The True Story of How the Soldiers Won the Battle and the Generals

The True Story
of How the Soldiers
Won the Battle and the
Generals Lost Iraq in 1991
A Presentation by
Douglas Macgregor,
Colonel (ret) U.S. Army
Author
Naval Institute Press, 2009
10 March 2010
"The political object is a goal, war is the
means of reaching it, and means can
never be considered in isolation from
their purpose."
Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege
“Why are you stopping?” asked the Republican Guard commander who
was now a prisoner of war in the hands of the 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment.
“Why do you not go to Baghdad? You have the power. Your army rules the
heavens and the earth…” In a voice filled with more anguish and
frustration than fear, my new Iraqi prisoner of war looked me straight in
the eye and said in heavily accented English, “Major, you must go to
Baghdad and end this. You must save Iraq . . .”
. . . Along the 73 Easting in the Iraqi desert 2200 hours, 26 February 1991
28 February 1991
Desert Storm, as
the 1991 Gulf War
is known, was
publicized to the
American people
and to the world as
a total victory and
a triumph of
American military
might.
But the truth was
there for anyone
interested in
finding it.
”The gate's closed… What isn't escaping is heavy tanks, what isn't
escaping is artillery pieces… I'm talking about the gate that closed on
the war machine that is out there.“
General Norman Schwarzkopf, CDR, U.S. Central Command,
25 March, 1991
“According to the new estimates, which represent a consensus view
among CIA, DIA and NSA, about 700 of Iraq's estimated 4,550 tanks in
southern Iraq and Kuwait escaped. About 1,430 of Iraq's 2,880 armored
personnel carriers are now believed to have escaped... American
generals say they have accomplished their mission and show no
interest in reopening hostilities.”
Michael Gordon with Eric Schmitt, “After the war; much more armor than US
believed fled back to Iraq,” The New York Times, 25 March, 1991.
27 March 1991
In addition, the general (Schwarzkopf) said in the interview, major
Republican Guard units had "bugged out" before the main attack
by American forces and crossed the Euphrates River… When the
shooting stopped, the general said, he was "suckered" by Iraqi military
commanders who asked for and received permission to fly helicopters
over Iraq.”
Patrick E. Tyler, “After the War; Schwarzkopf Says Truce Enabled Iraqis to
Escape,” The New York Times, 27 March 1991.
“The first Bush administration's decision to abandon the March uprising was a
mistake of historic proportions. With U.S. help, or even neutrality, the March
uprising could have succeeded, thus avoiding the need for a second costly war…
An American may understand what happened in 1991 as carelessness –
inexcusable, but not malicious. An Iraqi Shiite saw a superpower that called
for a rebellion and then ensured its failure.”
Peter Galbraith, The Ghosts of 1991, 30 November 2006.
•1 March – April 1991. Postwar Iraqi Uprising crushed by loyalist forces spearheaded by
the Iraqi Republican Guard.
•27 August 1992 Operation Southern Watch established.
Just as
World War II
began where
World War I
left off,
Operation
Iraqi
Freedom
began where
Desert Storm
ended in
1991.
•7 October 1994. 80,000 Iraqi troops including two veteran Republican Guard
divisions move South toward Kuwaiti Border. Madeleine K. Albright tells the UN
Security Council “Iraq might soon have some 60,000 troops and 1,000 tanks poised to
attack Kuwait.” U.S. responds putting 36,000 troops on planes and setting another 160,000
in motion. (SH plays yo-yo with US)
•1 January 1997 Operation Northern Watch established.
•31 October 1998 President Clinton signs the Iraqi Liberation Act into law. December
1998. Iraq accepts U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program.
•16 December 1998. Operation Desert Fox: a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq.
Stated goal: Disrupt Saddam's grip on power. Air strikes by US and UK forces continue
weekly into 2001. (7-14 tons per month on average)
•June 2002 – March 2003. Operation Southern Focus. (54.6 tons dropped on Iraq in
September 2002)
•16 October 2002. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution enacted.
•20 March 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Begins.
“By 2000, Arab leaders realized Saddam was more popular with their subjects than they…
Diplomatically, the U.S. was more “in a box” than Iraq.”
Angelo Codevilla, Advice to War Presidents, (Basic Books, 2009), page 107.
What people said before 17 January 1991:
“Third U.S. Army Personnel Command estimates VII Corps will take 20,000 casualties in the
first five days of fighting the Iraqi Army.”
Richard Swain, Lucky War. Third Army in Desert Storm, page 205
“Nobody wanted another Vietnam.”
General Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero, page 427
“The White House had been accustomed over the years to the military coming in with very
large force requirements for contingency plans. This was clearly partly out of caution, but there
was also the perception at times it was to dissuade the President from action.”
Robert M. Gates, Deputy National Security Advisor, 1990, The Generals’ War, page 154.
“If Saddam withdraws with most of his forces intact, we haven’t really won.”
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, 1991 from A World Transformed, page 473.
“Franks (LTG, VII Corps CDR) couldn’t make a decision to pee if his pants were on fire.”
Unnamed officer quoted by Rick Atkinson in Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf
War, page 255.
“Iraqi tank crews can fire every 8 to 10 seconds from a static defensive position, but are unable
to hit targets beyond 500 meters and nothing that moves.”
Lieutenant Colonel (ret), Israeli Defense Force, quoted in Armor Magazine, 1990.
“Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and control;
gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines, destroy
chemical, biological and nuclear capability; destroy Republican
Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; liberate Kuwait.”
U.S. Central Command Operations Order 91-001, 17 January 1991
“Pin (the Iraqi Republican Guard) with their backs against the sea, then, go in
and wipe them out… Once they’re gone be prepared to continue the attack to
Baghdad.”
General Norman Schwarzkopf, November 1990.
U.S. and Iraqi Land
Forces January –
February 1991:
Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait Theater of
Operations (South of the Euphrates River) included
540,000 troops organized into 12 armored and 30
other divisions including 4550 tanks plus 2,880
armored fighting vehicles (most with 1960s-vintage
Soviet and Chinese equipment). 80,000 man Iraqi
Republican Guard Corps equipped with 1970 era
Soviet tanks, BMPs and artillery.
By 21 February 1991 when U.S. and allied ground
forces attack into Iraq, Iraqi forces South of the
Euphrates were reduced through air attack and
desertion to 280,000 troops.
On 21 February 1991, Coalition forces numbered
840,000 men and nearly 8,000 tanks. U.S. ground
forces consisted of 116,000 soldiers in the XVIII
Airborne Corps, 110,000 soldiers in the VII Corps
and 107,000 Marines.
The VII Corps, under LTG Frederick Franks Jr., was
deployed to the right of XVIII Airborne Corps and
consisted of the 1st Infantry Division (mechanized),
1st and 3rd Armored divisions, the British 1st
Armored. Div., the U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment and the U.S. 11th Aviation Brigade.
2nd Cavalry in the
VII Corps Attack Across
Southern Iraq
23-24 February 1991
PL CORONA
PL LONESTAR
OBJ
GATES
PL LITE
Redfox Forward
Reconnaissance
Element
Basrah
OBJ
MAY
OBJ
MERREL
PL COORS
PL COLT
Republican
Guard
PL MILLER
OBJ
FEUCHT
PL Blacktop
Kuwait City
Limit of Advance on 25
Feb. 1991 at 1000 hours.
PL DIXIE
Limit of Advance on 24
Feb. 1991 at 1700 hours
PL BUSCH
PL BUD
Cougar Battlegroup
(Main Body)
Limit of Advance on 24 Feb.
1991 at 1000 hours
PL BECKS
Limit of Advance on 23 Feb.
1991 at 1500 hours
Saudi Arabia
PL HARPS
Kuwait
XX
PL LIME; Planned limit of
Advance for the 2nd Cavalry.
3
(3rd Armored Division)
PL
TANGERINE
XX
2
(Cougar)
Plan resulting from
decision by LTG Franks late
on 25 February to move 2nd
Cavalry back into the fight
on 26 February.
II
(Wolfpack)
II
1
TAW
TAWALKANA
REPUBLICAN
GUARD BRIGADE
X
3
XX
X
52nd
BRIGADE OF 52nd
ARMORED
DIVISION
IRAQI ARMY
1
(War Eagle)
XX
(1st Infantry Division
(mechanized))
XX
1
UK
(1st British Armored Division)
Rear Guard
Covering Iraqi
Republican
Guard Corps
Withdrawal
Cougar Battle Group Combat Power
Soldiers - 1,100
M1A1 Abrams Tanks – 42
Armored Fighting Vehicles (Bradleys) – 41
155mm Self Propelled Howitzers – 8
4.2” Mortars mounted in M113s – 6
M113A2 – 12
Republican Guard Brigade Combat Power
Soldiers – 2,100 to 2,300 (estimated)
T-72 Tanks – 70 (estimated since tanks from
Versus retreating units mixed in during fighting)
Armored Fighting Vehicles (all types) – 80+
Artillery Systems (all types) – 20+
Trucks – 40-50
Cougar Squadron in the Box
Formation on 26 February 1991
XX
Ten Kilometer
Zone of
attack.
Box
Formation
was ten
kilometers
deep.
Fox Troop
Ghost Troop
Direction of
Movement toward
73 Easting
I
Hawk Company
Eagle Troop
II
Dragoon Base issued a new fragmentary order (FRAGO) around 0522 hours to the
regiment: “2nd ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] attacks East to fix Tawalkana
Mechanized Division; on order, 1 ID [1st Infantry Division] passes through 2nd ACR to
continue the attack East… acknowledge, over!”
“Cougar 32,” I said very slowly and deliberately, “be careful what you report to Dragoon.
Be accurate, but don’t give Dragoon Base an excuse to stop us, over.”
3AD 59
XX
2nd Cavalry
3AD
XX
2nd Cavalry
68
Situation between 1600
and 1700 hours
73
Ghost 3rd Platoon Scouts Arrive 1620
hrs. 2nd Platoon Tanks attack at
1630.
3 T72
13 BMP
Ghost
Troop
2 T72
1618 hrs Cougar
attacks East
toward 70 Easting
Ghost 1st
Platoon Scout
Section
destroys T72s
in sandstorm
05
Forward Line of
Troops along the
73 Easting 1645
hrs.
MINES
3 T72s
17 T72
18 BMP
1618 hrs Eagle
Troop Punches
Right to attack
main defense.
Eagle
Troop
MINES
1640 hrs Eagle
Troop Smashes
through Brigade
Defense to 73
Easting
MINES
00
Cougar
II
Wolfpack
MINES
1 T72
1 BMP
29 T72
2 T55
11 BMP
3 MTLB
1 SA13
Eagle Troop
destroys battalion +
and consolidates
along 73 Easting
1645-1700 hrs.
3rd Armored Division
Zone of Attack
2nd Cavalry’s
Limit of Advance
1700 hrs 26 Feb
to 0600 hrs 27
Feb along the 70
Easting
Fox Troop
Note: Caisson Battery’s
Gun Platoons were
positioned immediately
behind Ghost and Eagle
Troops.
Hawk Company
73 Easting
Actual Cougar
Deployment along
the 73 Easting
from 1643 to 0600
hrs
Ghost Troop
Eagle Troop
Heavy Black Line
Marks Cougar
Squadron’s
Positions Along
the 73 Easting
after 1700 hours
26 February
2nd Squadron
ll
3rd Squadron
Iron Troop
N
E
Forty minutes after Eagle Troop
attacks, Iron Troop attacks to 73
Easting, then falls back behind 70
Easting, 2nd Cavalry Limit of
Advance.
Counterattack
(1700 hrs)
4 T 72 tanks, 10 BMPs +
BRDMS
73 Easting
Red 1
(Garwick)
Bradley Fighting
Vehicle with Scout
Squad
White 1
(Kilgore)
COLT
Abrams Tank
Ghost 6
Ghost 5
(Sartiano)
(Mecca)
Blue 1
(Hanes)
BMP Bunker
Green 1
(Kinsley)
Ghost FIST
(Deskevich)
BMP Bunker
Mortars
(SFC Newman)
Actions in Ghost Troop Zone of Attack
along the 73 Easting 1700 to 2100
hours, 26 February 1991
70 Easting,
2nd Cavalry
Limit of Advance
Eagle
Troop
73 Easting
Tactical Outcome
Cougar Squadron destroyed 93 Enemy
tanks in its zone of attack along with a
hundred armored fighting vehicles and
trucks. After the battle, more than 500
Republican Guards surrendered. How
many died is unknown, but at least 1,100
is a reasonable estimate.
Cougar Squadron lost one Bradley
Fighting Vehicle to enemy fire, one man
killed and two wounded.
NOTE: VII Corps used less than
15 percent of the 70,000 tons of
ammunition at its disposal.
Strategic Outcome
“In ten years, we’ll be back.”
The Soldiers of Cougar Squadron, 2nd
Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment in May 1991.
“Each service was allowed to attack the way it
preferred, with little thought about how an
attack in one area would affect the fighting in
another. Schwarzkopf yielded too unthinkingly
to the Marines’ demand that they be given a
major piece of the war and accepted more
than he would later acknowledge Franks’
mindset that the Iraqis were a determined
enemy that was prepared to stand and fight.”
Lieutenant General “Mick Trainor” and
Michael Gordon, The Generals’ War,
page 432.
Desert Storm’s Military Legacy
“Measured in 2010 dollars, the Korean War cost $393,000 per year for every person
deployed. And the Vietnam conflict cost $256,000. By contrast, the Iraq and Afghanistan
commitments have cost $792,000 per year per person.”
Carl Conetta, “The Pentagon’s Runaway Defense Budget,” AntiWar.com, 4 March 2010
“When Lieutenant General William Wallace, Cdr of the U.S. Army’s V Corps, and Major
General David H. Petraeus, Cdr of the 101st Airborne Division met on 27 March 2003 at a
site near Najaf, only five days after American forces began the attack to Baghdad, the
generals were deeply pessimistic. As far as they were concerned, ‘the war was in dismal
shape.’ ”
Rick Atkinson, Peter Baker and Thomas E. Ricks, “Confused Start, Decisive End,” Washington Post, April 13,
2003, page A01.
“The American people don’t fully realize what’s going on,” said the 27 year old Staff Sergeant
from Buffalo, New York. “They just know back home what the higher-ups here tell them. But
the higher-ups don’t go anywhere, and actually they only go to the safe places, places with a
little bit of gunfire. They don’t ever (expletive deleted) see what we see on the ground.”
Joshua Partlow, “I Don’t Think This Place is Worth Another Soldier’s Life,” The
Washington Post, 27 October 2007, page A10.
“Cash is my most important weapon in the war on terror.”
General David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command
Desert Storm’s Military Legacy
(continued)
Sergeant Nels
Andrew Moller,
Ghost Troop, 2nd
Squadron, 2nd
Armored Cavalry
Regiment
killed 26 February
1991.
“The distant rear of an army
engaged in battle is not the best
place from which to judge
correctly what is going on in
front.”
General U.S. Grant, Memoirs
of U.S. Grant, page 152.
The battle of 73 Easting offers conclusive evidence that a much more aggressive
advance across Southern Iraq by the Army’s VII Corps would have cut off any
attempted retreat by the Republican Guard Divisions leading to their destruction or
surrender in a larger corps-size battle on the model of Cougar Squadron’s fight
along the 73 Easting, solving many of America’s geopolitical concerns without
occupying Iraq.
Understanding why Desert Storm failed to achieve its true strategic aims in 1991
and why operations since 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq have been frustrating and
expensive, means grasping the difference between the soldier who fights and the
generals who command: No amount of courage and competence at the
soldier’s level can compensate for deficiencies of leadership and character
at the general officer level.