國立政治大學 - National Chengchi University

Transcription

國立政治大學
碩士研究論文
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Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in China:
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Incorporating the Scientific Development View
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中國幹部考核與幹部教育培訓: 以科學發展觀為例子
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作者
Julia Ritirc
李蒂綺
台北, 2013
學號：
100252021
學校單位：社會科學政治學系
輔導:
王振寰 (國家發展研究所)
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1 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in China
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of pictures and figures .................................................................................................................. 5
List of tables ........................................................................................................................................ 6
Executive Summary............................................................................................................................. 7
Foreword .............................................................................................................................................11
Preface ............................................................................................................................................... 13
Chapter 1—Introduction .................................................................................................................... 17
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Chapter 2—Strategic Initiatives and the Administrative System ...................................................... 23
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Tensions in central-periphery relations ................................................................................ 23
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Conflicts between economy and ecology ............................................................................. 28
Cadre accountability ............................................................................................................. 29
Organizational Change and Guided Evolution ..................................................................... 31
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Theoretical considerations .................................................................................................... 33
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Methodology......................................................................................................................... 34
Operationalization ............................................................................................................ 34
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Remarks on experiences in field work .............................................................................. 36
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General historical overview ..................................................................................................
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Chapter 3—The Evolution of the Cadre Management System ......................................................... 39
The grip of the Party ............................................................................................................. 41
Cadre selection and promotion ............................................................................................. 44
Cadre training and education ................................................................................................ 47
Promoting policies through the CMS ................................................................................... 50
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 52
Chapter 4—Responding to New Challenges in the 21st Century ...................................................... 55
Political, economic, social and environmental background ................................................. 55
A new ideology is born ......................................................................................................... 58
What is the Scientific Development View? ....................................................................... 58
What does “scientific” mean? .......................................................................................... 61
What is the role of the government in the task of transformation? .................................. 61
How is the conflict between environment and socio-economic development addressed in
the ideological realm? ...................................................................................................... 62
How is the conflict between environment and socio-economic development addressed in
the practical realm? ......................................................................................................... 64
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 66
Chapter 5—The Incorporation Scientific Development into the CMS ............................................. 69
Setting up evaluating systems under the Scientific Development View scheme ................. 69
Launch of trial projects .................................................................................................... 69
The Guangdong Cadre Evaluation System....................................................................... 73
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 81
Scientific Development in cadre education and training ...................................................... 83
Adoption and experimentation ......................................................................................... 83
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Party school curricula ...................................................................................................... 84
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Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 91
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Chapter 6—Critical Assessment ........................................................................................................ 92
Failed system in environmental politics ............................................................................... 92
Motivational factors and different outcomes ........................................................................ 95
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Scientific Development and the claim of objectivity in cadre evaluation ............................ 96
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Lack of political reform ........................................................................................................ 98
Use and effectiveness of cadre education ........................................................................... 100
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Chapter 7—Conclusion and Further Considerations ....................................................................... 104
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Appendix ..........................................................................................................................................112
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References ....................................................................................................................................... 123
LIST OF PICTURES AND FIGURES
Figure 1: The guided evolution model ..................................................................................... 33
Figure 2: Example of Management cadre................................................................................. 46
Figure 3: Example of party and government cadres ................................................................. 46
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Figure 4: The process of incorporation of the Scientific Development View .......................... 69
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Picture 1: Cadre training session .............................................................................................. 35
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Picture 2: Commemorative stamp of CPS ................................................................................ 48
Picture 3: How to achieve Scientific Development and construct an Ecological Civilization. 66
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6 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaList of tables
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Evaluation criteria under the Scientific Development View scheme ......................... 71
Table 2: Guangdong's development areas ................................................................................ 74
Table 3: Target category weight according to development areas in Guangdong .................... 75
Table 4: Evaluation system according to categories, criteria, validity and data providing
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agency for ecological development areas in Guangdong ......................................................... 78
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Table 5: Assessment of satisfaction level of the masses for leading bodies ............................. 80
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Table 6: Performance targets in Jingbian County ..................................................................... 82
Table 7: Analysis of proportionality of cadre training contents in Jiangsu Province ............... 85
Table 8: Global, national and local topics ................................................................................ 86
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Table 9: Coordinated development, innovation, and upgrading ............................................... 86
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Table 10: The Scientific Development View ............................................................................ 87
Table 11: Capacity building ...................................................................................................... 88
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Table 12: Green development ................................................................................................... 90
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Table 14: Seminar program of Chuxiong
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Table 13: Dealing with social forces ........................................................................................ 90
University, 23-31 July 2013.................................................................................................... 112
Table 15: Professional training for MEP ................................................................................ 113
Table 16: Jiangsu Province development targets 2010-2015 ................................................. 114
Table 17: Evaluation system according to category, criteria, validity, and data providing
agency for key development areas in Guangdong .................................................................. 116
Table 18: Evaluation system according to categories, criteria, validity, and data providing
agency for optimized development areas in Guangdong........................................................ 118
Table 19: Evaluation system according to categories, criteria, validity, and data providing
agency for urban development areas in Guangdong .............................................................. 120
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
During the Reform Era, China's impressive development was based on a strategy that favored
economic development in terms of GDP growth. The disastrous consequences upon the rural
and urban environment are also affecting its economy. Having become aware of its
vulnerability, China has been trying new ideas and concepts to overcome “GDPism” and turn
towards a more socially equitable and environmentally sound development model. At the 16th
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Scientific Development View 科学发展观 and Harmonious Society 社会和谐. Scientific
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Party Congress, the leadership generation under Hu Jintao adopted two new party guidelines,
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Development is a home-grown concept and reflects China’s ideas of a comprehensive and
balanced development that is subject of this thesis.
Drawing on recent literature that highlights the role of the CCP’s organizational apparatus in
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Chinese politics, I argue that the cadre management system (CMS) is important in organizing
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and sustaining the relationship between central and local governments, and in the party-state’s
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efforts to govern the country, its agents and society. It serves the transformation efforts as it
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transports the center’s ideas to the different levels of the party-state administration in order to
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make local cadres cooperate with central party lines and change their mindsets and political
attitudes.
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The CMS has a history of continuous evolution guided by leading figures in Chinese politics.
Ever since its re-establishment in the 1980s, the system has changed and thus responded to
external and internal challenges in economy, politics, society, and the environment. Due to the
success of the incentive and constraint system upon cadre behavior, policy decision-making
and implementation of economic policies during the Reform Era, the Chinese leadership has
good reason to carry on with its efforts in this administrative area. In environmental politics
however the proven system appears not to bring the promised success. The reasons therefore
are manifold. First, structural and political constraints hinder effective environmental policy
implementation. Second, uneven development makes it impossible to apply a top-down
strategy that demands the same standards and results from every region. China has to comply
with the logic of economic growth in order to develop the whole country. Third, harmonizing
the environment with economic development is a problem related to the development view 发
8 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaExecutive Summary
展观 of cadres and governments that is very much shaped by the development concept of the
Reform Era.
Since 2009, provincial governments have translated Scientific Development into their cadre
evaluation systems. Instead of merely re-arranging the validity of criteria and placing more
emphasis on social and environmental issues, they differentiated their jurisdictions into four
development areas 发展区 and adapted the evaluation criteria sets accordingly. Hereby a
greater weight is placed on environmental targets in all development areas. The idea of
differentiation––also formulated in the theory of Scientific Development––is to pin on local
strengths and to increase the latitude for environmental or social goals. Local disparities
should so be overcome, and incentives and constraints distributed more evenly among
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During the last decade, China has put much effort into the
大modernization of cadre schools and
cadre instruction. Cadre 立
training has taken a high degree of decentralization and
provinces, districts etc.
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fragmentation. Training contents are very diverse and cover issues of economic and social
management, environmental science, administrative and leadership capacities. The goal is to
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improve management capacities, diffuse knowledge, change the mind-sets of cadres and
foster loyalty to the Party.
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My thesis unfolds as follows: In Chapter one I introduce the topic under investigation and
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pose my research questions. Chapter two focuses on the existing literature on issues that
concern central-periphery relations, explains the prevailing theories in the study of
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bureaucracy and the decision-making process, introduces the findings of main studies on
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cadre accountability and education, and gives an overview on approaches of environmental
governance. Furthermore, treating the CMS as an adaptive system, I discuss theoretical
approaches of organizational studies that explain organizational change. They helped me to
define the variables and narrow my focus. I then present the methodology applied in this
research that I wind up with an account of my experiences in the process of this research and
in particular in my field work trip to Suzhou and Beijing in July 2013. In chapter three, I
revisit the history of cadre management and its functional role in Chinese reform politics. The
main proposition is that the system responds to external and internal challenges and develops
in congruence with its transforming environment. At the beginning of the 21st century, China
has been faced with a myriad of economic, social and environmental challenges. It has thus
commenced to turn towards a new development mode. The need for transformation of
development and the various challenges faced are formulated in Hu Jintao’s proposed
ideology, the Scientific Development View. Hence, in Chapter four I relate to the theory’s
contents, and the economic, social and environmental background against which it was
formulated and adopted. Finally I conduct an empirical research on cadre education in Jiangsu
Province, and formal regulations of the new cadre evaluation system under the Scientific
Development View scheme in Guangdong Province in Chapter five. Chapter six is a critical
analysis of the findings in cadre evaluation and education. I conclude with a short summary of
the main findings developed in the thesis and some further considerations.
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FOREWORD
This research grounds in research activities and extensive studies over a period of four years
on sustainable development and how China is trying to come to terms with the conflicting
interests of economy and ecology. The outcomes of this thesis base on knowledge that I have
acquired through my participation in two joint-research projects on measurement of
sustainable development and circular economy with China Renmin University and the
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Nations Environmental Program, and the successful completion of the Master program in
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Department for East Asian Studies/Sinology, University of Vienna, an internship at the United
Political Science at National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan.
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In the past two years during my studies at NCCU I attended seminars on methodology and
comparative politics that helped me to further develop my research and writing skill, and
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deepen my theoretical understanding. The syllabi of the courses on environmental governance
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contained important studies and works with which I acquired consolidated knowledge of the
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dynamics in environmental policy decision-making and implementation in China. Seminars in
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comparative politics broadened my perspective on the issue of development and
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C h political thoughtUdeepened my understanding of China,
my thinking. The classes on Chinese
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its history, politics and society in general. The professors at NCCU and Prof. Susanne
transformation in China, and helped me to adopt a more systematic and structural approach in
Weigelin–Schwiedrzik at University of Vienna provided me with valuable advice and pushed
me to cross academic and intellectual borders. They urged me not to take everything for
granted and instead ask more intriguing questions. I want to express my thanks to all of them!
I am very grateful for having Prof. Wang Jenn-hwan at National Chengchi University as my
Master thesis advisor, as he guided me very smoothly through the process of finalizing my
studies at NCCU. He is very able in imparting his expertise and familiarity with Chinese
environmental governance to his students, and always provides quick and valuable advice.
Even though he challenged me quite often in the choice of my research topic, he fully
supported me and my research goals.
I am much obliged to my PhD advisor Prof. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, University of
Vienna. Ever since my first Master thesis at the Department of East Asian Studies/Sinology,
she has never refused advice. Even at such a great geographical distance she continued to
support me during the three years that I spent in Taiwan. In spite of her various appointments
and her family life she always found the time to respond to my e-mails, gave me an
appointment when I quickly rushed through Vienna and proposed ways to solve the problems
I encountered in my research. I am very grateful that she has never let me down and refrained
from believing in me. Besides being a very insightful and brilliant scholar, she has a great
heart for young people, especially her students whom she motivates to higher
accomplishments and fosters their development on academic and personal level.
I thank Prof. Yang Zhi of China Renmin University for helping me and making me feel
welcome in Suzhou and Beijing. She opened up many channels and possibilities, and
introduced me to people that were important for this research. Even though she works as
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busily as a bee, she has spared a great deal of her time and exerted patience in answering my
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Furthermore I want to express my gratitude to the members of the graduation commission,
Prof. Guo Chengtian and Prof. Chien Shiuh-Shen.
Finally, I wholeheartedly thank my family who has always supported me in my ambitions and
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projects, although I might have given them a lot to worry about. My fiancé Roberto
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Marinaccio and my friend Elisabeth Heigl, with whom I share a very deep friendship, were
always there for me during the last two years and supported me unconditionally. Both
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challenged me in my thinking and incited me to reflect my approaches. It is especially due to
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the emotional support of these people that I have come so far, achieved what I have achieved,
and finished what I have started.
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PREFACE
At the beginning of the 21st century, sustainable development has become the new paradigm
adopted by governments in developing and developed countries alike. They are trying to find
adequate strategies and methods to cope with the consequences of industrialization and urbanization. The core problem of sustainable development is however how to harmonize or coor-
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dinate development that allows for social equity and a sound environment, but does not compromise economic growth.
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China’s impressive economic development during the Reform Era grounded in a strategy that
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favored economic development in terms of GDP growth rates, but neglected social inequalities and environmental degradation. The disastrous consequences upon rural and urban envi-
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ronment are significantly affecting China’s economy today. Having become aware of its vul-
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nerability, China has been experimenting with new ideas and concepts to overcome this
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tally sound direction.
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“GDPism”, and tries to turn development towards a more socially equitable and environmen-
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C h and social structures.
state makes use of its specific political
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In its push for transformation of its hitherto one-sided development model, the Chinese party-
the different levels of society and its subsystems. From a political vantage point, five spheres
can be discerned that describe the mechanism of transformation: ideology (Scientific
Development View), party (cadre management), management (institutions of environmental
governance), dissemination (media, workshops and research), and experimentation (local
policy projects).
First, the proclamation of an ideological doctrine by the CCP and its successive further development: Until recently, official documents treated the concept of Scientific Development as
an important guiding and major strategic thought. At the 18th Party Congress in November
2012, the Scientific Development View was elevated to the same level of the other four partyideologies, and the Party Regulations were revised accordingly.
Second, the incorporation of the ideology into the CCP’s organizational apparatus: China's
huge territory is administered by a vast number of party and government cadres who are em-
14 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaPreface
bedded in an institutional context of incentives and constraints: Appointment and promotion
give incentives; monitoring and evaluation provide constraints for local cadres to implement
national policies (Edin 1998: 100). In addition to that, cadres have to pass training circles in
party schools and cadre academies. After the adoption of the Scientific Development View at
central level in 2003, the Central Organization Department (COD) started to experiment with
new evaluation systems that incorporate the new idea a more balanced and reasonable development. Party committees at local level were given order to translate the theory into their cadre evaluation systems and the training curricula of party schools and cadre academies.
Third, the establishment and upgrading of institutions of environmental protection:
Institutions of environmental protection were already established after the launch of Reform
and Open Policy, however they were not being considered significant for China’s
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development, as priority was given to economic growth for achieving modernization. During
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the 1990s, a slight change was noticed as the government slowly began to acknowledge the
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adverse effects of economic growth and industrialization. However, it was not until the
beginning of the 21st century that environment protection gained momentum in the political
agenda, in particular under the 11th Five-Year Plan. China planned to reduce 20 per cent of its
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energy consumption per unit of GDP, 30 per cent of water consumption per unit of industrial
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added value, 10 per cent of the total discharge of major pollutants, and increase forest
coverage from 18.2 to 20 per cent (Wu nian guihua 2006). Measurement methods, frequency
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of monitoring and evaluation methods of the urban environment were standardized (Huanjing
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baohuju 2006). The body of environmental laws and policies grew. Finally, during the 11th
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National Congress, the environmental protection administration gained more clout when the
State Environmental Protection Administration was replaced with the Ministry of
Environmental Protection.
Fourth, the CCP party-state controls external institutions such as universities and other research institutions; in order to disseminate the idea of the Scientific Development View
among cadres and the society, media also plays an important role. Above all, in its claim that
development has to be framed in accordance with reasonable principles, universities and research institutions have a pivotal function. They develop models that applied in praxis can
help to attenuate the conflicts, such as those between economy and ecology. In doing research,
they support the development of Scientific Development 1 and its adoption. Furthermore they
provide training seminars for cadres to deepen their human intellectual knowledge. In general,
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I use Scientific Development View and scientific development interchangeably.
15 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaPreface
the Scientific Development View has become an extensively researched topic by various
scholars in Chinese universities, academic institutions and the Central Party School, not only
on theoretical grounds but also in the search for practical solutions.
International cooperation and academic exchange plays hereby an important role. Since 1978
and the Opening and Reform Policy, China has not only opened up economically, but also absorbed technical knowledge for its development and economic growth. Western approaches
have been studied, analyzed and adopted; academic exchange has vigorously been promoted.
Against the background of changing socio-economic, environmental and political challenges,
a more systematic approach is adopted to respond to them more appropriately. In The Great
Urban Transformation, Hsing You-tien (2010) hints that
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[s]ince the late 1980s, Chinese urban planners have been trained in schools using
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American city planning textbooks. Because the principle of efficiency in urban land
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use dovetails with the development discourse in contemporary urban China, the new
generations of city planners have enjoyed the political support of municipal
government leaders. (39)
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The Urban Rural Planning Law stipulates that every scale of administrative territory has to be
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planned according to a “Master plan.” David Bray (2010) points out that
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[t]he significance of contemporary 'master planning' lies less in discourses of national
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resurgence, than in a new manifestation of utopian modernism launched by Hu Jintao
through this 'theory of scientific development': within this paradigm, the key objective
of government planners is to re-order and standardize the built environment so as to
render communities and economies more transparent and governable. (2)
Drawing on international experience however does not mean that China is blindly emulating
models. In the case of promoting low carbon economy, Hofem and Heilmann (2013) explain
that
[e]ven though foreign actors played a crucial role in initiating exchanges, LCE [low
carbon economy, note from the author] policy diffusion must not be seen as emulating
Western models but rather as an open-ended process: A transferable “international
best practice” of building an LCE has not yet been established, and the Chinese policy
and research communities are determined to explore and generate novel LCE approaches that are compatible with local circumstances and needs. Learning from
abroad does not mean imitating foreign practice, but rather adapting and transforming
it. (201)
Fifth, policy experimentation: Since the adoption of Scientific Development has become an
strong factor in the competition between provinces and cadres for political authority and promotion, experimental policy projects have been launched that aim at the coordination of conflicting policy goals (for example between economic development and environmental protection). These policy projects are not necessarily successful in the first place as can be observed
in the case of Green GDP. 2 However they serve as important inputs in the circle of dissemi-
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nation, organization and implementation, as the experiences evolve and create the narratives
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of the national discourse of Scientific Development and have consequences upon the organi-
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zation of transformation.
The focus of the presented research is placed on the transformation efforts in the CCP’s
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organizational apparatus. I investigate how the ideological foundation of the Scientific
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Development View—in which the parameters of transformation are formulated—has been
translated into cadre evaluation and party school training contents. The goal is to reveal the
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organization of ideology in today’s China. In contrast to other researcher who chose a specific
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policy (field) or a law and investigate its implementation or enforcement, I look into the
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organization of ideology. The main contribution of this study is a systematic analysis how the
Scientific Development View has been incorporated into one part of the administrative system,
namely the cadre management system. By doing so, I reveal the interaction of the national and
local level and give examples of interpretation of the ideology in the local context.
2
Green GDP was an ambitious project launched by the State Environmental Protection Administration and the
National Bureau of Statistics in 2004 that aimed at the reflection of resource and environmental costs in
national GDP accounting. It eventually came to a halt in 2007. However, recent publications in the Chinese
press support the assumption that Green GDP accounting continues to be developed on local level.
CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the new century, the Chinese party-state’s rhetorically shifted its focus on a
concept of sustainability by denying the previous development concept which had been based
on high quantitative economic growth. The push for transformation aimed at the promotion of
a more balanced and reasonable development model that takes into account social and
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environment and ecology protected.
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At the 16th Central Party Congress, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted two new
ecological factors. By doing so socio-economic disparities should be reduced, and the
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party guidelines: Scientific Development View 科学发展观 3 and Harmonious Society和谐
社会. According to the official wording, the Scientific Development View aims at “a compre-
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hensive, coordinated, sustainable development holding on to the principle of putting the peo-
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ple first” (Xinhua News, 4 April 2004). 45 The theory, assigned to Hu Jintao, serves as an im-
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portant guiding and major strategic thought 重要指导重大战略思想driving development
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forward. It pursues a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development of economy,
politics, culture, society and environment.
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Its key theory is development, its core concern is to put the people first, its basic demand is comprehensive and coordinated sustainability, its fundamental method is to
take into consideration every aspect through planning and preparation. (Hu, 24 November 2007) 6
Modernization is considered a multi-facetted process, the theory is supposed to help China to
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The official English translation on Chinese webpages is the Scientific Development Outlook, in various
discussions with my Chinese professors at NCCU, I came to the conclusion that the transation view comes
nearer its original meaning.
The Chinese original is as followed: 坚持以人为本、全面、协调、可持续的发展
Short translations of terms are followed by the original Chinese working in the running text. The Chinese
originals of longer quotations are added in footnotes.
The Chinese original as followed: 科学发展观，第一要义是发展，核心是以人为本，基本要求是全面协
调可持续，根本方法是统筹兼顾。
18 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 1—Introduction
cope with the various emerging challenges such as resource depletion, economic vulnerability,
transformation of production structures, social discontent, low level of education, and uncoordinated policies that cause harm to the different subsystems of its social system.
Scientific Development is the solution for the newly emerged issues; it tackles the
problems of insufficient balanced development in some places and aspects that have
come with our country’s development process. It draws on the laws of development; it
is an innovative developmental idea and mode to transform development; it solves the
problems of development, and gradually offers solution for the unbalanced development of countryside and city, regions, economic and social, people and nature, and uncoordinated reasoning; it deeply reflects the new needs of China’s economic and social
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development that came with entering a critical stage of development. (Hu, 24 Novem-
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ber 2007) 7
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Since its adoption in 2003, local governments underlie more constraints. They are required to
pay more attention to social and environmental factors, and to search innovative solutions to
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enhance the coordination and harmonization of development. A growing body of environmen-
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tal laws and the upgrading of the State Environmental Protection Administration to ministerial
rank in 2008 improved the political leverage of environmental agendas. Moreover, since 2009,
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local party committees have to incorporate the idea of the Scientific Development View into
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their cadre evaluation systems, and train cadres in party schools and cadre training institutions
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accordingly. Changes in policy-making occurred and some new innovative projects were
launched that aim at solving the conflicting interests between economic and environmental
policy goals. Yet, problems in policy implementation and law enforcement have remained,
and the environmental situation in China is severer than ever before.
The pool of research on institutional aspects of environmental protection, sustainable
development, and their implications on local policy implementation is vast. The idea of the
Scientific Development View however has widely been neglected and dismissed by
international scholars as hollow and flowery phases. In China, on the other hand, Scientific
Development is widely seen as something very unique that helps to improve the country’s
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The Chinese original is as followed: 科学发展观正是为了解决新问题提出来的，它针对我国发展过程中
一些领域和方面出现的发展不够平衡问题，着眼于把握发展规律、创新发展理念、转变发展方式、
破解发展难题，进一步提出了解决城乡、区域、经济社会、人与自然发展不平衡、不协调的思路，
深刻反映了我国经济社会发展进入关键时期的新要求。
development as it is compatible with the specific circumstances and tackles the variety of
issues and challenges China is facing. By the same token, while environmental standards and
environmental accountability are focus of several case studies, so is not the incorporation of
the ideology’s demands in the incentive and constraint system.
In its efforts to push for a new development mode, the Chinese leadership makes use of the
party-state’s specific organizational structures. Drawing on recent literature that highlights the
importance of CCP’s organizational apparatus in Chinese politics, I argue that the cadre
management system (CMS) is important for organizing and sustaining the relationship
between the central and local governments. It thus plays a functional role for the CCP to
govern the country, its agents and society. Through incentives and monitoring development
should turn into a new direction. This assumption is based on past experiences when, after the
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Reform and Open Policy had been launched, cadres were incentivized to promote economic
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development. Success was evaluated and measured in growth rate numbers which were,
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henceforth, decisive for cadre promotion. This legacy of the GDP growth oriented evaluation
system however is now the root of many of China’s problems and poses obstacles to
sustainable policy implementation and law enforcement, in particular in the environmental
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Cadre education and training 干部教育培训 on the other hand was modernized in order to
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prepare cadres with new skills needed in the administration of a transforming country. In its
function of forma mentis, cadre education is intended to change the mind-sets of cadres. With
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the beginning of the 21st century, cadre training and evaluation have become vital in the CCP
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efforts to strengthen and improve state capacity 执政能力 and change China’s mode of
development 发展方式.
Instead of analyzing the institutionalization or organization of the sustainability paradigm, I
decided to focus on China’s home-grown idea of comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable
development, namely the Scientific Development View. The Chinese Party-state was initially
established and built on an ideology that penetrated its state-administration and society.
Despite the pragmatic change through the Reform and Opening Policy, the CCP and its
central leadership have not totally replaced ideology and refrained from formulating ideas via
a very complex and subtle rhetoric. Grounded in traditional Marxism, the CCP ideologies are
based on an understanding of socio-economic development. Even though the gap between
traditional Marxism and China’s contemporary interpretation of it is quite large, ideologies
formulated in China nevertheless represent a Marxist-Leninist kind of logic, and reflect the
Party’s idea of socio-economic development.
The spread of ideology serves the construction of unification and instilment of loyalty among
its members. The transportation of the leadership’s ideas of development contain political
guidelines, modes of conducts, and moreover priorities which the lower levels should adhere
to. Policy targets are always rhetorically embedded in party ideologies. Even though the
processes of policy decision-making and implementation are hindered by various political,
structural factors and behavioral patterns, ideology in China still reflects a concept of
development and the path on which China’s leadership is trying to direct the country. It is thus
important to decipher the contents of the rhetoric and analyze the background on which
ideologies are formulated, the discrepancy between ideology and praxis, and the underlying
factors that hinder their realization.
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The following chapters explore how China has responded to new challenges in the CMS, how
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its idea of a balanced and sustainable development has been transported from the center to the
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lower levels in administration and incorporated into cadre evaluation and education systems. I
hereby take particular interest in the ideological foundation of China’s new development
model. Scientific Development View is a home-grown ideational strategy of development by
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means of which China has been trying to turn development towards a more socially equitable
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and environmentally sound direction. It thus deserves more of our attention. The inquiry on
Scientific Development will help us to deepen our understanding of how China sees its future.
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The focus on the process of organizing ideology is an important work that reveals the
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relationships between center and periphery, the flow of ideas within the state bureaucracy, and
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the tensions between unification and diversity.
In my thesis I raise two research questions:
1) How does the CMS respond to external and internal changes?
2) How is the idea of a balanced, comprehensive and all-encompassing development
translated into cadre evaluation and training on local level?
My thesis unfolds as follows: Chapter two focuses on the existing literature on issues that
concern central-periphery relations, it explains the prevailing theories in the study of
bureaucracy and the decision-making process, introduces the findings of main studies on
governance. Furthermore, treating the CMS as an adaptive system, I discuss theoretical
approaches of organizational studies that explain organizational change. I then present the
methodology applied in this research that I wind up with an account of my experiences in the
process of my research activities, in particular during my field work trip to Suzhou and
Beijing in July 2013. In chapter three, I revisit the history of cadre management and its
functional role in China’s reform politics. The main proposition is that the system responds to
external and internal challenges and develops in congruence with its transforming
environment. At the beginning of the 21st century, China has been faced with a myriad of
economic, social and environmental challenges. It has thus commenced to turn towards a new
development mode. The need for transformation of development and the various challenges
faced are formulated in Hu Jintao’s proposed ideology, the Scientific Development View.
Hence, I relate to the theory’s contents, and the economic, social and environmental
background against which it was formulated and adopted. Finally, I conduct an empirical
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research on the formal regulations of the new cadre evaluation system under the Scientific
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Development View scheme in Guangdong Province, and cadre education in Jiangsu Province
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in chapter five. Chapter six is a critical analysis of the findings in cadre evaluation and
education. I conclude with a short summary of the main findings developed in the thesis and
some further considerations.
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CHAPTER 2—STRATEGIC INITIATIVES AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
This chapter comprises a review on the relevant literature and the theoretical approaches. It
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of bureaucracy and the decision-making process, introduces the findings of main studies on
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discusses the issue of central-periphery relations, explains the prevailing theories in the study
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governance, and present theoretical frameworks on organizational change. Finally, I introduce
the methodology I applied that I wind up with an account of my experiences in the process
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of this research and in particular during my field work trip to Suzhou and Beijing in July 2013.
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TENSIONS IN CENTRAL-PERIPHERY RELATIONS
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Before looking at institutions, strategies and mechanisms applied by contemporary rulers, we
have to take a step back and explain the tensions in which political regimes in China have
been embedded over the last two centuries.
Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (2004) describes the historical roots of the tensions between
center and periphery in China, their importance for political transformation and validity in
contemporary politics in China as a mechanism of modernization:
“Transformation in tradition” is a typical form of China’s path-consistent
modernization that requires perpetual bargaining between the center and the periphery.
The continued existence of the Chinese empire cannot be explained without the
influence and intentional use of this mechanism. (81) 8
8
The original German version is as followed: Das für China typische “Wandel in der Tradition” ist eine From
The assumption that this mechanism is also valid for and used by the incumbent leadership is
reasonable. Tensions between the central and local governments have not only resulted in
stalemates but also in changes.
Up until today, the inconclusive discussions on state control, atrophy or adaption are inapt to
give an answer why the CCP continues to rule in spite of socio-economic transformations and
the change of the international environment during the last 30 years. As a consequence, some
China experts have brought the Party and its efforts to strengthen the organizational apparatus
back into the focus of studies on political development. In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s,
recent literature has asserted a continued dominance of the CCP in state management. The
most insightful works are China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation by David
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Shambaugh (2008a), Frank Pieke’s (2009) The Good Communist: Elite training and State
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Building in Today's China, and The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor:
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Culture, Reproduction and Transformation by Zheng Yongnian (2010). The questions tackled
in the three monographs all boil down to the very essence of center-periphery relations. They
investigate the institutions and mechanisms by means of which the CCP is trying to sustain a
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balanced relationship in order to maintain power and govern the country, its agents and
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society.
Pieke (2009: 26) argues that the CCP tightens the grip on its agents through personnel
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management, in particular by appointing leading positions, and preparing cadres for the
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exercise of leadership on behalf of the Party through training. David Shambaugh (2008a: 111)
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holds that four recent political campaigns––Jiang Zemin's Three Represents, Hu Jintao's
Scientific Development View and Harmonious Society, and the campaign on the party's
Governing Capacity––have served to “win the minds of its members and the public” (111),
and underlie the efforts to strengthen the organizational apparatus from the top to the bottom.
In the viewpoint of Zheng Yongnian (2010: 150) the technologies and mechanisms of power
ground in the creation of the Party’s own “organic intellectuals” (150). By means of
organization and ideology the former exercises domination over the government.
While Shambaugh and Pieke argue that organizational strategies are based on Communist
ideology and a Leninist party model, Zheng (2010: xv) sees the nature of the CCP expressed
in a continuous struggle for hegemony and domination that crosses the borders of its historical
der pfadtreuen Erneuerung, die immer wieder zwischen Zentrum und Periphery ausgehandelt werden muss.
Ohne die Wirkung und bewusste Nutzung dieses Mechanismus ist die Kontinuität der Existenz des
chinesischen Reiches nicht erklärbar.
setting. Cultural connotations, historical continuity and discontinuity are embedded in the
CCP as political facts. The “organizational emperorship” (xivf) is a reproduction of China's
traditional imperial political culture in modern times.
Shambaugh, Pieke, and Zheng revived a debate over which the rise of pragmatic politics had
drawn a thick curtain: The question of ideology and organization. In his seminal work,
Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Franz Schurmann (1968) stated that the CCP
created an all-encompassing web of organizations that covered and penetrated the Chinese
society and its fabric.
Pure and practical ideology together constitute the ideology of organization. They
should be tools for the creation and use of organization. […] The ideas of pure
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ideology state values: moral and ethical conceptions about right and wrong. The ideas
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of practical ideology state norms: rules which prescribe behavior and thus are expected
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to have direct action consequences. Values and norms are tools through which two
important organizational functions are accomplished. First, they serve to motivate
individuals to give full commitment to the organization. Second, they give individuals
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a set of rational ideas with which to carry out the actions demanded by the
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organization. (38-39)
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During Mao Era, the central value of pure ideology was struggle (39). With the launch of the
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Reform and Opening Policy in 1978 however the central value in ideology became
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development. During the 1980s, scholars asserted the rising importance of the government as
the manager of economic affairs. They heralded the demise of ideology and the retreat of the
CCP as reformers pushed for more efficiency and effectiveness (Dittmer 1984; Burns 1989).
What they did leave behind though was the question of organization. Thirty years after the
pragmatic change, Shambaugh, Pieke and Zheng revived the old debate by putting the cart
before the horse: 9 the cadre management system.
Their research foci stand in contrast with local government studies that emphasize the power
structures in Chinese bureaucracy and the influence of media and society in the policy decision-making and implementation process. While they do not negate the existence or the severity of conflicts along vertical and horizontal power lines, and between central policy goals and
local interests, they highlight the role of party organization that eventually allows the center to
9
I borrowed this expression from Hon S. Chan et al. (2009) who used it in one of their articles on cadre
accountability.
reach its agents at the different levels of administration. Cadre management is important in the
CCP's efforts to instill and insure loyalty and commitment among its cadres, and aims at the
maintenance and legitimization of the Party’s power position. I argue that the CMS also
serves the function to transport ideas of development. The interpretation of development and,
finally, the implementation of policies rest on the local governments that deal with conflicting
interests between the central party guidelines and local circumstances and needs.
Analysts of Chinese politics experienced an overwhelming influence by the theory of
“fragmented authoritarianism” proposed by Kenneth Lieberthal (1992). The theory is
generally considered a great contribution to fathom processes within China’s bureaucracies.
Andrew Mertha (2009) called it the “most durable heuristic” (996) with which to analyze the
complex relationship between the different horizontal and vertical authority lines in Chinese
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bureaucracy. However, the theory and its generalizability have been criticized. Even
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Lieberthal (1992: 5) himself acknowledges in the introducing chapter of Bureaucracy,
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Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China the lack of empirical data over a wide
range of bureaucracy clusters, as the theory mainly grounds in empirical evidence drawn from
one of the six bureaucracy clusters under investigation, namely the economic bureaucracies. 10
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Yet, the main argument of the fragmented authoritarian theory still stands its grounds:
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The fragmented authoritarianism model argues that authority below the very peak of
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the Chinese political system is fragmented and disjointed. The fragmentation is
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structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding procedures.
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[....] Structurally, China's bureaucratic ranking system combines with the functional
division of authority among various bureaucracies to produce a situation in which it is
often necessary to achieve agreement among an array of bodies, where no single body
has authority over the others. (8)
Policy making comprises extensive bargaining between the involved actors and authorities.
This often leads to delays or stalemates of policy initiatives when the bargaining actors do not
come to an agreement.
The theoretical framework emphasizes on policy-making as a very controversial subject that
generates struggles within the bureaucracy, and between party officials and the society. It
10
The book was written at a time when access to information and informants were still very limited. The
situation changed considerably, however, information one acquires has to be carefully interpreted, evaluated
and cross-checked with other research.
however cannot explain the reasons for the CCP’s survival and why the party-state has
changed as it has. It lacks the perspective that the party-state is a learning system. In 2011,
two well-respected scholars—Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry—published “an
insightful and thought-provoking” (Chen, 27 September 2011) book that critically questions
existing models in explaining China’s developmental path and provides a new theoretical
framework. The claim is that guerilla war and resistance strategies in the pre-1949 era have
shaped and influenced policy-making and have so equipped the CCP with high resilience and
adaptability.
In a previous publication, Sebastian Heilmann (2008) describes the Chinese policy process as
a “point-to-surface” (2) approach in which local governments initiate policy experiments and
try to get formal and informal backing of higher-level policy-makers.
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The “model experiences” (dianxing jingyan) extracted from the initial experiments are
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coverage,
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disseminated
high-profile
conferences,
intervisitation programs and appeals for emulation to more and more regions. This
expansion process requires progressive policy refinement and affects a search for
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generalizable policy solutions. (2)
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promote them rests on the central government.
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Local governments are allowed to experiment with their own models, whereas the decision to
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The approach comes near to David Goodman’s (1985) central control and local flexibility.
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Goodman argues: “A province might claim to be adapting a central policy to local conditions
when in fact its provincial implementation is intended to achieve some other goal” (Goodman
1985: 7), and further infers that “the problem of reconciling competing national and local
interests […] overlays the need for both central control and local flexibility” (8). To carry out
policies is thus to cooperate with the central government. Yet, the interpretations of
development vary between central and local governments. In the context of sustainable
development, these competing models of development are expressed in the interpretation of
what is to be “developed” and what is to be “sustained”. In addition, as suggested in the
doctoral thesis by Sabrina Harbich (forthcoming) on resettlement policies in Yunnan, the pace
of setting new standards and adopting policies at central level does not correspond to the pace
and possibilities (or capacities) of implementation at local level.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN ECONOMY AND ECOLOGY
The field of environmental governance and sustainable development has harvested an abundance of studies during the last decade. Literature covers a wide range of topics, such as the
issue of competing interests between governmental agencies, and the influence of media,
NGOs and society on the implementation process.
Challenging the institutional and administrative approach, and in particular the fragmented
authoritarianism by Lieberthal (1992), various studies consider internal forces, i.e. NGOs and
media (Economy 2005), and external forces, i.e. INGOs (Zusman et al. 2005) and international politics (Yu 2008) as driving forces in China's environmental sustainable development. Lo-
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and constitute a study field on its own. Unfortunately, these
大 studies often pay too little atten立or even misjudge its impact. Elizabeth Economy (2005: 104)
tion to the central government
cal governments have become a strong focus of the study field of environmental governance
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ascribes the center the role of an inspector who sends inspection teams to localities to investigate whether local governments and local branches of the Environmental Protection Bureaus
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enforce the center's policies. Despite the growing prominence of NGOs, and influence of society and media in politics, the central government is more than just an “inspector” (104) as
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stated by Economy. Qi Ye et al. (2008) point to the strategic decisions on central level and
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how they influence local governments' behavior and the mindset of cadres.
Environmental governance is, in its nature, an interdisciplinary field, and has thus been
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strongly influenced by theories of biology, physics, geography and the like. In recent years,
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advocates of political geography and environmental geography have introduced new theoretical approaches. 11 Since environmental issues are trans-boundary phenomenon, politics of
scale has become a popular approach. Scaling serves as an analytical framework to capture
the dynamics of inter-regional and inter-state environmental governance (Bulkeley 2005;
Magee 2006; Bai 2007; Reed et al. 2010). Still, inter-regional and intra-regional approaches
are still under-represented in the field of environmental governance.
Environmental policy and its implementation on local level are inherent to the issue of state
capacity 执行能力, which has become a major concern for the Chinese leadership. Policy
implementation has always been a serious issue in contemporary China. China’s vast territory
comprises provinces that vary in their developmental states, social and environmental issues.
11
See for example Geographies of Governance, Bulkeley 2005.
The central government acknowledges these variations and is also aware of the different actors that come into play in the decision-making and implementation processes. In formulating
policies and guidelines the center takes these provincial variations into account, and leaves
enough leeway for local governments to adopt measures that are in accordance with local particularities. On the other hand, the challenging task of local governments is to find a way how
to carry out their enforcement duties and convince the center that is doing so. At the same
time they have to weigh their decisions in order not to harm local interests that could scare off
investors and destabilize society.
An illustrative example is hereby the enforcement of pollution standards. Various studies
show that the results are rather disappointing, especially because these threaten local economic interests. Either polluting factories are spared from being shut down because of their pivotal
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role in contributing to government revenues, or the local EPBs lack personnel and financial
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resources to efficiently monitor pollution activities in their jurisdictions. If pollution standards
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were still enforced, and factories shut down, significant economic and social harm was the
result (tax revenues, job opportunities, etc.). Hence, the expectations that economic, social,
and environmental interests would be better coordinated were not fulfilled. The socio-
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economic consequences of the competing interests of different State levels in sustainable de-
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velopment is very well displayed in Bryan Tilt's (2009) anthropological study on sustainable
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CADRE ACCOUNTABILITY
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policy in rural China. It shows quite plainly the conflict of economic and environmental inter-
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Studies on cadre accountability have revealed the ambiguous and adverse effects of evaluation
on policy implementation, and the implications on China’s state capacity (Edin 1998; Chan et
al. 1996; Guo 2007; Chan et al. 2009). While earlier research on accountability mostly applied
a neo-classical theoretical framework to explain principal-agent relations (Shih et al. 2004;
Zhang et al. 2004), recent works draw on more diversified approaches of public
administration (Chan et al. 2009).
The adverse and ambiguous effects, and behavioral patterns of officials can be explained by
the interaction of formal institutions of cadre accountability and informal factors such as
political coalition building or social capital (Tsai 2007), strategic behavior of cadres to obtain
tax alleviation, funding, and rent seeking activities for the purpose of supplementing one’s
income (Whiting 2004; Zhang et al. 2004; Kung 2009). The system of accountability—as it is
arranged now—is geared toward the fulfillment of higher level policy goals, namely the
compliance of lower-level organization to the requirements of their supervisory bodies. By
doing so it tightens control over officials and enhances accountability. However, enhanced
accountability does not necessarily produce better performance, as cadres have to make tradeoffs between the conflicting goals of different policies (Chan et al. 2009: S58). The weakness
of the accountability system lies in its conjunction with the evaluation system. In contrast to
the clear work targets that local cadres have to fulfill, evaluation lacks a clear basis (Edin
1998: 119). Another explanatory framework proposed by Steven Oliver (2013), a doctoral
candidate of University of California at San Diego, reveals the proneness of the system to
manipulation in terms of false reporting.
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Summarizing, the question of effectiveness of accountability is a matter of perspective and
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interests. Cadres are on the interface between state and society. Pressure is exerted by higher-
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level supervisory bodies that require local cadres to fulfill policy requirements, at the same
time pressure comes from society and the perceived interests of the local population. By the
same token personal vested interests play into the trade-off choices of local cadres when
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policy goals are conflicting.
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While research on cadre accountability has already started in the 1980s and harvested valuable results, the field on party schools and cadre training is still in its fledgling stages. Scholars
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have commenced to shed more light on the history of party schools, their role in party build-
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ing and in the professionalization of the cadre corps (Shambaugh 2008b; Chin 2011), and on
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the design of curricula (Guo 2009). Frank Pieke (2009) scrutinized the structures of contemporary party schools in their function for socialist governance. However, we still know little
about their implications on cadre behavior and policy implementation as there are no longitudinal surveys and studies on how cadre training affects the political attitudes and behavior of
cadres.
Generally speaking, literature on the CMS analyzes its components separately (training, evaluation, promotion), and thus does not sufficiently explain how the different elements operate
in their complexity, and how this complexity serves the center in its efforts to make local
agents cooperate.
I (Ritirc forthcoming) 12 recently completed an article in which I show how the CCP is trying
12
By the time writing this thesis, the article “Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The Chinese Cadre
Management System and its Responses to Internal and External Challenges” was still in preparation for
submission.
to tackle the issue of moral degradation in its CMS by incorporating cadre morality 官德
(literally, official morality) as a compulsory training session in party schools and adding this
criterion in cadre evaluation. The thrust for moral education and evaluation raises questions
on technical, political, legislative and philosophical problems. Furthermore, without an
appropriate legislative foundation, an independent judiciary and media, transparency and
democratic control the pure administrative approach is bound to be futile in the long run. Still,
even though the analysis does not investigate the impact or outcomes of moral training and
evaluation, it however shows how China is trying to come to terms with challenges by means
of managing its cadres. It also reveals that the two elements, training and evaluation, are
complementary, and they systematically react to changing policy guidelines.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND GUIDED EVOLUTION
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The CMS and its transformation efforts are best approached by theories of adaptive systems.
Organizations are adaptive and their survival depends on their ability to change with the
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transforming environment. I have thus delved deeper into theories of organizational studies
evolutions of big organizations.
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and found interesting approaches that tackle the issue of structural inertia and guided
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Studies on the phenomenon of “structural inertia” (Hannan et al. 1977) address big organiza-
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C h among the firstUwho applied evolutionary and ecologistructures. Hannan and Freedman were
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tions and their difficulties in responding to environmental changes by changing strategies and
cal perspectives to theorize on these difficulties. They assumed that “organizations seldom
succeeded in making radical changes in strategy and structure in the face of environmental
threats” (Hannan et al. 1984: 149). However, in a paper published seven after their first article
in 1970, their general assumption experienced a substantial change. The authors acknowledged that organizational change occurs frequently, and sometimes even in a radical form.
Above all, those organizations which structures are difficult to alternate tend to be favored by
the selection process. Hence, they survive environmental threats and transformations better
than smaller ones (149).
This proposition derives from a set of theorems they develop in their paper. The key argument
in their revised theory is timing. It is not the existence of inertial forces itself that threatens an
organization’s survival, what is crucial is the speed of response when environmental threats
and opportunities emerge. Hence, the important question is whether organizations are able to
learn about their environment, and change strategies and structures as quickly as the environment changes (151).
Time is not the only component that is crucial in intra-organizational evolution. Another factor determining the future of an organization is managers who are aware of the need to change
and their applied strategies. In their paper Strategy as Guided Evolution, Bjorn Lovas and
Sumantra Ghoshal (2000) “conceptualize an organization as an ecological system purposefully designed to guide the evolution of strategy” (876). The theory of guided evolution consists
of five main elements: (1) The units of selection: strategic initiatives, and human and social
capital (units of selection); (2) objective function: strategic intent; (3) administrative system;
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(4) sources of variation (everyone who has relevant knowledge); (5) agents of selection and
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retention (also including every employee) (875-876).
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The model proposed by Lovas et al. (see figure below) treats the top management as an active
and important factor in organizational ecology as it creates and guides evolutionary and ecological processes that in turn enhance adaption to or the enactment of changes in the external
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environment. Still, organizations do not change at will as they are subjected to inertial forces
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and evolutionary and ecological processes that shape the strategy and performance of organizations (876). Evolutionary and ecological forces do not operate outside the system, but they
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are integral to and part of formal strategies, structures and systems of the organization (876).
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The top management intervenes in these processes, and, by doing so, shapes the strategy and
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Approaches of organizational communication focus on the messages that are transported via
channels through interactants. Organizational communication crosses the boundaries of organizations and is influenced by the wider cultural, political, technological, and institutional
environment (McPhee et al. 2000; Lammers et al. 2006; Monge et al. 2008).
Figure 1: The guided evolution model
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Source: Lovas et al. 2000: 876
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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
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The Chinese leadership has a clear intention which it has repeatedly reiterated: transformation
of development. By doing so, it formulates an ideological framework that contains the param-
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eters of change and transformation (unit of selection or strategic initiative). Guidelines are
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adopted that should be adopted at lower levels. The sources of variations in the Chinese political system are cadres; they are supposed to implement policies according to the guidelines set
at central level. Some of these cadre become agents of selection and retention as they come up
with new ideas (i.e. policy projects) that they feed into the input-output circle and which consequently become part of the strategic intent. If successful, these ideas are promoted and even
emulated by other cadres in other jurisdictions. All of them are embedded in a system of formal structures and organizational routines (i.e. CMS) that gives incentives, sets constraints
and thus exerts a certain degree of control over their actions.
The focus of my research lies on the changes which the unit of selection brings on the administrative system or the changes that have resulted in the CMS after the adoption of the Scientific Development View.
I treat evaluation and education as complementary elements of the CMS that equally reflect
the ideas of development and transformation. They respond to external and internal challenges
in China and translate them into their systems. The CMS—besides instilling loyalty among
cadres—serves the function to transport ideas of development and thus organizes ideology. By
doing so, the leadership hopes to push China down the path of transformation. The interpretation and implementation rest on the local governments that tailor evaluation targets and cadre
education according to the strategic initiative decided on central level, at the same time they
make them compatible with local circumstances and needs.
Faced with the problem of policy implementation at local level, and rampant corruption within the Chinese bureaucracy, the quest for standardization and objectivity to make cadres more
accountable for their actions is important. In contrast to most of the studies on cadre account-
政治大
ability, I hold that the incentive and constraint system tackles the principle-agent and the so
立
called dictator’s commitment problem. 13
‧ 國
學
Finally, the channels that transport ideas and concepts are not entirely institutional (or administrative); personnel relations, technologies, and external institutions—such as media and academia—serve as developer and promoter of the ideas of development.
‧
sit
al
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OPERATIONALIZATION
y
Nat
METHODOLOGY
n
v
i
n
My thesis draws on an extensiveC
research
sources
of CCP and Chinese government
U
h e nofgtextual
i
h
c
releases, publications and reports in the Chinese press. Between July 18 and August 2, 2013 I
went on a field work trip to Jiangsu Province (I was based in Suzhou) and Beijing where I
conducted semi-structured one-hour (and more) open-end interviews with Chinese scholars of
different academic disciplines, one leading cadre of a private Chinese enterprise 民营, and
representatives of NGOs. I also participated in a cadre training session on Questions and
study on Ecological Civilization and circular economy 生态文明与循环经济研究问题 at
China Renmin University, Beijing. Participants were cadres of different age and rank of the
Chuxiong 楚雄州 Development and Reform Commission 发展改革委员会 that had
commuted to the capital for a one-week long training program at China Renmin University. At
13
The dictator’s commitment problem theorizes on power-sharing in dictatorial regimes. Boix et al (2013) state:
“Power-sharing in dictatorships is complicated by a fundamental commitment problem: no independent
authority can guarantee that the spoils of joint rule will be divided as the dictator and his and her allies
agreed.” (300).
this occasion I collected statements and reactions of the participants on the lecture and the
training program.
Picture 1: Cadre training session
政治大
Source: Photo shot by the author
立 during the session
‧ 國
學
In the first part of my thesis I revisit the development of the CMS in general and its
components, cadre evaluation and education. I hereby draw on international and Chinese
‧
academic publications, and refer to the most recent reform plans proposed by the CCP.
y
Nat
I decipher the ideology of Scientific Development View, crystallize its most important
sit
contents, and highlight the background—that is the socio-economic and environmental
al
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io
realities—against which the theory was formulated and the practical solutions promoted in
n
v
i
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interviews with scholars coming C
from
h evarious
h i U I repeatedly raised the question why
n g cdisciplines
China needs the Scientific Development View. By doing so, I tried to query the background
Chinese politics. I hereby borrow from the methodology of discourse analysis. In my
against which the theory was adopted. The different approaches brought very diverse
explanations and thus amplified the picture of Scientific Development and its significance for
China’s development.
In the next chapter, I analyze how these challenges and the strategies to tackle them are
translated into cadre evaluation and education. First, I introduce into the reform efforts of the
cadre evaluation system at national level induced by the Central Organization Department 中
国共产党组织部 (COD) that commenced in 2004, a few months after the official adoption of
Scientific Development. The complete proposal for a new evaluation system under the
Scientific Development View scheme was unveiled in 2008. Soon after its publication, local
party committees started to rearrange party and government cadre evaluation systems. Thanks
to a contact at the CPS in Beijing, I was able to lay hand on the complete set of documents on
the new cadre evaluation system of party and government cadres at bureau level in
Guangdong province. I hence present the new evaluation system focusing on formal
regulations rather on the analysis of outcomes. The evaluation system includes the appraisal
methods and the criteria sets with their respective weight in terms of points.
In the section on cadre education, I present the results of an analysis of party schools curricula
in Jiangsu Province. The time period of analysis is March 2011 to 2012. As objects of analysis I have chosen three party schools, Jiangsu Provincial Party School and Academy of Administration 中共江苏省委党校江苏省行政学院, Suzhou City Party School and Academy
of Administration 中共苏州市委党校苏州市行政学院, and Nanjing City Party School and
治
政
大free access to their curricula until
choice were rather practical as all three schools provided
立
recently. My intention was to reflect local differences in the design of training curricula. Each
Academy of Administration 中共南京市委党校南京市行政学院. The reasons for this
‧ 國
學
party school is at a different level in the administration and thus handles the task to respond to
central government guidelines and local interests differently. Unfortunately, I did not have
‧
access to the curriculum of Kunshan Party School which would have represented the countylevel city. I began with categorizing curricula according to their thematic subject. As a second
y
Nat
sit
step, I dwelled deeper into the issue how the concept of a Scientific Development is translated
al
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into the curricula of cadre schools and into the evaluation criteria of cadres. I decided for a
n
content related categorization of cadre training sessions because I wanted to capture the broad
Ch
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picture of the issues discussed in these schools. The contents of curricula give us an insight
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which topics are discussed, and which technical solutions are proposed. In other words, they
reflect the ongoing political discourse on transformation in China. Hence, party schools can
be used as objects of analysis to examine the discourse, its narratives and the solutions discussed within the CCP.
In addition to official releases and the information provided on the web pages of the party
schools, I collected reports on training classes in Chinese newspapers. Unfortunately I was
not able to establish contacts at the respective party schools and conduct interviews. The
conclusions drawn from the analysis have thus to be seen as mere hypothesis that need to be
verified in further study.
REMARKS ON EXPERIENCES IN FIELD WORK
In July 2011, I participated at a joint conference between National Chengchi University
(NCCU) and Yunnan University of Finance and Economics 14 where I presented my research
topic to a Chinese audience; some of the participating scholars were CCP members. After the
conference, I approached two leading cadres and asked them for interviews. However, both
the Vice-dean of the University and the Party Committee Secretary were quite reluctant and
refused going into the matter of Scientific Development, cadre education and evaluation. In
Beijing this July, I changed strategy and was more discreet in respect with my research
intentions. Prof. Yang Zhi 杨志introduced me at the beginning of her lecture on Ecological
Civilization and invited the participating cadres to share their opinions with me. This
prompted some cadres to take the initiative and talk to me. During the break and after the
three hours session, I asked cadres more on their impressions on the lecture they had just
政治大
assisted, their opinions on cadre training in general, what they liked and disliked, the
difference between cadre training in party schools and those at Renmin University, the reasons
立
why they had chosen Renmin University for training.
‧ 國
學
The reaction was the complete opposite that I had experienced in Yunnan. Time appeared to
have a beneficial effect. The conference in Yunnan staged at a time when preparations for the
‧
18th Party Congress were on-going. Tempers were running high, nerves tense. My field study
in Beijing instead was long after the new leadership had been selected and their tenure had
sit
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Nat
already been in full swing.
io
er
It was astonishing that young cadres at about my age approached me without any hesitation.
They appeared fairly curious about me and my undertakings. They also expressed quite
n
al
i
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U
v
openly their opinions, told me what they disliked and even made suggestions how cadre
Ch
engchi
education could become more interesting and useful. Middle-aged cadres with more
experience were very friendly, attentive to my questions and answered them orderly. By doing
so, they gave me time to formulate follow-up questions. They however avoided direct critical
statements. I also had a short conversation with a leading cadre who regularly commutes to
Beijing for meetings in the Central Development and Reform Commission. He acted very
self-assured, and thus was more interested in boasting about his position and his familiarity
with Beijing due to his regular visits rather than paying attention to the questions I raised. In
other words, he did not let the occasion slip to show off.
Professor Yang Zhi was—and still is—an important gatekeeper in China. Her husband Hu Si
胡似 is very familiar with party organization; together we went through the cadre evaluation
14
The university is home to a party school, cadre academy, and a Marxism Research Institute 马克思主义研究
院．
material of Guangdong and they helped me to clarify terms, expressions, and mechanisms. A
close cousin of Prof. Yang Zhi is Ms Zhang Shiyan 张式验. She is the incumbent secretary of
the party group 党组秘书 of CDV Limited (China Digital Video) 新奥特 in Beijing. The
interviews with Zhang Shiyan, Yang Zhi, and Hu Si were very helpful as I now better
understand organization structures within the Party and cadre evaluation. Unfortunately I
could not get in touch with cadres of the organization departments, as my informants and
contacts were not closely enough related to them.
Generally speaking, information which is necessary for a clear picture of the mechanisms,
processes and outcomes of cadre evaluation and training is hard to retrieve, especially for a
young scholar. Cadre training material such as manuals and training books can be purchased
治
政
in internet. Party school teachers are mostly affiliated with
大 universities and they normally do
立materials. This is also due to the fact that this kind of material
not hesitate in providing these
in bookstores and on Amazon. Furthermore, PPTs of seminars on various topics are dispersed
‧ 國
學
does not reveal any internal information that could be of relevance. The access to party
schools on the other hand requires local contacts and more gatekeepers that I still lack. Hence
‧
it is more difficult to enter party schools and do in situ research.
In respect with cadre evaluation, documents are partly dispersed online and information that is
Nat
sit
y
made public is discussed in Chinese media reports. The People’s Daily is also a very
io
er
important source where to retrieve more information on cadre evaluation and education as it
publishes statements of cadres and provides some insights. However, the material has to be
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v
handled carefully. Even though some negative aspects are pointed out in the reports, we
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cannot ignore the fact that the newspaper is the official mouthpiece of the CCP, and media in
general is still under the control of the Party. More specific evaluation data such as the weight
of criteria is harder to get, but not impossible. Relevant material necessary to establish clearer
cause-effect relationships (such as criteria with veto power) are only enclosed in internal
documents, hardly handed over to foreigners and much the less to young scholars or
Master/PhD students.
39 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 3—The Evolution of the Cadre Management S
CHAPTER 3—THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CADRE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Cadres
are
as
much
a
trusted
instrument of transformative rule as the
政治大
party's
立
primary
object
of
transformation.
(Pieke 2009: 32)
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Cadres are central in the efforts to keep the country unified and promote transformation, as
‧
they represent the Party, and translate its ideas into concrete policies on local level. Their
management, evaluation, training and monitoring is thus important for organizing and
sit
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sustaining the relationship between the center and the periphery. The form of cadre
io
er
management shapes the ability of the party-state to govern the country, its agents and society.
The crux of the party-regime’s survival is the Party’s grip on its cadres who are on the
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interface of party-state and society. The CMS is hereby functional in achieving this
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transformation, in particular cadre education and training.
The Chinese leadership holds that in order to solve the rising issues, it is necessary to improve
the scientific and cultural cultivation of cadres: Their scientific knowledge, scientific spirit,
instruction according to methodology should be strengthened; studies on literature, arts, history and other knowledge of human activities should be launched (Quanguo ganbu paixun
jiaocun bianshen zhidao weiyuan zuzhi bianxie 2006: 3). Learning and innovation are essential for implementing the Scientific Development View. Cadres are the central force in the
realization of the concept and thus have to improve their capabilities and knowledge in order
to achieve the goal of a good and fast socio-economic development 经济社会又好又快发展.
Learning is not only limited to learning from experiences of others or from the results of implementation efforts, it also encompasses instruction and cultivation (Zhonggong zhongyang
dangxiao chubanshe (benshu bianxie zu) 2008). Hereby the emphasis is placed on the ap-
plicability 学以致用 of knowledge that cadres have to gain. In his speech at the 11th National Cadre Instruction Joint Conference 第十一次全国干部教育联席会议 in 2010, Li
Yuanchao 15 李源潮, the then incumbent director of the Central Organization Department
(COD), pleaded for a fast reform of cadre training by making it more target-oriented 针对性
and effective 实效性 (translated literally, practically effective). By means of the Scientific
Development View and the healthy formation of cadres the government will be able to provide a better service (Dong, 28 February 2010).
Since the beginning of the new century, the CCP has been developing and expanding the system of party schools and cadre training academies which was accompanied with stricter requirements on cadres to participate in training programs offered in these institutions. Scien-
政治大
more objective and scientific 科学化
立
tific Development also pursues a reform of cadre assessment, evaluation standards and methods to render them
(Zhonggong zhongyang
bangongting 2009; Shi, 22 October 2011).
‧ 國
學
In this chapter I revisit the history and development of the CMS, and discuss the recent re-
sit
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y
‧
Nat
GENERAL HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
er
form proposals.
v
i
n
C h examination 考试录用,
different stages in history: recruitment
appointment and removal 人
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事任免, evaluation 干部人事考核, award and punishment 奖惩, promotion and demotion
n
The CMS regulates the various matters of personnel affairs. Its components have developed at
职务升降, position allocation 职位分类, personnel dossier 干部档案, training and education
干部培训教育, deployment and exchange 干部人事条培育交流, retirement 退休、李秀、
退职制度, payment and welfare 工资福利, prevention 人事会面, monitoring 人事监督,
appealing 申诉控告, legal protection 干部人事法律保障, qualification plans 人才规划,
statistics 干部人事统计 , qualification evaluation 人才测评 , consultation 人事咨询 ,
personnel representation 人事代理 (Xu et al. 1998). Organizational changes were subject to
shifting power relations, new policy orientations and goals, the legitimization process of the
CCP, and the external and internal challenges that resulted from changing international and
15
Zheng Qinghong was the successive president of the CPS from 2002 to 2007, and Vice President of the PRC
from 2003 to 2008. He held comprehensive responsibility for the task of party organization (Chin 2011: 23).
domestic environments.
Roughly speaking, the CMS developed in three stages: In 1949, after the foundation of the
PRC, a national CMS was established. During the Cultural Revolution between May 1966
and October 1976, the CMS was disrupted and many its functions disabled. With the launch
of the Reform and Opening Policy in 1978, the CMS was revived and aimed at the
rationalization and professionalization of the cadre corps.
In 2008, along with the 30th anniversary of reform, People’s Daily published a historical
overview on the development of the CMS. The account addresses the evolution of the CMS in
the face of socio-economic transformation, and how leadership decisions were translated into
the existing structures and the development of new ones. Development is revisited in four
phases: (1) 1949-1956, establishment and development; (2) 1957-1966, winding and
政治大
improvement; (3) 1966-1976, frustration and setback; (4) since 1976, establishment of the
立
order, and reform and opening. This phase is further divided into: (a) 1978-1986,
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incorporation of Deng Xiaoping's four modernizations; (b) 1987-1999, reform of the guiding
ideas, contents and focus of the CMS; (c) 2000, beginning of the overall and deep reform of
the CMS. (Li, 1 January 2008)
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THE GRIP OF THE PARTY
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Ch
and Social Security人民资源和社会保障部
e n g c(MHRSS)
h i U and the
In China two organs are responsible for personnel matters: the Ministry of Human Resources
Central Organization De-
partment (COD). Former is a ministry under the State Council and responsible for policies;
latter is a department of the Secretariat of the CCP 中国共产党中央书记处 that decides
over appointments or the nomenklatura of the party. 16 It is the most influential and important
organ in personnel matters and a central institution of the CCP. By means of party groups 党
16
Nomenklatura is a list of leadership positions and of those cadres who are suitable for these positions. Party
committees at every level have their own lists with positions over which they have the authority to decide.
For a more detailed explanation of the nomenklatura see Burns, John (1989): The Chinese Communist Party’s
Nomenklatura System. London: M.E. Sharpe, and Chan, Hon S. (2004): “Cadre Personnel Management in
China. The Nomenklatura System 1990-1998.” In The China Quarterly 179, pp. 703-743. A more recent
account by Heilmann, Sebastian and Kirchberger, Sarah (2000): “The Chinese Nomenklatura in Transition.”
In China Analysis 1, pp. 1-13. In respect with appointment the organization of posts, it is important to refer to
another administrative control function: the bianzhi system. Bianzhi establishes the number of posts in
administrative organs, enterprises, and service organizations. For further study refer to Brodsgaard, Kjeld
Erik (2002): “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System in China.” In The China Quarterly 170, pp. 361386.
组 that are installed in state departments and agencies at every administrative level the Party
exerts a dominating influence on job assignment decisions. In the past as well as in the present, the close relation between the two organs has been reflected in personnel overlap. Leading positions in both organs are assigned to party members. 17
The Personnel Bureau 人事局 was established in 1949 and was replaced by the Ministry of
Personnel 人事部 in 1988. In 2008, the Ministries of Labor and Social Security 劳动和社会
保障部 the Ministry of Personnel were concentrated under one ministry, the MHRSS. What
this fusion means for the political leverage and influence in personnel decisions is speculative,
however it suggests a diminished influence of the government organ and a persistent or even
growing power of the party organ, the COD. The personnel overlap in these institutions re-
政治大
The CCP has a vital interest in maintaining a certain degree of control and power over per立
sonnel administration. This is not only revealed in the institutional setting, but also in the hismains.
‧ 國
學
torical evolution of the CMS and the continued reform efforts thereof. The establishment of a
Civil Service System (CSS) in the 1990s marks an important institutional change in the CMS.
‧
In order to grasp the means and ends of personnel management in China, it is necessary to
understand the relationship between the Party and its agents, and the consequences the institu-
y
Nat
sit
tional changes had upon them.
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By the end of the 1980s, China’s economy had grown considerably and the efficiency of the
n
hitherto cadre management became a focus of discussion among China’s scholarly community.
Ch
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v
The rather “modest calls for reform” within the Party (Burns 1989: 745) ultimately found
engchi
18
their leading mouthpiece in Zhao Ziyang赵紫阳, China’s former General Party Secretary,
who proposed the creation of a CSS at the 13th Central Party Congress in 1989. Core of his
proposal were the dismounting of bureaucracy, a more objective performance appraisal system, and the retreat of local party committees in the selection and promotion process of cadres. Following the 13th Party Congress, preparations for a more modern and reformed CMS
began; the newly established MOP proposed a pilot scheme and a set of regulations. Regional
and city governments began experimenting with Western civil service techniques. The old
system was supposed to be replaced by a modern one with an emphasis on severer selection
standards and the formation of administrative skills of cadres. China therefore took much interest in European and US civil servant and government employee models, where public ad17
18
Yin Weimin 尹蔚民 is currently vice-director of the COD and the MHRSS.
Zhao Ziyang was General Secretary of the CCP from November 1, 1987 to 23 June 1989.
ministration separates politics and state administration. The goal was to create a CSS with
Chinese characteristics that applied to the specific needs of China’s political system, the socio-economic transformations, and its historical background. This meant also that a certain
degree of control of the CCP over the selection and position allocation process was to be
maintained. 19
One of Zhao’s central points of criticism concerned the over-concentration of power in cadre
management; he thus suggested the disentanglement of personnel power and administrative
responsibility 官人与官事脱节. In other words, Zhao recommended a diminished influence
of the CCP in the nomenklatura system, that is the selection government officials. The CCP
should maintain its control only over the allocation of leadership position, namely to recom-
政治大
mend candidates to the National People’s Congress and local congresses for election to state
office (Burns 1989: 746). This proposition touched the heart of the Party, and thus led to se-
立
vere tensions between the COD and the MOP.
‧ 國
學
After the downfall of Zhao Ziyang due to the events in 1989, the conservative forces that had
been opposing his plans anyway regained power and the reform came to a halt. However, the
‧
need to reform personnel administration remained. The project was taken up again after the
3rd Plenary Session of the 14th Party Congress in 1992 on which the establishment of a So-
sit
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Nat
cialist Market and Economy System 社会主义市场经济体制 was proclaimed. One year lat-
io
al
er
er, the Provisional Regulations on National Civil Servants国家公务员暂行条例 (later re-
n
ferred to as Provisional Regulations) were adopted. The Provisional Regulations were less
Ch
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v
ambitious than the draft presented by the MOP in 1989. Tensions within the personnel admin-
engchi
istration were not evident, since the fundamental relationship between Party and government,
and the nomenklatura system were not touched at all (Lam et al. 1996: 786).
The reading of the history of the civil service reform reveals the importance that the CCP
gives to personnel management and its control over it. The request for this continuity eventually became statutory law in 2005, when the Civil Servants Law 国务院法律 was promulgated replacing the Provisional Regulations. The law elevated the CCP’s institutionalized control
in personnel management to a new level. It expanded the Party’s role in personnel management and merged “a statutory civil service law and a non-statutory personnel management
19
The prominence the CSS has taken is also reflected in the rise of a new academic discipline, Public Administration Studies. In general, since the 1980s, Chinese literature on cadre management has covered a wide
range of topics. While international experts in the field of China Studies often apply theories of public administration and organizational studies, the Chinese academic discourse covers also approaches of comparative
historical institutionalism.
framework that hold absolute power over both cadres and civil servants” (Chan et al. 2007:
384). The revitalized and unified personnel management system is the CCP’s return to supremacy and significantly undermined the efforts to establish a relatively independent state
CSS. From a Western perspective, these outcomes are considered negative as China’s oneparty regime was consolidated and the hopes of many for political reform in China were disappointed. However, Chan et al. (2007: 384) point out that Chinese officials consider this
landmark combination of politics and administration a positive step toward developing a stable, adaptable, highly competent, rule-based, and legitimacy-enhancing administration.
CADRE SELECTION AND PROMOTION
政治大
Right after the foundation of
立the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the CCP established the
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學
Personnel Bureau (PB). Its vertical structure in the administration served the Party to control
and decide over the management of cadres. According to Doak Barnett (1967), the Bureau
“was one of the most powerful units in the organization […] that […] served as a key
‧
'watchdog' or control organ” (48) in the Mao Era. Each bureau in the respective department
sit
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Nat
was responsible to maintain personnel dossiers 档案 of every cadre. Today, the collection and
administration of the personnel dossiers is carried out by the MHRSS. Decisions on
io
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documentary.
er
appointments, promotions, transfers, and removals have always been based on this
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v
During Mao Era, vertical mobility in the party hierarchy was primarily dependent on
geographical location, sex, class background, age and the organization in which the cadre
worked (Oksenberg 1968: 79). In his accounts on career patterns, Oksenberg found that since
the center applied unevenly political pressure within the bureaucracy, advancement in some
institutions was more difficult than in others and required different skills and/or requirements.
Lateral mobility on the other hand occurred more often than vertical mobility. Career options
involved the choice of whether to seek promotions within an organization or to build oneself
into a specific position. Job transfers needed personal recommendations and the approval of
the PB and/or the COD. The transfer had to be justified in terms of interests of the state, and
had to fit into the annual personnel plan. Career depended both upon individual performance
and the performance of the work unit (65-67).
Oksenberg developed a basic operational code for political survival and advancement and
labeled these strategies as “The Five Do’s and Four Do Nots” (87-89). Adaptability, up-dated
knowledge of policy lines and their implications, and personal relations—in particular patronclient relations—were among the most vital requisites that a cadre had to possess. 20
When the new leadership launched the Reform and Opening Policy in 1978, they soon realized that officials needed to have additional skills in order to respond to the transforming environment and handle a modern administration. Due to the past experiences of volatile personnel relations, reform also aimed at the establishment of a meritocratic system for appointment and selection. Already in 1979, the COD issued Central Organization Department on
the Establishment of a Cadre Evaluation System 中共中央组织部关于实行干部考核制度的
意见 (People’s Daily, 21 November 1979). According to Melanie Manion (1985: 203), the
efforts to restore and develop the CMS was crucial to the successes of all other reforms em-
治
政
大 regulations and criteria for cadre
答 (Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu yanjiu shi et al. 1983)
立
recruitment, training, evaluation methods, contents and maintenance of personnel dossiers,
barked after 1978. In Questions and Answers on Party Organizational Work 党的组织工作问
‧ 國
學
lines of authority over cadres and veteran cadres were first formulated. Core of the restoration
project was the exchange of old and low-educated with young, educated and skilled cadres. A
‧
mandatory retirement age was introduced, and minimum education qualifications for specific
levels of appointment were introduced. While personal decisions 个人决定 were prohibited,
y
Nat
sit
personal recommendations 个人推荐 continued to be an influential instrument in cadre pro-
al
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io
motion. Latter were even encouraged as they could circumvent “rigidities of the step-by-step
n
v
i
n
Cadres are evaluated in regular C
evaluation
circles. In U
general, a yearly assessment of perforheng
chi
promotion pattern” (Manion 1985: 232).
mance takes place. Cadres suggested for promotion come under a special scrutiny, and further
training might been required. The results of the evaluations are then registered in the personnel dossier. Criteria distinguish each other in weight within the evaluation scheme. Validity is
attached to them that have implications for career advancements and financial benefits. In addition to that, validity reflects development priorities. Priority targets with veto power 一票
否决are important. If one of those targets is not fulfilled, the achievement of the other criteria
is annulled. If the evaluation of a leading body or cadre is negative, the respective cadres are
not considered in the next round of appointment and selection. The decision which targets
have veto power is mostly specified—if ever written—in internal documents. Still, their fulfillment alone does not guarantee promotion. Ordinary targets 一般指标 are not binding,
20
The importance of patron-client relations is also highlighted in the political biography of Zhao Ziyang by
David Shambaugh (1984).
hard targets 硬指标 are binding and decide over career advancement, financial bonuses, and
the salaries of collective cadres 集体干部. 21
Requirements and qualifications of cadres according to rank and position, and the process of
promotion are stipulated in Article 33 of the Regulations of the Chinese Communist Party 中
国共产党章程 . The Regulations for Selection and Appointment Requirements of Leading
Party and Government Cadres 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条列 also specifies who chooses, evaluates a qualified cadre and the procedures of evaluation for appointment. The evaluation and appointment process involves a democratic investigation 民主评价, this is an opinion assessment. The organization department of the respective administrative level publishes
the lists of leading cadres under assessment, either for the annual assessment or for the ap-
政治大
ple, management cadres 官干部,
立 educational cadres 教育干部, and party and government ca-
pointment to higher positions. There are different lists for different types of cadres (for exam-
‧ 國
學
dres 党政领导干部). Party members, cadres of the same unit 单位, and the masses 群众 (i.e.
work colleagues) are invited to state their opinions in formal opinion assessment sheets. The
lists contain the names, age, educational and professional background of cadres under assess-
Nat
Figure 2: Example of Management cadre
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ment (see the two examples below).
al
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XXX, born in September 1962 (50 years), originates from Heshan 鹤山,Guangdong 广东,. Started work in May
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C h云安县 commission andUvice-county governor (division level), 團省
nomics). Vice-secretary of Yun’an county
engchi
委副書記 vice-secretary of provincial committee and party group member. After March 1998, director，general
1979, joined the Party in June 1987, educational background, graduate student of provincial party school (eco-
manager, party committee secretary of Travel in Guangdong Co. Ltd. 广东中旅（集團）有限公司; since August 2011 director and party committee secretary of Guangdong Guangye Assets Management Co. Ltd. 廣業資
產經營有限公司
Source: Guangdong managing cadres pre-appointment list, retrieved from Guangdongsheng
zuzhibu 2013)
Figure 3: Example of party and government cadres
YYY, male, born in April 1969, originates from Jiangsu, Suzhou 苏州. Started work in August 1991, joined the
Party in October 1996. Graduate student of party school. Currently position Director of Bureau of Economic and
21
In China only state cadres 国家干部 receive a fixed and guaranteed salary that varies according to the rank
and position. Collective cadres are not on the payroll of the State.
Information Technology of Wuzhong District 吴中区, party committee secretary, appointed for the position to
district vice-governor of Wuzhong District.
Source: Suzhou city party and government leading cadres pre-appointment list, retrieved from
Zhonggong Suzhoushi shiwei zuzhibu ganbu jianduchu lianxi 2013
CADRE TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Party schools have been part of the organizational structure of the CCP ever since its foundation in the early 1920s. They served as institutions of recruitment and ideological training for
new cadres. In the light of the celebrations of the 80th anniversary of the Central Party School
政治大
tuting role in party building. Both were emphasized in a recent speech by Xi Jinping 习近平,
立
(CPS), 22 the CCP is taking particular interest in promoting the former’s history and its consti-
the new General Secretary of the CCP and former head of the CPS, when he inaugurated the
‧ 國
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spring term 2013 at the CPS in Beijing:
‧
For 80 years, the CPS has trained a great number of leading cadres for our
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country’s revolution, restoration and reform tasks. By holding to the Party’s thought
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line and promoting the Party’s theories it made an important contribution. The CPS
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has had an important function in promoting the Party and the matter of the people,
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and particularly in fostering the development of reform and opening. (People’s
Ch
Online, 1 March 2013) 23
engchi
In order to honor this historical event, a commemorative stamp was issued.
According to official party history, in May 1924, the newly founded CCP came to the decision
to reinforce inner-party education and started to establish party schools. Between 1925 and
1927, the first party schools were built in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and other places in
order to spread the idea of Marxism among cadres, and recruit new party cadres. Recently
published works on the histories of the CPS and local party schools emphasize the importance
22
23
The foundation of the precursor of the later established CPS dates back to March 13, 1933, when––as an
homage to Karl Marx who had passed away 50 years before––the then so called Soviet Party School 苏维埃
党校 in Ruijin 瑞金 (Jiangxi 江西)was renamed School of Marxism 马克思主义学校.
The Chinese original is as follows: 80 年来，中央党校为我国革命、建设、改革事业培养了大批领导干
部，在坚持党的思想路线、推进党的理论创新中作出了重要贡献，为推动党和人民事业发展特别是
推进改革开放发挥了重要作用。
Picture 2: Commemorative stamp of CPS
Source: retrieved from Chinau, 18 March 2013
政治大
given to systematic ideological indoctrination (Shambaugh 2008b: 829), and to the role of
party schools in the enterprise to produce a vast number of political and military cadres that
立
were needed for the revolutionary war (Pieke 2009: 37). In the 1930s, military academies—
‧ 國
學
such as the Military and Political University of Resistance against Japan 抗日军政军政—
fulfilled the function to groom leaders and train cadres for the anti-Japanese resistance. The
‧
revolutionary transformation of China’s government and society after 1949 needed further
recruitment, in which cadre training programs were vital components (39).
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During the Cultural Revolution, the Central Higher Committee Party School 中共中央直属
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高级党校 closed its doors and did not reopen until 1977 under its new and abbreviated name
CPS 中共中央党校 (Shambaugh 2008b: 829). In the meantime, some schools at local level
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C h Cadre SchoolsU五七干校 that sought to instill revowere turned into so called May Seventh
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lutionary values by forced production work; many party schools however were closed and
abandoned (Pieke 2009: 39). Yet, Mao-Zedong Thought study classes and other training classes continued to be organized in various localities. Pieke infers from that “a form of continuation of local party schools” (40).
The 1980s and 1990s saw a rebuilding and strengthening of party schools, as cadres with enhanced skills were needed to develop and modernize the country under Deng Xiaoping’s Four
Modernizations 四个现代化. However it was not until the turn of the century that cadre
training and education became a priority in the “run-up to the transition of power to the fourth
generation of leaders around Hu Jintao, when the party started in earnest to put its money
where its mouth was” (49). Pieke identifies a gradual rise and increasing prominence of party
schools in their function to reach out to society and the world from 1992 onwards, when Hu
Jintao changed his post of Party Regional Committee Secretary of Tibet Autonomous Prov-
ince and was selected member of the Politburo Standing Committee中央政治局常务委员会.
During his tenure as president of the CPS between 1993 and 2002, Hu dedicated much of his
efforts on cadre formation and the modernization of the system. After the power transition
was settled in 2002, the new Party Secretary pressed for the reorganization and reconstruction
of the leadership training system under close cooperation and coordination with Zeng
Qinghong曾庆红
24
(Chin 2011: 23).
The changing needs in political leadership came with the rapidly transforming environment.
In order to survive, it was necessary to balance the task of reform and innovation with the task
of preservation and protection of the party’s existence (28). The tensions between innovation
and preservation in the party building efforts are reflected in the founding of three leading ca-
治
政
大 innovation incubator” (28).
海 in 2005 that served the purpose to establish a “leadership
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However, the three academies are also part of a historiographical effort, as they construct and
dre training academies in Jinggangshan 井冈山, Yan'an 延安, and Pudong-Shanghai 浦东上
‧ 國
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represent the Party's auto-narrative of its birth (Jinggangshan), growth (Yan'an) and maturation (Shanghai) (Pieke 2009: 51).
‧
At the beginning of the new century, strengthening and improving cadre training and education has become a top agenda of the CCP. Since then, numerous resolutions, plans and out-
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lines have been published and adopted: Decision on Strengthening and Improving Party
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School Work in the Twenty-first Century 中共中央关于面向 21 世纪加强和改进党校工作的
n
决定 (Zhonggong zhongyang
National Plan for Caa bangongting mishuju 2000), 2001-2005
v
dre Education and
i
l C
n
Training 2001h 年 -2005 年全国
e n g c h i U干部教育培训规划
(Zhonggong
zhongyang zuzhibu 2001), 2006-2010 National Plan for Cadre Education and Training 20062010 年全国干部教育培训规划 (Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu 2006), Regulations on Cadre Education and Training Work 干部教育培训工作条列
(Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu
2006), 2010-2020 Outline of Cadre Education and Training Reform 2010—2020 年干部教育
培训改革纲要 (Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting 2010).
The system of cadre education and instruction is very complex, it is decentralized and fragmentized. On the one hand there are party schools and training academies. Cadres of every
rank, administrative level, department and organization have to attend training sessions at
their local party schools. Leading cadres also have to commute to the CPS and take classes to
24
Zheng Qinghong was the successive president of the CPS from 2002 to 2007, and Vice President of the PRC
from 2003 to 2008. He held comprehensive responsibility for the task of Party organization (Chin 2011: 23).
adjourn their knowledge on the political guidelines and directives. The system of these institutions corresponds to the three-tier administrative structure (central-province-city). However,
training does not only take place within the walls of party schools and training academies;
various seminars are jointly organized with universities and other research institutions (see
example of seminar program in table 13 in appendix, p. 101). While training in party school
also contains political ideology, contents of university-based seminars focus more on technical issues. In addition to that, every governmental department, service organization, enterprise, unit etc. is responsible for planning and organizing professional training, the sessions
are tailored for the needs of the respective department, organization or unit (see example in
table 14 in appendix, p. 102). Hence, objectives of cadre training classes are very diverse. On
the one hand they are supposed to meet the requirements of political instruction. On the other
政治大
hand they should convey valuable human intellectual knowledge that helps cadres in their
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administrative and political tasks. The emphasis shifts depending on the locus of the seminar
PROMOTING POLICIES THROUGH THE CMS
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and the hosting institution.
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Attitudes and behavior of local governments and cadres, and the ultimate success of
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development depend on a variety of factors. (Annual) evaluation criteria that decide over
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C h guidelines of the
They reflect the policy decisions and
e n g c h i U central government as well as they
promotion and transfer possibilities vary according to locality, time and administrative level.
reflect local priorities in a broader context of the central guidelines (Whiting 2004: 106).
The astonishing success of township and village enterprises (TVE) during the Reform Era
caught the eye of many scholars who subsequently tried to explain the economic success story.
Literature in this field has convincingly shown the positive relationship between economic
evaluation criteria and the promotion of local economic development. Subsequent studies
have tackled the intervening factors in local policy implementation, and have thus revealed
the complexity of motivations, ability, and willingness to implement policies on local level.
Most of the literature focuses on the lower administrative levels such as townships and
villages also because these levels give an excellent opportunity to analyze state-society
relations. They highlight how administrators handle the difficult task to respond to pressures
coming from superior bureaucratic levels and from the population below, and how they try to
satisfy both demands.
In the following I give a brief overview on the role of cadre evaluation in promoting
economic development in townships and villages during the Reform Era that research has
shown so far. The goal is to highlight the fundamental dynamics and mechanisms, and the role
of cadre evaluation in policy implementation.
The Reform and Open Policy gave way to various administrative and fiscal reforms.
Economic authority was decentralized from the center and provinces to the lower
administrative levels (cities, counties, townships and villages). These reforms also changed
the dynamics of political power struggle. In order to spur economic growth and rural
industrialization, local cadres assumed an entrepreneurial role. Acting as board of directors
they took part in major business decisions, such as appointing managers and launching new
products (Edin 1998: 100). The local state corporatism model (Oi 1992) resulted in an
政治大
exceptional growth of TVEs that accounted for a big proportion of total industrial output: 39
立
per cent compared to 28 per cent for the state-owned sector and 15 per cent for the
‧ 國
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individually owned sector (Edin 1998: 97).
Local state corporatism grounded in fiscal reforms that provided incentives to local
governments to promote economic growth. They were given economic authority in the sense
‧
that they could extract the revenues of the companies and reinvest them according to their
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own judgment. Economic autonomy however came with major responsibilities. Revenues had
to be used for the provision of public goods and other policy measures. Local cadres thus
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adopted a double role; they were administrative service providers and economic actors (99).
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However, the double role could not explain the phenomenon that revenues were extracted and
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reinvested rather than taken as an opportunity for rent-seeking. This behavior stood in sharp
contrast to dominant theories at that time. These were based on experiences of the fallacy of
state-led development where a high degree of corruption, rent-seeking behavior and economic
irrationality prevailed. The key question was why local cadres did promote economic growth.
The reasons had to be searched in the political or administrative system that provided
incentives and set constraints for local bureaucrats (100). Higher levels in the bureaucracy set
work targets that local cadres had to fulfill. The targets were specified in the one-year plans
and written down in the individual books 岗位责任书 of leading cadres. These
“performance contracts” (109) were the basis of evaluation that decided over promotion,
bonus and salaries. Shouldering the responsibility for all public expenditures––welfare and
health care, income provision and job creation––economic development became a necessary
precondition. Pressure came from both the superior organs and the local population. The
shortage of central funding made doing good business for revenue extraction compulsive for
local governments. Institutional constraints also came in form of monitoring (auditing and
inspection) by superior organs in bureaucracy. Bad performance or non-cooperation resulted
in the loss of annual bonuses or demotion (113).
Competition between the township governments (for foreign direct investment as well as
political authority) further spurred the devotion of local governments to economic
development in their own jurisdiction. This was the logic on which the incentive system was
based. Strong performance of one jurisdiction drove up target levels of others, as
remuneration, office tenure and higher appointments were contingent with the performance of
other jurisdictions (Whiting 2004: 111). However, the system also brought negative sideeffects. The revenue extraction and growth oriented targets contributed to the development of
政治大
overcapacity which resulted in financial losses of enterprises that then could not repay their
立
bank loans (113). The problem of unreasonable development and inefficiency prompted a
‧ 國
學
change of performance indicators: profit measurement was incorporated as a criterion into the
evaluation system. The new set of criteria forced cadres to look at the marketability of
products (114).
‧
If we look at the development of the evaluation system and its criteria from a historical
sit
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perspective and analyze each policy sphere, it becomes clear that change came with the
problems that arose due to measurement methods of development or to policies incited
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through previous evaluation criteria. In other words, targets often resulted in
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dysfunctionalities in policy implementation. However, the dysfunctionalities were tried to be
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solved by setting new targets and measurement methods in order to push development into a
better direction. Susan Whiting conclusively shows in here article Cadre Evaluation at the
Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule that
[…] the nature of the cadre evaluation system helps to explain dysfunctional aspects of
policy implementation at grass roots and that problems with policy implementation, in
turn, help to explain subsequent changes in the evaluation system itself. (101)
CONCLUSION
This chapter revisited the historical development of the CMS focusing on evaluation,
promotion and education, and on the importance of personnel management for the CCP and
its claim on power. It has shown that since the beginning of the 21th century the party
leadership has emphasized a lot of its efforts on further developing the system of cadre
selection, appointment, evaluation, training and education, and has put more pressure on local
party committees and governments to implement the new requirements of the reforms. The
crux of the party-regime’s survival is the CCP’s grip on bureaucrats who are on the interface
of party-state and society. They “are as much a trusted instrument of transformative rule as the
party's primary object of transformation” (Pieke 2009: 32). The CMS is hereby functional in
achieving this transformation.
In the last section of this chapter, I have pointed to the mobilization effects of the incentive
and constraint system in which cadres are embedded. Literature on economic performance has
conclusively shown that cadre evaluation criteria and the consequent benefits have incited
政治大
local cadres to spur economic growth. The Chinese party-state continues to embark reforms
立
and improvements on the CMS in order to tackle issues of policy implementation and hence
‧
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direct development also through the CMS.
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55 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 4—Responding to New Challenges in the 21st
CHAPTER 4—RESPONDING TO NEW
CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Confronted with major social, economic, and ecological problems the CCP decided on a new
政治大
development strategy after it had entered the 21st century. At the 16th Party Congress and its
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5th Plenary Session in the following year, two new leading political guidelines were adopted:
‧ 國
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Harmonious Society and Scientific Development View.
In this chapter, I first explain the ideological foundation on which China builds its reforms in
the CMS, and the economic, social and environmental background against which the new
‧
development theory was formulated and adopted. By doing so, I introduce the main contents
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of Scientific Development and the concept of Ecological Civilization that describe China’s
io
in carrying forward the transformation of development.
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en
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idea how to come to terms with environmental degradation, the role of government and cadres
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gc
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
BACKGROUND
The adoption of the Scientific Development View has to be analyzed from the international
and domestic vantage point, as both are crucial variables that have been influencing China’s
path of development, they contributed to the development of the theory of Scientific
Development, and the strategies applied for implementation.
At the beginning of the new century, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
further integration into the international system posed many challenges to the country in
adjusting economic structures and the financial system. The membership also came at a point
in history at which various countries (including China itself) had committed to a development
of sustainability. At the beginning of the 1990s, led by the United Nations, more and more
countries started to pay more attention to sustainable development. The new development
model called for a fortified consideration of social and environmental justice, more
participation of societies, preservation of nature and resources. In other words, governments
had devoted themselves consider more social and environmental factors in their development.
However, the cleavage of weak and strong sustainability—i.e. those countries which
performed better in terms of natural capital and ecological preservation and those that
continued to give priority to economic development—was drawn between rich, developed
countries and poorly developed, and emerging countries. Superior production modes and
production technology allowed rich countries to produce more environmentally sound. This
was also supported by the shift of highly polluting industries into less developed countries
where labor costs were low and environmental regulations lax. When transboundary
environmental problems became more pronounced and the global climate change debate
政治大
emerged, China again was faced with sharp criticism as its rapid growth caused a major part
立
of the world wide CO2 emissions.
‧ 國
學
Within China, development had achieved a high degree of unevenness. During the 1980s,
development policies in China favored the development of coastal areas over the development
of the inner-provinces. When it became clear that the expected trickle-down effect from East
‧
to West was not likely to occur, China launched a massive development program to promote
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economic development of its poorly developed western and less developed middle provinces
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(The Great Western Opening up and Development 西部大开发). Nevertheless, in spite of the
central government’s efforts, the costal-interior/western divide continued to grow.
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Even within regions, the discrepancies of development became more pronounced, in
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particular between rural and urban areas. Rapid urbanization accompanied by inappropriate
migration policies widened the gap between the haves and the have-nots, and between those
with and without access to welfare.
In the environmental realm, China was confronted with severe degradation that had started to
affect its economy. The hybrid economic system that emerged and gradually developed after
China had opened up to the entire world in 1978 combined elements of socialist command
economy and advanced capitalism. The highly speculative character of this system not only
regularly triggered preoccupations of overheating; it also exerted high pressures on China’s
natural environment (Muldavin 1997). Weak environmental legislation combined with the
implementation problem at local level aggravated China’s environmental and ecological
situation.
Still, switching from continued economic growth to environmental preservation was and is
still no option for China, as many parts of the country are still poorly developed.25 In order to
solve the issues of uneven development, economic growth and environmental degradation
China started—on academic level much earlier than on political level 26 —to search for
solutions that allow economic growth with less adverse impacts on the environment. Hightech technology, innovation capacity, and knowledge diffusion have become necessary assets
for China to gain.
On societal level, China’s leaders were confronted with visibly growing contentious actions
within the society. The number of protests has grown exorbitantly, especially after the turn of
the new century. Social scientists have demonstrated the fragmentation of social unrest in
China; protests and protesters are divided by various factors: location, generation, and
concerns. The reasons are structural as well as strategic (Solinger 1992; Pearson 1997;
政治大
Dickson 2003; Lee 2000; Perry 2007). In a briefing document of the Europe China Research
立
and Academic Network (ECRAN) on social unrest in China and the role of information and
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communication technology Göbel et al. (2012) find that the reasons for social unrest are
mostly immediate and involve interest groups who receive unfair treatment or those whose
interests are harmed. Even though these protests do not question the legitimacy of the CCP,
‧
they are still regarded as a considerable threat as they can “easily spiral out of control” (10).
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The pollution of the environment and its resulting impact on agriculture and health is a
leading cause of social unrest. According to Wang (2008), China saw an increase of 29% in
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environmental protests between 1996 and 2005. Protests occur in villages where governments
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allow factories to pollute the environment in order to boost tax revenues. The polluted water
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not only destroys agricultural production but causes severe harm to the health of villagers
(Göbel et al. 2012: 38); Liu Lee (2010) found out that there are 450 villages in China in which
the number of cancer patients is extraordinarily high. In contrast to villagers who protest
against immediate impacts, urban contentious actions are usually rooted in the fears of
eventual adverse effects in the future. Also, the social origins of the participants are different
from those in the villages; they usually involve members of the middle class with higher
incomes. The targets of protests are often decisions of the government to host chemical plants
(Göbel et al. 2012: 38).
25
According to the World Bank, China had an average Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 3,180 US
Dollars in 2003 and 9,060 US Dollars in 200(World Bank Data: “World Development Indicators.” Retrieved
from: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx (last checked, August 2013)
26
For a discussion on the relationship between the economic and academic discourse, and the research efforts
on Green GDP accounting see Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, and Ritirc, Julia (forthcoming): “Green or
Black Growth for China: The Development of the Green GDP Accounting System in the PRC.”
Social unrest catches the attention of media that help to spread the concerns of the protesters
to other parts of the country. Yet, in China a “combination of power and freedom” (partly due
to the lack of public participation) ensures that responsibility rests in the hand of local
governments (Ma 2008: B10). So far, environmentally motivated social unrest, media
coverage and NGOs are rather weak and do not seem to push local cadres into rethinking their
industrialization strategies, as their short term ability to suppress these riots is rewarded while
a change of strategy only implies high risks. Still, the leadership is well aware of the
destabilizing force and threat of these protests. This awareness is also reflected in the
increased spending on public security budgets and the efforts in technological upgrading
(information and surveillance systems) (Göbel et al. 2012: 57).
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A NEW IDEOLOGY IS BORN
政治大
WHAT IS THE SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT VIEW?
On November 15, 2003, Hu Jintao officially proposed his theory of the Scientific
‧
Development View. The emphasis of the development concept was placed on coordination
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and sustainability that takes into consideration social and ecological factors, and aims at
minimizing socio-economic disparities. By embracing a balanced development concept, the
io
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growth.
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leadership denied the previous concept which had been based on high quantitative economic
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Development grounds on growth, but growth should not be simplistically equated with
development. If we do not stress quality and benefits, focus on a coordinated
development of economy, politics, and culture, and attach importance to harmony
between people and nature, growth can increase imbalance and eventually sets limits
to [our] development. (Hu, 14 October 2003) 27
At the Central Work Meeting on Population, Resources and Environment 中央人口资源环境
工作座谈会 Hu explained the central values of the theory: It puts the people first 以人为本,
and is a comprehensive 全面, coordinated 协调, and sustainable development concept 可持
27
The original Chinese version is as followed: 增长是发展的基础，但增长并不简单地等同于发展。不重视
质量和效益，不重视经济、政治和文化的协调发展，不重视人与自然的和谐，就会出现增长失调、
从而最终制约发展的局面。
续发展观 (Xinhua Online, 4 April 2003a). In an article in Xinhua Online referring to the
speech by Hu, the meaning of the central values were summarized as followed: Putting the
people means to realize a comprehensive development of the people, satisfy their basic needs,
and their continuously rising material and cultural needs. By doing so, their economic,
political, cultural rights and interests are to be safeguarded. Comprehensive aims at the
promotion of economy, politics, and culture, and the realization of economic development and
social progress. Coordinated development is understood as integrative development of city
and countryside, regions, economy and society; harmony between people and nature,
domestic development and opening to the outside. It promotes the production forces and
relations, the coordination of the economic basis and the superstructure, and the coordination
政治大
between the spheres of economy, politics, and culture or every segment and aspect.
Sustainable development means to harmonize the relationship between people and nature, and
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to coordinate population, resources and environment. It continues the path of a civilized
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development of productive development, prosperous life, good ecology, and guarantees a
long-lasting development over generations (Xinhua Online, 4 April 2004b). The Scientific
‧
Development View realizes the goal of a well-off society 小康社会, it promotes and fosters
the socialist market economy system, strengthens the Party’s governing capacities 执行能力.
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et al. 2007: 34).
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By doing so, it draws on the experiences shared by developing nations all over the world (Lu
Coordination of uneven development is coined by the term “the five integrations” 五个统筹
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in party documents. Coordinated development as proposed in Scientific Development View
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refers to five areas: (1) city and countryside, (2) regions, (3) economy and society, (4) people
and nature, (5) internal development and external opening. What the theory demands is that
fundamental transformation of the economic growth mode is necessary. Economic structures
have to be adjusted and optimized, and the ability of innovation improved. Furthermore it is
important to create a resource saving and environmentally friendly society (Quanguo ganbu
peixun jiaocun bianshen zhidao weiyuan zuzhi bianxie 2006).
These tasks are accomplished by reform in six areas: the reform of the administrative system
政府行政管理体制改革, the development of a scientific performance evaluation system 科
学的政绩评价体系, the reform of the fiscal levy system 财政税收体制改革 and the price
form system 价格形成体制, enterprise reform 企业改革, and macro-economic regulation
宏观调控 (Quanguo ganbu peixun jiaocun bianshen zhidao weiyuan zuzhi bianxie 2006).
Lu Hugen 28 陆沪根et al. (2007: 114-115) summarize the Scientific Development View as
followed: First, it grounds in the drive for economic development, seizes the opportunity of
fast development and preserves a relatively fast speed of development. By means of
optimizing structures, and improving the quality and effectiveness of development, the
economic growth mode will be transformed, and economic structures adjusted. Speed,
structure, quality and effectiveness have to be congruent. Second, the Scientific Development
View makes sure that social development is achieved as fast as economic development. Third,
it pursues a coordinated development between rural and urban areas, hereby solving the three
problems of agriculture 三农问题. 29 This goal can be achieved by the urbanization of the
countryside 以城带乡, the industrialization of agriculture以工促农, the interaction between
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developmental states of regions are tackled by unleashing the excellence and economic force
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of each region: promotion of development of China’s western provinces and the traditional
city and countryside 城乡互动, and the coordination of development. Fourth, the different
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industrial bases in the North-East; acceleration of the emergence of the middle provinces;
further encouragement of the fast development of eastern provinces. At the same time,
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interaction between the middle, eastern, and western provinces has to be further fortified by
means of complementation, mutual promotion, and the joint development of new structures.
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Fifth, issues of resources and environment have to be stressed and the capacities for
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sustainable development need to be strengthened. In this respect, harmonious development of
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people and nature has to be planned holistically, as the relations between economic building,
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population growth and resource utilization, and ecological and environmental protection need
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to be handled properly. Scientific Development needs the engagement of the whole society
and an ecological friendly civilization needs to be built. Sixth, as China presses ahead with the
reform and opening process, it has to further adapt to globalization and respond to the new
challenges after having joined the WTO. Therefore it is necessary to seek more competition
and cooperation in the realms of international economy and technology development. Seventh,
the people have priority. Their interests are the starting and endpoint of the government’s
work, all efforts are for the people. Comprehensive development of the people is achieved by
satisfying their various needs.
28
29
Lu Hugen is managing vice-president of the Pudong Party School 浦东新区区委党校常.
三农问题 was formulated by the economist Wen Tiejun 温铁军 in 1996, and refers to problems related to
countryside 农村, agriculture 农业, and farmers 农民.
WHAT DOES “SCIENTIFIC” MEAN?
The scientific 科学 character of the new concept is ideologically linked to China’s history in
the 20th century, as well as to the CCP, its foundation on traditional Marxism and its claim on
having the final authority on truth and knowledge. In my interviews, “scientific” was
rephrased as reasonable 合理 or 有效 effective (Interview with Zhao Yanyun, Beijing, 26
July 2013). Development is considered a “complex” 复杂 process (Lecture with Yang Zhi,
Beijing, 31 July 2013). Thus it is important to comprehend processes, to establish and broaden
understanding by investigation 探索, research 研究, and discovery 发现 (Lecture with
Yang Zhi, 31 July 2013).
In its claim that development has to be framed in accordance with scientific principles univer-
政治大
Development and its adoption as they conduct research and insert new ideas and solutions in
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sities and research institutions have a pivotal function. They promote and support Scientific
the political and public discourse. Also, since the early 2000s, the State Council requires gov-
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ernment bodies to consult scientists and experts in preparing policy programs, laws and regulations (Hofem et al. 2012: 207).
‧
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE TASK OF TRANSFORMATION?
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After having clarified the main contents and goals of the Scientific Development View we
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now go about focusing on the role of the government in the task of transforming development.
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findings that countries with a GDP/capita
USD reach a critical moment
C h income of 1000-3000
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in their of modernization with major issuesg
related
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The idea of Harmonious Society and the Scientific Development View is based on the
to be addressed. 30 In the face of this situation, the relationship between the government and
its people can only be improved by the promotion of a harmonious society. Latter features
democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality. Harmony is in the
interest of the people and vital to China’s modernization as it helps to maintain social stability
and unity. The government, in particular high ranking officials, spearhead in the efforts to
safeguard the long-term interests of the people. They oversee the social and economic
30
Hu hereby refers to international development studies such as the widely recognized study by Adam
Przeworsky and Fernando Limongi (1997) who challenged the hitherto prevailing modernization theories by
Karl Lipset, Huntington and O’Donnell. In their cross-national comparative study they show that regimes are
likely to become instable and change regime type at a per capita level between 3000 to 4000 US-Dollars. See
Przeworsky, Adam, and Limongi, Fernando (1997): “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” In World Politics,
49 (2), pp. 155-183.
development. (Peoples’ Daily, 27 June 2005)
The government’s duty is to provide public goods and services, and it should regulate and
control development scientifically as well as reasonably (Bo 2005: 4). Social order and
harmony cannot be achieved, unless the government fulfills its function of effectively
supervising society (5).
HOW IS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ADDRESSED IN THE IDEOLOGICAL REALM?
In an article in China Environment News 中国环境报 , Wen Jiabao (17 April 2006)
acknowledged that the environmental goals of the 10th Five-Year-Plan were not realized, in
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particular the reduction of CO2 and COD emissions. In 2005, China’s nationwide CO2
emission increased 27% of emissions accounted in the year 2000, COD emission were only
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reduced by 2% and thus did not achieve the goal of 10% reduction. Wen named three reasons
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why the planned reduction failed: insufficient concern for environmental protection in the
drive for economic development, unreasonable production structures, and serious lack of
environmental law enforcement. The solution of these problems however is complicated as
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China is mired in two major antagonisms: its underdeveloped economy faces the people’s
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growing material demands, and socio-economic development exacerbates the pressures of
population, resources and environment. In order to dissolve these antagonisms and tackle the
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accompanying issues, China has to rely on Scientific Development. The old resource-
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consuming and environmental polluting development model has to be replaced with a new
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development concept and a model of innovation. The quality of development has to be
improved, and socio-economic development has to walk down the path of Scientific
Development. In order to achieve a healthy and well-off society, resource consumption and
emissions per unit have to be reduced, and environmental governance and ecological
construction have to be fostered. It is important to improve the quality of life and health of the
people. By doing so, the protection of the environment is the foundation for the further
existence of the Chinese people.
On the 17th Party Congress in November 2007, Hu Jintao reiterated that a nice and sound
ecological environment and long-lasting socio-economic development can only be realized
unless society acts in an environmentally friendly way, and economic development takes into
account the factors such as population, resources and environment (Hu, 24 November 2007).
The quest to build a resource saving and environmentally friendly society is linked to the
concept of construction an Ecological Civilization 生态文明构建. Ecological Civilization is a
concept inherent to the theory of the Scientific Development View. It was first proclaimed at
the 17th Party Congress in November 2007. However, only recently, under the new leadership
of Xi Jinping, the concept has gained real prominence in the political discourse (Interview
Yang Zhi, Beijing, 31 July 2013).
The realization of the Scientific Development View and its key contents can only be
accomplished if an Ecological Civilization is constructed. By doing so, sustainable
development is possible. At the same time, sustainable development is the basis for the
construction of Ecological Civilization, as only by treading the path of sustainable
development the construction of Ecological Civilization and the accomplishment of a well-off
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society are feasible. Also, the central ideas of the Scientific Development View and its
thorough implementation are achieved by the construction of an Ecological Civilization and
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the realization of sustainable development (Quanguo ganbu peixun jiaocai bianshen zhidao
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weiyuan zuzhi bianxie 2010: 1).
Ecological Civilization is related to the rising problems in the environment and resource
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scarcity. China’s resources and environment have paid a high price under its hitherto
economic growth model. In order to solve the environmental problems and contradictions of
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development in an industrial civilization, a new form of civilization has to rise in human
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historical development. The Construction of an Ecological Civilization will help to create
production structures, establish a new growth mode and a new consumption model. They are
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energy and resource-saving, and foster a ecologically and environmentally sound
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development. It is support China in its efforts to attenuate the ecological and environmental
degradation caused by China’s high population, its low economic starting level 底子薄,
resources scarcity, and the limited carrying capacity of the environment. The severe
environmental situation is exacerbated by the further industrialization, informatization,
urbanization, marketization and internationalization (6).
Ecological Civilization is to be constructed on four levels: First, values and conceptions: an
ecological culture and awareness has to spread among the masses, it has to become a cultural
awareness shared by the masses; the ecological moral will so turn into a social and public
moral. Hence, the traditional economic development impetus that aims at profit maximization
can change into a new ecological economy that maximizes welfare. Second, practical
approaches: green and environmentally friendly production structures take the lead and
become an important source of economic growth. Third, social implications: the precondition
to achieve harmony between people and nature is that the relationship between people and
people 人与人, and people and society 人与社会 are meshed. Rising pollution and other
environmental problems have led to social instability and are thus crucial factors that hinder
societal harmony. Environmental equity and justice promote a more harmonious relationship
between the people, and between people and the environment. Fourth, the factor time is
important, since the construction of the Ecological Civilization takes its time. What Europe
caused in 200 years of development, China caused in its short but fast development. Hence,
China is exposed to high pressure while facing two difficult tasks: on the one hand it has to
catch up lessons on industrial culture; on the other hand China’s development has to be
propelled down the path of Ecological Civilization (8).
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DEVELOPMENT ADDRESSED
立IN THE PRACTICAL REALM?
HOW IS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
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In the economic realm, China has tried to implement various models in order to increase
resource efficiency, reduce emissions, and promote economic growth. After years of
experimentation and international cooperation, the Chinese government is now promoting
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three models on national level: green economy, low-carbon economy, and circular economy.
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Low carbon economy and circular economy are both models that have China have been
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international cooperation.
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experimenting with over the past years. Both models have reached China through extensive
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In the year 2010, China had designated low carbon economy pilot zones 低碳经济试点区.
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At the same time, low carbon economy and related policy targets were integrated in the 12th
Five-Year Plan. Hofem et al. 2012 explain that British government units played a crucial role
in transporting the new approach to reconcile economic growth and ecological preservation
into China. Starting with 2003/2004, various workshops and conferences were organized in
China (203). However, the official endorsement in China came in 2007 when annual
evaluation reports on climate change in China 国家气候变化评估报告 were started to be
published (204). On domestic level, the Chinese Academy of Social Science Institute for
Urban and Environmental Studies 中国科学院城市环境研究所 and the National
Development and Reform Commission’s Energy Research Institute 中国发展和改革委员会
能源研究所 were prominent drivers in the research on low carbon economy and gave
important policy inputs (207). Public discussion was facilitated by top-level support for the
idea of embarking on the program of low carbon economy. Hu Jintao addressed the need of
low carbon economy and technology at the APEC summit in 2007. The Chinese press
published a serial of speeches held by CCP leaders of the upper-echelon (206).
Circular economy tells a similar story; expertise and technical assistance was provided by the
World Bank. The idea of the “life-cycle of economy-environment interactions” (World Bank
2009: 13) was taken up in China at the end of the 1990s. The concept and its goals to improve
resource efficiency and to protect the environment were formulated in the 11th Five-Year Plan.
In 2005, China launched the first round of pilot projects in seven key industrial sectors. 42
leading enterprises, four waste recycling and reuse areas, 13 industrial parks and 10
provinces/cities participated. In 2007, China launched the second round of pilot projects and
expanded the coverage of sectors and regions (The World Bank 2009: 14).
The photo illustrated below has been taken at a cadre training session at China Renmin
政治大
University on July 31, 2013 and shows Prof. Yang Zhi, a professor in economics and zealous
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promoter of low carbon, circular, and green economy. In her lecture on Ecological
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Civilization and Circular economy she proposes the three models—low carbon, circular, and
green economy—for the implementation of Scientific Development and the construction of an
Ecological Civilization.
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Prof. Yang Zhi has been working on the research on the three models and their
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implementation in China. By doing so, she has been drawing a lot on international experience,
and established cooperations with other universities and research institutions. The role of
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science and research and the interaction with politics becomes visible in the system of cadre
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education that is also organized outside traditional party institutions. In July 2013, cadres of
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the Development and Reform Commission (DRC) of Chuxiong commuted to the capital for a
special training week at one of China’s most prestigious universities. Some of them told me
that the training at the university is far more interesting than the one in local party schools.
The immediate contact with experts in the field is interesting, also the knowledge acquired.
However, some cadres expressed doubts or dissatisfaction, so did a young cadre who had just
started work in the DRC. He pointed out that training sessions are far too theoretical, instead
trainers should apply a more practical approach and tackle concrete issues. Even though the
problems that cadres face in localities in Yunnan differ quite a lot from those in the capital or
other provinces, cadre education would still be more useful if the different experiences,
solutions, and ideas of other places in China were discussed during those sessions (Short
interview and conversations with various cadres, Beijing, 31 July 2013).
Picture 3: How to achieve Scientific Development and construct an Ecological Civilization
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Source: Photo shot by the author during a cadre training session
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CONCLUSION
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at Renmin University, 31 July 2013
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The Scientific Development View is the ideological grounding of China’s idea how
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development should be arranged and organized, and reflects how China wants to cope with
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the hpeople,
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c hfoster
the diverse domestic and international problems and challenges. Its central demands and goals
are: safeguard the interest of
comprehensive, and
sustainable development. The new political guideline was adopted at a point in China’s
history when outcomes of its hitherto development concept started to severely hit its economy,
aggravated health issues and threatened social stability. At the beginning of the 21st century,
the push for a more balanced development became inevitable. It was important to make
development more reasonable and efficient. Hereby the focus was shifted on two spheres: the
technological and the non-technological (Interview with Zhao Yanyun, Beijing, 26 July 2013).
The conflicting goals of economic growth and ecological preservation can only be overcome
by means of an approach that covers society and all its subsystems. The economic, social and
cultural interests of the Chinese people have to be safeguarded. Hereby, the government, in
particular high ranking officials, oversee the socio-economic development and by doing so
they have to guarantee the long-term interests of the people. From the vantage point of
implementation and realization the claim of Scientific Development and Ecological
Civilization, China has started to promote low carbon economy and circular economy in order
to reconcile the conflicting interests between economy and ecology.
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69 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 5—The Incorporation Scientific Development
CHAPTER 5—THE INCORPORATION
SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT INTO THE CMS
This chapter tackles the implementation of the Scientific Development View in the Chinese
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process how the ideology was incorporated into the evaluation system(s) and cadre training
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contents. By doing so, I approach the implementation on national and local level and display
CMS, in particular in cadre evaluation and education. The following pages describe the
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its interaction. I focus on the reforms that were embarked on cadre evaluation and education
after the Scientific Development View had been adopted. Then I analyze how the
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requirements of the reforms and the ideology were translated into local evaluation systems
and party school curricula.
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SETTING UP EVALUATING SYSTEMS UNDER THE SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT
VIEW SCHEME
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LAUNCH OF TRIAL PROJECTS
The process of implementation of the new development view can be discerned on national
and local level. It has to be understood as an endless cycle with different interacting poles: the
center and its peripheries, in which experimentation is the main method applied.
After the proclamation of the Scientific Development View in 2003, the COD started to work
on a reform of the national cadre evaluation system. In 2004, a pilot project Trial method to
embody the demands of the Scientific Development View in a comprehensive evaluation of
local party and government leading bodies and cadres 体现科学发展观要求的地方党政领
导班子和领导干部综合考核评价试行办法 was launched. Zhejiang 浙江, Sichuan 四川
Figure 4: The process of incorporation of the Scientific Development View
Source: compiled by the author
and Inner Mongolia 内蒙古 were chosen to become pilot regions in which new evaluation
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experimented. Methods included democratic recommendation 民主推荐 , democratic
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investigation 民主测评, public opinion polls 民意调查, single interviews 个别谈话,
methods under the Scientific Development View scheme should be developed and
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performance analysis 实绩分析, and comprehensive evaluation 综合评价. Already in 2006,
the new methods were applied in the evaluation of leadership cadres. In 2007, the COD
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opened another round of trials; this time a pilot scheme to evaluate the work of party and
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government cadre in governmental departments (体现科学发展观要求的党政工作部门领导
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班子和领导干部综合考核评价试行办法) was created. The pilot project was probed over
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one year in different parts of various provinces, regions and cities, and in central government
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departments. Finally, at the beginning of 2008, a project on the development of an annual
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assessment of ministries and commissions was launched. The range of the project covered
ministries and commissions on national and local level, and was further expanded to include
the Peoples’ Daily, the China Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations. (Peoples’
Online 18 November 2009)
The new set of evaluation methods which had been extensively experimented over four years
in different regions at different administrative levels were finally unveiled by the Politburo of
the Central Government 中央政治局 in October 2009: Opinion on building and promoting
Scientific Development in the evaluation system of party and government leading bodies and
cadres 关于建促进科学发展的党政领导班子和领导考核评价机制的意见 (Zhonggong
zhongyang bangongting 2009). The document postulates that target criteria and methods
embody the Scientific Development View, and government performance should be evaluated
correctly 准确 . The realization and implementation of Scientific Development is a
requirement for promotion. Resource saving, environmental protection, security, social
stability and the degree of satisfaction of the local population are binding criteria in the
evaluation. Attention has to be paid to speed, mode and quality of development, the state of
economic development. Coordinated development of economy and society, and harmonious
development of people and nature define the new path of development in China. The reform
of the evaluation system emphasizes social stability, the protection and enhancement of
people's livelihood, and the abandonment of the hitherto GDP-based performance appraisal
system. The goal is (1) to realize Scientific Development (by pushing for a transformation of
development mode and increasing the quality and benefits of development), (2) to achieve a
comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development (by promoting the civilization level
of society and further building a resource saving and environmentally friendly society), and (3)
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to improve the livelihood of the people (by attending to the protection and improvement of
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livelihood). These purposes are given indicators that are similar to the targets later set in the
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provincial-level 12th Five-Year Plan (see example in table 15 in appendix, p. 102). According
to the Politburo document, the various targets are binding and bound to be implemented 必须
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确保实现的约束性指标.
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Average GDP per capita growth
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People’s Livelihood
Comprehensive, coordinated and
General budget revenue accounted for
the proportion of GDP
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Table 1: Evaluation criteria under the Scientific Development View scheme
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Strengthening the contribution rate of
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Real growth rate of per capita income
scientific and technological progress
of urban and rural residents
Urban and rural public services
Registered urban unemployment rate
spending accounted for the proportion
Increase of agricultural output value
of fiscal expenditure
and the proportion of high-efficiency
agriculture
Basic social insurance coverage in
urban and rural areas
Higher education enrollment rate
Health of urban and rural population
Tertiary sector output value accounted
Areas of public cultural and sport
for the proportion of GDP
facilities per 10,000 inhabitants
High-tech industrial output value
Indicator of a safe and sound society
accounted for the proportion of
industrial output
Energy consumption decrease rate, and
COD and SO2 emissions per unit
Level of internationalization of
reduction rate
economy
Green coverage rate in urban and rural
areas
Source: Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting 2009, compiled by the author
Cadres should be evaluated more regularly and a comprehensive evaluation and opinion
assessment system should be developed including the assessment of the satisfaction level of
the masses群众满意度测评体系. Furthermore, the basis of evaluators should be expanded,
procedures of evaluation and investigation 考察 31 of subjects proposed for recommendation
推荐提名 should be improved and publicly reported. 32 The results of the democratic
recommendation and democratic investigation should be analyzed, and the decision on
promotion subjected to two rounds of voting.
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(i.e. masses 群众). For the first time, the term “masses” includes work colleagues and the
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public.
However, while the document is clearer which work colleagues are to be
A central demand is to make evaluation more democratic by expanding the basis of evaluators
33
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interviewed—namely work colleagues one level above and below—it is less specific in
defining the term “public”.
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The document proposes the following forms of assessment and evaluation: public opinion 民
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意调查, conference assessment 会议调查, single dialogues 个别对话, consultation of the
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community 社区征询 via telephone and or internet. The goal is to understand the opinion of
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the masses on the effects of Scientific Development in the locality, on the work of government
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the beginning of every year during h
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departments, and the work style of leading bodies and cadres. The evaluation is conducted at
the Political Consultative Committee 政协会议 (CPPCC). Participants include party
representatives of the every department, representatives of the People’s Congress, members of
the CPPCC, and other representatives of the masses.
31
32
33
The documents on cadre evaluation use different terms for evaluation: kaocha 考察, kaohe 考核, pingjia 评
价, jianding 鉴定, shencha 审查 etc. do imply different purposes, contents of appraisal. Also, the
conducting agency and the subject under evaluation change. A reference for explication of rules and
regulations is Questions and Answers on Party Organization Work 党的组织工作问答 (1983, 1996). For a
detailed discussion on the 1983 version and the terminology of evaluation refer to Manion 1985: 226-231.
“Publicly” does not mean that evaluation results are disclosed to the broader public. Public in the above sense
includes party members of the unit the evaluated cadres are part of (Interview Hu Si 29 July 2013, and Zhang
Shiyan 30 July 2013).
The term masses 群众 is quite ambiguous, and its meaning in the Chinese context differs from its original use
in traditional Marxism. In respect with cadre evaluation, “masses” is mostly referred to work colleagues.
However, the term seems to undergo a transformation, as the new proposal on cadre evaluation includes
public opinion and its assessment as additional evaluation method.
Appraisal has to apply to scientific principles 34 and is to be conducted in regular examination
cycles. Seniority and the time a cadre has worked in a specific position, past and recent work
results, and quality and outcomes of the cadre’s work are criteria considered in the evaluation.
By doing so, the correctness and veritableness of the evaluation are improved. Every
jurisdiction has to set up its own indicators and standards.
Leading bodies are graded with excelling 优秀, very good 良好, general 一般, and relatively
poor 较差; leading cares with excelling 优秀, competent 称职, basically competent 基本称
职, and not competent 不称职. If the evaluation of leading bodies results in a low level of
satisfaction or reveals incidents that have negatively influenced the Scientific Development,
the superior Organization Department has to verify the situation and make adjustments
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大up. Party commissions at provincial,
An evaluation system for party commissions has to be set
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city and county level have to organize two convocations to brief on the work of equally
accordingly.
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ranking party commission and party commission members; on this occasion, a democratic
investigation and democratic review 民主评议 on the work performance have to be
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conducted. At the same time, an investigation and review of the superior-level party
commission, the leading government body, and government department chiefs can be
THE GUANGDONG CADRE EVALUATION SYSTEM 36
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conducted. 35
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In June 2008, Guangdong released its trial version of a new annual evaluation system under
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the Scientific Development View. Based on the information given in the document and its
attachments with a detailed list of evaluation criteria, their weight, and assessment sheets, I
examine the formal rules of this new evaluation system.
The document contains nine chapters. Chapter one of the document presents the general
principles the scheme adheres to, the subjects under evaluation (municipal party and
34
35
36
For the term “scientific principles” the document does not give any further explanation. In regard to the
methodology and standards of assessment, the document remains silent too. It does neither give any
instructions in regard to the definition of population, nor does it make any explicit claim on
representativeness, nor does it suggest any specific method of sampling or other regulations and methodology
for opinion assessment. Whether opinion polls meet the requirements of real scientific criteria is speculative.
The document uses “can” 可以. Thus we can infer that this bottom up approach within the political
hierarchies is still handled with cautiousness.
Evaluation criteria system and methods for annual appraisal for party and government leading bodies and
cadres at bureau level in Guangdong provincial and municipal departments 广东省市厅级党政领导班子和
领导干部落实科学发展观评价指标体系及考核评价办法 (试行) (Later referred to as Guangdong Cadre
Evaluation System) (Guangdong zuzhibu 2008).
government leading bodies and cadres, the president of the municipal court, the director of the
municipal procuratorate, the leading bodies and cadres of provincial commissions and
government departments, provincial commissions and government departments, provincial
court and procuratorate), the evaluation methods according to rank (performance evaluation
实绩考核, democratic investigation, and satisfaction level of the masses for the appraisal of
municipal bodies and cadre; work performance evaluation 工作效能考评for the appraisal of
provincial level leading bodies and cadres), 37 and the responsible organ that conducts the
evaluation (Provincial Leading Group Office for Appraisal省考核评价工作领导小组办公室,
abbreviated Provincial Appraisal Office省考评办).
Performance evaluation. According to the new framework, the 21 prefecture-level cities of
政治大
development areas 都市发展区, optimized development areas 优化发展区, key development
立
Guangdong are divided into four development areas and evaluated accordingly: urban
areas 重点发展区, and ecological development areas 生态发展区. Criteria are separated in
‧ 國
學
four categories (economic development 经济发展, social development 社会发展, peoples’
livelihood 民生, environment and ecology 环境与生态), and their weight defined according
‧
to the developmental necessities of the area. Common criteria 共同指标 are criteria that have
sit
y
Nat
to be fulfilled by all four development areas, specific criteria 类别指标 (literally criteria by
io
n
al
er
category) only apply to the specific development area.
Ch
Table 2: Guangdong's development areas
Urban development areas
i
n
U
v
e n g c hKeyi development areas
Optimized development
Ecological development
areas
areas
Guangzhou 广州
Zhuhai 珠海
Huizhou 惠州
Shaoguan 韶关
Shenzhen 深圳
Foshan 佛山
Jiangmen 江门
Heyuan 河源
Dongguan 东莞
Shantou 汕头
Meizhou 梅州
Zhongshan 中山
Shanwei 汕尾
Yangjiang 阳江
Zhanjiang 湛江
Maoming 茂名、
Zhaoqing 肇庆
Qingyuan 清远
Chaozhou 潮州
37
The four types of evaluation are in accordance with the Politburo document discussed above.
Jieyang 揭阳
Yunfu 云浮
Source: Guangdong Evaluation System, Guangdong zuzhibu 2008, chapter 9
Table 3: Target category weight according to development areas in Guangdong
Development Area
Economic
Social Development
People’s Lives
development
Urban Development
Environment and
Ecology
30
22
23
25
31
21
23
25
33
19
20
28
22
30
Areas
Optimized
Development Areas
Key Development
Areas
27
Ecological
立
Development Areas
政治大
21
Source: Guangdong Evaluation System, Guangdong zuzhibu 2008
‧ 國
學
If we look at the weight distributed to the target categories in the different development zones,
‧
we can discern that the development impetus is still prevailing. However, environmental and
ecological targets have gained considerably in importance, also compared to social factors.
y
Nat
sit
The data and analysis for the annual work performance evaluation is provided and conducted
al
er
io
by the responsible provincial-level departments and sent to the Provincial Bureau of Statistics
n
before the end of February of every year. The total score has 100 points. The Provincial
Ch
i
n
U
v
Appraisal Office is responsible for summarizing the final score of the province’s cities.
engchi
The democratic investigation assesses the performance of municipal party and government
leading bodies and cadres in their ability to meet the requirements of the Scientific
Development View. Applied to leadership bodies this method investigates ideological and
political construction, leadership capacities, work behavior and moral conduct. Similar to the
performance evaluation, the investigation distinguishes between common and specific
items/projects 项目. Common 共同 applies to all evaluated subjects, specific 类别 only
applies to some high ranking officials (committee secretary, mayor, committee vice-secretary,
municipal standing committee member, vice-mayor, president of court, and chief procurator).
Common projects/items are for example political quality, ideological and moral
accomplishments, development of innovation capacity, party style and honest governing. Both
investigations—specific and common—have to be conducted and attached to the annual work
report compiled by the Municipal Committees Assembly 市委全委会.
Evaluators include members of the Municipal Party Committee, People’s Congress,
government, Political Consultative Committee, members of the Discipline Inspection
Commission, Intermediate People’s Court, Municipal People’s Procuratorate, Municipal
Committee, municipal government departments, government-authorized social organizations,
important leading members of units in municipally-administrated enterprises, leading
members of county-level (city and district) Party and government, and other personnel that
has to participate. 38 In the assessment of municipal party and government leading bodies and
cadres four answer options are possible: outstanding, very good, normal, and relatively poor.
The assessment of satisfaction level of the masses is defined as a qualitative assessment of the
work results and public image of leading bodies and cadres. 13 contents are under scrutiny;
again four answers are possible: satisfied 满意, relatively satisfied 比较满意, not satisfied 不
政治大
满意, do not understand 不了解. There are two different opinion assessment forms for
立
leading bodies and leading cadres.
‧ 國
學
Those classified as leading cadres are representatives of the Party Congress 党代会代表,
representatives of the People’s Congress, members of the CPPCC, and others其他. Opinion
‧
assessment of leading cadres mostly concerns their work attitude and moral behavior.
Questions relate to the level of satisfaction in regard to the leading cadre’s work attitude and
y
Nat
sit
accomplishments, devotion to problem solutions, adherence to the Party’s principle of honesty
al
er
io
and self-discipline, respect for (party) hierarchy, and moral behavior and conduct (Guangdong
n
Evaluation System, attachment no. 5). The assessment has to be conducted at the beginning of
Ch
i
n
U
v
the yearly scheduled meeting of the People’s Congress and the CPPCC. Participants in the
engchi
evaluation involve grassroots, Party Congress representatives who have not yet participated in
democratic investigations, representatives of the People’s Congress, members of the CPPCC,
supervisors of Scientific Development View科学发展观监督员, 39 and other representatives
of the masses. The minimum amount of participants has to be 300. The assessment is assigned
to the Provincial Appraisal Office. The satisfaction level can be assessed through household
surveys, interviews using questionnaires, and polls or consultancy on the government
webpage. The answer possibilities correspond to the score 1 for very satisfied, 0.7 for
relatively satisfied, and 0.4 for not satisfied, “do not understand” is not accounted in the
assessment (Attachment 4 and 5 of the Guangdong Evaluation System 2008).
The department work performance evaluation is conducted on provincial and municipal level.
38
39
This includes for example retired cadres (Interview Hu Si and Yang Zhi 29. July 2013).
Unfortunately I was not able to retrieve information on this new appointment or institution during my field
work.
Evaluated organs are municipal level departments (for example the Environmental Protection
Bureau of the province or any municipality, comment added by the author) and their
representatives who conduct mutual evaluation (互评方式). Leading bodies and cadres of
provincial-level departments (for example the Guangdong Provincial Environmental
Protection Bureau, comment added by the author) are evaluated in terms of their competence
in accomplishing targets and tasks. In the democratic investigation municipal departments are
assessed as outstanding, very good, general, and relatively poor. The mutual evaluation of
department representatives grades “satisfied”, “relatively satisfied”, “not satisfied”, and “do
not understand.”
The Provincial Appraisal Office is responsible for the collection of the data and the
政治大
compilation of statistics. The comprehensive and final assessment of the department (B) is a
composite of the three single evaluations (democratic evaluation, assessment of the
立
satisfaction level of the masses, and department work performance). The leading body
‧ 國
學
department democratic investigation (J) accounts for 50 per cent, the department sector based
evaluation (X) for 30 per cent, and the representatives’ mutual assessment (H) for 20 per
‧
cent. 40
Consequences and operationalization of the evaluation results. The results of the opinion
sit
y
Nat
assessment are the basis on ground of which personnel decisions and decisions over of
assignment, training and bonuses are made. In the event of three years continued outstanding
io
al
er
grading, the respective cadre is placed on the reserve cadre list 领导干部后备
41
and
n
vand selection. If leading bodies
i
considered a priority case in the next round of promotion
n
Ch
U to hand in a written explanation to
e nsupervisors
score “normal” or “relatively poor”, their
g c h i have
the Provincial Commission and suggest improvement measures. The personnel in a body that
scored “relatively poor”, is not considered for promotion, selection or transfer to important
positions.
40
41
B=J×50%+X×30%+H×20%
The reserve cadre list serves to facilitate the appointment and promotion of suitable cadres. These cadres
undergo special training as they are designated for special posts (for a more detailed explanation see Manion
1985: 219, 223-224).
78 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 5—The Incorporation Scientific Development into the CMS
Table 4: Evaluation system according to categories, criteria, validity and data providing agency for ecological development areas in Guangdong
Category
Criteria
Agency
Economic
GDP development rate
Provincial Bureau of Statistics
develop-
GDP per capita development rate and GDP development rate ratio
ment
Development rate of tax revenue per capita
Provincial Department of Finance, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
Provincial Economic and Trade Commission, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
Administrative operating costs accounted for the proportion of general budget
Provincial Department of Finance
立
Private economic value added growth rate
‧ 國
High-tech manufacturing industries accounted for the proportion of industrial added
Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission
Social undertakings and public services spending accounted for the proportion of
ment
general budget expenditures
io
Social security index
Provincial Public Security Bureau, Provincial Safety Authority, Provincial
n
al
Information development index
Democracy and rule of law index
er
Develop-
y
Fertility rate in accordance with policy
Nat
Social
Provincial Tourism Bureau, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
sit
Tourism industry revenues development rate
‧
value
Provincial Economic and Trade Commission, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
學
Industrial added value of industrial parks accounted for the proportion of the city’s
industrial added value
Ch
i
n
U
v
Bureau of Statistics
e n g cProvincial
hi
Provincial Information Industry Department
Peoples’ Congress Election Committee, , 省政协提案委 ,
Provincial Court, Provincial Office of Legislative Affairs, Provincial
Department of Civil Affairs, Provincial Department of Justice, Provincial
Bureau of Letters and Complaints
High school education enrollment rate
Provincial Department of Education, Provincial Labor and Security
Department
Physicians every 10,000 inhabitants
27
政治大
Energy consumption reduction rate of industrial added value per 10,000 Yuan
expenditures
Validity
Provincial Department of Health
21
79 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 5—The Incorporation Scientific Development into the CMS
Public bus every 10,000 inhabitants
Provincial Department of Construction
People’s
Urban unemployment rate
Liveli-hood
Engel coefficient for urban residents
Guangdong Survey Organization
Urban and rural residents per capita income growth rate and per capita GDP growth
Guangdong Survey Organization, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
22
rate of more than
Basic social insurance coverage rate
Provincial Department of Labor and Security
政治大
Proportion of households in difficult housing situation in city and countryside
立
Food and drug safety index
Provincial Department of Construction, Provincial Office of Poverty
Alleviation
Provincial Food and Drug Administration
Urban and rural income ratio
Guangdong Survey Organization, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
‧ 國
學
Rural drinking water safety penetration rate
Provincial Department of Water Resources
Rural work force transfer employment rate
Provincial Department of Labor and Social Security
Forest coverage rate
and
Cultivated Land
Enviro-
Number of urban air quality days
nment
Emission reduction completion rate of main pollutants
Urban life waste treatment rate
Guangdong
Provincial Department of Land Resources
y
sit
Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau
al
Provincial Construction Department
n
Urban sewage treatment rate
Evaluation
30
er
io
Urban green space area per capita
Source:
Provincial Bureau of Forestry
Nat
Ecology
‧
New rural cooperative medical participation rate
Ch
System,
i
n
U
v
e n g Guangdong
chi
zuzhibu
2008,
attachment
no.
Table 5: Assessment of satisfaction level of the masses for leading bodies
Evaluation content
Very
Relatively
Not
Do not
satisfied
satisfied
satisfied
know
Handle issues according to law; publication of government
affairs
Basic democratic and political construction
Level and performance of department service
Development of mass cultural and sports activities
政治大
立
學
‧ 國
Citizen moral education
Creation of civilized cities (villages and small towns), units
‧
Expansion of employment and social security
sit
y
Nat
io
n
al
er
Attention paid to the income and housing situation of masses
Ch
engchi
Improvement of traffic, and of the production and living
environment
i
n
U
v
Solving issues regarding male and female school enrollment
and health
Comprehensive governance of social security
Handling the events of letters of complaints by the masses
Leading bodies’ ideological and political construction,
construction of basic organization of party and party member
troops, cadre troops, man power
Source: Guangdong Evaluation System, Guangdong zuzhibu 2008, attachment no. 4
Leading cadres that score “basic competence” are admonished and are not being considered
for promotion, selection and transfer for one year. Assessment of “incompetent” or “basically
competent” for two consecutive years leads to an adjustment in organization or demotion.
The evaluation scheme is an integral evaluation of two different kinds of evaluation. Work
performance evaluation concerns policy targets; its measurement is clearer and grounds on
statistical data. The other three evaluation types (democratic investigation, assessment of
satisfaction level of the masses, department work evaluation) are opinion appraisals on work
style and party loyalty, and thus do not provide accurate data or hard scientific facts. These
evaluations are commissioned by the Organization Department and are directed to members
of the CCP. Personnel without CCP membership is evaluated by its affiliated party (Interview
政治大
with Hu and Yang, Beijing, 29 July 2013). The Provincial Appraisal Office, which is the
responsible organ for the comprehensive evaluation (i.e. democratic investigation, assessment
立
of satisfaction level of the masses, department work evaluation) is installed within the
‧ 國
學
Provincial Party Commission of the Organization Department and is composed of CCP party
members (Interview Hu and Yang, Beijing, 29. July 2013).
‧
CONCLUSION
y
Nat
According to the explanation given by Maria Edin (1998: 110-111), the comprehensive
sit
evaluation generally serves as basis for decisions on promotion, the performance evaluation
n
al
er
io
on the other hand serves as basis for bonuses. The Guangdong document and my interview
i
n
C
decision regarding rewards, incentives,
penalization.
h eand
ng
chi U
v
partners however suggest that the different evaluation materials are used for all kinds of
Guangdong has divided its province into development zones, criteria of the performance
evaluation are weighed according to the state and possibilities of development. The idea––
also formulated in the theory of Scientific Development––is to pin on local strengths and the
latitude for environmental or social goals given the developmental state. Local disparities
should so be overcome, and incentives and constraints distributed more evenly among
jurisdictions. However, it is questionable whether this strategy is helpful in solving the issue
of environmental degradation, as the majority of the jurisdictions continue an economic
growth development. This orientation is also reflected in the distribution of criteria weight in
the evaluation system.
The division into development zones might serve the goal to make evaluation more just, as
cadres of poorer developed jurisdictions might have higher chances in the struggle for
political authority; their jurisdiction can perform well by means of showing off with
harmonizing economic and ecological goals. However, this model is less equipped for
mitigating uneven development and environmental degradation in the whole province.
Even in the case of ecological development zones, we cannot be sure that the new distribution
of criteria weight solves the conflict between economic development and environmental
protection.
The validity given to the single categories does not, alas, tell us the whole
truth of development priorities. Even though the highest weight of 30 points is given to
ecological and environmental targets in the ecological development zones, we cannot infer
any quality of its overall distribution. In addition, we have to know the targets with veto
power, as they are an important indicator of the direction of development.
To put it in other words, in order to make an analysis that brings to light how the evaluation
政治大
system influences development, we have to have the whole picture of weights given to each
of the criteria. Unfortunately, this information is only given in internal documents, seldom
立
handed over to (foreign) researchers. Hon S. Chan and Jie Gao were able to lay hands on such
‧ 國
學
materials. In their article on accountability and performance in regard to environmental and
social factors, they provide a table with detailed information of the weight of every criterion
‧
in Jingbian County in Shaanxi Province 陕西, including the weight of the other assessments
for cadre performance.
sit
y
Nat
io
n
al
er
Table 6: Performance targets in Jingbian County 42
Ch
engchi
i
n
U
v
Source: Chan et al. 2009: S53
42
This evaluation system stems from the year 2007. It had been set up before the COD issued the proposals to
design new evaluation systems according to the Scientific Development View.
SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT IN CADRE EDUCATION AND TRAINING
ADOPTION AND EXPERIMENTATION
The Scientific Development View was first introduced into the 2006-2010 National Plan for
Cadre Education and Training 2006-2010 年全国干部教育培训规划 , (Zhonggong
zhongyang zuzhibu 2006), the Regulations on Cadre Education and Training Work 干部教育
培训工作条列 (Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu 2006). Later the concept was further integrated into the reform proposals for cadre education and training in the 2010-2020 Outline of
Cadre Education and Training Reform 2010—2020 年干部教育培训改革纲要 (Zhonggong
zhongyang bangongting 2010). The announced reforms aim at a further expansion and mod-
政治大
cadres and institutions of instruction, the party schools’ overall adaption to the requirements
立
ernization of party and cadre training institutions, the enhancement of networking between
of a transforming world, nation and Party, and at the strengthening of cadre organization. Sec-
‧ 國
學
tion two of the document outlines four basic principles. Two important goals can be discerned: the incorporation of the Scientific Development View, and the extension of training
‧
focused on capacity building:
y
Nat
sit
(1) Hold on to the general image of serving, and putting the people first 坚持服务大
n
al
er
io
局、以人为本.
i
n
U
v
(2) Hold on to the reform for innovation and competitive selection of the best 坚持改
革创新、竞争择优.
Ch
engchi
(3) Hold on to practical application, connect study and application 坚持联系实际、
学用结合.
(4) Hold on to quality first, focus on actual effects 坚持品量、注重实效.
The four principles of the cadre training reform reflect the main goals of the Scientific Development View: Serving the people, innovation, practicality, and effectiveness. This observation
raises some important questions: How do local party schools translate the goals into concrete
contents? How are the discourses of development and its transformation reflected in the curricula? Furthermore, it is interesting to find out how the conciliation between central directives and local interests find its expression in curricula of local party schools, and how the
curricula of party schools differ from each other, also according to their administrative rank.
PARTY SCHOOL CURRICULA
In the following I present an analysis of three party school curricula in Jiangsu Province:
Jiangsu Provincial Party School and Academy of Administration 中共江苏省委党校江苏省
行政学院, Suzhou City Party School and Academy of Administration 中共苏州市委党校
苏州市行政学院, and Nanjing City Party School and Academy of Administration 中共南京
市委党校南京市行政学院. Training sessions were categorized in ten main topics: Economy,
Development and Modernization (Management, innovation, macro-economy, trade, agriculture) (EDM); Security and International Relations (SIR); Rule of Law (RL); Society, Social
Policies and Social Management (Public policy management, social forces, social transformation and social stability) (SSPSM); Morality, Corruption and Leadership Principles
政治大
Scientific Development View, harmonious society, Deng Xiaoping thought etc.) (ICCP); Ca立
(MCLP); Ideology and CCP (Party history and historical experiences, Marxism and Leninism,
pacity Building (CB); Party Building and State Capacity (Professionalization, state-society
‧ 國
學
relations) (PBSC); Culture (Cultural production, traditional culture) (C); Other (Theory and
Thought, Environment and Climate Change, other) (O). My analysis brought the following
‧
results:
y
Nat
First, EDM, ICCP, SSPSM cover the largest amount of training sesssions in party school
sit
education. In regard to the category EDM, the analysis has shown that the Jiangsu Provincial
al
er
io
Party School and Nanjing Party School curricula contain more theoretical classes with a more
n
v
i
n
in particular macro-economics. C
Cadre
and its contents in Suzhou are very much
h eeducation
ngchi U
global perspective (includes financial and economic issues of the USA and EU), they address
related to the policy agendas of the locality. Hence, similar to policy mandates in China that
differ in their significance by place, time, and jurisdiction, always in accordance with local
circumstances and needs, the same appears to apply to cadre training contents. Cadres also
learn about the successful development model of the satellite city Kunshan 昆山. Sessions
include training classes in the school and excursions to Kunshan. Kunshan is a county-level
city under the administration of Suzhou prefecture. In recent years, the city stood out with its
success in socio-economic development. 43 To incentivize cadres of other county-level cities
to follow the development path of Kunshan, in particular those in Jiangsu, is much in the
interest of the prefecture-level governments. Cities like Kunshan have contributed much to the
43
The importance of Kunshan as a model-city, and its regional and national promotion are reflected in the
allocation of provincial and national party school branches, and in the promotion of its model in Suzhou Party
School.
overall performance of the Suzhou prefecture in terms of GDP, relative social equality, and
environmental performance. By diffusing the “Kunshan phenomenon” 昆山现象 cadres of
other satellite cities within and without the prefecture can learn about the strategies applied
and take it as an example how to re-arrange development. 44
Suzhou also uses the party school to promote its successful development model, as the school
invites cadres of different rank and jurisdictions all over China to take classes in Suzhou
(Zhonggong Suzhoushi weidangxiao Suzhoushi xingzheng xueyuan). This is suggested by a
statement on the webpage of the school:
While satisfactorily fulfilling the task of rotational training of local cadres, Suzhou
政治大
uses its advantageous position for reform and opening and the school’s particular
management capacities. Ten thousands of county-level cadres, young cadres,
立
township and village cadres, and entrepreneur cadres of Xinzhuang, Tibet, Inner
‧ 國
學
Mongolia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Ningxia, Jilin, Henan, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangxi,
Anwei, Hubei, Guangxi and other provinces, cities, autonomous regions and
‧
subordinated cities have successively been trained here. (Zhonggong Suzhoushi
weidangxiao Suzhoushi xingzheng xueyuan)
sit
y
Nat
io
er
Hence, the case study classes on Kunshan are also an opportunity for Suzhou to show off with
its success in socio-economic development. The fact that Kunshan performance helped
n
al
i
n
U
v
several cadres of the county-level city to get a promotion is an additional motivational and
Ch
engchi
promotion factor. In May 2010, Xinhua reported that since the 1990s, the five Kunshan party
committee secretaries have been promoted; two became provincial leaders, three had
appointments as party or government chiefs 正职 at city-level. In 2010, twelve county-level
party committee secretaries were appointed to the rank of vice-bureau level (Xinhua Online, 5
May 2010).
Table 7: Analysis of proportionality of cadre training contents in Jiangsu Province
Party
EDM
SIR
RL
SSPSM
MCLP
ICCP
CB
PBSC
C
O
Total
43
2
6
25
15
42
21
7
2
13
176
School
Jiangsu
44
Bao Yuan 暴元 states that the Kunshan phenomenon served as important development incentive for satellite
cities in the middle and Western provinces (Bao Yuan暴元 (2005): “’Kunshan xianxiang’ dui zhongxibu diqu
xian huo jingji fazhan de qishi ‘昆山现象’对中西部地区县域经济发展的启示.” In Zhongguo xibu keji 20, pp. 7-9)
24.4
1.2%
3.4%
14.2%
8.5%
23.9%
12%
4%
1.1%
7.4%
152
9
8
30
1
99
0
16
22
12
43.6%
2.6%
2.3%
8.6%
3.5%
28.4%
2.6%
6.3%
3.4%
Suzhou
34
0
0
7
9
6
6
4
0
0
Party
51.5%
10.6%
13.6%
9.1%
9.1%
6.1%
Provincial
Party
School
Nanjing
Party
349
School
66
School
Table 8: Global, national and local topics
Jiangsu Provincial Party School
Nanjing Party School
Suzhou Party School
政治大
Comparative studies on the political
Studies on macro-economic management:
system of contemporary western
macro-economic management systems
立
Contemporary major global economic
trends
Current economic trends and macro
Changes and future trends in the
Studies on macro-policy management
contemporary international financial
models
structure
from international experience, making
good community work
Suzhou’s economic and social
Nat
development strategy
Strengthening autonomous innovation
al
er
io
sit
y
Studies on the forces the domestic
n
The enlightenment and transformation of
Ch
the CCP's development concept
Suzhou’s community work––learning
‧
control and regulation policy directions
demand expansion
Suzhou town building
學
‧ 國
developed states
Suzhou‘s city development strategy
engchi U
v
ni
capacities, promoting economic
development in Suzhou
Second, within the category EDM coordinated development within the region and the
jurisdiction (i.e. urban and rural areas), innovation and technological upgrading, and
agricultural modernization are prevailing issues. A regional perspective is adopted by the
provincial-level and provincial-capital-level party schools, Suzhou Party School focuses with
its development issues on the jurisdiction.
Table 9: Coordinated development, innovation, and upgrading
Jiangsu Party School
Suzhou Party School
Studies on technology and innovation
Ways and inspiration of coordinated devel- Modern Scientific Development and innova-
projects in Jiangsu
opment in Suzhou
tive strategies
Jiangsu's coastal development and
The experience of Kunshan economic and
Studies on coordinated regional development
coordinated regional development
social development
Integrative development of urban and rural
development
Studies on agricultural modernization
Suzhou economic and social development
projects in Jiangsu
strategy
Coordination and evolutionary laws of modern production structure
Actively promoting the building of an
innovative province
Studies on questions on quickly transforming
economic development mode
Studies on the integration of rural and
urban areas
Studies on maintaining a balanced and
fast development in Jiangsu
Deeper understanding of the spirit of
立
學
‧ 國
the Central Economic Work
政治大
Conference promoting a balanced and
fast development
‧
Nat
sit
y
Third, the new ideological party line of Scientific Development is well incorporated into the
er
io
curricula. The party schools in Jiangsu and Nanjing tackle the issue from a very theoretical
vantage point (ideological principals). Suzhou Party School on the other hand applies a more
n
al
Ch
i
n
U
v
practical approach and tackles its implementation by taking examples from the jurisdiction.
engchi
Table 10: The Scientific Development View
Suzhou Party School
Continuously increasing party leaders'
Studies on Socialism with Chinese charac-
Leaders' scientific decision-making: selec-
capacity for Scientific Development
teristics: Scientific Development View
tion and use of, incentives for personnel
studies
“Put people first” development concept
and leaders' cultural perspective
Patterns of Scientific Development in SuCultural perspectives and considerations
within the Scientific Development View
The 12th Five-Year-Plan and initiatives
in Jiangsu's situation of Scientific De-
Path-developing theory on the three issues
velopment
of agriculture: (1) The Scientific Development View is the essential mode of integration and thorough planning (2) putting the
people first is the core of the Scientific
zhou's economy
Development View
Thorough implementation of the Scientific
Development View
Fourth, cadres receive special leadership, organizational and management training. Jiangsu
Party School and Suzhou Party School offer training on leadership qualities, e-governance,
stress coping strategies etc. Nanjing Party School placed an emphasis on management studies
(macro-economic management theories, public management, human resource management
etc.).
Table 11: Capacity building
立
Suzhou Party School
Studies on increasing leadership capacities
administrative capacities
theory
of township and village party committees
Studies on strengthening organization
Western management theories: Strategic
and implementation capacities
management theories
‧
Leading cadres theoretical and
Studies on macro-economic management:
strategic thinking
macro-economic management and
io
n
al
adjustment
Increasing leadership influence
leading cadres qualities
Mental health of leaders
sit
Nat
Leaders’ capacities of emotional
income distribution policies
Pivotal issues of the strengthening of
er
‧ 國
Western management theories: classical
學
Increasing leading cadres'
y
政治大
v
i
Studies
on
macro-economic
management:
n
Ch
e n gmanagement
macro-economic
and
chi U
E-governance in public administration
How township and village leaders
assume responsibility for economic work
The transformation roles of leadership
employment policies
The arts of leadership
Building intellectual innovation and
Public management theories: performance
leading cadres study capacities
management of the public sector
Leaders’ innovative thinking
Human Resources Management: Human
Resource Planning
Innovative thinking in problem
solutions
Media communication
How to increase leading cadres
capacities to respond to the online
community 45
Fifth, the issue of increasing pressures on China’s natural environment has been translated
into the curricula of party schools. In 2005, the State Council issued a document that requires
local party schools to improve the knowledge of cadres on environmental issues. The
Decision of the State Council on implementing the Scientific Development View to strengthen
environmental protection (Guowuyuan 2005) states:
Cadre institutions of all levels should strengthen environmental training for leading
政治大
er, to strengthen environmental education for young cadres, develop nationwide ac立
tivities on popular environmental science, and foster nationwide the awareness of
environmental protection. (Guowuyuan 2005)
學
‧ 國
cadres and business executives. It is necessary to enforce training of green manpow-
‧
The analysis of party school curricula shows that this directive is adopted accordingly. The
curricula of provincial and city-level party schools contain training sessions on environmental
y
Nat
sit
and ecological building, green planning, low carbon technology, and climate change science.
al
er
io
Still compared to other economic and developmental issues, the proportion of instruction
v
i
n
Furthermore, in accordance with
to further promote international cooperation,
Cthe
U
h erequest
i
h
n
c
g
Suzhou Party School, Institute of Energy and Sustainable Development of Tongji University
n
concerning the environment and ecology is fairly low.
同济大学, and UNEP jointly organized a four-days-long workshop in September 2011:
Seminar on Topics of Suzhou’s Ecological Civilization and Sustainable Development 苏州市
生态文明与可持续发展专题研修班 . Prominent figures such as State Councilor Niu
Wenyuan 牛文元 , Ye Wenhu 叶文虎 , Director of the Chinese Research Center on
Sustainable Development of Beijing University 北大中国持续发展研究中心, and Lü Shihai
吕世海, researcher at the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences 中国环境
45 It is an interesting detail that Zhejiang Province has recently incorporated “Weibo writing” as an examination
form into its cadre evaluation system and in the curricula of its party school. See People’s Online (26 July
2012): “Zhejiang tiantai ganbu kao xie weibo yao dadao ‘xiyin yanqiu, yaohe xiaoguo’ 浙江天台干部考写
微薄要达到’吸引眼球、吆喝效果.’” Retrieved from:
http://leaders.people.com.cn/BIG5/n/2012/0726/c58278-18607013.html (last checked, June 2013)
科学研究院 were invited to join the seminar and give speeches. Another 45 leading
government officials and of five county-level and seven prefecture-level cities participated in
the four days session (UNEP et al. 26 September 2011).
Table 12: Green development
Suzhou Party School
Studies on building ecology projects in Environmental building and sustainable Issues of modern Chinese urban culture and
Jiangsu
development in Suzhou
ecology
China's green planning to solve the
Low
population
transformation
problem
and
Jiangsu's
innovative realization
of
modes
and
of
Climate change science and China’s situation
and challenges in the face of climate change
‧ 國
Sixth, societal challenges and the challenges posed by different social groups and forces (reli-
‧
gious communities, netizens, peasants etc.) found their way into the curricula. Cadres now
y
Nat
take classes in which they learn how to use Weibo, and crisis management in regard to dealing
n
al
er
io
sit
with the online community.
Table 13: Dealing with social forces
Ch
i
n
U
v
engchi
Studies on youth’s problems in a
The Pary’s theories and policies on
transforming period
intellectuals
Harbringer of social conflicts and their
Contemporary problems with ethnic
control
groups and religion––The World and
China
The form of online social conflicts and
the government’s response
Contemporary religious problems and
the Party’s religious policy
How
to
increase
leading
cadres
the
resource
學
technology
utilization
政治大
立
carbon
Suzhou Party School
Studies on peasants' lost land issues
capacities to respond to the online
community 46
Seventh, against the background of the increasingly revealed scandals on corruption and immoral behavior of party officials, the leadership started to act on the issue also on organizational level and incorporated cadre morality as instruction content in cadre training. We will
have a closer look on the issue in the next section of the chapter.
CONCLUSION
The tables above give an insight into the diversity of cadre education and training. In regard to
治
政
tackle issues of income disparities, integration of rural 大
and urban development. The curricula
立
also highlight that local party committees are trying—at least at rhetorical level—to
the demands of the Scientific Development View and Harmonious Society, local party school
‧ 國
學
implement the main principles of the cadre training reform and incorporate Scientific
Development on theoretical and practical level. Training contents are capacity-focused and try
‧
to link theoretical concepts with problems in realpolitik. Besides the instruction of party
ideologies and guidelines, cadre training focuses on managerial skills such as modern
y
Nat
sit
administration, e-governance and new communication technologies. Teaching approaches
al
er
io
such as case study sessions on experiences of other jurisdiction in particular on successful
n
models of coordinated economic and social development are very popular. The schools appear
Ch
i
n
U
v
to adopt a strategy of benchmarking or profiling. This tendency is suggested due to the
engchi
numerous classes in management theories in Nanjing Party School, and in Suzhou’s
promotion of its development model(s) to cadres all over China.
The analysis has not only revealed the variety of cadre instruction contents, it also shows how
external and internal challenges are translated into the curricula of party schools. In the future,
curricula will eventually become more diversified and will further translate current domestic
and international issues into their curricula.
46
It is an interesting detail that Zhejiang Province has recently incorporated “Weibo writing” as an examination
form into its cadre evaluation system and in the curricula of its party school (Xinhua Online 2012)
92 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 6—Critical Assessment
CHAPTER 6—CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
This chapter discusses the challenges of the CMS, and puts them into the larger framework of
political reform. First, I discuss the reasons for the failure of the environmental accountability.
Besides common arguments of existing literature, I also put forward some new considerations.
治
政
motivational factors that should be taken into consideration.
大 After that, I refer to the cultural
and political obstacles that立
hinder a higher degree of objectivity in the evaluation system.
Then I tackle the issue of (strategic) behavior and point to the influence of different
‧ 國
學
Before I tackle the positions on the effectiveness of cadre education, I discuss the use of
popular opinion polls in cadre evaluation as a way to put more pressure on local cadres to
Nat
y
‧
become more susceptive for the needs of the local population.
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FAILED SYSTEM IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS
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In spite of the ambitions and endeavors repeatedly expressed at central level, the
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establishment of the Environmental Protection Responsibility System, the incorporation of
and the greater weight given to environmental criteria in the cadre evaluation system,
environmental protection has not been as successfully been promoted by local administrators
as its original precursor, i.e. economic development. Except for some local initiatives and
experiments, local governments have in general continued to give priority to economic growth.
After billions of investments in renewable energy resources, reforestation, ecological
protection and reconstruction measures, China’s environmental situation is more
preoccupying than it has ever been before. The cadre incentive and constraint system failed in
effectively promoting environmental protection. However, the reasons for its failure are
systemic, structural, and political.
First, local governments shoulder the main financial responsibility for local administrative
and policy measures. Economic development is favored as it brings the necessary tax
revenues and creates jobs. This has also the effect that the priority given to economic
development and the blind eye turned to polluting industries is often supported by the local
population (see Tilt 2009).
Second, in the performance appraisal of local governments economic and some social
development criteria mostly weigh more than environmental criteria. The veto power criteria
are set according to local circumstances and needs, thus not every leading body or cadre in
every jurisdiction is constrained by an environmental target with veto power. In Guangdong,
out of 21 prefecture-level cities, only three are defined as ecological development zones in
which environmental targets value over the other three categories, economic development,
social development, and people’s lives. The majority of cities are defined as key development
政治大
areas in which economic development is given the highest priority. Furthermore, even if
environmental criteria take the largest share of points in Shaoguan, Heyuan, and Meizhou
立
(ecological development areas), priority to economic development over environment can
‧ 國
學
always be exercised by choosing economic criteria as targets with veto power that outgun the
protection of the environment. The same applies to maintaining social stability. If this target
decides over career advancement, local governments are less inclined to negotiate with
‧
environmental protesters. Hharmonizing the protection of the environment with development
sit
y
Nat
is less an economic issue than a problem related to the development view 发展观 and to
io
er
political ideals 执政理念, but a fundamental change of the development concept and the
mind-set of cadres is still due. As long as the traditional form of GDP prevails, it will
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determine reputations, performance, and promotions even if this means adherence to the
engchi
principle of black GDP 47 results in a further deterioration of China’s natural environment
(Zhang 2008). The documents of the 18th National Party Congress show how much the CCP
leadership is aware of the pressure resulting this development view and the public discussions
on it; they also reveal that the leadership has not yet had the courage to declare its final
farewell to GDP-ism. However, the recent statement and claim by Xi Jinping 习近平 that
GDP-pursuing officials will not be longer awarded with appointments and bonus give a
flicker of hope. So does the announcement that various provinces—among them Hainan,
Hunan 湖南, Anhui 安徽, Xinjiang 新疆—have established local Green GDP accounting
system and incorporated Green GDP into their cadre evaluation system (Yicai Online, 12 July
2013).
47
”Black” as the contrary to “green” GDP, refers to economic growth induced by environmental polluting
industries, such as oil and coal industry.
Third, evaluation does not account for the damage that one jurisdiction causes for another.
Lieberthal (1995) refers to this problem; he holds that the fragmentation of the country along
administrative boundaries often leads to the effect that polluting enterprises are located near
the downstream boundaries of jurisdictions with the result that one jurisdiction absolves itself
from responsibility, and pollution so becomes a problem for the government farther
downstream (286). Transboundary environmental protection is a sensitive issue that is still not
handled properly, neither on institutional nor on structural level.
A recent illustrative example was reported in the South China Morning Post on July 17, 2013:
According to a study by the Yantai Institute of Coastal Zone Research under the Chinese
Academy of Sciences published in Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, the annual algal
bloom that swamps the coast and beaches of Qingdao 青岛 is likely caused by seaweed
政治大
farming in the adjacent province Jiangsu. Since the findings of the study touch inter-regional
立
relations, and might have implications for the fast-growing and lucrative seaweed farming
‧ 國
學
industry, the topic is quite sensitive. Hence, scholars were reluctant to speak out publicly, and
the results of the study were discussed quite controversially. The chances to solve the problem
‧
and put preventive measures in place however appear to be slim as the root cause of the algae
bloom is still unclear and vested interests are involved (Li, 17 July 2013).
Nat
sit
y
This incident shows quite plainly the sensitivity of conflicting interests between economy and
io
er
ecology on inter-regional level. While Jiangsu’ governments can pride itself with an economic
development model that improves economic conditions and concomitantly reduces fishing
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v
pressures and over-exploitation of fish resources, Shandong officials are struggling for a
Ch
engchi
better environmental performance that is being compromised by the Scientific Development
performance of its neighbor province.
Fourth, China’s political system and its strategy applied continue to search the cure for the
disease in the optimization of the administrative system. The lack of civil participation,
transparency, and monitoring of external institutions (such as media and NGOs) still accounts
for a comparatively low pressure exerted on the government to enforce law and implement
policies in the environmental realm. Even though llocal riots against the degradation of the
environment are widespread, they do not seem to push local cadres into rethinking their
industrialization strategies. As already mentioned above, the short term ability to suppress
these riots incentivized by targets of high validity (i.e. targets with veto power) is rewarded
while a change of strategy only implies high risks.
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS AND DIFFERENT OUTCOMES
Various studies support the positive relation between promotion incentives and employee motivation. 48 The Chinese CMS grounds on these assumptions and tries to incentivize local
agents with promotion, bonus, and higher salaries to implement policy goals set at higher levels. Inappropriate monitoring, weak legislative foundation and a low level of law enforcement
have led exacerbate the structural deficiencies in environmental and ecological protection.
Since the CMS distinguishes between promotion, bonus and salaries for collective cadres, it is
necessary to have a closer look on how the incentive system works for different career (advancement) aspirations, in particular how it works for cadres without any aspiration at all.
治
政
大 context of the cadre evaluation
promoting economic development through the institutional
立 two kinds of evaluations: the work performance evaluation
system. She distinguishes between
Maria Edin (1998) tackles this issue in her article in which she tries to explain the success of
‧ 國
學
which is related to bonus and the ability and attitude evaluation that are related to promotion
(110). She writes: “Promotion is one important incentive for local cadres, which is linked to
‧
economic performance but also too many other criteria” (111). Today, promotion also depends on the performance in social and environmental matters. However, we still do not know
Nat
er
io
sit
y
how the different incentives (bonus and promotion) can affect cadre behavior differently.
Although many organizations have some form of reward strategies in place, they still
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v
lack in-depth understanding of which set of strategies are ideal for different cadres of
engchi
employees. This is because different cadres of employees may not necessarily be motivated equally by the same set of incentives. Moreover it is not enough to put incentives in place; there is need to evaluate how effective they are in influencing employees to achieve organizational goals. (Wambugu et al. 2013: 18-19)
Reward design and strategies have to consider differences of employees; financial incentives
do not guarantee good performance. Hence,
48
A useful overview on the incentive structures and literature gives Savych, Bogdan (2005): “Towards
Incentives to Transform Military Transformation: A Review of Economic Models of Compensation.”
National Defense Research Institute
it is absolutely clear that organizations can benefit from reward strategies so long as
they are fairly implemented, well communicated to employees, and managers clearly
understand the link between reward strategies and employees’ performance. It is a
known fact that most employees work well in an organization if they are being paid
well but yet money is not the only thing that can motivate employees to stay. Money
may attract people to the front door but something else is needed to keep them from
going out the back door (20).
According to Zhao Yanyun 赵彦云, director of the Department of Statistics, China Renmin
University 中国人民大学统计学院, cadres cannot shirk the responsibility and the duty to
治
政
mance does not merely result in losing the opportunity 大
to career advancement or bonus. Even
立keep a low profile and maintain their jobs have to correspond at
those cadres who just want to
implement policies that benefit the economy, the society and the environment. Low perfor-
‧ 國
risk demotion (Interview with Zhao Yanyun, 26. July 2013).
學
least to a certain degree to the requirements of the new development paradigm; otherwise they
‧
Still, empirically we do not have any reliable data that reflects the long-term effects on the
fate of those cadres who perform poorly or even fail the requirements more often than others.
Nat
sit
y
In the Chinese CMS, systematic research is hindered by scattered and insufficient information
io
er
enclosed to the public. In addition, the system itself is characterized by a high degree of information asymmetry between the different administrative levels and the cadre groups. In
n
al
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i
n
U
v
spite of Zhao Yanyun’s positive outlook on the effectiveness of the system and the institution-
engchi
al constraints it sets, we still cannot dismiss the hypothesis that cadres who aspire promotion
will always try to do a better job than those without or with fewer (career advancement) ambitions.
Finally, in order to come to terms with the implementation, enforcement, and moral hazard
problems, the Chinese State has to strengthen its legislative foundations and monitoring systems. Effective monitoring however needs independent institutions outside the political system, including media and the public. A precondition is the disclosure of information on government affairs. Both the legislative foundation and effective monitoring are still poorly developed in China.
SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE CLAIM OF OBJECTIVITY IN CADRE
EVALUATION
Faced with the problem of policy implementation at local level, and rampant corruption within the Chinese bureaucracy, the quest for standardization and objectivity in order to make cadres more accountable for their actions is clearly serving the Party’s interests in its struggle
for survival. However, it would be too simplistic and even misleading to infer that accountability is merely meant to be vertical and unidirectional or that it simply serves to tighten the
center's grip on its agents. Other than the principal-agent problem, the Chinese party-state also
faces the so called dictator’s commitment problem.
治
政
大Most dictators do not directly contator and his allies to credibly commit to joint rule.
trol enough resources立
to govern alone and therefore seek the support of notables with
The central dilemma of any dictatorship is to establish a mechanism that allows the dic-
‧ 國
學
whom they promise to share power. However, power-sharing in dictatorships is complicated by a fundamental commitment problem: no independent authority can guarantee
‧
that the spoils of joint rule will be divided as the dictator and his or her allies agreed
(Boix et al. 2013).
sit
y
Nat
io
er
Trust into leadership and into the fairness of their designed performance appraisal systems are
important considerations that the leadership does not ignore as these are vital for the further
n
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v
survival of the CCP. Corruption and promotion gained through dishonesty is a big problem
engchi
for the leadership as it can undermine its authority. Hence, the following hypothesis is reasonable: the efforts to improve the evaluation system in making it more objective and open to
scrutiny are also in the interest of cadres. It ultimately serves the credibility of the CCP rule
among its agents. An objective evaluation system enforces the trust that promotion is a matter
of achievement and performance, and not a matter of having (the right) connections. Two factors pose obstacles to the solution of these problems: the cultural predisposition of guanxi,
and the lack of transparency.
First, the issue of guanxi related to decisions in personnel administration is quite plain. The
procedures of promotion and its decision-making process are stipulated and formal procedures.
However, the system assigns some cadres with more decision-making competence and influence. These cadres are part of the Organization Department in their department, unit or organization. They have formalized veto power 一票否决 and oversee the process of promotion in
which they can also interfere. If cadres with veto power refuse promotion, the cadre handled
for career advancement has no chance to climb up the next rung of the ladder (Interview with
Hu Si, Beijing, 29 July 2013). On which basis these decisions are taken is not clear, neither is
clear in as much these cadres have to explain or defend their veto.
This leads us to the second factor: The lack of transparency is a problem that might cause further distrust and aggravate the dictator’s commitment dilemma, as cadres cannot solely count
on their abilities and merits to advance in the system. Principally, we have to ask whether cadres support a higher degree of objectivity that reduces the influence of personal relations, or
whether they prefer a formalized system of appraisal combined with the informal system of
guanxi. 49
政治大
Still, the reform of the CMS and the newly proposed evaluation schemes do promise some
higher degree of objectivity in terms of measurement of policy performance. In the past, data
立
on the accomplishments of governments and leading cadres were evaluated, was provided by
‧ 國
學
one institution. The new evaluation scheme commissions the agencies in their distinct policy
competences to provide data material. This decentralization of data provision power gives
more clout to various political administrations (such as the environmental administration) and
‧
sit
io
al
er
Nat
LACK OF POLITICAL REFORM
y
supports them in their efforts to represent the interests of their agency is concerned with.
n
v
i
n
Ch
(Jiangxi Province
e n g江西)
c h ihadUto consult
According to a small investigation published in People’s Daily (Shi 22 October 2011), cadres
in Jingdezhen 景德镇
the population on their
problems, and conduct opinion assessments 征求意见. In Ganzhou 赣州 (Gansu Province
甘肃) township party committees and all of their members were required to disclose
performance results to the local population. The material was put online, pinned on public
boards in townships and villages, and distributed to every household. After that, the city
received 160 replies that concerned 121 cadres; in 26 replies dissatisfaction and poor
government performance was expressed. As a result, 25 cadres were summoned for
interviews; one of them was deleted from the reserve cadre list.
Cadre evaluation under the Scientific Development View formally incorporates public
opinion. By including the result of opinion polls cadres are subjected to more pressure and
49
For an interesting study on the impact of economic performance and factionalism on career mobility see Choi,
Eun Kyong (2012): “Patronage and Performance: Factors in the Political Mobility of Provincial Leaders in
Post-Deng China.” In The China Quarterly 212, pp. 965-98.
thus are supposed to act more in the interest of the society rather than pursue their own
interests. Another explanation is the CCP’s struggle for legitimization among the Chinese
society. By ostensibly boosting the validity of social factors and introducing public opinion
assessment as a cadre evaluation method, the Chinese leadership hopes to reduce the growing
gap the Party and the society. Local officials suffer from a low degree of legitimization and
are targets of popular criticism and resentments. The rampant corruption and inappropriate
attitudes of cadres often induce protest, both in the virtual and the real space. The campaign
service for the people 为人服务 is part of the CCP’s efforts to make cadres more susceptive
to the needs of the people. Including public opinion into the institutional context of cadre
evaluation thus has to be seen in the context of the CCP's efforts to create the image of a
治
政
the 1990s, when the opinion polls were started being used
大 in order to improve the quality of
立 taken from performance pledges in Hong Kong and had
public service. The idea was
serving party 服务政党, other than just a ruling party 执政政党. These efforts trace back to
‧ 國
學
originally come from the British Citizens’ Charter Program under Prime Minister John Major.
Hong Kong implemented the Performance Pledge System under Governor Chris Pattern in
‧
1992 (Foster 2006: 226). In his article, Improving Municipal Governance in China: Yantai’s
Path breaking Experiment in Administrative Reform, Kenneth W. Foster explains how a small
Nat
sit
y
party cadre in his endeavor to improve public service and cadres’ attitudes towards the needs
io
er
of the local population implemented the so called Service Promise System. The model was so
successful that it brought Mr. Li a promotion to a provincial-level post, and the model was
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subsequently emulated in other provinces.
engchi
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Still, measuring the effectiveness of such opinion polls on governance, and the impact of
public assessment in cadre evaluation is a tricky undertaking. First of all, polls and
assessments are usually conducted by government and party departments, and not by
independent external institutions. Thus selection bias is highly probable. Second, it remains to
be seen how much opinion polls, service lines or the public assessments influence the
behavior of local cadres and politics, and thus increase the degree of public participation. In
some single cases the system might be successful, in others it might not. Hence, their
participatory value in terms of democratization should not be overstated.
However, opinion polls and public assessment have to be analyzed in the context of China’s
politics of inclusion. In recent years, the Chinese leadership has been confronted with
repeated calls for more democratization from the international community, and has also been
put under pressure by the growing prominence of NGOs. In official statements, party leaders
have repeatedly rejected a Western version of democracy. Yet, they are aware that the
continued exclusion of the population from politics is no sustainable option for the CCP and
its claim on power. Service lines, opinion polls, and public assessment serve the interests of
the leadership well, as they boosts the image of the Party, and make concessions to the
growing demand of participation without the Party being compelled to hand over its political
power monopoly. Measuring the effectiveness however is a tricky undertaking. First of all,
polls and assessments are usually conducted by government and party organs, and not by
independent external institutions. Thus selection bias is highly probable. Second, it remains to
be seen to which degree opinion polls, service lines or the public assessments influence the
behavior of local cadres and politics, and thus increase the degree of public leverage. In some
政治大
single cases the system might be successful, in others it might not. Hence, their participatory
value in terms of democratization should not be overstated. In regard to environmental
立
protection, opinion polls in the evaluation of government performance can have a positive
‧ 國
學
impact if resentments related to environmental degradation issues find their way onto the
questionnaires. In general, the design of questionnaires and the selected population for the
public opinion assessment are crucial factors, they however are no guarantee for the
‧
effectiveness of the assessment. Furthermore, unless no independent, external institution
sit
y
Nat
conducts the polls designated for cadre evaluation, their impact on convincing cadres to put
io
n
USE AND EFFECTIVENESS
a OF CADRE EDUCATION
er
more efforts into environmental and ecological protection is bound to be fairly low.
iv
l C
n
hengchi U
Despite the dominance of economic, development, and social management issues, and the
growing prominence of capacity building classes, ideology instruction is still a central task of
party schools. The huge number of these classes supports the assumption that ideological
bonding to party principles is something constitutive. Its complete replacement is not likely in
the future as it touches the traditions of the CCP, and ideology is at the very core of its governance (Pieke 2009: 35). We can thus say that the conceptual framework of cadre formation
applies to both politics of pragmatism and politics of ideology. However, disinterest, criticism
and doubts on the applicability and timeliness of Marxist theory are cautiously expressed by
professors and students of these very classes. Yet, open objection is still considered a political
risk.
In the classroom, party school professors have to present the theory of socialism with
Chinese style, although both the professors and the students feel it is nothing but
waffle and not a persuasive theory at all. If a professor ignores the dogmas in
textbooks and speaks out his mind, the trainees are usually satisfied but he may be
taking political risk. As a result, the courses provided in party school cannot really
answer the new problems accompanying social and economic changes in China today.
The central leaders' expectations that party-state cadres should be well versed in
Marxist principles as well as latest human intellectual products to handle the
politically and economically changing situations in the nation are hard to realize. (Guo
et al. 2009: 8)
政治大
In their study, Guo and Shan express their doubts whether cadre training is apt to “answer the
new problems accompanying social and economic changes in China today” (8). The question
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on the effectiveness of leadership training is not new in the studies on leadership manage-
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ment: How best to organize the efforts of individuals to achieve desired objectives? Which
type of leadership training is most effective? Have the trainee's leadership skills, techniques or
behavior changed for the better in his organizational situation? Do management development
‧
programs increase the leadership performance of the participants? Do these programs contrib-
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ute to the personal growth of the trainees (Kakar 1979)? Even though the objection is valid, it
is however important to continue to address these questions in the Chinese context by means
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of solid theory and appropriate methodology. To dismiss party schools as mere institutions of
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indoctrination or academic degree provider is in my point of view a terrible mistake. This as-
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sumption hinders us to fathom an important element in how China is trying to push for transformation and transport new ideas to all parts of the country and to the different levels of administration.
We do have to keep in mind that cadre training is very fragmented. Training sessions in party
schools are part of the evaluation and a requirement for promotion. Some classes are compulsory to every cadre, some classes are designed for cadres in certain positions in order to advance in their career. In general, training is widely considered essential for China’s transformation efforts. Buttressed on innovation (technology) and administration, the improvement of
the educational level and knowledge diffusion are important prerequisites for China’s transformation (Interview with Zhao Yanyun, 26 July 2013). Li Yuanchao points out that the competitiveness of a country lies in its strength of development. Latter grounds on its ability to
learn. Competition of development is in various senses competition in learning. Improving the
enforcement and implementation capacities of a country governed through a one-party system
cannot be decoupled from improving the level of cadre education and learning (Dong, 28.
February 2010). Furthermore, knowledge diffusion and awareness creation is that eventually
helps to promote a new concept of development. According to Yang Yhi, professor for economics at China Renmin University, this is the most important function of cadre education
and training (Interview with Yang Zhi, 31 July 2013).
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104 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaChapter 7—Conclusion and Further Considerations
CHAPTER 7—CONCLUSION AND FURTHER
CONSIDERATIONS
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At the beginning of the 21st century, sustainable development has become the new paradigm
of development for developed and developing countries alike. From a political vantage point,
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China can be considered a late-comer in changing policies towards more social equity and
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environmental soundness. At the turn of the century however China has started to push harder
for a transformation in development, and thus the protection of its environment and ecology.
In the 11th Five-Year Plans (2005), the environment gained unprecedented momentum. A
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growing body of environmental laws and the upgrading of the State Environmental Protection
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Administration to ministerial rank in 2008 increased the political leverage of the environmental agenda. New innovative projects were launched that aimed at solving the conflicting inter-
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ests between economic and environmental policy goals. Yet, problems in policy implementa-
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tion and law enforcement have remained, and the environmental situation in China is worri-
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some. Despite billions of investments and repeated acknowledgements at central level, China’s performance in sustainability remains weak. One of the main reasons is that economic
development continues to be a pivotal objective for local governments, as many parts of China still poorly developed and the overall living standard relatively low. On the other hand,
China’s economy is one of the fastest developing in the world, and the second biggest after
the United States of America.
During the 1980s and 1990s, China achieved impressive development based on a strategy that
favored economic development in terms of GDP growth. The restless exploitation of its natural resources, and the recklessness for its natural environment have had disastrous consequences upon rural and urban areas that are now affecting its economy. Having become aware
of its vulnerability, China has been trying new ideas and concepts to overcome “GDPism” and
turn toward a more socially equitable and environmentally sound development model. The
leadership has repeatedly expressed its intention and will to transform development.
From the viewpoint of China, sustainable development is a concept formulated from and for
developed countries. It does neither fit Chinese circumstances, nor does it sufficiently give
answers to the issues and challenges China is facing. This is why, at a crucial point in its
development, China decided to adopt its own concept of development to which sustainability
is inherent, as one goal, however it does abstract the growth imperative from China. The
ideological framework of the Scientific Development View contains the parameters for
change and transformation.
The party ideology consists of four meta-narratives: Putting the people first means to satisfy
the basic needs, and the continuously rising material and cultural needs of the Chinese people.
Development has to be comprehensive and thus aims at the promotion of economy, politics,
政治大
and culture, and the realization of economic development and social progress. It pursues
coordinated development between city and countryside, regions, economy and society. Finally,
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it should help to harmonize the relationship between people and nature, and to coordinate
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population, resources and environment. The word ‘scientific’ can be rephrased as reasonable
or effective. Since development is very complex, it is important to comprehend processes,
establish and broaden understanding by investigation, research, and discovery. Hereby science
‧
and academics play an important role which is also reflected in a decision by the State
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Council in 2005 which requires government bodies to consult scientists and experts in
preparing policy programs, laws and regulations. In order to foster the ecological awareness
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among the Chinese population and cadres, the party embarked on a campaign to build an
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Ecological Civilization. In spite of the need that all Chinese people join in, the main bearer of
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responsibility in the transformation efforts are the government and its agents at all levels of
administration, in particular high ranking officials.
On practical level, conflicting interests between pursuing economic growth and environmental
and ecological protection cannot be reconciled unless economy is restructured. Low carbon
production modes have to be established, green industries fostered, and waste flows are to be
reintroduced into the production cycle. Since the adoption of the Scientific Development
View in 2003, local governments underlie more constraints in the political decision-making
and implementation process. They are required to pay more attention to social and
environmental factors, and to search innovative solutions to enhance the coordination and
harmonization of development. Moreover, since 2009, local party committees have to
incorporate the idea of the Scientific Development View into their cadre evaluation systems,
and train cadres in party schools and cadre training institutions accordingly.
The process of incorporating the new development view into the organizational apparatus can
be discerned on central and local level; it has to be understood as an endless cycle with different interacting poles: the center and its peripheries. We can see this cycle more clearly if we
shift our focus on the process how the Scientific Development View was incorporated into the
cadre evaluation system.
It started with the formulation and adoption of the party ideology at central level. The COD
being the executive organ in cadre management then selected pilot regions were new methods
were experimented and developed. After the termination of experimentation the central government issued a formal document in which it requested all local party committees to develop
new evaluation systems according to the new requirements and methods proposed. In 2008
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and 2009, new cadre evaluation systems under the Scientific Development View scheme were
implemented in various localities all over China. Targets and their weights were adjusted, the
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evaluation and assessment methods of leading cadres revised, the basis of evaluators expand-
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ed. The goal was also to make evaluation more comprehensive and objective.
Guangdong was one of the first provinces to implement a new evaluation system under the
Scientific Development View scheme. Evaluation is composed of four separate appraisals,
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three of which concern the work style, performance and attitudes of leading bodies and
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cadres. They are subjective assessments of cadres on the evaluated subjects collected through
questionnaires. The responsible organ is the Provincial Appraisal Office, which is a party
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group within the provincial-level Organization Department. Its members are exclusively CCP
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members. The fourth appraisal method evaluates policy performance, and is based on
statistical data.
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The new evaluation scheme divides criteria into four categories (economic development,
social development, people’s livelihood, environment and ecology). Before, environmental
and ecological targets were subordinated to economic and social development targets, now
they have become a category on their own with a whole set of targets. Furthermore, the
province differentiates between four development areas (urban development areas, optimized
development areas, key development areas, and ecological development areas). Targets and
their weights are set according to the developmental states, needs, and prospects of an area.
The analysis on party school curricula in Jiangsu has revealed the variety of cadre instruction
contents, and how external and internal challenges are being translated into the curricula of
party schools. Training in Scientific Development is not limited to preaching principles of
party ideology, but is moreover expressed in a diversification of approaches and training
contents. A strong emphasis is placed on capacity training, and the diffusion of knowledge
such as modern public administration techniques, theoretical approaches, and technical
knowledge. Cadre training tries to convey managerial skills such as modern administration, egovernance and new communication technologies, and tries to link theoretical concepts with
real political problems. By doing so, local party schools tackle the issues of income disparities,
integration of rural and urban development, as well as environmental sciences and climate
change technology. Teaching approaches such as case study sessions on experiences of other
jurisdiction in particular on successful models of coordinated economic and social
development have been adopted in instruction.
Party schools appear to adopt a strategy of benchmarking or profiling. This tendency is
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suggested by the numerous classes in management theories in Nanjing Party School, and the
promotion of the Suzhou development model at Suzhou Party School that hosts training
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sessions for cadres from all over China. By using this strategy, models and approaches are
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diffused among cadres of different provinces; the flow of information in turn incites
emulation in other provinces and jurisdictions.
In order to understand the role of cadre education and training, we have to analyze it from the
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vantage point of its function for a single-party regime. Among scholars in China the training
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system is widely recognized as an essential component in China’s transformation efforts; it
increases the educational level of cadres and serves the goal of knowledge diffusion in general.
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Transformation in China is buttressed on innovation (technology) and administration. The
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improvement of the educational level and knowledge diffusion are important prerequisites
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therefore. Hence, to dismiss party schools as mere institutions of indoctrination or academic
degree providers is—in my point of view—a terrible mistake, since this assumption hinders
us to fathom an important element how new ideas are transported to the different levels of
administration in the country, and how China is trying to push for transformation.
Organizational theories provide a useful framework to reflect on the institutional change and
the way how China responds to the changing environment and the newly emerging challenges.
The asymmetry between the time of reaction, the time of investment into discontinuous
change, and the time when change becomes effective in the Chinese CMS is more pronounced
in environmental and social politics. This is due to the nature of their specific nature: while
economic development increases revenue extraction, social and environmental policies mostly
eat up these resources. The long-term benefits of a healthy environment are often disregarded.
Furthermore, proposed intentions to give more weight to social and environmental factors are
more rhetorical than real. Local evaluation system still largely value economic criteria over
social and environmental factors.
Local protectionism is a strong force that the central leadership is not able to compete with
under the current regime. The Chinese authoritarian political system that continues to exclude
society from participating more substantially in the political decision-making process exacerbates the problem of resource dependency (i.e. cadres as the source and object of transformation) and the resulting rigidity. Still, this resource rigidity can have two possible outcomes
for changes on the implementation level: in the case of economic development the enormous
resource of party and government cadres and the attraction of new and young cadres have
政治大
contributed to the fastest economic development of a country the world has witnessed so far.
In the environmental realm, the Chinese leadership has not yet found an equivalent alternative
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incentive for wealth creation. It is therefore pushing for a change of mind-set through educa-
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tion and training that eventually could curtail or contain obstinate economic accumulation.
In this regard, the role and importance of cadre education and its expansion become more
pronounced. According to Lovas et al. (2000: 755), external influence in the decision to re-
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spond to discontinuous change increases the likelihood that leaders structurally differentiate
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and thus set up new ventures from their parent organization. In the case of the Chinese CMS,
the leadership is determined to foster transformation by means of changing the mindsets of its
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agents. By doing so, it further refrains from substantial political reforms towards democratiza-
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tion. According to the Chinese leadership, the root of the problem is its sources of variations,
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i.e. cadres. Only by changing the concept of development in their minds, China can transform
its development.
Organizational and public management theories are useful in the investigation of the Chinese
CMS, however they cannot fully explain the reasoning behind structures, nor the mechanism
at work. The CMS is as a form how China organizes its state-society relations. For a more
complete analysis we have thus to broaden the historical perspective and consider traditional
Chinese philosophical approaches that explain the function of institutions and the role of the
State. It is also necessary to draw on the long tradition of the imperial examination system, on
Confucian approaches of state doctrine and imperial administration. How contemporary China
handles the legacies and experiences of China's past, both imperial and communist is an
exciting but under-researched topic.
In the chapter on the literature review I referred to the study by Zheng Yongnian (2010), The
Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, reproduction and
transformation. Zheng sees the nature of the CCP expressed in a continuous struggle for
hegemony and domination that crosses the borders of its historical setting (xv). Cultural
connotations, historical continuity and discontinuity are embedded in the CCP as political
facts. The organizational emperorship is a reproduction of China's traditional imperial
political culture in modern times (xivf). Some scholars might find this argument fairly
exaggerated, and even inside the Chinese scholarly community approaches in modern
political science dismiss the possibility to search the roots for contemporary problems in
traditional China. However, we should not disregard the fact that China does have a history
before the communist idea was brought into the country, and the current regime founded in
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1949. The strain of thought that imported concepts and ideologies cannot be enough to
explain and analyze politics of modern and contemporary China is also adopted by Julia
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Strauss (2003). She finds that the organizational model of modern Chinese bureaucracy
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and 1911.
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grounds on the xingzheng reforms (literally translated: administrative reforms) between 1902
“[They] laid down a basic agenda for central state action that virtually all of the Qing's
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successor regimes of the twentieth century would imitate and struggle to achieve,
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albeit through a variety of different tactics.” (833)
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Literature on imperial bureaucracy displays the similarities in the constituents of today's
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CMS. In imperial China, special rules and procedures were devised to insure honesty among
officials: the frequent rotation of officials to avoid the development of attachment to localities
or associates, a merit review system in which every official was appraised each triennium,
promotion, demotion and dismissal depended on evaluation ratings; periodic examinations
demonstrated scholastic capacity (Sterba 1978: 72).
When analyzing political institutions in a country we should be aware of its cultural traditions
and predisposition that determine the choices made in politics and in the establishment and
reorganization of institutions. Suzanne Ogden (1989) defined three competing values which
undermine political decisions in China: Chinese culture, socialism, and development.
Aufrecht and Bun (1995) found this framework very useful to examine the establishment of
the Chinese CSS for the purpose of determining its “Chinese characteristics”. The factors that
reflect tradition are: Confucianism, civil service examinations and scholar rulers, and guanxi.
Socialist values are expressed in: the CCP, cadres, work unit and equity. Development values
are: China’s size, poverty and education (176). The two studies support the efforts to pose
further research questions that eventually help us to better understand the mechanism of the
CMS. The approach opens up an interesting perspective and framework which should not be
discarded.
We face this issue in the study of cadre evaluation and in respect with the claim on objectivity.
Faced with the problem of policy implementation at local level, and rampant corruption
within the Chinese bureaucracy, the quest for standardization and objectivity in order to make
cadres more accountable for their actions is clearly serving the Party’s interests. Trust into
leadership and into the fairness of their designed performance appraisal systems are important
政治大
considerations that the leadership does not ignore as they are vital for its further survival. In
the efforts to solve the principle-agent problem and the dictator’s commitment problem, two
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factors pose obstacles: The cultural predisposition of guanxi, and the lack of transparency in
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the promotion process. In this respect, the research on the Scientific Development View
becomes even more interesting as the party ideology proposes a higher degree of objectivity.
Two questions become paramount and should guide further research: How does guanxi
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influence subjectivity and bias in evaluation practices in China? To which degree is guanxi
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being considered helpful or problematic in the matter of cadre performance appraisal and
promotion decisions? Is guanxi considered a disease that should be eradicated within the
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system, or should it be controlled to a certain degree in order to prevent moral hazard. If we
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tackle these questions, we cannot neglect Chinese culture and tradition.
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The question of ideology and organization has drawn the interest of scholars coming from
various disciplines. In spite of the general assumption that ideology as a belief system affects
politics and behavior, the concept still bears some weaknesses in establishing a clear
relationship between motives, purposes, and political action. 50 In China, ideology is
intrinsically linked to the CCP’s historical claim on power. However, the central value of
ideology has changed over the last 60 years. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, politics
were ideologically driven. The Party assumed supreme ideology by shifting external to
internal, and economic to political control (Schurmann 1968: 17). A major caesura came with
the Reform and Opening Policy in 1978. After its launch, economic development became the
ultimate goal and priority for the Chinese party-state, and the CCP’s new legitimization basis.
50
For a critical account of the concept of ideology in the empirical study of political behavior see Minar 1961;
for a study of the multidimensionality of the motivational basis of political party activism see Constantini et
al. 1996
Scholars asserted a rising importance of the government as the manager of economic affairs,
and a concomitant declining importance of Party and ideology; they even heralded the demise
of ideology and the retreat of the CCP (Lowell 1984; Burns 1989). The sources for this
“unsteady retreat” (Burns 1989: 739) were reformers within the party eager to improve
efficiency and effectiveness. The place of ideology in Chinese politics today is often
dismissed as pure rhetoric not worth to delve into. It is not more than a façade of a political
regime that is trying not to lose its face. Already in 1988, Lucian Pye countered the
prophesized atrophy of ideology with his book The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s
Political Culture. In his passionate writing style he tried to remind Western scholars that many
Chinese including the Chinese leadership still took ideology seriously and held on to their
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loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. This is also what I experienced in
my research. The claim that the Party should serve the people and that party cadres should act
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only and exclusively in the interest of the Chinese people was expressed by many of my
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interview partners. Even though we have to handle these statements with cautiousness and
look how these statements find their realization in practice, we still should not dismiss this
value as simple hypocrisy.
‧
On political level, party ideology today still serves the dichotomic function of unification and
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transformation. Furthermore, it reflects economic, social and other challenges in historical
periods and bears the ideas of their leaders. Examining ideology also means examining
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Chinese politics, especially if we place our focus on the gap between ideology and praxis.
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What explains the ambiguities? What are the reasons for party ideology to fail on the level of
implementation?
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This thesis tackled the changes which the transformation of development, formulated in the
ideology of the Scientific Development View, has brought on the administrative system or the
changes that have resulted in local cadre evaluation systems and cadre training after the
adoption of the Scientific Development View. The goal was to shed light on the process of
incorporation, this means the organization of party ideology in China. The outcomes, and
whether the new development concept bears fruits and solves the problems in policy
implementation and law enforcement are subject of further study.
112 Changes in Cadre Evaluation and Training in ChinaAppendix
APPENDIX
Table 14: Seminar program of Chuxiong Development and Reform Commission at Renmin
University, 23-31 July 2013
Date
Time
Class
Instructor
24.07.2013
Morning
Analysis of current investment
Luo Yunyi 罗云毅 (National
situation
Development and
立
政治大
Construction of urbanization
Yuan Chongfa 袁崇法
(National Development and
Reform Commission)
Administration communication
‧
Morning
Li Aihua 李爱华 (College
of Public Administration,
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y
Nat
Renmin University)
io
n
al
Morning
Afternoon
The dilemma and win-win of
Ma Zhong 马中 (College of
China’s environmental
Environmental Science,
er
Afternoon
26.07.2013
Commission)
學
25.07.2013
‧ 國
Afternoon
Reform
v
protection and economic
Ch
i
n
U
development
e n gReview
c h ion the history and
Renmin University)
岳庆平 Yue Qingping
future perspectives of the
(Department of History,
“Chinese Dream”
Renmin University)
Innovative thinking and
Gu Haibin 顾海滨 (College
strategic decision making
of Economics, Renmin
University)
27.07.2013
Morning
Faith and Life
温金玉 Wen Jinyu
(Department of Philosophy,
Renmin University)
Afternoon
Sightseeing and analysis:
Chinese National Museum,
Tiananmen Square, Great Hall
of the People
28.07.2013
Morning
Government and public
Yan Jun 殷俊 (Researcher on
Afternoon
relations and media
crisis and risk management)
communication*
29.07.2013
Morning
The development and
Gao Gang 高钢 (College of
tendencies of Internet
Journalism, Renmin
technology relay and its
University)
influence on social movements
Afternoon
Macro-economy analysis
Huang Weiping 黄卫平
(College of Economics,
Renmin University)
30.07.2013
Morning
Xin Qingfeng 辛青峰
Leader’s arts of language
(Communication University
of China)
政治大
Afternoon
Sun Xiangzhi 孔祥智
industries and development
(College of Agriculture and
tendencies
Rural Development, Renmin
學
31.07.2013
Morning
University)
Ecological Civilization and
Yang Zhi 杨志 (College of
question and analysis on
Economics, Renmin
circular economy
‧
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立
Emerging agricultural
University)
* Yan Jun changed the title of his lecture into “Government Public Crisis and Media
sit
y
Nat
Response”
n
al
er
io
Source: retrieved by the author at seminar
Ch
Table 15: Professional training for MEP
Category
Office management and
2009
e n g c2010h i
i
n
U
v
2011
2012
13
6
22
33
Planning and Finance
10
7
4
4
Policy and law
4
3
3
3
Technological and
14
5
12
10
9
9
9
8
integration
scientific standard
Environmental impact
assessment
Emission reduction
5
7
10
7
Environmental monitoring
24
26
31
28
Pollution prevention
19
18
18
23
Natural ecological
8
7
10
16
6
2
1
2
-
14
19
-
-
2
-
-
-
6
學
4
16
17
-
-
12
13
y
22
a140
l
120
and early warning
protection
Nuclear and radiation
safety
Environmental assessment
-
立
Propaganda and education
enforcement
Nat
Safeguard support
io
n
Total
8
sit
Supervision and law
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International cooperation
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Source: compiled by the author, retrieved from MEP
er
and emergency
政治大
v
ni
150
179
Table 16: Jiangsu Province development targets 2010-2015
Category
Target
Property
of
target
(binding or expected)
Economic Development
Regional GDP (billion, compared to level of 2010)
Expected target
Increasing the proportion of the tertiary sector in regional GDP
Expected target
(%)
Expected target
The contribution of consumption to increase the economic growth
Expected target
(%)
Expected target
High technology production share in value of industrial output
Technological Innovation
(%)
Expected target
Urbanization (%)
Expected target
Expected target
Proportion of R&D funds in GDP (%)
Expected target
Proportion of human capital investment in GDP (%)
Expected target
Manpower contribution rate (%)
Public Service
Number of patents per 100 million Yuan GDP
Binding target
Contribution rate of progress in science and technology
Expected target
Expected target
Universal high school education rate (%)
Expected target
Enrollment in higher education rate (%)
Binding target
Hospital beds (per bed)
Binding target
Public cultural service of internet coverage (%)
Binding target
Urban and rural basic social insurance coverage (%)
Urban and rural medical insurance rate (%)
Resources and Environment
Urban affordable housing construction
Binding target
Binding target
Binding target
Cultivated land (hectares)
Binding target
Ratio of non-fossil-energy in primary energy consumption
Binding target
政治大
Reduction of unit of GDP energy consumption*
立
Reduction of unit of GDP in carbon emissions*
Binding target
nitrogen oxide)
學
‧ 國
Reduction of major pollutant emissions * (COD, CO2, ammonia,
Increase of forests: forest coverage (%), forest volume (10,000
Binding target
Expected target
cubic meters)
‧
Binding target
Water efficiency and utilization factor in agriculture
Expected target
sit
Nat
Natural population growth rate (‰)
y
Water consumption reduction per unit of industrial added value
Expected target
Expected target
a l growth of per capita net income iofvrural residents
Annual average
C unemployment rate (%) U n
Urban registeredh
engchi
Expected target
io
Annual average growth of per capita disposable income of urban
n
residents
er
Peoples’ Life
Creation of urban jobs in five years (10,000)
* Fulfilling state-assigned targets
Source: Jiangsu 12th Five-Year Economic and Social Plan, 2011
Table 17: Evaluation system according to category, criteria, validity, and data providing agency for key development areas in Guangdong
Category
Criteria
Agency
Validity
Economic
33
Provincial Department of Finance, Provincial Bureau of
Development
政治大
Statistics
立
Administrative operating costs accounted for the proportion of general
‧ 國
Private economic value added growth
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budget expenditures
Provincial Economic and Trade Commission, Provincial
of the entire city’s industrial added value
High-tech manufacturing industries accounted for the proportion of industrial
sit
y
Nat
added value
‧
Industrial Transfer Park industrial added value accounted for the proportion
Social
Fertility rate in line with policy
Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission
Develop-
Social undertakings and public services spending accounted for the
ment
proportion of general budget expenditures
n
al
Ch
er
Provincial Economic and Trade Commission
io
Actual use of foreign direct investment growth rate
v
i
n
U
e n g cProvincial
h i Public Security Bureau, Provincial Safety Authority,
Provincial Peoples’ Congress Election Committee, , 省政协提
案委 , Provincial Court, Provincial Office of Legislative
Affairs, Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, Provincial
19
Department of Justice, Provincial Bureau of Letters and
Complaints
High school education enrollment rate
Provincial Department of Education, Provincial Labor and
Security Department
Physicians every 10,000 inhabitants
政治大
People’s
Liveli-
hood
Urban and rural residents per capita income growth rate and per capita GDP
Guangdong Survey Organization, Provincial Bureau of
growth rate of more than
Statistics
‧ 國
立
Proportion of households in difficult housing situation in city and
Provincial Department of Construction, Provincial Office of
countryside
Poverty Alleviation
Nat
sit
Statistics
Rural drinking water safety penetration rate
al
n
Rural work force transfer employment rate
Provincial Department of Water Resources
er
io
New rural cooperative medical participation rate
y
‧
20
學
i
n
U
v
Provincial Department of Labor and Social Security
Ch
Environ-
ment and
Cultivated Land
Ecology
e n g cProvincial
h i Department of Land Resources
28
Source: Guangdong Evaluation System, Guangdong zuzhibu 2008, attachment No. 1
Table 18: Evaluation system according to categories, criteria, validity, and data providing agency for optimized development areas
in Guangdong
Category
Criteria
Economic
政治大
Develop-
立
‧
y
Nat
expenditures
學
Statistics
R&D expenditure accounted for proportion of GDP
Provincial Science and Technology Department, Provincial
n
al
er
io
sit
Tertiary sector accounted for the proportion of GDP
Actual use of foreign direct investment growth rate
Social
31
‧ 國
ment
Validity
Agency
Ch
i
n
U
v
21
Develop-
i
engch
Social undertakings and public services spending accounted for the proportion
Provincial
ment
of general budget expenditures
Authority, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
Provincial Peoples’ Congress Election Committee, , 省政协
Public Security Bureau, Provincial
Safety
提案委, Provincial Court, Provincial Office of Legislative
Complaints
Educational and modernization development index
Provincial Department of Education, Provincial Department
of Labor and Security
政治大
Community health service institutions in numbers of emergency doors
accounted for the proportion of number of doors of health care institution in the
立
entire city 社区卫生服务机构门急诊量占全市医疗机构门急诊量的比重
Professional and technical personnel in urban units accounted for the
學
‧ 國
proportion of the number of workers in the post
Liveli-
hood
al
Provincial Department of Construction, Provincial Office of
n
y
Statistics
sit
io
城乡住房困难户占总户数的比重
er
23
Nat
‧
People’s
i
n
U
v
Poverty Alleviation
Ch
i
engch
Guangdong
Survey Organization, Provincial Bureau of
Statistics
Environ-
ment and
Cultivated Land
Ecology
25
Table 19: Evaluation system according to categories, criteria, validity, and data providing agency for urban development areas in
Guangdong
Category
Criteria
Economic
‧ 國
Validity
30
n
Modern service industry added value accounted for the proportion of tertiary
industry added value
R&D expenditure accounted for proportion of GDP
er
io
al
y
Nat
expenditures
‧
Statistics
sit
ment
Agency
學
develop-
立
政治大
Ch
i
n
U
v
i Science and Technology Department, Provincial
e n g c hProvincial
Import export volume development rate
Social
Develop-
Social undertakings and public services spending accounted for the proportion
ment
of general budget expenditures
22
Provincial Public Security Bureau, Provincial Safety
Authority, Provincial Bureau of Statistics
Provincial Peoples’ Congress Election Committee, , 省政协
提案委, Provincial Court, Provincial Office of Legislative
政治大
Educational and modernization development index
Complaints
立
accounted for the proportion of number of doors of health care institution in the
of Labor and Security
entire city
‧ 國
Provincial Department of Education, Provincial Department
學
Community health service institutions in numbers of emergency doors
Professional and technical personnel in urban units accounted for the propor-
y
Nat
Liveli-
hood
23
al
n
sit
io
People’s
Ch
er
tion of the number of workers in the post
‧
Rail transport accounted for the proportion of public transport
i
n
U
Statistics
v
i Department of Construction, Provincial Office of
e n g c hProvincial
Proportion of households in difficult housing situation in city and countryside
Poverty Alleviation
Environ-
ment and
Cultivated Land
Ecology
25
立
政治大
‧
‧ 國
學
n
er
io
sit
y
Nat
al
Ch
engchi
i
n
U
v
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國立政治大學 - National Chengchi University

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