Nations, the political and governmental
structures set up by the DPA have resulted in highly complex governance practices and
weak rule of law (UNBiH 2004). The Bosnian constitution that resulted from the DPA
established a framework of institutions based on equality and parity of representation by
Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Many of the State key functions are under
the control of the governments of either one of the two entities, or the
cantons/municipalities. The state only controls foreign policy, foreign trade, customs
policy, single monetary policy, immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation,
international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, regulation of inter-entity
transportation, and air traffic control. Besides, the DPA implicated a final decision
making instrument; an Official High Representative. This delegate of the international
community possesses far-reaching powers to reject or approve bills made by the members
of the state; he also has the power to fire members of the government.
The Dayton Peace Agreements caused a highly complex governance structure
within Bosnia. Republika Srpska is divided into 64 municipalities, all of which have local
policies and accompanying political powers. The Federation of Bosnian Croats and
Muslims consists of ten Cantons, and a total number of 84 municipalities. The political
powers lie mostly with the cantonal management; all ten cantons have their own ministry
as well as constitution. All in all, the complex governance structure of Bosnia means that
four million Bosnians with a weak economy have to support 14 governments, 150
ministries, 200 ministers and 146 local governments (National Human Development
Report 2005). As a result of this highly complex political structure, almost 70 % of the
taxes go to the financing of all these governments. This implies that all the other areas
requiring public funding in Bosnia, from infrastructure to social security, have to be
financed out of the remaining 30%.
The highly decentralized state has its consequences for the confidence of Bosnian citizens
towards politics. Half of the population thinks that regarding the present political
situation, things in Bosnia are getting worse (UNDP 2005a: 69). Respondents explained
this opinion results from the highly complex structure and the money that flows into it.
For a start the fact that policy can change from canton to canton creates indistinctness for
the population. It also makes politicians less visible and transparent, which leads to
distrust among the population towards them. The fact that the country is in fact governed
by an outside intervener does not encourage the faith of the Bosnians in their own politics
48
either. It gives them a feeling of ignorance: ‘as if we can not do it ourselves, as if we need
a foreigner to rule them (stated by the Sarajevan woman Maida).
Opinions about the presence of the international community in Bosnia are not that
optimistic among the respondents. The presence of the Official High Representative of
Bosnia, the highest body in policy making, is not considered to be an encouragement for
improvements by several Bosnians. A journalist put like this: ‘Paddy Ashdown (the
former OHR) is a disgrace for British diplomacy, and his politics are detrimental for the
Bosnian future’. This is supported by the fact that the percentage of Bosnians that have a
positive opinion about the OHR has decreased from 58% in 2004 to 42% in 2005. One
third of the Bosnian population has an unfavourable opinion about the OHR (UNDP
2005b), this is twice as much as the percentage of persons that have an unfavourable
opinion about the other international organizations mentioned. In particular, the
employers of the big organizations25 that implement the DPA are considered by some
respondents as arrogant, and they do not understand the situation in the country and the
subtle differences (stated by a Sarajevan girl). Because of their distance towards the
Bosnians they do not win their trust; one employee of one of those big organizations
confirmed this thought by saying the following:
‘I have lived in Bosnia for four years now but I do not speak the language. I have
been working in many countries and learned many languages, I do not need to learn
another one. Besides, these Bosnians are a retarded people. We try and change the
situation here for the better but it seems as if they do not want to change’.
Foreign employee for big organization, March 2005.
The Bosnians are sceptical about whether the presence of an OHR will come to an end;
‘there will always be another one’, has been said. An alternative for the presence of the
international community is not being brought up either though. The Bosnians know they
need some outside help, but at the same time blame the Dayton Agreements for this
difficult situation. There are many complaints about the situation, but no alternatives.
However, for the High Representative to leave would be no option though for several
Bosnians, like an inhabitant of Sarajevo said: ‘I know it prevents a new war’.
4.1.2 Level two: Middle-range level
Two areas in which DPA has had its influence on Bosnian society have been described so
far; the governance structure and the presence of the international community. While
doing so, the point of view of the respondents was the primary guide. Implications of the
agreements on top level of society have been discussed. The connection between this
level and the local level is lacking in many cases, and this is a reason for several
respondents to feel annoyed by the way things work in their country. The presence of 400
local NGOs26 does not encourage their confidence in the future. Most of these NGOs
carry out peacebuilding activities, whether in a social, cultural, economical or political
25
The biggest organizations that operate in Bosnia are EUFOR, OSCE, UNHCR and UNMIBH, all part of
the Peace Implementation Plan that was developed in 1997.
26
According to the OSCE, mentioned by Belloni, 2004.
49
way. Some of these projects that relate to media and peacebuilding will be discussed
extensively in chapter six. The high number of NGOs that operate in the country has been
called a circus; ‘Circus Sarajevo’27. Circus Sarajevo rambles from conflict area to conflict
area, leaving its indisputable marks on every country it visits.
Because of lack of understanding of the local population and their needs, absurd
situations have been created. For example providing washing machines in villages where
no running water has been arranged yet28. Besides, it has been argued that the presence of
the International Community (IC) in Bosnia has replaced the local labour market. The
remaining well educated professionals in Bosnia are working outside their field of
expertise because these jobs are better paid. Besides, it has turned out that Bosnians are
often confused about who is responsible for what and approach the international
community rather than local officials to address their needs (Belloni 2001). This way the
country has become dependent on the presence of the international community in Bosnia,
reason enough for thinking the country could never cope without the presence of the IC.
It can be argued that Bosnian Civil Society has its problems, which makes it
more difficult for the society to reconcile. One reason for the disappointing efforts of
civil society includes the strong connection with the top level of society. Whereas civil
society ideally should be the result of a strong advocacy among the population, in Bosnia
NGOs are mostly established by the big international NGOs. They are mostly local
branches or dependencies of the international NGOs. Many examples can be found in
which after a while these NGOs cast off the ‘mother’ NGO by only hiring local staff29.
Only a small number of local NGOs have emerged in BiH without patronage of
international organisations, apparently due to lack of finances, expertise and motivation
of local initiators. Although it can be argued that this could be the role of the
International Community which is present in Bosnia, in practice it does not seem to work
like this. A reason that was brought up by a woman who works for a local youth NGO, is
that young people are too involved with surviving in Bosnia in the first place, let alone do
one’s best for a higher goal; participating in civil society30. This tendency can be noticed
among more groups in Bosnian society; it is difficult enough to just live in Bosnia, so
they say. They may have much criticism about their situation but show little initiative to
change it.
However, there are projects that support the idea that a civil society can indeed
strengthen Bosnia’s situation regarding the reconciliation process. The Netherlands
Embassy in Sarajevo supports several projects that relate to peacebuilding. During the
years they have had many proposals from NGOs (whether local or not) that have
organized the same kind of activities related to reconciliation: several people with
different ethnic backgrounds come together to a seminar. In a setting which is abnormal
(different from everyday life) they meet, do games, fun activities, and maybe discuss the
war. While staying together in this distinct situation they are supposed to grow towards
each other and leave after one or two weeks with a diploma that says they are reconciled.
27
Borrowed from a documentary named ‘Circus Sarajevo’, made by Rejger and van den Broek (2000)
Based on a story heard about NGOs working in Srebrenica.
29
For example the organizations Internews and Nansen Dialogue Centre and Media centre; supported by
international NGOs but predominantly working with local staff.
30
Based on an interview with Amela, working for a local youth NGO.
28
50
Whether these kinds of projects contribute to reconnecting the population is, however,
doubtful.
The Netherlands Embassy has criticised these kinds of projects for different
reasons. First of all they are based on the idea that the participants of the seminar meet in
a different setting from normal life; this creates an artificial atmosphere which disappears
as soon as the participants leave the seminar. The second objection of the Embassy
concerns the target groups of these projects: mostly the people invited to these projects
are people who are already open to reconciliation, not those who started the fighting
during the war. The third point of criticism relates to the fact that there is rarely a followup to these kinds of projects; the participants leave in possession of a diploma and that’s
it. After having sponsored many projects that feature these characteristics, the Embassy
has become more critical in donating money to local projects (interview employee
embassy, March 2005). One of the organizations they do support though, is the Nansen
Dialogue Centre (NDC)31, that has tried to overcome the points of criticism by targeting
key figures in the society (who can spread the message of the seminars among more
people through their daily work) as well as having a follow up after the reconciliation
seminars. The participants do not only go to a seminar, but they are expected to actively
use the information they acquired at the seminar to bring about a dialogue in their society.
One of the projects of the NDC focuses on journalists; this project will be described in
chapter six.
4.1.3 Level three: Identifying group identities
Box 4.1 Bosnian Coffee
After the war a Bosnian visits a bar in Sarajevo. He asks for a kafa, the owner of the bar
says he does not have coffee. The client thinks: ‘hmm, these people are extremists’ and
asks for a coffee in the Serbian way: ‘can I have a kava please?’ The owner again says
he does not have a kava either. The client gets desperate about the presumed extremism
of the owner of the café, and tries the Bosnian version of the word: ‘could I have a
kahva please? The owner of the café answers: ‘No, I do not have water, so I do not have
coffee!’
Source: inhabitant Sarajevo
This joke can be considered as a metaphor for the ridicule of the Bosnian war. Bosniaks,
Croats and Muslims stem from the same ethnic Slavic tribe. While ethnically
homogeneity has diminished during the centuries because of dominance by outside
invaders, in the end the three groups are all former Yugoslavs. They speak variants of the
same language and on the basis of appearances a distinction between the three can not be
made. However, during the war the distinction was enlarged, and ten years after the war it
is still there. Citizens from Sarajevo often do not wish to identify with one of the ethnic
groups; they would rather call themselves ‘Sarajle’ (citizen of Sarajevo) or Bosnian. They
31
This organization is part of a network of NDCs in the Balkans. The aims and history of the organization
will be described more thoroughly in chapter 6.
51
are forced to take sides though, e.g. when they want to receive an identification card: the
application form asks for their ethnic identity. Different respondents described people of
the other ethnicities. While doing so, even the ones that stated they do not have
prejudices, passed judgements about the other ethnic groups. Table 4.1 shows some
random opinions that Bosnians from different ethnic origins expressed about each other.
The suspicious ideas the respondents in table 4.1 show about each other are
confirmed by figures of the UNDP, based on information of Psy-Ops. From the three
groups, the Bosniaks are most willing to accept people of different ethnicities living in
their vicinity. The percentage of very intolerant individuals (those who disapprove other
ethnicities living in the same entity or city with them) is around 3-4 % among Bosniaks,
6-14% among Bosnian Croats and 15-19 % among Serbs. Since 2001 Psy-Ops have been
executing this research which makes it possible to draw conclusions about trends in
interethnic tolerance in 2005. This analysis shows that there has been almost no change in
Bosniaks attitude towards other ethnicities during this period. Bosnian Serbs have shown
improvements in tolerant attitudes during the last five years. The Bosnian Croats
however, have shown a negative trend, decreasing in ethnic tolerance: this year,
according to Psy-Ops figures, almost 3% more Bosnian Croats disapprove of other
ethnicities living in their entity or city than in 2001.
Table 4.1 Bosnians about Bosnians.
Opinions
Bosniaks
about
Opinions
Serbs
about
Opinions
of
Bosniaks
Bosnian Muslims do
not have prejudices.
They are most open
towards
other
nationalities. They are
least nationalistic of
the three groups.
They think Muslims
are inferior. But they
can not help it: they
grew up with it. It is
like they are all on
drugs; in an insane
state of mind. Their
biggest fear is the fear
of Muslims.
Opinions of Serbs
Opinions of Croats
The Bosniaks have
become
crazy
fanatics, they read
their holy books; they
live like thousand
years ago now. They
think they are the
only victims, well we
lost people too.
Why do those girls
wear their veils? We
used to be a modern
country, now it is as
if we are an Islamic
state.
Nationalism
comes
before religion. We
are crazy people, it is
in our genes; we like
to rule. The ignorance
is in our roots. We
have
lost
many
people as well; you
do not hear anything
about that.
They think we have
done it ourselves,
they ignore the past.
52
Opinions
Croats
about
They are always
scared their national
vital interests are in
danger. For example
the language; we were
brought up with the
same language but
suddenly they want to
have
their
own
official language.
They
have
a
particular perspective
on things, like they
have
experienced
other things as us. Yet
we are the same.
They always tortured
us.
There
are
few
differences between
the three groups,
except
for
the
religion.
We,
Catholics, are the
least intolerant of the
three groups.
Source: own observations and interviews.
Personal ethnic identification
The high percentage of interethnic marriages during Tito’s reign has left its heritage for
the present generation of young people. During the war, people were forced to choose an
ethnic side while often this was not possible because of their mixed ethnic background. A
girl from Sarajevo illustrated this by saying that she does not know anymore who she is
nowadays; she comes from a Muslim family but her parents never declared themselves as
Muslims because they were communists. Another woman told me that she had trouble
during the war because she refused to choose an ethnic side. She was different, not a
Serb, but not a Muslim either. The high percentage of mixed marriages from before the
war has diminished after the war - two thirds of the Bosnian population does not approve
of their child marrying someone from a different ethnic distinct.32
Although some of the respondents prefer their country to become totally divided,
as to have a small country -Republika Srpska- within Bosnia and Herzegovina, others
expressed the need for Bosnia to stay one country. However, from interviews stems that a
precondition for being a Bosnian should be that one identifies with his country instead of
his ethnic group. For example Bosnian Serbs relate to Republika Srpska when speaking
about their home country33. But the other ethnic groups in fact also show this behavior,
the last ethnic tolerance measurements show that Bosnian Croats have nationalistic
tendencies as well (UNDP 2005b: 34).
32
Source: Psy-ops ethnical tolerance figures 2005.
Concluded from information from the young journalists’ survey in which citizens from three villages in
Republika Srpska were interrogated.
33
53
Box 4.2 tells about an event in which the Bosnian Croats show their ethnic preference
above national interests.
Box 4.2 Soccer in Bosnia
A Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo recalls the following situation:
‘A football club from Herzegovina (Bosnian Croat territory) played a game with a football club
from Poland. Of course I went and I wanted to support them, because if you watch a match you
have to support a team. For me (as a Bosnian Muslim) it was normal to support the group from
Herzegovina. But I could only do that if some condition was fulfilled. The condition concerned the
opening of the match; there is a ceremony, and you can see all the flags in the audience. Most flags
had the sign of Croatia, and I just wanted to see one or two flags from BiH, but there was only one
official Bosnian flag, on the playground. It is not a problem that there are Croats, but it is a
problem that they identify with their ethnic group instead of their country’.
Source: interview with inhabitant Sarajevo, July 8, 2005.
Consequences for reconciliation process
On the basis of certain factors that influence the reconciliation process, I have tried to
explain the current situation in Bosnia. The reason for doing so was twofold: at the one
hand I intended to describe the reconciliation process, and at the other hand this provided
a context for the circumstances in which NGO initiatives aiming towards social
reconciliation take place. Although it can be considered to be a peaceful solution of the
problems between the three ethnic groups, the Dayton Peace Agreements have caused
problems as well. By creating the division between the federation of Muslims and Croats,
and Republika Srpska, the DPA created ethnic discord in many areas of public life. By
respondents this was not considered to be encouraging for the reconciliation process. As
one of the respondents explained: a precondition for a better reconciliation climate is for
people to feel like Bosnians. The ethnical division, as well as the presence of the
international community that executes the general framework that was arranged by the
DPA, does not make them proud of being a Bosnian. The present NGOs, either Bosnian
or foreign, do not contribute enough to improving the reconciliation climate. This
presence is characterized by their huge number and their bad fine-tuning on the needs of
the Bosnian population. Besides, NGOs that execute reconciliation-aimed projects are
criticized because of their methods. Project evaluation often does not happen and it is
doubtful whether the people who have cooperated in their projects have put a step closer
towards each other. That a need exists for these kinds of projects is not doubted though:
interethnic tolerance is still not high and people are often forced to choose an ethnic
perspective.
The point of view while describing the above-mentioned problems was derived
from the population. Many complaints about the situation of Bosnia come from the
citizens. Despite their complaints however, initiatives to change the situation are rare.
54
4.2 Reconciliation as concept, perceived by Bosnian citizens
According to the theory used in this research, the reconciliation process can be considered
to be a social space where different elements meet. These elements are Truth, Justice,
Mercy and Peace. Following the theoretical model, people in post war societies should be
able to deal with these subjects. They are placed in order of importance and time, but in
the end all together make the reconciliation process. It should be noted that no
reconciliation process is the same and the elements presented here are based on
experiences from other post-conflict societies. The aim of applying these elements to the
respondents is to define the concept of reconciliation.
Perspectives on element one: Truth
According to the theory of Lederach, the first precondition for reconciliation is for people
to tell their truth about what has happened during a conflict. For all it should be said that
no such thing as ‘the truth’ can be found; people will always have their own version of
the story. However, about certain facts, agreements can be reached. It will turn out that
this agreement is not always found among the Bosnians. ‘Truth’ is a core aspect of
reconciliation as a whole. After describing the use of the concept of truth within the
Bosnian society, other ingredients of reconciliation can be built upon this element.
Because, as the report about the Bosnian reconciliation process of van de Mortel states as
well, the chance of a repetition of past events is more likely when people maintain their
own truth about those events and do not reflect on what has happened and why (van de
Mortel 2004). Box 4.3 is an introduction about how different the ‘truth’ can be
considered.
55
Box 4.3 ‘All Serbians falsify the truth’
On the 11th of July 2005 it was ten years ago that the Bosnians Serbs, with Ratko Mladic as
their leader, attacked the so-called ‘safe area’ Srebrenica. Nowadays there are mass graves
being found regularly and over a thousand bodies are still not identified. Many women search
for their lost husbands and sons, who have probably been killed. These are some facts that are
internationally recognized are not that obvious in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When for example
the national Memorial Day in Bosnia took place, at the same time in Belgrade, the capital of
Serbia and Montenegro, some buildings were besmeared. Slogans that said that “Srebrenica”
was not as bad as presented in the media, or even denied all events, were written down on
several walls. Numbers of deaths were over-exaggerated according to the Serbian authors of
such statements.
This version of the truth is different from the official one, and different from the one the victims
of Srebrenica have. But it is not just street kids who say these kinds of things. Last year the
American Senate draw a resolution, saying that the events in Srebrenica actually did happen
and that over 7000 men are missing. The Bosnian government wanted to copy the resolution
but the Serbian members of the parliament refused to accept it. There were no injustices in the
resolution but the Bosnian Serbian politicians could not acknowledge the events ten years after
the war ended. One Bosniak inhabitant from Sarajevo illustrated this by saying: Not a majority,
but all Serbian members of the parliament voted ‘no’ on that resolution. So you can imagine, in
that kind of situation, if you can not accept the truth, and that is the truth, how can you talk
about reconciliation? Another Bosniak stated that he had heard a presenter on the Serbian
national television say that 2000 persons were killed, some of whom were still missing:
‘probably they are in Australia or something’.
Comment on the opinions of the quoted Bosniaks came from a Serbian woman from Srpsko
Sarajevo (the Serbian part of Sarajevo). With regards to the ‘graffiti case’ in Belgrade she
stated that no Serbian denies the events of Srebrenica. Those events are horrible, but at the
same time though, nobody speaks about the murders committed by the Bosniaks from
Srebrenica in the surrounding (Serbian) villages. The leader of the Bosniaks is always put down
in the media as the hero, while the Bosnian Serb leader Ratko Mladic is portrayed as a criminal.
When the words of the woman from Srpsko Sarajevo were presented to a Bosniak girl from
Sarajevo, she got angry and said ‘All Serbians are the same: they all falsify the truth’
Source: own observations and interviews.
Several respondents characterized Bosnians by the fact that they tend not to speak about
sad things. Bosnians do talk a lot, but it does not concern painful memories. This has its
implications for the reconciliation process; if people would talk about the events, maybe
one version of the truth would be reached instead of three. However, it is difficult for
many persons to discuss certain things, to be honest and not to take sides, to keep a
distance between ones personal memories and political motives34. This is especially
difficult when it concerns acknowledging certain crimes that have either been committed
by a perpetrator, or on behalf of ‘your’ ethnic group.
Differences among the three ethnic groups exist in the extent to which people
discuss the truth, but also in the extent to which people acknowledge certain facts. In
Sarajevo there is a tendency to assert that a difference can be noticed, related to talking
34
As formulated by an inhabitant of Sarajevo.
56
about the truth, between the two parts of Bosnia. According to the mainly Bosniak
respondents from Sarajevo, people talk about ‘the truth’ more often in the Federation.
Many people in this area of Bosnia are more moderate than the inhabitants of Republika
Srpska, which means they would admit certain committed crimes and those guilty
persons are brought to court. According to these citizens, the inhabitants of Republika
Srpska have a different approach to ‘the truth’. However, when visiting a village in RS,
one may encounter people with other opinions about this matter. This is also confirmed
by a girl from Sarajevo who stated that sometimes she speaks with people from other
parts of Bosnia, which can be interesting according to her. They have different
perspectives on certain events because they belong to different ethnic groups, but they
have experienced the same things in the end. This does not concern all Bosnians though;
especially in big cities like Sarajevo people from all three ethnic backgrounds mingle.
The fact that Bosnia is ethnically divided compounds the fact that no accordance
about ‘one, common truth’ can be reached. People tend to surround themselves with likeminded people, also in the multi-ethnic city Sarajevo is supposed to be. Like a girl from
this city said: ‘people I am surrounded with have similar opinions and truths’. If people
from the same ethnic groups cling together like this, they will not exchange the different
versions of ‘the truth’. The different versions of ‘the truth’ do not only exist on a
grassroots level in the society, but also on a national level, as the example about the
resolution on Srebrenica in box 4.3 confirms. By the Serbian official authorities no
accordance has been reached about the actual number of deaths.
What is acknowledged by most respondents to be a characteristic for the process
is that truth, and reconciliation as a whole, is mainly an individual process. Everyone has
to look in the mirror and see if they have a clear conscience. Only when this is done, a
start can be made with making judgments about other groups. ‘You can only be sure
about yourself’ is what one of the respondents said, referring to the fact that people have
lied much during the war. Besides, most respondents agreed that the motivation of this
war should become clear; some say it was a civil war, others said it came from outside.
Although it can be considered as logical to know why this war has happened, as well in
relation to eventual conflicts at the Balkans in the future, it is one of the hardest tasks at
the same time. The opinions about the causes of this war still diverge much.
The media can be blamed for some of the suspicion relating to ‘the truth’, as well
as the politicians. They contributed to worsening the conflict in the first place. They
caused confusion and suspicion among the Bosnian population by their hate inspired
messages, something that determined people’s opinions towards other ethnic groups as
well as their opinions towards the media. Besides, it made that people do not know what
to believe anymore.
In 2000 the Association for Truth and Reconciliation was established in Sarajevo,
after the other Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) in, e.g. South Africa. The
objective of this association is to make ‘the truth’ about the events from the war
transparent. This commission could be an interesting tool for finding truth on a national
level, and by doing so encouraging the population to talk about the happened events. If
accordance about certain events would be reached on national level, it would maybe be
easier for the Bosnian population to do the same. However, six years after the foundation
of the association, the Commission has not started working yet. This relates to differing
57
interests within the TRC of different groups, for example organizations of victims feel
locked out. Besides, Bosnians tend to focus more on the judiciary system than on a TRC.
Therefore they are afraid that the International Community invests money in the TRC that
may be spent on the prosecution of war criminals35.
Perspectives on element two: Justice
The second element of reconciliation, as distinguished by JP Lederach, is justice. As has
been shown in the theoretical framework, justice is an important part of the reconciliation
process, and interesting for NGOs and the international community because it is not such
an abstract element as the other three ‘energies’. In order to reach legal justice for the
Bosnians, the international community established the International War Crimes Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1996. The core achievements of the tribunal have been
the establishment of the facts about committed crimes and by doing so unfolding some
parts of ‘the truth’36. The role of the tribunal, by sanctioning perpetrators of crimes, is to
offer satisfaction to the victims and their families. Besides, it wants to warn people that
may consider starting a new conflict, and thirdly it focuses on reducing a crime to an
individual act instead of keeping a whole nation responsible for the committed crimes.37
Though these three themes of the tribunal are all alive in Bosnian society, especially the
first theme is focused on the ‘normal’ citizen. This is why the respondents were asked
whether they felt the tribunal to be satisfactory, and also whether this legal justice is real
justice to them.
Tribunal as satisfaction
There continues to be a very high number of people who believe that war-crimes suspects
must be brought to court if collective guilt is to be reduced and inter-ethnic reconciliation
to take place (UNDP 2005b: 31). Figures from the UNDP stress the importance of justice,
and the precondition of justice for reconciliation as a whole. However, most respondents
stated that they were fed up with the Hague tribunal. They have been following it for
several years now, since the start, and have seen no actual outcomes. The criminals that
are brought to court receive low sentences, whereas they should live out their lives in
prison. Besides, it is a slow and inefficient institution. However, the dominant opinion is
that Bosnians do not seem to be able to judge each other without outside interference,
because of the three different truths. ‘None of these truths is strong enough by itself’. So
the fact that the International Tribunal has been established is accepted, but the efficiency
of the tribunal raised suspicion among the Bosnians.
Still, it is not the way the tribunal works (or does not work) that makes people
say they feel a distance towards the Tribunal. This is due to another reason; some
respondents stated that legal justice is not real justice to them. An official story of the
35
As stated by Nerma Jelacic, BIRN BiH country director
As is officially stated by the ICTY
37
As argued by Srdan Dizdarevic, Helsinki Committee Sarajevo, in an article named ‘truth and reconciliation
in Bosnia’.
36
58
International Tribunal does not give them satisfaction. An inhabitant from Sarajevo said
it like this: ‘12000 people were killed in this town, I can not listen to some statements
about it, I know what has happened’. This relates to the fact that the criminals in The
Hague are not the people that harmed them directly. Many perpetrators are not in prison
yet, besides, there have been so many people in Bosnia that were aware of criminal acts
or maybe have cooperated in crimes, and who are not brought to court. It looks like an
impossible task to try these people. Besides, it has been said that bringing a person like
Mladic or Karadzic to court does not make the atrocities they have committed undone.
The awful things have already taken place and a life time in prison can not make them
undone, as a girl from Sarajevo argued. The same girl wanted the two biggest criminals
to be caught so much during the war, she said, but nowadays she does not know what she
wants anymore. The process has become a political process instead of an emotional one;
the Bosnians themselves are not involved.
Hearing something about a criminal that has been convicted for some crimes and
is in prison now in a different country does not take away the feelings of angriness
among the Bosnian population. So saying that the tribunal serves as satisfaction for the
Bosnian population would be wrong. The fact that the criminals are in a country far away
makes the tribunal kind of invisible as well, despite the fact that the hearings with
suspects (like for example Slobodan Milosevic used to be) are broadcasted life on
Bosnian television. It is too far away, in other post-conflict countries38 they have learned
from this lesson already by having a tribunal in the country where the atrocities took
place (Sierra Leone). However, most of the respondent stated that the alleged war
criminals should be brought to justice, regardless of where a court may be (UNDP 2005b:
69).
Perspectives on element three: Mercy
The third element of reconciliation distinguished by Lederach is Mercy. This element is
especially strongly intertwined with the previous two energies: in order to forgive you
have to admit and tell ‘the truth’. But before persons can ask for forgiveness, they should
acknowledge committed crimes. Since it is difficult for the Bosnians to talk about ‘the
truth’, acknowledgments of mistakes you made, or crimes your ethnic group committed
are not being made to a large extent. However, efforts are being made on a national level
to acknowledge and apologize publicly; at the memorial day of Srebrenica39 in the
beginning of July 2005, the current Serbian president made a speech, saying that he feels
sorry about the crimes committed by the Serbians during the war. This speech caused
friction on both sides: the Serbians felt offended by the fact he excused them for things
they do not think he should apologize for, and the Bosnians did not care that much for the
excuses. As a Bosniak explained: ‘He was not even president of Serbia during the war’.
To this respondent it does not make a difference whether he apologizes or not; ‘in itself it
was a positive thing, but was it a private act or did he apologize on behalf of the whole
38
39
For example in Sierra Leone
It was ten years ago that the ‘safe area’ Srebrenica fell into Serbian hands.
59
society?!’ However, by several respondents it was argued that people have to apologize
on behalf of their ethnic group, even if they have not committed any crimes themselves.
If somebody has been through horrible things, if he or she has been hurt, it is
difficult to forgive. Like a Sarajevan girl argues: she does not know whether she would be
able to forgive the guy who killed her children. Although she always thinks people should
try to forgive each other, she does not know whether it is possible. Opinions about this
topic are divided though; a relation can be noticed between people that are strongly
religious and people who are not. For example Melisa who is Muslim argued very
strongly that everyone has to forgive each other in order to go on; she considered this
‘element’ to be a very important part of reconciliation. She made the strong comment
however; that people should never forget what has happened; although they can forgive
they should never forget.
Perspectives on element four: Safety
The fourth element that Lederach discusses is ‘Peace’, which has been translated in this
research into safety, or human security. Many factors can influence one’s human security,
and security can be perceived in very different ways, depending on the person. Therefore
this research only dealt with human security that relates to the war.
The biggest threat for a Bosnian life nowadays consists out of the landmines that
cover the country. As a result of the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the most heavily
mined country in Europe. A total number of 18145 landmines have been recorded so far
but the actual number is probably higher; it probably amounts up to 30 000 mines40.
Findings of the Landmine Impact Survey confirm that at least 1, 25 million inhabitants of
Bosnia are affected by mines to some degree, 11, 2 per cent of all communities are highly
affected by mines. When driving through Bosnia, one can see many places where demining teams are working to free the area from mines. But even when the area is
officially free from mines, Bosnians may still be too scared to go there. For example the
Olympic mountain near Sarajevo, Trebevic,41 is still covered with mines. A tour guide
from Sarajevo stated that because of rain and snow the mines move so the country will
never be completely free of mines; a reason for him and other Bosnians not to visit those
places anymore.
Although according to the UN report the landmines are the biggest threat to
Bosnian life, this is not the first argument respondents gave for not visiting certain places
anymore. Some Bosniaks said they had never visited Republika Srpska since the border
between the two areas became so clear. The Bosniaks said there was no need to visit RS
because they do not have family members living there, or business to do. The media had
played its part in contributing to fear about the other side amongst the Bosnians. A
woman from Sarajevo said that she hears so much in newspapers about people who are
nationalists, that this has become a reason for her not to visit those places. The same thing
40
These numbers are based on figures of the Common Country Assessment (CCA) for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Dec. 2004), p. 50. This report is composed by the United Nations department of Bosnia.
41
Sarajevo hosted the Olympic winter games in 1984, on the mountain Trebevic, part of the Olympics took
place.
60
happened to another woman from Sarajevo who has family members in RS. Because of
the propaganda (her words) of the media she did not dare to visit her family. One and a
half years ago she went for the first time and realized it was not as bad as the media
pictured it.
Not all respondents declared that they feel safe traveling through the whole of
Bosnia. A difference shows for a start in relation to holiday-destinations. It seems as if
Republika Srpska as a holiday destination is less popular amongst the Bosniaks than
Croatia; in summer holiday Sarajevans massively pack their cars and hit the road towards
Croatia. In winter holidays many Bosniaks used to go skiing in the RS before the war.
Nowadays however, they visit other mountains. This could relate to the mines in RS,
because of logistical reasons. However, amongst Bosniaks many suspicious feelings
towards the Serbians exist; ‘they are in denial’, is how a Bosniak put it into words, a
reason for him not to visit Republika Srpska. With those words he expressed the feelings
of many other Bosniaks. Besides the respondents that have difficulties visiting certain
place, there are many respondents that do visit the whole of Bosnia. They do cross the
country without fear; most Sarajevans included in the research do not have trouble
crossing the borders between the two entities. There is a difference though between
traveling in the whole country and living in an ethnically homogenous place when you do
not belong to that certain group. For example the town Srebrenica houses mainly Bosnian
Serbs (refugees that were not involved in the genocide of 1995). Few ethnic Muslims
have returned to their home town but mutual relations between the Bosnian Serbs and the
Bosnian Muslims are not good, as is the case in many villages with a majority of people
one ethnic group.
The police are an institution that should protect the safety of the people. However, those
respondents that stated they feel safe around the whole of Bosnia criticized the police,
because of the fact that they protect war criminals. It is expected from the police that they
could catch the criminals easily if they wanted; this way it seems as if they just do not
have the will to arrest them. This opinion is heard more often among respondents and
relates to the general feeling of muteness among the population. Besides, ‘it creates an
atmosphere of fear in the country’, as an inhabitant of Sarajevo stated.
EUFOR tries to protect the safety of the Bosnians as well. The troops that are
present in Bosnian society, at the one hand try to rebuild the country, and at the other
hand try to contribute to the safety of the Bosnians. Opinions amongst the respondents
are divided though, when it comes to whether the troops of EUFOR prevent a new war.
Over one third of the population thinks that violence will increase, but not lead to a new
war, the same percentage of people thinks that no change will occur (according to them
the presence of EUFOR does not make a difference, related to preventing a new war).
Few people think that ethnic relations would improve if the international military troops
will withdraw. On the other hand; almost twenty per cent of the population thinks that
war will resume when that happens. This seems like a high percentage but has actually
been reducing the last years: in 2002, 24% of the population used to believe a new war
would break out when EUFOR leaves, nowadays this is 17%. These predictions are all
based on opinions about the communal level. When it comes to personal safety though,
the percentage of the population that considers the presence of EUFOR to contribute to
their safety decreases. Whereas in 2002, 60% of the population thought EUFOR
61
contributes to their personal safety, nowadays 38, 5% believes so42. This finding can be
related to the fact that troops have withdrawn since then, and people have had the chance
to see things staying at ease.
The four elements revised
Especially the first and the second element of reconciliation are important for on the one
hand the Bosnians and on the other hand the reconciliation process. When speaking about
reconciliation with Sarajevans, one of the first things they will mention is the fact that
war criminals still walk around freely. The second thing is that people have to tell ‘the
truth’ about what happened, in order to be able to find common ground to build a future
on. Whereas truth and justice can be considered to be more or less independent elements
of reconciliation, mercy is not. As element of reconciliation it depends on the two
previous ones; to be able to forgive means that somebody firstly has to tell ‘the truth’,
secondly has to demonstrate remorse, and thirdly has to be tried, regardless of the place
or the legal system. The third and fourth energies are important for the country as well,
but to a lesser extent. They are not preconditions for the reconciliation process to
succeed; they result from the first and second energies. By respondents, forgiving is
considered to be less important than the other elements. ‘To forgive’ is often mentioned
in combination with ‘to forget’; to the respondents it is more important that people never
forget what has happened than that they should forgive. This is related to the fact that to
forgive is the hardest thing to do for the victims, and therefore not always possible. It
does not mean though that the reconciliation process will fail when this ‘element’ is not
answered.
Most respondents are not very optimistic about the way truth and justice are
present in Bosnia. Many people lie, do not acknowledge certain events, and even deny
occasions. This is perceived by the respondents as bad; as long as people do not talk
about what has happened, the reconciliation process will not start. The same thing counts
for justice: although not all respondents feel the same about arresting war criminals, to
many of them it is important. The fact that two of the main perpetrators of violence in
BiH, Mladic and Karadzic, are still not arrested causes anger amongst the population.
The respondents that have proclaimed it does not matter whether or not they are captured
explain that it will not bring them justice personally whether Karadzic and Mladic are
captured. The overall situation in the country will not get better when those criminals are
arrested according to them. However, it should be said that these respondents relate
reconciliation to the overall situation of the country. This category of respondents is
pessimistic, it could be stated that they have become indifferent about politics and the
future in general.
Initiatives that are developed by the International Community to promote this
(finding ‘the truth’ and encouraging justice) are e.g. the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) that is to be established in Sarajevo. The basic assumption of these organizations
42
All percentages mentioned are derived from statistics of the UNDP (2005), based on information of the
Psychological Operations Branch.
62
is that they satisfy the needs of the Bosnians, and that they will give them the chance to
reconcile. This assumption can be doubted upon though, because the support amongst the
population for these institutions is not strong. The legal justice that the ICTY provides
does not mean personal justice as well. Criticism of the ICTY includes observations that
the lawsuits are lengthy, the punishments are low, and the perpetrators are not even in
their own country. The other institution; the Truth and Reconciliation Commission does
not get down to it because of at least two reasons. The first reason relates to the strong
relation between ‘truth’ and ‘justice’. According to Bosnians, talking about 'the truth’
means that perpetrators should be brought to court. Since this seems to be the overall
tendency in the country, it could be argued that the international war crimes tribunal in
The Hague satisfies the needs of the Bosnians more. Besides, there is little support from
the authorities for a TRC; both the political and the religious leaders do not support such
a commission. Possibly this is because they have taken part in the conflict, or identified
with a warring party themselves (van de Mortel: 2004). The fact that this commission is
not supported from above is an indicator about the will in Bosnia to discuss ‘the truth’,
the first element for reconciliation.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter began by posing the following questions:
a. What are dominant perspectives of reconciliation in Bosnian society?
b. How does the reconciliation process proceed, based on these perspectives?
By analyzing what reconciliation means to different people within BiH, and how they
consider the subject, a start has been made to outline the reconciliation climate of Bosnian
society nowadays. The motivation for answering these questions has been twofold: firstly
it was of importance what the concept of reconciliation means in Bosnia because this
concept is central in the research. The second reason was to indicate to which extent
reconciliation has been reached in order to be able to judge the efforts of NGOs that will
be discussed in chapter six and seven. This chapter can be considered to be a precondition
for answering the main research question; it is partly meant to describe the Bosnian
context.
The presence of the international community (mostly by means of the Dayton
Peace Agreements) has influenced the Bosnian landscape to a high degree. The DPA has
both geopolitically (by drawing ethnic borders) and mentally (by creating a society in
which ethnic identity comes before all other characteristics) divided the country. Both on
a national level and on a personal level the international community has become part of
the daily Bosnian life. The interference of the international community in the Bosnian
politics has led to a complex governance structure with a foreigner (the OHR) leading the
country. This ensures that almost all aspects of the Bosnian society are under auspices of
the International Community. This has caused dependency among the Bosnians at the one
hand, and despair and distrust in their own country at the other. The few agencies that do
function without outside interference (e.g. hospitals) are often characterized by
63
corruption. It may be that the situation is changing, as different reports state43, but the
Bosnians do not notice these changes. They lose faith in their own country gradually,
which has its influence on the reconciliation process.
The demographical composition of towns is responsible for the ethnical
homogeneity in many of them. But also in mixed towns, as for example Sarajevo, the
borders between the different ethnic groups are maintained. Although there are many
people who do mix, because of mixed schools or work, if they have the choice, most
people prefer to be with people with the same ethnic background. People prefer to
surround themselves with like minded people; to prevent discussions with an ethnic
character. As long as the reconciliation process does not get started, this status quo will be
preserved.
For the reconciliation process, it is important for the respondents that the events
are discussed. When people do not talk about what has happened, the same thing happens
as with all the other wars in the area; so has been said; nobody talks about it, until at one
day the situation explodes. However, as the situation now looks, the feelings of hatred
between the three ethnic groups will not decrease soon. This is related to the fact that
many of the respondents do not have hope for a better future anyway. They do not have
the will to change things for the better because they have lost faith in a better future after
ten years of a country structured and effectively controlled by the DPA. This overall
feeling of apathy has taken over the population and it is difficult for NGOs to make any
improvements in the reconciliation process when Bosnian society is not open to these
efforts.
43
As for example shown by opinions of the Bosnians towards the present international community in their
country; Psychological Operations.
64
5 Media Climate Bosnia
Introduction
During the Bosnian war, print and electronic media were biased and used as a tool for
warfare. This is illustrated by the following quote of a Bosnian journalist:
No one can deny that the conquest of the news media was a precondition for
territorial conquest in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since this country was first shattered by
aggressive media outlets, and then by guns. Words can easily turn into bullets, and
the mighty visual language of TV is in particular ready for this.
Dusan Babic, 2005
Ten years after the war, the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina tries to keep up with the
standards of the rest of Europe. With some help from the international community, media
in Bosnia is functioning as in other countries, but the war has left its scars on the media
climate. The main research question concerns the contribution of media-related initiatives
in Bosnia to the reconciliation process. Before such an initiative can take place, the media
climate should be outlined, to know under which circumstances the NGO works. Besides,
describing the media situation can explain certain problems the Videoletters project,
discussed in chapter seven, faced. Therefore this chapter will answer the following subquestion:
What does the Bosnian media climate look like ten years after Dayton?
The question will be answered on the basis of several topics that relate to media in a postwar society. First the different types of Bosnian media (print and electronic) will be
described. This is followed by some indicators about the development of the media
climate and conditions that should be fulfilled in order to meet the universal standards of
the media44. Finally, some problems the media faces as well as possible solutions will be
brought up.
5.1 Bosnian print media
While walking down the old part of the Sarajevo, small kiosks, so-called ‘trafika’s’, pop
up wherever one looks. These small shops sell all kinds of things, but mainly newspapers
and magazines. In the federal part of Bosnia, 147 different kinds of magazines and
newspapers can be found, in Republika Srpska the number is a bit lower: the Bosnian
Serbs publish 81 varying magazines and newspapers (Press Council 2005). There are
seven daily newspapers in the country and at least five significant weekly or two weekly
magazines. The circulation of the newspapers all together is approximately 80 000 sold
copies a day. It is not possible to register to a newspaper, they can only be bought in the
trafika’s.
44
These indicators are determined and explained in the theoretical chapter, chapter two.
65
According to the Media Sustainability Index, the print media are characterized by three
features. The first one is the low circulation, which, can be explained by the fact that
many Bosnians have low purchasing power, they can not afford to buy a daily at a price
of €0,50. Secondly, the media market in the neighbouring countries is strong and
influences the Bosnian market with 13 daily newspapers and 61 foreign weekly or
monthly magazines. The third feature is the ethnically fragmented market, most papers
primarily cover the entity where they are based. Besides being a result of the war, this
also reflects the structure of the country’s territorial and institutional arrangements (MSI,
2005). As a result of these three problems the print media face, only five percent of the
total population buys newspapers (Babic, 2005).
Of the seven daily newspapers, the two most frequently mentioned by the
Sarajevan respondents are the Dvevni Avaz and the Osloboñenje. The Dvevni Avaz has
the biggest circulation, 12000 newspapers a day, followed by the Osloboñenje with 10
000 a day (Babic, 2005). The Dvevni Avaz targets a mostly Bosniak audience and could
be characterized as a family-oriented newspaper. It is owned by an Islamic millionaire
who invested much money in the newspaper. As a result it is accommodated in the nicest,
shiniest building of town. The view of the shiny new building of the Dvevni Avaz is in
painful contrast with the building standing next to it, the one of the other newspaper,
Osloboñenje. This newspaper, that has a mostly left-winged audience, has become
famous during the war for printing a paper every day. Reason for the Serbian besieger to
bomb and shoot the building, and turn it into the ruined building it is nowadays. The two
newspapers struggle for the biggest market share. Dvevni Avaz has the biggest share but
is closely followed by the Osloboñenje. It has been argued that the Dvevni Avaz wants to
absorb the Osloboñenje (Ahmetasevic, 2005). According to journalists working for the
newspapers, the battle is not that strong though because the newspapers attract different
kinds of readers. The third big newspaper in the country is the Nezavisne Novine, which
is located in Banja Luka and has a pro-Bosnian orientation and policy. Despite the
Serbian character of the newspaper, most Bosnian Serbs reject it and prefer a newspaper
from Serbia. This spill-over of the Bosnian media market also counts for the Croatian
newspapers and magazines that find an interesting market in Bosnia.
The character of the newspapers is defined by the political party it relates to. The
low circulation of the newspapers means that the publishing of the newspapers can not
solely depend on the incomes generated from the papers sold. Therefore, the print media
strongly depends on advertisement, which takes 30 percent of the product’s space.
Advertisers, as a rule, are large and profitable state-owned companies, which are under
the influence of a political party (Babic, 2005). As a result, newspapers may try to be
neutral and not connect with a political party, but they are stuck because they need the
incomes from advertisements to survive. As for the two newspapers described above, the
Osloboñenje is officially not related to politics, unofficially it is backed up by the Social
Democratic Party though (Samra Tzaferovic July 5, 2005). The Dvevni Avaz has an
unofficial political connection with the Muslim Political Party (SDA).
66
Formally no such connection exists, as a journalist working for the Dvevni Avaz
confirmed by saying the following:
There is no politician in this country, nationalist, liberalist or democrat who is
unwilling to talk to me.
Hussein Orahovac, July 23, 2005
However, Bosnian citizens know the connection exists, and many of them do not buy the
Dvevni Avaz because of its political connotation. The political influence is silently
accepted by the Bosnians, mainly because everything is connected to politics in the
country. This is just another area where politics interferes.
Press Council
The Press Council is an independent body which was founded in 2000, after the adoption
of a Press Code in 1999 by six journalist organisations. The Press Code contains 16
articles that relate to ethics, ethnic intolerance, discrimination and journalistic values. The
main function of the Council is to oversee a self-regulatory system for the print media
press in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by controlling the adopted rules of the Press Codes.
Practically, this means that it deals with complaints from members of the public about
newspapers and magazines, it does not actively control each article that has been
published, and therefore it is self-regulatory. This also implies that it is not authorized to
impose sanctions (Press Now, 2004; Press Council, 2003).
In practice, the Press Council has its troubles. During 2004, the Council dealt
with 24 cases, the Dvevni Avaz, the Osloboñenje and the Slobodna Bosna are amongst the
media houses that broke the code. It has been argued that many journalists have not read
the Press Code which makes them unaware of their rights and obligations (Ahmetasevic,
2005). The fact that the agency is self-regulatory, evoked critical reactions from
journalists. In a society that has such a strong internal division and split consciousness
and identity, the concept of self-regulation does not work. The Bosnian society needs
legislation, this way journalists and citizens do not benefit much from it (Babic, 2005).
Another point of criticism concerns the fact that a foreigner leads the Press Council. This
is another example of the Western dominance of Bosnia, it shows their mistrust and
suspicion towards the Bosnian population.
5.2 Bosnian electronic media
Approximately 190 electronic media outlets operate in Bosnia, most of which are local
radio and television stations. Only state-level public broadcasters and some commercial
networks cover the majority of the country. The fact that the number of transmitters is
that high is disputable: it does not reflect vital market with development potential and an
ability to offer diverse voices and opinions (MSI, 2005: 22). According to the journalists
included in this research, the large number of media outlets is problematic, too many
outlets for such a small country does not improve the quality of the transmitted shows.
All electronic media outlets are organized by means of ethnic lines. The state-level
67
television is the Public Broadcasting System which will be discussed in the following
section.
Public Broadcasting System
In May 2002, the Official High Representative designed two laws. The first one is the
Law on the Public Broadcasting System (hereafter called PBS) and on the Public
Broadcasting Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FTV), the second one is the law on
Radio-Television of Republika Srpska (RTRS). According to these laws, the PBS, named
as BHT1, should be a national and countrywide broadcaster, while the FTV and the
RTRS should remain entity-based public broadcasters45. Especially the Bosnian Croats
within the Bosnian parliament argued for exclusive national channels, because they
wanted to protect their linguistic, cultural and national identity (Media Plan Institute,
2005). This behaviour of the Bosnian Croats has been criticized by members of other
ethnic groups in Bosnia. As a journalist from Bosniak origin proclaimed:
People from the same region within Bosnia speak the same languages, whether they
are Croat, Serb or Muslim. But after the war they started using words from their
‘own languages’, stressing the differences. So now one can find the situation at the
PBS where people who are all from Sarajevo use different words and way of
speaking.
Samra Tzaferovic, journalist for a news agency July 5, 2005
In the end it was decided that the programming of the PBS is produced in three studios
with equal status: in Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, predominantly
inhabited by Bosniaks), Mostar (capital of the federation, predominantly inhabited by
Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks) and Banja Luka (capital of Republika Srpska,
predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Serbs). Bosnia is the only country in the region so
far with an authentic PBS, unlike Croatia that has a mix of public and state broadcaster of
national coverage, or Serbia that still has a state-run broadcaster.
Although this system has been internationally highly esteemed, the Bosnians did
not appreciate it to the same extent. According to data from the Mareco Index Bosnia46,
BHT1 has not reached a significant national audience, its share is even declining,
reaching only 4,5 percent of the total audience share in March 2005 (Media Plan Institute
2005). The leading broadcaster of the public channels is the Federal Television, but its
rating dropped from 23,8 per cent in 2004 to 18 percent in 2005. The shift was in favour
of commercial outlets, rather than other public service broadcasters (IREX, 2005).
The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the principle that the
three ethnic groups in the country have equal rights and presentation in official
institutions (see chapter four). As a result, the PBS is divided on the basis of the so-called
dividing key that determines the number of employees from varying ethnic origin. One of
the first things that is checked out when someone applies for a job is his or her ethnic
45
46
Primarily focused on the audience that live sin the entity they cover with their emissions.
An organization that researches among other things, audience ratings..
68
identity. So it could be argued that ethnicity is considered more important than
professionalism. The following quote illustrates the opinion of a journalist about this:
A colleague of mine, who is a great journalist, was trying to get a job in PBS. They
told him: “ok, you are good, but we have enough Bosniaks47 at the moment and you
can not work here. You may be a better journalist than some Serb or some Croat, but
we don’t need Bosniaks now, or Serbs, or Croats”.
Zarif, radio journalist , July 20, 2005
Another consequence that stems from the ethnic division within PBS is that journalists
are meant to highlight the news from different sides. The first rule of journalism is to
check the other sides of a story. However, when journalists are forced to highlight the
news form three ethnic perspectives, the objectivity of the news can be doubted. It is like
the days of Tito, when a Bosnian Croat e.g did a crime, Tito would try and find a Bosnian
Muslim and a Bosnian Serb to put in jail as well, to punish them equally. The same thing
happens with the news today. The following quote illustrates how this is done:
They are always trying to find three sides, if some Croat or Serb or Bosniak does
something criminal, they report it, but at the same time try to find somebody from
another nationality who did a crime to make it even.
Zarif, radio journalist , July 20, 2005
The fact that the PBS is organized through ethnic lines evoked mixed feelings among
journalists. Though they do not agree with the fact that ethnicity comes before
professionalism, they do not see an alternative for the situation. The relation between the
PBS, or the media in general, with other factors in the society is just too strong. Like an
inhabitant from Sarajevo stated, the strong relation between media and ethnicity should
not necessarily be considered to be negative, it is just a part of Bosnian life nowadays. It
is a consequence of the constitution: ‘national equality is followed by all other aspects’.
This is in itself not considered a normal situation, as another informant said: ‘If the
country should go on together, why keep the artificial division within the TV-stations?,
one national television would be better’ Still, this was the initial goal but it seemed that
the different ethnic parties wanted different things. In the end no alternative for the ethnic
division can be imagined, and as a result, the PBS, as a state-level institution, is trapped
in the situation and will not be able to change things.
The dividing key that is used for PBS does not always affect the contents of the
television shows as well. The RTRS for example tries to pay attention to subjects like
peace making, returning refugees and minority rights. They are supposed to have many
programs supporting the society and try to bring positive messages. However, from the
Media Sustainability Index report it appeared that minority groups are not interested in
programming that is made for them. According to them the state should take a more
active role in encouraging and funding these kinds of projects (MSI, 2005).
Despite these imperfections, opinions about the fact that such an institution exists
at all are predominantly positive. However, the situation is not perfect yet. The distance
47
Bosniak is another term for Bosnian Muslim.
69
between the normative/legal level and the factual situation should be bridged, which is
difficult (Media Plan Institute, 2005).
Commercial television
Beside the public broadcasting system, many commercial channels have come up during
the years after the war. Apart from the commercial channels from Serbia and Croatia that
many people watch, some Bosnian channels are popular as well. For example the TVstation Hayat, that targets Bosnian Muslims, or the Commercial channel OBN television.
Both TV-stations derive most of their income from advertisements and especially OBN is
doing well in attracting advertisers (Ahmetasevic, 2005).
Communications Regulatory Agency
The Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA) was originally established in 2001 by a
decision of the High Representative. This agency safeguards the media rules and laws
adopted by the Bosnian parliament. One law they implement is the Rule on Media
Concentration and Cross-Ownership, which implies that one physical or legal entity
cannot own two or more radio or two or more TV stations, which cover the same
population range. The CRA has the right to provide licenses to certain transmitters in
special circumstances (Media Plan Institute, 2005).
5.3 Professionalism in Bosnian media
On the basis of several indicators, the professional standards of quality of the Bosnian
society can be determined. This section will describe how the Bosnian media scores on
these indicators.
Like with many aspects of the Bosnian society, a change has occurred within the
media landscape, when comparing the system of before and after the war. Apart from the
fact that the country experienced a war which ruined the social and political
infrastructure, the society changed from a communistic system to a free market system.
This had its consequences for the professionalism of the media, in two opposite ways.
Before the war, when Bosnia was a part of Yugoslavia, journalists were supposed to
listen to the politicians, without being too critical about them. Nowadays, one of the
effects of the marketing game is that journalists can speak more freely about the things
they hear and see. Besides, if the media makes mistakes, they can be prosecuted by
anyone, whereas this was not possible before the capitalist system was introduced. The
Press Council has started giving citizens the opportunity to complain about the media. As
a journalist explained:
Slowly the media that make mistakes will disappear because they have to pay
money to the ones they harm. So the system will take care of it
Hussein Orahovac, newspaper journalist July 23, 2005
70
However, the free market system also implies that revenues for media outlets mainly have
to be obtained through advertisements. Since the economy in Bosnia is not flourishing at
the moment, and the number of media outlets is high, these revenues are relatively low.
The incomes derived from advertisements, combined with occasional donor support, are
not enough for reasonable wages for journalists. The wages are low or sometimes even
not paid. From a poll conducted by the Bosnian Journalists Association, it appears that of
the 110 journalists included in the survey, over half of them works without a contract
(Ahmetasevic, 2005). According to an editor of the Banja Luka-based newspaper
Nezavisne Novine, this insecure situation for the journalists may influence the objectivity
and adherence to professional standards of the journalists (MSI 2005: 22)48. A young
journalist from Sarajevo illustrated this by saying that he knows many good journalists
that take money from political parties which makes them in his eyes dependent on them.
As for him, he says:
They make a deal with the devil. I am still young and moral, I still did not accept
that offer, but who knows, maybe in two or three years I will accept
Zarif, radio journalist , July 20, 2005
Not all journalists in Bosnia are strong enough to resist the bribes they are offered, the
number of journalists that do accept is not known. The fact that it happens though, is
known by the Bosnian citizens, and it makes them suspicious about their media. As a
student from Sarajevo explained:
I know my friend hates the magazines I read, and that he reads Bosniak-oriented
magazines. I am really trying to understand him. He is telling me that my magazines
are not objective. Then, I really want to remain objective, and I try to critically
observe them. But, nevertheless, I tend to believe them.
Dunja, student psychology June 20, 2005
It is often difficult to judge whether an article or television item is objective or not, but in
a postwar country it is even more difficult. When the overall situation is not stable, which
is the case in Bosnia, every negative influence can cause agitation among the population.
So it is important that journalists do not give in to bribes. This can be overcome by
paying them enough.
Freedom of Speech
Although Bosnia is listed as number 33 in the world list of press freedom49, which is
above e.g the United States of America that posses number 44, some remarks can be
made about the freedom of speech in Bosnia. Freedom of speech for all Bosnians is part
of the Constitution, which makes it easier to compose laws that protect this freedom. One
law that concerns freedom of speech is the Freedom of Access to Information Act,
49
The organization Reporters ithout borders (RSF) keeps an index of all countries in the world, ranked by
press freedom. The list is released annually.
71
meaning that journalists as well as civilians have the right to get access to all information
they need. In practice however, this law does not sufficiently provide the access because
there is general ignorance with regard to the implementation of the law. Besides,
journalists often face arrogance among authorities, they regularly have a selective attitude
towards journalists, they are critical to whom they give information and to whom not.
The influence of politics on the media in Bosnia is disputable and endangers the
freedom of speech. Especially local media are susceptible to direct political influence, but
state-level public broadcasters are subjected to it as well (IREX, 2005: 20). This becomes
especially clear when relating to the PBS with its internal ethnic division which is
imposed by the Dayton Peace Agreements. Politicians that appear on the public channels
regularly misuse this information channel for their own interests. Not rarely these
interests have an ethnic motive. Research done by a research company from Croatia in
May 2005 showed that 75 percent of the 250 respondents felt that journalists’ work is
influenced by certain political parties and politicians (Ibid, p.21).
In general, journalists can say or write whatever they want to, but when they cross
the ethic line, they are restrained by the Press Council or the Communication Regulatory
Agency. The journalists in Sarajevo face less problems considering their work, than
journalists in smaller towns. However, box 5.1 shows the experience of a journalist from
Sarajevo when she worked in Konjic.
Box 5.1: Threat for a journalist
‘I worked as a correspondent for the Osloboñenje in Konjic, near Sarajevo. People there did not
appreciate my writing about the abuses in that place, so they threatened me. They called my
boyfriend and told him I disappeared. Another time I was threatened by a police commander. Both
times I called the helpline for journalists but it did not help me much. In theory journalists should
be able to call them anytime they want, but when you are threatened at 9 pm who will you turn
to?’
Source: Vedrana Zivak, journalist Oslobodenje, July 14, 2005
The journalist quoted in the box has bad experiences with the help lines for journalists,
other journalists included in this research do not even know of its existence. One
journalist explained he writes in a ‘harsh way’, meaning that he is not afraid to publish,
he says he will not spare the people he writes about just to be kind. As a result of his way
of writing he received phone threats but he did not turn to the telephone help lines. More
journalists think like him, they do not think the SOS lines are necessary. So though some
journalists are aware of the existence of these institutes they do not necessarily (want to)
count on them in case of need.
Hate inspired language
In November 2002 both entities adopted a Defamation Law, protecting civil rights by
punishing hate inspiring language in the media. The Communications Regulatory Agency
looks successfully after the implementation of this law for the electronic press. The
agency can punish transmitters when they broadcast programs that contain hate speech.
72
The punishment they can enforce ranges from financial fines and entering to premises to
seizure of equipment, closedown of operations and termination of license (Babic, 2005).
A journalist recalled a situation in which CRA used their power to shut down a radio
station:
I remember some radio station of which the owner was Sonja Karadžić, the daughter
of Radovan Karadžić. The station was shut down by RAK because they were talking
about Radovan Karadžić as a hero.
Zarif, radio journalist , July 20, 2005
The penalties that can be imposed upon the electronic media are in no comparison to the
ones for print media. The print media have a self-regulation system. In theory, the Press
Council should prevent hate inspiring speech but in practice print media are left to do
whatever they want. This led to a restoration of hate inspiring language in the print media
in 2002 during the last elections (Babic, 2005). A report from the American NGO IREX
concludes that:
A certain number of outlets –mainly newspapers- continue to produce content with
the nationalistic themes that in part instigated the war in Bosnia
IREX, 2005
The Bosnian journalist Orahovac confirms this by saying that the ethnic tensions that are
found in the Bosnian media stem from financial problems. He states that if ethnic speech
arises, it is because of lack of means, and unsatisfied feelings which make it easier to
express hate inspired language. To this journalist the miserable economic situation in
Bosnia as a whole is an explanation for all problems within the media.
Education journalists
Many Bosnians who can not find a job in the profession they are educated for, become a
journalist. Though no exact data are available about the number of employed or freelance
journalists, the Bosnian Journalists Association estimates that number of journalists is
approximately 1800 full-time people (Ahmetasevic, 2005). The number of uneducated
journalists among them is not known, but by several informants it has been assumed there
are many of them, becoming a journalist in Bosnia is not subject to rules. The high
number of self-declared journalists is considered a problem by some journalists, as the
next quote shows:
‘We have some people that are electricians, or slaughters, and they become
journalists! I know some one who is a waiter by profession, and now he is trying to
be a journalist, I do not think this is a good thing: if you are a journalist, you are a
journalist, if you are a waiter, you are a waiter’
Zarif, radio journalist , July 20, 2005
The Bosnian market has no room for all the fresh journalists that come from the faculty of
journalism, let alone for all the self-declared journalists. Like has been said before, the
73
wages for journalists are not high, some times they are not even paid at all so more
journalists means less money for each of them. However, at official (registered) news
agencies and radio and television channels, usually only people with an academic degree
are hired. What is worse though, is that the high number of uneducated journalists leads
to a decline of journalistic standards.
The place to learn journalistic standards is either the university or through
workshops provided by differing organizations which will be discussed in chapter six. In
five towns in Bosnia young people can be educated to become journalists: one in Tuzla,
one in Sarajevo, one in Mostar, and two in Banja Luka. In general, the education system
in Bosnia is bad, the faculty for journalism included. There is a need for educating
teaching staff, there are few technical tools for students in journalists and there is rather
low solidarity between journalists (CRA, 2005). The results of the young journalists are
not satisfying in general (MSI, 2005). An employee of the Netherlands Embassy Sarajevo
that sponsors projects for media improvements confirmed this by saying the following:
Bosnian journalists tend to write a lot. The criterion for print mediais not whether
the written piece is good, fore all it should be a lot.
Employee Netherlands Embassy Sarajevo March 2005
This is why the short courses that are provided by several NGOs can help fill up the lack
of information the fresh (and also experienced) journalists have. Examples of these kinds
of courses and the NGOs are described in chapter six.
Peace building and journalistic objectivity
The relationship between objectivity and ‘using media as a peace building tool’ is tense.
It could be argued that media should not carry any message (either negative or positive)
because this contradicts its objectivity. Since this is the main subject of this research it
needs some attention.
It looks like a discrepancy: trying not to break the sacred rule of journalism (see
next paragraph) and at the same time making media with a biased character. It has a
positive character, but still, especially the ‘Intended outcome programmes’ seem to be
biased when it is put like this. This is a strange and tricky situation: on the one hand the
journalist tries to bring positive change in the society and on the other hand he should be
objective50. Staal argues that media should never be the way tob ring change in the
society, whether positive or negative (interview March 2005). Journalists should report
the things they observe and follow the journalistic rules as much as possible. While doing
so, it would be good if they are able to report positive events and not always bad news.
This is also the opinion that the scholar Johan Galtung adherers, which is discussed in the
theoretical chapter. Some opinions of journalists contradict these opinions. For example,
a journalist who works for the RSTV (Republika Srpska Television) stated that
objectivity and positive messages go hand in hand. It should not be a problem according
to her. She refers to her work when she says that she just interviews the people she wants,
50
According to the previous director of the Dutch NGO Press Now, Paul Staal.
74
she lets them say anything they want and does not cut it in that way that she has the news
she wants. And this is objectivity according to her (Jasarevic, July 8, 2005). Although
journalists do not see the problem of uniting the two topics, Boro Kontic, the director of
the NGO Mediacentar, put it differently. He said that the two things are not in contrast in
the way Staal and Galtung see it. He takes a more moderate point of view by saying that
the two are not opposites but do deserve some thoughts (interview July 13, 2005).
A journalist for print media united the two opposites in the following way:
It does not matter anymore whether that news is objective or not. But if you bring
news with the same quality of objectivity on nice events, for coincidence of
neighbours of different ethnic background that refused to see each other for a long
time, have a nice Bosanska kafa51 again, then you unite the two events. You have
objectivity and good news
Hussein Orahovac, journalist for Dvevni Avaz July 23, 2005
In the end the problem does not seem to exist, and of course it also relates to the kind of
media (e.g whether it is informative of entertaining) one is talking about. As far as the
news is concerned, the informants agree that more positive events should be reported in
the society. If the news focusses constantly on negative events, such as new mass graves
that have been found, the society will not positively improve.
Task journalist post-war society
So far some problems the Bosnian media face have been described. It has become clear
that the media in this postwar country is subject to various mistakes. Like one of the
journalists said: ‘we need calm sea in this country’, so it important that the media does
not confuse the society even more than it is. Some last advices for journalists in in a post
war society will be given in this section.
One desirable quality for journalists that was mentioned a few times by
respondents concerns the ‘sacred rule of journalism’52. Although it seems obvious for a
journalist to use several sources that do not contradict each other before publishing or
broadcasting anything, this rule is violated much. Journalists are not always aware of
ethics within their journalistic work whereas especially in post-conflict societies this is
needed. Journalists should always check their facts several times and not be afraid to
write their names down under the article they write53.
While some journalists think their role in the post-conflict society is just to follow
the rules of journalism and try to be as objective as possible, others think it involves
more. For a start a journalist should promote the spirit of tolerance and reconciliation
instead of biased and inflammatory reporting54. Besides, he should try to restore
confidence among citizens. If the media are more engaged in writing about the positive
51
Translation: Bosnian coffee.
As stated by Boro Kontic, director Media Centre at July 13, 2005
53
According to reports of the Communications Regulatory Agency journalists have difficulties writing down
their names under the articles they write.
54
As stated by Dusan Babic, journalistic analyst for the NGO Media Plan Institute.
52
75
things that happen in Bosnia instead of only focusing on the bad things, they could help
improve living conditions in society.
A final advice for journalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerns the image of
the media. Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are tired of the situation in their country
in general, which is reflected in their opinion about the media. Journalists should be
aware of this and be extra careful in their approach towards the population.
5.4 Conclusion
The large number of media outlets in Bosnia exceeds the need of the population. The
number of television and radio stations does not represent the small population of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. It causes confusion among the population and the market is not big
enough for it. The revenues of the TV-channels have to be obtained through
advertisements but the offer of companies is not that high. Above all, companies are often
ethnically coloured which makes the advertisements coloured as well. The newspapers do
not have a high circulation, because citizens do not have the economic means to buy a
newspaper or because of spill-over effects from neighbouring countries. This spill-over
effect also affects the electronic media: many people watch TV-channels from Serbia and
Croatia.
Both electronic and print media are strongly ethnically determined. The ethnic
character of the TV- or radio broadcaster is almost always known. This counts as well for
the commercial channels as for the public broadcasters, as a result of the ethnic division
of the country through the Dayton Peace Agreements. The Public Broadcasting System
contains three TV-channels: one for the Bosniaks, one for the Bosnian Croats and one for
the Bosnian Serbs. The ethnic distinction exists for the print media as well, newspapers
and magazines are strongly related to politics, which is intertwined with ethnicity again.
For both print and electronic media, control agencies have been established. For
the electronic media it is the Communications Regulatory Agency that controls the
number of electronic outlets, the amount of hate inspired language of journalists and the
implementation of the laws and rules adopted by the government. Whereas the CRA has
the power to sanction media or journalists that cross the lines, the control agency for the
print media, the Press Council, has not. This institution works via a self-regulation
system, which means that citizens can complain when they read something which is
against the Press Code adopted by the Press Council.
The education system for journalists has its defects. For example, when
journalists are finished with university they often do not have the practical skills to be a
journalist. Besides, they are often not aware of the effects of their words, which decreases
the ethical standards of Bosnian journalists. However, besides the huge number of
journalists that graduate at universities each year, many people declare themselves
journalists without a proper education. This does not necessarily mean they are bad
journalists, but the market in Bosnia is not big enough for all these journalists. Especially
within the print media a rise of hate inspired speech has been noticed due to this trend.
A relation can be made between the bad economical situation of a journalist and
his objectivity. Wages are low or not paid at all which makes it easier for a journalist to
be bribed by politicians, something that happens often. With standardized wages this
76
problem could be overcome, but the media are mostly depending on self-financing by
advertisements. According to the International Federation of Journalists, there is no free
press if journalists work in conditions of fear and material insecurity (Babic, 2005). So
this relationship with economy and politics characterizes the Bosnian landscape.
All in all can be concluded that many efforts should be made to improve the
Bosnian media climate. Since the problems partially originate from the ethnic division of
Bosnia on a high level (through the Dayton Peace Agreements), the situation should be
tackled at this level. This also counts for the minimal wages of the journalists that should
be regulated on top-level. However, simultaneously journalists themselves should raise
their standards, in particular through their education. By several informants and reports
the short courses provided by NGOs are considered to be successful and filling up the
academic education of a journalist. If journalistic standards would rise, this may
encourage more Bosnians to buy a newspaper or to watch public television and make
them more critical rather than indifferent as is the case today.
77
Srebrenica, May 2005
78
6 Media and Peacebuilding
Introduction
According to the scholar Ross Howard, several ways can be distinguished in which the
media can make a contribution to the peacebuilding process of a post-war society. After
having outlined the circumstances in which NGOs operate in the Bosnian society, this
chapter will focus on answering the following question:
In what way do Non Governmental Organizations use the media to contribute to
the peacebuilding process?
The manual and structure for answering this question consists out of the theory of
Howard, described in the theoretical chapter, chapter two. Several Bosnian NGOs that
work with media and peacebuilding were subjected to Howard’s model by describing and
classifying their activities. The projects described in this chapter are by no means all
executed efforts in Bosnia in the field of media and peacebuilding. However, by choosing
these NGOs an effort has been made to test Howard’s scheme on the Bosnian society.
Every section starts with an explanation about the type of initiative before going over to
the actual activities of the concerning NGO. If possible, some remarks about the effects
of the NGO will be made; however, the sub question itself will be the main focus in this
chapter.
6.1 Type one and two interventions: Conventional journalism development
Type one and Type two media interventions can be characterized as ‘basic journalism’.
These kinds of interventions are especially needed in post-war societies where media has
to start from scratch again. In these societies, basic journalism skills have often made
room for non-objective, biased media. As chapter five showed us, this is also the case in
the Bosnian society, reason for some Non Governmental Organizations to try and help the
journalists develop journalistic skills. From the theory it appears that ‘type one’ and ‘type
two’ interventions are different.
Type one interventions contain activities focused on rudimentary journalism
training. It tries to overcome journalism constrained by its lack of professionalism,
diversity, freedom and technology. These media were often controlled by the state or
special interests. The focus of NGOs working in this field is on three subjects:
•
•
•
Providing technical equipment for the journalists
Training them in the basic skills of journalism
Encouraging the development of journalistic codes of conduct and a basic legal
infrastructure that protects journalists from intimidation.
79
Type two interventions go a step further than the preceding type. The focus is on
providing more responsible journalism development. While doing so, several topics are
focused on:
•
•
•
Developing investigative, explanatory and analytical reporting.
Promoting and providing models for a full media infrastructure (impartial
regulators, access to information, press councils).
Developing diverse, competitive and sustainable media outlets, especially
through management training. (Howard 2003)
Because these two types of intervention both commonly focus on developing both
journalistic skills as well as institutions that protect their work, they will be joined
together in this section. The activities of NGOs that relate to this field are not as clearly
divisible as the model implies. While describing these activities, there will be referred to
the elements explained above.
NGO: Mediacentar Sarajevo
This local NGO is part of a network of several Mediacentars in Former Yugoslavia, it
cooperates with the Mediacentars in Zagreb and Belgrade. This organization was founded
in 1995 when the war was still raging in Bosnia. During the last ten years the NGO has
developed several projects, all focused on serving the overall goal: increase the quality of
journalism. According to one of the donors: Press Now, Mediacentar is a key support
institute within the Bosnian media landscape, together with the Press Council and
Mediaplan, two other local organizations that promote better journalistic standards. Many
donors sponsor the organization, namely; Open Society BiH, Network Media Program,
BBC-World Service Training, Know-How, Usaid, Press Now, Swedish Helsinki
Committee, Irex, Unesco, Unicef, Norwegian People’s Aid, OPA, Fresta, SDC,
Chemonics, “One World Festival”- Prague, SEENPM, BH media community.
Type one/two project: Trainings and workshops of Mediacentar
The first project of the Mediacentar, the ‘BBC School of Journalism’, lasted from 1995
till 2003. The journalists that worked with electronic media were the target group of these
activities. During a ten-week training, these journalists, most of them already
experienced, underwent a training focused on basic skills. Particular focus was on the
practical work; how to use the technical equipment in stock. Besides this ‘school’, a big
number of workshops and trainings have been provided by the Mediacentar, attended in
total by 250 journalists. In these short trainings, special topics are discussed, related to
reporting in a post-war society. For example, one topic could be reporting about the warcrimes tribunal that is established in Sarajevo. According to the director of the
Mediacentar, all these students understood the key principle of the organization: to make
a journalistic story that views the event from all possible angles, in order to obtain a
comprehensive and accurate record (interview Kontic, July 12, 2005).
80
To promote this principle and the objective of the NGO further on, two websites have
been launched. The first one is the website for investigative journalism, education and
journalists’ cooperation in South East Europe: www.netnovinar.com. By way of this
website, journalists from various countries in the region exchange information which
promotes the level of journalism. The website will be supported by establishing a centre
for investigative journalism, in cooperation with other media centres in South East
Europe. The other website is also a key project of the Mediacentar, besides the school for
journalists; this website serves as a digital archive: www.idoc.ba. The database contains
information from the print media: articles that have been published in the daily
newspapers of Bosnia, around 70 % of the articles are entered into the database.
Interested people, varying from students or academics to the next door neighbour, can
download information on anything that has happened during the last ten years in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Development of the activities
During the years that the BBC school of journalists was a fact, 229 journalists have
graduated from the project with success. It is hard to tell though whether they have really
benefited from the School. The focus of this school was on the one hand on teaching the
journalists how to use the technical equipments. On the other hand the school taught them
how to use the principles of being a professional journalist, like using several sources
when reporting a topic, as well as producing balanced information. The NGO can only
assume that the journalists who have followed the courses do something positive with the
information they obtained through the school. No official follow-up exists about the
programs, but according to the director of the Mediacentar, the success of the project can
be measured on the basis of the number of journalists that have followed a course and are
visible nowadays:
Most of the time we know what they (the former students) are doing. The three
months course was finished by probably 220 young journalists from Bosnia.
Probably 60 or 70 % stayed in the media, 30/40 % of them left, disappeared; I do not
know what happened to them. Some of those people are now the best journalist in
the country, which makes one think that we did quite good job. But it is impossible
to see those results in one or two years. And of course if somebody is stupid, he is
still stupid when he finishes the BBC course.
Boro Kontic, director of Mediacentar July 13, 2005.
To illustrate his opinion, Mr. Kontic recounted an anecdote about one of the former BBCstudents. She was on television, presenting a big show, and Mr. Kontic was impressed by
the way she made journalism. He made the comment though, that the journalist was good
before she did the BBC school as well, it is impossible to say if her good presentation is
related to the activities of the NGO in any way. What can be said though, is that it is
interesting for a journalist to follow a course about journalistic skills. This is something
that journalists from different disciplines acknowledged. This counts as well for the short
courses on special themes that the Mediacentar provides, which are appreciated by the
81
journalists. These journalists already know the basics and like the focus of the courses of
the Mediacentar, to increase their journalistic knowledge. For example a journalist that
works for a news agency stated that she has learnt much from these courses, as they
provide the extra knowledge that a journalist may lack because of bad education or warrelated reasons55.
The activities of the Mediacentar regarding the schooling of journalists can be
placed under type one and type two media interventions. Some of the courses of the
Mediacentar are especially focused on teaching the journalists rudimentary journalistic
skills. The school for journalists, the cooperation programme with the BBC, was
especially focused on these so-called ABC skills (Accuracy, Balance, and Context). This
cooperation has now finished and, besides, immediately after the war it was more
important to teach journalists these skills than nowadays. Students are better trained these
days, also because of the efforts of other organizations (e.g. the Internews cooperation
with the university). It could be said that during the years a shift took place from courses
focused on rudimentary journalistic skills (type one) to courses focused on specialist
themes, more in depth journalism (type two).
Type one subjects to courses focused on type two subjects; before being able to
execute investigative journalism, a journalist should master type one skills. Therefore the
division between the two types of media-initiatives is not that clear when it comes to the
courses of the Mediacentar.
NGO: Internews
Internews Bosnia (also called Internews Sarajevo) was originally a branch of the
American NGO Internews, a humanitarian assistance organization that focuses on
assisting local media. The Bosnian department was established in 1996, and since 1998
the organization has been financially independent, managed by local staff. The goal of the
mother organization, as well as the local department is ‘providing experts, professional,
technical, and programming support to electronic/print media and production companies
in all segments of their work’. Besides, the NGO tries to achieve world standards in
journalism. A special goal of the local branch of Internews is ‘affirmation of media work
as a means of decreasing tensions, strengthening democracy, promotion of tolerance,
respect of local cultural, social, national and religious differences in BiH’. These goals
are attempted to be reached through different kinds of projects, some of them in particular
will be described in both this section and section 6.5. Since its founding in 1996,
Internews Bosnia has worked in nearly fifty cities to support more than 90 local TV and
radio stations in both the Federation and Republika Srpska.
Type one/two project: School of Journalists
The faculty of political science of the University of Sarajevo started cooperation with the
local NGO Internews Bosnia, to teach the upcoming journalists how to use technical
equipments. When the organization realized some problems exist in educating journalists
55
Based on an interview with Samra Dzaferovic, journalist for a news agency.
82
in Bosnia, they started the cooperation with the faculty of political sciences in 2000. The
services of Internews are restricted to teaching the students mainly practical skills. The
NGO provided computers with internet as well as material for the students to work as
journalists, because of a bad financial situation of the university these service can not be
provided by the university self. The aim of the project is to give the students the
opportunity to get some practical knowledge of the profession before entering the labour
market. Before Internews became involved, students did not develop this aspect of
journalism and perceived this as a problem because they lacked this kind of knowledge.
Because the activities of Internews Bosnia, in relation to the school of journalists,
are restricted to teaching the pupils practical skills, this is clearly a type one initiative.
With respect to the contents of the profession of a journalist, the faculty of political
sciences contributes to the education of the journalists. This kind of media initiative
differs from the activities of the Mediacentar, because it can be characterized better as a
type one initiative. Besides, the pupils that follow the school of journalists are still
studying whereas it is expected from the persons that follow the courses of the
Mediacentar that they know the standards of journalism.
6.2 Type three interventions: Transitional Journalism Development.
Type three media interventions go a step further than the development of basic
journalistic skills. Journalist still play the main role in executing the projects, but their
task differs from type one and two projects. Whereas they were carriers of information
within the first types, now they create dialogues within the community by raising conflict
related topics. This has also been called peace journalism; conflict resolution has become
absorbed in the journalism.
NGO: Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo
In 1995 the Nansen Academy in Lillehammer, Norway,56 started a training project for
people from former Yugoslavia. The program was about democracy, human rights and
peaceful conflict resolution. Since then thirty groups of people (300 participants) went to
Norway to follow seminars on this matter57. After the seminar they established offices in
whole of the Balkans, mostly occupied by locals. The Nansen Network expanded through
the years till a total number of nine offices; three of them are located in Bosnia (Banja
Luka, Mostar and Sarajevo). One NDC is located in Croatia, Osijek, two are located in
Kosovo (Bujanovac and Mitrovica), one is located in Montenegro (Podgorica), one in
Serbia (Belgrade) and the last one in Macedonia (Skopje) (NDC 2006). All offices have
their own projects, related to the problems that ought to be faced in the area. Within some
projects the different offices cooperate.
56
The Nansen Academy is an educational institution for adult students with different political, religious and
cultural backgrounds. The Academy is founded on the inheritance of humanism and aims at strengthening the
knowledge about this inheritance.
57
This information originates from a report of the Embassy of the Netherlands, written by van de Mortel.
83
The main goal of the organization is to promote the dialogue between different groups in
the society and while doing so ‘contributing to a high level of national reconciliation and
tolerance’. The results the NGO wishes to achieve are threefold:
•
•
•
To create an extensive network of those people currently co-operating in the
fields of interest of the group.
Competent individuals working actively for democratisation, reconciliation,
conflict resolution and peace.
An open forum for dialogue.
The NDC tries to achieve these goals through different kinds of projects. The
organization focuses on connecting people from different ethnic backgrounds through
seminars, followed by certain ‘leading figures or groups’ in society. The teachers-project
(described in chapter four, on reconciliation) is one example, other target groups are
politicians and, more relevant for this research: journalists. Secondly they realized
themselves that seminars alone do not guarantee peaceful co-existence. In the ‘Divided
Community Project’ the NDC tried to overcome the criticism that many NGOs receive:
the lack of follow-up after activities have been carried out. The next section will describe
how they do that.
Type three project: Divided Community Project for journalists
All nine Nansen Dialogue Centres are united in this project, which focuses on ‘divided
communities’ in their surrounding. For example NDC Sarajevo focused on Sarajevo
itself, while this is an ethnically divided town whereas NDC Skopje focused on Tetovo,
which is divided between Albanians and Macedonians. The target groups were different
each time but the main focus was to expand the original goal of the seminars that were
attended by all participants, by encouraging them to do something with the workshops
and meetings they had. One of the target groups that were dealt with in this project was in
particularly interesting for this research: journalists.
From every ‘divided community’ where a Nansen Dialogue Centre is
accommodated, two journalists were invited to work for the project. The journalists could
either work for electronic or print media, as long as they had some experience in their
work field. The main goal was to decrease hate speech in the countries participating in
the project. In total eighteen journalists came to Lillehammer in Norway and followed
workshops on conflict resolution. The focus of workshops was not journalistic skills: they
already proved to have these skills through their daily work. The reasons for joining the
project differed; two journalists from Sarajevo cooperated in the project because they
were ‘looking for adventure’58 or ‘wanted to help in decreasing the inequalities between
the ethnic groups’. Vedrana Zivak said that she thinks that people really do live in
divided communities and that these ‘artificial borders’ need to be crossed. It has to be
mentioned that the journalists receive some money for joining in the project, but the
58
For a Bosnian it is not easy to leave the country for a holiday because of financial reasons or lack of right
documents.
84
amount is so low that it could hardly be a main drive to participate in the project. After
the seminar in Norway they all received an assignment, depending on the way they work
as journalists they had to make a contribution to the project through their daily work, the
central theme was ‘prejudices’. The project was divided in several phases, after each
phase the participants came together to discuss the progress of their work and to make
new plans. In the first phase of the project the eighteen participants of the project had to
deal with a fixed theme, this was ‘prejudices’.
One of the ‘divided communities’ the Nansen Dialogue Centre concentrated at
was Sarajevo. Two journalists were invited to work at the project: Sladjana Jasarevic and
Vedrana Zivak, box 6.1 describes these journalists and the contents of their work.
Box 6.1 The two participating journalists from Sarajevo
Sladjana Jasarevic lives in Srpsko Sarajevo (the Serbian part of town). She works for RSTV, the
public television station for Republika Srpska and made a series of six television shows for the
Nansen Dialogue Centre. The subjects of the shows differed from a Bosniak woman working for
the police of Republika Srpska59 to the story of the mountain Jahorina. This used to be a popular
winter resort for all kinds of Bosnians but after the war mostly Bosnian Serbs come to ski here
since it is in the territory of Republika Srpska now. The thing the documentaries had in common
was that they were all dealing with prejudices.
Vedrana Zivak lives in Sarajevo. She works for the daily newspaper Oslobodenje and wrote a
series of articles on the subject of war criminals that are presented as national heroes in Bosnia.
This is a theme, which is actual in the country at the moment and therefore interesting for some
investigative journalistic research. In a series of five texts these articles were placed in the
Oslobodenje. Another series of articles concerned the problems of soldiers that fought on different
sides in the last war.
Source: interviews July 2006.
During their work for the Nansen Dialogue Centre they had to overcome several
difficulties. One of these problems concerned the journalistic work itself. The fact the
journalists want to show something that can be emotional and touching can give them
trouble. Jasarevic told me about a situation she faced when making a documentary about
a Bosniak girl from Srebrenica that works for the police of Republika Srpska nowadays:
The neighbours of the girl roped tyres around her car and they threatened her: ‘Don’t
you think it is more than enough that you work for the police of Republika Srpska,
why do you want to show it on the screen?’. So I gave up the story because I didn’t
want to cause any troubles for the girl; my intentions were to help. And off the
record she said that she has no problem to work there, she likes to work there, she
has fun with her colleagues, everything is just fine. The inhabitants of Pale accept
her and think that she is a very interesting person.
Sladjana Jasarevic, journalist RSTV, July 8, 2005.
59
This is an unusual situation. The woman was a Bosnian Muslim from Srebrenica, she worked for the police
department of Republika Srpska, the Serbian part of Bosnia. This is contradictory to many people, especially
because for example many Bosnian Muslims doe not even dare to go to RS, and vice versa.
85
Other situations concerned participants who had trouble doing their work for the NDC
because of opposition of their bosses. First of all the participants were journalists,
secondly they were ‘facilitators of critical dialogues within the community’ (as Howard
suggests journalists should be in this kind of media-intervention). This second role caused
them some trouble now and then. A few situations were mentioned in which participants
had to quit the NDC project. One journalist from Novi Pazar (southern Serbia) had
difficulties transmitting her radio show because of the political content of her program.
The radio show was not independent but hosted by the municipality that apparently did
not agree with the journalist. Another journalist, from Vukovar60 had trouble with the
editor of the newspaper he was employed. This editor opposed the idea of him
cooperating with the Serbs so the told him: “If you go, you’re out”. As a result the
journalist dropped the project. In two other places, Tetovo and Prijedor, the journalists
faced trouble with the editors as well and had to quit because of that. The fourth drop out
had to stop because of a lack of motivation.
Events like these indicate that projects like ‘Divided communities’ are not
developed without reasons; apparently not all editors or television directors subscribe to
the goals of the NDC and that it is necessary that Bosnian society is faced with
documentaries like the ones of Jasarevic.
Development of the Divided communities project for Journalists
The Nansen Dialogue Centre does not have the money or means to research the reach and
impact of their projects. However, an employee of the NDC said it is supposed that the
divided communities project contributes to decreasing hate speech and to better
interethnic relationships. The fact that the project has been found successful enough to
prolong it after phase one shows the confidence NDC has in the participants. The
Sarajevan journalists subscribe to this attitude, and reactions on their projects were
positive. Zivak said: ‘I received letters of readers telling me they were content about the
fact I am not one-sided in my story but discussing all three truths in my articles’. The
other journalist, Jasarevic, told me she had telephone calls of people she interviewed, they
were very content with the way she portrayed them.
One of the goals of the NDC is ‘achieving a network of those people currently
cooperating in the field of interest in the group’. This goal seems to have been achieved;
the participating journalists have good contact. The two Sarajevan women meet every
week, while before the NDC Vedrana Zivak may not have reasons to visit Srpsko
Sarajevo and vice versa. Also with the journalists from other parts of the Balkans they are
in good contact, they call each other if they need information. This serves several
purposes: the journalist can cross-check the facts by obtaining information from the
‘other side’, friendships between people from the whole of former Yugoslavia exist and
the journalists get to know more information on the situation in former Yugoslavia in
general. As Vedrana Zivak puts it: ‘an interesting thing was their choice for people who
60
Vukovar is a divided town in Croatia, the conflict here was between Serbs and Croats.
86
are cooperating in the project. They are from Kosovo, Albania, and actually it was only
then that I found out what is really happening in the other parts of SFRY61’.
In promoting the dialogue between members of different ethnic groups this
project can be considered as successful. The Nansen Dialogue Center seemed to be one
of a kind among NGOs that pursue reconciliation, for two reasons. The first one is that
they do not stop the project after the participants have followed a seminar and the second
one is that they seem to be the only network entirely devoted to promoting dialogue and
reconciliation in the region (Van de Mortel 2004).
6.3 Type four interventions: Media-based interventions.
Type four interventions are also called media-based intervention. The difference with the
previous three types is that the executer is not the journalist anymore; the focus has
changed to an outside intervener that set up a media project. The activities are mainly
focused on a highly specific audience. Objectives of this media-based intervention are: to
counter hate propaganda, or programming to provide immediately practical information
such as election and voting practices, refugee reunification, education or health advice
(Howard, 2002).
UN News
Right after the war ended, a branch of the United Nations made a radio program, which
made news for the whole of Bosnia. The overall message of the radio station was peace;
subjects that supported these objectives were ‘living together, returnees, nationalism’.
Every day the program would be online for thirty minutes, broadcasted by 45 radio
stations all around Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its employees were mostly young people of
different ethnic groups. The program stopped in 1999 because Bosnia did not need a
program like that anymore, other organizations took over (Zarif, Sarajevan journalist,
July 20, 2005)
EUFOR- Psychological Operation Branch
The international community established a peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia
in 1992. This military force changed into the Implementation force (IFOR) after the
Dayton peace agreements, before turning into the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) later on. In
December 2004 it changed for the last time, into the European Force (EUFOR). Among
many other things, EUFOR deals with media; they developed an entire media program,
including print and electronic media. This media program is part of the Psychological
Operations Branch, also called psy-ops. The goal of this organization is to change the
minds of the Bosnians in a positive way. My respondent put it like this: ‘during the war
so-called black psy-ops were spread, negative messages and hate speech. Nowadays it is
the tasks of the media-branch of EUFOR to spread white psy-ops to counter hate speech,
61
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
87
by fast actions, quick messages’. While doing so they focus on the following four
elements.
The first element concerns image building. The Bosnian population should know
EUFOR is trying to do good things, they should not be seen as enemies. Therefore certain
media approaches are launched to show the population that the actions of EUFOR should
be perceive as something positive instead of having a negative connotation. These kinds
of actions are also undertaken when things go different to how they were planned. For
example last year, a priest died by gunfire of EUFOR-soldiers while they where searching
for Radovan Karadzic. Events like these could harm the reputation that EUFOR has tried
to establish during the last few years so carefully. Therefore EUFOR immediately started
a media campaign to counter the ‘black psy-ops’. The second element is tolerance.
Through a magazine that is published every month: Mirko, EUFOR tries to improve the
tolerance level in society. The third theme they try to tackle is reconciliation: through
carefully planned actions they try to change the people’s minds concerning reconciliation.
The fourth theme is providing the population with information on, e.g., landmines.
The actions of psy-ops are mainly focused on young people. It is very difficult,
almost impossible, to change the mind of a 40-year old. Parents are often the guilty ones
but if the focus is on children, two goals may be achieved: the child tells his parents about
the things he has learned. At the same time the so-called ‘black psy-ops’ of the parents
towards their children are countered. Before a new media campaign is launched it is
checked precisely on the possibility of hate speech. It should be prevented against all
costs that the actions of EUFOR strengthen feelings of ethnic hate. Every six months
EUFOR measures the change in attitudes of people of different ethnic origins towards
each other. The differences in attitudes towards other ethnicities however, do not change
that much according to these surveys. The outcomes of the surveys of three years have
been compared; within those outcomes some small differences can be seen. For example
among the Bosnian Serbs the interethnic tolerance has increased over the three years62.
These differences in attitude can hardly be attributed to the efforts of EUFOR though.
This scepticism is subscribed by the Mediacentar director Boro Kontic, who stated that
the actions of EUFOR are like ‘sending a mosquito to an elephant’. He means that these
fast actions, the white ‘psy ops’ that EUFOR tries to spread, can be considered as pin
pricks. The process of altering the perceptions of some Bosnians of one another in a
positive way (the objective of EUFOR) takes years and years and the small
advertisements EUFOR spreads will not make that happen so he said.
The two projects can both be characterized as type four media initiatives. The UN
radio show was only executed for a short period, just after the war, with very clear
message. The program of EUFOR is much bigger than the UN news, and lasts for a
longer time. Both initiatives are executed by an outside intervener which characterizes
them.
62
For more information about ethnic intolerance and EUFOR reports, I refer to chapter six.
88
6.4 Type five intended outcome programming.
This type of media intervention is the most direct one of all. It focuses on promoting
reconciliation and reducing conflict, usually conducted by NGOs. The programs can have
an informative or an entertaining character and the media workers map play a role
themselves as conciliators in the field (Howard 2002).
Type five project: Internews: Balkan bridges
Amongst other projects that can be characterized as ‘type five’, Internews co-produced a
television program called ‘Balkan Bridges’. Immediately after the Bosnian war in 1996,
many people had difficulties finding each other again. According to the NGO these
problems were mainly of a logistical character. Because of damaged roads and nonworking infrastructure, former Yugoslavians lost touch with each other. Fourteen
episodes were broadcasted on television stations throughout the region. Each episode
showed a video-conference link that connected cultural figures, political analysts and
ordinary citizens in direct dialog to discuss key social and political events. Box 6.2 tells
the story of one of the episodes.
Box 6.2 Goran Bregovic and Davorin Popovic
In one of the episodes of the Balkan Bridges program, a satellite connection is established between
the Bosnian Serb composer Goran Bregovic, and the Bosnian rock star Davorin Popovic. The two
musicians used to play in the most famous band of the Balkans for many years: Bijelo Dugme,
originally from Sarajevo. When the war started, Bregovic, as a Bosnian Serb, was put in a
stalemate. He did not want to fight on any side, and said: ‘I am a musician, not a soldier’. Still, not
fighting in the Bosnian war was not an option: all healthy men were forced to pick a side and fight.
This was an impossible task for Bregovic: if he joined the citizens from Sarajevo in their struggle
it would mean he would maybe shoot his uncle who was stationed in the surrounding mountains,
or his nephew, living in the Serbian part of Sarajevo. At the other side; if he joined the Serbian
army it could mean he had to shoot his own friends in Sarajevo. Bregovic decided to flee the city,
he went to Belgrade and produced his best musical compositions during the war. Meanwhile, his
former colleague Davorin Popovic stayed in Sarajevo and fought. The latter blames Bregovic for
that, as many Bosnians do. The episode of Balkan Bridges is recorded one year after the end of the
war, when tensions were still high. During the episode it becomes clear that although the two
musicians are happy to see each other, they have many things to talk about and the situation
between the two is not clear. The reactions of the Sarajevans on the flight of Bregovic to Belgrade
in the days of the war still stand. Last year a reunion of the rock band Bijelo Dugme took place;
they held a big concert in four capitals of former Yugoslavia. In Sarajevo the opinions about Goran
Bregovic were divided: many people did not care anymore about the events from the war, and
visited the concert with the greatest joy. But many people however, were not at ease with the
situation: they still blame Goran Bregovic for leaving Sarajevo
Source: video material Internews, own observations
89
This story tells that even though the one to forgive: Bregovic, is an appreciated musician
in the whole of former Yugoslavia and even though his decisions are understandable,
people have difficulties forgiving him. Besides, it shows the interest of a program like
‘Balkan Bridges’; it focused on issues that were very real in the days after the war (and
probably still are). Articles from newspapers from those days confirm this positive
opinion about the TV-program; they wrote about the sensational character of the show,
that was one of a kind those days (Nasa Borba and Vreme (1996)).
Type five project: Mediacentar: Without Anaesthesia
Besides the ‘type one and two’ activities of the NGO Mediacentar that are described in
the first part of this chapter, they also execute a project with a ‘type five’ character. This
is the project ‘Without Anaesthesia’, which is a television programme, broadcasted on
BHTV 163. The program consists out of a series of documentaries that are collected on
several Documentary Festivals in Europe. They are not broadcasted on television before,
and in Bosnia, showing documentaries on television is not being done regularly as well.
The themes of these documentaries are mostly not so visible on regular television, so the
director of the Mediacentar stated. For example minorities, human rights, drug abuse,
women trafficking etcetera. The subjects are not directly related to the war or
reconciliation, for all they focus on issues that play a role in the Bosnian society
nowadays. All these documentaries however, are selected to raise awareness under the
TV-audience. Beside, they have a special message, saying that all people should be
allowed to say and think what they want. With the project, the NGO tries to redevelop the
culture that has originated in Bosnia during the last ten years. This culture implies that
people do not express their opinions, especially in the rural areas, because they are afraid
for negative reactions. This does not encourage the reconciliation process in Bosnia, by
broadcasting these documentaries, the organization hopes to contribute to changing this
culture.
Based on the viewing numbers of ‘Without Anaestashia’, few people have
watched the show. According to the director of the Mediacentar, this is because the show
was broadcasted on Monday evenings, after prime time. The program was even better
watched in the reprisal. Still, reactions on the program in the newspapers say it has been
appreciated by the public. Besides, people reacted who said they appreciated the fact that
this is just a normal documentary, dealing with topics that have become normal in Bosnia
during the preceding years. Because of these documentaries they started talking about the
subjects, which is a desirable result for a documentary maker, as well as for the NGO
who broadcasted it. Besides, local NGOs showed interest in the documentaries; they can
use them in order to educate Bosnians. For example an organization that works with
abused children found these documentaries helpful in providing the parents with
information.
The message of all of these documentaries is to make Bosnians aware of certain
issues. In this way it can be compared with the ‘white psy-ops’ that EUFOR tries to
63
This is the public radio-television for the entire area of BiH. More information about the public
broadcasting system can be found in chapter six on the media climate in Bosnia.
90
distribute under the Bosnian population, there are reasons however why they are
classified in different categories. First of all the kind of organization that executes the
project differs: the Mediacentar is a local NGO while EUFOR is an outside intervener.
Besides, the way in which EUFOR spreads the white psy-ops is more active than the way
in which the Mediacentar tries to do it. EUFOR wants to bring change, to change the
perception of the Bosnians on life. This goal is much to high for the Mediacentar; they
mostly want to inform the audience with their program but by targeting certain issues.
6.5 Conclusion
Let us look at the original question that was posed at the beginning of this chapter:
In what way do NGOs use the media to make a contribution to the peacebuilding
process?
Several initiatives of NGOs have been described in this chapter, are presented in a
classification, shown in table 6.1. By filling in this scheme it can be concluded that the
theory of Ross Howard is applicable to the Bosnian media climate. The comment has to
be made though that type one and two activities are very alike; on paper the difference is
clear, in practice however, these activities overlap, as can be seen in the workshops the
Mediacentar provides: it is hard to tell the line between basic journalism skills and
investigative skills, therefore in the scheme, type one and two activities are joined
together. Besides, the theory of Howard concerns more stages of a conflict, while this
research only enhances the post-conflict phase since that is the situation Bosnia finds
itself in.
Within the scheme, a distinction is made between the strategy the NGO uses to
contribute to the peacebuilding process, and the target groups the NGO tries to reach.
While the first three types of intervention focus on journalists, the fourth and fifth types
focus on the Bosnian population as a whole. This does not mean though the other
activities do not intend to reach the Bosnian population; they do it indirectly. With the
activities like training journalists, the line from activity of an NGO to the population is
long and not always clear. The activities that are part of type four and five, focus directly
on the (in this case) Bosnian population.
91
Table 6.1 Classification media initiatives.
Media initiative
Type one and two:
conventional
journalism
development.
Project
Mediacentar:
BBC
School of journalists.
Mediacentar:
netnovinar and Idoc.
Internews School for
Journalists
Type Four: Mediabased intervention.
UN News
EUFOR:
Psychological
operations branch.
Type five: Intended
outcome
programming
Internews:
Bridges.
Balkan
Strategy
Basic training in
standard ABC skills
for news gathering:
Accuracy,
Balance
and Context. Also
advanced journalistic
trainings
Information access for
investigative
journalism.
Provision of technical
support
and
equipment.
Also
trainings in the ABC
skills.
Establish temporary
media
productions.
Counter hate radio.
Meet
needs
of
affected
population
such as: landmines,
basic needs, safety.
Counter hate radio,
recruit local staff.
Provide programme
speaking directly to
conflict
issues,
discussion
of
stereotypes,
promotion
of
tolerance,
reconciliation.
Target group
Experienced
journalists.
Interested
people:
journalists, scholars,
researchers, students.
Students, upcoming
journalists.
Bosnian population
Bosnian population.
Bosnian population.
The main question of the research concerns the contribution that media-related NGOs can
make to the Bosnian reconciliation process. While this chapter does not intend to answer
that question, it is possible to judge the efforts of the mentioned NGOs on the character of
their projects. The fact that the line from activity to population is long and vague within
type one and two initiatives makes it extremely hard to measure the impact. Successes
have to be based on reactions of participants of the workshops and possible ratings under
the population about the media climate as a whole. Still, NGOs that carry out type
one/two or three activities, assume that better journalistic skills or journalism with a
positive message, contribute to the peacebuilding process as well as democratizing a
society.
While the line from activity to target group is shorter when it concerns type four
and five initiatives, it is still difficult to measure its influence. Chapter four on
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reconciliation shows that possible changes in attitudes among Bosnians towards the other
ethnic groups living in their vicinity do not occur often or easily. From this finding could
be concluded that effects of the Psychological Operation Branch (the type four initiative)
are not too numerous. Still, changes have occurred, interethnic tolerance has increased
during the years, the actual contribution of the EUFOR-efforts to this process are hard to
measure though. The same thing counts for the type five activities mentioned in this
chapter: although reactions have been positive about both examples, it is difficult to
measure the actual contribution of these programs to the peacebuilding process. It can be
assumed that broadcasting documentaries like the ones included in ‘Without Anaesthesia’
do contribute to raising awareness under the Bosnian population about certain issues.
Besides, it could be imagined that people talk about the contents of the programs, which
makes it more plausible to believe that the program has a positive impact on society.
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Mostar, March 2005
94
7 Videoletters, a type five media-initiative
Introduction
The preceding chapters focused on accounting for the circumstances in which mediainitiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina are carried out. In this chapter, a ‘type five’
initiative, an ‘intended outcome programme’, will be analysed. The project Videoletters
has the properties of such a media initiative; it is non-conventional journalism, it tries to
bring peace, and the media workers may play a role themselves as conciliators in the
field. This chapter intends to answer the last sub-question of this research:
What has been the contribution of ‘Videoletters’ to the Bosnian reconciliation
process?
The answer to this question will be found by first describing the background and contents
of the Videoletters project. Secondly the results of the project will be analysed, by
discussing the need, reach and reactions (or impact) on Videoletters.
7.1 Background of the project
For six years, since 2000, the authors of the project have been travelling over the Balkans
to find people who were willing to record a Videoletter for someone they last contact
with. Rejger and Van den Broek visited Mostar many years ago. Since the war, this town
has been ethnically divided between Croats and Muslims. When they spoke with the
Croats from Mostar they found out these people had not visited Sarajevo anymore since
the war, they were afraid to cross the ‘invisible border’. The Muslims in Sarajevo on the
other hand, were curious about the lives of the Croats in Mostar. This inspired Van Den
Broek and Rejger to start their Videoletters project. They figured that there would
probably be more people like these who were wondering how their former friends and
neighbours lived now. After travelling over the Balkans for six years they collected
material for twenty episodes of Videoletters.
Finding people that were willing to cooperate in making a Videoletter was not the
easiest job. In each episode a sensitive, touching and deeply personal story is being told; a
reason for some people not to want to express their story in public. The videoletters came
from the whole of former Yugoslavia but the stories were always related to one of the
wars that took place in the area in the 1990s. Since the situation in former Yugoslavia is
still tense in some areas, one can imagine it is hard for a filmmaker to interview people in
areas like these. Because of fear people were sometimes afraid to cooperate with the
project.
Because the episodes were about the former Yugoslavs, the filmmakers wanted
to broadcast it in the whole of the region. For the first time in over ten years, all the
directors of the public broadcasting organizations of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia
and Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia were brought together to discuss the
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possibilities of broadcasting the episodes. The independent television station B92 from
Serbia joined as well which made the total number of broadcasters come to seven,
covering almost the whole of former Yugoslavia (16.6 million people).
The makers of Videoletters did not want the audience just to be passive viewers
of the show, they wanted them to do something with the information they received. The
way the organization of Videoletters formulated their goal was: ‘videoletters is a tool for
reconciliation in post-war countries and a conflict prevention tool in multi ethnic
societies. By reconnecting former enemies, videoletters contributes to open
communication and makes reconciliation possible64. While trying to achieve this goal, the
series was the heart of a larger project. The ideology behind it was that the authors of the
show figured that they could reach a whole population through television with their
Videoletters. If they could encourage these people to make their own Videoletter and get
in contact with lost contacts again because of their project, they had reached their goal.
Two objectives were needed to try and reach this goal.
•
•
Reconnecting people who have lost contact due to one of the wars in former
Yugoslavia.
Humanising the ‘other side’. Reducing hate speech and talking about other
ethnicities in political terms. Not speaking in terms of ‘us and them’ but about
‘me and he/she’.
In order to reach these objectives, the organization of the Videoletters project developed
several tools. These ‘tools’ will be described in the following section. The donors that
realized the Videoletters project were: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Now,
Stability Pact, British Embassy Belgrade, XS4all, British Foreign and Common Wealth,
Dutch Embassy BiH, Swiss embassy, CARE, Office of the High Representative,
European Cultural Foundation, Open Society Institute, USAID, and the OSCE.
Contents of the project
7.1.1 Broadcasting
The core activity of the Videoletters project was broadcasting the series. All the public
broadcasters in the countries of former Yugoslavia broadcasted the show, however not at
the same time, as was planned. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo, the
show was broadcasted at the arranged time: Thursday 9 pm. The other broadcasters
differed from this time schedule. In Serbia the public broadcaster had difficulties with
five episodes of the show, these were broadcasted by the independent television station
B92.
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Source: www.videoletters.net September 2006.
96
In box 7.1 the contents of the non-broadcasted episodes are told.
Box 7.1 Non broadcasted episodes by Serbian public broadcaster
Mujerisa and Jovisa. This is the story about a Muslim woman (Mujerisa) who lost
her husband and children in the Bosnian war. Ten years after the war has ended, she
is still looking for the remnants of her children; because she was taken to a camp
she did not have the opportunity to bury them. With a Videoletter she asks her
former neighbours, Serbian Bosnians, for help.
Nenad and Ruder. Two boys from Sarajevo, Nenad is a Muslim, Ruder a Serb. In
the early stage of the war, Ruder’s family decides to leave Sarajevo. Nenad tries to
find Ruder again many years later, he never saw him again.
Irma and Dorde. They have been neighbours for a long time, living in Grbavica,
the part of Sarajevo that was Serbian territory during the war. Irma is Croatian,
Dorde is Serbian and was called Johnny before the war in which they shared their
fears. After the war Johnny left and went to live in Republika Srpska, and he let
people call him Dorde. Irma does not understand why he left without saying a
word, Dorde explains in his videoletter.
Vera and Vlasta. Vera is a Serbian woman who met Vlasta, a Croatian woman, 40
years ago. This is when their friendship started. During the Croatian war, Vlasta’s
son is shot. Vlasta declares on television in that period that for her, Serbs do not
exist anymore. Vera wonders many years later whether this counts for her as well.
Beli and Dejan. Two boys who grew up in Belgrade, Beli is Serbian, Dejan is
Croatian. As the ethnic identity of the friends seem to matter more and more, Dejan
and his family move to Croatia. Years later Beli gets involved in the students’
resistance movement: OTPOR, he fights against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic
Source: promotional material Videoletters 2005.
At first sight, the episodes do not have that much in common with each other, still there
must have been something that made the Serbian public broadcaster decide not to
broadcast it. Maybe this is related to the image the Serbians have in these stories: they are
the murderers of Mujerisa’s children and Vlasta’s son, the chasers of Ruder’s and Dejan’s
family, and the opponents of the Milosevic regime. Keeping in mind that the situation
concerning politics in Serbia is still tense, this can cause friction.
Besides the five episodes broadcasted by B92, one episode was considered not to
be suitable to broadcast by the makers of Videoletters themselves. They expected that the
episode about Emil and Saša (see box 7.2) would maybe cause unrest in Bosnia.
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Box 7.2 Emil and Saša, a Videoletters episode
Emil and Saša grow up in Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina. During their childhood they are
inseparable. If you are looking for Emil, you will also find Saša. If you call out for Saša, Emil
will come along too. Later on, during school hours, in secret they drink coffee in Sarajevo,
just like grown-ups do. They call themselves Yugoslavs. The war changes their world
instantly. Saša has to join the army: his father is Serbian. Emil has to flee: his father is
Muslim. Where Saša is, Emil can not stay; where Emil goes, Saša is not welcome. They never
speak to each other again. Ten years later, Emil explains in his videoletter to Saša why: ‘I
never called you because you did something horrible during war, so I heard’.
Source: promotional material Videoletters 2005
Saša denies having committed war crimes in the episode, but later on it turned out he lied
in the episode: he was serving in the Serbian army as a guard when a group of Bosnian
Muslims was killed. During the launch of the Videoletters project Saša came to Sarajevo,
upset and confused and threatening the authors of Videoletters. This incident convinced
the makers of the fact that it would be better for everyone not to broadcast the episode.
During the screenings of the Videoletters to my respondents later on in the research, this
episode was not used either.
The original plan included talk shows after the broadcasting of the series on
television. It was intended that after each episode a talk show would be hosted by the
broadcaster in which people would discuss the themes that were tackled in the episode
publicly. The motivation for this was that people would be encouraged to discuss the
episodes with their neighbours, friends and family. This again would stimulate the
reconciliation process of the country. Unfortunately the talk show only occurred once, on
the Serbian public channel. On the other stations there was no space for it, reasons for
this are unknown. In order to gain more viewers, the makers of the show invited famous
people from the Balkans to record Videoletters as well. These were not comparable to the
actual episodes, but mostly entertainment and advertisement. Some local fans and friends
of Videoletters, like Rambo Amadeus, a local rock star, recorded video messages.
7.1.2 Website
In order to make more people aware of the existence of Videoletters and to give them the
opportunity to find former friends, a website was launched in April 2005. On the one
hand the site serves to promote the project: there is a media division that shows all the
articles that were published in different newspapers and magazines all over the world as
well as TV-shows dedicated to Videoletters. As well the site gives information on the
contents of the project, on the things that have been done and reached so far, and the
things that will be done in the future.
On the other side the site was established to reconnect people. By making a profile of
themselves on the website, visitors of the site could show who they are and search for lost
contacts in the search engines. When someone wanted to try and find a lost contact, he or
she could email a member of the Videoletters organization who would help that person
98
record a Videoletter as well as trying to find the persons they look for. The last posts on
the website related to ‘finding people’ date from February 2006. An interesting finding is
that almost all the people who looked for lost contacts came from places that have an
internet counter. These people had recorded a Videoletter via the internet counter, the
contact people there had put them on the website.
Besides these ‘engines’, on forums on the site visitors discussed issues such as
the Diaspora of the Yugoslavian people, ethnic hatred, topics that relate to reconciliation.
The forums showed posted reactions every day, but not in big numbers. The profiles of
the people that enrolled in the forum-discussion shows were mainly young people (till the
age of 30). The discussions were not very profound, mostly it stayed superficial. Often
when people discussed the wars of former Yugoslavia on the internet, it does not take
long before they would get stuck into an endless discussion or fight. To make sure
visitors of the Videoletters website will not be offended; certain rules have been made up,
to protect them from harassment. If posted reactions were not correct according to these
rules, they will be removed by the organization.
The website served mainly as a supporting tool within the whole Videoletters
project. It is not the core of the projects that the makers wanted it to be, but it does
support other elements of the project. Especially for collecting the articles about
Videoletters that have appeared in the international press, as well as advertising for the
series, the website turned out to be an important element. When it concerned
reconnecting people however, it has been less effective. It did not reach a whole society
(at which the Videoletters organization targets its website) since many people do not
know how to use the internet. Neither did the ‘search engines’ reconnect people to a big
extent; visitors would rather record a Videoletter in an internet counter. Besides, the
number of people that discuss sensitive topics at the forums is not high, and discussions
are not profound. Within the Videoletters project, the website is literally the ‘web’, the
series are the spin, and all other activities are family members of the spin.
7.1.3 Internet counters
This part of the project served in particular for the ‘reconnecting-objective’. Because only
ten per cent of the Bosnian population has access to the Internet at home, they were given
the chance to visit the internet in an ‘Internet counter’. For Videoletters this was the
opportunity to meet more people and to give them a chance to really reconnect via the
website. Videoletters established a network of internet counters. Six of these places were
active in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the time the research lasted. Inhabitants of those
towns could visit the ‘internet counter’ to check out the website or to make an own
Videoletter. Local contact persons of Videoletters helped citizens who visited the
counters.
The services that Videoletters provided differed from town to town. For example
in Zenica, in the middle of Bosnia, one computer in an internet café would be reserved
for Videoletters. In Tuzla the internet counter was also the local office of the Social
Democratic Party (SDP). This is related to the fact that the Bosnian contact person for
Videoletters was at the same time a prominent member of this political party. In Bosnia
and Herzegovina, politics and ethnicity are often intertwined. The three ethnic groups are
99
presented in three political parties. Besides these political parties, other exist, one of them
is the Social Democratic Party. From interviews with respondents from Sarajevo it
became clear that trust in politics has diminished considerably during the last ten years.
Many people blame the politicians for the bad economic situation and the corruption.
They in fact blame the politicians for their daily misery. This also stems from chapter
four about reconciliation. When reasoning like this, the ties of the SDP and the internet
counters could have been an impediment for success of Videoletters. The SDP however,
has fewer connections to ethnic groups than the other political parties (source: interview
contact person Videoletters). Therefore using them for the project because they posses a
well-working network all over Bosnia, can be explained.
The internet counters were not used much in the beginning, but after a while
citizens found their way to these places. The contact person from Zenica said that people
in the city knew the internet counter existed but did not know what it offered them. This
internet counter was only open for a few days a week, and was not located in the centre
of town, which made it probably a bigger step for people to find and use it. The internet
counter in Tuzla was easier to reach. It was open five days a week and located in the
centre of town. But also at this time this was not a popular way to reconnect with people.
After a few months no new video messages were recorded anymore. The organization of
Videoletters tried to solve this problem by introducing a required quota of video
messages. It is unknown whether it is because of this quota, but in the end most
videoletters at the website derive from inhabitants of places with an Internet counter.
7.1.4 Telephone help lines
To help people that did not have access to the Internet, nor the will to visit an internet
counter, telephone help lines were opened each week after the broadcasting. These would
serve two objectives: providing information about the contents of Videoletters and
possibly giving some emotional support when needed. In other countries, institutes like
these have become quite normal during the years. In Bosnia however, emotional shows
like Videoletters, are not common, just like the idea of telephone help lines. After every
broadcast of an episode, the telephone number of the helpline appeared on television,
giving viewers the chance to call.
The telephone helpline was in fact the Mobile phone number of the Bosnian
contact person for Videoletters. A few times the PBS (the broadcaster of Videoletters in
Bosnia) forgot to show the telephone number on television. As a result few people called
for emotional help. The people that did call, however, mostly had logistical questions:
when is the next show? Where can I find more information about the website etc.
(source: contact person Videoletters Bosnia). In the end, more people called for
information about Videoletters than for counselling or guidance. As a result, the
telephone help lines had more of an informative character than a psycho-social one.
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7.1.5 Caravan
What is it about?
One aspect of the Videoletters project was a caravan that drove for five weeks through the
whole of former Yugoslavia in order to ‘bring Videoletters to the people’. The caravan
consisted of a bus, a truck with technical equipment, two cars, and twenty people who all
had a specific task. About half of the people on the bus was Serbian, half was Dutch,
other crew members were Bosnians and Croats. The caravan was supposed to serve at
least two objectives. Firstly it was about propagating the series and the website. Secondly
the caravan aimed to bring some joy and relief to war-scarred societies. In this way they
tried to ‘touch the heart of the community and therefore unroll a valuable program’
(source: Videoletters document 2005). Both objectives were to serve the overall goal of
Videoletters: using it as a tool for reconciliation.
Through different kinds of projects that were part of the caravan, these goals were
pursued. For example the flags-project; in each town children were invited to paint their
dream on a flag. Another example was the band that was present on the caravan; they
were meant to entertain the local people, to prevent the whole project from being too
serious and intimidating people. At the other hand though, the serious part of the tour
should not be underestimated; in the end it was meant to assist reconciliation and in order
to do so people were encouraged to record video messages and use the website.
Therefore, technical equipment as well as a film team was present on the tour, in order to
accommodate people’s wish to get in contact. So, in the end the Videoletters tour was
about bringing positive change in the concerning towns, by creating a positive and open
atmosphere (Box 7.3 illustrates how this was done). This ‘positive atmosphere’ was
designed to be a precondition for citizens to become active reconcilers.
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Box 7.3 A projects day
A ‘Videoletters-day’ in a village started at around one o’clock. The children of the
school in the certain village that was cooperating in the Videoletters project would
come at that time to paint their ‘dream flag’. The idea was that children would paint
their dreams on a flag instead of a nationalistic symbol that has become so typical for
the region. The same children had also joined in the ‘young-journalists-project’. This
meant they were appointed by the Videoletters organization to be journalists for a
day, interviewing their parents, neighbours, aunts or uncles with the help of a
standardized question list, provided by Videoletters. When the children would come
to paint, they brought the questionnaires, or ‘interviews’ they collected.
While the children were decorating the flags, the musicians of the bus tour had been
rehearsing with local musicians for their show later on that day. In every town the
caravan passed, local musicians were invited to play with the band of the tour:
‘Hotel’. Before they started their gig in the evening, attention would be paid to
Videoletters itself. On a big screen an episode would be broadcasted for all the
villagers to watch. These viewers were passengers or parents of the children that
were involved in the afternoon projects. The episodes that were broadcasted differed
from town to town. It was well planned which episode could be shown where. After
the broadcasting there would be ‘moderators’ to have talk shows with the audience
about the episode and related issues. The moderator team consisted of people on the
bus that were able to speak Serbo-Croat. In fact everyone could be a moderator when
they were speaking with the local citizens on their problems.
After the broadcasting, the mayor of the town spoke to the audience as well as to the
camera. This camera belonged to a director who was on the tour to record
videoletters of whoever wanted to make one, as well as videoletters of the mayor in
every town and one child in every town. The mayor and child in the next town would
see the videoletter of the previous town before recording their own. In that way a
chain of videoletters developed to a number of fifteen. Besides recording
videoletters, the director filmed the whole process of what was happening and made
a documentary on it.
After the broadcasting and the speech of the mayor as well of the makers, the concert
of the band would start for the town citizens.
Source: own observations
Where did the caravan pass?
The caravan started on the 4th of June 2005 in Belgrade. The places that the caravan
would pass were all places with a certain history related to the last civil wars in the area.
For example in Bosnia it visited Pale, Srebrenica, Višegrad, Zenica, Mostar, Brcko. All
these towns are either ethnically divided or strongly homogeneous. In Croatia they visited
places like Vukovar which has become famous for the massacre and destroying of the
village by Serbs in 1991. So all places chosen for the tour were quite characteristic in a
way and had in common that relations between different ethnic identities were still tense.
The bus tour was divided into two parts, the first part lasted two weeks, the
second part three. During the first part of the caravan, three places in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were visited: Pale, Srebrenica and Višegrad. In the first two towns the
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projects could be executed as planned, in Višegrad however, things went wrong because
of both rain and internal misunderstandings. The ‘young-journalists-survey’ contains
only ten respondents from Višegrad, in the other towns this number is much higher. This,
combined with the fact that the tour hardly stayed a day in this place, means that
Višegrad was not included while describing the situation in the area the tour visited.
Before doing so, the situation in Republika Srpska, the part of Bosnia where these towns
are located, will be outlined.
Republika Srpska
After the Dayton Peace Agreement that formally ended the Bosnian war was signed in
1995, the country was divided in two parts. One is the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (FBiH) which is predominantly inhabited by Bosniaks and Croats (covering
51% of the Bosnian territory). The other part is Republika Srpska, where most Serbians
of the country live (covering 49% of the Bosnian territory). Although this ‘republic’ has
its own ministry and government, it is part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore not
recognized as a sovereign state. The capital of Republika Srpska is Sarajevo, which is
located in FBiH. The largest city of Republika Srpska however, Banja Luka, represents
the administrative, economic and cultural centre of the Republic of Srpska. 38% of the
population lives in Republika Srpska, (MIB, 2000), a mixture of different ethnic
identities, but mainly Serbs.
Within the republic, the economic situation is worse than in the FBiH. This may
be a reason why people appear to feel more unsatisfied than in the rest of the country. For
example 33,2 % of the Bosnian Serbs expects to lose their jobs in the coming three
months. Compared to the Bosniak majority, of whom 20,8 % expects to lose their job,
and the Croat majority (12,3 %), this percentage is quite high. Also, 51 % of the
population in Republika Srpska expects the economic situation in BiH to be worse in six
months. For the Federation this percentage is 35 % (UNDP 2005a: 58). Besides, figures
show that of the three ethnic entities living in Bosnia, Serbs are most intolerant to
members of other ethnic groups. Especially in the ‘Pale region’ (consisting out of Pale
and a few surrounding towns), ethnic intolerance is high. One out of three Bosnian Serbs
does not approve Bosniaks or Croats living in RS, in the ‘Banja Luka-area’ this
percentage is only 10 per cent. Almost half of the citizens in the Pale region disapprove
of people of another ethnic identity living in their neighbourhoods, in Banja Luka this is
25%. The differences in ethnic intolerance in the whole country, including FBiH, lie
more between the rural and the urban areas than between RS and FBiH. But since a big
part of Republika Srpska is in fact rural area it can be explained why the intolerance may
be more present in this area of the country (MIB 2005). Figures from the survey that was
executed in three places in RS confirmed the above mentioned tendency. On the question
regarding the birthplace of respondents, a quarter of them stated their birth place was in
Republika Srpska. This is interesting because this ‘republic’ was not born yet by the time
they were, besides, it is not a country. Their birth country is in fact Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but these respondents are reluctant to identify with this country (source:
own survey).
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Pale
Pale is a town that lies 20 km from Sarajevo, this is one of the places the ‘youngjournalists survey’ was conducted. Almost 20% of the respondents declared themselves to
originate from Sarajevo. This city is known for its multi-ethnic character. Before the war
it was predominantly inhabited by Bosnian Serbs, nowadays the Bosniaks form the
biggest population group. Despite the fact that people of all ethnic identities fought next
to each other in the capital against the enemy in the surrounding mountains, many Serbian
inhabitants have left Sarajevo afterwards. The war did influence their feelings towards
their former neighbours, reason for them to move to Republika Srpska, for example to
Pale as many Sarajevan Serbs did. A respondent explained how this could happen.
‘I moved from Sarajevo, I still have a house there but I can not live there anymore. I
go there, but when I see my house and the people that live there now I get angry.
New kids are playing at the streets I grew up, Muslims live in my house, they have
their own way of life’
Respondent Pale 6th June 2005
This respondent is not the only person that thinks like this in Pale. Many of them still own
property in the town they used to live which causes feelings of dissatisfaction. Figures
from reports executed by the research company MIB confirm these findings. In
comparison with the rest of the country, in Pale inhabitants are least tolerant towards
people of other ethnic identities. For example in answer to the question whether
respondents would have objections if their son or daughter would marry a Croat or
Muslim, 30 percent answered yes65 (MIB 2005).
Young people from Republika Srpska often come to study at the University of
Pale. The higher education system in Bosnia in general is inadequate; when students have
finished university their diploma is not equal to diplomas from other European
universities. Within the universities a difference in competence exists, which is normal at
one hand. The University of Sarajevo is regarded to be a better institution than that in
Pale; facilities are better and the education level is higher. Still, young Serbians from
Sarajevo would frequently rather study in Pale: ethnicity is more important to them as
competence of the university. Many people that live in Pale prefer to identify themselves
as Serbian, above Bosnian. Of the 111 respondents from Pale, over 90% were born in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still on the question in which country their birthplace is located
nowadays, 23,4% of the respondents stated that their country of birth was Republika
Srpska, while in fact this is not a country (source: own survey June 7, 2005).
The importance of Pale during the war has diminished considerably since it is not
any longer the capital of RS. Every now and then the town is on the news because hunted
war criminals may be discovered on the streets. The unemployment rate is high which
may well feed ethnic hate. Like a member of the Videoletters crew told me: ‘If somebody
takes an eye of the other one, it means that two eyes should be taken from that person.
65
For the other two ethnic groups this percentage is slightly higher.
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Revenge according to them always means it should be more’ (crew member caravan June
13, 2005.).
Srebrenica
The town called Srebrenica has become known for one of the worst cases of genocide
since World War II, executed by Bosnian Serbs in the beginning of July 1995. After a
siege by the Bosnian Serbs of three years, the Dutch troops of the UN were unable to
protect the Muslim citizens of the town. As a result approximately 7000 Muslim men got
killed on their way to flee the town. Nowadays the town is supposed to be multi-ethnic
but predominantly Serbian. This may also be a reason why 28,4% of the respondents in
this town stated that their birth place was in Republika Srpska nowadays, this number is a
bit higher than the average of the three examined towns in RS, which was 25%.
When the UN proclaimed Srebrenica to be a ‘Safe Haven’, over 30 000 Bosniaks from
the whole area came to look for protection in the town. After the war most of the
survivors left Srebrenica which turned it into a predominantly Serbian town. The Mosque
and the Orthodox church still stand just 100 metres away from each other.
Many NGOs are operating in the small town, a famous one is ‘Zene Srebrenica’,
groups of widows from the town that tries to achieve justice; finding the truth about what
happened to their men as well as punishing the perpetrators. Besides such personally
driven NGOs, organizations more focused at reconciling the different ethnic groups in
town operate. For example the NGO ‘Werkgroep Nederland-Srebrenica’(WNS). This
organization aims at the returning Muslims to Srebrenica as well as reintegration of
Muslims and Serbs. While doing so, they have established different activities like
restoring houses, reconstruction of parks, visiting returnees, trying to give legal aid, all
kinds of things on a small scale. On the whole, activities like these are necessary and may
have a good influence on the society (Van de Mortel 2004). But tensions at group level
still continue and generally people do not speak publicly about what happened ten years
ago. Besides, the big Serbian Orthodox Cross on the hill near Srebrenica that can be seen
from the town raises questions for the Muslim population. Box 7.4 tells some impressions
of a crew member of the Videoletters team.
105
Box 7.4 Impressions of a Videoletters crew member
‘My impression is that they do not want to deal with what happened, in different ways.
Some of them are completely in denial about the past of that city. They have the excuse of
saying they are all suffering from experiences they had, loss of their family, other people
now living in their houses. There was this woman who told me she has a very hard life, she
lost many things in the war and she has been in Sarajevo during the whole war. She had to
leave Sarajevo after the Dayton agreement and she was very desperate because of poverty
and because of everything she lost.
‘I listened to tragic stories and then I asked: “do you feel like this place has suffered a lot?
Are you aware of how many people died here?” And she said: “well you know, that’s not
entirely true”. I asked her: “what do you mean?” She said: “we all lost people, WE lost
people too”. I asked her: “who is we, and who is them?” She said: “them, is the
Bosnians”.’
And there was this older lady I was speaking to, she was from the village close to
Srebrenica and who lives now there because her house has burned down and everything got
evacuated. She said she did not loose any body from her family in this last war, she was a
Serbian woman. After the war she found her old neighbour, who was a Muslim, again. She
told me: “The first time when I came back from Serbia I asked her about what happened to
her family, to her daughter, her son. She was crying, and she said that she had lost them
both in these killings. After that, I decided never to ask that direct questions again, because
I could not deal with her crying, I would feel guilty.” It is a taboo-issue that nobody talks
about. They have coffees, they sit together, but they never talk about loss or war.
Source: interview June 8, 2005
7.2 Results Videoletters: the (un) intended outcomes.
In this section the results of the Videoletters will be discussed on the basis of four
elements. These four elements together will complete the image about the results that
Videoletters may have obtained in Bosnia. Firstly the focus is on the need for a program
like Videoletters. This can be perceived as a continuation on chapter four, about the
‘reconciliation climate’ in Bosnia. In this section however, the relation to Videoletters as
a reconciliation project will be more explicitly made. The second subject that will be
discussed is the reach of Videoletters. Were people familiar with Videoletters and had
they seen the show? In order to say something about the impact the show may have had,
it is important to know how many people were in fact familiar with the program. Thirdly,
the reactions on Videoletters will be discussed. In order to judge the impact of the show,
it is useful to know whether people had understood the main message of the show and
whether they had attentively watched it. The Need, Reach and Reactions together, are
preconditions for a successful impact of Videoletters. Ideally impact studies include
gathering base-line data before the broadcast has been launched (Shochat, Hellmich,
Scheid, 2004). This research was unfortunately not big enough to obtain such data.
Therefore several indicators will be used to try and draw some conclusions about the
impact Videoletters may have had on the Bosnian society.
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7.2.1. Need for Videoletters
Videoletters assumed that many people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have lost contacts due
to the war. This was the direct motivation for them to start the Videoletters project. This
section will explain the areas in which Videoletters may contribute to the peacebuilding
process. While doing so, two indicators will be used: ‘places’ and ‘people’. These are
based on the survey which was conducted under the population of citizens in Republika
Srpska. The Videoletters caravan visited three places in this area, two of them are
described above extensively. In the third town, Višegrad, the young journalists’ project
was as successful as in the other towns. Therefore the number of respondents was very
low in Višegrad. This makes it difficult to compare the findings of the three towns. In
statistics about all respondents from RS however, the answers of ten respondents are
included. The indicators both refer to the objectives of Videoletters. ‘Places’ intends to
say something about ‘humanising the other side’ and ‘people’ refers to ‘reconnecting’.
Places
The questions that relate to the subject ‘places’ were included in the survey in order to
collect data about the need of respondents to ‘humanise the other side’. It was especially
interesting to know whether there are places that are not visited anymore due to the war.
As chapter four shows, ‘safety’ is a component of the reconciliation process. After an
ethnic conflict people have difficulties visiting certain places or countries because they
used to live there, or because they were stationed there during the war. It is possible that
they had experienced war crimes in that certain place, and now they do not feel safe there
anymore. Several excuses can be given for not visiting certain places. It is important
though that all citizens have the chance to visit the places they have difficulties with. If
they do not have this chance, the war continues in their heads which will not encourage
the reconciliation process. On the contrary, people will make things or situations worse
than they are, resulting in continuing feelings of ethnic hate. Creating opportunities for
these people to visit those places will help them face the past and into the future. What
Videoletters could do related to this area is helping these people put the first step in that
process.
In order to obtain information about the whereabouts of the respondents, they
were asked about their former holiday destinations. Broadly speaking it can be stated that
among the population of Former Yugoslavia, two holiday destinations were popular. In
the winter many people go skiing and in the summer many visit the Adriatic coast. The
survey supported this as well, indicating that most respondents used to visit the coastal
area in the past. The Adriatic coast is divided between three countries. South of Italy, it
belongs to Croatia, to continue in a small strip of Bosnian territory (only 20 km,
consisting out of one town: Neum), followed by Montenegro. Before the war, many
citizens of Bosnia often used to visit the Croatian and Montenegrin coast. Citizens of
Sarajevo still do, but the small town Neum has grown immensely during the last ten
years, turning into a modern resort. This indicates that many Bosnians focus on the
Bosnian seaside nowadays instead of the Croatian one. It is impossible to tell though
whether this trend is as a result of the war or whether it would have happened anyway.
107
The respondents from Pale were asked whether they still visit their former holiday places.
As table 7.1 shows, only three quarters declared to visit those places.
Table 7.1 Lost holiday places.
Town: Pale.
Do you still visit the place you went on holiday to?
N= 73
33,3 %
Yes
63,9 %
No
2,8 %
Unknown
100 %
Total
Source: own survey.
When Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) it was easier to visit the other republics (they were not countries yet) than
nowadays because no border controls then existed in Yugoslavia. Nowadays they do
exist, but for inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina it is not problematic to visit their
neighbouring countries. Passports are obtained relatively easily and visa restrictions do
not exist for these countries. Besides, the public transport system can bring people
everywhere. So these two practical factors can hardly be a reason for Bosnians not to visit
former holiday places.
A holiday is not the only reason to be familiar with certain places, of course visits
can have other intentions. This is why the respondents were asked a more general
question: whether there are places they do not visit anymore. Over 80 % declared not to
visit certain places anymore. These people was about their reasons for this, the answers
are explained in table 7.2.
Table 7.2 Reasons for not visiting.
Town: Pale
What is the reason for not visiting those places anymore?
N=62
War
Safety
Passport
Means
Don’t care
Total
43,5 %
6,5 %
6,5 %
38,7 %
4,8 %
100 %
Source: own survey.
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The survey consisted of open questions, which means that answers were not as black and
white as presented here. For example the answer ‘war’ was not explicitly given that often,
more times the answer was ‘for known reasons’, or ‘events’. Although ‘war’ is not
mentioned that explicitly, it is assumed these reasons and events relate to the war.
‘Safety’, is a label that covers answers dealing with this topic. For instance ‘fear of
mines’ was mentioned a few times, as well as ‘not feeling comfortable’. The label
‘means’ covers answers like ‘no time’, or ‘no money’, as well as ‘too old’ and ‘too far’.
The table indicates that almost half of the respondents do not visit certain places
they used to anymore, because of reasons related to the war. Besides, people do not feel
safe going or being there. If the war is a reason for not visiting certain places anymore, it
may be argued that the ‘invisible borders’ that Videoletters refers to, still exist. In this
way it could be argued that the objective of ‘humanising the other side’ is valid; people
do indeed have a need to be faced with the other side. What the table also shows though,
is that for almost 40 % of the respondents, other reasons are more important. Reasons like
‘money’ and ‘time’ and a simple ‘I am bored with that place’, are also mentioned many
times. Therefore it is difficult to tell whether the objective ‘humanising the other side’ is
well grounded, based on these findings. The objectives consists of other elements
though66, these are partially dealt with in chapter four, regarding reconciliation.
People
The invisible borders described above do not only exist in relationship to places; they are
even higher when it concerns people. One reason for inhabitants from Bosnia to visit the
neighbouring countries is because many people have family members living there.
Throughout the communist era, families commonly spread all over the republic,
nowadays many live in separate countries because the splitting up of Yugoslavia.
Concerning this issue, the town Pale symbolizes former Yugoslavia: as table 7.3 shows,
over three quarters of the respondents states that they have family members in the
surrounding countries.
Table 7.3 Family members in surrounding countries * Miss those people
Town: Pale
N=66
Family members surrounding countries
Miss those
persons?
Yes
No
Total
Yes
81,8 %
4,5%
86,4 %
No
10,6 %
3,0 %
13,6 %
Total
92,4 %
7,6 %
100 %
66
For example just associating with people from another ethnic identity; sending your children to mixed
schools, having coffees with the neighbours etc. Also dealing with people you have not met before.
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Source: own survey.
From these 66 people from Pale, 92,4% have family members in surrounding countries,
of whom 81,8 % declared that they miss those people. This does not mean though they
are not in contact anymore, maybe they just live far away, or even close and still miss
each other. The relationship with the war is not clear either; this is why another question
was asked to the respondents: ‘Do you have friends/neighbours/family, who you do not
see anymore after the war?’. Let us look at the answers of the respondents. Table 7.4
shows the findings of this question, combined with the question whether people feel sorry
for losing the contact
Table 7.4 Lost contacts.
Town: Pale, Srebrenica and Višegrad
N=191 persons67
Do you have friends/neighbours/family, which you do not see anymore after the war? *
Are there people among them whom you feel sorry that you don’t see anymore?
Lost contact?
Sorry
Lost contact?
Yes
No
Total
Yes
84,8 %
0%
84,8 %
No
4,7 %
10,5 %
15,2 %
Total
89,5 %
10,5 %
100 %
Source: own survey.
This time the word ‘war’ was included in the question. It does not mean though that the
people who lost contacts after the war, lost them due to the war. Contacts can be lost for
many other reasons. Since this question possibly was a bit vague, the high percentage of
people who have lost contact can be explained. Of all people that have lost a contact,
84,5% declared that they felt sorry about it. The same people were asked whether they
had contacted their lost relations by telephone. This question was asked in order to map
whether these contacts are still gone or not. As table 7.5 shows, a majority of the
respondents has had contact with former friends via telephone.
67
These are respondents from three towns: Pale, Srebrenica and Višegrad.
110
Table 7.5 Telephone traffic.
Town: Pale, Srebrenica, Višegrad
N=194
Did you call a lost contact after the war? * Did someone call you?
Did you call?
Someone call
you?
Yes
No
Total
Yes
59,5 %
5,0 %
65,1 %
No
12,3 %
22,1 %
34,4 %
Total
71,8 %
27,7 %
100 %
Source: own survey
Two third of the research population has declared to have telephoned a lost contact after
the war, one third did not call their former contact. And three quarters of the population
has declared to received telephone calls after the war. This gives us another picture of the
research population than table 7.3 and 7.4. From these tables could be concluded that
people miss each other and feel sorry for losing the contact. Table 7.5 clarifies that
missing someone does not automatically mean the contact is lost as well. It could be
argued, while examining these results, that the logistical problems to get in contact again
have been solved, something which is confirmed by the director of the local NGO
Internews:68:
‘Videoletters is out of date. Of course, just after the war, then it was important
because political distances were big then. But if you wish to go to Belgrade
nowadays, it is not a problem anymore. I wonder whether we need a program like
Videoletters, the only reason I can imagine for why this program is useful, is for
people who have big physical distance. For example if you have a relative in
Canada, this can be a nice way to stay in contact’.
Amir Ibrovic, director Internews, May 5, 2005
While stating that bridging physical distances is the only objective that Videoletters can
achieve, this informant neglects the emotional barriers that may need to be overcome to
make contact. The times have changed in comparison with the years just after the war.
Most citizens have the chance to visit relatives and friends in the neighbouring countries,
roads are restored and buses connect the whole of the Balkans. But as several respondents
stated, they are reluctant to visit places they used to go, mainly because of the war and
resulting events. These indicators contradict the words of Ibrovic.
68
Internews is a local NGO that focuses on reconciliation through media by several ways, for example by
their program ‘Balkan Bridges’ which will be described in chapter eight.
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Conclusion: Areas to affect
Many people lost contact with each other after the war. Whether this was due to the war
is not clear, as it is possible that it would have happened anyway. Almost all persons who
stated they had lost a contact however, felt sorry for losing it. Most of them again, had
contacted their former friends on the telephone. Whether the percentage of the people that
had telephoned each other corresponded with the percentage of people that felt sorry for
losing contact though, is not clear. Considering the fact that most people had telephoned
each other, Videoletters may be superfluous. Still, reconnecting people was not the only
objective of Videoletters. After the reuniting of friends, the image of the ‘other side’ also
needs to be positive in order to keep in contact. This is something that became clear
through some surveys as well; after making the first contact it is hard to keep in touch
because perspectives on events that took place may dramatically differ.
The second Videoletters-objective: ‘humanising the other side’ seems justified by
the results from the ‘places’- section of the survey. Many people proclaimed that they had
not visited certain places anymore they used to go to, and gave ‘war’ as a reason for this.
The high percentage of people that stated war to be a reason means at least two things.
Firstly that this is a field within reconciliation that has to be focused on; when talking
about reconciliation activities it is mainly about restoring contacts and not necessarily
visiting those places. Besides, this is something in which Videoletters can make a
contribution. Videoletters shows the audience images from the ‘other side’.
7.2.2 Reach of Videoletters
The organization of Videoletters intended to reach the whole population of Former
Yugoslavia through either the television broadcasts, or one of the other activities the
project consists of. The first step to influence people is to reach them, therefore this
section will discuss the reach of Videoletters in two ways; the ‘rough’ way, by describing
the number of people that have been in contact with Videoletters. And secondly will be
discussed whether the population was familiar with Videoletters and their message, as
well as reasons for not watching it.
Audience ratings
Reliable television ratings data for Bosnian television shows is not publicly available. The
Bosnian research company ‘Mareco Index Bosnia’ however, executes research about TV
audience viewing. Every month they pick one week in which the concerning TV-program
is broadcasted and examine the reach and extent in which people have watched the show.
The sample size consists of 1600 persons, originating from the fourteen major
conurbations in the country. These persons filled in diary forms, provided by MIB (MIB
2006). Two elements in particular were measured in their analysis of Videoletters. The
first element was the rating of Videoletters; this is the percentage of the research
population that watched the whole program. The first episode that was included in the
rating research attracted 2,4 % of the research population, the second and the third
episodes attracted respectively 2,3 % and 2,8 % of the viewers. The second element
112
concerned the ‘reach’ of the program. This indicator shows the percentage of the research
population that watched a part of the program. The average reach of the program is 4 %.
Few people got in contact with the program according to this program. If this percentage
‘reach’ is compared with the average percentage ‘rating’ however, it shows that many of
the people that saw the show, stayed tuned and watched the entire episode. This is
confirmed by the number of minutes that the research population watched the episodes.
One episode lasts thirty minutes; people stayed tuned in for an average duration of twenty
minutes. It is difficult to conclude anything from these indicators because no data of other
television ratings are available to compare it with. Considering the fact though that
Bosnians watch much television (based on own observations and conversations), the
ratings of the show are low, only a small part of the research population has watched the
show. Most did watch the show all the way through, indicating their attention and
interest.
Familiarity
The TV-program was not the only means through which Videoletters tried to reach the
population. For example the caravan that drove through the country was another way,
therefore people in the three villages in Republika Srpska were asked about their
familiarity with Videoletters. Table 7.6 shows that more than half of the respondents that
were reached by the caravan were familiar with (had heard about) Videoletters.
Table 7.6 Familiarity Videoletters
Town: Pale, Srebrenica, Višegrad
N = 194
Have you heard about Videoletters?
Have you watched Videoletters on television?
Pale
Srebrenica
Višegrad
Average RS
Heard about Videoletters
Yes
No
57,3%
42,7 %
73 %
27 %
90 %
10 %
64,9 %
35,7 %
Seen Videoletters
Yes
No
34,9 %
65,1 %
64,9 %
35,1 %
50 %
50 %
47,2 %
52,8 %
Source: own survey.
The respondents that said they were familiar with Videoletters had seen the TVcommercials or read articles about Videoletters in the local newspapers. The number of
respondents in Višegrad was very low which makes it questionable to draw conclusions
about the reliability of this data. The high percentage of people who had heard about
Videoletters in Srebrenica however, is striking, almost three quarters of the inhabitants
knew the show, besides, 30 % more people had watched Videoletters in Srebrenica than
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in Pale. Two things can be said when looking at the presented figures in table 7.6. Firstly
that just under than half of the respondents had watched Videoletters, this is considerably
more than the 4 % that was measured by the audience rating of Mareco Index Bosnia.
Secondly, for almost a fifth of the research population (17,7 %69 ), hearing about
Videoletters did not encourage them to watch the show as well.
Inhabitants from Sarajevo were also asked about whether they had seen the TVprogram, just after the broadcasting of the first episode. Of the fifty respondents, 32 %
(16 respondents) said they had seen the program, 68 % (34 respondents) had not seen the
program (source: sample survey from informant April 8, 2005).
Reasons for not watching Videoletters
As the percentages of the ‘viewing figures’ demonstrate, not everyone has seen
Videoletters on television. Respondents put forward two reasons for this. Firstly it is said
that not everyone had the opportunity to receive the program. Some respondents stated
they live in an area where BHTV 1, the TV-channel that broadcasted Videoletters, is not
received. A second reason for not watching Videoletters relates to its political
connotation. Like chapter five showed; many Bosnian citizens are often fed up with the
news on television, or anything they read in the newspapers. Many people have had
enough of politics and don’t see the future of Bosnia very positive, as the MIB report also
shows. As some respondents answered, this is a reason not to watch television programs
that are in any way related to topics like these. Although Videoletters tried not to have a
political connotation, they had. Instead of politics, they wanted to focus on humanising
the other side, but it did not work always this way; as the following quote illustrated,
Videoletters is sometimes perceived as a political program.
‘I did not watch more episodes of Videoletters than one, because actually it is too
much. During the war I was here, it was very hard in Sarajevo, and I think that I
tasted enough of it in my life, so I just want to skip these things. It is not that I do
not have feelings, but it is too much for me. Too much for my life.’
Respondent from Sarajevo July 6, 2005
7.2.3. Reactions to Videoletters
A day after the first episode of Videoletters was broadcasted; a small survey was
conducted under fifty respondents from Sarajevo. Amongst other questions, they were
asked whether they liked the episode. The results of this question are presented in the
following pie chart:
69
This percentage is calculated by deducting the averages ‘heard about’ minus ‘seen’; 64,9-47,2= 17,7
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Chart 7.1 Impressions of Videoletters Episode One.
What are your impressions with the video letters episode that
you've seen last night?
13%
Liked it a lot
Liked it
15%
Neutral
Did not like it
6%
66%
0%
0%
Did not like it at all
Did not watch it
Source: survey of informant April 2005
As the table shows, most people did not watch the series; the people who did watch it
however, were content with the show; they liked it, 13 % even liked it a lot. This positive
opinion about the TV-program was confirmed by screenings of a Videoletter episode. Just
after watching an episode, respondents were asked for their opinion of the show; most of
them answered they either liked it, did not expect it to be this interesting, or thought it
was touching.
Besides these one-to-one screenings of the Videoletters-episodes70, during the
Videoletters caravan the episodes were broadcasted on a big screen, for everyone who
was passing by to watch if they wanted to. Some reactions on these episodes (which
could be the same ones as used for the one-to-one screenings) were: ‘this episode reminds
me of my own childhood and youth and about all the sad things that happened
afterwards’. Other people were more sceptical, even negative. One respondent stated that
the war left inerasable, painful scars that could never heal. She could never react like the
people in the show because it was all too awful, she said. Other negative reactions can be
attributed to the drunken state some respondents were in by the time the episode had
finished. In the town Pale, they called the makers of Videoletters ‘stinky Dutch people’
who would never be able to solve problems that had been present in the Balkans for over
fifty years (source: observations June 2005).
So although most people are initially enthusiastic about Videoletters as a TVprogram, differing kinds of reactions on the show could be noted, depending on the
setting in which the episodes were shown. One explanation for this is that individuals are
70
One-to-one means that the episode is shown to a respondents, and afterwards he or she is interviewed about
it.
115
more careful in what they say; in a group they may take on another attitude because they
are with friends. Another explanation can be the places where the respondents came
from. Most respondents that cooperated in the ‘one-to-one- screenings’ live in Sarajevo,
while the respondents that were subjected to the mass-screenings inhabited Republika
Srpska. The reports from the MIB-company show that ethnic intolerance in Republika
Srpska is much higher than in Sarajevo. This could be an explanation why respondents
from this part of Bosnia were less open than in Sarajevo. It does not mean though that
respondents from the capital were all positive.
Comprehension of Videoletters from survey
Most respondents made a distinction between two topics when discussing Videoletters;
Videoletters as a TV-program and Videoletters as a tool for reconciliation. It was
however clear to them that it was more than just a TV-program. The question that was
taken up in the small survey conducted under respondents from Sarajevo shows this (see
chart 7.2). As the chart shows, most people support programs like Videoletters, one third
of the population even supports programs like these strongly. Only 2% of the research
population does not support programs like these. From the fact that most respondents had
an opinion about the contents of the show can be assumed they understood the ‘hidden
message’. This was confirmed by some interviewees who were asked what the message
of the TV-program according to them was. They mentioned issues like ‘nationalism is not
important’ and that ‘friendships can overcome war if they are strong enough’. So
respondents received the message of Videoletters as a reconciliation tool, and did not just
perceive it as a nice and interesting program.
Chart 7.2 Opinion about message show.
What is your position regarding projects of this nature?
2%
0%
17%
Strongly supportive
33%
Supportive
Neutral
Not supportive
Not supportive at all
48%
Source: survey of informant April 8, 2005
Detailed knowledge about the TV-program
116
The respondents from Republika Srpska were asked about their favourite episode and
character from the show. Especially inhabitants from the town Srebrenica scored well on
this question, most of the people who watched the show had an opinion about a favourite
episode. An episode which was mentioned several times by respondents as favourite
episode is the one about Edin and Tarzo. Reasons for appreciating this episode in
particular are: ‘because trust and friendship are trying to be re-established’ ‘because the
friends, no matter how the circumstances were, meet at the end’ and ‘because it ended
well’. Another episode that is mentioned is the one of Ivana and Senad (the contents of
this episode are described in box 7.5). Respondents remember the motherly feelings of
Ivana for Senad best and the way she takes care of the Muslim boy during war.
Box 7.5 Ivana and Senad. A Videoletters episode
As the war breaks out in Bosnia, children with cerebral palsy who are being treated in Belgrade do
not understand why they are not being visited by their parents in the hospital anymore. They do
not really understand what the word 'war' means, and feel abandoned by their parents. So does
Senad, a little boy from around Konjic. He asks Ivana, who brings the hospitalised children toys
and food, to become his 'second' mum. After the war is over, Senad returns to Bosnia. Ivana gets a
video-letter from Haifa, Senad's real mother. 'The Senad you and I knew is gone, forever. He now
works for the mafia; they make him beg', she cries. 'I wish he had stayed with you forever'. Ivana
sends video-letters to newspapers and radio and TV stations, appealing for help. She is convinced
that Senad will tell her why he abandoned his two mothers. If she could only find him.
Source: promotion material Videoletters.
This episode of Videoletters was rather neutral, and appreciated by many people. In
particular, the ‘humanity’ of Ivana was mentioned many times. This Serbian woman was
by all respondents perceived as a nice woman. Box 7.6 shows the experiences on one
inhabitant from Sarajevo that watched Videoletters and was touched by the episode.
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Box 7.6 Mr. Softics’ open letter to Ivana
Mr. Softic wrote a letter to Ivana, which was placed on the Videoletters website. He said he
dislikes everything that deals with politics, therefore he never watches any show that is related to
politics. According to him, Videoletters is a show that has a political message, but when he was
changing the channels that evening he stopped to watch the episode about Ivana:
‘I heard this woman talking, I was listening to her, and stayed a little bit on that channel. I did not
watch it from the beginning, I dropped in and continued watching. In a way I was touched with
story. Mostly it was wondering about how Ivana decided, during the war, she was in Serbia…for
me what was amazing about the episode was that someone from Serbia had that kind of reaction.’
Emir Softic, inhabitant from Sarajevo.
This respondent is a Bosniak from Sarajevo who had bad experiences during the war. He was in
Sarajevo when the city was besieged by Serbians and therefore held a bad opinion on this ethnic
group. He says he was surprised to see a Serbian woman being so kind and good to the Bosniak
children who could not stay in the country during the war. Watching this episode encouraged him
to write an open letter to Ivana, this letter was published at the website. The following fragment
comes from this letter:
‘Tonight's TV story has wrought a storm in "my life under the veil", squeezing tears from
my benumbed feelings, and - literally, "as the tears were drying on my face", and before the
detritus of my "daily tomorrows" has covered me again, I would hereby like to direct to You these
few words of gratitude, for the whiteness of human purity which has obviously been implanted by
Your upbringing, as well as granted to You by God; luckily, you have been able to preserve it and
remain whole. Although the humble apartment where I live with my family is in reality quite small
- our doors are wide open if your path should ever bring You to Sarajevo. May God take good care
of You, and may He give us more people like You’.
Ivana responded to this letter and email contact has occurred a few times between the two of them.
Source: interview Emir Softic, July 6, 2005
This is one example of a situation in which Videoletters was successful in getting people
connected. Besides, the other objective of Videoletters, (humanising the other side),
seems to have been successful as well in this particular case. As Mr. Softic stated: his
opinion on Serbians was not very positive, but after watching the episode he had to revise
his opinion by not regarding all Serbians the same, but seeing them as individuals. This is
a difficult and common problem for many of the different people living in Bosnia. Mr.
Softic had to admit not all Serbians are the same and therefore not all Serbians are bad.
Related to reconciliation this means that this is an individual process as well; Mr. Softic
had had bad experiences with the Serbians, therefore it was positive for people like him to
get in contact with so-called ‘good Serbians’, in order to counter the idea that they are all
criminals.
Gap between reality and show; representation
For an intended outcome approach like Videoletters, it is of importance that people
perceive the show as ‘real’. In this case the TV-program was a documentary series, of
which can be assumed the stories were not fictitious. In order to identify with the show,
however, viewers had to consider the program as real – as long as they did. the message
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would be understood, which again would make it more plausible that the show had had
influence71.
A few respondents doubted the credibility of Videoletters as a documentary
series. One respondent stated that ‘everything is forced, when people come and put a
microphone under your nose and tell you this or that’ (interview June 1, 2005). Another
respondent said that the program looked like a commercial to him, he said it was ‘nothing
new, happy ending, Hollywood story’ (interview June 30, 2005). From a few other
conversations the same opinion became clear. Most respondents however, did not doubt
the credibility of the show. This was shown by their first reactions after watching an
episode, some people started crying and others talked about their own war-related
experiences, or just remained quiet for a while. During the one-to-one screenings of
episodes, almost all times the same episode was shown to the respondents, the one about
Vlada and Ivica, the contents of this episode are described in box 7.7. After two
screenings it had become clear that this episode told a story about two common families
in former Yugoslavia that respondents could identify with.
Box 7.7. Vlada and Ivica. A Videoletters episode
Before the war, Vlada lives in Belgrade, Ivica near Zagreb. Their fathers are colleagues,
their mothers are friends. They all spend their summers together on the Adriatic seacoast.
When the war breaks out in Croatia, Ivica's mother calls Vlada's mother in Belgrade:
'Grenades are exploding all over, whole villages are burning, the Serbian snipers are right
across the street'. Vlada's mother cannot believe her ears. Later Vlada's father writes to
Ivica's: 'I know it for certain that this all happened. I am ashamed for everything that has
been done to you'. However, there is no reply. Perhaps they have grown to hate Serbs,
even us, thinks Vlada. Maybe they have never received the letter, his grandmother
comforts him. As long as you don't call them, you don't risk them hanging up on you,
says his sister. And then Vlada makes the decision to.
Source: Videoletters promotional material
The father of Vlada apologizes for everything the Serbians had done during the war. He
said that ‘first you are not a nationalist but after a while you become a nationalist
yourself’. This part caused discussion among the respondents, many recognized
themselves in this character and after seeing this episode, themes like nationalism and
extremism were discussed. Another person in this episode said something wise; the young
boy Vlada apologizes on behalf of the Croats for the atrocities committed during the war.
Bosniak respondents appreciated this gesture; they argued that not many Croats apologize
for the committed crimes in Bosnia, Croats are busier with their own war and their
suffering in the conflict with the Serbs. The fact that respondents reacted to an episode of
Videoletters in this way may be perceived as a good result. It made people think about the
71
Based on an evaluation report of the organization Search for Common Grounds, which executes among
other things type five media initiatives.
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message and how they had acted (or still acted) themselves. This could contribute to
reaching the second objective: humanising the other side.
Spreading the word
An indicator that shows whether a type five media initiative has reached the minds of the
target group is whether they have discussed the contents of the show with other people.
Discussing the contents means talking about the message of the show, as well as reaching
more people than just through television, this again would mean that these type five
initiatives influenced the society. This is why within the survey that was executed among
the respondents from Republika Srpska, a question about this topic was integrated.
Respondents did not score high on this question however: more than half of the
respondents that had watched the series did not discuss the show with people in their
surroundings. In Pale the percentage was higher than in Srebrenica; this can be perceived
as a confirmation of what has been said before: citizens from Srebrenica were more
familiar with Videoletters and its contents than inhabitants from Pale. The low percentage
of people that had previously discussed Videoletters can be explained in several ways. It
could be they did not like the episode, or it did not encourage them enough to discuss it.
Another reason was brought up by an informant: Bosnians tend not to talk about sad
things (the message of Videoletters has been perceived as sad) according to her. The low
percentage indicates that Videoletters was not integrated into society; therefore the
influence that the program may have had on the Bosnian society through this way may be
minimal.
7.2.4. Impact as a reconciliation program
Reconnecting; using the Videoletters tools
Did Videoletters encourage respondents to reconnect? The means that they provided for
people to reconnect have become clear meanwhile. But how did respondents perceive
these tools, would they; and did they use these tools to reconnect?
From the small survey which was conducted in Sarajevo it appeared that
respondents would be open towards using a website to re-establish contacts, 65 % (33
respondents) proclaimed themselves to be open towards this idea (source: survey
informant April 8, 2005). No data was available about whether people really used the
website for this purpose. As well from the internet counters where people could come to
record a Videoletter, no reliable data was available.
The Caravan reconnects
In the first part of the Videoletters caravan, few video messages have been recorded. In
all towns the mayor recorded a letter, as well as one child of a local school. It was
emphasized by the organization of the tour that every citizen of the towns was invited to
record a message, still, not many people found their way to the camera. In the first three
towns an average number of three letters was recorded. The longer the caravan lasted the
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more letters were recorded, due to the skills the crew members developed towards
approaching the small communities. According to the young journalists survey however,
people in Republika Srpska were willing to receive and record a video message. The next
tables show this.
Table 7.7 Will to receive and record a videoletter.
Town: Pale, Srebrenica and Višegrad
N=194
Town
Pale
Srebrenica
Višegrad
Average
Will to receive a Videoletter
Yes
No
Maybe
69,7%
21,1 %
9,2 %
83,8 %
10,8 %
5,4 %
100 %
76,7 %
16,1 %
7,3 %
Will to record a Videoletter
Yes
No
Maybe
56,4 %
41,8 %
1,8 %
73 %
21,6 %
5,4 %
100 %
64,9 %
32 %
3,1 %
Source: own survey.
These questions were asked to the respondents before the videoletters caravan visited
their village. So the answers are based on their knowledge of the series from TV. The
percentages show that people would rather receive than record a videoletter, which can be
explained by the fact that it can be scary to be in front of a camera. Some respondents
answered that they were willing to record a video message even though they do not like
the idea of being recorded. However, not all respondents were that willing, 16 % of them
refused to make a videoletter. The reasons they brought up for not wanting to record a
video letter differed from ‘not liking the idea of a camera’ to ‘there is no need for that
because I have found all my friends’
Opinions informants about reconnecting
The episodes that were shown to some key informants provoked strong reactions,
especially regarding the first objective of the organization. Respondents felt irritated and
sometimes even offended by the approach of Videoletters. They stated that if they wanted
to reconnect, they would do it themselves; if they would feel the urge to telephone
someone they would pick up the phone and do so. If they wanted to visit someone they
would travel to that person. Physical distances can be overcome, those borders do not
exist anymore according to for example the Internews director. The following quote
illustrates this opinion:
‘Videoletters is a great documentary project. But they are not connecting people,
because whoever wants to be connected, will be connected. If I want to call my
friend, I will call him, but he thinks I have to apologize to him, because I don’t live
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in my birth place anymore. My grandma and two of my uncles were murdered in
that place and he thinks that I need to apologize to him, or maybe because his father
died there, but his father died in action, in the war. My grandma was a 74 year old
woman who was killed on a bridge, by a sniper. I don’t think that Videoletters in
that way is a good project; they will not help me get in contact with my friend again,
but as a documentary series it is ok’
Informant from Sarajevo July 8, 2005
Although this informant states very clear he does not want the help of Videoletters, on the
other hand this quote shows that the situation between him and his friend is still tense.
Videoletters assumed that many inhabitants of former Yugoslavia struggle with the same
feelings and therefore need a support or guidance. This respondent however, states clearly
that he does not need a program like Videoletters to tell him to reconnect. The idea of
Videoletters as a tool for reconciliation even sounded ‘strange’ according to some people.
They do not like the moral element in the show that told them what to do, how to
reconnect. In this way, Videoletters might not have reached these respondents the way
they wanted to. It must be said however, that these people were highly educated citizens.
Besides, in their work field they encounter projects focused either on reconciliation or on
media. Therefore they might have stronger opinions about the show than citizens that do
not have a job related to these topics.
Within the survey that was conducted in the villages in Republika Srpska, the
respondents were asked whether they thought that Videoletters was helping to connect
people that hadn’t seen each other for a long time. This question was only answered by
thirteen respondents who all said ‘yes’. This number of respondents is very low, the
question may have been subjective, and actual reliability of the results is doubtful. Still,
the fact that all respondents answered positively is not that logical. In some places the
caravan faced, citizens were quite negative about Videoletters. For example the mayor of
Herceg Novi, a town in Montenegro, stated that ‘Videoletters is doing harm instead of
good’. The distinction between Videoletters as a TV-program and as a project must be
made here though; the caravan was not always welcome in every town it visited, which
might have influenced the opinions of these citizens about the whole concept of
Videoletters.
The fact that Videoletters as a reconnecting program is negative according to some keyinformants, does not mean it is perceived like that by everyone. Table 7.7 showed that
more than half of the people were willing to record a Videoletter for a lost contact. Also
from the one-to-one interviews it became clear that respondents think that Videoletters
was a good indicative which could really reconnect people. It is striking however that
most persons who stated it to be a good initiative were in the first place talking about
other people to reconnect, not so much about themselves.
Humanising: contributions Videoletters possibly made.
As mentioned above, a reliable baseline of the Bosnian society is not available. However,
as Section One demonstrates, emotional distances between places are long. Translated to
the objectives of Videoletters: ‘humanising the other side’ is justified, many persons in
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former Yugoslavia still perceive the other ethnic group as negative, mostly because of
ignorance. This also showed from the answers of the respondents that faced ‘one-to-one’
screenings. Most of them stated it was interesting to see the other side in the
documentary, to know how people in other areas of Former Yugoslavia live nowadays.
Also from the respondents on the Videoletters caravan it can be concluded that watching
an episode encouraged them to talk about topics related to ethnicity and nationalism.
Before watching an episode they were frequently sceptical and negative about other
people and about the situation in former Yugoslavia in general. After the broadcasting
they often talked in other terms; more on a personal level and using careful expressions72.
Besides, watching an episode made respondents realize that not every Serb or Croat or
Bosniak was ‘wrong’ during the war. It may be that they realized this before, that the
episode was not the direct motivation for them to realize it. Still, remembering it once
may also contribute to the humanisation (or even normalization) process.
Compared to the other objective, ‘humanising the other side’ is a process that
might take more time. Not to say that reconnecting is done easily; tables 7.4 to 7.6
indicate that reconnecting needs more than a phone call. However, improving people’s
perceptions of other ethnic groups is a process that takes a very long time. Some
respondents subscribed this by saying Videoletters can only make a contribution to this
process step by step. And even then it would not change much, she thinks. She was not
particularly negative about Videoletters however; the problem was that she expressed
herself to be negative about Bosnian society as a whole.
7.3 Conclusion
After having identified several aspects which all together form the results of Videoletters,
it is time to make some conclusions, beginning with the need for a series like
Videoletters. Opinions were divided about the need for a program like Videoletters,
which represents type five media initiatives. Some people said that ten years after the war
a TV-program like this is not needed anymore in Bosnia. A motivation for saying this
was that logistical impediments to communication had been abolished, besides, as some
respondents stated, many people had already contacted and reconnected with their former
friends. They assumed many people have done the same. From a survey that was
executed in the Republika Srpska however, it appeared that many people still missed
former contacts. They did ring up those people though, so to say that Videoletters could
help in restoring this initial contact would be inaccurate. Since from the survey, as well as
from interviews, it seems that the actual reconnecting of people has either already taken
place, or is perceived as something that other people do, not themselves, this objective
may be wrong. So the need for actual reconnecting may not be that present in Bosnian
society.
Where it seems that Videoletters could make a contribution though, is in
encouraging people to think differently about the other ethnic groups, and encouraging
72
These findings are based on the experiences of one of the members of the videoletters crew on the June 8,
2005. Moderators were present on the caravan to lead focus groups and talk shows; encouraging respondents
to talk about the episodes.
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people to think about their own situation regarding lost contacts. This can be perceived as
lifting the reconnecting objective to a higher level: it is not so much about reconnecting
in the first place but more about maintaining contacts. The assumption is that people
could and had found each other again, and Videoletters could help these old friends get
closer to each other if they were open towards that. When this ‘reconnecting-objective’ is
lifted to the higher level, it reaches the second objective of Videoletters: humanising the
other side. From chapter four about reconciliation in Bosnia it became clear that although
Bosnia is one country, it seems as if it consists of many islands that are connected by thin
lines. Videoletters showed episodes with characters from all ethnic identities in former
Yugoslavia, and by doing so created an opportunity from people of all ethnic groups to
see each other and possibly form new opinions about the other side.
From the official viewing figures of Videoletters it appeared that few people had
watched the series on television. The people that did find the television show, however,
stayed tuned and watched it, on average, for twenty minutes. This could say something
about the attention they held for the program. From different surveys however, it became
clear that almost half of the respondents had watched some of the episodes of the series
on television. These figures are much higher than the ones presented by the official
ratings. As these figures conflict, this could be due to the fact that the respondents from
Republika Srpska do not comprise a reflection of the whole Bosnian society, whereas the
official TV rating does. The reasons that came out of the survey for not watching the
program were either of a technical character (I can not receive the television show) or of a
political character (I do not watch any program on TV that deals with politics because this
country is a political mess).
Videoletters was both a TV-program and a reconciliation project. Most people
were only familiar with the series on television and not so much with the practical tools
that Videoletters provided to actually reconnect (website, telephone help lines, internet
counters). This ignorance can explain the different kinds of reactions respondents had on
the show. Broadly speaking, most respondents liked the TV-program. They appreciated
the way in which the series was made and admired the Dutch TV-makers for their will
and courage to make the documentaries, nobody contradicted this. To see it as a
reconciliation tool however, evoked mixed feelings. From one-to-one surveys it appeared
that many respondents thought the message of the TV-program was patronising, they said
they could do it themselves and they did not need a television program to tell them what
to do. Other respondents however, started telling about contacts they had lost themselves,
or persons they knew who had lost contacts. Despite the mixed feelings that Videoletters
caused among the respondents, it often did make them start to think about their own
situation. People felt touched after seeing an episode, it made them remember contacts
they might have lost, but there the process stopped. Where Videoletters might have
expected these people to use one of the tools they provided to record a videoletter, the
people in question usually did not.
Except for the shortcomings of Videoletters as a reconciliation program already
mentioned, other unintended outcomes were reached. For a start regarding the political
connotation of Videoletters; by respondents the program was regarded several times as
political while the organization emphasized the humane side of the program. Because
many people are fed up with politics, they do not watch news or anything that is related to
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politics. The political connotation Videoletters had according to some respondents, made
them not watch the show. Although the organization of Videoletters stated they were
‘new in their kind’, Bosnians were not as impressed as the international newspapers that
published big interviews with the filmmakers. People appear to be fed up with foreigners
coming to tell them what to do and how to reconnect. This had its consequences for the
appreciation of Videoletters.
Bosnians seemed to largely appreciate Videoletters as a TV-program. As a
reconciliation-approach however, many respondents were sceptical. Not many people
were encouraged by Videoletters to record a video message themselves. The ultimate tool
of the program was not much used. It did become clear however, that after seeing an
episode, respondents started thinking about their own lives. About contacts they had lost
themselves. Videoletters may have contributed to raising consciousness about
experiences and the daily situation among these people.
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Prijedor, May 2005
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8 General Conclusions
This chapter will answer the main research question, by drawing conclusions from the
four sub questions as discussed in the chapters four to seven. Let us return to the main
research question as outlined in the introduction of this thesis:
In what way do media related projects of Non Governmental
Organizations try to contribute to the reconciliation process in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and what are the results of these attempts?
The theoretical framework discussed the running debates from the subject of conflict in
general to the specific subject of the research: the positive contribution the media can
make to the reconciliation process. This theory was used when executing the research in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the theory stems that before being able to measure the
impact of a media-related initiative of an NGO, which is in itself a challenge, the
influence of other factors on these projects must be mapped. These factors relate to the
reconciliation- and the media climate; before turning to the case studies of this research,
this paper examined the circumstances under which the programs took place. Both
external ‘climates’ were considered based on their possible influence over the course and
outcome of media initiatives.
The case studies of this research consisted of several NGO initiatives that related
to media and peacebuilding. These initiatives varied in nature and objectives, but they all
intended to contribute to a better living atmosphere within Bosnian society. They tried to
do this either directly or indirectly. Different NGO projects have been examined within
this research: some of them dealt with trainings and workshops for journalists to improve
their journalistic skills, which can be perceived as an indirect way to bring positive change
to a society. In addition, however, projects where journalists have taken a more active
approach towards the population have also been included in this research. Journalists can
have this more active approach by deliberately including themes as peace, safety and
ethnicity in their work. The most direct way in which NGOs try to bring positive change
to the society is through the so-called ‘intended outcome approach’ in which the
population is affected by the project directly and asked to actively cooperate with the
project. Such a project has been examined in this research as well, by means of the
documentary series Videoletters which will be discussed later in this chapter.
8.1 The long path of reconciliation in Bosnia
Before executing the actual research, both the reconciliation and the media climate were
outlined. There is no blueprint for how a reconciliation process should develop but there
are indicators that depict whether people are willing to reconcile or not. These indicators
have been determined in the theoretical chapter, by means of the scholar Lederach.
According to many pre-eminent scholars, a reconciliation process consists out of four
elements. These elements are: truth, justice, mercy and peace. While examining the
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concepts of reconciliation in Bosnian society, two objectives were being pursued. On the
one hand the research explored the understandings of reconciliation among Bosnian
society, in order to learn more about the meaning of the concept. On the other hand it was
about researching the progress of the reconciliation process.
The first element as distinguished by Lederach is truth. On the basis of both my
informants and my wider background research, Chapter Four concluded that most
respondents do not talk about ‘the truth’ if they do not have to. Many people in Bosnia
prefer to surround themselves with like-minded people, something that is maintained by
the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreements (DPA) as well. The DPA created a
structure and laws that continue to ethnically divide Bosnia on many subjects. The
consequence of this policy is that people of different ethnic origins often do not have to
face each other if it is not necessary. As a result, they do not speak much about what has
happened, or acknowledge events on a public level, something which is a precondition for
the course of a good reconciliation process according to Lederach. The institute that might
help the Bosnians to talk about ‘the truth ‘on a big scale is the ‘Truth and Reconciliation
Commission’, after the example of the South African TRC. In Bosnia however, it does not
seem to work well because of political resistance on the one hand and little enthusiasm of
the population at the other hand. Most respondents did agree upon the fact that truth is a
very important element of the concept of reconciliation as a whole.
The second element that Lederach specifies is Justice. The institution that should
bring the Bosnian victims justice is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). But the respondents have proclaimed that it does not give them real
justice. Although the hearings in The Hague can be followed live on television in Bosnia,
the ICTY is too far away from them, and the imposed punishments are too low according
to the respondents. Besides, this court justice does not give them real justice so they say,
because the perpetrators have not committed personal crimes to them. However, despite
the fact that respondents are quite indifferent towards the ICTY, one of the things they
refer to while entering upon the subject of war and reconciliation is that many war
criminals have still not yet been arrested.
The third and fourth elements were perceived by my respondents as less important
for the reconciliation process to succeed than the first two. As some respondents said;
mercy, the third element sometimes is too difficult to execute, some deeds are
unforgivable. This does not mean though that reconciliation will not work. Mercy is less
of a precondition for the reconciliation process than truth and justice. The same counts for
the fourth element; safety. Whereas an assumption about this subject implied that safety in
Bosnia would actually mean the encounter of different ethnic groups, it has turned out that
especially the presence of many landmines is a threat for a Bosnian life. However, it can
be imagined that the fact that many war criminals have not been captured yet, combined
with the feelings of ethnic hate that are still present in many Bosnian areas causes
reluctant feelings to visit certain areas. Most respondents confirmed this, but made a clear
difference between travelling and living in the whole country. Almost all respondents
proclaimed to have visited, or have the will to visit the whole country; the Muslim
respondents would not mind visiting Serbian areas and vice versa. To live there, however,
is a different story. When talking with respondents it became clear that many of them
prefer to live in an area with people whom they perceive as like-minded. This also shows
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in the number of returnees; there are many refugees who have not returned to their former
homes yet because that area is ‘ethnically cleansed’.
The influence of the International Community on the ethnic division of Bosnia
should not be underestimated: by drawing up the DPA they determined that a border was
created between the three ethnic groups. With the policy of the General Framework of the
DPA, this ethnic division grew. At this moment a status quo has been reached; there are
few violent incidents between members of different ethnic groups, but people of different
ethnic origins do not often live side by side either. Ethnically based violence is still quite
an issue in Bosnia according to the International Organization on Migration (IOM) But on
the other hand, people of different ethnic origins do live together in peace in some
situations. This status quo that resulted from the DPA has its consequences for the
confidence of the population in the future. Many people are quite suspicious about
politics and this does not encourage the reconciliation process. The lack of confidence in
the future makes that people do not see the urge of living together and have become quite
indifferent towards certain approaches of NGOs and other organizations that focus on
peacebuilding.
8.2 Position of Bosnian media climate
Chapter Five described the media climate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By means of
several reports on the Bosnian media, drawn up by NGOs, it has been argued that the
media in Bosnia do not always function properly, when compared to the international
rules for journalism. The number of media outlets is too large, which causes confusion
amongst the population at the one hand and abundance of the media market in general.
The market is financially supported by revenues through advertisement, and the Bosnian
economy is not big enough to provide this support. An additional problem is that these
advertisements often have an ethnic character, as do many of the TV-channels themselves.
This means that the deeply divided Bosnian population often chooses to watch the TVshow that will not contradict the dominant beliefs of their nationality. Bosnia has a Public
Broadcasting System (PBS) at its disposal but this system is also ethnically divided. New
employees are reputedly hired on the basis of their ethnic identity and not because of their
journalistic skills. According to several journalists, this ethnic division within the PBS
also shows in the messages spread; if the news for example tells about a Bosniak who is in
jail, they will try to find a Serbian and a Croatian prisoner in jail as well. The ethnic
determination of media outlets also shows in print media; many newspapers and
magazines are obviously divided along ethnic lines.
Hate speech may often be noticed in the Bosnian media. This is for a start due to
the fact that these feelings are present among the population, as depicted in Chapter Four
as well. It can be argued that the media demonstrates these feelings. However, the bad
education of journalists may make them less aware of the ethics of their work. Bosnia has
many self-declared journalists who have not reached professional journalistic standards.
Universities provide education, but journalists that have finished university education do
not come up to international journalistic standards because they lack practical knowledge.
When these young journalists enter the labour market, they may more easily become the
victims as well as executors of hate inspired language. The third explanation for the
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presence of hate speech in the Bosnian media relates to one of the ‘holy rules of
journalism’: objectivity. The objectivity of journalists can be doubted upon according to
several respondents. Journalists often seem to be spokesmen of the government. There are
several cases known of journalists who have taken bribes from politicians, because they
are not paid well enough, if in any case they are paid at all.
For both print and electronic media, control agencies have been established. For
the electronic media, the Communications Regulatory Agency controls the number of
electronic outlets, the extent of hate-inspired language of journalists and the
implementation of the laws and rules adopted by the government. Whereas the CRA has
the power to sanction media or journalists that cross the lines, the control agency for the
print media, the Press Council, has not. This institution works via self-regulation which
means that citizens can complain when they read something which is against the Press
Code, adopted by the Press Council.
The Bosnian media sees many failures despite the fact they are so numerous and
influential. By financing TV- and Radio-programs, newspapers and magazines, the
International Community has influenced the media scenery to a high extent. However, as
the above-mentioned problems show, the reliability of the media in Bosnia can be
doubted, reflecting the population’s approach towards media. It has turned out from the
primary research carried out for this research that people do indeed doubt the credibility of
the media. Many respondents declared that they did not buy certain newspapers or watch
certain TV programs because of their interrelatedness with politics and nationalism. Other
respondents declared they did not watch the news anymore because it only brought them
sad and biased information which ‘they do not need in their post-conflict society’. From
speaking with the respondents, it can be concluded that most of them have a suspicious
opinion of the media; when it concerns the informative role the media can play,
respondents doubt its credibility. An informant stated that it is as if the Bosnian population
suffers from ‘media-tiredness’, which relates more to news programs than entertainment
programs. This ‘tiredness’ on the one hand means that media programs which focus on
bringing about positive change in society may not be as successful as expected by the
executors; the respondents included in this research have declared to shun programs with a
political message. On the other hand, although ‘media-tiredness’ makes it more of a
challenge to use the media to support social initiatives, NGOs must continue to access this
medium for further well-planned initiatives. Examples of how they can do this are
explained in the next section.
8.3 Five types of media initiatives by NGOs in Bosnia
Whereas the previous two sections mainly focused on the possibilities for success of
media initiatives by drawing conclusions from the environment in which the mediainterventions took place, this section is more analytical. Five types of media interventions
have been researched, based on the theoretical model of Ross Howard, an associate of the
Canadian NGO IMPACS, an organization that has much experience with media
interventions. The framework speaks of five different kinds of media initiatives. During
the research several projects of NGOs that work with media and peacebuilding have been
examined and categorized by character, based on Howard’s framework. The reason for
130
doing so was to make an inventory of the projects in Bosnia on the one hand, and to test
the model on the other. While the first objective is hardly achieved because the number of
projects that have been examined is by no means the total number of NGO projects,
relating to the first objective, some remarks can be made.
Within category one of Howard’s model, can be placed the NGO activities that
relate to rudimentary journalism training (type one). Two projects of the NGO
Mediacentar, and one project of the NGO Internews, all located in Sarajevo, have been
examined on the basis of indicators as depicted by Howard in the theory of this research.
While doing so, it has turned out that the projects cannot merely be placed in this category
because its activities go beyond basic journalism training. The projects also cover
activities which can be placed in the second category of Howard’s framework: responsible
journalism development. The three examined projects are difficult to define by character
because they often overlap and therefore cannot be placed in one category. When placing
all researched projects in a framework and defining them by target group (as has been
done in table 7.1), type one and two activities also come under the same category. The
indicators for placing initiatives under type one or two interventions are not defined
clearly by Howard. Based on the findings from the research can be argued that the
difference between type one and two activities is in practice superfluous. Therefore
Howard’s theory can be adjusted based on these researched projects.
Whereas the journalistic role in type one and two interventions relates to
traditional journalism: ‘the journalist reports news objectively’, within type three
interventions: transitional media development, the journalist is a peace worker at the same
time. The journalists are supposed to possess the provided journalistic skills, now it is
time for them to learn peacebuilding skills, in workshops and seminars. One project that
can be perceived as a type three initiative is the Nansen Dialogue Centre (NDC). This
project focused on divided communities in the whole of the Balkans, and asked journalists
to write articles or make radio- and television shows with a message which was focused
on peacebuilding. This project comes up to the standards of type three interventions as
defined by Ross Howard. Relating to the impact that a project like this may have on
Bosnian society, few concrete conclusions can be made. Monitoring or evaluating
instruments have not yet been developed or employed by the NGO. However, journalists
that have cooperated in this project have nevertheless declared that it was useful to them
as they met journalists of other ethnic identities and origin. Through such facilitated
interactions they could develop their journalistic network which may help them in their
work. How the project affected the population is again difficult to say because the line
from the seminar for journalists as provided by the NDC, to the citizen, is indirect and
long. The journalists that cooperated in the project and also within this research confirmed
they had had positive reactions (like letters or telephone calls) from the audience. This
research however, did not have the necessary facilities to execute an extensive research on
the impact of the NDC-program.
The type four and five interventions are different to the previous three
interventions, as they refer to more direct targeting of the population by NGOs. Whereas
within type one, two and three interventions the population is to be reached through the
journalists, within type four and five interventions, the NGOs reach them directly
themselves. Type four interventions: media-based journalism, often concern safety-issues
131
like landmines or war criminals. The two type four interventions that have been taken up
in this research have been initiated by the United Nations (UN) and EUFOR, the European
armed forces present in Bosnia. The United Nations program concerned UN News, which
was broadcasted on the radio just after the war, in order to calm down the Bosnian
population. Not much is known about this program. The media-program of EUFOR
focuses on the following four elements; image building (justifying their presence towards
the Bosnian population), tolerance, reconciliation and information. EUFOR spreads these
messages through magazines, television- and radio spots and billboards. By means of
surveys that are spread amongst a big share of the population every six months, EUFOR
tries to research the influence of their media program. The causal relationship between
their program and the reconciliation process in Bosnia however, is difficult to determine.
Besides, according to the outcomes of the survey, the attitudes of Bosnians towards people
of other ethnic origin are unlikely to be significantly altered within a half-year period. The
findings of the reports have also been clarified in Chapter Four (Reconciliation) and
Chapter Six (Media Initiatives). Whether these results can be attributed to EUFOR’s
efforts is difficult to say. As with the type one and two initiatives, my research had neither
the time nor the possibility to research the influence of these programs.
The type five NGO approaches are characterized by their direct approach of the
population, by NGOs or individuals. The difference between types four and five
interventions is not made explicitly clear by Howard in the theoretical framework; he
focuses on the executors of the projects. In the case of type four initiatives it is mainly an
outside intervener like an international organization or troop force that initiates the
program. Within the type five programs the intervener is an NGO or individual. Based on
the information that Howard gives us though it is difficult to place certain NGO initiatives
within this set of categories. For example the project ‘without anaesthesia’ which is
discussed in Chapter Six. This project is executed by the NGO Mediacentar and
comprises a documentary series for young people. Each episode discusses a topic that
appeals to young people and deals with problems they may face like drugs or prostitution.
In a sense this project can be a type four project because it brings informative
documentaries. However, the executor is not an outside intervener but a local NGO;
reason to characterize it as a type five initiative. Howard does not categorize the type four
and five activities on the basis of the contents of the projects; the indicators may be made
clearer.
Let us return to the two objectives as outlined in the first paragraph of this section.
The first objective of researching Ross Howard’s framework was to inventory the
peacebuilding activities in Bosnia. There are more media-related projects in Bosnia than
those mentioned so far. However the interventions that have been discussed can be
categorized within the Ross Howard’s theoretical categories. From the inventory of NGOactivities in Bosnia can be concluded that Howard’s typology can be used as a guide for
examining them. What could be further added to his theory, however, is a clearer
justification for dividing the activities in this way. The model does pay attention to the
different phases a conflict consists of, and the activities that can be executed within these
phases; it depicts pre-conflict initiatives, overt conflict initiatives and post-conflict
132
initiatives73. Whereas the conflict-phases and its accompanying activities are divided, the
account of the division of activities on the basis of its contents is meagre. From the daily
practice of NGOs that have been examined in this research can be concluded that NGOs
themselves do not make the division between the type one and two activities, as used by
Ross Howard. On the basis of the examined projects can further be argued that the
division between the two types of projects is superfluous. Also, the differentiation
between type four and five activities is vague; it can be concluded that it is difficult to
place activities in one particular category. So, although Ross Howard’s framework
provides initial assistance when classifying specific NGO projects, further analysis is
needed by other means, especially concerning the contents of each initiative.
8.4 Contribution of a an ‘intended outcome program’ to Bosnian society
The fifth type of media initiative, as determined by the framework of Ross Howard, will
be discussed in this section. This so-called ‘intended outcome program’ has been picked
out for more intensive research because it is focused directly on the population and
therefore more researchable than, e.g., a type one initiative. Besides, there was one type
five project which fitted in this research very well: Videoletters. This project was based on
a documentary series created by two Dutch filmmakers: by means of showing a television
show, a contribution was to be made to the reconciliation of Bosnia / the Former
Yugoslavia. The way they formulated it was: ‘videoletters is a tool for reconciliation in
post-war countries and a conflict prevention tool in multi ethnic societies. By
reconnecting former enemies, videoletters contributes to open communication and makes
reconciliation possible74 (source: website Videoletters). This was the actual goal of the
makers of the show, who interpreted the concept of reconciliation in two ways: first by
humanising the ‘other’ side and secondly by ‘reconnecting’ people. They particularly
focused on the personal level within their reconciliation approach. While doing so they
encouraged people to speak to each other and to discuss the events that took place during
the war. So of the four elements that reconciliation consists of according to the theoretical
framework which has been explored in this thesis, we can judge that the television show
aimed to provide ‘Truth’, as well as ‘Mercy’.
As the theory argues, before launching a peacebuilding program, the aims should
be clarified. It is extremely important to identify the goals before the start of a project,
especially when it concerns an ‘intended outcome’ such as Videoletters. However, the
goals of the project were not specified in more detailed terms than ‘reconnecting people’
by the initiators. No evaluation or monitoring tools, based on the objectives of the
program, were devised or used in order to research the effects of the project, and its
possible contribution to the reconciliation process. Despite this, there was a clear direct
motivation for starting the project: the documentary makers were open that they had
encountered situations on the Balkans that made them realise that many people miss their
former friends, neighbours and relatives. They wanted to help these people by giving them
the chance to make a video message and exchange stories of their lives. Whilst these
73
74
For more information on this subject I refer to the theoretical chapter.
This project-objective is based on information from the website of the project: www.videoletters.net.
133
experienced documentary makers normally remain on the level of actually making
documentaries, this time they developed themselves into peace workers. They organized a
bus tour, developed an internet website, and opened telephone help lines and internet
counters. While discussing the outcomes of Videoletters it is useful to make a distinction
between Videoletters as a television program and Videoletters as the whole project
(including broadcasting, bus tour, internet counters, telephone help lines etc.). While the
motivation was obvious for the organization, the desired outcomes of the show were not.
The Videoletters organization tried to reach the population in any way they could but
failed to consider that the Bosnian society may not have been ready for such a
reconciliation approach. From interviews with Videoletters-viewers can almost
unanimously be quoted that:
‘Videoletters is a good documentary series but it does not work as a reconciliation
approach’.
This is at the same time one of the conclusions of this research. In other words: the
documentary Videoletters is a good television programme, but the project should have
stopped at broadcasting the series. The makers have won some international prizes, and
no-one has denied the fact that the documentary series in itself is well-made and of a high
quality. However, to use such media outputs as a tool for reconciliation is something
different.
Several explanations, based on different arguments, can be found for drawing this
conclusion. One argument for stating that Videoletters has not been effective as a
reconciliation program is because several respondents doubted the need of this program.
They did not feel motivated by Videoletters to restore contacts with former friends again.
From the survey that was distributed among citizens in three towns in RS can be
concluded that although visa or passport restrictions are not a problem anymore, many
respondents do have trouble crossing the emotional bridge to former friends or places.
Those respondents who expressed suspicion about Videoletters as a tool for reconnection
did confirm that the program may evoke feelings of recognition amongst the Bosnian
population. Besides, the program may help people face the ‘other side’. However, the
television program did not encourage them to cross the ‘emotional bridge’. This also
shows in low response to the internet counters and telephone help lines in Bosnia. Most
respondents included in this research claimed that the approach of videoletters did not
motivate them to get in contact with lost friends again. The speculations of my
respondents support the conclusion that Videoletters was in the first place a good
documentary, rather than a reconciliation tool.
It is not clear whether a causal relationship exists between the low response75 and
the will to reconcile. Reasons for respondents not to approach the internet counters or
telephone help lines were related to logistical problems in case of the ‘counters’, or
reluctance to call unknown people, in case of the telephone help lines. Limitations of this
75
This low response is based on the reactions of Bosnians on Videoletters through the website, the internet
counters and the telephone help lines. Also the viewing figures are included in this conclusion of ‘low
response’.
134
character can be attributed to the organizational skills of Videoletters. During the
development of the Videoletters project, the organization realised that the goal, to use
Videoletters as a tool for reconciliation, may have been too ambitious. It was first
recognised, through the Videoletters caravan that rambled through the Balkans, that the
project should not target whole groups through activities; instead the focus should be on
individuals. The ambitious goals were adjusted more and more during the course of the
Videoletters project as a whole. This first became clear through the fact that the
Videoletters-episodes were shown in the first few towns on a big screen. The attendance
for the episodes was not as high as hoped, and many of the people who did come were
more interested in the band that would play after the episode had been shown. The same
syndrome applied to the other projects operated by the caravan; the children frequently
appeared more interested in painting a flag than the message behind the painting76.
Beyond a certain point, the tour did not appear to relate to reconciliation. This is why the
organization decided to show the episodes in the bus instead of outside in the open air.
The personal stories that the episodes told were considered more suitable viewing for a
small audience. In this way, a shift was made from a collective reconciliation imperative
to an individual approach. This shift was also a result of the low response on the project
through the telephone help lines and the internet counters. It is possible that many
Bosnians are not familiar with the concept or operation of such facilities, or maybe they
were reluctant to use these instruments.
Where Videoletters as a project did succeed though was telling the stories of many
people’s lives. While showing the stories of persons that used to love each other and were
separated because of the war, Videoletters touched many viewers. It appeared that people
were able to identify themselves with the people in the documentary. However, it is
doubtful whether TV is the right medium for reconciliation. The current media climate of
Bosnia and Herzegovina is not very suitable for reconciliation-initiatives of type five. The
diverse media landscape makes it difficult for the viewer to choose one TV-channel. This
choice is made even more difficult by the ethnic character of the TV-channels. The choice
of the organization of Videoletters to approach the Public Broadcasting Channel can be
considered the best option in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of its coverage of the
whole country. However, the outputs of the PBS are also influenced by ethnic divisions, in
turn influencing the opinions and/or behaviour of the viewers.
The organization of Videoletters could, and should, have researched the potential
problems related to the media landscape before broadcasting the show. If they had done
so, they could have prepared for low response; the viewing figures of the program in
Bosnia were disappointing as well as the response on the telephone help lines and the
internet counters that were established by Videoletters. The same principle applies to the
reconciliation climate in Bosnia: if extensive research had been executed concerning the
potential for reconciliation in Bosnia, the organization could have fine-tuned its goals and
aims based on its background findings. Through this process, appropriate indicators could
have been developed to test the influence of the project on the reconciliation process in
Bosnia.
76
Children from local schools could come to the Videoletters bus to paint a ‘dream flag’.
135
This study of media and reconciliation in Bosnia, through the example of several NGOs
and Videoletters specifically, can teach us lessons which can be applied to future project
both in Bosnia and other war-torn societies. The challenge to reconcile people from
different ethnic backgrounds in Bosnia is very big, and although from this research stems
that it is necessary to focus on this challenge, the contribution of an ‘intended outcome
approach’, like Videoletters, to reconciliation can be doubted. Of course this related in the
first place to the context because maybe other war-torn societies or people who have
experienced armed conflict react different on the program. However, what is very
important while researching this particular relation between media and reconciliation, are
the external influences on the program. Therefore, proper research and realistic goals must
be devised before starting such projects. Organisations must never underestimate the
severity of a populations’ divisiveness, and perhaps such a process has to come from
within if it is so have any long-term impact on social relations.
136
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