The Naval Review

Transcription

The Naval Review

Vol. XXXI.
No.
I.
THE
NAVAL REVIEW
" Think Wiseb.
Plan Boldb.
Act iwifth.''
For Private Circulation
(Foundcd in I 9 I z)
Copyr&bted under Act of r 91I
. NOTES
ON THE WARAT SEA
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Commerce Protection . The Air and the Sea.
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The Mediterranean and
North Africa . Atlantic . Home Waters . Russia. South Pacific and
Australasia. Casablanca . Postscript .
2. THE MODERN
CONCEPTION
OF SEA POWER
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3. NAVALOPERATIONS
IN THE EXPEDITION
TO NORTHAFRICA
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4 . SEA TRANSPORT
I N PEACEAND I N WAR
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5. SUPPLYING
TOBRUK
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6. MALTACONVOY . .
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7. FASTSHIPS . .
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S. . THE SEA SERVICES-SOMESUGGESTIONS
ON MUTUAL
AID . .
9 . AXE GRINDING . .
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10. AT THE END OF THE YEAR
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1I . NARROWER
STILLAND NARROWER . .
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12. ADDITIONAL
ENTRYTO THE ROYALNAVY-SOME SUGGESTIONS. .
..
13. REFITS: A SUGGESTION . .
. . . . .. . . . . . . . .
14. SENIORITY . .
. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
15. SALUTING . .
.. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
16. BATTLEDRESS
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17. A SUB-MARINER
REMEMBERS . .
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18. NAVALDIARYOF THE WAR
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19. CROSSWORD
PUZZLE..
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20. BOOKS:i.
The Nelson Touch." By Clemence Dane . .
.. .. . .
ii .
The Years of Endurance, 1793-1802." By Arthur Bryant
..
iii .
Surgeon's Mate "
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iv .
Founded upon the Seas." By Walter Oakeshott . .
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v . World War a t Sea." By Brian Tunstall
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vi . " The Navy and Defence." By Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield
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vii . " Destroyer's War." By A. D . Divine . .
viii .
We Sailed in Convoy." By Rlauice Brown . .
.. . . . .
ix . " Sea Flyers." By C. G . Grey : and Wits End." By John PIIcore
x . " We Landed at Dawn." By A . B. Austin ..
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xi .
Malta Invicta." By Bartimeus " . .
. . .. .. ..
xii .
Coastal Command "
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xiii . "Coastal Command at War." By Sqnadron Leader Tom Dud!eyGordon
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xiv . " Sailors at War." By Stanley Rogers
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xv. " They were Expendable." By W . Id. White ..
. . .. . .
xvi .
The Campaign in Greece and Crete " . .
. . . . . . ..
xvii .
Passed to You. Please." By J . P . W . Rfallalieu . .
.. ..
xviii . " Men Only in the Navy." By Tankey
.. .. .. ..
xix .
One-One-One."
By Gilbert Hackforth- Jones . .
. . ..
21. CROSSWORD
SOLUTION . .
.. .. .. . . .. .. . .
BALANCE
SHEET
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OBJECTSAND REGULATIONS
OF
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THE NAVALREVIEW."
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HON. EDITOR'S NOTES.
I am still being asked from time to time for copies of back numbers-and especially
the war numbers-of THE NAVALREVIEWto replace those lost in one way or another
by enemy action, and these requests have increased of late. Any members, therefore,
who do not wish to retain any, or all, their back numbers for the years 1939, 1940, 1941,
and 1942 are asked to return them to me for re-issue to make good such losses.
Material for the May number should reach me not later than the last wzek in April,
and earlier if possible.
Changes of address should be notified as soon as possible. Members to whom this
number has been ilzcorrectly addressed are urgently asked to let me know their correct
address, thus saving delay in delivery and extra work for the postal authorities.
RICHARDWEBB,
Hon. Editor.
ELBRIDGE,
WINDLESHAM,
SURREY,
23rd Febr~ary,1943.
BINDING
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Owing to conditions prevailing to-day, these prices are subject to alterations.
R. W,
NOTES ON THE WAR AT SEA.
" N o Captain can do wrong i f he places his ship alongside that of a n enemy."
Nelson's precept is being lived up to in spirit if not in exact lineal measure. In this
crowded quarter of events, big or small, momentous or merely exciting, the naval note
which rings most steadily through all is a tactical one. A general tendency to close-in
fighting with the destruction of the enemy as the sole pre-occupation ; the longer the
adverse odds the shorter becomes the range. And as is so often the case, the policy has
frequently brought a reward which cold theory could only prove to be impossible.
Of the many examples which could be quoted, are Sherbrooke's attack in the Onslow
with his destroyers in the North, the splendid American example of Callaghan with his
cruisers against the Japanese battleships in the night action in the Solomons, and the fight
of the little one-gunned Bengal in the faithful performance of her duty as an escort in the
Indian Ocean to give the tanker in her charge a chance of escape. And not least, the
heroic decision of the Dutch captain of that tanker when, having equal gun-power to his
escort, he logically considered himself a fitting consort rather than her ward and joined
her in the fight against two far more heavily armed Japanese merchant cruisers. The
Bengal has opened a fine tradition for the Royal Indian Navy, and the two ships as consorts
proved themselves fit descendants of their ancestors who were such worthy foes when
naval traditions were in the making. There is perhaps something after all to be said for
naval tradition and the idea of an aptitude for the sea.
When we come to our usual opening of a brief survey of the quarter's main events,
they are unusually crowded and more than ever show the dramatic rapidity of the
changes of fortune of this war. The last main instalment suggested that we were then
left in the throes of three important struggles on whose decisions the answers to three
questions depended ; whether Stalingrad held, what Alexander and Montgomery succeeded
in doing, and the results of the fight for Guadalcanal. Postscripts of a fortnight to three
weeks later were able to report signs that the answers were likely to be favourable.
With winter approaching and one more chance a t the most for a German attack before
it arrived, Stalingrad had good hopes of holding till the spring ; the Eighth Army
had broken Rommel in Egypt ; the Americans had inflicted a smashing reverse on the
Japanese at sea in the Solomons. But few, however optimistic, would have ventured
to forecast definitely all that has since happened.
Russia, in what would have been deemed impossible conditions, is reproducing, on a
grand scale from the Baltic to the Black Sea, Haig's strategy of a rattle of blows over the
whole front by which he finally smashed the German armies in 1918. Leningrad and
Stalingrad are relieved, the Caucasus practically cleared, many other important strongholds
in German hands threatened, and hordes of Germans in tangible numbers permanently
out of action with many of those left facing the same prospect. Rommel routed ; out of
Egypt, out of Cyrenaica, out of Tripolitania and into Tunisia for what may be his last
stand. The United Nations planted in Morocco and Algeria, standing by to essay the
completion of the job by clearing Tunisia, and the Axis from their,last foothold in Africa.
Papua cleared and the Americans the sole organised occupants of Guadalcanal, at least
until the Japanese are able to make a fresh and more successful effort to regain the island.
Our first preparations started in Burma for its recovery. Our lately-formed Far Eastern
Fleet now strong enough to act offensively with a carrier-launched air attack on Sumatra.
A rich meal for a persistent optimist, the role to which these Notes have steadily stuck,
finding or, as some allege, imagining the tiniest speck of silver lining when the clouds
are blackest. Now, when the spread of silver lining seems so wide as to suggest that
the stars have coalesced into one unbroken silver sky, [I hope I have not been infected
by Air Commentaries I], they had better switch over to the pessimist and search for flies
in the ointment.
There are certainly three. One, perhaps more irritating than dangerous, is the
apparent delay in Tunisia. Whatever its cause, the fact remains that since our first
surge, it is the enemy who, besides k i n g able to increase their strength, have done most
4
,
of what pushing back there has been. Although the strain on the enemy caused by our
North African landing must have greatly helped, and very likely made possible, Russia's
great effort, it cannot Mve had the same effect as an actuaIly synchronizing success in
Tunisia would have had. Nor, unless it comes very quickly, will such a success, when it
comes, be in time to pick up the series of con$inuous blows started by the Russians and
carry them on while they are gathering strength for resuming the great offensive in the
spring. If and when our armies clear Tunisia it must take some time before they are ready
to launch their next step in some offensive on European soil.
The second fly, not always so readily noticed, is that Papua and Cuadalcanal are
a very minute part of Japan's gains from which she will some day have to be driven.
If each aphis en each rose bush has to be tackled individually until it is dead, as is at
present the case, it will be a long job.
The third fly is an enormous one. The U-boat is not mastered ; nor indeed are there
any signs as yet that a start is being made in mastering it.
That is perhaps enough pessimism for one dose, and we can turn back to enjoy
the shining firmament while listing the events afloat before examining some of them
i n detail.
The Allied landing in North Africa was just in time to be noticed in the November
number. I t goes with the continuous naval work in the Mediterranean which can be
dealt with in more detail under its own heading. So can the continual attrition of
Japanese naval units and shipping in Australasian waters. The time for a forward naval
move in Indian waters in connection with the recovery of territory in the Far East
has not yet come. The two naval events there have been the carrier-launched attack
on Sumatra and the Bengab's fight. In the Atlantic we have the engagement in far
Northern waters with German units from Norway and the five-day U-boat attack on
the Atlantic convoy of early November.
, Other events GYf a more general nature which bear on naval matters are :-The
final settling of Madagascar in Free-French hands, and the occupation of Riunion.
The a d h e s i ~ naf Erench Somaliland to the d i e d side. The settIement of satisfactory
relations regarding Martinique. The adhesion of French West Africa to the anti-Axis
side, with Dakar and such ships as are there. The scuttling of the Toulon Fleet. The
assassination of Darlan. The Casablanca and Adana meetings. The partial mobilization
of Spain, which might be pro-Nazi, anti-Nazi, or merely pro-Spain in intention. Spain's
further unilateral infringement of international rights at Tangier. The relinquishment
of our extra-territorial in China with immediate moral effect and post-war consequences
which: should change our naval usages in those waters. The declaration of war by Iraq
and the breaking off of relations with the Axis by Chili, with a resulting denial of all
the Western American sea-board to the Axis. The launching of a 52,000-ton battleship,
the New Jersey, in the United States. New arrangements at the Admiralty for the
running of naval aviation. A new Chief for the Coastal Command, Air Vice-Marshal
Medhurst. A new-submarine-head
of the German Navy.
- The naval conflicts within our own shores have flared up with habitual ferocity in
the old, el& Air u. Ship controversy, the question of speed for merchant ships, the state
of the Fleet Air Arm, and the curious ending to the Secrecy of Cargoes question.
Above and behind all has been the never-ending, the most strenuous and most vital
battlepf
; the battle of sea transport and supply which again may well open the
ball. - -.... - - - - - i --.
COMMERCE PROTECTION.
-- .,SHIPBUILDING.
-The M-iflister of Production,- in describing the 1943 production programme arranged
with the United States, spoke 03 an undertaking to supplement our shipping resources
togive us the tonnage to maintain our programme of imports anil transport and supply
for fighting requirements ; of monthly deliveries of aircraft, substantially higher than
hitherto, to both the Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm to balance the striking
power of the two forces ; and a combined programme and allocation for escort vessels.
Th& last is perhaps -the most -important item of all ; for ship building as a replacement
-r-
/{
NOTES ON THE WAR AT
SEA.
5
of lost tonnage is but a making good of the ravages of a disease-The U-boat menXce ;
escorts are the antiseptic which kills the germs. Yet till the disease is mastered the
replacement of lost strength is all to the good ; in which connection it may be noted
that the American ship-building programme for 1943 will, if fulfilled, go far towards
filling most of our losses to the end of 1942. The forecast of 1943 output by Rear-Admiral
Vickery is 19 million tons.
Harking back to the irrecoverable past is of little use, but with respect to the
output of escort vessels one cannot prevent memories of one of those optimistic inter-war
statements on the Navy Estimates which spoke airily of having types prepared which
could be readily produced in numbers if convoying should prove necessary. One's
scepticism at the time seems well justified when one still hears, as one frequently does,
of fifty ships in a convoy escorted by no more than one destroyer and four corvettes.
There seems much to be said for a suggestion, made I think by Lord Winster, though
I cannot lay my hands on the record at the moment, that corvette-building should be
handed over to the United States for mass production.
A report issued by the House of Commons Select Committee on National Expenditure,
on the 4th of November, contains some interesting comments on the shipbuilding
situation at home. I t recommended the re-opening of more derelict shipyards, and a
review of the allocation of orders with a view to a concentration of particular yards
on particular types. I t noted that output per man has greatly improved, and is higher
than in the United States, but that there is still a lack of a sense of urgency among
the men and much warming of the knocking-off bell. Hence it urges the desirability
of giving some facts about losses to stimulate output.
SHIPPING LOSSES.
Public information of our shipping losses for the quarter is only general in character,
but sufficient to show-to those of the p.ublic who attelzd to it-that the submarine situation
remains extremely serious. Perhaps an increasingly serious one and certainly the most
important issue in allied strategy on which all other issues depend. One sign of the
continued severity of our losses is to be found in the stress which is at last being,laid
upon the seriousness of the problem of countering the U-boat in recent speeches of all
prominent leaders. General Smuts, by his speech, did a great service to the Navy, upon
whom the main weight of solving this problem and combating this danger falls whatever
others may say, for his is a voice to which the public listens, when the voices of experts
are casually dismissed. Partly because of his proved wisdom but largely, I suspect,
because to England he is not a prophet in his own country and also because, not being
an expert, he is not assumed to be ips0 facto ignorant of his subject.
So far as general information goes we have a few vague statements ; that November
losses were serious, that December losses showed a very large improvement and-from
the Washington Office of War Information-that the losses in the first twenty days of
January exceeded those for the first twenty days of December. An additional negative
piece of information was given by the American Secretary of the Navy when he assured
a press conference that statements that we were losing as much as a million tons a
month were definitely wrong.
For more detailed figures we have to turn to the German claims, for what they are
worth. In the August number these Notes suggested that though they were exaggerated,
they seemed to maintain a consistent exaggeration of from 25% to 35% ; that they
might therefore give a reliable indication of fluctuation in losses, and even, if the exaggerations were dlowed for, an approximation to the true amounts of loss. If we make this
allowance, and ignore the possibility that the degree of exaggeration may have increased
lately to offset the effect of bad news elsewhere, and ignore also much obvious fishings
for information as a claim for 16 tankers in one convoy, we have figures for November,
December and January of 1,035,200 tons, 447,879 tons, and 408,000 tons reduced to
possible figures of 728-623,000 tons, 336-291,000 tons and 396-265,000 tons respectively.
Their total claim for British and American tonnage for 1942 is 7,955,000 tons which
at the same allowance for exaggeration would become to between six and five million
tons ; not an improbable figure. Half a million a month !
6
NOTES OX THE WAR AT SEA.
To emphasize the vital importance of the anti U-boat campaign we have the relief of
Admiral Raeder by Admiral Doenitz, the late Chief of their submarine service, as head
of the German Navy, and his announcement on taking over that " the entire German
Navy will henceforth be put into the service of inexorable U-boat warfare." The same
policy was adopted last time. I t failed and brought the Germans to their final disaster
but only when the maximum British and American effort was concentrated on its
defeat.
PUBLICSTIMULATION.
Among recent speeches urging a far more intensive waging of anti U-boat warfare
has been one by the First Lord. The fair response of the average man who has
done what he can by switching off most of his gas and electricity and refraining from
burning the coal which he cannot buy, running his car which he may not use, or eating
the food which does not exist, is to answer, " Yes, I quite agree. But is not that what
you are there for ? " Still it is something to have the Air Ministry joining in the cry
and dragging its gaze from targets in Germany to notice the sea, even if one can detect
signs of a boosting of the aeroplane as a superior substitute to the surface escort as a
U-boat killer. The aeroplane's contribution is certainly invaluable and it can do things
which the ship cannot do ; and vice versa. The aeroplane is for the wide spaces, the
escort for the vulnerable spot. The aeroplane, or rather aeroplanes, can drop a few
depth charges in many places ; the ship can drop many depth charges in one place.
Instead of trying to displace the other let each augment the other's effort.
One has to suspect that the recent concurrence in the primary importance of mastering
the U-boat menace does not go as deep as words suggest and that we should read into
the First Lord's curious urging an appealing cry that the Admiralty still has to fight
hard to get what it should and must have to do its job properly.
Among the many things we are promised as an earnest that we are returning to
sanity after trafficking with false gods is the refurbishing of the Anti U-boat Warfare
Committee.
THE ANTI U-BOATWARFARECOMMITTEE.
The Prime Minister announces a re-casting and a freshening of this Cabinet Committee, " to focus and emphasize the need for supreme exertions and to make sure that
there was proper concert between all authorities." The regular and systematic control,
which presumably includes the strategic direction, of anti U-boat warfare remains with
the Admiralty. The Committee's job presumably is to see that they keep at it and also
to discover and exploit every possible contribution from scientists and others which
can further their work, and if necessary force them on the Admiralty's notice. The
question that is being asked is whether the necessary attention can be given by a
committee wholly composed, as this one is, of men whose normal jobs are tull-time
ones ; the Prime Minister, the civilian heads of the Admiralty and Air Ministry, the
professional heads of the two Services, the Ministers of Production and War Transport,
and, above all, the new Minister of Aircraft Production who as Deputy Chairman must
be the working leader of the Committee.
Of the many methods of reducing our shipping losses the one of reducing the enemy's
opportunities for attack by increasing the speed of cargo ships continues to be received
with a cold shoulder, in official quarters. There has been a long exchange of correspondence in the Press of late, mostly in the " Daily Telegraph," with " The Times "
joining in as a very late starter. The First Lord has contributed a vocal broadside.
These Notes need not follow the course of the combat in detail nor do more than
summarize the main points put forward in the many letters. Without derogation, it
may be said that some of the correspondents have been drawn into the lists, like myself,
by the interest and importance of the subject rather than by virtue of expert knowledge
or long study of the subject.
I t will be as well to start by summarizing the main points in favour of speed in the
two letters which reopened the subject. These were from Admiral Craig Waller who
7
is certainly a specialist in the subject if anyone is, since he has made it his own from
long before this War. He contends that " with all our means of detection and destruction,
utilizing to the full specialized surface craft and aircraft of the F.A.A. and R.A.F.,
depth charges, bombs, shellfire and ramming, we have made no serious impression on
the U-boats nor reduced to any appreciable extent the grave losses of ships."
He contends also that the German " wolf packs " are based on and only made
possible by the slow speed of our convoys, which allows of trailing for days and attacks
by night ; that the menace can be practically killed by building cargo ships and tankers
of sixteen knots or more instead of concentrating on the twelve-knotter ; that aircraft
are useless either as protectors of cargo ships or destroyers of submarines at night or
in thick weather, and, moreover, lack the ram and the heavy Q.F. gun. Experts have
convinced him that the design and construction of fast cargo vessels and tankers on
mass production lines is a practical proposition and that with Diesel engines the fuel
consumption would not be more than 25% greater than with the Scotch boilers and
reciprocating engines now in use. The shortening of voyage times would make the
fast ships the more economical.
Of the views evoked by this notably few are against these contentions. Those that
are often disagree with some only of the arguments and then not on principle but on
practicability. I add my comments, as I go along, in square brackets as a specimen
of how they strike an ordinary person who has no claim to any special knowledge or
study of the subject. I may remark that, as with most of my views, they are not
intended as a basis for controversy. If anyone is tempted to dispute them I shall not
answer since (i) life is not long enough, and (ii) the disputant's artillery would be better
employed on a worthier target.
An answer in Parliament stated that the Admiralty intention is to build the ships
which with the labour and resources available will give the best results. [This evades
the whole question, which is what are those ships and is the Admiralty's answer the
right one.]
Other expressions of opinion are as follows.
I t is pointed out that 16 knots or 10 knots makes little difference in dodging a
40-knot torpedo and 17 knots is suggested as a minimum useful speed. [Generally
speaking this is so, though the resultant speed does give 20% more time to bring the
torpedo astern or, if this is done, for side-stream and propellor wash to have a chance
of deflecting the torpedo. As to the speed of 17 knots I cannot see much virtue in the extra
knot from this point of view. I would suggest that the object of speed is not to evade
torpedoes but to evade attack.]
I t is also claimed that speed only helps in evading attacks if U-boats sight the
convoy from an after bearing and that they are usually already in position lying in
wait for it. [True, for one attack, if they are in the right spot ; but if they have to move
in, the higher speed of the convoy should reduce the angle of danger which has to be
screened by escorts outside torpedo range and so reduces the number required or
increases their density and efficiency.]
Both these points seem to miss the real one which Admiral Craig Waller puts
forward as the reason for more speed. If the speed of the cargo ship is above that of
the submerged speed of the submarine the latter cannot dog the convoy by day except on
the surface, when the aircraft really do get their chance, and so cannot make more
than one attack.
[The packs cannot become wolf-packs and have 35 goes in five days. One pack,
one go.]
So much for the operational side. On the industrial side are the following.
forward one-sided arguments aboui
Certain naval and air protagonists are
questions to which scientists engaged in Service Departments upon operational research,
either know, or are better able to determine, the answers. [(I) Are they ? (2) Cannot
the view of a service mind which is, or has been, engaged upon the actual loperatibnal
work or has studied the same, carry at least equal weight ? (3) Have these scientists
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produced the answers and, if not, are we to sit dowp and wait till they do so ? (4) Is
pot the true function of these scientists to produce the things which the operator needs
to fulfil his operational requirements and also to draw the operator's attention to new
discoveries and inventions whose use might enable him to adopt improved methods of
operation ?]
here is good authority for not accepting the point that aircraft are useless at
night or in thick weather; but it is not possible to discuss these matters in public.
[Without offence, this latter impossibility is a pity. There seems no confirmation of
an aircraft's utility under these conditions in available reports. Before accepting the
views of such an anonymous authority one requires to know how authoritative it is
and be able to judge the grounds for its opinion.]
I t is asked whether his experts have satisfied Admiral Craig Waller that the
necessary yards exist, that human and mechanical requirements are available, that
there exists sources of supply for Diesel engines to power the ships without delay, to
put in hand the mass production of fast Diesel-engined ships. Admiral Craig Waller
replied that he did not say that his experts said they could be put in hand but that
their production by mass was a constructional possibility.
Lastly, so far as the correspondence goes, is the all-important question, and probably
the critically important one, whether switching over to new methods could be effected
without holding-up or upsetting general war production or incurring unacceptable delay
in ship production. This point has often been put forward as the objection to building
fast ships, and usually in the shape of an impossibility. [Negatives to an innovation
are always easier to "prove" than positives, as they can quote experience, and negatives
have always been the enemies of progress. The positives require vision. I have no
doubt that countless experts can be produced to show it is impossible. To find those
who are prepared to show that it is possible is a far harder job, and harder still to
find among these those who can show it. And when this is done it still remains
to prove it. There is only one way ; to do it and make it possible. I t is what the
Russians have done. I t was impossible for tanks and heavy motorized units to move
in snow and other winter conditions. So they have made them move. We have done a
good deal that way, but we are perhaps better at achieving the morally impossible
than the materially impossible. The former is less trouble ; you simply have to go
ahead and do it. We have been doing hardly anything else in this war, at sea, on land,
in the air, or as a nation.]
And now for the First Lord's contribution.
To bring an 11-knot ship to 15 knots needs twice the power, [I should think an
underestimate], and 60% more labour. The cargo-carrying capacity would be lowered
by 20%. The counter argument is that the true figure is that we should want 20%
less ships, [I cannot arrive at a higher figure than 10% myself], to carry the same
quantity of cargo per y e p and hence less ships to build, less engines, less crews, less
lives to lose besides losing less lives through increased safety. On the anti-fast ship
side it is also pointed out that time in port, a considerable factor in a year's work, is
the same for any speed. [The First Lord's figures may be correct if no ships are sunk.
But if, as is claimed, the percentage of loss per fast ship is less his figures require
adjustment and the whole balance could easily be upset.]
We now come to the first of some points which makes one wonder, as in the case
of last quarter's statement of U-boats " sunk or damaged," if the First Lord may be
sometimes badly briefed or, if not, whether he may make unfortunate departures from
his brief. The point is this :
The losses of the fast and slow ship in this war are about the same percentage.
[Frankly, if this means that the losses in fast convoys is the same as in slow convoys,
all other conditions except speed being equal, this demands faith in miracles. If
however, it covers other conditions-fast ships proceeding out of convoy without escort
or ships that could steam fast steaming slowly in slow convoys (when they are slow
ships)-the statement is deceptive.]
The next of these points is a'statement that the criticism that we were not building
any fast merchant ships was not true. A considerable percentage of our output were
9
the faster kind of cargo ship. [But why, if they, as he states, lose at the same rate,
are they less profitable in cargo carrying and more extravagant in industrial effort ?
There is something illogical in this brief.]
To sum up : the whole problem seems to resolve itself into four questions.
(i) Are fast cargo ships advantageous and desirable ? My answer is Yes.
(ii) Can they be produced with the necessary qualities, constructively speaking ?
My answer is Yes.
(iii) Can they be produced industrially, considered from the point of view of
the whole war-output effort ? The answer may be that it is impossible.
(iv) If the answer to (iii) is that it is impossible, what can be done ? My answer
is : find the right men to get them produced, produce them and make it possible.
CARGOSECRECY.
The promised investigation by a High Court Judge into the question of marking
goods destined for shipment by convoys has been held. The terms of the enquiry
were :" To examine the system of marking goods destined for shipment, and to
report whether, in the interests of safety of ships, any changes, and if so what,
are desirable and practicable, having regard to the necessity of avoiding confusion
.- and delay."
Mr. Justice Tucker has reported that, in general, the existing system and the
instructions given are not open to objection on security grounds and that it is neither
desirable nor practicable to change the present practice of marking cargo with the
name of the port of destination.
As a potential criminal I am behind no one in awe of and respect for our Judiciary
and admiration of the Judicial mind. But the answer fails to satisfy me. I t amounts
to a verdict of " non-proven." But it was not a case of trying a charge of manslaughter
or murder where sufficient facts have to be established to make a case certain. 1 do
not want to know if the stable door was opened and let the horse get out. I want to
know whether if the stable door is unlatched there is a possibility of it becoming opened,
and if so would there be a chance of the horse getting out ?
Be that as it may, after Lord Cork and Lord Chatfield had enjoyed, with others,
a somewhat impertinent rap over the knuckles from the Parliamentary Secretary to
the Ministry of Transport, to the effect that it was most regrettable that speeches
should have been made which spread unjustifiable alarm among the public, we learn
that all is for the best in the best of all possible Ministries. The Ministry turns over
in its bed and goes to sleep again, and everyone should live happily ever afterwards.
But, can anyone explain to me why, after all this, the Ministry of War Transport has
changed its procedure, after all, and directed that, from the 1st of January, the names
of ships are no longer to be marked on packages but a code number is to be stencilled
instead ?
This Minister seems to specialize on this sort of second thought. There is indeed,
perhaps fortunately, nothing like leather.
T H E AIR AND THE SEA.
I am glad to say that my threat in November Notes, that I might be moved to add
to or dispute our reviewer's opinions on Major Seversky's book, "Victory through Air
Power " can come to nothing. I agree with B. H. S. that the .book is not one to be
lightly dismissed but that it is a pity that its wisdom on some points should be hidden
by so much exaggeration. I am inclined to apply to it a comment made by a reviewer
of a far shallower book on the same subject to the effect that " Demagogy has no place
in strategy."
I had hoped therefore that for once I should be able to get through this section with
only a notice on the performances of the Air at Sea and keep clear of the eternal cag.
But it was not to be.
10
Lord Trenchard reopened the subject with an article, on his old lines, in the " Daily
Telegraph " of the 4th December. I do not intend to follow the resulting correspondence
or examine his article or subsequent contributions in detail. One must not let our space
be bought up regularly by him to the exclusion of the real war that still continues.
I t is not worth it, as most of what can be said can be but repetition. But one may ask
what is behind his persistent disregard of both argument and facts ? Is the motive
simply an animus against the Navy ? Or is it merely to exalt the Royal Air Force,
regardless of consequences, by getting it control of all that moves in the air ? Or does
he really wish to see the Navy abolished and its place taken by the Air ; and if so does
he really believe that the Air could perform its work ? Has he ever thought out what
that means and worked out all its implications ; if, for example, our Home Fleet was
withdrawn, could the Air Force reach and destroy the German ships in Norway
and prevent them playing havoc with the North Russian Convoys or, if not, could the
Air carry the latter's cargoes ?
In fact, has he ever examined and faced the truth, or is he to be for ever content
to make sheer assertions and treat them as axioms or proven truths ?
"
T h e ruling passion, be it what it will,
The ruling passion conquers reason still."
Without reason and evidence to support them bare assertions can carry no weight,
and no such evidence has been offered. I t is for those who make these assertions to
provide the evidence in their support and not for others to disprove them.
I shall only notice three of these assertions which are particularly characteristic.
The first was in one of Lord Trenchard's subsequent letters and not in the article
with which he opened this attack. It is magnificent in an audacity which perhaps gives
a key to his outstanding success as an Air Leader in the field in the last war :" Since then [I9181 the R.A.F. has been continuously attacked by many retired
and serving officers of the Navy, the Admiralty, and a certain section of the
Press. . . . Air Officers have done their best to avoid counter-attacking and have
only defended themselves."
The next is not only devoid of evidence in support but in contradiction to facts :" No naval battle in the last 250 years has been fought more than 100 miles
from shore, and only one at that distance-Tsushima."
Before laying down the law on naval history he might at least extend his knowledge
of it for a century and a half to cover 1794 and the " Glorious First of June " fought
between three and four hundred miles from the shore. I n any case the assertion is
pointless. Most battles were fought close to the shore because it was the best place.
I t was the enemy's shore, where you knew their position and could be most certain
of getting them if they came out. In mid-ocean they might be anywhere and easily
missed. On one's own shore they might appear anywhere and each place had to be covered
while they might have achieved their purpose without ever reaching it. Can air forces
guarantee to do as much even in the absence of a covering enemy air force ?
The third example is a rejection of the generally accepted meaning of the term
" Sea Power "-presumably
because it disturbs-his argument, if it can be so describedand its substitution by a definition of his own :" By ' Sea Power ' I mean the keeping open of the seas and oceans for our
merchant ships by surface warships of all sizes, from battleships down to the
smallest craft and denying the use of the seas to the enemy."
A meaning for Sea Power which it has never had for twenty-five centuries and a
rendering which reeks of a confusion between " Naval Strength," " Sea Power," and
" Command of the Sea " with an arbitary exclusion of one of the most important naval
units of the day. I could dilate on this for hours, but I have been allowed a pre-view
of an article by Admiral Richmond for this number, which covers the ground completely
and with a clarity to which I could never attain.
11
It might well be asked what is the use of answering all these false assertions and
claims in these pages which only reachnaval eyes ; the eyes of men who are already aware
of the truth ? The answer is that it may perhaps keep busy men au fait with what they
are up against and also that not all of us, though seized with the right ideas, have the
gift of marshalling them clearly in our mind and presenting them properly and convincingly to others. We are all liable to be called upon at any moment to explain and
justify the naval standpoint to intelligent and enquiring minds. I t is for that reason
that I recommend a careful reading and minute study of Admiral Richmond's article.
Before accepting or repudiating any of the many claims made for the Air, or for
the Ship for that matter, a far greater mass of evidence than has been made public,
or perhaps even than is available, must be collected, sorted, set-out and examined.
Take the case of respective merits as killers of U-boats for instance. I t would be
necessary to divide the incidents into those away from convoys and those in the vicinity
of convoys. The latter would further have to be distinguished as those where detection
was effected before torpedoes were launched and those where detection resulted from
the launching or hitting of a torpedo. Those submerged and those on the surface.
Those resulting wholly from ship efforts, from aircraft efforts, or from a combination
of both. The number of kills, probable kills, or mere attacks under each category.
The latter data would have to be subjected to a common standard; probably the
naval one as the standard must be based on what was likely to happen to the U-boat,
of which a submarine man should be the best judge. The verdicts would require
dividing into those based on tangible results-prisoners, visible results, deductions from
similar previous cases or mere wishful thinkings. The numbers of each class of incident
would have to be compared and also the percentages of success for each. Similar data
would be required for cases of deterrence as well as of destruction ; very difficult to
ascertain. For failures to detect at all for both classes ; more difficult still. That is for
this subject alone. The same sort of thing would be wanted for the " dead battleship "
theory. I t is not enough to quote the Prince of Wales or Midway. An American case
has been mentioned where thirty-five out of thirty-nine attacking planes have been
shot down and the other four driven off. One must survey every case and also classify
them according to whether the result was due to numbers, absence or presence of
proper ancillaries in the case of the ships, better tactical performance, different national
aviation or gun technique, or different morale. Those are two only of a multitude of
claims, and specimens only of some of the data required to form a judgment on each.
To list all the h a n y claims and the data required for each would be far beyond the time
or space that can be given to a passing note.
There was a notable debate on the 27th of January in the Houseof Lords, on a motion
by Lord Winster, on the re-equipment of the Fleet Air Arm. From it and statements
elsewhere it aoes look as if the Navy was to get proper aircraft with which to operate
and indeed is getting them ; though in spite of specious excuses I cannot see why it
has taken four years for this to happen. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Keyes (to whom
congratulations on his elevation to the peerage) was just in time to join
the naval team in this debate. I t is a strong team, whose combined broadsides should
be shattering to their Air opponent in the future ; Lords Chatfield, Cork and Keyes,
not forgetting the invaluable sheet anchor of Lord Hankey. Their contributions were
another example of what the Lords can always put up in excellence and wisdom of
debate ; but one can only say that the official reply shows that the disheartening
experience of attacking an absorbent bolster must be as bad as in the Commons. In
fact it must be worse as the official spokesman is often second-hand and has no personal
skin to feel the pricks.
Without any personal knowledge of the more active members, the latest arrangements for handling naval aviation matters at the Admiralty sound extremely promising.
Most up-to-date and experienced " Air" admirals to run the operations and direct
aviation thought, with the task of extracting the necessary material in the hands of
one who is unequalled in getting all that he wants in that way and getting it quickly ;
12
NOTES ON THE WAR AT
SEA.
this was shown both in the last war as D.N.O. after Jutland and in this war, for example,
by his successful lightning campaign which rushed merchant seamen into effective
anti-aircraft gunners.
Of all the letters which appeared in the latest chapter of the Trenchard serial I
must confess that the one which appealed
to me most was from a wing-commander,
- R.A.F. :At one time or another each of the Forces-sea, land and air-has been
claimed as the " decisive factor " by respective protagonists.
If the experiences of the present prove anything a t all it is that while each
arm has its own proper spheres of employment " the decisive factor " resides in
the effective co-ordination of all three or any two of them in conformity with the
nature of the task to be performed.
In warfare, as in other things, a one-track mind is a very real danger."
We can well leave dissection of that one-track mind and find some of that co-ordination by getting afloat again ; starting in the Mediterranean.
'I
I
I
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTH AFRICA.
EASTERN BASIN AND LIBYA.
CAUSEAND EFFECT. (I.)
" Surely the pibroch of Europe i s ringing again in our ears !
I
I
And ever aloft on the palace roof the old banner of England Jew."
Tennyson.
On the 23rd of October the Eighth Army opened its attack on the Axis lines at El
Alamein. Three months later to a day, on 23rd of January, the Union Jack flew over
Tripoli. The bagpipes were heard in its streets and-Rommel's troops bolted for
Tunisia.
No one has ever thought of claiming the Peninsular War as a naval one or as
belonging to anyone but the British Army. Yet it was Wellington himself who said
in 1813 :" If anyone wishes to know the history of this war, I will tell them that it is
our maritime supremacy gives me the power of maintaining my army, while the
enemy are unable to do so."
The triumph in Libya is essentially the soldier's show. I t is the Eighth Army's
victory. Nothing and nobody can filch any of the full credit from them. Yet it affords
a model lesson in co-operation of the three Services, and is a perfect exemplification of
the point made by the R.A.F. wing-commander, mentioned in the preceding section.
The Libyan Campaign saw an exercise of land power. I t had a military (land or army)
object. I t was an exertion of land force or strength. Yet the Army could not have
done what it did, or at least have achieved it in the way it did, without tho support and
co-operation of the Air Force and unless the latter had extinguished the air force of
the enemy. The Air Force was air strength forming part of the land power exerted
to gain command of the land. Yet again, the Air Force could not have given that support
without the help of the land forces to gain and hold the positions for its successive
flying-grounds. The Air Force certainly could not have effected the clearance and occupation of Libya by itself whatever supremacy in the air it might have established over
the opening area. Furthermore, though the conquest of Libya was effected through
the exercise of land power in a combination of land strength and air strength, neither
the soldier nor the airman could have played his part unless they had been got there
in sufficient strength and with sufficient equipment, stores and fuel, by the Navy.
Naval strength played its part. While playing that part, it was locally exercising sea
power in performing one function of command of the seas ; making use of the seas for
ane's own purposes. I t was not the Royal Navy alone that did this ; it could make
NOTES ON THE WAR AT
SEA.
13
that use possible but the actual usage could only be made by merchant shipping. The
Merchant Navy also played its part. Both the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy,
Yhough exercising sea power in their own element, were also, in this case, forming part
of the land power by which victory was achieved. The Royal Navy made yet another
contribution to that land power, in helping in the maintenance of that advance by coastwise supplies, made possible by the cover of air strength from the land, made possible
in its turn by the work of land strength. The Navy and the Air Force made yet another
great contribution to that land power in their attacks, by submarines, by surface craft
and by aircraft, on Rommel's sea-lines of supply. By their ultimate object essentially
a part of land power, by their immediate object an exercise of sea power. And so it
goes on, interminably. Each arm in turn finds itself dependent, closely, or more
distantly but invariably, upon another. There can be no such thing for a country
separated from its opponent by water, and sharing a common ceiling of air, as a solely
naval, solely land, or solely air war.
WESTERN BASIN AND FRENCH AFRICA.
THE LANDING.
The outstanding event, the great landing operation, with the preparation, dispatch,
transport, and exact reassembling of the vast armada which carried the landing force,
belongs to the preceding quarter. Although many details have since been forthcoming
of the efficiency with which the work was performed and of the fine work carried out by
individual units, they add little new and only go to confirm the first verdict of a perfect
show ; perfectly planned, perfectly performed. When Admiral Colvin disclosed in a
Naval War Commentary that the officer responsible for the preparation of these plans was
the same as the one who directed the evacuation at Dunkirk, the efficiency of the planning
would cause no surprise to those who watched and noted " Bertie " Ramsay as a member
of one of the earliest War Staff Courses in 1913, with, incidentally, a Commander Pound
as one of his instructors.
The remarkable immunity from submarine attack on passage seems to have been
achieved by a combination of watching, hurrying and harrying by the Coastal Command
and a policy of evasive routeing. The credit for the remarkably small results achieved
by U-boats when they did gather on and after the force's arrival seems to be shared
by the R.A.F., the F.A.A., and surface craft. Their attacks over ten days were definitely
beaten, the Prime Minister told us, with one sunk or severely damaged for every transport
or supply-ship they sunk. Two tons of shipping were gained in North African ports
for every ton they destroyed. Here perhaps a qualification should be made for a point
commonly met with in reckonings of naval strength. Naval strength, whether royal or
mercantile, is not a matter of arithmetical numbers or tonnage, but, among other things,
of personnel and efficiency. Unless the ships become a part of the British Merchant
Navy with British seamen, I for one am not inclined to count them as equivalent to
the same number of British ships.
CO-OPERATION.
The whole business thus gave another striking example of interdependence and good
co-operation between the three Fighting Services. A rather special feature in this respect
was the part played by the Fleet Air Arm. As always, air cover was an essential for
the fleet in its approach and afterwards, foi- the troops in the landing, and for any
subsequent advance. But air cover entails a ground from which to take off. All the
land air-fields were-in possession ~f the.Fre~ch~.
Som,e aerodrome had t o be found from
which to make the first start. I t is only a fleet that can carry portable aerodromes
about in its pocket. The Fleet Air Arm put up the first airgraft- t6get things going till
the shore airfields could be seized from which the Royal Air Force could develop its
fultscale work ; i n one case a t least it was a naval pilot who landed on an aerodrome
to receive its surrender. The naval contfibution was small in scale and, only sufficient
perhaps while the Luf&a$e was getting over its first su~prise,but it was sufficient and
.indispensable,.not enty to- the Army, but to the Air Force.
14
..
ACTIVITIESAFLOAT.
- Results of the establishment of air supremacy by the R.A.F. in North Africa and
the extension of ground from which land-based air cover may be given over most of
the southern shore of the Mediterranean are soon visible. By the easier passage
convoys to Malta from the East, the beleaguered fortress, like Stalingrad, is turned
into a powerful base of attack. Surface operations begin to show themselves in what
was but lately the Axis-dominated waist of the Mediterranean. Rear-Admiral Harcourt
with three cruisers, the Aurora, Sirius and Argonaut and the destroyers Quentin and
Quiberon, on the night of 1st December sank or otherwise destroyed four ships and two
escorting destroyers out of a convoy bound for Tunisia. On the following night, after
torpedo aircraft had sunk a t least two ships out of a south-bound convoy off eastern
Tunisia, another light surface force sank a torpedo boat which had formed part of its
escort. Light forces sank a small supply ship, bound for Tripolitania, in the Gulf of Gabes
on 22nd December and again on 16th January when one sank another small supply
ship in the same area, while another sank a medium one and damaged an escort 100
miles N.N.W. of Tripoli. These few swallows so far are only signs of a summer which
may be expected, especially if the Germans in Tunisia should find it necessary to try
their hands at a Dunkirk. The Italians may wisely decide that they would be better
off where they are than bathing in their Mare Nostrum or sprinting or cowering in
their home land.
The main exercise of command of the sea during the quarter, by denying or restricting
the use of cross-Mediterranean sea routes to the enemy has been in the hands of submarines and aircraft. My incomplete records may give some idea of their respective
shares. Out of 97 recorded incidents, 559 go to submarines and 418 to aircraft. (These
halves come in because a submarine finished off a job begun by an aircraft). Of these
were :Definitely destroyed ; by submarines 444, by air 17i.
Beached ;
by submarines 5, by air 1.
Probably sunk ;
Hit ;
Where an aircraft's missile is unspecified it is credited as a bomb. An uncertainty
arises from the fact that it seems more difficult for aircraft to see the outcome of their
hits ; many classed only as hits by the air may have been sinkings. Of the 414 aircraft
results, 13: were definitely by torpedo and of these 8 were certain sinkings. I t may
be also notified that 3& sinkings and one probable were by naval aircraft. If these
were working from R.11.F. airgrounds it is a nice problem for the purist to classify
the type of warfare on which they were engaged.
Besides these incidents which refer only to merchant ships, the submarines sank
one cruiser, one destroyer, three escort vessels and one minesweeper, probably sunk one
other destroyer and also torpedoed one cruiser, one cruiser or destroyer and two
destroyers ; while aircraft torpedoed one cruiser and one destroyer, and hit, by some
sort of missile, five destroyers.
Although the largest share of the bag seems to go to the naval units, it in no way
suggest that the air units were not doing their full share of work. There were plenty
of other targets to engage their attention. But it does show that navies are by no
means dead.
I
ATLANTIC.
Before going further east from the Mediterranean we can turn back to the other
Western waters. Naval war in the Atlantic continues as the most important battle of
all : the long-drawn-out fight with the U-boats which has already been mostly covered
under the heading of Commerce Protection. Of detailed incidents there is the sinking of one
submarine by the Canadian Assimboine and the Dianthus, and of another by the
Canadian Chilliwack and the Dianthus and Primrose in connection with the five-day
attack on a convoy of early November. The United States also reported on 9th
November encounters in the South Atlantic between two raiders and merchantmen in
which one raider and one merchantman were sunk. Except for this there has been
15
nothing to suggest that sinkings from .raiders will be a noticeable feature of our
quarter's losses. With the West African coast and the South American one as far south
as the Plate in our hands and the opportunities thus given for operating aircraft, if
aircraft are available, the risks from raiders to our South Atlantic routes on both sides
should be much reduced. Besides these incidents there are one or two in pursuance
of the denial of the use of the sea to the enemy, with a report on 17th December of a
5,000-ton blockade runner intercepted, on 1st January of a 10,000-ton one scuttled,
and on 5th January of a large one sunk by the Scylla.
HOME WATERS.
In waters nearer home there have been no big commando raids, but hints of frequent
small-scale enterprises to keep the enemy disturbed.
Reports of light surface encounters with enemy coastal traffic have been less frequent
than in previous quarters ; five in all with the customary successful results. Total bag :
one tanker and four ships sunk, two probably sunk, and one set on fire ; one escort
sunk, two gunned, and three others hit.
THE ACTIONIN THE FARNORTH.
The outstanding event has been action on New Year's Eve in defence of a n important
North Russian Convoy, in which Sherbrooke earned his V.C. The spirit in which his
destroyers were led to close action with a far superior force, and forced back four
attempted attacks on the convoy was commented on in the opening of these Notes.
The strength of the " more powerful " supporting force which then engaged and drove
off the enemy has not been given ; but it appears to have consisted of two bigger units
which were probably not much, if at all, stronger than the pocket battleship and cruiser
which were thought to have comprised the main German body.
Allowing for the damage to one of their ships, hit by a t least five salvoes, the enemy's
withdrawal carries the suggestion that they were not prepared to risk losing their few
available ships by going all out to achieve decisive results.
In contrast to previous North Russian convoy actions this one was marked by the
complete absence of enemy aircraft. There is no mention even of the convoy being
first located by air reconnaissance. This may be accounted for by the shortness of daylight-illustrative of one limitation of aircraft at sea, weather conditions such as ice
and snow making taking off and landing difficult-illustrative of another limitation, or
the drain imposed on a dwindling air strength by events in Russia and Africa. Whatever
the reason, the convoy got through intact and undamaged a t the cost to us of the
Acasta. By the time that daylight has lengthened developments in Russia may have
made conditions far different to those of last year.
RUSSIA.
I t is practically impossible to keep pace with what is happening in Russia. Every
day is now bringing its " special announcement." Fortunately from my point it is
mostly taking place on land so far and one need only follow the general trend.
Since the two Russian armies joined hands to raise the siege of Leningrad on the
18th of January there seems to have been a pause on that front. But a fortnight is not
long in which to mount a new stage in an offensive, and on the last day of the month
the Germans report that this offensive has opened. During the whole of the present
great Russian offensive the news of the opening of each attack on a new front has come
from the Germans some days before it is mentioned by the Russians, and has invariably
proved true. The Germans seem to announce immediately the opening of the attack ;
their lies come in when describing its immediate failure. The Russians appear to wait
till it has completed its first stage. So it is probably safe to take it that the new
Leningrad attack has opened. In what direction and what further developments it
may produce remain to be seen.
16
NOTES ON T H E WAR AT SEA.
Besides what would seem the obvious first necessity of obtaining more elbow room
and the advantage of clearing the main railway to Moscow, and so restoring through
communication from north to south through the whole of Russia, an advance to the
west by clearing the southern Baltic shore in the neighbourhood of Kronstadt would
help the Baltic Fleet, when the ice goes, in resuming its offensive in which it has never
lost the initiative. An advance northward against the Finns if it cleared the Karelian
Isthmus would do the same, while its repercussions against the exhausted Finns might
go far to reopening the direct supply route from Murmansk and the White Sea and
even extend to the Northern Coast line itself with obvious benefits to our North Russian
convoys and to the Russian northern forces who have held their ground and been
actively aggressive from the start. All this is amateurish and optimistic " strategy."
But with a third of a million enemy wiped out in the Stalingrad pocket and prospects
of another big haul in the Caucasus the number of Russians continually released for new
efforts make many things possible which would have seemed dreams of the far future
three months ago.
Similar possibilities open in the South. With the clearing of the Caucasus,
Novorossisk seems certain to return to the Russians. Rostov may well go. The military
correspondent of " The Times " on 1st February even foresees a probability that the
Germans will draw back their whole line to the Dneiper, which might clear the Crimea.
If it did not clear it it would open the Crimea to recapture. In any case, the Blaek
Sea fleet which, even more than its opposite number in the North, has never given up
its activities, will find its work easier. In the past few weeks some of its units have even
carried out a lightning bombardment of Rumanian ports and it has apparently been
blockading Novorossisk since its loss. So far as the sea goes it has what is practically
a free hand. Rumania and Bulgaria have nothing to count. Its obstacle comes from the
air. Though this should lessen as the withdrawals of the Germans in Russia take their
airgrounds further from the sea, and their increasingly vital commitments elsewhere
increase the demands on an air force already feeling the drain of such losses as 740
machines captured in the Stalingrad pocket alone, their occupation of Greece and Bulgaria
prohibit any commercial use of the south-western corner of the Black Sea. Even though
the Mediterranean be opened, the best supply route to Russia remains closed until Greece
and the Aegean are again in our hands.
I t has been pointed out that under the Montreux Convention there is no legal obstacle
to the use of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus by our merchant ships. I t is only warships
that are forbidden passage ; which presumably includes military personnel by transport.
Germany has been passing supply ships for some time. But there is a vast difference
between the Germans and ourselves. The Germans would not mind if we hurt the Turks
in attacking their ships on the passage, even if we were able to do so. Indeed they
might welcome it as likely to drive Turkey from her neutrality to our detriment.
Besides which they can be sure that we would never attack Turkey for adhering to a
treaty. They, on the other hand, would never hesitate from fear of hurting a Turk and
would certainly bomb our ships in the Straits if it suited them and they had the means
and opportunity.
There are not many neutrals left now. Sweden and Eire in the north, both intent
on keeping out of it if they can ; it is to be hoped that they will only be allowed the
same degree of active influence when peace comes and no more of the benefits than
they have earned. Imagine Mr. de Valera being again allowed to preside and have a
voice in deciding how the fighting Powers are to shoulder the burden of re-establishing
and keeping worldorder ! I n the South, except for Turkey at the eastern end, there is
only Spain and a little overshadowed Portugal in the western end.
Spain decreed a partial mobilization in November, which might equally mean a
standing-by to take advantage of any German Iberian advance after the occupation of
17
Southern France as it might a determination to resist any attempt by either set of
combatants to add Spain to the many existing theatres of war. General Franco's speeches
and the further Spanish encroachments on international rights at Tangiers suggest the
former. We have reserved all our rights regarding the Tangiers violations and when
things begin to reverse themselves in the Western and South-western Europe there is no
reason why we and the United States should not immediately re-assert and re-establish
our rights, forfeiting those of Spain as having proved herself too untrustworthy to hold any.
When basing any calculations on the possible actions of neutrals we must be careful
to note the many reservations of belligerency which are current. Bulgaria, for instance,
is apparently at war only with Yugo-Slavia and Greece and not with Russia, or even
ourselves or the United States ; Russia is not at war with Japan ; the declared aim
of the French in North. Africa seems curiously insistent on the freeing of France and
avoiding any inclusion of completing the destruction of the Axis ; even Australia,
except for the A.I.F., while calling on the whole globe for more help, seems to limit its
own war to its immediate neighbourhood.
INDIAN OCEAN.
Going east to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, there is as yet little to keep us in
the former. The Bengal's fine fight has already been noticed.
The most noticeable feature afloat was the carrier air attack, officially described as
hehvy, on Sabang at the northern end of Sumatra. I cannot find the place myself in
any of my maps, but as its position is given in the Admiralty announcement and " The
Times " describes it as a good harbour on the small island of Puto Weh, which I am also
unable to find, its existence may be taken as granted. Since it is at least 1,000 miles
from any port of ours in Ceylon or India this must have meant a decided move of our
naval forces into the Indian Ocean to the eastward. Land advances into Burma are as
yet only on a small scale and probably represent no more than preliminary movemerits,
to recapture a port in Akyab as a first step towards regaining a seaboard as a bridgehead,
to which the sea can feed men and material for any eventual effort on Burma on a grand
scale. Ships of the Royal Indian Navy are already reported in the Mayu river in support
of these operations in the Arakan. But the narrow coastal strips of these operations is
only a fleabite, separated as it is by the Chin Hills and the Arakan range from Lower
Burma prope? and the Irrawaddy.
SOUTH PACIFIC AND AUSTRALASIA.
NEWS.
I do not know how it strikes others, but to me the South Pacific is the most difficult
to follow of all our campaigns ; except perhaps that of the fight against the U-boats
where the task is simplified by it being impossible to follow at all in a practical absence
of any information. To begin with, owing perhaps to the American form of government,
major pronouncements of general importance seem to come from all sorts of authorities,
in seeming independence and often in apparent contradiction ; from Secretaries of the
Navy, of War, of State, f ~ o mthe Australian Prime Minister, from supreme commanders
in Australia, from the Commander-in-chiefof the United States Navy, and from various
odd commanders afloat and ashore. Communiquksof operations come sometimes from local
commands and sometimes from high commands and often seem to relate to the same
thing, though it is seldom clear that, they do so. A vagueness as to dates adds to the
latter confusion. There is nothing like the clear-cut definition of Alexander's daily
communiqzlt or the centralized Russian ones.
NEW GUINEA.
For the operations in New Guinea another feature was added; a metaphorical
carrot was dangled in front 'of our noses and, as each endseemed to be gained, a new one
appeared just further on. The enemy driven from Wairopi were being forced back to
their last hold at Buna. But then a succession of new objectives appeared on the scene;
Gona, the seventy-mile coastal strip from there to Buna, Buna village, Buna mission,
18
Cape Anderidere, Buna aerodrome, Buna station ; and when Buna was at last cleared
and the job did seem really over we were given hard fighting for Sanananda inland of
the whole lot. The job was well done and the result satisfactory, Papua is clear ; but
its presentation was tantalizing and rather conducive of discouragement.
T H E SOLOMONS.
In the Solomons area there has been nothing fresh afloat on a big scale during the
quarter up to the end of January, but details have appeared of the action of the 12th
to 14th November which was briefly noticed in a postscript to the November Notes.
A feature of this night action was that battleships seem to have been engaged on both
sides while aircraft carriers were not. The result was again decisively in favour of the
American squadron. An amended American official statement of the 22nd of November
1 battleship, 1 battleship or large cruiser, 8
gave the results as :-Sunk-Japanese:
cruisers, 6 destroyers, 8 transports and 4 supply ships. American : 2 light cruisers,
7 destroyers. Damaged-Japanese : 2 battleships 1 cruiser, 7 destroyers. American:
of course not stated.
A corresponding Japanese statement is interesting as a measure of their exaggeration.
They reduce their numerical losses to one-third and increase the American ones by
one-third ; resulting in an exaggeration in the ratio of five to one. Their claim was
eight cruisers, four or five destroyers sunk ; two battleships, three cruisers, three or
four destroyers damaged ; against one battleship, one cruiser and three destroyers sunk,
one battleship damaged of their own.
Naval activity on a smaller scale comprised a surface attack of the 12th December
on eleven Japanese destroyers heading for Guadalcanal, of which five had been hit
from the air on the previous day, in which one more destroyer was sunk, one set on fire
and possibly sunk and one damaged at the cost of one motor-torpedo-boat. On the
2nd January American motor-torpedo-boats again scored a torpedo hit on one destroyer
off Guadalcanal and three possible hits on two more out of a force of eight, and on the
11th January scored two hits on a destroyer, one on another and two possibles on a
third, again off Guadalcanal.
Submarines also sank two destroyers in the Pacific during the quarter, while Air
Forces, busy all the while on land targets and Rabaul in particular, scored two cruisers
sunk, one light cruiser or destroyer sunk, four destroyers sunk ; five destroyers probably
sunk ; one light cruiser and one light cruiser or destroyer damaged and eleven other
destroyers damaged. This would bring their apparent total cruiser losses for the War
up to between twenty-eight and thirty-three and destroyer losses to between forty and
forty-six.
In assessing their total strength from which these can be deducted one has to allow
not only for building since the war opened but for the secrecy which screened any
Japanese pre-war building and made possible a greater original strength than that
shown in reference books. Even so, such losses must be severely felt in a strategy which
is dependent on very long lines of communication and supply from home bases.
I t is perhaps in connection with this question of supply that the air forces, used
purely as such and not as an integral part of, or in close co-operation with, surface
forces, has done most of its work at sea. Most reports of their work necessarily leave
the extent of the damage inflicted by them very vague, but it is definitely reported that
during the quarter the total of Japanese transports or other merchant ships sunk in
the general Australasian area, mostly from the air, is thirty-eight, with ten more
probably sunk and thirty-eight hit. If other results from Chinese and Burmese waters
are added the totals become a t least forty, fourteen and forty-one respectively. These
are minimum results from incomplete records.
Other events in Pacific waters are the sinking of a small ship off Australia by a
Japanese submarine, the sinking of an 8,000-ton German auxiliary off the west coast
of Australia, and a heavy air attack on Wake Island on the 21st December which must
presumably have been by carrier-borne aircraft and have involved the use of a surface
" task force."
19
I t is a hopeless job to try to disentangle the various items and allot their credit to
the different natures of attack but for those with accurate records of the losses of
warships it might be worth while comparing the results obtained by ships, by ships and
air in co-operation, by air alone though forming a part of a naval operation as at
Midway, and by air pure and simple. One has an impression that though air attacks
have been most frequent and continuous, presumably through inability to spare sufficient
ship strength for work from the main fleets and also because of the distances over the
area to be covered, yet when surface contact has been possible the damage has been
far greater and more decisive. In other words the Air has not shown itself as a substitute
for ships but as an invaluable supplement to them to help them in bringing an enemy
to action, to help them when in action, and to extend a fleet's scope by inflicting a
useful measure of damage when a fleet is unable to reach a desired area of conflict.
One point which has been brought out by all air operations against aircraft, and one
which must be a most important asset in future operations against the Japanese, is
the truth of at least m e of Major Seversky's dicta that " the factor of quality is relatively
more decisive than the factor of quantity." In all encounters the superiority of American
and our aircraft over the Japanese has been most marked ; with a normal result in
losses inflicted of something like five to one in our favour. This truth can upset his
other dictum, as shown by our own work in the Mediterranean, that " Land-based
aviation is always [my italics] superior to ship-borne aviation."
The same dictum also upsets any decisions on the value of anti-aircraft fire ; the
relation between the efficiency of the fire and the efficiency of the aviation affects each
case.
GUADALCANAL.
In Guadalcanal, United States army troops have relieved the U.S. Marine Corps
who have completed their duty which is one of those for which it exists : that of seizing
and establishing temporary and advanced bases. Colonel Knox states that the island
is now free of organized Japanese forces and all that remains to be done is the mopping-up
small parties.
THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC.
I
I
The clearance of Papua and Guadalcanal thus see the conclusion of two episodes of
an active defence. They are no more. The threat is still a Japanese one against Australia,
and not yet an Allied one against Japan. Although the Australian Prime Minister is
reported as having commented on the inadequacy of the Allied assistance, and of
American force in particular, to meet the situation, and of the need for a recognition
that the war against Japan should take first place, it is likely to remain so. The transport
required to support an effective offensive against Japan must call for so much shipping
that the demand cannot be met nor the supply routes be maintained until the U-boat
war is mastered. The quickest and surest, and probably the only, way to master it is
to knock-out Germany. I t would admittedly be most satisfactory if a direct offensive
against Japan could be carried out at the same time ; but when means do not permit of
the offensive being taken in two areas it is essential that the area in which it is taken
should be the one where it will have the greatest effect. The first steps in the defeat
of Japan are being taken where they can be most effective; in the Atlantic, in Russia
and in the Mediterranean. Opinions on the imminence and degree of immediate danger
to Australia differ. Reports from the area itself spoke of a concentration of Japanese
force presaging an attack on a far greater scale than hitherto experienced. Official
opinion in the United States immediately denied this. Opinion on the spot insisted on
the accuracy of their warning and the persistent air attacks on Rabaul tended to confirm
their view. Further confirmation comes on the 2nd and 3rd of February in the first reports
of a fresh and heavy clash at sea in the Solomon area. The American report does no
more than mention numerous sea and air actions in the Solomons area with losses on
both sides, which are not specified in the interests of further operations. The Japanese
report claims that " the enemy enterprise was completely foiled" with a loss of two
20
battleships and three cruisers and damage to another battleship and heavy cruiser.
What has happened or is happening at the time of this note is therefore uncertain but,
in the light of previous experiences of Japanese claims, it is safe to say that their
statement of American losses represents a figure which has not been reached.
CASABLANCA.
(Or is it twelve with a W.A.A.F. or two ?)
Fifteen months ago in an appreciative, if somewhat flippant, comment on the work
and spirit of the Wrens, I had occasion to note that though, by-the casualty list afloat,
that young and admired branch could claim to have taken its place as a full member
of the Service, yet an attractive but startling picture drawn by an old song still had to
remain but a poet's fancy. I t can now be recorded that the picture has come at least
a shade nearer from the remote background. Wrens, if not as members of the complement,
may have been borne on the books of a ship as " for passage only." (Historic and
fortunate argosy !) By a further combined operation in which the Prime Minister
travelled by air while the reporting staff of five Wren officers travelled in one of His
Majesty's ships, the latter gained a lively experience of life afloat in war with depthcharges " off," a full gale, honorary membership of the wardroom, and Saturday Night
at Sea to give full measure. An experience which possibly made true the second verse
of that same song :" W h e n wintry gales blow bleak alarms,
Come night's deep noon, and .ne'er a moon
Nor star aloft a watch to kee$ ;
T h e tar can be gay, as landsmen in day,
W i t h a cheering glass and a smiling lass,
While boom the wind blows,
And the ship steady goes,
Through the boundless deep."
But was it quite playing the game to make the Junior Wren reply to " Sweethearts
and Wives " ?l
If it had been but a year later she might have turned the tables nicely by demanding
to fulfil a combination of both if any of her male messmates had been sufficiently
palatable.
But enough of flippancies, however sincere at heart. I remarked last quarter that
large armies do not land in North Africa with no ultimate object beyond a winter in
the sun. Nor do Prime Ministers and Presidents. Nor, though one of them is a supreme
Commander-in-chief of his nation's forces, do they meet to conduct local operations on
however large a scale. Delayed though the preparatory step to be made good by those
operations may be, the meeting is a sure promise of more important moves to follow.
It is highly improbable that these moves were planned at that meeting. That must
have been done months ago and preparatory steps must have already been started.
But it is probable that time-tables have been adjusted and quickened in consequence
of an unexpected rapidity of progress elsewhere.
'Authority : Note in B.B.C. 6 o'clock news of the 2nd of February, 1943.
21
Where those moves may be and how many of them, remains to be seen by the
uninitiated.
" Shall we not sail against his territory ? ' Where shall we find a landing pluck ' someone asks. The war itself will discover the weak places in his position."--Demosthenes.
Greece and the Balkans with a freeing of the Dardanelles and an advance via the
Austrian plains ? Or Sicily and Italy, perhaps in conjunction with the former, and a
freeing of the Mediterranean ? Or France, from the north, or west, or south as a
diversion or for a subsequent advance on Germany in conjunction with Russia, and
with the mastery of the U-boat campaign by the occupation of the Channel and
Biscayan ports ?
That, or those, moves may not come in time to fill next quarter's Notes ; Tunisia
is still to tackle. But if fortune goes with us when the weather once settles in Tunisia
their openings may be showing themselves and our new Admiral of the Fleet may find
himself once more at congenial work. For sooner or later those moves are now sure to
come, since :He that no-thing undertaketh
No-thing he achieveth."
" Troilus and Criseyde."-Chaucer.
FAUTEUIL.
4 . 2. 43.
' I
POSTSCRIPT.
\
1
'
P.S.-Any comment on the Prime Minister's fine speech in the House of Commons on
the 11th of February would be superfluous and impertinent. It speaks for itself. The
most that can be done or required is to reproduce here, for purposes of record, his remarks
-from " Hansard "-on the U-boat campaign.
"The U-boat warfare takes the first place in our thoughts . . . the British and American
Governments have for some time past . . . given the task of overcoming them the first
priority in all their plans. This was reaffirmed most explicitly by the Combined Staffs
at Casablanca.
"The losses we suffer at sea are very heavy, and they hamper us and delay our operations.
They prevent us from coming into action at our full strength, and thus they prolong the
war with its certain waste and loss and all its unknowable hazards.
"Progress is being made in the war against the U-boats. We are holding our own, and
more than holding our own. Before the United States came into the war our calculations
. . . assured us of a steady and moderate improvement in our position by the end of 1943
on a very high scale of losses. Since then . . . the United States have entered the war
and their shipbuilding has been stepped up . . . for the year 1943 to over 13,000,000 gross
tons.
"When the United States entered the war she brought with her a mercantile marine
. . . of perhaps 10,000,000gross tons as compared with our then existing tonnage of about
-I am purposely not being precise-twice as much.
"On the other hand the two Powers had more routes to guard, more jobs to do, and
they therefore, of course, presented more numerous targets to the U-boats. Very serious
depredations were committed by the U-boats off the east coast of America until the
convoy system was put into proper order by the exertions of Admiral King. Heavy losses
in the Far East were also incurred at the outset of the war against Japan when the Japanese
pounced upon large quantities of British and United States shipping there. The great
operation of landing in North Africa and maintaining the armies ashore naturally exposed
the Anglo-American fleets to further losses, though there is a compensation for that which
I will refer to later ; and the Arctic convoys to Russia have also imposed a heavy toll, the
main part of both these operational losses having fallen upon the British.
"In all these circumstances it was inevitable that the joint American and British losses
in the past 15 months should exceed the limits for which we British ourselves, in
22
'
the da s when we were alone, had budgeted. However, when the vast expansion in the
Unite States shipbuilding is added to the credit side the position is very definitely
improved. I t is in my opinion desirable to leave the enemy guessing at our
real figures, to let him be the victim of his own lies, and to deprive him of every means of
checking the exaggerations of his U-boat captains or of associating particular losses with
particular forms and occasions of attack. . . .
"However, I may say that . . . our joint fleet is 1,250,000 tons bigger to-day than it
was six months ago. . . . The losses in the last two months are the lowest sustained for
over a year. The number of U-boats is increasing, but so are their losses, and so also
are the means of attacking them and protecting the convoys. I t is, however, a horrible
thing to plan ahead in cold blood on the basis of losing hundreds of thousands of tons a
month, even if you can show a favourable balance at the end of a year. The waste of
precious cargoes, the destruction of so many noble ships, the loss of heroic crews, all
combine to constitute a repulsive and sombre panorama. We cannot possibly rest content with our losses on this scale. . . . Nothing is more clearly proved than that wellescorted convoys, especially when protected by long-distance aircraft, beat the U-boats.
"We have had hardly any losses at sea in our heavily escorted troop convoys. Out of
about 3,000,000 soldiers who have been moved under the protection of the Royal Navy
about the world, to and fro across the seas, only 1,348have been killed or drowned, including
missing. That is about 2,200 to one against your being drowned if you travel in British
troop convoys in this present war. Even if the U-boats increase in number, there is no
doubt that a superior proportion of increase in the naval and air escorts will be a remedy.
A ship not sunk is better than a new ship built. In order to reduce the waste in the
merchant shipping convoys we have decided . . . to throw the emphasis rather more on
the production of escort vessels, even though it means some impingement on new building.
Very great numbers of escort vessels are being constructed in Great Britain and the
United States. . . . We have been promised, and the promise is beingexecuted, . . . our fair
allocation of American-built escort vessels.
"There is another point. Everyone sees how much better it is to have fast ships than
slow. However, speed is a costly luxury. The most careful calculations are made and
are repeatedly revised as between having fewer fast ships or more slow ones. The choice
is not entirely a free one. The moment you come into the sphere of fast ships engine
competition enters a new phase. I t starts with the escort vessels, but in other directions,
and also in the materials for the higher speedengines there come other complicated factors.
"I strongly advise the House to have confidence in the very capable people who, with full
knowledge of all the facts, are working day in day out on all theseaspects, and who would
be delighted to fit an additional line of fast ships, even at somelossin aggregate tonnage,
provided they could be sure that the engines will not clash with other even more urgent
needs.
On the offensive side the rate of killing of U-boats has steadily improved.
From January to October, 1942, inclusive, the rate of sinkings, certain and
probable, was the best we had seen so far in this war, but from November to the present
day, a period of three months, that rate has improved more than half as much again. At
the same time, the destructive power of the U-boat has undergone a steady diminution
since the beginning of the war. In the first year each operational U-boat that was at
work accounted for an average of 19 ships ; in the second year for an average of 12, and
in the third year for an average of 7*. These figures, 1 think, are in themselves a tribute
to the Admiralty and to all others concerned.
"Provided that the present intense efforts are kept up . . . and that anti-U-boat warfare
continues to hold first place in our thoughts and energies, I take the responsibility of
assuring the House-and I have not misled them so far-that we shall be definitely better
off, so far as shipping is concerned, at the end of 1943 than we are now, and . . . unless
something entirely new and unexpected happens in this well explored field, we shall be
still better off at the end of 1944-assuming that the war continues until then."
B
THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF SEA POWER.
,
I
THEmodern conception of sea power, as it appears in the speeches of Ministers, in the
columns of the Press and in many writings on " sea power " and " air power," differs, in
a most marked and fundamental manner, from the conception of the great thinker who
originated, or at least popularized and resurrected, the expression. This new meaning
lacks both the breadth and sweep which made Mahan's work so epoch-making and
differentiated it from all the earlier writings on naval affairs. This difference between
Mahan's meaning of the word sea power and that of these writers and speakers who now,
in my opinion, misuse the term, is this : that while he interpreted it in the objective sense
of the ultimate object which sea power achieves, the modern interpretation, with which
I join issue, is subjective, and refers to the narrower sphere of the material instrument with
which that object is attained ; and in so doing takes account only of one of the types of
material, excluding other types which, as everyone who has eyes to see is aware, play a
great part in the attainment.
What then is the meaning of the expression " sea power " ?
In the modern meaning that is daily being given to "sea power " the method of
Humpty Dumpty as expounded to Alice is applied : ("When I use a word it means just
what I choose it to mean and nothing more.") The term is used to mean " strength in
fighting ships of the surface and submarine types," as though those and those alone constituted " sea power." They are not, and they and their predecessors never have been,
the whole of sea power. They are a part, and an essential part, or an " e h e n t " of sea
power ; and they do not comprise the whole of even the material used in the prosecution
of sea warfare, for they omit one set of units whichis playing a highly important part in
war at sea and will in the future play an even more extensive part : namely, aircraft.
The operations of war at sea are conducted with a great variety of "instruments,"
and those instruments have undergone successions of changes. At one time they consisted of oar-propelled galleys armed with rams, and fought with swords, spears and
arrows. At another, of sail-propelled ships without rams, fought with guns on the broadside. At another, with steam-propelled ships with rams and turrets and armour ; and
to these the infernal skill of man added torpedo-carrying vessels, first on the surface then
under the surface. Finally, there came another kind of sea-fighting instrument, the
aeroplane. In those times of transition no one dreamed of speaking of "surface ship
power " or " submarine power " as distinct from " sea power." Both types were types
of the instruments of sea power, and so it is with the latest addition to the naval family.
President Roosevelt expressed this with equal accuracy and simplicity when he said, at
his fireside chat on 26th May, 1940, that America " could not have adequate naval defence
without ships, ships that sail on the surface of the ocean, ships that move under the
surface, and ships that fly." And later : " In sea operations the aircraft is just as much
an integral part of the unity of operations as the submarine, the destroyer and the battleship. The fleet that has 'planes is going to beat an equal fleet without 'planes."
You will observe that the President makes no differentiation between 'planes that fly from
shipboard and 'planes that fly from land. What the fleet needs is the 'planes, and this is
irrespective of whether they are ship-based or shore-based. I t is indeed strange that we,
who plume ourselves on being a maritime nation and on knowing something about sea
warfare, have been unable to understand this extremely elementary fact.
Let me return then to the meaning which Mahan attached to the expression sea power.
He says that in reading Mommsen's history of the Punic Wars he observed that the historian
attributed the outcome of those wars to " naval poyrer." Mahan saw that while naval
power, in the material form of ships, was the instrument of victory, it was the control of
the sea which was the determining cause ; and the ships were one, but not the whole, of
the elements which gave Rome the command of the sea. The ultimate aim, therefore, of
sea power, as he used the phrase, was control of the sea ; and that control could be achieved
only if all the constituent elements of strength at sea were present. So his first book was
intended to be devoted to " a consideration of the sources of sea power, commercial,
military, geographical, bases, colonies and aptitude." Sea power, in other words, is not
24
naval strength, as our modern interpreters suppose, but naval strength is one, and
certainly the most important, of the constituents of that larger thing, Sea Power.
The distinction that our present-day users of the word "sea power " make between
naval and air forces has its origin, as it seems to me, in the meaning they attach to the
word " Power." That word, as we are all aware, may mean either a quality, the ability
to do or to effect something, or the material strength by means of which that " something" is done. Both, needless to say, are linguistically speaking, proper, but in this
matter of sea power there is a profound and most important difference between them, and
it matters very greatly to the people of this sea empire of ours, dependent as it is upon
the control of the sea, which of those meanings we adopt. This is neither pedantic philology
nor academic hair splitting, still less is it a matter of petty jealousy or pride. To ask for
precision in the use of words is to be severely practical. I t is, I think you will agree, not
open to discussion that precision in the use of words is an essential preliminary to accuracy
of thought, and accuracy of thought the preliminary to correctness of policy
- and action.
he-proper approach to any problem of a practical nature is, I suggest, the objective
one. The first of all things to be done is to determine and to define the ultimate object
one has in view, and thereafter to maintain a clear distinction between the end and the
means by which it is attained. Ends, Aristotle tells us, differ. Sometimes the action
itself constitutes the end, sometimes there is something beyond that has to be accomplished
by the action which is the thing sought, the ulterior and final object. If, therefore, we
are to consider what constitutes sea power we must, as Mahan did, decide what ultimate
end sea power exists to attain.
The object of sea power throughout the many ages and wars from ancient Greece to
the reign of King George VI has been to control the sea, and he who controlled the sea was
able to send his own armies and his goods across it, and to prevent his enemy from doing
the same.
Sea power, in all past wars, was effective or lacking in full effectiveness according to
the extent to which it was capable of attaining those two ends. Its capacity to attain
those ends depended, whatever might be the type of vessel employed or the means of its
propulsion, upon the degree to which all the needs of sea power were fulfilled ; in other
words to whether all the elements of sea power were present and effective.
What are those elements ? They are three, in the material sense. There is of course
the personal element ; but that I do not propose to discuss, vast as its importance is ; for
it does not need discussion except in one particular which I shall mention. They are :
(1) Fighting instruments capable of taking part in the direct operation at sea, of overcoming
the resistance of the enemy and shepherding the merchantman or carrier of goods or men.
(2) Positions from which those instruments can work effectively, and in which they can
find their needs attended to. (3) Shipping capable of transporting men and goods; and
behind that and supporting it and the fighting fleet and industry-shipbuilding.
Taking these in turn. The need of the first is obvious. What is less obvious, it seems
is that it is quite immaterial what form they take : oar-propelled, sail-propelled, steampropelled, on the surface, under the surface or above the surface, armed with bows and
arrows, guns, torpedoes, depth charges, bombs or any other agent of destruction, those
weapon-carrying vessels are the instruments which achieve the end of sea power by
destroying the opposing forces at sea and by that means obtain command of the sea and
exercise control. Every day that passes is demonstrating this to every one who is not
too blind to see. Nearly all these fighting instruments were used in discovering, chasing,
crippling and destroying the Bismarck. All arms were engaged. Were not all these the
instruments of sea power ? In each of the three great sea battles in the Pacific, in the Coral
Sea, off Midway Island and off Guadalcanal, all of these types were present although it is
true that the first t,wo got no further than affairs of outposts in which the advanced guards
of aircraft only got into action. With what object did the enemy fight those battles? To
gain possession of islands as bases for his navy from which it could exercise the control of 1
the sea, extend his military conquests in the Pacific, and hold them against all attempts
to expel him till his enemies give up the attempt and accept defeat.
Turn to operations on a less majestic scale. Germany needs to use the sea routes
along the coast of western Europe to supply her armies and her sea forces in the cowtries
A;
1
25
she has invaded, Nortvay, Holland, Denmark, France. Road, rail, river and canal are
glutted with traffic, and transport is short. The needs must be supplied by other lines of
communication than the inland routes. They try to send the goods by sea. How do we
dispute their passage and seek to control that traffic ? We use our light forces of all kinds
that are capable of operating at sea against the carriers of these much-needed goods ;
destroyers, submarines, motor gunboats, motor torpedo boats, torpedo and bomb-carrying
aircraft, mines laid by surface and air minelayers. This is sea power in the working.
These are the lineal descendants of the brigs and cutters, the sloops, corvettes and rowboats of the fleet, which, in the Napoleonic wars, cut out the coasting vessels which were
trying to supply the fleet at Brest with its needs. The timber and spars, the hemp and
copper, that then came from the northern countries, the salt provisions that came from
the interior by way of the Loire and Garonne, could only make the final stage of their
journey to the naval base by the coastal route; but because of the efficiency of the control
they did not reach their destination, Brest dockyard and the great ships that required
them, with the result that those ships were largely immobilised. Brest ceased to be a
base of major operations. It was sea power exercised by these vessels and craft that
produced this result. I t is sea power exercised by its descendants that does the same
to-day.
We do not discriminate between one type and another and say that control is exercised
by " destroyer power " aided by " motor boat power " and " submarine power " ; but
for some wholly illogical and strategically incorrect reason those who conceive sea power
in modern terms speak separately of " air power."
And so I could continue over the whole broad range of the war at sea. I t is such
control of the sea as we possess with our sea power that enables us to send tanks and
munitions to Russia by way of Murmansk, fighting the way through the opposition of big
ships, cruisers, destroyers, motor boats, submarines, aircraft and mines. Why pick out
of these one for separate treatment ? All work, or should work, together on a common
plan, each doing that which it is best fitted to do. If Mahan were with us can there be
an iota of doubt as to whether he would call this a demonstration of sea power ? Again
five hundred transports cross the ocean, carrying armies from Britain and America to
North Africa. That which enables this great oversea invasion to be carried through is
sea power. There is control of the sea. The army of the Nile is reinforced and its strength
nourished by men and munitions that have made a 14,000-mile voyage round the Cape.
At some stages of that voyage it is guarded by one type of vessel, at another by other
types. The several fighting vessels and craft which gave this direct protection are the
instruments of sea power : the instruments which achieve that final object of enabling
ships transporting troops and trade to cross the sea and reach their destinations.
These fighting vessels, though instruments of sea power, do not constitute the whole
of sea power. They are one, and an indispensable one, of its elements. They could not
do that which they exist to do without bases. The story of sea warfare, of the eternal
struggle to command and control the sea in war, is one long record of the neld of bases,
of the impotence, the limitation of the power of ships without them.
Qar, Napoleon said, is a business of positions. He was thinking of land war, but the
saying is equally true of war at sea. One reason why Queen Elizabeth's war lasted
eighteen years and in all that time never succeeded in doing that which her statesmen
wished to do, cripple Spain completely by preventing her from receiving the bullion on
which her power of conducting war was assumed to depend, was that England had no
bases outside the Kingdom from which it could keep a continual watch on the Spanish
fleet and the treasure fleets from the Indies. Cromwell found that he needed a base in the
Straits' niouth in order to exercise influence in the Mediterranean and protect the Commonwealth's growing shipping with the Italian States and the Levant ; so he sends his officer
to discover whether Gibraltar, Oran, Bougie, Ceuta or Buzema can be taken-the ports
whose possession to-day is, we hope, to enable us to protect our shipping through the
western basin of the Mediterranean.
Queen Anne's navy could only make short-lived appearances in the same sea till it had
bases which enabled it to stay upon the station from year's end to year's end : first, the
use of Lisbon in 1703, Gibraltar taken in 1704, Minorca taken in 1708. The modern
26
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analogy is the inability of our patrol craft in the sky and on the sea to maintain a continuous
watch on the line of passage of the reinforcements going to the Axis army in Libya, and
nou- in Tunis, owing to the distance of their base from that line. We nearly lost India in
1782 because we had lost our base, Trincomali. Our operations in North America in
Rodney's time were hampered, as he wrote, by the loss of Rhode Island. To-day, if we
should have been driven from Alexandria in this war it is plain that we should have lost
control in the Eastern Mediterranean ; our sea power would have been ineffective. It is
equally plain what Malta means in relation to that object of sea power, the control of the
sea. The measure of its importance is to be seen in the 2,500 or more attacks, and the
thousands of aircraft losses accepted, in order to deprive us of this element of our sea
power. Indeed, does not the whole theatre of the war at sea testify to the same thing,
the essentiality of our possession of Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, Bermuda, Simons Town,
Trincomali, Mauritius, Aden, Mombasa, Madagascar ; and for what other reason than the
establishment of control of the South Pacific is this savage battle being fought for the
possession of Guadalcanal ? Is not the latest acquisition to the allied sea power, Dakar,
of signal importance ? How, in the face of these surely self-evident facts can anyone
speak of " sea power " as though it consisted solely in fighting ships-and a part only
of them, those on and under the surface ?
Here then are two elements of sea power : fighting instruments of all kinds capable of
direct action in the operations at sea, and the bases without which they cannot take part
in those operations. With these the sea can be controlled, the enemy can be deprived
of the benefit of its use in war. That, however, is an incomplete expression of sea power.
I t is not enough merely to deprive the opponent of the use of the sea. I t is necessary also
to be able to use it oneself, to send our own armies to protect our possessions, help our
allies, supply them with those thousands of tanks, aircraft, lorries and other munitions
which seem to be so lightly considered when we are told that the aid we give them is
inadequate : to reinforce our bases, to deprive the enemy of his, to bring us the food and
raw materials without which we can neither live nor fight-all of these are the necessary
tasks of sea power. There is one means only by which those troops and that trade can
be sent to their destinations in the quantities necessary : ships. Maybe in the future a
proportion larger than that of to-day will travel by air; but the bulky cargoes of grain
and timber, meat and oil, coal and iron and various essential ores can only be carried in
ships for-a long time to come. Therefore, for the purposes of obtaining the victory at sea
and of exploiting victory by its use, sea power needs shipping. Without shipping, the
victory would be sterile unless it were possible to reduce a great continental Power to
submission by blockade ; and that, as we all know from experience, is impossible.
Shipping is, therefore, a third indispensable element of sea power, and linked with it that
which produces, maintains and replaces it-a shipbuilding industry. The actual volume
of shipping is, moreover, a factor of the highest importance, for on it depends the staying
power, the capacity to take punishment without succumbing to the blows and losses to
which, even when the command and control are at their highest as they were after Trafalgar,
for instance, it is exposed. I t was because we possessed so great a volume of shipping in
those critical months of 1917 and 1918 when our fate hung in the balance and our survival
seemed to many, even in the highest rank in the navy, improbable, that our shipping was
able to stand the losses, and our power to replace them was not less vltal. Shipping
tonnage is analogous to the staying power, the condition, of a boxer. How greatly
shipping affects our ability to makz use of our fighting superiority at sea at the present
time is only too obvious. Our ability is limited by the tonnage available. Japan has till
recently possessed two of the elements of sea power, in the superiority of her naval forces,
composed of the three types defined by the President and the bases she has acquired, but
she does not possess either the volume of shipping of the Allies or the means they have
of replacement. The work of the American submarines and other vessels is not likely to
prove less deadly to Japan's shipping than that of the Axis to our own, and if her losses
reach the scale that it is not over-optimistic to expect, Japan's sea power, in its true
definition of ability to use the sea, will be crippled.
These three things, fighting ships, bases and a numerous and well-manned shipping
industry with the resources of shipbuilding behind it, are then indisputably the elements
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of sea power to-day ; as they always, at all periods of the world's history, have been the
elements. Sea power maj be said to resemble a three-legged stool standing on these three
supports. Take one away and the stool will fall.
How, then, have those who conduct our national affairs during the last score or so of
years since the end of the " First World War " cultivated and maintained the sea power
which had been the basis of British security in the past ?
They began by weakening it in its first element of fighting ships. They abandoned the
policy of the " Two Power Standard " in battleships, affirmed in 1888, itself only a
reaffirmation of the British policy throughout the eighteenth century since the Bourbon
alliance in 1737. They decided to pretend that it is possible to defend a two-hemisphere
Empire with a less than one-power navy. Both the British and the Australasian Governments rejected the proposal to meet the menace of Japan as Lord Jellicoe had recommended, apprehensive though the latter have continuously shown themselwes and, as
events have shown, with good reason, that Britain's difficulties in Europe would be Japan's
opportunity in the Far East. As to our cruisers, they deliberately departed from the
principle, regarded by generations of experienced seamen as axiomatic, that the number
of our cruisers is not a relative, but an absolute quantity, depending, that is to say, not
upon the numbers of a possible enemy, but upon the extent of the duties they will be
needed to perform. Our rulers, however, in 1931, aff~rmedthe precisely opposite doctrine,
that the cruiser numbers of our needs are a relative matter, depending on the numbers of
another Power. They reduced the number to fifty, a bare third of what had been needed
in our recent struggle for existence. On the same lack of principle they declared our
flotilla strength to depend on the number of submarines of an enemy, which, as all instructed
persons know, it never was, even if the destroying of submarines were the only duty of
destroyers which it had not been in the late war and, as we see daily in the present war it
is not : and these maids-of-all-work were cut down to a third of the number that had only
just saved us in 1917-18. In the same element of sea power they deprived the navy of
one of its arms, its air service, a force that had grown under the impelling need of modern
war at sea, as we have seen, to 2,800 machines and 55,000 men. While the navy was thus
being emasculated in the element of fighting ships, an attempt was made to stop the
building of the base at Singapore ; and loose talk was indulged in by people who imagined
themselves " advanced thinkers and realists " advocating the giving up of Malta and
Gibraltar ; the former was said to be no longer any use in consequence of the threat of the
air from Italy, the latter because Spain dislikes seeing Britain in that position, as Senor
Maura and Primo de Rivera had shown. We can see to-day whether those bases could
have been dispensed with. But we dispensed with the bases in Ireland of which the
Admiralty had said, at the time of the Irish Treaty, that without their use it would be
difficult, perhaps impossible, to feed the island in time of war : a cession that has cost us
thousands of tons of shipping, of lives of seamen, and of tons of cargoes. It is true that
the building of Singapore was continued, though not because of its importance but because
e more to cancel the contracts than to fulfil them. Aerodromes also were
it would b ~ v cost
built, but as there were neither ships to use the naval base nor aircraft to use the aerodromes, they merely served the purposes of the enemy who found these conveniences
ready made for their use. Sentry boxes without sentries in them are of no practical value
whatever.
Finally, in the third element of sea power, shipping and shipbuilding, nothing was done
to check the decline that foreign competition was causing. In 1914 the United Kingdom
owned 2,918 deep-sea trading ships. In 1936 this figure had fallen to 2,164 ; a fall of
25 per cent. ; the seamen fell from 196,000 to 160,000:the fishelmen from 76,000 to 50,000,
and between 1919 and 1938 the men emploqed in shipbuilding and repairing from 291,000
to 175,000.l
Thus in all its three elements British sea power was allowed to dwindle. The contrast
between this supine neglect and the energy of our ancestors as represented by a long
succession of Navigation Acts beginning in the reign of Richard I1 furnishes a measure of
Sir Westcott Abell. Merchant Sea Power, 1919-1939. The Andrew Laing lecture at Newcastle-oni y n e , 3 1 st October, 1911.
28
THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF SEA POWEP.
the want of understanding of either the importance or of the meaning, or both, of sea
power and of the elements of which it is composed.
The result of this neglect or blindness has been brought home in telling fashion during
this war. The misfortunes we have suffered in the losses of fighting ships, merchant
shipping, and colonial possessions with all thdr valuable products and the strategical
positions they occupy, in the delays which these losses have imposed on the development
of our offensive, are, with the exception of the defeat in France, due to the shortcomings
in our sea power ; as the failure of France to appreciate the strength and potentialities of
sea power made her think that all was lost when Paris was threatened and her armies
beaten, though far from destroyed. TO add to this there has been the failure to act on
the old and well-proven principle of British strategy that the first object of the combined
fighting forces of a maritime nation should be to obtain the command of the sea. What
nation, that, appreciating the importance of command of the sea, and of the Mediterranean
sea in particular, understanding that command depends on sea power and that sea power
demands the possession of bases, would have failed, in the seven months of its occupation
of Crete to take every possible step to render that island impregnable, or have excused
that neglect on grounds that there were more pressing demands elsewhere than the static
and active needs of its defence ?
The narrow interpretation of the term sea powzr which had led to one part of the
fighting forces which take part in the operations of sea warfare being segregated from the
other parts is in direct opposition to the principle which most of us have had drummed into
us from our youth-the principle of liaison of arms ; and it has had the result which
neglect or defiance of that principle have always had-inefficiency.
We in the Navy have
suffered from the same insidious disease. In my young days forty-five years ago there
was a gulf between the gunnery and torpedo specialists. The gunnery men despised the
torpedo as a weapon, the torpedo men reciprocated. Each " crabbed " the other's
weapon. And what was the result ? It was, in two words : tactics suffered. Battle,
in the eyes of the gunnery specialist, was to be a great gunnery duel ; it was to be won
by the artillery alone, not by the combined and co-ordinated action of all arms ; the
ships of the line, the cruiser forces, and the torpedo flotilla. To the two latter the purely
defensive function was assigned of preventing the enemy flotillas from disturbing the
gunfire of the great ships of the line of battle. So, though our battlefleet was double the
strength in broadside force of that of the enemy and our flotilla outnumbered theirs, the
battle at Jutland was indecisive. The flotilla effected nothing, not even its negative task
of enabling the big ships to complete their destruction without interference. The great
ships had to turn away, the very thing that, was to be prevented, The reason was to a
great extent that the flotillas had been treated as separate formations and not, as they had
been in the German Navy, as integral elements of the battle fleet, for over a score of years.
I had discussed their combined tactics with the Captain of the Kiel flotilla in 1897. It
was largely, I do not say wholly, because of this watertight segregation that the offensive
potentialities of the torpedo flotilla had been underestimated or condemned. There was
a lack of common outlook and of liaison of arms.
The same thing happened when the submarine appeared. She, in her turn, was kept
in segregation. During the two years in which I commanded the Dreadnought as flagship
of the Home Fleet from 1909 to 1911 the fleet saw nothing of submarines, and a proposal
to associate them in their training with the fleet was rejected. It is no exaggeration to
say that this segregation was one of the principal causes of the want of understanding of
the .potentialities of the submarine and, therefore, of the lack of precautions against her.
Segregation and separation were the parents of ignorance and unpreparedness.
Unwarned by these experiences of separating one arm from the remainder, a similar
segregation was impos2d upon the new naval weapon in the air. Precisely in the same
manner as in those other cases of segregation I have mentioned, the liaison between the
three arms on, under and above the surface was lacking. A spirit of competition and
mutual depreciation was engendered. The potentialities of the air arm working in combination with the other arms were not explored, as the potentialities of combination with
the surface and submarine arms had not been explored ; and it is in a great measure
owing to this sepalation that there has been weakness, both quantitively and qualitatively,
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in the air arm at sea. That, howev-.r, is not all. When, after a long time and against a
determined opposition, it was recognised that a return to the Navy of its air arm was
necessary, that return was partial. A distinction was made between those craft which
are ship-borne and those which are shore-based, a distinction that has no basis whatever
either in strategy or tactics, still less in logic. The ultimate aim of sea power, the true
meaning of the expression, was not understood. The facts that the ultim'ate aim is the
control of the sea, and that all those fighting instruments that are employed directly in its
attainment are naval, were either denied or ignored in this policy. The base from which
a vessel starts is immaterial. Every naval unit starts from a shore base, whether she is
a battleship, a destro~er,or a 56-foot motor boat. Because of this highly unscientific
allocation we saw, for some months after t h :outbreak of war, two separate forces operating
to the westward for the purpose of the defence of shipping, each working on its own lines,
unco-ordinatzd, and methods being employed that were futile in the highest degree. At
length both were placed under the same command; but, though this may serve as an ad hoc
mezsure, it is wrong in principle and will create great difficulties in the future. The
Americans discovered the need for unity of command in the operations at sea against the
submarines along their coasts more quickly than we did. By a decree in March, 1942,
the army 'planes and navy 'planes were placed under naval command.
Apart from questions of what may be called " theory," there is a serious " practical "
aspect of the question of whether this differentiation between ships and aircraft is to
continue. I t is clear that range and powers of aircraft are going greatly to extend, and
that many of the duties hitherto carried out by surface vessels will be carried out either
by aircraft working from shore bases or by the combined use of surface and aircraft.
The defence of trade is a grear responsibility which must rest upon the shoulders of one
authority. I do not regard it as practicable or possible to divide that responsibility.
When Pitt said he would be responsible for nothing that he did not direct he was giving
expression to a sound and fundamental principle of government and administration.
Those to whom that responsibility falls have the duty of preparing the plans and providing
and allotting the forces in peace. They must be acquainted with the shipping routes, the
resources, the seasons, the shipping employed: with, in fact, all that mass of
business which is concerned with supplying the needs of the Empire and distributing its products. Knowing what the requirements are, knowing the harbours and
the navigational factors, they can proceed to make the calculations and dispositions for
the defence in war. I t will, I imagine, be readily agreed that the persons best suited to
this work are seamen, and even our own seamen of the Navy are aware that they have a
good deal to learn before they can fulfil that duty adequately. I t seems, therefore, proper
to assume that it will be the Admiralty who in the future will be the Department responsible for the security of the trade routes and shipping and the admirals who command on
the foreign stations who will, as heretofore, be responsible for the strategy and planning
of the defence.
A part of that problem falls to a modern commander-in-chief. When, some twenty
years ago, I commanded in the East Indies, I had first to acquaint myself with the shipping
routes, ports, nature of exports and imports, coastal trade and the degree of importance
it held in the Indian system of distribution and so forth; and, with this information and
knowledge of the forces and ports of potential enemies, to see what there was to be done,
how it was best to do it, and the forces that would be needed ; where convoys would be
the most effective and economical means, where patrolling would serve. Then, surface
ships, cruisers and sloops, were the only types ; to-day a commander-in-chief would have
to bring aircraft into his calculations. They would be an integral part of his forces operating largely from shore bases. Undoubtedly he would need them for patrols in some areas, '
for convoy escorts, both on the ocean and for work on the coastal routes. I t would be
impossible for a commander either to frame plans or to make the calculations necessary
unless he had an assurance that the forces would be available ; and the efficiency of those
forces would depend upon the experience and training they had had in the tasks they
were to perform. What is true on the small scale of a foreign squadron is true also on the
larger scale of the Navy as a whole. The Admiralty of to-day and to-morrow cannot
calculate its " global " requirements if one of the classes of fighting craft that will have
30
to take part in the operations is not a part of its forces nor under its jurisdiction. So long,
however, as "power " is interpreted in terms of material, and we talk and think of " sea
power " and " air power " as two separate things instead of considering the problem in
the light of the ultimate object that it has to achieve, we shall have this anomalous situation
and our forces at sea will be inadequate in numbers and types. Nothing more uneconomical, in the full sense of that word, could be imagined.
But I am well alive to the fact that control of the sea is not an end in itself. It, in turn,
is a means to an end, and that end is the overcoming of the resistance of the enemy ; an
end attained either by assault on him within his own country, using whatever is the most
effective and economical means : which may be invasion by land forces or bombardment
by air forces or a combination of the two ; by siege, cutting off his means of making war ; or
again by a combination of assault and siege. One of the functions of sea power is to sweep
the road clear for the passage of the armies. That is the first and indispensable step, for
one can no more send a great army across an insecure sea than one can send men across an
insecure bridge that will not bear their weight. That, however, does not mean that no
military movements can be made until complete command and control have been won,
but until there is a sufficient control on the line of passage. Military movements are
absolutely necessary to enable control to be exercised, for unless positions are held the
fleet cannot operate. Bases, as I have repeated, are an essential element of sea power.
The campaigns in the Mediterranean furnish a most admirable example of the interrelation of land and sea operations. If the Army had been unable to hold Egypt in 1940,
the fleet could not have stayed in the Levant. If the fleet had had to leave the Army
would have been overwhelmed by the superior forces the enemy could have sent across
the sea from Italy. So the first task of the land forces was to hold the bases, and of the
sea forces to bring reinforcements to the army. But as the Army could not, until this
last campaign, hold positions westward of Alexandria, the sea forces could not maintain the
constant watch in superior force on the enemy line of communications between Sicily and
Africa. The appearances of our sea-fighting forces of all kinds could be intermittent only
from want of bases close enough to the enemy's lines of passage and he was able to send
strong forces to replace his losses and drive us back, exactly as the appearances of Queen
Anne's fleet on the line of communication between Toulon and Barcelona could only be
intermittent until we had bases in the Mediterranean. Now, sea power in two of its
elements, fighting vessels and transport vessels, has enabled two armies, one from the
United States and one from Britain, to reach Africa, and these armies are engaged in
adding the third element to sea power in the Mediterranean : bases along the north
African coast. With fighting strength in all its forms at sea and the bases it needs, a step
will have been taken towards attaining the object of sea power up the Strgits: command
andcontrol ; and the movement of military forcesin safety fromsouth tonorthandfromwest
to east will, we may hope, become possible ; control is a step towards that end. That, of
course, is still not an end ; it is the means to an end, crushing the enemy in his European
fortress. Even that is not an end. As more than one writer since Aristotle has said,
victory itself is not the ultimate object of war : which is peace. But to reach that ultimate
object we must proceed step by step : there are no short cuts. We must be clear as to
the object in each step and of each step ; and, while in each stage, must concentrate every
effort upon the attainment of the object of that stage. The object in the present stage
is to obtain control of the sea. We have not yet got that control, either in the Atlantic,
the Mediterranean, or the Pacific,and it is to sea power, in its three elements of fighting
ships that move on, under, and above the surface of the sea, merchant ships and bases,
that we must look to gain and to recover the command and control.
The title of this paper is "The Modern Conception of Sea Power." Actually, the
conception I have put forward is not modern ; it is the oldest of all conceptions. I t is
at least two thousand'five hundred years old. It is to that old conception that I wish to
return.
H. W. R.
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EXPEDITION TO NORTH
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NAVAL OPERATIONS I N T H E EXPEDITION TO NORTH AFRICA.
The First Lord of the Admiralty made the following statement in the House of
Commons (" Hansard," 3rd December, 1942) :" I can now give the House an account of the naval operations connected with the
expedition to North Africa.
" The vast armada necessary to carry the assault and the support troops had to be
escorted across thousands of miles of ocean, from the United States and from this country,
through waters where a formidable concentration of U-boats might take place within a
matter of hours of the order being given by the German Admiralty ; it had to be held
together in the rough waters of the Atlantic ; and the difficulties of manoeuvring large
numbers of vessels in the Straits of Gibraltar and in the approaches to the landing beaches
without lights and with no moon had to be overcome ; finally the troops had to be landed
on a potentially hostile shore dead on time and possibly also in the face of submarine,
surface and air attacks by the Axis forces. I t is difficult to convey an adequate picture
of what the organisation of this-the greatest amphibious expedition ever undertakenhas meant: The work entailed in the shipyards, amongst many other things, the mounting
of 1,250 anti-aircraft guns, with provision of special stowage for the ammunition and
accommodation for the guns' crews. After months of elaborate preparation, the success
of the expedition depended largely on the enemy remaining in complete ignorance of its
destination. Masses of men and material had to be gathered together but the purpose of
their assembly kept secret. The risks to be taken were considerable but success in
deceiving the enemy was complete. The elaborate precautions taken resulted in complete
surprise.
" The expedition was organized in three separate forces. One, which sailed from the
United States, was entirely the responsibility of the Americans. This unit assaulted
Casablanca and French Morocco. The other two units sailed from this country under the
protection of the Royal Navy. They comprised both American and British troops, and
were destined, one for the assault on Oran, and the other on Algiers. The convoys contained not only British and United States merchantmen, but Belgian, Danish, Dutch,
Norwegian and Polish vessels also. The Royal Navy escorts were assisted by Royal
Canadian Navy corvettes, and the Polish, Dutch and Norwegian Navies were represented.
The diversity of the nations present and the delicacy of the conrdination to be achieved
emphasize the forethought, care and skill required in the planning, for which the Planning
Staffs deserve high praise. Every step was taken to ensure the greatest protection possible
for the convoys. This was mainly achieved by the escorts themselves and by a co-operation
between carrier-borne aircraft and aircraft of the Royal Air Force, which reached a high
pitch of perfection. Anti-submarine patrols by Coastal Command aircraft in the Bay of
Biscay and off Gibraltar were intensified, and close air cover for movements of the convoys
was provided by carrier-borne aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm. These naval aircraft especially
distinguished themselves. Apart from giving protectiun to the landings, they secured such
a dominance of the air over the airfields that the R.A.F. and U.S. Air Forces were able to
land on them as soon as they were reached by the troops. The anti-submarine measures
also proved outstandingly successful. Here is an instance of co-operation between the
Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm. A German U-boat was sighted and attacked by
a Hudson aircraft of the R.A.F., forced to the surface and disabled. The Hudson then had
to return, but the news had passed to one of our carriers whose aircraft were immediately
on the track. The submarine was sighted on the surface by an Albacore and sunk by a
torpedo from that machine. This is the first occasion on which a submarine has been sunk
by an aircraft torpedo.
" Our operations clearly led to a regrouping of enemy submarines as soon as the surprise
was over. We had expected this and to sustain losses as a result. A very large number
of attacks on U-boats were carried out both by warships and by aircraft of the Royal Air
Force and the Fleet Air Arm. The assessment of all these attacks is not complete ; but
already we know of more than thirty which caused damage or destruction. The U-boat
assault has slackened a little ; but we have to keep our forces supplied by sea and we must
expect losses in consequences.
32
SEA TRANSPORT IN PEACE AND IN WAR.
" In these great tasks our losses so far have been considerably less than expected, and,
having regard to the scale of the operations, can be considered light, and are far less than
the enemy claims. We shall not publish merchant shipping losses, preferring that the
enemy should continue to,rely on his false claims as in the past. The following ships of
His Majesty's Navy were lost :" The destroyers Broke and Martin.
The corvette Gardenia.
The cutters Walney and Hartland.
The sloop Ibis.
The minesweeper Algerine.
The depot ship Hecla.
The anti-aircraft escort ship Tynwald. The small aircraft carrier Avenger.
" In addition the Royal Netherlands Navy lost the destroyer Isaac Sweers, which fought
many battles along with us and which, on 13th December, 1941, took such a gallant part
in the action which led to the destruction of two Italian cruisers and the crippling of a
torpedo boat. H.M. ships Walney and Hartland were two ex-American coastguard cutters.
They were lost in a gallant attempt to prevent the scuttling of block-ships in the harbour
of Oran. They broke through the boom and, although on fire, succeeded in penetrating
the inner harbour and before being sunk landed troops at the west end of the Bassin
Gueybin. His Majesty's destroyer Broke, successor of the earlier destroyer of that name,
which in the last war rammed and boarded a German destroyer in the English Channel, was
damaged as she burst through the boom at Algiers, enabling our forces to enter the harbour.
In this gallant action she was so severely damaged that she subsequently sank. Before
H.M.S. Ibis was sunk by an air attack her guns disposed of two Ju. 88's and 1 He. 111.
" Tales of gallantry and devotion to duty could be told to include every ship that was
in action. The examples given demonstrate, if that were necessary, that the spirit of the
Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy remains as always equal to every demand upon them.
" Since the landings on the North Africa coast took place, we have been able to announce
that His Majesty's submarines in the Mediterranean have destroyed three tankers, seven
supply ships and two destroyers, while, in addition, a six-inch gun cruiser, two destroyers
and four supply ships have been severely damaged. In the air, up to the last assessment,
25 enemy aircraft were destroyed by the anti-aircraft gunfire of our ships, and 15 more
were so severely damaged as to be probably destroyed. Eight other aircraft were destroyed
by naval aircraft operating from carriers and two possibly destroyed, while a further 39
are known to have been damaged either by gunfire or by carrier-borne fighter aircraft.
" This then is the balance-sheet.
The United States Navy and the Royal Navy have
landed in North Africa forces sufficient to seize the vast area and launch mortal battle with
the Axis for the control of the Sicilian Narrows. The Royal Navy has unostentatiously
transported to Egypt forces sufficient to hurl Rommel from Egypt and Cyrenaica. I t has
a t the same time with the Royal Air Force contributed to that victory by seriously interfering with Rommel's supply lines. Could the contrast be more striking ? Rommel's
army, whose supply lines stretch over 200 miles of water, is routed by the Eighth Army,
whose communications cover no less than 12,000 miles of water, and is threatened in the
rear by the Allied Armies whose supply must bs brought over some 3,000 miles."
SEA TRANSPORT I N PEACE AND I N WAR.l
WHATEVER
the development of air transport in the future, it is hard to visualize that it
can ever displace sea transport for heavy cargoes such as fuel or other heavy oils, coal,
mineral ores, meat, wool, grain, timber, cotton, machinery, etc., nor for the bulk of such
foods as dairy produce, tea, coffee; cocoa, or tobacco, whilst in war-time the transport of
large forces of troops, air ground staffs with equipment, munitions, stores, armaments,
tanks, and transport vehicles for overseas operations, together with the huge' supply of
petrol and fuel oil which they require, must devolve on sea surface vessels.
The writer of this article, Vice-Admiral Craig Waller, died a few days after its completion. Members
of THENAVALREVIEWwill know what a consistent and insistent advocate he has been for speed in
merchant ships, and his death-so greatly regretted by his many Service friends--comes a t a time when
the force of his advocacy appeared to be making itself felt. A delightful messmate, a fine seaman, and
a great gentleman, he will be sadly missed. and our very deep sympathy goes out to his wife and
family.-R.W.
33
Although we may and should endeavour to be more self supporting in future, it seems
impracticable to provide for all the food required by the inhabitants of this densely
populated island, which must be largely industrial ; and in any case we cannot produce
such things as tea, coffee, cocoa, and tobacco, nor fruit and dairy produce in sufficient
quantity or cheaply enough to meet the demands of our highly developed civilization.
Certain necessities, such as fuel oil and rubber, cannot be supplied
by the homeland.
- It is the essence of any sound economy to sell in exchange for what you buy, and this
demands exports-which in our case have been mainly manufactured articles-to countries
which are not highly industrialized ; but we have also been a large exporter of coal to
countries such as Italy, which has none of her own and requires it for her factories, railways,
power, heating, and lighting plant. Coal is undoubtedly most economically employed in
fixed plants onshore, and is extravagant in space, weight, consumption and man power
compared with oil as fuel for ship propulsion, except possibly for comparatively lowpowered vessels employed on coasting or short sea service where the mines are within easy
reach of the ships ports. We should endeavour to foster the coal export trade to the
greatest extent of our surplus production.
I t may be taken for granted that our Merchant Navy will continue to be financed,
managed and run by private enterprise ; but it is to be hoped that after the war the State
will insist ofi exercising some measure of control as regards the types and qualities of the
ships, so that, should war come again, we shall be in a better position to face the attack
on our sea transport which is almost cerrain to be a main feature of any likely enemy's war
plans-notwithstanding the claims made by protagonists of air power, it seems that the
submarine is likely to remain the greatest menace to transport on the high seas, being the
most difficult to counter on account of invisibility, and also because it cannot be tackled
by craft of its own type in itsownelement. Advances in the power, range, and destructive
qualities of aircraft will undoubtedly be countered by similar' advances in counter-attack
from the air, and it will be exceptional in the future for planes attacking ships to be
unmolested before reaching a favourable position to discharge torpedoes or bombs. I t is
certain also that the accuracy ahd power of ships A/A armaments will keep pace with
increase of efficiency of aircraft, which, moreover, cannot make themselves invisible nor
as a rule attack effectively in darkness or thick weather. On the other hand, although
the submarine is slow when submerged and very vulnerable on the surface or when
submerging, it is very hard to locate, and if it can get into a favourable position can make
an attack without exposing itself. It is for these reasons that I have consistently, since
nine months before the war, pressed for fast cargo ships and tankers, so that it would be
impossible for submarines to maintain any prolonged attack, and they would thus be
compelled to rely on the chance of being able to get into position for a single attack and
that at a fast-moving zig-zagging target. I t has been stated that the modern German
submarine has a maximum surface speed of up to 20 knots, but it is doubtful if such speed
could be maintained for long without excessive fuel expenditure, and in any case four
knots in hand is very different to the present 8 knots excess over an &knot convoy, or
12 knots if the submarine speed of 20 can now be attained. The underwater speed of
10 knots is unlikely ever to be exceeded, and I am convinced that, whatever the future
development of attack on, and defence of, surface ships may be, high ship speed is and
will remain the factor of primary
in minimizing losses from submarine warfare.
- importance
It may be taken for granted that for sea transport in war we will always rely on our
peace-time commercial navy, for any system of State-owned transport for war only would
be financially indefensible ; and, apart from this, the ships, if laid up, would become worn
and probably obsolete. Even with a commercial fleet in constant use a proportion must
suffer from age and wear, but we can rely on regular replacement to keep a considerable
proportion efficient and up to date, whilst the measure of State control which I have
suggested, combined if necessary with subsidy to cover the extra cost of war efficiency
qualities, should ensure that in future the Merchant Navy is better able to meet the dangers
of war than it was in 1939. At the same time our shipyards should be constantly up to
date and ready to meet the increased demands of war with comparative ease. I t should
be noted that the shipowners have (Feb., 1943) stated through the Chamber of Shipping
that they are in accord with the demand for faster cargo ships, and that they have no
M'
control over, or voice in, the design or construction of ships built to Government account
which have to conform to Admiralty requirements. They say that " a re-examination of
the Government's shipping policy in the light of the latest developments in submarine
warfare would seem to be called for." These are strong words from experts with inside
knowledge which cannot be lightly disregarded. It is surely high time that we dropped
the "ugly ducklings," which unfortunately cannot become swans, and concentrate on
fast cargo ships and tankers, even if only for post-war trade in which they would assist
to make up for the almost certain shortage of ships.
I t must be supposed that the types of cargo ships will always be decided by therequirements of peace-time, and thus, except for the effect of the probable great growth of airborne traffic as the result of vast strides in recent years in range, speed, reliability, and
weight-carrying power of aeroplanes, sea borne transport will demand similar ships to
those in use heretofore. I t is reasonable to suppose that an enlightened policy will be
adopted in regard to embodying the latest forms of machinery and fittings, so that, with
little if any increase in costs, weights, and fuel consumption, greatly superior war efficiency,
especially in the matter of sea speed, will be realized.
We have hitherto in this country failed to develop or to keep pace with progressive
foreign countries in the design, construction, and practical working of the heavy oil
internal combustion engine for marine propulsion, and it is on this type of machinery
that the future undoubtedly hangs. At present the heavy diesel engine of the reciprocating type in various forms and makes holds the field, and was installed with success in
some of our pre-war cargo passenger liners, notably the Shaw, Savill and Albion liner
Dominion Monarch, of 214 knots. This engine may either have direct drive or be geared
down, the latter system enabling a high engine speed which offers several advantages.
The diesel engine can also be employed to drive electric generators which operate motors
driving the propellor shaft, a system giving great ease in control of speed and reverse, but
involving extra weight. A new system which, if successful, will give great advantages
in regard to saving of weight and time in construction is now about to be tried, and in fact
is being installed as the main machinery of a new ship to be built for a well-known cargo
liner company. It is known as the Lighter Diesel Intercoupled Engine, and consists of a
number of comparatively low power units coupled by a patent elastic clutch to one shaft
through reduction gearing. The design for the ship referred to consists of eight 500 b.h.p.
diesels coupled four to each shaft of a twin-screw ship and giving 4,000 b.h.p. There are
also designs up to 9,600 h.p. with 1,000 b.h.p. units. These small units can be built very
quickly and lend themselves to mass production.
The machinery weight of the heavy diesel is considerably less than that of the marine
steam engine of the same power, whilst the weight of the light diesel multicoupled engine
is only one-fifth to half that of the heavy diesel and the oil fuel consumption of either
diesel is only 40% that of the steam engine.
A grave result of our failure to keep pace with the development of the heavy oil internal
combustion engine for ship propulsion has been its effect on our shipyards which, for want
of modern plant and failure to keep up to date, could not get contracts which progressive
British shipowners were compelled to place abroad. Thus, many of our shipyards closed
down, skilled workers drifted to other trades, and we lost our leading position in the
shipbuilding world ; with the result that we were gravely handicapped in meeting the
huge demand for ships after war broke out, and at the best could only produce in sufficient
quantity marine engines and boilers of the simplest and most obsolete type.
Turning to the probable types of ships in the post-war merchant fleet, it is to be anticipated that the ultra-fast leviathan ships of the QueenMary class will not be reproduced,
as their construction and running costs are out of all proportion to any advantage they
may possess. In the years before the war such ships were the result of international
competition for the Atlantic record and the demand by multi-millionaires, who were
prepared to pay fancy prices for luxurious accommodation and for the satisfaction of
travelling in a ship which might knock a few minutes off the best previous passage time.
Those who, for business or other reasons, require great speed will travel by air, whilst the
bulk of people, who enjoy the relaxation and health-giving qualities of sea travel and are
not in a desperate hurry, will patronize the passenger cargo-liner of round a b o u ~20,000
35
tons with a sea speed of 18 to 22 knots, which will be developed to suit this demand.
Such ships will be the troop transports of war.
Next to the passenger cargo liner comes the cargo liner, another well-known pre-war
type which will certainly be retained and should be the pride of our Merchant Navy in
peace and war. They will be fitted to carry passengers up to 200 in solid comfort, who
will, as heretofore, mostly be those whose business takes them on the scheduled route of
the liner-colonial civil servants, officers and their families proceeding to appointments
abroad, going on or returning from leave, etc. These ships will probably run from 5,000
to 12,000 tons gross and have a sea speed of 16 to 18 knots. I t is important that fares
should be not greater than, and that accommodation, food, and service should be at
least e.qual to, that of foreign ships running on the same route, so that our people may
not-as sometimes in pre-war days-be tempted to travel by ships of other nationalities.
The next class of ship will be the cargo ship at present known as the " tramp," the
general utility maid-of-all-work, which has carried bulk cargoes such as coal, grain, and
iron ore all over the world, picking up cargoes wherever they may be found and often
waiting in ports abrbad for considerable periods to obtain a contract or proceeding in
ballast from port to port for this purpose. Thus an appreciable proportion of her time
in " commission " may be unprofitable ; and the tendency has been to cut building and
running expenses to the utmost possible, with the result that the bulk of our cargo tonnages,
which provides the slow convoys in war, is not capable of more than 8 to 9 knots, which
may often mean only 7 knots average or less. I t would not seem impracticable, and
would certainly be a great advantage, if post-war agreements between nations could
allocate the bulk carrying trade, both regular and seasonal, so that regular cargoes could
be ensured and cut-throat competition avoided. I t would then, I suggest, be possible to
build the ordinary ocean cargo ships with a maximum speed up to 16 knots, whilst with
modern engines much lower speed could be used with economy when desired. These
ships would probably run from 4,000 to 8,000 tons gross and up to 10,500 d.w.t. The
last, but probably most important, type of deep sea freight carrier is the tanker, which,
fitted to carry oils of all sorts, has up to now averaged 8,000 to 10,000 tons gross with a
carrying capacity of 10,000 to 13,000 tons, their speed being between 10 and 12k knots.
We should certainly endeavour to ensure that tankers built in future and under our
control should have a maximum speed of 16 knots at least, and should be more easily
handled than those of pre-war design. I t is, of course, taken for granted that all our
deep sea ships shall be designed to take defensive armaments at short notice.
There remain a large assortment of ships for the coasting, home, and near trade which
I suggest can be left to develop along utility lines without interference.
The ships which I have anticipated for post-war ocean transport may be classified
as :(a) Passenger cargo ships of about 20,000 tons gross and 18-22 knots.
5,000 to 12,000 tons and 16-18 knots.
( b ) Cargo liners
4,000 to 8,000 tons and 16 knots.
(c) Cargo ships
8,000 to 10,000 tons and 16 knots.
(d) Tankers
These ships would form our transport and supply fleet in future wars.
In regard to armed merchant cruisers, I suggest that we should never in future anticipate the commandeering of ships probably very valuable for troop transport or cargo
carrying, in order to convert them into very indifferent and vulnerable fighting ships.
Provision should be made in the Navy Estimates for warships suitable for the purpose to
which the armed merchant cruisers have hitherto been devoted.
I have not so far touched on the question of fleet auxiliaries, and it' hardly comes
within the scope of this article, except in so far as valuable freighters might-if proper
provision had not previously been made by the Navy for special ships pr6perly designed
for the necessary services-be taken away from their proper role as cargo carriers. The
numbers of each type should be sufficient to maintain our fleets in peace, and in general
the ships should have the speed required to keep with the fleet during ordinary transfer
from base to base in war. This would especially apply to fuel ships.
A. C. W.
36
ADDENDUM.
On 9th February, 1943, was published an Interim Report on future shipping policy by
the GeAera1 Council of British Shipping (representing the Chamber of Shipping of the
United Kingdom and the Liverpool Shipowners' Association. The following is a short
summary of its remarks and recommendations :(1) Imports of food and raw material necessary and must be paid for by exporters,
shipbuilders and shipowners who must market their wares and services at competitive world prices.
(2) Loss of overseas investments and capital for financing the-movement of world
trade. British shipping employed on this trade is one of the great export
industries, and its prosperity is of primary importance : its ability to play its
part will depend on the equipment and efficiency of our ships.
(3) Restrictions imposed by foreign subsidised competition would vitally effect our
mercantile marine.
(4) I t is not expected that State control can be eliminated immediately after the
armistice, but when it comes it calls for the fullest policy of non-descrimination
which underlies the Atlantic Charter. A large and vigorous'British marine will
definitely require that international trade and its transportation shall be substantially
f~ee.
(5) The industry will need to provide elasticity in the use of ships needed to meet the
shortage lin quality tonnage. Government should delegate to the industry through
its organization the task of carrying out a national and international policy in
regard to shipping, liners through a liner committee and tramps under a licencing
system operated by an " International Administrative Committee," and supported
by effective government guarantees.
(6) The National Maritime Board having proved an outstanding example of successful
self-government should continue as joint machinery for agreement on questions
affecting employment and service conditions of employees.
(7) Re suggestions that shipping could be operated as a Department of State, all
experiments in nationalization have proved that the luxury of a State fleet is
most expensive. Shipping is essentially competitive. This does not mean that
the industry believes in unorganized activity of individuals without regard to
welfare of workers or the interests of the country.
My remarks on these proposals are :(I), (2) Are obvious and axiomatic.
(3) Foreign subsidies are indirect State assistance to their mercantile marine.
(4) I t will be difficult if not impossible to ensure that this condition can be attained,
though no doubt desirable. If our merchant seamen insist on the very high wage
they now enjoy (£24 per month in war and ,614 in peace for an A.B.) and our
ship building costs remain at such a very high level, it is hard to see how we can
compete with countries where a much lower standard of living is accepted. Before
the war a large proportion of the crews of our ships were coolies, Lascars, or other
coloured men on a low rate of wage.
(5) Evidently the " tramp " is still to be looked on as the scavenger of cargoes, to
be run on the cheap. We can trust the lesser companies to build ships which will
be thoroughly efficient for war if properly used ; but, if pre-war conditions are
any guide, we must expect that the ordinary cargo ships which must carry the
great bulk of cargoes in war will be of all sizes, types and speeds according to the
individual choice of the shipowner (of possibly one or two ships).
(6) No one wishes the State to run a great and intricate commercial business like our
mercantile marine ; but so long as the nation relies on it for the all-important
duty of sea transport in war there must be some control over the war efficiency
of the ships, and this must be exercised by the State.
A. C. W.
-
,
'
;
I
SUPPLYING TOBRUK.
SUPPLYING TOBRUK.
INthe spring of 1942, when the Eighth Army was in retreat, a sentence appeared in a
newspaper story : " The Army is back in Tobruk, it is now the Navy's job to supply them."
I wondered if the writer had realized just how much that job meant.
Now the campaign in Libya and Tripolitania is over it seems a good time to tell the tale
of theTobrukFerry, Tobruk's only linkwith the outside during the greater part of the siege.
When Tobruk was first invested during the retreat from Benghazi there were something
like thirty thousand troops there. Australians formed the majority of the garrison, but
there were many United Kingdom troops and an Indian unit there too. At first the
store situation was not too bad ; there were some shortages, naturally ; but Tobruk had,
been the supply port for the whole army in Cyrenaica: so there was some accumulated
surplus. Even so, the situation became, from the first, a very tricky one, and it remained
so to the end. Very soon after the siege began, Tobruk lost all air cover. I t was physically
impossible to operate aircraft from its two small landing grounds which were, from the
outset, at the mercy of the large enemy airfield only a few minutes' flying away (at El
Adem). Quite soon, too, the harbour, town, and landing grounds came under fire from
the enemy's heavy guns.
So there was Tobruk, cut off by land and air, its harbour covered by the enemy's guns
under continual straffing from the Luftwaffe and with its sea supply route fringed for a
hundred miles or so by a coast in enemy hands. Tobruk was certainly a problem.
Perhaps the problem would not have come to a head so soon if it had not been for the
wounded. A few stores and a few tanks, which mqch surprised the Germans in their May
attack, were filtering through in small, unobtrusive convoys, in tank-landing craft, in
captured Italian schooners. They were filtering through, successfully on the whole,
though there were sad losses. But the wounded were still a problem, and there were many
of them-for Tobruk had been a main base. The obvious solution was a hospital ship.
But the enemy is not very reliable in his behaviour to hospital ships, and though one
brought back her wounded in safety, the second was bombed. So another solution had
to be found, and the answer was, as it so often is, destroyers.
The Commander-in-chief was hard pressed for destroyers himself, the evacuations of
Greece and Crete were in progress, and all he could spare were two veterans of the last war,
sadly in need of refit. But their Australian crews got the last ounce out of them and they
did the job, running singly at first and then, as the dangers of the run were realized, together
for mutual support. Three hundred and twenty miles separated Tobruk from Alexandria,
with Mersa Matruh as a half-way house between. West of Matruh they were in comfortable
range of the Lzlftwaffe, and there was very, very little fighter cover available. Their
protection was their speed and the darkness, for their guns were not made for anti-aircraft
work. So they sailed at dawn from Alexandria with a few special reinforcements and a
few special stores. They steamed fast, but with care for their complaining rheumatic
engines, until they passed Sidi Barrani. There they left the coast and turned northwestwards, out to sea to clear Ras Azzaz (the north-east comer of Cyrenaica) before turning
west again for Tobruk. This was the worst bit, from Sidi Barrani until dark. Without
fighter cover, they were passing the Luftwaffe's front door. They went faster here.
Darkness relieved the tension a while ; they supped, and some slept a little. Then they
were off Tobruk. I t was anxious work entering the harbour. The enemy had scattered
mines broadcast, and, though there was a channel, the port was never easy to make exactly ;
the currents are unreliable and even the dim and shaded leading light was sometimes
counterfeited by the enemy. But,they found their way in, and, through the maze of
+
wrecks, they berthed.
All was bustle and activity now. Lighters came alongside for the troops and stores,
others brought off wounded and passengers, boats brought officers with despatches and
orders. Soon they were loaded, the stretchers slung from the beams of the messdecks and
lashed on the lockers, the walking wounded and passengers curled up in corners wherever
they could. Then they were off again, slowly and cautiously at first, through the treacher-
38
,
.
SUPPLYIN& TOBRUK.
ous minefield and then full speed. Around dawn they were anxious again, for they were
once more on the Lzlftwaffe's doorstep, but soon they were off Sidi Barrani and every
minute was safer. Afternoon saw them back in Alexandria.
I t was a nerve-racking job, even when the enemy was quiet, and often he was not.
They brought the wounded out ; but by then the store situation at Tobruk was less
happy and reinforcements were needed. The little unobtrusive convoys had attracted
the enemy's attention and were not getting through so easily. Their losses were becoming
very heavy. With the battle of Greece and Crete over, the Commander-in-Chief could
spare more destroyers, too. The ferry became a regular routine. They took up reliefs,
ammunition, fruit, and foods, cigarettes and tobacco, meat for the hospitals, money, mails,
medicines, motor tyres, tank tracks, gun barrels, mess stores-anything they could manhandle, it was all one to them. They brought back troops no longer needed, sick and
wounded, prisoners, and salved Italian gear. Whole divisions were relieved.
As the forces in Egypt were re-equipped, fighter protection became better and the
serious danger period was reduced to those intolerable half hours between sunset and dark
and between dawn and sunrise. It was in this dawn period that two destroyers were lost.
Then the enemy changed his tactics. He started bombing by flare light in the dark. I t
was horrid, but his success was fortunately confined to one ship. The ferry went on.
Bdt the destroyers were by no means alone ; indeed they were not even the chief
carriers on the job. The tank-landing craft, the schooners, the trawlers, whalers, sloops,
minesweepers, the gunboats and the incomparably gallant petrol tankers all played their
parts. They sent in few reports, not holding overmuch with paper work, and it was not
easy to extract their stories,
The schooners, perhaps, lent the most fantastic touch to the whole grim business. Old
ships, some captured from the Italians, some bought or hired, with weird old diesel engines
and curious assorted sails, they chugged their way up the three hundred miles of coast,
alone, without wireless, carrying a hundred or so tons of stores. They were armed, of
course, but not always quite as the authorities had ordered. Their idea was that every
man on board should have a weapon, how it was obtained was another matter, and they
could use their guns, too. Before they had done they had more than one enemy aircraft
to their credit, and one schooner, which arrived at Bomba by mistake one morning,
fought a successful withdrawing action against the coast defences. I t was the same
schooner, too, that was given fighter cover by a Messerschmitt.
The work of the gunboats was mentioned at the time ; the army was grateful for their
help, the enemy found them dangerous. They had their fair share of excitement, perhaps
rather more than their share, for all were damaged at one time or another and one was sunk
by bombing at Tobruk. One of the others had a lucky escape one day ; she was being
bombed, and all the bombs fell close on one side, bounced and went clear over the top.
The sloops suffered the worst. With their comparatively heavy armament, and slow
speed it fell to them to escort the vital petrol convoys. The convoys were slow ; they had
to spend whole days off the enemy coast, without fighter cover, and they suffered heavily.
I t was from one of these convoys that a South African armed whaler found herself the only
survivor ; the rest had been hit by heavy bombs. They were sinking round her and the
raids continued. The whaler, herself shaken, picked up the survivors and searched till
dark for more, before setting course for home.
The strange, box-like, tank-landing craft played no small share in the supply scheme.
Ungainly to look at, they can carry a lot of stores, and, like the schooners, they used
evasion as their chief protection. They had their losses ; but they had their triumphs, too ;
as when three of them met a U-boat on the surface and chased it into Bardia with their
pompoms.
The whole story of supplying and maintaining Tobruk is a story of little ships. The
dashes of the destroyer ferry were, perhaps, more spectacular than the slow crawls of
convoys, schooners, and landing craft. But the destroyers were only carrying quite small
cargoes and they were only in danger for a brief night. The others (who carried bigger
cargoes) spent days in the danger area and further days hiding in creeks and under
camouflage nets in the harbour a t Tobruk. The greater credit should be theirs.
R. E . T.
,
MALTA CONVOY.
MALTA CONVOY.
Some details that m a y help the imagination; they are all from memory and the seqzlence
m a y therefore be inaccurate.
.,
.,
I
i
I
WE set out full of ideas but by no means quite sure of our " job." When we heard the
details from our admiral we were overflowing with that eagerness and excitement that
comes when the monotony is to be broken, viewing imAginary pictures of medal-bedecked
heroes, a complete convoy entering Malta's harbour, planes falling from the skies, U-boats
coming up for their last gasp and H.M.S. . . . steaming serenely on, blinking now and again,
it must be admitted, but nevertheless going on. Already we had a pretty full experience
of anti-aircraft defence at sea, although none was of that concentrated single-ship attack
which many others had been through ; most of it had been among convoys where the
weakest was the object of attack. Personally, I was always too busy to see much in the
air, although once I did happen to glance up and saw a plane coming down at a fairly flat
angle to the sea, wondered why nobody was firing at it and then got busy again a t my job.
I t wasn't untileome time afterwards that I realized that s oke had been pouring from
its tail and that it must have been a goner. But back to "%alta Convoy.'' We picked
up our convoy, a lusty crowd of ships, and felt proud of our exalted position in such a
large tactical and strategical affair. All went well for few days ; then we arrived in the
area, submarines were reported and aircraft sighted. Then the attacks commenced ;
time after time the enemy made their attacks, but our fleet fighters made rings round them
and pulled their tail feathers out. But they did let a few through, so that we gunnery
people wouldn't be without a little very necessary practice ; after all, we had loaded up
to full capacity with everything from 6-inch to -303. Later on the job of keeping them
off did get a little too much for the fighters ; they could only stay in the air a certain time
and they often met the enemy 50 to 80 miles away from the convoy, so that one or two
of the enemy were bound to get through. Things began to warm up, bombs did really
start to fall among us (so I was told), and our guns began to lose some of the Arctic chill
which had been their lot for so long. Empty cylinders commenced their most dangerous
habits of hitting one in the back of the knee, anywhere. If one managed to keep out of
their direct line they hit something else and glanced off ; but they found you in the end,
there was no escape. We appeared to have lost a destroyer somehow; no one knew
where or how, but it turned out all right in the end ; she and an enemy submarine had
disagreed, and the destroyer had won with a slightly bent nose. I n the morning we were
up early for dawn attack ; few had even troubled about bed, and the Fleet Air Arm were
up early too. These boys were right on their toes and the enemy's necks. I came to the
conclusion that they thought it was their convoy. We were all tired, excited, unable to
sleep, keep awake, or eat. We knew we were in for big things, how big was still a guess ;
but the spirit of the game, of winning through and making another bit of history in which
our ship's name would figure, was always prominent. The convoy was still iatact ; but
up to that moment we had only just tasted things and there were heaps of ammunition
still left. Then the first one of the convoy dropped out, so we were not to get there without
loss. Oh well ! let's' get on ; perhaps we can manage the remainder. Then more air
attacks, more " sub " scares, ships all over the ocean apparently going nowhere in particular,
then peace once more and the escort gather in round the convoy like the hurdles round a
sheep pen ; steadily we steam on ; one of the convoy seems a bit slow-a near miss, we
suppose. After each phase the captain broadcasts over the loud speakers the result and
casualties, if any ; for some time he was able to say " the convoy is still steaming on to
Malta." A lovely day just nice for a " make and mend." The sandwiches seemed a bit
dry, but perhaps it is our mouths ; everyone cheerful ; at last they are on a real job with
some really good tools and things are happening too quickly to let one think for longand the convoy goes steadily on. Another air attack, the Fleet Air Arm go galloping into
the blue ; what faith the sailors put in them ! Even greater than the faith that the Merchant
Navy puts in the Royal Navy, and that is greater than the faith a young child has in its
parents. It's a big responsibility that the sailor flying men have taken on ; but they carry
40
M,AL.TA CONVOY.
it well and honourably, and the sailors know that guns may frighten the enemy but our
airmen stop them from going home. Suddenly a mild panic, everybody rushes to the
ship's side ; all one can see is three enormous forbidding bunches of yellowy black smoke ;
then an aircraft carrier emerges, mortally hit. "Can they save her ?" is the question on
everyone's lips ; she's listing badly ; now planes are sliding off the flight deck, and she
makes a sort of curling advance ; there is still hope that they may be able to save her ;
destroyers are flying to her aid, yes ! flying ; it seems that only their propellers are in the
water. The old lady is heeling badly now, and our hope begins to ooze ; but the convoy
must, and does, go on ; we turn, making frantic zigzags in case there are more " subs "
lurking ; the other carriers open out, their escorts hanging on to them and shielding them,
meanwhile throwing up curly white bow waves. The destroyers must hurry and the
other carriers must be looked after, for some of the "ugly duckling's" airmen are in the
air. Keep them a landing ground ; they are our first line of defence and attack. We
watch her go over, over, so slowly ; then suddenly she is no more. It's the first time many
have seen a ship hit by torpedoes and the first time many more have seen a ship sink,
and it brings a realization that the path is not strewn with flowers. Speculations are rife
as to how many planes she had in the air and the likelihood of most of her company being
saved. Soon the welcome news is made known to us that most of the ship's company are
saved ; but it is nevertheles3 a sad moment, for that ship with others of her kind accompanying us were doing wonderful work. Never mind, it's the fortune of war, and thoughts
turn to to-morrow, which is to be our big day. A few more attacks develop, but still our
guns are only just warm ; the lame one of the convoy has picked up station again, but
another is out of the running and making its way by a different route with a small escort.
Late that night a vivid glare lights the sky astern : somebody is having a spot of bother
with a fire ; the night is grey-black dark, and as far as we can see the convoy goes on. We
settle down for a rest with the thought of "Let them come-we are ready and eager."
Before dawn we are at our action stations again, haggard-eyed but not tired by a long
way. The Hurricanes, Spitfires, and Fulmars weave patterns in the sky as they look for
trouble, quite often finding it too, and dealing with it in their successful, business-like
manner. A few stragglers of the attacking force get through and make our way ; then
a torpedo attack is launched out of the sun ; but our fighters have frightened themand they
drop their loads at long range, so that we all have good time to avoid the deadly missiles.
We eat, we,rest, a few more rounds of ammunition are fired, the guns' crews spin yarns and
skylark am'ong themselves. Later in the day come more determined attacks ; the danger
zone is getting nearer, a few hits are registered by the enemy and the now famous Ohio gets
one but, led by her gallant captain, the crew manage to get its resulting fire under control.
We see somebody else has also great difficulty in keeping in position, but now it is everybody
for themselves, keep up or stay out of the way. Looking round the convoy one would
think it was the usual thing for these ships of the Merchant Navy to keep going with a fire
raging and a lump out of the hull ; faith and stickability seem to get them along. After
another fairly long attack we find an opportunity to have our supper, knowing that to-night
is to be an all-night sitting.
Men are chatting and putting the empties below so that there are as few obstacles as
possible to fall over in the dark. I am ruminating in the 0 . 0 . Q . ' ~caboose by the guns
when there is a dull thud, a shiver, a little spray, then a loud boom. I feel the ship go
over and realize what has happened ; yell out "Everyone to starboard ; " then, as I step
out of the caboose, a solid wall of water lands on the Cinch gun deck through which I
struggle to the starboard side, thinking meanwhile that the ship has plunged straight to
the bottom. The list of the ship seems great but is not. Gasping for breath, a bit shaken,
drenched with oil and water, I reach the crowd on the starboard side feeling a bit helpless
and useless. The ship has steadied now. Destroyers whirr round us dropping depth
charges. We observe that we are not the only ones, for another of the escort and one of
the convoy has also caught whatever it was ; a destroyer fires a few bursts with her 20-mm.
gun ; but it is apparently at one of our carley rafts blown off by the explosion ; they thought
it was a " sub" surfacing. Somebody gives an order to blow up lifebelts ; I find that
mine is in the caboose, go for it and one of the gun's crew asks me if we shall take our
boots off if we have to abandon ship. Something must be done ; so I get people busy
FAST SHIPS.
:$
41
freeing the rafts and floats ; the tension eases, everybody offers everybody else cigarettes ;
I take one, but with the water dripping from me it gets wet and tastes like old rope. Then
the warning comes through : " Enemy aircraft approaching ; " the order is given to man
the guns and stand by to open fire in local control, O.O.Q. directing ; the guns are manned
and ready before the O.O.Q. can reach a perch where he can view the sky. Nothing
happens ; we relax and prepare to try to trim ship, moving ammunition from port to
starboard and putting some overboard ; I even find time to consider my appearance now ;
three days' growth of beard, a white suit wet and oily, hair hanging over my brow enough
to frighten the enemy but not very comfortable.
Then a destroyer comes alongside for the admiral ; he and his staff, one or two wounded
and the ship's dog board her, and a spontaneous cheer is given as our well-liked admiral
leaves us to carry on the 'ob on which our minds had been set for so long. A few remarks
such as '' Carry on to dalta," "Good luck, Sir," and " Keep 'em going," then another
cheer, the destroyer leaves our side and the admiral says something to the effect of getting
our ship safely to port.
And so, realizing the truth of this, and knowing our nerve centre has gone and that
our value is now negative rather than positive, we set to and do what we can. The engineroom department and the damage control parties have done their work well, and soon we
set off with an escort on the long sad trek in the wrong direction, with only the consolation
that the convoy still goes on. Pensive and disappointed, we finally reach harbour safely ;
our sister ship has made it and eventually returns minus her grecian beauty. We feel
pleased with the result, but angry that our friendly enemy has beaten the flagship, for
as usual there has always existed a rivalry between us.
GUNS.
FAST SHIPS.
9
I
/
J
THE most pressing problem of the day is the speed of merchant ships. For therein lies
the solution of the successful war against U-boats.
The First Lord has been quoted as saying that single-screw standard ships of 10,000
tons deadweight and speed of 11 to 12 knots are the most economica1.l I wonder if the
First Lord would take the same view if he had conducted one or two convoys across the
Atlantic at an average speed of five knots; which perforce includes many hours when no
headway is made at all and every inducement is allowed the prowling U-boat to get into
position to attack. Speed is the greatest antidote to the submarine, speed with gun power
means immunity except for the accident which must occasionally happen of a U-boat
finding herself at the right place and at the right distance from the target during that short
space of time that the ship is in the danger space of the torpedo.
This danger space can be easily worked out with a bit of paper and pencil and varies
from 100% for a ship stopped to vanishing point when the speed of the target
approaches the speed of the torpedo. Having decided in order to reduce your danger
angle to a negligible risk you require a speed of 17 knots ; these 17 knots we must have ;
nothing less will suffice and nothing less will defeat the U-boat. Building 8-knot ships is
suicidal, building 10- to 11-knot ships is not much better because ship designers always
appear to leave out the conditions of the average voyage.
Every convoy commodore knows the problem at the Convoy Conference and the question
put to the master of a ship with a doubtful reputation : " How fast can you really steam ? "
and the positive assurance that she will do a steady 10 knots, 11 knots at a pinch ; and
then the same commodore scanning the horizon away astern at dawn some days later
looking hopefully for a wisp of smoke denoting the laggard, his convoy already reduced
to 5 knots and his problem to zigzag and hang about and add to the risk of the whole
convoy or leave her.
But, say the ship owners, we can't afford fast ships ; they are not economical. To
that I would say in war time any ship that brings her cargo safely across is economical,
N.R.,November, 1942, p..291.
42
THE SEA SERVICES-SOME
SUGGESTIONS ON MUTUAL AID.
and a ship that can make two voyages for one with one master and one crew must be
economical in spite of the extra fuel.
Then I am told that is all very well in war, but they wouldn't pay in peace. If such an
argument had been used as regards the air, how far should we have got ? There seems little
hope of any air liner or transport plane ever being an economical proposition in peace, but
it won't, it is hoped, stop air passenger lines or transport planes.
And is it going to be really uneconomical ? I believe the shipowner who has the
courage to build fast tramp steamers will win. The Japanese showed it could be donetrue, with subsidy. Hall and Holt and others showed it could be done in the open market.
Anyhow I venture to suggest it must be done ; if we are going to retain the world's
carrying trade we cannot continue to dodder along at 7 or 8 knots in a competing world.
And then the last and strongest objection for the present critical situation. I t takes
longer to build a fast ship ; they cannot be mass-produced. They can be, they must be,
if we allow there is no other equally positive answer to the menace of the U-boat.
Much valuable time has been lost. If the Government had really believed (as is so
constantly stated in the Press now) that the sea affair takes preference over everything
and that the U-boat is the only weapon with which the enemy can prevent us winning, if
this had been visualized at once, who could doubt that by now we should have had fleets
of fast cargo ships, immune from the U-boat attack and not animated targets drifting
backwards and forwards across the oceans.
HUGHJ. TWEEDIE.
THE SEA SERVICES-SOME
SUGGESTIONS ON MUTUAL AID.
(1) BOATSERVICE.
(2) HOSPITALITY.
(3) PROVISIONS.
(4) GAMES.
THESE suggestions are based on observations-during the last two-and-a-half years--of
the facilities offered the Merchant Navy in our Middle East and Asian ports.
(1) BOATSERVICE. What strikes one most forcibly is the boat service, or rather lack
of it, provided for officers and men of merchant ships in ports like ,Mombasa, Aden, etc.
In these ports merchant ships are anchored some distance away from the landing jetties
and there are practically no bum-boats available. Those that are there charge extortionately, whereas every naval ship runs a frequent boat service for her ship's company.
The scheme that was operating a t Suez might well be adopted at all ports wherever
circumstances permit, i.e. a routine tug which called a t all merchant ships in the harbour
two or three times a day. Many a time have I seen men stranded ashore, where, usually,
there is no decent sleeping accommodation, and we have taken them off in our boat. This,
of course, cannot always be done, and not unnaturally this is resented, the Merchant Navy
being just as much a national Service as any other.
Again, a scheme that we used in my last ship was to get in touch wit11 all nearby
merchant vessels and give them a copy of our boat routine ; then, if they wished to use
one of the routine boats, they hoisted a previously selected flag a quarter of an hour before
the routine time. We found this was much appreciated and did not entail much extra
boatwork. Surely .all local naval authorities could arrange one of these schemes modified
as necessary, or something similar.
(2) HOSPITALITY.Also I feel far more could be done in the way of hospitality. We
always made a point of getting some of the officers of nearby merchant ships on board for
a drink and a yarn ; and, as a result, we all'made some very good friends in this way.
Apart from making friends, many interesting subjects come under discussion in the
ordinary wardroom small-talk.
(3) PROVISIONS.Several times the wardroom mess ran out of cigarettes and wines.
On such occasions we always found the merchant ships very willing and helpful in making
I
AXE GRINDING.
43
up our stocks. And if the boot was on the other foot, we tried to be equally helpful.
This again could be more commonly done. Moreover, mutual help can also be arranged
with such supplies as meat and potatoes.
(4) My last point-GAMES FACILITIES. Every naval ship has a dread of being based
where there is a lack of sports grounds. How many games' secretaries think of arranging
games with merchant ships in company ? Or, if they don't want to play them, offering
them the loan of sports gear, sports gear being an item that most merchant ships lack ?
One may find that many merchant ships are unable to get enough men for a team ; but
why not organize combined teams from two or more ships ? If numbers are still a problem
for field games, try water polo.
I hope these notes will prove an incentive to my brother officers to go still further in
striving for mutual assistance between the two sea-going Services. This will help to
cultivate a spirit that is even yet sometimes lacking. This spirit needs acquiring in large
measure so as to ensure that any unpleasant feeling between the two Services-so unnecessary and so ridiculous-may, once and for all, be dispelled.
BUCK.
AXE GRINDING
I.
I
'
'
ii
INFORMATION.
I HOPE that not too many readers will say to themselves : "Another of these wretched
articles skipping from twig to twig," because to me the many recent articles under this
category have been the best value in THE NAVALREVIEW. I like to read other people's
various comments, grievances and ideas.
This war is providing many types of warfare for the Navy, and many of them are in
water-tight compartments, so to speak. The Western Approaches convoy escort work, the
East Coast convoys, the Mediterranean Fleet fighting, the Combined Operations and
various others provide very different types of warfare and hardly impinge on the rest of
the Navy. Each must produce incidents, problems and lessons which are of interest to
the whole Navy, as one cannot expect to remain in one's own "box" for ever ; and yet
it is remarkable how little one can learn of the other fellow's fighting and problems.
Unless one meets friends who have recently left other theatres, or one can send an
uncensored letter with official mail, one is reduced to newspapers, the B.B.C., Admiralty
publications, and THE NAVALREVIEW. Each of these is excellent in part ; Commander
Kimmins, for instance, has been of real value to me ; an Admiralty publication sometimes
has good articles by " chaps who have been there ;" but there are lots of campaigns and
operations which only provide figures ; what I may call the personal side ; and the various
problems and lessons are seldom touched on. THE NAVALREVIEWhas helped to fill the
gap, but, like the Press, it suffers badly from secrecy requirements.
I think we need another more informal magazine or publication with contributions
designed for the average naval officer from all commands and stations that have anything
to say :l the Western Approach News Bulletin (for those who have met it) somewhat approaches what I would like, but on a world-wide scale. First of all : proper and complete
accounts of all actions and operations ; secondly : notes or comments bearing on these,
from all branches ; thirdly : ideas.
Officers with ideas are supposed to submit them " through the usual channels." Some
ideas are too abstract or nebulous for this, and surely those,that are submitted would be
all the better for ventilation and piscussion unless secret. Again, many of those " turned
down " would be of interest if only to save someone else wasting his time. To take an
example : in my last ship an idea forwarded by one of the officers was one for using large
numbers of rubber bladders with air flasks (like R.A.F. dinghys) to be stowed in the holds
of merchant ships above or alongside cargo, to give additional buoyancy in " touch and
As the writer is serving abroad he would not have seen "A Plea for an Official ' Review ' " in the
August, 1942, NAVALREVIEW,when writing this article.-HON. EDITOR.
44
v
AXE GRINDING.
go " cases after damage. I t was turned down, mainly on account of rubber shortage,
but it seems to me an idea that would be of interest and might lead to other ideas. This
really leads me on to my second point, which I will call :
-
11. GETTING THINGS DONE.
Recently I lent my NAVALREVIEWto a friend of mine, suggesting that one of the
articles was on a subject on which I knew he held strong views and that he ought to write
REVIEW
his ideas. His reply was approximately : " What good will it do ? THENAVAL
is very interesting ; but it's read by very few, and anyhow it never does anything ;
nothing comes of any of those bright ideas." After contradicting him I turned to the
printed " Object " of THENAVAL
REVIEW,
the essential parts of which are : " to encourage
thought and discussion . . . to build up that body of sound doctrine which is so essential
to success in war." A cynic would say that unguided thought and discussion are more
likely to build up differences of doctrine. New thoughts and ideas are formulated ; but
it is difficult to tell whether they are accepted or not, and by how many. And if they are
accepted by the majority of the readers of THE NAVALREVIEWdoes this influence the
Service as a whole ?
Let me take a concrete case. A recent article on training midshipmen may have
influenced a few commanding officers or snotties' nurses to revise their training systems.
But it seems to me the Admiralty or official scheme will not be affected unless the Admiralty
Department concerned is manned by members of THENAVAL
REVIEW(and probably not
then). If this bright idea was generally " put up " to the whole Navy, a general opinion of
acceptance might, I suppose, affect the official view, in time anyhow. Unfortunately a
fairly low percentage of naval officers reads THENAVAL
REVIEW. It could be subsidized
and issued by the Admiralty, but I imagine most members would dislike this. The remedy
seems to be therefore in a publication such as I suggested in my first part.
It must not be thought that I should like to see us ruled by half-baked ideas ; but,
after all, the Admiralty or higher ranks cannot claim to have a monopoly of ideas in our
many domestic problems ; and where these are " submitted through the usual channels "
or confined to THENAVAL
REVIEWthere is no chance for public opinion to make itself felt.
Having got this off my chest, I can now pass to three subjects where I have more
practical suggestions and comments, secure in the thought that my most insane wanderings
will not disturb anyone unduly.
111.
AIR MINDEDNESS.
I agree very much with the sense of a recent contribution that a large number of naval
officers view air power and air warfare with disfavour, and know little about it and take
little trouble to learn or to bring about real liaison with the R.A.F.l Furthermore, due to
our own shortage of officers, very few naval officers can be spared to go into the Fleet Air
Arm. In the old days many friends and shipmates were in the F.A.A. or had been ; and
this helped us to keep touch.
Surely something must be done about this, for hardly anyone can deny that our future
is going to be very closely bound up with the air. Could not an air course be added to the
junior officers' short courses or be substituted for one of them, and could it not be given
also to more senior officers awaiting appointment or who could be spared ? If material
and personnel to staff a course cannot be spared, attachments to a F.A.A. station, a Coastal
Command station and a Fighter Command station would go a long way. Events in the
Pacific and Mediterranean must be taken to heart if we are to make good, and yet a large
part of the Navy is hopelessly ignorant about air power.
I should also like to support another contributor's plea for making aircraft " transporter
hips."^ Nearly all our failures have been largely due to a lack of aircraft, mainly fighters,
at the critical point. Fighters seem to be the least mobile, strategically, of all arms ; and
it does not appear as if much is being done about it. Aircqaft carriers proper-that is
aircraft operating ships-take a long time to build, and a large number of skllled personnel
Presumably the author is referring to " The Foundation of a Balanced Fleet " in the February,
1942, N.R.-Hox. EDITOR.
~ , N.R.
'"Attack is the Best Form of Defence " ; ~ k b r u a r 1942,
AXE GRINDING.
45
to operate. We must have simple, economical aircraft transporters as quickly as possible,
and the conversion of large liners would seem to be a practical move. The First Lord has
told us of the tremendous drain on our resources and the enormous effort needed to keep
Malta supplied with fighters using carriers as mere transporters. It is obviously
uneconomical ; and the lessons of Norway, Greece, Crete, Singapore, and Burma all
emphasize the urgency of the problem of fighter transport.
IV.
!
I
TRAINING.
I think most officers at sea in home waters feel very strongly on this point ; but, having
recently visited some of our training establishments at work, I think perhaps they are not
doing so badly with the material and time available. However, the idea that you must
produce a certain number of men for a certain rating out of a given quota seems to me a
wrong idea. If an A.A.3 quite unfitted for his job joins your ship he goes automatically
as a key rating at an H.A. gun, and will probably have to be taken away again in a month
or two and another man more suitable trained in his place.
It would therefore have been preferable to have received an A.B. untrained ; then
you know where you are. The same applies in some degree to petty officers and leading
seamen. I think a quota, whatever the material, is a bad system.
I suggest also that leading seamen and petty officers advanced on the temporary basis
should have something to indicate this (? a T under the badge), and again that the large
number of queer, non-executive petty officers that one meets nowadays should be more
clearly distinguished from those who can take charge properly-that is seaman P.0.s. In
a mob of naval ratings, in a draft in a train or trooper, it would be of use for the officers
to know who can be expected to take charge.
In a more general way I think I have noticed one curious thing. Junior officers in
general are very reluctant to appear keen. Exercises at sea or in harbour, special courses
or voluntary instruction, are usually lobked on as a " frightful bore." And it is not only
confined to the junior officers. I suppose it is an English characteristic, and possibly
saves us from being Nazis ; but it hinders efficiency. H.O. ratings, on the other hand, in
spite of their appearance, usually seem keen to learn when given a chance out of hours
or at other times.
Incidentally, about appearance : Once we used to be the smartest Service ashore off
duty : now, in saluting, rig and appearance, it seems to me we are the least smart. Caps
are more often " flat aback " than not, suits are dirty and uptidy, and saluting is very
poor. Junior officers set a wretched example ; they are untidy and seem ashamed to
salute. Sub-lieutenants R.N.V.R. are apparently taught not to salute any officer below
the rank of lieutenant-commander. I think these points are important and worth our
attention.
I
V.
I
SPECIALISTS AND HARD WORK.
I wonder if it is generally realized how far the present system of specialization of
officers has taken us. From my own term of fifty that left Dartmouth, there are only six
non-specialists. It follows that a large proportion are serving ashore in schools and suchlike, wherd I admit they are doing a splendid job with no hope of honour or glory ; but it
seems to me we miss these chaps at sea badly, particularly in command of destroyers and
small ships.
Surely it is harder to train an efficient all-round naval officer for sea than it would be
to train specialist officers, taken from the right type of men with mechanical or engineering
training. A certain number of R.N. specialists would be required, especially in schools, to
give the sea experience ; at sea I would extend the destroyer system of local specialists to
all ships. Executive officers appointed to a cruiser, for instance, would be selected and
detailed for the specialist jobs, doing a course in their particular gun, torpedo or whatnot
beforehand if necessary. Technical officers, like warrant ordnance officers, would probably
be required in greater number.
The idea is not new, but it leads to the second part of my heading-hard work. The
system suggested would require greater knowledge and more hard work from the average
46
AT THE END OF THE YEAR.
officer ; and I submit that he can easily give this. Most of us can do a lot more than we
think ; and the less we do, the less we think we can. I was amazed to read of " Geebos "
reckoning that destroyer correspondence officer was too much of a burden. I have had
lots of experience of this from all points of view, and during the war ; and I am of the
opinion that the job can be " eaten " by a normal hard-working person, and furthermore
that it is of great value to young officers. I t can easily be done in addition to the normal
watch keeping and divisional duties. The trouble is that work in the early morning and
late at night, when you can get on without interruption, is unknown to many of these
" overburdened " chaps.
There are many exceptions, of course ; but I do think that many of us hardly know
what hard work is. Ask any officer, lately in business, whether he works as hard now,
and the answer is usually " No." We have never learnt to work really hard; or if we did,
perhaps in courses, we have lost it now under the infamous specialist system where the
average officer has nearly all his work done for him. It is time we got busy.
AT THE END O F THE YEAR.
IT seems suitable and fashionable to be a little provocative while Christmas charity is
rampant in all hearts, so let us offer " Sirius " a nice glass of Eno's. Possibly he was a
shade over-thrashed as a snotty, but he really should not allow this to cloud his judgement
so much as to suggest that more A/S specialists are required. (Or, in the May edition,
that 50,0002-40,0002=30,000.) Or, indeed, more specialists of any sort. They cause
quite enough bickering as they are. If one must specialize it seems probable that (G)
does one the l e a ~ t ~ h a r m
and
, all the gabble about the dark art of navigation is nonsense.
All one really requires a specialist navigator for is to suggest the right moment to put
the wheel over in confined spaces in large ships which have a well-defined and previously
determined turning circle. Apart from that, anyone can take sights ; and an intelligent
midshipman (if not suffering from too much training) or ordinary seaman can do the
plotting.
It also seems a pity that " Seamanship " should have been so chided during the year.
It is only another name for experienced and developed common-sense, and if those who
abuse the term because they have been so frightened of it owing to their limited intelligence
would try to think it out, separated from the ballyhoo with which it and many other
subjects are surrounded, they would feel calmer and happier. As far as that goes, engineering is much the same. 98% of all practical problems on sea or land, or in the air,
really boil down to the solution of the vector diagram of forces or velocities. So call it
common-sense or mathematics if you like, but keep calm, chum, keep calm.
Audax's remarks on aircraft, etc., in " Maintenance of the Object " are essentially
sane ; quite apart from the benefit which would accrue to officers on leave were the
congestion in some of the bars of London relieved by the removal to sea, for a nice drop
of fresh air, of some of those who now waste their time in duplicating futilities.
The R.A.F. pays for sufficient advertising without getting any free from me, except
to say that both it and the Country should be grateful to the Fleet Air Arm for initiating
an interest in the compass as opposed to the local railway junction. This it did many
years ago. Unfortunately it apparently failed to instruct its sister Service in wider ideas.
Red lights are of value in these dark days of war. Yet still we have charts and books
corrected in red ink or red printing. Which seems a pity, as in the red light district, or
chart table, these corrections are often invisible.
In the loom of a new year a few more charitable, but no less disjointed, remarks may
not be out of place.
AT THE END O F THE YEAR.
47
Wars will not cease until we, in times of peace, are prepared to make sacrifices for the
common good comparable with those we make willingly, or permit to be forced upon us
without much resistance, in time of war. And this is a very wide subject capable of much
expansion, embodying the doctrine that education in the Christian ideal must lead us to
live
so that the ideal of " service " overrides the instinct of self-preservation. And by
"
service " I do not mean the travesty recommended in some commercial advertisements.
(Now that banking is to be run by the bishops let us turn over government to the professors
of history. They couldn't do worse than the business men.)
Perhaps Kipling-now, like seamanship, sometimes despised-may be allowed to
speak.
" Be well assured, though wave and wind
Have mightier blows in store,
That we who keep the watch assigned
Must stand to it the more ;
I
1
Be well assured, though in our power
Is nothing left to give
But time and place to meet the hour
And leave to strive to live,
Till these dissolve our Order holds,
Our Service binds us here.
Then, welcome Fate's discourtesy
Whereby it is made clear
How in all time of our distress
And our deliverance too,
The game is more than the player of the game,
And the ship is more than the crew ! "l
That perhaps described our Service which is " very old and very wise." But " service "
goes wider still and wider.
At first sight it seems that those who have enjoyed life most here below should be the
most reluctant to leave it, while those who have failed to find a great deal of fun in it should
be eager to embrance the delights of the next world, of which some of them seem so
confident. In practice this is not the case. Those who enjoy life most see no reason
why whatever stage of existence next awaits them should not be equally enjoyable ; and
therefore they are quite eager to embrace it if necessary. Others, confident as they may
be of future rewards, are usually most reluctant to quit the sphere where they haven't
had much of a time, but where it is obvious that some people can enjoy themselves and
therefore where it should not be impossible sometime for them to do the same ; whereas
they are reluctant to depart for the unknown which lurking suspicion suggests might be as
unsatisfactory to them as the already known. Faith, in fact, finds it difficult to overrule experience ; just as those who have had a happy childhood are better able to cope
with the realities and disappointments of later life. The young, in any case, always have
one supreme advantage. They may think and say that their elders are "bloody old fools,"
but it lies within their power to avoid becoming bloody old fools themselves. This they
may find more difficult of achievement as time goes on. ,
Which brings us to the final axiom : one of the fundamental and inescapable facts,
which helps to explain courage but in no wise diminishes our admiration for those who
display it. Life is not worth living unless it is also worth risking. I t cannot be the one
without it be the other. The more it is the one the more it is the other, and so on. To
be worth living life must be worth risking. Say it how you will.
NOBSPIL.
I
From "A Song in Storm." First published in
afterwards incorporated in " Sea Warfare."
"
The Fringes of the Fleet" (1915), which was
48
NARROWER STILL AND NARROWER.
NARROWER STILL AND NARROWER.
'
'
UNCLE"REMUS"has hooked a beauty. A fresh run gunnery jack with the black gaiter
markings still on him, unless I am mistaken. But it is a wily fish and has snagged the line
round every handy stone before finally hiding in a dark weed of prejudice ; so, though I am
a tyro at the gentle art, I feel bound to come along with a gaff to help. I hope my efforts
won't lose " Remus " his fish.
The trouble is that " Sirius " begs the question. He harks back to peace time ; he
derides archaic fancies of seamanship and the pre-war army (both as bad as using dynamite
in a trout stream) ; he mocks the purely technical branches ; he deliberately mistakes
" Remus's " meaning, and then retires behind a barrage of pseudo-scientific twaddle.
Moreover, " Sirius " passes over the main point of " Remus's " argument-that a large
proportion of specialists have to serve ashore in war-with the airy remark that he cannot
see " how this circumstance, unfortunate though it is, can be held to be a direct or even
indirect result of the present system of specialization."
Now the problem which is worrying " Remus," " Specialist " and my humble self is
just this : With so many specialists employed on shore duty during this rather important
war, how can it be arranged so that they can acquire the experience which will fit them for
brass hats and higher command ? We do not want to abolish specialists, strange though
that may seem, but to find some way of arranging things so that they will not be liable
to spend wars (when experience is more quickly gained than in peace) at desks and lose
their chances of command until they achieve (how ?) brass hats. At present both these
things undoubtedly do happen and (unless they think this is desirable) surely the system
must be at fault. " Sirius " offers no alternative solution, but I am open to conviction.
The rest of his criticism " Sirius " bases on the interpretation of the word detail.
He apparently assumes that " free of technical detail " means " without any technical
knowledge " whereas obviously, detail means, simply--detail. " Remus " never suggested
that the new Staff Officer types should be " without the first comprehension of the scientific
principles involved " ; what was suggested was that they need not know all the more
intimate technical details-a very different matter. The example of the guns failing to
fire is, of course, entirely beside the point. It would be a poor S.G.O. who could not put
up a barrage of bull until he and the ordnance officer had a look at the book. I have
noticed that is usually what happens at present. Moreover, I very much doubt if even
the present highly trained specialists find the details they are taught in the schools help
very much at sea-unless they go to old ships ; but with the aid of the book and their
knowledge of " the scientific principles involved " they soon worry out the answer. Why
can't the Staff Officer, who is not to be recruited from crCtins, do the same ? But R. C. He's
letter helps us to demolish " Sirius " here.
So, now that I have dis-entangled the line, will " Sirius " give us another run, please ?
I almost forgot my own small nibble, and I am afraid R. C. H. has run off with my
cast. Unfortunately it i s true that officers did specialize in subjects which did not particularly appeal to them because they thought it the only road to promotion. I coztld give
chapter and verse, but I do not particularly want to be lynched. I t is, of course, quite
true that they tried to choose subjects which suited their abilities-but abilities and
inclinations are not always the same thing. Sorry.
I do agree with R. C. H. about the remarkably anomalous position of C. I. N. O.'s
department. I t is marvellous that it does work so well ; but, I seem to remember a
D.I.N.O. telling me, it is kheir semi-civilian status which helps them to achieve their
excellent results.
In his third paragraph R . C. H. says of the technical specialists : " In fact technically
they are enthusiastic amateurs in the hands of their warrant officers in such matters, who
I submit are competent tradesmen, not professional technicians." This is, of course,
entirely to our purpose. I t should not be impossible to replace the present "tradesman "
warrant officers with professional technicians, either by upgrading or recruitment on the
I
ADDITIONAL ENTRY TO THE ROYAL NAVY-SOME
49
SUGGESTIONS.
lines suggested by R. C. H. Then the Staff Officers could get on with their work : which
should be administration, organization, training, and development, not crawling round
chasing earths and examining scores on breech blocks.
HUNT.
ADDITIONAL ENTRY TO THE ROYAL NAVYSOME SUGGESTIONS.
I
'I
i
I
I
THEwriter feels he must apologize for displaying perhaps too much and too avid a personal
interest in the following suggestions. However he would view his own success in passing
the examinations and in fulfilling the qualifications with no small apprehension.
It will be appreciated by even the most conservative-minded that the present flow
of officers entering the Royal Navy is inadequate. And if we are to have a post-war navy
such as " Geebos " suggests, in which he says that we will need to have established " main
fleets in those parts of the world where British or Allied interests are at stake, of sufficient
size to destroy decisively any enemy forces that may threaten those interests," then
surely it will have to be a large one. Then should not we, now we have the chance,
augment our present Dartmouth, Special, and Lower Deck entries from the vast numbers
of Reserves, of which a few will fulfil certain qualifications as regards age and service,
keenness and ability, that can be moulded without overmuch trouble into very creditable
naval officers ?
I t is fully appreciated that such entries are only possible in war time, for it is only the
war that has fitted these candidates from the Reserves with the qualifications required.
The candidates should be young officers between the ages of 20 and 23, taken from
the permanent or temporary lists of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., unmarried and without civil
employment before the war. They should be selected from those who have served a
minimum of two-and-a-half years in the Navy, two years of this amount as an officer.
The qualifications required could be divided into three groups :(a) To possess a full naval watchkeeping certificate.
(b) To have had consistent reports of keenness and ability from captains of ships
in which candidates have served.
(c) A report from the applicant's present captain stating that a satisfactory
standard has been reached in navigation and seamanship (including signals), confirmed
by examination if necessary.
The course designed to equip the successful candidates who have fulfilled the above
requirements should be the courses for the rank of lieutenant undergone by acting sublieutenants R.N., but to include the two terms at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich,
which the writer believes has been suspended in the case of officers of the R.N. Seniority
for the rank of lieutenant R.N. to count from the date of twentieth birthday and to depend
on the normal award of first, second and third class certificates.
The knowledge to many young Reserve officers that they may be allowed a chance of
obtaining a permanent commission in the Royal Navy will, I am sure, give them just the
right incentive calculated to produce the successful candidate. The number of entries
allowed in each year would be a problem for their Lordships, and does not come within
the scope of these suggestions.
The object of the above proposals is to set down a skeleton upon which an additional
entry could be achieved, and it is fully realized that not all questions have been answered
or all proposals made. But suffice it to say that the success of such a venture would
depend on whether we are going to have another Axe of 1921 or whether we are going to
be strong in peace as well as in war. Though there may be many who object to the noise
of gunnery officers and their guns, will any deny the satisfaction that would be felt if the
Excellent's motto " SI VIS PACEM PARA BELLUM " were thundered abroad with equal effect ?
C
T
50
REFITS
:A
SUGGESTION.
REFITS : A SUGGESTION.
WHEREVER
two or three naval officers are gathered together sooner or later they start
talking shop, and, sooner or later, the shop talk drifts round to refits and the men who do
the refitting. The tone of the discussion is usually one of admiring resentment, of envious
bewilderment, as they tell highly slanderous stories of their experiences in different yards.
The discussion is, of course, always most vigorous when it starts in the wardroom of a
ship refitting. A chance question, " How are the defects going ? " to a harrassed " Chief "
or first lieutenant as he comes in the first day is enough. He answers, invariably, that so
far there's damn all being done ; people have been to look at some of the jobs and
quite a lot has been promised ; but he ends gloomily with the prediction that it'll be a
hell of a rush.
Then everyone joins in. Someone remarks on the curious habit of defect lists which,
though they have to be sent in weeks in advance, never reach the departments concerned
until half-way through the refit. Someone else mentions the other peculiar dockyard
habit that, however long the refit is, nothing is ever finished until the last moment ; yet
if the time really has to be cut down they still, somehow, usually manage to finish.
After that the discussion becomes more detailed ; scraps and tid-bits of information
float around ; how a foreman in one yard can work wonders, if he feels like it and you
happen to have a few foreign stamps ; how the shipwrights are always " waiting for a
driller " in another ; how some minor base is poor on wiring but good a t getting stores ;
how another can be persuaded to do big jobs if the defect list makes them look small.
Endless little items of local knowledge, tricks of the trade, shifts and dodges which help
t o achieve the hoped for " good refit."
There are stories, too. Such as the washbasin in the wardroom bathroom of the
Expedient, which shall serve as an example of many. The first lieutenant is speaking :" I came up one morning to have my bath and found a dockyard matey sitting on the
side of the bath. I asked him what he was doing. He told me he'd come to fit the new
wash-basin, but couldn't do anything until the labourers brought it along. I gave up the
idea of the bath, thought ' they'll finish by tea time and I'll have one then,' and left him
to it. Towards the end of the forenoon I looked in to see if they'd finished. The new
basin had arrived; but the old man was still sitting on the side of the bath, and using it
as an ash tray. I asked what he was waiting for, and he told me he had done all he could
for the time being. He was a plumber, he was, and he couldn't do no more without a
joiner came along. So I rang up the foreman and told him the trouble. He promised
he'd send a joiner directly after dinner. I didn't have time to look in the bathroom again
during the afternoon, but when'I went along after tea I found there was no hope of a bath.
Both basins were on the deck, there were two sets of tools on the corner, and the bath was
full of crumbs and cigarette ends. I had my bath ashore.
" Next day I looked in about ten o'clock and found two men sitting on the side of the
bath. They couldn't do any more until a ship-fitter came along. So I rang up again
and, after lunch, the ship-fitter appeared. When I looked in after tea they seemed to
have made quite good progress, so I was rather surprised the next forenoon to find all
three men sitting on the bath, and nothing further done. The new basin was an inch
higher at the back and two new holes in the bulkhead were needed. So they couldn't
do nothing till a driller came along. That they couldn't.
" Well, there were about half-a-dozen drillers working in different places round the
ship, so I went to get one of them on the job. But that was quite impossible unless the
Inspector would give the order, and the Inspector couldn't be found. I tried all kinds of
persuasion on the drillers, I tried telephoning all over the yard ; but I could get no driller.
That night, after the dockyard had packed up, the E.A. drilled the two holes. I t took
him less than two minutes.
" Next morning, this was the fourth day of the job and a Saturday, I looked into the
bathroom about eleven thirty. There was no one there, tools, old basin, even the rubbish
in the bath, had gone. The new basin looked lovely. I stood there admiring it. Then
the driller arrived, There was a devil of a row."
SENIORITY.
51
I said, at the beginning, that the conversation was highly slanderous in these occasions,
but the examples I have given, though fiction, are typical enough. There must be SOME
reason for their trend. After all, naval officers are usually quick enough to give credit
where it is due, so why do they always complain about dockyards ? Is it because they
are jealous of the dockyardies' high pay without responsibility ? Is it because they hate
having men around them who are not under their orders ? (Both these reasons have been
suggested to me by dockyard officers.) Is it because, knowing how slackness or inefficiency
on their part is punished, they hate to see other people get away with it ? Or is it simply
that, as ship's officers, they hate not to have their ship in as fine a state as possible ?
Probably there is just a touch of jealousy or envy in the naval officer's attitude to the
dockyard matey, but most of his indignation is quite genuinely due to annoyance a t sheer
inefficiency and anger that, because of it, he is often forced to go to sea ill-equipped. Most
naval officers could tell stories like the one of the wash-basin, which show that the lack of
co-ordination, in even a single main dockyard department, is really appalling, and if that
is not inefficiency I don't know what is.
I have in front of me the " Who Does What " diagram of a dockyard, and from it I
see the following facts. To fit a set of torpedo tubes requires co-operation between three
main departments and between four sub-departments in one of them ; a mast requires
the attention of three departments ; a voice-pipe may be the job of one or two ; electrical
work may require a second department ; and many other similar things. All these
divisions of responsibility are obviously necessary, but they do lead to lost working time
and delays owing, I suspect, to lack of any proper co-ordinating staff in the yard. There
appears to be no one whose job it is to see that the refit as a whole is going on smoothly,
to see that the Engineering Department is not waiting for the shipwrights at the propellers
while the shipwrights (or ship-fitters) wait for the engine-fitters by the capstan. In theory
I know such a man should be unnecessary, but I can only assert that he is very necessary.
In practice the job is done by the ship's officers who, although they do their best, are not
always adepts at it and who, in war time anyway, have plenty of other things to do in
the way of training and paper work, as well as taking a little well-earned leave.
What is wanted, in fact, is a " Co-ordinator " in each ship refitting ; possibly, with
very small ships, he might manage two or even three, or in very large ships he might need
an assistant or assistants. His role would be liaison between the ship and the yard and
between the departments in the yard. He should have direct access to the captain of the
ship, the heads of Dockyard Departments and the Admiral Superintendent, but tact
would be his best weapon. The ideal man would need to have been at sea, for one of his
duties would be to satisfy the insatiable ship's officers ; he would have to understand
dockyard procedure, for he must be adept in circumnavigating its pitfalls ; he would have
to know the capacities and commitments of his dockyard, so that he could get the best
out of it. I believe he would save the country his salary by saving man-hours of dockyard time. I believe he could help ships to get ready for sea more quickly, more
contentedly and better equipped.
HUNT.
SENIORITY.
WIIILEsheltering under the cloak of anonymity I would like to discuss the question of the
seniority of younger officers. I have found the psuedonym under which I normally write
too easily
Of late, in an effort to bring us in line with our opposite numbers in the R.A.F. and
Army, the Treasury have increased the pay of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants : a reform
long overdue and very welcome. But the length of time required to reach the rank of
lieutenant-commander remains the same.
In times of peace, an average of one year as a sub-lieutenant, followed by eight long
years as a lieutenant,?brought the young officer his half-stripe at about thirty-one. It
was possible, with full house ones, to do it in just under thirty ; but the average was
about thirty-one.
52
'
SALUTING.
So far, so good ; the opportunities for experience at sea, in all conditions, were then
so few that this time was probably necessary to get the grounding required to carry
adequately the half stripe.
But surely the situation changes considerably in war. I argued throughout the course
of a recent evening on the respective value of a year's sea service in war compared with a
similar period in peace. Some said this, some said that ; but the general run of opinion
was that a year in war was worth at least three in peace. In order that no accusation of
exaggeration should be brought up, let us call it two to one.
How then can this very long period of waiting for the half stripe be shortened ? If
immediate action had been taken a t the beginning of the struggle the matter would have
been simply solved. " Time " would have been valued in the above proportion, with the
result that a sub. who obtained his second stripe on the first of January, 1940, would now
have six years' seniority : and would get his half stripe on the first of January, 1944. But
it is too late now and the difficulties of producing a similar scheme as this stage many.
The result would have been, however, that we should have been able to keep pace, in
age, with our equivalent ranks in the other two Services.
At present, the only possibly way of gaining advancement is by the scheme of additional
seniority for " Meritorious war service " ; a scheme which has many drawbacks owing to
the unjustness with which it operates. I speak without jealousy as I recently got a good
whack myself and have no personal complaint.
The scheme depends on senior officers (a) reading their A.F.O.'s and (b) making
out the required reports for the individuals who come to their notice ; but many captains,
especially those in administrative positions like Captain " D " and Captain " S " have
little time or inclination for the effort. Compulsory reports on all officers eligible would
have been a more fair method instead of relying on remembering the right man at the
right time.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Examine the lists of those who have been
awarded additional seniority ; and one finds, together with a few deserving cases, a mass
of paymaster officers, many of whom have tasted but little briny since the start of the
war. Some of these latter will admit, too, that they owe their success chiefly to the fact
that they typed out the letter and placed it in their captain's desk for signature.
Possibly I err on the side of imagination, but I paint a popular picture.
The fact that some universal improvement in the rate of promotion is required is also
shown by the seniority at which lieutenants are now getting commands-with four years
in for destroyers and two years submarines. These officers do the same job as lieutenant-commanders, but they are not recognized as such.
I regret that I can produce no ready answer to the problem. Grant of acting rank is
not a satisfactory solution, and I am inclined to think that some compromise with my
original scheme of war service counting more than peace service may help to find it.
But I feel that the problem should be solved ; otherwise we will become an " old
man " Service like the Army did between the wars.
X.
SALUTING.
WHENa law ceases to enjoy the support and approval of a good proportion of the people to
whom it applies, when the ordinary man can see no sensible reason for its continuance, then
that law is well on its way to becoming a dead letter, no matter what penalties are laid
down for its infraction. The British Statute Book teems with examples of laws which
nobody dreams of attempting to enforce. These laws have become obsolete because the
average man has decided that they do not represent contemporary opinion of what is
desirable or undesirable, or simply that the conditions which brought these laws into being
have ceased to exist.
In theory it would be a splendid thing if someone went through the laws of England
and then prepared a bill t o repeal all those which no longer made sense. But, unfortunately
for those of us who have tidy minds, there are far too many cranks about for the Govern-
SALUTING.
53
ment ever to sponsor such a step. (Imagine the outcry there would be if it were proposed
to repeal the law which makes attendance at Church on Sunday compulsory.)
I t may be discouraging to them to see so many laws they made so recently so widely
disregarded, but the alternative of repeal does not bear thinking about. I t would be far
too much like work.
Such considerations need not bother the Board of Admiralty, however. Their Lordships
make the Laws of the Navy (though not so euphoniously as Admiral Hopwood), and in
their wisdom repeal them. Sometimes quite soon afterwards. In fact it is not unusual,
due to the vagaries of the mails, for the repeal (or amendment) to precede the law (or order)
to which it applies ; but the well-trained seagoing bureaucrat can take things like that in
his stride. The object of this disquisition is to call attention to one of the King's Regulations which urgently calls for repeal. I am referring to the regulations governing the
personal salutes to be made to officers on shore, and I am suggesting that the moment
has come to bring saluting de jure into line with saluting de facto.
Uniforms cover the streets of our towns as thick as leaves in Vallambrosa. Perhaps
one in every six or seven is an officer of one of our Services, or of one of the Services of
one of our allies. I t is ridiculous to suppose that any appreciable amount of saluting goes
on between different Services or between different nationalities. Our seamen do not salute
Army secondlieutenants, even English ones. Soldiers do not salute lieutenant-commanders
although guardsmen often do. No doubt if you wear golden oakleaves round your hat
YOU get saluted a good deal more. For an admiral a shopping expedition down Piccadilly
must be sheer misery. But the ordinary junior officer is in the uncomfortable position of
knowing that he ought to be saluted while at the same time feeling pretty certain that
he will not be.
I suppose it would be possible to stop every man who did not salute, but it would cause
a good deal of ill feeling. Occasionally I do speak to a particularly flagrant offender.
I received the answer once that he didn't think I could be an officer as my stripes only
came half way round my sleeves. Generally speaking I think it will be agreed that the
law has fallen into disrepute.
In a certain shore establishment to which my ship was recently attached, I had to walk
about two hundred yards to reach the wardroom from the jetty. In that space I would
often have to return as many as twenty or thirty salutes, most of them given by total
strangers, some from my own crew. The place was an absolute hotbed of respect. A sailor
who came up from the boat to collect a stand easy " cuppo " or to arrange not to be drafted
abroad, or to join up with the queue outside the dentist's studio for an hour or so of gossip
with his friends, would find his arm was never still. The thing was a farce.
But moving along the coast, I presently joined a flotilla which had a floating depot ship.
There, as I walked about the ship, I still met members of my crew avoiding work in the
time-honoured way by wandering about the maze of offices and stores and establishing
alibis for themselves. But there was a difference ; none of them saluted me. And yet as
far as I could see discipline was not seriously undermined.
I seem to remember that even in big ships a satisfactory state of discipline can be
preserved without the necessity for the men saluting every officer that passes. Nobody
would suggest that the men are being disrespectful or ill-mannered onboard. Where
therefore is the necessity for these marks of respect on shore ?
I suspect that the truth of the matter is that the Army insist on it, and have requested
the Navy to conform. I doubt if it is a very old naval custom. Nelson's men certainly
would not have saluted an officer on shore, unless they particularly wanted to greet him.
Anyway, there was no recognized form of salute then.
The Navy, for all its reputation for conservatism, has often led the way in ref0rm.l
Here is an opportunity for the Admiralty to make a very popular gesture, popular with
all the men and with the vast majority of officers, by amending the orders on the subject
of personal salutes. The incessant saluting which the present orders make necesary
serves no good purpose, has no roots in the Navy, and is a confounded nuisance to
everybody.
W.
1 The Dartmouth scholarships t o boys from state-aided schools are a case in point.
interesting to hear how the scheme is working out.
It would be
A SUB-MARINER
REMEMBERS.
BATTLEDRESS.
" W's " article, " Dress Reform," voices the desires of many of us ; but the difficulty I
find in writing to support him is that I can think of no logical objection to battledress,
and so have nothing to argue against.
For comfort, convenience, economy, and even appearance it is incomparably better
than the normal sea rig worn in small ships and, I strongly suspect, compares favourably
with the sea rig worn by many officers in larger craft too.
On the grounds of comfort, anyone who has slept in his clothes for a week or so will
agree that battledress, while a somewhat scratchy substitute for pyjamas, is a great deal
better than a uniform suit. On the score of convenience, the pockets are good and can
hold, without discomfort, notebook, pencils, knife, cigarettes, matches, chocolate, flask,
morphia, first-aid dressings, money and torch-which are all most valuable to anyone who
finds himself bereft of everything but what he stands up in. Moreover, the pockets do
not let things fall out and they don't catch on every projection and tear. With a comfortably full blouse warm clothing and lifebelt can be worn underneath, which again saves
loose ends to catch on things. As to economy, there is no doubt at all. A uniform suit,
even of serge and from a multiple tailor, costs at least ten guineas. If worn at sea at all
it very soon becomes unfit for wear anywhere else, and not much later it ceases to look
anything like respectable. But a battledress costs less than four pounds, it requires no
brass buttons and very little gold lace ; it can be worn day and night ; it can, when
necessary, be bathed in and then it can be washed and ironed and look quite respectable
again. And for all this it costs little more than a third of a cheap uniform suit.
The appearance of battledress is probably the biggest hate most people have against it.
I admit Nelson would not have worn it, but I have yet to see anyone in these days going
into action in full dress either. Properly worn battledress is a tidy workman-like rig, much
better to look at than a torn, stained and patched cloth suit. I t is not, and never should
be, what the Army call a walking-out dress. I t should be worn, as tropical rig used to be,
a t sea and in outports, for work and for work only.
I am not writing as a theorist but as a practicing wearer. I have worn battledress, at
sea only, for the past seven months, and the points I have tried to make are the results
of experience.
One hint for those who would wear battledress if their figures were more youthful:
wear a kapok waistcoat under the blouse.
HUNT.
A SUB-MARINER REMEMBERS.
IV. TRAINING.
"To paraphrase Mr. Walter Page," observed Eeyore Smith, "there are three types of
article in THE NAVALREVIEW,and two of them are about the training of midshipmen.
I t seems that this is the one subject that everyone feels fully qualified to criticize ; and
why not ?
"At some time in every naval officer's career he becomes conscious of his shortcomings ;
and then, after indulging in a spot of deep and painful thinking, he comes to the conclusion
that he was badly trained in his youth. Satisfied with this explanation, he takes his pen
and writes quickly an article on how he should have been trained. Mind you, it isn't
only the naval officer who gets bitten this way. Many an author has made a fat living
by conscientious abuse of all who had the unprofitable task of educating him ; he starts
on his parents and works his way through his schooling and university periods until,
reaching his maturity, he starts in to tell off his country and probably becomes an M.P.
" Since, therefore, my dear Baxter, there is such ample precedence and half-an-hour
before the bar opens, I propose to take you through the early stages of my career ; one,
I may say, that started more brilliantly than it is ending. I t must, of course, be someone
else's fault that I am destined to remain with two-and-a-half stripes for ever, whilst
youngsters who were still in long clothes when I joined the Service are now flaunting four.
A
SUB-MARINER REMEMBERS.
55
" I t must indeed have been in the system of training, though it is difficult to reconcile
this with the number of successful officers upon whom it had no ill effects ; but then,
I suspect they all had influence or private means. Now I come to think of it, I too had
a small amount of ' push ' ; my uncle-not the one in the Inebriates' Home ; the other,
the M.P.-promised to look after my career. Perhaps he did. As for private means,
Aunt Fanny dropped me a few thou' but it ran out-the cost of living being what it wasand left me with an expensive thirst that has prevented me from leaving the sea, so that
I must forever remain afloat or else go dry in another sense.
" I started my boarding-school education at a small and old-fashioned establishment
where I acquired much merit and was considered a good and clever boy.
" I made a good impression a t the Interview, my health was excellent and I passed
into Osborne with an asterisk, which denoted I was honourably mentioned. That was
my first mistake, and I was soon made to understand that I was neither good nor clever
unless I exhibited a proper prowess in the art of chasing balls of various sizes according
to the season of the year.
This impression, forcibly applied, was confirmed when a Distinguished Old Gent.
visited the establishment to distribute prizes. He was a very fine-looking man,
and his port bosom was a blaze of colourful ribbons ; rather more than the
veteran of two major struggles would hope reasonably to accumulate. He gave
the prizes and then made a speech. Of course, he said, it was a good thing to
win prizes, but the others who were not so lucky must not despair. He, personally, had
never been other than bottom of his term, and look at him now. I did. I thought it
good to imitate him, and sank from my august position at the top of the term to a less
conspicuous position where my talent was suitably concealed. Alas ! early training will
have its way, andto my horror on passing out I found1 had won thescriptureprize. What
further annoyed me was the way the chief cadet captain went round the term at the prizegiving and warned them not to laugh when the prize was awarded.
" My time as midshipman was singularly unexciting. I was not bullied, flogged,
mastheaded or otherwise maltreated. I was given rather more responsibility than a youth
of 17 was fit to bear, but I and those in my care survived, and somehow or other I passed
over to the rank of acting sub., with little to be ashamed of except that I had obtained a
first class in seamanship and was for that reason suspect amongst those who viewed that
sort of thing as being vulgar ostentation.
Short courses at that time were interesting experiences. First we went to Cambridge,
where for six months, clad in cap and gown, we underwent studies calculated to broaden
the mind. Whether we succeeded in acquiring the necessary breadth of vision is a moot
point ; but there is no doubt a t all that we widened considerably the outlook of dons,
proctors and bulldogs. We also did the rowing fraternity a bit of good in the manner
of our training, and we were not shortcoming in the matter of football. I t was an
interesting experience to don the soiled garments of academic youth and to clatter into
Hall to sit cheek by jowl with denizens of the African jungle, to go to breakfast with the
Master and to yam to undergraduates until their eyes began to pop.
" I was still misguided enough to go for things intellectual, and actually established
a record by joining the college chess club ; my play, however, was too unorthodox, and the
captain of the club, after a trial game, folded his board and silently stole away.
" I t was the award of a first class that startled me into the realization that I was not
following the precept of the D.O.G. ; and so, on my arrival at Whale Island, I determined
that first things should come first and I concentrated entirely on the fascinating pastime
of frivolling with the young ladies of Southsea, returning to the Establishment with but
after the milk, falling asleep in lecture rooms after mid-day meals washed down with
strong drink, and generally avoiding the acquisition of knowledge about those weapons
against which I held a grudge on account of the noisiness of the specialist officers.
" The curriculum at Whale Island was pretty thorough ; those who had ears to hear
were defenceless against it, and I fear that I assimilated more knowledge than had been
my intention. After the examinations I was sent for by the instructing officer and went
along expecting to receive a reprimand for failing to pass ; instead I was told that I had
obtained a second class and that owing to the low standard of the class as a whole I would
56
A SUB-MARINER REMEMBERS.
be awarded as many additional marks as necessary to turn it into a first ; the only one
of the section.
" What could one do ?
At that time I read of the demise of the D.O.G., whose obituary
notice, which covered many columns of ' The Times,' failed to point out that he owed it
all to having been bottom of his term. But I, who knew this from his own lips, determined
once more to make a final effort to emulate him.
"The Vernolz in those palmy days was a series of strange wooden establishments,
afloat, they said, though I doubted it, and joined together by gangways ; they were full
of the most archaic appliances which, though excellent in their hey-day, were largely
outmoded. We were told by weary instructors that a fine new establishment was being
erected ashore in which we would find modern electrics, torpedoes, and all those weapons
that the torpedo branch had inherited as its position of Official Orphanage of Unwanted
Gadgets rightly warranted. We must make do with what there was, we were told ; after
all, the principle was the thing. The drawings too, suspended from hooks from the
bulkheads, and showing in red and black lines the waywardness of electric currents, were
not all correct.
" 'If Mr. X takes you through,' said our T.G.M., 'you want to go for this one, but if it's
Mr. Y he likes this.'
"Both, I believe, were wrong. The instructors had learned their patter long since, but
occasionally one heard extraneous instruction such as this :" 'Now the circumference of this 'ere is worked out by a fing what we calls Pi ; now
Mr. X is a very clever man-he's discovered what Pi isJ-an impressive pause and then
the climax, 'Three point one four of an inch.'
"And another which we used to chant in unison : 'Wot's the dooty of the local spring ?
To give the Torpedo Hup Hellum at the end of theJ-pause for climax-'run.
Right,
drop it down 'ere.'
" Excellent fun.
Needless to say, I achieved a good first on passing out.
" Thence to the Navigation School.
Here I decided that for my own safety and those
who might have the fortune to serve with me I must learn about the means of progressing
on the High or Low Seas. I slaved away on fascinating problems such as the time of
double high water on the Beaulieu River ; apparently a very important problem, though
the information could be got in the local paper more readily than by calculation. For a
few days at a time I understood exactly which coloured end of a bar magnet to thrust
into the binnacle and how to anchor a battle fleet on a line of bearing. I t was intriguing
work ; and, though I have never since worked out the time of high water in Beaulieu (nor
anywhere else) nor have been foolhardy enough to monkey with the magnetic compass and
(so far) I have not risen to the rank when one flings battle squadrons into anchorages,
I felt that I had a good deal of the mysteries of navigation tucked away in my brain for
future use. I was awarded a shaky second class on passing out, and I felt that I was getting
the hang of the way things went. Firsts I reckoned were really thirds, and vice versa ;
a good scheme, for it must satisfy everyone. I t takes a bit of working out, but you can
see what I mean.
"After the acquisition of several months of seniority from the efforts narrated above
I went to Fort Blockhouse for a course in submarines, and took a third class by working
many hours in the dog-watches. After that I put away childish things and, through the
lean years of peace, navigated various underwater craft with no little skill and a good
deal of trepidation all over (and under) the surface of the globe.
" Bear with me a little longer, Baxter, for the bar is not yet open ; what was wrong with
my early training ? If it had to be done all over again how should it have been different ?
How was it that I, who earned so much merit in my studies, failed to reach the pinnacle
attained by the Famous Admiral who acquired none ? Was it that the times were out of
joint, that I was not fortunate in possessing suitable parents, or that my purse was not
sufficiently lined ?"
Baxter opened his eyes.
" The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in ourselves that we are underlings,"
he murmured.
The pantry hatch slid up with a click and Eeyore caught the steward's eye.
" Who are you calling Brutus ?"
he demanded. " Waiter ! two gins."-G. H.-J.
-
NAVAL DIARY OF THE WAR.
I
'
1
1
iI
1: U.S. Navy Department announced that during the previous week's action in the Solomon
Islands two Japanese aircraft carriers and three cruisers were damaged. Allied bombers in the RabaulBuin area claimed to have destroyed a cruiser and damaged another. Two enemy convoys attacked
by British light forces in the Channel, a supply ship being sunk and others damaged.
2: U.S. Navy Department announced that American submarines operating in Far East had sunk
seven enemy ships and damaged three others.
3 : British bombers and torpedo aircraft in central Mediterranean damaged an enemy destroyer and
two supply ships. Officially announced in Washington that damage inflicted on Japanese fleet off Savo,
Solomon Islands, on October 11 was heavier than previously stated. Three enemy cruisers and five
destroyers were sunk during a thirty minutes' engagement.
4: G.H.Q , Cairo, announced that Rommel's army was in full retreat, and that naval and air forces
had sunk 50,000 tons of enemy shipping carrying Axis supplies and damaged a similar amount.
5: C.-in-C. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbour, disclosed that in the Midway battle only six U.S. naval
aircraft returned out of forty-one which carried out torpedo attacks on the Japanese fleet.
6: Admiralty announced that H.M. submarines in the Mediterranean had sunk six more Axis
supply ships and damaged two others. R.A.F. bombed Genoa.
7 : U.S. Navy Department announced that one Allied merchantman had been sunk in a n Atlantic
convoy after three days of U-boat attacks. Another heavy bombing attack on Genoa. U.S. bombers
attacked dockyard and submarine pens a t Brest.
8: Announced that large forces of American troops, escorted by powerful units of the R.N. and
U.S.N., had landed a t several points on Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of French North Africa, and
that the naval base a t Algiers had surrendered. U.S. Navy Department announced that American
m.t.b.s had damaged a Japanese cruiser and two destroyers off Guadalcanal ; one of the latter was
believed to have sunk. - 9: Announced t h a t more American landings had taken place in French North Africa. Quite
substantial local resistance had been met from Vichy naval forces and coastal artillery, especial& on
the Atlantic coast. Operations were being covered in the Mediterranean by a British fleet under
Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham. Admiralty disclosed particulars of recent attacks on a big convoy
in North Atlantic by U-boats, of which H.M.C.S. Assiniboine (Lieut.-Commander J. H. Stubbs, R.C.N.)
and H.M.S. Dianthus (Lieut.-Commander C. E . Bridgman, R.N.R.) had destroyed one. A second was
attacked and probably sunk by H.M.S. Primrose (Lieut. P. E. Kitto, R.N.R.) and H.M.C.S. Chilliwack
(Lieut. L. L. Foxall, R.C.N.) ; and later a third was rammed four times and sunk by H.M.S. Dianthus.
10: Announced that Oran had been captured by American troops supported by the Royal Navy,
and that French resistance in the Mediterranean had ceased. American warships and bombers had
disabled the French battleship Jean Bart, 35,000 tons, a t Casablanca. Admiralty announced that one
of H.M. submarines in the Mediterranean (under Lieut. 5. S. Stevens, R.N.) had torpedoed a n Italian
6-inch gun cruiser.
11: Admiral Darlan ordered hostilities t o cease evervwhere in French North Africa. Admiraltv
announced that one of H.M. submarines in Mediterranean, under Lieut. J. W. D. C o m b , R.N., hah
scored two torpedo hits on an enemy force of three cruisers and three destroyers.
12: U.S. Navy Department announced that American submarines had sunk seven Japanese ships
and damaged a destroyer in the Western Pacific. German announcement that the fortified zone of
Toulon would not be occupied.
13: Recapture of Tobruk by Eighth Army. R.A.F. again attacked Genoa.
14: U.S. Navy Department reported a naval action in progress in the Solomons.
15: Admiralty announced loss of H.M. submarine Talisman, 1,090 tons; and that, since the North
African landings, thirteen U-boats had been destroyed. Genoa again raided by R.A.F.
16: U.S. Navy Department announced that in the action in the Solomons in the preceding three
days, the Japanese had lost one battleship, five cruisers, five destroyers, and twelve transports. American
losses were two cruisers and six destroyers.
17: An enemy tanker sunk by British naval aircraft off Tripolitanian coast.
20: U.S. Navy Department stated that a German submarine flotilla was operating off Gibraltar.
21: G.H.Q., Cairo, stated that a 2,000-ton enemy vessel set on fire off Tunisian coast by R.A.F.
had later been torpedoed and sunk by naval aircraft. One of H.M. submarines (Lieut. A. J. W. Pitt,
R.N.) had sunk an enemy tanker under convoy in the Aegean, and probably sank a large supply ship
as well. A submarine under Lieut. C. P. Norman, R.N., had torpedoed and sunk a n Italian destroyer ;
another destroyer was probably sunk by a submarine under Lieut. T. E. Barlow, R.N.
22 : U.S. Navy Department announced the loss of a seventh destroyer in the Guadalcanal area during
the past week. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham stated that losses a t sea in the approach stage of the
North African campaign were much lower than expected. U.S. bombers sank a destroyer and two
small craft in the Buna-Gona area, Papua.
23 : Admiral Darlan announced that French West Africa had put itself under his orders. Admiralty
announced that one of H.M. submarines under Lieut. L. W. A. Bennington, R.N., had sunk two enemy
supply ships.
58
24 : R.A.F. sank an enemy merchant vessel a t Tripoli. Allied bombers sank two Japanese destroyers
in the Buna-Gona area and damaged a third.
25 : Admiralty issued particulars of an action in the Indian Ocean fought on November 11 by H.M.
Indian minesweeper Bengal (Lieut.-Commander W. J. Wilson, R.I.N.R.) and the Dutch motor tanker
Ondina, each armed with one 4-inch gun, against the Japanese raiders K i k o k u M a r u and Kamikawn
M a r u , each mounting six 5.5-inch guns. The former raider was sunk and the latter broke off the
action.
27 : French fleet a t Toulon, under Vice-Admiral de Laborde, scuttled to avoid imminent seizure by
the Germans. Four submarines escaped, two proceeding t o Algiers, one to Oran, and the fourth being
interned a t Barcelona.
28: Admiralty announced that H.M. submarines had sunk nine enemy supply ships en route to
North Africa and damaged three more. British forces landed in the island of Rdunion, 380 miles east
of Madagascar. U.S. Navy Department disclosed that in the action off Guadalcanal on October 11-.12
the Japanese had lost four cruisers and four destroyers.
1: U.S. Navy Department announced that American submarines had sunk a Japanese destroyer,
an 8,000-ton tanker, and three cargo vessels in the Pacific, besides damaging other ships.
2: A squadron under Rear-Admiral C. H . J. Harcourt, comprising H.M. Ships Aurora (Captain
W. G. Agnew), Sirius (Captain P. W. B. Brooking), Argonaut (Captain E. W. L. Longley-Cook),
Qviberon (Commander H . W. S. Browning), and Quentin (Lieut.-Commander A. H . P. Noble) intercepted
an enemy convoy bound for Tunisia shortly after midnight. Four supply ships and two escorting
destroyers were sunk. Some hours later H.M.S. Quentin was sunk as the result of attacks by enemy
dive-bombers and torpedo aircraft.
3: Light forces under Captain A. L. Poland, R.N., sank a n Italian torpedo boat off Tunisian coast.
U.S. Navy Department announced that on November 30 an escorted convoy of Japanese transports
was intercepted by American warships. The enemy lost six destroyers, two troop transports and a
cargo vessel. One American cruiser was sunk. Admiralty disclosed that in Allied landings in North
Africa warship losses comprised H.M. Ships Broke, Martin, Avenger, Ibis, Gardenia, Hecla, Walney,
Hartland, Algerine, and T y n w a l d . Loss of the Dutch destroyer Isaac Sweers and of five U.S. transports
was also incurred in these operations.
4: U.S. aircraft bombed dockyard a t Naples, causing an Italian cruiser to capsize in harbour and
damaging other ships. Loss of corvette Montbretia, manned by the Royal Norwegian Navy, announced.
5: Vichy admitted loss of five French submarines in North African operations. Enemy destroyer
set on fire by attacks of Allied aircraft off Tunisian coast.
6 : U.S. Navy Department issued a report on Pearl Harbour disaster, giving fuller details of damage
caused to American warships. Admiralty announced loss of H.M. submarine Unique.
7 : Announced that M. Boisson, Governor-General of French West Africa, had agreed to allow Allies
free use of Dakar as a base.
8: Secretary of U.S. Navy Department suggested that according to air photographs about onefourth of the French warships scuttled a t Toulon were not seriously damaged.
9: U.S. Navy Department announced that a Japanese destroyer had been sunk and three others
set on fire in an air attack on an enemy force north-west of Guadalcanal.
11: G.H.Q., Cairo, announced that Greek submarine Papanicolis had sunk a 6.500-ton enemy supply
ship. Loss of H.M. minesweeper Cromer and Greek submarine Triton announced. Light naval forces
under 1,ieut.-Commander A. A. F. Talbot, R.N., sank an enemy supply ship and a n escort vessel off
Dieppe.
12: H.M. submarines in Mediterranean torpedoed sundry enemy supply ships, sank an enemy
schooner, and damaged two trains on the Italian coast. U.S. Navy Department announced that one
(probably two) out of a number of Japanese destroyers had been sunk off Guadalcanal. One American
m.t.b. had been lost, also the transport President Coolidge.
12: One of H.M. submarines in the Mediterranean reported to have sunk an enemy armed cruiser.
Admiralty announced loss of H .M.S. Peny la%.
16: Admiralty announced that a n enemy merchant vessel of 5,000 tons had been intercepted by
our patrols in the Atlantic. Loss of H.M. submarine Unbeaten reported.
18: U.S. Navy Department announced that American submarines in the Pacific had sunk seven
Japanese ships. Admiralty announced that H.M. submarines in the Mediterranean under Lieuts.
S. L. C. Maydon and E. J . D. Turner, R.N., had sunk three enemy supply ships ; and that one under
Lieut.-Commander E. F. Balston, R.N., had torpedoed a large Japanese tanker in the Far East.
19: Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham stated that the average Axis loss was one supply ship every
day on the Tunisian route, and that French warships a t Dakar were now escorting coastal convoys.
20: A Japanese cruiser sunk by American bombers off north-east coast of Papua.
23: Admiralty announced landing of large quantities of war material and other supplies in Malta,
in course of which operation H.M.S. Petard (Lieut.-Commander M. Thornton, R.N.) and Greek destroyer
Vasilissa Olga had destroyed a U-boat. Also announced that one of H.M. submarines had sunk two
enemy supply ships ; and that another had torpedoed a destroyer and two supply ships off Sardinia.
A small enemy vessel had been sunk by our light surface forces.
24: A Japanese destroyer sunk by Allied bombers off Salamaua, New Guinea, and a transport off
Gasmata, New Britain. Assassination of Admiral Darlan a t Algiers.
25: U.S. aircraft claimed t o have sunk a large transport a t Rabaul.
,
.
59
1
I,
26: During attacks on an Atlantic convoy, escort ships under Commander R. Heathcote, R.N., of
H.M.S. Fame, sank two U-boats and damaged others in a period of four days. Three enemy supply
ships sunk by H.M. submarines on Tunisian route.
27: Allied bombers in Solomons raided Rabaul, reducing four transports t o wrecks.
28 : Naval torpedo aircraft sank a south-bound enemy supply ship off Pantellaria.
29: Admiralty announced that one of H.M. submarines under Commander B. Bryant, R.N., had
successfully attacked three enemy supply ships in Gulf of Hammamet, two being sunk and one beached.
30: U.S. Navy Department announced that American aircraft had sunk two enemy ships in
Solomons. Heavy daylight raid on submarine base a t Lorient by American bombers, protected by
R.A.F. fighters.
31 : Admiralty announced that in a brilliant engagement on North Russia convoy route our escorting
destroyers, resolutely and skilfully led by Capt. R. St. V. Sherbrooke, R.N., repelled a greatly superior
enemy force, including a t least two heavy ships. An enemy cmiser was damaged and a destroyer sunk.
H.M.S. Achates was sunk and H.M.S. Onslow damaged. Subsequently it was announced that H.M.S.
Bramble was missing and must be considered lost. The convoy reached its destination safely, and
Capt. Sherbrooke, who lost the sight of one eye, was awarded the V.C.
JANUARY,
1943.
1 : Admiralty announced that two of H.M. submarines in Mediterranean under respective commands
of Lieut. J . H . Bromage, R.N., and Lieut. J. S. Stevens, R.N., had sunk two large enemy supply ships
in the Gulf of Tunis. Another submarine under Lieut. M. G. R. Lumby, R.N., had torpedoed and
probably sunk a destroyer escorting a large supply ship off Bizerta. Loss of H.M.S. Blean announced.
2: Admiralty announced that a 10,000-ton enemy merchant vessel attempting to run the blockade
had scuttled herself on being intercepted by our patrols. U.S. Navy Department announced that
American submarines had sunk seven more Japanese ships and damaged a destroyer.
8: Admiralty announced loss of H.M. corvette Snapdragon.
4: Admiralty announced that during North African operations H.M. trawler Lord Nuffield had
destroyed the Italian submarine E m o . Loss of H.M.S. Firedrake announced. American m.t.b.s
attacked eight Japanese destroyers off north-west Guadalcanal, while in the New Georgia group U.S.
bombers damaged two other destroyers.
5: Admiralty announced that a large German vessel attempting to run the blockade had been intercepted and sunk by H.M.S. Scylla, Captain I. A. P . Macintyre, R.N.
6: Admiralty announced destruction of a troop transport and a supply ship, and probable sinking
of two more supply ships, by H.M. submarines commanded by Lieut.-Commander L. W. Napier, R.N.,
Lieut. R. B. Lakin, R.N., Lieut. A. C. G. Mars, R.N., and Lieut. A. J. W. Pitt, R.N.
7 : Return of H.M. submarine Thrasher (Lieut. H . S. Mackenzie, R.N.) t o a British port after having
sunk enemy shipping totalling 40,000 tons.
8: Allied aircraft sank two large transports bound for Lae, New Guinea.
9 : announced that a third transport had also been sunk off New Guinea. Rome admitted loss of a
submarine.
10: Admiralty announced loss of H.M. submarine Utmost.
11: U.S. Navy Department disclosed that the aircraft carrier already stated t o have been lost off
Santa Cruz Island was the Hornet, 20,000 tons ; and that the cruisers Juneau and Atlanta, and destroyers
Cushing, W a l k e , Preston, Benham, Monssen, Laffey, and Barton had been sunk off Guadalcanal during
Kovember 13-15, and the cruiser Northampton on November 30.
13: Admiralty announced loss of H.M. corvette Marigold.
14: Heavy raid on submarine base a t Lorient by R.A.F. bombers.
15: Admiralty announced that the submarine commanded by Commander B. Bryant, R.N., had
sunk an Italian minesweeper and a supply ship ; one commanded by Lieut. H . B. Turner, R.N., had
sunk two supply ships; and one commanded by Lieut. A. C. G. Mars, R.N., had sunk a large
supply ship near Naples. Loss of H.M.S. Partridge announced. Lorient again attacked by R.A.F.
16: Canadian Pacific liner Duchess of Bedford destroyed a U-boat. In a raid by Allied bombers on
Rabaul, five Japanese ships were sunk.
18: Admiralty announced sinking of two enemy supply ships by H.M.S. N u b i a n (Commander D. E .
Holland-Martin, R.N.) and H.M.S. Pakenham (Captain E. B. K. Stevens, R.N.) in the Mediterranean.
19: U.S. Navy Department announced that American submarines in Pacific had sunk a Japanese
destroyer and four other vessels.
20 : Admiralty announced t h t in addition to operations recorded under January 18, eleven more
enemy ships had been destroyed by our light forces in Mediterranean during January 17-19. Four
British destroyers, H.M. ships Kelvin (Commander M. S. Townsend), Lightning (Commander H . G.
Walters), Javelin (Lieut.-Commander J . M. Alliston), and Loyal (Lieut.-Commander H . E . F. Tweedie),
and the Greek destroyer Vasilissa Olga took part in these successes. One of H.M. submarines, commanded by Lieut. S. L. C. Maydon, R.N., had sunk an enemy supply ship and driven two others ashore.
Light coastal forces under Lieut. P. G. C. Dickens, R.N., and Lieut. J . Weedon, R.N.V.R., had sunk a
small enemy supply ship off the Dutch coast. Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham promoted to Admiral
of the Fleet.
21: G.H.Q, Cairo, reported that an enemy supply ship had been destroyed by naval aircraft off
the Tunisian coast, and another in the Aegean Sea. Vice-Admiral Ingram, U.S.N., announced that
five enemy submarines and a surface raider had been sunk in the South Atlantic during the past month.
22: Admiralty announced that British light forces had sunk an Italian submarine off Tripoli on
January 19. Allied H.Q. announced that bombers had sunk a n enemy vessel in the Sicilian Channel.
60
28: Occupation of Tripoli by Eighth Army. Allied H.Q. reported that one of H.M. submarines in
Tyrrhenian Sea had sunk an enemy supply ship, a trawler, and a schooner. Lorient bombed by U.S.
aircraft by day and R.A.F. by night.
24: Admiralty announced loss of H.M. submarine Traveller.
26: Admiralty announced sinking of five more Axis supply ships by H.M. submarines in the Mediterranean commanded by Lieuts. I. L. M. McGeoch, S. L. C. Maydon, J. C. Y. Roxburgh, and M. L. C.
Crawford, R.N. Flushing raided by R.A.F.
26: Announced that Mr. Churchill had met President Roosevelt a t Casablanca for a conference on
offensive operations in 1943, attended also by the various Chiefs of Staff. R.A.F. again bombed Lorient.
27 : R.A.F. bombed Burmeister and Wain shipyard and engineering works a t Copenhagen. American
aircraft bombed Wilhelmshaven.
29 : Torpedo aircraft of Coastal Command sank a large enemy ship off Norwegian coast, Reported
that a concentration of sixty Japanese warships and auxiliaries had been observed off Rabaul.
30 : Grossadmiral Raeder relieved as Commander-in-Chief of German Navy by Grossadmiral Karl
D6nitz, previously in charge of submarine operations. U.S. Navy Department announced that American
submarines had sunk a Japanese destroyer, a tanker, and four other ships in the Far East.
31 : Admiralty announced loss of H . M . submarine P 222.
F. E . MCMURTRIE.
CROSSWORD PUZZLE.
HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS (IX).
NOTE.-This puzzle reaches to the landing in North Africa. An asterisk, *, after a numbef, marks
words unconnected with the subject. Vertical clues are marked by a " d." after the number.
Rev "
means that the letters are in reversed order. " Dis " that they are out of proper order. Anagrams
are not specified. Numbers in brackets a t end of clue show the number of letters in each word of the
answer. Each word, portion of a word, or complete set of words begins a t a numbered square and
ends a t a thick line.
ACROSS.
What sounds like a charming passenger arrives with favourite York
rations a t the top of Portsmouth Harbour. (7.)
" If they run, why we follow, and run them ashore." Hearts of Oak. (8.)
See 12. (8.)
A between meal snack, that becomes drinkable with age and then sounds
like a report ; or taken in front of a meadow, as in ll.rev., suggests a
Yorkshire minster. (5.)
Spenser asked it t o runsoftly till he ended his song; but it goes rolling along
right t o the mighty sea. (6.)
" Modern Athens." (9.)
Bosom friend. (7.)
Worth a mass. (5.)
What Sir Henry Wotton said a n ambassador did abroad. (3.)
One of Jason's crew. (8.)
Stretch off the land. (3.)
62
CROSSWORD PUZZLE.
As the destroyer might have said when she caftured the Chinese forts.(4.)
I n these days of combined national effort ; Hurrah for the red, black or
school " ? (3.)
Anti-scorbutic fruit. (4.)
The same the same as 80.d. (2.)
" I have set my life upon a cast,
And I will stand the . . . of the die." (6.)
The hairy aborigine of the Far East turns back to the favourite child for a
flower. (7.)
A long this should be more accurate than a long 50. (3.)
This amusing and instructive contributor is not the star dog of the show ;
quite the reverse. (6.)
Stir : a golfer ? (4.)
See clue t o 42. (1.1.)
Turn this flower back to get a pet donkey in a first-class noisy frolic. (8.)
Celtic water. (3.)
" Breathes there a man, with soul so dead,
Who never t o himself hath said,
This is my . . ., my native land." (3.)
This African territory is the reverse of first class regarding gin. (7.)
Wasn't he a lamb t o write such nice essays ? (4.)
There are other carriers to act as . . . t o this . . . . (7.)
Philomel is reported to have uttered melodious sounds in musical succession
in its quadrate plane surface. (8.)
" . . . semper aliquid noui affert."
Pliny. (6.)
Singular old seamanship manual. ($.)
" W e are the boys of the . . . breed.
(7.)
Dog in France sat all muddled in a state of debility. (8.)
" I n meed of these great conquests by them got,
Corineus had that province utmost West." Fairie Queene. (8.)
I n these black-out days Mr. Valiant-for-truth would have handed this on t o
his successor with his sword. (5.)
Bad t o follow the gunners after Charles the Second's Chancellor. (9.)
Alone I did it. (2.)
DOWN.
Some there be that have no name for a memorial, but :" Our light naval forces attacked an escorted enemy convoy and torpedoed
a tanker of medium size. Gunfire hits were scored on several of the
escorts." (5.7.)
Same clue as for the preceding. (5.7.4.)
Shall not go in the first class in Africa. (7.)
" The . . . bewrays the doleful 'A.I.',
And culls the tribute of Apollo's sigh.
Still on its bloom the mournful flower retains
The lovely blue that dyed the stripling's veins." (8.)
Oi ! You'll find the bone inside. (5.)
Scene of a little fin-de-sidcle naval war in a climate hardly benign. (5:)
If the second syllable came from Riga you naturally find her inside thls sort
of ferocious animal. (6.)
I repeat the passage in music. (4:)
Father's brother only starts but hls sister takes a full part in this display of
fearless courage. (9.)
Dunvard. (7.)
The charm of Sir Walter Scott's novels ? (8.)
It was this schooner that sailed the wintry sea. (8.)
Lord Cork met his first lieutenant in 1887-88. (5.)
Not Greenland's icy mountain but fairly near it, though quite the opposite
sort. (5.),
20.d.rev.*
Civil
-- Defence
..
.
.
.
- . (1-1.1.\
(21:d1+31 .d.)rev.+37.d. Singular. (6.)
22.d.+25.d.+10.*
Toosey, as its natives call this Essex village. (5.5.)
24.d.rev.*
This in itself provides sufficient facts for deducing its solution. (4.)
. .
25.d.*
. . . it a vulgar abbreviation ? (4.)
(27.d.+34.d.)rev. fl9.d.rev. Mix up in German ruling party ; let the first be last and the last first. (6.)
27.d.+34.d.+35.d.rev.
His Highness of 85+86. (5.)
(29.d.+67.d.)rev.
The allied forces met this North African native recently ; but we did not see
his western neighbour on our Christmas dinner tables, (8.)
35.d.*
Mother's graduated. (2.)
36.d.
Frobisher. (6.)
41 .d,*
A method of election. (1.1 .)
1-
-
-
-
, - - - - - . I
-
CROSSWORD PUZZLE.
"A . . . by a river's brim,
A yellow . . . was t o him." Wordsworth. (8.)
.4ble and A.1. in her make-up, she shared with the Berwick in a fine display
of seamanship. (6.)
Game, dog. (6.)
A Naval Staff division in a unity of three. (8.)
" Water. water. evervwhere. no; anv d r o ~
t o dkink." (3.)
Two thousand,. one hundred, two fifties-and a zero make up this musical
sareeant. (7.)
~rishF.B.I. y4.j
You might write this word with a chalk. (6.)
You can find this this. (6.)
Last war's ranker F.M. seems t o go against the law. (3.)
But the Marbchal is straightforward. (3.)
This island is disarranged in 60.d.+72.d. (6.)
Was once Britannia's hound of peace. (6.)
I t was f a r from true to say of her that " superfluous lags the . . . on the stage,"
as Dr. Johnson did. (7.)
Spadeworker's companion. (5.)
A subtle emanation ; which :(4.)
. +83.d. if i t contains gold, produces the flush of dawn. (6.)
More welcome to a Mediterranean convoy than to a North Russian one. (3.)
Is this the whole of the cobbler's tools ? (3.)
Thus. (2.)
Transpose please, printer ; tremble pianist. (2.)
See 38.rev. (2.)
BOOKS.
" T H E NELSON TOUCH."
AN ANTHOLOGY O F LORD NELSON'S LETTERS.
DANE.
By CLEMENCE
(Heinemann. 15s.)
ITseems a matter for regret that the phrase " The Nelson Touch," which all readers of THE NAVAL
REVIEWknow as the authorized synonym for the Memorandum embodying the projected Attack a t
Traialgar, should be so constantly forced out of its context to serve an inferior purpose;, The present
anthologist, who naIvely introduces herself as one who hitherto has regarded Nelson as a stone figure
on the top of a column," cannot be excused on the score of ignorance : for on p. 271 she quotes the
well-known letter to Lady Hamilton, 1st October, 1805, in which the reception of the " Nelson Touch "
by the " Band of Brothers " is described by its originator. Intending readers of this volume, who may
have heard the book quoted without its sub-title, should understand that 281 pages out of 303 are filled
with letters from Nelson, or with extracts and quotations from Nelson's letters, the incomplete variety
being far the commoner. There is much t o be said for quoting a letter in extenso. There is much less
t o be said in favour of snippets. Thus, to take an example : on p. 243 Miss Dane supplies the following,
"Victory, October 22nd El8041 . . . Lord Keith loves a little money, and a great deal much better."
The original letter contains 123 words, in which Nelson sends one of his most intimate friends the on dit
as t o his successor, if one was wanted : "Sir John Orde, I a m told, is likely. Lord Radstock is trying ;
so is Sir Roger Curtis : and if a Spanish War comes, Lord Keith loves a little money, and a great deal much
better." Left in their setting the words convey a sly dig a t one who might be inclined to allow strategy
t o be affected by the opportunity of prize-money ; t o Nelson, not merely anathema, but anathema
maranatha. Lifted from their context, the words suggest the tinkle of tea-cups, and the spicy tit-bit
of scandal too often their accompaniment.
There is, apart from Miss Dane's twelve-page Preface, nothing new in this book. In 1866 Sir John
Laughton published "Letters and Dispatches of Horatio, Viscount Nelson and Duke of Bronte," an endeavour to compress the substance of the 3,500 Nelson letters in the seven volumes of Sir Harris Nicolas
within the compass of a single volume. In 1918Mr. Walter Jerrold anticipated, not only Miss Dane's preference for the " snappy par " over the unedited text, but also her chosen title ; for he called his anthology
" The Nelson Touch.
Miss Dane's book is less stodgy than Sir John Laughton's, if less well-informed ;
and is much more comprehensive than Mr. Jerrold's. I t is sub-divided into sections covering the active
years of Nelson's service career ; and each section is prefaced by italicized paragraphs which summarize
the annual record. Thus,
" Through the spring of 1804 he continues to guard the Mediterranean and t o wait for the
French Fleet-in April he is promoted to be Vice-Admiral of the White, Commanding-in-Chief in
the Mediterranean. He fights for his officers, who, he considers, have been slighted by the City
of London. He is still in desperate need of frigates."
Naval readers would doubtless have preferred the material to have been subdivided according t o
commissions rather than to years, but this is a small point. The main criticism, applicable alike t o
Sir John Laughton's book, Mr. Jerrold's, and Miss Dane's is this : that if anyone has the energy t o read
so much, he would be far better employed in studying an equivalent amount of Sir Harris Nicolas's
admirable "Dispatches and Letters," the gold-mine from which all writers on Nelson have derived their
most valuable material : the gold-mine which still contains as much precious ore as any that has yet
been minted. And the seven volumes of Nicolas can still be picked up for a guinea, a price t h a t compares
not unfavourably with that of war-time reading material.
The inquisitive may perhaps enquire how Miss Dane. the talented novelist, essayist, and playwright,
came to set naval officers such an excellent example ; how she came to sample the maglzum opus of
Nicolas ; and how she came to persevere from Volume I t o Volume VII. Her introduction t o the book,
as she explains in her Preface, was purely accidental ; accidental also was the compulsion which made
her, in the manner of St. Augustine, "take up and read." Infinitely more interesting and valuable is
the reason why she persisted in her self-imposed task until she had finished it.
" I kept the volumes and used t o read them every night, a t first because there was nothing else
to read, but soon because of their irresistible fascination. I was made free of a great man's mind.
Through his eyes I watched the dissolution and remaking of Europe. I saw how famous battles
were fought and won, and smelt the wind of mornings long, long forgotten, and knew as yet unhaloed
famous men and women and learned also the personal history of a simple, supple genius, how he
felt, suffered and exulted as he made his way through his life. And everything was conveyed to
me, not by the conscious skill of a professional writer, but by the unconscious exactness of a spirit
which could master any craft it needed t o use. . . ."
" Nelson's public work depended on his power of conveying his thoughts to superiors, equals
and inferiors, and in private life he,pad no other way of governing his household, or keeping in
touch with his lesser life ashore.
.. .
" Nelson's output was enormous.
I t s bulk would be handsome for a writer with no other
occupation, and yet it was but one item in this extraordinary man's expenditure of time, though
a vitally Pmportant one."
" He had from the first a kind of Defoe-ish accuracy in reporting, and if he never consciously
sought after the right word, he never used the wrong one. His thoughts are so lucid and he himself
so fearless that he always says precisely what he means, letting his manner reflect his mood. If he
feels dull, then the letter is conventionally worded and very flat. If he is flattered, gratification
rings through every line. . . . If he is angry, the sentences are gunfire."
Miss Dane quotes examples of his recorded dialogues with Foley and others, adding : " These phrases,
of course, are spoken, not written. But exactly the same sort of remark is scattered over his letters,
cropping up through the formalities, like flowers in a smooth-shaven lawn, wild and sweet."
This is a true and sincere tribute from one literary genius to another. Something of the same kind
has been said before, by David Hannay, for example, in his edition of Southey's Life ; but if i t has
been said before, i t has never been put better. Only once does Miss Dane's literary criticism go astray.
She is speaking of Nelson's "Sketch of his Life," which he wrote a t the instance of John McArthur in 1799.
She prints this in full, and tells us that, in forwarding it t o the recipient he wrote that i t should be
Turned into " much better language." Then she adds : " I t is probable that ' better ' t o Nelson meant
more pompous.' He could be extraordinarily pompous himself when he had time t o work the thing
up or felt that it was the due of the man a t the other end."
What Nelson actually wrote was : " I send you a Sketch of my Life, which I a m sensible wants
your pruning knife, before it is fit to meet the public eye. Therefore, I trust you and your friend will
do that, and turn it into much better language." " You and your friend" were the Reverend James
Stanier Clarke, one-time naval chaplain, and John McArthur, one-time purser and secretary t o Lord
Hood. At the date of Nelson's letter they had joined forces in the enterprise known as " The Naval
Chronicle," which ran a successful course for twenty years ; and in 1809 they produced Nelson's official
Biography. In both employments they never hesitated t o use the pruning-knife ; never hesitated t o
turn what a flag officer had written "into much better language." Miss Dane, as a literary critic,
would derive much amusement if she were t o compare what Nelson himself wrote with the revised version
appearing in " Clarke and McArthur," as their ponderous tomes are now, for brevity, described. If she
had been more conversant with ancient days and naval ways, she would have found no difficulty in
distinguishing between the letters which Nelson began, continued, completed and sealed himself and
those which were drafted by him in outline only, and worked up " by such a n admittedly competent
secretary as John McArthur, who was, by contrast with Nelson, a writer typical of his period, very
conscious of what " was the due of the man a t the other end " and therefore, to such a writer as Miss Dane,
formal, stiff, ceremonious, punctilious-in a word, exuding Pomp. All the more reason t o rejoice that
so many of Nelson's letters were begun, continued, completed and sealed by himself.
Apart from her illuminating comments on Nelson's literary style, Miss Dane deserves the most
careful attention when, as a woman, she treats of the two women, whom no book on Nelson can omit.
"At any rate," she writes, " his letters to his wife make the relationship between them perfectly
clear. He is very fond of her, always a t ease with her, and sure of her calm interest. H e looks
after her comfort in a matter-of-fact way, and treats her as a n agreeable companion. It is obvious
that he writes to her, not as a matter of duty, but because he enjoys writing to her. But there
is no sign of strong feeling. In most of the letters he might be addressing a youngish, friendly
aunt. One has to realize that, until he met his ' guardian angel,' as he calls her, a side of Nelson
was undeveloped. I t was through Emma that he found himself a human being. His love letters
are the raw material of his nature, and will, I suppose, one day serve a dramatist as the stuff of
the Cleopatra story in Plutarch served Shakespeare, even though a classic distance of time must
elapse before the greatest of all English love-stories can come into its own."
This may be fe~ninineintuition rather than a judicial summing up ; but it is frank, sincere, perceptive,
brief; and worth pages of the maudlin jeremiads of Southey or the rhetorical sententiousness of
Admiral Mahan.
Miss Dane's Anthology is not necessarily the last of such compilations. There is still room for
a volume which brings into small compass the pick of Nelson's wise words on national policy, the Navy's
needs, combined operations, naval strategy and naval tactics, with a n index which would enable the
naval officer to turn with quick facility to the quotation he required. The construction of such an
index would not be easy, but i t would supply a long-felt want. Miss Dane in her Anthology unconsciously provides a solution, of which she makes no use herself. For she gives t o her extracts and
quotations headlines to introduce or compere them, with a personal leaning towards a Shakespearean
!~g. Here are a few, taken a t random : " Egeria leaves for England " ; " The Children of Reuben " ;
Ban-Ban-Ca-Caliban " ; " Jack the Giant-Killer " ; " Turkey Trot " . " Pestered with a Popinjay " ;
" He disagrees with Rosalind " ; " Dost know this Water;fly ? " ; " ~ o u b thou
t
the stars be fire " ;
The Vichy Spirit " ; You cannot feed capons so " ; The Owls and the Pussy Cat " ; " Pistol
and Fluellen." If these tags were harnessed as clues to assist the searcher after the wherewithal t o
grace an after-dinner speech or lend force t o a thesis or lecture, they would perform a useful function.
Unrelated to an Index and unattached, they serve in this volume merely t o stress and emphasize
Miss Dane's literary leanings and her relish a t finding in Nelson a fellow-artist ; limner of the golden
phrase, the balanced thought, the haunting utterance ; " fitting aptest words to things " ; a genius
who, had he not been the victor of Trafalgar, might well have secured for himself as exalted a place
among the giants of English Literature.
GEOFFREYCALLENDER.
"
"
" T H E YEARS O F ENDURANCE, 1793-1802."
By ARTXURBRYANT.
(Collins, 12s. 6d.)
" From the outbreak of war with France in 1793 until the Peace of Amiens in 1801 England
alone among the opponents of the successive rulers of France held out continuously. Her allies
deserted her a t every stage. Her traditional ally, Holland, went over to France when the poison
of Jacobitism had deluded the Dutch people. Spain, an ally for a while, became the ally of France,
Prussia and Austria, beaten in the field, made peace ; Russia, won over to the enemy, revived the
Armed Neutrality of the North with Denmark, Sweden and Prussia."
So Mr.. Bryant summarizes in broad fashion the part played by this country and the conduct of our
allies during what he aptly calls " The Years of Endurance." They were indeed years of endurance,
and i t is natural that a comparison should be made by a present-day writer with those years we ourselves
have recently endured, and are still enduring ; for parallel threads run through the events of 1793-1801
and 1939-42. Even in many details, as distinguished from the broad stream of events, there are
remarkable resemblances, resemblances which we do well t o note and from which we can draw many
a useful lesson.
Mr. Bryant starts with a sketch of life in England in the years preceding 1793. She had gone through
the costly and bitter war of 1775-83 in which, though she had resisted the attempts of the three principal
maritime Powers of Europe-France,
Spain and Holland-to destroy her, and the endeavour of the
Northern Powers t o cripple her in the use of her sea power, she had suffered grievous losses and incurred
a heavy debt. Her great Empire in North America was lost, and with it a proportion of her present,
and still more her future, sea power. The unwisdom oi George I11 and his subservient ministers not
only deprived Britain of many citizens a.nd much territory. I t removed from her hands a coast line
replete with bases, a country rich in shipbuilding materials; a considerable tonnage of shipping and a
population comprising several thousands of seafaring men. Over a century and a half before the
disputes with the North American colonists began Raleigh had pointed out the great value of Newfoundland, not as a colony but as a " nursery of seamen '' ; its loss, he had said, would be a major calamity.
The loss of the 18,000 colonial seamen and the shipping of the colonies was an even greater blow.
Though there had been this blindness t o the importance of our sea power before that catastrophic
war, there was one man a t least who did not lose sight of the need for a strong navy : the younger Pitt.
There is one difference between the events of the years separating the two 18th century wars and those
of the years between 1918 and 1939. Intent though Pitt was ypon resto~ingthe shattered fortunes of
the country, and financier though he was, he would not allow economies to be made in the Navy
which would injure it. His successors of the twenty years truce of 1918-39 acted otherwise, and their
" economies " have proved costly indeed.
I t is t o be hoped that the lesson has been learnt, and that
Mr. Bryant's book will bring home t o a wide public, both in this country and throughout the Empire,
the unwisdom of tampering with the sea forces of the peoples of the Empire.
The course of the war is traced in a broad and comprehensive spirit. Mr. Bryant links together all
the elements which determined the strategy, diplomatic, financial, commercial, social, naval and military.
None is in a watertight compartment by itself, the relation of each to the others is made plain ; and
the result is that we are shown the war as a whole as it has not been shown before in popular histories,
in nearly all of which the military affairs are in one set of chapters, the naval in another and the economic
elsewhere, if they all appear a t all. With his eyes on our recent experiences of the present war he speaks
of the "Period of Appeasement" in the time before 1793. Then, as in our own day, there was a belief that
what was happening in France was the concern of France alone ; that the revolution there proceeding
would be confined to that country and would not result in a savage aggression. There was sympathy
with the revolutionaries, whose deep grievances were recognized. A bare year before the barefaced
invasion of Holland Pitt had declared that there was every probability of fifteen years of peace, and
had made reductions in the military establishment.
The French declaration of war on Great Britain and Holland in February, 1793, found England in
difficuities. Her alliance with Holland placed on her the obligation t o assist the Dutch ; but she did
not possess the army t o give effective support. Such help as she could send, she sent ; and, small though
the force was, in conjunction with those of the other allies, the enemy was driven out of the Low
Countries. But how the war should be conducted, what the Grand Strategy should be, remained to
be settled. During 1793 there were ibur courses open t o Great Britain, and, as they are illustrative of
the kind of problem that almost invariably threatens us, they possess a permanent interest. She
might raise more troops and reinforce her allies in France and the main theatre of the continental war ;
or take advantage of the situation created in the south of France by the anti-Jacobin rising which had
placed Toulon in the hands of the British fleet, sending a n army t o Toulon and from thence invade from
the south ; or assist the Vendean rising in the west-either of these two would create a diversion in
favour of Austria and Prussia ; or make war a t sea and in the French colonies, thereby destroying
French sea power and depriving France of the financial benefits of trade and commerce.
Each of these courses had its advantages and its advocates. Views as t o which was the best differed
greatly, as views to-day differ as t o how and where we should make our principal offensive. Pitt,
influenced as he was bound to be by his experience as a n economist, was convinced that France would
be unable t o resist the military attack of the allies, conducted by trained troops against a n untrained
and undisciplined rabble which had lost its experienced officers, and that her resistance would be shortened
'
1
:'
,
4
:
when her trade-the sinews of war-was destroyed by British attack in the Indies. I t is common t o
talk of the West Indian expeditions as a " filching of sugar islands," but the policy was not mere grabbing.
I t was based on the conviction that, without money, war was impossible. So certain was Pitt that the
war would be short that he imposed no income tax from 1793 to 1798. Burke, on the other hand, was
no less certain that the war would be long, that no decision would be reached by colonial conquests and
financial deprivations, that war in the West Indies would cost many lives from disease, as it had in earlier
wars ; and that a more rapid and sure method should be adopted. He saw the war in F r a n ~ eas a civil
war ; France, in his eyes, was divided, and it was for England t o make the most of that division by
assisting the Vendeans with all the forces she could raise and as soon as possible : a quick decision was
in his opinion what was called for. As t o an attack on the south of France from Toulon, this was
impossible for the reason that it would require, in General Grey's view, a t least 50,000 men, and these
were not available, nor could they be expected from the allies.
As we know, what was done was to dissipate force in all of these directions. In place of concentration
on a single object-the course which Wellington said, in 1813, was indispensable t o success-small
forces were sent to Ostend, others t o Toulon which were too few t o hold the place ; others to the Vendee
-they too were too few as well as being too late. The bulk of the disposable force was sent to the West
Indies where the troops perished in thousands from disease before the campaigns were brought t o a n
end four years later.
Allies, as Bryant says, deserted us. The first coalition broke in 1795. Spain, Holland, and Prussia
made peace-Holland, to whose appeal for help we had responded and who was our traditional ally
since 1674. The Cape of Good Hope then became a potential French base, as Madagascar last year
became a potential Japanese base : an expedition was sent t o seize i t in 1796, and other Dutch bases
which threatened our eastern trade were also taken-Ceylon, Malacca, Amboyna, and Banda.
France, like Germany, waged war to support war. She needed money, as Pitt had thought ; but
she had means of getting it that he did not foresee. She invaded her neighbours with a pretence of
setting them free but with the object of replenishing her empty treasury. 1796 was a bad year. Italy
was invaded, Spain went over to the enemy, the British Mediterranean fleet, outnumbered by thirty-eight
to fourteen, withdrew from the inner sea. Bonaparte's delight was unbounded. The sea was now a t
his disposal and he could move his armies by water t o Naples and Sicily. Worse was t o follow in 1797.
Austria entered into the preliminaries for peace a t Leoben in April, and confirmed the peace a t Campo
Formio in October. England was now isolated-and there were mutinies in her navy. The idea of
invasion, which had been considered by the Jacobins from the first days of the war, was revived. I t was
rejected by Bonaparte. He considered it impracticable a t that time, and he cast his eyes t o the east ;
there, in India, with the help of Tippoo Sahib, he saw the means of striking a t England's vulnerable spot,
her eastern trade, and he began his preparations for the expedition to Egypt.
Though Austria had made peace she had not given up hope of resuming hostilities. In order that
she should do so she required the help of a British fleet in the Mediterranean, and asked for it. SO,in
the spring of 1798, orders were sent t o St. Vincent t o detach a squadron under Nelson to the Mediterranean. The Nile campaign was the result, and an outcome of that campaign was the formation of the
second coalition of Great Britain, Russia, Turkey, Portugal, Austria and the Two Sicilies. The coalition,
for all its brave appearance, suffered from intrinsic weakness. Austria was a jealous and suspecting ally
and had a bad conscience into the bargain. She had deserted us a t Campo Formio and "it is in the
nature of defaulting allies to feel resentment towards those whom they have injured," sdys Bryant.
We may see an endorsement of the assertion in Vichy to-day. Naples was more of a 1ia;Plity than an
asset, a reed as broken as its Mussolinian successor. Nelson said of the Neapolitans,Fhat they had not
To-day's parallel
lost much honour, for they had little to lose ; but that they have lost all they had.
is plain.
Still, in spite of these weaknesses, the second coalition turned the tide. Austria hit back hard,
broke the French invasion through the Black Forest, rolled back the French in Italy. A Russo-Turkish
fleet retook Corfu, a Russian army reached the Italian front. Now, a t last, France was in real danger.
I t was only Bonaparte's return from Egypt that saved her.
In the meantime a resurvey of our own strategy was being made. The small army could not affect
the campaigns on the Continent ; what was now recognized as necessary was the destruction of the
French power a t sea. I t was decided that all efforts should be directed towards the destruction of the
enemy fleets in their bases, and with that in view expeditions were designed against the Texel, Brest,
Vigo, Ferrol, and Cadiz. Russia was t o co-operate. She took part in the first, which was unsuccessful,
refused to do her part in the second, and shortly after turned against us and, with Denmark, Sweden and
Prussia, formed the Armed Neutrality of the North the object of which was t o paralyze British sea power.
Austria's jealous Minister, Thugut, kept us in ignorance of the nature of the intended campaign in the
south, and as a result a British army, which might have been landed a t Genoa and taken part in the
battle of Marengo, did not go there. Marengo was a close-run affair. I t is not outside the bounds of
possibility that the small British contingent might have turned the scale. Instead, it went t o Egypt
and ejected the French who had been marooned there since the batle of the Nile.
The year 1800 saw black times return with the Armed Neutrality and a hostile Russia in the north
and, in the south, an Austrian collapse. The Empire made peace with Bonaparte on Christmas Day ;
the Two Sicilies also gave up. At home, Pitt went out of office and was replaced by the second rate
Addington-" Pitt is to Addington as London is t o Paddington." Timorous counsels then prevailed ;
the backbone of British resistance was weakened. Peace was made on terms t h a t bore but a small
relation to the victories won a t sea. The captured colonies were restored t o France and Holland,
Malta was to be evacuated. To Bonaparte the peace was welcome, for he needed a few years of peace
t o rebuild his navy, restore his finances, recover his western colonies. When those were accomplished
he would be in a position t o renew the struggle against England. The peace was therefore no more than
a truce. I t was broken again in 1803.
History can certainly make dull reading. Written, however, as Mr. Bryant has written the history
of those years of enduranre, with the comprehensive and all-embracing outlook which informs the whole
of the narrative, it is absorbing. The parallels already referred to, and the many others for which there
is here no space, are striking. There is a wealth of warning in the story ; there is also a wealth of encouragement and of grounds for confidence in this time of our own. Provided we maintain our sea power
and concentrate our efforts upon the command of the sea we may expect to come through this struggle
as we did that of the eight years of disappointment and desertions of Pitt's time. The book can be most
strongly recommended.
H. W. R .
" SURGEON'S MATE."
GRAY.
Edited and transcribed by ERNEST
(Robert Hale. 12s. 6d.)
INthe midst of this greatest of all struggles in our history, when life and service a t sea are strenuous
beyond all previous modern experience, it is perhaps opportune to look back a t times and see how our
predecessors fared in those long sea struggles of the 18th and early 19th centuries, how they lived, the
hardships and discomforts they endured, the severity of their discipline, and their everyday life aboard
ship.
We read to-day with horror of such naval punishments as flogging round the fleet ; and yet those
horrors pale by comparison with Nazi persecutions, concentration camps, wholesale massacre of the
Jews,-and the like, of the Hitler regime..
This book is in the form of a diary compiled from the notes of adventures and professional experiences
of John Knyveton, who was a surgeon in the British fleet during the Seven Years' War, 1756-62. It is
a plain, unvarnished tale of life a t sea in those days. John Knyveton sailed under Byng, Hawke, and
Boscawen, starting as surgeon's mate in the Ramillies, flagship of Admiral Byng, and finishing as chief
surgeon of the Edgar, sixty guns. He was present a t the battles of Minorca and Lagos, the siege of
Havana, and numerous other engagements. H e also roamed the seas in search of heavily laden Spanish
prizes.
I t was not long after his joining the Ramzllies that Knyveton had his first experience of the press
gang. The efforts of the latter having proved insufficient, complaint is made t o the authorities, who
thereupon
" Sent us one hundred and forty elderly paupers from the neighbouring parishes doubtless glad
to see 'em go. These being country folk are cleanly and not too infested with vermin ; not so
the fifty-six rats from the gaols and stews."
Knyveton thus gets, and gives, a very good idea of life aboard a first rate in those days, and pretty
grim i t was. Scurvy was rampant, floggings incessant, but the keenness of all t o get to grips with the
French is as great as ever. And so, on the 19th of May, the day before the battle of Minorca, he records :
"A great battle is imminent ; God preserve me and the Lord defend the right." The next entry is
on the 25th :"All my fervent exaltation has crumbled in disaster and despair. For we are returning to
Gibraltar and the fleet of La Galissonibre so far from being destroyed is not even dispersed. . . .
Deep gloom hangs over all decks and the men very eager for a further brush, aye, even our aged
pauper grandpapas."
But later, after the crime of Byng's execution, he speaks of :"Admiral Byng's house wrecked and Sir John Barnard, who rashly spoke a word in his defence,
near killed by a city mob ; till I begin t o suspect the poor man had been offered up as a scapegoat
sacrificed t o quieten the vulgar."
True words, indeed.
John Knyveton was a good doctor, being keenly interested in the welfare of all his ship's company.
Apart from performing bloody operations and amputations in the cockpit during engagements, he tried
t o ventilate the ship between decks and disinfected everywhere with sulphur and boiling tar. The
majority of the crew were men of all ages and walks of life, who had been brought on board by the press
gang. The new comers, as we have seen, were usually covered with vermin and sores of some sort
and needed treatment so as not to pass on the diseases. He appears to have had a great fight against
scurvy and yellow fever, many sailors, nevertheless, dying of these complaints, in spite of all his efforts.
Times have changed-and so has science ; John Knyveton's patients were fortified before their
operations with a swig of rum ; no ether, ~hloroform,or morphia existed in his days. Punishments
were very severe ; a pidshipman, aged 13 years, was chained for shouting "Mother, Mother I" when he
thought the ship was foundering. Then there is the gruesome account of the seaman who tried t o
desert and v a s flogged round the fleet.
" The .man was tied face downwards t o the thwarts, and gagged with a n iron bar, whilst our
-, captain read the sentence-fr~mthe gang-way, a n d a boat manned with a file of marines put off
from each ship. I inserted a stocking between the man's wrists and his lashings, lest his struggles .
tore the flesh off 'em ; and then with the ship's bell sounding a t half minutes, and the ship's drummer
beating the rogue's march beside the man, we rowed t o each ship followed by the other boats manned
by the musketeers ; and from each ship he received twenty lashes from the boatswain's mate, who
stood upon the ladder of each ship. After five ships had thus been visited, he was insensible, and
though I plied him with rum, the master-at-arms with difficulty roused him t o take further
punishment ; and after we left the eighth ship his backbone and ribs were bare and his mouth tore
open by the gag ; but the law being that he must receike a flogging from each vessel of the flotilla
concerned, twenty lashes were given until the eleventh was reached ; he dying a t the ninth ship
we hailed, the Trident of sixty-four guns, and I glad that he was no more able t o feel pain, being a
slender youth of twenty-two years of age ; and so they bore him ashore and buried him, as custom
is, without religious rites in the mud below tide mark as a n example t o the rest ; and some
grumbling from the sailors told off to wash down the longboat, a t the muck in it."
We must certainly thank God we did not live in those times.
Throughout the book his sad love-story provides a thread of romance, and there are a few illustrations.
The editor in his note prefacing the diary sums it up well :" In the navy, eighteenth-century life was incredibly harsh, and even brutal. But the tradition
forged by those men with whom John Knyveton sailed has inspired the gallant heroes of the
Rawalpindi, of the A l a ~ and
,
the airmen who darted upon the Italian fleet cowering behind its
defence boom a t Toranto.
" Welded by stark discipline into a strange band of heroes, our Empire, and the freedom all
under the British f a g enjoy, are their priceless gifts, bought by their endurance of monotonous
patrols and by their blood as they died in the cockpit or gasped out their lives on the splintered
decks of a ship that would not strike her colours."
A most interesting book, with never a dull page.
ONBD.
" FOUNDED UPON T H E SEAS.
A Narrative of Some English Maritime and Overseas Enterprises during the Period 1550-1616."
By WALTEROAKESHOTT.
(Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.)
"Alwaies obedience to be used and practised by a1 persons in their degrees, not only for duetie
and conscience sake towards God, under whose merciful1 hand navigants above all other creatures
naturally bee most nigh . . ., but also for prudent and worldly policie, and publike weal."
READERS
of THE NAVALREVIEWwho see on the title-page the above quotation frqm Sebastian Cabot's
" Instructions for the intended voyage to Cathay" may think that here a t last is a book on 16th century
enterprises by one who understands what he writes about. Disappointment awaits them, for
Mr. Oakeshott warns us with a rare honesty and endearing humility in the first line of his preface :
" This book . . . has no pretentions to original scholarship . . ." Now no book on this subject, so well
covered already by Sir Geoffrey Callender, justifies the time spent in writing, producing, and reading it,
or the materials spent in its production, unless i t fulfils one of two conditions. I t must either result
from original scholarship, or it must draw on the work of Tenison1 who has done the original research
for us, and made avauable most of the relevant documents i n extenso.
Mr. Oakeshott's book does neither, and so, as were various of the books of " D:; J. A. Williamson
and Protessor E . G. R. Taylor ( . . . whose books I have found invaluable)" and Professor Neale's
Queen Elizabeth,' or Mr. A. L. Rowse's ' Sir Richard Grenville ' . . . modern books that have been
used," it was out of date before it was published. Mr. Oakeshott has, however, an advantage over
some of these moderns since, like the people he writes about, he is a God-fearing man ; and if we are
to be condemned t o a repetition every few months of the 19th and 20th century caricatures of the great
men of the 16th, it is a t least preferable t h a t they should be served up by a writer having beliefs in
common with the subjects than by the mordant cynics of the school of Rowse. This advantage of
Mr. Oakeshott's only appears in those passages where he is not faithfully transcribing the false versions of
his own complacent contemporaries. Too often it succumbs. Throughout the book he is misled by these
poltergeists of historical study into treating the statesmen as small shopkeepers and campaigns affecting
the balance of power in Europe and America as if they were commercial transactions. An instance of
this is on p. 157 in the description of the English invasion of Portugal in 1589 to liberate that kingdom
from Spain and to restore King Antonio. This was a strategical campaign in a war embracing England,
France, the Low Countries, the Peninsula, North and South America. Whatever its origins, it was,
in execution, no more a private venture than was the recent allied landing in North Airica in 1942.
I t involved a force of 23,000 men and 130 ships, of which Sir Francis Drake wrote, Tnere was never
"
1 " Elizabethan England," Vols. I-VII (1933-40) can be seen a t R.N. Colleges a t Dartmouth and
Greenwich, in library 01 the R.U.S.I., in Plymouth Public Library, etc. (See " The Quarterly Keview,"
No. 555, Jan., 1943, pp. 13 and 14.) (See also THE NAVALREVIEW,February, 1941, p. 158.)
army in better order than this." Mr. Oakeshott, who was not there, calls it " one of those strange
privately subscribed ventures, with the Queen holding shares."
The attempt of this and other authors to graft the mentality of a 20th century literary gent. on to
16th century men of action not only makes it impossible for us, who peer with them through their hornrimmed spectacles, to know the subjects a t first hand, but also makes a book like this one so full of false
assumptions that the false assertions are too numerous to deal with, and by sheer weight of numbers
carry the day. Our knowledge of the 16th century is in a phase similar to that of the cartographers'
knowledge of the world as Mr. Oakeshott describes it two-thirds of the way down page 5 . The passage
is exactly applicable if we substitute Froude's intellectual offspring for the classical geographers, and
their most recent representatives for the cartographers : " Indeed the classical geographers began to
be credited with a n infallibility which some time later did some harm, for when the new discoveries
contradicted their views, the cartographers tended to reject the discoveries, and retain the classical
tradition." This kind of obscurantism is fooFsh and represents the conduct of a losing battle since
the discoveries cannot forever be hushed up or rejected." The appearance of any fresh book, however
innocent the author, which gives new currency to demonstrably ridiculous distortions is to be deplored,
nor can any such book hope for a long lucrative life as a trusted textbook.
Sir Francis Drake, champion of the Crown and Church of England, is shown as " Nobilisszmus eques
Angliae," facing p. 82. He would not recognize himself on pp. 32 and 33 as a flaming Puritan. The
poltergeists who have bemused thc busy Head Master of St. Paul's appear not to know that there were
penal laws against Puritans as well as Roman Catholics, and he makes no real distinction between
Puritans and the majority of the Queen's subjects who were of the Church of England, which a t her
accession was linked back to the 1st century Christian Church a t Glastonbury.
Drake's great friend and encourager a t Court, Lord Burghley, is turned into a cautious and suspicious
drag on most of his activities. There is no mention of Burghley's Memorandum urging " a very great
and royal war " (i.e. a preventive war) against Spain under Drake's direction for 1581. Though perhaps
temporarily inaccessible in the British Museum, this document was published in 1933 by Tenison and
so is is easily consulted.
In those days before income tax i t was not considered necessary to find a self-interested motive of
cupidity to explain the depense in the national service of many thousands of pounds of private fortune
as well as the sacrifice of health and heart : i t was called " voluntary increase." Spencer's angels who
served " all for love and nothing,>or reward " had their mortal counterparts.
When describing the Spanish voluntary increase " on p. 103-" Every gentleman about the court,
so it was reported, was ' building a ship or two to send after Sir Francis Drake ' "-no commercial
parallel is deemed necessary. But the book abounds in unsupported 20th century interpolations which
give the impression they are meant to make us feel a t home. A typical one is on p. 102 which depicts
Drake's homecoming in 1586 : " Doubtless he had been reckoning up in his own mind the balanye sheet
of the expedition." The book is riddled with soft and meaningless sentences beginning with But,"
"And," " Or," " Doubtless," " Still " ; in this respect it almost approaches
Mr. A. E. W. Mason's broad
-and vague intuitive journalese.
There are, however, four principal features which will alleviate the disappointment of those who buy
or read this book.
1. "A long-standing interest in the maps of the period may have made it possible here and
there to give a clearer account of a particular incident than has been given before." Mr. Oakeshott
is a real bibliophile, and he was able to indulge his love of original maps and cosmographic books
when he was Librarian a t Winchester College. His first chapter, " New Worlds for Old," does give
us the benefit of his first-hand knowledge of the history of Cartography.
2. He emphasises Drake's gentility ; for Drake came of an armorial family, which on the
Continent would be regarded as " noble." Thus is some amend made for Mr. A.&. W. Mason's
recent impudent belittling of the great commander when he said that, while not of the Gentry,
Drake was " above the Serfs." (What serfs were in England a t that date ?)
3. The author does not belittle the Duke of Medina Sidonia.
4. Mr. Oakeshott's own charm, as well as his spirit of goodwill and the purity of his intention
shine even through this quaint web of unworthy materials, and they give us a sure promise that,
when not blindly being led by the blind, he will be able to write a book that will do himself justice
and will survive t o carry an inspiring message to our children's children.
Unfortunately the defects of this book are such that it cannot but do more harm1 than good to the
trusting and ignorant among its readers, and it is these who matter besides being in a majority. Since,
however, "Any author's profits that the book may make during the war will be paid to the funds of the
Training Ship Arethusa. I t is a privilege to be allowed to offer this token of gratitude to an institution
that is doing fine work for the Navy," the duty of readers of THE NAVAL
REVIEWis clear. They must
buy as many copies as they can afford in order to return so quickly as possible the material components
to " salvage," and a t the same time to disembody, one must hope finally, a host of dizzy errors.
A typical misstatement of fact is the assertion on p 160 summing up after an account of the last
fight of Sir Richard Grenvllle a t the Azores in 1591 : "
and In that year the treasure convoys got
through t o Spaln accordmg to plan " This can only mean that our chronicler has not read any account
of the havoc wrought not long after the battle, while the Spanlsh ships yet lingered among the islands,
by the great tempest which was Grenville's monument, or else that Kmg Phihp's wonderful foresight
made about a fifty pev cent allowance for Acts of God and the Royal Navy In the collection of his
annual revenue.
$
<
To the busy layman, having no initiation behind the academic scenes and screens, a book published
by an University Press seems clothed with.' authority." I t may be that the directors of the Cambridge
University Press in their humility have not sensed their responsibility. But if the heralded expansion
of education for the King's subjects, both "juvenile " and " adult," is to have a n y meaning, and
particularly if education is to be allowed t o mean the development of character as well as of brains
and knowledge, then it is vital that the tales be true which they are told of the characters whom they
instinctively wish to emulate.
" WORLD WAR AT SEA."
By BRIANTUNSTALL.
(Seeker and Warburg. 12s. 6d.)
i
1
11
!
I
I
I
THE contents of this book call for too much attention and inward digestion for i t to be classed as
popular, though it is aimed a t the many thousands of the general public who wish to take an intelligent
view of the contemporary world battle. I t should hit its target, as it admirably fulfils its object of
providing a general guide to the events of the present war a t sea and to the conditions governing the
strategy and building policy of the navies engaged. I n its well-arranged and thorough survey, naval
men as well as the public will find much of value.
Mr. Tunstall prepares his ground in two opening chapters where he points out how the dissimilarity
of sea and land conditions affect the use made of the sea and also those who use it, and the fundamental
differences between sea and land warfare which result from this dissimilarity. I n this survey a reader
will find the purposes a t which naval strategy is aimed, the methods by which it achieves them, and
the reasons for and functions of the various means which it employs to do so. A naval reader may find
nothing new in these chapters, but will find most of the considerations which guide him in his work
set out plainly. Of the many sound things which Mr. Tnnstall has t o say I would quote the following :" Men who earn their living a t sea are in a sense set apart from their fellows.
They have a
technique and an experience which is distinct, unique and not easily communicable. . . . It is on
this corps of specialists, therefore, mainly professional, but with a useful amateur quota, that the
conduct of naval warfare mainly depends. I t is they who must exercise the chief command and
hold the most reskonsible positions. Landsmen who join the Royal Navy for the war may prove
themselves excellent seamen in a comparatively short time, and may show splendid initiative in
handling small ships, but they are unlikely to hold sea commands equivalent to those frequently
attained by war-time soldiers."
And again :" What is not so well understood is that, despite radical changes both in strategic conditions
and in the technical character of naval armament, Britain's traditional nava.1 strategy remains
unchanged. . . . This does not mean that the British Admiralty when faced by a new problem say
' W h a t would St. Vincent do now ? ' I t means rather that in dealing with the problem they
adopt a n attitude ofmind instinctively guided by the same ideas as St. Vincent's, not because
they are hidebound pendants, but simply because they are practical seamen going about the
business of sea warfare in a practical manner."
And yet again :" . . . I t is still seamanship which counts most in naval warfare, that is to say, the capacity of
each man to handle his own particular piece of gear, and do his own particular job, . . . despite the
worst that ' wind and weather ' and the enemy can do t o hinder him. Those who reckon the
fighting power of ships and fleets in terms of those devastatingly simple tabular comparisons
beloved of journalists, miss the most important of all factors in naval warfare, namely, seamanship,
training, tradition, and morale."
The meanings of those three terms, fighting power or naval strength, sea power, and command of the
sea are clearly explained. A precise and correct conception of what is meant by each is indispensable
for any understanding of naval warfare and strategy. But they are often so loosely used and treated
indeed as interchangeable that one could wish that Mr. Tunstall had set them out together a t the start
to force them bn a reader's attention, and repeated them again a t the end of these two chapters to
impress them firmly on the minds of his readers after they had read them in the text. As it is, they
come in casually and do not stand out enough.
The designs, and functions which have led to those designs, of the different types of ships, together
with the general considerations which have led to that distribution of functions are considered in three
chapters devoted to the British Navy, under the headings of Capital Ships, with which are included
aircraft-carriers, Cruisers, and Flotilla. Forces.
Later chapers deal with other navies ; each of the principal ones-the German, French, Italian,
Russian, United States and Japanese-having one to themselves, which explain the theories of war,
their strategic positions and strategic conceptions which have decided their choice of types which they
have selected t o constitute their fleets.
.
All of these chapters, like those on the British Navy, include brief descriptions with the numerical
~ t r e n g t hof each class of each type. These constitute what is a&andy and useful precis of the information for which one usually turns to " Jane," if one's opulence runs to such a volume.
A useful chapter deals with those important constituents of Naval Strength and Sea Power-Naval
Bases. It notices the changes which have been brought about in the use and organization of bases
by modern means of waging war, particularly by air power. I t also contains a valuable reminder of
the danger of the common fallacy that imagines that naval bases can by themselves render a particular
area secure or insecure, and of the fact that unless a base is provided with some kind of force, which
now demands more than a sea-going one, it cannot even defend itself from attack.
Mr. Tunstall devotes one chapter t o a carefully considered analysis of the subject of Air Power and
Sea Power. His outlook and treatment may be described as sanely balanced, avoiding either extreme
of the fanatical revolutionary or the ingrained die-hard :"Without in any way 'revolutionizing the principles of naval warfare,' . . . air power has
undoubtedly revolutionized its conduct. . . . Many people . . . will fail to see that principles matter
if once the practical methods af sea warfare are changed. Nevertheless the qualification is a
fundamental one."
Among nine clauses in which he summarizes his conclusions are the three following :" Owing to the limitations of shore-based aircraft, sea-borne aircraft are essential to any ocean
power ;
Owing to the limitations of all aircraft, surface warships cannot be dispensed with even in
confined and coastal waters ;
Nothing has so far happened to disprove the usefulness of capital ships, despite the fact that
that their freedom of action is being gradually restricted."
Mr. Tunstall ends these first two parts of his book by considering " Naval Power in the Post-war
World." He does not doubt that Anglo-American naval predominance in every ocean of the world
will be essential t o any world peace settlement, and, asking how this predominance will be exercised,
proceeds t o examine the two problems which have to be considered, " one political and the other
technical ; the first being by far the most difficult."
I n this chapter he makes a point which I consider most important and with which I fully agree.
Asking how the peoples of the two democracies are to be convinced of the necessity for an AngloAmerican naval partnership and predominance, he says :"Whatever the dictates of custom and etiquette may be, those who hold high naval command
cannot with a clear conscience avoid the responsibi1it.v of convincing their respective peoples of the
need for keeping a strong navy . . . and a partnership between the navies of Britain and America.'
[The italics are mine.]
The last part of the book consists of a strategical review of the present war a t sea, which he treats
in five phases :-Against Germany to April, 1940 ; the Invasion of Norway and the Low Countries,
and the Battle of France, the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain Alone ; the Mediterranean from June,
1940, to June, 1941 ; the Russian War ; the War against Japan with its Repercussions in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Naval readers may differ from some of his verdicts, for on most incidents there
are usually more than one naval opinion, but they will I think all agree that he has well applied the
lessons he ha drawn in the earlier chapters.
An excellent, interesting and valuable book ; one t o be read and recommended.
B. H. S .
" T H E NAVY AND DEFENCE."
The Autobriography of
ADMIRAL
OF THE FLEET
LORDCHATFIELD,
P . C . . G . C . B . , O.M., ETC.
(William Heinemann. 15s.)
MANYnaval and military officers who have risen to high rank write their memoirs and reminiscences
which usually take the form of a record of social and sporting events interspersed with the telling of
Service chestnuts. A man must write the book he wants to. At the same time one may fairly feel that
a man who has enjoyed the great prizes of his Service should write something which aims a t being of
use t o those who make a study of Service problems and to officers endeavouring to rise in their turn
t o the top. Percy Scott, Dewar, Jellicoe and Bacon have all written books of the latter type which
are worn and well-thumbed volumes with the student of naval questions. Lord Chatfield's book
inclines t o this category, but in the main the problems he discusses are administrative, organisational
and material. H e does not penetrate into the higher sphere of the art of command in war and what
appertains thereto. This no doubt reflects the fact that he never commanded in war and that, except
for some few months, his service in command of a ship was as flag-captain.
Our author had a uniformly successful career ; the reasons emerge clearly from the book. The
foundation of it all was a character of flawless integrity and a high sense of honour. Contributing factors
were that the Service suited h i m ; he was not irked by its disadvantages. He has an even, steady
outlook on life, a good understanding of human nature which made him able to impose discipline and
administer punishment impartially and without personal rancour. He seems to have been able t o
submit to the restraints on personal inclinations and tastes which are imposed by a life devoted to an
honourable ambition without undergoing any mental rebellions which he could not easily control.
Above all he was blessed with a strong, well-balanced intelligence, without any trace of that canker
of genius which has wrecked the advancement of many a better brain and which is so peculiarly disastrous in the naval profession. Chatfield's feet were always firmly planted on the ground, his mind
well in control of his actions. He made no excursions into cloud cuckoo land.
Chatfield's first ship was the Warspite under Admiral Hotham in the Pacific. This was in the early
'nineties when the minds of the older officers " were still embedded in sails . . . they hated engines and
modern guns ; the mine and torpedo were anathema to them." A fine tribute is paid to " these great
old seamen " who " had carried on the traditions of their own old leaders " and who now, imbued with
" a sense of being on the threshold of great events, yet an unconscious.resistance to their arrival," felt
their world passing away from them. Change is always difficult in the Navy.
I n the Warspite Chatfield met with the only reverse in fortune which seems to have befallen him.
He began as he was to go on, full of self-confidence, determined to learn his profession, already understanding the value of gaining all possible experience, welcoming responsibility, able to make up his
mind. A more obvious case for a first class in seamanship never drank cocoa in the middle watch.
The captain who presided a t his board was a fool and a bully who, to his own great discredit, gave
Chatfield a second class. I t was a shocking thing that a boy should be a t the mercy of such a man
after four years of hard work and good conduct. Had he had less balance the episode might have
thrown him out of his stride. As it was, no harm was done. Moreover, things often cancel out. On
the only occasion when Chatfield seems to have displayed equal lack of seamanship and commonsense,
and road-hogged up and down the Thames in a destroyer to a cricket match and back, he might with
complete propriety have been court-martialled, but escaped with the statutory notice of their Lordships,
displeasure. After the setback in seamanship the other firsts followed automatically. Gunnery was
the inevitable road for a mind inclined t o formalism, exactitude and matkriel. In this connection i t
is interesting to notice that our author, a great lover of sport and games, believes that fishing requires
a tactical mind and that chess is good mental training for the strategist. I t would be truer t o say
that fishing trains one's patience and chess one's memory. The idea that chess is an intellectual pursuit is a strange fable. I t is a facility, somewhat akin to a facility for languages, which is no proof of
intelligence. Having qualified, Chatfield found himself a t the opening of this century gunnery lieutenant of the Caesar, a smart ship in the Mediterranean Fleet which he was one day t o command. He
not only rendered unto Caesar the things which were Caesar's, but spent upon Caesar's guns the money
he had dreamed of devoting to polo. The time of renaissance in the Navy was a t hand, a time of
transition not only in matter but in mind. Over-confidence in our supremacy a t sea was beginning
to give way to awkward questionings if all was well. There was a restlessness of mind in the fleet.
Germany was seriously building a great navy. This gave the young school the incentive it was seeking.
There were even heretics who ventured to doubt if to be first ship in Monday morning's obsolescent
drills, or to be the best painted ship, compensated for an inability to hit the target. Gunnery was
beginning to come into its own, and not a moment too soon. The gunnery versus paintwork struggle
was t o be a long and bitter one, making some careers and wrecking others. I t was a time when there
was a surge of feeling towards modern appliances and technique, when the heresy of gunnery became
a new religion, when admirals ceased to be quite so dominant as i t was seen that the tactical use of new
weapons would not be guided by them alone. " 1900-1914 was a period of effort, of trial and experiment of a nature the senior Service had never known in its history." In it Chatfield played a serviceable part on the side of righteousness. H e tells the story of those years when the old was yielding
to the new, but it is a story which has been told once and for all by Percy Scott and it gains nothing
in this re-telling. Sir John Fisher arrived to command the fleet. Remorseless in his hatreds, he did
not lead but drove. Determined to budge the Navy from its old ways, he forced the captains to know
their job. Knowing most things he knew he had a good instrument in Chatfield, encouraged him and
used him to further his ideas when these were concerned with gunnery. Altogether life was well set
for the young gunnery lieutenant when suddenly he was translated to Sheerness. This is a convenient
point a t which to point out a marked feature in Chatfield's career. I n America the business doctor
is a well-known character. He goes to one sick business after another, locating their troubles and setting
them on their feet. So with Chatfield-if a ship or establishment had got into slack and evi1,ways
he was very apt, as we shall see, to be sent for. Sheerness Gunnery School was in " poor order and
" lacked ginger and enthusiasm." Chatfield pulled i t round in spite of a captain who had no waking
thought outside cricket, and found time to practice archery also. He had his reward in an appointment
to the Good Hope which, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Wilmot Fawkes, took Joseph Chamberlain
to the Cape. In this ship he was promoted t o commander a t thirty years of age. He was over the
first hurdle nice and early, and was appointed to the Venerable, flagship of Admiral Custance in the
Mediterranean. The Venerable, which (1904) was carrying out a series of gun trials to determine if
gunfire was to be controlled by a centralized system or independently by gunlayers and battery officers,
" was in poor order," her captain and the Admiral " were unhappy." The previous commander had
been a failure ; there was not even a station bill in the ship, she was the last a t drills, her decks had
never been holystoned. One cannat help feeling that the captain must have been as negligent as the
commander to tolerate such a state of affairs. The Admiral, notoriously an odd little man, did not
make things easy, being absorbed in the trials and also ignorant of what is entailed in running a ship.
Chatfield's good sense and ability pulled things round. Monday morning drill seems to have afforded
him immense happiness. Living those days over again when he was feeling his feet as a young and
successful man, his spirit soars and he observes : "nothing is impossible a t sea ; the smaller force
may crush the greater if it is .aided by the fighting inspiration which a great leader, a desperate chance,
a fight against odds can give." These are stirring words, slightly in the Balaclava manner, but an
obstinate conviction reina5ns that smaller forces have been having a rather bad time and that foresight
before a war works out better than inspiration during its progress. Another dictum that " the Navy
is the most rapidly moved weapon in the world " may or may not commend itself to Lord Trenchard.
Admiral Custance, having solved the self-evident problem of the trials in favour of ,centralized fire
control, passed on his way and was succeeded by an admiral whose only serious qualification for
command seems t o have been a command of language which he liked fo display sitting in his pyjamas
on the after-capstan. With war eight years away the second-in-command appointed by the Admiralty
to our principal fleet " was a decade behind the times and took little interest in modern things." His
cabin " literally swarmed with Siamese cats." He " had glass tanks in his gunports full of frogs and
strange fish . . . the cabin was kept a t a temperature of about 95' Fahrenheit and was painfully odorous."
Unsuccessful ministers frequently arrive in the House of Lords, a process known as kicking upstairs.
The Navy of old seems to have known the same practice. The commander who had reduced the
Venerable to dirt and slackness had left her to go to Whale Island, a promotion billet. Not unnaturally
Whale Island had gone slack also, and once again Dr. Chatfield was sent for to put the same man's work
right for a second time. I t was a congenial appointment, for our author's mind has its responses to
gaiters, the use of the human voice and the drill ground. Once again the trick was done, Whale Island
ceased to bring a blush to the gunnery cheek and could look itself in the face without shame. Once
more Chatfield had his rewards, this time from Cupid as well as from Mars, for in three short months
he got engaged, promoted to captain a t thirty-five, and married ; the second hurdle had been surmounted and first prize won in the great lottery. His next appointment, flag captain to Colin Keppel
in the Albewzarle in the Atlantic Fleet may well have been a decisive one, for here he met David Beatty.
then a young, but outstanding, captain in the Queen, who no doubt formed his own opinion of Chatfield.
Prince Louis of Battenburg was in C.-in-C.,and there is an interesting pen picture of him admonishing his
captains " some of them . . . elderly gentlemen, unable to march with the times, but . . . happy in command of their ships." One is glad they were happy, but war was now only four years off.
After the Albelnarle came the War College and another meeting with Beatty, now a rear-admiral.
Then a trip to India in the Medina with the King and Queen. Years ahead Chatfield was to go t o
India in a political capacity. On this occasion he records no impressions whatever.
I t was now 1912, and destiny began to work fast. Our young captain, as is the way with young
captains, wanted a cruiser. He went to the Admiralty to try his luck. David Beatty was Naval
Secretary. He not only gave him his cruiser but asked him to accompany him as flag captain when
he hoisted his flag during manoeuvres. Thus began one of those associations, such as that between
Foch and Weygand, of two men whose qualities are complementary and blend into an effective unity.
Jellicoe and Madden were too much alike. Beatty and Chatfield each had what the other lacked, and
between them they did great things. This principle of complementary characters working together
ought to be adopted and not left entirely to chance. Many of the difficulties, for instance, which inevitably occur when trying to select the right man for C.N.S. would disappear if the appointment of the
V.C.N.S. to go with him were considered a t the same time. Chatfield was far more than a loyal and
devoted flag captain to Beatty. He gave Beatty something without which Beatty would have been
less than he was. But while the association led Chatfield on to great heights it robbed him of the opportunity of independent command in war time, the supreme test and the making of the full sea officer.
Manoeuvres ended, and Beatty had, no doubt, made his decision. In March, 1913, Chatfield became his
flag captain when he hoisted his flag in the L.ion, in command of the battle cruisers. " I began a t that
moment to develop a curious, instinctive feeling, which steadily grew, that I was destined to rise t o
the top." I t would be unfair to the author (who, after all, wants people to buy his book !) to say anything of the fascinating pictures he gives of his admiral. They are given without hero-worship but
with a n impressively sincere and balanced admiration, and confirm one's own impressions of a man
with true elements of greatness in him. Beatty insisted on exercises a t full speed, Chatfield upon
firing practices a t long ranges " not then envisaged by the Admiralty." These were the right ideas,
but not all the captains liked them. In fact the Commander-in-Chief himself did not like the long range
firing, but Beatty eventually got his consent. Training on modern, progressive lines proceeded apace.
The idea of Beatty as " a mere Prince Rupert " is dispelled once and for all, and we see him as a thoughtful strategist and tactician, his mind concentrated on preparing his command for war.
There is not very much which is new in what Chatfield tells us of the war, and matters of controversy
are in the main avoided. The personal impressions have their interest, and we learn something of
" things which, had the authorities a t the Admiralty and a t sea been able to see earlier and more clearly,
might have had a great effect on naval history." With the U-boat the menace that it is today it is of
interest to notice that in 1914 submarines " were not looked upon by the average naval officer as a
serious menace." Chatfield points out that the fleet was never seriously menaced by the U-boat but
that we saw " defeat by submarine attack on the Merchant Navy staring us in the face." His remark
that " naval skill was finally to save the country " may awaken echoes of the old controversy as to
whether the Admiralty did or did not opposy, convoy. After Heligoland Bight the expenditure of
ammunition was stated to be " unacceptable to their Lordships which " showed a target practice
rather than a fighting mentality a t the Admiralty." In consequence economy prevailed a t Dogger
Bank when, by a greater expenditure of ammunition, more complete results might have been obtained."
With the loss of the Royal Oak in our minds the story of the Grand Fleet " homeless and insecure "
because Scapa Flow was not safe is of melancholy interest. The account of the Dogger Bank is of
interest for two remarks. The enemy's range wzs continually being lost " due to our lack of practised
skill in estimating i t a t those ranges and high speed." This is complemented by the statement that
onceaction is joined the admiral and captaincan contribute little "except to keep on steering in order
to close the range to the utmost and keep the ship steady on her course so as to make it easier for
"
"j
4
3=
I
II
the gun-layers. What you have put into the ship in training she will give again, no more, no less."
But surely there is more to the "Art of the Admiral " than this.
In the period immediately before Jutland Chatfield tells of a growing feeling of confidence in the
fleet, due to intensive training and the addition of many ships. The Navy felt proud of the weapon it
had created, " the shocks we were to receive shortly came like a bolt from the blue. We were yet to
learn how great can be the result in modern naval warfare of even a single material defect ; that even
courage and fighting efficiency can sometimes be neutralised by it." What becomes of the remark of
the Caesar's commander that nothing is impossible a t sea "? No new light is thrown on the handling
of affairs a t Jutland. The account given is objective, and controversial matters are avoided. One
matter of great interest is dealt with. Chatfield describes Arbuthnot's handling of his armoured cruisers.
He had some time before discussed with Arbuthnot how the latter would bring his squadron into action,
and was disconcerted by what he heard. His fears were justified in the event, but one wonders what
steps he took to bring the matter to the notice of those who could insist upon what was fatally dangerous
not being done. Summing up the action Chatfield observes that " Jellicoe acted with caution and the
world has fought battles on paper as to whether he was right or wrong." He cautiously adds " you will
probably act in emergency as you have trained yourself to act. The Battle Fleet could not envisage
and so had not been trained to meet, the peculiar conditions that it had suddenly to face in this fight.
I t had assumed, perhaps over confidently, that the action would take place in the circumstances in
which it was accustomed to exercise. . . . Most experienced commanders would probably have acted
a s did Sir John Jellicoe. His was a weapon on which the world depended . . . he was not prepared to
take immeasurable risks with it." The question arises of how far a Commander-in-Chief under such
circumstances has to think of the world situation. If the Admiralty has the consent of the Cabinet
for the Grand Fleet to go to sea and approves the movement to the C-in-C., has the latter any responsibility except to do his utmost to find and destroy the enemy ? Chatfield throws new light on
defects in our shell which came to light. The Admiralty was informed after the action of "grave doubts"
about our shell but returned a "re-assuring " reply. A chance conversation with a Swedish naval
officer revealed that German officers had said our armour-piercing shell broke to pieces on their armour.
Jellicoe re-opened the matter with the Admiralty who again scouted the idea that anything could be
wrong. Finally the Admiralty agreed to trials which revealed that our shell were designed t o penetrate
a t an impact of right angles to the armour plate and would not do a t a steep angle. Worse than this,
the shell rooms of the fleet contained shell which had failed to pass a test which was itself inadequate.
No victory could be looked for with the existing shell. New shell with a new filling were required,
and,.in the upshot these were supplied before the summer of 1918.
l h e intervening period was one of great anxiety. Some facts in this connection not recounted by
the author may be of interest. After Jutland the Board of Admiralty appointed a Committee to enquire
into the relative merits of British and German shell. This was due to a prevalent belief that our battle
cruisers had been sunk not because of defects in construction but because of the superiority of German shell.
The enquiry did not support this latter belief ; penetration through the armoured deck to the " vitals "
of the lost ships had not occurred. A few shell had penetrated the vertical armour. Our A.P. shell
were filled with lyddite and the German with T.N.T. Owing to the sensitiveness of lyddite our shell
would burst on impact without a fuze, but the detonation broke most of the metal of the shell into
comparatively small fragments. 10% of the German shell, fuzed, were said to fail to burst even on
thick armour. On this account the Admiralty preferred lyddite filling. I t appears probable that the
Admiralty were quite aware of the relative merits of lyddite and T.N.T., and a t what angles an A.P.
(capped) shell, filled lyddite, would perforate if merely brought up to weight without a burster, and that
it would detonate on striking armour 113 calibre thick a t all angles. The Germans had met with difficulty in getting A.P. shell with an insentitive T.N.T. filling to detonate, so that some 10% were
blind. Many, a t Jutland, passed through light armour without exploding. The Admiralty deliberately
chose lyddite as a burster in order to ensure detonation making our shell, on the whole, better than the
German. After Jutland it is probable that a more insentitive explosive for the burster, enabling the
projectile to hold together while penetrating armour, and a very accurately made delay action fuze
which would function after the shock of striking, were devised.
When Beatty succeeded Jellicoe as C.-in-C. he put Chatfield in charge of the gunnery of the Grand
Fleet, the principle of concentration of fire was introduced, many new and improved methods were tried
out and adopted, and the general fighting efficiency of the fleet greatly increased. Admiral Wemyss
had become First Sea Lord and wished t o carry out some re-organization of the Admiralty Staff.
Chatfield put forward the view that material progress was too much dominated by the producers of
material. They handed out a ship or a gun to the Navy and said, in effect, " get on with it." " Our
naval material had failed in many serious aspects." The time had come for the Navy to tell the
producer through the Admiralty what it needed. This view came to be generally accepted.
Chatfield saw the surrender of the German fleet as " a highly painful event " and envisaged " the
spirit of all past seamen writhing in dismay over this tragedy." May be ; may be not.
After the Armistice Wemyss held on a t the Admiralty, although Beatty had expected to relieve
him a t once. " Some friction arose " and Beatty discussed the matter " with some anger."
Meanwhile Chatfield, still a captain, became Fourth Sea Lord and found himself immersed in questions arising out of the new rates of pay, the granting of which had been scandalously delayed. The
vital question of oil reserves was also dealt with. He made acquaintance with the leisureliness of
Admiralty procedure, finding one paper of some importance which had been touring the departments
for a year. Beatty finally became First Sea Lord, Chatfield was promoted to rear-admiral and became
A.C.N.S. with two aims in his mind : to retain the principle of standardized training, and t o ensure
that the user of weapons, who was insufficiently represented a t the Admiralty, should be the directing
force in the production of naval material. Chatfield proposed to remedy this by putting the A.C.N.S.
"
to watch over the fighting efficiency of the fleet, circulating the lessons learned from the practices of
the two main fleets to all scattered squadrons and small forces. A tactical section recording and promulgating the experiences of all tactical exercises was instituted, thus ensuring that all fleets had the
benefit of the lessons learned by one. Further, it became the duty of the A.C.N.S. to advise the C.N.S.,
in co-operation with the Controller on gunnery, torpedo, signal and tactical requirements in relation
to new ships and weapons. These were wise and practical reforms which have stood the test of time
even if they have not entirely prevented failures and weaknesses on the material side. That side became
" not the master, but the skilled servant of the Fleet." The First Sea Lord, watching over the staff
and material sides, became the deciding authority between them. A Director of Scientific Research
was appointed with instructions to give priority to anti-submarine development. The research workers
and practical sailors worked hand in hand, and great strides were made. The problem of the Fleet
Air Arm also engaged Chatfield's attention, but in this volume he deals sketchily with it. The Air
Ministry was in control, but he did a t least form an Air Section of the Naval Staff. Disarmament was
the order of the day, and Chatfield went t o Washington for the great Conference. Disarmament and
economy forced difficult and harassing problems upon the Admiralty ; the axe-ing of officers, in particular, was a heart-breaking business. We are assured here that Service ability and no other consideration decided who should go. The author defends specia.lization and does not agree that the
specialist officer need cease to be a good seaman, while his high technical training will always stand
him in good stead.
After these years of fruitful work a t the Admiralty Chatfield took command of 'the Third Cruiser
Squadron in the Mediterranean and was a t Constantinople during the months preceding the Lausanne
Conference. There was plenty of work t o do, but these two years must have been halcyon days after
the high pressure work during the war and a t the Admiralty. They passed all too quickly and then
it was the Admiralty again, this time as Controller and t o say the final good-bye to Beatty who slipped
away " without acclaim or ceremony " after 74 years of struggle for the Navy during one of its most
difficult periods. Then came command of the Atlantic Fleet and finally the Blue Riband of the Navy,
C-in-C. Mediterranean. Amongst his experiences here Chatfield speaks in biting terms of " staff work
run mad," an outburst occasioned by his finding on sailing from Malta that his staff had settled what
was to be done on the cruise long in advance. I n particular it annoyed Chatfield t o find that the hands
were to bathe a t 5 p.m. next day. He plaintively enquired who could tell him what would be happening
a t 5 p.m. next day ? There is much force in what he has to say about " staff mentality," but it is rather
less than the whole story and the comparison between naval and army staff work is not entirely convincing. Chatfield pictures army operations as of necessity governed by detailed orders. In fact
this applies principally t o what takes place before the battle. Troops and supplies must arrive a t the
right spot a t the right time. Armoured and infantry divisions moving a t different speeds must not
interfere with each other. Ammunition must be dumped ready for the guns to perform their tasks.
Roads and traffic routes have t o be reconnoitred and allocated. Bridging must be available to replace
demolitions. The Navy has none of these problems. But once the battle is joined the Commander
is allowed the greatest freedom. Orders for the actual attack may consist of only half-a-dozen lines.
The suggestion which Chatfield appears to make that a Corps Commander is given detailed instructions
on how to act in a situation which may never arise is in fact inconceivable. But as such a Commander
is always tied down by such factors as state of roads and railways, terrain, availability of petrol and
supplies, he must to some extent plan his moves ahead. This chapter of the book will repay very close
study, in the course of which i t will be noticed that Chatfield's defence of the specialist is qualihecl
as regards the " intellectually-minded officers " who " rushed to this new opportunity," i.e. stafI work,
and so " tended to develop the strategic mind a t the expense of the training in leadership." He found
in the Mediterranean Fleet a tendency " t o over-organize, t o pre-arrange everything . . . so that nothing
remained for the C-in-C. . . . except to look a t the clock and then turn to the printed orders for the
cruise and see what was laid down to be done next." In this state of affairs he discerned a tendency
to sap initiative. The remarks and criticisms are fairly put ; but they are those of a man with a great
liking for doing things himself in his own way and with a great belief that initiative and improvization
will solve almost any situation.
It is a pleasure to read of this fine sailor enjoying his reward on his favourite cruising ground ant1
delighting in all that comes the way of the man who flies his flag in what is called, or used to be, the
Flagship of the World. But yet greater responsibilities lay ahead, and the offer to become First Sea
Lord came to him as was inevitable and right. The story of what he did in that office is to form the
subject of another volume, when we shall hear also of his brief but spectacular political career, in which he
rose like a rocket t o the eminence of the War Cabinet and descended with equal suddenness. Not
everything seems to be so well done a t present that there should be no room for a man of so much
experience and administrative capacity.
The principal thought left with the reviewer is this. How lucky were young officers who came
under Chatfield's leadership and guidance. How many young officers have failed because a t the formative period of their lives they served under officers who did nothing to bring them on. No duty seems
to have been nearer Chatfield's heart than that of setting a n example of leadership, fidelity to duty
and character. The passages on the spirit of the Navy, on the character of the sailor and on our national
characteristics are animated by a generous and manly nature. He writes now " to hand on to the young
seaman what 1 have learnt " and " to inspire him t o get the best out of himself." I'erhaps the main
lesson to be learned from this story of a fine career is that quite obviously from the time he joined his
first ship as a midshipman the author inspired the instinctive trust of the officers with whom he came
in contact because in all walks of life and duty, in great things and in small, he was above everything
a man who could be relied upon.
WINSTER.
" DESTROYER'S WAR."
A Million Miles by the Eighth Flotilla.
By A. D. DIVINE, D.S.M.
(John Murray. 6s.)
THISis a n account of the war as seen from H.M.S. Firedrake. It is a good account, with just sufficient
external detail to make it easy for the reader ; but it is not a history of the Eighth Flotilla's million
miles, and the much maligned staff of that flotilla would probably have some pretty caustic minutes t o
write on it if it was passed through the office as such. Apart from that and a few minor errors, probably
misprints or facts not fully known t o the writer, there is little one could find to carp a t in this book. Few
people, few destroyer officers anyway, would want to ; for, as an account of a destroyer's war, it
is good and fairly typical. The Firedrake was in most things and, with the rest of the flotilla, lived a
hard life ; but they were a lucky flotilla and, though they saw plenty of action, their losses seem t o
have been s1ight.l
Mr. Divine knows his Navy, and particularly the destroyers, well, and he writes without heroics
or sentimentality. There is, in fact, a pleasant sense of restraint, which brings out his point much better.
The air attack passages, for instance, are very true t o life and, knowing the actors, one can appreciate
the value a t the time of that conversation on restoring old houses. But here I do differ from the author.
I am sure there was some tension on the bridge ; unless, of course, the planes were obviously not passing
over the ship. I t is remarkable how detached one can feel on the screen when bombs fall near the battle
fleet. Sometimes, it is true, detachment breaks down. I t certainly broke on board the two destroyers
who were screening the Illustviot~safter she was first hit, while what seemed to be hundreds of dive
bombers peeled off a t her in an apparently endless stream. The destroyers realized early on that they
were not in the target area ; but they could do little or nothing t o help because they had no suitable
armament. It was maddening. The author mentions this lack of armament in his chapter on Narvik,
and indeed it is a fact we should do well to remember-that during the early part of the war, when enemy
aircraft were almost unchallenged by our fighters, few, very few, of our destroyers had adequate guns
for self-defence against aircraft.
There is another point, too, which I think should be made and which this book, like much else which
has been published, tends to obscure. Italian tactics and strategy may have been bad ; but their
gunnery and bombing were by no means to be treated lightly. Many beautiful high-level bombing
attacks completely smothered their targets in bomb splashes ; many well-directed salvoes straddled ;
but what the Italians lacked was the skill, or the luck, to convert those straddles into hits. I t is to be
hoped that their ill-success will continue ; but, even so, fighting Italians is not quite like taking candy
from a kid, and too much harping on their failure to make the most of their opportunities is a p t to give
a wrong impression to the unthinking. They are liable t o ask why our own ships in the Mediterranean
have not done more instead of asking how they have-against vastly superior forces above, below and
on the surface-managed to do so much.
Mr. Divine brings out rather well, perhaps too well, the unendingness of the destroyer's work.
Between the wars destroyer officers used to say that destroyers were " in on everything " ; if anyone
was exercising, battleships, cruisers, carriers, submarines or aircraft, they needed destroyers to
co-operate ; if there were riots in Palestine, wars in Spain, wrecks in the Atlantic-destroyers lent a
hand. So the destroyer officers got a very good grounding in general fleet work and a very fair idea of
the special requirements and problems of the different units of the fleet, as well as leafping their own job,;
Destroyer's War
and they gained, too, a certain amount of extraneous but very useful experience.
helps to show how this same trend has continued in war, it helps t o show how valuable has been the
destroyer's versatility, and how necessary.
I t is a curious thing that this very versatility produces a certain narrowness of outlook, a sort of
" sufficient unto ;he day " philosophy.
Destroyy people do not look ahead too much ; they may think
and talk of the next patrol," " next sweep," next boiler clean "-things of the immediate future
which require some attention. Of next year or even six months hence they speculate little. They are
concerned, on the whole, with the present and immediate future with this patrol, this sweep and this
submarine hunt. May be it is not altogethg good thing,,put I remember part of a speech t o destroyer
Gentlemen, he said, or words to that effect, "I regard
officers by a certain distinguished admiral.
my destroyers as my cavalry. And I should have no hesitation in losing the lot if i t were necessary t o
sink the enemy battlefleet or save our own." Perhaps under those conditions destroyer officers should
not look ahead too much-but they truqted t h a t admiral further than most.
But this is a review, not a n article.
The best parts of the book are, rightly, those covered by the author's own stay on board, and he has
most nobly refrained from embroidering the other parts. The air attack on Scapa, for instance, isapart just possibly from the quartermaster's remark-a completely unvarnished tale. The author was
not there, but it happened exactly like that.
Of the author's own stories the triumph of restraint is the second " Christmas Flap." Your reviewer,
with the comfortable knowledge that the boilers of his own ship were opened up, watched it with delighted
amazement, which turned rapidly t o a fearful admiration--ad everyjender was put over the side 1 But
then we, too, had been entertaining the petty officers.
The loss of the Firedrake has since been announced.
'
78
"
WE SAILED IN CONVOY."
Whether this book will go down well with the public I do not profess t o know : I hope it does, but
whether it will help them to understand what life in destroyers is like I rather doubt. I t is, I think,
quite impossible to make people who go home to their families every night, even if they do go to the
"Anderson," realize quite what it means to be in two watches and wet for days a t a time ; to come in,
and then-just as you have oiled, are expecting the mail and libertymen are cleaning-be sent out to
do it again. But this book may help. Finally, destroyer officers will, I think, like it and enjoy capping
the stories ; flotilla staff officers will be amused by parts of it ; other officers, and men too, would come
t o no harm from reading it.
HUNT.
"
W E SAILED I N CONVOY ."
By MAURICEBROWN. ,
(Hutchinson & Co. 6s.)
THISis an interesting little book, written by an author with a n interesting background. Mr. Brown
is apparently on the staff of the B.B.C. as a producer of radio plays, is a musical critic and has an obvious
passion for the sea, with experience of yacht cruising. The story he tells is of a voyage to New York
and back via Halifax in the autumn of 1941 in company with a colleague of the B.B.C. and Frank Laskier,
the merchant seaman whose remarkable broadcasts are probably familiar to us all.
The ship in which they sail is a tramp steamer of 5,500 tons gross, built in America in 1918 as one
of the U.S. Emergency Fleet ; now owned and manned by a Whitby firm of shipowners. The ship
is well found in the way of accommodation, but has her share of engine troubles.
No enemy is seen during the round trip, and this enhances the value of the story, which brings out
the strain of convoy sailing in " Winter, North Atlantic," in its least complisated form.
An incident during the homeward voyage, when the ship has t o heave t o in order t o secure a shifting
deck cargo, and is in danger of losing the convo,y, gives an interesting sidelight on straggling from the
straggler's point of view. The pages describing this incident ring very true indeed, and leave no doubt
whatever that the danger to the unescorted tramp is now only too fully realized by those on board.
The author, writing from a comfortable and well-fed ship, makes some scathing criticisms of the
conditions and amenities in the average old British-built tramp. That his remarks are not made from
first-hand experience does not detract from the fact that all sailors know them to be generally true,
and it is to be hoped that they will sink into the minds of the general public for which the book is mainly
written.
Mr. Brown is much impressed by the skill and knowledge required by the merchant seaman, whether
officer or rating, and refutes vigorously the shore-going idea that " it would be a pity to send the chap
to sea if he has any intelligence." We haven't changed much since the days of Mr. Midshipman Easy.
Mr. Brown also has some remarks to make about the running of seamen's clubs ashore, particularly
how their amenities and good-will can be spoilt by the behaviour of a few bad hats unless the management
is very firm and the " chuckers-out " well up t o their job. It must be a difficult business, and emphasizes
our blessings in being able t o provide a patrol.
A pleasant feature of the book is the family atmosphere of the ship, a large proportion of whose
company hail from Whitby, and are connected by domestic and social ties. Canadian regard for their
welfare while in Halifax also makes pleasant reading.
The author naturally makes but few remarks about the Navy, but those few are very much to our
credit and I hope that they are a reflection of the general feeling of the ship in which he sailed.
There is a n " interlude " describing life in New York just before Pearl Harbour, which is in the
nature of padding, and is of no special interest to naval readers.
Mr. Brown writes in the rather personal style used by journalists describing their experiences,
which seems t o be very popular just now. I t is quite easy to read and is illustrated by photographs
which do not add much t o one's knowledge.
As stated above, the book is primarily written for the general public ; but it is worth borrowing for a n
evening's readjng in order t o get a general impression of what is going on inside those slow, unhandy,
and weatherworn ships we sometimes accompany.
R.S.
" SEA FLYERS."
By C. G. GREY.
(Faber and Faber. 1942. 8s. 6d.)
"
~ ~ E C E N T La
Y highbrow
WITS END."
periodical remarked editor~allythat, if it chose to print large sections of pre-war
Bradshaw upside down, it could still sell its full permitted quota of coples This frank admission of
the effect of war-time restrictions on literary quality is one that wiU bear being kept in mind by readers
and by reviewers, there are indications that Q few of the publlshlng houses are beginning to think on
similar lines.
Mr. C. G. Grey was editor of " The Aeroplane " until 1939, and nearly all the pioneers of aviation
are or were personally known to him. His qualifications for writing the present hook are therefore
exceptional ; all the same, I feel bound t o reniark that it could have been so much better written.
The frontispiece is characteristic of the book, for i t is three parts right and one part wrong. I t
contains the photographs of the four persons who, in the author's estimation, created sea-flying or made
it possible. We should not quarrel with the inclusion of Rear Admiral Sir Murray Sneter-first head
of the Naval Air Department--in this gallery ; and thoughtful persons would probably not insist on
the exclusion of Brigadier-General William Mitchell of the U.S. Army Air Corps. Technicians would
applaud the recognition accorded to Mr. Glenn Curtiss. Rut the fourth person-well really! guess
who . . . The fourth person is he who in the past decade has done more than anyone, except perhaps
the enemy, t o hinder British naval aviation. Those ~ h require
o
further enlightenment on the identity
of this pioneer must obtain i t from Mr. Grey's pages.
The book is divided into forty jerky chapters, many of which bear little relation t o their headings,
and some of which could well have been omitted altogether, and is written throughout in the author's
familiar colloquial style. King Charles' head recurs continually, and is ?,ot t o be exorcised by the cry
of " Donkeys !" or even " Donkey !" For Mr. Grey, it takes the form of the boneheaded Admirals,"
a terrible body of Blimps who have done and are doing all they can to preserve the Navy from contamination by the new-fangled air weapon. There is also a curious obsession, continually repeated,
that the Admiralty is in no way controlled as regards its financial expenditure by the Treasury.
In its beginnings, Service aviation in this country was divided between airships, which the Committee of Imperial Defence decided in 1908 should be the province of the Admiralty ; and aeroplanes,
which were relegated to the Army. No machine capable of flying off or alighting on the water had yet
been produced, and not until January, 1911, did Glenn Curtiss make the first seaplane flight. I t was
about that time that their Lordships arranged for four naval officers to learn to fly under the Royal
.kero Club, though one officer, Lieutenant R. R. B. Colmore, had already done so in 1910 a t his own
expense. The four were Lieutenants C. R. Samson, R. Gregory and A. M. Longmore, R.N., and
Lieutenant E. L . Gerrard, R.M.L.I. ; and they had all obtained their certificates by May, 1911. They
were followed by Lieutenants R. Bell Davies, Spenser D. A. Grey, and R. H. Clark-Hall. Next came
Sub-Lieutenant F. E . T. Hewlett, taught by his mother ; then Captain R. Gordon, R.M.L.I. (at his
own expense), Engineer-Lieutenant C. R. J . Randall, Commander Oliver .%hwann, Sub-Lieutenant
C. H . K . Edmonds and Captain Godfrey M. Paine. The last-named became the first Commandant of
the Central Flying School formed a t Upavon on the creation in 1912 of the Royal Flying Corps, whose
Naval Wing was established a t Eastchurch and Military Wing a t Famborough.
I t is right that these names should be recalled and that they should be reprinted here. Mr. Grey
knew all these pioneers, though whether he has remembered their initials and ranks correctly I am not
a t present in a position to confirm, being stricken t o my couch by a calenture and prevented from
consulting the ancient Navy List which I ordinarily use t o check such details.' It is also fitting t o
remember that our present Prime Minister--then First Lord-took a course of flying instruction a t
Eastchurch a t that time.
As a first step, Naval Air Stations were formed a t Yarmouth, Felixstowe and Calshot. Seaplanes
operating from these bases took part in the 1913 manoeuvres, but for some time the development of
ship-flying remained in a very rudimentary state. It must always be something of a puzzle why this
should have been so. By the end of 1911 the American aviator, Eugene Ely, had demonstrated that an
ordinary wheeled aeroplane could take off from and land on the deck of a warship specially modified for
the purpose. I t is fairly well known that the first deck-landing was made by Ely on the cruiser Pennsylvania on the 18th of November, 1911, with the ship a t her moorings ; not so well-known that she
was pointing down-wind for the occasion, so that Ely's touch-down air-speed of some 30 m.p.h. was
increased relative t o the dezk by a tail wind of 10 m.p.h. The exploit was therefore not only the first
of its kind, but also (it may be safely said) the last. I t was also distinguished by the provision of palisades, athwartships arrester-wires in conjunction with the use of a landing-hook, and a landing-net
a t the fore end of the deck.
The flying-off notion was taken up in this country soon afterwards, a number of ascents being made
from trackways or " scenic railways " erected over the fore-parts of several of the older battleships.
Also, in 1913 the old cruiser Hermes was thus fitted ; but this ship was sunk by a U-boat in the early
months of the Four Years' War. The general idea governing the use of aircraft from and as an integral
part of the main fleets was to use seaplanes which should be hoisted in and out as necessary by vessels
specially modified for this service. This was a farcical idea, and The Aeroplane," the soundness of
whose technical opinions has seldom been open t o question, said it was farcical in 1913-aircraft (it
insisted) must be made to fly oti the decks of warships ; as for the return, a catching apparatus might
be devised, but for the time being we could be satisfied if the machine pancaked alongside the carrier.
(Query : I s it still satisfactory that catafighters launched in 1943 should have t o pancake alongside, or
that their pilots should have to bale out after a victorious combat ? )
In the same year (1913) the first aircraft torpedo was dropped by Lieut.-Commander Longmore; -or
it is so stated by Mr. Grey; but one had supposed that the Italian pioneer, Guidoni, had been the first
in this field.
' The Hon. Editor has kindly checked
h e s e details ; Mr. Grey clearly had not done so.
The Royal Naval Air Service was created on the 1st of July, 1914, having then a strength of about
50 officers, 550 men and 100 aircraft. It was merged into the Royal Flying Corps on the 1st of April,
1918, having by that time expanded t o a strength of about 5,000 officers, 85,000 men and 2,500 aircraft.
Its officers might not command ships unless so appointed ; but reference to the aforesaid ancient Navy
List shows that most of the early seaplane carriers were in fact commanded by R.N.A.S. officers.
Mr. Grey gives some account of the work and expansion of the R.N.A.S., expressly paying tribute
to the engineer officers who gave it a technical superiority over the R.F.C. during the early years of the
war. He also pays tribute to the memory of Commander J . C. Porte, an officer who, although invalided
before 1914 with tuberculosis, had become a famous racing pilot a t Hendon and lived to do remarkable
work on the development of flying-boats. There are also some good stories, including the one about
the R.N.A.S. officer who tried to bomb the Goeben when she was aground off Nagara Point with a torpedo
warhead. The cream of that story, which is not here related, was that the torpedo officer of the parent
ship concerned was still getting letters from the Director of Armament Supply five years afterwards,
asking him t o explain how he accounted for having expended a warhead without a torpedo.
The chapter on the develpment of deck flying is expanded from a lecture given before the Royal
Aeronautical Society in 1931 by Squadron-Leader W. R. Dyke Acland. Even so it contains several
mistakes ; thus, in describing the first deck-landing made in August, 1917, by Squadron Commander
E . H . Dunning, D.S.C., it is not correct t o say that the pilot, having manoeuvred his aircraft from the
starboard side to the centre-line of the deck of the Furious, " throttled down and allowed the machine
to sink on the deck." A more serious error is the statement that wheel-brakes had been introduced on
deck-landing aircraft by the time that arrester gear was abandoned in 1925. This is altogether untrue,
the facts being that deck-flying was conducted in British carriers for a t least five years thereafter without
the provision of either method of deceleration. What is significant is the circumstance that arrester
gear, which is a coarse and brutal expedient, had to be re-introduced for stopping the aircraft afler they
had been equipped with wheel-brakes.
There is room for a reasoned survey of the development of aircraft carriers and the machines successively adopted for operating therefrom, though possibly not in pages " excluding the material aspects
of the technical sciences." Such a survey, whose beginnings are barely scratched by Mr. Grey's book,
would certainly contain mention of the remarkable method of catching turret-launched fighters on a
long jackstay stretched between two booms, evolved by Wing Commander H . Busteed and Flying Officer
" Teddie " Gerrard a t the Isle of Grain shortly after the close of the war-(see the remark about catafighters earlier in this Notice).
The rest of the book is taken up largely by a review of past and present types of ship-borne aircraft,
flying boats and airships. I t is interesting t o notice that the Fairey Fulmar, first mentioned in operations
in 1941, is a re-hash of a 1934 design. The Fairey Swordfish, as its appearance suggests, is built to a
1933 spezification ; and the author remarks : " that it should still be in use indicates a curious lack of
appreciation of modern warfare in those who have been during that period responsible for the development of the Fleet Air Arm a t the Admiralty."
Mr. Grey has a n affection for airships, and thinks they could be usefully employed t o maintain
continuous A/S patrols over the Atlantic sea-routes, as well as for fast transport. He envisages the use
of helium-filled ships driven by diesel motors, carrying fighter aeroplanes. The stark record of disaster
and tragedy that has marked almost every attempt'to make the airship serve as a useful vessel for any
the future of aircraft carriers, Mr. Grey sees them
purpose is not so easily forgotten as he hopes.
operating long-range heavy bombers fitted with slip-wing " or " scrap-wing " devices and helped off
the deck by rocket accelerators. The reviewer believes that the dice are now so heavily loaded against
ship-borne aircraft in the matter of performance, permissible landing speed and take-off run, and carrying
capacity that, by the end of this war, most of the fleet carriers will be equipped with fighter aircraft
only ; and that except in the Pacific the Navy's air striking force will be shore-based.
There is no index, which is a pity in view of the many names of pioneers contained, but there is a
fairly comprehensive contents list. The photographs are excellent, though a few are wrongly described.
The " Times " critic called the book " rambling and untidy," which was, I think, fair comment ; but
it is worth getting hold of because it is the first attempt (however slipshod) that anyone has made to
cover this field.
9
If merit is any criterion, Lieutenant Moore's book-"Wits Endu--should be noticed before Mr. Grey's
latest dud. It is a novel about the Fleet Air Arm. At about the time of the fall of France, a Swordfish
squadron is sent t o a coastal aerodrome (sorry, airfield) for a rest. As things turn out, rest is about the
one thing it does not get. A minelaying flight ; an appalling raid on the station by Stukas ; a forlorn
hope attack, without fighter escort, on German invasion barges in a French port-these are some of the
scenes. They are well told and well knit. Lieutenant Moore, when not engaged as a naval officer, is
one of those writin' fellers ; and it is fairly plain that he knows his job-his job as a writer, I mean ; I
cannot speak as to his aviation efficiency. But it is a striking, and (to me) a welcome feature of this
book that it puts the observers in their right place, namely the back seat. Rut alas, truth is stranger
than fiction, and 1 a m afraid that in real life this tail has been allowed t o wag the dog to a n altogether
fantastic extent.'
461.
l Lieutenant Moore's latest book, " The Fleet Air Arm," appeared too late for notice in this issue ;
but I hope to deal with it in the May number. At a first glance, it is a much better buy than Mr. Grey's
work-461.
" W E LANDED AT DAWN."
By A. B. AUSTIN.
(Gollancz. 7s. 6d.)
IT has been said that " those who can, do ; those who can't, teach." As a reviewer of Mr. Austin's book
I feel like the teacher in such a case, for, although I was present throughoy? a large proportion of the
events described in this book and was, probably, much more " in the know than the author, I read it
with the greatest interest and pleasure. The story was stale to me ; much of it had appeared in the
daily Press ; much of the rest I knew already ; but I read it as one reads a good thriller. They say of
Crime Club novels, " I t is impossible to put this book down until finished," and I found it true of
" We landed a t Dawn."
The author's preface calls the book " the story of a landing on Hitler's France " and " a piece of
straight reporting." I wish that one could be certain that reporting would always be as accurate, well
informed, unprejudiced and security-conscious. Which is high praise, or meant to be, and intended
to show that Mr. Austin, who is the author of " Fighter Command," has judgment as well as skill in
writing-not that I, personally, always agree with his judgments. But, in spite of the preface, this little
book is more than a well-written and readable account of the Army's part in the Dieppe raid ; it is the
story of a Combined Operation as such and, though the author was attached to the Army and so, naturally,
describes things largely from the soldier's viewpoint, there is no undue emphasis on the work of any one
Service. That, in itself, is an achievement and, even for Mr. Austin with his intimate knowledge of
R.A.F. and Army and obvious familiarity with the Navy, must have been extremely difficult. Indeed
his knowledge of the R.A.F.'s problem is so much wider than mine that I hesitate to disagree with his
view that " the real importance of Dieppe is in the air," particularly as my judgment is liable to be
clouded by a minute gap in the " faultless fighter protection " of which he speaks. But, as I am in his
school of thought on the question of bomber preparation and support, I gladly waive my claim to the
insertion of the word " almost " ; perhaps it was only left out because the sentence includes it once.
Apart from that-perhaps personal-disagreement, the only criticism that I, as a naval officer, can fairly
make on the general tone of the book is that the author is really too kind and too appreciative of the
Navy. For it was the unexpected encounter with the enemy convoy which caused the chief setback
of the day.' Still, one does not have to agree with all the author's contentions to admit that the last
chapter of the book, " One foe, one fight, one force," is of itself a valuable contribution to the cause of
inter-service co-operation, and that singleness of outlook which the three Services must try t o achieve.
All the same, I doubt if we had quite that: complete singleness of outlook a t Dieppe, and I am fairly sure
that it was Captain Hughes Hallett, not General Roberts, who decided on the " last search for men in
the water, or on the beaches." Maybe it is a misprint, but t o naval eyes it looks odd.
Although " W e landed a t Dawn " covers a period of some three months, may be more, from the
author's first attachment to a beach-head or assault battalion until the Dieppe raid, the book hangs
together so well that one finds it difficult to single out particular sections or,incidents for mention.
I think this is a point worth noting, for I defy anyone not actually present to place " with certainty
any individual incident---except of course during the raid itself. The author shows a remarkable flair
for security, a flair less common in war correspondents than one might wish, and his chapter on careless
talk is only too true. Any officer who has done censoring will readily agree that, as the senior officer
said, " Love is unofficial enemy agent number one " ; particularly when he remembers that conversations, unlike letters, are not censored. The author's success in disguising facts and incidents without
once deviating from the titeral truth is most masterly. He covered his own tracks pretty well, too.
The day before the Dieppe raid a naval press officer asked one of the author's civilian colleagues, in my
presence, if he had any idea where Austin was. The reply was that he was " away on one of these
battle drill courses somewhere."
There are innumerable points which give one food for thought but which are unsuitable for discussion
here ; indeed, a review is not the place to do so. Amongst these are the great stress laid on prior training
for the.assault troops, whom we might well emulate more closely in this respect : the fact that No. 4
Commando did not tie their prisoners ; the moral value of smoke screens ; the apparent reliance on
WIT and R/T for communication between forces ; the forethought of the commando officers-and
incidentally the mess-bill collecting ship's doctor ; the use of mortars ; the importance of tactical
surprise ; the over-riding dependence on weather conditions. But I am not writing a n index.
There is one thing which I found curious. The lack of hunger amongst the returning commando
troops. Possibly it may be something t o do with the motion of landing craft, for my personal experience
was exactly the opposite. I ate several huge bully beef sandwiches and two extremely sticky slabs
of chocolate ; the tea was, of course, inevitable.
I confidently recommend this book t o naval officers, not only because it is a good book, with excellent
illustrations, and plenty of light as well as exciting passages, but because it is our job to supply, support,
carry, convoy and generally help the Army, and we cannot learn too much about tneir side of tnu business.
I hope that I have not given the impression that it is heavy. I t is far from that in any sense ; in fact it
is in the category classed " To be read for pleasure and studied for profit."
HUNT.
1 N.R., November, 1942. " Fauteuil's " figures a t the foot of page 277 and on page 278 require
revision. The odds against were really very high indeed, very much higher than one would expect,
though the reason for this is probably not yet releasable. But that the encounter did take place must
obviously remain a naval responsibility.
" MALTA INVICTA."
By " BARTIMEUS."
(Chatto & Windus. Is.)
THEgreat Mr. Whitaker gives a list of " Recipients of the George Cross " in his Almanac for 1943, and
he very properly heads that list with " THE ISLANDOF MALTA,1942." Never was an honour more
gallantly earned, as all the world knows, and as this little book so clearly shows.
The first raid on Malta, after Italy's treacherous stab-in-the-back of her former allies and saviours
in the Four Years' War, took place on the 11th of June, 1940, and "Bartimeus," writing on the same
day two years later, records a n air raid then just ending as the two thousand five hundred and
thirty-second. This gives some measure of what that gallant little island has endured.
Mussolini evidently thought Malta was " easy meat." The population, he expected, " the volatile,
excitable population, two hundred and seventy tF,ousand of them, would rise as one man and demand
peace." But they did nothing of the sort, and Bartimeus" asks -Why ? He finds the answer in
the Spirit of the Island, that spirit which is symbolized by the @eorge Cross "shared by every man,
woman, and child in Malta to-day."
The Germans, he tells us, are hated well enough. But the hatred for the Italians goes far deeper.
"So ferocious is this hatred to-day that it is held to be a disgrace to be killed by a n Italian bomber.
M ~ c c u[i.e. small fish fry] they call them, yelling defiance and shaking their fists skywards."
What Malta has had to endure is very concisely set out :" Until the German dive bombers appeared in the Mediterranean-that
is in January, 1941the Italians had succeeded in killing and wounding about two hundred Maltese and destroying
three hundred and fifty houses. In the next four and a half months the Germans killed half as
many again and demolished two thousand homes ; and then the Russian offensive claimed their
services and the Italians were left t o get on with the war by themselves. They did their best for
nearly seven months and they wrecked three hundred dwellings killing nearly a hundred civilians.
Then back came the Germans. . . . Between 21st December, 1941, and May, 1942-five monthsthey killed over eight hundred and injured nearly a thousand Maltese. They reduced to heaps of
rubble four thousand buildings."
But " Bartimeus " very clearly shows how all this, and all the grievous loss to the Maltese of their
beloved churches, auberges, and homes, only stiffened the powers of resistance of men, women and
children. Yes, even the children, for he tells us :" In all the weeks I was in Malta I never saw a child cry, and when the all-clear sounds they
come pouring out of the shelters in their hundreds, capering and cheering shrilly for the joy of being
once more in the sunlight beneath the blue sky."
There can be very few of my fellow members of THE NAVALREVIEWwho haven't-or
hadn'tmany friends among this gallant company. Dear old Baptist Borda-a
nature's gentleman if ever
there was one-Xaruana, Vella, Tabona, Tanti, Carmella-queen of lace-makers-with Grechs, Borgs and
Briffas innumerable ; how many of them have fallen to the barbarians' bombs ? But the spirit of those
old friends of ours evidently burns as brightly as ever in their sons and daughters, and, in the years to
come, the Malta of 1940-42 may well claim t o take its stand in the Hall of Fame with the Malta of
La Valette, the Malta of 1565.
Of the naval side little can yet be written : that is for the future, and what a tale it will make I
The shattering blows on the dockyard that so utterly failed of their purpose, the famous " Pepperpot,"
the experiences of the Illustrious and many others : for all these we must wait. And the same applies
t o the Army and the R.A.F. Only recently the veil has been slightly lifted and we have heard something
of Malta's air defences from the A.O.C. Mediterranean. In 1942, he has told us, fighter squadrons and
anti-aircraft guns destroyed 915 enemy aircraft for the loss of only 106 of our pilots.
And now we know that Malta-that " unsinkable aircraft carrier ,"-has passed to the offensive and
is joining in the attack on the enemy in Tunisia. What pleasure this thought must give those gallant
sons and daughters of Malta who have endured so much for King and Empire.
M. M.
Note.-A film, produced by the Army, R.A.F., and Crown Film Units, is now being shown in Lohdon
called "Malta, @.at."
It is well worth seeing. Unfortunately it only runs for about twenty mlnutes;
but in that time it comprises much of what Malta has endured. Pictures from the film are pubhshed
in " The Illustrated London News " of the 6th of February, 1943.-HON. EDITOR.
.
I
I
"
83
COASTAL COMMAND."
" COASTAL COMMAND."
.
~
..
The Air Ministry account of the part played by Coastal Command in the
Battle of the Seas, 1939-1942.
(H.M. Stationery Office. 2s.)
THISbook, which runs to 144 pages, continues the series of publications produced by the Ministry of
L
r
f
f
8
5
i
I
Information for the Air Ministry describing the work of the Royal Air Force during the present war.
I t is well produced on good paper, and contains a very large number of fine photographs which alone
are well worth the money.
The keynote of the book is " co-operation." Throughout, the fact is stressed that the Royal Navy
and Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force are fighting the war in combination.
"As Chaucer said of the doctor and the apothecary : ' Ech of hem made other for to winne.'
Together they seek out the enemy on the high seas t o destroy him. Together they are striving t o
keep free the great ocean routes along which steam in convoy ships freighted with the commodities
necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. Together they are denying such routes to the
enemy by the maintenance of a strict and pitiless blockade.
These tasks the Royal Navy has performed in time of war for upwards of a thousand years,
Coastal Command for scarcely a thousand days. But if the weapons it uses are something new
in the history of the world, if the craft it mans traverse the fields of air rather than the fields of
ocean, the object it intends to achieve is the same. It can be summed up in nine words : Find
the enemy ; strike the enemy ; protect our ships."
In order to illustrate the closeness of the co-operation between the two Services, the book commences
with an excellent and complete account, possibly the best yet given to the public, of the chase and
destruction of the Bismarck. The story is told for the first time of the flight from the Orkneys t o
Bergen by a naval aircraft, an aircraft normally employed solely on training duties and used on this
occasion because it was the only type available with the necessary range, with a special crew in order
to ascertain whether the Bismarck had sailed. It was on the report of this aircraft that the full naval
dispositions for intercepting the Bismarck were made, and, although Coastal Command can claim
credit for finding the enemy in Dobric Fjord, it was a naval aircraft which, by a flight in almost impossible conditions, laid on the pursuit. This fact was recognized by decorations to the officers concerned,
but for some undisclosed reason the story was never made public. The pursuit of the Bismarck is well
described in this book ; naturally the part played by Coastal Command is stressed, but apart from minor
inaccuracies the account is substantially correct.
A chapter is devoted to a description of the organization by which the activities of Coastal Command
aircraft are controlled and naval requirements met, in particular the operations rooms a t the several
Area Combined HeadquaFters from which the naval and air staffs jointly direct the war a t sea in each
main naval command in home waters. Some account is given of the meteorological and photographic
interpretation services, and of the work of the intelligence ofticers. Summing up this control :" I t is flexibility and the practice of close co-operation with the Royal Navy which are the
twin hall-marks of Coastal Command. Its forces are not only sent into action instantly, they can
be switched to any desired point with a speed never before achieved in warfare. They join ,with
ship-borne naval aircraft in extending the vision and striking power of the Fleet. . . .
The Royal Navy and Coastal Command are two Services with one common object, the defeat-and
destruction of the enemy. The men and women who serve in them wear uniforms of blue cloth.
Those on the backs of the Royal Air Force are of a lighter shade. That is all t h e difference."
If not quite literally true to-day, it is to be hoped that as the war progresses the colour of the uniform
will in fact become the only marked difference between the two Services. But there will always be
many in the Royal Navy who will continue to regret that this difference, with all that it must always
imply, should be necessary.
A brief description is given of the types of aircraft employed by the Command, the purposes for
which they are used and the duties of the various members of the crews. The necessity for really
accurate navigation, not fully realized by Coastal Command before the war, is stressed here.
"Ability to navigate accurately," runs a passage in one of the reports of their first Commanderin-Chief in this war, " is, I consider, one of the most important qualifications of a general I'econnaissance pilot, and my training policy has always been planned with that end in view." . . . It
was not easy, especially a t the beginning of the war, t o induce in the minds of the pilots and crews
the belief that in the compass lay their safety, but as the days and weeks passed by they became
aware and now fully understand that i t is dead reckoning that will bring them back t o base." '
A formidable indictment, this, of the pre-war training of a force whose main duty in time of war would
indubitably be to range over hundreds of miles of open sea in co-operation with ships. The best proof
of the change of view which was induced by bitter experience in the early days of the war was the
introduction by both Coastal and Bomber Commands of the observer-navigator into the crews of all
large aircraft, thus following what has been the unbroken practice in naval aircraft from the earliest
days of the old R.N.A.S.
The remainder and by far the greater part of the book is devoted to the exploits of Coastal Command
aircraft in the various phases of the war. Starting with Uyboat hunting and sweeping for magnetic
mines with specially-fitted Wellington aircraft in the early days, the story continues with the fighting
on the coast of Norway, the battle of France and the Low Countries, and the attacks on the " invasion
ports," on U-boat bases, and on German surface raiders in port. There is little here that is new.
Four interesting chapters describe Coastal Command's most important duty, the escorting of the
Atlantic convoys, in the course of which the aircraft of the Command have ranged the seas from Iceland
t o West Africa. The scope of the work is described in some detail, and accounts are given of a typical
patrol on convoy duty and of methods of combating both U-boat and Focke-Wulf.
The book concludes with a description of Coastal Command's anti-shipping campaign. Characteristically, the torpedo aircraft is relegated to the very end of the book ; the torpedo, the principal weapon
of naval aircraft, has always been the Cinderella of Coastal Command. One error in the torpedo chapter
must be corrected, in fairness to the naval air arm-the claim that an attack on Cherbourg on 17th
September, 1940, was the first occasion on which a torpedo had been dropped a t night in the whole
history of warfare. Although the night air torpedo attack was neglected by the R.A.F., naval readers
will hardly need t o be reminded that it was much practised by the naval air arm in the years preceding
the war. It may not be so widely known that the night air torpedo attack was first employed by the
naval air arm in this war in two most gallant and successful attacks on enemy shipping in Tobruk and
Port Augusta harbours on 5th and 10th July, 1940, respectively. A few other minor inaccuracies of
this sort will be noted here and there in the book.
Coastal Command being a home-based Command, this book deals exclusively with operations and
episodes which have taken place in the seas adjacent to the British Isles. The wider outlook of imperial
world-wide sea communications is not touched on. This seems a pity, for there have always been, and
are now, various units detached from the Home Command for service under other R.A.F. Commands
overseas, in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Indian Ocean, and Far East, to name a few of them.
The fact that they are for the time being removed from the immediate control of Coastal Command has
nothing to do with their duties, which of course remain virtually the same wherever they may be.
Thus, a great deal of interesting material basically concerned with the activities of Coastal Command
will presumably remain untold until the story of the R.A.F. overseas is published.
The work of Coastal Command and of those portions of other R.A.F. Commands performing similar
functions in other parts of the world is vital to the Royal Navy. Many, if not all, of these duties are
purely naval in character, and it is impossible not to regret that the Navy has been denied the means
of doing such work for itself. But the fact that Coastal Command does do a part of the Navy's work
renders it all the more vital that the two Services should know each other intimately. The Navy has
had, and still has, much to teach Coastal Command ; it has also something to learn from the younger
Service. This book should be in every wardroom in the fleet.
A. D. T.
"COASTAL COMMAND AT WAR."
By Squadron Leader TOMDUDLEY-GORDON.
Foreword by Sir Philip B. Joubert de la Fert6 (A.0.C.-in-C. Coastal Command).
(Jarrolds. 7s. 6d.)
IT is, perhaps, only a coincidence that the publication of this book should have synchronized so closely
with the more official " Coastal Command." But in fact its aim is somewhat different, as it consists
almost wholly of personal narratives of the increasing doings of the Coastal Command in many waters.
" Day and night they are flying between the Arctic Circle and the Equator, between the
Norwegian coast and mid-Atlantic . . . even in the dirtiest weather something is almost certain to
be up."
Their tasks are threefold : reconnaissance (" recco " they call it), convoy escort and striking purposes.
And they may have to fulfil all three functions in a single patrol.
Special mention is made of the " met " pilots who go up when no other aircraft are in the air " to
bring back a weather report which may determine whether or not Berlin is to be bombed that night by
Bomber Command. Gales, snow, mists-nothing stops them. Their work is unspectacular but of
priceless importance in planning operations of all kinds.
Then there is the " Legend of the Gremlins," those little imps of the clouds who " make your aircraft
do things it should not."
" White ones will wiggle your wing-tip,
Male ones will muddle your maps,
Green ones will guzzle your glycol,
Females will flutter your flaps.
Pink ones will perch on your perspex
And dance pirouettes on your prop ;
There's a spherical middle-aged gremlin
Who'll spin on your stick like a top ! "
But the heart of the book is a series of tales of the doings of " Coastal Command " on all its
services-and
wonderful tales they are. Its Chief, in a foreword, may well say of his Command, " I t
is immensely proud of its job and of the way it does it."
M. M.
" SAILORS AT WAR."
By STANLEYROGERS.
(Harrap. 10s. 6d.)
" Sailors a t War " is a collection of many of the chief events which have occurred in the war a t sea
since 1939. There is nothing new about them, and they have all been published elsewhere. As the
author says in the preface : " Much has been said, and deservedly so, of the gallantry of the Royal Air
Force in saving Britain in the autumn of 1940, but perhaps not enough has been said about the debt
the country owes the Royal Navy and the Merchant Marine."
There are stories of big ships, small ships, and the men who man them. Amongst others are the
destruction of the Bismarck ; the story of H.M.S. Illzdstrious ; the capture of a U-boat by a Hudson of
the Coastal Command ; minesweeping ; H.M. Trawler Moonstone which captured the Italian submarine
Galileo Galilei ; submarines ; the attack on the Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, and P r i n z Eugen in the Channel ;
and escapes from Norway and France.
There is a whole chapter t o the Merchant Navy, and the part it played a t Dunkirk, and of men who
have been torpedoed and bombed. Most impressive is the endurance of men whose only hope for many
days is the raft that carries them alone upon the sea till rescue comes.
" Only men of the toughest fibre and the highest courage can stand the strain of such a n
existence, and yet thousands of seamen returned to the sea after being torpedoed once, twice, thrice,
and often after nearly dying before they were rescued."
This book is quietly written, but all the more effectively letting courage, endurance, and heroism
stand out for themselves.
TRILAGH.
,
" THEY W E R E EXPENDABLE."
By W. L. WHITE.
(Hamish Hamilton. 6s.)
!
" T H E CAMPAIGN IN GREECE AND CRETE."
i
I
Issued for the War Office by the Ministry of Information.
(H.M. Stationery Office. 6d.)
i
[
12'
I
THEauthor has compiled this story from talks with four young American officers of M.T.B. Squadron 3
which sailed t o the Philippines in the summer of 1941. They were the squadron's sole survivors.
These frail craft were a t Cavite under the orders of Admiral Hart when the Japanese struck their
treacherous blow on the 7th of December, 1941, and this book tells in simple words the story of the
splendid fight they put up against overwhelming odds. They were in truth expendable, as the gallant
defenders of the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor were expendable, " to hold on a t any cost while
American power recovered from the first stunning blows of the war."
The M.T.B.s-there were six of them-mustered a crew of seventy-odd officers and ratings all told,
and, during the four months they were operating, they claim t o have sunk considerably more than a
hundred times their own tonnage, as well as conveying General MacArthur on the first part of his
dangerous journey to take over supreme command in Australia.
They were handicapped in every conceivable way. Their bases were bombed, their petrol supply
was badly sabotaged by the addition of wax-thereby involving many stoppages to clean the carburettor
-and they had to do their own repairs. None the less they fought on until all available torpedoes were
expended and all the boats were accounted for, and then planes were sent to take off some-but only
some-of those still left. General Sharp, a fine old soldier, in bidding one of them good-bye, said : " The
rest of us consider ourselves as being expendable, which is something that may come t o any soldier.
We are ready for it and . . . we will meet it squarely when it comes."
M. M.
THEfirst task of our Forces in war, and of the Army more than any, has always been to fight a losing
battle against desperate odds so that the nation may have time to make good its peace-time neglect
and be taught how t o fight. Never and nowhere has the Army shown better how well i t can do this
than in Greece and Crete. This booklet gives a good account of how it did it. In doing so it succeeds
in giving our soldiers a much-wanted tribute without any suggestion of the advertisement columns.
I t is adequately supplied with six outline maps which are accurately drawn instead of being made
meaningless by attempted simplification, as is now so often the case. If any fault is t o be found with
them it is that the outhne of the tortuous coasts of Greece is so finely drawn and of the same fineness
86
" PASS
TO YOU, PLEASE
"
as for rivers that it is not easy to distinguish the two. Furthermore, positions of forces are shown by
groups of hollow or black circles, and places are marked by similar circles which tends t o confusion.
The maps, as must be expected, are printed on the normal pages, and any reader who wishes to follow
the armies' movements carefully should try t p borrow a second copy of the booklet so as not to be
continually turning backwards and forwards t o refer t o a map.
Due notice and full appreciation is given to the part played by the Navy both for its importance and
performance and for its difficulties. But full details of the naval work are outside the scope of this
booklet whose concern, as is shown by the title of the series to which it belongs, is the Army a t War.
For details of the Navy's story the writers suggest that we must wait for the account which the
Admiralty will issue in due course. The work of the Royal Marines, filling so gallantly their accustomed
part of first t o arrive and last to remain, is of course treated in detail and with a full and richly-deserved
measure of praise.
Opinions may differ as to the wisdom and value of our intervention in Greece and Crete. The
writers, who seem different for the accounts of Greece and Crete, consider that it was wise on grounds
of national honour as well as of long-term strategy :" The operations . . . may well have destroyed a plan to drive a t the Caucasus through Turkey.
They certainly delayed the offensive against Russia for many critical weeks. They warded off
for a t least a whole year the danger of air-borne invasions against other bastions in the Middle
East. They gained time for the restoration of a very tricky and dangerous situation in Syria,
Iraq, and Persia. . . . For these reasons the campaign in Greece and Crete respectively, though a
tactical defeat, may well come to be considered a strategical victory."
This is a book to be read as much for its well-told tale of stubborn gallantry and skilful leadership
as for its lesson of how indispensable each of the Services, in proper strength, is in itself and to the
work of the others.
B. H. S.
"PASSED TO YOU, PLEASE."
By J. P. W. MALLALIEU.
(Gollancz: 5s.)
THIS is a book that should be of interest t o all officers who aspire to reach the higher ranks of the
Service, and pqssibly t o those who have already reached them.
As the professional career and activity of each one of us in the Fighting Services is closely affected
by the mentality, outlook and efficiency of the civil servants in Whitehall, we do well t o learn all we
can about such a body of men whose influence, when backed by so much power, can largely determine
our destinies.
This books informs us of much that we need t o know. I t is depressing information, but conveyed
with considerable fairness and skill. What a sorry record it is-of some eighty years timidity, incompetence and obstruction. One might almost say that these attributes have now become the civil
servant's long and " honourable " tradition, and that for him to act otherwise than in conformity with
this tradition would be to violate all the customs of his Service. Mr. Mallalieu (can this be the author's
real name ? ) gives the Civil Service its full measure of praise for its general integrity, good intentions
and loftiness of purpose, and for its aim t o carry out its work in an aura of extreme British respectability,
far above all motives of personal gain or profit. .And that is practically all that can be said for it. The
author's chapter on the pernicious influence of the Treasury over every other Government Department
confirms in detail all that one has ever heard to this effect, namely, that the academic obsessions~of
clever but narrow-minded accountants have for far too long been allowed t o influence matters of great
national importance. The Treasury is the real villain of the piece, and from its paralyzing grip on ail
.the departments of state civil servants have little chance to do anything but shirk responsibility
whenever possible, to avoid expenditure of any kind, to delay and to obstruct.
It is satisfactory t o note that among all the glaring cases of Civil Service muddle and inefficiency
quoted the author has never once found it necessary to mention the Admiralty. There must clearly
be some reason for this; and i t would be interesting t o know from what cause the Admiraltycivilservant
is apparently more enlightened and intelligent than his colleague in other Government Departments.
Has it, one wonders, anything to do with the fact that we employ large numbers of dockyard and civil
officers a t naval ports all over the world ? Can i t be that close contact with practical naval officers and
naval administration on the spot has fostered an initiative and common sense during early days which,
in the course of many years, have spread beyond the actual depwtmental officials concerned when they
ultimately returned to the Admiralty t o occupy higher posts ? One would like to think so. May this
not, in fact, be a hint of the greatest importance to bear in mind when we are looking for the direction
i n which t o reform and improve the Civil Service ? Unfortunately this sort of training ground is
obviously not open t o other ministries, whose contacts with the general public appear to be uniformly
unfortunate.
I t is when the author of " Passed To You, Please " comes t o consider what remedies he would
propose that it seems t o your reviewer he goes completely off the deep end. Mr. Mallalieu's great idea
throughout his otherwise excellent book seems t o be that the " capitalist system " and the " ruling
classes " are directly responsible for the civil servant's traditional ineptitude. Abolish classes " and
" plan " a social system devoid of private enterprise, introduce inspectors and officials u p and d
m the
"
r
#
country-apparently to make the " people " feel that they are having a say in the Government everywhere-and the Civil Service will automatically become transformed into a miracle of well-informed
executive efficiency 1 The author advances no real reasons or argument t o support this strange belief
except to quote a t great length and with evident knowledge and enthusiasm, the success of the Communist systein as worked in Russia. But this does not explain why it is so certain that what works so
well with Russian institutions in Russia will necessarily successfully effect a cure with one particular
ailing British inst~tutjonin Britain. These enthusiasts always overlook the fact t h a t the needs and
national problems of fiussia are totally different from those of Great Britain and her Empire, t h a t the
historical background and tradition of each country are totally dissimilar, and that though the future
progress, development and well being of mankind are among the common aims of both nations, that
aim is best reached by the methods most suited to each nation's temperament and genius. It is a pity
the author develops this Socialist-Communist theme to absurd lengths. The shortcomings of our
Civil Service will not be cured by " planning," or by organizing ourselves into a mad-house of trade
unionists, committees, petty officials, and factory inspectors Whatever effect this may have had on
Russian government departments, one feels pretty sure that its introduction here among our own
people would very soon lead to the Civil Service clutching us all permanently in its miserable embrace.
We must seek the remedy elsewhere While grateful t o Mr. Mallalieu for his masterly diagnosis of
the disease we shall assuredly seek a second opinion as t o the treatment. A great many of us should
be seeking it now.
JUNIOR-SENIOR.
" MEY ONLY .IN T H E NAVY."
By " TANKEY."
With a Foreword and Epilogue by " \V.~LRUS."
(C. Arthur Pearson.
I
I
I
?
2s. Gd.)
ALTHOUGH
I cannot claim that 1,plways sef eye t o eye with " Fauteuil " on all matters, I aclmit that
Tankey does, indeed, give us real " butter for our bread, though
I agree with him in one thing.
these tales are more than that--jam and honey with spices. " Men Only in the Navy " (Volume Four
in The Men Only Series) is a gay little book with a sad history, for its author has been lost on activy
service. " Walrus " in the Foreword tells us why " Lieutenant Jack Van de Kasteele, R.N.-' V. de K.
t o those who knew him-selected ' Tankey ' as his pen-name when first he turned his hand t o spinning
yarns on the Service in 1996."
" Men Only in the Navy " is a varied collection of some sixteen stories, several of which have already
been published. Each story is true to life, told in a light-hearted frame of mind, with a humorous
vein. There are stories of watch keeping ; impressions of women in the W.R.N.S., F.A.N.Y., and dockyards ; of unofficial censoring departments ; of pulling the cook's leg-a
fatal procedure ; Crossing
the Line ; Reporting for Orders, and several others. Illustrations are adequately supplied by Hynes.
" Walrus " tells us that these yarns are a selection from " Tankey's " manuscripts, all of which are
now in his possession. I t is greatly t o be hoped, therefore, that he will, a t some future time, make yet
other selections ; for we may feel sure that there must be many more good things. Two a t least have
appeared in these pages-'' The Trials of a Wren " and " With the Wats in Darkest Africa." Both
are real gems, and doubtless there are others like them.
To make a selection from those now presented to us seems almost invidious, but personally-for
sheer lightheartedness-my
vote goes to " Reporting for Orders."
To sum up, as " Walrus " says in an Epilogue-" Jesting trifles through these yarns may be, the
jest conceals a great truth-that great and glorious yet intangible thing which is a t once a thousand
years old and yet new to-day, whi-h has made our Navy what it is : the Spirit of the Service."
HYANTIC.
" ONE-ONE-ONE."
Stories of the Navy.
By GILBERTHACKFORTHJONES.
(Hodder & Stoughton. 7s. 6d.)
There are one or two books of short stories about the Navy in the last war and shortly before it which
I am glad to have, and to which I often return. The works of " Grand Fleet Chaplain " are a case In
point. I intend to add the volume under review t o my permanent hbrary for the same reason
Commander Hackforth-Jones is known under his own name t o readers of " Blackwood," and t o this
REVIEWas the narrator of the adventures of the sub-mariner. Some, but by no means all, of the
stories in this volume have appeared in one or other ot these publications, but are none the less welcome
in their new company The stories, none of which pretend to be strictly true, range from a Jutland
incident, through the intermediate years of peace, to the present war. They are told, even those which
have no connection with under-water affairs, very much from the point of view of the " sub-mariner " :
there is a gentle flavour about them which bring back a t once those excellent messmates and seamen
doing their " big ship " time.
I am not going t o spoil the book by giving away any of the stories, but I cannot resist one or two
points that have occurred t o me while reading them. I may not have been very thorough, but I think
the only female referred to, except the ships themselves, is the elephant in "A Problem in Seamanship."
I suspect that the author has made a "deliberate mistake" in " Responsibility," and I wonder if
destroyer officers who have escorted convoys will support my suspicions. I had always been under the
impression that the visiting habits of ships' bears were confined t o the detached mole a t Gib. I am much
intrigued t o find that their operations are more extended.
The Hon. Editor's favourite is " The Picnic," and with reason : I should have called the story
" One Damn Thing after Another," and have been extremely glad that I was not the wretched sub.
who had t o deal with them. My own favourite, I think, is the last story, " Someone's got to do it :"
the point of view of the man in no danger, in this case a captain (S), who has to lead from behind.
I think the author is right to put this story a t the end : it is the final test of our training in the Service.'
I wondered how the book would appeal to those without Service memories, and have tried it on
several relatives and friends. Their verdict is most favourable. For those in the Service I think t h e
book is one to buy, or a t any rate, to get into one's permanent possession.
") on his well-earned
Finally, I should like to congratulate Petty Officer Rodgers (in " One-One-One
promotion to Chief Petty Officer on the remarkably well-designed dust cover.
R.S.
Another member plumps for " The Passenger," which he calls " a powerful and exceedingly
sinister tale," alld which seems t o him so outstanding as to merit the description *' masterpiece."-HON. EDITOR.
SOLUTION TO CROSSWORD PUZZLE.
The following ships are named in this puzzle :-Abelia, Achates, Algerine, Argonaut, Ashanti, Aurora,
A v e ~ g e r ,Basset, Beagle, Bengal, Berkeley, Bever, Beverley, Broke, Bulldog, Chakla, Cornwall, Edinburgh,
Fareham, Gardenia, Hazard, Hecla, Hesflevus, Hyacinth, Hyderabad, Ibis, Malcolm, Motor-gunboat,
Motor-torpedo-boat, Nigeria, Nizam, Oribi, Petunza, Primrose, Quentin, Quiberon, Robin, Sirius, Taku,
Talisman, Thames, Torch, Trinidad, Undaunted, Unique, U s k , Veteran, Walney, Zinnia.
THE NAVAL REVIEW. BALANCE SHEET as at 31st December, 1942.
LIABILITIES.
Accumulated Funds as at 1st January 1942
Add : Surplus from Income and dxpenditure'~ccoGt
Subscriptions paid in advance
Sundry Creditors
. . .
::
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
6 s. d.
5,646 12 11
458 I 5
6
ASSETS.
INVESTMENTS :C2.950. 31% Conversion Loan-at cost
21'750. 4 ~ " ~ o i s o l s - a tcost . . . . . .
l350. 5 2 Conversion Loan (1944164)-at cost
£400. 4% Funding Loan (1960190)-at cost
£200. 3% Conversion Loan (1948153)-at cost
£250. 34% War Loan-at w s t
. . . .
£300. 3Y Defence Bonds
. . . .
£100. 3 2 War Loan 1955159'
. . . .
s. d.
6,104 14 4
9 0 0
184 11 11
(The market value of these Investments on 31st December,
1942, was 66,779 3s. 9d.)
Debtors .FO; ~ u b s c r i ~ t i o n s
. . . . . . . . . . . .
,, Sundries
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
,, Income accrued
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Cash at Bank-Deposit Account
. .
Less : Overdraft-Current Account
RICHARD WEBB,
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
S 0 0
419 0
52 6 8
----806 6 10
60 5 8
24 10 6
- 781 16
4
Hon. Editor and Trcasurcr.
AUDITOR'S REPORT.
We have audited the above Balance Sheet as a t 31st December, 1942, and, in our opinion, it accurately sets forth the financial position of THE NAVALREVIEWon that date.
Imperial House 80186 Regent Street, London, W.1.
GILLESPIE BROTHERS & CO.,
And at ~ewcasile-on-+ye.
Chartered Accwntaws.
11th February, 1943.
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT for Gear ended 31st December, 1942.
1942.
Dec. 31. To Printing and Production
. . . . . .
,, Literary Services
. . . . . . . .
,, Postages
. . . . . . . . . .
,, Stationery, Books, etc.
..
,, Office,Travelling and ~ m d r ;'Expehses ..
Telemams and Teleohones . . . . . .
~ u d Tand
t A C C O U ~ ~Fee
~ ~ .C .~ . . . .
,, Bank Charges
1942.
Dec. 31. By Subscriptions and Payments for back volumes
,, Interest on Investments
. . . . . .
,, Income Tax recovered
. . . . . .
,, Deposit Interest
. . . . . . . .
..
.
.
. . . . . . . . . .
Balance, being surplus for year
. . . . . .
895 9 6
458 1 5
1
-
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
6
1,064
179
106
3
s.
1
18
7
4
d.
0
3
6
2

The Naval Review

Transcription

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