army aviation combat operations

Transcription

# 22
2012
DOCTRINE
TAcTIQUE
TAcTIQUE
INFORMATIONAL AND DISCUSSION-BASED PERIODICAL
ARMY AVIATION
COMBAT OPERATIONS
a
TABLE OF CONTENTS
“Doctrine Tactique” is an informational and discussion-based periodical. It should not
in any way be considered an official doctrinal document. On a chosen theme, it seeks
to illustrate how tactical doctrine is understood or applied in the French Army, using
the individual testimony from within the forces.
Education, training, operational preparation and deployment to theaters of operation
represent the main areas of interest of this publication. Some international issues are
considered as well.
The editorial staff
3
Editorial
THE AVIATION DIVISION’S COMMAND POSTS
30
LCL Stephane LE FLOC’H, Operational Readiness Section - Aviation Readiness Cell Army Aviation Division - Headquarters, Land Forces Command
ARMY AVIATION COMBAT OPERATIONS: A MAJOR CAPABILITY OF
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER
MAINTENANCE PRINCIPLES FOR ARMY AVIATION’S UNITS
4
32
LCL Olivier ASSET, Head of Logistics Section, Army Aviation Division, (CFT)
Colonel Hervé AURIAULT, Head of Studies - Prospective Cell, COMALAT
6
AIR MOBILITY AND CONTINUITY IN AIR-LAND OPERATIONS
PLANNING THE COMMITMENT OF ARMY HELICOPTERS IN COMBAT OPERATIONS 34
LCL Franck AIGUBELLE, Army Aviation Operational Engagement Cell - CFT/DIV AERO
(French Land Forces Command/Aviation Division)
Colonel Michel DORANDEU, French Army Staff/Plans
THE ROLE OF NEW EQUIPMENT IN ARMY AVIATION’S TRANSFORMATION
9
ARMY AVIATION AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
LCL (P) Fabrice TALARICO, Army Aviation Officer at the Army Staff’s Plans Division
ARMY AVIATION AND ARMOR: COOPERATION OR INTEGRATED MANEUVER?
12
Colonel Alexandre NIMSER, Head of Studies and Future Plans Cell, Saumur Military Schools
DISMOUNTED COMBAT AND ARMY AVIATION COMBAT OPERATIONS:
THE RAISON D’ÊTRE AND THE CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMMITMENTS OF ARMY AVIATION UNITS
41
LCL Thierry LETELLIER, Doctrine Section - Lessons Learned - LOG Army Aviation Command (Research and Prospective Studies)
14
LCL Quentin BOURGEOIS, Deputy Director - Head of Doctrine, General Studies and Lessons
Learned Cell - Division of Studies and Future Plans for the Infantry
PEOPLE AT THE HEART OF ARMY AVIATION COMBAT OPERATIONS
17
Colonel Alain DENIAU, Head of Personnel and Air Regulations Cell - Army Aviation Command
TRAINING ARMY AVIATION PERSONNEL FOR OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT
37
Colonel Michel BONNAIRE, Special Operations HQ/Head,
Employment and Prospective Studies Department
THE COMMITMENT OF THE HELICOPTER BATTALION WITHIN
TASK FORCE LA FAYETTE
46
Brigadier General Pierre CHAVANCY, Commander 3rd (FR) Mechanized Brigade Commander Task Force La Fayette (April - November 2010)
1999: INITIAL-ENTRY IN KOSOVO - THE ROLE PLAYED BY ARMY AVIATION
48
Colonel Alain ESPARBES, Project Officer, Transformation BA M7 - French Commissariat
(Quartermaster) Directorate - Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 FFB (French Framework Brigade)
20
Brigadier General Olivier GOURLEZ de la MOTTE, Commanding the Army Aviation School (EALAT)
A SIMULATION POLICY IN SUPPORT OF INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING POLICIES
24
LCL Eric MERCK, Simulation Coordinator for the Air Maneuver Function Deputy Head of Studies and Future Plans Cell, Army Aviation Command
OPERATIONAL READINESS
ROLE PLAYED BY US ARMY AVIATION IN THE US TACTICAL MANEUVER
THE BIRTH OF FRENCH ARMY AVIATION - INDOCHINA AND ALGERIA
55
LCL (R) Claude FRANC, Project Manager, CDEF/Doctrine Division
27
LCL Stephane LE FLOC’H, Operational Readiness Section - Aviation Readiness Cell Army Aviation Division - Headquarters, Land Forces Command
50
LCL Philippe TESTART (FR) Liaison Officer Fort Benning (Georgia/USA)
AIR MOBILITY - THE U.S. 1ST CAV IN VIETNAM 1965-1972
59
LCL (R) Claude FRANC, Project Manager, CDEF/Doctrine Division
Directeur de la publication : Colonel (R) Georges Michel - Rédactrice en chef : Capitaine Gwenaëlle Denonin ✆ : 01 44 42 35 91 - PNIA : 821.753.35.91
Traductions : LCL (R) Jean-François Palard - CDT (R) Rémy Revenant - CNE (R) Boy
Révision des traductions : LCL (R) Donatien Lebastard - CAPT (USMC) Timothy Gallagher - Maquette : Christine Villey ✆ : 01 44 42 59 86 - PNIA : 821.753.59.86 Crédits photos : 1re & 4e de couverture : © Armée de Terre - Diffusion & relations avec les abonnés : Major Claudine Vacquier ✆ : 01 44 42 43 18 - PNIA : 821.753.43.18 Impression : Imprimerie BIALEC - 95 boulevard d’Austrasie BP 10423 - 54001 Nancy cedex - Diffusion : établissement de diffusion, d’impression et d’archives
du commissariat de l’armée de Terre de Saint-Etienne - Tirage : 2 000 exemplaires - Dépôt légal : à parution - ISSN : 2110-7378 - Tous droits de reproduction
réservés. Revue trimestrielle Conformément à la loi «informatique et libertés» n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, le fichier des abonnés à DOCTRINE TACTIQUE a fait
l’objet d’une déclaration auprès de la CNIL, enregistrée sous le n° 732939. Le droit d’accès et de rectification s’effectue auprès du CDEF. Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des
Forces 1, place Joffre - Case 53 - 75700 PARIS SP 07 - Web : www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr - Mel : [email protected]
doctrine tactique # 22
march 2012
2
Editorial
S
©Armée de Terre
ince rotary wing aircraft were first seen in
Indo-China, helicopters have participated in all
large-scale operations performed by French
armed forces. Today, helicopters are playing a
crucial part in the “ contact ” operational role more
than ever. They operate as an “ aviation combat ”
component in cooperation with the “ dismounted
combat ” and “ mounted combat ” components
while providing a multiplying and amplifying effect
for land-committed units.
Assets operating within low-altitude airspace can
play the same role; they are within direct view of
warfighters, and their crews are well schooled on
land battle.
In Afghanistan, our helicopters sometimes aid our
units in responding to operational emergency or
in evacuating casualties to safe havens. They can
land, recover infiltrated units or units in contact
with the enemy, speed to collect far-off information
at night, and deliver heavy and accurate fire
support in compliance with the CCA (Close Combat
Attack) procedure. During our deployments to
Africa, among the complex intermingling of media,
political and tactical issues, helicopters have again
proved they can be a decisive factor. Helicopters,
a crucial maneuver asset available to the joint
commander, perform missions with ground forces
in direct contact with the enemy and with those
engaged in long-term operations. This is
the primary advantage of rotary wing assets:
they provide the maneuver with new responsiveness,
combat power and a “ tailored ” effect on
the enemy.
Additionally, as emphasized in the White Paper for
Defense and National Security, crews actively take
part in “ ground protective security ”, in support
of our fellow citizens. This is the mission they
performed when they were the first and only unit,
except for Sécurité Civile (Civil support) units, to be
deployed on the night between June 15 and June 16
in Draguignan (Var département), during
the floods. Similarly, every summer they disembark
firemen into the midst of flames, while fighting
forest fires.
In order to meet all of these requirements, the Army
sought for more than ten years to obtain an
efficient operational tool, relying on men with skills
acquired through tough training. We can observe to
what extent rotary-wing combat resourcefully
adjusts and modernizes in order to meet today’s
and tomorrow’s requirements. Its integration within
battlespace digitization is improving, simulations
and evolutions in the organization of helicopter
units were adjusted with resolve and effectiveness.
Above all, new-generation aircraft are being fielded,
such as the HAP/HAD (Fire Support-Protection/Fire
Support-Destruction) Tigre (already concretely
and efficiently operational), and the NH90 Caïman.
These aircraft complement the inventory of
the other new contact assets, the “ Félin ”
Infantryman Equipment and VBCI Infantry Fighting
Vehicle in particular. Today, rotary-wing combat
is not warfighting by helicopters alone; it is now a
major component of the contact role, in the most
“ combined arms ” sense of the word.
doctrine tactique # 22 march 2012
Major General olivier traMond
commander, Forces employment
doctrine center
3
ARMY AVIATION COMBAT
OPERATIONS:
A MAJOR CAPABILITY
OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE
COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER
COLONEL HERVÉ AURIAULT, HEAD OF STUDIES - PROSPECTIVE CELL, COMALAT1
I
n one of its reference documents2, the army defines
tactical maneuver as the employment of forces on
the battlefield, combining movement, actual or potential
fire as well as immaterial effects, in order to reach a
favorable position over the opponent and fulfill the given
mission. additionally, it explains that the four-block
structure is the best option as it provides the required
flexibility of action: deployment in two echelons,
movement in depth with one reserve unit, and separate
actions. Finally it is reminded that, in addition to this
organization, all units must have a combined arms
structure down to the lowest level.
This is the rationale in which the rotary-wing combat
concept comes in: army aviation combat operations consists
of “ incorporating airmobile tactics, missions and courses
of action into the air-land maneuver in combination with
the other components of the ‘close combat’ function. ”
as a result, army aviation crews and helicopters are indeed
a maneuver element available to the combined arms
commander, exactly like an infantry or armor unit. While
it is true that he principal current operations do not
necessarily favor the development of a complex tactical
maneuver, these operations should not be considered
lasting principle. The aim of this document is to depict
the scope of aero-combat, which is characterized by close
engagement.
a component
of the “ close combat ”
function
aneuver is above all
the combination of the available
effects to fulfill the mission – in
contact and in the depth. In the Army,
the close battle function comprises
the following functions: dismounted
combat (infantry), mounted combat
(armor) and Army aviation combat
operations (aviation). Close combat hence
consists in combining the engagement
of these three components in order
to achieve the desired effect with
the assistance of the combat support
arms. The Army aviation combat
operations concept is the concrete
translation of the Army aviation’s role
in this combination: it takes into account
the evolution of the armed forces’
framework of employment, the huge
potential of new generation aircraft
and the extensive “Army culture of
the rotary-wing combat soldiers ”.
Since they are trained in the Army’s
centers and schools for the land battle,
the Army aviation personnel operate
according to the same courses of action
as infantry or armor service members.
Close combat units are fully
complementary.
M
Hence the combined arms commander
has in hand all the effects required to
maintain – or regain – his freedom of
action. The infantry carries out
uninterrupted actions by permanently
controlling the terrain in close contact
with the opponent and the population3.
Armor units are richly equipped with
communication and observation assets:
they have and permanently combine fire
power, mobility, intelligence and
protection4. Army aviation has fire,
intelligence, movement and command
capabilities, which enable them to
support the surprise effect with its quick
reaction capability. Land forces can hence
carry out three-dimensional combat.
1 Commandement de l’Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre : Army Aviation Command.
2 FT-02 General tactics, page 30.
3 INF 20.001 Doctrine for the employment of the infantry.
4 ABC 20.001 Doctrine for the employment of armored units.
4
Doctrine
a three-dimensional
land maneuver
To be perfectly optimized,
the effectiveness of the combined
arms maneuver must always rely
on the search for the best possible
combination of maneuver arms with
the additional contribution of
the combat support arms. Conversely,
setting aside one or the other
component, or restricting its
intervention to a mere reinforcement,
means depriving oneself of a major
expertise to the detriment of the unity
of effort and the economy of means.
This may jeopardize the force’s
freedom of action.
Any maneuver aims indeed at gaining
and/or keeping the initiative over
the opponent. To that end, the friendly
forces must be in a position to seize
any opportunity to throw the opponent
off balance. This ability largely rests
on the force layout’s adaptability and
quick reaction capability.
When designated the reserve unit,
they are engaged in order to enable
combined arms commander maintain
the initiative by restoring a favorable
force ratio.
When they are engaged in the course
of an overall action carried out along
two different directions, they seize –
either with reinforcements or as a
reinforcement of a unit – a point or
an area, cover the main action, harass,
intercept or participate in a cordon
and search operation. Additionally,
the technological progress will most
likely increase the helicopters tactical
capabilities. Their increased speed
and hence their reaction and stand-by
capability, their upgraded observation
and navigation equipment to the
benefit of an intervention in degrading
conditions, as well as their upgraded
weapon systems that allow for fire
beyond the line of sight while
remaining in contact with all units
engaged in the maneuver, will allow
Army aviation combat operations to
become one of the pillars of
tomorrow’s air-land maneuver.
Since the latter is partially based on
the concentration of effects, combat
helicopters will become an essential
tool.
from the first
echelon to
the reserve echelon
In compliance with the abovementioned four-block structure, Army
aviation is engaged in first echelon as
soon as the following tasks are
required: gather intelligence quickly,
make contact with the enemy, screen,
attack or fix the enemy before
the arrival of the maneuver troops.
They remain in second echelon in
order to impose their firepower and
extensive flexibility of action for
the purpose of destroying or
neutralizing an opponent’s position,
support troops in contact with
the enemy or capitalize on
the breakthrough carried out
by the units of the first echelon.
Based on the extensive Army culture
of the Army aviation personnel and
the increased capacities of the new
generation helicopters, Army aviation
combat operationsmakes it possible to
extend the land maneuver to the
vertical tactical dimension, and hence
reinforces the combined arms
commander’s freedom of action.
Moreover, the effect-based maneuver
will substitute for the maneuver based
on an accumulation of assets. Army
aviation combat operations, which
offers flexibility of action and firepower
– both in daytime and nighttime, will
play a major role in close coordination
with ground units in the course of an
information-based battle
©Armée de Terre
The Army aviation unit, which may be
reinforced by combined arms elements
or detach one or several modules5 to
support another battalion task force,
has specific skills that facilitate the
maneuver’s flexibility if they are used
in combination and coordination with
those of the combat units. Whether
the course of action is offensive,
defensive, security or an assistance
action, Army aviation combat
operations fulfills all missions
dedicated to the close combat function.
Especially in counterinsurgency
operations against an asymmetrical
enemy, the “Army aviation combat
operations” maneuver element can
perform the following tactical missions:
gather intelligence, cover, flank-guard,
destroy, neutralize, intercept, harass, air
land, participate in cordon and search
operations, search, isolate, escort and
participate in area control operations.
5 The module is the basic maneuver element. Composed of four to six aircraft focusing on the combination of effects in accordance with the mixed module principle, it is able to
maneuver and conduct two simultaneous actions in order to fulfill a mission (escort and heli-lift, attack and cover itself, carry out a delaying action over several axes, harass or
intercept in several points, participate in area control). This is usually the captain’s command level.
5
air mobility
robust capabilities
generated by a unique
“operational
laboratory”
and continuity
in air-land operations
I
nitially tailored for mass
confrontation, helicopter units have
easily adapted to the shifting postCold War context. Their continuous
employment, in France as well as in
overseas theaters, has validated their
relevance. Today French Army Aviation is
developing the framework of its future
employment from that experience.
COLONEL MICHEL DORANDEU, FRENCH ARMY STAFF/PLANS
S
ince the early 1980s, the organization and employment
of rotary-wing aviation units have been structured based on
the imperatives defined at that time by the motto of 4 airmobile
Division: « Fast, strong and far ». The three pillars, flexibility,
responsiveness and stealth, had been the foundation of a doctrinal
(and cultural) structure which capitalized on the following qualities:
initiative, autonomy and freedom of action. Thus, when international
tensions decreased, French army aviation (aLaT : aviation Légère
de l’armée de Terre) unsurprisingly drew from its operational culture
some courses of action that would be more appropriate to domestic
as well as overseas “ post-modern ” crises, which since 1991 have
appeared across the spectrum of conflicts.
In today’s geopolitical environment,
in which surprise and the unexpected
prevail, resort to modular and
responsive helicopter units has been
continuous2, whatever the background
or context. From their deployments to
variable-intensity conflicts3, the Army
extracted two original tools which have
become assets for future operations.
The first, the operations CP, necessary
for assuming framework nation
responsibilities, originates from the 1991
mass employment. The second,
the battalion-centered organization,
facilitates readiness and
the organization of deployments and
results from its constant participation
in simultaneous operations.
Today, operations in central asia are making commitments even
more complex by simultaneously concentrating the requirements
for “ coercive ”, “ peacekeeping ” and “ stability ” operations. In those
theaters, time is the 4th dimension of strategic action, and speed is
not as important as response to “ tactical emergency ”. additionally
the impact and power of weapons fade before the necessity for
adjustment of effects to the adversary, and increased range loses
significance when faced with the requirement for ubiquity.
From “coercion” to “crisis
management”, Army Aviation adjusts its
course of action to the opponents and
terrain, which drive its engagement.
When it responded with flexibility to
emergencies or social crises on national
territory (the troubles in 2005), when it
reinvented close-order array in order to
attack Iraqi defensive positions twenty
years ago, and when it provided the
connection between special operations
and peace-keeping, it established a
comprehensive doctrinal corpus which
integrates its action within the land
environment.
Provided it improves and adapts constantly, rotary-wing assets
reinvest their specific qualities in support of the continuity of tactical
and operational-level action, including in the domestic theater.
Thanks to its ability to eliminate distance, to shrink the opponent’s
areas of invulnerability, and to facilitate simultaneity of military
activities, the theater can be a continuous space where permanent
effects can be brought to bear. In twenty years’ time, that continuity
of action will be facilitated by the fielding of equipment now being
developed or designed: the Nh90, a versatile, multi-role helicopter,
the Standard 3 TIGrE, the multirole combat missile1, etc. This will
be supported by a thoroughly integrated air-land maneuver and
by “ ground ” operating more closely with “ above ground ”, already
evidenced by the “ ScOrPION ” environment.
1 Multirole multipurpose helicopter: 4-ton rotary-wing aircraft (HC4). Intended to supersede the GAZELLE, it will be equipped with recon systems, light armament, and will
have a 5-troop carrying capacity. It will be tailored for employment in land protective security. The TIGRE standard 3 refers to mid-service-life revamping (sight system,
main and surface-to-air armament, guided rockets, sea capability, etc.). MRCM: multi-role combat missile. This multi-mode target-seeking missile, equipped with multipleeffect warhead, will permit beyond line-of-sight fires, and will supersede the HELLFIRE system.
2 On average, 42 Army aircraft are permanently committed in overseas and domestic theaters of operations.
3 It should not be forgotten that high-intensity conflicts, involving a sizeable amount of heavy assets, have occurred about every ten years (Gulf War, Kosovo, Central Asia
operations) since the collapse of the eastern Bloc.
6
©Armée de Terre
Doctrine
Employment of rotary-wing units therefore became the
element necessary for the cohesion of air-land operations,
whatever the size and nature of assets established in the
force-generating process. The EU’s efforts to strengthen that
capability through its Capability Development Plan4, or the
priorities announced in the UK in spite of budget constraints,
provide evidence that it is still keenly regarded in order to
ensure continuity of action.
imagery, obstacle detection systems, new engines, etc.)
which extend the field of employment beyond the visibility
limits while also providing solutions to verticality issues
(mountainous or urban terrain). Thus it facilitates the control
of space by constricting the zone of action5, by strengthening
its “meshing” and by decompartmentalizing the units or
their stationing areas. This undeniable extra asset is today
particularly valuable in COIN activities.
army aviation combat operations
and continuity of action
That “super mobility” is in keeping with the use of tactical
UAVs which supplement coverage of the action zone and
make it possible to employ land assets in the vertical
dimension on a permanent basis. The UAV – helicopter
“cooperation”, which has been conceptualized since 2007,
capitalizing on current lessons learned, is moving towards
fuller integration. This integration maximizes their respective
capabilities: survivability, or a capacity to operate in a hostile
environment, thanks to the low signature of UAVs, and
the “man in the loop” asset for helicopters (crucial in
emergency situations requiring either instant decision-making
or reorientation of action based on situational elements
drawn and assessed from actual events). Making these two
systems operate in synergy, together with real-time data-link,
That continuity is now becoming possible because rotarywing units are more and more emancipated from the
constraints of the physical environment. They fill in the gaps
in the maneuver and connect the activities of assets
committed on the ground or in the third dimension within
one space of operations.
The higher mobility of the new generation of aircraft makes it
possible to reduce space and time available to the opponent.
It benefits from developing technologies (active laser
4 This plan, which provides the guidelines of the capability research work of the European Defense Agency, identifies an “increased availability of helicopters” in the list of
the 12 priorities agreed on by the member nations.
5 The Licorne operation demonstrated the importance of rotary-wing assets in the achievement of tactical actions necessary for control of the Ivory Coast airspace. Employment
of a “heavier” helicopter may be considered within that framework, if its ability for combined arms integration is effective, and if its intrinsic vulnerability does not detract from
its capabilities for tactical commitment. Since streamlining the assets to be deployed is always desirable, that particularly demanding capability prevails over a mere logistical
vocation.
7
could moreover make it possible to build original task forces,
tailored for the mission and the environment.
Without any environmental constraints, possessing selfsufficiency compatible with the maneuver of combined
units, or even capabilities supplemented by UAVs, ALAT
units are gradually developing a capability for continuous
action over the engagement zone.
combined arms integration
controlled
Their employment is no longer seen as opportune support,
but as a contribution to a common major effect.
That improvement, highlighted by the “concept of rotarywing forces in the Army ”6, is corroborated by
the promising prospects concerning future equipment
which will facilitate, by 2025, the synergetic operation
of lower tactical echelons tailored for desired effects.
Modern assets in Army aviation combat operations actually
make it possible to extend the concept of a combined
arms battalion task force7 to new “air-land” battalion task
forces or sub-task forces (company teams). Those units
are currently provided with compatible capabilities
(infantry-heavy, armor-heavy or helicopter-heavy), and are
tailored for security and contingency missions8, in contact
or in depth. Those task forces will rely on new modes of
cooperation between contact units (collaborative combat
and “beyond-line-of-sight” fires9) that the Hellfire system
will enable. Moreover, their prospects will be enhanced
by the development of future weapon systems (MRCM)
and sensors. These will also widen the range of current
devices (CCA)10 favored by the Army because of their
flexibility and the synergy created between helicopter
modules and ground units, including those of the lowest
echelon.
requirement to support the engagement of small-sized
combined arms elements11 (EOD teams, or liaison,
observation and coordination teams)12, which are widely
used today. By 2025, a medium-tonnage helicopter will,
thanks to its versatility, cover the whole spectrum of those
requirements, and, if requested, it will constitute
the mixed module basis (TIGRE or NH90), providing extra
mobility or facilitating command and control/coordination
of combined arms actions or of deployments on
the national territory.
These developments suggest possible capability gaps
by 2030. Increased integration of smaller echelons,
growing modularity of contingency detachments,
and the ability to get spaces under control and coordinate
effects while restricting the engagement of men on
the ground to what is strictly necessary, opens new vistas
which are being explored: fast helicopters, rotary-wing
vehicles intended for individual use, construction of
UAV–helicopter systems, development of rotary-wing
robotization, etc. Those equipment items are being
researched in France and abroad; their first results feed
research work on programs which are being initialized.
Even if they are of an exploratory nature, those prospects
are made credible thanks to the extreme modularity of
our helicopter units and to their constant adjustment to
the evolution of contexts and threats. In this regard,
and more than ever, French Army Aviation’s role lies at
the heart of air-land forces’ action, and it is one of its
irreplaceable and acknowledged pillars
The application of Army Aviation combat operations
makes all phases of the engagement of battalion task
forces and company teams more fluid. In this context, in
addition to the intelligence and reconnaissance functions,
which remain crucial, there has been an increasing
6 In the process of being updated.
7 Combined arms battalion task force or sub-task force (company team).
8 Those modern means make it possible to revitalize the “rotary-wing-heavy combined arms task force”, in the process of becoming obsolete since the activation of
security and intervention teams which used to be established on request, now emphasizing the corps structure fed with armor, infantry and helicopter units.
9 The “ beyond-line-of-sight fire” concept is in the process of being validated.
10 Within NATO (ATP 49), CCA refers to a system of standardized helicopter fire support to a unit in contact with the enemy. It is regularly amended and improved in
accordance with lessons learned on international level, and ensures a simple procedure as well as a sharing of responsibilities which favors engaging the enemy.
11 Including interdepartmental elements in the context of operations on the national territory.
12 Explosive ordnance disposal teams or liaison, observation and coordination teams.
8
Doctrine
the role of new equipment in
army aviation’s transformation
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL (P) FABRICE TALARICO, ARMY AVIATION OFFICER AT THE ARMY STAFF’S PLANS DIVISION
a
rmy aviation is currently undergoing significant changes and the deployment of the first TIGrE
haPs in afghanistan has already offered a glimpse into their future capabilities.
The armament programs currently being implemented not only seek to renew and upgrade
equipment, but also seek to offer new capabilities and an increased interaction with the other
actors of the battlefield.
In the end – around 2015 – the army will have high-performance heliborne weapon systems able
to operate by day and by night, in a joint or combined environment.
utility helicopters
Army aviation requires 133 utility
helicopters (French acronym HMA1) in
order to fulfill its operational contract2.
This is the number of helicopters
expected from the NH90 CAIMAN
program. Until the fielding of the
CAIMAN helicopters, the tactical
transport capacity will be provided by
PUMAs and COUGARs, as well as special
forces’ CARACALs.
The 44 upgraded PUMAs are currently
fitted with a UHF SATURN radio,
an electronic countermeasure system
composed of a radar warning system
and flare launcher, and a Euronav 3
navigation system. They will be
upgraded to the ICAO3 standards in
order to be able to fly without any
restrictions in all European airspaces.
These aircraft can also be fitted with
armor and MAG 58 side-mounted
machineguns. Their capabilities will
remain limited compared to those of
the other HMAs, but they will provide
the bulk of utility helicopters up to 2015
when they are replaced by the NH90.
COUGARs will undergo major
improvements. They will be fitted with
modern assets similar to those of the
CARACAL and NH90. Their avionics will
be upgraded more or less to the same
standard as that of the CARACAL.
They will be fitted with an electronic
countermeasures system composed of a
missile approach warning receiver with
embedded flare launchers and a radar
warning system. An electro-optical
sensor connected to an infrared camera,
a daytime camera and a laser
pointer/range-finder will improve their
night flying ability. They will also become
digitalized with the Army aviation’s
terminal information system (SITALAT).
The electronic countermeasure system
will include a missile approach warning
receiver, a radar warning systems, a
laser pointing warning system and flare
launchers. Armored parts and sidemounted machineguns will complement
the aircraft protection. The NH90 will
also be integrated into the Army
aviation’s digitalized environment.
The new-generation HMAs are indeed
designed as genuine digitalized weapon
systems fitted with the required systems
to operate in a hostile environment,
by day and by night. They can operate
together with the reconnaissance and
assault helicopters (HRA).
The NH90 will combine, on the one
hand, a carrier fitted with new
technologies, electric flight controls and
composite materials, and, on the other
hand, high-performance integrated
systems. It will hence have
the capabilities required to operate in
hostile areas, by day and by night.
It will be fitted with modern avionics, an
inertial navigation unit with embedded
GPS, a piloting FLIR, a weather radar and
an obstacle proximity warning system.
reconnaissance
and assault
helicopters
1 Hélicoptère de manoeuvre et d’assaut : maneuver and assault helicopter.
2 In French, the «contrat opérationnel» expresses the overall missions a service or branch of service is to be able to fulfill.
3 ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization.
9
By 2015, the TIGRE will fulfill the fire
support and destruction tasks while
the GAZELLE will be mainly dedicated
to the reconnaissance and information
collection missions.
As of mid-2011, the French Army has 30
TIGRE HAPs, 15 of which are up to
operational standards. The TIGRE HAP
has a 30 mm gun that can be operated
from the crew’s helmets, 68 mm rockets
and air-to-air MISTRAL missiles.
The STRIX sight is fitted with a TV
channel, an infrared channel and a direct
optical channel. The TIGRE has
minimized radar and infrared signatures.
It is fitted with a comprehensive selfprotection system which includes a radar
warning system, a laser pointing warning
system, a missile approach warning
system and flare launchers. The TIGRE
HAP is fitted with the data transmission
system called “TD SIR TIGRE”.
Nevertheless, this system must be
improved in order to be fully integrated
into the digitalized battle-space.
(7.62 mm) self-defense machinegun
allowing a high rate of fire. They will be
engaged together with the TIGRE and
NH90. Some will be fitted with a laser
designator in order to guide
the HELLFIRE missiles of the TIGRE HAD
and enable the latter to remain at a safe
distance and deliver fire beyond the line
of sight. The GAZELLE will also
significantly improve the TIGRE units’
destruction capabilities. They will fulfill
these missions until they are replaced
by the future 4 ton class helicopter (HC4)
around 2020.
The TIGRE HAD will be fielded in
the Army in 2012. This version has been
developed in cooperation with Spain. In
addition to the HAP’s capabilities, it will
have a more powerful engine and guided
air-to-ground weapons. The HELLFIRE
missile was selected as a provisional
solution but should be replaced by 2018.
Laser-guided rockets will complement
the HAD’s weapons in order to allow
accurate fire when missiles are not
necessarily required.
digitalization
The digitalization of the Army aviation
(NUMALAT) allows the helicopters’
weapon systems to be embedded into
the SCORPION system and into all units
involved in the vertical dimension.
The crew’s mission preparation modules
(MPME) enable the crews of a company
team to upload the data that resulted
from common preparation into their
various mission systems. The MPME
currently ensures the data transfer to
the Euronav 3, Eurogrid and SITALAT
systems of the GAZELLE, PUMA,
COUGAR and TIGRE HAP. The future
software version will be compatible with
the systems of the NH90 and TIGRE HAD.
Fourteen systems are currently in service
The TIGRE HAP has replaced the GAZELLE
CANON and GAZELLE MISTRAL while
the HAD will be the successor of
the GAZELLE VIVIANE HOT for destruction
missions. After 2015, only the most recent
GAZELLE – the current GAZELLE VIVIANE
and GAZELLE MISTRAL – will remain
fielded in order to carry out
reconnaissance missions. These
helicopters are fitted with the SITALAT
information system and a cal 30
ECPAD
The TIGRE HAP has been engaged
in Afghanistan since summer 2009:
its main task is to provide the ground
troops with essential daily combat
support. Its firepower and the accuracy
of its 30 mm gun enable it to engage
the enemy very close to the supported
units. The lessons learned from this
theater of operations confirm the
technological determinations concerning
the TIGRE, support the required
modifications (additional armor,
encrypted means of communication,
video recording, etc.), and initiate
reflections about future upgrades. Using
this framework, work is being carried out
in order fit the TIGRE with 68 mm rockets
with enhanced antipersonnel
effectiveness, to incorporate an
incoming fire detection system, to
improve its electro-optical systems and
to embed a laser pointer controlled by
the STRIX sight. The lessons learned
encouraged Army aviation to seek new
ways to enhance combined arms
cooperation. Digitalization will make it
possible to improve the effectiveness
of helicopter fire support as well as
cooperation with drones, a capability
other nations have already achieved.
doctrine tactique n° 22 march 2012
10
Doctrine
at the Army Aviation Center and School (EALAT) and forces.
The six final systems to be fitted on the NH90 will be delivered
in 2011. The helicopter fleet will be fully digitalized by 2015.
Finally, the HM PC CV operation makes up the keystone
of the NUMALAT architecture. This system will coordinate
the helicopters’ operations with the ground troops via the SIR
(later the SICS) and the other units involved in the vertical
dimension (air defense, aircraft, drones).
The NUMALAT will hence complement the aircraft’s inherent
capabilities in order to enable them to be integrated into a
digitalized environment and to operate more responsively
and more safely in the vertical dimension. It will significantly
increase the air assault capabilities in their contribution to
the air-land battle, especially in support of ground troops.
simulation
Simulation systems have significantly developed in Army
aviation. They provide a strong assistance in the fielding of
the new generation aircraft. The Army aviation’s simulation
policy highlights two components: a centralized simulation
at the EALAT and the TIGRE French-German School (EFA)
and a proximity simulation within the units. The centralized
simulation center gathers the «heavy» assets while
the proximity simulation uses motionless training systems.
Simulators allow technical and tactical training sessions.
They can also be interconnected in order to organize collective
training sessions.
Simulation makes it possible to provide safe training
conditions during complicated flying phases (technical
failures, landing in dusty or snowy conditions, etc.) or to
display a comprehensive tactical environment that would
otherwise require an extensive deployment of assets on
the ground. Simulation hence complements the indispensable
live-flying training while reducing maintenance requirements.
Simulation must now focus on combined arms cooperation
training. This can be done, for example, by interconnecting
the means that are already available in the branch schools;
however, this must result mainly in the creation of combat
firing simulators for helicopters. The greatest challenge will
be the incorporation of the helicopters – especially the TIGRE –
into the force preparation centers: CENTAC and CENZUB.
A significant improvement in terms of operational
performance4 is expected since air-land battle has become
much more complex: deep intermingling, multidirectional
threats, empty spaces and urban environments. While some
consideration may be already underway, much remains to be
done in order to have effective combat firing simulators and
evaluation systems. An actual combat simulation capability
would then be required by 2018 when the first SCORPION
units are operational.
4 Combat procedure implementation and training, “train as you fight” and cohesion
of the force in the pre-deployment preparation phase (MCP).
The relevance of simulation is increasing within the Army
aviation. In the end it will enable the combined arms
preparation of the units, which will enhance the synergy
of the air-land battle.
By 2015, Army aviation’s major equipment will have been
largely renewed in order to have extended capabilities and
increased interoperability. This will be the point when Army
aviation has completed the transfer of its airmobile capabilities
to air assault combat capabilities. The attack helicopters’
firepower and accuracy will have dramatically improved.
The range of engagement will increase significantly – up
to 8 km for the HELLFIRE missile with the ability to fire beyond
the line of sight. All aircraft will have an enhanced survivability
thanks to their self-protection and new armor systems.
The effective electro-optical systems connected to the
navigation and terminal information systems will allow day
and night actions in hostile areas with a high degree of
flexibility and reactivity.
The fielding of modern weapon systems in Army aviation is
undergoing significant changes that will improve its
operational effectiveness to the benefit of the air-land battle
GLOSSARy:
AAvn
CENTAC
CENZUB
DAR
EALAT
GPS
HAD
HAP
HC4
UH
HM PC CV
RAH
JVN
MCP
MPME
NUMALAT
LL
SICS
SIR
SITALAT
STC
TD SIR TIGRE
TV
UHF
Army aviation
Combat training center
Training center for urban combat
Radar warning system
Army Aviation Center and School
Global positioning System
Support and attack helicopter
Close support helicopter
4 ton class helicopter
Utility helicopter
Command post utility helicopter - In-flight command
Reconnaissance and assault helicopter
Night-vision goggles
Pre-deployment preparation
Crew’s mission preparation modules
Army aviation digitalization
Lessons learned
SCORPION command and information system
Regimental information system
Aviation terminal information system
Combat firing simulator
SIR TIGRE data transmission
Television
Ultra High Frequency
11
army aviation and armor:
cooperation or integrated maneuver?
COLONEL ALEXANDRE NIMSER, HEAD OF STUDIES AND FUTURE PLANS CELL, SAUMUR MILITARY SCHOOLS
D
ismounted combat units, mounted combat units and army aviation units belong to the “ close
combat ” operational function and the “ engagement-combat ” system of forces. Their common
feature is to take part in “ close combat ”1 operations. They are unique among combat arms because
they are the only units, tasked, during an engagement, to make contact with the enemy in order to
deliver direct fire on him.
contrary to the cooperation between infantry and armor, which is carried out effectively within the
combined arms battalion task force or the company team, army aviation and armor, whose shared
purpose is to primarily carry out mounted combat, cooperate usefully by providing combat support
(fire, transport, observation, etc.). This maneuver is not, however, similar to the “aviation-armor”
maneuver that used to exist in the past and should be conducted again. The aim would consist in
capitalizing on the numerous advantages provided by battle space digitalization in order to make
the best use of each component’s capabilities while compensating for their respective weaknesses.
Why and how would an aviation-armor maneuver be organized?
preliminary principles
T
he cooperation between Army aviation and armor
can be implemented in several ways, but each can
present challenges: how can the common action be
combined and at which level?
We need to know which type of cooperation can be
established at what unit level: What is the most effective
volume of Army aviation assets, what kind of aircraft (HRA,
HMA)2 should be committed and at what unit level should
they be integrated (combined arms battalion task force,
company team, platoon). Helicopters can maneuver
together with tanks, but only in a one-way action: Army
aviation operates in support of the armor unit, but never
beyond a mere fire/observation support, which, while
highly effective, is too restricted in time to actually envisage
a whole maneuver.
However this kind of maneuver allows for the optimization
of the typical capabilities of all mounted units (both on the
ground and in the air): speed (or high tempo), range (action
in depth), reach and firepower, as well as intelligence
collection and reversibility. Additionally, Armor and Army
aviation have complementary capabilities that should be
capitalized on in order to enhance the effectiveness of
the aviation-armor maneuver: maneuverability on
the ground (hampered in compartmented or rough terrain),
fire resilience and extended ground coverage of the armor
on the one hand, and the responsiveness (with a certain
degree of vulnerability) and enhanced mobility (but not
at all times) of aviation on the other hand.
Why Would the aviation/armor
maneuver be integrated and in
Which situations?
Depending on the mission (intent, tempo, effect on
the enemy) and the terrain, the integration of Army aviation
can help an armored unit retrieve its maneuvering capability
in a much more effective way than dismounting infantry
could. For example, in rough terrain3 where an armor-heavy
company task force could engage without capitalizing on all
its maneuvering and/or fire capabilities, the helicopters can
extend the reach of the armor’s maneuver while allowing
it to maintain its tempo: in mountainous terrain beyond
a pass or a ridge line, in marshy or soft sandy terrain, in
the vicinity of lakes. The Army aviation element could hence
be tasked with cover or support, gather information by
1 Close combat includes the following aspects: intermingling with the enemy, fighting in contact with the enemy, which necessitates a direct view of him, and engaging numerous and various
targets without delay.
2 HRA (hélicoptère de reconnaissance et d’attaque) = RAH (reconnaissance and attack helicopter).
HMA (hélicoptère de manoeuvre et d’assaut) = UH (utility helicopter = maneuver and assault helicopter).
3 That would nevertheless allow airborne observation, hence in not too densely wooded zones.
march 2012
12
Doctrine
probing the enemy, which the armored units could do only
by dismounting some of their elements (this would require
more time than available during a high tempo maneuver),
scout the advance of the armor units in a defile, take
action over enemy reinforcements or a withdrawing enemy
(as in desert areas).
In COIN4 operations, a mixed HRA patrol could join
the company team for up to five hours each day and
provide significant information in order to precisely direct
and optimize the action that would allow a high-pace
maneuver in armor-impeding terrains. In this framework,
the Army aviation’s action would be extremely effective,
either by conducting area surveillance in order to spot an
insurgent group and guide the armored unit, or by
scouting, covering or supporting movements (hence
increasing the tempo. They could also take part in route
clearing actions and convoy protection. The Army aviation
element, which should ideally be mixed, is hence fully
committed in the maneuver, since it has the same capacity
for autonomous action as one of the armored platoons of
the armor-heavy company task force.
hoW can the aviation/armor
maneuver be integrated?
Now, how can an Army aviation module be attached to
an armor-heavy structure (or conversely, depending on
the needs) by capitalizing on the information improvement
that will allow an effect-based maneuver? Two cases can
be envisaged:
©Armée de Terre/Jean-Raphaël DRAHI
1) The Temporary Establishment of an Aviation-Armor
Combined Arms Detachment
Setting up an aviation-armor combined arms detachment
aims exclusively at producing, by combining its own
assets, an effect on the terrain or the enemy for a given
mission, knowing that an organic unit cannot achieve
these effects. This temporary contingency structure can
only be justified in the framework of a strongly
decentralized maneuver in which the operational
environment requires immediate reactivity. However,
setting up or task-reorganizing an aviation-armor
combined arms detachment would surely require a great
deal of time and must hence be considered if it clearly
provides added value.
2) Full Integration of the Aviation-Armor Maneuver
The anticipated progress in available information should
make it possible to conduct an aviation-armor maneuver
by breaking free of network constraints. At the platoon
level, one would assume that all Army aviation servicemembers (including the trained pilots) are wired to
the platoon’s radio network. It would also be assumed that
the maneuver is conducted by the armor platoon leader
during a mission in which the terrain is particularly suited
for taking advantage of the Army aviation’s assets, while
optimizing the tempo of the armor unit’s action. Similarly,
at the armor-heavy company task force level, the Army
aviation element receives its mission over the company’s
network, as do all other platoons (also during the action).
The company commander would coordinate this mission
without requiring an additional radio. Effectively achieving
such an integration of maneuver would of course require
a high level of dedicated training, but it would definitely
bring significant added value to the employment of
aviation and armor. The refinement of procedures would
be required to lower the risk of friendly fire. However,
the common technical assets (battle space digitalization
and blue force tracking) as well as the fielding of an
individual identification system for each combatant or
each armored vehicle would make life significantly easier.
conclusion
Based on the future information improvement of close
combat and the acknowledged mobility of the Armor
and Army aviation vehicles, the armor-heavy battalion/
company task forces could hence be complemented with
Army aviation elements.
They are suited for security and/or
intervention missions in order to conduct,
immediately following the elaboration of
the scheme of maneuver, a genuine aviationarmor maneuver with a high tempo and/or
through terrain in which armored vehicles
would face mobility challenges. Hence they
will allow, in the course of the cooperative
close combat, the integration into a single
maneuver of close combat units and Army
aviation units, in order to directly contribute
to the combined arms commander’s tactical
objectives
4 Counterinsurgency.
march 2012
13
DISMOUNTED COMBAT AND ARMY AVIATION COMBAT
OPERATIONS: THE RAISON D’ÊTRE AND THE CONDITIONS
FOR A SUCCESSFUL MARRIAGE
LIEUTENANT COLONEL QUENTIN BOURGEOIS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR HEAD OF DOCTRINE, GENERAL STUDIES AND LESSONS LEARNED CELL - DIVISION OF STUDIES AND FUTURE PLANS FOR THE INFANTRY
a
s the army chief of Staff recalled during the meeting of the Operational Studies Steering
committee on 2nd July 2010, “doctrine does not aim to be rigidly executed but to be a
reference that is to be applied with situation-oriented judgment.” The author of this article
was S3 of the BaTFra1 in Kabul from September 2007 to January 2008, then of TF KaPISa from
December 2010 to June 2011. his analysis of the current situation on the cooperation between
the infantry and army aviation is hence based on his experience as well as on other operations
led by army aviation.
Operation MOUSQUETAIRE : The first mention of an
operational combined arms commitment of Army
aviation dates back to 5th November 1956. In
the course of Operation MOUSQUETAIRE, which
aimed at conquering the city of Suez in Egypt,
the 45th Royal Marine Commando was transported
inland by Westland Whirlwind Mark 2s and Bristol
Sycamore HC-12s helicopters of the Royal Air Force.
This first feat began a new era in combined arms and
joint cooperation.
Operation GORGON : A company team of some
100 soldiers from TF KAPISA was heliborne by
the COUGARs and CARACALs of the BATALAT
(Army Aviation Battalion) at over 2.500 m above
sea level, onto the mountain tops west of its target.
After infiltrating through particularly rugged
terrain, they conquered a constriction point that
denied access to the northern entrances to
the valley that simultaneously ensured the task
force’s cover.
As depicted in these two examples, the cooperation between Infantry and Army Aviation is nothing new and remains fully
relevant in 2011. Recent worldwide operations, especially those carried out by the Army, provide beneficial lessons learned.
They no longer always meet the operational scenarios envisaged during the Cold War against the countries of the Warsaw
Pact, but they are still carried out according to specific principles of employment. This article aims at describing these
principles from the point of view of the dismounted combatant.
The combination of Army aviation’s assets and the capabilities of dismounted combat has a leverage effect. This results
from the superiority provided by the control of the 3D space near the ground. However, this superiority is not a panacea
and follows rules of employment that need to be permanently kept in mind.
Integrating air assault combat into the combined arms battalion task forces’ operations creates a certain number of effects
in the fields of fire, maneuver and support. The success of this cooperation relies on taking into account typical Army
aviation restrictions and meeting certain requirements.
the added values provided by the control of the 3d space near the ground
A privilege of Army aviation, this control of the 3D space near the ground provides dismounted
combat with added value over its entire area of action, composed of the following domains:
intelligence, combat support, maneuver, command and control, and logistics.
1 Name of the former French battalion-size task force based in Kabul.
march 2012
14
Doctrine
© Armée de Terre
Since any maneuver is based on the ability to collect and analyze consolidated intelligence, Army aviation must be coupled to
the preliminary actions since their assets have the means to complement the range of sensors2. This intelligence gathered prior
to the maneuver can also be followed-up during the maneuver: The TIGRE attack helicopters are fitted with observation systems
that provide the HQ with information on enemy and friendly operations.
In terms of combat support, attack helicopters are firstclass assets that can deliver fire from the air and hence
complement the ground maneuver elements, with a high
degree of flexibility thanks to the helicopters’ speed and
mobility. Attack helicopters make up a genuine reserve of
fire assets that can reinforce various units in critical phases
or intercept enemy elements that have been spotted but
are out of the range of the ground troops. If they fly low
enough the psychological impact they can have on
dismounted combatants should also be taken into account,
since they reassure the latter when they are friendly but
terrorize them if they are enemy. This provides a unique
advantage over the enemy.
As far as the maneuver is concerned, Army aviation
provides infantry-heavy combined arms battalion task
forces with the ubiquity they do not initially own. Since
Army aviation is not impeded by terrain features, they
allow, with a true economy of forces, the conquest of poorly
accessible or remote areas, such as elevated areas in
mountainous terrain, the rear of the enemy or the heart of
the Amazonian jungle. Dismounted combat support units,
which cannot be separated from the core of the maneuver,
can benefit from these carriers’ support. For example,
the aircraft’s speed allows dismounted combatants to destabilize the opponent by conquering a key point of the terrain by
surprise. Coupled with their flexibility, their speed allows the concentration of assets during a change of the priority of effort.
Finally, Army aviation takes part in deception operations by operating in potential landing areas in order to create a factitious
ubiquity and raise doubts in the opponent’s mind.
From the command and control and logistics point of view, the added value of the Army aviation component shall not be
underestimated. By transporting the tactical command post teams, they foster meetings between the teams, enhance
coordination, and order preparation works. Relief operations, a particularly tricky phase in unsafe areas, are significantly
facilitated when the movements are carried out by helicopters. Helicopters can reach remote or poorly accessible areas, which
makes them an essential asset used to deploy radio relay stations in compartmented areas or to resupply isolated units.
Above all, helicopters are the best way to quickly evacuate wounded soldiers from the combat area and bring them to higher
level medical facilities. This is also a way to reassure dismounted combatants.
By enabling dismounted combatants to control an environment they do not normally control, Army aviation does indeed have
a multiplying effect over the actions taken by the infantry-heavy battalion task forces.
dismounted combat must knoW hoW to make use of aviation assets
this optimistic and ambitious depiction shall not conceal a certain number of constraints that
are translated into requirements for the success of the integration of the Army aviation
component. the aim within this framework is to capitalize on the effects that contribute to the
success of operations, but not to start by integrating an Army aviation maneuver into an
operation. nonetheless, the cooperation shall only be successful if the restrictions of use of the
proposed tool are well known.
2 Especially the light reconnaissance helicopters “VIVIANE”.
march 2012
15
The first condition is for the infantry-heavy battalion task force to anticipate the air assault maneuver in the case of a transport
of its troops by helicopters. The anticipation is needed to assure the time required for the reconnaissance of the landing areas,
especially in rough terrain. It is especially the case in the mountains where the wind conditions are particular and the landing
areas are rarely flat. This is all the more necessary as the crews may have various skill levels; hence, some landing areas
validated by an Army aviation unit may not be suitable for another unit. For example, dusty landing areas require specific aircrew
training. Overflying an area can be a form of compromise. While beneficial on some levels, this maneuver demands an
anticipation of the reconnaissance actions that must be carefully carried out before the planned operation and coupled with
deception actions whose goal is to obscure the actual areas of action.
Another restriction of use includes the inherent risks of any action taken from the air. As a first step, the commander of
the battalion task force must take into account the weather conditions3 , and hence plan either to postpone some actions,
or to carry them out without the Army aviation assets, or to cancel the operation. In a second step, the presence or absence of
enemies around the landing zone is a major criterion, since the destruction of a flying aircraft can have serious consequences.
In other words, it can be dangerous to have the major effect – and hence the success of an operation – be based on its Army
aviation component.
The added value of the heliborne action must also be carefully assessed: The in-flight or landing constraints may have such an
impact on the course of the maneuver that they may change its original scheme and even lead it astray. Additionally,
transporting a unit by helicopter too far from its area of action can ruin the desired effect. In that case, a traditional infiltration
on foot or in vehicles may be more effective. As a third step, the operation for the retrieval of the heliborne elements must be
considered. The following obvious observation must be made: The aim is not for the infantry to absolutely want to use utility
helicopters, but only to use them if they provide an actual tactical added value.
Finally, helicopters have limited capabilities in terms of flying time and payload. The question of flying autonomy and capabilities
is particularly relevant for attack helicopters4. Requesting helicopter fire support during the duration of an operation is
understandable but often illusory. Knowing of course that the capabilities of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft are different, a
realistic solution consists in combining their respective advantages. While their flying autonomy is much larger, fixed-wing
aircraft cannot maneuver in direct contact with infantry company commanders or platoon leaders. The deterrent effect of attack
helicopters, which can be closely associated to the battalion task force’s maneuver (whose crews are familiar with the land battle
and whose fire is more accurate), should be capitalized on during the phases that are assessed as the most challenging5. This
will also be the case for a tank destruction mission or a raid against armored vehicles. As far as utility helicopters are concerned,
heat and altitude may sometimes significantly reduce their payload. Increasing the number of rotations may be a solution, but
this increases the inherent risk of any heliborne operation, especially because of their inability to remain inconspicuous.
Hence the precondition for the successful integration of the Army aviation component into an infantry-heavy battalion task force
is the knowledge of the specific conditions of employment of rotary-wing aircraft.

While not new, cooperation between dismounted combatants and Army Aviation is only fifty years in the making.
This brief period nonetheless demonstrated the obvious added value provided by the combination of assets.
Infantry units never fight alone and seek assistance from any asset that contributes to the optimization or the facilitation of their
desired effects over the environment or the opponent. The raison d’être of the cooperation between the infantry and Army aviation
in an operation is based on the multiplying effect provided by the control of the third dimension to the benefit of the dismounted
combatants. The versatility hence gained by the battalion task force is complemented by the support and transport capabilities
that allow a better intelligence collection, facilitate movements and logistic operations, and reduce the fire delivery time.
The specific constraints to be taken into account for the employment of helicopters are mainly aeronautical in nature and linked
to the geographical environment in which the dismounted combat is to take place. These constraints require dismounted units
to have an excellent knowledge of the conditions required for this complementary tool.
The renewal of the fleet of attack helicopters (TIGRE) and utility helicopters (NH 90) should reinforce the assets dedicated to
the forces. Army aviation and infantry are very much aware of this as the current EXTA FELIN6 shall certainly associate the Army
aviation component to the current works
3 The genuine restrictions of use nowadays are rather the ability to fire the weapons and poor visibility rather than purely air-related constraints.
4 However it must be underlined that the TIGRE’s autonomy is three times greater than that of the GAZELLE.
5 For example : escort of a heliborne unit (see concept of employment of the Army aviation), disengagement phases, convoy escort.
6 EXTA FELIN (expérimentation tactique du système d’arme FELIN) : tactical experimentation of the FELIN weapon system. It was steered by the doctrine office of the Division of
Studies and Future Plans – Infantry and conducted by a combat company of the 13th Mountain Battalion between January and June 2011.
march 2012
16
OrganizatiOnal impact On army aviatiOn EmplOymEnt
PeoPle
At the heArt of Army
AviAtion CombAt oPerAtions
cOlOnEl alain DEniau
HEaD Of pErsOnnEl anD air rEgulatiOns cEll
army aviatiOn cOmmanD
however, the most advanced techniques and
tactics are not enough to ensure the best use of
those weapon systems which have absolutely
become life insurance for troops on the ground.
It is truly the people who, through established
organizations, recruitment, training, and their
professional career, are more than ever the key
to operational success.
In a highly constrained environment, army
aviation continues to thoroughly transform
itself while keeping people in the heart
of its concerns in order to constantly meet
the evolving needs of air-land maneuver.
©Armée de terre
T
he capability improvements added to
helicopters – diversified, powerful and
accurate weapons systems; protective
devices; ground-based or on-board means of
mission planning; satellite navigation
equipment; sensors, and increased endurance –
enable them to be incorporated, from a longtime perspective, into the very heart of the
action of ground forces. The maneuver of
helicopters, therefore, has never been more
closely integrated in the maneuver of ground
troops who would never think of being
committed in combat without these assets
capable of striking powerfully and accurately
as closely as possible to troops in contact and
providing them with essential additional
mobility.
An orgAnizAtion foCused on
oPerAtionAl Commitment
rmy Aviation as an organization brings together
nearly 5,700 military and civilian personnel, i.e. 4.5%
of Army manpower. If we only consider its core
businesses, i.e. personnel in the fields of aeronautics and
aircraft maintenance, the figure stands at almost 2.8%,
about 3,700 personnel. Army Aviation specificity is to be
made up of over 80% of senior personnel, both officers
and NCOs, who have a very high level of technical
expertise in addition to the tactical skills common to
the Army as a whole.
A
Around helicopters as weapons systems, the basic tactical
system includes of course pilots, but also, and just
as indispensable, mechanics, crew chiefs, air traffic
controllers, weather forecasters, simulator instructors,
intelligence specialists and airbase firefighters, reinforced
by signallers and administrative and technical support
staff. These are all specialties which – when they are wellcoordinated and working in synergy – make it possible to
take full advantage of all the capabilities of weapons
systems and of the environment, mission-preparing,
simulation and air traffic control equipment. Apart from
their technical specialties, these men have all gone
through the Army’s basic training schools. They must
also master, like any soldier, all the fundamentals of
ground combat and know how to operate in a combined
arms, joint or multinational environment if the need arises.
The aeronautics domain includes in particular the military
doCtrine tACtique # 22 march 2012
17
occupational specialty (MOS) of pilots whose
transformation from NCOs to officers was conducted from
2008 to 2010. The five other MOSs include air traffic
controllers (ATC), aircrew ground instructors, weather
forecasters, airbase firefighters, and crew chiefs, who are
not very numerous, but are specialized and essential for
the proper operation of the weapons systems.
The domain of aviation maintenance includes three main
MOSs. It is composed of a great deal of specialties at
the different levels of design, implementation and conduct:
maintenance officers, supervisors, librarians, technical flight
pilots, airframe and engine specialists, avionics and
armament specialists, structure and supply specialists,
who may be foremen, team leaders, engineers or skilled
mechanics).
helicopter2 and the reconnaissance and attack helicopter3)
or on aeronautics support. The battalion is thus the standard
organization of a helicopter battalion, an airmobile task force
or a helicopter-heavy combined arms battalion task force
committed in operations: it makes it possible to train and
live in continental France according to the same task
organizations and procedures used in overseas operations.
This review, which started in 2008 and will be completed
by 2012, has already contributed to the strengthening of
the exercise of command and control at various operational
levels, the rationalization of training and support, and finally
to the maintenance and promotion of the integration of
the various specialties: employment (aircrews)/maintenance
(mechanics)/environment (controllers, airbase firefighters,
ground instructors, signallers, etc.).
1 Tiger/maneuver and attack helicopter, Gazelle
Viviane/Tiger, Gazelle Viviane/maneuver and attack
helicopter.
2 Puma, cougar, caracal, Nh 90.
3 Gazelle Viviane, TIGEr.
©Armée de terre
In addition to the two thirds of
personnel who come under
the aeronautics and aviation
maintenance domains, the last third
consists of technical and administrative
support, including signallers, dog
handlers or motor mechanics.
In order to optimize human resources,
Army Aviation elected to have a
tighter organization with three
régiments d’hélicoptères de combat –
each with about 1,100 personnel – and
a régiment d’hélicoptères de forces
spéciales of about 250 personnel,
which is co-located and supported by
the 5th Régiment d’Hélicoptères de
Combat in Pau. These units are
fielding nearly 200 helicopters
altogether, i.e. ? of Army Aviation
aircraft. According to the principles of
economy of means and concentration
of efforts, these four units, which are
stationed on only three airfields,
accommodate all types of aircraft in
order to meet a level of operational
readiness adapted to the use of
combined modules1, with all the
means for preparation, training,
simulation, support and aviation
environment available on an
immediate basis.
Within Army Aviation units, adopting a
battalion structure has contributed to
the establishment of an appropriate
level of operational readiness,
concentration and economy centered
on one of the weapons systems
(the utility -transport and assault-
18
A trAining uP to internAtionAl
stAndArds, oPtimized for
oPerAtionAl requirements
In the last decade, the training system of aviation personnel
has been significantly redesigned in order to retain the ability
to train and operate in an airspace shared with numerous
civilian and military players. These training courses perfectly
meet the armed forces’ needs as well as the European
and international training and safety requirements.
Freedom of action in a shared airspace may only be
implemented through the formal recognition by the civil
aviation authorities of initial training courses. Thus, pilots,
mechanics, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, airbase
firefighters, and simulator instructors, are all affected
directly or indirectly and take courses approved or
recognized by the civil authorities to obtain titles (licenses
and/or certificates) which are internationally recognized.
These courses are long and costly (2 years to 2?
years for a pilot, 1 to 1? years for a controller, 1 year to 1?
year for a skilled mechanic, 1 year to 1? year for a
forecaster), but it is the price to pay to ensure the ability
to maneuver in the international sky.
As regards pilots, the joint convergence in initial and
specialized training and the sharing of resources
and trainers now make it possible to not only streamline
and reduce costs, but also to broaden the spectrum of
joint combat. In 1999, the EALAT School4 was certified
as a joint and interagency center of excellence for training
helicopter pilots. Since then, some foreign armed forces
have contributed to training and are training together with
their French counterparts, i.e. Belgians for basic training,
Germans and Spaniards at the Tiger French-German School
or at the French-German Training Centre for Tiger Technical
and Logistical Staff (CFA/PTL) in Fassberg. This dynamic
approach has contributed to joint integration with either
the Air Force in the 4th Special Forces Helicopter Battalion
or with the Navy at the NH-90 Joint Training Center (CFIA).
As regards mechanics, the entire training curriculum
has been revised in order to meet the maintenance
requirements of international civil aviation as of 2012.
The mechanics of the three services now attend the Air
Force NCO Academy (EFSOAA) in Rochefort for a one-year
training course before carrying on with technical
qualifications, conducted on a joint or allied basis as
appropriate. For Army Aviation, this training is conducted
by the Aviation Technical Division (DTA) in Bourges, which
is currently training nearly 300 trainees a year on Gazelle,
Puma and Cougar helicopters, as well as by the Tiger
CFA/PTL Center in Fassberg, and soon by the NH-90 CFIA
Center in Luc en Provence. Both centers have the facilities
to train about 100 soldiers a year to meet the forces’
operational needs.
Today, the Training Center for Air Traffic Controllers
and Air Defense (CICDA) in Mont de Marsan – approved
by the Directorate of Civil Aviation Security (DSAC) –
provides the ab initio training for Army Aviation controllers
as regards EU standards. The EALAT School in Dax only
conducts an additional technical-operational course
specific to land forces. Météo France provides training
for all Army Aviation forecasters.
ConClusion
Army Aviation has changed significantly at a sustained
rate in the last ten years, in a context where the armed
forces are gradually reducing their personnel strength
and the former is going through a tense situation as
regards human resources.
Army Aviation has placed people (and in particular their
training and the organization in which they perform) at
the heart of its concerns. Continuously falling within
the scope of a continuum between training and
employment, schools and battalions have continued to
change together in order to adapt their organizations to
operational needs. They provide training courses, which
are among the most specialized, based strictly on need
and at the best value for money with a constant concern
for safety.
This is a particularly complex, delicately balanced
system which combines relatively few highly technical
military personnel with sophisticated equipment,
enhanced fire, and mobility capabilities in a very
compelling normative world. This system operates
in a context of ever-increasing responsibilities borne
by each aviator, in an ever more complex militarycivilian, combined arms and joint environment.
All of these transformations, foremost affecting people,
are certainly one of the main factors which enable
the Army to have an efficient Army Aviation, ensuring
operational success
4 École de l’aviation Légère de l’armée de Terre = army aviation school.
19
trAining Army AviAtion Personnel
for oPerAtionAl Commitment
“OUr raisOn D’êtrE Is OPEraTIONaL cOmmITmENT”
BrigaDiEr gEnEral OliviEr gOurlEz DE la mOttE,
cOmmanDing tHE army aviatiOn scHOOl (Ealat)
a
s an army Branch school, the army
aviation school’s mission is
“ to provide the armed forces with
the military commanders, the aircrews
of helicopters and the various
specialists of combat aviation-related
operations required for the current
operational commitments”.
In addition, the quality approach
requires the school “to demonstrate
its ability to provide a product that
meets the customers’ needs and
the applicable legal and regulatory
requirements”.
specifically, the school is meant for
the forces and is at their disposal –
the cornerstone in the process of
preparation for operational
engagement. all school instructors pass
on their knowledge to the students
in order to meet this requirement.
The training curriculum is not firmly
fixed. Training should make the most of
new teaching resources at its disposal,
such as simulators, and incorporate
the lessons learned from recent
commitments.
The assessment of lessons learned
highlighted the need to focus on
battle-hardening activities, flights
under limited power, and coordination
with ground troops. New procedures
(cca1) must also be taught. Work
conducted on aircraft self-protection
has thus led to the modification of
combat flight training on Lhs and
Uhs2. Knowledge of English is essential.
Tactical exercises then take into
account current trends. conducted
in English and according to NaTO
procedures, they involve
counterinsurgency operations. This
orientation has altered the courses for
aircraft commanders, platoon leaders
or company commanders.
Finally, the school incorporates into
its training courses aZUr3 modules,
the combined arms common-core
syllabus (NBc, INTEL, LOG), and stress
management in order to keep pace
with developments related to the army
as a whole.
1 close combat attack (cca).
2 Light helicopter (Lh) and Utility helicopter (Uh).
3 actions in urban areas.
20
Pilot trAining
At dAx trAining AirbAse
T
he mission of the Army Aviation School
in Dax is to train helicopter pilots for
the Army, the Air Force, the Navy and
the Gendarmerie nationale.
“ Train, instruct and educate” – such is the raison
d’être of the school, even if at Dax the technical
side prevails. Training provided there is clearly
focused on the fundamental mission of a military
pilot, namely operational commitment.
The diplomas awarded meet civilian standards,
incorporating all the basic military aeronautical
training necessary for operational commitments:
low altitude, mountainous, NVG, or instrument
flights.
Upon arrival at Dax, students are immersed in a
joint environment. Instructors come from the three
services and the Gendarmerie and rely on their
operational experience to train future pilots. They
share their skills and expertise, contributing to
the ethical and behavioral training. The school
organizes conferences, lessons learned seminars
and training courses, which are all an integral part
of the preparation and arouse the curiosity of
the students.
Battle-hardening is accomplished by staying in
camp with combat firing training, escape raids, etc.
The school features English courses in aeronautics
as well as an introductory course in operational
English. Leaving the ab initio training course,
young pilots say they are sufficiently “ wellequipped ” and confident to attend further
operational training at the Army Aviation School at
the Cannet des Maures where they join officers’
courses conducted according to MOSs.

Pilot trAining At le CAnnet
des mAures AirbAse
T
he objective of the Basic Officers’ course
for Army Aviation lieutenants is to develop
the officer’s knowledge of his branch and
train him for his first job as a helicopter
section leader and a specialist of aviation combat.
Commander’s character building is notably
conducted through a series of ongoing coaching
actions by the training staff so that young officers
may establish a command style.
Leadership development, which is really
the common theme throughout the course, aims at
preparing the section leader to begin his
professional life, develop knowledge of his branch,
continue his military education and strengthen
his human qualities in an environment replete
with different skills and backgrounds. As regards
combined arms education, the objective is to acquire
minimum knowledge of all operational functions and
their combined use while emphasizing lessons
learned and the operational practice of the forces.
Operational training aims at developing the ability
to reason with great ease in order to overcome
the diversity and complexity of the current
commitments which require responsiveness and
adaptability.
Education of the young Army Aviation officer is of a
particular nature as the training approach is dual
as it is related both to the extreme technicality of
the skills taught and to the necessary continuum
of his overall education.
Captains then return to Le Cannet des Maures for
the Officer Advanced Course whose objective is “to
directly prepare young captains for the command of
the company they will be entrusted with”.
Teaching is based on active participation and
the enrichment that comes from sharing different
experiences. The EALAT School, a real melting pot of
joint training, is recognized as a center of excellence
for training helicopter pilots at the international level.
21
lessons leArned: An integrAl PArt
of trAining At the frenCh-germAn sChool
The French-German school is a good example of readjusting one’s training thanks to lessons learned.
Since January 20064, aircrew training has been conducted on the Close Support TIGER Helicopter in the French-German
TIGER School. Sharing lessons learned among countries that fielded the TIGER helicopter5 occurs regularly through
meetings of the TIGER Build-up Group, composed of the French, Germans, Australians and Spaniards. With the latter
in particular, the convergence of the employment of an almost identical asset led [French] Army Aviation and the FAMET6
to establish a privileged relationship, resulting in the integration of two Spanish officers as instructors at the TIGER
School in July 2010.
From an operational perspective, the school participated immediately in the deployment of the French TIGER in
the Afghan theater through the reinforcement of PTL7 personnel and recently of an instructor as a TIGER section leader
for almost four months. In the same mold of dynamic synergies in the TIGER sector, we must mention that two
instructors from the forces were assigned to the school in the summer of 2010 while an experienced flight instructor
and an ISPN8 instructor, who had perfectly mastered the simulation environment, were transferred to helicopter units.
This personnel turn-over between the school and the forces contributes directly to the spirit of ensuring up-to-date
procedures and the employment of assets according to entrusted missions.
photo fournie par l’auteur
Sharing knowledge is a source of continuous progress. The new challenges of the TIGER School, with the inclusion of
advanced training for ab initio pilots as of 2012, and the transition to the HAD version, will be supported by the latest
lessons learned.
4 for the French side. German training on Khs began in October 2010.
5 The TIGEr Build-up Group brings together France, Germany, spain and australia.
6 The FamET is the airmobile force of the spanish army.
7 Technical and Logistics Personnel. Twenty of them have been engaged since July 2009.
8 aircrew ground instructor, delivering theoretical and simulator instruction.
22
“nh-90 trAining - mAstering the teChniCAl
side to benefit oPerAtionAl Commitment ”
The NH-90 CFIA Joint Training Center (Army and Navy) was created on 1 July 2010 and is tasked with
the training, on the same site, of aircrews and maintenance personnel who will use the armed forces’ future
maneuver and attack helicopter.
Although mastering the technical side is an essential dimension of the school curricula, people must remain at
the heart of training.
When preparing the Cayman training courses, the challenge for the division training CFIA NH-90 aircrews
(pilots, crew chiefs, flight engineers) is the constant search for balance between the formal application of strict
procedures while learning technical maneuvers and the freedom of improvisation that should otherwise be left
to any combatant, so that he may adapt using his situational awareness.
IN COMBAT, ONE ONLY DOES WHAT ONE LEARNED – “ TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT”
In contrast to training that might be received in a civilian flight school, one must learn to fly by applying tactical
procedures currently used in the operational forces.
To achieve this goal, it is important to have a team of instructors with extensive military experience and
superior knowledge of recent commitments.
ENCOURAGE TEAMWORK TO TRANSCEND PEOPLE – “ TRAIN AIRCREWS”
Whether in the field of flight safety where the individual is inexorably the weakest link or in the lessons learned
from current commitments where cohesion is described as a key factor of combat effectiveness, teamwork is
essential. Future NH-90 training will incorporate the principles of working as a crew.
DEVELOP SITUATION AWARENESS – “ THE KEY ROLE OF SIMULATION”
Simulation tools are a major part in the education provided at the NH-90 CFIA Center. Used as support in about
70% of the training sessions, simulators offer more than just budgetary savings. The diversity of scenarios and
realistic tactical situations are a real asset for training.
Taking into account guidance from the higher echelon, the evolution of doctrine and lessons learned, which
require additional training or even a shift in the courses provided, the EALAT School, in order to respond as
much as possible the needs of the forces, requires units to assess the quality of the aircrews they receive
(it is notably the subject of cold assessments) in order to continuously improve the skill level of Army Aviation
aircrews.
Thus we’ve come full circle in applying the principle of continuous improvement outlined in the ISO 9001/2008
standard and symbolized by the “Deming’s wheel”, thus making it possible for the EALAT School to be
constantly in touch with the forces and responsive to their requests
23
A simulAtion PoliCy in suPPort
of instruCtion And trAining PoliCies
liEutEnant cOlOnEl Eric mErcK
simulatiOn cOOrDinatOr fOr tHE air manEuvEr functiOn
DEputy HEaD Of stuDiEs anD futurE plans cEll, army aviatiOn cOmmanD
T
N
Once the act of simulation has been
explained, this article will present air-land
battle simulation by demonstrating how a
simulation policy may contribute to an
operational function such as airmobility
and how a simulation and substitution
policy may be used to develop a true
continuum linking instruction, operational
readiness and pre-deployment training.
For the above reasons, it is necessary to describe
the essential parameters in order to enable policy makers to
make informed plans and financial commitments, and allow
human resource managers to organize and manage
the appointment of relevant personnel over time. These
parameters also enable builders to design and construct
the buildings that will house the simulation equipment.
Under these conditions, despite their costs and
the investments they require, simulation systems generate
savings and bring about significant improvements in
instruction and training.
he military naturally favors full-scale
training with men and resources
brought together in a complex operational
environment with real engagements.
Today’s constraints no longer allow us to
bring all of our resources permanently
together. Through substitution, simulation
has made it possible to create sufficient
conditions to provide the necessary realism
in both instruction and training.

simulation satisfies the armed forces’
need for a generally optimized system,
used from basic instruction to
operational commitment, in addition to
or instead of real operational
capabilities, in order to improve
operational readiness and generate
savings.
ew simulation systems prove their worth by
demonstrating an ability to adapt to changing
conflictual situations in areas of instruction and
operational readiness. They work effectively in preparation
for or in addition to real practical tactical training on
weapons, information an/or command systems.
Simulation makes it possible to ensure the uniformity
of several policies including those dealing with firing or
digitization. However, these new systems are costly in both
manpower and financial investment to acquire, develop, and
sometimes operate. It is therefore particularly important to
accurately justify their proven need, describe their planned
use, and program their costs, in both human and financial
terms. It remains then to prudently invest in a gradual
build-up.
Army aviation was compelled to draft a simulation policy
for the Airmobility function in order to establish a founding
document outlining these objectives and multiple
capabilities. This document was to present a strategy
explaining why, how and with which resources the ongoing
need for real simulator equipment (by using simulation and
substitution means) could be rationalized. To answer this
need, it had to be analyzed and organized according to a
continuum, from selection to pre-deployment training.
The fulfillment of this need must therefore be the most
efficient combination of different assets to meet the desired
objective – immediate operational readiness.
To meet their objectives given by Army Aviation, airbases
must be equipped with the required simulation equipment in
order to make it possible to train, instruct, both individually
and collectively, and then to prepare personnel to deploy
helicopters in strict compliance with flight safety.
24
According to Army Aviation, the requirement is based on six principles:
 The combination of training assets must be used in a phased manner to ensure an effective adaptation of the tool to
the educational objective. Thus, a flight trainer (on a fixed base) will only make it possible to learn technical skills and
procedures while a mobile flight simulator will make it possible to grasp complex combat flight body movements in
which the right balance, visualization and body sensations provide key decision-making elements;
 Certain exercises are not feasible in real flight because they generate too much risk for operational aircrews and
helicopters. These exercises, which make all the difference in case of conflict (missile or RPG fire on landing or in-flight
emergencies), must be performed in flight simulators, thus saving lives and airframes;
 Simulation equipment must be located as close as possible to users, inasmuch as acquisition and operating costs
permit, because the profitability of a simulator is dependant on maximum use1. Our aircrews’ overseas deployments
and commitments are such that simulators located far from airbases might only be used two to three weeks annually;
 Efficient use of complex simulators is based on specialist personnel operating synthetic equipment. For Army Aviation,
the stream of Aircrew Ground Instructors will make it possible, once it reaches its target size, to operate simulators to
their utmost capacity over optimized periods with maximum operational availability;
 All Army Aviation simulation equipment must be compatible with the simulation grid of combined arms and joint digital
warfare. International standards required for the interconnection of simulators are natively integrated into Army Aviation
simulator databases;
 Finally the effects of simulation must be controlled by a quality system that makes it possible to grow with a proactive
but pragmatic approach towards the optimal balance between the use of real assets and simulation equipment in
accordance with flight safety;
© Armée de Terre/Jean-Jacques Chatard
1 3,000 hours a year for a flight simulator and from 1,800 to 2,000 hours for a procedure trainer.
25
Starting from the identification of the simulation requirement, the airmobility function simulation policy has made it
possible to progress steadily over time and develop new simulation tools in step with the arrival of new systems and
regulations while strictly fitting into realistic financial planning. It also requires the coordination of training and
the assignment of personnel able to operate the equipment as well as to plan a cost-effective infrastructure without
blocking any unavoidable technical developments.

It is essential to note what a simulation policy may bring to an operational function.
When preparing for a particular war, it is possible to compile environment databases for a theater. Developed with
EDITH2 V3.3, the Army now has a database which very accurately depicts our area of responsibility in Afghanistan.
Thanks to the detailed modeling of Kabul and the accurate depictions of the Kapisa and Surobi valleys, the simulator’s
realistic display of this exercise area makes it possible for Army Aviation aircrews to prepare and to share information on
the environment, the local population and procedures. This database may be transferred to other simulators or virtual
simulation trainers within the Army3.
Other databases available on Army Aviation simulators and trainers also make it possible to train for “any ” war. In fact,
even when preparing for the current principal operation, it is essential to continue training on other skills and theaters that
will inevitably become relevant at the most unexpected moment. Simulation equipment allows the repetition of likely
exercises, the development tactical intelligence, and the revision of tactical knowledge acquired in school, whose retention
is essential.
Additionally, the environments which are modeled are all environment interfaces, so they natively allow combined arms as
well as joint training. Amphibious operations, CCA or CAS operations, as well as air combat may easily be played on
simulators which display aircraft, aircraft carriers, ground units, and even drones. This is why the training center for
CAYMAN (NH-90) aircrews and maintenance technicians will have simulation equipment developed on a joint basis with
the [French] Navy, just as TIGER simulation equipment was developed on an international basis with Germany.
Simulation (associated with substitution) is therefore the means for flexible and versatile training as well as for predeployment training. It makes it possible to train for current operations, but also for any combined arms, joint and allied
war. Simulation provides Army Aviation with the opportunity to support the training of many friendly nations, thus
demonstrating openness towards the outside world.

The release of the simulation policy for the operational function and its adherence to the training policy makes it possible,
after discussions with Army HQ, to promote the objectives of the lead proponent.
Once the target and the planning have been set, military commanders participating in training exercises may develop their
situational awareness. This is why it is important to describe a thoughtful simulation policy that generates significant
savings and increases the combat efficiency of our forces.
2 Entraîneur Didactique Interactif Tactique hélicoptères = helicopter Tactical Interactive Instruction Trainer.
3 It is also available to other services through the DGa/Um TErrE.
26
oPerAtionAl reAdiness
liEutEnant-cOlOnEl stépHanE lE flOc’H - OpEratiOnal rEaDinEss sEctiOn
aviatiOn rEaDinEss cEll - army aviatiOn DivisiOn – HEaDquartErs, lanD fOrcEs cOmmanD
T
he Operational readiness section, aviation Division, headquarters, Land Forces
command, is tasked with developing, planning and conducting training activities
for, on the one hand, its Operating command Post (PcmO) and, on the other hand,
its three subordinate helicopter units.
I
ntegrated in the Land Forces Command’s
Planning Office for Aviation Operations,
the Operational Readiness Section is taskorganized in three cells: Training, Planning
and Operations.
develoPment
The development work’s objective is to define
the general guidelines for training. Intended for
helicopter units, they are released annually.
They are fully consistent with the Land Forces
Command’s biannual directive and are to be found
in a single document, the Annual Directive for
Operational Readiness (DAPO), which is the
reference document on which helicopter units base
their work, and then build their own operational
readiness program.
© Armée de Terre
One of the challenges of this work is to maintain
the right balance between basic skills and new
procedures. In this area the DAPO Directive makes
a distinction between the preparation for “any ”
war and activities related to the preparation for a
“particular ” war.
Beyond contingency operational situations, it is
really about maintaining the fundamental skills of
aviation combat. Experience from recent conflicts
shows that fundamental skills are the only way to
ensure the adaptability of aviation forces. If
the Afghan theater is of course the operational
priority at the moment, it must therefore allow us,
most importantly, to revisit these fundamentals.
27
As regards overseas operations, the development work’s objective is to define schemes for pre-deployment training for
“the” war. It is the whole purpose of pre-deployment training. For Afghanistan, the helicopter battalion selected for forming
the core component of the PAMIR Helicopter Battalion models its preparation on that of the brigade staff responsible for
manning the La Fayette Task Force (TF) CP. Over a period of six months, it is based on a series of check points defined in
conjunction with the Land Forces Command’s pre-deployment training sections, the Aviation Division Cell for Aviation
Readiness (BPOA) and the selected brigade.
PlAnning
At the same time as development work, the Planning cell devises at Y-1 the activities of the year Y.
Conducted in conjunction with aviation combat’s players and supported forces, this work is validated by the Current
Readiness Cell (BCPO), Readiness Division (DPO), Land Forces Command, and then forwarded to Army Aviation Command.
At this stage, only the activities dealing with land forces’ readiness reach Army Aviation Command’s Training Office. It is
then collated with the requests made by the schools and the DGA’s Army Armament Design and Development Agency (STAT)
to finally determine the total annual flying hours recorded in the DM2600 Directive. For 2011, the allowance amounts to
34,000 flying hours, distributed among the three helicopter units and the three permanent helicopter detachments of the
Land Forces Command’s Aviation Division.
As regards the key planning areas in 2011, priorities are set as follows:
 Certification of the command posts of the Land Forces Command’s Aviation Division;
 Aviation combat down to the lowest combined arms echelons; the effort is again made in support of ground units
engaged in Afghanistan. The La Fayette battalions TFs are all supported by the Land Forces Command’s Aviation Division
during their rotation at the Mailly Combat Maneuver Training Center (CENTAC). All company teams conducting a training
period at the Canjuers Operational Assistance Detachment also receive helicopter support;
Increased integration of simulation in the readiness process. As an experiment, combined arms TFs are going to be sent
to the EDITH simulation center of two of the helicopter units of the Land Forces Command’s Aviation Division.
28
© Armée de Terre
Current oPerAtions
Airmobility operational readiness is conducted by two of the cells of the BPOA Office.
The Operations cell is responsible for daily air operations from Level 4 (Army Aviation Task Force) down to Level 7 (Flight Team).
The Training cell is responsible for monitoring staff activities from Level 4 down to Level 1 (Component). It also monitors, in a
centralized way, the fire exercises conducted on DGA sites and with the various specialized formations, i.e. Airmobility and the Navy.
However, 2011 will be primarily highlighted by the Airmobile Division’s participation in the two main Land Forces CP exercises –
FLANDERS and CITADEL-GUIBERT – exercises that are two of the main waypoints in the certification process of its CPs. Let us
recall briefly the significance of this certification.
The transfer of the 4th Airmobile Brigade’s skills to the Land Forces Command’s Airmobile Division resulted in the transformation of
the 4th Airmobile Brigade’s Tactical Operations Center in an Operations Command Post (PCMO). This provides Army Aviation with
the capacity to lead an air-land-heavy combined arms maneuver at Levels 1 and 2. However, unlike the 4th Airmobile Brigade’s CP,
the PCMO is now integrated in a divisional or component CP. Through a four-stage certification process, the options for
employment of this PCMO at Levels 1 and 2 are to be validated in terms of staff techniques and doctrine.
A study had already been conducted by the 4th Airmobile Brigade HQ before its deactivation. It made it possible to identify a model
for organizing the CP. Attempted during the exercise LANNES-FORTEL 2010, this model was validated on the technical side by
the Forces Employment Doctrine Center (CDEF). The 4th Airmobile Brigade then formalized this task-organization in a handbook
that is now used as a reference during deployments. Apart from these technical aspects, LANNES-FORTEL 2010 had also made it
possible to initiate the study of the PCMO’s new positioning within a division-level headquarters.
The Operational Readiness Section is to lead the certification process in conjunction with the two force headquarters, the RRC-FR,
the Forces Employment Doctrine Center and the Army Aviation Command’s Cell of Studies and Prospective. At the end of
the exercise FLANDERS, an interim report is to be submitted to the CDEF. The project will also be presented to the Lyon-based
National Air Operations Center in the first half of 2011.
For a certification in early 2012, the final report is to be submitted by December 2011 to the Commander, Land Forces Command,
after exercise CITADEL-GUIBERT
29
The AviATiOn DivisiOn’s COMMAnD POsTs
LiEuTEnanT-COLOnEL STéPhanE LE FLOC’h - OPEraTiOnaL rEadinESS SECTiOn
aviaTiOn rEadinESS CELL - arMy aviaTiOn diviSiOn - hEadquarTErS, Land FOrCES COMMand
In February 2011, the exercise FTSIC 2011 opened a training cycle which will end in November 201 with
the certification of the Aviation Division’s command posts – the PCMO1 and the Aviation Command Post.
While the transfer of the former 4th Army Aviation Brigade’s organic skills to Land Forces Command (LFC)
took place in full transparency, the integration of the PCMO at division level (Level 2) or component level
(Level 1) is a challenge that the certification stages intend to overcome.
Before highlighting the PCMO characteristics, let us present in simple terms what it is and what
the Aviation CP’s contribution is.
The PCMO
The PCMO is a command structure tasked to plan, coordinate and conduct aviation actions at the division or component (LCC2) levels.
It is manned by about twenty personnel distributed among the cells that previously were found in the 4th Aviation Brigade’s TOC3.
The establishment of a PCMO within a command post is not systematic. It depends on the number of aviation units to maneuver.
Once a volume of forces corresponding to a reinforced Aviation Task Force is exceeded, i.e. one to two aviation battalion TFs, manning a
PCMO becomes necessary. For a smaller volume of forces, a Planning and Current Operations team, the Aviation Support Detachment,
is enough to augment
the selected staff.
In the current
employment scenarios,
this assumption is of
course the most likely.
As part of the certification, the PCMO option,
however, was chosen
because it was considered
more appropriate to
validate the ability to
maneuver large aviation
forces.
Depending on the level
of employment of
the aviation component,
the PCMO may therefore
be integrated into a
divisional or LCC
command post.
Integration means that it
is incorporated into the
augmented structure to
become an integral part
of it. It may then take over
all the work carried out
by the Aviation Support
Detachment’s members
in the other CP cells (e.g.
the FSCC4 at division level
or the JEC5 at LCC level).
1 PCMO: Operations Command Post.
2 LCC: Land Component Command.
3 TOC: Tactical Operations Center.
4 FSCC: Fire Support Coordination Cell.
DOCTrine TACTique # 22
5 JEC: Joint Effect Center.
MArCh 2012
30
OrganizaTiOnaL iMPaCT On arMy aviaTiOn EMPLOyMEnT
The AviATiOn COMMAnD POsT
The PCMO also has a lighter structure, the Aviation CP, to conduct specific phases of the maneuver. In the event of an operation in
depth for example, a team with fewer than ten people deploys by helicopter to a field TOC.
Four PUMA-type aircraft are required to establish a single rotation. When it is active, the PCMO continues to operate, which means
that there is no COLOC6 to perform.
The Aviation CP also has the characteristic of not being the PCMO’s exclusive command asset. If it is provided for by planning, it may
indeed be used by a combined arms brigade as a tactical CP. This assumption will be specifically tested on a technical basis during
the next FTSIC exercise in February 2011.
AviATiOn BrigADe’s TOC/PCMO – whAT Are The DifferenCes?
The transformation of the Aviation Brigade’s TOC in a PCMO is not a fundamental change. Internally, it still has the key cells of a combined
arms brigade’s TOC – Future Maneuver, Current Operations, Assessment, Intelligence, Vertical Dimension, Combat Support, 2D and NBC,
and Operational Logistics. If an Aviation CP is manned, it also has two liaison detachments, intended to coordinate aviation operations
with the major adjacent units.
From an operating standpoint, however, the PCMO, differs significantly from its predecessor. Firstly, with the exception of the Aviation CP,
the Aviation Division no longer has the organic assets to control its own Aviation Groups. Integration into a division or LCC level
headquarters requires the use of modular blocks made available by land forces. Seven mobile CP shelters are now required to set up
the PCMO’s TOC. As regards the Aviation CP, the equipment of the 4th Headquarters and Signals Company is now held by the 53rd RT7
where this specific expertise is maintained.
This integration also implies a redefinition of staff positions. This is certainly the most significant change brought about by this new
disposition. While the deployment of the Aviation Brigade’s TOC apart from the divisional or LCC CP required it to be augmented by liaison
officers, the PCMO is now an integral part of the augmented CPs, thus providing an unprecedented level of integrated “aviation”
expertise.
Far from disrupting the existing structure, the PCMO therefore provides real added value to both the Division and the Corps in terms of
advice, planning and the conduct of aviation operations.
The redefinition of positions is also reinforced with a new definition of tasks. In a context where human resources are scarce, the PCMO
employment must be optimized by avoiding duplication.
At the command level, the PCMO remains under an Army Aviation general officer. He is mainly dedicated to command his subordinate
units, but he may also advise higher commanders on issues of aviation employment.
For Army Aviation officers embedded in Force Headquarters or the RRC-FR8, a new focus on G35 or G5 activities seems to be emerging.
While maintaining close contact with the cells tasked with coordination, e.g. the FSCC or AOCC9 cells, the PCMO drafts Army Aviation
orders while maintaining the necessary capabilities to advise the Force Commander or participate in the drafting of orders for Army
Aviation. (On this point, the certification will make it possible to determine whether to continue drafting fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)
in order to supplement the Army Aviation Annex of the LCC or division’s orders.) Experience has shown that an Army Aviation Annex
supplemented by detailed execution orders ensures that Aviation TFs perform satisfactorily.
The transfer of the former 4th Aviation Brigade’s skills to the Aviation Division has therefore resulted in a transformation of its TOC,
the main tool for operational command, in a PCMO. This development is now following a certification process to validate
the employment options defined in the implementation documents. These reflections demonstrate the extent of the work to be
conducted. Beyond the drafting of procedures, this project assumes a continuous exchange of information with the Force
Headquarters and the RRC-FR. It also requires close and constant monitoring from the Army Aviation Command’s Office of Studies
and Prospective.
Due to the organic transfer in 2010, 2011 will be the year of the operational change
6 COLOC: Change of Location of Command.
7 régiment de Transmissions (a Signal Battalion).
8 rrC-Fr: rapid reaction Corps - France.
9 aOCC: air Operations Coordination Cell.
MArCh 2012
31
MAinTenAnCe PrinCiPles
fOr ArMy AviATiOn’s uniTs
MAinTenAnCe in iTs
“BuilDing-uP PhAse”
LiEuTEnanT COLOnEL OLiviEr aSSET
hEad OF LOgiSTiCS SECTiOn,
arMy aviaTiOn diviSiOn, CFT1
I
n order to align with recent studies
conducted to ensure the consistency
between the new concept of employment
of helicopters, the modernization of landbased maintenance equipment and
the Army’s target structure, the Army Staff
decided in 20082 to assign the steering of
aeronautical maintenance management to
COMALAT3 and to share the conduct of this
maintenance between CFT and COMALAT.
1 CFT (Commandement de la force terrestre) = Land Force Command.
2 Order N°50045/DEF/EMAT/PP/BMCO/Aé dated 12 Nov 2008.
3 COMALAT (commandement de l’ALAT) = army aviation Command.
This new sharing of responsibilities was initiated during
summer 2009 by the transfer of the former Airmobility
Division of DCMAT4 to COMALAT and by the new distribution
of roles between the then involved parties: COMALAT,
the 4th Aviation Brigade and the new Maintenance
Division of CFT.
The period 2009-2010 was hence a transition year during
which part of the former DCMAT’s responsibilities were taken
over by the Logistics Branch of the Aviation Brigade,
thus allowing the Maintenance Division to focus on its
“building up”5.
The new aeronautical maintenance organization was
completed on 30th June 2010 with the deactivation of
the 4th Aviation Brigade and the transfer of its roles to
the CFT’s Aviation Division. However, management goals
have not been fully realized since, in the first half of 2011,
the Maintenance Division stands at only 75% of its manpower
(6 persons out of 8) while COMALAT’s Maintenance Division
faces a shortage of manpower as well.
4 DCMAT (Direction centrale du matériel de l’Armée de terre) = army Materiel Command.
5 Order N°50045/DEF/EMAT/PP/BMCO/Aé dated 12 Nov 2008.
MArCh 2012
32
OrganizaTiOnaL iMPaCT On arMy aviaTiOn EMPLOyMEnT
A TwO-heADeD
OrgAnizATiOn
While the aeronautical maintenance
organization aims to mirror that of
the land maintenance system, it
remains unique in that it shares
responsibilities within
the contracting domain.
Thus a specific domain was created
in which the CFT’s Maintenance
Division provides aeronautical
maintenance for the 3 RHC helicopter
units, prepositioned forces and
detachments deployed in overseas
operations, while COMLAT carries out
the remainder of the maintenance
(centers and schools, GAMSTAT6,
fixed wing flight, 9th Army Aviation
Support Battalion).
The AMAinT 7: A COnsisTenT level
The new functional chains of land and aeronautical
maintenance structures within the CFT domain have seen
the creation of a new link: AMAINT cells. The range of their
roles and their insertion into the chain of command
between employment and maintenance allows them
to become elements of standardization within the units
in which they are employed: Aviation Division for
the 3 helicopter units (RHC), the Army Special Forces
Brigade (BFST) for the 4th RHCFS and the specialized
brigades for the remaining operational functions.
These aeronautical and combined arms AMAINT cells are
not yet included in the table of organization and equipment
of the CFT Aviation Division, but, as soon as they are
manned, they will complete the “ building-up” of the land
forces’ maintenance organization.
lessOns leArneD
The notion of differentiated conduct of maintenance
between the operational units and the other units and
structures of Army aviation is not in line with the assets’
comprehensive management. This necessary adjustment
will allow for the better use of ever more scarce resources.
Partnerships and mutual reinforcements, in regards to both
readiness and deployments, time and again reveal daily
interactions.
Finally, in order to make sure that the whole organization is
fully consistent and allows the decision making process to
take place at each level, each echelon of aeronautical
maintenance must have its corresponding level of
responsibility in the field of aircraft employment.
The performance for this new aeronautical maintenance
structure will rest on its ability to face current and future
challenges: the integration of the new-generation aircraft
that will most likely cause high tensions in the field of
human resources9, or the accomplishment of the operations
contract10, which is characterized by a high number of
detachments to be simultaneously supported
The first lessons learned highlight the necessity to fine-tune
this new organization by more effectively sharing
the responsibilities in the field of project management,
especially regarding external organizations such as
the SIMMAD8 or the industry private companies.
6 GAMSTAT (Groupement Aéromobilité de la Section Technique de l’Armée de
Terre) = aviation group of the army Technical division: the gaMSTaT is the technical
and tactical evaluation center for army aviation’s equipment. its mission is to provide
the army hq with relevant and realistic options for equipment of helicopter units.
7 AMAINT (adjoint maintenance) = deputy for maintenance.
8 SIMMAD (structure intégrée de maintien en condition opérationnelle des
matériels de la Défense) = integrated structure for the operational maintenance
the defense’s aeronautical equipment.
9 Letter N°0687/DEF/COMALAT/BPrSA/S.rh/NP dated 10th Feb 2010.
10 In French, the « contrat opérationnel » expresses the overall missions a service or
branch of service is to be able to accomplish.
MArCh 2012
33
Planning The CommiTmenT
of army heliCoPTers
in CombaT oPeraTions
LieuTenanT-COLOneL FranCk aiGubeLLe
army aviaTiOn OPeraTiOnaL enGaGemenT CeLL
CFT/Div aerO (FrenCh LanD FOrCes COmmanD/aviaTiOn DivisiOn)
T
he force generation process of helicopter units is performed within the framework of GPPO1,
even if this procedure is not always strictly formalized. The aviation division (Div aerO) of
CFT2, and, more specifically the beOa (bureau engagement opérationnel aéromobilité: aviation
operational commitment cell), provides expertise within GPPO.
One of the features of the force generation process of a helicopter module is the integration of
the logistic aspect during the planning process.
The force commitment and planning process:
1 GPPO: Groupe Pluridisciplinaire de Planification Opérationnelle : cross-disciplinary operational planning group.
2 CFT : Commandement des Forces Terrestres (Land Forces Command).
doCTrine TaCTique # 22 march 2012
34
COmmiTmenT OF air mObiLe uniTs
The CPCO (centre de planification et de conduite des
opérations: Joint Operations Planning and Command
& Control Center) is tasked with planning, at the joint level,
operations in which France may be committed.
There are three types of planning:
• Early planning, which consists in developing plans
based on predicted future events or circumstances;
• Crisis response planning, in which plans are initiated
in response to an existing or looming crisis. This type
of planning requires a prompt process of coordination
and approval;
• Emergency planning, implemented in case of a crisis.
Within the context of that planning process, the joint
operational planning group develops the concept of
operations (CONOPS) which is approved by the Armed
Forces Chief of Staff. Analysis of the CONOPS task list
allows for the development of a statement of requirement
(SOR) for the force.
Army participation in theater planning results in activation
within CFT2 in LILLE of a cross-disciplinary operational
planning group (GPPO), the planning organization for
the Army forces chain.
It is directed by G5 of Land Operational HQ, through a
CPCO mandate, and its organization is modular (it is
composed of experts from the various CFT departments,
as well as external or foreign contingency reinforcements).
Within the context of planning for the operational land
component (Special Forces excepted), GPPO includes
all capabilities and operating systems, which have been
identified to accomplish the assigned mission.
Consequently, helicopter capabilities will essentially
be determined by Army Aviation assets detached from
the three RHCs (helicopter units).
gPPo (CfT) aCTivaTion
On July 1st 2010 the Aviation division of Land Forces
Command HQ (DIV AERO of CFT) took over responsibilities
held by 4th BAM. The brigadier general commanding
the aviation division, one of the six divisions of the Land
Forces HQ, serves as both the aviation adviser to the land
forces commander (COMFT3), and the authority
immediately above4 those three helicopter units;
he performs the planning and drives the unit’s preparation
as well as their operational commitment.
The aviation division is organized in two cells:
• The aviation readiness cell (BPOA: Bureau Préparation
Opérationnelle Aéromobilité), which is tasked with
the operational training of the battalions, in particular
monitoring and controlling pre-deployment training,
as well as with the operational training of staff
personnel of DIV AERO. This division is expected to man
an operational CP tailored to command a GAM
(groupement aéromobile : a battalion-sized TF)
• The aviation operational commitment cell (BEOA:
Bureau Engagement Opérationnel Aéromobilité) is
responsible for conducting the commitment of units and
organizing their logistical support. On behalf of DIV
AERO, this cell contributes to activities linked to
commitment planning. Within the framework of the force
generation process, it thus participates in the setting-up
of aviation detachments in anticipation of their
deployment (development of the Tables of Organization
and Equipment (TUEM: Tableau unique d’effectifs et des
matériels)); it also monitors their building-up from
personnel and equipment resources of the RHCs
Helicopters units through daily monitoring.
Officers from BEOA are Army Aviation experts within
the GPPO team. In this capacity they are selected and
assigned the tasks linked to that planning process. This
enables the Aviation division to meet the emergency
planning requirements.
forCe generaTion
The Aviation component of an operational land force is
defined in the scope of GPPO activities. It is built up from
reference Aviation modules, similar to each combat
function in PIA 05-402 (publication interarmées: joint
publication).
These generic modules will nevertheless be tailored
according to the requirements of the assigned mission
and with regards to available resources within the context
of force generation activities.
Within the context of emergency planning the CPCO may
decide to commit the Guépard detachment. Its Aviation
component has the capabilities of a mixed aviation team
with 3 light and 3 utility helicopters (PIA 05-402 ALAT 602type module). This emergency module can be the initial
backbone of the aviation force that would be deployed if
more sizeable assets were required.
The deployment of a detachment is performed by BEOA in
liaison with the Land Operational Headquarters which is
the lead element for the kinematics of force projection, as
well as the Maintenance Division (DIV MAINT) of Land
Forces Command which directs the force’s combat service
support.
The structure of an Aviation detachment usually includes
4 modules, possessing the proficiencies necessary for
a deployed helicopter unit:
• One command module tailored to the size of
the detachment and to its position within the force.
This includes a SIC (Système Informatisé de
3 COmFT : Commandant des Forces Terrestres (Land Forces Commander).
4 ais : autorité immédiatement supérieure (authority immediately above).
35
SIRPA TERRE
Commandement: command and control information
system (CCIS)) team, and may comprise liaison teams
to the reinforced unit;
Selection of major equipment (helicopters) is based mostly
on the remaining service capabilities of each aircraft
before major overhaul or periodical inspections6.
• One “aviation environment ” module, which may
comprise the following specialties: air control, fire
security, supply and Immediate Extraction (IMEX) team;
Selection is performed after checking with the equipmentowning unit as well as the BEOA logistical team.
This selection should also consider alternate aircraft;
it should be possible to deploy these on the theater of
operations7.
• One crew module, comprising operational crew
members (Military Occupation Specialty)5;
• One aviation maintenance module.
logisTiCal suPPorT
Logistics is a crucial aspect in the setting-up of an aviation
detachment. Therefore, it should be integrated in concert
with the start of the force generation process, as
the duration of the mission as well as the conditions
in which support will be provided will determine
the composition of the maintenance module.
Any aviation detachment with long-term commitment,
regardless of the number of deployed aircraft, must be
equipped with a deployment kit. It can then be supported
and carry out preventive and corrective maintenance.
These deployment kits include tools, technical booklets,
spare parts as well as repair and ancillary equipment.
Because each kit will be specific to the type of deployed
aircraft, this is a crucial step in the building-up of a
detachment. The BEOA logistical team will also ensure
the availability of kits specific to deployed aircraft 
5 Future designation to refer to the gunner mOs, today performed by Prbs (Pelotons de reconnaissance et de balisage: pathfinders teams).
6 as a general rule, overhaul of the deployed aircraft will be performed after 4 months or 100’ flight hours.
7 This concept applies more particularly to utility helicopters, which have different capabilities (20mm guns, winch, weather radars…).
36
ARMY AVIATION AS AN INTEGRAL PART
OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
(COS : Commandement des Opérations Spéciales)
COLONEL MICHEL BONNAIRE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS HQ/HEAD, EMPLOYMENT AND PROSPETIVES STUDIES DEPARTMENT
a
s a direct result of Lessons Learned from the First Gulf war (1990-1991),
the French special Operations Command (COs) was created in 1992.
it incorporated the special Forces in existence at that time under the same
command. Taking into account the potential added value of the vertical
dimension, particularly that provided by helicopters, COs immediately
incorporated rotary wing aircraft as well, thus providing specific
additional capabilities.
T
hus new capabilities appeared, dramatically widening the spectrum
of possible special action by integrating intelligence missions
simultaneously with the planning process, with a view to accomplishing
infiltration, combat support, destruction, and exfiltration missions while
using the vertical dimension, as a perfect complement to the other
components of special Forces.
T
hese special missions, performed by using the flexibility of air combat
assets, have obviously entailed expanding the size of the aviation
component of special Operations. as a unit dedicated to these operations,
it is employed as a full-fledge component of special Forces.
37
1. hisTory and size evoluTion
of The sf heliCoPTer uniT:
n 1992, the helicopter capability in support of
Special Operations Command (COS) started with
three UH crews made available to 4th RHCM,
garrisoned in PAU within 5th RHC. In 1993, a special
operations UH company was activated: EOS1
(Special Operation Helicopter Company 1), initially
with PUMA helicopters, but later reinforced with
COUGARs in 1995. In 1996, the temporary
designation “Détachement ALAT des Opérations
Spéciales” (DAOS: Special Operations Aviation
Detachment) was given to it. This title became the
official designation in 1997, when the detachment
became a battalion in its own right.
4ème RHFS
I
The requirement for a specific fire support
capability appeared rapidly and resulted in the creation of
EOS2 (Special Operations Helicopter Company 2) in 1998,
equipped with light helicopters of the GAZELLE type
(20 mm gun, MISTRAL air-to-air missiles, HOT missiles,
then VIVIANE / HOT), to provide additional intelligence
and fire support capabilities.
In 2000, the Land Special Forces Brigade was created,
and quite naturally, the DAOS was integrated, while its
building-up was still in progress.
The reorganization of Special Forces performed after
the 09.11 attacks induced the Joint Chief of Staff to order,
on an emergency basis, the manufacturing and
procurement of a Special Forces helicopter
(HUS: hélicoptère unités spéciales). The EOS3 (Special
Operations Helicopter Company 3), created in 2005,
is currently equipped with this helicopter, the EC725
CARACAL.
The French Department of Defense decided in 2006 to
allocate a specific utility helicopter unit to meet the specific
requirements of the National Gendarmerie Intervention
Group (GIGN: Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie
Nationale). The joint Helicopter Group was thus created
and included within the DAOS (Special Operations Aviation
Detachment). It was composed of two PUMA companies:
Special Operation Helicopter Company 4 (Land) (EOS4
Terre), and Special Operations Flight 5 (Air) (EOS5 Air).
The missions of the Joint Helicopter Group (GIH) were then
extended to the French Police Intervention Group (RAID: unité
de recherche, d’assistance, d’intervention et de dissuasion de
la police nationale) in 2009 for support missions.
The DAOS building-up was still progressing with
the creation, in 2007, of Special Operations Helicopter
Company 6 (EOS6). The addition of TIGRE helicopters
resulted in a dramatic increase in their attack capabilities,
in particular fire support.
Another step forward was taken in 2009 when the DAOS
was transformed into a battalion.This was the only unit
activation during a period when many units were
disbanded; its designation was “4ème RHFS: Régiment
d’Hélicoptères des Forces Spéciales”.
The Army Chief of Staff has now decided to consolidate
the Special Forces Caracal within 4th RHFS, while including
some AIR assets from the CAZAUX (Special Helicopter
Company / Pyrénées) in the PAU unit with 1 CARACAL, a
flight crew, and 8 technical-logistical personnel (PTL) being
added in 2010. 1 CARACAL, two crews and 8 PTLs will join
them in the summer of 2011.
This unit, comprising some forty helicopters of all types, is
now wholly integrated and, above all, dedicated to special
operations.
2. a Cos-inTegraTed, sPeCial forCesdediCaTed uniT.
Organically included within the Army, 4th Special Forces
Helicopter Battalion (RHFS) is under command of Land
Forces Command (organic link and support), and is a
subordinate of Land Special Forces Brigade. Its personnel
originate from Army and Air Force formations, subject to
assessment and specific selection (just like for any other
Army/Air Force/Navy Special Forces organization).
Operational employment and readiness training are
directed and conducted by Special Operations Command
HQ (EMCOS) under command of the general officer
commanding special operations (GCOS). Thus there is
continuity in preparation, as well as in employment, by
implementing the “ train as you fight ” mentality whenever
the “peacetime” deployment rules allow.
The ability to plan training autonomously and achieve
common readiness is one of the major benefits of this
unit’s integration into the Special Forces. It enables each
soldier to acquire response capabilities on the job, which
can prove to be crucial in the often sensitive operations
performed by Special Forces.
38
This specific readiness training is organized based on two
seemingly dissimilar main ideas. On the one hand training
is influenced by the COS motto “ Faire autrement ”
(“do it differently ”) which encourages investigating
innovative courses of action, procedures and deployment
processes. On the other hand its dedicated purpose is
to provide COS with a permanent aviation capability,
deployable immediately. It is apt to be used outside
the “pre-deployment training ” concept and commited to
unpredictable or previously unlikely conflicts or operations.
It is used in particular in areas of the third dimension:
air assault, rope suspension techniques (fast roping,
abseiling, Jacob’s ladder, nacelle fashion, hoisting, etc.),
airdrop, intelligence collection (FLIR, thermal, night vision
devices, cameras, etc.), fire support (on board or provided
by helicopters), path opening, supply, infiltration or
exfiltration of personnel or equipment, and all other
missions or systems operated between commandos,
helicopters, Air Force or Navy assets.
Constant common training is necessary to achieve a
mutual understanding and ensure proper application
by everybody of all special standard operating procedures
(SOPs). Applying these special SOPs, developed through
close cooperation between all components under
responsibility of COS, is the key to the success of
the mission.
A dedicated unit, this battalion is integrated in the early
stages of the planning process just like any other
component. The range of its capabilities can be
demonstrated and investigated during research work
related to operation design.
The battalion is much more than merely a rapid tactical
transportation or fire support unit to support commandos
on the ground: it provides autonomous operating capabilities
as well as combined operating capabilities. Thus it can
generate, if requested, specific aviation modules which are
tailored to the TFs or detachments established for a given
mission. These modules always include utility helicopters
and reconnaissance and attack helicopters. Thus this mix,
under the command of a single leader, can combine all
actions required by special operations such as
action/demolition, intelligence and insertion/extraction. That
particular type of employment requires that the assigned
module leader possess a thorough knowledge of the tactical
maneuver of ground forces, and the capacity to accurately
manage his assets, in accordance with the technical and
tactical capabilities of each aircraft. Thus, the modules are
systematically committed (successfully) in conventional as
well as special missions. All recent operations highlighted a
requirement for a combination of assets, and the deployment
of TIGRE FS (Special Forces) helicopters is a much anticipated
asset in support of helicopters which have already been
allocated to 4th RHFS.
4ème RHFS
This effective integration, illustrated by the synergy of
Intelligence/Action/Aviation combat power developed
within the Land Special Forces Brigade, as well as mutual
knowledge and operational practice, enable that unit to
be acknowledged as an essential component of Special
Forces.
3. 4Th sPeCial forCes heliCoPTer
baTTalion (rhfs) as an inTegral
ComPonenT of sPeCial forCes
39
Like all missions, a special operation requires thorough
preparation and a well articulated end state. The concept
of operation process considers all possibilities provided
by all available capabilities, including those provided
by the employment of helicopters. Leaving as little of a
footprint on the ground as possible, whenever necessary,
is one of the tenets of these operations; consequently,
employment of aerial dimension reduces delays and
minimizes the potential geographical constraints (or even
turning geographical features into an advantage, as in
the case of establishing positions on high ground).
This is also one of the reasons why 4th RHFS, an integral
component of Special Forces, functions similarly to other
COS units, by contributing to the manning of Special
Forces TF CPs, particularly for command of the various
specialist cells.
Lastly, the commitment of SF helicopters, alone or as a
complement to other SF components usually has strategiclevel effect. That commitment may be indicative of strong
national gesture, or, conversely, may appear as a limited
action (minimizing a specific action) in space and time 
hus, to quote Army Chief of Staff
General IRASTORZA (in EAALAT Aviation
Branch School of July 10th, 2008), just
as “Aviation is consubstantial with the Army ”,
4th RHFS is an integral part of COS.
The capabilities it provides are subject to
the development of new technologies and
to the imagination and inventiveness of SF
personnel. The success of special operations
relies foremost on the thorough integration
and mutual knowledge of the personnel
involved, and on their ability to think and
“ do it differently ” (COS motto) in missions
of strategic-level scope.
T
40
The CommiTmenTs of army aviaTion uniTs
by LieuTenanT COLOneL Thierry LeTeLLier
DOCTrine seCTiOn – LessOns LearneD – LOG
army aviaTiOn COmmanD (researCh anD PrOsPeCTive sTuDies)
«
This week was marked by the engagement of attack helicopters. an mixed
aviation team (1 Tigre and 1 Gazelle) intervened several times as of 1200 hours
in support of the battle Group … in the context of the operation … initially,
the Tigre fired 90 30 mm rounds ivO … on a position held by insurgents and
subsequently received small arms fire (saFire). The patrol intervened a second
time, firing 58 30 mm rounds and 10 rockets, enabling the ground forces to
withdraw. in the afternoon, because of a mechanical problem on the original
Tigre, another Tigre took off from … as the battle Group was again under enemy
fire, the patrol initiated an attack, firing 145 30 mm rounds on the north flank
of … , to the east of … , allowing the withdrawal of …”
On … , 2 impacts were observed on one of the Tigre’s main rotor blades.»
T
he weekly reports from the detachments, end of mission reports as well as after action reports, appear in quick
succession and continuously feed the databases of the Lessons Learned Cell of COMALAT (Army Aviation Command)
as well as those of EALAT (Aviation Branch school), of DIV AERO (Aviation Division) of Land Forces Command and its
battalions.
Beyond the necessary archiving work, these “glorious episodes ”, are meticulously scrutinized and methodically analyzed
in the same way as the more commonplace experiences of the men and women (pilots, mechanics, air traffic controllers,
firemen and all support personnel) of Army Aviation in order to extract the lessons which will then be gradually fed, in
various forms, into the doctrinal knowledge corpus, training processes, and the analyses of future requirements of aviation
combat.
Current events determine doctrine. We are thus forced to observe that most of the recent lessons learned were identified
inAfghanistan. They are useful complements to the skills acquired by Army Aviation during almost 60 years of military
experience; however, they do not fundamentally change the courses of action originating from a general framework and
tailored to the specific constraints of each theater of operations.
These practical lessons learned address the whole spectrum of aviation operations, but they do not necessarily share direct
links. Consequently, so as not to confuse the reader, the following study will be organized according to a familiar logic,
emphasizing an analysis of lessons related to the environment, enemy (ENY) then to friendly forces (FF).
doCTrine TaCTique # 22
march 2012
41
1. analysis of lessons learned relaTed To The environmenT and The enemy.
FLiGhT anD COmbaT TeChniques PermiT TO Diminish emPLOymenT resTriCTiOns reLaTeD
TO The envirOnmenT, buT nOT TO GeT riD OF Them.
n Afghanistan, especially at night, the ability to
distinguish relief is quite restricted in the narrow valleys
and visual contrast is limited. AGL Assessment is rendered
difficult because of a lack of two-dimensional elements
(trees, houses, buildings) which can be used as reference
points. The ground is quite level and covered with dust,
stones and rock, whose size is difficult to determine.
This difficulty is compounded by the relief, which creates
slope effects (loss of the horizon). Subsequently, it
becomes difficult to assess the height of the ridges to fly
over. To these constraints may be added the hazards
resulting from the loss of reference points while landing in
a dusty environment.
SIRPA Terre
I
Additionally, flight altitude depends as much on the weather
as on threat over the action area. Depending on light
intensity, altitude may be increased, even if terrain flight is still possible. The transit to the area of operations may be
performed in a tactical low-level (particularly by the Viviane Team), or at very low altitude, except for flights over urban or
suburban areas. On reaching the area, crew members perform the landing in accordance with the situation.
beCause OF a muLTi-FaCeTeD ThreaT anD very sTriCT rOes, POsiTive iDenTiFiCaTiOn OF The TarGeT
is a CruCiaL asPeCT OF The DeCisiOn-makinG PrOCess.
nsurgents know very well how to use their environment to evade identification and strikes by coalition forces. Thus crews
have observed that in daylight, thermal devices are not efficient enough to ensure accurate targeting because the ground
is heat-saturated. By night, insurgents use natural cover (vegetation, terrain features, rocks…) as well as various shields
(blankets) as thermal concealment.
I
In these conditions, the sighting systems of the Tigre (“ TV ” STRIX main sight and “direct optical ”) prove to be quite useful
for daylight direct observation. On the other hand, thermal IR remains the most useful observation asset at night.
saFire (smaLL arm Fire): a PermanenT ThreaT ThaT requires TaiLOreD resPOnses.
tatistics very clearly show that small arms (up to 12.7 mm) are the principal threat to helicopters in the Afghan theater,
though the surface-to-air missile threat should not be neglected.
S
There are a variety of technical responses depending on the equipment aboard the aircraft, such as missile launching
detection systems, decoys, armored plates and on-board weapon systems (self-protection and response capabilities).
Tactical responses are taught during the basic course, practiced during readiness training, and then applied during the
mission.
Aircrews begin with a thorough exploitation of the available intelligence over the action area, followed by the perfecting of
the necessary evasive/responsive maneuvers, learned during basic training, and repeatedly rehearsed prior to deployment.
42
Nap-of-earth flight, at a height and speed adapted to the threat, must be performed during operations in “ insurgent
controlled ” areas. This type of flight restricts opportunities for detection and fire by the enemy. However, in order to reduce
nuisance to the populace in densely populated areas, it should not be systematically performed over the area of
operations.
Consequently, night missions are favored, as the enemy is not equipped to fight efficiently in these conditions.
Yet, flights out of range of infantry light weapons and RPG rocket launchers (less than 600 m from the ground) are performed
depending on the tactical situation and mission. Statistically, the most dangerous altitude is between 100 and 600 m.
The LanDinG Phase OF FLiGhT when uTiLiTy heLiCOPTers are PiCkinG uP PersOnneL Or LanDinG is risky.
ir assault landing and especially
the embarkation of ground troops
on high terrain are frequent courses of
action in the theater of operations.
Insurgents locate landing areas, then
watch and wait for the helicopters to
come for troop recovery. As they know
the terrain perfectly, they try to infiltrate
as close as possible to the landing zone
(LZ), and stay concealed, avoiding any
contact. They wait patiently for the
helicopters to come back and then fire
rifle-launched grenades or light infantry
weapons while the UHs land or take off.
Consequently ground troop’s pick-up
zones (PZ) must be secured preventively
within a rather restricted radius, and be
covered by reconnaissance / attack
helicopters.
SIRPA Terre
A
The concepts of securing, then covering LZs should be understood as early as pre-deployment training by all players.
The air landing process has become an integral part of the maneuver, involving fire support and intelligence assets as well
as ground units and helicopters. Air assault landing procedures and coordination measures should be fully understood by
troops and crews, in order to reduce time on the ground as much as possible.
2. lessons drawn from friendly forCes’ aCTion.
awareness OF The TaCTiCaL siTuaTiOn by Crews shOuLD be ensureD ThrOuGhOuT The inTervenTiOn.
light procedures and techniques carried out and taught in Army Aviation allow combat requirements to be met with
the utmost safety and security. Preparation for a night mission will be longer, because the necessary coordination
elements are more numerous. Additionally, operation of aircraft and equipment necessary for flight in Night Vision Goggle
(NVG) mode necessitates additional time. A large-scale air mobile operation requires an incompressible time window for
planning and preparation: “ Proper Preparation Prevents Poor Performance”. This by no means rules out the response
capability of a helicopter module. It enables the crews to control the environment in which they fight, and enables the other
land units to understand the helicopter maneuver of the operation, and what they can expect from it.
The tactical HQs of the battalions of Helicopters Units play a crucial role in that process of planning, preparation and
conduct of operations.
F
43
The DeveLOPmenT OF mODuLariTy anD COmPLemenTariTy OF weaPOn sysTems.
he mixed Reconnaissance / Attack helicopter team (Tigre and Gazelle Viviane) or Reconnaissance / Attack and Utility /
Assault helicopters – is the basic module of aviation combat. The module leaders must absolutely know the assets and
limitations of each weapon system; they must also know everything about the command of these modules and have great
tactical understanding.
T
The Tigre / Gazelle module allows for a “complement ” to the Tigre’s firepower, provided by its 30 mm gun and 68 mm
rockets, thanks to the accuracy and power of the HOT missile.
In a reconnaissance phase, this combination profits from the Gazelle’s stealth as well as the observation capabilities of its
Viviane observation sights. It will be more specifically used in scouting missions. The Tigre, with its high speed and
firepower, will operate more specifically in response action, particularly in returning fire.
The mixed Reconnaissance / Attack – Utility / Assault module allows the performance of air assault landing, air movement
and logistical support missions (particularly MEDEVAC), in the best safety conditions.
SIRPA Terre
Protection of utility helicopters by attack helicopters is crucial, especially during the hazardous phases of take-off/landing,
and embarkation / debarkation of personnel within hazardous areas. We can then observe at once the decisive or even
deterrent effect of AHs on insurgents. Organization into mixed modules allows units to make use of complementary
systems, and operate fully within the space-time framework of land maneuver.
44
PrOven eFFiCienCy OF new-GeneraTiOn heLiCOPTers in FireFiGhTs.
nterventions, particularly at night under enemy fire, corroborate the first-rate operational capabilities of the Tigre.
Its firepower, self-protection and liaison systems enable it to be committed to multinational, combined arms and joint
engagements.
I
Usually, the Close Combat Attack (CCA) procedure is favored by land forces over the Close Air Support (CAS). Based on a
simple procedure and direct liaison between the supported unit and the crew, CCA allows for efficient and pragmatic
helicopter fire support for ground forces by facilitating the integration of helicopters within the ground maneuver, in
permanent compliance with ROEs, regardless of the tactical situation. Moreover, it improves the survivability of crews;
the crews take charge of the targets and are responsible for the decision to open fire (after authorization by the “ground
commander”); they adjust attack flight paths according to their assessment of the ground maneuver and of the threat.
The CAS procedure, which aims at delivering rounds on a target, requires the deployment of a FAC. Thanks to his expertise
and specific equipment, the FAC describes the target accurately, and indicates the approach route to the crew, as well as the
type of ammunition to be used, while ensuring de-confliction inside the action area.
The absOLuTe neCessiTy OF ensurinG aLL eCheLOns are FamiLiar wiTh
The aviaTiOn exPerTise ThrOuGhOuT The Phases OF aCTiOn.
ll recent operations have confirmed the requirement for aviation combat expertise among G3 personnel (Task Force,
Brigade Combat Team, Amphibious TF) so as to assure proper awareness of the new and therefore little-known
capabilities of the new-generation weapon systems from the early stage of the planning process. That process of exchange
and direct communication must prevail down to the lowest combined arms levels.
A
Within the same terrain compartment it is crucial to ensure air-to-ground liaison so as to provide technical coordination
measures (fire support and air assault landing) and information of a tactical nature essential to the safety of crews as well
as ground personnel.
Finally, interoperability is essential to the efficiency and credibility of Army Aviation crews who will be deployed in a
multinational context in order to minimize as much as possible the risks of misunderstanding. Combat aviation and related
tactical procedures appear daily in US TTPs (Techniques Tactics and Procedures). Drawing their substance from current
operations, they are constantly fine-tuned in order to adapt to enemy courses of action.
The use of standard procedures with NATO allied forces is effective.
ConClusion.
Drawn from real facts, collected lessons are regularly analyzed and subsequently sent to the Lessons Learned (RETEX)
Department of the Forces Employment Doctrine Center and simultaneously forwarded to all aviation combat players
through Lessons Learned (RETEX) news flashes. The purpose of these flashes is of course to inform but also to elicit a
proactive response from readers. Efficient RETEX is based on a permanent and interactive flow of facts and research
focused on coordinated actions. However it must not be forgotten that the aim of that process is not to change the overall
Forces employment doctrine as a result of localized examples. This risk has been identified, and it has been determined
that combining immediate analyses with those conducted well after the action is quite productive.
Thus the disseminated lessons learned directly contribute to permanently improving combat tools and the skills of
personnel involved. They do not challenge the essence of tactical or technical training, nor still less the doctrinal corpus of
Army Aviation. They are necessary complements to reactive adjustments which must be – as much as possible – fine-tuned
to the specificities and constraints of each theater
45
THE COMMITMENT OF THE HELICOPTER
BATTALION WITHIN TASK FORCE LA FAYETTE
BRIGADIER GENERAL PIERRE CHAVANCY, COMMANDER 3 (FR) MECHANIZED BRIGADE
COMMANDER TASK FORCE LA FAYETTE (APRIL – NOVEMBER 2010)
RD
1. GENERAL
T
he commitment of a helicopter battalion,
designated as “TF Mousquetaire” in Afghanistan,
is an integral part of the air-land maneuver, from
conception to execution. Its employment should never
be considered to be merely the “vertical dimension”
support to ground forces.
During the planning stage of air-land operations,
I never had the occasion to wonder about the service
origin of the crews available1. However, aside from
the most commonly shared procedures, shared
knowledge between ground forces and
“close-to-the-ground” forces is crucial.
TF Mousquetaire is equipped with a wide range but
limited number of aircraft2, almost systematically
involving reinforcement requests. The employment
of US helicopters from the Aviation Brigade
of 101st Air Assault Division makes up for
the complete lack of national heavy transportation
assets.
2. HELICOPTERS IN THE AIR LAND MANEUVER
Capabilities and area of operations.
The features of the area of operations restrict
the capabilities of helicopters, particularly during
the summer season. The temperature and altitude
had direct impact in the planning as well as in
the execution of missions. Those physical constraints
emphasized the national capability gap in the area of
heavy lift helicopters confronted by TF La Fayette.
The same is true concerning the Gazelle helicopters,
whose airlift capability in the summer period does
not always allow the mounting of HOT missiles,
although that weapon system proved particularly
efficient due to its firepower and accuracy against
constructions.
The great variety of staging areas for units (whether
temporary or permanent, Forward Operating Bases,
Combat Out Posts…) in mountainous terrain,
normally regarded as hostile territory, requires daily
employment of the BATHELICO (Helicopter Battalion)
utility helicopters, in order to perform liaison
missions safely and rapidly. Those tactical transport
and command support missions, including support of
numerous visitors, amounted to 30% of the overall air
potential.
1 There were personnel from the 3 Services.
2 2 Gazelles, 3 Tigres, 2 Cougars, 3 Caracals.
3 Real-time vision of the observation area by an UAV.
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Accounts
Finally, having only one aircrew available for each
aircraft also restricts the number of missions which
can be performed in a period of intense activity or
large-scale operations.
• Coercion, which allows units to break contact, thus
stopping any insurgent maneuver;
On the whole, it was possible to compensate for those
deficiencies by requesting divisional assets, provided
the proper anticipation of requests.
• The heliborne Quick reaction Force (QRF) allows
increased rapidity of deployment. However, due
to climatic hazards as well as temperature and
altitude constraints, it should be possible to resort
to a motorized QRF as an alternative;
Missions of the helicopter battalion
In the Afghan context and due to the geographical
features of the area of operations, helicopters are
crucial to the maneuver.
• Logistics, so as to supply committed units over
several days, particularly combat support units
composed of small elements, which are often
isolated on high ground and therefore cannot be
reached easily;
• Intelligence in depth, on the flanks or in contact
with the enemy, including exploitation and damage
assessment;
• Reconnaissance, including ground reconnaissance,
as on the occasion of the torrential rains in July;
• MEDEVAC operations, particularly in the case of
the French soldiers wounded in action, when
procedures require very close cooperation between
the helicopter battalion and the HQ medical cell;
• The dropping of leaflets in valleys in support of
psychological operations.
3. A FEW ITEMS FOR THOUGHT:
No operation was planned without:
• Full motion video (FMV)3 observation and
surveillance equipment;
• A vertical dimension capability minimally including
MEDEVAC facilities.
Therefore, the missions assigned to TF Mousquetaire
covered a wide spectrum of actions:
• Close Combat Aviation (CCA) support, very efficient
in sparsely populated areas, but can be restricted
in urban terrain due to possible collateral damage;
• Deterrence, particularly in the context of roadclearing missions;
The Tigre helicopter proved to be a particularly
efficient and reliable weapon system, in contexts
of deterrence as well as coercion operations.
Moreover, its flight endurance was also a valuable
asset considering the comparative narrowness of
the brigade’s area of responsibility.
ROEs require that direct fires should be based on
double identification, that is, by an aircrew and
by a ground element. It should be observed that
he initiation of Tigre support immediately induced
insurgents to try to break contact or hide
the weapons, then exfiltrate, thereby trying to evade
double identification and avoid being neutralized.
Some technical problems on the Tigre helicopters
restrict observation and/or exploitation capabilities,
particularly in urbanized terrain; as a comparison,
the optical sights of US Apache provide magnification
8 times more than those of the Tigre; they also
provide color vision whereas the Tigre has only
“ black and white ” mode on “ Super 8” type material
• Deception, which is used regularly, allows
keeping insurgents in doubt over the nature
of the operation or the strength of landed troops;
march 2012
47
1999:
INITIAL-ENTRY IN KOSOVO
THE ROLE PLAYED
BY ARMY AVIATION
BY COLONEL ALAIN ESPARBES
PROJECT OFFICER, TRANSFORMATION BA M7
FRENCH COMMISSARIAT (QUARTERMASTER) DIRECTORATE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G3 FFB (FRENCH FRAMEWORK BRIGADE)
(Note): the following article in based
on the author’s actual experience from
preparation to execution of the initial-entry
in Kosovo by the LECLERC Brigade.
I
n the last days of May 1999, while NATO
airstrikes were in full swing in Serbia and
against Serbian forces in Kosovo, 2d Armored
Division HQ relieved 11th Airborne Division HQ
in order to take command of the French
Framework Brigade in Kumanovo. The brigade
was embedded within the NATO land
disposition in Macedonia. Facing north, it was
alongside the main body built-up from British
and German armored forces deployed on either
side of Skopje.
T
he general view was that Belgrade would
maintain its uncompromising position and
would not agree to any deployment in Kosovo.
Consequently, land force engagement seemed
to be unlikely for political as well as military
reasons. The French elements of the brigade
were rather light. Most of the planned heavy
modules were parked in staging areas on our
continental homeland.
o everybody was surprised when we heard on the first
days of June that the negotiations – which had hardly
begun – could end very quickly. The Serbian armed
forces HQ and NATO, meeting on the Kumanovo airbase,
were likely to agree on the withdrawal of Serbian ground
forces from Kosovo. When the Kumanovo agreement was
signed on June 7th, according to which NATO’s entry into
Kosovo was to occur on June 12th at dawn, availability of
sealift assets turned out to be reduced because it had
previously been ruled out by our allies. Time allowance
for shipping Leclerc MBTs, artillery and engineers armored
vehicles precluded us from having them available before
June 15th at best. Consequently the FFB was without
coercion means.
These military constraints were no longer consistent with
the political goals. France could not be satisfied with being
forced to follow the pace of it’s allies after it had initially
taken command of the NATO extraction force. Delaying our
deployment until we were fully combat ready was certainly
not to be considered.
S
In that context, three decisions came in quick succession
to restore consistency between political will and military
capabilities. First, we were assigned the mission to secure
the Giliane zone. This area was assigned to US forces but
they could not deploy there before June 15th or 16th.
This Kosovo area borders the Kumanovo zone. However,
between them is a mountainous area, littered with mines,
which cannot be easily reached. The second decision was of
a technical nature, but of strong strategic impact: the British
operation plan which assigned the FFB to the last echelon
provided – on our request – that this brigade could also cross
the line of departure on June 12th at dawn, provided that
this was done on an independent basis. I very well
remember the British colonel writing those additional lines
on the planning sheet which had been drafted by ARRC;
he was quite sure we could never make use of that
opportunity. Finally, the Joint Chief of Staff dedicated one
Land HQ and 2 companies provided by 3rd RPIMa (Marine
Infantry Parachute Battalion) to the GUEPARD deployment
system. He added one BATALAT (Aviation Battalion), with
the capability to airlift one company in a single lift, to this
GUEPARD, using 20 UHs and 8 armed Gazelles.
The operation order I suggested on June 8th aimed to secure
Giliane by June 12th (end of day), reaching it by the only
possible mountain path. In addition to the considerable
HUMINT challenges which had to be confronted in order to
at least ensure there would be no Serbian opposition, and
at best to reduce the hazards of moving across mined areas,
there was only one asset in reserve: air assault GUEPARD.
On June 10th and 11th, as in training, the various detachment
leaders, including BATALAT, rehearsed the succession of
possible actions and responses on a sand table. In fact,
the narrowness of the engagement zone, together with
the organization in echelons, prevented any divergent
action. The COS (Special Operations Command),
thoroughly included in the OPLAN, but having some
autonomy of action thanks to its helicopters, decided to
facilitate the advance of the brigade column through
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Accounts
the whole of it was landed within 45 minutes.
Link-up with the motorized units was made
at the end of the day. The political goals had
been achieved.
SIRPA Terre
On June 16th the brigade entered Mitrovica.
This was the last area over which KFOR was
deployed, then under French responsibility,
so the atmosphere was hectic. There was a
mix of mutual incomprehension among allies,
continual coming and going of Serbian and
Albanian Kosovar people, and just as before,
our military assets were quite overstretched
to meet the requirements of our strategic
ambition. Brigadier General Cuche therefore
decided to accelerate relief by US forces in
Giliane in order to avoid any resumption of
the likely offensive by Serbs, whose forces
were unimpaired and fully equipped since
they had efficiently evaded air strikes.
intelligence activities and some direct actions.
Thus, as appeared in the Libération newspaper headlines,
“ France entered Kosovo along a goat track ”.
As had been expected, advance was difficult: minefield
survey, disturbances brought about by reactions of
surprise from the populace, skirmishes of no great
consequence but nevertheless of some importance
because there was only one approach route and no
tracked vehicles for free movement, incomprehension
from political and military leaders in the Giliane area.
Nevertheless we advanced neither more nor less than
our allies in the Kacanic defile. We were constantly
in a position to respond to a Serbian aggressive return.
On June 12th, armed helicopters contributed all day long
by collecting information on the enemy and, more
importantly, information on the friendly advance: it is
always crucial to get independent knowledge about what
is actually occurring in the field.
Again, air assault landings on Mitrovica as soon as the first
Leclerc MBTs from 501-503 RCC (a Tank Battalion) arrived,
as well as those later performed over the Leposavic area,
came as a surprise to the conflicting parties, and were quite
unexpected among our allies as well; these landings
appeared to emphasize a planned succession of operations.
The landing of paratroopers from the 11th Airborne Division
as well as the “Marsouins” of the Régiment de Marche
du Tchad (a Mechanized Infantry Battalion) in the area of
dilapidated chemical factories was a lasting image during
those few days when everything could shift dramatically.
I believe this was a way of exploiting the initial success
of June 12th, which had surprised everybody.
In mid-afternoon, it became clear that the initial-entry
challenge would be met successfully. Moreover, it turned
out to be possible to meet the objective without delay.
I can still remember the tense atmosphere in the Operations
Center, when the decision to commit our only reserve had
to be made. We had to be careful not to do it too soon in
order to maintain the ability to shift to another planned
course of action, or, more precisely, to relieve an engaged
element which could not move forwards. I can remember
the technical explanations provided by the Aviation cell
leader concerning time constraints and the night to come.
I remember as well that for the nth time that
the requirement to fly over the route followed by
the column was repeated, because it was safe from air
defense weapons.
I
n the overall assessment, I cannot
forget our Aviation crews who, at that
particular time and place, provided
the agility that allows men to act boldly.
By that I mean audacious men who are
clever enough to move faster than others,
even if they lack the means or powerful
assets to achieve their goals by force.
Thanks to this quality, they gain
the advantage over opposing forces as
well as over friendly constraints
As soon as was ordered by Brigadier General Cuche,
who commanded the maneuver from the forward echelon
of the column, GUEPARD was heliborne in two waves onto
an air assault landing area, as close to Giliane as possible;
march 2012
49
role played by uS army aviation
in the uS tactical maneuver
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIPPE TESTART
(FR) LIAISON OFFICER FORT BENNING (GEORGIA/USA)
a
n actor at the heart of all combat since 2001, us Army Aviation (USaa) has exceptional operational
experience. at the same time, it has experienced the human and mechanical wear of these last ten
years of war, perhaps even more so than other communities. Being already integrated into the tactical
maneuver, it is nowadays regarded as a crucial force multiplier.
Despite it’s success, USaa is in the process of preparing for a new transformation so as to be able to
operate, in the near future, over the whole spectrum of maneuver defined by the recent us Army
doctrinal agenda. If budgetary considerations do not overly affect transformation objectives,
contribution from tomorrow’s USaa, composed of renewed units and innovative assets, will be even
more decisive and relevant.
ORGANIZATION AND CURRENT MISSIONS OF US ARMY AVIATION
CURRENT STRUCTURE
The active service US Army Helicopter
operational force currently includes
11 brigades, known as Combat Aviation
Brigades (CAB), with roughly one brigade
in each division1. Reserve forces have
8 brigades. Currently those brigades
are of three different types: Heavy CAB,
Medium CAB or Light CAB, and can be
distinguished essentially by the number
and type of helicopter battalions they
comprise. All are already equipped with
UAVs. The following organization charts
provide the main outlines. Various
elements are additionally assigned to
Army Corps and Special Forces.
It may be observed that Army Aviation
organically mans coordination cells
within brigade combat team HQs. Those
cells, called Brigade Aviation Elements
(BAE), comprise 13 personnel and are
able to coordinate aviation combat, CS
and CSS operations as well as the
airspace within the brigade’s action zone.
They have digitized command assets
to achieve these tasks2.
1 2 in 101st Air Assault, 1 in Korea.
2 Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS), Air and Missile Defense Workstations (AMDWs), Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS) and Maneuver Control System (MCS).
50
InternAtIonAl
MISSIONS AND EMPLOYMENT
The basic mission of USAA, within a combined arms framework and a joint operational environment, is to find, fix and
destroy any enemy by fire and maneuver, as well as to provide combat support and combat service support.
The Aviation Brigade Field Manual3 describes the following missions:
Term for mission
FR
Term for mission
US
Comments
Enabling assets
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
Surveillance aérienne
Aerial Surveillance
Intelligence missions performed over vast areas or specific
points on a near-permanent basis
UAVs and Helicopters
Sureté
Security
Flank protection and covering missions in support of BCTs
Helicopters and UAVs
Attaque
Attack
Includes four sub-missions :
- Interdiction Attack Operations motly performed in depth
Hélicopters
- Close Combat Attacks, in contact with/in support of friendly forces
- Movement to contact
- Search And Attack Operations : employing light assest and
maneuvering to operate against samll enemy units (SF, armed
gangs scattered over areas difficult to access)
Héliportage
Air Assault
Helicopters
Hélitransport
Air movement
Helicopters
Soutien au
commandement
Command and Control
Support
Transport aérien
Air transportation
Evacuation médicale
Aeromedical Evacuation
Evacuation sanitaire
Casualty Evacuation
Evacuation by medically equipped or non-medically helicopters,
most often in contact
Récupération de
personnes
Personnel
Recovery
Performed minimally at Division level, as the CAB does not have
the means to implement CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue)
Missions dédiées
à l’Army aviation
Aviation Enabling
Missions
It may be noticed that this mission includes a «homeland»
component, in order to provide comand capabilities in case of
natural disaster
Logistical purpose, with a «homeland» component in order to
react as First Responder
Evacuation by medically equipped helicopters
Helicopters
Helicopters
Helicopters
- Downed Aircraft Recovery (Division level)
- Aviation Maintenance
- Forward Arming And Refueling Point Ops
- Air Traffic Services ;
- Airfield Management.
Helicopters
and
mission-tailored
assets
USAA has repeatedly accomplished all of these missions in operations over the last 10 years. However, since the end
of the Iraq offensive in 2003, its activities have been focused on missions of a more counter-insurgency type. While this
resulted in the acquisition of robust operational experience but it also led to the loss of know-how for conventional
missions and full-scale maneuver.
3 FM 3-04.111 December 2007.
51
ASSETS AND CHALLENGES
In order to accomplish these missions, US Army Aviation has about 750 Attack Helicopters (AH) 64 Apache;
728 Observation Helicopters (OH) 58 Kiowa Warrior; 1821 Utility Helicopters (UH) 60 Blackhawk; 520 Cargo Helicopters
(CH) 47 Chinook. Moreover, 345 Light Utility Helicopters (LUH 72) are to be fielded by 2015, mostly
for training.
USAA must meet many challenges.
Firstly, the current number and structure of brigades are deemed inappropriate to meet the requirements
of the US Army operational cycle as well as the tactical requirements in theater. In fact, for these reasons, brigades
are systematically reorganized as mission-tailored modules. This is why those structures will be changed.
Secondly, the operational tempo of activity of units is quite intense. It generates premature ageing of aircraft which are
submitted to very intensive use during operations. This ageing dramatically affects the oldest helicopters, particularly
the OH 58D Kiowa, which prematurely reach the authorized limits of their airframe serviceability life.
Another critical challenge is the making up for time lost in the training of crews coupled with a simultaneous increase
in the number of pilots to be trained. This difficulty will be addressed by adapting the training curriculum, increasing
assets (aircraft and simulators), privileging outsourcing, and better controlling the training flows.
Tactical training is added to the technical training of units. As their main activity today is counterinsurgency, they have
fewer skills related to large-scale maneuvers when facing hybrid threats which include more conventional opponents,
sometimes with modern equipment. The return to the “Full Spectrum Maneuver” is one of the major guidelines of US
Army for its combat readiness training, and USAA will have to learn again how to perform complex maneuvers, while
not disregarding counterinsurgency.
Finally, it will be confronted with the financial challenge involved by the economic crisis, following several program
cancellations in the last few years. However, analysts think that because of its acknowledged operational interest,
USAA will probably be safe from drastic cuts.
THE NEW EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS FOR CABs
THE US ARMY’S NEW DOCTRINAL AGENDA
The US Army has just published a new operating concept4 to be implemented during the 2016-2028 period. This concept
has been organized into sub-concepts according to combat related functions, and the task of tailoring the current
organization for this concept is currently under way. The prospective role of USAA therefore is included within the
functional concept of movement and maneuver5.
The US Army Operating Concept provides details for an ever-more complex and uncertain operational environment,
requiring greater adaptability and a capability to operate within the scope of full-spectrum operations. To that end, units
must be able to perform combined arms maneuvers as well as secure extensive areas while conducting ever-more
decentralized operations. Within the scope of the maneuver, units must be even more integrated and must achieve better
coordination of effect by using combined, interagency and multinational assets.
ROLE OF CABs IN THE NEW CONCEPT
Within this new concept, CABs are still organized so as to preferably operate at division level. However, they can, if
need be, operate directly in support of the theater joint command of a corps or multinational HQ. For that purpose,
they have appropriate command assets.
4 TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 The US Army Operating Concept 2016-2028 of August 19th 2010.
5 TRADOC Pam 525-3-6 The US Army Functional Concept For Movement And Maneuver.
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52
InternAtIonAl
Within that new framework, they keep the same missions as before, within an even more integrated combined arms
context, and are more open to joint activities. They take part in securing extensive areas by integrating into
the disposition and action of the brigades on the ground. Their objectives are to take part in the protection of the local
populace and facilities, and, above all, to deny the opponent any freedom of action.
They may have to reinforce battlefield surveillance brigades by providing tactical assets (reconnaissance teams)
or technical assets (reinforcement of UAV capabilities).
The new concept will also now emphasize command support missions by providing mobile, or even airborne HQs,
as well as communication relays provided by relay UAVs. It additionally stresses the theater logistical function.
NEW STRUCTURES AND NEW EQUIPMENT
ACTIVATION OF FULL SPECTRUM CABs
In order to adjust more appropriately to the operational cycle as well as to the new concepts, USAA is changing
the structure of its brigades. The three types of brigades will be replaced by multipurpose brigades called “Full Spectrum
CABs”, organized as shown in the following diagram. For specific reasons, some heavy brigades will remain.
The ultimate goal would be 9 Full Spectrum CABs and 4 Heavy CABs in active service, and respectively 6 and 2 brigades
in reserve forces. Four brigades must be deployment-ready on a permanent basis.
EVOLUTION OF EQUIPMENT
The most remarkable feature of these new brigades is
the number and employment of UAVs in the maneuver.
Each CAB will actually include one 12-strong MALE MQ1C
Gray Eagle UAV company; these UAVs are a version derived
from the Army’s Predator. These UAVs can be armed with
Hellfire missiles.
MQ1C Gray Eagle - Photo US Army
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53
Besides the unit operating at brigade level, there is also a company equipped with 8 RQ 7 Storm Shadow UAVs,
subordinated to the reconnaissance battalion, also equipped with 21 58D Kiowa Warrior OHs.
RQ 7 Storm Shadow - Photo USMC
Employment is particularly challengin because it goes beyond simply counting assets while emphasizing coordination
and complementarity.
In fact, UAVs ensure permanence of air assets, and they prolong action in depth and in time. Moreover they conserve
resources, as well as appropriate covertness. Finally, some can be used as communication relays.
Above all, it will be possible to operate these UAVs from helicopters thanks to information exchange as well as control
systems; these will permit, from piloted aircraft, the redirection of UAVs according to missions. This system has
already been tested satisfactorily. It will be included on future 64D Block III AHs and 58F OHs, which will supersede
current aircraft.

Ten years of warfighting seem to have convinced the US Army that there is a requirement for a powerful and modular
Army Aviation, capable of operating at the heart of the combined arms and joint maneuver. This is evidenced by its
current operational employment rate. Thus the ongoing transformation project is intended to meet the challenges
of wear as well as modernity; in order to face tomorrow’s many-faced threats
54
HIstory
the birth of french
army aviation
indochina and alGeria
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RESERVE) CLAUDE FRANC
PROJECT MANAGER, FRENCH FORCES EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE CENTER
the subject is also currently developed in “les chemins de la mémoire”, a publication of the War
commemorations, national Patrimony and Archives Directorate.
(Direction de la Mémoire, du Patrimoine et des Archives)
From a legal point of view, two decrees (march 3rd 1952 and November 22nd 1954) authorized
the birth of aLaT (aviation légère de l’armée de terre: French army aviation): the first one specifies
that light artillery observation aviation (aLOa: aviation légère d’observation d’artillerie) was an
organic part of the army1, while the second decree created the army aviation command
(cOmaLaT: commandement de l’aviation légère de l’armée de terre) in Paris, and stipulates that it will
succeed aLOa. however, these “ founding ” texts only confirmed an existing situation. It will be
useful to give some details about the genesis of that situation before dealing with the operational
engagement aspects of aLaT units in Indochina and, later, on an even larger scale in algeria.
ARMY AVIATION: WHY?
T
he issue of air assets organically dedicated to the Army first appeared in 1933, with the creation of the French Air Force.
General Weygand, who at that time was vice president of the War Council, could not prevail in his opposition to an
independent air force; he anticipated with clear-sightedness the future mistakes which would result from fashionable
“douhétisme”2; he had deemed the restoration of a “land air force” to be “inexorable”3. Thus, alongside the post-1936
French rearmament, air observation groups (GAO: Groupes aériens d’observation) were organized at corps level in 1937 to
accomplish missions of observation and adjustment of field artillery fires. Besides conventional observation aircraft, their
equipment included autogiros, the earliest rotary wing aircraft, which could not, however, perform hovering flight.
In 1939 / 1940, this debate was resumed within the Air Force between General Vuillemin, Chief of Staff at the time and a
staunch supporter of an independent Air Force, and General D’Astier de la Vigerie, commander of the air forces of the North
Armies Group. The latter, under General Billotte’s command4, thought that the efficiency of air support depended directly on
maximum integration into the land maneuver. As a result, this opinion entailed that C2 of air wings would be performed by a
major land command5. The short-lived “Campagne de France”, followed by defeat, put an end to that controversy.
1 As a consequence, all Air Force personnel assigned to it had to return to their original Service.
2 A doctrine expounded by General Douhet, according to which the rationale of vertical dimension activities is not to support ground operations but to provide deep action on an
autonomous basis, taking the shape of powerful air strikes.
3 Concerning the role of General Weygand in this controversy, see Colonel Guelton. “General Weygand and the question of air forces”. 1928 – 1935. Revue Historique de l’Armée,
1997/1, pages 31-43.
4 Army general commanding the 1st Armies Group. Concerning the Vuillemin vs. d’Astier controversy, see Patrick Facon “Batailles dans le ciel de France. Mai - Juin 1940” (“Battles in
the French Sky. MayJune 1940”). Paris; 2010. Perrin.
5 Around the same period, within the Wehrmacht, the air forces were grouped into «Luftflotten», more or less equivalent to French air corps, and were attached to the various corps;
these could delegate their employment to subordinate tactical levels. Thus Guderian, who was merely an armored corps commander, had a whole Luftflotte under his command in
order to break through the French disposition on the Meuse River; this enabled a correlation of forces overwhelmingly to his advantage over his opponent.
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The Liberation campaign was conducted (as regards the French Army) following US Army organization and equipment
standards. Thus artillery observation teams, or the gun-Piper Cub pair, were included in major ground units’ ORBATs6.
Moreover, these observation aircraft were occasionally tasked with missions in addition to mere observation: everybody
remembers the low-altitude flight over Paris, on August 24th, by a Piper of 2d Armored Division, dropping a message for
the French Home Forces (FFI: Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur) of the Police Headquarters. Leclerc himself had drafted:
“ Hold fast, we’ll soon be there! ”
When armed forces were reorganized in 1945, the Air Force still opposed the Army having its own “air forces ”;
however, the observation teams were reinforced and merged into platoons.
THE FIRST HELICOPTERS IN INDOCHINA. THE FIRST STEPS.
Thus it was within a rather unclear organizational context that 9th Colonial Infantry Division (9ème DIC) landed in Cochin China
at the end of 1945, with its aircraft platoon (originally observation Piper Cubs, later replaced by Morane 500). Gradually,
three artillery observation aviation groups (GAOA) were formed in Indochina: the 1st in Hanoi, the 2nd in Saigon,
and the 3rd in Tourane, before being deployed in Tonkin. Their designation numbers would later be changed, but their
strength would remain unaffected.
Concerning their employment, except in the case of large-scale operations on the high plateaus of Annam or in Tonkin,
in the Middle region, and then in the delta, aviation platoons were rarely used in their basic artillery observation function.
On the other hand, their casualty evacuation function would soon be highlighted7 thanks to the short landing capability
of the Morane 500.
Another capability soon prevailed over the others: command and control support. In October 1950, during the R.C.4’s combat,
Colonel Constans, who commanded the border zone, could achieve intermittent radio communications with Colonel Charton
in a significantly split and compartmentalized area, thanks only to a radio relay by a Morane flying over his column. It was
the pilot of the aircraft who indicated to Charton where the entrance of the Quang Liet track was located; this route enabled
him to outflank Dong Khe, which had been seized by Viet Minh8. But it was General De Lattre, commander in chief in 1951
that truly established this capability. In January, it was thanks to this aircraft that he was able to land several times in Vinh
6 One team in each division, whether armored or infantry.
7 One Morane 500 could perform the evacuation of 2 stretcher cases.
8 See LCL Charton’s report in Colonel Charton: «RC 4, la tragédie de l’évacuation de Cao Bang» («RC 4, the tragedy of Cao Bang evacuation»), Paris 1976. Albatros. Annex.
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HIstory
Yen, in direct contact with his mobile group commanders9, who were engaged in fierce combat against several major units
of the Viet Minh field forces; thus he could deliver his FRAGOs in real time and in accordance with current events. Throughout
his command, De Lattre regularly resorted to that means of transport, which enabled him to evade terrain constraints.
His successors would follow his example.
In 1950 an event occurred which, even if it went unnoticed at the time, was to dramatically revolutionize the employment
of Army Aviation in the years to come: in order to perform emergency CASEVAC, even in terrain where landing of
the Morane was impossible, the commander of the theater medical corps units managed the procurement and
availability on site of two “ Hiller ” helicopters. Gradually their number was increased in proportion with US assistance.
Eventually, the fielding of the first “ Sikorsky ” helicopters and the support of General Navarre10 allowed ALOA (light
artillery observation aviation) to activate and include an Army aviation group of units in Indochina; Major Crespin was
appointed commander of that group. As joint commander in chief, General Navarre was able to avoid the strong
reluctance of the Air Force. This group was task-organized into two maneuver assets: one “ Hiller ” LH11 company and
one “ Sikorsky ” UH company, under command of Captain du Puy-Montbrun. The first Army aviation group was born.
The UH company performed the first air assault landing of infantry platoons, notably, in the Delta. The “ Hiller ”
performed an increasing number of CASEVAC operations, particularly in Na San in November-December 1952.
Conversely, in Dien Bien Phu, the landing strip and the site were under fire of Vietnamese quadruple machine guns
and the LHs could no longer land by the end of March12.
Thus, at the end of the Indochina war, Army Aviation had gained its autonomy in terms of organization. It already
boasted an illustrious history in combat, and had started demonstrating the remarkable tactical capabilities of a
new weapon system i.e. the helicopter. At the time of the cease-fire, the Staff in Saigon had planned the fielding
of 100 aircraft with to the goal of performing a “ tactical maneuver of a new type, permitting forces to gain an advantage
over enemy ground forces thanks to its mobility and security13 ”.
ARMY AVIATION IN ALGERIA. HELICOPTERS SUPERSEDE AIRPLANES DEFINITIVELY.
Operations performed within the context of the conflict in Algeria truly enabled Army Aviation (ALAT became the new
designation for ALOA in 1954) to expand. Applying lessons learned from mistakes made in Indochina, it was used for
command liaison and CASEVAC missions, and, more particularly, as an asset intended for upgrading the mobility of
dismounted combat units, committed in very steep, split and compartmentalized terrain, with no alternate route14.
In this context, the old “gun-Piper” pair was superseded by the “infantry company (often airborne) - UH (Sikorsky H 55
or Vertol Banane H 21)” pair.
In such terrain, companies were often air landed directly on high ground, so as to be able to intercept an opponent who
favored infiltration or evasive action along routes whose main features were thalwegs. The increased mobility provided by
helicopters was explained by Colonel Buchoud, commander of 9th RCP (9e Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes, an Infantry
Parachute Battalion) in the report he drafted during the commitment of his battalion in the “Souk Arrhas battle” in late
April 195815.
“A captain, air-landed at 10 AM with his company 200 meters away from the rebels, engaged and disrupted them,
destroyed one of their platoons, took three automatic weapons from them, and was again committed at 8 PM, after
4 hours’ movement by truck in the night, was again committed at dawn, disengaged at 8 AM, then after another 4-hour
trip, was picked up by a helicopter at 3 PM, then landed again to contact.”
9 Among whom Edon, Castries, Sizaire, Vanuxem.
10 Report by General Navarre about his command period. SDH. Fonds Navarre. 1K 342.
11 Captain Valérie André served in that unit, accomplishing several hundred missions.
12The last EVASAN LH crashed in flames, hit by Vietnamese fire. The pilot and Second Lieutenant Gambiez, severely wounded and evacuated (his father was at the time COS
to General Navarre in Saigon), were burned to death.
13 General Ely. “Enseignements de la guerre d’Indochine” (“Lessons from the War in Indochina”). SHD Nb 10 H 983, page 199.
14 During those operations, the Air Force was still tasked with close air support missions, for which crews substituted jet fighters with T6.
15 Mentioned by Colonel Le Mire, “Histoire militaire de la guerre d’Algérie” (“A Military history of the War in Algeria”). Paris 1982. Albin Michel, p. 201.
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Colonel Jeanpierre, 1er REP (1e Régiment Etranger de Parachutistes : A Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion) Commanding
officer, shortly after an inspection by Defense Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas, sent him the following report16:
“ Finally, intensive use is made of helicopters. They are considered, in this battalion, to be the only truly relevant
and effective modern device in counter-subversion warfare. Most of the successes of 1er REP were achieved thanks
to the use of helicopters by top-rate troops, who could assault as soon as they landed. ”
How could such dramatic progress occur, within a few months, in the employment of helicopters, which prevailed
on the Algerian theater and adapted to this type of conflict? The key player in this remarkable adaptation was
Lieutenant Colonel Crespin.
Late in 1954, at the time of the first bomb outrages, there was only one GAOA (artillery aviation observation group) in Algeria.
As it was quickly assigned many missions, it had to be reinforced in equipment and personnel from formations garrisoned
in France. Helicopters were soon allocated to the platoons, which became of a mixed fixed/rotary wing nature (PMAH).
But the helicopters units soon became autonomous and, as of 1955, the G.H.2 (helicopter group 2) was established in Setif.
While commanding this unit, Lieutenant Colonel Crespin experimented with air assault reaction detachments (DIH:
détachements d’intervention heliportés), which could be attached on an autonomous basis either to a major unit of
General Reserves, to an area, or to a district17. Later this group was commanded by another illustrious leader, Major Déodat
du Puy-Montbrun. In 1956, when reorganization of command of the 10th Region18 built an army corps with the three former
divisions (Algiers, Oran and Constantine), an aviation group was established within each. Those groups comprised
32 divisional platoons, 15 of a mixed type. In 1960, at the culmination of the operational phase of the conflict, there were
394 helicopters (Bell and Alouette II LHs – H 21 Banane UHs and S 55 Sikorsky) operated by flying crews of the Army19.
CONCLUSION
Born in Indochina on a small scale,
French Army Aviation became
illustrious during the Algerian War
when it became an integral part of
the maneuver. Based on the lessons
learned, the GALDIV (Groupes
d’Aviation Légère Divisionnaire:
divisional aviation groups) and GALCA
(corps aviation groups) were
established in 1977, the forerunners
of helicopter battalions. Their
employment resulted in the concepts
of air mobility followed by aviation
combat. In this regard, the crews and
personnel of the helicopter battalion
currently deployed in Afghanistan
might be regarded as the heir to
the illustrious helicopter groups in Algeria
16 ibid.
17 In 1960, the colonel commanding 2d REC (2e Régiment Etranger de Cavalerie: a Light Armored Cavalry Battalion) was appointed commander of the Bou Khail operating district,
which had just been activated, with HQ located in Aïn Rich (Bou Saada sector), in order to stabilize that mountain range; during the four months of the operation, it was reinforced
by an air assault quick reaction detachment (D.I.H. détachement d’intervention héliporté) from the Algiers Corps aviation group.
18 A territorial command matching up the Algerian territory; an inheritance of XIX Corps, it had until then been divided into three divisions and one Command: the Southern Territories.
19 Captain Tristan LEROY. Army Aviation and Helicopter Museum.
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HIstory
AIR MOBILITY
THE U.S. 1ST CAV IN VIETNAM 1965–1972
LIEUTENANT COLONEL (RESERVE) CLAUDE FRANC
PROJECT MANAGER, CDEF/DOCTRINE DIVISION
a
s early as 1963, General Wheeler, the U.S. army chief of Staff, had a feeling that
the U.S. military would have to get involved directly in Vietnam. he subsequently
decided to establish a major airmobile unit which was intended for counter-insurgency
warfare in remote areas and could be quickly deployed. Between 1950 and 1960,
the US army had known an exponential increase of its airmobile capability, from 57 to
over 5,000 rotary-wing aircraft. however, up to that time, the concept of employment
of U.S. Army Aviation units had remained based on rotary-wing support, i.e. supporting
the ground maneuver at its own pace from helicopters whereas it then became a
question of fielding a division-level tool integrating helicopters to the ground
maneuver, but at their own pace and independent of the operators on the ground.
T
he new 15,500 strong unit was again designated the 1st cavalry Division. It fielded
450 helicopters1, 1,500 vehicles and field artillery initially limited to 105mm caliber.
Task-organized in 3 brigades, it had 8 infantry battalions (3 of which had the dual air
assault and airborne capacity), 3 field artillery battalions with 105mm guns, 1 heliborne
reconnaissance battalion and two helicopter battalions – one for airlift and one for air
assault. It would be built-up over two years: eighteen months spent experimenting with
lower tactical echelons, up to basic sub-unit level (company), then up to maneuver unitlevel (battalion) before spending the last six months of 1964 breaking-in the brigades’
and divisions’ staffs and maneuvering together with the u.s. Air Force. Declared combatready in June 1965, it was deployed to Vietnam in September of that year and engaged
in operations the following month.
1 Roughly 300 lightly armed UHs (CH-21) and 150 helicopter gunships AHs (UH-1B) equipped with 4 machine guns and 4 rocket launchers. Since neither the Vietcong guerrillas nor the NVA
main forces had armor at that time, anti-tank helicopters were deliberately overlooked.
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COURSES OF ACTION OF THE 1ST CAV UNITS
s maneuver was conducted at helicopter pace, all units
were invariably mixed – utility helicopters (UHs) with attack
helicopters (AHs) – and NOE flying was the rule. Airlifting
one infantry battalion with its combat support sub-unit2 the division’s basic maneuver unit - required forty-nine UHs. Fortyfour gunships were required for securing both the flight and the
very vulnerable phase of landing companies. This mixed helicopter
formation was divided into so-called Eagle basic packages – one
command and control helicopter, seven UHs, five AHs and one medevac helicopter. The flying formation was V-shaped, gunships
flying ahead of the airlift echelon and breaking the formation abreast of the landing zone. The breaking of the formation, coupled
with the landing of the battalion’s three companies and its support assets should not exceed two minutes.
Source : Internet
A
Landing and deploying the battalion, a critical phase, was entrusted to a team of scouts, called Pathfinders. These were
unobtrusively inserted three hours prior to the operation as close as possible to the battalion’s objective, without air support,
in order not to raise the alarm. Once they had reconnoitered and equipped the landing zone, these teams (two officers and
thirteen enlisted) would initiate radio contact with the flying formation 15 km away from the landing zone and would be
prepared to guide it, divert it or even cancel the heliborne operation up to 7 km away from it. Once in the 7 km-zone, it was no
longer possible to adjust, apart from cancelling the entire landing. During the landing phase of the troop carriers, gunships
hovered over the area to permit stabilized firing, and could thus provide immediate fire support to the battalion, usually with
grenades and rockets, to saturate the surroundings of the landing zone. Each battalion had a range of common radio
frequencies with the helicopter battalions.
Within the battalions, the soldiers’ load was kept as light as possible. The battalions, unlike those from infantry divisions, did
not have organic ground transport. While a motorized division fielded 3,500 wheeled vehicles, the 1st Cav had only less than half
of them. It was the same for combat trains: most of the brigades’ logistics (food and ammunition supply and evacuations) was
exclusively conducted by helicopters. This constraint drastically limited the range of the brigades’ operations; 80 km was a
maximum if the operation was to be sustained over the long term, which was the case in Vietnam.
Regarding the organization of command at the Vietnamese theater level, the division was directly subordinated to General
Westmoreland and composed the main component of his general reserve force.
Source : Internet
THE OPERATIONS OF 1ST CAV.3
From October 22 until November 27, 1965, 1st Cav was engaged in operations Long
Beach, All the Way, and Silver Bayonet against the 304th Division and NVA4 regular
regiments TD 32, 36 and 66 during the Pleiku attack by Special Forces and in the Ia
Drang Valley. The Division committed its three brigades, its entire artillery and all of its
helicopters. It was supported by 96 B-52 sorties (30 tons of bombs each) and 741
fighter-bomber sorties (2 tons of bombs each). The record spoke for itself: 897 small
arms and 126 crew-served weapons recovered and 3,500 dead or seriously wounded
enemies at the cost of 300 KIAs and 524 WIAs and the loss of 59 aircraft. In slightly
more than a month of operations, 24,598 helicopter sorties were conducted for 193
company landings. The division used 7,250 m3 of fuel, one million 5.56 rounds, 15,000
40mm grenades5 and 40,000 105mm rounds. The average flying distance was 65 km.
2 A field artillery battery.
3 The figures are drawn from the doctoral dissertation defended by Raymond Toinet, a Saint Cyr graduate from the Nouveau Bahut class (1945-1947), who had fought with the CEFEO [French
Expeditionary Corps in the Far East] in colonial field artillery units from 1950 to 1952 before moving on into business. It was published under the following title: A War of Thirty Five Years.
Indochina - Vietnam (1940 - 1975). Paris. 1998. Lavauzelle. 543 pages.
4 North Vietnamese Army.
5 Grenades fired from the front of helicopter gunships.
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Source : Internet
HIstory
The first lesson learned was that given
the losses (nearly 8% of personnel and
aircraft) and ammunition consumption,
operations could not have been
sustained beyond one month.
In addition, the initial assessment of
the nature and volume of air support
which was deemed essential had been
underestimated. Artillery support6
proved to be decisive, in particular
“aerial artillery ” –rockets fired from
helicopter gunships capable of
delivering fire support instantly – as it
was not dependent on the unavoidable
delays of setting-up for firing and
preparing for relocation. This weapon
system was used to neutralize an area
by saturating it, and not by firing at selected targets. Alerted on two-minute notice and located close to the target zone,
the “aerial weapons battery ”7 was capable of delivering continuous fire by rotating its firing flights every three minutes.
As combat support provided by 105mm guns was found insufficient, CH-54 helicopters were used to airlift towed 155mm
guns. However the divisional staff was faced with intractable problems of logistics as the number of UHs available to
airlift ammunition to the batteries was insufficient.
Given the logistical constraints mentioned above, the range of brigades’ operations never exceeded 65 km. This obviously
had a direct bearing on the conduct of operations. As helicopter squadrons operated from temporary bases, they had to be
moved according to the progress of the current operation in order to maintain mobility. This constraint was significant and
generated increased response times.
In 1966, the division took part in all major “search and destroy” operations, the official name of the operations
conducted by General Westmoreland – Matador (again in Pleiku), Masher, White Wing, and Crazy Horse. During
the latter, over a period of three weeks, almost 30,000 men would have been airlifted and field artillery would have fired
12,500 rounds a day, equivalent to four days of supply.
Until 1968, at the time of the Tet Offensive, the Division was engaged at this particularly punishing rate.
Major General Tolson, who commanded the Division from January 1967 until June 1968, reported the following figures:
• 1967: 977,933 helicopter sorties. 688 aircraft damaged, 36 shot down.
• First six months of 1968: 407,806 helicopter sorties, 271 aircraft damaged, 66 shot down.
The VC had in fact been able to adapt to this new threat and the NVA had greatly expanded its air defense assets. During
the siege of Khe Sanh8 in particular, any intervention by a division unit was systematically preceded by the U.S. Air Force
blinding the opponent’s air defense firebases. Such an increase in losses was also due to the decision to partially
abandon the division’s prescribed courses of action and use its units for reconnaissance, observation and liaison with
one or two aircraft. Missions that any helicopter unit organic to the infantry divisions could have assumed.
6 According to U.S. assessments and standards.
7 Battalions of 35 attack helicopters each equipped with four rocket launchers.
8 As regards the conduct of operations, it is now clear that the “siege of Khe San”, long considered as a “successful Dien Bien Phu”, was only a decoy for the NVA, used as a focal point to fix
[Allied troops] to conceal their preparations for the Tet Offensive and their new emphasis on urban operations.
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LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMMITMENTS OF THE 1ST CAV.
Rotary-wing maneuver, marked by the mass integration of helicopter units into the overall maneuver according to their
own specificities, proved to be an unquestionable added value towards achieving tactical success.
However, strong constraints were a threat to this type of engagement. It was crucial they would be acknowledged:
 Army aviation operations could not be separated from prior powerful air support (suppression of enemy air defense
(SEAD) missions) with which they had to be closely coordinated;
 Helicopter protection on the ground was essential. Dispersion due to maintenance constraints required building
strong airbases with all relevant security measures (airsheds, protected bunkers, ground patrols using up resources
and protection of night flights using up flight capacities);
 Permanent alert system, on the ground, for UHs and careful planning of the tonnage of logistic supplies for the Division’s
units;
 Complementarity and fire coordination of the Division’s organic artillery assets with specific types of fire delivered by
helicopter gunships;
 Requirement to maintain a risk-taking approach within crews.
As a conclusion, in his on-the-spot analysis of the Vietnam War, General Beaufre noted9:
“
The widespread use of helicopters resulted in establishing a series of protected
airbases which took up large numbers of strictly static personnel.”
That is to say that even if airmobility as conducted by the 1st Cav significantly sped up the tempo, or even the power
of the maneuver, the latter had always remained dependent on the constraints inherent in the fielding of such sizeable
assets. Used in a quasi-experimental way in the Vietnamese theater, 1st Cav’s engagement still made it possible to
impose rotary-wing combat as a key element of modern operations.
Today, when applied to the French Army, such a concept is obviously oversized. Furthermore, it is not the choice10 that
was made. Thus, under the concept of rotary-wing combat, helicopter units are fully integrated into the maneuver, not
supporting it, but really as a maneuver unit as shown in this Land Doctrine issue devoted to it as a true component of
the “ Contact ” tactical function 
9 Beaufre. General. The Revolutionary War. Paris. 1972. Fayard. Page 233.
10 Concept of Employment of Airmobile Forces in the Army, approved on February 1, 2011.
march 2012
62
( ARMY AVIATION COMBAT OPERATIONS « IN PICTURES » )
ArMy AVIAtIon coMBAt oPerAtIons
ARMY AVIATION COMBAT OPERATIONS:
A MAJOR CAPABILITY OF THE PRESENT AND
FUTURE COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER - p. 5
Credit photos : © Armée de Terre
THE ROLE OF NEW EQUIPMENT IN ARMY
AVIATION’S TRANSFORMATION - p. 10
Credit photos : ECPAD
ARMY AVIATION AND ARMOR:
COOPERATION OF INTEGRATED MANEUVER? - p. 13
Credit photos : © Armée de Terre/Jean-Raphaël DRAHI
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COMMITMENTS
OF ARMY AVIATION UNITS - p. 43
THE COMMITMENT OF THE HELICOPTER BATTALION
WITHIN TASK FORCE LA FAYETTE - p. 46
1999: INITIAL-ENTRY IN KOSOVO
THE ROLE PLAYED BY ARMY AVIATION - p. 49
march 2012
63
DOCTRINE
TAcTIQUE
C.D.E.F
Forces Employment
Doctrine Center

army aviation combat operations

Transcription

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