An Alternative to Weaponizing Space

FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
An Alternative to lXIea/Joni<ing Space
I
n 2002 the Eisenhower Institute convened a five-year project to investigate
the state of space security and to consider the potential risk of its weaponiza­
tion. The strategy was to assemble a prestigious international group of space
professionals, all of whom had worked on complicated projects including
launching craft into space. The project began without any preconceived
notion of the outcome, and the results are based solely on the rigorous
pursuit of facts. Given the experience of our panel we wanted to make
recommendations
to
the international community that would be politically
feasible while enhancing space security. We are grateful to the MacArthur
Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ploughshares, and the
Canadian government for their generous support of our work. In the course
of this project we produced the Space Security Index, convened conferences
and workshops that brought space experts together from around the world, and
we engaged the Pentagon, the United States Air Force, industry professionals,
and treaty lawyers to probe the dimensions of the problem.
Presented in this booklet is our proposal, the final product of this "Future of Space"
project. The Framework proposes an international regime to be established by the
nations actively engaged in the use of outer space. In sum, the proposal:
•
provides continuity and enhances space security;
•
keeps all countries from engaging in an expensive arms race;
•
creates a new forum for discussion of space issues;
•
contributes to confidence-building among nations and increases
economic and scientific benefits for the civil and commercial sphere;
•
provides for safe and secure access to space; and
THE EISENJ-IO\VER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
FRAMEWORK FOR SI'ACE SECURITY
An Alternative [0 IX/e(lponizing Sf)ace
An Alternative [0 \li'eaponizing Space
•
does not require the burden of an international treaty, though it allows for
the isolation of those states not in compliance.
In conclusion, space security has become a fundamental component of
international stability. A new direction is needed; indeed one which
capitalizes on the common interests and shared objectives of the international
community as a whole and serves the interests of each participating nation.
he medium of space has been transformed dramatically over the past half
T
century. From Sputnik to the International Space Station to GPS and
Galileo, the unique character of space has enabled nations and individuals
to learn, see, and connect in ways never before imagined. However, as this
environment offers opportunities, it brings with it certain limitations. Satellite
orbits are controlled by the laws of orbital mechanics, and their communication
capabilities obey the laws of electrodynamics. As a result, there are limits on
the number of orbital slots and frequency bands. At the same time, while space
assets orbit the Earth as a whole, they do not recognize national borders and
are, by nature, more vulnerable to attack than ground-based systems and much
more difficult to defend. They follow a predetermined and predictable course,
and they are left exposed and unprotected by either personnel or material.
This is why it becomes vitally important for nations and commercial entities
to cooperate on space security, as they inhabit ever closer quarters in space.
The current international space security approach, which can trace its birth to
the Eisenhower administration, acknowledges the importance of non-aggressive
military applications in space, a recognition which has served
to
enhance
national and international security for many years. Few, after all, can deny
that reconnaissance from space and early warning satellites strengthened the
stability of deterrence during the Cold War. Over the past'd ecades many nations
have invested in creating military space systems that have greatly augmented
their reconnaissance, communications, and targeting capabilities. These
assets' increasing value have made them integral to military planning by most
space-faring nations, both to defend and to target. These nations are now at a
crossroads. They must decide if security will be increased by weaponizing space
or by maintaining the status quo, where space is utilized for military purposes
but not yet as a base for destructive weapons.
For a medium that is inherently international in nature, space is predominantly
unregulated. The International Telecommunication Union is responsible for
the allocation of communication frequencies and orbital slots, but it has no
authority over what is deployed in orbit. The Outer Space Treaty forbids only
the presence of nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, in
orbit or on heavenly bodies and military installations on heavenly bodies.
THE EISENI-IO\VER ]l\ST1TUTE
THE EISENHO\VER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
An Alremari"e to \'(/ea/loni,ing S/lace
An Alternative co \X/elljJonizing SIJlIce
three major space powers - the United States, China, and Russia - already
By prohibiting a space-based missile defense system, the former ABM Treaty
had simultaneously banned the testing of space-based Anti-Satellite Weapons
possess the capability to attack satellites in Low Earth Orbits. This sobering
new treaty at the Conference on Disarmament, the United States' withdrawal
further escalation.
("ASATs") in an anti-missile capacity. However, despite some effOi·i:"to create a
from the ABM Treaty lifted any limitations on the deployment of non-nuclear
weapons in orbit. In addition, the currently adopted U.S. National Space Policy
specifically states that the United States will "oppose the development of new
legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access
to
or use of space."1 The new directive pledges the United States to preserve the
unregulated nature of space. These developments have led to a potentially
recognition should serve as a wake up call for immediate action to preempt
A space arms race always brings with it the possibility of the purposeful, or even
accidental, use of destructive space weapons. Aside from the grave military
damage an attack on space assets could cause, including the possible debilitation
of critical national defense infrastructure, offensive weapons in space could be
extremely disruptive to every day life in the public sphere. Satellites in orbit
around the Earth are now used for communications, banking operations,
unstable situation.
television broadcasting, airplane navigation, the Internet, weather and climate
The first nation to deploy weapons in space, even if only out of concern fo�
research, remote medicine and education, and numerous other important
moves, which could open a space arms race. Major space powers such as Russia
at risk either from direct attack or by the resulting barrage of high-speed space
space, yet are prepared to respond in kind to any U.S. attempt to deploy
would clearly have global repercussions.
services. All of these assets, and in many respects our quality of life, would be
the security of its own assets, will likely trigger a chain reaction of reciprocal
and China have made it clear that that they oppose the weaponization of
weapons there.z Moreover, China recently went further: the successful testing
of its anti-satellite rocket demonstrated that China, a newly emerging space
debris created from the destruction of other co-orbital assets. A war in space
This is why a joint effort on behalf of all major and emerging space-faring
power, has the capacity to kill satellites in Low Earth Orbit. It can be argued
nations to eliminate the threat of space-based warfare, such as the Eisenhower
attention, can be interpreted as a response to the United States' apparent
comprehensive response to space security threats.
that China's recent 2007 anti-satellite test, which garnered so much international
.
unilateral stance in space. It is important to note that China conducted its
Institute's proposal below, would be a significant and worthy first step toward a
In summary, it is our belief that the deployment of weapons in space by any
test after years of attempting to pass a resolution banning space weapons in
nation would increase the vulnerability of its own space assets and almost
the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.
certainly produce a number of other negative consequences, including:
Consequently, unregulated and unilateral action by any nation to weaponize
space could be quickly transformed into a new area of confrontation. The space
•
a possible initiation of an expensive arms race by the major space powers;
be irrevocably lost, if a single relatively primitive but properly guided missile
•
a resultant increase in the number of nations with space-based weapons;
•
damaged prospects for international cooperation on a new vision for space
security that all nations and comn1ercial entities seek for their space assets could
can hold our entire commercial, scientific, and military infrastructure hostage.
exploration; and
After a U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense interceptor managed to destroy an ailing
reconnaissance satellite on February 20, 2008, there is no doubt that at least
•
disintegration of space objects, which would create dangerous, high-speed
space debris fields in heavily used orbits.
I
United States National Space Policy. Whire I-lOHse, August J 1, 2006.
�
\X/hile senior Russian foreign affairs and defense officials have promoted an agrecmenr pr('"cming the wcaponi!<llion
of space in the UN's Conference on Disarmmncnr. they (lisa have promised a response should another nation (the
United States) deploy wcapons in space. Sergei Ivanov, Russia's Ivlinisrcr of Defense, stated in June 200j, "Russia's
position on this question has not changed for decades: \'(/e are categorically against the milil<lrbllion o( Sp'KC.
. .
I(
some stare begins to realize such plans, then we doubtless will take adequate retaliatory mcasures." China's recent
ASAT (est in January 2007 proves (heir coumry's willingness (0 use destructive weapons in space. The sllccess(ul rest
has been inrerprcted by some as a responsc lO "yc<1rs o( sword-rattling by the United States lin spaccl" (Philip Coyle,
Cenrer for Defense Infonnocioll, Fcbruary 12,2007).
THE EISENI-IO\VER INSTITUTE
THE EISENHO\VER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
All Alcernacive co lVealJolliZillg S/Jace
All Alcerna<ive co \\'Iea/Jollizillg S/Jace
The challenge in dealing with the first group - established space powers - is
to maintain the security of their space assets while avoiding the creation of a
hostile and unsafe space environment. An arms race, once sparked, would be
extraordinarily expensive and counterproductive to global security interests.
The second group - threshold space powers - may possess rocket technology
W
e believe that this fragile situation calls for a multilayered strategy,
which would bring together both existing and threshold space powers
capable of sending an object into Low Earth Orbit or have the capability to
become significant "players" in the future. The international community must
into a mutually beneficial and security-enhancing framework. The most
find ways to encourage these nations developing access to space to the extent
pragmatic approach for achieving a consensus among space-faring nations is to
that the MTCR allows, while ensuring that security in space for all nations is
maintain and "lock-in" the status quo, thus preventing the full weaponization
not decreased.
of space, but not attempting to scale back on systems which already are be,
i ng
deployed. Our strategy, applicable to both established and emerging space powers,
would reward responsible countries that choose to join the framework voluntarily
The third group - "countries of concern" - are important to engage, but the
complexity involved in drawing nations such as North Korea into the regime
while isolating those who do not abide by its principles. At the same time
could very well put its creation at risk. Should the regime's members believe it
the plan would not prohibit complementary measures undertaken by the
useful, they may engage these countries at a later date.
signatories in order to make their space assets more secure and redundant.
Key to this proposal is the establishment of a multilateral regime based on an
international agreement banning on-orbit offensive weapons and the testing
of any destructive anti-satellite weapon based on land, sea, air, or space. We
STRUCTURE
Create a Multitateml Regime similar to the MTCR.
recommend a regime similar in structure to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), which would have a voluntary membership.
The Space Security Framework (SSF) would be a voluntary agreement rather
There are three distinct categories of countries with different levels of space
commit themselves to abiding by certain principles in order to enhance their
capabilities:
mutual security in space. The creation of this new regime would have the
than a treaty and would create an organization of like-minded nations that
•
established space powers, which are capable of designing, developing, and
launching space assets independently;
•
emerging space powers, which are on the threshold of achieving a space
launch capability or are capable of designing and developing space assets
independently; and
•
"countries of concern," which possess basic rocket/satellite technology but
do not have the technical means or geographic capacity to launch satellites.
Each of these categories of nations is capable of posing, in its own way, a threat
to the security of space.
THE EISENHO\VER INSTITUTE
advantage of providing a forum outside the United Nations and the Conference
on Disarmament for discussing and acting on civil, commercial, and military
space issues with only existing or threshold space powers. It would eliminate
the need to negotiate with nations who may have opinions, but no power or
potential to play a role in space.
Aside from those nations that are currently in space or likely to be soon, the
regime could also include: countries with a favorable geographic location,
which is critical for launch purposes; satellite manufacturing capability;
ground stations; or any other critical function. Observer status could be
accorded to those nations that are consumers of space technology and want
to be associated with the pact.
TilE EISENHO\VER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
An A/renwri've [0 \'(Iea/Jonizing S/)Qce
An Alternati,ve w Weaponizing S/)(Ice
Each member of the regime would commit itself to the principles discussed
below. Each would also undertake to pass domestic legislation th<lt de
_ moi1strates
a minimal commitment to these principles as confidence-building measures.
Because membership in the regime is voluntary, collective punitive measures
could not be taken against those members that violate the regime's principles.
However, each member nation should, as part of its domestic legislation, enact
policies for dealing with both members and non-members that violate the
framework's principles.
The creation of this forum would be a critical first step toward ensuring that
space remains a secure environment for the assets of all space-faring nations.
After its establishment, the group would be in a strong position to engage ,
new emerging space powers and to address other important space security
issues, such as minimizing space debris and fairly allocating communication
frequencies and orbital slots.
2. B ASIC TENETS
2.1 The regime would be an agreement by all members, as current or
threshold space-faring nations,
to
maintain the status quo in space,
allow it to be freely used for commercial, scientific, and military
uses, but
to
refrain from the space testing of destructive space-based
weapons or ground-based ASATs and the deployment of any space­
based anti-satellite system.
2.2 The regime would not require any reversal of the already adopted
segments of the U.S. National Missile Defense program, nor 1V0uid
it ban potential equivalent programs of other nations. However, the
regime would ban the deployment and testing of the weapons
component of a space-based missile defense system. After all, it
would be indistinguishable from a destructive space-based weapon.
3. INDIVIDUAL REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP
PRINCIPLE S
The establishment of an international agreement creating a )'egime of
member nations who ag)'ee to work pW'posefully to prevent the deployment
of destructive space-based weapons and the testing of any destructive
anti-satellite weapon based on land, sea, ai)',
1.
0)'
space.
DEFINITIONS
1 A destructive space-based weapon: Any object deployed in orbit
designed to damage or destroy another object in space, in atmosphere,
or on Earth by directed-energy, explosives, or intentional impact.
3 1 Members would be a part of a new forum that engages in confidence­
building measures and discusses issues of mutual interest and concern
with other major space players. This would eliminate the need to
address these issues in other fora that may include nations who wield
no power in space. An initial activity might be a joint effort to address
the issue of space debris and engage in "orbit-cleaning" activities.
3.2 Members would pledge to enact domestic legislation, as a confidence­
building measure, that commits each nation to the basic principles of
this regime and sanction those members or non-members that violate
them. An outline of this legislation is attached as an Appendix.
1.2 A destructive ASAT test: The space test of a system based on land,
sea, air, or space that is designed to damage or destroy a space-based
object by directed-energy, explosives, or intentional impact.
1.3 Coordinated Space Awareness Center: A center jointly supported
and managed by members of the regime that is capable of detecting,
tracking, and identifying man-made objects orbiting the Earth.
THE EISENHO\VER INSTITUTE
4. JOINT ACTIVITIES
4.1 A powerful and constructive initial trust-building activity by this
space regime would be to establish a jointly-sponsored Coordinated
Space Awareness Center (see definitions) with access for all regime
members. It would also serve
to
increase transparency among nations,
so each could ensure that no destructive ASAT testing is taking place.
THE EISENIIO\'\lER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
An Alternatiw to Wlea/Joni,ing S/Jace
All Alternative to Wlea/JOlli,ing S/Jace
Enhanced space situational awareness, much like early warning
•
providing for mobility of space assets to defend themselves and their
connection with terrestrial nodes. The limitations of space maneuverability
systems in the nuclear weapons field, is critical to a nation's knowl�dge ofthe se­
as a means of deflecting attack are on-board fuel capacity, orbital mechanics,
curity of its space-based assets. Lack of full knowledge about an event can lead
and advance warning. Limitations of terrestrial nodes include maintaining
to hasty and reckless actions.
"line of sight" positioning with its space partner;
In addition to these collective rules and measures, individual member countries
•
or groups of them are free to undertake additional steps to enhance survivability
establishing system configuration changes - RF amplitude changing and
frequency hopping techniques to prevent jamming, encryption, orbit
of their space assets, such as redundancy and space situational awareness.
altering physical shape changing; and
Redundant systems capable of rapid deployment might serve both as a
deterrent to those interested in attacking space assets and insurance against
•
any such attack.
networking satellites to reduce single-point dependencies and to minimize
the impact of single-point failures.
Responsive space, consisting of flexible systems, infrastructure, and launch
capabilities, seeks to assure that a country's capability to replace any lost space
asset within a very short window of time would become economically and
tactically difficult for an adversary to eliminate. Even though responsive space
techniques and technologies provide a range of diverse measures that can
quickly meet a threat in space, the systems reside on the earth, thus eliminating
weaponization while providing a deterrent.
Space-faring nations would be free to use a range of measures to help protect
their assets without threatening other space powers. Among these options are:
•
hardening of satellites to radiation;
•
investing in the physical hardening of space structures;
•
investing in more redundant lines of communication between the ground
and satellites
to
counter any attempts at jamming;
•
adopting passive measures, such as a robust defense for ground-based systems;
•
assuring dispersal of space systems. In space, dispersal would involve
)
deploying satellites in a multi-satellite system such as GPS into various
orbital altitudes and planes. On the Earth, dispersal would involve
deploying mobile ground stations to multiple locations;3
3
COlll1terspacc Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, pg. 26, August 2, 2004.
THE EISENHO\VER INSTITUTE
THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
FRAMEWORK 1'01<' SPACE SECURITY
An Alternative to Wea/)onizing Space
An Alternative to \Veaponizing S/)ace
APPENDIX
SUGGESTED DOMESTIC LEGISLATION FOR THE UNITED STATES
(other nations will vary)
Jj
T
he cost of weaponizing space would be extraordinarily high and would
result in a net reduction of security for all space-faring nations and the rest
1. Testing Ban
of the world. We believe the strategy we have put forward would significantly
enhance space security by offering greater transparency to the international
a. Authorizing legislation to be enacted by Congress to limit/deny the
community, while making it possible to isolate countries that have illegitimate
appropriation of money to the Department of Defense for the testing or
deployment of destructive ASATs.
or hostile objectives with regard to space. Furthermore, such a plan would '
also include measures that should be acceptable for all space-faring nations
2. Sanctions Legislation
to employ without reducing the security of the others. By creating a regime
dedicated
to
Each nation will undertake to pass domestic legislation with this minimum
set of requirements:
averting the necessity of developing and deploying destructive
a. Legislation banning U.S. individuals and corporations from doing
space-based weapons and preventing nations from testing any permanently
business with entities of any nation, whether members of the regime or
destructive ASATs, all current and future space-faring nations would be taking
not, that are proven to have undertaken actions counter to the principles
of the agreement and have been acknowledged so by Congress.
the necessary first steps to enhance the security of their assets, while avoiding
the great cost of developing a new field of weapons.
b. Shared information/intelligence with other member nations so that each
nation may undertake similar action toward the nation or entity.
I�
THE EISENIIOWER INSTITUTE
TilE E1SENHO\X'ER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE SECURITY
An Alternative 10 lXiea/JOnizing S/Jace
An Alternative 10 IX/eaponizing S/Jace
THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE
SPACE E XPERT PANEL
From the inception of the project, the Eisenhower Institute's International
Space Expert Panel served as the primary strategy team for the development
•
Hubert Curieni", former President of CERN; first Chairman of the
European Space Agency; second President of the Academia Europea.
(Dr. Curien passed away on February 6, 2005.)
•
Susan Eisenhower, Chairman Emeritus and Chairman of Leadership and
Public Policy Programming of the Eisenhower Institute; President of the
of the program's defining project, The Framework for S/Jace Sewrity. The Panel
Eisenhower Group, Inc; appointed to the National Academy of Sciences'
played a vital role as an advisory board, providing leadership, knowledge, and
standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC);
an unmatched ability to cut through to the fundamental issues of space and
fonner member of the NASA Advisory Council; former member of the
its security. The Expert Panel consisted of some of the world's foremost space
International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force;
figures. We are indebted to their generosity and effort.
author of Partners in Space: US-Russian Cooperation After the Cold War.
INTERNATIONAL SPACE EXP ERT PANEL
•
•
Institute; former Chairman and Director General of the Swedish National
V.S. Arunachalam, former Defense Science Advisor for the Government of
Space Board; former Chairman of the Science Program Committee of the
India; fonner advisor to Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi; Distinguished Service
European Space Agency; first woman President of the Royal Swedish
Professor at Carnegie Mellon University; served five Prime Ministers and ten
Academy of Sciences.
Defense Ministers of India as their Defense Scientific Advisor and as the
Secretary of the Department of Defense Research and Development; founder
of the Center for the Study of Science, Technology, and Policy (CSTEP).
•
•
of the National Medal of Science, the nation's highest honor for the fields
Jacques Blamont, Scientific Advisor to the Chairman of the French Centre
of science and engineering; advisor to the U.S. government since the
Eisenhower administration.
former Scientific and Technical Director of CNES; Professor Emeritus at the
University of Paris VI.
•
Roger Bonnet, President of the Committee on Space Research; former
Scientific Director of the European Space Agency (ESA); Executive
Director of the International Space Science Institute; Director of Research
Emeritus at the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique;
former Associate Director General for Science at the French Centre
National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES); chaired a Commission to reflect on
the future of French space policy as requested by the French Minister of
Research and the Minister of Defence. During his ESA tenure, he directed
the launch of a total of 17 artificial satellites.
THE EISENHQ\VER INSTITUTE
Richard Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas]. Watson Research
Center; Adjunct Professor of Physics at Columbia University, recipient
National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), the French National Space Agency;
•
Kerstin Fredga, Chairman of the Swedish National Defense Research
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Senior Advisor, the Eisenhower
Institute; played a role in the negotiation of every major international
arms control and non-proliferation agreement signed by the United States
during the past thirty years; helped shape, negotiate, and secure U.S.
ratification of such international treaties as SALT, START, the ABM, INF,
and CFE treaties as well as conventions prohibiting biological and chemical
weapons; fonner Special Representative of the President of the United
States for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament; fonner
Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
Chairman of the Board of Thorium Power.
THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE
FRAMEWORK FOR S PAC E S E CU R I T Y
FRAMEWORK FOR SPAC E S E C U R I TY
All A/,erna,ille '0 Wfea/)Olli,illg Space
All A/,ernari'll e fa Wfea/)Olli<illg S/)ace
•
Peter Jankawitsch, Chairman, Supervisory Board, Austrian Space Agency;
•
Michael Yarymovych, fonner President of the International Academy of
fonner Austrian Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs; fonner Austr��n Permanent
Astronautics; former Vice President of International Technology and Advanced
Representative to the Security Council of the United Nations; former Chair­
Systems of the Boeing Company; President of Sarasota Space Associates.
man of the United Nations' Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
ADVISORY PANEL
•
Dr. Andre Lebeau, fonner President of the French National Space Agency
(CNES); former President of the National Center for Space Studies, France;
•
Alexey Georgievich Arbatov, Program Co-Chair, MoscolV Carnegie Endow­
ment Center; fonner member of the Russian Parliament and Deputy Chairman
Professor and President Emeritus, Societe Meteorologique de France.
of the Duma Defense Committee; Academician and Professor of the Academy
•
Reimar Lust, eminent space physicist; former President of Max Plank
of Defense, Security, and Policy by the President of Russia; Head of the
Gesellschaft (equivalent to the German Academy of Sciences); former
Center for International Security Center for the Institute for International
Director General of the European Space Agency; fonner Chairman of
Economy and International Relationships of the Russian Academy of
the Board of the International University of Bremen; recipient of the
Sciences; former Consultant to the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Bundesverdienstheuz - the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of
Germany - the only general state decoration of Germany.
•
Mr. Douglas Aldworth, Senior Policy Advisor for Missiles and Space
Security in the Non-proliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament
•
Division of the Foreign Affairs of Canada.
Vittorio Manno, Program Manager of the International Space Science
Institute in Bern, Switzerland; former Senior Scientist at the European
Space Agency's Science Directorate; former Scientific Attache at the
•
•
Dennis Papadopoulos, Professor, Departments of Physics and Astronomy
Brett Biddington, Space Initiative Manager, Global Defense and Space
Group, Cisco Systems Inc .
Italian Embassy in Vienna.
•
Pete Hays, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF; former Director of INSS; Professor,
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; former
at the University of Maryland.
Staff Augmentee at the White House Office of Science and Technology
•
Policy and the National Space Council.
Antonio Rodotat, fonner Director-General of the European Space Agency
(ESA); former Director of the Space Division of Finmeccanica Otaly);
Board of Directors, Arianespace; considered one of the founding fathers of
•
Dr. David Mutimer, Research Fellow; Department of Peace Studies,
Galileo, Europe's satellite navigation system. (Dr. Rodota passed away on
School of Social and International Studies, Bradford University; Deputy to
February 23, 2006.)
the Director of the Small Arms Survey in Geneva; Editor of the Canadian
An11twl Revietv of Politics and Public Affairs .
•
Roald Sagdeev, Distinguished University Professor and Director o f the
East-West Space Science Center at the University of Maryland; former
•
Dr. Robert Lawson, former Senior Policy Advisor, Non-Proliferation,
Director of the Space Research Institute in Moscow; fonner Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Foreign Affairs Canada;
International Mission to Halley's Comet; fonner advisor to Soviet President
currently, Senior Policy Advisor, Human Security Policy Division,
Mikhail Gorbachev on the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada.
THE [ISENI-IO\VER INSTITUTE
THE EISENIIO\VER INSTITUTE
FRAM E W O R K FOR S PA C E SEC U RITY
An Alternative to Weaponizing Space
•
General V ladimir Dvorkin, Principal Researcher, Institute of World
Economy and International Relations.
•
Sergei Konstantinovich Oznobischev, Co-Director of the Institute of
Strategic Assessments.
EISENHOWER INSTITUTE STAFF WHO WORKED
ON THIS PROJECT:
•
Suzanne Vogel, former Program Officer
•
Chad Kreikemeier, fonner Program Officer
•
Rick Farwell, Program Coordinator
•
Jane Kratovil, Director of Finance and Administration, Treasurer
THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE
TilE E I SENHOWER l :-J STITUTE
1 5 7 N. Washington Street
Gettysburg, PA 1 7325
tel 7 1 7-337-6685
fax 7 1 7 -337-8459