The Donovan Review - January 2012 Edition

Village Stability Operations -101
“Understanding USSOCOM’s role in VSO and ALP in Afghanistan and Beyond”
The Donovan Review
2nd Edition
United States Special Operations Command
Directorate for Intelligence
January 2012
The Donovan Review is a U.S. Special Operations Command publication. This
periodical is named in honor of General William Donovan, the "Father of
American Intelligence." The content is edited, prepared and provided by the
USSOCOM Directorate for Intelligence, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB, Fl
33621, phone (813)826-5637.
General William Joseph Donovan (January 1, 1883 – February 8,
1959) was a United States soldier, lawyer and intelligence
officer, best remembered as the wartime head of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS). He is also known as the "Father of
American Intelligence" and the "Father of Central Intelligence."
In the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
the nation was in a state of shock and horror. The day after the
attack, the United States officially declared war on Japan, with
Nazi Germany declaring war on the United States three days later. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt realized that to win the war, the country needed an
organization to gather important intelligence from around the world. The
president’s advisors knew just the man to lead such an outfit — Gen. William J.
Donovan, also known as “Wild Bill” Donovan. Donovan was the only American to
have received the nations four highest awards: the Medal of Honor, the
Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the National
Security Medal. After his death, Donovan was awarded the Freedom Award of the
International Rescue Committee. He is also a member of the Military Intelligence
Hall of Fame.
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SCOPE NOTE
Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) are becoming increasingly relevant to the
Commander, International Assistance Force (COMISAF) civil-military campaign for Afghanistan. Yet, this critical
SOF mission remains widely misunderstood, especially within CONUS-based organizations and headquarters.
Furthermore, USSOCOM and other CONUS-based organizations are playing increasingly important roles in
providing VSO and ALP training and education to Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces
(GPF) as they prepare for deployments to Afghanistan. Indeed, USSOCOM will likely play a much more prevalent
role in Afghanistan in the next few years at every level of war. VSO and ALP will be a large part of this mission set.
This edition of the Donovan Report is dedicated to familiarizing the reader with all aspects of VSO, along
with the growing support requirements this critical program places on USSOCOM’s operational and intelligence
activities in Afghanistan and beyond.
The author has outlined six key objectives for this article. First, this article will explain the historical
context within Afghanistan that requires a bottom-up and top-down approach. Second, it will describe the
evolution of the VSO and ALP programs and how they have evolved from relatively localized programs to key
components of COMISAF’s Civil Military Campaign Plan. Third, the reader will learn the key components involving
the whole of nation VSO methodology. Fourth, the author will demonstrate the organizational complexity that
challenges VSO and ALP along with the need for a robust network to manage this complexity. Fifth, the reader will
get a glimpse into the possible role VSO will likely play in transition in Afghanistan. And finally, the author will
provide the reader with distinct VSO implications for Special Operations and Intelligence professionals.
Front cover: Afghan Village Elders, District Security and
Governance Officials, Afghan Local Police, and US Special
Forces hold a shura in rural Afghanistan to discuss how to
connect this village to the Afghan Government. This
delicate balance of formal and informal governance is the
essence of VSO and ALP in Afghanistan.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ....…………………………
5
Strategic Relevance.......................................6
Executive Summary.....................................7
CW3 Romulo “Romy” Camargo
Wounded in Action in Afghanistan
This edition is dedicated to those SOF Warriors
killed and wounded in the process of
implementing VSO and ALP across Afghanistan.
Their heroic efforts to help Afghans stand up
for themselves have strategically improved the
stability landscape in Afghanistan for the long
war. Their sacrifice will not be forgotten!
Framing the Problem...Why VSO?
Regional Context and Tensions …………… 8
Ethnic Tensions..........................………
9
Pashtun Influence on the
Insurgency……………….......................
10
Pashtun Tribal Systems - What Has Worked
Before……………...........................................11
Changing Direction
Village Instability Operations……………
12
De-legitimizing the insurgent.........................13
Taking terrain away from the insurgent.........14
VSO Emerges.......................................
15
VSO Methodology
Afghans standing Up for Themselves……
Shape Phase………………………………..
Hold Phase……………..…………………..
Build Phase…………..…………………….
Transition Phase…………..………………
It Takes a Network…….…………………..
16
18
19
23
25
26
Conclusion
VSO Challenges Remain………………….
Looking Forward…………………………..
VSO Implications for Intel Professionals
VSO Implications for USSOCOM……….
28
29
30
31
Enclosures
VSO Recommended Reading List...………. 32
About the Author…………………………. 33
VSO glossary…………………………………. 34
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INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade since United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) helped Afghanistan from Taliban
control, USSOF continues to serve as a critical component of the Afghanistan Civil Military Campaign Plan. What
began as pure unconventional warfare with Army Special Forces and other SOF mobilizing Afghan Rebels to
overthrow the Taliban Government has now evolved ten years later into another form of SOF indirect warfare
known as Foreign Internal Defense (FID). USSOF’s role has never been more prominent.
At the epicenter of this FID effort is the requirement to prevent the Taliban and al-Qa’ida from reestablishing a capacity inside the country to project violence against the United States and its allies. This means
defeating the insurgent efforts to re-establish an Islamic emirate inside Afghanistan that could once again usher in
an unacceptable global terror threat to Afghanistan.
To prevent this, USSOF and allies will play a critical role in hunting down terrorist and insurgent leaders
seeking to re-establish safe havens inside Afghanistan. While it is important to target insurgents and terrorists as a
USSOF line of effort, Afghan history tells us that direct action is not enough. There must also be an indirect
approach. This mission involves USSOF building security capacity through enduring partnership with Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) to help them build a military and police capacity capable of combating the
insurgency and maintaining stability throughout the country.
While USSOF has been pursuing the regular FID applications of direct action and partnership with ANSF
over the last ten years, we've begun to learn that these are not sufficient to pacify the numerous security gaps in
rural areas controlled by insurgents. Because this is a rural insurgency, outlying villages are utilized as safehavens
to project violence and instability on the urban population centers. These villages are beyond the persistent reach
of Afghan National Security Forces and require an irregular dimension to the ongoing FID Remote Area Operations
campaign. This approach is known as Village Stability Operations (VSO).
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STRATEGIC RELEVANCE FOR VSO
Strategic Context. The goal of al-Qa’ida has not changed; re-establish a Pan-Islamic Caliphate. With Mullah
Omar as the Commander of the Faithful, al-Qa’ida and the Taliban seek to lead the “Black Banners” from the land
of Khurasan to victory in Afghanistan by removing U.S. and Western presence and re-establishing a Sharia-based
government throughout the country, all at the expense of tribal and cultural affinities.
“If you see the Black Banners coming from Khurasan, join that army, even if you have to crawl over
ice; no power will be able to stop them….and they will finally reach Baitul Maqdis (Jerusalem) where
they will erect their flags. The Black Banners will come from the east, led by military men with long
hair and long beards; their surnames are taken from the names of their hometowns and their first names
are from a kunya.” Hadith
Despite their tactics, techniques, and procedures, al-Qa’ida strongly desires to foment instability in order
to reestablish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from which they usher in a Pan-Islamic Caliphate across the globe.
The restoration of the Taliban as the head of the Afghan Caliphate is at the top of that list.
The importance of global SOF presence continues to increase in the face of an ever-changing and
dangerous world. Although al-Qa’ida has been damaged, they continue to operate from various safehavens,
inspiring others to do their bidding. While this represents a change in their method of operations, it still
represents significant global reach and a distinct threat to the homeland and our allies.
While hunting these terror cells down is extremely important, it is also critical that we prevent the crisis
before it can occur. This means SOF applying indirect lines of effort in places like Afghanistan to stabilize the
environment by helping local nationals stand up for themselves while simultaneously rendering terrorists and
insurgents irrelevant. This indirect approach involves building capacity within security forces and in some cases
irregular forces as well. SOF VSO is a key program within the USOCOM Indirect line of effort.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To properly achieve the strategic potential of VSO and ALP, one needs to fully understand the Afghan
context that created the need for VSO, along with the full spectrum, whole of society methodology that renders
the insurgency irrelevant to the Afghan population by re-empowering traditional and informal Afghan stability
structures.
VSO is a bottom-up stability program that embraces the vital role rural villages play within the Afghan
population. The majority of Afghans live in very small villages in rural Afghanistan, well beyond the reach and
influence of the Afghan government, and most coalition forces.
Many of these rural areas are Pashtun tribal zones that have historically been at odds with the Afghan
Government. In addition to being fiercely independent, Pashtun are quite egalitarian and often violently adherent
to their code of revenge and honor known as Pashtun Wali which governs daily life. The Pashtun have long relied
on these tribal institutions for maintaining security, economic development, governance, and rule of law where
the government could not. While these Pashtun tribal areas were often at the epicenter for unrest and violence
against the Central Government, the tribal and local stability institutions were also essential to national level
stability within Afghanistan. Today, most of the Afghan insurgency emanates from the Pashtun tribal areas.
Understanding the Pashtun tribal dynamics and the underlying critical causes of why this is the case is key to
stabilizing Afghanistan.
Thirty plus years of prolonged combat within Afghanistan, coupled with forced migration and
displacement of millions of Afghan villagers, has severely degraded the traditional Afghan tribal systems for local
security, economic development, and governance. This has left millions of Afghan villagers with numerous
grievances that include lack of food, predatory behavior by malign actors, land disputes, and inheritance issues
with no traditional village-level institutions to address them. Likewise, the Central Government is incapable of
providing solutions to these challenges. These sources of instability have allowed the Taliban and other insurgents
to move back into the villages starting in 2002 to begin a village-based insurgency that exploited local grievances
and severed the rural population from the Afghan Government and the Coalition.
A ten year top-down strategy by the Afghan Government and the Coalition made it even more difficult to
reach this outlying rural population who was being quietly co-opted and exploited by insurgents living in these
villages. Even USSOF, who were operating in many of the rural areas for years, were doing so from built up fire
bases and forward operating bases that kept them threat-focused vice population focused, and thus, detached
from the rural population.
In the Fall of 2009, USSOF began to re-examine their COIN approach in Afghanistan by conducting a
comprehensive study of previous periods of Afghan stability and what had worked during those times. What
emerged was a VSO program that required a bottom up approach to re-empower local institutions, with an
eventual connection to the Afghan Central Government. USSOF then initiated VSO by moving out of their forward
operating bases and into Afghan villages. This was decisive to VSO and enabled USSOF to identify numerous
grievances and sources of instability that were plaguing many Afghan citizens. Once living among the people in
villages, USSOF were able to address the local grievances of many Afghans by re-empowering local, tribal
institutions of security, economic development, and governance. This VSO bottom up methodology of reempowering Afghan local institutions took physical and human terrain away from the insurgents by rendering
them irrelevant in the eyes of the local population.
The next endeavor for VSO is to connect villages to the Afghan Central Government. This can include ALP
as well as Afghan and U.S. civilian programs. This balance of formal and informal stability represents the strategic
potential of VSO. This bottom up approach places many new demands on USSOF. Only by understanding the
local community and tribal stability systems, along with the whole of society requirements inherent to the VSO
methodology, can USSOF hope to achieve the Commander, ISAF strategic objectives for Afghanistan.
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FRAMING THE PROBLEM
AFGHAN CONTEXT-BALANCING FORMAL AND INFORMAL GOVERNANCE
A Land of Complexity. Understanding the numerous Afghan complexities and tensions that require a
bottom up approach are crucial to understanding VSO and its relevance in the current strategy. History tells us
that stability is achievable in Afghanistan. However, to achieve it, we must do a better job of understanding the
context in which it is possible. Indeed, Afghan stability is never achieved from the top down, and any strategy that
pursues this singular top-down approach is likely flawed.
Even its most stabile periods, particularly during the Musahiban Dynasty (1929-1978), Afghanistan has
1
always had difficulty governing from the center. Because over 70% of the Afghan population lives in rural villages,
the Central Government has always relied on local, traditional institutions to stabilize areas beyond the reach of
the Central Government. As such, these differences in formal and informal governance usually created a range of
significant “tensions” in regards to stability. During periods of relative stability of Afghanistan, rulers managed to
achieve and maintain a precarious balance between formal and informal institutions of security, development, and
governance.
However, there were always underlying tensions between these urban and rural governance mechanisms.
This is demonstrated by the turbulent history of Afghan governance and overthrows. Indeed, whenever a ruler
pushed too hard from the center, usually in a progressive, top-down fashion, the informal structures on the
“edges” would revolt. This phenomenon has been known as Nang (Pashun Word meaning nomad) and Qalang
2
(meaning tax). These two categories describe the urban population that becomes settled and supportive of a
central government versus rural nomads who raid for resources and openly resent the activities of an urban-based
government. The concept of Nang and Qalang is an age old tension that transcends ethnicity and tribe and has
underpinned many unstable periods in Afghan history, including the current Afghan insurgency.
1
2
Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan, A Cultural and Political History
Tribal Analysis Center, Afghanistan's Development, An Instability Driver? Pg. 5, August 2010
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NATIONAL CONTEXT - UNDERSTANDING TENSIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
Ethnic Tensions. Afghanistan is replete with significant ethnic tensions. Even after 10 years of Coalition
3
intervention, Afghanistan remains deeply fragmented along ethnic and tribal lines. Pashtu, Hazaras, Tajiks, and
Uzbeks comprise the largest ethnic groups in the country. Each has a fairly regional orientation and very distinct
lineages that define their support or non-support of the government; and certainly each has a range of tensions
with the other ethnic groups. Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks are of Turko-Perisan and who historically demonstrate
more support for GiROA. Many of the tensions between the rural people and the Afghan government are Pashtunrelated. As such, the preponderance of the Afghan Insurgency is Pashtun-centric. Let’s examine this further.
Understanding Pashtun Tribal Dynamics as a Key Factor in the Insurgency. Despite
ethnic complexities in Afghanistan, this is a Pashtun insurgency. Therefore, it is critical to understand Pashtun
tribal dynamics and traditional stability institutions
related to tribal dynamics. Dr. Khan Idris states, "an in...at the family and clan level, the society always
depth study of the Pashtun tribes and their internal
simmers with constant tensions and conflicts
dynamics in both Pakistan and Afghanistan would help
among local leaders and families. However, builtin mechanisms in the society prevent the low-level
illuminate why some tribesman harbor militants, why
simmering from reaching full blown boiling point
they join the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, why the Pashtun are
- most of the time."Dr.Khan Idris
prone to violence and insurgency, why Pashtuns
constantly fight among themselves and everybody else,
4
and why they constantly switch sides." Unlike the other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, Pashtun are very egalitarian
and tribal in nature. The Pashtun code of Pashtun Wali centers on honor and revenge. As such, there are tensions
that span from inter-tribal levels down to familial levels. Many of these tensions involve land disputes, inheritance
issues, water rights, and inter-tribal blood feuds. These tensions have historically been resolved by traditional
structures within a feudal system and local governance structure known as the jirga. In this system of local
governance, landed Afghan males who are the heads of their families, represent their interests in a group of elders
5
that convene at the village level. This jirga handled local affairs ranging from conflict resolution between two
aggrieved parties over a land dispute, to the economic development regarding the construction of grape huts or a
new guest house for the village mosque. To enforce the decisions of the Jirga, the village provided a small group of
3
IHS Jane's, Afghanistan, An IHS Janes Special Report, 7 October 2011
Dr. Khan Idris, Jirgas, The Pashtun Way of Conflict Resolution, Tribal Analysis Publishing, 2010
5
Dr. Sherman Taizi, Jirga System in Tribal Life, University of Peshawar, April 2007
4
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men known as Arbakai, Chaga, Chawelesti, and a range of other names depending on the particular Pashtun
Region in question. This local police force defended the village against outside threats, and enforced the decision
of the local jirga. Also, whenever local, traditional governance systems failed or reached an impasse, external
elites would often intervene to broker peace or render equitable solutions to grievances. This allowed for stability
between tribes and government, even when local institutions failed. These traditional tribal institutions of
security, development, and governance were extremely effective, and essential to stabilizing rural areas on behalf
of the Central Government.
DEFINING STABILITY
Pashtun Tribal Systems - What
has Worked Before. To achieve
stability in Pashtun areas, the Afghan
Government has long relied on the
traditional Afghan, community level
institutions of security, economic
development, governance, and rule of law
described earlier. There was also a loose
connection between these tribes and the
Afghan Government. However, the role of
these traditional institutions was critical in
6
maintaining a balance of stability. As we’ll
learn in the next section, these traditional
institutions have been severely degraded by Soviet Occupation, insurgents, famine, and a range of other factors,
making stability even more challenging and creating a need for a bottom up approach called Village Stability
Operations.
A Vanishing System. The Soviet influence on Afghanistan in the 1970s and 80s forever altered the delicate
balance of Afghan stability. The Soviets and Afghan Communists recognized the significance of village-level
stability systems and systematically dismantled them by killing or displacing the elders (Khans), re-distributing
land, and displacing entire villages to Pakistan. Additionally, many external elites were targeted as well. As such,
6
Scott Horton, Six Questions for Thomas Barfield, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/05/hbc-90007078
10
much of the feudal leadership was lost and with it, the institutional know how for economic development,
7
governance, and rule of law. Even basic agricultural skills such as crop rotation, food preservation and animal
husbandry were lost with the removal of the Khans from the scene of daily village life. Though some Khans
survived, most did not return to their farms. Today, villages are largely inhabited by sharecroppers who possess
little to no requisite skills necessary to exist beyond subsistence level nor do they provide any measure of wealth
or prosperity for their people. It was this environment of numerous sources of instability at the village level that
caught the eye of the Taliban and enabled their re-emergence in the form of a rural insurgency in 2006.
7
Dr. Dave Ellis, Afghan Population-Centric Concept of Operations, 11 November 2011
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CHANGING DIRECTION
BEATING THE INSURGENT AT HIS GAME FROM THE BOTTOM UP
Village “Instability” Operations. The Taliban have been conducting their own version of VSO since 2006
after the Taliban were pushed out of Afghanistan by Coalition Forces in 2001-02. Taliban insurgents managed to
work their way back into villages throughout rural Afghanistan over the next four years. By operating at the village
8
level, they mobilized, co-opted, and intimidated village populations to support their presence in the local area.
Also, by posturing themselves within the villages, Taliban insurgents were able to degrade traditional and tribal
structures within the village. Once this root cause of instability was established within the village, Taliban
insurgents could then identify and exploit local grievances and sources of instability (SOIs). Some of these SOIs
included such things as land grievances, tribal favoritism through development projects, and family inheritance
issues. In addition to fomenting instability, Taliban insurgents often exploited the root cause of the problem by
supplanting the village jirga system with a Sharia-based shadow structure, which offered a degree of stability in the
face of an inept Afghan Governance system and a fractured jirga/shura system of local governance.
While the absence of security is significant, it is symptomatic of a much larger problem. The sources of
instability and their root causes are the true reason for instability and the primary design for Taliban control of the
rural countryside. Meanwhile, the predominant Afghan and Coalition Strategy since 2002 has largely involved a
top-down approach that placed security forces and local government workers in fortified firebases and combat
outposts rather than Afghan villages where they could be cognizant of these SOIs. This “drive to work” approach,
further ostracized the Afghan and Coalition leaders and forces from the rural villages, while the Taliban insurgents
9
continued to exploit village sources of instability and mobilize rural populations in their favor. It was this
noticeable disparity between rural Afghan villages and the Government that led to the emergence of Village
8
9
Dr. Seth Jones, USSOCOM Briefing, May, 2011
Tribal Analysis Center, Development in Afghanistan; An Instability Driver?
12
Stability Operations in Fall of 2009, followed by the strategic implementation of the Afghan Local Police program in
Summer, 2010. Now that we know why VSO was needed, let's examine its potential effects on the insurgency.
De-legitimizing the Insurgent. The Taliban exerted control over Afghan villages by undermining
traditional village governance structures and by 2006 they had co-opted many villages across the country. Jirgas
and Elders (Khans) across the country were targeted and intimidated to either go along with Taliban activities or to
cease their activities altogether. In their place, the Taliban insurgents replaced the historically pragmatic Jirgas
with Sharia “Shadow Courts”. This kind of subversive activities by mullahs in rural Afghanistan is not new, and
actually quite common in times of turmoil throughout Afghanistan’s history. " Invariably, when there is an
emergence of extreme violence within Pashtun society, their clergy will be deeply involved. The exact opposite
10
is true when the Pashtuns are at peace: the mullah class is quiet and remains within its mosques and madrassas ".
Not only do these “Shadow Courts” supplant the more traditional Afghan governance mechanisms, they dispense
rule of law much faster and more efficiently than Afghan Government Judicial Mechanisms. As such, many of
these Taliban insurgent governance structures, though often brutal in nature, are more popular to local Afghans
than government entities. By working with Afghan villagers to re-empower their traditional village governance
structure of Khans, Maliks, and Jirgas…the local village is able to get behind a governance mechanism that is
culturally acceptable. This can lead to villagers “de-selecting” the Taliban insurgent and rendering him irrelevant in
the eyes of the populous.
“The most difficult military principle to accept in this analysis is that the Taliban is a symptom,
not a cause of the problem in Afghanistan. The greatest strategic advantage that the Afghan
Government and ISAF have is that the population does not generally like the Taliban, nor want it
back in power. As such, the Taliban is only useful inasmuch as the Afghan Government and ISAF
provide it the space to be relevant through identity politics, continued conflict, and a lack of
services. The Taliban will become less useful to the population as their basic needs become
increasingly satisfied and as local security forces (ANA, ANP, and ALP) become capable of
defending them”. Dr. David Ellis, USSOCOM
10
Tribal Analysis Center, Mad Mullahs, Opportunists, and Family Connections, Page, November, 2008
13
Taking Ground Away from the Insurgent. VSO has demonstrated a propensity to take physical and
human terrain away from the insurgency. Rather than take this terrain away in traditional, top-down targeting
applications, VSO does this from the bottom up with indirect actions. From the village level, SOF help Afghans
revitalize their informal tribal systems while rendering insurgent systems irrelevant.
As in any insurgency, there is little the insurgent fears more than being perceived as irrelevant in the eyes of the
11
people . This de-selection of insurgents by villages has already occurred in various degrees in VSO sites across the
country. While security enables this de-selection to occur, it is usually the revitalization of local stability
mechanisms such as the jirga for resolving local conflicts or the ability of villagers to improve their collective wealth
through improved agricultural applications that is most impactful.
However, most insurgents do not take this threat to their legitimacy lightly and retribution is swift and
extremely harsh. Attacks against VSO sites and ALP are rampant throughout the country. These attacks are often
higher than the attacks on Afghan Police and Army units. While this level of retribution can be seen as a useful
measure of VSO effectiveness against the insurgent, it also represents a strategic threat to stability. Many of the
informal stability mechanisms in these villages are quite fragile and held together by a few brave Afghans who see
the utility in the return of these pragmatic systems. The death or intimidation of these individuals can have a
12
strategic adverse impact on the overall stability of an entire district or tribal area.
Therefore, it is imperative that SOF leverage operational and strategic resources to continue to build
relative advantages in keeping these key leaders alive and these traditional mechanisms in place in the face of
growing intimidation. Next, let's examine the emergence of VSO and its associated methodology that it possible
for SOF to take key terrain away from the insurgent.
"...the “bottom-up” form of governance among Pashtuns reduces the role of mullahs in the
management of tribes". Dave Phillips, Tribal Analysis Center
11
12
Dr. Dave Ellis, Afghan Population-Centric Concept of Operations, 11 November 2011
Dr. Seth Jones, USSOCOM VSO Briefing, April 2011
14
VSO Emerges.
It’s the Cheese Stupid. One of the pitfalls made in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by all nations who have
attempted it, is a failure to understand that Afghanistan is challenged in its ability to govern from the center.
Therefore it must rely on a balanced relationship with outlying tribal institutions to maintain any semblance of
order. Dr. Tom Barfield uses the cheese analogy to represent the American Government and Western
Governments as American cheese, contiguous, and easily governed from the center. The Afghan Government is
more like Swiss Cheese with numerous gaps and holes precluding an ability to govern from the center and an
implied need for a much stronger local governance structure that is in balance with the center. Until the advent of
VSO and ALP, the Afghan Government and the Coalition has been pursuing a singular top down strategy (American
Cheese) instead of an approach that balances governance from the center with governance on “the edges” (Swiss
13
Cheese) .
A Change in Direction - from the Bottom Up. As the Taliban insurgency continued to grow in scope
and scale from the bottom up, and GIRoA and Coalition efforts seemed ever more detached from the Afghan
population, SOF began to recognize in the Fall of 2009 that there was a disconnect in its approach to stabilizing
Afghanistan. There was a growing recognition of Afghanistan’s inability to govern from the center and a renewed
awareness of the significant role rural villages play in every aspect of Afghan stability. This led to a focused
planning effort within CFSOCC-A to dissect previous periods of Afghan history where stability occurred and derive a
new approach to achieving it. The result was a bottom up program known as the Community Defense Initiative
which has evolved into the program we know today as Village Stability Operations. As shown below, VSO connects
bottom up efforts from the village with top down lines of operation of security, development and governance.
Let's examine how.
13
Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan, A Cultural and Political History
15
VSO Methodology. In recognizing the significant role of villages in Afghanistan, SOF developed the VSO
methodology. The VSO methodology is a bottom up approach that addresses security, development, and
governance. It is also a whole of nation process that operationalizes rural stability in support of the COMISAF Civil
– Military Campaign Plan. This methodology is critical to Village Stability and also underpins all SOF activities
related to the ALP program as well. The VSO methodology is a living process that has been developed over the last
two years by SOF practitioners in a range of rural villages to responsibly assist Afghans in standing up for
themselves and re-empowering their traditional institutions of security, economic development, and governance
to stabilize their communities in step with Afghan history and culture. It is imperative that SOF Leaders and
practitioners at all levels study and understand the VSO methodology.
Whole of nation Approach. VSO is joint and inter-agency in nature. It is also whole of community and
whole of nation in its application. Indeed, the VSO methodology requires security, development, governance, and
information lines of effort from the bottom up, as well as top down. This stability process is much larger than SOF
and even DOD. In fact, the VSO methodology requires active participation from local Afghan Villages, the Afghan
Government, the US Interagency, NGOs, and of course, Coalition Battlespace Owners (BSOs), just to name a few.
The VSO methodology offers a comprehensive and inclusive approach for handing stability over to the Afghan
people in an enduring fashion.
16
VSO Design. The VSO methodology acknowledges the need for a balance of formal (top down) and informal
(bottom up) Afghan systems and strives to re-empower informal governance mechanisms decimated by years of
war, while fostering a connection to the Central Government, usually at the District Center. VSO consists of four
phases which are shape, hold, build, and transition. Each of these phases represents a critical component of the
VSO process which begins with selecting the appropriate VSO Village and ends when there is an enduring balance
of formal and informal governance in key rural areas that can last beyond coalition presence in Afghanistan.
17
VSO Methodology – Shape Phase.
The shape phase is focused on gaining entry and access to the
appropriate Afghan village. This is decisive to VSO and is largely what sets this program apart from other COIN
efforts. In VSO, SOF are truly living and working among the Afghan people; measuring its VSO success by three
criteria: (1) SOF are able to help defend the Afghan village both day and night; (2) SOF are postured to responsibly
oversee all of their VSO and ALP activities with the local villagers 24-7; and (3) Afghan villagers view SOF as
welcomed guests of their village.
Achieving What is Decisive. Achieving entry into the village and overall success in VSO is not as much
14
about winning hearts and minds as it is about gaining trust and earning respect. What has worked well to date is
demonstrating to the Afghan people through word and deed that SOF is committed to helping them stand up for
their own community. SOF does this through several key actions. First, it must analyze the human terrain and
local environment to select the right area to conduct VSO as well as gain an appreciation for the sources of
instability and opportunities for SOF to leverage for gaining village entry.
Additionally, SOF must target the insurgent network in order to
reduce intimidation on the local village enough that they are willing to
allow SOF to live among them. Additionally, SOF must convince the
local Village Jirga/Shura to support VSO and ALP and to allow SOF to live
in their village. Once SOF have obtained entry into the village and have
successfully met the criteria mentioned above, they are now ready to
begin VSO in earnest and help Afghans re-claim and stabilize their
village during the Hold Phase.
"Achieving
entry
into
the
appropriate Afghan Village is
decisive to VSO and what largely
sets this program apart from other
COIN efforts in Afghanistan".
SOF’s VSO Partner: Afghan Special Forces are a critical component to every
phase of VSO activities, as well as transition to Afghan stability. Afghan Special
Forces were activated in 2009 and are part of the overall Afghan SOF Special
Operations Program. Trained by an Afghan Special Forces Cadre, that is overseen
by U.S. Special Forces, these 15 x man detachments are trained and organized
very similarly to U.S. Special Forces. Upon graduation, Afghan Special Forces
partner with CFSOCC-A units conducting VSO across Afghanistan. These
detachments play a critical role in every phase of VSO from leading efforts for
village entry to raising and training Afghan Local Police. ANA SF will also play a
crucial role in rural stability as the Coalition transitions to Afghan control.
14
BG Ed Reeder, Former CFSOCC-A Commander and Implementer of the Community Defense Initiative
18
VSO Methodology – Hold Phase. During the hold phase, focus is largely on stabilizing the village. This is
the true bottom up portion of VSO and it is what SOF is uniquely postured to perform based on its inherent
Unconventional Warfare skills, SOF enablers, and unique presence as guests in the village. These villages are
usually in bad shape. Most of them are heavily intimidated by insurgents and lacking collective confidence to
stand up for themselves. They also lack the traditional stability structures, such as the village jirga to resolve
conflicts and govern daily life. Hold phase involves helping the members of the Afghan community re-claim their
village from insurgent control and stabilize it along economic development and governance lines. The hold phase
of VSO is largely about fostering the re-empowerment of traditional, village level stability mechanisms
As we spend more time in the Afghan villages as guests of the community, and less time “driving to work”
from firebases and A-Camps, SOF is learning a great deal about the importance of traditional, village-level
institutions and systems. While we still have a great deal more to learn, SOF is gaining an appreciation for the
tremendous role, the village Jirga or Shura played in the role of security, economic development, justice, and
governance.
However, thirty years of warfare and assault on these institutions by the Soviets and Taliban insurgents,
especially in the south, have left them badly damaged and in some cases, inoperable. Hold phase is about
ascertaining the root causes for these sources of instability and executing a design to foster their re-emergence
15
within the village . This is why VSO is holistically focused on security, economic development, and governance at
the community level.
VSO Hold phase involves bottom up efforts to re-empower traditional village institutions
of security, economic development, and governance to create a “bubble of stability”
around the village, referred to as a Village Stability Platform (VSP). This "village platform"
is a necessary pre-condition for connecting villages to the Afghan Government.
15
District Stability Framework Quick Reference Guide
19
Local Security
Security in Hold Phase. Security is a very important component of stabilizing villages from the bottom up.
Because almost 80% of Afghans live in rural villages, Taliban insurgents focus on controlling these areas by
fomenting instability. As such, lack of a security is a major problem in most Afghan villages. It is a condition that
the Taliban insurgents seek to maintain so that villagers cannot stand up for themselves and the GIRoA and/or
Coalition cannot project into these areas. VSO re-empowers a traditional system of villages providing for their own
security. Under VSO, the village Jirga/Shura nominates, vets, and oversees a small group of Afghan men charged
with protecting the village. The village Shura ensures the local police force remains accountable to the village and
16
is not used for nefarious purposes by malign actors. These groups are small and defensive in nature. At some
point in the VSO methodology, this small force will become ALP and will connect to the GIRoA through MOI and
ANP while simultaneously remaining accountability to the village Jirga/Shura. Community involvement in security
through local reporting is also very important, and in some ways one of the most impactful aspects of security in
VSO.
Local expansion of VSO and ALP is key to increased stability in rural, ungoverned spaces. Spreading the
word of Afghans standing up for themselves against criminal insurgents is imperative to taking key terrain away
from the insurgents and expanding the reach of VSO. Hand held radios and the Radio in A Box (RIAB) can play a
key role amplifying VSO activities as well as mobilizing the population to report on Insurgent activity and support
local stabilization efforts without putting themselves at risk.
16
Courage Services, Tribal Dynamics in Afghanistan, Page 5, April 2008
20
Development in Hold Phase. Economic development is another major source of instability exploited by
Taliban insurgents in most Afghan Villages and a critical component of the VSO methodology. SOF has had to
17
“unlearn” much of what we thought we knew about economic development over the last ten years.
Many
villages are operating below subsistence level and their economic development needs are much more basic and
rudimentary than once thought. This has led to a misapplication of CERP projects and large scale development
such as roads and schools in rural areas. Large scale projects had very little value when most Afghans were
18
struggling with producing and preserving enough food just to survive through the winter months. By living
among the Afghan people through VSO, SOF have begun to better understand village SOIs, the importance of
fostering projects that reinforce positive community behavior toward security and stability, are vetted by the
Village Shura, are smaller in scale (usually around $5,000), and involve local labor and community ownership of the
project.
Learning from the Past. VSO economic development requires SOF practitioners to learn from the lessons
of misapplied large development projects and foster projects like the one below right, that are nominated by the
village shura, $5,000 or less, beneficial to multiple tribes or families, and involve local labor and/or funding.
17
18
Tribal Analysis Center, Afghanistan's Development, an Instability Driver, August 2010
Dr. Dave Ellis, Afghan Population-Centric Concept of Operations White Paper, 11 November 2011
21
Governance in Hold Phase. Village governance is crucial to Afghan daily life. Our knowledge of its critical
role in Afghan society continues to grow as SOF spends more time embedded in Afghan villages across the country.
The importance of the Afghan Jirga/Shura is due to a range of factors that include the austere, egalitarian nature of
the Pashtun Tribes and the historic inability of the Afghan Government to project persistent stability into the rural
19
areas. Village governance is represented through the Shura or Jirga. However, as stated above, this Shura
system and the elders who populate the shura have been methodically targeted and decimated over the last three
decades. In its place, Taliban insurgents have established shadow courts that provide their own version of Shariabased security, development, justice, and governance. The VSO methodology acknowledges the significant role of
the village Jirga/Shura and utilizes the hold phase to increase local Jirga/Shura capacity. SOF conduct focused
advisory assistance to foster re-emergence of traditional governance within the village. By re-empowering the
village Jirga/Shura, the Afghan villagers re-gain their method of local governance. This enables them to secure
their own community, conduct economic development that is in step with their immediate needs, and resolve
20
conflicts and govern their daily lives in a way that stabilizes their community. It should also be noted that a
strong Jirga is one of the best control mechanisms for ensuring VSO doesn't become co-opted by a singular power
broker or malign actor. The oversight of multiple village elders and even-handed external elites can also help keep
stability equitable within the community. Finally, VSO's re-empowerment of pragmatic, traditional governance
structures also renders the Insurgent Sharia shadow court structures irrelevant to the Afghan people.
Village Stability Platform.
When the bottom-up lines of operation of security, economic development,
and governance have been effectively applied in the Hold Phase, the village becomes stable. When this level of
stability is achieved, insurgent activity decreases, locals become more willing to stand up for their community, the
collective wealth of the village begins to increase, and pragmatic, traditional governance begins to supplant the
Taliban insurgent Shadow Court. There is also some willingness within the village to begin connecting to the
Afghan government, usually at the District Center level. At this point the village becomes a platform for
connecting the village to the district. This Village Stability Platform (VSP), can now provide a corridor between
village and government to overcome the pervasive tensions that normally exist between these two worlds. While
terribly difficult to achieve, this balance between top down and bottom up is essential to enduring national
stability in Afghanistan...and always has been. Once the VSP is achieved in the hold phase, it is time to move into
the Build Phase of the VSO methodology and foster the strategic linkage to the Afghan Government.
19
Although Jirga is historically a Pashtun-centric term, Jirga and shura are used interchangeably throughout rural
Afghanistan today and thus are used interchangeably in this article.
20
Dr. Khan Idris, Jirgas, The Pashtun Way of Conflict Resolution, Tribal Analysis Publishing, 2010
22
VSO Methodology in Build Phase.
Build phase is one of the most complex phases of the VSO
methodology. This is because focus during the build phase is on connecting the recently stabilized village to the
Afghan Government which invites most of the tensions discussed earlier in this article. While SOF play a crucial
role during build phase, stability now becomes a whole of nation/society approach of Afghan and Coalition
organizations charged with providing top down support to rural villages. Once unreachable from Government and
Coalition elements, SOF can now offer the stabilized village as a Village Stability Platform for District and Provincial
components to project the more enduring stability programs into these areas. Also, SOF can leverage their wellestablished trust and rapport with Village Elders to foster their re-connection with the District Authorities in a way
that is acceptable to both entities. This is not without tension and complexity however.
Bringing Villages to the Government . SOF can serve as helpful enablers to civilian Afghan and ISAF
stability partners by helping connect village leaders to the Afghan government. Achieving this connection between
rural villages and the Afghan government has been a challenge throughout Afghan history. This is because of the
inability to reach outlying districts through a top-down strategy. Government officials and Coalition members
simply had no credibility with local Afghans when asking them to support a central government which they had no
trust. VSO, however, works from the bottom up to enable SOF to win the trust and respect of an entire
community FIRST before moving them toward a connection to the Afghan government at the District Center.
However, some skeptics in the stability community have asserted that VSO and ALP work at cross-purposes to
larger stability efforts. Some also assert that VSO creates militias and governance mechanisms that are outside the
21
purview and control of the Afghan government. While these are valid concerns, most of these rural villages are
already outside the control of the Afghan government and under the control of the Taliban insurgents. SOF
employ VSO shape and hold phases to gain unprecedented entry into these villages, and then work from the
bottom up to help Afghan community members re-claim their village from Taliban insurgent control. SOF earn
trust by living and working among the Afghan villagers. Then by focusing on the village-level sources of instability,
before pressuring the village to connect to the Afghan government, SOF further solidify their credibility with local
community leaders. SOF can use this local credibility and rapport with local elders to encourage the village to
connect to the Afghan government. By utilizing the Village Stability Platform, Afghan National Security Forces can
tie Afghan Local Police into the District Security structure, economic development ministries can connect larger
scale development programs to villages that were once unreachable, and district and provincial level governance
structures can connect to traditional village governance structures that were previously defunct and nonparticipatory. This will provide the Afghan government with strategic reach that will be vital to successful
transition and enduring unilateral stability
21
Human Rights Watch, Just Don't Call it a Militia
23
VSO Methodology – Transition Phase. VSO transition is focused on establishing an enduring balance of
formal and informal stability institutions. This balance between top down and bottom up has long been essential
to periods of relative Afghan stability. To overcome the natural tensions associated with this balance and achieve
enduring stability, VSO transition will likely take some time to accomplish.
22
COMISAF has been clear that VSO will play a critical role in transition and beyond.
This is largely
because VSO addresses the rural component of Afghan stability. And we now know rural areas in Afghanistan are
the epicenter for the grievances and sources of instability held by most of the Afghan populace. These sources of
instability are in turn exploited by the Taliban insurgents for de-stabilizing the country and advancing their agenda.
It is imperative to stabilize rural areas for Afghan transition to succeed and for enduring stability to take hold. SOF
and VSO are critical to this line of effort.
We must be cautious against prematurely transitioning VSO sites. There will undoubtedly be strategic
pressure to transition rural areas to Afghan control as soon as possible. This is essential to achieving the strategic
aim of the United States. However, addressing the long-standing grievances of the rural population will require
persistent SOF presence and patience. Traditional governance institutions such as the Village Jirga/Shura along
with the technical skills of improving the agricultural wealth cycle are damaged and in some cases completely
absent. Re-establishing the traditional institutions of security, development, and governance for enduring
application, will be tantamount to long term stability. Transitioning before these traditional institutions are in
place will only allow Taliban insurgents to re-insert themselves into these sources of instability, cause major loss of
United States credibility, and de-stabilize the country after our withdrawal timeline.
In addition to ensuring traditional institutions are in place, SOF will also play a key role in fostering the
connection of the rural areas to the Afghan government. A large component of transition in Afghanistan will rely
on the Afghan capacity for managing stability in the rural areas. Although it has always been challenged to govern
from the center, the roles of the central, provincial, and district government structures will be vital and there must
be some formal connection to the outlying areas. SOF Leaders and staff members at all levels should ensure they
are familiar with and integrated with Afghan Ministries, programs, and civilian partners at every level of war.
As we work toward Afghan capacity for transition, we must consider all aspects of stability
inherent to the Afghan sub-national governance structures such as ANP (top left), Ministry
for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (Top Center) and District Governors (Top Right).
22
COMISAF, VTC Address to CFSOCC-A Commander's Conference, December 2011
24
Transition Phase-Anticipating Change. The strategic context for SOF in Afghanistan will continue to
change throughout transition as ISAF primacy gives way to Afghan control and the U.S. Country Team eventual
eclipses DOD's lead role in the COIN effort. As Afghan Ministries and Department of State continue to play a larger
role in the stability of Afghanistan, their ability to reach out to the security-challenged district and village areas will
likely be facilitated by SOF elements working from the bottom up to help connect ALP, local economic
development, and village Shuras to the Afghan government at the district level.
The historic challenges of this rugged land coupled with our own coalition organizational complexity will
likely render SOF’s contributing role in transition as imperative to success. Therefore, VSO transition must be
effects-based and tied to the capacity of traditional village-level institutions as well as the capacity of the village
and central government to connect in an enduring fashion at the district and provincial levels.
25
IT TAKES A NETWORK
Overcoming Organizational Complexity. VSO may not be new, but how we communicate within VSO
is somewhat novel. The growing complexity of stability in Afghanistan mandates a change in how we
communicate within the Coalition from the industrial age hierarchical construct to a network-centric and flat
communications approach. As we transition stability within Afghanistan, VSO will be instrumental as a supporting
effort to connect these formal governmental institutions to the outlying villages formerly unreachable due to
Taliban intimidation and lack of capacity. This top-down and bottom-up connection implies an unprecedented level
of network-type collaboration that will be essential to overcoming organizational complexity and multiple
organizational and inter-agency seams.
Afghanistan tensions are not the only challenges to how we communicate on connecting top-down to
bottom-up. There are numerous participants and actors in the complex stability community of interest. This
means a tremendous amount of organizational complexity within the Afghan government and the Coalition from
district to ministerial levels. As depicted in the diagram below, this organizational complexity can often make it
quite confusing to achieve unity of effort across the numerous gaps and seams that exist between SOF, Battle
Space Owners, Interagency members, NGOs, and of course, Afghan government officials.
Slide by CFSOCC-A
26
Taming Organizational Complexity
Taming Organizational Complexity through Collaboration.
The remote isolation of villages
coupled with a very complex organizational structure can make it tough to find answers to hard stability problems
that exist at the village level. In fact, solutions to significant stability challenges often exist in other locations than
the village or district in which the problem resides. Other than a nightly Situation Report, how can a local SOF
Commander find answers and resources to immense stability challenges? The ability to broker knowledge and
connect resources from strategic to tactical levels and across agency and directorate seams in support of local
complex problem sets was the genesis for the creation of the Village Stability National Coordination Center and
Regional Village Stability Coordination Centers (VSCC.) These organizations utilize Provincial Augmentation Teams
(PATs) and District Augmentation Teams (DATs) to help foster the connection between village and the Afghan
government. Additionally, VSCC’s employ a highly collaborative process that “flattens” communications channels
and utilizes a network approach from Village to District to Province to Regional to National and even CONUS levels.
VSCC’s are SOF led organizations, but they embed to support every BSO and civilian partner in Afghanistan.
VSO CONUS Network. Many of the knowledge and resource solutions to difficult VSO problem sets exist in
the United States. As SOF practitioners wrestle with stability challenges such as extreme negotiating with heavily
intimidated tribal elders, agriculture hardships, economic development woes, tribal feuds, and traditional
governance shortfalls, SOF need FID answers like never before. Many experts with these insights and perspectives
live and work in the United States. Additionally, many of the civilian programs for economic development and
governance are headquartered in the Washington D.C. area. Connecting forward deployed SOF to these experts
across the country is a growing requirement within the stability network. To further enable this connectivity across
organizational seams, SOF has embedded robust communications nodes in most every VSO site to enable
collaborative communications throughout the network. Additionally, there is a growing requirement to connect
this robust stability network within Afghanistan to the various stability proponents within the United States in
order to support growing VSO training and education requirements. USSOCOM is playing an ever-increasing role in
this CONUS-based aspect of the VSO network.
27
CONCLUSIONS
Challenges Remain
VSO is not a “silver bullet’ that wins the war in Afghanistan. It is, however, an essential component of the
Civil Military Campaign that addresses stability gaps in the rural, predominantly Pashtun areas of the insurgency.
However, there are several challenges that must be continuously addressed in the implementation of VSO and
ALP:
Intimidation. Intimidation plays a significant role in preventing local Afghans from standing up for themselves.
It also stands to seriously set back recent stability gains in informal governance and economic development if not
countered in a meaningful way. As Afghans continue to de-select the Taliban insurgent, intimidation will likely
increase. The Coalition must work closely with our Afghan partners to prevent this intimidation from causing a loss
23
in stability of key rural areas.
ALP Becomes Too Big Too Fast.
VSO should underpin the programmatic application of ALP. VSO
potentially revitalizes many aspects of rural Afghan stabilization, not just security. This holistic and balanced
approach rooted in the Jirga/Shura process goes a long way to preventing the uncontrolled emergence of a militia
or malign actors. However, the ALP process is much more programmatic and focused on numbers of police, vice
addressing sources of instability. ALP represents a vital component to legitimate linkage of village and
government, however, VSO must remain the primary methodology to anchor ALP for enduring stability and ensure
responsible application. Too much top-down in the execution of VSO/ALP -- both from GIROA and ISAF creates
24
inherent tension and over-management problems.
Ethnic Tensions. The preponderance of Taliban insurgent activity is in rural Pashtun Areas. Therefore, most
of the root causes of instability are due to the degradation of and breakdown of Pashtun tribal mechanisms.
However, the ethnic tensions between Pashtuns and the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks makes the non-Pashtun
Afghans very concerned about any coalition efforts that re-empower Pashtun stability systems. This report does
not take on the method by which to mitigate these ethnic tensions but notes they must be continuously addressed
and managed by all coalition members at every level. Additionally, the author suggests that the VSO program is
largely designed for Pashtun rural areas and may be ill-suited for applications in other rural areas that are less
egalitarian and more pro-GIRoA. Trying to force VSO into these areas in order to provide an “ethnic balance” of
VSO could have negative effects.
Tribal Tensions. Although VSO is largely designed for Pashtun Areas, it should be noted that Pashtun tribal
dynamics are very divisive and no region of the country is the same. Tribal in-fighting is a large part of Pashtun life
throughout the country. Tribal displacement and fractured tribal structures in South and West Afghanistan will
make VSO very challenging and not as well-received as in Eastern areas where Pashtun Tribal homogeneity exists.
However, in the East, SOF will have to continue to contend with inter-tribal feuding and security efforts that will
often outpace the ability of development and governance to keep pace. Better understanding of Afghan tribal
dynamics is essential to preventing unintended effects of VSO.
Telling the Story. There are many opponents to VSO. Many believe VSO creates “militias’ that will revert
Afghanistan back to the days of virtual anarchy. Many of these skeptics have valid concerns and are making
significant contributions to Afghan stability. SOF empowering Afghans to stand up for their own communities by
identifying and addressing sources of instability beyond just security is very important yet rarely communicated on
a strategic level to these opponents. Most opponents are often unaware of the full spectrum approach SOF is
utilizing in the realm of economic development and governance and that SOF views its role as a supporting effort
to formal governance institutions once the village is stabilized. Renewed efforts to communicate this narrative
23
24
Dr. Seth Jones, USSOCOM VSO Brief, April 2010
This challenge is reflected from battlefield surveys of SOF Commanders by the author in May 2011
28
could not only reduce the amount of opposition to VSO and ALP, but create conditions for increased unity of effort
to our vital stability partners in the Afghan, USG, and NGO community of interest.
Looking Forward
The Past Holds some Answers for Stability. Long term stability in Afghanistan will require a balance
of formal and informal governance structures. The Musahiban Dynasty, specifically under King Zahir Sha, is the
most recent example of how this balance can be obtained and managed. Ten years into this war, you will rarely
find a US SOF Operator or SOF intelligence professional who has not read The Bear Went Over the Mountain. Yet,
very few of our ranks know much about periods of Afghan stability or the traditional, local institutions that enabled
them. Rather than myopically studying Soviet failures, perhaps we should study Afghan success.
Many skeptics, when considering VSO as a component of transition, often state, “this might be working on
a small scale, but it doesn’t seem possible for sustaining during a drawdown in transition”. The author respectfully
disagrees with this point. What seems difficult to sustain in transition and drawdown of forces, are Western
based, top-down strategies of security, economic development, governance, and rule of law that are out of step
with Afghan history and culture and opposed by a large percentage of the population. While these types of formal
institutions are important for Afghanistan to move forward as a modern nation state, we ignore the traditional
institutions such as the village jirga, and its degraded capacity, at our peril. This mistake has been made by several
other external powers and lasting stability was a failure.
“Rather than studying Soviet failures, perhaps we should also
study Afghan successes.”
Final Comment. It is the author’s opinion that a recipe for stability going forward would be to learn from the
past Musahiban Dynasty and other key Afghan periods and work with our Afghan partners to re-vitalize traditional
stability structures in balance with the formal state structures. There have been far too many far-reaching changes
made to Afghan civil society to bring back the Musahiban "Golden Age" of the 20th Century. However, we could
do more to learn what has stabilized the country in the past. This is not advocacy for creating parallel institutions,
but rather revitalizing traditional ones that have been overshadowed by years of warfare, famine, and warlordism.
In conclusion, the Musahiban Dynasty, though turbulent at times, represents significant, recent historical
precedent that the Afghan people are much more apt to achieve stability when there is a balance of formal and
informal governance that is implemented and managed on Afghan terms by the Afghan people. Imposing Western
views or even Kabul-centric views of stability without considering the tremendous role the rural population plays
in Afghan stability is not a viable strategy for success. Much has changed since these times. It won’t be easy, and
numerous tensions will likely make it harder before it gets easier. Yet, there is little to no evidence to show that a
singular “top down” approach offers any hope for success in the future. VSO aims to support the ISAF Civil Military
strategy by invoking the historically strong urge of rural Afghans to stand up for communities outside the reach of
the Afghan Government. USSOCOM and its Special Operations Forces will play a vital role as stewards for this
strategic program into Afghan transition and beyond.
29
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Provide Full-Spectrum Intelligence. SOF must embrace the recommendations of Lieutenant General
Flynn and provide full spectrum intelligence that holistically looks at sources of instability. This requires SOF
intelligence analysts to look far beyond the “red network” and conduct holistic and historic analysis of such things
as district and village sources of instability, ethnic and tribal tensions, tribal research, the impact of development in
the area, and the current status of the informal governance structure, just to name a few. The SOF team relies
heavily on this information to begin engaging the local populous and to achieve eventual embed status within the
village.
Utilize the Intelligence Network to Help SOF Gain Trust and Entry into the Village:
Achieving entry into the village and overall success in VSO is not as much about winning hearts and minds as it is
about gaining trust and earning respect. This is inherently important in rural Afghanistan. SOF operators should
be empowered with tremendous local knowledge of Afghan villages and dynamics in order to negotiate and gain
trust with the local populace. This often exceeds the local knowledge of local intelligence practitioners and
requires the power of a network.
Help SOF and Afghans Overcome Intimidation.
While VSO shaping efforts should not be
exclusively focused on the Taliban insurgent threat, reducing intimidation on the populous is tantamount to
achieving successful SOF presence within the community. Intimidation is a significant problem throughout
Afghanistan and the rural villages are no exception. SOF intelligence and targeting efforts should focus on
reducing intimidation to an acceptable level so that SOF can approach villagers without threat of retribution and
for villagers to feel confident in allowing SOF to live among them. Looking through the lens of how an insurgent
network intimidates a village rather than how that same network targets SOF is a bit of a paradigm shift, but
necessary in mobilizing the populace to allow SOF entry into their village. Critical factors analysis and other
systemic intelligence analysis activities that look at the functions and vulnerabilities related to intimidation could
be very effective in helping SOF create operational design of kinetic and non-kinetic targeting approaches to
reduce intimidation and ultimately render Insurgent networks as criminal and irrelevant in the eyes of the Afghan
people.
Also key to reducing intimidation is leveraging the surgical Direct Action skills of select Afghan and
Coalition Strike Forces that are designed for these types of network targeting efforts. This allows SOF who are
conducting VSO to focus on gaining trust and moving into the village. Therefore the creation and utilization of
traditional target folders and targeting methodologies are still very relevant.
Analyzing the Green and White Networks. Transition is the key focus of the COIN effort in
Afghanistan now. Therefore it is imperative that analysts can effectively analyze the capabilities and capacity of
Afghan formal and informal governance to function both autonomously in that tenuous balance required for
stability at the Village and District levels.
Identifying and Analyzing External Elites.
When traditional, local institutions are incapable of
reaching consensus on critical issues, external elites often intervene to provide even-handed, peaceful decisions.
These external elites can also play a vital role in advancing favorable decisions toward stability when the village
mechanisms are at impasse. Intelligence professionals must continue to identify these external elites throughout
the national "grey space" and assess their potential for rendering "strategic assists" to VSO problem sets.
30
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR USSOCOM
Paradigm Shift in How SOF Train and Educate the Force. SOF must increase pre-mission
training in development, governance, and rule of law, while also increasing educational knowledge of Afghan
culture, ethnicities, social challenges, and tribal dynamics. Strategic growth of VSO has rendered SOF as the
default proponent of security, development, and governance at the village level. Based on the austere location of
VSO, coupled with diminishing civilian presence and poor civilian access to these areas, few development and
governance proponents are available to provide this technical expertise at the community level. In order to foster
the re-empowerment of rural, informal institutions, SOF must develop an in-depth understanding of traditional
security, economic development, and governance traditional institutions. These are complex topics and will
require a shift in focus and priority for pre-mission training. The recent emergence of the USSOCOM-led Joint SOF
Academic Weeks for each OEF Rotation are becoming essential precursor elements to SOF VSO pre-mission
training and should be maintained and continually improved upon. USSOCOM support to SOF OEF Mission
Readiness Exercises and VSO training events are also extremely important to Force readiness.
Understanding Sources of Instability and Developing Tools to Address Them.
Taliban
insurgents exploit local grievances of rural Afghans to promote their ideological agenda. Only by living among the
people, identifying their sources of instability, and implementing actions to address them, can SOF revitalize
Afghan communities and render the insurgent irrelevant in the eyes of the Afghan people. Developing skills to
identify sources of instability through the District Stability Framework and other assessment mechanisms is
essential for VSO success.
There is a Growing Demand for a VSO Network. VSO now includes all SOF components. There is
also growing participation from Afghan Ministries and Department of State, USAID, and U.S. Department of
Agriculture. There is also increasing interest in ALP within the General Purpose Forces. Additionally, many of the
low-density, high–demand subject matter experts in traditional development, governance, and tribal dynamics are
located in areas well away from normal SOF pre-mission training networks. While CFSOCC-A may be the forward
proponents for VSO, they do not have the capacity for CONUS-based VSO advocacy. The joint SOF nature of VSO,
coupled with the requirement to coordinate across Interagency and General Purpose Force lines makes USSOCOM
a logical choice as the CONUS based VSO proponent for training, education, and engagement. To meet this
demand, SOCOM will need to invest in developing a robust capacity to manage these requirements for brokering
stability knowledge and connecting VSO network members across the globe.
As USSOCOM increases its C2 role within Afghanistan, technical proficiency of VSO and the VSO
methodology from National to local levels will grow demonstrably. SOF will be required to address VSO issues
across various levels to include intelligence, resources and programs, operations, development, and governance.
Understanding the basic VSO methodology and the actors, practitioners, and subject matter experts within this
vast network will be vital to leveraging VSO and ALP for strategic success during the transition.
Learn to do Less with Less. As transition continues in Afghanistan, General Purpose Forces decrease, and
resources diminish, many stability advocates promote a theory of doing "more with less". However, there is a
growing sense that doing "less with less" actually is a much more effective bottom up approach. By understanding
how local communities have functioned in the past, SOF are able to revitalize many local aspects of security,
development, and governance that require less top down resourcing, yet can lead to a smoother transition to
Afghan control, along with more impactful effects on the population.
VSO will be applicable in support of Indirect Special Operations beyond Afghanistan. As
USSOCOM continues to conduct pre-emptive special operations designed to affect threats indirectly, VSO will
prove to be a very relevant methodology and application for countries with rural and agrarian societies dominated
by tribal structures, informal stability institutions and central governments challenged for projecting stability into
ungoverned spaces. Exporting the VSO methodology and the network approach to other theaters will likely be a
growing requirement for USSOCOM indirect lines of effort.
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VSO RECOMMENDED READING LIST
In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War In Afghanistan. By Dr, Seth Jones. This is a must read
for any VSO practitioners or anyone who is bound to work on the Afghan problem set. Dr. Jones
does an outstanding job of chronicling the evolution of the U.S, and NATO efforts in Afghanistan
and puts forth a recommended approach that is well informed from the successes and failures of
various empires who participated in the great game. Dr. Jones was also a key architect in the
Village Stability Program and has written numerous products on VSO and ALP.
Afghanistan – A Cultural and Political History. By Dr. Thomas Barfield. Dr. Barfield’s book does
an outstanding job of distinguishing the characteristics between Afghan’s numerous ethnic
groups and even more importantly, clearly demonstrates Afghanistan’s historic inability to
govern from the center – key reason for the emergence of VSO and ALP.
Jirgas – The Pashtun Way of Conflict Resolution. By Dr. Khan Idris. Jirgas is a two-part series
that is absolutely essential to understanding the governance line of operation within the VSO
methodology. Dr. Idris does a magnificent job of highlighting the traditional role of governance
in Afghan villages before the Soviet Invasion. These books are essential tools for VSO
Practicioners striving to re-empower Afghan informal institutions and render the Taliban
systems irrelevant.
Afghanistan’s Development: An Instability Driver. The Tribal Analysis Center
(TAC). This book is an outstanding primer for understanding how development
has been misapplied by the coalition and has also contributed to development.
This article is an excellent tool for understanding the development lines of operation within
VSO. There are many other helpful VSO products available on the Tribal Analysis Center.
www.tribalanalysis center.com
Pashtun Tribalism and Ethnic Nationalism. By Dr. Arturo Munoz. This book is a simple and
authoritative guide to understanding Afghan Pashtuns and the role they play in stability
within Afghanistan. The bulk of VSO and ALP sites are in Pashtun areas and this book will be
a very useful tool in understanding the rural Pashtuns, as well as other ethnic groups.
An Operational Design for VSO: By Dr David Ellis. This is an excellent road map for the VSO
practitioner to better understand Afghan sources of instability and how to address them. Dr.
Ellis is a member of the USSOCOM JIC and is a leading authority in advancing agriculture and
economic development issues with the VSO construct.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
LTC Scott Mann is the coordinator and planner for VSO training and education for
USSOCOM. He is a career Special Forces Officer with three tours in Afghanistan,
most recently as the Program Manager for VSO in CFSOCC-A and the Director of the
Village Stability Coordination Center – South. LTC Mann has worked with hundreds
of SOF, GPF, Interagency, and Afghan practitioners across the vast stability
community of interest in support of VSO initiatives and was the OIC for the
USSOCOM OEF 18 Academic Weeks.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Village Stability Operations
Village Stability Operations is a bottom-up counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that establishes expanding security
and stability bubbles around rural villages. As the security bubble expands outwards, more and more “white
space” is created that is inhospitable to the insurgents and allows the establishment and solidification of legitimate
local governance. As these security bubbles expand and connect, they simultaneously force the insurgents out and
connect local governance to the district government, and district governance to the provincial and national
governments. At the heart of VSO is a team- or platoon-sized element that embeds in the village – it moves into a
local house or compound and lives there 24/7 in order to achieve persistent engagement with Afghan partners at
all levels. This creates an unparalleled level of situational awareness and trust.
Village Stability Platform (VSP) – A village stability platform is a task-organized USSOF team with enablers which is
embedded in a village or village cluster with the primary task of conducting VSO.
Village Stability Staging Areas (VSSA) – Locations that are temporary in nature and are intended to be a base for
SOF teams to set conditions for establishing a VSP. Staging areas may serve as command and control or
operational support sites.
Village Stability Transition Team (VSTT) – A stay-behind element left to advise, assist and support follow-on forces
in a transitional VSP.
District Augmentation Team (DAT) – The DATs are district-level VSO representatives for linking GIRoA to villages
and are the primary advocates for the development and governance initiatives at the VSPs. The DATs live at or
near the district center and tie the VSPs within their district to the Battle Space Owners (BSO) and GIRoA.
Provincial Augmentation Team (PAT) – The PATs are the VSO link between the district and the Provincial
Reconstruction Team and GIRoA provincial governance. The PATs build and maintain relationships with the PRT
staff, BSOs, GIRoA ministry representatives and inter-agency representatives to assist the VSPs with development
and governance issues.
Village Stability Coordination Center (VSCC) – The regional command-based VSCCs coordinate and synchronize
Village Stability Operations and corresponding support with the RC and BSOs.
Village Stability National Coordination Center (VSNCC) – The Kabul-based organization assists the collaborative
VSO network with synchronization and coordination at the GIRoA national ministry and ISAF headquarters level.
Enablers and Thickening Forces
Key enablers for conducting VSO are the Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC), Tactical Military Information Support
Teams (TMTs), Civil Affairs Teams (CATs), military intelligence assets, military working dogs, Cultural Support
Teams (CST), Female Treatment Teams (FTT), interpreters, and service and support personnel.
To thicken SOF elements conducting VSO, CJSOTF-A employs two conventional force U.S. Infantry battalions.
These battalions are task organized to augment and integrate with SOF teams to provide additional combat power
for the VSP and can be used to reinforce a full SOF team or enable split-team operations. With proper mentoring
by SOF, these forces are an effective platform for expanding CJSOT-A’s VSO footprint and creating more “white
space” across the CJOA.
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