Dakar -Bamako Corridor Cost of Transport Analysis

Transcription

USAID
Dakar – Bamako Cost of Transport Analysis
Dakar-BamakoCorridor
CostofTransportAnalysis
Prepared for USAID Senegal
by Booz Allen Hamilton
September 3, 2010
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Contents
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 8
Methodology............................................................................................................................................... 10
Corridor Overview....................................................................................................................................... 11
Recent Developments and Achievements .................................................................................................. 34
Costs of Transport ....................................................................................................................................... 42
Challenges ................................................................................................................................................... 54
Recommendations ...................................................................................................................................... 60
Appendix A: Acronyms ................................................................................................................................ 68
Appendix B: Policy, Legal and Regulatory Framework................................................................................ 69
Appendix C: International Trade Statistics for Senegal and Mali ............................................................... 75
Appendix D: Interviews ............................................................................................................................... 81
Appendix E: Other Sources ......................................................................................................................... 82
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Table of Figures
Figure 1 Map of the Dakar - Bamako Transport Corridor ........................................................................... 11
Figure 2 Port of Dakar Traffic ...................................................................................................................... 14
Figure 3 Total Mali Export Traffic by Mode of Transport ........................................................................... 16
Figure 4 Total Traffic to Bamako ................................................................................................................. 18
Figure 5 Total Traffic along the Dakar-Bamako Corridor ............................................................................ 18
Figure 6 Total Traffic from Bamako ............................................................................................................ 19
Figure 7 Traffic of Agricultural Products Along the Dakar-Bamako Corridor by Volume ........................... 21
Figure 8 Traffic of Agricultural Products Along the Dakar - Bamako Corridor, by Month by Volume ........ 22
Figure 9 Overall Logistics Performance Index ............................................................................................. 40
Figure 10 Logistics Performance Index (International Portion) .................................................................. 41
Figure 11 Transportation Costs - Rice Import into Senegal ........................................................................ 44
Figure 12 Transportation Costs - Rice Transits to Mali ............................................................................... 46
Figure 13 Transportation Costs - Cotton Exports from Mali ....................................................................... 49
Figure 14 Improvement Opportunities Framework.................................................................................... 60
Figure 16 Top Ten Products Imported by Mali ........................................................................................... 76
Figure 15 Total Mali Imports (by value) ...................................................................................................... 83
Figure 18 Top Ten Products Imported by Senegal ...................................................................................... 77
Figure 17 Total Senegal Imports (by value) ................................................................................................ 83
Figure 20 Top Ten Products Exported by Mali (by value) ........................................................................... 78
Figure 19 Total Mali Exports (by value) ...................................................................................................... 83
Figure 22 Top Ten Products Exported by Senegal (by value)...................................................................... 79
Figure 21 Total Senegal Exports (by value) ................................................................................................. 83
Figure 23 Exports of Cereals from Senegal to Mali ..................................................................................... 80
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Executive Summary
The Government of Senegal’s (GoS) overarching 20 year plan for the development of agriculture
recognizes the importance of improved logistics. Trade and transport corridor development, particularly
along the Dakar-Bamako corridor, is increasingly being seen by the GoS as a matter of strategic national
importance. Although regional trade is increasing, Senegal is seeing the volume of transshipments
through its port and border points with Mali, one of its principal regional trade partners, steadily
decline. The GoS is therefore actively pursuing practical measures to reduce obstacles to expanding the
volume of trade passing along the corridor. The USAID Economic Growth Project (PCE)’s work on the
corridor supports the government’s trade policy objectives of improving the competitive position of
Senegal as a key transport artery in West Africa, particularly as it regards staple foods and cash crops.
The purpose of this report is to contribute towards the development of a baseline of transport cost
along the corridor Dakar-Bamako, and guide PCE leadership and the GoS in defining policy/regulatory,
physical, and management measures to develop and reduce costs of operation along the Dakar-Bamako
corridor. This report summarizes the results of the analysis of the cost of transport along the corridor,
which used three supply chains – imports of rice into Senegal and Mali, and exports of cotton from Mali
– to a) evaluate current traffic on the corridor; and b) evaluate the cost of transport along the corridor.
Rice and cotton were determined to be the main agricultural products moving along the corridor, and
therefore of the most relevance to USAID’s PCE project.
Senegal is strategically located and has reasonably well-functioning transport networks. The Port of
Dakar serves as the anchor for the corridor, and has a comparative advantage over other regional ports
in that it offers the only rail connection to Bamako, in addition to (soon-to-be) two roads. The GoS,
recognizing its potential to develop as a trade and transport hub in West Africa, has been heavily
promoting investment in and around Dakar: an agreement with Dubai Ports World to operate and
expand the container terminal, a Logistics Platform, and the planned development of a free zone
connected to the port via a new tollroad are among the high-profile projects. The GoS has invested in
other trade and transport related reforms in recent years, with impressive results: its Doing
Business/Trading Across Borders rank rose from 64 to 57; its Logistics Performance Indicator rank rose
from 101 to 58. Ongoing Customs projects on paperless processing, electronic filing and payment, and
electronic tracking promise improvements of transport along the corridor, if fully implemented.
Eighty percent of all Mali-bound traffic moves along the corridor by road. Since the trucking industry in
Senegal is dominated by a large number of very small operators, who own and operate an obsolete
trucking fleet, most of the traffic (≈90%) to Mali is carried on Malian trucks. Rail used to play a much
more important role in transport along the corridor. However, management missteps and lack of
investment have greatly deteriorated rail infrastructure, reducing its capacity and reliability, and thus its
share of Malian traffic. Today, only about 20% of Mali-bound freight is moved by rail. For outbound
traffic, however, rail is still the predominant mode of transport.
Trade along the corridor has been steadily growing in the last five years. Although 2009 saw a decline in
the volume of ocean traffic at the Port of Dakar (both for imports to and exports from Senegal and Mali),
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traffic along the corridor showed a modest increase due to an increase in bilateral trade, and in
particular exports from Senegal to Mali. Of all the inbound freight shipments to Mali from overseas, rice
comprises 10%, and is the only agricultural product of significant volume transported towards Bamako.
Outbound freight movements are dominated by cotton exports from Mali to overseas partners (86% of
all exports through Senegal), which have suffered a steady decline in recent years.
Trade in rice is significant, especially imports to Senegal. In 2008, Senegal imported $646M of rice (est.
750,000 tons), while the same year Mali imported $66M (est. 71,000 tons). The recent rice and
international financial crises have affected the imports of rice, which saw substantial increases in 2008
and, for Senegal, a significant decrease in 2009. 80% of rice shipments travel the corridor by road,
mostly in bulk or break-bulk, although premium rice shipments are containerized. Most rice imports are
characterized by large, infrequent shipments that are stored in bonded warehouses around Dakar,
where wholesalers buy the commodity in smaller quantities, and generally transport it using their own
trucking fleets. Senegal exports a small quantity of rice to Mali (about 1% of the total by weight). Trade
in cotton, although declining in the last five years, is the main outbound activity along the corridor. In
2008, Mali exported over $205M of cotton (39,368 tons). Cotton is mainly transported by rail (about
95%), where it is stored at a warehouse owned and operated by the GoM. Since most cotton is not sold
until after arrival in Dakar, it is transported in bulk and only containerized when it is sold.
Perceptions of transport and logistics costs among the trade community were generally favorable, with
a few exceptions: a) Port fees are considered excessive, especially for containerized cargo, especially for
Senegalese imports; b) Storage fees are considered high, and are attributed to insufficient capacity; c)
Delays for transport by road, due to harassment along the corridor and at the border are considered
high, with informal costs amounting to up to 5% of the total transport costs; d) Rail is too unreliable and
perceived to be biggest lost opportunity, and e) certain costs associated with road transport – Customs
escorts and guarantee costs for transit shipments – are high. The costs are summarized in the Table ES 1.
Senegal’s challenges with regard to trade and transportation in general, and along the Dakar-Bamako
corridor in particular, are in the areas of policy, infrastructure, logistics industry services, border
management, enforcement and integrity, and commitment and implementation capacity. The GoS lacks
an overarching sector-wide transport and logistics strategy, relying instead on a point-solution approach
to transportation capacity planning. The proliferation of ongoing programs, projects and initiatives
underscores the fact that the country’s leaders recognize that transportation is a priority, however it
also suggests that transportation capacity planning is more tactical than strategic. Senegal faces
continued infrastructure capacity challenges, in particular with rail, rural (feeder) roads linking
production facilities to main transport arteries, an obsolete trucking fleet, and logistics support
infrastructure such as storage and warehousing, in particular outside Dakar and close to the production
sites that need them most. Senegal is in the early stages of developing a transport and logistics “culture”
of understanding how its domestic transport and logistics markets operate in a global supply chain
context, and therefore needs to increase its competitiveness and professionalism. Moreover, continued
Customs reforms are dependent upon the successful implementation of a wide range of ongoing
projects, which will require firm commitment, coordination and change management efforts. Senegal
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also continues to experience enforcement challenges, in particular with control points along the
corridor, WAEMU axle-weight limits, and the Inter-state Road Transit (TRIE) agreement. Finally, the
country does not have a very good record for long-term commitment and follow-through, and
implementation of its many projects and initiatives often proves to be a challenge.
Senegal’s recent successes in trade and transport reform and investment should be a model for
continued growth to address remaining challenges. Recommendations can be summarized as follows:
Policy - Develop a comprehensive transport and logistics sector strategy and a related strategic plan that
are holistic and integrated.
Commitment and Implementation Capacity - develop a Program Management Office (PMO) mechanism
to oversee the implementation of the transport and logistics sector strategy. The PMO would be ensure
that all of Senegal’s reform initiatives achieve the desired results in a coordinated manner.
Infrastructure
Rail – improve the freight rail network, specifically in terms of capacity and reliability.
Roads – invest in building rural and feeder road links from production sites to freight networks
Logistics Support Structures – encourage construction of logistics support structures such as
warehouses, consolidation facilities, or other specialized storage facilities (e.g. refrigerated or
cooling storage facilities), especially those serving production sites
Border Infrastructure – construct a parking lot for trucks at the Kidira-Diboli border and provide
computer infrastructure for border port in Kidira
Services - increase the competitiveness of the transport and logistics sector and in particular the road
transportation industry, through activities such as improving business formation and operations,
develop policies to encourage trucking industry operators to renew trucking fleets, and promoting the
continued use of information and communication technologies (ICT).
Border Management - ensure that current Customs initiatives achieve desired results and conform to
international best practices
An independent review of Customs reform efforts, to ensure that projects such as Gainde 2010
and electronic cargo tracking meet requirements and are fully implemented at all border posts
Aim to reduce inspections at the Port of Dakar to less than 10% of all imports
Align the working hours of the Mali and Senegal Customs offices at the border
Facilitate private sector consultation and policy/regulatory impact analysis
Ensure conformance with international standards on automation, trade facilitation, and security
Fully implement the provisions of the TRIE agreement
Enforcement and Integrity - strengthen the enforcement and corruption fighting capacity of the GoS,
eliminate Customs escorts for transit shipments, and enforce the reduced number of checkpoints along
the corridor.
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Table ES 1 Summary of Transport Costs
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Introduction
Background
Senegal’s agriculture sector, which is among the most important sectors of the nation’s economy,
contributes to about 15% to GDP and employs just over 50% of the labor force. However, because it is
vulnerable to fluctuating seasonal conditions, food security continues to be an issue, and Senegal heavily
relies on imports, especially of staple crops such as cereals. This reliance on imports exposes Senegal to
rising food prices on the global market, such as the fluctuations in the global prices of rice in recent
years. In response, the Government of Senegal (GoS) has focused on increasing production of key
agricultural product, through the launch of the Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance
(GOANA)1, which aims to raise food production and reduce imports, especially for grain, cereal, meat
and milk production. Gradually, the sector overall is beginning to take on emerging opportunities both
domestically and internationally, including in related sectors such as transportation and logistics.
The GoS’s overarching 20 year plan for the development of agriculture recognizes the importance of
improved logistics targeting the development of a national marketing infrastructure as key to lowering
unit costs of moving goods from farms to consumers whether domestic, regional or international. In this
context, trading infrastructure is defined as more than physical roads and bridges, ports, and airports
and includes “soft” infrastructure related to information, management, communication, and
policy/regulatory environment.
Trade and transport corridor development, particularly along the Dakar-Bamako axe, is increasingly
being seen by the Government of Senegal as a matter of strategic national importance. Whereas fifteen
to twenty years ago, Senegal was much more at the center of regional trade patterns, it is increasingly
finding both its terms of trade and its position as a trade facilitator and service provider diminishing
substantially, as witnessed by a trade deficit of 1.2 billion FCFA2 in 2007. Although regional trade is
increasing, particularly within the WAEMU3 zone, Senegal is seeing the volume of transshipments
through its port and border points with Mali, one of its principal regional trade partners, steadily
decline. Moving forward, the GoS is keen on having Mali as a key “client” in regional trade expansion:
Mali is a major destination for Senegalese exports, comprising 23.8% of exports in 2008, an increase of
156% in the 2004-2008 period, although imports from Mali remain low, at 0.01% in 2008 (Source: ANSD,
National Agency of statistics and demographics). Senegal is therefore actively pursuing practical
measures to reduce obstacles to expanding the volume of trade passing along the corridor.
The Economic Growth Project (PCE)4 seeks to increase agricultural production as a means to enhancing
food security. PCE’s work on the Dakar-Bamako corridor supports the government’s trade policy
objectives of improving the competitive position of Senegal as a key transport artery in West African
trade, particularly as it regards staple foods and cash crops. The corridor is presently regarded as one of
1
Grande Offensive Pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance
Franc CFA
3
West African Economic and Monetary Union (see Appendix B)
4
Projet Croissance Economique
2
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the worst in the region, particularly in terms of the number of control posts, delays, and police
harassment related to arbitrary inspections and demands for bribes. PCE’s focus will be on developing a
baseline and working knowledge of the transport cost structure along the Dakar-Bamako corridor
covering conventional costs as well as governance issues (i.e. costs associated with control posts and
check points).
Purpose and objectives
The purpose of this report is to contribute towards the development of a baseline of transport cost
along the corridor Dakar-Bamako, and guide PCE leadership in concert with Senegal’s transport
authorities in defining short-term (6 months), mid-term (7 to 24 months) and long-term (25 – 60
months) actions of a policy/regulatory, physical, and management nature to develop and reduce costs
of operation along the Dakar-Bamako corridor.
Specifically, the objectives of this report are to:
Evaluate current traffic on the corridor
Evaluate the cost of transport along the corridor
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Methodology
The author of this report conducted interviews with various public and private stakeholders that
conduct trade and transport activities along the transport corridor. Stakeholders interviewed included
government agencies (mainly from Senegal but also from Mali), transporters, freight forwarding agents,
representatives of shipping lines, shippers’ councils, business associations and private importers (within
Senegal)5. The author also reviewed reports and other documentation related to the key trade and
transport initiatives and other relevant documents, statistics, and publications. The list of organizations
interviewed can be found in Appendix D.
Through the stakeholder interviews, the author collected average values for formal costs (official fees
and legitimate charges for handling and transport) and informal costs such as bribes, as well as the
delays taken for various steps along the process. The author collected data on each of these cost
categories for three different import, transit and export scenarios, for two commodities of importance
to the PCE project – rice and cotton, for two different handling modes (containerized and bulk), and two
different modes of inland transport (road and rail). The Dakar Port Authority provided statistics and
other information on the Dakar port, while EMASE6 provided statistics on transit traffic to and from Mali
through the Port of Dakar. The study also benefited from other studies conducted by USAID/West Africa
Trade Hub projects, and the World Bank. The answers to questions sometimes varied, and were not
always complete; therefore, the author selected the most representative responses for use in the cost
model and standardized the units of analysis to standard 20-foot containers and to metric tons (t). In
some cases, the author was able to obtain only one valid data point, rendering averaging impossible.
While much of the cost data in this report may be of limited statistical significance, this does not
diminish its importance in creating a baseline for future studies.
Because rice and cotton were determined to be the main (indeed, highly predominant) agricultural
products moving along the corridor (rice in an inbound direction and cotton in an outbound direction),
they were selected for the representative supply chains. Because the volume of other agricultural
products of interest to the PCE was minimal in relation to the volume of rice and cotton, the study was
limited to two commodities.
5
6
Efforts were made to include representation from Mali, however, response rates were low.
Entrepots Maliens au Senegal
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Corridor Overview
Senegal is strategically located and has fairly well-functioning transport networks capturing road, rail,
marine, and air modes, which serve the Dakar – Bamako corridor. Figure 1 shows the Dakar-Bamako
corridor, and Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the corridor’s four main modes of transport.
Dakar
Senegal
Mali
#
Kidira
#
#
Bamako
Figure 1 Map of the Dakar - Bamako Transport Corridor
Mode of Transport
Marine
Road
Rail
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Characteristics
The main anchor for the Dakar – Bamako transport corridor
Port of Dakar is the first port of call for southbound ships
Its location allows round-the clock access
Recent investments by Dubai Ports World have increased efficiencies
in ships’ handing, waiting time at anchorage, and truck turn-around
times
Port of Dakar has approximately 550,000 TEU7 capacity (planned
capacity at 1.5M TEU)
Direct rail and road links from Port of Dakar
One major road linking Dakar and Bamako, Kidira-Diboli
Road links to Mali built at Kedougou – Saraya & Saraya – Faleme
Construction of toll road to link Dakar city to Diass airport (about 40
km) and a planned free zone (Diamniadio Integrated Special Economic
Zone)
Unfortunately, an ECOWAS initiative to implement an international
road transit regime, the Interstate Road Transit (TRIE) agreement, has
not been achieved, complicating transit procedures and increasing
transit costs
Rail corridor (Dakar-Tambacounda-Kayes-Kita-Bamako, 1,240 km) is
the only regional rail connection to Bamako
TEU stands for Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, in reference to standard measure for ocean shipping container size
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Mode of Transport
Characteristics
Rail connections at the Port of Dakar, EMASE, and at the newly-built
Logistics Platform; however, only direct Dakar-Bamako transportation
is currently operational (i.e. rail is not used for domestic freight
transport)
The advantages of rail transport include simplified customs
procedures, adapted from the International Convention to Facilitate
the Crossing of Frontiers for Goods Carried by Rail (TIF)
There are no customs and police inspections en route. Customs
procedures have been simplified, and they are based on a single
transit document, the Transit International Ferroviaire (TIF) document,
which accompanies goods from Dakar to Bamako and replaces
Senegalese and Malian national customs documents and procedures,
thereby simplifying customs and administrative formalities and
reducing the cost and delays.
The implementation of an international customs transit regime on the
rail corridor between Bamako and Dakar has greatly facilitated train
movement between Senegal and Mali, unlike its less-than-ideal road
equivalent, the TRIE.
So far, air is not identified as a node in the Dakar-Bamako transport
corridor. However, as many of Mali’s exports appear to be low-volume,
high-value goods, this may become an increasingly important component.
Construction of Ndiass airport, increasing capacity to 2000 ha
Infrastructure support through a toll road and a free zone
Important link for perishables and high-value, low-volume goods
Air
Table 1 Dakar - Bamako Corridor Modes of Transport
Mali, as a landlocked country, has access to multiple regional ports. Therefore, Senegal must improve
the quality, speed, reliability, and cost-competitiveness of its transport network in order to advance its
strategic partnership with Mali. Senegal has a clear comparative advantage in the region, which it can
capitalize upon to develop itself as a trade and transport hub in West Africa, and in particular with Mali.
Country
Senegal
Port
Dakar
Distance to Bamako
Existing road - 1,400 km
New road - 1,200 km
Cote d’Ivoire
Abidjan
1,100 km
Ghana
Tema
1,600 km
Guinea
Conakry
< 1,000 km
Togo
Lome
1,700 km
Characteristics
Direct rail link
2 road links
First port of call for southbound ships
Last port of call for northbound ships
1 road link
Transits require military convoys
1 road link
2 border crossings
1 road link
Transit duties of 2.5%
1 road link
2 border crossings
Table 2 Regional Competitive Positioning
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Port Overview
The Port of Dakar has one of the largest deep-water seaports along the West African coast. It has an
advantage over other West African ports because of its deep-draft structure and 640 foot-wide access
channel which allows round-the-clock access to the port. Its strategic location at the extreme western
point of Africa and at the crossroad of the major sea lanes linking Europe to South America and North
America to South Africa makes it a natural port of call for shipping companies.
The Port Autonome de Dakar (PAD), as the port authority for the Port of Dakar, is pursuing ambitious
modernization plans in order to make the Port of Dakar a primary shipping hub for West Africa. The
modernization and extension of the existing port constitute the backbone for the “Port of the Future”
project. In 2007, the GoS signed an agreement with Dubai Ports World (DPW) to develop and run the
port’s busiest container facility. DPW has been operating the container terminal in the Northern zone
since 2008, and handles approximately 85% of container ship traffic at the port. DPW has implemented
many improvements to operations at the port, installing equipment, information and communications
technologies (ICT), and new processes.
The Port of Dakar is divided into two main zones. The Northern zone covers the jetties N°4, N°5, N°8, the
container terminal and the petroleum wharf. The southern zone covers jetties N°1, 2 and 3 and is
dedicated to general cargo, transit cargo for Mali, passenger and vehicle traffic. Less than 20% of the
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containerized traffic passes through the Southern zone, which is equipped with 15 mooring berths. A
22.9ha area of is being renovated and extended.
7,000,000
6,000,000
The Port of Dakar was visited by
2,406 vessels in 2007, including
786 container ships, 443 cargo
vessels, 339 carriers, 290 tankers,
245 fishing vessels, 41 ore
tankers, and 22 cruise ships.8
In terms of freight, traffic at the
Port of Dakar has fluctuated over
the last several years, with the
Import
latest decrease occurring in 2009
Export
4,000,000
and widely attributed to the
Transits - Mali
ongoing international financial
Transits - Other
crisis. The Port of Dakar has seen
3,000,000
Transshipments
an overall decrease in traffic of
Fish
13% from 2008 to 2009, with a
9% decrease in incoming traffic,
2,000,000
and 24% decrease in outbound
traffic. By far, the hardest hit
areas include exports from
1,000,000
Senegal (down 29%) and
outbound transits from Mali
(down 36%), while the fish
0
industry seems to be the
2006 2007 2008 2009
strongest (with a 15% increase in
Figure 2 Port of Dakar Traffic
inbound traffic and a 10%
increase in outbound traffic). Figure 2 depicts the evolution of port traffic at the Port of Dakar (Source:
Port Autonome de Dakar). Imports represent traffic destined for import into Senegal; exports represents
traffic exported from Dakar; transits represents all traffic that passes in transit through Senegal but is
either imported or exported by a third country. Of all transits, by far the largest share belongs to Mali –
the volumes represented in the graph comprise both transit shipments to and from Mali (in other
words, both imports and exports, except imports to and exports from Senegal). The countries in the
“Transits-Other” category include Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
tons
5,000,000
Road Transport
Road transport along the corridor is mainly along the Dakar-Kaolack-Tambacounda-Kidira-Kayes-Bamako
axis, with approximately 80% of all cargo moving to Mali using this transport artery. The trucking
8
Source: World Port Source
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industry in Senegal is dominated by a large number of very small operators, who rarely own and operate
more than a few trucks, and a half a dozen subsidiaries of large multinational carriers or logistics
providers (e.g. Maersk). With the exception of the fleets owned and operated by large multinational
companies, the Senegalese trucking fleet is obsolete, and most of the traffic to Mali is carried on Malian
trucks (by some accounts, close to 90% of all Mali traffic). Mali has only recently upgraded its trucking
fleet and has a large capacity to make the long trip from Dakar to Bamako.
If the Senegalese fleet were to be upgraded and become competitive with the Malian fleet, there is still
a cargo sharing agreement between Senegal and Mali which stipulates that 2/3 of all Malian traffic is to
be transported by Malian trucks (see Appendix B).
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
Imports by rail
800,000
Imports by road
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
Road transport has
picked up pace so much
over the last decade that
volumes are reportedly
on the order of 300
trucks/day at the border
between Senegal and
Mali. It is therefore very
timely that Senegal is
working on completing a
new Southern corridor
linking Dakar to Bamako.
The road, linking
Kedougou to Saraya, and
Saraya to Faleme and the
border with Mali, will not
only shorten the corridor by 180 km, but will also expand capacity for road transport between the two
countries.
Table 3 Total Mali Import Traffic by Mode of Transport
Rail Transport
Where in the past an estimated 80% of all cargo moving along the Dakar-Bamako corridor was by rail,
the rail network’s deteriorating state has reduced this to 20%. In 2003, Mali and Senegal privatized
international traffic on the Dakar-Bamako railway, the management of the new entity being assumed by
the Transrail consortium. Since then, mismanagement has led to Transrail not complying with the
conditions of its operating contract, which required Transrail to develop an investment plan for
maintenance and repairs along the corridor. The lack of investment, however, has caused severe
deterioration of the rail infrastructure, equipment shortages, and frequent accidents, resulting in poor
service and reliability for cargo shipments, and forcing traders and forwarding agents to choose road for
time-sensitive shipments.
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Figures 3 and 4 show the breakdown of cargo transported by road versus rail. Figure 3 includes imports
from Senegal, as well as inbound merchandise arriving by ocean at the Port of Dakar and moving in
transit through Senegal. (Source: EMASE)
100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
Exports by rail
40,000
Exports by road
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
Figure 3 Total Mali Export Traffic by Mode of Transport
Figure 3 includes exports to Senegal (including livestock), as well as outbound merchandise departing by
ocean at the Port of Dakar and moving in transit through Senegal. The steep decrease in outbound
traffic is due to a large drop in exports of cotton (most of which are moved by rail). (Source: EMASE)
Trade Volumes along the Dakar-Bamako Corridor
This section focuses on the volumes of goods transported along the corridor. Official overall
international trade statistics, as reported through the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the
World Trade Organization and the United Nations, can be found in Appendix C. The information
compiled in this section has been obtained through various channels:
•
•
•
•
•
International Trade Center
Malian Warehouses in Senegal (Entrepots Malien au Senegal (EMASE))
Official website and direct communication with the Port Autonome de Dakar
Senegalese Shippers’ Council (Conseil Senegalais de Chargeurs (COSEC))
Statistics and direct communication with Senegal Customs
There are two perspectives in approaching the Dakar-Bamako corridor trade flows: from a port
perspective, and from the landlocked country’s perspective. Port transit traffic refers to direct trade
between the landlocked country – Mali – and its overseas partners. However, the corridor trade flows
also include bilateral trade with the coastal country – Senegal – which may or may not be linked to
maritime trade. This adds some confusion in the strict comparison of figures. Whenever possible,
several sources have been used and included in this section, in order to enable a more comprehensive
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comparison that includes both the port perspective as well as the bilateral trade perspective. For clarity,
the terminology used to describe the two types of flows is defined as follows:
•
•
•
Imports
o Imports by Mali from Senegal
o Imports by Senegal from Mali
o Imports by Senegal from overseas (arriving via ocean at the Port of Dakar)
Exports
o Exports by Mali to Senegal
o Exports by Senegal to Mali
o Exports by Senegal to overseas destinations (departing via ocean at the Port of Dakar)
Transits
o Inbound transits are imports by Mali from overseas (arriving via ocean at the Port of
Dakar and moving in transit through Senegal)
o Outbound transits are exports by Mali to overseas destinations (moving in transit
through Senegal and departing via ocean at the Port of Dakar)
Information and statistics on trade flows along the Dakar-Bamako corridor is scarce, fragmented,
sometimes inconsistent, and in some cases, contradictory. Therefore, the statistics presented in this
section can only be treated as representative volumes or rough estimates. Additionally, there is an
increased likelihood that the available statistics are somewhat distorted due to certain peculiarities of
trade and transportation patterns in Mali. Normally, this should not be an issue, however the statistics
available were not detailed or descriptive enough to allow for such distinction. There are three specific
examples:
1. Inbound transit statistics can include previously warehoused freight – this is particularly true for
imports of rice, which arrive in large volumes (and mostly in bulk) at time intervals for storage in
warehouses and subsequent withdrawal in smaller quantities. Differences in reporting by
different entities and lack of sufficient statistics detail can result in different volumes for port
traffic and corridor traffic.
2. Outbound transit statistics may or may not include warehoused cotton. Malian exports of cotton
often arrive in bulk and are stored at the EMASE warehouses until they are sold. This business
practice can result in different volumes for port traffic and corridor traffic, and the available
statistics did not adequately account for these differences.
3. Inadequate statistics for low-volume goods – many goods which are shipped in small volumes
are consolidated with other goods, and the resulting description of the commodities
transported is reported as “Good of all kinds” or “Goods not otherwise specified.” Specific
statistics about the volumes of such goods are not available at present, although in some cases
17
USAID
the nature of the goods could be determined from available information (although not the
volume).9
Total Corridor Traffic
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
tons
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Figure 5 Total Traffic along the Dakar-Bamako Corridor
900,000
850,000
800,000
750,000
tons
700,000
Inbound
Transits
650,000
600,000
Imports from
Senegal
550,000
500,000
450,000
400,000
2006
2007
2008
Figure 4 depicts the
total volume of traffic
along the Dakar-Bamako
corridor, inclusive of all
imports, exports, and
transits (as defined
above) but excluding
Senegal traffic with
overseas partners.
Although 2009 saw a
decline in the volume of
ocean traffic at the Port
of Dakar, traffic along
the corridor showed a
modest increase due to
an increase in bilateral
trade between Senegal
and Mali, and in
particular exports from
Senegal. This increase
represented an increase
in volume by 35% in
2009 over 2008,
although the actual
value of bilateral trade
between the
neighboring countries
declined during the
same period by 18%.
2009
Figure 4 Total Traffic to Bamako
(Source: EMASE)
9
Specific commodity description, values, and weights must be reported to Customs authorities, regardless of
whether shipments are consolidated or not. However, the quality and detail of the statistics available was not
sufficient to allow for cross-referencing of this data among the multiple data sources. Therefore, low-volume
shipments are left in a bundled format for the purpose of measuring the volume of traffic along the corridor.
18
USAID
Inbound Traffic (Dakar – Bamako)
Inbound transits to Mali are dominated by petroleum products (30%), fertilizer (13%), rice (10%), iron,
equipment, and sugar (5% each), and wheat (3%)10. An additional 15% consists of “Goods of all kinds,”
which are various products of volumes that are sufficiently low to require consolidation with other
products. The resulting consolidated shipment is reported as “Goods of all kinds.” Imports from Senegal,
on the other hand, are dominated by cement (83%), followed by salt (6%), petroleum products (3%),
fertilizer (2%), and “Goods of all kinds” (2%). Rice is also exported from Senegal to Mali, although its
volume is low, at 1%, on average, of total exports to Mali by volume. The increase in the volume of
imports from Senegal is due to a 36% increase in exports of cement. (Source: EMASE)
Outbound Traffic (Bamako – Dakar)
Malian outbound transits are heavily dominated by cotton, on average comprising 86% of all outbound
transits by volume. The majority of the remaining volume of outbound transits can be attributed to
“Good of all kinds” (12%). Although the 12% cannot be accurately broken down by type of product,
other statistics indicate that the category contains products such as sesame seeds, animal skins and
hides, wood, precious stones, machinery and vehicle parts, and art and musical instruments, most of
which are high-value, low-volume commodities. The decrease in outbound transits is largely due to
decreasing exports of cotton from Mali. Exports of other products by volume appear to be slightly
increasing, although these are likely the aforementioned low-volume, high-value products. Exports to
Senegal, on the other hand, are mainly comprised of dried fruits (39%), “Goods of all kinds” (25%),
livestock (16%), and cattle feed (8%). The declines in exports to Senegal are most likely due to lower
exports of “Goods of all kinds,” peanuts, wheat bran, corn, and cattle feed. (Source: EMASE)
100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
tons
60,000
50,000
Exports to Senegal
40,000
Outbound Exports
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
Figure 6 Total Traffic from Bamako
10
Percentages based on averages over the last 4 years (2006 – 2009)
19
USAID
Traffic of Agricultural Products
Figure 7 depicts the total movement of agricultural products along the Dakar – Bamako corridor
(excluding domestic movements within Mali and within Senegal, respectively, and shipments between
Senegal and its overseas partners). Trade in agricultural goods along the corridor is mainly in rice for
inbound traffic and cotton for outbound traffic, although sugar, wheat and livestock are also traded in
large enough volumes. Figure 8 depicts monthly traffic of agricultural products along the corridor for
2009. (Source: EMASE)
N.B. Trade in livestock depicted in Figure 7 includes only exports of livestock from Mali to Senegal.
Statistics on livestock exports from Senegal to Mali were not available.
20
USAID
Traffic of Agricultural Products Along the Dakar - Bamako Corridor,
by Volume
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
tons
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
Rice (inbound transit)
63,861
49,999
70,454
83,951
Sugar (inbound transit)
21,081
38,819
15,442
35,515
Wheat (inbound transit)
24,511
18,398
13,643
11,583
Cotton (outbound transit)
82,912
60,208
39,368
24,238
Rice (import from Senegal)
5,657
5,823
435
2,205
Sugar (import from Senegal)
62
745
840
113
3,089
1,171
67
40
945
1,504
377
353
Beans (export to Senegal)
0
686
51
331
Livestock (export to Senegal)
0
9,063
7,288
7,092
Wheat bran (export to Senegal)
Peanuts (export to Senegal)
Figure 7 Traffic of Agricultural Products Along the Dakar-Bamako Corridor by Volume
21
USAID
20,000
Traffic of Agricultural Products Along the Dakar - Bamako Corridor,
by Month by Volume (2009)
Rice (inbound transit)
18,000
Sugar (inbound transit)
16,000
Wheat (inbound transit)
14,000
Cotton (outbound transit)
tons
12,000
Rice (import from
Senegal)
10,000
Sugar (import from
Senegal)
8,000
Wheat bran (export to
Senegal)
6,000
Peanuts (export to
Senegal)
4,000
Beans (export to Senegal)
2,000
Livestock (export to
Senegal)
0
Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09
Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09
Figure 8 Traffic of Agricultural Products Along the Dakar - Bamako Corridor, by Month by Volume
22
USAID
Supply Chain Descriptions
In line with the objectives of the PCE project, three supply chains representing the movements of
agricultural products along the Dakar-Bamako transport corridor were chosen as a baseline to describe
the inbound and outbound movement of commodities and to provide a framework to collect cost data.
Since rice and cotton are the top agricultural commodities transported along the corridor, by volume,
they were selected for more detailed study. Not all possible permutations of imports, exports and
transits of rice and cotton were examined, however; the study only includes the most common supply
chains, using the Port of Dakar as the anchor point. The supply chain schematics presented below are
generic and notional. More detailed process descriptions in the following section highlight differences
based on mode of transport and handling mode.
Supply chain 1 represents a transit shipment of rice. The shipment arrives via ocean transport at the
Port of Dakar, and in transported in transit to Bamako. The shipment may be containerized or in bulk,
and the transport to Bamako may be via road or rail.
Port of Dakar
Road Transport
Senegal – Mali Border
Supply chain 2 represents an import shipment of rice. The shipment arrives via ocean transport at the
Port of Dakar, and is distributed in Senegal via road.
Seneg
Ro
ad
Bamako
1
Supply chain 3 represents an export shipment of cotton. The shipment departs from Bamako and is
transported in transit to the Port of Dakar, where it departs via ocean transport. The shipment may be
containerized or in bulk, and the transport from Bamako may be via road or rail.
23
USAID
Commodity Profiles
Rice is the main inbound agricultural commodity moving along the corridor, and is both Senegal’s and
Mali’s top agricultural import, both by value and by weight. Cotton is the main outbound agricultural
commodity moving along the corridor, and most of it is shipped via ocean to overseas destinations.
Rice
Annual Imports
- Senegal
Annual Imports
– Mali
Origin
Mode of
Transport
Handling Mode
Characteristics
of Rice Imports
2009 value – $326,905,00011
2008 value – $646,209,000 (78% increase over 2007)
Annual volume – 750,000 tons (est)12
2008 value - $66,170,000 (66% increase over 2007)
Annual volume – 86,156 tons (2009); 70,889 tons (2008)13
Most imported from overseas, and transported via ocean to Dakar
Mali imports from Senegal – 3,530 tons/year (avg) ; less than 1% of total
– 2009: 2,205 tons
– 2008: 435 tons
– 2007: 5,823 tons
– 2006: 5,657 tons
20% rail (Mali transits)
80% truck (Mali transits)
100% truck (imports into Senegal & Senegal exports to Mali)
Most rice arrives at the Port of Dakar in bulk or in bags
Imports of premium rice are containerized
International trade in rice is mainly conducted through large international
trading companies. In Senegal, all rice importers work through trading
companies (e.g. Cargill, Nidera, Lois Dreyfus).
Typically, rice importers order large quantities of rice from traders (not directly
from producers), which arrives in bulk or in bags at the Port of Dakar as CIF14
cargo. The frequency of such shipments is approximately once every 3 months.
Bulk or bagged rice is moved from the port to bonded warehouses, which are
sometimes managed by a third party on behalf of trading companies (usually
inspection companies such as SGS or Cotecna). Rice is stored in bonded
warehouses under a special Customs regime until it is depleted.
Because it is not uncommon to load a ship without knowing the destination of
the rice, especially if directed to Africa, and also because shipments are
typically of very large quantities, traders carry the financial charges until a
buyer is found and rice delivered to the final destination. Thus, a bank acts as
intermediary between importers and traders.
A trader continues to give instructions, through a bank, to the company
operating the bonded warehouse to release a certain amount of rice to the
11
All statistics by value are sourced from the International Trade Centre
Source: Interviews with rice importers
13
Source: EMASE. The volume data provided by EMASE is inconsistent with estimates provided by rice importers
and freight forwarders specializing in rice, who place the average annual volume at 250,000 tons.
14
Cost, Insurance, Freight, an internationally-recognized INCOTERM
12
24
USAID
importer, until all the rice is depleted.
Wholesalers buy rice in smaller quantities at the warehouses, and generally
transport it using their own trucking fleets, usually for short distances.
Containerized shipments or smaller bulk shipments are typically released at the
port and do not have an intermediate bonded warehousing step as described
above.
Cotton
Annual Exports
- Mali
Annual Exports
– Senegal15
Mode of
Transport
Handling Mode
Characteristics
of Cotton
Exports
2008 value – $205,667,000
2007 value - $200,251,000 (22% decrease over 2006)
2009 volume – 24,238 tons
2009 value – $14,158,000
2008 value - $24,384,000 (21% decrease over 2007)
Volume information not available
95% rail (bulk shipments)
5% truck (containerized shipments)
Cotton is mainly transported to the Port of Dakar in bulk.
Some cotton is containerized in Mali (mainly shipments covered by a through
Bill of Lading).
All cotton loaded on vessels is containerized.
Cotton is covered under a special convention, and the Bollore Group has
exclusivity in its transportation.
Approximately 95% of all cotton exports from Mali are bulk, FOB Dakar.
Because most bulk exports are not yet sold, they are stored at the EMASE
warehouse until a contract of sale is signed.
Upon the completion of a sale, the cotton is containerized at the EMASE
warehouse, and is transported to the Port of Dakar for vessel loading.
A small percentage of cotton is moved directly to the Port of Dakar under a
through Bill of Lading. Such shipments are typically containerized in Mali, and
are transported by road.
Process Descriptions
Although the processes described in this section were approached from the perspective of importing
rice and exporting cotton, an attempt has been made to generalize the process descriptions so that
insight can be gained for all imports, transits, and exports, regardless of the type of commodity.
Import Process
#
Process Step
0
Vessel arrival
15
Comments
Data provided for informational purposes only. The study did not examine exports of cotton from Senegal.
25
USAID
#
Process Step
Comments
1
Carrier submits cargo manifest to Senegal Customs.
Customs official enter manifest data into Gainde 2000,
the Customs electronic system.
Merchandise is offloaded from the vessel and stored in a
Customs warehouse.
(For bulk shipments of rice) Rice is moved to a bagging
station within the port for bagging.
Cargo can also be immediately moved to a bonded
warehouse or a CFS outside the port (bonded
warehouses operate under a special Customs regime for
rice; there are no Customs agents at the warehouses but
Customs conducts occasional visits to ensure compliance)
Customs verifies the merchandise quantities as reported
on the manifest against actual quantities delivered by
physically counting and verifying the cargo
– for containerized cargo, the containers are counted
– for bulk cargo, the cargo is weighed
Orbus / Single Window process:
a) Importer or forwarding agent enters the
Commercial Invoice (CI) in the Orbus system.
b) The Orbus system determines all documents
required for the import, and calculates the duties
and fees due
c) The Orbus system sends a request to each
government agency for the relevant documents
d) The relevant government agencies access Orbus
and create the required documents
e) Forwarding agent prints out the documents and
attaches them to the commercial documents and
the Customs declaration (step 5)
Importer’s forwarding agent gathers and scans the
Commercial Invoice, the Bill of Lading, and the Packing
List, and creates an import declaration (usually submitted
any time after vessel arrival) in the Customs system
(Gainde 2000).
Paper manifests (except Maersk,
who can submit manifests
electronically)
SDV16 operates a CFS17 within
the port that can be used for
rice
2
2a
3
4
5
16
17
This step can take up to 1 day at
maximum
Data entry of the CI is manual
Self-filing is not possible
Advance import declaration is
possible for goods transported
by Maersk.
Pre-arrival Customs release,
however, is only available for
certain low-risk products.
Unless using the advance import
declaration, forwarding agents
wait for an Arrival Notice from
carriers. Sometimes, there can
be delays in the transmission of
this document that can exceed
the 10 days of free storage at
SDV is a transport and logistics subsidiary of the Bollore Group.
Container Freight Station
26
USAID
#
Process Step
6
Forwarding agent prints the import declaration, collects
all other documents pertaining to the import and
required by Customs (step 4), and physically delivers the
file to Customs.
7
Upon receipt of the import declaration, Customs agents
ensure that all the documents conform to the declaration
(i.e. document validation)
Customs system (Gainde 2000) performs risk analysis/
applies selectivity controls, and assigns the shipment to
one of four lanes.
8
9a
Green lane – the shipment is released following
satisfactory review of shipment documents
9b
Yellow lane – the shipment is released following
satisfactory review of shipment documents; Customs will
conduct post-release audit of the shipment
Orange lane – shipment is released following satisfactory
results from scanning the shipment. If the scan has
positive results, then the shipment is sent for physical
inspection (step 9d)
9c
9d
10
Red lane – forwarding agent asks Customs for an
appointment for the inspection; forwarding agent
coordinates with the terminal operator to move the
shipment to a dedicated inspection area at the
designated time; terminal operator moves shipment to
the dedicated inspection. Customs agents physically
inspect the contents of the shipment, which is released
following satisfactory inspection results.
Shipment is released by Customs
Comments
the port, and importers can
incur demurrage charges as a
result.
Other documents include
Commercial Invoice, Packing
List, Bill of Lading, Cargo
Tracking Note, and any other
documents required by other
government agencies as
submitted through Orbus (see
step 4)
Manual step that can easily be
eliminated through automation
Selectivity is based on relatively
simplistic criteria including the
nature of the goods, the country
of origin, classification, etc.
A true “Green Lane,” based on
international best practices such
as AEO18, would not require
document review for each
shipment
Cotecna operates the mobile
scanning equipment, and
coordinates the results of the
scan with Customs. This step
takes about 15 minutes because
the container doesn’t need to
be moved from its storage
location
The inspection itself takes 30
min per 20 ft container and 60
min per 40 ft container. Moving
a container from storage to the
inspection area takes more
time, due to port traffic
Electronic release is accessible
18
Authorized Economic Operator, part of the World Customs Organization’s SAFE Framework of Standards to
Secure and Facilitate Global Trade
27
USAID
#
Process Step
11
Forwarding agent takes the printed Customs release to
the port and pays all the port taxes and fees due.
(Payment of Customs duties and fees also takes place,
through the Orbus system.)
12
Forwarding agent (or transporter), presents the following
documents to the shipping line:
– Customs release
– Proof of payment of port taxes and fees
– Original BOL
Shipping line issues a delivery order for the shipment, and
delivers the cargo from the storage area and loads it on
trucks.
[Rice shipment] If rice arrives bagged, it is loaded directly
on trailers. If rice arrives in bulk, it is bagged before
loading on trailers. (This happens whether the
merchandise clears Customs at the port or at a bonded
warehouse outside the port)
13
14
15
16
17
The printed Customs release and the shipping line
delivery order are presented at the port gate to complete
exit formalities.
For bulk shipments, truck passes through a weighbridge
to verify the shipment weight comports to the weight
declared on the documents
[If rice moving to a bonded warehouse] Merchandise is
stored at a bonded warehouse, pending authorization for
release by traders and a Customs release. There is a
special Customs declaration allowing rice to be cleared as
it is sold.
[If rice stored at a bonded warehouse] Rice is loaded on
trucks
Rice is transported to its final destination
Comments
by forwarding agents in Gainde
2000
Typically payment is made to
the terminal operator, who
charges for port taxes and fees
on behalf of the port authority.
Delays can occur at this step,
because even though the port
operations are 24/7, the
opening hours for payment are
not.
PAD statistics indicate that the
turnaround time for this step
has been reduced to less than
20 minutes; however, interviews
with forwarding agents
suggested that this is not always
the case and delays do occur
due to some congestion at the
port (while infrastructure
upgrades are still ongoing)
When the WAEMU axle-weight
limit regulations become fully
enforced, all trucks will pass
through the weighbridge to
verify compliance with the
regulations
Transit Process (Inbound)
#
Process Step
0
Vessel arrival
Comments
28
USAID
#
Process Step
Comments
1
Carrier submits cargo manifest to Senegal Customs.
Customs official enter manifest data into Gainde 2000,
the Customs electronic system.
Merchandise is offloaded from the vessel and stored in a
Customs warehouse.
(For bulk shipments of rice) Rice is moved to a bagging
station within the port for bagging.
Customs verifies the merchandise quantities as reported
on the manifest against actual quantities delivered by
physically counting and verifying the cargo
– for containerized cargo, the containers are counted
– for bulk cargo, the cargo is weighed
Importer’s forwarding agent gathers and scans the
relevant commercial documents and creates a transit
declaration (S110) in the Customs system (Gainde 2000).
Forwarding agent prints the transit declaration, collects
all other required documents and physically delivers the
file to Customs.
A verification officer from the Customs clearance
department issues the Customs release for the transit
shipment and requests an escort, based on risk analysis.
Paper manifests (except Maersk,
who can submit manifests
electronically)
SDV19 operates a CFS20 within
the port that can be used for
rice
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
19
20
This step can take up to 1 day at
maximum
Self-filing is not possible
There is a lack of transparency
as to which transit shipments
require a physical escort.
According to Senegal Customs, it
is possible to release a transit
without an escort for nonsensitive products; however,
certain sensitive commodities
require an escort. Interviews
with the private sector,
however, suggest that all
transits must pay the transit
escort fees, even if an actual
physical escort does not always
accompany the shipment.
Forwarding agent takes the Customs release for the
transit shipment to the port and pays all the port taxes
and fees due.
Forwarding agent (or transporter), presents the following
documents to the shipping line:
– Customs release
– Proof of payment of port taxes and fees
– Original BOL
Shipping line issues a delivery order for the shipment,
delivers the cargo from the storage area and loads it on
SDV is a transport and logistics subsidiary of the Bollore Group.
29
USAID
#
11
12
13
Process Step
Comments
the truck.
The forwarding agent goes to the Inspection department,
which provides the escort agent per the instructions from
the verification officer.
If there is no escort, a Custom seal is attached to the
vehicle or container by the Inspection department at this
time.
The printed Customs release and the shipping line
delivery order are presented at the port gate to complete
exit formalities.
For bulk shipments, truck passes through a weighbridge
to verify the shipment weight comports to the weight
declared on the documents
The Customs escort agent leaves with the shipment,
carrying the shipment documents
The shipment moves from Dakar to the border crossing at
Kidira. En route, the vehicle passes through
approximately 30 checkpoints, verifying compliance with
regulations and matters such as the security, safety,
smuggling, etc.
When the WAEMU axle-weight
limit regulations become fully
enforced, all trucks will pass
through the weighbridge to
verify compliance with the
regulations
14
The shipment arrives at the Senegal – Mali border.
15
Upon arrival, the Customs escort signs the transit
declaration (the declaration must be signed in order to be
valid)
The documents (transit declaration, commercial
documents, and Waybill) are given to Senegal Customs
for processing
Senegal Customs transfer the documents to Mali Customs
for processing
The transporter pays Mali Customs any duties, taxes, and
fees due, as well as the TRIE guarantee (0.25% of the
goods’ value), for which Mali Customs issues an ECOWAS
ISRT LogBook
16
17
18
19
Although there are plans to
reduce the number of
checkpoints to three, at the time
of writing this project had not
yet been effectively
implemented
Often, the Customs escort does
not accompany the shipment
and does not arrive with the
documents required to cross the
border until well after the
shipment has arrived, creating
delays
The Waybill (road only) is
required by Mali but not by
Senegal
This is in contravention of a
2002 bilateral agreement
between Senegal and Mali
regarding transits, which was
modeled after the ECOWAS TRIE
agreement. (See Appendix B for
a detailed description of TRIE
and the bilateral agreement on
transits)
Mali Customs releases the shipment
30
USAID
#
Process Step
Comments
20
The truck moves to await the twice-daily escort convoy
into Bamako
The shipment moves from Diboli to Bamako. En route,
the vehicle passes through approximately 7 checkpoints,
verifying compliance with regulations and matters such
as the security, safety, smuggling, etc.
Although Mali has 3 official
checkpoints between Diboli and
Bamako, in reality there are
about 7 unofficial checkpoints
21
The process described above applies to transits transported by road, and is more complex than the
procedure for transits transported by rail. The advantages of rail transport include simplified customs
procedures, adapted from the International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Goods
Carried by Rail (TIF). In addition to no customs and police inspections en route, there are no Customs
escorts, Customs procedures have been simplified, and they are based on a single transit document, the
Transit International Ferroviaire (TIF) document. The TIF accompanies the goods from Dakar to Bamako
and replaces the Senegalese and Malian national customs documents and procedures, thereby
simplifying customs and administrative formalities and reducing the cost and delays.
Transit Process (Outbound)
The outbound transit process is a reverse of the inbound transit process. The outbound transit for the
purposes of this report is also an export from Mali, and since exports are encouraged and often enjoy
special privileges compared to imports, the outbound transit process is much simpler than the inbound
transit process. Additionally, particularly for the commodity selected – cotton – outbound exports are
almost exclusively transported by rail (95%). In addition to no customs and police inspections en route,
rail shipments encounter no Customs escorts, Customs procedures are simplified and are based on a
single transit document, the Transit International Ferroviaire (TIF) document. The TIF accompanies the
goods from Dakar to Bamako and replaces the Senegalese and Malian national customs documents and
procedures. Therefore, the outbound transit process is not described in as much detail as the other two
processes.
#
Process Step
1
Merchandise is prepared for export. If already sold,
merchandise is containerized; if not already sold,
merchandise is loaded on rail cars in bulk.
Shipper (or shipper’s forwarding agent) prepares the
shipment documents
2
3
4
6
Documents are filed with Customs
Mali Customs clears the shipment for export
Shipper pays all fees due to Mali Customs
Comments
Bill of Lading (if merchandise is
sold and is traveling on a
through BOL)
Waybill (if road)
Customs declaration (if road)
TIF (if rail)
TRIE carnet
Customs declaration/TIF fees,
31
USAID
#
Process Step
Comments
EMASE fees, Customs escort
fees, TRIE guarantee
7
Shipment leaves for Senegal; if transported by road, it is
accompanied by an escort
8
Shipment arrived at border crossing with Senegal
8a
(If rail) Shipment crosses the border based on the TIF
document
8b
(If road) Shipment goes through Mali Customs and
Senegal Customs formalities; a Senegal Customs transit
declaration (S110) is filled out; and an escort is assigned
9
Shipment is cleared at the border and continues to Dakar
10a (If road/sold) Shipment arrives at Port of Dakar
10b (If rail/unsold) Shipment arrives at EMASE; when sold,
shipment is containerized; loaded on trucks for delivery
to the port, and related shipping documents are created
11 The container is delivered, with all relevant documents,
to the carrier within the port
12 Container is stored until vessel loading (For exports from
Senegal: Customs clearance is automatic (except for
certain shipments that need specific documents such as a
COO), and the declaration and documents can often be
submitted after departure)
13 Senegal Customs physically inspects all containers from
Mali prior to vessel loading (For exports from Senegal:
Customs agents must be present at container stuffing
locations, and shippers must pay 10,000 CFA for a
certificate of stuffing)
14 Shipment is loaded on vessel
15 Vessel departs
The purpose of the inspection is
to control for illegal drugs
Documents
Various documents are required for the international trade and transport of commodities, some of them
commercial, others governmental or required for compliance reasons. The following table is not meant
to provide an exhaustive list of the documents required for international trade; rather, it is meant to
highlight documents specifically applicable to transport to, from and through Mali and Senegal (and in
particular, for shipments of rice and cotton). Therefore, commercial documents such as Commercial
Invoice, Bill of Lading (BOL), and Packing List are excluded from this discussion.
Name
Description
Cost
Cargo Tracking Note
(Bordereau de Suivi de
Cargaisons (BSC))
Required for all imports by:
Senegal – COSEC & Senegal Customs
Mali – CMC21
(Senegal) €15/20
ft container,
€30/40 ft
21
Conseil des Chargeurs Maliens, Mali’s shipper’s council and the equivalent of COSEC
32
USAID
Cargo Offer (Offre de
Cargaison)
Waybill (Lettre de Voiture)
Prior Notice of Imports
(Declaration Prealable
d’Importation (DPI))
Certificat of Verification
(L’Attestation de
Verification (AV))
Food product import
notification (Declaration
d’Importation de Produits
Alimentaires (DIPA))
TRIE Carnet
Customs declaration
Phytosanitary
Inspection/Certificate
Certificate of Import/Export
(Attestation
d’Importation/d’Exportation
(AI)/(AE))
Exchange authorization/
Commitment
(Autorisation/Engagement
de Change (AC)/(EC))
Declaration d’Importation
de Produits alimentires
Ostensibly required to enable Shippers’
Councils in West Africa to determine ocean
freight rates, the Cargo Tracking Note adds
another (mostly redundant) documentary
requirement (and associated cost) for importers
Required for all exports from Senegal by COSEC
& Senegal Customs
Required by the Mali Ministry of Transport, this
is a document that is not yet required in
Senegal. CCIAD has proposed introducing a
standard Waybill in Senegal, and is in discussion
with the Ministry of Transport
Required by Inspection Company (COTECNA) for
all imports to Senegal
container,
€50/300 tons
(bulk)
Required by Inspection Company (COTECNA) for
exports from Senegal
N/A
Required by the Control and Quality Division
Ministry of Commerce
N/A
Required by Mali Customs for all transits
Optional in Senegal
Required for all imports, transits, or exports
6,000 FCFA ($11)
required for all agricultural imports by DPV
(Direction de la Protection des Vegetaux)
Required for all imports/exports to/from
Senegal
N/A
2,500 FCFA ($5)
1000 FCFA ($2)
Senegal: 9,500
FCFA ($18)
N/A
1,000 FCFA ($2)
Required for all imports/exports to/from
Senegal
500 FCFA ($1)
Required by the Control and Quality Division for
food products imported to Senegal
N/A
Table 4 Selected Documents Required for Import and Export
33
USAID
Recent Developments and Achievements
Investment programs in transport and logistics are creating new capacities to support Senegal’s
economic development priorities. The nexus of investments is Dakar, which is clearly gearing up to
become a regional transport hub. Recent developments and achievements are positive and impressive,
but long-term progress requires firm commitment.
Initiative
Port of Dakar
Modernization
Dry Port Facilities
Dakar Logistics
Platform
Dakar Integrated
Special Economic
Zone (DISEZ)
Description
In 2007, DP World was awarded the concession to
operate and further develop the existing container
terminals at Dakar, with the aim of more than
doubling the capacity of the existing terminal (to
around 550,000 TEUs
Infrastructure upgrades such as a container terminal
extension and the installation of two post-panamax
ship-to-shore cranes and 10 gantry cranes has
improved port productivity during the 2008-2009
period
– Ships’ handling productivity has more than
doubled
– Waiting time at anchorage has decreased from
100 minutes to less than 10 minutes
– Truck turnaround time has decreased from 120
minutes to less than 20 minutes
Planned investments
– Construction of “The Port of the Future” will
provide deep sea berths and expand the capacity
to 1.75 million TEUs
– Construction of a fruit terminal with a 45,000m3
capacity
– Construction of a grain terminal
– Security enhancements such as C-TPAT
certification, ISO 28000 certification and physical
security (CCTV, access control)
Creation of a dry port in Bamako (ENSEMA), to
facilitate the storage and customs clearance of goods
Planned construction of dry ports at Kaolack and
Tambacounda would provide additional capacity
Completion of a Logistics Platform outside the Port of
Dakar
Total capacity - 21 hectares, warehousing capacity –
60,000 m2
Dakar Port Distribution Platform with a capacity of
8,500 m2 for distribution facilities
Construction of a 6,500,000m2 special economic zone
by Jafza International to support industrial,
commercial, logistics, and services activities
Status
In Progress
Complete
(Kaolack &
Tambacounda –
planned)
Completed
Opening expected
by the end of 2010
In Progress
Planning stage
34
USAID
Initiative
New International
Airport Blaise
Diagne
Dakar-Diamniadio
Tollroad
Road Construction
Railroad Upgrade
Enforcement of
WAEMU Axleweight Limits
Description
Located near the new international airport in Diass
Expected to support intermodal links to the port of
Dakar and to Bamako, through the Dakar-Mali
railway, the Dakar-Diamniadio tollroad, and the
existing road network
Construction of a new international airport at Diass,
40 km outside Dakar, to enable the prompt
movement of goods to international destinations
GoS projects 54,000 tons of air freight in 2020
Will increase air freight capacity, and is expected to
be especially beneficial for the transport of high value
goods and perishables (agricultural goods)
Connect Dakar to Diamniadio (34 km) and also the
new airport (40 km)
Provide easy access to DISEZ and enable the prompt
movement of goods from the site to destination
locations
GoS is in the process of expanding its road network
The construction of a new road along the Kedougou –
Saraya – Mali border stretch will provide a new 180km shorter Southern access to Bamako
Construction of a new road along the Saraya – Falémé
stretch, as well as a bridge at Falémé
GoS is planning the upgrade of the (highly outdated) rail
infrastructure
Upgrade the Dakar-Tambacounda stretch to standard
gauge
Addition of a third track between Dakar – Thies,
including an intermodal link at the airport
New track between St. Louis and Thies
Consideration of new tracks to Faleme and Matam
Both Senegal and Mali are expected to begin
enforcing the WAEMU regulation in the near future
(WAEMU members had agreed to fully enforce the
regulation by June 2010, however, delays with the
installation of weighbridges has resulted in both
countries extending the deadline)
Mali has installed 5 weighbridges at border crossings
with Senegal (at Diboli), Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso,
Ghana, and Burkina Faso via Togo, which together
handle 90% of the traffic coming into Mali
Senegal is going through a tender process for the
selection of an entity to install and operate its
weighbridge facilities along the corridor (expected to
be co-located at joint control post facilities)
Status
In progress
Planning stage
In progress
Construction stage
In progress
Completion
expected within a
year
In progress
Planning stage
In progress
Expected to be
operational in
early 2011
35
USAID
Initiative
Description
Status
22
Checkpoint
Reduction
Customs
modernization
It is expected that CCIAD will operate its existing
weighbridge at the Port of Dakar for WAEMU
regulation enforcement purposes
The GoS is also considering a requirement for
factories or facilities that ship more than 200,000
tons/year to weigh trucks as they leave the factory,
and is currently working on identifying those factories
that meet the volume parameter.
Following the shocking results of the WAEMU
Improved Road Transport Governance Initiative
(IRTG)23, Senegal has committed to reducing and
harmonizing the number of checkpoints between
Dakar and Kidira
– Gendarmerie24 controls will be reduced to 3 zones
– one round Dakar, one at Kafrinne, and one at
Kidira, with trucks displaying a zone-specific
sticker
– The Gendarmerie is adopting various anticorruption measures, such as a toll-free number to
report illegal checkpoints and officers carrying ID
badges and GPS devices to enable easy
identification and reporting
– The initiative to harmonize the checkpoints
includes reducing the number of checkpoints to
three, and co-locating all control agencies at these
checkpoints only (including weighbridges for the
enforcement of WAEMU axle-weight regulations)
Senegal was considered among the top reformers in
the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators for
Trading Across Borders in 2009
Senegal Customs is currently implementing its
“Paperless” project, whose objectives are to
implement fully electronic Customs processes and
procedures
Gainde 2010 is an upgrade of the automated
Customs system that will provide electronic
integration among all Customs border posts (this will
enable Customs to have “one version of the truth”
and collect comprehensive statistics)
In Progress
Completion
expected by the
end of 2010
In Progress
In various stages
of implementation
22
Dakar Chamber of Commerce
IRTG reports monitors road barriers along major West African transport corridors, and the delays and bribes
th
rd
transporters incur at these checkpoints. The 9 IRTG report, covering the 3 quarter of 2009, featured results
along the Dakar-Bamako corridor for the first time. The report revealed that Senegal had the densest
concentration of checkpoints (26 per trip) and the second highest level of extortion at checkpoints ($64 per trip).
24
According to the IRTG results, the Gendarmerie is the entity responsible for the largest number of checkpoints in
Senegal.
23
36
USAID
Initiative
Trade Facilitation
Single Window
Description
Gainde 2010 will also provide electronic data
exchange capabilities through the implementation of
EDI, allowing electronic integration between Customs
and economic operators25 (Senegal Customs already
accepts electronic manifests from once carrier,
Maersk)
Enabling legislature for electronic signature has been
passed, so after Gainde 2010 goes live, there should
not be a need for hard copy documents
Both the Port of Dakar and Senegal Customs have
implemented continuous, round-the-clock port
operations
Senegal Customs working towards developing an
Authorized Economic Operator AEO26program, and is
defining the criteria for certifying authorized traders
Senegal Customs has plans to offer simplified
procedures for authorized traders
A Customs Private Sector Consultation Working
Group is used to facilitate consultation with industry
A Public-Private Dialog framework is being put in
place to increase cooperation with industry
Transport and delivery of containers from the Port of
Dakar is being deregulated27, allowing all authorized
companies to transport and deliver containers to and
from the Port of Dakar
Orbus is the electronic system developed as Senegal’s
Single Window
Although its functionality is limited at present, Orbus
will be upgraded as part of the “Paperless” Customs
project
Current functionality allows traders to submit the
information for and electronically access documents
required by government agencies other than Customs
for importing and exporting; however, the documents
must still be printed out before submittal to Customs
When upgraded, Orbus is expected to be integrated
with Gainde 2010 and enabled to electronically
collect all relevant commercial documents, thus
eliminating the paper step and becoming a true
Status
In progress
No concrete
estimate for
completion
Completed
Upgrade in
progress
25
Gainde 2010 is being implemented in a phased approach, and the Customs offices at Dakar-Petrole and DakarYoff have been using it since January 12, 2009, and March 31, 2010, respectively. The system is currently being
tested at the Customs offices at the Port of Dakar.
26
Authorised Economic Operator is a Customs-Business partnership program defined in the World Customs
Organization’s SAFE Framework of Standards
27
As per Inter-ministerial order 6365, from December 31, 2009
37
USAID
Initiative
Joint Customs
border controls
Electronic tracking
of transit shipments
Truck fleet renewal
Description
electronic Single Window
Corbus, the electronic system developed by Gainde
2000 in parallel with Orbus, allows electronic
payment of duties and taxes to Senegal Customs28
The governments of Senegal and Mali are looking at
integrating Customs operations and procedures and
creating one-stop shop joint border posts at border
crossings
– Kidira-Diboli
– Border crossing along new Southern road
Mali is on schedule to complete a one-stop-shop joint
border post with Guinea in 2012 (including a
weighbridge for axle-weight limit enforcement and
joints administrative procedures such as Customs and
TRIE processing)
Customs has awarded a contract to the inspection
company Cotecna for the implementation of a project
to provide electronic tracking via GPS devices for
merchandise in transit
The GPS devices are supposed to replace the physical
Customs escort required for transit shipments by road
The devices track the position and movement of
trucks along the corridor, and can identify when
vehicles steer off the approved transit route, or when
vehicles make suspicious stops. The devices cannot,
however, prevent or identify any tampering with the
vehicle or the merchandise.
Recognizing the lamentable state of the Senegalese
trucking fleet, the GoS has begun a dialog with
economic operators to consider financing options
GoS is considering providing financial incentives to
economic operators, such as repealing the Value
Added Tax (VAT) or creating a program for financing
the purchase of vehicles
Status
Planned
No concrete
estimate for
completion
In Progress
In Pilot stage
Under
consideration
Improvements in Doing Business Indicators and Logistics Performance Index
Senegal has recently made significant improvements in trade and logistics indicators, although
opportunities for improvement remain. The Investment Presidential Council, through its working
groups, has placed significant emphasis on making sustained progress in improving performance against
the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators, and specifically in the Trading Across Borders category, and
thus improving Senegal’s trade facilitation capacity.
28
The system is operational since April 2010, however, banks are still being integrated
38
USAID
The Doing Business report provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement
across 183 economies, in 10 indicator sets. The pertinent data set for the purposes of this report is the
“Trading Across Borders” indicator set, which measures exporting and importing by ocean transport,
focusing on the documents, time, and cost to import and export. Table 5 presents Senegal’s
performance for each of these subindicators.
Trading Across Borders in Senegal
Rank
Cost to export (US$ per container) 29
Cost to import (US$ per container)
Documents to export (number)30
Documents to import (number)
Time to export (days)31
Time to import (days)32
2008
828
1,720
11
11
20
26
2009
64
1,078
1,920
6
5
14
18
2010
57
1,098
1,940
6
5
11
14
Table 5 Doing Business Indicators, Trading Across Borders
Senegal has been making impressive progress in recent years. In the 2009 edition of Doing Business,
Senegal was considered among the top reformers in the Trading Across Borders indicator. Through
aggressive reforms in Customs and port modernization, Senegal’s 2010 rank has improved by seven
points, with the country now ranking 57th in the world. Of the ten Doing Business indicators, this is by far
the area where Senegal ranks the highest, as its overall Doing Business rank is 157. (Note: the Doing
Business/Trading Across Borders indicators measure only the procedural requirements for exporting and
importing by ocean transport; inland transport and inland border procedures are not taken into
account; therefore these indicators do not accurately reflect the state of transport along the entire
corridor).
Customs and port modernization initiatives have almost halved the number of documents required to
export and import since 2008. However, while aggressive and highly successful port reform has
contributed to reducing the time to export and import by almost half, it is also the most likely
contributor to a slight increase in the cost to import and export. Since Dubai Ports World (DPW) has
taken over management and improvement of the container terminal in the North zone of the Port of
Dakar, industry has noted an increase in the port and handling costs. As DPW makes infrastructure
improvements and investments, port capacity is increasing, however, costs are rising as well. While
industry hails the increased efficiency at the port, they note that the port fees are too high.
29
All fees associated with completing the procedures to export or import are included, such as costs for
documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, terminal handling charges, inland
transport, cost for issuing or securing a letter of credit (costs based on 20-ft container)
30
Documents recorded include port filing documents, customs declaration and clearance documents, and official
documents exchanged between the parties to the transaction
31
The procedures measured range from the packing of the goods at the factory to their departure from the port of
exit
32
The procedures measured range from the vessel’s arrival at the port of entry to the shipment’s delivery at the
importer’s warehouse
39
USAID
When viewed from a regional context as well, Senegal’s Trading Across Borders reforms are impressive.
Compared to its regional partners, as well as with three other peers, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Romania
(developing countries with similar markets or GDPs), Senegal’s rank improvement fares very well. With
the exception of Mali, Senegal has the highest improvement in its Trading Across Borders rank, and is
ranked lower than only Tunisia and Romania (see Table 6). Senegal outperforms its Sub-Saharan Africa
partners in every single subindicator.
Country
Senegal
Cote
d'Ivoire
Ghana
Guinea
Togo
Mali
Tunisia
Vietnam
Romania
2009
64
2010
57
Change
-7
158
80
126
90
166
42
73
43
160
83
130
87
156
40
74
46
2
3
4
-3
-10
-2
1
3
Table 6 Trading Across Borders Rank Changes
Senegal’s improvements are also measured in a related report, the World Bank’s Logistics Performance
Index (LPI). The LPI takes a slightly different perspective on a similar issue, and is a perceptual measure
of a country’s logistics performance33. While related to the Trading Across Borders indicator, the LPI
measures a different, and broader, set of activities—from transport, warehousing, cargo consolidation,
and border clearance to in-country distribution and payment systems.34
Figure 9 Overall Logistics Performance Index
33
as measured on a 1 to 5 scale (lowest to highest performance)
The LPI relies on a structured online survey of logistics professionals from the companies responsible for moving
goods around the world: multinational freight forwarders and the main express carriers. Nearly 1,000 logistics
professionals from international logistics companies in 130 countries participated in the 2010 LPI edition.
34
40
USAID
Senegal was among the top 10 logistics performers in 2010 for low-income countries (behind only
Vietnam), outperforming its regional partners. Its 2010 rank, at 58, is much lower than in 2007, when
Senegal ranked 101st, and is significantly better than its regional partners, the next lowest being Togo at
96. Its overall LPI is at 2.86, compared with 2.37 in 2007, and it represents the biggest increase relative
to its regional partners. As with the Trading Across Borders indicator, Senegal’s LPI performance is due
to the significant port and Customs reforms undertaken by Senegal in recent years. Figure 9 depicts
Senegal’s LPI performance relative to its regional partners, three other similar countries (Tunisia,
Vietnam and Romania), and, for benchmarking purposes, 2007’s top performer and 2010’s second
highest performer, Singapore.
Figure 10 presents Senegal’s performance against the six LPI dimensions, and compares it against its
regional partners35:
Customs –perception of the efficiency of the Customs clearance process
Infrastructure –perception of the quality of trade and transport related infrastructure
International Shipments – perception of the ease of arranging competitively priced shipments
Logistics Quality and Competence – perception of the competence and quality of logistics
services
Tracking & Tracing – perception of the ability to track and trace consignments
Timeliness – perception of the frequency with which shipments reach the consignee within the
scheduled or expected delivery time
Customs
4
3
Timeliness
2
Infrastructure
Senegal
1
Cote d'Ivoire
Ghana
0
Guinea
Togo
Tracking &
Tracing
Int'l Shipments
Mali
Logistics Quality
& Competence
Figure 10 Logistics Performance Index (International Portion)
35
Data provided by logistics professionals working outside of the country. Since there is limited or inconsistent
input by logistics professionals working inside the countries,the domestic view is not fully represented here.
41
USAID
Costs of Transport
To calculate the cost of transportation along the corridor, the three supply chains previously introduced
were used, namely, imports of rice into Senegal, imports of rice into Mali transiting through Senegal,
and exports of cotton from Mali to overseas destinations, transiting through Senegal to the Port of
Dakar. Costs were determined in interviews with public and private sector entities, and were obtained
for containerized shipments (20 foot container), and for bulk shipments.
Rice is traditionally transported in bulk or in bags, arriving by ocean every 2-3 months in large quantities
(e.g. 3,000 tons), with Dakar used as a storage point. Dakar has many warehouses for rice (they are
mainly bonded warehouses, as rice is covered by a specific Customs procedure), where importers take
delivery of smaller shipments until depletion (the shipments typically clear Customs at the time the
importers take delivery). However, since the rice crisis in 2008, containerized shipment of rice has been
on the rise. Containerized shipments, however, are only of premium rice, because transport of rice is
very price-sensitive, and only premium rice shipments have the margins to allow the higher cost of
transport by container. Most rice still arrives in bulk, is bagged at the port, moved to a warehouse, and
picked up from there by rice distributors’ own fleets (however, one freight forwarder in particular has a
38% market share of the rice transported to Mali). 80% of the rice transported to Mali and all the rice
imported into Senegal is by truck. Because of truck overloading by smaller domestic (mostly Malian)
transporters, and to make imported rice competitive with domestic rice, the transportation of bulk or
bagged rice is considered to be quite cheap relative to the transport of other goods, at about 30 – 40
CFA per ton per km, making containerized transport, and transport by the larger multinational
companies not as cost-effective.
The transport of cotton, on the other hand, is almost exclusively by rail. Cotton is rarely sold prior to
arrival in bulk for warehousing in Dakar. Therefore, because the transport is not as time-sensitive,
transportation by rail is relatively cheaper, and Customs transit formalities are simpler, rail is the
preferred method of transport for bulk cotton from Bamako. Cotton is containerized in Dakar for the
onward ocean journey. A small proportion of cotton exports are sold prior to departure from Bamako,
and they are containerized there, and transported by truck on a through Bill of Lading. However,
containerized transits of cotton represent only about 5% of all cotton exports from Mali.
Assumptions
Costs do not include ocean freight, insurance, Customs duties and taxes, or domestic
transportation at the overseas country of origin or destination (for imports and exports,
respectively)
One Bill of Lading covers one 20 ft container and one 30-ton bulk shipment, respectively
The costs for bulk are calculated based on a 30 tons average weight (the weight varies based on
truck capacity). In reality, truck overloading is a very common practice (at least until the WAEMU
axle-weight limit regulations come into effect), causing pricing for haulage to be very low and
pricing certain hauliers out of the market
One 20 ft container of rice weighs 25 metric tons, on average
42
USAID
One 20 ft container of cotton weighs 10 metric tons, on average
Transport charges within Senegal based on a 180 km shipment to Kaolack
Large transport operators base transport tariffs within Senegal on a 3-zone tariff schedule that is
harmonized among them. Smaller operators negotiate transport prices based on kilometric ton,
usually about 30 - 42 FCFA/km/ton
Euro exchange rate used: 1 EUR = 1.27073 USD (used for calculating Cargo Tracking Note fees)
Dollar exchange rate used: 1USD = 516.127 XOF (FCFA)
Warehousing/storage charges are not included in calculation but are examined separately
43
USAID
Rice Import Costs
Figure 11 Transportation Costs - Rice Import into Senegal
44
USAID
Explanatory Notes:
1. For imports to Senegal, the port tax is calculated per metric ton, based on the nature of the
merchandise. For containerized shipments, this is 1,180 FCFA/ton, and for bulk shipments, it is
425 FCFA/ton
2. The handling fee for containerized cargo and for bulk is assessed based on metric ton and nature
of merchandise, at a rate of 5,001 FCFA/ton.
3. Lifting charges include lift on and lift off charges
4. Currently, weighbridge fees are only assessed on bulk shipments.
5. The fee for unstuffing a container.
6. Bagging fees only apply to rice that arrives in bulk
7. This only applies to bulk shipments of rice. Most containerized shipments are directly
transported from the port to the final destination.
8. This is applicable to bulk shipments of rice that are moved to a bonded warehouse. Bonded
warehouses do not have Customs agents on site, but must have representatives from an
inspection company (e.g. SGS, Cotecna)
9. Price per 20 ft container based on transport to Zone 2 (up to 250 km from Dakar). Price for a
bulk shipment is based on a rate of 30 FCFA/km/ton, based on a journey of 180 km
10. Source: 11th IRTG Report, 25 April 2010. Unofficial cost assessed per trip with 5 checkpoints on
average (2.68 checkpoints per 100 km, and $7.54 average bribe paid per 100 km, with approx.
200 km from Dakar to Kaolack)
11. Orbus fees are assessed on a per-document basis, however, only the first three documents are
charged, typically amounting to 2,500 FCFA per import.
12. 0.2% of the CIF value of all imports by ocean (except for a few strategic goods such as medicine).
13. The Freight forwarding fee used for the containerized shipment is based on a through Bill of
Lading for a transit shipment of rice. In Senegal, most freight forwarders assess their fees based
on a percent of the goods' value (some basing it on commercial invoice value, others on CIF
value), depending upon the nature of the goods, which is typically less than 1%. Because freight
forwarding fees are considered confidential due to competitive reasons, only two forwarding
agents provided costs – one for a containerized shipment, and one for a bulk shipment.
Therefore, the costs provided for the freight forwarding cost category may not be
representative of market prices for this service.
45
USAID
Rice Transit Costs
Figure 12 Transportation Costs - Rice Transits to Mali
46
USAID
Explanatory Notes:
1. For containerized cargo, the handling fee for containerized cargo is 71,106 FCFA per 20 ft
container of up to 10 tons; thereafter the handling fee is assessed based on metric ton, at a rate
of 5,001 FCFA/ton.
3. Currently, weighbridge fees are only assessed on bulk shipments
4. Customs physical escort and "Travail Supplementaire" fees are assessed for road transits to
Mali. There is a lack of transparency regarding the shipments selected for a physical escort.
Senegal Customs maintains that the need for an escort is determined based on the sensitivity of
the merchandise; private sector operators maintain that all shipments must pay these fees,
even if the escort does not always accompany the shipment. The need for a physical escort is
understood to be caused by the lack of an effective way to install Customs seals to enable
verification that the shipment has remained intact during transit. Senegal Customs is currently in
the process of piloting GPS electronic tracking devices that are intended to replace physical
escorts.
5. TRIE fee is 0.25% of the value of the shipment (by road), payable to the Senegal Chamber of
Commerce for the Senegalese portion of the transit; and 0.25% of the value of the shipment,
payable to the Malian Chamber of Commerce for the Malian portion of the transit. Since an
average value of a shipment of rice was unavailable, this charge cannot be calculated; however,
it's important to note that the charge is considered high by many of the economic operators
interviewed, especially for high-value shipments, making the use of rail preferable. There is a
lack of transparency as to whether the 2002 bilateral agreement between Senegal and Mali
regarding transits, which was modeled after the ECOWAS TRIE agreement, is actually
implemented in Senegal. (See Appendix B for a detailed description of TRIE and the bilateral
agreement on transits)
6. Source: 11th IRTG Report, 25 April 2010
7. There are three official payment points that charge official fees for maintenance of the roads;
the fees are 5,000 FCFA for small trucks or 1,000 FCFA/axle for large trucks. The charge was
calculated based on 3-axle trucks
8. Unofficial costs include 5,000 FCFA to expedite processing at the border, and 20,000 FCFA to
process the shipment without the official signature of the physical escort from Senegal Customs,
who often does not accompany a shipment but is required to sign the documents in order to
validate the transit declaration.
9. Only if shipment is not covered by a through BOL. Payable to Conseil Malien de Transport
Routier
10. Based on 500 FCFA/ton
11. It is assumed that the Mali Shippers' Council (Conseil Malien des Chargeurs or CMC) charges
comparable fees for the Malian Cargo Tracking Note and for all imports as the Senegal Shippers'
Council (Conseil Senegalais des Chargeurs or COSEC), since they are based on a standard issued
by the Union of African Shippers' Councils. Since the exact fees assessed in Mali were not
available, the same fees as Senegal were used
47
USAID
12. The Freight forwarding fee used for the containerized shipment is based on a through Bill of
Lading for a transit shipment of rice. In Senegal, most freight forwarders assess their fees based
on a percent of the goods' value, depending upon the nature of the goods, which is typically less
than 1%
48
USAID
Cotton Export Cost
Due to lack of response from forwarding agents based in Mali, the costs for cotton exports from Mali are
not comprehensive, and are based on a number of assumptions. The costs are a best estimate based on
information gathered from forwarding agents and other private sector operators based in Senegal.
Figure 13 Transportati
on Costs - Cotton Exports from Mali
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Explanatory Notes:
1. Source: 11th IRTG Report, 25 April 2010.
2. There are three official payment points that charge official fees for maintenance of the roads;
the fees are 5,000 FCFA for small trucks or 1,000 FCFA/axle for large trucks. The charge was
calculated based on 3-axle trucks
3. Road transport fees are based on the assumption that the same freight rates are applicable for
outbound transport as for inbound transport. 35 FCFA per metric ton per milometer are
assumed to be a reasonable estimate.
4. The author was unable to obtain the fees for transporting cotton by rail from Bamako to Dakar.
5. The author was unable to determine the Customs declaration processing fee charged by Mali
Customs. The fee charged by Senegal Customs is considered a reasonable assumption.
6. TRIE fee is 0.25% of the value of the shipment (by road), payable to the Senegal Chamber of
Commerce for the Senegalese portion of the transit; and 0.25% of the value of the shipment,
payable to the Malian Chamber of Commerce for the Malian portion of the transit. Since an
average value of a shipment of cotton was unavailable, this charge cannot be calculated;
however, it's important to note that the charge is considered high by many of the economic
operators interviewed, especially for high-value shipments, making the use of rail preferable.
There is a lack of transparency as to whether the 2002 bilateral agreement between Senegal and
Mali regarding transits, which was modeled after the ECOWAS TRIE agreement, is actually
implemented in Senegal. (See Appendix B for a detailed description of TRIE and the bilateral
agreement on transits)
7. Customs physical escort and "Travail Supplementaire" fees are assessed for road transits. The
need for a physical escort is understood to be caused by the lack of an effective way to install
Customs seals to enable verification that the shipment has remained intact during transit.
Senegal Customs is currently in the process of piloting GPS electronic racking devices that are
intended to replace physical escorts.
9. The Customs stamping fee is optional, for declarants wishing to receive proof of export
10. Freight forwarding fees are calculated as a percent of the goods' value, depending upon the
nature of the goods, and is typically less than 1%. Since an average value of a shipment of cotton
was unavailable, this charge cannot be calculated
11. Based on 500 FCFA/ton
12. The following fees, charged by Senegal Customs, are not included in the calculation
a. Certificate of stuffing – 10,000 CFA
b. Certificate of vessel loading–5,000 CFA
Warehousing and Storage Costs
Although the soon-to-be-operational Logistics Platform outside the Port of Dakar may alleviate some of
the problem, in general economic operators complain that there is insufficient warehousing capacity in
Dakar (and the situation is even more acute in rural areas, discussed later in this document). Insufficient
capacity increases the cost of storage, forcing some traders to use containers for storage, therefore
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immobilizing them for longer periods of time, decreasing their utilization, and increasing costs36.
Storage, however, is often necessitated by the lack of transport capacity – mostly by rail, but also by
truck, where there can often be an insufficient capacity of trucks in good condition.
In general, warehousing is provided at the Port of Dakar, at EMASE, and at other privately-owned and
operated warehouses and Container Freight Stations (CFSs).
Port of Dakar – Customs bonded warehouses at the port are operated by Customs-approved
companies
o Free storage: 10 days for imports to Senegal; 21 days for transits to Mali; 14 days for
exports of cotton from Mali; up to 5 days prior to vessel departure for all other exports
o After the free period, storage is charged based on commodity type. For rice, the charges
are:
For up to 15 additional days – 176 CFA/ton/day;
For up to 15 additional days - 511 CFA/ton/day;
For up to 15 additional days - 611 CFA/ton/day;
and so forth, with the daily charge getting progressively more expensive
o Warehousing capacity at the port is increasing, with the expected opening of a Logistics
Platform with a capacity of 40,000 m2 (60,000 m2 total, including open storage), and a
fruit terminal with a capacity of 5,400 m2 or 45,000 m3
EMASE – warehouses and open storage inside and just outside the Port of Dakar, operated by
the Government of Mali (specifically, the Ministry of Transport)
o Mali Customs bonded warehouse (located within the port) - 2,250 m2 capacity, 17,000
m2 open storage
o Warehouse dedicated for cotton exports in bulk - 30,000 m2 capacity, 7,000 m2 open
storage
o Free storage: 21 days for Malian imports; 30 days for cotton exports from Mali
o After the free period, storage fees are:
60 CFA/ton/day for imports of cereals;
80 CFA/ton/day for imports of other goods;
20 CFA/ton/day for imports of charity goods;
40 CFA/ton/day for exports of cotton
Other warehouses
o Bonded warehouses for rice operated by Customs-approved companies
average dwell time - 30-45 days
average charge - 750 CFA/ton for 30 days of storage
o ENSEMA – the dry port in Bamako has 14 hangars (of which 2 are refrigerated), with a
storage capacity of 70,000 tons
36
A new regulation by the GoS, however, will allow transport and logistics companies to charge for excessive
container usage, and is expected to be the impetus for traders and other economic operators to improve their
logistics operations.
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Summary of Observations
Perception of transport and logistics costs among the trade community was generally favorable, with a
few notable exceptions:
Port fees are universally considered excessive, especially for containerized shipments, and even
more so for Senegalese imports - 29% of total transport and logistics costs for imports to
Senegal vs. 9% for imports to Mali
Storage fees are considered high, and are generally attributed to insufficient capacity
Delays for transport by road, due to harassment along the corridor (at checkpoints) and at the
border, with informal costs amounting to up to 5% of the total transport and logistics costs
Rail is too unreliable and perceived to be biggest lost opportunity
Certain costs associated with road transport – Customs escorts and guarantee costs for transit
shipments – are high
Cost Component
Observations
Since DPW, port operations greatly improved but port fees
perceived as high
Small payments to facilitate faster delivery
Although not significant, delays sometimes occur
– Terminal congestion =>3-4 days at port
– 50% inspection rate
– Customs clearance within 24 hrs (2-48 hr range)
– Agents’ inefficiency & paper-based process causes delivery
delays
Rail is too unreliable; perceived to be biggest lost opportunity/issue
Perception about road transport: cheap for food products; expensive
for others
Transit escorts
New truck capacity
Unofficial costs for road are high(30-40K/truck)
40 checkpoints, road delays can be significant
Perceived as most challenging segment
Second biggest concern for industry
Road formalities more complex than rail
TRIE not well implemented
Delays can be significant
– 2-3 days on average
– Often caused due to shipment arriving before the documents
– Different business hours for SN-ML posts
– Insufficient resources (agents, scanning equipment)
– Lack of parking causes wait lines
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Cost Component
Observations
Transit escorts
Malian trucks have ≈100% market share
Senegalese trucks come back empty
When Senegalese fleet becomes competitive, would have to enforce
the bilateral freight sharing agreement
Checkpoints cause delays and bribes
Escorts by convoy cause delays
Storage fees perceived as high
Preferential rates with Mali (storage and port fees higher for Senegal
imports) +EMASE
Insufficient warehousing capacity, esp. outside Dakar
Unofficial costs were not identified
Warehousing necessary when there are delays due to transport
capacity – especially acute for rail shipments
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Challenges
Senegal’s challenges with regard to trade and transportation in general, and along the Dakar-Bamako
corridor in particular, can be organized in six main categories: policy, infrastructure, logistics industry
services, border management, enforcement and integrity, and commitment and implementation
capacity.
Policy
Senegal’s progress to date is substantial, and the country has demonstrated a commitment at the
highest levels of government to make changes in its trade and transport environment. Recent activities
such as the port modernization, Customs modernization, and investments in road, airport, and
warehousing infrastructure, especially around Dakar, demonstrate that the GoS recognizes the
importance of trade and transport to Senegal’s economic development, and Senegal’s unique
opportunity to leverage its strategic location as a transport hub for West Africa.
However, the GoS lacks an overarching sector-wide transport and logistics strategy, relying instead on a
point-solution approach to transportation capacity planning. The proliferation of ongoing programs,
projects and initiatives underscores the fact that the country’s leaders recognize that transportation is a
priority, however it also suggests that transportation capacity planning is more tactical than strategic.
One reason for this state of affairs is the structural makeup of the Senegalese government institutions. A
transportation modal separation exists within the government, and different agencies have jurisdiction
and responsibility over different modes of transport. There is no government component that views and
plans for transportation as an overall sector, and this segregation leads to a lack of coordination and the
absence of a sector-wide strategic approach. The consequences of insufficient coordination have led to
inadequate intermodal infrastructure, delays in projects due to interdependencies with other projects,
and, moving forward, potential for inaccurate total capacity planning.
Another policy area where Senegal is experiencing difficulties is in managing its strategic relationship
with Mali with respect to trade and transport. Mali is a landlocked country, but it also seems to have a
fair amount of clout, and choice within the region as to seaport facilities. Mali has used its clout to
negotiate favorable agreements and other concessions that, while benefitting the landlocked country,
may have an impact on the competitiveness of the transport sectors of both countries. A specific
example of such an agreement is the Memorandum of Agreement on Road Transport between Senegal
and Mali, which reserves 2/3 of all Mali-bound freight passing through the Port of Dakar for Malian
transport providers.
Infrastructure
Senegal has a functioning transportation network, especially when it comes to serving the main
transport artery, the Dakar-Bamako corridor. The main nodes include the recently renovated seaport, a
main road (Dakar-Kaolack-Tambacounda-Kidira-Kayes-Bamako), a second road to be completed within a
year (Dakar-Kaolack-Tambacounda-Kedougou-Saraya-Kenieba-Bamako), a railroad, and other facilities in
various stages of completion (e.g., Logistics Platform, Special Economic Zone). However, despite a recent
surge in road construction and rehabilitation, challenges remain.
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Rail
Despite being the only country with a rail link from its seaport to Bamako, Senegal has severely
neglected its great transportation asset. Whereas in the past 80% of the Mali-bound freight was
transported by rail and 20% by road, in the last five years the proportion has been reversed to 20/80.
The deteriorating freight rail network has reduced freight rail capacity and placed a significant strain on
road transport. The rail network has been facing various managerial and technical problems for a long
time, and insufficient investment has led to inadequate infrastructure to meet existing demand.
Examples include:
Outdated infrastructure (e.g., rail tracks) that often breaks down, causing delays in freight
movement, or even accidents. The frequency of such occurrences severely decreases reliability,
which in many cases is more important to traders than strictly cost
Equipment shortages (e.g., rail cars) causes delays, causing cargo to be stored immobilized, thus
forcing traders to bear higher inventory carrying costs (and sometimes direct storage costs)
This is a lost opportunity for Senegal, particularly because transportation by rail is cheaper than
transport by road, not necessarily because of lower direct transport costs, but mostly due to costs
related to border crossing and transit procedures. Specifically, benefits of transport by rail over
transport by road include:
No Customs escort fees
No TRIE guarantee (a total of 0.5% of the value of the goods) – this is a particular selling point
for high value goods
No checkpoints en route
Easier Customs procedures
Much shorter clearance times at the border
Road
Although the direct Dakar-Bamako corridor is well served by road, there is a lack of or insufficient rural
and feeder roads linking production sites to the main transport arteries. Although not as relevant from
the perspective of the landlocked country, this challenge is of particular import for the PCE project. As
Senegal ramps up local agricultural production, it needs to have a corresponding increase in feeder road
capacity. The lack of rural roads or, alternatively, the poor condition of rural roads prevents many
farmers from transporting their cargo from the field of production. As a specific example, mangoes from
the Casamance region are at particular risk of spoilage due to excessive wait times for a means of
transport, caused by the lack of good roads to the production sites. Often, up to 50% of the harvest can
be lost at the field of production.
Another potential issue is the prevalence among Malian transport operators of very large capacity trucks
that are significantly overloaded, therefore degrading the roads at an accelerated rate, and increasing
the need for road maintenance. Senegal and Mali have agreed to implement the WAEMU axle-weight
limit regulations, Mali has already installed five weighbridges at its border crossings, and Senegal is
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going through a competitive bid to outsource the installation of weighbridges. However, given that the
Malian trucking industry has recently upgraded its truck fleet, it remains to be seen how successful the
countries would be in enforcing this regulation, thereby protecting their road infrastructure
investments.
The state of the trucking fleet has an impact on the cost of transporting goods in transit to and from
Mali in a way that may not be immediately obvious. The poor condition of all but the trucks operated by
large multinational logistics companies prevents Customs seals from being effectively attached to them.
The ability to secure trucks carrying goods in transit is a requirement for the implementation of the TRIE
(both the bilateral agreement between Senegal and Mali and the WAEMU-level convention on which it
is based). The poor condition of the fleet therefore stalls the complete implementation of TRIE and
causes both Customs agencies to resort to a costly alternative to secure transit goods – namely, physical
Customs escorts. For a transit shipment, this amounts to $358 – not an insignificant amount. (This
amount does not apply to rail shipments)
Support Facilities
In a similar fashion, investments in warehousing and storage have been made, both in Dakar and in
Bamako. The ENSEMA dry port provides storage and warehousing facilities in Bamako, and Dakar has a
number of warehouses and container freight stations, with the Logistics Platform coming online soon,
and the Port of Dakar building fruit and grain terminals. From a direct Dakar-Bamako perspective, the
corridor is relatively well served with respect to storage and warehousing.
However, outside the main artery, Senegal has few dedicated facilities for support services, specifically
for agricultural and perishable goods, such as packaging facilities, cooling/refrigerated storage,
refrigerated trucks, and cooling stations along secondary roads or at production sites. As in the abovementioned example of mangoes produced in the Casamance region, the combination of pick-up delays
and lack of warehousing facilities (and particularly refrigerated facilities) causes spoilage rates of as high
as 50%.
Insufficient storage facilities also cause economic operators to store cargo in containers or rail cars, thus
immobilizing critical transport equipment, causing capacity issues and raising costs.
Services
Senegal is in the early stages of developing a transport and logistics “culture” of understanding how its
domestic transport and logistics markets operate in a global supply chain context. The transport and
logistics services industry is defined as the network of public- and private-sector intermediaries that
support freight logistics channels. Examples of services provided include warehousing, distribution
centers, cross-docking, goods insurance, consolidation and deconsolidation, customs brokerage and
information system value-added networks. Except for a few multi-national companies that operate out
of Dakar, the domestic transport and logistics services industry still needs to mature.
A key challenge for Senegal is improving its trucking industry to better support robust global trade
markets. The local industry is comprised of individual operators who often own just a few trucks, have
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few IT capabilities, and offer few value-added services. Add to these challenges the fact that the
domestic industry, on the whole, operates an obsolete fleet and has poor fleet utilization (specifically
with respect to outbound shipments from Mali), and the result is a sector that is not competitive and
lacks professionalism.
Another challenge that Senegal has only now begun to address is creating capacity to provide valueadded services such as consolidation, intermodal exchanges, and information systems.
Border Management
Senegal has achieved impressive success with the reform of its Customs administration. The time to
import has been reduced from 20 days in 2008 to 11 days in 2010 and the time to export has been
reduced from 26 in 2008 to 14 in 201037. Typical Customs clearance times have been reduced to less
than 24 hours, and can be as low at two hours. Yet, upcoming reforms are likely to yield even greater
results, as Customs migrates its Gainde 2000 system to Gainde 2010 as part of its “Paperless” project.
(Note: the Doing Business/Trading Across Borders indicators measure only the procedural requirements
for exporting and importing by ocean transport; inland transport and inland border procedures are not
taken into account; therefore these indicators do not accurately reflect the state of transport along the
entire corridor).
However, until Gainde 2010 is successfully implemented, Customs and industry still have to navigate
border management processes that are paper-based and manual. This greatly extends the time and
effort required by industry to complete the steps required for formalities. Implementation of Gainde
2000 is also not uniform, i.e. not all border posts use the same system, nor are they connected to each
other, which means that Customs has no central data repository and therefore cannot keep
comprehensive trade data statistics.
The full implementation of Gainde 2010, which is scheduled to utilize EDIFACT, will enable the electronic
exchange of data with industry, and can be expected to eliminate, or at least reduce, delays associated
with the printing and presentation of hard copy documents, and data entry or transmission errors. Fully
automated Customs procedures should reduce Customs clearance times even further, and there are
plans to implement a reduction in the number of inspections from 50% of all imports to 15% (although
this is still high when compared to best practices of less than 5%). The challenge that Customs faces with
its multiple ongoing modernization projects (including, in addition to the “Paperpless” project and
Gainde 2010, projects on simplified procedures, Authorized Economic Operator, and integration with its
Single Window front end) is one of commitment and change management. Many automation projects
fail because of a lack of change management, and expected productivity and efficiency gains are not
realized because the system is not utilized as envisioned. Unless the multiple Customs modernization
projects are coordinated and accompanied by a change management initiative, advances in border
management might fall short of expectations.
Senegal also experiences excessive delays at the border with Mali, which can be attributed to five main
root causes:
37
Doing Business 2010, Senegal
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Inadequate staffing
Insufficient equipment (especially scanning equipment)
Lack of joint border processes, compounded by different opening times in Mali and Senegal
(although there are plans to implement joint border processes at the new Southern border
crossing and later at Kidira/Diboli, implementation timeframes are unclear)
Congestion on the road caused by lack of parking facilities
Poorly implemented transit guarantee agreement (see appendix B)
Enforcement and Integrity
As the results of the 11th Improved Road Transport Initiative report demonstrated, Senegal and Mali are
still struggling to combat integrity along the corridor. The corridor was one of the worst performers
among the six regional transport corridors monitored,38 with an average of 39.63 checkpoints per trip,
$111.23 in bribes, and 196 minutes of delay. Senegal led the list of countries by density of checkpoints
per 100 km, with 3.71 checkpoints per 100 km. Of the agencies responsible for the checkpoints, the
Gendarmerie led with 2.46 checkpoints per 100km, followed by the police (1.09), Immigration (0.12) and
Customs (0.04). Senegal alone was responsible for $71.22 in bribes paid per trip, on average. Yet,
Senegal is making progress. Both the number of checkpoints and bribes fell by 10% over the previous
quarter, as the results of the report had a sobering effect in Senegal and caught the attention of the
President and the Prime Minister, who have begun reforms in the area, and are scheduled to be
implemented by the end of 2010.
Limiting the number of checkpoints along the Senegalese segment of the corridor to three
(around Dakar, Kafrinne, and Kidira)
Harmonizing controls along the corridor and co-locating all agencies with the right to conduct
controls at the three previously defined checkpoints
Instituting three zones around the checkpoints, with trucks receiving a sticker from the
Gendarmerie at each checkpoint that is valid for the entire zone
Providing all Gendarmerie agents with a visible ID and equipping them with GPS devices
Providing a toll-free number for transport providers to call in case of illegal controls
In July 2010, all WAEMU countries were scheduled to start enforcing axle-weight limits for trucks.
Although Senegal and Mali did not meet the deadline, they are well on the way to full enforcement, and
are expected to have it fully implemented by the end of 2010. Mali, in particular, has installed five
weighbridges at its main border crossings (together, handling over 90% of all traffic), and Senegal is
conducting a competitive bid proposal to select an operator for weighbridges along its segment of the
corridor. Both Senegal and Mali intend to co-locate the weighbridges at a limited number of control
posts along the corridor (at the time of writing, these are understood to be limited to three in Senegal,
one of which is at the Port of Dakar). However, given the preponderance for overloading of trucks to
reduce overall costs, and the recent renewal of the Malian fleet with trucks that are greatly over the
WAEMU limits (sometimes up to twice the limit), both Senegal and Mali are going to face an uphill battle
with the enforcement of this regulation. Additionally, if the Improved Road Transport Governance
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Tema–Ouagadougou, Ouagadougou–Bamako, Lomé–Ouagadougou, Abidjan-Ouagadougou, and Abidjan-Bamako
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reports are to be used as a guideline, it is likely that integrity would be an issue, with both truck
operators and weighbridge operators susceptible to corruption.
Finally, Senegal and Mali face a challenge in implementing the WAEMU TRIE agreement on the transit of
goods by road (see Appendix B). Not only have Senegal and Mali not implemented TRIE, but they have
signed their own bilateral agreement on the transit of goods by road, based on TRIE principles. Yet even
so, the agreement is not fully implemented, and industry faces a fragmented process, having to pay the
guarantee twice. Senegal and Mali are reportedly working on an electronic version of the transit
declaration (a single e-TRIE carnet, or State Road Transit Declaration) but that’s only one of the
requirements for the agreement to fully function. Senegal must first renew its truck fleet to enable the
attachment of Customs seals and the approval of vehicles according to TRIE criteria, and Senegal and
Mali must work out an arrangement for the collection and distribution of the TRIE guarantee funds. This
challenge is an important one, from the point of view of reducing the cost of transport along the
corridor, because the lack of a functioning TRIE agreement has caused Customs agencies in both Senegal
and Mali to resort to a costly alternative to secure goods in transit (by road) – physical Customs escorts,
which are very steep at $358 per shipment. The new Customs pilot to install GPS electronic tracking
devices on transit shipments is expected to alleviate the issue, however, it is important to remember
that those devices are meant only for tracking purposes, and cannot ensure that shipments are not
tampered with. Senegal’s challenge will be to ensure that these reforms are properly implemented and
coordinated without undue financial burden to the private sector.
Commitment and Implementation Capacity
While Senegal should be commended for making improvements, the country does not have a very good
record for long-term commitment and follow-through. Senegal has a veritable patchwork of regulations,
protocols, decrees, and decisions, and countless initiatives, committees, and working groups, yet despite
all the planning and good intentions, implementation often proves to be a challenge. Many projects are
never completed, or results are not achieved despite project completion. Senegal appears to have a
problem of long-term commitment as priorities shift.
The issue of long-term commitment is compounded by suboptimal coordination between interrelated
projects at the implementation level. The Senegalese government is in the midst of wide-reaching trade
and transport reform with many moving parts, which would not in and of itself be a cause for concern,
however, many of these projects do not appear to be well coordinated, and there are indications that
certain projects may be jeopardized as a result of other projects falling behind schedule. As an example,
the Dakar Integrated Special Economic Zone has missed a milestone because of a dependency upon the
Dakar-Diamniadio tollroad, which is behind schedule. Another issue is the fact that implementations are
often delayed or end dates become moving targets, resulting in confusion. During the course of
interviews conducted for this study, there was much conflicting information about projects and
initiatives, a challenge compounded by the lack of or difficult to locate official information about project
implementations and progress. To be sure, certain initiatives are well documented, such as for example
those spearheaded by the Investment Presidential Council, however, implementation challenges persist.
One reason for implementations petering out seems to be that accountability is poorly defined.
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Recommendations
Senegal’s recent successes in trade and transport reform and investment should be a model for
continued growth to address remaining challenges. Senegal is already implementing or is planning
programs that will be highly beneficial in improving the cost-competitiveness of its transport and
logistics sector.
Figure 12 shows a framework that Senegal can use as a guide for its improvement and investment
opportunities in the transport and logistics industry. Recommendations in the Policy and Commitment
and Implementation Capacity are overarching and foundational in nature – any actual, lasting
improvements in the other categories are highly dependent upon sound policy, commitment at the
highest levels of government, and the capacity to follow through on project implementation until
successful completion and achievement of results.
Figure 14 Improvement Opportunities Framework
Policy
The Government of Senegal needs to develop a comprehensive transport and logistics sector strategy
and a related strategic plan that are holistic and integrated. Such a strategy must be country-wide, take
all modes of transport into consideration (including air, marine, road, rail, river, and intermodal), and
integrate with other sector strategies (e.g. trade, Customs, agriculture). A strategic approach should be
broad and forward-looking, encompassing all relevant stakeholders and subsectors (e.g., transport
providers, logistics/service providers, infrastructure owners), recognizing future trends, forecasting
demand and supply, and planning capacity accordingly. A sector strategy should recognize that benefits
from improvements in an area may not be possible or realized without improvements in other areas.
This suggests the need to adopt a prioritization approach as part of the sector strategy formulation. The
GoS should look into ways to centralize strategic planning for the entire transport and logistics sector,
while also providing a venue for industry to participate in the planning process. A strategic planning
lifecycle could be implemented, designed to update and revise the plan on a consistent basis, or as
needed based on changing priorities. A two- or three-year lifecycle may be considered a reasonable
frequency for such a mid- to long-term strategy; however, sections of the strategy may need to be
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updated on a more frequent basis, such as annually. One option would be for the Government of
Senegal to require that the responsible Ministry revise the strategy every three years, and allow for its
update on an annual basis. To ensure progress against the strategy, it is recommended that the
responsible Ministry report on performance against strategic goals on an annual basis. The exercise of
measuring and reporting on progress will provide the added benefit of determining areas that may need
to be revised.
Going through a rigorous and disciplined strategic planning process would help the GoS balance its
priorities in a well-informed manner. However, for the strategic planning process to yield the most
benefits, firm commitment at the highest levels of government is required, as is the ability to shape
related policies, laws and regulations – i.e. this strategy requires stewardship and ownership at the
presidential or prime-ministerial levels, given the current government structure. The owner and
champion of the strategy needs to be able to exert influence over all government agencies involved and
be able to assign (and enforce) responsibility and accountability for results.
Donors and other NGOs could assist the GoS with the development of a transport and logistics sectorwide strategy and with strategic planning in general through the provision of technical assistance and
capacity building support.
Commitment and Implementation Capacity
The above-mentioned transport and logistics sector-wide strategy would not be successful or have any
impact if it is not complemented by strong commitment to results, a solid capacity for implementation,
and a robust governance structure. To provide these capabilities, the GoS should develop a Program
Management Office (PMO) mechanism to oversee the implementation of the transport and logistics
sector strategy. (Note: Not to be confused with Project Management) A well-established PMO
mechanism would provide the governance and planning necessary to manage the GoS’s portfolio of
projects related to implementing the transport and logistics sector strategy A PMO would serve many
important functions in ensuring that the strategy is implemented in a holistic and integrated manner,
rather than haphazardly:
Provide oversight and accountability and therefore drive the achievement of results
Implement monitoring and control of projects
Provide coordination and integration among dependent projects
o Act as a sort of Secretariat for strategy review
o Act as the main implementing body collecting the information required to periodically
assess program-level progress against the overall strategy
Ensure effective executive cross-project communication
Identify gaps in realization of strategic objectives and thus identify the need for new projects
In addition to providing the GoS the flexibility to change course with changing priorities in a controlled
manner, a PMO would provide change management capabilities, a necessity in Senegal’s current
environment of modernization and reform. In short, a PMO would be essential in ensuring that all of
Senegal’s impressive reform initiatives achieve the desired results in a coordinated manner. It is
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important to note, however, that a PMO is not positioned to manage day-to-day activities; those are left
for project management. Since a PMO sits atop a portfolio of projects, existing project management
structures would not be disrupted. Therefore, a PMO could be created to integrate and coordinate
projects, and ensure that the portfolio of projects collectively implements the transport and logistics
strategy and strategic plan.
Donors and other NGOs could assist the GoS with technical assistance in standing up a PMO. Such
assistance could include the development of a PMO framework, help defining the program management
structure, creating implementation plans, definition and capacity-building in PMO-related disciplines,
and setting up governance. Donors/NGOs could also provide independent oversight and/or performance
management and evaluation, stakeholder facilitation and liaison expertise, and technical, managerial,
and/or financial assistance at the project level, at least on a temporary basis, until the PMO has built
sufficient capacity to operate independently.
Infrastructure
Rail. The GoS needs to improve its freight rail network, specifically in terms of capacity and reliability.
Doing so has the potential to create a viable low-cost option for traders. Senegal has already conducted
a feasibility study on converting rail infrastructure to the standard gauge. However, it is only the first of
many infrastructure upgrades that needs to take place in order to improve the rail network. In addition
to upgrading the rail tracks along the entire length of the corridor, the rail capacity in terms of rail cars
also needs to be improved. Intermodal links should be considered – currently the rail offers only direct
service from Dakar to Bamako. With intermodal links along the corridor, domestic or regional freight can
also take advantage of rail service. Recognizing the grim state of affairs of the rail network since its
privatization, this would be a challenging project, however, if Dakar is to grow as a regional hub, a
functioning rail alternative is critical.
As a first step, donors and other NGOs could assist the GoS with organizing and conducting a substantial
economic study to determine the feasibility, costs, and benefits of modernizing the Senegalese freight
rail network. Depending upon the results of said study, donors and NGOs could further provide the GoS
with technical or financial assistance to improve the rail network and services. Such assistance could
include advising the GoS in reviewing the terms of the Public Private Partnership arrangement with the
rail operator, Transrail, identifying areas that require improvement, considering options (including
renationalization), and assisting with the development and oversight of an action plan for improvement.
Roads. The GoS should invest in building rural and feeder road links from production sites to freight
networks. This is especially important from the viewpoint of the PCE project, because of the heavy
reliance of perishable goods on quick and reliable transport linkages.
Donors and other NGOs could provide the GoS with technical or financial assistance with the
development of a robust rural road network, specifically, in the areas of network analysis, needs
prioritization, implementation planning and program/project management. It is important that
investment planning be considered in a network context to fully understand interdependencies and be
able to prioritize the allocation of resources.
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Logistics Support Structures. Another infrastructure investment that is of high importance to the PCE
project is the building of logistics support structures such as warehouses, consolidation facilities, or
other specialized storage facilities (e.g. refrigerated or cooling storage facilities), especially those serving
production sites.
Donors and other NGOs could provide the GoS with technical or financial assistance for the
development of a network of logistics supporting structures, specifically in the areas of network analysis,
needs prioritization, implementation planning and program management. Assistance could be provided
with identifying alternatives, such as, for example, establishing public-private partnership (PPP) or
financing frameworks.
Border Infrastructure. The Kidira-Diboli border crossing is heavily congested, and one of the main
culprits identified was a lack of parking facilities. With an unofficial statistic of 300 trucks crossing the
border daily, the pile-up of trucks along the road only exacerbates delays. The building of a parking lot to
move trucks off the road would be a “quick win” that should easily alleviate some delays at the border
at relatively little cost. The lessons learned at Kidira-Diboli should be used to inform the planning and
implementation of the second Senegal-Mali border crossing.
Additionally, to fully reap the benefits of Customs reform projects such as the Paperless project and
Gainde 2010 (see section below on Border Management), Senegal Customs must ensure uniform
implementation of these automation programs at all border locations. Senegal Customs must ensure the
availability of “soft” infrastructure at these border locations, including computer workstations, internet
connectivity, and all other computer support infrastructure and personnel necessary for the reliable
operation of required Customs systems.
Donors and other NGOs could provide the GoS with assistance in identifying a site for the parking
facilities, with project management of the construction, and assistance with procuring adequate system
infrastructure in support of Customs automation efforts.
Services
An important, although likely easily overlooked, component of the GoS’s strategy should be to increase
the competitiveness of its transport and logistics sector and in particular its road transportation
industry. Areas that require attention include the renewal of the country’s trucking fleet, investments in
intermodal exchanges, and the professionalization of the industry as a whole.
Donors and other NGOs are well positioned to assist the GoS with the professionalization and
competitiveness of the transport and logistics sector through technical assistance in the following areas:
Improving business formation and operations, through the creation and facilitation of a small
business center that is specifically focused on the transport and logistics sector
–
Education and best practices dissemination
–
Industry outreach and liaison
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USAID
Evaluate options to encourage trucking industry operators to renew trucking fleets
–
Financial incentives such as tax breaks, lower interest rates, rebates , leases (i.e. leaseto-buy), or assistance with upfront capital expenses, such as providing seed funding
(Note: donors can assist the GoS in evaluating the options and recommending an
alternative, however the GoS will have to establish policy and mechanisms to enable
this reform)
–
Provide services at the small business center to assist smaller operators with business
planning and procurement planning (e.g. Cost-Benefit Analyses, pricing, loan
applications, etc.)
Promoting the continued use of information and communication technologies (ICT), and
specifically electronic data exchange
Border Management
Since Customs modernization is already underway in Senegal, most recommendations in this area are
related to efforts to ensure that the initiatives achieve desired results and conform to international best
practices. Therefore, as independent “honest brokers,” donors and other NGOs can play an important
role in advising Customs and other border agencies regarding their modernization efforts. Specific areas
of technical assistance include:
An independent review (“health check”) of Customs modernization efforts, to identify potential
derailment areas, such as, for example, to:
–
Ensure that Gainde 2010 and Customs Paperless projects meet industry requirements,
leverage industry best practices, and integrate with other systems as intended (this
includes areas such as electronic data exchange, risk assessment and inspections,
process integration, data/document requirements)
–
Evaluate the implementation of the GPS electronic tracking project currently being
tested by COTECNA. Electronic tracking is touted as a secure alternative to Customs
escorts, however, those devices are meant only for tracking purposes, and cannot
ensure that shipments are not tampered with (which is a requirement of the TRIE
agreement). An independent evaluation of the project, assessing its benefits, and costs,
and the actual performance of the test against objectives is required; however, an
independent evaluation should also ensure that the project is requirements-driven and
not technology-driven, and meets the true needs of Senegal Customs and industry.
Facilitation of private sector consultation and policy/regulatory impact analysis – in particular,
involve industry in providing input during the creation of new programs (e.g. AEO program,
Orbus upgrades, etc.) to ensure it is not faced with requirements that are overly burdensome,
and to solicit ideas for improvement
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Advise on and ensure conformance with international standards on automation, trade
facilitation, and security, e.g.:
–
World Customs Administration (WCO) Single Window recommendation (Orbus)
–
WCO SAFE Framework of Standards
–
WCO Authorized Economic Operator guidelines
–
WCO Data Model – the WCO Data Model establishes a standard, international,
harmonized data set that meets governments’ requirements for international crossborder trade and is geared exclusively to the requirements of an automated
environment. By implementing the Data Model, Senegal Customs will harmonize its data
requirements, reduce redundant data requirements (such as, for example, the Cargo
Tracking Note), and transition from a document-centric Customs filing approach to a
data-set focus
Assist with the implementation of the Customs modernization program at all border posts,
including the implementation of joint border controls and processes
Fully implement the TRIE agreement, ensuring conformance with ECOWAS. Donor assistance
could include the development of a strategic plan, the development of an implementation plan,
liaison with industry and government agencies, program management, and monitoring and
evaluation of the program.
Finally, the GoS should consider taking a leadership position in the region by promoting a policy of
regional cooperation to create a single ECOWAS market. The elimination of borders within the region
will remove many of the barriers to efficient transport, not only along the Dakar-Bamako corridor but
also along other regional transport arteries.
The GoS should take steps to strengthen its enforcement and corruption fighting capacity, recognizing
that its commitment to enduring transparency, integrity, and effective enforcement require steady
leadership, an ability to monitor and evaluate progress, and the capacity to enact corrective action. This
recommendation rests on three pillars: prevention (“informed compliance”), enforcement, and
monitoring, oversight, and accountability. Informed compliance recognizes that many industry operators
are in contravention of regulations through a lack of understanding of the regulations. The enforcement
pillar takes into consideration all the components necessary to ensure that both public and private
sector entities are compliant with regulations, and in particular ensuring that the proper fines and
penalties are in place and are applied to discourage future non-compliance. Transparent monitoring,
oversight and accountability practices must be put in place to ensure proper enforcement and deter
lapses in integrity.
Donors and NGOs could assist the GoS in building “informed compliance” by providing education and
outreach to industry participants on new and existing laws, regulations and procedures. Assistance can
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also be rendered to improve the enforcement of laws and regulations, specifically regarding checkpoints
and axle-weight limits and minimize integrity issues. This can be accomplished through, for instance,
setting up governance structures to enable and implement monitoring, oversight and accountability
capabilities among relevant government agencies, or by recommending options, such as the use of
automation, simplification or audit-based controls, to improve integrity. Finally, in the long-term, the
GoS should consider doing away with checkpoint-based controls altogether. Alternative means of
enforcing compliance with laws and regulations should be evaluated.
Concrete Cost Reduction Opportunities
Many of the recommendations in this section are longer-term policy and large-scale investment and
modernization initiatives that are important as Senegal builds capacity in its transport and logistics
sector. However, there are several short-term opportunities to reduce costs and delays along the DakarBamako corridor, actions that may be relatively easy to implement (also known as “quick wins”).
Category
Infrastructure
Border Management
Action
Eliminate Customs escorts for
transit shipments
Enforce the reduced number of
checkpoints along the corridor
Build parking facilities at the
border
Fully implement Customs
paperless processing and
electronic filing (including
transitioning from a documentcentric approach to a data-set
approach, thereby harmonizing
data requirements)
Align the working hours at the
border (to be followed by
implementing joint border
processes, mid- to long-term)
Aim to reduce inspections at the
Port of Dakar to less than 10%
Benefit
Cost savings of $358 per
transit shipment
Reductions in delays at the
border due to document
delays
However, the GoS should
consider the relative value of
GPS cargo tracking devices
intended to replace Customs
escorts relative to their cost
Cost savings of up to $120 per
shipment
Reduce congestion and delays at
the border
Potential costs savings of up
to $40 (based on fees
assessed per document)
Reduce cargo dwell time at
the Port of Dakar
Potentially reduce freight
forwarding fees
Reduce border delays
Reduce delays at the border due
to handoffs between Senegal
Customs and Mali Customs
Reduce the workload of Customs
agents at the Port of Dakar and
therefore decrease Customs
clearance times (reducing the
upper clearance time range limit
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Category
Action
Benefit
from 48 hours)
Table 7 Improvement Opportunities Quick Wins
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Appendix A: Acronyms
AEO
BOL
BSC
CCIAD
CCTV
CFS
COSEC
C-TPAT
DPW
ECOWAS
EDI
FCFA
FOB
EMASE
ENSEMA
GoS
GOANA
GoM
GPS
ICT
LPI
PAD
PCE
PMO
TEU
TIF
TRIE
WAEMU
WCO
Authorized Economic Operator
Bill of Lading
Bordereau de Suivi de Cargaisons, Cargo Tracking Note
Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie et d’Agriculture de Dakar, Dakar Chamber of
Commerce
Closed Circuit Television
Conseil Senegalais des Chargeurs, Senegalese Shippers’ Council
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Dubai Ports World
Economic Community of West African States
Electronic Data Exchange
Frank CFA
Free on Board
Entrepôts du Sénégal au Mali
Government of Senegal
Grande Offensive Pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance, Great Agricultural Offensive for
Food and Abundance
Government of Mali
Global Positioning System
Information and Communications Technology
Logistics Performance Index
Port Autonome de Dakar
Project Croissance Economique, Economic Growth Project
Program Management Office
Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit
Transit International Ferroviaire, International Convention to Facilitate the Crossing of
Frontiers for Goods Carried by Rail
Transit Routier Inter-Etats des marchandises
West African Economic and Monetary Union
World Customs Organization
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Appendix B: Policy, Legal and Regulatory Framework
Regional Organizations
The two principal institutions that influence transport policy in the region and therefore have direct
relevance to this study include the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Senegal and Mali are members of both
organizations.
ECOWAS
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)39 is a regional group of fifteen countries40,
founded in 1975. Its mission is to promote economic integration in "all fields of economic activity,
particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce,
monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters ....." Several regional policy and legal
instruments governing interstate transport and transit facilitation have been created under the auspices
of ECOWAS, discussed below.
WAEMU
Created by a Treaty signed in Dakar, Senegal, in 1994, the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(WAEMU) 41 an organization of eight states42 of West Africa established to promote economic
integration among countries that share a common currency, the CFA franc. WAEMU is a customs and
monetary union between some of the members of ECOWAS, which aims to create a common market
and customs union, and coordinate macroeconomic, sector, and fiscal policies in order to achieve
greater economic competitiveness.
Trade and Transport Agreements
Two main conventions characterize the road transport and transit policies of Senegal and Mali, within
the framework of ECOWAS and WAEMU. These in turn have been supplemented over the
years by scores of protocols and recommendations, mainly due to the slow progress made
implementing these conventions among ECOWAS and WAEMU member states. In addition, a framework
of bilateral agreements exists between Senegal and Mali.
Inter-State Road Transport Convention (TIE)43
The Convention A/P.2/5/82 regulating Inter-State Road Transport (TIE) was adopted by ECOWAS and
WAEMU, with the objective of establishing the conditions for inter-State road transport within ECOWAS.
Specifically, the convention aims to:
39
Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO)
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Core d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
41
Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA)
42
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo
43
Transport Routier Inter-États (TIE)
40
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•
•
•
eliminate excessive road checks;
ensure equitable access to the freight generated by the external trade of the contracting parties
and harmonize the regulations concerning the highway code and transport;
establish sufficient autonomy to ensure supplies to landlocked countries, in keeping with the
transportation means of the transit countries.
To this end, the TIE Convention provides for the setting of annual quotas, by countries, of vehicles
authorized to undertake inter-State transport; the setting of rules on the distribution of freight between
transit states and landlocked countries, in respect of goods in transit and those placed on local markets
in the transit countries; the setting of itineraries open to inter-State traffic; and the setting of axle loads.
WAEMU Axle Load Limit Regulation
Signed under the auspices of WAEMU in 2005, and in line with the provisions of the ECOWAS IST
convention, the Regulation No. 14/2005/CM/UEMOA regarding Axle Load Limits sets up Axle Load Limit
Policies and outline permissible load limits for different types of trucks. Enforcing axle load limits has
posed a particular challenge in the region, with ECOWAS states only recently beginning to implement
the requirements embodied in the convention and complying with the WAEMU regulation. Overloading
trucks has been a wide-spread practice throughout the region, and many trucks have been heavily
reinforced in order to carry excessive loads – a practice that significantly increases the tare weight of the
trucks and therefore severely limits the weight of cargo that can be legally carried for the operators to
meet the gross axle-weight limits.
As of June 2010, all WAEMU countries had agreed to and were expected to begin enforcing axle-weight
limits; however, at the time of writing, neither Senegal nor Mali had yet done so. Senegal has
experienced delays with the installation of weighbridges, and Mali is faced with enforcing the rules on a
newly-upgraded fleet that is much heavier than the regulations’ allowance. Nevertheless, Mali has
installed 5 weighbridges, at border crossings with Senegal (at Diboli), Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
and Burkina Faso via Togo, which together handle 90% of the traffic coming into Mali. Senegal, on the
other hand, is going through a tender process for the selection of an entity to install and operate its
weighbridge facilities along the corridor (expected to be co-located at joint control post facilities). It is
expected that CCIAD will operate its existing weighbridge at the Port of Dakar for WAEMU regulation
enforcement purposes. Both countries are expected to begin enforcement by the end of 2010.
Inter-State transit of goods by road Convention (TRIE)44
This agreement, the Convention A/P4/5/82 concerning inter-State transit of goods by road (TRIE)
comprises economic or suspensive arrangements which allow goods to be transported by road, with all
duties, taxes and restrictions suspended by the customs service of a given member state, to the customs
agency of another member state, under cover of a single document (the State Road Transit Declaration,
or Le Carnet TRIE), without any unloading. The TRIE declaration serves to:
• approve the technical characteristics of means of transport;
• identify the goods, the vehicle and the purpose of the transit;
44
Convention relative au Transit Routier Inter-Etats des marchandises (TRIE); not to be confused with TIE –
Transport Routier Inter-Etats
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•
•
•
•
•
•
trace the itinerary and offices visited, including frontiers and destination;
specify journey deadlines and other requirements with which the driver must comply;
determine the scope of application of the transit arrangements and declaration (national
territory, several frontiers);
determine the liability of the principal obligee (carrier/forwarding agent);
set the procedures applicable to cases of force majeure;
provide statistical support and information for use in dealing with offences, settling disputes and
effecting cooperation between customs services
However, ratification and actual implementation proved problematic, and an additional convention
A/SP.1/5/90 was adopted, which defined a chain of national bodies responsible for the guarantee, with
each national body designated by each member state. The supplementary convention also specifies that
the guarantee should cover at least the sum of duties and taxes payable on the goods and any penalties
that might be incurred. In ECOWAS Member Countries, members’ respective Chambers of Commerce45
assume the role of the national body.
In practice, the ECOWAS-wide TRIE initiative’s success has been limited, due in part to the absence of a
common regional guarantee system. About 70 percent of the transit procedures in the ECOWAS region
still stem from bilateral accords and national regulations and practices46, which is still the case between
Senegal and Mali. In 2002 the countries signed a bilateral agreement regarding the transit of goods by
road, following the ECOWAS TRIE principles. The agreement stipulates that:
1) throughout the TRIE transport, duties and taxes due on the goods are suspended and secured by
guarantee, which is to be paid at departure, and is to be in the amount of 0.5% of the CIF47
value of the goods (of which 0.25% is due to each Senegal and Mali, with the GoS collecting the
entire amount, and reimbursing the GoM);
2) goods movement in approved vehicles or containers under customs seal, therefore eliminating
the need for Customs escorts;
3) the State Road Transit Declaration or TRIE carnet is the single customs declaration for transport
of goods, is taken into use in the country of departure, and enables Customs control in the
country of departure, transit and destination
4) except at the Customs office of departure and the Customs office of destination, there would be
no controls during transit
In reality, none of these items are functioning as intended and the agreement is effectively not
implemented, particularly in Senegal, where the TRIE is optional. The sharing of the TRIE guarantee did
not work as intended, and Mali now collects its 0.25% guarantee at the border. Information about
whether Senegal collects the TRIE guarantee amounts was contradictory and unreliable, and no hard
proof was available either way. Moreover, compulsory and expensive Customs escorts are still applied
for nearly all transit shipments, the cost of which is covered by the economic operators. Ostensibly, the
reasons for the continued usage of Customs escorts are identified as a lack of an approval process for
vehicles, and the inability to secure the obsolete Senegalese trucks satisfactorily, but it is likely that the
Customs administrations in both countries are unwilling to give up a lucrative source of revenue.
45
In Senegal – Chambre de Commerce d’Industrie et d’Agriculture de Dakar (CCIAD); in Mali – Chambre de
Commerce et d’Industrie du Mali (CCIM)
46
Source: Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade, www.gfptt.org
47
Cost, Insurance, and Freight is an internationally accepted INCOTERM
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Senegal is currently piloting an electronic tracking program intended to replace physical escorts with
GPS tracking devices, but it is still unclear what the cost implications of the new procedure would be for
the trading community. Also, the electronic tracking project only covers the national territory of
Senegal, with the devices removed at the border with Mali, therefore, its benefits would only extend to
the Senegalese portion of the journey. Furthermore, the TRIE carnet does not function as intended, and
is created and used at the border, making it unnecessary (Senegal uses a transit declaration S110 and
does not issue TRIE carnets). Senegal and Mali are reportedly working on developing an e-carnet for
TRIE but so far the carnet is only used in the territory of Mali. Finally, controls during transit are still a
common occurrence, adding not only informal costs but also imposing delays on transit shipments.
48
ECOWAS Brown Card
The Protocol A/P.1/5/82 establishing the ECOWAS Brown Card on transport insurance establishes the
ECOWAS Carte Brune for the purposes of third-party civil liability motoring insurance. The carrier must
take out third-party insurance to cover accidents caused by vehicles in member states. The Carte Brune
functions on the basis of a joint guarantee provided by the authorized insurance companies. Both
Senegal and Mali adhere to the Carte Brune agreement.
ECOWAS/WAEMU Regional Trade Facilitation Programme
The Regional Facilitation Programme was formally adopted by the Councils of Ministers of ECOWAS and
UEMOA in 2003. A Transport Facilitation Unit, hosted by the ECOWAS Commission, is tasked with the
implementation of the Regional Facilitation Programme. The programme was established to:
•
•
•
•
Remove physical and non-physical barriers to ensure better flow of traffic and facilitation of
trade;
Improve the maintenance of priority regional infrastructure
Harmonize technical standards and safety regulations;
Create regional physical facilitation infrastructures
Border crossings contribute to transit delays because of duplication of procedures, paperwork, and the
different operating hours. In recognition of the opportunity to improve efficiencies at the border, and
also building on the recommendations of WCO SAFE Framework, ECOWAS and WAEMU are taking the
lead for the establishment of joint border posts. Resolution 08/2001/CM provides funding for the
construction of 11 joint border posts, including a Kidira/Diboli joint border post. Implementation has
been slow, however, and for the moment a joint Kidira/Diboli border post remains in the early planning
stages. Similarly, ECOWAS and WAEMU are also pursuing the integration of customs automated systems
within member countries with the use of a single, uniform customs clearance document.
Improved Road Transport Governance (IRTG)
Another joint initiative undertaken by ECOWAS and WAEMU, in cooperation with the West Africa Trade
Hub, is the Improved Road Transport Governance (IRTG) program. The IRTG aims to reduce the delays
48
Carte Brune
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and corruption at checkpoints that occur along transport corridors in West Africa and which negatively
affect West Africa’s competitiveness in world markets. With the help of volunteer truck drivers and
other transport stakeholders, the program monitors road barriers along major West African transport
corridors, and the delays and bribers transporters incur at these checkpoints.
Reduction of control points49
With a view to limit road checks for transit trucks, UEMOA adopted Directive 08/2005/CM/UEMOA on
December 16th 2005. Containers, reefer trucks, tanker trucks, and all compliant trucks (according to the
Inter-State Road Transit Convention) are to be controlled only at departure, arrival, and at border
crossings; other controls are forbidden.
In practice, this directive has not been implemented, and checkpoints proliferate along West Africa’s
main transport arteries. As measured and reported in quarterly IRTG reports, in some instances
checkpoints along the corridors are increasing. Most alarming for the purposes of this report is the poor
performance of the Dakar-Bamako transport corridor. Data obtained from the 11th IRTG report for the
first quarter of 2010 reveal that the Dakar-Bamako corridor had the largest number of checkpoints,
which at an average of 39.63 are far more numerous than the next poor performer, OuagadougouBamako, at 30,42 checkpoints per trip on average, and double the number of checkpoints of the LomeOuagadougou, at 19.4 checkpoints per trip. Of the countries surveyed, Senegal had by far the highest
number of checkpoints per trip (25.28 on average), a 10.6% reduction over the previous quarter.
Recognizing the growing problem caused by the rampant proliferation of checkpoints along the corridor,
the GoS has issued a decree in 2009 outlining the reduction of checkpoints along inter-State road
corridors. The decree intends to limit the number of checkpoints along its transport corridors to three,
and calls for the co-location of the six controlling authorities at checkpoints, which are limited to the
Police, Customs, Gendarmerie, Water and Forests, and sanitary, phytosanitary and zoosanitary
authorities. Moreover, it is expected that the checkpoints will also house the weigh stations that Senegal
has agreed to put in place in order to meet its enforcement obligations under Regulation No.
14/2005/CM/UEMOA. However, the decree is not yet in force, and there is a lack of clarity as to an
implementation timeline.
Memorandum of Agreement on Road Transport between Senegal and Mali50
This bilateral agreement between the Governments of Senegal and Mali intends to harmonize the
countries’ respective policies in the area of road transport. It sets rules governing the road transport of
passengers and cargo between the territories of Senegal and Mali, including:
•
•
•
•
Total vehicle weight and dimension limits
Inter-state insurance (Brown Card) requirements
Road controls
Definition of the inter-State corridor
49
Arrete Primatorial Portant reduction des points de controle sur les axes routiers inter-Etats reliant le Senegal et
les Etats voisins membres de l’Union Economique Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA)
50
Protocole d'Accord Relatif Aux Transports Routiers Entre Senegal et Mali
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•
•
•
•
Freight sharing arrangement51
Authorization to transport
Technical visit requirements
Documentation requirements
International Rail Transport (TIF)
The TIF agreement defines the operational procedures for the rail network linking Senegal and Mali, and
the transit rules and procedures in their respective territories. The advantages of rail transport include
simplified customs procedures, which have been adapted from the International Convention to
Facilitate the Crossing of Frontiers for Goods Carried by Rail (TIF). There are no customs and police
inspections en route; Customs procedures have been simplified, and they are based on a single transit
document, the Transit International Ferroviaire (TIF) document, which accompanies goods from Dakar
to Bamako, thereby simplifying customs and administrative formalities and reducing related costs and
delays.
51
The arrangement sets the distribution of total freight tonnage passing through the Port of Dakar and destined to
Mali such that 2/3 of the total freight tonnage is to be reserved for Malian vehicles and 1/3 is to be reserved for
Senegalese vehicles
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Appendix C: International Trade Statistics for Senegal and Mali
Unless otherwise indicated, all international trade statistics included in this appendix are sourced from
the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations,
and are, in contrast to the corridor statistics presented in the main body of this report, presented in US
Dollars, or value.
Imports
Cereals, and rice in particular, are the top agricultural imports in both Senegal and Mali.
4000000
3500000
3000000
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
Imported Imported Imported Imported Imported
value in value in value in value in value in
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Over the last five years, the value of
imports into Mali has been increasing
(Figure 13). The biggest increase is due to
increases in the import of mineral fuels
and oils, and nuclear reactors and
machinery. However, there has also been
an increase in the import of cereal
products, most notably rice, despite a dip
in 2007-2008. Imports of cereal products
are heavily dominated by imports of rice,
which accounts for 70 to 80% of all cereal
imports (10 to 15% of cereal imports are
wheat). Refer to Figure 14, which depicts
the value of the top ten products
imported into Mali over the period of 2004 – 2008.
75
US Dollars (thousands)
USAID
800000
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc
700000
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc
600000
Vehicles other than railway, tramway
500000
Electrical, electronic equipment
400000
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime
and cement
Fertilizers
300000
Pharmaceutical products
200000
Articles of iron or steel
100000
Iron and steel
0
Imported
Imported
Imported
Imported
Imported
value in 2004 value in 2005 value in 2006 value in 2007 value in 2008
Cereals
Figure 15 Top Ten Products Imported by Mali
Imports into Senegal, meanwhile, declined in 2009 relative to 2008 (Figure 15). Much of this decline is
due to sharp decreases in the import of mineral fuels and oils, and cereals. Imports of cereal products, in
particular, experienced a 45% drop in 2009, much of it attributable to a 50% drop in the value of rice
imports. Whether this decline is due to the global financial crisis or the beginning of a trend remains to
be seen, particularly because imports of rice in 2008 were double 2007 levels.
Figure 16 depicts the value of
the top ten products imported
into Senegal over the period of
2005 – 2009. Imports of cereal
products are heavily dominated
by imports of rice, which
accounts for 70 to 80% of all
cereal imports (10 to 15% of
cereal imports are wheat).
7000000
6000000
5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
1000000
0
Imported
Imported
Imported
Imported
Imported
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USAID
2000000
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation
products
1800000
Nuclear reactors, boilers,
machinery
1600000
Cereals
1400000
Vehicles other than railway,
tramway
1200000
1000000
800000
Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible
animal product nes
600000
Animal,vegetable fats and oils,
cleavage products
400000
Iron and steel
200000
Pharmaceutical products
0
Imported value Imported value Imported value Imported value Imported value
in 2005
in 2006
in 2007
in 2008
in 2009
Plastics and articles thereof
Figure 16 Top Ten Products Imported by Senegal
N.B. The statistics available for Mali and Senegal do not cover the same reporting periods, with the
latest statistics available for Mali covering the period through 2008. Therefore, it is not possible to
determine whether imports by Mali have suffered the same decline in 2009 as have imports by Senegal.
Exports
US Dollars, thousands
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
Exported Exported Exported Exported Exported
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
It is of some interest to note that
Malian exports are going up by value
(in general) yet down by
volume/weight (through Senegal).
The main reason explaining this
discrepancy is that exports in cotton,
the primary commodity exported
through Senegal, are going down,
and cotton is Mali’s second largest
export, both by value and by
volume. Moreover, there has been a
significant increase in the export of
precious stones, commodities that
are low in volume but high in value.
Figure 18 shows the increase in exports of precious stones and decrease in exports of cotton in the
period 2004 to 2008.
77
USAID
1400000
Pearls, precious stones, metals,
coins, etc
Cotton
1200000
Live animals
US Dollars, Thousands
1000000
Nuclear reactors, boilers,
machinery, etc
800000
products, etc
Vehicles other than railway,
tramway
600000
Fertilizers
400000
200000
Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed,
fruit, etc, nes
0
Exported
Exported
Exported
Exported
Exported
Figure 17 Top Ten Products Exported by Mali (by value)
Figure 19 shows that Senegalese
exports, while enjoying an increase
over 2007, have fallen in 2009.
Figure 20 suggests that this dip is
due in large part to a decrease in
exports of mineral fuels and oils.
US Dollars, Thousands
2500000
2000000
1500000
1000000
500000
0
Exported Exported Exported Exported Exported
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
78
USAID
800000
products, etc
700000
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs,
aquatic invertebrates nes
600000
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone,
plaster, lime and cement
500000
Pearls, precious stones, metals,
coins, etc
400000
Inorganic chemicals, precious
metal compound, isotopes
300000
Tobacco and manufactured
tobacco substitutes
200000
Iron and steel
100000
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts
thereof
0
Exported value Exported value Exported value Exported value Exported value
in 2005
in 2006
in 2007
in 2008
in 2009
Cereals
Figure 18 Top Ten Products Exported by Senegal (by value)
Mali – Senegal Trade
Trade between Senegal and Mali is dominated by exports from Senegal into Mali, outweighing imports
on the order of 200% (as measured by value). In particular, salt, mineral fuels, and cereals, comprise the
top exports from Senegal to Mali. Following a sharp decrease in 2008, Senegal’s exports of rice to Mali
have increased four times, although it is too early to tell whether this increase represents the beginning
of a trend or is just a short-term anomaly.
79
USAID
40000
35000
US Dollars,
thougsands
30000
25000
Rice
20000
15000
Wheat and
meslin
10000
5000
0
Value in 2007
Value in 2008
Value in 2009
Figure 19 Exports of Cereals from Senegal to Mali
Senegal’s overall exports to Mali fell by 18% in 2009, again due to a decrease in exports of mineral fuels,
oils and distillation products. However, exports of salt and cereals, notably rice, have increased, as can
be seen in Figure 21.
80
USAID
Appendix D: Interviews
Government Agency
Industry Association
Traders & Transport
Providers
Other
Ministry of International Cooperation, Planning, Air Transport and
Infrastructure52
Department of Surface Transportation
Department of Internal Commerce
Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Analysis, Forecasting and
Statistics53
Senegal Customs
Mali Customs
EMASE54
Senegalese Union of Road Transport Workers55
Senegalese Union of Road Transporters56
Senegalese Council of Shippers (COSEC) 57
Saga/SDV
Maersk/DAMCO
SNTT
SAFCOM
Moustapha Tall
Delmas
Transsene
MSC
Dubai Ports World
Senegal Chamber of Commerce (CCIAD)
Dakar Port Authority58
COTECNA
Gainde 2000
West Africa Trade Hub
52
Ministère de la Coopération Internationale, de l'Aménagement du Territoire, des Transports Aériens et des
Infrastructures
53
Direction de l'Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques (DAPS)
54
55
Syndicat des Travailleurs des Transports Routiers du Senegal
56
Union Senegalaise des Transporteurs Routieres (USTR)
57
Conseil Sénégalais des Chargeurs
58
Port Autonome de Dakar
81
USAID
Appendix E: Other Sources
Investment Presidential Council, 9th Session, June 14, 2010
Senegal Investment Promotion Agency (APIX), http://www.investinsenegal.com/
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade, www.gfptt.org
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
(http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poldcd94.en.pdf)
“The Little Engine That Couldn’t”, by Myriam Cloutier, Wednesday May 20, 2009, accessed at
http://www.alternatives.ca/eng/our-organisation/our-publications/alternatives-internationaljournal/2009-559/vol-02-no-1-may-2009/article/the-little-engine-that-couldn-t?lang=fr
World Port Source, http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/SEN_Port_of_Dakar_2295.php
OT Africa Line, http://www.otal.com/index.asp
International Trade Centre
11th Improved Road Transport Governance (IRTG Report)
World Bank Doing Business Indicators
World Bank Logistics Performance Index
Government of Senegal, www.gouv.sn
Agence Autonome des Travaux Routiers (AATR), www.aatr.sn
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Dakar -Bamako Corridor Cost of Transport Analysis

Transcription

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