Erdogan Cabinet 2013

JHUMUNC
Erdogan Cabinet 2013
Background Guide
JHUMUNC XVIII
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Committee Overview
Topic 1: Immediate response to
the protests in Taksim Square
Topic 2: Addressing Turkey’s ascension
to the European Union
Erdogan Cabinet 2013
Merhaba and Welcome to The Turkish Cabinet!
The Third Cabinet of Prime Minister Erdogan will consist of fast paced and challenging
debate. The purpose of this committee is to address the situations at hand through the eyes of the
Turkish Cabinet, at a time of extreme difficulty. The Cabinet’s priorities will be to immediately
respond to the Gezi protesters that have taken to the streets in cities across the country, and to
address Turkey’s problematic accession to the European Union. Cabinet Ministers are expected
to participate in intense debate on a variety of unforeseen crises and take decisive action with
urgency, while being diplomatic and fair. Therefore, extensive research and preparation prior to
JHUMUNC 2015 will pave the way to success in our committee, but creativity and the ability to
think on one’s feet will also be extremely necessary. While this background guide contains an
overview of events that actually occurred in Turkey in 2013, delegates are encouraged to be
creative in order to reach alternatives to the policies adopted by the Turkish Cabinet, most of
which did not fare well for them. The Cabinet will convene in an emergency session at exactly 1
PM on 28th May 2013, just a few hours after Gezi protesters began their occupation of Taksim
Square.
Prime Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, but rose
to power with a landslide victory in the general election the following year. Since 2002, the AKP
has held onto its voters, securing victories in the general elections of 2007 and 2011. The AKP is
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believed to be the largest and most popular single political party in Turkey; this is a result of its
policies, especially those concerning the economy, which have been responsible for Turkey's
financial success.. However, the period of undisputed authority for the AKP seems to have ended
with the outbreak of the Taksim Square protests in Istanbul, which are spreading over into
smaller cities, as well as the capital, Ankara. The AKP is suddenly losing popularity within the
Turkish population as a result of its hardline approach to several policy areas. It is in the hands of
this Cabinet to quell the protests and calm the exasperated people of Turkey. It is absolutely vital
that the Cabinet act on its feet in order to prevent a national uproar.
Parliamentary Procedure
The Turkish Cabinet will not be subject to typical parliamentary procedure. The
committee will observe a continuous moderated caucus, with no speakers list, unless motioned
otherwise by the delegates. Delegates will be required to motion in order to set a topic for the
moderated caucus along with a speaking time. Unmoderated caucuses may be introduced with a
motion at the chair’s discretion. All motions will be voted on in order of most to least
destructive. Delegates are expected to motion to introduce directives and communiqués as well
as to move into voting procedure. This committee will require all directives and communiqués to
be passed with a simple majority, unless stated otherwise by the chair. Motions for round robin
discussions will be entertained, though they will not be a primary form of debate.
Delegate Biographies
Bekir Bozdağ (Deputy Prime Minister for Religious Affairs and the Turkish World): Bozdağ
belongs to Akdagmadeni in the Yozgat Province. By profession, he is a theologian, lawyer and
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politician. He began his political career some years after graduating with a degree in law from a
local university. His term in Parliament began in 2002 and has continued since then, after being
re-elected in 2007 and 2011. He is a trusted companion of the Prime Minister and was appointed
Deputy Prime Minister in the Turkish Cabinet in 2011.
Ali Babacan (Deputy Prime Minister for Economy, Banking and Treasury): Originally from
Ankara, Babacan is an important member of the Turkish Cabinet. Babacan began his career in
politics in 2001 when he served as a co-founder and board member of the Justice and
Development Party. He was elected to Parliament in 2002 and served as the Minister of
Economy, becoming the youngest cabinet member. In 2005, Babacan was appointed as chief
ambassador in Turkey’s accession talks with the European Union. His successful work enabled
him to be re-elected in 2007 and was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister
Erdogan’s second cabinet. In 2009, Babacan was named Minister of Economy, a position he
continues to hold since the AKP’s reelection in 2011.
Beşir Atalay (Deputy Prime Minister for Counter-terrorism, Human Rights and Cyprus): After
obtaining a law degree from Ankara, Atalay began his political career in 2002 in the Prime
Minister’s First Cabinet. He was appointed the Minister of Interior in 2007 and assumed the
office of the Deputy Prime Minister in 2011. Being an experienced political personality in
Turkey, Atalay is known to often differ in opinion with the Prime Minister over human rights
issues, particularly the treatment of journalists and free media in the country.
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Ahmet Davutoğlu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs): A diplomat by profession, Davutoğlu has played
an important role in shuttling diplomacy between the Israelis and Palestinians since 2008. He is
also a political scientist and an academic with numerous works on Turkey’s international image.
Davutoğlu has a clear vision for Turkey’s future and wishes to see it become a regional power in
Europe and the Middle East, with a greater influence on international politics. In 2009, he was
appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs and has since then maintained a close relationship with
the Prime Minister. However, he is known to have a mind of his own which cannot be influenced
easily; he feels strongly about many foreign affairs issues, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict.
İdris Naim Şahin (Ministry of the Interior): İdris Naim Şahin was elected to the Turkish National
Assembly in 2002 as a representative from Istanbul. In 2011, Şahin was chosen by the Prime
Minister to serve as the Minister of Internal Affairs;he is responsible for maintaining good
performance within the country’s security forces, including the Turkish police.
Mehmet Şimşek (Ministry of Finance): Mehmet Şimşek was elected to Parliament in 2007 as a
representative from Gaziantep, and he holds the post of Minister of Finance. Between 2007 and
2009, Şimşek served as the State Minister for Economic Affairs, before being appointed to his
current role. Şimşek is an experienced economist and analyst, having previously worked as the
chief economist and strategist at Merrill Lynch. His experience in the economic field is vast;
between 1998 and 2000 he served as senior economist and bank analyst for Deutsche-Bender,
and for UBS Securities in 1997. He also served as a senior economist at the US Embassy in
Ankara before his time at Merrill Lynch. Şimşek has been invaluable in designing Turkey’s
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economic policy and managing its finances. He has also become the face of Turkey’s rising
economic prospects in the world.
Sadullah Ergin (Ministry of Justice): Ergin began his political career in 2002 as a founding
member of the AKP. He is a representative from the Hatay province in the National Assembly.
Ergin was elected as the Minister of Justice in 2009. A lawyer by profession, Ergin served as a
lawyer for the Regional Directorate for Foundations of Hatay for five years. He then began his
work as a self-employed lawyer. He is also known to have completed his military training in
earlier years. Ergin is a trusted friend of Prime Minister Erdogan’s, but is known for his
Eurosceptic views about Turkey’s accession to the EU. This has made him a controversial figure
in the Cabinet.
Taner Yıldız (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources): Yildiz is a leading member of the
AKP; he is an electrical engineer by profession. His political career began in 2002 when he was
elected to Parliament. He served as an energy advisor to the Prime Minister during PM
Erdogan’s first Cabinet. He was appointed as the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources in
2009.
Ertuğrul Günay (Ministry of Culture and Tourism): A lawyer by profession, Günay became the
youngest Member of Parliament after his election in 1977. He began his political career as a
member of the Republican People’s Party of which he became the Secretary General in 1992.
However, he was excluded from the party in 2004 after which he joined the AKP. In 2007,
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Günay was elected as an MP from Istanbul and then from Izmir in 2011. He has held the
position of Minister of Culture and Tourism since 2007.
Recep Akdağ (Ministry of Health): Recep Akdağ began his political career in 2002, when he was
elected as Minister of Health. Since then he has held the position and served the Turkish
population through the provision of efficient and affordable healthcare. He is a physician by
profession and simultaneously serves as the MP for Erzurum. He is known to often have
differences with the Prime Minister but is very popular with his constituents.
İsmet Yılmaz (Ministry of National Defense): İsmet is currently the Minister of National
Defence. He is known for his all rounded expertise in several fields including law, consultation,
politics, and mechanical engineering. As Minister of National Defense, his top priority is to
protect Turkey from non-state actors, and foreign and domestic threats. He has been focused on
preventing the infiltration of radical Islamists into Turkey from neighboring countries. Yilmaz
has been extremely critical of Erdogan’s support for the West’s anti-Assad sentiments in Syria
and has warned the Cabinet of possible backlashes on several occasions.
Nihat Ergun (Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology): Ergun served as the Mayor of the
Derince district in Kocaeli Province in 1994. In 2007, he was re-elected to Parliament. He was
also chosen to be the acting chairman of the AKP’s parliamentary group. In 2009, Ergun
assumed the position of the Minister of Science, Industry and Technology. Ergun wishes to see
Turkey develop into an even more industrial state.
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Egemen Bağış (Ministry of European Union): Bağış has been an MP since 2002. He previously
served as the Minister of EU affairs and as chief negotiator in accession talks with the EU. He is
an MP for Istanbul in the Turkish National Assembly, Chairman of the Turkey-USA Inter
Parliamentary Friendship Caucus of the Turkish Parliament and Advisory Board Chairman of the
Istanbul 2020 European Capital of Culture Initiative. He is a prominent member of the AKP and
the Prime Minister closely considers his advice.
Zafer Çağlayan (Ministry of Economy): Çağlayan began his political career in 2007 when he was
elected to Parliament and appointed as a Minister. He previously served as the President on the
Ankara Chamber of Industry and Vice-President on the Union of Chambers and Commodity
Exchanges of Turkey. He has long lobbied for structural and microeconomic reforms in order to
bring the economy to a stable state and prevent it from overheating in the face of a rise in
investment in the country.
Cevdet Yılmaz (Ministry of Development): Yilmaz was appointed Directorate General of EU
relations and was elected as deputy of Bingol in 2007. In 2009, Yilmaz was appointed as the
State Minister in Prime Minister Erdogan’s second cabinet. In 2011, however, he assumed the
position of Minister of Development. He is a strong proponent of Turkey’s accession to the EU
and believes that Turkey needs to thrive in order to remain a frontrunner in Europe and the
Middle East.
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Hayati Yazıcı (Ministry of Customs and Trade): A lawyer and politician by profession, Yazici is
currently the Minister of Customs and Trade. In 1984, he quit his position as a judge to begin his
career as a freelance lawyer. He is a founding member of the AKP and began his time in
Parliament in 2002, when he was chosen as deputy of the Istanbul province. As the PM’s lawyer,
he enjoys a close relationship with Erdogan.
Erdoğan Bayraktar (Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning): Bayraktar serves as the
Minister of Environment and Urban Planning. He also serves as an MP for Trabzon and is a
leading member of the AKP. He has previously served as the President of the Housing
Development Administration, as a general contractor and has overseen the construction of
military lodges. He also completed his military service in 1979.
Veysel Eroğlu (Ministry of Forest and Water Management): Veysel Eroğlu is the Minister of
Forestry and Water and an MP for Afyonkarahisar. He is a leading member of the AKP. Eroğlu
has previously served as the General Director of the Istanbul Water and Sewerage
Administration. He has been credited for his successful work in the position including solving
the issue of water shortages in Istanbul by constructing dams, drinking water treatment plants as
well as water storing reservoirs. In 2007, he was elected to the National Assembly and he has
since then held the position of minister of environment and forestry. Eroğlu is responsible for
developing strategies to combat Turkey’s global warming. His work as an academic scholar is
valued in the country and beyond, and his scientific and technical reports have earned him heaps
of respect within the Grand National Assembly.
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Faruk Çelik (Ministry of Labor and Social Security): Faruk Çelik currently serves as the Minister
of Labor and Social Security, a position he has held since 2007. He also represents Bursa in the
Turkish National Assembly. He is a prominent member of the AKP. Çelik is a teacher and
businessman by profession but has been in neither field since his election to Parliament in 2002.
He also serves as the parliamentary group leader. Çelik is a trusted companion and supporter of
Prime Minister Erdogan. His advice is of great importance to the AK Party and the Prime
Minister.
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Topic 1: Immediate Response to the Protests in
Taksim Square
Introduction
Earlier this morning (28th May 2013), a group of protesters took to the streets of Istanbul
to contest the urban development plan for the Taksim Gezi Park, one of the last few green spaces
left in the city. The protests began as a result of violent eviction of a sit-in at the park by Turkish
police forces. These protests, which were the result of environmental concerns, eventually
became a platform through which citizens expressed anti-government sentiments, accusing the
Erdogan regime of curbing freedom of the press, expression, and assembly; and encroaching
upon Turkey's secularism. The committee must act to quell the violence that has erupted in
Istanbul without further upsetting the protestors and create some credibility for itself before the
situation spirals out of hand.
History
28th May 2013 saw a throng of anti-government protesters take to Taksim Square in the
center of Istanbul to challenge the government’s development plan for the Taksim Gezi Park.
The protests, that initially started as a peaceful sit-in carried out by a group of environmentalists,
soon turned into a mass demonstration against the government after police forces used violence
to disperse the sitting protestors. After the government’s initial use of violence, demonstrations
and strikes have spread across Istanbul, threatening to spread to other cities as well. The protests
have grown symbolic of anti-government sentiments over a variety of issues including freedom
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of speech and media as well as the government’s increasing efforts at introducing daily Islamic
values in a country that is constitutionally secular.
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been in government since 2002,
having won three consecutive general elections decisively. The AKP is well known and credited
for its economic successes, especially in dealing with the 2001 recession. However, the
popularity reign for the government seems to be eroding especially as it is accused of pursuing
an Islamist agenda and undermining the secularism that institutions in Turkey are based on. In
addition to this, the Erdogan government has met criticism as a result of the authoritative
methods that it has used to diffuse opposition e.g. the imposition of increasing restrictions on the
freedom of speech, curtailing the freedom of the media and engaging in human rights violations
through the use of police brutality against anti-government demonstrations.
At the core of the on-going public demonstrations is the issue of the government’s
increasing encroachment on Turkey’s secular values. Since 2011, the AKP has been accused of
furthering an Islamist agenda, attempting to introduce a round of politically conservative
measures to Turkish society. Moreover, since its last election victory, the AKP has assumed a
continuously autocratic style of government, imposing restrictions on freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and the use of the internet. It is also known to have developed strong ties
with Turkish media groups and television channels, and to be involved in heavy regulation of
content. The government has been accused of paying large sums to manipulate the content of
media channels such as newspapers and political shows. It has also used administrative and legal
means to quell skeptical media groups and journalists. It is for this reason that the media has
provided little resistance to the political structure that Erdogan is promoting. In simpler words, it
can be said that the government has been involved in “buying” loyalty and has therefore been
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successful at constructing a powerful alliance consisting of businessmen and media outlets,
which are ready to support the AKP regardless of its policies.
In addition to its strict approach to civil liberties and human rights, the government has
also been subject to criticism for being (seeming) increasingly Islamist. In 2012, the Parliament
ratified an education reform that strengthened Islamic aspects in courses at public primary and
high schools. The reform was described by the Prime Minister as an attempt at creating a "pious
generation”i, one that would be more in touch with the conservative elements of Islam.
Moreover, universities across the country are no longer able to legally sell and purchase alcohol
and there has been a huge row over kissing in public. This created frustration amongst the
citizens, most of whom tend to be more liberal than the government, as it seems. The
government has been exercising its right to arrest those who threaten the system, in the name of
preventing blasphemy. As a result, many of them have joined the Gezi protests demanding the
government to scale down its radical agenda of creating an order influenced by political Islam.
The government has also been criticized for its ambitious development plans across the
country. While the development of infrastructure has been one of the reasons for Turkey’s
economic successes in past years, the process has involved little or no input from the public,
even though the public has opposed many government projects. The Taksim Gezi Park is the
latest of such development projects. Despite public outrage, however, the government has
usually continued with its plans and dismissed opposition. The last few years have seen a number
of protests against the government’s willingness to ignore the environmental repercussions of
increasing development. Some of the projects that citizens have been vehemently opposed to
include: additional nuclear plants; the third bridge on the Bosphorus; and the construction of
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waste-dumps, nuclear and coal power plants, factories and hydroelectric power plants in the
Black Sea Region.
Many Turks have also become disillusioned with the current government as a result of its
stance on the Syrian Civil War and strong support for the Free Syrian Army fighting the
government of Bashar-al-Assad. Some are of the opinion that the Turkish government should
play a less active role in the Syrian War so as to prevent the influx of refugees through the
Turkish Syrian border. They are also worried that support for Syrian rebels will allow them to
use Turkey as a safe haven and training ground. The government’s policies over Syria have
created social tension in Turkey, especially as they are seen as strongly aligned with those of
Saudi Arabia.
Another reason for strong opposition to the government is the deteriorating economic
climate in the country. By January 2013, the structural weaknesses of the Turkish economy were
becoming apparent with economic indicators such as economic growth and purchasing power
indicating a worrying economic situation. Economic growth fell from 8.8% to 2.2% within a
year in 2012.ii Current employment figures indicate high levels of youth employment and an
inefficient work force. The current account deficit continues to increase as a percentage of the
GDP and increasing inflation is reducing the purchasing power of the Lira, especially as its value
drops e against the dollar. Relatedly, the government has also been accused of corruption,
especially as a result of its private development projects. There are reports that suggest largescale corruption within the government at a variety of levels through the use of private
corporation accounts.
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Goals of the Gezi Protesters
The protests consist of various social groups criticizing the government for its
undemocratic ways of running the country. These groups include the Taksim Solidarity
Movement, Environmentalists, Socialists, Communists, Social Democrats, Anarchists, Feminists,
the LGBT community, Kurds, and Kemalists. In addition to these, the following groups have
also been reported to have joined the protests: Anti-Capitalist Muslims, Libertarians,
Nationalists, Vamos Bien, Confederation of Public Workers’ Union, Confederation of
Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey, Istanbul Bar Association, Union of Chambers of Turkish
Engineers and Architects, Turkish Writers’ Union, Turkish Journalists’ Association and the
Turkish Medical Association.
The protesters have publicly released a list of demands to the Cabinet in the hope that the
government will make concessions to them. The methods used by the protestors to gain
international attention include protests, civil disobedience, sit-ins, strikes, public demonstrations
and rallies, online activisms over social media channels over, marched and cacerolazo.
Preliminary reports suggest the extensive use of Facebook and Twitter to mobilize protesters
against the government.
The protesters are adamant on continuing the civil unrest till as long as the Prime
Minister does not give in to their demands, which include:
1. A reversal of the development plan for Gezi Park
2. A nation-wide end to state brutality and police force against peaceful protests
3. The right to freedom of speech and expression
4. A free media and the release of arrested journalists in Turkish prisons
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5. A U-turn on the construction of a third airport in Istanbul, another bridge on the Bosporus
and development on the Ataturk Forest Farm and Zoo.
6. A discontinuation of the sales of public goods such as beaches and parks to private
corporations.
7. The creation of a more transparent system for government transactions.
8. An end to the Islamist agenda being furthered by the government
Possible Government Responses
There are many options that the government may consider in order to diffuse the tension
on the streets of Istanbul. The government could simply reverse the urban development plan for
Gezi Park hoping that this will appease the protesters. Moreover, the government could invite the
non-centralized leadership of the protests to engage in dialogue in the hope that negotiations
between the two sides will help to improve the deteriorating relationship between the state and
various workers’ unions that are now protesting. Both these options would allow the government
to make progress with the use of passive policies. However, the government does possess the
authority to make use of state force against the protesting parties. Although not the most ideal
option, the Prime Minister already has a reputation of using undemocratic methods of dealing
with resistance, e.g. mass arrests, tear gas and restrictions on the free media. While these
methods have been criticized as unfair, they have not damaged his reputation in the past and
have helped to effectively conclude rebellions against his regime.
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Recent International Action
The European Union has condemned the use of police violence against the peaceful sitins at Taksim Square this morning. German Chancellor, Angela Merkel publicly denounced the
use of violence against the protesters with the following comment: "I'm appalled, like many
others. I would like to see those who have criticism, who have a different opinion and a different
idea of society, having some space in a Turkey that moves into the 21st century. What's
happening in Turkey at the moment is not in line with our idea of the freedom to demonstrate or
freedom of speech. They are terrible images. ... I can only hope that the problems will be solved
peacefully"iii
The EU is urging the government to remain peaceful and committed to the provisions of
the acquis communautaire so that these protests do not create an additional obstacle as far as
Turkey’s accession to the EU is concerned.
Questions the Committee Must Address
1. What are the environmental repercussions of allowing one of the last green spaces in
Istanbul to be urbanized?
2. What are the likely consequences, domestically and internationally, of using state force in
order to disperse the protesting crowds?
3. To what extent is the government willing to make concessions to the protestors?
4. What would a failure at curbing the protests immediately mean for the
government? How could mass protests across the country affect Turkey’s future in the
European Union?
5. Does the Cabinet have an effective response to possible demands of its resignation from
office?
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6. If the protests were to spread, it is possible that they would serve to weaken Turkey’s
borders with warring nations such as Syria and Iraq, making it more accessible to
militants to infiltrate; how should the cabinet address this issue?
7. What is the future of political Islam in Turkey? Is there a future for it at all? If yes, how
will the general public digest an Islamization of the country? Is the government’s
involvement in the Syrian Civil War an indicator of the AKP’s Islamic agenda?
Bloc Positions
The sudden outbreak of riots in Istanbul is a concern for all of Turkey’s Cabinet
members. They should be keen to bring about an end to the uprising against the government.
There is, therefore, a consensus within the Cabinet that swift action must be taken in order to
quell the protests as soon as possible, so as to prevent them from spreading to other cities before
they gain momentum and are able to damage Turkey’s internal political structure and its
international image, especially with the European Union.
Erdogan bloc (Ali Babacan, Mehmet Şimşek, Taner Yıldız, Ertuğrul Günay, Recep Akdağ, Nihat
Ergun, Egemen Bağış, Zafer Çağlayan, Cevdet Yılmaz, Hayati Yazıci, Veysel Eroğlu, Bekir
Bozdağ, İdris Naim Şahin, Sadullah Ergin, İsmet Yılmaz):
This portion of the Cabinet is likely to unconditionally support the course of action
decided on by the Prime Minister
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Dissenting bloc (Faruk Çelik, Beşir Atalay, Erdoğan Bayraktar and Ahmet Davutoğlu):
These Cabinet Ministers may express reservations about the Prime Minister’s usually
authoritative methods of eliminating resistance. In particular, Erdoğan Bayraktar is known to
have had concerns about the development of the Taksim Gezi Park initially, having advised the
Prime Minister to halt plans to develop it into an urban space. He does not support the protests,
but feels that they could have been prevented if his advice had not been ignored. He strongly
believes that the development plan should be reversed. However, the Prime Minister has made
his decision and he will do whatever it takes for it to be implemented and while he expects his
Cabinet to support him, he is not one to change his mind if they do not.
Concluding Remarks
The crisis at hand is an extremely serious one; all eyes are on Turkey and the
international community expects the Turkish Cabinet to act effectively in order to ensure that
safety is restored to the streets of Istanbul. The fate of the country is in the hands of the delegates
who are responsible for making sure that the violence caused by the Gezi protests is not further
manipulated by anti-government elements in order to undermine the government’s position. The
government should be aware that the longer they take to control the demonstrations before they
spiral out of control, the higher the chance that they will have to resort to their usual use of state
force to disperse the crowds, which will gain them negative international attention and agitate the
Turks even more.
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Topic 2: Addressing Turkey’s Ascension to the
European Union
Introduction
Turkey began the process of its accession to the EU in 1987; it was officially recognized
as a candidate country in 1999 and negotiations for its accession began in 2005. However, the
accession procedure has been a complicated and slow one that has gradually created a level of
Euroscepticism within Turkey and the modern Cabinet. While there are significant benefits for
Turkey if it joined the EU, there are concerns about it being a Muslim country within the EU and
many countries have shown hesitation toward Turkey’s prospects of becoming a EU member.
The cabinet is responsible for debating how negotiations with the EU should progress and
whether more concessions can be made to fit the criteria of the EU acquis communautaire.
History
The relationship between Turkey and the European Union dates back to the mid-20th
century. Turkey has long wanted to gain membership of the EU. The procedure began with The
Ankara Agreement, which was signed with the European Economic Community on 12
September 1963. This agreement consisted of three different stages of accession to the EU;
preparatory, transitional, and final.iv Following the final stage, the Additional Protocol was
signed. The objective of the Additional Protocol was to extend The Ankara Agreement to the ten
new members of the EU at that point in time. One of these countries included the Republic of
Cyprus, which had and still has a relatively unstable relationship with Turkey.
There has been a slow yet gradual improvement in the accession of Turkey to the EU. On
December 13, 1997, the Luxembourg Council summit declared Turkey eligible to become a EU
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member. In order for a country to join the European Union, there is a membership criteria that
must be complied with. There are three aspects that must be fulfilled. These include providing
“stable institutions guaranteeing democracy”, “a functioning market economy”, and having “the
ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership”.v On December 11,
1999, the Helsinki European Council declared Turkey a candidate country. Furthermore, in 2002,
the Turkish parliament made reforms to meet the EU`s human rights criteria. In the same year
the Copenhagen European Council (EC) decided that if Turkey were to fulfill the criteria, then in
2004 the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey. On December 16, 2004, with
Turkey successfully complying with the criteria, the European Council declared Turkey eligible
for further negotiations, thus accession negotiations were opened. It was not until October of
2005 that the negotiations were formally opened. The process seemed to stagnate for a while
with very little progress until in February of 2008 when the Council decided to adopt the revised
accession partnership for Turkey.
As soon as the situation seemed to improve, protests erupted in Taksim square. Mr.
Erdogan's inappropriate response to the protests was viewed negatively by the international
community, specifically the EU.vi His response included the use of tear gas, and water cannons.
This was definitely a turning point in the accession process. It clearly went against the rules
required for EU membership. To further worsen the situation, Turkey responded by accusing
Western states of initiating the protests purposefully. Yigit Bulut, Mr. Erdogan’s chief advisor
then came out and called the EU “a loser, headed for wholesale collapse." Moreover, Turkey's
EU Minister and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bağış claimed “Turkey doesn't need the EU, the EU
needs Turkey. If we have to, we could tell them 'Get lost, kid!"vii
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Even with all these issues, there are many conflicting views on the accession of Turkey
into the EU. Cyprus who has been a EU member since 2004 has had a rough relationship with
Turkey. The EU eventually froze eight chapters from the talks as a result of Turkey not willing to
implement a trade agreement between them which was supposed to allow Greek Cypriots more
freedom. Italy, Spain, and the UK came out and explicitly stated their support for Turkey’s
accession into the EU. Angela Merkel, on the contrary, stated her disapproval of Turkey’s
integration into the EU, but was in favour of a sustainable and growing relationship with Turkey.
To further support this perspective, the Eurobarometer – a September/October survey which took
place in 2006 – indicated that 59% of the 27 member states of the EU were against Turkey’s
accession into the EU. Whereas, a mere 28% were in favour.viii Interestingly, however, only 54%
of the Turkish population indicated a willingness to join the EU.ix There seems to be hesitation
from both sides. This could be due to several reasons, including geographical, and religious ones.
99% of the Turkish population is Muslim. If Turkey were to be integrated into the EU, it would
not only have the largest population in the EU, but also the largest Muslim community.x
Moreover, the AKP government is interested in establishing Turkey as a more influential
regional player in the Middle East, raising concerns about whether Turkey really belongs in
Europe or not. At this point it seems that accession to the EU may simultaneously mean a
declining role in Middle Eastern politics for Turkey.
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Human Rights Issues
One of the impediments to Turkey’s accession to the EU has been the state of human
rights within the country. Although there have been several positive steps to further this endsuch as ameliorating Turkey’s treatment towards its Kurds- these are largely overshadowed by
various types of intolerance.
Although Kurds are the largest minority in the country, with some estimates that they
compose up to a quarter of the population, it is only recently that the government has opened
talks with the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in order to stop the armed conflict
stemming from the Kurd’s hope for some regional autonomy.
Currently, there are no laws allowing for education in Kurdish or any other minority
language. The very Constitution features an article that states, “No language other than Turkish
shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institution for training or
education.” This is symbolic of the denial of rights not only of Kurds, but also of other
minorities such as Armenians and Shiite Muslims. Without laws in place to protect their
language and culture, it is clear that Kurds are being denied a voice in their own country. Turkey
still has many steps to take in order to eliminate the abuses with respect to minorities.
Still, the extrajudicial killings that were so prevalent in the 1980s and 90s (up to 5,000)
against Kurds have decreased in number, if not in accountability. Protests are still held over the
lack of judicial concern regarding members of the PKK who were murdered, but there has been
progress regarding acknowledging the role the state played in these killings. A retired admiral,
Atilla Kiyat, revealed in 2010 that the former killings were in fact a portion of state policy, albeit
one that was kept secret. That combined with the unearthing of mass graves has at least led to
24 JHUMUNC
awareness of abuses certain Kurds were subjected to, and can give rise to hope that such state
atrocities can be prevented in the future.
Human rights abuses are even more evident when they apply to the whole of the Turkish
population- such as Turkey’s restrictions on the Internet that require all websites to pass through
an infrastructure created by Turk Telecom. This technology allows centralized decisions that
shut down sites, especially politically diverse opinions by online journalists. On the positive
side, YouTube was unblocked in 2010, but recently Turkey seems to be moving towards even
more intolerant measures as the number of blocked websites has increased to almost
30,000. These facts led Freedom House to give the country a score of partly free in 2013, based
also on how the European Court on Human Rights claims Turkey’s violated the right to freedom
of expression and information in the European Convention of Human Rights.
These human rights abuses with respect to the Internet are of particular importance
considering the Turkish people spend the second most time online per capita of any European
country, and how young people from 15- to 24-year-olds statistically use the Internet as a source
of news just as frequently as they use television.
Several more incidents provide hints towards a climate of violence in Turkey, such as the
killing of transgender activist, Ebru Soykan. Despite her request for protection from the
Prosecutor’s Office, the most they did was detain the suspect for two hours before subsequently
releasing him. This is symptomatic of more unsolved murders involving members of Lambda
Istanbul, which works on the behalf of LGBT rights, and of violence based on gender identity as
a whole.
Prison conditions have also been highly criticized by some international bodies like the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
25 JHUMUNC
Punishment (CPT). They recommended reminding staff that unofficial punishment of prisoners
was unacceptable, providing beds for every prisoner, and reviewing hygiene in cells. The largest
instances of abuse were only observed in certain types of prisons such as F-type prisons, which
are designated as high security. However, the Turkish prison system can also be seen as
requiring changes to meet the EU’s standards.
Impact of Gezi Protests on EU Ascension
Essentially, there is a wide disparity between Turkey’s proclaimed goals towards
improving human rights and reality. Especially with regards to the Internet and minorities, and
as evidenced by the teargas used in retaliation with the Gezi protestors, Turkey is not one of the
world leaders with respect to human rights, and it is impeding their already prolonged process of
joining the European Union. The question remains, however, whether Turkey should even
continue this process. From the Turkish perspective, there is an assortment of voices in the
Turkish government who at least outwardly appear Eurosceptic.
The Gezi protests in particular have created tensions between the EU and
Turkey. Human Rights Watch documented at least ten cases in which people were seriously
injured from the teargas canisters- and in one case, a man even lost an eye. Turkey’s police force
was clearly misusing its force against a protest that began as a peaceful protest about the
environment, and this violence soon spread to other areas of the country such as Ankara and
Izmir. The European Parliament called for the release of peaceful protestors who had been
imprisoned and for more details regarding the number of protesters hurt/detained, which weren’t
immediately complied with. The damaging effect of the action taken by police forces in Taksim
Square and Gezi Park therefore may have long lasting implications and preclude a painless
integration into the EU.
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Recent International Action
The status of Turkey’s qualifications for the EU remains doubtful for the current EU
members. The Turkish government’s recent controversial actions bring many criticisms from the
international community. In a televised debate between Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude Juncker,
two leading candidates for the European Commission, on May 20th, 2014, they both promised to
reject Turkey from joining EU. Both cited the human rights issues and concerns of democracy in
Turkey as the biggest disqualification for Turkey, with Schulz making a reference to the recent
government blocking of Twitter.xi
Furthermore, Turkey’s recent venture into the disputed waters with Cyprus, which calls
upon the more deep-set contention between the two nations over the natural resources in the sea,
like natural gas and petroleum has created further trouble for Turkey.xii This angered Greece, an
EU member, who threatened to undermine Turkey’s EU application process. Greece accused
Turkey of disobeying international law, uncharacteristic of a EU country. Peace talks between
the two countries are still in progress and the outcome will definitely impact Turkey’s accession
process.xiii
EU heavyweight Germany has long dismissed Turkey’s membership but has recently
agreed to resume talks on the accession of Turkey, though Chancellor Angela Merkel and her
Christian Democrats have yet to officially change their firm stance of opposition to the
accession.xiv France also somewhat softened its stance and agreed to unfreeze Turkey’s
application review.xv Lifting the freezing of chapters seems to be the first step towards
reconsideration of Turkey’s application, but does not guarantee anything for success, for Turkey
is still failing to qualify on many fundamental chapters on its social, economic and political
development.
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Questions the Committee Must Address
1. How does Turkey benefit from joining the EU? How do the EU nations benefit from
Turkey’s membership?
2. What are the arguments against Turkey’s accession to the EU? What are some internal
issues within the Turkish government that play against its accession?
3. How should Turkey handle its ethnic conflict with the Kurds as to comply with EU law?
4. How much control should the Turkish government have over free speech and internet
freedom as a result of the Taksim Square protests? How can the domestic unrest be
controlled without garnering negative attention from the Europeans?
5. How much does Turkey’s geographical and ethnic characteristics interfere with its
accession to the EU? To what extent does Turkey’s Muslim population contribute to
undermine the accession process?
6. What should Turkey make of its dispute over Cyprus with Greece?
7. What policies should Turkey adopt to qualify for other chapters that it is insufficient in,
i.e. agricultural development, freedom of movement for workers, etc.?
8. How can Turkey gain the support from EU members like Germany and France?
9. Is Turkey better off pursuing the Middle East instead of Europe? Is it a good idea for it to
become increasingly embroiled in the regional politics of the Middle East that is often
marked with violence?
10. To what extent does the Prime Minister’s unenthusiastic stance over Turkey’s EU bid
undermine the accession process? Would the situation be different if the Prime Minister
was wholeheartedly in support of membership of the EU?
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Bloc Positions
There are significant differences within the Cabinet as far as Turkey’s accession to the EU is
concerned. While some ministers see the EU’s membership as vital for the social, political and
economic improvement of the country, others are more agitated by the gradual and tedious rate at
which the bid is progressing and are under the impression that the sluggish speed of the
procedure is reflective of the hostility that exists within the EU for Turkey. Therefore, the
Cabinet is currently host to two groups, the eurosceptics and the europhiles.
Eurosceptics (Bekir Bozdağ, Beşir Atalay, İdris Naim Şahin, Sadullah Ergin, İsmet Yılmaz,
Faruk Çelik):
This is the group that is critical of Turkey’s accession to the EU. They argue that Turkey should
focus on improving its relationship with the Middle East instead, while simultaneously
maintaining a strong partnership with the EU. In their opinion, official integration into the EU is
not necessary, especially as they foresee increasing European influence eroding away Turkish
traditions and identity. One of their greatest concerns is the fact that joining the EU would
require Turkey to replace their currency with the Euro which has been extremely vulnerable
since the 2008 global economic crisis.
Europhiles (Ali Babacan, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Mehmet Şimşek, Taner Yıldız, Ertuğrul Günay,
Recep Akdağ, Nihat Ergun, Egemen Bağış, Zafer Çağlayan, Cevdet Yılmaz, Hayati Yazıci,
Erdoğan Bayraktar, Veysel Eroğlu):
The Europhiles in the Turkish Cabinet are those who believe that Turkey has much to
gain from joining the EU in terms of economic, political and social benefits. It is their opinion
29 JHUMUNC
that Turkey should play a more important role in world affairs through multiple international
forum and therefore advocate for Turkey’s membership of the EU, seeing it as a way of
enhancing Turkey’s say on the international stage. Some of them also believe that Turkey is
closer to Europe in its values and culture and would therefore be better off working closely with
the European Union as opposed to the Middle East of which many countries are marked by
political instability.
Prime Minister Erdogan has encouraged economic ties with Europe. He believes that
Turkey will be a successful member of the European Union if granted admission. However, his
official stance over the EU is uncertain - he has never publicly voiced his support or opposition
to Turkey’s bid for the EU. However, his recent foreign policy agenda suggests that he is
increasingly interested in striking a closer relationship with other Middle Eastern countries such
as Saudi Arabia and Qatar as part of his Islamist plans for Turkey. This could potentially raise
some concerns about whether Erdogan is prepared to give up some of his influence as a player in
the Middle East to become one in Europe.
Concluding Remarks
Turkey’s accession to the European Union has long been an area of contention;
completing the accession procedure is seemingly becoming increasingly difficult for Turkey.
With some EU members strongly opposed to the inclusion of Turkey, Turkey’s bid for
membership is becoming bleaker by the day, especially as divisions within the Turkish Cabinet
emerge over whether or not the country should continue to pursue the membership. It is in the
hands of the Cabinet to resolve their differences over this issue, reach a coherent consensus and
not give existing EU members additional reasons to oppose Turkey’s accession to the EU.
30 JHUMUNC
i
"'Not State's Job to Raise People According to Religion'" TodaysZaman. Sundays Zaman, 12 Feb. 2012. Web. 12
Oct. 2014. <http://www.todayszaman.com/national_not-states-job-to-raise-people-according-toreligion_271162.html>.
ii
“Turkey” World Bank: data.worldbank.org/country/turkey
iii
"Erdoğan, EU Leaders Exchange Criticism over Taksim Protests."TodaysZaman. Sundays Zaman, 17 June 2013.
Web. 12 Oct. 2014. <http://www.todayszaman.com/_erdogan-eu-leaders-exchange-criticism-over-taksimprotests_318486.html>.
iv
"History." History. Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.avrupa.info.tr/eu-and-turkey/history.html>.
v
"History." History. Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.avrupa.info.tr/eu-and-turkey/history.html>.
vi
"Erdoğan, EU Leaders Exchange Criticism over Taksim Protests."TodaysZaman. Sundays Zaman, 17 June 2013.
Web. 12 Oct. 2014.
vii
Breland, Ali. "The Long Road to Turkey's EU Accession." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 13 Feb.
2014. Web. 19 Oct. 2014.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-breland/the-long-road-to-turkeys-_b_4774619.html>.
viii
Breland, Ali. "The Long Road to Turkey's EU Accession." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 13 Feb.
2014. Web. 19 Oct. 2014. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-breland/the-long-road-to-turkeys-_b_4774619.html>.
ix
Cowell, Alan. "Turkey Turns Its Back on the E.U." The New York Times. The New York Times, 03 Apr. 2014.
Web. 19 Oct. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/world/europe/turkey-turns-its-back-on-theeu.html?_r=1>.
x
"Arguments for and against Turkey's EU Membership - Debating Europe."Debating Europe. N.p., n.d. Web. 19
Oct. 2014. <http://www.debatingeurope.eu/focus/infobox-arguments-for-and-against-turkeys-eumembership/#.VEPbDovF_bh>.
xi
“Juncker and Schulz say 'no' to Turkey in last TV duel” <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections2014/juncker-and-schulz-say-no-turkey-last-tv-duel-302278>
xii
“Cyprus, Turkey Braced For New Fight Over Gas Reserves”
http://online.wsj.com/articles/cyprus-turkey-braced-for-new-row-over-gas-reserves-1412957632
xiii
“Athens calls Turkey to respect International Law in Cyprus, or risk its EU membership” http://famagustagazette.com/athens-calls-turkey-to-respect-international-law-in-cyprus-or-risk-its-eu-p25922-69.htm
xiv
“Revival of Turkey’s EU Talks Beneficial for Germany: EU Minister Volzan Bozkir”
http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/10/15/revival-of-turkeys-eu-talks-beneficial-for-germany-eu-ministervolkan-bozkir
xv
“France Willing to Open New Chapters in Turkey’s EU Bid”
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/112764/World/Region/France-willing-to-open-new-chapters-inTurkeys-EU-.aspx
31