ioc company landing team (clt) after action report (aar)

IOC COMPANY LANDING TEAM (CLT)
AFTER ACTION REPORT (AAR)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1
CLT staged at PZ (simulated amphibious
ship) in Northern VA
4
ASCM threat destroyed by CLT IOT enable
follow-on joint force operation
2
3
~350 miles from Quantico, KC-130 air-toair re-fueling extends CLT’s range.
MV-22s insert CLT ~600 miles from PZ IOT
destroy enemy anti-access capabilities.
5
6
Post-destruction raid, CLT charges batteries
while denying enemy access to area.
CLT patrol at halt after contact with enemy
attempting to re-enter area
Overview
In late March 2013, based upon our 35th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 34th Commandant’s “Concept for
Enhanced Company Operations,” and the March 2012 MCCDC “Gaining and Maintaining Access” concept, IOC, in
conjunction with VMX-22 and MAG-49 Det A, conducted a long-range, night raid experiment between MCB
Quantico and MCRD Parris Island. Lessons learned from this experiment will be published in a forthcoming
Marine Corps Gazette article and also influenced the design of a CLT experiment that IOC executed in mid-August
2013 between MCB Quantico and Camp Blanding, Florida; VMX-22, along with VMU-2 and VMGR-234 were in
support of the CLT. This experiment was designed to test the CLT concept over a 96-hour period, while operating
hundreds of miles from its HHQ against an enemy armed with anti-access capabilities, such as C-802 or C-803
ASCMs. The CLT was a task-organized rifle company (-)(+), with two maneuver platoons, one of which had an
embedded CLT HQ element. A JTAC and JFO, along with Marines specifically trained to use the Enhanced
Company Operations (ECO) voice and data communications gear set were also part of the CLT HQ element.
Throughout the experiment, the CLT was referred to as the Blue Force (BLUFOR). The BLUFOR fought against a
platoon-sized opposition force (OPFOR). This OPFOR operated predominately in 6-12-man elements and
possessed capabilities similar to those used by Hizbollah during its 2006 war against Israel. For the duration of
the experiment, to include during the initial 600-mile aerial assault to conduct a destruction raid on a simulated
OPFOR ASCM site, the BLUFOR assumed the role as an initial forcible entry capability for a follow-on joint force.
As such, the experiment focused specifically on 1) long-range, air-ground command and control (C2); 2)
distributed platoon operations with a CLT HQ element providing C2 back to MCB Quantico (distance intended to
simulate operating from amphibious shipping or an intermediate staging base [ISB]); and 3) developing TTP for
employing a variety of expeditionary energy systems in tropical, thickly vegetated environments, replicating
weather and terrain considerations often present in the Asia-Pacific region, where our Corps has been ordered to
re-focus its efforts. What follows are lessons that we learned across the warfighting functions during the
experiment, as well as recommendations to enhance the CLT concept to make it a truly viable operational
employment option.
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Command & Control
Topic: Lightweight, world-wide universal, voice & data, communications
device.
Discussion: The BLUFOR inserted with more than 20 of three different radios
(i.e., PRC-117, PRC-150, and PRC-152), plus multiple quantities of the
Enhanced Company Operations [ECO] gear set components (i.e., Panasonic CF19 tough-book, squad digital camera, and associated SL-3 gear). Given “Gaining
and Maintaining Access’” guidance for initial forcible entry forces to be capable
of fighting for and rapidly communicating to HHQ information learned about
the environment, the BLUFOR’s communications’ equipment was deemed
mission essential. This said, compared to a relatively simple to use, yet very
capable device such as an iPhone, the BLUFOR’s communications’ gear seemed
way too heavy, expensive, and arguably, for a concept such as the CLT,
obsolete. Each communication device had different operating instructions that
had to be followed precisely to establish voice and data communications.
Further, employing the gear, specifically the ECO data capability, required the
BLUFOR to receive a 5-day training package funded by a MARCORSYSCOM
contract and then to have 0621 radio operators, who also received this
training, attached to both maneuver elements in Florida and in the HHQ cell in
Quantico. While such methods have worked in mature theaters of operation, if
the CLT concept is to evolve into a true capability, our Corps must immediately
attack more innovative solutions to our communications’ requirements.
Recommendation: Continue to experiment with & field a hand-held, universal
communications device capable of communicating across all frequency
spectrums in both voice and data. Additionally, given how often CLT missions
in Florida required operating in elements down to the squad level, ensure that
this device is fielded such that at a minimum each platoon commander, platoon
sergeant, and squad leader has one as part of his T/E. Further, if the Marine
Corps truly desires to make the CLT concept a reality in the near-term, make
fielding such a device MCCDC’s #1 ground combat element priority.
The above technology in a field expedient size & shape
to replace everything required below and much more…
Enhanced Company Operations C2
ECO Toughbook w/ V-Mail
Software and power cord.
PRC-150 w/ Data Cable
and appropriate antenna.
ECO CD Drive w/ USB
Cord.
Not shown is the
most important
piece to the ECO
C2 suite – trained
and educated
personnel
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Squad Digital Camera with
USB Cord. Holds XD
Memory Cards.
ViaSat card. Among
the most important
part of the equation.
Command & Control
Topic: Patrol wristwatch.
Discussion: While in Camp Blanding, the OPFOR used iPhones as its
primary means of communication. The iPhone’s iMessaging, Phone,
Camera and applications store allowed the OPFOR to significantly
improve its combat effectiveness on patrols relative to the BLUFOR
despite being outnumbered by more than 2:1 and without access to a
UAV or to MV-22s. OPFOR units were able to view satellite maps of
their actual position (Google Maps App) and conduct real-time battle
tracking of friendly units (Find My Friends App). Communication
with fire-teams, squads and higher was accomplished via text
(iMessaging App) and voice (Phone App). Intelligence updates were
sent with live pictures and video (Camera App) and weather reports
were always accessible (Weather App). The OPFOR used the Map My
Run application to plan patrols, track distances and establish rally
points. Despite significant levels of daily water precipitation, OPFOR
units never experienced any difficulties with their primary
communication asset as they waterproofed their phones using Ziploc
bags and LifeProof cases. Additionally, the OPFOR units had no
problems with battery life for their iPhones as they used commercial
solar chargers (~$150) to replenish battery life.
Augment patrol leader capability demonstrated in the
top left picture and replace most (all) computers in
right picture with below…
Recommendation: In conjunction with the previous recommendation
to develop a lightweight, world-wide, universal, voice and data,
communications device, the Marine Corps should develop (or
purchase) an all-purpose, wrist-mounted patrol “watch” to enhance
the CLT commander and all subordinate unit leaders’ awareness of
their AOs and ability to maximize tempo against the enemy.
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Fires
Topic: CLT fire support team (FST) effectiveness inside of an MV-22.
Discussion: Over the past 25 years, the Marine Corps has nearly
perfected the TTP required for effective FST employment when
conducting mechanized operations. Tens of publications exist that
provide “best practices” for who should be in the FST in certain
situations, where each member sits or stands when inside of or in close
proximity to an AAV, who has fires’ clearance and approval authority,
and what communications’ nets these individuals receive and transmit
– over voice and data means - information specific to employing fires in
support of a maneuver element(s). Despite expectations that the MV-22
will be one of the primary means to bring Marines into future antiaccess environments - evidenced by the projected $41 billion
investment that our Corps will make on 360 MV-22s - no such
publications or TTP exist for FSTs operating out of an “Osprey.” Further,
in its current configuration, the communications’ architecture in the
back of an MV-22 does not enable all members of a FST to maintain
anywhere near the level of battle-space situational awareness similar to
that which exists when operating out of an AAV. During the experiment,
we experienced this reality upon our initial insert. As just one example,
the MV-22 possesses an organic infrared sensor that enables observing
the ground for any potential obstacles when coming into the landing
zone, to include potential enemy activity. Currently, only the pilots can
observe this camera.
We know how a FST operates out of an AAV, as well as its
linkages to an FSCC. When on a mission hundreds of miles from
its HHQ, how does a FST operate out of an MV-22? Currently, the
MV-22 lacks the required voice and data communications’
capability to enable a CLT FST team.
Recommendation: Create a ground force C2 suite for the back of the MV-
22 that 1) maximizes a FST’s potential while airborne and 2) gives the
ground force commander the flexibility to co-locate himself with his
FST and to still have maximum situational awareness, if desired.
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Fires
Topic: Miniature UAV “kamikaze” PGM deployable from the back of an MV-22.
Discussion: Given the MV-22’s ability to easily out-pace and out-range
traditional RWCAS platforms, along with all MAGTF UAV capabilities, some
have questioned the logic of investing so much in an assault support aircraft
that currently requires significant FWCAS support for escort and pre-assault
overhead surveillance capabilities, especially when operating in a scenario
such as the one in this experiment. This said, when in Camp Blanding,
numerous situations developed where, instead of needing a section of FWCAScapable aircraft, or RWCAS-capable aircraft enabled by a time, resource, and
manpower intensive FARP, the BLUFOR would have benefited immensely if
the MAGTF possessed a miniature UAV “kamikaze”-type PGM capable of being
employed out of the back of an MV-22. A potential employment concept
would be to have 5-10, 50-100 pound “kamikaze” UAVs staged in the cargo
space area on the MV-22 that has the FST embarked. If the FST leader is able
to observe the MV-22’s IR camera (or another sensor) and can positively
identify a legitimate enemy target, he can then order one of his FOs to push
one or more of the UAV “kamikaze” PGMs out of the back of the MV-22. From
this point, the UAV “kamikaze” PGM is controlled remotely by the FO, under
the FST leader’s guidance. This entire process would be done while the FST
MV-22 is outside of visual and audible signature range, thereby allowing the
CLT FST to set conditions for assault force insert and follow-on actions, much
like the FST in an AAV often does during mechanized operations. Additionally,
this same FST MV-22 could have a belly-mounted, machine gun, such as the
GAU-17, 7.62 mini-gun, which would enable the FST leader, and potentially
assault flight leader (if after the FST inserts on the ground) to provide close-in
machine gun fires in support of the assault force. Such a capability would
drastically increase the CLT ‘s capabilities.
The MV-22’s speed & range have created a CAS gap ISO the
assault force. We employ Marines out of the back of MV-22s.
Why not do the same with a UAV “kamikaze” PGM? Similar
capabilities already exist for mortars.
Recommendation: Create a miniature UAV “kamikaze” PGM that is
deployable from the back of an MV-22 and that is employed by the FST leader
in support of the CLT commander’s ground SOM.
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Fires
Topic: CLT JTAC and JFO requirements.
Discussion: Repeatedly throughout the experiment, the importance of the
BLUFOR’s single JTAC was evident (shown in top left picture). He alone,
enabled by his VideoScout, was the connecting file to maximizing the value of
the UAV supporting the entire BLUFOR. Further, based upon current JCAS
guidelines, reinforced again in 1/6’s recent WTI 2-13 AAR, had CAS platforms
been available in support of the BLUFOR, he alone would have been the only
Marine in the CLT capable of clearing any aviation ordnance fired in support of
the ground force - regardless of whether employed from U.S. Marine, joint, or
coalition aircraft. This fact is absolutely critical to heed if our Corps wants the
CLT concept to evolve into a reality. Given the distance that a CLT should be
optimized to operate apart from its HHQ (i.e., at least 300 miles based on the
more than $141 billion that our Corps is scheduled to invest in the long-range
capabilities inherent in the F-35B/C, MV-22B, CH-53K, and KC-130J), the 1x
JTAC per company-sized unit model, especially if a CLT, is not sufficient. In
Camp Blanding, the BLUFOR was constantly operating with a minimum of 2
maneuver elements, often separated by kilometers in distance, and
occasionally, due to the dense vegetation and/or enemy activity, out of
constant communications with each other. Similar to the JTAC requirement
observations during the experiment, the present 2x JFOs per company model
is also not sufficient. Given the operational tempo maintained by the BLUFOR,
if the CLT only had 2x JFOs, these Marines would have been pushed to the
extreme within the first 24-36 hours of the experiment.
Our Corps has and will continue to invest billions of dollars to
provide revolutionary capabilities in the “A” in MAGTF. The
Camp Blanding experiment repeatedly highlighted the GCE’s
JTAC and JFO manning shortages to maximize our air combat
element’s ever-increasing capabilities.
Recommendation: Going forward, our Corps needs to allocate one 8002 JTAC
or 7502 FAC per CLT platoon and 1 permanently embedded 03XX JFO per CLT
maneuver squad. These JFOs should be created at TBS, SOI-E, and SOI-W.
Additionally, provide the JFOs a VideoScout capability similar to that provided
to JTACs and FACs to enable every maneuver squad to have immediate access
to video and still imagery, as required.
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Fires
Topic: Information operations (IO).
Enhanced Company Operations C2
ECO Toughbook w/ V-Mail
Software and power cord.
Discussion: Conducting a counter-IO campaign against the CLT’s actions
was an enduring OPFOR task during the experiment. After every
PRC-150 w/ Data Cable
and appropriate antenna.
BLUFOR-OPFOR direct fire engagement, the OPFOR, using iPhones,
always out-cycled the BLUFOR in communicating its narrative of what
ECO CD Drive w/ USB
happened and why to the experiment control force “local media.” The
Cord.
OPFOR was successful on the IO front primarily because it used civilian Not shown is the
important
cellular phones to take photographs, to comment on these photographs, most
piece to the ECO
C2 suite – trained
and then to send to the “local media” whereas the BLUFOR had to use
and educated
personnel
squad digital cameras provided in the ECO gear set to take pictures,
ViaSat card. Among
then transmit these pictures via cables to Panasonic CF-19 tough-books,
the most important
Squad Digital Camera with
part of the equation.
and then transmit picture files from the tough-books over limited
USB Cord. Holds XD
Memory Cards.
bandwidth to its HHQ in Quantico. Only after executing this timeconsuming process could the CLT’s HHQ determine how best to counter Following all direct fire engagements, CLT reliance on the ECO
C2 suite to communicate to its HHQ repeatedly led to the OPFOR
the OPFOR’s narrative that had already been released for at least 30
out-cycling the BLUFOR in the “narrative battle.”
minutes, and often much longer. The C2 section of this AAR already
highlighted the importance of providing future CLTs with a universal,
voice and data, communications system that eliminates the timeconsuming process described above; the IO lessons learned are just one
more reinforcement of why this communications’ capability is so
important for the CLT concept’s evolution.
Recommendation: 1) Ensure that future CLT-focused experiments
continue to emphasize how tactical-level actions can have near realtime strategic-level effects, especially during the initial parts of a
forcible entry operation and 2) continue to evaluate the CLT on how
quickly its HQ can communicate a proposed “strategic narrative” to its
HHQ following a significant interaction with the enemy and/or with an
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Maneuver
Topic: Marine rifle squad size.
Discussion: Over the past few years, some have questioned whether the
13-man rifle squad is still necessary. Given additional fire support and
communication assets that have been fielded since the creation of the
13-man rifle squad almost 70 years ago, some, with the presumption
that these assets have made the rifle squad more capable, ask, “why
can’t we save 2 boat-spaces per rifle squad - creating an 11-man squad IOT allocate these boat-spaces elsewhere in the MAGTF, or to eliminate
them altogether?” The experiment answered this question many times
over when reinforcing why the 13-man rifle squad is as vital today as it
has ever been. The distance from the BLUFOR in Florida to its HHQ and
reinforcements in Virginia repeatedly drove home the importance of
having a rifle squad equal in size, if not slightly larger, and with more
organic firepower, than that possessed by the OPFOR’s main maneuver
elements; specific to non-organic firepower, in Camp Blanding, in an
environment similar to much of the Asia-Pacific region, aviation assets
were unable to operate for at least multiple hours per day due to
inclement weather. In potential future (tropical) operating
environments, the ability of a rifle squad or platoon in contact to
request immediate CAS and to then have a section of aircraft on-station
in 15-30 minutes is by no means guaranteed; if anything, such a
capability is more likely not to be available than the opposite, especially
if the unit is in a long-range, anti-access operating environment,
hundreds of miles from amphibious shipping or an ISB.
Do not change the 13-man rifle squad T/O.
Recommendation: Maintain the 13-man rifle squad (and ensure that
one of these Marines is JFO-certified).
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Maneuver
Topic: CLT equipment load-out.
Discussion: During the experiment, the balance between the capabilities
needed for mission accomplishment and weight carried by the BLUFOR
(average pack weight was in excess of 90 pounds) was a constant issue.
With the goal of maintaining a high operational tempo and increasing
maneuverability, several aspects of the current, often standard, infantry
load-out were assessed. These items included the current composition
of MREs, USMC-issued boots, and USMC-issued clothing and gear for
tropical environments. The Microsoft Word-version of this AAR goes
into detail on each of these specific areas. Highlights WRT MREs
included experimenting with dehydrated meals, using biodegradable
package material, and issuing small stoves per fire team IOT reduce
weight, trash, and to provide a redundant means for water purification
in cold climates. Given that the tropical environment led to all Marines’
boots being saturated for the majority of the experiment, making boots
with less absorbent material and testing Gore-Tex boot liners and socks
should be considered. For clothing, most of which was wet throughout
the experiment, less absorbent and lighter materials should be tested,
along with issuing CLT Marines a light poncho that can be stored in a
cargo pocket and used for a make-shift, lean-to shelter. For gear, at a
minimum, we need to experiment with waterproof covers for main and
assault packs.
Must find ways beyond PPE to make
Marines lighter.
Recommendation: Aggressively attack any and all ways to reduce the
infantryman’s load; aside from weapons, optics, radios, ammunition and
water (which is covered in the Logistics section), the primary areas to
focus on are means of providing food, issued boots, issued clothing, and
better enabling Marines to waterproof their gear.
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Maneuver
Topic: Employment of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and/or motorcycles
for CLT operations.
Discussion: BLUFOR maneuverability was limited by the weight that
every Marine had to move dismounted. Despite using multiple patrol
bases, the BLUFOR frequently had to change locations and therefore
move with 90-plus pound packs per Marine through what was often
dense vegetation. While Camp Blanding was not an ideal environment
for employing an ATV(s) and/or motorcycle(s) for purposes of scouting
and/or to rapidly move heavier equipment (i.e., water, crew served
weapons, radios, etc.), future experiments focused on the CLT should
test scenarios where such assets might prove advantageous. Such
equipment, particularly a specially configured ATV, such as the M1161
Growler Internally Transportable Vehicle (ITV), could also prove very
helpful when required to move a casualty over long-distances and/or in
a rapid manner. This type of vehicle, if configured appropriately, could
also be used to enhance CLT voice and data communications or
retransmission capabilities.
While ATVs and/or motorcycles would not have been helpful in
Camp Blanding, small, agile and QUIET mobility assets could
prove very useful for a CLT IOT enable maneuvering against the
enemy, re-supply, and CASEVAC.
Recommendation: Incorporate in future CLT-focused experiments
scenarios where ATV or motorcycle employment would likely increase
the BLUFOR capabilities. During these experiments, develop
recommendations for which platforms are best, as well as TTP for
employing and maintaining during long- range, expeditionary
operations.
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?
Intelligence
Topic: Expeditionary, long-range, all-weather UAV platform optimized
for forcible entry operations.
Discussion: VMU-2 supported the BLUFOR with an RQ-7B Shadow UAV.
While the RQ-7B provided the BLUFOR with a valuable reconnaissance,
surveillance, target acquisition data collection and dissemination
capability, the footprint required to employ this system was significant
(see top 2 pictures to the right): 25 Marines, one contractor, seven
tactical vehicles, including two MTVRs, a 5,000 pound capable forklift,
two Quad-cons, etc. Such a footprint would prevent the RQ-7B (as well
as its scheduled replacement, the RQ-21A) from being able to support a
CLT in a long-range, forcible entry, expeditionary environment where
Marines operate primarily, if not completely, dismounted. Additionally,
the delicate nature of the RQ-7B’s wooden propeller and sensors
prevented the UAV from supporting the CLT during approximately 3040 percent of the experiment, including when the MV-22s inserted the
BLUFOR and throughout the initial destruction raid. These deficiencies
led to significant gaps in the BLUFOR’s ability to locate and target the
OPFOR. Until the MAGTF possesses such a UAV capability, joint-UAV
assets, such as the RQ-1 Predator or the MQ-9 Reaper, provide a more
realistic reflection of the UAV capabilities required to maximize a CLT’s
potential when executing initial forcible entry operations.
Initial footprint, forcible entry CLTs would benefit greatly if
supported by a truly expeditionary, long-range, all-weather, UAV.
Recommendation: Ensure future MAGTFs have an expeditionary, long-
range, all-weather UAV capability, or establish a memorandum of
understanding with the U.S. Air Force to provide such a capability in
support of future CLT exercises that simulate conducting forcible entry
operations.
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Intelligence
Topic: UAV noise signature and ability to detect movement on the
ground in tropical, thick vegetation environments.
Discussion: During the experiment after action review, the OPFOR
made clear that the RQ-7B in support of the BLUFOR was initially an
imposing asset, especially when it first appeared overhead. The RQ7B’s flight time, range, field of view, and communication dissemination
capabilities were all initially unknown to the OPFOR. However, the
OPFOR quickly determined that listening for the RQ-7B’s auditory
signature provided a clear indicator of when the UAV was operating, as
well as the ability to anticipate its proximity and heading. Additionally,
after 24 hours, the OPFOR realized that its separate elements could hide
fairly easily from RQ-7B observation because the UAV had difficulty
The CLT concept would benefit greatly if the next generation
tracking dismounted personnel in the tree-line; as a result, the OPFOR
became more brazen even when the RQ-7B was on-station. The OPFOR UAV was both quiet and more capable of detecting human
signatures in thick vegetation.
also determined that when in terrain that provided less natural cover
and concealment, standard Marine Corps-issue, green tarps provided
good protection from both visual and thermal signature. From quick
on-line searches, the OPFOR further determined more ways to hide
from overhead thermal signatures, such as cheap foil emergency
camping blankets and wool blankets with cheap magnetic foil coatings.
These on-line sites are as easily accessible to America’s enemies as they
were to the OPFOR, so it should be expected that future adversaries will
know all of this same information.
Recommendation: Ensure 1) the RQ-7B replacement does not give off an
audible noise signature and 2) that its sensors are capable of “seeing”
through thicker levels of vegetation typically found in the Asia-Pacific
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region.
Intelligence
Topic: Enhanced cultural awareness and language capability.
Discussion: Even in a scenario such as the one involved in this
experiment, it is likely that CLT Marines will come into contact with an
indigenous population and/or capture enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).
For this reason, our Corps should continue emphasizing the importance
of aligning specific units to specific regions of the world. Commanders
of these units can then incorporate in their training plans methods to
increase their Marines’ understanding of their respective regions.
Further, in these same regions, our Corps should determine which
languages are most frequently spoken by the indigenous populations
and then ensure that the tactical tablets mentioned previously have
language translation applications that enable Marines (and corpsmen) When “fighting for information” IAW the “Gaining and
to have two-way conversations with the indigenous populations.
Maintaining Access” concept, CLT Marines will most likely come
across enemy personnel and an indigenous population. The
Recommendation: 1) Continue to align specific units with specific
Marines must possess an understanding of their operational
regions in the world; 2) based on these designated regions, provide
environment and an ability to communicate with the humans
Marines with two-way, language translation applications on their
within this environment.
communication device; and 3) incorporate the capabilities of such
language translation applications in future CLT-focused experiments.
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Logistics
Topic: Rain catchers.
Discussion: In wet climates, rain water is by far the safest and easiest
way to get clean water, as it does not require Marines to be
geographically bound to an area with a water supply. As it rained every
day in Camp Blanding, the majority of drinking water was gathered
during heavy rain showers. Individuals from both the BLUFOR and
OPFOR used tarps, plastic trash bags, and MRE bags to collect rainwater.
Having frequent access to rain water saved valuable time for both
forces. This said, Marines need lightweight and durable vessels to
collect and store rain water, or other water sources, if rain water is
unavailable. For CLTs employed in scenarios such as the one in this
experiment, having issued, high-volume (30 liter) collapsible water
reservoirs that can be positioned at a patrol base would be a significant
combat multiplier. This water reservoir can be carried by one Marine
while moving, then filled at a water source, and subsequently moved
back to a secure location to serve as a point of re-supply for all Marines.
Once a position is to be vacated, the Marines can simply fill any
remaining canteens, collapse the container, and displace without
leaving any trace of their presence. A simple plastic bladder with a
virus/debris filter already on it, such as the Life Sack, which is used in
developing countries, provides a cheap and lightweight way to catch,
store, and filter water. When empty, it can be rolled up and packed away.
Provide CLT Marines the ability to catch,
store, and filter water.
Recommendation: At a minimum, provide each CLT maneuver squad
with a high-volume, collapsible water reservoir to catch, store, and filter
water.
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Logistics
Topic: Water filtration and purification.
Discussion: Each Marine inserted into Camp Blanding with 7-8 liters of
clean water, held in canteens, a standard issue CamelBak, and a variety
of personal water bottles and extra CamelBaks. For water filtration and
purification, Marines were provided with iodine tablets and an MSR
CamelBak adaptor. Iodine tablets worked. The filters were fairly
successful as well in removing all debris from the water; however, there
were some leakage and breaking issues where the filter and tube
connected, and Marines were not confident that the filters would
withstand rough handling over time. When rainwater is unavailable or
when units are operating in a more high- intense, kinetic environment,
Marines need a fast-acting, lightweight filtration system so that they can
drink water immediately available in their respective AO. The Life
Straw, also used in developing countries, allows the user to drink
straight out of the water source, such as a river or stream. Life Straws
are relatively cheap, durable, and weigh next to nothing. If the Marine
Corps can find a way to adapt a Life Straw to a CamelBak, it would
eliminate the need for both the MSR filter and iodine tablets.
Despite plenty of water sources available when conducting
operations in Iraq & Afghanistan, we were often unwilling or
unable to forage water. For the CLT concept to reach its
potential, we will have to fundamentally re-think how we
approach water re-supply. Integrating Life Straw technology
into the next generation CamelBak could potentially extend a
CLT’s culminating point by days, if not weeks.
Recommendation: For future CLT-focused experiments (and arguably as
standard issue for the Marine infantry), issue each Marine a Life Straw
to enable drinking water straight from available water sources.
Additionally, experiment with adapting Life Straw technology to the
next generation CamelBak.
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Logistics
Topic: Energy sources.
Discussion: During the experiment, one of the BLUFOR’s main
vulnerabilities was communications’ device battery life. All forces
utilized the Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System
(SPACES) technology, as well as commercially purchased solar chargers.
The SPACES system was marginal, offering only a single charge for a
PRC-152 radio battery after 8 hours of adequate sunlight. Given this
performance, the OPFOR found it more advantageous to use their
personal solar chargers. Although the personal chargers were only
used to charge cell phones, the chargers provided full charges for the
devices on a consistent basis. These devices were relatively inexpensive
and proved to be both shock-proof and waterproof. The civilian sector
currently has alternative energy products that are both durable and
inexpensive.
Over the past 3 years, our Corps has definitely taken positive
steps when it comes to renewable energy; for the CLT concept to
reach its potential though, we will need to leap well beyond our
current capabilities, particularly in the area of re-charging
batteries.
Recommendation: Assess the specific needs and duration of a CLT
mission before issuing SPACES. If SPACES are going to be issued, they
must be capable of charging more batteries, faster. Additionally,
experiment with embedding a solar panel into the upper portion of
Marines’ main pack to create a charge at any time.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Force Protection
Topic: Lighter and quieter personal protective equipment (PPE).
Discussion: Over the past decade, force protection in the form of PPE
has begun to infringe upon the other critical aspects of a unit’s combat
effectiveness, to include logistics and maneuverability. The current Flak
and Kevlar that are used by Marines can weigh upwards of 35-45
pounds with a full combat load out. Although the protection provided
by these systems rival any system used in the past, they are far too
heavy and cumbersome for expeditionary operations such as what the
CLT executed during the experiment. In Camp Blanding, the weight and
size of the current PPE systems decreased unit tempo, greatly increased
the decibel level of noise produced by moving units, and restricted the
individual Marine’s ability to move (i.e., to navigate obstacles, to climb
in/out of streams, to low crawl, etc.). Also, the current PPE systems
greatly affected logistical concerns for the unit commander. While
operating in tropical environments, wearing the current PPE causes
Marines to lose almost double the amount of fluids than if operating
without, as well as consuming more calories due to the increased
energy lost (BLUFOR operated with PPE; OPFOR without). In addition
to the Flak, current Kevlar helmets are themselves heavy and
cumbersome; specifically, when used in conjunction with the current
night vision system, which greatly increases the weight of a standard
Kevlar. The solution to these challenges is a happy medium between an
acceptable level of protection with a weight, size, and noise trade-off
that does not limit mobility and speed.
Must find ways to make PPE lighter, easier
to move in when in the tree-line, and
significantly less noisy when wearing.
Recommendation: Invest in and provide CLT Marines lighter and less
noise-generating PPE.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Force Protection
Topic: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
Discussion: In a CLT operation such as the Camp Blanding experiment,
after initial insert and following the MV-22s checking off-station, a
CASEVAC capability could potentially be hours away. For this reason,
the corpsmen assigned to CLTs must be highly trained and proven
capable of treating and communicating the nature and progress of a
Marine’s injury to the provider at the next echelon of care. In addition to
ensuring that highly qualified corpsmen are assigned to CLTs, our Corps
should also ensure that every Marine in the unit, at a bare minimum, is
a certified combat life-saver. Just as, if not more important, our Corps
should ensure that every CLT Marine successfully completes live-tissue
training prior to deploying; this training saved countless lives in Iraq
and Afghanistan and has subsequently decreased in availability at the
rapid rate due to the decrease in OCO funds. Our Corps’ next challenge
is to provide an enhanced medical treatment capability in designated
aircraft that, at a minimum, enables conducting blood transfusions.
This capability should be comparable to what is available from a U.S.
Army “Dust-off” platoon or U.S. Air Force “Pedro” unit. This capability
should be available in MV-22Bs, (future) CH-53Ks, and in KC-130Js.
The CLT concept requires finding ways to
extend the “golden hour.”
Recommendation: 1) Ensure corpsmen seeking assignment to a CLT are
thoroughly screened; 2) ensure all Marines assigned to a CLT are
certified combat life-savers and have successfully completed live-tissue
training; and 3) develop a long-range, “Blue-Green” medical capability
available on designated MV-22s, (future) CH-53Ks, and/or KC-130Js on
par with that provided by a U.S. Army “Dust-off” or U.S. Air Force
“Pedro” unit.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Force Protection
Topic: Fog and dust resistant lenses.
Discussion: One frequent issue encountered during the experiment was
the quality of the lenses on the BLUFOR optics, specifically on the PVS14s and rifle combat optics (RCOs). As a result of the humid climate, the
lenses on these devices fogged up frequently requiring them to be
wiped constantly in order to continue to maintain a clear sight picture.
In addition to the frequent fogging, the sandy terrain in Camp Blanding
led to the lenses accumulating dust and dirt which further degraded
their capabilities and required constant maintenance. A solution to this
issue would be to produce optics with lenses that had anti-fog
capabilities inherent to them. Although anti-fogging creams do exist,
they require constant re-application to maintain their abilities; an antifog lens would alleviate this issue. This technology could also be
developed with the ability to prevent dust from accumulating on the
lenses of these optics in order to maintain a clear sight picture at all
times without constant maintenance.
Our Corps’ optics are not optimized for tropical
environments. The CLT learned this the hard way in
Camp Blanding. Going forward, we should have antifogging and anti-dust capabilities built into our optics
(and kits made to modify our current optic inventory.
Recommendation: Modify the lenses in current optics to have anti-
fogging capabilities and ensure future optics fielded in the Marine Corps
have a similar capability.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Force Protection
Topic: Lack of grip strips on MV-22 ramp.
Discussion: While disembarking the MV-22s, several
Marines slipped while wearing heavy packs and carrying gear
off the back ramp. These falls had the potential to injure the
Marines before they could even get into the fight. The ramps
were only fitted with rubber strips that became slick during
wet conditions.
Recommendation: Add grip strips to the back ramp of MV22s that are similar to the grip strips on C-130 ramps to
prevent unnecessary injuries.
MV-22 ramp above should have grip strips on it similar
to the C-130 below.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Questions
• A more detailed (in Microsoft Word) version of this AAR will soon be available on
the MCCLL web-site under the title “Infantry Officer Course Company Landing
Team Experiment After Action Report.”
• The point of contacts for this AAR are Staff Sergeant Rocky Bosman
([email protected]), CWO3 (Gunner) Shelby Lasater
([email protected]), Captain Jonathan M. Cohen
([email protected]), and Major Scott A. Cuomo ([email protected]).