Chabad of East Boca`s motion to dismiss Document

Transcription

Case 9:16-cv-80195-KAM Document 23 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/08/2016 Page 1 of 23
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 9:16-cv-80195-MARRA
GERALD GAGLIARDI and
KATHLEEN MacDOUGAL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF BOCA RATON,
Defendant,
and
CHABAD OF EAST BOCA, INC. and
TJCV LAND TRUST,
Intervenors.
/
INTERVENORS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND
SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Intervenors Chabad
of East Boca, Inc. (“Chabad”) and TJCV Land Trust (“Trust”) move to dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint and state as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this case, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of: (1) an ordinance of the City of
Boca Raton that permits “places of worship” to be constructed in zoning districts where other
“places of public assembly” are allowed; and (2) discretionary decisions of the City’s Planning
and Zoning Board and City Council: (a) to grant a technical deviation regarding a proposed
parking facility; and (b) to permit a building with a height of 40 feet 8 inches after concluding
that the plan met the applicable standards of the zoning ordinances. The City’s ordinance,
however, is clearly permissible. Indeed, it was legally required. The Eleventh Circuit has
invalidated a zoning ordinance that “permits private clubs and other secular assemblies” but
1
“excludes religious assemblies” because such “differential treatment” is unlawful. Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2004). By revising its zoning
code to eliminate unlawful discriminatory treatment of religious institutions, the City in this case
did not establish religion; it created neutrality toward religion.
Moreover, in granting the parking deviation and height permit, the City acted pursuant to
local ordinances that authorize property developers to request – and city agencies to grant – just
such allowances.
Plaintiffs allege no facts suggesting that the City has not applied those
ordinances impartially without regard to religion. Plaintiffs do not allege that they or anyone
else made similar requests that the City denied because they were not religious in nature.
Instead, Plaintiffs’ argument appears to be that religious developers should be denied allowances
that are legally available to all residents of the zoning district. Neither the U.S. nor the Florida
Constitution requires such discrimination. Plaintiffs have not alleged any conduct that would
violate the Establishment Clause or the No-Aid Provision of the Florida Constitution. In fact,
not only are such variances entirely permissible; they are precisely what is mandated under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq.
Plaintiffs also cannot establish a denial of equal protection or due process. Plaintiffs have
not suffered any discrimination on the basis of religion – the ordinance facially applies equally to
religious and secular uses – and Plaintiffs have not alleged that any group has requested similar
allowances and suffered disparate treatment. Instead, Plaintiffs object to allowances (a core part
of the zoning system) having been afforded to a group they wish to exclude from the
neighborhood. That does not amount to an equal-protection claim. Moreover, Plaintiffs have
not identified a protected liberty or property interest that they were denied, or shown that in
2
being so denied they failed to receive process which they were due. In truth, Plaintiffs are
attempting to re-litigate local zoning controversies. 1
Plaintiffs’ claims here not only fall on the merits – the claims fail as a preliminary matter
because Plaintiffs can identify no personal injury traceable to the City’s conduct and they
therefore lack standing to maintain these claims. Plaintiffs assert no more than a generalized
interest in constitutional governance, which is insufficient for constitutional standing. Taxpayer
standing is unavailable because the case involves no transfer or appropriation of public funds.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ challenge to the city ordinance – brought eight years after its enactment
– is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.
Religious Animus Prevents Chabad From Acquiring Property in the Golden
Triangle Neighborhood.
Chabad is a local affiliate of Chabad-Lubavitch, a nonprofit religious organization that
ministers to the needs of the Jewish community. See, Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5
F.3d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1993). According to the allegations of Plaintiffs’ complaint, in 2007,
Chabad sought to acquire property for the purpose of conducting religious worship and
education, and it explored such a property in the residential area of Boca Raton known as the
“Golden Triangle.” Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. At that time, the Golden Triangle was zoned for singlefamily residences and “the majority of places of worship” in the City were “located in singlefamily zoning districts.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 25. Religious animus, however, led some residents to form
groups aimed at excluding Chabad from the neighborhood. Id. ¶ 24.
1 But see, Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts do not sit as zoning boards
of review and should be most circumspect in determining that constitutional rights are violated in quarrels over
zoning decisions.”).
3
In late 2007, the City proposed Ordinance No. 5014 to the City Council. The ordinance
would have made “places of worship” a permitted use (rather than conditional use) in all singlefamily residential districts – and would have allowed Chabad to operate a religious facility in the
Golden Triangle as a matter of right. Id. ¶ 25. Opposition groups were “extremely contentious”
and sought to prohibit “any and all” religious activities by Chabad in the Golden Triangle. Id.
¶ 26. In January 2008, the City Council declined to proceed with Ordinance No. 5014. Id. ¶ 29.
On March 25, 2008, the City’s manager told the City Council that City staff were “working” on
the issue of places of worship and would recommend an alternative solution. Id.
That consideration led the City to propose a different ordinance, Ordinance No. 5040, on
May 28, 2008. Id. ¶ 33. Ordinance No. 5040 left “places of worship” a conditional use in singlefamily residential districts, but it also aimed to “establish a consistent treatment for places of
worship and places of public assembly” in zoning districts, such as “B-1” industrial districts that
already allowed “places of public assembly.” 2 It did so by amending the definition of “places of
public assembly” to include not only areas where people assemble for secular purposes but also
areas “where people assemble for religious purposes.” Exhibit 1, at 3. The changed definition
was well-supported – and almost certainly required – by applicable constitutional and statutory
law. Where a zoning ordinance permits “secular assemblies” it may not “exclude[] religious
assemblies” because such “differential treatment constitutes a violation of § (b)(1) of RLUIPA.”
Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1231. And the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from
allowing one type of activity – in this case “public assembly” – when it is done for some
purposes but barring it when done for religious purposes. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
2 The text of Ordinance No. 5040 is attached to this motion as “Exhibit 1.”
4
Following four public hearings, the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 5040 on
September 9, 2008. Compl. ¶ 34. The effect was to allow any religious entity – including
Chabad – to operate a place of religious assembly where other “places of public assembly” were
permitted – the zoning districts classified as “B-1.”
B.
Plaintiffs Seek to Prohibit Places of Jewish Assembly In Areas Where
Secular Assemblies Are Permitted.
Later, Chabad and the Trust filed applications to build a religious center at 770 Palmetto
Park Road, a property owned by the Trust and located in a B-1 zoning district. Id. ¶ 28. The
application described a two-story building that would include a meeting area, religious display
area, parking structure, social hall, children’s playroom, kitchen, and bookstore. Id. ¶ 38. As part
of the application, Chabad and the Trust sought permission pursuant to Section 28-780 of the
City’s Code of Ordinances to construct a building with a height of 40 feet 8 inches. Id. ¶ 39.
That provision provides:
No building, structure, or part thereof, shall be erected, or altered in a B-1 district
to a height exceeding 30 feet; provided, that permitted buildings may be erected
or altered to a height not exceeding 50 feet upon consideration of the planning
and zoning board and recommendation to the city council. The city council shall
approve such construction as being not injurious to surrounding property and in
accord with the spirit and purpose of this chapter.
Boca Raton, Florida, Code of Ordinances § 28-780 (emphasis added). The application also
requested a technical deviation for the religious center’s proposed parking facilities. 3 Following
recommendations by City staff, the City’s Planning and Zoning Board conducted a final hearing
and approved the application and technical deviation on May 7, 2015. Compl. ¶ 42. The City
3 Plaintiffs’ complaint does not specify the nature of the parking issue, simply asserting that the City eventually
granted a “variance for parking and access.” Compl. ¶ 40. In fact, Intervenors requested a “technical deviation”
because the site plan for the religious center did not provide for “full internal vehicular circulation” as required by
Code of Ordinances § 23-190(h). Instead, the plan included two separate entrances to the parking structures. The
City’s Code of Ordinances allows an applicant to request a technical deviation from such parking requirements and
specifies standards that must be met before the “planning and zoning board, the city council, or the community
redevelopment agency, as appropriate,” approves the technical deviation. Boca Raton, Florida, Code of Ordinances
§ 23-190(k). This motion does not turn on the details of the particular deviation the City granted here.
5
Council granted the request for a height permit on May 27, 2015. Id. ¶ 43. Some residents,
including Plaintiffs, appealed the decision of the Planning and Zoning Board to the City Council
– which, after considering the appeal on July 28, 2015, voted unanimously to affirm the Board
and to approve the site plan and technical deviation. 4
Plaintiffs do not allege that they sought relief for the City’s approvals in state court.
Instead, Plaintiffs filed this suit challenging on constitutional grounds: (1) the adoption of
Ordinance No. 5040 by the City Council; (2) the approval of the parking deviation by the
Planning and Zoning Board and the City Council; and (3) the grant of the height permit by the
City Council. In Counts I and IV of their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the City violated the
Establishment Clause of U.S. Constitution and the No-Aid Provision of the Florida Constitution
by adopting Ordinance No. 5040 and approving the site plan for the religious center. Compl.
¶ 34. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege the City violated “Plaintiffs’ rights to equal treatment and
neutrality by the Government on religion and community citizenship.” Id. ¶ 78. In Count III,
Plaintiffs allege the City violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights because it “did not comply with
its own rules and law.” Id. ¶ 112. Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue an order declaring that the City
violated the U.S. and Florida Constitutions and enjoining Intervenors from developing the
property at 770 Palmetto Park Road.
ARGUMENT
Dismissal is required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) where the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claim. Stalley
ex rel. United States v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008);
Ductan v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., No. 15-22929, 2015 WL 6599755, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 30,
4 The City Council’s decision was formally rendered by Resolution 79-2015, attached as “Exhibit 2.”
6
2015) (“Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question.”). If jurisdiction exists, Rule 12(b)(6)
requires dismissal where the plaintiffs fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “In determining whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court
primarily considers the allegations in the complaint, although matters of public record … also
may be taken into account.” Response Oncology, Inc. v. MetraHealth Ins. Co., 978 F. Supp.
1052, 1058 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Courts “must liberally construe and accept as true allegations of
fact in the complaint … but need not accept factual claims that are internally inconsistent; facts
which run counter to facts of which the court can take judicial notice; conclusory allegations;
unwarranted deductions; or mere legal conclusions asserted by a party.” Id.
I.
THE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK
STANDING.
A.
Plaintiffs Have Not Sufficiently Alleged They Suffered a Personal Injury.
To survive dismissal for lack of standing, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). That “injury must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way” that is different from any injury suffered by the
community at large. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 134 (2011)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)). A plaintiff must allege
more than “the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.” Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm., 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974). Moreover, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing
for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Davis v. FEC, 554
U.S. 724, 734 (2008). Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate standing for any of their claims here.
“Traditionally,” for “Establishment Clause claims based on non-economic harms,” an
“actual injury occurs if the plaintiff is subjected to unwelcome religious statements and is
7
directly affected by the laws and practices against which his or her complaints are directed.”
Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Plaintiffs have not alleged such an injury. The complaint alleges that
Plaintiffs are Christian taxpayers in Boca Raton, Compl. ¶¶ 10-11, and includes the conclusory
statement that the planned religious center is somehow “injurious to residents in the area,” Id.
¶ 44, but nowhere do Plaintiffs allege any cognizable harm that the City’s actions have caused
them. By allowing a third party to develop its own property for its own purposes, the City has
made no “religious statements” endorsing any religious practice and has taken no action that
directly affects Plaintiffs. See, generally, American Humanist Ass’n v. City of Ocala, No. 5:14CV-651, 2015 WL 5123274, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2015) (finding standing only where the
plaintiffs “came into direct contact” with city-sponsored religious activities that “had the effect
of endorsing Christianity”). Plaintiffs have not alleged that they have “altered their behavior as a
result” of the City’s approvals or that, for example, they can no longer reside or own property in
Boca Raton. ACLU of Fla. v. Dixie Cnty., 690 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (denying
standing because the plaintiff had not shown that a religious monument “deterred him from
purchasing land in the County”).
The complaint also does not allege a personal injury with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, nor the nondiscrimination component of
the Establishment Clause. To maintain an equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs must have suffered a
“denial of equal treatment.” Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262 (2003); Midrash Sephardi,
366 F.3d at 1239 (recognizing that “the Establishment Clause ... and the Equal Protection Clause
... speak with one voice” in prohibiting “unequal treatment” of religious organizations). But
Plaintiffs do not allege that they ever requested – and were denied – approval of a similar site
8
plan, technical deviation, or height permit. “Without a request, there can be no denial. And
absent any personal denial of a benefit, the plaintiffs’ claim amounts to nothing more than a
generalized grievance about [the City’s actions’] unconstitutionality, which does not support
standing.” Freedom from Religion Found. v. Lew, 773 F.3d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 2014). In Lew, the
court held that a secular plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a tax exemption for religious
groups on equal-protection grounds because he failed to allege he personally claimed and was
denied the exemption. The same result obtains here: because Plaintiffs do not allege that they
were denied the same benefits allegedly extended to Chabad, they have suffered no denial of
equal treatment and lack standing for a claim sounding in principles of equal protection.
Similarly, Plaintiffs lack standing to bring a procedural due-process claim in connection
with decisions made by the City because they have not alleged that they were denied a property
or liberty interest to which they were entitled. See, Buena Vista E. Historic Neighborhood Ass’n
v. City of Miami, No. 07-20192, 2008 WL 1848389, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2008) (rejecting
“Plaintiffs’ arguments that they have a legally protected property interest in the preservation of
the character of their property interests, and therefore standing,” to challenge city’s issuance of
special permits for third parties’ construction projects).
Plaintiffs do not allege that their
property was re-zoned “without proper notice of a public hearing, in violation of Florida statute.”
Id. at *3. In fact, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the City Council held a series of public hearings on
Ordinance No. 5040 from July to September 2008. Compl. ¶ 97. Plaintiffs also do not allege that
the City’s actions “deprive them of the beneficial use of their respective properties by precluding
all uses or the only use, to which they are adapted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not have standing
based on preservation of the character of their respective properties or the neighborhood” and
cannot maintain a due-process claim. Buena Vista, 2008 WL 1848389, at *4.
9
Even with all inferences drawn in their favor, Plaintiffs allege only that the City
purportedly failed to abide by provisions of the federal and state constitutions when it acted on
the building application of a third party. Yet “an asserted right to have the Government act in
accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”
Allen, 468 U.S. at 754. Here, Plaintiffs “fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as
a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury
sufficient to confer standing under Art. III, even though the disagreement is phrased in
constitutional terms.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).
B.
Plaintiffs Lack Taxpayer Standing.
Having failed to identify a personal injury sufficient to confer standing, Plaintiffs might
invoke their taxpayer status and attempt to rely on the “narrow exception to the general rule
against taxpayer standing” established by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Winn, 563 U.S. at
130. That exception can apply only to claims under the Establishment Clause. See, Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007) (“We have declined to lower the
taxpayer standing bar in suits alleging violations of any constitutional provision apart from the
Establishment Clause.”). But it does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Flast stands for
the proposition that “individuals suffer a particular injury for standing purposes when, in
violation of the Establishment Clause and by means of ‘the taxing and spending power,’ their
property is transferred through the Government’s Treasury to a sectarian entity.” Winn, 563 U.S.
at 139-40. Accordingly, Flast allows standing only for the plaintiff “whose tax dollars are
‘extracted and spent’” and who therefore “knows that he has in some small measure been made
to contribute to an establishment in violation of conscience.” Id. at 142 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S.
10
at 106). If there is no transfer of tax dollars for sectarian purposes, taxpayer standing is
unavailable – even if the Government is allegedly subsidizing religion in other ways. Id. at 146
(“The fact that respondents are state taxpayers does not give them standing to challenge the
subsidies that § 43-1089 allegedly provides to religious [student tuition organizations].”).
In this case, Plaintiffs cannot allege that their tax dollars have been transferred to a
sectarian entity because the City’s building approvals did not entail the transfer of public funds
to Chabad. Taxpayer standing is therefore unavailable. 5
Plaintiffs allege that the City expended “staff labor and tax revenues” in going about the
evaluation and eventual approval of the site plan. None of those dollars were transferred to
Chabad, however. Nor were any tax dollars appropriated specifically to finance the City’s
activities in approving Intervenor’s application such that those activities added to the City’s costs
beyond normal operating expenditures. Even for municipal taxpayers, who might have a more
direct interest in the expenditure of municipal as opposed to federal tax dollars, such allegations
would be necessary to establish standing. See, Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Borough of
Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952) (denying standing because “[t]here is no allegation that
this activity [of religious instruction] is supported by any separate tax or paid for from any
particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the school”);
Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]hat was required for the
establishment of taxpayer standing … was a showing of a measurable appropriation or loss of
5 Florida has adopted the same limitation on taxpayer standing for challenges under the No-Aid Provision of the
Florida Constitution. See, Department of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659, 663 (Fla. 1972) (“We choose to follow
the United States Supreme Court (Flast).”); see also, Council for Secular Humanism v. McNeil, 44 So. 3d 112, 121
(Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“To withstand dismissal on standing grounds … the challenge must be to legislative
appropriations. … [A] plaintiff does not have standing to challenge other actions of the government simply by
establishing his or her status as a taxpayer.”); McCall v. Scott, No. 2014-CA-2282, 2015 WL 3945409 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
May 18, 2015) (“[A] complaint must be dismissed for lack of taxpayer standing where Plaintiffs do not challenge
appropriations.”).
11
revenue attributable to the challenged activities …. Nearly all governmental activities are
conducted or overseen by employees whose salaries are funded by tax dollars. To confer
taxpayer standing on such a basis would allow any municipal taxpayer to challenge virtually any
governmental action at any time.”); ACLU-NJ v. Township of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 262-64 (3d
Cir. 2001) (reviewing cases in which municipal taxpayer standing has been held to require
specific appropriations for the challenged practice). 6
“Municipal taxpayer status does not confer standing absent some allegation by the
plaintiffs of an illegal use of tax revenues.” Clay v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 76 F.3d 873, 879
(7th Cir. 1996). Simply paying the salaries of City staff members and council members to
perform the required functions of evaluating zoning proposals and holding hearings on
permitting applications is not illegal and does not confer taxpayer standing. See, Compl. ¶ 143.
“Because plaintiff has failed to show evidence of the misuse of municipal monies or property, he
has failed to demonstrate taxpayer standing.” Allen v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 719
F. Supp. 1532, 1536 (M.D. Fla.), aff’d, 880 F.2d 420 (11th Cir. 1989).
II.
CLAIMS ARISING FROM ORDINANCE NO. 5040 ARE TIME BARRED.
The limitations period in Florida for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is four
years. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs filed their complaint
more than four years after Ordinance No. 5040 was adopted in September 2008. Any challenge
to Ordinance No. 5040 must therefore be dismissed.
6 Similarly, in Pelphrey, the Eleventh Circuit found taxpayer standing to challenge county-sponsored invocations by
local clergy because the county expended public funds specifically “to select, invite, and thank invocational
speakers,” and therefore taxpayer dollars were spent implementing the constitutionally challenged program itself.
Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1281. That is a far cry from the unprecedented proposition that any municipal resident always
has taxpayer standing on the ground that the deliberative legislative process itself that led to the challenged
enactment or action necessarily entailed the use of governmental funds.
12
The complaint suggests that the limitations period should be tolled because the approvals
nearly seven years later by the Planning and Zoning Board and by the City Council of
Intervenors’ requests for a technical deviation and height permit somehow amount to a
“continuation” of the City Council’s adoption of Ordinance No. 5040. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36. That
suggestion contravenes common sense and controlling law. “The continuing violation doctrine
is premised on the equitable notion that the statute of limitations ought not to begin to run until
facts supportive of the cause of action are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person
similarly situated.” Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001).
Once such facts become apparent, the statute of limitations begins to run even if there are
ongoing consequences from the violation. Brown v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d
1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that equitable tolling is
warranted. Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006).
In this case, Plaintiffs should have been (and were) aware of the relevant facts in
September 2008. They knew of Chabad’s attempt to establish a religious center in the Golden
Triangle area, the City’s consideration and postponement of Ordinance No. 5014, and the content
of Ordinance No. 5040. 7 The limitations period therefore began to run in September 2008 and
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the ordinance is now time barred. Where, as here, Plaintiffs merely
“complain[] of the present consequence” of the alleged constitutional violation, tolling is not
appropriate. Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003); see also, Foley v. Orange
7 Plaintiffs assert that there were unspecified “secret meetings and back room agreements” between the City and
Chabad. Compl. ¶ 65. Plaintiffs do not say that such meetings only recently came to light. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege
no facts substantiating the bare assertion that such meetings ever took place, so there is no reason even to credit the
conclusory statement. Nevertheless, if the City Council’s adoption of Ordinance No. 5040 was otherwise lawful, the
existence of some prior understanding or agreement that motivated the Council would not render it unlawful. Courts
generally “will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.” Zibtluda, LLC v. Gwinnett Cnty., 411 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005). So, even if facts suggesting secret
meetings existed, those facts would not be “supportive of the cause of action” challenging the city ordinance.
13
Cnty., No. 6:12-CV-269, 2012 WL 6021459, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2012) (holding the
plaintiff’s claims accrued once he received administrative decision from the zoning board).
III.
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM ON THE MERITS.
A.
Plaintiffs Fail to State a First Amendment Claim (Counts I and IV).
In Counts I and IV, Plaintiffs claim the City violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and the No-Aid Provision of the Florida Constitution by adopting Ordinance No.
5040 and approving the site plan. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 36, 46, 132. Government action is consistent
with the Establishment Clause if it: (1) has a valid secular purpose; (2) has a primary effect of
neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and (3) does not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 8 Challenges
under the Florida Constitution are governed by Lemon test plus “a fourth consideration,” namely
that “[t]he statute must not authorize the use of public moneys, directly or indirectly, in aid of
any sectarian institution.” Rice v. State, 754 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
Ordinance No. 5040 satisfies these criteria. The purpose of the ordinance is “to establish
a consistent treatment for places of worship and places of public assembly.” Exhibit 1, at 1. This
is so clearly a legally permissible purpose that it is actually required. In Midrash Sephardi, Inc.
v. Town of Surfside, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a zoning ordinance that “permit[ted] private
clubs and other secular assemblies” but “exclude[d] religious assemblies” from a town’s business
district. 366 F.3d at 1231. Such “differential treatment,” the Eleventh Circuit said, “constitutes a
8 The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the Lemon test, though often criticized, remains governing law. See, Glassroth
v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has also made clear that “the Establishment
Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings,’” and “it is not necessary to
define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted.”
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014). Here, there is no question that governmental neutrality
toward houses of worship is an essential feature of the Establishment Clause; it is the clause’s “clearest command.”
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). “From the beginning, this nation’s conception of religious liberty
included, at a minimum, the equal treatment of all religious faiths.” Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d
1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2008).
14
violation of § (b)(1) of RLUIPA.” Id. That provision provides that “[n]o government shall
impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or
institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(b)(1).
Prior to Ordinance No. 5040, the City of Boca Raton imposed that
impermissible differential treatment in B-1 zoning districts by allowing “places of public
assembly” but prohibiting “places of worship.” When it revised the zoning code to adopt equal
treatment of secular and religious assemblies and institutions – and thereby to conform to the
requirements of federal law – the City Council certainly acted with a valid secular purpose. 9 See
also, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 532 (explaining that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits excluding religious practitioners from rights enjoyed by others).
The primary effect of Ordinance No. 5040 was neither to inhibit nor to advance religion.
The Supreme Court has been clear that “the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended,
when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to
recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.”
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995). Providing for
equal treatment of secular and religious assemblies does that. A law is neutral toward religion
where it confers benefits “upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious
organizations,” Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989). Ordinance No. 5040 – by
providing a uniform definition of “places of public assembly” without a special carve-out for
religious assemblies – defines a broad class that evenhandedly benefits secular and religious
9 Even apart from the legal mandate of RLUIPA, courts have recognized that fostering orderly development by
determining where places of worship ought to be permitted uses is a valid secular purpose. See, e.g., Concerned
Citizens of Carderock v. Hubbard, 84 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673 (D. Md. 2000).
15
alike. 10 In Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld tax exemptions
for religious institutions because the state “granted exemption to all houses of religious worship
within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include …
professional, historical, and patriotic groups.” Id. at 673. There is no principled distinction
between the statute upheld in that case and the ordinance here which permits places of worship
within a broad class of places of public assembly that includes secular uses as well. 11
Finally, Count IV should be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not allege that Ordinance
No. 5040 authorizes the use of tax revenues in aid of Chabad. “[T]he no-aid provision [of the
Florida Constitution] focuses on the use of state funds to aid sectarian institutions, not on other
types of support.” Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), aff’d in part, 919
So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006). The Florida Supreme Court has upheld grants to religious institutions of
the use of public buildings, see, Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trustees, Sch. Tax
Dist. No. 1, 115 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1959) (“[W]e find nothing in this record to support a
conclusion that any public funds have been contributed.”), and it has upheld a law authorizing
counties to assist educational institutions, including religious institutions, through the issuance of
revenue bonds, Nohrr v. Brevard Cnty. Educ. Facilities Auth., 247 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1971). These
forms of aid were permissible because “no disbursement was made from the public treasury.”
Holmes, 886 So. 2d at 356. Similarly, here, no disbursement has been made from the public
treasury and, therefore, the No-Aid Provision is not implicated. Instead, this case reflects the
10 In fact, the previously-existing carve out was inconsistent with government neutrality. See, Hubbard, 84
F. Supp. 2d at 674 (“[I]t is unconstitutional for government entities to exclude religious entities from public benefits
because of their religious nature.”). That Chabad benefitted from the City Council’s decision to end that exclusion
does not render the ordinance non-neutral. See, Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14-15 (“[T]he fact that religious groups
benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the
Establishment Clause.”).
11 There is also no allegation that Ordinance No. 5040 somehow fosters an excessive entanglement between
government and religion. The ordinance actually avoids entanglement that could arise in the conditional use
permitting process by making places of worship a permitted use.
16
evenhanded approach upheld in Nohrr: “[S]tate action to promote the general welfare of society,
apart from any religious considerations, is valid, even though religious interests may be
indirectly benefited.” Nohrr, 247 So. 2d at 307.
For similar reasons, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim that the City violated the Establishment
Clause or the No-Aid Provision when it approved the technical deviation for parking pursuant to
Code of Ordinances § 23-190(k) and the height permit pursuant to Code of Ordinances § 28-780.
These provisions authorize the City to grant technical deviations and height permits. Neither the
U.S. Constitution nor the Florida Constitution requires the City to exclude Chabad from invoking
zoning procedures available to all property developers in a B-1 zoning district. The City applied
these provisions to Chabad on equal terms – as it was required to do.
Plaintiffs assert that the City somehow violated the City Code when it granted the
technical deviation and height permit. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 140. This is precisely the sort of
conclusory statement, without supporting factual allegations showing how the Code was
violated, that is not entitled to any credence. Response Oncology, 978 F. Supp. at 1058. And
even if Plaintiffs could establish that the City somehow violated the Code, they would still need
to explain how these alleged violations of local zoning ordinances amounted to constitutional
violations. Neither the Establishment Clause nor the No-Aid Provision is violated when a
municipal government simply allows a private developer to build on private property – whether
the developer is secular or religious. The notion that permitting Chabad to utilize parking
structures without “full internal vehicular circulation” effectively made Judaism the established
religion of Boca Raton is laughably frivolous.
Plaintiffs have not provided any factual
allegations – apart from mere conclusory statements – that the City acted with any purpose other
than the neutral application of its zoning ordinances.
17
B.
Plaintiffs Fail to State an Equal Protection Claim (Count II).
In Count II, Plaintiffs assert that the City’s actions created “a special privilege for the
religion of Chabad” in violation of Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection. Compl. ¶ 62.
To state an equal-protection claim, plaintiffs may challenge “governmental classifications
that ‘affect some groups of citizens differently than others,’” in which case the plaintiffs
“generally allege that they have been arbitrarily classified as members of an ‘identifiable
group.’” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). In some circumstances, an
equal-protection claim can also “be sustained even if the plaintiff has not alleged class-based
discrimination, but instead claims that she has been irrationally singled out.” Id..
Plaintiffs here do not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs do not
allege that they are part of an identifiable group that has been subjected to discriminatory
treatment on the basis of religion.
While Plaintiffs conclusorily assert that “[a]ny secular
proposal of similar size would not have received similar treatment accorded the Chabad Project
by the City,” Compl. ¶ 72, they offer no factual allegations that anyone – let alone Plaintiffs
themselves – actually made a similar proposal and were subjected to discriminatory treatment.
Yet “[i]n order to establish a violation of equal protection based on selective enforcement, the
plaintiff must ordinarily show: (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was
selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible
considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional
rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.” Lisa’s Party City, Inc. v. Town of
Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs allege that the City granted a benefit to Chabad by approving its application. In
the absence of allegations that the City also denied a benefit to similarly situated plaintiffs,
Plaintiffs have not made out an equal-protection claim. See, Hi Pockets, Inc. v. Music
18
Conservatory of Westchester, 192 F. Supp. 2d 143, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[The plaintiff] was
not the party applying for the permit. [The plaintiff] was a third party who opposed someone
else’s … application. It was denied nothing. Therefore, [the plaintiff] was not ‘treated’ at all,
selectively or otherwise. … Failing to persuade authorities that someone else should be denied
a permit does not give rise to an equal protection violation.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs fail
to allege that they are similarly situated to Intervenors and suffered discriminatory treatment,
either as members of an identifiable group or as individuals. Without such allegations, Plaintiffs
fail to state an equal-protection claim.
C.
Plaintiffs Fail to State a Procedural Due Process Claim (Count III).
In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that the City violated their right to procedural due process
by approving Intervenors’ application even though it allegedly did not meet legal criteria under
the City Code. Compl. ¶¶ 108-12. To state a procedural due-process claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege: (1) the deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest; (2) state action; and (3) “constitutionally inadequate process.” Foxy Lady, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 347 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs’ procedural due-process claim fails for at least two reasons. First, Plaintiffs
have not alleged facts showing that they were deprived of an interest protected by the federal
constitution. The complaint asserts that Plaintiffs were deprived of a liberty interest but fails to
describe with any specificity the nature of that liberty interest. Compl. ¶ 114 (“As a direct and
proximate result of the City’s actions, the Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
and protected liberty interests were violated.”). That is the sort of “threadbare recital[] of a cause
of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements” that is not entitled to the
presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The failure to identify a
liberty or property interest with which the state has interfered is fatal to Plaintiffs’ due-process
19
claim. See, e.g., Royster v. Escambia Ctny. Nursing Home, No. 3:06-CV-52, 2006 WL 5882171,
at *3 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006) (“A procedural due process claim has not been alleged …
because, again, plaintiff fails to identify a liberty or property interest with which the state has
interfered.”).
Second, to the extent Plaintiffs complain that the City Council failed to follow the
mandates in the City Code of Ordinances, they fail to allege that they were denied sufficient
process. In addition to the numerous public hearings relating to Ordinance No. 5040 and the
Chabad application, see, Compl. ¶¶ 96-97, 105-07, Florida law affords Plaintiffs the opportunity
to remedy any violation of their right to procedural due process by challenging the City
Council’s decision in the Florida state courts. Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc.,
863 So. 2d 195, 198-99 (Fla. 2003) (noting that “[a]fter a zoning board rules on an application
for a special zoning exception, the parties may twice seek review in the court system,” including
review as a matter of right as to “whether procedural due process is accorded”). As the Eleventh
Circuit has said, “the process a state provides is not only that employed by the board, agency, or
other governmental entity whose action is in question, but also includes the remedial process
state courts would provide if asked.” Horton v. Board of Cty. Comm’rs of Flagler Cnty., 202
F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000); see, also, McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1563 (11th Cir.
1994) (holding that unless a plaintiff can show that the post-deprivation state-court remedies are
somehow inadequate, there is no procedural due-process violation).
Accordingly, in order to state a claim that their procedural due-process rights were
violated, Plaintiffs must plead that they attempted to obtain relief from the Florida courts but
were denied relief or that the state-court remedies are somehow inadequate. Id. at 1330; Lacy v.
City of St. Petersburg, No. 8:14-CV-252, 2014 WL 4376201, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2014);
20
Hudson v. City of Riviera Beach, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“[The plaintiff’s]
failure to plead that he attempted to obtain relief from Florida courts … dooms [his] proceduraldue-process claim.”). Plaintiffs have alleged neither that they attempted to obtain state-court
relief nor that the state-court procedures are inadequate. Plaintiffs therefore fail to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Dated: March 8, 2016
WEISS, HANDLER & CORNWELL, P.A.
One Boca Place, Suite 218-A
2255 Glades Road
Boca Raton, FL 33431
Telephone: (561) 997-9995
Facsimile: (561) 997-5280
By:
s/ Henry B. Handler
HENRY HANDLER
Florida Bar No. 259284
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
_
Jay P. Lekfowitz, P.C.
Steven J. Menashi
Elliot C. Harvey Schatmeier
Kirkland & Ellis LLP
601 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022
212-446-4800
Lawrence C. Marshall
300 North LaSalle
Chicago, IL 60654
312-862-2000
Attorneys for Chabad of East Boca, Inc. and TJCV
Land Trust
Lori H. Windham*
Daniel H. Blomberg*
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
1200 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036
202-955-0095
21
Attorneys for Chabad of East Boca, Inc.
*pro hac vice admission pending
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Appear Pro
Hac Vice, Consent to Designation, and Request to Electronically Receive Notices of Electronic
Filings was served by electronic filing on March 8, 2016, on all counsel or parties of record on
the service list that follows.
WEISS, HANDLER & CORNWELL, P.A.
One Boca Place, Suite 218-A
2255 Glades Road
Telephone: (561) 997-9995
Facsimile: (561) 997-5280
By:
s/ Henry B. Handler
HENRY HANDLER
Florida Bar No. 259284
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
_
Jay P. Lekfowitz, P.C.
Steven J. Menashi
Elliot C. Harvey Schatmeier
601 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022
212-446-4800
Lawrence C. Marshall
300 North LaSalle
Chicago, IL 60654
312-862-2000
and TJCV Land Trust
- and -
22
Lori H. Windham*
Daniel H. Blomberg*
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
1200 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036
202-955-0095
*pro hac vice admission pending
SERVICE LIST
Marci A. Hamilton
36 Timber Knoll Drive
Washington Crossing, PA 18977
[email protected]
- and Arthur C. Koski
Law Offices of Arthur C. Koski
101 North Federal Highway, Suite 602
[email protected]
Diana Grub Frieser
Office of the City Attorney
City of Boca Raton
201 West Palmetto Park Road
[email protected]
Attorney for Defendant
City of Boca Raton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
23
Case 9:16-cv-80195-KAM Document 23-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/08/2016 Page 1 of 24
FINAL 9/ 9/ 2008
Incorpo~; ted 1925
d'
11II __".,,_ "
~
ORDINANCE
5040
1
ORDINANCE
OF
THE
CITY
28,
CODE
BOCA
OF
RATON
2
AN
3
AMENDING
4
PROVIDING A DEFINITION FOR " PLACES OF WORSHIP"
5
AND " PLACES ' OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLY"; AMENDING THE
6
LIST OF PERMITTED AND CONDITIONAL USES IN MOST
7
ZONING
8
TREATMENT FOR PLACES OF WORSHIP AND PLACES
9
OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLY;
10
CHAPTER
DISTRICTS
CHURCH"
AND "
A
ESTABLISH
TO
ORDINANCES,
OF
CONSISTENT
REPLACING REFERENCES TO
WORSHIP
OF
PLACES
GOD";
OF
11
PROVIDING FOR PLACES OF WORSHIP AS A PERMITTED
12
USE
13
DELETING
14
LODGES, FRATERNITIES AND SIMILAR PRIVATE USES"
15
AND
16
IN
THE
R- 3- A
THE
INCLUDING
R- 3- C
AND
DEFINITION
ZONING
OF "
PRIVATE
CATEGORY,
SAID
DISTRICTS;
AS
CLUBS,
WELL
AS
THEATERS AND AUDITORIUM", IN THE DEFINITION OF
OF
PUBLIC
17
PLACES
18
PARKING
19
ASSEMBLY AND
ASSEMBLY;
REQUIREMENTS
DELETING
FOR
MODIFYING
PLACES
PARKING
OF
THE
PUBLIC
REQUIREMENTS
1
EXHIBIT 1
1
FOR
2
DELETING THE CATEGORY OF " INSTITUTIONS OF AN
3
EDUCATIONAL,
4
CHARACTER";
5
COMMUNITY SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS" FROM THE PUD
6
COMMERCIAL
7
RELATED USES FROM THE M- 3 DISTRICT AND THE L1RP
8
COMMERCIAL NODE; DELETING " MOVIE THEATERS" IN
9
THE L1RP DISTRICT; DELETING " DRIVE- IN THEATERS" IN
USES
INCLUDED
WITHIN
PHILANTHROPIC
DELETING "
NODE
SAID
RELIGIOUS
OR
PRIVATE
AND "
CATEGORY;
PRIVATE
AND
CLUBS
CLUBS"
AND
DISTRICT; AND MAKING SUCH AMENDMENTS
10
THE M- 1
11
AND REVISIONS, AS APPROPRIATE, TO ESTABLISH A
12
CONSISTENT
13
ASSEMBLY AND PLACES OF WORSHIP; PROVIDING FOR
14
SEVERABILITY; PROVIDING FOR REPEALER; PROVIDING
15
FOR CODIFICATION; PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE
TREATMENT
FOR
PLACES
OF
PUBLIC
AM- 07 -05)
16 (
17
WHEREAS, the City Council desires to amend various sections of Chapter 28, Code
18
19
of Ordinances, to
20
worship;
now
provide for consistent
treatment of
places of public assembly and places of
therefore
21
22
THE CITY OF BOCA RATON HEREBY ORDAINS:
23
24
2
Section 1.
1
2"
Section 28- 2, Code of Ordinances, is amended
Places of public assembly" shall
buildinq
follows:
structure where people
or
3
assemble
4
purposes. whether owned and/ or maintained
5
but is not limited to, public assembly buildinqs such
6
and fraternallodqes, assembly halls, exhibition halls, convention centers, and places of worship,
7
or
8
persons.
other
for
mean any area,
as
areas,
buildinqs
such
purpose.
or
social.
as
structures that
Places of worship" shall
9"
10
common
a
by
cultural. recreational
for- profit
a
as
or
not- for- profit entity. and includes.
auditoriums, theaters, halls, private clubs
used for reliqious purposes
are
mean any area,
buildinq
or
or
assembly by
structure where people assemble
for reliqious purposes.
Private clubs,
11 "
o'Nned or
lodges, fraternities
12
facilities
13
recreational purpose, but not
14
on as 3
operated by
business, and shall
a
and similar
corporation,
primarily
spocifically
for
private
association
profit
or
or
to render
a
Sec. 28- 340. Conditional
uses.
17
Conditional
may be
18
the
19
II:
owner
20 (
of the
subject property for
1)
Churches and
2)
Child
a
buildings
or
social, educational
or
mean
customarily
carried
exclude bottle clubs.
16
approval
shall
service that is
Section 2. Section 28- 340, Code of Ordinances, is
use
uses"
persons for
15
21
and/ or reliqious
the
hereby
amended
as
follows:
requested in single family residential districts by
following
uses
in accordance with Division 4 of Article
lorship of God and ~ 50cial service
places of '."
and places
activities.,.
of worship.
22 (
care,
adult
care
and
specialized
care
centers, and social service activities,
23
24
anyone of which may only be allowed as an accessory use to approved institutional
subject to provisions of section 28- 1416 et seq. Any child care, adult care and specialized
25
centers and social service activities
26
structure
27 (
28
29 (
30
31
32
existing
as
of
July
26, 1988, and
conforming
as
to
uses
care
use or
of that date may continue as a legal use under the requirements then in effect.
3) Public and nonprofit museums, libraries, social centers, parks, open space and
recreational areas including bodies of water and cemeteries.
4) Public, private and parochial schools having an established curriculum, including
as
kindergarten, elementary, middle and high schools, colleges and universities. All activities and
facilities normally considered accessory thereto shall be included hereunder, such as
dormitories, lunchrooms, bookstores, gymnasiums, playgrounds and athletic fields which are
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
owned and
operated by the main facility and used in connection therewith and which are located
on the same plot or on a plot which is confined therewith under a unity of title declaration.
5) Helistops, as defined, regulated and controlled by section 28- 1451 et seq.
6) Signs, as defined, regulated and controlled by chapter 24.
7) Detached buildings to provide living accommodations for servants or for
noncommercial guests in R- E- 2 and R- E- 1 zoning districts. Such building must be located on
the same plot as the main singlefamily residence of the employer of the servants or host of the
guests. The minimum living area of any such building or detached structure shall be 500 square
feet or more, and shall be limited to the use of accommodation of not more than 1 singlefamily
unit or equivalent at any 1 time.
8) Any nonresidential building or structure having a height in excess of 25 feet.
9) Antennas, towers, masts or satellite dishes which do not comply with the
provisions of section 28- 1300( 1).
10) Docks located on a vacant plot ( hereinafter " dock plot") which was platted in such
a manner as to be unsuitable for single-family development provided the following conditions
are
met:
18
11) Features, listed in the definition of
19
20
Code
of Ordinances)
21
nonresidential
22
regulations)
but
height
purposes of exempting
and structures ( authorized
for
buildings
only to the
extent the
height of the
of
building
in
feature
the
or
and structure ( section 28- 2,
height calculation, of
singlefamily residential district
from
same
the
structure exceeds 50 feet.
23
24
25
26
In the R- 2 district, the
27
places of worship of God and ~ 50cial service
28
Section 4. Section
29
Sec. 28- 417. Permitted
30
In R- 3 districts,
no
uses
uses
shall be
as
follows:
permitted:
churches and
and places of worship.
activities.,.
Code of Ordinances, is
hereby
amended
as
follows:
uses.
building
used, in whole
amended
permitted.
following conditional
28-417,
hereby
in
or
structure,
or
part thereof, shall be erected, altered
part for other than 1
of the
or
following specified
31
used,
32
uses:
33
permitted in R- 1 and R- 2 districts. Single- family dwellings shall conform to
requirements. Duplex dwellings shall conform to section 28- 386 et seq. requirements.
b) Multiple dwellings and uses accessory to multiple dwellings, including laundry
machines and vending machines fully enclosed within the main building; garages; recreational
facilities including cabana units, sauna units, recreation buildings, swimming pools, tennis
courts, golf courses, putting greens and shuffleboard courts, providing they are for the sole use
of the occupants and their guests; and private docks and mooring facilities shall not project
more than 5 feet into any waterway nor extend nearer than 25 feet to any other residentially
zoned property, except upon the approval of the city council in acting upon the
recommendations in regard thereto, made by the planning and zoning board in response to an
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
or
premises
a)
or
Uses
R- 1- B
4
or more
1
2
3
4
5
6
7(
8
9(
10
application for
modification of such
provision which is accompanied by the written permission
adjoining property. On waterways under the jurisdiction of the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, to the extent that the city lacks authority to regulate
same, the permissible projection of such structure into the waterway shall be determined by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers. None of the above accessory uses shall be operated
for the patronage of the general public.
c)
Churches and .Ef)ublic, private and parochial nursery kindergarten, elementary
and high schools.
d) Orphanages and child care, and adult care centers subject to provisions of
of the
owner
a
of record of such
section 28- 1416 et seq.
11 (
residential homes
subject
to the
provisions of section 28- 1304.
e)
Community
12 (
f)
13 (
g)
h)
Uses accessory to any of the above uses.
Home occupations, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1533.
14 (
Places of worship.
15
16
Section 5. Section
Code of Ordinances is
28-447,
hereby
amended
as
follows:
17
18
uses.
19
20
Uses
permitted
in R- 3- A districts
are:
21
22 (
a)
23
to section 28- 386 et seq.
b) Multifamily dwellings as
conforming
24 (
Single- family dwellings conforming
to R- 1- B
requirements, and duplex dwellings
specified herein.
c) Helistops, as herein defined, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1451 et
d) Community residential homes subject to the provisions of section 28- 1304.
e) Home occupations, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1533.
f) Child care and adult care centers subject to the provisions of section.
25 (
26 (
27 (
28 (
29 (
seq.
Places of worship.
q)
30
31
Section 6. Section
32
33
No
building
or
28-477,
structure,
hereby amended
as
follows:
uses.
or
in part, in R- 3- B districts for other than 1
or
of the
used,
or
premises
34
used, in whole
35
uses:
36 (
permitted in R- 1 and R- 2 districts. Single-family dwellings shall conform to
requirements. Duplex dwellings shall conform to requirements of section 28- 386 et seq.
b) Multiple dwellings, and uses accessory to multiple dwellings, including laundry
machines and vending machines fully enclosed within the main building; community garages;
recreation facilities, such as cabana units, sauna units, recreation buildings, swimming pools,
tennis courts, golf courses, putting greens and shuffleboard courts providing they are for the
sole use of the occupants and their guests; private docks and mooring facilities. Such docks
shall not project more than 5 feet into any waterway, nor extend more than 25 feet into any
other residentially zoned property, except by written permission submitted to the planning and
zoning department by the owner of record of such adjoining property. On waterways under the
jurisdiction of United States Army Corps of Engineers, the permissible projection into the
waterway shall be determined by that organization.
37
38 (
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
a)
or
Uses
R- 1- B
5
or more
following specified
1(
c)
2(
d)
3(
Lodginghouses.
Churches
and .Ef)ublic, private
f)
or
teaching of children.
e)
4(
5
Homes, centers and schools for care, boarding
and
high
6(
g)
h)
7(
i)
8(
9(
and
parochial
nursery,
kindergarten, elementary
schools.
residential homes
subject to the provisions of section 28- 1304.
Child care and adult care centers subject to the provisions of section 28- 1416.
Community
j) Places of worship.
10
11
hereby
amended
as
follows:
12
13
uses.
14
15
Uses
permitted
in R- 3- C districts
are:
16
17 (
18
19 (
20 (
21 (
22 (
23 (
Single- family dwellings conforming to R- 1- B requirements, and duplex dwellings
conforming
requirements of section 28- 386 et seq.
b) Multifamily dwellings as specified herein.
c)
Helistops, as herein defined, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1451 et seq.
d) Community residential homes subject to the provisions of section 28- 1304.
e)
Child
care and adult care centers subject to the provisions of section.
f)
a)
to
24 (
q)
Places of worship.
25
26
27
uses.
28
No
or
29
30 (
31
32
33
34
35 (
36
37 (
38
39 (
40 (
41 (
42 (
43 (
used in whole
building
or
in
or
structure
hereby
amended
part thereof shall be erected, altered
or
as
used
part in R- 3- D districts for other than 1 of the following specified
or
follows:
premises
uses:
permitted in singlefamily, duplex, townhouse and multiple dwellings, and
dwellings, including laundry machines and vending machines fully
building, recreation facilities, such as cabana units, sauna units,
recreation buildings, swimming pools, tennis courts, golf courses, putting greens, shuffleboard
courts and garages providing they are for the sole use of the occupants and their guests.
b) Churches and .Ef)
ublic, private and parochial nursery, kindergarten, elementary
and high schools.
c)
Uses accessory to any of the above uses shall not be allowed within the yard
requirements.
d) Helistops, as herein defined, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1451 et seq.
e)
Community residential homes subject to the provisions of section 28- 1304.
f) Home occupations, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1533.
g) Child care and adult care centers subject to the provisions of section 28- 1416.
a)
Uses
accessory to multiple
enclosed within the main
uses
h)
Places of worship.
6
1
2
Section 9. Section 28- 567 is
3
uses.
4
No
or
5
6(
7
8
9
10
11 (
12
13 (
14
15 (
16 (
17 (
used in whole
building
or
in
or
structure
hereby
amended
as
follows:
or
used
or
part in the R- 3- E districts for other than 1 of the following specified
premises
uses:
permitted in single-family, duplex, townhouse and multiple dwellings, and
b) Churches and .Ef)ublic, private and parochial nursery, kindergarten, elementary
and high schools. .
c)
requirements.
e)
f) Child care and adult care centers subject to the provisions of section 28- 1416.
a)
Uses
uses
18 (
q)
Places of worship.
19
20
21
22
No
23
24 (
25
26
27
28
29 (
30
31 (
32
33 (
34 (
35 (
36 (
used in whole
building
or
in
or
structure
hereby amended
as
follows:
or
premises
uses.
or
or
used
part in the R- 3- F districts for other than 1 of the following specified
uses;
permitted in singlefamily, duplex, townhouse and multiple dwellings, and
b) Churchos and .Ef)ublic, private and parochial nursery, kindergarten, elementary
and high schools.
c)
requirements.
e)
f) Child care and adult care centers subject to the provisions of section 28- 1416.
a)
Uses
uses
g)
Places of worship.
37
7
1
Section 11.
2
3
Conditional
4
districts for the
5(
6
7(
a)
and
high
Section 28- 598, Code of Ordinances, is
following
uses
follows:
owner
of the
property
in R- 4
in accordance with Division 4 of Article II:
Churchos and .Ef)ublic,
private
and
parochial
nursery,
schools.
b)
Orphanages.
8(
c)
Institutions of
9(
d)
Private
10
academic
11
Schools.
12 (
as
uses.
approval may be requested by the
use
amended
hereby
degree
e)
educational
an
and
colleges
and accredited
Docks,
mooring
boats, excursion
by
philanthropic
universities offering
or
character.
courses
the Southern' Association of
of
study leading to an
Colleges and Secondary
facilities and accessory uses or accessory buildings for charter
sightseeing boats; provided, that commercial fishing boats and
13
boats,
14
types of boats for commercial, business or industrial purposes shall not be permitted
unless upon consideration of the planning and zoning board and recommendation to the city
council. The city council shall, after public hearing, find that such use can be permitted without
unduly affecting other property in the vicinity and without violating the spirit and purpose of this
chapter. Any such permitted docks shall not project more than 5 feet into any waterway, nor
extend nearer than 25 feet to any other residentially zoned property. For waterways under the
jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the permissible projection into the
waterway shall be determined by that agency.
f) Hotels, apartment hotels and motels.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 (
fishing
or
other
23 (
q)
Places of worship.
24
25
26
27
Conditional
28
districts for the
29 (
30
31 (
a)
and
use
following
amended
as
follows:
uses.
approval may be requested by the
uses
hereby
owner
of the
property
in R- 5
Churches and .Ef)ublic,
private
and
parochial
nursery,
high schools.
b) Orphanages.
34
Institutions of an educational or philanthropic character.
Private colleges and universities offering courses of study leading to an
academic degree and accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary
35
Schools.
36 (
Cabana clubs and beach clubs. Such clubs may have restaurant- type
bars when located in the main building.
32 (
33 (
37
38 (
39
40
41
42
c)
d)
e)
rooms
and
f) Docks, mooring facilities and accessory uses or accessory buildings for charter
fishing boats, excursion or sightseeing boats; provided that commercial fishing boats and
other types of boats for commercial business or industrial purposes shall not be permitted,
unless, after consideration by the planning and zoning board and recommendation to the city
council, the city council shall, after public hearing, find that such use can be permitted without
boats,
8
1
2
3(
adversely affecting other property in the vicinity and
this chapter.
g) Hotels, apartment hotels and motels.
4(
h)
without
violating
the
spirit
and purpose of
Places of worship.
5
6
7
8
Conditional
9
districts for the
10 (
11
high
as
follows:
be
requested by
the
owner
of the
property in R- 5- A
uses
Churches and .Ef)ublic,
a)
and
following
amended
uses.
approval may
use
hereby
private and parochial nursery, kindergarten, elementary
schools.
12 (
b)
Orphanages.
17 (
or philanthropic character.
universities
offering courses of study leading to an
colleges
academic degree and accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary
Schools.
e)
Cabana clubs and beach clubs. Such clubs may have restaurant- type rooms and
18
bars when located in the main
13 (
14 (
15
16
19 (
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 (
c)
Institutions of
d)
Private
an
educational
and
building.
f) Docks, mooring facilities and accessory uses or accessory buildings for charter
boats, fishing boats, excursion or sightseeing boats; provided that commercial fishing boats
and other types of boats for commercial, business or industrial purposes shall not be permitted
unless, after consideration by the planning and zoning board and recommendation to the city
council, the city council shall, after public hearing, find that such use can be permitted without
adversely affecting other property in the vicinity and without violating the spirit and purpose of
this chapter.
g) Hotels, apartment hotels and motels.
h)
27 (
Places of worship.
28
29
30
uses.
31
No
or
building
32
used in whole
33
uses:
or
in
or
structure,
part, in R- B- 1 districts for other than 1
34 (
a)
Banks and financial institutions.
35 (
b)
Child
c)
Hospitals,
36
indigent
39 (
40 \;
41 (
42
43 (
and adult
care
centers
subject
or more
to the
or
of the
used,
as
follows:
or
premises
following specified
provisions of section 28- 1416
et
seq.
37 (
38
care
hereby amended
or
sanitariums,
orphanages,
nursing
for
aged,
fraternities and similar
private
homes,
institutions
infirm.
d)
Places of public assembly Private clubs;
e)
Reserved Churches and institutions of
lodges,
ffi85.
character, other than
f)
penal
or
an
educational,
philanthropic
correctional institutions.
Business offices,
professional offices and governmental buildings.
9
or
religious
2(
g)
h)
Duplicating, copying, letter
Personal service shops.
3(
i)
Retail stores.
1(
and secretarial service establishments.
6(
U) Bakeries and similar places for preparation of food to be sold
premises subject to the provisions of section 28- 1328.
k) Laundry and drycleaning
pickup shops, and drycleaning
7
establishments that:
4
5
8
9
10
11
12
1.
Use
only
nontoxic and nonflammable fluorocarbon solvents in
venting
no
13 (
I)
or
m)
Interior decorators,
15 (
n)
Commercial lots
16 (
0)
18
19
20 (
21
equipment which
or
photographic galleries, artists' studios.
garages for parking.
Reserved Theaters and auditoriums.
or
p) Retail establishments, established with the sole purpose of selling donated
articles
the public for the sole benefit of religious, philanthropic and eleemosynary
organizations not for profit upon written application to and approval by the city council.
q)
1386 et seq.
r)
23 (
s)
the
city
Motorcar fuel stations ( service stations)
subject
to the
provisions
of section 28-
Helistops, as herein defined, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1451 et seq.
Utility substations subject to the approval of the planning and zoning board and
council.
25 (
Uses accessory to any of the above
and outdoor storage of passenger cars,
t)
including living quarters for the owner
or pickup trucks used in the business
Outdoor display or storage of merchandise
uses,
26
or
operator
27
or
28
or
provided for as a permitted use.
equipment prohibited, except as provided in section
u)
Telecom web- hosting facilities.
29 (
pressing
to
22 (
24
the
Mortuaries.
14 (
17 (
and
on
gases into the atmosphere;
2.
Utilize a total of not more than 5 full- or part- time employees; and
3.
Utilize no pickup or delivery facilities to the establishment except those from
members of the consuming public seeking the service at the site of the establishment.
requires
emissions of fumes
at retail
items otherwise
panel
is
28- 1532.
30
31
32
uses.
33
No
or
building
34
used, in whole
35
uses:
or
in
or
structure
amended
part, in B- 1 districts for other than 1
and
36 (
a)
Business,
37 (
b)
38 (
c)
Duplicating, copying, letter
professional
hereby
governmental
or more
used,
or
of the
as
follows:
or
premises
following specified
offices.
and secretarial service establishments.
39 (
d)
Retail stores.
40 (
e)
41 (
f) Child
care and adult care centers,
subject
to the
provisions of section 28- 1416
et
42
seq.
43 (
44
Laundry and drycleaning pickup shops, self-service laundries ( including coinoperated laundry machines) in fully enclosed buildings, and drycleaning and pressing
45
establishments which:
g)
1.
46
47
requires
no
Use
venting
only
or
emissions of fumes
or
gases into the
10
atmosphere;
equipment which
1
2.
2
3.
3
Utilize
Utilize
members of the
4(
h)
5(
i)
a
total of not
pickup
consuming public
no
more
than 5 full-
or
part- time employees; and
delivery facilities to the establishment except those from
seeking the service at the site of the establishment.
or
Places of public assembly Private clubs,
Parking garages and lots.
lodges
and fraternities.
12 (
U) Bakeries and similar business for the preparation of food to be sold at retail on
premises, not including wholesale and subject to sections 28- 1326 through 28- 1332.
k) Pet shops, including grooming, but not including boarding, subject to the
provisions of sections 28- 1326 through 28- 1332. A pet grooming facility which, as of August 1,
1993, provided boarding for pets, may continue to provide boarding, subject to compliance with
applicable regulations.
I)
Helistops and heliports, as herein defined, subject to the provisions of section 28-
13
1451 et seq.
6
7
8(
9
10
11
the
14 (
Uses accessory to any of the above
and outdoor storage of passenger cars,
m)
15
or
operator
16
or
items otherwise
17
or
equipment
18 (
n)
is
provided
prohibited.
for
as a
permitted
use.
panel or pickup trucks used in the business
Outdoor display or storage of merchandise
uses,
19
20
21
uses.
22
No
or
building
23
used, in whole
24
uses:
25 (
a)
or
in
or
structure,
hereby amended
as
follows:
used,
or
premises
or more
or
of the
following specified
Business, professional and governmental offices.
Duplicating, copying, letter and secretarial service establishments.
26 (
b)
27 (
c)
28 (
d)
Post offices and
29 (
e)
Places of public assembly Private clubs;
governmental buildings.
lodges, fraternities and similar private
30
tI5e&:-
31 (
34 (
Churches and institutions of an educational philanthropic or religious
character, other thjn penal or correctional institutions.
g) Indoor theaters, auditoriums, ,!?aowling alleys and billiard parlors.
h) Bus stations or passenger terminals, not including open air storage and repairs of
35
vehicles.
32
33 (
f) Reserved
i)
36 (
37
Helistops and heliports,
as
herein defined,
subject
to the
provisions
of section 28-
1451 et seq.
41
U) Business schools, colleges, kindergartens, nursery schools, and child care and
centers subject to provisions of section 28- 1416 et seq.
k) Laundry and drycleaning pickup shops, self- service laundries ( including coinoperated laundry machines) in fully enclosed buildings, and drycleaning and pressing
42
38
39
40 (
adult
care
1.
43
44
45
46
47
requires
Use
only
equipment
which
emissions of fumes or gases into the atmosphere;
venting
a
total of not more than 5 full- or part- time employees; and
2.
Utilize
3.
no
members of the
or
consuming public seeking
the service at the site of the establishment.
11
I)
1(
2(
m)
Retail stores.
Retail establishments, established for the sole purpose of selling donated articles
religious, philanthropic and charitable organizations, not for
3
to the
4
profit, upon written application
public
for the sole benefit of
the
12 (
city council.
preparation of food to be sold at retail on
the premises, not including wholesale distribution and subject to section 28- 1326 et seq.
0)
p) Public utility substations, subject to approval by the planning and zoning board
after public hearing.
q) Vending machines in an enclosed structure.
r)
s)
Motorcar fuel stations ( service stations), subject to provisions of section 28- 1386
13
et seq.
14 (
t)
Marinas, including boat docks, fuel service, boat sales, rental storage, service or
repair, subject to approval of the planning and zoning board and the city council. The city shall
render its approval after public hearings, upon finding that the proposed use is consistent with
and not hazardous to surrounding developments and is in accordance with the spirit and
purpose of this chapter.
5(
6
7(
8(
9
10 (
11 (
15
16
17
18
n)
to and
approval by
Bakeries and similar businesses for the
19 (
u)
Mortuaries.
20 (
v)
Auction houses for
21 (
w)
jewelry, art goods, and household furnishings.
Repair shops for appliances and bicycles within a fully enclosed building.
Pet shops including grooming but not including boarding, subject
to
the
22 (
x)
23
provisions
24 (
of section 28- 1326 et seq.
y) Uses accessory to any of the above
or operator and outdoor storage of passenger cars, panel or pickup trucks used in the business
or items otherwise provided for as a permitted use. Outdoor display or storage of merchandise
or equipment is prohibited, and all such existing display or storage shall conform with this
provision within 6 months from June 22, 1970.
z)
25
26
27
28
29 (
uses,
30
31
32
33
No
building
34
used, in whole
35
uses:
or
in
or
hereby
amended
as
follows:
or
premises
uses.
structure,
or
of the
used
following specified
offices.
36 (
a)
Business,
37 (
b)
38 (
c)
39 (
d)
Post offices and
40 (
e)
Places of public assembly Private clubs,
professional
and
or more
or
governmental
governmental buildings.
lodges, fraternities
and similar
private
41
tI5e5.
42 (
46 (
subject to provisions of section 28- 1416 et seq.
alleys and billiard parlors.
g)
h) Bus stations or passenger terminals for local transportation facilities, not
including open- air storage and repairs of vehicles.
i)
Laundry and drycleaning pickup shops, and drycleaning and pressing
47
43 (
44 (
45
f) Child
care
and adult
care
centers
Indoor theaters, auditoriums, ~ eowling
12
1
2
1.
requires
Use
venting
no
only
2.
Utilize
4
3.
Utilize
5
6
7(
9
I)
the
premises,
10 (
m)
11 (
n)
12 (
0)
13
a
total of not
more
no
to the establishment
except those from
at the site of the establishment.
preparation of food to be sold at retail on
including wholesale distributions and subject to section 28- 1326 et seq.
Vending machines in an enclosed structure.
Helistops and heliports, as herein defined, subject to the provisions of section 28Bakeries and similar businesses for the
not
1451 et seq.
p)
Motor fuel stations ( service stations),
16 (
q)
Auction houses for jewelry, art
17 (
r)
for
18 (
s)
19
of section 28- 1326 et seq.
t)
Uses accessory to any of the above uses,
14 (
15
which
or gases into the atmosphere;
than 5 full- or part- time employees; and
pickup or delivery facilities
members of the consuming public seeking the service
U) Retail stores.
k) Personal service shops.
8(
equipment
emissions of fumes
or
3
subject
to
provisions
of section 28- 1386 et
seq.
provisions
20 (
goods, and household furnishings.
appliances
Repair shops
bicycles within a fully enclosed building.
Pet shops, including grooming but not including boarding. Subject
and
to
the
operator and outdoor storage of passenger cars, panel or pickup trucks used in the business
items otherwise provided for as a permitted use. Outdoor display or storage of merchandise
equipment is prohibited, and all such existing display or storage shall conform with this
21
or
22
or
23
or
24
provision
within 6 months from June 22, 1970.
25
26
27
Sec. 28- 894. Conditional Use.
28
Conditional
fB--
29
districts for the
following
use
uses
approval may
be
requested by
hereby amended
the
owner
as
of the property in POI
30 (
a)
b)
Places of public assembly Cultural, social and
Laboratories for analysis and research.
philanthropic institutions.
31 (
32 (
c)
Motorcar fuel service stations ( filling stations),
subject
33
34 (
follows:
28- 1386 et seq.
d) Governmental offices and
to the
provisions
of section
post offices.
37
Health spas and fitness clinics.
f) Restaurants exceeding 1, 000 square feet of customer service area which are
located within structures predominantly devoted to permitted uses. Predominantly shall be
38
defined
35 (
36 (
e)
as
occupying
2)
39 (
at least 75
percent of
a
structure.
Reserved.
40
41
42
43
No
44
part in
an
building,
structure,
hereby amended
as
follows:
uses.
or
land,
MC district for other than 1
or
part thereof shall be erected
or more
of the
13
following specified
or
used in whole
uses:
or
in
1(
a)
2(
b)
3(
4(
5(
6
7(
8(
9
Hospitals, convalescent homes, nursing homes and interim care facilities.
Outpatient care facilities, including surgical centers.
Pharmacies and stores for retail sale or rental of hospital or physical therapy or
e)
orthopedic equipment.
f) Establishments for physical therapy treatment.
g) Health care and allied services, including family planning clinics, group health
associations, visiting nurse associations.
c)
d)
10 (
h)
11 (
i)
12
13
U)
16 (
17 (
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Medical and dental educational and vocational centers.
400.401
testing facilities.
licensed by the state department of health
Adult Congregate Living Facilities Act, F. S. S
Medical and dental laboratories and
Adult
congregate living
pursuant
and rehabilitative services,
14
15 (
Places of worship Churches, synagogues and other institutions of 'Norship.
Offices for doctors, dentists and opticians.
et seq.
k) Child
facilities
to the
as
subject to provisions of section 28- 1416 et seq.
facility.
m) The following accessory uses are permitted to a hospital, convalescent home,
adult congregate living facility or nursing home: heliports; gift shops; floral shops; cafeterias;
snack bars; quarters for employees and personnel, including nurses, interns, doctors and
medical technicians; beauty shops; barbershops; recreation facilities; auditoriums or any other
uses which are accessory to or incidental to the normal operation of a hospital, convalescent
home, adult congregate living facility or nursing home, provided that there be no signs or
advertisements or promotional materials directed to the general public relating to such
accessory uses except for informational and directional purposes.
I)
care
and adult
care
centers
Substance abuse treatment
25
26
27
hereby
amended
as
follows:
uses.
28
Conditional
29
30
use
approval
may be
requested by the
districts in accordance with Division 4 of Article II for the
31 (
a)
or
structures used
exclusively
or
following
primarily
of the
property in L1RP
uses:
for amateur recreational
uses
32
and
33 (
wholesale provided that these uses are in
use. The total floor space of the warehousing, showroom or
wholesale uses shall not exceed 50 percent of the total square footage of the occupant.
c)
Public, private and parochial nursery, kindergarten, elementary and high schools.
34
35
36 (
mO'./ie
Land
owner
theaters.
b)
Warehousing,
conjunction with a permitted
showroom
and
Production studios for cinema, television, video and radio, and other facilities
pursuant to section 28- 977( k), with facilities designed or used to allow for an audience
d)
37 (
38
permitted
39
or an
observation
area.
40
14
1
Section 21.
2
Sec. 28- 981.
1)
3
Conditional commercial node
following conditional commercial
part of
4
in
5
accordance with Division 4 of Article 1\ and the
6
uses are
7
within the L1RP district.
8
a)
9
b)
Reserved
10
L1RP
The
non
districts
intended
as
a
primarily
a
conditional
node
special
and service
as
follows:
allowed.
uses
commercial
for the convenience of the
Private clubs,
uses
hereby amended
may be considered and
node
master
granted
plan approval
in
standards set forth in this section. These
employees
and
organizations '
patrons of permitted
JI.'
hich
have
uses
meetings
in
facilities.
private
13
e)
professional offices and governmental buildings.
14
f)
Retail stores of not
11
c)
12
d)
Business offices,
and
than 10, 000 square feet each of floor area.
drycleaning pickup shops, and drycleaning and
more
20
pressing
g) Laundry
1.
Use only nontoxic and nonflammable fluorocarbon solvents in equipment which
requires no venting or emissions of fumes or gases into the atmosphere;
2.
3.
21
members of the
15
16
17
18
19
23
subject
to the
i)
24
25
consuming public seeking the service at the site of the establishment.
Eating establishments of not less than 1500 square feet each of floor space,
provisions of section. 28- 1328 and section 4- 3( 5).
Motorcar fuel stations ( service stations), subject to the provisions of section 28-
h)
22
1386 et seq.
26
U)
27
k)
28
passenger
29
designated
30
wall, berm,
Hotels, motels of not less than 40 rooms.
Uses accessory to any of the above uses,
on
the
the outdoor
including
storage of
other items used in the business in such areas as
and screened from view from all roadways by a masonry
trucks,
panel
pickup
approved site plan
hedge or other landscaped
or
cars,
or
screen.
31
32
Section 22.
33
34
Section 28- 1072, Code of Ordinances,
is
hereby
amended
as
follows:
35
36
No
building
37
used, in whole
38
uses:
or
in
or
structure,
uses.
or
part thereof, shall be erected,
part, in M- 1 districts for other than 1
15
altered
or more
or
of the
used,
or
premises
following specified
1(
a)
2
approval
of the
3
as
4
shall
5
conditions
6
the
7(
8
Reserved Drive in theaters
planning and zoning
to the location of structures and location
be
conditioned
on
plot not less than 10 acres in area, subject to
city council after public hearings by those bodies
of drivevlays for ingress and egress, '.vhich approval
on a
board and
the faithful
adherence to the fulfillment
shall be determined to be necessary for the
welfare of the citizens.
as
general
b)
Helistops
and
heliports,
as
herein defined,
c)
Body and fender work
10 (
d)
Chemical laboratories.
11 (
e)
12 (
f)
Coffee roasting and other coffee
Cold storage plants.
14 (
15 (
16
17
18
19
20 (
21
22
23 (
24 (
25 (
26 (
27 (
28 (
within enclosed
to the
provisions
area
and
of section
buildings.
processing operations.
Cutting or blending of liquors.
h)
Carpenter and cabinetmaking shops.
i)
Hydroponic gardens, slat houses.
Manufacture, repair, assembly or processing of products from metal, bone,
U)
cloth, leather, paper, plastic, rubber, shell, plaster, wood or from materials similar in nature; any
such products may be sold upon the premises, but only from
enclosed showrooms or enclosed display rooms.
k)
Pottery and other ceramic products, utilizing kilns fired only by electricity or gas;
such
any
products may be sold upon the premises, but only from enclosed showrooms or
enclosed display rooms.
I)
Cinema production and development.
Motion picture studios.
m)
n)
Meat processing, excluding slaughtering.
Pattern making.
0)
Tool,
die and gauge shops.
p)
q)
Spray painting.
machines.
Automatic
30 (
s)
Tinsmith and sheet metal
31 (
t)
Motorcycle sales
u)
Motorcar
32 (
surrounding
g)
r)
29 (
subject
restrictions and
28- 1451 et seq.
9(
13 (
protection
of such
of the
screw
shops.
repairs within enclosed buildings.
fuel service stations ( filling stations), subject
and
to the
provisions of
33
section 28- 1386 et seq.
34 (
Repair shops for appliances and bicycles in an enclosed building.
x)
Upholstering shops in enclosed buildings.
Printing and engraving shops, newspaper publishing plants.
y)
Car laundries in enclosed buildings.
z)
a a)
Service and repair garages.
Truck sales, machinery sales, construction and farm implement sales.
bb)
Tire vulcanizing and recapping with no open storage.
cc)
Food catering establishments, preparation and storage only.
dd)
Warehouse and storage buildings.
ee)
ff) Railroad transfer and storage; truck transfer and storage.
Drycleaning plants and dyeing plants, laundry and drycleaning pickup shops,
gg)
and drycleaning and pressing establishments that:
1.
Use only nontoxic and nonflammable fluorocarbon solvents in equipment which
no
venting or emissions of fumes or gases into the atmosphere;
requires
2.
3.
members of the consuming public seeking the service at the site of the establishment.
hh)
Laundries, including coinoperated laundries.
35 (
36 (
37 (
38 (
39 (
40 (
41 (
42 (
43 (
44 (
45 (
46
47
48
49
50
51
52 (
v)
w)
16
1(
ii)
2
Uj)
Creameries.
Soft drink
bottling.
8(
pp)
9(
qq)
storage and warehousing, including lockers for
Carpet cleaning without equipment rental.
Boatbuilding, boat sales and repair in enclosed buildings.
Bakery plants.
Plumbing shops.
Sign painting and sign shops.
Newspaper and magazine distributors, storage and office.
10 (
rr)
Taxidermist.
11 (
ss)
Research and
12 (
tt)
Public
Frozen food
3(
kk)
4(
II)
5(
mm)
6(
nn)
7(
00)
13
16
uu)
gross floor
applicable
17 (
2.
safety
are
incidental to bona fide wholesale
uses.
training facilities within enclosed buildings.
A dwelling unit on the premises for an owner, manager
Athletic
or
caretaker of
an
that:
provided
Only 1 dwelling unit per
The dwelling unit shall
The
3.
industrial
conform
complex or development shall be permitted.
to all applicable residential building and Iife-
dwelling
unit shall not be located
near
dangerous materials, equipment
or
operations.
25 (
Child
xx)
care
and adult
care
centers
subject
to
provisions
of section 28- 1416 et
seq.
27 (
28
utility
subject to the approval of the city council upon the
and
zoning board after public hearing.
planning
Retail sales occupying, in the aggregate, no more than 1, 000 square feet of
in any plot. The maximum floor area limitation established herein shall not be
codes.
23
26
use,
1.
21
24
area
ww)
industrial
20
22
laboratories.
substations,
to retail sales which
vv)
18 (
19
use.
recommendation of the
14 (
15
testing
individual
manager
29 (
Uses accessory to
yy)
caretaker.
permitted
uses,
excluding living quarters for
an
owner,
or
zz)
30
32
Section 28- 1124, Code of Ordinances, is hereby amended
Section 23.
31
as
follows:
33
uses.
34
Conditional
may be
use
approval
requested by
the
owner
of the property in M- 3
35
districts for the
36 (
43 (
Any use which includes or will include outdoor storage of any kind.
Any use which will store, service, repair or clean motor vehicles or other
motorized equipment.
c)
Public utility service yards.
d) Any permitted M- 3 use fronting on Congress Avenue, Clint Moore Road,
Seaboard Coastline Railroad, Military Trail, N. W. 2nd Avenue, Dixie Highway, U. S. No. 1, N. W.
20th Street, Glades Road or Spanish River Boulevard.
e)
Motorcar fuel service stations, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1386 et
44
seq.
37 (
38
39 (
40 (
41
42
following
a)
b)
45 (
f) Wholesale
46 (
g)
h)
47 (
uses
establishments.
lodges, fraternities and similar private uses.
parochial nursery, kindergarten, elementary and high
Reserved Private clubs,
Public, private and
17
schools.
1
Section 24.
2
3
6
7
8
9
10
11 (
12
amended
as
Museum center. A
allowed.
uses
center is
conducted
organization
primary
pursuant
purpose of which is the production, exhibit, or display of fine or applied arts; the production and
presentation of performance arts; or the exhibit and display of items, collections, and other
objects and materials having educational, historic, scientific or industrial value and significance.
All accessory uses must be approved pursuant to this division.
b) Accessory uses. The following uses may be conditionally approved as accessory
uses in an approved museum center:
a)
with tax
exempt
museum
to Section 501 (
status
13 (
1)
Administrative offices for the
14 (
2)
One
15
hereby
follows:
4
5(
or more
not- for- profit
museum
museum
a use
c)(
3),
by
a museum
Internal Revenue Code, the
center and its lessees; and
shops operated by
the
museum
center
or
its
not- for- profit lessees;
3)
16 (
Studios and
production
facilities, which may be leased to for- profit entities, for
17
visual
18 (
20 (
shops, which may be leased to
for- profit entities, providing goods and services related to the museum center' s primary uses;
5) Schools, which may be leased to for- profit entities, for the performing or visual
21
arts and allied crafts and trades;
22 (
25
6) Places of public assembly I\ uditorium and auditorium bcilities, which may be
available to the general community, for the performance arts, and other programs and
assemblies. A museum center shall not contain more than one auditorium. The auditorium
shall contain not more than 750 seats. The auditorium entrance shall be internal to the museum
26
center;
19
23
24
or
4)
7)
27 (
28
29
30 (
31
32
33 (
34 (
35
36
37 (
38
39
40 (
41
42 (
performance
provided
building.
artists;
Retail, other than
Restaurants and
museum
catering
shops,
and services
facilities, which may be leased to for- profit entities,
are internal to the museum center main use
that all entrances to the restaurant
8) Events, performances, or occasions of a public or private nature;
Such other accessory uses compatible with the museum center use and
illlt91
the L1RP- 5 zoning district which are approved by city council.
c)
Special regulations.
1)
Process. A museum center conditional use approval shall be proposed in
with
the procedures of section 28- 340, of the City Code not in conflict herewith. In
accordance
the event of conflict, the provisions of this section 28- 1135 shall prevail.
2) Duration. The conditional use approval shall have a duration as set forth in the
conditional use approval, but not longer than 5 years. The conditional use approval may set
forth special conditions for the implementation of the use.
3) Schedule of uses. The conditional use approval may contain a detailed schedule
of approved accessory uses which may be implemented without further approval.
4) Outside signage. Outside signage for approved accessory uses is prohibited.
43
18
Section 25.
1
2
Section 28- 1173,
Sec. 28- 1173. Uses
4
Uses
5(
7
8
9
10
hereby
amended
as
follows:
3
6(
permitted
permitted.
in the LB civic center and limited business district
are:
permitted in R- 1 or R- 2 residential districts.
following uses when located in a new building, an existing residential
or
building
enlargement of an existing building subject to the recommendation of the planning
and zoning board and the approval of the city council, if the planning and zoning board and city
council find that the use, architecture and landscaping of the proposed building are in harmony
a)
Any
b)
The
use
with the character of the civic center:
Professional, business offices and financial institutions.
11
1.
12
2.
13
3.
Churches
14
4.
Educational institutions.
Undertakers' establishments.
or fraternal halls, civic auditoriums,
and
1Jibraries,
public buildings.
17
6.
18
7.
provided that no activity results
premises.
Photographic, blueprinting, photostating typesetting of printing establishments.
Buildings intended for the storage of governmental records or archives.
19
8.
Radio
20
9.
Places of public assembly.
Before approving any of the foregoing
16
objectionable
21
22
zoning
development
2.
25
26
28
3.
offensive
give
for the
The
hazards created
27
or
analysis
and
intensity
of
research
In
dust noticeable off the
or
consideration to the
city.
capacity
by the
or
television studios
The size and
1.
for
noise, odor, smoke,
board shall
23
24
Laboratories
5.
15
stations.
uses,
the
city council
and the
planning
and
following:
of such
use
and its effect
adjacent and feeder
on
the
streets to handle
comprehensive plan
of
peak traffic loads and
use.
The emission of noise,
light,
smoke, odor, gas, dust
or
vibration in noxious
or
quantities.
29
4.
The extent, nature and
30
5.
Fire and
31
6.
All other standards
police
arrangement of parking facilities,
entrances and exits.
hazards involved.
prescribed by
these
regulations
for the
use.
32
Section 26.
33
34
Section 28- 1242, Code of Ordinances,
is
hereby amended
as
follows:
35
36
No
building
37
used, in whole
38
uses:
or
in
or
structure,
part, in
uses.
or
the VC district for other than 1
39 (
1)
At
40 (
a)
Retail sales and services;
41 (
b)
Restaurants;
ground
level:
19
or more
or
of the
used
or
premises
following specified
1(
c)
Child
care
centers,
of sections 28- 1418, 28- 1420, 28sections of article XV, division 5 shall not apply to child care
subject
to the
provisions
2
1421, and 28- 1423. The
3
centers in the VC district;
4(
occupations, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1533;
Multiple dwellings ( including townhomes), and uses accessory
dwellings, including:
1.
Community garages;
5(
6
7
d)
10 (
11 (
Home
e)
8
9
remaining
2.
Recreation facilities such
cabana units,
as
sauna
to
units, recreation
swimming pools, tennis courts, putting greens and shuffleboard courts;
f) Parking lots and parking garages ( commercial, public, and/ or private);
g) Museums, libraries, social centers, parks, open space and recreational
12 (
h)
13 (
i)
14
m
multiple
buildings,
areas;
Places of public assembly Theaters and auditoria;
Live- work units;
Bars,
nightclubs
and
drinking
establishments;
15 (
k)
Entertainment;
16 (
I)
Business,
17 (
m)
18 (
n)
Laundry and drycleaning pickup shops;
Temporary outdoor retail sales ( e. g., farmers' markets, festivals) not to exceed 30
19
days
22
and medical offices;
per calendar year;
20 (
21 (
professional,
0)
Nursery, kindergarten, elementary and high
p) Reserved Churches and institutions of
character, other than penal or correctional institutions.
ground level:
professional,
23 (
2)
Above
24 (
a)
Business,
25 (
b)
Retail sales and services;
26 (
c)
27 (
d)
an
schools; and
educational,
philanthropic
or
and medical offices;
28
1.
occupations, subject to the provisions of section 28- 1533;
Multiple dwellings, and uses accessory to multiple dwellings, including:
Community garages;
29
2.
Recreation facilities, such
30
swimming
31 (
32 (
33 (
as
cabana units,
sauna
units, recreation
buildings,
pools,
putting greens and shuffleboard courts;
e)
Places of public assembly Theaters and auditoria;
f) Parking garages ( commercial, public, and/ or private);
g)
h)
35 (
i)
37
Home
tennis courts,
34 (
36
religious
Museums, libraries, social centers;
Reserved Private clubs, lodges, fraternities and similar
and
private
uses;
schools; and
high
Nursery, kindergarten, elementary
Reserved Churches and institutions of an educational, philanthropic or religious
other than penal or correctional institutions.
3) No permitted use shall be allowed a drive through window or provide a drive up
m
character,
38 (
39
service.
40 (
percent of the aggregate floor area used for retail sales and
serves the daily needs of the VC residents and/ or VC
include
Such
retail
uses
but
are not limited to shoe repair shops, ice cream shops,
employees.
delicatessens, drycleaners, beauty salons, barbershops, coffee shops, bakeries, nail salons,
video rental shops, opticians, drug stores, tailors, and news shops.
41
42
43
44
4)
At
a
minimum, 10
services must be of
a
character that
45
20
1
2
Section 27.
Sec. 28- 1655.
Required
hereby amended
as
follows:
3
4
5(
6
1)
on
The off-street
the basis of the
following
off- street
parking.
parking required by
minimum
this article shall be
provided
and maintained
requirements:
7
8
g)
9
vehicle
10
Bicycle
11
Reserved Theaters and other
places of assembly having fixed
seats: 1
motor
parking space for each 3 seats, plus 1 motor vehicle parking space for each employee.
parking spaces: 5 percent of required number of motor vehicle parking spaces.
h) Places of public assembly~ 1 motor vehicle parkinq space for each 3 seats, plus
15
one motor vehicle parkinq space for each 25 square feet of additional. qross floor area provided
for public assembly purposes. If places of public assembly include accessory and/ or related
public assembly uses for which parkinq is required pursuant to this Section 28- 1655, parkinq
shall be provided for all square footaqe, includinq square footaqe utilized for accessory or
16
additional
12
13
14
18
the parcel; provided, however, if such uses operate non- concurrently,
minimum parkinq shall be determined based upon the maximum parkinq demand created by the
non- concurrent use with the qreatest parkinq requirement. including private clubs, lodges and
19
fraternal
20
museums,
17
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
uses
on
buildings, assembly halls, exhibition halls, convention halls, community centers,
dance halls and skating rinks: 1 motor vehicle parking space for each ' 1 seats
for
provided
patron use or 1 motor vehicle parking space for each 50 square feet of gross floor
area occupied by customers, patrons or members, whichever may be greater, plus 1 motor
vehicle parking space for each employee.
Bicycle parking spaces: 5 percent of required
number of motor vehicle parking spaces.
i)
Reserved Churches: 1 motor vehicle parking space for each 3 fixed seats; for a
church using a multipurpose assembly area ' Nithout fixed seats, provide 1 motor vehicle parking
space for each 25 square feet. Bicycle parking spaces: 5 percent of required number of motor
vehicle parking spaces.
29
II)
30
31
1655
apply
1)
32
33
to
Development in the VC district: The off- street parking requirements of sec. 28specific uses in the VC District, except for the following:
Theaters and other .Ef)laces of public assembly having fixed seats: 1 space per 3
seats.
34
Section 28.
35
36
hereby amended
as
follows:
37
Sec. 28- 1724. Planned unit
38
In addition to all
development.
general provisions and general development parameters of this
following requirements shall apply
39
article, the
40
with Division 4 of Article II:
to all
21
planned
unit
developments
in accordance
1
2
U) Commercial nodes.
All commercial node
3
accordance with Division 4 of Article II and the
4
commercial node
1.
5
6
7
a.
b.
9
c.
10
d.
12
13
special standards
Conditional
The
uses.
following
uses
be
may
Banks, and
savings
Reserved Private clubs, and
service
community
governmental offices.
Retail stores of not more than 10, 000 square feet each of floor area, except that
supermarket of up to 45, 000 square feet and 1 drugstore of up to 14, 000 square feet may be
permitted in each node.
f.
which:
2)
Utilize
18 (
3)
19 (
4)
Do not exceed 2, 000 square feet in gross floor area;
Provide retail, noncommercial service only; and
5)
Do not process
with
all
and
state
applicable
federal
standards;
20 (
a
total of not
more
than 5 full
or
part- time employees;
garments delivered from other laundry
or
drycleaning pickup
shops.
22
23
g.
h.
24
I.
25
26
J.
k.
27
2.
28
a.
Restaurants.
One gas station per node.
Child care and adult care centers
Uses similar to the above if not
approved in a master plan.
specifically prohibited.
as
Uses prohibited. The following commercial node
29
b.
Small loan offices.
General business offices.
30
c.
Package
31
d.
Bars and
32
e.
Sale of secondhand merchandise.
33
f.
34
g.
35
h.
36
3.
Eating establishments having curb service.
Living quarters for an owner or operator.
Outdoor displays.
Design requirements. Commercial nodes
uses are
prohibited:
primarily selling alcoholic beverages.
cocktail lounges.
stores
shall
conform
to
the
following
requirements:
38
a.
No
more
than 2
percent of the total gross PUD acreage may be approved for
a
commercial node.
b.
40
A commercial node shall not exceed 10 gross
acres
nor
be less than 5 gross
acres.
42
43
in
organizations.
17 (
41
approved
Professional and
Laundry and drycleaning establishments
Use only equipment which complies
39
conditionally
and loan associations.
1)
37
set forth in this article. PUD
intended for the convenience of the residents of the PUD.
e.
15 (
21
in
1
14
16
conditionally approved
commercial nodes:
8
11
uses are
must be
uses
c.
Development
of
commercial
shall be limited to 25
nodes
shall
be
phased
so
that
commercial
of the total commercial nodes allowable until such
50
development
percent
as 25 percent of the residential units in the PD are developed.
d.
The parcel which is proposed for the commercial node shall contain sufficient
width and depth to adequately accommodate the proposed uses and shall be conducive to the
clustering of the buildings rather than the strip placement of the buildings.
No building or structure with a floor area of less than 2, 000 square feet is
e.
permitted.
f.
Access to a commercial node shall not be located within 500 feet of the perimeter
51
of
44
45
46
47
48
49
time
a
PUD. All
access
to the commercial nodes shall be from internal collector streets.
22
1
g.
Structures in
4.
Approval
commercial node shall not exceed 30 feet in
7
height.
development. The proposed development of the
commercial node; the size, nature and type of buildings; the architectural design, landscaping
and appointments; the business sign to be adopted and the exterior lighting to be utilized shall
be subject to the approval of the community appearance board. The architectural design shall
be compatible with the surrounding residential structures.
5.
Buffering of residential, open space area. The surrounding residential or open
8
space
2
3
4
5
6
areas
a
of
proposed
shall be buffered from the commercial node.
9
10
11
12
13
Section 29.
Section 28- 1658,
hereby
amended
as
follows:
Section 28- 1658. Measurement.
16
sports arenas, churches and other places of assembly in which
benches,
occupants occupy
pews or other similar seating facilities, each 20 lineal inches of
such seating facilities shall be counted as 1 seat for the purpose of computing off- street parking
17
requirements.
14 (
15
18 (
19
1)
2)
In stadiums,
Service stalls
parking spaces for
or
bays in auto and vehicle repair shops shall not be
meeting the parking requirements of this section.
counted
as
the purpose of
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Section 30.
If any section, subsection, clause
invalid, the remainder shall not be affected
Section 31.
and all sections and
by
such
or
provision of
this ordinance is held
invalidity.
All ordinances and resolutions
or
parts of ordinances and resolutions
parts of sections in conflict herewith shall be and hereby
Section 32.
Codification of this ordinance in the
City Code
are
repealed.
of Ordinances is
authorized and directed.
Section 33. This ordinance shall take effect
23
immediately upon adoption.
hereby
SSED AND ADOPTED by the
1
2
S;
day of ~ ,
City
Council of the
City of Boca
Raton this %
2008.
3
CITY OF BOCA RATON, FLORIDA
4
5
6
ATTEST:
7
8'
Su
9
a
Whelchel,
t~&~ -
Mayor
to /"
1.j '
S~ arma
Hagerty,
'
12' .
13 '.:
14
Approved
as
to form:
15
16
17
18
19
20
City Attorney
21
008119 Final
22
23
24
25
26
27
24
of
G
Boca R a
111COrporated
1925
RESOLUTION
1
79- 2015
2
A
3
CONSIDERING APPEALS OF THE DECISION OF THE
4
PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD ( RESOLUTION NO.
5
2015- 007)
6
REVIEWING
7
SUBMITTED
8
CONSTRUCTION OF A TWO- STORY PLACE OF PUBLIC
9
ASSEMBLY WITH A TECHNICAL
RESOLUTION
OF
THE
APPROVING
CITY
A
OF
SITE
PLAN (
SUPPLEMENTAL
BY
THE
BOCA
RATON
AFTER
INFORMATION
APPLICANT)
TO
ALLOW
DEVIATION
FROM
10
SECTION 23- 190, CODE OF ORDINANCES, RELATED
11
TO
12
MANEUVERING FOR THE CHABAD OF EAST BOCA
13
LOCATED
14
PROVIDING
15
REPEALER; PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE ( SPA- 14-
16
09/ 14- 95000005)
OFF- SITE
AT
VEHICULAR
770
FOR
EAST
CIRCULATION
PALMETTO
SEVERABILITY;
PARK
AND
ROAD;
PROVIDING
FOR
17
18
WHEREAS, on July 28, 2015 the Boca Raton City Council heard the appeal of Arthur C.
19
Koski, Esq. on behalf of Gerald and Deborah Gagliardi, Jon Randal McDonald, James and
20
Nancy Hendrey, lan and Kathleen MacDougall, Miles Olson, Keith Nelson, Chris and Lorraine
1
EXHIBIT 2
1
Fluehr, Anthony DiDonato, Richard R. Cappadona, Susan Elizabeth Stocker, Joneil Industries,
2
Inc., Phylles and George Linger, and Bill and Sharon Shubin,
3
Eubanks, Jr.,
4
LLC, and David W. Roberts ( collectively, "
5
Zoning Board ( Resolution No. 2015- 007) approving a site plan ( after reviewing supplemental
6
information submitted by the Applicant) to allow construction of a two- story place of public
7
assembly with a technical deviation from Section 23- 190, Code of Ordinances, related to off-site
8
vehicular circulation and maneuvering for the Chabad of East Boca located at 770 East Palmetto
9
Park Road, which was rendered on May 07, 2015 ( collectively, "Appeals");
10
11
12 ,
13
14
15
and the appeal of John R.
Esq. on behalf of Royal Palm Real Estate Holdings LLC, Royai Palm Properties
Appellant( s)"
from a decision of the Planning and
and
WHEREAS, the Appeals were filed and heard pursuant to Section 28- 56, Code of
Ordinances; and
WHEREAS, at the hearing, Appellant( s) appeared and stated reasons why he/ she was
aggrieved by the decision of the Planning and Zoning Board; and
WHEREAS, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Boca Raton City Council made a
determination on the Appeals; now therefore
16
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BOCA
17
18
I RATON:
19
20
21
22
23
Section
1.
Recitals:
The recitals contained in the preamble to this resolution are
incorporated by reference herein.
Section 2.
Findings:
That it finds that the evidence and testimony in the record for this
matter supports the approval of Resolution No.
2015- 007 by the Planning and Zoning Board
24
approving the site plan and associated technical deviation, requested by the Chabad of East
25
Boca located at 770 East Palmetto Park Road), based upon the criteria/ standards in the Code
26
I of Ordinances.
2
1
2
Section 3.
Determination:
That it hereby affirms, with the following modification
addition of new condition in Section 3, ( 3)j)):
3
3) j) Prior to the issuance of a main use building permit, an additional
4
handicapped parking space shall be included in the site plan to satisfy
5
regulatory requirements, and the size/ dimensions of all provided spaces
6
shall be reviewed and confirmed for compliance with the code,
7
8
the decision of the Planning and Zoning Board pursuant to Resolution No. 2015- 007 (
9
a site plan allowing construction of a two- story place of public assembly with a technical deviation
10
from
11
maneuvering for the Chabad of East Boca located at 770 East Palmetto Park Road).
12
13
23- 190,
Section 4.
Code
of Ordinances,
related
to
off-site
vehicular
circulation
and
If any section, subsection, clause or provision of this resolution is held invalid,
the remainder shall not be affected by such invalidity.
14
15
Section
approving
Section 5.
All resolutions or parts of resolutions in conflict herewith shall be and hereby
are repealed.
16
Section 6. This resolution shall take effect immediately upon adoption.
17
PASSED AND ADOPTED by the City Council of the City of Boca Raton this
gtiC.-
18
of
2015.
19
CITY OF BOCA RATON, FLORIDA
20
21
ATTEST:
22
23
Susan Haynie, Mayor
24
25
Susan S. Saxton, City Cle k
26
2
28
29
30
COUNCIL VOTE
YES
MAYOR SUSAN HAYNIE
DEPUTY MAYOR ROBERT S. WEINROTH
COUNCIL MEMBER MICHAEL MULLAUGH
COUNCILMEMBERJEREMY RODGERS
COUNCIL MEMBER SCOTT SINGER
31
3
NO
ABSTAINED
day

Chabad of East Boca`s motion to dismiss Document

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