Guadalajara Criminal Environment [Portada]

Transcription

GUADALAJARA
CRIMINAL
ENVIRONMENT
AUGUST 2012
Guadalajara Criminal Environment | August 2012
Executive Summary:
The Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (GMA) in the state of Jalisco is the second most populous in
Mexico, home to more than four million people and several multinational corporations. Along
with the rest of Mexico, Guadalajara experienced a steep increase in its homicide rate from 2006
to 2011. From 2010 to 2011, the murder rates in Zapopan and Tlaquepaque, two of the largest
GMA municipalities, rose by 50 percent. Though official figures have yet to be released,
Southern Pulse can confirm that the homicide breakout of 2011 has begun to recede.
Yet in the past year, the GMA has seen several of the largest mass homicide attacks in Mexico’s
history. In November 2011, 26 bodies were left in three vehicles at the Arcos del Milenio with
messages from Los Zetas written on the bodies in oil. We agree with the assessment that
members of the well-known Milenio Cartel executed the operation on behalf of Los Zetas, a
coupling specific to operations in Guadalajara that we refer to as the “Milenio-Zetas.” Then, in
May 2012, the Milenio-Zetas again left 18 dismembered bodies in two vans on the GuadalajaraChapala highway outside the town of Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos, located south of the GMA.
While some mass killings reflect a strategic focus on forcibly moving into or defending territory,
as we have observed in Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, and other states, the mass killings in
Guadalajara were messages, left by Los Zetas for their rivals in the Sinaloa Federation; that is,
Heriberto Lazcano, the leader of Los Zetas “spoke” directly to his old enemy Joaquin “El Chapo”
Guzman, the leader of the Sinaloa Federation. These bloody messaging devices did not indicate a
strong push made by Los Zetas into the GMA, as we had theorized in 2011. The Milenio-Zeta
coupling allows the larger organization to operate undercover in Guadalajara, preventing an open
conflict that Los Zetas would not win, and one that would most certainly draw resources from its
current concerns in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas.
2012  Southern Pulse | www.southernpulse.com
1
Our key findings are the following:
1. Los Zetas and rivals in the Sinaloa Federation are content with a non-confrontational
coexistence in the GMA.
2. There are two, tier-two groups in the GMA; each has aligned itself with a rival tier-one
group.
3. There are at least three, tier-three street gangs with specific areas of operation in the
GMA.
4. The GMA has seen a violence high-water mark that will likely not been seen under
current conditions.
5. The relative low value of the GMA plaza has resulted in the increased importance of rural
areas. Though this is true in other areas of Mexico, it is most salient in Jalisco among all
areas of our study.
6. The relative calm in the GMA will limit the growth of tier-three and tier-two street gangs
in the GMA
2012 © Southern Pulse • www.southernpulse.com
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary: ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 1
Rights: ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction: ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Guadalajara Criminal Environment: Strategic Discussion ................................................................................................................................................. 7
Guadalajara Criminal Environment: Tactical Review......................................................................................................................................................... 12
Tlaquepaque: ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Zapopan: ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Guadalajara:...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Selected Events, January to May 2012:................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
A Note on Methodology: ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 19
About Southern Pulse................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
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Rights:
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4
Introduction:
As we reached the end of our research efforts ahead of the publication of the first Englishlanguage book on Los Zetas, The Executioner’s Men, our investigators began to see a pattern
whereby Los Zetas appeared to be expanding southwest from a central base in Zacatecas toward
Colima and, specifically, the port at Manzanillo. These observations coalesced into the “Zetas
Cross” theory, which we still believe holds some truth today, especially where Los Zetas have
forced their presence upon Jalisco and the city of Guadalajara.
As the weaker of Mexico’s two most powerful criminal organizations, Los Zetas have reached a
point where they have established a comfortable beachhead in Guadalajara, and through control
of routes in the state of Jaslico, east of the city, the criminal organization has patched together a
logistics strategy to operate in the state. Though it runs counter to the traditional strategy of direct
confrontation, Los Zetas presence in Guadalajara rests on the premise that as a high-level
criminal organization, it has aligned itself with a smaller, locally focused group to support its
activities in the city and beyond in the state of Jalisco.
Our study of Guadalajara is the third part of a five-city study we initiated in the beginning of
2012 to seek support for our intelligence hypothesis that the future of security in Mexico is in the
hands of smaller criminal organizations, not the behemoths that dominated the past.
As a contribution to the ongoing conversation about the direction of public security in Mexico,
Southern Pulse published in January 2012 its first ebook, Beyond 2012, which presented a chapter
on public security in Mexico. This chapter concluded with a consideration of a future when
“super-empowered” street gangs will eclipse groups such as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa
Federation:
Whereas Mexico under the guise of six large, national-level criminal enterprises in 2006 could
have been considered a sea of tranquility punctuated by islands of violence (less than 100
municipalities out of 2,000-plus with violence) the opposite may be proven true by early 2014, as
the number of well-armed criminal groups jumps from the six significant groups we counted in
2006 - Sinaloa Federation, La Familia, Gulf Cartel, Beltra-Leyva Organization, Arellano-Felix
Organization, Carrillo-Fuentes Organization - to over 10 in 2012 with a steady growth of new
groups to bring the total number to possibly over 20 by the end of 2014.
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By the end of 2014, the men organized by El Chapo and his principal rival Heriberto Lazcano
will no longer be the principal drivers of violence across Mexico. At the hyper-local level, superpowered street gangs, armed with Twitter, You Tube, the weapon of fear, and an enviable armory
will man-handle local politicians and municipal police.
We believe that while the above process continues forward beyond August 2012, there are certain
cities in Mexico today that present an advanced case of how the criminal system in Mexico will
evolve as street gangs become more powerful. Guadalajara lists among the top four, which
include Monterrey (See Monterrey Street Gangs), Acapulco (see Acapulco Criminal
Environment), and Juarez. A fifth city, Tijuana, will serve as a “control case,” where we expect to
see the historical dominance of one group to be a harbinger of less violence and little to no
development of street gangs.
Within this brief report, we would like to present our assessment of the criminal environment in
Guadalajara from both a strategic vision and tactical viewpoint to support an understanding of
how the evolving criminal system in Guadalajara could impact the daily lives of those who live
there, as well as the business, particularly in the tourism industry, operating in the area.
Just as we stated in prior reports, we would like to add that in the best interest of time and space,
this report on criminal activity in Guadalajara makes some general assumptions:
1. The top-tier transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are the primary drivers behind
violence in Mexico in 2012;
2. The Mexican government will not significantly alter its current strategy in 2012 or
beyond, into the next administration;
3. TCOs in Mexico are in constant communication with leadership elements of street gangs;
4. TCOs do not solely rely on drug trafficking as a source of illicit revenue; and,
5. The line between TCOs and street gangs is so blurred that many in Mexico still consider
the two to be one single unit of criminality.
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Guadalajara Criminal Environment: Strategic Discussion
Our investigation concludes that while there is a broad spectrum of organized criminal activity, a
significant amount of the gang activity in the GMA may be classified in the following three
categories:
•
Tier-one: Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), i.e. the Sinaloa Cartel and the
Zetas
•
Tier-two: Regional trafficking organizations, i.e. Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion
(CJNG) and the Milenio Cartel, who serve as local operators, frequently working on
behalf of a Tier One ally
•
Tier-three: Localized street gangs - small time criminal opportunists, groups of less than
four or five individuals.
As we have discussed in previous reports, it is clear that a limited number of TCOs populate the
tier-one category. These international organizations execute high-profile crimes, manage the ongoing logistics of trafficking drugs, arms and humans across borders, and wield significant
political influence across Mexico and Central America, and likely beyond in South America,
Asia, Europe, and the United States.
In the GMA, the two most powerful trafficking organizations in Mexico, the Sinaloa Federation
and Los Zetas, struggle for control of the plaza, though the nature of the conflict is not as public
and bloody as that of Monterrey or Acapulco. Virtually all of the tier-one activity in the GMA can
be linked to either the Federation or Los Zetas. It is clear that Jalisco lies at the shifting frontline
between these two TCOs, where the Sinaloa Federation operates almost exclusively through tiertwo intermediaries, with most of the contracted work awarded to the CJNG.
Meanwhile, Los Zetas have established a direct foothold in the GMA, where they carry out their
own operations, punctuated by close collaboration with tier-two organizations. Our investigation
corroborates the popularly held notion that Los Zetas are most closely aligned with the Milenio
Cartel, a group we consider in August 2012 as a tier-two organization given its size, strength, and
limited national influence.
7
La Resistencia, another known tier-two organization that worked under the Sinaloa Federation in
the state of Jalisco in 2011, has been eclipsed by CJNG in 2012 following the arrests of at least
two La Resistencia commanders. In August 2012, CJNG has retained its position as top Sinaloa
Federation enforcers in the GMA despite the arrest of Erick Valencia, alias 'El 85’, the
organization’s recognized leader, and several of his associates from March to June 2012.
Southern Pulse investigators expect that the Sinaloa Federation leadership is open to new tier-two
contractors in the GMA and may forge an alliance, for instance, with Los Caballeros Templarios.
Likewise, the Sinaloa Federation could elect to accelerate growth in one of the larger tier-three
groups, spurring organization and growth. While we have not seen any precedence for a direct
tier-one to tier-three link, we cannot exclude this possibility in the GMA, where there appear to
be a strong sub-set of tier-three groups on the cusp of evolving into stronger, tier-two
organizations.
8
The heightened level of tier-three organizations presents one differentiator between the GMA and
the other urban zones we have reported on this year. A second differentiator is more apparent at
the state level, where Jalisco had resisted until 2011 the criminal activity that has chronically
plagued Nuevo Leon (Monterrey) and Guerrero (Acapulco).
While the state of Jalisco rests is in a critical position, between the Pacific Coast and Mexico City
along the east-west axis, and between the states of Michoacán and Sinaloa on the north-south
axis, control of Guadalajara itself is not necessary to control routes that pass through the state. For
this reason, violence in Jalisco east of the city of Guadalajara remains a constant concern while
the city itself remains quiet, relative to other urban centers.
Jalisco highways are important trafficking routes. In less populous areas of the state, such as
along the Durango and Zacatecas borders, organized crime violence is common in August 2012.
In many of Jalisco’s small towns, TCOs operate with impunity and avoid the human and financial
costs of battling the higher numbers police and soldiers found in cities. This strategy of rural
sovereignty is apparent in other areas of Mexico, but is most salient in Jalisco.
Government presence in the GMA is an additional factor that has led to limited criminal activity
in the city. When compared to other cities we have studied, the GMA experience with heightened
security, such as the lead up to the 2011 Pan American Games, strengthens our previous
conclusion that a heightened military presence serves to lower the rate of criminal events but does
little to remove the criminal element from a city.
Within a month of the mass homicides in November 2011, at the conclusion of the Pan American
Games, and in May 2012, police arrested gang members involved in the kidnappings, murders,
and dumping of the bodies. During the investigation of the 9 May body dump, police located and
freed 12 other individuals who Los Zetas had kidnapped and planned to murder. The dismantling
of a Cartel del Milenio-Zetas cell likely led to actionable intelligence, supporting several major
arrests in the GMA in 2012:
9
Undoubtedly, these arrests between March and June 2012 and the resulting destabilization of the
GMA criminal environment led to a rise in petty and non-violent crime – a steady source of
income for smaller criminal organizations at the tier-two and tier-three levels. Guadalajara has the
highest per capita car ownership rate of any city in Mexico, and car theft is correspondingly high,
as is the theft of car parts. Like car theft, kidnapping and extortion have increased as law
enforcement has tried to battle narco-trafficking and major TCO criminal activity.
Thanks to the drop in high-impact crime, security is no longer the top concern for most GMA
businesses and residents. Guadalajara is a safer-than-average city in Mexico but it has aboveaverage rates of extortion. High extortion numbers and other indicators such as vehicle theft and
non-violent crime suggest that there are hundreds of tier-three gangs in the GMA who defend
their local turf, usually without recourse or any connection to the cartels operating across the
country.
Wathside (Colonia Libertad), Florencia 13 (Colonia Santa Cecilia), and Los Once aka La Bajada
Loca (Colonia El Sauz) are three notable tier-three organizations that drive low-impact crimes in
the GMA.
In the GMA, neighborhood crime rates correlate very closely with their socio-economic
affluence, with the notable exception of Zapopan -- a special case because cartel leaders and their
lawyers, accountants, and other associates reside there, making it a special target for both rivals
and police action. The map below shows the areas where there has been conflict between Los
10
Zetas and Sinaloa/CJNG (blue), areas controlled by CJNG/Sinaloa (yellow), and the areas where
smaller tier-three gangs predominate (green):
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Guadalajara Criminal Environment: Tactical Review
The map below illustrates areas of the GMA currently targeted for rivalry violence and or areas
where we suspect the potential for an increase in violence:
Our tactical review assessed the frequency of violent crime in various colonias and areas in the
GMA to determine the relative danger or safety of specific locations. The most dangerous areas
are those where TCOs and their tier-two allies dispute territory. In such hotspots, the potential for
violence is high and may include civilian targets or affect innocent bystanders. Of secondary
concern are areas where tier-three gangs are common, driving up neighborhood crime rates.
We assess the following colonias as current or potential hotspots in the GMA based on the
criminal activity reported in these areas:
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Tlaquepaque:
Cerro del Cuatro
El Campesino
El Órgano
Los Puestos
Guayabitos
Lomas del Cuatro
El Sauz
Fovisste Miravalle
Hacienda de Vidrio
El Refugio
El Tapatío
Zapopan:
Constituión
El Vigía
Mesa Colorada
Villa de Guadalupe
Tabachines
Miramar
Guadalajara:
Comercial Abastos
Francisco I Madero
San José Rio Verde
San Juan de Dios
Polanco
Zona Central
Del Fresno
Heliodoro Hernandez Loza
Oblatos
Santa Cecilia
Insurgentes
Below we have provided an overview of violent areas:
Northern Periphery: Although central Zapopan itself offers some of the safest areas in the
GMA, the area along the Northern Periférico, including the colonias of El Vigía, Tabachines,
Constitución, and Villa de Guadalupe have seen some of the clearest confrontations between the
Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas. Zapopan is home to many mid- and high-level TCO operatives,
along with their professional and personal associates. Cartel leaders are targets for rivals and
police, who may carry out dangerous operations to detain these criminals in their home
neighborhoods. TCO operatives will frequently respond in kind, leading to deadly firefights and
streets blocked by narcobloqueos. Individual TCO members own and operate many Zapopan
nightclubs, where they engage in narcomenudeo and prostitution entreprises.
13
Downtown: Although the Sinaloa Federation/CJNG coupling dominates Guadalajara at a macro
level, on the micro-level a rotation of tier-three gangs drive much of the crime in central
Guadalajara. If these groups have any relation to the TCOs, it is not a close tie, but a loose
relationship. Our research indicates that some small gangs imitate the TCOs in their language and
actions. As we’ve seen before in both Acapulco and Monterrey, such copycat activity blurs the
line between where one tier begins and another ends.
In the downtown zone, narcomenudeo, theft, and robbery drive criminal revenue. The Zona
Central, along with the colonias just to the east, including San Juan de Dios, Oblatos, and
Insurgentes, report high rates of robbery, theft, prostitution, and drug and arms trafficking.
Tonalá: Many of the colonias surrounding Tonalá are economically depressed, with high rates of
both low-impact and violent crime. The most dangerous areas include the neighborhoods of
Insurgentes, Jalisco and Santa Cecilia where Ttier-two and aggressive tier-three street gangs
prevail. In the eastern part of Tonalá there are numerous industrial sites and empty lots with little
security. Organized crime cells frequently shoot their victims, or dump bodies they have killed
elsewhere, in these remote and isolated areas.
Cerro de Santa Maria and Cerro del Cuatro: The colonias of Cerro del Cuatro, El Refugio,
Fovissste Miravalle, Polanco, Francisco I Madero and Lomas del Cuatro in Tlaquepaque are
densely populated, poor, urban neighborhoods with a high rate of delinquency. These colonias are
considered unsafe areas, especially after dark. Crimes in these neighborhoods range from violent
carjacking, home invasion and murder to petty theft and graffiti. Tier-three street gangs, as well
as individual criminal opportunists, are engaged in criminal activity here.
Southeast Highways: Colonias along the Southern Periférico and south on Federal Highway 44 are
largely controlled by CJNG. Potential hotspots include Los Gigantes and La Gigantera in El Salto. Major
routes near the airport are likely to see more TCO activity, including roadblocks, especially if inter-cartel
violence begins to rise again. A number of large corporations have headquarters in this part of the GMA.
Tlajomulco de Zuñiga: This town, 10 kilometers outside the immediate GMA is a strategic
operational center for violent cells of Sinaloa Federation/CJNG, Los Zetas and other tier-one and
tier-two criminal networks. Although police have made significant arrests and drug seizures in
Tlajomulco, the area continues to see high levels of TCO violence.
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Selected Events, January to May 2012:
Date: 1 January 2012
Location: Boulevard de los Charros at Zarape in Colonia El Vigía, Zapopan
Event: Héctor Arteaga Delgadillo shot and killed
Location: Calle Toronja in Colonia Mesa Colorada, Zapopoan
Event: Man (Isaac Martínez López) found dead with his throat cut at a CJNG safe house
Location: 315 Calle Juan de la Barrera, Colonia Guayabitos, Tlaquepaque
Event: José Valentín González Mendoza shot and killed
Location: Pemex and Las Torres streets Colonia Hacienda de Vidrio, Tlaquepaque
Event: Police found a decapitated body wrapped in tape and a head in a bag
Evidence: Narcomensaje
Location: Avenida Ahuehuetes in Colonia El Sauz, Tlaquepaque
Event: Víctor Daniel Rosales Peña, alias El Chango, shot and killed
Evidence: Subsequent arrest of Jorge Ivan Navarro Torres alias El Chile of the “Los Once” or
“La bajada loca” gang
Location: Carretera a Cajititlán in La Calera, near Tlajomulco
Event: Eduardo Escalante García shot in the head and killed
Location: Colonia El Campesino, Tlaquepaque
Event: Decapitated body of Luis Alberto Salazar Flores found
Evidence: Narcomensaje from La Barredora
Location: Colonia Constitución at Venustiano Carranza and Alfonso Herrera
Event: Gloria Fajardo Martínez and two men shot and killed
Evidence: Subsequent arrest of CJNG member Everardo Zavala Lopez aka El Cuervo
Location: Colonia del Fresno at calles Fresno and Nogal
Event: José Ricardo Mejía González shot and killed
Evidence: Narcomensaje from CJNG
15
Location: Colonia Del Fresno at the corner of calles Naranjo and Membrillo
Event: Two young men, César Armando Bañuelos Morales and Daniel Alejandro Carrasco
Juárez shot. Carrasco Juarez was killed.
Evidence: 40 caliber casings
Location: Paseos de Los Almendros and del Los Frambuesos in Tabachines, Zapopan
Event: Javier Estrada Hernández shot and killed
Evidence: Super 38 and AK-47 casings; subsequent arrest of CJNG members
Location: Colonia San Jose Rio Verde
Event: Marcelino Hernandez Reyes, a 64-year old man found in his home with his throat slit in.
Location: Tlajomulco
Event: Four men beaten, gagged and left in a car; one died from the beating.
Location: Zapopan
Event: Miguel Ángel González Aguilar and Aida Figueroa Sánchez shot and killed by a young
man who fled in a van
Date: 6 February 2012
Location: Colonia Villa de Guadalupe at Anáhuac and José Maria Martinez in Zapopan
Event: José Luis Villarreal Mendoza beaten to death
Evidence: Subsequent arrest of CJNG members
Location: Near the Guadalajara Airport, on the road to Chapala
Event: Victor Álvarez Barragán, also known as Paletas, the brother of boxer Canelo, arrested for
arms trafficking
Location: Tlajomulco
Event: Police arrest 13 alleged Los Zetas members (including 2 women) in after merchants
reported extortion attempts by the group. Police seize AR-15, five other guns and 2 vehicles with
Durango plates.
Location: Historic Center of Guadalajara at corner of Alameda and Acerina
Event: Man (Édgar Guillermo Limón Álvarez) shot to death
Date: 3 March 2012
Location: Avenida Federalisimo and Calle Coahuila in Colonia Mezquitan Country
Event: A dismembered male and a female shot to death found in abandoned car
Evidence: Narcomensaje to Los Zetas
16
Date: 3 March 2012
Location: Callejon de la Cuchilla, La Gigantera, Tlaquepaque
Event: One male and one female found shot to death
Evidence: 9mm casings
Date: 9 March 2012
Location: Guadalajara
Event: Police ambushed by armed gang in Zapopan, presumably to divert attention from plans
targeting one of the gang’s leaders for arrest. CJNG Leader Erick “El 85” Valencia Salazar
arrested in Zapopan. CJNG members erect narco-roadblocks throughout Guadalajara. Later
apologize via posted narco-mantas. Police subsequently arrest 14 CJNG members for roadblocks.
Date: 3 April 2012
Location: Felipe Angeles and Guadalupe Victoria in Colonia Santa Isabel, Tlaquepaque
Event: Body found in abandoned house immersed in acid
Date: 5 April 2012
Location: 659 Calle Chapultepec, intersection with Francisco Márquez and Vicente Suarez, in
Colonia Juan de la Barrera, Tlaquepaque
Event: Omar Gabriel Zermeño shot and killed
Date: 8 April 2012
Location: Unspecified highway checkpoint
Event: Víctor Emilio Cazares, one of Chapo Guzman’s right-hand men in the Sinaloa cartel
arrested
Date: 18 April 2012
Location: Teatro de las Americas in Colonia Cerro del Cuatro, Tlaquepaque
Event: Body of unidentified man found. Man had been shot in the face and killed.
Date: 27 April 2012
Location: 63 Cuauhtemoc, Colonia Lopez Cotilla, Tlaquepaque
Event: Man (Gustavo Loza Lopez) found dead, shot in the back
Evidence: 9 mm casings
Date: 1 May 2012
Location: Alheli and Lomas Verdes in El Organo, Tlaquepaque
Event: Body of Daniel Maximo Robles Flores, a Zapopan police officer who was kidnapped
from his home on April 30 found.
Date: 9 May 2012
Location: Km 25 of the Guadalajara-Chapala highway, outside Ixtlahuacan de los Membrillos
Event: 18 mutilated bodies found in 2 abandoned vehicles
Evidence: Narcomensaje indicating alliance between the Zetas and Cartel del Milenio, against
the Sinaloa Federation
17
Date: 12 May 2012
Location: Colonia La Capilla at Calle Jesús Carranza and Cuauhtémoc, Tala, Jalisco
Event: Police arrest 4 people involved in the May 9 mass murder. At the time of their arrest
Ramón Parada Talamantes, César Alejandro Rodríguez Cervantes, Héctor Manuel López
Santisvais and Milton Eribaldo Castro Vega were in possession of 30 kilos of marijuana, 30
grams of crystal meth, and four guns. The arrest came thanks to information from Laura Rosales
Sanchéz (aka La Chaparra). La Chaparra, who oversaw 12 other people who were kidnapped, was
identified by the kidnap victims and also provided the information on the location of the 18
bodies.
Date: 13 May 2012
Location: Tala
Event: Police arrest Zeta leader Carlos Antonio Mercado (aka "El Chato") as the leader of the
cell that kidnapped and murdered the people whose bodies were dumped on May 9
Date: 21 May 2012
Location: Avendia Belisario Dominguez and Calle Chimborazo in Colonia Lomas
Independencia, Guadalajara
Event: Víctor Manuel Hernández Sotelo, Subdirector of the Municipal Police of Magdalena was
shot and killed by two men on a motorcycle while he was driving in his truck around 10:00am.
18
A Note on Methodology:
This document presents a free sample of a Southern Pulse survey report, which in this case is a
threat assessment of the Guadalajara Criminal Environment. We have prepared similar, tactically
focused, reports with interactive maps for several cities across the Americas.
In preparation for this demonstration report, Southern Pulse conducted a series of brief, pointed
interviews with sources on the ground in the GMA, consulted from nonproprietary information
gathered in the past to produce prior Guadalajara city reports for clients, and conducted an open
source review of street gang-related activity in the city from August 2011 to August 2012.
Normally, our team receives a list of specific physical assets or addresses, such as a hotel, with
which we may centralize our collection efforts and deepen analysis. Our normal method is to
begin with a series of questions a potential client would like answered. For this exercise, our
focus on the entire city diluted our ability to analyze specific sections of the GMA or
neighborhoods, though with limited time and effort we were able to present a complete picture, a
snap shot that will likely be out of date within a month or less.
Other limitations included the absence of consistent street-level surveillance and raw data input.
While we were able to consult with our investigators on the ground in Guadalajara, we were not
able to deploy them for this demonstration exercise. City security reports under contract present a
deeper level of analysis, complete with options for field photos, route analysis, hotspot predictors,
and recommendations. The absence of field investigators for this report explains why the tactical
section of the report is considerably shorter than the strategic discussion. Commissioned reports
are often weighed on the tactical, unless otherwise requested by the client.
19
About Southern Pulse
Southern Pulse is a decentralized, field-based investigations organization focused on security,
politics, energy, and business in Latin America. Founded in 2004 by investigative journalist and
author Samuel Logan, Southern Pulse prepares presentations and reports sourced from the ground
up. This organization began as a private human intelligence network in the Americas. Southern
Pulse is now based in Annapolis, Maryland, and runs its free online media monitoring service
from Washington, DC. Senior investigators operate from hubs in Mexico, El Salvador, Colombia,
Brazil, and Chile to leverage our network, unique access, and deep understanding of the region to
present solutions that mitigate risk for public and private sector clients with exposure to political,
security, financial, or legal risk in Latin America.
20

Guadalajara Criminal Environment [Portada]

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