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Knowledge in Civil Society or KICS is a forum for conversations amongst activists and academics
on issues relating to science and democracy. The forum seeks to promote a dialogue among its
members that could lead to a more people friendly science and technology plan. Current
concerns of civil society groups on the relations of science and society have been dismissed as
anti-science even if many of these groups are actively engaged in alternatives that are rooted in
a more democratic imagination of science policies. Academics, largely from the broad area of
science, technology and society studies, while perhaps better equipped to deal with the
complex issues of scientific expertise, governance and the democratic aspirations of people,
have in the past focused their attention more on science as understood by the state, or
increasingly, the market.
The KICS forum hopes to bring the activists from diverse sectors in civil society and the
academics to engage with the hitherto neglected aspects of science and democracy through a
process of dialogue, common exploration and joint work. Started in 2005, KICS carries out
these conversations through e-groups, sharing sessions, research studies, joint workshops and
general body meetings.
Dr. Chitra Krishnan was trained as a civil engineer at IIT Madras following which she worked on water
resource issues in rural Kerala before going on to pursue her Masters in environmental engineering in
USA. Her working stints in different rural contexts and an organic farm in the USA influenced her
markedly in her research quests. She completed her PhD from IIT Delhi on the traditional irrigation
system of South India (tanks and anicuts). She is currently practicing dryland agriculture in Tumkur
District, Karnataka and is involved in research studies in looking at the irrigation infrastructure from
below during the agricultural off-season. She is a member of the KICS forum.
www.kicsforum.net
CMYK
Irrigation
Infrastructure
– A view from below
The Case of the Tungabhadra River
Chitra Krishnan
A report on a short research study
supported by Knowledge in Civil Society
Irrigation Infrastructure
– A view from below
The Case of the Tungabhadra River
Chitra Krishnan
A report on a short research study
supported by Knowledge in Civil Society
Centre for World Solidarity
Xavier Institute of
Management,
Bhubaneshwar
October 2008
Irrigation Infrastructure - a view from below, The Case of the Tungabhadra River
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Disclaimer:
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ii
Acknowledgements
This report chronicles the working of various schemes that take off from one river – the Tungabhadra. It is written
for a general reader and seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the water sector by posing the realities
of today. Such an effort, it is hoped, could eventually feed into a “citizen’s primer” for the river – a place where
the ground level complexities of water sharing and use in a river basin are elucidated.
This study was possible only because of the invaluable support, encouragement and useful feedback of the
Knowledge in Civil Society (KICS) forum members. KICS encourages conversations amongst activists and
academics on issues relating to science and democracy. It also supports short research studies which would not
find an easy home in academic environments.
KICS provided a sounding board during this six month study. Various activists, academics and social
constructivists participated by sharing their views and experiences and by providing regular feedback right from
the idea stage to interim reports sent to them almost every two months. Himanshu Thakkar of South Asia
Network of Dams, Rivers & People (SANDRP) was prompt and meticulous with his comments and provided
useful references. His interest and insights on the study were immensely helpful and gave it much momentum
even though I often got to see his mails sometimes after few weeks.
M V Sastri and Rama Mohan from Centre for World Solidarity were very supportive in commenting and
extending the idea of the study through their networks on water and democracy and inviting me to share the
report in their networks. Prof. Weibe Bijker and Johanna Hoffken from University of Maastricht took an active
interest in the study from distant Netherlands and Dr. Uma Shankari and Shripad Dharmadhikary shared their
perspectives during the course of the study. Sri T. Hanumantha Rao read and commented on the report at short
notice.
A draft of the final report was circulated among the KICS members and this was presented at a KICS sharing
session in Hyderabad in August 2008 and I thank all the members for their feedback and suggestions. Dr. Dinesh
Mishra kindly came from Patna and provided insightful comments. It was his comprehensive book, Dui Paaton ke
beech mein, which tracks the interventions on the Kosi river over the past 50 years, that inspired this modest
attempt. I thank all these people who lent their expertise to the study.
Dr. C. Shambu Prasad, Co-ordinator of KICS, has shepherded the study from its inception and been instrumental
in seeing it through. He understood my preoccupation as a dryland agriculturist and allowed this work to be
undertaken on a part-time basis. I greatly appreciate all his assistance and ever present support.
Chitra Krishnan
iii
iv
Contents
Introduction…………….................................................................................................................
2
Tungabhadra River……..........................................................................................................
3
Sources……….......................................................................................................................
3
Plans And Designs (1950s).............................................................................................................
6
Tungabhadra Dam and Canals…………………………………...…………....................................
6
Rajolibanda Anicut………………………………….………………..………......................................
6
Sunkesula Anicut………………………………………………..…………..........................................
6
The KWDT Award……………………………………………………………….....……..................................
8
The Unplanned Unfolding……………………………………………….…….…........................................
10
Tungabhadra Dam……………………………………………...……………........................................
10
Rajolibanda Diversion Scheme……………………..…………...………...........................................
10
Sunkesula’s KC Canal…………………………………………...…...…..............................................
11
Recent Years………………………………..……………………................................................................
12
Running The Canals (2003-2005)…………………………….………..…….....................................
12
TB Left Bank Canal – 167 breaches and counting…………………..…..................................
12
Inter-State considerations –the TB Right Bank Low Level Canal(LLC)..................................
14
The poor cousin – TB Right Bank High Level Canal…………………………............................
18
Clash within A.P.- Rajolibanda ……………………………………...........................................
19
Uncertain Dependence: Sunkesula’s KC canal……………………...............….......................
22
Running the River (2003-2005)?............................................................................................. .
24
Lift Irrigation Schemes (LIS)…………………………………………….....................................
24
Mini-Hydel schemes......................................................................................................
25
Insights……………………………………………………………..................................................................
28
Further Work…………………………………….….…………………..…………….......................................
31
References………………………………………………...……….…..…………..…......................................
32
Appendix 1…………...…………………………………..………………………….…....................................
33
v
List of Abbreviations
TMC
Thousand million cubic feet
MW
Mega watt
HP
Horsepower
cusec
Cubic feet per second
CADA
HLC
Command Area Development Authority
High Level Canal
LB
Left Bank
LBC
Left Bank Canal
LLC
Low Level Canal
RB
Right Bank
A.P.
Kar
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
KC
Kurnool-Cuddappah
TB
Tungabhadra
RDS
Rajolibanda Diversion Scheme
KWDT
Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal
BJP
CM
Bharatiya Janata Party
Chief Minister
CPI (M-L)
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)
KRRS
Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha
MLA
Member of Legislative Assembly
MP
Member of Parliament
TDP
Telugu Desam Party
TRS
Telengana Rashtra Samiti
Cr PC
Criminal Procedure Code
GoI
Government of India
GoK
Government of Karnataka
GoAP
Government of Andhra Pradesh
GO
Government Order
SC
Supreme Court
vi
Executive Summary
Research on managing canal irrigation systems has
revealed that it is both complex and conflict ridden.
Studies have pointed out that technical expertise
needs to incorporate several social and economic
issues that manifest at various levels in the distribution
channels. Civil society groups have shown how the
context of water dynamics has changed with large
number of projects being planned and executed on
the river system due to demands of contending water
uses despite evidence of decreasing water availability
and repeated failure of irrigation schemes. There is a
need for detailed case studies that relate this rapidly
changing supply side dynamics of a river ecosystem
with increasing demand side conflicts.
The Tungabhadra is a major tributary of the Krishna
River in South India. The 250 km stretch of river –
beginning at the Tungabhadra Dam and leading to the
confluence of the river with the Krishna River receives
the most attention here. The conflicts on and
condition of the Tungabhadra Dam’s main canals, the
Rajolibanda anicut, and the Sunkesula anicut (KC
canal) are examined in detail. Other schemes on the
river – various mini-hydel projects and lift irrigation
projects under construction and in operation during
these two years (2003 – 2005) – are also discussed.
In this process, deeper insights into the economic,
political and technical compulsions of operating and
maintaining riverine schemes have been brought to
light. These include:
This study zooms in on one river, to examine the
various schemes on it. It seeks to link up the larger
politics of inter state and intra state conflicts with
critical questions on water availability and the river’s
changed potential. Taking the particular case of the
Tungabhadra in the Krishna river basin and following
the river flow as it is subject to various schemes in time
and space, it shows how simmering tensions are likely
to manifest as full fledged conflicts.
1. The form of water conflicts between upstream and
downstream users,
2. Nature and effect of users’ struggle for major canal
repair and tail-end supply,
3. The selective nature of political involvement, and
The report is structured chronologically beginning
with the 1950s when various river valley development
projects were taken up. After describing the plans and
designs of the 50s, it outlines their functioning in the
next four decades briefly. It then examines the water
schedule and delivery in the main canals of some
schemes along the Tungabhadra River during the
monsoons of 2003 and 2004. It has relied on various
kinds of accessible public information and points to
serious information and data gaps involved in
analysing water resource schemes.
4. Exacerbation of conflicts over mini-hydel and lift
irrigation schemes being constructed
The study tries to highlight the current situation with
respect to decision making by describing the day to
day running of the canals over two years in
considerable detail.
1
Introduction
Undoubtedly we make great demands on our rivers.
They are now our work-horses; their flow reined in by
structures that block their otherwise carefree
movements. Every civilization has harnessed its rivers
but it is the types of structures and the magnitude of
flow used that distinguish different eras.
India has put its faith largely in storages, as evident by
the 4600 dams built since 19474.
Both dams and anicuts though, are invariably
accompanied by one or more canals. These main
canals channel the (diverted or stored) water for
distribution (just like the main arteries of our body’s
circulatory system). They give rise to numerous
distributaries. Each distributary leads to minors and
field channels (akin to the capillaries in the body). It is
thus that a canal network irrigates the land.
Generally speaking, river structures fall into two
categories, namely dams (storages) and run-of-the
river (diversion) schemes. Dams are high barriers
across the river creating a large reservoir behind them.
After the reservoir fills up to its brim, water rushes out
through spillways located atop the dam. Run-of-theriver structures are low barriers whose purpose is to
raise the water level slightly so that a canal can receive
water. Most of the river’s flow is not held back, but
spills over the structure and moves on (see Fig 1).
These run-of-the-river structures go by various names
– anicut, weir or barrage1.
Canal irrigation, though, is beset with problems.
Recent statistics show this starkly. In 12 years (19912003) the country spent Rs 99,610 crores on Major
and Medium Irrigation Projects with the objective of
increasing canal irrigated areas. Yet there was
absolutely no addition to net irrigated areas by canals.
In fact the areas irrigated by canals reduced by 3.18
million hectares during this period (SANDRP, 2007).
Canal
Figure 1: Sketch of an anicut and its canal
As Gulati et al (2005) point out – “The most severe
problem facing Indian canal irrigation….. (is) the
rapid deterioration of systems that have already been
created. Such canals are then unable to carry the flow
they were originally designed for and the irrigation
potential is not met.” Further, as schemes proliferate,
river flow itself declines.
Pre-colonial India only built diversions. Dams on a
perennial river never existed then2. In (erstwhile)
Madras Presidency for example, 1129 anicuts existed
as of 1878 A.D.3 (Buckley, 1893). Post Independence,
Deteriorating canals and declining river flows provide
fertile ground for disputes over water. Joy et al (2008)
present numerous current water conflicts organizing
all 63 cases into eight broad themes. One theme is
River
Anicut
1
Anicut is the traditional Indian word. An anicut (or weir) is typically a solid masonry wall while a barrage looks like a bridge with gates
between every pair of piers. The gates can be opened partly or fully as needed.
2
The key word here is “perennial”. There were earthen dams on non-perennial rivers that are called tanks, built in pre-colonial times
(Krishnan, 2003)
3
Most of these anicuts (~ 95%) must have been built in pre-British times because the British built no new irrigation structure in Madras
Presidency till the 1835. (Krishnan, 2003)
4
This is not to imply that diversions have not been built since 1947. They have, but probably only a few hundreds or less.
2
Introduction
All India Net Irrigated Area-Canal
18000000
Ha
17000000
16000000
2003-04
2002-03
2001-02
2000-01
1999-00
1998-99
1997-98
1996-97
1995-96
1994-95
1993-94
1992-93
1991-92
1990-91
Year
1989-90
14000000
1988-89
15000000
Figure 2: Canal irrigated area in India between 1988 and 2003 (Source: SANDRP 2007)
about equity, access and allocation (other themes
include sand-mining, pollution, privatization etc.)
Since such conflicts are expected to increase, it is
necessary to know how they are addressed and
governed. The principal stakeholders include farmers
associations, Irrigation Department staff, other state
administrators, elected representatives and political
parties.
Among these three, the Krishna basin is placed in the
middle in terms of its basin area and average annual
flow. It is the fifth largest river basin in India. Recent
studies on the Krishna basin find that its flow to the
ocean in 1995-2005 had fallen by 80 percent
compared to its pre-irrigation discharge (1900-1960).
Thus it is closing to future water resources
development (Biggs, 2007).
This study focuses on the Tungabhadra river and
explores the major irrigation schemes on it. It seeks to
understand the condition of these schemes in recent
years and the conflicts they give rise to by elucidating
their working since inception in the 1950s. In doing
so, the roles and acts of various players in this arena
are presented. It thus provides a reality check on the
maintenance and operation of riverine schemes.
The Krishna river has two main tributaries, the Bhima
and the Tungabhadra. The Bhima is the northern
tributary while the Tungabhadra joins the Krishna
from the southern side after traversing a length of 534
kms (Fig 3). Tungabhadra’s basin occupies just over
one quarter of the Krishna basin area and it
contributes roughly one quarter of the Krishna’s
annual flow.
Tungabhadra river
The Tungabhadra, gets its name from the joining of
two rivers, Tunga and Bhadra. It is an inter-state river,
shared by Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. About 70%
of its length falls in Karnataka after which it forms a
border between the two states for 58 kms. Its last 100
kms are entirely in Andhra Pradesh and it ends beyond
Kurnool at its confluence with the Krishna river. (In its
A map of south India will show three major rivers viz.
the Cauvery, Krishna and Godavari. All three originate
in the Western Ghats (fed by the monsoon rain) and as
east flowing rivers, eventually discharge into the Bay
of Bengal. Some of their features are given below
(Table 1).
River
Cauvery
Length (km)
Basin area (sq km)
87,900
760
Krishna
1400
2,58,948
Godavari
1450
3,12,812
5
Ave. annual flow (TMC)
790
2585
4094
Table 1: Features of the major south Indian rivers
5
Based on Kumar et al, 2005
TMC is a very large quantity – roughly the amount of water that a population of one million would use in a year (assuming per capita water
use is 80 liters per day).
3
Bh
Kris
For centuries Tungabhadra this river has been
harnessed for irrigation. In pre-colonial times, a
number of strangely curved anicuts crossed the river
bed. There were 250 anicuts with 580 kms of canals in
that part of the Tungabhadra basin falling under the
Princely State of Mysore (Sankey, 1866)6. Further
downstream were at least 18 anicuts built in the
Vijaynagar period (16th century). Later in the colonial
period two more anicuts came up, one in 1866 A.D.
and another in 1923 A.D.
im
a
ANDHRA PRADESH
hna
Until 1950, there were no dams on the Tungabhadra
river. It was then that GOI embarked on a rapid “river
valley development” phase. The Tungabhadra river
was no exception and by 1960 two large dams and
one more anicut had been built on it.
KARNATAKA
Figure 3: The Krishna Basin with major tributaries and the
Tungabhadra sub basin marked
journey it receives the waters of many tributariesChoardi, Kumudvati, Haridra, Varada and Vedavati.)
Like many other rivers in the country, the
Tungabhadra, almost always forms a border, either
between to states or between two districts (Fig.4).
Thus, there are now many dams and anicuts along the
length of the Tungabhadra. These are shown in Fig. 57.
In the upstream reaches there is the Tunga Anicut, the
Bhadra Anicut and the Bhadra Dam. In the middle
reach is the large Tungabhadra Dam. Downstream of
this Dam, the river meanders through another 250
odd kilometres before its confluence with the Krishna
River. In this reach, the two largest schemes are the
Rajolibanda Anicut and the Sunkesula Anicut. A
number of anicuts built in Vijaynagar times (~ 1560
A.D.) and still functioning, are also present here.
HYDERABAD
KARNATAKA
Krishna River
MAHBOOBNAGAR
RAICHUR
Tungabhadra River
KOPPAL
GADAG
BELLARY
KURNOOL
HAVERI
DAVANGERE
ANANTAPUR
ANDHRA
PRADESH
For the present, we look into the second half of the
river (i.e. the Tungabhadra dam and downstream)8.
Three structures are prominent in this reach viz. the
Tungabhadra Dam, Rajolibanda Anicut and the
Sunkesula Anicut. Two of them were built and the
third, (i.e. Sunkesula) underwent major repair in the
1950s. Thus the plans and designs of the 1950s,
described below, form a reference point from which to
view their subsequent condition and performance.
CUDDAPPAH
SHIMOGA
Figure 4: A sketch of the Tungabhadra river along with
district and state boundaries
6
The Princely State of Mysore then extended as far up the river as the current backwaters of the Tungabhadra Dam. The condition of these
structures is not mentioned in Sankey’s report, which only enumerates them.
7
One or more canals take off from each structure but these are not traced on the sketch to keep it clear. Similarly, none of the various
tributaries that join the Tungabhadra are shown in the sketch.
8
Not enough information about the upstream structures and their working i.e. the Tunga Anicut, Bhadra Anicut and the Bhadra Dam, could
be found to draw up a full picture and are hence avoided in this report
4
Introduction
RAJOLIBANDA ANICUT
SUNKESULA ANICUT
TUNGABHADRA DAM
VIJAYNAGAR ANICUTS
Tungabhadra River
TUNGA ANICUT
Tunga River
BHADRA ANICUT
BHADRA DAM
Bhadra River
Figure 5: A schematic sketch of the Tungabhadra river with dams and anicuts shown
Sources
compiling and analysing articles in national
newspapers covering a recent five year period.
A study on Indian rivers has inevitably to contend with
limited data accessibility. As Biggs et al (2007) pointed
out for the Krishna basin, “Interstate competition for
water has restricted access to data to both other states
and third party research on stream flow and irrigation
diversions…” Thus flow data – its variation within a
year and over many years – is difficult to obtain.
Reliance on newspaper articles brings in a bias.
However, as long as the nature of the bias is laid bare
and kept in view, it need not be a handicap. These
biases are threefold. Firstly, the fact that these articles
find space in mainstream papers implies that only
parties and people with clout are represented.
Further, as is well known, they only portray “news”,
meaning mostly trouble and problems. Finally, there
are gaps in the narrative because generally only the
“trouble” is highlighted, not when and whether it was
resolved or how “normal” the situation is.
For this study, as a first step, all publically accessible
material was gathered and synthesised. These include
Survey of India maps, District Gazetteers, State
Archives and Government websites (State and
Central). A large part of the narrative was based on
5
Plans and Designs (1950s)
Tungabhadra Dam and canals
concerned with the Right Bank Canals while the Left
Bank Canals are the prerogative of Karnataka.
The multipurpose TB Dam was designed to hold 133
TMC water and generate 99MW of electricity.
Construction began in 1945 and it came into
operation in 1953. However its canals took much
longer to complete. The last of the canals was
completed 14 years later, in 1967.
Rajolibanda Anicut
The village of Rajolibanda which lends its name to the
anicut there lies 120 kms downstream of the
Tungabhadra Dam. The Rajolibanda anicut feeds a
canal on the left bank, benefiting mostly
Mahbubnagar District, A.P. (Telengana). (see Fig 6)
The Anicut itself is situated in Karnataka (Raichur
District) along with the first 43 of the 143km long
canal. The remaining 100 kms of the canal is in Andhra
Pradesh (Mahbubnagar District).
The RDS project was originally meant exclusively for
Mahabubnagar and planned by the Nizam.
Construction began in 1947. Due to the
reorganisation of states and formation of Andhra
Pradesh in 1956 it was handed over to Karnataka. It
was 1962 when this 820 m long anicut across the
river bed and the accompanying canal were finally
completed.
Photo 1: The Tungabhadra Dam
(Source:www.bharatonline.com/karnataka/)
Four canals now take off from the TB Dam, two from
the left bank and two from the right bank. Except for
the Left Bank High Level Canal, which being a Power
Canal is short (15 km) the other three are long;
between 200 and 300 kms long. These are the Right
Bank Low Level Canal (RB LLC), Right Bank High Level
Canal (RB HLC) and the Left Bank Canal (LBC)9. When
first built, these main canals (except the RB LLC) were
wholly lined ensuring little seepage.
Sunkesula Anicut
The Sunkesula Anicut is about 200 km downstream of
the Tungabhadra Dam, so far, that it takes five days for
The Left Bank canals fall completely within Karnataka
while the Right Bank canals cross over into A.P. at some
point. That makes them inter-state canals.
So in the beginning itself (i.e. 1953) the Central Govt.
established a “Tungabhadra Board” to deal with works
common to A.P. and Karnataka. This Board has the
Central Govt, A.P. & Karnataka as members and is
Photo 2: A flood discharge at Sunkesula barrage
(source: www.hindu.com2005)
9
The high level canals take off from the dam 35 feet above the level of the low level canals. Thus the high level canal receives water
only when the storage level in the dam is at least 35 feet above the dead storage level.
6
Plans and Designs (1950s)
water released at the dam to reach Sunkesula. This
anicut feeds a canal on the right (i.e. southern) bank.
This canal benefitting Kurnool and Cudappah Districts
of A.P. (i.e. Rayalseema) passes through 250 villages
between the towns of Kurnool and Cuddappah, thus
called the Kurnool-Cuddappah or KC Canal.
went bankrupt, the British Government. took over in
1882 and navigation was abandoned in 1933. Once
described as “the most regrettable incidents in the
history of Indian Irrigation”, its maintenance and
performance were subjects of considerable
controversy (Cudappah District Gazetteer, 1967).
The Anicut and its 300 km long canal, have a long and
chequered history. Built by a private irrigation
company in 1866, it was meant for both navigation
and irrigation. To cut a long story short, the company
The remodelling of the canal began to be seriously
considered only during the 1950s and between 1955
and 1961 it was remodelled for Rs. 7.5 crores by the
A.P. Government. That gave the canal a new life and it
began to be considered successful from then on.
7
The KWDT Award
Towards the end of the 1960s the Krishna Water
Disputes Tribunal was formed. It focused on the
disputes between the states of Maharashtra,
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh over sharing the
Krishna waters. This of course included the
Tungabhadra which is a tributary. The Tribunal’s
Award (also known as the Bachawat Award or KWDT
Award) was given out in 1973.
Bhadra Anicut
Tunga Anicut
Bhadra Dam
0
LBC
BELLARY
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Figure 6 : Chart showing the annual allocations for each scheme,
as allotted by the KWDT Award of 1973
In order to understand how the KWDT allocations
work out in practice and what problems there are, we
need to look into the various canal systems that take
off from the dams and anicuts. Again, restricting
attention to the second half of the river, there are five
canals to keep in mind, three taking off from the
Tungabhadra Dam and one each from Rajolibanda
and Sunkesula (Fig. 7). The main features of the canals
are given in Table 2 below.
MAHBOOBNAGAR
RDS
RB LLC
KURNOOL
L
ANA
KC C
TUNGABHADRA RIVER
RAICHUR
20
TMC
Legally, the picture seemed clear. The KWDT Award
clearly apportioned the quantum of water allocated to
each scheme annually. The larger structures and their
allocation are shown in the chart below (Fig. 6). As can
be seen, the largest allocation is to the Tungabhadra
Dam which is situated about half way down the river.
Then come the Bhadra Dam, the Sunkesula Anicut and
the Rajolibanda Anicut.
KRISHNA RIVER
Tungabhadra Dam
Vijaynagar canals
Rajolibunda Anicut
Sunkesula Anicut
RB HLC
ANANTAPUR
CUDDAPPAH
Figure 7: Sketch of various canals taking off from the Tungabhadra river and districts which they serve. (adapted from Survey Of
India maps)
8
The KWDT Award
were meant to supply water for two crops (both kharif
and rabi).
As is clear from the table, three of the canals are interstate, (LBC) lies entirely in Karnataka and the last (KC)
entirely in A.P. If their design capacities as also the
amount allotted to each under the KWDT Award are
considered, then the LBC and RB LLC ought to run for
more than 11 months in a year, assuming they flow
full all that time. RDS and KC should run for between 6
to 7 months and the RB HLC for just about 5 months
each year. In fact, except for the RB HLC which had
enough only for one (i.e. kharif) crop, all the others
Name
of main
canal
Completed
in
Length
(kms)
Reading the KWDT Award, one may think there is no
reason for conflict, except in a drought year. Yet there
is disquiet in the watered tracts, a variety of rumblings
that sometimes become explosive. The Tungabhadra
river’s case is probably not special but typical of many
of our rivers today.
Passes
through
Design
capacity
(cusecs)
KWDT’s
allocation
(T.M.C.)
Estimated No.
of months of
flow at design
capacity+
LBC
1963
225
Kar only
3100
92
11.4
RB LLC
1957
350
Kar + A.P.
1800
52
11.1
RB HLC
1967
188
Kar + A.P.
4000
50
4.8
RDS
1962
143
Kar + A.P.
850
17.1
7.7
KC
1961*
306
A.P. only
2600*
39.9
6.4
Table 2: The main features of the canals.
* The KC canal was remodelled between 1955 and 1961 as mentioned earlier
+
calculated as KWDT's allocation/Design Capacity
9
The Unplanned Unfolding
Designed to carry 850 cusecs, 90% of it (770 cusecs)
was to be made available at the A.P. border. By 1974,
A.P.’s complaints of insufficient flow at the border
prompted GoK and GoAP to meet and discuss this.
There were further discussions in June 1985, March
1986 and January 1989 between the two states but
no settlement was reached12. The natural premise was
that Karnataka was using more than its allotted share
in the first 42 kms of the canal.
Very often designs and plans, are like babies.
Eventually, children never turn out as their parents
hope they will. Plans suffer a similar fate. They don’t
turn out as the designers hope they will. The 1970s,
1980s and 1990s saw problems in all these schemes.
Although all details could not be gathered, some
outline can be presented for each scheme.
Tungabhadra Dam
The problem of reservoir siltation is inevitable and
evident here too. After 42 years, i.e. by 1995, the
Tungabhadra Dam had lost almost a quarter (24% ) of
its original storage capacity (133 T.M.C) and could
store only 100 T.M.C (Rao et al, 1996). Interestingly
enough, in Oct. 2003, the Karnataka High Court
dismissed a plea for desilting and dredging major
reservoirs. A public interest writ petition filed by a
retired Superintending Engineer of the Irrigation
Department had sought directions to the Government
to desilt and take up dredging in major reservoirs. The
Government, however, contended that there was no
obligation on it to desilt reservoir beds. It stated that
every reservoir had a certain life span, after which
they would not serve their purpose. The cost of
removing one tmcft of silt would be Rs. 100 crore, it
said10. The Tungabhadra Dam with 30 T.M.C. of silt
would thus require Rs. 3000 crore to desilt.
However, additionally, the flow entering the canal
head itself (i.e. in Karnataka) had declined. This flow
depends on the flow in the river at this site. In the
1960s for example, between 2 and 6 % of the river’s
annual flow entered the canal13. In 2003, there was
hardly any flow in the river here in peak summer14.
The nitty-gritty details make all the difference
The canal intake is at 1082 ft above MSL (mean sea
level). As is usual, this level is much above the river
bed level there. Thus only when the level of flow in the
river exceeds 1082 ft does it enter the canal. On the
other hand, in the anicut wall, there are 10 Hume
pipes. They are located 10 ft lower, at 1072 ft above
MSL16. These were put in during construction of the
anicut in the ‘50s. and were not closed up. Thus when
the river flow is low, all (or most) of it passes through,
downstream, and the canal will not receive water. If
the flow in the river is high enough, this flow
downstream will not matter so much as some part of
the flow will enter the canal intake.
Rajolibanda Diversion Scheme
As already indicated, the RDS canal first received
water in 1962. It was then completely lined and part
of it ran perennially and part of it two-seasonally11.
10
The Hindu, October 16, 2003 “HC rejects plea for desilting dams”
KWDT, pg 23, 115
12
Deccan Herald, March 31,2004, “Embroiled in water controversy”
13
KWDT, pg 54 and gauge data from 1961-62 to 68-69 in Archives, GoK
14
The Hindu, July 8th, 2003 quoting the then A.P. Irrigation Minister said there were no inflows to the RDS for 75 days each year.
15
The Hindu, July 19, 2006 “Tension at RDS anicut over sharing of water”
16
ibid.
11
10
The Unplanned Unfolding
When the issue of declining flows came up again in
1989, seven of the ten pipes were closed. TDP ruling
in AP and President’s rule in Karnataka ensured this
was done. There were elections in AP and Karnataka in
Nov. 1989 and the Congress party came to power in
both states. The next year (1990), all the pipes were
opened up so that lean flow went downstream
benefiting Kurnool farmers17. But there was violence at
the anicut. A bomb exploded damaging the upper
part of the anicut18. This had now become an intrastate issue for A.P. (Kurnool Dist. vs. Mahabubnagar
Dist.) and a nine member MLAs committee was set up
that time.
1961-71 appears to have been the heyday for this
canal and there was a steady increase in the amount of
water it used. There was enough water for the kharif
crop and a subsequent rabi crop and cultivation nearly
doubled in these ten years20. The KWDT Award
curtailed the water allocated to this scheme to its 1960
levels (KWDT used 1960 as a benchmark for deciding
the allocations to many of the schemes).
In 1996, just 35 years after it had been remodelled, a
project to modernize it was again taken up, this time
for over Rs 1,000 crores with Japanese assistance. The
modernization involved increasing the canal capacity
from 2,600 to 3,800 cusecs (30 % increases). It also
included abandoning the old anicut and building a
barrage21 in its place. The old anicut held no water
back, but the new barrage is designed to store up to
1.2 TMC of water. This barrage started functioning
from 2003. Thus since 1998, there has been no rabi
crop on account of “canal modernization” work. In
2001 and 2002 there was no crop at all (neither Rabi
nor kharif) because of insufficient water.
Not much data could be found for the later years but
in the decade, 1990-91 to 2000-01 A.P. drew 6.59
T.M.C. on average (41% of its allocated 15.9 T.M.C.)
while Karnataka drew 4.48 T.M.C on average (373%
of its allocated 1.2 T.M.C. )19.
Sunkesula’s KC Canal
Soon after remodelling in 1961, the area irrigated by
the KC canal increased substantially. The period,
These brief histories set the background for looking at
the running of these schemes in recent years.
17
The Hindu, July 20, 2003, “Government to divert Jurala water to Mahabubnagar”
ibid.
19
Times of India, July 18, 2003, “MLA held for fast over Rajolibanda”
20
This estimate is based on KC canal data for the period 1951-52 to 1968-1969 given in the KWDT Award.
21
A reminder that an anicut is typically, a solid masonry wall while a barrage looks like a bridge with gates between the piers. The
Sunkesula barrage now has 30 gates.
18
11
Recent Years
Running the Canals (2003-2005)
Kurnool district, it is the Irrigation Advisory Board
(IAB)22 that decides, while for the two right bank
canals of the TB Dam; it is the TB board23 that decides
the water schedule.
Tracking the running of the canals over the course of a
year brings out many issues that those who are
dependent on it have to face. The canals provide
water for both drinking and irrigation. Thus any
prolonged closure of the canals leads to serious
drinking water problems for the areas they command.
First each of the three TB canals is followed separately,
even though they all derive water from the same dam.
Then moving progressively downstream, the RDS, and
lastly the KC Canal are tracked in detail.
The natural year to consider is the “water year” which
starts on June 1 and ends on May 31 of the next year.
Since river flows vary greatly from year to year, it is
important to consider both a drought year and a good
year to see the differences in their effects on the
canals. The monsoons of 2001, 2002 and 2003 were
poor while 2004 was a good year. So taking the
monsoons of 2003 and 2004 gives both continuity
and a comparison between a bad and good year. Thus
the period covered herein is 24 months, between June
2003 and May 2005.
TB Left Bank Canal - 167 breaches and
counting
This canal, designed for a maximum discharge of
3,100 cusecs, lies entirely in Karnataka, running
through the districts of Koppal and Raichur (See Fig 5).
So no inter-state issues come up and it should run
relatively smoother. Two problems crop up here viz.
poor condition of the canal leading to frequent
breaching24 and hence disruption of supply and tailend deprivation.
June of 2003 was a particularly bleak time. The
monsoon of 2002 has been poor and the summer of
2003 is severe. The Tungabhadra river goes dry for the
first time in living memory.
2003-04
During the first six months of 2003, there is no flow in
the canal. On July 15, 2003 water is released to the
canal for drinking water purposes of villages and
towns in the command area25. Three days later the
canal breaches at several places - 200 metres of the
canal collapses26 and inflow is stopped for over ten
days. On Aug 1st water is again released, this time for
irrigation, but in the next three weeks there are
frequent breaches and hence disruption of supply.
The canal is not being maintained properly, and no
work in this regard had been taken up in the past three
years, allege the KRRS27. They are to stage a dharna.
Canals are generally opened in July, after the
monsoon has begun. They are then closed in
December for two weeks or so. The canals meant to
support a rabi crop, are again opened in January and
closed in March. The decisions to release water to a
canal or when to close it are not simple or plain.
Typically these decisions are not taken on site. A
meeting of politicians, bureaucrats and the concerned
engineers decides these matters in either the state
capital or the district capital. Thus, for example, in
22
The IAB members include the Collector, the MP, ZP Chairman and ten MLAs.
The TB board is chaired by a Chief Engineer of the C.W.C. (based in Delhi) and includes the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Water
Resources, Irrigation Secretary of Karnataka (based in Bangalore) and Engineer-in-Chief of Andhra Pradesh (based in Hyderabad).
24
Canal breach when the flow overtops their embankment. There is a rapid erosion of the embankment as the overflow water wears it
away and a gap is created in the embankment which can be many meters wide.
25
This is ensured by keeping the flow in the canal low enough so that it is insufficient for irrigation.
26
Deccan Herald, July20, 2003
27
The Hindu, August 22, 2003, “KRRS to stage dharna today”. KRRS is the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha
23
12
Recent Years
The Raichur bandh, called by Janata Dal (S) on Aug
21st against the government’s “failure to maintain the
canal”, is partially successful.
The new Water Resources Minister appeals to the
farmers to call off their agitation. He holds a high-level
meeting on May 10th. The meeting decides to issue
fresh tenders to take up more repair works at a cost of
Rs 4 crore. One tender for Rs 5 crore has already been
called for by the govt for repairing this left bank
canal31. So now a total of Rs 9 crore is to be spent.
Talk of ‘sabotage’ emerges but we are assured by a
party leader that the Congress was not responsible for
the breach in the canal at Mile 41. On learning about
the breach, elected representatives rushed to the spot,
took steps to prevent leakage and held discussions
with water resources minister and irrigation engineers,
he says28.
Canals should be repaired when there is no flow in
them, typically between March and June but it is
already July. Repair work on the Left Bank Canal (and
its sub canals) just begins. In Sindhanoor sub-division,
Rs 65.35lakhs is released after July 3, the tender
submission date. Water is released to the canal two
days later, on July 5th, for drinking purposes32. A week
later, the BJP chief alleges that contractors and
department officials have cheated the govt. by
inefficient work. Repair work is delayed by ten days in
July due to heavy rain but by July 18th, officials say
that Rs 9 crore has been spent on repairs to the canal.
Just two weeks to finish off Rs. 9 crore!
In December 2003, the canal is closed, - there is no
water for a rabi crop.
2004-05
Five months later, a new ‘water year’ is about to dawn.
In the searing heat of early May, 2004, farmers
depending on the TB LBC engage in protests and
dharnas along the canal, as there are no signs of taking
up of repair works of the canal, estimated at Rs. 225
crore and pending for the last four years. Many
instances in the recent past have given enough
indications that their (farmers’) agitation may turn
violent. Farmers have been making representations to
every leader coming to the area. They also met the
Chief Minister, but it was of no use. The flow of water
has been declining in the canal due to breaches in the
canal wall in many places and accumulation of silt29.
On July 25th, one week after ‘completing the repairs’,
this canal breaches at the 12th mile, as flow is
increased from 2800 to 3000 cusecs. Villagers notice a
fissure and inform officials, who initiate a temporary
measure to plug the fissure. A few hours later the canal
breaches and officials suspend release of water into
the main canal. The chief engineer is confident that it
will be repaired in a day33.
Proposals for repair works have been submitted
separately by Irrigation Department, Tungabhadra
CADA, Koppal and Raichur district administrations
years back. But the proposals are lying in cold storage.
The government had assured the farmers of taking up
of the repair works in April and set aside Rs 60 crore in
the budget. The funds were released. But the repair
works were once again postponed due to election
code of conduct in April, when state elections were
held30. The Congress returns to power, but in a
coalition this time.
In August, the issue is raised in the State Assembly. A
BJP MLA wants to know why the government is yet to
find a permanent solution to the breaches in the canal
when the Left Bank Canal has breached 167 times.
The government avers that the Rs 680 crore needed to
modernize the canal can only be released in phases,
owing to a fund crunch34.
On 1st Jan 2005, the State Government constitutes a
seven-member committee led by experts, to inspect
28
Times of India, 23 August 2003, “Raichur bandh partial”
Deccan Herald, May 11, 2004, “Tungabhadra canal: Farmers' agitation may turn violent”
30
ibid
31
Deccan Herald, May 12, 2004,” Allum’s appeal to farmers”
32
Deccan Herald, July 11, 2004, “BJP’s allegation”
33
Deccan Herald, July 26, 2004, “TB canal leaks again”
34
The Hindu, August 6, 2004, “Rs. 8,300 crores needed for irrigation projects”
29
13
the Tungabhadra Project and come out with
recommendations to improve the canals under it. The
govternment will seek funds either from the Asian
Development Bank or the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development to implement the
proposal, the C.M. says35. On Jan 29, it is learnt that
the proposed inspection by the expert committee has
been indefinitely postponed. According to official
sources, there is no need to conduct a fresh survey. An
earlier expert committee had already conducted a
thorough inspection a year ago i.e. January 2004.
That committee had submitted a report to the
Government and suggested a few steps to be taken to
strengthen weak portions of the canals. The
Government should refer to the report submitted by
the earlier committee and implement its
recommendations during the summer closure, say
elected representatives and farmers of the affected
districts36.
itself. But the canal has been closed since mid-March
and the work ought to have started earlier?
Inter-state considerations -the TB Right
Bank Low Level Canal(LLC)
This canal runs for 131 kms in Karnataka (Bellary Dist.)
and then through Andhra Pradesh (Kurnool Dist.) for
another 219 kms (See Fig. 6). On this canal ‘tail end’
deprivation begins at the Karnataka-A.P. border. As
with the Left Bank Canal, here too, the canal is
frequently breached and needs repair. Drinking water
for the town of Kurnool and water for industries in
Bellary enter the scene here. Going through it
chronologically we find that:
2003-04
In mid-July there is 17 TMC of water in the dam and it
can be released to the canals. The first priority is to
ease the drinking water scarcity in villages and fill the
tanks along the way. So water is released to the canal
on 16th July. Just three days later, when the canal is
carrying 1,200 cusecs, there is a breach at the 38.8 km
point. Water gushes out and eight to 10 metres of the
bund is washed away. Flow in the canal has to be
stopped. Repairs will take three days according to the
Superintending Engineer39.
But the govt. sticks to its agenda. On April 12th a new
expert committee inspects the Canal and its
distributaries and it is to formulate a strategy to
strengthen the canal permanently. The committee is to
study the breached portions of the canal to identify if
the breaches were reported on new stretches or were
recurring on strengthened portions. It is to submit its
report by September as it will help the department
bring pressure on the Government to reserve funds for
the project when it approves a supplementary
budget37.
There isn’t much rain in August. The situation is quite
worrisome40 and the Tungabhadra Board meets in
mid-September to decide the water schedule for the
canal. In late September tension prevails along the
canal due to short supply of water in the tail-end
areas. The Supt. Engineer tells agitating leaders that
water supply will improve in the next few days as they
had decided to close two distributaries every day to
ensure supply to the tail-end areas41. It is clear that
there is no water for a rabi crop. Inflows into the TB
Dam stop in early Nov and by end Nov the storage has
dropped to 37 TMC. On Jan 1st 2004, there is only 10
TMC left.
Meanwhile another summer is underway. This time
Rs. 17 crores has been set aside for modernising the
Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal. The Chief Engineer says
that priority will be given to vulnerable stretches of the
canals. Repairs of sluices and plugging of leaks will
also be taken up. The process of calling for tenders is
on and the work is likely to be taken up in the next 15
days38. So this time the repair work may start in May
35
The Hindu, January 2, 2005,” Panel to recommend steps to improve Tungabhadra canals”
The Hindu, January 30, 2005, “Inspection of Tungabhadra canals put off”
37
The Hindu, April 13, 2005,”Expert committee begins inspection of Tungabhadra canal”
38
Deccan Herald, May 28, 2005,”TB canal work to be completed by June 30”
39
The Hindu, July 20, 2003, “Breach in Tungabhadra Canal in Bellary taluk”
40
So worrisome that GoK decides to spend Rs.5 crore on a cloud seeding exercise in the TB reservoir. In mid-August meteorologists are praying
for an overcast sky, so that they can 'seed' the clouds and keep their promise! The seeding exercise does not meet with success.
41
The Hindu, September 26, 2003, “Excess water use in upper reaches fuels tension”
36
14
Recent Years
Kurnool town’s drinking water worries
In January 2004, water scarcity worries loom large in Kurnool Town. Although placed on the river
bank, Kurnool town’s water security is poor. This year, the river dries up in mid-Feb. In early Feb.
itself, the Collector of Kurnool holds a crucial meeting of revenue, irrigation and police officials to
discuss the strategy for safe transmission of 1.1 TMC of water from Tungabhadra dam to
Gajuladinne reservoir near Kurnool. The water is to be drawn through Tungabhadra Right Bank
Canal (LLC), which first passes through Karnataka for 131 kms. As per the tentative plan, water
would be drawn for 26 days at the rate of 500 cusecs. Of this, the rural water supply schemes are
expected to consume 22 % and two nearby towns 15 cusecs, while transmission losses, including
evaporation losses, were estimated at 32% at the rate of one cusec for every two km. After
transmission & evaporation losses and meeting the needs of upper reaches, around 220 cusecs
(43% of the released flow) is expected to flow into the Gajuladinne project which is 324 km from
the origin of the canal42.
The canal is opened on March 1 releasing water at a higher rate of 600 cusecs but only for 16 days.
Only 37% of this (220 cusecs) reaches Gajuladinne.The plan of the Kurnool district administration
and the Irrigation Department to fetch drinking water from Tungabhadra dam goes awry at the
last minute with people in the upper reaches diverting the flow43. They begin to look at other
sources for water for the town.
2004-05
A new ‘water-year’ begins. Late May 2004 itself,
brings pre-monsoon rain and storage in the TB dam
steadily rises in June. On July 11th, the canal is
opened. All of July, it fills tanks enroute. The flow is
kept low enough so that agriculture operations cannot
begin in July.
Board to take steps to release the State's share of water
through the LLC. "The dam is full and overflowing and
1,800 cusecs is being released into the LLC. Yet, we are
getting less than the quota allocated to us” stresses the
A.P. Irrigation Minister leading the team on a surprise
visit to the command areas. His attention is drawn to
the "failure" of the A.P. Government to release funds
for strengthening and maintenance of canals46.
Finally 25 days later, on Aug 4th the canal is opened
for agriculture44. The storage in the TB dam is rising
comfortably. On 13th it is almost full (at 105 TMC)
after a gap of 3 years. The annual ritual, of opening
the crest-gates on Independence Day, August 15, can
take place this year. Hundreds of people come to see
the spectacular sight of water gushing out of 33 of the
34 crest-gates45.
Sure enough, about ten days later, on August 30th, a
major breach occurs in the canal and water damages
standing crops in the vicinity. The breach occurs at the
82 km point when the canal was carrying around
1,400 cusecs. 40 metres of earthen embankment is
washed away and water from the canal floods the
nearby fields47. The picture below shows the breached
portion(Photo 3).
Promptly, a team of elected representatives and
leaders of farmers from A.P. urges the Tungabhadra
42
The Hindu, February 6, 2004, “Crucial meet today on Tungabhadra water releaase”
The Hindu, March 19, 2004, “Tungabhadra flow diverted”
44
The Hindu, August 4, 2004, “Irrigation meeting for monitoring of Tungabhadra flow”
45
The Hindu, August 16, 2004, “Tungabhadra Dam almost full”
46
The Hindu, August 18, 2004, “Mareppa leads farmers’ team to Tungabhadra Board”
47
The Hindu, September 1, 2004, “Breach in tungabhadra canal damages crops”
43
15
compared to the normal 600 cusecs. The Board’s
words have effect49.
There is a comfortable 43 T.M.C. of water in the TB
Dam on Jan 1st. Water for a rabi crop is released.
Farmers object to the use of water from the canal by
the Jindal Vijaynagar Steel Plant (JVSL), which set up a
multi-crore integrated steel plant in 1994 at around
the 40th km point on the canal in Karnataka. So the
Govt. asks it to draw water from the TB river instead of
the canal50.
Photo 3: The breached portion of the Tungabhadra Right Bank
Low Level Canal (Source: www.hindu.com, 2004)
In January itself, the Collector of Kurnool requisitions
the A.P. Government and the Tungabhadra Board to
spare 3 TMC of water for the drinking water needs of
towns and 190 villages depending on the canal51.
However in March there is uncertainty over release of
0.7 TMC of water for the drinking water needs of the
canal dependent villages and towns52.
The Tungabhadra Board holds a meeting on
September 3rd after a gap of one year amid agitations
by farmers on both sides for water. The Board asks
Karnataka to increase inflows from the TB Dam into
both, the High Level Canal (HLC) and Low Level Canal
(LLC) within three days. The meeting agrees that it will
be the Board's responsibility to ensure that AP receives
its allotted quota. It agrees to deploy CISF men along
the Karnataka stretch of the canals from patrolling to
prevent illegal tapping by farmers48. In ten days there
is improvement in the inflows at the AP border.
Inflows touch 560 cusecs while they were 300 earlier,
The Jindal Vijaynagar Steel Plant has been permitted
to draw 100 million litres per day (about 45 cusecs)
from the TB reservoir. In April, they propose that water
from Almatti Dam (150 kms away!) on the Krishna
river be given to them in the future. The Govt’s
response to the proposal is encouraging, they say53.
48
The Hindu, September 3, 2004, “Tunga board sets deadline for Karnataka”
The Hindu, September 13, 2004, “Improvement in inflows from Tungabhadra dam”
50
The Hindu, January 27, 2005, “Don’t get emotional, Prakash tells seer”
51
The Hindu, January 20, 2005, “Plea for release of water”
52
The Hindu, March 29, 2005, “Uncertainty over release of Tungabhadra water”
53
The Hindu, April 22, 2005, “Bellary industries looking at Alamatti for water”
54
The Hindu, August 18, 2004, “Lack of water hits sowing in several taluks”
55
Deccan Herald, August 10, 2004, “Left in the lurch: TB farmers on strike”
49
16
Recent Years
Box 1: Tail-end Deprivation
Consider the troubles of being an MLA of this
area. Step into the shoes of an MLA whose
constituency is one of the ‘tail-end’ regions of the
Left Bank Canal. You have won in the recently
concluded state election in April 2004. This year,
when the TB Dam is full (after a gap of 3 years)
you are keen to ensure water reaches your
constituency which begins at the 104th mile of
the 141 mile canal. The canal is opened for
agriculture on July 15th54 and should have
reached the 104th mile by July 22nd but it is
August 10th, the water hasn’t reached and
farmers are threatening to agitate55. The water
level at the 47th mile is 11 ft. Accordingly the
level at the 104th mile should be 5.75 ft. Instead
there is only 3.5 ft of water flowing there.
Increasing the level at the 47th mile from 11 to
11.75 ft makes no change at the 104th mile which
remains at 3.5 ft while the required level there is 6
ft.
drawing water illegally from the canal and its
distributaries. The Deputy Commissioner warns
that action will be taken against those who violate
the orders which are issued from August 20 up to
31st. They find farmers between the 47th and
104th mile drawing water illegally58. Nothing
helps. On Aug 29th, the district administration
expresses its inability to provide water to the
“tail-end” regions, admitting that police and
officials of the Revenue Department had also
been unable to tackle the issue59.
At the end of August, you return to your base,
after hopes of a ministerial berth in the expanded
cabinet have been quashed. You get back to
worrying about water. Of course, you have
discussed the issue with the C.M. in Bangalore
urging him to find a permanent solution to the
problem. He in turn, issued direction to the
Deputy Commissioner to ensure water supply to
the tail-end within two days60.
On Independence Day, you direct the release of
5ft of water in the canal at the 104th mile. And on
16th morning, there is 5 feet of water there!56
That is the power of your words.
But now, 50 days after the canal has opened,
water still hasn’t reached the tail-end. So you
organize a district level meeting of MPs,
engineers and elected representatives. You
inspect various stretches of the canal and find that
there is excess withdrawal between the 47th and
69th mile. You are a going to be a member of the
all party delegation that meets the Irrigation
Secretary in mid-Sept in Bangalore. That
delegation would then meet the Minister for
Water Resources to apprise him of the outcome of
the meeting. Then the delegation is to meet the
CM and urge him to constitute an expert
committee to go into the details of the proposal
and provide funds for it61.
But as an MLA, you have many aspirations
(especially the ministerial kind). So when you
hear that the C.M. is going to expand his cabinet
by 25th August, you leave for Bangalore
immediately after the Independence Day
celebrations. Soon as you depart, the level in the
canal at the 104th mile falls back to 3 ft - its earlier
level, which is insufficient for the tail-end areas57.
While you are away, farmers stage dharnas and
rasta-rokos. The district administration is under
pressure and imposes prohibitory orders under
Section 144 of the Cr. PC to prevent farmers from
What more are you supposed to do?!
56
Deccan Herald, August 21, 2004, “Tail-end farmers still thirsty for Tungabhadra water”
ibid
58
The Hindu, August 21, 2004, “Ban orders along TLBC to prevent water diversion”
59
The Hindu, August 30, 2004, “Tail-end regions of TLBC still dry”
60
The Hindu, September 1, 2004, “Sowing hit as water fails to reach tail-end areas”
61
The Hindu, September 13, 2004, “All-party delegation to meet officials”
57
17
Box 2: Drinking Water Scarcity
this scenario.) It seems that drinking water demands
of towns and villages did not get precedence over a
rabi crop in early 2005.
The rules are certainly in place. At least 2 TMC ft of
water has to be kept stored in the dam till May 1
every year as residual storage. But, indiscipline in
drawal of water has often plunged the water level to
less than 2 TMC ft. (Water storage in April-May had
gone below 2 TMC ft in 12 years since 1976-77)
Storage in Tungabhadra Dam
Storage in reservoir (TMC)
The water scarcity in the summer of 2004 is
understandable The 2003 monsoon
was poor and the TB Dam did not fill up. All the
TB Dam canals were closed in
December 2003 and here was no water released
for a rabi crop. What is curious is that
there is drinking water scarcity in the summer of
2005 also. After all the TB Dam
overflowed in the 2004 monsoon. Couldn’t
enough water have been saved up in
the TB Dam for the drinking needs of the villages
and towns dependent on it?
If the storage in the TB Dam for the Jan to May
period is plotted it becomes clear
that by mid-March the levels for both years are
the same! (Keeping the TB Left
and Right bank canals open from Jan to March
2005 for a short rabi crop results in
50
2004
45
2005
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1/1/2008
2/1/2008
3/1/2008
4/1/2008
5/1/2008
their irrigation tanks. The 18th breach is at the 78th
km. It forced stoppage of water to the canal for a week
in early September. Officials of the board made it clear
that they were not in a position to ensure even a drop
more than the allocated 1,600 cusecs at the Kar-AP
border due to the weak embankment62. So the kharif
supply was very erratic.
The poor cousin - TB Right Bank High
Level Canal (HLC)
This was the last of the canals to be completed. It was
fully operational in 1967. Another inter-state canal, it
covers 105 km in Karnataka and then moves on to AP
covering 80 kms there, in the district of Anantapur
(See Fig 5). Although designed to carry 4,000 cusecs, it
can actually carry only about 2,700 cusecs due to its
poor condition. There is no supply in the rabi season
for this canal. It is a one season canal.
2004-05
The next water year, beginning June 2004, saw more
breaches. Emergency repairs to the canal were carried
out just before the release of water in mid-July. But on
Aug. 2nd, the canal suffered a breach at the 13th km63.
Restoration of the canal takes ten days. The
Tungabhadra Board scheduled to meet on August 26 is
to discuss the overdrawal by Karnataka. The water
realised at AP-Karnataka border in is 1,300 cusecs,
30% less than the expected 1,850 cusecs64. The interState row over water percolates down to the districts
with farmers from a sub-branch canal and those from
a branch canal staging a protest at the canal executive
2003-04
The canal is reopened in July 2003 but suffers an
unprecedented 18 breaches in 40 days. The secretary
of the Tungabhadra Board admits that the condition of
the main canal embankment is weak at several places,
particularly in Karnataka up to the 85th km. On the
breaches occurring very often this year, he said a
majority of them had occurred naturally but some
were the result of attempts of Karnataka farmers to fill
62
The Hindu, September 12, 2003, “Assured water in HLC in doubt”
The Hindu, August 3, 2004, “Breach in Tungabhadra canal”
64
The Hindu, August 3, 2004, “State denied its share from Tungabhadra HLC”
63
18
Recent Years
engineer's office at Guntakal. They took the engineers
and lifted the shutters of the sluice to let water flow
into the sub-canal. As soon as the farmers left, the
engineers closed down the shutters!65 In early Sept.,
the Karnataka Government agrees to patrolling by
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel
along the canals in its areas to prevent illegal drawal of
water by farmers66. A week later, there is significant
improvement in the inflows reaching the canal67. By
late November inflows at the border have fallen again
to about 1,100 cusecs68. The Tungabhadra Board
assures the AP Govt. of increased flows at the border69.
Two days later on Nov 29th, the canal suffers a major,
10 feet wide breach at the 123nd km in A.P, when
there was about 2000 cusecs flowing in it. It is
estimated that the breach filling work will take about
six days70. In December the canal is closed.
expert committee’s proposal in toto was passed by
GoAP72. Some months earlier, in May 2003, the
Principal Irrigation Secretaries of GoK and GoAP met
and discussed RDS. They found that AP received
meagre flows in RDS (only about 50% of its
allocation) partly because of silt and accumulated
mounds on the canal-bed. They resolved to end the
problem by undertaking repairs to the sluices and
other structures in the head reaches. GoAP agreed to
release its share of the cost immediately73.
2003-04
In late June 2003 there was a small flow in the river
but that brought tension. The RDS farmers demanded
closure of all pipes in the anicut. By June 28,
Karnataka police were deployed at the anicut to
thwart sabotage by farmers under the KC canal who
had recently tried to break open some vents at the
Rajolibanda anicut. Collectors of Raichur (Karnataka)
and Mahboobnagar (A.P.) were in regular contact to
avert threat to the structure74.
Clash within A.P. - Rajolibanda
The tension at Rajolibanda in the 1980s and 1990s
has been mentioned earlier. In March 2003, thirteen
years after the 1990 violence at Rajolibanda, GoAP
appointed an expert committee to study the problem
at RDS and suggest remedial measures. The
committee opined that RDS canal received little water
because of three reasons.
However on July 4th, there was violence at the anicut.
Over a thousand farmers gathered on either end of the
820 metre long anicut – Mahboobnagar farmers at the
northern end and Kurnool farmers at the southern
end. As the Mahboobnagar farmers reached the pipes
to close them, a mob from the Kurnool side started
throwing stones; both sides fought pitched battles
raining stones at each other and several people
sustained minor injuries. The Kurnool police opened
two rounds of fire to disperse the farmers on both
sides75.
1. the construction pipes in the anicut are kept open
2. the river sluice shutters are not level with the crest
of the anicut but a foot lower71
3. accumulation of silt and debris at the anicut and in
the approach to the canal regulator.
This committee recommended that the silt be
removed and all the sluices and pipes be closed so as
not to allow any water flow downstream. Eight
months later a GO ordering implementation of the
That prompted the Chief Minister of AP to hold a highlevel meeting the next day, July 5th. A 10-point
package to resolve the dispute came up for discussion
at the meeting. This package involved modernizing
65
The Hindu, August 29, 2004, “Tungabhadra water row spreads to districts”
The New Indian Express, September 5, 2004, “Karnataka okays CISF patrolling along canals”
67
The Hindu, September 13, 2004 “Improvement in inflows from Tungabhadra dam”
68
The Hindu, November 25, 2004 “Anantapur riots facing crisis, says TDP leader”
69
The Hindu, November 28, 2004 “Tungabhadra Board gives State its due share”
70
The Hindu, November 30, 2004 “Tungabhadra canal suffers breach”
71
Apart from the Hume pipes there are river sluices in the anicut. These are notches in the crest of the anicut and are fitted with adjustable
falling shutters.
72
The Hindu, July 23, 2006, “RDS ayacutdars oppose opening of river sluice”
73
The Hindu, May 14, 2003, “AP., Karnataka agree to increase storage capacity of Jurala”
74
The Hindu, June 29, 2003, “AP., Karnataka join hands in Rajolibanda scheme”
75
The Hindu, July 5, 2003, “A.P. farmers clash over anicut closure”
66
19
the entire RDS canal network76. In mid July a TRS MLA
demanding that the pipes in the RDS be closed
immediately went on an indefinite hunger strike77.
pending arrears in respect of maintenance of the
canal81. An amount of Rs 8.30 crore being pro-rata
expenditure on RDS by the GoK between 1956 and
1997 (a period of 41 years) remained unrecovered
from GoAP as per Karnataka AG Audit Report (200001).
In a measure aimed at defusing the tension over
release of water to the tail-end areas of
Mahabubnagar from the RDS, GoAP expressed its
preparedness to feed the last 25 km of RDS through a
link canal connected to the Jurala Right Bank Canal
(i.e. Krishna river water) before August 2078. Police
from A.P. and Karnataka guarded the site for months
together.
Two months later, on 20th June, 2006, tension again
prevailed at RDS as farmers from Kurnool Dist.
gathered at Rajolibanda anicut to protest the closure
of the pipes. So the Karnataka irrigation officials
stopped the scheduled work responding to a request
by the irrigation officials of AP. They decided to
suspend the work till panchayat elections in AP were
over82. Less than a month later, in mid-July, another
attempt to implement the GO (i.e. closing the
remaining three pipes) was made. Kurnool and
Mahabubnagar farmers had assembled at the site with
Kurnool farmers resisting the closure. As the situation
turned very tense, officials withdrew for
deliberations83. A day later the work of closing the
three pipes with cement concrete began. A large posse
of Police were deployed at the worksite and in villages
of Kurnool Dist. to prevent farmers moving towards
the worksite. However, to ensure some flow
downstream, one of the river sluices was lowered by 2
ft (i.e. from 1082 ft to 1080 ft)84. This concession was
contrary to the recommendation of the GO, says the
leader of the RDS ayacutdars association85.
However, in early February 2004, there was cooperation. The pipes in the RDS anicut were closed for
a few days to enable the RDS canal to draw water.
After using its quota, the pipes were opened so that
there was flow in the river at Kurnool.
2004-05
In July, A.P.’s major irrigation. Minster announced in
the Assembly that RDS was to be modernized79. Six
months after that though, in December 2004, the
controversy of the vents at the Rajolibanda anicut
again snowballed. At a high-level meeting in
Hyderabad, the Irrigation Minister, Ministers-incharge of Kurnool and Mahboobnagar districts and
the MLAs of both districts were unable to resolve the
issue80.
2006
The future promises to bring forth more conflict
because the AP government has sanctioned a new
right-bank canal from the Rajolibanda anicut which is
to (ostensibly) irrigate another 50,000 hectares in
Kurnool district. Funds are already being released for
this 50 km long canal called the Guru Raghavendra
Canal86. Further, at this already beleaguered site, a
mini-hydel project is coming up that is dogged by
controversy (see Box 3).
Not much happened in 2005 but in March 2006,
GoAP sanctioned Rs. 39 crore for RDS modernization
and released the first instalment of Rs. 52 lakh (1.31%
of sanctioned amount) to Karnataka. However, repair
work on the main canal of the RDS which was to
commence in summer 2006 was shelved by late April.
The reason given was that A.P. had not cleared
76
The Hindu, July 6, 2003, “CM to call all-party meet on RDS row ”
Times of India, July 18, 2003, “MLA held for fast over Rajolibanda”
78
The Hindu, July 20, 2003, “Govt. to divert Jurala water to Mahabubnagar”
79
The Hindu, July 18, 2003, “Rajolibanda scheme to be modernised”
80
The Hindu, December 19, 2004, “High-level meet fails to solve Tungabhadra vents issue”
81
The Hindu, April 24, 2006, “Modernisation work on RDS shelved”
82
New Indian Express, June 21, 2006, “Rajolibanda diversion project stopped”
83
The Hindu, July 19, 2006, “ Tension at RDS anicut over sharing of water”
84
The Hindu, July 20, 2006, “Work on RDS sluices begins”
85
The Hindu, July 23, 2006, “RDS ayacutdars oppose opening of river sluice”
86
The Hindu, November 2, 2003, “Uneven rainfall hits agriculture”
77
20
Recent Years
Box 3: How a controversial project is pushed through
In 2003, Karnataka accorded approval for the
construction of a mini-hydel power plant, for
generation of 4.5 MW in the vicinity of the
Rajolibanda anicut. It entered into an agreement
with an A.P. based company for construction and
operation of the power plant that is to cost Rs. 20
crores.
will drop precipitously. This water cannot be put
into the RDS canal later because it will be let out
through a tunnel which is at a level lower than the
RDS canal. Citing inflows since 1998, they rule out
the availability of sufficient water for the hydel
project. It held that the project is unviable as it
would be able to use only 2 MW of its designed
capacity 4.5 MW89. (Surely then, the sanctioning
authorities knew all this but kept it under wraps.)
The work, which has already begun, is stalled on
the advice of MLAs.
For almost two years all is quiet. Then in Feb 2005
work on the project starts. By March, the
opposition in A.P. is activated. TDP leaders allege at
a press conference that this project, owned by a
relative of the C.M. of A.P., will affect farmers under
RDS and that Karnataka did not consult A.P. as
required by an inter-state agreement. They also
allege that another hydel project, located
downstream of Tungabhadra Dam in Bellary
district, belonged to the kin of the former C.M. of
AP. It was commissioned in December last year,
resulting in considerable delay in realisation of
water at the RDS anicut site87.
In April, the A.P. Govt decides to take over the
project subject to the approval of Karnataka,
following lengthy discussions at a high level
meeting chaired by the CM in early April. The
decision is to execute it through Genco so that the
project would be under Government control,
ensuring proper discharges to the RDS canal in
Mahabubnagar district and avoid generation
when the canal is in distress. A private individual,
on the other hand, may not have such
commitment, it was felt90.
Two days later, following an agitation by farmers,
the AP Government proposes a review of the
project and appoints a committee to review it
within a month. Based on its report A.P. will ask
Karnataka to withdraw permission given to the
company to build the mini-hydel plant. (On the
other hand, the Karnataka assembly is told a week
later by a minister that works on the project will be
completed expeditiously88.)
In May the Supreme Court, comes to the rescue. It
issues notices to the Union of India, Karnataka
State, Andhra Pradesh and the company following
a writ petition filed by some RDS farmers. The
lives of 40,000 farmers are at stake they aver. The
court rules that this project is in violation to the
KWDT award of 197391.
Around March 20th, the technical committee
appointed by the A.P. Govt. states that it strongly
feels the hydel project is detrimental to the interests
of the RDS farmers. The intake channel of the hydel
project is to be at a lower level than the level of the
RDS canal. Since it is to carry 5 times more water
(4200 cusecs) than the RDS canal, flow in the RDS
Judgement is finally passed in July 2008 which
dismisses the writ petition. The SC finds that the
Petitioners have no locus standi to agitate on water
disputes, only State can file a suit in the SC on it.
Also since the question of construction of Mini
Hydel Project is very much before the (new) KWDT
(set up in 2004), the matter is sub judice92.
87
The Hindu, March 8, 2005 “TDP charge against YSR's kin''
The Hindu, March 10, 2005, “AP farmers oppose mini hydel project”
89
The Hindu, April 12, 2005, “Project on RDS poses threat to State: panel”
90
The Hindu, April 10, 2005, “State to take over hydel project”
91
The New Indian Express, May 11, 2005, “Water row: SC notices to Centre, Karnataka, AP on AP farmers plea”
92
www.lawyerscollective.org, Magazine, July, 2008
88
21
Uncertain Dependence: Sunkesula’s KC
canal
As mentioned earlier, in 2001 and 2002 there was no
crop at all (neither Rabi nor kharif) under the KC canal
because of insufficient water and also canal
modernisation work. (Thus in 2003 the farmers here
must have been an agitated lot to cause the violence at
Rajolibanda described earlier.)
As part of the modernisation work, a new barrage
replaced the old anicut in 2003. However it led to
tension over “construction” vents, analogous to the
Rajolibanda case. In the old anicut there was a 2ft vent
allowing about 70 cusecs to flow downstream
uninterruptedly. This flow was important for
downstream users. When the new barrage was built, a
vent was not planned for. This alarmed downstream
users who prevented the construction vent from being
closed. (This “construction vent”, being larger, lets
out about 500 to 600% more water down river than
the vent in the old anicut.)
2003-04
No water reaches the canal in June, July or August of
2003. Generally the TB Dam should overflow in midAugust and that overflow should cause the KC canal to
open, but this year the TB Dam hasn’t filled up so
there’s no overflow. By September, KC canal farmers
are restless. About half-way down the KC Canal
thousands of farmers (led by a Congress legislator)
hold road blockades at about 20 places on NH-1893
demanding that water from Srisailam Dam (on the
Krishna river) be released to the KC canal94. The next
day, the A.P. Irrigation Minister rules out releases from
Srisailam because the present storage there does not
permit it95.
In late Sept. the A.P. Govt reviews reservoir storages.
There isn’t enough water in the TB Dam so they decide
that KC Canal will get water only for the Rabi crop and
that too only two wettings. Farmers are asked to go in
for irrigated dry crops, instead of paddy96.
Finally, at the very end of September, the river receives
a flood flow for the first time this year and some water
is let out to the canal97. Heavy rain in early October
brings full flow to the river and the KC canal is
reopened but no official announcement is made
considering uncertain supplies98. Canal flow reaches
tail-end region in one week from release. Yet, in midOctober, the agitation seeking release of Srisailam
water to KC canal continues. An all-party committee
meeting in Cuddappah calls for release of water from
Novebmer 15. They also demand that the vent in the
Sunkesula barrage be closed and only 67 cusecs be
allowed to pass through it, as it was in the old anicut99.
This opportunity to stock water in the barrage is lost
because the vent is letting out 350 cusecs which will
empty the 1.2 T.M.C. capacity in about 40 days.
The canal is to be closed on January 20th, just about
three months after it was opened. A scramble for
water ensues. Kurnool Municipal Corporation builds a
cross-bund at the 21st km in the canal to stock water
for the city. At mid-night on 18th January, a group of
farmers reach this cross-bund and destroy it. They are
anxious to irrigate their fields before the canal dries up
completely. The farmers are arrested. About 40% of
the 370 cusecs flowing in the river escaped through
the vent in the barrage100. The river near Kurnool dries
up on February 15 and remains dry for the next three
months. On May 19, the Tungabhadra river receives
flood waters. The pre-monsoon rains have arrived!101
93
The Times of India, September 24, 2003, “Rayalaseema riots block roads demanding water”
The KC canal, from it 120th kilometre onwards, has received water from Srisailam Right Bank Canal since around 1988.
95
The Hindu, September 25, 2003, “More water for Krishna delta”
96
ibid
97
The Hindu, September 30 ,2003, “Tungabhadra receives substantial inflows”
98
The Hindu, October 7 ,2003, “Heavy rain brightens hopes of KC canal reopening”
99
The Hindu, October 19 ,2003, “All-party panel seeks water for KC Canal ayacut by Nov. 15”
100
The Hindu, January 20 ,2004, “Tension over farmers' bid to divert water”
101
The Hindu, May 20,2004, “Tungabhadra receives flood water”
94
22
Recent Years
decides to postpone the decision and hold a meeting
ten days later by which time a clear picture would
emerge. They decide to send a delegation of MLAs to
the Chief Minister to get the vent in the Sunkesula
barrage closed105. By August 10th, it is clear that the
Tungabhadra Dam is going to surplus and KC canal
receives the overflow and opens on August 17th.
2004-05
A new ‘water year’ begins. The issue of the vent in the
barrage has been alive for the past one year but the
Government could not take a decision. Irrigation
officials who planned to close the vent receive
resistance from farmers of downstream areas,
especially those from the northern bank of
Mahabubnagar district. Downstream people want a
permanent structure at the same level as existed in the
past that allowed discharge of 70 cusecs, in fact they
do not want a discharge more than 70 cusecs as it
would help them if the water was stored in the
reservoir. Irrigation authorities agree that this right of
downstream people has to be established102.
The flow in the Tungabhadra river drops suddenly on
September 3106. This means that overflow from the
Tungabhadra Dam has ceased but nature is kind to the
KC canal. Though the overflow from the TB Dam
ceased more than a month ago, the river supports the
canal because of the rain in the catchment area below
the TB Dam. From October 28th though, assistance
from the TB Dam is asked for and taken107. Lush green
paddy fields reappear along the KC Canal in Kurnool
district after a gap of three years. The canal which got
insufficient water due to lean flow in the Tungabhadra
river in the past three years is flowing full this year108.
About 2.24 lakh acres is cultivated under the KC canal
in Kurnool and Cuddapah districts as against the
authorised ayacut of 1.75 lakh acres. Such a large
extent was cultivated this year under the canal after a
gap of ten years109.
Meanwhile Kurnool town continues to stock water in
the canal at its 21st km through a temporary cross
bund.
A month later, in July, nearly 300 farmers besiege a KC
Canal office at Mydukur (265 km down the canal).
They force out the office employees and picket it for
about three hours. Led by the Raithu Seva Sangham,
TDP, BJP etc they demand (among other things)
Srisailam water and closure of the vent in the barrage
at Sunkesula103.
Two months later, on January 5th 2005, the flow in the
canal reaches a critical stage. The supply declines to 25
cusecs at Sunkesula. Though the KC canal and RDS are
drawing 1,000 cusecs from the Tungabhadra Dam,
only 25 cusecs is realised much to the disappointment
of farmers and others. Water has to be supplied for at
least 150 days to complete the kharif crop. The canal
reopened on August 17 and supply completes five
months by January 17 but the canal is closed three
days earlier, on January 14110.
The river goes dry once again in the peak monsoon
with the flow ceasing at Sunkesula anicut for two days.
It is dry throughout an 80-km stretch upstream of
Sunkesula. Uncertainty prevails over reopening of KC
Canal this year too with the flow in the river not
getting stabilised even at the end of July. It cannot be
reopened, unless the flow stabilises at 1,000 cusecs or
above. Right now it is 12 cusecs104.
The Irrigation Advisory Board (IAB) meets on August 3
to decide on the date for reopening the canal but
102
The Hindu, June 5,2004, “Confusion over closure of barrage vent”
The Hindu, July 23,2004, “Riots picket KC Canal engineer's office”
104
The Hindu, July 27,2004, “Tungabhadra goes dry”
105
The Hindu, August 4,2004, “Irrigation meeting for monitoring of Tungabhadra flow”
106
The Hindu, September 4,2004, “Flow declines in Tungabhadra”
107
The Hindu, October 29,2004, “Tungabhadra water for KC canal”
108
The Hindu, October 13,2004, “Paddy fields reappear along KC Canal”
109
The Hindu, November 30, 2004, “Chances of water supply to rabi crop dim”
110
The Hindu, January 6, 2005, “KC canal flow in critical stage”
103
23
In February, irrigation officials are struggling to
maintain the base flow into the Canal to keep the
drinking water schemes functioning. There is a sudden
rise in the Tungabhadra flow with the discharge at
Sunkesula because of rain in the catchment area.
Though the canal is formally closed for agriculture
operations, the excess water in the river is diverted to
the canal. Around 1,400 cusecs is let into the canal
while around 400 cusecs flows through the vent in the
barrage into the river. This minor flood is likely to keep
the river alive till the end of the month. Otherwise it
would have gone dry by the middle of the month111.
All these schemes come under the Minor Irrigation
Department. It owes about Rs 90 lakhs to the power
company but has no intention of paying the bills. The
efforts made by farmers of the affected villages, to
drag the attention of legislators, ministers and MPs
towards the problem, have not yielded any result.
When asked about the reasons for the below-capacity
performance of these schemes, the officials cite
scarcity of power, outdated technology and broken
pipes. Also, the services of about 14 employees who
have been working under these projects as daily wage
workers for the last 20 years have not been regularised
till now.
Running the River? (2003-2005)
Till now only the canals that run due to gravity have
been discussed. However, the river is used for other
schemes too. A number of barrages to manipulate the
river flow have come up on the river in the past two
decades. These are promoted either for running lift
irrigation schemes or for mini-hydel schemes as
described below.
However, Karnataka’s Revenue Minister is
unconvinced. In August 2004, when the TB Dam is full
and surplusing, he calls for rejuvenating and ensuring
proper functioning of the existing lift irrigation
schemes and also by setting up new ones in Bellary
district114.
In Bellary District itself, a huge lift irrigation project is
underway near Allipur village, some 10km behind the
backwaters of the TB reservoir. In February 2005,
people of Allipur village, stop work on this Singatalur
Lift Irrigation Project (SLIP). They stage a dharna near
the project site seeking compensation and steps for
their rehabilitation on account of the village
submerging after the project is ready. This is the fifth
time they are holding a dharna since the launch of the
project. A former MLA participates.
Lift Irrigation Schemes (LIS)
“Why does the Chief Minister want to go in for lift
irrigation schemes. The Government has to pay crores as
power bill?” asks the TRS leader in A.P. in July 2005112
He has a point. In Harappanahalli taluk of Davangere
District, Karnataka, Lift Irrigation Schemes (LIS) have
gone defunct. Seven schemes, set up over the years on
the Tungabhadra river are in a bad way. The details as
they stood in December 2004 were as follows113
(Table 3):
Project Name
Started in
Command area
Garbagudi -I
1976
520 acres
150 acres (29 %)
Garbagudi –II
1976
460
200
Vatlahalli
1978
400
defunct
Tavaragundi
1983
400
defunct
Hagalavagalu
1983
2,000
600 (30 %)
Duggavati
recent years
1,500
560 (37 %)
Table 3: A few Lift Irrigation schemes on the Tungabhadra
111
The Hindu, February 4, 2005, “Tungabhadra flow increases”
He is angling for Almatti water instead, but we’ll ignore that for the moment.
113
Based on: Deccan Herald, December 3, “Irrigation projects go defunct, lands dry up and die”
114
The Hindu, August 16, 2004, “New irrigation schemes on Tungabhadra soon”
112
24
Currently irrigates
(43 %)
Recent Years
Originally designed to make use of 7.64 TMC of
Tungabhadra water, it involves constructing a barrage
upstream of the TB Dam. Work commenced, later the
Government decided to revise the plan to irrigate
more land (read that as ‘increase the barrage height’).
Now the design is for 11 TMC of water to be lifted and
Allipur village is sure to be submerged115. The power
needed to run this scheme is high. It will run on 16
vertical turbine pumps, 9 pumps of 1350 HP each and
7 of 725 HP each (about 13 MW in all).
The Andhra Pradesh Govt. is not far behind. As
mentioned earlier, The Guru Raghavendra project (for
Rs. 136 crores) is underway at the Rajolibanda site.
There 8.6MW is needed to lift 5.4 T.M.C. of water to
irrigate 50,000 acres.
Photo 4: The barrage across the Tungabhadra river near Bennur
village in Koppal district. (Source: www.hindu.com 2004)
This flash flood spells trouble for villages along the
bank of the river, principally Bennur village116 (~ 50
km downstream of TB dam). Two years ago, in 2002,
the Karnataka Govt. gave permission to a private
company from Hyderabad to establish a mini (4.5
MW) hydel power station. For this the company had
constructed a barrage across the river. However, the
company raised the height of the barrage to 19 feet,
five feet above the permitted level of 14 ft. This
increased the spread of the backwaters. (Villagers had
raised objections against increasing the height of the
barrage when that work started.) So when 48,500
cusecs were released to the river on August 15th, it
inundated Bennur village, damaged 150 irrigation
pump sets and destroyed standing paddy crop in 250
acres. On August 22, the district units of KRRS and the
CPI(M-L) took up the cause of the villagers and
demanded that the govt. initiate action for removal of
the barrage117.
Who will pay the power bill for these lift irrigation
schemes?
Mini-Hydel Schemes
The first mini-hydel scheme here dates back to 1990.
Now many more are coming up. They should be
benign, for they don’t “consume” water. They only
take up water momentarily and release it back to the
river. But the view from the ground is different.
Invariably, a mini-hydel scheme involves the
construction of a barrage to stock up some water and
very high discharges sent rushing down the pipes
(penstocks). This leads to problems. Consider this
event:
It is August 15, 2004. The Tungabhadra Dam is full
after a gap of three years. The annual ritual, of
opening the crest-gates on Independence Day, can
take place this year. Hundreds of people come to see
the spectacular sight of water gushing out of 33 of the
34 crest-gates, and the river receives a sudden flow of
48,500 cusecs.
Earlier in 2003, a 4.5 MW project was being built at
Mannur-Sugur in Bellary District. Here too, a
Vijaynagar era anicut was being repaired and raised to
make a barrage for the project. The private company
building it hoped to run the plant for 140 days each
year118.
115
The Hindu, February 8, 2004, “Villagers stop work on irrigation project”
Bennur is the site of an old anicut from the Vijaynagar times.
117
The Hindu, August 23, 2004, “Remove barrage across Tungabhadra”
118
The Hindu, September 30, 2003, “Work on mini-hydel plant progressing well”
116
25
short periods121. Given the erratic nature of the flows in
the river, these mini-hydel plants will run for about
three months in an year. At other times the flow will be
too low for power generation. Yet the “political will”
to create them is strong. Apparently, many of the
companies constructing them are owned by relatives
of ministers.
There is trouble with the proposed 4.5 MW mini-hydel
project in the vicinity of the Rajolibanda Anicut on the
Tungabhadra river. It is to take five times the water that
the RDS canal is designed for. This water is then to be
released at a level lower than the RDS canal. There it is
clear that the already beleaguered RDS will receive
hardly any water when the mini-hydel plant comes
up119.
These mini-hydel schemes are currently being
implemented or planned. What about the projects
already running? Casting a look at them leaves one
more disturbed (See Box 4)122. Data was available for
six of the schemes, five of them clustered just
downstream of the TB Dam. The sixth, Penna
Ahobilam lies at the fag end of the Right Bank High
Level Canal. There are at least three more mini-hydel
schemes, placed at the tail end of the Left Bank Canal.
If schemes so close to the TB Dam fare badly, those at
the far ends of the canals must have rarely seen a
working day! Why would you allow a hydro-electric
project at the tail-end of a canal, when you know that
water rarely reaches the tail-end?
The Karnataka Renewable Energy Development Ltd.
(KREDL) promotes such schemes. In March 2005, a
KREDL team, visits the Pusala Power Project on the
river in Bellary district. They are satisfied that the
company has implemented the project according to
the norms. Three units, each having a capacity to
generate 2 MW are being installed and about 90 per
cent of the civil works have been completed. The
project was to be commissioned by May 2005120.
Releases from the TB Dam to the river vary widely,
ranging from zero to one lakh cusecs or more. In
general, for small hydro power plants, it is not
economical to utilize large flows occurring over very
119
This scheme and its fallout are described in detail later in this report.
The Hindu, March 20, 2005, “1,000 hamlets to be electrified using solar power”
121
Quoted from the TCE Study “Sanapur Hydel Scheme - An Exploratory Hydrological Analysis”, published in TCE World 2002
122
The power generation figures are in Million Units (Unit = Kilowatt hours). All figures are from the monthly generation reports from the
Central ElectricityAuthority (www.cea.nic.in), Govt of India. For compiling this data and the accompanying map, and drawing my attention
to it - I am indebted to SANDRP’s staff.
120
26
Recent Years
Box 4: Hydro-electric power generation from Tungabhadra Dam and Canals
A look at the power generation figures for a few
operational schemes on the Tungabhadra river
and canals for this period (June 2003- May 2005)
show disturbing figures. It is of course known that
no power is generated in the months of April,
May and June as water storage is close to
negligible then. But three of the schemes –
Year
Month
Munirabad
Shivpur
(18 MW)
0
2
7
10
10
10
9
2
1
2
0
0
0
5
11
10
11
8.95
3.45
9.66
7.64
5.3
0.01
0
(27 MW)
2003
2004
2005
June
July
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
June
July
Aug
Sept
Oct
Nov
Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
0
0
6
11
11
9
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
17
13
14
9.74
3.37
5.79
2.08
0
0
0
Hampi, Mallarpur and Penna-Ahobilam generated no power at all in the 24 month period!
What then is the talk of “economic viability” all
about? Further, the remaining three schemes –
Munirabad, Shivpur and TB Dam - were running
below 50% of their capacity, for half the time
(12 months).
TB Dam
(36 MW)
Hampi
Mallarpur
Penna Ahobilam
(36 MW)
(9 MW)
(20 MW)
0
4
18
20
18
22
16
0
0
3
0
0
0
9
30
21
21
20.7
18.8
15
10
3.2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
The locations of these schemes are
shown below. The Shivpur and
Mallarpur power plants are on the
Left Bank Canal. The 99 MW
generating capacity of the TB Dam
is through the three plants at TB
Dam (36 MW), Munirabad (27
MW) and Hampi (36 MW). The
sixth plant is at the tail end of the
Right Bank High Level canal.
Mallapur
Shivpur
Gangawati
Munirabad
T.B. Dam
Hampi
Hospet H
igh
lev
el
c
an
al
Bellary
27
Insights
This report began by pointing out that water conflicts
on rivers are bound to increase in view of declining
flows as schemes proliferate) deteriorating irrigation
infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, this is borne out in the
case of the Tungabhadra river. By following the river’s
flow as it is subject to various schemes in time and
space, what became clearer was how different kinds
of conflicts are being addressed and governed. In that
sense this report provides a reality check. As discussed
below, it provides deeper insights into the technoeconomic and socio-political compulsions of
maintaining and operating riverine schemes.
Canal Repair
All the five main canals discussed here fall into a larger
frame typical to many canals in the country but rarely
in the limelight – their short life cycle. The canals start
well but within a decade or so their carrying capacity
declines significantly as they gets silted up both at
their entry and along its length123. Silting at the entry
means reduced flows into the canal. While silting
along the canal length leads to frequent breaching of
the canal. Thus adequate and timely delivery of water
in the main canal itself becomes impossible. In about
30 to 40 years the canals need major overhauling
(euphemistically called modernisation), which state
government simply cannot fund 124. So while we worry
about a dam’s lifetime being only a hundred years,
the canals need overhauling every 40 years itself.
Politics
Water, is clearly a vital matter for elected
representatives and party politics in general. Their
motivations cannot be brushed aside. However, it also
becomes clear that they are selective in the causes they
identify with. They lead agitations demanding more
water in the canals, as evident in the demand for
Srisailam water for the K-C Canal. Yet, when the issue
is repair of a canal, they avoid it. This was the case
when farmers in peak summer (May 2004) agitated
for repairs to the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal.
Similarly in Lift Irrigation Schemes that go defunct,
legislators, ministers and MPs turn a blind eye. In an
issue like tail-end deprivation, they are present but not
in the front seat. They resort to meetings or appeals to
the Chief Minister. One explanation for such
behaviour is that issues like canal repair and tail-end
deprivation are intractable problems. Another point is
that in these two issues, lack of accountability is very
convenient for the authorities.
It also becomes clear that technical proposals are not
enough. Despite numerous Governmental reports/
proposals for repairs, a “new” expert committee is
appointed to come up with a new report125. In the end
these reports gather dust, because they report that
Rs.833 crores is required for repair while the state
government is able to allocate Rs. 10 to 20 crores each
year. At this rate, the repair would take 40 to 80 years
by which time even more repairs would be
necessary126- if the system has not completely
collapsed by then. So we have to look for Japanese
assistance, or ADB or other such lending institutions to
repair/ modernize our canals.
Since the mid-80s, Participatory Irrigation
Management (PIM) has been encouraged by various
states. A three tier system with WUAs, DCs and PCs127 is
123
This happens because canals need annual maintenance, but this is routinely either neglected or inadequate.
Between 1996 and 2004 the KC Canal was modernised for Rs 1107 crore and was funded by the Japanese Overseas Bank with GoAP
contributing 11% of the cost. (The Hindu, June 5, 2004, “KC canal works in final stage”.) In the TB LBC there were no repairs in 2001, 02 and
03 and 1% of the amount needed was released in 2004.
125
In the case of the TB Left Bank Canal four separate reports for repair were submitted over many years (from Irrigation Dept, TB CADA,
Koppal District, and Raichur District) yet a new expert committee was appointed in 2005
126
This is akin to repairing an old house. If most or all cracks are not repaired at once, the house will have additional problems (new cracks or
wider cracks) the next year.
127
WUA means Water User Association, DC stands for Distributary Committee and PC stands for Project Committee.
124
28
Insights
envisaged. While PIM needs to be encouraged at the
tertiary level, it is also important to examine its
limitations at the Project level. Maintenance and
operation of irrigation systems demand huge finances
(MoWR). When the Government is not able to handle
the system with huge finances available with them,
won’t farmers be left with a “white elephant”, if PIM is
implemented at the project level? That can be
answered only if the actual maintenance costs on
canal systems over the decades are determined.
Given the reality of poor maintenance, one has to use
the estimates for “modernization” of various schemes
as a reflection of that amount.
imposed and the police, revenue and irrigation
departments of a district, all put together are called
into play128. It is perhaps then better to be a tail-ender
of an inter-state canal because the CISF personnel may
be patrolling it to prevent illegal withdrawals –
although this seems like an very expensive way to
address the problem.
Powerful vs. Powerless
It does seem that some projects are favoured when
compared to others. Sunkesula and its KC Canal have
just been overhauled but Rajolibanda languishes.
This may be because of its inter-state nature of the
latter or perhaps because Mahboobnagar district has
less clout than Kurnool district.
The 300 km KC canal needed about Rs. 1000 crore in
35 years time - this works out to about Rs. 10 lakhs per
kilometre per year. Let us half this, assuming that
government figures are inflated. Then for every
kilometre of main canal, Rs 5 lakhs per year is required
to keep it in good shape. This is a fairly large amount if
it is to be maintained by the users themselves every
year.
On the other hand, some seemingly ‘minor’ players
do succeed in getting their share of water. At
Sunkesula, downstream farmers, have been able to
ensure that a vent in the barrage is kept open (even
though there is a loud clamour from KC canal farmers
that it be closed). This guarantees some flow in the
river for downstream users. Similarly, less privileged
upstream farmers (Rajolibanda) put up a stiff
resistance to down stream farmers (KC Canal) who
wanted the Rajolibanda Anicut’s vents open.
Tail-End Deprivation
Tail-end is really a misnomer since it conjures up a dog
or a horse and its tail in relation to the rest of it.
Instead it is more like the tail of a snake. The tail-end
generally begins at the 2/3rds mark or earlier as in the
case of the TB right bank low level canal whose 38%
mark is at the A.P.- Karnataka border. Such also is the
case with the left bank canal.
Anicuts vs. Dams
It has been suggested that anicuts (diversions) should
be preferred to dams (storages) since diversions cause
less disruption in the flow of the river and also less
submergence and displacement. Here another reason
to prefer diversions emerges. Both the anicuts
discussed, Rajolibanda and Sunkesula are sites of
tension, as downstream users tried to ensure some
flow down river through vents whilst their opponents
sought to close the vents and block the flow in the lean
season.
Low flow at the tail end can be addressed in two ways
– either increase the flow released into the canal at its
head end or prevent excessive use of canal water in
head reaches so that more water reaches the tail end.
Increasing the flow in a canal briefly is in the hands of
an MLA or else a body like the Tungabhadra Board,
ordering dam authorities to release more water from a
dam is possible. What is almost impossible is to
prevent excessive use of canal water (before it reaches
the tail-end)–even when Section 144 of the Cr. PC is
In the case of the storages (dams) though, the
possibility of negotiating or agitating for some
downstream flow in the lean season appears to be
limited, as evident at the TB Dam129.
128
This happened in the case of the LBC in Aug 2004 (see Text Box 2)
The reason for this is not clear yet and needs investigation. It is not physically impossible for there are river sluices provided at the dam but
it probably has administrative and other causes.
129
29
Hence one can say that diversions are a more flexible
kind of intervention in that they have a higher
probability of ensuring river flow in the lean season.
Violence is not a fait accompli at these sites. There can
be co-operation, as exemplified in Feb. 2004. Then
the vents at Rajolibanda were first closed for a few
days to enable the RDS canal to draw water and later
opened to let water flow downriver.
Green technologies
Mini-hydel schemes are often welcomed as being one
of many ‘green technologies’. However the view from
the ground does not bear them out as necessarily
benign. They involve blocking the river bed with a
barrage and could require very large flows to run,
many times more than irrigation canals carry, as with
Rajolibanda. Every time you build a barrage,
upstream villages are prone to submergence. One may
think that anyway the water is not used, but put back
into the river, but the key point is about where the
water is released and who are deprived in the process.
Their release at a point downstream of an existing
irrigation canal or other users makes that release
useless for that canal, its farmers and other users. In a
situation where water is much used and contested,
mini-hydel schemes could exacerbate conflicts.
The Vijaynagar and older Anicuts
Although no details about the functioning of the
Vijaynagar anicuts during 2003-05 could be gathered,
they need to be mentioned here.
In the pre-British period, irrigation from the river was
through anicuts alone. Apart from 18 anicuts of the
Vijaynagar period there were numerous others. On the
Tunga river there were 31 anicuts and on the Bhadra
river, 19, or fifty in all. The total length of their
accompanying canals was 300 kms. As mentioned
earlier, if all the tributaries of the Tungabhadra River
were included, there were 250 anicuts with 580 kms of
canal length up to the present location of the
Tungabhadra Dam.
While the interlinking of rivers is underway at the
national level, there seems to be a lot of “minor”
interlinking going on within a river basin. There are
now so many structures and canals on the Krishna river
that any shortage felt in one location is “solved” by
creating “link canals” from other schemes. So when
the tail-end water scarcity at RDS comes up, Jurala
water (from Krishna river) is promised. KC Canal, after
its 120th km, has been supported by Srisailam Right
Main Canal since 1988. Tail-end scarcity on the TB Left
Bank Canal has, as its proposed solution, a link canal
from the 108th km of the Narayanpur Right Bank
Canal to the 109th mile of the TB Left Bank Canal.
Once such links are in place, one can become more
ambitious. Is that why industries in Bellary can
propose that water from Almatti (about 150 km away)
be given to them? Water from Almatti will flow into a
canal and through its link to another canal and so on,
eventually reaching the industries so far away.
Unlike modern anicuts which are generally built
straight across the river, these old anicuts, whose ruins
must still be visible, were very strangely curved.
Thus, prior to British intervention, hundreds of
curiously shaped anicuts, dotted the Tungabhadra
river and its tributaries. Was there some reason for
such curious shapes? Were they designed to ensure
that less silt entered the canal? Did they thus require
less maintenance? Unfortunately they were never
carefully studied for understanding the design
principles. Their potential and limitations have not
been assessed. (See Appendix 1). Instead they are
now all being used up as sites for barrages for minihydel projects – as evident at Bennur, and MannurSugur. These sites are probably preferred as they only
need to raise and modify the anicuts and do not have
to take up the added trouble of setting up
foundations. Such indifference to an alternative
irrigation design legacy is tragic.
30
Further Work
This short study has thus provided some insights about
how water resource schemes run. It is able to point out
the roles and acts of various players controlling the
river water today. It cannot, however, be considered
complete. Further work is needed.
in large numbers is not mentioned. The industrial
pollution of the water and the effect on the fishing
communities is untouched. Neither is there any word
on the 96,000 hectares of waterlogged land in the
command area of the TB Dam or about the illegal sand
mining in the river bed or about the fate of people
displaced by these projects. So in many ways this is not
a complete narrative of the river.
The story of our rivers must be written. We must be
aware – keep a record - of what is happening to our
rivers, in the relentless zeal to stop every drop of river
water going ‘waste’ to the sea. This record should have
begun long ago, in the 1950s itself, when the Indian
Government embarked on a rapid river ‘development’
spree.
Another important issue - the proposed tie up of this
river basin with the Inter-Linking of Rivers scheme must be mentioned. One link, the Bedthi-Varada link,
is proposed. This is to bring water to the Varada river, a
tributary of the Tungabhadra. This link proposal
envisages lifting 8.5 TMC of water through a height of
123 m from the west flowing, forested Bedthi river. A
15 km link canal with 7 km of tunnel length will
connect this to the Varada. This will need 61.1 MW of
power for a three stage lift. It sounds like a very
ambitious lift irrigation scheme and a record of the
functioning of lift irrigation schemes will reflect the
probable performance of such a scheme. The section
on lift irrigation schemes in this narrative reminds us to
ask - who indeed will pay for the power needed for this
scheme?!
That is why this report needs to be supplemented with
records from an early period, say the late 60’s and
early 70’s, after most schemes had commenced
operation. That will show the differences between
‘early youth’ and ‘old age’ of the irrigation schemes.
Such old information will be tedious to locate but is
possibly still worth the effort. Similarly a lot of
information that is lacking here could be obtained
using the RTI and thus attempt to give a more
complete picture. Visits to the areas under discussion,
dialogue with the farmers, engineers and others
concerned there can also add to these narrations. The
situation in the basin upstream of the point where
Tunga and Bhadra meet, the situation of minor
irrigation projects and groundwater throughout the
basin, the details and state of the old anicuts, etc are
also not included here.
It is also important to go beyond the Tungabhadra and
include the entire Krishna river, the second largest
river of peninsular India in terms of basin area and the
flow it carries. That will help broad base the insights
gained or modify them as necessary.
So, this is only a one-dimensional look at the river.
The cultural and ecological landscape is not
examined. The “pushkarams” celebrated on the river
and its many pilgrimage spots where people still come
Finally, such a report needs to be as pictorial as
possible - perhaps eventually be made into a
documentary. Only then can a larger audience be
hoped for.
31
References
SANDRP newsletter, Dams, Rivers & People, Vol 5
Issue 8-9 September-October 2007
MoWR: Status of Participatory Irrigation Management
(pim) in India: Policy Initiatives taken and Emerging
Issues, 2008-09-17
Buckley, R. B., “The Irrigation Works of India and
Egypt”, 1893
Rao, V. V., Shankar M., Sharma, S., Gupta, S.C.,
Thiruvengadachari, S., Sedimentation Survey of
Tungabhadra Reservoir through Satellite Remote
Sensing Techniques, CWC & NRSA, November 1996
Biggs, Trent; Gaur, Anju; Scott, C.; Thenkabail, Prasad;
Gangadhara Rao, Parthasaradhi; Gumma, Murali
Krishna; Acharya, Sreedhar; Turral, Hugh. 2007.
Closing of the Krishna Basin: Irrigation, stream flow
depletion and macro scale hydrology. Colombo, Sri
Lanka: IWMI. 38p.
Sankey, R.H., 1866, “Letter to the Secretary to the
Commissioner for the Government of the Territories of
his Highness the Maharaja of Mysore”
Krishnan, C. Tank and Anicut Irrigation – An
Engineering Analysis, PhD thesis, IIT Delhi, 2003
UNESCO (Source: based on data found at
www.webworld.unesco.org/water/ihp)
Kumar, R.; Singh, R. D.; Sharma, K. D. 2005. Water
resources of India. Current Science 89: 794-811.
Proceedings of the First Stakeholder Meeting, The
Tungabhadra River Basin, STRIVER, 9 - 10 January
2007, Hospet.
Biksham Gujja, K J Joy, Suhas Paranjape, Vinod Goud,
and Shruti Vispute ‘Million Revolts’ in the Making” –
EPW Issue: Vol 41 No. 07 February 18 February 24, 2006
32
Appendix 1
Engineering Design issues
“… when full of weeds, which under some conditions take
place within two months, the discharge …. falls to 95
cusecs…… or less than 23% of the designed discharge.”
One may begin to wonder - are many of our irrigation
systems inherently unsustainable, in terms of their
upkeep? Has it always been this way? More
ambitiously one may ask –is there a problem with the
engineering design itself? Are there, in fact, other
ways to design irrigation systems? These questions
need to be placed in the historical context.
In those days, the canals were cleared of weeds by
hand during closures, some 3 or 4 times in a year.
With the proliferation of canals such problems must
now have got out of hand.
The photo below gives some idea of magnitude of the
weed problem in an irrigation canal on the river Nile,
in Egypt.
There were no dams on the Krishna river till 1950a.
Until 1900 A.D., the Krishna river had only three
major projects (i.e. using more that 10 TMC of water
annuallyb). Their chronological order:
1855 A.D. Krishna Delta System (near river mouth)
1866 A.D. The KC Canal (located ~ 35% up river)
1892 A.D. The Nira Left Bank Canal (located about
70% up river)
That makes the Nira Left Bank Canal one of the early
interventions in the Krishna basin. This 160 km long
canal, took its supplies from the Vir Dam near Pune, (a
tributary of the Bhima). It started functioning in 1892
supplying water to villages in Baramati tehsil. Some
anecdotal information about its functioning gives us
an idea of the problems faced even today.
Irrigation canal infested with water hyacinth. Nile delta, Egypt
(source: www.fao.org)
One major factor that causes deterioration of
irrigation systems is the sediment present in water.
Presence of sediment / silt leads to continual changes
in the systems that are expensive to remedy. These
problems are three fold: viz silting of reservoirs,
scouring / silting of canals and sediment entering the
canal headd.
In 1915, about 20 years after the Nira canal started
operating, the Irrigation Dept. of Bombay Presidency
approached the Economic Botanist, for advice
regarding the serious blocking of irrigation canals by
aquatic weeds. Some idea of the blocking due to
weedsc comes through in a statement by the then
irrigation officer, speaking of another canal nearby.
Of these problems the first is best known. Reservoirs
meant to store water show accelerated silting rates
and hence reduced life spans. Less known is the fact
a
Between 1900 and 1950, there was only one major project added i.e., The Nira Right Bank Canal in 1928 AD. The proliferation of projects
on our rivers began in the 1950s. By 1973 there were more than 50 major and medium projects, today that number is close to a hundred.
b
The KWDT classifies major projects as those using more than 3 TMC of water annually. However, only for those projects using more than 10
TMC annually, does it give the “year of commencement of operation.”
c
Ref. “ The Aquatic Weeds in Deccan Irrigation Canals,” by D.V. Narayanayya, The Journal of Ecology, Vol.16, No.1, 1928, pp.123-133.
d
The rest of this section is based on the PhD thesis of C. Krishnan, titled “Tank and Anicut Irrigation Systems: An engineering analysis” I.I.T.
Delhi (2003).
33
Appendix 1
that the performance of canals is also affected by
sediment. In fact an early problem in irrigation
engineering was designing regime canals i.e. canals
that would neither silt up nor scour out over a year
(Kennedy, 1896). Desilting canals is very expensive
and is generally neglected except for sporadic
attempts.
Canal
t
icu
An
At the canal head however there is the third problem
— excessive sediment entering the canal head, which
is situated just upstream of a diversion structure such
as a weir. In fact weirs built on rivers to divert water to
canals have reported grave problems within 70 to 100
years of their existence (e.g. the Palar Anicut,
Tirukkoilur Anicut). These weirs silted up to the crest
and allowed excessive sediment to enter the canals
that took off from them. This caused significantly
reduced inflow into canals. As one engineer in 1950e
put it:
Right Bank
Was there some reason for such a curious shape?
Were they designed to ensure that less silt entered the
canal? Did they thus require less maintenance?
The true test of comparison of modern and traditional
anicuts would be a record of their functioning and
maintenance requirements over a few decades. Such
records are unfortunately not available. Yet it must not
be dismissed either.
‘the Tirukkoilur Anicut across the Ponniyar is typical of a
class of problems met with in this province. The anicut has
silted up almost to the crest in the course of years and it
overflows only 40 days in a year. There are canals taking
off at either flank but owing to heavy silting up of the
upstream and the consequent absence of storage,
supplies could not be maintained to the canals.’
It is in this context that the indifference now shown to
the Vijaynagar anicuts by building barrages on them
has to be viewed as tragic.
Krishnan (2003) compared the traditional and
modern anicut in a hydraulic model. Although much
more work needs to be done before a definitive
statement can be made, the traditional model showed
promise, in terms of controlling the sediment enter the
canal.
In some cases the problem has been serious enough to
lead to creating a new anicut upstream of the old one,
just as at Prakasam barrage in the Krishna Delta. All
these anicuts, built in the British period, were placed
straight across the river-bed.
However traditional anicuts, built prior to the colonial
era, like the Vijaynagar Anicuts on the Tungabhadra
were curiously shaped. As one British Engineer in
1923 put it:
It needs to be reiterated that many of these old anicuts
have been modified. Instead of depressions in the
crest, undersluices have been installed along with
crests being flattened. Originally there were no
regulators for the canal taking off but now the same
canals have regulators with sluice gates to control the
discharge into the canal. These changes would
significantly affect the flow and sediment transport in
the vicinity and could be different from what they
were meant to be originally.
“The old Indian plan was to build the anicuts at an angle to
the general direction of the river, the canal-head being
situated opposite the downstream flank of the anicut. The
object of this arrangement was perhaps to force the
current, which was obstructed by the anicut, towards the
narrowing waterway between the anicut and the rivermargin and thus to scoop a pool in front of the canalhead.”
e
River
Left Bank
Anon in Annual Report of Central Board of Irrigation and Power, 1950
34
Knowledge in Civil Society or KICS is a forum for conversations amongst activists and academics
on issues relating to science and democracy. The forum seeks to promote a dialogue among its
members that could lead to a more people friendly science and technology plan. Current
concerns of civil society groups on the relations of science and society have been dismissed as
anti-science even if many of these groups are actively engaged in alternatives that are rooted in
a more democratic imagination of science policies. Academics, largely from the broad area of
science, technology and society studies, while perhaps better equipped to deal with the
complex issues of scientific expertise, governance and the democratic aspirations of people,
have in the past focused their attention more on science as understood by the state, or
increasingly, the market.
The KICS forum hopes to bring the activists from diverse sectors in civil society and the
academics to engage with the hitherto neglected aspects of science and democracy through a
process of dialogue, common exploration and joint work. Started in 2005, KICS carries out
these conversations through e-groups, sharing sessions, research studies, joint workshops and
general body meetings.
Dr. Chitra Krishnan was trained as a civil engineer at IIT Madras following which she worked on water
resource issues in rural Kerala before going on to pursue her Masters in environmental engineering in
USA. Her working stints in different rural contexts and an organic farm in the USA influenced her
markedly in her research quests. She completed her PhD from IIT Delhi on the traditional irrigation
system of South India (tanks and anicuts). She is currently practicing dryland agriculture in Tumkur
District, Karnataka and is involved in research studies in looking at the irrigation infrastructure from
below during the agricultural off-season. She is a member of the KICS forum.

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