historical background- political aspects

TABLE OF CONTENTS
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND- POLITICAL ASPECTS ........... 4
CYPRUS HISTORY............................................ 4
OPPRESSION OF THE GREEKS.............................. 6
TURKISH TROOPS WERE GUIDED BY GREEKS............ 6
THE TURKISH PERIOD (1571-1878) ........................... 6
SELF RULE (AUTONOMY) ................................... 7
SUMMARY OF PRIVILEGES GRANTED TO THE GREEKS.. 8
THE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF ARMENIANS AND
TURKS ........................................................ 8
CONCLUSION................................................. 9
THE BRITISH TAKEOVER & IMPORTANT EVENTS ............ 9
1931 – THE UPRISING ..........................................14
TURKISH CYPRIOT EFFORTS TO BE ORGANISED ...........18
CYPRUS HISTORY 1950 - 1957................................19
1960 SETTLEMENT & INDEPENDANCE .......................28
GREEK ATTACKS 1963 - 1968.................................36
THE AKRITAS PLAN ............................................48
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS 1968 – 1974 .......................54
THE COUP & TURKISH PEACE OPERATION..................58
NEGOTIATION PROCESS .......................................63
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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRNC...............................65
TURKISH CYPRIOT CASUALTIES ..............................69
MURATAGA AND SANDALLAR VILLAGES MASSACRES..74
ATLILAR VILLAGE MASSACRE .............................75
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS.........................79
AID PROMISES TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS .............81
REACTIONS TO GREEK NO & TURKISH YES VOTE ......86
CYPRUS PHOTOS ...............................................88
TURKISH CYPRIOT PAIN .......................................94
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND- POLITICAL ASPECTS
Cyprus has been ruled by more than ‘two dozen’ nations, by medieval knights, citystates and self appointed kings during its long and turbulent history. Its rulers have
always been one of the strongest powers in the region, whose rule deeply influenced
the island in matters of religion, trade, culture, language, way of life and politics.
CYPRUS HISTORY
Cyprus is an island in the Eastern Mediterranean between the 34th and the 36th
Northern Latitudes and the 32nd and the 35th Eastern Longitudes. It is an island of
9.251 sq. km. Its distance to Turkey is 71 km. and to Greece 900 km. Its highest point
stands at an altitude of 1.019 mt. The longest distance between its East and West is 227
km. and between North and South 97 km. Its total coastal length is 782 km.
The first inhabitants of Cyprus were Neolithic tribes who came from Anatolia and Syria
about 7000 BC. They used stone vessels, did not know the art of making pottery, but
were well-established agriculturists, growing wheat and barley and domesticating
animals: sheep, oxen and dogs. New waves of settlers arrived in about 6000 BC, and
they brought with them skills in making pottery, and gradually the stone vessels used by
the first settlers were replaced by earthenware pots as cooking utensils. The first
inhabitants are classified by archaeologists as Neolithic tribes in the pre-pottery or a
ceramic stage, Neolithic A, and the folk who came later, Neolithic B.
The first settlers established small villages along the coast and some times they dwelt
in riverside settlements of circular huts. The objects found reveal a peaceful life of
farming, fishing, looking after animals and weaving cloth from wool. It must have been
a peaceful life because very few weapons were found during the excavations.
The adoption of bronze for implements and weapons, about 2500 BC, coincided with
the appearance of the ox, the plough, and a plain red pottery, suggestive of Anatolian
origin, of which large quantities have been found in rock-cut tombs of the period. It
may well be that immigrants from Anatolia first exploited the island's copper resources.
By the Late Bronze Age (1600-1050 BC) these had focused neighboring attention on the
island, which prospered as a commercial and culture link between East and West. Under
the name Alasia, Cyprus is recorded among the tributaries of Egypt, from the time of
Thotmes III, but it remained open to traders and settlers from the Mycenaean Empire.
On the disruption of that Empire, Achaean colonies established themselves in
settlements founded, according to legend, by heroes returning from the Trojan war
who brought with them their language and religion, perhaps by way of the coast of Asia
Minor.
In the late eighth century BC. by which time Phoenician enterprise had renewed early
ties with the Syria coast, the island was divided into a series of independent kingdoms,
tributaries of the Assyrian Empire. It was conquered by the Egyptians in the sixth
century BC and held until 525 BC, when, retaining its petty kingdoms, it became
absorbed into the Persian Empire. In 499/8 BC a revolt to assist the Greeks of Ionia in
their struggle against Persia was suppressed. Later, Evagoras of Salamis, having made
himself master of almost the whole of Cyprus (391 BC), raised the island to a position of
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virtual independence. Honoured and intermittently aided by Athens Evagoras even
seized cities on the Syria coast. But a punitive expedition forced him to give up all the
cities of Cyprus and he remained King of Salamis alone and a tributary of Persia.
It remained for Alexander the Great to liberate the island in 333 BC. At the division of
his Empire, Cyprus passed to the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt; it became a Roman
Province in 58 BC, was early converted to Christianity and on the partition of the
Roman Empire fell under the rule of the Byzantine Emperor. For 300 years from the
middle of the seventh century Cyprus lay, in the words of a contemporary English
visitor, "betwixt Greek and Saracens", ravaged by one Arab raid after another.
In 1185 Isaac Comnenos, a relative of the reigning Emperor of Byzantium usurped the
governorship of Cyprus and maintained his independence until 1191, when his rule was
brought to an end by Richard Coeur-de-lion, who was on his way eastwards to take part
in the Third Crusade. Richard occupied the island to avenge wrongs done to the
members of his following by Isaac, but after a few months sold it to the Knights
Templar. They in turn finding its occupation burdensome, transferred it, at Richard's
wish, to Guy de Lusignan ruled the island until 1489, although from 1373 to 1464 the
Genoese republic held Famagusta and exercised suzerainty over a part of the country.
The 300 years of Frankish rule were a great epoch in the varied history of Cyprus. The
little kingdom played a distinguished part in several aspects of medieval civilisation. Its
constitution, inherited from the Kingdom of Jerusalem, was the model of that of the
medieval feudal state; but, with that conservatism which characterized the island
throughout its history, it retained the Assizes of Jerusalem long after they had been
outmoded.
In 1489 Cyprus fell to the republic of Venice, which held it until it was won by the Turks
in 1571, in the Sultanate Selim II. The Venetian administration, elaborate but often
inefficient and corrupt, laboured under the excessive control exercised by the Signory,
which spent on it little more than one-third of the revenue it drew from the island. The
population increased to some 200000 but the former prosperity did not return.
In the long history of Cyprus, there has never existed a Cypriot nation. The Cypriot
population is the remnant of the many nations who occupied and ruled Cyprus.
“... at no time has the island been a constituent part of Hellenic Greece... That there
was real racial affinity with the Hellenic stock there is nothing to prove; the
anthropological evidence, so far as it goes, seems on the whole to favour the contrary
view.” (Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, pp. 488-89)
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OPPRESSION OF THE GREEKS
Before the Turkish Conquest in 1570-1571, oppression of the Greek Orthodox
inhabitants of Cyprus by the Catholic Latins (Lusignan and Venetian) was very severe.
(Doros Alastos, Cyprus in History, pp. 151-152; Sir George Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol.
IV, pp. 5-7)
During the Latin period of 380 years, (1191-1571) their autocephalous Orthodox Church
was oppressed and subordinated by the ruling Latin tyrants who were Catholics. The
lands and property of the Greek Orthodox Church were confiscated and given to the
Roman Catholic sees. The independent Orthodox Archbishopric was totally suppressed.
Orthodox churches were closed and the Greek bishops were deported to remote parts
of the island. (Hill, ibid., p.47, Ahmet Gazioğlu, The Turks in Cyprus, (London 1992) pp.
3-6)
The Greek Cypriots secretly sent a delegation to the Turkish capital, Istanbul, in 1560,
to ask for a Turkish conquest of Cyprus, promising the support of the local Greek
population during the Turkish expedition. (Dr. Salahi Sonyel, New Cyprus Magazine,
March 1988, Gazioğlu, op.cit. p.16)
TURKISH TROOPS WERE GUIDED BY GREEKS
As a matter of fact when the Turkish fleet landed troops at Salines, the port of Larnaca,
on 3 July 1570, the local Greek people gave a warm reception to the Turks. Some Greek
villages, such as Lefkara, sent envoys to Larnaca and offered help and guidance to the
Turkish Army.
THE TURKISH PERIOD (1571-1878)
The first general registration carried out in 1572, showed that at least 76 villages,
which were occupied mostly by Latins, were completely evacuated. Sinan Pasha, the
Beylerbeyi of Cyprus, recommended to the Turkish Government an immediate
resettlement of the island by transfer of people from Anatolia, in order to fill the
empty villages, to improve and develop the land and revive economic and social life.
The records of the Prime Minister's Archive in Istanbul show the total number of
families transferred to Cyprus from Anatolia in 1572 as 1689 families.
The Turkish Sultan’s firman dated 6 May 1572, addressed to the Turkish administrators
in Cyprus stated that the inhabitants should be treated with justice. (Prof. Halil
Inalcik, Ottoman Policy and Administration in Cyprus After the Conquest, the First
International Congress Studies Ankara 1971, p. 61)
Historians, scholars, and authors interested in Cypriot history have noted and praised
Turkish tolerance, magnanimity, and traditional generosity towards non-Moslems. These
include Greek Cypriot historians and writers who openly acknowledged this policy
towards the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and praised the ecclesiastical privileges granted
by the Turkish Sultans. George Chakallis, a distinguished Greek Cypriot lawyer,
politician, and historian wrote in 1902: ‘The Church of Cyprus has enjoyed important
privileges which were recognized by the Turks since the conquest of the island and
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always acknowledged whenever a new Archbishop was elected by an Imperial Berat.’
(G. Chakallis, Cyprus Under British Rule (1902), p.25.)
The Turks left it to the Greek Orthodox people to elect their Archbishop, who
consequently exercised deep-seated and abiding power in every town and village where
Orthodox people lived.
SELF RULE (AUTONOMY)
After the oppressive Latin occupation, it was the Turks who established, for the first
time in the long history of Cyprus, a civil administration based on communal self-rule
and free elections.
Turkish rule immediately ended the humiliation, slavery and poverty of the Greek
people, and they were given freedom and full citizenship rights. They were allowed to
own property and to transfer it. Thus the Greek Cypriot people became active in
agriculture as well as in commercial life.
According to Hepworth Dixon, a British Colonial Administrator and author, the Turks
were preferred to the previous Latin rulers because they granted the Greeks religious
privileges and full communal autonomy; ‘they respected their religious rights and their
village republics’. The Turks also tolerated their tardiness in paying their local taxes.
Although the native Turks paid regularly and punctually, the Orthodox Greeks were very
often in arrears. The Turks never forced the Greeks to settle their arrears on time;
instead they tried to obtain the money by making terms with the Archbishop of Cyprus.
( W.H. Hepworth Dixon, British Cyprus (1879), p.39.)
Dixon adds that the Turkish rule in Cyprus was based on a dual system. On the one side
there was the Pasha of Cyprus ruling from the Konak in Nicosia, while on the other
there was the Archbishop at St. John’s Cathedral. For the sake of peace and order in
the island Konak and Cathedral came to terms. This was achieved not by articles or
treaties but by consent.
During the Turkish period Greek was accepted as an official language together with the
Turkish. The Greek Cypriots were not obliged to learn Turkish or use it to correspond
with government departments and officials. They could use their own language in all
official correspondence and documents. Appeals and reports sent to the Turkish
Government in Istanbul relating to issues which they wanted to be considered by the
Porte (Bab-i Ali) could also be written in Greek.
The names of streets, squares, public places, and offices were displayed in both the
Turkish and Greek languages.
Turkish justice and tolerance provided a stable and peaceful life for the people of the
island as a whole, and apart from the minor incidents that took place during the revolt
against the Turks on the Greek mainland in the 1820s, the 308 years of Turkish rule in
Cyprus saw friendly relations between the two communities. This balance was
maintained by applying the principle of give and take, compromise, and justice.
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It is important to note that relations between the two races during the Turkish period
were sometimes so harmonious that the two communities actually joined together to
resist a number of tax increases.
A less well-known feature of Ottoman tolerance was the granting of special concessions
to Greek merchants. This policy led to the rise of Greek commerce and the Greek
merchant marine at the expense of the Italian city-states after the fall of
Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1453.
The stability, peace and repopulation of towns achieved by Ottoman rule regenerated
the economy of the eastern Balkans and of the eastern Mediterranean as a whole.
Turkish rule in Cyprus must therefore be seen in this wider context. The tolerance and
justice it brought to all Cypriots were based on this universality. It was not prejudiced,
and was therefore able to establish and maintain friendly relations and solidarity among
Moslems and Christians, Turks and Greeks of the island for more than three centuries.
The last Turkish Berat (Imperial decree), which was granted to Archbishop Sophronius in
1865, only thirteen years before the end of Turkish rule is considered to be one of the
finest examples of respect towards the religion of the ruled by those who were in
power. This Berat was similar to others granted to the Orthodox Church, its
archbishops, and bishops from the beginning of the Turkish rule in 1571. Even today it
can be regarded as an excellent example of Turkish tolerance towards other religions
and faiths. A complete translation of the Berat can be found in George Chakallis’s
book, Cyprus Under British Rule, referred to above.
SUMMARY OF PRIVILEGES GRANTED TO THE GREEKS
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The Greek Orthodox Church was granted many privileges and the Archbishop was
declared Ethnarch, the leader of the community.
The Greeks were free to elect their local rulers and run their schools as they wished,
thus enjoying a high level of autonomy.
Greek was accepted as an official language.
The Greeks were represented in equal number in local administrative councils,
district courts and other public institutions.
Special incentives were given to Greek Cypriots engaged in trade and commerce.
THE PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF ARMENIANS AND TURKS
It is very disturbing to see historical facts distorted for petty political purposes. For
instance, claiming that the Armenians of Cyprus suffered oppression under Turkish rule
is quite contrary to the truth and so far, has not been substantiated or documented.
However, there is concrete evidence from many authoritative historical documents,
which clearly testifies to the tolerance and respect of the Turkish authorities towards
all the Christian communities in the island, including the small Armenian population.
Furthermore, the harmonious and happy relations between the Turks and Armenians all
over the island are still within the living memory of the older generation in Cyprus.
People can actually remember the peaceful coexistence and very friendly, neighbourly
attitudes of the two communities, who shared the same streets in the Turkish sectors of
the main towns.
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The well-known Cypriot Armenian lawyer, writer, and poet, Naubar Maksudian, whose
articles have been published mostly in an English periodical called Great Britain and
the East, has on many occasions explicitly emphasized Turkish tolerance towards all the
Christian communities in the island, including the Armenians. One of his articles, a
Turkish translation of which appeared in 1946 in Dünya, the Turkish Cypriot monthly,
demonstrates the Turkish respect for foreign religions by recalling that the Turks gave
to the Christian communities within their provinces possession of those churches they
did not need, to be used once more exclusively for religious purposes, and not as
stables, warehouses, or stores as had been the case under the Latin domination.
He mentions, as an example of this policy, the handing over of the old Latin church in
Nicosia, called Notre Dame de Tyre, by the Turks to the small Armenian community.
Maksudian says that this Latin church had been used as a storehouse for salt by the
Venetians. When Nicosia was conquered in September 1570, Armenian dignitaries
applied to the Beylerbey, Muzaffer Pasha, the first Turkish administrator of Nicosia, and
requested him to give them this building for use as an Armenian church. Muzaffer Pasha
conveyed this request to the Turkish Sultan who responded without delay. Selim II’s
firman addressed to Muzaffer Pasha was dated Zilhicce 978 (1570) and ordered the
transfer of Notre Dame de Tyre to the Armenians in the island, to be used only for
religious purposes.
The Armenians not only enjoyed religious freedom under Turkish rule in Cyprus but
were also a successful population group. They had full and equal rights, practiced the
most profitable professions, and made a lucrative living as moneylenders, goldsmiths,
businessmen, bankers and merchants.
CONCLUSION
The Turkish Period of 308 years proved to be most encouraging for the Christian
community, in particular the Greek Cypriot population. It provided conditions of
tolerance and justice by which the Greek community revived and became prosperous.
THE BRITISH TAKEOVER & IMPORTANT EVENTS
5 May 1878: British Prime Minister, Lord Benconsfield (Benjamin Disraeli), wrote to
Queen Victoria suggesting that if Turkey accepted to hand over Cyprus to Her Majesty,
Britain would guarantee the protection of the Eastern Turkish provinces against the
Russians, by signing a treaty of Defense.
4 June 1878: The Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey
signed. It convention had only two articles. According to the first article, Great Britain
were guaranteeing to "join His imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending by force of
arms if Russia at any future time attempts to take possession of any further Turkish
territories in Asia and in return, in order to enable England to make necessary provision
for executing Her engagement, the Sultan further consent, to assign the island of
Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."
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1st July 1878: An annex to the Anglo-Turkish Convention was signed between the two
sides elaborating the conditions relating to the British administration of Cyprus. The
most important part of this annex was article 6 which was as follows:
"THAT IF RUSSIA RESTORES TO TURKEY KARS AND OTHER CONQUESTS IN ARMENIA
DURING THE LAST WAR, THE ISLAND OF CYPRUS WILL BE EVACUATED BY ENGLAND AND
THE CONVENTION OF 4th OF JUNE, 1878, WILL BE AT AN END".
(As a matter of fact those Eastern provinces were returned to Turkey in 1917 by Russia,
but Britain did not evacuate and hand back Cyprus according to this article. Instead she
unilaterally declared its annexation to the British Empire.)
22 July 1878: The first British High Commissioner Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at
Larnaca. The Bishop of Kitium, Kyprianos, read an address of welcome and reportedly
said: "we accept the change of Government in as much as we trust that Gt. Britain will
help Cyprus, as it did the IOANIAN ISLANDS, to be united with mother Greece, with
which it is naturally connected."
17 April 1879: First Legislative Council assumed its functions. Its members included
one Greek and one Turkish Cypriot (Mustafa Fuat Efendi). Thus both communities were
equally represented.
ENOSIS RUMOUR AND TURKISH REACTION
19 April 1881: The British Prime Minister, Gladstone, informed those Greek Cypriots
who advocated union with Greece (enosis) that "while H.M. Government leniently
desired the happiness of Cyprus they must remind the inhabitants that the island is held
by England under the convention with the Porte (Ottoman Government) as a part of the
Ottoman Empire and that proposals which would be a violation of that convention can
not be discussed".
FIRST ENOSIS MEMORIAL AND TURKISH OBJECTION
29 August 1881: The Greek Cypriot Archbishop, Bishop and the Greek representatives
of 6 districts sent a pan-cyprian memorial' to the Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley,
saying that "they considered it a secret duty to report the wishes of the people of
Cyprus (meaning the Greek Cypriots) who declared recently that their only desire is
union with mother country Greece".
December 1881: The Turkish Cypriot leaders visited the British High Commissioner and
informed him of their objection to the proportional representation, demanded by the
Greeks, because the two communities were always represented equally in such
Ottoman institutions and reminded the British Authorities that even in provinces where
the Christians were in a minority they had equal representation in local councils.
FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FAVOURING GREEKS
10 March 1882: The British Government decided to change the constitution in order to
meet the Greek Cypriot demand for proportional representation that was based on the
1881 census.
25 March 1882: The Mufti of Cyprus, Esseid Ahmet Asim Efendi, sent a telegraph to
Lord Kimberley complaining that, "By this arrangement our ancient and present
privileges shall be trodden under foot. We reject most positively the proposed system."
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28 June 1882: Lord Carnarvon, speaking in the British House of Lords, stated that the
Turkish claim to have equal representation was justified. He maintained that by
disturbing this equality, the 1882 constitution would create deep differences between
the two communities.
29 January 1893: A Turkish Cypriot deputation headed by the Mufti visited Sir Walter
Sendall, the then British High Commissioner and protested the Greek claims for the
cession of the island to Greece. Turkish Cypriot community were content with the
existing administration as long as Cyprus remained an integral part of the Ottoman
Empire.
ENOSIS AGITATION AND GREEK AGGRESSION
22 April 1895: Mifti Ali Rifki and other Turkish Cypriot leaders visited the High
Commissioner and complained about the Greek agitation for enosis and anti-Turkish
campaign.
1895: In almost every town the Greek Cypriots were provoked by the mainland Greeks
who were settled in Cyprus such as Frankudi, Katalyanos and Zannetos and particularly
by the Greek consul Philemon to organize enosis meetings and raise the Greek flag on
every occasion. The Turkish Cypriots resented the Greek agitation and demanded the
return of the island to Turkey.
9 May 1899: The Commissioner of Limassol reported to the Chief Secretary that the
Greek Consul, Philemon, used the occasion of sports festivities at Limassol for Hellenic
propaganda.
The Commissioner expressed his opinion that the Turkish population stood firm in the
face of the Greek agitation and behaved with great sense and moderation... He
recalled that Cyprus was still part of the Turkish Empire, ruled by Britain, and the vast
majority of those Greeks addressed by the Greek Consul were subjects of the Turkish
Empire.
HELLENIC PROPAGANDA IN GREEK SCHOOLS
1902: Canon F.D. Newham, the inspector of schools reported that in the Greek
elementary schools the teachers were engaged in Hellenic propaganda. "A song book
consists of material intended to inflame Greek patriotism and songs against the Turks.
In practice, whenever I ask to hear children sing, it is a war song "FORWARD, FOLLOW
THE DRUM THAT LEADS US AGAINST THE TURKS."
AGITATORS TRAINED IN ATHENS
20 February 1901: The Cyprus High Commissioner Sir W.F. Haynes Smith reported that,
"The agitators are mostly Athens-trained professional people such as doctors, advocates
and teachers. They return to the island imbued with Hellenic propaganda. ...They have
been bred up in the history of the success of agitation applied to the IONIAN ISLANDS
and may have seen the success of organised agitation and violence in Crete".
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RETURN IT TO TURKEY
22 June 1902: Representatives of Turkish Cypriots of Paphos district send a telegram
to the Colonial Office saying that "Should the island be handed over to an uncivilized
and unjust government the evil methods of the Cypriot Greek, which are known to you,
will increase and the catastrophe of the Moslem (Turks) is ensued certain. ... Should
you deem it necessary to hand over Cyprus to another nation we pray it may be
returned to Turkey whose right is indisputable". (PRO Document: CO 883/6) Similar
telegrams were sent to London also by the Turkish Cypriot leaders of other towns.
GREEK INSULTS AND ATTACKS
1912: The Italo-Turkish war of 1911-12 and the defeat of the Turks in Tripoli caused
excitement and joy among the Greek Cypriot community On 27 May 1912 Turkish
Cypriots who were traveling to Limas sol from Malay village in two buses were attacked
by Greeks. The Greeks insulted the Turks in the buses, threw stones and bottles at
them and started beating them with sticks. They repeated their attacks on Turkish
parts of the town, stormed the mosques; beat the Turks in shops and at the fair;
stabbed a Turkish hair-dresser (barber) to death in his shop; destroyed, plundered and
ransacked Turkish properties and wildly shouted the slogan "Long live Greece... Long
live enosis.." The British authorities, had to call for reinforcements from Egypt to help
to maintain the law and order.
UNILATERAL ANNEXATION
5 November 1914: An Order in Council was published on 5th of November 1914
declaring the annexation of Cyprus, still an Ottoman territory, to Great Britain, thus
unilaterally violating the terms of the Convention of 1878, by which only the
administration of Cyprus was handed to England.
CONDITIONAL OFFER TO GREECE
16 October 1915: Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, in an emergency
meeting of the Cabinet managed to have the decision of offering Cyprus to Greece
made on condition that Greece should join the war helping the Serbs who were
attacked by Bulgaria.
27 October 1915: The Greek government headed by Zaimis and the King were not
willing to renounce Greece's neutrality and join the war. Thus the offer was not
accepted. Therefore the British offer to hand over Cyprus to Greece lapsed and the
British parliament was accordingly informed on 27 October 1915.
10-18 December 1918: Turkish Cypriots were in a state of disappointment and in a
desperate position due to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. The
Greek Cypriot demand for enosis and their decision to send a delegation to the Peace
Conference in Paris to further their enosis desire, alarmed the Turks of Cyprus who
decided to hold a National Congress to review this critical development.
On 10th of December the Congress held its first session under Mufti chairmanship and
two resolutions were unanimously adopted. The first resolution said: Turkish Cypriots
strongly rejected enosis and demanded that when the future of the island is considered
at the Paris Peace Conference, the Turkish Cypriots' wish that Cyprus should be handed
back to its legal and real owner should be considered.
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The second resolution, provided that, the Mufti, Hadji Hafiz Ziai Efendi was elected and
appointed as the sole delegate and representative of the Turkish Cypriot community' to
present the Turkish Cypriot case in the Paris Peace Congress.
The British authorities in Cyprus were aware of the fact that a national movement
among the Turkish Cypriots might upset the balance in Cyprus and therefore they did
not permit the Mufti to leave Cyprus, thus preventing his contacts with the Turkish
delegates in the Peace Conference.
TREATIES OF SEVRES AND LAUSANNE
10 August 1920: By the Treaty of Sevres, signed on 10 August 1920, the Ottoman
government accepted on 5 November 1914 the proclamation of bilateral annexation of
Cyprus to Britain. But the government of the Turkish National Assembly, formed on 23
April 1920, rejected the Treaty of Sevres and the war of independence started by
Mustafa Kemal , had prevented its application. However Cyprus was already under
British rule and thus its status remained unchanged until the Treaty of Lausanne, signed
on 24 July 1923.
TURKISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE AND CYPRUS
1919-1922: Turkish Cypriots supported the war of independence under the leadership
of Mustafa Kemal, which was aimed at saving the Turkish mainland from being
partitioned by the Allied powers according to the Treaty of Sevres. Turkish Cypriots
followed very closely the events and developments in modern Turkey and adopted
Ataturk's reforms voluntarily, without being obliged by law or regulations.
CYPRUS DECLARED A CROWN COLONY
The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, is the legal document by which the
world recognized the unitary Turkish Republic as an independent state. By this treaty,
Turkey accepted the annexation of Cyprus to Britain.
AGITATION OF GREEK CONSUL, KYROU
One of the main agitators for Hellenic propaganda and the instigator of the 1931
uprising of Greek Cypriots during the Storrs' era was Alexander Kyrou, the Greek Consul,
who soon established relations with every brand of the ecclesiastical, legislative and
national agitation". (Storrs, Sir Ronald, Orientations (London 1937) pp. 590-591)
REJECTION OF CYPRIOTNESS
In 1930 (on the election day), Under Secretary for the Colonies Dr. Drummond Shiels
Visited Cyprus. While visiting Limassol, Dr. Shiels had a conversation with the veteran
Greek Cypriot politician Inonnis Kyriakides, saying that the British would gladly call the
Greeks of Cyprus, 'CYPRIOTS'. The veteran Greek Cypriot politician replied: "But Cyprus,
your honour, is not a NATION. Cypriots are also the Turks and the Armenians born here.
Why do you wish to avoid calling us by our name? ... We are among the most genuine
and pure parts of HELLENISM; and while you know this, you avoid acknowledging our
name." (Georghallides A political And Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918-1926
(Nicosia, 1979) p.398)
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30 years later, Archbishop Makarios, the first President of the bi-communal partnership
Republic of Cyprus, declared that "The agreements [the 1960 Accords] created a state,
but not a nation" emphasizing that there was no nation called `Cypriots' and it neither
existed in the past nor does it exist now...
THE SECOND TURKISH NATIONAL CONGRESS
The Turkish Cypriot populist leaders decided in 1931, to organize themselves in a
democratic way and to call a 'National Congress' to discuss the formation of a national
front in order to defend the Turkish Cypriot rights against governor Storrs and his
collaborators who were opposing the Kemalist reforms.
The meeting took place, with the attendance of about 150-200 Turkish Cypriot,
representatives coming from all parts of the island.
The Turkish National Congress passed a resolution defining the reforms of the religious
and educational institutions of the Turkish Cypriot people. Unfortunately, this
movement and its resolutions did not produce any concrete result, due to the
declaration of the state of emergency, following the 1931 October Greek Cypriots
uprising.
1931 – THE UPRISING
BURNING THE GOVERNOR'S HOUSE
Members of the new National Union gathered at the Commercial Club in Nicosia and
sent emissaries to call upon the church bells to be rung to summon the people.
Thousands swarmed inside and around the club's premises.
A cry was heard: "To Government House... To Government House." Following this,
"Dionysion Kykkotis, chief priest of the most important church in Nicosia stepped
forward and declared revolution.
A Greek flag was handed to him and he swore the people to defend it. One more speech
was made. The speaker kissed the flag and the cry to the government House was
renewed with frenzy. The leaders seized the flag and at about 6.45pm began to lead
the crowd in procession through the town." After setting cars alight the mob burst the
Governor's house to the ground. There had been also heated demonstrations and
attacks on government properties in all towns and in some villages following days.
The rioters deliberately burned down the Commissioner's house in Limassol. They did
know that the Commissioner was in the house with his wife and 12-year-old daughter
and two servants when they set fire on to it with petrol. They stoned police stations,
set fire to the forests, and destroyed property in nearly seventy villages.
There were more policemen injured than civilians: 6 people were killed and 30
wounded. The police had 38 wounded of whom 15 were Greeks and 23 Turks. (Storrs,
Orientations, p.599)
14
MEASURES TO SUPPRESS THE REVOLT
The ringleaders were arrested and some of them were deported. "There were in all
some 200 villages in which excitement prevailed and demonstrations were made. 70
villages were guilty of destruction of property". (Cmd. 4045, paragraph 60)
Sir Ronald Storrs admitted that the Turkish Cypriots suffered the hardships of all the
measures taken which were equally applied to both communities. The official report
which was published in 1932, described this injustice to the Turks saying that: "The
goodwill of the large Moslem population and the other minorities towards the
Government never wavered throughout the disturbances, though they suffered the
hardships of the curfew orders and other restrictions in common with their fellow
townsmen." (Cmd.4545, paragraph 65)
The constitution was withdrawn, the Legislative Council was abolished and the governor
ruled by decree. The flying of both Greek and Turkish flags, importing textbooks for
schools both from Greece and Turkey and the use of church bells were prohibited. The
repressive regime following the 1931 Greek Cypriot revolt remained in force until early
1940s.
TURKISH CYPRIOT NATIONALISM AND RELATIONS WITH TURKEY
Turkish Cypriot nationalism, which started to grow during the Turkish national
independence war in early 1920s, had been curtailed by the emergency laws of Cyprus,
following the 1931 Greek Cypriot revolt. In 1936, an English headmaster and an English
assistant master were appointed to the Turkish Lycee, and its name was changed to
Moslem Lycee. Despite the censorship of the Turkish Cypriot press during the repressive
regime in 1930's, news from Turkey concerning Atatürk's reforms continued to be
published. Thus, Turkish Cypriots were able to follow the modernization of the new
Turkish state and the adoption of Atatürk's reforms. For instance, when the new Turkish
alphabet, based on Latin script, was introduced in Turkey in 1928, replacing the old
Arabic alphabet, the Turks in Cyprus immediately followed suit.
By 1930, the Turkish alphabet had replaced the Arabic one, and Turkish Cypriot papers
started to appear in the new alphabet. Atatürk himself was deeply concerned with the
Turkish culture and language of Turkish Cypriots and asked his top level officials to
provide every assistance for preserving and developing Turkish culture and language in
Cyprus.
The regular weekly boat services of the Turkish Maritime Lines had maintained and
facilitated the warm and close links between the Turkish Cypriot people and the
mainland.
The Turkish Cypriot papers, like those in Turkey, published special editions with
photographs of Ataturk and articles about the importance of the national days and the
news about their celebrations.
Turkish Cypriots always thought and had a deep conviction that they had a common
destiny with Turkey. They shared not only the enjoyment of success, happiness and
advancement of the Turkish nation, but its sorrow and sad days as well. For instance an
earthquake, or other natural disaster or anything, which caused sorrow, saddened the
Turks in Cyprus who always started campaigns of aid on such occasions. They collected
15
and sent to Turkey money and all kinds of goods, such as clothes, blankets and similar
materials whenever there had been a major natural disaster.
Turkish Cypriots had also been very sensitive towards Ataturk's reforms based on
secularism. They had not allowed the misuse and exploitation of religion for any
political or personal purposes among the Turkish community. They always kept religion
separate from state affairs and strongly protested those few who attempted, from time
to time, to misuse or exploit religion, particularly for the purpose of weakening the
application of Ataturk's reforms for westernization. As a result of Ataturk's concern with
Turkish Cypriots the admission of Turkish Cypriot students to Turkish Universities was
facilitated; exchange of teachers were provided and social, cultural, sportive visits had
increased.
One of the very impressive and unforgettable events, before Ataturk died, took place in
June 1938. That was the visit to Famagusta of the Turkish training ship Hamidiye on 24
June 1938. (Fo 371/21935-3261)
ENOSIS CAMPAIGN RESUMED
Towards the end of the Second World War, enosis campaign had become once more the
main topic of the Cypriot politics. On 31 March 1943 Lord Faringdon stated in the House
of Lords that, Greece is not truly the mother of the Cypriots... and it is also a country
from which they could obtain no possible advantage. (Hansard, H/L Debate, ad 126 cols
1023-45)
While the Greeks protested Lord Faringdon's insults, the Turkish Cypriots sent telegrams
to London protesting against any proposals for self-government or union with Greece.
(The Times, 17 April 1943)
GREEK REFUGEES
Meanwhile Cyprus had become a safe place of Greek refugees from the Aegean islands
invaded by Germany. It was estimated that during the last 3 years of the war around
12,000 Greek refugees arrived in Cyprus and were settled in special camps and lodgings
provided by the government and Cyprus Mines Corporation. Many of them remained and
settled in Cyprus after the war was over.
PRELUDE TO DISORDER AND VIOLENCE
On 23 August 1946, the office of Bishop of Paphos (the Locum-tenens) had sent a cable
to the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Greek Prime Minister Tsaldaris,
asking that the question of Union with Greece should be raised at the Paris Peace
Conference. (The Times, 24 August 1946)
Following this cable, the Bishop of Paphos headed a Greek Cypriot delegation to London
in November 1946. The Turkish Cypriot people, who formed in 1943 their political
organization, KATAK, was closely following the Greek Cypriot political activities,
concerning the future of Cyprus. But when the Colonial Office assured them that the
interests of Turkish Cypriots would be safeguarded they declined from going to London
to challenge the Bishop of Paphos and Instead, Fadil N. Korkut the chairman of KATAK
sent a cable to the Colonial Office protesting enosis demands. In an interview with
Picture Post he also explained the Turkish Cypriot point of view: (Picture post, 11
January 1947. p. 33)
16
Turkish Cypriots did not believe that the British would leave the island. But they
stressed that if Britain decided to leave, Cyprus should go back to Turkey, its previous
owner and nearest neighbour. Turkey was, after all, in a better position than any other
neighbour to defend Cyprus. (Hill, op. cit. p. 564)
ENOSIS RESOLUTION OF THE GREEK PARLIAMENT
On 28 February 1947 the Greek parliament unanimously moved a resolution approving
the call for union of Cyprus with Greece.
This enosis resolution was as follows:
"The time has come for the settlement of the sacred national claim of the union of
Cyprus to Greece. The Greek National Assembly appeals to the noble and gallant people
of Great Britain, expressing the conviction that this claim will be fully satisfied". (The
Times, 1 March 1947)
EFFORTS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION
In early 1947 all was set for a fresh attempt to start new efforts to introduce a new
constitution providing self-rule in Cyprus.
LORD WINSTER'S MISSION
The British Labour government appointed a Labour peer, Lord Winster, early in 1947, as
the Governor of Cyprus with a special mission to form a consultative Assembly of
leading Cypriot representatives to work for a new constitution based on self-rule. But
the hope and opportunity for achieving self-rule was rejected by Ethnarchia, from the
first day it was proposed and consequently a real chance to develop the preliminary
stages leading to independence was lost.
FAILURE
The Greek Cypriot representatives who were under constant attack and severe criticism
directed by the nationalists and the Church, had to reject the British proposals in order
not to be branded as traitors yet again. The Archbishop and the Greek right wing
organizations denounced the proposals and the leftists renewed their objections and
withdrew from the Assembly on 20 May 1948.
Lord Winster, first adjourned the Assembly sine die and later on 12 August he dissolved
it stating that the offers would remain open for consideration if any reasonable and
fully representative leaders come forward to re-examine the proposals for the purpose
of their implementation. He also re-affirmed that no change in the status of Cyprus and
its sovereignty was contemplated. Thus a step forward, which would, certainly lead,
through evolution of self-rule, to independence was not taken.
Almost half a century later, some of the leading leftists who participated in the
Consultative Assembly and particularly Andreas Phantis, a prominent leftist trade
unionist admitted regretfully that by rejecting the British proposals in 1948, the Greek
Cypriots had missed the first real opportunity to realize, in a gradual and smooth way,
their ultimate goal.
17
TURKISH CYPRIOT EFFORTS TO BE ORGANISED
TURKISH CYPRIOT'S EFFORTS TO GET ORGANIZED
The Permission for the Municipal elections in March 1943 had raised the hopes that the
road to self-rule and political liberties would be opened as soon as the war was over.
Turkish Cypriot people who were underprivileged when compared with the Greeks in
running their own communal affairs wanted to be treated on equal basis.
A prominent British historian, Nancy Crawshaw observed that "it is a popular fallacy
that the Turkish Cypriots were highly privileged under the British. Their status and
influence, on the contrary steadily declined during the first 60 years of colonial rule."
(Nancy Crawshaw, THE CYPRUS REVOLT, London 1978 p.42)
The Turkish Cypriot leading personalities decided to organize themselves in order to
defend their communal rights effectively. The first such organization was KATAK which
was established in a meeting of representatives in 1943.
The formation of KATAK was followed by setting up the union of Turkish Farmers and
Turkish trade unions.
TURKISH CYPRIOT POLITICAL PARTIES
Political leaders such as Dr.Küçük and Necati Özkan thought that KATAK's central
committee members were too pro-British and not courageous enough to defend
properly the Turkish Cypriot rights. Therefore, in 1944 Dr. Küçük established his own
political party 'The Cyprus Turkish National People's Party'. He had also launched his
daily HALKIN SESI , two years earlier and started a campaign against the British colonial
government's interference in Turkish Community's affairs, such as education and Evkaf.
He demanded that Sheri Courts should be replaced by new family Courts and Sheri laws
by new family laws, similar to those applied in Turkey. He campaigned for the transfer
of the administration of Evkaf and schools to the Turkish Cypriot community. He
severely criticised the colonial government's biased rule, which favoured the Greeks in
so many ways and asked for fair and equal treatment.
Dr. Küçük and his leading party members competed in Municipal elections both in 1946
and 1949 and were elected. He started to be considered as the leader of Turkish
Cypriot people, towards the end of the 1940's.
THE FEDERATION OF TURKISH CYPRIOT ORGANISATIONS
The Turkish Cypriot representatives from all parts of the island met on 8 September
1949 in Kardes Ocagi Club in Nicosia and resolved for the formation of the ` Federation
of Turkish Cypriot Associations and Organizations', which was usually, called
`FEDERASYON' (The Federation). The Federation, survived until the establishment of
the Turkish Communal Chamber , in 1960, which took over the responsibility and duty
of running all Turkish Cypriot affairs, in accordance with the 1959 Zurich and London
Agreements. Its first chairman was Faiz Kaymak and the last one Rauf Denktas, who was
elected in 1960 to be the president of the Turkish Communal Chamber.
18
TURKISH POLICY ON CYPRUS
Following the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the newly-formed Turkish
Republic allowed Turkish Cypriots to opt for Turkish nationality. Turkey encouraged
Turkish Cypriots who had chosen Turkish nationality to emigrate to Turkey and a
Turkish Consulate was opened in Larnaca in 1925 to help facilitate this emigration.
9,800 Turkish Cypriots opted for Turkish citizenship and around 7,000 of them
emigrated and settled in Turkey. (Cyprus Annual Colonial Reports for 1923-1928)
The Turkish Foreign policy of Atatürk was based on the principle of not having any
expansionist designs on neighboring territories or islands. His declared principle had
been: `Peace at home, peace on world' . Cyprus, where a strong Turkish Community
had survived for centuries, was strategically vital for Turkey. However, as long as it was
in the hands of Britain, Ankara had no need to fear that it would be used against
Turkey's national interests. Nevertheless when the danger of uniting Cyprus with Greece
had reached to an alarming level, Turkey raised its voice to protect the Turkish Cypriot
Community and its vital national interests.
Apart from security reasons, Turkish concern over Cyprus was mostly based on the
perceived need for the survival of Turkish Cypriot cultural identity and its development
as well. Therefore, Turkey sent teachers and headmasters to promote Turkish
education, language and culture in Cyprus, except during the repressive years,
following the 1931 Greek uprising.
CYPRUS HISTORY 1950 - 1957
THE 1950 PLEBISCITE
The left wing Greek organizations, under the leadership of AKEL, had initiated the
move of organizing an ENOSIS plebiscite and also taking the issue to the UN, earlier
than the Church and the Greek nationalists.
The Church followed AKEL's initiative and decided to hold an Enosis plebiscite itself on
15 January 1950. As soon as this was announced the Turkish Cypriot press and leaders
started a campaign for opposing and rejecting this action. They also sent messages to
Turkey and asked the Turkish government to make representations to the British
government against such a development, which would substantially harm Turkish
interests and cause the end of Turkish Cypriot existence. When the date announced for
the plebiscite was nearing, the deep concern both of the Turkish Cypriots and of Turkey
forced the Turkish Foreign Minister N. Sadak to remove the Turkish Cypriots' anxiety
declaring that, "the union of Cyprus with Greece could not be considered. If the
question of handing over Cyprus is raised, the opinion of Turkey, the island's former
owner will be required."
The enosis plebiscite was held, as announced, on 15 January 1950. It was an event
monopolized by the Church committees. The Akelists were refused participation at the
Committee level, but all Greek Cypriots irrespective of their ideologies were called to
sign the books for enosis .
19
The books were kept open until the following Sunday and on 29 January an encyclical
signed by all the bishops announced a 95.70% vote in favour of enosis.
THE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE PLEBISCITE
A prominent Greek Cypriot scholar and author, Zenon Stavrinides commented: "It is not
easy to draw any definite conclusions from this event since the population was
persistently urged by the nationalists to "vote" and the "voting" took the form of signing
one's name under a petition in public. If a Greek was to `vote' on this issue at all it was
as embarrassing and risky for him to `vote' against enosis as to declare in public that he
was not a 'true Greek'". (Zenon Stavrinides, Cyprus Conflict, National Identity and
Statehood, p.28)
ANTI ENOSIS MEETING OF CYPRIOT TURKS
The Turkish Cypriot political leaders and associations organized a mass meeting in
Nicosia on 11 December 1949. 15.000 Turks from all over the island attended. The
Speakers denounced the enosis campaign of the Greeks and protested the attempt of
the church for a plebiscite. The meeting passed a resolution stating that Cyprus had
been for more than 300 years part of the Turkish Empire and as it was given to Britain
under a convention, the island should be returned to Turkey if British decides to leave.
GREEK EFFORTS TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE PROBLEM
The Bishop of Kition was elected as Archbishop Makarios III, on 18 October 1950. On the
occasion of his enthronement on 20 October 1950 he took the following oath: "I take
the holy oath that I shall work for the birth of our national freedom and shall never
waiver from our policy of uniting Cyprus with mother Greece" As a matter of fact he
continued to keep this oath until he died in August 1977. Makarios followed a very
active policy and did his utmost to internationalize the Cyprus question. He was
resolved to take the Cyprus question to the UN, demanding the right to selfdetermination, which would obviously lead to the union with Greece.
TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE
Annexation of the Dodecanese islands to Greece at the end of the Second World War,
had obviously increased the hopes of Greeks that the next step would be the cession of
Cyprus. Turkish press being aware of this Greek aspiration and hope, started to remind
all concerned that Turkey would never allow this Greek aspiration to be realized. The
common message from both Turkish statesmen and press had been to warn that,
"Cyprus Question could not be solved without Turkey"
The last Foreign Minister of Inonu's ruling Republican people's party, Necmettin Sadak ,
during a debate in the National Assembly on 23 January 1950, immediately after the
enosis plebiscite was held, declared that "There is no such a question called the Cyprus
question. Because Cyprus today is under the sovereignty and rule of British and we are
sure that Britain has no any intention to hand over the island to any other state.
CAMPAIGN FOR DISOBEDIENCE
Towards the middle of 1950's the Turkish government had been convinced that Greece
had a policy to annex Cyprus and therefore Turkey should follow a definite and clear
policy to oppose this Greek expansionism with vigour in every international platform
where the Cyprus question was taken by the Greeks.
20
On 13 January 1952, on the 2nd anniversary of the enosis plebiscite Makarios delivered
a speech declaring disobedience and passive resistance towards British administration.
He also stated that they were ready to resort every means to achieve their national
goal.
He wrote the following to the British Prime Minister on 10 May 1953: "We declare once
more, firmly and unshaken, that we insist on our claim for the union of Cyprus with
the free Hellenic state" A confidential FO paper about Cyprus, dated 19 November, had
withdrawn the attention to "the fact that Greek irredentist claims set up a counter
irritation in Turkey which, though content to leave matters as they are, would
certainly take it very much amiss if Greek pressure for the handing over Cyprus to
Greece became excessive. This might easily have a seriously disruptive effect on the
unity of the Balkan pact."
It was reported on 13 March 1954, that the Greek government decided to take the
matter to the UN unless Britain agreed to direct negotiations by 1st of September.
BRITISH OFFER FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION
In London, the philhellenes in the British Parliament, were pressing the government to
hold talks with Cypriots about the island's constitutional future. Henry Hopkinson,
Minister of State, stated on 28 July, in the House of Commons that "the Government
had decided that the time had come to take a fresh initiative in the development of
self-governing institutions in Cyprus" and added that they wished to make it clear that
they could not contemplate a change in the sovereignty of Cyprus.
He also stated that there were two distinct Communities in Cyprus each of which having
close links with their motherlands, Greece and Turkey. (Hansard, House of Commons,
28 July 1954, vol 531, cols 504-506; The Times 29 July 1954)
TURKISH INTEREST AND THE FIRST DEBATE IN THE UN
The big mistake of the Greek governments of the 1950s had been to undermine the
seriousness of the Turkish interest in Cyprus. They were under the impression that very
cautious and peaceful reaction of the Turkish Government, so far, was a sign of
weakness and that Turkey could be neutralized by an alliance such as the Balkan Pact
and with a few friendly statements or gestures, designed to remain merely on paper.
The Megali Idea aspirations of Greece and its false interpretation of Turkish moderate
attitude still seems to be a predominant factor which blocks the way for a final and just
settlement to the Cyprus dispute.
The Greek application to the UN in 1954, demanding self-determination for Cyprus
activated the Turkish foreign policy makers and a series of meetings took place in
Ankara in August, working on the strategy and tactics to be followed. Makarios clearly
admitted that their demand for the acknowledgement of the right to self-determination
for ` Cypriots would mean nothing but the union of the island with Greece and in fact
that was their main objective in taking the issue to the UN.
When he was asked about Turkish Cypriots' position and about their opposition to
enosis, Makarios, once more, tried to minimize and underestimate the Turkish
existence and its attitude, saying that `the view of the minority should not prevail
21
against the will of the majority', thus pretending that there was a Cypriot nation made
up of the Greeks and the Turks were simply a minority in that Greek Cypriot nation.
Needless to say this statement was utterly at odds with the accepted fact that the
Cyprus people were consisted of two distinct Cypriot peoples and that there was and
had never been a Cypriot nation on the island as Makarios himself admitted by declaring
years later, in 1960, that even "The Cyprus agreements (of 1959) had created a state
but not a nation". After having long discussion a draft resolution was voted and
accepted both in the political Committee and then in the Assembly by 50 votes to none
with 8 abstentions.
The full text of Resolution 814 (IX), adopted on 17 December 1954, reads: "The General
Assembly, considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt
a resolution on the question of Cyprus, decides not to consider further the item entitled
`Application under the Principle of Equal Rights and Self-Determination of peoples in
the case of the population of the island of Cyprus".
PREPARATIONS FOR TERRORISM
The day after Makarios returned from New York in early January 1955, he met with
Colonel George Grivas in the Larnaca Bishopric and told him that Marshall Papagos as
well was now in full agreement with their activities to form an underground
organization. . At this meeting the underground organization was named EOKA (Ethniki
Organosis Kyprion Agoniston: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).
Grivas arranged secret shipments of arms to Cyprus from Greece despite the
interception of Ayios Georgios and continued his preparations to start `The revolt'.
After consultation with Makarios, Grivas decided to launch `The struggle' on the night
of 31 March - 1st of April 1955. Grivas, Memoirs, (Longmans, London, 1964) p.32
TERRORISM STARTED
The first EOKA bombs exploded at 00.30 hours on 1st of April 1955 which lasted in 1959
and caused the death of more Greek Cypriot civilians than the total of British killed. It
created civil strife and mistrust between the two Cypriot communities. Sir Anthony
Eden, the British Prime Minister, underlined that "EOKA received direct support from
Greece in money, arms, organization and propaganda. Greek-speaking Cypriots were
awed by EOKA terrorists and subject to bombardment by Athens radio." Full Circle, The
Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden (London 1960), p.395
THE TURKISH CONCERN
In Turkey, during the months of July and August, there was a considerable increase in
public anxiety and tension concerning the Cyprus problem. The climbing terrorist
activities of EOKA and the fear that it would one day turn its guns towards Turkish
Cypriots were among the causes of increasing tension. Already 14 Turkish Cypriots were
killed by EOKA gunmen.
A note was given on 23 August to the British Ambassador in Ankara by which the Turkish
Government expressed its deep concern about the Greek Cypriot assault on Turkish
Cypriots and warned that the reactions to such incidents in Turkey were rising to
dangerous levels, and that Turkey could not stay passive any more regarding the threats
of annihilation of the Cypriot Turks. Therefore the Turkish Government demanded that
22
the British Government should take every step to prevent the terrorist activities and
fully secure the lives and properties of Turkish Cypriots.
THE TRIPARTITE LONDON CONFERENCE
In August 1964, Britain invited Turkey and Greece to a Conference in London, on the
Affairs of the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus.
Turkish Prime Minister Menderes, referring this invitation said:
"The fact that the most parts of the Turkish shores are surrounded by the threatening
observation posts of foreign states should be acknowledged by everyone. Today only
the shore facing Cyprus seems to be safe. Therefore Cyprus is a continuation of Turkey
and forms one of its essential security points. Thus, if any doubt is raised about its
present status, this has to be resolved not on technical merits but on the basis of other
more important and more substantial realities. Our delegation in London will defend
the preserving of the status quo as a minimum condition."
The London Conference opened at Lancaster House on 29 August 1955 and was attended
by delegations of the three countries headed by their Foreign Ministers.
Meanwhile Greece applied to the UN for yet another debate on the Cyprus question
before its delegation went to London, considering that the conference would fail.
Archbishops Makarios and Greek Cypriot leaders were disappointed and upset, because
Turkey was introduced as a party to the dispute. They called upon Britain to hold
bilateral talks with the Cypriots or with Greece only.
The conference ended on 6 of September without reaching a satisfactory conclusion on
the future of the island.
HARDING-MAKARIOS TALKS
Following the London Conference Britain decided to replace the governor of the island,
with a military man. The new governor Field Marshall Sir John Harding, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived in Cyprus on 3 October 1955 and the next day he met
Makarios in Ledra Palace. They had another three consecutive meetings all of which
ended without any progress.
Following the failure of these talks, the British government devised a new formula and
issued a new policy statement. Makarios rejected it immediately and asked the Greek
government to exert pressure on Britain by radio broadcasts and through international
action. He also wanted the US to be drawn into this process on the side of Greece and
the Greek Cypriots.
The Greek side's efforts to by-pass Turkey and to avoid Turkish participation in the
future talks were not considered to be either a fair or a viable approach by the British
Government. A. Eden, op. cit, p. 404
Eden, the British premier thought that they had to convince Turkey that the interests of
both Britain and Turkey would not be abandoned. Therefore sent a message to the
Turkish premier, asking for his understanding.
23
Sir John Harding expressed the opinion that Archbishop Makarios wanted to have an
agreement, but only if it is a step towards enosis . He suggested to London that,
Makarios must be pinned down or he will go on raising his price with each new
concession. The governor emphasized that as long as terrorism is not stamped out,
Makarios would take the line that the Greek people's dedication to enosis could not be
underestimated and that facts must be faced, and that it was not his fault if events
outside his control made it impossible for him to stick to his side of the bargain.
Consequently he would insist on demanding the early, if not immediate, exercise of
self-determination.
SECOND PHASE OF HARDING-MAKARIOS TALKS
The negotiations between the Governor and the Archbishop, resumed on 27 January
1956, in Nicosia. Harding, in his letter to Makarios before the resumption of talks stated
clearly that it was not British policy that self-determination could never be applicable
to Cyprus. But it was not now a practical proposition on account of the present
situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.' While the exchange between the Governor and
Archbishop headed to a stalemate, towards the end of February, the Governor
suggested that it would help if the Colonial Secretary could visit Cyprus. Lennox Boyd
accepted this and flew to Cyprus on 26 February. The day Lennox Boyd arrived, EOKA
exploded a large number of bombs in Nicosia, perhaps to warn both sides that it would
not tolerate any further `concessions' which might block the way to its declared goal,
uniting the island with Greece.
Lennox Boyd met Makarios on 29 February and repeated the British policy while EOKA
struck harder than ever with 19 explosions in Nicosia only. Makarios repeated his
position and insisted on his conditions. Lennox Boyd returned to London, the next day,
with empty hands and made a statement in the House of Commons on 5 March reading
out the final version of the British formula on self-government. He said that painstaking
negotiations of last 5 months ended with deadlock. A. L. Boyd added: "I must confess
with distress, that as soon as one obstacle is out of the way another one, unheard until
a week or two before, rears its head."
THE DEPORTATION OF MAKARIOS
The British now had reliable evidence that Makarios had all along close links with the
terrorist activities and actually encouraged plans for bringing secretly arms,
ammunition and explosive into the island. The Bishop of Kyrenia, particularly was even
more deeply implicated. In early March, the Governor suggested that the situation
demanded the removal of Makarios and Bishop of Kyrenia to some place where they
could do no harm. "We decided that the interests of order and security justified their
dispatch to the Seychelles and we authorised the deportations on March 6th. These
were carried out on March 9th." Eden, op, cit, p.412
THE IMPORTANCE OF TURKISH VIEWS REITERATED
On 14 May the House of Commons debated the Cyprus problem. A Conservative member
of parliament, John Maclay drew the attention of the House to the fact that the Cyprus
problem was one, which vitally affected three nations as well as the two peoples of
Cyprus. He maintained that the view of the people of Turkey on Cyprus was the crux of
the problem and any proposals, which were sentimentally and democratically attractive
but ignore the Turkish views, could not be justified.
24
He said:
"Britain is involved, NATO is involved, but the nation which has this island 40 miles off
its southern shore - an island which covers its key ports - her view on the future of
Cyprus demand the closest attention."
LORD RADCLIFFE'S PROPOSALS
Lord Radcliffe, a Constitutional expert was appointed in 1956 to prepare proposals for a
new Cyprus Constitution based on full self, government.
The Greek Cypriot leaders had refused to talk anybody on the future of Cyprus while
Makarios was in exile. Thus Radcliffe was confined to having meetings only with the
Governor, high ranking civil servants and Turkish Cypriot leaders.
The Secretary of State for Colonies, Alan Lennox Boyd flew to Athens and Ankara in
mid-December to explain Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals. The Radcliff's Report
provided self-government by which Cypriots would have rights to rule themselves. Only
a few hours after the Radcliff proposals were made public, Athens Radio announced
that the Greek Government rejected them completely. Thus the Greek Cypriot leaders,
including Makarios, who was informed about the content of the report the same day,
were not given a chance by Athens to consider the proposals and make their own
decision. The Turkish Prime Minister, A. Menderes issued a statement through Anatolian
News Agency that the Radcliff Report could provide a fair negotiation basis. Gazioglu,
Ingiliz Idaresinde Kibris (Istanbul 1960) s. 129
He also stated in the National Assembly that the Turkish Government considered
partition as a proposition that cannot be overruled. Because he said it would provide
Turkish Cypriots to live under the Turkish flag and thus Cyprus would not anymore be a
potential threat for Turkey.
He added that, Turkey would accept partition as a great concession, and no one would
be able to impose any other solution against the Turkish will. Washington post, 27
December 1956
SELF DETERMINATION AND THE UN
Meanwhile the Greek Government's appeal to the UN `for equal rights and selfdetermination for Cyprus' was accepted to be discussed during the 11th session. During
the debate in the Political Committee Turkish delegate, Salim Sarper, accused Greece
of having expansionist aspirations and thus acting against the Treaty of Lausanne which
excluded for all time any possibility of subjecting Cyprus to Greek rule. N. Crawshaw,
OP. Cit, p.222
Sarper underlined that self-determination was not applicable in all circumstances.
Greece, for instance had refused Turkey this right when it invaded Western Anatolia
and in the case of Western Thrace when that issue was discussed at Lausanne in 1923.
Thus Western Thrace, where the Turks were in majority was annexed to Greece against
the will of the majority of its population, as part of the Lausanne settlement.
He also stated that Turkey had attached great importance to the British policy
statement announced in the House of Commons in December which recognized the right
of self-determination for both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Communities on equal
terms. In other words, partition was accepted by Turkey.
25
Resolution 1013 (XI) was adopted by the plenary session of the UN as General Assembly
Resolution 1013 (XI), on 26 February 1957, by 55 votes to nil and one abstention, it was
follows:
"The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Cyprus, Believing that the solution of this problem
requires an atmosphere of peace and freedom of expression, Expresses the earnest
desire that a peaceful, democratic and just solution will be found in accordance with
the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and hopes that the
negotiations will be resumed and continued to this end."
TURKS HAD BEEN VICTIMS OF EOKA
Racial tension increased in early 1957, when EOKA attacked Turkish police and
auxiliaries. On 18 January four Turkish auxiliaries were injured while on guard at a
power station near the Archbishopric. One of them died. The news of this attack raised
anger among Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and crowds of young Turks crossed the `MasonDixon Line' which divided the Turkish and Greek quarters and took revenge by setting
on fire of some Greek shops. Ten days later another Turkish Cypriot policeman was
killed by an EOKA bomb. This also provoked intercommunal strife. Turkish Cypriot
workers went on strike in protest at the EOKA attacks against the Turks.
MAKARIOS RELEASED
In March 1956, after inflicting heavy losses to EOKA the Governor, considered that the
security situation was improved and Makarios's detention could be ended. On 28 March,
Lennox Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, announced the decision to release Makarios and
his compatriots. The Governor declared safe-conduct to Colonel Grivas and any member
of EOKA.
But Makarios not only refused to make a clear public statement calling for the cessation
of violence by EOKA, but also accused the British Government of intransigence and
announced his rejection of Radcliffe's plan for self-government. He also rejected the
NATO's offer of mediation.
On the other hand, Grivas refused to abandon `the struggle' and leave the island, until
there was an agreement based on self-determination. Grivas Memoirs, pp. 168-169
MORE KILLINGS, TORTURE AND ASSASSINATIONS
From the beginning of August 1957, EOKA resumed its attacks on both military and
civilian targets, killing Britons, Greeks and Turks indiscriminately.
This was a campaign of `insidious violence' . Political rivals were attacked and members
of left-wing associations and trade unions were punished by beating, wounding and
assassinations.
DEFENSIVE MOVE OF TURKS
EOKA's attacks against Turkish Cypriots, created tension and a grave danger to their
safety and future well-being. Thus some elements of the Turkish Community set up a
counter underground organization to defend Turkish Cypriots. The leaflets first signed
`9 September , and Volkan were distributed clandestinely. They stated that Turkish
26
Cypriot Youth would not allow EOKA to murder the Turks and would fight to the end to
protect Turkish rights and dignity. On 31 August 1957, four Turkish Cypriot youths were
killed when the bomb they were making exploded in their hideout in Küçük Kaymakli, a
suburb of Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriot leaders continued to urge restraint on their
followers, but EOKA's intensified killings of Turks added to the tension between the two
communities.
A NEW GOVERNOR
The efforts to solve the problem on the basis of self-rule leading to independence came
to an end when Greece took the issue once more to the UN. In Autumn of 1957, Sir John
Harding's two years term drew to a close. The general feeling was that the Cyprus
problem could only be solved not by military might but through negotiations. Now that
Makarios was free and Britain ready to transfer the sovereignty of Cyprus on condition
of retaining her military bases, it was time to appoint a new civil governor who might
create a new atmosphere towards this end. Sir Hugh Foot had been the choice for the
governorship. He had a reputation of being liberal and impartial.
FRESH EFFORTS AND A NEW PLAN
The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, revealed in his memoirs that he began,
however reluctantly, to feel in his own mind that `perhaps partition would be the only
way out' . Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959, p.660
He says, "This plan provided for the delineation of British military enclaves, where full
British sovereignty would remain, while the rest of the island would be ruled by a
`condominium' of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey with sovereignty held in
partnership."
THE MACMILLAN PLAN
The full text of the new British plan, was communicated to Ankara and Athens, on 10
June 1958. "The Greeks took a new and unexpected position. They now objected Turkey
playing any part, in the controversy, on the grounds that by the Treaty of Lausanne
Turkey had surrendered all her rights. This seemed a strange argument, since under the
same Treaty Greece had equally accepted the British occupation." Macmillan, Op. Cit,
p.668
Macmillan, himself announced the content of the plan in Parliament on 19 June. He
declared that the main purpose was to achieve a settlement "acceptable to the two
communities in Cyprus and the Greek and Turkish governments, subject to the
safeguarding of the British bases and installations." Ibid, p.669
THE OUTLINE OF THE PLAN
- It would provide the co-operation and participation of Turkey and Greece in a joint
effort to achieve peace, progress and prosperity of the island.
- The island would have a system of representative Government with each community
exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs.
- The international status of the island would remain unchanged for seven years.
- The governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and
Turkish Governments, would have reserved powers to ensure that the interests of both
Communities were protected. Ibid p.67
27
The Greeks strongly objected to the idea of having Turkish and Greek government
representatives in the 'governor's Council' , since this was equivalent to admitting 'de
jure' a Turkish 'presence in the island.
Macmillan, later made a few alterations to please the Greek side.
The modified plan was released on 15 August. The Greek Government again rejected it
and Makarios issued from Athens a statement declaring that `the Cyprus people' would
not accept any arbitrary decision and were now more than ever insistent on asserting
their right to self-determination. Macmillan commented that Makarios's statement
"could be interpreted to mean either independence or enosis . Ibid, p.685
The Greek government's official rejection came on 19 August and a week later the
Turks announced their acceptance. The British decided to implement the plan, because
if they had postponed it they "should have lost the Turks for good and civil war would
have begun."
1960 SETTLEMENT & INDEPENDANCE
ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE
Despite the implementation of the Macmillan plan by stages, the search for a final
settlement had also continued in the UN during the Autumn of 1958. Meanwhile NATO's
mediation efforts and British Government's proposal for a tripartite Conference were
refused both by Greece and Makarios. Thus the diplomatic activity was shifted to the
UN. The Greek Government's new policy was based on an interim period of selfgovernment leading to independence under the UN auspices, that status not being
subject to alteration without UN consent. (Reddaway, op. cit, p. 115)
Archbishop Makarios informed Britain that he was ready to accept independence with
guarantees for the ` Turkish Minority'. This new move was a tactic to halt the
implementation of the Macmillan plan, and had been decided upon jointly by Makarios
and the Greek Government. The British stand had been to stress that the solution `they
were seeking was one acceptable to the three Governments and to the peoples of
Cyprus and to achieve this end they were ready to enter into discussions at the
appropriate time with all concerned'. Xydis, op. cit, p. 294
The Turkish Foreign Minister, F. Zorlu, stressed that the right to self-determination or
independence should be given to both Cypriot peoples. He explained that in Cyprus
there were two separate peoples but not a nation and consequently each of them was
entitled to equal rights vis-à-vis independence and self-determination. He warned that
all the Greeks wanted was to dominate the Turks and use independence as a steppingstone to Enosis as was acclaimed publicly by Makarios.
The adopted final draft called for `a conference between the three governments
directly concerned and the representatives of the Cypriots ' and considered that the
`self government and free institutions should be developed in accordance with the
charter of the UN to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots' it urged such a
28
conference to be convened and ' that all concerned should cooperate to ensure a
successful outcome in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the UN" . Averoff described this as a defeat for the Greek side, saying that "the battle
was lost". Averoff, Lost Opportunities (New Rochelle, N.Y. 1986) 293.
The next day, 5 December, the United States and Britain initiated a move through
Mexican delegate for the replacement of the Iranian resolution with another that would
be acceptable to all. The meeting of the heads of delegates of Greece, Turkey, Iran,
Mexico the UK and the US the same day, resulted in an agreement was reached on a
text which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly in the afternoon, without
being put to the vote, it reads:
"The General Assembly,
Having Considered the question of Cyprus,
Recalling its resolution 1013 (XI),
Expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a
peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the charter of the United
Nations"
GRECO-TURKISH TALKS LEADING TO INDEPENDENCE
Following this resolution Zorlu's personal approach to Averoff suggesting bilateral talks
between themselves was accepted by the Greek Government. The Greeks were under
the pressure of the Macmillan plan, which provided a joint sovereignty for Turkey and
Greece over Cyprus. Therefore they had to accept the realities of the island and be
prepared to share the sovereignty with the Turks in order to prevent partition. Averoff
and Zorlu had a preliminary talk in New York on 6 December 1958 on a `partnership
republic' which would be run jointly by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots and soon
afterwards continued their talks in Paris. Zorlu explained the Turkish view on
independence, underlining the basic principles, which had to be complied with:
a) It would be a bicommunal republic. Each community would run its own affairs
separately
b) The power would not in all cases be shared in proportion to the relative size of the
two communities.
c) There would be separate municipalities in main towns.
d) The Head of State would be rotated between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities.
e) As partition was ruled out, Turkey would have two small coastal areas in Cyprus
under its own sovereignty.
f) Similar or perhaps larger base areas should be ceded to Greece and Britain would
retain one or two sovereign bases.
Averoff raised objection to the suggestion of having military bases and proposed
Austrian type of neutrality guaranteed by NATO or some other international body.
Meantime he ` readily admitted that there were two Cypriot communities and that was
why we should make different arrangements for them where necessary' . Ibid, p. 302
Zorlu expressed the opinion that all problems could be easily settled if Cyprus acquired
independence as a FEDERAL REPUBLIC. He also suggested that if Turkey and Greece
were left to themselves, without outside interference, they would be more honest with
each other and be able to talk things over within a more friendly atmosphere. When
29
Averoff rejected the federal solution, Zorlu suggested that they would have to find
some way of giving the Turks `watertight guarantees' for the security of the Turkish
Cypriot people and national security of Turkey. Macmillan commented: `the steady
advance of our progressive plan seems indeed to have been an important factor in
bringing about the improved attitude of both Greeks and Turks'. Macmillan, op. cit,
p. 690
During the second round of Paris talks in January 1959 Averoff and Zorlu reached
agreement on an overall framework providing a bicommunal Cyprus Republic and
decided to arrange a meeting between the two Prime Ministers for a final draft.
According to Averoff Makarios had no objection to the agreed outlines of the
independence. The Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers, Menderes and Karamanlis met in
Zurich on 6 February and it was announced on 11 February that they had reached an
agreement for a final Cyprus settlement which they initialed.
THE MAIN POINTS OF THE AGREEMENT
On 12 February the British, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers met in London and
decided that the UK Government would make a statement declaring that, provided the
Greek and Turkish Governments and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were agreed,
Britain would hand over the sovereignty of the island, outside the British bases, to the
Cypriot people (Turkish and Greek Communities).
Membership to international organization: One of the main principles was about the
joining of the Cyprus Republic to alliances and international organisations, which was
originally proposed by Averoff. It was as follows: In respect of foreign affairs, however,
there would be no veto on Cyprus joining alliances and international organizations of
which both Turkey and Greece were members'. FO 371/1441640-163526
This provision was later incorporated in Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee which says:
"The Cyprus Republic undertakes not to participate in whole or in part, in any political
or economic union with any state whatsoever" . When the Minister of State, Lord Perth,
enquired further about this provision both Zorlu and Averoff made it clear that `there
would be no objection to Cypriot membership of international associations of which
both Greece and Turkey were members.’ Ibid
The Joint Executive Authority: According to the "Basic Structure" of the Zurich
Agreement, Cyprus was to be an independent republic based on presidential regime,
with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president elected separately
by their respective communities. The executive authority was vested jointly in the
president and the vice-president who had separately veto powers on laws and decisions
concerning foreign affairs, defense and security. They had also the right to return for
consideration all other laws and decisions of the Government. Political Equality: The
main clauses of the ` Basic structure' together with the Treaties of Guarantee and
Alliance had laid down and confirmed the principle of political equality of both
communities in a partnership state based on functional federalism. Thus the state
created was a republic of which its two main peoples were accepted to be politically
equal co-partners. Legislation: The legislative authority was vested in the House of
Representatives, composed of 70% Greek and 30% Turkish Cypriot members elected
separately by their respective communities. The same percentage was allocated for
Turkish and Greek civil servants. Communal Chambers: Both Communities would run
30
their communal affairs through separate Turkish and Greek communal chambers.
Separate Municipalities: Separate municipalities would be created in the five largest
towns. The Constitutional Court: The supreme Constitutional Court would be composed
of one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot and one mutually acceptable neutral judge
who would presided over the Court. Any conflict of authority should be decided by the
Constitutional Court. Both, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance should
have constitutional force. Intervention: The Treaty of Guarantee provided that the
guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Britain) had a right and obligation to intervene
to re-establish the state of affairs created by the agreements.
SIGNING THE AGREEMENTS
On 17 February 1959, the London Conference on Cyprus opened at Lancaster House.
The Foreign Ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey were present with the Turkish
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot delegations, headed by Dr. Fazil Kuchuk and Archbishop
Makarios, respectively.
There were two long sessions that day. The Prime Minister of Greece, Karamanlis,
arrived the day the meeting started but Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, was not
so lucky. His plane crashed while landing near Gatwick Airport. Some of the Turkish
delegate died and 15 of them, including Menderes, survived with injuries. Consequently
he was not able to attend the Conference, as he was having medical treatment in The
London Clinic. Archbishop Makarios, who arrived in London with a crowded delegation
of Greek Cypriots for consultations, first raised various objections and said that he
would not sign the Zurich Agreement. Karamanlis and Averoff pointed out to him `the
inconsistencies of his position and the far reaching consequences that were likely to
ensue'. Averoff, op. cit, p 348
Karamanlis pronounced that no matter what Makarios may do he would have signed the
Agreement, and warned Makarios that that would be the end of the Greek Government's
Cyprus policy. Averoff told Makarios and his advisers that any further bloodshed in
Cyprus from now on would be their own responsibility." The next morning Makarios
changed his mind and decided to sign. When he was asked why he caused so much
trouble, he replied enigmatically that he had his reasons. Averoff says that his reasons
caused the Archbishop to keep up a display of stubborn inflexibility until the very last
moment. Clerides says that, Makarios was bluffing when he said he would not sign the
Agreements and he knew that if the other participants called his bluff, he would have
to sign Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus My Deposition, vol I, (Nicosia 1989) p.78
Dr. F. Kücük, The Turkish Cypriot leader who came to London with Rauf R. Denktas, his
main aid, and Osman Orek, had accepted the Zurich and London agreements and signed
them on 19 February on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people. Similarly Makarios signed
on behalf of the Greek Cypriots. Thus, together with the three guarantor powers,
Britain, Greece and Turkey, the two Cypriot peoples as well signed the relevant
documents for the final settlement of the Cyprus problem, on 19 February 1959.
Menderes himself, who was still in The London Clinic, signed the documents in his room
together with Macmillan and Karamanlis.
Despite the signing of the documents, Makarios made it clear during his speech to the
plenary session that he would seek `modifications on certain points', all of which,
31
according to Averoff, `were the very points that had persuaded the Turks to accept the
Agreements.' Palamas who was sitting next to Averoff observed: `This is the end. In a
week from now Cyprus will be partitioned and awash with blood'. bid, p. 352
Another prominent Greek diplomat, M. Melas commented: `No one will ever have any
faith in our signature. We have been humiliated and made to look ridiculous.' The above
observations turned to be true. The whole system based on bi-communal partnership
created by the Agreements was destroyed and unilaterally altered by Makarios who
ousted the Turks from their co-founder partnership status by force of arms, illegally
taking over the island's whole administration in 1963-64.
MAKARIOS IN GRIVAS OUT
Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus on 1st of March. On 17 March Colonel Grivas,
the EOKA leader, escorted by two senior Greek Army officers, was flown to Athens by a
Greek military plane, where he was given a national hero's reception. The next day he
was promoted to Lieutenant-General in retirement with full pay in the form of a
pension for the rest of his life. N. Crawshaw, op. cit, p.348
STEP TOWARD ENOSIS
K. C. Markides, a Greek Cypriot professor of sociology commented that `From the very
inception of independence the Greek Cypriots never concealed their unhappiness with
the constitutional set up or their readiness to proceed with its amendment in due time.
Some of them, both within and outside the Government, considered independence not
as a terminal stage but as another step toward the ultimate realization of Enosis. Much
of the legitimacy accorded to Makarios was based on the assumption that in reality he
had never given up the struggle for union with Greece and that the acceptance of
independence was nothing more than a tactical move that would eventually lead
toward the incorporation of Cyprus within the Greek nation'. Kyriacos C. Markides, The
Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (Yale university press, 1977) p.27 v He also, very
correctly, stated that the Turks were fully aware of this state of affairs and that the
Greeks would have used independence as a stepping stone towards Enosis as soon as
they felt the time was ripe for it. Averoff, while describing the advantages of the
settlement, stated that "the Agreements paved the way for the creation of `a second,
smaller Greece' which would win international recognition as such."Averoff, Op. Cit, p.
368
The Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, stated that certain provisions which might
possibly hamper the working of the state machinery have all been included in order to
prevent abuses of the system, and as time goes on, as long as the sense of fellow
feeling prevails, those provisions will not in any way affect the smooth working of the
constitution. Ibid, p. 376
THE TRANSITION PERIOD
A transitional Committee was appointed to facilitate the transfer of power. The
Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, presided at its first meeting on 4 March 1959, which was
attended by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kücük as the leaders of their communities. It
was decided that 7 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots would be nominated to
provisional ministries and they would join the Transitional Committee, thus setting up a
joint Council.
32
The following provisional ministers were nominated by the Governor on the advise of
Makarios and Dr. Kücük:
The Turks
1) Fazil Plümer: Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
2) Osman Örek: Minister of Defence
3) Dr. Niyazi Manyera: Minister of Health
The Greeks
1) Glafcos Clerides: Minister of Justice
2) Polykarpos Yiorgadjis: Minister of Labour and Social Services
3) Tassos Papadopoulos: Minister of Interior
4) Pascalis Pachalides: Minister of Commerce and Industry
5) Antonis Georghiadis: Minister of Communications and works
6) Riginos Teocharis: Minister of Finance
Archbishop Makarios undertook the responsibility for Foreign Affairs, for the time being;
but later he appointed Spyros Kiprianou to that Ministry.
THE ELECTIONS
In November, legislation was enacted to provide for the holding of the election of the
first President and of the first Vice-President of the Republic, before it had been
officially established. Dr. Kücük had no rival; so he was declared as the first vicepresident on 3 December 1959. Makarios had a rival, John Clerides Q.C, (the father of
Glafkos Clerides) who was supported by the strong Communist party, AKEL. The polling
took place on 13 December 1959 and Makarios was elected as the first president of the
republic. The negotiations on the size of the British Sovereign Bases created a situation
which had delayed the date of independence. On 1 st of July it was agreed that the two
Sovereign Base Areas would comprise of 99 Square miles. Britain was also provided
training and other facilities to meet their requirements. Before the transfer of power
and declaration of independence, the election of 35 Greeks and 15 Turks to the House
of Representatives took place on 1st August 1960.
AKEL, which supported the Democratic Union candidate, John Clerides, in presidential
elections, changed side and cooperated with Makarios's patriotic Front in exchange of 5
seats in the House, offered by the Archbishop. The Democratic Union had not contested
the election, owing to the `discriminatory character' of the electoral system. On the
Turkish side the National Front of Dr. Kücük had won almost all seats, except one which
went to an independent candidate. On 16 August 1960, the transfer of power was
completed and a new bi-communal Republic emerged in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The same day, the last British governor left the island and the co-partnership of the
Turkish and Greek Cypriots started. That has been the end of the British Rule of 82
years.
THE REPUBLIC'S DISINTEGRATION
The Co-partnership Republic based on politic equality and co-operation of the two
Cypriot Communities did not last long. It disintegrated within 3 years. The Greek
Cypriot leadership put the blame of this on the constitution which was the outcome of
the hard work of the joint committee composed of distinguished Turkish and Greek
Cypriot lawyers headed by Denktas and Clerides and legal advisers from Greece and
Turkey. A neutral (Swiss) adviser, Prof Bridel had also helped them. It was peculiar that
33
as soon as the republic was established the Greek Cypriot members of the
constitutional Committee were among the severest critics of the constitution they had
helped to draw up. J. Reddaway, Op. Cit, p. 128
The system was doomed to failure from the beginning, because Makarios did not regard
the constitutional settlement as final and he was looking forward to achieve the final
goal, which was to unite the island with Greece. As a matter of fact on 16 August 1960,
the very day the Republic was established he declared: "Independence was not the aim
and purpose of the EOKA struggle... Foreign factors have prevented the achievement of
the national goal, but this should not be a cause for sorrow ... New bastions have been
conquered and from these bastions the Greek Cypriots will march on to complete the
final victory." Zenon Stavrinides, the Cyprus Conflict, National identity and Statehood,
(Nicosia, 1975) p.40
It was not the "Unworkability" of the constitution, but this mentality, the Hellenic
aspirations and the Enosis desire which break down the Zurich and London accord and
caused the disintegration of the independent Co-partnership Republic of Cyprus.
Makarios stated the following:
"The union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration always cherished within the hearts of
all Greek Cypriots. It is impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a
republic." The Times, 19 April 1963
In the face of such clear evidence, it is absurd to imagine that the Greek Cypriot
leadership abandoned their ultimate goal of uniting the island with Greece, once the
independence was achieved and that instead they wanted to see the Cyprus Republic
survived as a bi-communal state. It is a more naivety to think that the Enosis dream was
forgotten after the 1960 settlement. John Reddaway observed that even in 1974 some
Greek Cypriots still refused to come to terms with reality and plotted to supplant
independence by union with Greece. That residue of Enosis fanatics precipitated in
1974 civil war and Turkish intervention. John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, p. 7476
ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION
Archbishop Makarios was resolved to amend the `several material provisions' of the
Agreements. Despite the assurance he gave both to Athens and Ankara that nothing
spectacular would be attempted his real intention was becoming only too clear. Averoff
says: "From our own and foreign diplomats and from reliable sources we learned that
the amendments Makarios was contemplating concerned all the basic provisions. In
effect, they amounted to abrogation of Agreements." Averoff Op. Cit, p. 424-5
Clerides, criticizing this attitude of Makarios, says: "An honest evaluation of the
situation during the period 1960-63 divorced from propaganda tendencies would lead to
the conclusion that there was no need to press for constitutional amendments, that
such a move was premature, that it was made before bridges of confidence were built
between the two communities." He also stressed that "When both communities were
questioning the sincerity of each other, over their real commitment to independence, it
was not the proper time to request constitutional amendments on the grounds that the
constitution was unworkable, when in fact unworkability could not be established."
Glafkos Clerides, My Deposition, vol I, p. 130
34
Averoff's opinion on the workability of the constitution was similarly positive. He
rejects the argument that the constitution was `unworkable' and says that this
argument was based on the false premise that the agreements could not be
implemented. "The fact is that they were implemented and did work smoothly for quite
some time". Averoff, Op. Cit, p.419
Averoff, one of the main architects of the Cyprus agreements, finally concluded: "of all
lost opportunities for finding a happy ending, or at least a tolerable settlement of the
Cyprus question, the tearing up of Zurich and London agreements was the most tragic.
And that, alas, is another indisputable fact". (Averoff p. 419)
And while the identity of the party who had torn the Agreements up is so manifest, one
wonders, how could the other guarantor powers (Greece and the UK) and the world
community at large, allow such an injustice to prevail for so many years, by recognizing
the usurpers as `The Government of Cyprus'? This is a question the UN Security Council
would do well to think about at the present time. This error of judgment has to be put
right without any further delay.
THE AKRITAS PLAN
Clerides revealed in his memoirs that the Greek Cypriots, immediately after the Cyprus
Republic was established, had decided to draw up a plan, "by virtue of which stage, by
stage, by unilateral actions they would abolish the `excessive rights' granted the
`Turkish minority', beginning with those amendments that were easier to make
unilaterally and leaving the most difficult ones after our right for unilateral
amendments was established by a de facto process". (Clerides op. cit, p. 207)
Prof. FORSTHOFF RESIGNED: The neutral West German judge Professor Dr. Ernst
Forsthoff of Heidelberg University who presided over the supreme constitutional Court
of Cyprus had to resign in 1963 in protest at Makarios's insistence not to implement the
vital provisions of the constitution, particularly those concerning the separate
municipalities in 5 towns. When in 1963 the rulings of the Court were rejected and
flouted by Makarios and his ministers the neutral judge had no other alternative but to
resign.
On 5 January 1964 Prof. Forsthoff, in an interview with Associated press said: "From the
moment I commenced my duties I noticed that there were allegations to the effect that
the constitution was not capable of being implemented, that revision was necessary and
the like. I faced these allegations with the following thought: Every constitution can
have its peculiar problems. There is no constitution in the world which has not got its
particular difficulties and problems. This is primarily a question of goodwill. If there is
goodwill a constitution can be implemented and this constitution is capable of being
implemented."
John Reddaway commented: "The record of the Greek Cypriot leaders' statements
[after independence] can not but raise serious doubts about the sincerity of their wish
to see the constitution succeed. From the outset they continued to proclaim publicly
their undiminished devotion to the cause of Enosis and their conviction that this was
still attainable if independence was treated not as an end itself but simply as a stage on
the road to union with Greece." Reddaway op. cit. p.132
35
Even Greek Cypriot authors and historians have admitted that the Greek Cypriot leaders
were consciously and deliberately trying to create the impression that constitution was
not workable in order to justify the overthrow of the bi-communal settlement and reopen the way to Enosis or total Greek domination. Zenon Stavrinides concluded that
"the constitution represented a set of arrangements which fell short of Enosis , and
short of a Greek-dominated independent state. This fact alone was sufficient to make
nationalist Greek leaders, and their obedient community unwilling to make the
constitution work" Z. Stavrinides, Op. Cit, p.55
13 POINTS OF AMENDMENT
Makarios submitted his 13 points aiming to reduce or completely remove the
constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots, both to Dr. Kücük, the vice president, and
to Ankara towards the end of November, at a time when intercommunal tension was
high. The Turkish side rightly rejected them, with justified explanation that this
attempt to change the basic articles of the constitution would create a dangerous
precedent. The effect of the Archbishop's 13 points would have been to abolish many of
the provisions for separate Communal institutions or rights and to create a unitary state
dominated by the Greeks with some guarantees for the Turkish Community, the model
of which was one that had already devastated and disintegrated the Turks left under
the Greek administration in the Aegean islands and Western Thrace.
ARMING PARAMILITARY GROUPS
This move of the Greek Cypriot leadership increased the tension between the two
communities. Clerides admits that "The Turkish Cypriots had more reasons to fear" and
in fact on the Greek Cypriot side there were both the forces which intended to change
the constitution and the forces which opposed independence.
GREEK ATTACKS 1963 - 1968
INTRODUCTION
In September 1963 the Greeks were drawing up a plan of action aiming at abolishing the
so-called `excessive rights' of Turkish Cypriots by `unilateral action' creating a fait
accompli. According to Clerides, this would have been achieved by the implementation
of the Akritas Plan prepared by a select committee including the Interior Minister, exEOKA Commander Yiorgadjis (Akritas). The Akritas plan, he says, declared that
unalterable objective of the Greeks "was to free the people of Cyprus [meaning the
Greeks] from the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance, so that we [the Greeks] would be
free to exercise the right of self-determination (Enosis)." Clerides, op. cit, p.207
He adds that any attempt by the Greeks to return to the policy of self-determination Enosis, had to pass through the process of amendments of the Agreements. Clerides has
been very clear about the decision of the Greek Cypriot leadership to abolish the
Agreements. He stated that, as far as the Greek Cypriots were concerned, "They
resented their existence, because they barred the way to self-determination - Enosis.
Therefore the Greek Cypriots were ready and willing to struggle for their abolition."
Ibid, p.210
36
The interior Minister, Yiorgadjis, started recruiting suitable Volunteers for his
paramilitary force, selected from the ex-EOKA fighters by himself. Apart from this,
there had been two more paramilitary forces. One formed by the socialist leader, the
personal physician of Makarios, Dr. Vasos Lyssarides, the other was formed under Nikos
Sampson, the notorious EOKA-gunman. Clerides reveals that "both of these paramilitary
forces were created with the consent of Makarios." Ibid, p. 219
The forces of the secret Akritas Organization were stationed particularly at places in
close proximity to Turkish villages. The late Professor Richard A. Patrick who was one of
the leading authorities on the Cyprus problem stated earlier than Clerides that, "in 1962
weapons-training for company-sized units was being conducted in the Trodos Mountains
under the guidance of the Greek Cypriot officers of the Cyprus Army and using arms
`borrowed' from Government armories. By December 1963, there were up to 10,000
Greek Cypriots who had been received and trained to some extent." Patrick Richard A,
Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971 (Contario 1976) pp. 37-38.
Clerides accepts that "The training of the Akritas forces was undertaken by officers of
the Greek contingent stationed in Cyprus and its plans of action, both defensive and
offensive, were worked out at military exercises carried out at various places. The
major exercise was carried out for three days in the Trodos mountains and the
headquarters of the force during that exercise was at the President Makarios's official
residence in Trodos." Clerides, op. cit p. 220
According to Prof Patrick, elements of the Greek Cypriot police and a number of Greek
Cypriot irregulars were attempting to irritate the Turkish elements into action in
December 1963. He believes that "had the incident of 21 December in the Tahtakale
quarter of Nicosia not occurred, there can be no doubt that a similar incident would
have been precipitated by Christmas." Patrick, R.A, op. cit, p. 38
The submission of the 13 points of amendment at the end of November 1963 created a
major constitutional crisis, which in turn led to renewed inter-communal fighting, as
foreseen and planned by the Akritas Plan. This crisis came at a very inopportune time.
Turkey was facing a government crisis and in Greece premier Karamanlis, "who had
exercised a restraining influence on Makarios" had resigned in June 1963. Prof. Pierre
Oberling, The Road to Bellapais, The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus (New
York, 1982) p.84
Averoff says that, Makarios considered this situation in his favour and changed his
course. Without consulting the new Greek Government he adopted the policy he had
long been contemplating, "the policy which he thought most advantageous to Cyprus
(the Greek Cypriot side). ...Within two months tragedy and disaster had struck. Blood
flowed freely, flames enveloped island more than ever before. ... One after another,
however, the opportunities were missed. Jingoism, demagogy, stupidity, moral
cowardice, all led the beloved island further down the slippery slope, until at last it
succumbed to the criminal intervention of mainland Greece on 15 July, 1974. ... And so
all our efforts ended in catastrophe." Averoff, op. cit, p.430
37
THE CHRISTMAS BLOODSHED
General Karayannis, the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard reveals that
when the Turks objected to the constitutional amendment, Archbishop Makarios put his
plan into effect and the Greek attack on Turks began in December 1963. On 21
December, Greeks launched their planned major attack on Turkish civilians. The
incident which was used as a pretext had taken place in the Tahtakale quarter of
Nicosia which was shared by Turks and Greeks. When a Turkish woman refused to be
searched bodly by a Greek male who had not even produced any convincing evidence
that he was a policeman and while a crowd of Turks were gathered to protest this
action the `Constables' of Yiorgadjis opened fire cutting the Turkish couple in half. This
slaughter was used as starting signal for further firing on Turkish civilian targets
indiscriminately, including the statue of Atatürk, near Kyrenia gate, and even Lycee
students, in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Küçük appealed
for calm, but the CBC, the Greek controlled state radio, did not broadcast his
statement. Authors like Robert Stephens, H. Scott Gibbons, H.D. Purcell, Prof. Oberling
and many foreign journalists vividly described the 1963-1964 assaults giving concrete
evidence that the Christmas attacks of the Greeks were preplanned and their
paramilitary and private armies were equipped with the arms and ammunition supplied
by the Greek leadership whose intention was to change the state of affairs created by
the Agreements, by use of all means, including force of arms. For instance, Robert
Stephens, a British author observed: "There is no doubt that these forces were brought
into action during the crisis and that part of them got out of control, resulting at one
stage in a small but savage massacre." Robert Stephens, Cyprus, A place of Arms (Pall
Mall press, London 1966) p. 181 .
Almost all foreign observes, had also jointly expressed almost identical views that, the
Greek police were issued arms by the interior Minister, whereas the Turkish police had
been disarmed the day before the fighting started; that the 21 st December incident
and the following attacks on the Turks were "Obviously planned and premeditated."
Reddaway, op. cit, p. 146
The result of the 1963-1964 Greek Cypriot attacks had been the destruction of 103
Turkish villages and over a thousand houses and shops. Over 25,000 Turkish Cypriots,
almost one fourth of the total Turkish Cypriot people were uprooted from their homes
and had become refugees. The Greek attacks, "clearly aimed at subjugating the Turks
by a swift knock-out blow." Ibid, p. 147 As a matter of fact it was stated in the `Akritas
Plan' that the Turks would be suppressed "immediately and forcefully."
THE GREEK ONSLAUGHT
The most dramatic and tragic Greek offensive was launched on the Christmas eve on
the Turkish positions in Kumsal area of Nicosia and particularly on the mixed suburb of
Kaymakli (Omorphita). The three children of a Turkish Major who was serving as a
doctor in the Turkish mainland contingent and his wife were killed in the bathtub where
they hide themselves. The Greek armed gangs riddled them with machine-gun bullets.
At midday Sampson, Who was the leader of a notorious EOKA assassination group during
1950's, with his private militia made an all-out attack against the Turks of Küçük
Kaymakli (Omorphita). They attacked with much superior weapons, including light antiaircraft machine-guns. The Turkish Cypriots' resistance was exhausted and resulted in
heavy losses. 700 Turkish hostages, mostly women and children were taken away by
Sampson's gang and imprisoned in a Greek school.
38
"The Greek irregulars ran wild, killing scores of Turks, including women and children,
smashing and looting Turkish houses and taking hundreds of hostages". Here are a few
selected pieces from the international press reporters who witnessed the Greek
onslaught during the bloody Christmas days of 1963: "The 70 year old Turkish Imam of
Omorphita was also killed together with his crippled son who were shot on sight". The
following is how S. Gibbons described the Greek attacks on two Turkish villages of
Mathiati and Kochatis: As the terrified Turks shuffled along, cowering from the blows
from rifle butts, the mob rushed into the houses, dragged the blazing logs from the
fireplaces and threw them at curtains and on beds. The wooden roof beams, dried out
over many years, smoked then crackled into flames. Along the street the Turks were
driven, dragging their wounded; women, many in their night dress and bare feet.
Before some of the buildings had fully caught fire, groups of them dashed inside,
smashing furniture and dishware, grabbing valuables and stuffing them them into their
pockets. Terrified noises from behind the houses drew the attention of the attackers to
the Turkish livestock. Breaking into the barns, they machine-gunned milk cows, goats
and sheep. Hens were thrown into the air and blasted by bullets as they squawked and
fluttered, their pathetic bodies exploding in feathered puffs. The mob roared in bloodcrazed delirium. The Turks were driven out of the village, along the freezing open road.
Near the next village, Kochatis, an all Turkish area the tormented refugees were left.
While the Turks of Kochatis rushed out to help their neighbours, the mob... returned to
Mathiati to continue their orgy of shooting, burning and pillaging". H. Scott Gibbons,
Peace without Honour, p.10
INTERNATIONAL PRESS REPORTS
"A few days ago 1,000 people lived here in the village of Skylloura. Then in a night of
terror 350 men, women and children vanished. They were all Turks. ... In the
neighbouring village of Ayios Vassilios , a mile away, I counted 16 wrecked and burned
homes, they were all Turkish. From this village more than 100 Turks also vanished; in
neither village did I find a scrap of damage to any Greek house. Peter Moorehead, Daily
Herald, 1.1.1964
"On the Greek Cypriot side they have preferred the fighting to continue, leading to the
extermination of the Turkish Community." The Times, 4.1.1964 "On Christmas eve many
Turkish people were brutally attacked and murdered in their suburban homes..." The
Manchester Guardian 31.12.63
"It is clear that a conspiracy exists to wreck the constitution which if it was workable, is
unworkable now. But this does not entitle Greek Cypriots to scrap the constitution and
opt for Enosis. The Daily Telegraph, Editorial 2.1.1964
On the Christmas eve the 21 remaining Turkish Cypriot patients at the Nicosia General
Hospital were taken away by the Greek armed men never again to be seen.
MASS GRAVES
In the evening Greek Cypriot terrorists raided Turkish and mixed villages near Nicosia
and the Turkish inhabitants of Ayios Vasilios were brutally dragged away. Many of them
were killed in cold blood and put in a mass grave. This mass grave was discovered on 13
January by the British truce force and the bodies of 21 Turkish Cypriot civilians were
removed. The two sons, 19 and 17 years old, and the granddaughter aged 10, of a 70
year old Turk were lined up outside the cottage wall. The gunmen machine-gunned
39
them to death. In another house, a 13-year old boy had his hands tied behind his knees
and was thrown on the floor. While the house was being ransacked, his captors kicked
and abused him. Then a pistol was placed at the back of his head and he was shot.
Altogether, 12 Turks were massacred that evening in Ayios Vasilios. Then the gunmen
turned their attention to the Turkish houses. They looted and destroyed, and finally,
exhausted, they set the houses on fire. In isolated farmhouses in the same region, nine
more Turks were murdered. Gibbons, Op. Cit, p.73
The non-stop attacks on the Turks Continued until the Turkish jet fighters flew low,
over Nicosia and the Turkish Army Contingent left its barracks to take strategic
positions. It was then that Makarios accepted to talk to the Turkish Cypriot leaders on
the terms of a cease-fire, which was never fully implemented.
THE TRUCE FORCE
A joint Truce Force, composed of British troops and liaison officers from the Greek and
Turkish Contingents was set up under the British Commander, Major-General Young on
27 December. A cease-fire line was drawn up by the truce force dividing Nicosia into
Turkish and Greek quarters, which was called "the Green Line", because it was marked
on the map with a green china graph pencil, which happened to be on the table.
R.Stephens, Op. Cit, p.185
It was only then that the foreign journalists were able to visit the Turkish areas, which
suffered heavy attacks. Their report stunned their readers. Here are a few more brief
pieces from their reports: "Dr. Vasos Lyssarides, a Greek-Cypriot M. P. and personal
physician to President Makarios, told me tonight that he leads one of the organisations
which have been fighting the Turks. This was the first confirmation of reports that
about four private armies on the Greek side were engaged in the clash." Daily Mail,
10.1.64
Several Turkish homes were ablaze tonight in the Omorphita area of Nicosia, and others
were looted by Greek irregulars. This has brought new tension to the situation. Daily
Telegraph 1.1.64
"By his erratic and intemperate behavior President Makarios is deepening and
prolonging the crisis in Cyprus. ... His intention to abrogate Cyprus's treaties with
Britain, Greece and Turkey, disclosed an alarming lack of appreciation of the realities.
... These treaties are the foundation of Cyprus's independence and the only security for
the continued existence of the republic. New York Herald Tribune, 4.1.1964
"... The constitution gives the Turks numerous political guarantees. These have not
prevented bloodshed. They need to be transformed into something more effective,
particularly if the President is going to persist in his idea of abrogating the treaties. So
far he has given no indication of what greater security he could offer the Turks. Indeed,
talk of scrapping the treaties has made them more than ever look over their shoulders
to Ankara for protection". The Times 4.1.64 Editorial,
40
THE LONDON CONFERENCE
On January 1st 1964, Makarios declared that the treaties of Guarantee and Alliance
were abrogated unilaterally. However, Duncan Sandys, the British Minister for
Commonwealth Affairs who was in Cyprus for cease-fire talks had strongly protested
this move by visiting Makarios and warning him about the serious consequences of this
folly. Eventually Makarios had to alter his decision stating that it was the Greeks' desire
to secure the termination of the two treaties by appropriate means. Sands also
convinced both Cypriot sides to participate in a meeting to be held in London in order
to find a solution to the problem. Turkey and Greece were invited also as guarantors
and interested parties. The London Conference failed to achieve any result, because
the Greek side insisted on a revision of the constitution in accordance with the 13
points submitted earlier by Makarios.
The British suggestion to send Cyprus a NATO force to replace the British truce force
was rejected by Makarios who insisted on having a UN peacekeeping force instead under
the control of the UN Security Council, where Soviet Russia was a permanent member
and the non-aligned states could also be influential. Both the Soviets and non-aligned
countries were openly supporting Makarios.
DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Following this incident, Britain took the Cyprus issue to the Security Council. After long
discussions it was accepted by all parties that the UN peace force would be sent to
Cyprus for preserving international peace and security and in order to achieve this, it
would "use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary,
contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to normal
conditions."
4 MARCH (1964) RESOLUTION
The reference made in this resolution to `the Cyprus Government' caused some
confusion at the beginning. Because `Government of Cyprus', according to the London
and Zurich Agreements had to be composed of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot ministers
with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president. Unfortunately the
resolution 186 of 4th March 1964, by-passed the question of who constituted
`Government of Cyprus'. Stephens says and many other international observers agree
that "the Security Council resolution left this point vague, but in principle the UN
continued to deal with Makarios and his Ministers as the Cyprus Government." R.
Stephens, op. cit, p.193
The UN's equation, in practice, of `The Cyprus Government' with `the Greek Cypriot
administration of Makarios' provided an opportunity for the Greek Cypriot side to
maintain the wholly Greek cabinet and the Greek Cypriot president as the only
executive organ representing the whole of the island. This injustice had been the crux
of the problem since and obstructed the achievement of a viable, lasting and just
settlement.
MEDIATION EFFORTS
The 4th of March Resolution (186) had also recommended the Secretary-General to
appoint a mediator, in agreement with `the Government of Cyprus' the three guarantor
powers and the representatives of the two Cypriot communities. The Secretary-General
U Thant, appointed on 27 March 1964, H.E. Sakari Tuomioja of Finland as mediator.
41
After Tuomija's sudden death Galo Plaza was designated to complete his mission. His
report was completed and submitted to the Secretary-General on 26 March 1965, ruled
out both self-determination and enosis. Both the Turkish and Greek sides expressed
their dissatisfaction with the report, thus it failed to contribute to a settlement.
THE ROLE OF UNFICYP & VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Security Council Resolution of 4 March 1964, had worked all along in favour of the
Greek Cypriot side. Apart from resulting in recognition of the totally Greek Government
of Makarios as the Government of Cyprus it had also created a situation in which
UNFICYP was not able to keep the peace and implement the cease-fire arrangements.
The Greek Cypriot policy of preventing UNFICYP from doing its proper job and thus to
achieve a unitary Greek state, resulted in blocking the way for a settlement and caused
more sufferings for both Cypriot peoples. Despite the presence of the UNFICYP, the
Greek Cypriot offensive had never stopped and also developed into an offensive of
economic blockades and violation of the basic human rights of the Turks, such as,
freedom of movement, communication, work, etc... The Turkish Cypriot refugees, who
were living in tents at the Northern suburbs of Nicosia, were short of food and
medicine. When on 11 March, a convoy of Red Crescent supplies were escorted to
Nicosia by British armoured cars `they were halted by armed Greek Cypriots. The sacks
of flour were thrown on the street and ripped open with bayonets.' H. S. Gibbons, Op.
cit, p.152
IN HUMAN EMBARGOES ON RELIEF SUPPLIES OF RED CRESCENT
By midsummer of 1964, the number of Turkish refugees reached a total of 25,000,
about one fourth of the total Turkish Cypriot population. The conditions in which they
had to live were extremely terrible and their survival depended only on the relief
supplies of the Turkish Red Crescent (counterpart of the Red Cross). Over 4,000 Turks
who had been employed by the Government as civil servants and labourers, lost their
incomes. Social benefits were also denied to the Turks by the Government of Makarios.
On top of that, Makarios's economic restrictions were implemented against Turkish
enclaves on the grounds that their supplies included strategic materials. Among the
banned materials were fuel, cement and even shoelaces. Makarios also imposed
restrictions on the imports of Red crescent supplies. Consequently its supplies were
examined at the port of Famagusta and on many occasions even more than half of
goods were claimed to be `strategic material' and thus were not allowed to be
unloaded. The international Red Cross had to fight to get its food supplies handed over
to the Turks. Ibid, p.174
RESTRICTED AREAS
The restricted Turkish areas were increased to cover more places during the further
Greek Cypriot attacks. After the Kokkina fighting, Makarios stopped all supplies not only
to the Turkish areas of Nicosia, but also to Lefka, Tylliria and Limnitis. Later in
September, the Turkish sectors of Famagusta and Larnaca were also included in the
restricted areas.
TURKISH CYPRIOTS' STARVATION
Makarios stated that essential foodstuffs based on a `caloric minimum' were allowed to
the Turks. However the international Red Cross specialists and neutral foreign observers
found that Makarios's `calorific minimum' was below the standards accepted in the
civilised world. UN Secretary-General U Thant had to state that the restrictions, "which
42
in some instances have been so severe as to amount to a veritable siege, indicated that
the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure as a
substitute for military action."
The official figures published by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, stated `the
number of Turks who received assistance from the Red Crescent relief amounted to
about 56,000, including 25,000 displaced persons, 23,500 unemployed and 7,500
dependants of missing persons, disabled and others.' The UN Secretary-General,
reported that, on receiving complaints about the starvation of Turkish Cypriots,
`UNFICYP carried out a preliminary survey on 16 August 1964 and found that 40 percent
of the (Turkish) villages had no flour and 25 percent had flour for only one or two
weeks.' Rauf R. Denktas, The Cyprus Triangle, (London 1988), p.39
The UN Secretary-General admitted that, `thousands of Turkish Cypriots sought refuge
in what they considered to be safer Turkish Cypriot villages and areas' and thus denied
the Greek Cypriot claim that this was an organised exodus to partition the island. UN
doc. S/8286
BUILDING MATERIALS BANNED
He also stated that, `another factor which has tended to aggravate the refugee
problem has been the Greek National Guard policy of asserting Government authority
by establishing a Greek military presence in Turkish Cypriot areas.' UN doc, S/7001
It was further stated in the same report that, the appeal of the President of the Turkish
Communal Chamber for the assistance of UNFICYP in the partial removal of the Greek
restriction on the building materials in order to build better shelters for the Turkish
Cypriot refugees who were confined to unhygienic settlements, was rejected by the
Greek authorities and thus the unhealthy, miserable and terrifying living conditions of
the refugees continued. An international research report on Cyprus, pointed out that,
`the world at large in general paid little attention to the plight of Turkish refugees and
gave them little in the way of sympathy or support.' Minority Rights Group Report No:30
(London 1976)
According to Denktas, the whole burden of the Turkish refugees, amounting to no less
than two million US Dollars a year was borne only by Turkey and the Turkish Red
Crescent for eleven years, from 1963 to 1974. Ibid, p.42
HUMILIATION AND HARDSHIPS
Turkish Cypriots were subjected to humiliating searches and long delays at roadblocks
on the public roads. The Turkish areas were put under a total blockade by the Greek
authorities whenever they liked. They were even preventing the entry of medicine and
other essential supplies to the Turkish areas.
The UN Secretary-General described the hardships imposed upon Turkish Cypriots as
`enormous' and said in a report to the Security Council: "These hardships include
restrictions on the freedom of movement of civilians, economic restrictions, the
unavailability of some essential public services, and the sufferings of refugees." UN Doc.
S/6426
He later reported that, `about one third of the Turkish population was estimated to
need some form of welfare relief.' UN Doc. S/7611
43
The Security Council failed adequately to respond to these serious hardships faced by
the Turkish Cypriots and left thousands of civilian Turks to suffer further in the hands of
the Greek authorities.
UNFICYP'S ROLE
The Greek Cypriots had done everything to check the movement of the UN peace
keeping force (UNFICYP) and to prevent their entry into military areas under their
control. They intended to use UNFICYP as a force to help the Greek Cypriot gunmen and
so-called `Government' forces to eliminate the Turkish Cypriot resistance, which they
branded as a `revolt' against the state. "The UN were effectively completely cut off
from observing the Greek Cypriot war preparations. Gibbon, op. cit, p.166
ARMS AND FORCES FROM GREECE
The Greek Cypriot side, in close collaboration with Greece, had acted in defiance of the
cease-fire arrangements ignoring the efforts of the mediators for a just settlement and
even against the provisions of the 4 March 1964 Resolution which envisaged a return to
normal conditions. The establishing of a Greek National Guard and importation of arms
from Greece, Egypt and Czechoslovakia, the shipment of thousands of the mainland
Greek troops, with the officers and ammunition clandestinely, to Cyprus, as agreed
between Makarios and the Greek Premier Papandreou were not a sign of peace. It was
later admitted by the son of the Greek premier, Andreas Papandreou that the Greek
military force in Cyprus reached to more than 20,000 by the spring of 1965. Andreas
Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, (New York 1970)
pp.132-3
The Greek Cypriot National Guard, in easy stages, was reinforced with 9,000 men and
950 officers from Greece who landed in Cyprus secretly, fully equipped and heavily
armed. Taki Theodoracopoulos, The Greek Upheaval (New Rochelle, N.Y, 1978) p.138
The First Commander of the National Guard was, Lieutenant-General Karayannis, of the
Greek Army. He was later, replaced by the EOKA leader General Grivas, who returned
secretly to Cyprus in June 1964 `to coordinate future military action against the Turkish
Cypriot people.'
THE KOKKINA BATTLE
Grivas immediately began touring the island, calling for Union with Greece. He
declared: "I shall not leave this island, until I return to Greece with the title deeds of
Cyprus in my pocket." The Turkish Cypriots' stronghold on the northern coast was the
enclave of Mansoura-Kokkina, an area which had been the only place where military
supplies from Turkey could be received. A few hundred Turkish students who were
studying in Turkish Universities and in Britain had been dispatched secretly to this area
for its defence. Grivas and Yiorgadjis decided to occupy this area and wanted to create
situations, which would justify their attack. They dispatched new forces to the area
and their military build-up continued in July 1964. By 7 August the Greek National
Guard at the area reached to 2,000 troops with six 25 ponder guns, two 4 barreled
Oerlikon 20 mm guns, mortars and armed cars. In addition, three newly acquired
Russian built Greek patrol boats, armed with 40 mm guns, patrolled the sea off the
Turkish enclave. H.S. Gibbons, op. cit, p. 167
When the new Commander of the UNFICYP General Thimayya protested to Makarios
about the build-up, he was promised by the Archbishop that they would not attack
44
before giving due warning. But on 6 August, only 2 days after this promise was made,
the Greeks attacked, overrunning the UN posts. The attacks were heavier the next day
and the Greek forces began to advance on Kokkina. The Greek patrol boats were also
shelling the Turkish enclave. The UN protested but the Greeks had completely
disregarded the UN warnings. The Turkish Cypriot student fighters, were faced with a
total annihilation. At the very last minute Turkish jets flew over the area in a warning
demonstration with the hope that the Greeks would cease their onslaught. Grivas and
Yiorgadjis, the interior Minister who were at the area, ordered the onslaught to
continue to the end. The next day, on 8 August, the Turkish student fighters evacuated
their positions and retreated to Kokkina for a last ditch stand. Around 200 Turkish
women and children, took refugee at the UN camp at Kato Pyrgos. The Greeks resumed
their bombardment from all sides. It seemed to be the final hour of Turkish students
and General Thimayya told the Turkish Cypriot leaders on phone that Makarios refused
to order a cease-fire and that he could do nothing more. Ibid, p. 168
TURKISH AIR BOMBARDMENT
The only hope for the Turkish fighters was the Turkish jets, which arrived at the very
last minute and intervened to check the Greek advance. They bombarded the Greek
military positions in the area. The Turkish Cypriot student fighters were saved and the
area continued to be held by the Turkish Cypriots, as an enclave since then. On 9 of
August the Security Council called for cease-fire and the battle of Kokkina ended.
MAKARIOS ORDERED THE ATTACK
U Thant reported to the Security Council on 10 September 1964 that it was not the
Turks who started the Kokkina battle. He emphasized that the "strenuous attempts of
the UNFICYP to secure a cease-fire was continually hindered" by the `Government'
forces. Glafkos Clerides revealed that "on the advice of the Military command and
Grivas the Government of the Republic (Makarios's Administration) ordered the attack
on Mansoura-Kokkina, ... without previous consultation with the Greek Government.
p10 Clerides, My Deposition vol II, p. 87
THE ACHESON'S PLAN
Talks were going through the summer months of 1964, between Turkey and Greece,
under the guidance of the former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who proposed
the union of Cyprus with Greece on condition that a portion of the island would be
ceded to Turkey in full sovereignty to be used as a military base and there would be
two or three small areas of the island where the Turkish Cypriots would be in the
majority. The Turkish Government accepted this plan in principle as a basis for
negotiations. The Greek Government rejected it. Later, Acheson altered his plan to
satisfy the Greek side. According to this modified plan, the Turkish base instead of
being a permanent sovereign base would be leased. He also modified his proposals
about two or three Turkish Cypriot cantons. The Turkish Government rejected the
second Acheson plan and the Greek Government accepted it half-heartedly, but
changed its mind again when Makarios took a negative stand. Thus, the Acheson mission
did not produce any result. On 19 August 1964, before the Geneva talks had not
completely failed, the Greek Premier sent the Defence Minister, Garoufalias to Cyprus
to present Makarios with a plan for ENOSIS. "The plan was simple enough. Cyprus would
declare ENOSIS and Greece would accept it. The Government of Cyprus would stand
down and Greece would assume the responsibility for what may come." Clerides, op.
cit, p.150
45
THE GREEK JUNTA AND CYPRUS
A group of Greek Colonels headed by George Papadopoulos took over the power in
Greece by staging a military coup on 21 April 1967. Makarios invited Colonel
Papadopoulos to Cyprus on 9 August. Clerides says that Papadopoulos explained to
Makarios his regime's policy, which was "to strengthen the defence of the island, to
promote the cause of Enosis and to maintain close and friendly relations between the
two governments." Ibid, p. 193
The Greek junta was anxious to achieve success on one of the national issues in order to
maintain its prestige and consolidate its position. They chose the Cyprus problem for
this purpose and hurriedly got in touch with the Turkish Government for a meeting on
the issue. A top-level meeting took place between Turkey and Greece in September
1967 at two frontier towns, on opposite sides. The Greek premier Kolias proposed
enosis for a final solution of the Cyprus problem "which was produced by the ignorance
of the real difficulties they were about to face." Clerides, Up. Cit, p.194
THE ENOSIS RESOLUTION
A few months after the military Coup in Athens the Greek Cypriot leaders decided to
manifest their ultimate desire to the Greek Colonels who took over the power. On 26
June 1967 the deputies had unanimously passed a resolution declaring that the struggle
for enosis would continue until it was realized. The enosis resolution was as follows:
"Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that
despite any adverse circumstances it will not suspend the struggle being conducted
with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle ends in success through the union of
the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland, without any intermediary stage."
DENKTAS ARRESTED
Denktas, who had secretly tried to land Cyprus on 31 October 1967 with a speed boat
was arrested at Karpass area and was confined in military camp in Nicosia where the
Greek mainland officers were in charge. After having been questioned by G. Clerides he
was transferred to the police custody where he remained until it was decided by the
Greek Cypriot Government not to prosecute him if he agreed to leave Cyprus. Denktas
accepted the offer and on 12 November he was sent back to Ankara on a plane.
THE KOPHINOU TRAGEDY
3 days after this incident the Kophinou tragedy had occurred. On 15 November General
Grivas ordered an attack on the Turkish village, Kophinou, which was situated on a
strategically important crossroads leading to Limassol both from Nicosia and Larnaca.
The Greek side were claiming then that the Turks at Kophinou had "repeatedly
prevented the (Greek) police patrols from entering the mixed village Ayios Theodoros, a
few miles away on a hillside. Ibid, p.200
The Greek side wanted to remove all Turkish roadblocks and put all Turks in the area
under the direct control of the Greek National Guard. Clerides admits that "On 13th and
14th November, strong units of the National Guard and select units of the Greek police
surrounded the villages of Kophinou, Ayios Theodoros and Mari. The joint Army
Headquarters informed Athens that the units had moved to their position and the
operation would commence on 14th of November." Clerides, op. cit, p.207
46
What remained now was to provoke the surrounded Turks to open fire or resist further
to Greek police patrols in order to start the attack. The Turks informed UNFICYP that
further patrols would be resisted because armed patrols would cause an increased
tension. Meanwhile the UN began negotiations with local Turkish leaders about how the
Greek patrols would he conducted. Grivas without waiting the outcome of these
negotiations ordered his 3,000 troops to move in. "The 2,000 Guardsmen, already
positioned in the area, rushed forward. Mortars and heavy artillery went into action
against the Turks." Gibbon, op. cit, p. 177.
The Greek `hordes' rushed up, seized the UN troops who were supposed to keep the
peace, and forcibly disarmed them. Then they smashed the UN radio to prevent their
communication with UNFICYP headquarters. The attacks on the Kophinou Turks by the
Greek forces were so brutal that Turkey decided to intervene under the Treaty of
Guarantee, and thus once more the two NATO allies were brought to the brink of war.
Even a 90-year-old Turkish villager who was paralyzed and confined to bed was riddled
with machine gun bullets and then his mattress was set alight. Many Turks who were
surrendered were taken away, with their hands raised, and machine-gunned. Turkish
houses had set on fire after being looted. Six houses and the schools were completely
destroyed by fire. Over 40 houses were partly destroyed. Following the information
received that a Turkish air strike was imminent and Turkey might intervene, the Greeks
began their withdrawal, on 16 November. The UN who moved in found 24 Turks dead
including 2 women.
All foreign observers once more realised how ineffective was the UN peace keeping
force to protect the Turks and peace. The UN Secretary-General reported on 8
December 1967 that the Kophinou operation had "caused heavy loss of life and had
grave repercussions." UN doc. S/8286 He concluded that the Greek attack on the
Kophinou area had been planned in advance.
WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK FORCES
Ankara's strong reaction put into action an intense diplomatic activity. The US
president, Johnson, sent his special envoy Cyprus Vance to the area. He succeeded in
defusing the crisis and secured an agreement according to which Greece agreed to
withdraw her forces and General Grivas, the Commander of the National Guard.
However, it was discovered later that the withdrawal had been only partially carried
out and when the UN had taken this up with the Greek Cypriot leaders it was explained
that the remaining Greek officers and men were on contract to train the Greek Cypriot
National Guard, itself an unconstitutional force. That was of course yet another
Byzantine trick. Denktas, op. cit, p. 51-52
THE POLICY OF `FEASIBLE SOLUTION'
Following the Kophinou attack Makarios realised that a new policy, based on diplomacy
rather than violence, should be followed. He therefore declared on 12 January 1968
that the new Greek policy was to seek a `feasible solution and not the desired solution'
thus implying that enosis was still the desirable, but not, at the time, a feasible
solution.' Clerides, op. cit, pp 214-5 Thus the issue of enosis was shelved temporarily
and only by necessity. As a result of this policy, Rauf Denktas, who had been banned by
the Greek Cypriot administration from entering Cyprus since 1964, was allowed to come
back. In April 1968 he had a triumphant return to Cyprus.
47
PROVISIONAL TURKISH CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION
As a direct result of the Greek Cypriot armed attacks and economic pressure the
Turkish Cypriot side was left with only one alternative: To defend themselves and to
set-up their own administration. The Partnership State created by 1959-60 Agreements
was usurped by Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were ousted from all
government organs by force of arms. Thus on 28 December 1967, following the brutal
attacks on Kophinou, the `Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration' was established.
THE AKRITAS PLAN
The rising tensions of the early 1960s spurred the formation of paramilitary groups on
both sides, and as the constitutional crisis came to a head in 1962-63, both prepared for
violence. The Greek Cypriots were better armed and more ideologically driven, and
appeared to welcome the crisis---possibly including Makarios's Thirteen Points, which it
sets out as a course of action---as a likely provocation to Turkish Cypriots. An expected
reaction from the Turkish Cypriot community, either to Makarios's constitutional gambit
or some other incident, would in turn set the Greek Cypriot cadres into action. The
plan for that action, revealed by a Greek Cypriot newspaper after the fact, was the socalled Akritas Plan, which is reproduced below.
The recent public statements of His Beatitude have outlined the course, which our
national issue will follow. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles are
neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is it possible to fix time limits for the
achievement of the various stages of their development. Our national cause must
always be examined and judged in the light of the conditions and developments of the
moment, and the measures which will be taken, the tactics, and the time of
implementing each measure must be determined by the conditions existing at the time,
both internationally, and internally. The entire effort is trying and must necessarily
pass through various stages, because the factors, which influence the final result, are
many and varied. It is sufficient, however, that all should understand that the measures
which are prescribed now constitute only the first step, one simple stage towards the
final and unalterable national objective, i.e., to the full and unfettered exercise of the
right of self-determination of the people.
Since the purpose remains unalterable, what remains is to examine the subject of
tactics. It is necessary to divide the subject of tactics under two headings, that is:
internal tactics and external, since in each case both the presentation and the handling
of our cause will be different.
A. External tactics (international).
During the recent stages of our national struggle the Cyprus problem has been
presented to diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise of the right of selfdetermination by the people of Cyprus. In securing the right of self-determination
obstacles have been created by the well-known conditions, the existence of a Turkish
minority, by the inter-communal conflict and the attempts to show that co-existence of
both communities under one government was impossible. Finally, for many
international circles the problem was solved by the London and Zurich Agreements, a
48
solution which was presented as the result of negotiations and agreement between the
two sides.
a) Consequently, our first target has been to cultivate internationally the impression
that the Cyprus problem has not really been solved an the solution requires revision.
b) Our first objective was our endeavour to be vindicated as the Greek majority and to
create the impression that:
(i) The solution given is neither satisfactory not fair;
(ii) The agreement reached was not the result of a free and voluntary acceptance of a
compromise of the conflicting views;
(iii) That the revision of the agreements constitutes a compelling necessity for survival,
and not an effort of the Greeks to repudiate their signature;
(iv) That the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
(v) That the strong element on which foreign states ought to rely is the Greek majority
and not the Turkish Cypriots.
c) All the above has required very difficult effort, and has been achieved to a
satisfactory degree. Most of the foreign representatives have been convinced that the
solution given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was signed under pressure and
without real negotiations and that it was imposed under various threats. It is significant
argument that the solution achieved has not been ratified by the people, because our
leadership, acting wisely, avoided calling the people to ratify it by a plebiscite, which
the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have done if called upon.
Generally, it has been established that the administration of Cyprus up to now has been
carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks have confined themselves to a negative
role.
d) Second objective. The first stage having been completed, we must programme the
second stage of our activities and objectives on the international level. These
objectives in general can be outlined as follows:
(i) The Greek efforts are directed towards removing unreasonable and unfair provisions
of administration and not to oppress the Turkish Cypriots;
(ii) The removal of these oppressive provisions must take place now because tomorrow
it will be too late;
(iii) The removal of these provisions, despite the fact that this is reasonable and
necessary, because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks is not possible bv
agreement, and therefore unilateral action is justified;
(iv) The issue of revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots and does not give the right
of military or other intervention;
49
(v) The proposed amendments are reasonable, just, and safeguard the reasonable rights
of the minority.
e) Today it has been generally demonstrated that the international climate is against
every type of oppression and, more specifically, against the oppression of minorities.
The Turks have already succeeded in persuading international opinion that union of
Cyprus with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it is estimated
that we have better chances of succeeding in our efforts to influence international
public opinion in our favour if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as
a demand to exercise the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for union
with Greece (Enosis). In order, however, to secure the exercise of complete and free
self-determination, we must get free of all those provisions of the constitution and of
the agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance) which prevent the free and
unfettered expression and implementation of the wishes of our people and which
create dangers of external intervention. It is for this reason that the first target of
attack has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which was the first that was stated to be no
longer recognised by the Greek Cypriots.
When this is achieved no legal or moral power can prevent us from deciding our future
alone and freely and exercising the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.
From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the success of our plan a chain of
actions is needed, each of which is necessary, otherwise, future actions will remain
legally unjustified and politically unachieved, while at the same time we will expose
our people and the country to serious consequences. The actions to be taken can be
summed up as follows:
a) Amendment of the negative elements of the agreements and parallel abandonment
of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is necessary because the need for
amendments of the negative aspects of the treaties is generally accepted
internationally and is considered justified (we can even justify unilateral action), while
at the same time intervention from outside to prevent us amending them is unjustified
and inapplicable;
b) As a result of our above actions, the Treaty of Guarantee (right of unilateral
intervention) becomes legally and substantively inapplicable;
c) The people, once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions of the Treaties of Guarantee
and Alliance regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination, will be able to
give expression to and implement their desire.
d) Legal confrontation by the forces of State of every internal or external intervention.
It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have any chance of success internationally in
our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of the
struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance, if it is accepted that the
above four stages are necessary, then it is unthinkable to speak of amendments in stage
(a) if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to aim at the amendment of the
negative aspects of the constitution by arguing that this is necessary for the functioning
of the State if stage (d) is revealed?
50
The above relate to targets, aims and tactics in the international field. And now on the
internal front:
B. Internal Front.
1. The only danger which could be described as insurmountable is the possibility of
external intervention, by force, not so much because of the material damage, nor
because of the danger itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to deal with
partly or totally by force), but mainly because of the possible political consequences.
Intervention is threatened or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention
would be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of weight both
internationally and in the United Nations.
From the history of many recent instances we have learnt that in not a single case of
intervention, whether legally justified or not, has either the United Nations or any
other power succeeded in evicting the invader without serious concessions detrimental
to the victim. Even in the case of the Israeli attack against Suez, which was condemned
by almost all nations, and on which Soviet intervention was threatened, Israel
withdrew, but received as a concession the port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Naturally,
more serious dangers exist for Cyprus.
If, on the other hand, we consider and justify our action under (a) above well, on the
one hand, intervention is not justified and, on the other, it cannot be carried out
before consultations between the guarantors Greece, Turkey and the UK. It is at this
stage of consultations (before intervention) that we need international support. We
shall have it if the proposed amendments by us appear reasonable and justifiable.
Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention by the choice of the amendments we
would request in the first stage.
Tactics: We shall attempt to justify unilateral action for constitutional amendments
once the efforts for a common agreement are excluded. As this stage the provisions in
(ii) and (in) are applicable in parallel.
2. It is obvious that in order to justify intervention, a more serious reason must exist
and a more immediate danger than a simple constitutional amendment.
Such a reason could be an immediate declaration of Enosis before stages (a) - (c) or
serious inter-communal violence, which would be presented as massacres of the Turks.
Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the first part and, consequently, it remains
only to consider the danger of inter-communal violence. Since we do not intend,
without provocation, to attack or kill Turks, the possibility remains that the Turkish
Cypriots, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the
constitution, will react instinctively, creating incidents and clashes or stage, under
orders, killings, atrocities or bomb attacks on Turks, in order to create the impression
that the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention would be
justified, for their protection.
51
Tactics. Our actions for constitutional amendments will be in the open and we will
always appear ready for peaceful negotiations. Our actions will not be of a provocative
or violent nature.
Should clashes occur, they will be dealt with in the initial stages legally by the legally
established security forces, in accordance with a plan. All actions will be clothed in
legal form.
3. Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established,
decisions and actions, which require positive violent acts, such as, for example, the use
of force to unify the separate municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels
the Government to intervene by force to bring about the unification of municipal
properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react violently. On the contrary, it
is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance, the provision of the 70 to
30 ratio in the public service, when it is the Turks who will have to take positive violent
action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but to refusal to act (to
implement).
The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regard to taxation
legislation.
These measures have already been considered and a series of similar measures have
been chosen for implementation. Once our right of unilateral amendments to the
constitution is established de facto by such actions, then we shall be able to advance
using our judgment and our strength more decidedly.
4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible to proceed to substantive acts of
amendment of the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has been
described above, without the Turks at tempting to create or to stage violent clashes.
For this reason, the existence of our organisation is an imperative necessity because:
a) In the event of instinctive violent Turkish reactions, if our counter-attacks are not
immediate, we run the risk effacing panic in the Greeks in the towns and thus losing
substantial vital areas, while, on the other hand, an immediate show of our strength
may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to sporadic insignificant
acts, and
b) In the event of a planned or staged Turkish attack, it is imperative to overcome it by
force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed in gaining command of the
situation (in one or two days), no outside, intervention would be either justified or
possible.
c) In either of the above cases, effective use of force in dealing with the Turks will
facilitate to a great extent our subsequent actions for further amendments. It would
then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction,
because they will now that their reaction will be weak or seriously harmful for their
community, and
52
d) In the event of the clashes becoming more general or general we must be ready to
proceed with the actions described in (a) to (b), including the immediate declaration of
Enosis, because then there would be no reason to wait nor room for diplomatic action.
5. At no stage should we neglect the need to enlighten, and to face the propaganda and
the reactions of those who cannot or should not know our plans. It has been shown that
our struggle must pass through four stages and that we must not reveal publicly and at
improper times our plans and intentions. Complete secrecy is more than a national
duty.
IT IS A VITAL NECESSITY FOR SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS.
This will not prevent the reactionaries and the irresponsible demagogues from indulging
in an orgy of exploitation of patriotism and provocations. The plan provides them with
fertile ground, because it gives them the opportunity to allege that the efforts of the
leadership are confined to the objective of constitutional amendments and not to pure
national objectives. Our task becomes more difficult because by necessity, and
depending on the prevailing circumstances, even the constitutional amendments must
be made in stages. However, all this must not draw us into irresponsible demagogy nor
to bidding higher in the stakes of nationalism. Our acts will be our most truthful
defenders. In any event, because the above task must make substantial progress and
yield results long before the next elections, for obvious reasons, in the relatively short
time in between we must show self-restraint and remain cool.
At the same time, however, we must not only maintain the present unity and discipline
of the patriotic forces, but increase it. This can only be done by the necessary briefing
of our members and through them of our people.
In the first instance, we must uncover what the reactionaries stand for. Some of them
are opportunist and irresponsible, as their recent past has shown. They are negative
and aimless reactionaries who fanatically oppose our leadership, but without at the
same time offering a substantive and practical solution. We need a steady and strong
government in order to promote our plans up to the last moment. These opponents are
verbalists and sloganists, but unwilling to proceed to concrete acts or to suffer
sacrifices. For example, even at the present stage they offer nothing more concrete
than recourse to the United Nations, that is, words again without cost to themselves.
They must, therefore, be isolated.
In parallel, we shall brief our members only ORALLY about our intentions. Our subheadquarters must, in gatherings of our members, analyse and explain fully and
continuously the above, until each one of our members understands fully and is in a
position to brief others.
NO WRITTEN REPORT IS PERMITTED. THE LOSS OF ANY DOCUMENT ON THE ABOVE
AMOUNTS TO TREASON AGAINST THE NATION.
No act can damage our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present
document or its publication by our opponents. With the exception of word-of-mouth
briefing, all our other actions, i.e., publications in the Press, resolutions, etc., must be
very restrained and no mention of the above should be made. Similarly, in public
53
speeches and gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal
responsibility of the Leader or Deputy Leaders, references in general terms to the plan.
They must also have the authorisation of either the Leader or the Deputy Leader who
must approve the text. ON NO ACCOUNT ARE REFERENCES IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER
PUBLICATION PERMITTED.
Tactics. Complete briefing of our people and of the public by word of mouth. Publicly
we shall endeavour to appear as moderates. Projection of or reference to our plans in
the Press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials and other responsible persons will
continue to brief and to raise the morale and the desire for the struggle of our people,
but such briefing excludes making our plans public knowledge by the Press or
otherwise.
NOTES: This document will be destroyed by fire on the personal responsibility of the
Leader and the Deputy Leader in the presence of all the members of the General Staff
within 10 days from its receipt. Copies or part copies are prohibited: members of the
staff of the Office of the Deputy Leader may have copies on the personal responsibility
of the Leader, but may not remove them from the Office of the Deputy Leader. The
Leader AKRITAS
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS 1968 – 1974
TURKISH CONCESSIONS
In early 1968, U Thant proposed bi-communal talks. Both sides responded positively and
the first meeting between Denktas and Clerides took place on 23 May. The first phase
of talks continued until 28 August 1968. Denktas concluded that, during the talks, the
Turkish Cypriot concessions were very substantial. In return the Turkish Cypriot side
wanted any future agreement to continue to guarantee Cyprus against Enosis or union
with another country, and the local autonomy to be the basis for a final settlement in
recognition of the partnership status of the Turkish Community ... Although there was a
wide degree of agreement on the `functions' of the local authorities and on the issue of
`local autonomy' the Greek Cypriot side was reluctant to give any meaningful autonomy
to the Turks. Clerides admitted that, "Any objective person examining the list of
additional powers and functions proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side would have come
to conclusion that they were well within what is accepted generally as normal local
government functions. Certainly such powers and functions were not much wider than
those laws of Cyprus which were enacted by the British Administration, when local
government was first introduced in the island and was in an undeveloped form."
Clerides, op. cit, p. 237
As a matter of fact the Turkish Cypriot side had made such substantial concessions that
almost all the provisions of the constitution which granted special rights for the Turkish
Community as a co-founder partner, and as were proposed by Makarios to be altered or
completely removed, were now accepted. Clerides wrote to Makarios on 28 June 1968
and explained to him the Turkish Cypriot concessions. Makarios thought that the Greek
Cypriot side could not reject Denktas's proposals but despite that, the reply of the
Greek side had to be delayed for tactical reasons and in order to induce for further
Turkish concessions. Clerides had strongly urged Makarios to accept the proposals of
54
Denktas and explained to Makarios that the powers proposed for local authorities were
far below the powers of a canton in a federal state. However Makarios rejected the
Turkish Cypriot proposals and thus the first round of talks, which lasted more than 2
years, ended without agreement.
CLERIDES-MAKARIOS DISAGREEMENT
The second phase of the intercommunal talks started on 29 August 1968 and lasted on 3
January 1970. Meanwhile Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, Pipinellis and
Caglayangil, met several times and made parallel efforts to solve the problems which
created difficulties during Denktas-Clerides talks.
Clerides reveals that there had been disagreement between himself as interlocutor and
Makarios on the issues of local Government. However Makarios had a different point of
view, which was explained as follows: "Our main aim should be to reduce the Turkish
Community's political status to that of minority, acknowledging autonomy only on such
matters as religion, education, culture, personal status but not in local Government."
Ibid, p. 272-3
Clerides admits that he `tried to convince Makarios that a more developed system of
local government would be needed, which should contain, at least, some element of
autonomy, with less control by the Government'. Ibid, p. 273
MAKARIOS DEFIES ATHENS
Even the Greek Premier Papadopoulos and Foreign Minister Pipinellis who had several
encouraging meetings with their Turkish counterparts, had not been able to convince
Makarios to accept Turkish proposals for self-government. On 5 January 1969 at a
meeting in Athens Pipinellis expressed his view that `from the Turkish side there was a
sincere wish to find a solution' and concluded that the Greek side should be more
flexible on the issue of local government. Ibid, p. 290
The Greek Premier Papadopoulos warned Makarios that if Turkey attacked, Greece
would not be in a position to help Cyprus. Therefore he added, "we must achieve a
solution to the problem, before a solution is forced on us." But Makarios insisted that
the subject of local government was a matter of serious concern for him and that he
was not prepared to back down on that issue. With this intransigent position of the
Greek Cypriot side the second phase of intercommunal talks ended. The Greek Cypriot
leaders thought that the Turks would capitulate and accept the Greek side's terms,
under the pressure of their tottering economy. "Makarios felt we should move slowly."
Ibid, p. 312
TURKISH POSITION
On 10 November 1969 the Turkish Premier, Süleyman Demirel, stated that `the Cyprus
problem was a national problem' and the main objective of the Turkish government was
to reach a solution `satisfying the rights and interests of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot
Community'. He also underlined that Turkey wanted the independence of Cyprus to
continue and that the only way to revive the independent Cyprus state was to reach a
settlement through negotiations. Demirel added that, such a solution would, without
any doubt, affect positively Greco-Turkish relations.
55
FRUISTLESS EFFORTS
The 3rd phase of the talks started on 1st December 1969. Denktas proposed that `as no
agreement was reached on local government it would be better to leave that issue
aside and try to resolve the differences on the constitution, scaling down the Turkish
Cypriot rights.' But, "once again the characteristic attitude of the Greek Cypriot
leadership to hang on to positions, ... played its damaging part, and an opportunity to
reach agreement with the Turkish side on the basis of a considerable improvement of
the Zurich agreements was lost." Ibid, p.359
That was how Clerides explained the failure to reach an agreement. Denktas stated
that, " For over two years the talks dragged on with fruitless exchanges of views. ...
The Turkish side drew up a comprehensive list of such matters, which needed
consideration. The Turks expected that an agreement on non-political issues would
enhance the chances of success in the international talks." Denktas, op. cit, p.55
Instead, on 14 March 1971, Makarios made a speech at Yialousa village, which proved
that such expectations were void. Makarios declared: "Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus has been
Greek since the dawn of history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have
taken it over; Greek and undivided we shall preserve it. Greek and undivided we shall
deliver it to Greece." According to Denktas, at a time when intercommunal talks was
focused on a solution based on independence such a provocative declaration of
intentions by Makarios was a very serious blow to all efforts. ..."and so talks broke down
after a last meeting on 20 September 1971." Ibid, p.55
Clerides regretted that a solution was not reached during his talks with Denktas and
blamed the Greek Cypriot side for this failure. "The irony of the situation is that in 1970
we were refusing autonomy to the Turkish Cypriot community on local Government.
The justification for our refusal was that it constituted a form of concealed federation.
... If today we were offered the solution which was possible in 1970 we would grasp it
with both hands and we would be celebrating a tremendous success." Clerides, op. cit,
p. 381
CONFLICT BETWEEN MAKARIOS, GRIVAS AND ATHENS
The Greek Government of Colonels was resolute in sorting out the Cyprus question on a
basis, which would both help to improve the Greco-Turkish relations and defuse the
Cyprus problem. It was therefore willing to accept the local government proposition
(autonomy) for Turkish Cypriots. In a letter to Makarios on 18 June 1971, Papadopoulos
warned that "if Makarios insisted on breaking the common front, the Greek Government
would have to act in the national interests of Cyprus Hellenism, however `painful' that
might be." Stanley Mayes, Makarios, p.112
Makarios rejected this warning, risking the worsening of relations with the Greek
military Government. In his letter of 4 August 1971 to Papadopoulos he plainly rejected
the proposition that the Greek Government would have a final say in resolving the
Cyprus problem. Clerides, vol III, p. 3
As a matter of fact, during the next two years the rift between Makarios and Athens
reached the limits of no return. Meanwhile the Greek Government initiated the talks
with Turkey on the level of Foreign Ministers which continued in an encouraging way
both between Pipinellis and Caglayangil first and then between Palamas and O. Olcay,
from 1968 to 1972. The Conflict between the Greek military Government and the
56
Makarios regime reached its climax in the early 1970's. In September 1971, Grivas once
more arrived secretly in Cyprus and immediately started underground activities against
both the intercommunal talks and the hegemony of Makarios. Clerides reveals that he
knew that Grivas and his supporters were opposed to the intercommunal talks and
observed: "They wanted Greece to negotiate the Enosis question directly with Turkey...
and if necessary to force Makarios to declare Enosis.
... In their view in such a development, the USA and NATO would intervene to prevent a
war between Greece and Turkey." Ibid p.111
Thus union with Greece would have become a permanent de-facto situation. With the
arrival of Grivas in Cyprus the polarization of the Greek Cypriots accelerated. Grivas
had immediately formed a pro-Enosis underground organization, called EOKA B, to
challenge the authority and policy of Makarios. Meanwhile Makarios were importing
arms mostly from Czechoslovakia for his own purposes. According to Clerides "these
arms were not imported in order to strengthen the (Greek) National Guard, but to arm
the supporters of Makarios, in order to defend him and his Government from a likely
coup by Greek Forces in Cyprus, and against attacks by Grivas's underground
organization EOKA B." Ibid, pp. 124-5
The Greek Government demanded that the imported Czech weapons should be handed
over to the United Nations Force. The Greek Cypriot police force was also divided. Many
of them were EOKA B members and had connection with terrorist activities. Makarios
had to rely only on private armed groups sympathizing with him and who were armed
by him, such as the armed groups of the socialist leader Dr. Vassos Lyssarides. On the
other hand, the former Minister of Interior, Yiorgadjis and EOKA gunman Nikos Sampson
had their own private armies directed against Makarios. Markides says that, "Order was
based on the balance of terror. ... Whenever EOKA B struck against supporters of the
Government (of Makarios), on equal amount of damage was inflicted on the supporters
of EOKA B." Markides, the Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, p.161.
As a result of this bitter feud, the helicopter of Makarios was attacked by gunmen from
the roof of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, opposite the Archbishopric. Makarios escaped
unhurt. His pilot was seriously wounded but managed to land safely. The former Interior
Minister, Yiorgadjis, the mastermind of the Akritas plan, had been the target of
Makarios supporters as being the main instigator of the attack. Only one week after the
helicopter incident he was shot dead in his car somewhere near Kythrea, 3 miles away
from Nicosia. Makarios launched a press campaign in the summer of 1973 against the
Greek Military and published a new paper called Eleftheros Laos (Free People) which
openly advocated the expulsion of Greek mainland officers. It also called upon King
Constantine and former premier Karamanlis to set up a Greek Government in-exile in
Nicosia. As a result, Cyprus had become a rallying point of Greeks who hated junta and
wished to re-establish the Monarchy. P. Oberling, Op, Cit, P. 154
Grivas died of a heart attack on 27 January 1974 in his hide-out in Limassol. Makarios
thought that he could coop easily with EOKA B terror as their leader was dead. But
EOKA B prevailed and its struggle became more violent. The anti-Makarios elements
demanded the removal of all `Anti-Hellenes' from the government and asked Makarios
to step down as president. They asked nothing short of a virtual take over. Markides,
Op. Cit, p. 165
57
After the death of Grivas, who defied Athens from time to time, EOKA B came under
the control of the military government in Athens. Under such circumstances Makarios
decided to send a letter to the president of Greece, General Phaedon Gizikis on 2 July
1974, asking him to remove the Greek officers from Cyprus. He claimed that, "the
Greek officers' support of `EOKA B' is in reality an undeniable fact" and that, " he
opposition press, which supports the criminal activities of `EOKA B', is financed by
Athens." Then, he bluntly accused the military regime with the following passages: "I
regret to say, Mr. President, that, THE ROOT OF EVIL IS TOO DEEP AND REACHES AS FAR
AS ATHENS. From there, it is fed and from there it is conserved and spreads growing
into a tree of evil; the bitter fruit of which Greek Cypriots are tasting today. And in
order to be more and absolutely specific I state that members of the military regime of
Greece support and direct the activities of the terrorist organization, `EOKA B' . This
explains the involvement of Greek officers of the National guard in the illegal actions,
conspiracies and other unacceptable situations."
..."In the effort to dissolve the state of Cyprus great is the responsibility of the Greek
Government. The Cyprus state can only be dissolved in the case of Enosis. Since,
however, the Enosis is not feasible it is imperative to strengthen the statehood of
Cyprus." ..."And I would request that the Greek officers serving in the National Guard
be recalled. ..."It must however, be kept in mind that I am not an appointed
commissioner, nor a locum-tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus, but an elected
leader of a large section of Hellenism and I demand analogous behavior towards these
from the National Centre." This letter of Makarios had diminished any serious hope of
cooperation or joint efforts between the Archbishop-president of Cyprus and the Greek
military government. The die was cast. Both sides had reached to a point of NO
RETURN. On 5 July Makarios sent an emissary to the exiled king of Greece in England
and to the self-exiled former Greek premier Karamanlis in Paris to brief them on the
gravity of the situation.
THE COUP & TURKISH PEACE OPERATION
THE COUP OF 15 JULY
The new leader of Athens' junta, Brigadier Ioannides, the chief of the military police,
was considered to be more authoritarian than his predecessor. He was a man known
both for his fiery anti-communism and intense hatred of Archbishop Makarios. Makarios
gave an interview on 6 June on the letter he sent to Ghizikis and stated that Athens was
financing and directing EOKA B with the aim of dissolving the Cyprus state. On 15 July
1974, the National Guard, led by Greek mainland officers staged a coup and overthrew
the Makarios government.
At about 8.30 am, tanks of the National guard reached the presidential palace and
started shelling it. At the same time the Cyprus Broadcasting station, the
telecommunication centre, and the Nicosia Airport were occupied. The presidential
palace were destroyed by shells fired from tanks and armoured cars and within minutes
the building was on fire. Makarios narrowly escaped through the back garden. He
stopped a passing van in which he arrived in Palechori Village and from there he was
driven to Kykko Monastery in the Troodos Mountain. From there he went to Paphos and
58
issued a statement informing the Greek Cypriot people and the world that he was alive.
He also used a local radio in Paphos to broadcast messages to the Greeks and asked
them to resist the Junta in every way. Acting on instructions from Athens, the Greek
General Yiorgitsis in Nicosia, started looking for a candidate to be appointed president
of the Republic. After having offered it to a few leading Greek Cypriots who were on his
list, but had refused to accept the offer, Nikos Sampson, an EOKA terrorist who had
killed first British soldiers and then in 1963-64 many Turks, had been recruited. He was
sworn in as president at 3. p.m on 15 July According to Clerides, "the real objectives of
the conspirators were to oust Makarios and his government in order to proceed with
direct negotiations with Turkey, and with the use of the good offices of the United
States, to achieve ENOSIS of the major part of Cyprus with Greece, conceding a smaller
part of Cyprus to Turkish sovereignty" Ibid, p. 343 From Paphos, Makarios was
transported to the Akrotiri Base by the British in a helicopter; then first to Malta and
from there on 17 July 1974 to London in an RAF transport plane. He visited 10 Downing
St, and talked first with the British Premier Harold Wilson and then with Foreign
Minister James Callaghan. When Makarios requested that Britain, as a Guarantor, had
an obligation to restore constitutional order and therefore should intervene to do so he
was told quite clearly that the British Government would not intervene to restore
constitutional order. Nevertheless, they said they still considered him to be the legal
President of the Cyprus Republic.
MAKARIOS ADDRESSED THE SECURITY COUNCIL
From London, the next day, Makarios went to New York and addressed to the Security
Council on 19 July 1974. The Turkish delegation in the UN supported both the validity of
the credentials of the Greek Cypriot delegate, Zenon Rossides which had been
cancelled by Nikos Sampson and the right of Makarios to address the Security Council.
Clerides, op. cit, p. 350 Makarios in his speech underlined the fact that the coup was
organised by the military regime in Athens and carried out by Greek army officers who
were serving in the National Guard and were commanding it. Makarios categorically
denied that what was happened in Cyprus on 15 July was not a revolution but "it was an
invasion which violated the independence and sovereignty of the Republic." He accused
the Athens regime of being `double faced' ; because while it agreed that the intercommunal talks would be based on independence, on the other hand, it established and
supported the EOKA B terrorist organisation the main purpose of which "was stated to
be the union of Cyprus with Greece." He stated the following: "As I have already stated
the events in Cyprus do not constitute an internal affair of the Greek Cypriots. The
Turkish Cypriots are also affected.
THE COUP OF THE GREEK JUNTA IS AN INVASION AND FROM ITS CONSEQUENCES ALL
THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS BOTH GREEKS AND TURKS WILL SUFFER .
In conclusion he asked the Security Council to invite the Athens military regime to bring
to an end its INVASION of Cyprus. He also described Nikos Sampson, the appointed new
president of Cyprus, "A Well known criminal", and said that the coup had cost much
bloodshed and many lives. Ibid, p.344 During the coup, many of the Makarios supporters
were killed and buried in mass graves. A Greek Cypriot priest, Papatsestos disclosed to
Athens daily TA NEA that, he himself have buried 127 bodies during the coup and he
was forced to bury another 77 bodies in mass graves. This revelation in TA NEA were
later reproduced in all Greek Cypriot papers on 27 February 1976. Papatsetsos was in
charge of the Nicosia Greek Orthodox cemetery and admitted that truck loads of dead
Greek Cypriots were hastily buried without any attempt to identify the bodies. He said:
59
"The most horrible experience of my life was seeing a wounded young Greek Cypriot
buried alive". He also admitted that 10 Turks were buried in that cemetery as well.
THE FIRST TURKISH PEACE OPERATION
The news of 15 July coup had raised a serious alarm and deep Concern in Turkey. The
Turkish government headed by Bulent Ecevit, who was in power in coalition with
Erbakan's National Salvation party ordered the Turkish Forces to be ready for all
probabilities. On 16 of June, Ecevit sent a note to the British Government urging it to
cooperate with Turkey in enforcing the Treaty of Guarantee. Despite the irresponsive
attitude of Britain he flew to London with his Foreign Minister Prof. T. Gunes on 17
June 1974 for consultations in conformity with the Treaty of Guarantee. But the British
Government led by Harold Wilson declined to participate in a joint action as envisaged
by the Article (2) of the Treaty, to protect the independence of the island and to reestablish the state of affairs. The American reaction to the coup was similarly
disappointing. Makarios was widely distrusted and the then Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger regarded him as a "loser" . He also was apprehensive that the Ioannides regime
in Athens, if challenged, might be overthrown by more radical officers with antiAmerican sentiments. Prof. Oberling, op. cit, p.161
According to a State Department official, Kissinger followed policy of "constructive
ambiguity" and sent his deputy Joseph Sisco, to shuttle between London, Athens and
Ankara to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Thus Americans not only had
not condemned the coup but also gave the impression that they might recognise the
Sampson regime and the new state of affairs created by the coup. Both the US and the
Guarantor power, the UK had also prevented the UN from condemning the military take
over in Cyprus by the Greek army officers and the puppet administration of Nikos
Sampson, arguing that too little information was available to come to any conclusion.
Ibid, p. 162 Among the permanent members of the Security Council only the Soviet
Union condemned the coup and had been supportive for a Turkish intervention to save
the independence of Cyprus and to reinstate Makarios. Ecevit's ultimatum of 18 July to
the Greek Government demanding the resignation of Nikos Sampson and the withdrawal
of the 650 Greek officers together with a firm pledge that the island would remain
independent was refused by Athens.
There was no any more time to be wasted. The Turkish Cypriot people were also
surrounded by the Greek National Guard and both the declaration of enosis and yet
another massacre of the Turks were imminent. Turkey could not afford to risk these
eventualities. Therefore, Ecevit ordered on 19 July, the Turkish Army to launch a
`peace Operation' and exercise the right of intervention, according to Article IV(2) of
the Treaty of Guarantee. The aim of this operation was to maintain the independence
of Cyprus and to protect the Turkish Cypriot people. The Turkish Peace Operation
started at early hours of 20 July 1974. It was a difficult amphibious action involving air,
sea and land forces. Three brigades of Turkish troops arrived by sea and landed, at a
beach, 5 miles west of Kyrenia, together with 40 tanks and light weapons. Paratroopers
were dropped a few miles north of Nicosia between Gonyeli and Hamitkoy.
A bridgehead was established and Turkish forces had a link up with Turkish Cypriot
fighters in St. Hilarion area and in Kyrenia Boghaz. Heavy fighting took place between
the Turkish Contingent and the Greek Contingent, which were in Cyprus in accordance
with the Treaty of Alliance of 1960. The Times Correspondent observed that "thousands
60
of Turkish Cypriots were taken hostage after the Turkish forces landed. Turkish women
were raped, children were shot in the street and the Turkish quarter of Limassol was
burnt out by the (Greek) National Guard." The Times, 23 July 1974.
The brutality of the Greek National Guard in Limassol and other Turkish areas they
surrounded was widely reported in the world press. For instance, a German tourist
described the atrocities of the Greek soldiers saying that "the human mind cannot
comprehend the Greeks' butchery" and added: "In the villages around Famagusta, the
Greek National Guard have displayed unsurpassed examples of savagery. Entering
Turkish homes, they ruthlessly rained bullets on women and children. They cut the
throats of many Turks. Rounding up Turkish women, they raped them all. Broadcast
from `The Voice of Germany' July 30, 1974.
The New York Times Correspondent witnessed that, 15 of the Turkish Cypriot men, who
were trying to defend themselves, were lined up after they surrendered and were shot
by EOKA gunmen in the mixed village of Alaminos, of the Larnaca District. The New
York Times, 29 July 1974
Many Turkish Cypriots were taken away as hostages. For instance, the Turkish Cypriot
men in Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos were all herded into the courtyards of the Greek
hospitals, Greek schools and stadiums. Many Turkish Cypriots who managed to escape
were sheltered for many weeks in the AKROTIRI British Base area, in a makeshift camp.
On 22 July Kyrenia was freed by the Turkish Army. Thus the Turks acquired a seaport,
which had been very vital for their supplies. Then the call for a cease-fire by the UN
Security Council was implemented.
ITS DIRECT RESULT
On the second day of the Turkish Peace Operation the Athens military Government
collapsed. Karamanlis returned from Paris and formed his civilian Government. In
Cyprus, Nikos Sampson resigned and Clerides took over the presidency as acting
president, according to the 1960 Constitution. The direct result of the first Turkish
operation was very positive: Democracy returned to Greece, Cyprus's independence was
saved and the way to constitutional order was opened. But the Greek side was not still
prepared to accept a new order, which would provide full security in a federal and
cantonal new system.
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
At the UN a draft resolution was approved by the Security Council Resolution No: 353
(1974) on 20 July at 16.00 hours London time. It `deplored the outbreak of conflict and
continued bloodshed' and `expressed grave concern about the situation which led to a
serious threat to international peace and security in the whole Eastern Mediterranean
area. It `called upon Greece, Turkey and the U.K to enter into negotiations without
delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus
and to keep the Security Council informed.' In conformity with this resolution and the
Treaty of Guarantee, Foreign Ministers of the 3 guarantor powers attended a
conference in Geneva , on 25 July 1974. They discussed the problem of Cyprus until 30
July and issued a joint declaration which underlined "THE EXISTENCE IN PRACTICE IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS OF TWO AUTONOMOUS ADMINISTRATIONS, THAT OF THE
GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY AND THAT OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY."
The terms of this declaration remained academic. The Greek side did not comply with
61
the undertakings to evacuate the occupied Turkish enclaves and to cooperate in
establishing a security zone. Instead they continued to attack Turkish areas and took
hundreds of Turkish Cypriot civilians as prisoners, in addition to the hundreds they had
taken hostage before the Geneva Conference. Thus, the Greek attacks caused the
evacuation of another 33 Turkish villages. On top of that, the Greek atrocities towards
Turkish civilians including women and children increased and became more brutal.
Almost the whole population of Aloa, Sandallaris and Maratha near Famagusta and
Tokhni, Zyyi and Mari at Larnaca district were massacred and wiped out. The Second
Geneva Conference which started on 9 August ended on 13th without any agreement on
a new Constitution and a cantonal system proposed by Turkey. The Turkish view was
based on a federal type of arrangement providing for autonomous areas. Whereas the
Greek and Greek Cypriot side insisted on a unified Cyprus on the basis of 1960
Constitution which, ironically, they now considered to be still valid. Thus they intended
to ignore the emerging new realities of the island, which were direct result of the coup
aiming at uniting the island with Greece, against the clear provisions of the 1960
Agreements and the Treaty of Guarantee.
On the other hand, the First Peace Operation and the cease-fire did not bring the
required security to the Turks of the island . The many Turkish villages were surrounded
by hostile Greek forces and thousands of them were hostages in the hands of the Greek
gunmen. `In the meantime Greek Cypriots started their massacres once again. 16,000
Turks had to abandon 38 more villages. Within the walls of Famagusta 10,000 Turks
faced danger of starvation, while 4,000 flocked to Konedra (Knodhara) village
surrounded by the Greek National Guard.' Ertekün, Necati Münir, In Search of
Negotiated Cyprus Settlement, (Nicosia 1981), p. 30
In Limassol and Larnaca, the Turkish Cypriot men, after their surrender, were herded
into makeshift concentration camps while the women and children were left at the
mercy of roving Greek gangs. In Limassol some 1980 men were detained in the open, in
the summer heat in the city's soccer stadium. In Larnaca, 873 men, ranging in age from
12 to 90 were confined in a school building, which was built to accommodate only 100
students. Oberling, op. cit, p.173 All Turkish Cypriots outside the areas held by the
Turkish army were in imminent danger of annihilation. Therefore Turkey could not
waste any more time by trying to challenge the diplomatic maneuvers and the
Byzantine tricks of the Greek side. Diplomatic negotiations were leading nowhere as
was exhibited in Geneva, and the annihilation of Cypriot Turks outside the protective
umbrella of the Turkish Peace Force could not be risked any further. The vulnerable
position of the Turkish Army itself which was restricted in a narrow area also
necessitated a second operation. `What was becoming increasingly obvious in Geneva
was that British Foreign Secretary Callaghan was encouraging the Greeks in their
intransigence, in an apparent effort at buttering the new democratic regime in Athens.'
Oberling, op. cit, p.178 On 12 August Callaghan announced that Britain was sending 600
Gurka troops to Cyprus and had cancelled the return of 12 Phantom jets and that 600
marine commandos had been sent to Cyprus at the height of Turkish military
intervention. This gave the impression that Britain would resist militarily any Turkish
advance and thus created false hopes on the part of the Greeks.
THE SECOND PEACE OPERATION
`The Turkish Cypriots had suffered too much and the Turkish Government had invested
too much effort and money in its military operation in Cyprus to be contented with a
62
proposal that constituted at best an overture to what could have been lengthy
negotiations. Creigh R. Whitney of The New York Times observed: "It seems clear that
the new Greek civilian Government in Athens felt itself unable to accept a far-reaching
solution now." The New York Times, 15 August 1974
Therefore the Greek side started to play with time in Geneva and asked for a 48 hours
adjournment on 13 August. This was not acceptable to the Turkish side for obvious
reasons and thus the Conference came to an end. Denktas, explained that the Greeks'
demand for adjournment was aimed at taking advantage of it to bring Makarios back
and reinforce their forces on the island. He said that Greek Cypriots were simply not
yet ready to negotiate realistically and were still hedging on the key question of bizonality; "namely that the Turks are entitled to full security and that this can only be
provided by a geographical area". The Times, 15 August 1974
The well-informed foreign observers had also expressed almost identical views: The
Greek Cypriot demands for `additional consultation' were reminiscent of years of
political haggling during which the Greek side had not yielded an inch." Cyprus: Minority
Rights Group Report, No: 30 (London, 1976) p.6 Ecevit, ordered the second peace
operation as soon as he learned that the Turkish proposals were rejected and additional
consultations had been demanded. Thus, on 14 August 1974 the second peace operation
started at dawn and was concluded on the 16th, after the Turkish Army reached
Famagusta on the East and Lefke on the west. Turkish policy was to have enough
territory in order to accommodate and safeguard the rights and well-being of the
Turkish Cypriot population. Once this was achieved, Ecevit ordered the cease-fire on 16
August. Since then, the Turkish Army stationed in the Northern part of Cyprus within
the frontiers established by the second peace operation, have not moved an inch
towards the Greek part of the island. And since 16 August 1974, there has not been a
single inter-communal fight, nor any bloodshed. Both the Turkish Cypriots and the
Greek Cypriots are happily living and prospering economically, socially and politically
within their regions under their own democratic system of government.
NEGOTIATION PROCESS
THE NEW CYPRUS
One of the direct results of the second Turkish peace operation had been the
emergence of a NEW CYPRUS, on which the two main Cypriot peoples, the Turks and
Greeks were physically separated mainly on considerations of their security and of
setting up a bi-zonal federal new republic based on political equality of both sides . The
Turkish Cypriot side after the completion of the voluntary population exchange in
accordance with the Vienna agreement of 2 August 1975 and after having witnessed
once more the delaying tactics of the Greek side during the five rounds of the Vienna
talks in 1975 and 1976, had realised that the separate Turkish Cypriot administration
had to be re-organised and updated in order to meet the people's requirements and also
to provide an opportunity for the Greek Cypriot side to grasp and adopt themselves to
the new realities of the island. In order to meet this new development and the already
existing situation, which needed an internal reorganization, Turkish Federated State of
Kibris, was proclaimed on 13 February 1975. By means of this the Turkish side aimed at
63
contributing towards a federal solution. Its new constitution was put to the referendum
of the Turkish Cypriot people on 8 June 1975, which was approved by a two-thirds
majority. The Turkish Federated State, did not seek international recognition, because
its aim was to keep the door open for federation and it was hoped that in a short while
the Greek side as well would follow suit and opened the way for a federal settlement.
DENKTAS-MAKARIOS GUIDELINES
Denktas the president of the Cyprus Turkish Federated State (CTFS) sent a letter to the
Greek Cypriot leader Makarios on 9 January 1977, expressing his readiness to meet with
him in the presence of the special Representative of the Secretary-General in the hope
that some understanding could be reached on the respective positions of both sides.
Ertekin, Op. Cit, p. 45 Archbishop Makarios agreed and thus the first summit meeting
between the two leaders took place on 27 January in the presence of Perez de Cuellar,
the special UN representative. This was followed by a second summit on 12 February
under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. During this meeting the
two leaders agreed on instructions, which would be a basis for the future
intercommunal negotiations. They came to be known as the FOUR GUIDELINES, and are
as follows:
1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, Federal Republic.
2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the
light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right
of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion taking into consideration
the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical
difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.
4. The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to
safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the
State." UN Document S/12323, para 5
The Four Guidelines have been a landmark and formed the basis of all negotiations
since. The Turkish initiative continued by preparing new proposals which were
submitted to the UN Secretary-General on 13 April 1978 in Vienna. . K. Waldheim found
the Turkish proposals worth considering and thus he visited Nicosia and handed them
over to the Greek leader for consideration, on 19 April. On 18-19 May 1979 Waldheim
was successful in bringing the two leaders around a table which resulted in a joint
declaration known since as the 'TEN POINT AGREEMENT'. According to this, both sides
agreed to resume inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979, on the basis of DenktasMakarios guidelines of 12 February 1977. The ten points agreement prepared the ground
for the resumption of inter-communal talks, in Nicosia, under the auspices of the UN
special representative Perez de Cuellar. The talks started on 15 June 1975 and recessed
sine-die on 22 June. There had been another long recession and the new talks resumed
14 months, later on 9 August 1980. The main reasons of failure were first the Greek
Cypriot sides negative attitude, manifested in the refusal, in contravention of point 6 of
the second summit agreement, to lift the economic embargo imposed upon the Turkish
side since 1974. They also refused to admit the other two agreed provisions in respect
to bi-zonality and security.
64
THE CAMPAIGN FOR INTERNATIONALISATION
Meanwhile the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou launched an intensive international
campaign at the expense of the inter-communal talks. The UN Secretary General in his
report to the UN General Assembly on 8 November 1979, referred to the Greek Cypriot
activities at international gatherings and at non-aligned conferences at Colombo,
Lusaka and Havana between June and September 1979, which were regarded by the
Turkish side as a violation of point 6 of the Denktas-Kyprianou agreement of 1979. UN
Report A/34/620, p.5, Para.
17 After intensive efforts of the UN Secretary-General, another series of intercommunal talks resumed on 9 August 1980 under the auspices of the new UN special
Cyprus representative Ambassador Hugo Juan Gobbi. On 5 August 1981 the Turkish
Cypriot side presented comprehensive proposals for the solution, which for the first
time offered specific territorial concessions. In return they demanded the
establishment of a bi-zonal federal republic in which the "equal co-founder partnership
status of the Turkish Cypriot community would be protected." Diplomatic observers
welcomed this move, but the Greek Cypriot leadership did not share their enthusiasm.
Denktas, op. cit, p.112
The Turkish Cypriot proposals were not regarded worth considering by the Greek
Cypriot leadership, because their policy was now based not on inter-communal
negotiation but on the internationalization of the issue by pursuing an "aggressive
diplomacy". In February 1982 the new Greek premier Andreas Papandreou visited
Cyprus and completely ignoring the inter-communal talks, proclaimed that Cyprus, 'a
Greek land' was under foreign occupation and that unless this was ended there could be
no solution of the problem. Ibid, p.113
The combined efforts of Athens and the Greek Cypriot leaders to internationalize the
issue had completely paralysed inter-communal negotiations under the UN auspices.
Resolution after resolution was passed by the Non-Aligned meetings and while
Kyprianou was in Delhi, to obtain one such resolution, the Greek Cypriot negotiator
requested postponement of the inter-communal talks. Meanwhile the Cyprus issue was
taken yet again to the UN by the Greek side. Denktas appealed to the Greek Cypriot
side not to take the issue to New Delhi and to New York and not to give up the
dialogue. He warned them: "You will not find us in the same position and with the same
status if you leave the negotiating table." Ibid, p.114
No one heeded this warning. Kyprianou and Papandreou were set on
internationalisation. As a matter of fact the Greek Cypriot leader, Kyprianou, was doing
only what the Greek premier was telling him to do.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRNC
TOWARDS THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
The Final Declaration of the New Delhi Non-Aligned Conference, adopted on 12 March
1983, expressed full solidarity with and support for `the Government of Cyprus'.
Necatigil Zaim, The Cyprus Question And The Turkish Position In International Law,
(Oxford, 1989) p.159-160
65
The Greek side intensified its propaganda campaign in international fora to mislead
world public opinion that the Cyprus problem was a problem of `invasion and
occupation', rather than a problem between the island's two communities. Accordingly,
instead of continuing intercommunal negotiations they took the issue once more to the
UN and insisted that the matter be discussed not at the Political Committee but at the
General Assembly, where the Turkish Cypriot side was barred from participating in the
debate. The UN General Assembly on 13 May, passed a resolution demanding the
immediate withdrawal of all the `occupation forces and the voluntary return of the
refugees to their former homes'. It was also suggested that the Security Council should
examine within a set time limit the question of implementation of various UN
resolutions on Cyprus.
`The Turkish Cypriots were specially concerned by paragraph two of this resolution
which affirmed, "the rights of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective
sovereignty and control over the territory of Cyprus and its natural and other sources."
and called upon all states to support and help the "Government of the Republic of
Cyprus" to exercise these rights. Necatigil, Op. Cit, p.164
Denktas described this resolution as fatal to our interest and therefore unacceptable.'
Denktas, Op. Cit, p.115
Kyprianou wanted to use both the New Delhi and this latest UN resolution as a basis for
further talks, thus imposing the Greek Cypriot hegemony over the Turkish Cypriot
people and the whole island. The Turkish Cypriot side refused to bow this pressure and
injustice and such one-sided resolutions, which were not legally, or morally binding.
The May 1983 UN resolution increased the awareness of Turkish Cypriots that they were
being downgraded to the status of a minority. It had also eroded the negotiating status
of the Turkish Cypriot side without having even listened their case. Denktas,
considering this total injustice and prejudice against Turkish Cypriot rights provided by
international treaties, decided to take steps for declaring an independent state in the
North. He said the General Assembly resolution was the `last drop' which caused the
Turks to reassert their partnership rights.' Ibid, p. 166
But before taking that step, Denktas invited Kyprianou to declare publicly that he
accepted the partnership status of the Turkish Cypriots and to confirm that it was the
desire of the Greek side as well to establish a bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic.
He also `called for lifting of the economic embargo and a `moratorium' on
internationalization and raising the Cyprus problem in international forms during the
intercommunal negotiations. Ibid, p. 166
Meanwhile the Legislative Assembly of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus reacted to
the UN resolution by adopting a motion on 17 June by which it underlined the equal
rights and status of Turkish Cypriots in an independent and sovereign Cyprus. This was
based on the fact that when Britain ended its administration in the island, sovereignty
was not transferred exclusively to one community but to both communities conjointly
as co-founder partners of the Republic. Kyprianou rejected the offer of Denktas for a
high level meeting under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. Moreover, Perez de
Cuellar's efforts for the resumption of the intercommunal talks on the basis of his
`indicators' failed, because Kyprianou was instructed by Athens to turn down this
initiative. Nicos Rolandis, the Foreign Minister of the Greek side, at last realized that
66
Kyprianou was not serious about a bi-zonal federation when he rejected the UN
Secretary' General's `indicators' which were intended to give a new motivation to the
intercommunal talks. Therefore he wrote to Kyprianou explaining his reason and
resigned. In his written statement on 25 September 1983, Rolandis said that the Greek
Cypriot leader, Kyprianou, had adopted a negative approach towards the UN SecretaryGeneral's `working points' right from the beginning.
DECLARATION OF THE TRNC
Denktas described his reasons of declaring independence saying that he had many
reasons to believe that nothing short of declaration of independence and some
movement to seek international recognition would oblige the Greek side towards a
settlement based on bi-communal partnership in a bi-zonal federal system. He stated: "I
believe that it was our rightful due to be free first and to assert our right to statehood
if we were ever to enter into a venture of political partnership with the Greek Cypriots.
If we did not assert our right of statehood as free people I saw no reason why the Greek
Cypriot side should ever settle the Cyprus problem by accepting us into a partnership."
Ibid, pp. 121-2
Denktas added that there was no alternative. The Turkish Cypriots were deprived of all
its rights and were treated as outlaws by the Greeks. As long as the Turkish Cypriots
stayed dormant in their present position the existing state of affairs would continue.
"We had to break this vicious circle. The world had to see that we existed... The key to
a federal settlement was the assertion of our statehood." Ibid p. 123
And the 'vicious circle' was broken on 15 November 1983, when Denktas addressed the
Turkish Cypriot Assembly and read the declaration of independence. Over ten thousand
of Turkish Cypriots had gathered in front of the Assembly who had expressed their joy
and pleasure by thunderous applause and cheers when Denktas declared the birth of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Following Denktas's address, the
Assembly (parliament) unanimously accepted the resolution for declaring
independence.
EXTRACTS FROM THE DECLARATION
-We hereby declare before the World and before History the establishment of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an Independent State.
- On this historic day, We extend once again our hand in peace and friendship to the
Greek Cypriot People. The two Peoples of the island are destined to co-exist, side by
side.
- We can, and must, find peaceful, just and durable solutions to all our differences,
through negotiations on the basis of equality.
- The proclamation of the new State will not hinder, but facilitate the establishment of
a genuine federation.
- The new Republic will not unite with any other State.
- The new State will continue to adhere to the Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee
and Alliance.
- The good offices of the UN Secretary-General and negotiations must continue.
- The new state will not allow any hostile activity against any country on its territory.
- It shall attach the greatest importance to the preservation of peace, stability and of
the balance of power in the region.
67
The resolution unanimously passed by the Turkish Cypriot parliament underlined that
the Turkish Cypriot side, `firmly adhered to the view that the two peoples of Cyprus
were destined to co-exist side by side and could and should find peaceful, just and
durable solutions through negotiation on the basis of equality'. It also expressed the
firm conviction that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would
not hinder but facilitate the re-establishment of the partnership between the two
peoples within the federal fremework and also facilitate the settlement of problems
between them.
MORE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LED NOWHERE
In accordance with the Assembly's resolution, Denktas published on 2 January 1984,
only 6 weeks after the declaration of independence the goodwill measures, for
establishing a federal partnership republic. The UN Secretary-General found the Turkish
Cypriots good will measures constructive but the Greek side did not accept to have
talks on them. On 17 April Turkey and TRNC exchanged ambassadors and thus two
states diplomatically recognized each other. Perez de Cuellar, the UN SecretaryGeneral, invited the representatives of both sides to meet him separately in Vienna
between 6-7 August 1984. On the 7th the Turkish Cypriot side accepted the SecretaryGeneral's `working points' as a basis for a summit meeting. On 10 September 1984
'proximity talks' started. The leaders of both sides met the Secretary General separately
and exchanged views on a draft agreement.
Denktas says, he accepted the draft put before him on 27th, when Perez de' Cuellar
gave him his solemn word that the concessions he had extracted from him would not be
binding if the Greek Cypriot side refused to accept the paper as an "intigrated whole."
Ibid. p. 133
Thus the document prepared by the UN Secretary-General had to be accepted as a
whole by both sides or rejected. Because, this was a package deal. Kyprianou, the
Greek Cypriot leader, was reported to have stated that for the first time in 10 years the
Cyprus problem was showing positive developments. He also added "without any doubt
the Turkish side has taken important steps for a just and viable solution of the Cyprus
problem." Haravghi, 3 January 1985
Despite this correct assessment Kyprianou asked 10 days adjournment `to consult his
people and to see the Greek premier, Andreas Papandreou', when he returned to
Washington after having talks in Cyprus and in Athens the Secretary-General announced
the date of the summit as 17 January 1985. That was a clear sign that all obstacles
were removed and the draft for an overall agreement as an `integrated whole' was
ready to be signed at the summit. But when on 17 January 1985 Denktas and Kyprianou
met with Perez de' Cuellar in New York, to sign the draft, Kyprianou wanted to have
further negotiations, thus declaring that all efforts made and all agreements reached
during those painstaking three rounds of proximity talks had been in vain. Now it had
once more become clear that the Greek Cypriot side intended to extract further
concessions in order to reduce the Turkish Cypriots' position to that of a minority in a
Greek Cypriot state. All attempts of the Secretary-General to convince Kyprianou that
he was letting go of an historical opportunity were of no avail. Thus the summit of 17
January 1985 had been a disastrous failure. The Greek Cypriot press and leadership put
the blame on Kyprianou and strongly criticised him for this `lost opportunity'.
68
The Times reported the following: "Un officials said Kyprianou even questioned the
basic tenets and principles of an accommodation with the Turkish Cypriots, including
the concept of `bi-zonality' and equal political status for the (two) communities." The
Times, 22 January 1985
The Greek Cypriot daily Alithia declared: "As long as Kyprianou is in office, no solution
is possible." Kyprianou rejected to sign the Draft Framework Agreement because as the
leader of AKEL, Papaiannou rightly stated: "This document could have been rejected
only by those who oppose federal solution to the Cyprus problem." Consequently all
efforts in 1980s as well as in 1990's were in vain because the Greek Cypriot side failed
to respond to the goodwill and desire of the Turkish Cypriot side for reconciliation.
Denktas concluded that, "The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and the
existence of the TRNC did not then, and do not now, constitute obstacles in the search
for peace in Cyprus. The international recognization and relations the Greek Cypriot
side enjoy, encourage them to play with time, to resort to dilatory tactics and to
persist in their deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of the Cyprus question".
Denktas op. cit, p. 149
"As long as the Greek Cypriots have the benefit of exclusive and unqualified diplomatic
and political recognition and support of the international community, it is evident that
they will have neither the political will nor the incentive or motivation to reach a
settlement through direct negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. The only way of
breaking the impasse over Cyprus and of overcoming Greek and Greek Cypriot
intransigence and obstructionism is for the international community to treat at an equal
level and on equal terms both the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek
Cypriot state. The Turkish Cypriot people hope and expect that countries in sympathy
with their cause will be the first to act in this constructive direction". Ibid, p. 152.
TURKISH CYPRIOT CASUALTIES
In memory of the Turkish Cypriots that were killed and are missing since 1960:
TURKS MARTYRED IN 1963
Name (Age)
Ali Osman (53)
Ahmet Kara Ali (50)
Osman Hüdaverdi (33)
Seyit Hüseyin (37)
Ali Mehmet (24)
Turgut Hasan (23)
Hasan Hüsnü (40)
Osman Cevdet (45)
Şükrü Şevki (44)
Hasan Hüseyin Çinko (23)
Hüseyin Mehmet Emin (22)
İsmail Mustafa (28)
Turgut Fahri (24)
Place
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
Küçükkaymaklı
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa
Date
31.12.1963
25.12.1963
25.12.1963
27.12.1963
27.12.1963
27.12.1963
26.12.1963
26.12.1963
26.12.1963
27.12.1963
29.12.1963
29.12.1963
29.12.1963
69
Kemal Ahmet Koççino (45)
İrfan Mehmet (24)
Ömer Hasan Debreli (46)
İbrahim Ahmet (60)
Osman Derviş (50)
Şükrü Tevfik (39)
Sezai Nidai (23)
Cemal Hüseyin Arifoğlu (26)
Erdem Mehmet (24)
Münür Yusuf (29)
Hüseyin Mustafa Vreççalı (39)
Ayşe Hasan Buba (49)
Ayşe İbrahim (11)
Bayram Hasan (70)
Hüseyin Cemal (18)
İsmail Mustafa (70)
Mehmet Ali Ömer (54)
Mehmet Hasan Buba (85)
Mustafa İsmail (37)
Ömer Hasan (19)
Ömer Mehmet Ali (65)
Hasan Mehmet Kabadayı (17)
Niyazi Cemal (39)
Salih Mehmet (55)
Kemal Hüseyin (34)
Nail Hüseyin (19)
Ali Fuat Mustafa (49)
Halil Mustafa Kemiksiz (44)
İbrahim Durmuş Musa (60)
Mustafa Mulla Hüseyin (27)
Derviş Mehmet (39)
Erdoğan Ahmet (29)
Hasan Yılmaz (25)
Hasan Ahmet Skordo (41)
Hasan Mehmet (35)
Hüseyin Osman (31)
Hüseyin İbrahim (21)
Cemal Mustafa (21)
Hüseyin Mehmet Buba (50)
Mehmet Osman Belligari (55)
Ramadan Ahmet (22)
Süleyman Hüseyin Aspri (44)
Şevket Cemal (34)
Şahap Şemi (40)
Vasıf Hasan (25)
İbrahim Nidai (32)
Şevket Kadir (24)
Özay Said (25)
Hasan Nural Cevdet (24)
Özer Ekrem Emin (27)
Ahmet Osman (32)
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Küçükkaymaklı / Lefkoşa
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Ayvasıl/Ay. Vasilios
Aredhiou Köyü
Aredhiou Köyü
Aredhiou Köyü
Aredhiou Köyü
Büyükkonuk / Lefkoşa
Büyükkonuk / Lefkoşa
Büyükkonuk / Lefkoşa
Mutluyaka-Larnaka Yolu
Lefkoşa-Kotchati Yolu
Eylenja Junstion
Eylenja Junstion
Eylenja Junstion
Eylenja Junstion
Erenköy-Trimithi
Kotchiati-Nisou Yolu
Kotchiati-Nisou Yolu
Dhali-Lefkoşa yolu
Lourudjina-Dhai yolu
Tera-Arodhes yolu
Larnaca
Akaki köyü
Larnaca Police Station
Lefkoşa
Kyrenia-Lapithos yolu
Kyrenia-Lapithos yolu
Lefkoşa
Erenköy-trimithia
Erenköy-trimithia
Erenköy-trimithia
26.12.1963
26.12.1963
26.12.1963
29.12.1963
26.12.1963
30.12.1963
31.12.1963
31.12.1963
26.12.1963
27.12.1963
27.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
27.12.1963
29.12.1963
29.12.1963
29.12.1963
31.12.1963
31.12.1963
31.12.1963
27.12.1963
24.12.1963
31.12.1963
31.12.1963
31.12.1963
31.12.1963
28.12.1963
25.12.1963
25.12.1963
26.12.1963
27.12.1963
29.12.1963
27.12.1963
23.12.1963
26.12.1963
18.12.1963
25.12.1963
25.12.1963
24.12.1963
28.12.1963
28.12.1963
28.12.1963
70
Mustafa Ali (23)
Hüseyin Ali (47)
Mehmet Raif (48)
Ramadan İsmail (21)
Ali Mustafa (50)
Vasit Mustafa (29)
Mustafa Arif (41)
Behçet Mehmet (20)
Mustafa Mehmet (28)
Fikret Hüseyin
Salih Ahmet Düztaban (35)
Yakup Ali Çavuş (45)
Hüseyin Yalçın (23)
Lefkoşa Hava Alanı
Agis Farm-Mia Milia
Lefkoşa
Ay.Demetrianos Farm
Lefkoşa Havaalanı Bölg.
Lefkoşa
Lefkoşa Genel Hast.
Tokni bölgesi
Tokni bölgesi
Tokni bölgesi
Ay.Sozomenos bölgesi
Lefkoşa Havaalanı
Ay.Marina Köyü
23.12.1963
21.12.1963
22.12.1963
21.12.1963
23.12.1963
22.12.1963
22.12.1963
29.12.1963
29.12.1963
29.12.1963
30.12.1963
24.12.1963
24.12.1963
TURKS MARTYRED IN 1964
Name (Age)
Rahmi Hasan (49)
Ayşe Rahmi (32)
Hasan Rahmi (15)
Zahide Rahmi (12)
Ahmet Rahmi (7)
Şerife Rahmi (5)
Mustafa Rahmi (2)
Ahmet Mulla Mehmet (66)
Cavit Sadık (45)
Fuat Hasan Gülali (23)
Ahmet Ali Osman (41)
İsmail Mustafa Balcı (38)
Hasan Osman (26)
İsmail İsmail (25)
Mehmet Hasan Onbaşı (24)
Mehmet Aziz (39)
Mustafa Salih Paşa (51)
Mehmet Osman (36)
Sami Hüseyin Arap (31)
Lütfi Celul (31)
Saydam Hüsnü (24)
Fehim Hüseyin (20)
Kamil Hüseyin Kuşuri (62)
Mehmet Yusuf (46)
Erol Mehmet Ali (20)
Hüseyin Mustafa (58)
Ertan Ali (18)
Rıfat Salih (41)
Hilmi Hamit (34)
Mustafa Karamehmet (37)
Mustafa Hüseyin Abuzet (30)
Osman Osman (24)
Ziya Ali (20)
Turgut Sıtkı (25)
Cengiz Ratip (33)
Palace
Livera Köyü
Livera Köyü
Livera Köyü
Livera Köyü
Livera Köyü
Livera Köyü
Livera Köyü
Morphou
Lefkoşa-Limasol Yolu
Yeniiskele/Trikomo Magosa
Yeniiskele/Trikomo Magosa
Yeniiskele/Trikomo Magosa
Turunçlu-Vatili yolu
Lefkoşa-Louroujina yolu
Lefkoşa-Louroujina yolu
Lefkoşa-Bağlıköy yolu
Lefkoşa-Bağlıköy yolu
Lefkoşa
Lefka-Ay.İrini yolu
Erenköy-Lefka yolu
Erenköy-Lefka yolu
Piroi bölgesi (Baf)
Piroi bölgesi (Baf)
Khoulou köyü
Latshia köyü
Latshia köyü
Lefkoşa-Magosa Yolu
Lefkoşa-Magosa Yolu
Hamitköy-Manres Lefkoşa yolu
Lefka Lefkoşa Yolu
Larna-Kyvisil yolu
Margi-Ay.Sozonenos yolu
Episkopi-Limasol yolu
Polis (Baf)
Polis (Baf)
Date
Ocak 1964
Ocak 1964
Ocak 1964
Ocak 1964
Ocak 1964
Ocak 1964
Ocak 1964
3.1.1964
2.1.1964
2.1.1964
2.1.1964
2.1.1964
26.1.1964
31.1.1964
31.1.1964
9.1.1964
9.1.1964
6.1.1964
1.1.1964
1.1.1964
1.1.1964
7.1.1964
7.1.1964
4.2.1964
22.2.1964
22.2.1964
6.2.1964
6.2.1964
3.2.1964
22.2.1964
25.2.1964
7.2.1964
13.2.1964
14.2.1964
14.2.1964
71
Kemal Mustafa (27)
Hüseyin Niyazi (26)
Tahir Kani (40)
İbrahim Kazım (18)
İbrahim Ali Bippiro (54)
Şevket Salih Sakallı (45)
Halil Abdullah (70)
İsmail Emin (80)
Yusuf Emir Hasan (74)
Adnan Ali Rıza (40)
Abdullah Haşim (27)
Fahri Ahmet (35)
Arif Hasan (21)
Hasan Derviş (23)
Nuh Ahmet (28)
Bayar Hüseyin Piskobulu (29)
Erol İsmail (28)
Özel Reşat Kansoy (29)
Ertuğrul Hasan Debreli (30)
Osman Hüseyin Mani (65)
Emir Ali Hüseyin (62)
Havva Emir Ali (54)
Fuat Mustafa (25)
Fuat Hüseyin (32)
Enver Hüsnü (25)
Fikri Haşim (28)
Fezile Ali (50)
Kamil Mehmet (50)
Mehmet Sinan (65)
Pembe Mehmet Sinan (55)
Mehmet Ahmet (45)
Hüseyin Halil Kavaz (60)
Hüseyin Osman Fogo (29)
Hüseyin Fikret Pipili (56)
Hasan Hüseyin Dohnili (45)
Nevzat Hüseyin (26)
İbrahim Gazi (30)
Kerim Mustafa (26)
Mustafa Osman Akay (24)
Mustafa Salih Karaman (66)
Mehmet İdris (60)
Memduh Sadık (27)
Sadık Elmaz (45)
Özkan Salim (18)
Ahmet Hasan Dayı (51)
Aytekin Zekai (28)
Ahmet Kocamehmet (39)
Hüseyin Mehmet (34)
Rezvan Hasan (38)
Sahali Mehmet Ali (36)
İbrahim Osman (57)
Ktima
Ktima
Ktima
Ktima
Ay.Theodoros bölgesi
Kyvisili bölgesi
Khoulou
Khoulou
Kyvisili bölgesi
Limasol
Lefkoşa-Larnaka yolu
Lefkoşa-Larnaka yolu
Dhekelia-Larnaka yolu
Dhekelia-Larnaka yolu
Kyrenia-Kazaphani yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa - Magosa yolu
Lefkoşa - Magosa yolu
Limasol-Lefkoşa yolu
Limasol-Lefkoşa yolu
Küçükkaymaklı
Lefkoşa-Lefka yolu
Lefkoşa-Lefka yolu
Lefkoşa-Lefka yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Yeşilırmak - Lefkoşa yolu
Pervolia (Larnaka)
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Mora yolu
Lefkoşa-Magosa yolu
Lefkoşa-Magosa yolu
Lefkoşa-Magosa yolu
Varosha
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Limasol yolu
Aghirda bölgesi
Aghirda bölgesi
Aghirda bölgesi
Geçitkale-Lefkonika bölgesi
Lefkoşa -Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa -Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa -Limasol yolu
Lefkoşa-Larnaka yolu
14.2.1964
14.2.1964
14.2.1964
14.2.1964
17.2.1964
5.2.1964
4.2.1964
4.2.1964
5.2.1964
10.3.1964
7.3.1964
7.3.1964
19.3.1964
19.3.1964
9.3.1964
18.4.1964
18.4.1964
18.4.1964
23.4.1964
23.4.1964
24.4.1964
24.4.1964
7.4.1964
24.4.1964
24.4.1964
24.4.1964
30.4.1964
30.4.1964
30.4.1964
30.4.1964
30.4.1964
30.4.1964
11.4.1964
10.4.1964
25.4.1964
25.4.1964
7.4.1964
17.4.1964
17.4.1964
17.4.1964
19.4.1964
20.4.1964
20.4.1964
24.4.1964
24.4.1964
24.4.1964
6.5.1964
24.5.1964
24.5.1964
24.5.1964
15.5.1964
72
Mehmet Mustafa Abuzet (24)
Turgut Mehmet (21)
Halil Ziya Desteban (53)
Ahmet Mustafa (57)
Canbulat Ali (34)
Hamit Mustafa (23)
Hüdaverdi Yusuf Osman (46)
Hasan Ziya (29)
Kemal Mehmet Emin (39)
Ziya Yusuf (33)
Mustafa Hasan (32)
Hüseyin Ahmet (29)
Hasan Ertuğrul Veli (39)
Kemal Enver Veloks (28)
Kemal Mustafa (35)
Hasan Mustafa Bari (32)
Hasan Hüseyin Fehmi (31)
Kamil Raif Dimililer (36)
Mehmet Ahmet İndiano (52)
Ahmet Fadıl Balamagi (22)
Behiç Hasan Göksan (35)
Durmuş Hasan (41)
Yusuf Tosun (61)
Bayram Mustafa (29)
Abdullah Emirzade (29)
Ali Musa (34)
Bayar İbrahim (23)
Hasan Taşer Mustafa (33)
Şifa Mehmet Ali (56)
Hüseyin Ahmet (58)
Şefika Hüseyin (38)
Hasan Halil Bulli (56)
Mehmet Arif Kamil (49)
Ali Hüseyin Genç (35)
Fuat Niyazi (20)
Eşref Salih (21)
Reşat Ahmet (48)
Celal Necip (80)
Ali Mehmet (56)
Yusuf Hüseyin Başi (80)
Hüseyin Paşa (55)
Mehmet Ahmet Dubara (50)
Erol Arif (22)
Ahmet İbrahim (56)
Hasan Recep Cin (56)
Yusuf İshak (45)
Yusuf Abdullah
Emir Ali Murat (75)
Ramiz Mehmet (60)
Mustafa İzzet Zorba (41)
Lefkoşa-Larnaka yolu
Lefkoşa
Pervolia-Meneu
Magosa
Magosa
Magosa
Magosa
Magosa
Magosa
Magosa
Pergamos-Magosa yolu
Pergamos-Magosa yolu
Magosa
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Larnaka-Dhekelia yolu
Vathilakas
Vathilakas
İnönü/Sinda-Perg. Yolu
İnönü/Sinda-Perg. Yolu
İnönü/Sinda-Perg. Yolu
Magosa-Pervolia yolu
Magosa-Pervolia yolu
Monarga
Psillatos-Sinda yolu
Lefkoşa-Magosa yolu
Scala - Magosa yolu
Scala - Magosa yolu
Scala - Magosa yolu
Mallia
Hamitköy-Mandres-Sykhari bölgesi
Lautros Bölgesi
Lefkoşa-Petrofani yolu
Lefkoşa-Petrofani yolu
Magosa
Polis-Baf yolu
Vaosha
Anadhiou-Kritou Marottu yolu
Anadhiou-Kritou Marottu yolu
Arodhea bölgesi
Dohni-Zyyi yolu
Lefkoşa-Magosa yolu
15.5.1964
10.5.1964
17.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
13.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
11.5.1964
12.5.1964
12.5.1964
12.5.1964
12.5.1964
24.5.1964
18.5.1964
10.7.1964
10.7.1964
2.7.1964
21.8.1964
11.8.1964
23.8.1964
23.8.1964
14.8.1964
5.9.1964
1.10.1964
73
TURKS MARTYRED IN 1965 & 1967
Name (Age)
Zühtü Mehmet Emir Ali (35)
Zihni Hasan (60)
Behri Yusuf Lambiro (40)
Salih Mustafa (25)
Şükrü Hasan (30)
Ramadan Şeker Ali (42)
Ali Hüseyin (49)
Mehmet Mehdi Ziba (51)
Fuat Mulla Salih (49)
Şükrü Redif (57)
Şefik Şükrü (20)
Palace
Ktima
Polis
Larnaka
Limasol
Xero bölgesi
Mathiati bölgesi
Baf-Mandria yolu
Baf-Mandria yolu
Baf
Ktima
Ktima
Date
Mart 1965
Mayıs 1965
5.5.1965
17.2.1966
Haziran 1966
18.7.1965
25.7.1967
25.7.1967
25.7.1967
25.7.1967
25.7.1967
MURATAGA AND SANDALLAR VILLAGES MASSACRES
On 1 September 1974 a shepherd noticed a hand on the ground, a tragic
evidence of what had happened to the inhabitants of the two villages. The
bloody murderers of the 20th centuries had killed 88 Turks on 15 August
savagely and stuffed them in that pit.
Turks brutally slaughtered and then burned down by Greek Cypriots in Murat
Ağa and Sandallar Villages:
Name (Age)
Emine Rüstem (38)
Sezin Rüstem (15)
Mustafa Rüstem (13)
Erbay Rüstem (12)
Sibel Rüstem (10)
Raziye Hasan (75)
Mustafa Hasan (48)
Havva Mustafa (40)
Türker Mustafa (16)
Tacay Mustafa (13)
Zalihe Hüseyin (70)
Ayşe Süleyman (47)
Dinavaz Süleyman (16)
Zalihe Süleyman (15)
Emine Süleyman (14)
Aliye Süleyman (12)
Havva Süleyman (11)
Gültekin Süleyman (9)
Rasime Osman (45)
Sezay Osman (16)
Hüseyin Osman (95)
Ayşe Hüseyin Osman (88)
Emine Bayram (38)
Halil Bayram (11)
Name (Age)
Ayşe Bayram (8)
Mustafa Bayram (6)
Şerife Bayram (1)
Mehmet Osman (82)
Zühre Mehmet (80)
Nadire Süleyman (70)
Enver Hüseyin (65)
Hasan Sadık (84)
Sevim Arif (15)
Seval Arif (12)
Hüseyin Arif (11)
Yüksel Arif (10)
Göksel Arif (8)
Şeniz Arif (5)
Hayriye Arif (4)
Derviş Sadık (70)
Havva Derviş (60)
Hatice Derviş (22)
Fatma Mehmet Tavukçu (35)
Mustafa Mehmet Tavukçu (10)
Talat Mehmet Tavukçu (8)
Mustafa Mehmet (55)
Ayşe Mustafa (50)
Okay Mustafa (14)
74
Eren Bayram (9)
Şifa Mehmet (60)
Ülfet Mehmet Salih (70)
Halil Hüseyin (65)
Emine Halil (60)
Cemaliye Hasan (42)
Rahmi Hasan (19)
Ayşe Hasan (15)
Ersoy Hasan (12)
Sevgi Hasan (10)
Uğur Hasan (9)
Özcan Hasan (6)
Erdoğan Aziz (45)
Fatma Erdoğan (38)
Kadriye Erdoğan (11)
Zehra Erdoğan (9)
Ahmet Erdoğan (8)
Ayşe Erdoğan (3)
Emine Hüseyin (40)
Seval Hüseyin (19)
Dudu Ali Osman (70)
Mehmet Hüseyin (17)
Ertan Hüseyin (14)
Erdinç Hüseyin (12)
Naziyet Mehmet (50)
Rahmi Hasan (72)
Emine Mehmet Salih (80)
Güldane Mehmet (44)
Serpil Mehmet (19)
Sevgül Mehmet (18)
Mustafa Mehmet (17)
Semra Mehmet (14)
Hasan Mehmet (13)
Savaş Mehmet (11)
Cengiz Mehmet (10)
Songül Mehmet (6)
Hasan Hüseyin Ali Çavuş (76)
Aziz Fikri (11)
Hüseyin Erdoğan (6)
ATLILAR VILLAGE MASSACRE
Atlılar village... 15 km to Magosa and totally inhabited by Turks... But,
Greek Cypriot murderers came... and it became the grave of 27 Turks...
The mass grave in Atlılar was found out on 21 August 1974. On 15 August
1974 57 males, females and kids were executed by shooting, stuffed on one
another in a ditch to be bulldozed later.
Name (Age)
Tülay Süleyman (27)
Hasan Süleyman (9)
Kemal Süleyman (6)
Okkan Süleyman (3)
Ayşe Hasan (55)
Narin Hasan (15)
Kıymet Hasan (20)
Gürhan Ali Çerkez (12)
Betül Hüseyin (12)
Mualla Ali Faik (28)
Gülden Ali Faik (4)
Özlem Ali Faik (2)
Selden Ali Faik (16 günlük)
Fatma Tahir (40)
Emine Tahir (18)
Emine Hasan Muhammet (29)
Ahmet Hasan Muhammet (3)
Bahire Hasan Muhammet (3)
Hasan Kara Hüseyin (68)
Name (Age)
Şifa Hasan Kara Hüseyin (60)
Nadir Hasan Kara Hüseyin (24)
Meral Hasan Kara Hüseyin (20)
Fatma Kamil Meriç (26)
Vedia Kamil Meriç (6)
Yonca Kamil Meriç (4)
Ozan Kamil Meriç (3)
Hakan Kamil Meriç (2)
Kağan Kamil Meriç (12)
Fatma Mehmet Naci (50)
Şükran Mehmet Naci (22)
Soncan Mehmet Naci (14)
Erünsal Mehmet Naci (10)
Nazım Hüseyin (6)
Şadiye Şadan (48)
Ülkü Şadan (22)
Fatma Şadan (19)
Rahme Cemal (65)
75
Name (Age)
Özkan Abdurrahman (25)
Salim Hasan Mikro (20)
İlkay Yusuf (24)
Mustafa Hasan (19)
İsmail Bekir (28)
Mustafa Salim (27)
Süleyman Ahmet (23)
Necati Hasan (35)
Lütfiye Ahmet (55)
Mehmet Salih Hüseyin (58)
Ahmet Behzat (36)
Osman Mehmet Hüdaverdi (25)
Mehmet Arif Tabakka (80)
Cafer Hasan (20)
Ali Hasan Civisilli (24)
Ömer Ali (25)
Ali Bodo (55)
Mehmet Ali Bodo (26)
Hasan Dildar (45)
Ahmet Hacı Halil (24)
Hüseyin Dildar (30)
Hasan Ali (35)
Mustafa Ali Nazif (25)
Tahir Osman (42)
Güney Hüseyin (22)
Yusuf Besim Ahçı (60)
İrfan Raif (19)
Mehmet Hüseyin (40)
Erdoğan Mustafa (29)
Kemal İsmail (39)
Mehmet Abdurrahman Çatallo(47)
Ayşe Ramadan (25)
İsmail Ahmet (55)
Kamil Ahmet (23)
Mehmet Emin Hüseyin (62)
Mahmut Mehmet Ali (36)
Bekir Mustafa (29)
Hasan Kara Mustafa (74)
Olgun Ali Emir (18)
Cemal Mehmet Salih (56)
Hüseyin Mustafa Arap (59)
Halil Hüseyin Kemaneci (16)
Mustafa Hüseyin (52)
Fikret Kalyoncu (29)
Fatma Ahmet Mulla Mehmet (75)
Hasan Mustafa Tüccar (61)
Mehmet Hasan (21)
Ahmet Cemal (48)
Tahir Mehmet (60)
Place
Magosa
Peristerona bölgesi
Peristerona bölgesi
St. Hilarion bölgesi
St. Hilarion bölgesi
St. Hilarion bölgesi
St. Hilarion bölgesi
St. Hilarion bölgesi
Ay. Ermolaos
Gönyeli bölgesi
Lefke
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Alaminos
Magosa
Gaziveren
Köprü
Akdeniz
Polis
Polis
Polis
Taşpınar köyü
Topçuköy
Topçuköy
Topçuköy
Topçuköy
Topçuköy
Taşpınar köyü
Serdarlı köyü
Akdeniz bölgesi
Kaleburnu bölgesi
Akdeniz bölgesi
Akdeniz bölgesi
Kuruova
Alaminos
Arpalık
Episkopi köyü
Neokhorio köyü
Date
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
20.7.1974
21.7.1974
21.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
22.7.1974
23.7.1974
23.7.1974
23.7.1974
23.7.1974
24.7.1974
2.8.1974
6.8.1974
10.8.1974
14.8.1974
76
Nazife Hasan (62)
Hüseyin Derviş (38)
Cemali Mustafa (58)
Ünal Adil (27)
Kemal Ahmet (51)
Faruk Şükrü (28)
Nahit Salih (41)
Musa Selim (26)
Erdoğan Enver (26)
Hasan Nahit (18)
Taner Hüseyin (27)
Turgut Ahmet (31)
Muharrem Ekrem (22)
Hasan Ahmet Küçük (24)
Ekrem Ahmet Küçük (30)
Erol Hüseyin (21)
Erdoğan Hüseyin Piskobulu
Arif Ahmet (26)
Hüseyin Ahmet (27)
Mehmet Hüseyin (22)
Hasan Hüseyin Piskobulu (27)
Ömer Ahmet İzzet (25)
Ahmet Mustafa (25)
Turgut Hüseyin Piskobulu (39)
Yüksel Hamza (20)
Osman Ali Bey (30)
Hüseyin Mehmet Raşit (50)
Adem Emir (46)
Aziz Ahmet (35)
Mustafa Ali Bey (36)
Hasan Veleddin (26)
Kamil Arif Bugafuri (45)
Niyazi Musa (31)
Şevket Derviş (55)
Mustafa Mehmet Kani (35)
İzzet Ömer Çavuş (75)
Turgut Yusuf (40)
Ahmet Mustafa (32)
Şeref Hüseyin (17)
Cuma Hamit (40)
Süleyman Mehmet Ali (51)
Salih Yusuf (30)
Ertem Bekir (37)
Durmuş Osman (52)
Derviş Mehmet (35)
Ahmet Hamza (22)
Hüda Velettin (28)
Mustafa Süleyman (26)
Enver Kaşif (23)
Hasan Hamit (48)
Muttalip Besim (36)
Neokhorio köyü
Kurtuluş
Kurtuluş
Limasol Çiftlikler
Limasol Çiftlikler
Limasol Çiftlikler
Limasol Çiftlikler
Limasol Çiftlikler
Limasol Çiftlikler
Limasol Çiftlikler
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Zyyi köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
Tokhni köyü
bölgesi
bölgesi
bölgesi
bölgesi
bölgesi
bölgesi
bölgesi
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
14.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
77
Behiç Cemal (29)
Kubilay İbrahim (25)
Hasan Fevzi (25)
Hüda Mustafa (28)
Arif Mustafa (27)
Hüseyin Salih Kumandan (48)
Cuma Yusuf (38)
Ziya İbrahim (30)
Osman Durmuş (16)
Behzat Hüseyin (17)
Yusuf Mustafa (17)
Osman Cemal (20)
Tünser Süleyman (24)
Erdoğan Hüseyin (27)
İrfan Mustafa (31)
Veli Mehmet Ali (43)
Mehmet Ali Mustafa (25)
Bekir Ahmet (23)
Ali Rıza Ahmet (28)
Aydın Ahmet (25)
Ahmet Niyazi (22)
Hasan Ali (36)
Hamit Cuma (20)
Savaş Kaşif (14)
Güner Hasan (25)
Kaşif Ahmet (55)
Osman Ali (31)
Münir Mustafa (20)
Cuma Hasan (16)
Mehmet Salih Garip (52)
Sadi Kasım (39)
Ömer Emir Ali (22)
Hüseyin Yusuf (21)
Emir Ali Bey (24)
Mehmet Kaşif (28)
Münir Kasım (31)
Yusuf Cuma (26)
Raşit Davut (45)
İbrahim Veleddin (25)
Mustafa Şevket (22)
Kamuran Kaşif (20)
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
Tokhni
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
köyü
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
15.8.1974
78
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS
The most noticable development in Cyprus since the troubled years of 1963-1974 has
been the European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) sponsor of the Annan Plan in
Cyprus.
The Annan Plan envisaged that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) cedes
territoial land to the South Cyprus Greek Government in exchange to become a joint
member state in a newly formed Cyprus Government.
The Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan overwhelmingly, while the Turkish Cypriots
overwhelmingly accepted the Plan. The voting figures for the Annan Plan referendum
were as follows -
The Annan Plan was not implemented because it had to be agreed to by both Turkish
and Greek Cypriots. Further discussions are being made in regards to a solution and
there is talk about possible ammendments in a revived ‘Annan Plan’ in the future.
(Refer over page to view a map of the land that would have been passed to the Greek
Cypriot Administration if the Annan Plan were implemented.)
79
80
AID PROMISES TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS
EU pledges aid for Turkish Cyprus
BBC European affairs correspondent
Monday, 26 April, 2004, 16:28
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3660171.stm
The EU has pledged to release almost 260m euros (£170m) to Turkish
Cypriots, following their approval of a UN plan to reunify the island.
The money is aimed at ending the economic isolation of Northern Cyprus
after years of sanctions.
The UN plan was accepted by 65% of Turkish Cypriots, but Greek rejection
means it cannot come into force.
Turkish Cypriot PM Mehmet Ali Talat has meanwhile formally asked the EU
to freeze Greek Cypriot membership.
Mr Talat was due in Brussels on Monday for
talks with enlargement commissioner Guenter
Verheugen, who has already bitterly criticised
the Greek Cypriot handling of the peace
process.
Mr Verheugen said the EU would work with the
Turkish Cypriot authorities to boost the
economy but this did not mean that the north would be recognised as a
separate state.
"I strongly reject the idea that co-operation is recognition in the sense of
international law," he said.
Mr Talat is also likely to travel to Washington in the coming days, officials
said.
Economic sanctions have been in force for years, leaving many Turkish
Cypriots with a low standard of living.
The government will now press for the right to sell goods direct to Europe,
and for direct flights to be resumed.
Details of Mr Talat's bid to freeze Cypriot membership were carried by
Turkish Cypriot news agency Tak.
It said Mr Talat had written to Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, asking for
membership to be suspended until the island could join as one.
81
"The Turkish people of the north, where EU laws will not apply, have done
their best for a solution, whereas the south has not done so," Tak quoted
him as saying.
"Therefore in order not to reward the Greek Cypriots, we asked that EU laws
not be applied to the south until there is a solution, and the island enters
the EU as a whole.
"In other words ... membership should be frozen."
Cyprus joins the EU on 1 May along with nine other states.
EU officials are angry that the divisions have not been overcome.
"We're all profoundly disappointed that this historic opportunity has been
lost," EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten said.
"I don't think the leadership of the Greek Cypriot community have behaved
well, to put it mildly - gagging (European) commissioners' attempts to speak
in the community and so on."
The island has been divided since 1974, when Turkish troops invaded in
response to a short-lived coup by Greek Cypriots.
EU to reward Turkish Cypriots
Ian Black in Brussels and Helena Smith in Nicosia
Monday April 26, 2004
The Guardian
The EU is to reward Turkish Cypriots for endorsing the UN reunification plan
for the island, which was thrown out by the Greek Cypriots in Saturday's
referendum.
European foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg are poised to lift the
economic embargo of the Turkish Cypriots, approve a €260m (£174m) aid
package for the north, and allow tariff-free entry of fruit and vegetables
into the EU.
"The Turkish Cypriots have taken a bold and important step and stopped
saying no after 30 years," a Brussels diplomat said.
Günter Verheugen, the EU's expansion commissioner, told German TV after
Saturday's vote: "What we will seriously consider now is finding a way to end
the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots."
The yes vote from the Turkish side is likely to boost the chances that Turkey
starts its long-awaited EU membership talks this year.
82
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's reformist prime minister, moved quickly to
cash in his chips, calling on the union to acknowledge the role played by his
country in changing minds in the north, occupied since the 1974 invasion.
"It is an undeniable fact that the Turkish side was the active and
constructive side for a Cyprus solution," Mr Erdogan said. "I believe the
policy of isolating Turkish Cypriots will now come to an end."
The no vote will cast a long shadow over the EU's enlargement with 10 new
members next weekend, including the Greek half of Cyprus.
EU leaders are furious at the Greek Cypriots, with Brussels expressing "deep
regret" at the outcome of the vote.
Chris Patten, the external affairs commissioner, yesterday accused the
Greek Cypriots of betrayal. He told the BBC: "They're not going to be a
popular addition to the family."
The results showed 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted yes and 76% of the Greek
community voted against the UN plan.
Mr Patten said: "There has always been an implicit understanding that we
would make Cypriot accession to the union easier and in return the Greek
Cypriot community and leadership would argue the case for a decent
settlement ... so I think we feel that we have, as it were, handed over the
chocolate and they have refused to hand back the crisps."
An air of stunned disbelief hung over the north yesterday.
"What is wrong with us? I don't understand, it's so stupid," said Ozgun Yoldas
outside his Nicosia kebab shop.
Greek Cypriots toed the line of Tassos Papadopoulos, their leader, who
termed the blueprint "unviable" and risky. But last night he said he would
work to ensure that Turkish Cypriots benefited from the island's EU
accession.
Abdullah Gul, the Turkish foreign minister, has ruled out possibility of a
second referendum on the plan. "With the Greek Cypriot answering no, the
partition of the island has been made permanent," he said. And Turkey
would not withdraw its 35,000 troops.
The international community hoped both sides would bury their ethnic
differences to endorse the plan in time for Cyprus joining the EU.
The ramifications of the no vote, according to EU diplomats, could be
devastating for the Greek Cypriots. The prospect of an EU border ending at
the island's UN-patrolled "dead zone" has especially unnerved mandarins in
Brussels.
83
With its sandbags, trenches and barbed wire, the 112-mile ceasefire line
resembles more of a 1914-18 battlefield than a modern border crossing.
"There is big disappointment," said Adriaan van der Meer, who leads the EU
delegation in Nicosia. "We wanted a reunited Cyprus to join the EU. We
firmly believe that the UN plan is viable and the best way forward."
It is thought the Greek no vote will also deepen the myths that split Cyprus.
"Look at this, all the Greeks want to kill us," said Mr Yoldsas, pointing to a
photocopy of an extremist nationalist newspaper with a tiny circulation in
Athens. The paper's front page was headlined: "A good Turk is a dead Turk."
Doors open for Turkish Cypriots
By William Horsley
BBC European affairs correspondent
Tuesday, 27 April, 2004, 00:37
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3661715.stm
After their overwhelming "yes" vote in the referendum on Cyprus unification,
Europe has been quick to reward Turkish Cypriots.
The Greek Cypriot "no" to the unification plan has been greeted with
international dismay.
But the EU's new policy points to swift and real benefits for their northern
neighbours.
And it marks a positive landmark in the long history of the Cyprus dispute.
The European commissioner for enlargement, Guenter Verheugen, made
clear after a meeting with EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg that the
acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots of the UN-sponsored plan for unification
would mean an end to their international isolation.
Corner turned
That isolation dates from the division of Cyprus in 1974.
Then, every country in the world except Turkey refused to recognise the
Turkish Cypriot authorities, condemning Turkey's military occupation of the
north.
The Turks have always argued that was a grave injustice, because they had
to use armed force to stop the forcible union of Cyprus with Greece
following a Greek-inspired coup in the south.
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The countries of Europe, the US and others now face a tortuous legal
challenge to undo 30 years of their own effective isolation of the Turkishspeakers in the north.
The international community is not yet ready to give formal diplomatic
recognition to the self-declared "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus",
which Turkey announced in 1983.
But some Muslim nations are weighing up such a move. And the EU has
turned a political corner by saying it will now work with the Turkish Cypriot
"authorities" in a systematic way.
Substantial aid
Already the EU has announced some important practical steps.
It will give substantial economic aid for development projects in the north,
and seek to improve freedom of movement for people and trade across the
Green Line buffer zone.
That could mean many new crossing-points.
Before long it is possible that the seaports in the north will be permitted to
import and export goods freely, and international visitors may be able to fly
there directly.
The first reaction of some to the mixed referendum result - a "yes" in the
north and a hefty "no" in the south - was to assume that the division of
Cyprus would be permanent.
Now, the tension of the campaign has given way to a realisation that there
could be an unexpected windfall.
Why? Because now that something more like political equality has begun to
emerge between the two sides on Cyprus, both may be led into a better
dialogue and reap the real benefits of closer trade and other contacts.
As always, detente will depend on the goodwill of leaders on both sides, and
of the "big powers" for which Cyprus is a pawn on a big political chessboard.
On the plus side, the referendum has called the bluff of those on both sides
in Cyprus who had dug in their heels against any change.
Cyprus will join the EU as a divided island, but change is already under way.
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REACTIONS TO GREEK NO & TURKISH YES VOTE
"The island has missed an historic opportunity to resolve 30 years of
division."
-- U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
"A unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been
missed. The secretary-general intends to give careful thought to the
implications of Saturday's results. Meanwhile Cyprus will remain divided and
militarized as it accedes to the European Union and the benefits of a
settlement will not be realized."
-- Special U.N. mediator for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto
"There is a shadow now over the accession of Cyprus. What we will seriously
consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of the Turkish
Cypriots."
-- EU commissioner for expansion, Günter Verheugen
"We deeply regret that the Greek Cypriot community rejected the plan."
-- The European Commission
"The embargoes must be lifted, the isolation must be brought to an end."
-- Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül (Turkish Foreign Minister)
Washington was "disappointed" by the Greek Cypriot vote, calling it a
"setback" to those seeking a united Cyprus.
-- The U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
[I hope] "the inhabitants of southern Cyprus would once again reconsider
whether this vote is the right one for them."
-- British Foreign Minister Jack Straw
"The No from the Greek Cypriots pronounces a death sentence on Kofi
Annan's peace plan and consummates the entry into the EU of a country
divided by barbed wire and patrolled by blue berets."
-- El Pais
"The exclusion of the predominantly Turkish north from the European Union
from 1 May is particularly hard on a population who have lived for 30 years
cut off from the world [due to the UN-sanctioned embargo on TRNC]."
-- El Mundo
"The Greek Cypriot result represents a tragic result for the EU."
-- Le Nouvel Observateur
"Greek Cypriots prevent reunification."
-- Sueddeutsche Zeitung
"Greeks prevent Cyprus unity."
-- Der Tagesspiegel
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The main point is the "worldwide regret at Cyprus vote."
-- Frankfurter Rundschau
"The reunification of Cyprus and thus the EU accession of both halves of the
island on 1 May has failed as a result of the overwhelming resistance of the
Greek Cypriots."
-- Der Kurier
"The Turkish Yes was no use - it was the Greek No that was decisive."
-- Magyar Hirlap
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CYPRUS PHOTOS
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Turkish Cypriots forced to live in inhumane conditions (1963-1974)
Missing Turkish Cypriots From The Town Of Taskent
Turkish Cypriot Students Murdered Ruthlessly By Greek Cypriot Terrorists
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Murdered Turkish Cypriot Children In Bathtub
Uncovering Mass Graves Of Turkish Cypriot Civillians
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Turkish Cypriots Rejoice With The Landing Of The Turkish Army
Greek Cypriot Priest Takes Arms Against Turkish Cypriots
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Peace Monument At Escape Beach (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus)
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The Aim Of Greek Cypriots Is To Unite Cyprus With Greece As Shown In This
Graffitti
The Presidential Palace After The Presidential Coup By The Greek Cypriot
Terrorists In 1974
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TURKISH CYPRIOT PAIN
Across the miles lies a land,
With deep blue seas and golden sand.
Olive trees outline the sky,
The big brown mountains are waving ‘hi.’
The breeze blows gently across your face,
The grass sways quietly, it leaves no trace.
This is North Cyprus, a piece of me, my land,
It is my everything; you’ll soon understand.
This piece of me I endeavour to preach,
Is slowly slipping out of reach.
Hardship & restrictions put into place,
Slowly puts a tear on my face.
I’m not alone in this state and bother,
I witness the tears of a newly borns' mother.
Recognise our rights, I demand it, this is inhumane,
The EU, South Cyprus, and the United Nations are to blame!
Broken promises to a crippled nation,
We pray to God for our salvation.
We are losing our youth to foreign lands,
We demand the right to work, with our two hands.
Remove the embargoes, recognise our rights,
Permit the Turkish Cypriot talent, to shine bright.
I hope you have understood our pain, how we suffer,
Life's too short let us cooperate with each other.
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