ABS Consulting



ABS Consulting
~ ABS Consulting
3 February, 2009
Pierre Be llavancc
Hcenan Blaikic
900, boul. René-Lévesque Est
Bureau 600
Québec (Qué bec) G 1R 213 5
Subject: Explosives Safet)' Siting Consulting
Review ofPotential Explosion Risk Stlul)'
f or Suburban Rail Lille Extension Report
Dear S ir:
This letter summarizes the resu lts of our revie w of the Potentia l Explosion Risk Study for
Subu rban Rail Line Extensio n Report prepared for the Age nce Metropolit aine de Transport
(A MT)I II ,
1. Background
General Dynamies (GD) operates a site with exp los ive storage magaz ines (ESMs) used in the
process of manu faetur ing amrnunition . Aeeo rding to G D, the storage magazi nes are eurrent lv
sited propcrly in accordance with NRCAN regulations and qua ntity-di sta nce (Q -D) cr itc riay l
However, a passe nger comm uter ra il Iine has been proposcd that crosses into the requ ired Q-D
explosive sa fety arcs . There are sixteen exp losives and ammunition storage ma gazi nes of
vary ing construction and a Safe Mar shal ling Arca (SMA) where explosives lade n sem i-trailers
are parked. Construction of the rai l line would ereate non compliance with NRCA N Q-D
requi rement s and would restrict ex plosives storage at the site.
T he AMT comm issioned a risk ana lysis for the enc umbered railline to determine whcthcr risks
posed by the rai l line encumberin g the requ ired Q-D se paration were acce ptable. The risk
ana lysis results arc summarized in the AMT report !'! Ge neral Dynamics as ked ABSG
Co nsulting Ine. (A13S Co nsulting) to rev iew and comm ent on the report.
1 Bakerkl sk. "Potential Explosion Risk Study for Suburban Rail Line Extension", BakcrRisk Project 0 1-1638-00 106, Final Report, September 19.2008.
z NRCAN. "Quantity Distance Princip lcs", Explosives Branch Natural Resourccs Canada. 1995.
\ li "'iG
( 'lI n 'll r till~ IJ J(~ •
• J-v ,m San 1\ :.1' 1\ !\ V<:I1U;:. ""\111 1: 215 • S'Ul '\11[('111" ,1 '( 7.'i2j2 US,\ • Tel- 11'.1"·1'1 5·5 1'15 • ,, \:-. 7 1: , . -,j\ ''' .~ l i.;
" ' l i 'l r
o !;- ÇI JI M, d I I Jl \t,.( ( !I I I
Explosive Sa/ ety Siling Consulting ~ Review ofAJ IT Risk Analysis
A BS Consulting Proj ect No: 2065 783
23 January, 200 9
2. AMT Ri sk Analysis Review
N RCAN Q-D Principlcs'I ' do not discuss risk ana lys is meth od s or risk acccptanc e criteria. Il
sho uld not be assu med that a risk analys is wo uld be accepted by NRC AN w ithout thci r
endor sement. llowev er, U.S. Departm ent of Defense Explos ive Safcty Boa rd (OOESB) '1'1'- 14
"A pproved Method ologie s and Algorithm s tor 0 00 Risk Based Exp losives Siting" cont ains risk
cr iteria utili zed by the DD ESI:l1 31. T he associated risk accep tance criteria arc presented below in
Table 1 for reference. The risk acceptance criteria are broken down tor Individual Risk and
Gro up Risk for employees (those volun tarily ex pose d ta expl osives hazard s) and a nonemployee /public (those invo luntar ily exposed ta ex plos ive hazard s). According to the OO ESI3
criteria. the risk accepta nce level for the passengers of the commute r ra il is 1 x 10.6 for
Individual Risk and 1 x 10'5 for Gro up Risk . The AM T risk ana lys is doe s not c learly summarize
bot h the Individual Risk and Gro up Risk to ail riders.
Table 1. The DDESB Risk Cri teria l31
Ri sk to:
Any 1 employee
(Annual Pr)
A li em p loyees
(Annual Er)
An y 1 non- cm ployee
(Annual l' rl
Ali public
(An nual Er)
Limi t maximum risk to 1 x 10'"
Attempt to lower risk to 1 x 10.3
Acc ept above 1 x 1O" w ith significant nati onal need onlv
Limit maximum risk to 1 x 10.6
Atte mpt ta lower risk if above 1 x 10"
Accept above 1 x 10' 3 with significant nati onal need on ly
T he risk anal ysis performed for the AM T report invol ves three basic co mpo nents:
1. Pr obability of an event
2. P robability an ind ividual is exposed to the eve nt
3. Prob ab ility offata lity given exposure to the eve nt
ABS Co nsulting rcviewe d the AMT risk analysis and have div ided our comments regarding the
anal ysis into two catego ries. The first eategory of co mments relat e to the und erl ying prin cip les
of the anal ysis. The seco nd catego ry involves technical item s of lesscr importance.
DDESB, "A pproved Methodologies and Aigorithms for DoO Risk Based Explo sives Siting", Tp· 14 Revision 4,
Novcmbcr,2008 .
Page 2 of 7
Exp losive Safe ty Siting Consulting -- Review of AAfT Risk Ana lysis
AI3S Consulting Proje ct No: ] 0657 83
3 February . ](J09
2. J. Principles of the Analysis
The AMT Risk anal ysis report doe s not referenee the so uree document for the risk analysis
method olog y or frequencies. Table 4 on page 12 o f the AM T report appears to be taken from
DDESR '1'1'-14, "Approved Methodologi es and Aigorithms lor DoD Risk Bascd Explosives
Siting"; howe ver , the va lues in thc table are not consistent with more recent versions o f '1'1'-14 .
Based upon the date of the report , Septernbcr 19,2008, the 3'ù revision o fTI'- 14 datcd 2
Fcbruary 200 7 wa s available and cou Id have bccn utili zed l"l. Thi s revision of T P- 14, although
not the latest, has frequencics of explosion thar diff cr from those utilized in the AMT report. In
addi tion, two basic principles of the risk analysis should be rcviewcd for accuracy: (1)
Passengers expo scd and (2) primary fragment s. Each oft hese is di scussed in detail in the
followin g two sections .
2.1.1. Passengers Exposed
The risk analysis assume s a train to carry 256 passen gers (see Section 4.1 .1 page 13) with a total
of 16 train s l'cr day, 5 days l'cr week (see Section 4.4 page 16). Therefore, the total daily
passcngcr load util ized for the AMT risk analysi s is 16 train s*256 passengers / train = 4,0 96
passengers/day. Howe ver, based on AMT publicl y relea sed inform ation, 6,575 passeng ers per
day will eventua lly travel through the GD site. The numb er of passe ngers ex pected to travel
through GD property is based on a posted numb er of2 ,300 parking spaees to be establi shed in
Terrebonne and Mascouche (the two train stations beyond the site on the train path ). AMT has
specifi ed that parking space sha ll represent 70% of the passenger load which equates to the 6,575
passcngcr cstimatc, T herefore, the probab ility ofa n indiv idual bein g exposed to the event should
be modified to rcflect the more recent AMT passengcr estimates.
The passenger level will a lso affect the statement that D5 di stance is the required separation.
Above 5,000 passengers, D7 separation distance wou Id be required .
2.1.2. Primary Fragments
The rail car construc tion is described in the report as eo nsisting of 12 mm polycarb onate
windows and 1/8 inch miId steel skin (sec section 3.1 page 4). Risk duc to primary fragment
penetration (i.e., piece s o f the ammunition casing) was ncgle cted due to the penetration
resistance of the windows (sec section 3.2.1 page 5 and section 4.1 pa~e la). However, ARS
Consulting analys is of the polycarb onate windo ws utilizin g Con WEpl 1showed that the design
basis fragment, from detonati on o f a single MI 07 round at a range of 300 rn, is capable of
pcnctrating the pol ycarbonate window . Figure 1 shows the result s of the ConWEP anal ysis and
notes that the fragment residual velocity is 26.4 mis (86.5 ft/sec). Thi s result contradicts the
AMT analysis and implies additional risk resulting from primary fragments.
DDES13, "A pprovcd Methodologies and Aigorithms for DoD Risk Bascd Explosives Slttng' '. TP- J 4 Revision 3, 2
February, 2007.
s ConWE P 2. 1.0.1, USA E Rcsear ch & Development Ce nter, 1997.
Page 3 o f7
3 February.
Explosive S{~fety Stttng Consulting - Revie w af AMr Risk: Analys is
.-1 BS Consulting Project No: 2065 783
Fr agment Penetration mto Lexan
Weapon .
Design fragment weight..
Initial fr agment veroctv.. .
Range to tarqet ..
Target truckness
64 35 gra ms
1030 meters/ sec
300 meters
1.2 cm
Fr agment striklng velocity
Fr agment pene tr ation
Res iduai veloclty of fr agment
after perf oration
Residuai fragment mass
arter perroranon..
u.s Ml 0 7 155 mm
5 1.52 meters/sec
3.249 cm
26 .37 meters/sec
Ran ge
met ers
Stri king
v etocity
22 0
24 0
26 0
28 0
4 00
4 20
44 0
4 60
4 80
69 1
565 9
46 3 .4
379 5
3 10 .8
254 .6
208 .5
170 .7
139 .8
114 .5
93 .79
76 .81
62 .9
5 152
42 .19
34 .55
23 .17
18. 98
15 54
12 .73
104 2
6 .992
16 .95
15 18
13 6
10 .9 1
9.77 1
8 753
6 .29
5 .634
5 .047
3 627
3 249
2 .91
2 .09 1
1 678
1 503
1.34 6
64 .35 grams
Fra gment
Fr agment
8 771
57 0 .6
45 9 .2
368 .9
295 .7
236 .5
93 .91
57 69
44 .81
34 .54
26 37
19 8 9
14 79
7 .639
5 .207
3 .333
0.828 5
63 .78
64 .07
64 .15
64 2 1
64 .25
64 .3
64 .32
64 .33
64 .34
64 .34
64 .34
64 .35
64 35
64 .35
64 .35
64 .35
64 .35
64 .35
64 35
64 .35
64 .35
64 .35
Figure I. C o n W .~ 1)151 Resu lts for Fragment Penetration of 12 mm Lexan Winilow at 300 m
Exp losive Sufety Stnng Consulting - Revie w of AMT Risk Analysis
.'lBS Consu lting Project No: 2065783
3 Februory, ]009
The AMT ana lysis considers fragments gencrated from a single M] 07 round . Chapter 5 1'1'-16,
" Methodo logies for Calculating Prirnary Fragment Characteristics'j' "conta ins methodol ogies for
cvaluating fragmentation o f stacks of munitions. The "s tac k effec t" can increa se the initial
fragment velocit y up to a factor of 2.0. In addit ion, for stacks of muniti ons, fragment masses are
increa sed by 50%.
Therefore, the risk to occupants from fragment penetration should be modified ta account for :
Effeet of Multiple Round Detonations on Fragment Veloc ity and Mass, pcr 1'1'-16
Chapter 5[6]
Primary fragment penetration of the polycarb onare wind ow .
Potential primary fragment penetration o f 1/8-inch rail car skin aller effects of
multiple detonations are considered.
2.2. Additional Tcchnical Commcnts
ABS Consulting has the following additional technical cornrnents concerning the AMT Risk
1. Executive Surnrnary
a. 1" paragraph . "re quired separation distanc e is D5"
i. No sub stant iation is given for this Q-D separatio n rather than more
restrictive D7.
b. 3rd paragraph, "a comparison to Ca nadian passenger train accident statistics and to
Quebec road accident statistics shows that the risk ta train passengcr s due to an
accidenta] explosi on at the GD site is 3,900 to 30,000 times lower for train car
travel over the same di stance.
i. No reference given .
ii . The risk for rail passcngers relative to e ther rail risk is not necessarily
relevant. NRCAN must determine acceptable risk.
c. Executive Summary Miti gation Discussion on Page ii
i, 05 stated as the requirement, but 0 7 is discussed tor ail of the miti gation
measurcs, Thi s is not consistent.
d. Footn otcs ]&2 on pages i & ii.
i. Footnote I states that 05 is distance rcqu ired to "most" roads and
highwa ys. This is not a proper defini tion of D5 as it pcrtains ta public
traffic routes in the NRCAN Q uantity Distance Principlcs. 0 5 is the
defin ed rcquircrncnt for "Medium l'rallie" or up ta 5,000 vehic les a day.
Il. Footnote 2 states that 0 7 distan ce is the se paration required ta " very busy
roads" and to " buildings where people may ass emble". Thi s is not a
proper definition of D7 as it perta ins ta public traffic routes in the
NRCAN Quantity Distance Principlcs, 0 7 is the dcfined rcquir em ent for
"l leavy T rame" or over 5,000 vehicl cs per day.
DDESB, "Methodo logies for Ca lculating Primary Fragment Charactcristics", TP~ 16 Revis ion 3. 18 Decc mbcr
2008 .
Page 5 of?
Explosive Sa/ely Stüng Consulting ~ Review of AA!T Rtsk Anaiysis
ABS' Consulting Proj ect .Vo: 2065 783
3 February. 2009
iii. Th e footnote nor the report states that Sec tion C.2A of the NRCAN
Quantity Distan ce Principl es defin es Group 4 as build ings and fac ilities
wh ich require Hcavy Traffic Ro ute d ista nces and sta tes examples as
i. main railway linc
highways and major roads
iii. major navigable waterways; and
Iv. non-vital stoc ks offuel
2. Section 2. 1 - Ge nera l Magazines Description
a. Page 2, last paragraph "distances shown in Table 1 arc the sho rtest dista nce from
the cdge of a magazin e to the center line of the proposed rail alignm cnt "
i. Q-D shou ld be the shortest distance from the edge of the magazin e to the
edge of the ra il line OR to the edge of the railline right ofway .
ii. Note: Raillinc docs not meet D5 for 1/3 of PlîSs co nsidered (5 of (5).
3. Section 3. 1 - Rail car construction
a. Second paragraph - "The window and door glaz ing is des igned to be ' bullctproof'
and resist the impacts o f24 lb concrete masonry units."
i. Bullet proo/ïs not a valid balli stic rating . Th e ball istic rat ing should be
ii. The impact encrgy o f the 24 lb CMU should be speci fied ,
4. Section 4. 0 - Risk Evaluation
a. Page 10, 2"d paragraph, "The risk ca lculated hcre reprcse nts the probability ofa
fata lity on the proposed comm uter train route as a res ult of an acci de nta i
explosion at the GD fa ci lity."
i. The risk only assesses fatalit y. Il is thereforc notcd thc risk of serious
inj ury or minor inj ury have not been eva luated and represe nt additiona l
Il .
Page 6 of7
Explosive Sof etv Siting Consulting - Revtew of AI\ f T Rtsk Analys is
3 Febrnary. J()()9
..l BS Consulting Project No : 2065783
J. Clos ure
ABS Co nsulting has revicwed the AMT Explosive Risk Ana lysis. In add ition to ma king
techn ical com me nts, quest ion s pcrtaining to the basic prin ciples of the risk evalu at ion werc
noted . These includcd:
Summa rizing both Indi vid ua l Risk and Group Risk
Pro vide a list of re ferences and state re ference document for frequencie s (Sec Tab le 4). If
reference is 1'1'-14 . util ize mo st recent revision o f T P- 14
Exposu re should be mod ified to reflect A MT pub lic est imat e of 6,575 passcn gers pcr
Probability of fatality of passengcrs to primary fragm ent s sho uld accouru for
o Multiple mun ition s perTP- 16 C ha pter 5 guidelines
o Fragment penetration of 12 mm po lycarbona te wi ndo w
o A ssess potential for penetrat ion of 1/8-inch rail car skin.
S inccrcly,
Ben F. Harri son , P.E.
Tcc hnica l Manager
A13 SG Co nsult ing Inc.
Page 7 01'7