Matson, The "Hollander Interest"

The “Hollander Interest”
Cathy Matson
History Department
University of Belawan
1n the fust years after New Amsterdam’s conquest in
Other English observersproposednot to defeatbut to
emulate the success of their northern neighbors,
especially with respect to Hugo Grotius’ belief in the
“natural and permanent” rights of nations to observe a
“freedom of trade” on the expansive, uninhabited, and
unconquerableopen seas.Writers like Matthew Decker,
William Petty, and Gerald Malynes extendedthis notion
to the rights of individual commercial activists to “find
vent” without constraint. As John Pollexfen put it, “Only
freedom in trade can make trade great.” This literature
promoting imitation of Dutch successwas most prolific
during a time when England began to emerge from a
period of economic trauma and enjoy an ascent which
would place its merchantsin first place amongEuropean
nations in the early eighteenth century; in the process,
Amsterdam would be dislodged from first place in
commerceand the statism which has come to be called
“mercantilism” would offer benefits and opportunities to
tradersthroughout its expanding empire.2
1664,there was very little unanimity about whether, and
how, New Yorkers ought to trade with Amsterdam.
Despitethe swift transferof power from Dutch to English
hands,the two nations confronted eachother aslong term
rivals, each with a different economic trajectory during
the seventeenth century. Amsterdam dominated the
northern fisheries and Baltic trades; had a strong
presencein the New World carrying trades; developed
superior shipping, warehousing, credit and banking
systems;and showedthe visible signsof successin dress,
art, and science.In contrast, England entereda phaseof
economic uncertainty after 1600 in which the Old
Draperies declined, inflation and unemployment rose,
and trading monopolies held extensive privileges in
foreign commerce. English theorists often noted their
country’s reliance upon Dutch skills and currency to
support its economy.
Together, these and other contrasts between the two
countries representeddifferent momentsin the separate
economic directions they travelled: Amsterdamattained
a peak of commercial prosperity in the 1640sto 169Os,
while England’s rise would become assuredonly after
the 1690s. Until then, the “Holland trades” were
England’s greatestperceived threat, one conceived and
maintained with an unprecedentedlatitude of commercial freedom.For their part, English theorists and statesmen divided sharply over the merits of this Dutch model
of “free trade.” Some of them believed that the only
feasible response was to construct a state based upon
legislation designed to defeat Dutch hegemony in
commerce with English taxes, manufactures, and
colonial markets. The most ambitious competitors in
English government and commerce were willing to
securegreaternational profits with naval power as well.
As the Duke of Albemarle put it in 1664, with reference
to the appropriatenessof taking New Amsterdam:“What
we want is more of the trade the Dutch now have.“’
The ambivalence of theorists and statesmen in
England was evident among colonists in the western
hemisphereaswell. For someof them, identifying Dutch
carriers wassynonymousin the minds of someobservers
with identifying contraband cargoes and usurers; for
other observers the Dutch were potentially valuable
collaborators in areas of intense international rivalry.
Among all rival Europeanpowers, only the Dutch tried
to establishlong term policies of neutrality and available
credit. By the seventeenthcentury, British West Indies
governors and merchants took note of the increasing
number of statist restraints on commerce and pleaded
with home officials to makeexceptionsenough to recognize “the necessity of free trade” with Holland and its
West Indies possessions.’ Virginia and Maryland
officials invested in tobacco exports to Amsterdam
before the 166Os,much of it in vesselstouching at New
Amsterdam,and the deputy collector of Newport, Rhode
Island regularly imported slaves from the Dutch before
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Fig. 46. The WestIndia Houseas seenfrom the OudeSchans,
Amsterdam,Netherlands. Courtesy of the Museum of the City of New York.
and after U3X4 Some English officials reported with
only slight exaggeration that “all of New England” was
trading with Amsterdam since the Dutch West India
Company settled on the Hudson River very early in the
century, and projected that this trade would continue, all
diplomatic settlementsbetweenLondon and Amsterdam
to the contrary.5
1660-1690
In the absence of reliable information about ship
registrations, tonnage,and the nature and values of cargoes, it is the reports of governors and individual observers which must provide the foundations of our
impressionsof New York City’s early tradewith the Low
Countries. Following the English conquest of New
Amsterdamin 1664the “hollander interest”continued to
offer an enviable commercial model among a small but
powerful minority of colonists. The reasonsfor this are
not difficult to attribute. For one thing, Albemarle’s
rhetoric, which was effective in building war chestsfor
England, was less useful in constructing New York
City’s tradeafter the war. No English vesselsflooded the
fledgling colony with finished goods in 1664, although
regular trade had been conducted between Amsterdam
and New Netherland before 1664. Since,the city’s first
English governors and merchantscould hardly overlook
the possibilities of securing the colony’s future by reviving this tradeand involving the conquenzdDutch in New
York City’s commercial life, they actively cast about for
the right meansto bring Dutch trade into the port. Given
these material necessities, the language and general
strategiesof free trade proved to be alluring ideological
props for their policies. Free trade notions were one way
to explain the evasion of English regulalions which did
not suit New Yorkers at one time or anotlheror to justify
the pursuit of economic opportunities outside of the
empire over the eighteenth century.
New York’s direct trade with Amsterdam continued
iegally for a brief period in 1664,until Governor Nicolls
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(1664-1668) received orders from London to freezethe
remaining assetsof the Dutch West India Company and
to assimilate Dutch tradersinto the newly forming body
of mercantile regulations. However, Nicolls quickly
grew more sensitive to the economic and social importance of a continued Dutch presencein New York and
granted exceptions to the Acts of Trade and Navigation
for ships headedto Amsterdam.
merchants who felt that even these few ships were an
unwarranted flirtation with their primary competitor
nation. They noted Lovelace’s “shortsightedness” about
mercantile precepts and his closenessto “Dutch petty
traders” and “Dutch usurers” in the colony; merchants
like Steenwyck, Cornelius van Ruyven, and Thomas
Delaval bore the more straightforward epithet “hogs,”
long a term of abusein England for the Dutch.”
One of the more active participants in this Dutch trade
wasCornelius Steenwyck,a former memberof the Dutch
West India Company and a future customsofficial under
the English. Dutch ex-Director General, Petrus
Stuyvesant,supportedmaking theseexceptions,pointing
out to crown officials at London that unless the Duke of
York’s colony traded with Amsterdam, French interlopers would redirect New York’s fur trade through
Canada and Spain would capture the budding West
Indies connections of the northern colonies. Besides,he
insisted, Dutch residents of the colony had rights to a
“free trade” with their mother country which antedated
the conquest;private well-being, that is, supercededthe
changing political rights of different states over their
inhabitants.Inlate 1664Stuyvesantaskedforpermission
to sendfour to six shipsa year to the Low Countries until
London could absorb the supplies of peltry and tobacco
which New Yorkers exported.6From late 1667 to late
1668 three ships per year were allowed clearance for
AmsterdamandRotterdam,andreportsindicated that the
quota was filled. In addition to Steenwyck, merchants
like Oloff van Cortlandt, JacquesCousseau,Nicholas de
Meyer, Margareta Philipse, and others engagedin this
commerce,even beyond its formal legal dates.’
The last of the Anglo-Dutch warsput a temporarystop
to Lovelace’s involvement in foreign trade, when Dutch
privateers took the Good Fame at either Texel or Sandy
Hook in 1673. That sameyear Steenwyck lost his ship
James;ThomasDelaval lost theMargaret, andFrederick
Philipse lost the Frederick. But these and other losses,
including the surrender of the city to the Dutch for one
year, only underscoredhow vital the Dutch trade could
be for supplying the city. Indeed, many of the city’s
Dutch paused long enough with English residents to
consider which mother country was, as Capt. John
Manning put it, the greater“enemy in our Bowells.“’ ’
Governor Lovelace (1668-1673) was also lenient
about the Dutch trade, but not out of disinterested
concern for the future of the colony. He and his brother,
Thomas, owned shares in the Hopewell (with Steenwyck), the Good Fame, and the Duke of York, and traded
through Dutch agents Eagidius Luyck, Francis Hooghlandt, Nicholas Gouvemeur, and Isaac Bedloo, all of
whom resided in New York. The first year of his
administration Lovelace not only lowered import duties
from 10% to 7% to accommodatethe city’s merchants,
but also appointedCornelius van Ruyven as the customs
collector. Van R uyven often proved his loyalty to fellow
Dutch countrymen by overlooking the port regulations
which affected arriving vessels.*Later in 1668 English
officials gaveLovelace permission to license threeships
per year from New York: in 1669this wasreducedto one
per year.g Nevertheless, there were some British
Upon resurrcnder of the city to the English in 1674,
many Dutch andEnglish merchantsassumedthe tradeto
Holland would reopen, and so they revived the demand
for open trade to Amsterdam once again, However, the
new governor, Edmund Andros, at first refused to sanction the principle of free or open trade, and in 1675 he
demandedoaths of loyalty to the crown from all city
residents. Eight Dutch residents, seven of them
merchants,refusedto take the oaths.When pressuredby
English officials to choose either constitutional loyalty
or individual economic privilege, most chose the latter,
even to the point of leaving the colony.‘* Members of
the Governor’s Council and merchants around New
York’s environs interpreted the rejection of oaths as a
testament of the commitment they shared to retain
contacts with Amsterdam,and in the following months
the Council-in which most memberswere concerned
in the Amsterdam trade-promoted resolutions to
support the commerce.‘3 By 1675, Andros himself
realized the political expedienceof accommodatingthe
Dutch traders and expressed a more enlightened
stance.14
These minor victories for the “holland party” of
tradersin New York were far from secure,however. By
the 1670snumbers of English merchantsbeganmigrating into the colony, someof them with clearly expressed
mercantile pretentions to enforce the Acts of Trade and
Navigation and curtail the favors extended to Amster-
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dam traders whom they regarded as little more than
“foreigners” who could never have the best interests of
the empire at heart. Even worse, they noted, was the
support given by “true Englishmen,” reputablecommercial and political leaders, to such activities which could
undermine the solidity of British domination.15 In
1680/81 these new arrivals joined in an attack upon
Governor Andros and the “Dutch tribe” by initiating an
agreementamong merchantsto stop paying port duties,
a sure method of withdrawing support for the govemment and drawing attention to their displeasure.Like the
more well-known non-importation movements in the
1760sto 177Os,theseEnglish merchantsbenefited from
the stoppage of commercial taxation. However, theirs
wasno simple mobilization of economic self interest and
ethnic hostility, for this opposition would fastenits future
upon the credit of London firms and becomeprominent
dry goods importers and peltry exporters by the end of
that generation. They were the founding members of
New York City’s Anglo-American elite. Traders to
Amsterdam could not help but interpret this as a direct
threat to their own enterpriseandforeseeseriousdifficulties. Andros’ removal and the appointment of a nearly
all-English Assembly by 1683 also boded darkly for
active Amsterdamtraders.16Under the newly appointed
Governor Dongan, the Assembly passed legislation
which taxed exports and imports, and forbid foreign
vessels at New York City; they also regulated more
vigorously New York’s commerce with New England
and Philadelphia after 1685, which made the notorious
Amsterdam smuggling activities of previous decades
harder to continue.”
Before the 1690sit was a received wisdom that Dutch
prices and shipping costs were lower and that
Amsterdam’s demand for agricultural staples,much of
which the entrepot’s merchants reexported to Europe,
was steadierthan England’s So it did not surprisemany
New Yorkers to hear from their govemers that colonial
merchants conducted a “common” and “practicable”
direct trade with Amsterdam, via Newfoundland,
Boston, Portugal, Dover, and Falmouth in these early
years.l8 A very conservative estimateof the New YorkAmsterdam trade from 1664 to 1668 is three or four
vesselsper year (eight in 1667) out of New York.lg The
city sustained this level of trade for the period 16741680,when four to five shipsper year clearedNew York
for Amsterdamor Rotterdam?’
Robert R. Livingston was only one of the most
successful Amsterdam traders; Livingston shipped
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goods from New York City with Stephanus van
Cortlandt from 1678 to 1681, and then on his own
account?’ Many early New York fortunes started with
direct loansof Dutch capital or by acceptingcommission
business in New York City for Dutch firms. Adolphe
Philipse beganwith both loans and commission business
in the fur, lumber, and slavetrades;by 1700he branched
into West Indies logwood, Virginia tobacco, southern
cotton, and SouthernEuropeanwines which were sent to
Dutch and English buyers.** During the 1690s at least
twelve New York merchantsmaderegular shipments of
peltry and tobacco to Amsterdam and ordered return
cargoes of cloth, weaponry, and gunpowder.23 Others
continued to carry southern tobacco to Rotterdam and
AmsterdamasDutch merchantshadbefore the conquest;
this trademight originate in the Low Countries and touch
at New York City before going south,or originate in New
York City and carry commodities directly from the
southerncolonies to Amsterdam-with or without a stop
at a British port to pay duties, depending on the disposition toward legality or smuggling.24
1690-1713
If the “anglicization” of New York City trade initiated
a long-term challenge which forced significant alterations in the Amsterdamtrade,King William’s andQueen
Anne’s Wars dramatized and escalated those changes
between 1690 and 1713. Indeed, imperial rivalry during
these years changed the character of the direct trade to
Amsterdam permanently. In earlier yeaus merchants
preferred to export peltry to Amsterdam where prices
were fairly stable, rather than to London where beaver
hats becameless fashionable by the end of the century
and prices fell with the demand for fur imports. But
during King William’s War Amsterdam prices also
fell-sometimes below London prices-and peltry exporters began to complain bitterly of French privateers
in the Northern seas while colonial middlemen lost
whole shipments to plunderers in the countryside north
and west of Albany.*’
In addition, the 1690salso signalled an end to reliable
government support for the legal Dutch trade. Although
Governor Fletcher, who arrived in 1692!,did almost
nothing to stop wartime clandestine voyages,especially
those to Amsterdam and Rotterdam from which he was
reputed to have made a personal fortune, he pursued a
public policy of bolstering import duties and renewing
mercantile commitment to prohibitions on foreign trade.
Appointed customs official William Dyer also tried to
follow Fletcher’s lead by setting new, and Ihigher,duties
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on somecity commerce.Dyer was vocally castigatedfor
this attemptto place “unlawful customesandImposicons
on the Goods and Merchandizes of his Maj’tis Leige
People.“26
This combination of wartime pressuresand a governor
who was overly ambitious forced all but the most
successfulmerchantsto abandon Amsterdam trade and
prompted their more advantagedpeers to concentrate
fortunes in fewer hands.Before 1690,thenumber of New
York merchantswith sharesin vesselsto Amsterdamwas
usually about thirty, and forty was not unheard of.
Between 1690and 1713the numberswho owned shares
of ventures in Dutch trade began to narrow and the
number of vesselsengageddiminished; out of the fifty
or so New York ‘City and Albany merchants who
engaged in the Amsterdam trade-as wholesalers or
smaller investors-between 1666and 1690,only a about
twenty survived and prosperedinto the later war years.”
As hard times forced someNew Yorkers to leave the
Dutch trade, those who were resilient madecommercial
adaptations which affected the future of this trade
significantly. One alternative open to merchants who
confronted unpredictable shifts of economic conditions
was to avoid initiating commercial transactions from
New York, and instead to let Dutch agentsand Amsterdam merchants place orders and arrange for all the
necessary fees, transportation, storage, and the like.
Although some of the traders at Albany retained shares
in voyagesto Amsterdambeforeandafter the 169Os,they
shipped less frequently than the pie-war years, and by
the end of Queen Anne’s War almost none of them
importcd regularly on their own accounts,Instead, they
factored for Dutch merchantsresident in Amsterdamor
London for a 2$!z%to 5% commission.28
Other New York merchantswere unable or unwilling
to adapt their businessin theseways, and chose to cope
with the increasingly unfavorable climate for Dutch
trade in more challenging ways. About ten to fifteen of
New York City’s roughly 125 merchants ignored
Fletcher’s taxes and rhetorical pleas for obedience to
mercantilism; like Fletcher, they simply participated in
smuggling Dutch cargoes through New Haven in the
I69Os. At least three city merchantssubscribedto joint
ventures with Dutch merchantsto the East Indies.2gA
few, envious of the“free ports” of New JerseyandRhode
Island, physically relocated to those places, or routed
their tradepastthe more liberal customsofficials there.30
Still others relocated to England or Holland to serve as
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factors for New York merchants,and especially to ferry
the legal and illicit trade. Levinus van Schaick, one of
thesereturnees,factored for the Livingstons, Schuylers,
Ten Broecks, Wandelaers,and Roseboomsuntil at least
1710. Having lived in both New York and Amsterdam,
Van Schaick availed himself of beneficial connections
in New York, London, and Amsterdam.31
All of these activities continued in the next decade.
Bellomont’s successin suppressing New York City’s
extensive involvement with piracy in the first decadeof
theeighteenthcentury hasbeenexplained well. However
historians haveneglectedBellomont’s hopesto force the
city’s trade with Amsterdaminto legitimate channels,a
hope which proved chimerical. Unscrupulous traders
continued to smuggle goods directly to Amsterdam.
These, said Bellomont in 1700, were among the most
“Dutchified” of New York traders.32By 1701 a coterie
of New York and Albany merchants-Robert R.
Livingston among them-jointly
ventured illegal
cargoesto Daniel Crommelin of Amsterdam.33By 1708
Colonel Robert Quary reportedto the Board of Tradethat
there was a persistent illicit trade in Dutch goodswhich
went mainly through Newport.34 Rutger Bleecker
engagedin at leastone smuggling voyage to Amsterdam
per year from 1707 through 1710:’ and an anonymous
merchant cleared for Amsterdam in 1710.36 Thus,
although fewer merchants of Dutch origins traded to
Amsterdam becauseEnglish merchants and principles
had “invaded” New York City, even warfare did not
obliterate the New York-Amsterdam trade. There were
two to four registered voyages per year to Amsterdam
fromNew YorkCityfrom 1706to 1716,andanuncertain
number of illicit ones, which is generally the level at
which New Yorkers traded to Amsterdam before 1689.
During theseyears of warfare the Dutch trade’s proportion of all New York commercealso remainedrelatively
stable.3’
Moreover, within the shrinking core of Dutch traders
were included many of the names with which we
associate eighteenth-century prosperity in New York
City: Robert R. Livingston, Stephen de Lancey,
Frederick and Adolphe Philipse, Nicholas Bayard,
Garret Bancker, Stephen van Cortlandt, Valentine
Cruger, Abraham de Peyster, Hendrick van Bael,
Livinius van Schaick.s8 In 1692 William Blathwayte
listed the nine wealthiest and most respectedmerchants
in New York City: seven were of Dutch origins; six
traded higher values of goods to Amsterdam than to
London before King Williams War.3g
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1713-1740
New York merchantshad two clusters of incentives to
continue the “hollander trade*’ with Amsterdam in the
yearsbetween 1713and 1740.The first of theseinvolved
the comparatively greaterbenefits of Dutch, as opposed
to British, trade with the colony. Amsterdam fiis
charged consistently lower wholesale prices for
manufacturessuch asstrouds,guns, gunpowder,and tea.
Sincethe 1670sEnglish fears that the Dutch were underselling them in New York were a constant refrain in
private correspondenceand many New York merchants
actually cited two prices for the samecommodity in their
correspondence.40Many Dutch merchants also offered
longer credit than was typical amongEnglish merchants,
often a full year without interest. Amsterdam warehousing and bulk cargoestechniquesof storageand sales
allowed Dutch merchantsto purchaseaheadof demand
when supplies were available; their ability to market
broadly and extensively also meantthey could take commodities of inferior quality along with the better ones, a
policy English merchantsrarely dared to try.41
Furthermore, while the parametersof English trade
were defined largely by the extent of the empire (and,
ironically, by additional Dutch demands for British
tobaccoand sugar), the Dutch serviced a vast systemof
markets outside of the production and consumption
capacities of Holland alone. For example, much of the
logwood, dyewoods, tobacco, fish, and slaves which
madetheir way to Amsterdamwasre-exported in time.42
Dutch freightage and insurance rates were also significantly lower until at least the SevenYearsWar,43and
merchants commonly noted in the period that
Amsterdam’s stock of specie was larger, its ships better
and more numerous, labor cheaper and more skilled,
services and quality of goods better, and warehouses
fuller, than England’s. Despite New York City’s attempts to deny licenses to Dutch agents to insure city
shippers and to serve as vendue masters, there were
Dutch representativesin New York City during much of
theeighteenthcentury. Daniel Crommelin, Adrian Hope,
and John de Neufville, kept factors in the city to help
discount bills of exchangeand make money transfers.44
This paper began with the observation that British
recognition of Dutch commercial superiority wasfraught
with ambivalence: they mixed admiration with fear,
emulation with jealousy. Since the 1690sBritish politics
was also affected by this discussion. Tories and other
“commonwealth” oppositionists often identified their
goals with the “hollander interest*’ or free, unrestricted
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trade. However, there was one significant difference
between these constituencies in England and the
arguments of their colonial counterparts in New York.
As England’s commercial security grew over the
eighteenth century, the country’s merchants solidified
their rise with legislation which not only did not emulate
the Dutch, but quite deliberately discriminated against
them.Whigs, conservativeand protectionirstin economic
policies, aggressively turned away from free trade
notions. But in New York, some colonists were persistently drawn to the Dutch as a model of economic
conduct and as a source of real econ0mi.cadvantages,
especially when New Yorkers’ interests collided with
those of their mother country.
The uses to which free trade notions and Dutch alliancescould be put by New Yorkers was also clearer after
Queen Anne’s War, and so although the numbers of
merchants engaged in the Dutch traffic shrank, selfconsciousnessabout a felt needfor its continuation grew.
For example,aswar conditions dissipatedafter 1713, the
fur trade entered a period of decline. Becausefurs were
New York’s primary economic staple (wheat would
replacefurs shortly, however) it incenseneldthem that the
item was enumerated-that is, added to the list of
commodities which were regulated from. England-in
1722 and that most of the trade was thereby diverted to
London. Some of them simply continued1to trade with
Amsterdam.And although furs comprised 40% of New
Yorkers’ goods to Holland before 1720, and only about
20-25% after 1722, their decline was even more rapid
with respect to London buyers after the latter date (due
to less English demand and falling pricfes as well as
higher imperial taxes). That is, although the trade as a
whole declined, Amsterdamremaineda preferredmarket
of New Yorkers. Moreover, by the 1730sElnglish factors
resident in New York exported far fewer of the colony’s
pelts than did the Albany and New York City merchants
with prior English and Low Countries connections.
Englishman John Lewis, for example, shipped 400-500
furs per year from 1720-1729, a figure corresponding to
Charles Lodwick’s, James Graham’s, and Edward
Griffith’s shipments. All of them were relatively recent
arrivals to New York. But Cornelius Cuyler, an established exporter of Dutch descent,averaged5,500 furs per
year in the period 1730-1734, which must have been a
large proportion of the entire trade by that date.The De
Lancey, Wendell, and Ten Eyck families, as well as
original traderswith the Dutch, also shipped fairly large
numbers of furs to Amsterdam, and occasionally to
England, in the 1730s.45
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As the fur trade declined, New Yorkers shippedother
commodities to Amsterdamfor which demandwasmore
stable, among them potash, flaxseed, and copper ore. In
1714, Governor Hunter feared that copper from “Mr.
Schoyler’s mines” in New Jerseywould be “carried into
the channel of our Trade to Holland.” Customssearcher
Francis Harrison reported in 1721 that indeed this was
happening.OtberobserverscommentedthatNewYork’s
long-standing wine trade with the Southern European
islands of Madera aud Canary also took on new charactcristics. After 1715 merchants not only included this
luxury item in their return cargoesto New York City, but
also shipped directly from southern Europe M Amsterdam to pay for cargoesof dry goods.In all of thesecases
merchantsremarkedthat theirchoiceof Amsterdamover
London markets was due to favorable Dutch prices,
freightage, insurance rates,and quality.“’
New York City into the 1740s chartered cargoes to
Amsterdamfrom the West Indies and occasionally even
supplied New York’s outgoing vessels for a triangular
route.” Because New York merchants and factors
availed themselvesof these West Indies opportunities,
the Dutch trade continued to occupy a place of importance in merchants’ ledgers.
The secondcluster of incentives to trade with the Low
Countries involved New Yorkers’ creative entry into the
Dutch Caribbean trade. Younger, newer, or interloping
merchantsin particular, but someof the older families as
well, developed ties with the Dutch merchants at St.
Eustatius, Surinam, Curacao,and Guinea, where newaIbeit indirect---routes to Amsterdam were established
and where new commodities could be secured.Like all
Caribbean traffic, the growth of Dutch West Indies
marketsreflected new opportunities that aroseout of the
dislocations of war, rising demand in Europe for
stimulants like sugar and coffee, and the greater
prosperity of the West Indies itself. These factors drew
many merchants to Caribbean trade as the supplies of
furs diminished in the northern colonics4’
Since about I700 a few New Yorkers had woven an
active network of trade involving Dutch goods and correspondentsin the West Indies and Amsterdam which
bypassedmandatory channelsof inspection and taxation
under the British mercantile system. Narrative
evidence-scanty and circumspect because of the
illegality involved-indicates
that New York’s
Amsterdam-boundvessels(whether Dutch or New York
owned) often simply eliminated British ports of call
where costly duties should have been paid for
enumerated items. From 1713 to about 1720, Evert
Wendell exported furs to his correspondentWilliam van
Nuys in Amsterdam, and imported dry goods and tea at
Newport or through family members at Boston. After
1720Wendell shippedhis commodities through Stephen
de Lancey in New York City, who in turn sent the goods
fiist to Boston, or dir=tIy to Amsterdam.51Others in
Albany also traded directly to Amsterdam and avoided
duties: in the 1720sHendrick Ten Eyck, Robert Sanders,
David van der Heyden,JellesFonda,andJacobGlen: and
in the 173OsAOs, Henrick Ten Eyck and Cornelius
Cuyler. Most of these traders at least occasionally
engagedin smuggling through Canadaas well.‘*
Thus, merchants like Cornelius and Philip Cuyler
clung to what peltry trade they could, but found their
trade with the West Indies increased, as they said, “of
necessity” becauseof “those unnatural acts” of Parliament.48 Fur traders Philip Livingston, Philip van
Cortlandt, Abraham de Peyster, Cornelius Ten Broeck,
Johannes de Peyster, Hans Hansen, Rutger Bleeker,
Evert Wendell, Ryer Gerritse, and others also turned
increasingly to trade with the West Indies after 1715.“’
Most of their voyages were shuttles betweenNew York
City and the islands; for transatlantic voyages, New
Yorkers usually deferred to Amsterdam carriers who
centered the goods in their home ports or marketed the
West Indian returns throughout Europe. For example,
“Robert and Peter Livingston and Company” ferried
betweenthe WestIndies andNew York during the 1720s
and 173Os,while the Dutch factors who were resident in
In the casesof both the fur trade and new West Indies
markets, earlier precedents for smuggling became
models of acceptablebehavior. As the tobacco, sugar,
molasses,and slave trades matured, Dutch West Indies
possessions attracted vessels from New York City.
Captainssubsequentlyreturned to the northern port with
foreign West Indies goods, or purchased sharesin the
ships and cargoesof tobacco,sugar,or dyewoodssent to
Amsterdamdirectly.
Long after furs were enumeratedin 1722, New York
City merchantsIsaacLow, William Glencross,Olaf van
Sweeten, John Barbarie, Benjamin Faneuil, Rip van
Dam, Henry Cuyler, and John Cmger shipped peltry to
Amsterdamfor Albany merchants,while city merchants
like Frederick Philipse, Stephan de Lancey, Philip
Livingston, Robert R. Livingston, Jr., Henry Cuyler, Rip
van Dam, and Hyman Levy tradeddirectly betweenNew
York and Amsterdamon their own accounts.This latter
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group also sold peltry in London and forwarded the net
proceeds to Dutch firms through Samuel Storke of
London. Merchantsat Amsterdamthen madeup cargoes
for the New Yorkers, which touched at Dover or the
Orkneys, where customs officials were notoriously
corruptible, before crossing the Atlantic.53 The
Bleeckers of New York City borrowed capital from
Charles Lodwick of London and transmitted it to the
Bleeckers of Amsterdam, who in turn supplied the
colony with orders for dry goods.54
1740to 1764
By the 1740sthe resilience of New York-Amsterdam
trading patterns became a primary concern of British
mercantilists, for it seemedthat the more imperial legislation circumscribed colonial trade, the more conviction
certain New Yorkers developed about the appropriateness-some said the necessity-of the Dutch West
Indies and smuggling trades. Their most common
argument was that without the foreign trade, necessary
specie and bills of exchange (the Dutch West Indies
supplied the greatestquantities of both) would neverpass
into their hands in large enough quantities to balance
their payments with the mother country for imported
manufactures.Moreover, the benefits of legal trade with
neutral Dutch possessions during peace time was
significant, illicit trade during wars was even more
profitable. Using establishedroutes and correspondents,
merchants simply gained more as risks rose. Thus,
although New York City entrancesfrom, and clearances
to, Amsterdamdeclined after 1740 there is no necessary
reasonto believe that the tradeitself declined.From 1724
to 1731 two to six ships cleared and zero to three ships
enteredNew York from Amsterdamper year. From 1740
to 1764only one to three vesselscleared and zero to two
enteredNew York City legally. Yet travel accountsand
private letters indicate a rise in the illegal trade with
Amsterdam,especially that which went via West Indies
possessions, the Orkney Islands of Scotland, or in
SouthernEurope where safeconduct passeswere easily
procurred. Also, retailers announced“holland goods” for
sale in New York with greater frequency over these
decades.55
The most perdurable route was that which took in the
West Indies on the outgoing voyage and passedthrough
New England on the return from Amsterdam. For the
West Indies connections,city exporters shipped lumber,
grain, bread, and small horsesto Curacao and Surinam.
However, the value of imports from those places was
often much lower than for exports, indicating that New
SEMINAR
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Yorkers either returnedwith specieand bills of exchange
or forwarded part of the the proceedson to Amsterdam
to pay for previous and future cargoes of cloth, paper,
and gunpowder. Or, as Archibald Kennedy noted in
1739, much of New York’s produce went to any of the
British or foreign West Indies islands, and retums were
in Dutch gunpowder that was smuggled through St.
Eustatius from Amsterdam instead of directly from
Amsterdam.56David “Ready Money” Provost, of solid
Dutch descent, returned from many voyages to St.
Eustatius at mid-century with rum and gunpowder as
well as foreign silver and bills of exchange; he usually
transferred these into a larger vessel at New York and
sent them on to Amsterdam?’
In the 1740sfur tradersin the Wendell and Livingston
families supplemented return cargoes of sugar and
molasses from the West Indies with rice from the
Carolinas and logwood from Honduras, or consigned
their captains to carry the goods direcltly to Amsterdam?8 Philip Livingston also periodically added New
York and New England flaxseed and local lumber to his
grain shipments to the West Indies; the.sewere transferred into Dutch ships at St. Eustatius and routed to
Amsterdam.5gSome merchants-Philip Livingston,
Robert and Barent Sanders, Hendrick Ten Eyck, and
John Cuyler-arranged cargoes into two separate
voyages: one to the West Indies, which was sold, the
proceedsbeing usedto load a second(larger or different)
vessel which then set out for Amsterdam from a West
Indies port without stopping to pay British customs.6o
Though Robert Sanderswasoriginally involved in the
fur trade, he shipped French West Indies sugar from St.
Eustatiusto New York for Robert and Ric:hardRay in the
173Os-1740s.and then on to the Van der Grifts of
Amsterdam on occasion.6l Alternatively, Sanders and
the Rays sold their peltiy in London ;and instructed
Samuel Storke to forward the net proceeds to Dutch
fiis, which were in turn asked to make up cargoes
which touched at Dover or the Orkneys before crossing
the Atlantic for New York City. Merchants such as
Robert Sanders,John Cruger, Cornelius Cuyler, William
Johnson,and JohannesBleecker exported fewer furs but
more ginseng and potash to Amsterdam from the 1730s
to 174Os, sometimes using the firm of Storke and
Champion as an intermediary with Dutch firms!*
By the mid-1740s thesejointly ventured connections
proved to be a popular meansof underwriting risks. The
Cuylers joined their capital with Edmu:nd and Josiah
“HOLLANDER
Quincy of Boston to smugglemixed cargoesto the Hopes
of Amsterdam.Christopher Bancker carried on a similar
business during the Seven Years War with Daniel
Crommelin of Amsterdam.63A few merchantsof Dutch
descentformed a syndicate of tradersto Amsterdamand
the Dutch West Indies: John Ludlow, Cornelius and
Philip Cuyler, Elias Desbrosses,Richard and Robert
Ray, and John Waddell. From the mid-1740s to the late
175Os,their correspondenceshows active commercial
interventions at Montreal, Albany, and New York City
in North America, to Curacao, St. Eustatius, South
Carolina and British Guiana to the south, to Amsterdam,
with stopsat Madeira or London on occasion.“4
The voyage which was initiated in New York City and
intended to terminate in Amsterdamcould be a complicated affair. From 1748 to 1750, during a period of
economic prosperity which followed King George’s
War, Gerard G. Be&man expandedhis correspondence
with Amsterdam merchants;he also insured New York
vesselsbound for Amsterdam in 1756-7 and 1761, and
owned sharesin the Sarah and Ann and Little Gurry in
1754to 1760.His and other vesselswhich were partially
filled with flaxseed rounded St. Eustatius, picking up
cocoaand sugarbefore crossingto Amsterdam.65Gerard
G. BeekmanandNicholas Gouvemeurof New York City
corresponded with Nicholas and Isaac Gouvemeur of
Curacao and St. Eustatius, and Daniel Crommelin and
John Hodshon of Amsterdam.66John van Cortlandt
imported West Indies sugar which he refined in New
York City, almost one half of which wasthen reexported
to South Carolina, England, or Amsterdam.B7Waddell
Cunningham speculatedin the purchaseof prize goods
which he sent in bulk quantities to Amsterdamin 1756.68
Through the Seven Years War voyages from the
Carolinas and West Indies to Amsterdam often were
funded-wholly or in part-with London credit. Then,
the return voyage to New York from Amsterdam was
secured by the London fiis transferring capital to
Amsterdamfor New Yorkers.6gLondoners like William
Snell, Richard Champion, Joseph Mica, and Samuel
Storke transfered funds or underwrote insurance for
Amsterdam voyages, and Waddell Cunningham converted bills of exchangeon London for Dutch currency
and credit through Snell in 1756.” SomeNew Yorkers
transportedgoods to London, where they disposedof the
fiist cargo and acquired a secondone for the jaunt from
London to Amsterdam. In Amsterdam the captain often
sold not only the freight but the vessel as well, placing
the return cargoes of less bulk and higher value in the
INTEREST”
259
holds of vesselsjointly ventured by many merchants7’
The return voyagesfrom Amsterdaminvolved primarily,
though not exclusively, five Dutch firms: Thomas and
Adrian Hope (future participants in funding first the
British during the SevenYears War, and then American
patriots during the Revolution); John Hodshon (whose
ties to London banking and government loans were well
known by the 1740s); Daniel Crommelin (a refugee
Huguenot who emigratedto New York in the 1720s.then
to Amsterdam by about 1733, where he remained until
his death in 1768); William van der Grift; and William
van NuYs.~*New Yorkers continued to bring back from
thesefiis the usual dry goods,tea,gunpowder,andodd
luxury items in special personal orders. That New
Yorkers continued to smuggle through these firms, to
and from Amsterdamduring the SevenYears War even
when privateering absorbed much of New York’s
commercial investment capital and when the high seas
wererife with enemyprivateersillustrates how important
the traffic was to the few merchants it would sustain.
Governor Hardy said in 1757 that it was common for
ships “to come from Holland, stop at Sandy Hook, and
smuggle their Cargoes to New York and carry their
Vessels up [the Hudson] empty.“73 From the 1730s to
by about
the 1750sthe ship Mary undMurguret-owned
sixteen New Yorkers-brought gunpowder from Holland to New York.74 Along with John Sherbume of
Portsmouth and John Reynell of Philadelphia, a coterie
of New York merchantschartered four vesselsin 1760
to smuggle French sugar through St. Eustatius and to
Amsterdam. Gerard 6. Beekman smuggled sugar to
Amsterdamthat year in a sole venture, andPhilip Cuyler
continued his correspondencewith John Hodshon.In all
casesthey smuggledback tea,“Dutch duck and checks,”
and silks.” Late that sameyear the Venus departedfrom
Amsterdamand sailed boldly directly into SandyHook
without paying duties.76
Even after the Revenue Act of 1764-the imperial
legislation which intended to tax more steeply and
enforce commercial legality more strenuously-New
York vessels went to Amsterdam without required
clearancepapers,duties, or the obligatory stop at British
ports. That year there were twelve New York clearances
for Newfoundland, five or six of which vessels made
their way to Amsterdamand Rotterdamby the end of the
year; whether two or threeof thesewent on to pay duties
or smugglethrough British ports, or the vesselswere sold
is unclear for there is no further record of them; but three
of the Newfoundland-t+Amsterdam vesselswerefilled
with linen, sailcloth, gunpowder, tea and bricks, which
260
SELECTED
RENSSELAERSWIJCK
were despatchedback from Amsterdam to New York
City through Rhode Island cities.” That same year,
1764,forty-one more vesselsclearedfor the West Indies
than entered from that area; after allowing that the great
majority of these vesselssmuggled molassesand sugar
through New England and Long Island, and that a few
rerouted legally through southern Europe and New
England, there were at least threeand perhapssix among
the forty-one vesselswhich crossedthe Atlantic directly
for Holland.78
Most return voyages were more direct, but probably
often less legal than the outward voyages. New York
captains came, for example, through a New England
port, especially after “watchdogs” from the British navy
planted themselves outside Sandy Hook in 1756.
Merchants Luke van Ranst, Rem Rapalje, Jacobusvan
Zant, John van Cortlandt, Isaac Roosevelt, Leonard
Lispenard, Peter Keteltas, David van Horn, and Henry
Bogert traded through James Rhodes, William
Molineaux, Solomon Davis, Henry Lloyd, William
Cooper, and John Erving of Boston, all of whom were
known smugglers and Dutch importers.79 But other
routes developedby the 1740sas well, as when a vessel
from Amsterdam bound for New York City registered
andpaid duties on part of the load often listing New York
City as a port of call, with the final destination being in
the Caribbean, and then proceeding to dump all of the
commodities at New York City. For example,Lt. Governor De Lancey reported in 1758 that merchantsof New
York and Boston ordered goods from Holland which
they landed at Rhode Island, though the laded port of
destination was St. Johns(Antigua). John Hodgshonwas
their Amsterdam connection.80Alternatively, Amsterdam goods were laded for New York City and madethe
obligatory stop at a British port to pay duties; but instead
of unloading andreloading the whole cargo,or “breaking
load” as the law required, the Orkney Islands collectors
might illegally clear vessels“by the lump” at very low
duties. The notorious tea trade often operated in this
fashion.81
The Legacy
Contemporary assessmentsof the trade with Holland
almost invariably exaggerated how many merchants,
how many ships, and what value of goodswere involved.
For example,even in 1752Governor Clinton clung to the
perception that the traffic to the Low Countries would
SEMINAR
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undermine England’s ascendancyinsisted that “Holland
. . . receivesmore benefit from the Trade of the Northern
Colonies, than Great Britain does.“82Oth,ersreferred to
all commerce which disrupted the status quo with the
generic epithet “hollander trade” or “dutchified interests.“83 Most threatening to colonial authorities,
however, was not the extent of New York’s trade with
Amsterdam,for it was never a large trade, but its persistenceandadaptability; there is no evidence that more tea,
for example,madeits way into New York after 1760,but
it was popularly known that Dutch tea was available in
large quantities at a low cost.
Whether its availability created demand or demand
motivated the continued liaisons with Holland does not
determine a more important generalization: that English
awarenessof the trade’s tenacity, its overlap with the
markets and dry goods trade, and t.he economic
advantagesof Dutch connections, drove late colonial
governorsto distraction and remainedan important issue
during New York’s imperial crisis at the end of the
century. It was in the context of much merchant
apprehensionthat the Dutch trade would ‘be cut off after
the war that Cadwallader Colden wrote in 1760 about a
clamour in New York for “Dutch free tra.de.“84Even at
the end of the colonial period some English observers
and loyal mercantilsts in the colonies believed that
Americans had developedhabits of luxury consumption
and political insubordination because of the opportunities provided by “hollander interests.” Indeed, some
found that the “Rage and Fury” againstimperial rule was
nosiest among the “Dutchified Patriots.“tl’
Nevertheless, no matter how out of proportion the
English fears of, or American hopes for [thetrade, what
remains important are the Dutch images, meanings, and
concrete reactions attached to it long after the ships of
Dutch and British economic development had crossed
paths, the former a once great trading power now on the
decline and the latter indebted for its ascent in part of
America to Dutch influences. Indeed, it is possible that
the language and habits of a “hollander trade”-often
interchangeably referred to as “free trade”-helped
American revolutionists discover how their interests
often could be bound more closely witlh the fate of a
traditional enemy than with the goals of their own
empire.86
‘WOLLANDER
‘For thesecontrastssee,eg., Violet Barbour, Capitalism
in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century, (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950); J.N. Ball, Merchants and Merchandise, The Expansion of Trade in
Europe, 1500-1630, (London: Croom Helm, 1977);C.R.
Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire: 1600-1800, (New
York Knopf, 1965), esp. chap. 2; and D.W. Davies, A
Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade,
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961), 119-45. Albemarle is
quoted by C. M. Anhews, The Colonial Period of
American History, 4 ~01s. (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press,1938,repr. 1964),4:61.
‘English literature discussing the Dutch is extensive and
only a few of the seventeenthcentury sourcesare noted
here.For favorable English views of Dutch accomplishments,seeNicholas Barbon,A Discourse ofTrade, (London, 1690; reprint Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press,
1903). esp. 123; Gerald Malynes, The h4aintenance of
FreeTrade, (London: 1622,reprintNew York: Augustus
Kelley, 1971); [Anon.], The Present Interest of England,
Stated, (London, 1671); [Anon.], A Discourse, consisting ofMotivesfor
the Enlargement ofFreedomon Trade,
(London, 1645); and Camw Reynel, The True English
Benefit, or an Account of the Chief National Improvements in Sir Charles Whitworth, ed., Scarce Tracts on
Trade and Commerce 2 ~01s.(London, 1674;repr, London, 1778), 1: esp. 14-15. For opposition to the Dutch,
see Thomas Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign
Trade, (written 1622; published London, 1664), repr. in
Scarce Tracts on Trade and Commerce, 2; Ralph Maddison, Great Britain’s Wemembrancer (London, 1665);
Josiah Child, Brief Observations, (London, 1668;
reprinted in William Letwin, ed. Sir Josiah Child, Boc
ton: Baker Library of the Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administrations, 1959); Roger Coke, A Discourse of Trade, (London, 1670), Part 2; William de
Britaine, The Dutch Usurpation, (London, 1672); William Petty, Britannia Languens, (London, 1680). Most
of theseearly economic tracts can be found in the 2080
of
reels of microfilm of the-Goldsmiths’-KressLibrary
Economic Literature: Resources in the Economic,
Social, Business .and Political History of Modern Industrial Society, pre-180%1850 (Woodbridge, a
Research Publications, 1975-Present). This collection
mergesthe holdings of the Kress Library at Harvard and
the Goldsmiths’ Library at the University of London.
The commercial rivalries and ambivalent sentimentsbetween the Low Countries and England are but one part
of the larger context of transatlantic relationships in the
INTEREST”
261
early modem period which I explore in my dissertation,
“Fair Trade, Free Trade: Economic Ideas and Opportunities in Eighteenth-Century New York City Commerce” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1985); see
chaps. l-2 on the ideological structure of empire.
3For West Indies statementsin favor of free tradeasthey
thought the Dutch practiced it, see, eg., Answer of
Charles Whe[e]ler, Governor of the Leeward Islands, to
the inquiries of the Council for Foreign Plantations,Dec.
9, 1671, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series,
American and West Indies, 1661-1738, ti. Noel W.
Sainsbury,J.W. Fortescue,and Cecil Headlam,42 ~01s.
(London: Public Record Office, 1860-1953), 16691674,290; (hereaftercited as Cal. State Papers); Petition
of the inhabitants of Antigua to Governor Lord
Willoughby, ibid., X61-1668,234, where they ask “for
a grant of free trade”; Petition of the President,Council,
and Assembly of Barbadoes,ibid., 1661-1668,29-30;
Petition of the Presidentand Council of Barbadoesto the
King, July 10, ibid., 1661,4ti Lord Willoughby to the
King, Jan. 11, 1663, ibid., 1661-1668, 162; Lord
Willoughby to the King, Nov. 41663, ibid., 1661-1668,
167-68; Propositions of Mr. Kendall, November 1664,
ibid., 1661-1668,253; Grder of the King and Council,
November 24,1675, Cal. State Papers, 1574-1674,eL
Noel Sainsbury (London: 1893), 303-4; An Account of
His Majesty’s Island of Barbadoesand the Government
thereof, 1676,ibid., 1574-1674,34849.
See also how Governor Windsor of Jamaica urged
planters to seek“free commercewith the plantations . . .
of SpainandI-Iollandl” despiteinternational rivalries, and
try “to admit them to a free trade;” Additional Instructions to Thomas Lord Windsor, Governor of Jamaica,
April 8, 1662, &I. State Papers, 1661-1668, 85. In
words reminiscent of Hugo Grotius’s plea for free ships
and free seas,Lord Willoughby, the governor of Barbados,claimed in 1666 that “Free Trade is the life of all
Colonies*’ and to regulate it as the Navigation Acts did
was to invite disaster;quoted by H. E. Egerton, A Short
History of British Colonial Politics, 5th ed., (London:
Methuen, 1918), 76.
Following the second Anglo-Dutch war many English
writers promoted a “‘Free Trade” with the Dutch of
Curacao; see, for example, Lewes Roberts, The
Merchant’s Mappe of Compce, (London, 1638), 120.
Throughout tbe eighteenth century some writers emphasized the desirability of freer trade in the Caribbean
with reference to Dutch successesthere; see,eg., writings of JonathanSwift, Daniel Defoe, JosiahTucker, and
262
SELECTED
RENSSELAERSWIJCK
Adam Smith Of course, the original free trade strain in
the Caribbeanbecomesa clamor for regulation by about
1713, and mercantilism is dominant from that time forward. SeeKlaus Knorr, British Colonial Theories, 15701850, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press,1944); and Eric
Williams, Columbus to Castro, (New York: Vintage,
1986), 529.
4Thomas C. Barrow, Trade and Empire, The British
Customs Service in Colonial
America, 1660-1775,
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1967), 21,
47. For evidence of cargoes going to Amsterdam with
Virginia and New England goods, and stops at New
Amsterdam, see Journal or Log of Two Voyages from
New Amsterdam to Holland and return, l-1663,
Misc. Mss., Ships-Dutch, New-York Historical Society;
Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State
of New York, ed. Edmund B. O’Callaghan and Berthold
Femow, 15 ~01s.(Albany, NY: The Argus Co., 1856
1887), I: 436-39, 264, II: 4344; (hereafter cited as
Documents Relative); Cal. State Papers, 1661-1668,
1123;Violet Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 93n33;
C. M. Andrews, Colonial Period, 4:137-38. Adrian van
der Donck, Description of the New Netherlands,
(London 1656; reprint Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press,1968), arguesthat the Dutch ought to be “free” of
Dutch West India Company regulations in order to
prosper.
‘Documents Relative, III: 46. See also Report [of the
Lords of Trade and Plantations], February, 1677, Cal.
State Papers, 1677-1680, 15-16; Journal of Lords of
Trade and Plantation, Mar. 28, 1678, ibid., 1677-1680,
229-30; Commissioners of Customs to Sir Philip Warwick, Feb. 12, 1661, Cal. State Papers, 1661-1668, 10;
Circular Letter from the King to [the Governors of his
Majesty’s Plantations], August 25, 1663, ibid., 16611668,155-56; Instructions for Coll. RichardNicolls, Sir
Robert Carr, George Cartwright, and SamuelMaverick,
Apr. 23, 1664, ibid., 1661-1668,200; Petition of divers
of his Majesty’s subjectstrading to the ports of Europe,
Jan. 19, 1676,ibid., l&X-1668,337; Order of the King
in Council, Mar. 10, 1676, ibid., 1661-1668, 358;
Thomas Cole to the Commissioners of Customs, Mar.
16,1676, ibid., 1661-1668,360.
%n 1664 the surrender document of the Dutch in New
Amsterdam stipulated that Dutch trade would continue
for at least six months; Documents Relative, II: 251-52.
On freezing Dutch West India Company assets and
Steenwyck, see “New York Colonial Records, General
Entries, 1664-1665,” New York State Library, Bulletin,
“History,” #2, (Albany: University of the State of New
York, 1899), 122-23, 133-43, 14849, 183-85. The
request for free trade is in Records of New Amsterdam,
ed.,BertholdFemow, 7 ~01s.(New York: Knickerbocker
Press,1897), V: 160-61.
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PAPERS
7The grant of three ships per year in 1667 and
Stuyvesant’sreasonsareatDocumentsRer!ative,m,11315,163&l, 164-65,165-66,175-78, andMinutes of the
Committee of Plantations, Oct. 17, 1667, Cal. State
Papers, 1661-1668,511. Seealso, Documents Relative,
III: 178-82. There is no statistical evidence about the
cargoesof thesevessels.
‘Documents Relative, l11:185,II: 651; Minutes of the
Executive Council of the Province of PJewYork, ed.
Victor H. Palsits, 2 ~01s.(Albany: State of New York,
1910),I: 39-40,56-57,64,113,171,194-95; (hereafter
cited as Minutes of the Executive Council. Other New
Yorkers who tradedwith the Dutch in the 11670s
included
Thomas Lovelace, Johannes de Peyster, Cornelius
Steenwyck, Olaff van Cortlandt, Jacque Cousseau,
Nicholas de Meyer, Frederick and Margaret Philipse,
Cornelius van Ruyven, Thomas Delaval, Johannesvan
Brugh.
‘Documents Relative, III: 164-67, 175-79.
*“Documents Relative, I: 263, II: 155-56; A Collection
of Papershandedin by Mr. Weaver,Septelmber26.1698,
Cal. State Papers, 1697-1698, 455-59. For other
comments hostile to Dutch in New York, see Col.
Nicholls to [the Governor and Council of
Massachusetts],July?, 1664, Cal. State Papers, 16611668,222.
1‘Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the
Revolution, ed., JamesLyon, 5 ~01s.(Albany: J.B. Lyon,
1894), I: 24-25, 111-23, 125-28, 137-411.These citations also indicate some of the vessels trading between
New York City and Amsterdam, some during the third
Angl&Dutch war.
12SirJohnWerdento Gov. Andros, Sep. 15,1675, Documents Relative, III: 233. The eight who refused the oath
were: Cornelius Steenwyck, Johannes van Brugh,
Johannesde Peyster,Nicholas Bayard, Eagidius Luyck,
William Beekman,JacobKip, Antonio de Mill. Seealso,
DocumentsRelative, II: 738-44. In 1676New York City
also began its formal moves to destroy aspects of
Albany’s economic predominance by creating a city
customstax monopoly and granting Albany a monopoly
of the fur trade; Andrews, Colonial Periald, IV: 105-6.
13Forexample, on the roles of Frederick Philipse and
Stephanusvan Cortlandt in this, seeRobert Ritchie, The
Duke’s Province, A Study of New York Politics and
Society, 1664-1691, (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North
Carolina Press, 1977), 98; for Nicholas Bayard and
Cornelius Steenwyck, ibid., 267n.26. Prominent Dutch
traders in the 1670s included Charleis van Brugge
(Bridges), Charles Lodwick, and the Wilsons and
Darvals, all with London credit and family connections.
The Wendells had family members in Amsterdam,
Albany, New York and-after about 1683-Boston; see
Wendell Family Papers,New-York Historical Society.
“HBLLANDER
14Documenfs Relative, II: 526, 532, 53942,643,734,
739-40; III: 236,329.
“For somemention of YohnHains,Thomas Willet, John
Winder, John Robinson, Caleb Heathcote, Thomas
Thatcher, Robert Sanford, Abraham Whearly, and
merchantsGriffith, Lloyd, and Robson, seeMinutes of
the Common Council of the City of New York, 167%
17’76,ed. Herbert Osgood, et al., 8 vols., (New York:
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1905) I: l-2,9,25-26; (hereafter
cited asMinutesof the Common Council). From 1675-85
at least fifty merchants entered the city from London,
Boston, and Barbados; see Curtis Nettels, “Economic
Relations of Boston,Philadelphia, andNew York, 16801715,” Journal of Economic and Business History, 3
(1931), 185-215. See also the case of Lewin, et al.
against Andros, and Fletcher’s loans at good interest
from English merchant newcomers, at Journal of the
Legislative Council of the Colony of New York, 1691-
1775,2 vols., (Albany: Weed, Parsons& Co., 1861), I:
35,49,75,85,100,114; (hereaftercited asJournal of the
Council); Cakndar of Council Minutes, 1668-1783, edi.,
Berthold Fernow, New York State Library Bulletin, 2
~01s. (Albany: University of the State of New York,
March 1902), II: 70,84,100,118,125.
‘6For Andros’ reputation, see, Anthony Brockholls to
Andros, 17 Sep. 1681,DocumentsRelative, III: 211-12,
233,281; Ritchie, The Duke’s Province, 115-20. Of the
sevenwealthiest merchantsin 1676only Leisler was not
“assimilated” and rejectedAndros’ leadership; seeroles
of Gabriele Minvielle, Johannes de Peyster, James
Laurence, and Nicholas Bayard in particular. Some of
the “faze traders” who refusedto pay taxesin 1680-1681
included M. Nicholls, John Laurence, Henry Be&man,
Schermerhom, Philipse, Van Cortlandt; see Colonial
Laws, I: 111-16. In 1688, Bayard, Van Cortlandt, and
Philipse were on the opposite side and scornedtax revolters like Cornelius Cuyler and Gerard Beekman and
Jacob Leisler; seeJeromeReich, Leisler’s Rebellion: A
Study ofDemocracy in New York, (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press,1953),69-73. The major opposition to
Andros’ alleged supportfor “free &ade”camefrom small
farmers who did not benefit from legislation favoring
New York City exporters, and newly arrived English
merchants who preferred special regulations which
would aid their entry into trade in New York City as
against “monopolies” of “Dutch” traders in either Albany or New York City, and who were against taxes in
all events: seeNettels, “Economic Relations,” 185-215.
For duties from 1674 to 1678, which were 2-3% on
imports and 1 sh. 3 d. on beaver expor& see Colonial
Laws, 1: 116-21.
“Colonial Laws, I: 24-25, 111-123, 125-28, 137-41.
For a 10% ad valorem tax passed in Dongan’s administration, seeColonialLaws, I: 170-7 1.For Dongan’s
belief that his policies were a successby 1685, see
IN-TEREST”
263
Answers of Governor Andros to enquiries about New
York, April 16, 1678,Documents Relative, III: 260-62;
Minutes of the Common Council, 1:18; Ritchie, The
Duke’s Province, 121-23. On Dongan and city
merchantsin general seeDongan to William Blathwayt,
Sep. l&1686, Documents Relative, III: 363-64; Dongan
to the Board of Trade, ibid., m: 393-99; Inslructions to
John Pdmer, Sep. 8, 1687, ibid., III: 475-77; Gabriele
Minvielle to John Werden, 1687, ibid., III: 361; Address
of the Mayor and Common Council to the King, 1688,
ibid., III: 424-25; Duke of York to Dongan, Aug. 26,
1684, ibid., III: 349-59; Werden to Dongan, Nov. 1,
1684,ibid.,m: 351-52.1683 export taxesrose to 9 d. per
beaver and 10% on dry goods imports; ibid., I: 165-67.
In 1684 the 10% ad valorem tax was extended to all
imports; ibid., I: 170-71. Leisler’s administration
lowered duties to 54% on selected items, which were
continued until 1700; An Account of Her Majesty’s
Revenue in the Province of New York, 1701-l 709, e&.,
Julius Bloch, et al., (Ridgewood, NJ: GreggPress,1966),
intro.; (hereafter cited as An Account of Her Majesty’s
Revenue); and The Documentary History of the State of
New York, ed.E.B. O’Callaghan, 4 ~01s.(Albany: Weed,
Parsons& Co., 1849-1851), II: 52, 73, 238, 340, 355;
Documents Relative, III: 270-71, 737-48. Only after
Leisler’s Rebellion was “free bolting” restored (against
English merchants’desires)and import taxesdisallow&
(which they favored).
“Andrews,
Colonial Period,
IV: 114-15; The
Correspondence of Jeremias Van Rensselaer, 16571674, e-d.,A.J.F. van Laer, (Albany: University of the
StateofNew York, 1932),26,67,150,376,388,390-91,
408, 412-13, 431, 446, 448, 466-72; Minutes of the
Executive Council, I: 39-40,56-57.64, 113, 171, 19495. On Dutch credit being liberal to the West Indies
planters, see Lewes Roberts, Merchants’ Mappe, 120.
On Dutch prices, Documents Relative, 8:480; and
CharlesWolley, A Two Years’ Journal in New York and
Part of its Territories in America, orig. published, 1701,
ed. Edward 6. Bourne, (Cleveland: Burrows, 190’2),
29-30.
“Ibid., p. 63; Documents Relative, II: 699-700, IV: 1133;
John van Cortlandt Shipping Books, Aug. 12, 1699 to
June 30, 1702, and 1702-05, New-York Historical
Society; An Account of Her Majesv’s Revenue, passim.;
Leder, Robert R. Livingston, 215,217; Stanley N. Katz,
Newcastle’s
New York, Anglo-American
Politics,
1732-l 753, (Cambridge,MA: Be&nap Pressof Harvard
Univ. Press,1968), 112-13,208-09; Correspondence of
Jeremias van Rensselaer, 26,67,150,376,388,390-91,
408, 412-13, 431, 446, 448, 466-72; Minutes of the
Executive Comcil, I: 3940, 56-57, 64, 81, 110, 113,
171,194.
“Documents
Relative, IJI:183; Lt.-Col. Edward
Thomburgh to the Assembly of Barbadoes, April 1.
264
SELECTEDRENSSELAERSWIJCKSEMINAR
1673, Cal. State Papers, 1669-1674, 475; Documents
Relative, III: 352,393.
21Correspondence of Jeremias Van Rensselaer, 376,
388,390-91,408,412-13.466-72.
22Answersof Governor Andros to enquiries about New
York, 16 April 1678, Documents Relative, III: 260-62;
Minutes of the Common Council, I: 18
23Lawrence Leder, Robert R. Livingston, 1654-l 728,
and the Politics of Colonial New York, (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of
Early American History and Culture of Williamsburg,
VA, 1961), 24,37-38.
24An Account of Her Majesty’s Revenue, intro.; Patricia
Bonomi, A Factious People, Politics and Society in
Colonial New York, (New York: Columbia University
Press,1971), 60-68..
25JohannesKerfbyl to Abraham de Peyster,Oct. 3.1690,
Nov. 20, 1690, De Peyster Papers, 1690-1710, NewYork Historical Society, 29-30; Gov. Fletcher to Board
of Trade,24 Dec. 1698,DocumentsRelative, IV: 443-51;
Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 20-21,95-96.
26Governor Fletcher to William Blathwayt, Sep. 10,
1692, Documents Relative, III: 846; Board of Trade’s
Report on the Northern Colonies, Sep.3,1696, ibid., IV:
227-28; Fletcher to Blathwayt, Mar. 8,1693, Cal. State
Papers, 1693,#179; Report from the New York Council
Minutes, Apr. 14, 1693, ibid., 1693, #274. Fletcher
favored this hardening core of English merchants with
land grants and allowed piracy to flourish in New York.
For the land grants, see Documents Relative, IV: 191,
1045,III: 230; Minutes of the Common Council, I: 25-26,
29-37, 50-62; Proceedings of the General Court of
Assizes, 1680-1682, New-York Historical Society
Collections, XLV (New York: NYHS, 1912), 8-17.24.
The English merchantsinvolved were: John Robinson,
William Pinhome, and Edward Anthill, all soon to be
prominent dry goods importers, and other English
importers, including Samuel Wilson, John Young,
Thomas Willett, Thomas Hicks, John Jackson,Richard
Stillwell, John West, John Laurence, Samuel Moore,
William Darvall, and John Delavall. See also note 15
above.
When Combury becamegovernor, he granted a renewal
of the bolting monopoly :from 1702-04, but did not
necessarilyfavor the Dutch trade;Reich, Leisler’sRebellion, 164. It is also clear from Leder’s study of military
contracting that governors used the interest-bearing
loans and opportunities to profit from victualling commission as a prerogative power, and that Cornbury,
Hunter, Bumet and Cosby did not dispensethesefavors
to Dutch tradersor merchantswho had not “assimilated”
into the English structure of the city; Lawrence Leder,
“Military Victualling in Colonial New York,” in Joseph
R. Frese and Jacob Judd, eds., Business Enterprise in
PAPERS
EarlyNew York, (TarrytownNY: SleepyH:ollow, 1979),
1654, at 37-38. Robert R. Livingston and Stephanus
van Cortlandt were early victuallers, and long assimilated; in 1692-95 they both defeatedthreenon-assimilating Dutch in Albany who wantedprovisioning contracts:
Kilian van Rennselaer,Levinus van Schaick, and Dirk
Wessels.SeeLeder, Robert R. Livingston, 68-70.
27For example, Public Records Office, E 190:644/2
(Dec. 1677, the Rebecca): 117/l (Apr. 1683, the
Blossom); SO/l, 841/3, $3419; and An Account of Her
Majesty’s Revenue, intro. The numbers of Amsterdam
tradersbefore and after 1690are basedupon my preliminary gleanings from myriad colonial sources; see
Matson, “Fair Trade, Free Trade,” chap. 3-6.
2sThe Livingston-Redmund Mss., Hyde Park, New
York, show evidence for R. R. Livingston’s shipments
in the 1690s and his dealings with Albany-area
merchants; in the collection see, “Freight List of the
Brigantine Robert, Dec. 3, 1694.” Also, Jonathan
Pearson,transl., Early Records of the City (and County of
Albany and Colony of Rensselaer, Deeds, 1678-l 704,
(Albany: Univ. of the Stateof New York, 1916), 324, for
a mention of “free trade” to Amsterdam in 1687 and the
New York City merchants’ “monopoly” of export business.The referencecould have been to New York City’s
“great merchants,” Cornelius Cuyler, Stephen de Lancey, andFrederick Philipse. For the efforts to keepduties
low during the 169Os,seeAn Account of AYerMajesty’s
Revenue, intro.
29RobertLiv’in gston to William Blathwayt, ibid., 12324; Documents Relative, III: 846, IV: 29, 33, 159, 172,
183. For the voyages to the Far East, Commissionersof
the Customsto the Lords of the Treasury, Nov. 16,1696,
Cal. State Papers, 16961697,213-15.
30DocumentsRelative, III: 846.1~: 29,33,159,172,183.
31Van Schaick Papers,Box 1, 1696, New York Public
Library; Leder, Robert R. Livingston, 49,77-95, where
there is evidence that he traded directly with merchants
Harwood and Blackall of London, and thalt Fletcher had
shares in the Dutch voyaging vessels in 1692; and
Wolley, A Two Years Journal, 59.
32Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, 1700, Documents
Relative, IV: 792.For evidenceof importing Dutch goods
in 1702-03, see Miller Papers, Abraham de Peyster
Papers,and Abraham .Wendell Papers,all at New-York
Historical Society. As Leder points.out, while-Bellomont
.hopedto imposeand enforce duties and regulations upon
all dity merchantsin mercantile fashion, his complaints
against ‘tfree ,trade*’and “Dutchified” commerce were
matchedby his attacksagainstthe assimilalted,Dutchand
New England merchants with land grants or special
commercial privileges too. Also, Bellomont’s council
was neither Leislerian nor Fletcherian, .but moderate.
Generally, though, Leder concludes that tlhe“Dutch” on
“WOLLANDER
the Council and Assembly are contrary to Bellomont’s
plans, including merchantsVan Sweeten,Hansen, and
Van Brugh; Leder, Robert R. Livingston, 170-73.
33The merchants in this illicit trade network included
Robert R. Livingston, JohnL. Livingston, SamuelVetch,
Onzee van Sweeten, Levinus van Schaick, Micajah
Perry, Margaret Schuyler, Jacobus van Cortlandt, and
threelessermennamedBarbarie,Pero,andIVIarquis.The
English (and some French) participants included
merchants Caleb FIeathcote, Philip French, Thomas
Wenham, Dirk Wessels, David Jamison, and Peter
Fauconnier and one named Vesey. The vessels were
Catharine, Industry, and Dove. See Leder, Robert R.
Livingston, 174-75, 181; and An Account of Her
Majesty’s Revenue, passim.
3keport of Robert &u-y to the Board of Trade, April 6,
1708, Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, ser. 2, IV, (Boston: IvIassachusettsHistorical
Society, I887-9), 149-55, at 152.
35HarmanusVeening [of Amsterdam] to Rutger Bleecker, May 5,1707; June 16,1708; Apr. 49,1709; June 15,
1710,Bleecker-Collins-Abeel Papers,New York Public
Library.
36Documents Relative, IV: 792.
37Leder,Robert R. Livingston, 84-85. The Dutch were
RobertR. Livingston, Stephanusvan Cortlandt, Nicholas
Bayard, Gabrielle Minvielle, Frederick Philipse, Philip
Schuyler, and Charles Lodwock; the English were
Graham and Lewis Morris. Blathwayte went on to say
that Englishmen J. Dudley, William Pinhorne, and
Richard Townley were of rising influence, and that John
Lawrence and Thomas Johnson were among other
English “wretches” of no money or influence.
38An Account of Her Majesty’s 1ZevetrtJe,passim;
Thomas Archdeadon,Mew York City, 1664-l 710: Conguest arnd Change, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1976), 4850. For New York City shipping to Amsterdam, 1706-16, seeC. 0.5/1051.) Bb98. A similar rise in
proportions of all West Indies Bade,and New York City
involvement in West Indies-Amsterdam trade may have
been the case, although the evidence is inconclusive:
ibid. From mid-1715 to mid-1718,85 of 645 clearances,
or 13% of New York’s voyages were legal ones to
foreign ports; CO. 324/10, at 386-87.
39%)ublicRecords Office, E 190/80/l, fols. 87-89; E
117/l (April 1683,theBlossom),E 644/Z (Dec. 1677,the
Rebecca). Also, E 190 841/3, 834/9. Some of these
traders, including Philipse, Barbarie, and Stephen de
Lancey, were also in the African pirate trade; Robert R.
Livingston and Abraham de Peyster are relatively new
entrants in this trade; seeRitchie, The Duke’s Province,
194.
40SamuelMaverick Letter to London,New-I’orkPlistori.=
ml
INTEWEST”
265
Society, Collections, III: Clarendon Papers (New
York: New-York Historical Society, 1869), 126-28. See
also Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam, 21, Andrews,
Colonial Period, IV: 114; and Matson, “Fair Trade, Free
Tradee,”chap. 4.
41Answer of Sir Charles Whe[e]ler, Governor of the
Leeward Islands, to the inquiries of the Council for
Foreign Plantations, CQ~.State Papers, 1669-l 674,290;
hdrews, Colonial Period, IV, 24-28, esp. 28.
4%heseDutch practicesalso standin contrast to English
ones,where more capital is going into governmentloans
or “‘vertical integration” of new manufactures, and
merchants remain relatively non-specialized. See, eg.,
Report of the British Board of Trade and Plantations,
November 1702, Mss., New York Public Library; Lord
Cornbury to the Board of Trade, 1702, Documents
Relative, IV: 1003; Edmund Randolph to the Board of
Trade, CO. 323:2, #6; Randolph to the Board of Trade,
Cal. State Papers, 1696,214: [?I to the Board of Trade,
ibid., 1669, 487, 553; Jacob Judd, “Gleanings from a
Captain’s Letters,” New-York Historical
Society
Quarterly, 52 (%968),270-74; and Barbour, Capitc2lism
in Amsterdam, 2 l-23.
“3Cadwallader Colden, The Interest of the Colony in
Laying Duties: or A Discourse, Skewing how Duties on
Some Sorts of Merchandise may make the Province of
/dew-I’ork Richer, (New York:1726); Charles M.
I-Iough, Reports of Cases in the Vice Admiralty of the
Province of New York and in the Court of Admiralty of
the State of New York, 1715-17&I, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, I925), 64-65; and Matson, “Fair
Trade, Free Trade,” chaps.3 and 4.
“%ollan to the Board of Trade, Feb. 26, 1743, CO.
S/883, Ee87; &-row,
Trade and Empire, 153.
“‘See correspondenceof William van Nuys for 1716,and
the Cuylers, Ten Eycks, Van der I-Ieydens,and Wendells
for the %72Os,all at the New-York Historical Society;
Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, Nov. 28, 1700,
DocumentsRelotive, IV: 790; Hunter to Mr. Popple,Apr.
9, 1715, Ccal. State Papers, 1714-1715, 144; IVIr.
SecretaryStanhopeto the Council of Trade and Plantations, Jan. 15, 1715, ibid., 69-70; Council of Trade and
Plantations to Governor Hunter, June 22, 1715, ibid.,
208-210; An Account of Her Majesty’s Revenue, intro;
Documents Relative, m: 475-77; Robert Ritchie,
“London IvIemhants, The New York IvIarket, and the
Recall of Sir Edmund Andros,” New York History, 57
(Jan. 1976), 530. Thomas Norton, The Fur Trade in
Colonial New York, 1686-1776, (Wladison: Univ. of
Wisconsin Press,1974), 102,109, saysthat the trade to
Amsterdam halted with enumeration; the evidence
offered in this essaydiffers from his point of view. On a
dispute which developed between John Lewis and
Cornelius Cuyler, and on the sizesof their shipments,see
266
SELECTED
RENSSELAERSWIJCK
Minutes of the Common Council, I: l-2,9,25-26.
4eRobertHunter to theBoardofTrade, 1714,Documents
Relative, V: 462; Cal. State Papers, 1706-1708, 671;
ibid., 1711-1712, 439; Andrews, Colonial Period,
Iv: 104-05.
470n West Indies smuggling via the Dutch since at least
the 158Os,seeD. W. Davies,A Primer ofDutch Overseas
Trade, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961). On the rise of the
Dutch in the Caribbean in general, see Comelis C.
Goslinga, The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild
Coast, 1580-1680, (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press,
1971). For British responses, see n. 3 above. For an
excellent example of New York trade with the Dutch in
the Caribbean and Amsterdam, an involved set of
relationships even in the early years of the eighteenth
century, see Philip van Cortlandt Letterbook, 17131722, New-York Historical Society (microfilm copy at
the Univ. of Tennessee,Hoskins Library).
48ComeliusCuyler to Richard Jeneway,Jan. 13, 1728;
to SamuelBaker, Apr. 11,173O;to John Cruger, Aug. 3,
24, Oct. 16, 1731, Cuyler Letter Book, American
Antiquarian Society.
49Journuf of the Votes and Proceedings of the General
Assembly of the Colony of New-York. . .1691. . .1765,
I: 538-39,544; (hereafter cited asJournaf of the Assembly); Colonial Laws, II: 281-94,35071,401,485,537,
553; David Armour, “The Merchants of Albany, New
York, 1686-1760,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern
University, 1965,175-76.
“See miscellaneousentries listed in “Ships” file, NewYork Historical Society: Jacob Wendell, Letterbook,
New-York Historical Society; Peter and Robert
Livingston, Jr., Letterbook, Museum of the City of New
York; and Miscellaneous Manuscripts, New York State
Library. The latter gives evidencethat Livingston’s business with Samuel Storke alternated between legal and
illicit voyages.
‘*Davies, Dutch Overseas Trade, chap. 12; Leder,
Robert R. Livingston, 37-38,90 n.35; Richard Sheridan,
Sugar and Slavery, An Economic History of the British
West. Indies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1974), 45-48; and Richard Pares, Yunhes and
Creoles, The Trade Between North America wad the West
Indies before the American Revolution, (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 19. For specific
casesof West Indies-New York trade in the seventeenth
century, see, eg., Documents Relative, II: 746-56, III:
385; Cal. State Papers, 1661-1668,47,295; ibid., 16691674,226,295; John van Cortlandt Shipping Book, Aug.
12,1699 to June 30,1702, New-York Historical Society;
Abraham de PeysterPapers,1695-1710,New-York Historical Society. For Van Nuys and Wendell, seeWilliam
van Nuys [of Amsterdam] to Evert Wendell, July 4,
1716, Ever-t Wendell Ledger, 1711-1738, New-York
SEMINAR
PAPERS
Historical Society.
520n the 172Os,seeNorton, The Fur TPQ&, 84-5; C.O.
5/1224; Barrow, Trade and Empire, 151. On the 1730’s
see New York Gazette, Oct. 1, 1739, R.obert Sanders
Letter Book, Sanders Account Book, and Cornelius
Cuyler Letter Book, all at the American Antiquarian
Society.
53Thebest recordsof entrancesand clearancesare in the
New York Gazette, 1724-1731, 1737-1’764; and C.O.
5:1222-23, 1225-26. On international connections, see
William Roberts, III, “Samuel Storke: ,4n Eighteenth
Century London Merchant Trading to the American
Colonies,” Business History Review, 39 (;1965), 147-70.
54Charles Lodwick Papers, New-Yolrk Historical
Society.
55New YorkGazette, 1724-1731,1737-1764; Cornelius
Cuyler Letter Book, 1729-1756, American Antiquarian
Society; John Ludlow, Account Book, Vol. l-2, NewYork Historical Society; Philip Livingston Business
Letters, 1734-1739, American Antiquarian Society;
John Alsop Letters, New-York Historical Society;
L.eder,RobertR. Livingston, 125-26; William Alexander
to John de Neufville, Jan. 14,1755, and Mar. 19,1758,
Alexander Papers,Vol. 2, New-York Historical Society:
Christopher Bancker, Waste Book, entries for 1754,
New-York Historical Society; Philip Cuyler Letter
Book, New-York Historical Society. An intriguing argument that the West Indies was vital to Anglo-American
trade,and that the Dutch in the West Indies were integral
to imperial interests,is at New York Gazelte, July 24,3 1,
Aug. 2,9,20,1732.
56Archibald Kennedy to the Board of Trade, Jan. 10,
1738, C.O. 5/1059; Archibald Kennedy, Esq. vs. Sloop
h!QPgQPet & bfQPJ’, 1739, c.0. 5/1059, fol. 132-33;
JosephGoldenberg, Shipbuilding in Colonial America,
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976),
20-21, 100-05. On dyewoods and Honduras or St.
Eustatius shipments, see C.O. 3/51-75; 390/9, B6-B7;
Abraham Keteltas Account Book, 1744-1761, John
Keteltas Correspondence,1761-1769, Samuel Gilford
Correspondence, and Peter du Bois Accounts, all at
New-York Historical Society.
57Virginia Harrington, The New York Merchant on the
Eve of the Revolution, (New York: Columbia University
Press,1935). 222-23.
5sFor example, Robert R. Livingston Papers, Reel 1,
Nicholas Gouvemeur Correspondence, John Cruger
Letters, Correspondenceof Richard and Robert Ray,
Misc. Manuscripts, Francis Lewis Correspondence,
1751-1786, Abraham Keteltas Account Book, 17441761, all at the New-York Historical Society. For
evidenceof a Dutch ship which smuggled sugarthrough
South Carolina and Jamaica in 1748, and traded with
New York on some voyages, sex?Barrow, Trade and
“HOLLANDER
INTEREST”
267
Empire, 146,151,166.
Beekmans, 33 1.
5gPhilip Livingston Letters, Museum of the City of New
York.
@Philip Livingston to Robert Livingston, Mar. 25, Apr.
21, June 10, 1724, and Philip Livingston to and from
Isaac Gomez [of Cura9ao], 1725, Philip Livingston
Letters, Museum of the City of New York; Robert
§anders, Letter Book, 1750-1758, and Invoice Book,
“Exports”, New-York Historical Society; Cornelius
Cuyler to David van Brugh, May 31, 1736; to John
Livingston, 1735; to and from John Cuyler, 1749-50,
Letter Book, American Antiquarian Society; Gerard
Bleecker to and from David Munville [of Barbados],and
to Hendricke Ten Eyck, Jan. 1729, Box 1, Bleecker
Papers,New York Public Library.
6tRobertSanders,VoyageBook, 1748-1756,New-York
Historical Society.
@Forexample, on the 1720sseeMisc. Iv&s.,New-York
Historical Society; C.O. 511224; Barrow, Trade and
Empire, 151.On the 1730sseeRobert Sanders,Account
Book, New-York Historical Society; Cornelius Cuyler,
Letter Book, American Antiquarian Society; William T.
Baxter, The House of Hancock: Business in Boston,
1724-l 775,(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,
1945), 72-73,90-91; Roberts, “Samuel Storke,” 14770.
63Edmund and Josiah Quincy to Thomas and Adrian
Hope, 1745, C.0, 323/K&113; Christopher Bancker,
Waste Book, 1754, New-York Historical Society; John
W. Tyler, “The First Revolution: Boston Merchants and
the Acts of Trade, 1760-1774,” Ph.D. Dissertation,
Princeton, 1980, 36; Charles Henry Wilson, Anglo-
67Johnvan Cortlandt to David Purviance [of Martinique], 15 Dec. 1672, John van Cortlandt Letter Book,
New York Public Library: Gregg and Cunningham to
William Woodbridge, July 4, 1756, Letterbook, NewYork Historical Society; Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce, chap. 6.
6%VaddellCunningham to ThomasGreg, 11 Dec. 1756,
and Greg and Cunningham to William Snell and Co. [of
London], June 4, 1756, Letter Book of Greg and Cunningham, New-York Historical Society.
69JoshuaGee to the Council of Trade and Plantations,
Oct. 27, 1721, Cal. State Papers, 1720-1721,470-75,
esp. 474; David Macpherson, Annals of Commerce,
Manufactures, Fisheries, and Navigation, 4 vols., (London, 1805).IIX 164-66; Francis Lewis Correspondence,
1751-1786; Hugh Wallace, Letters; John Alsop
Correspondence,1733-1794; Charles Nicoll, Account
Books; Walter and Samuel Franklin Correspondence;
John Waddell Correspondence, all at the New-York
Historical Society. Merchants could also voyage from
New York City to the West Indies and on to Amsterdam,
where cargo and vessel both were sold; Goldenberg,
Shipbuilding, 20-21,100-05.
‘()Robert.s,“Samuel Storke,” 147-70.
71PhilipCuyler to JohnHodshon, 17Jan. 1758;to father,
3 Dec. 1759, Philip Cuyler Letter Book, New York
Public Library.
72 Important examples of dealing with the five Dutch
fiis include John Ludlow Letter Book, 1755-1756,
American Antiquarian Society; Abraham Cuyler Letter
Book, Alexander Papers, Vol. 1, and Christopher
Bancker, Waste Book, 1754, all at the New-York
Historical Society. See also Robert SandersLetters to
and from John and William van der Grift [of Amsterdam], Robert SandersVoyage Book, 1748-1756, NewYork Historical Society. Sanderssharedthese ventures
with Robert and Richard Ray of New York City.
73GovemorHardy to the Board of Trade, July 15.1757,
C.O. 5/1068, fol. 30-33; GeorgeClinton to the Board of
Trade,Gct. 4,1752, CO. 5/1064, fol. 14447.
‘%-row,
Trade and Empire, 149-50.
75JohnSherburne [of Portsmouth] to John Reynell, 15
Mar. 1760, Coates-Reynell Papers,Box 11~Historical
Society of Pennsylvania; Pares, Yankees and Creoles,
148-49; Gerard 63.Beekman to Adam Schoales,9 Sep.
1760, Beekman Letter Book, New-York Historical
Society.
‘9yler, “The First Revolution”, 68.
” e.0. 511225-1226;New York Gazette, entrance and
clearancenotices for 1764.
78C.0. 5:1225-1226. A similar imbalance in entrances
Qutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1941), chap.
6-7.
%or the 1740sseeLord John, Earl of Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American States, With
Europe and the West Kndies, 6th ed., (London, 1784),
234; ThomasPownall, The Administration of the British
Colonies.4th ed., (London, 1764),5ff.; DocumentsRelative, V: 686; VI: 154-55, VII: 162, 215, 612, WI: 255.
Specific examplesof theseintricate and varying voyages
in the %74Os-1750s
can be found in the correspondence
cited in the sevenpreceding notes.
65Philip White, The Beekmans of New York in Bolitics
and Commerce, 1647-1877, (New York: New-York
Historical Society, 1956), citing Gerard G. Beekman to
and from Mr. Townshend, May 18,1761,27ln. and the
Daybook, 1756-57,297-98; on John de Neufville, 3&l8.5;on the Havana and St. Eustatius trade through New
York,281,298,401-02;andontradeafter 1764,46466,
472.
Barrington, New York Merchant, 250-52; White, The
268
SELECTED
RENSSELAERSWIJCK
and clearancesobtained in 1768,1769, and 1770.
“Tyler, “TheFirstRevolution,” 17,36,50,190,343-44;
Lt. Governor de Lancey to the Board of Trade, Jan. 5,
1758,C.O. 5/1068, fol. 160-62.
*(%or example, Cornelius Cuyler, Letter Book, 17521764, American Antiquarian Society; Abraham Yates,
Papers,Box 1, 1760, New York Public Library; Christopher Bancker,WasteBook, May 11,23, Aug. 24,1752,
New-York Historical Society; Lt. Governor de Lancey
to the Board of Trade, Jan. 5, 1758, C.O. 5/1068, fol.
160-62.
*lEdmund and Josiah Quincy [of Boston] to Capt.
Sinclair, Apr. 10, 1745, C.O. 323/13, fol. 179-80.
82GovemorGeorge Clinton to the Board of Trade, Oct.
4, 1752, C.O. 5/1064, fol. 14447; New York Gazette,
Oct. 1,1739; Norton, The Fur Trade, 176,208-10. Lined
SEMINAR
PAPERS
up against Cosby, Montgomerie, Johnson, Clarke, and
Clinton were Oliver and Stephende Lancey, John Watts,
and someAlbany merchants.
*“‘P,” Providence Gazette, Jan. 21,1764.
84CadwalladerColden to his son, The Co/den Letters on
Smith’s History, 1759-l 760, New-York Historical
Society, Collections, I (New York: New-York Historical
Society, 1868), 183-84.
%ondon Public Advertiser, Jan. 26, 1775; Address of
the People of GreatBritain to the Inhabitants ofAmerica,
(London, 1775), 5.
%or an example of the enduring ties to Amsterdamup
to and during the American Revolution, seeJohn Alsop
Correspondence, 1733-1794, New-York Historical
Society. See also -Matson, “Fair Trade, Free Trade,”
chap. 7 and conclusion.