Open Innovation in the Food Industry: An - Insights

Transcription

Open Innovation in the Food
Industry:
An Evidence Based Guide
S.W.F. Omta, F.T.J.M. Fortuin & N.C. Dijkman
Open Innovation in the Food
Industry:
An Evidence Based Guide
Prof. dr S.W.F. Omta
Dr F.T.J.M. Fortuin
N.C. Dijkman, MSc
Wageningen University and
Research Centre
Food Valley NL
Manager Sustainability ABN.
AMRO
Colophon
 2014 Food Valley NL
Authors:
Prof. dr S.W.F. Omta (Wageningen University and Research
Centre)
Dr. F.T.J.M. Fortuin (Food Valley NL)
N.C. Dijkman, MSc (Manager Sustainability ABN. AMRO)
Cover design: Roland Klefoth (Food Valley NL)
Printing:
GVO drukkers & vormgevers B.V.
All rights reserved.
Nothing from this publication may be reproduced, stored in a computerized
system or published in any form or in any manner, including electronic,
mechanical, reprographic or photographic, without prior written permission from
the publisher, Food Valley NL, P.O. Box 294, NL-6700 AG Wageningen, The
Netherlands.
www.foodvalley.nl
ISBN 978-908-222-12-06
First published, 2014
Table of Contents
Preface ................................................................................................... 9
Introduction .......................................................................................... 11
Open innovation ........................................................................................ 12
Open innovation in the food industry ......................................................... 15
Partners in open innovation ....................................................................... 17
Critical failure factors for open innovation ............................................. 21
Defining problems and establishing objectives ............................................ 21
Lay the proper groundwork and change course in time ................................ 21
Make roadmaps .............................................................................................. 21
A new perspective: looking ahead.................................................................. 22
Partner selection ........................................................................................ 23
Think beyond your own interests ................................................................... 23
Look beyond technology ................................................................................ 23
Drafting a collaboration agreement ............................................................ 24
Agree on terms ............................................................................................... 24
Getting a handle on risks: it is possible .......................................................... 24
Implementation of the open innovation project .......................................... 25
When fear gets the upper hand…................................................................... 25
Invest in trust .................................................................................................. 25
Connect cultures............................................................................................. 26
Communicate often and extensively .............................................................. 26
Expose conflicts .............................................................................................. 26
Monitoring, finalisation and evaluation ...................................................... 26
What role does cost play? .............................................................................. 26
Increasing complexity, rising costs ................................................................. 27
Management and coordination needed......................................................... 30
Conditions for effective innovation ................................................................ 30
Critical factors for open innovation in the food sector ........................... 31
Critical failure factors ................................................................................. 31
Low rational commitment and free riding ..................................................... 31
Low team cohesion ......................................................................................... 31
Innovation insecurity ...................................................................................... 32
Lack of hierarchy............................................................................................. 32
Critical success factors ................................................................................ 32
Contractual protection from distrust ............................................................. 32
Bogus solution ................................................................................................ 33
Double agendas’ in public-private partnerships............................................. 33
18 complex projects in focus ......................................................................... 33
Impossible demands? ..................................................................................... 34
Varying outcomes ........................................................................................... 34
Costs and knowledge ...................................................................................... 34
Network stability as primary indicator ........................................................... 34
Impact of formal agreements ......................................................................... 35
Striking differences ......................................................................................... 36
Clarity is more important than a 'big stick'..................................................... 36
Necessary incentives ...................................................................................... 36
Experience helps ............................................................................................. 37
A formalised structure is also important for SMEs......................................... 37
Recipes in jeopardy......................................................................................... 37
Striving for balance ......................................................................................... 38
Competencies make all the difference ........................................................... 38
Top-down solutions ........................................................................................ 38
Open innovation in food and high-tech SMEs ........................................ 39
The seed sector is highly innovative ............................................................ 40
Similarities with high-tech sectors ..................................................................... 40
Description of participating companies ....................................................... 41
Personnel involved in innovation ................................................................... 41
Turnover and patent applications .................................................................. 41
Profitability and market introductions ........................................................... 41
For a correct interpretation............................................................................ 41
Contact between R&D and marketing............................................................ 42
Go or no go ..................................................................................................... 43
Reward policy ................................................................................................. 42
Performance indicators and lessons learned ................................................. 43
Successful open innovation projects ........................................................... 43
Satisfied partners............................................................................................ 43
Importance of product development ............................................................. 43
Contact moments ........................................................................................... 44
Personnel exchange........................................................................................ 44
Contractual agreements ................................................................................. 44
Unsuccessful open innovation projects ....................................................... 44
Conclusions ........................................................................................... 47
Why is collaboration of such significance for innovation? ............................ 47
Factors to consider when collaborating in an open innovation project ......... 47
First of all: critical self-analysis ....................................................................... 47
Careful selection of partners .......................................................................... 48
Are clients suitable partners? ......................................................................... 48
One partner or more? .................................................................................... 49
Create trust ..................................................................................................... 49
Keep the project from becoming a goal in itself ............................................ 50
Leaking of essential information .................................................................... 50
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure ......................................... 50
Learning experiences for innovative SMEs in the food sector ....................... 51
Acknowledgements ............................................................................... 52
References ............................................................................................ 52
About NetGrow ..................................................................................... 58
Preface
Innovation is essential to success in the food sector. Since most food firms don’t
have the competencies nor the capital needed to innovate on their own, they
need to find partners to join forces in open innovation collaborations. However,
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the food sector often face
difficulties in establishing a strategic and efficient network. Understanding how
food SMEs use their networks and how food networks can become more
supportive to food SMEs for open innovation was the first objective of the EU 7th
Framework NetGrow project. How important this is was demonstrated by a
finding of one of the NetGrow surveys among over 250 food SMEs in 6 EU
countries, in which a clear correlation was found between openness of food firms
in terms of diversity of interactions with other actors and the firms’ innovation
performance (in terms of new products and processes introduced). The second
objective of the NetGrow project was to develop –based on the insights gainedan evidence based toolbox with guidelines for open innovation for food SMEs.
This toolbox provides an overview of food networks in the 9 countries that
participated in the NetGrow project and contains tools that assist in selecting and
exploiting the network that best fits the company's needs (Fortuin and Omta,
2014).
The present report provides guidance for the next step: using the links of your
network to engage in open innovation alliances. It contains guidelines on how to
start, conduct, and successfully complete open innovation projects. It is based on
the insights gained during the NetGrow project combined with empirical evidence
from research on open innovation within and outside the food sector. It provides
answers to questions like how to select partners? What are the dos and don’ts for
collaboration in open innovation trajectories? And which projects are suitable to
9
be carried out in an open innovation setting, which projects could better be
executed in-house? Parts of this report were published in ' Samenwerken voor
Open Innovatie: Kunst of kunde?' (Omta et al., 2011).
10
I
ntroduction
The European food industry operates in a turbulent market, characterised by
global competition, and fast changing demands for sustainability of
production and transparency of chain processes. Consumers demand
healthier, locally produced products and put high pressure on animal welfare.
Competition in the food industry is also more intense than ever, and
manufacturers must be continually alert in order to remain relevant for
distribution channels. It is evident that the European food industry has to adapt to
these fast changing circumstances and that its innovativeness has to be enhanced.
An additional obstacle for innovation in the food industry is the difficulty of
ensuring intellectual property rights; though it is doubtful whether this is still a
problem. Up through the late 1990s, when a secret recipe was the most important
form of protection (as it often still is today), such patents were only seen
sporadically. A recent example of how this has changed is the more than 800
patents upon which Nestlé depends to protect its Nespresso coffee-making
system, including the capsules and the necessary technology. During the research
for this report, an R&D director from a medium-sized multinational in the food
sector emphasised the great – and still increasing – import of patenting (see also
figure 4):
“Especially in the last three years, the patenting of products and processes has
expanded so rapidly that this can be called the biggest development in the past
decade.”
In her dissertation (2011), Janssen demonstrates that there are indeed cases of
radical innovation in the food sector. She counts, for example:
 Five technical breakthroughs (including Fridéale and Valess)
 Four trend-breaking innovations (e.g., Breaker and Knorr Vie)
 Three breakthrough innovations (Becel pro-activ spread, Senseo and
Optimel control).
Although nearly everyone associates it with products, innovation is a much
broader term. Furthermore, Kühne shows in her dissertation (2011) that
innovations, in particular those involving processes, are becoming more frequent
in the ‘traditional’, artisanal food sectors such as Italian cheeses and hams,
Belgian beer and Hungarian sausages.
Introduction
11
All of this revolves around the combination of product, process, market and
organisational innovation, with the goal of restructuring market-directed internal
business processes and chain processes. Take the wine industry. In their
Handbook of Innovation in the Food and Drink Industry (2008), Mitelka and
Goertzen count 28 viticulture innovations, from crops to harvest and from
organisation to marketing. Even the mere existence of this handbook
demonstrates how important innovation has become in the food sector. And this
importance is on the rise.
Open innovation
Innovation is becoming increasingly complex, and often also more expensive.
These factors make it impossible, or nearly so, for individual businesses to develop
and introduce new products and processes independently. Innovation has
become an unavoidable interplay of various parties who combine their knowledge
and turn problems into design requirements. This is how they create
opportunities. In the past several years, the term open innovation introduced by
Chesborough (2003) has thus become a key concept. This term characterises the
shift to a system in which chain partners, knowledge institutions, governmental
bodies and even competitors work together to develop new products and
processes quickly and effectively.
Figure 1: Open innovation
us
Chesbrough (2003) in adaptation by Garcia
Introduction
12
Figure 1 shows that in open innovation the boundaries of a firm become, as it
were, blurred. Ideas and technologies are not only developed internally, but also
originate outside the company. The firm licenses in and, if necessary, also licenses
its own knowledge out to companies that can use it to create more value. Spinout companies put products on the market – at some distance – on the basis of
technologies they do not consider core technologies. At the same time they buy
products from other firms in order to complement their product portfolio beyond
their core competencies.
Actually, open innovation works like a lever. An individual business only has to do
part of the work itself; other firms do the rest. This generates income and
accelerates the innovation process. And yet open innovation project participants
are left with plenty of managerial issues: above all, how an organisation can profit
the most from others’ expertise while still retaining enough potential value itself.
It is hence a balancing act. On the one hand, businesses want to be open and
make use of others’ know-how. On the other hand, they need to protect
themselves in order to prevent competitors from running off with their profitmaking expertise. This is a constant source of tension. In order to maximise the
leverage and minimise the risks, businesses must find partners with
complementary knowledge and skills. Preferably, partners with a comparable
organisational culture, for example in terms of decision-making and planning.
Fortuin (2007) demonstrates that there are big cultural differences between firms
that tend to have long gaps between various product generations and those in
which this time is short. Examples of the former are firms in aircraft construction,
pharmaceuticals and the food sector (especially seed improvement). In consumer
electronics, mobile telephony and the computer industry, on the other hand, one
product generation comes on the heels of another. With innovation, time
perspective is essential.
An open innovation project is called an ‘innovative alliance’ when a firm
collaborates with just one partner. When there are several partners, it is a
‘network collaboration’. The first of the two forms is the most common, most
likely because of its advantages: innovative alliances are easier to manage and
make it easier to reach agreement about property rights. However, there can be a
downside: as there are fewer participants with diverse backgrounds, creativity
may be diminished and some competencies may be lacking.
Introduction
13
Traditional collaboration usually looks like a regular project, with a defined goal,
start date and endpoint. In contrast, the collaboration of chain partners in open
innovation projects continues beyond the end of the project. When competitors
work together, this is usually in the form of pre-competitive collaboration
projects, after which the original innovation partners resume their competitive
roles. In practice, open innovation processes are difficult to manage effectively,
especially if they involve a network of partners. It is an art – or a science – to
ensure that collaboration does not get bogged down in endless consultation and
compromise seeking.
At the same time, open innovation is not only about collaboration. When there is
a high degree of specialisation, a firm can limit the complexity of the innovation
process by outsourcing part of the process to specialised organisations or
knowledge institutions. This does, however, place high demands on the firm in
terms of absorptive capacity: the firm’s ability to acquire new knowledge or
expertise and to put it to use to set up innovative activities in order to respond
actively to a constantly changing environment. This is also demanding for
personnel, who must be able to understand complex technological innovations
and integrate them into business processes. In addition, there is a need for
specialised alliance or network managers capable of managing an extensive
internal and external network, as in open innovation projects.
A recent large-scale empirical study in Europe by Ebersberger et al. (2011) shows
that – in general – open innovation has a positive impact on the innovative
potential of a business. Open innovation incorporates several dimensions: taking a
broad view of developments, collaborating concretely in a process, and seeking
external knowledge (external innovation expenditure1). This might include making
use of contract R&D, sourcing expertise tied into machines or components, or
establishing licences or patents. If a firm is focused solely on this search for
external know-how, the collaboration will actually have a negative impact. A
business must know what it is and what it is capable of, and must experience the
1
External innovation expenditure involves arm’s length contracting related to the
procurement of technology ‘embodied’ in machinery and components, the purchase of
problem-solving capabilities through contract R&D, or the acquisition of technology and
capabilities in the form of patents or licences. External innovation expenditure is, for
example, less contingent on a firm’s internal capabilities or absorptive capacity than
search and screening activities or collaboration for innovation.
Introduction
14
‘why’ of knowledge development. Enough attention must be devoted to creating
and maintaining its own absorptive capacity. Ebersberger says:
”First, make sure your own competencies are satisfactory. Only then will
the lever begin to work, and can you profit from open innovation.”
Open innovation in the food industry
Open innovation is becoming increasingly important in the food sector. According
to Sarkar and Costa (2008), there is rapid growth in the number of open
innovation projects. One explanation is that more than 90% of the sector consists
of SMEs, which are generally regarded as highly flexible and innovative. However,
because they have limited resources for in-house R&D, they must maintain a
broad network of partners to provide them with scientific and technological input
(Knudsen, 2007).
Figure 2: Various industries arranged on a continuum from closed to open
innovation
Paul Isherwood, Director Innovation and External Networks at GSK
Introduction
15
Figure 2 shows that the food sector is just under the middle of the continuum
from closed to open innovation: on a par with consumer electronics, just behind
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, but ahead of semiconductors. Furthermore,
the sector is increasingly active.
The food industry is moving progressively in the direction of open innovation.
Food firms are making a strategic choice to focus more intensively on their core
competencies. They are looking beyond the walls of their own organisations,
actively seeking knowledge, technology and partners to implement a portion of
the innovation process.
Figure 3: Development of the number of probiotics patents from 1990 to 2010
Adapted from Bornkessel et al. (2011)
The boundaries between various industries, such as food, pharmaceuticals and
cosmetics, are also rapidly blurring. As shown in figure 3, food firms involved in
probiotics are patenting more frequently, both independently and in partnership
with pharmaceutical companies.
The development of probiotics really started after the market launch of ‘Activia’,
the innovation breakthrough from Danone in 1987. Activia was the first yoghurt
based on probiotics. This product aids digestion due to the addition of the Bifidus
Regularis bacteria. We can see that the increase in number of patents since 1999
has been nearly linear, with an obvious acceleration in the food sector in 2005.
Furthermore, in 2009, we see an indisputable climb in the number of patents
based on collaboration between food and pharmaceuticals firms. Recently,
Introduction
16
though, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) dismissed many health claims
– to the disappointment of many food firms.
Until recently, there was no empirical evidence for the true relevance of open
innovation in the food sector. Batterink (2009) has shown convincingly that open
innovation became increasingly important for innovative food firms during the
period 1994-2006, especially since 2000 (see also figure 5). This convincing
evidence emerged from the responses to six serial Community Innovation Surveys
(CIS) by more than 1300 innovative food firms.
Cees ‘t Hart, CEO at Friesland Campina, presented a beautiful example of
collaboration from specialised roles. Regarding activities of their cheese, butter
and powdered milk division, he said:
“For the marketing of these products, collaboration with the marketplace plays an
important role. We can do it all ourselves, but sometimes specialised companies
can do it much better. Besides, market forces are so strong that you can’t always
beat them.”
Partners in open innovation
Figure 4: Percentage of innovative food firms that collaborate with various
partners in open innovation projects
CIS
Introduction
17
Figure 5 clearly shows that building and maintaining an external network is now
crucial for the survival of innovative food firms. Until 2000, only 15-20% of
innovative food companies collaborated with suppliers, clients and knowledge
institutions. Since then, these collaborations have become more common: up to
45% with suppliers and 30-35% with clients and knowledge institutions. The rate
of collaboration with competitors is the lowest and also shows the least increase,
from 10% until the year 2000, and then up to only 15%. Interestingly enough, the
same CIS database reveals that the pattern of collaboration between innovative
food firms is very comparable to that in high-tech sectors. This is true for both the
increase and the distribution among the various types of partners.
Enzing et al. (2009 and 2011) investigated three specific issues:
1. What is the role of various partners in an open innovation network?
2. What influence does involving these partners have on the success of
market introductions?
3. What chances do new products have of surviving on the market?
In total, Enzing researched 129 innovative products: 76 for the consumer market,
37 for the industrial market (ingredients and machines) and 16 for the food
service market. The products studied were very successful: Enzing established
that almost two-thirds of the products were still on the market seven years after
introduction. This outcome was unexpected, as there is little mention in the food
sector’s professional literature of new products having a long life (Buisson, 1995;
Rudolph, 1995; van Poppel, 1999). Apparently, the radical character of these
products increased their chances of survival.
Another conclusion was that the innovative products developed by food firms in
open innovation networks were more successful than those that came from the
firms’ own R&D labs. Innovations resulting from chain partners’ collaborations
with universities and research institutes performed particularly well. Collaboration
with companies that supply ingredients was very valuable for long-lasting market
success, for example in the development of functional foods and probiotics.
Ingredient suppliers have indeed begun generating more total product concepts,
which encompass both a product’s ingredients and its formula (Joppen, 2004).
Enzing discovered, furthermore, that business-to-business clients were involved in
the development of about 30% of the new products. However, in none of the
cases studied was there a correlation (positive or negative) between the
Introduction
18
involvement of these clients and the success of the market introduction. This was
also true for the new products’ long-term market performance.
Knudsen (2007) even found a significant negative correlation between client
involvement and market performance in food innovation processes. He concluded
that when clients were too closely involved, this inhibited the creativity necessary
for development of more radically innovative products. Bonner and Walker (2004)
also concluded that clients tend to express preferences for products that are
already known, which results in more incremental innovation.
Another negative aspect cited by innovators during the interviews was the
possibility that direct involvement of clients in open innovation trajectories could
result in dependence. A dependent relationship can have a negative influence on
the openness so essential to the process. Supplier management, for example,
worries about unintentional indiscretion during innovation discussions because
there is always the risk of leaking information – formulas or profit margins, for
example – that the supplier would rather not reveal to its clients.
We suspect, though, that the relationship between food retailers and
manufacturers in innovation trajectories is changing. This has to do with the
emergence of private label products: the client's level of influence depends on
whether the manufacturer has its own product line or produces for a brand. We
are seeing more and more examples of food retailers and private label
manufacturers collaborating in innovation projects; in these instances, consumer
data (cash register information) provide the basis for what is often a more
incremental type of innovation.
Introduction
19
Introduction
20
C
ritical failure factors for open innovation
In search of certainty about possible pitfalls, referred to as critical
failure factors, Omta and van Rossum carried out a study in 1999 on the
‘dark side of open innovation’. They spoke with ten alliance and
network managers in large businesses representing various industries in the
Netherlands and Ireland.
For insight into problems that may arise in both domestic and international open
innovation projects, they asked each manager for in-depth commentary on an
open innovation project that had not gone well. These projects concerned issues
such as the development of radical new products, faster time-to-market or more
efficiency in production and chain processes. In addition, the alliance and network
managers were asked to indicate which lessons they had learned from their
experience and what recommendations they could make based on these lessons.
In this chapter, we discuss these problems and recommendations for the various
stages of the open innovation process.
Defining problems and establishing objectives
Lay the proper groundwork and change course in time
As open innovation projects focus on new technologies and/or markets, a careful
preliminary study is essential to making a balanced assessment of technological
and business opportunities. In two cases, the partners were so enthusiastic about
the collaboration itself that – without conducting any research – they labelled the
business opportunities ‘good’ in advance and went on much too long in the
chosen direction.
MacLaghlan (1995) comments that it can be traumatic enough shutting down an
R&D project in one’s own lab, let alone in a shared effort. Bruce et al. (1995) also
touches on this, adding that ‘collaboration’ as a phenomenon has a tendency to
create its own agenda.
Make roadmaps
These kinds of problems could probably have been prevented if the technology
and the market had been carefully researched beforehand. Businesses must try to
predict the technological and market potential of an innovation as accurately as
possible. A number of respondents said that input from sales and marketing was
Critical failure factors for open innovation
21
too focused on the short term, despite the fact that, for radical innovation, it is
vital to look much farther into the future: about five to ten years. On the basis of
such prognoses you can draft market-technology roadmaps in which future
product plans are tied to:
 Expected developments in the various technologies;
 Emerging trends in customer needs;
 Possible competitor activities.
These roadmaps require regular cross-functional adjustment; about once every
one to two years (see boxes 1 and 2).
A new perspective: looking ahead
In 2007, Fortuin studied cross-functional collaboration between R&D, marketing
and sales and the business units of large multinational companies. This research
revealed that there is often still a gap between the short-term view of marketing
and the business units on the one hand and, on the other, the R&D long-term
orientation that is essential for radical innovation. Recent research by the authors
of this report demonstrates that the short-sightedness of marketing and sales in
combination with the future orientation of R&D still causes problems in the food
sector. The cultural clash between these two groups continues to play a role in
their mutual communication. Expressed as stereotypes, it’s a case of bringing
together the ‘Poindexters’ in R&D and the ‘golf-playing executives’ in marketing.
Automobile manufacturer Henry Ford once said:
“If I had asked customers what they wanted, they would have said ‘a faster
horse’.”
There are similarities between Ford’s famous quote and this food sector R&D
director’s characterisation of the dissonance inherent in innovation:
“Marketing plays an essential role when it comes to indicating trends, but
contributions from marketing are more likely to put the brakes on true
breakthrough innovations. This is because they extrapolate from existing lines,
while radical innovations require you to go in a different direction. […] Yet the
translation to marketing is essential. The ‘not-invented-here syndrome’ is present
not only between firms, but also between business functions.”
22
Partner selection
Search quickly and in the right place
If you don’t have a clear picture of your R&D environment, you will tend to
overlook obvious partners. This is often due to too little commitment on the part
of top management to finding the right partner. In one case, the entire process of
finding a partner with the required competencies took five years (!), and once the
partner had been found the business momentum was gone. During that time, of
course, the market had changed. In another case, a prominent university
laboratory in the firm’s own country had not appeared on the radar because the
firm had been searching the globe for collaboration partners. The possibility of
excellence just around the corner had occurred to no one. In two cases, the
partner’s technological competencies and financial resources were insufficient to
successfully implement its share of the collaboration.
Think beyond your own interests
Erens et al. (1996) studied fifty companies in Europe, the US and the Far East,
including Airbus, Boeing, Canon, Hitachi, IBM, Philips and Toyota. The researchers
concluded that many prestigious firms were too egocentric in their search for a
suitable partner. The authors emphasise that businesses should not be looking
solely at what they need from a partner, but also at what they themselves have to
offer in terms of assets such as skills, market access and economies of scale. An
R&D director from a multinational dairy company put it this way:
“Our central position in our business network often allows us to see more
possibilities for the specific innovations of our partner companies. Because we
consciously search for advantages for our network partners in other markets, our
partners are in turn motivated to make extra investments in new technologies.
This is an efficient mechanism for maintaining a stable and efficient innovation
network.”
Look beyond technology
Furthermore, Erens emphasises that firms generally focus too much on the
tangible aspects of the collaboration, despite the fact that a good match of
intangible factors – such as organisational culture and the chemistry between
(top) managers – is much more important for successful collaboration. Bailey et
al. (1996) studied 70 firms in the United Kingdom and also arrived at the
conclusion that choosing collaboration partners purely on technical grounds
results in solutions that are not always optimal.
23
Drafting a collaboration agreement
Agree on terms
One of the most important problems revealed was that the collaboration had not
been planned out, and the interests of the firm had been insufficiently secured
beforehand. In half of the collaborative ventures, the lack of attention to business
interests was named as the leading cause of (serious) problems. Partners had not
agreed on how they would divide the effort, both financially and in terms of R&D
– nor how they would divide the yield. Furthermore, there was not enough prior
agreement on the nuts and bolts of the collaboration: details such as hiring an
alliance manager or network manager, decisions about monitoring, and criteria
for go or no go. Some collaborative partnerships do not include a clause on what
to do if one of the partners pulls the plug. The study tells of one partner who left
the project in order to put the knowledge gained to competitive use.
Getting a handle on risks: it is possible
The advantages and disadvantages of (open) innovation projects are often difficult
to predict. Unexpected results can send the process in a very different direction
than the one planned. As illustrated in the examples above, if clear agreements
are not reached beforehand, with or without official contracts, this ambiguity can
be a source of conflict. Yet the idea that uncertainty appears to be inherent to
innovation led a number of respondents to remark that it is very difficult – even
impossible – to cover everything in contracts, because especially in open
innovation projects, the gains are often uncertain and unexpected problems may
arise. The path of the unknown certainly does not always lead to the intended
goal. And still the goal that is reached can be very valuable. This feature of
innovation can be used to help structure the process. SKF, the world’s largest
producer of ball bearings, had had previous experience with collaboration
partnerships formed for open innovation, and thus already knew that they do not
always end up at the point planned, but do have other interesting outcomes.
Unexpected outcomes led to discussions afterwards: which of the participants is
responsible for what portion of the costs, and is everyone’s profit from the
proceeds directly proportionate? Because of this experience, they now reach clear
agreements in collaborations with large automobile manufacturers. They
currently stipulate in contracts that SKF owns the rights to every innovation within
the ball bearing system (i.e. the housing and linked ABS system), while rights to all
other innovations go to the car manufacturer, regardless of who thought of it.
This works well in practice. There have been no conflicts over property rights since
they began to work in this way.
24
Implementation of the open innovation project
When fear gets the upper hand…
Distrust and fear during an innovation trajectory were the problems mentioned
most often. Six of the ten collaborations experienced these problems at some
point. Some were worried about divulging too much confidential information and
technological expertise because they were concerned that their partners might
have a hidden agenda, or that their partners would look after only their own
interests. Sometimes these fears were justified. Two collaborations failed because
one of the partners turned out to be more interested in exploiting the information
and technology gained than in mutual success. Another fear was that the R&D
partner would merge with a competitor, thereby increasing the risk of sensitive
information leaks.
Collaboration with another business is not the only source of worry; collaboration
with universities can also lead to concern. One of the respondents mentioned
being worried about the possibility that strategic information would fall into the
wrong hands if the doctoral students involved were eventually to be hired by the
competitor. Furthermore, respondents warned of asymmetrical collaboration
between large and small businesses, and between suppliers and clients.
Intercultural problems arose in three cases. For example, language difficulties and
cultural differences hampered communication between the Japanese and
European businesses. Interestingly, there were also problems with the American
businesses. Two collaborations derailed when American partners showed up for
negotiations with their lawyers and weighty contracts. This violated the other
party’s trust and the collaboration never really got off the ground. In two other
cases there were complaints about lack of openness on the part of the American
partners, and failure to provide up-to-date information.
Invest in trust
Partnership management is all about creating trust. Lack of mutual trust keeps
businesses from investing in less tangible (radical) innovation trajectories focused
more on the long term. As it is easier to predict their risks and benefits, these
businesses are more likely to choose projects aiming to improve efficiency. Thus,
if trust is an issue, the resulting chain will likely be single-dexterous: one-handed.
25
Connect cultures
Achieving effective collaboration requires bridging the various business cultures;
sometimes these bridges cross the lines of responsibility in the participating
businesses. Having studied 84 alliances, Lorange et al. (1992) conclude that trust
and commitment are necessary conditions for a long-lasting collaboration.
Communicate often and extensively
Firms must forge alliances to create win-win situations. The challenge is to find
the critical balance between openness and confidentiality. As long as the
collaboration lasts, it is essential that partners keep each other abreast of their
activities. Frequent communication and sending (or forwarding) all reports
facilitates mutual understanding. Furthermore, interim progress checks save costs
because they prevent expensive adjustments later in the process.
An alliance or network manager’s primary competence is speaking the language of
the various collaborating parties. This goes beyond merely knowing the technical
jargon and being able to help seek solutions in various areas, although that is
certainly essential. Truly critical, however, is a feel for cultural differences, as this
is crucial for the images participants will have of each other and the open
innovation project. The manager must also recognise the interests of the various
partners, as bringing together these – often conflicting – interests and images
often creates tense moments. And yet these moments are useful because they
make underlying differences visible early on, and this clarity often helps move the
innovation process through obstacles or hesitation.
Expose conflicts
Also essential for creativity and learning in teams is a sense of safety. Bringing
information about objectives and potential conflicts to the surface early in the
game can support the creative process. Clearly, then, stress tolerance and conflict
management are valuable competencies of alliance or network managers,
complemented by capable monitoring of progress to ensure that these
differences, real or imaginary, are exposed in time.
Monitoring, finalisation and evaluation
What role does cost play?
Partners in large innovative collaborations tend to underestimate problems
regarding communication and coordination, and also the costs associated with
these problems. Transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985) is often used to
26
analyse these problems. Firms aim to reduce costs. If the internal costs exceed
those of the collaboration, they will choose to collaborate. This theory predicts
that the extent and form of collaboration are influenced by the specific
investments required to achieve that collaboration.
Collaborative relationships between firms must be arranged so that the
transaction costs are minimised while keeping the risks acceptable. Both
collaboration partners will need to continually evaluate what they are willing to
invest in the relationship with an eye to preserving this balance.
Increasing complexity, rising costs
Gerritsma and Omta (1998) investigated the communication and coordination
costs of thirteen large open innovation projects at Philips. They assigned a score
(standardised at 0–100) for project complexity, based on ten parameters including
the number of radical product and process innovations, the desired production
volume and the complexity of the parts required from suppliers. The study
revealed an exponential relationship between project complexity and
development costs (see figure 5). The authors concluded that management at
Philips had underestimated the communication and coordination costs, especially
those related to contacts with suppliers and between the various business
functions.
Figure 5: R&D project complexity versus development costs
Gerritsma and Omta (1998)
27
Box 1: Wageningen Innovation Assessment Toolkit (WIAT)
WIAT consists of two scientifically based analytical instruments: one for evaluating
innovation capacity at the corporate level (WIAT company) and one for assessing whether
an individual open or closed innovation project meets the innovation objectives (WIAT
project). These instruments are supported by a continually updated, comparative
database of innovative food firms in comparison with high-tech businesses.
WIAT
company
evaluates a company
in terms of its
innovation potential,
practice
and
performance
and
compares
its
innovation profile –
as described by the
general director, the
R&D director and the
marketing director on the basis of a structured questionnaire – with that of the leading
innovative businesses in the agrifood and technology sectors. WIAT company thus helps
companies to link their corporate business strategy to their innovation strategy by
maintaining focus within their innovation portfolio on what should be done in-house,
what can be outsourced and which innovation trajectories could best be implemented
with other firms and/or knowledge institutions.
Point 0 represents
the average for the
database; green is
the
range
of
responses given by
the various people
working on the open
innovation project;
dark green is the
average when higher
than the database;
yellow is the average when lower than the database.
WIAT project diagnoses the strengths and weaknesses of the innovation projects. This tool
can indicate the potential for technical and commercial success of a given open or closed
innovation project at an early stage by comparing the product and process innovation
profiles drafted by those involved in the project with a database of new product and
process profiles from successful and failed projects. WIAT project thus provides early
warning signals that, in turn, can be used during cross-functional meetings for projectlevel decisions regarding go/no go, adjustment, outsourcing or collaboration.
28
Box 2: The open innovation matrix
Innovation isn’t only about collaboration. The complexity of the innovation process can
also be reduced by outsourcing some of the work to specialised businesses or to
knowledge institutions. Management tools such as the open innovation matrix designed
by the authors (Omta and Folstar 2005, Fortuin 2007) can be used by food firms to decide
which technologies and products should be developed in-house, which should be
developed in collaboration with one or two partners and which would preferably be
outsourced. The first step is to determine the competitive impact of the firm’s various
technologies by classifying them by category: emerging, fast-growing, key and existing
technologies (Roussel et al. 1991). The second step is to evaluate the firm’s internal
competencies in terms of each of these technologies.
The open innovation matrix
Competencies of the firm
Technology
Weak
Average
Emerging
Environmental scan
Scan or collaborate
Fast-growing
Collaborate
Share risk
Key
Optimise
Optimise
Existing
Outsource
Outsource/trade
Strong
Collaborate
In-house
In-house
Sell/trade
Although emerging technologies can have an influence on the future competitive position
of a business, a great deal must be done in the area of market and technology
development before they can begin to change the basis of competition. When internal
technological competencies are weak or average, an effort to close the gap could be in
order. However, the uncertainty of this situation calls for a scan of the R&D environment:
seeking fitting partners through flexible relationships, preferably in strategic partnerships
and alliances, or via contract research and sponsorship of knowledge institutions. In any
case, adequate protection of patents should be considered. Fast-growing technologies
have the potential to change the competition in the medium-long term. When
technological competencies are strong, there should be a preference for in-house R&D
whenever possible. Extra investments may be necessary for the research and
development of various applications of the technology in new products and markets.
When technological capacity is average, risk sharing through strategic alliances seems to
be the most prudent route.
When technological competencies are weak, the most realistic alternative is joint
development. As key technologies are essential for the short-term survival of a business, it
is necessary to track competitors’ R&D efforts intensively. Key technologies should, if
possible, be owned by the business and protected with patents. When technological
competencies are weak or average, extra technological capacity should be acquired, for
example by expanding the firm's knowledge base through acquisition. For non-critical
existing technologies, outsourcing could be the appropriate choice when technological
competencies are weak; when they are average, they can serve as a medium of exchange
in a partnership. When they are strong, they can either be used as a medium of exchange
or be sold, leaving the business to concentrate its R&D on fast-growing and key
technologies.
29
Management and coordination needed
Four large partnerships exceeded their budgets – some substantially so. One key
problem was the difficulty of managing such a large network, and the lack of
agreements to this effect. Open innovation projects need to be managed
differently than in-house innovation. Many times, the composition of the
partnerships, the structure and the management of the network were not chosen
explicitly, but tended to evolve or come about by coincidence rather than as a
result of planning.
Conditions for effective innovation
During the past decade, the authors of this study incorporated its results in the
development of a number of management tools to help businesses innovate more
effectively. Of major importance is that a firm first develop a keen awareness of:
 Its own focus;
 Success and failure factors;
 Key risks and uncertainties;
 Drivers of and barriers to innovation.
These insights provide the basis for a firm’s innovation strategy as a whole and
also serve as a focus for individual innovation teams. The Wageningen Innovation
Assessment Toolkit – WIAT – (see box 1) is designed to aid this process. The open
innovation matrix (box 2) is an instrument developed to help businesses decide
whether an innovation trajectory can best take place in-house, be pursued in
collaboration with others, or be outsourced. Although both tools were originally
intended for large firms, they are also useful for SMEs in streamlining innovation
processes.
30
C
ritical factors for open innovation in the
food sector
Critical failure factors
To gain insight into the most important problems typical of open innovation
projects in the food sector, Du Chatenier (2009) conducted a survey in various
links of the food chain: among producers, food firms and supermarkets actively
involved in open innovation projects. She also interviewed people working in
knowledge institutions and intermediaries that had initiated and/or facilitated
such projects. These twenty interviews were followed by focus group discussions
in a so-called Group Decision Room aided by group decision-making software.
Seventeen experts participated in these discussions. The following problems for
open innovation projects in the food sector (in order of importance) were
mentioned in both the interviews and focus groups:
Low rational commitment and free riding
Mentioned in ten interviews and in one focus group discussion. Respondents
formulated this problem as follows:
"There are too many parasites. Of course you want to give, but you don't know
what you will receive in return. This makes you cautious."
"Some companies participate in open innovation projects for strategic and political
reasons, not for the sake of the project itself. They pursue their own rather than
joint interests."
Low team cohesion
Mentioned in eight interviews and both focus group discussions. The power gap in
relation to the customer (particularly between food producers and supermarkets)
was named explicitly in three interviews and in one focus group discussion. A few
quotes:
“Collaborating with the client is complicated. Everything you say can be used
against you."
“It is difficult to give direct feedback because you are very dependent on, and don't
want to lose, the client."
Critical factors for open innovation in the food sector
31
“The two cultures are totally different. In academia they have time to think things
through, whereas I have to justify every single minute to my boss."
Innovation insecurity
Mentioned in four interviews and both focus group discussions. A comment about
a radical innovation project:
“The innovation process is not linear. It develops in totally different directions. You
never know what might happen."
Lack of resources and commitment from higher management
Mentioned in four interviews and one focus group discussion. One quote:
“My firm wants me to participate in this open innovation project, but at the end of
the day I will be judged by how well I solve the daily problems within the
company."
Lack of hierarchy
Mentioned in two interviews and in both focus group discussions. An example of a
complaint:
“You have no direct hierarchical relationship with your innovation partners. That
makes it difficult to alert them to their responsibilities.”
“To collaborate successfully in an innovation network, firms have to be very much
aware of their own capacities. Each one has a role to play; for some this is directed
more toward efficiency and for others toward innovation. The aims of an
individual firm have to fit with the collaboration it enters into.”
Critical success factors
In 2010, Tepic et al. initiated a study of complex innovation projects focused on
sustainability in the food sector. The researchers looked specifically at whether
the combination of contractual agreements and trust leads to success, and if so,
how. Here too, transaction cost theory offered an analytic framework.
Contractual protection from distrust
In open innovation projects, there is often fear of opportunism: i.e. that firms will
pursue their own interests by implicitly or explicitly breaking promises. If one
collaborative partner suspects another of acting opportunistically, this will lead to
32
a breakdown of trust. To protect themselves from opportunism, parties enter into
contractual agreements.
Bogus solution
These contracts in themselves generate extra transaction costs. Moreover, they
offer only limited protection. No contract is watertight, and certainly not in
relation to open innovation projects, in which unexpected extra costs and benefits
are more the rule than the exception. Extensive and one-sided contracts with
many requirements and risks in the form of penalty clauses certainly do not help
build a trusting relationship.
Double agendas in public-private partnerships
Good collaboration revolves largely around finding the right trade-off between
the material and immaterial aspects, i.e. between business interests and building
partner trust. Public-private collaborative projects provide an ideal context in
which to study trust-building in complex innovation projects which lack certainty
about results. Here there are clear differences between the objectives and
interests of the various participants. Although sustainability and business
continuity are often overlapping objectives, this is not always the case. Publicprivate collaborative projects are characterised by double agendas. There are
many possible types of objectives that need not coincide. The partners work
together within the overall objective of the whole project, while they are, in any
case, also trying to achieve their own objectives.
Eighteen complex projects in focus
A research project looked at 18 such projects in which the partners had already
been working together for 3 to 4 years. These were large projects with an annual
budget of more than one million euros, often involving a diverse variety of
partners. The study focused specifically on innovation insecurity and complexity,
both of which were caused on the one hand by the large heterogeneity of the
network and on the other hand by the complexity of the technology and
objectives.
A good example was a project in which an agribusiness park was to be developed.
The objective was to create an eco-industrial complex where companies use each
other's waste streams in order to restrict collective energy consumption and
minimise CO2 production. The project involved many different stakeholders,
including representatives of the companies themselves and government
33
authorities, but also branch organisations, environmental groups and special
interest groups of consumers and local residents.
Impossible demands?
Other projects were less complex with respect to the heterogeneity of
participants, but more complex in the sense that they encompassed a seemingly
impossible combination of demands. For example, a new housing system for
chickens had to fulfil all the requirements for organic production, but still house
30,000 chickens so that the farmer could achieve his return on investment.
Varying outcomes
Open innovation projects have uncertain outcomes and are by nature chaotic.
Heterogeneity is often high, partners vary in their interests, perceptions and
approaches, and a tendency toward opportunistic behaviour is not uncommon.
These characteristics can create challenges for both the continuity of the
innovation networks and their stability. A heterogeneous collaboration can
stimulate creativity, but if the goals and interests of the partnership are too far
apart this can easily lead to conflicts.
Costs and knowledge
The coordination costs of complex collaborative partnerships can also prove to be
much higher than expected. In addition, fear of opportunistic behaviour can make
partners more reticent, particularly in sharing knowledge about topics such as
firm-specific technology, new markets, trends and future developments or
possibilities.
Network stability as primary indicator
There is another problem with this type of complex and sustainability-oriented
projects: the outcome (increased sustainability) is not clear until years later. In
this research, network stability was therefore chosen as the most important
indicator of performance. For each of the collaborative partnerships, the network
stability indicator measured whether and to what extent they were able to
achieve each of the objectives after their three or four years of working together.
The criteria for this indicator include the following:
 How satisfied are the parties with the collaboration?
 Have the parties become more open and collaborative?
 To what extent are external parties interested in the outcomes achieved?
The study revealed that six of the collaborative partnerships had achieved little or
no network stability (low in figures 7 and 8). In five cases obvious progress had
34
been made, but there was still some insecurity about the stability of the network
(medium). In seven collaborative partnerships the outcomes were so positive that
the partners were (in some cases: very) motivated to continue with the innovation
after the project was completed (high).
Figure 6: Level of formality and network stability
7-point Likert scale
Impact of formal agreements
Figure 6 compares the degree of formalisation at the start of a project to the level
of network stability eventually achieved. Formalisation refers to the
establishment of clear (in some cases contractual) agreements. The degree of
formalisation was ascertained by measuring a number of parameters, including
whether agreements were made with respect to:
 Confidentiality
 IP protection
 Partners’ objectives and contributions
 Monitoring frequency and criteria
 Discontinuation of the collaboration by one of the partners.
These data were converted to a 7-point Likert scale. A score of '1' indicates that
none of the points were agreed upon in advance. A score of '7' indicates that
agreements were made on all of the points at the start of the collaboration.
35
Striking differences
Figure 8 also shows another outcome: in projects that achieved little or no
network stability after four years, little attention had been paid at the start to
arriving at clear and/or contractual agreements. This effort had in any case been
much lower than in the projects that achieved average or high network stability in
the same time span. The projects with low stability received a score of 3.7, and
the others received a score of 5.0.
Clarity is more important than a 'big stick'
The specific agreements reached were actually not so important. They were filed
somewhere and only consulted in the event of conflicts or unexpected
developments, such as the departure of one of the partners due to a takeover by
another company. They served primarily as a means to clarify the objectives of
the open innovation project and of the individual partners. This process made it
possible to identify (real or imagined) conflicts of interest and perceptions at an
early stage – while they were still manageable.
Figure 7: Rational commitment and network stability
7-point Likert scale
Necessary incentives
As illustrated in figure 7, there should be clear incentives for all actors to
participate in the collaboration. Figure 8 clearly shows the importance of rational
commitment for network stability. When partners see their own interests and
perspectives reflected in the project objectives, stable collaboration becomes
36
more likely. Projects with low network stability scored 4.3, those with average
stability 4.8, and projects with high network stability 5.7. This supports the
findings in chapter 3 indicating that low rational commitment is the most
important failure factor for collaboration in the food sector.
Experience helps
A final important factor for achieving network stability is whether the partners
have previously worked together. With respect to this indicator, the projects with
low network stability received a score of 2.3, those with average network stability
3.5, and those with high network stability 3.9. Whether the parties have
experience working together is thus a significant factor.
A formalised structure is also important for SMEs
Formalisation at the start is thus essential. This holds true not only for
multinationals, but also for SMEs in the food sector. Establishing a clear structure
right away creates a framework for collaboration. It also ensures that the
strategic objectives of the various partners are clear, and thus subject to
discussion, at an early stage in the project.
Recipes in jeopardy
An SME in the food sector needs to make formal or informal agreements
regarding certain issues before revealing a recipe, or other confidential
information, to innovation partners. Secrecy has always been, and still is, the most
important way of protecting such key information. For the director of an
innovative food company, revealing the company's formulas and recipes was the
greatest obstacle to participation in open innovation, especially when this
involved collaborating with large companies. During the interview, he expressed
this concern as follows:
"Our recipes are our most important intellectual property. The problem is that you
can't protect them with patents, and secrecy is difficult to maintain if a much
larger client demands openness about recipes as a condition for collaboration."
For this reason, it is essential that solid, negotiated agreements be made at the
start of any collaboration for open innovation. In principle, the aim should be a
win-win situation. All parties have to see the benefit of the collaboration. That it
is possible to work together with clients was illustrated by a director of another
innovative food company:
37
"Our added value for the customer in terms of collaboration with clients lies in our
knowledge of where the bottlenecks are and how to use them to our advantage."
Striving for balance
The fact that the partners' rational commitment was key to a good outcome of
the open innovation process shows that in these cases the negotiation process
was implemented effectively. It also shows that the various partners managed to
strike an intricate balance between:
 Advantages and disadvantages
 Risks and opportunities
 Investments and potential return.
Competencies make all the difference
A firm should choose collaborative partners in terms of its own sharply defined
key competencies and on the basis of a well-delineated innovation strategy.
Collaborations in which the contributions of the various companies consist of
poorly or moderately developed competencies generally lead to suboptimal
outcomes (see boxes 1 and 2).
Top-down solutions
Open innovation projects are in direct competition with in-house projects for
available resources and attention to engineering. This is often a losing battle,
however, because blood is, after all, thicker than water. This was demonstrated in
chapter 3. Since strategic interests play a prominent role over the successful
course of an innovation project, involvement of top management is essential.
Problems can also arise between business functions, such as with supplier
relations. This type of obstacle can only be resolved at management level. An
R&D manager of a large company in the food sector illustrated this as follows:
"During the economic recession of 2008 to 2010, our purchasing function was
compelled to revise the terms and conditions for the most important suppliers.
Only with the CEO's direct intervention were we able to prevent relations with
suppliers from deteriorating to the extent that the open innovation projects they
were involved in would have to be terminated. By bringing R&D and purchasing
together in the negotiation process with the suppliers, we were able to create a
win-win situation in which the short-term disadvantages for the suppliers were
outweighed by greater advantages in the long term."
38
O
pen innovation in food and high-tech
SMEs
Reinmöller et al. (2010) found that collaboration with high-tech
companies can produce high returns for food companies, which tend to be more
low or medium-tech in nature. This appears to support Ebersberger's (2011)
position on the impact of external innovation expenditure:
“A positive impact is found in those countries which are the farthest away from
the technological frontier.”
Countries, and probably also companies, thus make use of the knowledge of
pioneers to strengthen their own innovative capacity. To discover what
innovative food companies could learn in the open innovation processes of hightech companies, the present authors conducted a comparative study in 2011 of
open innovation in food and high-tech SMEs. The study participants were:
 Eight innovative companies in the seed industry
 Three innovative food SMEs
 Four high-tech SMEs.
Most of the interviewees were general managers of an SME and managers who
were directly involved in collaborative projects. Every respondent was asked to
complete a questionnaire for a number of open innovation projects the company
had been involved in.
All together, 32 open innovation projects were reviewed, of which 27 were
successful (i.e. they resulted in the expected outcome) and 5 were not successful
(the desired outcome was not achieved or the projects were terminated
prematurely). In the seed sector, 15 successful and 2 unsuccessful open
innovation projects were reviewed. The three innovative food SMEs were
involved in three of these successful projects and the two that failed. This result
was compared to the one failed and nine successful open innovation projects that
involved a high-tech SME (see figure 8).
Open innovation in food and high-tech SMEs
39
Figure 8: (Un-)successful open innovation projects in the seed improvement, food
and high tech sectors
Before discussing the open innovation projects, we will first give an impression of
the innovative seed sector. We will then describe the participating companies and
their innovation processes, and, finally, elaborate on the successful and
unsuccessful open innovation projects.
The seed sector is highly innovative
The food industry is generally classified among the 'low-innovation' sectors.
However, this is definitely not the case for the seed improvement sector. The
most important Dutch seed companies spend on average 25% of their sales on
R&D. In this respect they are clearly among the global leaders. Due to climate
differences and culturally determined consumer preferences, the R&D
laboratories of innovative seed companies are located throughout the world.
Similarities with high-tech sectors
The development time in the seed sector is also reminiscent of high-tech sectors.
It takes six to twelve years to bring a new variety onto the market. The failure rate
is also similar: only one in twenty cultured varieties ever makes it to the market.
Open innovation is very important in this sector. This is illustrated by the four
seed improvement companies that together own Keygene, a molecular genetics
research institute in Wageningen, which has laboratory facilities in the US and
China. Keygene has drastically accelerated the R&D process in seed improvement,
thanks to techniques such as seed selection based on genetic mapping. In
40
addition, Keygene offers a platform for open innovation for SMEs via the Keygene
Innovators Club.
Description of participating companies
Personnel involved in innovation
In this research study it became clear that seed companies should be seen as hightech. The companies employed on average 487 people, 144 of whom (almost
30%) were directly involved in innovation, and 16 in open innovation projects
(11% of the innovation personnel). Although the number of FTE in the high-tech
SMEs was lower (163), a larger percentage of the staff members – 108 (66%) –
was involved in (open) innovation projects. In the innovative food companies,
about 30 of the (on average) 100 personnel were involved in some way in open or
in-house innovation projects. The percentage of sales generated by new products
put on the market in the previous three years was somewhat lower for the seed
companies than for the high-tech SMEs: 37% versus about 50%.
Turnover and patent applications
The fact that these companies also reported about 50% turnover from new
products demonstrates just how innovative the selected SMEs in the food sector
were. Interestingly, the average life cycle of product generations in all sectors was
comparable, namely nine years. The participating companies in the seed industry
applied for an average of eight to nine patents (breeder's rights) in the previous
three years, compared to five to six applications among high-tech SMEs. In
contrast, SMEs in the food sector applied for not one patent.
Profitability and market introductions
Innovation leads to distinctive character and this ensures better margins for
innovative companies. Indeed, all of the companies reported that they were more
profitable than their competitors (on average 4 to 5 on a 7-point scale). All of the
respondents also believed that their companies generally introduced products
onto the market sooner than the competition (from 4.6 for high-tech SMEs to 6.3
for innovative food companies on a 7-point scale).
Correct interpretation
For a correct interpretation of the results, it is important to remember that
although the food and high-tech SMEs were carefully selected, they were
relatively few in number. The results presented can therefore only give an
indication. Moreover, the deviations in size of the food, seed and high-tech
41
companies may to some extent explain the differences found. Indeed, just the fact
that the larger companies are more professionally organised could alone be
responsible for some of the differences, particularly in the reward policy for
innovation, performance indicators and lessons learned. We note, however, that
even taking this into account, the differences found are striking. Nevertheless, to
validate the results, a larger number of high-tech and food companies would need
to be reviewed.
The innovation process of the participating firms
The authors of this study investigated the innovation process and the open
innovation projects by means of semi-structured interviews in which open
questions were combined with closed questions based on a 7-point scale.
Table 1. Answers to the closed questions posed during the comparative open
innovation survey among innovative food, seed improvement and high-tech SMEs
(successful collaborations)
Reward system that promotes
innovation
Use of performance indicators
Capturing of lessons learned
Degree of complementarity in the
collaboration
Degree of trust in the partner(s)
Would you want to work
together again with the same
partner(s)?
Willingness to make additional
investments
Development of new products in
the open innovation project
Development of new processes in
the open innovation project
Risk that confidential information
will be leaked
Prior confidentiality agreements
Prior agreements on property
rights and returns
Innovative food
Seed improvement
High-tech SMEs
1.3
4.5
3.9
2.7
2.7
4.1
4.0
5.4
5.3
6.3
4.9
5.1
5.3
5.6
5.6
6.7
6.1
6.1
5.0
5.4
4.8
6.3
6.2
5.1
5.7
4.1
3.0
3.0
2.7
4.1
3.0
6.3
5.0
3.0
5.9
6.8
7-point Likert scale questions: from 1= not at all to 7 = very much/to a great extent
Contact between R&D and marketing
When asked about the organisation of the innovation process, all of the firms
indicated that they focused considerable attention on communication between
42
R&D and marketing. The two departments met on average weekly to monthly to
discuss the innovation projects.
Go or no go
More significant differences among the firms emerged when we asked about
structured 'go' or 'no go' moments. These were least frequent (once every nine
months to a year) in the innovative food firms, compared to biweekly to monthly
in the high-tech SMEs. Table 1 provides an overview of the answers to the closed
questions.
Reward policy
The differences in reward policies to promote innovation were striking. From
'nearly non-existent' (1.3 on a 7-point scale) in the innovative food firms to 'very
common' in high-tech SMEs and in the seed sector (3.9 and 4.6).
Performance indicators and lessons learned
There was also a clear difference in the use of key performance indicators and
capturing of lessons learned at the end of an innovation process. From 'seldom' in
the innovative food firms to 'often' in the seed improvement sector and even
'very often' in the high-tech SMEs.
Successful open innovation projects
Satisfied partners
As could be expected, the respondents were generally satisfied with the
collaboration in the successful innovation projects. How well partners
complement each other in open innovation projects is comparable in the hightech and food sectors: between 4.9 and 6.3 on a 7-point scale. The partners
generally trust each other and would like to work together again. There is also a
clear willingness to make extra investments should that be necessary.
Innovative food firms often develop new processes together with ingredient and
machinery suppliers. This type of collaboration is clearly less common among seed
companies and much less common among the high-tech SMEs.
Importance of product development
Not only process but also product innovation is vitally important for the seed and
food firms studied. Product development within the collaboration is even more
important for innovative food SMEs and the seed companies than for the hightech SMEs.
43
Contact moments
The frequency of contact was about the same in all of the collaborations. On
average, partners met face-to-face once a month, for example during progress
reviews, and communicated by telephone, Skype or e-mail on a weekly or
biweekly basis.
Personnel exchange
Personnel exchange is clearly more common among high-tech firms than in the
food sector. This was the case in all open innovation projects in the high-tech
sector. On average personnel were exchanged 142 hours per month for 7.5
months among the high-tech SMEs compared to 97 hours per month for 5 months
in the research institute. In the seed sector, 13 exchanges took place, but these
were comparatively shorter, namely 15 hours for two months. Personnel
exchange was almost non-existent in the food sector. This may be related to the
relatively lower level of education among workers in the food sector.
Contractual agreements
Despite the importance of confidentiality (with respect to recipes for example) as
described in Chapter 1, firms in the food and seed sectors clearly estimate less risk
that confidential information will be leaked than do firms in the high-tech sector.
This may explain why the innovative SMEs in the food sector pay much less
attention to confidentiality agreements than the high-tech SMEs. The seed
companies did not appear to be concerned about this because they made solid
contractual agreements to start with. When it comes to property rights, revenues
and results, the SMEs in the food sector clearly make fewer prior agreements than
the high-tech SMEs and the seed companies.
Unsuccessful open innovation projects
Considering the limited attention innovative SMEs in the food sector pay to
confidentiality and the establishment of property rights, it is not surprising that
these firms in particular encountered opportunism in working with partners in the
unsuccessful open innovation projects (6.0 versus 1.5 in the seed sector; the hightech sector did not indicate any problems). Interestingly, agreements were
apparently made at this conjuncture – after the fact. By then it was clearly too
late.
It thus appears to be important, especially for the innovative SMEs in the food
sector, to make clear agreements in advance. One of the directors of an
innovative food company had this to say:
44
"For me, innovation is a passion. In the past when I began working on innovation
projects with others I always assumed they were as passionately committed as I
was. But I learned my lesson over the years and am now definitely less trusting. It
felt at times like the partner was stabbing me in the back."
45
46
C
onclusions
Why is collaboration of such significance for
innovation?
Collaboration works, both right away and in the long run
This report confirms that open innovation pays off: products that food firms
developed in open innovation networks performed better than products
developed entirely in-house, both in terms of return on investment – at market
introduction and in the long run – and in terms of survival. Open innovation works
like a lever for a firm’s capacities. Collaboration with chain partners (particularly
with ingredient suppliers) and knowledge institutions (universities and research
institutes) provides an especially valuable contribution for the success of the
innovations.
Factors to consider in open innovation
Still, plenty of management issues remain for potential participants in open
innovation projects. To some extent, collaboration will always be a trade-off
between one’s own interest and that of the other party. How do you benefit from
others’ knowledge and expertise while ensuring that your own business retains
enough potential value? And how do you prevent a collaboration from getting
bogged down in endless negotiations and compromises? A number of
recommendations for the preparation and implementation of an open innovation
project are described below.
First of all: critical self-analysis
Collaborative partnerships to which the various businesses contribute poorly
developed or just average competencies tend to produce suboptimal results. So
you should start by examining your own competencies. Businesses should not
only be looking at what they need from a potential partner; they should also be
wondering what they have to offer that partner, not only in terms of technology,
but also regarding process and organisational skills.
Because food firms are choosing to increase their focus on their own core
competencies, a business will have to take a critical look at what it has to offer in
collaboration. Personnel play a big role here. Do they understand complex
technological renewal processes and can these be integrated into the business
processes? Does a firm have specialised alliance or network managers who are
capable of managing an extensive internal and external network?
Conclusions
47
Careful selection of partners
A good collaborative effort involves a balanced trade-off between material and
immaterial aspects. In other words: business interests versus trust between
partners. To optimise the leverage effect of open innovation and to minimise risk,
businesses should seek partners with complementary knowledge and skills –
preferably with a comparable organisational culture, as would be the case when
both companies are, for example, family-run businesses.
An ‘ideal’ partner should:
 Be committed to the collaboration and have comparable expectations;
 Possess complementary technological possibilities and knowledge;
 Be both able and willing to share financial risks;
 Not have been guilty of opportunist behaviour in previous collaborative
partnerships;
 Have a comparable organisational culture and similar operational
routines;
 Be truly amenable to collaboration, open communication and attention to
quality and vision.
It is vital to choose collaborative partners on the basis of one’s own sharply
defined key competencies and a well-defined innovation strategy. A management
tool for assessing one’s own key competencies is the Wageningen Innovation
Assessment Toolkit (WIAT, see box 1 on page 21). The Open Innovation Matrix
(see box 2 on page 21) can be of benefit for considering whether an innovation
project can best be implemented in house, carried out in collaboration or
outsourced.
Are clients suitable partners?
Especially the collaborations between food firms and ingredient suppliers tended
to result in long-lasting market success, as in the case of functional foods and
probiotics. This was less true when business-to-business or other clients were
involved in the collaboration. Close involvement of clients can be expected to
result in more incremental rather than radical innovation because they tend to
express a preference for products that they already know. There were also
concerns that information which suppliers prefer to keep from their clients, such
as formulas and recipes or profit margins, could inadvertently come to the fore
during open innovation trajectories. Low team cohesion, as in the case of a power
gap between food firms and food retail, is therefore an important failure factor in
food sector collaboration. And yet we suspect that the emergence of private-label
producers is changing the relationship between food retailers and manufacturers
Conclusions
48
in innovation trajectories. We are seeing more examples of close and positive
collaboration between food retailers and private-label manufacturers. In these
cases, client data determines the direction of the – indeed, often more
incremental – innovations. So we believe that the demonstrable rise in privatelabel products competing in the premium segment, and the fact that these private
labels are functioning more prominently as calling cards for the respective
retailer, qualifies the previously cited results regarding client participation in
collaboration.
One partner or more?
An open innovation project is called an innovative alliance when there is
collaboration with just one partner. When more partners are involved we speak of
network collaboration. Alliances are the most common and have the advantage of
being easier to manage than a network of partners. Agreements on property
rights are also more easily reached within alliances.
A disadvantage of alliances is that, with only one partner, creativity can be limited
due to the smaller number of participants with different backgrounds.
Furthermore, essential competencies can be lacking. On the other hand, several
partners in a trajectory mean increases in transaction costs as the network grows,
as these costs are related to the exponential rise in coordination costs. In other
words: consider a potential expansion carefully in relation to the objectives of the
collaboration.
Create trust
Partnership management is all about trust. In order to arrive at an effective
collaboration, a bridge must be built between different organisational cultures,
sometimes crossing lines of responsibility in the participating firms. Successful
cooperative relations are thus characterised by gradual development and small,
relatively uncomplicated projects, culminating in tacit knowledge transfer,
whereby the partners intuitively understand each other’s intentions.
Teambuilding is a good way to nurture trust. This could be in the form of mutual
site visits to allow partners to look around in each other’s firm, all the while
learning more about the other’s situation. For network stability it is pivotal that
partners have both trust in and experience with each other.
When mutual trust is lacking, it is better to choose a straightforward trajectory,
whose results can be more easily determined on the basis of ‘hard’ financial data.
Mutual distrust keeps businesses from investing in less tangible innovation or
Conclusions
49
radical innovation with a long-term focus. The greatest failure factors for
innovative collaboration in the food sector are low rational commitment and free
riding. In these cases, partners are overly focused on their own objective and the
innovation trajectory is considered subordinate.
Keep the project from becoming a goal in itself
Open innovation projects, even more than in-house innovation projects, have a
tendency to create their own agendas. Furthermore, love is blind. When partners
are determined to make their collaboration a success, they may overestimate the
technological possibilities and business potential of the new product.
Leaking of essential information
One of the biggest worries for management of a firm involved in an open
innovation project is that essential knowledge and skills could leak out. This can
happen when, for example, previous partners develop into direct competitors or
are bought out by competitors. To prevent this, management must put some
thought into the legal structure of the collaboration. Maybe a light structure is
sufficient, such as a technology agreement with licence stipulations and
agreements on possible exchange of researchers. A minority interest could be
preferred, or a joint venture.
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure
Advance agreement on property rights and confidentiality (particularly regarding
recipes and formulas) is essential – so it is surprising that innovative SMEs in the
food sector indicate that they often fail to take these steps. Time spent on clear
agreements at the start can prevent problems later on. Agreements can be
documented regarding:
 objectives and expected results for each phase of the collaboration
project;
 distribution of tasks, decision making, secrecy;
 investment of resources by the various partners, and division of property
rights (including patents) and potential returns;
 time schedule and monitoring scheme;
 sanctions for noncompliance with agreements, and arbitration procedures
for resolving conflicts;
 criteria for admitting new members and for ending the collaboration.
Conclusions
50
Not the contract itself, but the process of moving together through the
formalisation and becoming aware of what is or is not desired – that is the crux. In
which shared value can you place your trust?
Learning experiences for innovative SMEs in the food sector
Innovative food sector SMEs in particular can learn something about
professionalism in and around the organisation of the R&D process from high-tech
SMEs. Valuable points are the number of go and no-go moments, performance
rewards for innovation, the use of performance indicators during the innovation
project and the capturing afterwards of lessons learned. Precisely because it is so
important to reach agreements in advance on property rights and confidentiality,
it is remarkable that the innovative SMEs report omitting this step. Considering
the risk of opportunistic behaviour by one or more partners, innovative SMEs
could clearly learn a lesson here. We expect that the protection of intellectual
property may, and should, be taken more seriously in the future, as is already the
case in the seed improvement and high-tech sectors.
Slowly but surely, the world is developing into a network economy. Countries are
becoming more interconnected and competition more international. In this global
network economy, businesses can no longer focus only on short-term returns.
Knowledge and flexibility have become survival skills; investment in innovation
and knowledge development is therefore indispensable. In order to arrive at
successful innovations, public-private collaboration between businesses,
knowledge institutions and government is also gaining in importance. This makes
the success of businesses increasingly dependent on the degree to which they can
collaborate in both domestic and international networks. The food industry is no
exception: intense competition, complex new technologies and highly demanding
consumers (motivated in part by NGOs) call for multidisciplinary, rapidly available
solutions.
Innovation is a prerequisite for future successes. An often-heard criticism of the
food sector is that it is characterised by certain conservatism and, by extension, a
lack of collaboration. This report demonstrates the benefits of collaboration.
Although not always easy to realise – dependent as it is on human interactions – it
is essential. We expect that the lessons in this report regarding innovative
collaboration can contribute to the needed enhancement of the innovative
potential of the European food industry, and thus also to its leading international
position.
Conclusions
51
Acknowledgements
“The research leading to these results has received funding from the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development
and demonstration under grant agreement n° 245301”.
Our gratitude goes to the businesses that participated in the interviews, thereby
offering us valuable insight into their thoughts and actions.
52
References
Abdirahman, Z..Z. and L. Sauvée 2013, The Implementation of a Quality
Management Standard in a Food SME: A Network Learning Perspective.
International Journal on Food System Dynamics, 3(3), 214-227
Bailey, W.J., R. Masson and R. Raeside 1996, Choosing Successful Technology
Development Partners: A Best Practice Model. Proceedings of the 6th
International Forum on Technology Management, pp. 271-83
Batterink, M. 2009, Profiting from external knowledge. How firms use different
knowledge acquisition strategies to improve their innovation performance.
Wageningen Scientific Publishers, Innovation and Sustainability Series – Volume 3,
ISBN: 978-90-8686-101-9, S.W.F. Omta and E.F.M. Wubben (eds), pp. 190, Winner
of the Dutch Dissertation of the Year competition in Business Economics and
Business Administration
Bonner, J.M. and O.C. Walker, 2004.Selecting influential Business-to-business
customers in new product development: relational embeddedness and knowledge
heterogeneity considerations. Journal of Product Innovation Management 21:
155-169
Bornkessel, S., S. Bröring, F.T.J.M. Fortuin and S.W.F. Omta 2011, Innovation at
the borderline of agrifood and pharma. Evidence from public available data:
scientific publications and patents, Pharma-Nutrition Conference, Amsterdam, 20
April
Bruce M., F. Leverick, D. Littler and D. Wilson 1995, Success Factors for
Collaborative Product Development: A Study of Information and Communication
Technology, R&D Management, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 33-45
Buisson, D., 1995. Developing new products for the consumer. In: D.W. Marshall
(ed.) Food choice and the consumer. Chapman & Hall,Cambridge, pp.182-215
CBS Statline 2010, Research en Development (R&D) door bedrijven, SBI 2008 en
bedrijfsomvang.
53
Chatenier, E. du, J.A.A.M. Verstegen, H.J.A. Biemans, M. Mulder, and S.W.F. Omta
2010, Identification of competencies for professionals in open innovation teams,
R&D Management, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 139-150
Chesbrough, H.W., 2003. Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and
Profiting from Technology. Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge Mass.
Erens F., R. Stoffelen, F. van de Ven and L. Wildeman 1996, Alliance and Networks:
The Next Generation, Proceedings of the 6th International Forum on Technology
Management, pp. 77-91
Enzing, C.M., M. H. Batterink, F.H.A. Janszen and S.W.F. Omta 2011,Where
innovation processes make a difference in products’ short- and long-term market
success, , British Food Journal, Vol. 113, No. 7, pp. 812 - 837
Enzing C.M. 2009, Product innovation in the Dutch food and beverage industry. A
study on the impact of the innovation process, strategy and network on the
product’s short and long term market performance. Wageningen Scientific
Publishers, Innovation and Sustainability Series – Volume 5, ISBN: 978-90-8686131-6, Prof. Dr S.W.F. Omta and Prof. Dr F.H.A. Janszen (eds), pp. 160 FNLI 2010,
De stille kracht route voorwaarts voor de Nederlandse levensmiddelenindustrie.
Fortuin, F.T.J.M. and S.W.F. Omta (eds.) 2014, NetGrow Toolbox. Tools for open
innovation in the food industry, EU 7th framework programme 245301 NetGrow,
ISBN 9789081609395, pp 31
Fortuin, F.T.J.M. and S.W.F. Omta 2009 (a), Does the developed world still have a
competitive edge in innovation? A comparative study of leading food processing
companies in the Shanghai area and the Netherlands. In: D. Zylbersztajn and
S.W.F. Omta (eds), Advances in supply chain analysis in Agri-food systems, Editora
Singular, Sao Paulo, ISBN 978-85-86626-50-0, pp. 341-363
Fortuin, F.T.J.M. and S.W.F. Omta 2009 (b), The Wageningen Innovation
Assessment Toolkit. How to improve the potential of transition projects? In:
Transitions towards sustainable agriculture, food chains and periurban areas.
Recent experiences from the Netherlands, K.J. Poppe, C. Termeer and M.
Slingerland (eds.), Wageningen Academic Publishers, Wageningen, The
Netherlands, ISBN 978-90-8686-117-0, pp. 189-201
Fortuin, F.T.J.M. and S.W.F. Omta 2009 (c), Innovation drivers and barriers in food
processing, British Food Journal, Vol. 111, No. 8, pp. 839-851
54
Fortuin, F.T.J.M. 2007 (a), Strategic Alignment of Innovation to Business. Balancing
the Exploration and Exploitation Function, Wageningen Scientific Publishers,
Innovation and Sustainability Series – Volume 2, ISBN: 978-90-8686-056-2, Prof.
Dr S.W.F. Omta (ed.), pp. 174 Second in the Dutch Dissertation of the Year
competition in Business Administration and Business Administration
Fortuin, F.T.J.M. and S.W.F. Omta 2007 (b), Aligning R&D to business. A
longitudinal study of BU customer value in R&D, International Journal of
Innovation and Technology Management, Vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 393-414
Fortuin, F.T.J.M., M. Batterink and S.W.F. Omta 2007, Key success factors of
innovation in multinational agrifood prospector companies, International Food &
Agribusiness Management Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.1-24
Garbade, P.J., 2014, Management of innovation in networks and alliances. PhD
thesis Wageningen University, Wageningen, the Netherlands
Garcia, M. 2011, Future R&D Strategies in Food & Drinks: Evolution from
Orthodox Approaches to Open Innovation, Proceedings of the International Food
and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA 2011), June 20 to 21,
Frankfurt, Germany
Gerritsma, F. and S.W.F. Omta 1998, The Content Methodology. Facilitating
performance measurement by assessing the complexity of R&D projects, in
Management of Technology, Sustainable Development and Ecoefficiency,
Pergamon, Elsevier Science Ltd, Amsterdam etc., pp. 101-110
Hamann, K. 2012, Innovation and Development Support – Experiences from Food
Networks in Canada and New Zealand. Proceedings of the 6th International
European Forum on System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks, February
14th, Innsbruck-Igls, Austria
Janssen K.L. 2011, Driving the food market. Proactive consumer involvement to
support radical product innovation, ISBN 978-90-817459-0-1, p. 237
Joppen, L., 2004. New product Development Survey; Faster, higher and
stronger.Food Engineering & Ingredients. September: 30-35
55
Knudsen, M.P., 2007. The relative importance of interfirm relationships and
knowledge transfer for new product development success. Journal of Product
Innovation Management 24 (2): 117-138
Kühne, B., V. Lefebvre, C. Cochez and X. Gellynck 2013, The importance of
networks for knowledge exchange and innovation in the food industry. In: G.
Martinez (ed.). Open innovation in the food and beverage industry: Concepts and
case studies. Woodhead publishing, Cambridge, 189-211
Kühne, B. 2011, Understanding innovation capacity in food chains. The European
traditional food sector, ISBN 978-90-5989-420-4, pg. 184
Lorange, P., J. Roos and P.G. Bronn 1992, Building Successful Alliances, Long Range
Planning, Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 10-17
MacLachlan, A. 1995, Trusting Outsiders to do your Research: How does Industry
Learn to do it? Research.Technology Management, Vol. 38, No. 6, pp. 48-53
Mitelka and Goertzen 2008, in The Handbook of Innovation in the Food and Drink
Industry, ed. R. Rama, ISBN 1560222980, p. 428
Nilsson, M. and C. Sia-Ljungström 2013, The role of innovation intermediaries in
innovation systems. 7th International European Forum (Igls-Forum). February 18 22, 2013 - Innsbruck-Igls, Austria
Omta, S.W.F., F.T.J.M. Fortuin en N.C. Dijkman 2011, Samenwerken voor Open
Innovatie: Kunst of Kunde? Rapport ABN AMRO, November, pp. 39
Omta, S.W.F. and P. Folstar 2005, Integration of innovation in the corporate
strategy of agri-food companies, in Innovation in agri-food systems (2nd ed.),
Wageningen Academic Publishers, ISBN 90-74134-51-3, pp. 223-246
Omta, S.W.F. 2004, Management of Innovation in Chains and Networks. The
Emerging World of Chains and Networks. Bridging Theory and Practice. Reed
Business Information ISBN 90-5901-9288, pp. 205-219
Omta, S.W.F. and W. van Rossum 1999, The Management of Social Capital in R&D
Collaborations, in Corporate Social Capital and Liability, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Boston, Dordrecht, London, pp. 356-376
56
Roussel, P.A., K.A. Saad and T.J. Erickson, 1991, Third Generation R&D. Harvard
Business School Press, Boston, Mass.
Rudolph, M.J., 1995. The food product development process. British Food Journal
97: 3-37
Sarkar, S. and A.I.A. Costa 2008, Dynamics of open innovation in the food industry,
Trends in Food Science & Technology 19, pp. 574-580
Schiefer, G. and J. Deiters 2013, Mapping formal networks and identifying their
role for innovation in EU food SMEs. Bonn, Germany: Universität Bonn-ILB Press
Sorenson, D. and M. Henchion 2013, The Relationship between Governance and
Performance: Implications for Network Formation and Management. Agricultural
Economics Society of Ireland (AESI) Annual Conference. 7th November 2013
Tepic, M., S.W.F Omta, J.H. Trienekens and F.T.J.M. Fortuin 2010, Structural and
relational governance in open innovation projects in the agri-food sector.
Proceedings of the 8th International Academy of Management and Business
(IAMB 2010), June 28 to 30, Madrid, Spain, Best Paper Award Top-team
Agri&Food 2011, Topsector Agri&Food.Agri&Food: De Nederlandse Groeidiamant,
Top-team Agri&Food, pg. 124
Tidd, J., J. Bessant and K. Pavitt 2001, Managing Innovation: Integrating Technological, Market, and Organizational Change. John Wiley & Sons, New York etc.
Van Poppel, A., 1999. Nieuwe producten. Te veel missers. Trends 13 May, pp. 78
and 79
Viaggi, D., M. Raggi and F. Minarelli 2013, System Dynamics and Innovation in
Food Networks. 7th International European Forum (Igls-Forum). February 18 - 22,
2013 - Innsbruck-Igls, Austria
Williamson, O.E. 1985, The Economic institutions of capitalism, Free Press, New
York
57
About NetGrow
Objective
The objective of the NetGrow project is to improve the strategic network
behaviour and network learning of European food SMEs, leading to increased
innovation, economic growth and sustainable competitive advantage.
Instrumental in achieving this is usable know-how about network learning, the
attitude of food SMEs in different EU member states towards networks and the
functioning and performance of different types of networks.
Innovation
In the NetGrow project, innovation is the implementation of new combinations of
existing resources, which are new or significantly improved products; methods of
production; sources of supply; ways to organize business; and the exploitation of
new markets or new ways to reach existing markets.
Innovation network
Throughout the innovation process different kinds of networks are needed,
because there is no “one-size fits all” network. A network is a set of actors
connected by a set of durable ties. The actors are firms (competitors, suppliers,
customers, auxiliary businesses etc.), knowledge centres (universities and
research centres etc.) and other actors (network organizations, governments,
special-interest groups, industry organizations etc.). The ties are the relationships
between the actors. Thus, to be an Innovation Network, the network organization
has to support SMEs in the implementation of new combinations of existing
resources with a view to realizing innovations.
Strategic network behaviour
Understanding what is to be gained from actively engaging in networks,
identifying the most promising networks, selecting the most appropriate one and
learning how to use their services and activities to achieve the company’s
innovation goals.
Network learning
Once a company is actively participating in a network, the company learns how to
make optimal use of the linkages, knowledge and opportunities provided in the
network to achieve its goals.
58
If you are interested in learning more about NetGrow, you are welcome to
contact NetGrow via:
www.netgrow.eu
NetGrow Partners:
Ghent University
X. Gellynck, B. Kühne, V. Lefebvre
Food Valley NL
F. Fortuin, R. Kleijwegt, R. Klefoth
Instituttet for Fødevarestudier & Agroindustriel Udvikling
K. Hamann
Institut Polytechnique LaSalle Beauvais
L. Sauvee, Z. Abdirahman
Skane Food Innovation Network
M. Nilsson, C. Sia Ljungström
Teagasc – the Agriculture and Food Development Authority
M. Henchion, D. Sorenson
University of Bologna
R. Ghelfi, M. Raggi, P. Chatzinikolaou
University of Bonn
G. Schiefer, J. Deiters, E. Heuß.
University of Debrecen
J. Felfoldi, K. Kovács
59
60
61
62
63
64

Open Innovation in the Food Industry: An - Insights

Transcription

Similar documents

Public overview CP - ANIMA Investment Network

Invu Document Management Product Sheet

Ciencia, tecnología y valores: Axiología de la tecnociencia

1 Selling Innovative products

Circular Flow Chart

CleverAdvice Company Profile_en 214x301mm

INICIATIVAS PROPOSTAS Apresentação das diferentes iniciativas

ATLANPOLITAN NETWORK BUSINESS SUPPORT

Business Development Service Providers

Slajd 1