LCD-78-116 Review of Army`s Efforts To Develop TACFIRE

DOCU NET RBSURE
05922 -
B1566594 ]
(Review of ray's Efforts To Develop TACFIRE]. LCD-78-116;
B-163074. June '2,1978. 10 pp. + 7 enclosures (28 pp.).
Leport to Sen.
General.
illiam Proxsire;
y Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller
Ii3sue Area: Automatic Data Processing: Design, Development, and
Installation of Software (106).
Contact: Logistics and Cosaunications Div.
Budget Funct,on: iscellaneous: Automatic Data Processing
(1001).
Organizatior. Concerned: Department of the rm7.
CongressionAl Relevance: House Comittee on rmed Services;
Senate Consittee on Armed Services. Sen. illia. Proxmir.
Auter moacre than 10 years o effort, the rayes Tactical
Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) was completed 4.n January 1978.
The Govtrriment ust now decide whether TCFIRE should enter
full-sca.a production while comunications, aintenance,
equipment, and software problems still exist. The TCPIRB
equipment tested during Operational Test III and scheduled for
product n is not the equipment the rmy plans to field; the
Army has identified new equipment based on updated technology as
potential replacement for certain TCFIBB components. Computer
programs for nuclear fire planning and corps artillery
operations need to be tested and completed before TCIRE is
fielded. The programs need to be rewritten because of changes
made to nuclear doctrine in July 1977, but rewriting ham not yet
begun. The TACFIRE coupiler, a program that converts prograner
language to achine-readable instructions, contains at least 27
deficiencies that could disrupt computer operations and cause
data processing errors. The production decision should be
delayed to give the ramy tinme to: somplete software development;
correct known system problems and deficiencies; complete
.
development, testing, and evaluation of new equipment and
associated software; and assess the ipact that the changes will
have cn t.e TACFIBE contracts, production schedules, and
?eployment requirements. The Secretary of Defense should direct
the rmy to delay full-scale production of TCFIRB
to permit the
program to be reassessed. (RRS)
COMPTROLLE
GENERAL OF THE UI4ITED STATES
WA5IHNGTON. D.C.
B-163074
2054
Junie 2, ]978
The Honorable Williai Proxmire
United States Senate
Dear Senator Proxmire:
Pursuant to your June 21, 1977, request, we have reviewed
the Department of the Army's efforts to develop the Tactical
Fir. Direction System (TACFIRE). Our findings, conclusions,
and rcommendations, presented orally to your staff on February 3, 1978, are summarized below.
TACFIR
LDFVFr,OPMENT COMPLETED
AfteL ;aore than 10 years of effort, TACFIRE's development
phase was completed in January 1978, when Operational Test III
ended.
The Government must now decide whether TACFIRE should
enter full-scale production. The Amy Systems Acquisition Review Council is to make this decision in September 1978 based
on the results of Operational
est III and other factors.
We don't know whether the test results will show that
TACFIRE is ready for production, since the Army's calculations of the results have not yet been completed.
However,
our observations indicate that some problems, including communications, maintenance, equipment, and software problei.s,
still exist.
Communications problems
TACFIRE uses digital communications and a digital message device to link the forward observers with the TACFIRE
computer at the battalion level. This link is the primary
path for inputting fire mission ata into TACFIRE. The Army
encountered roblems with it during Operational Test III.
The tactically deployed forward observers of the 2/19
Field Artillery Ba-talion, using the digital message device
with standard rmy field radios, were unable to consistently
transmit fire missions digitally to the battalions' fire
direction centers.
Raw data recorded by t-e Army testers
LCD-78-116
(941134)
B-163074
showed that only 28 percent of the tactically deployed
forward observers' igital transmissions during the testing period were successful. When digital communications
did not work, the forward observers reverted to voice communications.
The Army has r'ot identified the cause of the communication problems. Hoever, the problems may be caused, partly
or wholly, by the use of standard Army radios designed primarily for voice communications. This was true even though
the radios used in the test were finely tuned ano supported
hy extraordinary maintenance measures, including special
training and the use of civilian depot maintenance personnel.
Maintenance problems
Equipment was repaired under a different maintenance
concept from that intended for use in the test. The planned
concept required equipment users to make 90 percent of the
repairs onsite within an hour and to report those that could
not be made within that time to the direct support maintenance battalion. The maintenance battalion was to make all
other repairs except those requiring general support or
depot-level maintenance.
However, during the test, equipment users reported equipment breakdowns immediately to the maintenance battalion,
which in turn replaced troublesome components with operable
ones. The replaced components were then sent to a LittonThis facility
operated maintenance facility for repairs.
done at Tobybe
handled depot-level maintenance, which will
hanna, Pennsylvania, when TACFIRE becomes operational.
Because the maintenance concept was not followed, the
test was not a realistic exercise of the system. Consequently,
the test did not provide sufficient data to properly determine the mean-time-to-repair, spare parts allocations, validity
of the maintenance concept, or ability of the equipment users
t3 make repairs. Without a fully developed and tested maintenance capability, there is little assurance that TACFIRE
will be maintainable under critical operational conditions.
Equipment and software problems
During the 12-day test, the Army encountered numerous
equipment and software problems that may preclude TACFIRE
from meeting the operational requirement of a mean time
2
B-163074
between failures of 150 hours. The problems included many
computer dumps and freezes like those experienced during
the earlier Developmental Test III and vauLous quipment
problems involving line printers, digital data terminals,
digital message devices, and mass core memory units.
The dumps and freezes shot down computer operations and
caused (1) systems to be reloaded and restarted and (2)
data bases to be reconstructed at a frequency not expected
of a computer that has completed its development phase. Despite these problems, testing was not delayed, primarily because of backup computer procedures and the different maintenance concept employed. According to a testing official,
had the intended maintenance concept been used, testing would
have been administratively stepped because the spply of spare
parts and components would have been exhausted aftr
days
of testing.
Bec 'se of the problems, the operational test results
most likely will not conclusively show that TACFIP is opera-tionally ready or that it should enter full-scale production
without corrective actions. Those problems alone may be
sufficient to delay production. However, ot more significance is TACFIRE's lengthy development, which has produced,
in our opinion, a technologically outuated system that apparently will be obsolete before production is completed.
As a result, the Army plans to make major changes in key
TACFIRE components.
NEW EQUIPMENT TO REPLACE
TACFIRE COMPONENTS
The r'ACFIRE equipment tested during Operational Test III
and scheduled for production is not the equipment the Army
plans to field. The Army has identified new equipment based
upon today's technology as potential replacement for certain
TACFIRE components. The equipment is being developed with
Government funding but has not yet been tested as part of
TACFIRE.
Battery level computers
The Army is developing a battery level computer to give
the firing batteries a computational capability integrated
with TACFIRE. The computer will replace the obsolescent
computing device called FADAC, which was fielded in 1964,
and the TACFIRE Battery Display Unit, which provides the
3
B-163374
Its introduction into TACFIRE
batteries with firing data.
will satisfy a longstanding requirement for battery-autonomous
operations.
The battery level computer needs to be cested with
TACFIRE, particularly to determine the adequacy of the interfacing software. This s to be done n November 1978.
Replacement computer
The Army has idertified two fourth-generation computers
(one Litton and one Contro. Data Corporation) as potential
replacements for the TACFIRE computer, which is techIt is competitively testing these
nologically outdated.
computers at the irection o the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. The iurpose of the testing is to introduce
competition into TACFIRE and other major development programs, such as the Tactical Operations System and the Missile
Minder which use the TACFIRE computer, and to determine
whether to retain o. replace the TACFIRE computer. The
testing was scheduled to be completed in March 1978; the
replacement decision will be made in September.
Replacing the TACFIRE computer with a modern technology
computer offers a number of advantages, including faster
computations, increased operational reliability, fewer maintenance requirements, and compactness. The latter advantage
would allow the Army to reduce the size of the TACFIRE
equipment and thus increase operating space, which is
presently cramped, within the van housing the equipment.
ilso, the replacement would eliminate potential supply problems of providing parts for outdated circuitry and subcomponents.
Acquiring a new TACFIRE computer would significantly
affect the program. Its introduction would delay production
schedules to permit system testing. Also, if it is not the
Litton computer, all production options not exercised will
be voided and new contracting may be required. According
to Litton and Control Data, enough of the new computers
could be available for system testing in November 1979.
Digital message device
The digital message device is used by the forward observer to input target information into TACFIRE. This
component is being redesigned to incorporate new circuit
4
B-163074
technology and to reduce it3 sizes The new device should
be available for testing with TACFIRE by June 1980.
Secure digital measase
device
The present digital message;-device is unsecured. Transmissions need to be manually encrypted. Otherwise, they
must be sent in clear text that can be intercepted and used
by enemy forces to disclose the forward observer position,
friendly units' locations, and other tactical information.
This deficiency is being corrected through the development
of a rypto device, which is now available for testing with
TACFIRE.
Digital data terminal
The digital data terminal is the communications equipment link between the computer and TACFIRE's input devices.
It is being redesigned to incorporate new technology that
will increase communications throughput and reliability.
The increased throughput is significant because the Army's
new fite support team concept substantially increases the
number of forward observers that will be inputting data
into TACFIRE. The faster terminal, which should be ready
for TACFIRE testing in June 1980, will provide a greater
capacity to handle the increased communications.
Magnetic tape unit
nit, used to load the TACFIRE comA new magnetic tape
correct operating deficiencies.
to
puter, has been developed
This unit is pre.:ently available for testing.
Digital plotter map
The existing plotter map is subject to mechanical failure and is considered inadequate. Electronic maps that have
been developed and are being tested should be available in
June 1982.
TACFIRE APPLICATION
SOFTWARE NOT COMPLETED
Ccmputer programs for nuclear fire planning and corps
artillery operations need to b, completed and tested before
TACFIRE is fielded. The programs that had been written for
luc]ear fire planning need to be rewritten because of changes
5
-
363074
made to nuclear doctrine in July 1977.
not yet begun.
This rewriting has
TACFIRE is supposed to operate under the Army's corps
structure, in which the corps commander directs and controls
the artillery at all echelons. This requires TACFIRE, and
particularly the computer programs used at the corps, division, and battalion echelons, to be interoperable and integrated. TACFIRE has accomplished this at the division
and battalion levels, but the programs needed to automate
the corps operations and to integrate them into TACFIRE
have not yet been developed.
The development of the corps programs will affect the
completed ptc of TACFIRE. Changes to division and battalion computer programs, communications software, and operating procedures will be required to integrate the corps
Also, more equipment will
artillery operations into TACFIRE.
be needed to process the additional workload. The effort
will be substantial, but until it is completed and tested,
TACFIRE will not be a complete system.
The Army received a proposal rom Litton in August 1977
to do the development work. The proposal has not been
accepted, purportedly because of the Army's desire to do
The Army presently does not have a work
the work in-house.
r.an or a target date for completing the work.
TACFIRS COMPILER IS DEFICIENT
The TACFIRE compiler, a program that converts programer
language to machine-readable instructions, was purchased from
It contains at least 27 deficiencies that can disLitton.
rupt computer operations and cause data processing errors.
These deficiencies have been identified by Litton, which has
proposed to fix them for about $600,000.
NEED FOR SMART TERMINAL
TACFIRE includes a variable format message entry device
tnat provides two-way digital communications between the
fire direction center and remote users. This device constricts communications because it cannot be programed to
perform certain functions and it lacks the ability to store
and forward messages. The need for a programmable or smart
terminal is recognized by the U.S. Army Field Artillery
School.
B-163074
CONCLUSION
The new equipment developments offer the Army an opportunity to improve and upgrade TACFIRE before it enters fullscale production and to preclude costly retrofitting. This
opportunity--coupled with the nee'd to cc.nplete software
development (particularly corps software) and the uncertainty
of whether TACFIRE, as presently configured, will work
adequately after it is fielded--indicates that the production
decision should be delayed.
The delay will give the Army time to (1) complete software development, (2) correct known system problems and deficiencies, (3) complete development, testing, and evaluation of new equipment and its associated software, and (4)
assess the impact that the changes will have on the TACFIRE
contracts, production schedules, and deployment requirements.
It will also give tiL Army an opportunity to plan and incorporate the Reserve Forces requirements into the TACFIRE
program. Presently, none of thoae requirements are in the
program, although the Reserve Forces have about 55 percent
of the Army's artillery.
We recognize that delaying production may affect TACFIRE's
October 1980 scheduled deployment to Europe, where it is most
needed. However, we believe that the advantages of deploying
an improved, completed, and fully tested TACFIRE would justify
delaying deployment. This belief is compatible with those
of the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctine Command and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army,
Europe.
The latter has stated that a complex system such as
TACFIRE should be thoroughly tested in the ontinental
United States and then issued to Europe with proven logistic,
maintenance, and training packages. de added that the deployment of TACFIRE with the battery computer system was considered a significant advantage.
The Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command has stated that while the need to deploy
a combat multiplier such as TACFIRE to Europe at the earliest
danger of hastily introducpossible date is understood, t
ing a new complex system before establishing a thoroughly
stressed logistics package, refined and tested doctrine
(especially corps), plus equipping our force wit a mixture
of equipment, greatly outweigh the advantage of early
7
B-163074
These statements were made in rsponse to an
introduction.
inquiry into whether TACFIRE should be deployed 10 months
earlier than scheduled.
RECOMMENDATION
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Army to delay full-scale production of TACFIRE to permit
the program to be reassessed, Specifically, a special Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council should be convened
to consider the two alternatives of redesign and redirection
of the program to incorporate the system improvements that
have been identified. Of these alternatives, we recommend
that TACFIRE be redirected so that the Active and Reserve
Forces can be equipped with an improved, completed, and fully
tested TACFIRE within the shortest time. The details of
this recommendation are included in our briefing document.
AGENCY COMMENTS
We discussed our review with officials of the Cffice
of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army.
The Army's Director of Combat Support Systems (Office of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and
Acquisition) acknowledged the existence of the system improvements. According to him, development programs often
lag ehind technology and continual attempts to catch up
would tend to keep programs in the development stages. He
said that new equipment or improvements will always be
available but that at some point a decision must be made
to go with a certain equipment configuration or technology.
He concluded that in such cases, a system can be upgraded
by retrofitting or replacing equipment with higher performance equipment or components.
We agree that technology is elusive and that retrofitting
is a way of catching up after a system i developed and
produced. However, in the case of TACFIRE, technology that
can improve the system is available now, before full-scale
production begins. Moreover, the enhancements under consideration constitute major realignments of the system. We believe that the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
should determine hich of the improvements we itemized
should be included in the production configuration and which
should be postponed for future incorporation.
8
B-163074
The officials also commented on the various test results,
including our observations of Operational Test III, and fiRnciaI matterc. Where appropriate, we modified our briefing document to accommodate their views.
Your staff requested a copy,.of the briefing document
containing the information presented above for your use
during hearings on the fiscal year 197.9 military budget.
We are formally transmitting a copy of that document as
enclosure I. Five classified pages have been withdrawn,
but we can provide them to you separately if you wsh.
We are also transmitting the following information,
requested by your office, as enclosures II through VII.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum for the
Secretary of the Army, daLt ' January 28, 1975,
concerning production approval or TACFIRE.
Office of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering memorandum for the Assistant Secretary
of the Army (Research and Development), dated
February 20, 1975, concerning TACFIRE Program
Supplementary Guidance.
General Blanchard's message, dated August 5,
1977, concerning TACFI'E deployment and fielding.
General Starry's letter to General Kerwin, Army
Vice Chief of Staff, dated August 26, 1977, concerning TACFIRE deployment in Europe by Octob.r
1980.
General Kerwin's letter to General Starry, dated
September 12, 1977, concerning'TACFIRE deployment
in Europe.
Abstract of Modification 130 to the Litton TACFIRE
contract, which established a $1 million incentive
for Litton to fix software problems.
9
B-163074
discuss
If you desire, we will gladly meet wth you to
assistance.
other
TACFIRE in greater detail or provide
As discussed with your office, we are sending copies
of the Senate
of this letter and enclosures to the Chairmen
Services,
Armed
and
Appropriations
on
and House Committees
Army, and
the
of
Secretary
the
Defense,
of
the Secretary
other interested parties.
S
ti
y yours
Comptroller General
of the United States
Enclosures - 7
10
ENCLJSURE
I
ENCLOSURE
TACFIRE BRIEFING DOCUMENT
1
I
ENCLOSURE I
ENCLOSURE I
co
w~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
'i·
Ar~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a
2
ENCLOSURE
I
ENCLOSURE I
4-
>
c
o
,
04
E4.
L
HU
-
:
3
e
O
4'
I
e
-
.C
0aI
_
e*
w u
0.
a
e-0
00
GE
43
C
9-
VI
I~-
o
9-
h
0
.
_
_
I
5
-.
_-
_
I
43
3
C
43
4.
u
43
y
'..
lb
(1
O
0
oE
.
_
ei
.
ENCtSURE I
I
ENCLOSUR
oz
r~~~
LWa,
La
LI
M
Z
0.
Z
-
c
L
0o
L
Z
LU
L
V
CWL CZ
"fi
o
UU
O
o
=,,
O
U-
*-
a:
CL
~
W
~
am
B
0.
_
K
U-S
Li
Z
w
0I
U-U.
~
5-
w
=
L
-
CD-
O
C
LI
ClO
C
FO
0
LU
LII
~:i
U..
W
LI
U
'-4
O
O
CD
0
~~~~~~~~~~~~
U)
iii
CD
.I
I
oU
;-
o~w
B-
U
L-4
v
z
Bo:
oZ
LU
~~~W~~~~~
-.
3
:u
4
LU B-LI 0.
a:
W
~c
LLJ
' U.~~~~~~~
LU
oeC
)
LI
eL:
W
I'-L
0.~~~c
~~ *
I
-4.~~-
,J
L kiI
0lKI
@_
L
:~v
4'
C-)
B-~~~~~~=.
=
'
Z
.
2
-1cr
M
8
M
U-
L
y_
c
L0
-~
B
o
c
Xc 4 -_
*
U.A
O~~~~~~O
WZ~~~~~C
4n
LU
QC
_-
FW
C
I-~~~~~~~C.
L
-:
LU
.1
.
0
1
a
_
II
L2~~~~~
-4
g
:
6,;
C.
L
)
CD
=
'
8
W
4L
4z
..
I
U.
B.-"
Io
0
O
AC
ENCLOSURE
I
ENCLOSURE
I
-_
u,
Li
.-.
F_
a:~
OL
cc
O-
<r z
-
z
Z
C
W~~
~ ~~~~~~C
~
i
-V
c~~
-
0
O
cm
r
O
FwSE
C
-
O
*
0
L
Ol
a
1,
F
C
U
4(A
o
_
I
W
~
0
UJ
c C
-
o
Q
es
O Li.
S
-
F-
Li
3
-
0
sIC
CD
>
(A
X
IA
In
J"~
C.)
O.
: @
LiiC
Lii
W
7.
wa2
w.
~
~
C
e,,;M
~~
(IAI0 )
~
o0
CD
>:
-
0
-~
Z
~
c
M
0
J
e
(
C3
O
U
t-v
_
I
C.)
Lii
Z3
0
F-C
=-
w
-
I
I.)
Q.
I-
0--
0F-
0
.C
oCA
o0
LU
w
-
L
Uc.
et:
0
Z
Li
1
-
C-i
Q
0,Ui
_
J
Q
Lii
~
o :i
C
n
.C
C.
~-i
w
~
~0
o
0
0
.
t
=i
i
°-
~
.
~
CI-
-
L
< .:
Li
O
J
Q
- L ii
ac
0*
IC
Li
I-)
0
U
0
C
-.
F
.
i
(d-
u
0
z
F
1-
1
a.
a-
z
0
*
Li
a-U1
z
0
~
~
*
a-n
(~0
~
N
I
I
C)
-n
l
of~~~o
C)
~~~~~Ln
_
Uur
L
0O
CD
o
W
-
cc
F-i
o
0u
U
|
C)
0
-
:o
U.
L
Z
-_
F
Yr
h
.
M
Q
Li
03
ILl
5
et
o
CL~
a~~~
a-
I
U-
F-F-
0
z-
..i
O
E
:
(fl
~
~~ ~
a-
ii
F0O
Z
h_i
IZ
~~n
=
-
V)
o
-
zC
0
1-I
ILi
CD
ZlZ
O
*.
e
:
F-
W
~z~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~U
V0
=-
II
-.C
9D
t
s-s
*.
0=
IC.
_0-
o
O:
ii
C-DA
U.
ID
o
CLvZ
_ F-)
f
F)
cmi
-. -Zo=
LI
v
"~~~c
g
i
a>
co
.W
Li
O
- Cie
Lo
= 0:
I
F~c
La
-
>
t
U
C
O
0
C)
-
0
01O
a.
E
^
0~
t
1
or
Z
o
L-i
0
cm-
0.
Z
C)
w
*
0
C.0
n
V
C0
C
s
C
C
CD
CD
cc
W
-
<
tQ.
.
U
..JCCD
l
C:
Q
cF
r
S
O
^
C
Lii
e(
O
w
W*
JC
0
0
ZI:
W
0
Q.
M
CD
Li
z
L
Li
M
-
zo
c
.3
Li
r-
BQ<°Q<
ENCLOSURE I
ENCLOSURE I
z
-r
*.
L
u
L
U
z
a.)
C
;
W
-
a
z
U-
tn~~tnu
L
I
0
wP
4n
L~~~~~
C
0
C
Li
Li
0
Li
u
(
U,
.,
2
e~~~~~~~~~~
c
Li
(A
Z
C~
CD
-
LiLi
ILi-
~
J
-
0
uC.
Lin
.j
w
s-iZ
I
h
Li
N
U 0.
~~~
-~~~~~
b-
.
Li
0
0
kK I.-. U0
I.Cc
(A
L
V) W 1=
I-
Li
s-
Li
(A,
=
o
w~~~~~~~~~~
t;
a
co
c
C =
.
i
-IC
V
.
i-
i
L
UJ
i
Li
AC
0 C Li
f%
Li
I
"
~
w
U-
a.
I- Li
I
C)w
o
L
0-
w
U
I
5?
Li
~cv~~~~rc ~
0
CD
L
Uo
in
w~~~~~~~~~~~~n
C
:
P.
040
0
a"
9
I
'
Li
?
LL.
_j
w
-J
*
i
w
I-
t0
~
-
-
La
-f
0.
Li
UL
LiL
,19
c
r-
o~Li
I
Zi
.-
s
4A
-I
t
5
I-
a
I.&
C
D
Lii
8-4~s
4Z-
<I
(A
4
-
r
w
Li
Li-
L
ui
-U.
Li~~~~~i
i
U
C
0
~~~
~--
8-4.
-
M-
~~~
~ ~ a. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~' I1w
~~~L
W~-
~
~
~
I
C~VI
S I
I
i
W.
U
<).J
Li.
6
w
C
a.
ui
10
cm
ENCLOSURE I
ENCLOSURE
V
-~~~~~~J~~
o
o
C
a~
I
V)
~-
C)
V)
o
w
o-
%c
c
M
-cc
u
Lio
o_r
0
_-
-_w)
e
m
-
1
U'JC
I
U=
L
Li
U
Z
,i
_
0
-
i
--
E
LO)
K
1
C
-i
th
-J
L
o
0
*
U
i
D
I
L
7
0
Lii
U)
Li
0
l
W
Kn
.
K
F-
tm
YC
U)
Si
0
c \J
i
c
=
a
0
o
3
1
:I
_
Cd)
I0
*
M
0
0
:-
;
0¢
-
co
U
Z
O
=
0
L
0
I-
O
Lii
=
C
L_
-J
X
U
_
s
LL
.L
:j a.J
V
.
_
:
0
O
)0
c
-
03
--
LA
O
OOL
K
0OJJ
e
-I
Li
I
CD
m
0.1
_
C
o
r
p.>L
ffi
CD
o
c
I-
c
0
w
V)
o
I.-
0
ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE I
I
=
F-
o
zz,;
C
4A
8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L
(-)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>~~~
_'
<-)
ki
-_
Z
F
Ix
O
I
~~~
~~~
>Z
I._
F-
cZc
J
>
W
S
c
'
ui
~
~
0L
O
(r)
O
_
ca
K
n
0.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<
1
C
I
<
i m-
LU
F
L.A
B
Ia
0
O
0
L.
W
;,u
-
_
a
-F@
CJ
-,
Z
O
;
4
__,
Z
Z
t
=
Co°,
>0
F
f
C
U
w
Z
_l
z~~~~~
~
r
ex
w
<
4
Zo
°
~
~
cm
L
CDU
z
I
~4
O
Z
ffi
ill
~~
~
~
o
L
Y
lLr~~~~~~~~~W
t2
0i
.
I
B.
B S
Fu
0 0 UB-
o-
F-
I
Qa
F--
CZ
BU,
-I
. J
U-
uJ
Z
0
Lu
:IIC.)
4/)
...
B- J
)
0)
Lfl
a
U..
LIBFLi
0-L
£
g
-
~~~~~~
L Z~~~~~
U)
Uj
UJI
_ F-
Z
0
0
F
LI
S.-
F-
C
n
a
0>
O
C
B
-
B
I.
I.
0~~~~~~~
5/
6n
0
&
z
t
X
CL
~
wr
I.
Io
,
rY
~L,
u
*J
c
c
II
d~~~~~~~~~~~~~;c
L
O
Oc-Vo
-J
w
L
oc
0-U
ZC
Z
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U-
V
B-
FL
CD
I
aW
LI
I
F-
K
fi
Ln
0
O
"
J
F
r
IC
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
a
C.
W.
U,
UJA
U
U
CD
8~~~~
o
a.
U
-J4
-U,
o
LIn
|
L4L
(%JL
-.
C.)
3
11
u
=
s-
0r
r
%
c c.-
L0
~
-J
3.-
°
N
tY
Z~~~L
L,
z
N
J
F-
M
0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~LI
Z3·
:-B.
0
BL
LL.
LL
yp
CD
a:
o)
ENCTOSURE
I
ENCLOSURE I
CZ
cr:I
OI
o
(A~~~~~~~~~~~~2
~
U
~
~
~
L
LU
0
.
o )
CA_
-
Ji
V
Ln
m
o
(A
L
_
T5
27~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~O
cO
(
F
CM,^
F
s
0
0--I-V
0
0
z
w
O
V
O~~~~~~
w
L_
O
(A
0
J
-
8~~
2~
LUi
C)
J
_
Oo
0
-i
JU
J
(A
0Ca
V)e
tU
LC
_-
L
I-
L
D_
O
b
0
08
-
0
~
B
ZUJI-
L
0
1ui
-lc
L
U.
@
Ci
o
: LU
BO-
I)LU~
LU
LU(A
t
uJ
IC 1i
.i
Z
wf
#
C~~~~~~n.
LU
^
I-
cm
0)
V)
C
ci
3
(
~
(
0)U
Ou
6
LU
S
JLU
ui
C
a.
U
cn
0
CD
Z0
O-4
1
*
1
-
Z
.'
NC
.CYJ Z
Z~
LU
A
in
L
B
(
A
ZU
co
I
U
U-
~
'
i
_
C)
..
-
(A
(K
=
c0
>J.
e
O-
c
~
C
I
B
I PI
- C'J
'.IU B- IL.
LU
I
I .. 4
;r o
v,
0
00I
.I
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~
I
T
wui99
E
-2
CD
uj
cc
>
0
aCD
(
-U- - J
a
-
LJ
=
D
0
o
0
C
U
a-
ZE
U
Z
1
C
WU
0
_.
U<
(A~~4
tn
(A
c
>.
0
L
J
LU
0)
0w
[
.u
LU
w
LU
Z
0J
V~~~~~~~~~~~~~
a
Q
I-(A
f
LU
(A
r
I
-
C
LU
w
1=
i
a
'-
B-
;e
3
UI--
a- Z4
>
C-
0
Ci
X
LUAZ
ILU 0
I~~I
0
C
~< Z
0
0)
)
u
0-
-J
Z
U
0Z
C3~~~~~~
XQ
0
D_.
J
"
U
D
-
1ZZ.
w
0.
w
LU
^
D
0.1
...
f
um
w
<.
-
-
V
0.
CD
~ ~o ~
DA
IWe Ie
O
L&'
0-l
-cc
Ci
0
CD
Z
L
B-
~~~~~IJ
~
C
0
J
t'
e
.
B-
I)
LIU
L
=
C
U
-
m
I
L
Z,
C
ui~~~~U.
(A
°F
I-I:J
o
1A
O
D
0
(
A
~j
OI
°°
2w
'S
-.~
Ci
.
0
UCD
(A
Z.
Z
>t
>Ca
uj
cc,
-
w1
~
o
w
U.
_
O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~V
_
|
D
I9
~
~
C
-
ENCLOSURE I
EICLOSURE
U,
L
c- #-
0
o
I
I
v,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
o
W
CL
L)
(.
U..
u
vr~~~~~~~~~c
W
LU.
U.
.
CD.
tB
c
C.
"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t
LU
0
m
wJ~~~~~-
LU
Ic
a
cr
z
im
a:.
U,
U
II
,
o
z
p-
e
-
-9-
4n
LU
..i
z
U,
Q~~~
V1C~~Z
2
'3
LU~~~~~c
in
~~t-~L
-aI
Wr
W CD
W
z~~~~~U
U.J
W
U.
r Cm~
x
U,
..
3 ')
Z~~~V
LUUZ0 S
LU
I-
LU
i
W
g6
4i-
0
i
I-.
LULU
0-6
0.
z
L
4n
-
LUe
~
ui
ii
I-
I-
I~U
,
LU-
.J
U
YO
Li
0
a~
0
J
Z,
&f
U,
I-
U,
I
LS
-I~
10
0
B~~~~~~~~C
aU
I
0
B
U
-g
(.
iS
U,
~~
~
~
I!
~~-
L
ENCLOSURE I
ZNCLOSURE
-J
I-_
00
0
gY
. .
w
·
oc
U," 0V)
W
-i
W
V)
Li
i
'L
I- Lc
LU
Z
o
r4v)
wr,
cw
E ~~cnr
a
>-
I-
>
Zo
F-.
s
c
W
F--
sr
z
Z
o
:s
z:
O
Z
-
LW m
CD
Wo CZ
C~~~~~~~~~~C
W~~~~
:
Y
39
0
W~~
LU
0
~
4-
0
m
0
u-F-w8
Q
LU
iN~~~c
0
>-.
-
4-O
LUa
F-
_
0~~~~~~L
J
=J
<
F
cn~
1-1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
D:L
_
g
C.
3
-4
gW
z
8 U-U
CZ
Z
u>tj
Z
W
°r
O
LU
LU-
ZUr
iF-
_CZ
00
'Clcr
U
"
>5h
r~
X
W
Y~~~1
a
0
K
x
W
-Jc
o
W~~
O
V)~~~~~~~V
o
ZrC
K
-Ci
>
7Z
c
>C
Z
>
J
LW
)
Z
4
P
L
Z
Z
Co
I.
4: 1)P
FLU
0
1
1
LU
.F
W
1
F
KC
Z
g~~-
_.
I
O
I
ENCLOSURE
I
ENCLOSURE
o
A,>~~~~
0
o
*
m
mc
_
I-
_-
-
L
o
--
0.
Vt
a;
(
z
w
o-
z
o
=
U
-
(A Cco
0c
LU
Z
O
iooA
K_
Z -
U.
-
CD
F
LU
I-
mo
,
-
n
U
LL I
o
O
oC
o
-
e
~~LU
I-<
M
LU:
o
u
0l
(A
_
LU
0
-:
-cc~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
-U
-4
21-
Ui
Z
.
M
o~
K
c
0
cU
LU
<
x
I
CO
cc
co
0
W
U*
M.
M
3-
0~
IX
_zm
b-I
ui
a.00
L.
CD
Z
0.
.
C
c-
o
i
-
co
- K
CL
*
*
M
0
u
I.
-
O
uC1
e.
-
cZ
C0
-cc
(
.
Ii-
0
=
D
r
-
M
IzU
m1
Cl:
uio
ci~~~~~r-.c
oA
_
K
o
w
t.>
£C
(I
z
V)
0
LU
FCD
A
U.
LU
C)
uj
(
c
(A
O
o
K
KD
a
z
I-
i
c
n
vo
es
0
tn
LU
s
I-~
z
L
=0
C
0
~~
.
O
K
(
cc
I-
U. 0
.
0la
X
zA
n
M
_
.
w
Cm.A
ui
z
O
I
W
i
L- u
M
0
fi
44
~ ~
8
~A
(A
CL
X
~
I-
z
°
LU
w
LLJ
V:
F--
0j
C.)
ui
CL
LU
0
0
0
s-i
La.
I-K
oc
wM
to9
C.)
=
=
.
LU
I
I
L
L.
I
0
r-
z
-.
O=
C
~~~~CD=
-
a:
0
.-
Ci
M
uo_
w
LU
00u
J
Z
;M o
e
J
0
-i
LUZ.
e
~
Lo0
M.
o
-
w
01
OIQ
l- -
w
LU
at)
1X
(.*
_
I
Z-VI
wU
Z
Z
=
O
tou
Z
LU
w
0
._s:
ce
(A
8
(
(
.LJ
U.
L
ZDJ
u
0
LM U
)
DC
)a
C)
I--(A
L
a.
-
I
z3
U1
~
f~
0
0
c
IC
c
..
I
s
VI
LU
LUM=
-~~1
I
ENCLOSURE I
ENCLOSURE I
w
Wco
LI.J
o UW>2:
LaJ
Li
2:Q
-J
0.
Q
Zs.
tJ
CD
-
Lr
UC
OC.
to.I
K
I-
u~
LL
CD
CD
2:
~)ccL-
-
<
C
CD
u"
u
~I
Li-
j..uLs
;
u
us
2
La..
.
2C
mI
-
z
tn
W
U
L1~~~L
2
CD
--
CD! LU
oD
LU.
u~~~~s
Li..
-~Li
LAJ
U.
C.)
i
w~~~~2:(f
2:
..
2:2
L~~~~~~~~2ZPU
LU~~~~0.
LA
K~~
LLLJ
- 3c I-
0,
j
Ucs
0
m~~~~~~~~~~~~~
L61
w
O~~~~
II-O
P"<
U-
-i w
acl:
I
=
.W
2:
IgU0
Z
0
L-o01
w
Uws
J
w
w
~
w
W
W2
L2:
n
m~~~~~~~~~w0
uu
U
:NN-
HCL..
0
a
u0
=
~w W 4c~La ~0:w ~
~
4n U
wui
W C~~~~iG1
C.
L
-
LL.
e
i
v,
sr0
U
0
-i
)
us
L)
)
a
1
a
.
2:
I-
*
4
V)
a
cn~~~~~0
~
w
w
=O:
a
-
a-C;r
Cn 0
bo
I
a
CZ
.J
L
!
m
-
uirl
I
U.
0
zie
w
U
Lu
-L
CD
~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ILL
o
a:
>
w
4-a
a.usO.
U-
m
CL
iI
2:
H
U-inU-
&J
LLJ
W
-
2:
0
v
w CDr
K~
Li
0D:
-J
E
LU
2-
R
c
w.
I
S co
U.
-
co
3
I-
u-
S~
-
0.
L
0..
V)2:~~~~
m
I--
0
U.
m
w
ui W
L.J
V
ui
w
co
(10)
au
ai
Z
u.
ui
C~
H
I-
HC/)~~I--
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
U
U
ui 01
ENCLOSURE I
I
ENCLOSURE
0
w
u~~~~~~~~~~~~~a
(
o
0u
~
~~~~~~>
a
v,
I
U.
-J
u,~U.
--
u~
-J
T
*
(a
U.,
ui
ci
(a
w
-J.-0.
I
-4
-
3
LA-
uj
uj
(\l
xK
U.
Lii
aU
0
Li
In
L
Lii
-4
~~~~~JIA
Lii
0
Li
U-
OD
in
-4
-
L/)-
39*
-~~~~~~~~~~~X
J
cc=t
juiC
L
-J
I-
I-
I
a
Z
Li
~
Let
ui
:C
-n
0
Li
3
Z
9
U
0_a
I
LiU
(a
.4
LJ
.
U-
0
Z
=
-
,
u.
LI
-
-
.J
i
LAJ
Wa
i
30~
LI
I-
0'
.
3.
CY
Li
A
~
u
0.
e
V)
K
>
Z
0
0
<
0
-J
lm~
9
Iin
4C
-
0U-
4
~
~
-W
.-J...)
Li
w
I-
LJ
Pu
LM
0
ii)
C
co
0
(
cc
-
X.
·
v uit
C
in
in
(a
9
i
U.
(a
U,
I
(
&,
I
0
=
Li
nL
4(
0
U
LLI
Li
I
,
-
..J
~
~
C~
I4-.~~~-J-J
0
-iU
tn
i
C
j
CD
w
a.0
i,U
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~fl
-J
-n
CDLi
0.
0. Li
o4 -~
-
11
-J
Li
=
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0nY
U -
o
~
n
0.
-
C
CD
i
L
0
'u0
JZ
(a
r
4I
Li
9-
0
La
cw~c
ou
I
.CC
< I
LU L U..
(a
L)
9-0L
-1
0
c
t
C> Li
0
i
t-
0
in I"
9-
0
c.
0U
Ui
#A
::a-J
V)~~~~.
U-1
n
-~
0
-J
3
Li.
Cc
(a
0
9-'
w
0~~~~~~~~~~~~
O~~~~~~~~C
~~~~~uCD
-.a
Li
0
I.0 Cd)
(I)~~~~~~~~~LA
Z(a
Li
0
CD
(a
C
K
K
0
U,
=
-
Z
C~
B
Li
-IC
i
In
U
Li
CD
9UW
XV) I-0
co
w
ui~
-cc
~~~~~~~~~Z
w
C-13
z~~~~C3
(a
0
C
r
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
U.
~~-aO~nO
wC
~~~~~~~~~~~~~CD
Z
-J
CD
K
::,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~w
U,
V)~~
·
U
U
Li
*
Li
U
UZ~~~~,
-(
U.-J
U
-~~~c
Z
0~~~~~~
K
LiV
a
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~w
w~~~~~0i
CD 3 r
L
"e~~~~~~~~~~>
(a
-C3
I-
ZLL
~a
C.D
ucr
2C
0
LJ
-J~~~~w
Li
-JI
(J
C.
I
iM
(
)
-
-0.
·
9(a~~~n
(a
CZ
14
i
-ccJ
0
4
E
I-
i
C
Li
Z
.
ENCLOSURE I
ENCLOSURE I
LII
U9
W
CI
uI
IICW
LI
>-
~~~~~
-
CD,
L
-
o,,,V-
zM
W
W
-
LAJI
w
a-
I-e
S
V)
oQ
W
zo3o
W
.)U.
_.
LI
4~
:
>-
_,
>
.
V)
W
4,
_
4..)Z
-
Z
)
=)
I
_
0
iac
4)
o
Li
a,
<
o
W
V8I
W*
s
. ° :
0.
CD
II
L
W
a
Wc
4)->
Zz Z 0_ s,,
i
1
0
W
>-
ce
W
coJ
.z
f
3
W
0)
2c
-J
Z
C
z
C
LA-
_U.
LI
Q
zO
W
0,..
tz.n
I-
;_
LU-
C]
C
D
U.
K-
I-
O
U..II-
ZI
at
C.,
0
V)
LIV)
W
W
0-
,
0
-
0,C,
-
0
-
.
CZ
43
8CD
°
W
X
UJ
CLa
.
LI
1
I
15Va
-c
c
3
ENCLOSURE I
ENCLOSURE I
i
v,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;>
vu
-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~v
a-cc
a-
4~~
u.1 LU
O
~
LU
C'J
Z
Z
O
a-
~
es
0
a-
wOI o°°oa o
!
C
=3
o:
CD
z
oz
-
a-
La
-
LU
0
K
in
LU
a
LU
CD
Z
c
Q
J
u
aw
v
L
U
0c,
a.
$
0
L
IU
~
.
WZ
La..I--)
0
a-
-
CL :I-
LU
aIU
O
Ej
0
C)
~~~~~J
~~~~~VKI.
aa- a-
~~
ai-.
LU -i
LU
a-
tAK
a
a.0
a-a01
aj
co
aa-D
at~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~w
a-
LUS
I-J
:-
4A
-Cu
0
J
0
L
-
w
g
..a
UJ
,
CDaPa
uJjJ
...J~~~~~~~=LLA
a--C
a4c
u*
cm
aZ.
*.
w
<
=
-i
a-
0
C
L
i
r
LU
LUc
LUaJ~
4 ^..
LLU
U
L
L- a-ac
U
j
c
..j
a-
C>
Vs
LUL
w
0u
L
..
j
C
a
a
la~0~
C)
0o
0
<
-0
LU
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~E
C
w
-L1
I
.
U-
a-
C3 ELu
LU
0A
2c.
o°
CA
-
0..
-
0g
o. *
a- a-
-i
u
z
C
I
K~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~A.A
a- aco
am°
0.6
ww-i
a.
ui
a-
-
L
LU
LU
ul
-
z
C-o
0
oaL
u~~~~oUJ
0
a-cl
a- -
_u
U
o
uj
..
o
L
0
LU
VI
LU
C.)
u
oX
c
_.
z
0
0
a-
n1
0
OU
aL
a- .J
CAJ
wUi
-
inLU uO
0
B u
*
in
L
IzB
ILU
LU
J
..
-
O°CDa0
a-
c
in tn~~~~~~i
_ LU
LU-
-J
K
O
a
U
i)
{-
|
ui
0
-
=
=u
-
-.
Cl
ea
a
C
l_
C)
°
La
LU~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
..J
a&n
t.rca:o
°o
:I-
A LCD
LUJ
16
L
U
0
a0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
ENCLOSURE I
ENCLOSURE I
cc
9
K
0
KDa
Ca
L
z
W
0C
-
Uo o
l en W
CK
U.
W
C
.e
Le
-c c
~~~
LU~~i
Li
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~na
or
In
LU
IL.
oM
vy
=MU
CDIf
0
w~~~~c
uc~~~~~~~~~~
W
MU
o0C
o:
" o
W
o
I.-
M
o
~z
K
W
W
0
s
F
I
2C
C
K
-
I..,..
U
cc
L
ce°
0
-
LC
o
-LK
vxI~~~~~~l
' zr F
LUg
~~~CI
,
~~
.1
ffi =
LU
Li
W
~..J
J
~
~
,
,
s:~~P
@
,
,
O
...
LUC)
0
-,
LU~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t
u
g..
I
u~~~C
o
0.
0
.-
La
...
j
..j
-
In
LUW
0
-=~~~~~'
17
.I
CD~
I
~ ~~~~~~
Clc~
La'
W
I-
...
J
4n
-
.
-A
I
o,
J
In
,
-
U
_
r
CW
1S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1t
_.
LUIL o
In
I
L
In
L
-
A
W..
-W
& dK
Li
g
o
LU
in
0. _O
f~~~~~
&n
*
vt
-W
-
La
0w
UA
_
-4
0
I
UU
_
X
Li
0
S
Li .W
co
cc
oJ
o
Ca
CM
0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L
CD
Ot
w
Ce<-
0
LL~
o
Lc
~~ Z
o: z
=zz
Qo
0e
LUa
<
=
K
E
o
ff
CD
8
La
In
Li~~~~~~
LU
W
I.
c
An
L
ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE
I
U
.
u
O
C
c
K
KL
-J
0
U
U
K
UR UL~. I
w
LU
K
)
-U
I.
K((
I
0
-
0-J
-JL
-J
a.
cc
2LU
0
U
.)
0.;)
0
K
LI.. OLJ
I
-
I.I
Z
18
.
n
I
I
ENCLOSURE II
ENCLOSURE II
COPY
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D.C.
20301
January 28, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SUBJECT:
Production Approval for TACFIRE
The Army is hereby authorized to proceed with a limited procurement of TACFIRE by exercising the option with Litton to
procure 14 sets of TACFIRE equipments. Based on the recommendation of the DSARC, the TACFIRE program is changed from
an LRIP program to a "Limited Procurement" program. This
limited procurement will permit employment with some of the
early deploying divisions and an examination of the doctrinal
impact. This decision should not be construed as authorizing
full-scale production even if all of the provisions of the
Department of Defense Directive 5000.3 are satisfied in subsequent testing. The Army will expedite completion of testing
of the changes being made to the DT/OT II baseline to assure
system readiness to proceed with DT/OT III. The alternative
to proceed with the core/drum memory configuration as tested
will be retained until the all mass core memory is proven in
acceptance testing.
Within 90 days the Army will provide the following:
1. Funding, schedule, and testing plans which fully support the program for upgrading TACFIRE subsystems.
2. The details of the Army's approach for providing competition on selected items in follow-on production if it appears practicable to pursue competition for this system.
3. A plan for the conduct of
a. A detailed review of artillery command and control
requirements including consideration of new weapons and target
acquisition systems, battery level computation requirements
and foreign developed artillery command and control systems.
b. An analysis of potential changes in artillery
doctrine with the introduction of TACFIRE or an alternative
system.
/s/ H. P. Clements, Jr.
19
ENCLOSURE III
ENCLOSURE III
COPY'
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING
Washington, D.C.
20301
February 20, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY (R&D)
SUBJECT: TACFIRE Program - Supplementary
Guidance
In his memorandum of January 28, 1975,
which approved lim'ted
procurement of TACFIRE, the DepSecDef
identified several requirements to which the Army must respond
within 90 days
after the limited production approval.
The
memorandum is to provide additional details purpose of this
expressed in Secretary Clements' memorandum. on the guidance
For example,
while TACFIRE is apparently effective
at division and battalion level, it does not satisfy the
critical need for a
battery level computer that would be capable
of single gun
solutions applicable to CLGP and which
would
also offer potential improvements in accuracy and allow
battery dispersal
for improved survivability.
While limited production of TACFIRE has
been authorized,
before we commit to any production beyond
tlat, the Army
should complete the following tasks and
submit
appropriate
reports to OSD at least 90 days prior
to the DSARC IIA:
a. Conduct operational tests of the TACFIRE
system which
incorporate a realistic battlefield electromagnetic
(RF) environment as well as concentrated EW activities
that would
reflect, to the degree feasible, enemy
EW capabilities in
the 1980's.
b. Conduct a thorough review of artillery
ADP requirements specifically addressing:
- the adequacy of TACFIRE to handle new
CLGP, and improved target acquisition weapons, e.g.,
capabilities.
- battery level computation requirements
and the need
for ADP at corps and group levels.
- suitability of foreign ADP developments,
e.g., FACE,
MILLIPAC, for battery level needs and
the
problem of
interface with TACFIRE at battalion and
division
levels.
20
ENCLOSURE III
ENCLOSURE III
COPY
c. Conduct further cost effectiveness analyses. The
cost effectiveness information developed to date has been
constrained by organizational limitations imposed by current
doctrine and has shown only modest improvement with the introduction of TACFIRE. Are there other system configurations
which would take advantage of TACFIRE developments that would
prove more cst effective? iow would an equal investment in
an available battery (FACE) o battery/battalion (MILLIPAC,
ODIN) level system and additional weapons compare to TACFIRE?
k status report addressing, RF and EW test plans, the approach
to the artillery DP review including the systems to be considered, the plans for the expanded COEA analys.'s, and other
pertinent conridecr.tions should be submitted t OSD by
September 175.
Expeditious testing of the changes to the DT/OT II baseline
as noted in the DepSecDef memorandum will permit early examination of the questions outlined above and will enable the
Army to conduct DT/OT III with equipment and concepts more
fully defined to exploit the application of ADP technology
to fire support operations heretofore unrealized.
/s/ Robert N. Parker
Robert N. Parker
Principal Deputy
21
ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE
IV
S
JNCL -IF
*
IV
D
DEPARTIENT OF THE ARMY
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENT'R
772i7132 8
TOR
P.CN = 77217/07087
CCSN = SCD037
RTTLZYUW RUFCAAA4151 2171330-UUUU-RUEADWD.
ZNR LUUUU
R OGC738Z AUG 77
FM CNCUSAREUR HEICELBEFG GERMANY //AEAGC-RSIi/
1 FUWTR:E/CDRUSwFAS FT SILL CK //ATZR-AGPA//
ChMOLTH NJ //CRCPM-DCS-TF//
RUECEIA/PM ARTADS FT
Ir:C RJFTFRA/CCRV CORPS FRANKFURT GERMANY //AETVFSE//
CNROE VA //ATCD//
RUZLAIA/CDR TRADCC FT
RUEeD,/CA XLSIFCC //GAMO-RQ//
CCfFS MCEHRINGEN CERANY //AETSAT-FSE//
RUFLCWA/CnDRV.
RU;Fil'i/CDR 41ST ARTY GF BABENHAUSEK GERVANY
RLFTTEA/CDP42D ARTY GP C] ESSEN GERMANY
RUFYTJA/CCR72D ARTY GP ERTHEIP GERMANY
RUFvTRA/CDR210TH ARTY GP FERZGGEKAUQCH GERMANY
RUFLFTA/CDRSEVENTH ARMY TNG COMD GRAFENWOEHR GEANY
RUFZ1MA/CDR 1ST ARMO DIV ARTY ZIRNDORF GERMANY
ARND D1\ ARTY HANAU GERMANY
RLFUSA/3D
RLF1UVA/8TH INF CIL ARTY EAUM.-CLDOE GERMANY
RUFYTLA/3D INF DIV ARTY KITZINGEN GERMANY
UNCLAS
SUBJ: TACFIRE DEPLOYMENT ANC FIELDIN1. USAREUR HAS EXAMINEC TFE ALTERNATIVES FOR TACFIRE DEPLOYMENT/
TRAINING IN EUROPE AS PRESENTED BY TFE USAFAS BRIEFING TEAM DURING
8-29 JUNE 1577.
ThEIR VSIT CKN
2. 'USAREUR CCNCURS ThAT TACFIRE TRAINING FOR USAREUR UNITS MUST BE
-ACCOMPLISHED IN EUROPE.
USAREUR FAVORS THE "CONUS FIRST-EUROPE ASAP" DEPLOYMENT OPTION.
3.
THE FIELDING OF A CCMPLEX MAJOR SYSTEM, SUCH AS 'ACFIREv MUST BE
MAINTENANCE,
ACCCMPANIEC BY THOROUG-LY 7ESTED AND' PROVEN LOGISTlC
AND TRAINING PACKAGES. THE AVAILABILITY OF THE BATTERY COM UTER SYSTEM WITH THIS OPTICN IS CCNSIDERED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE.
USAREUR FAVORS THE CONVERSION/TRAINING OF ONE DIVISION ARTILLERY/
4.
THIS CONVERSION RATE MINIMIZES ANY
FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP AT A TIME.
ACVERSE READINESS IMPACT THAT MAY INITIALLY RESULT DURING THE CONADDITIChALLY TH!S OPTION REDUCES USAREUR TRAINING AND
VERSION.
IkICF: WCULD BE DOUBLED IF THO DIVISION ARTILRECUIREMENTS
SUPFORT
LERY/FIELD ARTILLERY GROUPS kEPE TO BE TRAINED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
B1
*.
*
*.
**. ** ****t--*+-*
UNCLASSIFIED
*t*:*.*
**+*,'*:**
22
*
PAGE 01
050738Z AUG 77
RUFDAAA/4151
ENCLOSURE V
ENCLOSURE V
UNl CD STAT[S AFfPY TRAIN,N'
o
wnF
4t
*
r
C
AN' D CO;R. hC COAMAND
go
-r
' t'
Etbr,
'
FORT MIOtROL. ,i GINIA
2651
16 August 1977
ATCD-CF-F
General Walter P. Kerwin, Jr.
Vice Chief of Staff
United States Army
Washington, D. C. 20310
Dear General Kerwin:
During the last Tactical Automation Appraisal (TAAM) at Fort Hood,
you directed that TRADOC examine the feasibility of deploying TACFIRE
to Europe prior to the scheduled October 1980 tar'get date. Since
the TAA, we have Z:,orughly examined the early fielding options and
their impact on training, personnel, and logistics. In addition, a
team from the Field Ar-illery School carried the various training
and deployment alternatives to Europe and briefed the USAREUR staff.
Our investigation found that we could, in fact, get TACFIRE to
Europe in December 1979, some ten months prior to our original target
date. However, there were some serious drawbacks, e.g., the first
two division artilleries would be equipped with the interim battery
display unit equipment rather than the new battery computer system,
thus introducing an equipment mix in Europe;..the CONUS sustaining
base for Europe would be the 1st CAV DivArty only; the logistical
package would have been stressed under only.a' ne division load
during TACFIRE OT III and a full corps equipped with TACFIRE would
not have received a CONUS shakedown prior to European deployment.
General Blanchard's 5 August 1977 TACFIRE Deplo)yment and Fielding
message requests the October 1980 deployment date and stressed the
importance of a complex system such as TACFIRE being thoroughly
tested in CONUS and then issued to Europe with proven logistic, maintenance and training packages. The USAREUrR message went on to say
that waiting an additional ten months to deploy TACFIRE with the
battery computer system was considered a'significant advantage.
23
ENCLOSURE V
ENCLOSURE V
6bhle the need to deploy a combat multiplier such as TACFIRE to
Europe at the earliest possible date is understood, the danger of
histily introducing a new complex system prior to the establishment
of a thoroughly stressed log package, refined and tested doctrine
(especially corps), plus equipping our furce with a mixture of
equipment, greatly outweigh the advantage of early introduction.
Recommend that we adhere to the original plan and introduce TACFIRE
together with the battery computer system in Europe in October of
1980.
Sincerely,
DONN A STARY
Ceneral, SA
Commanding
24
ENCLOSURE VI
.c'·,, *
ENCLOSURE VI
DEPARTMhriT OF THE ARMY
oeltic oT HE ClIS OF STAF
~,
*t,
WASNINGTON. D.C.
3t10
12 September 1977
Dear Ca
In l
of your investigation of the possible ten month acceleration of
TACFIRE to USAREUR, and of General Blanchard's desire for assurance that
the logistics, aintenance, and training packa;es are solid, I agree that
the Octobe- 1980 deployment date should be maintained.
The key issue of acceleration is TCFIRE's impact as a combat ultiplier.
Therefore, it s essential tnat -e overcome the problems we face in fielding this system, rhe rationale of waiting for the Batterv Comouter Svste(BCS) prior to the deployment offers obvious advantages. However, further
slippage in fielding TACFIRS must be avoided. Our recor in tl area of
battlefield autoration can certainly be improved and I support full development of the key TRADOC roles as the Army's doctrinal focal point and combat
developer for battlefield systens.
Therefore, I concur in adhering to the October 1980 deployment of TACFIRE
and BCS with the understanding that the delivery of a complete package
will present an iriediate capability to USAREUR.
Sincerely,
General, Jited States Armv
Vice
f of Staff
General Donn A. Starry
Commander
US Army Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Ionroe, Virginia 23651
25
ENCLOSURE VII
VII
ENCLOSURE
,*"
.I6
t.,.*.
P00130
DMB0O7-68-C0154
^s uto III
4@0"
* Dlll
Electronic Systems Procurcment Birnch
Procurement & Production Directorate.
United States A5m Electronics Comm,-ld
Fort Monmouth, New Jcrs.v 07703
QM
lND
I
T
"'~.U'
-sw
flnSrtIE
D6t
I
.4r
OU.
6t4
ItrlC@klnr
! %'1
,
LAr IP)
G
CoutT
{
.
A
..
O ---
b
d
-r.Q
15
.*
6I4$
r
r tErl_
rP-'*
*-^
r
rrm rz
oull -C.-tr4
rof
C
^r*O
r
46t1
O 1 l C
t
77
tO t;
W"_GE
r _li r
-M1
*
C,
1tD S OU.'rG r"C0Ir
t *.e e
r
---1
_;
.
to:
..Furds allotted as of ths dat e are ll chergeable
!.
SlOOn ,00
2152035 5624450 P5212-2570 S28-043
y .(
Do.
67 Dee
FrrII,
Ott
.
C4 *b6.6
.
*.-r.
_e
*r
O
.--.
0B
*
SO.K&)O.*
O
SO.- .
' 4*
-.
Dr*6tr.4
TC *,t *
..
Cl.
*
*
.
........'I '..., **,OI
4....
LITTON SYSTEMS, INC.
Division64l.0A
.
1 .... Systems
Data
8000 Woodley Avenue ,
en Nuys, CA 91409
."
n
Chiet,
DCASC-Litton
21300 Burbank Blvd
Woodland Hills, CA 9136
' ...
'
"
..
.
...
..
.
....
I
.. * -Co
,.~,
A
ACM
C-5-75137-01
Jnn'30
wTr)P'^
'. s .'Ii!)t'i
1
OF CNTRACT
SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION
OF 5AMENDMENT
'
M
.
P00118 exercising thc Low Rate Initial
WHER£AS the Governmcnt issued Modific'tion
by Kodification
in ModificFtion P00088 as aended
contined
option
(LRIP)
Production
P0009; and
the
P00121 and P00122 (See Note 77) to modify
WHEREAS the Government issued Modification
75.
Feb
26
dtd
(SOW),
Work
of
LRIP Statement
RI? program as reflected in the revised
the revised LRIP prograr.
modification refleta
NOW THZREFORE the partie 'alree that this
'
hercin&.ter reerred to as Limited Procurement (.).
katil ACKrOWtDCD:
_
is amended as followi
ARTICLE 1 - ARTICLES ASD SUPPLIES CALLED FMR
and Exhibits thoreco,
CLINS 0016 through 0035, including sub-CLINS, Attachments
following.substituted
the
and
except for CLIN 0023. are deleted in their entirety
[] t,.
I..
3 lo:4e
~ iIUf
~,9414~
N-14
C. 6
HAp
IZ
oy
e.*d et.
'1
tton
Li,,4)
i! I~
Cl
-
S stems,
I
......... :10 s
r *w A
H
Inc.
. Iim
.. O
D,,.
s ......
..
C.-
1'
rl
2
s
·
2
6
'
e2
i
ENCLOSURE VII
ENCLOSURE VII
SOFTARE INCENTIVES
of four parts,
The Software Inccnti',es consistr
each of which stand alone:
a,. Transitioning to include verification.
EPR).
b.
EPR correction (short title:
c.
All
d.
Preliminary Qualification Tests (short title:
CAIM operating system (short title: ICrU).
PQT).
2., Total incentive dollars are hown in Table T.
Incentives won in one part shall not depend on 'gaining any
portion of the ihcentives in any other part.
TABLE I
$200,000
Transitioning
PQT
200,000
EPR
300, 000
MCMUI
300,000
TOTAL
3.
TRAnSITON'ING,
consist o
$1,000,000
The trnnsitioning incentive program shall
a ;o:::al PSS(3) Compiler,.Asse-: -
of* the current tape version (version 32A)
rT,
c-p.ilation
o;; the PSS(D) con-
.piler and :a .cet;:lio conlsistin o appiicatic: :orn
copilcd
the B compiled 'eirsion to tl;c
timing c:iprilg
(bnscline) version, and the first five hours of DivArty
scenario 5 run on both the PSS(A) and PSS(D) compiled tape
versionsa,
Ohjel tivc.
To complete the transitiOning process to the PSS(B)
27
ENCLOSURE VII
ENCLOSURE VII
TACFIRE SOFTWARE INCENTIVE PROGRAM
The Army paid Litton $1 million to accelerate software
development so that operable software would be ready for
scheduled testing starting with Final Qualification Testing
in November 1976. The payment was made because Litton was
not contractually committed to demonstrate software capabilities until Final Qualification Testing. Problems
identified at that time would have delayed further testing
including DT/OT III. By paying Litton $1 million the Army
bought time to fix software problems before testing began.
The payment was for the following:
1. Accelerated transition of software from a developmental compiler to the deliverable compiler. The
transition was completed July 1975, 14 months earlier
than scheduled. ($200,000)
2. Accelerated correction of 100 software problems
identified during DT/OT II. Corrections were completed January 1976, 9 months earlier than planned.
($300,000)
3. Accelerated demonstration that new Mass Core Memory
Unit functioned with software application programs.
Demonstration completed June 1976, 5 months earlier
than planned. ($300,000)
4. Army participation in contractor preliminary software qualification tests, wh. ch contractually enabled
the Army to identify problemL as they occurred and
to have them fixed before formlal testing. ($200,000)
28