LWP-G 7-5-2, Musorian Armed Forces – Land

Transcription

The information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly,
to the media or any person not authorised to receive it.
AUSTRALIAN ARMY
LAND WARFARE PROCEDURES GENERAL
LWP-G 7-5-2
MUSORIAN ARMED FORCES – LAND
OPERATIONS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
This publication supersedes Australian Army Trials Doctrine, The Musorian Armed Forces,
4.3, Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 1997 and Australian Army Trials
Doctrine, The Musorian Armed Forces, 4.3, Supplement, Land Operations, Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures, 1998.
This publication is a valuable item and has been printed in a limited production run. Units are
responsible for the strict control of issues and returns.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
iii
AUSTRALIAN ARMY
LAND WARFARE PROCEDURES GENERAL
LWP-G 7-5-2
MUSORIAN ARMED FORCES – LAND
OPERATIONS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES
AND PROCEDURES
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
© Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army) 2001
24 May 2010
Issued by command of
the Chief of Army
D.R. Groves
Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant
Defence Intelligence Training Centre
LWP-G 7-5-2 MUSORIAN ARMED FORCES – LAND OPERATIONS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND
PROCEDURES, 2001 AL2
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
iv
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
1.
This document contains Australian Defence information. All Defence information,
whether classified or not, is protected from unauthorised disclosure under the Crimes
Act 1914 (Commonwealth). Defence information may only be released in accordance
with the electronic Defence Security Manual and/or DI(G) OPS 13–4 as appropriate.
2.
When this information is supplied to Commonwealth or foreign governments, the
recipient is to ensure that it will:
a.
be safeguarded under rules designed to give it the equivalent standard of security
to that maintained for it by Australia;
b.
not be released to a third country without Australian consent;
c.
not be used for other than military purposes;
d.
not be divulged to a non-Defence organisation unless that organisation is
sponsored and cleared by an accepted Defence organisation (‘sponsoring’ means
giving an assurance that the organisation has a need to know for Defence
purposes; ‘clearing’ means guaranteeing for security); and
e.
not be downgraded or declassified without Australian Government approval.
Released to:
.............................................................................................................................
Released by:
.............................................................................................................................
(Signature)
.............................................................................................................................
(Appointment)
Date Released: .............................................................................................................................
© This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced
by any process without written permission from Doctrine Wing, Army Knowledge Management Group, Land Warfare
Development Centre, Tobruk Barracks, PUCKAPUNYAL VIC 3662.
LWD 7-5-3 MUSORIAN ARMED FORCES – LAND OPERATIONS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES,
2001
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
v
AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE
Doctrine Wing, Army Knowledge Management Group, Land Warfare Development Centre is
responsible for the management of this publication. The sponsor of the publication is Director
Training and Doctrine Group. The doctrine contained herein was approved on
9 November 2001.
1.
Proposals for amendments or additions to the text of this publication should be made
through normal channels to the sponsor. To facilitate this, there are amendment
proposal forms at the back of this publication.
2.
It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned amendment lists
have been made in this publication.
Amendment List
Number
Date of
Endorsement
1.
9 Nov 2001
2.
24 May 2010
Produced By
Publication
Amended By
Date Amended
3.
4.
5.
3.
All superseded Amendment Certificates should be retained at the rear of the
publication for audit purposes.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
vi
DISTRIBUTION
This publication has been distributed to a number of Training Command and Land Command
units. A complete distribution list is provided in the rear section following the text.
LWD 7-5-3 MUSORIAN ARMED FORCES – LAND OPERATIONS, TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES, 2001
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
vii
PREFACE
This publication supersedes Australian Army Trials Doctrine, The Musorian Armed Forces,
4.3, Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 1997 and Australian Army Trials
Doctrine, The Musorian Armed Forces, 4.3, Supplement, Land Operations, Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures, 1998.
Aim
1.
The information provided in this publication is not to be construed as a strategic or
tactical assessment of any perceived or potential enemy. The aim of this doctrine is to
provide a notional training enemy capable of undertaking conventional and
unconventional operations. Consequently, the training enemy, the Musorian Armed
Forces, is capable of a range of possible threats from the lower level requirements of
trials through to the highest level of conventional operations, such as consideration for
America, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA) and other coalition-level problems. The
inherent flexibility of the doctrine (the ability to develop almost any level and type of
threat) will significantly reduce the impact of changing strategic guidance and provide
the Australian Army with the means to develop the widest possible range of operational
scenarios to meet training requirements at all levels and against which the
organisation, equipment and tactics of the Australian Army may be discussed and
evaluated. Note: The flexible nature of this doctrine should not be abused.
Although it is possible to develop (almost) any level of threat, unit commanders
should confine their level of threat to that contained within current strategic and
Army guidance.
2.
The Australian Defence Force Publication – Operation Series 17 (ADFP 17), Joint
Exercises and Training details the procedures for planning and conducting joint and
combined exercises within the Australian Defence Force. It is recommended that
ADFP 17 be consulted prior to planning an exercise utilising the Musorian training
enemy.
3.
This publication is part of the new doctrine which replaces Australian Army Manual of
Land Warfare (MLW) 3.2.2, The Musorian Armed Forces, 1980 and MLW 3.2.3, The
Kamarian Armed Forces, 1983. Under this new doctrine, the Musorian Armed Forces
1
assume the role of the Australian Army’s sole training enemy . The new doctrine,
which was initially released as Army Trials Doctrine (ATD) Series 4, provided the user
with a far more detailed training enemy than has previously been available. The new
training enemy is still based on the fictitious nation of Musoria, with the Musorian Series
doctrine consisting of the following:
a.
LWD 7-5-2, Musorian Armed Forces Aide-memoire, 2001, and
b.
LWP-G 7-5-2, Musorian Armed Forces – Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures, 2001.
Authority
4.
1
LWP-G 7-5-2, Musorian Armed Forces – Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures, 2001 has been released for the purpose of training, evaluation and
comment by selected subject matter experts. The Director Training and Doctrine Group
has the authority to issue this publication for limited distribution, as per the distribution
list, and for a prescribed life span. Subject matter advisers are requested to analyse
The Kamarian Military Forces are still used in joint exercises at the operational level.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
viii
and comment on Developing Doctrine LWP-G 7-5-2 by 31 March 2002. This will enable
the final LWP-G 7-5-2 to be published as fully endorsed doctrine by mid 2002.
5.
This publication may be used for training purposes until March 2002. Furthermore,
users are authorised to use developing doctrine for training purposes except where the
detail in this publication overlaps with current endorsed safety doctrine. In this case the
current endorsed range safety publication has primacy.
6.
The sponsor for LWP-G 7-5-2 Musorian Armed Forces – Land Operations, Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures, 2001 is the Land Warfare Development Centre.
Comments are to be forwarded to Doctrine Wing, Training and Doctrine Group, Land
Warfare Development Centre.
Level
7.
This publication is for use by officers of all corps either as commanders, staff officers or
trainees in training establishments.
Scope
8.
LWP-G 7-5-2 attempts to present a generic force order of battle, capable of providing
the widest range of possible military capabilities in such a way that a multitude of
organisations and equipment can be utilised for any exercise scenario. By using a
flexible style of development, exercise planners can tailor a training enemy (from squad
to division; conventional or unconventional) to suit any particular training requirement.
Additionally, the exercise planner has the option of training against an enemy whose
base structure is composed of special purpose forces, an infantry division, a motorised
or mechanised infantry division and an armoured division. In utilising these features
however, unit commanders should remain cognisant of the parameters provided
by current strategic and Army guidance.
On-line Doctrine
9.
This and other doctrine publications are available via the Army Doctrine Electronic
Library website located at: http://adel.defence.gov.au. Paper copies may be out of
date. The Army Doctrine Electronic Library is the authoritative source for current
doctrine. Users are to ensure currency of all doctrine publications against the Army
Doctrine Electronic Library.
Gender
10.
This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
ix
CONTENTS
CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
iv
AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE
v
DISTRIBUTION
vi
PREFACE
vii
CONTENTS
ix
ABBREVIATIONS
xxiii
PART ONE.
LAND CONCEPT FOR OPERATIONS
1-1
CHAPTER 1
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
1-1
SECTION 1-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
Tactical Principles and Factors
Force Development
1-1
1-1
1-2
1-3
SECTION 1-2.
COMBAT FORCES
Combined Arms
Infantry Forces
Armoured Forces
1-4
1-4
1-4
1-4
SECTION 1-3.
COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES
Anti-armour
Artillery
Aviation
Engineers
Intelligence
Communications
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-8
SECTION 1-4.
SPECIALIST TECHNIQUES
Combat Surveillance
Electronic Warfare
Reconnaissance
1-8
1-8
1-9
1-10
SECTION 1-5.
ECHELONS AND RESERVES
1-11
SECTION 1-6.
CHEMICAL OPERATIONS
General
Organisation for Chemical Operations
Training
Employment of Chemical Weapons
1-11
1-11
1-12
1-12
1-12
CHAPTER 2
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
2-1
SECTION 2-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
Types of Offensive Operations
Forms of Offensive Manoeuvre
2-1
2-1
2-1
2-1
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
x
SECTION 2-2.
ECHELONS, RESERVES AND OBJECTIVES
Echelons
Reserves
Objectives
SECTION 2-3.
THE ADVANCE TO CONTACT
General
Divisional Tactical Guidelines
Conduct of Advance
Combat Support
Control of the Tactical March
Action on Contact
2-7
2-7
2-8
2-9
2-10
2-11
2-11
SECTION 2-4.
THE PURSUIT
General
Tactical Guidelines
Conduct of the Pursuit
2-12
2-12
2-12
2-12
SECTION 2-5.
THE ATTACK - BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
General
Types of Attack
Tactical Guidelines
Frontages and Depths of Objectives in the Attack
Timings and Rate of Advance in the Attack
Spacing
2-14
2-14
2-15
2-15
2-16
2-16
2-17
SECTION 2-6.
THE ENCOUNTER BATTLE
General
2-17
2-17
CHAPTER 3
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
3-1
SECTION 3-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
Types of Defensive Operations
Defence Zones
Echelons and Reserves
SECTION 3-2.
AREA DEFENCE
General
Tactical Guidelines
Conduct of Divisional Area Defence
Summary
3-5
3-5
3-6
3-8
3-25
SECTION 3-3.
MOBILE DEFENCE
General
Conduct of Divisional Mobile Defence
3-26
3-26
3-27
SECTION 3-4.
DELAYING ACTION
3-29
SECTION 3-5.
THE WITHDRAWAL
General
Infantry in the Withdrawal
Mechanised Infantry and Tank Forces in the Withdrawal
3-29
3-29
3-29
3-30
SECTION 3-6.
THE RETIREMENT
3-31
2-5
2-5
2-6
2-7
3-1
3-1
3-1
3-2
3-4
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xi
CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
4-1
SECTION 4-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
Campaign Planning
Campaign Phases
Command, Control and Communications
Command and Control in the Target Country
Communications
Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Characteristics
Targeting Criteria
Deception
Propaganda
Types of Operations
Administrative Support to Special Operations
Self-sufficiency in the Area of Operations
Conclusion
4-1
4-1
4-1
4-2
4-3
4-3
4-3
4-4
4-5
4-6
4-6
4-7
4-7
4-10
4-10
4-11
PART TWO.
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
5-1
CHAPTER 5
RECONNAISSANCE
5-1
SECTION 5-1.
INTRODUCTION
5-1
SECTION 5-2.
PRINCIPLES
General
Focus
Continuity
Aggression
Timeliness
Accuracy
Reliability
5-1
5-1
5-2
5-2
5-2
5-3
5-3
5-3
SECTION 5-3.
ZONES OF RECONNAISSANCE RESPONSIBILITY
General
Resources
Reconnaissance Troop Control
Chief of Reconnaissance
Division Organisations and Assets
Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion
Artillery Assets
Engineer Assets
Chemical Assets
Brigade Organisations and Assets
Brigade Reconnaissance Company
Artillery Assets
Engineer Assets
Chemical Assets
Battalion Organisations and Assets
Air Reconnaissance Assets
Reconnaissance Groupings
5-3
5-3
5-4
5-5
5-5
5-5
5-5
5-8
5-8
5-8
5-8
5-8
5-8
5-8
5-9
5-9
5-9
5-9
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xii
SECTION 5-4.
RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS
General
Observer
Observation Post
Patrol Squad
Reconnaissance Team
Reconnaissance Ambush Team
Reconnaissance Detachment
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-10
5-11
SECTION 5-5.
RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
General
Independent Reconnaissance Patrol
Combat Reconnaissance Patrol
Officer Reconnaissance Patrol
Commander’s Reconnaissance
Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol
Chemical Reconnaissance Patrol
5-12
5-12
5-13
5-13
5-14
5-14
5-14
5-14
SECTION 5-6.
RECONNAISSANCE PATROL METHODS
General
Observation
Raids
Ambush
Reconnaissance by Combat
Reconnaissance Group
5-15
5-15
5-15
5-15
5-16
5-16
5-16
SECTION 5-7.
RECONNAISSANCE DATA COLLECTION
General
5-17
5-17
SECTION 5-8.
RECONNAISSANCE DURING THE PHASES OF BATTLE
General
In the Advance
In the Penetration Battle
In the Enemy Depth
In the Defence
5-17
5-17
5-17
5-19
5-19
5-20
5-20
SECTION 5-9.
RECONNAISSANCE UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS
General
Mountains
Forests/Jungle
Desert
Cities
5-21
5-21
5-21
5-21
5-21
5-22
CHAPTER 6
INFANTRY AND THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM
- GENERAL
6-1
SECTION 6-1.
INTRODUCTION
6-1
SECTION 6-2.
MECHANISED FORCES
6-1
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xiii
SECTION 6-3.
AIRBORNE AND HELIBORNE FORCES
Introduction
Airborne Operations
Principles of Airborne Operations
Preparation for an Airborne Assault
Airborne Tactics
Air Movement
Air-drops
Drop Zone Procedures
Movement to the Objective
The Attack
The Defence
Link-up
Heliborne Operations
Doctrine
Missions
Conduct of Operations
6-2
6-2
6-2
6-3
6-3
6-4
6-5
6-5
6-5
6-6
6-7
6-8
6-9
6-9
6-9
6-10
6-10
SECTION 6-4.
INFANTRY WEAPONS AND SUPPORTING ARMS EQUIPMENT
Battalion Weapons
6-10
6-10
ANNEX:
A. Weapon Penetration and Armour Protection
6A-1
CHAPTER 7
INFANTRY AND THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM
- OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
7-1
SECTION 7-1.
INTRODUCTION
7-1
SECTION 7-2.
Introduction
Considerations
Groupings and Organisation for Combat
Planning the March
7-1
7-1
7-1
7-2
7-4
SECTION 7-3.
THE ATTACK
Types of Attack
The Encounter (Meeting) Battle
Conduct of the Encounter (Meeting) Battle
The Quick and Deliberate Attack
7-6
7-6
7-6
7-7
7-9
SECTION 7-4.
THE BRIGADE ATTACK
Description
Scenario
Planning and Reconnaissance
Deployment of First Echelon Battalions for the Assault
Coordination for the Assault
Brigade Second Echelon Commitment
7-10
7-10
7-10
7-12
7-13
7-14
7-14
SECTION 7-5.
THE BATTALION ATTACK
Formations
Combat Support
Attack Frontages and Formations
Command and Control
Breakthrough from the March
Breakthrough from a Position in Close Contact
7-15
7-15
7-15
7-15
7-17
7-17
7-18
SECTION 7-6.
THE PURSUIT
7-21
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xiv
SECTION 7-7.
CONDUCT OF THE TANK BATTALION ATTACK
Attack on a Prepared Position
Second Echelon Tank Battalion in a Brigade Attack of a Prepared
Position
Attack on an Enemy Hasty Defence
Pursuit
7-21
7-23
SECTION 7-8.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN
General
Doctrine
Offensive Tactics
7-27
7-27
7-27
7-30
SECTION 7-9.
TACTICAL RIVER CROSSINGS
General
The Considerations of a Tactical River Crossing
Equipment and Organisation
Types of Assault Crossing
Assault Crossing From the March
Prepared River Crossings
7-32
7-32
7-33
7-33
7-34
7-34
7-40
CHAPTER 8
INFANTRY IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
8-1
SECTION 8-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
Philosophy of Defence
Principles
Siting Factors
Direct Fire Planning
Use of Natural Obstacles
Frontages
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-1
8-2
8-2
8-2
8-3
SECTION 8-2.
THE BATTALION IN DEFENCE
Battalion Defence
Chain of Command
Staff
Combined Arms Operations
Conduct of a Battalion Defence
Conduct of the Defence
8-3
8-3
8-3
8-3
8-4
8-4
8-9
SECTION 8-3.
CONDUCT OF A TANK BATTALION DEFENCE
Introduction
The Tank Battalion
Tank Battalion in Defence
8-10
8-10
8-10
8-11
SECTION 8-4.
THE MECHANISED COMPANY IN DEFENCE
Company Defensive Considerations
The Conduct of a Company Defence
8-14
8-14
8-18
SECTION 8-5.
EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS AND WEAPONS IN
DEFENCE
Fire Plan
Artillery in Support of Infantry
Anti-tank
Tanks
AGS-17
Engineers
Air Defence
Nuclear and Chemical Defence
Night Defence
8-25
8-25
8-26
8-27
8-27
8-28
8-28
8-32
8-32
8-32
7-25
7-26
7-26
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xv
SECTION 8-6.
WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS
General
Conduct of the Withdrawal
8-33
8-33
8-33
SECTION 8-7.
DEFENSIVE TRENCH WORKS
Company/Platoon Level Trench Works
Positioning Squad and Platoon Defences
Construction Sequence
Platoon Positions
Obstacle Plans
Conduct of the Platoon Defence
Tanks in the Defensive Battle
8-34
8-34
8-35
8-36
8-38
8-46
8-49
8-50
SECTION 8-8.
DEFENCE IN SPECIAL TERRAIN
8-51
SECTION 8-9.
DEFENDING IN URBAN TERRAIN
Introduction
The Battalion Defence
8-52
8-52
8-52
CHAPTER 9
ARTILLERY
9-1
SECTION 9-1.
ARTILLERY COMMAND AND CONTROL
Coordination and Communications
Fire Control
Target Acquisition
9-1
9-5
9-5
9-6
SECTION 9-2.
CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
Fire Planning - Basics
Precision and Advanced Conventional Munitions Attack
Remote Mining
Fire Planning in the Attack
Artillery in Defence
Counter Bombardment
9-6
9-7
9-13
9-15
9-17
9-20
9-23
SECTION 9-3.
ARTILLERY ORGANISATIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS IN
Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition
Equipment and Ammunition
Deployment
Movement
9-25
9-25
9-25
9-26
9-31
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
General
Command and Control
Command and Communications
Fire Planning
Attack and Defensive Operations
Counter Bombardment
9-32
9-32
9-32
9-32
9-33
9-33
9-33
9-34
SECTION 9-4.
CHAPTER 10 ENGINEERS
SECTION 10-1.
GENERAL
Technical Tasks
Organisations
Missions
10-1
10-1
10-1
10-1
10-3
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xvi
SECTION 10-2.
RECONNAISSANCE
General
Methods
Engineer Reconnaissance Organisations
Engineer Reconnaissance on the March
Engineer Reconnaissance During the Offence
Engineer Reconnaissance in the Defence
10-6
10-6
10-7
10-8
10-8
10-9
10-10
SECTION 10-3.
FORTIFICATIONS
General
Types
Fortification on the March
Fortification During the Offence
Fortification During the Defence
10-11
10-11
10-11
10-13
10-13
10-13
SECTION 10-4.
ROUTES
Lines of Movement
Route Preparation and Maintenance
10-20
10-20
10-20
SECTION 10-5.
PASSAGE THOUGH OBSTACLES
Types of Obstacles
Breaching Responsibilities
Breaching Explosive Obstacles
Non-Explosive Obstacles Breaching Techniques
Combined Obstacles
Lane Marking
10-22
10-22
10-22
10-24
10-26
10-27
10-28
SECTION 10-6.
GAP CROSSING
Assault River Crossing
Engineer Support to Assault River Crossing
Ferry Crossings
Engineer Support to Ferry Crossings
Bridge Crossings
Engineer Support to Bridge Crossing
Fording and Underwater Crossing
Engineer Support to Fording and Underwater Crossing
10-28
10-28
10-29
10-32
10-33
10-34
10-35
10-36
10-37
SECTION 10-7.
ENGINEER OBSTACLES
Mobile Obstacle Detachment
Explosive Obstacles
Speed and Methods of Laying
Non-explosive Obstacles
Combined Obstacles
Employment of Obstacles
10-38
10-38
10-40
10-42
10-43
10-45
10-47
SECTION 10-8.
CAMOUFLAGE
On the March
During the Offence
During the Defence
10-47
10-47
10-48
10-48
SECTION 10-9.
WATER SUPPLY
10-48
SECTION 10-10. COMMITTAL OF SECOND ECHELONS AND OPERATIONAL
MANOEUVRE GROUPS
10-49
CHAPTER 11 MUSORIAN ARMY AVIATION
11-1
SECTION 11-1.
BACKGROUND
11-1
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xvii
SECTION 11-2.
ORGANISATIONS
General
11-1
11-1
SECTION 11-3.
DIVISIONAL AVIATION BATTALION
Role
Tasks
Characteristics
11-1
11-1
11-1
11-2
SECTION 11-4.
THE AVIATION BRIGADE
Role
Tasks
Characteristics
11-3
11-3
11-3
11-3
SECTION 11-5.
GENERIC AVIATION TACTICS AND OPERATIONS
General
Anti-armour Tactics
Rolling Attack
Pre-planned Ambushes
Anti-helicopter Tactics
Pre-planned Attack
Anti-helicopter Search and Destroy Mission
Close Air Support and Aerial Fire Support
Close Air Support
Aerial Fire Support
Air Mobile/Air Assault Operations
11-4
11-4
11-4
11-4
11-5
11-6
11-6
11-6
11-6
11-7
11-7
11-7
SECTION 11-6.
AVIATION SPECIALIST OPERATIONS
The Search and Attack Mission
Destruction of Enemy Command, Control and Communications
Systems
Seizing River Crossings
Seizure of Vital Ground
Disruption of Enemy Reserves
Exploitation after Chemical Strikes
Seizure of Beachheads
Operations in Mountainous Country
Operations with Special Forces
11-8
11-9
11-9
11-9
11-9
11-9
11-10
11-10
11-10
11-10
SECTION 11-7.
OPERATIONS IN THE PHASES OF WAR
General
The Advance to Contact
The Pursuit
The Encounter Battle
The Deliberate Attack
The Defence
11-10
11-10
11-11
11-11
11-11
11-11
11-12
SECTION 11-8.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT
11-13
SECTION 11-9.
DEVELOPMENTS
11-13
SECTION 11-10. CONCLUSION
11-13
CHAPTER 12 MUSORIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS
12-1
SECTION 12-1.
THE NATURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Introduction
12-1
12-1
SECTION 12-2.
THE ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES
Tasks
12-2
12-2
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xviii
SECTION 12-3.
COMMAND STRUCTURES AND ORGANISATIONS
Command Component
Combat Components of the Raider Brigade
Special Forces Battalion
Strike Battalion
Special Operations Command Support Battalion
Service Support Battalion
12-3
12-3
12-5
12-5
12-7
12-10
12-11
SECTION 12-4.
THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Phases
Insertion and Extraction
Methods of Insertion and Extraction
Resupply Techniques
Reconnaissance Operations
Offensive Operations
Support Operations
Combat Search and Rescue Operations
Training Assistance Operations
12-11
12-11
12-12
12-12
12-16
12-17
12-18
12-19
12-19
12-19
CHAPTER 13 LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS
13-1
Scope
13-1
SECTION 13-1.
INTRODUCTION TO LOGISTICS
War and Logistics
Logistic Principles
13-1
13-1
13-2
SECTION 13-2.
LOGISTIC OPERATIONS
Organisation of the Rear
Strategic Logistics
Operational Logistics
Tactical Logistics
13-6
13-6
13-6
13-7
13-8
SECTION 13-3.
DISTRIBUTION
Supply Operations
Transport Operations
Salvage and Destruction
13-10
13-11
13-19
13-20
SECTION 13-4.
MATERIEL SUPPORT
Equipment Maintenance, Recovery and Repair
Recovery and Repair During Combat
Technical Services
Organisational Maintenance Services
Maintenance Responsibilities
13-20
13-20
13-22
13-22
13-23
13-23
SECTION 13-5.
PERSONNEL SUPPORT
Health Services Support
Anticipated Loss Rates
Traffic Control
13-24
13-24
13-26
13-26
SECTION 13-6.
SUPPORT ENGINEERING
Route Repair and Maintenance
Military Roads
13-26
13-26
13-27
SECTION 13-7.
SUSTAINMENT
Rear Area Security
13-27
13-27
SECTION 13-8.
LOGISTIC PLANNING
Centralised Planning
Tailoring of Logistic Units
13-28
13-28
13-28
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xix
CHAPTER 14 COMMUNICATIONS
14-1
SECTION 14-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
Tasks
14-1
14-1
14-1
SECTION 14-2.
COMMUNICATIONS
General
Principles
Organisations
14-2
14-2
14-2
14-4
SECTION 14-3.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
General
Principles
14-10
14-10
14-11
SECTION 14-4.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
General
Electronic Combat
Integration and Planning
Target Priorities
Information Requirements
Electronic Support
Electronic Protection
Electronic Attack
Physical Destruction
Deception
Signals Reconnaissance
Electronic Jamming
Organisation
Implications
14-12
14-12
14-12
14-13
14-13
14-14
14-14
14-14
14-15
14-15
14-15
14-15
14-18
14-19
14-21
SECTION 14-5.
EQUIPMENT
14-21
DISTRIBUTION
412
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 2–1:
Figure 2–2:
Figure 2–3:
Figure 2–4:
Figure 2–5:
Figure 2–6:
Figure 3–1:
Figure 3–2:
Figure 3–3:
Figure 3–4:
Figure 3–5:
Figure 3–6:
Figure 3–7:
Figure 5–1:
Figure 5–2:
Figure 5–3:
Figure 5–4:
Figure 5–5:
Figure 5–6:
Single Envelopment
Double Envelopment
Single Penetration
Multiple Penetration
Pincer
Musorian Forces in Pursuit Operations
Musorian Defence Zones
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Division Area Defence
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Battalion Area Defence
Mechanised Infantry Division Area Defence
Mechanised Infantry Brigade in Defence
Mechanised Infantry Battalion in Defence
Employment of Tactical Reconnaissance Assets (Against
Partially Prepared Defence)
Figure Eight Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Racetrack Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Zigzag Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Loop Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
March Formation of a Reinforced Mechanised Company (BMP)
as a Reconnaissance Detachment
2-2
2-2
2-3
2-4
2-5
2-13
3-4
3-10
3-13
3-15
3-17
3-19
3-21
5-4
5-6
5-6
5-7
5-7
5-11
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xx
Figure 5–7:
Figure 5–8:
Figure 5–9:
Figure 5–10:
Figure 5–11:
Figure 5–12:
Figure 7–1:
Figure 7–2:
Figure 7–3:
Figure 7–4:
Figure 7–5:
Figure 7–6:
Figure 7–7:
Figure 7–8:
Figure 7–9:
Figure 7–10:
Figure 7–11:
Figure 7–12:
Figure 7–13:
Figure 7–14:
Figure 7–15:
Figure 8–1:
Figure 8–2:
Figure 8–3:
Figure 8–4:
Figure 8–5:
Figure 8–6:
Figure 8–7:
Figure 8–8:
Figure 8–9:
Figure 8–10:
Figure 8–11:
Figure 8–12:
Figure 8–13:
Figure 8–14:
Figure 8–15:
Figure 8–16:
Figure 8–17:
Figure 8–18:
Figure 8–19:
Figure 8–20:
Figure 8–21:
Figure 8–22:
Figure 8–23:
Figure 8–24:
Figure 8–25:
Figure 8–26:
Figure 8–27:
Figure 9–1:
Figure 9–2:
Figure 9–3:
Figure 9–4:
Figure 10–1:
Figure 10–2:
March Formation of a Patrol
Independent Reconnaissance Patrol Conducting
Reconnaissance by Observation
Key to Symbols Used in this Chapter
Reconnaissance in the Advance
Reconnaissance in the Penetration Battle
Reconnaissance During Operations in the Enemy Depth
Brigade Tactical March Order
The Squad in Formation Assault
Brigade Attack from Line of March
Battalion Commander’s Work Map
Plan for the Commitment of the Brigade Second Echelon
Deployment of the Combined Arms Mechanised Battalion in
the Attack
Mechanised Battalion Deploying from the Line of March to
Participate in a Division Breakthrough Operation
Deployment of a Tank Battalion Company Into the Attack
Reinforced by a Mechanised Company
Reinforced Mechanised Company Attack Through a City
Mechanised Battalion Conducting an Assault River Crossing
Engineer Support for a Mechanised Battalion
Tank Underwater Crossing Site
Tracked Amphibian Crossing Site
Pontoon Bridge Crossing Site
Mechanised Battalion in Defence
Reinforced Tank Battalion in Defensive Deployment
Company Defence Deployment by Echelon
Dispositions of a Company in the Defence
Company Deployment, Main Defensive Area
Company Deployment with Alternate Positions
Conduct of the Company Defence
Company Layout in the Security Zone
Squad Size Patrol at the Halt
Squad Patrol Formations
Anti-tank Ditch Measurements
Log Barrier and Wire Obstacles
Section Trenches
Platoon Trench System
Second Order of Trench Work
Third Order of Trench Work
Completed Trench Work
Fortified, Reinforced Platoon Strong Points
Personnel Shelters/Dugouts
Individual Rifleman Trench
Position for Two Riflemen
Machine Gun Position
Grenade Launcher Position
Platoon Commander’s Observation Post
Infantry Fighting Vehicle Trench
Sketch of Anti-tank Minefield
A Reinforced Mechanised Company Defending in Urban Terrain
Standard Artillery Battalion Combat Formation
Howitzer Battery in Standard Formation
Battery Formation Variants
Multiple Rocket Launcher Battery Deployment
Combat Engineer Tactical Missions and Technical Tasks on the
March
Combat Engineer Tactical Missions and Technical Tasks for the
Offence
5-12
5-13
5-18
5-18
5-19
5-20
7-3
7-9
7-11
7-12
7-13
7-15
7-16
7-20
7-24
7-31
7-36
7-37
7-38
7-39
7-39
8-6
8-12
8-15
8-16
8-18
8-19
8-20
8-22
8-23
8-24
8-30
8-31
8-34
8-35
8-37
8-37
8-38
8-39
8-40
8-41
8-42
8-43
8-44
8-45
8-46
8-47
8-53
9-28
9-29
9-30
9-31
10-4
10-5
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xxi
Figure 10–3:
Figure 10–4:
Figure 10–5:
Figure 10–6:
Figure 10–7:
Figure 10–8:
Figure 10–9:
Figure 10–10:
Figure 10–11:
Figure 10–12:
Figure 10–13:
Figure 10–14:
Figure 10–15:
Figure 10–16:
Figure 10–17:
Figure 10–18:
Figure 10–19:
Figure 10–20:
Figure 10–21:
Figure 10–22:
Figure 10–23:
Figure 10–24:
Figure 10–25:
Figure 10–26:
Figure 10–27:
Figure 10–28:
Figure 10–29:
Figure 10–30:
Figure 10–31:
Figure 11–1:
Figure 11–2:
Figure 11–3:
Figure 11–4:
Figure 11–5:
Figure 12–1:
Figure 12–2:
Figure 12–3:
Figure 12–4:
Figure 12–5:
Figure 13–1:
Figure 13–2:
Figure 13–3:
Figure 13–4:
Figure 13–5:
Figure 14–1:
Figure 14–2:
Figure 14–3:
Figure 14–4:
Figure 14–5:
Figure 14–6:
Figure 14–7:
Figure 14–8:
Figure 14–9:
Figure 14–10:
Combat Engineer Tactical Missions and Technical Tasks for the
Defence
10-6
Engineer Reconnaissance in the March: Division and Brigade
10-9
Open Slit Trench
10-12
Communications Trench
10-12
One and Two-Man Fighting Position
10-12
Motorised Battalion in the Defence
10-14
Squad Strong Point
10-15
Platoon Strong Point
10-16
Company Strong Point
10-17
Machine Gun/Anti-tank Launching Position
10-18
Anti-tank Gun Emplacement
10-18
Emplacement for Tank or Armoured Personnel Carrier with
Anti-tank Launcher
10-19
Position of the Movement Support Detachment in the March
10-21
Location of Obstacles Clearing Detachment/Obstacles Clearing
Group in the Battalion Attack
10-23
Location of Movement Support Detachment in the Brigade
Attack
10-23
Typical Attack Formation, Mechanised Division
10-24
Breaching a Remotely Laid Minefield
10-25
Minefield Breaching
10-27
Assault Crossing Schematic
10-29
Key to be used with figures 10–23 to 10–26
10-30
Engineer Support of a Motorised Infantry Battalion Crossing
10-31
Engineer Support of a Ferry Crossing Site
10-34
Engineer Support of a Bridge Crossing
10-35
Engineer Support at a Tank Underwater Crossing Site
10-37
Mobile Obstacle Detachment Support to the Attack
10-39
Protective Minefields in Front of Defensive Positions
10-41
Side Hill Cut
10-44
Escarpment/Counterscrape Techniques
10-45
Combined Tactical Obstacles
10-46
The Rolling Attack
11-5
Pre-planned Ambush Attack
11-5
An Example of an Air Assault
11-8
Ranges of Aviation Operations
11-8
A Deliberate Attack
11-12
Special Operations Command
12-4
Raider Brigade
12-4
12-6
Strike Battalion
12-8
12-10
Motorised Rifle Battalion Rear Service Support Elements
During the March
13-10
The Supply Chain
13-12
Artillery Ammunition Resupply
13-16
Refuelling of a Tank Company
13-17
Refuelling a Ground Attack Aviation Flight on a Highway Strip 13-18
Strike Battalion High Command Link
14-6
Strike Battalion Command Net
14-7
Strike Battalion Company Command Net
14-7
Strike Battalion Platoon Command Net
14-8
Strike Battalion Strike Support Command Net
14-8
Strike Battalion Fire Support Net
14-9
Strike Battalion Tactical Air Support Net
14-9
Strike Battalion Administrative Net
14-9
Special Forces Net
14-10
Organisation of an Electronic Warfare Company
14-12
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xxii
TABLES
Table 2–1:
Table 2–2:
Table 2–3:
Table 2–4:
Table 2–5:
Table 2–6:
Table 3–1:
Table 3–2:
Table 3–3:
Table 6–1:
Table 6–2:
Table 6–3:
Table 6–4:
Table 7–1:
Table 7–2:
Table 9–1:
Table 9–2:
Table 9–3:
Table 9–4:
Table 9–5:
Table 10–1:
Table 10–2:
Table 13–1:
Table 13–2:
Table 13–3:
Table 14–1:
Table 14–2:
Table 14–3:
Table 14–4:
Table 14–5:
Distances Between Echelons
Road Movement Speeds
Length of Tactical March Column
Frontages and Depth of Objectives
Attack Timings
Rates of Advance in Attack
Area Defence Frontages and Depths
Summary of Deployment Grouping for Divisional Area Defence
Mobile Defence Frontages and Depths
Armoured Protection of Musorian Fighting Vehicles
Armoured Protection of Australian Fighting Vehicles
Penetration Capabilities Own Force Weapons
Armoured Penetration of Musorian Fighting Vehicles
Chart for Deployment in Columns
Tank Attack Frontages
High Explosive Ammunition Expenditure Norms Against
Unobserved, Stationary Targets at 10 Kilometres or Less
Maximum Effective Dimensions of Artillery Fire Concentrations
in Hectares
Maximum Permitted Rates of Fire
Planning Dimensions of Remote Anti-tank Minefields Laid by
BM-21 and 9P140 Multiple Rocket Launchers
Deployment of Artillery
Composition and Grouping of Typical Movement Support
Detachments
Estimated Stopping Power of Typical Panels
Locations of Tactical Logistic Elements
Standard Units of Fire (Rounds Per Weapon)
Ammunition Holdings Within a Division/Brigade
Musorian Armed Forces Radio Equipment Capabilities
Signals Intelligence and Direction Finding Systems
Special Forces Electronic Warfare Capabilities
Musorian Communications Equipment
Musorian Electronic Warfare Equipment
2-6
2-8
2-9
2-15
2-16
2-17
3-8
3-25
3-26
6A-1
6A-1
6A-2
6A-2
7-14
7-22
9-9
9-10
9-12
9-16
9-27
10-21
10-40
13-8
13-13
13-15
14-3
14-16
14-21
14-22
14-24
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xxiii
ABBREVIATIONS
1.
The following abbreviations are used in this publication. Their sources are as shown.
ADFP 103
AD
air defence
AFS
aerial fire support
AFV
armoured fighting vehicle
AM
amplitude modulation
AO
area of operations
AOP
air observation post
APC
armoured personnel carrier
ATGW
anti-tank guided weapon
C2
command and control
C3
command, control and communications
C3I
command, control, communications and intelligence
CAIRS
close air support
CNR
combat net radio
COOP
craft of opportunity
CP
command post
DF
direction finder/finding
DZ
drop zone
EMP
electromagnetic pulse
ESM
electronic warfare support measures
EW
electronic warfare
FDC
fire direction centre
FEBA
forward edge of the battle area
FFR
free flight rocket
FGA
fighter ground attack
FM
frequency modulation
FO
forward observer
FOB
forward operating base
FPF
final protective fire
FS
fire support
FUP
forming up place
GPMG
general purpose machine gun
HE
high explosive
HEAT
high explosive anti-tank
HF
high frequency
HQ
headquarters
hr
hour
humint
human intelligence
IFV
infantry fighting vehicle
IR
infrared
LMG
light machine gun
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xxiv
LofC
lines of communciation
LOS
line of sight
LZ
landing zone
medevac
medical evacuation
min
minute
MLRS
multiple launch rocket system
MRL
multiple rocket launcher
NBC
nuclear, biological and chemical
OMG
operational manoeuvre group
OP
observation post
PL
phase line
POE
point of entry
POL
petrol, oils and lubricants
RAP
rocket-assisted projectile
REC
radio electronic combat
RPG
rocket propelled grenade
RPV
remotely piloted vehicle
RW
rotary wing
SAM
surface-to-air missile
SF
Special Forces
SFMG
sustained fire machine gun
sigint
signals intelligence
SSM
surface-to-surface missile
TGSM
terminally guided submunition
UAV
unmanned aerial vehicle
UHF
ultra high frequency
VHF
very high frequency
VSTOL
vertical short take-off and landing
Common Military Usage
AA
assembly area
ACRV
artillery command and reconnaissance vehicle
ATGM
anti-tank guided missile
EC
electronic combat
ICM
improved conventional munition
LTD
laser target designator
This Publication
AAG
army artillery group
ACM
advanced conventional munition
AGL
automatic grenade launcher
AGRA
army group of rocket artillery
ALE
automatic link establishment
ASE
aircraft survivability equipment
ATGL
anti-tank grenade launcher
BaAG
battalion artillery group
BAT
tracked bulldozer
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xxv
BBDA
Back Blast Danger Area
BMD
amphibious tracked A vehicle 4 pax
BMP
amphibious tracked A vehicle 8 pax
BrAG
Brigade artillery group
BTR
amphibious wheeled A vehicle
BTU
tank dozer
CB
counter bombardment
CDF
Capital Defence Forces
CF
concentration of fire
CMTA
commander of missile troops and artillery
COP
command observation post
COR
chief of reconnaissance
CRP
combat reconnaissance patrol
DAG
division artillery group
DAvnB
divisional aviation battalion
DHB
divisional helicopter battalion
DIM
mechanical mounted mine detector
DMI
Directorate of Military Intelligence
EA
electronic attack
EMS
electromagnetic spectrum
EP
electronic protection
ES
electronic support
FE
force element
FOP
forward observation post
FRP
forward reconnaissance patrol
GF
ground forces
GMZ
tracked mechanical mine layer
GSP
floating tracked ferry
I&W
indications and warning
ICAT
image capture and transmission
IMR
engineer reconnaissance A vehicle
IP
identification point
IRP
independent reconnaissance patrol
IS
information system/s
km
kilometre
kph
kilometres per hour
LC
line of contact
LOP
lateral observation post
LP
listening post
m
metre
MAAvn
Musorian Army Aviation
MAF
Musorian Armed Forces
MBRL
multi-barrelled rocket launcher
MOD
mobile obstacle detachment
MRP
mobile reconnaissance post
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
xxvi
MSD
movement support detachment
MTK
armoured mechanical mine clearer
NAP
national asset pool
OCD
obstacles clearing detachment
OCG
obstacles clearing group
PAS
precision air strike
PFM
artillery delivered anti-personnel mine
PMP
truck mounted pontoon
PMR
truck mounted ribbon bridge
PTS
tracked amphibian
PSTN
public switched telephone network
RB
raider brigade
RBF
rolling barrages of fire
RD
reconnaissance detachment
RDM
remotely delivered mine
REG
repair and evacuation group
RFC
reconnaissance fire complex
RP
reconnaissance patrol
RRT
radio reconnaissance team
RSC
reconnaissance strike complex
RTAV
reconnaissance and target acquisition/vectoring
RTF
Raider Task Force
SACLOS
semi-automatic command line of sight
SB
standing barrage
SCF
successive concentration of fire
SG
Strategic Group
SMT
special mission team
SOC
Special Operations Command
SOCCE
special operations command and control element
TMM
truck mounted scissor
TOP
technical observation point
UF
units of fire
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-1
PART ONE.
LAND CONCEPT FOR OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 1
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
SECTION 1-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
1.1
The Musorian Armed Forces (MAF) Ground Forces (GF) comprise the largest branch of
the MAF. The MAF GF are attempting to increase their capacity, at the general staff
level, to conduct campaign planning whilst embracing the concepts inherent in the
operational art. The MAF GF embrace the concepts of manoeuvre theory, directive
control and command and control (C2) warfare. However, these emerging concepts are
little more than rhetoric at the lower levels. The MAF GF are attempting to develop the
application of information warfare at the operational and tactical level. Musoria believes
that the successful outcome of any military conflict will be dependent on the MAF taking
advantage of technological advancements and modern weapons acquired over recent
years. The impossibility of waging warfare successfully without a high level of
coordination between naval, ground and air/aviation forces is stressed. To achieve this
coordination of effort, the MAF have sought to have flexible organisations and doctrine
at the higher level.
1.2
Roles. The roles of the MAF GF are as follows:
a.
to defend the territory of Musoria and her colony;
b.
to deter attack by any nation and, should the deterrence fail, to bring any war to a
conclusion favourable to Musoria;
c.
to assist in the maintenance of internal security;
d.
to engage in production and construction work and aid in the national development
of Musoria; and
e.
to support the foreign policy objectives of Musoria.
1.3
Nuclear and Chemical Capability. Musoria has no nuclear weapon capability and is
unlikely to develop one before 2015. Musoria does however, possess the ability to
develop and deploy chemical weapons, but at the tactical level only. The decision
whether to wage chemical warfare will be determined by Musoria’s ability to develop an
enhanced and superior chemical arsenal, as well as other political and military
variables. It is unlikely, in the present political climate, that Musoria would resort to the
offensive use of chemical weapons. However, should the Musorian mainland be
threatened, it is conceivable that chemical weapons would be used to stave off defeat.
1.4
Differences in Musorian conventional vis-à-vis chemical operations are reflected in army
and formation tactics rather than manoeuvre within formations. The major differences
between conventional and chemical operations at formation level is that conventional
tactics have narrower frontages, closer objectives and reduced rates of advance.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-2
1.5
Offensive Action. Musorian tactical doctrine stresses offensive action. The Musorians,
however, recognise defensive operations as a necessary form of combat adopted to
gain time while allowing them to commence or resume offensive action, or to economise
in one area in order to concentrate their effort in another. When forced to defend, a
Musorian commander is expected to seize the initiative and resume offensive action as
quickly as possible. In offensive operations, emphasis is placed on the use of mobility
and fire-power. In defensive operations, anti-armour and air defence techniques
predominate.
1.6
Night Operations. Musorian doctrine stresses the importance of night operations. The
MAF GF are expert in both combat and administrative operations under the cover of
darkness. During night training, emphasis is placed on stealth, flanking movements,
encirclement, close combat and the coordination of supporting forces. Attacks may
sometimes be launched without a preparatory bombardment in order to gain the
element of surprise. Armour is used extensively at night and most vehicles are equipped
with night driving and firing aids. Increased use of night vision aids and weapon sights
by all ground forces can be expected in the future.
1.7
Command and Control. Musorian commanders carry full responsibility for all aspects
of their subordinates’ activities. Some commanders thus tend to take on minor duties
which in other armies would be delegated to subordinates. Many commanders do not
use their staff to full effect. Staff procedures in some instances tend to be cumbersome
and time wasting, leaving little to the imagination and initiative of lower commanders.
When Musorian operations are dislocated, they are likely to revert to a system of tight
control and constant supervision. This is more prevalent at the lower levels of command
and leads to a lack of flexibility. They are attempting to improve the efficiency of their
command chain to allow greater flexibility in the planning and implementation of
operations at all levels.
Tactical Principles and Factors
1.8
Musoria’s tactics are based on the following principles and factors:
a.
Surprise and Security. The Musorians achieve surprise and maintain security by
concealing the timing, weight and direction of attack, by making full use of their
night fighting capabilities and by camouflage deception and strict communication
discipline. They utilise rapid movement and employ careful protection against air,
nuclear and chemical attack.
b.
Cooperation. Musorian doctrine stresses that success in war is achieved through
the close cooperation of all arms and services of the armed forces.
c.
Morale. The MAF GF prides itself on the maintenance of morale within all levels of
command. Consequently, the MAF GF is regarded as a highly motivated
organisation with good morale.
d.
Control. The system of command posts (CP) and communications is designed to
ensure the continuity of control over Musorian forces regardless of enemy action.
Control is achieved by:
(1) thorough and detailed planning,
(2) use of standard formations and procedures,
(3) main and alternate CPs, and
(4) duplication of communications systems.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-3
e.
Dispersion. When not concentrated for a specific tactical mission, units are
dispersed to an extent consistent with terrain and final employment.
f.
Reconnaissance. Detailed reconnaissance at all levels is a facet of Musorian
tactics. The main means of MAF GF reconnaissance are:
(1) Air/Aviation Reconnaissance. Air or aviation reconnaissance is currently one
of the main sources of combat intelligence.
(2) Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding. Facilities exist for electronic
intercept and direction finding at army and divisional level.
(3) Reconnaissance Teams. Reconnaissance teams are organic to army and
divisional levels.
(4) Artillery Observation. Artillery observation includes the use of radars and
spotting techniques.
g.
Fire-power. The massive use of concentrated fire-power is emphasised in doctrine
as an important tool for influencing the course of the battle. As Musorian forces do
not have access to tactical nuclear munitions at present, the term ‘fire-power’ refers
to the following types of conventional fire support:
(1) artillery, rockets and mortars;
(2) tank and anti-armour weapons;
(3) offensive air support; and
(4) air defence.
h.
Manoeuvre. Musorian tactics emphasise mobility in offensive and defensive
operations. The predominantly infantry history of the Musorian Army has led to an
emphasis on tactical mobility, especially in difficult terrain where troops on foot can
cover up to 25 or 30 kilometres per day. The modernisation and
motorisation/mechanisation of Musorian forces has provided even greater tactical
mobility. Tactical manoeuvre in the MAF GF is based on fire and movement.
Force Development
1.9
In the course of Musoria’s modernisation and military reorganisation, emphasis has
been placed on the need for mobility and balanced forces. The introduction of motorised
and mechanised infantry troops, armour and sophisticated combat support equipment
over the last decade has resulted in the transformation of the MAF GF from a basically
infantry-oriented force lacking fire-power to a mobile balanced force with considerable
conventional combat power.
1.10 The MAF GF are organised into infantry and armoured combat forces, combat support
forces consisting of anti-armour, artillery, engineers, intelligence, communications and
service support elements. The highest fixed tactical organisation in the MAF GF is a
division. However, an expeditionary army may be raised from the units of a region.
Additional units may be allocated to the expeditionary army from either the National
Asset Pool (NAP) or the Capital Defence Forces (CDF). The MAF GF do not form the
Western equivalent of a corps, but utilise the flexibility of the expeditionary army to
achieve their aims.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-4
SECTION 1-2.
COMBAT FORCES
Combined Arms
1.11 Successful Musorian military operations depend upon the integrated employment of all
arms. The basic tactical formation for sustained operations is the division, which is
increasingly becoming an integrated combined arms formation of motorised/mechanised
infantry, armour, aviation and supporting artillery elements. The mounted infantry
elements greatly enhance mobility, artillery augments fire-power and armoured forces
provide manoeuvre, momentum and direct fire capabilities. Formation and unit
attachments and reinforcements are allocated in response to specific types of
operations, likely hostile forces, terrain and operational objectives.
Infantry Forces
1.12 The Musorian Army continues to be infantry-oriented. The battalion, which has a
standard organisation, is the basic infantry unit. It can be rifle, motorised or mechanised.
At present some infantry divisions are motorised in trucks and others in armoured
personnel carriers (APCs) or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Where unit mobility
depends on trucks, the tactics utilised are essentially the same as for infantry units
moving on foot. The army is continuing with a policy of re-equipping all motorised units
with APCs or IFVs. Special Operations Command (SOC) contains a raider brigade, an
airborne brigade and a support brigade.
1.13 The Role of Infantry. The role of the infantry is to close with the enemy and destroy
him.
1.14 The Role of Special Forces. The role of the Special Forces (SF) is to conduct special
operations. These operations may be conducted at the strategic or operational levels
and may, rarely, be conducted at the tactical level.
1.15 The mechanised divisions of MAF GF are developing as the most versatile arm of the
MAF. These formations are considered capable of employment in most terrain and
climates, except jungle.
1.16 Infantry on foot, though diminishing in numbers, is still a sizeable element of the MAF
GF. Infantry formations are skilled in jungle warfare techniques and insurgency
operations, and are also familiar with motor and mechanised tactics and the techniques
of limited war.
1.17 The SF elements of the MAF are capable of conducting operations across the spectrum
of conflict. These operations include conventional operations, elite conventional
operations and unconventional operations.
Armoured Forces
1.18 Tanks are employed at all levels in direct support of infantry, motorised and mechanised
operations. Armoured formations are also deployed independently and allocated
specific objectives. With the exception of those from independent armoured formations,
tanks are generally employed as part of a combined arms group. However, when
favourable circumstances exist they may be employed en masse for limited periods.
Exploitation is the principal role of armoured units. Reports on recent Musorian tactics
indicate that tanks, even on independent operations, have some supporting motorised
or mechanised infantry integral to the force to help in the protection of armour against
short-range anti-tank weapons. The principal task of armour in operations is:
a.
Offensive Operations. Armoured units seize deep objectives before hostile forces
are able to group for defence or counter-operations.
b.
Defensive Operations. Armoured units destroy hostile penetrations and, as part of
the reserve, are used in counter-attacks.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-5
1.19 Tanks are also employed in direct and indirect fire support roles to supplement artillery
and for long-range engagement of armour and other targets.
SECTION 1-3.
COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES
Anti-armour
1.20 The Musorians emphasise the following factors in anti-armour warfare:
a.
vigorous rather than passive activity;
b.
massed fire by all weapons;
c.
manoeuvre by anti-armour weapons;
d.
effective long-range fire;
e.
surprise; and
f.
decisive action.
1.21 The Musorians believe that there are two main methods of destroying armoured
vehicles:
a.
group destruction by massed fire, and
b.
single destruction by direct fire after group destruction (enhanced by the use of
integrated obstacles).
1.22 The Musorians stress the human element in the anti-armour battle. Individuals are
specially selected, highly trained and motivated. The Musorian anti-armour policy is
aggressive. All units including services have anti-armour weapons and artillery has a
secondary anti-tank role. The anti-armour plan is included in all phases of war and
embraces air/aviation, artillery, infantry and engineers.
1.23 The anti-armour fire plan is detailed and coordinated at the highest level practicable.
Anti-armour groups are dispersed throughout columns of troops during tactical moves.
Artillery
1.24 Artillery is a major component of any combined arms force and is normally employed in
large numbers in both offensive and defensive operations.
1.25 Musorian artillery support is characterised by massive concentrations intended to
ensure that all likely targets are destroyed. The concept of ‘fire strike’ is used. This
concept involves intense bombardment by all artillery weapons in an attempt to defeat
opponents with the minimal use of ground troops. Artillery fire is also used extensively
on targets of opportunity and fortifications and to support attacks by infantry and
armoured units.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-6
1.26 Artillery is normally centralised, but flexible artillery groups are formed to support
specific operations:
a.
Divisional Artillery Group. The divisional artillery group (DAG) may be allocated up
to three battalions of NAP or regional force artillery units in addition to divisional
artillery.
b.
Brigade Artillery Group. One or two battalions of the divisional artillery may be
allocated to a first echelon of the brigade and controlled by the brigade artillery
group (BrAG). A leading infantry, motorised, mechanised infantry or tank battalion
may have up to a battalion of artillery in direct support.
c.
Surface-to-surface Artillery. Musorian surface-to-surface artillery includes guns,
howitzers, gun-howitzers, self-propelled guns, free flight rockets (FFRs) and multibarrelled rocket launchers (MBRLs). Their roles are:
(1) Towed Guns. Towed guns provide all types of direct and indirect fire support
(FS).
(2) Self-propelled Guns. Self-propelled guns provide all types of direct and
indirect FS and, because of their mobility, are well suited to supporting
motorised, mechanised and armoured unit operations.
(3) Free Flight Rockets. FFRs are employed to deliver conventional warheads at
medium and long range. They may also be used for nuclear and chemical
delivery.
(4) Multi-barrelled Rocket Launchers. MBRLs are employed to deliver crushing
artillery strikes at a decisive moment in the battle and are normally
superimposed on important targets.
d.
Anti-armour Artillery. Anti-armour artillery is incorporated into the detailed and
coordinated anti-armour fire plan in which flanks and likely armour approaches are
covered by mutually supporting anti-armour weapons sited in depth. Surface-tosurface artillery units normally have a secondary anti-armour role.
e.
Surface-to-air Artillery. Air defence artillery is primarily responsible for low altitude
air defence. Air defence artillery in conjunction with fighter aircraft also has a
responsibility for medium air defence. Priority for air defence is normally given to:
(1) formation headquarters and rear areas;
(2) march routes;
(3) logistics and support arms;
(4) vulnerable points on routes, water obstacle crossings and defiles;
(5) bridging sites; and
(6) advancing troop formations.
1.27 Likely targets are protected in accordance with their usefulness. Weapons are normally
sited to ensure mutual support between weapon systems and flanking formations to
ensure air cover at all height bands and on all likely approaches. Air defence weapons
are sited to engage attacking aircraft for the longest possible time. Though the denial of
air targets to hostile forces is the primary role of Musorian air defences, a crucial
secondary role is the achievement of a high hostile aircraft attrition rate. Air defence
weapons are deployed with all Musorian units. At formation and unit level, passive
measures to protect Musorian forces from air attack are considered vital. The
importance of dispersion, concealment and mobility of forces, and the use of deception
measures is particularly emphasised.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-7
Aviation
1.28 Army aviation has enjoyed increased rates of utilisation and improved equipment in
recent years. The divisions include an aviation battalion which has airmobile,
reconnaissance and attack capabilities. Anti-tank, deep operations and the attack of
enemy C2 elements are stressed.
1.29 In addition to the divisional aviation battalions, the assault helicopter brigade is an Armylevel formation that trains in the seizure of vital ground, such as bridges and
beachheads, and also has a significant anti-armour capability.
1.30 C2 of aviation forces has changed in recent years to ensure that tactical level
commanders have access to appropriate forces. Aviation commanders exercise a high
degree of initiative in the employment of their forces. Aviation forces will generally not
be in the thick of battle, but will use their superior range and speed to conduct search
and destroy missions, and the seizure of critical points on the battlefield, thus disrupting
the enemy’s activities behind their lines. Aviation is also used in the close air support
(CAIRS) role, to strengthen other fires at critical times.
Engineers
1.31 Combat engineer units are found at brigade and divisional level. Above divisional level,
specialised engineer organisations exist with responsibilities for construction, bridging
and assault crossing.
1.32 The primary role of combat engineers is to assist the maintenance of momentum by
overcoming natural and man-made obstacles such as rivers and minefields while at the
same time, hindering the movement of enemy forces. Secondary roles include
camouflage, fire protection, damage clearance and water supply.
Intelligence
1.33 Musorian forces regard intelligence gathering as essential to operational planning.
Musorian intelligence objectives and activities are those implicit in any military force
engaged in war. Within the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), the military
operations battalion is utilised to supplement unit intelligence capabilities, particularly in
the raising of an expeditionary army. The reconnaissance and electronic combat (EC)
battalions and signals battalions are organic to military districts and divisions. However,
the battalions belonging to the DMI are more likely to have a remotely piloted vehicle
(RPV) squadron. SOC is allocated assets on an as-required basis.
1.34 Intelligence cells are present at all MAF GF headquarters down to company level.
Additionally, intelligence staff are found at regional and military district headquarters. At
expeditionary army level, DMI provides personnel and equipment to operate the
intelligence portion of the operations centre of the CP. This includes data processing
(manned and operated by signals personnel), analysis and evaluation, cryptographic
and dissemination functions. At divisional level, the intelligence staff officer is the focal
point for information from all sources under the control of the division, and for
information received from outside the division. An expeditionary army’s area of interest
may extend 800 kilometres past the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) while a
division’s area of interest may extend 450 kilometre forward of the FEBA. Although
these distances appear great, it should be remembered that Musorian tactical doctrine
for offensive operations emphasises rapid advances during the first few days of an
offensive. Maximum use of aviation assets assists in the achievement of information
gathering at these ranges. For these reasons, expeditionary army-level staff must be
constantly concerned with long-range planning, and divisional staff, while remaining
concerned with the immediate tactical situation, must concurrently plan for future
operations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-8
1.35 Expeditionary armies and divisions employ all their organic information-collecting
sources within their areas of interest, while also relying on higher headquarters for
information. Apart from utilising intelligence units (allocated from DMI), intelligence staff
make extensive use of the collection capabilities of various observation and
reconnaissance elements of the air force, the surveillance equipment of artillery target
acquisition elements, the divisional reconnaissance unit, long-range patrols and other
organic elements found at all levels of command. Clandestine agents are also used to
collect information and conduct subversive activities and sabotage. In retrograde
actions, extensive use is made of ‘stay-behind’ elements consisting of small bodies of
regular troops which are given specific intelligence missions. Counterintelligence
operations are conducted at all levels of command either by assets allocated from the
DMI or unit intelligence operators.
Communications
1.36 The Musorians recognise that effective C2 of tactical units in combat depends upon
reliable, efficient and uninterrupted communications. The principal means of
communication is radio. Line, foot, vehicular and aircraft messenger act as
contingencies for this system. Organisation of communications is dependent on the
requirements of the commander to meet his objectives. It is the commander’s
responsibility to organise his communications accordingly. The allocation of
communication equipment must be sufficient to allow the effective control of combat
operations.
1.37 Some of the principles which govern communications are:
a.
Radio is the principal means of communication. Messenger and other liaison
services are used to augment this, and for high security tasks.
b.
Line is used extensively, particularly in defence, in the preparation phase of
offensive operations and when time and the situation permits.
c.
Operator discipline is strict, operation procedures are of a high order and security
precautions are observed to the letter.
SECTION 1-4.
SPECIALIST TECHNIQUES
Combat Surveillance
1.38 General. Musoria has a highly capable array of surveillance, target acquisition and night
observation devices. The principles of employment are:
a.
passive sensors are preferred to active sensors because of their greater security,
and
b.
different suites of sensors are used to complement each other to ensure verification
of collected information.
1.39 Most combat surveillance equipment is designed to complement Musoria’s philosophy
of continuous and rapid action. To this end, the equipment is designed to locate the
opposition, manoeuvre rapidly under all conditions of visibility and accurately engage
hostile forces.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-9
1.40 Night Driving Aids and Night Sighting Devices. Night driving aids and night sighting
devices for direct fire weapons at unit level and below allow night operations to be
carried out on the same scale and with the same intensity as daylight operations.
Formerly, these devices were exclusively active infrared (IR) emitting devices but these
are now being replaced with various passive image intensification and IR detecting
sensors. Ground surveillance radars are found at divisional, regimental and battalion
level and in various artillery units. Sensing devices designed for static employment in
support of defensive operations are given secondary emphasis.
1.41 Ground Sensors. Unattended ground sensor deployment is centralised at divisional
level. When activated, unattended ground sensors emit radio frequencies which are
monitored by simple, lightweight, portable ancillary equipment. All unattended sensors
can be emplaced by hand, aircraft and by artillery. Most sensors are capable of being
equipped with explosive anti-tamper devices. Basic doctrine requires the employment of
a chain of three to five sensors mixing detection techniques to confirm not only the
approach of a target, but also in an attempt to determine the nature of the target. Sensor
activations are monitored from the ground and from aerial platforms. Better
configurations have the capability to record activations at a central location. However,
the process of data linking these into a fire control system to bring down immediate and
accurate defensive fire is still under development.
1.42 Aerial Surveillance. Musoria’s aerial surveillance and reconnaissance equipment
includes conventional cameras, sideways-looking airborne radars and IR detectors.
Photographic, radar and IR imagery can be processed mid-flight. A data link to enable
processed imagery to be transmitted directly to the ground from the surveillance aircraft
is also being developed. The MAF GF have an RPV capability within the
reconnaissance and EC battalions of the DMI.
Electronic Warfare
1.43 General. MAF GF conduct offensive and defensive electronic warfare (EW) operations
to disrupt or degrade hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) while
protecting their own equipment from hostile jamming. Musorian EW units are capable of
locating, identifying and jamming all types of communication and non-communication
receivers over a wide range of frequencies. At army and divisional level, special
purpose radio electronic combat (REC) units exist. Below divisional level, commanders
may be authorised to use their organic assets to conduct unsophisticated EW
operations when special purpose units have not been attached from a higher level.
1.44 Electronic Attack. Electronic attack (EA) is used to complement Musorian fire-power
and manoeuvre capabilities by degrading the enemy’s C2 and offensive FS systems.
EAs are usually directed at communication nets where signals are weak, where there is
a natural background of atmospheric disturbance and where nets are large and operate
in a confused environment. REC elements have the ability to conduct electronic
deception operations. Deception operations are aimed at taking the opposition by
surprise during critical phases. To achieve this, Musorian operators will occasionally
enter hostile communication nets to deceive opposing operators.
1.45 Electronic Support. Musorian intelligence is adept at collecting information for use
operationally or to support EA. During search and monitor operations, signals
intelligence (sigint) personnel are tasked with recording and locating the source of the
signals they intercept, as well as analysing their technical characteristics and operating
procedures. Musorian electronic warfare support measures (ESM) collection agencies
give priority to tactical, logistic and communication nets in support of combat operations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-10
1.46 Electronic Intercept and Direction Finding. Facilities exist for electronic intercept and
direction finding at army and divisional level. The MAF GF intercept capability is quite
extensive. In operations, intercept units are moved forward immediately behind the
leading brigades. Direction-finding (DF) capabilities are equivalent to those of intercept,
although the reaction time for intercept and DF varies. Information derived from
intercepting ‘in clear’ traffic is evaluated and rapidly analysed. Decryption, however is
slow. While information from DF is evaluated quickly, it is unlikely to provide a
sufficiently accurate fix or identification of the target to allow it to be engaged without
confirmation by other means.
1.47 Electronic Protection. Electronic protection doctrine relies on the exacting training
given to communication and other electronic operators for the prevention of hostile
jamming and deception. The basic means used to prevent hostile disruption includes
the proper siting of antennae and radars behind radiation barriers, controlled radar
emissions and scan sectors, the use of dummy loads for testing and good operating
techniques.
Reconnaissance
1.48 Air/Aviation Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance missions are flown by fixed and rotary
wing (RW) aircraft. The altitude at which air/aviation reconnaissance is normally carried
out varies from 5 to 1 500 metres depending on the type of aircraft conducting the
reconnaissance, the likelihood of fighter interception and the air defence threat.
Strategic and long-range photographic reconnaissance can be carried out at altitudes of
up to 20 000 metres. Reconnaissance speeds vary from 100 to 150 kilometres per hour
for RW aircraft, and 500 to 900 kilometres per hour for fixed wing aircraft. The distances
over which aerial reconnaissance takes place vary, depending on the type of aircraft
being flown and the altitude at which the aircraft flies. It can be in excess of
2 000 kilometres for photographic missions carried out by light bomber aircraft or
150 kilometres for RW divisional aircraft.
1.49 MAF aircraft are capable of both photographic and visual reconnaissance. Some
electronic reconnaissance has been introduced, but the state of its development and its
effectiveness are currently unknown. All reconnaissance aircraft carry weapons and are
capable of carrying out ground attacks on opportunity targets. In addition, a significant
proportion of reconnaissance missions are carried out by teams of aircraft on a search
and attack basis.
1.50 Reaction Time. Reaction times vary, but as a general guide:
a.
Targets found by visual reconnaissance. These targets are:
(1) engaged approximately 60 minutes from first report (however, attacks may
occur on initial contact if contact is made by aviation assets and significant
disruption is assured), and
(2) engaged by conventional artillery after approximately 30 minutes from first
report.
b.
Targets found by photo reconnaissance. Photo processing and interpretation is
probably up to Western standards, however targets found by photographic
reconnaissance are unlikely to be attacked within two hours.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-11
1.51 Ground Reconnaissance Teams. Reconnaissance elements at expeditionary army
level are capable of operating up to 300 kilometres inside enemy-held territory and
those at divisional level up to 150 kilometres inside. Reconnaissance by SOC personnel
is mission specific and is planned and controlled at the highest level of command within
the area of operations (AO). Previously positioned agents and stay-behind teams may
assist these reconnaissance groups. Reconnaissance is directed across the full extent
of the AO in both offensive and defensive phases to discover avenues of approach,
enemy positions, particularly headquarters, and weak points in the enemy defence.
1.52 Artillery Weapon Locating. Army and divisional artillery units are important elements
in the total Musorian reconnaissance effort. They contain:
a.
surveillance and weapon locating radars;
b.
sound ranging devices; and
c.
flash spotting OPs.
SECTION 1-5.
ECHELONS AND RESERVES
1.53 Musorian offensive and defensive operations are normally carried out using first and
second echelon forces and a specific reserve force. In offensive operations each
echelon is allocated an immediate and subsequent objective. In defensive operations
each echelon occupies a main defence and second defence position. In defence above
battalion level a separate counter-attack force is nominated. Detailed comments on
Musorian echelons and reserves are included in the following chapters of this
publication.
SECTION 1-6.
CHEMICAL OPERATIONS
General
1.54 The Musorians refer to chemical weapons as ‘weapons of mass destruction’. Although
the decision to use chemical weapons must be made at government level, once it has
been made these are considered to be tactical weapons. When used, chemical
weapons will be integrated with other weapons available to the MAF GF on the
battlefield.
1.55 In keeping with MAF GF tactical doctrine, chemical operations are planned using the
following principles:
a.
Surprise. Surprise denies an enemy time to react and, as with conventional firepower, increases shock effect. Surprise is achieved by secrecy in planning,
camouflage, deception, decisive and unexpected action, and rapid, massive firepower strikes.
b.
Security. Security against chemical retaliation is achieved through dispersion,
careful selection of assault areas, depth in defence, and fire support.
c.
Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance for chemical strikes is employed well forward of
the FEBA. Reconnaissance elements are responsible for reporting on enemy
chemical weapons sites, airfields, logistics installations, and troop assembly areas.
Musorian troops are well practised in the reconnaissance of, and movement
through, contaminated areas. During the advance, contaminated areas are either
bypassed or crossed in sealed vehicles to maintain momentum.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-12
d.
Fire-power. Musorian commitment to the principle of superior fire-power is reflected
in the range and scale of issued weapons capable of delivering chemical munitions.
Musorian doctrine directs that an initial massive chemical strike will be used to
achieve surprise and penetration and will neutralise effective resistance.
Organisation for Chemical Operations
1.56 Musorian forces are well organised and equipped for both offensive and defensive
chemical operations. Commanders at all levels are taught to conduct operations in a
hostile chemical environment. Chemical defence elements are organic to units and
formations at all levels, and chemical defence battalions are found in army and regional
troops. The specialist chemical troops are trained and equipped for chemical
reconnaissance, identification and decontamination. Specifically, their tasks are as
follows:
a.
reconnaissance of known or likely areas of contamination;
b.
issuing warnings of contamination;
c.
monitoring changes in degree of contamination;
d.
monitoring contamination of personnel, weapons and equipment; and
e.
decontaminating personnel, weapons, clothing, equipment, vehicles, defensive
positions, and sections of road.
1.57 Chemical defence battalions are rarely employed as whole units. Reconnaissance and
chemical decontamination battalions are allocated and grouped as required. Chemical
defence battalions found at regional and army level have the same role and structure.
1.58 Early Warning. Early warning and detection is provided by manual and battery
operated devices that detect all standard lethal Western chemical agents. Automatic
warning alarms are activated by nerve agents.
Training
1.59 Musorian training aims not only at defence against chemical weapons, but also to
achieve the ability to attack through contaminated areas to immediately exploit the
results of their offensive chemical operations.
1.60 Musorian use of diluted toxic chemicals to provide realism in field training has been
confirmed. The Musorian soldier is well trained in the use of his protective clothing and
is often required to don his protective suit without notice. This is intended to increase
psychological preparedness, improve combat efficiency under stress, and raise
confidence in the soldier’s protective equipment.
Employment of Chemical Weapons
1.61 The MAF GF hold adequate stores of chemical munitions for offensive use at the
tactical level. The agents held fall into the following two categories:
a.
non-persistent, such as hydrogen cyanide (blood agent) and the nerve agents sarin
and soman; and
b.
persistent or semi-persistent:
(1) nerve agents (VR-55 and other V-agents); and
(2) vesicants (blister agents) (Mustard agents, Lewisite).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-13
1.62 Non-persistent agents are used:
a.
in advance of the main penetration, i.e. on:
(1) defiles, river crossings, and communication centres on the main axis of attack;
(2) airfields and dropping or landing zones prior to airborne assault;
(3) enemy positions to be attacked;
(4) anti-armour defences; and
(5) C2 systems; and
b.
on facilities that are to be captured for use after they have been overrun, i.e:
(1) air bases;
(2) major logistics areas;
(3) petrol, oils and lubricants (POL) storage depots; and
(4) transport centres (harbours and airports).
1.63 Persistent and semi-persistent agents are used:
a.
near the FEBA to:
(1) secure flanks;
(2) neutralise bypassed urban areas;
(3) restrict enemy mobility;
(4) prevent enemy access to favourable terrain;
(5) prevent easy access to vital facilities which will be needed in the near future,
such as rail and road networks and airfields;
(6) block routes of reinforcement or counter-attack; and
(7) hinder enemy withdrawal; and
b.
in rear areas against enemy:
(1) nuclear-related sites, i.e., air bases, nuclear depots, field artillery, and C2
means (radars, ground control stations, navigation transmitters);
(2) reserves; and
(3) tactical air bases.
1.64 Either non-persistent or persistent agents are employed against:
a.
well dug-in enemy positions;
b.
headquarters, reserves and assembly areas; and
c.
along the flight path of an airborne assault.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
1-14
This Page Intentionally Blank
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-1
CHAPTER 2
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 2-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
2.1
Musorian doctrine stresses the offensive operation as the decisive form of combat. The
main purpose of offensive operations is to destroy opposing forces, rather than the
capture or retention of ground. Mobility, rapid movement, fire-power and shock action
are the characteristics of Musorian offensive action. This doctrine applies at all levels.
2.2
Musorian commanders believe that victory will be more easily achieved by striking in
selected areas with overwhelming fire-power and numerical superiority. A troop and
weapon ratio of 3:1 is considered the minimum, but ratios as high as 10:1 are preferred.
This concentration of force occurs in the area of assault, with the intention of breaking
through the front line defences and into the rear of the enemy force to destroy reserves,
command centres and support echelons.
Types of Offensive Operations
2.3
The Musorians recognise four major types of offensive operations:
a. tactical lodgement;
b. advance to contact;
c.
pursuit; and
d. attack, of which the main types are:
(1) the encounter battle,
(2) the quick attack, and
(3) the deliberate attack.
Forms of Offensive Manoeuvre
2.4
The MAF GF employ two distinct offensive tactical manoeuvres:
a. envelopment, with variations such as single and double envelopment; and
b. penetration, which is characterised by a strong single thrust by a breakthrough force.
Variations are the multiple penetration and the pincer, which are normally used
above divisional level.
2.5
Single Envelopment. Single envelopment manoeuvres as shown in figure 2–1, are
used where there is an opportunity to pin hostile forces against an obstacle. This
manoeuvre permits concentration of effort in one direction, thus seeking to ensure
maximum combat superiority over the enemy in the decisive area. The attacking units
attempt to push through weakly defended or unoccupied areas to create gaps which
permit the exploitation forces to strike deep into the enemy rear. A supporting attack is
developed by succeeding echelons to exploit the break in the enemy’s defences,
encircling and destroying him.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-2
Figure 2–1:
2.6
Single Envelopment
Double Envelopment. Musorian doctrine stresses that this is the most decisive
manoeuvre, contributing effectively to the encirclement and destruction of the enemy. It
is used when the Musorian forces enjoy troop and weapon superiority and there is little
risk of defeat. Following the double envelopment, supporting attacks by succeeding
echelons exploit the initial success and are instrumental in the final destruction of the
enemy. Figure 2–2 illustrates the double envelopment manoeuvre.
Figure 2–2:
Double Envelopment
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-3
2.7
Single Penetration. Single penetration manoeuvres, as shown in figure 2–3, are
conducted against overextended enemy positions in order to destroy enemy reserves.
This manoeuvre divides the enemy’s defences and allows his defeat. The single
penetration is conducted by attacking in great strength along a narrow front. One or
more supporting attacks are conducted for deception purposes and to limit the enemy’s
manoeuvre capability.
Figure 2–3:
2.8
Single Penetration
Multiple Penetration. When a double envelopment is not possible, multiple penetration,
as shown in figure 2–4, is used if sufficient forces are available to give the required
numerical superiority. This manoeuvre consists of a series of penetrations to the depth
of the enemy’s reserves with subsequent encirclement and destruction of the separated
enemy forces. Large forces are required for this manoeuvre and it is normally only
carried out by formations above divisional level (i.e., an expeditionary army).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-4
Figure 2–4:
2.9
Multiple Penetration
Pincer. When faced with an enemy whose flanks appear to be unassailable, the
Musorian commander will often resort to the pincer manoeuvre, as shown in figure 2–5.
This consists of two penetrations made to create assailable interior flanks. Mobile forces
attack through the gaps created by initial penetrations, making deep penetrations up to
and including enemy reserve areas. Musorian forces meet at the rear of the enemy to
engage possible enemy reinforcements. Other forces, forming the inner pincers, divide
and destroy the encircled enemy forces. Supporting attacks for deception purposes and
the final destruction of enemy forces are also used. The pincer manoeuvre is normally
only used above divisional level.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-5
Figure 2–5:
SECTION 2-2.
Pincer
ECHELONS, RESERVES AND OBJECTIVES
Echelons
2.10
General. In offensive operations, formations and units are normally divided into first and
second echelons, supported by artillery, anti-armour and engineer units. A separate
reserve of armoured and infantry troops is normally formed. At the infantry and armour
company level, only one echelon is formed.
2.11
First Echelon. The first echelon at any level consists of the leading assault elements
required for the first phase of an operation. The proportion of troops allocated to the first
echelon varies according to the strength and depth of the defences and the frontage of
the attack. It is normal, except in encounter battles, for Musorian formations and units to
attack with the greater part of their strength deployed in the initial assault.
2.12
At divisional level in a quick or deliberate attack, the first echelon normally contains two
regiments of infantry or motorised/mechanised infantry and a tank brigade less a
battalion. The armoured division normally attacks with two brigades in the first echelon
and each brigade with two battalions forward. Where frontages are abnormally wide, this
may increase to three. Tank battalions and companies in support of brigade and
battalion attacks are normally allotted on a decentralised basis, for example, a tank
company in support of an infantry battalion.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-6
2.13
Second Echelon. The main role of the second echelon is to pass through the first
echelon and develop the offensive by capturing subsequent objectives, usually on the
axis of the main thrust. When the first echelon is halted or repulsed on a main axis, an
attempt may be made to commit the second echelon on a more weakly defended axis,
or on a flank. Pressure on the original axis is maintained by the first echelon until the
second echelon attack has been launched.
2.14
At divisional level the second echelon contains the third brigade. In an armoured
division, most of the mechanised battalion is normally located in the second echelon.
However, when heavy opposition is expected or poor tank terrain encountered, most of
the mechanised battalion may be in the first echelon. It is now normal tactics for tank
units to fight with infantry support, particularly in night operations. Tasks for second
echelon units include:
a. reinforcing the attack of first echelon units;
b. repelling enemy counter-attacks;
c.
destruction of enemy strong points bypassed by first echelon units; and
d. replacement of first echelon units which have suffered heavy casualties and are no
longer capable of achieving their objectives.
2.15
Distances Between Echelons. The maximum and minimum distances between
attacking echelons by day and by night are shown in table 2–1.
Table 2–1:
Distances Between Echelons
Serial
(a)
Formation/Unit
(b)
Minimum [km]
(c)
Maximum [km]
(d)
1.
Division
15
30
2.
Brigade
5
15
3.
Battalion
1
3
Reserves
2.16
General. At battalion level and above, Musorian commanders normally form a reserve,
separate from first and second echelons and consisting of tanks, motorised/mechanised
infantry, if available, and combat support. For a division, the combined arms reserve
would normally be a reinforced battalion supported by armour, at brigade level, a
company and at battalion level, a platoon. The reserve at brigade and divisional level is
divided into two components:
a. Commander’s Reserve. This reserve normally contains a high proportion of antiarmour weapons and is the commander’s contingency force used to replace
destroyed units, stop penetrations and provide local security. The commander’s
reserve may be deployed at the commander’s discretion and without reference to
higher authority.
b. Counter-attack Force. This is the second component of the reserve and normally
contains a high proportion of armour and aviation. It is a highly mobile force and in
offensive operations is tasked to exploit breakthroughs, repel counter-attacks and
act as a shock force. The counter-attack force at any level is only deployed after
obtaining release authority from the unit or formation’s immediate superior.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-7
2.17
Replacement Policy. If leading echelons in offensive operations suffer losses of 40 to
50 per cent or more, they are replaced by second echelon units. The remaining first
echelon elements are amalgamated and reformed as ad hoc reserve groups. Even after
severe losses a unit is seldom withdrawn completely from the battle.
Objectives
2.18
Immediate and Subsequent. In offensive operations each level of command has an
immediate and a subsequent objective. These are normally allotted to the first and
second echelons at each level respectively. Achievement of a unit’s or formation’s
immediate and subsequent objective corresponds to the achievement of the next higher
commander’s immediate objective. For example, the battalion’s immediate objective for
its first echelon may be the destruction of the enemy in the forward pits, and the
subsequent battalion objective given to the second echelon the destruction of the
forward pit reserve force. Both of the battalion’s objectives form the immediate objective
of the brigade.
2.19
After the immediate objective is achieved, first echelon units, if still combat effective,
proceed directly to the subsequent objective. Where severe casualties are sustained,
first echelon units are replaced or reinforced by second echelon forces. The subsequent
objective is then achieved. When subsequent objectives are achieved, the formation or
unit prepares for the continuation of the advance.
SECTION 2-3.
General
2.20
The advance to contact is the cornerstone of Musorian tactical operations. Surprise,
organisation of the force for battle and speed of execution are the predominant
characteristics of Musorian doctrine for the advance to contact.
2.21
To ensure security during movement, Musorian forces deploy air and ground
reconnaissance elements to the front, flanks and rear of the force. Forces operating in a
covering troop role are coordinated at army/divisional level and may operate over 200
kilometres ahead of the reconnaissance elements of the main force. Deep
reconnaissance elements operating as covering troops are highly mobile, self-contained
and operate independently of following formations.
2.22
Wherever possible, the advance to contact is conducted on a broad front with a strong
mobile reserve employed to add depth. Movement by night as well as by day is normal
practice; night driving aids ensure minimum dislocation and reduction of speed in the
advance after dark.
2.23
Although Musorian doctrine outlines the procedure for the advance to contact of an
army, the details of such an advance are sketchy. It is expected that the army would
normally advance with one and possibly two divisions up.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-8
Divisional Tactical Guidelines
2.24
Routes. A division will have at least two, and perhaps three or four, main march routes
and these may extend across a front 20 to 30 kilometres wide. The number of columns
in the advance is determined largely by the number of useable roads and the suitability
of the ground for cross-country movement. The distance between major columns is
determined primarily by the effective range of weapons, ground and the enemy situation.
When an encounter is expected, there is at least one route for each first echelon
brigade. It is normal for a formation to select and prepare reserve and lateral routes for
use in an emergency.
2.25
Road Movement Speeds. Normal speeds, which are guidelines only and do not include
halts, are shown in table 2–2.
Table 2–2:
Road Movement Speeds
Serial
Surface
Time
(a)
(b)
(c)
Motor, Mechanised and Armoured
(d)
Foot
(e)
1.
Road
Day
20-30
4
2.
Road
Night
15-20
3.4
3.
Cross-country
Day
10-15
2
4.
Cross-country
Night
5-10
1.5
Average March Speed [kph]
2.26
When opposed, a Musorian motorised/mechanised armour force would anticipate
moving 50 to 70 kilometres in 24 hours, providing the opposition can be bypassed or
quickly overcome in an encounter battle or quick attack.
2.27
Halts. Normal tactical march procedures call for halts as follows:
a. foot march: ten minute halts each hour and a 20 minute rest period every four hours;
and
b. motorised, mechanised and armoured march: twenty to 30 minutes after every three
to four hours in a move taking longer than 24 hours.
2.28
Foot Marches. Musorian troops conduct a normal march over an eight hour period, with
hourly and four hourly halts. A forced march is conducted over 12 hours, with halts. For
marches in excess of 12 hours, breaks for meals and sleeping are usually made at the
commander’s discretion.
2.29
Length of Tactical March Columns. The length of a tactical march column varies
greatly between infantry and other formations. Table 2–3, which does not include
reconnaissance elements or forward detachments, is a general guide.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-9
Table 2–3:
Length of Tactical March Column
Serial
(a)
Type
(b)
Division [km]
(c)
Brigade [km]
(d)
1.
Armour/Mechanised Infantry
50-80
25-40
2.
Motorised Infantry
50-100
25-50
3.
Infantry
25-50
12-25
Note:
1.
Distance between vehicles is 20 to 50 metres
Conduct of Advance
2.30
Regardless of the type and size of the formation in the advance to contact, the
components of the force are similar and are normally encountered in the following order:
a. reconnaissance elements;
b. forward detachment, except in infantry formations;
c.
advance guard or advance detachment;
d. main body; and
e. flank and rear guards.
2.31
Reconnaissance Elements. Reconnaissance elements are employed on each of the
routes. Reconnaissance elements vary widely in composition, but typically include
motorised/mechanised infantry units, light amphibious tanks, scout cars and motorcycle
combinations. They are reinforced as required and may be grouped as follows:
a. Divisional Reconnaissance Elements. Divisional reconnaissance elements move 50
to 100 kilometres ahead of the main forces. They advance on a front too wide to
form a regular screen in front of the advancing regiments.
b. Brigade Reconnaissance Elements. Each brigade is responsible for its own close
reconnaissance patrols (RPs). Reconnaissance elements normally move 10 to 20
kilometres ahead of the advance guard and:
(1) report the state of the route,
(2) locate and describe obstacles, and
(3) locate the enemy.
c.
Battalion Reconnaissance Elements. Battalions mount their own RPs of up to
reinforced platoon strength.
d. Specialist Reconnaissance Elements. Specialist reconnaissance elements are
provided by artillery, chemical and engineer reconnaissance detachments (RDs) and
are usually integrated with combined arms RPs. Elements of SOC (if allocated) may
also be utilised for the conduct of reconnaissance, however the C2 of these
elements is retained at the highest level of command in the AO.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-10
2.32
Forward Detachments. All formations at divisional level and above include forward
detachments, as outlined below:
a. A division may dispatch a forward detachment to seize important lines such as
defiles and water obstacles and to hold them until the arrival of the main body.
b. A division normally does not form more than one forward detachment although an
army may task brigade-sized formations to capture important objectives.
c.
A forward detachment usually consists of a divisional helicopter battalion possibly
reinforced by elements of the assault helicopter brigade. It may move 24 to 36 hours
ahead of the main forces and may cooperate with airborne or armoured forces.
2.33
Coup de Main. Coup de Main operations are aimed at delivering a decisive blow to the
enemy and possibly winning the immediate battle. Coup de Main forces can be ground
combat based or airborne. Coup de Main forces will target enemy centres of gravity, for
example, headquarters and vital logistic centres.
2.34
Advance Guard and Advance Detachment. The advance guard is the first echelon in
the advance. The advance guard of a division is normally a combined arms force of
infantry and armour supported by artillery and engineers. Advance guards and
detachments operate as follows:
a. When a division moves in a single column, the advance guard is based on a
brigade. When the division moves in parallel columns each leading brigade provides
an advance guard, usually of battalion group size on its main axis. The breakdown
and composition of this force varies widely.
b. An advance detachment, normally of company size, may be formed to cover each
minor axis.
c.
The tasks of the advance guard and detachment are to clear minor opposition,
particularly anti-armour weapons, locate the forward edge of the main position and
cover, preferably from a flank, the deployment of the main body for an attack.
2.35
Main Body. The main body is the second echelon in the advance. The main body
advances with its headquarters, air defence and anti-armour elements well forward. Its
principal task in the advance is to be correctly grouped so that it may be launched to
capture objectives which are too strong for the advance guard to overcome.
2.36
Flank and Rear Guards. Flank and rear guards are mounted by the division as a whole
and by each march echelon. They may vary from section to company strength.
2.37
Armour. Terrain is a deciding factor in the role and positioning of armour in the advance.
Normally tanks are allocated to the advance guard or the combined arms reserve with
the task of supporting infantry or motor rifle elements. In open country armour leads, in
close country and built-up areas, armour moves with infantry support. Armour is used
where possible to maintain the momentum and speed of the advance.
Combat Support
2.38
Surface-to-surface Artillery. The role of artillery in the advance is to deliver
concentrated fire to pin down enemy forces when they come within range and to counter
flank attacks by hostile forces. Surface-to-surface artillery in the advance to contact
operates as follows:
a. Artillery moves well forward during a tactical march to be available for rapid
deployment during an encounter battle.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-11
b. Most of the field artillery moves either as part of the advance guard or forward
detachment, or towards the head of the columns that comprise the main body.
c.
The divisional anti-armour reserve normally moves on the most threatened axis,
either behind the advance guard or behind a first echelon brigade. Anti-armour subunits are allocated to advance guards or forward detachments.
2.39
Surface-to-air Artillery. Air defence weapons are deployed within march columns with
a priority task of protecting headquarters. Air defence weapons only picket the route
when forced to by air activity, as they prefer to move with the column. However, critical
terrain features such as river crossings, road junctions, defiles and motor rifle halt areas
may force some picketing by air defence elements. Medium and light machine guns from
infantry units are deployed throughout the column to assist with air defence against low
flying aircraft.
2.40
Engineer Support. Engineer support for the tactical march includes engineer
reconnaissance, route preparation, clearance, maintenance and obstacle crossing.
Engineers in the advance to contact operate as follows:
a. Engineer platoons may be allocated to the advance guard or forward detachment.
b. Movement support detachments (MSDs) of platoon or company strength are
allocated to each main route. If an encounter with the enemy is not expected, these
may move behind the reconnaissance screen. These detachments are equipped
with short gap crossing and minefield clearance equipment.
c.
River crossing equipment (pontoon bridges, ferries and amphibians) normally move
towards the head of divisional columns when a crossing is anticipated.
d. Mine-ploughs and mine-rollers are moved well forward to assist in the breeching of
minefields during an assault.
Control of the Tactical March
2.41
Movement instructions are simple and comprehensive, with start points, report lines,
release points and march speeds laid down for each unit. Use is made of dispatch riders
and liaison officers to pass orders.
2.42
Radio silence is normal during the tactical march with the following exceptions:
a. movement control and traffic regulator nets,
b. air warning broadcast nets,
c.
contact reports, and
d. reports on reaching successive report lines.
Action on Contact
2.43
On contact, Musorian forces engage enemy leading security detachments and screens
with part of the leading elements of the advance guard, attempting to destroy and
contain as many of the enemy as possible. The remainder of the advance guard is
committed to an attack. If the advance guard attack is unsuccessful, the main body is
deployed to destroy the objective.
2.44
Rapid and bold offensive action is considered the key to success in these
circumstances, even against a strong enemy force. Attacks from the line of march are
common. Once the opposition has been overcome, the Musorian forces organise and
continue the advance to contact.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-12
SECTION 2-4.
THE PURSUIT
General
2.45
Musorian doctrine stresses that decisive defeat of an enemy force can only be achieved
by rigorous and continuous exploitation of tactical advantages. The pursuit phase begins
when the enemy is routed or attempts to break contact in a planned withdrawal.
Musorian commanders have a duty to maintain contact and are expected to take up
pursuit without further orders.
2.46
The pursuit may be:
a. directly along the same axis as withdrawing troops;
b. along parallel axes attempting to overtake or outflank the withdrawing troops; or
c.
a combination of both. Within a division, immediately following a breakthrough, one
brigade engages in direct pursuit and the others pursue along outflanking routes.
Tactical Guidelines
2.47
To encircle and destroy withdrawing enemy forces, the latter must be slowed down
sufficiently for Musorian units to outstrip them and emerge on their flanks and rear. To
this end, Musorian forces:
a. follow up closely, maintaining constant pressure on the enemy and forcing them to
deploy;
b. use airborne and heliborne troops, forward detachments, air and artillery strikes to
block or delay the enemy at defiles, river crossings and other critical points on
withdrawal and counter-attack routes; and
c.
overtake retreating columns with motorised/mechanised or armour forces
penetrating rapidly on parallel routes. These forces attack the enemy’s flanks and
rear, cut off his withdrawal and destroy him piecemeal.
Conduct of the Pursuit
2.48
When it becomes apparent that the enemy is planning or has begun to withdraw, an
attack is launched to confuse and disrupt his plans. Once it is determined that a
withdrawal is in progress, pursuit is initiated. During the pursuit, available units are
committed, piecemeal if necessary, to ensure contact is maintained. Once initiated, the
pursuit can only be terminated on the orders of a higher headquarters. Musorian pursuit
operations are depicted in figure 2–6.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-13
Figure 2–6:
Musorian Forces in Pursuit Operations
2.49
In the pursuit, close and continuous pressure on the enemy is considered necessary to
prevent his regrouping for defensive operations. Musorian forces form two or more
columns to exert direct and flank pressure on the withdrawing enemy in an attempt to
overtake, encircle and destroy him.
2.50
Flanking columns may be organised from second echelons and reserve forces. It would
be normal for them to be motorised and reinforced with tanks. Speed is emphasised and
enemy strong points are bypassed so critical points on the enemy withdrawal routes
such as road junctions, water crossings, urban areas and airfields can be seized and
defended.
2.51
Where forward detachments are deployed, these may move up to 30 kilometres ahead
of the main force on the axis of pursuit. Forward detachments usually avoid becoming
heavily engaged and attempt to outmanoeuvre and encircle the enemy. Other missions
may include assistance in the intensive reconnaissance effort which is conducted around
the enemy withdrawal routes.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-14
2.52
During the conduct of a pursuit, divisions and regiments are given an axis of pursuit. The
vulnerability of their flanks during the pursuit necessitates allowing formations and units
to operate as free-ranging forces with considerable tactical independence and
responsiblity for their own flank security. Formations and units, in addition to immediate
and subsequent objectives, are given sufficient guidance on future operations and the
axis of advance to ensure an uninterrupted advance to contact once the pursuit has
been terminated.
2.53
During the pursuit, divisional artillery is normally decentralised and placed under
command of regiments and forward detachments if deployed.
2.54
Interdiction of enemy withdrawal routes is achieved by the employment of demolitions
and mines placed by reconnaissance, special groups and forward detachments.
2.55
The pursuit is one phase of operations in which Musorian subordinate commanders can
exercise a greater degree of flexibility and initiative without reference to higher authority.
SECTION 2-5.
THE ATTACK - BASIC CONSIDERATIONS
General
2.56
The overall objective of Musorian Army offensive action is the destruction of enemy
forces and materiel. This is accomplished by penetrating main defences and launching
formations into rear areas to ensure opposing forces are unable to regroup as a viable
defensive force.
2.57
Musorian forces emphasise depth in attack by organising their resources into echelons.
Musorian doctrine stresses the importance of night offensive operations and training
emphasises the night attack. A Musorian attack normally begins with the neutralisation
of defences using preparation fire from aircraft, artillery and armour. This is followed by
simultaneous attacks on one or more axes in a pincer, envelopment or penetration
manoeuvre. Formations and units not involved on the main attack axis support the
operation by developing secondary attacks designed to ‘fix’ the enemy and prevent
redeployment. A fresh formation or unit is held ready to exploit any breakthrough.
2.58
At army level, immediate objectives may be 10 to 15 kilometres deep. Subsequent
objectives may be up to 25 kilometres behind the enemy FEBA. With a predominantly
motorised/mechanised or armour formation, this may extend to 50 kilometres, both
achievable in a single night. Frontages and depths of objectives at lower levels are
illustrated in table 2–4.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-15
Table 2–4:
Serial
16-40
(60-120)
8-12
(10-25)
3-4
(Up to 6)
1-2
(2-3)
300-500
(1 000)
-
4-8
(35-40)
2-4
(5-15)
1-2
(2-7)
500-800
(1-2)
250-350
(Up to 800)
100-150
(200)
10-15
(60-90)
3-5
(20-30)
2-3
(8-15)
1-2
(2-4)
-
-
(b) Subsequent
30
(120-150)
10-15
(50-70)
3-5
(20-30)
2-3
(8-15)
-
-
Depth of Operation
35-40
(150-180)
20-25
(80-100)
-
-
-
-
(b)
Frontage:
(a) Sector
(b) Attack
Depth of Objective:
(a) Immediate
3.
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Platoon
[m]
(h)
Division
[km]
(d)
(a)
2.
Company
[m]
(g)
Battalion
[km]
(f)
Brigade
[km]
(e)
Expeditionary
Army [km]
(c)
Frontages/depth
1.
Frontages and Depth of Objectives
Ordinary figures are for dismounted rifle infantry.
Figures in brackets are those for motorised and mechanised infantry formations and units.
Unit and sub-unit frontages will be reduced when operating at night, in close country or built-up areas.
Types of Attack
2.59
Musorian doctrine recognises three different types of attack which influence their tactics
at formation level and below. These are:
a. The Encounter Battle. This type of attack is used by leading units on meeting light
enemy resistance such as covering forces. The attack is carried out immediately
from the line of march and consists of either a frontal penetration assault or an
envelopment to take the enemy in the flank or rear. Initially the attack may be by a
company-sized force but, depending on the enemy strength, may quickly become a
battalion or formation operation.
b. The Quick Attack. When lightly prepared enemy positions are encountered, a quick
attack may be conducted. Depending on the enemy strength, it may be carried out
by a company, unit or formation-sized force. If good intelligence is available and the
ground is suitable, the attack is made directly from the line of march. At battalion
level, a quick attack can be mounted within one hour of the first contact.
c.
The Deliberate Attack. This is only mounted against a well-prepared enemy
defensive position or when a quick attack has been repulsed. Deliberate attacks at
battalion, brigade, and higher levels are usually mounted.
Tactical Guidelines
2.60
The principles and factors governing Musorian tactical doctrine in the attack are similar
to those of the Australian Army. Particular emphasis is placed on the following factors:
a. Reconnaissance in Depth. Reconnaissance in depth is a prerequisite for the
selection of the correct axes and breakthrough sectors. At divisional level and
above, this may include intercept and DF using radios and radars as well as air and
ground reconnaissance.
b. Neutralisation of Enemy Defences and Reserves. Neutralisation is achieved by the
use of massed fire-power and by jamming radio nets and radars at critical stages of
the battle.
c.
Rapid Exploitation. Rapid exploitation includes the development of powerful and
rapid thrusts in depth and on narrow fronts to take advantage of the shock effect of
massed fire-power. Where possible, tank and mechanised infantry are used to
achieve this. It also includes the swift crossing of obstacles.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-16
Frontages and Depths of Objectives in the Attack
2.61
Typical guidelines for frontages and depths of objectives in the attack for an
expeditionary army and subordinate formations and units are illustrated in table 2–4.
Timings and Rate of Advance in the Attack
2.62
Timing. The time taken to complete an attack is dependent on a number of factors.
These include:
a. directives from higher authority,
b. reconnaissance and deployment time,
c.
terrain,
d. distance to and between objectives,
e. weather,
f.
availability and type of FS,
g. the state of the defensive position, and
h. the morale and likely reaction of the enemy.
2.63
Table 2–5 indicates in general terms the total amount of time Musorian commanders
allocate for attack preparations and assaults in their planning.
Table 2–5:
Attack Timings
Serial
(a)
Force
(b)
Type
(c)
Encounter/Quick [hrs]
(d)
Deliberate [hrs]
(e)
1.
Division
Infantry
Motorised/Mechanised
Infantry
8-16
12-24
6-12
9-20
Infantry
Infantry
3-6
5-9
2-4
4-6
Infantry
Infantry
2-4
3-5
45 minute (min) 2 hour (hr)
3-4
30-45 min
45-60 min
20-30 min
30-45 min
2.
3.
4.
2.64
Brigade
Battalion
Company
Infantry
Infantry
Rate of Advance. The rate of advance varies with the type of offensive operation
(encounter or deliberate attack), the terrain, and the strength and tenacity of the
opposing force. Table 2–6 details generally accepted rates of advance which may be
varied and should be interpreted with a degree of flexibility.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-17
Table 2–6:
Rates of Advance in Attack
Serial
(a)
Activity
(b)
1.
Rate of advance from line of departure to objective:
(a) open country
(b) close country
2.
Fighting through defended position:
(a) heavily defended
(b) lightly defended
Dismounted
(c)
Mounted
(d)
2-3 kph
(35-50 m/min)
10-15 kph
1-2 kph
(15-35 m/min)
5-10 kph
3-400 m/h
(5-7 m/min)
1.5-2 kph
4-600 m/h
(7-10 m/min)
2-5 kph
Spacing
2.65
Infantry. During the attack, a dismounted company moves with troops spaced between
5 and 10 metres apart, depending on the type of country. A company under these
conditions covers between 250 and 350 metres, and a battalion 500 to 800 metres.
Motorised/mechanised vehicles are spaced 50 to 100 metres apart. When an infantry
company dismounts from its APC, the vehicles move 100 to 200 metres to the rear of
the infantry and provide FS.
2.66
Tanks. Tanks attacking with motorised infantry in open country normally move 100 to
150 metres apart, ahead of the infantry but within small arms range. Tanks attacking
with dismounted infantry are normally 100 to 200 metres apart in open country and travel
about 100 metres ahead of the infantry. Tanks attacking with no infantry in open country
are usually 50 to 100 metres apart. In close country the spacing between tanks is
decreased. In very close country infantry precedes the armoured elements. (Spacings
such as timings and rates of advance must be interpreted flexibly.)
2.67
It should be noted that, in offensive operations, Musorian companies normally fight as
individual entities with little fire and movement between platoons. There is little freedom
of action in the attack below company level.
SECTION 2-6.
THE ENCOUNTER BATTLE
General
2.68
The encounter battle is used to overcome light resistance during the advance of
covering troops and the leading elements of the main force. Encounter battles may be
fought by all units from division to platoon. Rapid and bold offensive action is considered
the key to success, even against a stronger enemy. Frontal assault or envelopment are
considered the best methods of isolating and destroying enemy forces. To achieve this,
the Musorian commander commits his forward troops to battle while rapidly
concentrating the remainder of his forces and resources for powerful thrusts on decisive
axes. He attempts to locate the flanks and rear areas in order to disrupt enemy
defensive plans and cut off lines of retreat.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
2-18
2.69
The first echelon normally comprises the advance guard, which is a combined arms
force varying in size and composition according to terrain, known enemy strengths and
the number of routes being used in the advance. The first echelon may be a division for
an army, a brigade for a division-sized force or a reinforced battalion for a brigade-sized
advancing force. The second echelon at each level comprises the main body.
2.70
As seizure of the initiative is paramount, thorough reconnaissance and detailed planning
are overridden by the need for quick and decisive action. Great reliance is thus placed
on the results of reconnaissance carried out prior to the contact.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-1
CHAPTER 3
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 3-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
3.1
Musorian doctrine recognises that tactical defence is necessary, but stresses that it is a
temporary expedient adopted to:
a. economise the use of forces to allow an offensive to be mounted in another sector,
b. gain time to concentrate forces,
c.
create a favourable situation for an attack by inflicting losses on a superior enemy
force,
d. consolidate captured objectives, or
e. cover a withdrawal.
3.2
In spite of the emphasis on offensive operations, Musorian forces are well equipped for
defensive operations. Musorian formations and units hold impressive scales of antiarmour and air defence weapons and their allocation of engineer equipment at brigade
level and above including trenchers, dozers and minelayers is well balanced between
offensive and defensive requirements.
Types of Defensive Operations
3.3
General. The Musorians believe that the basic purpose of defence is to gain time to
prepare for the counter-offensive while preserving their own forces. In order to achieve
this they employ three broad types of defensive operations: area defence, mobile
defence and retrograde operations.
3.4
Area Defence. Area defence is organised in depth and is designed to deny vital areas to
the enemy or to halt attacks while inflicting significant losses in men and materiel.
Forward defence positions engage the enemy decisively and defend their locations with
no thought of withdrawal to successive positions. Musorian forces drawn from second
echelon formations and units counter-attack once the enemy offensive has been blunted
or halted. Area defence is based on:
a. firmly holding areas of tactical importance with troops well dug in;
b. retaining anti-armour reserves in the second echelon to block penetration, and
strong armour forces to counter-attack;
c.
the use of all available fire-power; and
d. maximum use of both natural and artificial obstacles.
3.5
Mobile Defence. Mobile defence has developed from Musorian experience in mobile
insurgency warfare. It is a ‘hit and run’ defence based on a war of movement. Mobile
defence is based on:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-2
a. the trading of ground for time – in situations where distances and frontages are large
and the holding of terrain is not critical, the Musorians attempt to cover these by
using strong mobile forces to trade ground for time, while other forces prepare for a
counter-offensive;
b. a series of defence/withdrawal actions by hard-hitting mobile forces which take
advantage of every opportunity to inflict casualties on the enemy without undue loss
to themselves;
c.
retaining ground for only as long as delay or casualties are imposed on the enemy
without inextricably involving their forces; and
d. organisation of forces to allow them to break contact at will and continue their
rearward movement until the purpose of the mobile defence is achieved or until they
have withdrawn to where the bulk of their forces are deployed in an area defence
role.
3.6
Retrograde Operations. Retrograde, or backward moving operations, are conducted by
Musorian forces to create a more favourable situation for the initiation or resumption of
the offensive. Retrograde operations, although essentially defensive, are employed in
both the offence and defence phases of war to preserve forces and to gain or maintain
the initiative. There are three types of retrograde operations which the Musorian forces
employ:
a. Delaying Action. A delaying action is an operation in which a force under enemy
pressure trades space for time.
b. Withdrawal. The withdrawal is an operation in which a force in contact disengages
from the enemy, either voluntarily or as a result of enemy pressure.
c.
3.7
Retirement. Retirement is a voluntary movement to the rear by forces not in contact
with the enemy.
Retrograde operations are carried out at night where possible and are supported by
artillery. They are often preceded by local counter-attacks. Retrograde operations are
undertaken with the aim of accomplishing one or more of the following:
a. maintaining the integrity of one’s own forces;
b. harassing, exhausting, resisting, delaying and inflicting punishment on the enemy;
c.
drawing the enemy into an unfavourable situation;
d. disengaging from combat;
e. gaining time without becoming decisively engaged;
f.
permitting the use of elements of a force elsewhere; or
g. avoiding combat under undesirable conditions.
Defence Zones
3.8
The combat area is divided into two zones, the security zone and the main defence
zone. These zones are further organised into successive belts designed to provide depth
to the defended area.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-3
3.9
The Security Zone. The security zone is controlled by screening forces and security
forces and is located forward of the main defence zone. Screening forces are
predominantly reconnaissance units deployed well forward of the main defence. When a
corps is deployed, it provides the main screening force which operates in a similar
fashion to covering troops. Security forces are deployed to the front of the main defence
zone. They provide security from hostile reconnaissance, observation and surprise
attack. Where possible they engage the enemy at long range and force him to deploy
prematurely. At divisional level, security forces may be located up to 15 kilometres
forward of the main defence zone.
3.10
The Main Defence Zone. The main defence zone is divided into main defence and
second defence positions. These positions consist of a series of mutually supporting
self-sufficient strong points or localities. The positions form stable pivots from which antiarmour reserves and counter-attack forces may manoeuvre, supported by massed firepower. Obstacles are constructed forward, between and within positions, to form
defensive belts which hinder an enemy advance, canalising and causing him to
concentrate and provide lucrative targets. Figure 3–1 depicts the schematic layout of
Musorian defence zones.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-4
Depth of Operation
Up to
200 km
10 –
30 km
SCREENING
FORCES
Belt A
S
E
C
U
R
I
T
Y
Z
O
N
E
SECURITY
FORCES
Belt B
Belt C
Belt D
FEBA
10 –
20 km
MAIN
DEFENCE
POSITION
D
E
F
E
N
C
E
8–
10 km
10 –
20 km
Belt F
GAP
Z
O
N
E
SECOND
DEFENCE
POSITION
Belt E
MAIN
DEFENCE
BELTS
Belt G
SECOND
DEFENCE
BELTS
Belt H
GAP
Counter-attack Force and
Commander’s Reserve
Figure 3–1:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Belt I
Musorian Defence Zones
Main defence position contains first echelon forces.
Second defence position contains second echelon forces.
Distance not to scale.
Echelons and Reserves
3.11
In defensive operations, at each level of command above company, two echelons are
formed. In addition, uncommitted reserves, which include tanks and anti-armour
weapons, are formed. The reserve is divided into a commander’s reserve which the
commander can deploy at his own discretion, and a counter-attack force which can only
be deployed on the authority of the commander’s immediate superior. The allocation of
troops to echelons varies depending on the type of defensive operation being conducted.
Details of troops in echelons is covered in detail in the sections dealing with each type of
defensive operation.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-5
SECTION 3-2.
AREA DEFENCE
General
3.12
During an area defence, the combat zone consists of a security and main defence zone.
These in turn comprise:
a. The security zone:
(1) screening forces, and
(2) security forces.
b. The main defence zone:
(1) main defence position;
(2) second defence position;
(3) reserve, including the counter-attack force; and
(4) headquarters.
3.13
The Security Zone. The security zone is patrolled by reconnaissance elements and
other forces drawn from second echelon troops who fight delaying actions on the most
important axes. Within the security zone, forces operate in the following manner:
a. Screening Forces. Screening forces are primarily reconnaissance units deployed
well forward of the main defence. At corps level they may be deployed 200
kilometres forward, at divisional level 50 kilometres. Screening force tasks include:
(1) provision of early warning,
(2) maintenance of liaison with security forces, and
(3) determination of enemy strengths and main axes of advance.
Part of the screening force may be given a stay-behind role in likely enemy assembly
areas (AAs), the remainder fall back under pressure into the main defence zone
where they cover gaps, protect flanks and maintain security in rear areas, particularly
against airborne attack.
b. Security Forces. Security forces are deployed in front of the main defence zone in
relation to their mobility. Each level of command down to and including company,
deploys security forces forward of the FEBA. A corps may deploy a reinforced
brigade 20 to 30 kilometres out from the main defence zone; a division or reinforced
battalion 5 to 15 kilometres out. Security forces, which are normally drawn from
second echelon forces, are tasked to:
(1) defend if the situation permits;
(2) engage the enemy at long range to force him to deploy and thus slow down his
advance;
(3) deceive the enemy as to the strength, dispositions and intentions of the forces
in the main defence zone;
(4) maintain contact with the advancing enemy force; and
(5) protect the main defence position from surprise attack.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-6
3.14
The Main Defence Zone. The main defence zone’s main defence position is the bulwark
of the defence and is occupied by first echelon troops who are expected to hold out even
if bypassed or encircled. The second defence position is occupied by second echelon
troops. The second defence position also supplies forces for the security zone. At corps
level, the main defence zone normally consists of a main defence position of two
reinforced divisions and a second defence position containing most of the third division
including additional armour and artillery. At divisional level, two reinforced brigades are
deployed as first echelon troops in the main defence position and at battalion level two
companies fill this role. Area defence above divisional level is not covered in detail in this
publication.
3.15
In the conduct of area defence, emphasis is placed on the protection of troops and
materiel; thus terrain is a major consideration in selecting area defensive positions.
Tactical Guidelines
3.16
Stability. Stability requires an overall balance in the defending force so that it has the
ability to repel attacks, prevent enemy activities in rear areas, including airborne
activities, and retain the capability to destroy penetrations of defensive positions.
3.17
Security. Security is directed at denying the enemy detailed knowledge of the main
defence zone and impeding his approach to it. This may include action by security zone
forces, and the implementation of deception measures including:
a. camouflage and concealment,
b. dummy equipment and locations,
c.
fire discipline,
d. alternate position development, and
e. electronic silence.
3.18
Patrolling. Patrolling in the security zone is extensive during daylight hours. Patrolling is
on foot and by motorised elements of the screening and security force. OPs and listening
posts (LPs) are established forward of the main defensive position and at night to the
flanks. Patrols, OPs and LPs are prime methods of obtaining information on advancing
enemy elements and maintaining the security of the main defensive zone.
3.19
Use of Key Terrain. By properly preparing the key terrain, which dominates the main
avenues of approach, the defender offsets some of the enemy’s initiative and
advantages. One method of accomplishing this is the preparation of fire and obstacle
plans which restrict the enemy’s freedom to manoeuvre, but increases that of the
defender by canalising the enemy into prepared killing grounds.
3.20
All-round Defence. Although oriented primarily towards the most likely direction of
enemy attack, Musorian units prepare alternate and supplementary positions and are
prepared to repel attacks from any direction. All-round defence includes construction of
strong points in depth and extensive obstacle and fire planning.
3.21
Defence in Depth. Depth presents an attacker with a series of strong points which
absorb his momentum and provide time for Musorian reserves to counter-attack.
3.22
Anti-armour Defence. Anti-armour defence is regarded as one of the most important
aspects of the defence. Anti-armour weapons are allocated down to sub-unit level while
anti-tank reserves are maintained at brigade level and above.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-7
3.23
Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition. Sensing devices in support of defensive
operations are of secondary importance to Musorian ground forces in line with their
philosophy of offensive action. Nevertheless, a range of sensing devices is held at unit
level and above for use in area defence operations. At battalion level, ground
surveillance radars are employed, particularly at night. Mortar locating radars are also
used extensively. In area defence, at divisional level and above, gun-locating equipment
is deployed. Active and passive night observation and sighting aids are found down to
company level.
3.24
White Light. White light is used freely at night once an attack has begun. White light
posts are established in each forward company strong point. Once a hostile attack starts,
the ground to the front of the main defence position is continuously illuminated to
silhouette the attackers. Anti-armour units make use of target illumination at night by
means of white light. This negates the effectiveness of night firing aids on attacking
armour.
3.25
Coordinated Fire Plan. Fire is coordinated to destroy the attacking force as it
approaches the defended area. Fire is planned in front of the FEBA, to the flanks, in
prepared killing zones within the defended area and for counter-attacks. Fire plans
employ heavy concentrations of both direct and indirect fire and include:
a. Counter-battery Fire. Counter-battery fire is used primarily during the enemy’s
preparation fire. It anticipates the enemy’s preparatory bombardment and engages
his batteries and deployment areas. Information required for this type of fire is
obtained primarily by radio intercept.
b. Barrage Lines. Barrage lines are lines upon which fire is called as the enemy attacks
in order to disrupt the attack and separate tanks from infantry. Barrage lines are
located both in front of the FEBA and in the depths of the defence.
c.
Fire Pockets. Fire pockets are sectors of ground within the defended area covered
from two or more sides by the intensive convergent fire of defending units and into
which attempts are made to channel enemy forces which penetrate the FEBA.
3.26
Mobile Counter-attack Forces. Musorian doctrine considers the counter-attack the
most decisive phase of defensive operations. Counter-attacks are planned at all levels
from battalion up. Spontaneous local counter-attacks occur at company level and below.
As far as possible, counter-attacks are launched from a flank and the tactics employed
closely resemble those of the encounter battle and quick attack.
3.27
Echelons and Reserves. The allocation of troops to echelons in area defence includes
both infantry and motorised infantry. The mechanised infantry division normally deploys
two reinforced brigades in the first echelon and one brigade together with organic tank
support in the second echelon. The commander’s reserve and counter-attack force
include tanks and anti-armour elements. A higher proportion of anti-armour weapons is
held in the commander’s reserve.
3.28
Frontages and Depths. In general, the frontage and depth of an allotted defence
position is determined by terrain, enemy capabilities and whether the area being
defended is a main or subsidiary sector. Some guidelines to the frontages and depths of
formations and units in area defence are shown at table 3–1.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-8
Table 3–1:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.29
Area Defence Frontages and Depths
Serial
Formation/Unit
(a)
(b)
1.
Area Defence
Frontage [km]
(c)
Depth [km]
(d)
Expeditionary Army
16-40
1
(35-60)
28-44
(50-70)
2.
Division
8-12
(20-30)
9-15
(15-20)
3.
Brigade
3-4
(10-15)
3-6
(7-10)
4.
Battalion
1-2
(3-5)
1.5-3
(2-3)
5.
Company
0.5-1
(1-1.5)
0.5-0.75
(0.5-0.75)
6.
Platoon
0.25-0.35
(0.3-0.6)
0.25-0.35
(0.2-0.5)
Figures in brackets are those for mechanised infantry formations and units.
Gaps between adjacent battalions may be up to 2 kilometres, between companies up to 1 kilometre, and
between platoons up to 300 metres.
Obstacles. Maximum use is made of obstacles throughout the defensive area and
positions are normally selected behind natural anti-tank obstacles. Natural obstacles are
improved, but it is seldom considered possible to create extensive artificial obstacles
other than minefields. The extent of prepared minefields is limited by considerations of
time and logistics, to covering the approaches to the main defence position.
Considerable use is made of mobile obstacle detachments at all levels of command to
lay hasty minefields to meet specific threats as they develop.
Conduct of Divisional Area Defence
3.30
General. When an expeditionary army is deployed on area defence operations, primary
responsibility for the security zone is accepted by the army headquarters. In this
situation, screening troops operate in the security zone in a covering troop role. At army
level, the screening forces operate at ranges up to 200 kilometres forward of the FEBA
and consist of highly mobile combined arms forces of infantry and armour supported by
artillery and engineers. These forces are coordinated by expeditionary army
headquarters. In addition, an army security force is deployed across the frontage forward
of the main defence zone. In these operations, lower formations still deploy screening
and security forces in the security zone.
3.31
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Division. The infantry/motorised infantry division in area
defence is depicted at figure 3–2. The conduct of area defence in the security and main
defence zones include the following:
a. The Security Zone. The security zone is dominated by divisional screening and
security forces to a depth of approximately 50 kilometres. They are as follows:
(1) Screening Forces. Troops from the divisional reconnaissance battalion normally
make contact with the enemy 40 to 50 kilometres in front of the FEBA. They fall
back under pressure without becoming inextricably engaged and pass through
the security forces into the divisional second defence position. Artillery is on call
for use against targets when the screening force is close to the FEBA. When the
screening force is operating outside of the security force and main defence
zone artillery range, artillery accompanies the security force or the force utilises
air support and its own integral weapons.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-9
(2) Security Forces. Following the withdrawal of the screening force, the divisional
security forces, supported by air strikes and artillery fire, conduct a delaying
defence before withdrawing into the divisional second defence position. The
security force is mobile where possible, and located five to 15 kilometres in front
of the main defence location.
b. Main Defence Zone. The main defence zone contains the main and second
divisional defence positions which are occupied by first and second echelon troops
respectively. The main defence position is organised as a series of mutually
supporting strong points and localities which are expected to hold out when
bypassed or encircled. Extensive patrols by day and LPs by night are deployed
immediately forward and to the flanks of the main defence position by first echelon
forces. These supplement the security zone forces. The second defence position
occupied by the second echelon brigade also establishes alternative and switch
positions across possible lines of penetration. The second echelon is also
considered as a supplementary divisional reserve which is only committed on the
orders of the commander should the divisional counter-attack fail. The following
activities are likely to occur in the main defence zone during the conduct of a
divisional area defence battle:
(1) Pre-assault. An intense counter-battery fire plan, assisted by air strikes, is fired
to pre-empt and, if possible, neutralise the enemy’s preparation bombardment.
Likely enemy AAs and lines of departure are engaged to disrupt the attack.
Radio silence is maintained throughout this period.
(2) The Assault. As soon as the enemy assault is launched, fire from all available
weapons is brought to bear. Infantry heavy weapons and supporting artillery
attempt to separate enemy tanks from their supporting infantry so that the tanks
may be more easily destroyed by infantry anti-tank weapons. The attack is
blunted or halted, where possible, before the enemy penetrates to the rear of
the main defence position.
(3) Divisional Commander’s Reserve. This force, containing a high proportion of
armour and anti-armour elements, is sited to cover the most likely enemy
thrusts or to cover a killing zone into which armour has been canalised. It may
be located in an AA or to the front of the second defence position. This force is
under the direct command of the divisional commander and is used to stem
initial penetrations between brigades and cover axes on which enemy armour is
most likely to penetrate.
(4) Divisional Counter-attack Force. A mobile combined arms group is formed from
second echelon troops as the divisional counter-attack force. Where possible,
the infantry elements are motorised. The force counter-attacks enemy
penetrations once they have been halted or stabilised by echelons or the
commander’s force. The expeditionary army commander or the divisional
commander in a divisional setting retains the prerogative to commit the
divisional counter-attack force. The committal of the counter-attack force, if
successful, is normally the first step in a new Musorian counter-offensive.
(5) Defence in Depth. The second echelon brigade normally organises the second
divisional defence position with two of its three battalions establishing strong
points, often on the reverse slopes of key terrain features, some six to 12
kilometres behind the FEBA. Blocking positions are also constructed. The third
battalion of this brigade is usually motorised and may form part of the divisional
counter-attack reserve. Tasks of the force in the second defence position
include to:
(a)
provide depth to the defence and prevent deep penetration by the enemy;
(b)
provide a firm base to support a divisional counter-attack;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-10
(c)
in the event of the divisional counter-attack failing, to be prepared to
constitute a counter-attack force under the control of the corps
commander;
(d)
cover the withdrawal of the remnants of the divisional first echelon should
this be required; and
(e)
provide rear area security.
8-12 km
Depth of Operation
Divisional
Security
Zone
(up to 50 km)
Screening Forces
Division
3-4 km
3-4 km
5-15 km
Division Security Forces
FEBA
1-2 km
1-2 km
Divisional
Main
Defence
Position
3-6 km
Divisional
Main
Defence
Zone
BrAG
BrAG
Reserve/
Counter-attack
Force
3-6 km
Division
Second
Defence
Position
3-5 km
DAG
Figure 3–2:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Division Area Defence
Main defence position contains first echelon.
Second defence position contains second echelon forces.
Gaps between elements within a defence position are not shown.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-11
3.32
The Infantry/Motorised Infantry Brigade. The organisation of the rifle brigade in area
defence is depicted at figure 3–2 as part of the divisional defence. It consists of the
following:
a. The Security Zone. Each forward brigade provides a brigade screening and security
force from its second echelon. The screening force may operate independently or in
conjunction with the divisional screening force. The security force operates some
three to five kilometres in front of the FEBA and is deployed in positions nominated
by the divisional commander. When further defence is considered unprofitable, the
divisional commander orders the security force to withdraw through battalion and
company security positions into the divisional main defence position.
b. Main Defence Position. The following activities are likely to occur in the brigade main
defence position:
(1) Pre-assault. Troops in defensive positions occupy shelters during the enemy’s
preparation fire and until enemy forces approach to within small arms range.
(2) Assault. Organic small arms and support weapons open fire from the main
defence positions as the assaulting enemy force comes within range. First
echelon battalions in the main defence position do not withdraw even if
bypassed or encircled. If the enemy penetrates the main defence position he is
fired on from all sides, by weapons located on the flanks, in depth and in strong
points in the forward areas not overrun. Local counter-attacks are also mounted
to contain these penetrations. The brigade reserve may be committed to
stabilise the situation.
(3) Brigade Counter-attack. Should local counter-attacks fail, the divisional
commander orders the brigade counter-attack force sited in depth, to launch a
counter-attack in an attempt to restore the integrity of the FEBA or contain the
penetration.
(4) Defence in Depth. Defence in depth is established by the second echelon
battalion or brigades located in the divisional main defence position. These
battalions are 3 to 6 kilometres behind the FEBA. The second echelon performs
similar tasks to those outlined for the division second echelon.
c.
3.33
Second Defence Position. The brigade second defence position is occupied by the
third battalion of the brigade. No further details are provided.
The Infantry/Motorised Infantry Battalion. The infantry/motorised infantry battalion in
area defence is depicted at figure 3–3. It consists of:
a. The Security Zone. The following battalion activities are likely to occur in the security
zone:
(1) Each forward battalion in the main defence position establishes a security
position with forces drawn from its reconnaissance and second echelon troops.
These security positions are coordinated by the brigade and may be up to 2
kilometres forward of the main defence position but within range of indirect fire
weapons.
(2) The strength of the security force varies, but is usually a platoon from the
battalion’s second echelon reinforced by battalion reconnaissance troops,
mortars, heavy machine guns and anti-armour weapons.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-12
(3) Depth may be added to the defence by deploying additional security forces from
the battalion’s first echelon. These may consist of a reinforced section provided
by each of the forward companies which are located 750 to 1 000 metres out
from the main defence position.
(4) As the attacker approaches the main defence position, he encounters
increasing resistance and delay imposed by the battalion’s security position.
The battalion security force withdraws at the last minute through a company
security position to rejoin the battalion second echelon.
b. Main Defence Position. Battalion actions in the main defence position include the
following:
(1) Pre-assault. Control of the final 200 to 300 metres in front of the main defence
position is considered crucial to the conduct of the defence. Heavy frontal and
flanking defensive direct and indirect fire is required to cover this area.
(2) Assault. The battalion main defence position is organised for mutual support
and all-round defence. Battalion troops attempt to destroy the attacking enemy
force by fire both in front of and within the position. Ground not occupied by
troops in trenches is controlled by fire, obstacles, patrols or ambush parties.
Each sub-unit of the battalion from platoon upwards has a local counter-attack
plan. These counter-attacks are timed to take advantage of the vulnerability of
an attacker when his own artillery support has lifted and he is trying to close
with the defender. The battalion reserve may be committed to stabilise the
situation.
(3) Battalion Counter-attack. The battalion counter-attack force is drawn from the
battalion second echelon and, if possible, is a combined arms group. The
battalion counter-attack force is launched on the orders of the brigade
commander. If enemy penetration is in such strength that the counter-attack is
unlikely to succeed, the battalion counter-attack may be withheld and used to
support a brigade counter-attack.
(4) Defence in Depth. The battalion’s second echelon occupies the battalion’s
second defence position, which is normally on a reverse slope some 2 to 3
kilometres behind the FEBA. Where time allows, alternate positions for first
echelon companies should be prepared. Sub-units occupying second defence
positions perform similar tasks to those at divisional and brigade level.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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Figure 3–3:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.34
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Battalion Area Defence
Reserve counter-attack forces located with echelon forces in defence positions.
Mechanised Infantry Division. Much of the tactical doctrine concerning Musorian
infantry rifle troops in area defence is also applicable to mechanised infantry troops.
Thus for detailed information on mechanised infantry formations and units in area
defence, beyond that which follows, the information dealing with infantry and motorised
infantry troops in area defence should be consulted. The mechanised infantry division in
area defence is illustrated in figure 3–4. The conduct of area defence in the security and
main defence zone includes:
a. Security Zone. This zone is dominated by mechanised infantry screening and
security forces. Activities in the security zone include:
(1) Screening Forces. Screening forces normally consist of the divisional
reconnaissance battalion reinforced as required. The battalion may be deployed
up to 50 kilometres forward of the FEBA.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-14
(2) Security Forces. Forward detachments may operate up to 16 kilometres in front
of the FEBA. These detachments are of reinforced battalion or company size
and come from the divisional second echelon mechanised infantry brigade.
They harass and impede the enemy advance and normally withdraw before
being attacked by the main body or if threatened with encirclement.
b. Main Defence Zone. Divisional activities in the main defence zone include:
(1) Pre-assault. Long-range fire engages approaching armour to cause dispersion,
delay and destruction. At the same time, other artillery and mortars engage
AAs, forming up places (FUPs) and targets along probable routes leading to the
forward edge of the defended area. This fire is aimed at separating tanks from
supporting infantry.
(2) Assault. Tanks and APC fire from main or alternate positions within company
strong points or, in the case of reserves, previously planned deployment lines.
Tanks engage armoured vehicles at ranges up to 2 000 metres and anti-tank
guided weapons (ATGWs) engage at ranges up to 3 000 metres. Enemy
infantry are engaged by infantry small arms and armoured vehicle machine
guns at ranges of 400 to 600 metres. Any penetration within the main defence
position is counter-attacked by local battalion and brigade counter-attacks in an
attempt to repulse the penetration. The divisional reserve may also be
committed.
(3) Divisional Counter-attack. Should local counter-attacks or planned artillery FS
fail to restore the penetration of the main defence zone, the primary counterattack force available to the division, the tank brigade, less the two or three
companies reinforcing the first echelon mechanised infantry brigades, is
committed on orders from the army or divisional commander.
(4) Defence in Depth. Defence in depth is provided by the second echelon
mechanised brigade which normally organises defence areas across the rear of
the defence zone approximately 10 to 15 kilometres from the FEBA. These
defence areas are sited to protect key terrain and control avenues of approach
from the front.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-15
20-30 km
Divisonal
Security
Zone
(up to 50 km )
Depth of Operation
(-)
(-)
Division Screening Forces
10-15 km
up to
16 km
(+)
10-15 km
(+)
(-)
Division Security Forces
FEBA
3-5 km
Divisonal
Main
Defence
Position
6-8 km
Divisonal
Main
Defence
Zone
3-5 km
(-)
(-)
(+)
X
X
BrAG
Reserve/
Counter-attack
Force
3-4 km
Division
Second
Defence
Position
6-8 km
BrAG
(-)
(-)
XX
(-)
DAG
Figure 3–4:
Notes:
1.
2.
Mechanised Infantry Division Area Defence
Not to scale.
Gaps between elements within defence position are not shown.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-16
3.35
Mechanised Infantry Brigade. The mechanised infantry brigade in defence is depicted
at figure 3–5. It consists of:
a. The Security Zone. As divisional screening and security forces fall back, brigade
security forces establish contact with the enemy. These brigade security forces may
consist of:
(1) Forward Positions. Forward positions are established five to 10 kilometres in
front of the main defence position and are manned by reconnaissance elements
and reinforced companies drawn from the second echelon battalions of first
echelon brigades. They protect the main defence position from surprise, and
engage enemy reconnaissance vehicles and vanguards. They operate in a
mobile role, both mounted and dismounted.
(2) Battle Outposts. Battle outposts are normally established as an alternative to
forward positions. They are located approximately two to five kilometres forward
of the main defence position and are manned by reconnaissance elements and
platoons from the first echelon battalions. Their tasks are similar to those of
forward positions.
b. Main Defence Position. Brigade actions in the main defence position include:
(1) Pre-assault. Artillery engages the enemy at the same time as the forward
positions or battle outposts come into contact with the advancing enemy force.
The artillery fire also covers the withdrawal of security forces back to the main
defence position.
(2) Assault. Little small arms fire from front line positions occurs until the enemy
attack reaches a line about 400 metres from the main defence position. At this
time the enemy force encounters anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles and is
brought under direct tank, anti-tank, artillery and small arms fire. Penetrations of
the main defence position may occur but are blocked by second echelon
companies of first echelon battalions and anti-armour reserves. Sub-units
counter-attack local penetrations between strong points. Troops are dismounted
and fight from protected and concealed pits. APCs may be dug in or operate as
mobile fire platforms.
(3) Brigade Counter-attack. Major penetrations of the main defence position are
blocked by deployed anti-tank reserves. Should the reserves fail to stop the
attack, the counter-attack force is committed. The brigade counter-attack may
be launched from a ‘switch position’ dug between the main and second defence
positions or from the flank of the most likely enemy thrust.
(4) Defence in Depth. Defence in depth consists of the second defence position
occupied by the second echelon battalion located 3 to 6 kilometres behind the
FEBA.
c.
Second Defence Position. The second defence position is occupied by the third
battalion of the brigade. No further details are provided.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-17
Depth of Operation
10-15 km
Brigade Security Forces
Brigade
Security
Zone
(up to 25 km)
3-5 km
5-10 km
Brigade Security Forces
FEBA
1-2km
Brigade
Main
Defence
(3-4 km)
Switch
Positions
Anti-armoured Reserve
Counter-attack Force
Brigade
Main
Defence
Zone
BrAG
Brigade
Second
Defence
(3-4 km)
Figure 3–5:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
3.36
Mechanised Infantry Brigade in Defence
Battle outposts replace forward positions in the security zone.
Tank battalion allocated.
Gaps between battalion and company are not shown.
Mechanised Infantry Battalion. The mechanised infantry battalion in defence is
depicted at figure 3–6. It consists of:
a. The Security Zone. Battle outposts, of approximately platoon strength, drawn from
the second echelon companies, delay the enemy as long as possible and eventually
withdraw to prepared positions.
b. Main Defence Position. Battalion actions in the main defence position include the
following:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-18
(1) Pre-assault. Tanks are the primary target and, as they come within range, the
fire of all anti-tank weapons is directed at them. Machine gun and rifle fire are
used in an attempt to separate infantry from tanks.
(2) The Assault. Defending strong points are normally occupied by first echelon
dug-in companies, each of which is normally reinforced by an anti-tank platoon,
a platoon of tanks and a platoon of mortars. Sub-units remain in place until
overrun or ordered to withdraw. Enemy penetrations in gaps between units are
expected and these gaps are turned into killing areas. Uncommitted elements
adjacent to threatened areas may be employed to engage the flanks of
attacking enemy forces. Local counter-attacks employing small mobile reserves
and tank forces are employed by the battalion to help maintain the integrity of
the defended area.
(3) Battalion Counter-attack. This force normally comprises a tank platoon which is
located approximately 1.5 kilometres behind the first echelon. Two or three
deployment lines for the counter-attack force are planned to cover flanks and
gaps between strong points. The counter-attack force may be required to mount
counter-attacks in conjunction with second echelon companies and the brigade
reserve.
(4) Defence in Depth. Defence in depth normally comprises the second echelon
company of the battalion. It may be a reinforced platoon if the battalion is
defending a wide zone.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-19
Figure 3–6:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Mechanised Infantry Battalion in Defence
Reserve/counter-attack force located with second echelon forces in second defence positions.
Gaps of 0.5 to 1 kilometre between company positions are not shown.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-20
3.37
Armoured Troops. In an area defence battle, the armoured troops may be directed to:
a. operate in a mobile role in the security zone, in conjunction with reconnaissance
forces;
b. hold a designated area;
c.
destroy an enemy penetration by direct fire;
d. engage the enemy from ambush;
e. protect defending units as part of an anti-tank strong point;
f.
provide indirect FS; and
g. form a part or all of the reserve or counter-attack force.
3.38
Expeditionary Army. Traditionally, an expeditionary army has an armoured brigade.
However, at expeditionary army level, armoured formations are likely to be employed as
part of the army screening and security force in the security zone. The expeditionary
army commander is unlikely to commit his tank formations, other than those integral to
divisions, to assist in the defence of the main position. He is more likely to keep tank
formations concentrated to the rear of the second defence position and task them as
reserve and counter-attack troops.
3.39
Divisional Tank Battalions. The tank battalions of the mechanised, motorised and
infantry divisions have a primary role of counter-attack and secondary role of assisting in
the defence of the main position, which have already been covered. The formation’s tank
counter-attack force is normally held in a reserve position behind the second defence
position and is ready to counter-attack, preferably from a flank, as soon as the formation
reserve has blocked the penetration. As the counter-attack role is essentially offensive,
the tactics employed are similar to those described in the encounter battle. The tank
division can, however, be tasked to conduct a defensive battle when time is needed to
mass the necessary forces to continue the offence, to consolidate captured positions or
to repel ground attacks. In such instances, tank formations are employed in first echelon
roles and their deployment is generally similar to that of mechanised infantry troops.
3.40
Tank Battalion. The tank battalion in defence is depicted in figure 3–7. Tanks,
reinforcing first echelon infantry, motorised infantry and mechanised infantry units or
comprising first echelon defensive forces themselves, are emplaced in prepared
positions. Musorian doctrine avoids massing units larger than a battalion as a basic
forward defensive unit. The following are guidelines to the deployment of the tank
battalion:
a. Distances shown are a guide only and are determined by terrain, cover, comparative
strengths and available fire support.
b. The tank battalion normally deploys with two companies forward and one in depth,
each of which is mutually supporting.
c.
A platoon from the second echelon company may operate initially as a security
detachment, falling back as the enemy approaches.
d. On occasions, a mechanised, motorised or infantry company is attached to the tank
battalion, with a platoon attached to each tank company.
e. In the event of penetration, the rear company normally counter-attacks, supported by
fire from the forward tank companies. However, on occasions one of the forward
companies may counter-attack direct with artillery defensive fire.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-21
Figure 3–7:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
3.41
Reserve/counter-attack forces located with second echelon.
A one kilometre gap is allowed for manoeuvre by reserve or counter-attack forces.
Artillery Support in Area Defence. Artillery support in area defence is centralised until
the main attack begins. Some artillery may be allotted to the army and divisional security
zone forces at an earlier stage; however, once these artillery units return to the main
defence zone they come under centralised control. Once the attack has commenced, the
decentralisation and deployment of artillery depends on the additional artillery received
from regional or district formations for the conduct of the battle. Regions may allot each
division an extra one or two battalions. The division may in turn allot one or two
battalions in support of each first echelon brigade, while retaining at least one battalion
under divisional control. Artillery subordinated to first echelon brigades deploys behind
forward battalions and divisional artillery further back. Artillery is sited to provide effective
support at maximum ranges consistent with the security of the guns.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-22
3.42
The organisation of artillery in defence differs little from that in offence. FFR units are
deployed about 10 to 16 kilometres behind the FEBA. The DAG normally deploys in the
vicinity of the divisional second defence position 6 to 12 kilometres behind the FEBA,
while the BrAG is located behind the first echelon battalions of the first echelon brigade,
about 3 to 6 kilometres behind the FEBA. A number of alternative fire positions are
developed for each sub-unit. In addition, during the latter stages of the battle in the
security zone, roving artillery groups may deploy forward to provide FS from temporary
positions and confuse the enemy as to their actual deployment. As far as possible all
artillery weapons are deployed in concealed and dispersed positions. The Musorians
believe that effective defence is based on concentrated fire using all available artillery,
mortars, tanks and rockets. The use of artillery in defence is based on concentrating
artillery fire against the enemy’s most important grouping of forces and against targets to
his rear and flanks. The fire plan includes counter-preparation fire, defensive fire and
counter-attack support. Tasks are allotted in the following general order of priority:
a. Counter-preparation fire:
(1) counter-battery fire,
(2) neutralisation of enemy C2 facilities,
(3) neutralisation of enemy columns and troop concentrations, and
(4) interference with the deployment of attacking troops.
b. Defensive fire:
(1) support of forward positions;
(2) neutralisation of the enemy in front of the forward defences;
(3) neutralisation of enemy units that have penetrated the defences;
(4) covering by fire, gaps, flanks, engineer obstacles and natural obstructions;
(5) firing of smoke rounds against enemy OPs; and
(6) battlefield illumination during night attacks.
c.
Counter-attack support.
3.43
Fire plans are elaborate and, for counter-preparation fire, aim to anticipate hostile
preparatory bombardments by engaging likely enemy artillery positions. Linear and area
defensive fire concentrations are planned to cover gaps, likely areas of attack and
possible areas of penetration. Artillery planning includes supporting fire for counterattacks. Fire plans are flexible and incorporate counter-battery fire, barrage lines and fire
pockets.
3.44
Tank Participation in the Defensive Fire Plan. Tanks are used in both the indirect and
direct fire role as follows:
a. Indirect Fire. It is common practice to use indirect tank fire to augment the fire plan.
Tank units from the division second echelon are deployed in the gun area and are
considered as reinforcing artillery.
b. Direct Fire. Tanks are employed to fire from hull down positions in the main defence
position against tanks supporting enemy infantry.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-23
3.45
Anti-armour Support in Area Defence. The Musorian concept of anti-armour defence
includes unit strong points with the anti-armour weapons, firing positions prepared for
occupation by tanks and anti-tank reserves, planned indirect artillery fire on vulnerable
avenues of approach, and the extensive use of anti-tank mines and other obstacles.
Artillery guns in the direct fire role are also considered as effective anti-armour weapons.
If the armour threat warrants, some of the divisional or brigade artillery may be employed
exclusively in the anti-tank role. Anti-armour weapons are employed so that their fire
interlocks along the front of the defended area and in depth. Organic anti-armour
weapons complement divisional and brigade anti-armour reserves. These reserves are
held in hides and have a number of alternative positions reconnoitred and prepared
along the most likely armour approaches. Tasks given to anti-armour weapons include:
a. destruction of tanks and armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) before they reach the
main defence zone;
b. destruction of tanks and AFVs which have penetrated the main defence position;
c.
reinforcement of first echelon anti-tank defences; and
d. covering the deployment of counter-attack forces.
3.46
Air Defence. Air defence of ground forces is provided by the presence of aircraft airsuperiority, and surface-to-air guns and missiles. Surveillance and acquisition radars are
extensively used. Musorian tactics stress passive defence measures as well as active
ones. During the defence, the dispersion and concealment of ground forces is
considered important and deception measures are widely used. Air defence in the
divisional area is coordinated by the divisional commander but controlled from corps
headquarters. It is characterised by area and point protection. Area protection is
provided by surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and point protection is provided by
organic divisional and brigade air defence guns and missiles. Man-portable missiles,
automatic weapons and small arms supplement specialist air defence by saturating the
battle area and engaging low flying hostile aircraft. Priority air defence tasks in defence
include the protection of:
a. headquarters,
b. artillery emplacements,
c.
mobile elements of the second echelon and reserve, and
d. routes forward and rear areas.
3.47
Above divisional level, aircraft and surface-to-air area missiles provide most protection.
The control of these weapons is centralised and co-ordinated at the highest formation
headquarters.
3.48
Aviation. Aviation elements will generally not participate directly in the defence of an
objective. Primary roles and tasks in an area defence include any of the operations
deemed necessary to disrupt the enemy build-up in the attack, particularly attacks on
enemy FUP and AA, C2 elements, indirect FS assets, and enemy reserves.
3.49
Aviation will also be involved in pre-planned ambushes in killing areas along the
expected enemy approaches. During mobile defence and retrograde operations, aviation
units will provide security to ground forces while they make a clean break. They may
also conduct feints in an effort to deceive the enemy that a counter-attack is occurring, or
that a change to offensive operations is underway. Helicopters will also play a key role in
the counter-attack.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-24
3.50
Engineers. The primary mission of engineers in defence is to assist combat elements in
preparing defensive positions, to supervise and assist in the preparation of obstacles
and to assist in maintaining the mobility of reserves. Defensive engineer planning is
based on detailed reconnaissance and analysis of the battlefield and includes:
a. Field Defences. The degree of assistance provided for field defences depends on
the availability of engineer machinery and explosives. Some guidelines are:
(1) a trencher can dig in an infantry platoon in one to one and a half hours;
(2) a tank dozer attachment can dig two to four revetments per hour;
(3) one-man trenches and some tank revetments can be dug within two to three
hours of occupying a position; and
(4) revetted positions for tanks, AFVs, guns and CPs can be completed in five to 10
hours and reserve deployment lines prepared.
b. Obstacles. Obstacles may include demolitions, flooding, wiring and mining:
(1) Anti-tank minefields are laid to divert enemy tanks into killing areas and to
protect company strong points. These are placed across likely tank approaches
about 400 metres in front of the forward defences and across approaches to the
BrAG and DAG.
(2) Field defences such as anti-tank ditches, tank traps and barbed wire are also
used.
(3) During the course of the battle, minefields in the depth of the position are laid on
pre-determined deployment lines.
c.
Counter-attack. Routes are prepared for counter-attack and counter-penetration
forces to reach their deployment lines.
d. Deception. The construction of dummy positions is an engineer responsibility.
3.51
Communications. During area defence operations, MAF GF use radio, line,
messengers, visual and audio signals. Though units down to company level are
equipped with radios, line is laid where possible up to divisional level. Field cable in
forward areas is used for security purposes and is laid on the ground or buried in shallow
trenches to avoid hostile artillery fire. Maximum use is made of radio intercept to attempt
to locate enemy artillery positions, concentration areas, AAs and the axis of the main
attack. This information is used in planning artillery counter-battery and defensive fire
plans.
3.52
Combat Surveillance. During area defence, Musorian forces deploy an array of combat
surveillance devices. Ground surveillance radars are used at battalion level, particularly
at night. The DAG and BrAG deploy gun and mortar locating surveillance equipment to
enable rapid neutralisation of located guns and mortars. Remote sensors may also be
deployed to pick up movements of enemy forces and equipment. At company and
battalion level, night observation and sighting equipment are deployed with armour and
infantry elements. Illumination of the battlefield as part of area defence planning is
standard. All or parts of the area to the front or flanks of the area defence position are
illuminated with white light as required.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-25
Summary
3.53
Table 3–2 summarises the deployment locations of Musorian main combat and combat
support groups during divisional level area defence.
Table 3–2:
Summary of Deployment Grouping for Divisional Area Defence
Serial
(a)
Grouping
(b)
Deployment
(c)
1.
First Echelon
The first echelon occupies the main defence position as a
series of mutually supporting strong points and localities.
Patrolling to the front and flanks of the main defence position
is carried out by first echelon troops. The main defence
position frontage is 8 to 12 km and the depth of the position
is 3 to 5 km.
2.
Second Echelon
The second echelon occupies the second defence position.
Alternate and switch positions are prepared. The second
echelon also provides the bulk of the security zone forces.
The second defence position is some 3 to 7 km to the rear of
the main defence position. The frontage of the second
defence position is the same as the main defence position,
the depth of the second defence position is 3 to 5 km.
3.
Commander’s
Reserve
Located to the front of the second defence position. Contains
a high proportion of armour and anti-armour forces.
Deployed by divisional commander to stem penetration
between brigades and cover likely enemy penetration axes.
4.
Counter-attack
Reserve
Mobile force formed from second echelon forces. Counterattacks penetrations once they have been halted. Normally
located in area of, or to the front of, the second echelon
forces deployed on the authority of the army or divisional
commander.
5.
BrAG headquarters
(HQ)
Artillery decentralised prior to the main assault. The BrAG is
located behind the first echelon troops in or directly behind
the main defence position some 3 to 6 km from the FEBA.
6.
DAG HQ
Deployed in the second defence position some 6 to 12 km
from the FEBA.
7.
FFR Battalion
10 to 16 km from the FEBA.
8.
MBRL Battalion
9.
Air Defence
Priority of protection is given to HQs, artillery emplacements,
mobile elements of the second echelon and reserves.
10.
Engineers
Assist in the preparation of defensive positions, obstacles
and preparing access for mobile reserves.
11.
Brigade Main CP
12.
Divisional Forward
CP
If formed, 6 to 8 km from the FEBA.
13.
Divisional Main CP
8 to 12 km from FEBA, in the area of second echelon forces.
14.
Divisional Rear CP
To the rear of second echelon forces.
15.
Logistic and Rear
Service Units
Medical facilities from division located behind the main
defence position for forward casualties. These are evacuated
to rear of second defence position. The rest of logistic and
rear services are located behind the second defence position
out of enemy artillery range if possible.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-26
SECTION 3-3.
MOBILE DEFENCE
General
3.54
Mobile defence is employed by Musorian forces when the terrain on which it is
conducted is not considered critical, thereby allowing space to be traded for time.
Maximum casualties are inflicted without becoming decisively engaged. Opportunities
are constantly sought to set up ambushes and traps for the advancing opposition. Mobile
defence offers sufficient continuous resistance to prevent infiltration and to force the
enemy to concentrate and deploy for deliberate attacks.
3.55
Mobile defence is conducted as a series of defensive battles fought at previously
designated lines of resistance forward of a final interception line. It is characterised by
surprise, limited counter-attacks and ambushes carried out in strength. First echelon
forces engage the enemy at long range causing casualties and time-consuming
deployments. As the enemy advances towards the defence he is subjected to repeated
flank attacks by mobile units. Once the enemy concentrates for an attack he is engaged
heavily by indirect fire and air support. Musorian mobile forces are then likely to counterattack to exploit the disorganisation and confusion of the opposition. When threatened
with decisive combat, Musorian forces in mobile defence disengage and move back to
the next designated defence line.
3.56
The commander of an expeditionary army may order a portion of his force to conduct a
mobile defensive operation to give his main force time to prepare an area defence to the
rear or plan a counter-offensive. The period of time which the enemy must be delayed is
laid down by the corps or higher formation commander. The actions of subordinate
commanders involved in mobile defence are aimed at holding up the opposing forces for
the required time. Subordinate commanders normally select a series of delaying
positions within their areas through which they leapfrog their subordinate formations or
units. These leapfrog movements are not necessarily rearwards, but may be directed to
the flanks to avoid heavy contact. Thus, as the enemy forces advance, they expose their
flanks and rear to the defending Musorian forces.
3.57
Frontages and Depths. Some guidelines to the frontages and depths of formations and
units in mobile defence are illustrated in table 3–3.
Table 3–3:
Serial
Formation/Unit
(a)
(b)
1.
Mobile Defence Frontages and Depths
Mobile Defence
Frontage [km]
(c)
Depth [km]
(d)
Expeditionary Army
32-80
1
(80-120)
Depth varies too much for
average figures to be laid down.
2.
Division
16-24
(40-60)
3.
Brigade
6-8
(20-30)
4.
Battalion
2-4
(8-15)
5.
Company
1-1.5
(2-6)
6.
Platoon
0.5-0.7
(1-1.5)
Note:
1.
Figures in brackets are for mechanised infantry formations and units.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-27
Conduct of Divisional Mobile Defence
3.58
Mechanised Infantry Division. Musorian motor rifle divisions, with their organic mobility
and fire-power are ideal for this form of defence. They may act independently or be
allocated additional troops from the tank division to increase their capacity to conduct
mobile defence. As with area defence, a security zone and main defence zone are
established.
3.59
The Security Zone. The security force, which is controlled by the divisional commander,
normally consists of two reinforced mobile battalions drawn from the second echelon of
main defence position brigades. The security force operates some 5 to 10 kilometres in
front of the main defence position and performs the combined tasks of screening and
security forces in area defence. On completion of its allotted tasks, the security force
withdraws through the FEBA and the battalions revert to the operational control of their
respective front-line brigades.
3.60
Main Defence Zone. During mobile defence, the main defence zone extends rearwards
from the FEBA to the final interception line designated by the commander. Within the
zone there are a number of intermediate interception lines selected by the divisional
commander and from which delay is imposed on the advancing enemy and maximum
casualties inflicted. The distance between the FEBA and intermediate and final
interception lines is dependent on the total amount of delay to be imposed, the terrain
and the amount of delay which can be imposed at each intermediate interception line.
The distance between intermediate interception lines should be sufficient to ensure that
opposing forces have to make successive deployments in order to attack each in turn as
they advance. At divisional level the distance between intermediate interception lines
may be in the vicinity of 30 to 50 kilometres. Intermediate and final interception lines are
divided into main defence and second defence positions as in area defence. Two
brigades, the division’s first echelon force, are deployed abreast in the main defence
position. The remaining brigade, the division’s second echelon, occupies the second
defence position in depth. The distance between main and second defence positions
may be in the vicinity of 15 to 20 kilometres.
3.61
Similarity Between Area and Mobile Defence. The similarity between mobile and area
defence ceases at this point. Within main defence positions at brigade level and below in
mobile defence, a third of the strength constitutes the first echelon while two thirds are
held back in the second echelon and as a reserve. Conversely, fire-power is deployed
with two thirds of its strength forward and one third to the rear.
3.62
Main Defence Position. At divisional level, first echelon brigades are formed into
combined arms groups supported by artillery, anti-armour, engineers and signals. The
main defence position is organised as a series of defensive belts across the divisional
front, stretching from the FEBA back towards the second defence position. Forward of,
within and to the rear of the main defence position small-scale defensive battles
involving surprise attacks, followed by rear or lateral withdrawals, are continuously
fought in an attempt to delay, fragment and exhaust enemy forces to the stage where
piecemeal destruction is possible. Initial contacts by the forward elements are vigorously
followed up by counter-attacks and fire-power concentrations from main defence position
rear elements. At no stage of this operation do Musorian forces become decisively
engaged. First echelon brigades in the main defence position gradually pull back and
withdraw through the second defence position to a new main defence position on the
next interception line.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-28
3.63
The Second Defence Position. At divisional level this is normally occupied by the third
brigade, the remainder of the division’s organic strength, the divisional counter-attack
force and troops allotted from corps not deployed in the first main position. The second
defence position is organised as an area defence or mobile defence, depending on
whether the divisional concept is to conduct further mobile defence operations rearwards
or use the second defence position as a stepping stone for a divisional counter-attack,
leading to a new counter-offensive. The second defence position assists in the
withdrawal of the first echelon troops as they move back from the old main defence
position to a main defence position on a new intermediate interception line. The second
defence position, as well as providing a firm base, also conducts small-scale defensive
battles to further weaken the opposing forces and cause casualties. If the division is
moving back to a new interception line, then the second main position slowly moves
rearwards and eventually passes through the new main defence position to a new
second defence position. If the division feels that the opposing forces have been
weakened sufficiently or become overextended, then the divisional commander may
decide to launch his divisional counter-attack force through the second defence position
to take advantage of the situation and destroy the advancing enemy.
3.64
Counter-attack. The tank brigade/battalion is normally designated as the divisional
counter-attack force and is located in or to the rear of the second defence position. It is
not launched by the divisional commander until he is certain that the enemy forces have
been weakened sufficiently or become disorganised so that they will be destroyed by the
counter-attack. The divisional counter-attack force in mobile defence, unlike area
defence, is directly controlled by the divisional commander and is committed on his
authority.
3.65
Stepping Back. The stepping back process in the main defence zone from one
intermediate interception line to another continues until the final interception line is
reached, the purpose of the mobile defence operation is achieved, or the enemy shows
signs of weakening. In the latter case, a divisional counter-attack is launched and the
Musorian forces move over to the counter-offensive.
3.66
Artillery in Mobile Defence. In area defence, the fire plan is centralised at expeditionary
army and divisional level. However, in mobile defence, the planning and employment of
artillery are delegated to subordinate commanders so that fire is responsive to rapidly
changing tactical situations. The organisation of artillery is similar to that in area defence
and a DAG and BrAG are established; however, both are deployed closer to the FEBA
providing direct support to battalions and brigades. Roving groups are also formed and
are normally deployed in the security zone or main defence zone as part of a combined
arms team.
3.67
Anti-armour. The majority of anti-armour weapons are allocated to front-line units to
counter potential tank threats. Front-line units are responsible for planning their own antiarmour defence.
3.68
Air Defence Artillery. Air defence artillery remains essentially the same as for area
defence. In mobile defence there is a need for greater mobility.
3.69
Engineers. Engineer tasks are similar to those in area defence. However, greater
emphasis is placed on the preparation of obstacles and withdrawal routes.
3.70
Communications. There is greater use of radio communications rather than line in
mobile defence. Communications are a vital element of coordination and control in
mobile defence.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-29
SECTION 3-4.
3.71
DELAYING ACTION
The Musorian delaying action differs little from mobile defence in the application of
tactical principles. Delaying action is not discussed further.
SECTION 3-5.
THE WITHDRAWAL
General
3.72
Musorian forces conduct a general withdrawal when it is necessary to disengage forces
from combat with the enemy. Whenever possible, withdrawals are carried out at night.
Formations and units operating as part of a larger force may only withdraw on the orders
of a superior commander. However, a formation or unit on an independent task may
withdraw at its commander’s discretion, subject to the general instructions received from
a superior commander.
3.73
Though local withdrawals are normal in area defence operations, general withdrawals by
Musorian forces are uncommon and delaying actions are considered preferable. A
general withdrawal is planned in detail. The withdrawal normally takes place on a broad
front and, if not in darkness, under cover of smoke and artillery fire. Limited armour
counter-attacks may precede withdrawals and rearguards are always used. Extensive
use is made of flank security forces to block outflanking and enveloping attempts by the
enemy. Conventional artillery support is used to assist rearguard operations and to help
in the blocking of flank and enveloping threats. Key terrain features along the route
including defiles, bridges and road junctions are occupied by elements of the
withdrawing force until the main body has passed through.
Infantry in the Withdrawal
3.74
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Division. During the withdrawal of an infantry division, the
forward brigades holding the main defence position are withdrawn through the brigade
holding the second defence position to selected brigade AAs. Forward brigades then
move in march column to the divisional AA. The divisional march column is then formed
and movement to the rear continues. The rear brigade concentrates, moves to the
divisional AA and then to the rear. This brigade forms the rearguard for the divisional
move.
3.75
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Brigade. The withdrawal of an infantry brigade takes place
in a number of phases:
a. Phase 1. Companies closest to the FEBA, less delaying and covering forces, move
to company AAs. This part of the withdrawal is also covered by the battalion’s
second echelon.
b. Phases 2 and 3. Forward company covering forces and company delaying elements
move to AAs.
c.
Phase 4. Forward battalion second echelons, less delaying and covering forces,
disengage and withdraw to company AAs. Concurrently, first echelon move to
battalion AAs.
d. Phases 5 and 6. The disengagement and withdrawal of the remaining forward
battalion covering forces and delaying elements completes the withdrawal of the
brigade first echelon.
e. Phases 7, 8 and 9. The brigade second echelon disengages and withdraws in the
same manner as the first echelon. Concurrently, first echelon battalions move to the
brigade AA and on orders from the division the brigade moves to the divisional AA.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-30
3.76
Following the arrival of the last brigade at the divisional AA, the division’s covering force
is completely withdrawn. The withdrawal is protected by rearguards and flank guards
which occupy defensive positions astride the withdrawal routes.
3.77
Infantry/Motorised Infantry Battalion. The withdrawal of an infantry battalion takes
place as follows:
a. To provide security, a battalion, when it moves, leaves delaying and covering
elements. These elements are allotted additional automatic weapons to increase
their fire-power and usually consist of a section or a platoon from each forward
company.
b. Battalion heavy weapons located in forward companies are withdrawn first. Mortars
remain in action to cover the withdrawal of forward elements.
c.
Forward companies withdraw simultaneously with platoons on separate routes,
leaving behind their covering and delaying elements. The platoons rendezvous in a
designated company AA behind the rear company. Once concentrated, companies
move back in march column to the battalion AA and then on to the brigade AA.
d. Once the forward companies have concentrated, the rear company withdraws,
concentrates into march column and moves back to the battalion AA and then to the
brigade AA.
e. Delaying and covering elements continue their deception activities until the last
possible moment. Various deception measures are employed including ambushes
and raids forward of the defensive position. When the time for their withdrawal
arrives, delaying and covering elements move quickly from the abandoned position.
However, if the situation demands, delaying elements are expected to remain and
fight until overrun.
f.
Once a clear break is achieved, troops move rapidly to the rear. A covering platoon
is redeployed, if necessary, in front of the battalion AA to protect the assembly and
march column of the battalion.
Mechanised Infantry and Tank Forces in the Withdrawal
3.78
Whenever possible, mechanised infantry and tank units are assigned to cover the
disengagement of the main force. These units remain in the forward battalion areas to
represent an unchanged defence pattern and to confuse and deceive the enemy. They
begin to withdraw when the main body has passed through the rearguard.
3.79
When mechanised infantry and tank units are involved in the withdrawal-rear-guards are
always used. These rearguards normally consist of mechanised infantry units reinforced
by tanks and engineer units. Rearguard elements hold a series of defensive lines in
succession. They fall back as enemy pressure increases, but not before forcing the
enemy to deploy, thus delaying him and gaining additional time for the withdrawing main
force to make a clean break.
3.80
Extensive use is made of flank mechanised infantry and tank security forces in order to
block flanking and envelopment attempts by the enemy. These forces, normally
reinforced by anti-armour and engineer units, move along the flanks to allow Musorian
forces to withdraw in relative safety.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-31
3.81
Artillery in the Withdrawal. Musorian doctrine emphasises fire-power in the withdrawal,
but not to the extent that artillery weapons are likely to be lost to the enemy, or slow
down the withdrawal. Once the withdrawal has started, speed of movement is paramount
and roads in forward areas are kept clear for forward units. In many instances, guns are
moved to the rear before the withdrawal starts and only provide support from extreme
range. However, guns may be redeployed to support rearguard and flank guards if
required.
SECTION 3-6.
3.82
THE RETIREMENT
The retirement is a defensive operation following a successful disengagement that
enables friendly forces to move back without direct pressure being exerted on them.
Retirement consists of a withdrawal followed by a tactical march away from the enemy.
The tactical march is conducted in the same manner as the advance to contact in the
offensive, however:
a. A strong rearguard is deployed and generally maintains contact with the enemy.
b. The ultimate destination of the retiring force is normally an AA or location from which
to prepare for subsequent counter-offensive or area defence operations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
3-32
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-1
CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
SECTION 4-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
4.1
Musoria employs the general term ‘special operations’ to describe operations conducted
for military, political or economic purposes within an area occupied by the enemy and
which make use of the local inhabitants and resources. Musoria considers
unconventional warfare to be a legitimate means of achieving specific political aims
outside Musorian territory when other avenues fail. The Musorian principles of war
governing the conduct of special operations are similar to those outlined for conventional
operations, although the emphasis may vary to suit the objective.
4.2
The Musorians will plan a special operations campaign to support the achievement of
their national political objectives. Accordingly, the sequence and nature of these
operations will be subject to political constraints, and the Musorians have developed
appropriate supporting doctrine which is applicable throughout South-East Asia, the
South-West Pacific and the Australasian regions.
Campaign Planning
4.3
General. A Musorian special operations campaign against a target country will probably
be characterised by intermittent minor actions, involving well-armed forces up to
battalion strength well versed in the arts of deception and surprise. The Musorians will
decide when and where to fight, avoiding the target country’s defence forces when
appropriate, and exploiting vulnerabilities caused by terrain, distance and weather. The
pattern of these incidents will be unpredictable and intended to force the target country
to spread its military resources over as wide an area as possible. Many of these
incidents may be executed utilising civil as well as military assets. This could include
light aircraft, small trading vessels and fishing boats. Musoria, doctrinally, currently has
two categories of special operations; non-violent and violent. Musorian campaigns favour
operations that have a low military risk factor but offer the greatest political benefit.
4.4
Non-violent Operations. The operations that may be utilised during a non-violent
campaign include the following:
a. incursions into sea and air space of the target country (including overflight of vital
assets and offshore territories by civil or military aircraft);
b. harassment of merchant, fishing and naval vessels by Musorian civil, naval and air
force elements;
c.
harassment of civil and military aircraft by Musorian Air Force elements; and
d. propaganda and psychological operations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-2
4.5
Violent Operations. The following violent operations may be employed as part of a
special operations campaign:
a. direct attacks on the target country’s merchant and naval vessels;
b. mining of the country’s ports and maritime approaches;
c.
air attacks on targets located offshore or on the mainland;
d. sabotage of vital assets located in the target country and/or offshore, including those
on offshore territories;
e. raids on vital assets, population centres and settlements in the target country,
including those on offshore territories; and
f.
state-sponsored terrorism within the country and/or associated supporting nations of
the target country.
Campaign Phases
4.6
Musoria tends to escalate an unconventional low-intensity operation through a number of
phases. These phases (usually three) are as follows:
a. Preliminary Phase. The preliminary phase is characterised by deteriorating relations
with the target nation and is likely to involve a series of deniable or disavowable
actions. The following actions may occur during this phase:
(1) Landing and transit rights for civil and military aircraft and shipping through
Musorian-controlled areas may be restricted or denied. The Musorians would
attempt to manipulate international, specifically regional, opinion with a
propaganda and psychological operations programme to support their political
aims.
(2) As a dispute deepened, a broader range of measures might be used against the
target country. The target country’s nationals, including diplomats, business
personnel, media representatives and tourists in Musoria may be specifically
targeted for harassment. The Musorians could provide covert support to criminal
organisations operating in the target country (for example, drug runners,
smugglers and illegal immigrant rings) whose intensified activities would place
increased pressure on the target country’s authorities.
(3) Musorian fishing and other civilian vessels, with the tacit agreement and support
of their government, might operate illegally within the target country’s fishing
zone and possibly engage in non-violent confrontation with civil and law
enforcement vessels.
(4) Hostile acts, displays of hostile intent, acts of terrorism and sabotage may be
supported or undertaken anywhere within the target country’s territory, including
continental and offshore vital assets, islands and territories.
(5) Reconnaissance of targets, particularly in the target country, would be
conducted, either covertly or clandestinely.
(6) Musorian agents would attempt to foment civil unrest by aiding and abetting
issue-motivated groups within the target country, and providing advisers, funds
and equipment.
(7) Chemical and biological agents, especially those harmful to the target country’s
agriculture, could be introduced.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-3
b. Low-level Phase. Musoria may choose to intensify the conflict by inserting small
numbers of armed personnel into the target country to conduct raiding operations.
Possible targets (identified in the preliminary phase) could include major military or
civil installations. However, the focus may be on more vulnerable and isolated
elements of the nation’s infrastructure such as communications and transport links
and facilities supporting remote settlements, or even the remote settlements
themselves.
c.
Escalated Low-level Phase. In this final phase, Musoria may increase the frequency
and scale of raids and would probably conduct air attacks against the target
country’s vital assets and population centres. In this phase, the Musorians may be
prepared to either supplement or substitute unconventional tactics and forces with
military units prepared to confront the target country’s armed forces directly, in a
more conventional setting. It is at this point that the unconventional nature of the
conflict ceases. The forces employed by the Musorians, at this initial transition stage,
could well remain SF personnel from the SOC (for example, raider brigade [RB] or
the airborne brigade). If the conflict escalates further, the Musorians are most likely
to deploy an expeditionary army based on one of the military regions.
Command, Control and Communications
4.7
Musorian special operations are joint in nature. For special operations campaigns,
command is retained at the highest level, i.e. at Supreme High Command Headquarters.
Commander SOC is responsible for the planning and conduct of all special operations
campaigns. While operational level command of a special operations campaign is
exercised from Musoria, tactical command may be exercised from:
a. a headquarters established in a neighbouring country or colony;
b. a headquarters established in the target country;
c.
a seaborne C2 centre;
d. a Musorian or pro-Musorian embassy in the target country; or
e. from Musoria itself, using long-range communications.
Command and Control in the Target Country
4.8
Although Musorian SF operations are mission-specific, the MAF still acknowledges the
problems associated with commanding and controlling forces deployed to a
neighbouring or regional nation. SOC operations against the guerrilla forces operating in
Kamlipua have, however, given the Musorian SF personnel extensive experience in C2
in a ‘foreign’ nation. Large scale raids will, generally, have a tactical headquarters
inserted into the target area. The problems of greatest concern to the SOC are:
a. the vulnerability of long-range communications; and
b. the difficulty of retasking inserted forces (would only occur under exceptional
circumstances).
Communications
4.9
The Musorian military communications consist of high capacity microwave and satellite
communications with back-up high frequency (HF) facilities. Medium earth stations are
located in the Capital Region and small earth stations are located throughout the
country. Musorian-sponsored small earth stations are also located on the islands of
Kamlipua.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-4
4.10
The MAF has purchased a variety of modern communications equipment for use in
special operations and issued this to the SOC. The equipment, which is allocated down
to the smallest tactical unit involved in an operation, includes secure burst transmission
HF radios and a small number of frequency-hopping HF radios.
4.11
The SOC also uses a variety of covert techniques for communications where
appropriate. These include:
a. brush contacts,
b. dead letter boxes,
c.
microdot messages using a variety of materials,
d. encoded messages in overt letters to sympathisers and agents, and
e. encoded messages in overt radio and television transmissions.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance
4.12
General. Musoria conducts a broad range of reconnaissance and surveillance activities
throughout the region. These activities are carried out by Musorian Government civilian
employees, MAF personnel (particularly members of SOC) and members of the DMI.
While the Musorians consider extensive clandestine and covert reconnaissance and
surveillance to be vital to their success in special operations campaigns, the costs in
terms of time and resources has led to full-scale reconnaissance being conducted
against only a few regional nations. Some of the types of reconnaissance and
surveillance techniques utilised by Musoria within a target country may include:
a. the use of ‘tourism’ as a cover for reconnaissance;
b. the purchase of assets in the target country for utilisation by agent networks;
c.
establishment of links within dissident groups;
d. establishment of joint trade and cultural associations;
e. establishment of consulates in operationally important locations;
f.
use of Musoria aircraft as platforms for aerial reconnaissance;
g. use of Musorian merchant and fishing vessels for hydrographic and oceanographic
research;
h. recruitment of target country nationals to work in pro-Musorian front organisations;
and
i.
use of third country assets (particularly Kamlipua).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-5
4.13
Military-specific Activities. Historically, the MAF takes advantage of every opportunity
to travel widely and conduct reconnaissance activities within the target country during
the preliminary phase of a campaign. The actual members of the assigned force may be
inserted for close reconnaissance, or a separate group may be utilised. Extensive
collection of open source material needed for the planning and conduct of operations will
occur and filming and photographing of targets will take place. Aids for target
identification and navigation may be installed. Further to the methods listed previously,
the MAF reconnaissance and surveillance activities may include:
a. clandestine use of submarines for hydrographic and oceanographic research and
reconnaissance in the target country’s territorial waters;
b. covert use of fishing vessels with MAF crews for reconnaissance and the
establishment of caches;
c.
covert over-flights by civilian aircraft with MAF crews to establish target country
surveillance capabilities; and
d. covert incursions by civilian aircraft with MAF crews to establish caches and insert
and extract agents.
4.14
Close Reconnaissance. Close reconnaissance of the enemy and the objective may be
conducted for periods of days or weeks by any of the selected reconnaissance team.
Following thorough briefings, the reconnaissance element, once deployed, will produce
detailed sketches or photographs of the objective from a number of vantage points,
paying particular attention to natural and artificial obstacles and cover. Daily routine at
the objective is noted, as is the location of all security posts or strong points. Manning
and equipment at the objective is recorded as well as the nearest units capable of
responding in support, together with an estimate of the time and capacity to respond.
Routes by which an enemy may advance or withdraw in response to an attack are also
detailed. Efforts are made to gather all possible biographical data on significant civilian
and military leaders within the vicinity of the objective in an effort to assess the likely
response to an attack and to identify targets for ‘neutralisation’.
Characteristics
4.15
General. MAF special operations are meticulously planned, are rehearsed in detail
whenever possible, and are characterised by surprise, speed, seizure of the initiative,
manoeuvre and mobility. SOC Commanders are adept at using local resources to assist
in achieving their mission.
4.16
Musorian doctrine also stresses unity of command and effort, from the initial planning
stages through to the completion of the operation. The Musorians emphasise detailed
planning and adherence to orders in the execution of operations, but there is evidence
that SOC Commanders have greater opportunity for improvisation and use of
unorthodox tactics when employed on special operations tasks. Detailed compilation of
information on the enemy, terrain and the local situation is the most prominent
characteristic of MAF military planning.
4.17
MAF SF personnel will be organised and equipped for each specific operation and will
be logistically self-sufficent for short periods. The possibility of resupply from within the
target country cannot be discounted and it can be assumed that caches and supply
networks would exist. To gain tactical mobility, it is possible that transport may be
inserted with a force, stolen or covertly supplied by agents in place. Normally, however,
forces are likely to be inserted close to the objective. Pre-positioning of stores and
preparation of equipment may be carried out several months prior to actual operations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-6
Targeting Criteria
4.18
Most potential targets for Musorian offensive action are contained in well-defined, but
widely dispersed, areas within 200 kilometres of the target nation’s coastline. The
following factors are considered by the Musorians when selecting targets:
a. Importance. The likely political impact of a successful attack on a target will be the
major consideration in deciding its importance. Military results alone will be a
secondary factor unless they lead to a significant reduction in the capacity of the
target country’s defence force to conduct operations. Accordingly, targets likely to be
attacked could be civilian rather than military. Even remote settlements could be a
worthwhile military target, although not important in a conventional military sense.
b. Vulnerability. Target vulnerability is a function of its purpose, location, size and the
degree to which it is protected. Attacking poorly protected targets has the added
advantage of creating pressure on the target country’s defence force to increase the
allocation of its resources to protective tasks, thereby diminishing its capacity to
carry out offensive operations and possibly exposing previously protected targets to
attack. Regional wet seasons will inhibit the mobility of both Musorian and the target
country’s forces, but may also increase the vulnerability of some potential targets.
Large flood plains and the increased capacity of rivers and streams will tend to
channel forces on foot or in vehicles along roads and high ground. During the wet
season, waterways may also provide increased opportunity for the deployment of
MAF forces.
c.
Location. The targeting of more widely dispersed assets will place greater pressure
on the target country’s defence forces. However, military or other action against
targets in more developed areas cannot be discounted.
d. Access. Access to targets will be influenced by distance, terrain, weather, the means
of insertion and extraction available to the MAF, the tactical mobility of the inserted
force and the target country’s defence force presence or threat. Therefore, it is likely
that targets on or close to the coast may be more likely to be attacked because they
are more accessible than targets in a nation’s interior.
e. Reconstitution. A target which can be repaired quickly after damage or destruction
will generally be less attractive to the Musorians than one whose serviceability would
have a protracted and adverse effect on the target country’s civilian community,
economy or defence.
Deception
4.19
Purpose. The Musorians place great emphasis on deception to mask the insertion,
extraction and resupply of forces in special operations. Deception is an important part of
Musorian campaign planning. Musorian doctrine recognises three levels of deception:
strategic, operational and tactical.
4.20
Strategic Deception. Strategic deception is employed to deceive an enemy as to the
likelihood and timing of Musoria’s committing a force to resolve a conflict or to protect its
national security interests. It is by nature longer term, conducted on an elaborate scale,
and is usually subject to political constraints. It may also disguise the actual commitment
of Musorian forces.
4.21
Operational Deception. Operational deception endeavours to deceive an enemy
regarding the time, place, strength and nature of an intended Musorian campaign.
Operational deception may support the strategic effort and the distinction between
strategic and operational deception may not always be clear, particularly since it may
involve naval, land and air forces acting together.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-7
4.22
Tactical Deception. Tactical deception is undertaken to achieve surprise on the
battlefield. In special operations this deception is usually planned at formation level and
executed at unit level in the field. Covert and clandestine operations may also be
employed. Common tactical deception methods utilised by the SOC include the
following:
a. electronic deception,
b. dummy air-drops and air-landings,
c.
false reporting of ships and aircraft in distress,
d. masking operations with legitimate activities such as fishing, and
e. use of aircraft and vessels utilising the military and civil markings of the target
country.
Propaganda
4.23
Propaganda is regarded by the Musorians as an important element at any level of war.
They emphasise its value in special operations, where it is closely linked to the denial of
responsibility for operations. A common trait of Musorian propaganda is to attribute MAF
operations to internal dissent within a target country. Musoria then accuses the target
government of blaming the Musorian government for acts of aggression for the target
country’s own political ends. Musorian propaganda also often attempts to link hostile
acts to a third party.
4.24
Musorian propaganda will be generated from within the Musorian media and through
pro-Musorian organisations in the target country. Clandestine networks in the target
country can be expected to use propaganda and subversion to:
a. strike directly at the target country’s defence force;
b. test the resolve of the target country’s government;
c.
attack the will to fight of the target country’s population; and
d. enlist various levels of support for its operation within the target country.
Types of Operations
4.25
Harassment. Musorian harassment consists of actions to harry, disrupt or hinder the
operations of a nation, force or unit, short of weapon engagement or attack, and is
regarded as a particularly useful technique in all phases of a special operations
campaign. While the levels of harassment may vary in each phase of a campaign, as
may the particular methods used, it is important to note the differences between
harassment and hostile acts in Musorian doctrine. The aims of harassment are:
a. to assist in deception operations;
b. to act as a precursor to large-scale operations;
c.
to force the target country to deploy security forces; and
d. to demonstrate the target country’s inability to maintain its own security.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-8
4.26
Other Hostile Acts. In the preliminary phases of a special operations campaign, a
number of hostile acts may occur. These actions are normally a task for covert elements
of the MAF since deniability is a prime consideration for success. Often these acts will
aim to portray civil unrest or criminal disorder in the target country. Hostile acts
committed as part of the preliminary phase of a special operations campaign may
include:
a. assassination of local community figures;
b. random nuisance mining and booby trapping;
c.
ambushes;
d. destruction of navigation beacons;
e. acts of sabotage (see below);
f.
sniping; and
g. criminal activities, for example arson.
4.27
Sabotage. Musorian doctrine regards sabotage as an act, falling short of a military
operation, which is intended to:
a. damage, destroy or neutralise important national assets;
b. disrupt and harass the civilian population;
c.
aid and encourage dissident groups within the target country;
d. act as a deception measure;
e. assist in the undetected insertion and extraction of forces; and
f.
4.28
destroy confidence in the capabilities of the target country’s defence forces.
Sabotage may be carried out by Musorian forces inserted for a specific mission, by
Musorian agents operating in the target country, or by dissident groups aided by
Musorian agents. Sabotage may be:
a. Overt. Overt sabotage occurs when the results of a mission are obviously due to an
act of sabotage, for example a bomb explosion. An act of sabotage may be made
overt by a claim of responsibility.
b. Covert. Covert sabotage occurs when the results of the mission are not able to be
confirmed as being due to sabotage.
4.29
Route Denial. Route denial is an operational technique favoured by the SOC since it
can be used to create pressure on a target government with minimal effort. The
Musorian concept of route denial includes measures taken to interrupt or destroy:
a. roads, rail links and bridges;
b. domestic and international air routes;
c.
rivers, canals and other inland waterways; and
d. coastal and international shipping routes.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-9
4.30
Raids. The Musorians regard raids as an important aspect of special operations
because they offer advantages of unpredictability, deniability and psychological impact.
Raids are used by the SOC to:
a. destroy target country assets which threaten the success of operations;
b. create and maintain a lack of confidence in the target country’s government;
c.
destroy the credibility of the target country’s defence forces;
d. support dissident groups; and
e. act as a means of deception.
4.31
While raids may be conducted during any phase of a special operations campaign, the
emphasis will be on the deniability of operations during the early stages. During the later
stages deniability will be of lesser importance. The SOC principles governing the
conduct of raids are:
a. thorough reconnaissance,
b. thorough rehearsal,
c.
limited objectives,
d. centralised planning, and
e. centralised control.
4.32
The characteristics of SOC raids are:
a. maximum support to a limited number of ground forces;
b. short duration, but may include the seizing and holding of foreign territory for a
limited period;
c.
confined to a specific geographical area of operations; and
d. a lack of mission flexibility, that is, raids are mission-specific and the changing of a
mission once a force has deployed will only occur under exceptional circumstances.
4.33
The size of a raiding force will vary according to the target and raid objectives. The
constraints limiting the size of a raiding force are:
a. logistic support,
b. method of insertion and extraction, and
c.
4.34
the requirement to achieve maximum disruption at minimal cost.
Terrorism. The Musorian Government claims to have renounced the use of terrorism as
an instrument of national strategy, but it is known to have used state-sponsored
terrorism in the past, to achieve its political ends. The Musorians may use terrorism to:
a. act as a deception measure;
b. promote instability within the target country;
c.
commit the target country’s defence force to areas away from the MAF principal
focus of operations;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-10
d. attack those elements of the target country’s defence forces most vital to the
conduct of operations; and
e. eliminate members of the target country’s defence force and government.
Administrative Support to Special Operations
4.35
General. As a result of deniability and operational constraints (for example, compromise
by detected resupply), Musorian forces inserted into a target country will probably suffer
significant administrative support problems particularly during prolonged operations.
While problems may be encountered obtaining rations, water and basic stores support, it
is likely that far greater problems will be experienced in other areas, such as:
a. obtaining weapon parts;
b. maintaining ammunition stocks;
c.
provision of medical care and medical evacuation (medevac);
d. provision of parts for specialist equipment, especially communications equipment;
and
e. provision of transport.
4.36
Effect on Operations. Unreliable support available to forces engaged in special
operations operations has a number of consequences, including:
a. tendency for forces to be inserted for very limited periods, thus avoiding the need for
resupply;
b. preference for operations to be conducted close to the coast, airstrips, drop zones
(DZs) and landing zones (LZs); and
c.
extensive use of covert and clandestine support elements.
Self-sufficiency in the Area of Operations
4.37
Preliminary Caching. Many operations are likely to be supported by a programme of
preliminary caching. Generally, caches will be established for those operations longer
than 10 to 14 days. Where possible, caches will be established at or near the points of
insertion and the target. Caches may be established by Musorian elements already
operating in the target country, by local sympathisers, by Musorian agents or by caching
parties from Musoria.
4.38
Foraging. Musorian special operations doctrine emphasises foraging as an operational
skill to:
a. reduce individual loads on deployment,
b. increase the time between resupply,
c.
reduce the reliance on caches and the associated risk of compromise, and
d. provide experience in the area of operations in the event that evasion and escape is
required.
4.39
Theft. To reduce the likelihood of compromise, the theft of items required to support
operations is not encouraged by Musorian doctrine, but, in extreme cases of need it is
condoned.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-11
4.40
Sympathisers. The extent of sympathy for Musoria throughout the region is unknown,
but it should be assumed that it does exist. These sympathisers may provide safe
houses, stock and restock caches, provide medical assistance, provide transport, act as
couriers and provide communications.
4.41
Purchasing. Purchasing of the required support may be attempted, particularly during
the reconnaissance phase of operations. SOC personnel may, in the initial stages if, for
example, they are operating as tourists, purchase items for caching. However, as the
operation proceeds and becomes more open and the risk of compromise increases, this
option will become less attractive.
4.42
Third Country Support. Third countries may support Musorian activities against a
particular nation within the region, although it is unlikely that this support would be
decisive within the target country.
Conclusion
4.43
Musoria has well developed doctrine for the planning and conduct of a special
operations campaign and supporting operations. It has joint C2 doctrine and procedures,
and has developed the communications capabilities to support those arrangements.
Musoria has conducted broad reconnaissance and surveillance operations throughout
the region, and comprehensive studies of several nations.
4.44
The Musorians have developed relatively sophisticated procedures and doctrine for the
targeting, planning and execution of a range of violent and non-violent unconventional
operations in the maritime, land and air environments. Musoria is further developing the
capabilities required to conduct such operations. It currently possesses the maritime,
land and air capabilities needed to conduct covert, clandestine and overt special
operations campaigns throughout the region. Additionally, the Musorians recognise the
value of, and employ, deception and propaganda in the support of special operations
campaigns.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
4-12
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-1
PART TWO.
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 5
RECONNAISSANCE
SECTION 5-1.
INTRODUCTION
5.1
The MAF views reconnaissance as a critical element of combat support. Its vision of
future combat is a battlefield developing unevenly and neither units nor formations being
able to rely on the security of their flanks or rear. Friendly and enemy forces will become
mixed, with the combat situation developing and changing quickly. Reconnaissance
elements must warn commanders of developing threats and identify enemy strengths
and vulnerabilities. Obtaining this information is critical to the effective employment of the
MAF troop control system. MAF reconnaissance can decisively influence the outcome of
a battle, operation, or campaign.
5.2
Reconnaissance is especially important with MAF emphasis on the destruction of enemy
high precision weapons and the conduct of high speed, continuous combined arms
operations. MAF commanders are taught that it is necessary to locate 75 to 80 per cent
of possible targets before launching an attack in order to have a reasonable chance of
success. Commanders attempt to locate 100 per cent of the highest priority targets such
as high-precision weapons and CPs. This degree of target location demands a high level
of skill from all levels of reconnaissance troops.
SECTION 5-2.
PRINCIPLES
General
5.3
Reconnaissance represents all measures associated with organising, collecting and
studying information on the enemy, terrain and area of upcoming operations. The history
of wars convincingly attests that only where aggressive, continuous reconnaissance is
conducted are combat missions performed in a timely manner with minimal losses. At
the same time, a poor attitude towards reconnaissance has been the cause of many
failures.
5.4
With modern combat operations characterised by a high degree of manoeuvrability at
high rates and to a great depth, the role of reconnaissance has increased in importance.
Without the decisive actions of reconnaissance forces and assets, it is impossible to preempt the enemy, seize the initiative and successfully conduct battle. The MAF uses the
following principles to guide its reconnaissance activities:
a. focus,
b. continuity,
c.
aggression,
d. timeliness,
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-2
e. accuracy, and
f.
5.5
reliability.
Because of the close interrelation of these concepts, units engaged in reconnaissance
strive to satisfy all principles simultaneously and continuously.
Focus
5.6
Focus is the strict use of all reconnaissance measures to support preparation and
successful conduct of battle and performance of missions in a phase of battle. The MAF
achieves focus in its reconnaissance by defining missions, areas and targets, based on
a thorough knowledge of the situation. The MAF executes a unified reconnaissance
plan, with centralised command and control of assets, concentrating all information
collected on the enemy in a single entity, the staff.
5.7
The actions of reconnaissance units must meet the commander’s needs. Focus
emphasises the monitoring of those elements and objectives that are critical to the
accomplishment of combat operations. Each level of command develops a
comprehensive reconnaissance plan in accordance with the unit mission.
Reconnaissance resources are scarce, so the commander must carefully define and limit
reconnaissance objectives. He must also maintain a reconnaissance reserve. The
commander concentrates his reconnaissance assets on the critical sectors of the
battlefield. He must be able to quickly redirect the reconnaissance effort, and even
change the plan if the situation changes.
Continuity
5.8
The MAF achieves continuity of reconnaissance by constant conduct of reconnaissance
during preparation for and in the course of battle. Continuous reconnaissance is
essential on the modern battlefield. It ensures the uninterrupted flow of information under
all conditions. Continuous reconnaissance provides constant coverage of the enemy
situation. To ensure continuity, the MAF employs a variety of assets with deep
overlapping coverage. MAF reconnaissance units attempt to maintain contact with the
enemy at all times, and conduct reconnaissance in all directions, including the flanks and
rear, in order to prevent surprise.
5.9
The MAF does not restrict reconnaissance efforts to a single phase of the battle or a
time of day. It collects information 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in all weather
conditions. Not only must MAF reconnaissance answer specific requests for information,
but it must continuously collect information on all aspects of the enemy, weather, and
terrain to meet future requirements. Commanders at all levels are responsible for
organising continuous reconnaissance. Reconnaissance is a combined arms mission,
not solely the business of reconnaissance troops, be they aviation, armoured or infantry.
Aggression
5.10
Aggressiveness of reconnaissance is required of all commanders, staffs and sub-units
conducting reconnaissance to collect intelligence under all conditions and by all
methods. Aggressive reconnaissance is achieved by skilful organisation of
reconnaissance forces and assets, wide use of initiative by all commanders, and bold,
decisive actions of reconnaissance elements. Reconnaissance troops conduct
intelligence collection creatively and energetically, bringing maximum assets to bear on
the battlefield to ensure success. The MAF employs all its collection assets with vigour
and adheres carefully to the reconnaissance plan. It requires its commanders to be
prepared to alter the plan when MAF initiatives or enemy actions dictate.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-3
5.11
Although reconnaissance is their primary mission, all reconnaissance units are trained to
defend themselves and conduct offensive operations. Reconnaissance units are not
used for reconnaissance by battle. Normally a manoeuvre battalion or larger combined
arms force will conduct this reconnaissance. The MAF stresses the need for initiative,
resourcefulness, and daring in the conduct of reconnaissance. MAF reconnaissance
troops attempt to penetrate enemy defences, ambush and raid enemy forces, and, as a
last resort, draw fire to determine enemy positions. In short, reconnaissance troops
aggressively do whatever is necessary to meet the commander’s intelligence needs. The
MAF reconnaissance elements would not hesitate to conduct offensive actions against
high priority targets as determined by the commander. Such targets may include
commanders at brigade level and above, nuclear delivery means or munitions or attack
helicopters on the ground.
Timeliness
5.12
Timely information is critical on the modern battlefield. Because of the high mobility of
modern armies, there are frequent and sharp changes in the battlefield situation. As a
result, information quickly becomes outdated. Timely reporting enables the commander
to exploit temporary enemy vulnerabilities, adjusting his plans to fit a changing battlefield
situation. The MAF achieves timeliness through increased automation for troop control
and processing of information, near real-time aerial down links, and satellite down links.
Accuracy
5.13
The MAF uses all available reconnaissance means to verify the accuracy of reported
information. An MAF commander bases his decisions on reconnaissance information;
thus, the more accurate and complete the information, the better the decision. By
comparing and crosschecking reports, the MAF commander tries to overcome enemy
deception and concealment. The MAF tries to achieve accuracy through the creation of
overlapping coverage and improved technology. It continues to upgrade equipment
capabilities without significantly increasing personnel.
Reliability
5.14
Reliability of reconnaissance is achieved through the collection of intelligence tailored to
the tactical situation and identifying and assessing diversionary and false enemy
intentions, actions, and targets. Reliability is attained by selection and distribution of
reconnaissance forces in terms of missions and targets in accordance with their
capabilities. Information gained must be constantly reviewed and confirmed in order to
be of value. The accuracy and reliability of reconnaissance information is critical to the
destruction of high-precision weapons, logistics centres, C2, and communications.
SECTION 5-3.
ZONES OF RECONNAISSANCE RESPONSIBILITY
General
5.15
Each headquarters, from division to battalion, has a zone of reconnaissance
responsibility, subdivided into three parts. The parts are defined as follows:
a. Detailed Reconnaissance Zone. The depth of this zone is determined by the
effective range beyond the forward edge of the weapon systems commanded by the
headquarters.
b. General Reconnaissance Zone. Within this zone, the headquarters must be able to
monitor sufficient enemy activity to ensure its own plans are not disturbed by
unexpected enemy moves.
c.
Rear Reconnaissance Zone. Within its own rear area, the headquarters must be
able to monitor enemy activity, particularly the use of chemical strikes or airmobile
forces.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-4
5.16
The width of the zone of reconnaissance responsibility broadly equates to the
headquarters’ frontage of operations, but the general reconnaissance zone may overlap
into the zones of flanking elements.
Resources
5.17
Tactical reconnaissance supports division and lower echelons. Divisions, brigades and
battalions carry out tactical reconnaissance; however, armies/army corps can provide
tactical intelligence in support of division/brigade combat activities. Figure 5–1 illustrates
the employment of division tactical reconnaissance assets. The reconnaissance
information of interest to an MAF divisional commander concerns the enemy and terrain
directly opposite him on the battlefield out to a depth of 100 to 150 kilometres. His own
reconnaissance assets are not adequate to cover his entire area of responsibility. As a
result, higher command support is vital to the performance of the division’s missions. In
addition to dedicated ground reconnaissance units, the MAF employs chemical, artillery,
engineer, RPV, and radio intercept and DF units to gather tactical reconnaissance
information.
Figure 5–1:
Employment of Tactical Reconnaissance Assets
(Against Partially Prepared Defence)
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-5
Reconnaissance Troop Control
5.18
Within division and brigade headquarters, the chief of reconnaissance (COR) is
responsible for organising reconnaissance in accordance with the commander’s plan. In
the battalions, the chief of staff is responsible for planning and organising
reconnaissance, based on the commander’s guidance. Divisions and brigades organise
specific radio nets to link reconnaissance sub-units with the headquarters. Battalions
monitor this net, especially when operating independently of the main body, but do not
usually maintain a specific reconnaissance net. Every level of command is expected to
maintain a reconnaissance reserve to be tasked for missions that arise during the course
of battle.
Chief of Reconnaissance
5.19
At the division or brigade level, the COR works for and reports to the chief of staff. The
chief of staff has overall responsibility for providing the necessary information for the
commander to make decisions. The chief of staff has a more clearly defined role in
structuring the reconnaissance effort at this level than at higher levels. To assist him,
infantry divisions and armoured divisions have a reconnaissance asset similar to an
army/army corps but tailored to the size and mission of the division/brigade. Their
organisation provides the division/brigade commander with ground, target acquisition, air
defence, chemical, engineer, and radio electronic reconnaissance coverage throughout
his area of operations.
Division Organisations and Assets
5.20
The reconnaissance resources organic to a division are summarised below. Given the
size of the divisional area of responsibility and the level of detail required, commanders
are always likely to feel a shortage of reconnaissance assets in their sector of
responsibility.
Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion
5.21
An infantry division (infantry/motorised/mechanised) or armoured division has a
reconnaissance battalion, consisting of two reconnaissance companies, a long-range
reconnaissance company, a signals and jamming company and an REC company. It
may also include an RPV squadron. The long-range reconnaissance company operates
in small teams at distances up to 100 kilometres in advance of the division; these teams
can be inserted by parachute, helicopter, vehicle or on foot.
5.22
The two reconnaissance companies may operate as one company, forming an RD, or
can be deployed as platoon-sized RPs. The companies will operate across the divisional
frontage and to a depth of up to 50 kilometres. The RPs consist of two to three vehicles
each, operating on multiple axes, in the area between the long-range reconnaissance
company and the brigade reconnaissance company. The size and vehicle mix of each
patrol depends on the terrain, enemy strength, and the importance of the axis, with the
main axis receiving the primary reconnaissance effort.
5.23
RPV missions are planned by the division’s COR. Flight profiles vary according to the
mission. For example, surveillance missions employ a figure eight or racetrack flight
pattern, maintaining the RPV over its assigned surveillance area (see figures 5–2 and
5–3). Reconnaissance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment missions
employ a zigzag or loop flight pattern allowing thorough coverage over a specific target
area (see figures 5–4 and 5–5). Some variance to these basic flight paths can be made
at the discretion of the operators, who can take control of the RPV in order to change its
altitude, speed, direction of flight, etc.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-6
Figure 5–2:
Figure 5–3:
Figure Eight Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Racetrack Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-7
Figure 5–4:
Figure 5–5:
5.24
Zigzag Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Loop Flight Path for Remotely Piloted Vehicle
As it acquires priority point and area targets during these missions, the RPV immediately
transmits their locations via secure radio communications directly to the unit’s fire control
centre. As a rule, only general target location (within 1 to 2 kilometres) is possible;
occasionally, however, the RPV location, combined with terrain and map association,
can make it possible to determine target location to within 100 metres.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-8
Artillery Assets
5.25
There is a target acquisition battery organic to the division’s artillery brigade. This battery
has battlefield surveillance radar mounted on mobile reconnaissance post (MRP)
vehicles. Each of the brigade’s howitzer battalions also has a battlefield surveillance
radar, and each howitzer and rocket launcher battalion has artillery command and
reconnaissance vehicles (ACRVs). The mechanised and armoured division’s SAM
missile brigade has a target acquistion/early warning battery and the 57 mm anti-aircraft
gun brigade has a fire control (aerial surveillance/target acquisition) battery.
Engineer Assets
5.26
The divisional engineer battalion includes an engineer reconnaissance platoon. This
platoon has wheeled APCs for battlefield mobility.
Chemical Assets
5.27
The division’s chemical defence company has a chemical reconnaissance platoon. It
establishes chemical and radiological OPs as well as radiation patrols. The chemical
defence company can attach individual chemical and radiological specialists to elements
operating in advance of the main forces, such as advance guards, security elements, or
RPs.
Brigade Organisations and Assets
5.28
MAF infantry brigades and armoured brigades have organic reconnaissance sub-units
that include a reconnaissance company or platoon, reconnaissance elements of a
howitzer battalion, an engineer company, and a chemical protection platoon. The
brigade COR plans and coordinates the reconnaissance effort in the same manner as
the divisional COR.
Brigade Reconnaissance Company
5.29
Tank brigades have an organic reconnaissance company with two to three
reconnaissance platoons. Infantry brigades have a reconnaissance platoon. This
company/platoon normally operates 25 to 30 kilometres forward of the brigade, and can
operate out to a maximum distance of 50 kilometres. Patrols of one to three vehicles
conduct reconnaissance avoiding detection and engagement by the enemy. Patrols can
fight and may be required to conduct reconnaissance by combat.
Artillery Assets
5.30
The howitzer battalion organic to a mechanised brigade and tank brigade has its own
reconnaissance assets. These include ACRVs and MRPs with battlefield surveillance
radars. When organised for combat, the brigade may have additional artillery battalions
assigned to its BrAG. These battalions have similar reconnaissance assets, and can
bring additional radars from the target acquisition battery of the parent artillery brigade.
Engineer Assets
5.31
A brigade’s combat engineer company normally does not have a separate
reconnaissance unit. The brigade reconnaissance company often integrates engineer
specialists into the different types of RPs as the situation requires. For example, frogmen
may be attached to assist in the reconnaissance of water obstacles.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-9
Chemical Assets
5.32
A brigade’s chemical protection platoon employs three chemical reconnaissance squads.
Each squad has a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance vehicle.
These squads may reinforce the RPs formed by the brigade reconnaissance company.
Their role is to identify and mark areas of contamination, finding routes around the
contamination. They may also find the shortest route through it, and select certain areas
for decontamination. They monitor the effects of chemical or nuclear weapons and
provide warning of downwind hazards.
Battalion Organisations and Assets
5.33
Motorised/mechanised platoons may be used as RPs or combat reconnaissance patrols
(CRPs). A tank battalion uses tank platoons to provide RPs, unless an infantry sub-unit
has been attached to it.
5.34
Battalions may deploy a variety of reconnaissance groupings. A patrol vehicle on the
axis of advance is the absolute minimum, and, as the battalion approaches the enemy, a
forward patrol usually forms part of the march security grouping. In mobile battles, for
example, after penetrating the enemy’s tactical defence and in meeting battles, a CRP is
formed. When the terrain or tactical situation warrants, two or three patrols may be
formed from one battalion. In conducting reconnaissance, a battalion has a general
reconnaissance zone to a depth of up to 10 kilometres and a detailed reconnaissance
zone to a depth of up to five kilometres. The width of these zones corresponds to the
battalion’s total frontage.
Air Reconnaissance Assets
5.35
A division has a reconnaissance helicopter company with three platoons equipped with
MI-24 (Hind G2). Dedicated reconnaissance helicopters conduct visual, radio intercept,
thermal imaging, photographic and IR reconnaissance. In addition, the division’s assets
have RPVs to support reconnaissance requirements. These support intelligence
planning and targeting operations by providing real time information to the intelligence
section. Additionally, helicopters are frequently used by engineer and chemical troops to
assess routes and obstacles and areas of contamination behind the forward edge. This
is not generally done within enemy airspace, though opportunities may arise in a highly
fluid battle. Attack helicopters submit normal intelligence reports during their missions.
Reconnaissance Groupings
5.36
The MAF distinguishes between reconnaissance groupings and security groupings. An
MAF commander may send out a sub-unit to perform either reconnaissance or security,
but not both at the same time. Of course, a march security grouping provides some
reconnaissance information by reporting on what it encounters, but that is not its primary
mission. Likewise, a reconnaissance grouping provides security indirectly; by reporting
what it sees, it reduces the commander’s risk of surprise. The reconnaissance
grouping’s primary missions cause it to avoid enemy contact whenever possible, in order
to continue to collect and pass on information.
5.37
At the tactical level, ground forces employ a variety of small reconnaissance groupings,
tasked and tailored to fit the specific needs of the tactical commander in a situation.
These elements vary in size and composition from a few scouts to a battalion. They may
or may not have reinforcements as motorised or mechanised troops, tanks, artillery,
combat engineers, NBC reconnaissance assets, and other specialists.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-10
SECTION 5-4.
RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS
General
5.38
A reconnaissance element is an organic or temporarily established sub-unit (team) with
necessary reconnaissance equipment to perform a specific reconnaissance mission.
Reconnaissance elements include observers, OPs, patrol squads, RPs and CRPs,
officer RPs, RDs, reconnaissance teams and teams for conducting probing RPs and
reconnaissance ambushes.
Observer
5.39
Within a squad, platoon, or company, an observer is assigned to reconnoitre the ground
and air, enemy and terrain, and for observing the actions and position of his own subunits and adjacent units. He positions himself near the sub-unit commander and reports
everything noticed during observation to him. The observer uses all observation devices
available, such as binoculars and rangefinders, to conduct reconnaissance.
Observation Post
5.40
The OP is a team with necessary equipment and documents assigned within a battalion
for reconnoitring the ground and air enemy. The OP is also the place from which the
team performs the assigned mission. It is intended for reconnoitring the enemy in a given
sector. Elements are assigned to an OP from reconnaissance, artillery, engineer, infantry
and tank sub-units.
5.41
OPs are organised during the defence and when preparing an attack. They are
positioned on the forward edge in sub-unit combat formations or on the flanks. An OP
should have observation devices, a large scale map or diagram of the terrain,
observation log, compass, communications equipment, and equipment for giving
warning signals.
Patrol Squad
5.42
A patrol squad (patrol vehicle or tank) is, as the name implies, a single vehicle (or
dismounted squad in operations on foot) with a reconnaissance mission. Patrol squads
may be the only reconnaissance element deployed when the risk of meeting the enemy
is low. Patrol squads may also be deployed to cover the flanks or rear of a sub-unit. All
forms of patrol deploy patrol squads to the limit of their battlespace.
Reconnaissance Team
5.43
The reconnaissance team is formed from specially trained personnel of the
reconnaissance sub-unit, usually at squad strength. The reconnaissance team conducts
operations in the enemy rear to search for high-precision weapons, C2 facilities,
reserves, airfields and other targets. A reconnaissance team may be inserted into the
enemy rear by helicopters or aircraft with a parachute landing, on foot or in fighting
vehicles.
Reconnaissance Ambush Team
5.44 The reconnaissance ambush team operates at squad or platoon strength. It is used in all
types of battle: in the depth of the enemy disposition, on, and ahead of, his forward
edge, and in his rear area. Observers, a capture element and an FS element are
assigned to the team to conduct the ambush.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-11
5.45
The largest organisation the MAF employs at the tactical level to supplement specialised
reconnaissance is the RD. It is used during mobile phases of battles on the main axis, or
to reconnoitre key objectives in depth. A division or a brigade may send out a battalion or
company-strength RD. Company-sized detachments are the most common. Battalionsized detachments reconnoitre objectives that can be advantageous to seize and hold
for some time, for example a river crossing. Such a detachment may be based on a
mechanised/motorised or tank battalion, or company. The detachment may receive
reinforcements as tanks (if it is not a tank sub-unit), artillery, combat engineers, or NBC
specialists.
5.46
The RD generally deploys along an axis or a given zone along the most important
direction of the attack. Its mission is to acquire information on the terrain and the
enemy’s location or gaps in his defences. It is employed primarily in the attack but can
be used during the march in anticipation of meeting battles. In the defence, in the
absence of close contact with the enemy, an RD may be sent out forward of the security
zone to determine the enemy’s composition and main avenue of attack. The march
formation of an RD is illustrated in figure 5–6.
Figure 5–6:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
March Formation of a Reinforced Mechanised Company (BMP)
as a Reconnaissance Detachment
The RD in this example is formed from a Mechanised Company equipped with BMPs, reinforced by a sapper
section (in amphibious wheeled A vehicle (BTR)) and a chemical reconnaissance section (on RKhM).
Two or more RPs have been sent forward so that the RD can cover a frontage of 6 kilometres or more. In
some cases only one RP may be employed.
The RD commander personally reconnoitres the main axis.
The 3rd MRP is available to act as a reserve and replace any RP which suffers serious casualties, or it can
provide support for an RP in trouble.
A BTR-equipped, reinforced mechanised company would also have an anti-tank section (with onexBTR),
probably in the main body of the RD.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-12
5.47
The RD dispatches platoon-size RPs to reconnoitre specific objectives along the
detachment’s axis. It is important to note that the RD’s primary mission is
reconnaissance. If the RP does encounter a weak enemy force, it may engage that
force. When the detachment encounters the enemy’s main forces, it assumes an
observation mission, attempts to determine the composition and disposition of those
forces, reports to the supported commander, and continues its mission.
SECTION 5-5.
RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
General
5.48
The MAF distinguishes between various types of patrols that fit under the general
heading of RP. Figure 5–7 illustrates the march formation of one of these patrols. Other
than the specific types of RP described below, the MAF uses the generic term RP to
describe a tactical reconnaissance element dispatched from a RD in the process of
accomplishing its mission. Up to a platoon in size, this patrol may operate several
kilometres to the front or to the flanks of its parent brigade or division. It accomplishes its
mission through observation, ambushes, raids, and, when necessary, combat. The RP
operates up to 15 kilometres from friendly sub-units; one sent out from a RD can operate
up to 10 kilometres from its main body.
400 - 1 200 m
Patrol
Squad
Platoon
Commander
RP
IRP
CRP
FRP
Engineer
Recon
NBC
Recon
= reconnaissance patrol
= independent reconnaissance patrol
= combat reconnaissance patrol
= forward reconnaissance patrol
Notes:
1.
This formation would be adopted by any form of patrol, whether RP, independant reconnaissance patrol,
CRP, or forward reconnaissance patrol.
2.
Engineer and NBC reconnaissance elements are not found in all patrols. If attached to patrols they may take
the form of two to three soldiers travelling in the patrol's own vehicles.
3.
The patrol's vehicle moves 400 to 1 200 metres ahead of the platoon commander's vehicle. The exact
distance is determined by visibility at the time.
4.
When contact with the enemy is not expected, the patrol moves at its best speed and may use roads.
5.
When contact with the enemy is possible, RPs of all types move off roads and by tactical bounds. The patrol
occupies a good observation position, from which the commander can see the axis to be reconnoitred. The
patrol vehicle bounds forward to another good observation position, moving tactically, while the remainder of
the patrol observes its progress. The main body then joins the patrol vehicle, and the process is repeated.
6.
FRPs, because they are march security, rather then reconnaissance, tend to follow roads.
7.
In the event of unexpected contact with the enemy, patrols try to withdraw, break contact, and then reach a
position from which to identify and report the strength, composition, and location of the enemy. If this is not
possible, the patrol is supposed to stun the enemy by a resolute attack, defeat him, and resume its mission.
FRPs may be more willing to engage the enemy in battle.
8.
When the presence of the enemy is suspected, but he refuses to reveal himself, the patrol vehicle may be
used to trick the enemy into opening fire.
Figure 5–7:
March Formation of a Patrol
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-13
Independent Reconnaissance Patrol
5.49
A division or brigade may send out an IRP with a specific mission to an objective. It is
usually a platoon-sized element reinforced with engineer and other specialists. As with
the RP, the IRP accomplishes its missions through observation, ambushes, raids, and
combat, if necessary. However, it operates at a greater distance from the parent brigade
or division than the RP and may stay out longer. Both types of RPs dispatch squads or
individual armoured vehicles to examine terrain features, detect enemy forces, or
provide security. Figure 5–8 provides an example of an IRP conducting reconnaissance
by observation.
Figure 5–8:
Independent Reconnaissance Patrol Conducting Reconnaissance by
Observation
5.50
A motorised/mechanised, tank, or infantry battalion (or company) will organise and
dispatch CRPs. Most CRPs do not have dedicated reconnaissance specialists. Like the
RP or IRP, the CRP consists of a reinforced platoon. A CRP moves in front of, or on the
flanks of, its parent battalion or company to reconnoitre and provide security. In the
absence of direct contact, it normally moves no more than 10 kilometres ahead of the
next friendly company/battalion-sized element, so that the latter can observe it and
provide fire support. The CRP is limited in the depth of its actions and has a greater
security role than the types of reconnaissance elements mentioned earlier.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-14
5.51
A manoeuvre battalion conducting an independent mission, such as a forward
detachment or advance guard, may send out one or more CRPs. During combat or in
the absence of direct contact with the enemy, any battalion may send out CRPs if the
commander feels he has insufficient information about the situation. Past practice
dictated that a battalion would usually send out a single CRP to cover its route of march.
The MAF uses a battalion employing two to three CRPs on alternate routes and flanks.
5.52
A CRP employs the same techniques as other RPs. It may engage a weaker enemy
force using an ambush, or it may avoid contact altogether, taking up a concealed OP or
manoeuvring around superior enemy forces. If it encounters what it considers to be
enemy scouts or security forces, it attempts to penetrate them to locate the enemy’s
main force. The CRP’s mission is reconnaissance, first and foremost. If it observes a
threat to its parent unit, it it is best employed reporting on the enemy’s activity rather than
by sacrificing itself to stop the threat.
Officer Reconnaissance Patrol
5.53
An officer RP is sent out when there has been an abrupt, unexpected situation change.
Its purpose is to update information on the enemy and terrain in the battle operations
area, determine the position of friendly troops, or to check contradictory situation data.
Depending on assigned missions, one to three officers are assigned to an officer RP
and, in addition, three to five soldiers may be assigned for security. This patrol can move
by helicopter, tank, amphibious tracked A vehicle 8 pax (BMP), BTR, motorised vehicle,
or motorcycle. The officer RP allows the MAF commander to oversee and maintain tight
control over the manoeuvre of his subordinate force. These patrols usually do not go
outside the area under the immediate control of that commander’s unit or formation.
Commander’s Reconnaissance
5.54
Tactical commanders at battalion level and above, conduct commander’s
reconnaissance, where possible, as part of the planning process. The commander takes
his subordinate manoeuvre and fire support commanders to the field site to fine tune and
coordinate his battle plan. Commander’s reconnaissance is a vital part of the troop
control process and is replicated at the operational level. The MAF takes elaborate
measures to disguise the conduct of this reconnaissance and the ranks of the
participants.
Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol
5.55
The engineer RP consists of a squad or a platoon of engineer specialists sent out to
obtain engineer intelligence on the enemy and the terrain. In enemy territory, it deploys
jointly with another ground reconnaissance element. It can also include one or two
chemical reconnaissance specialists.
Chemical Reconnaissance Patrol
5.56
The chemical RP determines the extent and nature of any NBC contamination. These
patrols come from chemical reconnaissance elements of organic chemical protection
sub-units. They may operate independently or as part of other manoeuvre and
reconnaissance elements. The normal size of a chemical RP is a chemical
reconnaissance squad with one special chemical reconnaissance vehicle.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-15
SECTION 5-6.
RECONNAISSANCE PATROL METHODS
General
5.57
Whatever the designation of the patrol, its tactics are largely standardised. Once the
patrol is mobile, one of its member vehicles is sent forward to the limit of visibility and
support by fire. This distance is determined by terrain, time of day, and weather, but it is
usually 400 to 1 200 metres. When enemy contact is not expected, all the patrol’s
vehicles may be moving at the same time, but when contact is imminent, the patrol
moves in bounds between overwatch positions. The patrol commander observes from an
overwatch point while the patrol vehicle moves to the next position.
5.58
If the enemy is discovered in an unexpected position, the patrol commander immediately
reports the location to his headquarters. If a patrol observes enemy reconnaissance or
march security elements, its task is to avoid contact and continue on to locate the main
force as rapidly as possible. In the event of a surprise encounter with a small enemy
force, when evasion is impossible, the patrol acts decisively to destroy the enemy,
capture prisoners, if possible, and continue its mission.
5.59
MAF RPs may gather information using a number of standard methods. These include:
a. observation,
b. raids,
c.
ambushes, and
d. reconnaissance by combat.
Other tactical reconnaissance elements may use some of the same techniques.
Observation
5.60
Observation is the most common and important method of gathering reconnaissance
information. In many cases, it is the only source of information. Observation is the
coordinated inspection of the enemy, terrain, weather, obstacles, and adjacent friendly
forces during all types of combat activity. The MAF conducts observation from BMPs,
BTRs, tanks, RW and fixed wing aircraft, as well as from static ground positions.
5.61
The MAF has great confidence in the utility of observation, but it also recognises its
limitations. It is often difficult to determine enemy intentions through observation alone.
To supplement observation, the MAF conducts raids and ambushes to capture
information that can give a clearer picture of enemy strengths and intentions.
Raids
5.62
Reconnaissance tactics involve two methods of conducting raids. The difference
between the two lies in the purpose of the raid and the type of reconnaissance element
performing it. The raids are classified as either a reconnaissance or destruction raid.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-16
5.63
The reconnaissance raid is intended to capture prisoners, documents, or weapons. A
dedicated RP or an infantry/motorised/mechanised sub-element up to platoon strength
may conduct this raid. In either case, the patrol may have attached combat engineer,
chemical protection, and communications personnel. The patrol is often divided into
three elements: a squad to make the assault and capture prisoners; a squad to provide
covering fire; and the remaining support personnel. The patrol can receive artillery or
mortar support if the situation dictates. Patrols of this type operate at night or under other
conditions of limited visibility. Their targets are selected in advance, and ideally they
have time to study them before undertaking the mission. Typical targets are individual
soldiers or small groups of soldiers near the forward edge of friendly troops. This type of
raid normally takes place when the MAF is in direct contact with the enemy. Its primary
goal is to obtain information; any damage or destruction of enemy installations is
incidental.
5.64
The destruction raid’s primary purpose is to destroy targets in the enemy rear. The
attack is sudden and comes from an unexpected direction. The sub-unit conducting it is
normally a team of reconnaissance or special-purpose forces inserted deep into the
enemy’s rear area. Regular ground force sub-units or partisans may also execute this
type of raid. Targets often include airfields, headquarters, small garrisons and depots.
Ambush
5.65
RPs often conduct ambushes as a means of intelligence collection. Patrols may also
execute an ambush to delay reserves or to inflict damage on a target of opportunity.
Reconnaissance ambushes are arranged during all kinds of battle, on any terrain, at any
time or day, and under various weather conditions, ahead of the front, on the flanks and
in the rear of the enemy.
5.66
In setting up an ambush, a reconnaissance element selects a concealed position along a
probable route of enemy travel and then camouflages itself. It places observers to give
early warning of approaching enemy personnel and vehicles. The observers continue to
report on reinforcements after the ambush has occurred. In addition to observers, the
team includes an assault group and a security group and blocking forces.
5.67
The MAF’s most ambitious and least-preferred ground reconnaissance tactic is
reconnaissance by combat. When other means of gaining information have failed, an RP
can undertake reconnaissance by combat. The sub-unit that conducts reconnaissance
by combat is normally a reinforced infantry/motorised/mechanised or tank company from
the relevant brigade, or a reinforced battalion from the division. Reinforcements include
specially trained reconnaissance personnel, as well as engineer and artillery
reconnaissance personnel. Sub-units conducting the reconnaissance by combat receive
support from artillery fire, and in some instances, aviation.
5.68
The sub-unit performing this mission penetrates enemy defences to a depth sufficient to
cause him to reveal his dispositions and firing systems in response to the penetration. Its
primary purpose is to discover weak points in the enemy’s defences. This aggressive
tactic carries with it a distinct risk. When used against an enemy forewarned of such
tactics, or when attempted without sufficient preparation or expertise, it can fail. Aside
from resulting in heavy casualties, it could also reveal MAF intentions. Reconnaissance
by combat is most often used to gather information for an attack when all other
reconnaissance efforts have failed.
Reconnaissance Group
5.69
A reconnaissance group operates independently in the enemy’s rear area. Within a
division, it is almost certain to come from the long-range reconnaissance company of the
division reconnaissance battalion. Reconnaissance groups are usually squad strength
and particularly target high-precision weapons, C2 posts, headquarters, and reserves.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-17
SECTION 5-7.
RECONNAISSANCE DATA COLLECTION
General
5.70
Reconnaissance elements are tasked to acquire the following types of data:
a. Enemy Forces. Information on the composition, capabilities, location and intentions
of the enemy is of vital importance to the commander. The location and readiness of
high-precision weapons attain the highest priority. Details of headquarters,
communication centres, defended areas, and artillery positions are also important.
Division and brigade commanders also task reconnaissance to locate enemy
reserves and second echelons. Every effort is made to discover boundaries and
open flanks suitable for attack.
b. Topographical. Much of the MAF’s reconnaissance effort is devoted to finding good
routes for manoeuvre units through difficult terrain. The identification of lateral
routes, vital ground and possible sites for communications equipment and assembly
areas is also important. Timely information on the nature and extent of obstacles is
seen to be essential if the advance is to continue. Especially important in this context
are possible sites for crossing water obstacles and assessments of enemy
demolitions and minefields.
c.
Contamination. Areas of contamination, resulting from both enemy and MAF strikes,
have to be located. Reconnaissance also provides information to evaluate the
degree of hazard involved in crossing them.
SECTION 5-8.
RECONNAISSANCE DURING THE PHASES OF BATTLE
General
5.71
The conduct of reconnaissance varies according to the phase of the battle.
Reconnaissance may support a parent organisation in its advance to contact (in a
meeting battle or attack from the march) or in its penetration of enemy defences. Other
circumstances may dictate the use of reconnaissance by combat. Reconnaissance
missions continue as the attacking force moves into the enemy depth. If the force adopts
a defence, reconnaissance plays yet another role.
In the Advance
5.72 When advancing to contact and penetrating an enemy covering force, an MAF division
covers its frontage with patrols, each patrol covering a sector of two to three kilometres.
An RD advances on the main axis; with the remainder of the front covered by RPs. This
screen avoids combat and moves to locate the main body of the enemy force. In a
meeting battle, some patrols stay in contact with the leading enemy units as they
approach the formation, while other patrols attempt to penetrate the enemy main body.
Figure 5–9 provides the key to symbols used in figures 5–10 to 5–12. Figure 5–10
illustrates the conduct of reconnaissance in the advance.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-18
RD
Reconnaissance Patrol
Battalion Column (Division second echelon)
Independent Reconnaissance
Patrol (Subordinate to Division)
Observation Post (OP)
Independent Reconnaissance
Patrol (Subordinate to Regiment)
Artillery Observation Post
Engineer Observation Post
Forward Patrol
Radar
Patrol Squad
Division Commander’s OP
Sound Ranging Line
FD Forward Detachment
Reconnaissance Area
RR Radioelectronic (Radio and Radar)
Reconnaissance assets
ADVG
Advance Guard
Battalion Column (Division first echelon)
Figure 5–9:
Key to Symbols Used in this Chapter
Figure 5–10: Reconnaissance in the Advance
5.73
If the enemy is preparing to hold a main defensive position, some patrols establish a line
of static OPs reporting on enemy defences. Other patrols attempt to find gaps or open
flanks in enemy positions. RPs are also deployed on the flanks of the division with the
number of these patrols determined by the proximity of friendly formations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-19
5.74
First echelon brigades deploy their RPs behind the divisional patrols. The advanced
guard battalions of these leading brigades, along with any forward detachments, deploy
CRPs and their own RPs. Battalions in the main body of the first echelon brigade can
deploy forward patrols, but do not employ CRPs unless they are about to contact the
enemy. In second echelon or reserve brigades, only patrol vehicles are likely to be used.
In the Penetration Battle
5.75
Much of the division’s intelligence is acquired by OPs in the front line. Radar, DF and
artillery reconnaissance assets are fully deployed. Figure 5–11 illustrates
reconnaissance being conducted in the penetration battle. The division reconnaissance
battalion and first echelon RPs try to find gaps through which RPs can be inserted. Raids
can be mounted by reconnaissance or combat units to identify enemy units. At this stage
of the battle, a large proportion of the divisional long-range reconnaissance company will
have been inserted into the depth of the enemy defences.
Figure 5–11: Reconnaissance in the Penetration Battle
Note:
1.
Key located at figure 5-9.
5.76
If reconnaissance sources fail to provide the detailed targeting information required for
the success of the fire plan, the commander may be forced to employ reconnaissance by
combat. This is only employed when other methods have failed, because of the high
casualties that may be sustained. Reconnaissance by combat is employed on the sector
of the main attack but, in order not to reveal this sector, diversionary reconnaissance is
conducted across the whole front.
5.77
Each effort involves a reinforced company or battalion supported by a heavy fire plan
(including air-strikes) and deception measures to convince the enemy that a major
assault is contemplated. The attacking force aims to penetrate one to two kilometres and
then launch raiding parties to capture prisoners or equipment. Every possible
reconnaissance asset monitors the progress of the reconnaissance with commanders
located in forward OPs to assess the enemy defences. First echelon forces will be ready
to launch major attacks in the event reconnaissance reveals exploitable weaknesses in
the enemy defences.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-20
In the Enemy Depth
5.78
Once an attack is launched on the enemy’s main defences, reconnaissance elements
are ready immediately behind the assaulting troops. First echelon battalions place CRPs
immediately behind their first echelon companies, committing them once the enemy’s
forward company positions have been overcome. Brigade and division-level RPs and
possibly a division-level RD, are inserted once gaps have been created. Artillery strikes
and smokescreens cover their commitment. When exploiting a penetration, units and
sub-units operate with open flanks, using additional RPs to cover these flanks.
Figure 5-12 is an example of reconnaissance during this phase.
Figure 5–12: Reconnaissance During Operations in the Enemy Depth
Note:
1.
Key located at figure 5-9.
In the Defence
5.79
In the defence, reconnaissance focuses on the security zone. There is considerable
emphasis on the use of static OPs. Within each first echelon battalion, these may include
OPs, the battalion command observation post (COP), numerous company and platoon
OPs, artillery OPs, LPs, and ground radar. When assuming the defence out of contact
with the enemy, a CRP or RP can be pushed forward. If the division withdraws to occupy
its defensive positions, some reconnaissance groups of the long-range reconnaissance
company can be left as stay-behind parties. If the division goes over to the defensive out
of contact with the enemy, an RD can be sent to establish contact with the attacking
enemy, monitoring his approach. Second echelon brigades or reserves can also deploy
assets into the intervals between defence lines.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-21
SECTION 5-9.
RECONNAISSANCE UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS
General
5.80
The MAF is prepared to conduct reconnaissance under all conditions and types of
terrain. In particular, the MAF trains to conduct reconnaissance in mountains,
forests/jungle, desert, extreme cold and built-up areas.
Mountains
5.81
The MAF modifies observation methods when conducting reconnaissance in
mountainous regions, due to the terrain. For example, where two or three OPs could
cover an area in level terrain, mountainous conditions can require additional posts.
Employment of ground RPs is more important as a result of limitations imposed on OPs.
The conduct of raids is difficult in mountainous areas, but the MAF expects to
successfully conduct ambushes. The restriction of enemy units to established road and
trail networks decreases the possibility of the ambush team’s detection and, at the same
time, increases the number of targets that pass through an ambush site.
Forests/Jungle
5.82
The limitations of wooded areas are similar to those found in mountainous regions.
Terrain conditions in wooded areas can change drastically within a short period of time
depending on the weather and season. Rolling, forested terrain allows raiding parties
good concealment along the approach to their objective, increasing their chance of
success. The MAF likes to infiltrate raiding parties through lightly defended forward
areas and attack objectives in the enemy rear, where MAF troops are not expected and
where success can demoralise enemy forces. For that reason, MAF tacticians consider
wooded terrain ideal for conducting ambushes. Equally, jungle provides good opportunity
to identify enemy movement on known tracks and water courses including the potential
for ambush.
Desert
5.83
The features of desert terrain and the nature of combat and logistics support in such
areas place a number of additional requirements on reconnaissance. In addition to usual
missions, reconnaissance must establish the degree to which enemy troops are
equipped and trained for desert operations; features of alignment of enemy combat
formations and the degree of engineer preparation of positions. Reconnaissance also
attempts to determine the presence of water sources in the enemy disposition, their
capacity and the presence and capacity of pipelines; as well as convenient bypass
routes to deliver strikes against the enemy from flanks and rear.
5.84
It is not the number of assigned forces and assets, nor methods of conducting
reconnaissance, that is of decisive importance in performing reconnaissance missions in
desert areas. Rather, it is the specific nature of preparation and training of personnel
assigned to reconnaissance and their logistics support that is crucial to the smooth
operation of reconnaissance missions in desert areas.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
5-22
Cities
5.85
MAF doctrine emphasises that combat in cities differs significantly from tactical
operations in normal field conditions. Combat in the city is characterised by, close and
continuous contact with the enemy; independent actions by small units; constraints on
troop control; difficulty in using tanks, BMPs and BTRs and problems conducting
reconnaissance. The MAF places emphasis on pre-combat information gained from
informers, refugees, special-purpose forces, maps and aerial photography. The MAF
exploits information from town plans, tourist brochures, service facility charts and aerial
photographs for the latest information about the condition of communications systems,
utilities, enemy defensive deployments, location of civilian concentrations and other
related data. MAF reconnaissance emphasises a three-dimensional perspective of cities,
providing information on conditions above (multi-storey buildings) as well as below
(sewers, subways, etc) the city streets.
5.86
RPs and reconnaissance by combat on a large scale, operate mainly in the terrain
surrounding and along the immediate approach routes into the city. Once the battle
within built-up areas begins, the MAF collects new intelligence information primarily by
observation, and the use of patrols and helicopters. It also increases the number of
observation points, particularly in the upper stories of buildings. This added elevation
provides improved observation among the ruins of buildings where activity is usually
more difficult to detect.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-1
CHAPTER 6
INFANTRY AND THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM - GENERAL
SECTION 6-1.
INTRODUCTION
6.1
Musorian tactics rely heavily on effective use of the combined arms team to ensure
success on the battlefield. Given that infantry units are traditionally organisations based
around the motorised soldier, their reliance on other agencies for combat power is total.
Musorian doctrine utilises those infantry units without organic transport for operations in
close country, urban terrain or for heliborne manoeuvres.
6.2
Infantry units that have a mobile capability include motorised, mechanised and airborne
units. Motorised and infantry units are substantially identical, except that motorised
forces are able to draw light and medium wheeled transport vehicles, generally trucks,
from the brigade to achieve mobility. While these units operate in the same way as
infantry units, their advantage lies in their ability to move complete forces quickly out of
contact, using existing roads and tracks.
6.3
Mechanised. Mechanised units operate either the BTR series APC or the BMP series
IFV. Mechanised units will mainly operate in the combined arms team and will rely
heavily on tank support. There is little difference in the way BTR and BMP-equipped
units operate except for the improved protection, mobility, and fire-power of the BMP IFV
which gives the commander more flexibility. Mechanised units can operate over most
types of terrain but are more suited to open ground where speed of mobility is greater.
6.4
Airborne. Airborne units are largely the same as infantry units, but can be operationally
inserted by parachute. On the conventional battlefield, airborne forces are likely to be
employed in coup de main operations, seizing key terrain, and influencing the deep
battle.
6.5
Weapons. Musorian doctrine relies heavily on the utilisation of concentrated fire-power
from infantry forces. Infantry units carry a number of small arms and larger weapons,
either organic to the units themselves, including motorised, mechanised and airborne
battalions, or found in the brigade. Standard infantry weapons range from individual
arms to machine guns, rocket launchers, flame-throwers, grenades and missiles.
SECTION 6-2.
6.6
MECHANISED FORCES
BTR Armoured Personnel Carrier. The BTR family of vehicle is the standard APC of
the mechanised battalion. The BTR-60 utilises twin rear-mounted petrol engines, while
the BTR-70 can be fitted with diesel engines. Standard armament on the BTR is the
14.5 mm machine gun. The vehicles have a good amphibious capability in calm waters
(waves of less than 70 centimetres) with a top water speed of 10 kilometres per hour. On
road, the BTR can reach 80 kilometres per hour with a range of up to 500 kilometres.
With a two-man crew the vehicle can carry up to 14 infantry soldiers. The major
weakness of this vehicle is its lack of rear ramp, requiring infantry to dismount out of two
roof hatches, risking considerable exposure. The petrol variants for this vehicle are also
liable to self ignite. Operational service has shown that concentrated small arms fire into
the area of the front road wheels can achieve penetration and kill the driver. The weapon
penetration and armour protection capabilities are illustrated in annex A. The tyres are
self-inflating, but the steel road wheels can be smashed with concentrated small arms
fire and shrapnel.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-2
6.7
BMP Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The BMP tracked vehicles were procured by the MAF
to ‘give the commander a swiftness of manoeuvre and increased fire-power’. The BMP is
a vehicle suited for intimate work with tanks in operations requiring rapid exploitation and
pursuit. BMPs are diesel-powered vehicles capable of 70 kilometres per hour on roads
and five to eight kilometres per hour in water. With a three-man crew, the vehicle is
capable of carrying an eight-man squad. The squad sits in a centre seated configuration
and can fire its weapons through portholes, providing increased fire-power while
remaining mounted during the fight-through. The BMP-1 carries a 73 mm unstabilised
gun, whilet the BMP-2 carries a 30 mm cannon. Both vehicles can carry a variety of antiarmour weapons, such as AT-3. The armour protection is superior to that of a BTR. The
BMP can outpace a T-62 and keep up with a T-72 tank. The key vulnerability of the BMP
is its tendency to self ignite if hit. Fuel cells in the rear door are close together and
operational service has proven that a penetrating round is very likely to explode
ammunition or fuel.
6.8
BMD Airborne Infantry Combat Vehicle. The amphibious tracked A vehicle 4 pax
(BMD) is a lightweight version of the BMP. With one less road wheel than the BMP, the
BMD can carry only six passengers, but carries the same number of weapons, while
variable suspension allows for easy air transport. The BMD-1 73 mm gun can be
replaced by the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher (AGL). The BMD is also fully suited
to delivery by airdrop. There are no rear doors and dismounting occurs through the top.
6.9
Organic tank organisations start with the mechanised brigade. Tank support is integral to
infantry tactics and the MAF utilises the T series of tank. The T-72 represents a
technological improvement over the T-62 with improved protection and fire-power. The
main areas of improvement are in the gunnery system, which includes a laser
rangefinder. The vulnerability of this tank lies in its poor gun elevation depression angles,
similar to the T-62. The reliability of its gun system and, in particular, the auto-loader is
questionable.
SECTION 6-3.
AIRBORNE AND HELIBORNE FORCES
Introduction
6.10
Airborne and heliborne operations are integral to Musorian operations from the strategic
to the tactical level. These styles of operations provide the Musorian commander with
great flexibility on the battlefield, especially in maintaining the speed and tempo of
offensive operations.
Airborne Operations
6.11
This section will examine airborne operations on the conventional battlefield. A Musorian
airborne force will air-drop or air-land considerable combat power and mobility into its
AO. The Musorians have closely copied their old Soviet ally in mastering airborne
operations and place a high priority on manning and equipment of airborne forces.
Musorian airborne operations can be strategic, operational or tactical in scope and
objective.
6.12
Strategic Operations. The Musorians use airborne forces in strategic operations as an
extension of national power. Airborne forces are inserted in large numbers to establish a
new theatre or seize bases of strategic importance.
6.13
Operational. Airborne forces are often used on operational missions and can be
dropped up to 300 kilometres behind the FEBA to seize key objectives. These objectives
may include:
a. airfields,
b. communication centres,
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-3
c.
headquarters,
d. weapons storage,
e. bridges,
f.
logistics facilities, and
g. key terrain.
6.14
These airborne operations are not conducted in isolation and the Musorian ‘hold until
relieved’ policy requires these forces to be self-sustaining and capable of holding terrain
for up to 72 hours. Such airborne operations generally start at the brigade level.
6.15
Tactical Operations. Musorian airborne forces are most likely to employed in tactical
operations. Tactical airborne operations are normally carried out in conjunction with land
attacks. They occur no further than 100 kilometres behind the FEBA and the units
involved are usually battalion group size. Airborne operations will usually involve support
from heliborne forces providing troop insertion and aerial fire support (AFS). These
airborne battalions will be expected to hold until relieved for up to 48 hours. FS to
airborne forces will come from aircraft, long-range artillery and organic FS. Tactical
airborne operations can be employed:
a. in support of breakthrough attacks,
b. in support of rivers crossings,
c.
to cut off enemy reinforcements,
d. to block withdrawal routes, and
e. to seize immediate tactical objectives such as bridges.
Principles of Airborne Operations
6.16
The Musorians use the following principles in planning and conducting airborne
operations:
a. Surprise is a principal advantage. Extensive security measures are used in all
phases of the operation to prevent early detection and to minimize enemy reaction
time. Night airborne assaults are a primary means of achieving surprise.
b. Landings are made in undefended areas or in areas where enemy defences have
been effectively suppressed.
c.
There must be effective air cover for the en route formation, and enemy ground air
defence weapons along the flight route must be suppressed.
d. Airborne assaults are given FS by air strikes, missile strikes, and the artillery
accompanying advancing ground forces as it comes within range.
Preparation for an Airborne Assault
6.17
An airborne operation requires extensive coordination between the control headquarters
and the airborne force, supporting aviation, and ground maneouvre forces.
6.18
Planning considerations for Musorian airborne operations include the mission, troops
and support available, terrain, the depth of the operation, flight routes, air superiority,
DZs, surprise, security, and the enemy situation.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-4
6.19
Intelligence for an airborne operation is obtained by aerial reconnaissance, clandestine
agents, sympathizers, maps, sigint, long-range patrols, or airdropped reconnaissance
teams. Of major concern is the enemy armour, artillery, and air threat. Reconnaissance
activities may also be performed outside the projected objective area as a deception
measure.
6.20
A typical DZ is three kilometres by four kilometres. A brigade is normally is allocated one
or two DZs. If two DZs are used, battalion integrity will be maintained. A division uses
four to six DZs. Alternate DZs are designated for emergency use. Follow-on forces are
normally dropped into the DZs used by the initial assault wave.
6.21
The following estimates are prepared during planning for an airborne assault:
a. determination of the composition, strength, and capabilities of the enemy forces in
the DZ area (or those near enough to interfere with the landing operations and
subsequent attack on the objective);
b. determination of the nature of the terrain and condition of the road network, as well
as location of natural and man-made obstacles that would interfere with the air-drop
of men and equipment; and
c.
selection of suitable primary and alternate DZs.
Airborne Tactics
6.22
Air-drops will normally be made where defences are weak and local air superiority can
be gained. Air-drops will often be made at night in order to achieve surprise. Transport
aircraft will approach DZs along routes clear of air defence forces and will normally be
escorted by fighters.
6.23
A battalion will normally use one DZ and insert within a 30 kilometres radius of the
objective. If the objective is undefended, airborne forces will drop directly onto it to
achieve surprise and confusion.
6.24
The first element is a security element and is responsible for eliminating enemy
resistance in the DZ. The Musorians will usually try to complete the operation in one
flight. However if more than one flight is required, the first assault wave will contain
forward CPs and crew-served air defence and anti-tank weapons, as well as manoeuvre
units. The second wave will consist primarily of support elements.
6.25
Flight routes are chosen to minimize flight times to the DZ. They are also planned to
minimize the threat of aerial intercept and ground air defence.
6.26
Airborne unit marshalling areas are dispersed to prevent detection of an imminent
operation and to reduce vulnerability to a pre-emptive strike. Conversely, marshalling
areas must be close enough to departure airfields for ease of aircraft loading. Normally,
no more than a company would be accommodated in any one area.
6.27
Airborne troops scheduled for an operation are strictly segregated from the surrounding
population. Units receive their missions in the marshalling areas and unit commanders
then organize their units for loading on to aircraft.
6.28
The loading process is designed so that lead aircraft over a DZ carry reconnaissance
and security troops to secure the DZ. The security force is armed to defend against
enemy air and armour attack. Main assault forces are loaded so that platoons,
companies, and battalions land with unit integrity intact.
6.29
For security reasons, air-drops most commonly to take place at night. Units normally
move to departure areas after nightfall with radio silence observed in marshalling areas
and while en route to and at departure airfields. Normally, more than one airfield will be
used for operations involving more than a single brigade.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-5
Air Movement
6.30
Aircraft will usually fly from the DZ or LZ, in a formation that ensures the proper jump
sequence. Commanders and their chiefs of staff at battalion level and above are
transported in separate aircraft to ensure that a unit’s entire command structure would
not be lost if one plane were shot down.
6.31
The Musorians consider the air movement phase of an airborne operation to be its most
vulnerable phase. They emphasise the necessity to create a threat-free flight corridor
from the departure area to the DZ or LZ. All along the flight path, FS assets are targeted
against enemy air defences. Fighters and fighter bombers escort transport aircraft to
protect them from enemy fighters and ground fire. The protection element of the air
movement phase is carefully coordinated. Passive defence measures taken during the
air movement phase include conducting movement during hours of darkness, using
more than one flight route, maintaining radio silence, and flying at very low altitudes. The
Musorians may also use EW measures during this phase.
Air-drops
6.32
Musorians employ only one type of aircraft for each DZ. Combat air-drops are usually
conducted at an altitude of 150 to 300 metres. Low altitude air-drops are preferred so as
to minimise the time individuals are in the air. This also increases the likelihood that a
unit’s equipment and men will land close together. During training, the Musorians have
conducted personnel drops as low as 100 metres, and used steerable canopies in an
effort to increase unit integrity during air-drops.
6.33
The first element to be dropped is usually a small reconnaissance and security force.
The main assault force is dropped at least 15 minutes later. The BMDs and crew-served
weapons precede their respective personnel during the air-drop.
6.34
The Musorians employ several methods for dropping cargo by parachute. Equipment
weighing less than 30 kilograms is dropped in padded containers, while equipment
weighing up to 1 000 kilograms is secured to standard cargo platforms. BMDs, motor
vehicles, self-propelled guns, and other heavy items may be secured to special shockabsorbing platforms and dropped by a multi-parachute system. The Musorians also use
non-shock-absorbing platforms with a retro-rocket braking parachute system, used
extensively to drop BMDs. The retro-rocket system allows its cargo to descend five to six
times faster than the multi-parachute system. Two ground probes, mounted on diagonal
corners of the cargo platform, electrically fire the retro-rocket system’s explosive charge.
The explosive charge fires when the sensors touch the ground and close the electrical
circuit.
Drop Zone Procedures
6.35
The reconnaissance and security force’s immediate mission is to secure the DZ before
the main body lands. This force, which could be up to a company for each DZ used in a
brigade air-drop, takes up defensive positions around the DZ’s perimeter. Of special
concern are the main enemy avenues of approach into the DZ. The force also
establishes LPs and OPs beyond the DZ to provide early warning of an approaching
enemy. Anti-tank and air defence weapons are integrated into the perimeter defence.
6.36
If the main body is air-dropped during daylight hours, personnel move directly to their
pre-designated attack positions, but if the DZ is not on the objective, personnel assemble
in battalion AAs. However, if the air-drop is conducted at night, personnel assemble
before occupying pre-designated attack positions. If the DZ is not on the objective,
personnel dropped during the hours of darkness assemble as companies and move to
battalion AAs.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-6
6.37
If the DZ is under strong enemy attack, personnel assemble and move immediately to
the DZ perimeter to establish defensive positions. Any available BMD are utilised for this
movement. If the DZ is not on the objective and the battalions assemble first, contact
with enemy units is initially avoided. They attempt to evade enemy ground forces and
hide from the air threat. If active defence against an air attack is required, at least one
entire platoon per company or one company per battalion is assigned the mission.
6.38
The Musorians consider an enemy air attack to be a serious threat to a landed airborne
force. Musorians use small arms fire, and even rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), and the BMD’s main gun against air attack as well as the
battalion and brigade’s crew-served and shoulder fired air defence weapons. When an
enemy threat against the DZ has been successfully neutralised, units move to battalion
AAs located either at the DZ boundary or a few hundred metres outside the DZ.
6.39
If a follow-on air-landing is planned, the brigade’s initial assault force leaves a rear
detachment at the DZ to provide security and to assist in the landing of the follow-on
force.
6.40
The air-drop and reorganisation phase at the DZ is considered to be the most vulnerable
period in an airborne operation following the air movement phase. All actions taken at
the DZ are aimed at clearing it before an enemy force arrives.
Movement to the Objective
6.41
A brigade-sized airborne operation uses three pre-designated battalion AAs on or near
the boundary of the DZ. Movement to the final objective is most often conducted in
battalion march columns along parallel routes. Battalions may be assigned separate final
objectives. Companies and platoons are often assigned intermediate missions (raids) to
be accomplished during their movement to the final objective.
6.42
Speed and security are the primary concerns during movement to the objective.
Battalions move in a tactical march formation as long as possible, allowing the battalion
to move quickly and maintain security. A unit in tactical march formation establishes
forward, flank, and rear security elements, with a battalion advance guard of up to a
reinforced company in strength. In the main body of any march formation, attached
artillery elements are located at the head of the column to allow immediate deployment.
Anti-tank weapons are located behind the artillery followed by any attached crew-served
anti-aircraft weapons.
6.43
The airborne force tries to maintain movement to the objective even if an enemy force is
encountered during the march. If evasion of enemy forces during this phase is not
possible, the airborne force attacks the enemy with the forward security element of the
advance guard, but not necessarily with the main body. The decision to deploy the main
body depends on the size of the enemy force. If the force is too large to be handled
successfully by the advance guard, but small enough to be destroyed quickly by the
main body, then the commander will probably use the main body to attack the enemy.
However, if the enemy force is so large that the commander believes the main body
would become decisively engaged in an attack, then he will attempt to avoid contact and
lead the main body on an alternate route to the objective. In this case, the advance
guard would be left in contact with the enemy.
6.44
If the airborne force is moving at night, established road networks may be used to reach
the objective quickly before dawn. If movement is during the day, the unit moves crosscountry using terrain features to provide concealment whenever possible. Radios carried
by the airborne force during the movement phase remain in the ‘receive only’ mode until
contact is made with the enemy. Transmissions are made only by the commander.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-7
6.45
During the march, the unit maintains all-round aerial surveillance. BMD and anti-aircraft
crews are given an air sector to keep under constant surveillance. If a unit comes under
strong air attack, the commander deploys the anti-aircraft weapons. If the air attack is
not repulsed immediately, then the anti-aircraft element may be left in place to provide
coverage while the main body continues its movement to the objective.
6.46
Reconnaissance missions during the ground movement phase are extremely important,
since the information received before departure may be limited or no longer current. The
airborne commander sends out reconnaissance teams to acquire information on the
routes of march and enemy forces in the area. A battalion may deploy one of its organic
platoons, often with engineer elements attached, as an RP.
6.47
The RP investigates the trafficability of routes, and possible ambush and river crossing
sites. Within the area of the objective itself, the RP tries to locate good battalion
assembly areas. Patrols will also attempt to gain information on enemy dispositions on
and around the objective.
6.48
The reconnaissance element generally moves under cover of darkness. Mounted
elements will use the BMD’s onboard navigation equipment to assist movement. RPs
operate up to 15 kilometres in front of the main body and generally seek to avoid combat
with the enemy. If attacked by an enemy force, they will attempt to break contact and
continue to move forward.
6.49
Companies or platoons that have accomplished intermediate missions (raids), march to
battalion AAs near their battalion’s final objective. There they join their battalions in the
assault.
The Attack
6.50
Time spent in battalion AAs is kept to a minimum. Battalion commanders confirm their
unit strength after the march and raids, and receive enemy situation reports from their
RPs. Because airborne operations are conducted within enemy territory and require
speed and surprise, Musorian commanders conduct operations without full personal
reconnaissance. Following situational updates, Musorian commanders refine the
missions of their subordinate and attached units in accordance with Musorian doctrine,
which dictates that plans of attack almost always involve an envelopment or flank attack.
6.51
Offensive tactics of airborne forces are similar to those employed by infantry forces.
Unlike raids, the attack at the final objective is usually aimed at overwhelming the enemy
and gaining control of an enemy-held area or facility. Final objectives most common in
Musorian airborne operations include river crossing sites and airfields.
6.52
Prior to the attack, supporting units are deployed to maximum effectiveness. Attached
artillery supports the airborne units as they close in on an objective. Engineer elements
are positioned to move in quickly and clear the area of obstacles. Air defence sections
are positioned where they can engage attacking enemy aircraft or helicopters.
6.53
Battalions normally depart AAs in a pre-battle formation, often comprising three
companies arrayed in a line, wedge, or echelon. Company pre-battle formations
comprise three platoon columns with 150 to 200 metres between columns. Attack
formation is normally assumed within 1 000 metres of the objective, but sub-units try to
get as close as possible before deploying. 200 metres is generally the minimum distance
for deployment into attack formation.
6.54
Platoons in a company attack formation deploy with a 50 metre interval between squads
with BMDs, and a 50 to 100 metre interval between platoons. The maximum attack
frontage for an airborne company is 500 metres.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-8
6.55
Prior to receiving the signal to attack, BMD radios remain in the ‘receive only’ mode so
that only the company commander and platoon commander can transmit messages.
Once the attack begins, all radios can transmit and receive messages.
6.56
If the enemy is estimated as being weak, and parlicularly if he lacks anti-tank weapons,
the airborne force may attack in one echelon with personnel mounted in BMDs.
However, if the enemy is considered strong, the airborne force will most likely attack in
two echelons with personnel dismounted, advancing between the BMDs. The BMDs can
be used in intimate support of the dismounted force.
6.57
During a night attack, the company commander designates an axis of for each platoon
commander. The BMD gyrocompass will be set on the same axis. Seizure of river
crossing sites typically takes place in the same manner. However, the commander
adjusts his plans to account for the requirements of the mission. The RP’s mission is
modified to include finding suitable crossing sites so that units can be deployed to seize
key terrain on both sides of the river. Combat engineers scout the river to determine its
depth, width, speed of current, river bottom characteristics, existence of floating
obstacles and mines, riverbank composition, and slope of the bank. Sub-units are tasked
with preventing enemy destruction of bridges or ferries during the attack.
6.58
An airfield will probably be seized using two directions of attack. During the attack, units
remain mounted in BMDs for as long as possible. Within the attack plan, commanders
designate units to seize the control tower, POL storage areas and any radio beacon
towers. In addition, designated units attack the enemy main and reserve security
elements.
The Defence
6.59
Once an airborne brigade or battalion has seized an objective, its mission is to defend
the objective until the arrival of other forces. In almost all cases the airborne force will
use a 360 degree perimeter defence. Whether the defence is established in depth or
with all units forward depends on the enemy threat and the terrain. If the commander
places the majority of his forces forward, he will maintain a small mobile reserve. A
brigade has a company-size reserve, while a battalion would maintain a platoon-size
reserve.
6.60
Defensive positions are built on a series of sub-unit strong points, with each company
assigned a strong point within a battalion defensive position. The company may
establish a defence in depth or defence with all platoons forward. The company
commander designs the defensive position so that ground avenues of approach are
heavily defended by anti-tank weapons.
6.61
The commander places shoulder-fired air defence weapons forward of the perimeter.
The air defence sections are located on high ground so that an enemy air threat can be
challenged before it reaches the company’s position, or in the case of helicopter
gunships, while it is firing from a distance. The company commander places obstacles
and anti-tank weapons in intervals between platoons and between adjacent companies.
6.62
A company defence is built around a series of platoon strong points. These strong points
are approximately 400 metres across. BMDs are placed 200 metres apart within each
platoon position. They are usually placed in defilade on the reverse slope of hills to allow
maximum protection. Company commanders designate the primary and alternate
platoon defensive positions and, in turn, platoon commanders designate both primary
and alternate positions to their squads.
6.63
The company commander prepares a company fire plan that ensures the entire
company defensive area is covered by interlocking fire. Intervals between the company
and flanking companies are also covered by fire.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-9
6.64
Platoon commanders site each BMD on receiving the primary axis of fire from the
company commander. The platoon commander indicates terrain features to be used as
the BMDs’ arcs of fire; these are usually placed in defilade approximately 200 metres
apart and 50 to 100 metres to the rear of squad personnel. Squad members prepare
prone firing positions to make themselves less vulnerable to enemy or friendly fire. The
platoon commander locates RPG anti-tank grenade launchers (ATGLs) between the
BMDs; the RPGs are also allocated sectors of fire.
6.65
During the defensive battle enemy tanks are given target priority. The Musorians will
engage armour at maximum ranges with all available anti-tank weapons. They will seek
to avoid having a BMD engage a tank one-on-one.
6.66
The individual Musorian soldier is trained in hand-to-hand combat against tanks. Firing
from prone positions, soldiers use automatic weapon fire to destroy an enemy tank’s
observation devices, following this with a grenade when the tank comes within eight to
10 metres.
6.67
Ambushes may be placed on primary avenues of approach approximately five kilometres
from the main defensive perimeter. Ambush forces are generally platoon to company
size. The location of an ambush is chosen to facilitate attacking an enemy as it crosses a
natural defile. The unit conducting an ambush avoids decisive engagement with the
enemy. Once the commander has made the decision to withdraw, the unit moves to its
previously prepared defensive position on the objective.
Link-up
6.68
Airborne units either await a link-up with friendly forces or fight their way back to friendly
lines. To accomplish link-up, the airborne unit sends its reconnaissance element to meet
advancing ground units. The reconnaissance element provides information on the best
approaches into the area, the security situation on the objective, and the enemy
situation.
Heliborne Operations
6.69
Heliborne operations have been a part of Musorian doctrine since the 1960s. The
Musorians appreciate the tactical advantage of heliborne operations, which provide rapid
manoeuvre of combat troops, unconstrained by obstacles on the ground. Compared to
parachute drops as a means of inserting troops, heliborne operations require less
training and can penetrate enemy airspace at a low level. On the other hand, availability
and capabilities of helicopters limit the size, scope, and frequency of heliborne
operations.
Doctrine
6.70
Musorian heliborne units are inserted in enemy territory up to 50 kilometres or more
behind the FEBA by day or night. The Musorians will however, conduct most of their
heliborne operations within range of divisional artillery. The assault force is usually of
battalion size or smaller. The heliborne force may be assigned the capture of an
objective that supports the larger ground plan. A heliborne force will usually be relieved
within hours of reaching its objective.
6.71
All battalions are capable of undertaking heliborne operations. Infantry and motorised
battalions are more suitable and train regularly in these operations. Heliborne operations
are designed for light scale infantry forces.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-10
Missions
6.72
Typical heliborne missions include:
a. the neutralising of enemy C2 facilities;
b. the seizure of key terrain, such as the far bank in a river crossing operation;
c.
the pursuit of a withdrawing enemy;
d. an attack on enemy defensive positions from the rear;
e. the disruption of combat support and combat services support;
f.
deception and sabotage;
g. large scale ambushing; and
h. the blocking of enemy movement.
Conduct of Operations
6.73
Heliborne operations are characterised by the following considerations:
a. divisional commanders and above authorise heliborne operations;
b. troop lift aircraft are usually supported by gunships and fighter aircraft;
c.
LZs will be selected close to objectives but should be clear of any threat;
d. minutes prior to landing, gunships will perform a final reconnaissance to determine
suitability of the LZ;
e. defended LZs will be avoided, and alternate LZs will be used;
f.
the ground force will ideally be moved in one lift; and
g. heliborne operations will generally be conducted at night.
SECTION 6-4.
INFANTRY WEAPONS AND SUPPORTING ARMS
EQUIPMENT
Battalion Weapons
6.74
Musorian tactics require a heavy concentration of automatic fire from infantry weapons
when engaged in combat. The weapons described in this section are organic to either
the infantry, motorised, mechanised, battalions, or found in the brigade. The information
provided focuses on the key capabilities and major vulnerabilities of the Musorian
weapons. LWD 7-5-2 Musorian Armed Forces Aide-memoire, 2001 chapter 5 provides
tabulated data on MAF weapons and details weapon ranges according to Musorian data.
The information is based on sources documenting the performance of Soviet
manufactured equipment on operations such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the ArabIsraeli wars.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-11
6.75
The following small arms can be found in the infantry company:
a. AK-74. This is the standard assault weapon for the rifleman and is carried
throughout the battalions. The maximum effective range is listed at 500 metres, but
operational experience suggests that the weapon is most effective at 200 metres
when used by an average firer. Musorian tactics dictate that rifle fire is used en
masse, utilising the weapon’s automatic capability to achieve a greater weight of fire
and increase the probability of an accurate strike to 500 metres.
b. RPK-74. The RPK-74 is a heavy barrel AK-74 with bipod, and acts as the squad light
machine gun (LMG). Infantry, motorised, and airborne squads use two LMGs, while
the mechanised squad uses one.
c.
The 9 mm Pistol. Used by some officers and AFV crews, the 9 mm pistol is based on
the German Walther PP pistol. Small and light, it is useful for very close personal
protection, but not suitable for combat shooting.
d. Anti-tank Grenade Launcher, RPG 7V. A dedicated gunner per squad will carry the
RPG-7V with up to four spare rounds. This weapon is designed to provide the squad
with close-in armour protection and is designed to be used en masse. The high
explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round easily detonates against mesh, is less effective
against spaced armour, and requires up to 14 seconds to reload. The signature is a
large flash in the back blast danger area (BBDA) and smoke which will linger for up
to eight seconds. The likelihood of a first round hit is low, but several RPG-7s will be
sited on the same task, increasing the probability of a hit. All squads carry the
RPG-7V.
e. Anti-tank Rocket Launcher, RPG-18/22. Issued two per squad, one per mechanised
squad, the RPG-18/22 is a second weapon carried by a rifleman over the shoulder.
It is a tube-launched disposable weapon. This weapon is designed to provide the
squad with close-in armour protection. The RPG-22 has a slightly larger warhead
than the RPG-18. Both weapons are capable of penetrating over 300 mm of armour
at the maximum effective range, making both capable of defeating current service
Australian armour. However, it has less than 30 per cent hit probability at its
maximum effective range.
f.
SVD, 7.62 mm Sniper Rifle. The Dragunov sniper rifle was first produced in the
1960s. Variants to this rifle include a bolt and semi-automatic action. This rifle is
generally well constructed, providing the finer tolerances required for precision
shooting. Each platoon has one sniper with an SVD sniper rifle. The rifle uses a four
power scope and Musorian doctrine indicates a 50 per cent hit probability on a mansize target at 800 metres. The sniper can engage two targets in not less than 30
seconds with accuracy. While all other platoon weapons are designed to provide a
heavy weight of automatic fire, the SVD is designed to provide a high level of
accuracy on a man-size target at 800 metres. The sniper can be employed either
from platoon down to squad level. Musorian snipers are selected from rifleman
training and undergo a two-month intensive sniper’s course.
g. PKM, 7.62 mm General Purpose Machine Gun. The stated range of the PKM as
1 000 metres has been determined as accurate by Western observers. This gasoperated belt-fed machine gun is renowned for its robust design and reliability, with
a negligible stoppage rate. The general purpose machine gun variations include
bipod/tripod mount or vehicle mount. It is capable of sustained fire.
h. LPO/RPO Flamethrower. Man-packed with a range of 50 metres and fuel for six
bursts, the LPO/RPO flamethrower is well utilised by each platoon. In the defence,
the flamethrower can be used in the counter-penetration role, while in the attack it
can be held by platoons and deployed forward in the assault to achieve break-in and
help reduce strong points.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6-12
i.
6.76
Grenades. The Musorians rely heavily on the use of grenades. During the assault,
riflemen will throw several grenades in quick succession when closing with forward
pits. In the defence, grenades will be thrown to destroy assaulting enemy and deny
penetration. There are several hand-thrown grenades in service with the MAF. The
standard RG-42 and RGD-5 high explosive (HE) grenades have a casualty radius of
45 metres with a lethal radius of 15 metres. The Musorians still have a stock of
RKG-3M anti-tank grenades. Using a HEAT warhead, these grenades are lobbed,
while a small stabilising drogue ensures a proper angle of impact. Its armour
penetration is listed at 125 mm. Although difficult to use, it is well suited to urban
terrain or hurled from features offering a height advantage. The RDG-1 and 2 smoke
grenade emit a dense white smoke. The grenade will burn for 90 seconds and cover
an area of 20 x 8 metres.
The following key weapons can be found in the battalion:
a. SPG-9 73 mm Recoilless Rifle. Firing six rounds a minute to an effective range of
1 000 metres, the SPG-9 can also fire a HEAT rocket assisted round. In the defence,
it is generally sited forward and complements other anti-armour weapons. In the
attack, it is best employed in an overwatch position. It has a three-man crew, and is
normally carried in an APC or truck. It is man portable, but has less than 20 per cent
hit probability at maximum effective range.
b. AT 3 to 8. AT 1 to 3 are early generation wire-guided missiles requiring intensive
operator training. These early wire-guided missiles required the operator to optically
track and adjust the missile in flight. With a slow time of flight, easy detection, and
susceptibility to operator error, these missiles could be defeated by sudden last
minute movement and direct fire towards to the gunner’s location. AT 4, 5, and 7 are
second generation weapon systems which utilise the ‘semi-automatic command line
of sight’ (SACLOS) system, which is similar to TOW and Milan. The AT series
weapons can be mounted on a number of different AFV platforms. The AT 6 and 8
are radio guided and constitute a larger weapon system.
c.
AGS-17 Automatic Grenade Launcher. The grenade launcher is accurate as a direct
fire weapon onto AFV type targets at 700 metres and area targets to 1 200 metres.
The weapon’s primary function is to provide neutralising fire to assaulting forces in
the attack, and to break enemy assaulting forces from a defensive position.
d. Surface-to-air Missiles. SAMs such as the SA-7 ‘Grail’ are passive IR homing
missiles. The SA-7 has a slant range of 4 500 metres and is primarily sited in depth
and to the flanks of infantry battalions to protect high value targets. The missile
requires a defined heat source to target, which makes targeting modern aircraft with
heat dispersion exhaust difficult. The missile can be defeated by counter-measures,
such as flares or evasive manoeuvres. The SA-7 makes up for its lack of accuracy
by distracting pilots at low altitudes when launched, especially when several missiles
are fired at the same aircraft.
Annex:
A.
Weapon Penetration and Armour Protection
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6A-1
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 6
WEAPON PENETRATION AND ARMOUR PROTECTION
SECTION 6A-1.
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLE PROTECTION
6A.1
Tables 6–1 and 6–2 below contain the armour protection figures for Musorian and
own force AFVs. While different sources may produce different figures, those listed in
these tables can be used as a guideline when planning operations against an enemy
equipped with Soviet-style equipment.
6A.2
The numbers are expressed in terms of millimetres of equivalent homogeneous rolled
steel. For example, a vehicle may have X centimetres of frontal sloped aluminium
armour, which is comparable to Y centimetres of rolled steel armour equivalent. Some
tanks may have thinner but more advanced armour which will produce a higher figure.
Table 6–1:
Armoured Protection of Musorian Fighting Vehicles
Serial
(a)
AFV
(b)
Units
(c)
Frontal
(d)
Side
(e)
Rear
(f)
1.
T-72 MBT
Tank units
450
150
100
2.
BTR-70 APC
Mech units
20
7
5
3.
BMP-2 IFV
Mech units
37
18
17
4.
BRDM SCOUT
Recon units
15
10
10
5.
BMD-2
Airborne
19
18
16
6.
ZSU 23-4 AA
Air Defence
16
10
9
7.
2S6
Air Defence
Table 6–2:
Armoured Protection of Australian Fighting Vehicles
Serial
(a)
AFV
(b)
Frontal
(c)
1.
LEOPARD A1
2.
M113 APC
3.
LAV 25
SECTION 6A-2.
6A.3
Data to be provided
Side
(d)
Rear
(e)
300
95
45
20
16
16
30
22
7
WEAPON PENETRATION
Tables 6–3 and 6–4 below indicate the penetration capabilities of Musorian and own
force weapons.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
6A-2
Table 6–3:
Penetration Capabilities Own Force Weapons
Serial
(a)
Weapon
(b)
1.
LEOPARD A1 105 mm
2.
MILAN
3.
TOW
4.
LAV 25 25 mm
65 mm/500 m
5.
M 113 APC 12.7 mm
6.
MAG 58 7.62 mm
7.
Carl Gustav 84 mm
8.
Steyr 5.56 mm
9.
SRAAW 66 mm
300 mm at 200 m
10.
M 79/203 40 mm
40 mm at 200 m
*
Ranges [mm/range]
(c)
475 mm/1 000 m
465 mm/1 500 m
455 mm/2 000 m
425 mm/3 000 m
1 300 mm all ranges to 1 950 m
1 400 mm all ranges to 3 750 m
60 mm/1 000 m
55 mm/1 500 m
50 mm/2 000 m*
30 mm/175 m
25 mm/625 m
23 mm/1 250 m
19 mm/1 500 m
25 mm/0 m
15 mm/375 m
8 mm/625 m
6 mm/1 250 m
6 mm/100 m
5 mm/300 m
400 mm to max range
4 mm/400 m
Armour piercing at 90 degrees.
Table 6–4:
Serial
(a)
Armoured Penetration of Musorian Fighting Vehicles
Weapon
(b)
Ranges
(c)
1.
T-62 MBT 115 mm gun
320 mm/500 m
305 mm/1 000 m
285 mm/1 500 m
270 mm/2 000 m
2.
BTR-60/BRDM
14.5 mm MG
35 mm/100 m
32 mm/500 m
20 mm/1 000 m
15 mm/2 000 m
3.
BTR-60/BRDM/
T-62/SGM 7.62 mm MG
25 mm/100 m
10 mm/500 m
7 mm/1 000 m
4 mm/2 000 m
4.
T-62 12.7 mm MG
25 mm/100 m
20 mm/500 m
15 mm/1 000 m
13 mm/2 000 m
5.
AK-74 Aslt Rifle
6 mm/100 m
5 mm/300 m
4 mm/400 m
6.
BMD-1 73 mm gun
7.
BMP-2 30 mm cannon
65 mm/100 m
60 mm/500 m
8.
AGS-17 30 mm grenade
9
SPG-9 73 mm RCL
300 mm/1 000 m
55 mm/1 000 m
35 mm/3 000 m
30 mm at 1200 m with a 25% hit probability at max range
400 mm/1 000 m
10.
RPG-7
300 mm/200 m
11.
RPG-22
12.
AT-3
400 mm to 3 000 m with a 87% hit probability at max range
13.
AT-4
1 305 mm to 2 000 m with a 85% hit probability at max range
14.
AT-5/AT-5i
750/1 305 mm to 4 000 m with a 80% hit probability at max range
15.
AT-6/AT6i
900/1 400 mm to 5 000 m with a 90% hit probability at max range
16.
AT-7
375 mm at 250 m with a 20% hit probability at max range
1 305 mm to 1 000 m with a 85% hit probability at max range
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-1
CHAPTER 7
INFANTRY AND THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM - OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS
SECTION 7-1.
7.1
INTRODUCTION
The MAF place great significance on the maximum use of combined arms tactics at all
levels of command. Musorian doctrine places the emphasis on mechanised operations
with tank support in order to achieve the combat power and tempo required for
offensive operations.
SECTION 7-2.
Introduction
7.2
This section will examine the role of the battalion as part of a brigade in the advance.
The Musorians divide the march into two distinct elements: the movement organisation
and march security. Movement organisation is designed to ensure high speed, rapid
combat deployment, and effective control. Tanks and artillery are usually positioned
towards the front, and anti-aircraft weapons are distributed throughout the column(s).
All-round security is provided during the march to ensure uninterrupted movement, to
prevent surprise attack, to keep threat reconnaissance units from observing the main
body, and to create the most favourable conditions for deployment of the main body in
a meeting engagement. Advance, flank, and rearguard units ensure all-round security
during the march. In addition, stationary flank outposts occupy critical terrain until the
main body has passed.
Considerations
7.3
The March. The march (advance) should be conducted at night or under conditions of
limited visibility. The speed at which the march is conducted depends on the situation.
A BMP/BTR-equipped battalion can move at up to 30 to 40 kilometres per hour by day,
and 25 to 30 kilometres per hour by night and during other conditions of limited
visibility. If tanks and artillery are attached, the average speed for day marches is 20 to
30 kilometres per hour and 15 to 20 kilometres per hour at night. Foot marches will be
undertaken only when transport is not available. Infantry formations marching on foot
will attempt to cover 20 to 40 kilometres a day in a tactical march, although achieving
this rate will be largely dependent on terrain, weather, and enemy interference.
7.4
Control. The interval between vehicles ranges from 50 metres during road movement
and 50 to 100 metres during tactical cross-country movement. Control measures along
the route of advance include initial start points and easily recognisable control lines.
Communication during the march is achieved through the use of messengers, flags,
and radio (when phase lines [PLs] are crossed).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-2
7.5
Halts. In a motorised/mechanised march, halts of up to 30 minutes occur every two to
three hours. During the second half of a march, a long halt of two to four hours is
standard. During short halts, distances between vehicles in column formation are not
changed – men and vehicles maintain the march intervals. During long halts, vehicles
are dispersed and camouflaged. Foot marches are based on a 10 minute rest for every
60 mins marched. Soldiers are given a one hour break every four hours. Infantry
formations on foot will increase their security commensurate with the time spent at the
halt. During a long halt, sentries will be placed and the flanks of the column better
secured. Depending on the indirect fire threat, the infantry soldiers may also dig shell
scrapes.
Groupings and Organisation for Combat
7.6
Groupings. During an advance, the march commander will generally allocate one third
of his force to an advance guard with the remaining two thirds as the main body. The
brigade commander allocates tank, artillery, air defence, anti-tank, engineer, and
chemical units to his battalions. Battalion commanders organise their own units for the
march. When feasible, attachments are made prior to the march, with battalion
commanders normally placing attached tank, artillery, and anti-tank forces near or at
the head of their march formation. As a general rule, battalions will receive up to a tank
company under command. Engineer assets and artillery are also likely to be pushed
forward.
7.7
Missions. Battalions may be designated advance guard, forward or rear detachment,
or remain part of the main body of the brigade during the march. Figure 7–1 depicts the
grouping of a battalion as an advance guard. As a general rule, the battalion
commander will employ a vanguard based on a company group. The vanguard
commander will push out a CRP, also known as ‘point’. The CRP is usually based on a
platoon with one tank, or up to a platoon in support. Battalion reconnaissance will
generally operate up to 15 kilometres forward of the CRP or out to a flank. As the
brigade’s advance guard, the battalion ensures the uninterrupted movement and
security of the main body. It must also prevent threat reconnaissance elements from
reaching the main body. The advance guard grouping is responsible for:
a.
battalion reconnaissance forward of the CRP to provide immediate intelligence and
confirm brigade reconnaissance on enemy and route going including flanks;
b.
provision of a CRP as early warning for the vanguard and to clear enemy up to
squad size. The CRP will also fix larger forces up to platoon size in preparation for
a vanguard attack and provide information on the route;
c.
provision of a vanguard which will clear enemy up to platoon size. It will also fix
larger forces up to company size in preparation for a vanguard attack and clear
obstacles; and
d.
provision of a main guard which will conduct route clearance for the main body.
The main guard will also clear enemy up to company size and fix larger forces up
to battalion size in preparation for a vanguard attack. Main guard companies will
generally have a vanguard mirror grouping to enable quick change of the vanguard
to facilitate relief or bypass policy and to provide route clearance for the brigade
main body.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-3
BATTALIONS ADVANCING
MECHANISED
BATTALION
(+)
TANK
BATTALION
DIRECTION
OF
ADVANCE
COMBAT
RECONNAISSANCE
PATROL
UP TO 5 KM
COMPANY
ADVANCE GUARD
1 BRD Mrkh
1-1.5 KM
1 BRD Mrkh
(-)
(-)
(-)
BATTALION
ADVANCE GUARD
Saggers
+ SPG-9
(-)
120 mm
mortars
5-10 km
FLANK
SECURITY
FLANK
SECURITY
HQ
HQ
ZSU-23-4
ZSU-23-4
122 mm
mortars
MAIN BODY
122 mm
(-)
122 mm
(-)
(-)
ATGM
BRDMs
(-)
(-)
ABOUT 3km
SVCS
SVCS
REAR SECURITY
Notes:
1.
The artillery battery may be increased to a battalion in some situations.
2.
The rear security platoon is often only a single vehicle.
3.
This diagram shows battalions advancing either as a brigade advance guard or on an independant route of
advance.
Figure 7–1:
Brigade Tactical March Order
7.8 Forward Detachments. When acting as a forward detachment, the battalion conducts
reconnaissance or seizes and holds key terrain until the arrival of the main body of the
division.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-4
Planning the March
7.9
The brigade commander’s march order to his battalion commander will include:
a.
information on threat and friendly forces;
b.
topographical and meteorological data;
c.
the mission;
d.
execution of the mission (start time and location, coded reference control points,
security information and coordination);
e.
administrative and logistics data; and
f.
command and signals information.
7.10 After reading the brigade commander’s march order, the battalion commander
completes his command estimate and determines:
a.
column formation and composition of security elements;
b.
actions to be conducted by security elements and the main body where contact
with the threat is possible;
c.
use of attachments; and
d.
NBC, air defence, and cover and concealment measures.
7.11 Planning the March. The battalion commander studies the mission, briefs his chief of
staff and technical deputies, calculates movement tables and issues a warning order to
his subordinate elements. The battalion commander meets his attached artillery
commander and coordinates his movement plan with the artillery fire plan.
7.12 The battalion commander’s warning order to his unit describes the conditions under
which the march will be conducted, its length, required preparation, designation of
security elements, information regarding attachments, and the time and location for
receiving the march order.
7.13 The battalion commander and his staff draw up the march order. The battalion
commander makes a detailed map analysis of the terrain. Prior to issuing the combat
order to his unit, the battalion commander’s march order is approved by the brigade
commander.
7.14 The brigade order and the battalion march order form the basis for the battalion
commander’s combat order to his subordinate elements. The march order states the
battalion’s mission, control measures, command and signals instructions, and detailed
instructions to each subordinate unit on actions to be taken in the event of threat action
along the march route. Once the brigade commander has confirmed the battalion
commander’s march order, the battalion commander issues verbal combat orders to his
subordinate elements.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-5
7.15 The verbal combat order from the battalion commander to his unit commanders is a
combination of data derived from the brigade order and the battalion commander’s
march plan. It includes:
a.
details of threat and friendly forces;
b.
the mission;
c.
detailed instruction for each of the battalion’s subordinate elements, coordinating
instructions, action on threat contact, anti-aircraft, and NBC defence;
d.
command and signals; and
e.
logistics details.
7.16 The battalion commander disseminates his orders via the communications net, which
includes every vehicle in the battalion.
7.17 Command and Control. The battalion commander and the attached artillery
commander are normally located well forward, either to the rear of the vanguard or at
the head of the battalion’s main body. His ideal position within the advance guard
enables him to best observe threat action, formulate his plans, and deploy his unit.
7.18 To control his unit during the march, the battalion commander relies on messengers,
flags, traffic controllers, and, to a lesser degree, radios. The battalion commander
generally remains on radio listening watch, as the passing of PLs and other
checkpoints, NBC and air warnings are all transmitted by radio.
7.19 Conduct of the March. The march is strictly controlled, with the start times, passing of
control points, rates of advance, and spacing of vehicles rigidly supervised. If a vehicle
breaks down due to technical difficulty, the commander or driver gives the designated
signals to prevent following vehicles from slowing down. If the vehicle can be repaired
by the crew and/or the battalion maintenance section, it rejoins the column; otherwise,
it is evacuated by the brigade.
7.20 Gorges, bridges, built-up areas, river crossing points, and other hazardous areas for
the column are crossed without halting and at maximum speed. Effort is made to
bypass built-up areas. Engineers, as part of a CRP when the battalion is the advance
guard of the brigade, supervise the removal of obstacles.
7.21 During short halts, the column halts in order and at intervals established in the battalion
commander’s order. Crews of air defence weapons and designated air sentries remain
on alert.
7.22 During long halts, companies disperse to assigned areas, but are prepared to move out
on short notice. These areas are selected to take advantage of natural terrain features
for protection. Hot food is prepared while equipment is checked.
7.23 The battalion’s reaction to enemy aircraft depends on the terrain it occupies. If cover is
sufficient along the route of march, the battalion halts and attempts to conceal itself
from aerial observation; otherwise, vehicles increase their speed, lengthen the intervals
that separate them and engage aircraft. ATGMs mounted on the BMP are often used
against attacking helicopters. At night, vehicular night vision devices are used, and
personnel fire at threat aircraft only on order of the company or battalion commander.
7.24 Termination of the March. The march terminates with the the meeting battle, the first
phase in the destruction of the threat’s forces.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-6
SECTION 7-3.
THE ATTACK
Types of Attack
7.25 A large force may concentrate on the conduct of an envelopment or pincer movement,
leaving the battalions and brigades as part of that force to focus on seizing terrain or
destroying the enemy in order to develop the larger scheme of manoeuvre.
7.26 The three forms of attack on the battlefield are:
a.
The Encounter Battle. The encounter battle is also referred to as a meeting battle.
This type of battle usually occurs when two moving forces clash, or when
unexpected enemy forces are encountered. The encounter battle is designed to
clear smaller enemy forces quickly in order to maintain the momentum of the
advance. For infantry forces this will usually mean staying mounted in AFVs and
employing FS to force the enemy to withdraw in the shortest possible time.
b.
The Quick and Deliberate Attack. The quick and deliberate attack is also termed
an attack against a defending threat, and is employed if an encounter battle is
unsuccessful or likely to be unsuccessful. Quick attacks will be employed against
an enemy that is in an unprepared or early stage of defence. Deliberate attacks
will normally be conducted against well defended positions. While they are similar
to the quick attack, the infantry commander will conduct a more detailed
reconnaissance and planning in the execution of this attack. The aim of the quick
and deliberate attack is to achieve a decisive breakthrough. When conducting an
attack, the Musorians refer to closing, contact, and penetration of the enemy as
‘breakthrough operations’. Brigades and lesser units will generally be concerned
with achieving the breakthrough.
c.
The Pursuit. Pursuit operations will be conducted following breakthrough
operations and are designed to vigorously exploit success on the battlefield.
Brigades and battalions both engage in pursuit operations.
7.27 At divisional level and above, the ground forces attack in depth. The offensive against a
defending threat is conducted in two distinct but overlapping stages. The first involves
the concentration of combat power at a chosen point to rupture the threat defences and
achieve a breakthrough. The second stage comprises the intensification of the attack
by rapid exploitation of success.
7.28 The breakthrough is achieved by concentrating manoeuvre and fire units at a decisive
point. In the breakthrough sector, the Musorians will use first echelon forces to achieve
breakthrough and seal the shoulders of the penetration. Second echelon forces will be
required to pass through and seize subsequent objectives. Reserve forces will remain
uncommitted and are then given an offensive mission during the battle.
7.29 Musorian forces rely heavily on the sheer speed of execution and tempo in their
attacks. The effects of obscuration may however, reduce weapon ranges and lead to a
close fight. The Musorians may also deliberately attack with the majority of combat
power forward to the detriment of their flanks and rear.
The Encounter (Meeting) Battle
7.30 Characteristics. The rapidly changing situation, the presence of gaps and open flanks,
and freedom of manoeuvre allow the more able and aggressive commander to defeat
forces of equal and even superior strength. The meeting battle may occur:
a.
in a surprise attack when the threat is attempting to occupy forward defensive
positions, and
b.
during a breakthrough when approaching threat reserves are encountered.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-7
7.31 To achieve success in the meeting battle, the Musorians stress:
a.
continuous reconnaissance,
b.
immediate reaction by battalion commanders, and
c.
speed and aggression in order to unbalance the enemy.
7.32 Objective. From the point of contact, the depth of the objective given to a battalion in
the advance guard could be up to eight kilometres. If it is unable to achieve this
objective because the enemy force is too large (for example contact has been made
with an opposing battalion), then the advance guard of the brigade is tasked with
delaying the largest possible threat force and giving the rest of the brigade the time and
intelligence data to enable it to enter the battle effectively.
7.33 Command and Control. The advance guard battalion operates five to 10 kilometres
ahead of the brigade main body. The brigade commander will allow more freedom of
action to the advance guard commander. The dynamic nature of the meeting battle will
impose additional strain on the battalion commander and his staff in their efforts to
control the actions of subordinate units.
7.34 Once contact has been made, radio is the primary means of control. Instructions by the
battalion commander are brief, as tactics are based on well-rehearsed battle drills.
Conduct of the Encounter (Meeting) Battle
7.35 The stages of the meeting battle include:
a.
the initial stage,
b.
the deployment,
c.
the attack, and
d.
the termination.
7.36 Initial Stage. The meeting battle commences when the advance guard’s vanguard
clashes with the threat security forces. The vanguard attempts to destroy the threat and
continue its mission, or if forced on the defensive by a superior threat, to hold its
position and support the attack by the main guard. During this initial phase, battalion
reconnaissance forces will patrol aggressively to gain information. They will try to
determine the location of key weapons, possible boundaries, and weak points in their
estimate so as to support the commander. These aggressive tactics may well involve
establishing contact.
7.37 Deployment. The commander moves forward quickly to make an estimate of the
situation, and issues orders to his attached artillery. The artillery deploys from the
march, supports the advance detachment by fire, and prepares to support the
deployment and attack by the main body. Having formulated his plan, the battalion
commander makes alterations to his attachments and orders the deployment of his
unit. He will generally attack in two echelons, retaining one or two platoons in reserve.
The battalion rear service elements are moved well forward. The battalion
commander’s coordinating instructions will include:
a.
mission of the vanguard element of the advance guard;
b.
artillery (to include mortar) FS plan;
c.
sequence of deployment for the tank and infantry units;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-8
d.
combined arms coordination; and
e.
coordination signals (originally determined prior to the march, and subject to lastminute refinement).
7.38 The brigade commander is notified of his advance guard commander’s plans for the
meeting battle, and supports him with artillery fire when within range.
7.39 The Attack. In most meeting battles, it is assumed that the threat has not had time to
prepare the terrain, create a fire plan, or deploy anti-tank weapons. To take advantage
of these factors, the battalion normally attacks mounted when mechanised, with tanks
preceding the mounted infantry supported by artillery and mortar fire. Should threat
anti-tank fire be heavy, the battalion attacks dismounted. When attacking dismounted,
the infantry stays within 200 metres of the tanks to provide intimate support. BMP/BTRs
support the armour infantry attack by fire. If anti-tank fire is strong, attached tanks stay
back with the BMP/BTRs and support the attacking dismounted infantry by fire.
7.40 A concealed approach to the deployment line is used. Specific attack frontages depend
on the situation and weather. The deployment of two companies in the first echelon and
one acting as second echelon or reserve is normal. The battalion frontage is usually
around 1 000 metres. When all three companies are attacking abreast, the frontages
will increase to approximately 500 metres per company with up to 200 metres lateral
interval between companies. Terrain restraints may not allow the battalion’s subelements to attack on line; companies are echeloned (heavy right, heavy left), or attack
in wedge formation. The attack is rapidly developed into the depths of the threat
formation. There is no mopping up of small threat groups, as this task is handled by the
brigade main body.
7.41 Tactics at the squad and platoon level during the attack focus on achieving a break-in
as far as the forward pits of the defensive position. Musorians will expect at least partial
neutralisation of a defensive position through their weight of indirect fire. This will
enable assaulting infantry to close the assault gap and move quickly into the forward
pits. Lead assault elements will be heavily armed with grenades which will be thrown
when close to the forward pits. If caught in the open the Musorians will employ fire and
movement at the group, squad, and platoon level. During the fight-through, the
Musorians will skirmish through a position using grenades and RPGs to reduce
resistance and maintain the momentum of the assault. The platoon flamethrower will be
brought forward to reduce pits and bunkers. Figure 7–2 depicts the squad in assault
formation.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-9
Figure 7–2:
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
The Squad in Formation Assault
On dismount from BMP, assistant squad leader commands vehicle with vehicle gunner and driver making
up the three crew. BTRs require two on dismount, usually assistant squad leader as gunner and second
crew as driver.
APC/IFV can be used in intimate support or FS.
Mechanised operations will involve tanks used in direct FS and leading the assault 200 to 300 metres
forward of the infantry.
7.42 Termination. The meeting battle at battalion level terminates when the threat has been
destroyed, forced to retire, or when the battalion has to assume the defensive. In the
first two situations, the battalion resumes the march or launches pursuit operations. If
forced on the defensive, the battalion attempts to inflict maximum casualties and buy
time for the brigade to deploy. In the latter case, the advance guard battalion supports
the attack of the main body by fire.
The Quick and Deliberate Attack
7.43 Concept. Quick and deliberate attacks are normally aimed at achieving a
breakthrough. The concept of the breakthrough operation envisages the destruction of
an enemy force in prepared positions in a small sector of the FEBA, and subsequent
penetration and reduction of positions in depth. Breakthrough operations are conducted
by concentrations of manoeuvre elements and fire-power at selected points. The
Musorians seek to establish decisive superiority in the breakthrough sector while
maintaining pressure all along the enemy’s front. Tank brigades take part in
breakthroughs as part of a divisional operation. Each brigade is normally organised into
two echelons for the operation, and is reinforced with engineer and mechanised troops.
Battalions may be organised in one or more sectors within their zones of responsibility;
the attack is usually led by tanks. Frontages will depend on mission, time, enemy and
terrain considerations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-10
7.44 Characteristics. Breakthroughs are conducted against three types of defences; hasty,
positional, and fortified. The difference between positional and fortified defences is one
of degree, with the latter being better prepared, more complex, in greater depth, and
therefore more difficult to breach. Weapons employment affects attack frontages and
formation in a breakthrough operation. Large amounts of conventional artillery are
concentrated to support the breakthrough effort, which is usually directed at the
weakest point in the threat’s defences. The breakthrough sector, regardless of the type
of defence it is directed against, attempts to concentrate numerical superiority in men
and equipment on a narrow sector, while pressure is maintained along other sectors
through supporting attacks.
7.45 Objective. The objective of the breakthrough is threefold: to split and disperse the
threat’s defence, to set the conditions for the pursuit, and to complete the destruction of
threat forces. The battalion is assigned an immediate objective of 1 000 to 1 500
metres in depth; that is, a distance just beyond the depth of the threat’s forward
defending companies but short of his reserve positions. The battalion’s subsequent
objective encompasses threat reserves to a depth of up to four kilometres from the
FEBA.
SECTION 7-4.
THE BRIGADE ATTACK
Description
7.46 A brigade attacking in the first echelon of a division will normally aim to penetrate,
destroy, or neutralise forward strong points of defending enemy battalions, to continue
the attack to an enemy battalion rear area, and to be prepared to continue the attack
into enemy brigade and division rear areas.
7.47 The actual frontage of the attack can extend from three to eight kilometres, although
the typical attack frontage for a brigade is four to five kilometres. The distance between
echelons may extend from five to 15 kilometres, depending on the situation.
7.48 A brigade attack from the march will generally follow the sequence discussed below:
a.
Artillery and air assaults will prepare the defender’s position from the initiation of
the attack until the arrival of the assault forces at their respective objectives. The
duration of the preparation could extend to 50 minutes.
b.
The forward movement of the brigade from its position in the AA will be
simultaneous with the preparation of the enemy positions. This will disguise the
movement and noise from the defender, and will mask the point of attack or main
effort.
c.
The brigade will break into battalion columns eight to 12 kilometres from the
enemy defensive positions, company columns four to six kilometres, platoon
columns one to four kilometres, and battle formation 300 to 1 000 metres.
Scenario
7.49 The following scenario traces the actions of a mechanised brigade from the issuing of
the operation order to the final assault (see figure 7–3).
Notes:
1.
2.
Figure 7–3:
300 TO 1000 M
H-5
APPROACH MARCH - 15 KPH
MOUNTED ATTACK -5 - 10 KPH
DISMOUNTED -1 - 4 KPH
STANDARD RATE OF ADVANCE
FEBA
TIME: H-HR
1-2 KM
DEPLOYMENT LINES:
INTO BATTLE
FORMATION
OVERALL RATE OF
ADVANCE MAY BE
MUCH SLOWER:
SOME 1-2 KPH
2 TO 3 KM
H-15
INTO PLATOON
COLUMNS
4 TO 6 KM
H-40
INTO COMPANY
COLUMNS
DISTANCE FROM FEBA
8 TO 12 KM
H-60
ARTILLERY
PREPARATION STARTS
INTO BATTALION
COLUMNS
BEHIND REAR
BN)
REAR SVCS
(MOVS 3 TO 5 KM
40 TO 70 KM
H-3 HRS TO H-5 HRS
(MOVS AHD
OF LEADING
BNS)
ARTY GP
BDE
BRIGADE ASSEMBLY AREA
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-11
Brigade Attack from Line of March
For diagrammatic purposes the battalion has been shown with all three companies in the first echelon;
normally at least one platoon will be maintained in battalion reserve.
Battalions may attack with a company and tank platoon held in the second echelon.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-12
Planning and Reconnaissance
7.50 Issuing of the Brigade Commander’s Order. At 1000 hours, 17 August, the brigade
commander issues his order while located in the AA. Enemy elements (mechanised
brigade) have halted the Musorian advance, and up to an enemy mechanised infantry
battalion is defending in the sector assigned to the first mechanised brigade. The first
mechanised brigade is to move from its assembly area, which is about 30 kilometres
from the line of contact (LC), and attack from the march with two reinforced battalions
in first echelon. The tentative H-hour is 0400 hours, 18 August. The third mechanised
battalion is in the second echelon.
7.51 The first echelon battalion commanders plot their work maps. The first battalion
commander determines:
a.
an initial rate of advance of approximately 1.5 kilometres per hour (battalion
immediate objective is to be seized by H +1); and
b.
a tentative combat formation with two companies in the first echelon, based on
attack frontages of approximately 1.5 kilometres.
7.52 Preparation of the commander’s work map, evaluation of the situation, and the decision
are emphasised. These serve as a foundation for all subsequent coordination, such as
FS and second echelon commitment (see figure 7–4). Time is the overriding
consideration in planning.
83
2nd ECHELON
COMMITMENT
82
1
3
81
3
2
80
79
05
06
07
Figure 7–4:
08
09
10
11
12
Battalion Commander’s Work Map
7.53 Reconnaissance and Development of the Target List. At 1230 hours, 17 August, the
brigade commander and subordinates assemble in the vicinity of the FEBA to perform
the commander’s reconnaissance. The information from this reconnaissance will be
supplemented by an artillery reconnaissance and target data from units in contact and
higher headquarters. The brigade artillery officer develops a map plot of enemy targets
and a target list.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-13
7.54 The Musorians believe that reconnaissance is a key factor in refining the preliminary
decision, developing the fire plan to include anti-tank suppression, and breaching the
enemy defences.
7.55 Suppression of Anti-tank Weapons. Reconnaissance elements will identify enemy
emplaced ATGMs, and dug-in tanks within and between platoon strong points. The
brigade commander will generally order at least one tank platoon and one ATGM
platoon to be employed in a direct fire role in the sector of the first mechanised
battalion. An artillery battery can also be allocated for direct fire support.
7.56 Brigade Artillery. Brigade artillery will develop the direct fire plan, to include a table of
distribution for fire missions. The Musorians will strive to locate 60 to 70 per cent of the
enemy anti-tank systems, and to destroy 50 to 60 per cent. Anti-tank suppression will
be closely coordinated with the preparation and the assault force deployment.
7.57 The first battalion (the main effort) attacks from line of march at 0400 hours, 18 August
(see figure 7–5). The battalion crosses the assault line at H-7 minutes. The first
battalion commander determines the location of deployment lines and the time.
Deployment of the brigade into columns at lower levels is calculated and closely related
to the terrain, route passibility, timing of the preparation, and the nature of enemy
defences (see table 7–1). Any deviation in deployment can impact adversely on the
assault and related support.
83
SCALE EXPANDED
1P
1
20 km
82
1
2
81
11
FEBA
13
ASSAULT LINE
H 7 MIN
PLATOON COLUMN
H 16 MIN
COMPANY COLUMN
H 22 MIN
Figure 7–5:
15
17
19
21
42
BATTALION COLUMN
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-14
Table 7–1:
Chart for Deployment in Columns
Serial
Route Segment
Segment
Length
(c)
Permissible
Rate of
March [kph]
(d)
Travel
Time
[min]
(e)
(a)
(b)
1.
Platoon Column to Assault Line
1.5
10
9
2.
Company Column to Platoon Column
2
12
10
3.
Battalion Column to Company Column
6
20
18
4.
Brigade Column to Battalion Column
20
25
48
5.
Assembly Area to Initial Point
5
25
12
34.5
21(average)
97
6.
Totals
Coordination for the Assault
7.58 During the artillery preparation and the deployment of the first battalion for the assault,
the first artillery battalion commander and first battalion commander are collocated at
the COP. The following coordination measures are used:
a.
pre-planned artillery fires are conducted in accordance with the fire plan;
b.
direct fire weapons and ATGMs destroy designated targets;
c.
a direct fire tank platoon joins the first battalion deploying for the assault;
d.
the first echelon assaults on order;
e.
engineers clear minefields during the last strike of the artillery preparation;
f.
battalion second echelon is committed and direct fire means are displaced on
order; and
g.
air defence supports the assault.
Brigade Second Echelon Commitment
7.59 By 0630 hours (H+2.5), the first battalion has broken through enemy defences, but met
increased resistance north of REDKIY Woods. Enemy forces are moving toward the
area from GOLUMBOY Woods. The second echelon battalion (third battalion), in
column near SYCHEVO, received orders to be committed on the right flank of the first
battalion with an H-hour of 0700 hours (H+3).
7.60 The third battalion is committed from the march; it is supported by a 10 minute fire
assault by the first artillery battalion on the strong point north of REDKIY Woods. The
second echelon commitment plan is refined and implemented on order. The second
echelon is committed on a flank. The timing and the availability of FS are critical
elements (see figure 7–6).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-15
GUSTOV
WOODS
BYSTRYY
BROOK
XX
H
COMMITMENT
LINE
1
KOBINO
1
2
1
H 35
PLATOON
COLUMN
SYCHEVO
3
REDKIY
WOODS
GOLUMBOY
WOODS
Figure 7–6:
Plan for the Commitment of the Brigade Second Echelon
SECTION 7-5.
THE BATTALION ATTACK
Formations
7.61 The three basic formations used by ground forces are the march, pre-battle, and battle
formations. The march is organised to ensure rapid unit deployment into the pre-battle and
battle formations. This formation is used when contact with an intact threat force is not
imminent. When contact with the threat is imminent, units deploy from the march to the prebattle formation. These formations are dispersed laterally, in depth, and with means of
reinforcement. They may be in line, echelon (right or left), wedge, or inverted wedge
formation. When it is possible to penetrate, disrupt, or overly extend defences in the pre-battle
formation, units will deploy into battle formation to overcome stronger defences. The battle
formation is formed when columns deploy into linear formations echeloned in depth. These
formations include first and second echelons, reserve (combined arms, tank, engineer,
chemical) and artillery groupings. Should the attack be successful, units would redeploy into
pre-battle formation for more rapid movement.
Combat Support
7.62 The Musorians achieve desired superiority in men and equipment for the breakthrough
by concentrating (for a relatively short period of time) on a narrow frontage. The battalion
could be heavily reinforced with up to two tank companies, one or more artillery battalions, a
platoon of combat engineers (equipped with flamethrowers and obstacle-clearing equipment),
and a chemical detachment. When attacking on a one kilometre frontage, the battalion
commander could have 60 to 100 mortar and artillery tubes in support.
Attack Frontages and Formations
7.63 The battalion may attack as part of the brigade’s first or second echelon. As part of the
first echelon, it will normally attack with three heavily reinforced companies: two in the first
echelon (or with all three companies in the first echelon against a hasty defence) attacking on
a frontage of about 1 000 metres, and one in the second echelon (reserve). If the threat’s
defences, particularly his anti-tank defences, have been sufficiently neutralised, the battalion
would attack mounted, otherwise it will dismount. The situation determines the battalion
formation, although for control purposes, an attack on line is preferred over echelon (right,
left) formations. Figure 7–7 depicts the deployment of a combined arms mechanised battalion
in the attack.
Figure 7–7:
TK COY COMD
MR COY
COMD
A-TK
SECT
A-TK SECT
MG SECT
MR COY
COMD
MG SECT
A-TK SECT
A-TK SECT
9P-148
9P-148
AGS-17
PL
MG SECT
MG SECT
2S-31
BTY
SA-16
SECT
SA-16
SECT
SA-16
SECT
SA-16
SECT
MR COY
COMD
TK COY
COMD
RECCE PL
MT - 12 PL (ATR)
2ND ECH MECH COY
2ND ECH TK COY
ENGR COY
2S1 BTY
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-16
Deployment of the Combined Arms Mechanised Battalion in the Attack
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-17
Command and Control
7.64 The battalion commander will move within 500 metres of his first echelon. The battalion
chief of staff is located to the rear in battalion main headquarters. When an artillery unit
is attached to the battalion, the artillery commander will normally accompany the
battalion commander; the mortar battery commander will also be close by, while
forward observers (FOs) (from attached artillery) will accompany the first echelon
companies. When the battalion leaves the assembly area, the battalion commander,
with the attached artillery and mortar battery commanders, is located where he can
best control his unit. Company and platoon leaders are at the head of their respective
elements. Guides are also employed to ensure speed and aid in control of the battalion.
7.65 Though radio is the primary means of control in the attack, flags, flares, and
messengers are also used. A CP is located from which the commander may best
observe the attack. The CP is rarely moved during a counter-attack, on commitment of
the reserve, during a transitional phase (such as switching from the attack to the
defence), or during heavy threat air attack.
Breakthrough from the March
7.66 Normally, when the battalion, acting as part of the brigade, attempts a breakthrough
from the march, it will first occupy an AA to make final preparations for the assault.
When properly chosen, the AA provides dispersion, offers security from threat
observation and fire, and makes it more possible to achieve surprise.
7.67 Attempting a breakthrough from the march entails strict coordination of deployment
times with FS, engineer support, and movement control. It may also be conducted
through forces in contact, thus involving a passage of lines. This type of operation
involves extensive coordination with the unit to be passed through.
7.68 In addition to the situation, the determinant for the battalion’s attack frontage is to
create the required superiority in combat power from the threat FEBA all the way to the
battalion’s subsequent objective. The depth of the battalion’s immediate and
subsequent objectives will also vary depending on the situation.
7.69 Battalion formation also depends on the situation. Extended line formation is usually
used in open terrain and when the threat FEBA is comparatively straight. The extended
line formation allows maximum fire-power to the front and facilitates C2. The wedge is
commonly used in the depth of the threat’s defences, after breakthrough has been
achieved. The battalion attacks from the march mounted in BTR/BMPs, although threat
fire may force a dismounted or mixed attack. In the latter case, part of the battalion
fights from BTR/BMPs while the other part fights dismounted.
7.70 When the battalion leaves the assembly area, it moves as rapidly as possible to the
threat FEBA, and deploys according to the brigade commander’s order. Battalions
deploy into columns eight to 12 kilometres from the FEBA, companies form columns
four to six kilometres from the FEBA, and platoons 1.5 to four kilometres from the
FEBA. Squads form assault lines as close as possible to the threat; usually within 300
to 1 000 metres of the FEBA.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-18
7.71 A 30 to 45 minute artillery preparation is planned to inflict maximum damage on the
defender up until the time that the assault line is reached; artillery and mortar fires are
then shifted into the depths of the threat’s defences. Breaches are made through
minefields by a combination of artillery fire, tanks, and sappers. The leading battalion in
the main attack despatches tanks equipped with mine-ploughs and mine-roller
assemblies, together with supporting infantry and sappers, to clear one path per
attacking platoon (three per company). Explosive fired line charges clear paths several
metres wide and a few hundred metres long, and are supplemented by sappers armed
with the UZ-series bangalore torpedoes, each of which can clear a lane two to three
metres wide.
7.72 Troops follow tanks through breaches made in minefields and then deploy in line
behind the tanks and assault the threat’s forward positions. The actions of the battalion
change most dramatically after the forward defences have been breached. Tanksupported first echelon companies attempt to exploit success and widen the gaps in the
defences as rapidly as possible. Efforts are made to prevent the threat from reestablishing his defences, or withdrawing in an orderly fashion. Strong points
established in the depth of the defences are bypassed whenever possible.
7.73 The reinforced second echelon company would be committed to aid a faltering first
echelon unit, to exploit the success of the first echelon by continuing the attack into the
depths, or to deal with a counter-attack.
Breakthrough from a Position in Close Contact
7.74 Factors increasing the complexities of this type of attack are:
a.
the constant threat of nuclear and conventional fire, necessitating the dispersal of
personnel. Assault positions must, therefore, be only briefly occupied;
b.
the difficulty of concealing attack preparations; elaborate ruses must be devised to
achieve surprise;
c.
the threat of sudden enemy counter-attack during the passage of lines; and
d.
elaborate engineer preparation of the assault line.
7.75 In addition to organising an attack from the march, the battalion commander also
determines:
a.
the assault position his battalion will occupy, and the routes they will use to occupy
it; and
b.
BMP/BTR locations and procedures for using them in support of the dismounted
attack.
7.76 Ideally, the battalion occupies the assault position during darkness or other periods of
reduced visibility. BTR/BMPs are initially left in the rear (moving up to revetments when
given a signal) while dismounted infantry move to their assault positions by way of
concealed routes and communications trenches. To achieve surprise, the battalion’s
first echelon assault companies will occupy the second trench of the defending forces.
During preparatory fires, the first echelon assault companies occupy the first trench and
the second echelon company (reserve) occupies the second trench. Attached tanks
occupy a designated AA and are given a start line, normally located one to two
kilometres from the FEBA, while attached engineers are located in communications
trenches close to the companies they will support. The battalion mortar battery and
attached and supporting artillery occupy positions prior to the time the battalion
occupies its assault positions and the battalion medical point is located just behind the
second echelon (reserve) company. The remaining battalion rear service elements are
further back, but generally within four kilometres of the FEBA.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-19
7.77 Forces relieved by the battalion during the passage of lines will perform one of three
actions: retire to the rear, support the attack by fire, and/or join in the attack. In the first
case, they may be formed as a reserve or sent further to the rear for rest; in the
second, their organic and attached weapons would participate in the preparatory fires
in support of the attack; in the third case, they would support the initial assault by fire
and participate in one of the brigade’s attacking echelons.
7.78 When given the attack signal, first echelon assault companies, following closely behind
their attached tanks and supported by BMP/BTR fire, penetrate the threat’s forward
defences and attack his reserves. The battalion commander and his staff follow closely
behind the first echelon and, in turn, are followed by the battalion’s second echelon
(reserve). Mortars, attached artillery, and air defence forces move on order to support
the attack into the depth of the defences (see figure 7–8).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-20
Figure 7–8:
Mechanised Battalion Deploying from the Line of March to Participate
in a Division Breakthrough Operation
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-21
SECTION 7-6.
THE PURSUIT
7.79 Objective. The objective of the pursuit is to prevent an organised withdrawal and
complete the destruction of threat forces as rapidly as possible. The battalion attempts
to achieve these objectives through the increased mobility and fire-power of its own
elements and its attachments. The battalion normally conducts the pursuit (as part of
the brigade) frontally, on parallel routes, or by a combination thereof.
7.80 Conduct of the Pursuit. Aware that the threat is withdrawing, the battalion
commander reorganises his forces as necessary, maintains close contact with the
threat, and informs the brigade of his actions.
7.81 The brigade commander radios his orders to the battalion commander to conduct a
pursuit. A battalion is usually assigned a pursuit axis, told what threat forces to destroy
and the objectives to be seized. The battalion commander radios missions to his
organic and attached units while on the move. The depth of the objectives depends on
the situation.
7.82 The battalion, attacking initially in its former formation with a first and second echelon
(reserve), first attempts to destroy the withdrawing threat’s covering force. Having done
so, the battalion either deploys into a single column in march formation or conducts the
pursuit on parallel axes. In the former case, a company reinforced with tanks,
engineers and chemical troops forms the forward patrol of the advance guard, and a
series of meeting engagements takes place. In a pursuit on parallel axes, the battalion
sends out stronger security elements to the threatened flanks.
7.83 Attached engineer and artillery units play a key role in pursuit operations. Engineers
remove obstacles, prepare detours around damaged parts of the route, and lay mines
on the threat’s withdrawal routes and probable counter-attack axes. Artillery engages
targets up to maximum range, deploying from columns in less than ideal firing
positions. Artillery must be able to come out of action quickly and rejoin the march
formation. Prompt receipt of target data determines the success of the artillery during
the pursuit. The new self-propelled artillery units are especially well suited to pursuit
operations. Heliborne and/or airborne forces seize key terrain in the threat rear, thereby
disrupting threat withdrawal.
7.84 Rear service personnel of the battalion follow behind the combat formations, and keep
the brigade informed of the medical, supply and maintenance status of the battalion
and its attachments.
SECTION 7-7.
CONDUCT OF THE TANK BATTALION ATTACK
7.85 Tank Battalion Support. A tank battalion is supported by the fire of artillery and
aircraft and will generally have the following attachments from other arms in the
offensive:
a.
one mechanised company;
b.
an engineer platoon; and
c.
armoured recovery vehicles, supply vehicles, and ambulances.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-22
7.86 Echelons. A battalion usually attacks in two echelons. The second echelon, which may
comprise one tank company, follows the first echelon at a distance of three kilometres.
If the first echelon fails to reach its objective, the mission is taken over as a priority task
of the second echelon. When the first echelon takes its objective, the second echelon is
used to exploit its success. The second echelon is frequently (but inaccurately) referred
to in military writing as a ‘reserve’. The true reserve (usually one tank platoon) is
formed by the battalion commander. The reserve is not given a mission at the outset of
an operation. It is used to contend with unforeseen contingencies and to make a shift in
the thrust of the operation.
7.87 Attack Frontages and Depths. Terrain, the degree to which the threat force has been
neutralised, and whether nuclear weapons are to be employed, dictate the frontage of a
battalion during an attack. The distances shown in table 7-2 may be taken as typical.
Table 7–2:
Tank Attack Frontages
Serial
(a)
Unit
(b)
Frontages [m]
(c)
1.
Tank Battalion (Wedge)
1 500
2.
Tank Company
500
3.
Tank Platoon
150
4.
Tank Intervals
100
Note:
1.
Distances will increase by 25 per cent when fighting in a nuclear threat environment.
7.88 A battalion attack in two echelons is normally carried out to a depth of three to four
kilometres. After preparation rites, the first echelon conducts an attack to overcome the
threat forward positions. When the first and second echelons have consolidated their
positions, the second echelon attack is delivered against the threat’s positions in depth.
7.89 Relative Strengths. The Musorians judge that the usual ratio of attackers to defence
should be between 3 and 5 to 1 in tanks. But a threat force that is two or three times as
strong as the attacking force may be engaged if preparation fires have effectively
neutralised the threat defensive position. This inversion of usual attack defence ratios is
indicative of the results the Musorians expect from the destructive force of heavy
artillery fire.
7.90 Fire Support. FS for the tank battalion is normally arranged by the brigade
commander. Artillery is allocated from divisional resources. FS may be augmented by
direct or indirect fire from tank units not taking part in the attack. Preparatory fire is
usually on a timed basis and can be up to 40 minutes in length. Artillery attached to an
attacking tank battalion covers the movement of the battalion’s first echelon. During the
final assault, artillery engages threat reserve positions. Musorian tanks close to within
150 to 200 metres of artillery fire during the advance. Artillery targets in support of
second echelon missions are selected by the tank battalion commander after
consolidation of the first echelon objectives.
7.91 Smoke. Smoke may be used before or after the start of an offensive. Before the
offensive starts, the control of smoke is likely to be retained at brigade level or higher.
When the battalion penetrates the threat defences, the battalion commander may call
for smoke either to conceal a flank or to confuse the threat as to the direction of the
attack. The Musorians recognise the value of smoke in obscuring the field of vision of
ATGM operators. Since the tank unit commanders regard ATGMs as the threat’s most
dangerous anti-tank weapon, smoke will frequently be used.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-23
Attack on a Prepared Position
7.92 Deployment. A tank battalion requires an initial deployment area of eight to 10 square
kilometres to prepare for an attack on a prepared position. The area should be out of
threat observation, allow for camouflage, and have good access roads. In this area,
tanks are resupplied with ammunition and POL and are prepared for combat.
Preliminary orders are given and units from mechanised battalions and other attached
units join the tank companies. A point at the front of the deployment area is designated
the departure point from which subsequent movement is timed. Once the battalion
starts its advance no stops are made, although movement control points may be
established approximately every 1 to 1-1/2 hour march along the route. Routes are
sometimes posted with coloured markers. An area is selected some four to six
kilometres from the threat position for companies to deploy into column. Companies
move into a column of platoon one to three kilometres from the position depending on
the terrain, and into an assault line 1000 to 500 metres in front of the threat position.
Second echelon companies remain approximately three kilometres behind the first
echelon in the advance movement. Figure 7–9 depicts the deployment of a tank
battalion into the attack reinforced by a mechanised company.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-24
Figure 7–9:
Deployment of a Tank Battalion Company Into the Attack
Reinforced by a Mechanised Company
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-25
7.93 Reconnaissance. When a tank battalion attacks from a position which is behind the
FEBA, the battalion commander conducts ground reconnaissance with the
commanders of his tank companies and attached units. The battalion commander and
the reconnaissance group follow the planned route of advance, and familiarise
themselves with the departure and control points and those deployment areas behind
their own FEBA. Detailed reconnaissance is made of fording points and other critical
points. Areas to be used as second echelon deployment areas and by the battalion
medical aid station and the battalion support group are confirmed. Radio
communications are established with units which are to support the tank battalion with
fire. In the assault, the battalion commander maintains personal surveillance over the
battlefield from his CP. The battalion commander is able both to transmit updated
tactical intelligence to the brigade commander and to personally influence the battle.
7.94 Estimate. An estimate is made of the amount of neutralisation possible. Special
attention is paid to identifying threat tanks and ATGMs. The location of the battalion
CP, the fire positions of attached AFVs, and dismounting areas for mechanised infantry
are planned.
7.95 Attack Coordination. The tank battalion commander is responsible for coordinating
passage of lines, and supporting fires of attached units and those along the FEBA
which are within range. This coordination is worked out within the fire plan laid down by
the brigade commander. Movement timings are planned so that the battalion attacks as
soon as possible after air or artillery strikes.
7.96 Obstacle Crossing. A tank battalion crosses minefields after clearance of platoon
lanes by engineer units or by battalion tanks equipped with mine-ploughs. Mineploughs and rollers from the brigade engineers are fitted as required. Such clearing
operations may be covered by the use of smoke. Engineer units create passages in
obstacles (including minefields) by demolition, usually during the preparatory artillery
barrage. Once made, these passage are marked and guarded by engineer units.
Narrow defiles, canals, or streams which could impede the attack are bridged by
engineer units.
7.97 Assault Action. Following preparatory fires, the first echelon of the battalion assaults
in company line formation. An assault speed of 14 to 22 kilometres per hour is usual.
Tanks engage targets according to the priority set by company commanders. This strict
fire control ensures the concentration of fire. Dismounted infantry follow the tanks as
closely as possible to gain cover from fire. Infantry in APCs follow 150 to 200 metres
behind the tanks. Second echelons assault through gaps in the first echelon. The
battalion consolidates on the objective once it is taken and threat counter-attacks are
neutralised by artillery fire. The battalion commander then calls the battalion support
group forward to replenish POL and ammunition or continues the advance as ordered
by the brigade commander. Damaged tanks are repaired in the battalion position if and
when possible. Each deputy company commander for technical affairs is responsible
for the vehicles of his own unit. Technical assistance is provided where necessary by
the brigade. A separate technical radio net is established and supplemented by audio
and visual signals as needed. Human casualties are evacuated once the tank is moved
into a covered position.
Second Echelon Tank Battalion in a Brigade Attack of a Prepared Position
7.98 Concept. The tank battalion in the second echelon of a brigade’s attack on a prepared
position can have one or more of the following missions:
a.
completion of the mission of first echelon units;
b.
destruction of threat deep or reserve positions;
c.
neutralisation of threat counter-attacks;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-26
d.
pursuit of a withdrawing threat;
e.
attack of threat hasty or mobile defensive positions; and
f.
destruction of threat nuclear delivery means.
7.99 Since achieving such objectives can result in many changes in the routine described for
a first echelon unit, each stage of planning is abbreviated. Success usually depends on
the initiative of the brigade commander and his close monitoring of the status of the first
echelon units.
7.100 Second Echelon Planning. The battalion commander in the second echelon must be
thoroughly familiar with the missions of the first echelon units. This includes a
knowledge of fire planning and FS. He also receives the following information from the
brigade commander:
a.
details of attached and detached units,
b.
intelligence information on known threat positions in depth and reserves,
c.
deployment areas and routes of advance, and
d.
the priority of likely missions and objectives.
Once his mission is defined, and after making his estimate of the situation, the second
echelon tank battalion commander issues his orders by radio.
Attack on an Enemy Hasty Defence
7.101 Concept. The Musorians consider that a threat will move into a hastily prepared
defensive position:
a.
at the outset of operations,
b.
when making contact with an advance guard,
c.
during mobile defensive operations, and
d.
when the Musorians have the initiative during a withdrawal or pursuit operation.
7.102 Deployment. The breakthrough of a threat hastily prepared defensive position is
attempted from the line of march, usually after a successful attack on a prepared
position. The tank battalions which carry out the operations are task-organised and
supported in the same way as for the meeting engagement. Advance guard units
assault threat strong points and attempt to disrupt the defence before it can stabilise.
The operation is dynamic and FS is utilised as it becomes available. The main body
deploys into combat formation directly from the march and assaults to the flanks and
rear of the threat position to prevent threat reinforcement. Initial success is exploited to
force the threat to withdraw. Should the initial breakthrough of such a hasty defence
fail, a further attempt is made from a different flank or axis. In this case the battalion
which made the initial assault consolidates on the most advantageous terrain and gives
direct FS to the attack of a second echelon battalion.
Pursuit
7.103 Concept. Once a breakthrough of either a prepared or hasty defensive position has
been accomplished, a tank battalion will reform into columns and attempt to disrupt the
threat’s withdrawal. Such an operation may be carried out by pursuing the threat
directly, on a parallel route, or both.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-27
7.104 Deployment. During the pursuit, a tank battalion uses the tactical formation
appropriate to the situation. The battalion remains in combat formation until the threat is
forced to retreat, but will form into march columns as soon as practicable, in order to
effect a rapid advance. If the battalion penetrates the rear deployment area of a routed
threat, it can be expected to form into tactical columns headed by a reconnaissance
element and an advance guard. The battalion commander is charged with making
every effort to retain contact with the retreating threat by means of RPs and flank
security detachments.
SECTION 7-8.
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN
General
7.105 Although Musorian doctrine stresses speed and dynamic manoeuvre, the realisation
exists that any operation will invariably involve combat in built-up areas. Despite the
decrease in tempo and increase in attrition, the Musorians acknowledge that this type
of warfare is often unavoidable.
7.106 The decision to attack a city or town may be politically, strategically, or tactically
motivated. Tactical reasons for attack include:
a.
the city or town is key terrain;
b.
the area encompasses vital communications crossings;
c.
it is necessary to protect an exposed flank;
d.
it serves as a diversionary operation;
e.
it would tie down enemy troops and reserves; or
f.
the built-up area is unavoidable due to the extent of urbanisation.
Doctrine
7.107 Planning for the Musorian offensive is based on the expectation that their lead
echelons will cut off and destroy enemy forces before they can occupy cities. If this is
not possible, the Musorians will plan to bypass pockets of resistance with leading
echelons and continue the advance. Bypassed enemy-held areas are isolated and may
be neutralised by following echelons.
7.108 At the divisional level, the principles of offensive operations in urban terrain are:
a.
conduct initial attacks from the march after reconnaissance;
b.
launch attacks from positions in contact with the enemy if initial operations fail to
make progress;
c.
decentralise C2;
d.
maintain continuous pressure on the enemy;
e.
conceal movement through use of smoke and darkness; and
f.
integrate company-size combined arms assault teams.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-28
7.109 While combined arms assault teams provide the main effort during combat in cities,
heliborne assaults on key points may be used. Helicopters may lift troops to key points
in the battle area. During combat in cities, a Musorian division normally attacks in two
echelons at each level of command with the following frontages:
a.
division:
4 to 6 kilometres;
b.
brigade:
2 to 3 kilometres;
c.
battalion:
400 to 600 metres; and
d.
company: 200 to 300 metres.
7.110 Main axes are along major roads to capture key areas, to disrupt the defence, and to
cross the area in the shortest possible time. Division and brigade axes are major roads.
A battalion might advance on two or three parallel streets, with one company axis per
street.
7.111 Combat on such restricted frontages and axes of advance results in the following
significant control problems:
a.
difficulty in coordinating attacks progressing at different rates with FS;
b.
communications problems caused by a large number of very high frequency (VHF)
radios operating in close proximity and being screened by buildings;
c.
identification of targets and coordination of fire against targets in depth; and
d.
logistic problems, particularly the resupply of ammunition, which may be used at
an extremely high rate in intense combat.
7.112 The commander determines force size and composition based on the area’s size,
shape, building type, and street patterns as well as the strength of defending forces.
Attacking forces are not evenly distributed around the built-up area. They are employed
over the most favourable avenues of approach. Because of the manpower-intensive,
close-combat nature of combat in cities, infantry and mechanised, rather than tank
units are preferred. Normally, brigades coordinate the attacks and battalions conduct
them. Division and brigade resources reinforce the battalions as required. Individual
battalions may have a variety of missions, depending on the situation. Reserves are
created at brigade rather than divisional level.
7.113 Mechanised battalions may be employed in either the first or second echelons of an
assault on a city or town. In either case, their organisation, tasks, and assault tactics
are generally the same.
7.114 Musorians term their assault battalions which are fighting in cities ‘assault
detachments’. They are organised into two echelons. Each company is formed into an
‘assault group’. A typical combat organisation for an assault group is:
a.
a mechanised company;
b.
one or two tank platoons;
c.
anti-tank guns;
d.
an artillery battery, in the direct fire role; and
e.
a combat engineer platoon.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-29
7.115 In addition to the FS on hand at company level, the battalion commander normally has
artillery and mortar units under his control to give indirect FS to his assault groups.
Indirect fire weapons are employed to destroy enemy strong points and to neutralise
enemy reserves.
7.116 Assault groups are task organised. Likely assault group tasks include:
a.
attack or seizure groups consisting of a mechanised platoon reinforced by tanks;
b.
a covering and holding group consisting of up to a mechanised platoon reinforced
by anti-tank guns;
c.
an FS group which includes attached artillery in the direct fire role and
flamethrowers; and
d.
a group of combat engineers equipped with bangalore torpedoes and mineclearing devices.
7.117 One or two mechanised squads may be used as a reserve force to either strengthen
attacking or holding groups or to carry out a contingency task. Tank units are used to:
a.
serve, with combined arms reinforcement, as an advance guard in the approach to
the city;
b.
cut off or envelop the enemy before he reaches the built-up area;
c.
envelop the city;
d.
reinforce infantry in street fighting; and
e.
serve as a mobile reserve.
7.118 Artillery. Artillery is decentralised during offensive combat in cities. The commander
may attach up to 50 per cent of available artillery to assault groups to be used in the
direct fire role. The remainder is organised into an artillery group to provide on-call
indirect and counter-battery fire. Howitzers and mortars are used for counter-battery
tasks. Preparatory fires are shorter than normal, five to 20 minutes being the historical
precedent. Anti-aircraft weapons, both hand-held and crew-served, are used to cover
artillery firing positions and commanders’ OPs against low-flying aircraft and
helicopters. When not engaged in this primary role, they suppress enemy ground fire.
7.119 Engineers. The missions of engineer sub-units accompanying assault groups include
engineer reconnaissance, destruction of buildings, mine clearance, and clearing routes
of rubble to allow movement of tanks, APCs, and artillery.
7.120 Unlike combat in more open terrain, the Musorian doctrine stresses decentralised
control in combat in cities. This puts a heavy burden on the battalion’s communication
systems. However, only through decentralisation can they cope with the tactical
problems of controlling troops fighting in close quarters.
7.121 It is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used within a city. Extensive destruction
and contamination would only hinder offensive progress. They may however, use nonpersistent chemical weapons because of their potential for human destruction without
causing material damage.
7.122 The Musorians can be expected to use psychological warfare, including threats,
promises, misinformation and rumours. These would be directed against both military
defenders and the civilian population.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-30
Offensive Tactics
7.123 Combat in urban terrain imposes demands for a slower pace and tempo of attacks;
longer duration of commitment; shorter, intense preparatory fires; and specially tailored
forces. Musorian tactics reflect these concepts.
7.124 Initial reconnaissance of a target urban area is made following study of large-scale
maps, aerial photographs, and background intelligence reports. Tactical intelligence will
update such background data from long-range RPs, agent reports, aerial
reconnaissance, and sigint. When required, task-organised reconnaissance groups
drawn from battalions and tank units reinforce divisional and brigade reconnaissance.
7.125 The specific mission of reconnaissance units and groups from divisions and brigades is
to identify:
a.
enemy deployments outside the built-up area;
b.
strong points within the city;
c.
CPs and communications centres;
d.
reserves; and
e.
enemy withdrawal routes and successive defensive positions.
7.126 Battle Procedure. On receiving his orders from the brigade commander, a battalion
commander clarifies his mission by studying his superior’s concept of attack. He
immediately gives his subordinates a warning order containing the battalion’s mission,
with his guidelines for its completion. The battalion commander then makes his
estimate of the situation. He assesses the enemy, the need for reconnaissance
missions, the battalion’s combat organisations, tasks for his own troops, and terrain.
Using large-scale maps and aerial photographs, the battalion commander studies the
objective area and assigns tasks to individual assault groups.
7.127 If time and the situation allow, the battalion commander conducts a terrain
reconnaissance of his objective, from a suitable vantage point. The assault group
commanders accompany him, and they coordinate ‘on the ground reference points’ and
targets for supporting weapons. During this reconnaissance, the commander selects
and defines departure lines and unit boundaries.
7.128 The battalion commander and his staff prepare the attack order, which includes:
a.
objectives to be seized;
b.
approach routes, lines of departure, and PLs for the assault;
c.
method of assault of individual buildings and blocks;
d.
actions of flanking units;
e.
method of destroying bypassed groups of enemy;
f.
details of fire and movement;
g.
details of smoke, chemical, and flamethrower use;
h.
locations of CPs and control points; and
i.
the procedure for moving these forward during the attack.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-31
7.129 Control of battalion offensive tactics in cities differs significantly from combat in open
terrain. Company-size assault groups attack concurrently and independently (see figure
7–10). A major reason for decentralisation is the greatly restricted area of observation
and radio transmission range. The Musorians pay particular attention to the difficulties
inherent in coordinating indirect artillery fire.
Brigade Boundary
Mortar battery (120 mm)
Mined barricade
Battalion Boundary
Truck-mounted bridge
Portable obstacle
Mechanised Company
reinforced by tanks in the attack
Mine-sweeping tank equipped
with mine-clearing roller
Blockhouse
Mechanised Platoon in
the attack
Battalion commander
Battalion commander’s CP
Control line
Company commander’s CP
Mixed minefield
(anti-personnel & anti-tank)
Anti-tank hedgehogs
Artillery battery in firing position
Concertina wire obstacle
Buildings (most structures
are of stone)
Destroyed bridge
Barbed wire barrier
Figure 7–10: Reinforced Mechanised Company Attack Through a City
7.130 The battalion COP is located 200 to 300 metres behind the assault groups. The
battalion commander personally assigns indirect fire missions to the artillery
commander who is located with him. The Musorians believe that the battalion
commander, by staying as far forward as possible, can personally influence the
conduct of an attack.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-32
7.131 Preparatory indirect artillery fire against urban targets is intensive but short, normally
lasting only five to 20 minutes. Tactical aircraft attack enemy reserve positions, artillery
emplacements and communications centres. As assault units reach a safety line,
artillery fire is shifted to the enemy rear. Smoke is used to conceal approach routes.
7.132 Canals and rivers that flow through cities pose significant obstacles to the attacker.
Accordingly, reconnaissance elements identify likely crossing areas and standing
bridges which are designated as priority objectives. Assault crossing parties with tanklaunched bridges may be positioned well forward in attack units.
7.133 The Assault. After destroying strong points at the edge of the city, assault groups
move forward on major roads toward the centre of the city. Smoke may be used to
cover flanks or conceal forward movement. Infantry soldiers may carry up to twice the
normal allocation of ammunition to compensate for high intensity fire. If resistance is
light, the Musorians may move infantry forward, mounted in BTR/BMPs with tank
support. Most common, however, is for infantry sub-units to move on foot along streets,
clearing buildings one-by-one. Where necessary, they clear houses by simultaneous
assaults from roof and ground floor. Extensive use will be made of automatic weapons,
grenades and the platoon flamethrower.
7.134 Combat engineers attached to assault groups make entry and exit holes through
masonry walls. They make maximum use of underground passages. Specially
assigned teams follow up assault groups to destroy small enemy parties that survive
the initial assault.
7.135 Tanks are used to support infantry and to neutralise enemy strong points. Musorian
doctrine calls for strong reserves of tanks at both battalion and brigade level.
7.136 Tactics for fighting at night remain basically the same as those used by day. The
Musorians try to maintain the same attack intensity at night. Illumination is used both as
an aid to their own troops as well as a means to blind the enemy.
7.137 The battalion second echelon is used to exploit the success of first echelon assault
groups. Normally, the brigade commander gives the order to commit the battalion
second echelon to the assault. It may leapfrog through first echelon sub-units already in
contact with the enemy. Occasionally, the second must complete the task of first
echelon sub-units.
SECTION 7-9.
TACTICAL RIVER CROSSINGS
General
7.138 The Musorians recognise the need to undertake fast and effective tactical river
crossings in the offensive in order to maintain speed and tempo. In response to these
challenges, Musorian planners have devoted considerable resources to improving the
river crossing capabilities of their combat equipment. They have provided their ground
forces with stocks of specialised bridging and assault crossing equipment. River
crossings are practised consistently in Musorian Army exercises.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-33
The Considerations of a Tactical River Crossing
7.139 The Musorians stress the considerations of a successful tactical river crossing as:
a.
reconnaissance,
b.
early planning and thorough organisation,
c.
destruction of the enemy in the area of water obstacles,
d.
speed and surprise,
e.
broad front crossings,
f.
swift development of the attack on the far bank,
g.
continuation of the attack throughout the crossing,
h.
skilful and rapid engineer employment, and
i.
air defence.
Equipment and Organisation
7.140 To ensure a rapid advance, the Musorians have built river crossing capabilities into
numerous types of ground force equipment. All Musorian APCs, IFVs, airborne fighting
vehicles, and scout vehicles produced since the 1960s are amphibious, as are some
self-propelled artillery and tactical SAM carriers. Musorian medium tanks have been
provided with snorkels for crossing obstacles up to 5.5 metres in depth.
7.141 Extensive tank snorkelling training is conducted. Tank crews train for up to two months
before their first underwater crossing. Tanks cross underwater in first gear and follow a
predetermined azimuth with the aid of the on-board gyrocompass. This direction can be
altered by instructions radioed to the tanks from the unit commander. If a tank stalls on
the bottom, it must be flooded before crew members using their breathing apparatus
can open the hatches and escape.
7.142 A snorkelling tank cannot cross a water obstacle if the entry slope exceeds 47 per cent
(25 degrees ), if the exit slope is greater than 27 per cent (15 degrees), or if the current
water velocity is more than three metres per second. It is also impossible if the water is
deeper than 5.5 metres, if there are craters or large boulders on the river bottom, or if
the bottom is too soft.
7.143 Unmanned tanks can be moved across a river by means of a winch system. This
system permits a tank company of 10 tanks to be moved across a river up to 200
metres wide in about 35 minutes (excluding preparation). One pulley block and an
anchoring unit are transported to the far bank in a tracked amphibian, APC, or power
boat. It must be installed 30 to 45 metres from the water’s edge if three tanks are to
cross simultaneously or 10 to 15 metres for a single tank. After tanks are prepared for
underwater crossing, they are pulled across by two armoured recovery vehicles while
their crews cross in APCs or tracked amphibians.
7.144 Accordingly, there are several models of both tank and truck-launched gap bridges for
rapidly crossing ravines, partially blown bridges, anti-tank ditches, road craters, and
similar obstacles. Gap bridging is used frequently in combination with pontoon bridges
to provide shore connecting spans or to extend the bridge to sufficient length.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-34
7.145 Each Musorian infantry and motorised brigade uses truck-launched bridges, while the
mechanised and tank brigades use truck and track-launched bridges. Divisional
engineers use pontoon and ferry bridges. The armoured vehicle-launched heavy
bridges can span up to 20 metres with a 50 ton capacity. Other notable bridging
equipment includes:
a.
The Truck Mounted Pontoon Bridge. Up to 119 metres long with a 60 ton capacity,
this bridge can be constructed at seven metres per minute in three metres per
second water velocity. The bridge will take tanks travelling at 30 kilometres per
hour. River bank preparation is critical.
b.
The Truck Mounted Scissor Bridge. This bridge is moved in four trucks and can
launch up to 42 metres of bridge in 40 minutes.
Types of Assault Crossing
7.146 There are two basic types of Musorian tactical river crossing:
a.
the assault crossing from the march, and
b.
the prepared river crossing.
7.147 The Musorians prefer the crossing from the march, which is often the expected method.
Normally, the Musorians only conduct the prepared crossing out of necessity within
direct enemy contact.
Assault Crossing From the March
7.148 An assault crossing from the march is conducted with forces moving towards the river
in dispersed march formation, across a wide frontage, at top speed. Forward
detachments or airborne or heliborne forces may seize favourable crossing sites in
advance. All measures are taken to ensure that the crossing is conducted as swiftly as
possible and that the offensive is continued on the opposite shore.
7.149 A decision to conduct a crossing from the march is made as early as possible to allow
maximum time for appropriate organisation of forces and crossing equipment, and for
reconnaissance of crossing sites.
7.150 The Musorians prefer crossing sites with gently sloping banks. Commanders use maps,
aerial photographs, engineer and combat patrols, radar, signals, and human
intelligence to determine the following:
a.
river width, depth, and current;
b.
entry and exit gradients;
c.
composition of river bottom;
d.
bank composition and height;
e.
obstacles on banks;
f.
approach and exit routes;
g.
critical terrain features overlooking both banks;
h.
possible fording, ferrying, bridging, and snorkelling sites; and
i.
information on enemy defences.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-35
7.151 The number of RPs depends on the width of the river and the number of required
crossing sites. Patrols can vary from squad to platoon size. RPs operate up to 50
kilometres forward of a division’s main body.
7.152 Engineer reconnaissance units are equipped with tracked amphibians, scout cars, or
APCs. They often mount a profilograph (a device used to determine width and depth of
rivers) or the newer echo depth finder.
7.153 Securing the Far Bank. APCs, preferably BMPs, make a rapid amphibious crossing to
seize a bridgehead on the far bank. Their crossing is normally covered by smoke and
supported from the home bank by all available FS. Heliborne or, possibly, airborne
forces, may be used to seize and hold a bridgehead on the far bank. Once the
bridgehead is established, tanks cross by ferry, by fording, or by snorkelling. Artillery
and other combat support equipment crosses on tracked amphibians. Later, tactical
bridging is emplaced for follow-on forces.
7.154 The Musorians consider units engaged in a river crossing to be especially vulnerable to
enemy aviation. They emphasise the need for tactical air defence at river crossing sites
before a crossing is attempted. In some tactical situations they may choose to move
part of their air defence assets across first to maximise the range of these weapons
and their ability to protect subsequent units making the crossing. Placement and
movement sequence of air defence assets will vary as the Musorian commander
assesses each new tactical situation.
7.155 Sub-units acting as forward detachments advance as quickly as possible to the river,
bypassing enemy forces whenever possible, to seize home bank crossing sites or to
swim the river to seize a far bank bridgehead. A forward detachment differs from an
advance guard, which has responsibility for clearing a route for advancement of its
main force. Forward detachments attempt to slip through enemy lines to force and hold
crossing sites. Advance guards follow and fight through any enemy encountered to
make way for the main forces.
7.156 Based on reconnaissance, the commander organises his unit to ensure the most
expedient crossing and continuation of the offensive. The Musorians stress that tactical
air support is more critical during river crossing operations than during any other type of
ground operations.
7.157 A mechanised battalion acting as a forward detachment is usually reinforced with a
tank company, an artillery battalion, ferry and tracked amphibians, and air defence,
anti-tank, and chemical defence sub-units ranging from squad to company size. When
acting as a forward detachment, a mechanised battalion would be two or three hour in
front of the main body. Figure 7–11 depicts the mechanised battalion conducting an
assault river crossing.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-36
GSP FERRY
ASSEMBLY
AREA
GSP
CROSSING
SITE
MECHANISED
COMPANY
TANK COMPANY
FIRING
POSITION
MECHANISED
COMPANY
ARTILLERY
BATTALION
MECHANISED BATTALION
TANK COMPANY
ARTILLERY BATTALION
MECHANISED
COMPANY
HELIBORNE
ASSAULT
PTS
CROSSING
SITE
PTS
ASSEMBLY
AREA
UP TO 5 KM
Figure 7–11: Mechanised Battalion Conducting an Assault River Crossing
Note:
1.
GSP refers to a tracked ferry.
7.158 Advance guards destroy enemy forces to ensure an unhindered advance by the main
force. As they approach the water barrier, advance guards exploit the success of
forward detachments or air-landed elements, forcing the obstacle from the march and
developing the attack into the depth of enemy defences when possible.
7.159 Engineer platoons will have been attached to the mechanised battalion from brigade
and division. The battalion deploys into company columns approximately five
kilometres from the water, and the APCs of the companies deploy on line in three
separate sectors approximately 400 to 500 metres from the bank. The attached tank
company and artillery support the crossing by fire. Few tanks are transported in the first
wave. Artillery, ATGMs, anti-tank reserves, and mobile obstacle detachments (MODs)
(possibly equipped with mechanised minelayers) cross immediately after the first
echelon.
7.160 Figure 7–12 depicts the engineer support for an assault crossing by two mechanised
companies while the third company and support elements cross over a pontoon bridge.
Bridges are erected only after the far bank has been secured to a depth precluding
direct enemy fire on the crossing site. However, if the enemy defence has been
neutralised by fire or the far bank has been seized by airborne or heliborne forces,
bridge construction may begin along with the assault crossing.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-37
Figure 7–12: Engineer Support for a Mechanised Battalion
7.161 Crossing times for a mechanised battalion vary depending on the width and velocity of
the river, time required to prepare embankments, enemy activity, visibility, and
equipment available. Mechanised battalion crossings will generally take from 45 to 90
minutes. In 45 minutes the battalion could reasonably expect to cross combat
elements, excluding support and logistic elements.
7.162 Tank unit crossings are more complicated than mechanised battalion assaults.
Although tanks may be attached to support infantry assault crossings, a tank battalion
usually crosses in the second echelon. However, a tank battalion could cross in the first
echelon in a weakly defended sector.
7.163 A tank battalion crosses a river by fording, by going over bridges, by being transported
aboard ferries, on tactical pontoon bridging, or by snorkelling. Although Musorian tank
crews receive periodic underwater training, snorkelling is the least-preferred option.
Some elements may snorkel across at one site while others cross elsewhere by other
means. Sealing (turret rings etc.) areas are selected near concealed routes about three
to five kilometres from the river. Snorkels are installed about one to two kilometres from
the water barrier.
7.164 Some tanks provide FS for the crossing, and artillery is used in both direct and indirect
fire. The far bank must be secured before tank snorkelling starts. Efficient traffic control
is essential. If the traffic controller permits tank formations to mass, they become a
lucrative target for enemy aviation and artillery. Tanks cross under water in column
formation at approximately 30 metres intervals. They cross at low speeds without
shifting gears or halting. The tank must be halted to remove waterproofing before the
turret can traverse and the main gun can fire. Figure 7–13 depicts a tank underwater
crossing site.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-38
Figure 7–13: Tank Underwater Crossing Site
7.165 Once mechanised and some tank elements have crossed, artillery and air defence
elements are crossed on tracked amphibians. A typical brigade crossing sector would
be 10 kilometres wide, with two to three battalions crossing in the first echelon.
Brigades will be allocated tracked amphibians, ferries, and pontoon bridging from
division, and possibly corps organisations as mission and resources dictate. With
engineer support, a mechanised brigade can cross a river 200 metres wide with a
current of two metres per second in two or three hours. A tank brigade normally does
not cross in the first echelon. Once bridging has been erected, second echelon
mechanised or tank brigades can normally cross in less than an hour. Figure 7–14
depicts a tracked amphibian crossing site. Figure 7–15 depicts a pontoon bridge site.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-39
UP TO 5 KM
SHORE
ROAD
ACC
ERP
CC
LOADING
AREA
LEGEND:
CC
Crossing Commander
K-61/PTS Tracked Amphibians
Traffic Regulators
Crossing Border Indicator
ERP
Engineer Regulating Point
Road Signs
ACC
Assistant Crossing Commander
Figure 7–14: Tracked Amphibian Crossing Site
ANTI-MINE
BARRIER
SHORE
ROAD
PONTOON
LAUNCHING
SITE
150-250 x 50m
SG
BT
PONTOON VEHICLE
PARKING AREA
(WITH RESERVE PONTOONS)
SG
G
ERP
ACC
CC
LEGEND:
CC
ALTERNATE
SITE
Crossing Commander
ERP Engineer Regulating Point
Road Signs
ACC Assistant Crossing Commander
BT
Bridge Team
SG
Shore Guard
Outpost
G
Bridge Guard
Figure 7–15: Pontoon Bridge Crossing Site
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
7-40
7.166 Depending on the tactical situation, a division crosses a major water barrier with one,
two, or three brigades in the first echelon in a zone 20 to 30 kilometres wide. A
division’s combat elements can cross a 200 metre wide river in approximately five or
six hours, using equipment organic to the division. If reconnaissance and site
preparation time is included, a division’s total crossing time may be approximately nine
hours. A division might receive reinforcement from a regional force’s or army’s engineer
units.
Prepared River Crossings
7.167 The Musorians expect to cross most rivers from the march at lightly defended or
unoccupied sites and devote less attention to the enemy-opposed prepared crossing.
Such a crossing requires detailed planning and preparation, centralised control, and
massive suppression of enemy fires. They conduct a prepared crossing from a position
in contact. The prepared crossing is used as a last resort, when an assault crossing
from the march fails or is not possible.
7.168 A prepared crossing requires intensive reconnaissance. By day, troops observe enemy
defensive positions and activity. Under cover of darkness, engineer and RPs measure
the river, inspect obstacles, and pinpoint crossing areas.
7.169 During preparation, troops make maximum use of existing fortification as well as cover
and concealment for personnel and equipment. They prepare roads and cross-country
routes for movement to crossing sites, AAs and artillery positions. Such work is
performed at night.
7.170 The number of troops required to launch the initial assault in a prepared river crossing
is normally double the requirement for occupying defensive positions. The crossing
generally takes place either at night or under a smoke screen. An artillery preparation is
fired against enemy strong points and airborne or heliborne forces may be used to
block enemy reinforcements. Some artillery is employed in the direct fire role to
neutralise enemy weapons remaining in the enemy defensive sector.
7.171 The prepared crossing is conducted in a similar fashion to the assault crossing.
Numerous APCs swim across on a broad frontage supported by all available direct and
indirect fire. Tanks and other heavy weapons and equipment follow. Bridging is
emplaced only when bridge sites are secure from enemy observation and direct fire.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-1
CHAPTER 8
INFANTRY IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
SECTION 8-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
8.1
This section covers the MAF battalion through to the squad level tactics, techniques and
procedures employed for defensive operations, with specific emphasis on the
mechanised units. The tactical and procedural difference between mechanised forces
and infantry/motorised is minimal. In the defence, mechanised forces are generally able
to integrate their AFVs into the defensive position. Mechanised forces can also defend
over a more dispersed area and engage the enemy at longer ranges, with a greater
weight of fire. Mechanised forces are more likely to engage in mobile defence where
their mobility can be utilised. Battalion level procedures and tactics during defensive
operations will also be discussed
Philosophy of Defence
8.2
Success in defensive operations is predicated on two interdependent factors:
a. Stability. Stability in defensive operations is loosely defined as the ability to
withstand enemy strikes using all types of weapons, repulse attacks by superior
enemy forces, prevent the landing and operations of airborne/air assault forces, hold
important areas, and eliminate the enemy upon penetration. Defending units are not
authorised to abandon their positions and withdraw without orders from the senior
commander. They must be prepared to operate when isolated, encircled, or cut off
from the main force. Musorian doctrine commits its first echelon with a clear mission
to remain in place and with significant combat power in order to successfully repel
the enemy.
b. Aggressiveness. Aggressiveness is the ability to deliver continuous strikes with all
resources against the attacker, imposing one’s will on the enemy, creating
conditions unfavourable to him, conducting manoeuvre, and counter-attacking. This
means that the defence is organised in sufficient depth to provide maximum firepower and freedom of internal movement and manoeuvre.
Principles
8.3
The Musorian Army states that the purpose of defence is to inflict maximum casualties,
to hold the defended area, and to create favourable conditions for the resumption of the
offensive operation. The principles of defence are:
a. Stability. Stability is achieved by defence in depth, closely coordinated fire and
obstacle plans, and a strong mobile reserve.
b. Security. Security is provided by combat security forces which give early warning,
prevent enemy reconnaissance of the main defensive position, force the enemy to
deploy prematurely, inflict maximum casualties, and coordinate long-range fire on
enemy formations.
c.
Use of Key Terrain. The use of key terrain includes a fire and obstacle plan which
restricts the enemy’s freedom of manoeuvre and canalises its forces into prepared
killing grounds.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-2
d. All-round Defence. Prepared alternate and supplementary positions provide 360
degree defensive capabilities. Battalion strong points, echeloned in depth, with
extensive barriers and fire planing, provide the backbone of the brigade defence.
e. Defence in Depth. Echeloned battalion strong points absorb the momentum of the
attack and provide time for mobile reserves in the counter-attack.
f.
Anti-tank Defence. Anti-tank defence is provided by the liberal allocation of anti-tank
weapons down to all levels, and the formation of strong anti-tank reserves at
battalion level.
g. Coordinated Fire. Coordinated fire is planned in such a way as to destroy the
attacker approaching the defended area, in front of the FEBA, on the flanks, and in
prepared killing areas within the defended area. In a nuclear environment, nuclear
strikes will be planned by division and higher units against the enemy’s nuclear
weapons, major reserves, and C2 posts.
h. Mobile Counter-attack Forces. Mobile counter-attack forces are required to launch
counter-attacks. Commanders from battalion level up maintain reserves for this
purpose.
Siting Factors
8.4
Frontages will normally be determined by the nature of the threat and enemy. The
following factors will be considered by the ground commander in siting his force:
a. Dispersion and Depth. A battalion will defend in two echelons, with a second
echelon of one company. Companies and platoons are deployed in one echelon. On
adverse terrain, such as plains and steppes, a battalion defends in one echelon. On
terrain the attacker finds difficult, the defence is broadened frontally and reduced in
depth. Gaps between companies increase, but gaps between platoons do not.
b. Deception. The location and size of the defence must be concealed. Methods
include:
(1) use of dummy positions;
(2) use of alternate positions;
(3) camouflage and communications security;
(4) use of forward positions/battle outposts;
(5) use of terrain, especially reverse slopes; and
(6) use of active reconnaissance and patrolling to deny the enemy the ability to
reconnoitre the position.
Direct Fire Planning
8.5
Positions are sited to use organic weapons at their maximum effective ranges. This
suggests the use of forward slopes, commanding heights, and so forth. Musorian
doctrine recognises the dangers inherent in this practice and warns the commander that
‘the advantages and disadvantages of setting up defences on commanding heights
(forward slopes) must be evaluated in every case. Reverse slopes will often be
preferable since they facilitate surprise counter-attacks’.
Use of Natural Obstacles
8.6
Natural obstacles are utilised to slow the advance and canalise the enemy. It is common
practice to choose lines of defence that lie behind water obstacles, swamps, ravines,
various types of defiles, and other obstacles so that these obstacles are under constant
observation and fire from the defending force.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-3
Frontages
8.7
In siting a defence, key factors which will increase or reduce frontage measurements
include, in priority:
a. nature of the terrain;
b. time available to defenders to prepare positions; and
c.
estimated size, strength, and intentions of enemy forces.
SECTION 8-2.
THE BATTALION IN DEFENCE
Battalion Defence
8.8
Discussion of the battalion defence will be based on a mechanised organisation which
will be capable of achieving broad frontages and depths due to the range and fire-power
of its organic weapons and armoured vehicles.
8.9
Battalion Defence. A battalion can defend in an area that is three to five kilometres
wide and up to three kilometres deep. It normally defends in two echelons. The interval
between the two first echelon companies and the depth echelon company is
approximately 500 metres. Doctrinally, a two echelon battalion defence is preferable, but
circumstances can dictate a single echelon deployment.
8.10
Company Defence. A company position is generally up to 1 500 metres wide and 1 000
metres deep. The interval between company positions is from 500 metres to 1 000
metres.
8.11
Platoon Defence. A platoon position is 300 metres wide and 300 metres deep. Intervals
between adjacent platoons can be up to 300 metres. The platoon defends in one
echelon.
8.12
Section/Squad Defence. A mechanised squad/section defends as part of a platoon and
occupies a frontage of up to 100 metres. If the section trenches are not interconnected,
intervals between them are normally 50 metres, but can extend up to 150 metres.
Extensive use will be made of squad size patrols forward of the battalion main defensive
position.
8.13
Calculating Frontages. Commanders treat frontage measurements as guidelines.
Frontages and depths vary at all tactical levels. Terrain will dictate deployment in the
defence. A platoon in the defence is assigned a strong point 400 metres wide and 300
metres deep. In sizing up the situation, the platoon leader concludes that his platoon can
defend a frontage of up to 500 metres. If he ignores the advantages of terrain and
restricts himself to textbook dimensions, he wastes time and effort in defensive
fortifications and his defensive fire will be less effective.
Chain of Command
8.14
The unit’s available personnel are utilised initially to reconstitute a destroyed command
element. Should the battalion commander be incapacitated, he would normally be
succeeded by his chief of staff or the first company commander (who is normally the
senior company commander).
Staff
8.15
The battalion chief of staff, the deputy commander for technical affairs, and heads of the
various rear service elements communicate with their counterparts at brigade, thus
relieving the battalion commander of many administrative and supply details and
allowing him to concentrate on implementing brigade tactical orders.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-4
Combined Arms Operations
8.16
Tanks. A tank unit is usually allocated in support of a mechanised or motorised
battalion. Tanks are normally placed in support, which allows the commander to
maintain control over his sub-units. Such an arrangement facilitates the concentration of
platoon and company fire onto particular objectives. However, tank platoons may be
decentralised and placed under the operational control of the company commanders.
8.17
Artillery. To achieve the desired FS effect, the BrAG, DAG, and Army Artillery Group
(AAG) are formed. An artillery grouping is temporary in nature and consists of two or
more artillery battalions. It may be created from other artillery assets pushed up to the
brigade from follow-on elements. This is aimed at retaining the indirect fire-power in the
lead battalions while still providing the fire-power of a BrAG. The artillery battalion or
battery will either be supporting or attached. If attached, the artillery will fire for the
battalion commander. If it is supporting, its first priority is to the brigade artillery
commander.
8.18
The battalion commander’s control over his organic mortars and attached artillery may
vary with the phases of the operation. Artillery fire planning is centrally coordinated with
flexibility built in to allow for close support of manoeuvre elements.
8.19
Engineers. The Musorians utilise two types of engineer support: technical engineers
and combat engineers (sappers). The technical engineers are organic to army and
perform sustainment engineering tasks. The sappers are found in a combat engineer
battalion and company which are organic to a division and brigade, respectively. They
conduct mobility, counter-mobility, survivability and reconnaissance missions for their
manoeuvre units.
8.20
Air Support. Direct air support to a battalion commander will be a rarity, since the
divisional commander normally directs supporting air assets through air liaison staffs.
Forward air controllers could however, be assigned to a brigade defending as the
division’s main effort. This is not to say that tactical air assets would not be used to
support or interdict the attacker in the battalion’s area of interest. High-performance
aircraft and helicopter gunships often support in this manner. However, the battalion
commander has no direct organic communication with high-performance aircraft or
helicopters.
8.21
The Motorised/Mechanised Brigade. Although the battalion has considerable firepower, it lacks sufficient organic combat and combat support elements for many types of
operations. For this reason it operates as part of the brigade and, in fact, the battalion is
normally reinforced or supported by the brigade and sometimes by the division.
Conduct of a Battalion Defence
8.22
Characteristics of the Battalion Defensive Area. Regardless of the type of defence, a
battalion will defend an area, which is a sector defined by left and right boundaries, by a
forward edge, and by the positions of service and support units in the rear. In front of this
sector, it deploys battle outposts. Within this area, it constructs primary and alternate
company strong points; a battalion reserve position; main and secondary fixed and
mobile positions for artillery, mortars, tanks, and other FS assets, each with designated
lines and sectors of fire; air defence firing positions; a battalion CP; logistic support
areas; barriers and obstacles; deployment lines for the second echelon’s counter-attack;
and paths or routes to and between positions for manoeuvre, resupply, and evacuation.
A defending battalion also constructs false (deceptive) positions, both within and outside
the defensive area. Each battalion will normally construct at least one false company
position, and each company at least one false platoon position, depending on the time
available.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-5
8.23
A battle outpost, usually a reinforced platoon positioned forward of the battalion,
provides security. It denies enemy reconnaissance from reaching the main position, and
provides defending companies early warning of a surprise attack. The battalion
headquarters is responsible for FS for this platoon. The defensive area’s forward edge is
characterised by terrain that permits good observation and fires, especially long-range
anti-tank fire. The first trench line is sited to take advantage of natural anti-tank obstacles
and to facilitate barrier construction.
8.24
Within the defensive area, the battalion is normally arrayed in two echelons and
dispersed in order to reduce the destructive effects of concentrated conventional
munitions. This same dispersion is practised in a nuclear environment to reduce losses.
For the same reason, within the first echelon companies, platoon positions may be
several hundred metres apart. The mission of the first echelon is to inflict maximum
casualties and materiel losses on the attacking force, hold important positions or
objectives, delay the movement of the enemy, and create favourable conditions for his
defeat by nuclear and conventional fires and by counter-attacks conducted by the
second echelon. The entire battalion position achieves mutual support by tasking
companies to provide support to each other, with the second echelon covering the gaps
and flanks of the first echelon.
8.25
The mission of second echelon companies is to conduct a counter-attack, or when that
is not feasible, defeat the attacking enemy by fire from an occupied strong point position,
or line. If the enemy has breached first echelon positions with the use of fire, then the
second echelon may fill these breaches or replace first echelon units.
8.26
Attached tanks are normally allocated to defending company strong points, but control of
the mortar battery and the AGS-17 AGL platoon remains centralised with the battalion
commander. The anti-tank platoon normally deploys intact under the control of the
battalion commander on the most likely armour avenue of approach, or in a position to
assist the commitment of the second echelon. The battalion commander normally retains
control of the air defence platoon.
8.27
System of Fire. One of the most crucial elements of a battalion defensive area is its
system of fire. Simply stated, the system of fire is the combination of planned fires of all
assigned and attached weapon systems organised for the defeat of the enemy.
Elements of the system of fire include regions, sectors, and lines of massed,
concentrated, and barrier fire; zones of dense multi-layered fire from all weapons on the
approaches to the defence, in front of the forward edge, on the flanks, and in depth; and
manoeuvre by fire. The system of fire is integrated into the commander’s plan for the
battle, and takes into consideration the natural and planned engineer obstacles.
8.28
Each company prepares a system of fire to defeat enemy tanks by constructing primary
and alternate tank firing positions in each platoon strong point, with fire concentrations
for each tank platoon. Designated BTR/BMPs will serve as manoeuvrable anti-tank
weapons, together with battalion anti-tank assets and attack helicopters. The
manoeuvrability of these weapon systems provides a basis for their survivability, and
serves to confuse the enemy as to their precise location. First echelon companies also
plan anti-tank ambushes at their forward security positions, on their flanks, and within
their company strong points.
8.29
Mechanised company weapons are organised to deliver interlocking and flanking fire,
with designated sectors of concentrated fire for specific platoons and companies. Light
and heavy on-call or ‘duty’ machine guns are placed in false platoon positions on the
flanks of the real positions, along with an RPG launcher in position on the right flank of
the battalion. The AGS-17 platoons deploy in the company strong points, split between
the forward edge and the depth of the positions. Some BMP/BTRs occupy positions on
reverse slopes, with their machine guns laid to deliver interlocking fire on the
approaches to the forward edge.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-6
8.30
The artillery battalion and the mortar battery provide indirect FS. The artillery battalion
deploys some distance to the rear of the battalion, as indicated in figure 8–1. The
artillery battalion commander however, collocates with the battalion commander at his
CP. The mortar battery’s primary position is just to the rear of the first echelon.
2
A
C
B
DUMMY STRONG
POINT (PLATOON)
D
3
1
3RD
PLATOON
1ST
PLATOON
SWAMP
2ND
PLATOON
2ND MECH COY
E
G
4
H
F
1ST
PLATOON
2ND
PLATOON
1ST
PLATOON
3RD PLATOON
2ND
PLATOON
1ST MECH COY
3RD MECHANISED COMPANY
(RESERVE)
LAKE
KEY
ARTILLERY BATTALION IN FIRING
POSITION
ARTILLERY BARRAGE (LETTERED)
BATTALION FOOD SUPPLY POINT
ATGM
BATTALION COMMANDER’S
COP
BATTALION AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT
MIXED MINEFIELD
(ANTI-PERSONNEL AND ANTI-TANK)
COMPANY COMMANDER’S
COP
BATTALION FOOD SUPPLY POINT
ARTILLERY CONCENTRATION (NUMBERS)
TECHNICAL OBSERVATION POINT
COMPANY MEDICAL POINT
BATTALION MEDICAL POINT
BATTALION BOUNDARY
BATTALION REFUELLING POINT
MORTAR BATTERY (120mm)
A
Figure 8–1:
Mechanised Battalion in Defence
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-7
8.31
The artillery battalion commander plans indirect fire on likely enemy avenues of
approach and deployment lines, on sectors between company strong points, and on the
flanks and in the depths of the company and battalion positions. The artillery fire plan
includes an illumination plan for night combat actions. The defending battalion also plans
to employ combat helicopters in its system of fire, with primary firing positions on the
battalion’s flanks.
8.32
Engineer Preparations. A second important element of a battalion’s defensive position
is its engineer preparation. Engineer work facilitates the actions of the defender, and at
the same time hinders the actions of the attacker. The first engineer priority for a
Musorian defending battalion not in contact with the enemy is to prepare firing positions
for individual and crew-served weapons, tanks, BMPs, anti-tank weapons, and other
weapon systems. It clears fields of observation and fire, constructs COPs and medical
points, erects obstacles and barriers in front of and between strong points, prepares
movement routes to deployment lines for counter-attacks and firing lines, and
establishes water supply points.
8.33
The second engineer priority is to develop fighting positions for rifle squads, tanks,
BMPs, and other weapon systems in secondary or temporary firing positions; complete
the construction of CPs and medical points; construct covered dugouts for each squad
or crew; erect cover for weapons, equipment, ammunition, and other materiel; and
create additional obstacles in front of and between strong points. The final step in the
engineer preparation is concealment. Although local materials are used as available, a
broad inventory of devices will be used to deceive the enemy’s human and technical
reconnaissance efforts.
8.34
Units use locally procured items rather than prepared construction materials. The first
and second trench lines are continuous, and the third is almost continuous. The unit cuts
trails for tanks and APCs to move to threatened sectors within the position. These trails
are made to resemble anti-tank ditches when viewed from the enemy side.
8.35
Revetted shelter increases the survivability of each rifle squad. Platoon and company
commanders have CP shelters, and even the battalion support elements are dug-in. A
mechanised/motorised battalion which skilfully exploits the defensive characteristics of
average terrain has a survivability rate of 40 per cent. By dedicating four-fifths of the
manpower of the battalion to engineer tasks while the other one-fifth stands guard, in
four to six hours the survivability rate further increases to 62 per cent. After two to three
days of preparation, 85 per cent of the battalion can be protected in covered shelters,
and vehicles can protect remaining personnel. This level of engineer preparation will
enable 80 per cent of defending forces to survive three nuclear strikes of one kiloton
each.
8.36
The defensive position in figure 8–1 includes five false (deceptive) platoon sized
positions, three along the forward edge and two in the depth of the battalion position.
The large number of trenches, paths, firing positions, false positions, and shelters in the
battalion position serve multiple purposes. They harden the defence and make it more
dynamic, their quantity confuses the enemy as to which are actual and which are false,
and they enable the defender to achieve surprise by the speed with which he can
manoeuvre from within his own position to the threatened sector.
8.37
The other major aspect of engineer support to the defence is the construction of countermobility obstacles in front of and within the battalion position. Minefields are especially
important in this regard. As figure 8–1 shows, mixed minefields are constructed across
the battalion front. Other engineer obstacles include barbed wire entanglements and
anti-tank obstacles in front of the battalion position, and a 700 metre long anti-tank ditch
within the position between the two forward company strong points.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-8
8.38
These obstacles are closely tied in to the system of fire. On one armour avenue of
approach, for example, engineers have buried hundreds of kilograms of explosives in
the soil. At the twist of a firing handle, tons of earth could be churned up into an anti-tank
obstacle. The area around this obstacle then becomes a killing ground for anti-tank fire.
8.39
Reconnaissance. While the Musorians are preparing the defensive position, a battalion
commander conducts reconnaissance to determine the enemy situation. He is
particularly concerned with the enemy’s preparations for attack, main avenues of
approach, and time of attack. Other reconnaissance tasks include the location of enemy
reserves and their direction of movement, and the positions of artillery and other weapon
systems. The commander employs a wide range of human and technical
reconnaissance systems. If he is not in contact with the enemy force when he begins
construction of his defensive position, he deploys a CRP. This patrol usually comprises a
mechanised squad. If in contact with the enemy, a battalion commander employs all
available means of observation, and in addition, may detail a small part of his force to
make contact with the enemy.
8.40
Preparation of the Defence. There are several necessary and sequential steps in the
preparation of a defence, beginning with the receipt of the order. The commander must
organise the battle by gathering information, evaluating the situation, making a decision,
establishing tasks for organic and attached units, organising coordination and systems of
fire, and planning logistic support and C2. After his battalion occupies the defensive
position and begins construction of strong points and engineer obstacles, the
commander exercises continuous control to ensure that tasks are performed as ordered.
8.41
The battalion commander walks the terrain with subordinate commanders and passes
down his detailed instructions in the form of an oral order. The battalion commander’s
order is more task-oriented than mission-oriented. For example, for first echelon
companies, it will specify the following: attachments, strong point locations, and axis of
concentration of main effort; the mission required to defeat the attack and destroy the
enemy penetrating the position; traces of the forward edge and trench lines; all control
measures for fire concentrations in front of and around the company position; how and
with what forces to support the flanks and space between positions; who is responsible
for them and who is supporting.
8.42
The battalion commander provides similarly detailed instructions to the second echelon
company, the attached artillery battalion and mortar battery, AGL platoon, the anti-tank
platoon, those elements subordinate to the battalion headquarters, and the unit
designated for combat security (the platoon guarding the battalion from a position well
forward along the main avenue of approach).
8.43
The battalion commander conducts coordination at the same time as issuing his order
for the defence. This is another set of important detailed instructions to specific units of
the battalion. It includes such information as target lists for all indirect and direct fire
weapons, control measures for fire and/or movement, time schedules for all events,
measures for defeat of air assaults and fixed wing or RW attacks, actions on enemy use
of chemical or nuclear weapons, and signals for communication and mutual recognition.
Similar coordination must also be conducted with adjacent battalions.
8.44
After the battalion commander has issued his order, subordinate commanders return to
their units and accomplish all tasks necessary to prepare for battle.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-9
Conduct of the Defence
8.45
As soon as the battalion occupies a defensive area, designated tank, BTR/BMP, and
other weapon systems take up positions. The crews of these so-called ‘duty’ weapon
systems continue to stand watch while the remainder of the unit prepares the position,
vehicles, or weapons. In figure 8–1, 20 per cent of the defending battalion is set aside for
duty, while the other 80 per cent begins work. Preparation of the position continues in
this manner until work is complete, or the attack begins.
8.46
An attack is expected to be preceded by reconnaissance that is conducted by a force
ranging in size from reinforced company to reinforced battalion. During this pre-battle
reconnaissance, which may include a limited ground attack, the enemy attempts to
discern the organisation of the defence. If possible, only the duty weapons in the false
positions engage and defeat the enemy reconnaissance. After repulsing this
reconnaissance, units that have disclosed their positions may relocate to alternate
positions. If the enemy reconnaissance penetrates the defensive position, the battalion
commander takes whatever measures are necessary to destroy the penetration,
including the commitment of his second echelon.
8.47
When the attacker’s artillery preparation begins, troops take cover in their dugouts and
covered trenches, and crews take cover in their fighting vehicles. Selected crews man
their weapons stations to prevent the enemy from using the artillery preparation to
breach engineer obstacles. If the preparation includes nuclear or chemical ordnance, the
commander uses all his forces to close gaps created in his position, while he and his
staff re-establish command, control and communications (C3).
8.48
The emergence of troops from their shelters and their reoccupation of firing positions are
critical junctures in the battle. This must be done before the enemy long-range direct fire
systems (tanks and ATGMs) come into range of the position, so crews are prepared to
engage them at maximum range with indirect fire. As the attacking force moves towards
the defensive position, the defensive battalion commander concentrates his battalion’s
fire against the most threatened sector, targeting armoured vehicles when they enter the
obstacle system. If enemy infantry are dismounted, an effort is made to strip them away
from the armoured vehicles.
8.49
When enemy soldiers come within 30 to 40 metres of the forward positions, troops
engage them with grenades and point-blank fire. The battalion makes every effort to
defeat the attack in front of the forward edge of the defensive position. If, however, the
enemy penetrates into the defence, the commander strengthens the flanks of the
penetration, stops the forward movement of the penetrating force, and then destroys it
with a combination of fire and manoeuvre. If necessary, the defensive commander uses
his second echelon or reserve to launch counter-attacks.
8.50
After defeating the enemy’s attack, the battalion commander re-establishes his position,
replenishes his ammunition stocks, rebuilds destroyed fortifications and obstacles,
repairs or replaces damaged equipment, and evacuates his casualties. If his defence
succeeds, but the enemy penetrates to his right or left flank, the battalion prepares for
all-around defence. It might also, on orders from the brigade, attack into the flank or rear
of the bypassing enemy force. If the enemy’s superiority is sufficiently weakened by his
defeat, the Musorians may change to the offensive.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-10
SECTION 8-3.
CONDUCT OF A TANK BATTALION DEFENCE
Introduction
8.51
This section examines the tank battalion in defence. Because of the combined arms
nature of the Musorian Army it is necessary to have an understanding of the
employment of tanks in the defence.
The Tank Battalion
8.52
Subordination. In both tank and mechanised divisions, the tank battalion is subordinate
to a brigade. In some divisions, there is also an independent tank battalion subordinate
to the divisional commander.
8.53
Organisation. In a tank battalion organic to a tank brigade, there are 31 tanks (10 per
company plus one for the battalion commander). In the tank battalion of a mechanised
brigade, there are 31 tanks (10 per company plus one for the battalion commander).
Battalions are also equipped with an armoured recovery vehicle, an armoured scout car,
and an ambulance. Each battalion also has nine mine-clearing ploughs. Soldiers are
equipped with personal weapons. Hand-held SAMs and tank-mounted anti-aircraft
machine guns are found in varying numbers in each type of battalion.
8.54
Command. Usually a major or a captain commands a Musorian tank battalion.
Companies are commanded by captains or senior lieutenants and platoons by
lieutenants. A commander below battalion level has little latitude in the way he executes
his mission except when his unit is employed as a reconnaissance group or a march
security detachment. The battalion headquarters is divided into a CP and a support
group.
8.55
Battalion Command Post. The battalion CP is mounted in an APC. It is controlled by
the battalion chief of staff, normally a captain or senior lieutenant. The CP is manned by
the operations officer, communications chief, an NBC specialist, radio operators, and
clerks. The battalion commander is mounted in a tank for combat operations.
Communications are maintained by the CP with the battalion and brigade commanders.
The NBC warning net is also maintained in the CP. A second APC is sometimes held in
the battalion with radios on listening watch on the same nets as the CP, but without a
radio or NBC warning net. The battalion CP collates and disseminates tactical
intelligence and prepares operation orders under the battalion commander’s guidance.
8.56
Battalion Support Group. This group consists of the deputy battalion commander for
technical affairs, the medical section and the supply and maintenance platoon. When the
battalion is on the march, the support group supplies the necessary ammunition and
POL by direct delivery in halt areas. When in action, the tanks are resupplied in their
forward positions. The support group establishes a technical observation point (TOP) in
order to locate damaged tanks. A repair and evacuation group then carries out on-thespot repairs or evacuates a damaged tank. Medical teams recover the wounded,
administer first aid, and evacuate them to aid posts for treatment or movement to the
rear. The battalion’s support resources are augmented from the brigade as required.
8.57
Control. The battalion commander controls the battalion by radio, visual, and audio
signals in the employment of well-rehearsed tactical formations and drills. Terrain is
identified by reference points. Maps are extremely detailed and treated as classified
documents. Tank units are usually led by commanders except in the assault.
8.58
Radio. Radio nets are controlled at battalion level when possible. Commanders from the
brigade artillery, and air defence units attached to a tank battalion join the battalion
command net. Companies transmit FS requests to the battalion commander, not directly
to the support unit. This reduces the time available for artillery to engage targets of
opportunity.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-11
8.59
Radio Security. Radio transmission security is strictly enforced. Code words or numbers
are used for reference points.
8.60
Orders. The battalion commander issues his operation order orally, by written
instructions, or by radio. The preferred method is oral. The battalion mission is usually
defined by the brigade commander, with details of FS allocated and a time schedule set.
8.61
Reinforcement. During defensive operations, a tank battalion is normally reinforced by
the following units:
a. a mechanised company,
b. an engineer platoon,
c.
an artillery battalion and mortar unit to support the battalion by fire, and
d. chemical specialists to monitor the NBC hazard if required.
8.62
Deployment. During defensive operations, a tank battalion usually deploys in one
echelon. Normally, a reserve the size of one platoon is constituted. Brigades deploy
combat security detachments up to 15 kilometres forward of the main defensive position
to break up probing attacks. Platoon sized RPs are dispatched up to 500 metres in front
of the battalions and exposed flanks. Two or three defensive emplacements are dug for
each tank. This is done either by engineers or by a combat tank fitted with a dozer blade.
A tank with a dozer blade attachment can dig between two and four emplacements in an
hour. Minefields, wire, and demolitions are used to direct the enemy into killing areas.
Mines are laid in clusters of 50 to 100.
8.63
Defensive Positions. The basis for a tank battalion defensive position is the anti-tank
fire plan. A commander lays out his defence so that tanks have overlapping areas of
observation at 1 000 metres without turning the turret. Mathematical analyses have been
used to arrive at the following frontages, depths, and intervals as ideal:
a. platoon:
(1) 150 metres between tanks,
(2) 300 metres frontage, and
(3) no depth.
b. company:
(1) 300 metres between platoons,
(2) 1 000 metres frontage, and
(3) 500 metres depth.
c.
battalion:
(1) 1 000 metres to 1 500 metres between companies,
(2) 5 kilometre frontage, and
(3) 3 kilometre depth.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-12
8.64
Tanks are positioned on reverse slopes when possible, and have one or two alternate
positions. The intervals between sub-units are covered by indirect fire. Local protection
for tanks is provided by infantry dug in up to 200 metres in front of tank positions. The
BTR/BMPs of the mechanised units are also positioned on reverse slopes. Each platoon
and company position is designed as a strong point with all-round defence. The battalion
position is set up so that strong points are in mutual support.
8.65
Defence Organisation. The drill for organising a defensive position is affected by both
the tactical situation and the availability of time. A defence taken up in contact with the
enemy is initially linear. Tanks remain in the positions they occupied when the offensive
lost its impetus (see figure 8–2). Such a defence is developed as time and enemy action
allows. Reinforcement occurs as soon as possible, and positions are adjusted until the
situation is stabilised. This may take from 10 to 12 hours.
Figure 8–2:
Reinforced Tank Battalion in Defensive Deployment
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-13
8.66
Reconnaissance and Orders. After being given his mission, the battalion commander
moves quickly to his assigned area with the commanders of attached units. Task
organisation and fire coordination are finalised. Reconnaissance is conducted. If time is
short, the battalion chief of staff positions the second echelon and the reserves. During
the reconnaissance, orders are issued for:
a. attachments of mechanised units to tank companies;
b. location of company and platoon strong points;
c.
zones of concentrated tank fire;
d. positions of CRPs and flank security units;
e. fields of fire;
f.
indirect FS missions;
g. orders initiating direct and indirect fire;
h. actions to be taken against air attack;
8.67
i.
priorities for engineers;
j.
protection from nuclear strikes;
k.
designation of counter-attack routes and lines of deployment; and
l.
defence points to the front and flanks.
Administrative Planning. After the commander’s reconnaissance and the issue of
orders, the deputy commander for technical affairs will:
a. position the TOP;
b. organise the recovery and repair of damaged equipment;
c.
arrange evacuation of second-line tank casualties to workshops in the rear; and
d. locate the supply platoon and plan the resupply of ammunition.
8.68
The deputy commander for technical affairs also arranges the combat administration of
the battalion for the move forward into the defensive position.
8.69
Conduct of the Defence. A defender will expect to face conventional artillery fire before
a ground attack and will be prepared to expect nuclear strike. After such preparatory fire,
the tank battalion commander restores the integrity of the position by relocating his tanks
and communication equipment as necessary. To preserve the security of tank firing
positions, combat security detachments repulse enemy probing attacks. Smoke may be
used to obscure strong points and to silhouette an assaulting enemy. Combat security
detachments act as artillery FOs for as long as possible before breaking contact. As the
enemy closes, the tanks concentrate fire on targets in previously designated areas.
Artillery and machine gun fire are used to try to separate the enemy infantry from their
armour.
8.70
Infantry Supporting Fire. Infantry FS, especially against enemy APCs, is provided by
the BTR/BMPs of attached units. Each infantry company is also equipped with hand-held
anti-tank weapons which, together with the ATGMs, add significantly to the combat
power of company and platoon strong points.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-14
8.71
Counter-penetration. The tank battalion commander must use his resources to mount
counter-penetration operations against enemy elements that succeed in breaking into
the battalion’s defensive perimeter. The enemy penetration is reduced by artillery fire,
tank fire, and attached APCs. The battalion reserve manoeuvres along previously
reconnoitred routes to bring maximum direct fire to bear.
8.72
Counter-attack. Counter-attacks are organised by a higher commander to dislodge an
enemy from within the perimeters of a tank battalion defensive position. Counter-attacks
may be supported by the tank battalion either by fire or by assigning sub-units to
accompany assaulting forces. The brigade commander orders the delivery of counterattacks by sub-units of the second echelon battalion on routes reconnoitred beforehand.
8.73
Service Support in Combat. During combat, ammunition forward resupply is carried
out, when required, under cover of smoke or artillery fire. POL is resupplied during lulls
in the battle. Damaged equipment is removed by a recovery and evacuation group to a
position where it can be prepared to move back for repair under its own power.
Wounded crewmen in damaged tanks are removed for evacuation once the vehicle has
been relocated to a covered position. During combat, the deputy commander for
technical affairs makes a daily assessment of equipment conditions, repair and recovery
status, and issues orders for routine servicing.
8.74
Second Echelon Defence. A tank battalion that is used in a brigade’s second echelon
of defence has the following missions:
a. provide depth to the battalion’s defence,
b. provide a counter-penetration force for use inside the battalion’s defensive
perimeter,
c.
provide a counter-attack force for use in the first echelon battalion’s defensive
perimeter, and
d. provide an exploitation force to pursue an enemy whose attack fails.
8.75
The last three missions require considerable time for reconnaissance. The defensive
position of a second echelon battalion is laid out in the same manner as that of a first
echelon unit. As a second echelon battalion assumes the defence out of contact with the
enemy, the position is capable of being developed extensively by engineers. Second
echelon battalions establish communications with the brigade headquarters and first
echelon units. During combat, the battalion commander monitors the battle and collects
and collates tactical intelligence. The second echelon commander is free to manoeuvre
his tanks within his battalion defensive perimeter to face a threat to a particular flank. If
the battalion is required to counter-attack, the commander sends out a CRP before
moving into the assault on pre-arranged routes.
SECTION 8-4.
THE MECHANISED COMPANY IN DEFENCE
Company Defensive Considerations
8.76
When given the order to go on the defensive, the company commander deploys his
force in an assigned area approximately 500 to 1 000 metres in width and 500 metres in
depth. The company normally defends as a single echelon with all three platoons in line.
If terrain and situation dictate, or if defending alone in the security zone, the company
will defend in two echelons with two platoons forward and one in depth. Figure 8–3
depicts a company defensive deployment by echelon, while figure 8–4 illustrates
dispositions of a company in the defence as part of a battalion.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-15
Company in One Echelon
300400 m
Up to
300 m
Up to
300 m
Company in Two Echelons
Up
to
500 m
Up to
300 m
300400 m
Figure 8–3:
8.77
Company Defence Deployment by Echelon
Terrain plays a vital part in the company defensive layout. If possible, the commander
will deploy behind natural obstacles such as rivers, swamps, ravines, and defiles. Where
no natural obstacles exist, engineering obstacles will be constructed with the resources
available. The company will position itself to engage the enemy at maximum range and
to intensify fire on the enemy as he approaches the obstacle.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-16
Mechanised Platoon
Mechanised Company
Mechanised Platoon
Mechanised Platoon
Mechanised Platoon +
Anti-tank/Machine Gun Platoon
Mechanised
Platoon
Mechanised
Company
Mechanised Platoon
Tank Platoon
Mechanised
Platoon +
Anti-tank/
Machine Gun
Platoon
Tank Company
Tank Platoon
Mechanised
Platoon
Mechanised
Company
Tank Platoon
Mechanised
Platoon
Tank Platoon
Mechanised Platoon
Mechanised Platoon
Tank Company
Mechanised
Company
Mechanised Platoon
Figure 8–4:
Tank Platoon
Dispositions of a Company in the Defence
Tank Platoon
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-17
8.78
Reverse slopes are also employed to put elements covertly into position and enable
them to launch surprise attacks on the enemy. Since forces may have to dig in under fire
and observation from the enemy, a reverse slope defence is often chosen. Advantages
of this position are that it hinders or precludes observation by the enemy, seriously
degrades enemy long-range anti-tank fire, silhouettes enemy forces on the crest line,
and prevents attacking forces from receiving support from following forces. A
disadvantage of such a position is that the maximum ranges of all weapons systems
cannot be exploited. If possible, a combination of forward and reverse slope positions is
used to take maximum advantage of the terrain.
8.79
After completing his plan, the company commander issues his orders to his platoons and
attached commanders, usually from a point on the ground from which the defence and
likely enemy avenues of approach can be surveyed.
8.80
Platoons are sited, and supporting weapons such as the company PKM and general
purpose machine guns (GPMGs) and the battalion’s AGS-17s are assigned and given
missions. Areas for concentration of fire are designated and tasks for securing flanks,
boundaries, and gaps are included. The commander will also:
a. allocate to supporting artillery, areas in which to concentrate fire;
b. site main and alternate positions for anti-tank weapons with main and secondary
areas of fire and procedures for opening fire; and
c.
task platoons with engaging enemy aircraft.
8.81
Methods of engineer preparation are detailed. They include where, when, and how to
build fortifications, shelters, and obstacles. Plans for camouflage and deception are also
covered.
8.82
After issuing his orders, the company commander plans the coordination necessary for
the defence. He carefully integrates the company fire plan with the artillery, other
weapons, and adjacent elements.
8.83
Finally, the company commander issues a sketch of the defensive strong point to the
battalion commander, including:
a. reference points and distances to these;
b. enemy positions;
c.
platoon strong points and their primary and secondary areas of fire;
d. main and alternate firing positions for AFVs, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons,
machine guns, and AGLs, as well as their primary and secondary sectors of fire;
e. the fire concentration sectors of platoons, obstacles, field defences, and shelters;
and
f.
the location of the company commander.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-18
The Conduct of a Company Defence
8.84 The battalion to which the company belongs will prepare the battalion defensive area in
depth along a series of defensive belts or trench lines. A battalion may construct three or
four trench lines with connecting communication trenches. Companies in the first
echelon will occupy the first and second trench lines, with a distance of up to 500 metres
between them. If the company is in the second echelon, it will be located with supporting
battalion weapons in the third trench line, about 1 000 metres behind the second trench
line. The battalion reserve, usually a reinforced platoon, is located in the fourth trench
line, up to 2 000 metres behind the first trench line. Within the battalion sector, intervals
between companies can be up to 1 500 metres. The overall battalion frontage will
seldom exceed five kilometres (see figure 8–5).
WOODS
DUMMY
POSITION
FIRE
SACK
1 COMPANY
2 COMPANY
3 COMPANY
BATTALION
RESERVE
Figure 8–5:
Company Deployment, Main Defensive Area
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-19
8.85
The company will deploy its platoons along the first trench line. Each platoon has a
communications trench leading back to the second trench line where the main company
CP is located. Weapons are sited to cover the entire company front and have
interlocking fire with adjacent elements. Although primarily oriented to fight an enemy to
their front, the company will prepare alternate and supplementary positions to repel
attacks from any direction. Each platoon will establish an OP of up to section level as far
as 600 metres in front of the first trench line for early warning of enemy activity by day,
and up to 200 metres by night. (see figure 8–6).
WOODS
DUMMY
POSITION
FIRE
SACK
1 COMPANY
2 COMPANY
3 COMPANY
BATTALION
RESERVE
Figure 8–6:
Company Deployment with Alternate Positions
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-20
8.86
The company commander will control his defence from a COP. He has two such posts, a
primary and an alternate. These are concealed, and are chosen for good observation of
the battle area and to facilitate troop control. Communications within the company
defence rely on buried telephone landline and messengers. Signals flares are also used.
8.87
Enemy reconnaissance is destroyed or repelled by designated units engaging from
specially selected positions that will not give away the main defensive positions. Some of
these special positions may be well forward of the main defence. After enemy
reconnaissance is destroyed or repelled, units exposed by firing are relocated (see
figure 8–7).
Figure 8–7:
Conduct of the Company Defence
8.88
During the enemy artillery preparation, company personnel remain under cover, with
only machine gunners and observers remaining at their post. Friendly artillery units fire
on enemy artillery and mortars, and on enemy tanks and infantry forces readying for the
attack.
8.89
When enemy artillery fire shifts to engage targets to the rear, company personnel
occupy their stations and meet the advancing enemy with fire. If weapons have been
destroyed by enemy bombardment, the remaining weapons are relocated to restore the
fire plan. ATGMs engage the enemy at maximum effective range. Tanks open fire at
2 000 metres, and BMPs at 800 metres. Section machine guns open fire at 600 metres,
and small arms fire at 400 metres.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-21
8.90
Priority is allocated to the destruction of enemy tanks followed by APCs. Enemy infantry
are destroyed once separated from their combat vehicles. The three platoon snipers’
primary task is to locate and kill enemy officers, observers, signallers, machine gunners,
and snipers.
8.91
If the enemy penetrates a company strong point, personnel continue to defend their
assigned areas and attempt to destroy the penetration by fire. Tanks are destroyed with
all available anti-tank weapons and infantry are engaged with grenades and hand-tohand combat. Artillery is used to contain the spread of the penetration, and the
battalion’s reserve is committed to destroy a breakthrough. If bypassed, the company
remains in position and continues to hold the strong point, engaging the enemy with all
available weapons.
8.92
Should the enemy assault be repelled, the company commander concentrates his fire on
the enemy attacking adjacent companies. He redistributes firing positions, shifts key
weapons locations, repairs trenches and obstacles, replenishes ammunition, and
prepares for further enemy attacks.
8.93
Company Layout in the Security Zone. The company is up to 15 kilometres forward in
the security zone. The company is reinforced and assigned a security sector, area of
responsibility, defensive position, and reconnaissance zone. The security sector is from
1 500 to 2 000 metres wide. The company conducts RPs up to squad size 5 000 metres
forward and defends in two echelons. One platoon stationed in depth is designated the
main support platoon, and the commander uses it as his reserve force. The other two
platoons are stationed forward in an outpost line. Field security posts are established
600 metres in front of the outpost line by reinforced sections (see figure 8–8).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-22
OUT TO 3000 m ATGM
2000 m TANK
WOODS
MINEFIELD
ARTILLERY
CONCENTRATION
HILL 601
800 m SMP
600 m MG
400 m RPG
FIRE SACK
1 Platoon
2 Platoon
500 m
TANK
ALTERNATE
TANK
PRIMARY
1500 m
Figure 8–8:
CP
WOODS
Company Layout in the Security Zone
8.94
One platoon equipped with tanks and mortars and with engineer or anti-tank elements is
deployed up to five kilometres in front of the company position as a security platoon. It
prevents surprise attacks, and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements. The platoon
will force the enemy to deploy. Threatened with being overrun, the platoon will withdraw
within the strong point on the orders of the commander. The company deploys on
favourable terrain to inflict damage on the enemy and cause him to deploy. The battalion
commander will order the withdrawal.
8.95
Patrolling. Squads on patrol will usually have a fire controller in support or carry a radio.
The aim of squad size patrols is to deny reconnaissance and gain information. Patrols
are generally aggressive in nature and will rely on indirect FS. Figure 8–9 depicts a
squad at the short halt. Figure 8–10 depicts squad patrol formations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-23
Figure 8–9:
Squad Size Patrol at the Halt
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-24
Figure 8–10: Squad Patrol Formations
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-25
8.96
Digging In. Defences are constructed in a sequence that guarantees personnel are
always combat ready. Initially, observation/firing sectors are cleared; individual trenches
for automatic riflemen, RPG gunners, machine gunners, SAM operators, and AGLs are
dug; COPs are constructed; then primary and secondary firing positions for APCs and
tanks are designated. Slit trenches are constructed for all other personnel.
8.97
One-man trenches are initially dug to allow firing from a lying position and are 24 inches
wide, 67 inches long, and 12 inches deep, with a 15 inch high earth parapet in front of
the trench, sloping towards the enemy. The soldier will continue to dig to allow firing first
from a kneeling position at a depth of 60 centimetres, and then a standing position at a
depth of 100 centimetres with a 50 centimetre parapet. Often two-man trenches will be
constructed. A machine gun emplacement consists of two one-man trenches positioned
at a small angle with a 100 x 100 centimetre pit and a parapet on three sides to a height
of 60 centimetres, except in the arc of fire where it will not be more than 20 centimetres
high. Time allocations in good ground are as follows:
a. individual shallow trench - 30 minutes;
b. individual standing trench - 1.5 hours;
c.
two-man standing trench - 2.5 to 3 hours; and
d. machine gun emplacement - 2.5 hours.
8.98
Individual trenches are linked into section trenches dug by mechanised engineering
equipment. Secondary positions for vehicles and heavy weapons are prepared and
communication trenches are dug connecting primary fighting positions and shelters. The
trenches are curved or zigzagged with straight sections from 15 to 20 metres long at
angles of between 120 and 160 degrees from one another to limit injury from fragments.
Cover is prepared for weapons, ammunition, and supplies, and covered slit trenches or
dugouts are prepared for every section.
8.99
Section trenches are linked to form platoon and company trench systems.
Communication trenches are equipped with individual foxholes, machine gun
emplacements, and recesses for ammunition.
SECTION 8-5.
EMPLOYMENT OF SUPPORTING ARMS AND WEAPONS
IN DEFENCE
Fire Plan
8.100 All forms of FS are planned to destroy the attacker during an approach to the company
strong point, in front of the main trench line, on the flanks, and in prepared killing zones
within the defended area.
8.101 Indirect fire is primarily the responsibility of battalion and higher levels of command, and
is based on a series of previously selected fire lines concentrated on likely avenues of
approach.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-26
8.102 Standing barrier fire is fire placed on a single line of concentration to disrupt an enemy
attack. It is fired to the front and flanks of the strong point. Standing barrier fire will be
conducted no closer than 300 to 500 metres from the position. This allows direct fire
anti-tank weapons to effectively engage enemy forces as they emerge through the
concentration. It begins as the enemy approaches the planned fire concentration line
and continues at a rapid rate until the infantry is cut off from the tanks and halts its
attack. Fire will be shifted to destroy infantry attempting to go around the fire
concentration line. Standing barrier fire will be used in combination with other artillery fire
as well as direct fire.
8.103 Rolling barrier fire is based on several successive lines of concentration, each closer to
the defensive position. The lines are planned for terrain that can be easily observed from
a ground observation point and will be separated by 400 to 600 metres or more. The
final line will be 300 to 400 metres from the position. Artillery units participating in the fire
mission will be assigned a sector of fire on each successive fire concentration, and fire
will continue until the bulk of the advancing force has moved through the barrage when it
will be shifted to the next line.
8.104 Final protective fire (FPF) is planned within 100 metres of the strong point. The company
commander has the authority to call for fire immediately in front of his strong point.
8.105 Emphasis is placed on anti-tank fire planned to engage enemy tanks with continuous fire
from the point of first detection. ATGMs are given an engagement area out to 3 000
metres from the forward edge of the position. Tanks firing first engage attacking tanks at
2 000 metres. The engagement range for artillery used in the direct fire mode is 1 500
metres. Self-propelled guns or RPG weapons engage the enemy at ranges less than
1 000 metres.
8.106 The fire plan complements the obstacle plan and makes use of both natural and manmade obstacles. Obstacles disrupt enemy formations, restrict manoeuvrability, and
channel the enemy into areas on which the company can bring maximum fire-power to
bear. Obstacles are located within 200 to 400 metres of the position to allow the enemy
to be easily observed and effectively covered by fire.
Artillery in Support of Infantry
8.107 Artillery is used in the defence for both direct and indirect fire. In the direct fire role, it
provides for increased fire into fire sacks and for breakthroughs within the defensive
area. In the indirect fire role, it is used to provide flexible fire in concentrations to affect
the battle within the entire defensive area and into the enemy’s depth.
8.108 There are two types of command relationships for artillery: attached and supporting. An
attached artillery unit is under the operational control of the manoeuvre force
commander. A supporting artillery unit remains under control of its parent artillery
organisation, and its fire is delegated.
8.109 It is unlikely that artillery will be attached directly to a defending company in the main
defensive area, but an artillery battalion may be attached at battalion level. A battery will
then be assigned to support the company, and will conduct fire missions for it. The
artillery fire plan is composed by the artillery battalion, and reflects the tasks of the
battalion. It covers the most likely avenues of approach within the defensive area,
providing optimum FS to all companies. The mechanised battalion may have additional
artillery in support from brigade artillery. A company operating in the security zone may
have an artillery battery directly attached to it.
8.110 Mortars organic to the battalion will fire the battalion fire plan. A company operating
forward in the security zone may have elements of the battalion mortars attached.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-27
8.111 A battery commander’s COP will collocate with the supported unit. The battery COP is
located within 1 000 metres of the front line to provide observation of the enemy and
actions of the supported company. The battery commander, a rangefinder operator, and
a radiotelephone operator are located at this COP, which is responsible for controlling
the battery’s fire and is near the company commander’s COP to ease coordination. If the
COP must be abandoned, an alternate OP is selected. The battery COP is also
augmented by flank or forward observation posts (FOPs) as required. The FOP is
manned by the HQ platoon commander, a scout, and a communicator. In the security
zone, the FOP would initially be stationed with the security platoon and would fall back
with it to the battery COP. The lateral observation post (LOP) is provided for observation
in areas unobserved by the battery COP. It is usually manned by two men from the
headquarters platoon’s reconnaissance section, and can place direct fire on observed
targets.
8.112 Should the defending company be positioned on a critical approach, it could expect to
receive artillery fire from the artillery battalion as part of the battalion fire plan, fire from
the battalion mortar battery, and fire from brigade artillery. If the company is defending
on a secondary axis during an attack, artillery fire would be reduced to that of the
supporting battery. If the company were on a secondary axis with a major attack
elsewhere in the battalion defensive area, it would not receive any artillery at all.
Anti-tank
8.113 The company has up to 15 RPG-7Vs and 22 RPG-18s, and is trained to wait until tanks
advance within 15 to 20 metres before engaging with anti-tank hand grenades. BMPs
mounting SPIGOTs or SPANDRELs have the added advantage of being able to
dismount these weapons and employ them separately. Weapons are positioned to
provide the strong point with all-round anti-tank defence.
8.114 In the main defensive sector, anti-tank elements may be integrated into first echelon
company strong points. These elements are platoon size, and come from the battalion
anti-tank platoon or brigade anti-tank company. They will be positioned to ensure
coverage of main armoured approaches and anti-tank obstacles.
8.115 Leaders of supporting anti-tank elements will remain with their weapons. With guidance
from the company commander, they will select their deployment lines, firing positions,
and movement routes.
8.116 Both attached and integral anti-tank weapons are sited to engage the enemy at
maximum possible ranges, with enfilade fire, cross fire, and surprise short-range
ambushes.
Tanks
8.117 A company may receive tank support, usually in the form of a platoon, which will
normally be located behind the second trench line. Terrain is the main consideration in
its positioning. Each will have primary and alternate positions and primary and
secondary sectors of fire.
8.118 These tanks will be dug-in and camouflaged. The T-64, T-72, and T-80 are equipped
with a self-entrenching device that will allow their crews to prepare a rough hull-down
position within 30 minutes in good soil. The T-64B and the T-80 are able to fire the AT-8
SONGSTER ATGM from their main guns out to 4 000 metres instead of 2 000 metres.
This enables these tanks to destroy the enemy at long-range with the first shot. This
weapon may also used effectively in an anti-helicoper role.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-28
8.119 The heavy machine gun can be dismounted and set up in a ground-mount position
manned by the driver up to 100 metres in front of the tank; a communications trench
would connect back to the tank.
AGS-17
8.120 The mechanised battalion has a platoon of six AGS-17s. The AGS-17 is a 30 mm AGL
with a 29 round drum magazine; it is capable of delivering over 60 rounds per minute out
to 1 700 metres. The AGS-17 is used for either direct or indirect fire, and has both HE
anti-personnel rounds and HEAT rounds. This platoon will fight with a section of two
launchers assigned to each company. The ability to deliver large amounts of fire will be
employed in areas where the heaviest fire concentrations are required.
Engineers
8.121 As the company is digging in, engineer assets begin the construction of a barrier system
that uses existing natural obstacles. The objective of the barrier system is to canalise the
enemy into fire sacks where he can be destroyed by fire. Fire is planned on every
obstacle.
8.122 Minefields can be anti-personnel, anti-tank, or mixed, with mixed being most common.
They can be laid by hand or mechanically, surface laid or buried. Outside of the
company position, they will not be marked, but if inside the strong point this may occur.
8.123 In addition, directional mines similar to the claymore have been developed. The MON-50
has a range of 50 metres; the MON-100 and MON-200 are large versions with 100 and
200 metres range.
8.124 Minefields are sited at the near end of a killing area or astride likely enemy avenues of
approach. They are also employed on the flanks and elsewhere to canalise the attacker
into pre-planned killing areas. Initially, minefields are laid within 300 to 500 metres of the
company position, allowing coverage by all the company’s weapons. Close-in defensive
minefields may also be constructed perpendicular to the position, starting as close as 10
metres and extending out as far as 60 metres.
8.125 A planned defensive minefield of two additional belts will be constructed, one within the
effective range of tank fire and another within the range of ATGMs.
8.126 The length, depth, and density of the minefield depends on time, equipment, types of
mines, the ground, and an estimate of enemy intent. It is not unreasonable to construct
several minefields 300 metres or more in length, each able to cover an entire platoon’s
frontage.
8.127 A company can lay mines by hand if no mechanical support is available. In four hours, a
platoon with a sapper sergeant can lay 240 mines covering an area 400 metres long, if
laid as a hasty minefield in three rows with five metres between mines. In five minutes,
with support from brigade engineers, three truck mounted ribbon bridges (PMR)-3/60
minelaying trailers can lay a 500 metre long minefield. In eight minutes, with divisional
engineering support, the division’s three Tracked Mechanical Mine Layer (GMZ)
armoured minelayers can lay a 1 100 metre long minefield.
8.128 Non-explosive obstacles are used both with and independent of minefields. These are
anti-tank ditches, escarpments and counterscrapes, dragon’s teeth, timber and ice
barriers, and barbed wire entanglement.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-29
8.129 Anti-tank ditches are constructed on level terrain or gentle slopes of up to 15 degrees.
On 45 degree forward slopes, escarpments are constructed and on reverse slopes,
counterscrapes. Obstacles are not required for slopes over 45 degrees as these
constitute obstacles themselves. Assistance from brigade engineers reduces the time
needed to produce these obstacles. A tracked bulldozer (BAT)-M can construct from 11
to 50 linear metres of standard anti-tank ditch in an hour, an MDK-2 or MDK-3 ditcher
can construct 29 to 33 metres, and a tank dozer (BTU) mounted on a T-55 can construct
12 metres to 28 metres. One linear metre can be dug by hand in 25 man-hours.
8.130 Anti-tank obstacles can be constructed of dragon’s teeth or boulders. Boulders used
must be at least 80 centimetres high, placed in three rows two to three metres apart with
1.5 to two metres between boulders. They may also be buried up to 20 centimetres deep
and loosely wrapped with barbed wire. Log barriers are also used. A log crib is
constructed with two walls of logs 30 to 40 centimetres in diameter 1.8 metres apart.
Each wall is supported by posts at least 1.5 metres high. The crib is braced from the side
opposite the approach route and filled with earth. It takes six to eight hours to build a six
metre obstacle. Dragon’s teeth and log barriers are employed on roads and through
narrow passageways, and in gullies, river beds, and constricted areas (see figure 8–11).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-30
Figure 8–11: Anti-tank Ditch Measurements
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-31
8.131 Wire obstacles will be situated to allow good small-arms coverage less than 30 to 40
metres from the position. They will be hidden from enemy observation. Twenty manhours are required to construct a permanent five wire fence 100 metres long and three
rows deep using metal stakes. Low wire entanglements or concertina wire is often used
to create obstacles. Mobile wire obstacles such as knife rests or hedgehogs are created
to emplace obstacles across roads, ditches, and trenches quickly, and to close breaches
in defensive obstacles. A company will have from three to four hedgehogs or knife rests
to close off individual trench sectors during construction within the trenches. It takes four
man-hours to make a knife rest and one to make a hedgehog (see figure 8–12).
Figure 8–12: Log Barrier and Wire Obstacles
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-32
Air Defence
8.132 The company uses shoulder-fired SA-7B GRAIL or SA-14 GREMLIN SAMs from the
battalion’s air defence platoon, as well as massed small arms fire for air defence. Air
OPs are established near the COP on terrain offering good visibility. Sectors for
observation and fire are assigned to air observers on a rotating schedule that provides
continuous all-around protection. The attached SA-7 or SA-14 SAMs are collocated at
these air OPs. Air defence within the company is also provided by the 12.7 mm antiaircraft machine guns of the attached tanks, 14.5 mm machine guns on the BTR-70s,
and by ground-mounted 12-7 mm NSV machine guns. The 30 mm automatic cannon on
the BMP-2 has anti-helicopter capabilities. ATGMs may also be used in this role.
8.133 A helicopter is engaged with the massed fire of a single platoon, and high-performance
aircraft by all the weapons of the company. Aircraft will be fired on as they come within
range. Passive air defence measures used include camouflaging vehicles, equipment,
and positions, and constructing dummy positions and vehicles.
Nuclear and Chemical Defence
8.134 The company executes NBC defence plans in accordance with the battalion plan. It
disperses its position to deny an attractive target and uses effective field fortifications.
The company has an NBC non-commissioned officer with a small team of extra duty
NBC specialists. These specialists can check unit NBC equipment and help in
decontaminating personnel and equipment. In the defence, they can be attached from
the brigade’s chemical defence company.
Night Defence
8.135 Two primary considerations in a night defence are security and illumination. LPs are
established and each platoon details extra observers. OPs are brought closer to the front
line – about 200 metres out. No less than 50 per cent of sub-unit personnel remain in
their positions, ready to open fire and repulse enemy attacks. Personnel are assigned to
destroy enemy night vision devices. Patrolling is increased to reduce the possibility of a
surprise attack. Light and sound discipline is imposed, and movement is held to a
minimum. Weapons exposed during the day are moved to alternate locations.
8.136 Weapons with night vision devices are positioned with primary and alternate positions to
cover main approaches. Active IR night vision equipment exists for short-range target
illumination, and there are also image intensifiers for weapon systems such as automatic
rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers as well as battlefield surveillance such as
the NOD, NNP-20M. The weapon sight NSP-U can be fitted to the RPK-74 light machine
gun or the AK-74 assault rifle, and one is issued to each section.
8.137 The illumination plan includes measures taken to illuminate the sector and blind the
enemy. Illumination posts are normally positioned in front of each platoon with two or
three alternate positions 40 to 60 metres apart. They are equipped with flares and
located to provide full illumination coverage. Since it requires relatively little time to
activate a flare, each post can simultaneously fire two flares, illuminating a frontage of
400 to 480 metres. The flares have a range of 200 to 250 metres and will burn for seven
seconds. Incendiary and HE fire may be directed behind the attacking enemy to
silhouette him.
8.138 The company withdraws its additional observers prior to daylight. The Musorians take
advantage of the dark to evacuate casualties, replenish ammunition, and feed.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-33
SECTION 8-6.
WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS
General
8.139 Withdrawal operations are integral to any operation involving rearward movement of
troops and equipment. Defensive operations such as mobile, delay and retrograde will
involve units conducting coordinated withdrawals in and out of contact. ‘Retreats’ are
conducted above divisional level. A withdrawal will be approved at the highest level and
any request to withdraw will require approval two levels higher than the requesting unit.
8.140 Withdrawal operations are integral to delaying defence and will be well rehearsed and
conducted as a matter of course. Withdrawal during area defence will be undertaken to
avoid destruction or conform with flanking units. The withdrawal in mobile defence could
be part of the greater scheme of manoeuvre to achieve a better tactical advantage over
the enemy. Units operating as battle outposts in the security zone will conduct
independent withdrawal operations. This type of operation is conducted with great speed
and use of fire-power. A mechanised platoon in a battle outpost could be clear of its
position within five minutes from the time the withdrawal is ordered.
Conduct of the Withdrawal
8.141 An infantry battalion conducting a withdrawal will usually do so from an area defence
position. All attempts will be made to withdraw out of contact due to the lack of integral
mobility which would otherwise help achieve a clean break. Motorised battalions will also
attempt to withdraw out of contact and will rely on motorised transport to pick up and
move forces from the old to the new defensive area. Mechanised forces may well
attempt to withdraw in contact when conducting delaying or mobile defence. This could
occur when sufficient delay and attrition has been inflicted on the enemy. Even in this
case every opportunity will be made to achieve a clean break out of contact through the
use of FS and manoeuvre.
8.142 The withdrawal of a battalion from area defence will covered by a rearguard. This will
normally be provided by brigade and division and usually consist of tanks. The mission
of the rearguard is to fight and deny penetration of an attacking force while the
withdrawing force achieves a clean break.
8.143 The characteristics of a withdrawal are:
a. every attempt will be made to avoid withdrawing forces in contact;
b. massed use of all forms of fire will be used in FPF to achieve a clean break;
c.
when defending in two echelons the second echelon will generally cover the
withdrawal of the first echelon, if the ground permits;
d. a withdrawal out of contact will generally be conducted at night and silently to
achieve surprise;
e. pre-withdrawal activities include the back-loading of non-essential stores and
equipment, and the rearward movement of reconnaissance groups and rear parties;
f.
heavy and served weapons may be moved early if they are in danger of being lost to
enemy action;
g. obstacles and gaps in minefields will be closed; and
h. extensive use of booby traps will occur on likely pursuit routes including the use of
surface-laid mines.
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8-34
SECTION 8-7.
DEFENSIVE TRENCH WORKS
Company/Platoon Level Trench Works
8.144 The key to understanding the Musorian defence lies in an appreciation of trench system
designs. With the advent of IFVs, continuous trench lines are now only used at platoon
and company level.
8.145 Section Trenches. The mechanised section/squad typically has a continuous trench
line extending up to 100 metres along its front. Within this trench line, section members
occupy a 30 metre wide section of the trench. The remainder of the trench and the
communications trench to the rear contain alternate firing positions and ammunition
recesses. Musorian commanders believe that preparing and equipping the unoccupied
areas of the trench allows the section to manoeuvre along the front and depth of the
position (see figure 8–13).
Figure 8–13: Section Trenches
8.146 The Platoon Trench System. Within the platoon position, the three section trenches
may be connected or there may be gaps (usually of 50 metres, but up to 150 metres)
between section trenches. In the depth and flanks of the position, fall-back positions will
be prepared for the three sections and their vehicles. Each platoon position will have a
communication trench 110 metres in length that extends from the main trench line
rearward towards the platoon commander’s COP (see figure 8–14).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-35
Figure 8–14: Platoon Trench System
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Trench width is 0.4 to 0.7 metres. Depth is 1.1 metres.
Construction rate is 0.8 man-hours per metre of trench.
Trench lengths are 15 to 20 metres before turns (120 to 160 degrees).
Positioning Squad and Platoon Defences
8.147 The squad occupies a frontage of 100 metres, and mans a 30 metre wide section of
trench. The BMP/BTR firing positions are set up inside, behind, or on the flank of the
section trench. Alternate IFV fighting positions are created. IFV positions are chosen on
slopes, behind elevations, or behind cover so the enemy is continuously observed and
engaged at maximum ranges. The section locates trenches for its IFV and weapons
using existing terrain features, such as rivers, streams, ditches, buildings, and so forth.
The section must be able to engage the enemy at maximum ranges without dead
ground/concealed areas within 400 to 500 metres of the position.
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8.148 The platoon strong point should be on advantageous terrain, built up using engineer
assets and adapted for all-round defence. It must meet the following requirements:
a. personnel must be able to engage enemy forces frontally and on the flanks to the full
effective range of the platoon’s weapons;
b. sections are sited to provide mutual support, flanking fire, and cross fire;
c.
the terrain must be exploited to the maximum extent to conduct anti-armour, and
anti-helicopter fire; and
d. the position must be developed to the extent that personnel are protected against
nuclear or incendiary (Napalm/fuel air explosives) attack.
Construction Sequence
8.149 Orders of work from shell scrape to full overhead cover are established. The sequence
for preparing the defence is:
a. First order of work:
(1) Observation and firing sectors are cleared of debris/obscuration.
(2) Individual trenches or two-man trenches (foxholes) for crew-served weapons
are dug.
(3) COPs are prepared.
(4) Primary and secondary positions for IFVs are established.
(5) One open shelter is prepared for each platoon.
(6) Positions are camouflaged.
b. Second order of work (see figure 8–15):
(1) Individual trenches are combined into section/squad trenches.
(2) Secondary positions are prepared for heavy/crew-served weapons.
(3) Communication trenches are dug to the primary fighting positions and to the
shelters (dugouts).
(4) Cover is prepared for vehicles, ammunition, and supplies.
(5) One covered slit trench or dugout is prepared for each vehicle.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-37
Figure 8–15: Second Order of Trench Work
c.
Third order of work (see figure 8–16):
(1) Section trenches are interconnected to become a continuous platoon or
company trench system.
(2) Communication trenches to the rear are dug, first to 0.6 metres deep, then 1.1
metres.
(3) Fighting and communication trenches are fully equipped. They have attached
and individual foxholes, machine gun emplacements, recesses for ammunition,
and some parts of the trench system are covered. Figure 8–17 illustrates
completed trench work.
Figure 8–16: Third Order of Trench Work
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8-38
Figure 8–17: Completed Trench Work
Platoon Positions
8.150 Fortified, Reinforced Platoon Strong Points. Construction of fortified, reinforced
platoon strong points requires 840 man-hours or 21 machine hours, excavation of 1 540
cubic metres of soil, 45 cubic metres of wood, and 135 kilograms of wire. Construction of
revetments in the slopes requires 350 man-hours, 20 cubic metres of wood, and 120
kilograms of wire (see figure 8–18).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-39
8
8
2
4
1
8
3
9
3
8
10
6
2
400m
4
3
1
100m
1
8
7
8
3
1
1
5
7
4
6
8 3
5
3
200m
300m
1. Rifle position
2. Machine gun position
3. Grenade launcher
4. Shelter
5. Communications trench
6. Latrine
7. Covered trench section
8. Tank
9. Tank firing position
10. COP
Figure 8–18: Fortified, Reinforced Platoon Strong Points
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
A fortified platoon position requires 840 man-hours or 21 machine-hours, 45 cubic metres of wood and 135
kilograms of wire.
Fortified positions may be adopted by infantry, motorised or mechanised forces when time and resources
allow.
The above diagram also illustrates the use of AFVs in the position.
Note the increased degree of all-round defence which is indicative when the platoon is operating as a battle
outpost, or a platoon in a platoon outpost position within a company.
8.151 Personnel Shelters/Dugouts. Figure 8–19 illustrates personnel shelters/ dugouts.
These are constructed to protect personnel during enemy air or artillery attack. They are
usually connected to a section fighting trench or to a communication trench.
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Figure 8–19: Personnel Shelters/Dugouts
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-41
8.152 Individual Rifleman Trench. Figure 8–20 illustrates the individual rifleman trench. Each
mechanised squad consists of nine men, two of which (the driver and gunner) remain
with the IFV. Within the trench itself there are firing positions for the machine gunner, the
grenadier and his assistant, and three or four riflemen. Preparation requires removal of
2.4 cubic metres of soil, 8.5 man-hours using an infantry shovel, six man-hours using an
engineer shovel, 0.4 cubic metres of logs, and 14.5 metres of barbed wire.
+50-60
+30
_0
+
-110
RECESS
50
CROSS SECTION
+30
+50-60
20-30
+50-60
-110
30
OVERHEAD
Figure 8–20: Individual Rifleman Trench
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8.153 Position For Two Riflemen. Figure 8–21 shows a position for two riflemen.
Construction requires removal of 3.8 cubic metres of soil, 11 man-hours using an
infantry shovel, eight man-hours using an engineer shovel, 0.7 cubic metres of logs, and
14.5 metres of barbed wire.
+30
30-40
+50-60
20-30
+50-60
-110
30
150
OVERHEAD
+50-60
+30
_0
+
-110
RECESS
50
CROSS SECTION
Figure 8–21: Position for Two Riflemen
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8.154 Machine Gun Position. Figure 8–22 illustrates a machine gun position. There is
normally one machine gun position per squad for a mechanised squad and two for an
infantry squad. Each position requires removal of 3.3 cubic metres of soil, 10 man-hours
using an infantry shovel, seven hours with an engineer shovel, 0.4 cubic metres of logs,
and 14.5 metres of wire.
Figure 8–22: Machine Gun Position
Notes:
1.
2.
Rear berm is not present for anti-tank weapons.
Berm height is 50 to 60 centimetres.
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8.155 Grenade Launcher Position. Figure 8–23 illustrates a grenade launcher position. This
is usually a single, two-man grenade launcher position within a section trench.
Figure 8–23: Grenade Launcher Position
8.156 Uncovered Platoon Commander’s Observation Post. Figure 8–24 illustrates a
platoon commander’s OP. This position requires excavation of 4.6 cubic metres of soil,
7.5 man-hours using an infantry shovel, and five man-hours using an engineer shovel.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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Figure 8–24: Platoon Commander’s Observation Post
8.157 Infantry Fighting Vehicle Trench. Figure 8–25 illustrates an IFV trench. The APC/IFV
is occupied by the driver and gunner and, on occasion, the section commander. The
latter normally fights the battle from the centre of his section’s trench line. Construction
of a trench without shelter requires removal of 48 metres of soil and expenditure of 65
man-hours using engineer shovels. Note that for a BTR-60P, a revetment is not
constructed in the firing sector.
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Figure 8–25: Infantry Fighting Vehicle Trench
Obstacle Plans
8.158 Protective Minefields. Minefields are anti-personnel, anti-tank, or mixed. They are laid
mechanically or by hand, and are surface laid or buried. Within a defended area, they
are marked (fenced). Outside the defended area they are not marked. A protective
minefield is covered by direct fire, located near the fire sack and astride the most likely
enemy avenue of approach. Minefields are employed in conjunction with other obstacles
to canalise the attacker into fire sacks. Size, density and characteristics of protective
minefields vary according to:
a. time available;
b. equipment available;
c.
estimates of the enemy/ground; and
d. characteristics of available mines.
8.159 The length of a minefield varies. No standard template for a platoon defensive minefield
can be produced. Figure 8–26 shows a sketch of an anti-tank minefield.
a. A formula is used to determine minefield size, density, and kill probabilities. Typically
mine outlays per kilometre of front are:
(1) anti-personnel: PMN, PMD-6 (HE), 2 000 to 3 000; OZM-4, POMZ-2M, 100 to
300; and
(2) anti-tank: anti-track mines, 500 to 750; anti-hull mines, 300 to 400.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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b. Mixed minefields are regarded as the primary type of obstacle in contemporary
warfare. They are established in front of defended positions. Mixed minefields
consist of TM-62 anti-tank mines and PMN anti-personnel mines. The minefield has
four rows of anti-tank mines. Around each anti-tank mine are clustered three antipersonnel mines. Other characteristics include the following:
(1) four straight parallel mine rows offset by one lateral pace (one metre);
(2) anti-tank mines are buried and anti-personnel mines are camouflaged or buried;
(3) distance between each anti-tank mine in a row is four metres; and
(4) intervals between rows are 10 to 15 metres.
Figure 8–26: Sketch of Anti-tank Minefield
8.160 Other Obstacles. In addition to minefields, non-explosive obstacles are used
extensively. These include:
a. escarpments and counterscrapes (15 to 45 degrees);
b. dragon’s teeth;
c.
timber barriers; and
d. wire, including:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-48
(1) wire entanglements with short or long pickets;
(2) wire fences;
(3) trip-wire entanglements; and
(4) snares and barbed wire entanglements.
8.161 Non-explosive anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles are used independently or in
conjunction with minefields. For example, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines are often
set up on the approaches to anti-tank ditches or dragon’s teeth to increase the difficulty
of crossing.
8.162 Camouflage. Camouflage is designed to conceal the actual disposition, composition,
and activity of platoons, fortifications, and obstacles from all types of enemy
reconnaissance. The basic camouflage missions include:
a. concealing the position so it cannot be detected;
b. establishing dummy positions to lure the enemy into an attack, harmless to the
defenders; and
c.
concealing the signature of a target to misrepresent it or camouflage it under another
objective that is not of value to the enemy. For example, a truck mounted pontoon
(PMP) bridge across a river will be concealed by siting it under a destroyed bridge.
8.163 The primary clues to the positions of trenches and fortifications are fresh spoil, the dark
colour of firing ports and entrances into fortifications, and paths connecting trenches to
fortifications.
8.164 To conceal fighting and communication trenches in terrain with grassy cover,
breastworks and rear parapets are turfed, the grass is scattered, and the ditch is
covered with branches. Vertical trench camouflaging is set on the trench parapet.
Loopholes and observation slits are also covered with vertical camouflage. Machine gun
pits and foxholes are covered with camouflage set up on pickets or wire arches. In open
terrain, trenches are hidden by covering them with camouflage and by digging dummy
trenches.
8.165 COPs are set up in locations with natural camouflage. When they are positioned in open
terrain, the observation top, the viewing slits, and the communication trench cul-de-sacs
are camouflaged. Observation structures are camouflaged under terrain features. Radio
antennas are painted protective colours, and cable lines are laid along existing lines and
embankments conforming to the terrain pattern.
8.166 Camouflage sets are usually used to conceal tanks and self-propelled guns. When
material is not available, tanks in cover are concealed with camouflage prepared by
piling local materials onto a wire or pole frame. Emplacements for direct fire weapons
are concealed from enemy land observation with vertical and inclined camouflaging
constructed from standard camouflage sets and local materials.
8.167 Minefields and wire obstacles are camouflaged by selecting locations by terrain
characteristics. When a minefield is in a field, the turf over the hole is carefully cut and
removed. After the mine has been placed, the turf is replaced and the grassy surface is
restored. Packing, markers, and stakes are removed from the mined areas, and traces
of the mining are concealed.
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8.168 Roads and cross-country tracks in deployment and defensive areas are usually built
behind natural concealment. Approaches to the firing positions and individual
fortifications are concealed by putting up removable camouflage covering or piling up
local materials.
8.169 To camouflage weapon systems, all weapons and their fortifications conform to terrain
that maximises use of natural concealment. When weapon systems are deployed in
open terrain, they are carefully concealed with standard camouflaging and local
materials; secondary, temporary, and dummy firing positions are also set up.
8.170 The primary engineer measures in imitating platoon dispositions include preparing
dummy deployment areas and dummy positions, and conducting false vital activity.
Dummy strong points, defensive areas and artillery firing positions, are built at the same
time as actual positions. Dummy strong points are set up in elevated areas, on the
outskirts of forests, and in other exposed sections of terrain. Entrenchments and other
fortifications are built in dummy strong points and dummy artillery firing positions.
Dugouts are prepared to protect personnel in the dummy command, and emplacements
are prepared for their combat equipment.
8.171 It is extremely difficult to camouflage units, especially combat equipment, in open terrain.
All local terrain features and relief folds of the background are used.
8.172 If the terrain is of one colour and has no features, camouflaging is accomplished by
artificially marking the terrain. Emplacements, dugouts, and other fortifications are built
directly on these blemishes and are camouflaged under them. The breastworks are
given altered shapes to distort the appearance of one type of fortification constructed at
different points in the same position.
8.173 It is commonly believed that it is best to assign areas for deployment (concentration) in
winter, in thick coniferous forests, or predominantly coniferous mixed forests. Small
populated areas should also be occupied. Winter camouflage sets, various local
materials, and especially snow are used for camouflage. White camouflage uniforms are
often used by personnel.
Conduct of the Platoon Defence
8.174 After receiving the order to go into the defence under direct enemy pressure, the platoon
commander orders his squads/sections to take positions. He organises OPs and
develops a fire plan with targets in front of the position, to the flanks, and in the rear. He
also establishes priorities for engineer work. In the combat order, the platoon
commander indicates:
a. section missions, their primary and secondary sectors of fire, firing positions for
combat vehicles, and their primary and secondary sectors of fire;
b. areas where platoon fire is to be concentrated (fire sacks), which weapons will cover
gaps between adjacent units and the flanks, and the sequence of occupying
positions; and
c.
the time frame for completing engineer work and camouflaging.
8.175 In addition, the platoon commander determines the sequence for destroying enemy
infantry and tanks in front of the forward edge in the event the enemy breaks through,
and on the flanks and rear. He establishes signals for target designation, coordinates
actions with adjacent units employed in the area, and indicates the sequence for
servicing vehicles.
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8.176 The fire plan is based on the close mutual support of all weapon types combined with
engineer barriers and natural obstacles. All obstacles and their approaches must be
utilised for flanking and crossing fire and all-round defence. The fire plan is ready when
all weapons have occupied their positions, the ammunition is broken out, and data is
prepared.
8.177 In the case of a mechanised platoon, the platoon commander’s COP is equipped as a
strong point close to the commander’s combat vehicle. He must be able to see the
terrain in front of the forward edge of the defence, on the flanks, and across the entire
platoon defensive position.
8.178 Attacks by combat helicopters and low-flying aircraft are repelled by concentrated
platoon fire. When the enemy closes, he is hit by all platoon weapons at maximum rate
of fire. The first to be destroyed are tanks and combat vehicles. The infantry is cut off
from the tanks and destroyed by infantry weapons.
8.179 Tanks and combat vehicles that break into the platoon strong point are destroyed by
anti-tank weapons. Infantry are hit with grenades and destroyed by hand-to-hand
combat. If the enemy bypasses the strong point, the platoon maintains an all-round
defence and continues to hold the strong point. If the enemy attack is repulsed, the
platoon commander concentrates fire on the enemy attacking adjacent units. During
night battles the platoon commander organises the preparation of weapons and devices
for night firing, and stakes the primary direction of fire for anti-tank weapons without
night sight.
Tanks in the Defensive Battle
8.180 Tanks will be integral to a mechanised unit’s defensive plan, and they are most likely to
be used to support infantry and motorised forces. The Musorians see the employment of
tanks in defence as critical to massing lethal anti-tank fire into the fire sacks.
8.181 If the tank platoon’s mission is to support a mechanised or a motorised company, it will
be broken up, and individual tanks will each support a rifle platoon. The tank is
positioned behind the squad trench lines, and its main gun fire is integrated into the
platoon fire plan. The tank is used to kill tanks, followed by other armoured vehicles. The
tank commander is allocated an engagement line, identifiable by natural or man-made
features. Only on order will he be permitted to reposition the tank to alternate or
supplementary firing positions. If dug in, the tank will be linked to the platoon trench
system, so resupply and evacuation may occur under cover.
8.182 If the tank platoon fights as an entity, it will most likely be augmented by an infantry
element to provide close-in support. The platoon commander begins by conducting a
reconnaissance of the proposed battle position, then positioning his tanks to take
advantage of both day and night fire, as well as camouflage. Once in position, each tank
is assigned an orientation based on identifiable terrain. Alternate and supplementary
positions are also selected. Individual range cards are drawn by tank commanders, then
sent to the platoon commander for consolidation. OPs are established as appropriate.
The platoon commander will ensure he achieves massed or overlapping fire along the
most threatening enemy avenue of approach. He will designate a trigger line to optimise
the target hit probability and achieve massed fire-power. Movement to alternate
positions during combat will be on order. Generally, movement to reserve positions is
planned to draw the attacker deeper into the kill area, present more obstacles in depth,
and trick the enemy into attacking dummy positions.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-51
SECTION 8-8.
DEFENCE IN SPECIAL TERRAIN
8.183 Defence in Mountains. In mountain terrain, the defender is hampered by the large area
of dead ground and the hidden approaches that hinder observation and allow the enemy
to approach the forward edge and attack by surprise. Defences in mountains will be
decentralised and sited with larger gaps between companies than on regular terrain.
Company strong points are set up to hold key terrain with an all-round defence and
mutual support between them. Gaps between the strong points will make it easier for the
enemy to turn and envelop them. The forward edges of mountain ridges, heights, and
spurs are chosen to give good fields to view and fire over the approaches. Ambushes
and obstacles are employed in areas that are difficult to reach and hard to cover by
observation and fire. RPs and standing patrols are organised to cover these areas.
8.184 Field fortifications in areas where the soil is no deeper than one metre will use partially
dug-in positions with embankments constructed of stone, sandbags, and dirt. If the soil is
deeper than 1.5 metres, then ordinary field fortifications will be constructed.
8.185 The fire plan is prepared with provision for overlapping enfilade fire, crossfire, and
surprise short-range fire all around the edge of the position. Weapons are placed in
steps on the slopes facing the enemy and on the reverse slopes of heights to eliminate
dead zones and hidden approaches to the position. Artillery is located for direct fire at
maximum range because indirect fire is restricted by large areas of dead ground.
Mortars are preferred for indirect support.
8.186 Tanks will be attached to company strong points that are defending major axes such as
roads junctions, exits from valleys, defiles, the edges of forests, and mountain river
crossings.
8.187 Engineer obstacles will be used to block hairpin turns, defiles, and potential avalanche
sites. Detours around obstacles will be heavily mined with both anti-tank and antipersonnel mines. Due to the restricted nature of the terrain, fewer anti-tank mines will be
required than in normal conditions. The use of anti-personnel mines will be increased.
The restrictive terrain will enable effective use of off-route and MON series mines.
8.188 Increased reliance will be placed on local air defence by shoulder-fired SAMs, and
longer-range weapons will be held at higher levels of command.
8.189 The defence will be similar to that on regular ground. The enemy will be engaged by fire
as he reaches the distant approaches. Tanks and other armoured vehicles are
destroyed as they attempt to manoeuvre on difficult ground. If the enemy is successful in
breaching the defensive position, the company will remain in place and maintain an allround defence. If the conditions are favourable, the battalion will launch a counter-attack
to destroy the enemy force.
8.190 Defence in Winter. In deep snow, the frontage of the company will increase up to 2 000
metres with platoons defending on 500 metre frontages. The company strong point will
be sited in locations that provide shelter to the defenders, such as populated areas and
forests. The strongest defences will be constructed along roads and areas of light snow
that are the most likely avenue of approach. The flanks of positions are strengthened to
counter enemy ski-borne attacks, although it will be hard to construct elaborate
defensive positions due to the frozen state of the earth. To remedy this, parapets of
packed snow are built around weapons and vehicles. Snow will be packed to conceal
the strong points, and may be packed on the upper portion of combat vehicles to aid
concealment. The emphasis is on maintaining peak efficiency of company personnel,
and two-thirds of the company will stay in warming shelters when not engaged.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-52
SECTION 8-9.
DEFENDING IN URBAN TERRAIN
Introduction
8.191 The Musorians regard cities as either military, political, or economic centres. Their
philosophy on defending in cities is that combat will be intensive and casualties will be
severe. The Musorians will never discount the employment of nuclear weapons by the
enemy in a dramatically escalated conflict involving Musorian defence of a captured city.
Accordingly, Musorian forces will establish their defensive positions on the approaches
to the city whenever possible. This allows them to use ordinary field defence tactics,
which are more economical in manpower and equipment. However there are
circumstances that may dictate defence within a city. They are:
a. to stop an enemy offensive in which a city is the objective,
b. to defend a port or naval base, or
c.
to defend a key political or economic base.
8.192 Defence of a city when not in contact with the enemy allows time for reconnaissance and
building of fortifications. Units operating well beyond the outskirts of the city provide a
covering force to protect the preparations. The Musorians consider the city’s layout and
types of structures, the time of year, and the climate, important in the planning of the
defence.
8.193 The Musorian concept of defence in cities is to draw enemy manpower and equipment
into kill zones and to destroy them. The tactics and weapon systems used depend on
the situation and terrain.
8.194 The Musorians try to canalise enemy movement into the defended zone of a city by
strongly held positions on the flanks. Musorian doctrine calls for control of the rate of
enemy advance by launching local counter-attacks. The enemy is to be defeated and
repulsed on the outskirts, if possible. The Musorians plan to allow the enemy to engage
in close combat in the centre of the city only as a last resort.
The Battalion Defence
8.195 A battalion normally defends as part of a brigade. The battalion may be placed in either
the brigade first or second echelon of defence. The first echelon mission is to prevent
penetration of the built-up area. In the second echelon, its mission is to contain an
enemy penetration and restore first echelon positions. There is a degree of tactical
flexibility within these missions in that battalions may find that the direction of enemy
assault has changed a primary approach into a secondary one. Battalions positioned on
primary approaches have smaller frontages than those positioned on secondary ones.
The mission of a reserve battalion is to reinforce or replace battalions in the first or
second echelons.
8.196 A battalion usually holds a number of company strong points. It is reinforced by tanks,
anti-tank guns, and artillery employed in the direct fire role. Other artillery and mortar
units also provide indirect fire support. Figure 8–27 depicts a reinforced mechanised
company defending in urban terrain.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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Tank
Battalion ammunition
supply point
122 mm howitzer
Battalion refuelling
point
Mortar battery
(122 mm)
Battalion food
supply point
Company
commander’s CP
Battalion
commander’s CP
Company medical
point
Portable obstacle
Artillery concentration
(numbered)
Concertina wire
obstacle
Artillery concentration
(lettered)
Mixed minefield
(anti-personnel
anti-tank)
Battalion TOP
Barbed wire
barrier
Company
ammunition point
Battalion medical
aid point
Mined barricade
Buildings (most
structures are
of stone)
Figure 8–27: A Reinforced Mechanised Company Defending in Urban Terrain
8.197 The defence in both the first and second echelons consists of a series of company-sized
strong points. Each company is reinforced by tanks and artillery according to its mission
and the tactical situation. Although the maximum frontage of a company strong point is
about 200 metres, the exact frontage and depth of the battalion depends on:
a. the combat strength of the battalion,
b. whether it is defending on a primary approach,
c.
the estimated strength of the enemy, and
d. the layout of the city and the types of buildings.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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8.198 A company of tanks will normally be attached to a battalion defending in a city. The
company is employed either as individual platoons or as single tanks set in ambush
positions. Tanks may be used in a mobile role with two or three alternate positions for
each tank, or they can be employed in a stationary role to reinforce the anti-tank
defences. On the outskirts of the city, tank units channel enemy forces into the kill zone
or conduct counter-attacks to slow the enemy rate of advance. Tank ambush positions
are established on the outskirts of the city and further out in the neighbouring
countryside.
8.199 Battalions can receive up to 50 per cent of divisional artillery, including heavy artillery to
be used in a direct fire role. Artillery pieces are emplaced either singly or as platoons
and may come under the command of the infantry company commander. Each gun has
two or three positions. The artillery remaining under direct command of the brigade or
division is placed in covered positions outside the city and delivers indirect fire on
request. Smoke conceals the movement of troops and equipment between strong points.
8.200 A combat engineer platoon may be attached to a battalion and normally remains under
the centralised control of the battalion commander. Engineers will be employed to:
a. lay mines and prepare obstacles as part of the counter-mobility plan;
b. prepare the demolition of buildings, and clear fields of fire; and
c.
create passages through buildings for covered movement in and between strong
points.
8.201 Aviation is used in a ground attack to break up enemy attacks and neutralise enemy
forces attempting to bypass the city. In addition, aviation is employed to destroy enemy
aircraft used in close support of ground combat.
8.202 The restrictive nature of urban terrain will require the detailed siting of anti-aircraft
systems. The smaller and lighter shoulder-launched SAMs can be sited on roof tops or
in clear areas such as parks. The larger SAMs which are dependent on their radar
systems, are better suited to being sited on the outskirts of the city where there is less
interference with target acquisition.
8.203 Before establishing a battalion defence, the battalion commander will conduct an
estimate and will consider the following factors:
a. enemy approaches and manoeuvre areas;
b. length of projected stay in the defensive position;
c.
support required from flanking units; and
d. logistics considerations, including stockpiling of water, medical supplies, and food.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-55
8.204 The battalion commander will then site the defending companies and supporting
weapons, OPs, and kill zones. The battalion commander’s orders will detail the
following:
a. missions and groupings of each company;
b. sectors of fire, and areas of concentrated fire;
c.
boundaries and detail of flank protection;
d. reserve responsibilities;
e. tasks of supporting tanks and artillery;
f.
engineer tasks;
g. security arrangements; and
h. the fire plan.
8.205 In organising the fire plan, the battalion commander positions his tanks and anti-tank
weapons at the edge of the urban area to maximise the effective ranges of these
weapons, especially wire-guided weapons. After the initial anti-tank battle, remaining
weapons are withdrawn to prepared positions within the built-up area. A few ATGMs
may be relocated to successive firing positions within the city. ATGMs are not suited to
firing at close-range targets because of minimum range limitations. Tanks and anti-tank
weapons cover major roads, parks, and squares. Artillery and mortars cover possible
enemy approaches. Selected artillery alternate positions allow the guns to be used in the
direct fire role. The guns cover lines or areas with natural or engineer-made obstacles.
Apart from the fire-power under the direct command of the battalion commander, the
brigade also has an indirect FS plan. The weapons remaining under division and higher
control are generally located outside the urban area. Air strikes from tactical aviation,
including both fixed-wing and RW aircraft will also support ground forces.
8.206 A reinforced battalion deploys in one or two echelons, depending on the size and layout
of the assigned sector. A reserve of one or two platoons will be created when the
battalion deploys in a single echelon. When the battalion deploys in two echelons, the
mission of its second echelon is to hold a position and to destroy by counter-attack any
penetration of the battalion’s first echelon. Such counter-attacks may be conducted in
conjunction with either battalion or brigade reserves.
8.207 The company creates strong points in buildings and prepares for all-round defence.
Doors and windows that are not required for use are filled with bricks or sandbags. Holes
for firing hand-held weapons are knocked through walls. The troops mine, barricade, or
destroy stairways. Access between floors is achieved by cutting holes through the floors
and using ropes or ladders. Covered communication routes by underground passages
connect the strong points. Weapon systems locate on different levels to cover dead
space. Snipers are positioned on roof tops and in attics.
8.208 The gaps between strong points, streets, and open areas are mined and obstacles
constructed. Bridges over rivers and canals are either destroyed or prepared for
demolition. Buildings are demolished to clear sectors of fire and to create obstacles for
enemy armour.
8.209 The Musorians stress the importance of fire-fighting during combat in cities. Combustible
material will be removed from strong points. Continuous monitoring is maintained on the
fire, chemical and biological hazard.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
8-56
8.210 Battalions obtain intelligence from OPs and LPs, adjacent units, and the brigade staff.
While in defensive positions on the outskirts of the city, APC mounted RPs are deployed
to maintain contact with the enemy. When combat moves into the city, foot patrols
remain in contact with the advancing enemy. Ambushes are prepared on the most likely
enemy approaches to maintain security and to gain tactical information.
8.211 The defensive fire plan is designed to separate enemy infantry and tanks. Artillery
breaks up enemy formations approaching the built-up area. FS is used on the enemy’s
flanks to canalise movement into kill zones.
8.212 A mobile covering force engages enemy reconnaissance and lead units before they
reach the edge of the built-up area. The covering force manoeuvres to meet the enemy
threat as it develops, while combat remains on the outskirts of the built-up area. Once
enemy pressure intensifies, the covering force withdraws and takes up a prepared
defensive position.
8.213 Once the enemy reaches the edge of the built-up area, the Musorians recognise that
combat will break down to a series of small-unit engagements at the company strong
points. These engagements are fought at close range with both heavy and hand-held
weapons. When enemy infantry and tanks attack together, Musorian defenders try to
destroy the infantry first. This makes the unsupported tanks an easier target in the city.
8.214 If the enemy succeeds in penetrating a company strong point, the Musorians plan
immediately to call in a heavy volume of artillery and mortar fire to prevent enemy
advancement into the sector. This fire will support the deployment of the battalion
reserve. If deployed in two echelons, the battalion’s second echelon will counter-attack.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-1
CHAPTER 9
ARTILLERY
SECTION 9-1.
ARTILLERY COMMAND AND CONTROL
9.1
MAF GF have always placed the greatest possible stress on the role of artillery in
combat. Foreign observers have often been mesmerised by the MAF GF’s tank and
infantry strength, however the MAF GF have traditionally regarded artillery as the main
battle winner.
9.2
The basic principles in allocating missions and organising missile and artillery units are
fourfold:
a. Centralised Control. The MAF GF believe in exercising control at the highest
possible level to ensure maximum flexibility, maximum effort at the decisive point
and logistic economy. The ability to manoeuvre massed fires laterally and in depth,
made possible by the contemporary improvements in reconnaissance, target
acquisition, communication, automated assistance to decision making, weapons’
range and lethality can only be fully exploited with centralised direction. Centralised
control does not, however, extend to the details of fire planning in most instances.
The senior commander will establish the area for the concentration of effort and the
scale of that effort, timings and the target priorities. Lower echelons choose the
method and form of inflicting fire damage. Thus the system of forming task-oriented
artillery groupings at different levels does not reduce flexibility and contradict the
principle of centralised control. Army and regional commanders have the wide and
deep-looking reconnaissance and target acquisition means, the logistic flexibility and
the high speed data processing and communications capability to establish or reestablish control rapidly and at will. The employment of missiles with ranges of
several hundred kilometres will always be determined by Strategic Group (SG). The
level of control over the bulk of artillery will vary according to the phase of an
operation. During a penetration, it will be exercised at higher formation level, in an
advance against a weak enemy and on a broad frontage, or in a large meeting
engagement, it may be focused at lower formation, but with a strong grouping of
long-range assets still held at army/regional level. In the pursuit, much control will
usually be devolved downwards to unit level. In defence, a counter-preparation will
be organised at higher formation level while the rest of the operation may see the
lower formation as the main focus but with strong, long-range groups at
army/regional level.
b. The Struggle for Fire Superiority. The struggle for fire superiority is always the first
priority task for the missile and artillery troops (in close cooperation with EW and
aviation).
c.
Priority for Support. The MAF GF continually stress the importance of concentration
of effort and the reinforcement of success. Thus, in allocating artillery to subordinate
formations and units, an even distribution is rejected in favour of massing support on
the main axis. In the attack, resources will be switched from the support of less
successful elements to aiding those making the best progress. In the defence, they
will bolster the position of those forces in greatest need.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-2
d. The Basic Fire Unit. When employing non-precision ammunition fired by tube
artillery, the MAF GF will engage small targets with a single battery. A raiding group,
outflanking group, vanguard or flank guard based on a mechanised or tank company
may be reinforced by a battery. Normally, however, the basic fire unit is the battalion.
This reflects the MAF GF desire to deliver the scientifically established norm to
achieve the desired effect on the target as rapidly as possible. This is partly because
the bulk of casualties inflicted by a fire strike occur in the first minute or two (before
the enemy recovers from surprise and takes cover), partly because of the danger of
an armoured, mobile target motoring out of the impact area before the norm has
been fired and also because short engagements reduce the likelihood of enemy
counter-bombardment being conducted in good time.
9.3
Groupings. The MAF GF form temporary, mission-oriented groupings to ensure
flexibility in concentrating artillery fire. It must be emphasised that these groupings are
temporary in nature, usually for a specific task. The BrAG, for example, is only formed if
artillery units from division, or higher, are handed down to the brigade. If a brigade has
no artillery allocated from higher, a BrAG will not be formed. Integral artillery, while it is
part of a BrAG when formed, does not constitute a BrAG in itself.
9.4
AAG, regional command artillery groups, DAGs, BrAGs, and battalion artillery groups
(BaAG) provide continuous artillery support to manoeuvre commanders, and allow the
required degree of centralised control. The strength of artillery groupings depends on the
mission of the supported unit, the strength of the enemy and the importance of the axis.
The guiding principle is the achievement of maximum concentration on the decisive axis.
Artillery groups usually consist of a least two battalions of similar or mixed type units:
field guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). A designated
commander and staff provide the group’s C2. The commander and staff of the organic
artillery brigade or battalion usually form the core of the group’s C2 element. A high
proportion of the MAF GF artillery (25 to 30 per cent) is held in the reserve of SG and
from there allocated and reallocated to different axes in accordance with the overall
strategic concept. SGs also possess formidable artillery groupings (typically two to five
surface-to-surface missile [SSM] and cruise missile brigades, an artillery division, one to
two heavy artillery brigades and one to two heavy MRL brigades) which are likewise
devolved to armies and regional commands according to operational requirements.
9.5
Missile Groups. SG will form a variable number of groups of operational SSMs and
cruise missiles for deep strike. Their task is to win (in cooperation with air and deep
operations) the operational level contest for electronic fire superiority. Their principal
targets will be enemy airfields, deep strike means (especially reconnaissance strike
complexes [RSCs]), air defences and major headquarters. Others could include
operational reserves and key infrastructure targets such as bridges or power generation.
Army and regional SSM brigades are used against similar objects in the operationaltactical zone.
9.6
Higher Formation Artillery Groups. AAGs and army groups of rocket artillery (AGRA)
and regional equivalents are formed from organic and attached long-range assets and,
as required by the phase of an operation, medium artillery as well. These are used first
and foremost for deep fire missions, to carry on the struggle for electronic fire superiority.
Their primary targets will be enemy artillery (especially elements of RSCs and
reconnaissance fire complexes [RFCs] and MRLs), C2 entities, helicopter forward
operating sites, EW facilities and air defence systems. They will also manoeuvre massed
fires in support of manoeuvre elements, to suppress strong resistance, damage and
disrupt reserves and break up counter-attacks. These groups include:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-3
a. Army Artillery Group. The AAG is formed from SG assets allocated to an army and
the army’s own assets, less any decentralised to divisions. The SG commander
usually distributes SG artillery assets to committed armies according to the assigned
tasks. An army could have four to eight battalions for its primary counter-fire mission.
With closer to four battalions, the army would form one AAG; with closer to eight, it
would probably form two AAGs. The AAG uses longer-range systems to attack deep
targets such as headquarters, air defences and reserves.
b. Army Group Rocket Artillery. An army would not normally allocate the MRLs from its
organic rocket launcher brigade to its subordinate divisions. With these and
additional rocket battalions possibly allocated to the army from the SG level rocket
launcher brigade, the army commander would form an AGRA. The three to seven
artillery battalions in the AGRA do not include any SSM units. With closer to seven
battalions, the army might form two AGRAs. It is normally reserved to support the
army’s main attack axis.
9.7
Lower Formation Artillery Groups. DAGs and BrAGs comprise organic and attached
medium artillery and MRLs, though a formation acting autonomously may also receive
some long-range assets as well. These groups are used as directed from above to
contribute to the long-range battle (for example, by suppressing air defences in support
of friendly air penetrations or the insertion of airmobile or ground raiding forces). Their
main role, however, is the FS of the manoeuvre elements of their formation.
a. Divisional Artillery Group. The divisional commander allocates artillery to form a
DAG. The division may organise more than one DAG if made necessary due to the
span of control, number of battalions available, and assigned missions. The DAG
can vary in size from two to four battalions. With as many as six to eight battalions, a
division would normally form two DAGs. The mission of the DAG is to provide FS for
the division. The DAG assists the army with the counter-battery mission; when
possible, it may perform this mission itself.
b. Brigade Artillery Group. The BrAG provides fire support to first echelon manoeuvre
brigades and battalions. A BrAG has artillery battalions from organic, attached and
supporting non-divisional artillery units. Normally, BrAGs have two to four artillery
battalions and, temporarily, the numerical designation of the supported brigade. The
BrAG destroys targets that hinder the advance of the attacking forces or supports
the defence of the brigade. After a successful penetration, usually during the
exploitation or pursuit phases, battalions of the BrAG may be directly subordinated
to leading manoeuvre battalions. In this case, the commander of the BrAG is able to
return the artillery battalions to central control, for example to defeat an enemy
counter-attack.
c.
9.8
Unit Artillery Groups. A BaAG consists of organic and attached artillery which acts in
direct support of the unit. Similarly, a combined arms battalion may be reinforced by
a medium artillery battalion in direct support.
Tactical Manoeuvre Detachments and Groups. Tactical manoeuvre detachments and
groups, which are operating semi-independently, will usually have an artillery battalion or
battery placed under command. Examples include forward, raiding, outflanking, air
assault and airmobile detachments and groups.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-4
9.9
Regrouping. Whenever possible, changing situations will be met by the manoeuvre of
fire from one axis to another. The MAF GF flexible communications, computer-assisted
decision-making and centralisation (as far as possible) of control make it possible to
mass fire on threatened sectors or opportunity targets regardless of unit or formation
boundaries. As combat becomes more fluid, actual artillery groupings will be altered in
line with the evolving nature of combat and the strengths and missions of supported
groupings. For instance, on the committal of a second echelon, artillery may be
detached from a ‘tired’ formation and used to reinforce the fresh one. The centralisation
of much logistic support at higher formation level makes the achievement of quite
substantial regroupings relatively quick and easy.
9.10
At brigade and above, an artillery officer responsible for planning and coordinating
artillery fires can usually be found on the staff of manoeuvre unit commanders. His title is
chief of artillery at brigade and division level and the commander of missile troops and
artillery (CMTA) at regional command, army and SG level. This officer controls, but does
not command, the artillery units organic or attached to his manoeuvre unit. The
commander of the organic or attached artillery unit commands and is directly responsible
for the performance of his unit. At manoeuvre battalion level, the commander of an
attached artillery sub-unit is the battalion commander’s FS coordinator. He advises the
commander on how best to use available FS assets.
9.11
In combat, the artillery groups form the framework for the control of artillery fires in the
division. Centralised decisions govern the employment of artillery. The divisional
commander, for example, exercises control over all organic and allocated artillery within
the division. He bases his decision on the recommendations of his chief of artillery. The
following procedures apply to this process:
a. The divisional commander specifies the artillery organisation for combat and the
tasks for the artillery.
b. The divisional chief of artillery conducts and coordinates fire planning.
c.
The DAG commanders report directly to the divisional chief of artillery.
d. BrAG commanders report directly to the supported manoeuvre brigade commander,
but retain contact with the divisional chief of artillery.
e. Artillery battery and battalion commanders keep their supported manoeuvre
commanders informed and report to their controlling artillery headquarters.
f.
9.12
The divisional chief of artillery coordinates targeting data with intelligence section
and the COR.
Command Relationships. The manoeuvre commander has operational control of an
attached artillery battalion or battery. The parent artillery organisation retains control of a
supporting artillery battalion or battery. It delegates its fires to a particular manoeuvre
force:
a. Attached. The divisional commander may attach an artillery battalion to a first
echelon manoeuvre battalion during a penetration, deep attack, meeting
engagement, or some defensive actions. The manoeuvre battalion commander
gives orders to an attached artillery battalion. He can allocate batteries to support his
manoeuvre companies. He may assign missions to the artillery units during critical
times: when they accompany the advance guard or forward detachment; when they
penetrate enemy defences; when they support the commitment of second echelon
forces; or, when they repel a counter-attack. If designated as attached, the artillery
battalion no longer belongs to an artillery group. This artillery battalion may support
both the manoeuvre battalion and brigade.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-5
b. Supporting. A supporting battalion remains subordinate to the parent artillery unit or
the artillery group. If a battalion in the BrAG has no brigade missions, it can fire
missions for the battalion that it supports. The manoeuvre battalion commander
cannot task its batteries separately to support his subordinate companies, even
though supporting, and supported commanders may be collocated. A supporting
artillery battalion carries out missions for the manoeuvre battalion only if the artillery
group commander permits or specifically directs the action.
9.13
Fire Plans. The fire plan of an attached battalion reflects the specific support of the
battalion to which it is attached. The fire plan of a supporting battalion reflects the tasks
of the parent manoeuvre force and its artillery group. The senior commander allocating
the artillery can change the mission of attached or supporting artillery during the course
of combat. The period of attachment normally covers the time required to accomplish a
particular tactical mission. This period could vary from a matter of hours to several days.
Coordination and Communications
9.14
The artillery commander is located near the commander of the manoeuvre unit he
supports and usually has face-to-face coordination. He can also enter the command net
of the supported unit. Artillery commanders retain rigid control of the deployment of
weapons and OPs, except when sub-units have special missions. This allows them to
provide continuous artillery support in all phases of combat.
9.15
Radio and wire are the primary means of MAF GF communication. MAF GF artillery
units also use messengers, visual and sound devices. Senior and supporting units
establish communication with subordinate and supported units. Radio is the primary
means in fluid combat situations. Wire is a backup mode and is especially important in
static combat. The MAF GF use wire communications whenever sub-units remain in one
location for any length of time, normally in AAs or defensive positions. To provide
redundancy, artillery wire nets parallel the wire nets of the supported units.
Fire Control
9.16
The MAF GF use an extensive system of OPs to provide FS to the manoeuvre forces.
These OPs are mobile to allow them to accompany rapidly moving forces. They may be
wheeled, tracked, or airborne. The configuration depends on the level of command and
the type of units. The most important types of OPs are:
a. Command Observation Posts. The COP serves as both an OP and CP. Since the
battalion is regarded as the basic fire unit, its COP is the place where decisions are
made and from which orders stem. The artillery commander locates the COP to
observe his zone or sector of fire. From it, he studies the target area and terrain,
follows the progress of friendly forces, and directs or coordinates artillery fires. In
most cases, the artillery commander collocates his COP with the forward CPs of the
supported manoeuvre unit commander. The COP normally contains the artillery
commander, and fire direction, communications, and reconnaissance personnel.
Both battalions and batteries have fire direction centres (FDCs) at the firing position.
The COP and the FDC conduct fire direction computations simultaneously. Often,
the succession of command is COP, FDC, and then per order or standing operating
procedures. The COPs and FDCs are mounted in tracked or wheeled ACRVs which
are equipped with:
(1) day/night observation and rangefinding equipment;
(2) topographic survey equipment;
(3) artillery fire direction computer equipment (manual and electronic); and
(4) communication equipment.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-6
b. Forward Observation Posts. Artillery commanders can establish one or more FOPs
to supplement the COP. At the battery and battalion levels, the FOPs contain the
intelligence officer (or headquarters platoon leader), a scout, and a radio man. An
FOP may be with the supported unit commander or with one of the advance
manoeuvre elements. The FOP assures continuous close FS for the manoeuvre
forces when the COP is displacing. The FOP will usually be mounted in a tracked
MRP vehicle which has a battlefield surveillance radar as well as observation and
rangefinding equipment. In the offence, the MRP may advance closely behind or
within lead mechanised or tank sub-units. They conduct reconnaissance and fire
missions on the move or during short halts. During a march, MRPs move as part of
an artillery RP in the forward security element of the supported mechanised or tank
unit. This single vehicle can perform reconnaissance and adjust artillery fire on
targets while located with these units. In the defence, MRPs may form part of the
combat outposts in the forward security zone.
c.
Lateral Observation Posts. The artillery commander may establish an LOP in order
to cover areas not observable from the CPs and FOPs. At battalion level and higher
artillery echelons, the LOP accurately locates targets, reference and registration
points, and can adjust fire. The LOP is usually on the flank of the supported unit and
should have a good view of the artillery sub-unit’s zone of responsibility. The artillery
sub-unit or the division’s artillery brigade may send reconnaissance and
communication personnel to form the LOP.
d. Dummy Observation Posts. The MAF GF use a dummy OP to confuse the enemy
about the actual position of the COP. After the commander establishes a functional
COP, scout observers construct a dummy COP. Dummy OPs simulate radio
antennas and other equipment to give the impression the position is occupied. They
normally have applications only in static situations.
Target Acquisition
9.17
Each MAF division has a target acquisition battery as part of the integral divisional
artillery regiment. This battery provides the division with a weapon locating and
surveillance capability. It is equipped with battlefield surveillance radars, countermortar/battery radars and sound ranging/acoustic sensor equipment.
9.18
In most cases, C2 of these assets will be retained at the divisional level. This is the
lowest level at which the counter-battery battle will usually be fought. In most cases, the
division will only fight the close counter-battery battle, concentrating on field artillery and
mortars. In exceptional cases, when brigades may be sent on independent tasks and
face a significant artillery threat, some target acquisition assets may be allocated to, or
grouped within that brigade. This is especially the case in relation to the MAF SOC,
where it is highly likely that some assets may even be grouped as low as to the company
level.
SECTION 9-2.
9.19
The Employment of Artillery. Artillery is regarded by the MAF GF as the main battle
winner. Artillery is employed in the following manner:
a. In the Offensive. In the offensive, artillery is the principal means by which an
advantageous force ratio can be achieved on chosen sectors, gaps can be blasted
through the defence, the enemy’s tactical reserves destroyed or disrupted and
counter-attacks repulsed. It is the effective action of artillery that is regarded as
primarily responsible for creating conditions in which tactical and subsequently
operational manoeuvre can be generated.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-7
b. In Defence. In the defence, artillery is the principal means by which the attacker’s
preparations are disrupted and any force that reaches or penetrates the forward
edge can be repulsed and counter-attacks executed successfully.
9.20
Growing Importance. If anything, the role of artillery has grown in significance as far as
the MAF GF are concerned. Fire superiority was always regarded as the precondition for
success in the attack, that is, the attacker had to be able to execute his fire missions
while reliably suppressing counter-fire. It was also the cornerstone of defence, even if it
could only be achieved for a limited time at the crucial point in the battle. In future war,
artillery will be restored to the sort of dominance it enjoyed before the large-scale
mechanisation of armies, thanks to its ability to locate and immediately destroy even
individual, moving armoured targets to depths of 70 kilometres and more (with MRLs) or
even hundreds of kilometres (with cruise or ballistic missiles). The outcome, not only of
battles but also operations, will be decided largely by which side gains and maintains
electronic fire superiority. In the tactical zone, the primary executors of this mission are
the missile troops and artillery, closely followed by EW and airpower. Tank, mechanised
and airmobile troops will make a significant, but still lesser contribution. Moreover, the
generation of tactical, and later operational, manoeuvre will depend on the reliable
suppression of an even higher proportion of the enemy’s direct fire weapons than before
as they, too, have gained in range, accuracy and lethality and thus in the ability of
relatively small groupings to stop and even destroy superior forces. Thus, to a significant
extent, tactical success will, in the future, depend on the operational commander’s
manoeuvring and concentration of the fire systems which he controls.
Fire Planning - Basics
9.21
General. Artillery fire is usually the basic means by which a favourable correlation of
forces is achieved for the attack. MAF GF scientifically calculate artillery requirements in
terms of the numbers of weapons and rounds needed to produce a given effect on
enemy targets. These norms are strictly adhered to. If insufficient artillery or ammunition
is available to achieve its necessary result, MAF GF will accept the imperative to engage
fewer targets, if necessary adjusting the tactical or even operational plan (for instance,
by narrowing an attack sector): alternatively, the artillery preparation may be prolonged
to take in more targets, or airpower may (weather permitting) be used to make good any
shortfall.
9.22
Definitions. MAF GF define various levels of effect that may be sought by
bombardment. The combined arms commander specifies the effect required and, on that
basis, the artillery commander calculates how many rounds have to be fired to achieve
it:
a. Harassing Fire. Harassing fire is used to inhibit manoeuvre or force the enemy to
move and thus provide targets for air attack and to damage enemy morale.
b. Neutralisation. Artillery fire at this level inflicts minimal damage but paralyses the
defence during, and for a very short time after the bombardment. This is the
minimum acceptable effect if an attack is to succeed. Fire has to be timed precisely
to see the attacking troops onto the defended position. MAF GF calculate that an
AFV crew will require only 30 seconds to recover from the effects of a bombardment
and an ATGM crew will need one to two minutes. Neutralising fire is usually
employed only against an enemy assessed to be weak and when insufficient time is
available to artillery reconnaissance to establish precisely the enemy’s positions.
Often, in such a case, an attack will be executed without the mechanised troops
dismounting, the artillery continuing to neutralise enemy infantry as it is overrun by
switching from HE to flechette rounds as the attackers arrive at the forward edge.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-8
c.
Suppression. Suppression is the effect achieved on a sub-unit by the infliction of
about 30 per cent casualties to men and equipment. It will render the target grouping
combat ineffective for a period of minutes to hours as the effect of the bombardment
on morale will render even the uninjured troops incapable of offering organised
resistance and C2 will be disrupted. MAF GF commanders will normally aim to
achieve at least suppression before subjecting even a hastily defended position to
attack by tank and mechanised troops.
d. Disruption. By inflicting 25 to 30 per cent casualties on an attacking force, MAF GF
believe that it will effectively break up an enemy attack.
e. Destruction. Destruction is, to all intents and purposes, achieved if 50 to 60 per cent
losses are suffered by an enemy grouping or 70 to 90 per cent of an individual
target. The target grouping will cease to exist as a fighting force for up to 24 hours
(depending on the state of its morale, availability of replacements, C2 restoration,
etc). Destruction is seen as the only worthwhile objective when engaging missile or
MRL units or, increasingly, artillery.
9.23
Expenditure Norms. Norms are established and adhered to for every conceivable
combination of target, desired effect, range and weapons used. Table 9–1 shows how
many HE rounds MAF GF consider necessary to suppress or destroy various targets.
The weight of ammunition required for several target types is colossal, though the
targets themselves are often small. For this reason, MAF GF prefer, wherever possible,
to engage point targets with precision munitions delivered by artillery or aircraft or by
direct fire from tanks, ATGM, anti-tank guns or howitzers. The norms can be reduced
significantly if advanced conventional munitions (ACMs) are employed. Cluster
munitions will lower them by a factor of three to six, depending on the nature of the
target. With laser guided rounds, they can be reduced by a factor of 10, and with carrier
munitions with terminally guided sub-munitions (TGSMs), by a factor of 15.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-9
Table 9–1:
Serial
High Explosive Ammunition Expenditure Norms Against Unobserved, Stationary Targets at 10 Kilometres or Less
Target
Required
Effect
Guns and Howitzers
Mortars
MRLs
(a)
(b)
(c)
122
mm
(d)
1.
Missile Launcher
Destruction
300
280
200
70
-
-
140
360
200
2.
Battery of armd SP guns (mortars)
Suppression
450
360
270
70
-
450
220
400
240
3.
Battery of towed guns (mortars)
when dug in
Suppression
240
220
180
100
400
240
160
320
180
4.
Unarmoured SP Guns
Suppression
310
260
260
115
-
300
290
440
210
5.
Battery of towed guns (mortars) in
the open
Suppression
90
80
60
30
180
90
40
120
60
6.
SAM battery
Suppression
150
150
100
60
-
-
-
200
100
7.
Signals and radar vans in the open
Suppression
200
200
150
60
-
200
100
240
100
8.
Troops in prepared strong point
Suppression of
1 hectare of
target
200
200
150
60
-
200
100
240
100
9.
Troops in hastily prepared
defensive position, tanks and
APCs
Suppression of
1 hectare of
target
150
150
110
45
300
140
85
180
80
10.
Troops in assembly area in the
open
Suppression of
1 hectare of
target
20
20
15
5
35
10
8
8
5
11.
Dug in CP with overhead cover
Suppression of
1 hectare of
target
200
200
150
60
-
200
100
240
100
12.
CP in the open, or vehicle
mounted
Suppression of
1 hectare of
target
50
50
40
15
-
25
20
20
15
13.
AT GM, anti-tank gun or other
individual target in the open
Suppression
140
140
100
50
240
140
80
-
-
130
mm
(e)
152
mm
(f)
203
mm
(g)
82
mm
(h)
120
mm
(i)
160
mm
(j)
Medium
Calibre
(k)
Large
Calibre
(l)
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-10
9.24
Size of Target. Table 9–2 sets out the size of target area that can be engaged
effectively by various fire units. Such concentrations are used to neutralise enemy
positions in the attack, to break up troop concentrations, and to disorganise attacking
infantry and tanks in the defence.
Table 9–2:
Serial
Maximum Effective Dimensions of Artillery Fire Concentrations in
Hectares
Fire unit
Tanks and
APCs
10 mins or
1 rocket
salvo
(c)
Troops,
equipment
in the open
3-4 mins or
1 rocket salvo
(d)
Troops, Equipment Under Cover
5
mins
10
mins
15
mins
20
mins
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(a)
(b)
1.
120 mm Mortar
Battery
1-2
15
1
1-2
2
2-3
2.
122 mm / 152
mm Howitzer
Battalion
5-6
18
3-4
5-6
7-8
9
3.
130 mm Gun
Battalion
3-4
15
2
3-4
4-5
5-6
4.
BM-21 Battalion
3-4
60
3-4
Note:
1.
9.25
6-8
A battalion concentration can cover three to 12 hectares, but an average concentration covers six hectares
in a 200 x 300 metre rectangle. This figure is used for calculating when producing quick fire plans in a
rapidly changing situation.
Density of Fire. The MAF GF are not concerned merely with delivering the prescribed
number of rounds to the target. They recognise that, in contemporary conditions, the
density of fire is important (ie, the number of rounds per minute landing on each
hectare). In several circumstances, a high density of fire, 24 to 30 rounds per minute
per hectare minimum, is desirable, for the following reasons:
a. Surprise. The first salvo is the most destructive and should therefore be heavy.
The MAF GF believe that the greatest morale and material returns are achieved in
the first three to five minutes of any fire mission, and one third to one half of the
ammunition allocated to the target should be fired in that time. The burst fire
capability of 2S-19 and MRLs is particularly valued for this reason. For instance
the SMERCH is capable of launching all rockets within 38 seconds.
b. Accuracy. Even in a mobile, fast developing battle, where detailed survey
becomes impossible, accurate fire can still be delivered thanks to the combined
use of satellite navigation, laser rangefinders and computerised fire control. These
systems also avoid the loss of time and of surprise in executing fire strikes by
doing away with the requirement for adjustment. If satellite navigation fails and
time constraints preclude detailed survey, the MAF GF recognise the need for a
high density of fire to compensate for subsequent inaccuracy.
c.
Armoured, Mobile Targets. Tanks and APCs or self-propelled guns can simply
motor out of a fire concentration in two to three minutes. Therefore the required
number of rounds to suppress or destroy a target must be delivered in less than
that time.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-11
d. Enemy Counter-battery. Artillery may be located in as little as one to two minutes
after opening fire, and enemy counter-battery fire can be brought down in a further
two to three minutes. Short engagements will reduce MAF GF vulnerability by
allowing timely changes to fire positions.
e. Meeting Battles. In a fast developing meeting battle, there will only be a short time
available for artillery preparation before the manoeuvre troops close with the
enemy.
9.26
Rates of Fire. To achieve the required density of fire within an acceptable time scale,
sufficient artillery must be allocated to the mission. It is rare, using traditional
munitions, that this can be achieved by a single battery. This has led MAF GF artillery
to make the battalion the basic fire unit. Some targets will need to be serviced by even
more than a battalion. It is necessary to combine the data in tables 9–1 and 9–2 with
that in table 9–3, which deals with rates of fire, to calculate the artillery concentration
required to deal with a target. With modern computerised fire control however, it is
possible to service a target needing, for example, 21 howitzers firing for no more than
five minutes (for example, a self-propelled battery 15 kilometres distant) by tasking
weapons from several battalions. This would have the advantage of confusing enemy
locaters and reducing the effectiveness of counter-bombardment. It would also
optimise artillery usage, as appropriate howitzers could be selected on the basis of
such factors as known barrel wear, need for barrel cooling and ammunition availability
with each weapon.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-12
Table 9–3:
Serial
(a)
Duration
of Fire
(Minutes)
(b)
120 mm Mortar
Large
bomb
(c)
Small
bomb
(d)
122 mm Howitzer
Charge
Maximum Permitted Rates of Fire
152 mm Howitzer
Charge
152 mm Gun/
Howitzer Charge
Full
Red
Full
Red
Full
Red
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
2
2
203 mm
Gun, all
Charge
MRL Salvoes
1
(k)
122
mm
(l)
220
mm
(m)
300
mm
(n)
1
1
1
1.
1
9
9
6
6
4
4
4
4
1
2.
3
25
25
16
16
12
12
12
12
2
3.
5
30
30
25
25
20
20
20
20
3
4.
10
35
35
40
40
30
30
30
30
6
5.
15
40
40
55
55
40
40
40
40
9
6.
20
65
70
50
50
50
50
12
7.
25
70
80
60
60
55
60
15
8.
30
75
90
65
70
65
70
18
4
9.
40
85
110
75
90
70
80
22
3
10.
50
90
130
80
105
80
95
26
5
11.
60
70
105
100
150
90
120
85
110
30
6
4
3
12.
120
110
165
150
260
135
210
120
200
60
8
6
5
Notes:
1.
2.
50
75
Calculations based purely on reload times. As MRLs usually relocate immediately after firing, travel time will normally have to be added.
The 2S-19 can fire 8 rounds in the first minute as it has a burst fire capability.
2
3
2
2
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-13
9.27
Precision Munitions. The neutralisation and suppression of area targets will, in the
MAF GF view, still be the most common mission of artillery, thanks to enemy
camouflage and concealment measures, mobility and the frequent lack of time or
means for detailed, in-depth reconnaissance, not to mention the limited supply of
precision munitions due to cost considerations. However, the revolution in military
affairs has given missile and artillery troops the additional capability of engaging group
or point, hard, mobile targets with precision weapons which have a 70 to 90 per cent
probability of destroying the target.
a. Laser-guided Munitions. All artillery over 100 mm calibre can now fire semi-active
laser-homing rounds. These are used to destroy armoured vehicles and other
point targets quickly, economically and with a high level of certainty (70 per cent).
Maximum ranges are, respectively: 152 mm, 18 kilometres; 122 mm, 10
kilometres; 120 mm howitzer/mortar, 7.5 kilometres; 120 mm mortars, four
kilometres. The main limitation on their use is the need to illuminate the target with
a laser target designator (LTD) whose range is only seven kilometres. The
restricted range of the LTD and the low rate of fire consequent on conducting only
one engagement at a time with each LTD are among problems partly overcome by
the widespread issue of LTDs. Each reconnaissance platoon has one, as does
each artillery OP, each mechanised company (in the commander’s vehicle) and all
attack and observation helicopters. There may be a reserve pool held in each unit
to equip RPs, air-landing units and others in need. It is possible that tactical
drones are being equipped with a smaller version in addition to their normal
sensors.
b. Terminally-guided Sub-munitions. SSMs, cruise missiles and artillery (152/155
mm, 220 mm and 300 mm) can now deliver carrier warheads which release a
number of TGSMs over a group target such as a column or concentration of AFVs.
These TGSMs then home in on individual vehicles using millimetric wave and/or
IR terminal guidance.
9.28
Advanced Conventional Munitions. Seven other types of ACM have been identified
in the MAF GF arsenal:
a. Concrete Penetrating Sub-munitions. Concrete penetrating sub-munitions can be
delivered by missiles. They are primarily used for airfield denial. Shells for 152 mm
and 203 mm artillery are also available for destroying fixed fortifications and
demolishing other concrete structures such as motorway bridges or buildings.
b. Volumetric Warheads. Volumetric warheads can be delivered by missiles, artillery
of 152 mm calibre or over or large MRLs (Uragan and Smerch). These are
employed against buildings, field fortifications, large group targets, airfield
installations and any other target vulnerable to a blast wave of minor-nuclear
force. Volumetric warheads are also used for rapid minefield clearing.
c.
Cluster Munitions. Cluster munitions were developed before TGSMs for use in
missiles and large rocket artillery. These remain a mainstay of the inventory and
will continue to be so as TGSMs are too expensive to be used freely. The large
beaten zone of unguided sub-munitions (both anti-tank and anti-personnel) makes
them highly effective area suppression systems for use against such targets as
missile launch sites, aircraft in the open, headquarters, deployed artillery, logistics
installations, concentration areas and strong points. As the Circular Error of
Probability (CEP) of rocket carriers is normally about 0.5 per cent of range,
Uragan and Smerch have rockets with cluster munitions that can be given mid and
late flight guidance by artillery locating radars to ensure high accuracy at long
ranges.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-14
d. Anti-radiation Missiles. Both Uragan and Smerch can deliver anti-radiation
missiles to destroy enemy radars, especially those linked to air defence and
artillery locaters.
e. Remote Jammers. All MRLs and artillery of 122 mm or greater calibre can deliver
carrier munitions which dispense varying numbers of VHF and HF
communications jammers over a wide area. These are used to disrupt
communications within dispersed artillery positions, concentration areas, etc
through barrage jamming lasting up to one hour.
f.
Electromagnetic Pulse. Artillery of 152 mm or greater calibre or large MRLs can
deliver a round which will create a localised electromagnetic pulse (EMP). This is
used to disrupt communications within dispersed artillery positions, defended
areas, troop concentrations, etc.
g. Chaff Munitions. All guns and MRLs can deliver chaff to jam all types of enemy
radar. This is especially important in suppressing enemy air defences where
actual destruction is not possible.
9.29
Reconnaissance Strike/Fire Complexes. The development which has wrought the
most far-reaching change in the nature of the future battlefield, has been the
development of the RSC and the RFC. Each type of complex comprises four main,
interconnected
components:
a
dedicated
reconnaissance
and
target
acquisition/vectoring (RTAV) system with a multiplicity of sensors (optical, IR, radar,
magnetic, acoustic and radio/radar DF and intercept) and secure down links with a
large capacity; a mobile, automated intelligence fusion and fire direction centre and
dedicated precision weapons systems. Given real-time reconnaissance/ target data,
automated processing of the rapid stream of data and an up-to-date set of target
priorities based on the operational/tactical situation, commanders can engage the
most important elements of an enemy grouping in near real-time and verify the
effectiveness of fire strikes.
9.30
RSCs are formed to engage targets at the operational and operational/tactical levels.
The RTAV systems include satellites, small, low radar signature (i.e., survivable)
RPVs with long endurance, manned aircraft that can look deep from the safety of
friendly airspace and long-range RPs. Fire means include SSMs, cruise missiles and
stand-off weapons launched by aircraft. The strength and composition of each
complex will vary according to the operational situation and the demands likely to be
made on it, but dedicated systems (with a measure of redundancy) are required to
ensure that vital targets are not left unserviced because the means are otherwise
employed. The dimensions of the reconnaissance strike area will correspond with the
zone of detailed reconnaissance and deep fire destruction of the parent formation.
9.31
RFCs are formed to engage targets in the tactical zone. The RTAV systems include
shorter range RPVs, ground-based radars and radio/radar DF and intercept, EW
helicopters and long-range RPs. Fire means include MRLs, long-range artillery and
possibly aviation. As with the RSC, strength and composition will depend on
circumstances and the area covered by the RFC will be that of the parent formation’s
zone of detailed reconnaissance and deep fire destruction.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-15
9.32
Combating Enemy Precision Weapons. Finding technical and tactical solutions to
this problem is MAF GF’s highest priority. Precision weapons are information
dependent: they need very accurate, timely information on the nature and location of
the target, the terrain and atmospheric conditions. Effectiveness depends on the
‘normality’ of the position and state of each precision weapon’s sub-systems, each
target and the environment in the location of the weapons system, the warhead’s flight
path and the target. Thus, it is possible to disrupt strikes by physically attacking
system components; inflicting electronic disruption; denying reconnaissance accurate
information about target locations; disrupting the normal state of the atmosphere in the
area of the flight path of carrier munitions and TGSMs; influencing sub-systems
controlling navigation, precise timing and meteorological support and automatic
control. Therefore, combating precision weapons is a multi-measure business
consisting of consecutive and simultaneous, joint and separate actions by formations,
units and sub-units. Countering precision attack takes place in four areas:
a. Physical Attacks. Physical attacks are conducted on: associated reconnaissance
sub-systems; command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) centres;
delivery means (including both launchers and ‘carrier’ munitions); elements of
navigation, precise time and meteorological support; munitions depots and
deployment routes.
b. Electronic Attack. EA is effected on information sub-systems and channels for the
passage of reconnaissance data, navigation and precise time and meteorological
support and C3I.
c.
Concealment. Concealment of the locations and movements of friendly troops,
deception of the enemy through the use of dummies and disinformation, combined
with dispersion and manoeuvre to avoid likely strikes is essential.
d. Collective Protection. Collective protection of friendly troops to destroy or deflect
guided munitions as they approach the target (for example, through the use of
automatically triggered directional grenades or decoys, for instance, in tank
defensive aid suites, or, in the near future perhaps, the employment of a plasma
weapon to ionise highly the air through which incoming missiles must fly, thus
causing them to malfunction)is also essential.
Remote Mining
9.33
General. MAF GF place great stress on remote mining by both aircraft (fixed wing and
RW) and by artillery. Its great range, speed of obstacle creation, flexibility and (in the
latter case) responsiveness at short notice make it an essential tool in defence and
one of great value in the offensive. The casualties inflicted by the mines themselves
are generally considered less important than the disruption and delay they cause. This
is particularly the case where the enemy can be held in a fire pocket or other location
when he can be hit by air or artillery strikes. Often as significant is the disruption to the
enemy’s scheme of manoeuvre and timetables. The late arrival of, for instance, a
second echelon or an outflanking detachment may mean that the enemy can be
defeated in detail.
9.34
Capabilities. Remotely delivered mine (RDM) munitions have been fielded for
operational and operational-tactical missiles for deep strikes. At the tactical level, they
can be delivered either by 152 mm or larger calibre guns or howitzers or by MRLs.
The latter are, however, the principal delivery means because of their range
(especially the Uragan and Smerch systems) and their greater payload and beaten
zones, not to mention the speed with which they can carpet large areas with mines.
RDM munitions include:
a. Mines. Remotely delivered mines known to be in service include:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-16
(1) Anti-personnel. The artillery delivered antipersonnel mine (PFM) is a plastic,
pressure-operated mine which self destructs after up to 24 hours. The POM2S is a tripwire operated fragmentation mine with a tripwire length and lethal
radius of 10 metres, also designed to self-destruct after a period of up to 24
hours.
(2) Anti-tank. The PGMDM is a plastic, track-attack mine which can be set to selfdestruct in up to 24 hours. The PTM-3S is a magnetic influenced mine of the
second generation which can be set to self-destruct in up to 24 hours.
b. Tube Artillery. The standard 152 mm RDM round contains nine anti-tank or 36
anti-personnel mines. The area covered by a single salvo from a battalion of 18
weapons is 525 x 375 metres.
c.
Multiple Rocket Launchers. A 122 mm rocket can carry six anti-tank or 24 antipersonnel mines and a 9P140 ‘Uragan’ rocket can carry 24 anti-tank or 312 antipersonnel mines. The beaten zone of battery and battalion fire missions of each is
detailed in table 9–4. Corresponding figures are not available for the 9A52
‘Smerch’.
Table 9–4:
Planning Dimensions of Remote Anti-tank Minefields Laid by BM-21 and
9P140 Multiple Rocket Launchers
Serial
Dimension
(a)
(b)
BM-21
(c)
9P140
(d)
BM-21
(e)
9P140
(f)
1.
Width (m)
1 200
4 000
3 500
12 000
2.
Depth (m)
300
500
300
500
3.
Area (ha)
36
200
105
600
Note:
1.
9.35
Battery
Battalion
A BM-21 battery comprises six weapons and a battalion 18: the 9P140 counterparts are eight and 24.
Types and Use of Remote Minefields. The manoeuvre of obstacles is used both to
create barriers to enemy manoeuvre and to pin forces in place and inflict disruption. In
the first case, mines are delivered in front of the enemy in the direction in which his
progress is undesirable. In the second, they are laid actually onto his troops to prevent
further movement save at a cost in either casualties if he drives through or time if he
stops to clear lanes. Each technique has several applications:
a. Barrier Minefields. Barrier minefields are created on actual or potential avenues of
advance, withdrawal or redeployment to inflict delay; hamper a passage of lines;
hinder deployment into pre-battle or battle formation; disrupt the enemy’s entry
into combat; close passages already created through obstacles; close gaps in
deployment; build up obstacles in a penetration sector; prevent the enemy’s
widening of a penetration to the flanks; protect boundaries; cover the manoeuvre
of friendly forces (especially during counter-attacks or withdrawal); or seal off the
area of an air-landing.
b. Pinning Minefields. Pinning minefields are used to: delay or prevent the movement
of columns (particularly of second echelons, reserves or outflanking, forward or
raiding detachments); disrupt an attack or counter-attack, strike the enemy just
before or even after he is within effective range of direct fire weapons; close
breaches driven through the obstacle system; disrupt the work of CPs, logistics
facilities, helicopter forward operating sites or gun positions; prevent the relocation
of artillery or of manoeuvre forces which are to be subject to air or long-range
artillery attack; prevent air-landing forces from moving immediately against their
objective and win time (half an hour to an hour) for the anti-landing reserve to
mount a counter-attack.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-17
Fire Planning in the Attack
9.36
General. The fire planning process includes target acquisition, combat organisation,
the assignment of missions, determination of ammunition requirements and the
formulation of a detailed fire plan. This plan is coordinated and approved at the level of
the highest participating formation. Thus, in an army attack, the army commander will
lay down timings and specify the engagement priorities. His CMTA will allocate
targets, timings and communications to the AAG and DAGs. With the fire units, time
and ammunition remaining, the divisional commanders and their division CMTAs will
apportion tasks to their DAGs and BrAGS. Brigade commanders may then use what is
left for targets of purely brigade interest.
9.37
Priorities. The priority given to each target will obviously vary according to the stage
of the battle. Thus, for instance, enemy reserves will be a high priority at the time of
committal of a second echelon. The approximate order of importance is, however:
a. precision delivery means and associated C2;
b. conventional artillery, air defence systems and mortars;
c.
defensive strong points, especially ATGMs and tanks within them;
d. CPs, OPs, communications and radar facilities; and
e. reserves, logistic support units and routes used by the units moving up to counterattack.
9.38
Phases of Fire Support. The aim is to crush the enemy through the conduct of an
‘artillery offensive’, the continuous supporting fire of artillery through the entire depth of
the defence. The duration of this will vary with circumstances. There are four stages in
the FS of a penetration and breakthrough from the march. Each phase may be
repeated for the committal of a subsequent echelon:
a. Fire Support of the Advance from the Depth. This phase lasts from the attacking
formation’s departure from its waiting area until its arrival on its line of deployment.
It may last over an hour. During this period, air, missile and long-range artillery
attacks are carried out against enemy air defences, surveillance means, precision
weapons, artillery and aircraft on their bases (including helicopters and EW and
reconnaissance means). The aim is to protect the advancing columns by
destroying or harassing enemy systems that could interfere. Artillery fire for this
phase is likely to be conducted largely from temporary fire positions, with the
artillery shifting to its main positions for the preparatory phase.
b. Preparation. The preparation phase begins when the attacking force deploys into
battalion columns and lasts until it arrives at the enemy’s forward positions. It thus
lasts up to 40 to 50 minutes, or less in an attack from a position of close contact.
MAF GF do not favour long preparations as they compromise surprise and give
the enemy time to carry out counter-measures. If enough artillery and/or ACMs are
available, giving a high density of fire, the preparation should be as little as 20 to
25 minutes. Electronic fire superiority should already have been established in
phase one, but aviation will continue to suppress enemy artillery, air and EW
assets in phase two. The artillery will shift the focus of its fire to enemy forward
positions, then to immediate reserves, then back to forward positions again. All
known or suspected strong points, anti-tank weapons, OPs, radars and EW sites
will be suppressed and enemy C2 disrupted. The use of precision, cluster and
volumetric munitions will greatly reduce the weight of ammunition and time
required while still ensuring the adequate servicing of all targets: volumetric
munitions are seen to be particularly effective against field fortifications. Although
the preparation period usually lasts for 40 to 50 minutes, ideally all the artillery will
not be firing for the whole period. There will be a series of bombardments, the first
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-18
and last being the most powerful, with pauses for batteries to alter their gun
positions to avoid enemy counter-bombardment (CB). Ideally, for this reason,
individual fire missions should not last for more than five minutes (possibly less if
enemy artillery has been thoroughly suppressed), possibly with air attacks filling
any significant gaps, though problems of coordination and target acquisition in the
dust and smoke created by artillery fire will limit the effectiveness of aviation.
c.
Support. The support phase begins as the assault troops deploy into battle
formation. It is considered vital that the enemy does not identify the transition from
preparatory to support phases, alerting him to the need to fully man fire positions
and unleash defensive fires. To conceal the imminence of the assaulting troops’
arrival on the enemy’s forward edge while still continuing to suppress the enemy,
artillery may switch for the last salvo or two to flechette rounds which will not
endanger the leading tanks. It continues until they have fought through the first
echelon brigade’s defences. In this phase, first priority goes to maintaining fire
superiority. To assist the advance forward, fire is preplanned on sequential lines
moving progressively deeper into the enemy’s deployment, and to the flanks of the
advance. Great stress is placed on the continuity of support, making sure that the
fire of the artillery and the advance of the manoeuvre troops do not get out of
phase.
d. Accompaniment. This phase begins when the enemy’s forward brigades have
been bypassed or penetrated and continues until the formation’s mission is
accomplished. It is a phase of greater manoeuvre, characterised by meeting
battles, attacks off the line of march to penetrate defended lines in depth, the
repulse of counter-attacks and the support of heliborne landings. Artillery units will
have to displace more frequently, moving forward with the units they are
supporting. In this phase, artillery is expected to show considerable flexibility in
manoeuvring its fire and in shifting units onto the most critical sector, for example
to support the committal of a second echelon. There must be close cooperation
between the gunners and army aviation, on whom much of the FS burden will fall
in this phase as much of the artillery will, at any time, be either moving or out of
effective range and thus unable to support attacks during a rapid advance.
Because MAF GF see the future battlefield as being highly dynamic, characterised
by great mobility and meeting engagements/ battles, accompaniment will, in fact,
be the normal form of artillery support. MRLs are seen as being particularly
valuable in fast moving actions. Thanks to their ability to deliver a heavy weight of
fire in a matter of seconds (14.1 tonnes of HE can be put down by a BM-21
battalion in 20 seconds), they are very suitable for engaging mobile armoured
targets or for CB. The long-range ACMs and RDMs of 9P140 and 9A52 are an
important addition to MAF GF artillery’s ability to support a rapidly developing
battle.
9.39
Types of Fire Support. Artillery offers several forms of FS to attacking troops. The
techniques are not, of course mutually exclusive. A combination of three or four is
likely:
a. Fire Against an Individual Target. Fire against an individual target involves firing
on separate targets such as an ATGM, OP, radar post, or weapon emplacement.
A battery can engage up to two such point targets simultaneously.
b. Concentration of Fire. Concentration of fire (CF) is the fire of several batteries or
even battalions on a single area target. It is used against precision weapons,
strong points, CPs, OPs, artillery and mortar positions and enemy columns.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-19
c.
Successive Concentrations of Fire. The normal form of artillery support in the
attack is lines of successive concentrations of fire (SCFs) to the front and flanks of
the advancing troops. On each line of SCF an artillery battalion is given either one
group target (for example, a platoon strong point) or two to three individual targets
(for example, ATGM). Given that anti-tank weapons are deployed in great depth, it
is considered desirable to fire on two or even three lines simultaneously. SCFs are
on call, as are their transfer to subsequent lines, enabling supporting artillery to
react flexibly to differing rates of advance within the attacking formation.
d. Moving Barrage. The use of SCFs is appropriate against strong point defence. If
the enemy has created a fortified area, or even a thick network of trenches,
making it difficult to locate the exact position of strong points, a barrage is seen to
be the most reliable support for a breakthrough. The moving barrage is a
continuous curtain of fire successively switched from bound to bound immediately
in front of the attacking troops. It may be single or double, depending on the
strength of the defence and availability of artillery. Main and intermediate lines are
nominated. The distance between them depends on the nature of the defence and
the expected rate of advance, but it is usually 300 to 1 000 metres between main
and 100 to 300 metres between intermediate lines. The switching of fire from one
main line to the next occurs on the order of the commander of the supported
manoeuvre unit, and from one intermediate line to the next on the order of
individual artillery battalion commanders on the basis of their observation of
progress in their sector (on average, after two to three minutes).
e. Massed Fire. Massed fire is the concentration of the bulk or all of available artillery
of a lower or even higher formation to destroy a large grouping in a short period of
time (for example, an enemy FUP or AA). This is planned at formation level only.
f.
9.40
Direct Fire. Fire over open sights is considered economical in ammunition terms
and at the same time gives a better guarantee of the destruction of point targets
than indirect fire. This role is not limited to tanks, ATGM and other traditional direct
fire weapons. Often substantial numbers of guns may be used in this way,
particularly against structures which require large rounds for their demolition.
Typical Fire Plan. This example of a typical fire plan is based on a division conducting
a penetration battle. The enemy’s covering forces have been destroyed or driven back
and the troops in contact have established that the division faces the better part of a
brigade at about 70 to 80 per cent, dug-in in a hasty strong point type of defence.
Intensive reconnaissance has revealed the alignment of the defence and has
pinpointed many targets in the depth as well as in forward positions. Meanwhile, the
artillery to support the attack has deployed: the division has been reinforced by three
battalions and an AAG, and an AGRA of four battalions each is in general support.
During the night, the division has moved up, its advance from the depth being covered
by air and long-range artillery strikes on enemy airfields, helicopter forward operating
sites, precision weapons and other long-range artillery, EW sites, radars and air
defences.
a. Preparation. The first echelon regiments will move forward from a waiting area 20
kilometres from the line of contact, deploying into battalion columns at a distance
of 12 kilometres, into company columns at five kilometres and into platoon
columns at two kilometres. The advance and deployment into battle order will take
50 minutes. During this period, a preparation will be fired as follows:
(1) H-50 to H-45. A sudden heavy series of fire strikes against all identified strong
points, artillery and mortar positions, CPs, OPs, radars, EW sites and air
defences will occur at H-50 to H-45 (Troops in contact prepare for
reconnaissance by battle and assault troops deploy into battalion columns.).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-20
(2) H-45 to H-30. Systematic attacks on all identified elements of the enemy first
echelon battalions, to be followed by reconnaissance/raids by platoons of the
units on the LC occur at H-45 to H-30. Air attacks are conducted on enemy
artillery responding.
(3) H-30 to H-24. Intense CB effort characterises H-30 to H-24 (Tank and
mechanised troops will be deploying into company columns. Troops in
contact will conduct reconnaissance by battle, probing for weak spots or any
sign that the enemy is trying to withdraw.).
(4) H-24 to H-16. H-24 to H-16 sees systematic attacks on enemy depth
defences, reserves and air defenders. Meanwhile, fire planning for the
support phase is revised in light of the results of reconnaissance by battle.
(5) H-16 to H-11. CB and attacks on C2 occur from H-16 to H-11 (Tank and
mechanised troops will be deploying into platoon columns. Reconnaissance
by battle is ended and troops so engaged consolidate any gains or withdraw
where repulsed.).
(6) H-11 to H hour. H-11 to H-hour is greeted by intense fire on forward
defending companies and anti-tank weapons (Assault troops deploy into
battle formation.).
b. Support. Support past H-hour involves:
(1) H-hour to H+25. H-hour to H+25 sees SCFs in a timed program to the depth
of forward defending companies and CB.
(2) H+25 to H+50-60. SCFs are on call to depth of forward enemy battalions from
H+25 to H+50-60. Defensive fires are on call to meet counter-attacks (see
below).
(3) Planned Variant. The above fire plan will be executed if the enemy remains in
place to conduct a positional defence. If however reconnaissance, conducted
either during the FS for the advance from the depth or in phases 2 to 3 of the
preparation, reveals that the enemy is preparing to withdraw and practise
manoeuvre defence, an alternative, pre-prepared fire plan will be employed.
c.
Avoidance of Stereotype. While the above fire plan is described as ‘typical’, it must
be remembered that MAF GF stress the need to avoid stereotypical plans in the
interests of surprise. Thus, for example, false shifts of fire or the use of flechette
rounds to allow FS to overlap the beginning of an assault are but two possible
variations on a theme.
Artillery in Defence
9.41
General. Great stress is placed on the integration of artillery, air, anti-tank and EW
assets into an overall defensive fire plan. Several variations of the plan are produced,
based on the various approach and deployment options open to the enemy. It is
recognised that, in the attack, the enemy is likely to enjoy superior FS. It is thus
particularly important to manoeuvre massed fire-power against key groupings at the
crucial moment and not dissipate resources. FS is planned in five phases, the first two
being of an operational and operational-tactical nature and planned at SG and
army/regional levels respectively. These are:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-21
a. Fire on Distant Approaches. Fire on distant approaches is denial of movement and
deployment of enemy forces. This is carried out by fixed wing aviation, SSMs and
long-range artillery using both precision and conventional munitions. Where
possible, enemy units are destroyed as they move up, but if target intelligence is
inadequate, disruption and delay will be inflicted by creating barriers of RDMs. To
ensure maximum reach into the enemy’s depth, long-range systems and SSMs
(including RSCs and RFCs) will initially deploy as far forward as the security zone.
If the defensive is adopted when already in contact with the enemy, this phase will
concentrate on the enemy’s second echelon. Throughout the period prior to the
enemy’s attack, considerable attention is paid to denying the enemy good target
intelligence for his preparation by the maintenance of strict radio silence and the
destruction, by specially chosen anti-tank systems firing from temporary fire
positions, of enemy reconnaissance vehicles. As much of the artillery as possible
will remain silent until needed to repulse a major attack, and batteries used prior to
the main enemy blow failing will fire from temporary fire positions or be used as
roving batteries to confuse enemy artillery intelligence.
b. Counter-preparation. This desirable operational-tactical blow is part of the first
phase, being designed to disrupt the enemy’s deployment and preparation for his
attack. It employs all available weapons. The aim is to anticipate the enemy’s
preparatory bombardment by a few minutes. The intelligence necessary to
achieve this is not, of course, easy to acquire, and the time required to organise it
may well be lacking (i.e., 68 hours at army or regional level). Commanders will be
faced with a difficult decision. When accomplished successfully, however, it can
be devastatingly effective. Artillery is best used to hit enemy tank and infantry
concentrations forming up for the attack, though CB is not neglected. Meanwhile,
air attacks are launched against enemy air bases, helicopters, vertical short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) forward operating sites and artillery.
c.
Support of the Battle for the Forward Edge. Artillery repulsion of the attack is the
second phase of the defence. Given that this phase is largely tactical in nature,
most artillery assets will be controlled by the forward divisions. AAGs/AGRAs and
regional equivalents will still be held, however, for CB and to give the
army/regional commander the means to switch support quickly from one axis to
another and to support higher formation counter-attacks. Army aviation resources
will also remain under army/regional command direction to continue hitting depth
targets and to provide a flexible fire-power reserve that can be quickly
manoeuvred to meet dangerous developments. DAGs/regional equivalents and
(where formed) BrAGs will endeavour to break up attacks and split armour from
the infantry with pre-planned linear and box concentrations both in front of forward
edge positions and minefields, in gaps between strong points, and eventually in
depth. Generally, guns and MRLs will start to engage the enemy 25 to 30
kilometres from the LC and howitzers will open fire when the enemy is 15 to 20
kilometres distant. Short but intense fire strikes, no more than five minutes in
duration, are effected, and will be followed by displacement to nearby alternative
fire positions to avoid counter-battery fire.
d. Support for Defending Troops in Their Depth. The enemy is expected to penetrate
the defence, but to pay an appropriate price and be canalised. The artillery will
support defensive positions in depth, separate enemy infantry from armour and
fighting troops from their logistic support and create disruption. If necessary,
artillery may even be used in the direct fire role as a backstop against armoured
penetrations. Generally, artillery plays a key role in creating suitable conditions for
the launching of a counter-attack (strike).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-22
e. Support for Counter Blows. A density of at least 50 to 60 weapons per kilometre
will be necessary to ensure the success of a counter blow, and the preparation will
last at least 30 to 40 minutes. Artillery will require two hours for preparation,
including one of daylight. This factor, and the time required to move second
echelon artillery forward, must be taken into account in planning.
9.42
Fire Planning. Artillery and aviation FS in defence are planned to accomplish the
following, in rough order of priority/order of occurrence:
a. an SG counter-preparation is normally fired on the junction of two armies/ regional
commands, using the assets of both. It is conducted on a sector 20 to 25
kilometres wide with a density of 40 to 50 weapons per kilometre to a depth of 25
to 30 kilometres (including air strikes). Normally, three to four fire strikes will be
delivered in a period of 25 to 30 minutes;
b. an army or regional command counter-preparation is executed on a 10 to 15
kilometres sector with a density of 30 to 40 weapons per kilometre to a depth of 10
to 15 kilometres (or 25 to 30 kilometres if airpower is made available). It, too, will
last 25 to 30 minutes;
c.
destruction of enemy precision weapons and their C3I;
d. destruction of aviation on airfields and destruction, or at least neutralisation, of
enemy artillery. This includes use of smoke to blind enemy OPs and fire units;
e. disruption of C2;
f.
support for covering forces in the security zone;
g. neutralisation or disruption of enemy march columns, concentrations and units
deploying to attack;
h. defensive fire to protect forward units, cover gaps or halt units which have
achieved a penetration;
9.43
i.
support for counter-attacks;
j.
remote mining of terrain, or of breaches in obstacles. Battlefield illumination at
night; and
k.
destruction or remote mining of logistic dumps.
Types of Defensive Fire. The following are three types of defensive fire peculiar to
the defence. Standard concentrations and massed fire may be employed as well.
a. Standing Barrage. Standing barrages (SBs) are established in the open, where the
enemy can be seen in time to bring down fire on the target (i.e., 150 - 200 metres
in front of cover), and not less than 300 metres in front of dug-in troops or 400
metres forward from troops in the open. The width of an SB will depend on the
terrain and the organisation of the defence, but must ensure a density of not more
than 50 metres per shell. Battery, or supported company commanders, may call
down an SB.
b. Deep Standing Barrages. Deep SBs are fired on narrow approaches, with fire
delivered simultaneously on several lines.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-23
c.
Rolling Barrages of Fire. Rolling barrages of fire (RBFs) are prepared on the most
likely enemy approaches. They consist of two or three lines, the distance between
them depending on likely enemy deployment lines, rates of advance and the
visibility between bounds. The first line may be two to four kilometres from the
forward line of defence (where the enemy is expected to deploy into platoon
columns), with a second 700 to 1 000 metres distant and a third 400 to 600 metres
away. The final line is designed to create a curtain of fire which will separate
enemy tanks from their infantry. The width of an RBF will vary as does that of a
SB, but there must not be more than 25 metres between shells.
9.44
Artillery in the Direct Fire Role. MAF GF guns and howitzers are all equipped with
the sights necessary for direct fire engagements. Should enemy armour break
through, artillery sub-units may be used, in extremis, as an anti-armour back-stop.
They will be expected to delay and disrupt the attackers and thus create favourable
conditions for a counter-attack into the enemy’s flank.
9.45
Protection of Support Assets. It is necessary to ensure the continuing viability of FS
units especially if the enemy has superior resources. Thorough camouflage of gun
positions and helicopter forward operating sites is stressed. Radio silence is
maintained for as long as possible (certainly until the start of the main attack), line
communications being used until no longer adequate to exercise timely control.
Artillery guns and batteries each have primary and alternate firing positions. Artillery
concentrations will be short, but very intense, and fire units will expect to move
frequently to avoid CB. Roving batteries will also be used to confuse enemy artillery
intelligence. The activities of these are carefully planned in advance by the CMTA,
who lays down their itinerary, fire positions and missions. Roving batteries should
leave dummies in their positions when they move on to give the impression they are
still occupied. Some batteries and individual guns may also be deployed in the direct
fire role, preferably in defilade or reverse slope positions so that they can surprise the
enemy at short range.
Counter Bombardment
9.46
The Problem. In the offensive, the attainment of electronic fire superiority is a
precondition for success. In defence, it must be denied to the enemy and actually
achieved for at least a specified time in specific areas to create favourable conditions
for the conduct of counter moves. These essential requirements mean that the duel
with enemy artillery is the most critical of the artillery’s missions. The struggle is a
difficult one. Most artillery is now self-propelled and armoured. It tends to deploy just
long enough to complete a fire mission and then relocates to a hide or the next fire
position (i.e., it is in action for only about five minutes in any one position or
considerably less for multiple launch rocket systems [MLRSs]). It is thus more difficult
to locate in advance than was the case in the past and the time available to bring
down fire is greatly reduced: if the enemy guns have a burst-fire capability which
enables them to move after an engagement of only a minute or so, there may not even
be time for artillery locating radars to do their job and pass data to the fire control
centre. Furthermore, with batteries dispersed over a kilometre square or more (and
even greater areas for MLRS), there can no longer be any question of suppressing an
entire battery with area fire: guns and rocket launchers have to be engaged
individually.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-24
9.47
Organisation of Counter Bombardment. Winning electronic fire superiority is the
priority task for any formation. This requires a combined arms effort. The
army/regional commands are normally the lowest level at which operational and
operational-tactical missiles, fixed wing and RW aviation and long-range artillery and
MRLs are integrated with deep-looking RTAVs. Most CB is usually organised at this
level, however some close CB may be fought at the divisional battle in the case of
enemy mortars and light field artillery. Automated collection, processing and
dissemination of intelligence in a system integrated with fire means has reduced the
time from detecting a target to engagement by RSCs and RFCs to two to three
minutes: efforts are being made to halve this time. Because artillery earmarked for CB
has to be in constant readiness to engage fleeting targets, such units are not
considered to be available for other fire missions not connected with the struggle for
electronic fire superiority. In practice, the entire AAG and AGRA and their regional
equivalents will generally be devoted almost exclusively to this struggle, at least until
fire superiority is won. MAF GF particularly favour the use of Uragan and Smerch for
CB missions because of their great range and beaten zone with cluster munitions.
These MRLs are linked to RPVs and artillery locating radars in RFCs for the conduct
of CB, as is much tube artillery.
9.48
Counter Bombardment Tactics. Increasingly, MAF GF theorists argue that mere
suppression of enemy artillery is not enough. It may win time to execute an attack or a
manoeuvre, but the suppressed unit will still be able to return to the battle for
electronic fire superiority. Destruction is now the normal goal.
a. The Size of Fire Units. The size of fire units employed is driven by the need to
deliver the volume of fire required to destroy the target before it can leave the
impact area (i.e., in one to two minutes in the case of a self-propelled gun). Thus,
to give a 50 per cent chance of destroying a single gun at a range of 15 kilometres
and firing for one minute with HE will require 21 x 152 mm gun-howitzers.
Alternatively, one to two heavy MRL cluster rockets with terminal guidance
provided by an artillery locating radar will almost certainly accomplish the task.
b. Pinning the Enemy in Place. A favoured MAF GF tactic is to pin enemy artillery
with RDMs so that the norm for ammunition expenditure can be fired by a smaller
fire unit over a longer period or so that the enemy can be attacked by aviation.
c.
Disrupting Enemy Communications. The most promising approach to CB is seen
to be the disruption of radio communications within dispersed battery positions,
either with remotely delivered jammers or the use of EMP. This will force the
enemy either into a time-consuming move or into a more compact deployment
pattern where line or even voice is used to control the gun position. In the latter
case, the enemy will present a more vulnerable target for subsequent CB fire
missions.
d. Other Targets. CPs, FDCs, artillery locating radars, DF and intercept stations,
ammunition dumps and other targets vital to the enemy’s conduct of long-range
battle enjoy as high a priority for engagement as fire means.
9.49
Reducing Vulnerability to Enemy Counter Bombardment. Reducing vulnerability to
enemy CB is, of course, critical to success in the struggle for electronic fire superiority.
Where possible, artillery will fire short fire missions and then relocate immediately.
Where necessity precludes this tactic, ‘roving’ guns will be used to confuse enemy
locaters and dummies will be deployed when time and the tactical situation permit to
draw fire (MAF GF believe that replicating 20 to 30 per cent of the actual number of
fire positions will reduce losses by about one third: moreover, enemy guns engaging
dummies reveal themselves for destruction by counter-fire).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-25
SECTION 9-3.
ARTILLERY ORGANISATIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS IN
Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition
9.50
Artillery RPs have the primary mission of locating enemy artillery units. The patrols
can also set up OPs behind enemy lines to adjust artillery fire and to report on enemy
organisation and deployment. Other OPs and stations send intelligence data to the
COP. The commander determines whether they are to be engaged and if so the COP
relays to them the firing position.
9.51
The artillery brigades of the MAF GF have an organic artillery sound ranging and radar
reconnaissance battery. This battery provides the bulk of the division’s artillery
intelligence. The battery sub-units include the:
a. sound ranging platoon;
b. radar reconnaissance platoon (with a counter-mortar/counter-battery section and
two surveillance radar sections); and
c.
topographic survey platoon.
Equipment and Ammunition
9.52
Equipment. MAG GF field artillery consists of mortars, howitzers, field guns,
gun/howitzers, and MRLs. Formerly, a majority of MAF GF field artillery was towed
with the exception of its MRLs, which are primarily truck mounted. Towed guns are
lightweight, low-cost, simple, and extremely mobile on hard surfaces. Their
disadvantages are a lack of cross-country mobility and no gun crew protection against
chemical or conventional counter-battery strikes. The MAF GF will continue to employ
towed weapons, especially in non-divisional artillery units, but its current emphasis is
on acquiring self-propelled artillery systems:
a. Howitzers. Tracked, self-propelled howitzers greatly enhance the MAF GF’s ability
to provide continuous support to mechanised and tank brigades. The MAF GF’s
cross-country mobility and speed allows its forces to keep pace with combined
arms operations.
b. Multiple Rocket Launchers. The MAF GF use MRLs to deliver strikes at decisive
moments in battle. The MRL is an excellent area coverage weapon, and its rapid
ripple fire is an excellent delivery system for chemical agents, HE, submunitions,
fuel air explosives, smoke, and scatterable mines.
c.
9.53
Mortars. Each mechanised battalion also has an organic 120 mm or 82 mm mortar
battery. These indirect FS weapons help the brigade to maintain fire superiority.
Ammunition Types. MAF GF conventional shells are HE, fragmentation, and
fragmentation HE. They are the standard projectiles for all howitzers and guns. The
MAF GF uses HE shells to destroy fortifications and fragmentation shells against
personnel and equipment in the open. Fragmentation HE shells have fuzes for either
instantaneous or delayed detonation. A time fuze is available for airburst effects.
Special ammunition includes:
a. high-precision;
b. chemical;
c.
anti-tank;
d. smoke;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-26
e. illuminating;
f.
concrete-piercing;
g. rocket-assisted projectiles (RAPs);
h. scatterable mines;
9.54
i.
improved conventional munitions (ICMs); and
j.
flechettes.
Unit of Fire. The unit of fire (UF) is a fixed number of rounds per weapon, or weapon
system, for planning and accounting purposes. It is not an authorised allowance or a
daily expenditure rate. UF is the basic factor for planning ammunition requirements in
each action. Ammunition distribution and stockage also have units of fire as a basis of
measurement.
Deployment
9.55
The MAF GF tend to deploy artillery well forward, especially in the offensive. There are
three reasons for this: the need to reach as deep as possible; the increase in
expenditure norms as range lengthens; the time required to relocate artillery (by
deploying forward, it can ensure continuity of FS for attacking units for longer before
having to displace).
a. Indirect Fire. Table 9–5 sets out deployment norms. These are yardsticks only and
actual deployments will depend on terrain, real estate management and the
anticipated course of the battle.
b. Direct Fire. MAF GF frequently deploy sections or individual guns very close to the
line of contact to destroy point, hard targets such as pill boxes and defended
houses with fire over open sights (a capability possessed by all towed and selfpropelled weapons). In combat in built-up areas, forests and mountains, a high
proportion of artillery may be so employed.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-27
Table 9–5:
Deployment of Artillery
Distance
Between
weapons
Between
Batteries
From line
of
Contact
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
20-60 m
-
Mortars
Attack
Defence
Combined
Mortars/
Howitzers
(1)
Guns and
Howitzers
122 mm
MRLs
220 mm
MRLs
Attack
50-150 m
Defence
Attack
Defence
50-300 m
(2)
Attack
DAG/
BrAG
(f)
AG/
ReAG
AGRA/
ReGRA
(g)
0.5-1.5
km
-
-
-
-
1-2 km
-
-
-
0.5 to 3
km,
usually
about 1
km (3)
1-3 km
1-3 km
-
-
2-4 km
2-4 km
-
-
-
2-4 km
4-6 km
8-10 km
-
4-6 km
6-8 km
10-12
km
-
-
4-6 km
5-8 km
-
-
6-8 km
6-8 km
-
-
10-15
km
10-15
km
-
-
15-20
km
15-20
km
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
20-25
km
1-2 km (3)
Defence
Attack
150-500
m (2)
Defence
300 mm
MRLs
BrAG/
Comb
Arms
Bn
(e)
Attack
Defence
Individual
weapons
widely
dispersed
(3)
Note:
1.
2.
3.
9.56
High angle.
Dependent on air and ground threat.
Determined by survey.
MAF GF artillery is usually deployed in the following manner:
a. Artillery Battalion. Battalion firing positions normally comprise a large triangle with
three batteries dispersed to each of the three points of the triangle. Figure 9–1 is
an example of a standard artillery battalion combat formation. Batteries in the
battalion area locate 500 to 1 500 metres apart with a 20 to 50 metre interval
between guns. The triangle forms a forward or reverse wedge pointed toward or
away from the enemy. The battalion chief of staff operates the battalion FDC
which is inside the triangle of batteries and located 300 to 500 metres from one of
the batteries.
b. The artillery battalion commander can select the battery firing location, but it is
normally the responsibility of the battery commander. Both consider local factors in
concealing firing positions: wooded areas, foothills, and thickets. The MAF GF
conceal the entrance to, and exit from, all gun positions as much as possible. For
an unconcealed or open gun position, the battery must have enough range to
accomplish a direct fire mission at the weapons’ maximum effective direct fire
range. The battery senior officer/gun position officers select individual fire
positions. The fire position affords cover for the gun crews and their ammunition;
and it should have interlocking arcs with adjacent weapons.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-28
c.
An artillery battalion utilises primary, alternate, and temporary gun positions in the
offensive. The temporary position enables the artillery unit to accomplish shortterm or emergency missions. Such missions may include FS or defending a
forward position. The defence requires primary, alternate, temporary and dummy
locations.
Figure 9–1: Standard Artillery Battalion Combat Formation
d. Artillery Battery. Because of the increased mobility of self-propelled artillery, the
MAF GF move artillery batteries, platoons, and individual guns within an assigned
firing position area to escape enemy counter-battery fire. Within his assigned area,
the battery commander selects a primary position and one or more alternate or
secondary firing positions. Each position is at least 500 metres away from the
previous position. The battery/platoon fires a mission of three to four minutes’
duration and then moves to a secondary position. This technique is used during a
long offensive preparation or in the defence when forward or rearward movement
is limited.
e. Figure 9–2 is an example of a howitzer battery deployment in standard formation.
The battery often forms a straight line with equal intervals between guns. This
pattern of deployment reduces emplacement / displacement time. It also simplifies
the computation procedures required for battery fire missions. The reduced
computation and mission time enable batteries to complete missions and relocate
more quickly. This reduces their exposure to enemy fire and compensates for the
vulnerability inherent in the formation. The senior officer of the battery operates
the battery FDC which is centred 100 to 200 metres behind the line of artillery
weapons.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-29
Battery COP
Minimum
400 metres
Gun position OP on most
likely tank approach
20-50metres
Up to
300 metres
15-20metres
Ammunition
Shelter
Ammunition Recess
(Immediate Ammunition)
15-30metres
Platoon
Leader
Battery
Senior
Officer
To
ion
sit
po
e
at
ern
alt
Figure 9–2:
f.
Maximum
200 metres
NOTE : Slit trenches and crew shelters
may be dug beside gun pits and CPs.
Positions may be linked by
communication trenches.
Towing vehicles
hidden in the woods
Howitzer Battery in Standard Formation
MAF GF artillery uses formations that vary the interval between guns and disperse
the guns in depth with the aid of electronic field artillery computers. Figure 9–3
provides some examples of the variants a battery might use. Even with computers,
the MAF GF may retain the linear formation for speed and simplicity. Its goal is to
reduce the time that a firing battery remains in position after the first round fires.
Given the tempo of operations, MAG GF artillerymen must now deliver effective
fire from emergency positions without firing a registration. Under these conditions
and with redundant artillery assets, the linear deployment retains its utility and
attractiveness to artillery commanders.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-30
Figure 9–3:
Battery Formation Variants
g. Battery firing positions consist of two firing platoons of three guns each. The
platoons may be separated by a few hundred metres for greater survivability. Each
platoon has a platoon headquarters and three gun sections. The platoon leader of
the first firing platoon is the senior firing position officer. The battery commander is
normally at the COP with the supported unit commander.
h. Multiple Rocket Launchers. The MRL places heavy fire on important targets at
decisive moments in a battle. The MAF GF also employ MRLs in roving gun
missions and counter-attacks. Rocket launcher batteries move forward one to five
kilometres from their camouflaged positions to occupy fire areas to support
operations. The launchers usually remain loaded, and one or more ammunition
trucks accompany each one to these fire areas. To evade counter-battery fire,
rocket launchers normally move to either a camouflaged position or to a new fire
area immediately after firing. Figure 9–4 illustrates a typical rocket launcher
battery deployment.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-31
Figure 9–4:
Multiple Rocket Launcher Battery Deployment
Movement
9.57
In planning the deployment of its units, MAF GF artillery commanders follow the ‘rule
of a third’. When only a third of the maximum range of their artillery remains in front of
the attacking MAF GF troops, they move a third of their force forward. Once
redeployment starts, no more than a third of the available guns are moving at any one
time. This leaves two-thirds of the artillery in position to support operations.
Redeployment is by battalions whenever possible, with a typical bound being five to 10
kilometres long.
9.58
In the offensive, an artillery battalion leapfrogs its batteries forward individually in
bounds of some three to four kilometres. By day, it takes a towed howitzer battery
about 35 minutes to move, from receipt of the movement order until it is ready to fire
the first round in its new position. At night, the same move requires about 45 minutes.
On average, a self-propelled battery requires up to 10 minutes and a towed artillery
battalion up to 12 minutes to leave a location and move out into a march column.
9.59
The senior commander determines the length of a day’s march column and the
average speed. An artillery march column has 25 to 50 metre intervals between
vehicles and 100 metres between batteries. An artillery battalion occupies 1.5 to 2.5
kilometres of road space, depending on vehicle spacing. At night a column of tracked
and wheeled vehicles can move at a speed of up to 25 kilometres per hour. During the
day the column has an average speed of 25 to 30 kilometres per hour.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-32
SECTION 9-4.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
General
9.60
Musorian special operations can be conducted by the SOC or conventional units
assigned to conduct special operations. FS provided by conventional units in support
of special operations will usually follow conventional artillery tactics. FS conducted by
MAF SOC integral artillery units however, will differ. This section outlines the operation
of the integral FS means within the raider battalion.
9.61
The MAF SOC requires a highly mobile, yet potent, FS capability. The crucial factor in
achieving success in special operations is survivability and surprise. For this reason,
unorthodox means, deviating from tactics outlined in conventional operations can be
expected. In special operations, FS is utilised for a number of different purposes.
These include:
a. destroying vital assets;
b. covering withdrawals from engagements;
c.
harassing opposing military/police forces; and
d. terrorising civilian settlements.
9.62
In order to achieve the above goals, the MAF SOC requires a diverse weapon suite
capable of both destruction and/or neutralisation. While the tier one forces (SF
Battalion) are not equipped with any integral FS assets, maximum use will be made of
air-delivered stand-off munitions (Precision Air Strike (PAS) strikes). The tier two
forces (raider battalions) are equipped with a combination of light and medium mortar
systems, light tube and rocket artillery systems.
Command and Control
9.63
Basic Principles. The MAF SOC FS C2 principles are the same as those for
conventional operations. However, the MAF SOC recognises the limitations placed on
FS through the increased requirement for lighter scale operations. Therefore, while still
maintaining centralised control and priority of support as basic principles, the MAF
SOC recognises that the assets available may not always achieve the struggle for FS
or the battalion as the basic fire unit.
9.64
Groupings. Groupings are similar in special operations to conventional operations. As
the Raider Brigade (RB) never deploys at brigade level on operations, but deploys
battalion level task forces, the FS assets from the brigade will be handed down to the
battalion task force and grouped into the BaAG.
9.65
Regrouping. Due to the dispersed nature of operations, it is unlikely that FS assets
will be regrouped between the various raider task forces once deployed.
9.66
Command Relationship. As the raider task force (RTF) operates independently, the
task force commander has full command of any FS assets grouped to support the task
force on operations.
Command and Communications
9.67
The artillery commander collocates near the task force commander and usually has
face-to-face coordination. He can also enter the command net of the supported unit.
Artillery commanders retain rigid control of the deployment of weapons and OPs,
except when sub-units have special missions. Radio is the primary means of artillery
communication.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-33
9.68
Fire Control. The system of providing observation and fire control to special
operations is the same as per conventional operations.
Fire Planning
9.69
The raider artillery uses the same types of fire as per conventional operations, even
though the rates of ammunition expenditure may differ. The types of fire are:
a. harassing fire,
b. neutralisation,
c.
suppression,
d. disruption, and
e. destruction.
9.70
Expenditure Norms. Ammunition expenditure, due to limited resupply capability when
operating offshore, will be minimal. Usually only one UF will be deployed with the FS
asset, with one UF held in a cache.
9.71
Rates of Fire. Integral FS will use minimum rates of fire to achieve tasks. For this
reason, most artillery and mortar fire will be observed. Rocket fire will usually be
utilised if unobserved fire is required due to the weight of fire that can be brought to
bear on a target in a short period of time. Maximum rates of fire are as per table 9–3.
9.72
Developments in technology have given artillery troops the additional capability of
engaging group or point, hard, mobile targets with laser-guided munitions which have
a 70 to 90 per cent probability of destroying the target. The delivery systems which
can use laser-guided munitions within the raider brigade are the 120 mm mortars.
Usually 30 per cent of all 120 mm mortar munitions held will be laser-guided
munitions. The limitations of these rounds are:
a. maximum achievable range with 120 mm laser-guided munitions is four
kilometres, and
b. maximum range of the LTD is seven kilometres.
9.73
Each reconnaissance platoon and each artillery OP is equipped with the LTD.
Additional holdings of LTDs may be held at the battalion level in case other users have
a requirement.
Attack and Defensive Operations
9.74
Raider units will avoid decisive contact, therefore it is rare that the attack or defence
will be utilised. Where the defence or attack is used, FS will be as per conventional
operations, with rockets (107 mm Type 63) being utilised to achieve weight of fire, and
laser-guided 120 mm mortars being used to destroy point/key targets. The aim of a RB
fire plan is to use indirect FS as an offensive weapon to augment special operations
offensive operations. Operational commanders will seek to concentrate fire on to a
single target for a very short period of time prior to or during the commencement of an
attack. Integral 82 mm mortars, found at the raider company level, are the key means
for providing close support to smaller raider operations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
9-34
Counter Bombardment
9.75
In special operations, the MAF SOC recognises its vulnerability to indirect fire if
located by enemy forces, especially if the raider forces have limited mobility. Raider
task forces can therefore often be expected to have passive sound ranging equipment
deployed. Radar, due to its size and active signature, is not normally utilised by MAF
SOC forces. The system utilised by the MAF GF and SOC is the Nobeltech Soras 6,
developed in Sweden. This system is a modern computer assisted sound ranging
system, which includes nine microphones, a computer and a meteorological unit. A
minimum of three microphones is deployed about one kilometre apart. When all
microphones are deployed, they are placed in an area eight kilometres wide and one
to two kilometres deep. The position of each microphone is determined by satellite
navigation. The system will usually achieve a range of between 1.2 and 2.5 times the
length of the base. If all microphones are deployed, this could be as much as 25
kilometres for the detection of 105 mm guns.
9.76
Counter-battery fire is usually conducted by the Chinese manufactured Type 63, 12
barrel MRLs. Using improved South African Mechem ammunition, the range that can
be achieved is 11 000 metres, where 80 per cent of all rockets fired will land within an
area of 150 metres by 200 metres. The expected kill area is 120 square metres and
maim area is 504 square metres. These rockets can either be launched as part of an
MRL or they can be individually launched from a tripod.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-1
CHAPTER 10
ENGINEERS
SECTION 10-1.
GENERAL
10.1
Engineers are specialist troops who carry out functions peculiar to their discipline for
all elements of the MAF. The range of tasks and support missions generally require
specialist skills, engineer equipment and/or munitions. There are two types of
engineers: combat engineers, and special category engineers.
10.2
Combat engineers are those whose tasks may require direct contact with the enemy
while the special category engineers do not normally engage with the enemy.
Together, these engineers perform a range of technical tasks to support operations.
Technical Tasks
10.3
10.4
Engineers perform nine different technical tasks in support of operations. These are:
a.
reconnoitre the enemy and the terrain,
b.
prepare fortifications,
c.
prepare and maintain routes of movement,
d.
prepare and maintain passages through obstacles and areas of destruction,
e.
equip and maintain gap crossing,
f.
establish engineer obstacles,
g.
effect camouflage measures,
h.
establish water points, and
i.
conduct engineer tasks to eliminate the after-effects of a nuclear strike.
Reconnaissance, obstacle clearing and establishing obstacles are primarily the
responsibility of the combat engineer, while the other six are executed by both combat
and special category engineers.
Organisations
10.5
Divisional Engineers. Engineers are organic to each division, and take the form of an
engineer battalion. The only variation between the two divisions (tank and infantry) is
that the battalion supporting the tank division has GMZ (minelayers) instead of PMRs
to lay minefields. Each battalion has:
a. a combat engineer company with an engineer and mine-laying platoon. The major
equipment includes; engineer reconnaissance A vehicles (IMR), vehicle mounted
mine detector (DIM), armoured mechanical mine clearers (MTK) and PMR or
GMZ;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-2
b. an assault crossing company with two amphibian platoons, one ferry platoon and
one engineer dive platoon. The major equipment types in the company are tracked
amphibian (PTS), floating tracked ferries (GSP or PMM-2) and 10 assault boats;
c.
a construction company with four platoons: water supply, bunker construction,
special task and heavy equipment;
d. a road and bridge construction company with a support platoon and three road
and bridge platoons. The company holds both tank and truck-launched bridges, a
sawmill capability, grader and the only concrete mixer in the division;
e. a pontoon bridge company with two pontoon platoons holding pmps, a power boat
platoon and a support platoon;
f.
one engineer reconnaissance platoon with IMRs and DIMs; and
g. combat service support platoons of signals, maintenance and services.
10.6
Brigade Engineers. One engineer company is organic to each of the brigades. Each
company has:
a. a mine platoon,
b. a bridge platoon with TMMs, and
c.
a construction platoon.
10.7
Battalion Engineers. The separate tank battalion attached to the infantry division
battalion has organic engineers though they are limited in terms of capability.
10.8
Tactical. Tactical employment of engineers does not always follow strict
organisational lines. Instead units and sub-units are reorganised on a task basis and
form the following functional groups:
a. Engineer Reconnaissance. Engineer reconnaissance obtains information on the
enemy, the engineers and the terrain so engineer commanders can carry out
engineer support missions effectively. Engineer reconnaissance is the mission of
engineer force units either independently or as part of military reconnaissance
groups and CRPs.
b. Movement Support Detachments. MSDs improve the axis of advance. They fill in
cratering, construct bypasses, improve the approaches to and construct bridges
over minor gaps and finally, create and mark lanes through minefields. The MSD
is usually established from divisional and brigade engineer units.
c.
Mobile Obstacle Detachments. The MOD is the basic building block of the
counter-mobility effort. These are formed at every level from unit to SG and are a
standard feature of tactical and operational missions. MODs lay minefields, dig
anti-tank ditches, carry out demolitions and create other obstacles such as abatis.
d. Obstacles Clearing Detachments/Groups. Similar to the MSD, an obstacles
clearing detachment (OCD) is created when more resources are needed to clear
obstacles or debris. They are established from organic assets within the battalions
and are reinforced with engineers and equipment such as BAT-Ms. They are used
extensively in urban environments and under conditions of extensive destruction.
Though not an engineer organisation, they execute an engineer function and are
considered important in movement support.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-3
10.9
These functional groups often include reinforcements from the senior commanders,
especially on the main effort. They are not permanent groupings, but instead will be
formed as the operational and tactical situations require.
10.10 Other Ground Forces. Engineers are organic to other ground forces within the MAF.
These are:
a. Airborne Infantry. The airborne infantry brigade has an engineer company which is
capable of executing a range of technical tasks. It includes two engineer platoons
and one bridging platoon with bridging assets able to be air-dropped. Each
airborne infantry battalion has an organic engineer platoon, which has two
engineer squads and one mine squad.
b. Special Operations Command. SOC has an engineer company as a component of
the commando brigade which includes a mines, road and bridge and construction
platoon. The commando battalion has one platoon which has two engineer
sections. Tasks in support of special and unconventional operations are those
technical tasks listed, adapted to prevailing conditions.
Missions
10.11 Engineer support missions correspond to the activities of the supported manoeuvre
units. The technical tasks identified above constitute the basic activities performed by
engineer troops in support of the march, offence and the defence. The combined arms
commander specifies the tactical mission, the initiation time, the duration of the
mission and the location or area for accomplishing the mission. The engineer
commander then selects the engineer task which best supports the tactical mission
and determines the appropriate mix of troops, equipment and material necessary to
perform the task under the prevailing conditions.
10.12 Tactical Missions. Engineers will be allocated a variety of tactical missions all of
which will be constituted from the technical tasks. Figures 10–1, 10–2 and 10–3
illustrate the relationship between tactical mission and technical tasks for the march,
offence and defence. The following points are of particular note:
a. March. The march is an organised movement of troops in columns on roads or
cross-country routes. The engineer role in the march is to support both:
(1) the preparation prior to the march, and
(2) troop requirements during the march.
The principle missions include preparation in form-up, rest and accommodation
areas, and mobility.
b. Offence. In the offence, the primary mission is to assist in maintaining high rates of
mobility. Emphasis is placed on clearing and maintaining routes for manoeuvre
elements, the clearance of mines and other obstacles, crossing gaps, and creating
obstacles to assist in flank protection and protection against counter-attack.
Engineer reconnaissance plays a significant role in the success of these tasks.
c.
Defence. Engineer support for the defence centres on fortifying friendly troop
positions, effecting camouflage measures and adapting the terrain for defence.
The defence also sees extensive use of obstacles to interfere with the enemy’s
offensive action.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-4
March
Time
Spt to
preparations
for the march
Spt during the
march
Tactical
mission
Spt to tp movt
Prep in FUP,
rest, and
conc areas
Technical SPT
tasks
Passages in
Obs & perform
CHAPS
Extract,
purify and est
water points
Prepare &
maint tp movt
routes
Engr
camouflage
measures
Engr recon
Eliminate En
effects
Prep
fortifications
Figure 10–1: Combat Engineer Tactical Missions and Technical Tasks on the March
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-5
Offence
Time
Spt in prep for
the attack
Tactical
mission
- engr spt to:
Reinforce
captured
positions
Commitment
of 2nd echelon
Repelling
counterattack
Crossing
water
obstacles
Breakthrough
of def lines
Area
clearance
Meeting
engagement
Adv,
Deployment &
transition to
the offence
In form-up
areas
Extract,
purify and est
water points
Engr
camouflage
measures
Establish
obstacles
Equip and
maintain gap
crossings
Engr recon
Prepare &
maint tp movt
routes
Prep
fortifications
(in fups, etc)
Clear passage
in obs
Eliminate
effects of en
nuclear strike
Technical spt
tasks
Spt during the
offence
Figure 10–2: Combat Engineer Tactical Missions and Technical Tasks for the Offence
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-6
Defence
Spt to
defensive
preparation
Spt during the
defence
Reinforce
lines taken in
counter-attack
Repelling
counter-attack
During battle
to retain
positions
2nd echelon in
counter-attack
The defensive
area
Extract,
purify and est
water points
Engr
camouflage
measures
Establish obs
& perform
dmls
Equip and
maintain gap
crossings
Engr recon
Prepare &
maint tp movt
routes
Prep
fortifications
in def areas
Clear passage
in obs during
counter-attack
Eliminate
effects of en
nuclear strike
Figure 10–3: Combat Engineer Tactical Missions and Technical Tasks for the Defence
10.13 Engineers play a role in supporting the reserve, in particular the minelayers, who are
associated with the commander’s reserve in support of the anti-armour assets.
SECTION 10-2.
RECONNAISSANCE
General
10.14 A great deal of effort and emphasis is placed on engineer reconnaissance because it
is considered the key to success of the engineer mission and subsequently, the
supported commander’s mission. The reasons for detailed and timely information and
intelligence are as follows:
a. Engineer support is limited on the battlefield, thus it must be applied correctly and
in a timely manner in order to be effective.
b. Engineer tasks consume a great deal of time and resources, both limited
commodities on the modern battlefield.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-7
c.
In some cases, engineer equipment is difficult to manoeuvre around the battlefield
due to its physical characteristics. Its positioning must therefore be carefully
planned.
Methods
10.15 The three basic types of engineer reconnaissance are:
a. observation,
b. land and aerial photography, and
c.
raids and direct examination.
10.16 Observation. Observation is used in tactical situations where the reconnoitred
objective is located in terrain controlled by the enemy, but visible from areas occupied
by friendly forces. At night and during times of limited visibility, LPs are established
and, when possible, engineer OPs are augmented by linguists.
10.17 Engineer OPs are manned by two sappers (three for 24-hour operations) and
communications are provided by the commander establishing the OP. The engineer
OP is located close to the forward edge of friendly forces, on terrain that provides
natural cover, good fields of vision and concealed reporting to the rear. Modern optical
instruments allow the OPs to observe a sector of one to two kilometres wide and up to
six kilometres deep. As a rule, an engineer OP is established every 200 metres along
a front. OPs have the following tasks:
a. discovering the locations, type and pattern of enemy defensive positions and
fortifications;
b. discovering the location of obstacles, and the nature of natural barriers and
features;
c.
studying the terrain to detect sound approaches to the enemy’s forward edges;
and
d. determining the location and types of enemy engineer support.
10.18 Land and Aerial Photography. An important method for obtaining engineer
reconnaissance information is aerial photography. Aerial photography allows for
reconnaissance of deep objectives when it is impossible to obtain information by other
means.
10.19 Engineer reconnaissance of routes and adjacent terrain is often conducted by
helicopter and later confirmed by vehicle reconnaissance.
10.20 Terrestrial photography is used a great deal in engineer reconnaissance to expose
enemy engineer preparations and other individual objectives that lie within the range
of modern photographic equipment.
10.21 Raids and Direct Examination. Raids are used to collect exact details of
installations, determine the nature of obstacles and fortified structures, capture
documents and examples of enemy engineer equipment in the enemy position
(including deep operations). Engineers also obtain such information through the
interrogation of prisoners.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-8
10.22 Unit commanders assigned to conduct a raid first establish continuous observation of
the objective and the approaches to it. They then determine the details of the raid,
including combined arms support for the raid group. The raid group is organised into
three elements:
a. an obstacle removal party to clear lanes on the route to the objective and close
them on withdrawal;
b. a search group headed by the engineer commander; and
c.
a security element to protect the search group against attack and provide cover for
the withdrawal.
10.23 Direct examination obtains information on terrain and objectives in the enemy position
when there is a need to determine the exact nature and configuration of obstacles,
new engineer equipment, munitions or weapons.
Engineer Reconnaissance Organisations
10.24 Three types of engineer reconnaissance elements exist:
a. engineer reconnaissance groups;
b. engineer RPs; and
c.
engineer OPs (as mentioned above).
10.25 Engineer Reconnaissance Group. Engineer reconnaissance groups are formed from
engineer reconnaissance and other engineer units, with the exact composition
depending on the mission. They can operate independently in front of the FEBA but,
as a rule, they operate as part of an operational reconnaissance group deep in the
enemy AO to collect generic information.
10.26 Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol. Engineer RPs are engineer squad to platoon size
organisations which often operate with chemical warfare scouts. Again, the
organisation is mission-dependent for example:
a. if they are operating behind friendly elements they will move well forward of the
battalions (one to two hours) and collect information independently; or
b. if they are anticipating contact, they will operate with combat patrols.
10.27 Patrols are target-driven, collecting precise information on the enemy, terrain and
important objectives. Patrols assigned a specific mission will be equipped accordingly
with specialist equipment. In the case of a wet gap crossing, water speed indicators,
water vanes, bottom probes and diving equipment are used.
Engineer Reconnaissance on the March
10.28 Engineer reconnaissance on the march is conducted to:
a. determine the condition of both on and off-road routes and their most difficult
sections. Mounted squads are dispatched as patrols to reconnoitre each route;
b. detect and determine the nature of obstacles, demolitions work and determine
routes around or methods to overcome them; and
c.
reconnoitre terrain at planned rest and concentration areas as well as determining
and marking the best routes to such areas.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-9
10.29 Various methods will be used to obtain the necessary information. The large volume of
information required to be reviewed in generally short time-frames results in the use of
a variety of mapping techniques, military geographic handbooks and geographic
information systems.
10.30 The relative locations of engineer reconnaissance elements are shown at figure 10–4.
Figure 10–4: Engineer Reconnaissance in the March: Division and Brigade
Engineer Reconnaissance During the Offence
10.31 Engineer reconnaissance on the attack is established to obtain information
concerning:
a. Enemy Engineer Support. Engineer support in enemy defensive positions, areas
and belts are reconnoitred. One OP can observe a battalion frontage (one to two
kilometres) but, two OPs and an LP are likely to be established on the main effort.
Precise information to be reconnoitred includes:
(1) enemy obstacles and demolitions created both during preparation for and the
conduct of the attack;
(2) troop movement routes and cross-country trafficability;
(3) location of obstacles established during enemy withdrawal and counterattack; and
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-10
(4) water obstacles on the friendly axis of advance over ground advantageous for
engagement.
At this point, enemy obstacles and demolitions deep in defensive areas will be reconnoitred
by the senior engineer forces. As a rule, engineer route reconnaissance will be conducted by
MSDs while locations to establish situational obstacles to repel counter-attack are
reconnoitred by MODs and units tasked to establish obstacles.
b. Enemy Engineers. The composition and location of enemy engineer forces and
the equipment used by them is reconnoitred in order to ascertain the main effort.
Engineer Reconnaissance in the Defence
10.32 As in the offence, engineer reconnaissance in the defence is continuous, especially
during preparations for, and during the course of the battle. The efforts of engineer
reconnaissance during preparation are directed at:
a. Preparation of the Defence. During preparation of the defence, engineer
reconnaissance will be assigned to:
(1) determine the most favourable terrain to prepare defensive positions,
(2) reconnoitre locations of proposed minefields and demolitions,
(3) reconnoitre areas to prepare construction material, and
(4) reconnoitre routes to manoeuvre to and between positions.
b. Detect Enemy Preparation for the Attack. Enemy preparations for the attack are
usually detected through OPs on the forward edge of the defensive positions and
each first echelon battalion will have two or three of these. The OPs are looking
for:
(1) increased enemy reconnaissance of friendly obstacles and the clearance of
lanes through them;
(2) enemy restoration of existing routes and preparation of additional routes to
the forward edge;
(3) increased intensity of enemy engineer work on an individual axis;
(4) the appearance of new enemy engineer units and sub-units; and
(5) increased supplies of enemy engineer equipment.
c.
Transition to Defence. When adopting a defensive posture from an attack, the
engineer reconnaissance efforts detect the location and extent of enemy
minefields, regions of destruction, booby traps and radioactive contamination
which may have been created on their withdrawal.
d. Counter-attack. During the counter-attack, engineer reconnaissance will:
(1) determine the condition of routes and bridges,
(2) mark detours around areas of destruction, contamination and situational
obstacles established by the enemy; and
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-11
(3) after the successful counter-attack, determine the status of the defensive
positions and extent of supplementary or alternate defensive positions and
obstacles.
SECTION 10-3.
FORTIFICATIONS
General
10.33 Fortifications increase the effectiveness of all weapons by protecting personnel,
weapons and equipment from enemy destruction. The MAF GF accomplish
survivability through the efforts of the entire force and maximise the terrain to provide
cover and concealment. Engineers greatly aid survivability through the use of
excavation equipment and by winning local construction materials.
Types
10.34 There are three types of fortifications:
a. Trench. The trench is the basic fortification and can be partially or totally dug-in.
b. Ground. Ground structures are erected when the ground water table is high.
c.
Underground. Underground structures are built without disturbing the natural
surface layers.
10.35 The level of protection afforded by these structures against direct or indirect fire is
dependent on whether it is:
a. Open Structure. Open trenches afford protection for personnel and equipment
from enemy direct fire and reduce the radius of destruction of both conventional
and nuclear weapons by a factor of 1.5 to two times that of unprotected positions.
They are used as fighting, communication and observation trenches by rifle
squads, and for holding combat and transportation equipment. Figures 10–5, 10–6
and 10–7 illustrate types of trenches.
b. Covered Structure. Covered trenches, dugouts and shelters are established to
provide 2.4 to 3 times the protection from all types of enemy fire (conventional,
nuclear and incendiary).
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-12
Figure 10–5: Open Slit Trench
Figure 10–6: Communications Trench
Figure 10–7: One and Two-Man Fighting Position
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-13
10.36 These structures are constructed from a number of materials including earth, timber,
reinforced concrete, metal, fibreglass frame and fabric. Protection afforded from
conventional and nuclear munitions includes good protection for personnel from the
shock wave and thermal radiation of a nuclear blast. They also reduce the amount of
penetrating radiation and prevent radioactive and toxic agents falling directly on troops
or equipment. Engineers receive extensive training in shelter construction and have
access to a range of prefabricated shelter and fortification components.
Fortification on the March
10.37 Rest, halt and assembly areas are predetermined and reconnoitred by engineers.
Selection of sites is dependent on the amount of natural cover and concealment
afforded by each site. Though rest areas are unlikely to be extensively fortified,
engineers will, at a minimum, construct air defence weapon positions. Erection of
protective cover for personnel and material will depend upon the amount of time units
spend in each location. Guidelines for engineer works are:
a. Eight to 12 Hour Halts. A unit which halts for eight to 12 hours will receive three to
five hours of engineer fortification. Engineer tasks include preparing open and
covered trenches for personnel, air defence weapons and security positions.
Engineers also construct a revetment for CP vehicles at battalion and higher
levels.
b. Twenty-four Hour Halts. When a unit halts for up to 24 hours, engineers will carry
out between 10 and 12 hours of work. Tasks in addition to the above include
construction of:
(1) covered slit trenches and partially dug shelters for personnel,
(2) hasty or prefabricated shelters for CPs and medical stations,
(3) covered revetments for supply stocks, and
(4) protection for water points.
c.
Beyond 24 Hours. If units halt for more than 24 hours, the engineer effort will in
the order of another 10 hours per day of graduated effort throughout the position.
Fortification During the Offence
10.38 Fortification during the offence is used to facilitate smooth and protected movement to
contact with the enemy. Normally, AAs are prepared for each battalion sized unit
through the use of trenchers, excavators and self-entrenching blades. Positions are
constructed for all personnel. Prefabricated structures for battalion CPs and OPs can
be constructed within four to five hours. When sufficient time exists, these will be
carefully camouflaged. A motorised battalion without augmentation will completely
protect itself within 30 hours and a tank battalion within 10 to 12 hours of arrival; this is
substantially decreased with engineer support.
Fortification During the Defence
10.39 Full preparation of the defence involving entrenchments, communication ditches,
positions for tanks and infantry and CPs is labour intensive. It is a task beyond the
capabilities of any organic engineer unit and, subsequently, fortification of a position
utilises all troops and equipment available.
10.40 Manoeuvre commanders assign priorities and the best level of protection is provided
where possible. The priority of work is from front to rear and preferably takes place at
night or under reduced visibility.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-14
10.41 A battalion defensive position will be fortified with:
a. strong points;
b. mortar and anti-tank firing positions;
c.
a battalion CP;
d. a battalion aid post and supply platoon location; and
e. firing positions or individual trenches for reinforcing units.
10.42 Figure 10–8 illustrates this schematically.
FIGHTING TRENCH
1 OR 2 RIFLE COY
BN SUPPLY POINT
TANK
PLATOON
ENEMY
3-7km
1 OR 2 RIFLE CO
BN CP
ANTI-TANK
SECT
MORTAR
POSITION
RIFLE
PLN
LEGEND
APC
OPEN SHELTER
RATIONS/FUEL
TANK
CP
CONCEALED VEHICLE
TRENCH
COVERED SHELTER
AID STATION
Figure 10–8: Motorised Battalion in the Defence
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-15
10.43 Fortification of a motorised battalion defensive position is likely to be as follows:
a. First. Observation and firing sectors are cleared. Individual trenches for automatic
weapons, grenade launchers, machine guns and air defence weapons are dug.
CPs and OPs, primary firing positions for BMPs, tanks and other weapon
platforms are created. Open slit trenches for personnel and covered slit trenches
for battalion aid posts are dug and camouflaged.
b. Second. Individual trenches are connected at squad level. Secondary firing
positions for BMPs, tanks and other weapon platforms, communications trenches
to primary fighting positions and to shelters are dug. Cover is prepared for
vehicles, ammunition and other supplies. Slit trenches for personnel, weapons and
combat vehicles are covered, and dugouts in the order of one per platoon and one
for the battalion aid post are constructed.
c.
Third. Squad trenches in platoon and company strong points (see figures 10–9,
10–10 and 10–11) are interconnected, shelters are built (one per company) and
communications trenches to the rear are dug (initially to 0.6 metres then
developed to 1.1 metres). The fighting and communications trenches are equipped
with attached, individual foxholes, emplacements for firing machine guns and
grenade launchers (as represented in figures 10–12 and 10–13), loop holes,
overhead protection and recesses for ammunition. Some parts of the trenches are
also covered.
Figure 10–9: Squad Strong Point
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-16
Figure 10–10: Platoon Strong Point
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-17
Figure 10–11: Company Strong Point
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-18
Figure 10–12: Machine Gun/Anti-tank Launching Position
Figure 10–13: Anti-tank Gun Emplacement
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-19
10.44 Fortification of a tank battalion defensive position is likely to be as follows:
a. First. Tank company strong points, positions for any attached motor or
mechanised sub-units, CPs for company and battalion commanders, aid stations
and the battalion supply platoon area are all constructed.
b. Second. Primary and secondary tank entrenchments are dug in company strong
points (see figure 10-14). Covered slit trenches (dugouts to protect against shock,
radiation and incendiary weapons) are dug for crews. One shelter per company
will be built where time allows.
c.
Third. Slit trenches are covered for the company CP, and primary and secondary
entrenchments for the command tank. Fortification preparation for the strong
points for motor or mechanised elements, aid stations and supply platoon area (as
per the motor infantry defence positions).
Figure 10–14: Emplacement for Tank or Armoured Personnel Carrier with Anti-tank
Launcher
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-20
SECTION 10-4.
ROUTES
Lines of Movement
10.45 A line of movement is any military road or track prepared for the movement of military
forces. A military road is any avenue intended for use by wheeled vehicles, a path or
track is an avenue designed for tracked vehicles which runs parallel to military roads.
At water obstacles, wheeled vehicles move on roads and across bridges, while
tracked vehicles move in column on tracks and ford water obstacles. It is possible to
categorise a line of movement by direction (frontal and lateral), significance (primary
and secondary) and vehicle type (wheeled, tracked or mixed).
10.46 A manoeuvre commander will determine what lines of movement the force will use
and reconnaissance determines which lines are available and their condition. The
commander will then instruct the road and bridge construction company of the
divisional engineers to prepare and maintain specific lines of movement. The engineer
commander will either:
a. concentrate work on one section of road, or
b. divide the unit into repair teams to work simultaneously on separate sections of
road.
Route Preparation and Maintenance
10.47 Movement Support Detachment. The MSD usually has responsibility for route
preparation and maintenance at the tactical level. The role of the MSD is seen as vital
to both a rapid advance and to security. Security is considered vital, as any delay to
movement of the main body may cause congestion at an obstacle, creating a target for
artillery or air attack. Once the first echelon is committed to battle, the MSD moves
behind or prepares a route for the committal of the second echelon.
10.48 Composition. An MSD may have infantry, armour and air defence for protection,
tracked diggers, dozers with cranes, dump trucks, tank and truck-launched bridges,
mine detectors and clearers, trucks with explosives and possibly metal trackway, and
NBC reconnaissance. Within its organic resources, a division can form three to four
MSDs of approximately company size.
10.49 Grouping. An MSD will be organised into two or three sub-groups. These are the
reconnaissance and clearance group (or a reconnaissance group and a clearance
group) and the road-bridge group. Some examples of the composition and grouping of
typical MSDs are given in table 10–1.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-21
Table 10–1:
Composition and Grouping of Typical Movement Support Detachments
Variant
(a)
Recon and Clearance Group
(b)
Road-Bridge Group
(c)
1.
Sapper sections (2 x BTR)
MT-55 Tank with mine clearing
equipment.
BAT-M
2-4 x Truck Mounted Scissor (TMM)
2.
IMR
MTK
Sapper section (BTR)
BAT 2/3
2-4 x TMM
Note:
1.
Recon Group
Clearance Group
Road-Bridge
Group
3.
MT-55
IMR,
Sapper sections
BAT 2/3
2-4 x TMM
4.
Helicopter, Sapper section
(truck)
Tank with mine clearing
equipment.
Sapper section (truck)
Tank with BTU
Engr section
2 x BAT-2
2-4 x TMM
5.
Tank with mine clearing
equipment.
Sapper Section (BTR)
IMR
Tank with BTU
MT-55
2-4 x TMM
BAT-M
Any MSD may be reinforced with mechanised infantry or tank troops for local protection. Mechanised
infantry troops may often act as a labour force. A chemical reconnaissance section often accompanies the
MSD.
10.50 The location of the MSD in the march is shown in figure 10–15.
Figure 10–15: Position of the Movement Support Detachment in the March
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-22
10.51 Planning Norms. The ability of an engineer unit to prepare and maintain routes
depends on the amount of work to be done. The MAF GF generally use one of several
planning estimates. Optimally, a road and bridge construction company (or reinforced
combat engineer company) can maintain 80 to 100 kilometres per day of road in the
dry months. If the road receives severe damage, this capability drops to 20 to 40
kilometres per day. Similarly, one company can prepare 50 to 70 kilometres of crosscountry routes per day (increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2.0 for tracked vehicles only).
Preparation rates are degraded by 15 to 25 per cent during the wetter months. Night
reduces performance by a further 25 to 30 per cent, and if the enemy has destroyed
sections of the route, the rate falls by another 50 to 75 per cent.
10.52 Route Marking. Engineers use a standard sets of prefabricated signs to aid traffic
control along a line of movement. They space markers on cross-country routes every
75 to 100 metres so that a driver can see two markers simultaneously. They use fewer
markers on paved roads. The types of signs used on lines of march are:
a. Indicators. Indicator signs are erected on the left-hand side, along a route of
movements or in pairs along both sides of prepared routes within visual range to
indicate the direction of traffic and the intended user.
b. Warnings. Warning signs are set up on the right-hand side of the route, 50 to 70
metres from a hazard to alert drivers and advise a reduction in speed.
c.
Prohibitions. Prohibition signs designate sites where traffic is forbidden.
SECTION 10-5.
PASSAGE THROUGH OBSTACLES
10.53 The MAF GF anticipate having to overcome obstacles to their mobility on the march,
offence and defence, though this is a task most often executed during the attack.
Establishing passage through obstacles will only occur following reconnaissance.
Methods for breaching and creating lanes are then determined.
Types of Obstacles
10.54 The MAF classify obstacles as either:
a. explosive obstacles,
b. non-explosive, or
c.
combined.
Breaching Responsibilities
10.55 Creating passages for mobility in all environments is a primary engineer task. The
MSD has the task of mine-clearing during the march, although the advent of RDM has
resulted in this becoming a task for all troops on the march. Each battalion also forms
an obstacles clearing group (OCG) to create gaps in explosive and non-explosive
obstacles, especially protective obstacles. Normally the OCG follows the first echelon
companies in APC/AFV and moves forward to create gaps for those forces as
required, as illustrated in figure 10–16.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-23
OCG
MR CO
(2D ECHELON)
MR CO
ENEMY
DIRECT
SUPPORT
ARTILLERY
MORTAR BTRY
UP TO
2 KM
BN CP
TK CO
AA SECTION
PLANNED LINE
OF DEPLOYMENT
FOR 2ND ECHELON
BATTALION
SUBSEQUENT
OBJECTIVE
BATTALION
IMMEDIATE
OBJECTIVE
MR CO
0
UP TO
3 KM
ARTY BN
1
2
3KM
Note: A battalion forms an obstacle clearing group which is a mini MSD.
Figure 10–16: Location of Obstacles Clearing Detachment/Obstacles Clearing Group
in the Battalion Attack
10.56 The divisional combat engineer company is organised specifically to clear primarily
obstacles, generally in MSD configuration. The company commander determines the
exact location of the obstacle, ascertains the assets required for the task and develops
the plan. MSD employment in the attack is illustrated in figures 10–17 and 10–18.
Figure 10–17: Location of Movement Support Detachment in the Brigade Attack
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-24
Figure 10–18: Typical Attack Formation, Mechanised Division
Note:
1.
Location of the first Divisional MSDs and Regimental MSDs after contact is made.
Breaching Explosive Obstacles
10.57 The most significant explosive obstacle the MAF GF anticipate encountering are
mines. The advent of RDM has increased the threat to rear areas and increased the
emphasis on all-arms breaching. Figure 10–19 graphically represents the action of
breaching through a minefield which has been remotely emplaced.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-25
Figure 10–19: Breaching a Remotely Laid Minefield
10.58 Techniques. Engineers reconnoitre, provide advice on and breach minefields. During
an attack from the line of march however, the engineers will not always conduct the
breach. Infantry, armour and artillery all have an important role to play, with that of the
armour the most significant. The MAF will employ three basic techniques for breaching
explosive obstacles:
a. Clearing By Hand. Hand clearing of minefields is rare, except for the following
situations:
(1) dealing with nuisance mining;
(2) when surprise is required and clearance can be done at night;
(3) when clearing own minefields; and
(4) occasionally, on the approaches to a river crossing.
Teams assigned to hand clear a lane will be equipped with probes, mine
detectors, shovels and lane marking tape.
b. Clearing By Explosives. In an attack on a position with detailed preparation or
during a river crossing, engineers carry out explosive breaching. Explosives used
are generally:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-26
(1) block charges, for example 200 grams trinitrotoluene (TNT) with mechanical
or chemical fuzes;
(2) manually placed line charges, such as the UZ-1 and -2 bangalore torpedos
and the BDT mine-clearing charge (towed up to the minefield then winched
across);
(3) rocket assisted emplaced line charge, such as the UZR-3 triple charge
bangalore torpedo and MTK/MK-2 armoured mine-clearer. This projects an
explosive hose to a depth of 180 metres, and, being amphibious, is
particularly valuable in river crossings as it can clear a path on the enemy
bank for APCs swimming over to exploit; or
(4) fuel air explosives delivered by artillery.
c.
Clearing By Mechanical Means. The use of rollers and ploughs (in conjunction
with line charges) is the primary means of breaching enemy minefields. Tanks
fitted with ploughs and rollers move to detect the forward edge of the obstacle
approximately 70 to 100 metres in front of the first echelon. On detecting the
forward edge, they signal using coloured smoke, and clearing commences once
the other ploughs and line charges move forward. Tanks will plough through
minefields in platoon or company columns. As ploughing tanks can only advance
at about six kilometres per hour and columns are very vulnerable, doctrine
emphasises the plentiful use of smoke and strong artillery support.
10.59 Regardless of the exact number, passage must guarantee that armoured and infantry
companies can attack simultaneously. One lane is provided for each first echelon
infantry or tank platoon, totalling six per battalion. Each lane is then widened by the
OCG or the engineers, who will fully clear at least two of the lanes using bangalore
torpedoes or line charges to ensure safe passage for artillery and logistic vehicles. If
operating in a nuclear environment, only one lane is cleared per company.
Non-Explosive Obstacles Breaching Techniques
10.60 Non-explosive anti-tank obstacles, anti-personnel wire obstacles, abatis, other log
obstacles, and natural barriers are expected to be encountered on the battlefield.
Crossing points are established at a minimum rate of one lane per first echelon
battalion and the OCGs are used for this task. Each may have an MTU bridgelayer
and engineer mine-clearing vehicle, and each tank company will also operate with
BTUs (dozer blade). The OCG mounted on APCs will move forward of the first
echelon company when ready to establish passages in the obstacles. On arriving at
an obstacle, troops dismount and reconnoitre under covering fire.
10.61 Passage will be established by the appropriate means, in particular:
a. Dry ditches are filled by tank blades, or charges set to collapse the sides.
b. Crossings are built over wet gaps using the TMM, MTU20 or wooden
constructions.
c.
Dragon’s teeth and rock barriers are cleared using explosives.
d. Wire is cleared using tanks, artillery and mortar fire, explosives (bangalore
torpedoes), and by hand using wire cutters, bayonets and special entrenching
tools. Wire obstacles are often hand-cleared by infantry soldiers.
e. Log barriers are cleared with explosives and the debris removed with earth
movers.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-27
Combined Obstacles
Figure 10–20: Minefield Breaching
ANTI-TANK MINEFIELD
BANGALORE TORPEDO
TANK W/DOZER BLADE
TANK W/ROLLERS
TANK W/PLOUGH
LOC OF ROLLER INSTALLATION
LANE WIDENED BY PLOUGH ROLLER
BREACH BY LINEAR CHARGE
ROLLER TX BREACH
LEGEND
SM
ATTACK SECTION
PLOUGH TX BREACH
ACV
10.62 Passage through combined obstacles requires engineers with the MSD or OCG to
dismount and clear the region of mines under covering fire. Once the extent and type
of explosive obstacle is determined, it may be cleared with explosive charges. The
non-explosive obstacles can then be dealt with. Figure 10–20 illustrates the conduct of
this activity.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-28
Lane Marking
10.63 Prior to the breach, minefield boundaries along the forward edge are marked with onesided signs not visible to the enemy forces. On clearance, lanes are marked, with
special signals lights posted if this occurs at night. If lanes are cleared using
explosives, the track is considered adequate marking for the first echelon units. After
the first echelon units pass through, the lanes are staked and signposted for the
second echelon and reserve passage.
10.64 The unit which cleared the lane is usually responsible for its marking and traffic
control; in most cases, this will be the engineers. At an appropriate time, control of
lanes and traffic is handed over to the Commandant’s Service2 for maintenance,
widening and closure where necessary.
SECTION 10-6.
GAP CROSSING
10.65 Detailed reconnaissance on a broad front is conducted prior to the commencement of
any gap crossing, in particular for wet gap crossings. It is expected that the enemy will
try to hold, or at least to delay on river lines. Ideally, such attempts to do so will be preempted and thwarted by the actions of forward detachments, air assault or landing
forces, resulting in the main forces being destroyed on the home bank as they try to
withdraw. Whether or not such operations succeed, formations will endeavour to cross
water obstacles on a wide frontage, directly from the march without pause, and
develop the attack into the depth without halting to consolidate. If a crossing from the
march does not succeed, a further effort with brief or even detailed preparation will be
mounted:
a. Crossings over small rivers (up to 100 metres wide) are organised at divsional/
brigade level, largely using organic engineer resources.
b. The crossing of medium rivers (100-150 metres wide) and major rivers (those over
150 metres wide) are considered a SG-level problem.
Assault River Crossing
10.66 The assault river crossing is a crossing over a water obstacle where the enemy is
defending on the far bank. They are usually made from the march during the offensive.
The objective of an assault river crossing is to project combat power onto the far side
of the obstacles and seek to destroy the retreating enemy.
10.67 In order to ensure a high rate of advance, assault river crossings must be planned well
in advance and the means must be appropriately positioned within the formation.
Forward detachments are expected to cross in one to two hours, first echelon divisions
or brigades in six to nine hours and the combat elements of the whole expeditionary
army in 15 to 24 hours. To achieve these demanding timings, the following tactical and
engineer measures are necessary:
a. Crossing Sites. Each first echelon lower formation initially establishes at least
three assault crossing points (one to two for each leading regiment or one per
combined arms battalion). Three to four crossings are then established for heavy
ferries and amphibians, three to four underwater or fording points for tanks (if the
nature of the river allows, as the current must be less than 1.5 metres per second)
and, eventually, one to two pontoon bridges. Figure 10–21 illustrates the
organisation of various types of crossing sites.
2
The Commandants service comprises toops deployed by staff at all levels for the
purpose of maintaining order in areas where troops are disposed or deployed, for the
regulation of traffic and monitoring the observance by troops of camouflage measures.
The Commandant’s Service operates along march routes, in the vicinity of waiting
areas, rear units and establishments, at passages through obstacles and contaminated
areas, at water crossings, etc.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-29
b. Deployment of Engineer Resources. Bridging and ferrying units are positioned well
forward to ensure a speedy build-up on the far bank. Otherwise, the enemy will
have time to bring up reserves or forces from its passive sectors and seal off the
bridgehead. Forward detachments will have assault crossing equipment attached.
Other engineer elements, assigned to support the crossing of the main forces of
first echelon divisions or brigades, will move immediately behind the forward
detachments if the far bank is weakly defended. If, however, the defence is strong,
such elements will move within the main body of each division. The pontoon
bridging will probably follow the first echelon of leading lower formations, with the
aim of rapidly facilitating the crossing of the second echelon by bridge.
c.
Strategic Group Assault Crossings. In addition to assault crossing and bridging
equipment, SGs possess large quantities of line of communications (LofC)
bridging. At the earliest possible moment, these are used to replace tactical
bridges to free the latter for future tactical use elsewhere. Construction of LofC
bridging could start as early as 180 hours after the initial crossing.
FIGHTER
COVER
TAC AVIATION
SUPPORT
ARTILLERY BATTERY
(DUG-IN POSITIONS)
DIRECT FIRE BY
TANKS AND ARTILLERY
AMPHIBIOUS TANKS
FIRING IN WATER
OP
ENEMY
POSITIONS
ARTILLERY ON
TRACKED AMPHIBIANS
(K-61/PTS)
1 PLT
CC
2 PLT
CROSSING
COMMANDER
DIRECT FIRE FROM
ARTILLERY IN
CONCEALED POSITIONS
3 PLT
MOTORIZED RIFLE
TROOPS ON BMP’s
Figure 10–21: Assault Crossing Schematic
Engineer Support to Assault River Crossing
10.68 Engineer support to an assault crossing (figure 10–23) includes:
a. continuous reconnaissance from OPs and the use of patrols along the river and
adjacent terrain;
b. advice to formation commanders on the choice of crossing sites, though tactical
realities may compel the utilisation of less than optimal points initially;
c.
clearance of the banks, river bed and approach routes;
d. preparation or improvement of routes to the crossing sites, establishment of the
sites themselves (including retrieval) and organisation of a Commandant’s Service
there;
e. delivery of assault crossing equipment to the river;
f.
preparation of combat equipment loading sites;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-30
g. preparation of cover for Commandant’s Service;
h. conduct of camouflage measures and the creation of dummy crossing sites as part
of the deception plan; and
i.
establishment of rescue and evacuation services.
10.69 Combat reconnaissance groups with up to a platoon of amphibious APCs are tasked
with gathering information on the river in the battalion’s forced crossing sector.
Operating on a wide front, the patrol can reconnoitre two or three sites favourable for a
crossing in a relatively short time and also reconnoitres the approaches to them.
10.70 To refine information on locations favourable for the conduct of an assault crossing,
engineer sub-units assigned to prepare the sites send out engineer RPs at the rate of
one for each crossing. These patrols observe enemy defences, measure the width and
depth of water obstacles, current speed, inspect the bank, reconnoitre the river bed
and adjacent terrain, noting carefully the presence of obstacles.
Figure 10–22: Key to be used with figures 10–23 to 10–26
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-31
Figure 10–23: Engineer Support of a Motorised Infantry Battalion Crossing
10.71 Units approach the river from traffic control points along routes that have been
prepared during the attack. As they proceed, the MSD and the units assigned to
support the crossing prepare cross-country tracks. A riverside lateral LofC is prepared
three to five kilometres from the water obstacle to allow units and crossing vehicles to
manoeuvre along it.
10.72 During route preparation, engineer units make use of existing roads and concealed
approaches to the river and, when necessary, they construct bypasses around
destroyed and mined sections or clear lanes in minefields and mark routes with road
signs.
10.73 When a river has a steep bank, launching and retrieval points are constructed during
assault crossing preparations. The ground condition, the unavoidability of wetting the
ground and the slope of the bank underwater at the retrieval point where the
swimming vehicles exit the water onto the bank are considered. The slope of the
underwater portion of the exit cannot exceed eight degrees for self-propelled vehicles.
10.74 When the slope or bank is steep, an exit point is built using BTU (BAT) and
concentrated block charges which are prepared before the crossing. The charges are
laid in the bank slopes in two rows at different depths.
10.75 Exit points on the opposite bank are most frequently prepared using explosives after
the first wave crews have crossed. BTUs and BATs are used to clear the launching
and retrieval points after the block charges have been exploded. When necessary, the
freshly turned ground is reinforced with road covering elements and fascine. The
launch and retrieval points are marked with one-sided reference signs.
10.76 Loading areas are prepared on the near shore close to the waterline to load combat
equipment onto the self-propelled assault crossing vehicles. They are established on
terrain that is concealed from enemy observation. Channel sandbars, spits, beaches
and level areas are used for this purpose. Area preparation includes inspecting the
areas for mines and preparing routes. Loading may also take place in the water
without the assault crossing vehicles exiting the water.
10.77 Traffic control points are usually prepared where the cross-country track leading to the
crossing intersects the riverside lateral LofC. Entrenchments are dug for personnel
assigned to maintain the assault crossing and overhead cover is added if time permits.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-32
10.78 Camouflage measures are observed to conceal the assault crossing. This consists of
camouflaging the approach routes and loading areas and creating a smokescreen.
10.79 The assault crossing unit assigned to prepare the crossing, advances to the water
obstacle with first echelon sub-units. The commander of the crossing sub-units
determines the order for loading and landing the first wave, and the use of the assault
craft. An assault crossing platoon leader is assigned as crossing commander. The
commander and traffic control squad move to the water obstacle behind the engineer
RP and, using reconnaissance information, determine and mark the approach route to
the bank, the launch and retrieval points for amphibious vehicles and loading areas.
Traffic control points are established and crossing preparation and maintenance
occurs.
10.80 The crossing commander controls the operations of amphibious vehicle crews during
combat equipment loading and movement in the water. Communications will consist of
a megaphone, radio, light signals and pennants.
10.81 The platoon assault crossing vehicles with the first wave units move from the loading
area to the marked crossing axis and though the water at 50 to 100 metre intervals.
10.82 Some of the personnel and equipment from the engineer unit assigned to prepare the
assault crossing usually move with the first wave under command of the assistant
crossing commander. They inspect the opposite bank for mines and when necessary,
clear lanes in obstacles, and prepare and mark water exits for amphibious vehicles.
10.83 After unloading, amphibious vehicles return to the near shore to bring the next wave
across. The amphibious vehicle and crossing vehicle crews load and unload combat
equipment.
10.84 Traffic control points regulate the movement of successive waves to the location
where they are to be loaded on amphibious vehicles. Equipment that is waiting to be
loaded is hidden in assigned areas using terrain folds and natural cover.
10.85 Amphibious vehicles enter the water in first or second gear. They use second gear
instead of propellers when crossing shoals. The amphibious vehicles move through
the water at maximum speed and, when the tracks touch the ground, they revert to
first gear.
10.86 Once the crossing is completed, the amphibious vehicles concentrate at the indicated
area (usually on the opposite bank) on the commandant’s signal, and their crews
perform technical servicing and prepare the vehicles to complete the march.
10.87 If mechanised infantry units organise the crossing on their organic amphibious APCs
or IFVs, then an officer from the forces making the crossing is usually assigned as
assault crossing commander. One or two combat engineer squads are assigned to
reinforce the first echelon motorised rifle battalion in battle.
Ferry Crossings
10.88 Ferry crossings are conducted to cross tanks, artillery, APCs, wheeled vehicles and
other bulky equipment. Tracked self-propelled ferries and transport ferries from the
authorised pontoon fleet as well as ferries gathered from local amphibious means are
used for the crossing.
10.89 Tracked self-propelled ferry sub-units and pontoon sub-units advance to the river
behind the first echelon sub-units. They start assembling ferries after the opposite
shore has been taken by the first echelon sub-units.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-33
10.90 Ferry crossing capacity is usually around the size of a tank platoon or artillery battery.
The number of ferries in one ferry crossing depends on the width of the water
obstacles and its current speed. There are usually two or three ferries operating per
crossing on rivers up to 300 metres wide and, when the river exceeds 300 metres,
there may be up to four. As a rule, ferry crossings are not used to assault across
narrow rivers, instead bridges are immediately assembled or launched.
10.91 Tanks cross on ferries in waves. Those tanks next to go, advance to the bank (loading
site) and the remainder assemble in concealed areas or take up positions to fire at the
enemy defending the opposite bank.
Engineer Support to Ferry Crossings
10.92 Ferry crossings involve primarily the same mission as an assault crossing. Engineers
are tasked with:
a. preparing mooring sites to tie ferries to the bank,
b. preparing areas for unloading pontoon vehicles and towing equipment into the
water, and
c.
assembling the ferries.
10.93 Ferry crossings (figure 10–24) are usually set up on sections of water obstacles that
have gently sloping banks, sufficient depth and nothing submerged along the banks or
in the ferries’ direction of movement.
10.94 Based on the results of engineer reconnaissance, the assault crossing platoon leader
makes a decision on the preparation and maintenance of the crossing. He determines
the number of ferries, the method for moving them into the water, the number of
moorings, the composition and location of traffic control points, rescue and evacuation
points and, when necessary, river security.
10.95 Cross-country tracks are prepared and marked to move pontoon units and GSP
crews. This is done on the basis of one track per unit from the riverside lateral LofC to
the natural cover closest to the river, and one track per mooring from there to the
water line.
10.96 When possible, areas for unloading the pontoon/bridge fleet from the automotive
transport are prepared in locations covered from enemy observation. Area preparation
includes inspecting the terrain for mines, selecting and marking approach routes,
levelling the area when necessary, filling in craters and holes and clearing the area of
rocks and stumps. Shore platoons carry out these tasks.
10.97 Approaches to the water, launching sites and exit points on the opposite bank are
prepared while ferries are being assembled. Launching and exit points must be no
less than five metres wide and their slope cannot exceed 10 degrees.
10.98 After ferries have been assembled and the moorings prepared, personnel not busy
servicing the ferries dig trenches as cover for personnel assigned to support the
crossing. They then reconnoitre and prepare a reserve location for a ferry crossing as
well as moorings.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-34
Figure 10–24: Engineer Support of a Ferry Crossing Site
10.99 The platoon and traffic control squad move to the water obstacle behind the tank unit.
When they come out on the river, the tanks in the first wave take up firing positions
near where the ferry crossing has been set up.
10.100 The assault crossing platoon leader with his attached engineer unit (combat engineers
or road and bridge construction engineers) prepare and mark a ramp into the water for
the ferries and the areas for loading and unloading tanks. A two-man crew is assigned
to anchor the ferries while they are being secured by rope.
10.101 The pontoon/bridge company usually follows the first echelon sub-units to the crossing
site allocated. After the river has been reconnoitred and while the vehicles are being
unloaded, some pontoon personnel cross over to the far bank where they begin
constructing moorings and exit points.
10.102 The company commander assigns a senior soldier and a service crew to each ferry to
maintain the ferry crossing. He also assigns motor launch crews, whose responsibility
it is to load and secure combat equipment, cast off and move to the far bank, unload
the ferried combat equipment and return to the near shore.
10.103 Depending on the nature of the river and the availability of towing equipment, the
ferries can be either pushed or towed by launches or rope.
Bridge Crossings
10.104 Bridges provide the greatest capacity for river crossings. The physical and tactical
situation will dictate whether floating bridges are launched, low-level floating bridges
used or floating bridges with fixed approach spans are built.
10.105 Floating bridges and truck-mounted treadway bridges are launched on sections of a
river with narrow widths, slow current speeds (less than 0.5 metres per second) and
appropriate depths. Truck-mounted bridges allow bridge crossings to be prepared over
obstacles up to 40 metres wide in a short time. These rivers also allow combined
crossings on elements of wooden bridges and earth embankments. Floating bridges
and truck-mounted bridges can be replaced with low-level wooden floating bridges
assembled from prefabricated elements or built from local construction material.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-35
10.106 Floating bridges can only be used to cross wide rivers at night, and will most often be
used when there is a shortage of crossing equipment. At dawn these bridges are
dismantled and ferry crossing resumes.
10.107 Bridge construction sites will be selected so that the near bank is gently sloped, has
good launching points, concealed areas for deploying crossing equipment reserves
and wheeled transport, and also a well developed road network. The opposite bank
should allow rapid bridge exit preparation.
Engineer Support to Bridge Crossing
10.108 Engineer support to a bridge crossing begins with an engineer reconnaissance of the
water obstacle to select a site for assembling (or constructing) the bridge. The
preparation of a bridge crossing (figure 10–25) includes:
a. preparing routes for moving to the river and returning to pontoon parks and
transportation;
b. preparing areas for unloading pontoon sections (bridge construction elements);
and
c.
assembling the floating bridge, or partially building bridges on rigid supports and,
when building a bridge with fixed approach span, adding the floating section.
10.109 At the same time, engineers:
a. construct cover for traffic control personnel,
b. prepare locations for wheeled transportation after they are unloaded, and
c.
assemble the reserve crossing for wheeled vehicles.
Figure 10–25: Engineer Support of a Bridge Crossing
10.110 During the engineer reconnaissance, special attention is paid to finding a near bank
that is gently sloping with good approaches to the water line, and whose flood land
and banks have firm soil to provide passage for heavy equipment.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-36
10.111 Preparing an access route to the crossing should make use of an existing road as well
as routes prepared by attacking sub-units. When conditions are favourable and there
are forces and equipment available, two routes, one for wheeled and the other for
tracked equipment, are prepared.
10.112 Pontoon units use attached BAT route clearers to prepare a route along the near bank
(an unloading area) with branches according to the number of transports to be
unloaded simultaneously. They also prepare a route from the unloading areas to the
area for assembling transportation after it has been unloaded.
10.113 Pontoon units unload as many launches and fleet sections as possible on a wide front.
Vehicles being unloaded move parallel to the river bank, turn and back sections into
the river, release them into the water and then move to the assembly areas. Water
depth must be at least 0.5 metres (when the bank is steep, at least one metre) when
PMP fleet sections are unloaded.
10.114 When the bridge is launched along the near bank, the floating portion is usually
assembled upstream from the bridge axis and then turned across the river, lined up
with the bridge and anchored. The bridge is then coupled to the bank.
10.115 When the bridge is launched by individual sections, the whole bridge is assembled
piecemeal and towed while under construction. A bridge launched with ferries uses the
same sequence as when launched by sections, but instead of assembling sections,
they assemble and align ferries from one or both banks.
10.116 To maintain the bridge crossing, the pontoon unit leader (crossing commander)
assigns a bridge party to monitor the operation, bridge security, bank party to maintain
routes, duty unit, traffic control points and OPs to observe the river and establish
rescue and evacuation services.
10.117 The MAF GF also employ bridgelayers, mechanical bridges and road and bridge
construction sets in various combinations to cross dry valleys, small rivers, ox-bow
lakes and canals.
Fording and Underwater Crossing
10.118 Tank crossings at deep fords and underwater crossings are established to increase
the tempo of tank sub-unit crossings and to achieve surprise crossing water obstacles.
This method gives the MAF GF the capability of crossing a large number of tanks on a
wide front in a relatively short time and reduces losses in assault crossing equipment.
However, this method can be used only in sections of the river that have good,
conventional approaches and exits, with a bottom which is level and hard. There
cannot be holes, craters, large boulders or other obstacles on the river bottom. In
order for medium tanks to cross under water, the river cannot exceed five metres and
the current cannot exceed two metres per second. The allowable ford depth that tanks
can cross using partial pressurisation depends on the current speed and can be 2.5
metres with a current speed of up to one metre per second; 2.4 metres with a current
speed of up to two metres per second; and 2.3 metres when the current speed
exceeds two metres per second.
10.119 Tanks cross along prepared routes at slow speeds, without changing gears or
direction. They maintain a distance of at least 50 metres between tanks and a tank
battalion is assigned one or two prepared routes for crossing.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-37
10.120 Fording is one of the basic methods that units use to cross shallow rivers. This allows
tanks and other equipment to cross simultaneously at the beginning of the crossing.
Engineer Support to Fording and Underwater Crossing
10.121 Engineer support to tank crossings at deep fords and underwater fords (figure 10–26)
includes:
a. inspecting the assigned crossing site for enemy obstacles on the approaches and
in the water,
b. reconnoitring and preparing a track for tanks to move along the bottom,
c.
constructing entrances into the river and exits from it, and
d. building cover for traffic control and rescue and evacuation personnel.
Figure 10–26: Engineer Support at a Tank Underwater Crossing Site
10.122 When reconnoitring an underwater tank crossing and deep fords, RPs operate with
two divers and a engineer-scout with a mine detector, bottom prod and use block
charges to destroy mine obstacles. They determine the quality of bottom soil and the
landing strip along the river bank, while the remaining members of the patrol check the
river profile on a tracked amphibious transport with river surveillance equipment and
other instruments. When they detect holes, craters, boulders and underwater
obstacles, these are marked with buoys. Crossing borders are marked with signs and
axis signs are set up along the axis on the banks.
10.123 One or two engineer-sapper squads, two tanks (with ploughs and BTU’s) and other
equipment are assigned to prepare underwater tank crossings and deep fords. When
underwater tank crossings and deep fording commences, engineer squads maintain
approach routes, entrances into and exits from the water. Units that are crossing set
up their own traffic control, rescue and evacuation services.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-38
10.124 Ford crossings are the primary means for troops to cross shallow rivers. When
preparing ford crossings, the area is reconnoitred and mine obstacles and other
barriers in the river and approaches to it are cleared to a width of 10 metres, the
bottom of the river is levelled, entrances and exits from the river are established and
the crossing borders are marked. When the river bottom and the banks have loose
soil, they are reinforced with rocks, crushed stone, wooden lane covering or fascine
paving.
SECTION 10-7.
ENGINEER OBSTACLES
10.125 Engineer obstacles inflict both personnel and equipment losses on the enemy forces,
delay enemy movement and impede enemy manoeuvre in all types of operations.
Combat engineers are responsible for establishing obstacles and carrying out
demolitions. They must remain firm against all types of enemy fire-power and be
difficult to breach. Obstacles are closely tied into the fire plan, both direct and indirect,
but are designed not to hamper the manoeuvre of friendly forces. Most importantly,
obstacles conform with the terrain and climatic conditions.
Mobile Obstacle Detachment
10.126 MODs are formed at every level from unit to SG and are a standard feature of tactical
and operational formations. They consist of anything between an engineer squad to
company with two or three mine-laying vehicles per platoon. The MODs deploy with
defending units and the anti-tank reserves.
10.127 Tasks. MODs lay minefields, dig anti-tank ditches, carry out demolitions and create
other obstacles such as abatis. In defence, they help to prepare the obstacle systems
and, once the attack commences, they wait concealed to create new obstacles on the
most threatened directions. Whether on the attack or in defence, they are used to:
a. protect the deployment lines of attacking/counter-attacking forces;
b. cover the flanks of formations/units;
c.
fill in gaps which exist or develop within operational or tactical formations;
d. gain time for the mounting of counter-moves;
e. cover gun lines;
f.
help to seal encircled forces; and
g. aid in deception by creating dummy OPs.
MODs normally work in close conjunction with the anti-tank reserves during the course
of an operation or battle, their work materially contributing to their survivability and to
the stability of the defence.
10.128 Composition. MODs are built around minelayers. Divisional engineer battalion
minelayers may be used to reinforce the MODs of subordinate formations or units as
well as to form two to three MODs of their own. In addition to minelayers, MODs will
have trucks with extra mines, explosives for demolition and the creation of obstacles.
MODs will often have dozers, road harrows and mechanical ditchers for obstacle
creation and for digging in elements of the anti-tank reserve.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-39
10.129 During the Offence. In the offensive, the MOD will usually move forward with the antitank reserve, either on an open flank or in a central position, ready to deploy to any
threatened direction; in the latter case, they usually advance behind the first echelon
to ensure a prompt response to any threat (figure 10–27).
Enemy
Enemy
Advance
Guard
Deployed
Reconnaissance
Advance Guard
MOD
MOD
Advance Guard
S2 Artillery
Battery Deployed
Main Body
Main Body
2. The Advance Guard Engages the Enemy While the Main
Body Begins a Sweep into the Enemy’s Flank.
Reconnaissance Detects and Reports Enemy
Enemy Armour Threat
Enemy
Advance
Guard
Deployed
Reconnaissance
Main Body
MOD
3. As the Main Body Drives Toward the Enemy’s Flank, Reconnaissance Detects an Enemy Armour Threat
to the Main Body’s Flank.
Enemy Armour Threat
Enemy
Main Body
AT Missile
Battery
D
Advance
Guard
Deployed
M
O
1.
AT
Mines
4. The Main Body Deploys its MOD to emplace Mines and Antitank Weapons to stop the Enemy Armor Threat. Once Secure
from the Armour Threat, the Main Body can Continue its Drive into the Enemy’s Flank.
Figure 10–27: Mobile Obstacle Detachment Support to the Attack
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-40
10.130 During the Defence. In defence, the MOD lurk concealed in hides on a threatened
axis or flank, or in a central position, often between the first and second echelon. The
GF consider the element of surprise crucial in mine warfare. Minefields laid well in
advance can be discovered by enemy reconnaissance and timely measures can be
taken to neutralise them. It is therefore often more efficient to lay a minefield during
the course of a battle, preferably at the last minute, directly in the path of a developing
threat. Such a use of mines is not only tactically advantageous, but economical in
resources, which may be an important consideration when supplies are limited.
Explosive Obstacles
10.131 Tactical Minefields. Tactical minefields figure largely in defence, whether deliberate
or situational. They help to compensate for numerical inferiority and they win precious
time to react to an attack. They are laid in front of defensive positions and in depth, to
help to break up the attack and to canalise the enemy into engagement areas. They
may also be used to cover gaps in combat formations, flanks and boundaries. In all
cases, they may be covered by fire, even if, in extremes, it is only that of artillery.
Tactical minefields are usually ordered by formation commanders in order to influence
the course of battle.
10.132 Tactical Minefield Design. The usual practice is to lay panels of three or four parallel
rows of mines. A tactical minefield will comprise of at least two such panels, generally
three and sometimes even four. Panels are laid at such distances from the forward
line of defence as to allow for a graduated increase in the numbers of weapons which
can be brought to bear against an advancing enemy. The estimated stopping power of
typical panels is illustrated in table 10–2. Thus, a typical tactical minefield will have a
panel configuration of:
a. the first panel will be laid about 3 000 to 4 000 metres from the forward positions
so that it is covered by the fire of ATGM and artillery (with both HE and laserguided munitions);
b. the second panel will be laid 1 000 to 1 500 metres from the forward positions, at
which range, tank guns, BMP cannons, shorter range ATGM, infantry grenade
launchers and heavy machine guns can add their fire; and
c.
the final panel is almost always 300 to 400 metres distant, where RPGs and small
arms can engage.
Table 10–2:
Estimated Stopping Power of Typical Panels
Anti-Personnel Minefields
Anti-Tank Minefield
(b)
Track Width
(a)
Full
Width
(d)
(c)
(e)
TM 57/62
TM57/62
TM57/62
TMK-2
PMN/
PMD-6N
POMZ
-2M
OZM4
Density per km
550
750
1 000
360
2 000
200
200
Depth of Field (m)
30-80
30-80
45-120
30-80
5-30
10-20
10-20
Number of Rows
3
3
4
3
2-4
2
2
Distance between:
rows (m)
mines (m)
15-40
5.5
15-40
4
15-40
4
15-40
8-10
over 5
1-2
10
10
10
10
45
65
75
75
15
30
63
Per cent chance of
hitting:
tanks
personnel
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-41
10.133 Anti-tank Minefields. Anti-tank minefield rows are 20 to 40 metres apart, often with
one of the rows comprising full width mines. Rows are laid so that the mines form a
chequerboard pattern with a row spacing of four to 5.5 metres between track width
mines and eight to 11 metres between full width mines. The dimensions of panels will
vary greatly, but tend to be between 60 and 120 metres deep. In urban areas, groups
of four to six mines will be placed on narrow streets and alleys.
10.134 Anti-personnel and Mixed Minefields. Anti-personnel and mixed panels are used in
tactical minefields and are located on dismounted infantry approaches or closest to the
defensive position. Minefields are never mixed within a row, rather homogeneous rows
of either type are emplaced.
10.135 Other Minefields. Other minefields include:
a. Protective Minefields. If sappers have not laid a panel immediately in front of an
infantry position, sub-units will hand-lay their own protective minefield for close-in
protection from 30 metres forward of their positions (figure 10–28). They can also
create small, instant anti-personnel mine obstacles using the 100 metres range
PKM man-portable dispensers. Air-landing detachments will usually have enough
mines to create these sorts of obstacles.
Figure 10–28: Protective Minefields in Front of Defensive Positions
b. Nuisance Mining. Nuisance mining is favoured by the MAF GF, particularly in
mobile defence, retrograde operations and by forward, and raiding detachments
and groups. This type of mining is used to incite caution on the part of the enemy,
thus slowing the momentum and disrupting activities even in the enemy’s depth.
Nuisance minefields are not necessarily covered by fire, though it is desirable,
even if it is only by artillery.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-42
c.
Off-Route Mining. Off-route mining is generally employed for the following
purposes:
(1) as form of nuisance mining which is quite effective and difficult to counter;
(2) for defeating attempts at infiltration by reconnaissance troops; and
(3) together with other obstacles such as abatis and conventional mining,
hampering outflanking, forward or raiding detachments/groups.
d. Dummy Minefields. Dummy or decoy minefields are established to mislead the
enemy for the following reasons:
(1) to distract attention from the locations of actual minefields;
(2) to provide withdrawal routes for friendly forces and win time to occupy the
next position while the enemy proves the minefield;
(3) to mislead an enemy bypassing a dummy minefield which, in the interest of
speed, may regard it as flank protection, only to fall victim to a counter-attack
through it; and
(4) these may be the only answer in secondary sectors when mine resources are
low.
Dummy minefields are constructed by digging up the ground, leaving signs of
engineer activity and emplacing minefield markers. An aid to the deception may be
a single row of active mines, or one or two inert rows to give plausibility to the
deception.
e. Anti-Helicopter Minefields. Anti-Helicopter minefields are laid on likely avenues of
approach both to cause casualties and to force the helicopters to gain altitude and
thus expose themselves to ground fire from which the terrain previously sheltered
them.
Speed and Methods of Laying
10.136 Mechanical Laying of Anti-Tank Mines. GMZ or PMR mine trailers towed by a BTR
or a truck will lay buried mines at about six kilometres per hour on clear ground. Thus
a platoon of three can expend a basic load of 200 mines to create:
a. a panel 1 100 metres long, comprising three rows where buried mines are laid 5.5
metres apart in 22 minutes;
b. a panel 800 metres long, comprising three rows where buried mines are laid four
metres apart in 16 minutes; and
c.
a panel utilising emergency, surface laying and laying of mines in existing furrows
takes half the time.
10.137 After laying, minelayers replenish, a task which takes about 20 minutes. The load for
the PMR is usually dependent on the prime mover. Armed mines may be laid with this
method however, if unarmed mines are laid, an additional two or three sappers will act
as the arming party. The timings are purely for laying and take no account of the time
required for reconnaissance, the issue of orders and the marking of the field limits.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-43
10.138 Anti-Personnel Mines. Currently, anti-personnel mines have to be emplaced by hand
or delivered by the UMZ dispenser system carried on the back of a load carrier, and
firing 11 520 x PFM-1S or 720 x POM-2S per salvo out to 100 metres. Frequently,
anti-personnel mines are not laid, save perhaps in the panel nearest to the forward
positions, as they complicate the recovery of the mines for future use.
10.139 Aircraft Laying. Ground attack aircraft can carry up to eight KMGU dispensers, each
with 12 anti-tank mines. Medium lift helicopters can surface-lay anti-tank mines (200
per load) at five metres spacing using chutes. A flight of three can create a panel
1 000 metres long in five minutes. Alternatively, helicopters can use the PKP-1
dispenser, laying a 2 400 x 50 metre strip, though with only half the density of a chutelaid panel.
10.140 Anti-tank Ditches. The presence of anti-tank ditching in explosive obstacles
considerably improves the stopping power of a minefield. MDK-2M will create a ditch
4.5 metres deep and four metres wide, the time required depending on the nature of
the soil.
10.141 Controlled Minefields. Where the tactical situation dictates and time allows, a
controlled minefield may be hand-laid. This is often desirable where a manoeuvre
defence is required, for example, friendly forces may have to withdraw, counter-attack
or resume the offensive across it.
10.142 Remotely-Delivered Mines. Tube or MBRL delivered RDMs are used to increase the
density of a tactical minefield or reseed it after a breach. They may also be the only
means of covering areas unsuitable for mechanical laying such as areas subject to
inundation or under thick crops.
Non-explosive Obstacles
10.143 Non-explosive obstacles are categorised according to function, including:
a. anti-tank;
b. anti-personnel; and
c.
anti-assault landing.
10.144 There is also a range of non-explosive obstacles:
a. Ditches. Anti-tank ditches are dug on tank-favourable avenues of approach both
on level terrain and on gentle slopes (up to 15 degrees). They are dug using earthmoving equipment or explosive devices.
b. Escarpments and Counterscrapes. Escarpments and counterscrapes are set up
on slopes on an angle of 15 to 45 degrees and turned appropriately towards the
enemy and friendly forces respectively. Figures 10–29 and 10–30 illustrate some
of these types of obstacles.
c.
Dragon’s Teeth. Dragon’s teeth are wooden, metallic, stone or ferroconcrete
tetrahedrons, which are set up in rows and placed in areas making them difficult
for enemy to tanks to traverse.
d. Barriers. Mobile and permanent barriers are constructed mainly from barbed and
plain wire. Mobile barriers are used to quickly cover passages in demolished
sections of obstacles and also when it is difficult to establish other types of
obstacles.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-44
e. Anti-assault Landing. Anti-assault landing non-explosive obstacles are a
combination of the above, including two-horned dragon’s teeth, concrete
tetrahedron, and others, which are placed in the water using boats.
f.
Craters. Road cratering is a common activity. Planning figures for one squad
(likely to be assisted with an auger) are:
(1) 30 to 45 minutes for an eight metre crater;
(2) one to two hours for a 12 to 15 metre crater; and
(3) 1.5 to 2.5 hours for a 12 to 15 metre crater.
10.145 Non-explosive obstacles are not placed in patterns and are erected by both engineers
and force troops.
Figure 10–29: Side Hill Cut
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-45
Figure 10–30: Escarpment/Counterscrape Techniques
Combined Obstacles
10.146 Non-explosive anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles are used independently or in
combination with other types of obstacles, including mixed minefields and trip flares.
Often gaps are left in non-explosive obstacles for friendly troops to manoeuvre
through; these passages are then closed with mines. Figure 10–31 is a diagram of a
combined tactical obstacle belt.
“A”
3
2
1
“B”
“LION”
Figure 10–31: Combined Tactical Obstacles
GL PL
M
M
LAKE
“C”
KEY:
M
M
MOVING BARRAGE
STANDING BARRAGE
PLATOON POSN
BMP
NUISANCE MINEFIELD
OFF-ROUTE MINE
ANTI-TANK DITCH
DEMOLITION
PROTECTIVE MINEFIELD
PANEL OF MINEFIELD
KEY:
MARKER, START + END OF ROW
FLAG, SHOWING LIMIT OF PANEL
GMZ
20-40M
20-40M
GMZ PLATOON LAYING A PANEL
300-400M
(COVERED BY
ARTY,ATGM,
TKS,HMGs,
RPGs,AGS,
SMALL ARMS)
1000-1500M
(COVERED BY
ARTY,ATGM,
TKS,HMGs)
3000M
(COVERED BY
ARTY,MORS,
ATGM)
DISTANCE FROM
FORWARD EDGE
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-46
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-47
Employment of Obstacles
10.147 Employment norms for establishing obstacles are:
a. tactical controlled minefields are laid parallel and perpendicular to the defensive
front;
b. one minefield is laid for each platoon along the forward edge;
c.
minefields are laid on flanks and in gaps between units;
d. engineers lay tactical minefields, while other arms lay protective minefields which
are always perpendicular to the front; and
e. minefields are only marked on the friendly side.
SECTION 10-8.
CAMOUFLAGE
10.148 The term ‘camouflage’ includes concealment, deception and obscurants, many of
which are used in conjunction to project information in a controlled manner.
10.149 Camouflage is used to alter the appearance of personnel and equipment and blend
them with the surrounding terrain. Six types of technical camouflage are used:
a. camouflage paint;
b. artificial camouflage (nets and screens);
c.
anti-radar camouflage;
d. mock-ups (decoys);
e. lights and thermal camouflage; and
f.
smoke camouflage.
On the March
10.150 Measures used in the preparation for and during the march to hamper or prevent the
enemy from discovering the true deployment of units, their actions and intentions are:
a. demonstration actions;
b. selection of terrain with natural screen (thick wooded, gullies, buildings etc);
c.
selection of routes of march that minimise tracks and dust;
d. construction of artificial screens (horizontal and vertical screen, corner reflectors);
e. movement at night, in fog, or under other conditions of low visibility, including
smokescreens created by the use of obscurants;
f.
convoy procedures and light discipline; and
g. concealed rest halts enhanced by individual vehicle screens.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-48
During the Offence
10.151 During the offence, the aims are essentially the same as on the march, and measures
include:
a. selection of terrain for its screening effect;
b. use of obscurants (smokescreens);
c.
use of artificial and natural camouflage screens;
d. simulation of characteristic defensive measures to ‘mine’ the terrain in view of the
enemy using decoy minefields or lending the appearance of reinforced defensive
positions; and
e. use of concealed routes for movement of supplies and reserves.
During the Defence
10.152 During the defence, a number of measures are used to mislead the enemy about the
size and location of forces and weapon systems and about the nature of the defensive
engineer preparations. These measures include:
a. use of screening properties of terrain, darkness and other conditions of limited
visibility during engineer preparations of defensive positions and positioning of
forces;
b. camouflage painting of materiel;
c.
use of local material and standard issue camouflage screens;
d. strict camouflage discipline;
e. construction of false strong points, decoy positions and equipment;
f.
false action to draw attention; and
g. assimilation of minefields and obstacles into the terrain.
SECTION 10-9.
WATER SUPPLY
10.153 Engineer reconnaissance is an essential function in the provision of water to all forces
on the battlefield. Reconnaissance for water is conducted by both engineer RPs and
groups. Detailed site reconnaissance prior to establishing water points is conducted by
the water supply platoon. Part of site selection is determining the quality of the water,
carried out with the assistance of the medical services.
10.154 Water points are established by the water supply platoon in engineer battalions as
close as possible to the front and to force distribution agencies, as engineers have a
limited storage capability.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-49
SECTION 10-10. COMMITTAL OF SECOND ECHELONS AND
OPERATIONAL MANOEUVRE GROUPS
10.155 The committal of a second echelon or operational manoeuvre group (OMG) is one of
the most critical and vulnerable periods of combat. The engineer troops play a vital
part in ensuring its success. They ensure the OMG’s timely arrival on the line of
committal, and provide support for OMG deployment and protection against flank
attacks. Their tasks include:
a. Engineer Reconnaissance. Engineer reconnaissance of the area of the advance
and the sector of committal (not least to assess the impact of battle damage on
routes) is essential. This becomes exceptionally difficult if there is a last minute
change of axis to an unexpected new direction. In this case, a map
reconnaissance must supported by a helicopter survey of the routes.
b. Preparing Routes and Breaching Obstacles. Preparing routes and breaching
obstacles for the movement and deployment of the formation is also critical. These
may be roads used by the first echelon in its advance, either wholly or in part. In
its move to its line of deployment, a division or brigade will require two to three
routes and an expeditionary army, at least five to seven (including two for each
first echelon lower formation and one for army/corps troops). Simultaneously, at
least one to two reserve routes should be created. Ideally, engineer work for the
committal of an OMG or second echelon should be completed by the resources of
the first echelon. In the event of early committal however, these are likely to be
over-stretched. Higher formation engineers (including the reserve) may have to be
used to prepare routes, and MSDs of the OMG/second echelon may even have to
be employed as well. When the exploitation force reaches its line of committal, it
will need even more routes to deploy for battle (usually two for each first echelon
unit). The preparation of these, together with associated minefield breaching and
gap crossing, will be the responsibility of the formation being committed.
c.
Protection of Flanks. Protection of exposed flanks during deployment and the
completion of the breakthrough is extremely important. The MOD of the formation
will aid in increasing the stability of a defensive line established in conjunction with
the anti-tank reserves.
d. Concealment and Deception. Engineer troops will continue to execute operational
measures to conceal movement and deceive the enemy.
10.156 Resources. Preparation of routes must be accomplished in a very limited time, and
bypasses may have to be created where battle damage is especially severe or where
obstacles (including remotely delivered minefields) are insurmountable in the time
available. Thus, strong road sub-units are required and each route will have engineer
road and bridge construction company support allocated to it (this is likely to be in the
form of an MSD). A portion of the engineer reserve may have to be committed to
provide a boost in resources.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
10-50
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-1
CHAPTER 11
MUSORIAN ARMY AVIATION
SECTION 11-1.
BACKGROUND
11.1
Musorian Army Aviation (MAAvn) was raised in 1983, with manning and equipment
relocated from the Air Force. The capability was raised as a result of C2 issues between
the two services. The change to the army was marked by the restructure of MAF GF
divisions to include organic helicopter units, and the raising of the aviation brigade.
11.2
This restructuring represents a remarkable degree of flexibility which is counter to the
traditional Musorian philosophy of over-centralisation. Administrative and logistics links
to the Musorian Air Force still exist, but, as development proceeds, these links may well
be severed.
11.3
Control of MAAvn has been decentralised to ground commanders at divisional level and
below. By ‘relaxing’ this control, the Musorians appear to be attempting to increase the
availability of this valuable combat multiplier to the commander on the battlefield.
SECTION 11-2.
ORGANISATIONS
General
11.4
There are two basic organisations within MAAvn. They are:
a. the divisional aviation battalion (DAvnB), allocated to divisions; and
b. the aviation brigade, which is part of the NAP, and can be allocated to the divisions
for special operations. Detachments from the aviation brigade can be allocated to
the DAvnBs for short periods to achieve local concentration.
11.5
Both organisations can be reinforced for special operations, or when the mission
dictates, by Air Force detachments.
SECTION 11-3.
DIVISIONAL AVIATION BATTALION
Role
11.6
The role of the DAvnB is to conduct anti-armour, anti-helicopter, and aviation support
operations in support of the division.
Tasks
11.7
The tasks of the DAvnB are:
a. CAIRS to the division in all operations;
b. anti-armour operations;
c.
anti-helicopter operations;
d. air assault and airmobile operations in support of divisional operations;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-2
e. commando missions for the division;
f.
formation of the forward detachment and part of the advance or flank guard for the
division in the advance;
g. formation of the FS group for the encounter battle and the deliberate attack;
h. provision of the following specialist tasks to the divisions:
(1) search and attack missions,
(2) capture of crossing sites and obstacles,
(3) destruction of CPs,
(4) isolation of groups on enemy withdrawal routes,
(5) act as counter-attack forces,
(6) destruction of radar, communication and logistic installations, and
i.
to provide other air assault tasks in support of the division, such as envelopment
operations (when reinforced).
Characteristics
11.8
The DAvnB has the following characteristics:
a. Shock Action. Through the use of rapid manoeuvre, the battalion can provide firepower at critical times during an operation. Because of the range of the helicopter,
surprise attacks on rear areas exploit the effects of shock action.
b. Concentration. Command is held at the highest level. Helicopters are employed in
concentration to achieve shock action.
c.
Fire-power. All battalion helicopters are equipped with an offensive capability.
d. Protection. The battalion has one company of assault troopers which, when not
employed on offensive operations, will provide protection to the battalion. All aircraft
operate aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) which improves their survivability in an
air defence environment.
e. Flexibility. The battalion is self-deployable or air portable in heavy lift transport
aircraft. The battalion headquarters can command helicopter detachments from the
aviation brigade for reinforced operations. Platoons can be detached for special
operations, but cannot support themselves. Strikes can easily be conducted to a
range of 150 kilometres by day or night, in all but the most extreme weather
conditions.
f.
Electronic Combat. The battalion often works closely with the reconnaissance and
EC battalion. The reconnaissance and EC battalion enhances the DAvnB’s ability to
attack enemy C3 facilities.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-3
SECTION 11-4.
11.9
THE AVIATION BRIGADE
The aviation brigade is part of the NAP. The brigade, or detachments of it, may be
allocated to divisions for special operations. Detachments will normally be commanded
by the divisional helicopter battalions (DHBs).
Role
11.10 The role of the aviation brigade is to provide organic aviation support to the Army.
Tasks
11.11 The primary tasks allocated to the aviation brigade are:
a. seizure of river crossing sites;
b. seizure of vital ground;
c.
seizure of beachheads;
d. disruption of enemy reserves and support areas;
e. destruction of enemy C3 facilities, including strategic C3 assets;
f.
exploitation after chemical strikes;
g. destruction of enemy chemical delivery means;
h. conduct of operations in mountainous and/or remote terrain;
i.
support to SF operations;
j.
reinforcement of the DAvnB for specific tasks, particularly anti-armour operations;
and
k.
conduct of operations as part of the lodgement force.
Characteristics
11.12 The aviation brigade has the following characteristics:
a. Fire-power. All helicopters in the Brigade have an offensive capability.
b. Flexibility. The brigade can conduct operations independently, but is more effective
when supported by the combined arms team. The brigade headquarters can
command and control elements from other arms and services. Battalions,
companies or platoons can be detached to the DAvnB for special operations. The
brigade can hold ground until relieved by other divisional or army assets.
c.
Shock Action. The brigade achieves shock action through the use of speed, mobility
and fire-power.
d. Concentration. Doctrinal employment specifies concentration of forces. The brigade
is usually employed en masse to achieve a high priority task. The commander is
willing to accept a high casualty rate to achieve the tasks allocated.
e. Command and Control Warfare. The brigade is often employed to attack C3 facilities
deep behind enemy lines, and may be reinforced by the reconnaissance and EC
battalion to achieve maximum disruption of C3 facilities, elements and installations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-4
SECTION 11-5.
GENERIC AVIATION TACTICS AND OPERATIONS
General
11.13 Aviation tactics and operations fall into four broad categories:
a. anti-armour tactics;
b. anti-helicopter tactics;
c.
CAIRS/AFS; and
d. air mobile/air assault operations.
Anti-armour Tactics
11.14 MAAvn anti-armour tactics have been developed on exercises and by assessment of
other armies’ tactics. All aircraft can conduct anti-armour operations, and all anti-armour
operations conform to the same basic tactics. MAAvn commanders are willing to accept
high casualty rates in order to achieve the higher commander’s aim.
11.15 Anti-armour assets of the DAvnB, often reinforced by the aviation brigade, routinely form
part of the leading elements of the division in both offensive and defensive operations.
11.16 The two basic anti-armour procedures are:
a. rolling attack – typified by speed and manoeuvre; and
b. pre-planned ambushes – which are typified by static attacks.
Rolling Attack
11.17 The rolling attack was developed for MAAvn helicopters which were unable to maintain
out-of-ground effect hovers with high fuel and weapons payloads (Hind and Hip). This
reduced agility and manoeuvrability at low airspeeds.
11.18 The anti-armour helicopters usually operate in pairs comprising a leader and a wingman.
A platoon of Hind E/F (seven aircraft) would operate as three pairs with one aircraft as
the attack controller.
11.19 A typical rolling attack by a pair involves an approach speed in excess of 50 knots (100
kilometres per hour) at low level (five to 10 feet above highest obstacle) followed by a
pop-up at approximately five kilometres to the target to fire AT-6 missiles. The wingman
follows the leader and fires approximately two seconds after the leader. Cannon and
machine gun can be used from 2 000 metres to neutralise enemy air defence weapons
while other pairs conduct their missile attack. This is illustrated in figure 11–1.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-5
Figure 11–1: The Rolling Attack
11.20 When the platoon is involved, the same procedure occurs simultaneously along a
frontage of approximately one kilometre. Where possible the rolling attack occurs
against the flank or rear of a target.
Pre-planned Ambushes
11.21 This procedure is also used when conducting FS for a deliberate attack. Basically, the
aircraft move into pre-planned positions which have been reconnoitred by
reconnaissance helicopters. They are allocated targets on the objective, or tanks which
are forming the spearhead of the enemy advance or attack. This is illustrated in figure
11–2.
Figure 11–2: Pre-planned Ambush Attack
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-6
11.22 As far as possible, all anti-armour contacts are coordinated with ground force anti-tank
guided weapons to achieve maximum shock action on an armoured force. Mi-24 and Mi28 have been observed on exercises conducting independent anti-armour operations
deep into the opposing force.
Anti-helicopter Tactics
11.23 Great emphasis has been placed on anti-helicopter operations by the MAF GF. The
MAF GF view enemy attack helicopter employment as having the capability to severely
disrupt their operations.
11.24 There are two types of anti-helicopter tactics:
a. the pre-planned attack; and
b. the search and destroy.
Pre-planned Attack
11.25 The divisional commanders determine likely enemy killing areas and zones which may
affect their advance and/or attack. Likely enemy anti-armour helicopter locations are also
determined. Aware that the enemy tactics involve linear use of helicopters to achieve
maximum fire-power of the asset, the battalion, brigade or detachment commander
plans a flanking attack on the enemy firing position. This type of attack catches the
enemy helicopters, which are in linear formation, aligned in easy fire lanes. This is
usually conducted by sequential pairs of aircraft (particularly the Mi-28). SU-25 are
usually employed in conjunction with helicopters in anti-helicopter operations.
Anti-helicopter Search and Destroy Mission
11.26 The aim of the search and destroy mission is to locate and destroy enemy helicopters
which have, or have the potential to, interfere with MAF GF operations. The offensive
patrolling is conducted by Mi-24 or Mi-28 aircraft providing security to all operations.
Patrolling can extend well into enemy territory to threaten and destroy support
helicopters or their bases.
11.27 For all operations, Mi-24 and Mi-28 aircraft are allocated enemy helicopters as their
priority target. They quickly switch from their current operation, to pursue enemy
helicopters and are willing to ‘tail chase’. With their superior speed and agility, the Mi-24
and Mi-28 can usually achieve the aim in less than five kilometres. They will employ any
available weapon system to achieve success.
Close Air Support and Aerial Fire Support
11.28 CAIRS and AFS provide intimate, direct fire to ground forces. They differ in the following
respects:
a. CAIRS is provided by both helicopters and fighters ground attack (FGAs). When
helicopters conduct CAIRS, they will conduct high speed rolling attacks
characterised by high rates of fire; and
b. AFS is conducted as a specific operation with appropriate fuel and weapons load,
allowing the aircraft to fire from a series of static positions, under detailed direction
from ground forces.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-7
Close Air Support
11.29 CAIRS is generally conducted during highly mobile or short notice operations, or if
appropriate static fire positions are not available, within cannon/MG range. Rolling
attacks similar to those conducted against armour are employed. A minimum number of
runs (typically three) will be conducted, due to the vulnerability of the helicopters.
Maximum rounds will be employed on each attack run, and aircraft will conduct
sequential runs to provide security as other aircraft complete their firing runs. Each run
will be conducted from a different direction, and the passes will be from flanks and, if
possible, from the rear.
11.30 The SU-25 Frogfoot will also conduct CAIRS. These aircraft will be allocated to the
aviation brigade and DAvnB for the duration of an operation. Target marking will
generally be performed by helicopters as the FGA approaches the target. The FGA has
rockets, cannons, missiles and bombs.
Aerial Fire Support
11.31 Helicopters will fire on enemy targets from a series of static firing positions which are
generally in close proximity to friendly ground forces. To a greater extent than CAIRS,
targeting is directed minute-by-minute by the ground forces, and will concentrate on the
destruction of air defence and anti-armour weapons. Helicopters will also employ antiarmour missiles for high value targets, and may use rockets if appropriate area targets
exist.
11.32 In AFS missions, aviation commanders have greater knowledge of the close tactical
situation, thus providing faster, more accurate support to the ground forces. Conversely,
they are intimately involved with the close battle, and are therefore more vulnerable.
AFS missions are similar to the intimate support provided by tanks in the attack.
Air Mobile/Air Assault Operations
11.33 Air mobile and air assault operations will always be supported by offensive aviation, and
usually by offensive air support. Airmobile operations are those operations where
heliborne forces are inserted into an area not directly defended by enemy troops. Air
assault operations, by contrast, are opposed.
11.34 During either type of operation, Hips and Hinds would be supported by tactical fighters
and artillery during the run-in to the target and troop deplaning. The helicopters remain in
the area to suppress enemy fire and for assistance in taking the objective. They may
also control artillery and FGA FS for the ground force commander. An example of an air
assault is at figure 11–3.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-8
Figure 11–3: An Example of an Air Assault
11.35 All offensive fires are closely coordinated during an air assault. FGA aircraft will loiter in
order to provide CAIRS, and will generally be controlled by the helicopters.
SECTION 11-6.
AVIATION SPECIALIST OPERATIONS
11.36 Aviation specialist operations are conducted by both the DAvnB and the aviation brigade
during all phases of operations. The ranges of aviation operations are detailed at figure
11–4.
SF OPS
SEARCH AND ATTACK
SEIZURE OF VITAL GROUND
RECONNAISANCE
ANTI-ARMOUR
CAIRS
AFS
0
50
100
200
300
400
500
RADIUS OF ACTION - MAAvn Aircraft (km)
Figure 11–4: Ranges of Aviation Operations
600
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-9
The Search and Attack Mission
11.37 Up to one third of the reconnaissance and/or attack helicopters will be employed in
aggressive patrolling in an effort to locate and attack or destroy (depending on the
target) any force that it finds. The aim of this type of operation is not necessarily the
destruction or neutralisation of the target, but to demoralise enemy forces while they
conduct reconnaissance, battle procedure or logistics operations. Search and attack
missions can be conducted up to 200 kilometres from the helicopters’ base.
Destruction of Enemy Command, Control and Communications Systems
11.38 Destruction of enemy C3 systems is a paramount role for MAAvn units. It involves deep
penetration behind enemy lines, and into areas with sophisticated air defence weapons
systems. The Musorians are willing to accept heavy losses to achieve the aim.
11.39 The main difficulty lies in locating the equipment which, when destroyed, will render the
system ineffective. Much of the reconnaissance effort of the Air Force and MAAvn will be
devoted to locating C3 systems and it is probable that forces, specifically earmarked, will
be held in readiness for the purpose of destroying them. Attack elements from the
aviation brigade are generally allocated this task.
Seizing River Crossings
11.40 Rivers can present a formidable series of obstacles to advancing forces. Musorian
ground troops possess very effective bridging and ferry equipment, but generally, rivers
are defended and building bridges under fire is a difficult task. Provided conditions are
suitable, including the slope of the banks and the speed of the current, Musorian tanks
may cross.
11.41 Secure river bank areas are therefore a necessity and air assault troops may be used to
capture both banks and set up defensive positions around them. Battalions of the
aviation brigade, reinforced by infantry, artillery, combat engineers and divers are well
suited to such tasks and are able to make certain preparations before the main body
arrives.
11.42 It is generally desirable to capture bridges intact, and this operation is essentially an
airmobile or air assault. Depending on the importance of the bridge, this may be
conducted by either the DAvnB or the aviation brigade.
Seizure of Vital Ground
11.43 Assault troops and air assault helicopters may be employed to capture ground which
dominates Musorian routes forward or ground, the seizure of which makes the enemy
situation untenable. Such attacks ahead of their forward troops will assist in maintaining
the momentum of the Musorian advance.
11.44 On exercises, MAAvn units have been observed landing on the objective held by the
enemy with close support provided by other helicopters.
Disruption of Enemy Reserves
11.45 Musorian observers of the Yom Kippur War watched the Egyptians launch an airmobile
assault over the Suez Canal on the first evening of the campaign. The subsequent
disruption and delay enforced on the forward Israeli reinforcements was extremely
effective. The MAF GF would undoubtedly use the same tactic for the same purpose and
to frustrate troops and hinder the withdrawal of enemy forces.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-10
Exploitation after Chemical Strikes
11.46 It is expected that air assault and airmobile tasks will be conducted within 20 minutes of
chemical strikes to exploit the confusion and occupy important terrain. Even if the
seizure of ground is not contemplated, such forces may conduct armed reconnaissance,
damage assessment and a survey to evaluate chemical hazards.
Seizure of Beachheads
11.47 MAAvn units can be employed to capture beachheads for amphibious forces. Air assault
forces are landed initially on the beach, while other troops are carried further inland to
take key terrain and disrupt the movement of enemy forces.
11.48 Artillery, anti-armour weapons and missiles are underslung or carried as internal loads
on the second wave. Infantry battalions will usually cooperate in such assaults.
Operations in Mountainous Country
11.49 Musorian observers watching the invasion of Afghanistan were impressed with the ability
of helicopters to traverse the most inhospitable terrain. Fast moving CAIRS aircraft and
artillery find it difficult to operate in hilly terrain and, in the ground attack role, armed
helicopters can be much more effective.
11.50 The use of helicopters may be the only way that a commander can reconnoitre his area
and they will often help communications by acting as radio relay stations. Transport
helicopters are used to bring forward supplies and take back casualties as well as lifting
troops to seize vital ground. Armed helicopters also have a role to play in supplementing
local air defence, where the ground limits Musorian radar cover, and reduces the
effectiveness of air defence weapons by masking the approach of enemy aircraft. The
success of operations in Afghanistan was largely due to helicopter support in one form
or another.
Operations with Special Forces
11.51 Aviation cooperation with SF ensures good use is made of the characteristics of both
these elements. Combined operations will include:
a. insertion and extraction of SF teams;
b. resupply of SF teams;
c.
pathfinding or LZ security by SF for conventional airmobile operations such as point
of entry (POE) or beachhead seizure; and
d. interdiction of ships underway.
11.52 Combined training occurs regularly with both the raider battalions and SF battalions.
Aviation support can be provided to SF by the divisional helicopter battalions, but more
often by the aviation brigade.
SECTION 11-7.
OPERATIONS IN THE PHASES OF WAR
General
11.53 The helicopter is being used increasingly in all phases of Musorian GF operations. It
must be remembered that the aviation specialist operations will not change through the
phases of war.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-11
The Advance to Contact
11.54 In the advance, the DAvnB will typically form the forward detachment, seizing vital
ground and other important assets such as bridges. The air assault company of the
DAvnB can be reinforced from other units. The helicopters will typically remain with the
ground forces for security, conducting aggressive patrolling while the advance catches
up. They will then redeploy to a subsequent location.
11.55 The reconnaissance company will be part of the divisional reconnaissance elements,
along with armoured and mechanised units. They will typically be up to 100 kilometres
ahead of the main force. Because of the flexibility of the helicopter, if the rate of advance
is high, aviation reconnaissance may operate 200 kilometres ahead.
11.56 If not employed as the forward detachment, helicopters move with the advance guard,
generally at the point, or in the flank guard.
11.57 The aviation brigade will conduct similar tasks to the DAvnB during regional operations.
Attack detachments from the aviation brigade are typically assigned to the DAvnB in
most operations to ensure maximum use is made of the Havoc’s anti-armour
capabilities.
The Pursuit
11.58 The DAvnB will play a key role in the pursuit. Attack helicopters will maintain contact with
the fleeing enemy. If appropriate, the air assault company can deploy behind the fleeing
enemy to ambush him, or to divide him onto two axes. The attack helicopters can
conduct anti-armour ambushes along the enemy’s withdrawal route.
The Encounter Battle
11.59 Because of the speed with which aviation forces can be deployed and redeployed, they
play a critical part in the encounter battle. Air assault companies, with support from their
helicopters, can quickly conduct an encounter battle against a company-sized enemy.
11.60 When larger enemy forces are involved, the DAvnB will be employed as soon as it
becomes available in an effort to force the enemy to withdraw. In a larger encounter
battle, the DAvnB will attack from the flank or rear, where possible, due to its inherent
mobility.
The Deliberate Attack
11.61 In the deliberate attack, MAAvn unit activity is coordinated with mass concentration of
artillery fire and/or fast moving CAIRS aircraft. The attack may occur in conjunction with
another special operation.
11.62 MAAvn units conduct close FS on the initial objectives for the ground forces while
artillery suppresses enemy air defence and targets which may interfere with the
helicopter operation. This presents a difficult C3 task. Figure 11–5 shows how the
aircraft pass under artillery fire rather than through a corridor cleared by own artillery fire.
In this way the helicopter’s flexibility can be used to better advantage. The attack
helicopters prefer to attack from the flank or rear.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-12
Figure 11–5: A Deliberate Attack
11.63 Reconnaissance aircraft may be tasked with finding the flanks and depth of the enemy
position and to assist with C2 and act as an air observation post (AOP) during the attack.
The Defence
11.64 MAAvn will generally not directly participate in the defence of an objective. Primary roles
and tasks in area defence include any of the operations deemed necessary to disrupt
the enemy build-up in the attack, particularly attacks on enemy FUP and AA, C2
elements, indirect FS assets, and his reserves. MAAvn would also be involved in preplanned ambushes in killing areas along the expected enemy approaches.
11.65 In the mobile defence, aviation units will provide security to ground forces while they
make a clean break. They may also conduct feints in an effort to deceive the enemy that
a counter-attack is occurring, or that a change to offensive operations is underway.
11.66 In retrograde operations, the speed, fire-power and flexibility of the helicopter make their
use critical. They will be employed constantly to ensure minimum casualties are
sustained by ground forces, and that breaks from contact are made cleanly. Helicopters
will play a key role in the counter-attack.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-13
SECTION 11-8.
LOGISTIC SUPPORT
11.67 The three helicopters operated by MAAvn have the following characteristics that are
significant when considering logistics:
a. Interchangeability. Most major aircraft components are interchangeable (engines,
gearboxes etc.) which simplifies service support arrangements and reduces the size
of repair platoons;
b. Simplicity. The aircraft are proven on the battlefield and have few between-service
failures, resulting in high availability rates (80 per cent or better); and
c.
Fuel Requirements. The aircraft are large and relatively inefficient when considering
fuel consumption. A planning figure of 1 800 litres per hour should be used for all
three helicopters.
SECTION 11-9.
DEVELOPMENTS
11.68 MAF GF commanders have seen the effective employment of helicopters and are
developing their capacity to participate in all operations. At all stages, helicopters are
employed in close cooperation with other arms, although some operations will dictate
independent actions.
11.69 With the introduction of Mi-28 and the SU-25 into the MAF GF armoury, new roles and
tasks are constantly being developed. The expansion of the tasks for other aircraft
include:
a. the aerial delivery of mines;
b. deployment of smokescreens;
c.
delivery of chemical weapons and agents; and
d. the deep penetration task (up to 500 kilometres behind the FEBA).
11.70 MAAvn tactics have swung more to the psychological destruction of the enemy, and the
capture of ground to the enemy’s rear, in deference to the capture of immediate vital
ground.
SECTION 11-10. CONCLUSION
11.71 MAAvn tasks do not significantly alter through the phases of war. The aviation weapons
systems are flexible and are used at tactical level to ensure their characteristics are
exploited. Offensive operations are of prime importance to MAAvn units and at all stages
the following principles are emphasised:
a. shock action;
b. flexibility;
c.
surprise; and
d. fire-power.
11.72 MAAvn commanders are willing to accept high casualty rates in order to achieve the
higher commander’s aim.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
11-14
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-1
CHAPTER 12
MUSORIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS
SECTION 12-1.
THE NATURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Introduction
12.1
Special Operations are defined as ‘measures and activities conducted by specially trained and
equipped forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objectives by means
outside the scope of conventional forces’. The Musorians make extensive use of special
operations, both in support of conventional operations and as an end in themselves. They
believe the operations have considerable utility across the spectrum of conflict, have a
disproportionate effect in comparison with the size of the force employed, are cost-efficient
and demonstrate a level of national resolve. The Musorians conduct special operations
aggressively and will accept significant casualties if the mission is deemed to be strategically
important. Their operations are an amalgam of:
a. Conventional Operations. A typical example of their use of conventional operations would
be the seizure of a point of entry by a small force landed by parachute or small boat,
exploiting the advantage of surprise.
b. Elite Conventional Operations. Elite conventional operations are typified by such activities
as long-range patrolling behind enemy lines. This was once considered an unconventional
skill, but the lines of battle are now so fluid and force/space ratios are so low, that this type
of operation is now considered only elite conventional in nature.
c.
12.2
Unconventional Operations. Unconventional operations include clandestine or covert
intelligence gathering operations often conducted months or years in advance of the
outbreak of hostilities.
Special Operations are conducted by SF, although the Musorians will make extensive use of
non-SF support elements to ensure operational success. SF are capable of all three types of
special operations. Special operations are characterised by:
a. Joint in Nature. SF will exploit the capabilities of the Musorian Naval and Air Forces and
other Land Force Elements. This exploitation will include:
(1) the use of specialist air, land and sea insertion platforms;
(2) the use of EW and specialist intelligence support; and
(3) the provision of FS, usually by air-delivered stand-off munitions, due to the extreme
range of most SF operations from Musoria itself.
b. Time Critical. The operation must be committed during limited windows of opportunity to
exploit a perceived weakness in the enemy’s defences which may be targeted by a small
light-scale force exploiting surprise.
c.
Strategic Effect. Special operations may be conducted at all levels of war. Strategic effect
is achieved by exploiting the ability of SF to attain operational-level objectives through
timely tactical-level activities.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-2
d. Unorthodox Means. The crucial factors in achieving operational success are force
survivability and surprise. The traditional principles of war will still be applied, but will be
dominated by these two factors. The Musorians will however, accept high levels of
operational risk if the level of reward offered by an operation is commensurately high.
Often operations will include aspects of, or will be coordinated with, acts of statesponsored terrorism:
(1) assassinations;
(2) bombings; and
(3) hijacks/hostage-taking.
e. Specialist Training and Equipment. The rigours of the operating environment require
personnel to be specially selected, trained and uniquely equipped. The Musorians allocate
resources to units in training according to a tiered system which ensures that short-notice
units are accorded high priorities in equipment acquisition and training resources:
(1) Tier One: SF battalion – very short notice to move, very high levels of readiness and
skill;
(2) Tier Two: raider battalions and airborne battalions – short notice to move, high levels
of readiness and skill; and
12.3
The Musorian materiel acquisition process will acquire mission essential equipment at very
short notice to equip elements of the SF battalion. The strike battalion is issued with standard
Musorian materiel but will be considered a high priority for equipment.
SECTION 12-2.
12.4
THE ROLE OF SPECIAL FORCES
The role of SF is to conduct special operations. These operations may be conducted at the
strategic or operational levels and may, rarely, be conducted at the tactical level. They will be
conducted both in peace and war. The Musorians will actively undertake special operations
during peace and periods of heightened political or economic competition to attain national
advantage. SF, more noticeably than conventional forces, are regarded as a tool to attain
national goals and will be used aggressively to do so.
Tasks
12.5
The Musorians conduct three generic types of special operations:
a. reconnaissance operations,
b. offensive operations, and
c.
12.6
support operations.
These operations may be conducted either overtly, clandestinely or covertly depending on the
nature, sensitivity and aim of the task.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-3
12.7
Reconnaissance Operations. Musorian reconnaissance operations are intelligence gathering
activities involving reconnaissance, surveillance and other techniques. They may be
independent tasks or may be employed to verify other sources of intelligence gathering. They
may include:
a. collection of political, economic, psychological or military intelligence;
b. collection of technical military information – this may involve the escort of a specialist into
enemy territory;
c.
target detection and surveillance; or
d. reconnaissance to support future special operations or conventional operations.
12.8
Offensive Operations. Offensive special operations will usually be limited in scope and
duration. The light scale of Musorian special operations forces will necessitate a timely
withdrawal from the battlefield before enemy conventional forces – particularly armoured
vehicles or attack helicopters can respond. They may be executed at long-range and can
produce deniable or non-escalatory results. Typically they involve:
a. attack on critical capabilities including materiel (sabotage, mining, remote target
designation, raids) and personnel (kidnapping, assassination, terrorism, bombing, sniping);
b. interdiction of LofC, bases, etc; and
c.
12.9
seizure, destruction or neutralisation of key points, communications nodes and population
centres.
Support Operations. Support operations include all operations where special operations act
in support of other conventional or special forces. They may be reconnaissance tasks or
offensive tasks. The following additional specialist support tasks will also be conducted:
a. recovery of captured equipment and personnel;
b. propaganda and psychological operations;
c.
pathfinding;
d. training assistance to indigenous resistance groups;
e. bomb damage assessment; and
f.
acting as bodyguards.
SECTION 12-3.
COMMAND STRUCTURES AND ORGANISATIONS
Command Component
12.10 Special operations are commanded and approved at the highest level. The consequences of
operational failure, particularly in peacetime operations which breach another nation’s
sovereignty, are such that most special operations will be approved by the Cabinet. Strategiclevel command issues will not be dealt with in this publication.
12.11 Musoria’s special operations capability is based on the SOC. The organisation of the SOC is
illustrated in figure 12–1.
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12-4
Figure 12–1: Special Operations Command
12.12 Special Operations Command. The SOC is a non-deployable divisional-level headquarters.
It provides the full range of staff support and operational functions to its subordinate units and
conducts higher level planning for the conduct of special operations campaigns. Its operational
elements will be drawn from the RB or attached elements of the airborne battalion. As special
operations are rarely conducted above unit level, it devolves the responsibility for the detailed
conduct of operations to the RB headquarters.
12.13 Raider Brigade. The RB is the principle SF formation of the MAF. Its organisation is illustrated
in figure 12–2.
Figure 12–2: Raider Brigade
12.14 The role of the RB is to conduct special operations beyond the range and capability of other
MAF elements. The RB has never operated at brigade level – but will frequently form a RTF
headquarters to command elements of the SF battalion, a strike battalion and supporting
assets. When combined SF/raider operations are conducted below unit level, the RB will
determine which element should command the operation. The command options are listed
below:
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-5
a. Raider Task Force Headquarters. Large scale independent special operations, such as
major offensive operations or seizure of a significant POE will be commanded by a RTF
headquarters. These operations are essentially conventional in nature and may also be
assigned to the airborne brigade rather than the RB. The RTF headquarters is a
deployable headquarters based on the RB headquarters. If this operation is conducted in
support of a larger operation, the same RTF headquarters would be collocated with the
supported commander and would act as a brigade-level special operations command and
control element (SOCCE).
b. Special Operations Command and Control Element. A SOCCE provides C3 support to a
special operations element under the command of a supported commander. It will be
located with the senior operational or theatre commander (usually Commander Land
Forces or the Commander Musorian Expeditionary Force or one of his corps or divisional
commanders). It provides:
(1) command, liaison and specialist advice;
(2) secure communications to the deployed special operations force element (FE) and
supporting assets; and
(3) liaison officers to supporting units and formations.
c.
Special Forces Headquarters. When the special operations task component is
predominantly SF or where the critical element of the task is best coordinated by an SF
commander, an SF headquarters will be directed to command the operation. This element
will normally be based on an SF company headquarters augmented with additional
support from the SF battalion.
d. Raider Headquarters. When the special operations task component comprises
predominantly raiders or where the critical element of the task is best coordinated by a
raider commander, a raider headquarters will be directed to command the operation. This
element will be based on a raider company headquarters augmented with additional
support from the strike battalion.
Combat Components of the Raider Brigade
12.15 The RB’s combat units are the SF battalion and two raider battalions. Both units are capable of
conducting special operations – but are organised, selected, trained and equipped to perform
different roles.
12.16 The SF battalion provides the MAF with its highest level of special operations capability. For
training purposes it is organised on the structure illustrated in figure 12–3; but because of its
organic nature it could provide up to three SOCCEs and 27 patrols to conduct independent
operations over a wide theatre.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-6
Figure 12–3: Special Forces Battalion
12.17 Role. The role of the SF battalion is to conduct special operations beyond the range and
capability of other MAF elements, particularly small-scale covert and clandestine operations.
12.18 Tasks. The SF battalion is tasked with providing the following capabilities:
a. reconnaissance – either overt, covert or clandestine;
b. recovery operations;
c.
small-scale offensive operations;
d. propaganda and psychological operations;
e. pathfinding; and
f.
training assistance to indigenous resistance groups.
12.19 Special Forces Patrol. The SF patrol may number from one to 20 personnel, but for
organisational purposes it is based on eight trained SF soldiers. It will possess the following
characteristics:
a. Composition. The patrol is task-oriented and has integral command, communications and
medical capabilities. Both male and female soldiers are employed in covert patrols.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-7
b. Insertion. The patrol may be inserted into the tactical area of responsibility by the specialist
deployment assets of the combat support company or with the assistance of MAF longrange insertion assets. All members will be static line parachute qualified. Some will also
be free-fall parachute or dive qualified.
c.
Skills. The patrol will be highly skilled in regional languages (with English as their main
second language), communications, first-aid, demolitions and weapon usage.
d. Mobility. The patrol may insert with integral mobility if the task requires a long transit. In
covert operations in peacetime, maximum use would be made of civil transport.
e. Administration and Logistics. Patrols will deploy with sufficient rations and equipment to
conduct the operation without resupply. Caching or covert use of the civil infrastructure
may be necessary.
f.
Communications. A range of overt and covert communications will be employed, including:
(1) a variety of combat net radios, including Satcom;
(2) internet;
(3) mobile phones;
(4) image capture and transmission (ICAT) equipment; and
(5) communications through and to agent networks.
Strike Battalion
12.20 The RBs are designed to conduct larger-scale offensive operations than the SF battalion.
Operationally they will usually operate in company groups, although operations are possible
from section to brigade level. They have a limited ability to conduct clandestine or covert
operations and would usually be employed on more overt conventional or elite-conventional
operations. The organisation of the strike battalion is based on the structure illustrated in figure
12–4.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-8
Figure 12–4: Strike Battalion
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-9
12.21 Role. The role of the strike battalion is to conduct operations beyond the range and capability
of other MAF elements, particularly large-scale overt offensive operations.
12.22 Tasks. The strike battalion is tasked with providing the following capabilities:
a. overt reconnaissance and surveillance patrolling; and
b. large-scale offensive operations.
12.23 The strike battalion is not capable of covert or clandestine operations. It is essentially a
specialist infantry battalion with amphibious and airborne capabilities, experience of operating
closely with the SF battalion and improved integral FS assets.
12.24 Strike Company. The strike company is the basic combat element of the strike battalion. It
possesses the following characteristics:
a. Composition. An operational company has three manoeuvre platoons, each comprising
three sections. Each section consists of eight personnel and has two LMGs. The
company’s support weapons platoon is equipped with medium mortars and AGLs or
sustained fire machine guns (SFMGs) (depending on the operation). The company will
make extensive use of shoulder-fired anti-armour weapons. On some operations its
organic fire-power will be augmented by assets from the battalion’s mortar platoon and
anti-tank platoon.
b. Insertion. The company may be inserted by air using static-line parachute into either a
land or water DZ. It may also be inserted by either rigid inflatable boats or small craft from
the battalion’s amphibious platoon.
c.
Skills. The company will include members proficient in demolitions, advanced first aid,
roping and climbing and weapons usage.
d. Mobility. The company will generally be restricted to movement by foot once inserted,
although vehicles may be either parachuted or air-landed to augment operational mobility.
e. Administration and Logistics. The company will deploy with sufficient rations and
equipment to conduct the operation without resupply. If a target is to be held for a
protracted period (in excess of 48 hours) following capture, the company will require
resupply.
f.
Communications. The company employs the following communications systems:
(1) ultra high frequency (UHF) secure radios from section to platoon level;
(2) VHF secure radios from platoon level to company and battalion level; and
(3) HF secure radios from deployed companies operating on independent tasks over long
ranges to the SOCCE or SF/strike headquarters. This capability is supplied by a
detachment from the battalion signals company.
12.25 Special Mission Team. A special mission team (SMT) is structured to perform a specific task.
It may draw specialist personnel from any area of the MAF or from civilian agencies, but would
generally be based on members of either the SF or raider battalions.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-10
12.26 The SOC support battalion provides specialist arms support to the SF and raider battalions
during both special and conventional operations. This support is most readily apparent during
conventional operations, although some aspects (particularly specialist intelligence support)
may also be exploited during unconventional operations. It augments the RB’s operations
through the provision of the following specialist capabilities:
a. FS;
b. combat and strategic intelligence support;
c.
air-mobile armoured capability; and
d. field engineering.
12.27 The structure of the SOC support battalion is illustrated in figure 12–5.
Figure 12–5: Special Operations Command Support Battalion
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-11
12.28 Role. The role of the SOC support battalion is to provide fire-power and other specialist
support to the RB.
Service Support Battalion
12.29 The service support battalion provides service support to the combat elements of the RB.
SECTION 12-4.
THE CONDUCT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Phases
12.30 Musorian special operations are conducted in three phases:
a. Preparation. The preparation phase will incorporate:
(1) Planning. Missions are planned and approved at the highest level, with detailed
planning being conducted at all levels.
(2) Preparation and Rehearsals. Because of the complex and often delicate nature of
special operations, preparations and rehearsals must be meticulous. All elements of
the operational force will be rehearsed, including the insertion and extraction assets.
b. Execution. Execution incorporates:
(1) insertion,
(2) conduct and sustainment, and
(3) extraction.
c.
Post-operation procedures.
12.31 While each MAF special operation will be unique, many commonalties will exist across all
special operations. The preparation and post-operation procedures phases will be generally
similar – often differing only in the size of the FE and the nature of the supporting assets.
Techniques used during insertion and extraction are standardised in training to be performed
as drills, although the specific conditions of each activity will make every insertion/extraction
an operation in its own right. The aspect of special operations which will vary significantly from
one operation to another is the conduct of the task once the target is reached. This will be
influenced by:
a. the mission,
b. the nature of the target,
c.
the capabilities of the FE,
d. strategic or operational effect to be achieved, and
e. the experience and preference of the special operations tactical commander.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-12
Insertion and Extraction
12.32 Musoria is an island continent; consequently, to support its political aspirations in the region, it
has had to develop a capability to conduct force projection operations. The method of
conducting force projection will be dependent on:
a. mission,
b. enemy situation,
c.
weather,
d. topography and hydrography,
e. distance,
f.
availability of support, and
g. troops involved.
12.33 Covert Operations. The method chosen should be simple, secure and appropriate to the
task. During covert operations in peacetime this will often entail the use of civil airlines or crafts
of opportunity (COOPs) to insert personnel. Specialist high-value signature equipment
(vehicles, civil radios, mobile phones, computer equipment, night vision equipment etc.) may
be purchased in the target country, delivered through an agent network or diplomatic bag or
air-dropped prior to the commencement of a specific activity. Overt operations, or operations
conducted during conflict, would generally employ military assets.
12.34 Overt Operations. The combat elements of the MAF SOC are trained in a wide variety of
insertion/extraction procedures. To reduce the skill level required of individual special
operations soldiers, most insertion/extractions will be conducted for the SF patrol or raider
company by the specialist mobility platoons from the combat support company or by a
supporting arm or service. Each means of insertion/extraction will offer relative advantages
and disadvantages. These will be considered by the tactical special operations commander
when planning future missions.
12.35 Once insertion across the air/sea gap has been achieved (with the exception of cross-border
operations) the problem of tactical mobility must be overcome. This may result in insertions
being complicated by the requirement to deliver vehicles into the AO, either by surface craft or
aircraft (para-drop or air-land).
Methods of Insertion and Extraction
12.36 Air and Combination Air/Water. Air is the most rapid means of clandestine insertion and
extraction. Air and combination air/water insertion and extraction techniques include:
a. static-line parachute from very low altitude onto the land, parallel to the beach just beyond
the surf zone (beach parallel) or as a marry-up with a parent craft in the sea (marry-up at
sea);
b. static-line parachute from medium altitude using high-performance parachutes;
c.
high altitude low opening parachute (SF battalion only);
d. high altitude high opening parachute (SF battalion only);
e. parachute load follow with small craft into the ocean;
f.
air-land using fixed-wing aircraft;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-13
g. air-land using RW aircraft;3
h. helocast or RW touch down into the sea; and
i.
airborne rappel, fast rope, rope extraction or winch from RW aircraft.
12.37 Advantages and Disadvantages. Each insertion and extraction technique offers particular
advantages and has specific disadvantages. These include:
a. Advantages:
(1) flexible;
(2) fast and accurate (thereby enhancing the element of surprise);
(3) short exposure (and possible avoidance in combination air/water insertions) to hostile
countermeasures; and
(4) able to achieve the delivery of supplies in excess of individual loads.
b. Disadvantages:
(1) vulnerable to enemy air detection and defence systems;
(2) affected by adverse weather conditions;
(3) presents injury risk to personnel especially during night parachute insertions, or
insertions in adverse weather or sea conditions;
(4) presents risk of damage to or loss of equipment, especially during parachute
insertions;
(5) requires specially trained aircrews;
(6) requires sterilisation of land insertion sites;
(7) requires detailed planning and synchronisation of air/water platforms as combination
air/water methods are relatively complex; and
(8) presents less viable option for extraction, particularly after tactical surprise is lost.
12.38 Characteristics. Generally, air and combination air/water insertions and extractions have the
following charactersitics:
a. Aircraft Insertion Tactics. The force is normally inserted in a single aircraft or small number
of aircraft flying very low, without escort and at night. The aircraft may employ frequent
course changes en route to the run-in Identification Point (IP) then maintain a straight run
into the DZ or LZ. The drop or air-land occurs with a single pass or straight-in approach.
After the insertion, the aircraft continues to conduct deception activities. The aircraft route
should be planned to overfly both the primary and alternate DZ or LZ. When conditions
preclude using the primary, the aircraft will proceed to the alternate in an attempt to
accomplish the insertion.
3
Strategic operations using RW aircraft would usually necessitate air-to-air refuelling, the use of
a floating of land-based forward arming and refuelling point or the establishment of a significant
forward operating base (FOB) inside enemy territory. The risk posed by the high signature of
establishing such a base would be weighed against the return provided by having integral RW
mobility and FS behind an enemy’s front line. Such a base could be established for only a short
period, and may not be viable against an enemy equipped with satellite surveillance platforms.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-14
b. Pathfinding. Patrols from the SF battalion would usually insert into an unmarked DZ or LZ.
They would then pathfind for the later insertion of either raider, airborne or conventional
forces. A pathfinder task may be achieved by only one to two men who covertly lay the IP
marker. For larger overt insertions, such as a battalion airdrop, an SF platoon is required.
This platoon conducts surveillance over the area of the DZ prior to the drop, places early
warning parties on the approach roads to the DZ and then marks the DZ.
12.39 Insertions and Extractions by Water. Water insertion and extraction are secure and
economical means of clandestine movement into and out of the AO. Generally, this involves
two stages. The first stage is the delivery or recovery stage where the personnel transit from a
base area or forward operating base to a drop-off or pick-up point at sea. Delivery or recovery
can be by aircraft, as outlined for parachute load follow, or by surface or sub-surface vessel.
The second stage is the penetration or withdrawal stage where personnel move from the dropoff or pick-up point to a beachhead or the target area, or vice versa. This stage may, in many
cases, be classified as tactical mobility rather than strategic or operational insertion or
extraction; however, an understanding of the various water mobility techniques is important in
the planning of water insertions and extractions. In addition to the combination air/water
techniques already outlined, water insertion and extraction techniques can include any
combination of the following:
a. Delivery or Recovery:
(1) submarine launch and recovery of small watercraft; and
(2) surface vessel, both COOP and Naval vessels.
b. Penetration
or Withdrawal. Following
release
penetration/withdrawal to or from the beach may be by:
from
the
insertion
craft,
(1) sub-surface swimming (SF only);
(2) surface swimming; and
(3) small watercraft, both motor and paddle powered.
12.40 Advantages and Disadvantages. Each delivery or recovery and penetration or withdrawal
method offers particular advantages and disadvantages:
a. Advantages:
(1) offers long-range delivery and recovery capability;
(2) sub-surface techniques offer excellent security;
(3) provides a means of tactical mobility and limited extraction capability when using
small craft;
(4) provides relative freedom from weather considerations during the delivery/recovery
stage;
(5) allows the possibility of en-route operational briefings, rehearsals, and intelligence
updates;
(6) enables transport or recovery of large quantities of accompanying supplies or
captured equipment, especially on board surface craft; and
(7) submarines offer clandestine intelligence gathering and communications support in
the area of operations prior to and following insertion.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-15
b. Disadvantages:
(1) need for high levels of watermanship and diver training;
(2) vulnerability to high winds and sea states during transition from delivery/recovery
stage to penetration/withdrawal stage and during the penetration/withdrawal stage;
(3) possible loss of equipment and stores during transition and penetration/withdrawal;
(4) relatively long time required for the penetration/withdrawal phase especially if long
distances have to be covered; and
(5) vulnerability of personnel during initial beach landings.
12.41 Beach Reception. Arrival at a beach landing site is conducted in much the same manner as
parachute insertion into a marked DZ. The SF platoon would, in this case, conduct beach
marking, security and reception duties in lieu of pathfinder duties.
12.42 Tactical Mobility. Land insertion into the AO is possible only during cross-border operations
or from an established firm base within the AO. Prior to development of such a base the force
will still have to cross the air/sea gap by one of the previously mentioned means. The large
land mass, limited number of insertion points and placement of enemy sensors would usually
force the MAF special operations commander to land some distance from his target to
commence his approach march. This ‘march’ may be achieved in vehicles or on foot and may
be from 20 kilometres to 100 kilometres. This would usually be achieved in a single night.
Vehicles would then either be cached and the target approached on foot, or vehicles would be
used to approach the target. Land movement has its greatest chance of success when the
enemy’s lines are over extended, the combat zone is fluid or portions of his borders are
inadequately secured. A well organised, stable and closely knit defence in depth may prohibit
land insertion.
12.43 The MAF special operations commander would usually seek to use some form of tactical
mobility to increase the effectiveness and chance of success of his operation. The options
available to him are:
a. use ‘in theatre’ of conventional MAF soft skinned and armoured vehicles;
b. use of long-range patrol vehicles from the combat support company;
c.
covert use of civil vehicles procured through hire (in peacetime), agent network or theft;
and
d. foot.
12.44 Advantages of Tactical Mobility. The advantages of tactical mobility are:
a. for cross-border operations it requires the minimum of inter-service support;
b. it provides the opportunity for concurrent wide-area intelligence gathering;
c.
it provides flexibility due to enhanced mobility;
d. it allows increased carrying capacity; and
e. it provides increased security, as the water or air insertion point can be located a
considerable distance from the target.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-16
12.45 Disadvantages of Land. The disadvantages of insertion onto land are:
a. insertion of vehicles from air or sea platforms is a complicated operation;
b. greater logistic burden for protracted operations; and
c.
provides significant signature.
Resupply Techniques
12.46 Deployed MAF special operations combat elements will avoid receiving external resupply due
to the operational security risks created. Insertion into the AO will normally be conducted with
sufficient combat supplies to undertake the assigned mission. In training, the MAF special
operations soldier will carry combat supplies (less water) for sustainment up to 14 days. Three
days water will be carried. Additionally, water will generally be won within the AO. Vehicles will
carry up to 30 days’ combat supplies.
12.47 The conduct of special operations over prolonged periods, or in the event of unforeseen
materiel requirements, may make resupply unavoidable. If the need for resupply can be
predicted, it will be prepared in detail prior to the deployment of the combat element. This may
include the prepacking of supply bundles and rehearsals with delivery agencies. Resupply is
an SOC operations staff function and requires similar planning effort to the initial insertion. In
planning and conducting resupply missions, all personnel and agencies involved must take
special care to ensure that the deployed combat element is not compromised. During strategic
missions, resupply will generally be by air or water. During cross-border operations or
operations from an FOB, they may be conducted by land.
12.48 Types. The following four types of resupply need to be considered when planning and
executing special operations missions:
a. Emergency Resupply. Emergency resupply is pre-planned and packed by the combat
element prior to its insertion. The supply bundle will generally contain essential equipment
and will usually be inserted into the AO onto a prearranged or on-call location. One
example of emergency resupply may be the resupply of communications equipment if no
communications are made within a certain time of a prearranged communications
schedule.
b. Automatic Resupply. Automatic resupply is pre-planned and packed by the combat
element prior to insertion and will contain predicted supplies such as food, fuel, water and
ammunition. Automatic resupply is inserted into the AO onto a prearranged or on-call
location and alleviates the need for lengthy communications between the combat element
and its FOB.
c.
On-call Resupply. On-call resupply is packed by administrative support personnel
following detailed requests from the deployed combat element. On-call resupply is
generally inserted into a location selected by the combat element after its insertion into the
AO.
d. Other Resupply. Other resupply includes pre-planned and opportunity resupply. Preplanned sources may include caches, friendly indigenous forces and known indigenous
products. Opportunity sources may include captured enemy and improvised equipment,
and any other product that might be acquired.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
12-17
12.49 Air. Air is the most rapid and commonly used means of resupply. Aerial resupply techniques
include:
a. fixed-wing and RW air-land of supplies;
b. low altitude air-drop (by free drop, heli box or parachute); and
c.
high altitude air-drop (free fall steerable stores bundle).
12.50 Aerial resupply techniques generally mirror air insertion techniques and involve similar
planning considerations and offer similar advantages and disadvantages.
12.51 Water/Land. Specific water and land resupply techniques have not been developed.
Generally, water and land resupply techniques mirror water and land extraction techniques
and involve similar planning considerations.
12.52 Caching. In some circumstances, caches may be pre-placed within the AO and used by
combat elements. While the placement of caches allows these combat elements to operate
over long periods without external resupply, their utility is limited by the difficulty of placing
them in the AO and the durability of stores. When planning and conducting caching
operations, consideration must be given to the following:
a. expected time that the supplies will be left in the cache;
b. shelf life of the supplies to be cached;
c.
protection of supplies against environmental factors;
d. location of the cache, including ease of recognition for recovery and possible recognition
by local inhabitants or enemy forces;
e. time required to lay and recover the cache; and
f.
consequences of discovery by the enemy.
Reconnaissance Operations
12.53 Special reconnaissance operations are intelligence gathering operations involving
reconnaissance, surveillance and other techniques. Special operations elements of the MAF
conduct special reconnaissance operations to obtain or verify by visual observation, or other
collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an
enemy. Special reconnaissance may also be used to collect data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes
target acquisition, area assessment and post-strike assessment.
12.54 Special operations conducted at strategic level collect and report information beyond the
sensing capabilities of tactical collection systems and complement other national and theatre
collection systems (for example, high altitude imagery or signals intelligence) which may be
affected by weather, terrain masking or enemy countermeasures. In addition, special
reconnaissance may be used to cue high technology assets.
12.55 In order to gain specific, well defined and time-sensitive data, special reconnaissance teams
may use conventional battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance techniques. Alternatively
they may:
a. conduct human intelligence (humint) operations to exploit the knowledge of local
inhabitants, indigenous tribes, agents in place, recovered prisoners-of-war or hostages;
b. deploy with sigint collection assets. These may come from the EW platoon integral to the
SF signals company or from other MAF specialist assets;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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c.
deploy with specialist personnel or equipment which will allow remote interrogation of the
spectral emissions of targets; and
d. provide ground cueing to MAF reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
and possibly satellites.
Offensive Operations
12.56 The MAF view offensive operations as the decisive phase of war. This aggressive viewpoint is
reflected in the conduct of MAF special operations. Offensive operations conducted by special
operations combat elements are normally limited in scope and duration and usually
incorporate a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. They may be conducted
unilaterally by special operations combat elements or in support of conventional forces. These
operations are usually designed to achieve specific, well defined results of strategic,
operational or critical tactical significance. Often offensive operations will be conducted which
have limited tactical effect, but which will produce significant operational and strategic
deception. They frequently occur beyond the reach of tactical weapons systems or where the
strike capabilities of conventional forces might constitute unwarranted escalation.
12.57 Unlike other MAF strike forces, special operations may be employed to produce deniable or
non-escalatory results. Special operations provides a unique capability in that they are able to
selectively target individuals for assassination or capture. Frequently they will conduct
offensive operations which have limited tactical effect, but which will produce significant
operational and strategic deception.
12.58 Offensive operations can be conducted by individuals and small units from patrol (SF
battalion) to RB size. Although normally thought of in terms of close combat operations,
offensive operations can also include stand-off attacks by weapon systems either delivered,
directed or designated by special operations combat elements. Offensive operations include:
a. Raids. A raid is a highly coordinated infantry (mounted or dismounted) attack which
maximises the effects of fire-power, surprise and shock action to produce effects which
are disproportionate to the size of the raiding force. It is meticulously planned and
executed. It will rarely be achieved with the aim of seizing and holding ground, although
this can be achieved with a considerably reinforced raiding force with integral anti-armour
and anti-air assets. Similar techniques will be employed in special operations:
(1) Ambushes. An ambush is conducted where the MAF aim is to rapidly destroy through
concentrated fire-power a moving or temporarily halted enemy.
(2) Direct Assaults. When the target and mission require precise or discriminate
application of force beyond the capability of other forces, direct assaults are
conducted.
b. Stand-off Attacks. Stand-off attacks are conducted in support of close combat actions or
independently when the target can be sufficiently damaged or destroyed without the
commitment of close combat forces. Typically, special operations would use a combination
of the following weapon systems to conduct these attacks:
(1) laser-guided PAS;
(2) observed Naval gunfire support and heavy artillery fire if available (tactical operations
only);
(3) 81 mm mortars;
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(4) 30 mm AGL;
(5) SFMG;
(6) sniper rifles, both 7.62 mm anti-personnel and 12.7 mm anti-materiel; and
(7) long range anti-armour weapon and SAM to temporarily deny the use of airfields.
Support Operations
12.59 Recovery Operations. The MAF undertake recovery operations for two reasons:
a. to rescue personnel or equipment from enemy-controlled or otherwise hostile territory and
to return them to safe areas. Within Musoria the same techniques and personnel are
employed on counter-terrorism operations; and
b. to capture specially targeted high-profile hostages (often this operation will be an
alternative to an assassination operation for which the planning considerations are not
dissimilar).
12.60 The SF battalion is responsible for recovery operations both domestically and internationally.
Small-scale overt, covert or clandestine recovery operations are characterised by detailed
planning, rehearsal and thorough intelligence analysis. They may utilise an amalgam of
special reconnaissance, offensive operations and other special operations techniques. They
may be conducted independently or with the assistance of conventional force assets and will
almost invariably be joint. The recovery force would usually comprise a combination of a
mobile assault force with superior room combat skills and a sniper component. These
operations may be conducted from patrol to SF company level. Coordination of a recovery
operation outside Musoria poses considerable difficulty and would only be conducted for a
high value target. Close quarter combat and sniping skills would however, be employed on
most SF battalion offensive operations.
Combat Search and Rescue Operations
12.61 Musorian SF have an inherent capability to conduct search and rescue and combat search
and rescue missions. These missions would normally only be undertaken by SF where the
recovery of personnel or materiel is beyond the capability of normal search and rescue assets
assigned to the operation.
Training Assistance Operations
12.62 The multi-skilled nature of MAF special operations personnel, coupled with their experience in
cross-cultural instruction, makes them ideal for engagement with Musoria’s allies through
military, paramilitary or humanitarian assistance. Such assistance could include advice and
training in basic military skills (i.e., weapons, minor tactics, leadership) to irregular, paramilitary
and military forces of the host nation as well as skills to host nation SF units.
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CHAPTER 13
LOGISTICS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS
Scope
13.1
The MAF GF believe that future combat operations will be characterised by the lack of a
clearly defined front line. Combat will be spread over a deep and wide area, while encounters
with the enemy will be limited to a series of intense but short battles and engagements, rather
than steady attrition. The MAF GF visualize such conflict stretching from the point of combat
back to the national capital. The MAF GF logistics system is based on this concept of combat,
and on the principles of echelonment and centralisation of C2. The result is a flexible logistics
system designed to meet the demands of the MAF GF concept of operations.
13.2
There are two aspects to the MAF GF logistics support concept – national and operationaltactical. The national aspect includes the entire country, its population, economy, government
and political structure. It is the production base for necessary war materiel, the mobilisation
base for personnel replacements, and the control centre for the complete war effort. The
operational-tactical aspect includes the activities of all military units that provide maintenance,
materiel, and medical support to combat forces.
SECTION 13-1.
INTRODUCTION TO LOGISTICS
War and Logistics
13.3
Short War Scenario. MAF GF logistic planners traditionally prepare for war that will be
characterised by a single, high speed, deep, strategic offensive operation. The combat force
will be very intense in the early stages, consuming vast quantities of supplies. Once the MAF
GF break through organised defences, and the attacking formations have progressed deep
into the enemy’s rear, logistic requirements will reduce, along with the effectiveness of the
enemy’s defence.
13.4
MAF GF logistic planners intend the overall duration of a war to be short – that is, to achieve a
decisive victory within three to four weeks at most. MAF GF logistics is organised to support
this sort of war. The emphasis is on the supply of fuel and ammunition and the immediate
repair of lightly damaged equipment. Fuel and ammunition supply chains are designed to be
highly mobile and flexible to cope with the dynamic, manoeuvre character of operations.
13.5
Future War. MAF GF recognise that they may have to conduct a strategic defensive
operation, at least initially, and that this would most likely occur just after initial lodgement of
forces in the AO. Despite this ‘pause’ in the offensive, the nature of combat will still be
characterised by broad manoeuvre. The MAF GF believe that the logistic system at the SG4
level and below is still appropriate, albeit with some adjustments to meet the possibility of a
defensive phase and the changing demands of a high technology battlefield (for example, the
provision of air and ground defence for logistic elements). Any system capable of supporting
deep offensive operations is deemed more than equal to the less demanding task of
supporting defensive operations with shortening LofC (assuming that the enemy is denied a
level of air superiority that will enable him to carry out an effective air interdiction operation).
4
The SG comprises elements of the military region not allocated to the expeditionary army, and
any other elements that may be attached from another military region. The SG maintains the
LofC from the theatre POE to the homeland, and will most often be concentrated at the POE.
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13.6
Protracted Conflict. MAF GF logisticians have also hedged against the possibility of
protracted conflict. Mobilisation reserves exist, and logistic stocks for a further two months of
fighting are held in strategic depth (though this figure is considerably smaller for expensive but
all-important items such as precision munitions). If, however, the war is to become at all
prolonged, it will by definition become more attritional in nature. As a consequence, less
flexible modes of logistic support will become the norm.
13.7
Nature of the Logistic System. The MAF GF do not consider appropriate the traditional
logistics system whereby forward divisions collect supplies from dumps to the rear5, and
evacuate rearwards their casualties and damaged equipment. Rather, they insist that
formations must be prepared to live off mobile stocks, at least for a few days, and not depend
on constant resupply from a higher formation. Medical and maintenance elements must move
well forward to work in areas where there has been heavy fighting, and casualties are
concentrated.
13.8
Combat is also expected to take place day and night (with the cover of darkness becoming an
increasing illusory advantage for logisticians). There are consequently increased demands on
logistic support and for a higher level of operational security for logistic units. Accordingly, the
logistic support for lower formations has been increased.
13.9
New, smaller formations have a tail comparable in size with their larger predecessors, thus
raising their sustainability. To prevent identification and attack, their materiel support units are
prepared to move almost as frequently as the combat units they support, and other logistic
elements (workshops, hospitals, etc,) are organised to keep up with and support the combat
troops. To this end, their mobility and flexibility are being improved and greater provisions are
being made for their ground and air defence. There is still seen to be a requirement for a high
degree of centralised direction and control however, so that rapid adjustments can be made to
meet changing operational situations.
Logistic Principles
13.10 Foresight. Given the combined arms commander’s assessment of the probable course of
future operations, the logistics commander (known as the Chief of the Rear) must forecast the
likely requirements for personnel, materiel and equipment (including their movement). He will
specify the logistic point of main effort as a guide to his planners and subordinates. This will
coincide with the operational or tactical direction of main effort in spatial terms, but may well be
different in temporal terms, as the demands for tactical or logistic concentration of effort do not
necessarily coincide in time. The operational plan must not be limited or its implementation
delayed through a lack of logistic support which could have been anticipated. Given the
increased destructiveness and reach of current and future weaponry, this principle becomes
both more fundamental and more difficult to realise.
13.11 Simplicity. Although the support of deployed forces on the fluid battlefield is a complex
undertaking, the plan to provide that support must remain simple, easy to understand and
implement.
13.12 Economy and Centralised Operational Control. These principles are inextricably linked:
a. Economy. Many items of supply are exceedingly expensive and can therefore be provided
in only limited numbers. Moreover, even if the cost were no object, the MAF GF would be
reluctant to over-insure logistically, as an unnecessarily large logistic tail will hamper
manoeuvre and divert excessive combat strength to its protection. It is vital to make the
most economical use of available assets, and this demands control at the highest practical
level.
5
The term ‘rear’ is applied to those areas normally occupied by the logistics support elements.
Therefore, ‘rear services’ refer to logistic services, Chief of the Rear refers to the logistic
commander, and so on.
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b. Centralised Operational Control. The bulk of logistic resources is held at the military region
and SG levels. The amount allocated to each lower formation will be tailored according to
its strength, the importance of its mission, the nature of the terrain and the anticipated
nature and intensity of combat. This ensures their economical use, the concentration of
effort on the most important axes and on those groupings executing the main tasks – this
contributes to operational flexibility. Formation commanders who are familiar with the
overall operational concept and situation can reach balanced decisions as to priorities for
support. If necessary, commanders strip resources from stalled or burned out subordinate
units/formations or from those on axes which have lost their significance, and relocate
them to others making a more decisive impact on operations. The rapid switches of
emphasis from one sector or axis to another and from offensive to defensive action (and
vice versa) that will characterise future war would, in the MAF GF view, be far more
difficult in a decentralised system. Such switches will be difficult anyway; not least
because offensive and defensive action each put stress on different aspects of logistic
support. Such switches are thus sources of inefficiency and possibly of waste. The
management of a centralised system within the context of a dynamic, manoeuvredominated battlefield has been made possible by the automation of many processes and
the provision to logistic headquarters and units of the same satcom, radio and land
navigation systems as are issued to combat elements. Asset tracking, the monitoring of
expenditure and the transmission of huge volumes of data required are no longer an
inseparable problem. The logistics elements of formations are sufficiently flexible and
manoeuvrable to conform to the frequent changes that will inevitably beset a commander’s
plans. The rear services are accordingly able to ensure that the combat customer is
supplied where and when required, the tactical situation permitting.
13.13 Reserves. The continuous, uninterrupted supply of tactical formations from the operational
rear will not always be possible in non-linear combat. Divisions and brigades must be able to
cope with periods of intense combat with limited resupply from above, until enemy groupings
in the friendly depth have been eliminated or the logistic system is reorganised to meet the
new situation. They thus carry the mobile stocks necessary to make them self-sustaining for a
period of at least three to five days. The aim is to preserve these stocks intact for as long as
possible so that, when the supply chain breaks down, the formation can continue to fight until
such time as the supporting unit/formation can restore it. As a corollary, whenever mobile
stocks diminish, even at the lowest rates of consumption, they are replenished as soon as
possible.
13.14 Ammunition and fuel holdings at all levels include an emergency reserve (normally part of the
mobile reserve). The size of this will be specified by the senior commander. At the operational
level, substantial reserve stocks are created in peacetime and (bearing in mind the likely
nature of the initial period) echeloned in some depth on likely axes.
13.15 There are four major categories of stores and equipment reserves in the MAF GF. These are:
a. Strategic Reserves. Strategic reserves are stocks of supplies and equipment controlled by
the Government, which are stored in central depots within Musoria. In wartime, they come
under the jurisdiction of the MAF, and may only be released for use when authorised by
the Council of Ministers.
b. Mobilisation Reserves. Mobilisation reserves are the stocks of stores, weapons and
equipment held for resupply of newly activated military units on mobilisation. These
reserves are controlled by the Department of Defence and are held in military depots
within Musoria. Mobilisation reserves consist of current, obsolescent and some obsolete
weapons and equipment. They may only be released for use when authorised by the
Minister for Defence.
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c.
Tactical Reserves. Tactical reserves are supplies of stores, weapons and equipment held
separately by each of the armed services for usage and loss replacement in the initial
stages of conflict. Tactical reserves will vary depending on the type, scope and likely
duration of operations. Tactical reserves are normally held at MAF level, though
percentages of these reserves are allocated to logistics and operational commanders and,
in the case of the MAF GF, down to formation level. Tactical reserves are released for use
when authorised by the operational commander responsible for them.
d. Mobile Reserves. These are reserves of weapons, equipment, ammunition, fuel, water and
rations permanently located with formations and units. Mobile reserves may be located in
bases and depots or on formation transport, and are normally carried by organic transport.
Mobile reserve quantities held vary with the level of the formation or unit and the type of
operation. Mobile reserves are constantly replenished; the quantity required being
determined by usage rates. Mobile reserve levels cannot be extended or reduced from
that laid down without permission of the overall force commander.
13.16 Forward Delivery. It is the responsibility of higher commanders to keep their subordinates
supplied. The concept governing resupply is not demand-pull, but supply-push, with resources
being distributed to subordinate commanders in accordance with priorities established at the
higher level (i.e., in line with the logistic point of main effort). This philosophy will often cramp
the style of formations on secondary axes, but it ensures economy in the use of both stock and
transport, and the maintenance of the operational commander’s aim. Using their transport
assets, formations deliver forward to their subordinate units/formations. Often, to save time, an
echelon will be skipped. For example, SG transport may deliver direct to divisions, or division
to battalions. Sometimes, however, uncommitted or less hard pressed units/formations will be
required to collect from the superior units to maintain the concentration of resources on key
axes. In the offensive this may also be required when the separation of formations becomes
too great as a result of higher formation assets having difficulty in keeping pace with the
advance. As a principle, however, each level must keep up with its subordinates and not
attempt to interfere in the rapidity of the advance, far less press the resources of its successful
subordinates for its own use.
13.17 The concentration of the bulk of transport assets at higher formation level underpins the
forward delivery system. The waste which this system used to create when stocks were
delivered is now greatly lessened by improved asset tracking and stock control. It is not
eliminated, however (for example, a tactical reserve of artillery ammunition dumped in gun
areas for a bombardment may have to be temporarily abandoned if the enemy decides to
withdraw rather than fight). MAF GF logistics planners consider the cost worth paying in the
interest of speed and simplicity, the more so now that the recovery of such stocks is eased
and accelerated by their being dumped on dismountable flat racks.
13.18 Flexibility in the Use of Movement Resources. Planning is based on the use of all
movement resources available. Motor transport is the primary means of supply from division
downwards, though high priority items may be delivered by air. In an emergency, large scale
air resupply may be attempted (for instance to a battle group, separate operational unit or an
encircled grouping). Strict delineation of vehicles by function is not followed. Standard load
carriers are used, where necessary, to carry fuel (in pillow tanks or cans) and when returning,
they carry the wounded or damaged equipment. Even combat vehicles are pressed into
service at times. The mobility of rear services is expected to match that of combat formations.
13.19 Supply Priorities. The usual order of priorities for resupply is:
a. Priority 1 - precision and other ACMs;
b. Priority 2 - POL;
c.
Priority 3 - technical materiel (which requires little lift);
d. Priority 4 - conventional ‘dumb’ ammunition; and
e. Priority 5 - food, medical supplies and clothing.
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13.20 During a pursuit (which may constitute four fifths or so of an offensive operation’s duration),
the priorities of ammunition and fuel will usually be reversed, but otherwise the principle
demand is usually for ammunition. Ammunition and fuel resupply consumes more than 80 per
cent of the weight of all supplies transported in the resupply process.
13.21 Captured Materiel and Local Resources. While logistic planning in no way depends upon
them, units and formations are urged to make maximum use of local resources and captured
materiel. Special staff exist at formation level to organise their exploitation. Fuel in particular is
likely to prove valuable and the engineers of the fuel supply service are equipped with special
pumps to exploit civilian filling stations. Foraging may well provide most of the troops’ food
after a few days. Combat units too are expected to utilise local resources. For example,
airborne troops may acquire civilian transport, engineers will hunt for aggregate for filling in
craters, etc. Captured food and fuel will generally be utilised after testing and approval by
mobile field laboratories of the materiel support battalion.
13.22 Forward Positioning of Support Elements. In non-linear combat, losses will not be incurred
evenly along the line of contact and at a predictable rate. Instead, there will be areas of
intense fighting and often lengthy passive sectors. Opposing forces will often be intermingled
and the enemy will be attempting to conduct deep battle. In these circumstances, the
traditional evacuation of personnel and equipment casualties for treatment in safe rear areas
will no longer be appropriate. Maintenance and medical facilities are moved well forward to the
areas of greatest need and set to work in location. The emphasis is on quickly returning lightly
wounded personnel to combat and quickly repairing equipment where damage is minimal.
More serious casualties are then evacuated, if possible, and longer repairs are left to higher
formation facilities. The brigade and battalion teams move on to the next battle area and start
again, with division and SG resources following as fast as possible. In defensive operations,
however, casualties are physically evacuated if there is little likelihood of an assumption of
offensive action in the near future.
13.23 Survivability. The growing threats of enemy aviation missile and raiding attacks, added to
uncertainties inherent in the fragmented nature of the battlefield, have dispelled the illusion
that there is such a thing as a safe rear area. The need to protect rear services and to ensure
their mobility has been added to MAF GF principles of logistic support.
13.24 Force Restoration. Units may be kept up to strength by piecemeal replacement of casualties
during combat, especially using lightly wounded personnel and damaged equipment that can
be returned to duty within hours. Once casualties are sufficient to threaten total loss of combat
effectiveness (normally about 50 per cent of unit strength), the unit concerned is withdrawn
and restored out of combat. Timely replacement of units and formations that are no longer
effective in the first echelon is vital to the maintenance of momentum in the advance and
stability in defence. The eroded formation would not necessarily be removed from the order of
battle. It may be reorganised into composite groupings or it may be reconstituted with repaired
equipment and fresh personnel.
13.25 Pre-positioned Materiel. This is not so much a principle of logistic support as an
infrastructural move to cope with the changing nature of war in the modern world. As such, it
provides an essential background to an understanding of the system at work. With the
increasing transparency of nations’ affairs to the international community through such
agencies as the mass media and the United Nations, the potential geographic location of a
future war will be identifiable much earlier than has often previously been the case. On the
other hand, highly visible mobilisation, concentration and deployment may be politically
undesirable or it may provoke a pre-emptive strike. For this reason, the MAF GF pre-positions
supplies and sets of equipment for units/formations of the mobile forces in forward areas. Not
all their logistic requirements are pre-positioned as the expense would be prohibitive, and MAF
GF planners calculate that a logistic build-up, particularly of a non-warlike nature such as
medical and repair facilities, can be carried on in crisis or even pre-crisis periods without a
severe public relations penalty. Pre-positioning arrangements are also being negotiated with
friendly countries. This will greatly speed up the process of mobilisation and deployment as
only the requisite personnel need be moved, and this can be effected quickly by sea and by
air.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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SECTION 13-2.
LOGISTIC OPERATIONS
Organisation of the Rear
13.26 General. The MAF GF group logistic elements supporting combat groupings into ‘rear’ groups.
That is, these logistic elements are just to the rear of the combat groupings, providing the
necessary logistic support to maintain the operational commander’s aim. The MAF GF further
organise the rear into three levels, corresponding to the different levels in military art:
a. strategic rear - this extends from the SG back to the homeland;
b. operational rear - this comprises the rear of the expeditionary army; and
c.
tactical (troop) rear - this is the rear of divisions, brigades and their subordinate units.
Strategic Logistics
13.27 Tasks of the Strategic Group Rear. The rear services of the SG are responsible for providing
logistic support to the SG itself, as well as to the expeditionary army. The SG rear has five
basic tasks:
a. maintenance of adequate materiel reserves and the timely supply of the subordinate
formations (with priority going to those acting on the main axis);
b. the collection, evacuation and treatment/repair of casualties and damaged equipment;
c.
the preparation and operation of LofC (including traffic control);
d. the organisation of the security and defence of its rear services installations and the
maintenance of order in the operational rear; and
e. exploitation of local and captured resources.
13.28 Organisation and Deployment of the Strategic Group Rear. The growing complexity and
diversity of equipment and units have resulted in SG rear services becoming similarly
complex, diverse and large. There is no fixed composition of the SG’s rear. The size of the
formation, the scope and importance of its mission, the terrain over which it is to operate and
the availability of logistic resources will all help to determine the make up of the rear services.
To make this vast conglomeration of disparate units manageable, the rear services are divided
into two basic groupings, with substantial resources also being decentralised to the
expeditionary army as required by the operational plan:
a. Strategic Group Mobile Base. An SG mobile base is set up at the POE to maintain a
specific amount of materiel reserves, usually at least two days’ worth of stocks, held on
wheels (much being carried on demountable flat racks) to ensure a speedy and flexible
response to changes in the operational situation. Each of its material support battalions is
totally self-sufficient in transport and can move forward or rearward without having to draw
on non-organic resources. It is expected to move every three days if the SG’s rate of
movement is averaging 40 to 60 kilometres per day. The guiding principle is that the
separation from the expeditionary army’s materiel support battalion is preferably 60 to 100
kilometres and certainly no more than 150 kilometres (i.e., half a day’s march).
Redeployment is executed sequentially, by sub-units to ensure continuity of operation.
Ideally, it should also be located close to a railway line. A mobile base can maintain up to
two to three expeditionary armies and attached SG troops. Naturally, the deployment of
such a base requires a large area, at least 100 square kilometres and sometimes more
than double that. The mobile base usually will comprise:
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(1) one to two materiel support battalions (located 30 to 40 kilometres from the supported
units);
(2) one to two missile engineer technical companies (located 50 to 70 kilometres from the
supported missile battalions);
(3) one to two mobile hospital battalions;
(4) one to two maintenance battalions;
(5) one to two terminal platoons of the materiel support battalion for loading and
unloading;
(6) one to two engineer battalions;
(7) a separate camouflage and concealment company to provide protection and help in
camouflage and concealment (when augmented); and
(8) one to two chemical defence companies for reconnaissance and decontamination.
b. Strategic Group Rear Base. The SG rear base is set up at the point of departure in
Musoria, and maintains a further ten days’ stock, of which its organic transport can lift
more than one tenth in a single lift (more if the separate transport battalion is used to ship
materials forward rather than to provide transport within the base area, its primary
function). The rear base is normally located near a port or along a railway line. The rear
base comprises:
(1) depots for each supply item,
(2) elements of a materiel support brigade,
(3) elements of a medical treatment brigade,
(4) an engineer battalion, and
(5) a chemical defence battalion.
Operational Logistics
13.29 Organisation and Deployment of the Expeditionary Army Rear. The expeditionary army
rear is much smaller than the SG mobile base, as befits an organisation that is required to be
as mobile and flexible as the formations it supports. It is envisaged that it will displace every
second day, assuming the tempo of an operation is 40 to 60 kilometres per day. Initially
deploying only 60 to 80 kilometres from the line of contact, it must not permit the interval
between it and the rear of the first echelon formations to exceed 125 kilometres (i.e., half the
range of expeditionary army transports’ daily march). Ideally, it should remain about 60
kilometres from lower formation rear areas (with the base having an alternate deployment area
15 to 20 kilometres from the main one). Thus, in the event of a rapid pursuit or withdrawal, the
rear may even be expected to move daily (less some medical and repair facilities needed to
care for the seriously wounded and to complete at least light repairs and to tackle some
medium ones). Redeployment is executed sequentially, by sub-units, to ensure continuity of
operation. The expeditionary army rear normally holds only three to four days’ stocks on
wheels, which makes it imperative for the SG materiel support battalions to keep up with the
advance. If consumption rates are lower in some of the formation’s subordinate elements, this
figure will be conservative for the formation as a whole.
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13.30 Chief of the Rear and Deputy Commander for Armament. The Chief of the Rear is a deputy
commander and the principal logistics staff officer at every level upwards from unit. He
coordinates all logistic planning and controls transport resources. The Deputy Commander for
Armament is responsible for technical support (repair, maintenance and the supply of major
end items) among other functions. He is the other major figure in the organisation of the rear
support and is, like the Chief of the Rear, a deputy commander. It is essential for the Chief of
the Rear to know the exact situation, both tactically/operationally and logistically, so that he
can adjust to sudden changes in plan. To accomplish this, he:
a. monitors continuously the fuel, ammunition and other states of all subordinate elements.
He endeavours to anticipate when resupply will be needed, and uses supply-push rather
than the demand-pull to satisfy those needs;
b. monitors the operations net and maintains constant communication with all subordinates;
c.
pays frequent visits to subordinate units, or has members of his staff do so; and
d. checks on movements through the Commandant’s Service and through the use of
helicopter reconnaissance.
Tactical Logistics
13.31 At the tactical level, logistics support is fully mobile. Logistics elements support tactical units
with ammunition, POL, and rations to ensure continuous combat operations. Supply elements
deliver materiel to the rear of combat supply elements deployed on the forward edge. Table
13–1 illustrates the average locations of tactical logistic elements in the offensive and defence.
Table 13–1:
Locations of Tactical Logistic Elements
Serial
Unit
Logistic Element
Distance from
Forward Edge
(Offence)
(d)
(a)
(b)
(c)
1.
Company
Ammunition supply point
Rations supply point
Medical point
2.
Battalion
Repair point
Medical point
4 km
5 km
5 km
1.5 to 3 km
2 to 3 km
3 to 5 km
3 to 5 km
1.5 to 3 km
3.
Brigade
Repair point
POL supply point
Medical point
Damaged motor vehicle collection
point
10 to 15 km
up to 15 km
10 to 15 km
10 to 15 km
5 to 7 km
5 to 7 km
10 to 20 km
up to 20 km
10 to 20 km
10 to 20 km
6 to 10 km
6 to 10 km
4.
Division
Supply dump (ammo, POL, rations)
Repair point (tanks, weapons)
Repair point (wheeled motor
vehicles)
Medical point
25 to 30 km
20 to 40 km
10 to 14 km
35 to 50 km
35 to 50 km
up to 20 km
10 to 14 km
up to 20 km
Distance from
Forward Edge
(Defence)
(e)
100 to 500 m
up to 1 km
100 m
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13.32 Division. In all, the tactical rear carries about five to six days’ stocks (depending on the
intensity of combat), of which almost one half is held at divisional level. The divisional rear is
small and highly mobile, comprising only a materiel support, a maintenance and a medical
battalion. It may move daily, sometimes twice a day, in fast moving operations or when it has
to displace to escape from attack. In recognition of the increased fixed and rotary-wing air
threat posed to logistic elements of formations, point air defence batteries are now usually
provided for their protection (in addition to the area protection afforded by lower and higher
formation SAM regiments).
13.33 There is now also a greatly increased ground threat from forward and raiding detachments,
stay behind parties and bypassed groupings. These can do great damage to logistics areas
and even small numbers of armoured vehicles can destroy convoys or block supply routes. To
cope with this problem, the rear services now possess their own dedicated protection
elements. This reduces, though does not always eliminate, the need to divert combat
elements. These troops are under command of the Chief of the Rear.
13.34 The divisional rear aims to remain within 40 to 50 kilometres of the line of contact in the
offensive or up to 70 kilometres on the defensive. Expeditionary army elements will also
operate in the divisional rear. These will include one to two separate medical detachments and
maintenance and evacuation elements.
13.35 Brigade. At brigade level, supplies are loaded onto vehicles to maintain equal mobility with
combat elements. The brigade Chief of Rear services is responsible for all supply actions and
at this level has no branch chiefs to assist him. Maintenance functions are the responsibility of
the deputy Commander for Technical Matters. Located up to 20 kilometres from the forward
edge, brigade logistics elements directly supply subordinate battalions and, when required,
can also supply line companies.
13.36 Battalion. Battalion logistics support is self-contained. Supplies are maintained with the supply
and service platoon and transported on battalion vehicles. Prescribed norms of supply are
maintained for all classes of materiel, with resupply provided directly by brigade or division
logistic elements. The battalion Chief of Staff is the organiser of rear service functions, while
the Deputy Commander for Technical Matters and the Deputy Chief of the Rear are in charge
of maintenance support. The supply and service platoon commander is responsible for receipt,
storage and delivery of supplies to companies. He deploys and operates battalion ammunition,
fuel and ration points. The battalion physician’s assistant is Chief of the Battalion Medical
Section and is responsible for gathering and evacuating wounded personnel from the
companies and the battlefield. Figure 13–1 illustrates rear service support elements for a
motorised rifle battalion during the march.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-10
MEDICAL POINT
SUPPLY PLATOON
REPAIR SHOP
MOTORISED RIFLE BATTALION
REINFORCED WITH TANKS AND
ARTILLERY IN MARCH COLUMN
FUEL TRUCK
FIELD KITCHEN
BATTALION AMBULANCE
WITH TRAILER
BATTALION AMBULANCE
WITH TRAILER
TRUCK WITH WATER
TRAILER
BATTALION AMMUNITION
TRUCK
TRUCK WITH FIELD
KITCHEN TRAILER
REPAIR WORKSHOP
WITH TRAILER
NOTES
1. WHEN THERE IS NO ENEMY THREAT, FUEL TRUCKS ARE OFTEN PLACED AT THE HEAD OF THE REAR SERVICE ELEMENTS.
2. DISTANCES BETWEEN REAER SERVICES VEHICLES IN THE MARCH ARE NORMALLY THE SAME AS THOSE SEPARATING OTHER VEHICLES
Figure 13–1: Motorised Rifle Battalion Rear Service Support Elements During the March
13.37 Company. The company commander is responsible for organisation of his rear services. The
Deputy Commander for Technical Matters is responsible for organisation of company-level
maintenance. The company first sergeant is responsible for accountability and maintenance of
the unit’s weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, etc. Medical and sanitary matters are supervised
by the unit commander and the battalion physician’s assistant.
SECTION 13-3.
DISTRIBUTION
13.38 Materiel support includes the storage, transportation, and supply of ammunition, POL, spare
parts, food, clothing, water, and other consumable items.
13.39 The peacetime military region, or the wartime expeditionary army, receives its supplies from
the national storage depots or in some cases, directly from the industrial production line. The
SG delivers the items directly to the expeditionary army which, in turn, delivers equipment to
supported divisions, and the divisions deliver to the brigades. If necessary, intermediate
echelons may be bypassed to deliver items directly to the user.
13.40 The conditions of the ongoing battle dictate the location of supply dumps and stockpiles. Being
highly mobile, divisions do not create stockpiles but maintain mobile stocks as far forward as
possible. At division level, replenishment points are set up at convenient road junctions, but
supplies remain uploaded whenever possible. The replenishment point is under command of a
Deputy Commander for Resupply, who is subordinate to the divisional Chief of the Rear.
Usually divisional supply points are well dispersed.
13.41 Air resupply may be considered on a small or moderate scale when other methods have failed
or when extreme speed is essential. High value cargo has the top priority for air supply.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-11
Supply Operations
13.42 General. It is considered essential to maintain stock levels at or near the norm for as long as
possible in all formations and units. This means that, when interdicted, enemy counter moves
or even the rapid pace of operations, interferes with or even cuts the logistic cord, formations
can continue combat action by eating into their mobile stocks until such time as supply lines
are reopened. In order to achieve this, skip-echelon resupply is practised wherever possible.
For instance, SG materiel support elements will, where they can, bypass the expeditionary
army rear and deliver direct to the division/brigade, or the expeditionary army’s transport may
dump a tactical reserve of ammunition for an artillery preparation with the brigade artillery
regiment or even in the gun areas. This procedure speeds up the operation of the system by
avoiding time-consuming transloading (a reduced problem, though, now that MAF GF are
using dismountable flat racks). Where a formation’s stocks are consumed, however, early
resupply must be carried out to bring them back up to their previous levels. The expeditionary
army may be resupplied daily and divisions/brigades up to twice a day.
13.43 Modes of Transport. In offshore operations, road is the primary mode of transport. Supplies
moving forward from SG mobile bases to expeditionary army mobile bases will be transported
overwhelmingly by road - at least 90 per cent. Some urgent, high value items such as high
precision munitions may be delivered by air. Air resupply will also be used to sustain airborne
formations operating in the enemy rear, and perhaps forward detachments. Air resupply may
also be used, to the limited extent it is possible, in support of battle groups, separate
operational units or encircled groupings. Figure 13–2 illustrates the supply chain.
CB BN
REAR
BN
REAR
REGT
REAR
Figure 13–2: The Supply Chain
SKIP ECHELON DELIVERED
DELIVERY BY AIR
PIPELINE
ROAD TRANSPORT
ROAD TRANSPORT
TROOP (TACTICAL) REAR
(5-6 DAYS CBT SUPS)
35-70 KM (USUALLY SHORTER FOR BDE)
CMBT
ELMS
CMBT
ELMS
BDE REAR
(MAT SP BN)
BDE REAR
(MAT SP BN)
OPERATIONAL REAR
(3-4 DAYS CBT SUPS)
UP TO 125 KM
ARMY/REAR
(MAT SP BDE)
OPERATIONAL - STRATEGIC REAR
(4+DAYS CBT SUPS.
CAN MAINT 2-3 ARMIES
AND/OR CORPS)
UP TO 150 KM
SG REAR
BAS
(10+DAYS CBT SUPS.
FOR HOWEVER MANY
FORMATIONS ARE IN SG)
SG FORWARD (MOB)
BASE
(MAT SP BDE)
STRATEGIC
REAR.
(OIL
REFINERIES
AND
STRATEGIC)
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-12
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-13
13.44 Dismountable Flat Racks. The MAF GF, like other armies, is now making wide use of
dismountable flat racks. This has greatly decreased turn-around times and has made easier
the recovery of stocks dumped but not used. The MAF GF regards this as a revolutionary
development in military transportation. It significantly reduces the problem inherent in its
forward delivery system and, at the same time, enables the rear services to keep pace with the
demands of manoeuvre warfare.
13.45 Ammunition Supply. Ammunition supply, particularly artillery ammunition, normally amounts
to well over half the total tonnage (depending on the intensity of combat). The figure used to
be as high as 70 to 80 per cent, but precision and other ACMs have significantly reduced the
amount which needs to be moved.
13.46 Ammunition Holdings. To simplify logistic planning and standardise ordering and issuing
procedures, the MAF GF use units of fire (UF) accounting units comprising a given number of
rounds per weapon (equating to a basic load). Tables 13–2 and 13–3 illustrate the UFs and
holdings of major items of ammunition held within a division or brigade. All the ammunition
held by the division/brigade is in the form of mobile stocks, replenished daily to maintain
established levels. This ensures:
a. ready availability,
b. ability to weather an interruption to supply or an unanticipated increase in consumption,
c.
possession of a mobile reserve, and
d. the ability to cope with highly mobile operations.
Table 13–2:
Standard Units of Fire (Rounds Per Weapon)
Weapon
(a)
AFVs
Medium Tank:
ATGM
Shells
AAMG
Coaxial machine gun
BMP-2/BMD-2:
ATGM
Cannon
Coaxial machine gun
BMP-3:
ATGM
Shells
Cannon
machine guns x 3
BTR-80:
HMG
Coaxial machine gun
Rounds
(b)
40
500
3 000
5
150
2 000
8
40
500
6 000
500
2 000
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-14
Weapon
(a)
Artillery
120 mm Mortar
2S-0/23/31
2B-16
2S-1
2S-3
2S-19
2S-5
2S-7
2A-36
2A-65
BM-21
9P-140
9A-52
Anti-tank
9P-148
9P-149
MT-12:
ATGM
Shells
2A-45M:
ATGM
Shells
AT-4
AT-13
Air Defence
2S-6:
SAM
Shells
SA-11
SA-13
SA-15
Infantry Weapons
82 mm Mortar
AGS-17
RPG-16
RPG-18
RPO-A
PKM
RPK-74
AK-74
SVD
Note:
1.
Rounds
(b)
80
50
80
60
60
40
30
50
50
120
32
24
15
60
60
4
8
2 000
8
8
8
120
87
20
100
2 500
1 500
450
150
Numbers given are HE rounds only. Special natures (precision, fuel-air, cluster, RDM, incendiary, smoke, remote
jammers etc.,) have to be provided seperately, according to need. Relative scarcity of ACMs means that their issue
will be rationed, particularly to formations and units not at the point of logistic main effort.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-15
Table 13–3:
Ammunition Holdings Within a Division/Brigade
Location
(a)
Artillery
(b)
Tank
(c)
IFV
(d)
ATGM
(e)
SAM
(f)
SAA
(g)
With weapons
In Battalion & Brigade Transport
In Divisional Transport
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
1
1
1
Total
5
5
5
5
7
4
13.47 Planning for Artillery Supply. Once the commander has made his plan and designated the
groupings to be supported, his Commander Missile, Rocket and Artillery Troops works out a
fire plan and the resulting ammunition requirements. The Chief of Missile and Artillery
Armaments then designates ammunition dumps to supply the ammunition and co-ordinates its
delivery with the Chief of the Rear and the recipient units. The Chief of the Rear provides the
transport for delivery. Ideally, there will be time for expeditionary army transport to deliver
ammunition to division/brigade artillery regiments before the attack. This tactical reserve
preserves the lower formation’s mobile reserves intact. In the event of a more hurried attack,
division/brigade transport may deliver the rounds direct to the gun areas (preserving the unit’s
mobile reserves) and be resupplied from the rear later. Figure 13–3 illustrates the ammunition
resupply system at work. Shells are delivered fully prepared, but time must be allowed in
planning for their unpacking from pallets, sorting, degreasing and stacking or loading into SP
guns or resupply vehicles and for arming.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-16
A. ARTILLERY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY
(1) BATTALION
KEY
REGT TPT DELIVERS AMMO
TO BN SUPPLY PT
BN ARMD, TRACKED TPT
COLLECTS FROM BN SUPPLY
POINT DELIVERS TO BTY
(2) BATTERY
NOTE:
ARMD RESUPPLY VEHS VISIT BTY SUPPLY PT
IN TURN AND MOVE TO ALT FIRE POSNS.
GUNS REPLENISH ON MOVING TO ALT FIRE
POSN AFTER A FIRE MSN.
Figure 13–3: Artillery Ammunition Resupply
13.48 Ammunition Expenditure. In fighting through well prepared defences, MAF GF planners
calculate on using over three UF of artillery ammunition per lower formation per day, with
hasty defences requiring about two UF, a meeting engagement under two UF, an advance
against covering forces about one UF, and a pursuit approximately one UF. In defence on the
enemy’s main axis, a division or brigade will expect to expend over three UF per day, whether
the defence is well prepared or hasty. With the widespread use of ACMs (for example, area
effect warheads such as cluster or fuel air explosives and precision munitions which can
destroy identified point targets with one to two rounds), MAF GF planners anticipate a
considerable reduction in the number of rounds required to achieve the suppression or
destruction of many targets. Tank ammunition is likely to be at the rate of one UF per day
against a defending enemy and in a meeting battle, and much less in other forms of action, but
it is less of a problem, requiring about one third of the lift required for the artillery. Small arms
and air defence ammunition, mines, explosives and other natures pose much smaller lift
problems, their weight being almost infinitesimal compared with that of artillery and tank
combined.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-17
13.49 Petrol, Oils and Lubricants Supply. POL supply will sometimes account for over half the
total weight to be moved (up to 70 per cent in the pursuit):
a. The number of different types of POL which have to be moved is very limited compared
with the various natures of ammunition - the overwhelming bulk will be diesel.
b. Captured stocks can be utilised. These, when civilian supplies are included, are likely to
be very considerable, especially if the expeditionary army mounts a surprise offensive at
the outset of a conflict. Similarly, when defending on friendly territory, civilian stocks can
be tapped, at least in more populated areas.
13.50 Holdings. The POL accounting equivalent of the UF is the ‘refill’, the amount of fuel carried in
a vehicle’s internal fuel tanks (i.e., excluding the external fuel tins often mounted on vehicles).
The road range of most MAF GF A and B vehicles with one refill is approximately 500
kilometres, though some logistic vehicles enjoy a substantially greater range. A division or
brigade normally carries three refills of diesel (including the vehicle’s initial fill), with another
two to three at expeditionary army level and two to three times that at SG. As with ammunition,
stocks are kept up for as long as possible by timely resupply from higher units/formations.
13.51 Petrol, Oils and Lubricants Resupply. Following the desirable practice of skip-echelon
supply, wheeled, soft skinned bowsers will often deliver to first echelon battalion refilling
points, with combat vehicles retiring there to replenish. Figures 13–4 and 13–5 illustrate the
replenishment of a tank company and a ground attack aviation flight. Fuel can also be
delivered by ordinary load carrying vehicles, either in pillow tanks or tins, to division/brigade or
even unit supply points. In the case of delivery by tin, demountable flat racks are all but
mandatory to save time. Air resupply, using fixed or rotary wing aircraft, can also be used to a
limited extent, for instance to support forward or airborne detachments or, for short periods in
an emergency, even entire battle groups (this will depend on achieving a favourable air
situation).
A. A TANK COMPANY RECEIVES FUEL IN THE BATTALION REAR
REFUELLING HOSE
AND NOZZLE
TION
RIBU
DIST
IBLE
X
E
L
F
PIPE
REFUELLING POINT
MARKER PLACE
BOWZER
AND TRAILER
Figure 13–4: Refuelling of a Tank Company
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-18
MOTORWAY LANE
PRIMARY FUEL STORAGE CELL
REFUELING HOSE
AND NOZZLE, 20M
AND 30M
FLEXIBLE PRESSURE HOSE
FUEL TRANSFER PUMPING STN
PILLOW
TANKS
NOTE: This technique is used to refuel attack helicopters operating in the enemy’s depth.
Figure 13–5: Refuelling a Ground Attack Aviation Flight on a Highway Strip
13.52 Consumption. MAF GF planners believe that each division/brigade will need around 160-200
tonnes of POL per day to maintain itself in the field, with expenditure rising to over 400-500
tonnes daily in the attack or meeting engagement. With almost 480-600 tonnes already in the
vehicles and a further 1 200-1 500 carried in unit and higher formation transport, a
division/brigade has enough stocks for three to five days’ combat. Thus, at the lower level,
where resupply is most problematical, POL is much less of a problem than ammunition. Once
combat has lessened in intensity as penetration and breakthrough give way to manoeuvre,
bowsers can be supplemented by using ordinary load carrying vehicles, fewer of which will be
needed for ammunition, to carry fuel.
13.53 Rations. Rations are issued based on meals per man per day. Basic ration norms determine
the amount of food products issued to feed one man for a 24 hour period. Supplemental norms
determine the amount of rations to be issued in excess of the basic ration norms. They are
based on conditions under which the men are serving or the nature of their service. Dry rations
are issued on the basis of one kg per man per day while fresh rations are based on two kg per
man per day. Divisions carry a five day food supply.
13.54 Water Supply. The water supply in the field is planned by engineers in co-operation with the
medical service. When time permits, a water supply plan is drawn up and includes survey, a
water supply chart, and a work schedule. The location of existing water resources in the
expected zone of operations is established for the survey. The water supply chart indicates
which wells to use, and how to deploy water supply stations. The work schedule designates
water points and the soldiers assigned to them. The schedule details daily water requirements,
transportation requirements for hauling the water, and equipment for handling it. The normal
rate of water consumption per man is about 10 litres per day. This includes water for drinking,
food preparation, washing, laundry and bathing. Under restricted water conditions, the daily
allowance is reduced to about five litres per day which eliminates use of water for uses other
than personal consumption and cooking.
13.55 Clothing. MAF GF soldiers receive military clothing at the time of induction. Supplementary
clothing, including field clothing, is issued after they have arrived at their unit. Subsequent
reissues occur at specified intervals and are issued from the unit depot.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-19
13.56 Vehicles. Procurement and resupply of vehicles and end items are the responsibility of the
various chiefs of service arms or technical services. The MAF GF does not have a resupply
procedure for unit end items while the unit is engaged tactically. The unit in combat is replaced
by another unit when attrition reaches a certain level. Mobile contact teams fix repairable
equipment and return it to action as soon as possible. This is the only way to replace
equipment end items. Damaged equipment is not repaired in the field if it requires more than a
few hours’ work. The MAF GF keeps a certain number of wheeled and tracked vehicles in
storage during peacetime to preserve them. A minimum number of vehicles is kept for normal
training and administrative uses, generally from 15 to 35 per cent of the vehicles authorised.
Transport Operations
13.57 The MAF GF transportation services include traffic management, railroad operations, railroad
maintenance and construction, highway construction and maintenance, highway regulation,
and operation of all transport modes including pipelines.
13.58 Rail Transport. Railroads are the principle means of transporting military hardware for the
initial stages of an operation. During battle operations, the military rail transport staff of SG
Chief of the Rear plans and directs rail shipments and movements. SG logistics bases are
usually located near large rail centres. The Chief of Rail Transport at SG level is responsible
for dispatch of supplies from rail stations to expeditionary army logistic bases.
13.59 Motor Transport. Extensive use of motor transport begins at the SG level. Transport units are
organic to the expeditionary army from division to battalion levels. The normal sizes of the
units are as follows:
a. division - materiel support battalion;
b. regiment - materiel support company;
c.
battalion - motor transport section with supply platoon; and
d. company - no specific motor transport section.
13.60 The primary means of delivery below divisional level is by truck. The priority allocated to the
movement of ammunition is indicated by the two ammunition transport companies in the
materiel support battalion at divisional level. These trucks have all-wheel drive, giving them an
off-road capability that is well suited to front-line ammunition delivery.
13.61 The POL transport company has the same basic truck as the ammunition company. The POL
version has a 5 000 litre tank with a 4 200 litre tank mounted on a trailer.
13.62 The other company in the battalion is the cargo transport company. Its mission is to deliver
items of supply other than ammunition and bulk fuel.
13.63 A major strength of MAF GF transport is the great quantity and extensive use of trailers.
Loaded trailers are pulled forward to fighting units and exchanged for empty trailers. The
empty trailers are returned to rear logistics bases for reloading. In this manner, fighting units
maintain maximum quantities of critical supplies such as ammunition and fuel.
13.64 Second echelon unit logistics elements support first echelon units. This practice increases the
transport capability for logistic support to the first echelon regiments and divisions. Logistics
bases can be located deeper in the SG or expeditionary army rear areas. This placement
reduces congestion in the main combat area, but requires long LofC that could be likely
targets for enemy air interdiction strikes.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-20
Salvage and Destruction
13.65 Maximum use is made of captured stores and equipment. Both friendly and captured materiel
is subject to intensive salvage. If equipment is beyond repair, troops usually strip it down to
component parts and include these parts in their stock inventories. The expeditionary army
may also use captured materiel on a short-term basis to replace its own equipment losses.
SECTION 13-4.
MATERIEL SUPPORT
13.66 Forward positioning of maintenance and recovery operations provides effective support for the
high speed tempo of the expeditionary army’s combat operations. Lower-level units have a
limited maintenance capability and depend on higher-level maintenance units to provide direct
and backup support. A regiment collects its damaged vehicles and does what light repairs it
can before continuing the advance. A division works in a similar fashion, leaving unfinished
work to the expeditionary army or SG. The bulk of repair resources are based at expeditionary
army level and are assigned to key axes.
Equipment Maintenance, Recovery and Repair
13.67 Importance. Recovery and repair of damaged materiel plays a crucial role in the sustainability
of MAF GF formations. Rapid repair, rather than the provision of replacement equipment, is
the basic means whereby combat strengths are maintained. MAF GF expect up to one third of
all AFV ‘kills’ to prove irreparable. Of the remainder, it expects to put up to two thirds back into
action within one to two days.
13.68 Advantages. The MAF GF expect to benefit from two major factors in keeping up equipment
strengths when they are conducting offensive operations. These are:
a. Availability and Reliability. Combat vehicles are kept in a nearly run-in state and little used
in peacetime training (heavy reliance being placed on simulators and training vehicles held
over the wartime establishment). As a result, the MAF GF can expect approaching 100 per
cent availability at the start of the conflict (after normal teething problems have been
overcome). They can also expect relatively few routine mechanical breakdowns during the
course of a short operational life. Given the limited life expectancy of AFVs in future
conflict, MAF GF design them with an operable range of only 3 600 kilometres before a
major overhaul is needed. This limitation produces valued compensatory trade-offs, such
as reducing the size and therefore weight of vehicles and the scale of maintenance
support that units require.
b. Possession of the Battlefield. In the advance, it is possible for the expeditionary army to
recover and repair both combat and non-battle casualties. By the same token, the enemy
will be denied this ability.
13.69 The System. The system is based on the accomplishment of repair as far forward as possible,
with repair facilities being moved to the scene of combat rather than waiting for damaged
equipment to be evacuated to them. Priority is given to light repairs taking a maximum of three
hours. Once these are completed, medium repairs requiring replacement or overhaul of at
least two major assemblies and taking nine hours maximum are undertaken. Capital repairs
are unlikely to be undertaken during the course of an operation.
a. Unit. The regimental maintenance company/combined arms battalion platoon recovers
casualties to a damaged vehicle collection point. The unit repair shop, located nearby,
then classifies them and does as many light repairs as it can before following the combat
elements to their next area of battle.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-21
b. Division/Brigade. The division or brigade maintenance battalion moves forward to an area
conveniently located near the scene of the heaviest fighting and sets up repair points for
AFVs and artillery and for other vehicles. It will tackle the light repairs left undone by units,
and in the unlikely event that these are completed before the battalion moves on, it will
begin on medium repairs. Even division/brigade assets will, however, expect to move two
or even three times in a day if the advance is very swift, though the deleterious effect such
frequent moves may have on repair rates can be reduced by leapfrogging elements
forward. If the formation is conducting manoeuvre defence or withdrawal, efforts will
concentrate on recovery and repair of lightly damaged vehicles and the destruction of
those left on the battlefield.
c.
Expeditionary Army. Organic assets are limited to a single maintenance battalion for
armoured vehicles, wheeled vehicles and artillery. In addition, there may be military region
assets in the form of one recovery and one repair battalion for tanks, and one vehicle
recovery company (and rear units for special equipment). In the expeditionary army rear
area, there will, however, be substantial SG assets, the number depending on the
importance of the axis and severity of anticipated fighting. These will deploy to locations
convenient for the various damaged vehicle collection points established by the lower
formations and will carry out as many repairs as possible before the momentum of the
advance demands their forward displacement. They aim not to fall back more than 60 to
80 kilometres from the line of contact. In defence or withdrawal, they will concentrate on
evacuation and repair of lightly damaged vehicles.
d. Strategic Group. SG will have up to five battalions each for armoured and wheeled
vehicles and for artillery. There will be three to four battalions each for tank and wheeled
vehicle recovery and six to 10 repair battalions. These are the resources (together with
others for specialised equipment) which deploy forward, either in the expeditionary army
rear or in the SG mobile base. A further six or more workshops will be at work in the SG
rear base.
e. Repair Parts. Lower formations have repair parts to deal with results of three days of
average intensity combat, and cannibalisation from equipment needing capital repairs will
provide more. The expeditionary army and SG have sufficient repair parts to cover the
demands of their respective operations. With each repair battalion dealing with
approximately 10 tank and 27 motor vehicle medium repairs per day, or twice these
numbers for light repairs, MAF GF planners expect to return well over half their equipment
losses to units within two to three days. These will go to restore the strength of units
withdrawn from the first echelon into reserve or possibly to augment fresh formations
arriving from the operational depth. Combat strengths will be maintained at acceptable
levels (operationally speaking) until the end of an operation (i.e., an expeditionary army
will hope to conclude its operation with, for instance, about 60 per cent of its tanks).
13.70 Anticipated Loss and Repair Rates. In conventional operations, the MAF GF anticipate a
loss rate of 10 to 15 per cent per day in tanks and about one third that for IFVs, APCs and
wheeled vehicles. These figures (already double those of past wars) may increase by about 50
per cent where the enemy employs significant quantities of high accuracy conventional
weaponry, though casualties inflicted by shaped charge projectiles will usually be quickly
repairable unless they set off secondary explosions.
13.71 Maintenance Facilities. Maintenance facilities in the field are provided for the following items
of equipment:
a. tracked vehicles,
b. wheeled vehicles,
c.
artillery and ordnance,
d. engineer equipment,
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-22
e. signals equipment, and
f.
chemical equipment.
13.72 Service for these items is provided by fixed and mobile repair facilities that extend repair
capabilities forward into the battle area.
13.73 Vehicle Repair. The MAF GF classify vehicle repairs as routine, medium or capital:
a. Routine Repairs. Replacement, adjustment or repair of individual components that can be
made within a short time are classified ‘routine’. Major components are not disassembled.
This category is performed at levels below division.
b. Medium Repairs. Major overhaul of at least two basic assemblies is classified ‘medium’.
This category of maintenance is performed at regiment or divisional level.
c.
Capital Repairs. Major overhaul or complete disassembly of a piece of equipment is
termed a ‘capital’ repair. This is the most extensive category of maintenance and can be
performed at expeditionary army and SG levels.
Recovery and Repair During Combat
13.74 During combat operations, a TOP is established in the forward area of each combat battalion.
The purpose of the TOP is to monitor the battlefield for damage, to assist crews, and to call
repair and recovery units forward. It comprises several vehicle operators, one or more
mechanics, a medic, battalion NBC personnel, and at least one combat engineer. It is
supervised by the deputy Commander for Technical Matters. The entire group is mounted in
an armoured vehicle with radios and night vision devices.
13.75 The TOP maintains radio contact with the battalion commander and recovery and repair
elements. Company TOPs may be established if the battle area is beyond observation range
of the main TOP. The Chief of the TOP assesses the nature of damage and status of the crew
of an out-of-service vehicle and initiates action to recover the vehicle and accomplish repairs.
If repairs can be made in five hours or less, the battalion Repair and Evacuation Group (REG)
repairs the vehicle on-site, or evacuates it to the repair and evacuation site.
13.76 A REG usually comprises one tracked recovery vehicle, a tank repair workshop van, and a
parts truck. Regimental REGs may be used to support a specific battalion if required. REG
repair priorities are based on the required repair time, with equipment requiring the least time
for repairs being completed first. The division evacuates vehicles or equipment damaged
beyond the repair capability or capacity of the regiment to the division’s damaged vehicle
collection point. If the division is unable to repair the damaged item, it is evacuated to either
the expeditionary army or SG for necessary maintenance. Higher level unit transportation
assets accomplish the evacuation.
13.77 If evacuation from lower to higher echelons is not possible, vehicles can be left along specified
evacuation routes to await mobile maintenance teams providing direct or backup support. The
higher unit’s team will remain to complete repairs as the lower units move forward in support of
continuing combat operations. A major goal of the evacuation process is to clear damaged
equipment from avenues of approach of follow-on combat units.
Technical Services
13.78 The MAF GF also uses periodic checks of equipment known as technical services. These
services are performed at regular intervals on most equipment. Examples of technical
services for tanks include:
a. Routine Inspection. A routine inspection is conducted before tank movement as a preoperational check and takes 40 minutes.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-23
b. Preventive Maintenance Service Number 1. Preventive maintenance service number 1 is
conducted after tank movement and at 100 to 150 kilometres intervals during a long road
march. This service takes between 9 to 12 hours.
c.
Preventive Maintenance Service Number 2. A six to seven hour thorough inspection
termed ‘preventive maintenance service number 2’ is performed every 1 000 kilometres.
d. Preventive Maintenance Service Number 3. Preventive maintenance service number 3 is a
nine to 12 hour comprehensive inspection of all vehicle systems performed every 2 000
kilometres.
Organisational Maintenance Services
13.79 Divisional Level. The division maintenance battalion comprises a battalion headquarters, a
tank/track vehicle maintenance company, a motor vehicle maintenance company, an ordnance
maintenance company, a materiel services platoon, a recovery platoon and a special
maintenance platoon. Within the companies and platoons, there are vans, supply trucks and
recovery vehicles. These companies and platoons are capable of performing both routine and
medium repairs. In combat, they establish damaged vehicle repair and collection points that
are similar to regimental REGs.
13.80 Regimental Level. The regimental maintenance company performs routine and some medium
repair functions. Motorised rifle and tank regiments have both wheeled and tracked vehicle
workshops. Each of these elements may form REGs to provide support to subordinate
battalions.
13.81 Battalion Level. The battalion repair workshop contains a shop truck and mechanics who can
make routine repairs on tracked and wheeled vehicles. In combat, this repair workshop can be
reinforced with a vehicle recovery section.
13.82 Company Level. The only maintenance conducted at company level is driver and crew
preventive maintenance and routine inspections.
Maintenance Responsibilities
13.83 The Chief of Artillery at regiment and above is responsible for maintenance of small arms,
automatic weapons, mortars, artillery and missiles. Motorised rifle and tank regiments usually
have two or three armourers to perform light repair on small arms and some automatic
weapons. Armourers in artillery regiments can do routine maintenance on artillery pieces as
well as on small arms. Artillery repair in tank regiments is done by the tank workshop.
13.84 At divisional level, routine to medium repairs are made in the artillery maintenance company of
the maintenance and repair battalion. Artillery repairs at regiment and division consist primarily
of replacing parts from available stocks.
13.85 A signals company is found at regimental level. The operators repair signals equipment, when
possible. Radio, telephone and radar units generally have some testing equipment and spare
parts for routine repairs. Medium communication repairs are completed at divisional level.
Signals repair units perform capital repairs at expeditionary army level. Engineer and chemical
equipment maintenance and repair are accomplished in the same manner as signals
equipment at divisional and higher echelons.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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SECTION 13-5.
PERSONNEL SUPPORT
Health Services Support
13.86 General. The medical system is designed to return as many soldiers as quickly as possible to
duty, and, apart from emergency life-saving treatment, priority is given to those men who can
be put back into action.
13.87 The two principle missions of the medical service in combat are the evacuation and treatment
of casualties, and the prevention of disease in the area of operations. The medical service is
further responsible for the combat readiness of the military medical staff of the armed forces.
During combat operations, each MAF GF command level from company to SG has organic
medical support units or personnel. At each level, medical support units are subordinate to
both the combat unit commander and the next higher level of the medical service. For
example, the battalion physician’s assistant is subordinate to both the battalion commander
and the regimental senior physician. This system responds to the needs of the combat units
and allows close coordination between medical levels for treatment and evacuation of
casualties.
13.88 Medical Doctrine. MAF GF medical doctrine divides the range of medical treatment into three
categories:
a. The first category of procedures includes only mandatory life-saving measures.
b. The second category includes procedures to prevent severe complications of wounds or
injuries.
c.
The final category of treatment includes procedures that are accomplished only when
there is a low casualty load and reduced enemy activity.
13.89 The focus of MAF GF combat doctrine on high speed offensive operations calls for a highly
mobile medical support system. Its component units must be capable of repeated forward
deployment with a minimum loss of efficiency. Repeated forward redeployment of medical
units and continuous rearward evacuation of casualties demand close coordination between
medical levels and medical and combat commanders.
13.90 MAF GF combat medical doctrine stresses the timely return of recuperated sick and wounded
to their units. At each stage of evacuation, medical personnel detain and accommodate those
casualties whose expected recovery period falls within prescribed limits. Only casualties
whose prognoses indicate extended recovery periods reach a SG or home country hospital.
Medical personnel also supervise the selection and preparation of grave sites to preclude
health hazards. Responsibilities for burial, however, fall on other rear services personnel.
13.91 The basic principle of MAF GF combat medical support is multi-stage evacuation with
minimum treatment at each level. From company through SG, each level has specific
responsibilities for the care of the sick and wounded. As casualties move through the combat
evacuation system, medical personnel at each level make effective use of medical facilities by
repeated sorting of the wounded (triage). Medical personnel treat the lightly wounded who can
be returned to combat and those casualties who would not survive further evacuation without
immediate medical attention. The MAF GF emphasise that major medical treatment should be
performed at an army-level mobile field hospital.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
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13.92 Medical System. Medical units move forward with the troops they are supporting, setting up
facilities in areas where heavy fighting is taking place.
a. Unit. At battalion level, casualties merely receive first aid. The regiment’s medical
company can undertake medical operations, but treatment is kept to a minimum. For the
most part, casualties are assessed and documented and left to division or brigade or, in
the most serious cases, earmarked to go straight to the expeditionary army level. Light
casualties are retained until fit to return to duty. In the mobile forces, the combined arms
battalion has a large medical platoon capable of giving treatment, though stabilisation is its
main function and detailed work is left to brigade.
b. Division/Brigade. The medical battalion can handle up to 400 to 500 casualties in 24
hours. Serious cases are sent on to expeditionary army level or direct to SG after any
necessary stabilising treatment. Serious surgery and extended care are practised only at
the operational level. Casualties likely to recover in 10 to 15 days are held at
division/brigade, which has facilities for 400 to 500 patients. These men can then be
returned to units of the formation needing replacements. It is not anticipated that the
division or brigade medical battalion will be able to handle the heavy casualty load
involved in a penetration battle. Indeed, it will be over-stretched by the first day’s fighting
and will be unable to move even after two days. Thus, each first echelon lower formation
will be augmented by one to two separate medical detachments from SG resources (each
organised like a division/brigade medical battalion). These medical units will leapfrog
forward, moving every two days on average.
c.
Expeditionary Army. Expeditionary army resources are deployed to support the axis likely
to see the most casualties. Separate medical detachments may reinforce forward divisions
and brigades, supplementing their effort and easing the problem created by frequent
moves by the lower formation battalions. A further two to four separate medical
detachments are kept as a medical reserve to deal with the sudden influx of mass
casualties which will result from enemy surge operations and/or deep strikes. Also
operating in the expeditionary army rear, 60 to 80 kilometres from the line of combat (at
least initially) will be mobile hospital bases from SG. One is deployed in support of every
two to three divisions or brigades in contact. A mobile hospital base comprises up to 6 500
beds in all, deployed in one to three locations. There are two triage hospitals (each 500
beds), four multipurpose hospitals (each 300 beds), nine field surgical hospitals (each 200
beds), three mobile internal hospitals (for diseases, each 200 beds), two mobile
psychiatric and two field epidemic hospitals (each 200 beds) and one for especially
contagious diseases. There is a 1 000 bed hospital for the lightly wounded, where patients
expected to recover in 15 to 30 days are held, pending return to combat units, and minor
units such as blood banks, mobile oxygen and x-ray stations etc.
d. Strategic Group. In addition to the four to six mobile hospital bases supporting army
operations, there will be two to three rear hospital bases established in the SG rear base.
These comprise the same elements as mobile hospital bases (though with three triage
hospitals) and, in addition, 15 evacuation hospitals (each 400 to 500 beds), and six
hospitals for the lightly wounded (each 1 000 beds). These hospital bases are deployed at
or near railheads in two to three locations. The mobile elements can be used as medical
reserves or to set up new mobile hospital bases if the interval between those operating in
the expeditionary army rear and the SG rear base becomes too large.
e. Evacuation. At each level, it is the responsibility of the higher echelon to collect casualties
from the lower echelon. Ambulance facilities are limited, with division and brigade
companies moving 80 casualties and SG and expeditionary army battalions being able to
carry only 300 casualties each in one lift (and the separate air ambulance regiment
transporting 180). Thus most wounded, especially being evacuated back to expeditionary
army level, can expect to be backloaded in empty load carrying vehicles returning from
ammunition or fuel runs. From expeditionary army backwards, ambulances and rail
transport will be more common. Of course, as with ammunition and POL supply, skipechelon evacuation will be practised whenever possible.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-26
Anticipated Loss Rates
13.93 Loss rates vary sharply with organisational levels and according to the type of fighting
involved. MAF GF planners anticipate an average daily loss rate of about 0.9 to 1.8 per cent
for the expeditionary army, 4.5 to 9 per cent for divisions and brigades and 15 to 25 per cent
for units, these figures being 50 per cent higher than those of past wars. These averages
conceal important variations. In penetration battles and city fighting, for instance, daily loss
rates double or treble, while they can fall to half or less during pursuit. About one quarter of all
casualties are expected to be killed or missing. Of the wounded, up to one quarter are
expected to be severe, about 50 per cent medium and about 35 per cent light. The medium
and light cases provide the manpower reserve for replenishing losses.
Traffic Control
13.94 Both at expeditionary army and SG level, the Commandant’s Service provides a large and
efficient traffic control organisation. It is seen as essential to provide for timely and concealed
movement, concentration and deployment of troops and supplies. The Commandant’s Service:
a. regulates the movement of troops on routes, water crossings and passages through
natural or engineering obstacles;
b. monitors progress and the observation of established procedures (including camouflage
and concealment measures);
c.
marks routes and concentration areas;
d. provides security against enemy reconnaissance efforts; and
e. maintains order in the civil population.
13.95 After a thorough prior reconnaissance of routes, crossing and assembly areas to be used, a
Commandant’s Service is set up. It may be reinforced by engineering assets, recovery
vehicles and helicopters, and a reserve will be maintained to react to enemy actions (for
example, by setting up bypasses). Numbers, already substantial, will be swollen in wartime by
the addition of troops from the Military Vehicles Inspectorate (i.e., garrison traffic police), and
the Service enjoys a high proportion of carefully selected and trained officers.
SECTION 13-6.
SUPPORT ENGINEERING
Route Repair and Maintenance
13.96 Railways. Every SG has railway construction assets, with a mixture of railway and railway
bridge construction units. There is no standard allocation, as the requirements of SGs will
vary. In addition, there is a separate railway bridge construction unit for the repair or
construction of large bridges. These units are used to repair and keep open the rail lines
needed by the SG within its boundaries, advancing them steadily during the course of an
offensive. Up to 40 to 50 kilometres of track may be restored per day if damage is light. Total
destruction is reckoned to halve the rate of repair. In addition, as an offensive proceeds, one to
two railheads may be established to increase the turn around of trains by up to 30 per day
(and the rear services will create two to three distribution stations per expeditionary army, with
two reserve ones as well). A railway exploitation unit provides the skilled personnel to run the
railways within the operational rear.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-27
Military Roads
13.97 Repair and Maintenance. An SG will have two to four road construction and Commandant’s
Service brigades (each usually with three construction and control battalions, a separate
construction battalion and a separate bridge construction battalion), and a separate bridge
construction asset for work on large bridges over major rivers. As with railway troops, the
allocation and grouping varies according to need. Each road construction and Commandant’s
Service brigade can run sectors totalling 900 kilometres of road, repairing up to 90 kilometres,
constructing underwater bridges up to 110 kilometres long (bearing 16 tonnes) and
establishing up to 160 traffic control posts. Bridging regiments deal with large bridges linking
military roads. Each expeditionary army will be supported by at least one military road capable
of taking a traffic volume of 10 000 vehicles per 24 hours.
SECTION 13-7.
SUSTAINMENT
Rear Area Security
13.98 The Threat. In past wars, many armies have made effective use of partisan and guerrilla
movements to support their operations, both offensive and defensive. Often, these have been
augmented by the use of regular forces to create a front in the enemy’s rear. Such actions
have often provided returns disproportionate to the level of effort involved. Rear area security
is thus seen to be a problem of significant dimensions.
13.99 Future War. The MAF GF expect any enemy to make a considerable effort to conduct
reconnaissance, espionage and diversionary action in its operational rear. These will be
particularly effective in areas where the local population is not sympathetic to the MAF GF
cause. In addition to these threats, MAF GF anticipate attacks on their rear areas by aviation,
airborne and heliborne forces, as well as larger scale problems caused by enemy operational
manoeuvre forces and/or bypassed groupings. The more operations are characterised by
fluidity and manoeuvre, and the less dense the forces deployed on either side, the greater the
threat is perceived to be.
13.100 Measures to Meet the Challenge. The MAF GF meet this challenge in a number of ways:
a. Dedicated Security Forces. The expeditionary army deploys a considerable counterintelligence effort. It also allocates considerable assets for security tasks. This may well be
an Interior Troops’ formation, equipped with and trained for conventional as well as
unconventional warfare. The expeditionary army deploys a logistic protection regiment as
well, while divisions and brigades have strong battalions, and regiments and combined
arms battalions have a company. These troops come under command of the Chief of the
Rear and are not available to reinforce the efforts of the combat elements. Their task is
purely the protection of logistics areas and convoy escort. Usually, the Chief of the Rear of
a lower formation is allocated some point air defence from the division/brigade air defence
regiment to fill gaps in the regiment’s general defence, area coverage and/or thicken the
defence of key installations. Moreover, as the threat of air and sea landings grows, there is
an increasing emphasis on deploying anti-landing reserves (probably including, or even
based on air-mobile units) to provide rapid reaction. Such forces will often be well placed
to reinforce logistics areas.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
13-28
b. Other Measures. All logistics and communications units are capable of self-defence.
Repair units will have an augmented ability to protect themselves, as the crews of
damaged equipment usually remain with their equipment while they undergo repair.
Similarly, the convalescent sick and wounded provide a reserve of manpower. Wherever
possible, added security is also achieved by deploying rear support elements near
refurbishing or second echelon forces. As is the case with combat troops, the rear services
are expected to be able to deal will remotely delivered mines, both in logistics areas and
when carrying out resupply.
SECTION 13-8.
LOGISTIC PLANNING
Centralised Planning
13.101 Centralised planning requires concurrent tactical and logistical planning as well as
coordination with civilian industry and transportation. The bulk of supplies and transport
resources are concentrated at higher formation levels. This enables MAF GF commanders to
concentrate support where it is needed most, if necessary, switching axes rapidly to take
advantage of unexpected opportunities. Centralised planning also ensures coordination of
civilian production with military requirements.
Tailoring of Logistic Units
13.102 Tailoring allows allocation of logistic resources to the combat elements that are essential to the
success of the mission. This enables the MAF GF commander to assign priorities for logistic
support.
13.103 Staff Procedures. To ensure rapid reaction to the combined arms commander’s decision, the
Chief of the Rear, the Artillery Supply Officer and Chief of POL Supply attend combat
briefings. While manoeuvre unit/formation commanders are preparing their combat plans, the
Chief of the Rear and his two principle deputies rapidly formulate proposals for logistic support
using prepared calculation tables. Using prepared proformae, the Chief of the Rear issues his
proposals at the same time as unit/formation commanders issue their orders. Once they have
been approved by the combined arms commander, he issues copies, either paper or by
secure fax, to subordinate combat units/formations so that their rear services can be briefed at
the same time as their manoeuvre sub-units/units. Thus rear support planning is completed at
the same time as combat planning. The Chief of the Rear and his deputies then return to the
rear control post to implement the logistic plan.
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14-1
CHAPTER 14
COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION 14-1.
INTRODUCTION
General
14.1
MAF Signals seeks to control the EMS and deny it to its enemy during combat action. Signals
consists of specialist troops who provide the communications systems, information systems
and electronic warfare systems for commanders at all levels of the MAF. These systems are
an integral part of MAF C2 and assist in the maintenance of uninterrupted troop control,
flexibility and security.
14.2
There are three inter-related areas within Signals:
a. communications;
b. information systems (IS); and
c.
EW.
14.3
The Musorians recognise that communications assist commanders in exercising C2. These
communications must be reliable and efficient to support the commander’s plans and
withstand likely enemy interference. Communication systems must be able to cope with the
expected volume of traffic and still provide a degree of flexibility and redundancy in case of
interference through physical and/or electronic attack.
14.4
The MAF have yet to develop an integrated information system. They do however, recognise
the requirement for a rugged and versatile command, C3I system, whether in barracks or in
the field. Information systems can be used to enhance the coordination and control of combat
forces through automated management of key battlefield information and functional areas.
They can also be used to automate task orders and provide decision support, communications
processing, graphics and text displays, information management, and monitoring of friendly
and hostile forces.
14.5
The MAF GF conduct offensive and defensive EW operations to disrupt and degrade hostile
use of the EMS while protecting their own equipment from hostile interference.
Tasks
14.6
MAF Signals organise communications with subordinate, adjacent and higher headquarters.
They plan wire, radio and mobile communications to ensure the commander has continuous
and uninterrupted tactical control. Specific responsibilities of Signals include:
a. organising radio nets;
b. laying wire;
c.
establishing callsigns and radio procedures;
d. organising courier services;
e. operating message centres;
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-2
f.
developing information systems;
g. implementing EW measures; and
h. supervising the supply, issue, and maintenance of signals equipment.
SECTION 14-2.
COMMUNICATIONS
General
14.7
Musorian doctrine stresses offensive action. While secure radio is the principal means of
communication in offensive action, the MAF is aware of the threat of enemy radio intercept/DF
and communications jamming. Therefore, the MAF stresses the use of alternative means of
communications. During periods of disruption of radio communications or radio silence, the
MAF employs wire, messengers, liaison officers, and visual and audio signals. Messengers
are the preferred method for delivering combat orders. Whenever possible, the MAF prefers
personal contact between commanders or their representatives and subordinates, especially
as the commanders carry full responsibility for all aspects of their subordinates’ activities.
14.8
Radio is the primary means of communications within MAF divisions. An integrated tactical
radio system consists of lightweight manpack sets, vehicle mounted radios and transportable
radio relay systems. In defensive situations, a variety of cable laying devices and switchboards
is used to establish wire communications. Wire lines are used extensively in assembly areas
and along march routes.
14.9
Modern combat net radios (CNRs) are the primary means of tactical communications for the
MAF GF and operate in either the HF, VHF or UHF frequency bands. MAF CNR are capable
of secure data transmissions, as well as high quality voice. SF units have radios capable of
frequency-hopping, burst transmission and automatic link establishment (ALE). These offer
good protection against EW.
Principles
14.10 The following general principles apply to MAF communications:
a. Security is a prime consideration for selecting the means of communication.
b. The responsibility for maintaining communication runs from higher to lower. If the higher
unit cannot establish communication, the responsibility moves to the subordinate unit.
Lateral communications are established from right to left.
c.
Radio is the primary means of communication within MAF divisions.
d. Wire is the primary means of communication for defensive military operations. Wire
encompasses the military landline and includes any available national telephone services
as a single system. Couriers can augment either wire or radio.
e. Command nets are designed to provide communication with subordinates at least two
levels down. This communication structure allows, for example, a brigade to command a
company, if necessary. This supports the Musorian system of tight control and constant
supervision.
f.
The communication systems must be sufficiently mobile to change location as rapidly as
the combat elements which they serve.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-3
14.11 MAF field communication equipment ranges from simple, easy to operate electronic devices to
more complex vehicle-mounted equipment. GF radios include low-power UHF, VHF, and HF
manpack sets and VHF and HF vehicle-mounted types, medium-power VHF and HF radios of
a mobile variety, ground-to-air radios, burst transmission and multi-channel radio relay
equipment. Although limited in availability, secure radios and phones are used by major
headquarters. Mobile phones, UHF handhelds and TACSAT UHF may also be utilised when
available. An example of MAF radios and their capabilities is included in table 14–1.
Table 14–1:
Musorian Armed Forces Radio Equipment Capabilities
Serial
Type
Example
Frequency
(c)
Power
Output
(d)
(e)
Planning
Range
(f)
(a)
(b)
1.
VHF, Manpack, Low
Power
AN/PRC 77
1.3 to 2 W
30 to 75.95 MHz
5 km
2.
VHF, Portable, Very
Low Power
AN/PRC
126
0.5 W
30 to 88 MHz
1 to 4 km
3.
VHF, Vehicle Mount,
Medium Power
AN/VRC 46
AN/VRC 49
35 W
30 to 75.95 MHz
25 to 30 km
4.
HF, Manpack, Low
Power
PRC F1/F3
5W
1.6 to 30 MHz
Up to 24 km
Ground wave
5.
HF, Vehicle Mount,
Medium Power
CHX 200
100 W
1.5 to 30 MHz
up to 400 km
6.
HF, Vehicle Mount,
High Power
CHX 200
400 W
1.5 to 30 MHz
up to 800 km
7.
Radio Relay,
VHF/UHF
CTM 200
2.5 W
225 to 400 MHz
610 to 960 MHz
1.35 to 1.85
GHz
40 to 50 km
Note:
1.
1
Range is 25 kilometres while on the move; 30 kilometres while stationary with vehicle antenna.
14.12 International telecommunications are via leased satellite trunks through a number of fixed
earth stations or high-power HF rear links. Portable satellite communications ground stations
may be available worldwide. Satellite systems may be used to provide long-range
communications, primarily rear links between deployed forces and strategic sites. Satellite
communications allow voice, data and imagery traffic at high data rates, allowing the rapid flow
of information to assist in decision making. Satellites are being used to extend critical C2
communications and support long range surveillance units and special operations forces.
14.13 Communications units are either allocated or assigned at all levels from military region to
brigade to support internal headquarters and to provide communications with higher,
subordinate, and adjacent units. At the tactical level, each military district receives support
from its parent region during wartime. Each mechanised infantry division has a signals
battalion and a reconnaissance and EC battalion: motorised and light infantry divisions have
either a signals battalion or company. Most infantry divisions have company-sized signals and
reconnaissance units, although some better equipped infantry divisions may have battalionsized units of these types. Each separate or divisional brigade has a signals company to
support itself and its subordinate units. Only mechanised infantry units have organic signals
troops at battalion level.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-4
Organisations
14.14 Divisional. Both motorised infantry and tank divisions have signals units and communications
equipment to provide redundant links between levels of command. They are capable of
operating with alternate modes of communication under all conditions. The primary types of
communication equipment are:
a. HF and VHF radio (primary communications means);
b. VHF and UHF multi-channel radio relay;
c.
wire or cable;
d. messenger; and
e. visual and audio.
The MAF extend mobile communications through radio and wire integration and by
interconnection with fixed military and existing or electronically captured civil communications
facilities.
14.15 Normal radio nets in the division include command, staff, coordination, warning, and special
purpose nets. Divisional commanders may also establish other nets as required, when the
necessary equipment is available:
a. Command. The command nets link the divisional commander, chief of staff, and alternate
CP with regimental commanders and major support units. This net is duplicated when a
forward CP is formed. The divisional commander can contact battalion commanders if
desired. This skip-echelon working enables the commander to exercise direct control over
key subordinate groupings. These links may also be used to maintain control if an
intermediate headquarters is put out of action.
b. Staff. The staff net provides the chief of staff a means of communication with staff
elements of the reconnaissance and elcetronic combat battalions and the motorised
infantry and tank brigades. Other principle staff officers, notably the chiefs of artillery,
reconnaissance, air defence, chemical protection, and the rear, use their own dedicated
nets to ensure the uninterrupted flow of information and orders. These also provide
backup nets if the command net is interrupted or overloaded.
c.
Coordination. The coordination nets link the divisional main CP with the divisional rear,
with the division’s second echelon/reserve units/sub-units, and with adjacent formations.
They can also link the division with any groupings performing special missions in the
division’s area of responsibility, such as airborne, heliborne or amphibious landings, or an
army-level forward detachment or OMG. The motorised infantry, tank brigades, and FS
units all monitor these nets.
d. Warning. The warning net consists of radio receivers set on a designated warning
frequency throughout the division. This net is for tactical alert, air and NBC warnings.
e. Special Purpose. The special purpose nets employ radiotelegraph and radio relay
equipment to communicate with units executing special missions (such as the division’s
forward detachment) and with airborne units behind enemy lines.
14.16 Divisional Procedures. Before contact is made with the enemy, most radio and radio relay
systems maintain a listening watch with transmission strictly controlled. MAF units usually
observe radio silence when defending or departing AAs. During radio silence, wire and
messengers are the primary means of communication. While moving towards the enemy, units
normally limit radio transmissions to voice and use code words informing commanders they
have accomplished assigned tasks or have encountered unexpected difficulties. The MAF GF
also use visual signals, such as flags and flares, to a greater extent during movement. Usually
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-5
only the commander and reconnaissance elements have permission to transmit. In the
offence, MAF units maintain limited transmissions until the outbreak of battle, when those
authorised to transmit may do so without restriction. In an attack against a defending enemy,
the MAF considers the battle to have begun at the commencement of the artillery preparation.
In the encounter battle, they lift radio silence when any element of the advancing MAF force,
other than the CRP, makes contact with the enemy. When contact with the enemy occurs,
units reinitiate normal radio procedures. Subordinate commanders inform the divisional
commander when they reach control lines, encounter obstacles, make contact with the enemy
or have important information to report.
14.17 Brigade. The motorised infantry and tank brigades use four types of communication systems
to maintain troop control. These are radio, telephone, messenger and audio and visual signals.
The brigade organises retransmission stations for sub-units on independent missions or those
located a long distance from headquarters. A MAF GF brigade uses a wide variety of radio
nets.The command net usually operates on VHF, with an alternate net maintained on HF.
Manoeuvre, combat support and attached combat sub-units are on the command net,
although manoeuvre companies normally maintain a listening watch. The rear CP controls
service support sub-units on an administrative net. Brigade headquarters and manoeuvre subunit headquarters have receivers operating on the NBC and air warning net. A staff net
operates direct links between the brigade commander, the brigade headquarters, the
reconnaissance company, the air defence battery/battalion and the anti-tank battery/battalion.
14.18 Brigade Procedures. The brigade chief of communications is responsible for the production
of communications plans and instructions for specific combat actions, and will assign each
battalion a block of frequencies and callsigns. The brigade headquarters has responsibility for
establishing communications with subordinate, attached and supporting sub-units. The
practice is usually to establish communications from left to right between lateral sub-units of
equal size. When loss of communications occurs during combat, all sub-units out of contact
attempt to re-establish. It is standard procedure to provide communications from brigade
headquarters to company level, allowing for continuance of combat action if the intervening
(battalion) commander becomes a casualty.
14.19 Battalion. The battalion’s organic signals platoon collocates with the battalion CP, providing
additional HF radio capability along with wire and messenger service. Radio is the most
important means of control available to the MAF battalion commander. The MAF insists that
only the speed and flexibility of radio communications meets the demands for troop control in
modern combined arms combat. It also stresses the importance of being able to employ other
means of control to supplement or, if necessary, to replace radio communications. The MAF
trains extensively in the use of audio and visual signals and pyrotechnics. In the battalion
command group, both the commander and the chief of staff operate on the brigade command
nets (both the VHF net and the backup HF net). The chief of staff has primary responsibility for
maintaining these battalion stations in the two brigade nets. This leaves the battalion
commander free to use both time and communications resources to control the battalion. The
battalion commander also operates the net control station on his own VHF battalion command
net, in which his chief of staff and organic company commanders operate. The battalion chief
of staff operates the net control station on the battalion command and coordination net. If
companies are operating independent VHF command nets, the battalion commander is
capable of communicating directly with any subordinate company’s platoons or squads by
turning to that company’s net. Apart from the commander, chief of staff and organic
companies, the battalion command and coordination net includes the deputy commander for
technical affairs, the commanders of any reinforcing manoeuvre or FS sub-units, and the CRP.
Organic support elements also operate stations in the battalion command and coordination
net, but normally do not transmit unless called. The deputy commander for technical affairs
uses a second radio to control the battalion technical support net. Battalion repair and
recovery elements monitor this net, and disabled combat vehicles may tune to the net to
request assistance. Finally, the chief of staff maintains the only battalion station in the higher
headquarters’ NBC and air warning net, and retransmits any warning messages on the
battalion command and coordination net.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-6
14.20 Battalion Procedures. The battalion commander directs the combat actions of his sub-unit
from his command vehicle/position located near his companies. In the defence, the battalion
relies primarily on telephone communications and wire, but also makes extensive use of
messengers, signals flares, and radios. Before contact with the enemy, radio silence is
established, except for brief transmissions concerning reconnaissance reports and the
crossing of control lines. In an attack, the commander controls the battalion primarily by radio,
although messengers, personal contact, signals flares, signals flags and other means are also
used. Below brigade level, the MAF does not employ significant levels of secure voice
equipment. Therefore, from brigade to platoon level, it is routine to transmit commands by
radio in clear text during combat. However, MAF radio operating procedures require the use of
code names and callsigns in the interest of security. During the ground reconnaissance phase
of preparation for combat, the battalion commander and his signals platoon commander
disseminate most information orally. At this time, the battalion commander assigns code
names to major terrain features. This local encoding process is usually supplemented by an
encoded map reference grid system. Some codes may come from higher headquarters. The
battalion signals platoon commander issues station callsigns as part of the communications
operating instructions. At this time, the battalion officers record such information as the
assigned code names, frequencies, callsigns, and perhaps even a simple radio net diagram on
their maps.
14.21 Independent/Strike Battalion Communications Structure. Normal radio nets in a battalion
deployed independently or as a strike battalion include high command, command, FS, tactical
air support and administrative nets. Battalion commanders may also establish other nets as
required, when the necessary equipment is available. Radio nets employed within a strike
battalion include:
a. Strike Battalion High Command Link. As illustrated at figure 14–1, the primary means for
this link is the portable satellite terminal to provide secure voice and data. The alternate
means is the HF radio providing secure voice and data, probably using equipment similar
to CODAN and/or MEROD (see Section 14-5. Equipment).
Figure 14–1: Strike Battalion High Command Link
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-7
b. Strike Battalion Command Net. The primary means for this net is either the HF and/or VHF
frequency agile radio, depending on the distances involved. The alternate means for this
link is the HF or VHF radio providing secure voice and data, probably using equipment
similar to CODAN and/or MEROD (figure 14–2).
Figure 14–2: Strike Battalion Command Net
c.
Strike Battalion Company Command Net. The primary means for this net is the low power
HF and/or VHF manpack radio providing secure voice. These radios may be frequency
agile. Elements of the strike support company allocated in support of a strike company will
appear on that company’s command net, for example if the air defence (AD) section or
mortar section is in support of a company it will appear on that company’s command net
as shown (figure 14–3).
Figure 14–3: Strike Battalion Company Command Net
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-8
d. Strike Battalion Platoon Command Net. The primary means for this net is the low power
VHF manpack radio providing secure voice (figure 14–4).
Figure 14–4: Strike Battalion Platoon Command Net
e. Strike Battalion Strike Support Command Net. The primary means for this net is the low
power VHF manpack radio providing secure voice. Communications from SOC down to
company headquarters are provided by the signals platoon. The establishment of
communications from company headquarters down is integral to company operations
(figure 14–5).
Figure 14–5: Strike Battalion Strike Support Command Net
Note:
1.
Strike Battalion Company Support Net. The primary means for this net is the low power VHF manpack radio providing
secure voice. The MFC is from the weapons platoon headquarters and is usually collocated with the headquarters of
the company being supported. Other elements may appear on this net if they are allocated from the strike support
company, for example the AD section.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-9
f.
Strike Battalion Fire Support Net. The primary means for this net is the low power VHF
manpack radio providing secure voice. The FSCC is provided from within the strike
support company headquarters. Maximum use of line is made whenever possible. The
MFC allocated to the company headquarters may communicate directly with any mortar
section allocated in support of that company (figure 14–6).
Figure 14–6: Strike Battalion Fire Support Net
g. Strike Battalion Tactical Air Support Net. The primary means for this net is the low power
VHF secure voice manpack radio (figure 14–7).
Figure 14–7: Strike Battalion Tactical Air Support Net
h. Strike Battalion Administrative Net. The primary means for this net is the low power VHF
secure voice manpack radio (figure 14–8).
Figure 14–8: Strike Battalion Administrative Net
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-10
14.22 Below Battalion. The battalion is the primary element for the execution of manoeuvre.
Consistent with that concept, the MAF centralises control of radio communications at battalion
level. In combat, the battalion commander attempts to maintain a position from which he can
observe and direct the actions of all his companies. Requests for FS almost always involve
coordination at battalion level. The supporting artillery commander collocates with the
manoeuvre battalion commander. When individual motorised infantry or tank companies
operate with their parent battalion, all of the battalion’s combat vehicles may monitor the
battalion command net and receive orders from the battalion commander. When tank
companies reinforce a motorised infantry battalion (or visa versa), the company commander
can monitor that battalion’s command and coordination net and pass orders to his platoons on
his own company command net. Company commanders also have the authority to transmit on
the battalion nets. They have the authority to call for supporting fire in combat, but such calls
for fire must go through the battalion commander. While MAF tactical communication practices
seem restrictive, they are adequate for the company commander’s control authority, the fire
control of his tanks, BTRs, or BMPs, and the deployment of his company in battle drills.The
battalion commander however, retains full control and visibility of events as he is directly
responsible for all his subordinates’ actions.
14.23 Special Forces. SF units severely limit their use of radio communications in recognition of the
threat of EW. SF units have radios capable of frequency-hopping, burst transmission and ALE.
SF units establish nets as required, typically as illustrated in figure 14–9. The primary means
for the SF Company is HF radio using spread spectrum with ALE, error correction and
adaptive power. The alternate means is a portable satellite terminal providing secure voice
and data. SF units may also use digital mobile phones with commercial encryption, the internet
and the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Intra-patrol communications are
provided by low power VHF and/or UHF radios.
Figure 14–9: Special Forces Net
14.24 During offensive operations, the MAF emphasises a high rate of advance. This demands that
the structure supporting the overall troop control process be highly mobile. Tactical CPs and
associated communications must relocate frequently to maintain uninterrupted control. This
has a significant impact on the size and field configuration of the supporting communications
structure.
SECTION 14-3.
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
General
14.25 The MAF’s ambition is to introduce modern command IS to the battle field. IS are designed to
facilitate the speedy compilation and distribution of operational orders, and assessments of
reports and returns which may be required to support intensive land warfare. The Musorians
have yet to develop the IS capable of realising their ambitions. MAF Signals are responsible
for the development of IS and the integration of such systems into present and future MAF
organisations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-11
Principles
14.26 The following general principles apply to MAF IS:
a. ease of deployment,
b. ease of use,
c.
system support, and
d. security.
14.27 The MAF is seeking to incorporate commercial off-the-shelf information technology with a
robust, tactical wide area network, providing a secure environment in which to process
classified data. The MAF intends to develop highly reliable and maintainable systems that are
easily upgraded or extended and can be implemented with minimum risk, addressing the need
for greater effectiveness and interoperability. They seek to incorporate effective message
handling into a frequently changing secure network. The MAF are hoping to develop an IS that
can be used in barracks with commercial equipment, thus providing a common operational
and non-operational environment. Common software and communications interfaces will
seamlessly link peacetime locations and the field, providing users with sophisticated software
packages and tools with which to prepare, distribute and receive information and directives.
The use of commercial products will offer reduced costs in training. The management and user
interface will hide system detail providing an interface suitable for many users.
14.28 Proposed features of the MAF IS are:
a. hardware based on proven commercial equipment giving optimum flexibility and minimal
system spares requirements;
b. geographic information system;
c.
office automation capability, including word-processing, spreadsheets, presentation and
image processing packages;
d. distributed relational databases for multi-site topologies; and
e. special applications for combat calculations, intelligence assessments and crisis
management.
14.29 The range of tasks to be performed by the MAF IS would include:
a. maintenance of the overall battle picture,
b. generation and upkeep of orders of battle,
c.
formal messaging between nodes,
d. intelligence on enemy orders of battle,
e. initiation of intelligence collection,
f.
threat assessment,
g. coordination of resources,
h. planning of operations, and
i.
control of forces for specific operations.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-12
SECTION 14-4.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
General
14.30 The MAF is keenly aware of the dependence of modern military forces on communications
that support C2 and intelligence. Effective communications contribute to sound C2; the loss of
communications is the loss of C2. The loss of C2 in combat ultimately ends in defeat. The
MAF seeks to control the EMS and deny it to its enemy during combat actions. As a result, the
MAF is actively acquiring systems to degrade the C2 assets of enemy forces.
14.31 The MAF recognises the importance of what its enemies call EW. The MAF has made
significant technical advancements in signals reconnaissance and jamming. In particular, it
has modernised those systems that can disrupt enemy communications and electronics
through jamming and deception. The MAF has developed its capabilities into an integrated
system known as ‘EC’. Figure 14–10 illustrates the organisation of an EW company.
Figure 14–10: Organisation of an Electronic Warfare Company
Electronic Combat
14.32 EC is an integral part of MAF doctrine. It consists of the use of all means of manipulation of
radio-electric emissions throughout the EMS. This includes electronic jamming of radios and
radars, as well as the launch of a physical attack on communications centres and transmitters
by ground troops, artillery and aircraft. EC objectives are to limit, delay, or nullify the enemy’s
use of his communications systems, and, at the same time, protect MAF systems. EC is
combined with imitative and deceptive communications methods to support deception. EC
supports all types of offensive and defensive actions. At army and divisional level, special
purpose EC units exist. Below divisional level, commanders may be authorised to use their
organic assets to conduct unsophisticated EW operations when special purpose units have not
been attached from higher.
14.33 The MAF has been upgrading its EC systems and technology to supplement its aging
equipment. The older systems focused on small-scale tactical uses, while the operational use
was limited to targets of opportunity in conjunction with local offensive and defensive
operations. Newer EC systems are centralised in the DMI. The DMI controls national-level
intelligence assets and may allocate some of its forces to support GF organisations. As the
DMI acquires newer EC equipment, it transfers the older equipment to EC organisations at
lower levels of command.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-13
14.34 Electronic Combat and the Divisional Battle. EC will influence the divisional battle in a
variety of ways:
a. Defensive Measures. MAF divisions make extensive use of EC to confuse enemy
communications systems. It is particularly likely to be used to protect assembly areas and
river crossings.
b. Offensive Use. EC strikes will be targeted against identified headquarters and
communication centres as part of the preparation of the attack. Strikes are coordinated
with the start of major attacks and will subsequently be used to assist the commitment of
second echelons, forward and raiding detachments.
Integration and Planning
14.35 Integration and planning are critical to the overall success of EC. The MAF planning process
stresses close coordination between the reconnaissance, EC and combat planners. It ensures
that a more complete interruption of enemy electronic control occurs through the combination
of jamming with physical destruction. The MAF accepts that it is not possible to completely
deprive enemy forces of their means of control for extended periods of time. Accordingly, MAF
EC planners have established models to estimate ‘critical times’ in C2 procedures. These
critical times amount to the total time required to complete a series of steps in control,
including:
a. collection and reporting of data,
b. evaluation and decision,
c.
issue of orders and preparation, and
d. completion of action.
Target Priorities
14.36 The MAF assigns enemy communications and C2 nets a priority based on their expected
impact on the battle. It selects targets with the intention of eliminating them either by physical
destruction or by jamming. Although EC target priorities depend on the command level and
can change as the tactical situation develops, they are generally:
a. high precision weapons systems,
b. C2 systems,
c.
artillery, tactical aviation, and air defence systems,
d. reserves,
e. logistic centres, and
f.
point targets that jeopardise advancing forces.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-14
Information Requirements
14.37 Essential to the success of MAF EC objectives is the collection of accurate and timely
information. The MAF requires information on the enemy’s electronic order of battle,
equipment types, emission characteristics, and locations. It obtains some technical information
concerning enemy electronic equipment from open source material, such as technical manuals
and field manuals. Reconnaissance, target acquisition, EC, and information collection assets
available at the various command levels collect the remainder. Signals reconnaissance
provides the primary means of locating targets of specific interest to the EW effort.
Electronic Support
14.38 Identification, location and the nature and use of enemy electronic emissions is the key to
countering and exploiting them. Electronic support (ES) includes all means used in this
collection and analysis. Within the MAF, ES is the mission of DMI units and the radio and
radar reconnaissance company of the reconnaissance and EC battalion. The MAF deploys
radio intercept, and radio and radar DF receivers as part of its collection effort. Technical
analysis is then performed for EC purposes. In accordance with the EC plan, emitters are
targeted for deception, jamming or destruction. Units in whose sector radio and radar
reconnaissance teams are operating may be augmented by an EC liaison representative at
the brigade main CP, who passes targeting information to the artillery fire control system
through the manoeuvre brigade intelligence officer. Targets of air interest are passed directly
by the DMI to the Air Force.
Electronic Protection
14.39 Electronic protection (EP) includes any active or passive procedures to protect the friendly use
of electronic systems. MAF commanders try to enforce a high level of EP consciousness in
their subordinates and equipment operators. The MAF objective for EP is the satisfactory
operation of its electronic equipment in the face of enemy disruption. EP is the responsibility of
every soldier who uses or supervises the use of radios, radars, or other electronic equipment.
The MAF accomplishes EP through:
a. strict enforcement of signals security,
b. equipment redundancy,
c.
system design,
d. operator skill, and
e. alternate methods of communication.
14.40 The MAF places emphasis on individual and organisational field-expedient EP techniques.
Operator EP training occurs at all organisational levels. The MAF practises major moves while
in conditions of radio or even electronic silence. Its use of battle drills also reduces its
dependence on long radio orders in the attack. The MAF employs alternate passive EP, such
as use of wire, visual methods, messengers, manual encryption or, uncommonly, secure
communications devices. The MAF may protect its communications from enemy EW using a
jamming screen.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-15
Electronic Attack
14.41 MAF EA is employed to neutralise enemy communications and electronics through jamming
and deception. EC doctrine establishes a requirement to destroy enemy C2 and weapon
systems communications. When these systems cannot be destroyed, they should be jammed
at critical times. Reconnaissance and EC battalions in the DMI have a ground-based jamming
company. The Air Force has several communications jamming aircraft. The aging electronics
have, in some cases, been replaced with either commercial ‘off-the-shelf’ systems, or military
systems available on the open market.
Physical Destruction
14.42 Integral to the MAF EC doctrine is the use of physical destruction. The primary means of
defeating the enemy communications and radars is through fire. Even a small raid or
harassing fire on a headquarters can interrupt the enemy planning cycle. Critical C2 nodes, air
defence radars, and satellite terminals are priority targets. The MAF can physically attack in
three ways:
a. indirect fire,
b. ground attack, and
c.
air attack.
Deception
14.43 While deception is a multi-disciplined part of the operation, no aspect more lends itself to the
use of deception than interference with enemy communications. The MAF employ:
a. imitative, manipulative and deceptive radio transmission; and
b. deception radar and radio emitters used to portray false units.
Several components are employed simultaneously for maximum effectiveness. The MAF
seldom, if ever, uses electronic deception alone. Deception is employed through disinformation
to alter the perceptions of the enemy. Disinformation is an especially effective way of
disrupting an opponent’s C2. The employment of deception does, however, require planning.
Dedicated tactical non-communications means of deception are poorly developed in the MAF.
Extensive use of dummy positions is practised, using field expedient materials. Troop
movements are simulated by such means as use of civilian vehicles to portray movement to
radar, and marching refugees to portray the movement of troops in the rear.
Signals Reconnaissance
14.44 Identification and location of enemy electronic emissions and understanding their nature and
use are the key to countering and exploiting them. Signals reconnaissance is the sum of all
means used in this collection and analysis. In the MAF, signals reconnaissance is the mission
of:
a. the airborne signals reconnaissance assets of the Air Force;
b. the signals reconnaissance battalions of the DMI; and
c.
the radio and radar reconnaissance company of the reconnaissance and EC battalions of
the DMI and some regions, armies, districts and all divisions.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-16
14.45 The MAF has a wide variety of assets for signals reconnaissance. These include assets for:
a. radio reconnaissance (radio intercept and DF); and
b. radar reconnaissance ( radar intercept and DF).
The MAF deploys radio and radar intercept and DF receivers as part of the collection effort.
Specialists then perform technical analysis to identify high priority targets. In accordance with
the EC plan, the specialists target emitters for destruction, deception, jamming, or further
exploitation. When radio and radar reconnaissance units support a particular brigade or higher
organisation, an EC liaison representative augments the organisation’s main CP. The EC
liaison representative passes targeting information to the artillery fire control system through
the manoeuvre brigade’s COR.
14.46 As indicated in table 14–2, the MAF has ground-based capability to intercept and DF enemy
emitters within the following distances from the forward edge of friendly troops:
a. artillery ground radar - approximately 25 kilometres;
b. VHF communications - approximately 40 kilometres;
c.
HF ground waves - approximately 80 kilometres; and
d. HF skywave - unlimited.
Table 14–2:
Note:
1.
Signals Intelligence and Direction Finding Systems
System
Signals
(a)
(b)
20
40
Intercept
Receiver
VHF-UHF
--------
loss of signal
Radio
Direction
Finder
VHF-UHF
HF GROUNDWAVE
HF SKYWAVE
----------------------
loss of signal
---------------
Radar
Direction
Finder
VS. GROUND
SURVEILLANCE
RADAR
25km
loss of signal
Intercept Range (km)
(c)
60
-----------
1
80
------->
unlimited
Ranges vary significantly based on terrain and weather conditions. Mounting intercept and DF systems on airborne
platforms greatly extends these ranges.
14.47 Priorities. The radio and radar intercept and DF priorities correspond to the manoeuvre
commander’s EC information requirements. In general, priorities of intercept and DF are
similar in both the offence and defence. Radio intercept and DF priorities include:
a. reconnaissance C2 nets,
b. artillery nets,
c.
air defence nets,
d. manoeuvre force C2 nets,
e. tank communications,
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-17
f.
radio jammers,
g. NBC communications, and
h. engineer nets.
14.48 Radar intercept and DF priorities include:
a. radar jammers;
b. ground and battlefield surveillance radars;
c.
target acquisition radars;
d. counter-mortar and counter-battery radars; and
e. air defence radars.
14.49 Offence. In the offence, the intercept and DF assets locate with the organisation conducting
the main attack, normally behind the first echelon forces. The unit commander coordinates
with the COR, located at brigade and higher levels of command, to ensure continuous
coverage of the most critical sections of the battlefield. The signals reconnaissance battalion
commander and his staff select alternate positions that have line of sight (LOS) along the
avenue of approach. This enables the assets to leapfrog forward in support of the battle.
14.50 Defence. In the defence, the unit commander coordinates positioning of his assets with the
COR. Initially, the assets may locate within the security zone, behind the security zone forces
in their initial positions. The depth to which these assets position depends on the terrain and
disposition of forces in the security zone. As security zone forces fall back to their successive
positions, signals reconnaissance assets fall back to previously reconnoitred positions offering
good LOS. If deployed within the main defence belt, assets position behind the first echelon
battalions of the first echelon brigades. They position on terrain offering good LOS and
reposition frequently to avoid enemy EW activities and subsequent destructive fire.
14.51 Direction Finding. The purpose of DF is to locate transmitting enemy radio and radar
emitters. The MAF DF capability is equivalent to that for intercept. The MAF uses DF to:
a. provide approximate locations of enemy electronic emitters;
b. provide locations that, when applied with intercept, terrain analysis, or other means, have
sufficient accuracy to target with artillery fire;
c.
develop a ‘picture’ of the battlefield to reveal the locations and intentions of enemy units;
and
d. provide adequate locations for firing on most radars and jammers.
14.52 Because of the length of transmission, the peculiarity of their signals characteristics, and
power output, it is easy to locate jammers and identifying them as targets for attack by
suppressive fire. Due to a radar’s unique signals parameters, DF can locate radars with
greater precision than it can for radio emitters, often within 50 to 200 metres. It is possible to
evaluate information from DF resources quickly, but this usually requires further confirmation
by other sources. DF targets within conventional artillery range receive priority. Among these,
targets that are time sensitive and considered a serious threat, receive priority and are
candidates for immediate engagement. If an enemy emitter remains active for at least 25
seconds, the MAF targeting sequence can continue even after emissions cease.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-18
14.53 Apart from the targets located by DF, MAF Signals will anticipate developing other targets due
to lax enemy communications security and poor EP. This implies that good communications
security EP measures can limit the effectiveness of MAF radio and radar reconnaissance.
MAF intercept and DF equipment is also vulnerable to deception because it only locates
electronic emitters, not necessarily units.
Electronic Jamming
14.54 Another part of the EC concept is the requirement to jam enemy C2 and weapon systems
communications that the MAF cannot destroy by fire-power. All types of electronic equipment
are vulnerable to both jamming and deception. MAF electronic jamming disrupts enemy
communications and electronics. The jamming mission belongs to the airborne jamming
assets of the Air Force, ground-based radar jammers at national level, and the reconnaissance
and EC battalions at national and some division and higher levels of command. Jamming
secure voice and data link burst communications may force the enemy to transmit in clear.
This allows for exploitation of combat information. Jamming can also aid in DF by forcing the
enemy to transmit longer, allowing time for tip-off and multiple DFs. When not dedicated to a
jamming mission, jammers may assist in radio and radar intercept. Jammers may also support
EP by providing a jamming shield to protect MAF communications from enemy EW efforts.
14.55 EC doctrine establishes a requirement to destroy enemy C2 and weapons system
communications. At critical times, the MAF can jam these communications when destruction is
not possible. The primary MAF methods of jamming are:
a. radar jamming by using barrage, sweep, and spot noise, pulse, chaff, and decoys;
b. pulse and simulation jamming of command guidance systems; and
c.
radio jamming of amplitude modulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM) signals using
barrage, sweep, or spot noise.
The MAF supplement radio jamming capability with assets allocated down from national level.
These may include a considerable number of airborne radio jamming and ground-based and
airborne radar jamming sets.
14.56 Effectiveness. Technical factors govern jamming effectiveness. The most important of these
are the distances of the target receiver from the jammer and between the transmitter and
receiver of the targeted enemy communications. The technical factors include:
a. target link distance (distance between the enemy transmitter and receiver);
b. the distance between the jammer and the enemy receiver;
c.
radio LOS between the jammer and the enemy receiver;
d. antenna polarisation;
e. effective radiated power of the jammer and the enemy transmitter; and
f.
weather, terrain, and vegetation.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-19
14.57 Deployment. Jammers are priority targets for destruction. Because of their high power and
unique electronic signature, they are relatively easy to detect and locate. Ground-based
jammers must deploy within the range of indirect fire weapons and are highly susceptible to
damage. Taken together, these factors dictate that the MAF must thoroughly plan and execute
jammer deployment for their survival. Jammers have to move to survive and to maintain
favourable transmission paths against enemy radios that are moving as the battle progresses.
A fluid, high-tempo battle requires the jammers to displace frequently. The MAF preselects
primary and alternate sites for each phase of the battle. These sites must:
a. be accessible and concealed from enemy direct fire weapons,
b. provide for continuity of the mission,
c.
facilitate electronic massing of several jammers against priority targets, and
d. facilitate communications.
14.58 Priorities. Priorities for jamming vary with the tactical situation. The following are general
guidelines for initial priorities:
a. attack enemy communications and command guidance systems for artillery, rocket and
SSM forces;
b. disrupt enemy communications, target acquisition, and guidance systems for air defence
forces;
c.
jam enemy critical C2 links; and
d. protect friendly C2 systems.
14.59 Offence. In the offence, divisional jamming assets normally deploy slightly behind the forward
manoeuvre units. Jamming assets position near the forward edge of the battle area and
selectively jam critical communications links, normally using barrage and spot noise or pulse
signals.
14.60 Defence. In the defence, jamming assets normally locate in the security zone and in the main
defence belt behind the first echelon battalions of the first echelon brigades. They position on
terrain offering good LOS and reposition frequently. In the security zone, priority is given to
enemy reconnaissance nets. As the enemy approaches the main defensive area, priorities
shift to divisional and brigade-level FS and manoeuvre nets, in that order.
Organisation
14.61 Signals Reconnaissance Battalions. One to three signals reconnaissance battalions are
organic to the DMI. Although the composition and equipment strengths vary, the standard
includes one radio intercept company, one radio DF company, and three radar intercept and
DF companies. The radio intercept company and radio DF company provide radio
reconnaissance through the interception and DF of enemy radio communications. Radar
intercept and DF assets provide radar reconnaissance through the interception and DF of
radar signals. The DMI may allocate these battalions as a whole to support a military region or
army, or may allocate individual companies to support specific missions or fulfil specific asset
shortfalls. Regions or armies receiving these battalions either retain them or allocate them to
subordinate districts or divisions.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-20
14.62 Reconnaissance and Electronic Combat Battalions. Composition and equipment of the
reconnaissance and EC battalions of the DMI are almost identical to the battalions organic to
some military districts, armies, and all infantry division structures. This includes two
reconnaissance companies, one long range reconnaissance, one radio and one radar
reconnaissance company (intercept and DF capability) and one jamming company (radio
jamming capability). An RPV squadron is organic to the army and higher reconnaissance and
EC battalions. District and divisional reconnaissance and EC battalions may or may not have
an organic RPV squadron. In addition to video and still cameras, an RPV may house a radio or
radar reconnaissance system or low powered radio jammer. The COR, division and higher,
plans RPV missions. Flight profiles vary according to the mission. The RPV acquires or jams
priority targets during these missions. The DMI may allocate these battalions to military
regions or the armies during wartime. Regions or armies receiving these battalions either
retain them or allocate them to subordinate districts or divisions. The divisional commander
may allocate a reconnaissance and EC element to a brigade conducting a supporting attack.
14.63 Musorian Armed Forces Divisional Electronic Warfare Company. Assets from the
Reconnaissance and EC battalion can be grouped to provide a divisional EW company if
required by the tactical situation. If an EW company is formed, it is generally organised as
shown below. The role of the company is to provide EW support to the divisional commander.
To fulfil its role, the company provides:
a. ES, including DF in three configurations:
(1) radio reconnaissance platoon usually deployed as radio reconnaissance teams
(RRTs);
(2) light ES platoon; and
(3)
medium ES platoon.
b. EA and communications security monitoring through the EA/EP platoon; and
c.
EW advice to the division.
14.64 The EW company will deploy in support for all levels of MAF operations. RRTs deploy forward
with the reconnaissance, battalion or company elements. Light assets will normally be located
in support of battalion or brigade size groups. Medium assets will provide ES to the brigade or
divisional staff. EW assets are normally under command of the supported unit for Indications
and Warning (I&W). Technical control and codeword reporting occurs direct to the EW CP.
MAF doctrine is heavily oriented towards ES. The MAF philosophy is to gain all available
battlefield information before committing to battle. To this end, their EW focus is on collection
by all and every means available to them.
14.65 Detailed information concerning MAF EW equipment can be found in Section 14-5 of this
chapter. EW equipment within the company is distributed as follows:
a. radio reconnaissance platoon - 10 x Delfin manpack systems;
b. light ESM platoon - 8 x RACAL Seeker I and II ESM/DF systems;
c.
medium ESM platoon - 4 x EL/K-7036 ESM/DF systems; and
d. EA/electronic protection platoon - 3 x JB-31V jammers, which are being replaced by
Thomson-CSF TRC 285 tactical VHF jammers.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-21
14.66 Musorian Special Forces Battalion Electronic Warfare Platoon. The MAF SF battalion has
one EW platoon comprising an EW platoon headquarters and three EW teams. The EW
platoon headquarters consists of five to eight personnel and normally deploys with battalion
headquarters to coordinate EW support. EW teams consist of five personnel and normally
deploy in support of SF company headquarters. The EW platoon provides the SF battalion
with ES, limited EA, and DF. Table 14–3 is indicative of the equipment capability of each SF
EW team.
Table 14–3:
Serial
(a)
Electronic Warfare Capability
(b)
Technical Details
(c)
1.
ESM
1.5 MHz TO 1.2 GHz
2.
EA
20-80 MHz
Low Power 5-10 Watts
3.
DF
Sector DF
Accuracy 5-15 degrees
Note 1
4.
COMMS
20-80 MHz
Note 2
5.
CCI
Secure Voice/Data
Note 3
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
Special Forces Electronic Warfare Capabilities
Remarks
(d)
There is evidence that the MAF may have recently purchased a number of new DF equipments with improved
accuracy of between one and three degrees.
Although not previously seen, EW Teams are also capable of fielding HF communications.
Previously observed cryptographic equipment includes equipment similar to CODAN 9001/9003 and MEROD.
14.67 During unconventional or covert operations, the SF EW team would be tasked with conducting
a radio reconnaissance in the intended area of operations by mapping the radio frequency
spectrum. It would be very unlikely for any EA to be used. The primary aim is to build an
electronic order of battle. During conventional operations, the SF EW team would provide
intimate EW support in the form of I&W. EA may be used as required, particularly during an
attack or withdrawal.
Implications
14.68 The MAF expects to gain a high proportion of intelligence from EW and from air and ground
reconnaissance tasked on the basis of EW supplied information. Jamming is unlikely to affect
many units, though where it is used it may become critical unless operators are trained in
electronic protection skills. More likely is the threat of attack by air and ground forces after DF
and traffic analysis have provided the MAF with the target’s location and value. If MAF ground
forces generate the desired rates of advance, the effectiveness of EW units will be reduced
due to the need to relocate frequently to support combat operations.
SECTION 14-5.
EQUIPMENT
14.69 Tables 14–4 and 14–5 provide an overview of the communications and electronic warfare
equipment presently in service with the military and security forces of Musoria. There are plans
for the MAF to procure more CIS and EW equipment in the future, however, types and
quantities are as yet not able to be identified.
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-22
Table 14–4:
Equipment
Purpose
Description
(a)
(b)
(c)
MEROD
(Message
Entry and
Read Out
Device)
Secure Data
Communications
used with
UHF/VHF and HF
radios
CODAN
8528
Musorian Communications Equipment
Frequency
Range
(d)
Power Output
Range
Mobility
Crypto
Issued to
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
Portable burst
transmission
unit
N/A
N/A
N/A
Vehicle or
manpack
Built in
crypto
Strike Battalion
Signals Platoon
Divisional
Signals
Company/
Regiment
Medium range HF
communications
HF transceiver
2-24 MHz
125W
Vehicle
Built in
crypto
Battalion
Signals Platoon
CODAN
9001
Used with HF
radios
HF Fax and
Data Interface
N/A
N/A
N/A
Manpack
Divisional
Signals
Company/
Regiment
CTM 200
SERIES
Medium capacity
strategic and
semi-mobile
operations
Multi-channel,
Multi-band
Radio Relay
(UHF - C band)
225-400 MHz
610-960 MHz
1.35-1.85 GHz
2.5 W
40 to 50 km
Static and
Vehicle
Divisional
Signals
Company/
Regiment
CHX 200
Voice and morse
medium range
communications
HF base station/
vehicular
transceiver
1.5 -30 MHz
100 W medium
power
400 W high
power
up to 400
km
up to 800
km
Vehicle
mounted
Divisional
Signals
Company/
Regiment
INTELSAT
Rear Link
Satellite
Terminal
K and L band
Various
N/A
Vehicle or
man
portable
Highest HQ
Strike Battalion
Signals Platoon
SF Company
VARIOUS
Rear Link
HF Burst Radio
2-30 MHz
N/A
Manpack
1.5 - 30 MHz
Built in
crypto
OTLP
SF Company
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-23
Equipment
Purpose
Description
Frequency
Range
(d)
Power Output
Range
Mobility
Crypto
Issued to
(a)
(b)
(c)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
AN/PRC 77
Portable short
range VHF radio
VHF, Manpack,
Low Power
30-75.95 MHz
1.3 - 2 W
8 km
Manpack
Battalion
Signals Platoon
AN/PRC
126
Short range
VHF, Portable,
Very Low Power
30-88 MHz
0.5 W
1 to 4 km
Man
portable
Battalion
Signals Platoon
Infantry
personnel
AN/VRC 46
AN/VRC 49
Short range two
way radio
telephone
communications
VHF, Vehicle
Mount, Medium
Power
30-75.95 MHz
35 W High
Power
1 to 8 W Low
Power
8 to 40 km
Vehicle
Infantry
personnel
PRC F1/F3
Short range HF
communications
HF, Manpack,
Low Power
1.6 - 30 MHz
5W
Up to 24
km Ground
wave
Manpack
Battalion
Signals Platoon
Infantry
personnel
AN/GRC
106
Medium range HF
communications
HF High Power
2-29.99 MHz
400W
Up to 80
km Ground
wave
Vehicle
Battalion
Signals Platoon
AN/ARC
51BX
Short range UHF
communications
UHF, Vehicle
Mount, Medium
Power
225-400 MHz
20 W
Vehicle or
static
Division Signals
Company/
Regiment
HX390
Short range
tactical
communications
VHF/UHF
Handheld
Transceiver
138-174 MHz
400-512 MHz
2-4 W
Manpack
Infantry
personnel
SF Company
MA 4470
Used with VHF
and HF radios
Audio
Encryption
Device
N/A
N/A
Manpack
Divisional
Signals
Company/
Regiment
2
N/A
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-24
Table 14–5:
Equipment
Purpose
Description
(a)
(b)
(c)
SEEKER I & II
Intercept and DF
equipment.
SEEKER I
manual,
SEEKER II
automated
ELTA EL/K 7036
COMINT
System
Musorian Electronic Warfare Equipment
Frequency
Range
(d)
Power
Output
(e)
Range
Mobility
Issued To
(f)
(g)
(h)
Combined intercept
and DF in a mobile
GS-type vehicle
2 MHz to 1 GHz
N/A
N/A
Light Vehicle –
GS type vehiclemounted
Light ESM
Platoon
Tactical
COMINT system
provides
intercept and DF
Provides combined
intercept, DF and
analysis capability in
a truck-mounted
shelter
0.5 - 510 MHz
with possible
extension to 1
GHz
N/A
N/A
Medium – truckmounted shelter
Medium ESM
Platoon
Thomson-CSF
TRC 285
Jammer
To jam links or
networks in the
high HF and
military VHF
spectrum
Shelter mounted
single position
jammer
20 - 100 MHz
4 kW
N/A
Medium – truckmounted shelter
EA/electronic
protection
Platoon
DELFIN
Manpack
Lightweight
intercept and DF
Ruggedised
scanning receiver
and a DF system
capable of stand
alone LOB of a
target emitter
Intercept:
0.1 MHz -2 GHz
DF:
1 MHz-1.4GHz
N/A
N/A
Manpack
RRT
RACAL Jamcat
Low cost EA
capability for
use with any
CNR
A single add-on
ruggedised case
which connects to
the transceiver by an
audio connect cable.
N/A
N/A
N/A
Manpack
RRT
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-25
Equipment
Purpose
Description
(a)
(b)
(c)
Thomson- CSF
BLB 20
A barrage or
sliding
frequency
expendable
Jammer
A single ruggedised
case with a 1.8m
omni-directional
antenna which is
used for jamming
and reception of
remote control
transmissions.
Frequency
Range
(d)
Power
Output
(e)
Range
Mobility
Issued To
(f)
(g)
(h)
20 - 110 MHz
2W
N/A
Portable
RRT
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
14-26
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
412
DISTRIBUTION
1 JAU
1
1 Joint Support Unit
5
21 Construction Squadron Workshop
2
1st Armoured Regiment (Tank)
5
1st Aviation Regiment
5
1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
5
1st Combat Engineer Regiment
5
1st Combat Services Support Battalion
5
1st Commando Company
2
1st Commando Regiment Headquarters
5
1st Field Hospital
5
1st Field Regiment
5
1st Ground Liaison Group
1
1st Intelligence Battalion
5
1st Intelligence Company
5
1st Joint Movement Group – Adelaide
1
1st Joint Movement Group – Brisbane
1
1st Joint Movement Group – Darwin
1
1st Joint Movement Group Headquarters
1
1st Joint Movement Group Joint Movement Control
Centre
1
1st Joint Movement Group Joint Movement Control
Office – Perth
1
1st Joint Movement Group – Melbourne
1
1st Joint Movement Group – Sydney
1
1st Joint Movement Group – Townsville
1
1st Logistic Support Group (Operational Deployment
Force) Workshop
1
1st Media Support Unit
1
1st Military Police Battalion
2
1st Military Police Platoon Logistic Support Group
(Operational Deployment Force)
1
1st Parachute Surgical Team
1
1st Psychology Unit
1
1st Topographical Survey Squadron
1
1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers
(Reconnaissance)
5
1st/19th Battalion, Royal New South Wales Regiment
5
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
413
2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
5
2nd Cavalry Regiment (Reconnaissance)
5
2nd Combat Engineer Regiment
5
2nd Commando Company
2
2nd Division Intelligence Company
5
2nd Field Hospital
5
2nd Force Support Battalion
5
2nd Military Police Company
2
2nd Preventative Medicine Company
1
2nd Topographical Survey Troop
1
2nd/10th Medium Regiment
5
2nd/14th Light Horse (Queensland Mounted Infantry)
5
2nd/17th Battalion, Royal New South Wales Regiment
5
3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
5
3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Parachute)
5
3rd Brigade Administrative Support Battalion
5
3rd Combat Engineer Regiment
5
3rd Field Squadron, 9th Combat Engineer Regiment
1
3rd Forward General Hospital
5
3rd Military Police Company
2
3rd Preventative Medicine Company
1
3rd Psychology Unit
1
3rd Recovery Company
1
3rd/9th Light Horse South Australian Mounted Rifles
(Armoured Personnel Carrier)
5
4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando)
5
4th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando)
Signals Squadron
1
4th Brigade Administrative Support Battalion
5
4th Combat Engineer Regiment
5
4th Field Regiment
5
4th Intelligence Company
5
4th Military Police Company
2
4th Preventative Medicine Company
1
4th/3rd Battalion, Royal New South Wales Regiment
5
4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse
(Reconnaissance)
5
5th Aviation Regiment
5
5
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
414
5
5th/6th Battalion, Royal Victorian Regiment
5
5th/7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
5
6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
5
7th Combat Services Support Battalion
5
7th Command Support Unit
5
7th Field Battery, 3rd Field Regiment
2
7th Field Regiment
5
7th Signals Regiment (Electronic Warfare)
5
7th Signals Regiment Workshop
1
5
5
8th Signals Regiment
5
8th/7th Battalion, Royal Victorian Regiment
5
8th/12th Medium Regiment
5
9th Battalion, Royal Queensland Regiment
5
5
9th Force Support Battalion
2
10th Field Ambulance
1
10th Force Support Battalion
5
10th/27th Battalion, Royal South Australian Regiment
5
5
11th Military Police Platoon
1
11th Psychology Unit
1
11th/28th Battalion, Royal Western Australian
Regiment
5
12th Chief Engineer Works
1
12th MC, Logistic Support Group (Operational
Deployment Force)
1
1
12th/16th Hunter River Lancers (Armoured Personnel
Carrier)
5
12th/40th, Battalion, Royal Tasmanian Regiment
5
5
13th Field Battery, 5th Field Regiment
5
13th Field Squadron, 13th Combat Engineer Regiment
1
1
1
1
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
415
14th Transport Troop
1
15th Ground Liaison Section
1
1
1
15th Transport Squadron
1
16th Air Defence Regiment
5
16th Battalion, Royal Western Australian Regiment
5
16th Field Battery
2
17th Construction Squadron
2
1
19th Chief Engineer Works
1
21st Construction Regiment
5
21st Construction Squadron
2
21st Psychology Unit
1
22nd Construction Regiment
5
23rd Field Regiment
5
23rd Support Engineer Company
1
25th/49th Battalion, Royal Queensland Regiment
5
30th Terminal Squadron
1
31st Battalion, Royal Queensland Regiment
5
35th Field Squadron, 11th Combat Engineer Regiment
2
39th Engineering and Mechanical Squadron
2
41st Battalion, Royal New South Wales Regiment
5
42nd Battalion, Royal Queensland Regiment
5
44th Transport Squadron
1
46 Military Police Platoon
1
48th Field Battery
2
51st Battalion, Far North Queensland Regiment
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
71st Ground Liaison Section
1
72nd Ground Liaison Section
1
1
131st Locating Battery
2
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
416
103rd Medium Battery
2
103rd Signals Squadron
2
104th Signals Squadron
2
105th Engineer Support Squadron
2
2
2
110thSignals Squadron
2
111th Combat Supply Platoon
1
126th Commando Signals Squadron
2
1
141st Signals Squadron
2
142nd Signals Squadron
2
2
2
152nd Signals Squadron
2
1
161st Reconnaissance Squadron
1
162nd Reconnaissance Squadron
1
171st Operational Support Squadron
1
176th Air Dispatch Squadron
1
A Field Battery, 12th Field Regiment
2
A Squadron, 10th Light Horse
2
ABCA Office, Land Warfare Development Centre
9
Army Aviation Training Centre
100
Army Communications Training Centre
100
Army Engineering Agency
Army Logistic Training Centre
1
200
Army Logistic Training Centre Puckapunyal
3
Army Logistic Training Centre Townsville
3
Army Malaria Institute
1
Army Military Police Training Centre
20
Army Promotions Training Centre
200
Army Promotions Training Centre Detachment – New
South Wales
80
Army Promotions Training Centre Detachment – North
Queensland
80
Army Promotions Training Centre Detachment –
Victoria
80
Army Recruit Training Centre
30
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
417
Army School of Music
1
Australian Defence Force Helicopter School
1
Australian Defence Force Languages School
1
Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
5
Australian Defence Staff (Washington)
1
Australian Defence Staff O/SEAS
1
B Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment
2
Combat Arms Training Centre
5
Command and Staff College
110
Defence Corporate Support Centre – North
Queensland
1
Defence Corporate Support Centre – South
Queensland
1
Defence Corporate Support Centre – Sydney Central
1
Defence Corporate Support Centre – Western
Australia
1
Defence Intelligence Oorganisation
3
Defence Intelligence Training Centre
60
Defence Signals Directorate
3
Deployable Joint Force Headquarters
10
Director General, Future Land Warfare
1
Emergency Response Squadron
1
Headquarters 1 Brigade
5
5
5
5
5
Headquarters 1st Logistic Support Group (Operational
Deployment Force)
1
Headquarters 2 Division
10
Headquarters 2 Division Royal Australian Artillery
1
5
5
5
5
5
5
Headquarters Australian Theatre
5
Headquarters Aviation Support Group
1
Headquarters Force Logistic Support Group
5
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
418
Headquarters Logistic Support Force
5
Headquarters Logistic Support Force Engineers
1
Headquarters Northern Command
5
Headquarters Special Operations
3
Headquarters 26th Transport Squadron
2
Headquarters Training Command – Army
5
Hobart Logistic Platoon
1
Joint Logistic Unit - North
1
Joint Logistic Unit - South
1
Joint Logistic Unit - West
1
Joint Training Staff
30
Land Command Battle School
5
Land Command Battle School, Battle Wing Canungra
1
Land Command Liaison Section Butterworth
1
Land Headquarters
10
Land Warfare Development Centre
15
Land Warfare Studies Centre
1
New Zealand Army
5
Office of the Chief of the Army
1
Office of the Deputy Chief of the Army
1
Parachute Training School
2
Pilbara Regiment
5
Proof and Experimental Establishment Graytown
1
Proof and Experimental Establishment Port Wakefield
1
Psychology Research Group
1
Regional Training Centre (New South Wales)
80
Regional Training Centre (North Queensland)
50
Regional Training Centre (Northern Territory)
80
Regional Training Centre (South Australia)
50
Regional Training Centre (South Queensland)
80
Regional Training Centre (Tasmania)
50
Regional Training Centre (Victoria)
80
Regional Training Centre (Victoria) Detatchment
20
Regional Training Centre (Western Australia)
50
Royal Australian Air Force
5
Royal Australian Navy
5
Royal Military College
400
School of Artillery, Combat Arms Training Centre
150
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
419
School of Infantry, Combat Arms Training Centre
150
School of Military Engineering, Combat Arms Training
Centre
150
Ship’s Army Detachment Kanimbla
1
Ship’s Army Detachment Tobruk
1
Ship’s Army Detachment, Manoora
1
Soldier Career Management Agency
1
South Queensland Logistic Group
1
Southern Logistic Group
1
Special Air Service – Swan Island
2
Special Air Service Base Squadron
2
Special Air Service Regiment Headquarters
5
Special Forces Training Centre
15
The Adelaide University Regiment
25
The Melbourne University Regiment
25
The Monash University Regiment
25
The North West Mobile Force
5
The Queensland University Regiment
25
The Sydney University Regiment
25
The University of New South Wales Regiment
25
The Western Australia University Regiment
25
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
420
DEVELOPING DOCTRINE
AMENDMENT LIST NUMBER 2 TO LWD 7-5-2, MUSORIAN ARMED FORCES – LAND
OPERATIONS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES, 2001
1.
This amendment is to change this publication in line with the Army Learning Steering Group 2010. No
content wil be changed. The new number is LWP-G 7-5-2 and will be reflected as such on Army
Doctrine Electronic Library.
2.
The cover, signature page and preface are the only amendments and the applicable pages are
attached.
3.
The information contained in the header and footer of the publication will not be changed as this would
require a complete reprint.
LWP-G 7-5-2 MUSORIAN ARMED FORCES – LAND OPERATIONS, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES, 2001 AL2

LWP-G 7-5-2, Musorian Armed Forces – Land

Transcription

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