ADFP 25 - Prelims (Psychological Operations)

Transcription

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
PUBLICATION
OPERATIONS SERIES
ADFP 25
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The information given in this document is not to be communicated either directly or
indirectly, to the media or to any person not authorised to receive it.
ADFP 25, First Edition,1995
Sponsored by:
Assistant Chief of the Defence Force (Operations)
Headquarters Australian Defence Force
Developed and Produced by:
Commandant Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
Published by:
Director Publishing
Defence Centre - Canberra
ª Commonwealth of Australia 1995
This work is copyright. No material is to be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, for any purpose outside the course
of Commonwealth employment, without the written permission of the publication sponsor.
ADFP 25
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE
PUBLICATION
OPERATIONS SERIES
Australian Defence Force Publication 25 (ADFP 25) - Psychological Operations , is issued for use
by the Australian Defence Force and is effective forthwith.
A.L. BEAUMONT
Admiral
Chief of the Defence Force
24 April 1995
Headquarters
Australian Defence Force
Canberra ACT 2600
ADFP 25
iii
AMENDMENT CERTIFICATE
1.
Proposals for amendment of ADFPs are to be forwarded to:
Commandant
Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314
AUSTRALIA
2.
An information copy of the proposed amendment is also to be forwarded to:
Russell Offices (M- B - 42)
CANBERRA ACT 2600
AUSTRALIA
Amendment
No.
Date
Effected
Signature
Date
ADFP 25
v
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATIONS
OPERATIONS SERIES
STOCK NUMBER
(NSN)
ADFP 1
Doctrine
7610-66-139-0587
ADFP 2
Division of Responsibilities Within the Australian
Defence Force
7610-66-139-3520
Supplement 1
International Interoperability Arrangements Handbook
ADFP 3
Rules of Engagement
7610-66-135-2263
ADFP 4
Mobilisation Planning
7610-66-139-4137
ADFP 6
Operations
7610-66-139-4138
Supplement 1
Maritime Operations
Supplement 2
Land Operations
Supplement 3
Air Operations
ADFP 9
Joint Planning
Supplement 1
ANZUS Planning Manual (APM)
Supplement 2
Australia’s Territorial Base Line
ADFP 10
Communications
7610-66-139-4139
ADFP 11
Offensive Support
7610-66-139-4140
ADFP 12
Amphibious Operations
7610-66-139-4141
Supplement 1
Amphiluous Operations
7610-66-139-4141
ADFP 13
Air Defence and Airspace Control
7610-66-139-4142
ADFP 14
Air Transport
7610-66-139-4143
ADFP 15
Operations in an NBC Environment
7610-66-139-4144
ADFP 17
Joint Exercises and Training
7610-66-139-4145
Supplement 1
Umpiring Handbook
ADFP 19
Intelligence
7610-66-139-4147
ADFP 20
Logistics
7610-66-139-4148
ADFP 21
Movements
7610-66-139-4149
ADFP 22
Sea Transport
7610-66-139-4150
ADFP 23
Strategic Strike Operations
7610-66-139-4151
ADFP 24
Electronic Warfare
7610-66-139-4152
ADFP 25
Psychological Operations
7610-66-139-4153
ADFP 29
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
7610-66-139-4154
ADFP 31
Beach Intelligence
7610-66-139-3519
ADFP 37
Law of Armed Conflict
7610-66-139-4155
Supplement 1
Commander’s Guide
7610-66-139-3518
ADFP 25
vi
ADFP 39
Airborne Operations
7610-66-139-4156
ADFP 41
Defence Public Information Policy During
Periods of Tension and Conflict
7610-66-133-6630
ADFP 43
Evacuation Operations
7610-66-139-4157
ADFP 45
Special Operations
7610-66-139-4158
ADFP 53
Health Support in Joint Operations
7610-66-139-3258
ADFP 56
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
7610-66-139-4159
JOPNO
Joint Operations Notebook
7610-66-139-4162
TACAID
Tactical Airborne Information Document
STAFF DUTIES SERIES
ADFP 101
Glossary
ADFP 102
Service Writing
ADFP 103
Abbreviations and Military Symbols
ADFP 25
vii
FOREWORD
1.
The doctrinal and procedural aspects of psychological operations have been derived from
established principles, experience and lessons learnt by allied nations during major exercises and
actual operations.
2.
A key consideration in the planning and execution of psychological operations, whether it be
a component of a single Service, joint or combined operation, is that the principles remain
unchanged. ADFP 25 - Psychological Operations is suitable for use at all levels of war and within all
strata of command.
3.
Responsibilities of national agencies and allusions to specific
operations- related bodies serve as indicative bases for doctrinal development.
psychological
4.
Every opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine constructively its
contents, applicability and currency. If deficiencies or errors are found, amendment action should be
taken. Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre welcomes assistance to improve this publication.
5.
ADFP 25 is not to be released to foreign countries without the written approval of
ACOPS.
ADFP 25
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CONTENTS
Cover
Authorisation Page
Amendment Certificate
Australian Defence Force Publications Operations and Staff Duties Series
Foreword
Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Glossary
International Symbols
Distribution List (back of publication)
Page
iii
v
vii
ix-xii
xiii
xv
xvii
DL-1
Paragraph
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AN THE PRINCIPLES OF
WAR
Selection and Maintenance of the Aim
Cooperation
Concentration of Force
Economy of Effort
Security
Offensive Action
Surprise
Flexibility
Morale
108
109
110
111- 12
113
114
115
116
117
THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Coordination
Timeliness
Credibility
Intelligence
Evaluation
118
119
120
121
122
CATEGORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Psychological Action
Strategic Psychological Operations
Operational Level Psychological Operations
Tactical Psychological Operations
Psychological Consolidation
124- 5
126
127
128
129
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND OTHER SUPPORT
PLANS
Deception
Public Relations and Public Information
Operations Security
Military Civic Action
130
131- 2
133
134- 6
DEFENCE AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY AND DEFENCE
FORCE AID TO THE CIVIL POWER
Psychological Operations in Modern Conflict
138
Annex:
A.
Psychological Operations in the Gulf War
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CHAPTER 2
THE ELEMENTS AND TECHNIQUES OF
Psychology
Behavioural Research Principles
203- 4
205
BEHAVIOUR IN ACTION
The Individual
Individual Needs
Physical and Psychological Conditions
Behaviour and Attitude Modification
Degrees of Attitude Change
Needs and Behaviour
206
207
208
209
210
211- 12
THE IMPACT OF THE GROUP
In-groups and Out- groups
Group Leadership
Mass Action
213- 7
215
216
217
COMMUNICATION
Techniques
Evaluation
218- 23
220- 1
222- 3
Annexes:
CHAPTER 3
A.
Hierarchy of Needs
B.
Techniques
RESPONSIBILITIES
Australian Defence Force Command Centre
Operations Staff
Psychological Operations Staff
Relationship with Other Staff
Communications Staff
Psychologists
Intelligence Staff
301
302
303
304
305
306- 7
308
NATIONAL LEVEL
Policy Determination
309- 10
STRATEGIC LEVEL
Defence Intelligence Organisation
315- 18
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
General
Intelligence Support
Principles
Tasks
Joint Psychological Operations Staff Responsibilities
Staff Relationships
Maritime Headquarters
Land Headquarters
Air Headquarters
Headquarters 1 Division
Headquarters Northern Command
319
320- 2
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
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Chapter 3
(Contd)
COMBINED OPERATIONS
General
Special Considerations
Command and Control
332- 4
335- 6
337- 8
SINGLE SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES
Army
RAN
RAAF
339
340
341
Annex:
A.
CHAPTER 4
Determination and Implementation of Psychological
Operations Policy
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROCESS
INITIAL RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE
Direction
405
COLLECTION
TARGET ANALYSIS
FORMULATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
PLAN
IMPLEMENTATION
Production and Dissemination
Evaluation
411- 12
413
Annexes:
CHAPTER 5
A.
The Psychological Operations Process
B.
Psychological Operations Media
STAFFING PROCESS
Introduction
The Commander’s Concept
Intial Research and Intelligence
Basic Psychological Operations Study
Psychological Operations Estimate
Associated Intelligence Collection Planning
Monitoring Effectiveness
Target Analysis
Analysis of the Audience
The Psychological Operations Plan and Orders or Instructions
Annexes:
A.
Suggested Format of a Basic Psychological Operations
Study
B.
Suggested Format and Contents of a Psychological
Operations Estimate
C.
Example of a Psychological Operations Annex to an
Operation Order
501
502- 3
504
505- 6
507- 8
509
510
511
512
513
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CHAPTER 6
COUNTERACTION
National Level Requirements
Counter-psychological Operations Estimate
Threat Analysis
The Products of Analysis
Analysis of the Source
Analysis of the Content
Audience Analysis
Media Assessment
Analysis of the Effect
Targets of Enemy Psychological Operations
Military Forces
Individual Training
Civilians
Counteraction Selection
601- 3
604
605- 6
607
608
609- 10
611- 12
613
614
615
616
617
618
619- 21
EXECUTION OF COUNTERACTION
Techniques
Restrictive Measures
623
624
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACAUST
ACOPS
ADF
ADFCC
AHQ
AO
Air Commander Australia
Australian Defence Force
Air Headquarters
area of operations
CDF
C2W
CJFA
CNS
COMNORCOM
Chief of the Defence Force
command and control warfare
Commander Joint Forces Australia
Chief of Naval Staff
Commander Northern Command
DCAS
DGPI
DIO
DJOPS
Deputy Chief of the Air Staff
Director General of Public Information
Director Joint Operations Staff
HQADF
HQNORCOM
JFC
joint force commander
LCAUST
LHQ
Land Commander Australia
Land Headquarters Australia
MCAUST
MHQ
Maritime Commander Australia
Maritime Headquarters Australia
NORCOM
Northern Command
PM&C
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
RAAF
RISTA
Royal Australian Air Force
reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition
SPCG
Strategic Policy Coordination Group
ADFP 25
xv
GLOSSARY
concept of operations
A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to
accomplish the mission.
counter-action
Efforts to negate, neutralise, diminish the effect of, or gain information from foreign
psychological operations.
directive
a.
b.
c.
A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered.
A plan issued with a view to putting it into effect when so directed, or in the event that a
stated contingency arises.
Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or
procedure.
information
In intelligence usage, unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the
production of intelligence.
intelligence
The product resulting from processing information concerning foreign nations, hostile or
potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is
also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in
such activity.
joint
Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one
Service of the same nation participate. (When all Services are not involved, the participating
Services shall be identified, eg Joint Navy- Army.)
joint force
A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of the Army,
Navy and Air Force or two or more of these Services operating under a single commander
who is in turn directly responsible to CDF.
military civic action
The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local
population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture,
transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and
social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces
with the population.
observer mission
A group of military and/or civilian personnel with supporting elements established by a
United Nations Mandate to supervise and/or to observe and report on the observance of a
truce or other agreement.
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peacekeeping
An operation involving military personnel, without powers of enforcement, to help restore and
maintain peace in an area of conflict with the consent of all parties.
propaganda
Any information, ideas, doctrine or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion,
emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either
directly or indirectly.
psychological action
The use of psychological media and supporting activities in peace and war designed to
reduce the potential or actual enemy’s prestige and influence in potentially hostile or neutral
countries and to increase friendly influence and attitudes in these countries.
psychological consolidation
Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed at the civilian population located
in areas under friendly control in order to achieve a desired behaviour which supports the
military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commanders.
psychological operations
Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral
audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political
and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, consolidation
psychological operations and battlefield psychological activities.
public information
Information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully
informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support.
source
In intelligence usage, a person from whom or thing from which information can be obtained.
target audience
An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations.
ADFP 25
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
101. Psychological operations are joint operations which are planned activities in peace and war
directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour
affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The objective of ADF psychological
operations is to cause enemy, friendly and neutral personnel to act favourably toward Australia and
its allies.
102. The psychological profile of a country’s population is an important element of national
power. When political or economic competition between nations develops into military conflict, all
elements of national power may need to be applied to achieve a successful resolution. The
psychological dimensions of a conflict could be as important to conflict resolution as the physical
dimensions.
103. The effects of psychological pressure can assist in securing national objectives. Coordinated
social, political, economic and military action should be applied in a controlled and coordinated
manner to maximise the effectiveness of national policy.
104. Effective psychological operations can increase the destructive power of forces and reduce
the need to apply combat force; they are therefore a force multiplier that can reduce casualties.
The effectiveness of psychological operations is derived from being a component of a well-designed
operation; they are not a replacement for combat power but may be employed when the use of
combat force is inappropriate. Psychological operations can be either cohesive (directed at friendly
or neutral target audiences) or divisive (directed at enemy audiences).
105. Psychological operations are a component of command and control warfare (C 2W) and have
the potential to damage an enemy’s command and control system by lowering morale, instilling fear
and breeding distrust. They may be directed toward enemy command and control systems, when
divisive themes are employed, or may be directed to protect friendly force command and control
systems, when cohesive themes are pursued.
106. Psychological operations are applicable throughout the continuum of conflict and permit
well-prepared nations to reinforce themes, which may be conceived and even covertly pursued in
times of peace, with follow-on programs implemented during times of heightened tension or
hostilities. The application of psychological operations should be assessed against target audience
vulnerability in terms of susceptibility, accessibility and viability. Failure to evaluate the target
audience may render any plan unworkable.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
107. The principles of war guide the planning and conduct of all operations by the ADF. While
the weight given to a particular principle depends on the circumstances, psychological factors affect
each of the principles of war.
Selection and Maintenance of the Aim
108. Psychological operations may support national and military objectives. In peace they may
focus on economic or political objectives; in time of war they will generally focus on hostile military
activities, the enemy and allied force vulnerabilities. Psychological operations should always support
themes designed to achieve the aim of operations.
Cooperation
109. All elements of military power should cooperate to ensure delivery of a consistent
psychological message.
ADFP 25
1-2
Concentration of Force
110. Psychological operations are part of the effort to concentrate all available force against the
enemy. While the products of psychological operations are widely dispersed, their efforts
concentrate on the aim of inducing a behavioural change in a target audience. Themes and effort
should be consistent if maximum effect and credibility of psychological operations are to be
maintained.
Economy of Effort
111.
Psychological operations can act as a force multiplier by:
a.
contributing to C2W, in concert with operations security, deception, electronic warfare
and destruction;
b.
overcoming
audiences;
c.
providing reassurance and guidance to isolated or disorganised friendly target
audiences; and
d.
sustaining target audience morale in friendly military forces.
censorship, illiteracy and interrupted communications with target
112. Psychological operations can increase the cumulative effect of successful combat operations
if they are correctly integrated into the campaign plan. The end result of these operations is lower
enemy morale than would have been achieved by the application of combat force alone.
Psychological operations can simultaneously reinforce desirable behaviour in neutral or friendly
audiences using complementary themes.
Security
113. Psychological operations support provided to a deception plan enhances the overall security
of the campaign plan. Psychological operations units and staff must abide by security procedures
set in place by the supported formation, otherwise longer term operational plans may be
jeopardised. Psychological operations staff routinely develop awareness programs for supported
units to reduce individual susceptibility to hostile propaganda and contribute to operations security.
Offensive Action
114. When applying psychological operations friendly forces take the battle to the enemy and
attempt to influence enemy behaviour on the battlefield to the advantage of the ADF.
Surprise
115. The element of surprise can dislocate a force’s expectation of events and impose a state of
mental confusion within that force. Surprise and the consequent psychological effect favours the
force seizing the initiative. Psychological operations support to a deception plan can enhance
surprise by giving credence to feints and ruses.
Flexibility
116. The preparation of uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders enhances the flexibility of
an operation. Psychological operations staff must be prepared to modify their themes in the light of
unfavourable evaluation and changing strategic or operational circumstances.
Morale
117. Psychological operations can bolster friendly force morale while decreasing that of the
enemy. Themes directed at enemy forces should be complemented by psychological themes aimed
at friendly military audiences which emphasise the ascendancy of those forces and their cause over
the enemy.
ADFP 25
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THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Coordination
118. Coordination of events ensures that psychological operations are coordinated with the focus,
timing and intensity of operations. Compromise may be required in some circumstances, eg
operational security concerns might outweigh the perceived benefit of psychological operations that
rely on the release of information detailing aspects of a commander’s future intentions.
Timeliness
119. Psychological operations activities must respond to rapidly changing strategic or operational
circumstances. Responsive and effective psychological operations activity maximises the
psychological impact of enemy defeats or setbacks and can help to minimise the impact of
setbacks to our own forces.
Credibility
120. The temptation to distort situations to maximise their effect must be avoided. Deceitful ploys
can usually be identified by an enemy, and almost invariably by our own forces, and will destroy
credibility and detract from friendly force activities.
Intelligence
121. Modification of a target audience’s behaviour requires a detailed understanding of their
religious, cultural, economic, political, historical and current operational influences. Relevant and
timely intelligence is of fundamental importance to the initial design and subsequent modification of
psychological operations. Psychological operations staff should receive constant and accurate
feedback on the results of psychological operations activities, including those themes and measures
being absorbed, ignored or countered by the enemy. This information can be obtained through
interrogation of prisoners of war and other intelligence sources.
Evaluation
122. The effectiveness of psychological operations messages and themes must be verified by
evaluation. This is achieved through pre-testing material using an audience, which preferably
includes members of the target audience, and where possible, timely and periodic evaluation to
assess the effectiveness of the delivered product.
CATEGORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
123.
Psychological operations may be categorised as:
a.
psychological action,
b.
strategic psychological operations,
c.
operational psychological operations,
d.
tactical psychological operations, or
e.
psychological consolidation.
It should be noted that the categories of psychological operations can be complementary and occur
simultaneously.
ADFP 25
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Psychological Action
124. When international relations deteriorate and hostilities may occur between groups, activities
may be initiated by these groups as a means of demonstrating strength to potential enemies or
strong support for actual or potential allies. Such activities, planned to reduce an enemy’s prestige
and influence while at the same time increasing friendly influence and attitudes in potentially hostile
or neutral countries, are referred to as psychological action.
125. Most peacetime activities conducted by the ADF with regional powers are designed to build
trust and promote regional ties by encompassing aspects of diplomacy, marketing and defence
cooperation. These activities are designed to reduce the potential for conflict and while they are not
a deliberate attempt to conduct psychological action, they may have an inadvertent psychological
impact. Examples of such activities are:
a.
combined exercises,
b.
port calls and goodwill visits,
c.
exchange and liaison postings,
d.
consultations,
e.
public information activities,
f.
maintenance and demonstration of a technologically superior force structure, and
g.
maintenance of highly trained and well organised armed forces.
Strategic Psychological Operations
126. These are actions which pursue long term, mainly political objectives and are designed to
undermine a potential or actual enemy’s will to fight. Strategic psychological operations can be
directed against an enemy’s leadership (the dominant political group, government and its executive
agencies), towards the population as a whole or particular elements of the population. Objectives
will be determined by Government in consultation with Defence and other national agencies and
may be applied as a means of conflict prevention or deterrence. Objectives may be designed to:
a.
exploit audience setbacks,
b.
weaken an audience’s faith in their ultimate chance of victory,
c.
cast doubt on the legitimacy of aims,
d.
foment distrust in leadership,
e.
develop resistance to governmental ideologies within the population,
f.
create resistance and disaffection within specific audiences, and
g.
encourage resistance movements within enemy occupied areas.
Operational Level Psychological Operations
127. This level of operation is designed to bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces
and civilians in areas where operations are planned or conducted. Objectives will be developed by
the operational level commander and should conform to strategic guidelines. Psychological
operations at the operational level aim to lower enemy morale and facilitate the successful
prosecution of operations within a theatre or area of operations.
ADFP 25
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Tactical Psychological Operations
128. These actions bring psychological pressure to bear on enemy forces and civilians in support
of tactical military ground, air or sea operations. Tactical psychological operations may be
constrained by lack of staff and planning time. There may not be time to develop carefully
orchestrated and coordinated psychological operations for endorsement at the highest level as it
may reduce the effectiveness of activities planned and conducted at the tactical level.
Psychological Consolidation
129. Actions designed to foster the establishment or maintenance of order and security and gain
the support of a population in an area of operations, to advance political and military objectives, are
referred to as psychological consolidation. Military civic action is part of the consolidation
undertaken to improve the standing of military forces by contributing to the economic and social
development of a population. The judgment and conduct of troops dealing with the civil populace
will be fundamental to achieving the desired level of cooperation from the population.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND OTHER SUPPORT PLANS
Deception
130. Psychological operations should be used to support deception plans by contributing to
conditioning the enemy to the deception scenario. Coordination of psychological operations and
deception plans must be effected at all levels by operations staff.
Public Relations and Public Information
131. Maintenance of national strategic effort will be assisted by securing domestic support for
ADF operations and activities. The media is a major factor in influencing public perceptions.
Maintenance of favourable relations and coordination with media will help to maintain consistency
among public relations, public information and psychological operations. All published information
will be accessible to the enemy, therefore, coordination and careful scrutiny of information must be
undertaken before it is released for publication.
132. A requirement will exist to ensure continuity between public information plans aimed at local,
national and international audiences. The use of centrally controlled mechanisms that mirror
arrangements used for dissemination of public information is essential to ensure full exploitation of
resources available within media organisations in a way that is secure and consistent. Information
exposed to or provided to the media must not contradict psychological operations products and
themes.
Operations Security
133. Formulation and implementation of a psychological operations plan should reflect operations
security requirements. If the real aim of the psychological operation is obvious to the enemy then
other operations planning may be compromised.
Military Civic Action
134. Military civic action encompasses use of elements of military forces on projects such as
education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health and sanitation
designed to assist a civilian community. Noting that military civic action may often take place in the
absence of a psychological operations dimension, the principles of conducting military civic action
are that:
a.
it may be an element of the psychological operations plan,
b.
policy must be decided at the highest level,
ADFP 25
1-6
c.
consultation and agreement with the local authorities must occur in the formulation of
plans,
d.
maximum participation by the local population must be encouraged, and
e.
maintenance of projects should be within the capacity of the local population.
135. While military civic action is of particular importance for operations outside mainland
Australia and its territories, it can also assist in countering enemy propaganda within Australia
particularly when used to support and maintain local infrastructure.
136. Military civic action may also be undertaken in cooperation with philanthropic organisations
and, in overseas deployments, the ADF might operate in support of accredited non-Government
organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Any ADF operations in
support of such philanthropic or non-Government organisations should not compromise the
protected or neutral status of those organisations. Responsibility for the coordination of military civic
action with psychological consolidation rests with the operations staff.
DEFENCE AID TO THE CIVIL COMMUNITY AND
DEFENCE FORCE AID TO THE CIVIL POWER
137. The skills required in psychological operations may be applicable in peacetime in support of
defence aid to the civil community and defence force aid to the civil power. Appropriately trained
and equipped personnel can perform various tasks such as the broadcast of messages detailing
the location of health support services or feeding points in areas of natural disaster or messages
designed to maintain or restore public confidence in the civil authorities.
Psychological Operations in Modern Conflict
138. Psychological operations have occurred in all major conflicts in which Australian military
forces have been involved. An analysis of psychological operations during the Gulf War is at
Annex A.
Annex:
A.
Psychological Operations in the Gulf War
ADFP 25
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 1
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE GULF WAR
COALITION PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
1.
The objectives of Coalition forces psychological operations during the Gulf War were to:
a.
gain acceptance and support for Coalition operations;
b.
encourage Iraqi disaffection, alienation, defection and loss of confidence;
c.
create doubt in Iraqi leadership;
d.
encourage non-cooperation and resistance;
e.
strengthen confidence and determination of friendly states to resist aggression; and
f.
improve the deterrent value of Coalition forces.
Products Used
2.
of:
In supporting their objectives, Coalition psychological operations forces made extensive use
a.
leaflets,
b.
radio broadcasts, and
c.
loudspeaker operations.
The Use of Leaflets
3.
Leaflets were the most commonly used product, with some 29 million disseminated in the
Kuwait area of operations. Leaflets were delivered from a variety of platforms including C - 130, A-6,
F - 16 and B - 52 aircraft and artillery projectiles.
4.
The initial themes of leaflets were peace and brotherhood. Increasing the intensity of the
psychological operations message as events evolved, leaflet themes changed to an emphasis on
the United Nations deadline. After the deadline passed and Operation DESERT STORM began,
themes emphasising the abandonment of equipment and desertion were used. Leaflets were also
used which informed specific Iraqi units that they were going to be bombed. A number of B-52
strikes were thus advertised. Feedback from Iraqi prisoners of war validated the success of these
operations.
Radio Broadcasts
5.
`Voice of the Gulf’ was the Coalition’s radio network. From 19 January it broadcast from a
variety of ground-based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours a day for 40 days. Radio scripts were
prepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi propaganda and disinformation and encouraged
Iraqi defection and surrender.
ADFP 25
1A-2
Loudspeaker Operations
6.
Loudspeaker teams were used effectively throughout the theatre, with each manoeuvre
brigade making extensive use of attached loudspeaker teams. Surrender messages were prepared
by cross cultural teams in Arabic and were broadcast in both Kuwait and Iraq.
7.
The messages complemented those delivered by leaflets. Iraqi soldiers were encouraged to
surrender, were warned of impending air attacks and were told they would be treated humanely
and fairly. Many captured Iraqi soldiers mentioned hearing the broadcasts and had surrendered to
the Coalition forces because they feared further bombing.
Psychological Operations and Deception
8.
As a result of the coordinated use of leaflets indicating likely Marine amphibious operations
and the use of airborne troops by Coalition forces, significant Iraqi combat power was spread
piecemeal in an attempt to cover threats which were never planned to materialise. Numerous Iraqi
divisions were deployed on the coastal approach to Iraq to await a Marine landing which did not
eventuate and engineer battalions were tasked to emplace anti-airborne stakes in likely drop zones
throughout the desert.
Validation of Psychological Operations
9.
Operational analysis indicates that 99 per cent of Iraqi prisoners of war interviewed had
seen leaflets and 70 per cent stated that the leaflets influenced their decision to defect or
surrender. Surrendering and defecting soldiers invariably had leaflets in their possession, despite
Iraqi Army standing orders that anyone in possession of a leaflet would be executed forthwith.
10.
Interrogation of prisoners of war indicated that 80 per cent had heard `Voice of the Gulf´.
The broadcasts were considered nearly as credible as those of the British Broadcasting Corporation
and more credible than their own government`s radio broadcasts. The threat to Iraqi troop morale
from `Voice of the Gulf´ was considered so serious that Iraqi commanders outlawed possession of
transistor radios by their soldiers. The fact that quantities of the radios were recovered from Iraqi
prisoners of war indicates that the premium placed on accurate advice of the progress of the war
by Iraqi soldiers was high. Disobedience of higher authority by possession of the radios provides
positive evaluation of this particular psychological operations product.
11.
Loudspeaker operations were successful in persuading and instructing thousands of Iraqi
troops how to surrender. In one case an Iraqi battalion surrendered to a helicopter when the
loudspeaker team broadcast that `death from above was imminent´. Coalition psychological
operations were effective to the extent that the Iraqis organised squads whose function was to hunt
and execute deserting, defecting and surrendering Iraqi soldiers.
IRAQI PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Cultural Misappreciation
12.
The Iraqis did not appreciate their audience. The Iraqis destroyed their credibility when they
broadcast stories to Coalition troops which were offensive by nature of their moral imputations and
which illustrated a minimal understanding of Western society.
Control of the Media
13.
Saddam Hussein held absolute control over his own media. In seeking to repeat,
deliberately or incidentally, the success of the North Vietnamese psychological operations campaign
by driving a wedge between Coalition forces and the media, Hussein orchestrated what Peter
Arnett of Cable News Network observed in his reports from Iraq.
ADFP 25
1A-3
Psychological Operations Success
14.
Hussein used extensive psychological operations, including the application of combat power
in support of psychological operations. An example is the use of SCUD missiles, an inaccurate
vehicle of little threat to manoeuvre units when carrying a conventional payload. His use of these
missiles against Israel occasioned the redeployment of a significant number of theatre ground
based air defence assets to Israel and Saudi Arabia. The US public’s fear of high casualties and
subsequent redeployment of air defence assets proved that this campaign was a limited strategic
success for Iraq.
15.
Strategically, however, Saddam failed because he did not draw Israel into the conflict. This
aspect of his psychological operations campaign was directed against the Muslim member nations
of the Coalition. Participation with Israel in a war against a nation of fellow Muslims would create
enormous pressures within the Coalition. This situation would have greatly improved Saddam’s
chances of victory, given that the withdrawal from the Coalition of even one wavering member was
likely to occasion similar action from fellow Muslim member nations.
Psychological Operations Failure
16.
Saddam failed to appreciate the horror with which Western nations viewed the threatened
employment of weapons of mass destruction. His threats to use such weapons served to harden
the resolve of both Coalition troops and world opinion. The use of captured Coalition pilots to read
obviously prepared ’atrocity statements’, regardless of their apparent physical appearance, also
served to alienate Saddam and the Iraqis from world opinion.
17.
Saddam’s credibility was eroded, in the longer term, by the ’Baby Milk Factory’ episode.
Some European peacemakers accepted the story at face value and retransmitted the Iraqi reports
as factual. In the shorter term, this represented success for Saddam; ultimately the implausibility of
the factory sign, hurriedly manufactured in English for the benefit of Western audiences, was
appreciated. Iraqi credibility was damaged and was not restored by the time of the ceasefire.
CONCLUSION
18.
The extensive use of psychological operations by opposing sides in the Gulf War is
evidence of the continuing and growing relevance of psychological operations to conflict. The
success each side achieved in psychological operations reflects the extent to which the principles
of psychological operations were adhered to, particularly coordination, credibility and evaluation.
19.
The Coalition’s psychological operations campaign was well-orchestrated. The credibility of
the campaign was maintained to the end, partly due to the Coalition’s ability to demonstrate the
consequences of not abiding by surrender requirements contained in leaflets and broadcasts. The
target analysis conducted by the Coalition was essentially accurate.
20.
The Iraqi psychological operations campaign, while not without success, was dogged by
relatively poor target analysis and lacked credibility in the eyes of the less susceptible, non-Muslim
member nations of the Coalition. This flaw left the Iraqi psychological operations susceptible to
Coalition counter-action. In addition, the continuing high morale of Coalition forces militated against
the effectiveness of Iraqi psychological operations.
Source:
1.
Conduct of the Gulf War: Final Report to Congress , April 1992
ADFP 25
CHAPTER 2
THE ELEMENTS AND TECHNIQUES OF
201. Psychological operations are designed to maintain or change human behaviour to contribute
to national or allied objectives. To achieve this objective, psychological operations should be based
on a sound knowledge of individuals and groups to which they may belong.
202. The study, prediction and control of human behaviour is based on a number of scientific
disciplines including psychology, sociology and anthropology. Research findings, concepts and
procedures from these disciplines will facilitate planning, product development and the evaluation of
Psychology
203. Psychology has been defined as ’the scientific study of behaviour and mental processes’.
This reflects psychology’s concern with an objective study of observable behaviour. It also
recognises the importance of understanding mental processes that cannot be directly observed but
which must be inferred from behavioural research.
204. A person’s actions can be explained from several different points of view as many differing
approaches to psychology are possible. These approaches are not mutually exclusive; rather, they
tend to focus on different aspects of complex behaviours. Most psychologists take an eclectic
viewpoint, using a combination of several approaches in explaining psychological phenomena. The
three major approaches relevant to psychological operations are as follows:
a.
All forms of behaviour by a person can be observed and measured using scientific
principles. The behavioural approach studies what factors elicit behavioural change,
and the rewards and punishments that maintain or modify these changes.
b.
The cognitive approach argues that people are not passive receivers of messages;
rather, the mind actively processes information and transforms it into new forms and
categories. Cognition refers to the mental processes of perception, memory and
information processing whereby a person acquires knowledge, solves problems and
plans for the future.
c.
The phenomological approach focuses on a person’s subjective experience and
tends to reject the notion that behaviour is primarily controlled by unconscious
impulses or by external stimuli. Rather, people are the builders of their own lives
because they can make choices and set goals to enhance their personal growth.
Behavioural Research Principles
205. Correct use of research methodologies will maximise the effectiveness of psychological
operations. Thorough research and understanding of psychological operations and their impact will
promote more predictable effects and allow more impact from these operations to be incorporated
into the commander’s design for battle. The application of social science principles is often
instrumental in the development of effective products and actions for psychological operations.
Similarly, the use of research methodologies are an essential element of the evaluation process for
these operations.
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2-2
BEHAVIOUR IN ACTION
The Individual
206. Organisations consist of a number of individuals. To achieve the aim, psychological
operations must be designed to effect either modification to or reinforcement of the attitude of
individuals. Attitude has been defined as ’an enduring system of judgments, emotions and action
tendencies which predispose an individual to behave in certain ways to achieve particular
objectives or goals’. Attitudes are derived from one or more of the following elements:
a.
An individual’s knowledge, perceptions and beliefs about him self are organised into
an internally consistent system, a cognitive consistency which the individual will
subconsciously strive to maintain. As a result many cognitive attitudes are stable and
new information which is contradictory tends to be rejected. Evidence which only
marginally alters accepted beliefs is more likely to be accepted. Accordingly,
psychological operations which seek to modify peripheral viewpoints have a far
greater chance of success than those directed at core attitudes.
b.
Emotions are states of psychological arousal, socially acquired and reinforced
responses which generate attitudes. Emotional responses act as safety valves to
permit the expression of feelings. This process may be exploited by offering
alternative outlets for expression which promise similar or greater relief to an
audience.
c.
Action tendencies are the behaviour patterns acquired in the course of a person’s life
which take the form of standard responses to key situations, objects and
propositions. Psychological operations can successfully redirect action tendencies,
providing that the redirection is consistent with the emotional and cognitive attitudes
of the audience.
Individual Needs
207. In addition to the attitudes adopted by an individual, he/she is also driven by the need to
meet purely individual needs. These range from simple physical requirements such as food, water
and shelter to complex psychological demands such as recognition and self-esteem. These needs
are important to psychological operations as they are identifiable and the target audience can be
reminded of them. At the same time, the target audience can be presented with solutions for
satisfying those needs in a manner consistent with the interests of the initiator’s objectives.
Physical and Psychological Conditions
208. External stimuli which bear directly on an individual’s value system or physical wellbeing are
of particular significance to psychological operations where target audiences are exposed to
unfamiliar or extreme situations. The impact of these situations can often produce temporary
emotional and behavioural responses which override pre-existing attitudes. These mood fluctuations
can be exploited by psychological operations and the preparation of friendly forces to withstand
psychological operations attack must seek to minimise these impacts.
Behaviour and Attitude Modification
209. Social acclimatisation, spontaneous information gathering and instinctive needs are
essentially unplanned attitude forming processes. Psychological operations products aimed at
behaviour and, ultimately, attitude modification should:
a.
introduce, at the cognitive level, new information designed to modify the individual’s
view of his world;
b.
where it is evident that the audience has been obliged to repress strongly held
feelings, provide an apparently legitimate means of expression;
ADFP 25
2-3
c.
use key communicators (persons of established or perceived influence and prestige)
to influence an audience to embrace attitudes or behaviour patterns previously
considered inappropriate; and
d.
identify and highlight an unsatisfied audience need coupled with the offer of a
solution which will support the psychological operation’s aim. In this instance the
audience will tend to justify its acceptance of the course of behaviour as a product of
necessity.
Degrees of Attitude Change
210. The extent of attitudinal change through psychological operations or other actions will fall
into one of the following categories:
a.
Compliance is the simplest and least enduring form of change. It results from a
conscious decision by the target audience to accede to the demands of the
propagandist in response to threats or inducements. It is unlikely to survive the
removal of the threat or inducement and represents only a temporary and pragmatic
change of behaviour, with little if any change in attitude.
b.
Identification is a more reliable form of attitude change and comes from the
identification of an audience with the opinions of a particular individual or group.
Behaviour emulation is intrinsic to identification and the change is more enduring
than compliance. The duration of identification is dependent on continuing adherence
to the propagandist’s theme.
c.
Internalisation occurs when the target audience accepts as its own the attitudes of
the propagandist. The new attitudes may become as firmly entrenched as previously
held views. Internalisation can occur only when the proposed attitudes are compatible
with existing target audience values.
Needs and Behaviour
211. Maslow’s theory of hierarchical needs (1970) illustrates how one major psychological theory
has been utilised in developing potential psychological operations products. It must be noted that
Maslow’s theory is not definitive; rather, it serves as a medium within which to discuss human
behaviour theory. The theory states that in addition to attitudes adopted in the course of the
learning process or by social acclimatisation, the individual is driven by the desire to satisfy purely
individual needs. These range from the simple requirements of the body to complex psychological
demands and can be represented as a hierarchy, with the most fundamental and primitive needs at
one end of the scale and the most complex and abstract at the other. This is represented at
Annex A.
212. The theory of motivation suggests that the individual is constantly striving to progress
through the scale of satisfaction. As soon as one need has been satisfied, attention and effort
switches to the attainment of the next goal. Society or the individual can alter the relative positions
of elements within the hierarchy but the bottom level is almost universal in application. The
importance of this theory to psychological operations is the link established between need,
behaviour and satisfaction. If a need can be recognised and the target audience constantly
reminded of it, then the audience is highly likely to accept a proferred solution.
THE IMPACT OF THE GROUP
213. The behaviour and attitudes of a target audience are the product of those influences which
affect individuals. Characteristics of the organisation and behaviour of groups apply to groups of
any size. The characteristics of groups must be understood in order to appreciate their influence on
the conduct of psychological operations. A highly motivated and well led group, bound by an
accepted set of norms and values, is bound by exceptionally strong forces. Within the group an
individual’s performance or behaviour is influenced by a number of dynamic and interactive systems
and processes such as groups, leaders, organisations and environment. This interplay of influences
on individual performance is depicted at figure 1.
ADFP 25
2-4
Figure 1 - Influences on Individual Performance
214. Group dynamics, particularly in smaller groups, are influenced by such factors as spatial
proximity, the capacity for intimate communication, the provision of paternal protectiveness by
authority figures and the gratification of certain personality needs. An example of gratification is the
presumed aura of self-sufficiency stemming from membership of a military organisation.
Psychological operations must encompass potential target audiences within the categories of
`leader’, `group’, òrganisation’ and ìndividuals’. This will ensure that intended target audiences are
considered within a dynamic relational system.
In-groups and Out-groups
215. Membership of any particular group often implies rejection of one or more alternative groups.
Psychologically, this rejection must be continually reinforced in the minds of the membership. This
is achieved by identifying the chosen association as an ìn-group´ deserving of support and
allegiance. Implicitly, members of òut-groups´ are treated with caution or even hostility. The
resultant polarisation can be exploited by psychological operations by either exacerbating the
current distinctions or by providing support to only one group at the expense of others.
Group Leadership
216. Internal leadership must be analysed by the psychological operations staff, with special effort
dedicated to the identification of those individuals who most influence group attitudes and policies,
some of whom may not appear in the context of a hierarchical (military) organisation. These
individuals will be prime targets as their removal from a position of influence leaves a void which
can be exploited by psychological operations. Communications within groups should also be
analysed in order to target those points into which psychological operations messages can be most
readily inserted for wide and influential distribution.
ADFP 25
2-5
Mass Action
217. Societal groups are targeted by psychological operations staff as part of long-term action to
change the balance of opinion within a society. Where a quick reaction is required, it is possible to
provoke a group into taking mass action in the form of demonstrations or riots. The possible
short-term benefits of such a course may be offset by a number of disadvantages: unpredictability
of group behaviour, bringing discredit upon the group arguments in the eyes of the uncommitted
and the provocation of a counteraction by the authorities upon a group which may not survive such
a reaction.
COMMUNICATION
218. Psychological operations are effected through some means of communication, with the aim
of conveying the required message to the target audience. The message, designed to accomplish a
specific objective through an identified target audience vulnerability, is transmitted via the selected
media to the target audience.
219. Messages should be simple, unambiguous and designed to reflect the language and
symbols of the target audience. An inappropriately presented message is likely to lose its meaning
or reflect an unintended nuance. Once the message has been received the target audience must
be kept under scrutiny to determine its effect.
Techniques
220. Successful communications in psychological operations stem from the use of proven
techniques. Information on such techniques is at Annex B.
221.
In order to be successful, propaganda should be:
a.
based on information which is, to the audience, credible truth;
b.
presented in a form which will attract and excite the audience;
c.
designed to exploit psychological or physiological needs; and
d.
suggestive of a course of action which seems to provide an effective method of
satisfying those needs.
Evaluation
222. Testing products, both before and after dissemination, is an essential part of the
psychological operations process. A number of sampling techniques and statistical methods from
the social sciences could be incorporated into the process as ongoing procedures to facilitate the
evaluation process and allow modification as required.
223. Many other areas of the social sciences such as cross-cultural studies, consumer
psychology, political behaviour and religious behaviour provide information relevant to the
development of psychological operations products and themes.
Annexes:
A.
Hierarchy of Needs
B.
Techniques
ADFP 25
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 2
HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
Level
Components
Physiological
Homeostatic
Safety
Examples
Instinctive drives
Primitive sensations
Body maintenance - eating,
drinking
Reproduction
Taste
Security
Stability
Freedom from fear and anxiety
Self-defence
Government
Law and order
Financial security
Belongingness
Group membership
Friendship
Love
Children
Home or community
Esteem
Self-respect
Success
Self-actualisation
Fulfilment of potential
Full use of faculties and talents
Cognition
Thirst for knowledge
Education
Access to news
Aesthetics
Art and beauty
Artistic expression
ADFP 25
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 2
TECHNIQUES
1.
Communication difficulties can be avoided when dealing with differing cultural traditions if the
following aspects are considered:
a.
psychological operations staff must be fully briefed on the target audience, including
the society to which the target audience belongs;
b.
propaganda should be pre-tested on a representative audience prior to its release;
and
c.
the campaign must be monitored and apparent errors rectified.
The Target Audience
2.
Each audience must be examined by a section of the psychological operations staff who
concentrate on one ethno linguistic group. Specific target audience groups are analysed to identify
their vulnerability and susceptibility and a prototype of each group is developed against which draft
materials are evaluated.
The Themes
3.
This represents the final link in propaganda development as it relates the audience’s needs
to psychological operations objectives. Theme selection is based upon the psychological operations
estimate and a compromise between the aims of psychological operations and audience
susceptibilities. The following three themes are considered to have wide applicability:
a.
Members of the target audience are encouraged to identify with a group holding the
’right’ attitudes and values (in-group); all other groups (out-groups) are characterised
as deserving of rejection.
b.
The outcome of events is suggested to be inevitable. The audience is encouraged to
modify its behaviour to best accommodate future circumstances.
c.
The policies of current or potential leaders are represented as being legitimate and
acceptable to group interests.
The Means
4.
In presenting the message to the target audience it is imperative that the broadest possible
range of delivery means is considered. Means of delivery belong to one or more of the following
categories:
a.
psychological action (see chapter 1),
b.
civil military action (see chapter 1), and
c.
propaganda (see chapter 6).
ADFP 25
2B-2
The Nature of Propaganda
5.
Propaganda is the deliberate distribution of a message by any means of communication that
advances the friendly cause or harms an enemy’s intentions. It consists of information, ideas or
special appeals disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any
specified group to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly. Propaganda is classified in the
following manner:
a.
black propaganda purports to originate from a source other than the true source,
b.
grey propaganda does not specifically identify any source, and
c.
white propaganda is disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or an
accredited agency.
6.
Propaganda is most likely to be effective when based on information which appears to the
target audience as credible and does not attack their core beliefs, when developed with an
accurate knowledge of the receptivity of the target audience or presented in a cultural form that will
attract the interest of the target audience.
Truth and Credibility
7.
A truthful and credible reputation must be established and maintained with the target
audience. Credibility is the product of the audience’s reaction to the sponsor’s message in the light
of personal knowledge and experience. If factual information is used that contradicts the audience’s
entire body of understanding and beliefs, it is unlikely that the information will be received as
credible.
Gaining Audience Attention
8.
If influence is to be exerted over an audience their attention must be gained and held.
Useful techniques to gain audience attention include the use of novel, dramatic or repetitive (but
varied) messages.
Techniques
9.
Consideration of the attitude of the target audience and psychological operations objective
will assist in deciding the style of argument used to present the message. Techniques available for
message presentation include the following:
a.
Glittering generalities, traditional and nostalgic appeals capitalise on the audience’s
core attitudes. They seek to identify the message with cherished values such as
freedom or popular cultural or historical images.
b.
Character assassination and guilt by association (the smear campaign) are direct
attacks on the character, credibility and motives of public figures, institutions or
philosophies. Attacks on core beliefs should be avoided.
c.
Simplification and card-stacking relies on the presentation of material which supports
the theme and the calculated exclusion of material which does not support the
theme.
d.
The employment of humour is dependent upon an intimate and current knowledge of
the cultural values of the target audience.
e.
Testimonial endorsement of the message is provided by prestigious and influential
communicators.
f.
Credibility is gained if information emanates from sources at target audience level
and is phrased in the vernacular of that audience. This is particularly relevant in
societies with marked class differentiation.
ADFP 25
2B-3
Rumour
10.
A rumour is an item of information, truthful or otherwise, which is communicated to an
audience and spreads spontaneously. To be acceptable it must be unconnected to its sponsor.
Audience receptivity will be heightened by a shortage of timely and credible information and the
existence of a real and immediate interest or concern about the chosen subject matter. While a
useful psychological operations weapon, the use of rumour is subject to the following dangers:
a.
Progressive mutation may occur after release. A message is subject to the vagaries
of human memory when retold; it may become distorted to the extent that it provides
no benefit to the sponsor.
b.
Attribution should be avoided. If a rumour is traced back to its originator, the
credibility of the information source will be seriously damaged.
c.
Unintended effects may ensue; a rumour may generate an unintended effect on the
target audience or spread to an unintended audience, including neutral or friendly
forces.
d.
Rumours may linger indefinitely; at some future time they may embarrass the
sponsor.
Key Symbols
11.
These are a simple and effective means of transmitting an idea or emotion, particularly to an
illiterate audience. They may be visual (Christian cross or red cross), audible (slogans,
catchphrases or music) or behavioural (Hitler salute or handshaking).
ADFP 25
CHAPTER 3
RESPONSIBILITIES
301. The ADFCC is the facility through which CDF commands, directs and controls ADF
operations. Accordingly, CDF is responsible for overall direction of psychological operations in
accordance with national objectives. Psychological operations support to the ADFCC is provided by
DJOPS.
Operations Staff
302. Psychological operations are an operations staff function which relies upon effective
involvement of all staff branches for successful planning, conduct and supporting activities.
Operations staff are responsible for executing the psychological operations plan in concert with the
operation. They are also responsible for adjusting psychological operations plans due to changing
circumstances and for their coordination with phases of the operation. The senior operations officer
at all levels of command is responsible for the execution and modification of the psychological
operations plan.
Psychological Operations Staff
303.
Responsibilities of psychological operations staff are:
a.
preparation of psychological operations estimates and development of resultant
collection plans;
b.
advice to commanders on the psychological operations implications of military
operations and activities;
c.
preparation and implementation of psychological operations plans;
d.
evaluation of the effect of hostile propaganda on friendly forces; and
e.
advice on counter-propaganda methods.
f.
The above responsibilities are assumed by operations staff when psychological
operations staff are not raised.
Relationship with Other Staff
304. Psychological operations staff should develop a close working relationship with other
branches within the headquarters. In particular, they should keep abreast of current operations and
responses to psychological operations collection requirements. Close relations should also be
maintained with public relations staff to ensure that public information activities support the
psychological operations plan.
Communications Staff
305. Access to secure communications at superior and subordinate echelons of command, lateral
headquarters and psychological operations agencies is vital to the timely dissemination of
psychological operations products at all levels. Communications branch staff at all levels provide
the necessary communications support.
ADFP 25
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Psychologists
306. Specialists in the field of clinical psychology, whether Service officers or civilian experts,
provide a valuable contribution to psychological operations. At the tactical level, in particular, the
psychologist is a flexible vehicle of scientific knowledge and skills and can provide much needed
input to the design and conduct of psychological operations. Psychologists are well placed to
conduct job analyses for specialist psychological operations staff and to construct and administer
appropriate selection measures for such staff.
307. An understanding of the way people behave and communicate and the factors which
influence behaviour is essential to the conduct of effective psychological operations. Trained
psychologists can contribute to the preparation and conduct of training in these areas.
Psychological validation procedures may be incorporated into psychological operations as a means
of monitoring and evaluating the impact of psychological operations products.
Intelligence Staff
308.
Intelligence staff responsibilities relating to psychological operations are:
a.
advice to commanders on related intelligence collection priorities;
b.
tasking, or staffing requests for sources and agencies for the collection of information
and intelligence relating to current and future psychological operations;
c.
processing and dissemination of related intelligence; and
d.
provision of related intelligence support to superior and subordinate elements and
other agencies as required.
NATIONAL LEVEL
Policy Determination
309. National psychological operations policy is conceived as an extension of peacetime
diplomatic and security policies that Government pursues to fulfil national strategy. As the world
becomes more interconnected by common economic activity and growth of global information
transfer, influence by persuasion will be continuous. At the strategic level, psychological operations
focus on achieving national exposure of agreed themes via appropriate media. CDF is responsible
for the overall direction of psychological operations in accordance with national objectives
established by Cabinet. To this end, activities which support psychological operations objectives
would normally be coordinated at all levels of Government, up to that of the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). The process of determining and implementing national
psychological operations policy is illustrated at Annex A.
310. The effort of civilian agencies with psychological operations responsibilities should be
coordinated during operations with military staffs. Such coordination is effected through the
Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG). This responsibility may be delegated to a similar
group at assistant secretary level. SPCG composition and planning responsibilities are covered in
ADFP 9 - Joint Planning.
STRATEGIC LEVEL
311. At the strategic level psychological operations are the responsibility of ACOPS and are
implemented through Director Joint Operations (DJOPS) by the Staff Officer Grade Two Counter
Intelligence (SO2 CI). During operational planning there should be close liaison and coordination
between ADF Command Centre (ADFCC), DIO (through the ADF Intelligence Centre), joint
commands and the single Services. Early and close liaison is vital to facilitate effective and timely
psychological operations support to the headquarters controlling the operation.
ADFP 25
3-3
312. DJOPS has responsibility for the central direction and coordination of all ADF psychological
operations processes, including:
313.
a.
providing psychological operations staff advice to HQADF policy formulation
processes and contingency planning,
b.
advising on development of ADF capabilities for the passage and processing of
psychological operations data, and
c.
advising on single Service psychological operations issues.
DJOPS is also responsible for policy guidance and the effective management of:
a.
identification of strategic psychological operations requirements,
b.
strategic psychological operations estimate preparation,
c.
psychological operations staff tasking,
d.
psychological operations evaluation, and
e.
implementation of counter-action within ADF establishments in the Australian support
area.
314. While established to fulfil the psychological operations requirements of their particular
commander, psychological operations elements remain under the technical control of DJOPS, who
is empowered to ensure that ADF psychological operations are coordinated and conform to national
policy.
315. DIO has responsibility to monitor Australia’s strategic environment and provide the Minister,
the Department and the ADF with timely warning of changes, particularly in respect of adverse
psychological operations, security and defence-related situations or developments in the
Asia/Pacific region. DIO’s psychological operations functions are to:
a.
provide high quality information, such as the psychological operations capabilities of
other nations, and analytical support;
b.
ensure that joint commanders have ready access to psychological operations data
and assessments relevant to their functions;
c.
maintain close relationships with other Australian and allied psychological operations
agencies and to establish links with other foreign agencies; and
d.
provide the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and other Government
departments and instrumentalities with related information and assessments.
316. DIO and ONA provide strategic level support, including assessments of potential target
audiences in the operational area. These assessments provide judgments on the broad
international environment relevant to the formulation of psychological operations policy.
Psychological operations capabilities and intentions of foreign powers whether they be hostile,
neutral or friendly towards Australia are reflected in these estimates, as are broad political,
economic and technological considerations.
317. Although DIO provides specific strategic assessments to satisfy the requirements of the
Department of Defence and the ADF, some elements may be devolved to the joint commands.
Within Australia, the production of estimates, basic intelligence collection and the planning and
execution of psychological actions directed at friendly forces and the local population may be
allocated to joint commanders, Commander Joint Forces Australia (if appointed) or a joint force
commander.
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318. In overseas deployments the commander of the deployed headquarters may be given
responsibility for the operational level psychological operations estimate, using details provided by
DIO and any other available sources. DIO consults ONA and ADF psychological operations
elements, as appropriate, in the preparation of its estimates.
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
General
319. The application of national psychological operations objectives at the operational level and
complementary psychological operations objectives designed to support the aim of the commander,
is effected as follows:
a.
Specialist staff are responsible for the implementation of policy, planning and the
organisation of training. In times of large scale commitment of forces, it is likely that
specialist staff will be augmented by the use of attached personnel with expertise in
matters relevant to the prosecution of psychological operations. This includes the use
of single Service psychologists and external consultants from such fields as the
behavioural sciences, the media and the commercial advertising industry.
b.
Specialist introductory training of nominated appointments at formation headquarters
enables these staff to:
(1)
advise the commander on psychological operations policy,
(2)
advise the commander on the psychological implications of military operations
and activities,
(3)
evaluate the impression made by hostile propaganda on friendly forces and
advise on propaganda methods,
(4)
identify the intelligence required to support the planning and conduct of
psychological operations, and
(5)
assist the intelligence staff in identifying suitable sources of the information
from which this intelligence can be derived.
Intelligence Support
320. Effective psychological operations are dependent on timely, continuous, accurate and
detailed intelligence. A thorough knowledge and understanding of potential target audiences is
essential if psychological operations are to be effective. Continuing research into the social and
physical geography of potential areas of operations, infrastructure and enemy armed forces is
required to support psychological operations.
321. At the strategic level, DIO is responsible for this research. At the operational level, both at
HQJFA (if raised) and at joint force headquarters (JFHQ), the joint intelligence centre would
undertake specific support to psychological operations planning.
322. Psychological operations support to joint operations comprises all personnel, equipment and
resources involved in the production and dissemination of psychological operations in support of the
operational commander. Support includes the staffs, agencies and resources in the joint commands
and any other JFHQ established. Inadvertent psychological impact may attend ADF participation in
such activities as short warning conflict, peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and
offshore contingencies.
ADFP 25
3-5
Principles
323. The principles which guide psychological operations at the tactical level (see
paragraphs 118 - 22) are evident at the operational level. However, the increased complexity of
operational level warfare necessitates consideration of the additional principles of:
a.
development of a unified campaign supportive of national policy and the operational
commander’s concept of operations,
b.
interoperability and mutual support between all elements of the psychological
operations system, and
c.
employment of automated data processing capabilities to support joint psychological
operations.
Tasks
324.
Joint psychological operations tasks include:
a.
collecting, producing and disseminating data necessary for the planning and
execution of operational missions;
b.
advising JC on psychological operations priorities;
c.
providing psychological operations support to subordinate elements of the joint force;
and
d.
undertaking psychological operations missions and tasks assigned by higher
command.
Joint Psychological Operations Staff Responsibilities
325.
Responsibilities common to the joint psychological operations staffs include:
a.
identification of related intelligence requirements;
b.
maintenance of relevant databases;
c.
coordination with other commands for the ready flow of relevant information;
d.
system development and psychological operations training;
e.
representation at relevant international exchanges and within Service-to-Service links;
and
f.
representation in ADF
dissemination processes.
psychological
operations
planning,
production
and
Staff Relationships
326. To be effective, the joint psychological operations staff must be an integral part of the
operations branch. In addition, the majority of agencies on which the psychological operations staff
rely for information, product dissemination and monitoring is often tasked by other elements within a
joint headquarters.
ADFP 25
3-6
Maritime Headquarters
327. Psychological operations is the responsibility of the Chief Staff Officer Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence, who is responsible to Maritime Commander Australia (MCAUST)
for:
a.
developing, coordinating and implementing maritime psychological operations policy;
and
b.
managing all maritime psychological operations assets.
Chief Staff Officer Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence also provides psychological
operations policy advice to Chief of Naval Staff (CNS).
Land Headquarters
328. Psychological operations support to nominated JFHQ is the responsibility of Colonel
(Operations). This is implemented through Intelligence Branch, which provides psychological
operations support to Land Commander Australia (LCAUST) for the conduct of land operations.
Branch tasks are dependent upon the nature of Army support to, or involvement in, ADF
operations. The responsibility to maintain accurate psychological operations databases is an
ongoing one, as is the need to disseminate relevant products to higher and lateral headquarters
and to formations commanded by LCAUST. Specific tasks include:
a.
formulating psychological operations requirements for the planning and direction of
joint and combined operations;
b.
developing operational level psychological operations products, eg psychological
operations supporting plans to Australian Joint Service Plans;
c.
providing direct, relevant and timely psychological operations support to Land
Command elements and the command structure of the ADF, including operational
level psychological operations estimates;
d.
liaison with HQADF (via the ADF Intelligence Centre), Maritime Headquarters (MHQ),
Air Headquarters (AHQ), deployable joint force headquarters, Headquarters Northern
(HQNORCOM), subordinate psychological operations staffs and units and other
agencies on psychological operations matters;
e.
providing advice and assessments to LCAUST on the psychological operations threat
to ADF personnel deployed on peacekeeping and defence cooperation tasks;
f.
coordinating the collection of psychological operations related intelligence in Land
Headquarters (LHQ)-led joint and combined operations; and
g.
exploitation of captured personnel in the monitoring of psychological operations
programs with the staff of other LHQ branches.
Air Headquarters
329. Responsibility for support to psychological operations rests with Chief of Operations and is
implemented through the Senior Operations Officer. AHQ Air Intelligence Centre is responsible, in
coordination with DIO, for the collection, analysis and direct dissemination of intelligence to
operational elements of the RAAF. This includes advice on psychological operations counter-action.
ADFP 25
3-7
Headquarters 1 Division
330. Within HQ 1 Div, psychological operations are the responsibility of Staff Officer Grade One
(SO1) (Operations). In formulating psychological operations support requirements and planning
psychological operations, CJFA/LJC may draw upon basic psychological operations studies
produced by 1 Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition Unit (1 RISTA), a
unit of 1 Division which includes psychological operations specialist staff.
331. Control and coordination of psychological operations resources are the responsibility of the
Commander Northern Command (COMNORCOM), through Staff Officer Grade One (SO1) Joint
Operations. SO1 Joint Operations is assisted in the design and monitoring of psychological
operations by the Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC), whose tasks include:
a.
preparation of psychological operations estimates for operations within the Northern
Command area of operations;
b.
participation in planning joint psychological operations intelligence collection;
c.
reviewing and updating the HQNORCOM basic psychological operations intelligence
requirements;
d.
liaison with DIO, JIC, subordinate psychological operations staffs and units, and other
psychological operations agencies; and
e.
provision of specialist psychological operations advice to special-to-task groups.
COMBINED OPERATIONS
General
332. The nature of combined operations necessitates flexibility and foresight in the provision of
psychological operations support. ADF psychological operations doctrine must be compatible with
that of our major allies. However, each allied nation involved in the operation will normally operate
separate psychological operations systems, which comply with their own national laws, in support of
their own national policies and deployed military forces. The integration of separate psychological
operations into a combined system may present difficulties. Additionally, combined operations may
involve nations outside normal alliance agreements and any operational and procedural differences
may be compounded by language and cultural differences.
333. During combined operations, psychological operations objectives must be multilaterally
agreed and liaison initiated at the highest levels to ensure that operations are coordinated. The
formation of a combined psychological operations centre at the operational level, the deployment of
liaison officers to allied headquarters and the establishment of a psychological operations network
complete with secure communications will assist this coordination. The combined psychological
operations staff should plan the deployment of assets to support the commander’s mission.
334. National considerations affecting the conduct of psychological operations should be reflected
in any written directives. There may be instances where the interests of an ally must be
subordinated to Australian national objectives as reflected in psychological operations objectives.
Special Considerations
335. The principles of combined psychological operations are similar to those for joint
psychological operations. However, the involvement of allied nations requires the consideration of
additional factors necessary to achieve an effective and coordinated effort. The diverse nature of
allied forces and their operational doctrine and national interests create challenges to a combined
effort.
ADFP 25
3-8
336. Responsibilities for the prosecution of psychological operations must be agreed by all
nations contributing to the headquarters staff, or with psychological operations responsibilities,
largely in accord with procedures employed by the lead combined operations staff. Considerations
which might ease integration of psychological operations efforts are:
a.
development of a combined psychological operations system acceptable to all allied
nations;
b.
establishment of clearly defined channels for the flow of information;
c.
establishment of agreed standard operating procedures for combined psychological
operations;
d.
development of a secure, reliable and dedicated communications system;
e.
establishment of liaison between allied psychological operations units;
f.
establishment of a common data base with agreed formats and reports; and
g.
interoperability of systems.
Command and Control
337. A combined forces commander is appointed from either the nation with jurisdiction over the
territory under threat or the nation providing the preponderance of forces. In either case, the
organisation of the combined psychological operations centre will be dictated by the nature of the
supported force and the theatre of operations. Combined psychological operations staff should
develop a system which provides for the input of multinational all-source information, its subsequent
conversion to psychological operations products and dissemination.
338. There may be difficulties with releasing highly classified, compartmented intelligence
essential for the evaluation of psychological operations. For this reason, essential elements of
friendly information must be determined well in advance for the timely development of sanitising
and release guidelines. A combined psychological operations centre should have tasking authority
over all psychological operations agencies deployed to support the operation.
SINGLE SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES
Army
339.
Army is responsible for:
a.
development and provision of Army doctrine, training publications and minor
specialist equipment including broadcast equipment;
b.
provision of Army aircraft placed in support of operational or tactical level
commanders;
c.
sponsorship of specialist psychological operations units and staffs; and
d.
provision of training support to the other Services.
Director-General Army Operational Support is responsible to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff
for implementing counter-action within Army establishments in the Australian support area.
RAN
340. Navy is responsible for the provision of naval support to psychological operations.
Director-General Naval Policy and Warfare is responsible to the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff for
implementing counter-action within RAN shore establishments in the Australian support area.
ADFP 25
3-9
RAAF
341. RAAF is responsible for the provision of air support to psychological operations.
Director-General Support Services - Air Force is responsible to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for
implementing counter-action within RAAF establishments in the Australian support area.
Annex:
A.
Determination and Implementation of Psychological Operations Policy
ADFP 25
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 3
DETERMINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS POLICY
ADFP 25
CHAPTER 4
401. The execution of psychological operations, a component of command and control warfare,
consists of six stages:
a.
initial research and intelligence,
b.
direction,
c.
collection,
d.
target analysis,
e.
formulation of the psychological operations plan, and
f.
implementation.
402. The stages are not discrete, neither are they finite; throughout the psychological operations
process, intelligence is reviewed and compared to initial estimates. Collection of information
continues throughout the process. The campaign evaluation, part of the implementation stage, may
initiate a re-assessment of the initial target analysis.
403. Psychological operations are a cyclic activity, with evaluation and feedback from intelligence
leading to adjustments to activities and new approaches. Even when military operations are
completed there is a need to sustain psychological operations against the possibility of the
resumption of operations by the enemy. The psychological operations process is depicted at
Annex A.
INITIAL RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE
404. Intelligence provides the basis for planning psychological operations campaigns directed at a
specific target audience. The required approach and associated themes are deduced from the basic
psychological operations study. Current intelligence on the target audience is required to determine
the effect of the commander’s concept of operations and psychological operations upon the target
audience. Modifications may be required to material to attain psychological operations objectives.
Direction
405. The commander’s concept sets the framework within which supporting psychological
operations plan must fit. The psychological operations estimate supports the commander’s aim and
reinforces adherence to national objectives in the form of guidance, directives and operation
instructions. In identifying the target audience, the psychological operations estimate provides a
focus.
COLLECTION
406. The collection stage follows initial research. Collection aims to validate the premises upon
which the commander’s concept was based, in particular the current attitudes and behaviour of the
target audience. Revalidation of assumptions is a continuing requirement as the environment
affecting the target audience, and their resultant attitude, is not static. Psychological operations staff
must be aware of those attitudinal variations. Moreover they must incorporate the effects of these
changes into current and future psychological operations so that they remain relevant, credible to
the audience and, therefore, effective.
ADFP 25
4-2
TARGET ANALYSIS
407. Target analysis is explained in some detail at paragraph 511. The aim of target analysis is
to ensure that appropriate messages reach the target audience to induce attitudinal changes
required to achieve the psychological operations objectives.
FORMULATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN
408. Tasks required to achieve the necessary attitudinal changes in a target audience and the
resources required to accomplish those tasks are identified in the psychological operations plan.
The plan must be flexible and readily modified if the results appear ineffective. Commanders
conducting psychological operations should establish an advisory group incorporating members
from:
a.
operations staff;
b.
intelligence staff;
c.
public relations specialists;
d.
psychological operations specialists (including psychology staff);
e.
political and civic representatives, where appropriate; and
f.
legal staff.
409. The psychological operations advisory group, under the lead of the operations staff, is
responsible for ensuring that:
a.
psychological factors are considered during planning,
b.
the commander is advised of options, and
c.
policy and guidance is produced.
IMPLEMENTATION
410. The final stage of the psychological operations process is the production of material, its
dissemination and evaluation of the product and the campaign.
Production and Dissemination
411. Propaganda material is prepared based upon the themes, symbols and media selected for
the target audience (from target analysis). The first draft of material should always be tested to
gauge its effectiveness. This eliminates errors in analysis and interpretation, weaknesses in the
concept behind the propaganda or any misappreciation of recent changes in the situation of the
target audience; all these factors may render psychological operations ineffective. Testing may take
one of three principal forms:
a.
Survey sampling gauges the reaction of a sample of the target audience by
questionnaire or personal interview. This is the most reliable method.
b.
If the target audience cannot be accessed, it may be possible to test using a panel of
refugees, defectors or other representatives.
c.
As a last resort, a panel of experts, individuals with knowledge of the target
audience, may be used for testing. This method is not as reliable as other methods,
but may reveal inconsistencies or nuances overlooked by originators.
ADFP 25
4-3
412. Psychological operations staff carefully monitor propaganda production to ensure that the
finished product retains all original meaning of the draft. The finalised product may then be
distributed in accordance with the psychological operations plan, using any of the media described
at Annex B.
Evaluation
413. All plans implemented must be subject to continuous evaluation after product dissemination
(referred to as post-testing) to appraise the credibility, reliability, relevance, accuracy and
effectiveness of the plan. Where weaknesses in the plan are revealed, the relevant sections should
be reviewed and adjusted.
Annexes:
A.
The Psychological Operations Process
B.
Psychological Operations Media
ADFP 25
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 4
ADFP 25
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS MEDIA
Serial Media
1.
Leaflets
Production Considerations
Delivery Considerations
Relatively simple and quick to
produce at all levels.
Can be delivered by:
1. hand,
2. airdrop,
3. balloon drop, or
4. artillery shell.
Choice of means determined by:
1. tactical situation,
2. air defence threat, and
3. counter-battery threat.
2.
Posters
As above.
Primarily delivered by hand.
3.
Audio Messages
Successful production requires:
Delivered by:
1. recording facilities, and
1. ground-mounted
speakers, and
2. a speaker fluent in target
audience dialect/language.
Use can be made of existing
facilities or new facilities can be
provided.
2. aircraft speakers.
Effectiveness of means
determined by:
1. tactical situation,
2. weather, and
3. air defence threat.
4.
Radio Broadcast
As for Serial 3.
Radio transmissions can be
vectored or the power varied in
order to minimise the risk of
interception by hostile elements
or an unintentional audience.
Transmitters can be located
inside or outside the area of
operations.
5.
Audiovisual
messages:
An expensive and timeconsuming process. Usually
only conducted at strategic and
possibly operational levels.
Delivery affected by:
1. film
2. videotapes,
and
1. broadcast facilities, and
2. ownership of receiving
equipment (eg television
sets).
3. television
ADFP 25
CHAPTER 5
STAFFING PROCESS
Introduction
501. Psychological operations must be planned and coordinated at the highest level. Failure to
direct psychological operations efforts toward achievement of a defined national aim will result at
best in failure to achieve the psychological operations aim and, at worst, in the sending of
misleading signals to the adversary, particularly at a time when diplomatic initiatives might have
avoided a military commitment. Such considerations must guide the design and application of
psychological operations at both the strategic and operational levels.
The Commander’s Concept
502. Following the conduct of an appreciation, the commander’s concept is produced. The
concept may reflect a significant reliance on the success of activities designed to achieve a
debilitating reduction in the enemy’s morale. In the first instance this may be sought by
overwhelming relative strength and surprise, but these measures should be reinforced by
psychological operations activities designed to ensure effects are sustained and the perception of
inevitable loss is maintained in the enemy’s mind.
503. Psychological operations activities and their intended results will appear in the concept,
along with the relative emphasis and priority accorded them by the commander. Psychological
operations objectives are not usually stated in the concept, but may be stated in the form of a
written psychological operations directive. In this case, the psychological operations plan will be
based on both documents.
Initial Research and Intelligence
504. A thorough knowledge and understanding of the target audience is essential if psychological
operations are to be effective. This requires continuing research of the sociology, demography,
culture, economic circumstances, human and physical geography, infrastructure and political and
military hierarchy of the target audience. At the strategic level this task is conducted by the Defence
Intelligence Organisation (DIO). At the operational level, the psychological operations staff at the
joint/joint force headquarters use information from their own sources to supplement intelligence
provided by DIO.
Basic Psychological Operations Study
505. A basic psychological operations study provides information for staff to familiarise
themselves with the characteristics of the enemy society and to identify possible target audiences.
The basic psychological operations study incorporates biographical, political, demographic, cultural,
infrastructure and sociological intelligence and should be comprehensive. A suggested format for a
basic psychological operations study is at Annex A.
506. Production of the basic psychological operations study is a DIO responsibility. Integration
agreements between DIO and the joint commands for intelligence production may, however,
devolve this responsibility. Joint/joint force headquarters, for example, may be tasked with the
production of regional basic psychological operations studies. If a study is not readily available,
psychological operations staff will commence assembling a study from other material. Country
studies provide a good starting point for the collection of psychological operations intelligence, but a
wide variety of sources, beyond those used for the production of operational intelligence, are
required to identify the cultural subtleties and tensions that provide themes for successful
ADFP 25
5-2
Psychological Operations Estimate
507. The psychological aim required to support the commander’s concept of operations must be
identified. The aim focuses the psychological operations estimate, which identifies the psychological
operations mission. The estimate identifies tasks to support the commander’s concept of operations
and the order in which they should be accomplished. It contains all known political, military, social
and economic factors relevant to a specific situation. The psychological operations estimate should
also address:
a.
enemy counter psychological operations capabilities,
b.
their likely effectiveness, and
c.
how they might be overcome.
A suggested format for the estimate and guidance on the contents is at Annex B.
508. The estimate defines the target audiences, the psychological operations objectives to be
achieved with each target audience and initial components of the psychological operations effort.
Any assumptions used in the absence of intelligence should be checked against firm intelligence as
soon as possible. The estimate must be constantly reviewed in the light of ongoing changes in the
conditions and attitudes of the target audience and the general military situation. Such changes
may require a new psychological aim, mission or tasks.
Associated Intelligence Collection Planning
509. Notwithstanding the availability of a basic psychological operations study, there remains the
need for current intelligence concerning: changes in the social and material conditions of the target
audience, shifts in popular attitudes resulting from political and military events, indications of the
receptivity of the target audience and the effectiveness of various psychological operations
measures. The intelligence community collects such information from:
a.
prisoners of war and defectors,
b.
refugees and civil administrators,
c.
civil and paramilitary police,
d.
newspapers and magazines,
e.
research reports, studies and academic journals,
f.
foreign media broadcasts,
g.
intelligence studies by allied intelligence staffs and agencies,
h.
captured documents, and
i.
agents.
Monitoring Effectiveness
510. Following promulgation of the commander’s concept of operations the effect on the target
audience must be determined, especially with reference to current attitudes and behaviour. The
constant input of intelligence supporting psychological operations throughout the planning and
implementation stages is necessary to ensure timely and appropriate effort. Interrogators may be
specifically tasked with exploiting sources in search of information to support the conduct of
ADFP 25
5-3
Target Analysis
511.
Each target audience must be examined in relation to the appropriate task to discern:
a.
target audience attitudes as they relate to the mission;
b.
the desired target audience response in support of the psychological objective, which
flows from the psychological operations estimate;
c.
lines of persuasion for each psychological objective;
d.
themes and symbols to express the lines of persuasion;
e.
media suitable to approach the target audience; and
f.
the intensity and timing of the campaign.
The staff tools used in target analysis are described in ADFP 19 - Intelligence .
Analysis of the Audience
512. Audience analysis establishes the target audience and route of the message, as well as
indicating other groups which may have been exposed to it in the process of transmission.
Audiences may be categorised as follows:
a.
The apparent audience is the obvious and immediate target of the message. It may
be the only recipient.
b.
The intermediate audience becomes involved when the recipient is employed only as
a link in the communication process.
c.
The unintended audience consists of social groups which may overhear the message
enroute to its target. As the message has not been tailored to their attitudes and
values it may generate an adverse reaction.
d.
The ultimate audience is the intended target of appeal; if the material has had
significant impact then this group will need to be the subject of counteraction by the
enemy.
The Psychological Operations Plan and Orders or Instructions
513. Following close consultation between the operations and psychological operations staff,
direction on the purpose and form of the psychological operations effort is given in the form of a
written psychological operations directive or as a section of the commander’s concept of operations.
In either case, a psychological operations plan and associated orders or instructions will
subsequently be produced, either as a discrete document or as an annex to the operation order
(see Annex C).
Annexes:
A.
Suggested Format of a Basic Psychological Operations Study
B.
Suggested Format and Contents of a Psychological Operations Estimate
C.
Example of a Psychological Operations Annex to an Operation Order
ADFP 25
ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 5
SUGGESTED FORMAT OF A BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS STUDY (1)
PART 1 - THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Introductory Description
1.
This provides a brief survey of the target area to enable an overall understanding of its
primary physical characteristics. It contains the following:
a.
physical geography, which includes major features of the target area, with emphasis
on any identifiable geographic regions within which elements of the population may
be susceptible to separatism, demography, ethnicity, religion, tribalism, culture or
human geography;
b.
climate variations which may contribute to lifestyle or cultural differences; and
c.
natural resources, their socio-economic importance and any other relevant factors.
History
2.
This is a selective description of the target society’s historical growth, especially those
aspects with a continuing influence, including:
a.
a general outline dealing in detail only with events, personalities or periods remaining
within the public consciousness;
b.
social history, including social groups and migration patterns; and
c.
political development, including the influence on the current political structure of
traditional forms of rule.
Society and Culture
3.
This provides discussion of the component social groups of the target society, including
commentary on the values and expression forms which separate groups, or which identify one with
another. The following aspects are considered:
a.
population distribution, including pattern of settlement and major population centres;
b.
ethnic and racial groupings which perceive themselves as discrete from the
remainder of the population;
c.
languages and literacy within each group;
d.
class structure, including socio-economic classes and their correlation with racial or
ethnic groups;
e.
moral and ethical values which have a significant effect on social behaviour;
f.
legal norms which have a significant effect on social behaviour;
g.
customs, folklore and traditional behaviour patterns;
h.
artistic expression, including forms and symbols of particular emotional significance;
ADFP 25
5A-2
i.
religious beliefs and their influence on the population; and
j.
family structure, including importance of the family group to the individual and its
relationship with larger social organisations.
The Economy
4.
This study summarises the economic organisation and activities of the target population and
identifies areas of stress and resentment resulting from inequities in the distribution of wealth or the
control of economic power. The contents are:
a.
general outline of significant industrial, agricultural and commercial economic activity;
b.
distribution of wealth and land, including ownership of industrial resources and the
land tenure system, including popular attitudes towards current forms of economic
organisation;
c.
intent and effect of taxation policy of government or other agencies or groups, such
as guerillas or occupying forces, who impose taxes on a subjected population;
d.
distribution of work within a society with emphasis on the relationship between
membership of social groups and employment prospects; and
e.
labour relations, as reflected in membership, philosophy and effectiveness of
employee organisations, including the incidence of labour unrest.
Science and Technology
5.
The assessment of the impact of science and technology upon the society includes:
a.
indigenous scientific resources, including the educational and technical facilities to
meet local needs;
b.
imported science and technology, including the extent of dependence upon imported
assistance and exerted donor influence;
c.
the scientific community, including membership and influence of the technical elite;
and
d.
social impact, including popular attitudes towards the changes promoted by scientific
development.
Social Conditions
6.
This section describes the living conditions of the populace, noting perceived deficiencies,
and including:
a.
nutrition, including the availability, cost and quality of food;
b.
health, availability of medical treatment, endemic diseases and mortality rates;
c.
housing supply and ownership;
d.
adequacy of public services such as transport, water supply, sewerage, drainage and
roads;
e.
education resources and accessibility;
ADFP 25
5A-3
f.
extent, administrative efficiency and adequacy of welfare programs; and
g.
extent, nature and control of distribution of foreign aid and the attitudes of recipients
towards donors.
PART 2 - POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Government and Politics
7.
An analysis of the distribution of power within society describes the formal apparatus of both
government and power centres external to the constitutional structure. An assessment is also made
of popular attitudes towards the political system and leadership, including:
a.
the constitution and institution as the overt framework of the government and law,
including the constitutionally appointed organisations through which power is
exercised;
b.
political parties, including their philosophies, aims and support bases;
c.
interest groups and other power centres, in particular membership, alignment and
influence of organisations outside the spectrum of government and recognised
political parties;
d.
distribution of power and the decision making process, including relative importance
of groups discussed and their influence upon the formulation of government policy;
e.
administrative machinery, in terms of efficiency, membership and influence of the
public service; and
f.
popular attitudes towards political life as reflected in the degree of involvement of the
populace in political organisations.
Foreign Relations
8.
This section covers the formal and informal relationships existing between the target society
and those of other nations, in particular the degree of influence achieved by each party in the
process of communication. These relationships include:
a.
the strategic situation, including a short resume describing the major factors
governing a nation’s foreign policy;
b.
formal alliances and the effects upon domestic opinion of bilateral treaties and
membership of multinational bodies;
c.
traditional relationships and established popular feelings of friendship or hostility
towards other nations; and
d.
non-governmental relations as reflected in communication patterns, support or
influence among social and political groups within the target area and similar groups
or governments without.
ADFP 25
5A-4
Security Forces
9.
This section examines the police and armed forces, including the social and political
affinities of their members and the degree of political influence exercised by them over
Government. This section also considers the psychological operations capabilities and
achievements of the armed forces in reference to their own personnel and society as a whole.
Additionally, the susceptibility of police and servicemen to psychological operations is assessed,
along with the approaches and media to which they are most receptive. There may be more than
one set of forces: enemy and Government forces supported by the ADF; ADF allies and the enemy
or, in peacekeeping, forces of each of the protagonists. The assessment includes:
a.
establishment and order of battle, including outline organisation, strength, equipment
and deployment;
b.
recruitment of regular, conscript and reserve personnel, together with the quality and
type of training they receive;
c.
component elements within specific social groups;
d.
leadership, including quality and social identity of officers and senior ranks;
e.
internal cohesion, including stress between ranks and branches of the Service,
disciplinary arrangements, welfare and morale;
f.
foreign and military alliances, specifically sources of aid, and resultant influences and
identification with allied armed Services;
g.
political orientation, including degree of involvement and influence in governmental
order exerted by the armed Services;
h.
internal propaganda and indoctrination, including extent and duration of programs and
the degree of success achieved;
i.
access and receptivity of personnel to external media; and
j.
psychological operations units, equipment, manpower and techniques, the media
employed and the means of delivery.
PART 3 - COMMUNICATIONS
Facilities and Flow
10.
This section outlines the availability of media, its audience and the degree of acceptance.
Governmental arrangements to control domestic and externally sourced information are explained,
as well as the extent of interpersonal and informal communications within various social groups,
including:
a.
press and broadcasting facilities, ownership and political orientation;
b.
mass media audience access, including ownership of television and radio sets,
consumption of newspapers, perceptions of the truth and the credibility of available
press and broadcasting output;
c.
availability of foreign information penetration, including available sources and content
of the material and audience receptivity; and
d.
informal communications by interpersonal communication and social interaction,
within and between groups.
ADFP 25
5A-5
Government Information Services
11.
The organisation, authorship, themes and techniques employed, target audiences and effect
of government information services are considered as follows:
a.
organisation and control, size and structure, responsible department and key policy
makers;
b.
aims and themes of editorial policy, research facilities and prominent propagandists;
c.
media available to Government and the philosophy governing their selection;
d.
form, purpose and effectiveness of external output; and
e.
overall effectiveness of the program, key themes to be countered and exploitable
weaknesses.
PART 4 - POTENTIAL TARGET AUDIENCES
12.
From the evidence deduced from Parts 1 to 3, tentative identification may be made of:
a.
groups within the target society which may be potential target audiences due to their
susceptibility or influence over society;
b.
group attitudes which reveal conditions and attitudes of the selected groups;
c.
key communicators who would be suitable channels for the transmission of
messages due to community respect for their views;
d.
media, including the means of communication which are available and esteemed by
the audience; and
e.
themes and symbols likely to support psychological operations.
PART 5 - BIBLIOGRAPHY
13.
This section provides a list of source material, including a commentary indicating particular
subject areas and the political or other bias of authors.
Note:
1.
This annex provides a format, with brief explanatory notes, suitable as a basis for a
comprehensive basic psychological operations study. Not all points covered will be relevant
in every case and the annex is not exhaustive.
ADFP 25
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 5
SUGGESTED FORMAT AND CONTENTS OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL
OPERATIONS ESTIMATE
Commander’s Concept of Operations
1.
The estimate commences with a statement of the commander’s concept of operations. The
mission must be borne in mind constantly by psychological operations staff. Operational milestones
must be specified in space and time.
Psychological Operations Capabilities
2.
Consideration of own psychological operations capabilities should include:
a.
psychological operations resource availability, including:
(1)
manpower (having expertise such as linguistic capabilities or media training);
(2)
equipment; and
(3)
available external sources of manpower and equipment (government agencies
and commercial resources);
b.
media access to potential target audiences;
c.
any restrictions imposed by higher authority (themes to be avoided or target
audiences to be excluded); and
d.
time available to prepare and mount psychological operations.
3.
The conclusions drawn from the above considerations indicate the possible size and scope
of the psychological operations effort.
Current Attitudes
4.
This section determines the current attitudes of each target audience identified in the basic
psychological operations study and relates them to the commander’s concept of operations.
Elements that influence the attitudes and behaviour of a group’s members, but over which they
have little or no control, are referred to as conditions. Examples of such conditions are constant
bombardment of a unit and inefficiency on the part of unit officers.
5.
By listing the conditions that relate to the commander’s concept of operations, the analyst
highlights those factors influencing, or even creating, target audience attitudes that also relate to
the commander’s mission. This process readily identifies relevant attitudes in the next step of the
estimate (see paragraph 7). Conditions must be considered from the perspective of the target
audience but not that of the analyst, for it is the target audience whose attitudes and behaviour
require modification.
6.
It may be helpful to organise the conditions under environmental headings. For example, in
considering the civilian population, in the context of internal security, appropriate headings might
be:
a.
political,
b.
economic,
c.
social,
d.
security forces’ activities, and
e.
insurgents’ activities.
ADFP 25
5B-2
7.
The next step is assessment of the target audience’s attitudes to the conditions and the
intensity with which they are held. Only attitudes relating to the operational concept are considered.
The analyst starts with the concrete and obvious (conditions) and from these deduces the abstract
(attitudes). Some target audience attitudes relating to the commander’s concept of operations may
result from culture rather than from immediate conditions. These must be considered as they may
modify or override the attitudes to the conditions. An example is the role of Japanese troops’ belief
in `bushido´ in overcoming the harshness of local conditions as the troops continued to fight.
8.
The final step in this section of the appreciation is to determine whether identified attitudes
are favourable or unfavourable to the accomplishment of the commander’s operational concept.
The following example is provided to assist in the understanding of the basic method:
a.
Commander’s Concept of Operations.
the insurgents’.
`To restore law and order in X by defeating
b.
Target Audience. The target audience is the uncommitted population of X.
c.
Condition. The security forces are enforcing restrictive security measures (road
blocks and curfews) aimed at insurgents, but which affect the daily lives of the target
audience.
d.
Attitude. The target audience is resentful and angry over inconvenience caused by
the measures.
e.
Effect on the Commander’s Concept of Operations. The attitude is unfavourable
in that it adversely affects the relationship between security forces and the target
audience, making the security force’s task even more difficult.
f.
Psychological Operations Objective. The psychological operations objective is to
gain the support for the security forces of the uncommitted population of X.
Potential Psychological Missions
9.
Potential psychological missions are identified by considering what might reinforce
favourable attitudes or weaken unfavourable attitudes. From the example in paragraph 8, if a
number of attitudes had been identified, all indicating an unsatisfactory relationship between the
security forces and the target audience, a potential psychological mission would be to reverse this
situation. A possible mission would be `to gain the support and cooperation of the uncommitted
population for security forces’.
ADFP 25
ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 5
EXAMPLE OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ANNEX TO
AN OPERATION ORDER
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
(1)
ANNEX X TO
OPORD X/XX
DATED DMY
Refs:
1.
A.
(2)
Psychological Operations Situation:
a.
Enemy. This section should cover any enemy tactical, operational or strategic
psychological operations in support of operations. Any details on general enemy
actions should be referred to a relevant intelligence summary.
b.
Friendly. Only covers friendly psychological operations action relevant to the
operation.
2.
Mission. A clear and realistic statement of the psychological operations mission. It may be
drawn from the psychological operations estimate.
3.
Execution:
a.
Target Audiences. Only those relevant to the psychological operations mission.
Drawn from the psychological operations estimate.
b.
Psychological Objectives. Drawn from the target analysis worksheets. For detail at
the tactical and operational levels, see Manual of Land Warfare part one, volume
two, pamphlet No. 10 - Psychological Operations.
c.
Unit/Formation Identification.
d.
4.
(1)
Grouping.
(2)
Tasks. Individual unit/formation tasks drawn from the campaign control
sheets. For detail, see Manual of Land Warfare part one, volume two,
pamphlet No. 10 - Psychological Operations.
Coordinating Instructions:
(1)
Timings.
(2)
Locations.
(3)
Any special requirements.
Administration and Logistics:
a.
Production of relevant psychological operations material.
b.
Allocation of psychological consolidation material.
ADFP 25
5C-2
5.
Command and Signal.
a.
Command and control details.
b.
Codewords or nicknames.
c.
Communications plan.
Notes:
1.
Usually same classification as remainder of order.
2.
Maps, instructions or related documentation such as basic psychological operations study or
psychological operations estimate.
ADFP 25
CHAPTER 6
COUNTERACTION
National Level Requirements
601. The possibility of hostile psychological operations is ever present and an awareness of the
potential for adversary propaganda against Australian target audiences at the national level must be
maintained. Information of adversary propaganda or psychological operations can originate from a
number of sources including the business community, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT), the international media and expatriates, or overseas visitors. An Australian response to
hostile psychological operations may be required at ministerial level and is likely to involve several
areas of Government. Such a response would necessitate a highly coordinated approach by
Australia.
602. The threat can have such effects as a change in foreign investment attitudes, altered trade
preferences or evidence of a negative attitude towards Australian nationals (either resident or
transiting). The form of the threat lies in how the effects are achieved. Whatever the form of threat,
confirmation of its existence should be coordinated at national level to provide advice to
Government. Such advice will enable Government to determine actions to be taken to counter
enemy propaganda.
603. DFAT and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) can provide information or
intelligence pertinent to propaganda generated external to Australia. The Office of National
Assessments (ONA) is capable of producing from such advice an assessment of the likely effects
on Australia and its interests of the adversary’s propaganda. In the event of enemy propaganda
being generated from within Australia, for example by a disenchanted ethnic group, responsibility
for both collecting the necessary intelligence and producing an assessment of the likely effects on
Australia and its interests of the adversary’s propaganda rests with the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).
Counter-psychological Operations Estimate
604. Before commencing the propaganda campaign an adversary will complete a psychological
operations estimate. An appropriate response to adversary propaganda efforts is the completion of
a counter-psychological operations estimate which addresses our own vulnerabilities, potential
adversary intentions, psychological operations capabilities and target audiences (sections of the
Australian population) and measures required to counter enemy attacks. These should be
incorporated in the counter-psychological operations plan.
Threat Analysis
605. Effective psychological operations are responsive to the situation and attitudes of the threat
source. The threat source may not necessarily be our target audience. The threat source may be a
hostile government whereas the target audience may be the civilian populace of the country in
question. Threat analysis commences with the preparation of a comprehensive basic psychological
operations study on the threat source which is updated by continuous monitoring of information by
all sources and agencies. Such monitoring includes analysis of enemy propaganda, which provides
current information on the appropriateness of friendly counter-psychological operations and is useful
in countering enemy propaganda.
606. In cooperation with the Attorney General’s Department, ASIO is responsible for monitoring
the effectiveness of enemy propaganda directed against the Australian population, within the
parameters stated at paragraph 603. If the ADF is operating in defence of another country,
counteraction activities would be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the defended
country’s national psychological operations policy, consistent with Australian national policy.
ADFP 25
6-2
The Products of Analysis
607.
The following information may be gathered by propaganda analysis:
a.
conditions affecting the target audience and resultant attitude modification;
b.
effectiveness of psychological operations on the target audience;
c.
issues sensitive to the enemy (issues which the enemy perceives to affect the
enemy’s target audience, but which betray enemy sensitivities);
d.
weaknesses in the enemy’s knowledge and understanding of the enemy’s target
audience;
e.
successful enemy propaganda themes requiring positive counteraction;
f.
enemy material suitable as the basis of a counterpropaganda campaign due to its
clumsiness, insensitivity or inhumanity;
g.
indications that the enemy is preparing public opinion for a particular activity or
eventuality;
h.
errors of fact indicating a weakness in enemy intelligence; and
i.
changes in enemy propaganda authorship suggestive of personnel changes at the
higher political level.
Analysis of the Source
608. Such analysis identifies the enemy individual or agency which released the material. This
may indicate the authority with which the propagandist is speaking and whether the view of the
propagandist is representative of the group for which the propagandist speaks. The credibility of the
author in the eyes of the target audience may also be assessed.
Analysis of the Content
609.
This furnishes the majority of information to be extracted from reviewed material, including:
a.
propagandist techniques by which the approach may indicate areas of enemy
concern: vagueness may indicate a desire to turn the target audience’s attention
away from a potentially damaging aspect;
b.
factual information by which the enemy may reveal extant societal circumstances: this
may constitute feedback on friendly psychological operations;
c.
correlation with previous material, which reveals changes to previous approaches or
lines of argument, indicating a possible shift in enemy policy or tactics; and
d.
fluctuations in quality of output, which may reveal a change in the organisation and
resources of the enemy propaganda machine.
610. The single most important analysis is that of the message itself. Its purpose and appeal may
be apparent; or it may be indirect in nature, concealing its true aim behind bland or routine
phraseology. The question of ultimate purpose is the critical element in this analysis.
ADFP 25
6-3
Audience Analysis
611. This process establishes the enemy’s target audience and route of the enemy propaganda
message, as well as indicating other groups which may have been exposed to it in the process of
transmission. Details of friendly target audience categories are found at paragraph 512.
612. Identification of the friendly target audience is inconclusive at this stage and it is set aside
pending an analysis of media. Initial selection of media reflects the perceived media habits of the
target group; media examination may confirm or deny initial target audience assessment.
Media Assessment
613. The enemy will generally use the media of choice from those available, in which case it may
be assumed that the choice reflects the enemy’s understanding of the degree of influence enjoyed
by the various media over the enemy’s target audience. In order to reinforce or reject the original
estimate of the enemy’s target audience, the analyst must have a sound knowledge of the variety
and relative acceptability of media available to the enemy and of affinities between particular social
groups within the friendly target society and specific media.
Analysis of the Effect
614. An analysis of the effect of enemy propaganda reveals the influence of the message upon
the target audience. It also reveals the secondary or accidental results occasioned from unintended
audiences, results which may not have been anticipated by the sponsor and may therefore be
counterproductive to enemy objectives.
Targets of Enemy Psychological Operations
615. The enemy will use every aspect of psychological operations to bring psychological pressure
to bear upon target audiences. For the purpose of countering enemy psychological operations,
these target audiences may be classified as either friendly or neutral military forces or civilians.
Military Forces
616. Well led and highly motivated troops well informed of the current battle situation are difficult
target audiences for enemy psychological operations. In countering enemy psychological operations
directed at military forces the following should be considered:
a.
leadership,
b.
morale and esprit de corps,
c.
discipline,
d.
physical fitness,
e.
conviction of purpose,
f.
spiritual belief,
g.
timely and accurate information,
h.
reliable postal services,
i.
countering rumours,
j.
the media, and
k.
adequate rest and recuperation.
ADFP 25
6-4
Individual Training
617. Instruction in the enemy’s political, social, economic and cultural objectives should be
conducted to inoculate troops against enemy propaganda. The display and considered criticism of
enemy propaganda is a useful means to this end. An explanation of friendly psychological
operations can provide a balance and reinforce friendly force superiority.
Civilians
618. Civilians may be subjected to enemy psychological operations which seeks to demonstrate
unsound government policies or leadership, the inevitability of defeat, the possibility of loss of
civilian life and property, and uncertainty of the future. To counter the effects of enemy
psychological operations against civilians, the following measures should be implemented:
a.
a reliable and timely public information program,
b.
access to a friendly news service,
c.
countering rumours,
d.
psychological consolidation,
e.
military civic action,
f.
counterpropaganda, and
g.
security against enemy action.
Counteraction Selection
619. The next step is an analysis of options to counter the possible effects of enemy propaganda
(the enemy psychological operations campaign). Analysis of the presented options will lead to the
selection of a preferred option for the neutralisation of enemy propaganda. This is usually referred
to as counterpropaganda, which is propaganda designed specifically to counter or capitalise upon
enemy propaganda. It is an essential component in a psychological operations to avoid loss of the
propaganda battle by default.
620.
Counterpropaganda may be either:
a.
defensive counterpropaganda, which either shields the audience from enemy
psychological operations or lessens the impact of the messages to which they are
exposed; or
b.
offensive counterpropaganda, which exploits any errors by the enemy propagandist
by highlighting them to his audience.
621. Provided with the counter-psychological operations estimate and assessment from ONA or
ASIO, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet will provide the Security Council of Cabinet
with information or broad options addressing a response that will be either diplomatic, military or a
combination thereof. The Security Committee of Cabinet is privy to information from all members of
the Australian intelligence community and can readily assume responsibility for deciding the
national response to adversary propaganda. As not all requisite information and intelligence may be
available, the Security Committee of Cabinet should be provided with updates as necessary to
review its initial response.
ADFP 25
6-5
EXECUTION OF COUNTERACTION
622. The next stage is the application of the counter-action in accordance with psychological
operations objectives. The preferred option may require modification to comply with national policy.
The success of counterpropaganda is dependent upon the quality of enemy propaganda analysis.
Techniques
623.
The following techniques may be used to counter enemy propaganda:
a.
forestalling, which involves pre-emptive presentation, in the best possible light, of
material likely to be used by the enemy;
b.
direct refutation, which employs a point by point rebuttal of enemy claims, covering
every aspect of his statements;
c.
indirect refutation, which refutes the enemy message without repeating it and is
achieved by introducing a new argument which, if adopted by the target audience,
tends to invalidate the enemy position;
d.
diversion, by which attention is drawn from enemy propaganda by the introduction of
another, high impact theme;
e.
silence, which involves calculated avoidance of the issue;
f.
immunisation, the continual use of information and education services to predispose
the audience to ignore messages from particular sources;
g.
minimisation of the relative importance of an argument to lessen its impact;
h.
imitative deception by altering the content or imitating the style of enemy propaganda
to change the effect of the propaganda or discredit further efforts; and
i.
ridicule of an effective propaganda source to reverse belief to contempt or
amusement.
Restrictive Measures
624. Physical restrictions on the flow of enemy propaganda material and punitive action against
members of the enemy’s target audience possessing such material are of questionable value. Such
measures generate inordinate interest in those items which do penetrate the controls and punitive
action may cause resentment.
ADFP 25
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR ADFP 25
(as at 22 Feb 95)
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144 Sig Sqn
152 Sig Sqn
615 Sig Tp
Land Force Sig Unit
1 RAR
1/19 RNSWR
2 RAR
2/17 RNSWR
1
5
3
1
3
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
3
2
ADFP 25
DL-4
3 RAR
4 RAR
4/3 RNSWR
5/6 RVR
5/7 RAR
6 RAR
8/7 RVR
8/9 RAR
9 RQR
10/27 RSAR
11/28 RWAR
12/40 RTR
16 RWAR
25 RQR
31 RQR
41 RNSWR
42 RQR
49 RQR
51 FNQR
NORFORCE
Pilbara Regt
1 Avn Regt
5 Avn Regt
161 Recce Sqn
162 Recce Sqn
171 Comd and Liaison Sqn
173 Gen Spt Sqn
1 Div Int Coy
2 Div Int Coy
7 Int Coy
HQ 9 Tpt Regt
HQ 10 Tml Regt
3 Tpt Sqn
7 Tpt Sqn
8 Tpt Sqn
10 Tpt Sqn
11 MC Gp
15 Tpt Sqn
16 Tpt Sqn
26 Tpt Sqn
30 Tml Sqn
35 Water Tpt Sqn
44 Tpt Sqn
176 Air Dispatch Sqn
SAD HMAS TOBRUK
1 Fd Amb
1 Fd Hosp
2 Fd Hosp
3 Fd Amb
3 Fwd Gen Hosp
5 Fd Amb
6 Fd Amb
7 Fd Amb
10 Fd Amb
2 Fd Log Bn
39 ADE Maint Pl
1 MP Coy
1 Psych Unit
TRAINING COMMAND
HQ Trg Comd
C&SC
3
3
2
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
6
110
LWC
PTS
RMC
Army College of TAFE
Army Maritime School
Army School of Transport
RAAOC Centre
RAEME Training Centre
School of Armour
School of Army Health
School of Army Aviation
School of Artillery
School of Infantry
School of Military Engineering
School of Military Intelligence
School of Military Police
School of Military Survey
School of Signals
1 Trg Gp
2 Trg Gp
3 Trg Gp
4 Trg Gp
5 Trg Gp
6 Trg Gp
7 Trg Gp
11 Trg Gp
Monash University Regt
57
1
2
2
11
49
2
2
3
2
4
34
32
1
40
1
1
34
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
LOGISTIC COMMAND
HQ Log Comd
Bandiana Log Gp
Brisbane Log Gp
DNSDC
Adelaide Log Bn
Army Spt Unit Darwin
Broadmeadows Log Bn
Perth Log Bn
Puckapunyal Log Bn
ACT Wksp Pl
1 MU
2 MU
3 MU
4 MU
5 MU
6 MU
7 MU
8 MU
BASC Albury/Wodonga
BASC Darling Downs
BASC Enoggera
BASC Enoggera 1 Div RANLO
BASC Hunter Valley
BASC Lavarack
BASC Liverpool
BASC Puckapunyal
BASC Randwick
BASC Rockhampton
BASC Watsonia
1 Mil Hosp
3 MP Coy
Bandiana Log Gp
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
104
ADFP 25
DL-5
AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE OFFICE
DOCAS
AFPOL3
DAFLS
DGPP
DOMAT- AF
RAAFSUCAN Library
2
1
1
1
1
4
BASES
Amberley
HQSRG
82WG
1SQN
2AFDS
23SQN
38SQN
114MCRU
1
1
1
2
1
2
4
Darwin
321TSF
6
East Sale
32SQN
SAN
2
3
Edinburgh
HQMPG
24SQN
1
1
Fairbairn
34SQN
AHQIAC
RAAFSC
1
1
4
Glenbrook
AHQ
RAAFSUGLEN
4
2
Pearce
306ABW ( 306TSF)
1
Richmond
HQALG
86WG
36SQN
ATTU
MATU
ALCC
1
2
1
4
1
1
Tindal
322TSF
75SQN
3
1
Townsville
323TSF
84WG
35SQN
SUWAG Library
1
1
1
1
Williamtown
302ABW
302TSF
81WG
3CRU
76SQN
1
1
2
2
1
Williams
SUWIL (Library)
21SQN
RAAFCOL
CENBAN
CPE
1
2
1
1
1
INDEPENDENT UNITS
1CAMD
1RSU Det A SALISBURY
RAAFPU
Inquiries:
SOPUBS
ADFWC
RAAF Base
WILLIAMTOWN NSW 2314
Ph: (049) 28 7357
DNATS: 841 7357
Fax: (049) 28 7574
1
1
19

ADFP 25 - Prelims (Psychological Operations)

Transcription

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