THE FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE: CONFLICT AND

Transcription

THE
FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN
BANGLADESH-INDIA RELATIONS
by
KAZI ASADUL MAMUN
M.S.S.,University
Of Dhaka,1980
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
D e p a r t m e n t Of P o l i t i c a l
We a c c e p t
this
thesis
as
Science
conforming
to the r e q u i r e d standard
THE
UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
August
©
1984
K a z i A s a d u l Mamun, 1984
In
presenting
this
thesis
in
partial
fulfilment
of
the
requirements for an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y
of
British
Columbia,
I
it
freely
available
for
permission
agree
her
the
Library
shall
reference
and
study.
I
for
purposes may
or
that
extensive
It
p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s
allowed without my
Department of
written
Political
for
is
August
15,
1984
agree
Department or
understood
financial
permission.
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copying of t h i s t h e s i s for s c h o l a r l y
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representatives.
make
gain
that
by
his
copying or
shall
not
be
ii
Abstract
The
as
origins
1951
when
India's
River
Pakistan
plans
only
of the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e go back as f a r
against
the
Government
and
miles
since
from
1971
the
East
Pakistan
Bangladesh,
argued
two
and
the
o v e r a l l ecology
covered
between India and
a l l aspects
c o n f l i c t has
agrarian
of the lower d e l t a .
Although
Two
helpful
and
analytical
d i s p u t e s and
Ganges
waters
as of
1984,
approaches
As a
explaining
the
result,
--
to
international
Farakka
states
at
a l l , what
dispute d i f f i c u l t
Barrage
presented
the
river basin.
hydrologic-economic
to r e s o l v e , and
types
why
of p r o p o s a l s
India and
dispute.
The
the more powerful
they have f o r developing
two
a
make t h i s
Bangladesh
have
the
(the
states reveals
s t a t e , i s a l s o the upper r i p a r i a n .
the lower r i p a r i a n —
thesis
is
p o s i t i o n of India which, i n a d d i t i o n to being
the s t r a t e g i e s that Bangladesh —
This
there
A n a l y s i s based on unequal power r e l a t i o n s h i p
superordinate
river
are
factors
"asymmetric dyad") which e x i s t s between these
the
the
—
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e l i t e r a t u r e e x p l a i n s why
dispute
been
no s o l u t i o n i s imminent.
to power r e l a t i o n s between unequal
in
have
Bangladesh, these agreements have not
of r i v e r i n e development.
continued
Indian
the
i n t e r i m agreements on s h a r i n g of
reached
border.
that
d i v e r s i o n . o f Ganges water would s e r i o u s l y threaten
economy
of
to c o n s t r u c t a massive barrage a c r o s s the Ganges
eleven
Pakistan,
protested
Therefore,
as the subordinate
can employ are
state
limited.
o u t l i n e s i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l the
as w e l l as the hydrologic-economic
and
aspects
of
the
political
dispute
and
tries
to demonstrate the c o r r e l a t i o n of o v e r a l l power r e l a t i o n s
between India and
employ.
The
Bangladesh with the p o l i t i c a l
main
have acted according
costs
and
argument
to t h e i r
benefits
ranging
what
from c o o p e r a t i v e
it
considers
strategies
an
i s analysed
although
periodically
marginal
concessions
predominant
direction
i s that both India and
interpretation
involved
Bangladesh, for i t s p a r t , has
equitable
i n turn
Ganges waters.
political
resolving
the
dispute.
variety
of
strategies
in an attempt to secure
solution.
Each
of
for i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s .
Bangladesh
negotiations
Bangladesh
the
pursued a
India,
political-economic
of
in
over
they
of
to r e t a l i a t o r y
from
strategies
has
been
the
able
to
these
Overall,
extract
l a t t e r , because of i t s
position,
has
controlled
the
sharing
and
augmentation of
iv
Table
of C o n t e n t s
Abstract
L i s t of F i g u r e s
Acknowledgement
i i
vi
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
1
A.
4
THE GANGES AND ITS BASIN
B. THE FARAKKA BARRAGE
9
C. CONFLICTING INTERESTS OVER FARAKKA .
Chapter II
INTERNATIONAL RIVER DISPUTES AND BARGAINING STRATEGIES:
SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
21
A.
36
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES
B. COERCIVE STRATEGIES
10
39
Chapter I I I
THE
A.
NEGOTIATIONS OVER FARAKKA
50
THE FIRST STAGE: A BARRAGE ACROSS THE GANGES?
B. THE SECOND STAGE: NEGOTIATIONS OR DELAYING TACTICS?
C.
INDIAN OBSTINACY OR PAKISTANI WEAKNESS?
51
...54
65
D. THE THIRD STAGE: SOLUTION ON THE HORIZON?
68
E . THE QUESTION OF AUGMENTATION
81
F. PROCEEDINGS AT THE UNITED NATIONS
85
C h a p t e r IV
THE 1977 BREAKTHROUGH AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. PRELUDE TO THE GANGES WATERS TREATY
96
97
B. THE GANGES WATERS TREATY: ITS LIMITATIONS
IMPLICATIONS
AND
106
C. NEGOTIATION OVER THE QUESTION OF AUGMENTATION
109
D. THE INDIAN PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION
110
E . THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION
114
F. THE CHRONOLOGY OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER AUGMENTATION
115
G. A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
128
Chapter V
ASYMMETRIC DYADS AND UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM CONFLICTS
137
A. THE F I V E STAGES OF THE FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE
140
B. THE FARAKKA BARRAGE: THE ARCHETYPE OF AN UPSTREAMDOWNSTREAM CONFLICT
151
C. STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY PAKISTAN/BANGLADESH
154
BIBLIOGRAPHY
181
•
APPENDIX A - STATUTE OF THE 1972 INDO-BANGLADESH
RIVERS COMMISSION
APPENDIX B - 1975 FORTY-DAY UNDERSTANDING
JOINT
186
188
APPENDIX C - INDO-BANGLADESH AGREEMENT ON SHARING OF GANGA
WATERS AT FARAKKA
189
APPENDIX D - CONSENSUS STATEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS ..193
v a
List
of
Figures
Figure
1
- Map
o f the Ganges
River
Basins
and
the
Brahmaputra
Figure
2
- Map
Its
and
Figure
3
- Map
Showing the
Augmentation of
Indian
Ganges
Figure
4
- Map
Showing the
on A u g m e n t a t i o n
Bangladesh
Proposal
o f Ganges Flows
Showing the F a r a k k a Barrage
and
Feeder Canal,
Bhagirathi-Hooghly
Other Rivers
Proposal
Flows
on
Vi
Acknowledgement
It w i l l not be p o s s i b l e to thank a l l the people by name who
helped me r e s e a r c h and w r i t e t h i s t h e s i s . There have been
however, without
much
more
whose h e l p w r i t i n g the t h e s i s would have been a
difficult
Professor
John
discussing
so
R.
task.
Wood,
volatile
I
want
to
thank
f o r the many
and
suggestions about c e r t a i n
proved
some,
elusive
hours
a
substantive
my s u p e r v i s o r ,
topic
aspects
he
spent
with
of
in
me. H i s
the
thesis
t o be very v a l u a b l e .
I
especially
want
to
thank
my
wife,
Sumaiya,
whose
p a t i e n c e , encouragement and support made i t p o s s i b l e f o r me
continue
writing
even
in
the
midst
exhaustion. I f t h i s t h e s i s has achieved
excellence,
i t i s due
to
her
r e l e n t l e s s p e r s u a s i o n to c a r r y on.
colleague,
M i c h a e l P. Howlett,
of- mental and p h y s i c a l
a
certain
constructive
I
to
also
want
measure
criticisms
to
thank
of
and
my
who p r a c t i c a l l y taught me how to
use the word p r o c e s s o r and e d i t e d e a r l i e r d r a f t s of the t h e s i s .
I am g r a t e f u l to my f a t h e r , K.A. Mamun
supplied
with
a
constant
source
Barrage
d i s p u t e from Bangladesh.
fellow
graduate
S r . , who
me
of m a t e r i a l s on the Farakka
I a l s o want
to
thank
a l l my
students at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h
Columbia
who, sometimes u n w i t t i n g l y , helped me i n the completion
project.
kept
of
this
1
I.
The
for
its
INTRODUCTION
r e l a t i o n s between India and
the f i r s t
Bangladesh
were
few years a f t e r the former helped
independence from P a k i s t a n
amicable
the l a t t e r
in December, 1971.
Since
gain
then,
however, r e l a t i o n s have d e t e r i o r a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l y on a number of
issues,
1
the most important
the Farakka Barrage and
i t s consequences f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n
the waters of the Ganges
states.
India's
navigability
River
primary
Barrage p r o j e c t was
of
of which i s India's c o n s t r u c t i o n of
between
purpose
to prevent
in
the
two
neighbouring
undertaking
the s i l t i n g and
to
the Farakka
improve
the port of C a l c u t t a by d i v e r t i n g v i a a
canal a q u a n t i t y of water from
the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly
whose bank the c i t y
River,
Bangladesh maintains
on
that
the
western Bangladesh i s having
Ganges
diversion
to
of
of
flush
the
feeder
out
the
i s located.
water
a d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t on
away
from
i t s agrarian
economy.
Although
1975,
2
the
Farakka
was
government t r i e d
still
a
Bangladesh
came
first
of
i n t o being,
squarely on the shoulders
was
important
that
as
3
before
1951
The
India from c o n s t r u c t i n g the
in
its
of the new
there
when
Pakistan
attempts.
When
the onus of n e g o t i a t i n g with
the Bangladesh government was
had an
Pakistan.
unsuccessful
l i n e s pursued by P a k i s t a n ,
which
part
i t s best to prevent
Farakka Barrage but was
While
not commissioned
the o r i g i n s of the d i s p u t e go as f a r back
Bangladesh
fell
Barrage was
government i n
b a s i c a l l y arguing
were
two
important
India
Dhaka."
along
changes
e f f e c t on the ongoing n e g o t i a t i o n s .
Pakistan
had
negotiated
with
India
the
from
The
a
2
position
country
of
equality
whereas
compared with undivided
I n d i a , had
a much more d i f f i c u l t
important
change
India before
barrage,
was
had
not
enough
substantive
"sharing"
Farakka
remedy
issue
to
originated
water
with
Barrage
the
to accept
from
the
question
construction
India,
of
it
water
r e s p e c t i v e demands of India and
thesis
cooperate
in
of Ganges waters.
The
Ganges
riparian,
the
question
to
efforts
of s h a r i n g and
c e n t r a l question
might
the
dispute
of
the
meet
to
the
Bangladesh.
made
by
riparian,
6
augmentation
this thesis will
to answer i s : what are the s t r a t e g i e s that
lower
equitable
commissioning
the
5
there
subsequently c e n t r e d on how
analyses
on the v i t a l
accompli.
of
Pakistan/Bangladesh to i n f l u e n c e I n d i a , as the upper
to
the
needs, the
Thus, while
and
with
of
that
respective
of "augmentation."
second
negotiating
both s i d e s acknowledged
shifted
by
was
The
Farakka as a f a i t
their
scarcity
This
Pakistan
meet
the
certainly vis a vis
task to c o n f r o n t .
to
that
and
a much weaker
started actual construction
As n e g o t i a t i o n s went on and
was
Pakistan
that while
the l a t t e r had
Bangladesh
Bangladesh, being
Bangladesh,
attempt
as
the
employ to e x t r a c t an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n
from i t s preponderant neighbour?
Chapter II
conflicts
there
from
examines
a
the
theoretical
problem
of
standpoint.
f o r an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n i n d i s p u t e s
upstream-downstream
What p o t e n t i a l i s
l i k e Farakka?
If an
e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n seems u n l i k e l y , what options are a v a i l a b l e to
the lower r i p a r i a n ?
outline
a
number
In
of
order
to
answer
these
questions
s t r a t e g i e s that a downstream country
I
can
3
employ i n an
effort
to e x t r a c t
powerful upstream country.
the
an
equitable solution
These s t r a t e g i e s
works of r i v e r d i s p u t e a n a l y s t s and
theorists.
which
T h i s chapter a l s o
certain
they are
strategies
likely
to f a i l .
In short,
r e l a t i o n s h i p between c e r t a i n
political
ones--and
likely
the
I attempt to
success
from
relations
conditions
to succeed and
structural
the
derived
international
discusses
are
are
from a more
under
those where
determine
the
conditions—particularly
and
failure
of
certain
strategies.
In Chapters III and
picture
of the
In
these
and
from
a few
two
Barrage d i s p u t e are
In Chapter V,
in
Farakka
conclusions
My
applied
compiled
a
comprehensive
scholarly
works w r i t t e n
India
of
regard
that
to i n t e r n a t i o n a l
outlined
and
the
objective
to
some
on
topic.
the
7
by
Farakka
context.
in Chapter II are
actions
in
rethe
success or f a i l u r e of each i s
is
to
derive
upstream-downstream
of
the
adopted
during
Pakistan/Bangladesh's
and
government
strategies
influence
strategies
ultimate
hope
the
accounts,
examined in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l
dispute
with
general i n the
to
the
light
Barrage
analysed.
have
newspaper
chapters,
Pakistan/Bangladesh
examined
I
e n t i r e Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e between India
Pakistan/Bangladesh
publications,
IV,
these
theoretical
conflicts
conclusions
r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e s elsewhere.
may
in
be
4
A.
THE GANGES AND
A
ITS BASIN
b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the Ganges River and i t s basin
enable us to understand the hydrologic-economic aspects
dispute.
Although
in
Asia,
9
languages-- i s only the
i t s basin
with the exceptions
China.
rises
The r i v e r
in
Tibetan
the
itself
into
supports
i s 1,557 miles
southern
Himalayas
a
concentration
of 300
(2,506
on
the
southeasterly
sluggish
through
river,
flowing
populated
Ganges
divisions—the
km)
long.
Indian
Middle
course
most
of
before
one
t r a c t s of t e r r i t o r y
basin
Upper
can
be
Ganges
i t s course
falls
it
is a
i n the world.
divided
into
three
broad
basin which i n c l u d e s the s t a t e of
entirely
within
Bangladesh.
India;
f i v e streams r i s e
of U t t a r Pradesh.
or
Delta
area
In the Upper Ganges
i s f e d by f i v e headstreams--the B h a g i r a t h i , the
Alaknanda, the Mandakini, the Dhauli
Alaknanda
it
Ganges basin which i n c l u d e s the s t a t e s of Bihar and
b a s i n , the r i v e r
These
It
of the most f e r t i l e and
West Bengal i n I n d i a ; and the Lower Ganges Basin
which
1 0
s i d e of the
U t t a r Pradesh and p a r t of the s t a t e of Madhya Pradesh i n
the
on
the Bay of Bengal, through i t s main d i s t r i b u t a r y ,
For
The
longest
l a r g e r than that of any country
the Padma i n Bangladesh.
densely
a
fifteenth
of India and the People's Republic of
border and f o l l o w s
empties
the
8
m i l l i o n people, a p o p u l a t i o n
earth
of
the Ganges River or Ganga --as i t i s c a l l e d
in most of the Indie
river
will
Ganga,
and
the
Pindar.
i n the Uttarkhand d i v i s i o n of the s t a t e
Of these,
the two main
headstreams
are
the
which r i s e s about t h i r t y m i l e s north of the Himalayan
peak of Nanda Devi, and the B h a g i r a t h i , which o r i g i n a t e s
10,000
Figure
1
5
feet above S e a - l e v e l i n an
glacier
known
as
i c e cave at the foot of the Himalayan
Gangotri.
The
true
source of the Ganges,
however, i s c o n s i d e r e d to be at Gaumukh,
south
of
Gangotri.
After
1 1
the
about
thirteen
Alaknanda and
miles
the B h a g i r a t h i
u n i t e at Devprayag, they form the Ganges' mainstream which
through
the
outer
(southern)
mountains at R i s h i k e s h .
The
Himalayas
r i v e r then
to
emerge
flows on to
cuts
from the
Hardwar,
a
sacred p l a c e f o r the Hindus.
Although
there
i s seasonal v a r i a t i o n
i t s volume i n c r e a s e s markedly as i t
and
enters
a
i n the Ganges' flow,
receives
region of heavier r a i n f a l l .
more
From A p r i l
the m e l t i n g Himalayan snows feed the r i v e r , while
season
from
floods.
left-bank
1 3
Gomati, and
In
the
in
to June,
the
rainy
J u l y to September, the r a i n - b e a r i n g monsoons cause
In the Upper Ganges b a s i n , the
tributaries
tributaries
are
the
Jumna
principal
(Yamuna) and
t r i b u t a r i e s i n t h i s region
right-bank
the Tons r i v e r s .
are
the
The
Ramganga,
the
the Ghagara.
Middle Ganges b a s i n , the main t r i b u t a r i e s from the
Himalayan region to the north are the Gandak, the Burhi
the Ghugri, and
the K o s i .
The most important
the l a s t
southern
Gandak,
tributary
i s the Son.
In West Bengal,
the
flows, the Mahananda j o i n s i t from the n o r t h . *
Ganges
The
to Farakka,
westernmost
Indian s t a t e through
to
the
south
and
of
Calcutta.
The
flows
at the apex of the D e l t a .
distributary
of
the Ganges i n the D e l t a
area i s the Hooghly, on the east bank of which stands the
city
which
1
r i v e r then s k i r t s the Rajmahal H i l l s
southeast
1 2
The
Hooghly
itself
is
joined
by
Indian
two
6
tributaries
flowing
Rupnarayan.
In Bangladesh, the Ganges i s j o i n e d by
Brahmaputra
(called
Ghat.
in
from
the
the
Damodar and the
the
mighty
the Jamuna i n that c o u n t r y ) , near Goalundo
The combined stream, now
Meghna
west,
River above Chandpur.
called
the
Padma,
joins
the
The waters then flow i n t o the Bay
of Bengal through innumerable channels, the l a r g e s t of which
is
known as the Meghna e s t u a r y .
Apart
from
distributary
Bengal,
the
Hooghly
and
the
Meghna,
streams which form the Ganges d e l t a
the
Jalangi;
Bhairab, the Kobadak,
and
the
are:
other
in
West
i n Bangladesh, the Mathabhanga,
the Gorai
the
(Madhumati), and the A r i a l Khan.
In the D e l t a r e g i o n , the Ganges, as w e l l as i t s t r i b u t a r i e s
and d i s t r i b u t a r i e s ,
course.
times.
Such
In
changes
1785,
Mymensingh;
the G a n g e s .
it
15
i s c o n s t a n t l y v u l n e r a b l e to changes
the
now
have
occurred
Brahmaputra
i n comparatively
flowed
past
the
of
joining
There are a l s o i n d i c a t i o n s that the B h a g i r a t h i , or
Nullah")
was
the
most
Ganges i n the seventeenth c e n t u r y .
at l e a s t s i n c e
clear,
recent
city
flows f o r t y m i l e s west of i t before
one of i t s s e v e r a l branches (Hooghly, S a r a s v a t i , Adi
"Tolly's
in i t s
Ganga,
important d i s t r i b u t a r y of the
However, i t has been
1770, when the Damodar, which helped to
shifted
i t s mouth
80
or
m i l e s to the s o u t h .
silting
keep
it
1 6
The lower
reaches of t h i s l i n e , the Hooghly proper, r e t a i n t h e i r
vitality,
being fed by streams such as the Rupnarayan and the Damodar.
The r i v e r s
have
i n the West Bengal area are
been d e s c r i b e d as dead or d y i n g .
them to the sea.
very
sluggish
and
L i t t l e water passes down
The r i v e r s i n the Bangladesh d e l t a r e g i o n ,
on
7
the
other hand, are broad and a c t i v e , c a r r y i n g l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s
of water
to the Bay of Bengal.
They are a l s o i n t e r c o n n e c t e d
by
innumerable c r e e k s .
The
Ganges
subcontinent
water
basin c o n t a i n s the l a r g e s t
(see Map-1).
supply
is
As has been
dependent
river
mentioned
snows
Precipitation
in
in
the
the
earlier,
the
p a r t l y on the r a i n s brought by the
monsoon winds from J u l y to October, as w e l l as
Himalayan
system i n the
hot
river
season
basin
on
from
the
April
accompanies
melting
to
the
June.
southwest
monsoon winds, but i s a l s o r e l a t e d to c y c l o n e s that o r i g i n a t e i n
the Bay of Bengal between June and October.
of
rainfall
Only a small amount
occurs i n December and January.
The average annual
r a i n f a l l v a r i e s from 30 inches at the western end of
to
over
90
inches
in
the
eastern
end.
1 7
the
basin
The d e l t a
region
experiences s t r o n g c y c l o n i c storms both before the
of
the monsoon season, from March to May,
from September to October.
relief
over
and
overemphasized.
mighty
of
is slow.
the
and
variation
in
1 8
numerous
tributaries
the i n h a b i t a n t s of the basin cannot
beginning
of
civilization,
be
capital
emperors f l o u r i s h e d on the banks of t h i s
Pataliputra
other
and t h r i v e d as
for
From the
kings
river.
numerous
Today
Since there i s l i t t l e
importance of the Ganges and i t s
distributaries
cities
and at the end of i t ,
the e n t i r e surface of the Gangetic P l a i n , the rate
of flow of the r i v e r
The
commencement
(now
Patna),
Delhi,
Allahabad,
and
c i t i e s had sprung up on the banks of the Ganges
important
river
not
political
only
and
represents
commercial
the
major
centres.
source
of
8
livelihood
are
f o r the i n h a b i t a n t s of i t s great
a l s o h e l d sacred by the Hindu community.
Hindus that those
sins.
for
The r i v e r a l s o provides a constant
the
greater
Bangladesh.
deposits
The
I t i s b e l i e v e d by
source
constant
flooding
during
of
all
of f r e s h f i s h ,
forms the primary
m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n
nutrition
i n West Bengal and
the
rainy
season
a r i c h a l l u v i u m over the land which makes the Gangetic
p l a i n one of the most f e r t i l e
t r a c t s of t e r r i t o r y
overcrowded and a l l u v i a l Gangetic
its
i t s waters
who bathe i n the Ganges are absolved
a food, which, combined with r i c e ,
The
basin,
life-blood
from
the
river
basin,
itself
i n the world.
therefore,
and
draws
i t s numerous
t r i b u t a r i e s and d i s t r i b u t a r i e s .
Before
the
area
1971)
Partition
now
1 9
forming
Bangladesh
(East Pakistan
was e n t i t l e d t o draw s u p p l i e s of
(Padma i n Bangladesh).
plain
i n 1947, there was never any doubt
had
not
only
Historically,
water
u n t i l December
from
the Ganges
the people of the Gangetic
enjoyed the b e n e f i t s of the r i v e r but had
a l s o , on o c c a s i o n , been subject to i t s tremendous wrath.
every
year, c y c l o n e s o r i g i n a t i n g over the Bay
colossal
of
f l o o d s a l l over the Ganges basin and these
the
two
different
created, therefore,
traditional
states
i t was
of
expected
Pakistan
that
r i v e r would go on as b e f o r e .
cause
floods claim
regularity.
and
the
Almost
Bengal
l i v e s and destroy crops and l i v e s t o c k with alarming
When
that
I n d i a were
use
of
this
When I n d i a decided to
c o n s t r u c t the Farakka Barrage e x a c t l y at the apex of the d e l t a ,
it
was
protest.
not
at
a l l surprising
that P a k i s t a n
r a i s e d a c r y of
9
B.
THE FARAKKA BARRAGE
The Farakka Barrage i s s i t u a t e d at l a t i t u d e 24 degrees
and
45 minutes North and l o n g i t u d e 87 degrees 50 minutes East .on the
Ganges
of
River i n the d i s t r i c t
West Bengal.
Calcutta
and
I t i s about
about
i s about
back
rail
a
300
18 km.
barrage i t s e l f
both
of Murshidabad
km.
the
north
of
the
city
of
west of the Bangladesh border.
2455 metres
long
and
l i n k and a motor road.
barrage begins a feeder c a n a l which
meet
i n the Indian s t a t e
Bhagirathi-Hooghly
on
Just upstream
runs 42.6
River
supports
km.
The
its
of the
southward
to
j u s t downstream of another
barrage (designed to prevent water
that s p i l l s over the
Barrage
from e n t e r i n g the B h a g i r a t h i -
in
the
monsoon
Hooghly) at J a n j i p u r .
the
season
There
Bhagirathi-Hooghly
i s also a
just
c o n t r o l the water e n t e r i n g
upstream
cross
of
regulator
as
silt
i t d i r e c t l y when the Ganges
excluders,
flow down the Ganges.
across
the feeder c a n a l to
The Farakka Barrage a l s o i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l high v e l o c i t y
known
Farakka
floods.
sluices,
which are intended to allow s i l t
The barrage was designed
so
that
to
silt-
free water w#uld be d i v e r t e d down the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and the
sediment
load
of
the Ganges would be c a r r i e d by the remaining
flow i n that r i v e r on to Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal.
The
canal
has the c a p a c i t y to handle 40,000 cubic feet of water
per
second
(cusecs)
2 0
and c o n t a i n s l o c k s at
both
ends
n a v i g a t i o n from the Ganges through to C a l c u t t a .
completed
in
began i t s f i r s t
graphic
1970
and
official
understanding
of
the
Farakka
21,
provide
The Barrage
the feeder c a n a l i n 1973.
o p e r a t i o n s on A p r i l
to
The
1975.
was
project
(For
a
Barrage and the feeder
Figure 2
4
10
c a n a l , c o n s u l t Map-2).
C.
CONFLICTING INTERESTS OVER FARAKKA
India's
subsequent
construction
effect
from other
According
the
Farakka
Barrage
and
on the t o t a l volume of water passing
the Padma i n t o East
c r i t i c i s m not only
of
Pakistan
through
( l a t e r Bangladesh) came under heavy
from P a k i s t a n
quarters
its
(and l a t e r Bangladesh) but a l s o
i n the r e g i o n a l and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena.
t o I s h t i a q Hossain:
Of the v a r i o u s i s s u e s
responsible
for deteriorating
Indo-Bangladesh
relations,
construction
and
commissioning
of a dam at Farakka... has
perhaps
attracted
the most a t t e n t i o n
from the r e s t of the
world.
2 1
This
was
concerted
in
efforts
construction
a
large
chance
part
to
due
to
Pakistan's
stop the Indian
to s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s
the two governments
the i m p l i c a t i o n s .
and
start
construction
The
to save the port of C a l c u t t a
Bhagirathi,
of the Ganges u n t i l
degenerate
a general
had
India, however, managed
simultaneously.
India has c o n s i s t e n t l y defended i t s move by c l a i m i n g
an e f f o r t
and
government from s t a r t i n g
on the p r o j e c t s i t e before
to d i s c u s s
consistent
from
that
i t was
silting.
which had been the p r i n c i p a l d i s t r i b u t a r y
about
two
into a s i l t - l a d e n
hundred
years
ago,
began
r i v e r when the Ganges regime began
eastward s h i f t about that time.
When
this
occurred
the Padma assumed the r o l e of main channel and d i s t r i b u t a r y .
a
result
the
Hooghly
s i l t a t i o n problem.
river,
the
began
Moreover,
to
to experience an ever
since
the
Hooghly
As
increasing
is a
tidal
t i d a l bores began t o a f f e c t the n a v i g a b i l i t y of the
11
r i v e r by d e p o s i t i n g huge amounts of sand.
headwater supply
between
the
diminished
sea t i d e s and
as the headwater supply
and
this
Over the decades,
overturned
the headwater flow.
the
the
balance
In other words,
reduced, t i d a l waters began to
penetrate
more and more i n l a n d .
There are
fears
about
1795.
22
i n d i c a t i o n s that
future
of
the
Since the c l o s u r e
of
this
decrease
the
the
in
the volume of raw
into
been aware as e a r l y as
of
the
Hooghly
there was
could
1795
be
expressed
port of C a l c u t t a as e a r l y as
vital
port
would
mean
a
a g r i c u l t u r a l goods
a committee was
the c o n d i t i o n of the H o o g h l y .
had
rulers
m a t e r i a l s and
t r a n s p o r t e d to the mother country,
inquire
British
appointed
Thus, the
23
that unless the
to
British
headwater
flow
i n c r e a s e d through a r t i f i c i a l means,
a danger that C a l c u t t a port
would
have
to
be
shut
down.
At
independence i n 1947,
there
i s documented evidence
the Boundary Commission went to the l e n g t h of v i o l a t i n g
p r i n c i p l e of d i v i s i o n of t e r r i t o r y between India and
majority
religion--in
order
to
Farakka
belonged
Murshidabad, i t was
Ganges c o u l d achieve
award
the
entire
to
the main
Pakistan—
enable India to take s u i t a b l e
measures f o r the d i v e r s i o n of Ganges waters
Although
that
to
the
Hooghly. *
2
the Muslim m a j o r i t y d i s t r i c t
the obvious p l a c e where a barrage a c r o s s
this diversion.
The
Murshidabad d i s t r i c t
Commission decided
to I n d i a .
According
S i r C y r i l R a d c l i f f e , the chairman:
...to prevent the Hooghly from l a n g u i s h i n g
altogether
and
r u i n i n g the h e a l t h and i n d u s t r y of Bengal, i t i s
absolutely
necessary
that
the
headwaters of
the
of
the
to
to
12
Hooghly
state.
should be under the c o n t r o l of the West Bengal
2 5
Pakistan
of
received
the Hindu m a j o r i t y d i s t r i c t
of Khulna by way
compensation.
The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Farakka Barrage was
be
the
Indians."
the
"only
2 6
technical
solution
to
the
considered
problem
I t was p r o j e c t e d that by the j u d i c i o u s o p e r a t i o n
Farakka
Barrage,
fluctuating
the
of
i t would be p o s s i b l e not only to prolong
the upland s u p p l i e s i n t o the Hooghly but a l s o to "even
sharply
by
to
hydrographs
in
the
river"
out
the
thus
2 7
c o u n t e r a c t i n g the d e t e r i o r a t i n g e f f e c t s of the preponderance
of
the t i d a l flow.
Pakistan
and
subsequently
d i v e r s i o n of waters at Farakka
effects.
were
Bangladesh
will
have
have
disastrous
As n e g o t i a t i o n s dragged on, the i l l
presented
in
a
more
detailed
that
economic
e f f e c t s of Farakka
f a s h i o n to impress on the
Indian government the urgency of the s i t u a t i o n .
argued
c l a i m s are given below.
removal of water from the Ganges/Padma would
A
summary
of
They argued that
produce
seriously
d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s on East Bengal's economy by:
1) lowering
the water
table
i n Bangladesh's eastern
part and thus reducing the moisture content of the
soil
immediately a f t e r
the monsoons and causing a
s e r i o u s d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the summer output of those
high y i e l d
rice
strains
whose growth depends on an
abundant supply of water;
2) a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g the n a v i g a b i l i t y of the Padma
and
its spill
channels, e s p e c i a l l y
the G o r a i Madhumati, both by d r a s t i c a l l y lowering or e l i m i n a t i n g
the water l e v e l s of these water courses and by causing
the Padma River bed t o r i s e as a r e s u l t of the s i l t i n g
caused by such reduced flow. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n about
13
1135
km.
of major waterways
i n Bangladesh
was
expected to be n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d as a drop i n water
levels
of
up
to s i x feet was a n t i c i p a t e d i n the dry
season;
3) aggravating the monsoon
f l o o d s i n Bangladesh
by
limiting
the amount of
flood
water which
would
normally d r a i n o f f i n t o the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and
by
decreasing
through
dry season s i l t a t i o n the c a p a c i t y
of the Padma r i v e r bed to accommodate the
wet
season
flow;
4) damaging the a g r i c u l t u r e of the c o a s t a l areas of
Khulna, B a r i s a l , and P a t u a k h a l i d i s t r i c t s as
well
as
p a r t s of nearby d i s t r i c t s l i k e Jessore and F a r i d p u r by
a l l o w i n g s a l i n e water to penetrate deep i n l a n d i n t o an
area
of more than
20,000 square
kilometres.
The
resulting
loss
of
cultivable
land would
probably
reduce
the
amount
of
farm
employment, f u r t h e r
i n c r e a s i n g the n a t i o n ' s hardship;
5) decimating
the
forests
i n the c o a s t a l areas,
causing
them to become poorer
i n d e n s i t y and to
produce
lower
quality
wood.
An
example are
the
Sunderban f o r e s t s i n Khulna d i s t r i c t where i n a d d i t i o n
to the
expected
loss
in d i s t r i c t revenues and the
reduced
supply
of
timber
f o r housing
and
other
construction,
the
changed
e c o l o g i c a l balance of the
f o r e s t regions would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t forms of
animal
l i f e presently r e s i d i n g there;
6)
reducing
in both
q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y the water
supplied
to
the
urban
industrial
centres
in
Bangladesh's
lower
delta,
thereby
hurting
their
growth, c r e a t i n g d i f f i c u l t y i n the d i s p o s a l of
their
effluents
and
raising
the
death rate due to waterborne d i s e a s e s and the d e c l i n e i n s a n i t a t i o n ;
7) d e c r e a s i n g the e x t r a c t i o n of food i n the Bangladesh
d e l t a s i n c e f i s h i n g would be e l i m i n a t e d as a source of
l i v e l i h o o d for thousands of fishermen and d e a l e r s . An
important source
of
p r o t e i n for many 'Bangladeshis
would
thus
be c u r t a i l e d .
The expected change i n the
hydrographic c o n d i t i o n s of the Padma's lower
reaches
would
stop
the movement of many f r e s h water f i s h
v a r i e t i e s up the r i v e r .
In a d d i t i o n , a l a r g e p a r t
of
the
water
system would go dry i n the months between
December and May and many other v a r i e t i e s of f i s h
and
prawn would become l a n d - l o c k e d and d i e ;
8)
r e t a r d i n g the
s u c c e s s f u l planning
or execution
(both present
and
future)
of
land
and
water
development p r o j e c t s i n the area by e i t h e r s e v e r e l y
reducing
or making
unpredictable
the
necessary
14
supplies
of
Padma water. The most prominent example
i s that of the
Ganges-Kobadak p r o j e c t ,
intended
to
i r r i g a t e almost two m i l l i o n acres in K u s h t i a , Jessore,
and
Khulna d i s t r i c t s .
A l l in a l l , i t has
been
estimated that e i g h t to nine d i s t r i c t s i n B a n g l a d e s h —
containing t h i r t y m i l l i o n
people
(one-third
of
the
total
p o p u l a t i o n of Bangladesh) and about one quarter
of the c u l t i v a b l e land-- w i l l be a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by
the Farakka p r o j e c t .
2 8
India
has
Bangladesh's
data are
of
them.
i s given
naturally
claims
inaccurate
gone
to
by m a i n t a i n i n g
or by p r o v i d i n g a
A summary of India's
great
that the
lengths
to
refute
latter's technical
different
interpretation
responses to Bangladesh's
claims
below:
1) In attempting
to
refute
the
basic
claim
that
Bangladesh needs more of the Ganges-Padma water than
India i s w i l l i n g to allow, Indian o f f i c i a l s note
that
whereas the Ganges basin i n India i s r e l a t i v e l y a r i d ,
the d e l t a area i n Bangladesh i s always green.
They
note
that Bangladesh's r a i n f a l l averages 190 cm.
per
year as opposed to 63-127 cm.
on the Indian s i d e , and
the r a i n f a l l of
the
wet
season
i s so
great
that
despite
a
s h o r t , dry season, Bangladesh's s u b s o i l i s
not d r i e d out s u f f i c i e n t l y to i n h i b i t
the
growth
of
forests.
They a l s o contend
that monsoon r a i n s are
s u f f i c i e n t to s a t u r a t e
the
soil
f o r at
least
two
months a f t e r the
rains, u n t i l
about
the
end
of
December.
2) To Bangladesh's emphasis on an adequate
supply
of
water
i n the dry months of March, A p r i l , and May,
the
Indians counter that during that p e r i o d even with
the
locks
at
Farakka
being c l o s e d , the waterflow of the
Ganges-Padma in Bangladesh
i s normally
superior
to
that
at
Farakka.
They a l s o c l a i m that there i s a
regeneration of almost 20,000 cusecs and t h e r e f o r e i t
is
unnecessary
f o r India
to
reduce i t s own meagre
allotment.
3)
The
Indians emphasize
that
Bangladesh
is
not
l a c k i n g i n water, but r a t h e r overrun with i t , and that
i t s a g r i c u l t u r e would a c t u a l l y gain by having the flow
of water reduced, e s p e c i a l l y in the summer months when
15
floods
inundate
countryside.
extensive
areas
of
the Bangladesh
4) To counter Bangladesh's claims r e g a r d i n g l o s s e s
to
inland
navigation,
the Indians p o i n t out that there
has not been p r e v i o u s l y any organised n a v i g a t i o n along
the Padma, and that s p i l l channels l i k e the Gorai
are
seasonal
i n nature and
only
n a v i g a b l e during the
floods.
5) To
Bangladesh's
c l a i m s about
silting
due
to
d i v e r s i o n of the Ganges waters at Farakka, the Indians
counter
that
s i l t i n g i s no problem i n the dry season
because the r i v e r i s then r e l a t i v e l y
silt-free.
The
Indians a l s o
argue
that
i n the r a i n y
months the
i n c r e a s e d percentage of s i l t i n the Bangladesh
river
system
which
r e s u l t s from d i v e r s i o n of 40,000 cusecs
of s i l t f r e e water at Farakka i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t .
6) Regarding s a l i n i t y , the Indians c l a i m
that
since
the
t o t a l d i s c h a r g e of water by the r i v e r s Meghna and
Brahmaputra, even i n the dry months, i s approximately
200,000 cusecs, the problem
of seawater i n t r u s i o n
should not occur. The Indians have been s i l e n t on the
i s s u e of d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t s of s a l t
water
on
fish,
f o r e s t s , or urban a r e a s .
7) India
a l s o f l a t l y denies that the Farakka Barrage
will
hurt
Bangladesh
irrigation
projects
on
the
grounds
that
a) the r e d u c t i o n i n the flow w i l l be so
i n s i g n i f i c a n t as not to be missed, b) the requirements
of planned and e x i s t i n g p r o j e c t s are so small
as to
put no burden on present or f u t u r e water s u p p l i e s , and
c) the r e g i o n s ' s morphology
i n v o l v i n g f l a t ground,
annual f l o o d s , and s h i f t i n g r i v e r s i s i m p r a c t i c a l f o r
big i r r i g a t i o n schemes. In any event, they suggest an
extension
of Bangladesh's pumping system should be an
a l t e r n a t i v e or s u p e r i o r source of i r r i g a t i o n .
2 9
Thus I n d i a has assembled a v a r i e t y of t e c h n i c a l arguments
in
combination attempt to show that no matter how
Ganges-Padma waters may
vital
to
India
be to Bangladesh,
they
important the
are
and to p r o j e c t s i t has a l l o t e d them.
when the Farakka Barrage p r o j e c t was
still
which
much
more
In f a c t ,
i n the planning stage
16
it
was
calculated
Bhagirathi-Hooghly
that
and
besides
The
water
the
facilitate
communications, and
The
of
the
p r o j e c t would improve C a l c u t t a ' s
drainage
of the r e g i o n ,
improve
increase the mileage of i n l a n d n a v i g a t i o n .
principal conflict
dry season
preservation
the port of C a l c u t t a , there would a l s o be
a number of side b e n e f i t s .
supply,
the
i n the Ganges d i s p u t e
flow of the Ganges.
The
seasonal
is
over
fluctuation
this
period,
Hooghly and
India's
rising
f o r i r r i g a t i o n are
demand f o r water to maintain
in
the ecology
to promote i n d u s t r y , i r r i g a t i o n , and
India
as
and
successor
Bangladesh
has had
influence
them.
The
the power to
f o r i t s needs.
have
consequences of Indian d e c i s i o n s but have had
to
Bangladesh's
navigation.
the upper r i p a r i a n country,
its
with
the
of the Ganges d e l t a and
implement p r o j e c t s on the Ganges to provide
Pakistan
May.
needs for water to f l u s h
conflict
the
i n the
flow makes water scarce d u r i n g the p e r i o d January through
In
3 0
East
suffered
the
only l i m i t e d power
d i s p u t e over s h a r i n g of the Ganges i s
about attempts by Pakistan and
Bangladesh
to
influence
Indian
policy.
Although the government of M o r a r j i Desai
treaty
with
Bangladesh
renewed f o r another two
the q u e s t i o n
of
November
years a f t e r
1977,
i t expired
t h i s has
i n November
T h i s t h e s i s attempts to d i s c u s s the
sharing
existing
dry
season
a l t e r n a t i v e methods of augmenting t h i s flow
perspective
and
been
1982,
of sharing and augmentation of Ganges waters i s f a r
from r e s o l v e d .
issues
in
signed a f i v e - y e a r
and
flow
from
substantive
and
examining
a
bargaining
explores v a r i o u s s t r a t e g i e s which c o u l d
assist
17
Bangladesh
i n persuading
i t s upstream neighbour
to cooperate.
18
NOTES
1. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the h i s t o r y
of
Indo-Bangladesh
relations
since
1971
p r e s e n t s a dismal p i c t u r e .
A number of i s s u e s have
not o n l y clouded t h e i r
relations
but
have a l s o
l e d to the
exchange of
fire
between
the two c o u n t r i e s ' border s e c u r i t y
f o r c e s over d i s p u t e d t e r r i t o r y .
Below i s a l i s t of some of
the
more c o n t e n t i o u s i s s u e s between these two c o u n t r i e s :
a. D i s p u t e over the maritime b e l t ;
b. Indian support f o r pro-Mujib g u e r r i l l a s ;
c. the s h a r i n g of Ganges waters;
d. d i s p u t e s
over Muhurir Char (an i s l e t on the Muhuri R i v e r , the
boundary between Bangladesh and the Indian s t a t e of T r i p u r a ) ;
e. d i s p u t e over the Purbasha i s l a n d i n the Bay of Bengal;
f. smuggling o p e r a t i o n s c a r r i e d on both s i d e s of the border;
g. d i s p u t e over i l l e g a l border c r o s s i n g s on
both
sides
of
the
border; and most r e c e n t l y ,
h. d i s p u t e
over
I n d i a ' s plans to c o n s t r u c t a barbed wire fence
around the 1700 m i l e s of the Indo-Bangladesh border.
2. The 7000-foot long barrage was completed
i n 1970
and
the
26.5 m i l e long feeder c a n a l took another four years to complete.
The
barrage and feeder c a n a l were f i n a l l y commissioned i n 1975
following
an
interim
agreement
signed between
India
and
Bangladesh on A p r i l 18 1975.
3.
When Indian p l a n s to c o n s t r u c t a dam at Farakka were made
p u b l i c through Indian p r e s s r e p o r t s ,
the P a k i s t a n government
sent a note of p r o t e s t to New D e l h i .
The o r i g i n s of the Farakka
Barrage
d i s p u t e can be t r a c e d to t h i s date. When P a k i s t a n was
dismembered i n 1971 and Bangladesh
achieved independence,
the
new
government
in Dhaka pursued the case with India along the
l i n e s adopted by the P a k i s t a n government from 1961-1971.
4. Dhaka i s the c a p i t a l
city
of
the People's Republic of
Bangladesh.
Before November 1982, i t was s p e l l e d "Dacca" when
i t was
officially
changed
by
Presidential
Order.
The
new
spelling
i s closer
to the phonetic usage and t h i s v e r s i o n has
been used throughout the t h e s i s .
5. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Farakka
Barrage
was
completed
1970
before Bangladesh
had achieved independence (1971).
feeder c a n a l , however, was not completed u n t i l 1973.
in
The
6.
The word " r i p a r i a n " denotes a country through which a
river
flows.
In the case of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r flowing through
two c o u n t r i e s , t h e r e f o r e , the upstream
country
is called
the
upper r i p a r i a n , and the downstream country, the lower r i p a r i a n .
Both c o u n t r i e s are c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f e r r e d to as c o - r i p a r i a n s .
7.
To
date, only two
major works have been w r i t t e n on the
Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e . Of these, the only p u b l i s h e d work
has
19
been w r i t t e n
by B.M.
Abbas who was d i r e c t l y
involved i n
n e g o t i a t i o n s with
India
over a p e r i o d
of ten years.
The
following
i s the b i b l i o g r a p h i c r e f e r e n c e :
B.M.
Abbas, The
Ganges Water Dispute, (Dhaka: U n i v e r s i t y P u b l i c a t i o n s
Limited,
1982).
The other
i s a Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n by Ben Crow i n the
U n i v e r s i t y of Edinburgh i n 1980. I t i s e n t i t l e d
The P o l i t i c s
and Technology of Sharing the Ganges. T h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n has not
yet been p u b l i s h e d .
8.
The Ganges River
i s c a l l e d the "Ganga" i n a l l the Indian
languages i n c l u d i n g B e n g a l i .
In Bangladesh where the o f f i c i a l
language
i s Bengali,
people
r e f e r to the r i v e r as the Ganga
although o f f i c i a l l y the a n g l i c i z e d name has been
retained.
In
t h i s t h e s i s , the name Ganges w i l l be used t o a v o i d c o n f u s i o n .
9.
Encyclopaedia
10.
Ibid.
11.
Ibid.
B r i t a n n i c a p.879.
12.
In the terminology
of f l u v i a l
morphology,
right-bank
t r i b u t a r i e s r e f e r to those which
join
the mainstream on the
right
i f one stands with
h i s back
to the source and looks
downstream. By t h i s method, the r i v e r s j o i n i n g the mainstream
on the l e f t a r e c a l l e d the l e f t - b a n k t r i b u t a r i e s .
13.
See footnote 12.
14.
Encyclopaedia
B r i t a n n i c a , op.
cit.
p.879.
15.
Nafis
Ahmed, An Economic Geography of Bangladesh
D e l h i : Vikas P u b l i s h i n g House, 1 976) , p. 9.
'
,(New
16.
O.H.K. Spate, A.T.A.. Learmonth, and B.H. Farmer,
India,
Pakistan and Ceylon: The Regions,
(London: Methuen and Co.
L t d . , 1972), p.574.
~
17.
N a f i s Ahmed, op.
c i t . , p.18.
18.
In the d e l t a region
of Bangladesh,
g r a d i e n t i s f i v e inches per m i l e .
the
average
seaward
19.
The word
"Partition"
r e f e r s to the c r e a t i o n of two new
n a t i o n s - - I n d i a and Pakistan--from the s i n g l e Dominion
of India
in August 1947.
20.
A cusec
equals
1 cubic
foot per second. In f l u v i a l
morphology, a cusec i s a measure of the volume of water i n c u b i c
feet f l o w i n g through a p a r t i c u l a r c r o s s s e c t i o n of a r i v e r i n
one second.
21.
I s h t i a q Hossain,
"Bangladesh-India R e l a t i o n s : Issues and
Problems," Asian Survey, V o l .
XXI, No.
11, November 1981,
20
pp.1115-1128.
22.
C.J. Mohan, "Problems of Navigable Approaches to the Port
of C a l c u t t a , " C a l c u t t a Port Annual, 1958, p.192.
23.
Jayanta
Kumar
Ray,
International Studies, V o l .
24.
S.K.
Nag,
"The
Annual, 1970, p.159.
"The
Farakka
17, (1978): 239.
Study
of
the
Agreement,"
Hooghly," C a l c u t t a Port
25.
A report w r i t t e n by C y r i l R a d c l i f f e
on
the
Bengal.
See P a r t i t i o n Proceedings, No.
2, p.49.
partition
26.
I n d i a . M i n i s t r y of Information and B r o a d c a s t i n g .
Reference Annual, 1969 p.295
27.
in
of
India: A
Ibid.
28.
For a d e t a i l e d
list
of Bangladesh's
complaints,
see
Government
of
Bangladesh,
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
publication
White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute
Dhaka,
September 1976.
29.
Ibid.
See a l s o Jayanta Kumar Ray,
30.
" I n d i a : A Reference Annual
op.
op. c i t .
cit.
, p.295.
21
II.
INTERNATIONAL RIVER DISPUTES AND
BARGAINING STRATEGIES:
SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
International
r i v e r disputes
contemporary world scene.
The
world's
made
population
commodity.
The
means to make
However,
vitally
has
are a common phenomenon i n
alarming rate of
fresh
more
efficient
use
of
use
makes
these
waters
n a t i o n a l water r e s o u r c e s .
to
of
overcome than p h y s i c a l ones.
it
of an
valuable
provided
the
resource.
1
states
exploitable
boundaries
are
is
basin
to
than
present
real
often more d i f f i c u l t
not
at
all
to
surprising,
there should be a problem of sharing
Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e
p r i m a r i l y a r i v e r dispute
analyse
the d i s p u t e
as
states.
I aim
It w i l l
i s any
the
waters
solution
depend
the c o - r i p a r i a n s ,
in any
river
In
on
the
order
to
theoretical
disputes
as
dispute
u n i t s as opposed to two
a
The
which
which occurs between
sovereign s t a t e - - t h e
which are hydrologic-economic.
between
Bangladesh i s
with r e l a t i o n s between unequal
r i v e r dispute
or more sovereign p o l i t i c a l
one
neighbours.
international river
soon be c l e a r that
autonomous u n i t s w i t h i n
and
i n t h i s chapter to e l i c i t
from l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g
is i n t e r n a t i o n a l — t h a t
equitable
between India
between two
f o r m u l a t i o n s from work done on
two
the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r between r i p a r i a n s t a t e s .
The
well
very
vital
readily
Political
and
that
this
getting
less
use
therefore,
efficient
of
of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r e s h waters i s a l s o
important, the d i f f i c u l t y
obstacles
a
r a p i d advancement of technology has
although the
cooperate
water
growth
the
chances
number of f a c t o r s not
o v e r a l l state
stakes involved
of
or more
of
an
a l l of
relations
f o r each of them,
22
their
general
techniques
they
bargaining
the f i n a l
foreign
policy
chose
to
objectives,
employ
c h i p s each holds, may
outcome.
According
and,
a l s o be
the
bargaining
more importantly,
important
to David G.
the
factors
in
LeMarquand:
The complex i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y i n a basin
is
often
unrelated
to a n a t u r a l system. Demands on
the shared resources d i f f e r
between basin
countries
due
to many f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g p o p u l a t i o n
growth,
economic development, c u l t u r a l
practices,
foreign
policy
objectives,
and
the
availability
and
a c c e s s i b i l i t y of other domestic water r e s o u r c e s .
2
It i s not
s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , that s o l u t i o n s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l
river disputes
encompass
much
more
than
purely
hydrologic-
economic i s s u e s .
Although
disputes
my
the
literature
i s vast and
contention,
planning
open and
and
long
and
d e t a i l e d , most of
however,
r i v e r d i s p u t e s are
the
that
The
i t is legalistic.
of
years
disputes
f i n a l outcome i s more a
of the most comprehensive works on
has
been
w r i t t e n by David G.
is
self-interested
bargaining,
result
of
both
short
river
is
disputes
that,
while
hydrologic-economic i s s u e s , he
considerations.
international
LeMarquand.
from other authors d e a l i n g
the
It
term p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a f f e c t i n g the d i s p u t i n g
LeMarquand apart
solution
of
strenuous p o l i t i c a l
r i p a r i a n s than i t i s of hydrologic-economic
One
international river
most s o l u t i o n s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l
results
lobbying, and
secret.
d e a l i n g with
with
r e c o g n i s i n g the
importance,
What sets
international
importance of
s t r e s s e s the point that the
i s the r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
latter's
3
river
he
divides
To
relationships
final
clarify
among
23
international
a) p u b l i c
co-riparians
i n t o the f o l l o w i n g
resources;
c)
integrated
d)
upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t . "
development o p p o r t u n i t i e s ;
first
cooperation
two
among
relationships
basin s t a t e s .
e x i s t s when a l l s t a t e s
to
the
other
on
relationship,
share
A "public
resource
may
users'
an
i s able
detriment.
approximation
international
i s involved.
to
relationship
access to the
to
exploit
the
States' navigation
of
a
public
river.
The
when
goods
second
two
action
In t h i s i n s t a n c e , use of
by one country may d i m i n i s h the b e n e f i t s
eventually
a l l riparian
river, a l l will
water.
the
goods"
"common pool r e s o u r c e s , " occurs
also
example,
the
conducive
states
a r i v e r or lake as a boundary, but no upstream-downstream
relationship
but
most
have equal and u n r e s t r i c t e d
r i g h t s represent the c l o s e s t
relationship
and
are
resource, and when none of the s t a t e s
resource
categories:
goods;
b) common pool
The
four
On
the
harm
i t s own
basin s t a t e s
suffer
other
from
hand,
conflict
relationships,
l e s s as one
the
resource
reduced
without
an
quality
a l l w i l l benefit
In t h i s category
I f , for
of the
from concerted
of
disputes,
high because the
through c o o p e r a t i o n .
arise
in
the
the chances of r e a c h i n g e a r l y
country
to the others
interests.
to reach agreement w i l l be q u i t e
w i l l benefit
Should
common
c o u n t r i e s dispose of t h e i r e f f l u e n t s i n
to reduce the e f f l u e n t s .
incentives
the
i s able
to
agreement.
third
and
settlement are much
receive
benefits
In
third
the
fourth
from
category
the
of
24
" i n t e g r a t e d development o p p o r t u n i t i e s , " two
are
in
an
upstream
upstream-downstream
country
providing
may
benefits
decide
to
to
build
itself,
forms.
example
benefit.
The
latter
benefits
for
riparians actions.
the
a river.
dam
which,
brings
is
undertakes
An
while
benefit
country
received
The main problem here l i e s
by
to
a
a
good
the p r o j e c t and
which
from
the
the upper
i n c a l c u l a t i n g an
" e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of c o s t s and b e n e f i t s " between
which
countries
upstream country w i l l want to
downstream
pay
on
Flood c o n t r o l
reach an agreement with the
will
a
also
in c e r t a i n
such
more
relationship
downstream country
of
or
the
country
the country which p r o f i t s as a
result.
The
are i n
f i n a l category can a l s o be found where the basin s t a t e s
an
upstream-downstream
relationship.
however, the upstream country uses a r i v e r
Its
utilisation
for i t s sole
makes consumptive use
interests
i f , for
water
satisfied.
agreement
such
that
own
the
In such cases, the economic i n c e n t i v e s to
are extremely
users'
may
example,
flow
of
reach
be
an
low because the upstream s t a t e r e c e i v e s
demands.
The
in accordance
dispute
between
Bangladesh over s h a r i n g of the Ganges waters f a l l s
category of hydrologic-economic
LeMarquand's
profit.
the downstream country's needs cannot
maximum b e n e f i t by e x p l o i t i n g the r i v e r
its
case,
(such as f o r i r r i g a t i o n ) of the water,
d i v e r t s i t , p o l l u t e s i t e x c e s s i v e l y , or r e g u l a t e s
the
this
does not b e n e f i t the downstream country and
well be d e t r i m e n t a l to the l a t t e r ' s
it
In
typology
with
India
in t h i s
only
and
last
relationships.
is helpful
i n s o f a r as i t s p e l l s out
25
which d i s p u t e s can be solved e a s i l y and
degree
of d i f f i c u l t y .
examination of case
reveals
that
studies
of
upstream-downstream
to cooperate.
set of i n t e r n a l and
the
which
upstream
may
have
These types
other
persuade
the
down
to
agreed to d e s a l t
Mexico
in
f o r these
the
Colorado
agreements, LeMarquand o f f e r s a
e x t e r n a l v a r i a b l e s which the
countries
have
to take
generally
important
to
to
international
policy
a
specifically,
to
riparian(s),
formulation.
foreign
its
policy
willingness
areas
of
mutual
to
LeMarquand
7
in
certain
depending
on
the
contends
non-executive
refer
objectives
and,
concern about i t s
link
principles
the
with
the value
that
this
situation,
riparian
the
brings
co-
i t places
cluster
v a r i a t i o n s for d i f f e r e n t
specific
dispute.
factors
concern
i t s d e s i r e f o r r e c i p r o c i t y , and
acts
While
and
such f a c t o r s as a country's
other
sovereignty.
s o l u t i o n or
on a r i v e r
External
6
policy-making
image, i t s w i l l i n g n e s s to adhere to the
with
variables
domestic
repercussions
country's
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,
dispute
of
decision-makers
into consideration.
include bureaucratic, executive,
approaches
and,
conflicts
As an example he c i t e s the case
I n t e r n a l f a c t o r s r e f e r to the types
on
greater
5
As an e x p l a n a t i o n
of
ones which may
S t a t e s and Mexico where the U.S.
part of the water i t passes
River.
a
agreements have been reached, there must be
country
of the United
with
He a l s o s t a t e s that s i n c e even a cursory
f a c t o r s besides hydrologic-economic
upstream
which
of
conflicts
about
a
non-solution.
there
can
be
no
doubt
about the c o n t r i b u t i o n of
26
LeMarquand's typology
potential
I
i n t e r n a t i o n a l river disputes
and
their
f o r r e s o l u t i o n , h i s a n a l y t i c framework i s by no means
all-encompassing.
but
of
want
To be
f a i r , LeMarquand admits t h i s
to point out
some of the terms and
himself;
8
concepts he
has
s t a t e s that
in
used which, I b e l i e v e , need some e l a b o r a t i o n .
LeMarquand makes a keen o b s e r v a t i o n
an
upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t ,
f o r cooperation
there
when he
i s no economic
when an upstream country uses
an
international
river
to the detriment of the downstream country and
has
r e c i p r o c a l power over the
no
former.
ambiguous i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s and
been
able to give
power i n the
9
The
the
to t h i s day
One
s t a t e s that
nobody
has
definition
of
i t i s the
c a p a c i t y of a s t a t e to c o n t r o l the behaviour of o t h e r s .
has
certain
attributes:
resources,
industrial
population
usually
capacity,
not
always
that
intangible
defines
as
supports the
war"
are
form the core of "power a t t r i b u t e s . "
Most
concepts
degree
another
however, give the
The
such
of
as
perceive
b a s i s of our
one
tangible
its
of
1 1
attributes
Morgenthau, f u r t h e r , argues
national
determination
element
impression
a r e l a t i o n a l context,
that we
however, that such
f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s of
yet
natural
and
c o n s t i t u t e power.
"the
Power
1 0
advantage,
military
general
capability,
authors a l s o recognise,
may
geographical
latter
term power i s very
i t a s a t i s f a c t o r y meaning.
i n t e r n a t i o n a l context
incentive
morale
with which a
government
power.
which
12
in
he
nation
peace
and
These a t t r i b u t e s ,
that power i s a s t a t i c concept.
In
power assumes a p s y c h o l o g i c a l dimension in
country to be more powerful than
perception,
another.
however, i s based on a comparative
27
assessment
of
countries.
S u l l i v a n makes an
"one
should
liabilities
the
attributes
focus
on
of
certain
attributes,
r e l a t i n g to the power
r e l a t i v e and
contest
between
"powerful"
will
two
of
countries,"
assessment.
countries,
automatically
the
be
contention
(unless
that
country
former) becomes ambiguous.
the downstream country to
relative
the
term:
all
has
on
is
more
Seen i n t h i s
country
negotiate
a
in upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t
1
between
unequal
elsewhere:
is
15
relations
apply
to
a
countries
b a r g a i n i n g power
Asymmetric
Other
unequal
neighbours.
Canadian-American
conclusions
two
the
have equal
upstream
scholars
group from C a r l e t o n U n i v e r s i t y have conducted
between two
not
It
relationships
in the works of i n t e g r a t i o n s c h o l a r s such
Keohane and Joseph Nye. "
relations
power over
do
of unequal
of "asymmetric dyads."
prominently
downstream
situations.
r e l a t e d to the concept
i s the concept
a
settlement.
respective
Closely
of
"Power" must i n c l u d e the c a p a c i t y of
b a r g a i n i n g power v i s - a - v i s t h e i r
their
not
upstream
reciprocal
countries
on
that
the "winner."
downstream
on
and
that i n a s p e c i f i c
country
about
why
no economic i n c e n t i v e to n e g o t i a t e where t h i s country i s
country
Robert
these
Power, t h e r e f o r e ,
13
using an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r to the detriment
figure
by
c e r t a i n a s s e t s or
i t i s by no means guaranteed
context, LeMarquand's
having
possessed
i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t when he asks
others when making a comparative
is
power
such
the
extensive research
c o u n t r i e s , and
specifically,
Although
t h e i r work
between
the
asymmetric
as
as
years
dyadic
is
based
1963-1972,
relations
28
....(the
theory)
provides a context f o r the a n a l y s i s
of s h i f t s i n i n t e g r a t i o n and the
quest
f o r enhanced
autonomy
i n Canadian-American
relationships.
(In a
broader
sense),
the h i s t o r y
of
this
particular
relationship
serves
as a r i c h i l l u s t r a t i o n of dyadic
r e l a t i o n s where the subordinate country
continues
to
be
attracted
to the s u p e r o r d i n a t e one as a r e s u l t of
expected economic gains, while p e r i o d i c a l l y t r y i n g
to
reassert
an arm's l e n g t h r e l a t i o n s h i p with the l a t t e r
in order to a v o i d the p e r c e i v e d p o l i t i c a l
c o s t s of
increased i n t e g r a t i o n .
1 6
What
emerged
most
discrepancy
between
integration
and
policy.
how
clearly
from
growing
t h e i r a n a l y s i s was
Canada-United
continuing
Based
disintegration
i s s u e s are
aim
on
Lemarquand's
category
in
this
section
upstream-downstream
country.
to
conflict
Before proceeding,
of
psychological
to
art
and
afford
p o l i c i e s i n peace or w a r . "
words,
implementation
out
is
leaves
strategy
upstream-dowstream
of asymmetric
with a
dyads,
17
of
the
The
have
term " s t r a t e g y " i s
employing
military
to
superordinate/upstream
the
political,
f o r c e s of a n a t i o n or a
maximum
support
to
adopted
S t r a t e g y i s a l s o d e f i n e d as the a r t
of d e v i s i n g or employing plans or stratagems
other
of
there are c e r t a i n terms which
d e f i n e d as "the science and
group of n a t i o n s
realm
adopt i n seeking a s o l u t i o n
be d e f i n e d to c l a r i f y t h e i r meaning.
economic,
the
to o u t l i n e a set of s t r a t e g i e s that a
subordinate/downstream s t a t e may
an
in
economic
settled.
c o n f l i c t s and the C a r l e t o n group's concept
I
States
S u r p r i s i n g l y , however, what t h e i r study
specific
a notable
involves
both
toward a g o a l .
the
planning
of a s t a t e ' s course of a c t i o n s i n i t s e f f o r t s
achieve a s o l u t i o n to a d i s p u t e i t has with another
state.
1 8
In
and
to
29
S t r a t e g i e s may
be
implemented through p e a c e f u l means (e.g.
n e g o t i a t i o n ) or through the conduct of war.
of
power
relations
between
o f t e n the weaker s t a t e in
strategies
limited.
it
different
is
that
relations.
threatens
By
finds
against
the
consideration
categories
riparian
means.
T h i s i s not
fought
over
the
For
intended
of
theory
number
dispute
and
the s o v e r e i g n t y
reasoning,
usual f o r a
unless the
international
rights.'
9
to
achieve.
river
little
category
implying
wars
Usually,
to
have
that two
to s e t t l e an
that
the
not
been
however, s t r a t e g i e s
the
objectives
they
fall
who
into
of f o r e i g n p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s of a
states rarely,
i f ever, wage war
international river
i s a l s o the more powerful
likelihood
disputes
T h i s i s s u b s t a n t i a t e d by H o l s t i
In a s u p e r o r d i n a t e - s u b o r d i n a t e
riparian
latter
of the former in a t a n g i b l e
to say, however, that
riparian
a g a i n s t each other
of
s t a t e s are not u s u a l l y s e t t l e d through v i o l e n t
"middle-range"
s t a t e thereby
evoke
practice
contends that i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e s o r d i n a r i l y
the
of
discussing
i n s t a n c e , i t i s not
adopted by c o u n t r i e s are p r o p o r t i o n a t e
are
the
when
a g a i n s t another country
same
between
that
i t s preponderant neighbour i s
different
to launch war
directly
dyad
important
realities
unequal s t a t e s , however, very
r e a c t i o n s by s t a t e s in
international
way.
use
Another
strategies
country
can
a
two
Given the
dispute.
2 0
r e l a t i o n s h i p where the upper
of the two
downstream
states,
there
is
s t a t e would achieve
a
r e s o l u t i o n of the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e by employing s t r a t e g i e s which
c o u l d l e a d to war.
powerful
country
Pursuing
a violent
would not only f a i l
strategy against
to achieve
a
more
i t s objective,
30
the subordinate country may
in
areas
Another
which
it
important
discussing
considers v i t a l
factor
strategies
configuration
which
is
open to
be
tends
survival.
remembered
while
country, how
pressures
to i t s n a t i o n a l
must
that
generally
specific
a l s o leave i t s e l f
the
to
while
overall
power
favour
the
t h i s a f f e c t s the outcome of
" m i d - l e v e l " d i s p u t e s v i s - a - v i s a weaker country
no means c e r t a i n .
According to Keohane and
is
by
Nye:
The
t r a n s l a t i o n from c a p a b i l i t i e s to outcomes depends
on
the
political
process.
Skill
in
political
bargaining
affects
the
translation.
States
with
intense p r e f e r e n c e s and
coherent
positions
will
bargain
more e f f e c t i v e l y
than s t a t e s c o n s t r a i n e d by
domestic and t r a n s n a t i o n a l a c t o r s .
2 1
T h e r e f o r e , i f the subordinate/downstream country can prepare i t s
strategies
carefully
preponderant
an
and
with
its
achieve
optimal s o l u t i o n to the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e d e s p i t e the
overall
In
country
in their
an
relations.
upstream-downstream
conflict
upstream
country.
the
upstream
convince
suits
the
interest
the
the
subordinate/downstream
of
the
the downstream country
country
upstream country that as a r e s u l t of the
u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n taken by the l a t t e r on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
i s being a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d .
f i r s t phase of the d i s p u t e .
persuade
of the
The o b j e c t i v e of the downstream country i s ,
therefore, twofold: f i r s t ,
to
where
i s using an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r to the detriment
downstream country, the s t a t u s quo
has
effectively
i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e that i t can
inequality
neighbour,
bargain
The
T h i s i s the
o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s phase
the superordinate/upstream
river,
is
to
country to acknowledge that
31
a problem indeed e x i s t s .
The
second
country
phase
begins
acknowledges
problem and agrees to n e g o t i a t e with the
that
once
the
there
is a
country.
The
subordinate
downstream
country
s t r a t e g i e s i t can employ to i n f l u e n c e the
country to cooperate.
In order to
has
a
variety
of
make
the
upstream
acknowledge that a problem indeed e x i s t s , the lower
country
riparian
may
do the f o l l o w i n g t h i n g s :
1) It may
with
lodge a formal complaint
regard
to
the
with the upper r i p a r i a n
latter's
unilateral
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r emphasising
that
harm
state.
to
the
lower
riparian
such
irrigation
action
This
Pakistan which p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t I n d i a ' s
action
on
would
was
cause
the case
of
(in P a k i s t a n ) .
2 2
Lodging
West
with
developing
respond
diplomatic
c o n s t i t u t e s an
courtesy.
It
Punjab
and
a formal complaint with the upper
r i p a r i a n compels that country to
also
in
the
interest
important
solution
to
however, i s to s i g n a l
the
dispute.
i t s concern
The
to the
primary
upstream
of
first
step i n the downstream country's o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y to achieve
optimal
an
systems on the Indus River l a r g e l y to meet the needs
of East Punjab ( i n India) to the e x c l u s i o n of
Sind
action
state
an
objective,
country
and
persuade i t to n e g o t i a t e .
2)
The
notes emphasising
objective
country may
the l e g a l r i g h t s
of
exchange d i p l o m a t i c
lower
riparians.
2 3
The
of t h i s s t r a t e g y i s to keep channels of communication
with the upstream country open.
The
upstream
country
usually
32
responds
supports
The
by
citing
an
exchange
The
of
diplomatic
notes
also
second
phase
d i p l o m a t i c technique
of
country
2
signifies
that
the
begins
when
the
negotiate
with
the
the
dispute
agrees
to
country.
Negotiation
advancement
through
i s d e f i n e d as a
f o r the p e a c e f u l settlement
of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s .
n e g o t i a t i o n are accomplished by compromises
reached
dispute. *
i s w i l l i n g to n e g o t i a t e .
the
norm or precedent which
i t s own p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n to the s p e c i f i c
upstream country
and
international
direct
personal
of
differences
The o b j e c t i v e s of
and
contact.
accommodations
Reaching agreement
through n e g o t i a t i o n i m p l i e s a w i l l i n g n e s s on both s i d e s t o
mutually
acceptable
concessions
( q u i d pro quo ).
make
Ultimatums,
t h r e a t e n i n g speeches, boycotts and walkouts are o f t e n r e l a t e d to
n e g o t i a t i o n and may a f f e c t
its
ultimate
success
or
failure.
S k i l l f u l n e g o t i a t i o n i n v o l v e s agreement at the l e a s t cost
leaving
the
relations.
The
other
side
relatively
(while
s a t i s f i e d ) to good f u t u r e
2 5
w i l l i n g n e s s of the
country
to
n e g o t i a t e , however, should not be a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d as a
sincere
In
fact,
desire
to achieve
i t may
procrastination.
agree
The
a s o l u t i o n to the r i p a r i a n
to
negotiate
upstream
i n f l u e n c e d by a few important
In
between
and
the
United
government entered
States
country's
factors.
be concerned about i t s image.
with
the
the
intent
decision
First,
will
t h i s country
Colorado
Mexico,
dispute.
the
River
United
of
be
will
dispute
States
i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n with Mexico d e s p i t e the f a c t
33
that
i t had no economic i n c e n t i v e to do so.
felt
that
by
pursuing
its
own
The
interest,
United
States
i t would damage i t s
r e l a t i o n s with Mexico and
i t would p r o j e c t to the r e s t of
America
world
and
the
third
country that pursues
consequences
a neighbour
i t s own
the
image of a s t r o n g powerful
national
i n t e r e s t heedless
to i t s poorer n e i g h b o u r s .
on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r
concessions on other b i l a t e r a l
arrangements
or
support
may
2 7
According
scheme may
for
a
multilateral
to H o l s t i ,
In
countries
trade
of
isolation"
the
i s more common.
In the second
begins,
United
the
where
States
issue
of
relations
and
Canada,
good f a i t h
s t r a t e g i e s may
to
area
phase of the d i s p u t e , when a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n
achieve
cooperative
those
achieve
an
state
can
employ c e r t a i n
solution
coercive.
are
i t s objective.
to
to
the
into
two
Cooperative
employed
i n a gesture of
a l s o i n c l u d e responses
optimal
and
which
subordinate/downstream country
in
more
"issue
These s t r a t e g i e s can be c l a s s i f i e d
are
is
communication,
riparian
strategies
areas
are
to
categories:
areas
conflict
s t r a t e g i e s i n order
broad
policy.
28
dispute.
trade
l i n k a g e between p o l i c y
r o u t i n i z e d and where there i s a t r a d i t i o n of easy
such as between
the
be used to gain
i s s u e s , such as f a v o u r a b l e
be t y p i c a l of c o u n t r i e s where a high l e v e l
characteristic.
of
Second, agreement with
26
LeMarquand c a l l s t h i s connection i n b a r g a i n i n g
"linkage."
Latin
by
cooperation
Coercive
and
As such c o o p e r a t i v e
queries
made
by
country p e r t a i n i n g to t e c h n i c a l or
aspects of the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .
the
strategies,
on
the
legal
the
34
other
hand,
are
those
which
state
are
to
state
Coercive
strategies
be i m p l e m e n t e d
negative
inducements.
in
the nature
of a quid
country
may
exchange
fora
inducements
and
may
dispute
offer
include
the
those
The
following
conflict
riparian
which
involve
lists
country
with
adopt
a preponderant
1.formal
Stage
into
country.
strategies
an
a
upstream-
CONFLICTS
Strategies
of diplomatic
3.talks
between
4. j o i n t
survey
notes
leaders
5. e x c h a n g e
of t e c h n i c a l
data
6. p e r s u a d e
the upstream
state
solution
the
protest
2.exchange
Negotiation
in
measures
neighbour.
Cooperative
Stage
party
probable
may
Negative
retaliatory
third
are
i t wants i n
dispute.
by a s t r o n g e r
table
which
or
t h e downstream
to
UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM
Pre-negotiation
are those
of the subordinate/downstream
downstream
the dispute.
country something
which
the
by t h e u s e o f p o s i t i v e
I n o t h e r words,
the
the
on
upstream
intervention
at the behest
to resolve
inducements
p r o quo.
solution
are
i n order
Positive
by
put pressure
may
employed
i s beneficial
that
f o r longer
term
35
Coercive
Intra-issue
7.pressure
i s o l a t ion)
(issue-area
Strategies
t o upgrade
8.retaliation
upstream
Pressure
talks
(project
harmful
country
9.internationalization
organisation,
10. m u s t e r
support
(regional,
11. m o b i l i z e
public
to
(regional
U.N.,
ICJ,
etc.)
from
other
powers
international)
domestic
and
international
opinion
Extra-issue
(i ssue-area
linkage)
12.Positive
and n e g a t i v e
economic
sanctions
analysing
Before
to
remember
that
these
while a l l
individually
of
their
relations
between
a
of
climate
strategies
solution
the
including
strategies
Since
have
mutual
a better
lodging
objective
formal
When,
f o r some
of
on
For instance,
tradeoffs
and
worthwhile
or
dispute
failure
state
of
when
there
is
achieve
reason,
the
the
relations,
may
by
of the
the success
depends
suspicion
chance
be
c a n be u s e d
the course
bilateral
economic
to the dispute.
by
during
combinations,
in
i t would
strategies
the c o - r i p a r i a n s .
confidence
characterised
these
country
or i n c e r t a i n
achieving
strategies,
cooperative
an
optimal
relations
hostiltity,
are
coercive
succeeding.
complaints
and exchange
of
diplomatic
36
notes
have a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d , we w i l l s t a r t
with the t h i r d
s t r a t e g y on our l i s t .
A.
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES
3) I t i s always always f r u i t f u l
hold
formal
issues.
were
or
informal
I f the leader
to
hold
treated
as
one
of
two
the
talks
with
country,
his
the
of many "problems."
will
river
have
the
strategy.
Mexico) s t a t e v i s i t
deadlock
2 9
In
authority
1972,
dispute
It must be remembered,
to
when
the
whom
Farakka
the
cooperate,
make
the
compromises
flexible
Echeverra's
(of
however,
3 0
that
a
breakthrough
project
t o the superordinate/upstream
in
i s of low
state.
Barrage
dispute
to
by
speed
For
up
negotiations
promoting
t a l k s t o the
Indian engineers and West
project
had
Bengal
politicians
a high p r i o r i t y prevented d i s c o u r s e
between m i n i s t e r s from both c o u n t r i e s f o r ten y e a r s .
3 1
4) The subordinate/downstream
country may suggest
of
i n order to ensure e f f i c i e n t
the
be
P r e s i d e n t Ayub (of P a k i s t a n ) and Prime M i n i s t e r
ministers' level,
to
President
issue.
Jawaharlal Nehru (of India) decided
over
could
to develop a
i s p o s s i b l e only when the r i v e r
or m i d - l e v e l p r i o r i t y
instance,
the
t o Washington and t a l k s with Nixon broke the
on the Colorado s a l i n i t y
negotiations
in
Besides, where there i s a
necessary to reach agreement, or at l e a s t
bargaining
to
country
counterpart
strong commitment by the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p to
negotiators
states
t a l k s over a wide range of b i l a t e r a l
of
for leaders
international
river
management of the r e g i o n ' s water
resources.
This
joint
survey
joint
constitutes
37
the o v e r a l l s t r a t e g y
body
to
ensure
rivers.
of the downstream
equitable
d i s t r i b u t i o n of b e n e f i t s from common
In the Canadian-American case, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Commission
was
set
up
Boundary Waters T r e a t y .
the
border
I t s f u n c t i o n s are to approve or r e j e c t
3 2
governments,
solutions
and,
to
to
at
the
conduct
water
Joint
in 1909 under the Canada-United S t a t e s
p r o j e c t s that w i l l a f f e c t the n a t u r a l
at
country to c r e a t e a j o i n t
l e v e l of
request
of
investigations
resource
and
the
that
other
will
recommend
boundary
problems.
ensure smooth n e g o t i a t i o n
or even proper t e c h n i c a l e v a l u a t i o n
even i f such a
either
side
does
national
a
data.
body
two
waters
However, the c r e a t i o n of
available
joint
boundary
not
necessarily
In a h o s t i l e s i t u a t i o n , i t i s more l i k e l y
joint
would
body
were
reflect
the
created,
opinion
representatives
of
their
The c r e a t i o n of a j o i n t body, however, i s
inasmuch
it
riparian
lends
data
i t may
country
may
do on i t s own
initiative
state's
or
request.
t e c h n i c a l data c o n s t i t u t e s the downstream
continue
offer
negotiations
on
in
response
Most
to
the
state's
strategy
to
the one hand, and a l s o to dispose of
i n t e r n a t i o n a l river disputes
years and even decades of n e g o t i a t i o n .
by
exchange
An o f f e r to exchange
t e c h n i c a l problems i n an e f f o r t to seek a p o l i t i c a l
other.
to
p e r t a i n i n g to the p a r t i c u l a r r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .
caused
helpful
dispute.
technical
the
of
an i n s t i t u t i o n a l outlook to r e s o l v i n g a
5) The subordinate/downstream
This
that
respective
governments.
as
of
3 3
solution
on
are s e t t l e d a f t e r
The delay
is
primarily
the massive amount of t e c h n i c a l data that have to be
38
c o l l e c t e d , produced, s c r u t i n i z e d and evaluated before a s o l u t i o n
can be reached.
The
exchange of t e c h n i c a l data, however, can be turned
a double-edged weapon by the superordinate/upstream
so
chooses.
Sometimes
conflicting
s i d e s can c r e a t e a deadlock
data
state
produced
in negotiations.
If
into
if it
by the two
the
upstream
country decides to p r o c r a s t i n a t e , there i s a good chance that i t
will
demand
more
and more " r e l e v a n t " data from the downstream
state.
6)
The subordinate/downstream country may appeal to the upstream
country saying that r e s o l v i n g the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e w i l l
be
in
the
country.
the
long-range
interest
fact
of the superordinate/upstream
In many asymmetric dyadic r e l a t i o n s around the
world,
p o p u l a t i o n i n the subordinate/downstream s t a t e i s i n a l e s s
favourable
economic
situation
neighbours,
States,
compared
country.
as i s the case with,
then
people
If
with
that
these
say, Mexico
of
country
country
of
and
i n t h e subordinate counry
greater
ordinarily
population
the
living
cope
does
not
with
want
illegal
opportunity.
to
take
United
near the
move
to
The upstream
in
additional
immigration.
The i n f l u x of
people c o u l d c r e a t e economic as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l
problems f o r
the
or
economic
the
c o u n t r i e s are
border of the superordinate country, may be tempted to
the
in
s u p e r o r d i n a t e country.
The n e g o t i a t o r s from the downstream
country may convince the government of the upstream country that
i t s u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n on
worsen
the
economic
the
international
situation
in
the
river
downstream
could
only
country.
39
Therefore,
would
long
B.
an e q u i t a b l e
also
be
and
immediate s o l u t i o n
3
COERCIVE STRATEGIES
category
outside
the
tradition
of
strategies
state
issue area.
of
may
be
within
the
In the case of two
strained extra-issue
often.
3
applied
or
issue-area
by
the
issue area i t s e l f
or
s t a t e s which have
a
easy communication, quid pro quo
area i s more common whereas between two
states
linkage
within
the
issue
where
relations
i s p r a c t i s e d more
5
Intra-issue
The
linkage
state
may
put
pressure on
superordinate/upstream s t a t e to upgrade t a l k s from the
bureaucrats to the
leaders
of
some p o i n t s
instance,
the
if
they
are
with the
negotiating
l e s s than the amount i t had
upstream
quantities
the
be
state.
For
of flow of
an
have to accept a
originally
i n t e r e s t of a quick s o l u t i o n which can
political
In order
even have to concede
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r , the downstream country may
quantity
of
arrange a t a l k between
c o - r i p a r i a n s t a t e s or may
in i t s n e g o t i a t i o n s
the
level
l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l decision-makers.
to do t h i s the downstream country may
the
problem
to the advantage of the upstream country in the
7)
the
term. "
This
are
to
demanded.
found only at
In
the
l e v e l , however, t h i s c o n c e s s i o n i s very minor.
8)
The
a
p r o j e c t of
subordinate/downstream s t a t e may
i t s own
with the
sometimes go ahead
i n t e n t of p u t t i n g pressure on
upstream s t a t e .
T h i s of course depends on
the
of
topography
their
terrain.
For
the two
countries
instance,
if
with
the
and
the
40
downstream
country
were
s t o r e the waters of the
release
it
in
such
i n a p o s i t i o n to b u i l d a r e s e r v o i r to
international
a
manner
as
river
to
in
question
cause harm to crops by
f l o o d i n g areas upstream, the upstream country might be
to s e t t l e the o r i g i n a l d i s p u t e .
country
will
project
and
depend
its
on
The
the
perception
reaction
technical
of
the
downstream country to see the p r o j e c t
9)
The
Although
arbitration,
the
upstream
determination
of
country
may
t h r e a t e n the upstream
be
p r o g r e s s i n b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s once the
r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n of a r b i t r a t i o n .
and
hostility
the
through.
both p a r t i e s have to agree
upstream
suspicion
the
i t s i n t e n t i o n to s e t t l e the d i s p u t e
arbitration.
mutual
of
persuaded
f e a s i b i l i t y of such a
subordinate/downstream country may
country by d e c l a r i n g
and
to
through
submit
to
persuaded
to make
downstream
country
In a dyadic s i t u a t i o n where
r e i g n supreme, a r b i t r a t i o n
p r o v i d e a f r u i t f u l method of r e s o l v i n g a r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .
was
how
I960.
10)
India and P a k i s t a n signed the
Indus
Waters
may
This
Treaty
in
36
The
downstream
domestically
government
and
of
country
create
the
may
politicize
unfavourable
upstream
the r i v e r d i s p u t e
opinion
country.
of
m a i n t a i n i n g c o r d i a l b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s and a l s o to preserve
the
persuaded
project
upstream
to s e t t l e the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .
country
may
However, i f the
be
river
i s of top p r i o r i t y to the upstream country t h i s s t r a t e g y
is l i k e l y
to
11)
downstream
The
the
the
the
interest
image of a " f r i e n d l y " neighbour,
In
against
fail.
country
may
create
unfavourable o p i n i o n
41
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y against
the upstream country by
latter's
unilateral
action
unethical,
i l l e g a l and
a v i o l a t i o n of human r i g h t s .
done by
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g the
s a i d than done.
General
long
The
and
tedious
against
stages of
the
The
of the
final
issue
comes
a
vote.
remain uncommitted.
superordinate.
for
s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e that
country
a
bilateral
easier
through
can
issue.
number
Because
Assembly
of
of
sure of the
states
this,
wording
even
may
if
the
i t i s quite
decide
to
not want to antagonize
the
a number of reasons.
international
issue and
several
expect to come up
Once i t comes to a vote,
an
be
of the upstream s t a t e at
General
through b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n .
the
lobbying
These s t a t e s may
state
T h i s can
as
issue of t h i s type i n the
never be e n t i r e l y
r e s o l u t i o n in the
to
river
T h i s , however, i s
from r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
p o s s i b l e that a s i g n i f i c a n t
essentially
of
downstream
s t a t e can
the
Nations, f o r example, i n v o l v e s a
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g the
downstream
international
b r i n g i n g up of an
process
opposition
the
issue.
Assembly of the United
subcommittees.
all
on
portraying
should
First,
riparian
they
may
dispute
is
t h e r e f o r e be
Second, by v o t i n g
in
resolved
favour
of
downstream country they might antagonize the upstream s t a t e
with which they may
Third,
some
of
have economic and/or
these c o u n t r i e s may
political
relations.
have s i m i l a r problems with
t h e i r neighbours where t h e i r own
p o s i t i o n s are e q u i v a l e n t
superordinate/upstream c o u n t r y .
These s t a t e s do
taking
sides
in
the
dispute,
to
create
an
precedent which might l a t e r c o n f l i c t with t h e i r
finally,
it
must
be
kept
in
mind
that
not
to
the
want,
by
international
interests.
any
And
international
42
o r g a n i s a t i o n operates not on the b a s i s of e q u a l i t y
b a s i s of the power wielded by member s t a t e s .
may
combine
in
There
internationalization.
gets
resolutions
a
obligatory.
A l l these
factors
vote,
nature
Therefore,
itself
negotiations
additional
problem
with
In the u n l i k e l y event that the downstream
this
country may f i n d
resume
is
favourable
of
on the
favour of the upstream s t a t e when the issue i s
internationalized.
country
3 7
but
are
most U.N.
General
recommendatory
Assembly
rather
than
i t i s very l i k e l y that the downstream
i n the unenviable p o s i t i o n of having
with
the
upstream
state
after
to
spending
months of hard work and money i n i t s e f f o r t s to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e
the
issue.
Internationalization, therefore,
downstream
state
employs
in
t a n g i b l e progress i n b i l a t e r a l
state
be
takes
the
desperation.
negotiations
strategy
When
and
which
a
there i s no
the
upstream
a non-compromising stand, i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n may
way
to
internationalization,
the
only
break
riparian
and may cause some embarrassment to
country.
is a
For
fear
of t a r n i s h i n g
the
deadlock.
Through
d i s p u t e becomes p u b l i c i z e d
the
i t s international
country may decide to agree
image, the
to an optimal
s o l u t i o n to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e .
12) The subordinate/downstream s t a t e may a l s o
the
of
government
the l a t t e r
very
put
pressure
of the upstream s t a t e by approaching
s t a t e through
the superpowers.
on
the leader
Although
there
is
l i t t l e p r o b a b i l i t y of the superpowers doing anything on an
official
level,
they may i n f o r m a l l y request the
leader
of the
43
superordinate/downstream
equitably.
pressure
The
on
country t o s e t t l e the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e
the
state
other co-basin s t a t e s i n the r e g i o n .
may
state
The
also
put
by approaching
s t a t e may f e e l threatened i f a l l the s t a t e s i n the region
align
themselves
Bangladesh's
Cooperation
South
in a
proposal
could
formal or even i n f o r m a l o r g a n i s a t i o n .
to
create
the
South
Asian
Regional
(SARC), a r e g i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n of a l l the s t a t e s of
Asia,
for instance,
predominance by
India
was
although
viewed
as
a
i t was
to
be
threat
an
to i t s
important
member.
38
The
above-mentioned s t r a t e g i e s may be used
in combination
to
achieve
with others by the
an
at l e a s t o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n to the
I t must
be
remembered,
in
precludes
be pursued
different
times
and
downstream
Although
however,
relations
the
between
a
particular
the
country
from pursuing many
the aforementioned
strategies
may
to
the
there
are
s t r a t e g y i s the only course of a c t i o n
For i n s t a n c e , when there i s no progress i n
b i l a t e r a l negotiation,
open
the
stages of an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t ,
when
that
by the subordinate/downstream country during the
which i t can pursue.
course
the
country
the
courses of a c t i o n .
all
state
or
inequality
country
equitable
riparian dispute.
overall
i n d i v i d u a l l y or
internationalization
may
be
the
only
subordinate country d e s p i t e the f a c t that
t h i s s t r a t e g y does not b r i n g about an immediate s o l u t i o n .
Also,
r e l a t i o n s between c o - r i p a r i a n s may vary during the course of the
44
dispute for d i f f e r e n t
useful
during
reasons
particular
and
some
periods
and
strategies
state
for
options
open
application
country
in
prove
f u t i l e at other times.
T h e r e f o r e , although these s t r a t e g i e s are
downstream
may
an
to
against
the
a
upstream-downstream
c o n f l i c t , the success or f a i l u r e of each alone or i n combination
with
others depends on the r e l a t i o n s between the two
the p r i o r i t y
river
the superordinate/upstream
project.
The
negative
higher
the
country,
the
inducements
it
has
country
and
country
places
on
the
priority
placed
by
the
more
to
in
states
positive
be
and/or
offered
order
to
by
agree
the
to
a
settlement.
The
foregoing
disputes
will
now
approach
versus
be
in
a
useful
asymmetrical
example
of
relationship.
trying
two
The
countries
been thwarted
signed
i n 1977
there was
in
a
1971)
However,
when
an
have
time
T h i s was
and
India to reach
interim
between the governments of I n d i a and
resolved.
dyad
structural
treaty
was
Bangladesh,
s p e c u l a t i o n from n e u t r a l q u a r t e r s that the problem
been f i n a l l y
the
Barrage
India-Bangladesh
i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to persuade
an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n .
analyse
N e g o t i a t o r s r e p r e s e n t i n g Bangladesh
(and t h e i r P a k i s t a n i predecessors before
again
to
riparian
i n i t i a t e d over the Farakka
d i s p u t e between I n d i a and Bangladesh.
is
understanding
applied
n e g o t i a t i n g process which was
to
had
u n f o r t u n a t e l y not to be because
as soon as the t r e a t y e x p i r e d i n November, 1982,
a Memorandum of
45
Understanding
extended
the p r e v i o u s t r e a t y f o r another
in the absence of a comprehensive s e t t l e m e n t .
explain
both
the achievement and
solution.
We
and
speculate
task
is
to
a
permanent
and
w i l l a l s o analyse the a c t i o n s taken
Bangladesh i n the context of the framework
chapter
years
tenuousness of t h i s agreement
and analyse the f a c t o r s which are o b s t r u c t i n g
equitable
Our
3 9
two
on
the
laid
down
in
p o s s i b i l i t y of a permanent
e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n with India over s h a r i n g of the Ganges
by
this
and
waters.
46
NOTES
1. David G. LeMarquand, I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s : The P o l i t i c s of
Cooperation, (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1 977) , p. 1 .
2.
Ibid.
3.
Ibid.
LeMarquand presents
an a n a l y t i c
framework and
d i s c u s s e s four case s t u d i e s using h i s framework to e x p l a i n
each
case.
The four case s t u d i e s are :
a.
The Colorado
s a l i n a t i o n problem between the United S t a t e s
and Mexico.
b. The Columbia River T r e a t y signed between the U n i t e d
States
and Canada.
c.
The Skagit V a l l e y and Ross Dam issue between the United
States and Canada.
d.
The Rhine River p o l l u t i o n problem between S w i t z e r l a n d ,
West
Germany, and the Netherlands.
4.
Ibid
• i
p.8.
5.
Ibid
• t
p. 1 0.
6.
Ibid
• /
pp.15-20.
7.
Ibid
•
i
pp.12-15.
8.
Ibid
•
i
p. 1 9.
9.
Ibid
• /
p. 1 0.
10.
K.J .
Holsti ,
I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : A Framework f o r
3d. ed., (Englewood C l i f f s ,
New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e Analysi s
H a l l , Inc., 1977), p.165.
11.
Michael P. S u l l i v a n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s : T h e o r i e s and
Evidence
, ( E n g l e w o o d - C l i f f s , New J e r s e y : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc.,
1976), p.159.
12.
Hans J .
Morgenthau,
for Power and Peace
, 3d.
p.131 .
13.
S u l l i v a n , op.
P o l i t i c s Among Nations: The S t r u g g l e
ed., (New York: A l f r e d Knopf, 1965),
c i t ., p.163.
14.
Robert
0.
Keohane and Joseph
S.
Interdependence: World P o l i t i c s i n T r a n s i t i o n
Brown and Company, 1977).
Nye,
Power and
, (Boston: L i t t l e
15.
Michael
B.
Dolan,
B r i a n W.
Tomlin,
and Harald von
Reikhogff,
" I n t e g r a t i o n and Autonomy
i n Canada-United S t a t e s
R e l a t i o n s , 1963-1972," i n Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Science,
June 1982, XV:2, pp.331-363.
47
16.
Ibid
., pp.332-333.
17.
Webster's T h i r d New I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y
Language, Unabridged e d i t i o n , p.2256.
18.
of the
English
Ibid.
19.
The best example of an armed c o n f l i c t over an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
r i v e r was the 1967 Middle East war between I s r a e l and
Jordan.
Although,
the
war
ostensibly
occurred over the waters of the
River Jordan, i t i s c l e a r that there were other b a s i c
political
and r e l i g i o u s reasons. T h i s e s t a b l i s h e s the c o r r e l a t i o n between
the
level
of
hostility
between two s t a t e s and the chances of
armed c o n f l i c t .
Hence, as
a
rule
war
does not
take
place
between two s t a t e s over r i p a r i a n r i g h t s .
20.
H o l s t i , op.
c i t . , pp.
148-151. H o l s t i s t a t e s that these
objectives
are
generally
concerned
with s a t i s f y i n g domestic,
s o c i a l , and economic demands through i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements or
by m a i n t a i n i n g amicable r e l a t i o n s with neighbouring c o u n t r i e s .
21.
Keohane and
Nye,
op.
c i t . , p.
53.
22.
J.D.
Chapman
(ed.),
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l River Basin,
(Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia P u b l i c a t i o n s Centre,
1963), pp.
35-36. The Indus Waters Treaty was
signed
between
India
and
Pakistan
in September
1960.
The t r e a t y c o u l d be
negotiated
only
because
both
sides
agreed
to World
Bank
mediation and i n t e r v e n t i o n .
23.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law A s s o c i a t i o n .
H e l s i n k i Rules on the Uses
of the Waters of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s ,
(London:
The
International
Law
A s s o c i a t i o n , 1966), pp.
8-11.
The H e l s i n k i
Rules authored by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Law
Association
(I LA)
in
1966,
provide
the
most
important
and
widely accepted l e g a l
g u i d e l i n e s f o r use in s e t t l i n g
international river
disputes.
While
the H e l s i n k i Rules do not have the force of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
law, they have been both a p p l i e d and c i t e d in i n t e r n a t i o n a l
and
interstate
river
disputes
The c e n t r a l u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e i s
that each basin s t a t e i s e n t i t l e d w i t h i n
its territory,
to
a
reasonable
and
equitable
share
i n the b e n e f i c i a l uses of the
waters of
an
i n t e r n a t i o n a l drainage
basin.
The
downstream
country
usually
f i n d s the " e q u i t a b l e and reasonable" c l a u s e of
the H e l s i n k i Rules
favouring
i t s stand
on
an
international
river.
24.
F.J.
Berber, R i v e r s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law,
(New
York:
Oceania P u b l i c a t i o n s Inc., 1 959) , pp.
14-19. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g
to note that
amongst
the
innumerable volumes on
norms
and
precedents
on
international river
disputes,
there i s almost
always a norm or precedent which supports a p a r t i c u l a r
state's
position
in a
specific
dispute.
For
instance,
in d i r e c t
o p p o s i t i o n to the
Helsinki
Rules'
"equitable
and
reasonable
apportionment" stands the p r i n c i p l e of "absolute s o v e r e i g n t y " or
48
"first
principle."
This
principle
was
first
espoused
by
American Attorney-General Harmon in 1895 in connection with
the
dispute
with
Mexico over
the u t i l i s a t i o n of the Rio Grande.
Harmon r u l e d that the U.S.
c o u l d do whatever i t wanted with the
waters of the Rio Grande w i t h i n U.S.
territory
regardless
of
any p o s s i b l e i l l - e f f e c t s the U.S.
a c t i o n might have on Mexico.
The
Harmon D o c t r i n e , t h e r e f o r e , supports the upstream country's
p o s i t i o n in an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t although
in
recent
times,
t h i s r u l e i s h a r d l y c i t e d by any r i p a r i a n n a t i o n because
of i t s i m p e r i a l i s t i c c o n n o t a t i o n .
25.
Jack C.
D i e t ionary,
p.218.
Piano and Roy
Olton,
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s
(New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, Inc . , 1969),
26.
LeMarquand, op.
27.
I b i d . , p.
c i t . , p.
12.
13.
28.
K.J.
H o l s t i and T.A.
Levy,
"Bilateral
I n s t i t u t i o n s and
Transgovernmental
Relations
between Canada and
the
United
S t a t e s , " i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , 28:4 (1974): 875-901.
29.
LeMarquand, op.
30.
Ibid.
31.
See
32.
LeMarquand, op.
c i t . , p.
17.
Chapter III of t h i s t h e s i s .
c i t . , p.
56.
33.
The Columbia River Treaty signed between the United
States
and
Canada
in
1961
was preceded by more than twenty years of
n e g o t i a t i o n . The f i v e - year Ganges Waters Treaty signed between
India and Bangladesh in November 1977 was
preceded
by
twentyf i v e years of n e g o t i a t i o n and b a r g a i n i n g .
34.
K.J.
H o l s t i , "Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , " i n Steven L.
S p i e g e l and Kenneth N.
Waltz ( e d s . ) , C o n f l i c t in World P o l i t i c s
, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop P u b l i s h e r s Inc., 1971), pT
384.
Taking
the Canadian-American s i t u a t i o n , H o l s t i maintains
that Canadian n e g o t i a t o r s f r e q u e n t l y emphasise the nature of the
Americans'
own
long-range
interests.
They appeal
to
the
o p p o s i t i o n s ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t , but from a time p e r s p e c t i v e that may
be d i f f e r e n t from that of American n e g o t i a t o r s .
In an upstreamdownstream c o n f l i c t , n e g o t i a t o r s from the subordinate/downstream
country may t r y a s i m i l a r b a r g a i n i n g p l o y .
35.
H o l s t i and
36.
See
Levy, op.
footnote
no.
c i t . , pp.
875-901.
24.
37.
Mark W.
Zacher,
I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f l i c t s and C o l l e c t i v e
S e c u r i t y , 1946-1977 , (New
York: Praeger
Publishers,
1979).
49
Zacher
makes
the
point
that
the
United
Nations
i s an
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the
world's power
brokers
and
not
a g l o b a l p o l i c e s t a t i o n as i s commonly supposed.
In
t h i s sense, t h e r e f o r e , powerful c o u n t r i e s hold more sway even in
the General Assembly.
38.
The concept of South Asian Regional Cooperation
was
first
proposed
i n May 1980 by P r e s i d e n t Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh.
It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the idea was f l o a t e d
when
Mrs.
Gandhi's government threatened to scrap the November 1977 Ganges
Waters T r e a t y .
See,
Rajendra
Sareen,
"South Asian Regional
Cooperation," i n Indian and Foreign Review, 20:20 (August
1-14)
pp.
12-15.
39.
The
Memorandum of Understanding was drawn up c o l l e c t i v e l y
by the f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s of Bangladesh and
India
during
Gen.
Ershad's v i s i t to new D e l h i at the beginning of October, 1982.
Although t h i s Memorandum has been c a l l e d a two year extension of
the 1977 T r e a t y , a few important m o d i f i c a t i o n s have been made in
some of the p r o v i s i o n s and the r e v i s e d v e r s i o n tends
to
favour
India.
This
would i n d i c a t e that the problem of water s h a r i n g ,
far from being r e s o l v e d , i s s t i l l very much a d i s p u t e d i s s u e .
50
III.
THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER FARAKKA
The Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e has a t h i r t y - t h r e e year h i s t o r y
h i g h l i g h t e d by over t h i r t y
official
1960.
Farakka
Negotiations
distinct
stages.
to
Indian
the
over
The f i r s t
bilateral
can
be
meetings
divided
into
stage began with P a k i s t a n ' s
government
about
the
in
the a l l e g e d c o n s t r u c t i o n of a
f i r s t meeting
of t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s from both c o u n t r i e s .
continued u n t i l the independence
third
stage
spanned
c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh and
interim
treaty
Bangladesh
in
"equitable
June
The
1960 and
i n December 1971.
s i x years beginning with the
lasted
The
in
of Bangladesh
about
November,
governments.
negotiators
until
1977
fourth
the
between
signing
the
stage
of the
Indian
started
and
when
from both s i d e s sat down to r e d e f i n e the concept of
apportionment"
considerable
criticism
since
the
1977
treaty
aroused
from c e r t a i n q u a r t e r s both i n Bangladesh
and I n d i a .
Current n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka
be included
i n the
first,
Indian
1951, and ended i n 1960 when the path was c l e a r e d f o r
second stage began with the e x p e r t s ' meeting
The
four
protest
massive dam a c r o s s the Ganges, which was r e p o r t e d i n the
press
since
fourth
stage
f o r two
issue can a l s o
important
reasons:
the 1977 t r e a t y over Farakka was renewed f o r a p e r i o d of
two years i n November 1982, without any important changes having
been made; and
revolves
second,
around
the
the
substance
Division
negotiations
problem of e q u i t a b l e s h a r i n g .
stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s a l s o d e a l s with
augmentation
of
the
larger
still
The f o u r t h
question
of
of the dry season flow of the Ganges.
of
the
Farakka
negotiations
i s not merely an
51
attempt at
during
maintaining
each
of
chronological
these
stages
A.
THE
with those
is
debatable
shows
that
p r i o r i t i e s which were o f t e n
of the other
in
side.
FIRST STAGE: A BARRAGE ACROSS THE
It
It
n e g o t i a t o r s on e i t h e r s i d e had a
d i f f e r e n t order of p r i o r i t i e s —
sharp c o n f l i c t
order.
GANGES?
whether or not the exchange of d i p l o m a t i c
notes and
l e t t e r s between the governments of India and
regarding
India's plans to c o n s t r u c t a barrage across the Ganges
qualify
as
negotiations.
which suggest that the
There are c e r t a i n
1951-60 p e r i o d was
n e g o t i a t i o n s between P a k i s t a n and
issue.
First,
"meaningful"
succeeding
two
the
negotiations
stages.
between
Second, i t was
recognised
the
two
stage
there was
T h i r d , i t was
d u r i n g the
c a l l e d the primary stage
that
Farakka
the
to be
project
1951-60 p e r i o d that
P a k i s t a n government suggested a r b i t r a t i o n by a
reach a s o l u t i o n .
in the
a d i s p u t e which had
could
begin.
of
f o r more
countries
during t h i s period
the a c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the
lower
first
however,
these d i p l o m a t i c exchanges paved the way
governments
to
reasons,
India over the Farakka Barrage
r e s o l v e d before
order
Pakistan
In f a c t , the
third
party
1951-60 p e r i o d can
of the d i s p u t e as P a k i s t a n ,
being
r i p a r i a n , managed to persuade India that there was
the
in
be
the
indeed
a problem.
In 1951
the f i r s t
news of
India's
plans
to
construct
a
barrage on the Ganges at Farakka, eleven m i l e s upstream from i t s
point
of
entry
through Indian
Pakistan
into
press
expressed
East P a k i s t a n , came to Pakistan's
reports.
concern
In a note dated October
and
notice
19,
p o i n t e d out that i t should
1951
be
52
c o n s u l t e d before any
schemes
interests
into
were
r e p l i e d on May
project
put
8,
was
1952
only
a
May
were
1953.
cooperation
adding
that
T h i s was
Farakka
water
a request
t h e r e f o r e the
no
similar
proposed
information
would
have
on
Farakka
cooperative
Barrage.
steps
toward
upstream.
Brahmaputra b a s i n s .
up
this
reaches
advised
In May
suggestion
by
of these two
Pakistan
In
model of those
In 1957,
delaying
set
India
1954,
tactics,
proposed
in
the P a k i s t a n
a joint
the
project
in
Ganges
A
United
Nations
and
took
of the upper
February,
up a f l o o d c o n t r o l commission on
1956
the
2
government,
frustrated
arbitration
of
by
India's
the d i s p u t e .
s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l s of the P a k i s t a n government were:
1)
the
suggested
government
survey
and
Pakistan
from India on
merely
India's reply
set up by I n d i a .
the Pakistan
India
control
proposing
rivers.
to
Instead
1955,
to be
Pakistan's
from
forthcoming
flood
of
which, c o u l d not i n f l u e n c e
downstream
was
note to
a p r o j e c t which would s u f f e r
1
but
changes
The
the d e s i r a b i l i t y
f u r n i s h e d India with some d e t a i l s of the Ganges-Kobadak
but
Barrage
not r e p l i e d to u n t i l
for information
diversion
causing
and
"cooperation
c o n d i t i o n s i n India because i t was
of
Ganges
hypothetical."
t h i s was
Ganges-Kobadak i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t ,
incapable
stage
vital
government
P a k i s t a n wrote another
but
the
its
Indian
the
In t h i s r e p l y India repeated
reciprocal."
from
that
"purely
cooperation.
Indian government in 1952
22,
out
prejudice
The
preliminary
P a k i s t a n government's f e a r s
the
to
operation.
pointing
at
note a l s o suggested
likely
technical
program
should
be
The
53
requested
to a s s i s t
r i v e r system;
i n the development
2) t h e p r o j e c t s i n b o t h
jointly
by
experts
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ; and
i n the eastern
c o u n t r i e s should
be
examined
from
both
countries
before
3) t h e U.N.
S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l s h o u l d be r e q u e s t e d
to
appoint
an
engineer
to p a r t i c i p a t e
i n experts'
meetings.
3
The
United
Pakistan
Nations
negotiations.
put
forward
agreed
a
The
was l i m i t e d
for
with
stage
While
urgency,
Indian
finally
agreed
the
to
the Indian
Nations
technical
river
proposals
reluctantly
information
thereby
officially
notified
to hold b i l a t e r a l
In
the
meetings of
Pakistan."
of n e g o t i a t i o n s over
notes
a
Farakka,
and
even
limited
reflected
reluctant.
amount
two
some
India
of
technical
the P a k i s t a n
government
of i t s plans
to a s s i s t
therefore,
between t h e
by P a k i s t a n
only a f t e r
government
programme
sent
slow
occurred
system.
of a c t u a l
specific
government
technical
government
exchange
but t h i s
onset
the
a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the f u t u r e .
r e a c t i o n was
informed
eastern
exchange o f
involving
the
the
Indian
of
t o the exchange of d i p l o m a t i c notes
countries.
information
the
of i t s i n t e n t i o n
nature
first
hastened
India rejected
t h e Nehru
parliament
suggestion
matter
Pakistan,
stage
this,
technical
the
Although
by
the
with
Indian
in
to a limited
setting
line
government's
to request
a
i n the development
United
of the
54
B.
THE
SECOND STAGE: NEGOTIATIONS OR
The
took
DELAYING TACTICS?
f i r s t meeting of t e c h n i c a l experts
place
from
June 28 to J u l y 3,
t h i s meeting India d i d not supply
1960
any
of
both
at New
countries
Delhi.
i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e d to the
Farakka p r o j e c t ; i t s u p p l i e d only a note on the Teesta
a
barrage
to
During
be b u i l t across the Teesta
River
project,
in the north of
West Bengal.
The
second meeting of t e c h n i c a l experts
between October
"project
was
report
provided
experts
flows
1 and
3,
for
perusal
The
exchange of
The
Dhaka
and
of
the
Pakistan
1960
and
data.
between
point
were
1963
r e p l y was
December
in
that
the
27,
both
had
Indians
considered
the Pakistan
1961
and
sides
also
confined
agreeing
to
January
expressed
demanded
8,
the
more data but
irrelevant
by
s i d e requested
forthcoming,
1965
meeting,
by
a r e c o r d of the Ganges'
the
to
an
1962
view
a
fourth
6
At
s i n c e most of
the
considerably
smooth
hindered.
a f i n a l meeting but when no
a reminder was
1965.
Pakistan,
was
that
been made i n the exchange of d a t a .
the Indian government in May,
August
a
5
o p e r a t i o n of meetings between experts was
By
government
a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n on
t h i r d meeting of experts was
c o n s i d e r a b l e progress
these
at t h i s meeting that
f o u r t h meeting of t e c h n i c a l experts which took p l a c e at
"successful"
this
i t was
India also provided
between. 1948
Teesta.
and
the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the port of C a l c u t t a "
f o r the
from I n d i a .
1963
took p l a c e at Dhaka
sent by d i p l o m a t i c note to
India e v e n t u a l l y r e p l i e d in
meeting
of
experts.
however, c o u l d not take p l a c e before May,
1968
This
because
55
war
had
and
broken out between I n d i a and
i t took three years
these c o u n t r i e s to be
The
fifth
technical
The
two
1965
f o r normal d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between
as
it
turned
out,
final)
meeting
from both c o u n t r i e s took p l a c e i n May,
s i d e s c o u l d not
demanding more
i n September
restored.
(and
experts
Pakistan
reach any
technical
accusing
the Indians
Helmut
Kulz
and
the
the
atmosphere
side
Pakistan
of u n n e c e s s a r i l y d e l a y i n g the
describes
1968.
agreement with the Indian
information
which
of
side
proceedings.
pervaded
this
meeting:
. . . i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , a f t e r a l l these d e l a y s ,
that
the
last
meeting
showed wide divergence
of views
between the two d e l e g a t i o n s
on
almost
a l l issues.
While
the
Indian
delegation
insisted
on
further
meetings to exchange data,
the
Pakistan
delegation
maintained
that
enough data
had been exchanged and
that the problem r e q u i r e d immediate
tackling
at
the
political
level
to achieve a s o l u t i o n of the problem
a c c e p t a b l e to both c o u n t r i e s i f necessary through
the
mediation of a t h i r d p a r t y .
7
The
five
meetings
of
technical
experts
"upgrading" of the t a l k s over the Farakka issue
government.
issue
and
reason
"promote"
and
talks
as
to the p o l i t i c a l
they
could.
the
level
to
8
level,
Most
Indian
the
Indian
observers--both
from P a k i s t a n - - have suggested that the
India's r e l u c t a n c e to d i s c u s s
procrastination.
negotiation
long
those
behind
political
by
an
Though the P a k i s t a n governments wanted to f o r c e the
side r e s i s t e d as
neutral
represented
was
the
The
Indian
occur
only
direct
result
government
after
the
the
issue
of
wanted
Farakka
a
at
policy
real
the
of
meaningful
Barrage
was
56
completed and
operational.
T h i s stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s
conscious
effort
by
the
Pakistan
Farakka issue at the p o l i t i c a l
President
Nehru
was
India
were
in
characterized
government
and
Prime
London
for
M i n i s t e r s ' conference in March 1961.
They
discussion
parliament.
two
He
some
months
later
s a i d that he had
c o u n t r i e s should
in
the
Jawaharlal
Commonwealth Prime
met
to
number of t o p i c s i n c l u d i n g the Farakka p r o j e c t .
the
discuss
Nehru
the
a speech to the
Farakka
a
described
Indian
suggested to Ayub Khan that
cooperate over
a
government.
Minister
the
by
to d i s c u s s
l e v e l with the Indian
Ayub Khan of Pakistan
of
also
the
project.
He
a l s o t o l d Ayub Khan:
Let us do i t i n such a way as to b e n e f i t each
and l e t us decide t h i s at m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l .
other...
9
He
f u r t h e r recounted how
they had
meeting of m i n i s t e r s but
that t h i s c o u l d only be
necessary t e c h n i c a l data had
to
agreed that there
first
should
fruitful
been gathered.
be a
i f the
Nehru went on
say:
I hope that a f t e r the next meeting, which i s going
to
take p l a c e
fairly
soon, both p a r t i e s would be in
possession of these f a c t s .
Then the time w i l l
come,
if
i t i s considered necessary, f o r m i n i s t e r s on both
s i d e s to meet and
discuss,
that
i s not
to
allow
matters
to
be
dealt
with by
o f f i c i a l s who cannot
decide t h i n g s .
1 0
Nehru's
political
promise
l e v e l was
to
discuss
the
Farakka
taken up by Ayub Khan.
Nehru (dated March 27,
1961)
attaching
a
He
issue
at
sent a l e t t e r
tentative
list
the
to
of
57
points
for
discussion
h i s t o r y of the case.
his
desire
that
at the m i n i s t e r i a l meeting, and
In t h i s l e t t e r , Ayub Khan
"such
Nehru's r e p l y was
a meeting should
somewhat
expressed
the
Pakistan's
s i d e - - would be completed
"enable
East
that
the
hope
that
tentative
the
i n c r e a s i n g the
as
soon
has
been
scope of
a
the
project,
as
without
the
for
this
demands
consideration
by I n d i a .
that the
jeopardized
project
1 2
could
made
He
and
that
not
be
taken
(dated May
into
19,
1961)
Pakistan
would
Teesta
rivers
were
a l s o s t a t e d that a m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l
Nehru's l e t t e r dated J u l y 6,
expressed doubts as to whether the necessary
would be completed by the
was
the
thereby implying
l i v e s of the people of East
way.
To
to
the
i f waters from the Ganges and
any
it
from
possible
giving
1 1
us
Ayub Khan's r e p l y
meeting would be a p p r o p r i a t e .
a l s o made the
that
proceeding with i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n
without c o n s u l t i n g us,"
in
sense
reservation
and
disturbed
the
f u l l exchange of d a t a - - a l s o
information,
be
be arranged e a r l y . "
in
Ganges-Kobadak p r o j e c t ,
"Pakistan
out
expressed
m i n i s t e r s ' l e v e l meeting to be h e l d soon."
Pakistan
pointed
also
a brief
exchange
f o u r t h meeting of e x p e r t s .
f o l l o w i n g general
of
The
1961
data
letter
remarks:
One
more matter
to which I must a l s o r e f e r , i s the
d i s t i n c t i o n you s t i l l seem to make between the
rights
of the upper and lower r i p a r i a n i n paragraph 7 of your
letter,
which
implies
that
the
lower r i p a r i a n can
proceed u n i l a t e r a l l y with p r o j e c t s , while
the
upper
riparian
should not be f r e e to do so.
I f t h i s was to
be so, i t would enable the lower r i p a r i a n to
create,
unilaterally,
h i s t o r i c r i g h t s in i t s favour and go on
i n f l a t i n g them at i t s d i s c r e t i o n thereby
completely
blocking
a l l development
and
uses of
the
upper
riparian.
We cannot, o b v i o u s l y accept t h i s
point
of
view, e s p e c i a l l y when t h r e e - f o u r t h s of the length of
the Ganges l i e s in Indian t e r r i t o r y , which g i v e s India
58
the p r i o r i t y of i n t e r e s t
It
river.
i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that India
construction
on
were exchanged.
Indian
in this
the
Farakka Barrage
countries.
against
without
The
had
already
started
Farakka Barrage at the time these
P a k i s t a n had lodged
government
1 3
beginning
previous
protest
a formal p r o t e s t
the
letters
with
the
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the
agreement
between
the
was r e j e c t e d by I n d i a i n two
two
separate
notes dated June 20 and 29, 1961. " Understandably, there was no
1
f u r t h e r d i r e c t correspondence between the two l e a d e r s .
The Nehru-Ayub meeting of March
because
it
concerning
dispute
1971.
few
was
the
1961
was
very
important
only agreement between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n
the Farakka Barrage, and i t set the p a t t e r n
throughout
the
1960s
until
for
Bangladesh was formed i n
However, s i n c e there was no w r i t t e n agreement,,
months
of
disagreement
the
over
understanding
its
the
being
reached,
interpretation.
This
within
there
is
a
was
clearly
i l l u s t r a t e d by the correspondence between the two l e a d e r s .
In
an
effort
to
t e c h n i c a l exchanges with
government
decided
reach a s o l u t i o n and r e a l i s i n g that the
India were going
nowhere, the
to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e the i s s u e .
of a c t i o n was f i r s t made p u b l i c by Pakistan's
before
the
press
in
minister
14, 1967 a f t e r he had
Barrage.
The f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s t a t e d that "the Farakka Barrage
the
threatened
foreign
course
touring
threatens
region
on December
This
completed
1 5
the
Dhaka
Pakistan
by
the
Farakka
e n t i r e e c o l o g i c a l p a t t e r n of the d e l t a region of
East P a k i s t a n " and that f o r P a k i s t a n ,
"the q u e s t i o n
assumes
an
59
importance
which
transcends
P a k i s t a n would approach "the
purely
economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; "
international
agencies
concerned,
i f her e f f o r t s to solve the problem through n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d not
y i e l d any
As
r e s u l t s w i t h i n a reasonable
part
superpowers
support
1 6
of t h e i r campaign to b r i n g up the Farakka Barrage
i s s u e in the U n i t e d Nations,
the
time."
of
the
the
Pakistan
dispute
from the S o v i e t Union.
government
and a p p a r e n t l y
Mr.
Kosygin
became prime m i n i s t e r i n
solution
lines
also publicly
the
played
in
Treaty.
1 8
Hussein,
conciliatory
the
raised
the
leading
foreign
up
question
on the one
India's
the
to
one
it
had
the Indus Waters
of
States
to
Pakistan,
attend
hand, and
the Bank
19
Nothing
i n t e r v i e w with Ben
f e e l i n g that had Ayub not
c o u l d probably
and
f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , on the o t h e r .
by the World B a n k .
an
India
1 7
Arshad
with the World Bank's p r e s i d e n t
t o l d the Bank that India would be w i l l i n g
In
a
the
U.N.
A number of c o n v e r s a t i o n s were h e l d between the Bank
and Hussein,
then
to
minister
while he was. v i s i t i n g the United
meetings.
urging
from the World Bank that i t p l a y
role similar
negotiations
However, the
1966,
of the Indus Waters T r e a t y .
r e j e c t e d an o f f e r
a mediatory and
obtained some
despatched a l e t t e r
to I n d i r a Gandhi, who
along
informed
f u r t h e r was
Crow, Hussein
fallen
Desai,
Desai
apparently
to c o n s i d e r
mediation
heard
of the p r o p o s a l .
a p p a r e n t l y expressed
i n 1969,
have been p u r s u e d .
Morarji
the
Bank's
the
proposal
2 0
India's a c t i o n s during t h i s stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s c e r t a i n l y
reflect
typical
upstream
country
economic i n c e n t i v e to cooperate
behaviour
where there i s no
with the downstream country
and
60
the
downstream
country
upstream c o u n t r y .
Pakistan
time.
holds
To
2 1
redress
f e a s i b l e at the time.
impression
Pakistan's
construct
a
Barrage.
on
off-take
the
of
on
the
season use.
reports
nor
financially
never
been
The
The
reservoir
discussed
proposed
would
in the west
barrage was
started
in s e v e r a l
barrage,
known
have been b u i l t
i n the
Understandably,
India
reacted
strong p r o t e s t .
K.L.
these
Rao,
and
have
southwest
of
East
to s t o r e water f o r dry
extended
certain
into
India,
areas
in
of
to make to the Lok
India.
irrigation
and
Sabha about
the
project:
If (the p r o j e c t i s ) executed ( i t ) w i l l cause harm
to
l a r g e t r a c t s of t e r r i t o r y belonging to I n d i a by way of
submersion and e r o s i o n , e t c . The Government of India
have lodged a strong p r o t e s t with
the
Government
of
P a k i s t a n and have urged that no c o n s t r u c t i o n should be
undertaken
on
(the)
Padma which may
i n j u r e the
upstream area of I n d i a .
2 3
This
to t h i s p r o j e c t proposal with a
Indian m i n i s t e r
comments
the
I t s o s t e n s i b l e purpose
a l s o intended
would
at
as f a r upstream as the Farakka Barrage.
could
to
although
in East P a k i s t a n , probably
flooded
had
22
Barrage,
have
•power,
was
had
governments.
Ganges
certainly
reservoir
the
s t r a t e g y for a short
planned
the Gorai-Madhumati R i v e r .
The
however,
Ganges downstream of the Farakka
project
to i r r i g a t e huge areas
Pakistan.
the
However, the mere mention of i t seemed to
this
consultants'
as
neither well
v i c i n i t y of Hardinge Bridge,
almost
imbalance,
over
t h r e a t to r e t a l i a t e came in the form of plans
meetings of the two
was
the
power
on Indian p o l i c y makers.
barrage
Work
several
simply
reciprocal
government followed a r e t a l i a t o r y
T h i s s t r a t e g y was
make an
no
61
There was
The
height
a s u b t l e irony embedded in Pakistan's
of the Ganges Barrage would depend on how
India agreed to r e l e a s e at Farakka.
very
little,
water, and
Since
proposal.
then
If India agreed to
release
the Ganges Barrage would have to s t o r e more
t h i s might pose a t h r e a t to West Bengal
no work was
much water
in
India.
done on the p r o j e c t , the whole t h i n g may
been planned by the Pakistan
a u t h o r i t i e s merely as a
2 4
have
bargaining
tool.
The
1968-71
p e r i o d during
t h i s stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s
the Farakka Barrage a l s o witnessed an
of
talks.
attended
The
last
f i v e meetings h e l d during
by s e c r e t a r i e s ( s e n i o r c i v i l
ministries
servants)
the
In the
talks
first
on
the
of the
three meetings Pakistan
relevant
Pakistan
the two
the
for
countries for
such a framework f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n
governments at the p o l i t i c a l
that
the
also
to
s e c u r i n g an adequate q u a n t i t y of water.
wanted to evolve
plea
for
regarding
which purpose adequate data were a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e , and
machinery
experts
pressed
framework f o r a settlement
e q u i t a b l e s h a r i n g of Ganges waters between the two
devise
level
t h i s p e r i o d were
from both c o u n t r i e s rather than by t e c h n i c a l
or engineers.
substantive
"upgrading" of
over
data
level.
available
2 5
India disagreed
were s t i l l
incomplete
by
on
and
inadequate.
In the
f o u r t h meeting of s e c r e t a r i e s h e l d at Islamabad from
February 24 to March 2,
the
1970
the
Pakistan
f i n a l p o s i t i o n taken regarding
pointed
out
the
futility
except
in
the
context
delegation
recorded
a l l the t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s
of f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of
these
and
issues
of agreed a l l o c a t i o n of water from
the
62
Ganges to East
The
July
Pakistan.
f i f t h and
16
and
21,
last
1970
2 6
s e c r e t a r i e s ' meeting
in
New
recommendations on t h i s occasion
Delhi.
was
held
between
Pakistan's
specific
were:
1) that the p o i n t of d e l i v e r y of supply to Pakistan of
such quantum of water as may be agreed upon w i l l be at
Farakka;
2) that c o n s t i t u t i o n of a body of
one
representative
from each of the two c o u n t r i e s f o r ensuring d e l i v e r y
of
agreed
s u p p l i e s at Farbakka
i s acceptable
in
p r i n c i p l e ; and
3) that a meeting be h e l d in three to s i x months' time
at a l e v e l to be agreed upon by the two governments to
consider
the . q u a n t i t y
of
water
to be s u p p l i e d to
Pakistan
at
Farakka
and
other
unresolved
issues
r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o and to eastern r i v e r s which have been
the
subject
matter
of d i s c u s s i o n in these s e r i e s of
talks.
2 7
Agreement on the
technical
"point
of
delivery"
argument surrounding
ended,
regeneration;
presumably,
agreement that
next meeting should d i s c u s s water s h a r i n g s i g n i f i e d the
technical
exchanges.
This
to
There was
almost
that
agreement i n January
titled
over
the
issue,
1971,
The
which
I n d i a ' s Farakka Barrage and
East P a k i s t a n ,
and
what
Nehru
a decade p r e v i o u s l y was
another meeting should be h e l d .
position
the ensuing
i n the t a l k s .
2 8
Ayub
becoming a
new
was
r i g i d i t y of
published
of
had
reality.
that
Pakistan's
in a pamphlet
i t s Adverse Consequences on
s t r u g g l e for independence by
on which the
Pakistan governments took d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposite
impasse
and
at India's suggestion,
m a j o r i t y of Bengalees in East Pakistan
an
the
can be c a l l e d the t u r n i n g p o i n t in
the n e g o t i a t i o n s in the sense
agreed
end
the
Indian
stands,
the
and
created
With the independence of Bangladesh
63
in December 1971,
nascent
the
Bangladesh government.
Any
over
the onus of n e g o t i a t i n g with India f e l l on
d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t e d to t h i s stage
Farakka would be incomplete
of
the
negotiations
i f no mention were made of
the
attempted i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Pugwash movement i n t o the d i s p u t e .
During
in
the Addis Abbaba conference
January
1966,
the
members
development problems in India and
resolved
that
some
P a k i s t a n , should
which
they
Pakistan.
The
outside
of
to
the
University,
that
Center
offered
to
for
there
was
a
need
rivers.
Revelle
was
group
India
and
nations
on
P r o f e s s o r Roger
the
Studies
It
Pakistan.
3 0
of
the
Ganges
of
particularly
well
qualified
The
Pugwash
initiative
for
the
task
I n d i a expressed
of
the
Pugwash
team.
Pakistan
enthusiasm, but met
No
and
with a
refused
Indira
stumbling
to
explanation for t h i s r e f u s a l
o f f e r e d by the Indian government.
in
seemed to make some
block when the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e
with
and
2 9
headway i n i t i a l l y when both Ayub Khan
Gandhi
was
to look i n some d e t a i l at the
because he had d i r e c t e d a l a r g e s c a l e d e s a l i n a t i o n programme
West
at
s e r v i c e s of h i s
f o r such a study.
n a t u r a l resource development of the basins
Brahmaputra
both
Population
provide
to w r i t e a prospectus
Pugwash
both
might work on a c o o p e r a t i v e b a s i s .
research s t a f f
agreed
among other t h i n g s ,
organisation,
of
held
discussed
i d e n t i f y problems common
Revelle, director
Harvard
of the Pugwash movement
However, the
team
did
meet
was
meet
with Ayub Khan.
Since p r e l i m i n a r y s t u d i e s of c o o p e r a t i v e development of
the
64
Ganges
basin
had
already
been completed, the group continued
with a study of the Pakistan p o r t i o n of the b a s i n , with
from the World Bank and other
study
emerged
a concept
p r o p o s a l to use a
water
storage
the
groundwater recharge
heavy
pumping
system
Ganges
as a
would
for
basin
and
solution.
lower
increasing
the
During
the
measures would increase the rate
of
percolation
flood
to
recharge
reservoirs.
that
could
be
used
By t h i s means, the
nearly
thirty
Harvard
c e r t a i n people
some m e r i t .
government
3 2
was
almost
government
the
reasons
l y i n g behind
probable
reason
completed
was
the
water
that
the
underground
estimated
for
both
dispute.
was
and,
at
conceived.
forwarded
of
by
massive
the
late
foreign
stage,
Indian
the dubious
the f a c t that the Farakka
this
There
b e l i e v e d that i t had
f o r i t s r e j e c t i o n was
offers
not i n t e r e s t e d
been so c a r e f u l l y
Barrage
i n I n d i a , however, who
of
so
various
r e j e c t e d by the Indian government.
as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n
motives i t saw
Another
One
season,
provide
Such a p r o p o s a l , t h e r e f o r e , undermined
the b a s i s of the e n t i r e Farakka
were
season,
general flow of the
Ganges R i v e r c o u l d be s t o r e d , p r o v i d i n g enough
T h i s proposal was
dry
researchers
per cent of the annual
India and East P a k i s t a n .
induced
groundwater t a b l e and
In the wet
31
underground
suggesting
water f o r i r r i g a t i o n and other uses.
waters
From t h i s
known as the "Ganges water machine,"
massive
in
i n t e r n a t i o n a l agencies.
funding
the
aid.
Barrage
Indian
i n abandoning a p r o j e c t which had
65
C.
INDIAN OBSTINACY OR
PAKISTANI WEAKNESS?
Twenty years of n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka issue
no
real
progress
diplomatic
experts'
1971
saw
During
notes
level
toward
and
and
ten
a
solution.
meetings
five
(five
at
its
way
an
"Indian"
Therefore,
India's terms.
no
any
"talks."
Even
inclination
to
to press
Minister
negotiate
with
said
this
stage
on the t o p i c .
have f e l t
reached,
was
not
interpretation,
but
to
Nehru,
next
j u b i l a t i o n the
was
few
on
Pakistan
who
requests
had
shown
government,
the
1961
as
some
was
parts
Nehru-Ayub
the only d i s c u s s i o n by p o l i t i c a l
the
be
Its basin includes
negotiations,
Indian
years
Pakistan
Soon a f t e r t h i s
there
formal agreement with the P a k i s t a n
the
these
Pakistan
leaders
government
understanding
disagreement
as
government
also
c o n s t r u c t i o n on the Farakka Barrage without
During
must
time that "what India does with
short-lived.
only
was
Bangladesh.
of
However, any
stand
Ganges
Pakistan
refer
3
agreement in London was
was
the
33
f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s on the Farakka
i s India's b u s i n e s s . " "
of I n d i a , Nepal, T i b e t , and
During
with
the
at one
year
as opposed to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
documents
Prime
have
India's r i v e r s
might
the
completion.
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that although
opportunity
to
river
"discussion"
i s s u e , Indian o f f i c i a l
reported
technical
p e r i o d , Indian n e g o t i a t o r s took an o b s t i n a t e
essentially
missed
the
to
that l a r g e l y d e r i v e d from t h e i r a s s e r t i o n that
one.
innumerable
at the s e c r e t a r i e s ' l e v e l ) ,
the Farakka Barrage w e l l on
this
After
showed
having
to
its
started
reached
any
government.
no
negotiations
took p l a c e
66
between the two
s i d e s as
over many t e r r i t o r i a l
between
India
and
restored.
issues.
elapsed
but
them
deteriorated
In September 1965,
and,
before
at f u l l
government brought the
the United Nations.
members
between
broke
out
although i t l a s t e d only a
few
normal
war
diplomatic
relations
During t h i s i n t e r v a l , c o n s t r u c t i o n work on
Farakka Barrage continued
Pakistan
3 5
Pakistan
days, s e v e r a l years
were
relations
no
Pakistan's
pressure
swing.
In September
the
1968,
the
issue to the General Assembly of
p o s i t i o n was
was
put
on
supported
India.
by
As a
3 6
most
result,
Pakistan went back to the n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e ; only t h i s time,
s e c r e t a r i e s of both c o u n t r i e s were
present.
T h i s part of the n e g o t i a t i o n s
talks
by one
actual
secretaries
respective
in
from
negotiations,
either
political
predecessors.
side
leaders
Despite
only because
agreed
of
some
Pakistan
was
Farakka
would
the general
ecology
the
the
employed
unfortunately,
F i r s t , Pakistan
opinions
their
no
the
of
the
technical
Indian
demands.
Pakistan
Whereas u n t i l
damaging to the economy of East Pakistan
and
from
1968
1960-1971
bargaining
could
tried
elicit
to
that
a
1962,
at
of the area,
India
from
barrage
the
several
had
because
negotiators
n e g o t i a t i n g percentages of t o t a l Ganges'
Throughout
the
of
There was
however,
as
t r y i n g to impress upon
be
"upgrading"
ladder.
reflected
much
an
these c o n s t r a i n t s , some t e c h n i c a l p o i n t s
were r e s o l v e d but
to
represents
more notch i n the d i p l o m a t i c
progress
the
onwards
they
flow.
p e r i o d , the P a k i s t a n
techniques,
any
elicit
were
none
major concessions
cooperation
government
of
which,
from I n d i a .
from
India
by
67
emphasising
country
the
legal
rights
of
co-riparians
undertook a p r o j e c t l i k e l y
interests
Pakistan
Soviet
of
the other.
tried
and
to
be
prejudicial
one
to
the
Second, when t h i s t a c t i c got nowhere,
to put p o l i t i c a l pressure
American
whenever
leaders.
on India by t a l k i n g
Third,
3 7
keeping the option of
b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s open, the P a k i s t a n government brought
the
issue
in
the
General
Assembly
Fourth, hoping to put d i r e c t pressure
the
question
irrigating
of
building
large
Pakistan,
parts
would
also
a
of
western
have
of
the United
Barrage
and
raised
which,
besides
southwestern
underground
up
Nations.
on I n d i a , P a k i s t a n
Ganges
to
East
r e s e r v o i r s that c o u l d
f l o o d p a r t s of West Bengal i n I n d i a .
Why
their
c o u l d Pakistan not
way
on
explanations.
its
the
One
eastern
prevent
Farakka
issue?
and
The
completing
the Farakka p r o j e c t , was
their
There
other p o s s i b i l i t y
manifesto,
to become a f a i t a c c o m p l i .
Barrage had
having
two
care
logical
enough
about
seems to be that I n d i a , bent on
only s t a l l i n g
they
claimed
neglect of e a r l i e r governments has allowed
3
9
f o r time.
that
the
cause.
"the
Farakka
become a f a i t accompli,
i t i s very
The
In
criminal
Barrage
While i t i s c e r t a i n l y true that
that the P a k i s t a n government had allowed
nothing
are
tended to give credence to the f i r s t
election
Farakka
from
t h e r e f o r e d i d not advocate i t s p o s i t i o n
strongly.
38
Indians
i s that P a k i s t a n d i d not
wing
Awami L e a g u e
the-
the
doubtful
t h i s to happen by
doing
about i t .
The
deliberate
second
policy
possible
of
explanation,
procrastination
that
there
was
a
pursued by I n d i a , seems
68
c l o s e r to the t r u t h .
Indian
Indian
answers
The
to
constant
Pakistan's
statements and
procedure
had
establish a
without
openly
the evasive nature
the beginning
f a i t accompli
repudiating
dispute
a
technically
in
of a l l
replies
the view that India's a t t i t u d e
the
been c a l c u l a t e d to gain
with
its
Farakka
p r i n c i p l e of
India's r e f u s a l to meet with the team
devised
i n c r e a s i n g delay
the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n some of i t s
-from
time and
ever
notes,
to P a k i s t a n , a l l s t r o n g l y support
and
and
sound way
from
project
"cooperation.""
Harvard
which
had
to undermine the b a s i s of
i s a l s o i l l u s t r a t i v e of the Indian
government's
0
the
actual
intentions.
D.
THE
THIRD STAGE: SOLUTION ON
This
months of
ended
stage
1972,
with
of
negotiations
signing
Ganges waters, d i f f e r e d
First,
were p e a c e f u l and
chasacterised
as a d i r e c t
HORIZON?
which
started
soon a f t e r the independence of
the
respects.
THE
of
a
Bangladesh,
earlier
the c o n d i t i o n s surrounding
no sense of
the
stages
these
of
India's
and
in
several
which
India.
Bangladesh's
the
negotiations
strain
n e g o t i a t i o n s between P a k i s t a n and
result
and
t r e a t y over the sharing of
from the two
there was
in the e a r l y
had
Second,
newly
found
f r i e n d s h i p , n e g o t i a t o r s on both s i d e s were more t o l e r a n t of each
other's views and
presented
needs
of
which was
formula
were w i l l i n g
by the other
the
other
side.
to at l e a s t examine the
proposals
T h i r d , each, r e c o g n i s i n g the water
s i d e , was
w i l l i n g to c r e a t e a j o i n t
charged with the task of c h a l k i n g out
an
body"
1
appropriate
f o r s h a r i n g Ganges waters between the c o - r i p a r i a n s .
Despite
a
mutual
recognition
of
each
other's
needs,
69
however, i t took India and
on
a
water s h a r i n g
Bangladesh almost s i x years
formula.
The
No
42
sooner
had
Treaty
embodying
the t r e a t y been signed
the
launched
editorial
aimed at the s i g n a t o r y governments.
h i s t o r y of the events l e a d i n g up to
Treaty
the
between Bangladesh and
different
forces
contend with before any
Discussions
the
Farakka
continued
meet
returned
January
and
1972
power.
On
in
A brief
the
B.M.
43
went
early
1972
February,
issued at the end
and
and
to
Bangladesh m i n i s t e r s
to
New
Indian m i n i s t e r of
Abbas t o l d the press
there.
to
including
M i n i s t e r s came from I n d i a
Abbas
Rao,
issues
from
in Bangladesh and
that
Delhi
in
irrigation
suspicions
and
4 4
prime m i n i s t e r s of the two
January,
1977
reached.
p r e v i o u s l y hampered the n e g o t i a t i o n s between India
longer
and
on both s i d e s had
bilateral
started
years.
January 24,
Pakistan were no
The
negotiators
project
to t a l k to K.L.
critics
verbal
of
sort of agreement c o u l d be
counterparts
their v i s i t s .
which had
which
f o r the next two
their
signing
a
I n d i a w i l l enable us to understand
about outstanding
Barrage
the
scathing
end
such
than
from both s i d e s of
attacks
border
agree
d i s p u t e , however, d i d not
with the s i g n i n g of the November 1977
formula.
to
now
March of
friendly
1972.
of the February meeting
The
countries
joint
met
statement
said:
The two Prime M i n i s t e r s emphasized that the
geography
of
the
region
provided
a
natural
basis
of
cooperation...They
discussed
the
problem
of
flood
c o n t r o l , Farakka Barrage and other p r o b l e m s .
45
At
the
c o n c l u s i o n of the prime m i n i s t e r s ' meeting i n March the
t r e a t y of F r i e n d s h i p , Co-operation
and
Peace was
signed.
This
70
treaty
was
to be v a l i d
for t w e n t y - f i v e
years,
and
specifically
i n c l u d e d agreement t o :
make j o i n t s t u d i e s and take j o i n t a c t i o n i n the f i e l d s
of f l o o d c o n t r o l , r i v e r
basin
development, and
the
development of h y d r o e l e c t r i c power and i r r i g a t i o n . "
6
In
the
discussion
simultaneously
was
among
officials
which
took
with the prime m i n i s t e r s ' meetings, the
taken to e s t a b l i s h a J o i n t R i v e r s Commission."
months of the
7
place
decision
Within
four
independence of Bangladesh, the c o - r i p a r i a n s t a t e s
agreed to e s t a b l i s h a j o i n t
body:
so that the water
resources
of
the
region
can
be
utilised
on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s f o r the mutual b e n e f i t
of the peoples of the two c o u n t r i e s . *
8
The
Statute
1972,
of the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission
i n c l u d e d the
Article
signed
in
November
following provisions:
4
(i)
The Commission s h a l l have the
in p a r t i c u l a r :
following
functions
a)
to maintain
liaison
between
the p a r t i c i p a t i n g
countries
in order to ensure the most e f f e c t i v e j o i n t
e f f o r t s in maximizing the b e n e f i t s from common
river
systems to both c o u n t r i e s . . .
b)
to
study f l o o d c o n t r o l and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s so
that the water resources of the region can be u t i l i s e d
on an e q u i t a b l e b a s i s f o r the mutual b e n e f i t
of
the
peoples of the two c o u n t r i e s .
(iii)
The
Commission
shall
a l s o perform such other
f u n c t i o n s as the governments may, by mutual agreement,
d i r e c t i t to do."
9
The
J o i n t R i v e r s Commission was
coopertion
intended
to act as a
i n a l l areas of r i v e r development.
The
forum
for
Statute
laid
71
down that each government should appoint
Commission
a
engineers)
and
staff.
to
the
The
provide
adequate
chairmanship
Statute
ruled
Commission's
of
secretarial
the
and
out
public
scrutiny
dispute
i s not
quoted
7 of
the J o i n t
Rivers
but
the
unless
the
mentioned
paragraphs
i n the
from
the
above gave the governments freedom to r e f e r the
to the Commission i f they so chose.
The
in
meetings
specifically
Commission's terms of reference
topic
of
Article
proceedings:
Farakka
Statute
supporting
Commission was to a l t e r n a t e
A l l meetings
shall
be c l o s e d
Commission d e s i r e s otherwise.
The
Rivers
chairman and three members (two of whom should be
between the two governments i n s u c c e s s i v e years.
the
Joint
first
meeting of the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission
June 1972, before the S t a t u t e had been s i g n e d .
this
was
indicative
of
the
importance
was
held
I f anything,
attached
to
river
development by both
India and Bangladesh and of t h e i r d e s i r e f o r
mutual c o o p e r a t i o n .
A press note i s s u e d at the end of the f i r s t
meeting s a i d :
The
Commission
considered r i v e r development works i n
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna System
i n general and
w i l l take i t up i n d e t a i l i n i t s next m e e t i n g .
5 0
It
as
i s important
i f the
Indian
Farakka
statements
officials
to note that while on the s u r f a c e i t seemed
dispute
issued
was on i t s way to being r e s o l v e d ,
after
meetings
with
Bangladesh
avoided any mention of Farakka and r e f e r r e d g e n e r a l l y
72
to
"river
government
will
development"
wanted
become
in
the
region.
and
that
c o n t r o l , and
tactic
thesis.
power,
after
h i s Bangladesh
mentioned
Indian
c l e a r e r when we a n a l y s e Indo-Bangladesh a c t i o n s i n
In a statement issued by K.L.
Ahmed,
the
to achieve through the adoption of t h i s
Chapter V of t h i s
irrigation
What
Rao,
he
was
in April
complete
i t was
on power, f l o o d
On h i s r e t u r n
Khandakar
would
gave
more
Moshtaque Ahmed.
added
1972,
misconceptions about Farakka had been c l e a r e d up.
Rao
also
Moshtaque
Bangladesh's
Dhaka,
Rao
agreement
for
that
from
irrigation.
minister
met with Khandakar
counterpart,
there
Indian
details
about
the
He s a i d that sharing
meeting with
of
the
water
be s e t t l e d at the meeting of the two prime m i n i s t e r s , but
that Farakka was no longer a problem.
going
The p r o p o r t i o n
of
water
t o each country was yet t o be s e t t l e d , but the doubts and
m i s g i v i n g s of Bangladesh had been
It
was
misgivings
not
were,
came down t o
made
or
public
removed.
what
51
Bangladesh's
how they were " c l e a r e d up."
actually
devising
a
formula,
India's p o s i t i o n were d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed.
doubts
and
F o r , when i t
Bangladesh's
and
I f Rao's statement
i s to be accepted at face value, one probable e x p l a n a t i o n can be
given
f o r Bangladesh's
willingness
to
d i s c u s s broader r i v e r
problems r a t h e r than Farakka: Bangladesh was hoping t o convince
India
of i t s good f a i t h i n s e t t l i n g the Farakka i s s u e and other
outstanding b i l a t e r a l
issues
between
these
issues.
two
As i t turned out,
countries
however,
most
were s e t t l e d when I n d i r a
Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman met i n 1974, but not the
issue
73
of the Farakka
In
Barrage.
the meantime, events
Bangladesh and i n other
bearing on
political
the
i n t e r e s t e d q u a r t e r s which were to have a
outcome
leaders
were t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n India and
of
i n West
this
dispute.
Bengal
began
In
In
the
Rajya
Sabha
(upper
1972,
lobbying the Indian
c e n t r a l government f o r what they saw as t h e i r
waters.
August
share
of
Ganges
of
the
Indian
house
p a r l i a m e n t ) , Rao, the m i n i s t e r f o r i r r i g a t i o n and power, made
a
statement c o n f i r m i n g that the l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of Bangladesh
would
be kept
i n view, and that no arrangement of the o p e r a t i o n
of the Barrage would a f f e c t that
The
what
country.
c h i e f m i n i s t e r of West Bengal returned from D e l h i
the
press
with
r e p o r t e d as an "agreement" on the o p e r a t i o n of
the Farakka Barrage.
According
to t h i s
-the feeder c a n a l of the barrage
December, 1973;
"agreement":
would be completed by
. - f o r f i v e years a f t e r . that
40,000 cusecs
c o u l d be
diverted
down the Hooghly and, f o r the f o l l o w i n g two
years, the d i v e r s i o n s would be v a r i e d e x p e r i m e n t a l l y ;
-at the end of seven years there would be a
During
1972, the World Bank was m a i n t a i n i n g
r i v e r development schemes i n Bangladesh.
a well-known c o n s u l t a n t t o , among other
a
review.
close
52
watch
on
The Bank a l s o employed
things:
•evaluate
the water
supply
picture
(of the GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna basins)
and
to
examine
the
possibility
of m a i n t a i n i n g or even augmenting the low
flows of the r i v e r s . . .
(and) t o examine the need and
possibilities
for international
c o o p e r a t i o n between
the c o u n t r i e s s i t u a t e d i n the r i v e r b a s i n s .
5 3
74
The
c o n s u l t a n t recommended that c o n s i d e r a t i o n be
establishment
under
United
Nations
Brahmaputra-Meghna
Coordinating
countries—India,
Bangladesh,
auspices,
Committee,
Nepal,
Sikkim,
Whatever r o l e the World Bank may have played,
intervention
again
in
the
dispute.
i n December, 1972.
The
with
given
to the
of
Ganges-
a
five
and
member
Bhutan. "
5
i t made no
public
The J o i n t R i v e r s Commission met
press
were
informed
that
the
Commission had:
decided
to c o n s i d e r
a framework f o r p r e p a r a t i o n of
long term plans f o r the development
of major
basins
common to I n d i a and Bangladesh.
The
Commission
a l s o recommended a programme f o r
j o i n t survey of the River Ganges from Farakka
up to
the
Gorai
off-take
to enable
the p l a n n i n g of
development works of mutual
interest...
Two groups
have been
s e t up f o r the study of c e r t a i n r i v e r s i n
Bangladesh and I n d i a , on p o s s i b i l i t i e s
of augmenting
water d i s c h a r g e s i n these r i v e r s .
The Commission a l s o
received
b a s i c data
on works executed
or under
execution i n the Ganges-Meghna-Brahmaputra r i v e r basin
and
decided
that
this
should
be
supplemented
further.
5 5
This
and
r e l e a s e i n d i c a t e s that the q u e s t i o n of the Farakka
its
effects
Commission.
were
However,
56
matter was given a high
In
1973,
several
being
discussed
i t i s not
in
clear
the
Joint
Barrage
divers
whether or not t h i s
priority.
more
meetings
of
the J o i n t
Rivers
Commission were h e l d but l i t t l e was p u b l i s h e d about the s u b j e c t s
they
discussed.
In J u l y of the same year, Khandakar Moshtaque
Ahmed l e d a Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n to New D e l h i .
Indian
team
l e d by
external a f f a i r s .
Sardar
Swaran
I t met with
an
Singh, Indian m i n i s t e r of
The Indian team a l s o c o n s i s t e d of
two
other
75
ministers:
minister
D.P.
Dhar,
minister
f o r i r r i g a t i o n and
for planning;
power.
of t a l k s over the Farakka Barrage
pleasant
realising
friendly bilateral
r e l a t i o n s , the
K.L.
Rao,
T h i s unannounced "upgrading"
issue
by
India
s u r p r i s e to the Bangladesh government.
s i d e s were slowly
and
that
even
in
an
57
came
as
a
However, both
atmosphere
issue c o u l d prove d i f f i c u l t
of
to
resolve.
The
meeting r e a f f i r m e d
that a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on
Ganges waters would be taken when the two
The
press
release
issued a f t e r
e f f e c t s the Ganges d i v e r s i o n s
sharing
prime m i n i s t e r s
the t a l k s belaboured the
might
have
on
of
met.
58
possible
flooding
inside
Bangladesh:
The d i s c u s s i o n s d e a l t mainly with the commissioning of
the
Farakka
Feeder
Canal
and
i t s impact
on
Bangladesh... the Farakka p r o j e c t
might
increase
the
flood
intensity
in Bangladesh by
reducing n a t u r a l
s p i l l discharges in the B h a g i r a t h i .
This
point
was
discussed
and
the Indian s i d e assured the Bangladesh
side that the feeder c a n a l and
the
Jangipur
Barrage
will
be so operated that the B h a g i r a t h i w i l l continue
to r e c e i v e during the monsoon p e r i o d as much water
as
before,
or
more i f p o s s i b l e .
It was accepted by the
government of India that the Farakka
Barrage
Project
will
not increase the f l o o d i n t e n s i t y of the Padma i n
Bangladesh.
There was d i s c u s s i o n about
the
Farakka
Barrage
Project
and
i t s impact
on
both c o u n t r i e s .
It was
agreed
that
the
two
sides
would meet again
and
continue
the d i s c u s s i o n s with a view to a r r i v i n g at a
s o l u t i o n to the problem. The two s i d e s f u r t h e r agreed
that a mutually acceptable s o l u t i o n w i l l be a r r i v e d at
before o p e r a t i n g the b a r r a g e .
5 9
This l a s t
sentence, though i t provided
was
first
the
government that
definite
and
i t would not a c t
public
no b a s i s f o r a
solution,
commitment by the
unilaterally.
Indian
76
The
e a r l y months of
pressing
issues
a l s o r e l a t i n g to the
was
Bangladesh's
and
also
subcontinent.
attempt
to
acceptance
Republic of China was
against
were
taken
up
by
get
at
The
most prominent
recognition
the
Islamic
entry
i n the United
in
Summit.
successfully wielding
Bangladesh's
the
the
The
threat
Nations.
alliance
with
which
t r i a l s of
195
prisoners
to
of the
Indian
February
prevent
1971
war
Indo-Pakistan W a r .
foreign minister
1974
at
the
Swaran
invitation
m i n i s t e r , Dr.
Kamal Hossein.
at the end
their
of
crime
There was
meeting.
Farakka Barrage i s given
The
United
People's
of
veto
Pakistan
high-level
60
Singh
of
issue
Presumably,
mainland China's p o s i t i o n r e f l e c t e d an
wanted
other
mainly concerning the government of Bangladesh
but
Nations
1974
came
the
to
Dhaka
in
Bangladesh f o r e i g n
a long
portion
joint
communique
relevant
to
the
below:
Both
sides
a v a i l e d of the o p p o r t u n i t y to d i s c u s s the
use of the water resources of the
two
countries
for
the
common b e n e f i t
of the peoples of Bangladesh and
India.
They agreed that to meet
this objective
the
Joint
Rivers
Commission should c o n t i n u e , as a matter
of p r i o r i t y , i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the
development
of
the
water
resources of the r e g i o n .
The two Foreign
Ministers
also
discussed
the
question
of
the
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the waters of the Ganges between India
and
Bangladesh and the need f o r an e a r l y d e c i s i o n on
the matter. They were c o n f i d e n t that t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n
on t h i s s u b j e c t had advanced t h e i r common approach f o r
an e a r l y s o l u t i o n to t h i s
issue.
Both the
Foreign
Ministers
agreed
that a mutually a c c e p t a b l e s o l u t i o n
will
be
a r r i v e d at
before
operating
the
Farakka
Barrage P r o j e c t .
6 1
Whether
doubtful.
this
The
could
be
called
progress
agreement that a "mutually
toward a s o l u t i o n i s
acceptable"
solution
77
must
precede
operation
of
the Barrage had
almost i d e n t i c a l wording, in Swaran Singh's
with
Khandakar
meeting of the
progress.
Moshtaque Ahmed.
two
There
foreign
was
an
first
earlier
That i t was
ministers
can
indication,
hardly
however,
Rivers
Farakka
in i t s d i s c u s s i o n s .
priority
discussion
r e i t e r a t e d at
communique, that the J o i n t
question
emerged with
Commission
be
called
in t h i s
was
that a formula
Farakka Barrage was
In
March
guesses
1974,
and
f o r t h i s t r a n s f e r and we
as to the probable
Flood
ones.
acreage,
create
a
Americans and
A below average
make
educated
rice
harvest
of
on
its
was
known
to
be
t r a n s f e r was
favoured
by
both
Commerce and F o r e i g n Trade to a t t r a c t
feet.
in
The
thus put
other probable
The
new
the
to head
outside
country
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r Ahmed's
more s i n i s t e r and had a d i r e c t
toward the Farakka Barrage.
the
to
Khandakar
the Arabs, would be the a p p r o p r i a t e person
Ministry
was
entire
r a t e a l l helped
in f o r e i g n exchange r e s e r v e s .
c a p i t a l to redress t h i s imbalance and
back
only
an unprecedented i n c r e a s e i n the r a t e of
huge d e f i c i t
Moshtaque Ahmed, who
the
economy of Bangladesh
p o p u l a t i o n growth and a s t a g g e r i n g i n f l a t i o n
the
to
There are a number of
can
The
Control
1973-74 season as a r e s u l t of massive f l o o d i n g of the
rice-growing
the
Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed was t r a n s f e r r e d
t a k i n g a t u r n f o r the worse.
the
a
operational.
of Foreign Trade in Bangladesh.
explanations
was
would be worked out before
from the M i n i s t r y of Water, Power,
Ministry
the
t h i s point
in the d i s p u t e , the only p o s i t i v e s i g n toward a s o l u t i o n
mutual reassurance
joint
giving
Till
the
b e a r i n g on h i s views
correspondent
of
the
Hindu
78
could
the
not
resist
irrigation
ministries
simultaneously.
deep, in a
l i n k i n g K.L.
K.L.
stance
Moshtaque had
question."
of
Rao,
based
India
on
old
also
noted
giving
Dhaka
to
adopted.
proved
62
a
As
to
new
approach
be
too
to be
transfer
of
important
ministers
to
And
Khandakar
that
rise
the
to
transfer
of
speculation
in
the Farakka question
to
the
other
vital
might
Farakka
tough p r o p o s i t i o n at
prime
sharing
be
issue
i n t e r e s t s of both
portfolios.
a r e a l i s a t i o n by n e g o t i a t o r s
both s i d e s that agreement on
two
himself
r e s o l v e d by mere "upgrading" of t a l k s or by
s u r e l y , there was
The
known to d i g
l a t e r events were to i n d i c a t e , the
countries
very
almost
a h a r d - l i n e r on the Farakka
Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed was
that
Bangladesh
arguments."
of being
reporter
Ahmed's removal from
and
he wrote, "was
a "reputation
The
Rao's and
Gradually
and
the
but
leaders
on
of Ganges waters would be a
best.
ministers
finally
met
in May
1974
i n the
immediate wake of the Simla T r i p a r t i t e Conference between I n d i a ,
Pakistan,
and
Bangladesh.
A l o t of outstanding
were s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s o l v e d .
was
16,
6 3
The
the Farakka Barrage i s s u e .
1974
exception
In the
to
bilateral
these
issues
successes
j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n of
they agreed that there would not
be
enough
water
meet the needs of both c o u n t r i e s :
The two Prime M i n i s t e r s took note of the f a c t that the
Farakka
Barrage P r o j e c t would be commissioned before
the end of 1974.
They
recognised
that
during
the
period
of
minimum
flow,
there
might not be enough
water to meet the needs of C a l c u t t a Port and the
full
requirements of
Bangladesh and, t h e r e f o r e , the f a i r
weather flow of the Ganga i n the
lean
months would
have to be augmented to meet the requirements of both
countries.
I t was agreed that the problem
should
be
May
to
79
approached with understanding so that the i n t e r e s t s of
both
c o u n t r i e s are
r e c o n c i l e d and the d i f f i c u l t i e s
removed i n a s p i r i t of f r i e n d s h i p and c o o p e r a t i o n . I t
was a c c o r d i n g l y decided that the best
means of
such
augmentation
through optimum u t i l i s a t i o n of the water
resources of the region a v a i l a b l e to the two c o u n t r i e s
should be s t u d i e d by the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission.
The
Commission should
make s u i t a b l e
recommendations
to
meet the requirements of both the c o u n t r i e s .
It
was
recognised that i t would take some years
to give
effect
to the
recommendations
of
the
Commission as accepted by the two Governments. In the
meantime, the two s i d e s expressed t h e i r determination
that before the Farakka P r o j e c t i s commissioned
they
would a r r i v e
at a mutually a c c e p t a b l e a l l o c a t i o n of
the water a v a i l a b l e during the p e r i o d of minimum
flow
in the Ganga. *
6
The
importance of the prime m i n i s t e r s ' meeting l i e s
f a c t that i t gave the
Joint
discuss
of the flow of the Ganges.
no
augmentation
Rivers
Commission
forum or method of n e g o t i a t i o n was
of
the
more
urgent
l a i d down
q u e s t i o n of how
a
mandate
for
settlement
to share the e x i s t i n g
N e g o t i a t i o n s on t h i s s h a r i n g
took
1975
Serneabat,
in
February
Bangladesh prime
brother-in-law
and
the
Power, and J a g j i v a n Ram,
Agriculture
and
They met
again
w i t h i n two
reached.
Under
66
Mujibur
dry
finally
D e l h i , between Abdur
Sheikh
Rab
Rahman's
Bangladesh M i n i s t e r f o r Water and
I n d i a ' s newly
appointed
Minister
However, they made l i t t l e
for
progress
6 5
in A p r i l
s i d e s . and,
minister
new
Irrigation.
in t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s .
i n New
to
Unfortunately
season flow of the r i v e r .
place
i n the
this
1975.
days, an
There was
optimism
i n t e r i m "understanding"
agreement,
India
could
on
had been
divert
q u a n t i t i e s of water f o r f o r t y days beginning the 20th of
both
small
April.
80
India
would
receive
a f r a c t i o n of the water i t had o r i g i n a l l y
demanded but the agreement c o n s t i t u t e d
an
important
precedent
inasmuch as Bangladesh conceded that India c o u l d begin
of
the
Barrage.
agreement.
However, too much should
not be made of t h i s
The understanding s e t t l e d n e i t h e r of the outstanding
p r i n c i p a l questions
and
operation
augmentation
of the c o n f l i c t : d i s c u s s i o n s on both
were
to
continue.
The
sharing
government-owned
Bangladesh Observer noted:
The
agreement
will
not d i s t u r b the d i s c u s s i o n s
regarding the a l l o c a t i o n of f a i r weather flows of the
Ganges during
the lean
months as envisaged i n the
Prime M i n i s t e r s ' d e c l a r a t i o n of May 1 974.
67
The
agreement was only
operation
of
an
interim
one
allowing
J o i n t teams were to observe
the e f f e c t s of the d i v e r s i o n s a t Farakka, on the
and
experimental
Hooghly
River
i n s i d e Bangladesh.
Though t h i s understanding c o n s t i t u t e d a step forward,
were
criticisms
on
both
s i d e s of the border.
The absence of
Serneabat, the Bangladesh m i n i s t e r , from the o f f i c i a l
the
Farakka
Barrage
Bangladesh's
quoted
as
misgivings.
describing
"driblets...in
Nevertheless,
canal
was
interpreted
as
an
there
opening of
expression
of
Moreover, a West Bengal m i n i s t e r was
India's
quantities
that
share
do
not
of
serve
the
water
our p u r p o s e . "
water s t a r t e d f l o w i n g down the newly b u i l t
i n t o the B h a g i r a t h i and j o i n t o b s e r v a t i o n
observe the e f f e c t s of these d i v e r s i o n s .
as
68
feeder
teams s e t out to
81
E.
THE
QUESTION OF AUGMENTATION
While
the
two
ministers
a l l o c a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g
discussing
methods
Commission met
standstill
of
were
negotiating
increasing
that
December.
The
flow.
on the
two
teams
"the
Joint
agreed
conclusions
6 9
should be augmented by the c o n s t r u c t i o n of storage
water
becomes
concept, a r g u i n g
Brahmaputra
Chapter
7 0
year
the
The
two
15,
1975,
Ganges
o«f
Mujib
was
diverting
Farakka and
1976.
are
Mujib was
a
opposed
more
discussed
killed
this
"realistic"
in
detail
in a coup d ' e t a t .
i n Bangladesh.
I t was
i n Bangladesh to take over the r e i n s
eliminated.
Amidst
i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of the the new
reasons
team
in
The
Mujib's r u l e had a l i e n a t e d the Awami League from
for the m i l i t a r y
on
was
proposals
the m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n
once
Indian
year
IV.
On August
last
The
in the
that a c a n a l to t r a n s f e r s u r p l u s water from the
into
alternative.
scarce.
Ganges
r e s e r v o i r s on
r i v e r ' s Himalayan t r i b u t a r i e s f o r r e l e a s e l a t e r
when
two
Rivers
Bangladesh proposed that the dry season flow of the
the
the
were advocating
c o u l d not, t h e r e f o r e , come to any
subject."
Although
was
i t s d i s c u s s i o n s came to a
d i f f e r e n t methods of augmenting the flow and
Commission
interim
flow, the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission
monthly from June 1974,
by
an
Ganges
continued
undetermined,
water
all
this
born country,
at
the
rate
did
of
chaos
power
i n the
the Indians
went
of 40,000 cusecs at
to do so f o r the remainder of
Bangladesh
q u i t e easy
1975.
71
For
not p r o t e s t u n t i l e a r l y
82
Just before the outbreak of
renewed,
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the two s i d e s met
vociferous
i n New
issue.
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Bangladesh's new
Gandhi,
the
officials
Indian
but
at
foreign
the
end
u n i n f o r m a t i v e statement was
Bangladesh
protest
note
secretary
of
the
released.
started
7 2
a
D e l h i to d i s c u s s the
p r e s i d e n t met
and
visit
other
Mrs.
relevant
only a s t r a i n e d
On January
year
dispute,
15,
of p u b l i c
1976
of
73
"surprised
The Indian government responded saying that
and pained" at such propaganda,
i t had been agreed at the p r e v i o u s
s i d e s would
refrain
from " h o s t i l e
month's
it
particularly
meeting
that
7
February and March, the Bangladesh government p r o t e s t e d
withdrawals
the maximum
mark
Indian
to the new
allowed
border.
regime
Ganges'
flow
During
imminent,
of Ganges waters were c o n t i n u i n g at or near
by
Simultaneously Bangladesh was
the
both
propaganda." "
t h i s time, with the low dry season
Indian
was
because
f r e q u e n t l y , i n s e v e r a l forums and by a v a r i e t y of media.
all
the
the forty-day understanding c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the
agreement.
In
a
dispute.
Bangladesh a l l e g e d that Indian withdrawals at Farakka a f t e r
end
and
the
Farakka
suffering
Barrage
Project.
from armed a t t a c k s along
Awami Leaguers and other- elements,
opposed
in Bangladesh, were making i n t e r m i t t e n t
i n t o the c o u n t r y .
raids
7 5
Before n e g o t i a t i o n on the Farakka i s s u e c o u l d resume, there
were
some
p r e c o n d i t i o n s set by both India and Bangladesh
had to be met.
could
start
Bangladesh's
only
position
was
that
which
negotiations
when the Indian withdrawals s t o p p e d .
76
India
wanted to meet only i f the t a l k s were c o n f i n e d to the s h a r i n g of
83
water during
made
some
dispute.
the p e r i o d March 15 to May 1 5 .
positive
suggestions,
Bangladesh
commissions
proposed
even
the
Both
7 7
at
the
creation
for
height
of
talks,
India
announced
a
also
of the
international
f o r the Ganges and Brahmaputra r i v e r s
the end of March, a f t e r Bangladesh had r e l a x e d
sides
and, toward
7 8
its
precondition
concession.
Mrs.
Gandhi
r e p o r t e d l y t o l d the Bangladesh High Commissioner i n New D e l h i :
India i s t a k i n g steps to keep up the downstream
at
the March
15th l e v e l during the r e s t of the
season to the extent p o s s i b l e on the b a s i s
of
availability
of waters.
I t i s now Bangladesh's
to chose i t s response i n a h e l p f u l manner t o pave
way f o r r e s t o r a t i o n of mutual c o n f i d e n c e .
flow
lean
the
turn
the
7 9
At
the
same
time
I n d i a had made —
effects
of
Mrs.
Gandhi t o l d Bangladesh that the o f f e r
f o r the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission to
withdrawals
on
Bangladesh
Bangladesh accepted
the o f f e r and t a l k s
month
These
in
topic.
Dhaka.
They
were
were
--
study
remained
resumed
the
the
open.
following
t e c h n i c a l t a l k s on a r e s t r i c t e d
reminiscent
of
the
1960-1971
period
of
n e g o t i a t i o n s between India and P a k i s t a n .
India again
its
any agreement c o u l d be
former
negotiated,
The
p o s i t i o n , saying that before
t e c h n i c a l problems had t o be s o r t e d
t a l k s occurred
subcontinental
the t a l k s
shooting
rounds
were
of
Bangladesh,
Neither
announced,
on
discussions,
up
i n a p e r i o d when r e l a t i o n s
neighbours were at a low ebb.
incidents
the
out.
India
had
the b o r d e r .
and
Hooghly
side issued d e t a i l s
8 1
protested
between
the
before
against
two
The o f f i c i a l s met f o r two
through
River
the
what
8 0
A few days
travelled
of
reasserted
to
they
southwestern
Farakka Barrage.
had
achieved,
but
84
within
a
few
days of the r e t u r n of the Bangladesh team, B.M.
Abbas was quoted as saying that Indian f i g u r e s
f o r withdrawals
from the Ganges d i d not t a l l y with Bangladesh's
measurements.
In
April
1976,
the
first
Indian withdrawals at Farakka was
Bangladesh.
of
to
against
emerge
within
political
importance
leader
c a l l e d upon the g e n e r a l
i n Bangladesh to o r g a n i s e a p r o t e s t march to condemn
Indian
action
Farakka.
the
beginning
protest
Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhasani, a peasant
considerable
public
consolidated
unilateral
withdrawal
of
talks.
Ganges waters at
Estimates
of
the
size
of
the march range
of thousands to h a l f a m i l l i o n p e o p l e .
peaceful
with
Maulana
Bhasani
at
the
head.
8 4
unpleasant
Farakka
incidents.
The
8 5
importance
of
now
rallied
this
were
march
country
made
it a
was
with the Bangladesh government.
Indian f e e l i n g c o u l d be aroused i n Bangladesh
that
no
of the
T h i s i n c i d e n t a l s o i n d i c a t e d to the Indian government that
in
was
The p r o c e s s i o n
People i n Bangladesh who had only been aware
Barrage
from
The march
stopped s i x m i l e s short of the Indian border and there
symbolic.
the
The t h r e a t was c a r r i e d out ten days a f t e r the end of
8 3
hundreds
of
82
point
to
i f the
publicize
anti-
government
the
issue
domestically.
Soon a f t e r t h i s i n c i d e n t , I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y ,
Mehta,
led a
p u b l i c clamour
months.
86
At
announced that
Nations.
"goodwill"
over
the
the
m i s s i o n to Dhaka i n mid-June and the
dispute
beginning
of
died
August,
i t had decided to take i t s
One f i n a l
Jagat
down
f o r almost
however,
case
to
two
Bangladesh
the U n i t e d
round of t a l k s was h e l d before the i s s u e was
85
raised
in
the
United
Nations.
Rear
Admiral
Bangladesh l e d a d e l e g a t i o n to New D e l h i but
reached.
on
no
four
different
points:
within
the
Bangladesh
Ganges
difference
of
was
Basin;
Bangladesh's r i g h t to veto upstream
t a l k s regarding
India
favour
of
d i d not accept
withdrawals;
there
was
a
augmentation.
include
Nepal
87
PROCEEDINGS AT THE UNITED NATIONS
the
first
half
position
Nations,
two.
had
advocated by Dhaka.
d i s p u t e of t h i s
i n t e r n a t i o n a l support during
of 1976 had not been p a r t i c u l a r l y
only B e i j i n g and Islamabad
nature
wholehearetedly
The f i r s t
could
be
brought
was to i n c l u d e the World
over
successful--
supported
augmentation.
up
in
the
United
i t s o p t i o n s down to
Bank
in
any
further
T h i s o p t i o n was suggested to
Bangladesh government by one of i t s diplomats on
the United N a t i o n s .
the
Among the v a r i o u s ways i n which a
the Bangladesh government narrowed
negotiations
to
was
opinion as to the l e n g t h of the dry season; and,
Bangladesh's attempt t o muster
the
agreement
in
India r e j e c t e d o u t r i g h t any proposal which would
F.
Khan of
The disagreement between India and Bangladesh c e n t r e d
augmentation
in
M.H.
secondment
He proposed t h a t :
at
an a p p r o p r i a t e stage of n e g o t i a t i o n s (Bangladesh)
may agree to d i s c u s s the Indian p r o p o s a l
for a link
canal
between the Brahmaputra and the Ganges provided
that
India
agrees to a World
Bank r o l e
i n the
realisation
of a p r o j e c t i n v o l v i n g
Ganges-Brahmaputra
basin development.
8 8
The second o p t i o n was to b r i n g the whole i s s u e up i n the
Nations
General
Assembly.
United
The Bangladesh government chose the
86
l a t t e r course.
In p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h i s ,
first
Bangladesh
then I n d i a p u b l i s h e d pamphlets s e t t i n g out t h e i r
In
order to r a i s e t h e i r grievance
diplomats
had
proceedings
in the
to n e g o t i a t e
of the General
agenda
maneuvered
finally,
a
of
into
the
a
Assembly;
committee
resolution
through
to
for
the
with
be
the
8 9
s u c c e s s f u l l y , Bangladesh
the
Assembly: an item had
that committee had
favourable
course
cases.
and
item
preparatory
to be
then
included
had
to
a p p r o p r i a t e concerns;
persuaded
to
consideration
be
and,
recommend
of
the
a
General
Assembly.
In the f i r s t
of
the
dispute
India pressed
Committee
was
procedural
Committee,
India
but the item was
accepted.
than by the P o l i t i c a l
the
in
item was
line
referred
with
to
only
preparatory
representatives
were
able
to
case
which had
India
Political
The
first
skirmishes.
two
India's
their
losses
Rear
Admiral
M.H.
Khan
to the S p e c i a l P o l i t i c a l
p u b l i c proceedings
delay
ceased
while
intermediaries,
resolution
Again
recoup
f o r e i g n s e c r e t a r y , Jagat Mehta, r e p l i e d .
through
Economic
Special
9 0
stage,
in
the
put
the
which f o l l o w e d .
A f t e r a postponement,
embarrassing
At the next
Bangladesh's w i s h e s .
were
Bangladesh
consideration
Committee.
the
stages, however,
backstage war
opposed
f o r the q u e s t i o n to be c o n s i d e r e d by the
rather
defeated;
stage
was
been
and
At
that
behind
with
India's
stage,
the
there followed what amounted to an
both p a r t i e s l o b b i e d and
withdrawn and
evolved
Committee and
the
scenes.
The
negotiated,
Bangladesh
r e p l a c e d by a consensus statement
the
assistance
of
an
ad
hoc
87
mediation
aligned
Syria.
committee,
countries:
There
9 1
c o n s i s t i n g of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of f i v e nonAlgeria,
i s no doubt
Egypt,
Guyana,
S r i Lanka,
that the consensus
and
r e s o l u t i o n was a
way of saving f a c e .
Most of the membership of the General Assembly
to express t h e i r concerns f o r Bangladesh's
was
quite
another
concern i n t o v o t e s .
that
India,
as
matter
when
plight.
i t came
In the backstage war,
were w i l l i n g
However, i t
to t r a n s l a t i n g
Bangladesh
countries
a l l expressed
their
u n w i l l i n g to take s i d e s i n the Assembly.
One f a c t o r
the major powers were themselves, at home, upper
India.
While
sympathies,
the course taken by Bangladesh was i t s assessment
like
realised
one of the champions of the non-aligned cause,
had a l o t of support from a l l over the t h i r d world.
aligned
this
non-
they were
influencing
that
many
riparian
of
states
9 2
As an attempt, to m o b i l i z e support, or t o o b t a i n t h i r d p a r t y
intervention,
successful.
Bangladesh's
action
in
the
Bangladesh d i d achieve p u b l i c i t y
the consensus
U.N.
f o r i t s case,
r e s o l u t i o n which the General Assembly
c o n t a i n one c o n c e s s i o n to Bangladesh's
was not very
and
endorsed d i d
objective:
It
i s open to e i t h e r p a r t y to report to the General
Assembly at i t s t h i r t y - s e c o n d s e s s i o n on the progress
achieved i n the settlement of the p r o b l e m .
93
The
next
chapter w i l l analyse the n e g o t i a t i o n s l e a d i n g up
to the f i v e - y e a r agreement reached between India and
Bangladesh
for s h a r i n g the dry season flow of the Ganges i n November 1977.
88
NOTES
1.
The
Ganges Kobadak P r o j e c t i s a c a n a l i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t
drawing water from the Ganges at Bheramara, in Kushtia d i s t r i c t .
The p r o j e c t was
s t a r t e d under
the
United
Nations
Technical
Assistance
Programme
in 1951, and the P a k i s t a n government gave
i t s approval i n 1954.
The p r o j e c t has been bogged down both
by
technical
difficulties
and
by
the
inappropriateness
for
agriculture.
Irrigation
only
s t a r t e d i n the
late
1960s.
However, u n l i k e some other p r o j e c t s which seemed to have been
h u r r i e d through
in order
to e s t a b l i s h
Pakistan's
right
to
historic
usage of
the
water,
the Ganges-Kobadak p r o j e c t was
sanctioned p r i o r to the approval of the
Farakka
Barrage.
Its
construction
was
started f i r s t
and
i t s t a r t e d consuming the
Ganges waters before the Farakka d i v e r s i o n .
2.
Ben Crow, The P o l i t i c s and Technology of Sharing the Ganges.
Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation,
Edinburgh U n i v e r s i t y ,
1980,
p.94; Helmut R.
Kulz, "Further Water Disputes between India and
Pakistan,"
in The I n t e r n a t i o n a l and Comparative Law Q u a r t e r l y ,
Vol.
18, (July 1969): 718-739.
3.
Government of
Bangladesh.
Dispute, September 1976,
p.12.
White Paper on the Ganges Water
4.
The
Indian
m i n i s t e r of
irrigation
and
power made the
f o l l o w i n g statement to the Indian Lok Sabha:
"...Government of India have agreed to a meeting of
experts
of
India
and
Pakistan
for a
limited
purpose
of d i s c u s s i n g
p r o c e d u r a l . d e t a i l s and arrangement f o r exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n . "
Lok Sabha Debates, August 25 1959, "Indo-Pakistan
Gangetic B a s i n , " S2, 3_3, C o l . 4324.
5.
The
Hindu, August 6 1960,
6.
Helmut Kulz, op.
7.
Ibid.
talks
on
the
"Talks on E a s t e r n R i v e r s . "
c i t . , p.722.
8.
For
neutral perspectives
see Ben Crow, op.
c i t . ; also
Helmut K u l z , op.
c i t . For Indian views see Jayanta Kumar
Ray,
"The
Farakka
Agreement,"
in I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , V o l .
17,
1978, pp.
235-246; f o r Pakistan/Bangladesh
views see,
for
example, S.M.
Burke, P a k i s t a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y : A H i s t o r i c a l
A n a l y s i s (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press,
197 3),
pp.381 -383.
With the
exception of most of the Indian w r i t e r s , both n e u t r a l
observers
and
w r i t e r s from
Pakistan/Bangladesh
are
of
the
opinion
that while
the
barrage
was being c o n s t r u c t e d , India
d e l i b e r a t e l y put o f f meaningful n e g o t i a t i o n s .
9.
Lok
Sabha Debates,
S i t u a t i o n , " 32, 56, C o l s .
August
16
2405-2560.
1961,
"International
89
10.
Ibid.
See a l s o Kulz, op.
c i t . , p.723.
11.
Ibid.
12.
I b i d . , pp.723-724.
13.
I b i d . , p.724.
14.
Dawn, K a r a c h i , December 15 1967.
15.
Ibid.
16.
K u l z , op.
c i t . , p.724.
17.
Dawn, K a r a c h i ,
July
suggestions on Farakka."
16
1968,
"India r e j e c t s Kosygin's
18.
Only on a very few occasions has India accepted any course
other
than
bilateral
n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the settlement of
disputes.
The U.N. mediated i n the Kashmir d i s p u t e i n 1949 but
reached an impasse. The World Bank provided
c o n c i l i a t i o n and
mediation
f o r the Indus d i s p u t e , and some broader d i s p u t e s were
s e t t l e d by an a r b i t r a l t r i b u n a l i n 1948.
19.
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that the 1977 Treaty with
signed a f t e r M o r a r j i Desai became prime m i n i s t e r
leader
of the Janata c o a l i t i o n which defeated
Congress Party at the p o l l s e a r l i e r i n the same
20.
Ben Crow, op.
Bangladesh was
of India as the
I n d i r a Gandhi's
year.
c i t . , p.117.
21.
David G. LeMarquand, I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s : The P o l i t i c s of
Cooperation,
(Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre,
1977).
p.10.
22.
The t e c h n i c a l s t u d i e s were c a r r i e d out by T i b b e t t , Abbot,
McCarthy,
Scratton
of the United
States
and
Associated
C o n s u l t a n t s and Engineers of K a r a c h i , P a k i s t a n .
23.
Lok Sabha Debates, March
31 1969, " C o n s t r u c t i o n of a
barrage a c r o s s River Padma by P a k i s t a n , " S4, 2_6, C o l . 46.
24.
Dawn, K a r a c h i , June 11, 15, and 21, 1969, "The t r u t h
Ganges waters."
25.
Government
p. 1 3.
26.
Ibid.
27.
I b i d . , p.14.
of
Bangladesh.
"White Paper..."
about
op. c i t . ,
28.
Water I n v e s t i g a t i o n s D i r e c t o r a t e , EPWAPDA, Dhaka. See a l s o
Dawn, June 2 1971, "East wing's water needs f o r eastern
rivers
90
established,"
published.
in
which
an
aide-memoire
sent
to
India
is
29.
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y .
Center
for
Population
Studies,
Bangladesh: Land, Water and Power S t u d i e s , F i n a l Report,
June
1972, p.1.
30.
Revelle
had been a s s o c i a t e d
with
President
Kennedy's
technological
approach
to the s o l u t i o n of a l l manner of
problems.
See
E.B.
Skolnikoff,
Science, Technology, and
American F o r e i g n P o l i c y , (Cambridge: Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e of
Technology Press, 1967), pp.156-157.
31.
Roger R e v e l l e
and V.
Lakshminarayana,
Machine," i n Science, May 9 1975, pp.611-616.
32.
Ben Crow, op.
"The
c i t . , p.121.
33.
The Barrage
i t s e l f was complete but the 26.4 mile
c a n a l was not f i n i s h e d u n t i l December 1973.
34.
Kulz, op.
Ganges
feeder
c i t . , p.724.
35.
There were outstanding d i s p u t e s between India and P a k i s t a n
in
areas
of Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch, bordering the
Rajasthan Desert.
36.
See Appendix D.
of the United Nations
f o r Consensus Statement put on the
General Assembly.
agenda
37.
Dawn, K a r a c h i ,
July
16 1968, "India r e j e c t s Kosygin's
suggestions on Farakka."
Pakistan's
foreign minister
at the
time Arshad Hussein
had s e v e r a l t a l k s with Roger R e v e l l e and
a l s o the p r e s i d e n t of the World Bank
regarding
a multilateral
approach t o Farakka.
38.
The Awami League, under the l e a d e r s h i p of Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman won 167 out of 169 seats
i n the N a t i o n a l
Assembly i n
Pakistan
from East P a k i s t a n i n December 1970. Since the Awami
League wanted t o c a p i t a l i z e on the Farakka i s s u e , i t i s u n l i k e l y
that t h e i r views would have r e f l e c t e d
the a c t u a l s t a t e of
affairs.
As i t turned
out, t h e i r own a t t i t u d e toward I n d i a
regarding the Farakka Barrage was as strong
as the P a k i s t a n
government's had been a f t e r Bangladesh was c r e a t e d .
39.
I n d i a . M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Bangladesh Documents,
"Awami League M a n i f e s t o , " p.81, undated, New D e l h i .
40.
Kulz, op.
c i t . , pp.734-735.
41.
As e a r l y as February
1972, the prime m i n i s t e r s of
Bangladesh and India met and decided
to c r e a t e
the IndoBangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission to look i n t o the problem of
sharing the water resources of the r e g i o n . See Appendix
A for
91
the
Statute
of the J o i n t
Rivers
Commission
for a detailed
d e s c r i p t i o n of i t s f u n c t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .
42.
Jayanta
Kumar
Ray,
"The
Farakka
Agreement,"
in
International Studies, V o l .
17,
1978,
pp.235-246.
In t h i s
a r t i c l e P r o f e s s o r Ray launches a s c a t h i n g a t t a c k on
the Janata
Government's
policy
of t r y i n g
to b e f r i e n d
Bangladesh by
s a c r i f i c i n g the needs
of C a l c u t t a
and West
Bengal.
Indira
Gandhi had always been a g a i n s t the 1977 Agreement.
43.
B.M.
Abbas was
the a l t e r n a t e leader i n the f i r s t f i v e
e x p e r t s ' meetings h e l d between India and
Pakistan.
After
the
independence
of Bangladesh, Abbas became Advisor to the Prime
M i n i s t e r on f l o o d c o n t r o l , i r r i g a t i o n , and power, and,
i n that
capacity
was Bangladesh's c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r on the Farakka i s s u e
with I n d i a . He
was
also
the f i r s t
chairman
of the IndoBangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission.
44.
The Hindu, January 23 1972, " J o i n t Indo-Bangla steps f o r
f l o o d c o n t r o l mooted." Subsequent a r t i c l e s i n January 24 and 29
i ssues.
45. S a t i s h Kumar (ed.) Documents on India's F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1972
, ( D e l h i : Macmillan, 1975).
Joint
Statement
on
the
talks
between the prime m i n i s t e r s on February 8, 1972.
46.
Treaty of F r i e n d s h i p , C o - o p e r a t i o n and Peace between the
People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of I n d i a ,
of
March 19 1972, A r t i c l e 6.
47.
S a t i s h Kumar, op. c i t .
48.
Appendix
A.
49.
Appendix
A.
50.
S a t i s h Kumar, op.
c i t . Press note of June 26
1972.
51.
Hindustan Times, May
5
1972,
"Eastern H o r i z o n s ; " a l s o ,
Keesinqs Contemporary A r c h i v e s , A p r i l 9-15 1972, p.25822, "IndoBangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission."
52. The Times of I n d i a , August 2 and 15,
1972,
not
h i t Bangla's i n t e r e s t s :
Dr.
Rao,"
and
M i n i s t e r happy."
"Farakka
will
"Bengal Chief
53. M.
Maasland, Water Development P o t e n t i a l s of the GangesBrahmaputra- Meghna River B a s i n s , World
Bank S p e c i a l
Project
Department, Washington, August 30 1972, (with r e v i s i o n s February
12 1973), p.1.
54.
Ibid.,
p.20.
55.
S a t i s h Kumar, op.
c i t . Press r e l e a s e of December 13
1972.
92
56.
Taking the i s s u e s in order:
"Major r i v e r b a s i n s " could apply
to
the
Brahmaputra,
to
the
Ganges, or, s t r e t c h i n g the "major" somewhat, to the Teesta.
The
scarcity
of
dry season water i s much l e s s on the Brahmaputra.
The l i k e l i h o o d i s that the press r e l e a s e i s p r i m a r i l y
referring
to the River Ganges.
"Development
works of mutual
i n t e r e s t " in the s t r e t c h of the
Ganges r e f e r r e d to could be (1) the
Farakka
Barrage,
(2)
the
Ganges-Kobadak P r o j e c t , or (3) the proposed Ganges Barrage.
57.
The
58.
to
The
PMs."
Times of I n d i a , J u l y 13 and
Times of I n d i a ,
J u l y 19
14,
1973.
1973.
"Farakka d e c i s i o n l e f t
59.
S a t i s h Kumar (ed.) Documents of India's Foreign P o l i c y
, ( D e l h i : Macmillan, 1 9 7 6 7 ^
Press r e l e a s e of J u l y 18 1973.
1973
60.
During the independence s t r u g g l e i n Bangladesh
from March
25
to December
16,
1971
the
Chinese government had always
supported the p o s i t i o n of the c e n t r a l government i n Islamabad.
To
some people i n Bangladesh t h i s was a cop-rout and others were
perplexed because Mao's philosophy
is full
of
revolutionary
struggles.
In
the matter
of P a k i s t a n versus Bangladesh, the
government in B e i j i n g was always c l e a r .
In
fact
the
Chinese
recognition
of
Bangladesh came only
after
Mujib had
been
assassinated.
A l s o the h o s t i l i t y between China
and
India i s
well
known.
As
long
as
a
s u i t a b l y a n t i - I n d i a n government
p r e v a i l s i n Dhaka, token Chinese support can be counted on.
61.
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, February
1974,
Vol.
XX,
"Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t Communique," of February 15 1974.
62.
The Hindu, March 23 1974, "Indo-Bangla stand on
(by R.
Krishna Moorty from Dhaka).
p.34,
Farakka."
63.
The May meeting i n 1974 between Mrs.
Gandhi and
Sheikh
Mujibur
Rahman
i s reported
to have been very s u c c e s s f u l . A
number of b i l a t e r a l
i s s u e s were r e s o l v e d and
new
areas
of
cooperation
agreed
upon.
The f o l l o w i n g i s a complete l i s t of
t h i n g s d i s c u s s e d and t h e i r r e s u l t :
i ) many small boundary d i s p u t e s were s e t t l e d ;
i i ) c l o s e r trade cooperation was agreed upon;
i i i ) both c o u n t r i e s pledged to i n c r e a s e exports to meet balanced
trade t a r g e t s set at e a r l i e r t a l k s ;
iv) establishment of four j o i n t i n d u s t r i e s , t a k i n g raw m a t e r i a l s
from one country to labour
and
machinery
in the
other,
was
agreed upon;
v)
i t was agreed that a j o i n t survey would be c a r r i e d out f o r a
r a i l l i n k to connect C a l c u t t a with A g a r t a l a (a d i s t r i c t of India
l y i n g to the east of Bangladesh); and
v i ) p r o t o c o l s were signed making new Indian c r e d i t s a v a i l a b l e to
Bangladesh.
93
64. Foreign A f f a i r s Record, May
1974,
"Indo-Bangladesh
Joint
D e c l a r a t i o n " of May 16 1974, p.55; a l s o , The Hindu, May 17 1974,
" I n d i a , Bangladesh sign p o l i t i c a l , economic, p a c t s . "
65.
61 .
Lok
Sabha
Debates, March 24 1975, S5, V o l .
66. The Hindu, A p r i l
waters problem."
17 1975,
"Short-term
67.
Bangladesh Observer, A p r i l
44,000 cusecs i n lean p e r i o d . "
19 1975,
L, 25, C o l .
solution
to
Ganga
"Bangladesh w i l l get
68. Marcus Franda, "Indo-Bangladesh R e l a t i o n s ,
" i n American
U n i v e r s i t i e s F i e l d s t a f f Reports, South A s i a S e r i e s , V o l . XIX,
16, September 1975, p.10.
69. Government of
p. 1 6.
70.
Bangladesh.
"White
Paper..."
op. c i t . ,
I b i d . , pp.14-16.
71.
In a statement
printed
i n The Hindu, February
"Ganga waters: India r e f u t e s Bangla c l a i m , " an
Indian
of
external
a f f a i r s spokesman wrote: " I t i s no s e c r e t
one that the Farakka Barrage has
been
operating
at
optimum c a p a c i t y 40,000 cusecs s i n c e June 1975."
19 1976,
ministry
from any
near or
72. The Statement only i n d i c a t e d that the Indian government was
alarmed about Bangladesh's treatment of Hindus i n Bangladesh and
that
Bangladesh had complained of g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s from w i t h i n
India.
Foreign A f f a i r s Record, December 1975,
"Indo-Bangladesh
J o i n t Statement" of December 8 1975, pp.319-333.
73.
Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s ,
"Bangladesh: the Farakka Dispute."
October
15
1976,
74. Foreign A f f a i r s Record, January 1976,
"Official
Statement
on a n t i - I n d i a n
propaganda i n the Bangladesh p r e s s , " January 10
1976, p.1.
75.
Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh's c h i e f m a r t i a l law
administrator
t o l d a Swedish newspaper t h a t :
"The Indians have sent s e v e r a l thousand men a c r o s s the border i n
the
north.
They
are Bangladesh c i t i z e n s but are equipped and
supported by the Indian army."
See Crow, op.
c i t . , p.402.
76. Bangladesh Observer, March
15
1976,
"Talks
meaningless
unless India stops withdrawal of Ganges water u n i l a t e r a l l y . "
77. Xinhua News Agency, March 16 1976,
t a l k s on Ganges waters r e j e c t e d . "
"Indian
precondition for
94
78.
The Hindu, March 19 1976,
for t a l k s on Farakka."
79. The Hindu, March 30 1976,
with the envoy."
"Bangla r a i s e s extraneous
"PM
stresses
issues
Indo-Bangla
amity
80.
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, A p r i l 1976, " O f f i c i a l statement of
Indo-Bangladesh t a l k s on Ganga waters."
of A p r i l 26 1976.
81.
Ibid.
82.
Bangladesh Observer, May 12 1976,
t a l l y with a c t u a l o b s e r v a t i o n s . "
"Indian
figures
do
not
83.
Bangladesh Observer, A p r i l 19 1976, "Bhasani p l a n s s i l e n t
March to Farakka;" see, a l s o , Dawn, A p r i l 20 1976, Bhasani plans
p e a c e f u l march on Farakka."
84. Dawn, May 17 1976,
border;" see, a l s o , New
" F i v e l a k h people s t a r t trek
York Times, May 17 1976.
to
Indian
85.
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record,
May
1976, " O f f i c i a l Statement of
a n t i - I n d i a n propaganda over
Farakka;"
see, a l s o ,
Far E a s t e r n
Economic Reiview, May 28 1976, "Bhasani's march f o r s u r v i v a l . "
86.
"Bangladesh: the Farakka d i s p u t e . "
October
15
1976,
87.
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record,
September
1976,
"Official
Statements on a n t i - I n d i a n propaganda on Farakka," of September 4
an 10; see, a l s o Bangladesh Observer, September 12 1976, "Absurd
Indian ideas thwart Farakka i s s u e . "
88.
Syed
Anwarul Karim,
I n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the Ganges
Water Issue with S p e c i a l Reference to the U n i t e d Nations on
a
paper submitted i n June 1976, p.39.
89.
Government
of -«India.
M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , The
Farakka Barrage, s e v e r a l e d i t i o n s , undated, New D e l h i
(probably
first
published
in
late
September
1976);
Government of
Bangladesh.
Ministry
of F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ,
White Paper on the
Ganges Water D i s p u t e , September 1976.
90.
U n i t e d Nations Document
(Summary Record) A/BUR/31/SR.1,
pp.7-10 and 13-14, records t h i s d i s c u s s i o n .
91. F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, November 1976,
statement on Farakka i s s u e , " pp.
321-328.
"Foreign S e c r e t a r y ' s
92.
T h i s account i s based on i n t e r v i e w s conducted by
Ben
Crow
with Bangladesh diplomats i n New York and with a d e l e g a t e to the
Special
Political
Committee who was present when the item was
raised.
See Crow op.
c i t . , p.
407.
95
93.
See
consensus
statement
i n Appendix
D.
96
IV.
The
of
the
THE 1977 BREAKTHROUGH AND ITS AFTERMATH
d i s c u s s i o n of the Farakka i s s u e i n the General Assembly
United
negotiation
Nations
between
India
formula f o r a quick
Bangladesh
who
neither
and
that
Although
their
there
of
progress was a c h i e v e d .
of the issue had been
this
was achieved
the
process
First,
1
were
government's
c a l l e d , almost e i g h t years a f t e r the f a c t
sort
the
Bangladesh
i n some measure.
Second,
issue i n the U.N.
of
India
the
fact
i t seems
just
that
government's
More s t a t e s became aware of
taken by
the
express
between
India
not be made of Bangladesh's U.N.
the same p e r i o d ,
underwent
several
the
important
Indian
Bangladesh
e f f e c t on the outcome of the Farakka
indicates
However,
strategy
domestic
changes
wishes
T h i r d , the
and
that the Bangladesh move had p a i d some d i v i d e n d s .
during
the
that Bangladesh brought up the
must have embarrassed the l a t t e r c o u n t r y .
should
some
intention,
one year a f t e r the issue was r a i s e d i n the U.N.
much
in
i f internationalization
General Assembly a g a i n s t
f a c t that the t r e a t y was signed
many
b l u f f had been
the Farakka Barrage issue and the r e s p e c t i v e stand
disputants.
of
Bangladesh nor o f f e r e d any new
solution.
felt
hastened
too
because
political
scene
which undoubtedly had an
question.
At the end of 1976, Emergency Rule i n India came to an end.
In the general
e l e c t i o n s of March 1977,
head
Janata
of
the
coalition
overwhelming m a j o r i t y .
political
change should
While the
was
Morarji
voted
into
importance
not be o v e r r a t e d ,
note that w i t h i n nine months of the
2
Janata
Desai
of
at the
power
the
by an
domestic
i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to
Party's
coming
to
97
power
in
New
Ganges was
Delhi,
a
t r e a t y over s h a r i n g . t h e waters of the
signed between I n d i a and
Bangladesh.
T h i s chapter examines the process by which the 1977
emerged,
discusses
some
Treaty
of the l i m i t a t i o n s of the t r e a t y ,
and
records the progress of d i s c u s s i o n s about i n c r e a s i n g the Ganges'
dry
season
flow.
government's
i t was
It
"softer"
played
argued
that
stand on Farakka
by no means the
Bangladesh
is
only
or
the
a very c r u c i a l
while
time
on
most
willing
certain
that
to reach agreement was
important
reason.
r o l e i n a r r i v i n g at the terms
the Indian government.
used once i t became
Janata
helped reach agreement,
of the t r e a t y by p u t t i n g the r i g h t amount
right
the
the
of
pressure
at
the
The approach Bangladesh
Janata
government
that of "maximizing
was
b e n e f i t s and
minimizing c o s t s . "
In the 1977
principle
Farakka
the
dry
The
last
that
Treaty both
there
Barrage
was
and
agreed
in
not enough water f l o w i n g through
the
i n the dry season.
season
Both p a r t i e s concluded
of
chapter
the dry season
deals
PRELUDE TO THE
with
but
no
progress
was
headed by V i c e Admiral M.H.
and,
problem
of
analyses
GANGES WATERS TREATY
made.
d i f f e r e n c e from previous meetings,
Bangladesh
that
I n d i a on t h i s q u e s t i o n .
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of I n d i a and Bangladesh
1976
the
flow of the Ganges and
the stands taken by Bangladesh and
A.
Bangladesh
flow of the Ganges would have to be augmented.
s e c t i o n of t h i s
augmentation
India
on
the
There
however.
Khan who
was
met
was
in
December,
one
important
This
meeting
was
then the navy c h i e f of
Indian s i d e J a g j i v a n Ram,
India's
new
98
agriculture minister
substantive
issues
important p o l i t i c a l
of
many
in
again
off
not
these
and
says
two
on the
that
diversion
the
leaders
Reports
important
India
of
was
i n New
more
meeting ended, the
than
Indian
15,000
however, e l a b o r a t e d
the
hopes
This
the
was
meeting
being
broken
discussion
sharing.
One
was
report
"more than h a l f " the
willing
cusecs.
3
to
accept
that
dry
India's
A f t e r the New
government announced
ended without agreement.
the
in s i g h t .
before
that
Bangladesh
not
raised
because
Delhi
i s s u e of water
Bangladesh was
the
adjourned, resumed, adjourned
indicate
offered
Although
same, the meeting between
for some time yet
then resumed again
season flow but
had
still
delegation.
leaders of both c o u n t r i e s
to be
altogether.
focussed
were
their
Bangladesh that a s o l u t i o n was
unfortunately
between
headed
Delhi
the
talks
A Bangladesh government spokesman,
on the deadlock in the
f o l l o w i n g words:
The
negotiations
were not
successful
because
the
Indian s i d e f a i l e d to recognise
the
urgency
of
the
situation
and
the
serious
adverse
effects
on
Bangladesh of the
continuous withdrawals of
Ganges
water at Farakka, e s p e c i a l l y with the onset of the dry
season s i n c e November."
The
details
Eastern
was
of
the
t a l k s , described
a month l a t e r
Economic Review, r e v e a l that the
snubbed
for
Indian
domestic
Bangladesh
political
i n the
delegation
reasons.
scheduled meetings were unceremoniously c a n c e l l e d to the
of M.H.
Khan who
was
l e a d i n g the Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n .
the Bangladesh team l e f t
head of I n d i a ' s
called
on
policy
Admiral
f o r home, however, J a g j i v a n Ram
planning
Khan
to t e l l
division,
him
G.
Far
Two
chagrin
Before
and
the
Parthasarathy,
" o f f the r e c o r d " that
the
99
Indian
and
government c o u l d not i n i t i a t e any new move
could
not
consider
any
proposal
presented
on
i t s own,
by Bangladesh
because, "such a move would have s e r i o u s adverse e f f e c t s on the
Congress
Party's e l e c t i o n chances, e s p e c i a l l y i n West B e n g a l . "
Cancellation
of
scheduled
meetings
with
the
5
Bangladesh
d e l e g a t i o n may a l s o have been I n d i a ' s way of showing d i s p l e a s u r e
with
Bangladesh's move i n the United
if
India
was
telling
its
would
Nations.
I t was almost as
subordinate
neighbour
that
not h e l p Banglasdesh's cause i n any
way.
Although n e g o t i a t i o n s were broken o f f and
of
an immediate settlement
breakdown
of
negotiations
the
possibility
seemed remote, n e i t h e r side used the
to
generate
propaganda.
The
Bangladesh government knew f u l l w e l l that to blame the breakdown
of
talks
on
the
Indians
l i m i t a t i o n s of the U.N.
part,
were
content
would draw domestic a t t e n t i o n to the
resolution.
6
The
Indians
for
their
to keep a low p r o f i l e s i n c e the s t a t u s quo
s u i t e d t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s .
During the e a r l y months of 1977, P r e s i d e n t
Bangladesh
and
Iran.
to
gain
paid
support
of
M.H.
s t a t e v i s i t s to the People's Republic
During these v i s i t s ,
international
Farakka i s s u e .
support
from Chinese l e a d e r s
Khan's
the
the Bangladesh
president
f o r h i s country's
visit
two
i n January
1977.
7
tried
stand on the
nations
would
commitment,
be
able
of
A f t e r the f a i l u r e
to New D e l h i , Z i a v i s i t e d
making any
of
of China
He was s u c c e s s f u l i n e x t r a c t i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s
Shah t a c t f u l l y avoided
hoped
Ziaur Rahman
Iran but the
saying
to
that
settle
he
their
100
differences.
8
Bangladesh c o u l d
international
months of
support
1977.
for
therefore
its
stand
In the words of Ben
muster
only
limited
on Farakka in the e a r l y
Crow:
Bangladesh c o u l d muster the
support
of
only
a
few
friendly
nations.
Amongst
the
more powerful, only
China was
willing
to make p u b l i c
declarations
of
support
and,
since
China and I n d i a and not r e s o l v e d
the d i f f e r e n c e s which had caused the
1962
war,
that
support
could
not be r e a d i l y converted i n t o pressure
on the Government of I n d i a .
9
Bangladesh's p o s i t i o n in the n e g o t i a t i o n s
propitious
turn
at
this point.
In March 1977,
f a c t i o n of the Congress Party was
defeated
Janata c o a l i t i o n headed by M o r a r j i D e s a i .
New
Delhi
was
pledged to a p o l i c y of
a s i m i l a r p o l i c y , any
manifestation
noticeably
in
India's
Mrs.
new
1975.
sought
tangible
11
neighbourliness"
were made
on
The
of good-neighbourliness
relations
right
both
Ram,
a
dramatic
following
report
Indian
there
from
its
and,
was
occasion
actual negotiations,
its
with
policy
inception.
within
10
weeks
was
Bangladesh
Rahman
in
hand,
had
of
"good-
Some concessions
of
the
Indian
were resumed once more.
who
m i n i s t e r , headed the
was
from
sides
election, negotiations
Jagjivan
from
the
a l s o been committed to
Janata government, on the other
results
by
government in
e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Sheikh Mujibur
August,
Gandhi's
at the p o l l s
The
a
"good-neighbourliness."
Although I n d i r a ' s Congress government had
absent
seemed to take
now
the Janata government's defence
delegation
to Dhaka
in
April.
It
by most accounts but when i t came to
was
more drama than
the Far Eastern
agreement.
Economic Review
The
records
101
the events immediately a f t e r the meeting of A p r i l
15,
1977:
In a rare
i f not unprecendented
outburst of
rage
India's
Babuji J a g j i v a n
Ram
shouted
at pressmen,
w a i t i n g at the s t a t e
guest
house here
( i n Dhaka),
"Take
i t from me, nothing has been s e t t l e d . . . "
And
h a l f an hour l a t e r at the a i r p o r t , while Khan and
Ram
remained
behind c l o s e d doors i n the VIP lounge, Jagat
Mehta ( I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n
s e c r e t a r y ) read out a
onesentence
statement
to newsmen: "An understanding has
been reached the d e t a i l s of which are to be worked out
at a meeting of the o f f i c i a l s of the two
governments
to be h e l d i n D e l h i as soon as p o s s i b l e . "
1 2
When Mehta was
should
asked to e l a b o r a t e , however, he r e p l i e d that they
not ask him any more q u e s t i o n s i n the " i n t e r e s t of
Bangladesh
friendship."
Indo-
1 3
It seems that some sort of agreement was
reached,
however,
and that India had made a c o n c e s s i o n on the q u a n t i t y of water
be
given
Bangladesh
to
in the d r i e s t ten-day p e r i o d of the y e a r .
Although the d e t a i l s of t h i s
"understanding"
authoritatively
they
published,
can
be
have
never
tentatively
been
pieced
together from what d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s t o l d the newspapers at
the
t ime.
In
concede
might
January,
the
Indian
had
been w i l l i n g to
in
the
driest
be reduced to 25,000-27,000 cusecs.
One
that the withdrawals at Farakka
c o v e r i n g the A p r i l
round
figure
cusecs,
of
20,500
d r i e s t p e r i o d , was
the
delegation
quantity
of
discussions
suggested
1
in
is
the
case,
then
report
that
the
to be withdrawn by India d u r i n g the
the
treaty
signed
November, i t seems probable that t h i s report
that
newspaper
agreed upon by both s i d e s . "
specified
periods
the
Indian
was
Since
the
this
following
correct.
d e l e g a t i o n had
is
If
conceded
1 02
between 4,500 to 7,000 cusecs, w h i l s t Bangladesh had
only
500
to 3,500 c u s e c s .
The
other
Earlier,
made by India
India had
May,
Treaty,
was
a
five-month
dry
In
p e r i o d of s h a r i n g ,
i s s u e s , however, remained
c a l l e d understanding of A p r i l .
was
the
division
The
the
wanted
November
from January to
problem
unresolved
in
most important
five-month
the
so-
issue i n t h i s
of water between the two
throughout the remainder of the
term
season.
the
agreed upon.
Certain
category
the
by them as
from mid-March to mid-May, whereas Bangladesh had
a seven-month, November to May,
1977
involves
i n s i s t e d on a lean
season, the p e r i o d of lowest Ganges flow d e f i n e d
period
away
1 5
important concession
l e n g t h of the dry p e r i o d .
given
period.
countries
The
long-
of augmentation of the Ganges' flow a l s o remained
unresolved.
The
meetings
question
of
between
India
i n New
help
to
B.M.
Delhi.
plan
the
but
of
the
in
i n t o a deadlock.
was
Ganges.
reached
16
Jagat Mehta of
third-party
The
It
is
at
a later meeting.
meeting between
because
Jagat
agreement
Mehta
would
technical
quite
to i n c r e a s i n g
deadlock
was
finally
17
One
and
have
dry
would
be
B.M.
Abbas
the
season
by
s t a t e s that the
prejudiced
views
broken
report
was
The
possible
because of c o n t r a d i c t o r y
agreement i n p r i n c i p l e that both c o u n t r i e s ' p r o p o s a l s
studied
subsequent
India r e j e c t e d t h i s p r o p o s a l .
presented by both p a r t i e s with regard
flow
raised
Bangladesh proposed
ran
impasse
was
Abbas of Bangladesh and
projects
meeting t h e r e f o r e
that
augmentation
first
postponed
forthcoming
103
legislative
assembly e l e c t i o n s i n West B e n g a l .
There are r e p o r t s that Bangladesh was
promise
from
the
negotiations
Bangladesh
with
government
attacks.
In
June
India
had
1977,
from bases i n
over
the
Farakka
in
the
issue
tied
to
meet
in
London
the
across
the
Zia
and
informally.
agreed to "see that no s h e l t e r was
from
extract
guerrilla
India.
issue,
of
Prime
to
Minister
criminal
elements
period
was
promised
released
acceptable
to
territory.
be
prevent
India had now
and,
second,
the
further g u e r r i l l a
two
the q u a n t i t y
Indian
government
a t t a c k s i n t o Bangladesh
its
own
Farakka,
i n any f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n the
Jagat Mehta and B.M.
meeting
decided
to
put
p r o p o s a l regarding the long-term augmentation
Republic of China and Nepal should a l s o be
the
however,
Abbas met
differences
a c c o r d i n g to the o f f i c i a l
accounts,
made
Bangladesh, viewing India's c o n c e s s i o n s as a sign of
q u e s t i o n , s u g g e s t i n g that
this
restored
to Bangladesh during the five-month
w i l l i n g n e s s to reach a s o l u t i o n over
forward
under
20
c o n c e s s i o n s from Bangladesh's p o i n t of view: f i r s t ,
to
the
At t h i s meeting Desai
given
in n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka i s s u e .
water
In
guerrilla
From t h i s p o i n t onward, a degree of c o n f i d e n c e was
of
1 9
border, whatever might have taken p l a c e
previous regime."
a
the Commonwealth Conference once again
p r o v i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r P r e s i d e n t
Desai
t r y i n g to
Indian government not to encourage
o p e r a t i o n s i n t o Bangladesh t e r r i t o r y
its
1 8
were
less
2 1
i n Dhaka i n August.
between
statement,
included.
People's
the
"narrowed
sanguine.
two
During
sides
down."
22
Bangladesh
were,
Other
was
1 04
apparently
sticking
programmes
were
to
its
not
a
that
f a c t that consensus
had
been reached on a l l aspects of the Farakka i s s u e , there
were
that
the
settlement.
J a g j i v a n Ram
Despite
2 3
Indian
during
the
the
bilateral,
government
visited
Merchant Chamber of Commerce that
Bangladesh
for
development
for
indications
matter
long-term
but
quadrilateral discussion.
not
case
West
was
preparing
Bengal
" i t would not
monsoons and
leave
and
for a
told
the
be
f a i r to f l o o d
i t dry
in the summer
months when i t too needs water." " West Bengal l e a d e r s were
not
convinced
the
2
and
lobbied
the
Central
maximum d i v e r s i o n at Farakka, but
was
was
government, demanding
to no
apparent
effect.
It
2 5
c l e a r from J a g j i v a n Ram's statement that Desai's government
ready to
put
its
policy
of
"good-neighbourliness"
into
operation.
Talks
when B.M.
was
between
India
and
Bangladesh resumed i n September
Abbas l e d a Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n
to New
It
at , t h i s stage that the Bangladesh government, e n v i s a g i n g
treaty
from
i n the
India.
f u t u r e , decided
to
extract
that
agreement
rebutted
the
had
been reached.
t h i s statement,
understanding.
26
By
saying
and
that
it
B.M.
was
Abbas,
only
a
said
sharply
verbal
mid-month the t a l k s reached a snag because
on
f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n s over the
long-term q u e s t i o n
of
benefit
Bangladesh, however,
of Bangladesh's i n s i s t e n c e
India,
maximum
a
E a r l y in September, Prime M i n i s t e r Desai r e f e r r i n g
to the A p r i l meeting between J a g j i v a n Ram
The
Delhi.
including
course would have nothing
reasons behind India's
r e f u s a l are
China
and
Nepal
in
of augmentation.
to do with t h i s
proposal.
l u c i d l y explained
in t h i s
1 05
e d i t o r i a l by G.K.
Reddy i n The
Hindu :
India
cannot
a f f o r d to
l e t Nepal
line
up
with
Bangladesh and to look to China f o r i n s p i r a t i o n . . . A n d
whatever King B i r e n d r a ' s (of Nepal) f i x a t i o n ,
India
has
to d i s p l a y a l l p o s s i b l e p a t i e n c e and
imagination
in making him r e a l i s e in h i s own way where Nepal's own
interests
lie
in
the
geopolitics
of
the
subcont i n e n t .
2 7
Toward the end
meeting
between
of the month, there were h i n t s that a summit
Zia
and
agreement c o u l d be
reached.
had
but
been achieved
of each other's
the
summit
basic
was
the
Upon
Indian
forwards
their
met,
that the
set
B.M.
2 8
As
and
and
remained was
how
during
remaining
however,
for a while
visiting
in
would
to
May,
dry
be
already
In the A p r i l
reached
on how
ten-day
understanding,
period;
b)
and
therefore
question
two
periods
had
of
that
countries
the
only
30,
t h i s p e r i o d being
the d r i e s t
five
been
much water each country would r e c e i v e during
to A p r i l
a
c) the p r i n c i p l e
studied
agreement
to
been reached on
the only unresolved
fourteen
final
acceptable
ten-day
season; and
be
and
receiving
29
not
backwards
to d i v i d e the water between the
months.
21
agreement
out.,
Z i a was
Dhaka,
f o r the leanest
f o r the time being,
period A p r i l
before
a l i n g e r i n g suspicion
i t turned
v e r b a l agreement had
January
the
an
T a l k s were h e l d up
long-term development should
aside
was
of
Abbas s h u t t l e d
Delhi
would
a) s e t t i n g the d i v i s i o n
five-month,
necessary
main d e t a i l s
south of India and
and
New
i n s t r u c t i o n s on what
Since
be
r e t u r n , the P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s Committee of
between
Bangladesh.
would
r e a l hurdle
required.
in the
cabinet
The
intentions.
not
because Desai was
Egypt.
the
Desai
the
spell.
106
The
five-month dry
period
p e r i o d s and
agreement had
India
Bangladesh
and
ten-day
was
divided
into
fifteen
not yet been reached on how
would
linear
r e c e i v e i n the remaining
distribution
eighths
of the flow or an asymmetric d i v i s i o n .
of
the
Ganges'
presumably
flow
given
Bangladesh
f o r the whole of the
p e r i o d of s h a r i n g .
An asymmetric d i v i s i o n , on the
would
an
give
India
India would r e c e i v e an
30
accepted
was
increasing
acceptable
September 30,
period
1977,
Treaty
A
3 0
five-month
hand,
flow.
From
an asymmetric d i v i s i o n which meant that
t h i s only when Desai
extended
Waters
an
a
five-
other
i n c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of the
Bangladesh's standpoint,
M.H.
fourteen
f i n a l problem seems to have been on a c h o i c e between
l i n e a r d i v i s i o n would have
an
much water
periods.
The
April
ten-day
of
proportion
alternative.
had
sharing.
3 1
In
Surjit
after
the
Bangladesh
early
initialled.
( t e x t in Appendix B) was
and
water
However, Bangladesh
agreed to meet
the agreement was
Khan of Bangladesh
of
signed
Singh
on
morning of
The
Ganges
on November 5,
Barnala,
the
by
new
Indian M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e .
B.
THE
GANGES WATERS TREATY: ITS LIMITATIONS AND
The
Ganges
Waters
fifteen articles.
describes
in
The
detail
for
increasing
part c o n t a i n i n g
the
consists
of
f i r s t part c o n s i s t i n g of
three
seven
parts
and
articles
arrangements f o r the s h a r i n g of waters of
the Ganges at Farakka.
a r t i c l e s addresses the
Treaty
IMPLICATIONS
The
second
important
dry
part
consisting
of
four
i s s u e of long-term arrangements
season flow of the Ganges.
four a r t i c l e s d e a l s with
clarification
The
of
final
the
107
terms
of
the t r e a t y and a l s o s e t s down a time l i m i t
f o r future
discussions.
While the t r e a t y i t s e l f
government,
there
i m p l i e d success f o r the
Bangladesh
were some a r t i c l e s w i t h i n the document which
e s p e c i a l l y protected i t s i n t e r e s t s .
treaty, for instance,
Article
II
(ii)
of the
states:
...Provided
further
that i f d u r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r t e n day p e r i o d , the Ganga flows at Farakka come down t o
such a l e v e l
that
the share of Bangladesh i s lower
than 80 per cent of the (agreed s h a r e ) , the r e l e a s e of
waters to Bangladesh d u r i n g that ten-day p e r i o d
shall
not f a l l below 80 per cent of the (agreed s h a r e ) .
3 2
This
was
government
the
"safeguard"
clause
requested by the Bangladesh
(and assured by the Janata government) to ensure that
continued upstream withdrawals would not d i p i n t o whatever
of the waters
government
was
was
allocated
to
Bangladesh.
The
share
Bangladesh
w e l l aware that the waters reaching the Farakka
Barrage ( i n West Bengal) where d i v i s i o n of the waters would take
place would dwindle as i r r i g a t i o n was extended i n
clause
India.
This
would guarantee Bangladesh's share d u r i n g the d r i e s t ten
days at the end of A p r i l at 27,-600 cusecs, 80 per cent, that i s ,
of 34,500 c u s e c s .
The
empowered
3 3
Indo-Bangladesh
Joint
Rivers
Commission
under A r t i c l e IX of the t r e a t y to produce schemes f o r
augmentation and propose a s o l u t i o n which would
and
feasible."
The t r e a t y
first
be
to
both
governments
three years of the t r e a t y ' s d u r a t i o n .
had any doubts
about
"economical
f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d that the JRC would
have t o submit i t s recommendations
the
(JRC) was
India's
sincerity,
Article
within
I f Bangladesh
XII,
which
108
stated
that
the
"quantum
of
water
Bangladesh at Farakka... s h a l l not
agreed to be
be
reduced,"
released
provided
to
some
measure of assurance.
At
first
glance,
the
h i s t o r i c dispute
over the
and
On
Bangladesh.
that
this
1977
t r e a t y seems to have r e s o l v e d
sharing
of Ganges waters between India
c l o s e r s c r u t i n y , however, i t
treaty
only
the e x i s t i n g flow.
solved
the
To r e s o l v e the
becomes
immediate problem of
more
complicated
augmentation, the t r e a t y only e s t a b l i s h e d n e g o t i a t i n g
and
a deadline
which
the
for d i s c u s s i o n s .
treaty
The
no
way
the most e f f i c i e n t
signalled
By
mutual
population
that
as before
to conclude a l a t e r
for
a
treaty,
during
a
and
Bangladesh
while
solution
would
long-range
agreement.
therefore,
In the words of a
an
agreement
34
cannot be
i n t e r p r e t e d as an
international river.
ideal
It
product of i t s h i s t o r i c a l circumstances, the d i s p u t e s
f o r c e d the two
c o u n t r i e s to
circumstances
d i c t a t e d that n e g o t i a t i o n
on one
the dry
aspect
enter
into
of the development of the
season flow.
of
solution,
a pactum de contrabendo or
final
in
because of the r i s i n g needs of
agreement f o r the development of an
the
India
on both s i d e s of the border.
lawyer, the t r e a t y was
The
of
procedures
to both s i d e s , i t was
both
desire
recognising
r e q u i r e hard b a r g a i n i n g
the
issue
to manage the water resources
s i g n i n g the t r e a t y
their
simultaneously
sharing
would be e f f e c t i v e a l s o i n d i c a t e s that while
acceptable
the Ganges.
clear
f i v e - y e a r time l i m i t
t h i s temporary s o l u t i o n was
way
an
an
agreement.
should
river,
Future t r e a t i e s may
which
These
concentrate
augmentation
be r e q u i r e d to
is
only
of
resolve
109
disputes a r i s i n g
C.
from other
NEGOTIATION OVER THE
aspects
of r i v e r i n e
QUESTION OF
development.
AUGMENTATION
Although n e g o t i a t i o n s s t a r t e d immediately a f t e r the
of
the
Ganges
Waters
i n t e r m i t t e n t l y and
1979,
and
most
Treaty,
little
the
progress
meetings
was
made.
signing
continued
During
only
1978
and
of the d i s c u s s i o n s between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of
Bangladesh centred
on
35
procedural
issues.
There
India
were
no
meaningful examinations of the a l t e r n a t i v e augmentation schemes.
In
several
Commission
meetings
(JRC)
of
during
the
the
Indo-Bangladesh
1978-1979
period,
Joint
no
Rivers
achievements
were announced.
In
India.
late
1977,
President
Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh v i s i t e d
During h i s v i s i t i t was
upgraded
to
government.
include
By
36
transformed
virtue
of
relevant
this
The
political
intertwined.
influence
and
decision,
upgrading
of
the
JRC
aspects
of
whatsoever
on
the
the
this
JRC's
no
be
from
each
JRC
was
recommending
with
"greater"
by mutual agreement i s an
increasing
I t i s only i r o n i c that
would
the
t e c h n i c a l commission
m i n i s t e r i a l - l e v e l commission made
predecessor.
JRC
ministers
i n d i c a t i o n that both governments recognised
and
the
from a p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l body with only
powers, to a p o l i t i c a l
powers.
the
decided.that
more
that
the
Ganges
technical
flow
"upgrading"
were
had
no
efficiency—the
new
progress
than
its
110
D.
THE INDIAN PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION
In
March
exchanged
what
augmentation
important
because
can
of
the
be
the
governments
called
dry
of the two
of I n d i a and Bangladesh
formal
season
to be f a m i l i a r with the
they
schemes
1978,
proposals
flow
of
details
for
the Ganges.
of
these
It i s
proposals
represent not only the r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l
governments
but
the
technical
the
aspects
views
of
these
have remained the cornerstone of each s i d e ' s b a r g a i n i n g
strategy.
The
Indian
proposal
is
entitled
Proposal f o r
Augmentation of the dry season flow of the Ganga.
Henceforth,
t h i s document w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as
the
Indian
Proposal
for
convenience.
The
Indian Proposal c o n t a i n s a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of how
the augmentation of the
Ganges'
Indian
involves
plan
basically
flow
can
be
effected.
The
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a barrage
a c r o s s the Brahmaputra and a c a n a l to take water from that r i v e r
to the Ganges at Farakka.
construct
the
three
Himalayas
Brahmaputra.
At a l a t e r
stage
India
intends
storage r e s e r v o i r s i n the e a s t e r n f o o t h i l l s of
to
The
supplement
whole
the
project
dry
season
flow
of
includes
five
separate
s t r u c t u r e s and the estimated cost at 1978 p r i c e s would be
six
billion
to
U.S.
dollars.
3 7
f o l l o w i n g arguments to j u s t i f y
The
Proposal
also
the
about
o f f e r s the
the Indian plan f o r augmentation:
1) Shortage i n the Ganges Basin cannot be overcome
schemes w i t h i n that b a s i n ;
by
2) a l l f e a s i b l e
reservoir
sites
w i t h i n the Ganges
cannot s t o r e enough water f o r the combined
needs of
India and Bangladesh;
Figure 3
111
3)
the
needs of
Indian
drought
areas o u t s i d e the
Ganges b a s i n must be c o n s i d e r e d , and s i n c e the Ganges
i s the nearest source of the water any plan to augment
the
Ganges flow should a l s o be able to meet the needs
of these areas;
4) there i s unused water a v a i l a b l e i n the
Brahmaputra
and
the Meghna r i v e r b a s i n s at times of the year when
shortages i n the Ganges are most acute.
The
f o l l o w i n g i s a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the Indian Proposal
and
the f u n c t i o n of each component:
The
Brahmaputra
The
Barrage
Indians propose to c o n s t r u c t a barrage
Brahmaputra at Jogighapa,
a c r o s s the River
i n Assam, about 70 m i l e s downstream of
the s t a t e ' s c a p i t a l , Gauhati.
The
be approximately
the s t r u c t u r e would be s i m i l a r to
the
1.5 miles and
one at Farakka.
The purpose of the barrage
r i v e r l e v e l so that water w i l l
The
l e n g t h of t h i s barrage
flow by g r a v i t y
would
i s to r a i s e
the
into a canal.
Canal
Indian planners p r o j e c t a 200 m i l e - l o n g
transport
the
the Farakka
water
Barrage.
Ganges-Brahmaputra
would
be
estimates, the c a n a l
which
will
to the Ganges at a p o i n t j u s t upstream of
The
Indian
canal
Proposal
should
cusecs, and a depth of 30 f e e t .
waterway
canal
nearly
would
3 8
900
have
a
suggests
that
this
capacity
of 100,000
In t h i s case the width of
feet.
occupy
3 9
According
20,000
acres
to
of
the
Indian
land
in
Bangladesh and about 44,950 a c r e s i n I n d i a .
The Dams at Dihang, S u b a n s i r i , and
The
River
south from China
Brahmaputra
to I n d i a .
is
Tipaimukh
called
the Dihang as i t turns
I t f a l l s through
a d i s t a n c e of 7,500
11 2
feet
i n 200 m i l e s .
considerable."
fill
The h y d r o e l e c t r i c p o t e n t i a l
The Indian government
0
proposes to b u i l d a rock-
dam at a s i t e 25 miles north of the Assam p l a i n .
will
be
basalt
this
foundations.
dam
power
The estimated
gross
storage
w i l l be about 26.5 m i l l i o n acre feet
generator
load
factor).
reservoir
However,
alone
the
in the midst
Indian
could
government
store
enough
capacity
(MAF).
The
estimates
north of the Assam
dam
this
town
120,000
cusecs.
that the second dam
would
by
to be b u i l t
North
be
tributary
T h i s dam
would
at a gorge 40 miles
The
reservoir
would be a b l e to s t o r e an estimated
7.5 MAF of
could
of
augment
about
the
25,000
e l e c t r i c i t y would be generated
however,
this
of which l i e s the Indian town of Along.
be a 700 f e e t high r o c k - f i l l dam
Brahmaputra
(at 60%
water t o augment the dry
j o i n the Brahmaputra on the p l a i n s of Assam.
water and
live
that
on the River S u b a n s i r i , which i s the f i r s t major
the
of
r e s e r v o i r would f l o o d an area of 137 square miles
The Indian Proposal suggests
behind
jointed
b u i l t at the dam would provide 7,500 MW
The
dam
and a h y d r o e l e c t r i c
season flow of the Brahmaputra from 60,000 to
built
The
80 feet high, 1.5 m i l e s long, r e s t i n g on hard,
storage of the r e s e r v o i r would be 17.2 MAF,
to
i s , therefore,
Lakhimpur.
dry
season
flow
cusecs.
About
1,800
by t h i s dam.
When
of
MW
the
of
operational,
the dam would f l o o d 41 square m i l e s of t e r r i t o r y and a
large v i l l a g e c a l l e d D a p a r i j o i n I n d i a would be f l o o d e d .
According to the Indian P r o p o s a l , the t h i r d
constructed
at
a
place
dam
would
be
c a l l e d Tipaimukh on the R i v e r Barak.
T h i s would be a much smaller one compared with the other two and
113
would
provide
a
live
storage
of
6
MAF
and
600
MW
of
h y d r o e l e c t r i c power.
The
Indian
Proposal
also
Bangladesh d i s t r i c t s of Dhaka and
India
could
s i t e s are
be
also
provided.
prevented."
mentioned
states
that
Sylhet
along
A
1
but
projected
north-south
crosses
district
no
detailed
Ganges-Brahmaputra
flow
in
descriptions
are
link
the River
on
this
in.the
canal
and
crosses
could
a
disrupt
of n a t u r a l drainage.
In p a r t i c u l a r , the
Teesta
northwest
at
a
of Rangpur i n Bangladesh.
Bangladesh
position
Kochar
number of p o t e n t i a l r e s e r v o i r
s e r i e s of r i v e r s i n northwestern Bangladesh
canal
with
i n the
Level-Crossings
The
the
flooding
point,
following
the
point
of
the
Anticipating objections
from
Indian
Proposal j u s t i f i e s i t s
way:
For major r i v e r s i t would be more convenient
to
level
crossings
which would permit n a v i g a t i o n
along the r i v e r s being n e g o t i a t e d . "
have
also
2
A four-way r i v e r canal
envisaged
j u n c t i o n , s i m i l a r to a road j u n c t i o n ,
f o r the Teesta c r o s s i n g and
T h i s would be a major engineering
in
the
world.
crossing could
one
regulator
Indian
also possibly
elsewhere.
p r o j e c t , p o s s i b l y the
engineers
be operated with one
at the o u t f a l l of the
believe
that
barrage across
canal."
3
is
largest
such a
the
level-
river
and
1 14
E.
THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL FOR AUGMENTATION
The Bangladesh government's
called
proposal
P r o p o s a l f o r the Augmentation
the Ganges.
henceforth
It
will
be
called
f o r convenience.
f o r augmentation
is
of the Dry Season Flow of
the
Bangladesh
Proposal
The main t h r u s t of the Bangladesh
argument r e s t s on the premise that there i s enough water i n the
Ganges basin t o meet the needs of the three c o u n t r i e s
Nepal).
The
reservoir
s i t e s of
remaining
Bangladesh
which
31 i n Nepal.
Proposal
52
are
identifies
located
a
in
total
India
details
of
the
design
o p e r a t i n g procedures, or the
Bangladesh
Proposal,
of 83
and the
T h i s document i s c o n s i d e r a b l y weaker i n
t e c h n i c a l d e t a i l compared with the Indian P r o p o s a l .
no
(including
of
the proposed r e s e r v o i r s ,
cost
however,
There
of
these
presents
are
their
reservoirs.
an
estimate
The
of the
a d d i t i o n a l dry season flow which c o u l d be generated i f a l l these
r e s e r v o i r s are b u i l t .
major
Bangladesh planners c o n c e n t r a t e on twelve
r e s e r v o i r s i n Nepal
on
the
three
main
trans-Himalayan
systems: the K a r n a l i , the Gandaki, and the Kosi r i v e r
The
included
Bangladesh
in
any
augmentation.
proposal
future
The
implies
discussions
that
on
Nepal
the
systems.
should
question
Proposal a l s o i m p l i e s that the water
be
of
stored
in the p r o j e c t e d r e s e r v o i r s i n Nepal should be a l l o c a t e d f o r the
needs of C a l c u t t a port
is
interesting
to
i n India and of western
note
that
u n t i l now, development
r e s e r v o i r s i n Nepal was a subject of
and
Nepal.
Indian
Bangladesh.
discussion
It
of these
between
India
had o f f e r e d to f i n a n c e the c o n s t r u c t i o n of
some of these r e s e r v o i r s and buy h y d r o e l e c t r i c power from Nepal.
'
j
V j
>
S
j
V
7fc^>;y H M ^ A ^ 7 V
w
.iv
yy
ii • ,1 •
f
\
.
.
.
•
>s
/
i
s
/
i /
/
•~,J
N
L K J L.
A
/
M
A
0 /
H
T
.<v. ,-
/
^'-^
/^ C\\'7\Vv y.-V
c t L
,
\^y'x i
/ A
MAP SHOWING THE BANGLADESH
,^0^^-'*"
PROPOSAL
ON AUGMENTATION OF GANGES FLOWS^
«\
U
Figure
4
0
U
1
M
S
0 1
s
- . y
'S
/ ' V
j
0
0)
115
The
of
Bangladesh proposal f u r t h e r estimates the t o t a l
flow
generated
from
a d d i t i o n a l 310,000 cusecs.
the
dry
Indian
amount
and Nepalese r e s e r v o i r s at an
T h i s c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e
during
season to meet the needs of the three c o u n t r i e s .
This
estimate c o n s t i t u t e s the crux of the Bangladesh p r o p o s a l .
F.
THE CHRONOLOGY OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER AUGMENTATION
Despite the exchange of d e t a i l e d p r o p o s a l s f o r a l t e r n a t i v e
projects
proceed
that
to
augment
the
Ganges'
flow,
beyond t h i s p r e p a r a t o r y stage.
the important
or more, are
Ganges.
n e g o t i a t i o n s d i d not
The reason
for this
was
q u e s t i o n of whether two c o u n t r i e s , or t h r e e ,
vitally
concerned
in
the
augmentation
of the
U n t i l t h i s v i t a l p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n c o u l d be r e s o l v e d ,
the chances of reaching a consensus on the t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n of
augmentation were v i r t u a l l y
consistently
argued
that
nil.
the
Ganges i s a b i l a t e r a l concern,
India.
The
Indian
government
q u e s t i o n of augmentation of the
t o be d i s c u s s e d by Bangladesh and
The view i s embodied i n the 1977 Treaty which
provision
f o r the
involvement
of
other
Bangladesh government, however, has a c t u a l l y
interests
of Nepal cannot be ignored.
makes
governments.
insisted
Nepal i s s i t u a t e d
the Ganges
and
Bangladesh's
Ganges would be c a r r i e d out mostly
For
these
reasons,
proposal
within
Bangladesh argues,
no
The
that
Ganges b a s i n , i t s r i v e r s c o n t r i b u t e most of the dry season
of
has
the
i n the
flow
f o r augmenting the
Nepalese
territory.
Nepal must be a p a r t y t o
the n e g o t i a t i o n of augmentation.
In May 1979, the t h i r d meeting of the Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t
11 6
R i v e r s Commission
the
Indian
(JRC) a f t e r the 1977 Treaty had
ministerial
T h i s s l i g h t concession
intervention.
M i n i s t e r M o r a r j i Desai
Nepal be approached.
the
signed,
s i d e conceded that the Nepalese government would be
"approached."
on
been
was made because of
prime
J u s t p r i o r to the JRC meeting Prime
had v i s i t e d Bangladesh and suggested that
However, the concession
understanding
that
i t d i d not
was made by
India
p r e j u d i c e the "basic
b i l a t e r a l c h a r a c t e r of the n e g o t i a t i o n s of the augmentation
the
flow."
The
4 4
might have i n the
Judging
the
from
Indian
status
negotiations
which the Nepalese government
was
not
This
never
ambiguous
envisaged
concession
to the Bangladesh government.
therefore,
publicly
clarified.
I n d i a ' s a c t i o n s even today, i t becomes c l e a r that
government
commission.
acceptable
exact
of
that
there
a
formal
from
trilateral
India
was not
It i s quite
natural,
was no agreement to commence surveys of
the a l t e r n a t i v e schemes f o r augmenting the dry
season
flow
of
the Ganges.
India's
i n s i s t e n c e on b i l a t e r a l i s m on the i s s u e i s c l e a r l y
i l l u s t r a t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o the response given to a t h i r d
i n t e r v e n t i o n which was made i n January
Indian p a r l i a m e n t ,
assistance
days l a t e r
1978.
In a speech to the
P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r of the United
f o r the
development
States o f f e r e d
of the region's r i v e r s .
the Prime M i n i s t e r of B r i t a i n , James Callaghan,
a similar offer
in Bangladesh.
46
party
4 5
Two
made
The i n t e r v e n t i o n s were welcomed
in Dhaka but r e b u f f e d i n New D e l h i .
Nothing more has been heard
of them s i n c e .
With
the
return
of
Mrs.
Gandhi
as
prime m i n i s t e r i n
117
January
1980,
the Indian a t t i t u d e
compromising.
notice
During Mrs.
that
the
Indian
fence-mending
concern
to the short-term
agreements
address
a
become
non-
made by the
Janata
the
focus
moved from the q u e s t i o n of augmentation back
s h a r i n g of the e x i s t i n g dry season
U.N.
conference.
o p p o r t u n i t y to meet Mrs.
augmentation.
have
In subsequent months,
7
P r e s i d e n t Ziaur Rahman v i s i t e d New
to
to
Gandhi's e l e c t i o n campaign, she gave
government should be undone."
of
seems
The
Gandhi
D e l h i in
During
to
flow.
February
this v i s i t
discuss
the
1980
he took the
question
of
f o l l o w i n g r e p o r t quoted from the Hindu i s a
good i n d i c a t i o n of the change in Indian
attitude:
The
new
government's
policy
toward
neighboring
c o u n t r i e s i s to continue to s t r i v e for a c o n s o l i d a t i o n
of
r e l a t i o n s with them i n mutual i n t e r e s t .
(But) the
Indian view i s that one-sided concessions do not
lead
to
lasting
f r i e n d s h i p , but only end up by d i s t o r t i n g
the r e l a t i o n s h i p and doing more harm in the
long
run
in
the
long
run.
So i t i s necessary to a s p i r e to a
c e r t a i n . d e g r e e of r e c i p r o c i t y to give both
sides
an
abiding
stake
in
the
p r e s e r v a t i o n of
equally
beneficial relations."
8
The
new
p o s i t i o n can be
i n t e r p r e t e d in two
q u i t e p o s s i b l e that the new
the
short-term
predecessor.
existing
dry
sharing
season
the
proposal
augmentation.
to
Bangladesh
In my
to
accept
is
to accept
negotiated
question
it
by
of
its
sharing
have been
the
o p i n i o n the l a t t e r
Indian
seems to
case.
In the March meeting of the JRC,
minister,
not w i l l i n g
flow
the
First,
flow, the Indian government may
pressure
have been the
of
Second, by b r i n g i n g up
t r y i n g to put
for
government was
ways.
Kedar
Pandey (who
the new
Indian
had p r e v i o u s l y been the
irrigation
irrigation
1 18
m i n i s t e r f o r the s t a t e of West Bengal) warned that
invoke her r i g h t
were
made
in
i n v e s t i g a t i n g augmentation p r o p o s a l s . "
i n the Lok Sabha,
say that s i n c e i t was a b i l a t e r a l agreement,
That
5 0
would
to review the Treaty i n November i f no p r o g r e s s
when he was q u e s t i o n e d l a t e r
it.
India
the
Indian
threat
However,
9
the m i n i s t e r
they would stand by
to scrap the t r e a t y was a ploy
aimed at g e t t i n g Bangladesh's acquiescence on the matter of
Inedian
proposal
for
i l l u s t r a t e d by G.K.
dry
did
season
augmentation
is
Reddy's report on the m i n i s t e r ' s
the
further
statement
in The Hindu :
The M i n i s t e r . . .
i s m i s s i n g no o p p o r t u n i t y to do some
p l a i n speaking to Bangladesh
on
the Ganga
waters
problem.
He
has been
sounding a note of warning,
presumably with the p r i o r
lknowledge
of h i s s e n i o r
Cabinet
colleagues,
that the 1977 Farakka agreement,
in i t s present form, w i l l
have to be
scrapped i f
Bangladesh
continued to drag
i t s feet
over the
question of augmentation of the flow d u r i n g
the dry
season."
51
During
most
became p o l a r i z e d .
in
any
of March and A p r i l of 1980, the Farakka i s s u e
Bangladesh i n s i s t e d on Nepal's
discussion
threatened to
over the q u e s t i o n of augmentation and
scrap
government r e l e n t e d .
is
a
reflection
Bangladesh's
participation
of
policy
the
1977
Treaty
unless
The f o l l o w i n g report
the
to
Nepal
Bangladesh
in the Times of India
Indian government's
include
the
India
in
d i s p l e a s u r e over
discussions
augmentation:
..Instead
of c o o p e r a t i n g with t h i s country (India) i n
making the agreement work i n r i g h t earnest, Bangladesh
has p e r s i s t e d i n a negative and
dilatory
attitude
which amounts, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l
purposes, to a
of
1 19
r e f u s a l to implement
some c r u c i a l
clauses
of the
agreement.
For i n s t a n c e , a commitment to formulate a
long-term plan to augment the flow of the Ganga i s as
much a part
of the agreement as the p r o v i s i o n f o r a
guaranteed minimum
supply
of the Ganga waters to
Bangladesh d u r i n g the lean months f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e
years..For i f no progress c o u l d be made i n the longterm plan w i t h i n the s p e c i f i e d time-frame, India w i l l
have no o p t i o n but to ask f o r the scrapping
of the
f i v e - y e a r formula f o r water sharing during next year's
review
of the 1977 agreement
which has a l s o been
s p e c i f i c a l l y provided f o r i n the accord i t s e l f . "
5 2
A f t e r the 17th meeting of the JRC i n New D e l h i which took
between
February
27-29,
an
official
of
the Indian
place
external
a f f a i r s m i n i s t r y i s s u e d the f o l l o w i n g statement:
Whether i t i s the i s s u e of the augmentation
of the
flow
of the Ganga or the sharing of the Teesta waters
or indeed the q u e s t i o n of the waters of any of the
common r i v e r s ,
the true meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e of
the i n t e r i m Farakka accord must not be d i s t o r t e d or
else
the
future
of
this
agreement might be
jeopardized.
5 3
The
Indian
government was attempting
to show that Bangladesh had
reneged from i t s p o s i t i o n as s i g n a t o r y to the
therefore
there
was
observe the Treaty
no
reason
anymore.
1977
f o r the Indian
The Indian
Treaty
and
government to
p o s i t i o n of not agreeing
to i n c l u d e Nepal i n d i s c u s s i o n s was defended on the grounds that
India d i d not l i k e
"a
multilateral
approach
to
a
bilateral
issue." "
5
Relations
between
India
and Bangladesh d e t e r i o r a t e d once
again d u r i n g most of 1980 and 1981. The f e e l i n g of
had
been
restored
mutual s u s p i c i o n .
that
Bangladesh
by
Desai's
trust
that
government was now r e p l a c e d by
Under these circumstances,
i t i s not
unusual
adopted an ambiguous n e g o t i a t i n g s t r a t e g y -- a
1 20
s t r a t e g y which i n v o l v e d d i s p l a y i n g a keen i n t e r e s t
long-term
solution
trilateral
and
in finding
a
yet not budging from i t s i n s i s t e n c e on
involvement.
Bangladesh's
strategy
is
described
a c c u r a t e l y by Inder Malhotra i n the Times of I n d i a :
In
a l l fairness
i t must be recognised that not only
does the Farakka i s s u e a f f e c t the l i v e s of m i l l i o n s of
people i n Bangladesh, i t i s a l s o
a highly
emotive
q u e s t i o n i n that c o u n t r y . Moreover, a l l the complexes
arising
from the c l o s e
p r o x i m i t y between India and
Bangladesh and the d i s p a r i t y i n t h e i r s i z e s come
into
play
whenever Dhaka takes up the Ganga water problem
with D e l h i .
A curiously
ambivalent
negotiating
strategy
i s the r e s u l t .
On the one hand, Bangladesh
pleads f o r magnanimity and g e n e r o s i t y from i t s bigger
neighbour: on the other i t attempts o v e r t l y and
covertly
to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e
the p u r e l y
bilateral
issue.
5 5
The
stalling
Indian government was c l e a r l y unimpressed with Dhaka's
tactics.
releases,
New
Through
Delhi
made
official
i t c l e a r that
agree to the Indian p r o p o s a l of
might
have
altogether.
attitude
to
consider
Sensing
the
the
statements
long-term
option
central
of
and
press
i f Bangladesh d i d not
augmentation,
India
s c r a p p i n g the Treaty
government's
uncompromising
toward Bangladesh, the government of the s t a t e of West
Bengal wasted no time i n i t s attempts to pledge i t s support f o r
the
Indian
position.
The
West
Bengal
assembly
unanimously
adopted two r e s o l u t i o n s r e q u e s t i n g the Union government
to modify the Indo-Bangladesh Ganga waters agreement
minimum
of 4 0 , 0 0 0
cusecs of water
part of the year and to take
i n the Hooghly
necessary
maintain and improve n a v i g a b i l i t y of that
The
18th meeting of the JRC was h e l d
to ensure a
i n the l e a n e s t
conservation
river.
to t r y
steps
to
5 6
i n New D e l h i
in April.
121
Although
Jamaluddin
Ahmed, Bangladesh's Deputy
Prime M i n i s t e r ) and leader of i t s d e l e g a t i o n to
Premier
the
(Deputy
New
Delhi
t a l k s , s a i d that the t a l k s were " f r i e n d l y , " no s o l u t i o n had
actually
conflict
reached.
that
In f a c t , the two p o s i t i o n s were i n such sharp
the two s i d e s had not been able to agree even on
the minutes of
Indian
been
the
meeting.
Inder
57
Malhotra
reflected
the
attitude:
Only
those out of touch with r e a l i t y c o u l d have been
s u r p r i s e d by
the f a i l u r e
of the l a t e s t
round of
Farakka
talks
between t h i s
country (India)
and
Bangladesh. The divergence between the approaches of
the
two
s i d e s has
been so great that to look f o r a
meeting ground between them
is like
expecting
two
p a r a l l e l l i n e s to meet.
For
once
the J o i n t R i v e r s Commission appointed under
the Farakka a c c o r d , signed by the Janata government i n
November 1977 has even dispensed with the f o r m a l i t y of
r e c o r d i n g the two s i d e s ' agreement to d i s a g r e e .
And
although another meeting of the JRC i n Dhaka has been
mooted, i t i s c l e a r that the deadlock cannot be broken
at
the t e c h n i c a l
level
at which
the
Commission
functions.
A way
out of the
impasse can only be
f o r c e d at the highest p o l i t i c a l l e v e l .
5 8
Malhotra's main point
the
i s s i g n i f i c a n t : the
JRC made i t a l l the more d i f f i c u l t
is essentially
the
time
of
of
augmentation
by
former
signing
Indian
the
to
referring
include
seems Mr.
arrangements
which
Ram
Nepal
I t was
revealed
later
defence m i n s t e r , J a g j i v a n Ram,
treaty
had
also
had a f f i r m e d that
in
to M o r a r j i Desai's
exchanged
Bangladesh c o u n t e r p a r t a " c o n f i d e n t i a l " l e t t e r .
it
of
political.
w i l l i n g n e s s to "approach" Nepal i n 1979.
that
nature
to f i n d a s o l u t i o n
The Bangladesh government had t r i e d
discussions
technical
at the
with
In t h i s
his
letter,
i n d i s c u s s i n g the long-term
to augment the Ganges' flow, the two c o u n t r i e s need
122
not
exclude N e p a l .
trying
to
treat
understanding.
The
According
5 9
this
to
letter
one
as an
report,
Bangladesh
was
i n t e g r a l part of the
1977
60
19th JRC
meeting was
held
during
July
8-11,
While
t h i s meeting a l s o f a i l e d to b r i n g about any
Indian
and
the
end
Bangladesh p o s i t i o n s , the
stated
that
"it
d i s c u s s i o n s at the JRC,
also."
The
6 1
the JRC
a l s o decided
ministers,
by
It was
the
20th
meeting
that
at
a
followed
meeting and
Mrs.
Narashima Rao
met
in
issues.
and
Dhaka
The
continue
the
other
levels
It
was
by a meeting of the
two
Rao
of August.
and
during
Gandhi
Shamsul Hague of
the
be
be
foreign
taken
and
worked
ministers
during
Ziaur
the
Rahman
, however, the 20th meeting of the JRC
foreign ministers'
s i d e s had
in
level.
The
meeting.
the b a s i c
Indian
issues
16-17
were
external a f f a i r s
the Bangladesh f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r
on August
was
This
presumably r e a l i s e d that such a
sorted
minister
Shamsul
to d i s c u s s a number of
Haque
bilateral
issue of long-term augmentation of the Ganges'
f i g u r e d prominently i n t h e i r t a l k s .
at the end
at
at
6 2
a f t e r the
both
higher
to
issued
that the 20th meeting of
D e l h i at the end
meeting would be p o i n t l e s s unless
out
agreed
f i n a l decision could
out
h e l d on August 30,
statement
necessary,
Narashima
change in the
hoped that a l l the d e t a i l s c o u l d
Delhi.
i t turned
indicates
P.V.
between
September in New
As
i n New
JRC
meeting so that the
summit,
where
that t h i s would be
Bangladesh.
out
been
Dhaka meeting a l s o decided
would be h e l d
foreign
and
had
joint
1980.
of t h e i r t a l k s s t a t e d :
The
joint
statement
flow
issued
1 23
India
and Bangladesh should c o n t i n u e t h e i r e f f o r t s t o
maintain a c l i m a t e of mutual t r u s t
and understanding
and
further
consolidate
and strengthen the f r i e n d l y
r e l a t i o n s between them.
63
Regarding Farakka, the j o i n t
inevitable
statement
contained
the
by
now
line:
Efforts
should be i n t e n s i f i e d
to f i n d
a mutually
acceptable s o l u t i o n at an e a r l y date t o the problem of
the long-term augmentation of the dry season
flow of
the Ganga at F a r a k k a . "
6
In
other
words,
r e s o l v e d as ever.
great
the Farakka i s s u e was s t i l l
as f a r from being
I t was c l e a r that both s i d e s were
exercising
r e s t r a i n t and both s i d e s were aware that n e g o t i a t i o n s had
to continue i f a s o l u t i o n was t o be reached.
The
20th
Commission
session
(JRC) was
of
the
held
in
s u r p r i s e , i t d i d not make any
issued
at
the
end
of
a
view
to
make
New
Delhi
progress.
of
the
agreement."
Ganges
but, to
The
joint
Rivers
no one's
statement
a
within
i t was
of the JRC i n Dhaka very
renewed
attempt
recommendations concerning the augmentation
flow
Joint
the New D e l h i t a l k s s t a t e d that
decided to h o l d the next meeting
"with
Indo-Bangladesh
the
time
of
limit
to
the
early
submit i t s
dry
specified
season
i n the
65
The date of the review was due i n two months on November 5,
1980.
I t was extremely u n l i k e l y that
augmentation
previous
the
agreement
over
the
q u e s t i o n could be reached i n two months where every
meeting of the JRC had f a i l e d to produce any r e s u l t s .
Meanwhile, the domestic p o l i t i c a l
s i t u a t i o n s i n both
Bangladesh
1 24
and
India
had
preoccupied
Rahman
taken
with the
was
more
from members
a
t u r n f o r the worse.
volatile
concerned
of
the
Awami
situation
Mrs.
Assam
was
and
Ziaur
about the o p p o s i t i o n he was
facing
League
in
Gandhi
because
the
economy " had
deteriorated.
The
next
round
of
talks
over the augmentation q u e s t i o n
c o u l d not be h e l d before November 5 i n Dhaka.
the nature
Indian
that
delegation
was
as p r o v i d e d
f o r by the
headed by Mr.
to
12,000
longer.
formula
cusecs and
sharing
Treaty.
Kedar Pandey who
had
received
agreed
e x i s t i n g dry season flow
to
The
reported
t h i s s i t u a t i o n c o u l d not
He a l s o s a i d that India
for
t a l k s were i n
1977
in the l a s t dry season the port of C a l c u t t a
10,000
any
of a review
The
only
continue
the
1977
i n the hope that
Bangladesh would agree to the Indian proposal of
a
through
the Ganges and
Bangladesh
Brahmaputra
Minister
Rivers.
for
territory
6 6
Kazi
Power,
had
Anwarul
Water
responded to the Indian
Bangladesh
thereby
joining
Huque,
Resources,
minister's
the
and
by
has
never
below
44,000 c u s e c s .
T r e a t y , t h e r e f o r e , achieved
nothing
augmentation
was
problem
impact, implementation,
The
to
Control,
saying
to be s a t i s f i e d with only 34,000 cusecs
three years during the lean season whereas
but
6 7
in
Bangladesh government was
for the
historic
usage
review
of the
1977
terms
of
solving
the
"considering
the
to
of the
trying
that
The
confined
and progress
canal
Bangladesh
Flood
statement
last
been
link
1977
its
agreement."
best,
68
meanwhile,
i n t e r e s t Nepal in t a k i n g a more v o c a l r o l e i n the a f f a i r s of
the region i n general and
e s p e c i a l l y , regarding j o i n t management
125
of the eastern
rivers.
President
visited
Nepal in an e f f o r t
stand
river
on
apparently
formal
in
issues.
getting
stance in the d i s p u t e ,
international
river
and
augmentation of i t s dry
as
with
suspicion.
April
13 which s t a t e d that o f f i c i a l s
by
Dhaka
consistently
bilateral
government
nothing
as
The
was
Ganges
question
was
still
should
at t h i s
in
with
between
New
Delhi
its
inclined
to
also
view
"unfriendly
should
stated
the
act."
that
1981
Muchkund
Bangladesh,
announced
Dubey,
in
Indian
Calcutta
Bangladesh meeting to d i s c u s s
i s s u e s would be h e l d s h o r t l y .
The
these
the
policy
all
be
solved
the
Indian
season flow of
the
as
the
including
broad
High
entire
both
trying
by
that
on
and
Bangladesh was
i s s u e s of mutual concern to both c o u n t r i e s .
Mr.
on
saw
By May.1981, both Bangladesh
i f the deadlock were to be broken.
of
courtship
7 1
to broaden the scope of the d i s c u s s i o n s
range
co-
Bangladesh campaign
of augmentation of the dry
not decided.
the
neighbours—that
neighbours
report
the
in the Times of India
conscious attempt to subvert
by India
an
over
include a l l
India r e a l i s e d that concessions would have to be. made
sides
formal
government
discussions
a report
same
short of an
The
was
a
problems
7 0
Nepalese
government of India looked
followed
bilaterally.
The
such
season flow
There
Bangladesh
but agreed that the Ganges was
states.
moves
The
of
a t a c t i c a l postponement of a
basin
6 3
Rahman
to secure i t s commitment to a
development
succeeded
Ziaur
a
On May
Commissioner
a
high-level
range
of
3,
to
Indo-
bilateral
7 2
meeting, however, c o u l d not
take place
f o r a long
time.
1 26
During the month of May,
low
over
the
Indo-Bangladesh r e l a t i o n s reached a new
question
of ownership of a new
i s l a n d which had
sprung up at the mouth of the Hariabhanga River i n
Bengal.
The
Talpatty
in
carried
down
island,
known
Bangladesh
was
by
as
formed
flag.
Because
the
ownership.
The
Indian government.
(India's
Upper
Narashima Rao
by
deposits
of
sediment
As soon as the i s l a n d
island
was
Answering
suggested a
questions
Indian
the
so c l o s e to the Indian
joint
idea was c a t e g o r i c a l l y
House),
of
sent a naval s h i p and r a i s e d
border, the Bangladesh government
verify
Bay
Moore i n I n d i a and South
the River Hariabhanga.
emerged, the Indian government
Indian
New
the
in
survey
to
r e j e c t e d by the
the
Rajya
Sabha
external a f f a i r s minister
Mr.
said:
India's t i t l e to New
Moore
island
is clear.
The
question
of j o i n t
survey requested by Bangladesh i s
premature and not r e l e v a n t at p r e s e n t .
7 3
The t a l k s on augmentation were once again i n t e r r u p t e d by an
unexpected event.
May
31,
1981
President
while
Ziaur Rahman
he was v i s i t i n g
7
was d e c l a r e d the new
ensuing general
Nationalist
Party
voted to power.
however,
elections
because
(BNP)
Sattar
on
of
March
had
been
November
Justice
only
25,
rule
1981,
the
country.
7 5
Although
on
ViceIn the
Bangladesh
S a t t a r was once again
for
a
few
months,
1982 Lieutenant General
Ershad, Bangladesh's army c h i e f d e c l a r e d m a r t i a l law
the
Zia's
p r e s i d e n t of Bangladesh.
under
could
assassinated
the c i t y of Chittagong i n
Bangladesh. " J u s t i c e Abdus S a t t a r , who
President
was
H.M.
throughout
Ershad made some important changes i n
1 27
the domestic
office
sphere,
issued
a
the
Chief
directive
to
Martial
the
Law
effect
Administrator's
that
Bangladesh's
f o r e i g n p o l i c y would remain unchanged.
Indo-Bangladesh
leadership.
the
After
Indian
improved
Mujib had been a s s a s s i n a t e d
Zia's
growing
ties
subcontinent
Obaidullah
d i d not
find
favour
Khan, Ershad's a d v i s o r
to an Indian
i n August 1975,
round
27-31, 1982. The
countries
in India.
Besides,
Khan
Bangladesh
who
Mr.
Kedar
press
release
Pandey,
India.
of t a l k s were h e l d
A.Z.M.
indicated
delegation
7 6
i n Dhaka during
was
l e d by
August
A.Z.M.
Union
The Indian
Minister
delegation
was
for Irrigation.
l e d by
The j o i n t
i s s u e d at the end of the t a l k s s t a t e d that the two
s i d e s "achieved
a
greater
measure
of
elements to be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n
7 7
had
i n the
had by now become M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e
f o r the m i l i t a r y government.
solution."
with
j o u r n a l i s t that the m i l i t a r y r u l e r s were anxious to
next
Obaidullah
smaller
on a g r i c u l t u r e
s o l v e the Farakka Barrage issue with
release,
Ershad's
with the Muslim world and h i s
wooing of Nepal and the other
The
under
government had viewed the Bangladesh l e a d e r s h i p
suspicion.
constant
relations
understanding
on the
f o r f i n d i n g an e q u i t a b l e
While not a great d e a l can be read
from t h i s
i t was c l e a r that the two s i d e s had decided
in t h e i r e f f o r t s t o f i n d a mutually acceptable
press
to continue
s o l u t i o n and a l s o
agreed to meet as o f t e n as necessary at a p p r o p r i a t e
levels.
128
G.
A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
Further
negotiations
Bangladesh
between
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of
Ershad
paid
his first
visit,
Mr.
P.V.
M i n i s t e r . and
Minister,
1 977.
as
a
During
official
A.R.
up
a
two-year
October
October
visit
Rao,
1982, Gen.
to I n d i a .
Indian
Shams-ud-Doha,
During h i s
External
Affairs
Bangladesh
Foreign
Memorandum of Understanding
however",
the
In e a r l y
Narashima
Mr.
drew
This,
78
and
had c l e a r e d the way f o r a formal understanding t o be
drawn up on a number of i s s u e s .
reported
India
which
was
e x t e n s i o n of the Farakka agreement of
i s essentially
visit,
Mrs.
d i s c u s s e d the 1977 agreement on
a misrepresentation.
Gandhi
Farakka
and
and
Gen.
agreed
Ershad
that
the
agreement had not proved s u i t a b l e f o r f i n d i n g a s a t i s f a c t o r y and
durable s o l u t i o n .
to be extended
the
7 9
On that b a s i s , the 1977 agreement was agreed
f o r another two years with the understanding that
Indo-Bangladesh
Joint
undertake and complete
18
months
Rivers
Commission
t e c h n i c a l and f e a s i b i l i t y
two c o u n t r i e s .
within
sharing
between
What the j o i n t press r e l e a s e d i d not say i s
that the new understanding omits the 80 per
guaranteed
studies
of the s i g n i n g of the Memorandum of Understanding to
augment the flow of water and ensure e q u i t a b l e
the
(JRC) would
Bangladesh's
cent
share d u r i n g the d r i e s t
end of A p r i l a t 27,600 c u s e c s .
8 0
clause
ten days at the
The Gandhi-Ershad
Memorandum of
Understanding has a c l a u s e which d i r e c t s the JRC " t o ensure
a f u l l and f i n a l agreement i s a r r i v e d
The Memorandum of Understanding
favours
the
interests
of
India
at."
i s an
over
which
that
8 1
understanding
those
which
of Bangladesh.
129
Without
the 80 per cent "safeguard" c l a u s e , any arrangements
divide
the
Ganges
perspective,
irrigation
waters
at Farakka a r e , from the Bangladesh
increasingly
expansion
irrelevant.
next
decade
f u n c t i o n of the 1977 Treaty —
--. . w i l l
remain
unchanged
d i f f e r e n c e : whereas the
steady
supply
of
current
but
1977
water,
or
rates
there
Treaty
so.
8 2
will
Thus
be
guaranteed
the Gandhi-Ershad
the
first
Bangladesh
not
agreement
over
augmentation
d i s c u s s i o n s have proved
by
matter
s e r i o u s l y below
that
time.
i n t r a c t a b l e we can
assume
a
promises
only
average
d u r i n g the next two dry seasons and the two c o u n t r i e s can
an
flow
one important
Memorandum
This w i l l
the flow i n the Ganges does not f a l l
of
not be enough water
that of s h a r i n g the e x i s t i n g
only a share of a dwindling supply.
if
At
i n I n d i a , there might
in Farakka d u r i n g the
to
reach
Since
that
past
future
d i s c u s s i o n s w i l l prove to be every b i t as d i f f i c u l t .
The
second
function
of
the 1977 T r e a t y was to e s t a b l i s h
procedures f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s of augmentation.
of
Understanding
significantly
which
the
negotiations
study
alternative
recommendations
will
modifies
to
the
take p l a c e .
augmentation
The new Memorandum
circumstances
The JRC was asked t o
proposals
and
make
the
result
that
no
Memorandum of Understanding,
ensure
that
its
the two governments w i t h i n three y e a r s .
was unfortunate that n e i t h e r s i d e accepted the other's
with
JRC
has
been
It
position
surveys c o u l d be conducted.
the
in
In the
directed
a f u l l and f i n a l agreement i s a r r i v e d a t . "
8 3
"to
Nepal
w i l l not be i n v o l v e d i n d i s c u s s i o n s and the nature of the c l a u s e
i n d i c a t e s that
the
economic
and
technical
aspects
will
be
130
discussed,
eschewing
the p o l i t i c a l
i m p l i c a t i o n s . " On both the
8
o b s t a c l e s which prevented progress i n the past,
Bangladesh
has
been o v e r r u l e d : the l i n k c a n a l i s to be c o n s i d e r e d , i g n o r i n g i t s
political
implications;
the
but without the involvement
The
Bangladesh
of Nepal.
Memorandum of Understanding,
continuation
of
the
1977
Treaty
h e a v i l y favours the Indian s i d e .
understanding
avoid
out, the
chance of success.
as
political
continuing p o l i t i c a l
sorted
therefore,
but
a
is
not
a
new agreement which
In terms of content,
the
new
i s as much concerned with the hydrologic-economic
a s p e c t s of r i v e r development
religiously
scheme w i l l be s t u d i e d
issues
the
solutions.
involved
understanding
previous
over
are
one,
As
not
and
long
as the
recognised
augmentation
both
and
has l i t t l e
o
131
NOTES
1.
T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y true when one c o n s i d e r s that
for
almost
twenty-six
years the two s i d e s had been n e g o t i a t i n g without any
results.
Bangladesh's b r i n g i n g the issue up
i n the
U.N.
in
September
1976,
and Desai's assuming the r e i n s of power in New
D e l h i in March 1977, occurred w i t h i n the space of a few
months,
therefore
c o m p l i c a t i n g the c o r r e l a t i o n of the two events to the
a c t u a l s i g n i n g of the t r e a t y in November, 1977.
It
is clear,
however, that b r i n g i n g up the i s s u e in the United Nations helped
the
Bangladesh government
regain
i t s confidence and play i t s
cards c a r e f u l l y i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s .
2.
Foreign p o l i c y i s s a i d to be a
rational
continuum
evolved
over
decades by
various
governments and
also
through
the
i n t e r a c t i o n of
different
government
departments.
Therefore,
although
the
thrust
of
p o l i c y might change with a change i n
government, the a c t u a l process of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n remains the
the same. I t i s q u i t e u n l i k e l y f o r governments to make a
180
degree
turn
from
an
e x i s t i n g pattern,
e s p e c i a l l y on
a
substantive issue.
3.
The Hindu, January 24
leaves."
4.
Holiday,
January 30
5.
Far Eastern
watery grave."
1977,
1977,
"No
accord
" A f t e r t a l k s what?"
Economic Review, March 4
6.
A
s i m i l a r argument
is
"What prospect f o r , t a l k s . "
7.
Dawn, January
March
19
1977,
sovereignty."
on Ganga: Bangla team
1977,
made i n H o l i d a y ,
"Talks
meet
January 23
10
1977,
"China-Bangladesh
relations,"
"Bangladesh
fully
prepared
to uphold
8.
Dawn, March 12, 1977,
"Bangladesh
issue to Shahanshah of I r a n . "
chief
explains
a
1977,
and
its
Farakka
9.
Ben Crow, The P o l i t i c s and Technology of Sharing the Ganges,
unpublished
Ph.D.
d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Edinburgh, 1980,
pp.169-170.
10.
The Janata Party manifesto, Both Bread and L i b e r t y , says:
"The Party w i l l s t r i v e to r e s o l v e
such outstanding
issues
as
remain with some of i t s neighbours and w i l l c o n s c i o u s l y promote
a good neighbour p o l i c y . "
(p.25).
11.
Ever s i n c e Mujibur Rahman was a s s a s s i n a t e d
on
August
15,
1975 the Indian government became unsure of how the new m i l i t a r y
government
i n Dhaka would react to Indian p a t e r n a l i s m .
One of
the b e t t e r known freedom
fighters,
a c e r t a i n Kader
"Tiger"
1 32
Siddiky
along
with
h i s f o l l o w e r s refused to accept the new
government and i n a b i d to put up v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n to the new
regime i n Dhaka c r o s s e d over to Indian t e r r i t o r y .
Here h i s band
of
men were given s h e l t e r and p r o t e c t i o n . O c c a s i o n a l l y , Kader
S i d d i k y and h i s troops
would enter
Bangladesh and r a i d and
plunder
the
border
areas.
The government
of Bangladesh
requested the Congress government t o put a stop to S i d d i k y ' s
activities
and hand him over
t o Banhgladesh.
The Indian
government d i d not comply.
12.
Far E a s t e r n Economic Review, May 6 1977, "As
the Ganges T a l k s . "
13.
you
were
at
Ibid.
14.
The n e g o t i a t i o n s concentrated on the flow d u r i n g the p e r i o d
April
21-30, the ten days of lowest
flow, and there was
agreement that the t o t a l flow i n t h i s p e r i o d should be taken as
55,000 cusecs, the 75% a v a i l a b i l i t y v a l u e .
The d e t a i l s of t h i s p e r i o d come from:
1) F i n a n c i a l Times, A p r i l
27 1977, "Ganges water agreement
near."
2) The Hindu, A p r i l 15 1977, " J a g j i v a n to decide
other
issues
besides Farakka."
3) The Hindu, A p r i l 20 1977, "Concessions to Bangla over Ganga
waters."
4) The Hindu, A p r i l 26 1977, "Bengal M i n i s t e r c r i t i c i s e s Farakka
accord."
15.
Ibid.
16.
Bangladesh.
Dhaka, September 1976.
White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute,
17.
The Hindu, May
11 1977, "Farakka
economic a s p e c t s , " by G.K. Reddy.
18.
t a l k s hinge on techno-
Dawn May 12 1977, "Indo-Bd t a l k s on Ganges waters
fail."
19.
The Hindu, A p r i l 15 1977, " J a g j i v a n to d i s c u s s other issues
besides Farakka;" see, a l s o , footnote #11.
20.
The Hindu, June 11 1977, " Z i a happy over
21.
The Hindu, J u l y 16 1977, "Farakka:
long term s o l u t i o n . "
22.
India's
thinking
on
a
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record, August 6 1977, "Talks on Farakka."
23.
The Hindu, August
9
headway," by G.K. Reddy.
24.
talks."
1977,
"Farakka
talks
made
little
The Hindu, August 30 1977, " I n d i a may s e t t l e f o r l e s s water
1 33
with Dhaka."
25. The Hindu, September
plea to c e n t r e . "
15 1977,
26. The Hindu, September 5 1977,
Farakka, says Bangladesh."
27.
The Hindu,
apart?"
by G.K.
September
Reddy.
16
"Farakka water: Bengal team's
"Only
1977,
28. The Hindu, September 25 1977,
by G.K.
Reddy.
a
limited
"India,
accord
on
Bangla d r i f t i n g
"Summit on Farakka P o s s i b l e ? "
29. On the morning of September 28, a f u l l
meeting
of
Zia's
Council
of A d v i s o r s was d i s c u s s i n g the f i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s to be
given t o B.M.
Abbas before he returned
to D e l h i .
They
were
interrupted
by
the news that a h i j a c k e d Japan A i r L i n e s plane
was asking p e r m i s s i o n to land in Dhaka.
See,
Sunday,
Delhi,
October
1977,
"The
coup
coupland."
In the subsequent chaos
caused by the h i j a c k , two
rebellions
were attempted,
one in
Dhaka and
the other i n Bogra. Neither succeeded and though a
few people were k i l l e d i n the attempts, s e v e r a l
hundred
people
were executed
later.
D e s p i t e a l l t h i s , the i n s t r u c t i o n s were
given to B.M.
Abbas and he got back to New
Delhi
i n time to
i n i t i a l the t r e a t y on September 30, 1977.
30. The Hindu, September 28 1977, "Farakka: Dhaka summons Abbas
for f r e s h b r i e f i n g , " a n d The Hindu, September 30 1977, "Agreement
of Farakka," by G.K.
Reddy.
31.
Ibid.
32.
Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on Sharing of Ganga Waters at
Farakka , A r t i c l e l I ( i i ) , See Appendix B.
33. Ben Crow, " A p p r o p r i a t i n g the Brahmaputra,"
P o l i t i c a l Weekly, December 25 1982, p.2097.
34. Hassan,
717.
35.
36.
P.M."
i n Harvard I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law
Ben Crow, op.
The Hindu,
c i t . , The P o l i t i c s . . .
December
20
1977,
in
<•
Journal,
Economic
19:2,
and
(1978):
, p.177.
"Zia's f r u i t f u l
t a l k s with
37.
I n d i a . M i n i s t r y of A g r i c u l t u r e and I r r i g a t i o n ,
Department
of
I r r i g a t i o n , Proposal f o r augmentation of the dry season flow
of the Ganga, New D e l h i , March 1978,
p.83.
1 billion
equals
1,000,000,000 i n the American t r a d i t i o n .
38.
Ibid.
, p.68.
134
39.
The depth and d i s c h a r g e a r e given, the slope appears to be
s i m i l a r to that of the Farakka Barrage feeder c a n a l .
The c r o s s
s e c t i o n a l area and width can t h e r e f o r e be c a l c u l a t e d .
40.
Maasland
has c a l c u l a t e d
that the power p o t e n t i a l of the
unregulated minimum flow i n t h i s region i s 30 GW at 60% load
f a c t o r . Water development p o t e n t i a l s of the Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghna b a s i n s , World Bank, Washington, 1973, p.20.
41.
Indian P r o p o s a l , op.
c i t . , p.8.
42.
Ibid.
43.
Ben Crow, op.
44.
The Hindu, May 13 1979, "India's gesture to Bangla."
, p.67.
45. USIA, D e l h i ,
speeches," D e l h i ,
c i t . , The P o l i t i c s . . .
, p.304.
"Toward our common g o a l s : t e x t s of remarks and
1978, p.18.
46.
The Hindu, January 7 1978, "Callaghan gets warm welcome."
47.
The Economist, December 8 1979, "Back to I n d i r a R a j . "
48.
The Hindu I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n ,
President C o r d i a l talks in D e l h i . "
February 2 1980, "Bangla
49.
t a c t i c s won't do Bangla t o l d . "
March
8
1980,
50.
March 29 1980,
Waters a c c o r d : m i n i s t e r blames Janata government."
51. The Hindu I n t e r n a t i o n a l E d i t i o n , March 29
India warns Bangladesh."
52.
adjourned."
March
53.
Times of I n d i a , March
i n c o r r e c t and u n f a i r . "
54.
4
1980,
1980,
"Ganga
"Farakka:
"Delhi-Dhaka
"Bangla
talks
statement
Times of I n d i a , A p r i l
15
1981, "Farakka and i t s F a l l -
8 1980, "Review of Farakka urged."
57. Times of I n d i a , May 1 1980, "Farakka and i t s F a l l - o u t , "
Inder M a l h o t r a .
58.
is
Ibid.
55.
Times of I n d i a , January
out," by Inder Malhotra.
56.
1
1980,
"Delay
Ibid.
by
1 35
59.
Ibid.
60.
Ibid.
61.
Times of
summit."
62.
India,
12
1980,
"Ganga waters issue goes to
Ibid.
63.
i l l e g a l entry."
64.
July
August
19
1980,
"Delhi-Dhaka
stop
Ibid.
65.
r i v e r waters i s s u e . "
September 2 1980,
"Bangladesh obdurate on
66.
Times of I n d i a , November 7
1980,
"Dhaka
India suggests long-term pact on Ganga."
67.
to
talks
extended:
Ibid.
68.
Times of I n d i a , November 9 1980,
D e l h i next week."
"Talks on Ganga waters in
69.
Bangladesh Times, May 16 1981, "India takes stubborn
on Ganges: B i t t e r campaign launched a g a i n s t Bangladesh."
70.
Ibid.
71 .
Ibid.
72.
Bangladesh Times, May
shortly."
4 1981,
73.
Bangladesh Times, May 9 1981,
proposal on South T a l p a t t y . "
stand
" H i g h - l e v e l Indo-Bangla meet
"India r e j e c t s
joint
survey
74.
Ziaur
Rahman was a s s a s s i n a t e d in a p l o t to overthrow him
led
by
Maj.-Gen.
Abul
Manzur.
The
coup
attempt
was
unsuccessful.
A l l those
involved
were executed
and
Zia's
President
J u s t i c e Abdus S a t t a r
took
over
as
President
of
Bangladesh.
75.
Lieutenant
General H.M.
Ershad was the army c h i e f at the
time Zia was a s s a s s i n a t e d .
He
was
the
one
responsible
for
sending army detachments to Chittagong to subdue the mutineers
and punish the o f f i c e r s r e s p o n s i b l e .
When S a t t a r
was
elected
President
i n the general e l e c t i o n s of November 1982, the armed
f o r c e s under the l e a d e r s h i p of Ershad demanded that they
should
have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o s i t i o n
in the r u l i n g of Bangladesh.
J u s t i c e S a t t a r refused and the armed f o r c e s took over power
on
March 25,
1982
in a b l o o d l e s s
coup o s t e n s i b l y to f i g h t the
c o r r u p t i o n p r a c t i s e d by the p o l i t i c i a n s who had
been
in power
1 36
and
which, a c c o r d i n g to the army, had eroded the very f a b r i c of
s o c i e t y i n Bangladesh.
76. Times of I n d i a , A p r i l 18 1982, "Coup to a v o i d
bloodbath,"
by Anthony Mascarenhas, s t a f f correspondent of the Sunday Times,
London, i n a s p e c i a l to the Sunday Review to the Times of I n d i a .
77.
h o p e f u l note."
September
78. Times of I n d i a , October
scrapped."
79.
Ibid.
80.
Ben Crow, op.
81.
Ibid.
, p.2098.
82.
Ibid.
, p.2097.
83.
Ibid.
, p.2098.
84.
Ibid.
8
1
1982, "Farakka t a l k s end on
1982,
"Farakka
accord
c i t . , " A p p r o p r i a t i n g the...," p.2097.
to
be
1 37
V.
ASYMMETRIC DYADS AND UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM CONFLICTS
The
Farakka
Barrage
dispute
between
India
and
Pakistan/Bangladesh p r o v i d e s s c h o l a r s with a u s e f u l study of an
upstream-downstream
c o n f l i c t over an i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r .
the t h i r t y odd years that the d i s p u t e has
been
c o n f l i c t has evolved through many s t a g e s .
T h i s chapter analyses
the
strategies
adopted
by
r i p a r i a n s t a t e i n i t s attempt
an
equitable
and
Pakistan/Bangladesh
that
an
long-range
equitable
reached so f a r because
as
t o i n f l u e n c e India i n
s o l u t i o n throughout
stages i n the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e .
been
going
Over
and
on, the
the lower
negotiating
the d i f f e r e n t
My c e n t r a l argument
has
long-range s o l u t i o n has not been
of the i n h e r e n t i n e q u a l i t y
i n the o v e r a l l
r e l a t i o n s between India and Bangladesh.
In
bound
any r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e between two neighbours,
t o be hydrologic-economic
i s s u e s which have t o be s e t t l e d
before an agreement can be reached.
case
studies
dealing
with
there are
However,
international
an
analysis
riparian
of
disputes
r e v e a l s that the f i n a l outcome depends on other f a c t o r s as w e l l .
The o v e r a l l s t a t e of r e l a t i o n s
stakes
involved
between
the c o - r i p a r i a n s ,
f o r each of them, t h e i r general f o r e i g n
the
policy
o b j e c t i v e s , the b a r g a i n i n g techniques they choose
t o employ and,
more i m p o r t a n t l y , the b a r g a i n i n g r e s o u r c e s
commands,
each
a l s o be important f a c t o r s i n the f i n a l outcome.
the
final
political
solution
i s more
a
considerations affecting
first
factor
which
In other words,
r e s u l t of short and long term
the d i s p u t i n g
than i t i s of p u r e l y hydrologic-economic
The
may
co-riparians
considerations.
i s important
i n determining the
138
r e l a t i v e ease or d i f f i c u l t y with which an
international
d i s p u t e can be s e t t l e d between two c o u n t r i e s i s
position
vis-a-vis
an
international
be
divided
difficult
into
its
sole
According
co-riparians
profit.
Its
r e g u l a t e s the
flow
needs
does not b e n e f i t
w e l l be d e t r i m e n t a l to
the
of
the
cannot
be
Farakka
Barrage
with
latter's
i t , p o l l u t e s i t e x c e s s i v e l y or
water
such
that
satisfied.
In
the upstream s t a t e r e c e i v e s maximum b e n e f i t
accordance
the
(such as f o r
the
downstream
such
cases,
economic i n c e n t i v e s to reach agreement are extremely
in
can
"upstream-downstream
utilisation
i r r i g a t i o n ) of the water, d i v e r t s
river
to
Of these, the d i s p u t e s most
i f , f o r example, i t makes consumptive use
country's
relative
In t h i s category, the upstream country uses a r i v e r
downstream country and may
interest
1
to r e s o l v e are the ones he c a l l s
conflicts."
for
four c a t e g o r i e s .
their
river.
LeMarquand, r e l a t i o n s h i p s among i n t e r n a t i o n a l
riparian
only
its
by
own
d i s p u t e between I n d i a and
low
the
because
exploiting
the
user's demands.
The
Bangladesh
falls
in
t h i s l a s t category of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r d i s p u t e s .
In
an
the lower
power
upstream-downstream
r i p a r i a n can do unless
over
the
upper
whether or not the lower
influence
conflict,
the
this
riparian.
riparian
By
2
there i s very
country
upper r i p a r i a n to cooperate.
and
the
The
from
asymmetric-dyadic
Carleton
University.
relationship
3
(their
capacity
to
superordinate-
Bangladesh
f r u i t f u l l y a n a l y s e d using the conceptual apparatus
scholars
reciprocal
r e c i p r o c a l power I mean
possesses
subordinate r e l a t i o n s h i p between I n d i a
has
little
can
be
of a group of
According to them, i n an
terminology
for
two
1 39
countries
in
an unequal
r e l a t i o n s h i p ) , the s u b o r d i n a t e country
although economically dependent
on
tries
length
to
maintain
an
arm's
the
superordinate
relationship
s u p e r o r d i n a t e p a r t n e r i n order to a v o i d the p e r c e i v e d
costs
of
increased
s i t u a t i o n where the upper r i p a r i a n
the
state,
vulnerable
position.
agreements
have
the
even
reached.
in-
The
5
such
How
a p p l i c a t i o n of the s t r a t e g i e s o u t l i n e d
countries
countries
country
e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n but i t . i s my
negotiations,
the
chances
it
is
hand.
the
may
to
country
successful
and
i n Chapter
able
to
II,
persuade
Getting
the
to cooperate does not assure an
contention
winning
country.
be
the
However, with
cooperate.
of
also
situations
c o u n t r y . w i l l be depends on the s p e c i f i c c o n f l i c t
its
is
to engage the superordinate/upstream
the nature of r e l a t i o n s between two c o - r i p a r i a n s .
a prudent
political
in n e g o t i a t i o n s over the r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e .
downstream
its
downstream country i s i n a very
However,
been
country can attempt
with
i n t e g r a t i o n . " T r a n s l a t e d i n t o an upstream-
downstream c o n f l i c t
superordinate
country
that
by
initiating
country can maximize
concessions
from
the
In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , however,
country which has the upper
1 40
A.
THE FIVE STAGES OF THE FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE
The Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e has not
the
thirty
odd
years that
remained
static
i t has been going on.
over
Based on the
nature of the o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of power r e l a t i o n s between the cor i p a r i a n s , the d i s p u t e has evolved through
stage had
i t s own
influenced
the
five
stages.
p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r which, to a l a r g e extent,
b a r g a i n i n g s t y l e adopted by each r i p a r i a n .
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the d i s p u t e i n t o stages helps
the
actions
context.
and
It
committing
reactions
also
saves
us
to
of the d i s p u t a n t s i n an
us,
as
political
The
analyse
historical
analysts,
from
o u r s e l v e s to a s i m p l i s t i c a n a l y s i s of the s t r a t e g i e s
used by Pakistan/Bangladesh as the lower r i p a r i a n
the
Each
strategies
employed
by
state.
Pakistan/Bangladesh
While
were
very
instrumental i n persuading India to cooperate, t h e i r success
failure
at
particular
periods
depended to a great extent on
relations
between
powevr
relationship
Pakistan/Bangladesh
Barrage
dispute
d i s p u t e and a l s o enable
certain
strategies
The
which
will
a
the
clarify
us
changing
pattern
of
state.
during
of the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e
the
the
to
or
following
existed
five
the
and
analysis
between
stages
structural
appreciate
the
of
power
the
of
India
the
the
and
Farakka
context of the
importance
s t a t e may
of
use to
achieve a s o l u t i o n to an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t .
a.
the
The Exchange of D i p l o m a t i c Notes: The
Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e spanned
first
stage
of
a p e r i o d of nine y e a r s .
As
141
mentioned e a r l i e r ,
i t began on October
19,
complaint
by
the
lodged
Pakistan
with
1951
with
a
government
r e g a r d i n g the l a t t e r ' s plans to c o n s t r u c t
the
formal
of I n d i a
Farakka
Barrage
a c r o s s the Ganges a few m i l e s from the East P a k i s t a n border.
ended
in
June i960 with the f i r s t meeting of t e c h n i c a l
It
experts
from both c o u n t r i e s .
R e l a t i o n s between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n
c o r r e c t " which i s another way
were
"diplomatically
of saying that although d i p l o m a t i c
channels were open, r e l a t i o n s were l e s s than f r i e n d l y .
of
power,
Pakistan
and
India
were
In terms
roughly equal with I n d i a
having a s l i g h t edge owing to i t s l a r g e r p o p u l a t i o n and
land
area.
As c o - r i p a r i a n s on a number of major
r i v e r s , such as the Indus,
India
was
in
an
the
Ganges,
and
countries
newly independent
wary
of
s c a l e war
and
other
especially
dispute,
t h e r e f o r e mostly
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and development.
each
Brahmaputra,
advantageous p o s i t i o n by v i r t u e of being
During t h i s stage of the Farakka
with domestic
international
the
upper r i p a r i a n .
were
greater
They
s i n c e they had
over the d i s p u t e d Kashmir area i n 1948.
the
both
occupied
were
very
fought a small
6
During t h i s p r e p a r a t o r y stage P a k i s t a n simply wanted to get
India to acknowledge that a problem e x i s t e d , and,
i n order to do
t h i s , P a k i s t a n f o r m a l l y p r o t e s t e d about the a l l e g e d c o n s t r u c t i o n
of the Farakka
sense
that
when
sent r e m i n d e r s .
because
Barrage.
7
P a k i s t a n was
no r e p l y was
The
Pakistan
quite
forthcoming
government's
persistent
the
from I n d i a , P a k i s t a n
efforts
a f t e r a while the Indian government agreed
with P a k i s t a n on a r e c i p r o c a l b a s i s .
in
paid
off
t o cooperate
However, although P a k i s t a n
1 42
s u p p l i e d the Indians
project,
information
the Indians withheld any
Farakka p r o j e c t .
of
with
on
the
Ganges-Kobadak
information p e r t a i n i n g to the
India d i d agree to exchange a
limited
amount
t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n with P a k i s t a n but t h i s concession came
only a f t e r plans f o r the Farakka p r o j e c t were f i n a l i z e d and
Indian parliament
b.
had approved i t .
Wallowing in T e c h n i c a l Data:
The
second stage of
Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e began with the f i r s t
June 1960
and
Relations
lasted
between
until
India
decade to such an extent
first
in
May
1965,
December 1971.
8
the
the
e x p e r t s ' meeting in
Indo-Pakistan
war
of
1971.
and P a k i s t a n d e t e r i o r a t e d d u r i n g
that they engaged i n war
then
in
September
1965,
three
and
this
times:
f i n a l l y in
T h i s l a s t c o n f r o n t a t i o n dismembered P a k i s t a n
what used to be East Pakistan became the
the
independent
state
and
of
Bangladesh.
A comparative power assessment of India and
this
period
would
u n t i l Pakistan was
international
Egypt
and
alignment.
recognise
split
system
On
India gained
of
the
concept
the other
The
South
two
economy
border
exposed
its
the
o r i g i n a t i n g , along
with
and
practice
of
(CENTO and
proved
that
c o u l d s u s t a i n a long, drawn-out c o n f r o n t a t i o n .
conflict
with the People's
India's
Republic
vulnerability.
1 1
non-
integrated into
became a member of the
Pakistan
two
in
East Asian Treaty O r g a n i s a t i o n s
wars between India and
during
between the
some s t a t u r e
s i d e , P a k i s t a n was
American system of a l l i a n c e s and
and
rough balance
because
Yugoslavia,
9
up.
a
Pakistan
of
However,
China
the
the
Central
SEATO).
10
neither's
India's
in
1962
border
143
c o n f r o n t a t i o n s with China only i n c r e a s e d
to
India's
strengthen and modernize i t s armed f o r c e s .
to
do with S o v i e t and American h e l p .
1 2
determination
T h i s i t proceeded
Despite attempts
by
both
India and P a k i s t a n to achieve s u p e r i o r i t y , both s i d e s were about
equal i n m i l i t a r y
capabilities.
N e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka
The
i s s u e s t a r t e d between experts
substantive technical
i s s u e s that were
d i s c u s s e d i n c l u d e d an assessment of the needs of
and East P a k i s t a n .
available
In order to f i n d out how
during
different
months
d i s c h a r g e measurements had to be
points
of
the
Ganges.
ended on January
exchange
8,
of d a t a .
1962
By
of
port
much water would be
the
carried
Calcutta
year,
out
surveys of
along
different
the f o u r t h experts' meeting which
c o n s i d e r a b l e progress was
made
in
the
However, f u r t h e r progress c o u l d not be made
1 3
because of I n d i a ' s demand f o r more and more data.
During t h i s stage, there was
of
the
dispute.
In
the f i r s t
a definite shift
i n the
focus
stage P a k i t s t a n ' s e f f o r t s were
u n s u c c e s s f u l l y d i r e c t e d toward stopping India from b u i l d i n g
Farakka
Barrage
without
c o n s t r u c t i o n on the Farakka
being
consulted
p r o j e c t was
first.
underway, the
the
Once
focus
of
the d i s p u t e (from P a k i s t a n ' s standpoint) s h i f t e d to an e q u i t a b l e
allocation
of
the
Ganges'
spurred t e c h n i c a l exchanges.
flow.
The q u e s t i o n of a l l o c a t i o n
Despite
with these s o - c a l l e d t e c h n i c a l meetings,
follow I n d i a ' s l e a d .
East
Pakistan's
The presence
western
border
Pakistan's
i t had no c h o i c e but to
of the Farakka
had
frustrations
changed
d i s c u s s i o n s from an argument over a " p r i n c i p l e " to
Barrage
the
an
across
focus
of
argument
144
over
"sharing."
Had
India
stage and
probable
not
allowed
insisted
on more and
that r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from India and
management
India's
of
intention.
Ganges
It
not
Barrage was
complete and o p e r a t i o n a l .
Barrage
to decide
Embrace; The
assassination
Negotiations
However, that was
that
anything
third
the
the
of
Sheikh
Mujibur
circumstances
established
Bangladesh, now
negotiating
initially
Rahman
over the Farakka assumed a new
changed
Indian
an
with
conditions
and
in
Farakka
in
light
subcontinent.
The
that
country,
subcontinent.
The
stronger
these
no
sense
more
confident
negotiations
of
the
India.
were
peaceful
and
strain
that
had
Pakistan.
of Bangladesh's independence, the
to c r e a t e a j o i n t
body in
order
that
water
resources
of the region c o u l d be u t i l i s e d on an
basis
for
mutual
the
countries." "
1
This
it
a
months
governments decided
1975.
was
was
four
the
in
the
c h a r a c t e r i z e d n e g o t i a t i o n s between India and
Within
with
the
independent but p o l i t i c a l l y weak country,
surrounding
there
predominance
with
August
dimension
weakened
Indian
the
ending
in
the
never
u n t i l the Farakka
stage of
1971
dismemberment of Pakistan not only
also
efficient
d i s p u t e spanned more than four years beginning
c r e a t i o n of Bangladesh i n December
of
ensured
surprising
was
Paternalistic
Pakistan c o u l d have
have
waters.
is
unwilling
would
government
c.
this
p o l i t i c a l exchanges to take p l a c e , i t i s q u i t e
hammered out an agreement which
joint
more data d u r i n g
benefit
joint
body
of
the
peoples
was
called
the
of
two
"the
equitable
the
two
Indo-Bangladesh
145
J o i n t R i v e r s Commission
(JRC).
issue went ahead at f u l l
JRC,
the
Indian
proposing
India's
speed.
government
ministerial
part
Negotiations
had
a
level
j It
Bangladesh
meetings.
l o t to
15
This
was i n I n d i a ' s
Indians
The
explained
The Barrage had been completed i n
late
1973.
16
i n t e r e s t to r e s o l v e the i s s u e at t h i s p o i n t .
wanted to push a s o l u t i o n through d u r i n g the I n d i r a As i t turned
Barrage.
out,
lack
of
by
the
1 7
progress
fact
over
that
the
during
Farakka
the
issue
first
Bangladesh's e x i s t e n c e , Bangladesh's l e a d e r s f e l t
Mrs.
the c i v i l
war.
Bangladesh
to
differ
leaders
with
There c e r t a i n l y were d i f f e r e n c e s
countries,
but
felt
of
very
had with
grateful
during
i t would
between
be
issues.
the two
Bangladesh's l e a d e r s thought i t more prudent to
India.
actually
I n d i a ' s views as to
needed
during
the d i f f e r e n c e s
how
much
the dry s e a s o n .
statement issued a f t e r the
1974 c o n t a i n e d
on
There were a l s o r e p o r t s that Sheikh Mujib
was naive enough to accept
since the j o i n t
that
opinion
be
few years of
India on most b i l a t e r a l
emphasize good r e l a t i o n s rather than focus
Bangladesh
can
Gandhi's government f o r l e n d i n g a c t i v e support
inappropriate
of
on
i s s u e s were s e t t l e d during the summit but not the issue of
the Farakka
they
l e a d e r s by
do with the s t a t e of the Farakka
Mujib summit h e l d i n New D e l h i i n May 1974.
many
Farakka
generosity
but the feeder canal would not be ready u n t i l
The
to
the
r e g u l a r s e s s i o n s of the
surprised
Barrage and the feeder c a n a l .
1970
Besides
over
1 8
Indira-Mujib
water
However,
summit
only a statement of p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r than an
a c t u a l agreement, Mujib o b v i o u s l y had h i s own d o u b t s .
1 9
1 46
While Bangladesh was f o l l o w i n g a p o l i c y of c o o p e r a t i o n
I n d i a , India r e c i p r o c a t e d i n a
way
paternalism.
believed
Indian
leaders
which
sometimes
with d e l e g a t i o n s
because
from P a k i s t a n .
Bangladesh's
chief
T h i s stage
signed
than
Pakistan
of the d i s p u t e a l s o
B.M.
Abbas, had a l s o
delegations.
saw
an
2 0
interim
agreement
between India and Bangladesh so that India c o u l d
the now completed Farakka Barrage and the
experimental
misgivings
chose
basis.
It
2 1
to
feeder
canal
operate
on
an
i s c l e a r that Bangladesh had c e r t a i n
about t h i s agreement, but
not
they
T h i s proved to be d i f f i c u l t
negotiator,
been a key member of p r e v i o u s
resembled
that they would have a
much e a s i e r time d e a l i n g with Bangladesh n e g o t i a t o r s
had
with
f o r reasons
yet
unclear
make too much of i t . On the augmentation i s s u e ,
however, Bangladesh took a tougher
stand.
was t o t a l l y opposed to the Indian p r o p o s a l
Because
Bangladesh
f o r augmentation, JRC
d e l i b e r a t i o n s came to a s t a n d s t i l l by December 1974.
The
a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Mujibur Rahman i n August
an end to t h i s
Barrage
stage
of
the
Farakka
dispute.
the q u e s t i o n
d.
and
From H o s t i l i t y
to Compromise;
Bangladesh d e t e r i o r a t e d during t h i s
in
dispute.
Farakka
The foeus of
of s h a r i n g
to
of augmentation.
Barrage d i s p u t e .
were
The
was o p e r a t i n g under an i n t e r i m agreement.
the d i s c u s s i o n s had now s h i f t e d from the question
1975 brought
some
R e l a t i o n s between India
stage
of
the
Farakka
India's i n i t i a t i v e s and Bangladesh's responses
ways
reminiscent
The events of August
of
the
1975 (Mujib's
second
stage
of the
assassination
and
1 47
its
aftermath)
were
i n t e r p r e t e d by India as m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of
a n t i - I n d i a n sentiments, and attempts by Bangladesh
diplomatic
relations
a n t i - I n d i a n moves.
Indian
High
to
establish
with P a k i s t a n , China, and Saudi A r a b i a as
There was
Commissioner
an attempt
on
in Dhaka to kidnap
November 26,
1975.
These
the
events
brought the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two c o u n t r i e s to an a l l time
low.
Not
willing
to accept the s i t u a t i o n
I n d i a began to mount a massive propaganda
new
i n Bangladesh,
campaign
against
the
r u l e r s i n Bangladesh and there were a l s o r e p o r t s of a t t a c k s
on outposts
along
Indian
2 2
side.
During
the
Mymensingh-Meghalaya
a l l this
time,
India
continued
withdrawal of Ganges waters at Farakka.
Bangladesh
protest
note
started
border
a
its
On January
year
from
unilateral
15,
of p u b l i c
the
1976
a
dispute.
Bangladesh a l l e g e d that Indian withdrawals at Farakka at the end
of the f o r t y - d a y agreement c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the
understanding.
23
Meanwhile,
w i t h i n Bangladesh, p u b l i c outcry a g a i n s t Indian
a t t a c k s and u n i l a t e r a l withdrawal of
crescendo.
protest
Hundreds of thousands
march
organised
Ganges
waters
reached
of Bangladeshis took part
by
Maulana
nonagenarian
nationalist
leader. " It
that
Bangladesh
authorities
while
existing
is
2
took
Bhasani,
a
interesting
not
permit
government's way
country
was
a
of
united
confrontation.
demonstrating
2 5
to
in a
famous
to
note
no steps to stop the
p r o t e s t march, they assured India that Bangladesh border
would
a
T h i s was
India
a g a i n s t India i n the f i g h t
the
that
forces
Bangladesh
the
for their
whole
water
148
rights.
I t i s reported
that
the
protest
border s e c u r i t y f o r c e s on the a l e r t .
Meanwhile,
for the f i r s t
they
bargaining
s t r a t e g y of r e q u e s t i n g
delaying
were
tactics
resumed,
on
the
compromising a t t i t u d e on
prompted
Bangladesh
As d i s c u s s e d
for negotiations
India
went
issue
to
matters
its
of
bilateral
to take the matter to the United
concern
Nations.
i n Chapter I I I , however, the Bangladesh s t r a t e g y of
dividends.
impasse i n t a l k s was not broken u n t i l M o r a r j i Desai was
government
in
considerably.
relations,
power
Indo-Bangladesh
With a c e r t a i n
degree
relations
of
harmony
improved
restored
i n the ensuing months.
in
Undeterred by the lukewarm
r e c e p t i o n i t r e c e i v e d i n the General Assembly, Bangladesh
proceeded
to
political
support.
During
negotiations
approach
this
international
agencies
stage
adroitly.
of
Once
issues i n negotiations
the
dispute,
Bangladesh
i t chose
f o r maximum b e n e f i t .
Bangladesh at l e a s t with
2 8
f o r moral and
tackled
the Bangladesh government sensed
the November 1977 agreement between
the Ganges' f l o w .
still
27
India's w i l l i n g n e s s t o s e t t l e the d i s p u t e ,
favoured
Janata
b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka d i s p u t e made
some progress
out,
old
India's
e l e c t e d Prime M i n i s t e r of India i n March 1977. With the
other
and,
and i t s general non-
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n d i d not pay immediate
The
back
an exchange of data.
Farakka
other
Indian
withdrawals c o u l d be f e l t
Bangladesh pressed
although
kept
2 6
the e f f e c t s of Indian
time.
march
regard
India
to
include
As i t turned
and
Bangladesh
to dry season share of
In June 1977, Ziaur Rahman was able to get a
1 49
promise from M o r a r j i Desai
i n London
to
the
effect
that
the
Indian government would not g i v e s h e l t e r to g u e r r i l l a s i n Indian
territory.
On
2 9
the
question
of
augmentation,
both
c o n s i d e r each other's p r o p o s a l s w i t h i n the next
charged the JRC with the t a s k .
s i d e s agreed to
three years
and
From 1977 to e a r l y 1980, the JRC
d e l i b e r a t i o n s proved f u t i l e because n e i t h e r India nor Bangladesh
would
budge
from
their
positions
on
the
question
of
T h i s stage of the d i s p u t e r e v e a l s an i n t e r e s t i n g aspect
of
augmentat i o n .
upstream-downstream
country
and
domestic
a
conflict
between
a
political
changes
within
the
improve the chances of the downstream
settlement.
However,
too
because the upstream country
that
might
these can
downstream
be
do
much
country.
Sometimes
upstream
country can
country
should
not
i s not l i k e l y
country
"windows
i s prudent,
of
negotiate
be
made of t h i s
to agree to
d e t r i m e n t a l to i t s i n t e r e s t s .
i s create
to
a
anything
A l l changes l i k e
opportunity."
I f the
i t can take advantage of the
o p p o r t u n i t i e s , j u s t as Bangladesh d i d .
e.
stage
Stalemate or Indian V i c t o r y ?
of
the d i s p u t e began i n January
r e - e l e c t i o n as Indian prime m i n i s t e r .
stage
of
The
the
dispute,
the
focus
fifth
and
1980 with Mrs.
Throughout
has
this
current
Gandhi's
current
p r i m a r i l y been on the
augmentat ion of the dry season flow of the Ganges.
Although the
q u e s t i o n of augmentation was r e p e a t e d l y d i s c u s s e d by the JRC i n
i t s meetings d u r i n g
1977, 1978, and 1979, there was no p r o g r e s s .
1 50
It
was
only a f t e r January
a blatantly p o l i t i c a l
been
argued
that
colour.
the
l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of
India
and
underplay
always
that the Farakka d i s p u t e assumed
Throughout
non-solution
the
Both
nature
In
this
of
differing
Bangladesh.
successful.
political
1980
the
the
the
o b j e c t i v e s are more prominent
has
been
objectives
diligently
dispute
current
it
d i s p u t e has
political
countries
of
thesis
of
tried
but
to
were
not
stage
of
the
dispute,
than
in
the
previous
stages.
The
an
f i f t h and c u r r e n t stage of the d i s p u t e
important
reminder to r i v e r d i s p u t e a n a l y s t s and
asymmetric dyads that the f a t e s are i n favour
country
i s in many ways
in
the
dyad.
With
India's a t t i t u d e became
Mrs.
totally
students
of
of the predominant
Gandhi's r e t u r n to power,
non-compromising.
India
not
only expressed
i t s r e g r e t s over the stalemate
on the question
augmentation,
it
of n e g o t i a t i n g the
s h a r i n g aspect
which, a c c o r d i n g
Bangladesh.
India
30
also
raised
to
be
enough water
received
drier
for
its
c l a u s e , there was
than
share
and
of
very l i t t l e
and
Lt.
General
India.
water
leader) in November 1982,
of
the
eighty
per
Because
f o r use
(Bangladesh's
clause.
Therefore,
1980
not
Bangladesh
cent
i n West Bengal.
signed
India r e f u s e d to allow
cent
of
under the e i g h t y per
water l e f t
Ershad
progress
As a r e s u l t , there was
When the Memorandum of Understanding was
Gandhi
favoured
To be f a i r , the winter
usual.
Bangladesh
fair
to I n d i a , have h e a v i l y
blames Bangladesh f o r the lack of
over the augmentation q u e s t i o n .
proved
the q u e s t i o n
of
new
the
by
Mrs.
military
inclusion
although
the
151
has been h a i l e d as an
the
1977 Agreement f o r another
year
formula
guarantees
other a g r i c u l t u r a l
activities
are extended
Nepal
from
consultations.
Ganges'
flow
with
no
T h i s means that as i r r i g a t i o n and
Bangladesh w i l l be l e f t with a dwindling
The
of
two y e a r s , i t i s a c t u a l l y a two-
f o r sharing the dry season
f o r Bangladesh.
extension
also
This
i n West
Bengal,
share of Ganges
specifically
means
that
waters.
leaves out
Bangladesh's
p r o p o s a l s f o r augmentation w i l l be very hard t o r e a l i z e .
Bangladesh
has
not
augmentation q u e s t i o n
.
budged
from
i t s position
The Memorandum of Understanding
to e x p i r e i n a few months.
i s due
I t i s only a q u e s t i o n of time
India can r e a s s e r t i t s predominance i n t h i s
B.
over the
before
regard.
THE FARAKKA BARRAGE; THE ARCHETYPE OF AN UPSTREAM-DOWNSTREAM
CONFLICT
The
Farakka
barrage
dispute
d i s p u t e between two neighbours.
be
traced
as
f a r back
i s essentially
The o r i g i n s of the d i s p u t e
as 1951 when P a k i s t a n , quoting
press r e p o r t s , lodged a formal p r o t e s t with
India
regarding
and
this
11 miles from the East Pakistan
s t a r t e d a d i s p u t e between
continued
until
the Farakka
Barrage
Bangladesh, and although an
Indian
India
of
across
border.
and
3 1
Pakistan
1971 when East Pakistan seceded
Pakistan and became the independent s t a t e of Bangladesh.
1971,
can
the government
the l a t t e r ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n of a barrage
the Ganges River about
The p r o t e s t note
a riparian
from
Since
d i s p u t e continued between I n d i a and
interim
agreement
was
signed
in
1 52
November
1977,
the
dispute
resurfaced
agreement had
f a i l e d to r e s o l v e a l l the
the
Barrage.
Farakka
India
and
Bangladesh
(starting
formula
from
for
countries.
the terms
To
3 2
of
comprehensive
the
which
of
However,
era)
years
Farakka
which have to be
settlement
the
provides
waters
is
on
both
reached
Barrage d i s p u t e
satisfactorily
can be reached.
Ganges'
agreement
between
negotiations
the only
between
sides
guiding
these
and,
flow
resolved
progress
in
The
during
i n v o l v e s two
first
the
t h i s i s s u e but
discussions
countries during
of Understanding
dry
to extend the
second
issue
1982.
between
1977
involves
the
agreement f o r
the q u e s t i o n
proposed
violently
Bangladesh
alternative
and
India.
schemes
1977.
issues
comprehensive
countries.
sharing
The
1977
f o r the d u r a t i o n of
the
In the absence
any
of
both
two
of
from
in force, a
both
Memorandum
countries
more
years.
increasing
augmentation
was
The
of augmentation of the
Both I n d i a and
opposed to the other's
be
season when the flow i s
to meet the
for
a
likely
different
representatives
leaders
season flow of the Ganges i n order
both
only
with
will
i s s u e i n v o l v e s the
the time the t r e a t y was
between
two
unless
country
r e s o l v e d before a
t r e a t y which ended on November 5,
of
1977
soon, i t i s q u i t e
lowest and cannot meet the needs of both
signed
with
even the share of Ganges waters i t r e c e i v e d as of
The
of
associated
of
that Bangladesh as the subordinate/downstream
denied
this
i s increasing dissatisfaction
agreement
settlement
because
the agreement of
Ganges
there
issues
embodies
Pakistan
sharing
this
date,
again
dry
needs
Bangladesh have
but
scheme f o r p o l i t i c a l
each
is
reasons.
153
Bangladesh proposed the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 81
23
would
be
in
Nepal
reservoirs
on the Ganges b a s i n .
dry
season.
Because some of these
Nepal, that country,
included
in
according
future
at
important
least
should
on augmentation.
other
solution
to
during
also
In f a c t ,
the
an e q u i t a b l e
River
Brahmaputra
Bangladesh border.
of
this
barrage
on
an
its
or
Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e .
I n d i a , meanwhile, has proposed c o n s t r u c t i o n of a barrage
the
be
interested states constitutes
s t r a t e g y f o r Bangladesh to achieve
optimal
later
r e s e r v o i r s would be i n
Bangladesh,
discussions
attempt to i n c l u d e Nepal and
an
to
which
These r e s e r v o i r s
would s t o r e water during the monsoons f o r r e l e a s e
the
of
territory
just
A canal would be c o n s t r u c t e d
across
outside
just
the
upstream
to l i n k the Brahmaputra R i v e r with the Ganges
j u s t upstream of the Farakka Barrage.
Part of
the
would have to pass through Bangladesh t e r r i t o r y .
link
canal
The a d d i t i o n a l
flow of the Brahmaputra would e f f e c t i v e l y augment the dry
season
flow of the Ganges f o r both c o u n t r i e s .
Today,
after
of sharing and
seems
that
the e x p i r y of the
augmentat ion
India,
being
winning the b a t t l e .
But
without
The
a
fight.
Bangladesh withstand
more
economic
southwestern
region.
both
agreement, the
being
issues
re-examined.
It
the upstream/superordinate country
Bangladesh i s
important
not
about
question
India's p r e s s u r e ,
that the more time i t takes
the
are
1977
is
to
how
give
up
long
can
keeping i n mind the
to reach a comprehensive
a d v e r s i t i e s Bangladesh has
is
fact
settlement,
to s u f f e r i n i t s
1 54
C.
STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY
PAKISTAN/BANGLADESH
In an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t ,
has
very
few
r i p a r i a n to
although
In
legalistic
Chapter
approach
resolving a r i p a r i a n dispute,
precedents
which
support
p a r t i c u l a r dispute
the
upper
citing
the
India's a t t e n t i o n .
the
bargaining
In
downstream
the
riparian's
for
help
stand
and
in
discussions
reasonable
can
adopt
in
norms
a
with
c i t e d the H e l s i n k i Rules'
country
well
apportionment"
a
agrees
to
number
of
to reach an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n to
case
of
the
adopted
Formal p r o t e s t and
Farakka
the
to f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the
following
T e c h n i c a l exchange;
to upgrade t a l k s ;
Attempts to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s ;
t h r e a t of
retaliation.
Internationalization;
Issue-area
linkage;
strategies
exchange of d i p l o m a t i c
Cooperat i o n ;
Pressure
Barrage
dispute:
T a l k s between l e a d e r s ;
The
usually
that
dispute.
Pakistan/Bangladesh
effort
shown
Once the upstream country
s t r a t e g i e s in order
the r i p a r i a n
have
international
lower
Pakistan
3 3
I
not
u s u a l l y forms a b a s i s
riparian.
negotiate,
II,
does
p u b l i c i z e d p r i n c i p l e of " e q u i t a b l e and
to get
country
options a v a i l a b l e with which to induce the upper
cooperate.
a
the downstream
notes;
dispute,
in
an
1 55
10) M o b i l i z e
opinion.
domestic
and
international
public
34
Although
these
strategies
were
given
necessarily
in
the
discernible
in
conceded to h o l d
order
not
employed at one time nor
above,
once
clearly
I n d i a had
talks.
the p e r i o d preceding
Pakistan's
were
actions
Formal p r o t e s t and exchange of d i p l o m a t i c
During
they
objective
was
to
notes
a c t u a l n e g o t i a t i o n with
make
India
India,
acknowledge
that a
barrage at Farakka would be d e t r i m e n t a l
to the i n t e r e s t s of East
Pakistan.
a
the
To t h i s end, P a k i s t a n
lodged
Indian government e x p r e s s i n g
barrage at Farakka.
consulted
vital
before
Pakistan
Pakistan pointed
out
p r e l i m i n a r y stage,
that
any p r o j e c t or scheme l i k e l y
saying
that
the l a t t e r
protest
the
While
project
kept on sending
i t should
India
was
tried
only
notes
followed
on
at
a
government
i t s d i p l o m a t i c notes with reminders every
sending
to
requesting
To keep the matter moving, the P a k i s t a n
India delayed
be
to p r e j u d i c e i t s
cooperation.
up
with
concern about India's proposed
i n t e r e s t s was put i n t o o p e r a t i o n .
reassure
formal
time
i t s replies.
The s t r a t e g y of l o d g i n g a formal p r o t e s t and
following i t
up with d i p l o m a t i c notes was p a r t l y s u c c e s s f u l inasmuch as India
was persuaded t o maintain
a steady
However,
to
nature
were
when
i t came
correspondence with
actual
i n f o r m a t i o n of a t e c h n i c a l
p e r t a i n i n g to the Farakka Barrage
silent.
Pakistan
c o u l d press the Indians
was
also
Pakistan.
project,
the
Indians
in a peculiar position. It
only so much s i n c e c o n s t r u c t i o n work had
156
not
s t a r t e d on the p r o j e c t s i t e at
matter
forward,
Pakistan
negotiation.
point.
To
suggested a r b i t r a t i o n
move by P a k i s t a n prompted the
direct
that
Indian
move
i n 1957.
government
to
the
This
35
agree
India agreed t o exchange a l i m i t e d amount
of t e c h n i c a l data with P a k i s t a n .
Pakistan's
o b j e c t i v e to
enter
i n t o d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n with I n d i a , t h e r e f o r e , was achieved
combination
of
arbitration.
There were c e r t a i n reasons why these
compelling
strategies
succeeded
India to agree t o d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n .
F i r s t , at
that p o i n t of the d i s p u t e , I n d i a was
intervention
might
result
worried
that
Second, by
n e g o t i a t e , I n d i a was a c t u a l l y conceding
nothing
contrary,
the
I n d i a ' s favour
projects
in
third-party
i n an i n j u n c t i o n which c o u l d
c o n s t r u c t i o n work at the barrage s i t e .
the
by a
l o d g i n g a formal p r o t e s t , exchanging d i p l o m a t i c
notes and suggesting
in
to
exchange
of
technical
prevent
agreeing
to
to P a k i s t a n .
On
data c o u l d work i n
since i t c o u l d get i n f o r m a t i o n regarding
East
Pakistan.
certain
T h i r d , and most i m p o r t a n t l y , the
exchange of t e c h n i c a l data would g i v e India the time to go ahead
with the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Farakka Barrage without
of the work being
In
January
after
1976,
the Bangladesh government a l s o lodged a
the
end
of
the
"forty-day
c o n s t i t u t e d a breach of the a g r e e m e n t .
although
a
danger
stopped.
formal p r o t e s t with I n d i a , a l l e g i n g that Indian
Farakka
any
36
withdrawals
at
understanding"
Unfortunately,
however,
Bangladesh p r o t e s t e d f r e q u e n t l y i n s e v e r a l f o r a and by
variety
of media, Indian withdrawals at Farakka continued at
or near the maximum mark allowed
by the p r o j e c t .
In t h i s
case,
157
the
lodging
of a formal p r o t e s t was
more an act of
desperation
on the part of Bangladesh rather than a well-planned
It
i s not
s u r p r i s i n g that India d i d not
Relations
low.
between India and
Both s i d e s were complaining
their
common
border.
because. Bangladesh
unacceptable
the
flow
India was
had
to I n d i a .
at
set
of shooting
some
would
preconditions
be c o n s i d e r a b l y
a l r e a d y withdrawing water the s t a t u s
interest.
Fourth,
the
assassination
came as a shock to Mrs.
displeasure
to
the
Gandhi
new
incidents
across
n e g o t i a t i o n s c o u l d not
T h i r d , with the onset
Farakka
favourably.
Bangladesh were at an a l l - t i m e
Second,
3 7
respond
strategy.
and
resume
which
were
of the dry-season,
reduced and
quo
since
suited
its
of Sheikh in Bangladesh
she
wanted
to
show
her
regime i n Bangladesh by t a k i n g a tough
stand on the Farakka i s s u e .
T a l k s between l e a d e r s
During
various
Pakistan/Bangladesh
points
in
arranged
r i p a r i a n s t a t e s i n an e f f o r t
to
clear
up
heads
of s t a t e conference.
Farakka Barrage.
I t was
Farakka
Barrage
dispute,
between l e a d e r s of the
co-
to e i t h e r speed up n e g o t i a t i o n s
or
i n London i n
point.
1961
These two
d i s c u s s a number of b i l a t e r a l
and
talks
some c o n t e n t i o u s
M i n i s t e r Nehru met
the
P r e s i d e n t Ayub and
during
Prime
the
Commonwealth
l e a d e r s met
i n f o r m a l l y to
i s s u e s i n c l u d i n g the
agreed by the two
issue of
l e a d e r s that
the
Pakistan
India would cooperate on the Farakka Barrage p r o j e c t and
decision
to
a l l o c a t e shares
at the m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l .
clarified
the
Indian
3 8
the
of the Ganges' flow would be taken
Unfortunately,
however, Nehru
later
p o s i t i o n by saying that m i n i s t e r s ' l e v e l
158
meetings c o u l d take place only a f t e r the t e c h n i c a l
s o r t e d out.
not
Although the Nehru-Ayub "understanding" of
reap immediate b e n e f i t s f o r P a k i s t a n ,
for
future
negotiation
between
the
co-riparians:
d i d not
in
progress
see eye
these
but
India
broken by d i r e c t
intervention
suggested
Nepal c o u l d be
direct
disagreed.
from
Prime
This
India
included
impasse
was
Desai
who
Minister
point for
so that n e g o t i a t i o n s
Zia
was
conference.
in
New
her.
time,
however,
personal
clear
contact
the l a s t
had
Treaty
during
impossible
severely
her
for
anything
on
up.
39
to address a
The
problem
between
failure
of
with
the
two
direct
l e a d e r s of the c o - r i p a r i a n s t a t e s in
be e x p l a i n e d
in the f o l l o w i n g way.
criticised
office
for the
that Z i a ' s suggestion
attack
smoothly.
1980
this
tete-a-tete
the
five-year
campaign.
to change her
the
reason
the
election
her
e l e c t e d to
important
Gandhi to d i s c u s s
between
instance can
Gandhi
proceed
Since d i s c u s s i o n s of augmentation were making
Mrs.'
l e a d e r s d i d not
could
D e l h i i n February
he met
This
"approached."
the
i n t e r v e n t i o n by a leader r e s o l v e d a c o n t e n t i o u s
no progress,
direct
of
instance,
President
being
flow
In t h i s
the time being
U.N.
political
Bangladesh wanted Nepal to be
discussions
that
formula
c o u l d be made because Bangladesh and
to eye.
did
experts.
In d i s c u s s i o n s of augmentation of dry season
no
were
1961
i t d i d set the
d i s c u s s i o n would follow t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n by
Ganges,
issues
of
It
Prime
Ganges Waters
was
tune j u s t a few
Mrs.
well
nigh
months a f t e r
Minister.
The
other
f a i l u r e of the Zia-Gandhi meeting
to i n c l u d e
the Indian
Nepal
in
discussions
p o l i c y of b i l a t e r a l i s m
was
was
a
in dealing
159
with
i t s neighbours."
only
achieve
Therefore,
0
p a r t i a l success.
meetings between
leaders
On matters of n a t i o n a l p r i o r i t y ,
d i r e c t p e r s o n a l contact between l e a d e r s of d i f f e r e n t
not
likely
In
to r e s o l v e
late
states
1977,
President
Zia
during
a
to upgrade the J o i n t
visit
Rivers
(JRC)
to i n c l u d e m i n i s t e r s from both governments."
this
decision,
the JRC
was
transformed
1
to I n d i a
Commission
By v i r t u e of
from a p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l
body with only recommending powers to a p o l i t i c a l and
with
"greater"
powers.
meeting between Z i a and Desai
was
now
represented
Bangladesh
had
by
In
this
political
informal
of the JRC.
decision-makers,
wanted f o r many years.
commitment
technical
i n s t a n c e , an
changed the nature
can always h e l p c l e a r up l i t t l e
strong
n e g o t i a t o r s w i l l have the
Meetings between l e a d e r s
problems..
to
reach
bargaining
strategy."
authority
agreement,
It
something
Where
there
is
by the n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p to cooperate,
necessary
is
anything.
persuaded M o r a r j i Desai
body
can
to
make
the
a
the
compromises
or at l e a s t develop a
flexible
2
Cooperation
At v a r i o u s times d u r i n g the Farakka Barrage
Pakistan
and
dispute,
Bangladesh f o l l o w e d a s t r a t e g y of c o o p e r a t i o n
India with mixed r e s u l t s .
A cooperative
strategy
was
their
sincerity.
countries
f o r i n s t a n c e , suggested
should
India
They proposed that the c o - r i p a r i a n s work
j o i n t l y to manage t h e i r common water resources
Pakistan,
with
adopted
because Pakistan/Bangladesh hoped that t h i s would convince
of
both
consider
in
constructing
1961
efficiently.
that
the
two
a j o i n t barrage.
The
160
southwestern r e g i o n of
gravity
channels
East
f e d from
p o t e n t i a l s i t e e x i s t e d at
barrage
Pakistan
a
could
barrage
Lalgola
across
which
would
e q u a l l y i n India and East P a k i s t a n .
satisfactory
from
an e n g i n e e r i n g
be
irrigated
the Ganges.
have
been
The expensive
unnecessary
I f the barrage
Pakistan
could
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the c o s t of the barrage
was
totally
unsuccessful
because
c o n s t r u c t i o n on the Farakka s i t e .
not
taken
seriously
considered
this
to
by
be
the
were
standpoint, the p r o j e c t would
Bhagirathi-Hooghly
and
A
put the
have s u b s t a n t i a l economic advantages f o r both East Pakistan
India.
by
and
feeder c a n a l would have
have made a s u b s t a n t i a l
itself.
India
4 3
had
This
strategy
already
begun
Besides, P a k i s t a n ' s o f f e r was
Indians
who,
perhaps
rightly,
a ploy on P a k i s t a n ' s p a r t t o delay the
c o n s t r u c t i o n of the barrage
a t Farakka.
In e a r l y 1972, Bangladesh suggested
the c r e a t i o n of a j o i n t
body which would a c t as a t e c h n i c a l and a d v i s o r y body to the two
governments
rivers.
4 4
f o r developing
India
agreed
the
India
45
agreed
o b j e c t i o n s to c r e a t i n g
resources
at once to the suggestion
Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission
1972.
water
with
a
(JRC) was
Bangladesh
joint
body
of
and the Indo-
formed
because
which
common
i n March
i t had no
would
have
only
recommendatory powers and would be manned p r i m a r i l y by t e c h n i c a l
experts
the c r e a t i o n of such a body.
is
there
any
mention
of
India a l s o had another
In the S t a t u t e of the JRC, nowhere
c r e a t e d to " c a r r y out a comprehensive survey
shared
by the two c o u n t r i e s . "
interest in
I t was a body
of the r i v e r
T h i s meant that w i t h i n the
system
scope
161
of
the
JRC's
a c t i v i t i e s would be i n c l u d e d the Brahmaputra and
Meghna b a s i n s , along with the
shared
rivers.
which was f i r s t
Ganges,
the
Teesta,
and
other
Judging from I n d i a ' s p r o p o s a l f o r augmentation,
mentioned
i n 1974, (the Ganges-Brahmaputra
link
c a n a l ) , Bangladesh's
p r o p o s a l to c r e a t e a j o i n t body was a l s o i n
India's
Bangladesh,
interest.
p r o p o s a l i n good f a i t h
the
on
the
other
hand, made the
i n order t o e f f e c t a prompt
Farakka Barrage i s s u e .
Moreover,
a time when Indo-Bangladesh
solution
the suggestion was made at
r e l a t i o n s were at t h e i r best and the
Awami League government i n Dhaka had not yet gotten over
grateful
to New D e l h i
to
f o r the support i t had given
l i b e r a t i o n d u r i n g the c i v i l
feeling
Bangladesh's
war l e s s than a year p r e v i o u s l y .
T e c h n i c a l Exchange
Throughout
the n e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka Barrage
there were times when t a l k s were completely broken
India
the
and Pakistan/Bangladesh.
exchange of t e c h n i c a l
other
projects
s t a r t i n g point
in
both
issue,
o f f between
When n e g o t i a t i o n s were resumed,
information
countries
about
were
the
always
barrage
and
an important
f o r both s i d e s .
N e g o t i a t i o n s over the Farakka i s s u e broke
down
completely
j u s t before the 1965 war between P a k i s t a n and India and were not
resumed
1968,
until
1968.
the
two s i d e s met i n New D e l h i i n
they exchanged t e c h n i c a l d a t a . "
August
quantities
early
6
After
Mujib's
death
1975, n e g o t i a t i o n s broke down f o r almost a year.
t h i s period, India
in
When
of water
unilaterally
continued
from the Ganges.
to
withdraw
in
During
large
When n e g o t i a t i o n s resumed
1976, t e c h n i c a l t a l k s formed the b a s i s
of
discussions
1 62
between
the
Indian
and Bangladesh d e l e g a t i o n s .
exchange c o n s t i t u t e d an important s t r a t e g y
country to r e s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s
Technical
order
exchange
Thus t e c h n i c a l
f o r the
downstream
a f t e r a p e r i o d of stalemate.
also
had i t s s u b s t a n t i v e
aspects.
t o determine how much water would be r e q u i r e d
for Calcutta
port and how much f o r p r o j e c t s i n Bangladesh, two t h i n g s had
be
calculated
first:
1)
basic
discharge
Ganges, and 2) p r o j e c t d e s c r i p t i o n s to
projects
downstream of Farakka.
that although these d i s c u s s i o n s were
interpretation
of
considerations."
role
at
7
technical
data
water
needs
of
i n t e r e s t i n g to note
"technical,"
each
side's
was i n f l u e n c e d by p o l i t i c a l
Thus t e c h n i c a l exchange assumed
the s t a r t or resumption of n e g o t i a t i o n s
a l l e g e d " o b j e c t i v e " nature.
to
measurements of the
assess
I t i s very
In
Technical
India t o put o f f meaningful p o l i t i c a l
an
important
because of i t s
exchange, however, helped
negotiation
as
long
as
possible.
Pressure to Upgrade
Throughout
Talks
the
negotiations
I n d i a , Pakistan/Bangladesh put
talks
from
the
decision-makers'
attempting
to
First,
of
technical
level.
convince
over the Farakka d i s p u t e
pressure
experts'
The
lower
on
level
India
to
riparian's
the
political
political
strategy
of
l e v e l was the d i r e c t r e s u l t of two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Pakistan/Bangladesh f e l t that India was using
technical
upgrade
the upper r i p a r i a n to upgrade t a l k s to
the
exchange to put o f f s e r i o u s n e g o t i a t i o n .
even when the t e c h n i c a l problems were sorted out,
the
to
with
decision-makers
from
both
excuse
Second,
i t was
countries
only
who were
1 63
capable
of
pressure
making
on
the
India
to
Bangladesh) wanted to
Farakka
substantive
upgrade
bring
decisions.
talks,
about
a
By
Pakistan
quick
putting
(and
solution
later,
to the
dispute.
The
Nehru-Ayub
"agreement"
of
1961
d i d l a y down
foundations of m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l meetings between
riparians."
claiming
However,
8
India
that Nehru had agreed
later
to
the
clarified
ministerial
level
a f t e r a l l the t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s of the d i s p u t e
out.
For i n s t a n c e ,
pressed
two co-
i t s position,
only
Pakistan
the
meetings
were s o r t e d
f o r m i n i s t e r i a l meetings i n
November 1962 and May 1963 to move the matter forward, but India
refused
to comply.
Pakistan
India
civil
servants')
because
was
only
after
r a i s e d the issue i n the U n i t e d
that
The
It
September
1968
Nations General Assembly
agreed to upgrade t a l k s to the s e c r e t a r i e s ' ( s e n i o r
level.
strategy to
India
was
upgrade
talks
not i n t i m i d a t e d .
was
largely
unsuccessful
India agreed to r a i s e the
l e v e l of t a l k s only when i t s u i t e d i t s i n t e r e s t s .
For i n s t a n c e ,
India r a i s e d the l e v e l of the t a l k s to the m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l
1972
without being
was
that
requested to do so by Bangladesh.
the Farakka Barrage was nearing
in India's
i n t e r e s t s to reach a s o l u t i o n
could go i n t o o p e r a t i o n
Attempts to Involve
In
an
both Pakistan
on
several
when
in
The reason
completion and i t was
so
that
the
barrage
as soon as c o n s t r u c t i o n was completed.
Third Parties
attempt to hasten a s o l u t i o n to the Farakka
crisis,
and Bangladesh attempted to i n v o l v e t h i r d
parties
occasions.
The
rationale
behind t h i s p o l i c y was
1 64
simple:
a
non-partisan
international
approach
to
third
organisation)
the Farakka
party
(be
it a
one.
The
dispute.
only
task
India to agree to t h i r d party
easier
said
than
done.
Farakka Barrage dispute
or an
would presumably b r i n g an o b j e c t i v e
A
mediated
t h e r e f o r e , would be i n f i n i t e l y more e q u i t a b l e
negotiated
state
settlement,
than a b i l a t e r a l l y
that remained was to persuade
involvement.
India
This
repeatedly
proved
to be
i n s i s t e d that the
was e s s e n t i a l l y a b i l a t e r a l problem and,
t h e r e f o r e , a s o l u t i o n c o u l d only be the r e s u l t of b i l a t e r a l , not
multilateral,
discussion.
As e a r l y as 1957, Pakistan
dispute.
India
proposals
categorically
but agreed
technical
suggested
that
information
on
rejected
the
two
arbitration
Pakistan's
countries
common r i v e r s .
secondary
motive.
The
to
sometimes
resulted
i n progress
negotiations
with
India.
Pakistan's
promoted b i l a t e r a l c o n s u l t a t i o n
diplomatic
notes
information
with that
One
question
of
involve
made
bilateral
of a r b i t r a t i o n
indirect
exchange
of
country.
augmentation
Bangladesh's
position
on the
has been to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s i n
Bangladesh's proposal
f o r augmentation
includes
r e s e r v o i r s i n India and Nepal which can, t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,
s t o r e enough water to maintain the Ganges' flow during
season.
had a
third parties
in
suggestion
an
also
India to a d i r e c t exchange of t e c h n i c a l
of the c o r n e r s t o n e s of
discussions.
storage
with
from
exchange
The lower r i p a r i a n ' s
the d i s p u t e
being
specific
could
s t r a t e g y to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s i n
suggestion
i n the
By
attempting
to
include
Nepal
in
the dry
discussions,
165
Bangladesh wants to increase
is
the
that
lower
riparian
country
on
concessions.
a
India
i t s bargaining
power.
Since
v i s - a - v i s Nepal, i t wants to deal
basis
knows
in a t r i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n , i t
that
to
extract
same advantage that
from Nepal as the
state.
also
objectives.
believes
in the
"divide
region
and
Nepal
in
from broader and
power
in
maximum
i t receives
discussions
more basic
South
political
India
gain maximum b e n e f i t from the other
states
in i t s d e a l i n g s with them by adopting a p o l i c y
act
in
If
the smaller
concert,
enjoys.
in d i s c u s s i o n s has
not
because
India
s t a t e s i n the
might
lose
Bangladesh has
some
of
succeeded so f a r and
it
goes
against
one
i s l i k e l y to f a i l
While
to
put
Bangladesh
pressure
was
on
the
this
to
intimidate
Considering
apparently
enough
the s t a t e of Sino-Indian
decades, t h i s i s hardly
appropriately
in the
surprising.
basis.
India
able to get
on
not
in
of India's c a r d i n a l
d e c l a r a t i o n s of support over i t s stand
was
the
Bangladesh's s t r a t e g y to include Nepal
also t r i e d
China.
of
region were
p o l i c i e s - - t h a t of d e a l i n g with neighbours on a b i l a t e r a l
approaching
of
Asia,
rule."
future
include
predominant
i t can
advantage i t now
the
to
stems
As the
that
allowed to
lower r i p a r i a n
refusal
augmentation
with
bilateral
w i l l have to give Bangladesh the
India's
India
Farakka
Chinese
issue,
India."
r e l a t i o n s over the past
Crow sums up the
by
9
two
situation
f o l l o w i n g words:
Bangladesh c o u l d
muster
the
support
of only a few
f r i e n d l y nations.
Amongst
the
more powerful,
only
China
was
willing
to make p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n s of
support and, since China and India
had
not
resolved
the
d i f f e r e n c e s which had caused the 1962 war, that
166
support c o u l d not be r e a d i l y converted
on the Government of I n d i a .
into
pressure
5 0
Pakistan/Bangladesh
through the
also
superpowers.
In
tried
to
1968,
the
put
Pakistan
requested the S o v i e t Union to b r i n g pressure
settle
the
Farakka
dispute
equitably
Kosygin, the then Soviet premier, sent
urging
a s o l u t i o n on the
1978,
President
Carter,
offered assistance
A few
offer
"requests."
far
Bangladesh.
53
New
Bangladesh's s t r a t e g y
with
its
Indian
In
5 1
parliament,
region's
rivers.
5 2
made
a
Britain
ignored
these
has
C l e a r l y , India views i t s
neighbours
It i s not
country
i n t i m i d a t e d by other
not be
Alexei
to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s
important p r i n c i p l e .
will
of
to
to I n d i r a Gandhi
D e l h i simply
produced no p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s .
p o l i c y of b i l a t e r a l i s m
India
Indus Waters T r e a t y .
i n a speech to the
India
government
quickly.
a letter
for the development of the
in
on
to bear on
and
days l a t e r , Prime M i n i s t e r Callaghan
similar
so
l i n e s of the
pressure
as
based
on
s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , that
major powers, be
an
this
they
r e g i o n a l or i n t e r n a t i o n a l .
Pakistan/Bangladesh's s t r a t e g y
the
dispute
was
at best a " c a l c u l a t e d r i s k . "
the d e s i r e d r e s u l t of India agreeing
On
On
occasion,
other
from
i t accelerated
occasions,
India
to i n v o l v e t h i r d p a r t i e s
to the extent
mediation.
the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i n g
that the
o f f the b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i n g
I t never produced
to t h i r d party
this strategy triggered a
Indian
process. "
5
in
hostile
process.
reaction
government almost cut
1 67
Threat
of R e t a l i a t i o n
According
to LeMarquand, i n an upstream-downstream c o n f l i c t
the upstream country has no economic i n c e n t i v e to cooperate
the downstream country
over
the
former.
clarified
country
signalling
project
The
55
i n Chapter
can
elicit
its
own
else,
One
India
t h r e a t was
could
the
which
the
Pakistan
going
have adverse
government,
been
downstream
ahead
i s by
with
effects
having
a
i n the
tried
on the Farakka Barrage i s s u e .
i s s u e d i n the form of p a s s i n g
on
plans
to which P a k i s t a n would c o n s t r u c t a barrage
the Ganges in East P a k i s t a n t e r r i t o r y .
as
power
followed a r e t a l i a t o r y s t r a t e g y f o r a while in
according
simply
reciprocal
from the upstream country
an e f f o r t to make India cooperate
The
in
i t s i n t e n t i o n of
which
The
has
of r e c i p r o c a l power has
way
cooperation
country.
everything
concept
II.
to the l a t t e r
of
upstream
unless the l a t t e r
with
"Ganges
Barrage."
T h i s barrage
This
was
barrage,
on
known
a s i d e from
i r r i g a t i n g huge areas
i n East P a k i s t a n would
for
Because of the l o c a t i o n of t h i s
dry season use.
also
to
store
water
reservoir,
i t would be p o s s i b l e to f l o o d huge areas
i n West Bengal ( I n d i a ) .
The
considerable
New
very mention of t h i s p r o j e c t caused
Delhi.
K.L.
power, expressed
parliament)
Rao,
alarm
in
the Indian m i n i s t e r of i r r i g a t i o n
and
h i s apprehensions
about the p r o j e c t .
implemented,
it
would
The
Ganges
of
Lok
Sabha
East
(Indian
s a i d that i f the p r o j e c t were
eroding these
a s u b t l e irony embedded
Barrage
the
cause harm to l a r g e t r a c t s of
w i t h i n India by submerging and
There was
He
in
in
areas.
territory
5 6
Pakistan's
scheme.
P a k i s t a n c o u l d act as a l e v e r on
1 68
India.
If India were u n w i l l i n g to r e l e a s e to
sufficient
opt
would
10 feet
force
The
proposed barrage
a
would have to be
(from 45 to 55 f e e t above s e a - l e v e l ) and
India
to put high marginal
banks of Indian p a r t s of the G a n g e s .
India
Pakistan
supply of Ganges waters, East Pakistan would have to
f o r a higher barrage.
r a i s e d by
East
this
embankments along
implicit
to
in East P a k i s t a n ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Ganges Barrage
was
clear.
As
it
negotiations
turned
after
out,
the
there
The
57
was
threat
both
some
progress
in
the
p r e s e n t a t i o n of East P a k i s t a n ' s Ganges
Barrage p r o j e c t to I n d i a .
P a k i s t a n was
threaten
India
extremely
with
a
f o r t u n a t e to be
project
of
i t s own.
pursued t h i s s t r a t e g y with a l i t t l e more
quite
likely
Farakka
that
dispute
turmoil
prevented
that
attention
to
quite
the
and
India.
problems and
take
position
to
If P a k i s t a n
had
determination,
quite
going
possible
through,
concentrating
Barrage
it
dispute.
5 8
that
at
the
this
was
perhaps
Pakistan
I t i s unfortunate
The
situation
f u l l advantage of the
"reciprocal
was
the
undivided
that owing to domestic
f i n a n c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s , Pakistan
the
its
the only time d u r i n g
had
is
time
in i t s proposed Ganges Barrage p r o j e c t
Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e that
over
is
was
from
Farakka
to P a k i s t a n
unique
It
Pakistan
country
a
would have been f o r c e d to s e t t l e
amicably.
domestic
presented
India
in
is
the
power"
political
not
able
to
opportunity.
Internationalization
Internationalization
involves
the
taking
of
a disputed
issue to a r e g i o n a l or an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n by
one
or
169
more of the d i s p u t a n t s with an aim to reach a s o l u t i o n .
of
"mid-level"
when
disputes,
relations
considerably.
subordinate
between
unfavourable
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n normally
the
disputants
have
In a s u p e r o r d i n a t e - s u b o r d i n a t e
state
may
In case
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e an
international
opinion
against
deteriorated
r e l a t i o n s h i p , the
issue
to
create
the superordinate
country
thereby
issue.
With regard to i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i p a r i a n d i s p u t e s , however,
the
chances
p u t t i n g i n d i r e c t pressure
occurs
of
r e s o l u t i o n are not good.
have been d i s c u s s e d
During
in detail
the course
the
Helsinki
Nations.
Rules'
apportionment."
riparian
It
Pakistan
of
Assembly on two separate
first
took the issue
to
a strong case based on the
"equitable
and
reasonable
s t a t e s and urged the i n t e r n a t i o n a l body t o put pressure
s o l u t i o n c o u l d be reached.
levelled
accusations
explained
The reasons f o r t h i s
a l s o emphasised the r i g h t s of lower
on India to cooperate i n order
charges
General
presented
principle
59
the
of the Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e , the i s s u e
In September 1968, P a k i s t a n
United
resolve
i n Chapter I I .
was taken to the United Nations
occasions.
on i t to
were
the
against
not
in
that a f a i r l y quick
The Indian
i t by
the
government
claiming
least
and e q u i t a b l e
defended
that
justified.
the
Pakistan's
India
also
importance of the Farakka Barrage p r o j e c t i n the
r e j u v e n a t i o n of the port of C a l c u t t a .
Pakistan's
s t r a t e g y succeeded only
insofar
as
subsequent
b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s were e l e v a t e d from the l e v e l of t e c h n i c a l
experts
to
the
level
of
senior
remembered that i n 1968 Indo-Pakistan
civil
servants.
I t must be
r i v a l r y was w e l l known
to
1 70
the
rest
opposite
of
the
world.
stands on almost
General Assembly, the
be
one
could
Since
of
all
India and
issues
they
at
each
other.
Moreover,
these damages were h y p o t h e t i c a l
a long way
In any
continued
to
of
forty-day
Pakistan's
Pakistan
case,
at
that
s i n c e the Farakka Barrage
issue to the United
Nations
in
withdraw water u n i l a t e r a l l y even a f t e r the
"agreement."
ditch
of
effort
unilaterally.
the
to
India
to prevent the
1976.
stop
was
In
60
this
India
from
s u i t a b l y embarrassed and
issue from being
D e l h i on
the
T h i s was
a t a c t i c a l move by India to d i s s i p a t e the
attempts to
the
foil
to
the
United
Bangladesh's
item
in
There
water
eve
move,
Nations.
the
of
bilateral
the
Farakka.
6 1
force
behind
Despite
India's
latter
managed
the agenda of the General Assembly.
requested both p a r t i e s to hold
a
l o b b i e d hard
s e s s i o n to hold b i l a t e r a l t a l k s on
f i n a l wording of the r e s o l u t i o n , however, was
ministerial
instance,
r a i s e d in the General Assembly.
Assembly
request
expiry
withdrawing
General
Bangladesh's
India
i s s u e by Bangladesh represented
India even i n v i t e d Bangladesh to New
include
states
a year a f t e r the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
the
the
from completion.
Bangladesh took the
last
in
of the damages that would be caused to East
were b e l i e v e d to have been exaggerated.
T h i s was
on
taken
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community mistook Farakka to
polemics
assessment
was
voted
had
those "excuses" f o c u s s i n g on which these two
hurl
point
Pakistan
very mild and
negotiations
at
to
The
only
the
l e v e l . ( S e e Appendix D f o r text of the r e s o l u t i o n ) .
is
no
doubt
that
the
Bangladesh
move
caused
171
considerable
interesting
signed
embarrassment
to
only
note
much should
that
India.
It
the
months
issue.
after
the
also
being
of
a
Bangladesh
Although
the o v e r a l l support
slightly,
the r e s o l u t i o n had only recommending powers.
other
states
in
similar
i n terms votes
Bangladesh
f o r Bangladesh p o l i c y
situations.
favoured
makers
Bangladesh
to
can r e s o r t to i s s u e - a r e a l i n k a g e .
that Bangladesh can o f f e r concessions
India has shown i n t e r e s t .
to India
The success
s t r a t e g y w i l l depend on the kind of p r i o r i t y
Brahmaputra l i n k c a n a l .
linked
could
Linkage
It i s important
where
There can be other
to a Farakka settlement.
in
6 2
remember
T h i s means
other
areas
or f a i l u r e of t h i s
India p l a c e s on the
i s s u e s which can be
For example, India has o f f e r e d
to buy n a t u r a l gas from Bangladesh on a number of o c c a s i o n s .
one
time, Z i a agreed to s e l l
Bangladesh
government
natural
reversed
f o r c i b l e occupation
of a d i s p u t e d
India
shown
has
also
l i n k from A g a r t a l a
West
Bengal
m i l i t a r y access
gas
after
but the
India's
in
developing
6 3
railway
India wants to c o n s t r u c t a r a i l
Bangladesh.
of India to C a l c u t t a
For fear of p r o v i d i n g a
i n t o Bangladesh, the Bangladesh
never agreed t o the p r o p o s a l .
India,
At
i s l a n d on the Bay of B e n g a l .
i n the eastern extremity
through
to
i t s decision
interest
communications with Bangladesh.
in
to
however,
subordinate/downstream country
sympathy
that
move
It i s clear,
gain the
Issue-area
very
As has been mentioned before, too
not be made of the s t r a t e g y .
Bangladesh
is
that the i n t e r i m Ganges Waters Treaty was
fourteen
internationalize
to
government
has
172
These
are two areas which could be reopened and a t r a d e o f f
might be made with I n d i a .
S e l l i n g n a t u r a l gas to India would i n
f a c t b e n e f i t Bangladesh as w e l l beacause i t has
resources
of
districts
the
this
commodity,
i n Bangladesh.
distance
from
in Comilla
The proposed railway
Agartala
Bangladesh would a l s o gain
network.
mostly
huge
untapped
and Sylhet
link
would
to C a l c u t t a by a thousand
an
improved
railway
cut
miles.
communication
I t i s up to the policy-makers i n Dhaka to reopen these
negotiations
and
link
i t to the Farakka i s s u e .
India might be
interested.
Since
the
Farakka d i v e r s i o n s are causing
much
hardship
to
people of southwestern Bangladesh, they have been forced t o
move elsewhere.
search
for
so
Some of them have even crossed
of b e t t e r economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
t h i s migration,
i s already
barbed-wire
is
fence
futile
over to India since
around
and
that
nothing
a
entire
1700 miles
Bangladesh
accurate. *
6
India's
with Bangladesh.
l i n k canal
of the IndoDelhi
that
i t i s i n the long-range i n t e r e s t of
65
overall
superiority
m i l i t a r y and economic c a p a b i l i t i e s g i v e s
in n e g o t i a t i o n s
allow
the
Bangladesh.
In the f i n a l a n a l y s i s ,
to
is
Dhaka c o u l d t r y to convince New
India not to impoverish
regard
1971
reason
attempting to prevent t h i s i n f l u x by b u i l d i n g a
Bangladesh border.
this
Whatever, the
the f a c t that at l e a s t a m i l l i o n
n a t i o n a l s have c r o s s e d
India
over to India i n
to be b u i l t
But i f Bangladesh
i t the edge
refuses
through i t s t e r r i t o r y ,
India can do short of using m i l i t a r y f o r c e .
seems u n l i k e l y that India w i l l do t h i s .
with
to
there i s
So f a r , i t
Meanwhile, the pressure
1 73
on
the
government of Bangladesh to augment the dry season
of the Ganges i s i n t e n s i f y i n g because
as
irrigation
I n d i a i n c r e a s e Bangladesh's share w i l l decrease.
solution
to
this
in
both
countries
Farakka Barrage d i s p u t e i n t o a c o n f l i c t
Despite
needs
in
With no agreed
s t r u g g l e f o r a scarce resource
d e s p e r a t i o n of m i l l i o n s
flow
i n s i g h t , the
may
escalate
the
of major p r o p o r t i o n s .
r i g o r o u s b a r g a i n i n g by both P a k i s t a n and Bangladesh
with India over
the Farakka Barrage i s s u e , an e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n
has
reached
not
been
even
today.
There
were
times
when
n e g o t i a t i o n s between the two c o - r i p a r i a n s showed some p r o g r e s s .
T h i s p r o g r e s s , however, was more the r e s u l t of Indian
concession
than
i t was of any conscious
Pakistan/Bangladesh
followed at
dyadic
where
situation
superordinate
country
the
the
b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y that
time.
upstream
power, i t i s q u i t e u n l i k e l y
In
an
country
that
asymmetric
i s also
the
upstream
country
room to maneuver.
too h e a v i l y
in
f o r the downstream country
the
downstream
can achieve much i n the way of r e s u l t s i t d e s i r e s .
o v e r a l l power r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t i l t e d
the
unilateral
favour
The
of
to have much
174
NOTES
1. David G. LeMarquand,
I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s : The P o l i t i c s of
Cooperation, (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, 1977), p.8.
LeMarquand
identifies
four f o l l o w i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between coriparians:
a) p u b l i c goods; b) common pool
resources; c)
i n t e g r a t e d development o p p o r t u n i t i e s ; and d) upstream-downstream
conflict.
For a d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the four c a t e g o r i e s ,
see Chapter 11.
2.
Ibid.
, p. 1 0.
3.
Michael
Dolan,
Brian
Tomlin,
and H a r a l d
von R e i k h o f f ,
"Integration
and Autonomy
i n Canada-United R e l a t i o n s , " i n
Canadian J o u r n a l of P o l i t i c a l Science, June 1982, XV:2, pp.331363.
4.
Ibid.
5.
The
passes on
economic
country.
, pp.332-333.
United
States
agreed
to d e s a l t p a r t of the water i t
to Mexico i n the Colorado
River
d e s p i t e having
no
i n c e n t i v e to cooperate as the superordinate/upstream
See LeMarquand, op. c i t . , p.10.
6. For a b e t t e r understanding of the Kashmir problem, see S.M.
Burke,
P a k i s t a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y : An H i s t o r i c a l A n a l y s i s ,
(London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973), pp.21 -46.
7.
B.M.
Abbas, The Ganges Water Dispute,
Press L i m i t e d , 1982), p.19.
(Dhaka: U n i v e r s i t y
8. In May 1965, I n d i a and P a k i s t a n
fought
a war over the
disputed
Rann of Kutch t e r r i t o r y on the Indo-Pakistan border.
T h i s was f o l l o w e d by a bigger
war over
Kashmir
i n September
1965.
The f i n a l war which decided I n d i a ' s predominance beyond
q u e s t i o n was fought
i n December
1971 over
East
Pakistan.
P a k i s t a n troops s u f f e r e d a resounding defeat at the hands of the
Indian
armed
f o r c e s on December
16, 1971.
Bangladesh was
created
and a new balance
of power e s t a b l i s h e d
i n the
subcontinent.
For a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the f i r s t two IndoP a k i s t a n wars, see Burke, op. c i t . , pp.318-357.
9. The concept of non-alignment f i r s t gained currency
i n 1961
during
the Belgrade conference as the middle-of-the-road p o l i c y
in i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .
The foundations of the movement were
l a i d s i x years e a r l i e r i n the Bandung conference
(Indonesia).
The
origins
of the movement i s c r e d i t e d to Jawaharlal Nehru of
I n d i a , Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt,
and Josef
Broz T i t o of
Yugoslavia.
.Initially,
however, non-alignment was viewed as a
v e i l e d form of p r o - S o v i e t i s m .
10.
P a k i s t a n j o i n e d the Baghdad pact on September 23, 1955. In
August 1959, the name of the o r g a n i s a t i o n was changed
to the
175
Central
Treaty
O r g a n i s a t i o n . Although the U.S.
had cancassed
for the Baghdad Pact and l a t e r f u l l y p a r t i c i p a t e d in i t s work,
it
never
officially
signed the t r e a t y . P a k i s t a n r a t i f i e d the
Manila Pact on January 19, 1955.
The Manila Pact l a t e r came to
be known as the South East Asian Treaty O r g a n i s a t i o n .
11.
The
f i r s t p u b l i c i z e d border i n c i d e n t took p l a c e at Longju
in the North East F r o n t i e r Area (NEFA) on August 26,
1959.
On
this
occasion
the
Chinese and Indian border f o r c e s exchanged
fire.
The second border i n c i d e n t , which was
actually
a
brief
war,
s t a r t e d when the Chinese c r o s s e d Thagla Ridge, which I n d i a
claimed as the boundary, and
threatened
the
Indian
post
of
Dhola.
The
Chinese a c t u a l l y
d i d not
a t t a c k en masse u n t i l
October 20, on both the eastern and western f r o n t s , p u t t i n g
the
Indian army i n ignominious f l i g h t everywhere. While the Chinese
rounded
some 4,000 Indians
as
p r i s o n e r s of war, the Indians
c o u l d not capture even one Chinese s o l d i e r .
12.
By September 1965, United
States
economic
a i d to
India
exceeded
$6
billion
and
military
a i d to the tune of $84.5
million.
India continued
to
receive large q u a n t i t i e s
of
military
a i d from the S o v i e t Union b a f t e r i t s wars with China.
See Burke, op.
c i t . , pp.278, 301.
13.
Helmut R.
Kulz, "Further Water Disputes between India
and
Pakistan,"
i n The I n t e r n a t i o n a l and Comparative Law Q u a r t e r l y ,
Vol.
18, (July 1969): 722.
14.
B.M.
Abbas, op.
15.
Ibid.. , p. 32.
cit. ,
p.30.
16.
The c o n s t r u c t i o n of the barrage was completed i n
the feeder c a n a l was not ready u n t i l December, 1973.
1970
but
17.
The
May
1974
meeting
between Mrs.
Gandhi and Mujibur
Rahman i s reported to have been very s u c c e s s f u l .
A number
of
bilateral
i s s u e s were s e t t l e d and a number of new d e a l s struck
between India and Bangladesh. Although there was no
definitive
agreement
on
the
Farakka
i s s u e , the f o l l o w i n g new d e a l s were
struck and i s s u e s r e s o l v e d : 1) many small boundary d i s p u t e s were
s e t t l e d ; 2) c l o s e r c o o p e r a t i o n on trade was agreed upon; 3) both
c o u n t r i e s pledged to i n c r e a s e t h e i r
exports
to meet
balanced
trade t a r g e t s set during e a r l i e r t a l k s ; 4) establishment of four
j o i n t i n d u s t r i e s , t a k i n g raw m a t e r i a l from one country to labour
and machinery i n the other; 5) i t was agreed that a j o i n t survey
would be
carried
out f o r a r a i l l i n k to connect C a l c u t t a with
A g a r t a l a ; and
f) p r o t o c o l s were signed
making new
credits
a v a i l a b l e to Bangladesh.
18.
B.M.
Abbas, op.
c i t . , pp.34-35.
19.
According
to B.M.
Abbas when Mujib c o n f e r r e d with Abbas,
he r e a l i s e d h i s e r r o r and decided to r e l y on Abbas's judgement.
1 76
20. B.M.
Abbas was the a l t e r n a t e
leader
in the f i r s t
five
experts'
meeting
held
between
I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . A f t e r the
independence of Bangladesh Abbas became Advisor
to the
Prime
Minister
on
f l o o d c o n t r o l , i r r i g a t i o n , and power, and, i n that
c a p a c i t y was Bangladesh's c h i e f n e g o t i a t o r .
He
was
also
the
f i r s t chairman of the Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission.
21.
India
and Bangladesh agreed to run the Farakka Barrage on
an experimental b a s i s from A p r i l 21 to May 31, 1975.
The accord
was announced on A p r i l 18, 1975 i n the form of a p r e s s r e l e a s e .
22.
B.M.
Abbas, op.
c i t . , p.46.
23.
"Bangladesh: The Farakka D i s p u t e . "
October
15
24.
The Vancouver Sun,
May
17
1976,
"Bangladesh
p r o t e s t e r s end march c l o s e to Indian border."
25.
Ibid.
26.
Ibid.
1976,
anti-dam
27. Bangladesh sent a d e l e g a t i o n under the l e a d e r s h i p of
B.M.
Abbas to the United Nations Water Conference h e l d i n Mar Del
P l a t a , A r g e n t i n a from March 14 to 25,
1977.
B.M.
Abbas
was
elected
chairman
of one
of the two
committees.
The major
Bangladesh p r o p o s a l with regard to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n in
the development of shared water r e s o u r c e s was met with immediate
response from most of the lower r i p a r i a n s t a t e s .
28.
See Appendix
C f o r p r o v i s i o n s of the 1977 Ganges Waters
T r e a t y . A r t i c l e II (2) of the Agreement assures Bangladesh
80%
of the agreed share.
29.
The
Janata Party M a n i f e s t o , Both Bread and L i b e r t y , says:
The Party w i l l r e s o l v e such o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s as remain with
its
neighbours and w i l l
c o n s c i o u s l y promote a good-neighbour
policy,
p.25.
30.
See footnote
#28.
31. The f i r s t l e t t e r of p r o t e s t was w r i t t e n by
the government
of
P a k i s t a n on October 29, 1951.
T h i s i s the date which marked
the beginning of the d i s p u t e .
32. See Text of the 1977 Agreement between India and Bangladesh
in Appendix C.
33. The
Helsinki
Rules authored by
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Law
Associaton
i n 1966,
p r o v i d e the most
important and widely
accepted l e g a l g u i d e l i n e s
f o r use
in s e t t l i n g
international
river
disputes.
See
International
Law A s s o c i a t i o n , H e l s i n k i
Rules on the Uses of I n t e r n a t i o n a l R i v e r s ,
(London:
177
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law A s s o c i a t i o n ,
1966).
34.
Ben Crow, The P o l i t i c s and Technology of Sharing the Ganges
, unpublished
Ph.D.
t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Edinburgh, 1980,
p.114. Although Crow i d e n t i f i e s P a k i s t a n ' s s t r a t e g y t o be these
f i v e , he l i m i t s h i s d i s c u s s i o n t o the 1960-1970 p e r i o d .
I agree
with
him, but only
partially.
I argue that
these
five
s t r a t e g i e s were used throughout the d i s p u t e from 1951 up t o now.
I also
s e r i o u s l y doubt Crow's c o n t e n t i o n that these s t r a t e g i e s
were used i n the order
given
i n an e f f o r t
to increase the
pressure
on India
t o cooperate.
As I argue throughout the
t h e s i s , a subordinate/downstream country has a l i m t e d number of
options
available.
I t uses whichever i t t h i n k s w i l l give i t
maximum b e n e f i t a t a p a r t i c u l a r time and a c c o r d i n g
t o the
dynamics of the s p e c i f i c c o n f l i c t .
35.
Government of Bangladesh. White Paper on the Ganges Water
Dispute, Dhaka, September, 1976, p.13.
36.
The Hindu, February 19 1976, "Ganga waters:
Bangla c l a i m . "
India
refutes
37.
See Crow, op. c i t . , p.402; see a l s o , Foreign A f f a i r s
Record, A p r i l 1976, " O f f i c i a l Indo-Bangladesh T a l k s
on Ganges
Waters of A p r i l 26, 1979."
38.
Nehru and Ayub were i n London i n March 1961 t o attend the
Commonwealth heads of s t a t e conference.
They mmet t o d i s c u s s a
nvumber of i s s u e s and the q u e s t i o n of the Farakka issue a l s o
came up. Thre was no fpormal understanding but they decided t o
cooperate
on the Farakka p r o j e c t . Nehru had t e n t a t i v e l y agreed
that
as soon as the t e c h n i c a l aspects
were s o r t e d
out,
discussions
among m i n i s t e r s
from
both c o u n t r i e s
c o u l d take
place.
T h i s , they hoped would pave the way f o r a comprehensive
settlement of the i s s u e .
39.
Bangladesh, however, d i d not accept t h i s concession because
Nepal's p o s i t i o n i n f u t u r e d i s c u s s i o n s was not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d .
40.
The Times of I n d i a , January 15 1981, "Farakka and i t s F a l l out," by Inder Malhotra.
41.
PM."
42.
The Hindu,
December
LeMarquand, op.
20
1977, " Z i a ' s f r u i t f u l
t a l k s with
c i t . , p. 17.
43.
Dawn (Dhaka d a t e l i n e ) , J u l y 12 1961,
c o l d shouldered."
"Pakistan's
proposal
44.
B.M.
Abbas who was a l t e r n a t e leader
of the Pakistan
d e l e g a t i o n i n n e g o t i a t i o n s with India over the Farakka
Barrage
issue
stayed
back
i n Bangladesh a f t e r the c r e a t i o n of that
country.
In Mujib's c a b i n e t he was f i r s t a d v i s o r to the Prime
1
78
Minister
on f l o o d
control,
irrigation,
and power.
He has
w r i t t e n an a u t h o r i t a t i v e account of the n e g o t i a t i o n s
from 1960
onward.
In t h i s book, The Ganges Water D i s p u t e , he c l a i m s that
d u r i n g Mrs. Gandhi's v i s i t to Bangladesh
i n March
1972, he
proposed
a joint
rivers
commission
of the two c o u n t r i e s .
Apparently,. Mrs.
Gandhi r e a d i l y endorsed the i d e a .
The idea
was
a l s o supported by Sheikh Mujib, Sardar Swaran Singh India's
foreign minister,
as w e l l
as Abdus Samad Azad,
Bangladesh
foreign
minister.
See B.M. Acbbas, The Ganges Water D i s p u t e ,
(Dhaka: U n i v e r s i t y Press L i m i t e d , 1982), pp.31-32.
45.
The J o i n t R i v e r s Commission
was f i r s t
mentioned
i n the
joint
statement
issued
a t the end of I n d i r a Gandhi's v i s i t to
Dhaka i n March 1972. However, the JRC f i r s t met i n June 1972
with B.M. Abbas of Bangladesh as i t s chairman.
46.
Government of Bangladesh. White Paper on the Ganges Water
D i s p u t e , Dhaka, September, 1976, p.13.
47.
A good i l l u s t r a t i o n
of the p o l i t i c a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
technical
data
i s to be found
i n the way each s i d e used
measurements of the Ganges' flow to support i t s own
position.
The
Indians
used measurements taken a t Farakka
and the
Pakistanis
used measurements taken
farther
downstream
at
Hardinge Bridge i n East p a k i s t b a n . The two measurements d i d not
tally
because
at
Hardinge
B r i d g e , the Ganges'
flow i s
supplemented
by
groundwater
seepage.
Therefore,
the
measurements taken here asre g r e a t e r
than those recorded a t
Farakka. The Indians used the flow measurements a t Farakka to
prove
that
since
Pakistan
received
more water
a t Hardinge
B r i d g e , the Indians should have
to r e l e a s e
less
water to
Pakistan.
The Indians, of c o u r s e , needed a l l the water they
c o u l d get at Farakka f o r the r e j u v e n a t i o n of C a l c u t t a p o r t .
48.
Lok Sabha Debates,
S i t u a t i o n , " 32, 56, C o l s .
August
16
2405-2560.
1961,
"International
49.
Dawn, January
10 1977, "China-Bangladesh r e l a t i o n s , " and
March
19
1977,
"Bangladesh
fully
prepared
to
uphold
sovereignty."
50.
Crow, op.
51.
Dawn, J u l y
Farakka."
c i t . , pp.169-170.
16 1978, "India r e j e c t s Kosygin's suggestion on
52.
USIA, D e l h i , Towards our common g o a l s : t e x t s of remarks and
speeches," New D e l h i , 1978.
53.
The Hindu, January 7 1978, "Callaghan gets warm welcome."
54.
A f t e r Bangladesh r a i s e d the i s s u e i n the U n i t e d Nations i n
September
1976,
India
was o b v i o u s l y
angered.
Bilateral
n e g o t i a t i o n s which followed were a mere f o r m a l i t y .
No progress
179
c o u l d be made because the Indian d e l e g a t i o n demanded more data.
This
deadlock
was
not
broken
until
I n d i r a Gandhi l o s t the
e l e c t i o n to M o r a r j i D e s a i .
55.
LeMarquand, op.
cit•
,
p.10.
56.
Lok Sabha Debates, March
31
1969,
"Construction
Barrage across the River Padma by P a k i s t a n , " S4, 2_6, C o l .
57.
B.M.
Abbas, op.
cit. ,
of
a
46.
p.26.
58.
In
1969,
Ayub
Khan's
ten-year
long
"benevolent"
dictatorship
came to an
end.
M a r t i a l Law
was
declared
throughout P a k i s t a n because of the student unrest throughout the
country
but
particularly
i n East P a k i s t a n .
In East P a k i s t a n ,
the movement a g a i n s t m i l i t a r y r u l e was a c t u a l l y spearheaded
by
the Awami League. Amidst a l l t h i s chaos, the communication from
Islamabad to i t s n e g o t i a t o r s over the Farakka i s s u e was u n c l e a r .
Besides,
the Ganges Barrage was such a mammoth p r o j e c t that the
P a k i s t a n government might have used i t to put pressure on I n d i a .
59.
See
footnote
#33.
60.
Mrs.
Gandhi
had
considered
Mujibur
Rahman to be
her
"friend"
and
protege.
It
i s s a i d that she had a b s o l u t e l y no
i n k l i n g of h i s b r u t a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n . A f t e r t h i s
incident,
she
summoned
senior
Raw o f f i c e r s (Research and A n a l y s i s Wing), the
Indian
version
of
a
secret
s e r v i c e and
reprimanded
them
severely.
The
timing
a l s o corresponded with
her
assuming
e x t r a o r d i n a r y powers under Emergency
regulations.
Withdrawing
water u n i l a t e r a l l y from Bangladesh at t h i s p o i n t was, t h e r e f o r e ,
q u i t e normal f o r I n d i a .
61.
Abbas, op.
c i t . , pp.55-56.
62.
It i s quite
a common p r a c t i c e by s t a t e s to l i n k v a r i o u s
issues in a bargaining s i t u a t i o n .
The subordinate
state
in a
superordinate-subordiante
r e l a t i o n s h i p may sometimes o f f e r the
stronger power something that country may want i n exchange f o r
something
i t wants from the superordinate country.
This issuearea
linkage
works only
when what
it
wants
from
the
superordinate
power
i s not very important to that country.
In
that sense, the subordinate country i s always at a
disadvantage
v i s - a - v i s i t s superordinate p a r t n e r .
63.
Bangladesh Times, May 9 1981,
proposal of South T a l p a t t y . "
"India r e j e c t s j o i n t
survey
64.
Since the p a r t i t i o n
of
India
in
1947,
Bengali-speaking
people
from both West Bengal and what i s now Bangladesh s t a r t e d
emigrating to Assam. Very
soon,
these
Bengalees became
the
e l i t e , educated c l a s s in Assam. The Assamese people have always
resented
this
i n v a s i o n of
t h e i r homeland. S t a r t i n g in 1980,
there was an o r g a n i s e d movement a g a i n s t I n d i r a Gandhi's
policy
180
of
l e t t i n g i n Bengalees. The estimated number of Bengalees who
went over to Assam i n a p e r i o d of t h i r t y year must be c l o s e to
one m i l l i o n .
65.
Sometimes subordinate/downstream c o u n t r i e s
may
t r y to
convince the upstream c o u n t r i e s that a long-range and
equitable
solution i s in their interest.
T h i s s t r a t e g y u s u a l l y works when
i t i s employed with some other p o s i t i v e s a n c t i o n .
181
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186
APPENDIX A - STATUTE OF
THE 1972 INDQ-BANGLADESH JOINT RIVERS
COMMISSION
Chapter I
The C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s
Pursuant to the r e l a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i p and c o - o p e r a t i o n
that
e x i s t between India and Bangladesh,
D e s i r o u s of working together in h a r n e s s i n g the r i v e r s common to
both c o u n t r i e s f o r the b e n e f i t of the peoples of the two
countries,
D e s i r o u s of s p e c i f y i n g some q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g to these matters,
WE
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Chapter II
Article 1
There s h a l l be e s t a b l i s h e d an Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s
Commission, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the Commission.
Article 2
( i ) The Commission s h a l l be c o n s t i t u t e d by each p a r t i c i p a t i n g
government a p p o i n t i n g a chairman and three members; of these two
s h a l l be engineers. The Chairman and three members s h a l l
o r d i n a r i l y hold o f f i c e for a p e r i o d of three y e a r s .
( i i ) Each p a r t i c i p a t i n g government may a l s o such e x p e r t s and
a d v i s o r s as i t d e s i r e s .
Article 3
The Chairmanship of the Commission s h a l l be h e l d a n n u a l l y
turn by Bangladesh and I n d i a .
in
Article 4
( i ) The Commission s h a l l have the f o l l o w i n g f u n c t i o n s in
particular:
a) to maintain l i a i s o n between the p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o u n t r i e s in
order to ensure the most e f f e c t i v e j o i n t e f f o r t s i n maximising
the b e n e f i t s from common r i v e r s to both c o u n t r i e s .
b) to formulate f l o o d c o n t r o l works and to recommend
implementation of j o i n t p r o j e c t s .
c) to formulate d e t a i l e d p r o p o s a l s on advance f l o o r warnings,
f l o o d f o r e c a s t i n g and cyclone warnings,
d) to study f l o o d c o n t r o l and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s so that the
water resources of the region can be u t i l i s e d on an e q u i t a b l e
b a s i s fpor the mutual b e n e f i t of the peoples of the two
c o u n t r i e s , and
e) to formulate p r o p o s a l s f o r c a r r y i n g out c o - o r d i n a t e d
research
on problems of f l o o d c o n t r o l a f f e c t i n g both the c o u n t r i e s .
( i i ) The Commission s h a l l a l s o perform such other f u n c t i o n s as
the two governments may, by mutual agreement, d i r e c t i t to do.
187
Chapter III SUPPORTING STAFF AND
SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 5
Each government w i l l provide a p p r o p r i a t e supporting s t a f f and
s e c r e t a r i a l a s s i s t a n c e to i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n the Commission
to enable them to d i s c h a r g e t h e i r f u n c t i o n s i n an e f f e c t i v e
manner.
Chapter IV SESSIONS
Article 6
( i ) Subject to the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s s t a t u t e , the Commission
s h a l l adopt i t s own r u l e of procedure.
( i i ) Meetings may g e n e r a l l y take p l a c e a l t e r n a t i v e l y i n the two
c o u n t r i e s , subject to the conveniencce of the two c o u n t r i e s .
( i i i ) S p e c i a l meetings of working groups or ad-hoc expert groups
duly nominated by the r e s p e c t i v e governments may be arranged, as
r e q u i r e d , by mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n of the Members.
Chapter V RULES OF PROCEDURE
( i v ) The o r d i n a r y s e s s i o n of the Commission s h a l l be h e l d as
o f t e n as necessary, g e n e r a l l y four times a year. In a d d i t i o n
s p e c i a l meetings may be convened any time at the request of
e i t h e r government.
Article 7
A l l meetings s h a l l be c l o s e d meetings
d e s i r e s otherwise.
u n l e s s the Commission
Chapter VI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 8
The Commission s h a l l submit confirmed minutes of a l l meetings
the two governments. The Commission s h a l l a l s o submit i t s
annual r e p o r t s by the t h i r t y f i r s t of January, next year.
to
Article 9
D e c i s i o n s of the Commission s h a l l be unanimous. If any
d i f f e r e n c e s a r i s e i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s S t a t u t e they
s h a l l be r e f e r r e d t o the two governments to be d e a l t with on a
b i l a t e r a l b a s i s i n a s p i r i t of mutual respect and understanding.
Done i n Dhaka on the 24th day of November, Nineteen Hundred and
Seventy Two.
188
APPENDIX B - 1975 FORTY-DAY UNDERSTANDING
JOINT INDO-BANGLADESH PRESS RELEASE
EMBARGO:Not t o be p u b l i s h e d / b r o a d c a s t / t e l e c a s t
BST on 18th A p r i l , 1975.
before
1730 hours
Dacca/New D e l h i , A p r i l 18:
The d e l e g a t i o n from India l e d by H i s E x c e l l e n c y S h r i J a g j i v a n
Ram, M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e and I r r i g a t i o n and the d e l e g a t i o n
from Bangladesh l e d by H i s E x c e l l e n c y Mr. Abdur Rab Serneabat,
M i n i s t e r f o r F l o o d C o n t r o l , Water Resources, and Power met i n
Dhaka from the 16th to 18th A p r i l , 1975. The t a l k s were h e l d i n
a c o r d i a l atmosphere and were c h a r a c t e r i s e d by mutual
understanding that e x i s t s between the two f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s .
The Indian s i d e p o i n t e d out that while d i s c u s s i o n s regarding
a l l o c a t i o n of f a i r weather flows of the Ganga d u r i n g lean months
in terms of the Prime M i n i s t e r s ' d e c l a r a t i o n of May, 1974 a r e
c o n t i n u i n g , i t i s e s s e n t i a l to run the feeder c a n a l of the
Farakka Barrage d u r i n g the c u r r e n t lean p e r i o d .
I t i s agreed
that t h i s o p e r a t i o n may be c a r r i e d out with v a r y i n g d i s c h a r g e s
in the ten-day p e r i o d s during the months of A p r i l and May, 1975
as shown below ensuring the continuance of the remaining flow
for Bangladesh.
Month
Ten-day p e r i o d
Withdrawal
April
May
1975
1975
21st to 30th
1st t o 10th
11th to 20th
21st
to 31st
11,000
12,000
15,000
16,000
cusecs
cusecs
cusecs
cusecs
J o i n t teams c o n s i s t i n g of experts of two governments s h a l l
observe at the a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e s i n both the c o u n t r i e s the
e f f e c t s of the agreed withdrawals at Farakka, i n Bangladesh and
on the Hooghly R i v e r f o r the b e n e f i t of C a l c u t t a P o r t . A J o i n t
Team w i l l a l s o be s t a t i o n e d at Farakka to record the d i s c h a r g e s
i n t o the feeder c a n a l and the remaining flows f o r Bangladesh.
The teams w i l l submit t h e i r r e p o r t s to both the governments f o r
consideration.
April
18, 1975.
189
APPENDIX C - INDO-BANGLADESH AGREEMENT ON SHARING OF GANGA
WATERS AT FARAKKA
The f o l l o w i n g i s the text of the agreement between the
Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the
People's Republic of Bangladesh on s h a r i n g of the Ganga waters
at Farakka and on augmenting i t s flows signed i n Dhaka by S h r i
S u r j i t Singh Barnala, f o t the Government of the Republic of
India and Rear Admiral Musharraf Hussain Khan, f o r the
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on November 5,
1977.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH,
THE GOVERNMENT OF
DETERMINED to promote and strengthen t h e i r
f r i e n d s h i p and good n e i g h b o u r l i n e s s ,
r e l a t i o n s of
INSPIRED by the common d e s i r e of promoting
t h e i r peoples,
the w e l l being of
BEING d e s i r o u s of s h a r i n g by mutual agreement the waters of the
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v e r s f l o w j i n g through the t e r r i t o r i e s of the two
c o u n t r i e s and of making the optimal u t i l i s a t i o n of the water
resources of t h e i r region by j o i n t e f f o r t s ,
RECOGNISING that the need of making an i n t e r i m arrangement f o r
sharing of the Ganga waters at Farakka i n a s p i r i t of mutual
accommodation and the need f o r a s o l u t i o n of the long term
problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga are i n the mutual
i n t e r e s t s of the peoples of the two c o u n t r i e s ,
BEING d e s i r o u s of f i n d i n g a f a i r s o l u t i o n of the q u e s t i o n before
them, without a f f e c t i n g the r i g h t s and e n t i t l e m e n t s of e i t h e r
country other than those covered by t h i s Agreement, or
e s t a b l i s h i n g any general p r i n c i p l e s of law or precedent,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
A. Arrangements f o r s h a r i n g of the waters of the Ganga at
Farakka
Article I
The quantum ogf waters agreed to be r e l e a s e d by India to
Bangladesh w i l l be at Farakka
A r t i c l e II
( i ) The s h a r i n g between I n d i a and Bangladesh of the Ganga waters
at Farakka from the 1st January to the 31st May every year w i l l
be with r e f e r e n c e to the quantum shown i n Column 2 of the
Schedule annexed hereto which i s based on 75 per cent
a v a i l a b i l i t y c a l c u l a t e d from the recorded flows of the Ganga at
Farakka from 1948 to 1943.
190
( i i ) I n d i a s h a l l r e l e a s e to Bangladesh waters by 10-day p e r i o d s
in the quantum shown i n Column 4 ogf the Schedule:
Provided that the a c t u a l a v a i l a b i l i t y at Farakka o f f the Ganga
waters d u r i n g a ten-day p e r i o d i s higher or lower than the
quantum shown i n Column 2 of the Schedule i t s h a l l be shared i n
the p r o p p o r t i o n a p p l i c a b l e to that p e r i o d ;
Provided f u r t h e r that i f d u r i n g a p a r t i c u l a r ten-day p e r i o d , the
Ganga flows at Farakka come down to such a l e v e l that the share
of Bangladesh i s lower than 80 per cent of the value shown in
Column 4, the r e l e a s e of waters to Bangladesh d u r i n g that tenday p e r i o d s h a l l not f a l l below 80 per cent of the value shown
in Column 4.
A r t i c l e III
The waters r e l e a s e d to Bangladesh at Farakka under A r t i c l e I
s h a l l not be reduced below Farakka except f o r reasonable uses of
waters, not exceeding 200 cusecs, by I n d i a between Farakka and
the p o i n t on the Ganga where both i t s banks are i n Bangladesh.
A r t i c l e IV
A committee of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s nominated by the two
Governments ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d the J o i n t Committee) s h a l l be
constituted.
The J o i n t Committee s h a l l set up s u i t a b l e teams at
Farakka and Hardinge Bridge to observe and record at Farakka the
d a i l y flows below Farakka Barrage and i n the Feeder Canal, as
w e l l as at Hardinge B r i d g e .
Article V
The J o i n t Committee s h a l l decide i t s own
functioning.
procedure and method of
A r t i c l e VI
The J o i n t Committee s h a l l submit to the two Governments a l l data
a l l data c o l l e c t e d by i t and s h a l l a l s p o submit a y e a r l y report
to both the governments.
A r t i c l e VII
The J o i n t Committee s h a l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementing the
arrangements c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s part of the Agreement and
examining any d i f f i c u l t y a r i s i n g out of the implementation of
the above arrangements and of the o p e r a t i o n of the Farakka
Barrage. Any d i f f e r e n c e or d i s p u t e a r i s i n g i n t h i s regard, i f
not r e s o l v e d by the J o i n t Committee, s h a l l be r e f e r r e d to a
panel of equal number of Indian and Bangladeshi e x p e r t s
nominated by the two Governments which s h a l l meet u r g e n t l y at
the a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l to r e s o l v e i t by mutual d i s c u s s i o n and
f a i l i n g that by such other arrangements as they may mutually
agree upon.
191
B.
Long-Term Arrangements
A r t i c l e VIII
The two governments recognise the need to cooperate with each
other i n f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n to the long-term prpoblem of
augmenting the flows, of the Ganga d u r i n g the dry season.
A r t i c l e IX
The Indo-Bangladesh J o i n t R i v e r s Commission e s t a b l i s h e d by the
two Governments i n 1972 s h a l l c a r r y out i n v e s t i g a t i o n and study
of schemes r e l a t i n g to the augmentation of the dry season flow
of the Ganga proposed or to be be proposed by e i t h e r Government
with a view to f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n which i s economical and
feasible.
I t s h a l l submit i t s recommendations to the two
governments with a p e r i o d of three y e a r s .
Article X
The two Governments s h a l l c o n s i d e r and agree upon a scheme or
schemes, t a k i n g i n t o account the recommendations of the J o i n t
R i v e r s Commission and take necessary measures to implement i t or
them as s p e e d i l y as p o s s i b l e .
A r t i c l e XI
Any d i f f i c u l t y , d i f f e r e n c e or d i s p u t e a r i s i n g from or with
regard to t h i s part of the Agreement, i f not r e s o l v e d by the
J o i n t R i v e r s Commission, s h a l l be r e f e r r e d to the two
Governments which s h a l l meet u r g e n t l y at the a p p r o p r i a t e l e v e l
to r e s o l v e i t by mutual d i s c u s s i o n .
C.
Review and D u r a t i o n
A r t i c l e XII
The p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s Agreement w i l l be implemented by both
p a r t i e s i n i n good f a i t h .
During the p e r i o d f o r which the
Agreement c o n t i n u e s to be i n f o r c e in accordance with A r t i c l e 15
of the Agreement, the quantum of waters agreed to be r e l e a s e d to
Bangladesh at Farakka i n accordance with t h i s Agreement s h a l l
not be reduced.
A r t i c l e XIII
The Agreement w i l l be reviewed by the two Governments at the
e x p i r y of three years from the date of coming i n t o f o r c e of t h i s
Agreement ar as may be agreed upon between the two governments.
A r t i c l e XIV
The review or reviews r e f e r r e d to i n A r t i c l e 13 s h a l l e n t a i l
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the working, impact, implementation and
progress of the arrangements c o n t a i n e d i n p a r t s A and B of t h i s
Agreement.
A r t i c l e XV
T h i s Agreement s h a l l enter i n t o f o r c e upon s i g n a t u r e and s h a l l
remain i n f o r c e f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e years from the date of i t s
coming i n t o f o r c e .
I t may be extended f u r t h e r f o r a s p e c i f i e d
1 92
p e r i o d by mutual agreement i n the l i g h t of the reviews r e f e r r e d
to i n A r t i c l e 13.
IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly a u t h o r i s e d
t h e r e t o by the r e s p e c t i v e Governments, have signed t h i s
Agreement.
DONE i n d u p l i c a t e at Dhaka on November 5, 1977 i n the H i n d i ,
Bengali and E n g l i s h languages. In the event of any c o n f l i c t
between the t e x t s , the E n g l i s h t e x t s h a l l p r e v a i l .
1 93
APPENDIX D
-
CONSENSUS
S T A T E M E N T AT
THE
UNITED
NATIONS
1. T h e p a r t i e s a f f i r m e d t h e i r a d h e r e n c e t o t h e D e c l a r a t i o n
on
P r i n c i p l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law
concerning
Friendly
Relations
a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n among S t a t e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C h a r t e r
of
the U n i t e d N a t i o n s and s t r e s s e d , i n t h i s r e g a r d ,
their
u n a l t e r a b l e commitment t o s t r e n g t h e n
their bilateral relations
by a p p l y i n g t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t
of
disputes.
2. T h e p a r t i e s r e c o g n i s e d
the u r g e n c y of the s i t u a t i o n ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the onset of a n o t h e r dry
season.
3. B o t h p a r t i e s a g r e e d
s o l u t i o n and,
to that
Dacca (Dhaka) a t the m
view to a r r i v i n g at a
t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n c a l l e d f o r an
urgent
end,
have d e c i d e d
t o meet u r g e n t l y
at
i n i s t e r i a l level for negotiations with a
f a i r and e x p e d i t i o u s
settlement.
4. T h e p a r t i e s a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e p r i m e o b j e c t i v e o f s u c h
i n t e n s i f i e d c o n t a c t was
to promote the w e l l b e i n g s of
their
p e o p l e s and a g r e e d t o f a c i l i t a t e the e s t a b l i s h m e n t
o f an
atmosphere c o n d u c i v e t o the s u c c e s s f u l outcome of
the
negotiations.
5. T h e p a r t i e s u n d e r t o o k t o g i v e d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n
appropriate
ways o f u t i l i z i n g t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e
system.
6.It
i s open to e i t h e r p a r t y
at i t s t h i r t y - s e c o n d session
settlement
of the problem.
to
on
to the
United
r e p o r t to the G e n e r a l
the p r o g r e s s achieved
most
Nations
Assembly
i n the

THE FARAKKA BARRAGE DISPUTE: CONFLICT AND

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