TURKISH-RUSSIAN POLITICAL and ECONOMIC RELATIONS

TURKISH-RUSSIAN POLITICAL
and ECONOMIC RELATIONS
DURING ERDOGAN-PUTIN
PERIOD BETWEEN 2003-2013
YEARS
__________
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selim BAŞAR
Assist. Prof. Dr. Elnur Hasan MİKAİL
TURKISH - RUSSIAN POLITICAL and ECONOMICAL
RELATIONS
DURING
ERDOGAN-PUTIN
PERIOD
BETWEEN 2003-2013 YEARS
Copyright © 2013, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selim BAŞAR, Assist.
Prof. Dr. Elnur Hasan MIKAIL
Tüm hakları yazarına aittir. Yazarın izni alınmadan kısmen
veya tamamen çoğaltılması veya farklı biçimlere çevrilmesi yasaktır.
Kapak
Yeliz Gazeloğlu
ISBN
978-605-4738-33-5
SertifikaNo
14721
Baskı ve Cilt
SAGE Matbaacılık
Baskı Tarihi
Ocak 2013
Yayınevi
YAYINCILIK
Kazım Karabekir Cad. Kültür Çarşısı
No: 7 / 101-102 İskitler / ANKARA
Tel : 0312. 341 00 02 - 0312. 341 00 05 Cep : 0549 341 00 02
www.sageyayinevi.com [email protected]
1
PREFACE
This book is written by two Turkish Researchers; they’re
an Associate Professor Dr. Selim BAŞAR is Ph. D. of an
Economics from Erzurum, Atatürk University, and another one
is an Azerbaijan corned Assistant Professor Dr. Elnur Hasan
MİKAİL, is Ph. D. of History and an Expert of an International
Relations from Kars, Kafkas University.
This book’s Economics related parts has been prepared
by Assoc. Professor, Dr. Selim BAŞAR and International
Relations related parts has been prepared by another Assist.
Professor, Dr. Elnur Hasan MİKAİL.
We’re, an authors of this book, an Associate Professor,
Dr. Selim BAŞAR and an Assistant Professor, Dr. Elnur Hasan
MİKAİL are very glad to introduce you this book as a mixed
impressed performance of our collobarative work about most
popular subject of today and nowadays “Turkish Russian
Relations” as well.
We’re very pleased to thank to our family members for
their boundless supports as they’ve been assisted us both via
their moral help in this book’s writing process.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selim BAŞAR
Assist. Prof. Dr. Elnur Hasan MİKAİL
February, 2013/TURKEY
2
CONTENTS
PREFACE ...........................................................................................2
CONTENTS ........................................................................................3
INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………..7
FIRST CHAPTER
1.1.
HOW RUSSIANS AND TURKS PERCEIVE EACH
OTHER? …………………………………………………………...10
1.2. WHAT ARE WE EXPECTING FROM THE VISIT OF
PUTIN? .............................................................................................12
1.3. RUSSIA IN THE PERIOD OF PUTIN: THE RETURN OF
REAL POLITIC ...............................................................................12
1.4. RUSSIA "AT THE REAL POLITIC STAGE" ....................13
1.5. BREST-LITOVSK OF RUSSIA .............................................15
1.6. MAIN LINES OF THE AMERICAN ATTACK ..................16
1.7. THE RISE OF PUTIN .............................................................19
1.8. MANIFEST OF THE MILLENIUM .....................................21
1.9. PUTIN OPERATIONS BEGIN ..............................................27
SECOND CHAPTER
2.1. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE COLD
WAR (1992-2002) .............................................................................29
2.2. RUSSIA IS ON THE STAGE OF REAL POLITICS ...........30
2.3. RUSSIAN-IRAN CO-OPERATION IN CAUCASIA AND
MIDDLE EAST ................................................................................34
2.4. THE RUSSIAN EAGLE LOOKS EAST ...............................36
2.5.
KOREA PROBLEM AND ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) ..................................40
3
2.6. RUSSIA GOVERNMENT’S PRIME MINISTER PUTIN:
WE MUST NOT FEEL GUILTY FOR GREAT PURGE IN
STALIN PERIOD ............................................................................43
2.7. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
EURASIA'S GEOPOLITICS ..........................................................43
2.8. TOWARD A NEW GEOPOLITICS ......................................46
2.9.
WHO GAINS MORE FROM RUSSIAN-TURKISH
ECONOMIC RELATIONS? ..........................................................48
2.10. PUTIN - THE “WOLF”, AND ERDOGAN IS THE
“LAMB”? ..........................................................................................49
2.11. RUSSIAN-TURKISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE
POST-SOVIET ERA ........................................................................50
2.12.
TRADE
AND
ECONOMIC
COOPERATION
IMBALANCE ...................................................................................50
2.13. MILITARY COOPERATION: RUSSIAN WEAPONS FOR
A NATO MEMBER .........................................................................51
2.14. RUSSIAN - TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE FIELD OF
ENERGY AND POWER IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA .............52
2.15. TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS DYNAMICS ..................54
2.16. ECONOMIC FACTOR ..........................................................55
2.17. PAIN POINTS .........................................................................56
2.18. EURASIAN IDEAS .................................................................56
2.19. MILESTONESIN RUSSIAN - TURKISH MUTUAL
RELATIONS DURING THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD .............58
2.20. RUSSIA - TURKEY: THE NEW EURASIAN ALLIANCE:
THE QUEST FOR THE LOST EMPIRES ...................................59
2.21. ON THE WAVES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM AND
NOSTALGIA ....................................................................................61
2.22. THE ROADS LEAD TO BRUSSELS ...................................62
2.23. THE GEOPOLITICAL ZIGZAG: RUSSIA AND TURKEY
ACTING IN CENTRAL ASIA AND IN THE CAUCASUS ........64
2.24. THE FIRST TRIAL OF STRENGTH ..................................64
2.25. THE CHECHEN CARD AND THE KURDISH TRUMP ..66
2.26 UNITED AGAINST THE OLD ENEMY .............................68
2.29. PUTIN - ERDOGAN: RAPPROCHEMENT CONTINUES
(SOCHI SUMMIT REVIEW) .........................................................70
2.30. ERDOGAN TO PUTIN: TIME TO KEEP YOUR WORD 70
2.31. TURKEY FALLS BEHIND IN TRADE WITH RUSSIA ...72
2.32.
ENERGY
SIGNALS
IN
TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS: AFTER BSEC SUMMIT 7.......................................3
4
2.33. THE WEAKEST LINK OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS ....................................................................................76
2.34. TURKEY AND RUSSIA: FROM COMPETITION TO
CONVERGENCE ............................................................................78
2.35. CHECHEN QUESTION HARMS TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS ....................................................................................82
2.36. PUTIN'S VISIT TO ANKARA; RUSSIAN-TURKISH
RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE ..................................................85
2.37. GROWTH OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 86
2.38. RUSSIAN PROJECT FOR OIL PIPELINE VIA TURKEY
.............................................................................................................88
2.39. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIAN FEDERATION .................89
2.40. COMPETITION IN CENTRAL ASIA .................................92
2.41. PROBLEMS IN THE CAUCASUS .......................................95
THIRD CHAPTER
3.1. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE CONFLICT
IN CHECHNYA .............................................................................101
3.2. RELATIONS WITH TURKEY .............................................105
3.3. RELATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR ...106
3.4. ERDOGAN, PUTIN DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS
IN RUSSIA ......................................................................................109
3.5. AZERBAIJAN SENDS DEPUTIES TO TRNC TO MARK
31ST ANNIVERSARY OF PEACE OPERATION ....................109
3.6. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS .....................................111
3.7. FROM RUSSIAN TOURISM TO RUSSIAN ALLIANCE .113
3.8. COMPARISON OF RUSSIA, TURKEY, ISRAEL, AND THE
USA ..................................................................................................115
3.9. RUSSIA'S "KURDISH CARD" IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RIVALRY .......................................................................................116
3.10. EU-RUSSIA ENERGY DIALOGUE ..................................124
3.11. KYOTO PROTOCOL AND POSITIONS ..........................125
3.12. NEW RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINE DEAL CUTS THROUGH
EU UNITY ......................................................................................128
3.13. EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT .........................................................130
3.14. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT: REALITY OR
FICTION? .......................................................................................130
5
FOURTH CHAPTER
4.1. ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TURKEY AND
RUSSIA .......................................................................................133
4.2. RUSSIA’S SUPPORT FOR TURKEY’S ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS ...................................................133
4.3. THE LAST PERIODS OF THE SOVIETS and THE
RELATIONS .............................................................................135
4.4. ECONOMIC and SOCIAL INDICATORS OF RUSSIAN
FEDERATION ...........................................................................137
4.5. ECONOMIC and SOCIAL INDICATORS OF REPUBLIC
OF TURKEY ..............................................................................143
4.6.
ENERGY
and
RUSSIA-TURKEY
ECONOMIC
RELATIONS ..............................................................................147
4.7. ENERGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ............................154
4.8. TESTING ENERGY PRODUCTION ON ECONOMIC
GROWTH .......................................................................................160
CONCLUSION ...............................................................................167
REFERENCES ..............................................................................170
6
INTRODUCTION
USA’s getting confused against their military forces getting
stuck in Afghanistan and Iraq and Iran’s challenges is encouraging
Russia. The USA-Russia power struggle on the line lying from The
Baltic to Kirghizistan is reminding of the Cold War.
In the comrehensive report titled 'Russia's Wrong Direction:
What the United States Can and Should Do?', that was prepared by the
independent task group of the famous CNR and published on the
March of 2006, it was stated that with Putin’s second period in the
government the Russian society and Russia’s foreign policy is
continuing to change in a way that can cause troubles for USA and
those cases were accented.
It is continuing to be important for USA that the cooperation
with Russia is carried on. Preventing the terrorists from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, Russia’s cooperation related to the Iran,
energy and HIV/AIDS issues matter to develop USA’s benefits.
However in many areas USA-Russia relations have disappointed
hopes. Russia is headed to the wrong direction. For all this reasons it
would be more suitable that USA makes ‘cooperation in chosen areas’
instead of ‘comprehensive partnership’ and also ‘oppositon in chosen
areas’.1
Again in the year 2006 USA Land Forces Command’s organ
'Strategic Studies Institute' published a report titled 'Iron Triokas, The
New Threat From The East', that was prepared by Richard J.Krickus
and examines Russia from the perspective of USA.
‘Russia is a threat.’ In his report Kriskus defines Russia as a
threat. USA, that focused on the global terror after 11 September
2001, has neglected Russia, that is holding a security thread. This is a
delusion based on two reasons. First one is related to that it became a
perception that the violence in the Caucasus, demographic and health
crises, economical uncertainties, income unevenness and returning to
autocracy were going to form a problematic Russia. The second
delusion in the perception is related to that Russia is a living threat
and this threat is appearing by Russia’s bringing it’s power on the
security policies of the Central and Eastern European countries back
on.
According to Krickus the actors and the circumstances of the
1
ÖZBEK, N., “New Orientations in Russian Foreign Policy”, Eurasia File, Volume:
3, No: 4, Ankara, 1996, pp. 23.
7
Russia’s new attitude can be expressed as ‘Iron Trioka’(Iron Triad)
‘Powerfull Leader’ like Putin, that whilom aimed to improve Russia’s
security benefits by exploiting the energy wealthiness of the regions,
that were under Russia’s control, is the first element of the ‘Iron
Triad’. The dictators of the economy, that are using the energy card
of the Russia, mafia and extrajudicial military personnel are forming
the second leg of the ‘Iron Triad’ while the regional actors, that are
forming an atmosphere for Russia’s benefits on the region, that is on
the east of the Baltic Sea, are forming the third. Kriskus is not seeing
Russia as only a military threat but as an element, that can destabilise
the region and the whole Europe, and he wants precautions to be
taken.
Just unite the geographical area which encloses the Baltic
Sea, Estonia which has a shore border to Baltic Sea, Letonia, Lituania,
Polonia, and after that Belarus, Ukrania, Romania and Bulgaria with a
line on the map of Eurasia and add up Black Sea Region and Caucasia
to the area. Just expand the area in such a way that it will include the
Caspian Sea, Cenral Asia countries, Kazakhistan, Uzbekhistan,
Kirghizistan, Tadzhikstan. Here on this geography there takes place
the USA- Russia power struggle and it seems that this struggle will
gain fever and grow.
The USA would like to control the hwyl of Russia on the
Baltic area and surround her by democratizing and drawing the East
European countries into the NATO; and expand the containment line
by controlling the Black Sea region through its future base camps in
Romania and Bulgaria by getting into the Black Sea region and
settling in South Caucasia. The energy-rich Caspian Basin and the
Central Asian countries both form USA’s containment line extension
and the life space within this power struggle.
Despite the demographic and democracy problems, fifteen
years old Russia is far more powerful now. Putin has well centralized
the political strength, fixed up the stability on a large scale. Also
restored and revived the economy. Rising oil prices reflect on the
Russian balance sheets as handsome profits and Russia’ s foreign
exchange reserves have exceeded 180 billion Dollars.2
Russia owns rich strategical resources. The richest natural gas
reserves exist in Russia. On the rank order Russia takes the eighteenth
place and is the second greatest oil exporter. This allows her to use
2
CROZIER, Brian; The Rise and Fall of The Soviet Empire, An Imprint of Prima
Publishing, National Review, California, 2000, pp. 57-127.
8
this power as a weapon when the need arises. Russia has no more
tolerance for losing and USA’s coming close to her. It gains Russia
power to collaborate strategically with China against the USA. Due to
the confusion arising from the USA’ s military forces coming to a
deadlock in Afghanistan and Iraq and challenges of Iran against USA
encourage Russia. The USA- Russia power struggle on the line
extending from Baltic to Kirghizistan reminds the Cold War era.
9
FIRST CHAPTER
1.1. HOW RUSSIANS AND TURKS PERCEIVE EACH
OTHER?
How two community perceive each other is very important in
terms of determining the degree of relations among them. Besides our
economic and social relations, in Russia that also take an important
place in our foreign policy, common beliefs about Turks, especially
attitude against the Turkish made article, is determinative in a great
deal of matters as well as approaches in foreign policy. Similarly,
image of Russia in Turkey occasionally leads us to perceive events
happen in our neighbour wrongly. This however, prevents relations to
improve into the necessary tone. In this chapter we will try to go over
Turkey’s and Russia’s views about each other. At first we should see
this: There are differences between Russia that is perceived in Turkey
and Russia in reality. We must put the Russia in the necessary place in
our head. Our current image of Russia largely shaped/was shaped in
the Cold War period. Wars made during the Otoman Empire period
were used effectively in the shaping of this image. Primarily we
should overview through this perspective.1
Public, tradesfolk in the public are faster in the matter of
changing this viewpoint. But, governors of states, bureaucrats and
soldiers both in Russia and Turkey can still carry the traces of past or
they don’t have proper visions belonging to the new situation. How
much we can get closer to Russia in political, economic and cultural
issues? Or how much we can have them get closer to us? Primarily the
answer of this question should be given. When talking about Russia,
we remember the concepts like Great Petro, Catherina, policy of going
down to the hot waters, danger of communism. The concepts that gain
admission during the last 15 years are: shuttle trade, tourism of
Antalya, blue current, Turkish builders, Turkish students who study
there. As it is seen, concepts are changing from comminatory concepts
into commercial and cultural terms. That is to say, the contents of our
relations are also changing. In Russian history books, a beheading and
sheding blood image have been ascribed to Turks. To be like a Turk
having been used in the meaning of feeble minded and clumsy. But
nowadays it is possible to divide the views about Turks into three. The
first group is people who have no idea concerning Turks. The second
group is people who have positive conviction. These are people who
10
had come to Turkey for tourism or commerce, or people who
acquainted with a Turk in Russia. The third group however, is people
who have negative conviction. These are generally jingoists and
orthodoxs. We can add the soldiers and state bureaucracy brought up
during the Soviets.3
We, Turks hadn’t made a great effort to acquainted with our
500 year neighbour. There were no serious reviews, books and etc.
written about Russia and Russians neither in the Otoman nor the
republic period. A.N. Kurat’s history books named “Russian History”
and “Russian-Turk Relations” couldn’t be outreached yet. There was
no university which educated Russian history till 1991. Now the status
is a little bit better. Russian language, history and politics are given
together at some of our universities. Yet it isn’t enough. However
Russians had begun to explore Turks so early. In 1754 Turcology had
been begun to teach at Kazan University in Russia. In 1818 Oriental
Institute was builded in Moscow. The number of written book and
article by this time is over ten thousand. Turcology studies are being
done currently in a great deal of universities.3 In our relations,
economy is going ahead of politics. Businessmen are compelling the
politicians. People go beyond theirself are primarily the businessmen.
Commercial relations that begin with gas purchase, construction,
shuttle trade and tourism are proceeding through Turks building
factories there and Russians aspiring TÜPRAŞ here. The framework
of the cooperation between us may extend along to political
cooperation in Caucasus and Central Asia. In the word of one English
statesman, “England hasn’t got conventional friends and conventional
enemies. England has benefits.” We should behave according to this
and give up emotionality in foreign policy.4
Russia is one of the known nations that had established an
empire.5 It has got a comprehensive cultural and historical
infrastructure. There had been a great many characters who have
worldfamed importance in literature, philosophy, art and science.
Although the Tsarist Russia was collapsed, this imperial notion had
3
MANSUR, Raul; Moscow. The Series of Visual Travel Guides, Dost Kitabevi
Publishing, Ankara, 1999, pp. 34-123.
4
İVANOV, İgor Sergeyeviç; Foreign Policy of Russia and the World
(Compilation from Articles and Conferences), International Relations Moscow
State University, Russian Diplomacy Encylopedia – ROSSPEN Publishing, Moscow,
2001, pp. 23-89.
5
KAPUSCİNSKİ, Ryszard; Imperialism, Om Publishing, First Edition, İstanbul,
1999, pp. 56-90.
11
proceeded. The Soviets is one of the big empires of history. After the
subversion of the Soviets, a short period of interregnum had been
experienced in Russia. However Putin, head of the state, aroused this
imperial discourse again after coming into power. This notion was
accepted on behalf of the society. We call this, pretension of
becoming a superpower. The pretension of becoming a second polar
against America. The declaration, made by Putin recently, related to
irrepressible atomic bomb should be evaulated in this context.6
1.2. WHAT ARE WE EXPECTING FROM THE VISIT
OF PUTIN?
In the last decade so many Turkish Authority visited Russia
but they could not set up an elite and consistent foreign policy with
Russia. But after these visits, the relationships with Russia were not
good as expected. The politicians of both countries could not make
important steps to developing the relations. 7
In our thoughts, the visit of Putin is much exaggerated in the
public opinion and we have great expectations. Initially, Turkey has
to determine the limit of their proximity with Russia. Then, it can be
possible to enlarge the frame formed by Russia for Turkey within the
Russian policy.8
1.3. RUSSIA IN THE PERIOD OF PUTIN: THE
RETURN OF REAL POLITIC
The ‘well-intentioned’ politicians who were catastrophic to
their people by exaggerating their period came to a bad end. The
biggest victory of the multi dimensional attack against socialism was
the disassociation of Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty Organization
states. It is taken into consideration that If the mentioned states have
formal characters in the relationships with socialism, it will be
realized that ‘the victory’ declared is not be a certain defeat of
socialism.9 The important thing in view of our topic is the
characteristic of ‘New System’ which was set up by the imperialist
block under the leadership of USA, ‘the winner’ party10. As it is said
6
Freedman, Robert O. (2002). Russian Policy toward the Middle East since the
Collapse of the Soviet Union. University of Washington.
7
Dr. İhsan Çomak, Foreign Policy AnalysT
8
Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Regional Perspectives,”
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 21, Issue 2 (June 2002): 167-183.
9
Hurriyet, 3 November, 1995.
10
ÇEÇEN, A., “Internationalism of National States Against Globalism of
12
over, the main characteristic of this system was set forth as
‘unipolarity’. In view of international relation, there are two
hypotheses lying behind the thesis:
1. Soviet Union (Russia), which is the ‘other pole’, was
destroyed and will not have an outstanding role in the world scene in
the anticipated future.11
2. The victorious imperialist block will fill elementarily the
hegemonic gap remained from its opposite pole like as the sand in the
hourglass by preserving its unity and integrity.12
After ten years later from ‘the victory’, it is verified with each
international development that the second hypothesis fell down
certainly. The imperialist block is far from preserving its integrity
after quelling its domestic enemy ( the movements of worker
struggling for power and national movements struggling against
imperialism) temporarily by the effect of disassociation of Soviet
Union which was ‘the common enemy’. Actually, the elimination of
‘the common enemy’ made the conflicts of interest between USA,
Germany, France, England and Japan underlying ‘the victorious
block’ and the policies suppressed since 70 years came to the fore
again. It is an actual example for us that these nations and their allies,
who killed lots of people in Iraq as a show of force against the whole
people in the world in 1991, fell into a dispute after the last USAEngland attack to Baghdad in 16th February.13 Is the anticipation as
‘Russia will not get on its feet again’ which is another factor of the
hypothesis true? Before answering it is necessary to remind that ‘USA
and the other ‘victorious’ imperialists were acting thoughtlessly
depending on this anticipation for 10 years. Then, the inter-imperialist
relations will eventuate in new inversions and the consequences of the
failure of this anticipation will not be useful for the people that
adopted the anticipation.14
1.4. RUSSIA "AT THE REAL POLITIC STAGE"
At this point it is required to consider closely that Russia had
started in Putin's period international attacks. After falling of USSR
Imperialists”, Global Report, no: 1, 2001.
11
AKTÜKÜN, İlker; SSCB’ den BDT’ ye Nasıl Varıldı. Marksist Bir Tahlil İçin
Saptamalar, Sorun Press, 1. Edition, İstanbul, 1995, pp. 67-90.
12
Political Science Review 82 (1988): 133-154.
13
MARPLES, R. DAVID; Russia, 1917-1921, Pearson Education Limited, Essex,
2000, p. 12-89.
14
St. Petersburg Press (2000-2007)
13
was one of tehe ascertainment that / which had been given voice by
American ideolegen :''USA had been rescued at/in welt politic from
ideolocigal barriers any more.'' This was meaning, that American
foreign policy had reached again middle class, which was prior to
socialist blackto ''real politic'' real policy period. If it is required to
give an example: some of countries and realationships which was
acceptable more or less effect area of USSR will have been gained
new oppurtunities for the hegomony projections not to be hinder
ideological obstaclesand would have been improved.15
Indeed, in the last decade had been experienced that a series
of country from Indıan to Anglo, which were in Soviet effect area,
into the effort of including fully to imperalistic system ocular
condensation. Meantime, hegomony classes of some countries such as
Turkey, Greece and Pakistan started to bewail in the direction of
"losing their importance" after Cold War. Provided that issue one or
another imperialist got rid of ideological connection, it would be at
fault to think this connection would prevent only some blows of USA.
What for USA was valid, also were valid for other imperialists,
especially for the Russian imperialism which they had rescued entirely
from socialistic mask. In the last years well known imperialists of the
world started to keeping on the conflict and dangerous waters of "
Real Politic".16
In the Revisionist SSCB period emphasized to "defending"
view of Russian administration to west with strong attack effect of
imperialist block and as unavoidable. Exept of some exeptional
couldn't develop and attack exept for protecting their positions in the
west. The basis of this effort had been that politic: "One group of
weak country, which were taraditoinal Russsia and the Russian effect
area between Russian front and enemies. "And Putin is face to face
much more serious situation, because those talked of weak countries
(such as toward to west Ukraine, Belarus; toward to south Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc.) had snatched to west effect area. Like
Poland old members of Warsaw Treaty Organisation members of
affiliated with NATO's members are shown that "buffer had started to
come to pieces by the western imperialists. As a reminder, in summits,
15
Kiewiet, Roderick and Douglas Rivers, “A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting”.
Political
behavior, 6 (1984): 369-391.
16
Popkin, Samuel, The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1991.
14
which was made about to Germany's combination in the circumtances
of the being USSR, NATO had promised won't expand one milimeter
to eastwards and won't accept any Warsaw Threaty Organisation
country as a member of them. Putin's Russia seems quite angry not
keeping these promises.17
In remuneration for three Europe country NATO, Russian
started to take precautions. First, accepting to USA the Baltic
countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) to the NATO announced clearly
that it will see as red line invasion. This defination was meaning that
NATO's expanding to Baltics will be accept direct threat to Russian
national interests. Second precaution came from the security area.
Russian administration became aggressive its nuclear doctrin with a
shocking blow to the world. Old doctrin in USSR's period was giving
a quarantee that USSR won't be the first part of this nuclear attack.
Howewer, this new doctrin gave using nuclear power the green light
in case of being vital threat to national interest.
1.5. BREST-LITOVSK OF RUSSIA
Russia aftermath the USSR ( The Union Of Soviet Socialist
Republics); depicted a scenery of a government which was
economically, military, administrative, politically and socially in
essential collapse. In order to comprehend the dimensions of the
collapse, it will be adequate to convey that the result of the period
named as the “Cold War” in failure, is described as the “Russian
Brest-Litovsk” by the perspectives of our present day Russian
strategists. It is a fact that after First World War, like German
imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism was also faced with a bill of
thrashing defeat. Who “extended” the bill was USA and its allies and
in this bill there occured a series of heavy “pen”, from Russian
economy being subordinated by western monopolies to the
counteraction of Russian policy by various ways, from “American
style of living” to “Western type democracy”, till the disposal of
“Russian spheres of effect “ in world regions of importance.18
17
Tucker, Joshua, “Reconsidering Economic Voting: Party Type vs. Incumbency in
Transition
Countries,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999.
18
http://tr.rutam.org. ; ÇEÇEN, A. “Internationalism of National Governments
contrary to Imperialist Globalization”, Global Report, number: 1, 2001.
15
The bill, was tried to be paid by Boris Yeltsin who was
passionately supported by USA and his cadres. Economy was indexed
to IMF(International Monetary Fund) patented “ shock treatment”
(Russian term full shock, zero treatment!), national government under
the name of “western type democratization”, was cell divided, even
town managements almost turned into a state of independent, regional
duchies. While Western imperialists started making the horse prance
at East Europe and Caucasia which are traditional “ Russian
domains”, positions at Middle East, Africa and Latin America were
abondoned. American hegemony, which was imposed on cultural and
ideological areas, lasted till the break up of national identity. Let’
convey a tragicomical example that shows how heedless were the
attacks of USA imperialism: In recent years, in a very important part
of Hollywood films screening in the whole world and surely in
Russia,(Red Wave, The Jackal, The Saint, GoldenEye, The
Peacemaker, Air Force-1, Ronin, The Blues Brothers 2000…) mafia
who is showed as the “enemy”, marauder generals who are a waste of
cold war, old inquiry agents, nuclear weapon smugglers and launders,
the common characteristic of all these is that they are “Russian”. It is
known that this table reflects at least one side of the coin, but the
problem is, what feel Russian youth and community who watch these
films.!19
1.6. MAIN LINES OF THE AMERICAN ATTACK
Madeleine Albright, a familiar name, who was the foreign
minister of Bill Clinton period talks about the nearly insolent politics
of USA about Russia and its “old effect areas” in this way:
“America’s approach here is helping the countries to get rid of the
useless habits of the past, and to accept that cooperation will provide a
richer, proud and peaceful shared future, as in other areas around the
world. This principle reflects to our support programs intended for
New Independent States: These are programs such as building up
democracy, encouraging the economic development, preventing the
arming, educating judges, advancing the status of women, providing
the basic human requirements, supporting academic programs like
Muskie scholarships. Board of Citizen Democracy, Sister Cities, Open
Society Institute, Eurasia and MacArthur Foundations and others are
helping our tries to strengthen the civil society and to create strong
19
YELTSIN, Boris; Midnight Diaries, Turkey Isbank Culture Publications,
İstanbul,2000, page 78-90.
16
communities.20
Even for United States , the future is not guaranteed. If we are
too lazy to look beyond our borders, we can see that a new world is
being formed at which our presence is not felt, our values are not
shared, our products are not welcomed and our citizens are not secure.
But if we repeat our promise of helping the Independent States and
others who are worthy, we will see that, everywhere the children are
citizens and participators, they leave aside their origins and build up
communities, and they are participators in the global market. Free
societies and open economies make progress in that way, allies and
friends of USA are formed by that way.” 21 The main goals of USA
regarding the “transformation” of Russia can be listed as :
1) Banking Sector : Ensuring the financial dependency of the
Russian Banks to USA, under the name of “Saving from Speculation
and Arbitrariness”
2) Energy Sector : It is calculated that in the next 7-8 years
ahead, for reaching the production rate that was present just in 1988,
Russia must make an investment of 15 Billion dollars per year.
Western energy monopolies, first among them being USA , are
covetting this profitable field. In exchange of these “services”, USA is
insisting on subjects such as clarification of tax regime, the act of
taking the property rights under guarantee and international
arbitration. In case such laws are laid down, Russia, who is owning
rich oil and gas reservoirs, will be dependent to foreign capital in the
energy field.22
3) Food : The damage on Russian agriculture caused ten
millions of people to come face to face with the threat of starvation.
Especially north and south regions and poor masses in big cities ended
up being in need of foreign aid. USA is subjugating terms such as “tax
discount for customs and foreign capital” for the food aids it did, and
will do.23
20
Colton, Timothy, “Economics and Voting in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs, 12
(1996): 289-317.
———. Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia,
Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2000.
21
ILHAN, A., “Eurasia Truth” – “Eurasia Center of the World” – “Eurasia Belongs to
Eurasian”, Republic, 1998
22
STANKOVIC, S., “Russia In Search of Itself”, Eurasia File, Volume: 1 Issue: 1,
Ankara, 1994
23
Republic (2000-2007)
17
4) Cultural and Ideological Area : Hundred millions of dollars
transferred to various funds in accordance with Freedom Support Act
in USA are used to in Russia , too, in addition to other countries, for
the goal of making the so-called “Western Ideals” common. Right
along with scholarships given in this content, thousands of American
supported organizations are formed under the name of “nongovernmental organization”. Those organizations take upon
themselves functions such as taking of the Russian politicians to USA
for “education”.24
5) Waekening the army: Agreements like START 1 and
Chemical Weapons Convention rought down the power of Russian
army to minimul level. And now, by START 2 and START 3
agreements, that army power is being tried to be completely
eliminated.25
At the end of the intensive ‘American Aid Progression’ which
was tried to continue presently, situation of the country was heartrending as of March 2000. National income had decreased forty
percent rate, industy and agriculture had collapsed, investment had
gone down. Forty percent of population below poverty limit, was
living less a dolar income in a day. Although inflation reduced paralel
decrease of public buying power, it was approximately thirty percent.
Average life had declined sixty age at men. Deaths had passed births
fifty percent rate. Four third of drinking water was dirty according to
international standarts.26
Situation wasn’t very great at military area. At the end of
the armament program which was presented as ‘Mutual Peace
Progression’, while USA army was staying very strong, nuclear
warhead had been destroyed remain from Soviet, three countries
which were the member of the ancient North bloc had been
completely purified from weapons. Hundreds of ballistic rockets,
bomber and submarine (183 of these were nuclear submarines) had
been existed. 80 tone refinement urinium at Russia’s control, had
been bought very cheaply by USA, a series of agreement had been
signed to Russia leaders for preventing armanent again. Basic aim,
24
TEZCAN, Y., “Power Struggle Over Eurasia and Turkey”, Defense, Issue:2,
Ankara, 1998
25
http://www.russianembassy.org.
26
Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Russians in Kazakhstan and Demographic Changes:
Imperial Legacy and the Kazakh Way of Nation-Building,” Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 5,
Issue 1 (February 2004): 61-79.
18
demilitarization of the relations with Western.27
The same events happened at civil society. 35 thousand
young Russian were removed and educated under ‘USA Support
Program’. Credit and education was provided to 275 thousand small
business. Finance was given to 300 television canals and indefinite
newspapers which were expansive wide Russia ground. Dozens of
American Finance Foundation and Ideology Company started to
influence within Russia politics. During Yeltsin period, persons who
were recommended by these companies or came direct from these
companies, had an important influence Kremlin corridors.28
The most intensive state, under Nixon Government,
principal strateji of USA army protected inevitabily the force which
would ‘get over with two and a half conflict at the same time’
(towards USSR and China war plus region war) and after, ‘get over
with one and a half conflict’ (towards USSR or China war plus
region war). George Bush period, this strateji was changed as
getting over with region wars at the same time. Therefore, this was
notice that Russia had been ‘out of the game’.
1.7. THE RISE OF PUTIN
Vladimir Putin take his first step to become ‘the only leader’
of the country under circumstances which we tried to outline in upper
lines. When Boris Yeltsin appointed this old KGB member whose
name had never been heard in national policy in 16th August 1999, his
politic life is thought to be finished in a couple of months later like
many other ‘President Of Yeltsin’ before him too. According to the
comments which took place nowadys in Russian media, Putin’s most
vital personality was his loyalty and Yeltsin chose him complately
because of that reason. 29
His aim was to make his personal defraudation and his
dirty jobs not to be irritated after his expiring government. In the
following days, it was understood that the mentality represented
27
Granberg, A. ed. Regionalnoe rasvitie: Opyt rossii i evropeiskogo Soyuza [Regional
Development: The Experiences of Russia and the European Union], “Ekonomika”,
Moscow:
2000.
28
"Russian-Armenian War Games Scored", FBIS-SOV, 8 April, 1995.
29
YELTSİN, Boris; Geceyarısı Günlükleri, Türkiye İş Bankası Culture Publication,
İstanbul, 2000, pg. 78-90.
19
by Putin was much more than that.30
The thing which made Vladimir Putin’s star shine was
the Cechnya problem which had prepared many organizer
politician’s political death. In the same month when Putin
became president, Shariatic Vahhabi Operation which got Saudi
Arabia’s and Pakistani’s assistance directly and USA’s assistance
indirectly made a critical movement and entered their neighbour
country Dagestan. The declared aim was uniting Cechnya and
Dagestan under Sharia’s flag and after ran away the Russians
founding the Independent Islamic Government. This group which
did not hesitate to show Cechnya people’s national demands to
the western imperialists for he sake of their benefit was expecting
that the coruption seen in all fields in the last period of Yeltsin in
Russia would be beneficial for their case and after 1994-‘96 war
Russian Army would hesitate to embark a second Cechnya
adventure.31
Yet Vahhabi’s Dagestan attack meant the ‘last drop’ in
Caucasia for Russian imperialism. Firts of all, the oil pipeline
between Baku (Azerbaijan) and Supsa (Georgia) was opened
again with the support of USA. After that event, Azerbaijan and
Georgia signed an agreement for Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. The
usage of these two pipelines which were planned to be secured by
NATO meant that even a gram of oil would not drain from the
Russian land. If the Vahhabi attack directed towards Dagestan
meant the Cechnya’s first step of gaining independence from
Russia, same thing could be happened in this area too. Russia
was under threatened of losing Nort Caucasia. The bombs which
exploded in Moscow and the other big cities respectively and
which caused approximately 300 civilian’s death helped to
Putin’s government to manufacture public opinion for a counter
attack. The Russian attack which still continues was started in
September 1999. 32
Russia’s first military success conduced to shine Putin’s
star. With the contribution of ‘the independent media’ which was
30
Lepper, S.I. “Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy Targets”, Public Choice 18
(1974): 67-81.
31
Lewis-Beck, Michael, and Tom Rice, Forecasting Elections. Washington DC: CQ
Press, 1992.
32
MANSUR, Raul; Moscow. Görsel Gezi Rehberleri Series, Dost Bookstore
Publication, Ankara, 1999, pg. 34-123.
20
under Kremlin’s control this old spy who was seem insignificant
a few months ago was propagated as ‘the iron fist which Russia
needs’.33
Yeltsin, with a last movement, suddenly resigned on
December 31 in 1999 and assigned his place to Putin until the
election. The three months time after the resignation which
catched the outs unawares would be enough to ensure succes for
Putin in election.34
1.8. MANIFEST OF THE MILLENIUM
Vladimir Putin was giving too different answers from
previous Yeltsin to the questions raised both domestically and by the
West as to ‘who he was and what he wanted to do’. A speech that
outlines the duty Putin set for himself, has a special importance. This
speech, titled ‘Russia On the Threshold of the Millennium’ and made
at the end of 1999, is known for a typical bourgeous pragmatism and
eclectism. Nevertheless, at the expense of trying the reader’s patience,
we have to relay the important points of this speech.35
Putin is relaying the socio-economic condition of the country
with these datas: ‘National income of our country diminished almost
in half at the 1990’s... In the aftermath of the 1998 crisis, per capita
income dropped to 3.500 USD and this is five times lower than the
average of G7 countries. Structure of the Russian economy has
changed and the key sectors have become petroleum, energy
engineering and metallurgy. These correspond to % 15 of the national
income, % 50 of the total industrial output, % 70 of the exports.
Efficiency in real sectors has experienced a great slowdown. It is
above the world average in the production of raw materials and
electricity, but the condition in other sectors is % 20 to 24 of the
U.S.A. average. % 70 of our machinery and equipment is older than
10 years and this is higher than the twofold of the figure in developed
countries. These are the results of ever-decreasing national
33
http://www.mid.ru.
Ul’yanovsk Oblast Committee of State Statistics, Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie
Ul’yanvoskoi
Oblasti v 1999 godu [Economic Situation in Ul’yanovsk Oblast in 1999]. Ul’yanovsk:
Ul’yanovsk Oblast Committee of State Statistics, 2000.
185
35
Popova, Ol’ga, “Tarkhov sdalsia, promeniav Samaru na Cheboksary”, Samarskoe
Obozrenie, 14
(9 Oct. 2000).
34
21
investments especially in real sectors. Foreign investors are not
deemed to be rushing for contributing to the development of Russian
industry.36
The total of the foreign direct investments (FDI) toward
Russia is only 11.5 billion USD. As for China, it received 43 billion
USD in FDI. While the top 300 international companies were
allocating 216 billion USD for research and development in 1997,
Russia made a deduction in this field. Only % 5 of Russian companies
are concerned with productive output. Foreign companies have far
surpassed Russia especially in the field of science-intensive civilian
production. Russia is responsible for % 1 of such products in the
world market, the U.S.A. is providing % 36 and the Japan is % 30.’37
Putin proceeds to the vital questions next: ‘The question of the
Russia is what to do now. How can we provide full capacity operation
of new market mechanisms? How can we overcome the deep
ideologic-political disunity in the society? Which strategic targets can
unite Russian society? What kind of a rank will Russia hold in the
international society in the 21. century? Which economic, social and
cultural boundaries do we want to achieve within the next 10 to 15
years? What are our strong and weak points? And at the moment,
what kind of material-moral sources do we have?’38
All these should not leave the impression of Putin’s ‘passion
for socialism’. He, was only after a political gain from this passion
and does not hide his hostile attitude toward socialism: ‘Russia has
spent three fourths of the last century under the implementation of the
communist doctrine. It would be a mistake to omit, even deny the
undeniable achievements of those periods. But it would be a greater
mistake not to comprehend the extraordinary price, our people and
nation paid for this Bolshevik exercise, even further its historical
uselessness. Communism and the Soviet power did not make Russia a
dynamic society and a country in wellfare with free people.
36
Goskomstat Rossii, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegonik: 2000. (Moscow:
Goskomstat, 2000).
37
Berkowitz, Daniel, and David Dejong, “Russia’s Internal Border” Regional Science
and Urban
Economics 29 (1999): 633-649.
38
Lavrov, Aleksei “Budgetary Federalism.” In Conflict and Consensus in EthnoPolitical and
Center-Periphery Relations in Russia, edited by Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin.
RAND,
Washington DC 1998.
22
Communism pushed our country behind the economically developed
countries by clearly displaying awkwardness about a stable national
development. This road, very far from the main road of civilization
was an impasse.’39
These perversions do not seem to be much different from
those of Yeltsin or Talbott. But Putin was also saying different things
that Yeltsin could never be and this was what it counts: ‘Experience of
the 1990’s clearly shows that without paying an excessive price, and
actuall renewall of our country can not be provided with the abstract
models and programs extracted from the foreign school books. A
mechanical imitation of the experience of the other countries will not
guarantee success. Every country, including Russia has to search its
specific way of renewall.'40
After he drew today’s alarming table, Putin lines up some
kind of principles needed to be followed in order to get rid of the
current situation. In the second part of the speech in which the the
problem of the country is declared to get limited to not only
economical but also political and to an extend ideological,
psychological and ethical; the recipe for the sovereignty is being
defined. This recipe consists of three parts: 'Russian ideal', 'Powerful
State' and 'Effective Economy'. So, what is this Russian ideal? We seet
that on one side of this concept lies the “social convention" Notion of
the French Revolution:'The lack of Civil Convention and unity is the
reason for our reforms being slow and painful.We spend our force for
political fights instead of visible Works for the amendment of Russia.
What the Russian people want is only stability, trust for the future and
the possibility for the planning of both their and their childrens’
forthcoming decades. They want to work in a durable, peaceful and
secure law order. And they want to take advantage of the oppurtunities
came by the ownership, free enterprise and market relations. On this
basis, our community began to accept the supranational global values
before the national, communal or ethnical benefits. These values are
freedom of expression, travelling to out of borders and other political
rights as well as human rights. People appreciate the ownership, free
39
"West Softer on Turks in Kurdistan than Russians in Chechnya", FBIS-SOV, 29
March, 1995.
40
Gelman, Vladimir and Olga Senatova, “Sub-National Politics in Russia in the Post
Communist
Transition Period: A View from Moscow”, Regional and Federal Studies, 5 (Summer
1995):
211-223.
23
enterprise and getting wealthy.41
The other side carries a national quality: 'another step for the
unity of the Russian society is the traditional values of them:
Patriotism, the faith on the sovereignty of Russia, Statism and Social
Solidarity. If we leave aside the exploitation of nationalist emotions,
the difference of Putin from the initial ones lies in the third article: 'A
powerful state for the Russians is not an abnormality to get rid of. On
the contrary, they assume it as the source and guarantor of the order,
the initiator and the main propulsion of every change. '42
Putin is claiming to find a solution to the identity problem by
creating a “Russian ideal” from all of these: 'In my view, the new
Russian ideal will arise from the global, general humanitarian values
along with the compound or organical combination of traditional
Russian values succeeding in the historical aspects.' 'We happen to see
the first signals of Putin reforms under the title of 'Powerful State’.
The new leader sees the first step of the political unity in the unity of
judgement: 'In Russia more than 1000 federal laws are still in force
while in republics, regions and autonomous areas thousands of laws
are in force. Not all of these are compatible with the constitution. If
Ministry of Justice, Attorney Generalship and Judgement works as
slow as they do today,a bunch of laws against the constitution may
cause judicial and political problems. Under the circumstances,
constitutional security of the state, capacity of federal center,
controllable position of the country and unity of Russia gets
endangered. ' The target of these remarks is the policy of United
States' named decentralization. Putin,in the part of 'Effective
Economy', makes a clear warning to the Western Friends: 'It is quite
early to bury Russia as a great power.' Right after this, the musts of
Russia are listed in three articles43:
1. A long term development strategy,
2. Arrangement of economical and social areas by the
government,
3. A reform strategy compatible with Russia.
41
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, Brookings Occasional Papers, May
1996.
Iyenger, Shanto, and Donald Kinder, News That Matters: Television and American
Opinion.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
42
ONAY, Yaşar; Russia and Change, Nobel Publications, 1. Press, Ankara, 2002, pp.
67-90.
43
Akşam (1998-2007).
24
The elements of this strategy is as follows: 'Dynamic
economical development', 'an energetic industrial policy', 'a rational
structural policy ', 'effetive financial system', 'struggle with off the
record economy and organized crime in economy, finance and credit
sectors', 'a continual entegration of Russian economy into world’s
economical structures' and 'modern agricultural policy'.44
The call made at the end of the speech is also remarkable:
'During the last 200-300 years, Russia, for the first time, experiences
the danger of falling into the second, even the third league among the
countries of the world. We barely have time to eradicate this threat.
We are to force all of the entellectual, physical and ethical powers of
the society. 45
Also, we are in need of a coordinated and creative labor. No
one else can do it for us. Everything is up to us, only to us.'
After giving an 'alarming' table for today, Putin arranges some
'principles' that should be followed in order to be recovered from
current situation. In the speech of defining the country's problem as
'not only economic, but also politic, and to some degree ideological,
spiritual and moral', the 'rescue prescription' is defined at its second
part. This prescription consists of three parts: 'Russian Ideal', 'Strong
State' and 'Effective Economy'. Then, what is this 'Russian Ideal'? In a
part of this concept, we see that French Revolution's 'social contract'
concept is underlying: 'Due to the absence of Civil contract and union,
becomes the reason for our reforms to be that much slow and go hard.
Instead of concrete assignments for renewing Russia, we spend our
power for political fights. [Russians] wish the opportunities of
planning stability, believing in the future and planning their and their
children's decades. They wish to work in restful, secure and reliable
law and order. They wish to evaluate the chances of possession, free
enterprise and the chances that are being created by types of market
relations. Our citizens, at this point; above benefits of society, groups
or ethnicities, began to agree with supra-national universal values.
These values are the independencies of free speech, free foreign travel
and other political rights with human independencies. People
appreciate becoming to be the owner of a possession, doing a free
enterprise and making good money.'
44
Colton, Timothy, and Jerry Hough, Growing Pains, Washington DC, Brookings
Institute Press,
1998.
45
http://tr.rutam.org.
25
The other leg carries a 'national' qualification: 'For the unity of
Russian society, the other leg is Russians' traditional values:
Patriotism, believe in Russia's greatness, statism, social solidarity.' If
we ignore the exploitation of national emotions, Putin's difference
from the previous ones is at the third code: ' For Russians, a strong
state is not an abnormality has to be recovered. On the opposite, they
see it as a source and guarantor of solidarity, the starter of every
transition and its basic driving force.'46
With creating a 'Russian Ideal' from all these, Putin is at an
assertion of solving the identity problem: 'I think the new Russian
ideal will appear with; the composition of universal, general
humanistic values with traditional Russian values that have come
through time or with their organic combination. 'Besides, at the title of
'Strong State', we see the first signals of Putin 'reforms'. New leader,
sees the first step of political unity as the unity of justice: 'In Russia,
there are still federal laws above 1000, there are several thousands of
laws in republics, regions and sovereigns. All of them are
incompatible with the constitution. If the Ministry of Justice, Office of
the Chief Public Prosecutor and jurisdiction, behave slowly like they
today behave for solving this problem, laws that are against
constitution, can create judicial and political problems. At this
circumstance, state's Constitutional security, the capacity of federal
center, governing the country and Russia's totality come to be in
danger.' These words target the politics of 'regionalism'
and 'decentralization' that they are being imposed by USA. Putin, in
'Effective Economy' part, warns 'Western Friends' clearly: 'It is too
early for burying Russia that is a great power, into a grave.' After then,
he lists three statements that Russia has to do47:
1. A long term development strategy,
2. Organizing economy and social place by state,
3. A reform strategy that fits Russia.
This strategy's elements are 'dynamic economic development',
'energetic industry politics', 'rational constitutional politics', 'efficient
financial system', 'at the field of economic-financial-credits, informal
economy and struggle against organized crime', 'constant integration
of Russian economy to world economic constitutions' and 'modern
agriculture policies'.48
46
ONAY, Yaşar; Russia and Transition, Nobel Publications
Akşam (1998-2007).
48
Gibson, James, “Politics and Markets”, Journal of Politics, 58:4 (1996): 954-984.
47
26
The call that is at the end of the speech, should also be given
importance: 'For the first time in last 200-300 years, Russia is at the
danger of going down to second or even third league through world
states. We have no time left for destroying this threat. We should force
49
all the intellectual, physical and moral powers of the nation.'
We need to work coordinately and creatively. No one will do
this for us. Everything are resisting on us, only us.'
1.9. PUTIN OPERATIONS BEGIN
One of the primary results concluded from this comprehensive
“millennium speech” is the determination of Putin to unite the
“nation” behind interests and policies of Russian imperialistic
bourgeoisie. By all means, to ensure this “aggrieved” role is featured
and enthusiastic calls to laborers and proletarians during Soviet Union
are imitated unsuccessfully. Another result is responsive to
“identification” problem of Russian bourgeoisie: Putin and the class
he represents see USSR period as a “bad experience” and “deviation”
and therefore they accept that their roots reach to Russian Tsardom.
One of the elements of long-awaited “Russian ideal” is based on “free
market” and the other on “traditional Russian values”. It is clear that
“national solidarity” intended on this basis bear a reactionary
characteristic; however, it cannot be concluded from here that US
would be “content” with these circumstances.50
Actions of Putin within this framework are not at all
compatible to US impositions. The new leader first established
“Strategic Research Center” as a commanding council to ensure
economical renewal. After that he increased income tax. And finally
he rolled his sleeves up to subjugate administration of 89 republics
and region to the center, and created seven “super regions”
administered through direct assignments. Membership of these
administrators in Council of Federation which is the top layer of
Russian parliament was cancelled. Military based politicians who
proved their commitments to the center were appointed to several
republics and regions by voting or assigning: Gen. Boris Gromov
(Moscow)51, Gen. Vladimir Şamanov (Ulyanovsk), Gen. Vladimir
49 ONAY, Yaşar; Rusya ve Değişim, Nobel Yayınları, 1. Baskı, Ankara, 2002, pp.
67-90.
50
AKTÜKÜN, İlker; SSCB’ den BDT’ ye Nasıl Varıldı. Marksist Bir Tahlil İçin
Saptamalar, Sorun Publications, 1st edition, İstanbul, 1995, page 45-90.
51
MANSUR, Raul; Moskova. Görsel Gezi Rehberleri Serisi, Dost Kitabevi
27
Kulakov (Voronez) and Admiral Vladimir Yegorov (Kaliningrad), and
Colonel Aleskey Lebed and Aushev selected before Putin. Putin
appointed soldiers to seven “super regions”: Pulikovski, Latyişev,
Çerkesov and Poltavçenko.52
These “military steps” were clear evidences for American
supported politicians in Putin’s Kremlin to give their places to oldnew military men. As a matter of fact, the share separated from the
budget for military was increased as much as possible. Reflection of
the on-going cleaning to international public opinion began by
crossing to media area. Media barons Boris Berezovski and Vladimir
Gusinski who are the most important ones of Russian “oligarchs”
appeared during Yeltsin period began to have hard times. Offices of
two US supported bosses was swooped down in 2000, their directors
were put under surveillance together with themselves, they were
investigated for embezzlement and by this way they were made
ineffective. As a reminder, Berezovski had 49 percent of state channel
ORT during Yeltsin period. MediaMOST of Gusinski embodied
several newspapers and TV channels, one of which is NTV. At the
same time, “sudden attacks” were made to these bosses and Lukoil,
Norilsk Nikel and Avtovaz companies which had become finance
source of other Pro-Americans. Curiously enough, Berezovski was
one the people organizing the rise of Putin. It seemed like “Continuing
Yeltsin period without Yeltsin” dreams of him and people like him
came to nothing. Because of people’s anger to these parasites, almost
no power dared to stand before Putin. Even opposition parties in
Duma were supporting the steps taken passionately. Opposing leader
Grigory Yavlinski addressed as: 'USA government fooled us. While
they were preaching on free market and free society, they passionately
continued to support a small group most suitable to Washington’s
choices.'53
Publications, Ankara, 1999, page 34-123.
52
ROSE, Richard & MUNRO, Neil; Elections without Order. Russia’s Challenge to
Vladimir Putin, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, page 67-145.
53
Moses, Joel, “Political-economic Elites and Russian Regional Elections, 19992000: Democratic
Tendencies in Kaliningrad, Perm, and Volgograd”, presented at the annual convention
of the
American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Washington DC,
November
15-18, 2001.
182
28
SECOND CHAPTER
2.1. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE
COLD WAR (1992-2002)
Washington in a little bit daze, in case, could not respond
much to those steps that Berezovski and Gusinski, who went to
Washington at the end of September, 2000 to ‘complain’ about Putin,
got back by making out that they “had bitten the dust”. Washington
knew that encouraging these two magnates would added up to coming
face to face with Putin whose intention had not been clear yet. Paul J.
Saunders, a right-wing writer, explains about this attitude as: ‘The
latest developments has an evidental reasoning that the Kremlin aims
to become more powerful on Russia’s mass media. However, reading
these actions as if there is an attempt for the freedom of the press will
result in ignoring the Russian realities and other suspicious
developments.’54
After all, Washington, for instance, had just to make a weak
objection considering ‘the democracy’ and the ‘freedom of the press’
when Andrei Babitski, a news reporter on the Radio Liberty which
was in relation with the U.S.A, was arrested. ‘The witch-hunt’ process
- taking the intellectuals backed up by the U.S.A into custody or
squelching them - has still held on since Babitski.55
Another step, which was symbolically important, was taken
by the new Russian governance on the road to the construction of a
national identity, of which Putin complained about the inexistence.
The anthem of the Soviet Union was adopted as the national anthem in
law enacted by Duma. The music remained unchanged but the lyrics
had been replaced by nationalist-chauvinistic lines reminding the
Tsarist Russia!56
Right after that, Putin put pressure on the neighboring states
about discharging the debts mostly arising from oil and gas and thus
began to use it as a trump in order to have a political clout over them.
These states had to accpet that they were dependent on Russia as well
as they were not in a resisting position against it. !57
54
http://www.gazetasng.ru.
http://www.russia.com.
56
CROZIER, Brian; The Rise and Fall of The Soviet Empire, An Imprint of Prima
Publishing, National Review, California, 2000, p. 57-127.
57
Milliyet (2003-2007).
55
29
The very annyoing part would have definitely played by Putin
in arena of international politics. Putin made his first statement in
‘Millenium Summit’ in September, 2000 by announcing his intention
in that arena. He began his speech by affirming that the U.N.
guaranteed the freedom from the arbitrariness of hegemony and diktat,
a direct target to the U.S.A. Then he laid emphasis on the ABM (AntiBallistic Missile) Treaty, which was ignored by the U.S.A., as the
"foundation" of international disarmament. He, finally, asserted that
the countries had rights to "national self-expression" and
"independence", again targeted the American hegemony. The
following day, two writers from the U.S.A. said: “Vladamir Putin's
speech shows how misguided the Clinton administration was in its
portrayal of the new Russian leader as a ‘leading reformer’.”58
2.2. RUSSIA IS ON THE STAGE OF REAL POLITICS
At this point, it is needed to look closely to the breakthrough
that Russia started during the Putin’s period. After Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics’ collapse, one of the ascertainments uttered by
American ideologues was America’s having get out from the
ideological blocks in the international paths. This meant America’s
foreign politics’ return to the pre-socialist block bourgeois
Realpolitics’ (realist politics) period. If it is needed to sample, the
relations with the coutries that little or more accepted as in the
USSR’s influence zone could be improved without facing with
difficulties and new opportunities would be gained for hegemony
projection.59
Actually, in the last decade, in the effort of precisely counting
some coutries -that in the ‘Soviet influence zone’ from India to
Angola- to the imperialist system, a dramatic concentration occured.
Meanwhile, some countries’ , such as Turkey, Greece and Pakistan,
dominant classes started to complain that they lost their importance
after the Cold War. However, if the matter is this or that imperialist’s
getting rid of the ideological links, it is inaccurate to think that these
58
TİMAKOVA, Natalya, KOLESNİKOV, Andrei, GEVORKYAN, Nataliya; First
Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin,
Public Affairs Publications, New York, 2000, p. 56-89.
59
Atkeson, L.R., and R.W. Partin, “Economic and Referendum Voting: A
Comparison of
Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections,” American Political Science Review, 89
(1995): 99107.
30
links just handicap America’s move. The valid thing for the USA was
valid for the other imperialists, especially Russian imperialism that got
rid of its socialist mask. In recent years, world’s certain imperialists
started to advance in Realpolitic’s conflicting and dangerous waters.60
In the period of revisionist USSR, Russian governance’s view
to west had been giving priorty inevitably to defence with the impact
of imperialist block’s heavy attack. Soviet imperialism, excluding
some exceptions, could not advance even a small move except from
protecting its west position. In the basis of this effort was Tsarist
Russia’s traditional politics that means “some weak countries’ -being
in the Russian influence zone- being stand between the Russian
borders and foe.” But Putin is face to face with a more serious case,
because point at issue countries (in the west Ukraine, White Russia, in
the South Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia) are about to be lost. Old
Warsaw Pact’s members like Poland, having join the membership of
NATO, shows that the tampon is started to be disentegrated by the
west imperialists. It is needed to remind that, in the condition of
USSR’s existence, in the summit of two Germany’s unity, NATO
promised that it would not expand even a milimeter to the East and
accept any Warsaw Pact countries to its membership. Putin’s Russia
seems to be resentful for this promises’ not to be done.61
As reciprocation to three East Europe countries’ acceptation
to NATO, Russia started to take some apparent precautions. First, it
clearly announced that it would see three Baltic countries’ (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania) being taken to the NATO, as an assault to the red
line. This definition meant NATO’s broadening to Baltic would be
accepted as a direct threat to Russia’s national interests. Second
precaution came from the field of security concept. Russian
government, with a world shocking move, made the nuclear doctrine
offensive. Old doctrine in the period of USSR guaranteed that it would
not be the first side starting the nuclear attack. But in the new
doctrine, in case of a vital threat to the national interests, it give green
light to the nuclear power usage.62
60
Belin, Laura, “Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media”, in ed.
Archie Brown,
Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
61
Kramer, Gerald, “Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964,”
American
Political Science Review, 65 (1971): 131-143. 181
62
Weatherford, “Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Differences in
Political
31
Russian’s third precaution was to come into exist a formation
in which who is the ‘boss’ can not be argued resembling the old
Warsaw Pact in the East Europe .Started parallel to the Independent
Countries Community’s (ICC) becomin nonfunctional,the first step of
the enterprises was to buil a union between the White Russia and
Russia resembling a confederation (a company in external policy , the
same money unit).After the communists’ coming into power in
Moldavia, this country has a chance to participate in the unity.On the
other side,supporter of the West,Ukrainian leader Leonid Kucma’s
withdrawn from the public life with the scandals and not taking the
supports that he except from his friends caused this country being
forced to the ‘unity’ by Russian.63
Altough it seems impossible at the moment, in the last ten
years, having often supported from the USA and becoming the third
country, the Ukraine’s return to the Russian imperialism’s arms
undoubtedly will be an extraordinary victory for Putin.Even the Putin
government is limited,the evidences,too,relating that it is on the
around of a big alliance and can form an alternative to the ‘USA’ in
West,are becoming powerful.Lastly on February, German Minister of
foreign Affairs Joschcka Fischer’s visit to Moscow, was the scene of
some critical meetings.After debating USA’s National Rocket
Defence Shield (NRD),Fischer and Putin expected Germany’s being a
kind of ‘mediater’ between Russia and USA even they do not express
clearly.From the supporter of USA the Carnegie Foundation’s
Moscow Office, Alexander Pikayev, was evaluating this visit with a
disturbing question: Whether is this a long-term Russian-German
agreement or is this temporary relating to the hesitation in the
relationship of USA-Russian.While Alexander Rahr from the German
Foreign Politics Association was in the view of ‘the field had been
opened for the other east-west connection’ because of the falling of
the government.While the common point the strategist are likeminded is that the’defence diplomacy’ days between Yeltsin and
Helmut Kohl,it means the politics’ talking too much but doing nothing
Responses to Recession,” American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1983): 917-938.
White, Stephen, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes. Chatham:
Chatham
House, 1996.
63
Pacek, Alexander, and Benjamin Radcliff, “The Political Economy of Competitive
Elections in
the Developing World,” American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995): 745-759.
32
is over. 64
But still, it should be remembered that with paying Russian
almost 20 billion dollars debt to the Germany, the problem of
ownership of the Kaliningrad (or Koenisberg) in the Baltic,will be a
great obstacle for two countries’forming a long-term
‘alliance’.European Integration is evaluating the Kaliningrad, which
passed to the U.R.S.S. from Germany during the Second World War
,as a ’ Troy Horse ‘ in the middle of the ‘Europe’.But while Russia
using the Kaliningrad as a military base,on the other hand it tries to
maket his region a kind of ‘Russian Hong Kong’ which will reduce
the economic problems.Putin’s dashes in south worths to
attention.First of all the new leader strengthening their relationship
with Armenia and stiffend the existance of Russian military in this
country.65
Thus, he both made the necessary pressure among the
Azerbaijan and its ‘fickle’ leader Haydar Aliyev and also he tried to
prevent the Armenian government from the annealing politics
supported by the ‘genocide pact’ coming from West.The Russian
attack in the Chechenia was used as a means of renewing the pressure
on countries in Middle East66’.This pressure seems especially to the
neighbour country Georgia.Really, achieved to escape from a series of
assosiation ,Georgian leader Eduard Sevardnadze was expressing
clearly that this country hah to enter the ‘NATO’67.
With the Second Chechen War,this split voice was
comparatively digested.It should be remembered one more time that
Chechenia’s gaining an ‘independence’supported by USA will abolish
the Russian last control point in the region and there will not be any
obstacle in front of the petrol-natural gas tube line passing through the
soils belong to the West’s ‘customer’regimes.Related to USA and its
alliences’expressions:We respect to the Russian’s soil wholeness’,
there is the problem of tube-lines on the backwards of summons with
regards to the war has to be ended with a political
solution.However,the problem is not just because of the
petrol.Winston Churchill’s speeches in 1919 are still
64
MANSUR, Raul:Moscow.The Service of Visual Travel and Guide .Dost
Publication,Ankara,1999, pp. 34-123.
65
Hurriyet, 25 January, 1995.
66
TIKENCE,M.’Russian Federation’s Middle East Policy’, Strategy,
96/3,Ankara,1999.
67
DAGI,Zeynep,’Russian’s Near-Enviroment Policy and Turkey’, Tradition and
Change in Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1998.
33
current:’Controlling the Old Russian Empire,if the North Caucasus
and Khazar Region are not under the control of Western powers,it will
not be confident’. 68
2.3. RUSSIAN-IRAN CO-OPERATION IN CAUCASIA
AND MIDDLE EAST
When mentioning Caucasia and Caspian, it is also essential to
examine the alliance between Russia and Iran, which is an exact
model for the “Realpolitic”. As it is acknowledged, two countries
have a relationship whose dimensions extend gradually for the last
three-four years and which even gains a “strategic” characteristic. In
the military field, an intense arms transfer attracts attention from
Russia to Iran. Up to now, Russia has delivered arms in İran in bulk
amounts which consisted of a nuclear submarine, war planes and
tanks. Moreover Russia, challenging the USA embargo for Iran,
supports both the country’s “civil purposed” nuclear power plants and
ballistic rocket programs through technology transfer. However,
commercial relations between these two countries are not in the
desired level yet. As of 1997, the trade capacity between Iran-Russia
reached only to half billion dollars and this amount was even below
the capacity of Turkish-Iran trade. As for the political cooperation
between said countries, it is in the wake of developing despite the
existing certain weighty issues.69
The Caspian lays the foundation of a possible Russia-Iran
axis. Remembering the top level council’s Moscow visit under the
presidency of Iran President Hatemi in march, the main topic of this
visit was the Caspian itself. Yet, Iran and Russia have not adopted a
common attitude on this vital issue such as the status of Caspian Sea.
Iran asserts the dissertation of Caspian’s “being shared equally among
five coastal states”. As for Russia, it is not meaning to give up the
SSR’s heritage in this area; it takes a stand towards sharing the
Caspian Sea particularly between Iran and itself and leaving
“fragments” to the other coastal states. 70
The failure of both states to reach a settlement regarding
68
CECEN,A,’National Countries’ Internationalism Against to Imperialist Globalism’,
Global Report, series: 1, 2001.
69
MARPLES, R. DAVID; Russia, 1917-1921, Pearson Education Limited, Essex,
2000, s. 12-89.
70
AKTÜKÜN, İlker; How SSR ended in CIS. Determinations for a Marksist
Analysis, Sorun Publications, 1. Edt., İstanbul, 1995, p. 78-120.
34
Caspian is known to strengthen the USA’s hand, which is the “alien”
side and which has completely opposite projects with those of Russia
and Iran. Therefore, it may be alleged that these two regional states
which are under the Baku-Ceyhan constraint, will either find a
common path or have to leave Caspian to the USA in an indirect
manner.71
The political scissors in the other important issues between
Tehran and Moscow is gradually closing. While the opposition is
supported by arms and education against Taliban who is boosted in
the Afghanistan by Pakistan and the USA; the government is
supported against the followers of sharia in Tajikistan. Two countries
display such an attitude as supporting Armenia in Karabakh issue as
well as being ready to play role as the “alternative mediator” at any
time. Iran, even going far more, stands near Russia, but not Muslim
Vahhabies in the Chechenia matter.72
Iran-Russian axis comes into agenda not only within Middle
Asia and Caucasia, but also within Middle East day by day. The
government of Iran which was excluded from the Middle East “peace”
process by the USA, plays a disturbing role for the USA peace,
through its local forces that it moves in Palestine and Lebanon.
(Hamas, Hizbullah and İslamic Jihat). In the diplomatic front, both
countries support Palestine against Israel, therefore they gained the
sympathy of the public of the region. It is possible to utter that two
countries will strengthen their positions in Middle East diplomacy, in
case the “American Peace” that is insisted on Palestine continues to
stumble.73
Finally, two countries are acting together in cessation of BM
embargo and American attacks on Iraq as if showing that there is no
limit in pragmatism of Iranian mullahs. Here it is beneficial to
mention the approach of Bush government in USA to Iran by opening
a paranthesis. It was being asserted that Bush and his team would
show a ‘different’ approach to Iran from the point of view that they
71
http://www.gaikoforum.com.
Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Ottoman Kurds of the First World War Era:
Reflections in Russian Sources,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 42, Issue 1 (January
2006): 67-85.
73
Hale, Henry, “The Regionalization of Autocracy in Russia”, in Erin Powers (ed.),
Harvard
University Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series, 42
(1998).
72
35
were under the influence of American petroleum monopolies.74
However, Bush surprised several environments by deciding to
reaggravate the sanctions against Iran which had been alleviated
before. This step is seen as a signal that USA-Iran relationships will
stiffen not soften at least in the short term. After ‘carrot’ policy
followed by Clinton government against Iran, such a harsh step, of
course, is also related to Russian-Iran axis. USA will continue to
shake sometimes ‘carrot’ and sometimes ‘stick’ in order to prevent
these two forces which may damage Middle East and Caucasia plans
from collaborating. Leaving aside the developments such as
intervention in Cyprus problem via Russian bases reopened in Syria
and S-300 missiles given to Greece, it will be seen that Russian’s
policy in West-South wing and Middle East are policies of ‘gathering
of strength’.75
So indeed, despite all complaints and protests of Western
imperialists, Russian imperialism demands its spheres of influence
which it deems as its ‘legitimate right’ in these regions and tries not to
leave its ‘backyard’ to foreigners. Head of ‘Russian eagle’ looking at
East, Asia-Pacific is watching a much more active and aggressive
attitude in Putin period.76
2.4. THE RUSSIAN EAGLE LOOKS EAST
It is a known fact that Russian imperialism didn't or couldn't
attach enough importance to the Asia-Pacific as from 1960's. The
most important reason of this 'neglectful' attitude was the division of
China and Soviet Union and USA' s boundary conflicts with Japan the
most important ally of her in the region. However the famous
74
Kudinov, O., Osnovy organizatsii i provedeniia izbiratel’nykh kampanii v
regionakh Rossii [The
Basics of the Organization and Carrying-out of Election Campaigns in Russia’s
Regions],
Kaliningrad: Iantarnyi Skaz, 2000.
75
Freedman, Robert O. (2002). "Russian Policy toward the Middle East under Putin."
Demokratizatsia 10(4).
76
Laboratory for Regional Analysis and Political Geography, “Expert” Institute, the
Union of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and the Moscow National Bank, Predprinimatel’skii
klimat
regionov Rossii: Geografiia Rossii dlya investorov i predprinimatelei [The
Entrepreneurial
Climate in Russia’s Regions: A Russian Geography for Investors and Entrepreneurs].
Moscow: “Nachala Press”, 1997.
36
'ideological limitations' of Soviet-time also surely had an impact on
some points. For all these reasons, Russia was frequently called as 'the
sick man of Asia'. However 'New Russia' joined the APEC
(Association of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) more quickly
than anticipated, built an unexpected 'strategical alliance' with China
and started to strengthen the relationships with ASEAN countries. As
Indian and Russian relations was proceeding in a similar line as in the
soviet-time, the problems with Japan were also in a way of solution.
As a consequence of all these, Russia's trade with Asian countries
increased to 31.5 billion dollar in 1997 while it was 21.4 billion dollar
in 1994.77
The Asia-Pacific region is described as 'the clash area of near
future' by USA the dominant imperialist power. However, the
difficulty of USA to take up a suitable position with this ascertainment
gives a hint about the future of USA hegemony. 'Unconcern' towards
Russia's actions in the region can be denoted as the most important
evidence of this difficulty. Actually, USA didn't even take Russia's
Asia attacks, chiefly the relations with China, seriously to date. US
strategists had passed over and sniffed at the first steps of presently
much debated alliance between Russia and China. 'As the most
importantly and widely, the increase of Russia's action in the region
was interpreted as a tactical step more than a strategy. According to
this interpretation, Russia didn't show a long-term interest in the
region; took steps which are shaped by anti-Western attitudes and
immediate economic needs.' explains Rouben Azizyan the reasons of
this attitude.
The viewpoint which had dominated American strategists up
to recent period is clearly expressed as 'wrong', by ascribing to
'Clinton era', by the sympathizer groups of Bush government. Already
in 1992, Moscow78 showed her intention for being much more active
in the Asia-Pacific, by changing her 'America and Asia focused'
foreign policy. 'Russian diplomacy should act in accordance with the
spirit of ancient Russian emblem; in this emblem an eagle with two
heads looks both West and East.' said the last President Boris Yeltsin,
in his Seoul visit in 1992.79 The main futures of Russia's new Asia
77
Turkish Daily News, March 17, 1994.
78 STANKOVİÇ, S., “Rusya Kendisini Arıyor”, Avrasya Dosyası, Cilt: 1 Sayı: 1,
Ankara, 1994.
79 DAĞI, Zeynep; Rusya’nın Dönüşümü. Kimlik, Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika, Boyut
Kitapları, 1. Baskı, İstanbul, 2002, s. 67-123.
37
policy are mentioned by the Foreign Minister of the period Andrei
Kozirev, who spoke at China People Diplomacy Association in 27th
January 1994. According to Kozirev, Russia's priority was improving
the trade relations with the region countries. Already in that time onethird of Russia's total foreign trade was made with Asia-Pacific
countries. Secondly and maybe the most importantly, Moscow 'didn't
see the contradictions with the region countries as irreconcilable and
would work to establish stable and well-balanced relationships with
them.' Russia declared in this way that she would make an effort to
reduce the tensions which has been continuing for decades with Japan
and China.80
Yeltsin featured Asia-Pacific as 'the third priority of Russia' in
his speech, made at the Federation Council in June 1996. First and
second priorities were Commonwealth of Independent States and
Western Europe. USA had engaged in Asia in paralel with growing
unrest. 'Strategical partnership' with China was the priority in Asia.
Collaborating by signing a peace treaty with Japan was also
mentioned in the speech.81
In addition to NATO's insistence to stretch in the East, when
the Kosovo attack began, Moscow increased her activity in the region
to the top. 'Russia is going to ask for new allies in the East against to
expansion of NATO to the East' declared the Minister of Defence
Pavel Graçev, in November 1995.82
In this direction; the relations among Russia, China and, India
have rapidly improved, moreover Russian politicians have started to
talk about establishing a 'strategical triangle' among three states. It is
obvious that this 'triangle' the establishing possibility of which is
gradually increasing despite all obstacles will carry the target to be a
focus against USA hegemony.83
Nontheless, Russian imperialism is in case of exhibiting a
balanced attitude which doesn’t oppose each its benefits in Asia and
Europa, depending upon announced precedences. This “balance” is
headstone of also the policy called “Eurasia Approach”84 today.
80 TEZCAN, Y., “Avrasya Üzerindeki Güç Mücadelesi ve Türkiye”, Savunma,
Sayı:2, Ankara, 1998.
81 http://www.kremlin.ru/withflash/Vneshnyaya_politika619.shtml
82 TEZCAN, Y., “Avrasya Üzerindeki Güç Mücadelesi ve Türkiye”, Savunma,
Sayı:2, Ankara, 1998.
83 http://www.kremlin.ru/withflash/Vneshnyaya_politika619.shtml
84
ROSE, Richard & MUNRO, Neil; Elections without Order. Russia’s Challenge
to Vladimir Putin, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, s. 67-145.
38
According to commentator Karen Brutents, this approach “ is
strengthening the central geographic position and physical existance
of Russia in Europa and also in Asia objectively.”85
Moscow management was assessing that getting strong of
China could cause a new power balance which would be able to gain
advantage for Russia. Not only China and India , but also Iran was
included to strategic cooperation plans. It is seen that Russia-China
agreement that was knitted by correlative visits, signed deals and arms
sale gradually turned into an anti-American color. When China
gradually hardens its resistance against enlargement of NATO, Russia
is targeting military existance of USA in Asia and USA-Japan safety
agreement. At Pekin visit of Russian Secretary of Defence Igor
Sergeyev on October 1998, two countries announced that they would
take common action on three international problems. Two countries
were going against expanding of NATO “categorically”, condemning
West to use force in Kosava and criticizing the anti-rocket defence
shield which USA wanted to build up in Asia with Japan.86
Two countries started to take common action against West
compulsion about subjects like Taiwan, Tibet and Chechenia which
were “smaller issues”.3 It is needed to remind that, when a few years
ago China didn’care about enlargement of NATO, the term’s Russian
Secretary of Defence Igor Radyonov was saying that USA-Japan
agreement wasn’t creating anxiety. However now, for example
Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov, was saying “ NATO is converting
to a global organization. For this reason, it is needed to make other
countries our allies.” As a component of Russia’s this activity, it is
needed to mention about arms and technology exportation towards
China. Stil, Russia who is the most important importer of China will
get the most profit from the China management decision taken in past
weeks about “increasing military budget in the rate of 18 percent
yearly”. Arms sale of Russia to China triple increased in last six years
and today one third of annual tradition between two countries is in
military type. The source of seventy percent of arms imported by
China is Russia, and 30-40 percent of Russia’s total arms sale is going
85
Harris, George. (1995). "The Russian Federation and Turkey." In Regional Power
Rivalries in the New Eurasia, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles Smolansky. New
York: M. E. Sharpe.
86
Fiorina, Morris, “ Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections:
A MicroAnalysis”, American Journal of Political Science, 22 (1978): 426-443.
39
to China. Between 1991-’97, China bought arms worth 6 milliard
dollars from Russia and this importation is continuing to exist at
average 1 milliard dollars level yearly.87
China bought 48 Sukhoi Su-27 type war planes, 8 S-300 air
defence misilse systems and 4 Kilo-class submarines between 1992’97. On March 1996, after the show of force of USA in Taiwan
Bosphorus, new purchase orders came: 2 “Sovremenny” class guided
missile destroyer and KA-27 and KA-28 type helicopters. It was
reflected to press that, because of the same annoyance , China targeted
to build up its own airplane carrier by buying Russian technology.
Moskow could set goal to increase total arms exportation to yearly 6
milliard dollars in the next years because of China’s big interest in lots
of Russian made arms from flame throwers to ironclads.88
But the cooperation between two countries is not limited to
only arms sale. Russia is helping to also China’s nuclear power station
building programme. Today, more than 200 Russian firms are taking
office in building power station in Lianyungang in Jiangsu region of
China. In last six years, nuclear exportation of Russia towards China
increased to 150 million dollars from zero yearly. It is expected this
amount to be doubling in next years. As a result of such a cooperation,
Pekin is addicted to Moskow for maintenance and repairing of
possessing developed submarines and war planes. Chinese officers are
getting training in Russia. There were 177 Chinese officers getting
training in Russia by 1998. The number of Russian military
consultants and experts who were charged with supporting China
army was 5205.89
2.5. KOREA PROBLEM AND ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)
We have mentioned that the end of the ideological conflict of
the “Cold War” created new opportunities not just for the US, but also
for Russia and the other competing imperialists. From the perspective
of Russia's Asian policy, the most recent example of this is the Korea
problem. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, the US,
China and Japan have been gradually confronting each other in a
87
SAMİ, H. “ Eurasia Choice “, Öncü Kadro ( Precursor Cadre),number
7/8,Eskişehir 1998.
88
http://www.russian-orthodox-church.org.ru/en.htm.
89
İLHAN,A.
“
Eurasia
Truth
“-“Eurasia
World’s
Centre”“Eurasia,Eurasian’s”,Cumhuriyet (Republic) 1998.
40
frequent and dangerous way on the problem of the Korean
Peninsula.90
Moscow's current policy on Korea relies on three basics:
Russia is a neighboring country to the Korean
Peninsula.
A conflict in Korea would threaten Russian interests.
Russia wants to have good relations with both North
and South Korea.
On this basis, there have been two changes in Moscow's
Korean policy . The first was Yeltsin's “caring for South Korea”
tendency in the beginning of the '90s. The second change, which
corresponds to the Putin period, however, fixed this “historical drift.”
In the new period, Moscow followed a policy of having “balanced
relations with both South and North Korea.” It is known that this
policy would serve to increase its influence on the peninsula, because
Russia has some qualities that other “concerned” countries do not
have. It does not pursue an expansionist political line like China, it
does not arouse “bad memories” and it does not repel like the US.
Thus, both North and South Korea consider Russia a “stabilizing actor
between China and Japan.” After all, the US followed the policy of
“elephants” toward these two Asian powers and behaved toward
Koreans as if they were the “porcelain in the China shop” since it does
not need to take local powers into its reckoning.91
The target at the core of this alternative approach, which Putin
showed during his visit to the Korean Peninsula, is not very easy to be
achieved after all. Russia has to follow an approach that would not
“annoy” the North or the South that would contribute to the
consolidation of the peninsula even if they are not ready for this. If
Russia happens to achieve success in such a delicate policy, it would
be a giant leap toward its biggest aim in the region, because the union
of the two Koreas would eliminate the only excuse for the American
occupation forces in the Far East.92
It is possible to say that the predictions done before the
90 http://www.mfa.gov.tr.
91 YELTSİN, Boris; Geceyarısı Günlükleri (Midnight Diaries), Türkiye İş Bankası
Kültür Yayınları (Türkiye İş Bankası Cultural Publishing), İstanbul, 2000, p. 78-90.
92 http://www.nartajans.net/nuke/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1888,
2007-07-03.
41
summit conference with regard that the conference would be
unsuccessful were almost exactly realized. Poland and Baltic
Countries once more expressed their discomfort about the agreement
signed between Russia and Germany which offers to export the
Russian gas underneath the Baltic Sea. However, the countries at issue
oriented their criticism not only to Russia but to Germany, as well. 93
Russia also revived the energy issue in the summit
conference. Moscow that gains important achievements in Central
Asia94 and guarantees to export the Central Asia gas to Europe over
Russia wants to posses the domestic markets of European countries. It
creates a discomfort in Russia that European countries do not open
their domestic markets to Russian energy giant Gazprom and that they
consider this as a Russian expansionism. Another issue that Russia
fells discomfort with is that USA places rocket defense systems in the
territories of new European countries. Although the EU platform was
not suitable to discuss this matter, Moscow brought forward this issue
in the summit conference. However, as it was in the energy area, the
sides could not get an agreement on this issue. Though the deadline of
the agreement offering to collaborate was not extended, the sides
decided to carry out the negotiations on abolishment of visa regime.
The trade scale of 231 milliard Dollars between Russia and EU
indicates that the relationships are not so poor. As a matter of fact, EU
is the biggest trading partner of Russia. 95
The topic that was dealt both before and after the summit
conference was the democratization problem and violation of human
rights in Russia. The representatives of the opposition group made a
parade on this issue in Samara on the same date with the conference.
That the opposition leader of “Civil Front Union,” the world
champion of chess, Gari Kasparov wasn’t allowed to get on the plane,
to some extent, justifies the EU countries’ fears
related to the
democratization problem in Russia. Even though the EU countries,
mainly Germany, dealt with the subject in the conference, the answer
of Putin was ready. Putin said that there isn’t a “perfect democracy”
in any place of the world, the demonstrations in Samara do not pose
93
DAĞI, Zeynep, “ Russia’s Near Surrounding Politics, and Turkey” “Conventions
and Change in Turkish Foreign Politics” 1998
94
TİKENCE, M “Central Asia Politics Of Russian Federation” Strategy, 96/3,
Ankara, 1999
95
ÖZBEK, N, “New Trends in Russian Foreign Politics” Eurasia File, Volume:3,
Number:4, Ankara, 1996
42
any risk, and thus, the government did not do anything to stop them.
Moreover, Putin called for an objective treatment towards Russia
stating that EU applies a double standard both in energy and
democratization areas. 96
In conclusion, Russia- EU summit conference showed that the
sides would not be willing to step back on many important issues.
Baltic countries, on the other hand, will go on to oppose to Russia by
getting support both from USA and EU. The disagreements between
Russia and old Iron Curtain countries obstruct the improvement of
cooperation between Russia and EU, drastically. 97
2.6. RUSSIA GOVERNMENT’S PRIME MINISTER
PUTIN: WE MUST NOT FEEL GUILTY FOR
GREAT PURGE IN STALIN PERIOD
Russia Government Minister Vladimir Putin indicated that
Russia must not feel guilty for great purge that was done in Stalin
period and said that there are countries which have worse pages in
their histories. Vladimir Putin reminded 70. anniversary of “great
purge” which was done in Former Soviet Union in 1937, named as
“government terror”, killed, prisoned and exiled millions of people for
political reasons, and said “There are bad pages in our history but
others have worst”. Putin said “We must remember our history’s these
bad times but noone has right to feel quilty in Russia for this reason”
in his speech addressing teachers and was published in TV’s.98
Putin argued USA’s atom bomb in Japan was worse than
infringements in Stalin period, and mentioned what USA did in
Vietnam. Putin said “We didn’t use nuclear weapon, pulverized
chemicals to thousands of kilometers and destroyed a small country
with bombs which are 7 times more than the ones in 2. World War.
We don’t have black pages like these or others”.99
2.7. TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR EURASIA'S GEOPOLITICS
As a result of its geography, Turkey maintains a multi96
http://www.russianembassy.org.
http://www.asam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.asp?ID=1625&kat1=6&kat2=, 2007-07-03.
98
http://www.turkey.mid.ru.
99
Haller, H. Brandon and Helmut Northrop, “Reality Bites: News Exposure and
Economic
Opinion”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 61:4 (1997): 555-575.
97
43
dimensional and dynamic foreign policy. Turkish foreign
policymakers are carefully analyzing their foreign policy options in
light of the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. Within this set of
complex links, Turkish-Russian relations appear rather perplexing.
Historically, there have been many wars between these two states up
until the end of WWI. Both countries have imperial legacies and have
experienced a post-imperial traumatic loneliness. Great imperial
legacies and the feelings of isolation after the collapse of the previous
empires are important factors that shape the national memory of these
countries.100
After Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Turkey in
December of last year, Turkey's prime minister paid a one day official
visit to Russia on January 10, 2005. It is relevant to analyze current
factors that determine the relations between these two states. Domestic
politics in Russia is often the result of competing views of Westerners,
anti-Westerners, Eurasianists, ultra-nationalists and nostalgic
communists. Russian foreign policy is generally determined along the
line of domestic political preferences. There is a symbolic pendulum
in Russian foreign policy that vacillates between Europe and Asia
depending on the political balances currently at play. Russian foreign
policy is today more critical of the West and follows a more Eurasianoriented path. For Moscow, the existence of such national memory
and geopolitical orientation makes it difficult to determine a fixed and
well-functioning foreign policy towards Turkey. Like Russia, Turkey
has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern and European identities and
different interests at stake in all of these regions. Another significant
factor is that both countries are going through dynamic domestic and
economic transformations. The change in the early four years of the
current decade is surely dramatic at both societal and state levels.101
More specifically, the future of Turkish-Russian relations will
be a product of bilateral, regional and international developments.
High-level mutual visits in the recent period underline a number of
important issues between the two states. Although observers seem to
have an optimistic perception of the relations both in Moscow and
100
09 February 2005
Blanchard, Olivier, and Andrei Shleifer, “Federalism with and Without Political
Centralization:
China Versus Russia,” working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research,
[online
series] (March 2000 [cited May 6, 2000]); available from World Wide Web@
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7616.
101
44
Ankara, there are issues of contention between the two states. The
issues of bilateral relations will be trade, investments by Turkish and
Russian businessmen, tourism, natural gas purchases, Russian oil
tankers transiting the straits, future pipeline projects that may pass
through the Trace or Anatolia, the Chechen question, Russian arms
sales, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on Russian soil. A major
recent development is the Russian leader's statement that the Turkish
society in Northern Cyprus deserves better treatment from the
international community, since the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of
the U.N. plan designed to put an end to the division of the island.102
Although there is much talk about the convergence of interests
between Turkey and Russia, one should also point out the conflicting
ones. Both countries favor improving their current relations and
adopting a more pragmatic stance on the international arena. Officials
on both sides signed a number of agreements, which will surely
facilitate the establishment of constructive relations.103
The volume of bilateral trade reached $10 billion in 2004, and
both sides aim to increase this volume to $25 billion by 2007.
Turkey's construction sector is active in Moscow and is increasing its
market share in Russia. Russian businessmen closely follow Turkey's
privatization process and want to take part in energy projects in
Turkey. Another major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to
Turkey. Considering the Iraq crisis and potential instability in Iran and
Syria, Ankara pays serious attention to military modernization
projects and has an interest in Russian arms supplies. Finally, Russian
tourists increasingly prefer Turkey's Mediterranean coast for their
vacations.104
At another level, the mutual agenda is set around Russia's
energy geopolitics, its near abroad policies, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(B.T.C.) oil pipeline, ethnic secessionist movements in the Caucasus,
the reduction of Russian military forces in the region in accordance
with international agreements, and the problems emerging after the
102
"Policy on Turkish Kurds Seen as Inconsistent", FBIS-SOV, August 12, 1995.
Przeworski, Adam, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin eds., Democracy,
Accountability and
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.,; Michael R. Milgrim,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), pp. 519-537,
This article consists of 19 page(s).
104
Mutz, Diana, “Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience”,
American Journal
of Political Science, 36:2 (1992): 483-508.
103
45
Iraq war. Russia dislikes the B.T.C. pipeline, which is expected to
transit Azeri and Kazak oil to the West. Moscow regards this pipeline
as a challenge to its status in the Caspian basin and an obstacle to its
oil trade. Although the major conflict surrounding the B.T.C. pipeline
was between Russia and a number of former Soviet states, it indirectly
influenced Turkish-Russian relations. However, the Blue Stream
project -- a natural gas pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey via
the Black Sea -- and several other Turkish-Russian oil pipeline
projects have led to the emergence of a "low profile" policy
concerning oil politics on the part of Russia. Although it is speculative
at the moment, the head of British Petroleum Company in Azerbaijan
recently floated the possibility of carrying Russian oil through the
B.T.C.105
According to the official Turkish policy line, the Chechen
question is a Russian internal problem. Turkish officials frequently
declare that Russian security measures should not violate human
rights in Chechnya. However, a large Chechen diaspora in Turkey
follows a different line and tries its best to assist Chechen guerrillas,
creating significant tensions between the Turkish and Russian
governments. In return, Turkish officials have expressed discontent
about the Kurdistan Workers Party's -- a separatist Kurdish armed
movement -- activities in Russian territories. For the time being, both
sides extend considerable vigor in order not to sever their relations on
account of trans-boundary ethnic problems.106
2.8. TOWARD A NEW GEOPOLITICS
Russia has a regional profile and is sensitive about losing its
influence in ex-Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as
a significant regional player, pursuing a special relationship with the
E.U. and paying serious attention to building good relations in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. How closer Turkish-Russian relations will
be interpreted in Brussels and Washington is another important
question.107
The U.S. military deployment in different parts of Eurasia, the
105
Tufte, Edward, “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional
Elections,” American
Political Science Review, 69 (1975): 812-826.
106
"Kurdish Problem Seen as International", Turkish Daily News, 1 May, 1995, A3.
107
Zharmukhamed Zardykhan, “Post-Soviet Integration in the Light of KazakhstaniRussian Relations,” Asia Insights (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS)), No. 2
(June 2004): 17-18, 24.
46
pro-Western change in domestic landscapes of Georgia and Ukraine,
the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are, among others, the
developments that have paved the way for the emergence of a new
geopolitics in Eurasia. The European and U.S. expansion into former
Soviet territories influences Russian policymakers to seek new
alliances in Asia. Russian rapprochement with Iran, China and India
are examples of this new policy. In this sense, the new developments
in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks are bringing together the policies
of not only Russia and other major Asian powers, but also of some
critical European states such as France and Germany.108
After receiving a negotiation date for E.U. membership,
Turkey is emerging as a European actor in the region. However,
Turkey's new orientation was tested during the subsequent domestic
transformations of Georgia and Ukraine. Turkey adopted a low-profile
attitude toward the Russian policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Georgia,
and sensitively displayed a constructive outlook by pointing to the
relevant international norms and agreements as the way to resolve the
crises. Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any "Russia versus the
West" struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow.109
One other important area of contention is Turkish-Armenian
relations, which are held hostage to historical enmities and Turkey's
pro-Azerbaijan policies in the Caucasus. Currently, Russia is the main
ally of Armenia, and possible Russian mediation between Turkey and
Armenia on a number of issues can be expected. Following recent
positive developments on this front, there may be Russian-Turkish
joint attempts to solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.110
108
Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. (2001). "Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling
Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership." In Turkey in World Politics,
ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci. Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener.
109
During the then Prime Minister Demirel's visit to Moscow, Boris Yeltsin said,
"Russia and Turkey will regard each other as friendly states and will go for a fullblooded dialogue and cooperation in all areas", ITAR-TASS, 25 May, 1992.
110
Report Drafted By Dr. Bulent Aras; The Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a
subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to
the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the
written permission of [email protected]. PINR reprints do not qualify under FairUse Statute Section 107 of the Copyright Act. All comments should be directed to
[email protected].
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=265&language_id=1;
18 July, 2007
47
2.9. WHO GAINS MORE FROM RUSSIAN-TURKISH
ECONOMIC RELATIONS?
Economic relations are not only shaped by the mutual
economic needs and possibilities. International power balances, ally
obligations and anxieties about internal politics may sometimes
impose that simple commercial calculations are becoming a subject to
sophisticated equations. Consequently, highly obvious national
interests could be rejected in the name of some other “bigger and
hardly explainable national interests”. The Turkish-Russian relations
are full of examples of that kind. For instance: the biggest project that
the two countries carried out together so far, the Blue Stream. First,
the project had been qualified as “undesirable”, then “technologically
impossible”.111 Even after it had been realised, issues such as struggle
against corruption and price bargains may still be used to hinder the
Turkish-Russian trade, Turkish Referans Gazetesi writes.112
The Turkish-Russian Rapprochement Annoys the West. One
may ask the reason why to seek problems in the Turkish-Russian
economic relations when Russia is on the first row in Turkey’s foreign
trade. In 2004, the trade volume increased by 60 per cent, and reached
11 billion dollars. By the first five months of this year, in Russia,
importation increased by 65.3 per cent, and exportation by 24.7 per
cent. The target is to raise the trade volume to 25 billion dollars in a
couple of years. Nevertheless, even if this evolution is a very rapid
one, it should be emphasised that this is the consequence of a natural
course, just a like the flow of a river in its own bed. If Turkey had
made one tenths of its efforts that it makes for the European Union for
Russia, what would have been obtained?113
The main subject of 15-20 years long evolution on the
Ankara-Moscow axis is the business world. It is not a secret that in
Russia as well as in Turkey, official and political elites along with the
medias, being the leaders of the game, have restrictive attitude. From
December 2004 till today, we can easily affirm that a different
situation has emerged. The United States of America, which utter
sometimes its annoyance towards the anti-American feelings that rose
111
AIA Turkish section, 12.08.2005
Ozgur Ulke, Istanbul, 18 July, 1994, 4.
113
Hanson, Phillip, “Samara: A Preliminary Profile of a Russian Region and Its
Adaptation to the
Market.” Europe-Asia Studies 49 (1997): 407-429.
112
48
in Turkey, in last months, did not hide anymore that they are also
anxious about the Turkish-Russian rapprochement. The former
Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations, Richard
Holbrook, wrote in his article entitled “The End of Romantics” in
Washington Post: “Russia is in a very close but disguised contact with
our ally, Turkey. Thanks to this contact, Russia wants to spread its
influence as far as in this region”. That was an important sign.114
2.10. PUTIN - THE “WOLF”, AND ERDOGAN IS
THE “LAMB”?
Especially after the Sochi Summit between Vladimir Putin
and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, some interpretations of that sort had been
also made in Turkey. Authorities, who had decoded the game of Putin,
which consists in using the difficulties that Erdogan had lived through
in the United States as a trump and thus having Turkey on Russia’s
side in the Middle East and the CIS region, also uttered their anxieties
about the fact that in Sochi, hours long discussions had been made
without taking minutes. Same authorities seem to struggle devotedly
in order that the “ex-KGB man” will not deceive the Turkish Prime
Minister.115
This funny wolf-lamb fable apart, there are many problems in
the Turkish-Russian relations that should be seriously pondered on. To
understand what economic gains would bring such reflections to
Turkey, it is enough to look upon the mutual trade course of last years.
Turkey has to take more profit from this giant potential that is Russia
in the name of its own national interests. All the same, that must not
be an alternative and/or a threat to the United States or the European
Union. Thus, Turkey, which has strong relations with its neighbours,
will be able to act more confidently in its relations with its Western
interlocutors.116
114
Golosov, G.V., “Povedenie Izbiratelei v Rossii: Teoreticheskie Perspektivy I
Rezultaty
Regionalnikh Viborov,” [Voter Behavior in Russia: Theoretical Perspectives and the
Results
of the Regional Elections] Polis, 4 (1997): 44-56.
115
Key, V.O., The Responsible Electorate; Rationality in Presidential Voting, 19361960.
Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1966.
116
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=312 ; 18 July, 2007
49
2.11. RUSSIAN-TURKISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA
Fifteen years after the Soviet Union collapse, Russia and
Turkey have become leading trading partners.117 The volume of the
trade has grown from $200 million dollars in 1990, to $10 billion in
2004 with estimated growth rate of 15-20 percent a year. As a leading
trading partner of Turkey, Russia is secondary only to Germany.
Vladimir Putin's visit to Ankara in December 2004 and the reciprocal
visit to Moscow of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in January 2005 are
considered as a new move towards promotion of bilateral cooperation.
In Erdogan`s opinion, the volume of trade between two states will
reach $25 billion in 2007.118
Active cooperation between the two countries is primarily
conducted in the sphere of power and energy policy, however
Moscow aspires to maximal diversification of commercial and
economic relations.119
2.12. TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION
IMBALANCE
Prior to the beginning of the nineties trade between the
countries was balanced, but later started to lean towards greater
benefit for Turkey. That tendency caused concern in Moscow, and it
was reflected in Putin's statement during his visit to Ankara. Putin
noted that Turkish businessmen surpass their Russian colleagues,
being more active and enterprising.120
Fuel and energy carriers constitute a substantial part of
Russian exports to Turkey, while Turkish companies are involved in
various areas of the Russian economy. Turkish companies conduct
construction projects in Russia. Turkish "Vestel" invested $15 million
in manufacture, installation and adjustment of TVs in Russia.
Branches of the "Ramstore" Company created a network of
117
Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section; 19.04.2005
Kinder, Donald and D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: The American
Case,” British
Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981): 129-161.
119
Irina Grudinina, "Ex Officio: Moscow Won't Let Kurdish Organizations Build
Nests in Russia", Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, 30 August, 1995, v.47, n.31,
23.
120
Ostrovsky, Arkady, “Putin Sends General to “Retake” Old Outpost of the Red
Economy”,
Financial Times, (Dec. 23, 2000), electronic version.
118
50
supermarkets in Russia. Turkish firms invested greatly in the Russian
brewing industry. Recently, Russian companies, supported by the
government, started to enter the Turkish market. Russian firms
participate in Turkish companies privatization tenders and will take
part in a tender on construction of an aluminum producing complex
and modernization of metallurgical plant. Russia proposes to sell its
mining equipment to Turkey. According to Turkish Minister of
Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi Guler, "Russians are interested
in construction of power stations run on natural gas and coal as well as
hydroelectric power stations". In one project, Russia will lay electric
cables on the bottom of Black Sea to transfer electric power to
Turkey.121
An essential contribution to development of trade relations is
brought to Russia by so called "shuttles" (small dealers, bringing and
marketing Turkish goods in Russia) and by tourists. The number of
the Russian tourists visiting Turkey, grows constantly: in 2003 1,2
million Russians visited, in 2004 - 1,7 million. The Russian Minister
of Industry and Energy Victor Hristenko considers, that with tourism
and "shuttle trade", the commodity circulation volume between two
countries reaches $15 billion.122
2.13. MILITARY
COOPERATION:
RUSSIAN
WEAPONS FOR A NATO MEMBER
Turkey is the first NATO country, which has started to buy
Russian weapons. From the middle of the nineties Turks purchased
various Russian arms and military equipment (including helicopters,
armored vehicles, automatic rifles), which they use against the
Kurdish militants. Military cooperation between the countries
expanded greatly after the military cooperation agreement and the
cooperation agreement on military personnel training were signed in
2002 during the visit of the Commander of the Joint Staff of Russia
General Kvashnin to Ankara. Russia aspires to achieve renewal of the
121
Ramsden, Graham, “Media Coverage of Issues and Candidates: What Balance is
Appropriate in
a Democracy?”, Political Science Quarterly, 111:1(1996): 65-81.
Regionii Rossii: Politika i Kadry” (Regions of Russia: Politics and Cadre) website at
http://www.materik.ru/mfpp/polika
122
Powell, G., and Guy Whitten, “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting:
Taking Account
of the Political Context,” American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993).
183
51
suspended tender to manufacture of 145 helicopters under Russian
licenses (project Ka-50/2 "Erdogan").123
2.14. RUSSIAN - TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE
FIELD OF ENERGY AND POWER IN THE POSTSOVIET ERA
From the beginning of the last decade Russia has become the
main supplier of natural gas to Turkey. Projects to use Turkish soil for
the transit of Russian gas by pipelines are also being considered. At
the same time, certain disagreements in bilateral relations in the
sphere of power and energy still exist.124
Agreements on deliveries of Russian natural gas to Turkey
and the use of Turkey as a transit point for Russian energy carriers are
considered today a basis of rapidly evolving bilateral relations in the
economic sphere. At the same time, the parties are unable to overcome
a number of divergences. The project of an oil pipeline Baku –Tbilisi
– Ceyhan (BTC) construction became a cause of sharp disagreements
between Russia and Turkey in the 90s. Ankara and Washington
actively supported this pipeline construction by which the Azerbaijani
and Kazakh oil could be transported to the West. Moscow considered
the BTC pipeline an encroachment on Russian interests in the Caspian
Sea area, and a handicap for Russian oil deliveries to the European
market. The situation changed in 1997 when the parties signed an
agreement on construction of a gas pipeline, "Blue stream", passing
under the Black sea to Turkey. With its completion in 2002, Turkish
dependence on Russian energy carriers grew sharply. Today Turkey
receives 80 percent of its natural gas (16 billion cubic meter) from
Russia.125
Simultaneously, Turkey is ready to act not only as a consumer
of Russian gas, but also as a transit point for Russian oil and other
energy carriers. From Moscow's point of view this will substantially
reduce Russia's losses from deliveries of the Kazakh and Azerbaijani
oil by the BTC. If earlier Russia had tried to counter its construction,
now the Russian government has dropped its opposition, and, together
with Turkish leadership is developing variants of transit oil pipelines
123
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=43 ; 18 July, 2007
Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section; 14.05.2005.
125
Reynolds, Maura, “Russia’s ‘Cruel’ Soldier Comes Home”, Los Angeles Times,
(January 19,
2001).
124
52
through the country, leading to the West and to the Middle East.126
Thus the Kremlin solves two strategic problems: increasing
deliveries of oil to the West and receiving a direct outlet to the
Mediterranean coast. The opportunity of Russian oil deliveries
through the BTC with the participation of British Petroleum is being
examined; the parties are negotiating for the construction of a Trans –
Thracian oil pipeline from Turkey's western Black Sea coast.
According to the specifications of this project, the pipeline could
transport about 60 million tons of oil a year directly to the
Mediterranean coast of Turkey. The government of Turkey supports
the idea, but does not want to finance its construction, fearing that it
will turn unprofitable. The Trans – Thracian pipeline will essentially
ease the bottleneck in the Bosphorus straits and Dardanels through
which Russian and Kazakh oil tankers pass en route to the West.127
Today the transportation of oil through these passages has
turned out to be one of the most problematic questions of bilateral
relations in the field of power. The volume of transportation grows
continuously, and has doubled since 1996, reaching 150 million tons a
year. Four thousand Russian tankers passed through the straights in
1996. In 2003 the number grew to eight thousand. Opening the
Tengiz-Novorossisk oil pipeline will allow increasing export of
Kazakh oil, but simultaneously will add to the overload on the
Bosphorus and Dardanels.128
Russia aspires to increase the intensity of the transportations;
however Turkish authorities have imposed rigid restrictions, claiming
that the big turnover of goods in rather narrow passages can lead to
failure, ecological accidents and disasters for the 15 million people
living on the coast of the Bosporus. However, in addition to the
justified fears of an ecological character, Ankara is trying to stimulate
oil companies and the Caspian states not to use tankers but the BTC
126
Insight Turkey: Special Issue Devoted to Turkey and Russia from Competition to
Convergence 4(2), April - June 2002.
127
Butler, David and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain. New York: St.
Martin’s Press,
1969.
128
Tsuladze, Avtandil, “Tri pravitel’stva – tri istochnika protivorichii” [Three
Governments – Three
Points of Contention] in Segodnya No.164 [cited 28 June 2000]; available from World
Wide
Web @ http://www.7days.ru/w3s.nsf/Archive/
2000_164_polit_text_culadze1.html
53
pipeline. The USA also hopes to increase as much as possible the
usage of the BTC, by toughening the restrictions on Bosporus passage
transfers.129
Washington seeks to weaken dependence of the central Asian and Caucasian republics on Moscow and simultaneously hinder
Russian domination of the international market of energy carriers. The
Trans – Thracian pipeline should ease the disagreements between
Russia and Turkey around the transportation of oil by Bosporus
passage. Delivery of Russian gas and oil to Turkey is creating a basis
for wider cooperation in the sphere of energy and power. During
Putin's visit to Ankara in December 2004, the Memorandum on
development of cooperation in the gas sphere between "Gazprom" and
Turkish company "Botash" was signed, according to which Russian
gas will be transferred to Syria and Israel. " Botash " will assist
Gazprom" in the creation of distributive networks and gasholders.
Putin has received Erdogan`s promise to reconsider the decision
concerning the Russian company "Tatneft ". (Turkish authorities have
cancelled the results of the tender for privatization of the local oilextracting company "Tuprash", which "Tatneft" won in January
2004).130
2.15. TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS DYNAMICS
After collapse of the USSR, Moscow continued perceiving
Turkey as NATO sentinel and a traditional rival in the area of the vital
Russian interests: the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Central Asia and the
Middle East. Kremlin considered Ankara as a leading sponsor of
Islamic and separatist movements in the Caucasus. Russian leadership
was afraid that Turkey, appealing to "pan -Turkism" and wide
common cultural grounds with the peoples of the Central Asia, is
trying to expand its influence upon them.131
Turkish government was irritated by Russian counteracts
against lining of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Both countries
accused each other in supporting separatists: the Chechen - in Russia,
the Kurdish - in Turkey. Revision by both states of previously
developed stereotypes begins at the end of the '90s. Ankara and
129
Cited in William Linn Westermann, "Kurdish Independence and Russian
Expansion", Foreign Affairs, v.70, Summer 1991, 50.
130
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=78; 18 July, 2007
131
Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section. The 90s: from "image of enemy" to "feeble
partner"; 12.05.2005
54
Moscow start to perceive each other not as a threat, but rather as a
weak and, consequently not very dangerous competitors, colliding
with the same external challenges and problems.132
"The Default" in Russia, its military failures in the war with
the Chechen resistance, its inability to defend interests of Serbia in the
Balkans, reduced the fear of "Russian Bear" in Ankara.
Correspondingly, political and economic crisis in Turkey at the
beginning of 2001 was perceived in Moscow as a sign of weakness
and instability. It lowers the level of concern about the possibility of
Turkish expansion in the Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both
countries aspire to benefit from mutual relations - both on political
and economic level. Simultaneously, the rising of the US influence in
the Caucasus leads to a rapprochement of the former adversaries.133
2.16. ECONOMIC FACTOR
Visit of the Russian Prime Minister Victor Tchernomyrdin to
Ankara in December 1997 (first visit in the rank of prime minister
after the collapse of the USSR) opens a new page in Russian-Turkish
relations. It was followed by a reciprocal visit of Bulent Ecevit to
Moscow in November 1999, during which the parties came out with
joint declaration on fighting terrorism. Prime Minister Mikchail
Kasyanov's visit to Turkey in October 2000 strengthened the ties that
were previously attained. The apogee of partnership was the arrival of
Vladimir Putin to Ankara in December 2004, and the visit ?¾f Recep
Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow on January 10, 2005.134
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and leading Russian
businessmen accompanied Putin during this visit. Erdogan was
accompanied by 600 Turkish businessmen in his visit to Moscow.
Economic cooperation became the foremost basis of rapprochement.
The volume of trade reached 10 billion dollars in 2004, and is growing
15-20 % annually. Russia became Turkey's second most important
trade partner after Germany. The "Blue stream" gas pipeline turned
Russia into main supplier of natural gas to Turkey. Projects of Russian
132
Bloom, Howard, and Douglas Price, “Voter Response to Short-run Economic
Conditions: The
Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession,” American Political Science Review,
69
(1975): 1240-1245.
133
Peterson, Paul, City Limits. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981.
134
Belonuchkin’s,
Grigoryi
“Politika”
website
at
http://www.cityline.ru/politica/vybory
55
and Kazakh oil delivery via Turkey to the West were developed,
reducing tension around Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline issue. Figures
of the Russian tourism to Turkey grow rapidly. Military cooperation is
also on the rise. From the end of the '90s Turkey started to receive the
Russian military equipment, including helicopters and armored troop
carriers.135
2.17. PAIN POINTS
Despite the intensive process of rapprochement there are still
several controversial issues. They include the Chechen and the
Kurdish separatism, the Nagorny Karabakh problem, the Cyprian
question, the Russian military bases in the Caucasus, the intervention
of Turkey in Georgia's and Azerbaijan's policies.136
Turkey strives to attain replacement of the Russian peacemaking contingent in Aphasia, as well as in the other "hot spots" in
the Caucasus, with the international forces. Moscow in its turn is
discontented with the deliveries of Turkish military equipment to
Georgia, as well as with the participation of Turkey in modernization
of the Air Force base near Tbilisi. At the same time parties aspire to
soften existing disagreements. Turkish leaders constantly repeat, that
"the Chechen question is Russia's interior problem". Russia has
limited the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) activity in the country,
but Ankara insists on the announcement of this group as a "terrorist
organization".137
2.18. EURASIAN IDEAS
Russia and Turkey today share much deeper understanding of
geopolitical issues. After the intrusion of the USA in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and the increase of the American military presence in the Eastern
and Southern Europe, both states demonstrate obvious anti-American
shift in their policy. Turkey aspires to enter the EU with its aversion to
"US Hegemony", while Russia tries to strengthen ties with France and
135
Stein, Robert, “Economic Voting for Governor and U.S. Senator: The Electoral
Consequences of
Federalism,” Journal of Politics 52 (1990): 29-53.
136
Jewell, Malcolm, and David Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American
States. Chicago:
Dorsey, 1988.
137
Slider, Darrell, “Russia’s Market-Distorting Federalism”, Post-Soviet Geography
and
Economics, 38 (1997): 445-460.
56
Germany – the principal conductors of the anti-American policy in
Europe. Russia is extremely concerned about the loss of influence in
Ukraine and Georgia, and Turkey is worried by the attempts to
restrain its presence in the Balkans. Both countries emphasize their
"Eurasian nature" (this phrase belongs to the ambassador of Russia in
Turkey Alexander Lebedev), are dissatisfied with their minor role in
the world, and look for the new allies in Asia, approaching Iran, China
and India. Relations between Ankara and Damascus improved to a
great extent after the Turkish Justice and Development Party came to
power.138
Kremlin also revives its "special relations" with the Syrian
regime in economic and military sphere. Both Turkey and Russia
refused to support the US military operation in Iraq in 2003. Growing
concurrence of interests between Turkey and Russia leads to the
signing, in 2001 in New York, of the "Eurasian cooperation
agreement".139
Ankara in a pointed manner stays out of the US and NATO
attempts to "entrench" on the Russian borders. In return Russia
supports Turkish position on Cyprus. Frank anti-American moods
dominate in the intellectual and political elite of both countries
("Edinaya Rossiya" - United Russia and Turkish Justice and
Development Party). Both countries gradually chill off the
cooperation with Israel – the main US ally in the Middle East, while
simultaneously building partnership with Israel's sworn enemy - Syria.
Both Ankara and Moscow indefatigably repeat that they "aspire only
to defend their national interests". In the ''real politic'' it is expressed
by the attempts to regain influence, which both countries possessed
throughout the blossoming era of the empires: the Russian - the Soviet
and the Ottoman.140
138
Samara Oblast Committee of State Statistics, Samarskaia Oblast-99: Satisticheskii
Sbornik
[Samara Oblast-99: Statistical Collection]. Samara: Samara Oblast Committee of
State
Statistics, 2000.
139
——. Political Control of the Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1978).
Turret, Stephen, “The Vulnerability of American Governors, 1900-1969,” Midwest
Journal of
Political Science, 15 (1971): 108-132.
140
Heath, Anthony and Bruno Paulson, “Issues and the Economy,” Political
Quarterly, 63 (1992):
432-447.
57
With regard of the aforesaid, there is a tendency between the
parties to coordinate the opposition to Washington and to create the
Eurasian alignment to ''counterbalance'' the American "Atlantism".
2.19. MILESTONESIN
RUSSIAN
TURKISH
MUTUAL RELATIONS DURING THE POSTSOVIET PERIOD
1992 – Süleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of Turkey
visited Moscow. Signing of the "Principles of bilateral relations
between the Turkish Republic and the Russian Federation". In June
the president of Russia Boris Yeltsin came to Istanbul to the summit
of leaders of "Organization on economic cooperation on the Black
Sea" states.141
1993 - Tansu Çiller, the Prime Minister of Turkey visited
Moscow. The agreement on creation of a Joint committee and
Working group in the sphere of telecommunications, energy, industry
and hi-tech was signed. 1995 - Tansu Çiller participated in May 9th
celebrations of the 50th anniversary of victory over the fascist
Germany. Çiller and the head of the Russian government Victor
Tchernomyrdin discussed the future of mutual relations.142
1996 - Süleyman Demirel, ex-Prime Minister of Turkey
participated in Moscow summit of leaders of "Organization on
economic cooperation on the Black Sea" states. Parliaments of two
countries signed the Protocol on cooperation and the Memorandum of
cooperation in fighting terrorism. Construction of Turkish Trade
center started in Moscow.143
1997 - Victor Tchernomyrdin came with an official visit to
Ankara in December. It was the first visit of the Russian Prime
Minister to Turkey after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The parties
141
Cheibub, Jose Antonio, and Adam Przeworski, “Accountability for Economic
Outcomes” in
Democracy, Accountability,a nd Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan
Stokes,
and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
142
Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, “Elections and
Representation.” In
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan
Stokes,
and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
143
Romanovsk, M.V. and O.V. Vryblevsk, Budjetnaia systema rossiskoi federatsii
[Budget System
of the Russian Federation]. Moscow: “Iurait”, 2000
58
agreed on a long-term program on cooperation in economic,
commercial and scientific sphere.
1999 – The Prime Ministers Bülent Ecevit and Vladimir Putin
signed in Moscow the Joint declaration on fighting terrorism and the
Report on creation of the Incorporated economic committee, which
lays a foundation for further economic cooperation.
2000 - the Prime Minister of Russia Michael Kasyanov visited
Turkey. The parties signed the agreement on creation of Joint
committee on cooperation in the field of military industry.
2001 - Igor Ivanov`s, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
visit to Turkey laid down a basis for the bilateral cultural cooperation.
Representatives of both countries signed in New York the "Eurasian
cooperation agreement".
2002 – General Anatoly Kvashnin, commander of the Joint
Staff of the Russian Federation, visited Ankara in January. The parties
signed the frame cooperation agreement in military sphere and the
Cooperation agreement in preparation of the military personnel.
General Hussein Kivrikoglu, Turkish Chief of Staff visited Russia in
June. The Joint bilateral Committee on military and technical
cooperation met in Ankara in September. The "Blue stream" gas
pipeline was activated.
2004 – Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdalla Gul came
to Moscow to discuss with his Russian counterpart the issue of the
Chechen and the Kurdish separatism, and the situation in Nagorny
Karabakh and in Cyprus. Official visit to Turkey of the Russian
President Vladimir Putin took place in December. The parties signed
several documents, including the Joint declaration of friendship and
multi-plane cooperation strengthening.
2005 - Official visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of
Turkey Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan took place in January. The visit was
dated for the opening of Turkish Trade center in Moscow.144
2.20. RUSSIA - TURKEY: THE NEW EURASIAN
ALLIANCE: THE QUEST FOR THE LOST
EMPIRES
The collapse of the Soviet Union has not changed traditional
mutual perceptions of the Russians and Turks. For Russians, Turkey
has remained, as before, the primordial contender on the Caucasus and
144
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71; 18 July, 2007
59
Black sea, the carrier of a hostile culture and alien values, the
instrument of American policy and NATO`s sentinel on the southern
flank of the weakened Russian empire.145
For Turks, Russia, as in the old days, has been associated with
threat - "the northern bear" - unpredictable, dangerous, and capricious.
These historical myths, boosted by mutual suspicions, have affected
politicians from both countries. Ankara accused Moscow of
supporting Kurdish separatists: Russian suspected Turkey of aiding
Chechens and spreading a Pan-Turk ideology in the post Soviet
region. The Kremlin feared that Ankara would try to pull Central Asia
and the Caucasus away from Russian influence. Turks were afraid of
Russian intrigues in the Balkans and Cyprus, having proof that
Moscow has warmed up its relations with Syria and Iran.146
At that time the positions of these two countries on any major
geopolitical question were contradictory. Turkey felt isolated and saw
the USA as a major source of support. Russia, which had begun the
next conflict in the Caucasus, also preferred amity rather than enmity
with the USA.
However, at the turn of the century, the mentality of the
political elite of both countries started to transform, affecting political
reality. On the one hand, both Moscow and Ankara saw American
policy as an obvious display of "hegemonism". On the other, they
started to perceive each other differently. The Kremlin saw US actions
through a prism of stereotypes developed in times of "the Cold war ",
and based its policy on the false assumption that Washington was
obsessed with the desire to put pressure on Russia.
Undoubtedly, the American political "penetration" at the end
of the last decade to all of Russia`s "near abroad" - from Central Asia
up to Georgia, increased greatly. However, the Kremlin wished not to
acknowledge the strategic purposes of the US actions, such as, for
example, the struggle against Islamic extremism. This Russian policy
entrapped the country in a world of imaginary chimeras of "an
American anti-Russian plot".147
After Saddam Hussein's overthrow, Turks started to accuse
145
Asim Oku, AIA Turkish and Caucasian sections, From Rivalry - to Finding the
Common Opponent ; 06.06.2005
146
—. “Pskov Under the LDPR: Elections and Dysfunctional Federalism in One
Region”,
Europe-Asia Studies 51:5 (1999): 755-767.
147
Reuters, 23 February, 1994.
60
Americans of encouraging the separatist actions of the Iraqi Kurds. A
fear, bordering on panic that, after the inevitable "GI`s" departure
from Iraq, a hostile Kurdish enclave would be created on the border
with Turkey, where local separatists could operate, eclipsed all other
concerns. Ankara started a feverish quest for allies to prevent such a
development. Former quarrels with neighbors - Iran and Syria receded (1). Turkey was ready to settle all former disputes with
Armenia and Greece, and also sought support from Russia, which had
its squabble with Washington.
2.21. ON THE WAVES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM
AND NOSTALGIA
From the beginning of the new millennium Russia and Turkey
started to see each other not as opponents but as partners, both
economic, and political (3). As mutual fears declined, animosity to
America increased. Nationalist Slavophile tendencies were more
distinctly traced to the ruling Russian establishment's policy, while the
Turkish ruling party of Justice and Development persistently
emphasized that the country belongs to the Muslim world.148
Turkey’s already unsteady relations with Israel, continue to
deteriorate (4), in order to become chairman of the Organization
Islamic Conference. Russia hopes to strengthen its own status in this
organization. An anti-American mood reigns in the political and
intellectual elites of both countries, and simultaneously in both
Moscow and Ankara nostalgia over lost influence is felt. Both
Russians and Turks do not want the West to consider them as minor,
"younger" partners, and they aspire to regain their influence over the
borders of former empires – the Ottoman and Russian (and later Soviet).149
Political leaders and nationalist intellectuals see Turkey and
Russia as carriers of the Eurasian historical tradition, compelled to
resist the Atlantic cultural and political intrusion into the area.
Thus two fundamental factors of Russian - Turkish relations
take shape: the common aspiration to reach "strategic depth" (the term
148
Fair, Raymond, “The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for the President”, The
Review of
Economics and Statistics, 60 (1978): 159-173.
149
Sezer, Duygu Bazoglu. (2000). "Turkish-Russian Relations: From Adversity to
'Virtual Rapprochement'." In Turkey's New World, ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri
Sayari. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
61
of Turkish professor Ahmet Davutoglu (5), meaning the actual return
to historical spheres of influence) and unity on the ground of "
Eurasian historical commonality".
2.22. THE ROADS LEAD TO BRUSSELS
Therefore, remaining a member of NATO and a formal ally of
the USA, Turkey has started secretly, but insistently, to counteract
American policy in all aspects : in relations with the EU, in the Middle
East (6), in Central Asia, Caucasus and Cyprus, and is acting in unison
with Moscow. Turkish relations with the EU constitute a good
example. Originally the Kremlin was concerned about Turkey's
joining the EU, and tried to convince Ankara to rely on cooperation
with Moscow, instead of Brussels.150
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs implied that if
Turkey became a member of the EU, cooperation with Russia would
become complicated. However, the approach of the Kremlin changed
later, and after Vladimir Putin`s visit in December, 2004 to Turkey, he
made an unexpected statement of an opposite view. Putin welcomed
the introduction of Turkey into the European community and even
called upon Brussels to speed up the process. It was an obvious
reassessment of values. Since the beginning of operations in Iraq,
Moscow concentrated on rapprochement with Europe to the
disadvantage of the USA.
If Turkey enters the EU, keeping and developing relations
with Russia, Putin's stand in Europe will strengthen. The ruling
Turkish party of Justice and Development has its own interests. The
greater influence Turkey will have in the international arena and the
stronger relations it will have with the leading countries of the region
(undoubtedly including Russia), the higher will be its prestige in
Europe. So, the interests of Russia and Turkey coincide.151
And thus it becomes obvious that the positioning of these
Eurasian powers in the EU is unfortunate for the USA and its main
regional ally Israel. The anti-Americanism and the current political
150
Powers, Denise and James Cox, “Echoes of the Past: The Relationship between
Satisfaction with
Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland ”, American Political Science
Review, 91
(1997): 617-633.
151
Serova, Evgenya. “Federal Agro-Food Policy in the Conditions of the Financial
and Economic
Crisis,”Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives, November 1998.
62
position on the Middle-Eastern conflict and Iraq unite three centers of
force: Moscow, Brussels and Ankara.
Rapprochement with Moscow has already yielded fruit for
Turkey in the extremely important question of the Cyprian problem.
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have supported the plan of the secretary
general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, on Cyprus. However, the
project has encountered resistance by the residents of the Greek part of
the island and Athens.
In his turn, Putin, while visiting Ankara, supported Annan's
plan, declaring to Erdogan’s pleasure, that "it is absolutely senseless
and ridiculous to continue the isolation of the Turkish part of Cyprus".
Brussels prepared a compromise, a variant of Annan`s plan,
but the support of the Kremlin strengthened the position of Ankara
considerably. Obviously, Russia`s vote will be decisive in solving the
Cyprian problem.
Besides, the republic of Cyprus, as a member of the EU, can
fulfill its plan of vetoing Turkey`s acceptance into the Community.
Moscow, having special relations with Greece, is quite capable of
preventing this.
Turkey appears to be depending on Moscow on a whole
spectrum of vital problems – from the future of Iraqi-Kurdistan
relations with the EU and the Cyprian question. In addition to this
political dependence, there is an economic one - dependence on
Russian gas. Taking into account growing anti-American moods in the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Putin's environment, it is easy
to assume that by approaching Moscow, Turkey will be
simultaneously distancing from Washington.152
1 - Characteristics of the Russian-Turkish relations in the
sphere of economy and energy in the post-Soviet era.
2 - The Union of Four
3 - Characteristics of the Russian-Turkish relations in the
post-Soviet era
4 - The Union of Four
5 - In 2000 Erdogan`s adviser on foreign policy prof.
Davutogly published a book "Strategic depth". He stressed the
152
World Bank, Russian Federation Data Profile, online version at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=RUS&CCOD
E=RUS
&CNAME=Russian+Federation&PTYPE=CP Last accessed on November 21, 2001.
63
importance of control over all the ex-Ottoman territories as Ankara
and Turkey`s influence must play a "special role" in their future.
6 - The Union of Four153
2.23. THE GEOPOLITICAL ZIGZAG: RUSSIA AND
TURKEY ACTING IN CENTRAL ASIA AND IN
THE CAUCASUS
Having begun with a spontaneous rivalry for the Caucasus and
Central Asia, Moscow and Ankara came slowly to the coordination of
their actions in these regions.154
- Probing through fighting: Nagorny Karabakh and Georgia
- The Chechen crisis: politics versus emotions
- The union of the new era: against fundamentalists and... the
USA
The rise of the independent Turkic-speaking states in Central
Asia and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) after the disintegration of the
USSR opened hitherto unprecedented opportunities for Ankara. But
also it demanded a cardinal reassessment of traditional conceptions.
During the last decade of the existence of the USSR Turkey
avoided interfering in the internal affairs of Turkic-speaking Soviet
republics, desiring not to worsen relations with Moscow. After the
collapse of the Communist bloc, the economic and political interests
of Ankara demanded total revision of the existing doctrine. It was
obvious that the newly arisen states of Central Asia and the Caucasus
would become the object of manipulations of all the regional powers Russia, Iran, Pakistan, China, - and Turkey did not wish to stand aside
in the "Big game".
2.24. THE FIRST TRIAL OF STRENGTH
Events in the post-Soviet area were developing so rapidly, that
Turkey had to adapt and develop its new concept while running.
Broadly speaking, Turkish relations with Russia from the moment of
the USSR`s collapse can be divided into three stages.
The first stage was marked by a spontaneous succession of
events and contradictions in both countries` policies. Turkey did not
hasten to abandon its previous tactics. Russia, headed in the beginning
of the 90s by adherents of pro-Western policy such as the head of the
153
154
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=149 ; 18 July, 2007
Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section; 09.06.2005
64
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev and deputy
Prime- Minister Arkady Gaidar, also did not want to exacerbate
relations with their southern neighbor in particular, and NATO as a
whole.
Therefore, Moscow rather languidly reacted to the increasing
Turkish penetration into Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus.
However, both regional powers could not remain inactive and stand
aside during the sharp, bloody conflict between their traditional (in the
religious and ethnic sense) allies in the Caucasus.155
Throughout the Nagorny Karabakh conflict Russia supported
Christian Armenia - a member of the CIS. Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan
was not a part of the CIS, thus, it was left on it’s own and suffered
constant defeats. Ankara could not stand aside. Political interests plus
Pan-Turk ideology and nationalism that overflowed Turkey at that
time, forced the Turkish government to rush to help president
Elchibey, setting itself against the Kremlin. The situation escalated;
obvious threats were sounded in the heat of the fighting between
Armenians and Azerbaijanians, such as, for example, the expression
of the commander of the CIS united armies Russian Marshal
Shaposhnikov`s warning that "Turkish intervention can provoke
World War III".
The intensity of mutual relations around Nagorny Karabakh
was heated up by the events in Georgia. Turkey hastened from the
very beginning to establish friendly relations with Georgia, which, as
well as Azerbaijan, refused to enter the CIS. It was obvious that good
relations with Tbilisi were of huge value for Turkey. First of all, the
leading country in the Southern Caucasus, Georgia, would become a
buffer, separating the Turks from weakened, but still hostile and
potent Russia. Secondly, in the beginning of the 90s a project, the oil
pipeline Baku – Ceyhan, emerged, and it was necessary for Turks, that
it should pass through the territory of a friendly state. Armenia
obviously was not suitable for this role; accordingly, all hopes were
pinned on Georgia.156
Moscow reacted to the rapprochement of Ankara and Tbilisi
with extreme aggression, and unleashed several bloody ethnic
conflicts in the territory of Christian and traditionally friendly
Georgia.
155
"Kislovodsk: Yeltsin Speech, Reactions Cited", FBIS-SOV-96-108, 4 June 1996.
Chubb, John, “Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections,”
American
156
65
First the Kremlin provoked a separatist movement in Ossetia,
then in Abkhasia, which finally separated from Georgia.157
Thus Russia and Turkey, without any special wish, were
drawn into the conflict, which at this stage ended with the defeat of
the Turks. Azerbaijan had lost the war, Elchibey `s government was
overthrown, Russian obedient Aliev came to power, and the republic
entered the CIS.
Georgian events developed along a similar scenario. The
country appeared to be extremely weakened, and was compelled to
enter the CIS. Russia put its four military bases there.
In Central Asia, Russia also successfully played on local
ethnic contradictions (the conflict between Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and
Tadjiks in Fergana Valley is a good example).
This succession of events was not unpredictable. Russia
possessed incomparably more knowledge of local realities in the
Caucasus and in Central Asia and had more powerful levers of
influence, rather than Turkey. Also Russia had its own protégés in the
area – representatives of the former Soviet elite.
The first stage of spontaneous antagonism ended with a
victory for Moscow. The new stage of confrontation, a conceptual
one, came next.158
2.25. THE CHECHEN CARD AND THE KURDISH
TRUMP
Up to the middle of the 90s Turkey and Russia finished
reinterpreting the post-Cold War situation, and had formed a new
priority for the direction of foreign policy.
The "pro-Westerners" in Russia were dislodged by the
supporters of the "Eurasian course" who considered that Moscow
should strengthen as much as possible its influence on the "near
abroad" (in southern areas) – and first of all – on the countries of
Central Asia and the Caucasus - even if it would irritate the West.
Turkey, in its turn, started to feel the growing pressure of Moscow and
feeling isolated in the region, turned to search for support to the USA
157
Maslow, A., Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper, 1954.
Solnick, Steven, “Gubernatorial Elections in Russia, 1996-1997,” Post-Soviet
Affairs, 14 (1998):
48-80.
158
66
and its ally - Israel (1).159
Disagreements between the parties grew stronger, separatism
of Chechens and military actions in this republic, which started in
1994, aggravated the situation even more. Formally, Ankara kept its
neutrality and called the Chechen problem "internal Russian
business". However, the Muslim population of Turkey did not hide its
sympathy for the Chechens.160
A nationally focused elite demanded that the government
support their co-religionists in the Caucasus and in Central Asia (2).
Chechens and Daghestanians residing in Turkey appealed for support
for their fellow tribesmen, and rendered aid through various sorts of
welfare funds and nongovernmental organizations (3). Moscow had
accused Ankara of secretly aiding Dzhokhar Dudaev (4)The Russian
representatives asserted that $20 million dollars and various weapons
came to the Chechens from Turkey via various channels.
Russians started to support the Kurdish Working Party (PKK)
in a pointed manner, and organized a conference in 1994 on "The
History of Kurdistan". The tension between two states reached an
apogee when a group of Chechen insurgents - citizens of Turkey –
captured a Russian tourist ship in January of 1996.161
Although in 1995 Turks and Russians signed the Protocol to
Prevent Terrorism, attitudes between them remained extremely tense.
Turkey amplified its involvement in Georgia and the Central Asian
states. Ankara rendered large loans to them (750 million dollars - to
Azerbaijan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia and
Tajikistan), trained their experts, sent its advisers and experts, and
invested billions of dollars. Moreover, Turkey even started to "flirt"
with the Muslim community in Russia.162
In May 1998 Turkish State Minister Ahat Andican arrived on
an official visit in Tatarstan and signed a contract on economic
159
Tiebout, C., “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Journal of Political
Economy, 65 (1956):
416-24.
160
“Russia: Turkey Questions 'Official Support' for PKK," FBIS-SOV, 22 May,
1996 and Cumhurriyet, 21 May, 1996.
161
Treisman, Daniel, “Russia’ Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Trans
itional Economy”,
Economics and Politics, (1999).
162
DeMaris, Alfred, Logit Modeling: Practical Applications, Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications
1992.
67
cooperation with the Russian republic. Ankara invited representatives
of Tatarstan, Dagestan and Bashkiria to a conference on the Cyprus
question in Istanbul, putting Moscow in a rather ticklish position.163
Political confrontation was supplemented by an economic
collision. Moscow endeavored to have oil and gas from Kazakhstan,
Azerbaijan and Turkmenia go through Russian territory. Turkey,
being supported by the USA, directed streams of energy carriers
around the Russian territory, for example, via the pipeline Baku –
Tbilisi- Ceyhan.
2.26. UNITED AGAINST THE OLD ENEMY
The turning point in the struggle for influence in Central Asia
and the Caucasus came at the beginning of the new century. The clear
Eurasian policy of both states, the far-fetched threat of American
intervention and common economic interests (5) pulled Moscow and
Ankara together, leveling regional contradictions between them. Turks
and Russians relied on cooperation with each other and ousting the
USA from the region. Putin's and Erdogan`s policy makers came to
the conclusion that both countries could not cardinally change the
regional balance of forces, but together were able to resist American
involvement.164
Vexing questions remained, but they were not causing as
much concern as before and were viewed in the common context of
geopolitical partnership. Ankara was still dissatisfied with the Russian
military presence at Georgia and Armenia, and Moscow felt
uncomfortable with Georgian-Turkish and Azeri-Turkish military
cooperation (6) However, disagreements are now hidden so as not to
threaten quickly growing cooperation. Russia, as before, is not ready
to put pressure upon Armenia, but the Turks are and weighingthe
question of lifting of a blockade from this country as a gesture of good
will, and as a returning favor for support of Turks - Cypriotes by
Moscow. Turkey tries as much as possible to distance itself from the
Chechen problem. Russia, in its turn, is distancing itself from support
of Kurdish separatists. A balance of power is being established in
Central Asia. Ankara continues to develop its economic and cultural
ties there, though Turks are not too pleased with the results. In turn,
Moscow is coming to the conclusion that taking into account the
163
Olson, 112.
Popova, Ol’ga, “Tarkhov nachinaet i proigrivaet”, Samarskoe Obozrenie, 14 (2
Oct. 2000).
164
68
danger of the spread of Islamic radicalism, cooperation with Turkey in
this region is more expedient than struggle.165
Putin supports the Turkish desire to enter the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (which includes six countries - Russia,
China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia and Tajikistan), Erdogan
supports Russia's aspiration to constrain the onslaught of Islamic
radicals.
From the beginning of the new century the countries have
entered a third stage of mutual relations in Central Asia and the
Caucasus region. Remaining competitors for spheres of influence,
they have become partners and coordinate their actions, aspiring to
limit the influence of the West.
(1)- Russia and Turkey in the Middle East: "The Union of
Four"
(2) -A well-known Turkish political scientist, an expert on the
international problems, Hussein Bagchi wrote: "Turkey cannot and
should not remain indifferent concerning the Russian policy on
Caucasus and in Central Asia. Russia cannot be considered here as a
unique predominant power anymore".
(3) - About 25 thousand Chechens live in Turkey and about
50 charitable pro-Chechen organizations operate there.
(4) - The visit of Dudaev to Turkey in 1995 and his meeting
with the Turkish high ranking military command became grounds for
the accusation
(5)- Russia - Turkey: The New Eurasian Alliance: the Quest
for the Lost Empires
(6) - Turkey, Georgia and Armenia signed in January 2002 in
Ankara the tripartite agreement on regional security, which displeased
Moscow. The Kremlin was also dissatisfied with the modernization of
the Air Force base in Marnaul near Tbilisi by Turks and Turkish
participation in the creation of the Military Academy in Tbilisi.
According to the director of the Caucasian project in the Center of
Strategic and International Researche, Zeino Baran, "in the past
Georgia asked Russia for help in the struggle against the Ottoman
empire, today Georgia receives military, economic and political aid
from Turkey".166
165
"Russia: Turkish Assembly Speaker on Talks with Chernomyrdyn", FBIS-SOV,
18 July, 1996.
166
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=156; 18 July, 2007
69
2.29. PUTIN - ERDOGAN: RAPPROCHEMENT
CONTINUES (SOCHI SUMMIT REVIEW)
On July, 17-18 the fourth meeting of Vladimir Putin and
Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the last seven months took place. It
passed in the residence of the Russian President in the Black Sea
resort-city of Sochi and had a friendly, informal character.
Negotiations of the two leaders lasted much longer than it was
scheduled – four and a half hours. At a certain stage of the meeting,
representatives of the Russian and Turkish business circles were
allowed to participate in it, in particular, one of "Alpha - group" heads,
Pyotr Aven.167
During the conversation Putin and Erdogan confirmed the
arrangements achieved during the visit of the Russian president to
Ankara in December, 2004. Besides, they have planned ways of
widening further interaction in such areas as economy, power, military
cooperation and regional policy.168
Continuation of the article (the issues of the summit
negotiations):
- Economy
- Energy and Power Sphere
- Military Cooperation
- Secret Services
- Regional Issues169
2.30. ERDOGAN TO PUTIN: TIME TO KEEP YOUR
WORD
The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit
Sochi, known as Russia’s holiday resort, as guest of the Russian
President Vladimir Putin. It is reported that during the visit, the
Cyprus issue will be discussed. Putin, who met Erdogan last January
in Moscow, then stated that Russia is ready to give its support to the
project of abolishing the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot part, and also
167
Asim Oku, AIA Turkish and Caucasian sections; 22.07.2005
Paldman, Martin, “How Robust is the Vote Function?: A Study of Seventeen
Nations over Four
Decades” in Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support. Edited by Helmit
Northrop,
Michael Lewis-Beck and Jean Dominique Lafay. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press,
1991.
169
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=268 ; 18 July, 2007
168
70
to the Annan Plan on the United Nations platform. According to some
sources, Erdogan will remind Putin during his visit to Sochi this
weekend of the fact that the Russian gesture has not been materialised
yet, the Turkish Zaman newspaper reports. In fact, because of
Russia’s veto threat, the United Nations report is suspended in the
Security Council.170
The Turkish Prime Minister, who will meet Putin in Sochi as
a response to the special invitation of the Russian President, is also
expected to discuss international political evolution and other regional
issues. The Turkish diplomacy uttered its wish to see Russia in a
“promising attitude” about Cyprus issue, after the European Union
and the United States of America. Ankara’s initiatives have just begun
to receive some positive reactions from the United States of America
and the European Union even though these do not match to the
expected level.171
After the referendum in Cyprus in April 2004, the report
prepared by the United Nations General Secretary, Kofi Annan is
suspended because of the veto threat of Russia. During the visit of the
Turkish Prime Minister to Moscow in January of this year, Putin had
called Kofi Annan on the phone as a surprise and afterwards he stated
to Erdogan: “We support the plan, which carries Mr. Annan’s name.
In this plan, there is also foreseen the improvement of economical
relations with the Turkish Cypriot part and the abolishment of the
isolation upon this part of the island”. Furthermore, the statement of
Putin during the then press conference on the 11th of January was of a
special interest: “In the Security Council, we had voted before the
referendum in Cyprus. We acted that way in order to prevent any
external influence during the referendum. We had discussed with the
United Nations General Secretary. I stated that I support his efforts to
resolve the Cyprus conflict. We will support any solution, which will
bring the Annan Plan to life. We think that the economical isolation of
the Turkish Cypriot part is not fair. We will support Mr. Annan’s plan
in an active way”.
The statement of Putin had been interpreted by Ankara as a
“gesture”. Now, Ankara demands the concrete fulfilment of this
gesture, which has not been carried out since. The admission of the
170
AIA Turkish section; 14.07.2005
Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian
Foreign Policies Since the Gulf War", Middle East Policy, vol. IV, No.3, March
1996, 111.
171
71
Annan Plan in the Security Council will be a “historical diplomatic
triumph” for Turkey, for in this way the uncompromising attitude of
the Greek Cypriot part will be confirmed.172
During the meeting between Erdogan and Putin, it is expected
that the evolution in Caucasus will be discussed. Erdogan will inform
Putin of Turkey’s firm attitude against the Armenian genocide claims
once again. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the political evolution
in the Middle East and the improvement of economical relations
between Turkey and Russia will be also on the agenda of the
meeting.173
2.31. TURKEY FALLS BEHIND IN TRADE WITH
RUSSIA
Turkish-Russian trade closed up by the end of 2004 with 7
billion dollars, and by the end of four months of 2005 with 3 billion
dollars loss for Turkey, Zaman newspaper informs. Although the
Russian President, Vladimir Putin, during his visit to Turkey in
December 2004 declared of increasing of the Russian purchases from
Turkey to turn the tide in favour of the latter, so far it was ineffective.
According to the decision reached between the official committees of
the two countries during Putin`s visit, Turkey would have paid for $1
billion worth Russian natural gas with its goods. As a matter of fact,
that decision is reviving the article from the Turkish-Soviet natural gas
agreement signed in 1984, which was not applied since 1994.
According to specialists, commercial relations between the two
countries should base on mutual interests and balance. According to
the Turkish Institute of Statistics and to the Undersecretary of Foreign
Trade, in 2004, Turkey's exports to Russia reached $1.8 billion,
though its import from Russia peaked $9 billion.174
By the end of the same year, bilateral trade closed up with
Turkey lagging behind Russia by $7.1 billion. As for the first four
months of this year, Turkey`s trade balance is minus $3 billion. In
comparison with $675 million Turkish export to Russia, Russia
exported $3.7 billion worth of goods to Turkey. According to
specialists, Russia has to balance bilateral trade, which turned
unprofitable to its partner. To that purpose, Russian officials should
172
Elizabeth Fuller, "Turkish-Russian Relations, 1992-1994," RFE/RL Research
Report, vol.3, no.18, 6 May, 1994, 9.
173
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=237; 18 July, 2007
174
Turkish Daily News, 22 July, 1995, A3.
72
follow the statement of Putin during his visit to Turkey as well as start
using the above-mentioned article of the Agreement from 1984. It is
even proposed to let Turkey to pay for all its purchases of oil and
natural gas from Russia with goods. Russia is the third biggest oil
importer for Turkey, and the first one in supplying of natural gas.175
The faculty member from Thracian University, Dr. Sadi
Uzunoglu stated: "As far foreign trade, countries can use protective
measures every now and then, for instance in agriculture. But in
bilateral trade, balance is of a great importance. For that reason,
Turkey has to look over its commercial relations with Russia. Turkey
has to set in motion its political and commercial weight. For instance,
quota measure is applied against China. If necessary, a similar
measure could be applied to some Russian goods with similar
justifications".
Moreover, the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan
is intended to call the Russian President personally to resolve the
"Mediterranean fly crisis" between the two countries. As it is known,
Russia had stopped its fresh vegetable and fruit importation from
Turkey on the 31st of May claiming that goods suffered from
Mediterranean fly larva, package deformities and quality corruptions.
According to the Turkish newspaper, Radikal, Erdogan called Putin
yesterday, but could not talk with him, for he had a meeting with the
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair who is in Russia on an official
visit. Spokesman of the Turkish government, Cemil Cicek, stated that
the phone contact with Putin is to be made as soon as possible.176
2.32. ENERGY SIGNALS IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS: AFTER BSEC SUMMIT
The summit was marked by discussions over intense energy
competition in the region, which attracted more debate than the pros
and cons of the summit. Even Russian President Vladimir Putin
attributed special attention to the energy issue during his speech at the
summit and suggested launching the Black Sea Energy Ring
Project.177
Throughout the 1990s there was intense energy competition
175
AIA Turkish section; 14.06.2005
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=164; 18 July, 2007
177
SİNAN OGAN, President of the Center of International Relations and Strategic
Analysis for Turkey (TÜRKSAM); The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
held its 15th annual summit in İstanbul.
176
73
between Turkey and Russia. It was in 2001 in New York when
Turkish and Russian foreign affairs ministers signed the Eurasian
Cooperation Agreement and competition ended. The agreement
expanded the scope of cooperation between the two countries. In the
period following the agreements there was cooperation in the energy
sector between Turkey and Russia. However developments in recent
months suggest that Turkey and Russia once again have conflicting
energy interests.178
The Turkish Energy Ministry, which lacks a comprehensive
energy policy, does not fully understand what Russia would like to do
in the energy sector. Certainly Russia’s inability to properly analyze
events has a role in the problem. It’s important to analyze and
understand Putin, who has written a thesis on Russia’s energy policy.
Russia had been offering different cooperation opportunities and
energy projects to Turkey for quite some time. The first project Russia
offered to Turkey was a role in the construction of the Nabucco
pipeline, but Turkey did not provide a sufficient answer. There was a
serious problem in this project that stemmed from a lack of support
from the US and EU, which had made Turkish opposition a real
psychological problem for itself. The project was about cooperation,
but they did not provide any economic or political support to this
project, which was significantly important for the EU in regards to its
energy security. Moscow implemented every strategy to block the
project and it was delayed yet again.179
Russia’s second offer to Turkey was to cooperate in the
expansion of the Blue Stream project to transfer Russian gas to
southern Europe and Israel. But the Turkish Energy Ministry once
again did not provide a complete answer. The ministry conducted
analyses and determined the offer would decrease Turkey’s
competition power. It was known that the offer was an alternative to
the Nabucco pipeline. But what Turkey miscalculated was that Russia
was determined and would find itself another partner.180
In another project Russia expected support for Turkey in
178
An Overlooked Problem in Turkish-Russian Relations: The 1878 War Indemnity
"The question of which idea could unite and inspire Russians today is included in
the program of sociological studies conducted by the Russian Independent Institution
of Social and Ethnic Problems, and based on Russia-wide and regional surveys".
FBIS-SOV-96-126-S, 28 June, 1996, 48-9
180
Glinskaya and S.N. Smirnov. Moscow: State University Higher School of
Economics, 2000.
Goskomstat Rossii, Regionii Rossii: 2000, (Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000).
179
74
construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan project. During the Turkish
Armed Forces (TSK) Attack/Tactical Reconnaissance Helicopter
(ATAK) acquisition project, President Putin personally followed the
tender for the 145 helicopters. But as a result of the developments that
occurred in the aftermath of Russia’s elimination from the tender,
which closed a few months ago, Turkish-Russian relations were
pushed into competition in the energy sector.
We must never forget that Russia uses energy as a tool in its
foreign policy, employs successful energy diplomacy and that every
step it takes is part of a preplanned giant project.
As a result of cooperation problems with Turkey, Russia
bypassed Turkey with its trans-Baltic Nord Stream. It also cut out
Ukraine and Poland with the Blue Stream. Now the South Stream
project, which will take Russian gas by pipeline under the Black Sea
into Bulgaria, will bypass Turkey once again.181
The South Stream Project that Putin announced during the
Balkans Energy Conference was part of an effort to free Russia from
dependence on neighbors to transfer its natural gas. Russia did not put
all its eggs in the same basket and first bypassed İstanbul’s Bosporus
only then bypassing Turkey altogether via Bulgaria and Greece. Given
that Russia has signed natural gas agreements with Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan and announced that it will build the South Stream Project,
Turkey is no longer the main natural gas supplier to the West.
These developments prompted the energy-deprived
government to take action. Energy Minister Hilmi Güler all but chased
after Putin, who was in Central Asia, but returned empty handed. Then
Turkey asked Putin for a role in the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil
pipeline and the South Stream natural gas pipeline. Lastly Turkey
requested support during the BSEC summit for the Samsun-Ceyhan
pipeline and noted that they were ready to cooperate in the
construction of the second Blue Stream. But it’s clear that without a
strategy, diplomacy in energy does not work on a project basis.182
While there are critical developments taking place in the
energy sector all around the world, Turkey’s agenda is occupied by
artificial crises and the elections. In response to these developments
neither the prime minister, the foreign affairs minister nor the
181
Ogburn, William, and Inez Goltra, “How Women Vote: A Study of an Election in
Portland
Oregon”, Political Science Quarterly, 34 (1919): 413-433.
182
Turkish Daily News, 27 March, 1996.
75
president have taken any steps. The energy minister’s visit to Central
Asia, which was only to satisfy spectators, resulted in utter failure. In
the elections there is a 50-50 chance you will win or lose and you
always have the opportunity to try again. But in foreign policy there is
no reconciliation or compensation for mistakes or lost opportunities.183
2.33. THE WEAKEST LINK OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RELATIONS
I attended an important meeting in Moscow at the Prezident
Hotel last week. The 2006 Awards of Merit were handed out at the
ceremony sponsored by the Association for Business and Friendship
between the Russian Federation and Turkey (RUTID).
The jury picked important figures and institutions that made
significant contributions to the reinforcement of Turkish-Russian
friendship in the fields of economy, art, sports and media. Both Zaman
and Russia’s prominent daily Izvestia were given awards in the media
category. Turkish and Russian intellectuals and businessmen gave
short speeches on furthering bilateral relations and friendship. I had
the opportunity to gather together with a number of Russian
colleagues. My overall impression of my contacts there is that two
historically hostile countries that fought numerous wars in the past are
now maintaining friendly relations for the first time in their histories.
This is a unique development. Of course there are many factors that
contributed to the improvement of bilateral relations. For instance the
collapsed blocs after the end of Cold War created an appropriate
environment for rapprochement. Peoples who opted to remain distant
until the collapse because of ideological differences today develop
sympathy. In summer times, Antalya, a city in the southwest of
Turkey, becomes a Russian town where the Russian tourists find
inexpensive and high-quality resorts as well as warmth and attention.
Russians shift their interest from Antalya to Erzurum in the winter.
More importantly, today there is no longer any reason for the enmity
between the two countries, expected to last forever, to continue.184
The visible improvement in commercial activities is another
solid indication as regards the betterment of bilateral relations
183
EKREM
DUMANLI,
[email protected],
Op-Ed;
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=115272 ; 18 July,
2007, First Published in WEB Site in 29.06.2007
184
"Turkish Influence in CIS Countries on Rise", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dec. 27,
1995 in FBIS-Central Eurasia-Daily Report, March 1, 1996, 8-9.
76
between the two countries. A significant portion of the huge buildings
in Moscow were constructed by Turkish contractors. Turkish giants
such as ENKA, Rönesans, Nurol, Alarko and Gama maintain a line of
quality beyond their European competitors. Strong ties were also
established with Russia in sectors like tourism, textile and retail.
Both parties are pleased with the rapprochement. They have
every reason to be pleased given that bilateral relations have caused
nothing but constant enmity up until recently. It was peoples of both
countries who had to suffer from the deteriorated relations; they
remained concerned about a probable state of warfare all the time.
Today the situation is very different. Of course Turkish Prime
Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin have
done much to improve bilateral relations. The leaders created a
miracle. Ten years ago it was impossible to imagine that Turkish and
Russian leaders would come together for cooperation. However, today
both leaders exert their utmost effort to improve commercial and
cultural relations. Furthermore the strengthened ties do not bother
other major world political players, including the US and the EU.
There is no doubt that this is a huge diplomatic success. The Turkish
public’s good feelings for Putin and the Russian public’s sympathy
toward Tayyip Erdoğan is just like a dream.185
The positive bilateral relations notwithstanding, Turkish and
Russian intellectuals or businessmen ask this question in large
gatherings: is there any chance that something would break this
historically important and solid friendship? In other words, will this
friendship be replaced by the old concerns? The commonly held view
is “no.” There is no going back in Turkish-Russian relations. Above
all remarkable bridges were built between the two countries;
authorities from both countries who overcame huge obstacles in the
fields of education, economics and culture made enormous progress
by which their peoples were pleased. For this reason state figures
would by no means take any steps that could be regarded as retreat
from the current situation since such a move would be disruptive to
historical friendship.186
This is the general view. However everybody sees the weakest
link of Turkish-Russian friendship. This link is more visible in
185
"Yeltsin Not Satisfied with the Handling of Avrasya", FBIS-SOV, 22 January,
1996.
186
Logan, Mikal Ben Gera, “Short-term Economic Changes and Individual Voting
Behavior.”Manuscript, Yale University, 1977.
77
Turkey. Groups and individuals who were hostile to the opposite
camp during the Cold War era are uneasy with the current situation.
They do not openly acknowledge their dissatisfaction; however they
try to sabotage the friendship between the two countries. Those who
can understand Turkey best are able to see the saddest part: A small
and marginal group tries to present itself as friend of Russia but
actually has a hidden agenda to sabotage the Turkish-Russian
friendship. They engage in disruptive activities relying on state
apparatus and hiding their former identities as intelligence agents.187
The presence of this seemingly friendly group is the weakest
link of Turkish-Russian relations. Hopefully this risk does not exist in
Russia. But even if it does, the best thing to do at this stage is to keep
the bridges between the two countries alive and intact. This is the wish
commonly expressed by the peoples of both countries; besides, the
interests of Russia and Turkey require the continuation of good
relations. The progress made so far is a success story for both
countries; a story that should not be sacrificed to the concerns of the
Cold War era.188
2.34. TURKEY AND RUSSIA: FROM COMPETITION
TO CONVERGENCE
Russia's ambassador to Turkey looks at the turbulent past of
Russian-Turkish relations and concludes that these have come a long
way in recent years. The upcoming visit of Russian President Putin to
Turkey in November is likely to be a landmark in the development of
a more positive friendship.189
The Turkish ambassador to the Russian Federation presents an
overview of relations between Moscow and Ankara. These have
gained momentum since the end of the Cold War, often through
economic contacts. The ambassador suggests that in future we may
even see a strategic partnership emerging between the two
neighbours.190
187
Tidmarch, Charles, Lisa Hyman, and Jill Sorkin, “Press Issue Agenda in th 1982
Congressional
and Gubernatorial Election Campaign”, Journal of Politics, 46 (1984): 1226-45.
188
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=113726; 18 July,
2007 , http://www.deik.org.tr/councils_eng.asp?councilId=61 ; 18 July, 2007, First
published in Website in 12.06.2007.
189
Russia and Turkey in the 21st century: what is behind us and what is ahead? by
Alexander Lebedev; April-June 2002; Volume 4, Number 2.
190
Turkish-Russian relations: from bilateral co-operation to multidimensional
78
Turkey's former head of state discusses the Caucasus Stability
Pact, Turkey's view of Abkhazia and Chechnya, the Blue Stream
pipeline project and Ankara's role in regional organisations.191
Over the last few years, Russia and Turkey have come much
closer together - overcoming the 'schizophrenia' of the past, when
economic realities argued for closer ties, while geopolitical realities
pushed the two further apart. Much of this is due to the realisation in
both capitals that there was a major gap between their ambitions and
their abilities.192
Turks do not have the luxury to not understand Russia, with
whom it has much more in common than it is actually aware
Kiniklioglu argues. The misperceptions on either side are not only
capable of spoiling the relationship, but at times, they have the
potential to become the source of serious security risks.193
Historically, Turkey and Russia have been adversaries for
centuries. Russian military chiefs have also long considered their
southern neighbour a respected and important foe. ince the collapse of
the Soviet Union, this has begun to change. Military relations are now
more co-operative, though still betray an underlying lack of trust.194
The Caucasus is an area of vital concern to Russia, and thus,
Kanbolat argues, the Kremlin's military doctrines of the 1990s made
intervention in Chechnya inevitable. After the second Chechen war,
while Moscow may have restored its control in the North Caucasus,
the South may have been permanently 'lost'.195
Despite much rhetoric, Reynolds argues, the recent conflict in
Chechnya has had very little impact on Turkish-Russian relations.
This was not the case during the first Chechen war, but developments
since have pushed Ankara and Moscow closer together, while
marginalising pro-Chechen forces in Turkey.196
Ulchenko looks at the troubled state of both the Russian and
partnership, by Nabi Sensoy.
191
Where to now with Turkish-Russian relations?, an interview with former President
Süleyman Demirel.
192
Really burying the hatchet: Russia and Turkey find themselves on the same side by
Dmitri Trenin.
193
Turkish-Russian relations: the role of mutual perceptions, by Suat Kiniklioglu.
194
Russian-Turkish military relations: much mutual respect, but many mutual
misgivings, by Pavel Felgenhauer.
195
The Caucasus policy of the Russian Federation and the war in Chechnya, by Hasan
Kanbolat.
196
Russian-Turkish relations and Chechnya, by Michael Reynolds.
79
Turkish economies, both of which have been hit by major crises over
the last decade. Analysing the causes of these, she draws some
worrying conclusions about the likelihood of further troubles being
ahead.197
In the years since the crisis, Russia has moved rapidly towards
a more efficient market economy. This process holds many lessons for
economies such as Turkey's. In particular, Russia's experience shows
the necessity of rapidly implementing structural reforms.198
Economic and political processes in Eurasia have been
developing within the context of a disintegrating previous Soviet-era
structure on the one hand, and globalisation on the other. Urazova
argues that the implementation of the recently agreed Action Plan will
commit both countries to joint exploitation of the possibilities these
processes provide.199
The 11 September attacks changed not only military relations
in Eurasia, but economic ones as well. In particular, they have raised
the prospect of something not long ago unthinkable - Russian cooperation over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.200
Relations between Turkey and Russia cannot be separated
from the two countries' relations with the West, Kazgan argues.
Following the end of the Cold War, trade boomed, yet with financial
crises and unsuccessful economic policies, Turkey's share of the
Russian market has shrunk, while Russia's share of the Turkish market
has remained stable.201
Russia has often been suspicious of pan-Turkic and panIslamic views in Turkey regarding Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Kireev looks at these, and how economic links are nonetheless
growing despite older paranoias.202
Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey enjoyed generally
good relations, Meyer argues, with both struggling to establish their
independence against Western intervention. The inter-war years were
thus in strong contrast to the Cold War that followed. However, now
197
Factors of economic growth destabilisation in Russia and Turkey, by Nataliya
Ulchenko.
198
The post-1998 crisis performance of the Russian Federation and the lessons for
emerging markets, by Selçuk Caner.
199
Russia and Turkey: Eurasian integration processes, by Elena Urazova.
200
Russia’s changing Baku-Ceyhan policy and regional strategic balances, by Sinan
Ogan.
201
A survey of Turkish-Russian economic relations in the 1990s, by Gülten Kazgan.
202
Turkish views on Eurasian collaboration, by Nikolay G. Kireev.
80
the 1920s and 1930s may have more to teach us, as Turkey and Russia
begin a new period of warm relations.203
The print and TV media of the two countries often present
"the other" in less than flattering terms. Negative images in each
country's media of their neighbours have destructive effects, Aksay
argues, and have to be changed.204
This year marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of one of
Turkey's most outstanding poets. Mitler gives a brief biography of the
great man's life, which ended in exile in Moscow.205
The Russian deputy foreign minister examines the sudden
"popularity" the Caspian states have achieved, thanks to their massive
energy reserves. Arguing that the international community must do all
it can to help the states of the region overcome their considerable
difficulties he also suggests that the five Caspian littoral states must
co-ordinate their policies better if they are to live in greater prosperity
and security.206
The Turkic Tatars lived in the Crimea for centuries - until
becoming victims of Stalinist-era resettlement policies. Many now
live in Turkey, which itself enjoys good relations with Ukraine, the
country of which the Crimea is now a part. Kirimli gives the story of
these remarkable people.207
Turkey and Russia are instrumental in providing peace and
stability to the region. Turkey has better opportunity to advance its
interests in the region by being with Russia instead of against it, Gür
argues. He continues to outline the major directions of Turkey-Russia
co-operation.208
Located at Ankara's Bilkent University, the CRS has emerged
in recent years as an important link in the chain towards a greater
understanding of Turkey's giant northern neighbour.209
203
Russian-Turkish relations in the 1920s and 1930s, by Mikhail C. Meyer.
Turkish-Russian relations: the role of the media, by Hakan Aksay.
205
Nazim Hikmet: poet, playwright, novelist, memoirist, by Louis Mitler.
206
Prospects for prosperity and security around the Caspian Sea: a view from
Moscow, by Victor I. Kaluzhny.
207
Turkish-Ukrainian relations and the Crimean Tatars, by Hakan Kirimli.
208
Economic and commercial co-operation between Russia and Turkey in Eurasia, by
Turgut Gür.
209
The Centre for Russian Studies (CRS), Bilkent University. Ankara Center for
Turkish Policy Studies; http://www.insightturkey.com/is3.htm ; 18 July, 2007.
204
81
2.35. CHECHEN QUESTION HARMS TURKISHRUSSIAN RELATIONS
While Turkey and Russia contend with new political
uncertainties, relations between the two countries have sunk to their
lowest point in several years. Russia’s Chechen policy has prompted
anger on both sides that could prove hard to dispel.210
Eight days after Russian soldiers used a potent gas to seize a
Moscow theater from Chechen guerrillas who had taken patrons
hostage, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP)
triumphed in Turkish elections November 3. [For background see the
Eurasia Insight archives]. In the intervening time, a diplomatic
episode revealed Chechnya’s potential to damage relations between
the two countries.211
On October 28, the Islamist-leaning Yeni Safak, a prominent
Istanbul daily, published a commentary that denounced Russia’s
"brutal" theater operation, while more liberal and mainstream press
quoted Turkish experts deeming the operation a "disaster." Two days
later, Russian Ambassador Alexander Lebedev dispatched a blistering
five-page diplomatic note to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The note
accused Turkey of revealing deep-seated anti-Russian bias in its
coverage of the siege – and of hypocrisy in the global "war on terror."
Such vitriol, rare in diplomatic conduct, hints at how Russia’s
campaign to eradicate Chechen insurgency may rekindle tensions
between Moscow and Ankara.
Russia has branded Turkey as "soft" on Chechen terrorism
since 1996, when armed Chechens hijacked a ferry on the Black Sea.
Though the episode ended peacefully and Turkish authorities arrested
and jailed the hijackers, all later escaped. In April 2001, the same
rebels besieged a Swissotel in Istanbul for 12 hours, much to the
embarrassment of the Turkish government. Russia has tended to
contrast this history with Turkey’s tough stand against its domestic
separatists, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK.212
"Is a terrorist who carries out terrorist attacks against Turkish
210
Jon Gorvett 11/07/02. Jon Gorvett is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.;
Posted
November
7,
2002,
Eurasianet;
http://www.eurasianet.org
;
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav110702a.shtml ; 18 July,
2007.
211
Stigler, George, “General Economic Conditions and National Elections,”
American Economic
Review, 63 (1973): 160-167.
212
Hurriyet, 23 July, 1995, 19.
82
citizens in Turkey a completely different thing to the Chechen terrorist
who carries out sabotage against Russians in Russia?" Lebedev asked
in his letter.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vow to root out Chechen
rebels wherever they are located may prompt further tense exchanges
with Turkey. Some 5 million Turkish citizens trace their ancestry to
the North Caucasus, which was once part of the Ottoman Empire.
There are many Chechen and Caucasian associations and foundations
in Turkey. Echoing US President George W. Bush’s quick moves to
shut down Islamic charities after the September 11 terrorist attacks,
Lebedev accused these Chechen and Caucasian groups of providing
financial and other material support for Chechen terrorism. On
October 30, the Anatolia news agency quoted Lebedev as saying that
"there is proof" that some of the Chechen theater captors placed calls
to Turkish phone numbers during the siege. All of Turkey’s Chechen
associations strongly deny any link to terror.213
"No proof of any connection has been offered. We don’t have
any connection with arms either – the money we send to the Chechens
is for medical aid and food for families," Mehdi Nuzhet Cetinbas,
president of the Caucasus Foundation, told EurasiaNet.
Muktedir Ilhan, press spokesman for the Chechen Cultural
Foundation in Istanbul and former head of the now-disbanded
Caucasus-Chechen Solidarity Committee in Turkey, made similar
comments. "We don’t approve of the theater attack. We don’t approve
of any type of action that harms civilians. However, you have to think
about what brought these people to this. In the last eight years, 20
percent of the population of Chechnya has been killed."214
Despite the escalating rhetoric, Turkish officials have tried to
play down any idea of a rift. The Turkish foreign ministry responded
calmly to the ambassador’s letter, reiterating Turkey’s anti-terrorism
stance and calling on the Turkish press to report "responsibly" events
such as the theater siege.215
"In Turkish-Russian relations, both sides generally try to keep
things cordial," Professor Iltar Turan of Bilgi University’s
213
Sniderman, Paul, and Richard Brody, “Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance”,
American Journal
of Political Science, 63 (1977): 501-521.
214
"Turkey Broadens Presence in Transcaucasus", Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dec. 27,
1995 in FBIS-Central Eurasia-Daily Report, Jan.22, 1996, 45.
215
"Significance of Caucasus Region for Russia Viewed", Rossiyskiye Vesti, May 31,
1996 in FBIS-Central Eurasia-Daily Report, June 28, 1996, 58-9.
83
International Relations Department told EurasiaNet. "Turkey has
nothing to gain from exploiting the problems Russia has with its
internal unity."
Indeed, Turkey may suffer if its relations with Russia come
under strain. Russia has become one of Turkey’s major trading
partners in recent years, with an official trade volume of around $4
billion, and "shadow economy" activity could account for an extra $4
billion. Many Turkish construction firms are also operating in Russia,
representing about $1 billion worth of investment. And Russia is one
of Turkey’s most important suppliers of natural gas, a role highlighted
by the recent completion of the Blue Stream gas pipeline under the
Black Sea. [For background, see the EurasiaNet Business &
Economics archive].
Nevertheless, the strident tone of Lebedev’s note may become
more common in Turkish politics, and in the way the two countries
deal with each other. The AKP’s electoral landslide has deprived
many of those who promoted commercial contacts with Russia of
power.216
"In the past, certain Turkish government officials did
whatever the Russians wanted," says Ilhan, "but now, as they have lost
their seats in parliament, their parliamentary immunity has gone along
with this. Hopefully, now we’ll see some justice." Russia and Turkey
differ over the meaning of that word when it applies to Chechens.217
This study deals with the interaction between the Turkish and
Russian nation-building and identity creation processes with special
focus on the long history of political, cultural and religious conflict.
National identity creation is a process of interaction rather than a
simple linear development since the ethnic group defines itself not
only according to a collective self-image, but also with respect to
others'. The dualistic epistemology based on self-other polarities West and East, Europe and Asia, Christianity and Islam - is central to
the history of Turkish-Russian relationship and interactive identity
construction. With 'transitionary' or 'amalgamated' cultural superidentities, the images of Turk and Russian pose multitudes of
216
Feldman, Stanley, “Economic Self- interest and Political Behavior,” American
Journal of
Political Science, 26 (1982): 446-466.
217
King, Gary, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem. Princeton, Princeton
University
Press, 1997.
84
problems to tackle. Acknowledging the complexity and difficulty of
this particular task, this work will attempt to simplify the interaction
between the two peoples based on their respective images and
perceptions of the other.218
This paper will argue that, from the moment the two peoples
met on the geopolitical stage, their respective images have been
conditioned by negative identites and perceptions, and mostly, by their
insecurities. Geopolitical rivalry had been the outstanding factor in the
two peoples' relations on state and sub-state level, despite the change
in its nature and intensity over time. In the imperial, Cold War, and
even early post-Cold War periods, they regarded each other as
enemies, threats to each other's very existence. Although both were
victims of civilizational exclusion both in the Western and Eastern
worlds for the attributes that made them similar to each other, the
cultural frontier dividing the Turks and the Russians endured for
centuries. Their differences proved to be difficult to overcome despite
the similarities of their respective eclectic cultures.219
2.36. PUTIN'S VISIT TO ANKARA; RUSSIANTURKISH RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
The two day State visit to Ankara from 2 September by
Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, three decades after the
last visit by Soviet Union's President Nikolay Podgorny in 1973,
underlines the reshuffling of strategic perceptions by major players in
the region. This comes after Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyep
Erdogan's recent visit to Tehran which capped warming relations
between Turkey and Iran and their efforts to put aside deep-rooted
historical and ideological differences, because of the developments in
the region. Clearly Turkey is moving away from its Nato ally USA
and its good regional friend Israel.220
218
Li, R.P.Y. “Public Policy and Short-term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior: A
Reformulation
and Expansion”, Political Methodology, 3 (1976): 49-70.
219
Http://www.allacademic.com/one/www/www/index.php?cmd=www_search&offset=
0&limit=5&multi_search_search_mode=publication&multi_search_publication_fullte
xt_mod=fulltext&textfield_submit=true&search_module=multi_search&search=Searc
h&search_field=title_idx&fulltext_search=TurkishRussian+or+Relations+or+and+or+the+or+Evolution+or+of+or+Identities%2C+or+I
mages+or+and+or+Perceptions; 20 July, 2007.
220
by K. Gajendra Singh. (K Gajendra Singh, served as Indian Ambassador to Turkey
85
Even the 1973 Podgorny visit, when the author was first
posted at Ankara was Turkey's show of anger at Washington's
warnings that it should not use US arms in its dispute over Cyprus
with Greece, also a Nato member. Of course that was at the peak of
the Cold war and that visit was an expression of frustration. But now
we are in post cold war era after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 9/11
attacks, US led invasion of Iraq and the deteriorating security situation
and daily bloodbath there. March 2003 was a watershed when the
Turkish Parliament rejected the government motion (with 2/3rd
majority in the Parliament) to allow ally USA's troops to open a
second front against Iraq from the Turkish soil.221
Perhaps for the first time in history after centuries; since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Russia no longer share a
border. But strategic interests of Turkey and Russia still overlap in
"near abroad" i.e. in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some
degree of geopolitical competition is inevitable. As an expert put it
"Turkish-Russian interactions highlight how the relationship between
key regional powers in the post-Cold War context can be
characterized by significant cooperation and conflict at the same
time." In the short term the security problems appear to be
manageable, but they will always remain a major long-term concern.
For the time being the magnitude of Turkish-Russian trade (based on
large-scale energy imports to Turkey) and the need for coexistence at
the political level works against more competitive policies.222
2.37. GROWTH OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS
Perhaps the most positive development in Russian-Turkish
relations in recent years has been 15%-20% annual growth in trade.
Bilateral trade between Turkey and Russia, which was just 200
million U.S. dollars 15 years ago, has reached US$ 8 billion. In 2003
Turkey exported $1.3 billion worth of goods to Russia, while its
and Azerbaijan in 1992-96. Prior to that, he served as ambassador to Jordan (during
the 1990-91 Gulf war), Romania and Senegal. He is currently chairman of the
Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. The views expressed here are his own.- Email:
[email protected]); http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1101.html; 20 July,
2007.
221
Bunce, Valerie, “Should Transitologists be Grounded?”, Slavic Review 54:1
(Spring 1995): 111127.
222
Ibid.
86
imports were $5.4 billion. Till early 1990s trade was balanced. Russia
is now second only to Germany as Turkey's trading partner. Turkish
Vestel company invested $15 million and started production of TV
sets in Russia. Koc and Enka group's Ramstore opened more
supermarket chain stores totaling a score. Turks are also very active in
the construction business.223
While Turkish entrepreneurs and traders were active in
Russia, Russian entrepreneurs have also become active in the
privatization of Turkish companies, specifically, Tatneft, which won a
tender for Turkey's largest petrochemical company, and Europe's
fourth largest. Russia also wants to sell helicopters for Turkish armed
forces.224
In mid -1990s Turkey became the first Nato country to buy
arms, rifles, helicopters etc for use against Kurdish rebels from Russia
as western nations refused to sell them. The number of Russian
tourists to Turkey is also on the rise. In 2003, some 1.2 million
Russians visited Turkey. This number is expected to rise to 1.7 million
by the end of 2004. ''Blue Stream'' natural gas pipeline forms the basis
of higher trade and closer economic relations, increasing Turkish
reliance on Russia. In 1986, Turkey had signed an agreement with
Russia (for 25 years) for 6 billion cubic meters of natural gas .A
similar agreement was signed in 1998 for 8 billion cubic meters of
"Turusgaz." Moscow wants to extend the pipeline to Israel. In 2003,
the problems of supply of Russian natural gas through Blue Stream
were resolved during the visit of Erdogan to Russia, as the leader of
Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Russian Gazprom
company agreed to a lower gas price and the amount of natural gas to
be purchased by Turkey.225
223
Anatoly Golitsyn, The Perestroika Deception, London, Edward Harle, 1995, 150,
note 53.
224
Gontmakher, E.S., “Prinsipy I osnovye elementy sotsialnoi strategii” [Principals
and Basic
Elements of Social Strategy]. In Territorial’nye Problemy Sotsialnoi Politiki, edited
by E.B
225
Serkov, I.B., “Vlast Postroilas” [Political Power is Established] 1-2 (10-16
January) 2001
electronic version at http://www.lgz.ru/archives/html_arch/lg01-022001/polit/art1.htm
accessed September 6, 2001.
87
2.38. RUSSIAN PROJECT FOR OIL PIPELINE VIA
TURKEY
Now Russia is keen on a Trans-Thracian pipeline, which
would allow its oil to reach the Mediterranean from the Black Sea
without passing through the congested Bosporus Straits. Oil traffic
through the Straits has risen by 30 percent to about 2.8 million barrels
per day in the last two years, mainly from the Black Sea port of
Novorossiisk. This figure would increase, as exports to the Black Sea
via the Caspian pipeline from Kazakhstan are set to grow to 67 million
tons per year.226
The increasing traffic through the straits has been a bone of
contention between Russia and Turkey for many years. The TransThracian pipeline, from Turkey's western Black Sea coast, 193
kilometers south to Ibrikbaba on Turkey's Aegean coast, would ease
the bottleneck in the straits. The proposed pipeline could transport
about 60 million tons per year directly to the Mediterranean The
Turkish government supports the idea, but does not want to finance
it.'' London-based Center for Global Energy Studies analyst Julian Lee
told the Moscow Times recently that ''Turkey doesn't want to fall into
the trap which Ukraine did with the Odessa-Brody project, of building
a pipeline nobody wants to use. The government (Turkish) would
rather see an international consortium take the project forward".227
The Trans-Thracian pipeline proposal is to overcome the
restrictions imposed by Turkey on the passage of tankers carrying
Russian and Kazakhstan oil to the world market through the
Bosphorus Straits. In 2003 over 8,000 ships sailed through the Straits
compared to 4,000 in 1996, and carried some 150 million tonnes of
cargo. About 15 million people live along the shores of the Bosphorus
and there have been some blazing accidents.
However, apart from the ecology and safety of the inhabitants
of the region, the Turkish authorities want to force oil companies and
the governments of the Caspian region to use the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline, which is now being built. Oil from Azerbaijan is hardly
enough to fill the requirements of the new 'line,' whose chief backer is
226
Zemtsov, Boris, “Piarom po Reitingu” [Public Relations for Ratings]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 236
(2287) 14 December 2000. http://www.ng.ru/regions/2000-12-14/4_reiting.html
accessed
November 23, 2001.
227
Hough,Jerry, Evelyn Davidheiser, and Susan Lehmann, The 1996 Presidential
Election.
88
the United States. The shift from tankers would fulfill the political and
economic objectives of the pipeline. There is also the problem of an
extra 9 million tons of oil per year that could flow through from
Ukraine's Druzhba pipeline to the Black Sea. So Turkey remains
advantageously placed for transfer of energy from the Caspian basin
to the Mediterranean.228
Turkey is looking for Russian support on north Cyprus
question during Putin's visit. Russia, a permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council, is seen as a sympathizer of orthodox Greek
Cypriots, who overwhelmingly voted against a U.N. plan in April at
reunification of the island. Greek Cypriots oppose efforts at U.N. and
European Union to end international isolation of Turkish Cypriots.
Turkey did note that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with
Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat on the sidelines of
the mid- June foreign ministers meeting of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) in Istanbul.229
2.39. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIAN FEDERATION
There was a flurry of visits between Russia and Turkey soon
after the collapse of the USSR. These included the visit of Foreign
Minister Hikmet Çetin to Moscow on 20-22 January 1992 and a
reciprocal visit to Ankara by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei
Kozyrev next month. During Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel
official visit to Moscow on 25-26 May 1992, the "Treaty on the
Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the
Russian Federation" was signed replacing an earlier but similar treaty
bearing the same title. This treaty established the legal basis of the
relations between the two countries and also confirmed the
willingness to improve their relationship.230
Russian President Boris Yeltsin was in Istanbul on 25 June
1992 for the first summit meeting of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation (BSEC). Foreign Minister Çetin paid another official
visit to Moscow on 1 March 1993, while Prime Minister Tansu Çiller
made an official visit on 8-9 September 1993. During the visit, the
Joint Transportation Committee and a Working Group in the fields of
228
Vadim Yegorov, "Opinion: The Russian Army has a likely Adversary", Current
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press", January 10, 1996, v. 47, n. 50, 12.
229
Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky in The Wall Street Journal,
15 February, 1994.
230
Ozgur Ulke, 4
89
telecommunications, industry and transfer of high technology were
established.231
Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets paid an
official visit to Ankara on 15-20 July 1994 and signed two Protocols
on bilateral economic relations and debt rescheduling related to the
Turkish Eximbank loans extended during the Soviet Union period.
Tansu Çiller visiting Moscow on 9 May 1995 for the ceremony to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, held
official talks with Russian Premier Chernomyrdin. As President,
Demirel visited Moscow on October 25, 1996 to attend the third
summit meeting of BSEC.232
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit to Ankara on 15-16
December 1997 was the first visit of a Russian Premier since the
collapse of USSR in 1991. Prime Minister Ecevit was in Moscow on
4-6 November 1999.A Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the
Struggle against Terrorism, Agreements on Abolition of Visas for
Diplomatic Passports, Cooperation in the Veterinary Field and a
Protocol on Cooperation in the field of Information were signed
during the visit. The Protocol on Joint Economic Commission
provided the framework for bilateral economic cooperation.233
During Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 's visit on
23-25 October 2000 when he was accompanied by Ministers of
Energy, Public Property and Industry, Science and Technology and
other high ranking officials, agreements including the formation of a
Joint Committee on Cooperation in Defense Industry, were signed.
During Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's visit to Ankara on 7-8
June 2001,a Cultural Exchange Program for 2001-2003 was signed.
Mr. Ivanov and his counterpart also held consultations on possible
areas of cooperation in Eurasia.234
231
De Figueiredo Jr, Rui J.P., and Barry Weingast, “Russian Federalism: A
Contradiction in
Terms”, Hoover Digest, 4 (2001) online version: http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/
publications/digest/014.Weingast.html accessed November 24, 2001.
232
Misckiewicz, Ellen, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in
Russia. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
233
Remmer, Karen, “The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America,”
American
Political Science Review, 85 (1991): 777-800.
234
Zhuravskaya, Yekaterina, “Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal
Federalism Russian
Style,” Journal of Public Economics, 76 (2000): 337-368.
90
In early 2004, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul visited
Moscow after a gap of 8 years. The two sides discussed accusations
by the other side of harbouring hostile and terrorist groups, like
Chechen and other groups by Turkey and Kurdish groups by Russia.
PKK, a Marxist Kurdish rebel group had support from USSR and its
proxy Syria, but Syria was forced to shut down its operations in 1999.
Russia has also taken some steps against the Kurds.235
But the Chechen led violent actions in Moscow and else
where in Russia and terrorist acts in Istanbul have brought realism to
their view on international terrorism. This is a major problem
worrying Moscow and Ankara. But any agreement after Gul's visit
remained unknown. Many Chechen leaders including Akhmed
Zakayev, a representative of the so-called president of Ichkeria and
Aslan Maskhadov, lived in Turkey. Russians complain that while the
activity of the followers of the pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic Nurcular
organization, is banned in Turkey, they carry out a wide variety of
intelligence service related tasks in Russia.236
At a press conference, Gul responded that Moscow had
supplied Turkey with 'a list of Turkish citizens involved in terrorist
activity' and that it would be thoroughly studied. He agreed that some
of the fighters killed in Chechnya might be Turkish citizens and
declared: 'Terrorist acts have occurred in Istanbul, and their
perpetrators also hold Turkish passports.' As for funds collected for
humanitarian purposes in Chechnya they are handled by Turkish Red
Crescent, he added. Gul said that Turkey had demanded' that Russia
declare PKK, now called Kong La as a terrorist group. 'The Russians
had promised to study the question, the minister added.237
Contacts at military level have also been established after the
signing of the "Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military
235
Schmitter, Phillipe with Terry Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists
and
Consolidologists: How far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” Slavic Review
53:1
(Spring 1994):173-185.
236
Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper, 1957.
237
Seligson, Mitchell, and Miguel Gomez, “Ordinary Elections in Extraordinary
Times: The
Political Economy of Voting in Costa Rica.” In Elections and democracy in Central
America
edited by John Booth and Mitchell Seligson. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press,
1989.
91
Field and Agreement on Cooperation of Training of Military
Personnel" in January 2002 during the visit of General Kvashnin,
Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation to Ankara. Chief of Staff of
Turkish General Hüseyin Kivrikoglu returned the visit in June 2002.
The first meeting of the Joint Military-Technical Cooperation
Commission was held in September 2002 in Ankara and the second
meeting in November 2003 in Moscow. Relations have also been
established at the level of the parliaments. During the visit of the
Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) Mustafa
Kalemli to Moscow on 14-18 July 1996 a "Protocol on Cooperation
between the TGNA and The Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation" was signed.238
2.40. COMPETITION IN CENTRAL ASIA
Muslim tribes around the Black Sea and the Caspian and the
mountainous Caucasian region which separates Russia and the Middle
East and Anatolia, migrated to the Ottoman empire and are now
spread all over in the region and beyond and have long established
roots. The region has complex linkages and relationships between the
people of Turkey and people of Caucasian region which were
established when the Empire was shrinking. The contacts between
citizens of Turkish republic and the republics in Central Asia are also
abiding.239
But after the First World War, the Bolshevik revolution in
Russia and the creation of the Turkish republic in Anatolia by Kemal
Ataturk, the contacts with Muslim people of not only Central Asia but
the Caucasian region ceased almost all together. A pan Turkic leader
Col. Turkesh told the writer that he met Turks from central Asia first
time in New Delhi, when invited by Indira Gandhi to meet delegations
from USSR. Even the relations with the Arabs were limited, who
according to the Turks had revolted against the Sultan Caliph. Ataturk
jettisoned the Arab and Ottoman religious heritage and the Islamic and
central Asian baggage. He turned around Turks to look West and
become westernized, modern and secular citizens to reach the level of
238
Moe, Terry, “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story”, Journal of
Law,
Economics, and Organization, 6 (1990): 213-253.
239
Zaller, John, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992.
92
contemporary European civilization.240
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey's
historical enemy, pleased Turks no end. It opened the floodgates of
exchanges and relations between the Turks of Anatolia and the Turkic
people of Central Asia and the Caucasus. There were delegations
galore, with the two "lost people" hugging each other, with many
Central Asian leaders bending down to touch the soil of Turkey with
their foreheads on first arrival. The Iranians and the Russians had cut
off exchanges and relations between the Ottomans and its ethnic kin in
the Caucasus and central Asia, known as Turkistan.241
The author remembers much to his surprise the romantic
vision sold to former Communist states by western leadership and
media that with democracy and capitalism prosperity was round the
corner. Soon the reality dawned how the western leadership diddled
the ex-Communist leadership, making them reliant on western
capitalism and institutions. US $ 200 billion were transferred from
Russia to the western banks and institutions under the charade of
globalisation.242
Many Central Asian leaders to whom power fell like manna
from heaven in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union were
confused and rudderless. They were cautious and wanted good
relations with all. The US encouraged Turkey' efforts as it was afraid
that Russia would try to wrest back control of its "near abroad", which
it tried in many ways, but the horse had already bolted from the
stable.243
Fears that Iran would export its version of fanatic Islam and
support anti-US regimes in Central Asia also proved farfetched. After
an eight-year long debilitating war with Iraq in the 1980s, in which
Iran lost a million young people, there was little energy or money left
to spread its message of Shi'ite revolution. Except for the Azeris and
some other pockets, most people in Central Asia are Sunni Muslims,
240
Elazar, Daniel, Exploring Federalism, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press,
1991.
241
Duch, Raymond, “A Developmental Model of Heterogenous Economic Voting in
New Democracies”, American Political Science Review, 4:95 (2001): 895-910.
242
Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its
Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998.
243
Montinola, G., Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The
Political
Basis for Economic Success,” World Politics, 48 (1996): 50-81.
93
closer to the more mystic Sufi way of life. They have a very high level
of education and a lifestyle of drinking and good living. With deepgrained nomadic habits, they could not easily be led to Islamic
fundamentalism. It were the ill-conceived US, Saudi and Pakistani
policies that brought Wahabi Islam to Central Asia. It was further
aggravated by former Communists, now ruler's propensity to use fear
of Islamic fundamentalism to crush all form of opposition to their
dictatorial rule, based on clan and regional linkages only.244
Except for the Caspian basin because of its energy resources
and in Kyrgyzstan, the American leadership soon lost interest (except
after 11 September). The Caspian basin has between 100 to 200
billion barrels of oil. The US courted Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev,
touting him as a democrat and helped his country join the World
Trade Organization in 1998. The reason was to have a friendly regime
with freedom to base personnel and sensing equipment to monitor
China, next door. Akayev has proved no different than leaders of other
Central Asian republics in terms of his record on democracy
though.245
Early 1990s were an opportune moment for Turkey, which
under the dynamic leadership of Turgut Ozal had successfully
undergone a decade of economic reforms, opening its economy to the
West, especially Europe. The country had many trained managers and
experts who, because of ethnic, linguistic and religious similarity,
became advisers and even ministers in the new Turkic republics in
Central Asia (CARs). Both at state level and in the private sector,
Turkey made large investments in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The
Turkish government provided loans amounting to US$750 million to
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
Turkish private investment runs into billions of dollars. Turks have
established successful industries run hotels, textiles and other
businesses.246
Turkey also arranged to train 10,000 students and teachers
from the new republics. Turkish as spoken in Turkey has been purified
by excluding many Arabic and Persian words. Many European words,
244
Heatherington, Marc, “The Media’s Role in Forming Voters’ National Economic
Evaluations in 1992”, American Journal of Political Science, 40:2 (1996): 372-395.
245
Robinson, W.S., Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,
American Sociological Review 15:3 (1950): 351-357.
246
Hibbing, J.R., and J.R. Alford, “The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions:
Who is Held
Responsible?” American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981): 423-439.
94
especially from French have been added. The Azeri language is quite
similar to Turkish, as well as the Turcoman language. The languages
spoken by Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and in Kazakhstan are somewhat different.
Originally, Soviet Russians prescribed Latin script for the Central
Asian languages, but when Ataturk changed to the Latin script from
Arabic, the Russians changed to Cyrillic. Many Turks have opened
schools in Central Asia, too. Turkey also started beaming Avrasia TV
programs to Central Asia, but with uneven results.247
The initiative to bring the new central Asian Turkic countries
together was taken up by President Ozal, but unfortunately he died in
1993. But Turkey's efforts to create an area of influence in Central
Asia were opposed by the newly independent leadership. A loose
organization of Turkic states exists without having achieved much.
Cento was reorganized with CARs joining in to create the new
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). To soothe the Russians, a
Black Sea organization was also created, but it remains equally
ineffective. Many Turkish leaders complained in mid 1990s that
Central Asian governments did not repay Turkish loans, while they
paid back Western ones. The author was told that the new CARs
leadership would like to establish authoritarian political regimes and
try to follow the capitalist system of East Asia. It has certainly
succeeded rather well in its first objective.248
2.41. PROBLEMS IN THE CAUCASUS
While Russians might have plotted borders of Soviet republics
in such a way that there are territorial disputes almost among all
neighbouring states, which became independent after the collapse of
USSR e.g between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Ossetias in Russia and
Georgia and between Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks in the Ferghana
valley, to name only a few of them. But it too was caught in the
sudden denouement. I recall Russian Ambassador in Baku, forced to
operate his Mission from a suite of rooms in a rundown tourist hotel,
while USA, UK and even Israel had occupied prime property.249
To avoid loss of control in the north Muslim Caucasus, i.e.
247
Hosmer, David, and Stanley Lemeshow Applied Logistic Regression. New York:
Wiley and
Sons 1989.
248
McDonald, Ronal, and Mark Ruhl, Party Politics and Elections in Latin America.
Boulder:
Westview Press, 1989.
249
Oates, Wallace, Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972
95
Chechnya, Dagestan etc, which would result in the disintegration of
the Russian Federation itself, Russian objectives remain that it
maintain military bases and influence in Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia, deploy Russian troops to guard the external frontiers of the
three Trans-Caucasian states, exclusive CIS (i.e. Russian)
peacekeeping troops in the region and station more Russian tanks and
armoured vehicles in the north Caucasus even though this violates the
terms of the CFE Treaty.250
Russia also wants that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan route their oil and gas exports via Russia. It is thus clear
that Russian and Turkish interests (or rather of USA as well) are
bound to clash in the Caucasus.251
Therefore, soon after the collapse of USSR, nationalist
Russian politicians, ex-communist cadres, ambitious Russian generals,
local mafia, Turkish groups and international oil executives all entered
the fray to play their part for personal or national gains on the
Caucasian chessboard.
There are ten million inhabitants of Turkey whose families
originate from the north Caucasus and the Trans-Caucasus, which
were once parts of the Ottoman Empire. It is estimated that there are
25,000 Turkish citizens of Chechen decent alone. Around 50 official
Caucasian solidarity associations are active in Turkey. These groups
invariably pressurize the Turkish government to oppose Russian
involvement in the Trans-Caucasus and against Russian military
operations in Chechnya. Even Turkey was put in an embarrassing
situation when Azeri president late Heydar Aliyev, accused a Turkish
group in 1995 of trying to overthrow him with the help of his
opponents in Baku.
Turkey remains wary of Russian military bases in Georgia and
Armenia as a potential threat. Ankara would also like CIS
peacekeeping forces in the South Caucasus to be replaced by
international forces, since these peacekeeping troops are mostly
Russian.
250
Niemi, Richard, Harold Stanley, and Ronald Vogel, “State Economies and State
Taxes: Do
Voters Hold Governors Accountable?” American Journal of Political Science, 39
(1995):
936-957.
251
Norpoth, Helmut, Michael Lewis-Beck, Jean-Dominique Lafay, Economics and
Politics: The
Calculus of Support. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991.
96
At the same time Russia is also unhappy with Turkish military
and security officials' cooperation with their counterparts in Georgia
and Azerbaijan. In January 2002 in Ankara, Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey concluded a tripartite agreement on regional security. Moscow
is especially unhappy with Turkish assistance in modernizing the
Marneuli airbase near Tbilisi. In October 2002 a Turkish military
delegation attended the formal opening of the United Military
Academy in Tbilisi, set up and co-staffed by the Turkish armed forces.
Speaking at the opening ceremony, Georgian Defense Minister
Lieutenant General David Tevzadze stressed that instructions would
comply with NATO standards.
Zeyno Baran, director of the Caucasus Project at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, pointed out recently, "in the
past, Georgia had asked the Russians for help against the Ottomans,
but today Georgia receives military, economic, and political assistance
from Turkey." Turkey has become Georgia's main trading partner,
with a flourishing border /shuttle trade. There has been talk of
improving railway connection between the two countries but no
concrete step have been taken. But as long as Georgia has problems
with Russia, it will need Turkey and USA. Apart from strategic
reasons Turkey also needs Georgia for its Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline.
It appears that every one is coming to Georgia's aid. "For
example, the boots of our soldiers are from Turkey, and their
uniforms, worth 9 million euros, are from Italy. The UK, Romania,
Bulgaria, Israel and the US also help. We do not conceal this, "said a
Georgian press report. The Georgian army will be equipped with
Israeli made Tavors instead of the classic Kalashnikov (AK-47).
But USA remains the main actor and successfully replaced an
aging Shevardnadze with a more pliable Georgian leader .The
skirmishes or the great game, in spite of USA being embroiled in Iraq
goes on.252
Relations between Turkey and Russia have taken significant
turns for the better in the past several years, culminating in the visit of
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow in
December 2004 and followed by Russian President Vladimir Putin's
reciprocal trip to Ankara in January 2005. How can we begin to
252
Mutz, Diana, Paul Sniderman, and Richard Brody, eds., Political Persuasion and
Attitude
Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996.
97
account for this rather sudden warming of relations between Turkey
and Russia, and what does this mean for the region? These questions
can perhaps best be approached from the perspective of the larger
regional landscape of issues whose substance and potential resolution
are of particular importance to Turkey and Russia. These can be
conveniently parsed into matters of (1) mutual economic and financial
advantage, (2) regional security concerns, and (3) domestic political
considerations. The present improvement of relations between Russia
and Turkey has unfolded in the context of Turkey and Russia's
simultaneously complex and somewhat conflicted orientations toward
the Western world in general, and post-Soviet increase in U.S. global
influence in particular. In any case, the improvement of TurkishRussian relations will significantly alter the geopolitical landscape of
Eurasia for the foreseeable future.253
While Turkey and Russia contend with new political
uncertainties, relations between the two countries have sunk to their
lowest point in several years. Russia's Chechen policy has prompted
anger on both sides that could prove hard to dispel.254
Eight days after Russian soldiers used a potent gas to seize a
Moscow theater from Chechen guerrillas who had taken patrons
hostage, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP)
triumphed in Turkish elections on 3 November. In the meantime, a
diplomatic incident revealed Chechnya's potential to damage relations
between the two countries.
On 28 October, the Islamist-favoring Yeni Safak, a prominent
Istanbul daily, published a commentary that denounced Russia's brutal
theater operation, while more liberal and mainstream press quoted
Turkish experts deeming the operation a disaster. Two days later,
Russian Ambassador Alexander Lebedev dispatched a blistering fivepage diplomatic note to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The note
accused Turkey of revealing deep-seated anti-Russian bias in its
coverage of the siege--and of its hypocrisy in the global war on
terrorism. Such criticism, rare in diplomatic conduct, hint at how
Russia's campaign to eradicate Chechen insurgency may rekindle
tensions between Moscow and Ankara.
Russia has branded Turkey soft on incidents of Chechen
253
posted on TOL Wire on 8 November 2002, Chechen Question Harms TurkishRussian
Relations,
from
Eurasianet,
by
Jon
Gorvett;
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200601/ai_n16537297; 20 July, 2007.
254
MOSCOW, 8 November (Eurasianet)--
98
terrorism since 1996, when armed Chechens hijacked a ferry on the
Black Sea. Though the episode ended peacefully and Turkish
authorities arrested and jailed the hijackers, they all later escaped. In
April 2001, the same rebels seized a Swissotel in Istanbul for 12
hours, much to the embarrassment of the Turkish government.
Russia has tended to contrast this history with Turkey's tough
stance against its domestic separatists, the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK).
"Is a terrorist who carries out terrorist attacks against Turkish
citizens in Turkey a completely different thing to the Chechen terrorist
who carries out sabotage against Russians in Russia?" Lebedev asked
in his letter.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's vow to root out Chechen
rebels wherever they are located may spark further tension with
Turkey. Five million Turkish citizens can trace their ancestry to the
North Caucasus, which was once a part of the Ottoman Empire. There
are many Chechen and Caucasian associations and foundations in
Turkey.
Echoing U.S. President George W. Bush's quick moves to
shut down Islamic charities after the 11 September terrorist attacks,
Lebedev accused these Chechen and Caucasian groups of providing
financial and material support for Chechen terrorism. On 30 October,
the Anatolia news agency quoted Lebedev claiming that "there is
proof" that some of the Chechen theater captors placed calls to
Turkish phone numbers during the siege. All of Turkey's Chechen
associations strongly deny any link to the terrorists.
"No proof of any connection has been offered. We don't have
any connection with arms dealings either--the money we send to the
Chechens is for medical aid and food for families," Mehdi Nuzhet
Cetinbas, president of the Caucasus Foundation, told EurasiaNet.
Muktedir Ilhan, press spokesman for the Chechen Cultural
Foundation in Istanbul and former head of the now-disbanded
Caucasus-Chechen Solidarity Committee in Turkey, made similar
comments. "We don't approve of the theater attack. We don't approve
of any type of action that harms civilians. However, you have to think
about what brought these people to this. In the past eight years, 20
percent of the population of Chechnya has been killed."
Despite the rhetoric, Turkish officials have tried to play down
any idea of a rift. The Turkish foreign ministry responded calmly to
the ambassador's letter, reiterating Turkey's anti-terrorism stance and
99
calling on the Turkish press to report responsibly on terrorism-related
events.
"In Turkish-Russian relations, both sides generally try to keep
things cordial," Professor Iltar Turan of Bilgi University's
International Relations Department told EurasiaNet. "Turkey has
nothing to gain from exploiting the problems Russia has with its
internal unity."
Indeed, Turkey may suffer if its relations with Russia come
under strain. Russia has become one of Turkey's major trading
partners in recent years, with an official trade volume of around $4
billion and the underground economy activity could account for
another $4 billion.
Many Turkish construction firms are also operating in Russia,
representing about $1 billion worth of investment. And Russia is one
of Turkey's most important suppliers of natural gas, a role highlighted
by the recent completion of the "Blue Stream" gas pipeline under the
Black Sea.
Nevertheless, the strident tone of Lebedev's note may become
more common in Turkish politics, and in the way the two countries
deal with each other.
"In the past, certain Turkish government officials did
whatever the Russians wanted," says Ilhan, "but now, as they have lost
their seats in parliament, their parliamentary immunity has gone along
with it. Hopefully, now we'll see some justice."
Russia and Turkey differ over the meaning of that word when
it applies to Chechnya.
100
THIRD CHAPTER
3.1. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE
CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA
For centuries, Turkey and Russia have been rivals for regional
supremacy. Recently, the two countries have realised that friendly
relations are in the interest of them both. Accordingly, co-operation
rather than rivalry appears to dominate their ties. This development
has been welcome by the EU, which sees these countries as the two
largest imponderables on the European horizon.
The general understanding is that Russia is a European
country while Turkey belongs to Asia, despite the fact that the two
vast countries both span the continents of Europe and Asia (although
they no longer share a border). The reason for the above distinction is
that in both countries the majority of the population as well as the
capital city are located on the continent where they are respectively
assigned.
In December 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan paid a visit to Moscow before Russian President Vladimir
Putin reciprocated with a trip to Ankara in January 2005. In November
2005, Putin attended the inauguration of a jointly constructed Blue
Stream natural gas pipeline in Turkey. This sequence of top-level
visits has brought several important bilateral issues to the forefront.
In 2004, trade between Turkey and Russia was worth some
$11 billion. By the end of August 2005, this figure reached almost $10
billion, and it is expected by both Moscow and Ankara to increase to
$25 billion by 2007. Russia is Turkey's second-largest trading partner
after Germany, while Turkey is Russia's 14th trade partner. Russia
exports to Turkey fuel and energy products (72% of total), as well as
metals (16%) and chemical goods (4%). Turkey, in turn, sells textiles
(30%), machinery and vehicles (23%), chemical goods (15%) and
food products (15%) to Russia.
Turkish companies are present in significant numbers in
Russia’s construction, retail and brewing industries. Russia’s
investment in Turkey is worth $350 million while Turkey’s
investment in Russia totals $1.5 billion.
The two countries consider it their strategic goal to achieve
"multidimensional co-operation", especially in the fields of energy,
transport and the military. Specifically, Russia aims to invest in
101
Turkey’s fuel and energy industries, and it also expects to participate
in tenders for the modernisation of Turkey’s military.
In the strategic energy sector, the two countries are in
agreement to implement large-scale projects, some of which compare
with the Blue Stream gas pipeline , which was officially inaugurated
in November 2005. Among other developments, Russia will increase
gas supplies to Turkey and will allow Russian companies to engage in
gas distribution in Turkish territory. Talks are also underway on ways
to increase Russian electricity deliveries to Turkey.
Moscow's initial reaction to Turkey drawing closer to the EU
was lukewarm. "If you enter the EU we cannot meet frequently," Putin
was reported as telling his host, Prime Minister Erdogan, during the
former’s visit to Ankara in late 2004. However, at the two leaders’
next meeting in Moscow in January 2005, Putin already said that
Russia was in favour of Turkey’s EU membership, primarily since it
promised to open up new trading channels for Russia. ''We welcome
Turkey's success at the EU Brussels summit,'' Putin said in Moscow.
''I hope that Turkey's integration in the European Union will open up a
new horizon for Russian-Turkish business cooperation.''
Regarding the outstanding issue of Cyprus (which is tied
closely to Turkey's EU membership bid), Russia has declared support
for the plan put forward by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. ''We
will support any resolution that comes out of the implementation of
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan," said Putin. He added that
the economic embargo on northern Cyprus was "unjust". In April
2004, Russia used its veto to block a resolution that sought to outline
new UN security arrangements in Cyprus.
In return, Turkey's Erdogan has pledged to "fully support"
Russia's quest for membership of the World Trade Organisation.
"Many barriers in the way of trade and economic co-operation
between our countries may undoubtedly be removed after completion
of Russian-Turkish negotiations on Russia's WTO entry on acceptable
terms," reacted Putin. The EU concluded a deal with Russia on the
latter's accession to the WTO in May 2004. Russia may become a full
member of the WTO in 2005.
The conflict in Chechnya remains high on the two countries’
bilateral agendas. Several Turks trace their ancestry to the Caucasus,
including Chechnya, and they have always been sympathetic towards
the Muslim militants in the war-torn Russian region. Earlier, Russia
issued calls for Turkey to crack down on Turkish “philanthropic
102
organisations” that allegedly channelled money and arms to rebel
groups in Chechnya. In turn, Turkey accused Russia of backing
Kurdish rebel groups who have been fighting for autonomy in
Turkey’s southeastern regions since the early 1980s. The recent
rapprochement promises to bring both countries closer to negotiated
solutions.
The Caucasus remains a moot point between the two
countries. Turkey’s main ally in the Caucasus region is Azerbaijan,
whereas Russia’s ally is its rival, Armenia, which continues to insist
that Turkey committed 'genocide' against its people during World War
One. ''We are all aware about the historical problems between
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia will contribute to the peace process,"
Putin said. "We do not want negative relations with any of our
neighbours, including Armenia," Erdogan responded.255
Many observers have hailed Russian Presidential spokesman
Sergei Yastrzhembsky's announcement that Turkey has requested an
extradition file for Chechen propagandist Movladi Udugov as
signifying both a serious blow to the Chechen resistance and a
watershed in Turkish-Russian relations. This assessment grossly
overestimates Turkish support for the Chechen cause - and conversely
the Chechens' dependence on it - as well as the salience of Chechnya
in dealings between Ankara and Moscow. If made, the request will
have no fundamental impact either on the course of the war in
Chechnya or on Turkish-Russian relations.256
BACKGROUND: On January 9, the office of the Russian
Presidential Spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky announced that Turkey
had requested the extradition file for Movladi Udugov. Udugov is
closely tied to the radical wing that includes Shamil Basaev and the
Saudi-born Khattab, has played a prominent role as a propagandist in
the Chechen conflict, and has for periods of time resided in Istanbul.
News agencies throughout the world picked up the announcement, and
the next day the Russian press was abuzz with speculation about how
the request dealt a blow to the Chechen resistance and how it signified
a watershed in Russian-Turkish relations. Yastrzhembsky himself
255
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-russia-relations/article-134083 ;
24 July, 2007.
256
Michael A. Reynolds; CENTRAL ASIA - CAUCASUS ANALYST Wednesday /
January 30, 2002. Michael A. Reynolds is Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Near
Eastern Studies of Princeton University. He has conducted extensive research in
Turkey and Russia.
103
crowed that "A new wind is blowing."
Curiously,
no
Turkish
authority
has
confirmed
Yasztrzhembsky's claim. When asked on January 18 about the matter
at a press conference in Washington DC, Turkish Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit in his typical style cryptically responded that "there are
different opinions about the fight against terrorism - even in some
democratic West European countries." Ecevit's response echoed his
opening statement and was a veiled reference to the refusal of several
Western European countries to label the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) a terrorist organization. It may well have been directed at
Russia as well. Moscow has long maintained ties to subversive
Kurdish groups in Turkey, and has on more than one occasion in the
1990s alone exploited those ties to pressure Ankara. The
unwillingness of these states to prevent the PKK from using their
territories to raise funds and organize attacks against Turkish targets
continues to be a source of great frustration for Ankara.
IMPLICATIONS: Even if Yastrzhembsky's announcement
were correct, it would have little significance. Turkish support is of
marginal importance for the Chechens, and Russian-Turkish relations
have been quite positive for some time now. In marked contrast to the
situation in the first Chechen war, Turkish support for the Chechen
cause during this war has been significantly limited. The Turkish
government has impeded, and at times banned, pro-Chechen rallies,
restricted the ability of pro-Chechen organizations to operate and raise
funds, and forced a number of Chechen activists to leave the country.
Turkish media coverage of the conflict has been scanty, and the
media's tone has been cool, even at times hostile. Overall public
opinion in Turkey is not far from apathetic to the Chechen cause.
Moreover, the kidnapping of Turkish citizens in Chechnya
following the first war, the radical Islamic image of Basaev and
Khattab, and the initial attack on Dagestan also served to disorient and
alienate most of Turkey's North Caucasian Diaspora, which during the
first war had provided a united and enthusiastic organizational
backbone for the Chechen cause. The only significant constituency
group among which the Chechen cause has found support is the
Islamists - but the Islamists' support is a mixed blessing. By linking
their cause to that of Turkey's Islamists, the Chechens and their
backers pit themselves against the Turkish State establishment and the
military in particular. The immensely powerful Turkish National
Security Council regards Islamic radicalism as the greatest threat to
104
the Turkish Republic, ranking it ahead of even Kurdish separatism.
Ongoing pressure from the Turkish state, such as the banning last year
of the Islamic-minded Virtue Party, forces the Islamist movement to
concentrate its resources on survival and limits the support it can
provide to an outside issue such as Chechnya.
In addition, there is no indication that either Moscow or
Ankara have recently regarded Chechnya as an impediment to
building closer ties. Indeed, their relations in both the diplomatic and
economic spheres have only improved since the second war,
beginning with Ecevit's signing of several agreements on the eve of
the Russian storm of Grozny in 1999. The agreements included one on
joint anti-terrorism and one on a formal commitment to the Blue
Stream project, an ambitious effort to pipe Russian natural gas to
Turkey under the Black Sea. Ecevit's visit was followed by a
reciprocal visit to Turkey by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov in 2000. Accompanied by a high level delegation, Russian
Foreign Minister Ivanov this past year met not only with the Turkish
president and prime minister, but also delivered a special address to a
large gathering of Turkish businessmen in Istanbul. Both sides are
planning for a visit to Turkey by Russian President Putin later this
year, and Blue Stream is expected to be delivering gas to Turkey
before the summer.257
3.2. RELATIONS WITH TURKEY
Through most of the 500 years preceding the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey were enemies. Initially it was an
expanding Ottoman Empire that conquered traditionally Russian
lands, but then as the Ottoman Empire weakened, it was tsarist
Russia's turn to expand at the expense of the Ottomans. Highlighting
Russian expansion was the Treaty of Kuchuk Karnadji in 1774, which
not only gave Russia the Crimea, but also the right to intervene in the
Ottoman Empire to protect orthodox believers. Then, in the nineteenth
century, it was Russian military pressure, in cooperation with Britain
and France, that helped free Greece from Ottoman control in 1827.
While the Russian drive against the Ottoman Empire and Moscow's
efforts to control the Turkish Straits failed during the Crimean War
(1853 - 1853), twenty years later (in 1876 - 1877) Russia helped free
the Bulgarians from Ottoman control in a war against the Ottoman
257
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=46 ; 24 July, 2007.
105
Empire. During World War I, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were
on opposite sides, with Russia's ally Britain promising the straits to
Moscow to help keep it in the war.
Following World War I, when the communists seized control
of Russia and Kemal Attaturk took power in Turkey, there was a brief
warming of relations as Moscow supplied weapons to help Turkey
drive out the armies of their common enemies, France and Britain.
During World War II, Turkey was ostensibly neutral but appeared
sympathetic to the Germans, and at the end of the war Stalin
demanded bases in the Turkish Straits and Turkish territory in
Transcaucasia. Stalin, however, was unable to implement Russian
demands because of U.S. support for Turkey. At the same time,
however, by solidifying its control over the Eastern Balkans, Moscow
posed a threat to Turkey on its border with Bulgaria.
Throughout the early stages of the Cold War, Turkey was a
loyal member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
sending troops to help the United States in the Korean War - much to
the anger of Moscow. Relations between Moscow and Ankara,
however, began to warm in the 1970s (in part because of the U.S.Turkish conflict over Cyprus) and in the 1980s the two countries
negotiated an important natural gas agreement. Still, at the time of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, relations could be seen as correct if not
particularly friendly.
3.3. RELATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE
USSR
Since the end of 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved,
Turkish-Russian relations have gone through three stages. The first
period, 1991 to 1995, saw a mixture of economic cooperation and
geopolitical confrontation; the second period, 1996 to 1998, witnessed
an escalation of the geopolitical confrontation, and the third period,
1998 to 2003, following the economic crisis in Russia in August
through September 1998, saw the relationship transformed into a far
more friendly and cooperative one.
In the first period trade was the primary factor fostering the
relationship. By the time of the Russian economic crisis of 1998, trade
had risen to $10 billion per year, making Turkey Russia's primary
Middle East trading partner and at the same time creating a strong proRussian business lobby in Turkey, composed of such companies as
106
Enka, Gama, and Tekfen. Indeed, Turkish companies even got the
contract to rebuild the Russian Duma, damaged in the 1993 fighting,
and Turkish merchants donated $5 million to Yeltsin's 1996 reelection
campaign. Moscow also sold military equipment to Turkey, including
helicopters (prohibited for sale to Turkey by NATO) that the Turks
could use to suppress the Kurdish uprising in Southeast Turkey.
If economic and military cooperation was evident during this
period, so was competition. With the collapse of the USSR, Moscow
feared Turkish inroads into Central Asia and Transcaucasia seen by
the Russian leadership as the soft underbelly of the Russian
Federation. Reinforcing this concern were Turkish efforts to promote
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline route for Caspian Sea oil that
would rival Moscow's Baku-Novorossisk route. For its part, Turkey
complained about the Russian military buildup in Armenia and
Georgia, about the ecological dangers posed by Russian oil tankers
going through the straits, and about Russian aid to the Kurdish rebels.
On the other hand, once the first Chechen war had erupted in
December 1994, Moscow complained about Turkish aid to the
Chechen rebels.
Relations between Turkey and Russia sharply deteriorated in
1996 after Yevgeny Primakov became Russia's foreign minister.
Primakov sought to create a pro-Russian grouping of states such as
Greece, Armenia, Syria, and Iran to outflank Turkey. Furthermore, he
supported the sale in January 1997 of a very sophisticated SAM 300PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system to the Greek portion of Cyprus,
something that, if deployed, would threaten the airspace of a large part
of southern Turkey. Turkey took the proposed SAM-300 sale
seriously and threatened to destroy the missiles if they were deployed.
Finally, Moscow stepped up its diplomatic support for the Kurdish
rebellion, allowing Kurdish conferences to be held in Moscow.
The only bright spot in Turkish-Russian relations during this
period came in December 1997 when then Russian prime minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin came to Ankara to sign the Blue Stream natural
gas agreement, which would increase the amount of natural gas
Turkey would import from Russia from 3 billion cubic meters per year
in 2000 to 30 billion cubic meters per year in 2010, with 16 billion
cubic meters coming from the Blue Stream pipeline under the Black
Sea and 14 billion cubic meters coming from enlarged pipelines
through the Balkans.
Following the Russian economic crisis of August-September
107
1998, confrontation gave way to cooperation in the Russian-Turkish
relationship. This was due to a number of causes. First, Primakov's
efforts to build an alignment of Iran, Armenia, Syria, and Greece
against Turkey fell apart as Greece and Turkey had a major
rapprochement. Second, the economic crisis weakened Russia so that
Primakov, who had become prime minister in September 1998,
realized that Russia simply did not have the economic resources to
implement the multipolar diplomatic strategy he had sought to
promote, at least until Russia had rebuilt its economy. The
consequences for Russian-Turkish relations were almost immediate,
as Russia began to prize Turkey as an economic partner instead of
confronting it as a geopolitical rival. Thus in October 1998, Russia
refused to grant diplomatic asylum to Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah
Ocalan. Next, Moscow acquiesced in the deployment of the SAM-300
system on the Greek island of Crete instead of on Cyprus. Then,
Moscow indicated it would not oppose the Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline. Finally, Moscow stepped up its efforts to find external
funding for the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, which it made the
centerpiece of its policy toward Turkey.
This change in policy direction toward Turkey was reinforced
after Vladimir Putin became Russia's president in January 2000. In
October 2000 Russian prime minister Mikhail Khazyanov came to
Ankara and stated that cooperation, not confrontation, was the
centerpiece of Russian policy toward Turkey, and in November 2001,
at the United Nations, then Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed an action plan for
Turkish-Russian cooperation in Eurasia.
Tensions remained over Kurdish and Chechen issues, over
Russian military deployments in Transcaucasia, and over the passage
of Russian oil through the straits. However, by the beginning of 2003,
even with an Islamist now heading the Turkish government, RussianTurkish relations were better than at any time in the last 500 years.
Whether this rather halcyon condition will continue is a question only
the future can decide.258
258
http://www.answers.com/topic/relations-with-turkey ; ROBERT O. FREEDMAN,
24 july, 2007.
108
3.4. ERDOGAN, PUTIN DISCUSS BILATERAL
RELATIONS IN RUSSIA
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is currently in the
Russian Federation for an official visit, yesterday met with his
Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to discuss a number of issues,
including economic and trade ties between the two countries and
regional issues. Speaking at a joint press conference before their
meeting, Putin thanked Erdogan for visiting Russia and said that
cooperation between Ankara and Moscow was rising, adding that the
trade volume between the two countries had exceeded $10 billion. “I
believe the trade volume between our two countries will reach $25
billion within a few years,” predicted Putin, adding that cooperation
between the two countries wasn’t limited to the economic sector
alone. “We also cooperate in fields such as investment, energy and
technology,” said the Russian leader. For his part, Erdogan thanked
Putin for his invitation and praised the strengthening political, trade
and cultural ties between the two countries, adding that he hoped this
trend would continue. The two leaders later met at a dinner hosted by
Putin where they discussed investment, trade, the Cyprus issue,
terrorism, and Turkey’s European Union membership bid.259
Tomorrow the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
is set to hold ceremonies marking the 31st anniversary of the 1974
Peace Operation which brought peace and stability to the island. Prior
to the official ceremonies, social and cultural activities are expected to
start today on Turkish Cyprus. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul is due
to attend the ceremonies with an accompanying delegation. The
TRNC will also host many European figures in the ceremonies.260
3.5. AZERBAIJAN SENDS DEPUTIES TO TRNC TO
MARK 31ST ANNIVERSARY OF PEACE OPERATION
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev yesterday sent a
delegation of eight deputies to the Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC) to attend ceremonies marking the 31st anniversary of the
1974 Peace Operation. Speaking at Ataturk International Airport,
Azerbaijani Deputy Hadi Recebli said that this was the very first visit
of Azerbaijani parliamentarians to the TRNC and that it was a historic
event. The deputies will meet with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts
as well with TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat. In related news,
259
260
/Turkiye/.
/Star/.
109
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that he appreciated
Aliyev’s actions, hailing it as an important step in recognizing the
TRNC. Just last week, in another crack in the TRNC’s isolation, a
private Azerbaijani airline announced it would introduce direct flights
from Baku to the TRNC’s Ercan Airport.261
Speaking at a press conference in Ankara yesterday, Iraqi
Interior Minister Beyan Bagr Sulag said that Iraq would always stand
by the Turkish nation and government in their fight against terrorism,
adding that such terrorism was unacceptable. Sulag, who is currently
in Ankara to attend a meeting, also criticized a wave of terrorist
attacks in Iraq, saying that recently over 100 civilians had died in his
country due to these attacks.262
Speaking in Trabzon yesterday, True Path Party (DYP) leader
Mehmet Agar criticized the ruling Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government, claiming that its efforts against terrorism are
“weak.” “Recently terrorist attacks in Turkey have risen due to this
weakness,” said Agar, adding that the terrorist group PKK/KADEK
was also supported by foreign countries. “I believe that the Turkish
nation will overcome this hardship.”263
Italian opposition leader Piero Fassino is due to arrive in
Ankara tomorrow upon the invitation of main Turkish opposition
Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal. During his
visit, Fassino and Baykal will discuss a number of issues, including
Turkey’s European Union membership bid and international issues,
said a CHP written statement. Fassino will also meet with Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul to discuss Turkey’s EU bid.264
Israeli Ambassador to Ankara Pinchas Avivi over the
weekend expressed his sorrow over the latest terrorist attacks on
Turkey. On a trip to the Eastern Black Sea region with his family,
Avivi also stated that it is Ataturk who first comes to mind when
people mention Turkey. “Turks are very lucky to have had such a
great leader,” he said. “There are many leaders in the world, but
eternal ones like Ataturk are very rare.” Expressing his solidarity with
Turkey in the face of recent attacks, Avivi stressed, “Countries should
unite to fight global terrorism and establish a joint platform to take
261
/Turkiye/.
/Turkiye/.
263
/Cumhuriyet/.
264
/Turkiye/.
262
110
more effective measures against terrorists.”265
Gen. Ethem Erdagi, commander of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, over the weekend stated that
Turkish troops deployed in Afghanistan would not participate in direct
anti-terror operations in the region. Turkey took over the ISAF
command for a second term on Feb. 13 and will hand it over to Italy
on Aug. 4. “During our command, the number of terrorist attacks has
fallen,” Gen. Erdagi said. “Turkish soldiers have a special place in
Afghan people’s hearts because the two nations have close historic
and cultural ties, which were in particular reinforced during Ataturk’s
time.”266
Speaking at a festival in the northern province of Giresun,
State Economy Minister Ali Babacan yesterday hailed the Turkish
economy as “the new shining star of the world,” saying that nothing
stood in the way of Turkey’s success. “The key to economic success is
trust,” said Babacan, adding that the nation has ample resources. “If
we trust in ourselves and win the world’s confidence, there is no
reason why we can’t succeed.”267
3.6. TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Columnist Semih Idiz comments on Turkish-Russian
relations. A summary of his column is as follows:
“We are in Sochi, a Black Sea vacation resort, for Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with Russian President
Vladimir Putin. Up to now, the two leaders have reportedly focused
on the issue of international terrorism and discussed the Cyprus
issue.268
After last week’s terrorist attacks in London, the issue of
global terrorism has become more important to both countries. Both
Turkey and Russia have been fighting terrorists for a long time. While
we are familiar with the PKK terrorism, Russians also know this
phenomenon very well due to Chechen terrorists. In addition, the
occupation of Iraq and the latest developments in the region are very
important to both countries. Neither Moscow nor Ankara is happy to
see US forces in the region. Furthermore, both Moscow and Ankara
are closely following political developments in the Central Asian
265
/Hurriyet/.
/Hurriyet/
267
/Aksam/.
268
From The Columns… By Semıh Idız (Mıllıyet).
266
111
countries.
As for the Cyprus issue, Erdogan is very likely to ask Putin
why Russia blocked the latest Cyprus report prepared by the UN
secretary-general. Moscow once supported the Annan plan. Therefore
Ankara believes that Russians can play an active role in the
international community to help Turkey end the isolation of Turkish
Cyprus.
Those are some of the political issues that we expect the two
leaders will talk about. Moreover, there are also economic issues to be
debated by the two. The value of bilateral economic cooperation
between Turkey and Russia is believed to be $14-15 billion, and the
bilateral trade volume stands at some $11 billion. The recent fruit and
vegetable import crisis between the two countries showed that the
leaders of both countries must work harder to improve their
commercial cooperation. This meeting marks the fourth visit between
Erdogan and Putin since last December. It may be an exaggeration to
call our bilateral relations strategic partnership, but Turkish-Russian
relations have already grown in importance to the extent that they
affect the entire region.”269
With Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey tomorrow, a new stage
of bipartisan – and eventually bilateral – cooperation will be launched.
Very little has been published so far on the advanced rapprochement
between the age-old enemies on Black Sea’s northern and southern
shores.
The Russian presidential monarch’s visit is due to the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) summit, but it has been made
clear by the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Vladimir Ivanovskiy that
Putin intended to discuss key topics of bilateral cooperation, focusing
on energy.
Earlier this month, in a meeting held at Moscow’s Prezident
Hotel, the 2006 Awards of Merit were handed out at a ceremony
sponsored by the Association for Business and Friendship between the
Russian Federation and Turkey (RUTID). The obscure jury selected
figures and institutions that had supposedly made significant
contributions to the reinforcement of Turkish-Russian friendship in
the fields of economy, art, sports and media.
Izvestia, Russia’s prominent daily, and Zaman, key
269
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/ING2005/07/05x07x18.HTM ;
24 July, 2007.
112
propaganda tool of the Islamic Extremist Turkish premier Erdogan,
were given awards in the media category. Conspicuously used as
decorative bibelots, Turkish and Russian intellectuals and
businessmen gave short speeches on ways to widen and deepen the
bilateral relations and friendship.
The event was soon overshadowed by the spectacular visit the
Turkish Air Forces commander Faruk Cömert paid to Russia ten days
ago, which was the first since the establishment of diplomatic
relations, 87 years ago. The Turkish general returned home with the
decision to immediately establish a hot line between the two countries'
air force commanders. The visit’s target was mainly to reciprocate the
2004 visit of the Russian air force commander to Turkey.
Quite interestingly, an extensively apologetic discourse
ensued, creating further questions about the timing of the visit, and the
discussions engaged. The Turkish daily Today’s Zaman in an article
written by Lale Sari Ibrahimoglu (18/6) quoted a Russian military
analyst saying "Russia does not think that Turkey's acting like the bad
boy of NATO will serve Russia's interests. On the contrary, Moscow
has been seeking good relations with NATO and a good NATO ally
like Turkey will serve and currently serves the Russian interest. For
example, it was through Turkish intervention that Russia participated
in this year's European and NATO navy commanders' meeting, held
once a year".
According to the same newspaper " both Turkish and Russian
diplomatic and military sources ruled out that the growing trust
between the militaries of both countries, reflected in the increased
high-level military visits by top commanders, should be interpreted as
part of an alleged growing tendency within the Turkish Armed Forces
(TSK) to liken itself to the rather tough Russian military".
3.7. FROM RUSSIAN TOURISM TO RUSSIAN
ALLIANCE
It is interesting to notice how various spectra from old times
still insist to put the concept of "people" at the epicenter of such
perilous deals. Ekrem Dumanli, an Islamist Turkish journalist, in his
article entitled "The weakest link of Turkish-Russian relations"
(Today’s Zaman 12/6), deliberately puts it this way: "Peoples who
opted to remain distant until the collapse because of ideological
differences today develop sympathy. In summer times, Antalya, a city
in the southwest of Turkey, becomes a Russian town where the
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Russian tourists find inexpensive and high-quality resorts as well as
warmth and attention. Russians shift their interest from Antalya to
Erzurum in the winter. More importantly, today there is no longer any
reason for the enmity between the two countries, expected to last
forever, to continue".
The confusing reference to Tourism is made only to be
followed by the insidious ‘conclusion’ that there is no reason for
enmity between Russia and Turkey! Mr. Dumanli defiantly attributes
the ‘development’ to the collapse of the Soviet Union
(euphemistically termed as ‘end of Cold War’), but he seems
unfamiliar with the New Cold War; in addition, he naively enough
presents himself as totally unaware of the US anti-missile defence
systems for Eastern Europe. He even forgets that Turkey and the US
are still members of the same alliance (NATO) whereas Russia has
recently conducted a hateful propaganda against the NATO’s further
expansion in Eastern Europe. Although Muslim, Mr. Ekrem Dumanli
conveniently and ‘morally’ forgot the fair and tragic name of
Chechnya.
Over the past five years, the secretive Erdogan government
followed its Russian rapprochement agenda, harmfully alienating the
country from its natural allies, the US and NATO. It is true that
economic cooperation increased over the past few years and Turkish
contractors participated in numerous tenders, taking a proactive part in
Russia’s Construction Sector. Turkish companies such as ENKA,
Rönesans, Nurol, Alarko and Gama maintained a line of quality
beyond their European competitors.
Can all this be translated to a political rapprochement of
tectonic implications? To believe Erdogan’s personal apologist, Mr.
Dumanli, "It was peoples of both countries who had to suffer from the
deteriorated relations"! This statement would make everyone laugh as
it pertains to sheer fiction!
Both anti-democratic rulers, Kremlin’s tyrant and Ankara’s
perfidious Islamist simulator, have good reasons to join forces. Both
know that their countries will be rejected by the Berlin – Paris axis;
both have open accounts with the West and for different reasons. The
pathetic European Liberals, who offer a support to the Islamists of
Turkey in order to cheat them, will be rewarded with unprecedented
treachery from Erdogan’s Islamists, if they win the forthcoming
elections; it will be their way of reaction to the French Free Masonic
hysterical anti-Turkism.
114
Both Putin and Erdogan hate America and passionately expect
the ultimate confirmation of the US defeat in Iraq. The two loathsome
and anti-democratic rulers know that they are rejected at home;
Erdogan by the majority of the people and the military; Putin by the
dozens of millions of oppressed peoples, and the democratic Russians
of the persecuted parties of the opposition. That is why they need each
other.
As their aficionados put it "of course Turkish Prime Minister
Tayyip Erdoðan and Russian President Vladimir Putin have done
much to improve bilateral relations. The leaders created a miracle. Ten
years ago it was impossible to imagine that Turkish and Russian
leaders would come together for cooperation. However, today both
leaders exert their utmost effort to improve commercial and cultural
relations. Furthermore the strengthened ties do not bother other major
world political players, including the US and the EU. There is no
doubt that this is a huge diplomatic success. The Turkish public’s
good feelings for Putin and the Russian public’s sympathy toward
Tayyip Erdoðan is just like a dream".
That is why they conclude that "There is no going back in
Turkish-Russian relations. Above all remarkable bridges were built
between the two countries; authorities from both countries who
overcame huge obstacles in the fields of education, economics and
culture made enormous progress by which their peoples were pleased.
For this reason state figures would by no means take any steps that
could be regarded as retreat from the current situation since such a
move would be disruptive to historical friendship".
3.8. COMPARISON OF RUSSIA, TURKEY, ISRAEL,
AND THE USA
The case would be still a simple political equation, if the
Turkish military were still in good terms with the US. Yet, despite the
fact that the Turkish state consists in the world’s best break wave
against the Islamic Terrorists, and the Turkish military are its
strongest guardian and element, part of the American establishment
seems to pursue an erratically anti-Turkish attitude.
Part of America’s Liberal establishment supports the antiTurkish agenda of miniscule and geo-strategically insignificant
neighbors of Turkey (Armenia and Cyprus), fuels the Kurdistan strife,
promotes Erdogan and his Islamists in order to easily achieve their
anti-Turkish agenda’s goals, and opposes Turkey’s natural and
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salutary presence in Iraq. The devious group causes tremendous
damage to the US interests in Iraq, where only Turkey could replace
America and Britain, and impose order and discipline, to the US
interests in Israel, whereas an Israeli – Turkish alliance would end up
Assad’s and Abdallah’s tyrannies within a week, and as it can be
easily surmised through the aforementioned, to the US interests in the
Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia.
The Turkish secular political parties and the military will also
have no problems with a coalition with Russia and China in case for
one reason or another the Anti-Turkish hysteria continues. As guards
of the Democratic Order and the Secular Republic introduced by
Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish secular political parties and the military
stick to the ideas implemented by the great visionary and leader; either
Europe and America stick to the same ideas or not is not an issue of
importance. In 1940 when Europe was covered by Nazism, Turkey did
not change of adapt its ideals and values to Hitler’s.
And one should not forget that in the same way Turkey
protected most of the Balkans’ Jews at those days, Turkey – not
America – is the Only Power that can effectively protect Israel today,
turning to dust the analphabetic, barbaric and cannibalistic regimes of
Damascus, Amman and Riyadh. To do so, Turkey will have to stay
and will effectively stay Secular – either the apostate French
Freemasonic lodge wants it so or not!270
3.9. RUSSIA'S "KURDISH CARD" IN TURKISHRUSSIAN RIVALRY
When Boris Yeltsin proclaimed the "five principles of
Russia's Caucasus policy" at the Kislovodsk meeting with the
Transcaucasian heads of state and leaders of the republics of the North
Caucasus on June 3, 1996, he pointed out that cooperation and
stability in the Caucasus were a must for Russia's normal
development. According to his view, cooperation in the region "under
a strong joint control" could only be done by way of strengthening
"federalism," and therefore Russia "intended to continue to carry out
its peacekeeping functions" to maintain this process.
In fact, while Yeltsin was proposing this cooperation concept
based on Russian hegemonic leadership, he was representing the
270
By Prof. Dr. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis, Published: 6/24/2007;
http://www.buzzle.com/articles/rise-of-a-sinister-russo-turkish-axis.html ; 24 July,
2007.
116
majority view in Russia which believes that the best way to unite and
inspire Russians today is the unification of Russia's peoples for the
purpose of its revival as a "great power". It is not an unwarranted
conclusion to link this phenomenon to the imperial explanations of
some politicians and elements of the old communist apparatus. Russia
appears determined to take initiatives to maintain its 'big brother' role
in the region and also to take every precaution to meet any challenges
from other regional powers to prevent its hegemonic policies.271
During the early years of the post-Communist period, while
Iran's "pariah" position generally excluded it from filling the vacuum
in Caucasian and Central Asian politics left by Russia's "temporary
departure", the US and its western allies quickly appealed to their
NATO ally Turkey to represent the secular and democratic role model
for the newly emerging states. With its cultural and ethnic ties to the
region's peoples, Turkey was prepared psychopolitically for the role,
and rushed to fill it.
President Turgut Ozal, who was personally interested in
Turkic and Islamic ties, traveled to the area many times and signed
numerous agreements. Having strengthened his personal friendship
with President Bush by supporting America in the Gulf War, he
helped to build up the image of an emerging "Turkic world" stretching
from the Adriatic to the Great Wall". Until 1993 Turkey took an
escalating role in the Caucasus and Central Asia as the
"westernchoice".
As Russian authorities began recovering from the
destabilizing affects of the rapid change, and realized there was little
to be gained in Eastern Europe, they turned their attentions to the
south as Peter the Great had done centuries before. At that time, the
Russian Empire's challenge to the south brought a long front
stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus, a "competition line"
along which it met with the Ottoman Empire. During that period
before the time of nation states and through thirteen major wars, this
competition line determined the character of conflict in TurkishRussian relations. It also created a culture of skepticism regenerated
by domestic conservative elements which even today poisons the
chances for constructive cooperation. With Moscow's renewed
271
by Ersel Aydinli; Ersel Aydinli is a faculty member in the International Relations
Department, Kirikkale University, Turkey and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. at
McGill University.
117
perception of Turkey as a major threat to Russian interests in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, the Kremlin began conducting a unilateral
and exclusionary policy at practically every point in its relations with
Turkey, indicating a defection from their promises of cooperation.
Given the history of competition, sucha defection was not unexpected.
After mid-1993 Russia's unilateralism in its relations with
Turkey would be very evident. Russian authorities charged that the
Minsk Group which includes Turkey and the US aims simply to
sabotage Russian interests. Aleksei Arbatov, Russia's director of the
Center for Geopolitical and Military Forecasts, has described Turkey
as a military adversary of the near future. Long before these academic
analyses, radical Russian politicians mentioned "wiping out Turkey in
the process of re-creating the Russian Empire". It was even said that
the 1992 Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between Russia
and Turkey was the result of rumors leaked that Turkey was planning
to intervene in Azerbaijan. Russia's unilateralism was a natural output
of its Caucasian policy which saw "any attempts to encircle its
southern borders" as a direct threat to its security, and led a unilateral,
Russian-dominated joint action, and hegemonic stability in the region.
The separatist movement in Chechnya, attempts to exclude
Russians from Azerbaijani Caspian oil reserves, and the involvement
of "third" parties, mainly Turkey, Iran, and multinational corporations
backed by western powers, presented a threat to Russia's integrative
policies towards the Caucasus. Since regional interests were
categorized as being of vital interest to national security, the response
would include every means available. Turkish attempts to broaden its
presence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, and Russian
apprehension that Turkey might now fill the role of "big
brother"meant that Turkey fell into this threat category.
While Russia was desperately trying to crush the separatist
movement in Chechnya to secure its interests in the Caucasus, the
impression that Turkey was somehow supporting Chechen guerrillas
provided a perfect counterattack platform to pacify Turkey not only in
the Chechen issue but in overall Turkish foreign policy towards
Caucasian oil issues and Central Asia. This platform was the
"Kurdish card".
Long before the current post-Soviet rivalry began, there was
concern about Russian/Soviet involvement in the Kurdish issue. An
article from a July 1946 issue of Foreign Affairs stated that the
Kurdish independence movement was considered the most dangerous
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of all Middle East troubles because of the support it got from Soviet
Russia, and that the Kurds' "grievances, ammunition, and fighting
nature could make them players in a Soviet game".
The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) became active in the
early 1970s as a Marxist-Leninist organization, and was a natural
target for Soviet agitation which Turkey, as a NATO country,
attracted. After the 1980 military coup in Turkey, the PKK survived as
the only anti-establishment terrorist organization in the country, this
time as a rural insurgency movement beginning to concentrate on
Kurdish nationalism along with its Marxist ideology. Since then
Turkey has spent approximately $6-7 billion annually in this struggle
which has claimed the lives of more than 10,000 Kurdish and Turkish
civilians.
Most of the terrorist activity has occurred in southeastern
Turkey, through which the projected Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will run.
A Kurdish threat against a proposed pipeline was discussed in August
1995 when Ahmad Dere, the Kurdistan National Liberation Front
spokesman in the CIS, spoke of the Kurdish leadership's intention to
obstruct construction of a pipeline for shipping Caspian oil across
Turkey. Thus Russia discovered the "Kurdish Card", which could be
used against Turkey's rising influence in CIS countries.
The first sign of playing the Kurdish card came with a
conference entitled "The History of Kurdistan" held in Moscow in
February 1994, and organized by the Kurdistan Committee and the
Kurdistan Liberation Front, both of which were affiliated with the
PKK. After the Turkish press discovered that the Russian Ministry of
Nationalities and Regional Policy was the co-organizer of the
conference, the Turkish Foreign Ministry sent a protest to the Russian
Ambassador, and received a response denying all allegations. It went
on to say that they would not allow similar conferences to be held in
the future, but warned that Turkey should be very careful not to play
similar trump cards, such as a Turkic-Muslim Chechen republic. A
report published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta some time before the
incident, suggested that Moscow might consider using the PKK to
exert pressure on the Turkish leadership as a counterweight to
Ankara's alleged support for Chechen leader Dudayev. It was also
reported by the Turkish press that the Russian Foreign Ministry had
started to work on formulating a clear policy on the Kurdish problem
in early 1994.
While Kurdish groups from Turkey were exploiting the
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growing rift between Turkey and Russia, a convention of Kurdish
organizations from the CIS ended on October 31, 1994 in Moscow
with a decision to establish a "Kurdish Union," with the PKK as its
nucleus. The PKK had chaired the three-day convention. It was
noteworthy that Moscow refrained from any action against the
gathering despite the fact that the organizers themselves
acknowledged the PKK link.
Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary, Ozdem Sandberk,
flew to Moscow to discuss the matter, but again the Russians denied
the PKK link. During the same period that the representative of
Kurdistan's National Liberation Front in the CIS was urging the
Russian president to act as a "mediator and peacemaker between the
Kurdish movement and Turkey, he was calling the Caspian pipeline
project a "manifestation of pan-Turkic plans".
At the end of 1994, Turkey was still treating the Chechnya
issue as an internal matter of the Russian Federation, but as the
Russians began to intensify the attack in Chechnya and to perform
indiscriminate air raids resulting in high civilian casualties, Turkey
faced the dilemma of whether or not to speak out. Moscow chose this
time to host PKK officials in an effort to draw attention to Turkey's
sympathy for the Chechens and win more support from influential
sources in Russia for the separatist Kurdish movement by opening a
Moscow bureau. The Russian official response to the Turkish
Ambassador in Moscow was that the PKK bureau in Moscow was
opened for "Kurdish cultural activities only".
By early 1995, the PKK-Chechnya circle was becoming more
apparent. The Russian Ambassador to Ankara presented Turkish
officials with evidence of a flow of weapons to Chechnya via Turkish
territory. As the Russians complained about the matter, two former
Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament who had fled the country
to found the Kurdish parliament in exile, came to Moscow to pursue
their goals. The Russian Foreign Ministry again denied any affiliation
of Russian officials with these attempts, while simultaneously
allowing the "Kurdish House", a Kurdish center under PKK control, to
open in Moscow.
Public opinion in Russia was becoming more sensitive about
the alleged Chechnya-Kurdish connection, and began blaming the
West for being softer on Turkish activities in Kurdistan than on
Russian ones in Chechnya due to overlapping Turkish and Western
interests on the 'project of the century' on Caspian oil".(17) As Turkey
120
began to recognize the seriousness of the situation and of PKK
dominance in "cultural activities" in Moscow, officials were sent to
Russia, and a "Protocol to Prevent Terrorism" was signed. Moscow
would forbid the PKK in Russia.
This first agreement marked the initiation of a cycle of PKK
or Kurdish-related activities in Russia followed by Turkish protests,
and Russian denials of any official responsibility but tacit approval of
their continuation. Turkey's extreme sensitivity on the issue meant
that subsequent negotiations would eventually end with oral or written
agreements for Turkey's not getting involved in the Caucasus in
general, and Chechnya in particular. Russia had found Turkey's most
vulnerable side.
At the end of January 1995, Russian officials visiting Turkey
repeated that Russia would not allow the Kurdish House and the PKK
in Russia, in turn Turkey appeared to agree to taking a low profile
regarding Russian efforts to reassert its presence in the Caucasus.
Within this atmosphere, Russia started to storm Chechnya,
and Turkey made only empty and weak protests. Russia even
conducted joint military maneuvers with Armenia near the Turkish
border, demonstrating the seriousness of its intentions in the
Transcaucasus. On the other side, Turkey was trying to fold up its sixweek-old cross-border operation against PKK separatists in Northern
Iraq, with little protest from Russia.
Turkey and Russia reiterated on July 21, 1995 that they would
not tolerate separatist movements threatening the other's territorial
integrity. While Turkish officials were assuring that the Chechen
organizations in Turkey would not be allowed to engage in activities,
Albert Chernyshev, former Russian Ambassador to Turkey and later
Deputy Foreign Minister, having said previously that Russia
considered the Kurdish problem to be Ankara's "internal affair", was
saying, "we must understand each other. People who live in glass
houses should not throw stones". Chernyshev might well have been
describing the hub of Turkish-Russian relations with a realistic
approach. This speech also marked the fact that Russia's Kurdish card
was operating still, and would be one of the strongest leverages of
Russian foreign policy strategists to pacify Turkey and to thwart
Turkish desires to become a regional power in the Caucasus.
Towards the end of 1995, Russia would play the card further.
Members of the Russian Duma agreed to host the third international
conference of the Kurdistan Parliament in exile. The Russian
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executive branch blamed the Duma, but Turkey remained
unconvinced, and the act was publicly considered as one of "Russian
treachery. Russia was also ignoring the Conventional Forces
Reduction Agreement in which it had agreed to reduce its forces on
NATO's northern and southern flanks. Turkey's already intimidated
position could not meet this challenge of Russian unilateralism.
In 1996 Russia applied to the Kurdish card repeatedly, placing
Turkey in a defensive position which was often at the expense of the
dynamism of its policies towards the Caucasus and Central Asia. The
year witnessed heavy diplomatic traffic to repair the wounded
relations between the two countries.
The January 1996 seizure of the Avrasya sea ferry by the proChechen terrorists escalated already tense communications between
the parties. Yeltsin showed his dissatisfaction with the handling of the
crisis, claiming that Turkey had delayed liberating the hostages in
order to keep international attention on the Chechnya issue. In March,
the Undersecretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry conducted official
talks in Moscow calling for a "new era in ties", and stated that the
Russians had prevented the setting up on Russian soil of a radio
station operated by the PKK. The Russians, having secured the early
Azerbaijani oil flow through the northern route as opposed to the
Turkish route, were saying that they were satisfied with Turkey's
position on the Chechen crisis. Despite the rhetoric, Russia appeared
determined to use the PKK card. At a meeting with the PKK and
Aleksandr Nevzorov, a department head of the ministerial-level
Internal Intelligence Service, Russian government officials openly
declared that the PKK was not a terrorist organization, and that Russia
should use the Kurdish issue to pressure Turkey. In July, the Turkish
Parliament Speaker was told by the Russian Prime Minister that he did
not have specific information about PKK activities, but he would have
the matter investigated.
Shortly thereafter, Russian and Turkish journalists discovered
a Kurdish camp, administered and sponsored by the PKK. This camp
had been used in part as a clinic to treat wounded PKK members and
was located within a three hour drive of the Kremlin. The
correspondent of the Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda ironically
mentioned the similarity between this incident and the "Chechen
guerrillas lick[ing] their wounds with the help of the Crimean Turks."
Despite Turkey's continued passive position on Chechnya and
the Caucasus, Russia had become less conciliatory, deeming it
122
unnecessary even to verbally support Turkey against the PKK.
Turkish plans to set up a security zone in northern Iraq to prevent
PKK attacks received stern warnings from Moscow.
In October 1996 Turkish President Demirel met with Russian
Premier Chernomyrdin following meetings of the Black Sea
Cooperation Organization. Chechnya and the PKK were the major
topics of discussion at this high level meeting. Once again
Chernomyrdin promised the administration would stop any "political"
PKK activities in Russia. So far, an intimidated Turkish foreign
policy caused by the cycle has helped Russia to gain time for dealing
with the Chechnya problem, and to obtain one of the two early oil
routes for Caspian oil. When Viktor Ustinov, Chairman of the
Committee for Geopolitics of the State Duma of Russia called on the
Kurds and Russians for "joint work" to create an independent Kurdish
state, it was clear that the separatist PKK organization was playing a
sizable role in frustrating practical realization of the pipeline project's
"Mediterranean option".
In December, Deputy Prime Minister Ciller paid a visit to
Moscow to discuss PKK/Chechen affairs with the hope of normalizing
relations. Again the Russians made mention of arms shipments from
Turkey to Chechnya, a charge which Turkey denied. In turn Turkey
brought up the PKK issue and was met with firm denials. The visit
seems destined to become another in the cycle of failed diplomatic
rhetoric.
The skeptical and chaotic character of five centuries of
Turkish-Russian relations continues to prevail and to promote
defection from any cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In
the current era, the syndrome of fear of being divided inherited from
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, forces Turkey to try and stop the
Russians from playing the Kurdish card at any cost. To do so they
must stay away from Russia's hegemonic policies in the Turkic world
of the Caucasus and Central Asia. There is no doubt that Russia has
played the Kurdish card effectively, and the challenge of the PKK has
severely restricted Turkey's ability to play a strong role not only in the
Caucasus and Central Asia but also in the Balkans, in particular the
Bosnian conflict. The Kurdish card has given Russia unprecedented
leverage in its relations with Turkey. Unless Turkey is able to find a
solution to its PKK problem, it seems likely that Russia will continue
123
to use the Kurdish card to secure its strategic interests.272
3.10. EU-RUSSIA ENERGY DIALOGUE
The EU-25 is dependent on Russia for 25% of its gas and 25%
of its oil. Conversely, sales of raw materials to the EU provide most of
Russia's foreign currency and contribute to over 40% of the Russian
federal budget. In October 2000, the EU and Russia agreed to start an
Energy Dialogue dealing with issues such as security of supply,
energy efficiency, infrastructure (e.g. pipelines), investments and
trade.273
Launched at the EU-Russia Summit in Paris in October 2000,
this bilateral Energy Dialogue aims at securing Europe's access to
Russia's huge oil and gas reserves (the country holds one third of the
world´s known gas reserves). The dialogue is based on the assumption
that interdependence between the two regions will grow - from the EU
for reasons of security of supply; on the part of Russia, to secure
foreign investment and facilitate its own access to EU and world
markets (the EU is responsible for over half of Russia's trade
turnover).
The current structure of the Energy Dialogue aims to ensure
the close involvement of the EU Member States, the European energy
industry and the International Financial Institutions. Four thematic
working groups are bringing together more than 100 European and
Russian experts from the private sector and from the administrations
to discuss investments, infrastructures, trade and energy efficiency
issues and to prepare further proposals for the Energy Dialogue.
For the EU, Russia is today the single most important external
supplier of natural gas and oil. Some commentators say there is a risk
of the EU becoming so dependent on supplies of energy from Russia
that it constrains EU head of states from criticising any failings in the
development of Russian democracy, human rights and freedom of the
press.
On the other hand the EU is Russia´s main economic partner.
Bilateral trade amounted to 96,55 billion euro in 2004. Over 60% of
Russia´s export revenue comes from energy, and most of it is in the
form of exports to the EU. So Russia is as dependent on the EU as the
272
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/HOMEPAGES/USAZERB/232.htm ; 24 July,
2007.
273
Published: Monday 28 November 2005 | Updated: Friday 29 June 2007.
124
EU is on Russia. European energy dependence will increase over the
foreseeable future as North Sea production declines. According to
official forecasts , the EU will import over 70% of its energy by 2030.
Russia is home to 27% of the world's known gas reserves as
well as to vast oil fields. For the EU-25, Russia is the main supplier of
hydrocarbons. 25% of its gas (50% of all imports) and 25% of its oil
(over 30% of all imports) come from Russia. Sales of its raw materials
to the EU provide foreign currency and over 40% of the Russian
federal budget.
Russia´s biggest energy monopoly Gazprom holds 25% of the
world´s gas reserves and produces 94% of Russia´s gas and 16% of
global output, supplying a quarter of the EU market via transit trough
Ukraine and Belarus. The company´s BOE (barrels of oil equivalent)
reserves are slightly behind Saudi Arabia and Iran, and ahead of Iraq
and Kuwait. Gazprom´s daily production is equivalent to 10.3 million
barrels of oil. Russia´s total daily exports of all oil (crude and
derivative products) amounts to just over 7.0 million barrels: about
85% of it goes to the EU. Challenges for the fossil fuels sector
include:
establishment of uniform "rules of the game";
increase of oil extraction, rise in quality of oil products
produced in Russian oil refineries;
further liberalisation of the gas market;
provision of transport system access rules;
creation of a favourable investment climate and interest of
companies in their activities in the Russian market.
main projects of common interest: Northern European TransBaltic natural gas pipeline; development of the Shtokhman natural gas
field; Yamal-Druzhba oil pipeline interconnection, BurgasAlexandroupolis oil pipeline project.
3.11. KYOTO PROTOCOL AND POSITIONS
In October 2004 the Russian State Duma approved the
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in
February 2005. The Commission has provided technical assistance
through the TACIS programme since January 2005. Challenges for
the implementation of the Kyoto protocol:
joint pilot projects on energy efficiency in Russia:
Arkhangelsk, Astrakhan and Kaliningrad. Recently a joint project on
125
"Renewable Energy policy and Rehabilitation of Small Scale Hydro
Power Plants" has been launched.
promotion of renewable energy sources: joint investment
projects in the use of energy from rivers for local power supply; use of
heat from mine waters for local heat supply in mining towns of
Russia; power use of biomass, including recycling of waste from the
woodworking industry for the production of heat and electricity of
wood granules as well as projects, focused on the complete production
cycle and use of liquid biofuel for transport; manufacturing of wind
energy equipment and creation of wind energy stations in Russia.
extraction and utilisation of associated gas.
Interconnected electricity network between Russia and the EU
Discussions on the reform of electricity systems are being
pushed by the Commission and the Russian government, together with
RAO-UES , Eurelectric and the Union for Co-ordination of
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE ). An agreement in principle
between the CIS Electric Power Council and Eurelectric on the market
and environmental roadmaps was reached in Vienna on 14 June 2005.
Recently a comprehensive feasibility study on the interconnection of
the transmission systems of the Union for the Co-ordination of
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) and the Integrated Power
System/United Power System (IPS/UPS) was launched. Challenges to
be faced in the move towards a grid interconnection include:
absence of a sufficient regulatory framework in Russia;
need to adopt similar environmental and safety standards for
electricity production, such as clean coal combustion rules and the
guarantee of nuclear safety;
need to put in place the necessary infrastructure for the joint
use and synchronisation of the electricity systems of Russia and the
EU;
implementation of modern methods of power control
management technologies;
financial guarantee scheme for EU investors.
Physical security
Transportation of oil: the safe and reliable transportation of
crude oil and oil products, including transport by rail and sea, is an
important sector of co-operation. Marine pollution is a particularly
serious concern for EU countries. The EU is encouraging Russia to
implement International Maritime Organisation (IMO) standards.
Activities undertaken in this direction under the Energy Dialogue are
126
to be continued in the framework of the EU-Russia Transport
Dialogue.
Surveillance system: the use of satellite navigation in the
energy sector includes exploration, construction, transport and site
monitoring. Russia is carrying out an ambitious programme of
modernisation of its GLONASS system, which it plans to open up for
civilian purposes. The European programme GALILEO aims to set up
by 2008 the first global satellite navigation system specifically
designed for civilian and commercial applications. The joint use of
GLONASS and GALILEO for the safety of energy transport
infrastructures (for example to prevent accidents and detect leaks in
oil and gas infrastructure) and energy production is an objective that
has been pursued since 1999. An agreement is likely to be adopted in
2006-2007.
Nuclear materials: nuclear safety and decommissioning
(avoiding another Chernobyl). Trade relations in the area of nuclear
materials between Russia and the new member states are estimated to
be worth more than 180 million euro per year to Russia, and
correspond to 80% of the market in the new member states (or 25% of
the market in the EU-25). An agreement on trade in nuclear materials
is currently being negotiated to establish transparent, stable and
predictable rules in the interests of and for the viability of the nuclear
industries of both parties.
Despite five years of successful co-operation in the
framework of the dialogue, a real breakthrough is still lacking. EURussia energy relations remain highly dependent on broader EURussia negotiations on the "four spaces " - economic, legal, security,
research - on which progress is slow (EurActiv, 11 May 2005).
Meanwhile, bilateral deals between Russian and separate EU states
continue to prevail over a specific EU approach.
The European Federation of Public Service Unions ( EPSU )
recognises the growing dependence of the EU on oil and gas from
countries outside the EU, especially Russia. But EPSU regrets the
absence of a social dimension to the EU-Russia dialogue. “The energy
dialogue should be accompanied by a dialogue or series of dialogues
including all stakeholders, such as trade unions, environmental groups
and others. A European energy community is more than a playground
for large multinational companies. It requires the equal involvement of
companies and trade unions,” stated Jan Willem Goudriaan, EPSU
Deputy General Secretary.
127
The International Network for Sustainable Energy ( InforseEurope ) thinks that the dialogue gives too much focus to traditional
forms of energy and should increase its focus on energy efficiency and
renewable energy. The electricity interconnections must not lead to
environmental dumping of electricity, thus the requirement for equal
environmental and safety standards is important. The dialogue should
not lead to the sale of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from
EU countries to Russia.
Jennifer Morgan, Director of the WWF Global Climate
Change Programme criticises the "old-style approach in energy
relations between EU and Russia for focusing on oil, gas and
pipelines, which continues to dominate at the expense of renewable
energy. By joining forces towards non-carbon energy, the EU and
Russia could significantly contribute to the reduction of global
greenhouse gas emissions, thus combating climate change. However
the overall priorities of the EU-Russian energy relations seems to have
gone back to the seventies when the entire debate was geared towards
oil, gas and nuclear and supply pipelines".
Donald Jensen, director of communications at Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty , thinks that Vladimir Putin is trying to put state
management of natural resources at the centre of the country’s foreign
policy. "With Russia’s greatly diminished military and generally
unappealing international image, Putin has little alternative available
to him if he is to achieve his goal of making his country a great power.
The prospects that this strategy will work, however, are far from
certain," adds Jensen.274
3.12. NEW RUSSIAN GAS PIPELINE DEAL CUTS
THROUGH EU UNITY
On 23 June, Italian gas giant Eni and Russia's Gazprom
agreed to cooperate on a new pipeline that will increase Russian
natural gas flows to EU markets. The deal is widely seen as increasing
the EU's dependance on Russian gas, and appears to run counter to
European efforts to "speak with one voice" in external energy
relations.275
Russia currently provides over 40% of the EU's natural gas
needs, but political relations between the EU and Russia have been
274
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-russia-energy-dialogue/article-150061 ; 24
July, 2007.
275
Published: Monday 25 June 2007 | Updated: Monday 2 July 2007.
128
plagued by difficulties (see EurActiv 15/05/07 and 22/05/07) and the
increasingly monopolistic control of state-controlled Gazprom over
Russian natural gas resources is a source of concern for Europe.
The EU has attempted to present a united front to Russia as
part of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, launched in 2000, but
bilateral deals between Russia and EU member states continue to
prevail over a specific EU approach (see our LinksDossier).
If approved by regulators on both sides, the new pipeline,
known as "South Stream", will pass through the Black Sea and into
Bulgaria, bringing 30 million cubic meters of gas annually to EU
markets.
Italy's Minister of Industry Pierluigi Bersani considers South
Stream "a deal between Russia and Europe" that will increase
Europe's energy security.
But others are concerned that Russia may ultimately abuse the
EU's dependance on its natural gas for political purposes, particularly
after Russia cut supplies to the Ukraine in January 2006 (EurActiv
11/01/06).
In an effort to diversify its supply, the EU has been backing
several new pipelines, such as the Caspian Nabucco project (EurActiv
27/06/07). The EU has also launched a "Black Sea Synergy" strategy
designed in part to increase energy cooperation countries in the region
(EurActiv 11/04/07).
But the South Stream deal may conflict with both of these
efforts, as Gazprom investments for Nabucco are now highly unlikely
and South Stream, which runs through the Black Sea, was agreed
outside the framework the EU's strategy.
While the advantages for Europe as a whole remain uncertain,
the deal is certainly a victory for the Italian gas giant.
Eni is Gazprom's largest customer and Europe's largest gas
company in terms of sales. Unlike BP and Shell, which have been
forced to sell key Russian assets to Gazprom, as part of the South
Stream deal Eni will likely allowed to keep a number of assets
recently acquired in Russia.
Eni has also offered Gazprom guaranteed supply contracts to
2035, as well as extensive access to the Italian market.
The European Commission reacted with pragmatism to the
announcement, with one spokesperson in Brussels saying that, due to
rapidly increasing demand for gas in Europe, "every new
infrastructure that can help meet this rising demand is a positive
129
thing".276
3.13. EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT
Finland, the current holder of the EU Presidency, will host the
EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki on 24 November. The EU delegation
will be led by Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen and the Russian
delegation by President Vladimir Putin. The EU will also be
represented by the President of the European Commission, José
Manuel Barroso, and High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, Javier Solana.277
The EU-Russia Summit will be paralleled with a separate
high-level Northern Dimension meeting. The meeting will be attended
by the Northern Dimension partners: the EU, Russia, Norway and
Iceland. The aim is to adopt a new Northern Dimension Framework
Document to replace the current Northern Dimension Action Plans.
The framework document will turn the Northern Dimension into a
common policy, to be pursued by all Northern Dimension parties as of
the beginning of 2007.278
3.14.
TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RAPPROCHEMENT:
REALITY OR FICTION?
Is Turkey’s honeymoon with Russia over? The short answer
is “not yet.” This question rightly assumes that there was indeed a
major rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow. Understandably,
many Western analysts fail to see the logic behind a Turco-Russian
coupling. After all, Turkey and Russia are old rivals, with long
histories of war, animosity and strategic divergence. But historic
rivalry is not eternal destiny. In addition to growing energy deals,
trade volume and mass tourism, the last few years witnessed the most
crucial factor creating a common ground between Ankara and
Moscow: frustration with Washington.279
Ankara’s troubles with Washington are well known but worth
276
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/new-russian-gas-pipeline-deal-cuts-euunity/article-164920 ; 24 July, 2007.
277
24 Nov 2006 Venue: Helsinki, Third country meetings; General Affairs and
External Relations.
278
http://www.eu2006.fi/calendar/vko47/en_GB/1159261767620/?u4.highlight=Russia ;
24 July, 2007.
279
OMER TASPINAR; [email protected] ; Columnists.
130
repeating since they give Russia a positive image. Turkey’s most
pressing concern is the Kurdish question in Iraq. The fact that the
Kurds are now America’s best friends, and more importantly, the fact
that the PKK has found a safe haven in northern Iraq is proving too
much to digest for even the most pro-Western circles in Turkey.
Washington’s inaction exacerbates Turkey’s conspiracy-prone
political environment. As a result, everyone in Turkey believes a
Kurdish state in northern Iraq is around the corner -- courtesy of the
American invasion.
In addition to the Kurdish issue, Turkey’s anti-Americanism
is compounded by another identity problem: radical secularism.
America’s clumsy attempts to promote Turkey as a “model” or more
recently as a “source of inspiration” in the Islamic world have
disastrously backfired. The perception that America is supporting
“moderate Islam” in Turkey deeply alienates the staunchly secularist
Kemalist elite. Already alarmed about AK party’s so-called “hidden
agenda” of Islamicization, the Kemalists have become the most antiAmerican circle in Turkey, closely followed by anti-Kurdish
nationalists. The implications for Washington are bleak. By alienating
the Kemalists and Turkish nationalists at the same time, America has
basically “lost” most of Turkey.
But why should such Turkish frustration create a TurkishRussian rapprochement? Mainly because Russia is now equally
frustrated with America. Moscow has its own axe to grind with
Washington because of its loss of influence in its’ “near abroad.” In
that sense, Turkey’s troubles with Washington coincide with longerterm Russian disgruntlement over American encroachment in Eastern
Europe, the Caucuses and Central Asia. Turkey and Russia’s concerns
about Iran, Iraq and Syria also seem to converge. Both countries see in
Iraq a chaos that has damaged their national interests -- Turkey more
profoundly, but Russia as well, given its Iraqi oil contracts. In Iran,
Turkey’s interests in heading off the PKK and the potential emergence
of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq complement Russia’s interests in
investing in the Iranian civilian nuclear power and nurturing an antiAmerican ally. In Syria, Turkey sees a platform against a potential
Kurdish state, while Russia is looking to rebuild relations with an old
Soviet-era friend.
More important than their common interests in the Middle
East, is Ankara and Moscow’s new agreement about their respective
minority problems. Unlike during the 1990s, Turkey and Russia now
131
support each other’s positions on Chechnya and the Kurds -expressing similar fears of terrorism and separatism. This is hardly
surprising. Russia and Turkey are both status-quo oriented powers.
They put a high premium on stability in their neighborhood. They
share an aversion towards potentially chaotic regime change and see
the Bush Administration’s “freedom and democracy” agenda as a
hegemonic and destabilizing policy that will damage their national
interests on their southern tiers. Under such circumstances, it is no
wonder that Putin’s Munich speech denouncing American
unilateralism was put on the Turkish General Staff’s official website.
Despite all these factors, it is still extremely premature to
speak of a “strategic convergence” between Turkey and Russia. What
we have is tactical flirtations born out of frustration with America.
This is hardly a regional strategic realignment. After all, Moscow has
done absolutely nothing to help Turkey vis-à-vis Cyprus, Armenia,
and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. And Moscow’s recent decision to
go ahead with the Burgaz-Alexandroupolis bypass oil pipeline -- a
project that favors Bulgaria and Greece at the expense of the SamsunCeyhan option -- clearly illustrates the realistic limits to TurkishRussian relations, even in the field of energy. History may not be
destiny. But it still matters in shaping national interests.280
280
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/yazarDetay.do?haberno=106434 ; 24 July,
2007.
132
FOURTH CHAPTER
4.1.
ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN
TURKEY AND RUSSIA
In the pre-republican term, Turkish-Russian commercial
relationships were very low. In that period, Russia exported to Turkey
principally petrol, sugar and weavings. After the proclamation of the
republic, a new thought which is related to the improvement of
Turkey’s commercial activities with Russia came up. While the
importation of Turkey from Russia in 1923 constituted just 2% of
Turkey’s total exportation, in 1924, this figure went up to 3.29%. On
the other hand, petrol, food stuff and lightening stuff were imported
from Russia and tobacco, mine and animal were exported to there.281
The commercial relationships between the two countries had
improved until the year 1926, but from that year on some problems
occurred in the importation between Russia and Turkey. At that time,
Russia overtaxed on the goods that were imported from Turkey. In
consequence of the bilateral discussion about the issue, the Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation was signed in 1927. According to this
agreement, Russia opened new commercial representative agencies in
Turkey and the commercial representatives were given diplomatic
immunity by arranging the status of them. Besides, both countries
agreed that the goods which would be sent to a third country could
pass in transit and duty-free. In 1929, the import volume of Turkey
was 275,000,000 liras, 6.43% of which, 16,467,000 liras, was
constituted by the goods imported from Russia. In the same year, total
export volume of Turkey was about 150,000,000 liras, 3.49% of
which, 5,422,000 liras, was constituted by the goods exported to
Russia.
4.2. RUSSIA’S
SUPPORT
FOR
TURKEY’S
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
In 1932, Russia accepted to grant a loan of 16 million liras.
The two countries came to an agreement that the repayment of this 20year-dated loan would be of the goods that Russia intended, not
dollar-denominated. This loan would be used for the financing of the
industrial enterprises. It is made a decision that machines would be
281
Annual of Turkey, (1927)
133
brought from Russia, where the textile industry had improved very
much, to Turkey for the textile industry. A group of Russian experts
came to Turkey in 1932 to determine where that Russian loan would
be used but before they came, they had given to Turkey some vehicles
of producing such as lorry, tractor, which Turkey need. The Russian
expert team examined on-site to decide the suitable places for the
establishment of cotton weaving mills.
As a result of those study trips, the experts filed a report to
Turkish officials and as it was stated in that report, they recommended
establishing cotton factories in Nazilli and Kayseri, and also
increasing of cotton production. The construction works of the factory
which was built in Kayseri started rapidly and while its construction
was going on, the General Directorate of Sumerbank sent the young
who would work for the factory to Russia for internship. When the
first five-year development plan was put into practice, hosiery was
constructed in Kayseri at first by the loan Russia had sent, and its
plants and machinery were brought from Russia. Russian engineers
also worked in construction of this factory. At the same time, a school
which is related to industry was settled down in Kayseri. In this
school, the people would be trained for both making industrial
production and the production of the required equipment. It was
planned to be produced better fabrics in the Chintz Factory of Nazilli,
though its production would be less than that of the Hosiery of
Kayseri.
In addition to Nazilli, a cotton factory was built in Ereğli.
Republic of Turkey, which was trying to complete its establishments
of production with the support of Russia, raised volume of trade with
that country. According to the records of the year 1934, while petrol,
gas, cable, iron and steel products, lightening stuff, various household
goods, flooring, paper and textiles were being bought, wool, angora,
animal, hunting leather, olive and orange were sold. Within the same
year, a group was sent there to buy materiel. Various railroad projects
were carried out in the East with the support of Russia once again.282
The first frame of the economic relationships between Turkey and
Russia is the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was signed
by Turkey and USSR on the 8th of October, 1937. Commercial
activities between Turkey and Russia, which were gained speed
thanks to that agreement, were at the level of about 100 rubles a year.
282
KORHAN (2012)
134
With the visit of Ismet Inonu, Turkish prime minister of the term, to
Moscow in 1937 with the visit of Kosigin, Russian prime minister of
the term, to Turkey in 1966, the economic relations between the two
countries increased.
4.3. THE LAST PERIODS OF THE SOVIETS and
THE RELATIONS
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, A new chapter in the
history of Russian-Turkish relationships opened. Russian-Turkish
relations are on an upward trend. The supply of natural gas from the
USSR to Turkey along the Trans-Balkan pipeline, beginning in 1987,
represented an evolution of the traditional relationship.
Turkey started to buy natural gas from Russia for the first time
with this agreement. In accordance with the agreement, it was
stipulated that 70% of the price of natural gas which was bought from
Russia would be paid through the exportation of goods and service.
By this means, it was aimed to constitute new opportunities to
increase the exportation of Turkish industry products. It was also
intended that Turkish building contractors could operate in
construction sector in Russia and that the price of natural gas to be
paid by this way as well. Between the years 1987-1994, when the first
purchase of natural gas started, natural gas importation amount to 1.9
billion dollars was made. Between those dates, the exportation amount
recorded within the scope of the list of goods was 271 million dollars,
and the total construction works valued at 609 million dollars.283
Turkish construction sector has undertaken 1191 projects, which is
amount to 34 million dollars, in Russia up to now.
After the subversion of USSR, the agreement on Economic
and Commercial Cooperation, which was signed on the 25th of
February, 1991, is an important reference point. Except for those main
agreements, other important agreements were signed –such as the
agreement which established the mechanism of Joint Economic
Commission, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Agreements about
customs issues, Cooperation in Tourism, Preventing Double Taxation
in Taxes Levied on Income, Mutual Promotion and Conserving of
Investments, and Protocol on International Road Transport.
When Vladimir Putin, prime minister of Russia at that time,
visited Turkey in 2009, the common goal was that the volume of trade
283
ŞEN, C. G. (2003)
135
between the two countries in the next five years would be raised up to
100 billion dollars.
After 1990, main products that Turkey exported to Russian
Federation were food products (25%), weaving products (20%),
chemicals (10%) and automotive industry products (7%). Main
products that Turkey imported from Russian Federation were petrol
and petroleum products (37.6%), natural gas (32.4%), coal (5.8%) and
non-ferrous metals.
Russian investments in Turkey up to now have approached to
8 billion dollars. The tender bid of the nuclear power plant, which
Turkey would install in Akkuyu, Mersin, has been given to Russian
Federation.
In Turkish-Russian economic relations, shuttle trade took an
important place, in 1990s in particular. But later on, it has decreased.
The following reasons have influenced the decrease of shuttle trade:284
 After the financial crisis in Russia in 1998, Russian
importers have canalized in alternative markets such as China, Poland
and Greece, instead of Turkey.
 Russian government has restricted grey economy and
shuttle trade within the framework of its negotiations with IMF, WTO
and other international organizations.
 Domestic producers in Russia have grown stronger in time.
With western firms’ penetrating into the market, an adverse opinion
has emerged against shuttle trade.
 With the import-substitution policy implemented by
Russian government, a great number of products subject to shuttle
trade began to be produced domestically.
With a domestic circular that Russian Federation published in
July, 2008, the controls for all delivery from Turkey to Russian
Federation have become intense. A fully customs control has been
applied for all of the products which were consigned from Turkey.
This application was not only cramped with Turkey, but also it
involved Greece, Italy, Mongolia, Public Republic of China and the
United Arab Emirates. But the controls for Turkish goods were more
widely and more commonly applied. High negotiations were started
between the customs offices of the two countries to remove the crisis
and it was stated to constitute a system named Simplified Customs
Frontier (BGH / SCF) between the countries in 2009.
284
KIRCI, (2007)
136
4.4. ECONOMIC and SOCIAL INDICATORS OF
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Russia, which made a rapid progress after the subversion of
the Soviet Union, covered an important distance in terms of economic
and social indicators. Various economic and social indicators
belonging to Russia are given below.
Table 1. Economic and Social Variables
Federation (2010)
Agricultural land (% of land area)
Agricultural machinery, tractors per 100 sq. km of
arable land
Trade in services (% of GDP)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Private capital flows, total (% of GDP)
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
External debt stocks (% of GNI)
Energy production (kt of oil equivalent)
Electricity production from oil, gas and coal sources
(% of total)
Electricity production (kWh)
Population density (people per sq. km of land area)
Total reserves (% of total external debt)
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
Real interest rate (%)
Tax revenue (% of GDP)
Household final consumption expenditure, etc. (% of
GDP)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Adjusted net national income (annual % growth)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24)
Literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and
137
of Russian
13,16252739
27,10308008
7,751079472
5,320056291
1,73659725
2,846341852
31,13928636
1293048,656
67,11864309
1,03612E+12
8,665880599
91,60802584
8,435001025
6,353304254
13,37642774
48,32027456
31,05139985
21,28838951
22,2877369
2,462593447
14820,97585
33,75998853
4,327953916
99,74997
99,46801
above)
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary
School enrollment, primary (% net)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
Pupil-teacher ratio, secondary
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)
Nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people)
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with
access)
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)
GINI index
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)
Population, total
Source: World Bank.
89,85614
18,06296
93,36552
88,57177
8,46536
4,10175
11,9
9,7
8,5191
70
5,074826314
40,11
7,5
141930000
As it can be understood from the data, the income per capita
in Russia is about 15,000 dollars. The inflation is around 8% and the
real interest rate is negative. National savings are at a very large scale,
which is 30% of the generalized system of preferences (GSP).
According to the figures of Economic Intelligence Unit, in
2011, the unemployment rate is 7.5% and the inflation rate is 7.7% in
Russia. The exportation of the country is 407 billion dollars and the
importation is 268 billion dollars. The total external debt of the
country is about 406 billion dollars. The gross domestic product
(GDP) is 1.8 trillion dollars in 2011. The income per capita is about
16,575 dollars.
In livestock industry, both the number of animals and
production considerably has gone down comparing with the early
1990s. With the recent investigations and limitations, the importation
of the poultry products and red meat has been restricted. The
authorities of the Ministry of Economic Development and Commerce
have stated that those restrictions aimed to increase home production,
not to prevent the importation, and that it has been achieved the goal.
Animal production is on the rise, though it is highly faraway from its
level in the early 1990s.
The production that the Russian people make in small areas
still constitutes 52% of total animal production. Russian government
138
takes effective measures to improve the livestock industry. Within the
framework of the national plan declared in 2005, it is aimed to
establish, renew and modernize big commercial animal production
centers, and intended to provide loan facilities for those who make
production in small quantities and for special needs.
In recent years, agricultural credits have considerably raised
depending upon the massive subventions given by the federal
government. The national program, which was put into effect in 2005,
and which is related to increasing the government support in four
areas, including agricultural sector, significantly makes contribution to
the development of especially small-sized agricultural enterprises.
Traditional cultivated areas provide 87% of total production and they
have a very important role in the sector.
Industrial infrastructure in Russia, the inheritance of the
USSR, has a structure which is energy base, technologically
backward, low-value-added, and which basically concentrates on
processing and defense industry. Even in the areas that the USSR
technologically has a competitive advantage such as space and
aviation, production rates have decreased because of insufficient
investments and the loss of the labor. The competitive power of the
producers in the international market has weakened with the removal
of the subventions, which are the holdover of the USSR.
Russian government is aware of the fact that the country
cannot maintain its development by exporting natural resources, and it
tries to constitute industrialization policies. For this reason, Russian
government aims to put in action various factors, including foreign
capital, to establish industrial plants which would make production for
both firstly domestic demand and then the exportation to
commonwealth of independent states (CIS / BDT) and other countries.
The problems and high taxes in customs encourage making production
for domestic demand. The demand conserves its vitality and increases
the production in parallel with the economic development.
The most important ones among these figures are those related
to development. Educational and health indicators in Russia have been
at a high level.
The retail industry grew at the rate of 8.1% in 2002, and it
maintained the same trend in 2003 and the rate of growth in this year
was 8%. In 2004, the growth of the sector fastened and it was reached
to a growth rate of 12.1%. The growth rate, which reached to 12.8% in
2005, was at the rate of 12.5% in the first ten months of the year 2006.
139
The growth of the retail industry of Russia is presumably 475 billion
dollars. 80% of this amount is constituted by importation and 20% of
it by home production. Approximately 10% of this figure is formed by
textile, leather, carpet and ready wear. By 2006, Russia has become
the 8th biggest retail market in the world, by surpassing some countries
such as Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Italy.285
Within the scope of the development program applied in
Russia, it is aimed to increase the number of incoming tourists. After
the economic crisis in Russia in 1998, especially for the last three
years, the interest of the Russian tourists to overseas journeys has
increased because the level of income of the Russian has started to rise
again. Similarly, the income Russia generated from tourism has also
started to rise in the meantime and it has increasingly come up to now.
But it is difficult for the middle income tourists to come to the country
because the accommodation facilities are very limited for them in
Russia.
Russia was visited by about 20.2 million tourists in 2006 and
it became the 10th most visited country in the world in the same year.
About the two thirds of the tourists visited Russia were the members
of former Soviet Republics. But a great number of those visitors going
to Russia were likely seasonal workers. Germany, Finland, the USA,
England, Italy, France, Japan and recently South Korea can be
counted among the countries that send most tourists to Russia. It is
estimated that the tourism income of Russia was about 7.6 billion
dollars in 2006 and that this figure increased one third in 2007. The
rate of the foreign tourists coming Russia in 2008 increased at the rate
of 7.6%.
The number of the Russian tourists who went out of Russian
Federation for holiday reached 7 million 753 thousand in 2006 and it
was seen that Turkey kept its situation as the most preferred country
by the Russian tourists. Turkey was followed by respectively Egypt,
China and Finland. The number of the Russian tourists visited Turkey
in 2007 was about 2.5 million. According to the Russian Tourism
Service (Rostourism), this figure decreased to 2.212 million in 2008.
In recent years, another remarkable point with the Russian
market is that the last minute sales have increasingly risen. Today,
40% of those coming Turkey from Russia make their reservations 1 to
10 days before the beginning of the holiday.
285
DEIK (2011)
140
All of the economic environments agree on the issue that a
reform is needed in the banking sector in Russia. By the end of the
year 2006, 934 banks are the member of the Deposit Insurance Fund,
which was constituted in 2004. These banks represent 99.3% of all
personal accounts. The upper limit of the accounts within the scope of
insurance, which was 100,000 rubles in the early 2006, increased to
190,000 rubles in August, 2006, and to 400,000 rubles in March,
2007.
The commercial banking system in Russia was constituted for
the first time with the establishment of non-state banks in accordance
with the cooperatives law made in 1988. 2500 banks were established
in Russia by the year 1994 due to the lack of licensing and
supervision. But the economic crisis in 1998 inflicted a heavy blow on
the banking sector.
The number of the banks in Russia was 1,329 in 2004. This
number reached to 1,350 in 2006. In the early 2008, the number of the
banks in Russia decreased to 1,200 and according to the statement of
the Central Bank of Russian Federation, this figure decreased down to
955 in 2010. According to the predictions made by again the Central
Bank, it is expected the number of the banks in Russia to fall down to
900. The banks split up into six groups, in terms of their size of assets
and capital structure:
State Banks: Rosselkhozbank, which transfers state subsidies
into agricultural sector, is one of them. VTB and Sberbank are the
commercial banks that have 37% of the total bank assets of the
country. In 2003, considerable steps were taken to incrementally
remove the special privileges given to Sberbank with the aim of the
development of the banking system.
Banks of Big Capital Groups: The banks belonging to this
group, which are named as “local treasurers” instead of profit centers,
and the large part of which is constituted by the loan they provide for
their shareholders and by the cash resources they value in the
international markets, control 16% of the total bank assets of the
country and the free cash resource amounted approximately 12 billion
US dollars, which is kept in the Russian banks.
Universal Banks: These banks, the size of assets of which is
between 250-300 million dollars, consider profit maximization more
important than the previous group.
Medium-Scaled Banks: The size of assets of these banks, the
number of which is about 50, changes between 100-250 million
141
dollars. The target group of this bank group, which can be seen the
most steady and profitable one in Russia, is constituted by mediumscaled investments.
Small-Scaled Banks: The banks in this group, the size of
assets of which is less than 100 million dollars, have 18% of the total
bank assets of the country. In this group, which has a very
heterogeneous structure, there are local banks that serve to small
business as well as there are a number of ones that have been
established especially to carry out the complex financial operations.
Foreign Banks: They have had about 15% of the Russian bank
assets since October, 2006. The risk caused by the administrative and
legal structure in Russia on personal and commercial banking service
still goes on. However, important steps were taken to promote foreign
capital flow into the Russian Banking System with the law
amendments passed through the Russian Parliament in 2006. On the
other hand, it is expected that foreign investors will trust more in the
banking sector with the completion of the membership process to the
WTO. Most of the foreign banks are in Moscow and Petersburg. Of
Turkish banks, Deniz Bank, Finans Bank, Garanti Bankası, Yapı
Kredi Bankası and Ziraat Bankası have branches in Russia. According
to the statement made by the Secretariat of Treasury, total investment
amount of those banks is 183 million dollars.
The major obstacle for the banking sector is that the Russian
people don’t still trust in the banking system. Because of this, personal
savings cannot be turned into an investment. Nevertheless, it is
observed that the people have recently begun to trust in banks.
As a result, the Russian banking system is very far away from
its existing potential due to the lack of experience, rapidly changing
financial market, the lack of confidence to the banks, legal
infrastructure deficiency, and the disruptions of supervision.286
The most important trade centers of Russia are Moscow and
Petersburg. Apart from them, the thirteen cities with the population of
more than one million are also important trade centers. The population
of the country is about 140 million. There are approximately 74
million females and 66 million males. The population between the
ages 15-64 is around 100 million. The demand for consumer’s goods
has risen rapidly in recent years because middle class has become
widened.
286
DEIK (2011)
142
With the rise of demand for natural gas and other resources,
the gross domestic product (GDP) in Russian Federation has also risen
rapidly after 2000s. Since the demand hasn’t been able to be met
domestically, importation has also considerably increased. While the
people of Russian Federation increasingly have higher standards of
living, especially the retail industry has increasingly gained
importance as well. Within this scope, the activities of the branded
firms in particular have increased in Russian Federation.
Turkey is the third country to which Russia exports most after
Germany and China. Germany and China again shares the first two
ranks in the ranking of the countries from which Russian Federation
imports. Turkey is on the 15th rank in the ranking of the countries from
which Russian Federation imports.
4.5. ECONOMIC and SOCIAL INDICATORS OF
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
Republic of Turkey, which was founded in 1923, has made
progress in its economic development.
Table 2. Economic and Social Variables of Turkey (2010)
Agricultural land (% of land area)
389110
Trade in services (% of GDP)
7,737972014
Current account balance (% of GDP)
9,953890394
Private capital flows, total (% of GDP)
4,587840098
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
2,069076528
External debt stocks (% of GNI)
40,08755002
Energy production (kt of oil equivalent)
33263,558
Electricity production from oil, gas and coal
sources(% of total)
74,6315771
Electricity production (kWh)
2,28406E+11
Population density (people per sq. km of land area)
94,52896197
Total reserves (% of total external debt)
12,85255171
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
6,471879671
Tax revenue (% of GDP)
20,56740611
Household final consumption expenditure, etc. (% of
GDP)
71,15472988
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
23,74084016
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)
21,78939511
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
32,63450842
143
Adjusted net national income (annual % growth)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24)
Literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and
above)
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)
School enrollment, primary (% net)
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)
Hospital beds (per 1,000 people)
Nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people)
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with
access)
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)
GINI index
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)
Population, total
Source: World Bank
9,275534906
13468,12902
14,92681663
7,19585375
96,5701932
85,34715677
26,35232
98,92401
82,10694
3,95
15,2
3,1
1,9
90
6,740391064
40,34
11,89999962
73639596
The Turkish economy, which began to become narrow in the
last quarter of the year 2008 with the effect of the global financial
crisis after a nonstop growth of 27 quarters, started to grow strongly at
the end of 2009, after it became narrower four quarters in a row.
While lots of the developed countries haven’t got over the
effects of the crisis yet, the Turkish economy, which got rid of the
negative effects of the global crisis and started to grow strongly from
the year 2010, completed the year 2011 with an unusual growth rate of
9.2% and it succeeded to be Europa’s fastest-growing economy and
the world’s second fastest-growing economy after China.
Exportation caused the growth rate to increase visibly in 2011
and it reached to 6.5%. Though importation, which has the reducer
effect on gross domestic product (GDP), grew at the rate of 10.6%, its
rate of increase has fallen down almost in half comparing with the
previous year. Public consumption grew at the rate of 4.5% in 2011.
In public investments, there has been a considerable loss of
acceleration. Public investments increased 17.7% in 2010 and it
decreased at the rate of 3.2% in 2011 comparing with the previous
144
year.
While the agricultural sector’s share of total product fell down
to 9.16% in 2011, its growth rate rose. Agriculture, hunting and
woodcraft, which are the main components of the sector, considerably
increased in each quarter of 2011 comparing with the same periods of
the previous year. In this regard, the sector grew at the rate of 2.4% in
2010 and its growth rate reached to 5.2% in 2011.
When analyzing the sub-units of industry sector, a remarkable
growth can be seen going on though there is a partial slowdown in
manufacturing industry, and mining and quarrying comparing with the
previous year. The manufacturing industry, which showed a growth at
the rate of 13.6% in 2010, completed the year 2011 with a significant
growth of 9.4%. The production and distribution of electric, gas,
steam and hot water grew at the rate of 8.8% with a rise of 1.5%
comparing with the previous year.
When checking out the sub-sectors of service industry, which
has the biggest share in national income, highly remarkable growth
rates can be seen. The fastest growth rate is of wholesale and retail
sale, with the rate of 11.4%. This is followed by construction sector
with 11.2% and transportation sector with 10.8%.
With the significant economic growth of 8.5% in 2011, the
rapid recovery that was seen in 2010 went on in labor market. The
unemployment rate in Turkey was 9.8% in 2011, when it was over
10% in most of the developed economies, which have single digit
unemployment rates before the crisis, and it was even over 20% in
some European economies.
Turkey met with high inflation in the late 1970s, the inflation
with three digits was seen for the first time in 1980. The average of
consumer price index between the years 1983 and 1994 is 62.7%. But
when sub-terms are looked over, the increase rate in the index can be
seen to be 37.9% in 1981-87, and 66.6% in 1988-93. While the
average of the term 1995-2001 is 71.6%, it is 80.7% in 1994-2000. All
these developments show that Turkey hasn’t been able to bring the
inflation under control despite all efforts. Even when the sub-terms are
considered, it can be seen that the inflation rose year by year and that
prices were destabilized. The inflation had been chronically in rise for
long years and it could be brought under control only when the
Transition to the Strong Economy Program was put into effect after
the crisis in 2001 and with the steady of the single-party government
in 2002. The inflation, which was recorded as 68.5% at the end of
145
2001, decreased to 29.8% in 2002, to 18.4% in 2003, and to single
digit level by the year 2004.
In that term, “implicit” inflation targeting was preferred until
2006 and from that year on, it was concentrated on “open economy”
inflation targeting and price stability. This strategy highly contributed
to the fight against inflation and the inflation was 11.8% in average
between the years 2002 and 2010.
As it can be seen in the Table 2, which contains the data about
the balance of merchandise trade of Turkey, in 2001, importation and
exportation were respectively 31.3 and 41.4 million dollars, and they
increased respectively at the rate of 17% and 21% in average a year.
When in 2011, exportation reached to the level of 135 billion dollars
and importation to 240.8 billion dollars. However, except for the crisis
years, the exportation-importation coverage ratio can be seen to
decrease continuously. While this rate was 75.7% in 2001, it was 56%
in 2011. On the other hand, while the export share in gross domestic
product (GDP), which we can count as an indicator of the integration
level of Turkish economy and global economy, was between the
ranges of 15-16% in the last ten years, it increased to 17.4% in 2011.
The import share in gross domestic product (GDP) was 21.1% in
2001, and it regularly increased and reached to 27.5% in 2008, and it
was 31% by the year 2011. When compared January-February terms
of 2011 and 2012, it can be seen that while the rate of increase of
importation is going on, exportation has considerably slowed down.
Because while exportation was 19.6 billion dollars in the term of
January-February in 2011, it was 22.1 billion dollars in the term of
January-February in 2012 by increase at the rate of 12.9%. the raise in
importation in the same term was only 1.9%.
By the year 2012, the continual constriction in foreign trade
deficit in Turkey has gone on in June, too. In June, while exportation
rose to 13.3 billion dollars by increasing at the rate of 16.9%
comparing with the same month of the previous year, importation took
place at the level of 20.4 billion dollars by constricting at the rate of
5.4%. Thus, the exportation-importation coverage ratio reached to
64.9% by increasing 12.4% comparing with the same month of the
previous year. When analyzing the distribution of exportation by
countries in the first half of the year, Germany can be seen on the first
rank with a share of 9%. When compared with the same term of the
last year, it can be understood that the economic activity has been
weak, that the export share of European countries has went down in
146
general meaning, and that the share of Middle East countries has
raised. In this term, Iran, whose foreign trade relations have increased,
has become the second biggest market with the share of 7.9% it got
from exportation. The rapid increase in gold export to Iran played a
very important role in this development. The 4.4 billion dollars part of
the exportation with Iran, which is amounted 5.9 billion dollars, is
constituted by gold export. Russia is on the 6th rank in exportation.
4. 6. ENERGY and RUSSIA-TURKEY ECONOMIC
RELATIONS
As in the last century, energy has increasingly gained
importance in terms of economic activities in the 21st century as well.
The factors leading raise in global energy demand are especially the
rapid growth in China, that India is a new economic actor, and that the
USA and Russia don’t want to give up global power.
Beside this, the European Union countries are the other
important demand actors. The rapid growth of the countries, which
have grown especially for the last 15-20 years, causes the energy
demand to increase. Primary energy consumption and frontward
consumption projection in terms of energy resources are given in the
Table 3.
Table 3. Primary Energy Consumption and Forecasts (Mtep)
2
2
2
2
2
2
009
015
020
030
035
0092035*
(%)
Coal
.294
.944
.083
.099
.101
,8
Oil
.987
.322
4.384 4.546 4.645 0,6
Natural Gas
.539
2.945 3.214 3.698 3.928 1,7
Nuclear
03
796
929
1.128 1.212 2,1
Hydroelectricity 80
334
377
450
475
2,1
Biomass
and 1.230 1.375 1.495 1.761 1.911 1,7
Garbage
Other
99
97
287
524
690
7,8
Total
12.132 13.913 14.769 16.206 16.961 1,3
Source. EPDK
As it can be seen on the Table 3, it is predicted that energy
consumption in the world will increase in the next 20-25 years. In this
147
sense, the demand for all kinds of energy resources rises. It is
expected that the rise in the consumption of natural gas will be more
than the rise in the demand for petrol and coal. Within this scope, it is
natural that the cooperation and trade of energy between countries
increase. It can be expected that energy-based cooperation between
Turkey and Russia will increase.
The amount and share of various countries in energy
consumption in the term of 2009-2010 are given on the Table 4.
Table 4. Primary energy consumption of Countries (20092010)
Consumption,
2009
(Mte
p)
USA
2.204,1
Canada
312,5
Brazil
234,1
France
244,0
Germany
307,4
Italy
168,3
Spain
146,1
RussianFed. 654,7
Turkey
101,0
Iran
205,9
S. Africa
118,8
S. Arabia
187,8
India
480,0
Indonesia
132,2
Japan
473,0
S. Korea
236,7
Australia
125,6
China
2.187,7
UK
203,6
World
11.363,2
Source. EPDK
Consumption,
2010
(Mte
p)
2.285,7
316,7
253,9
252,4
319,5
172,0
149,7
690,9
110,9
212,5
120,9
201,0
524,2
140,2
500,9
255,0
118,2
2.432,2
209,1
12.002,4
Change, The Share of
(%)
Total
Consumption,
(%)
3,7
19,0
1,3
2,6
8,5
2,1
3,4
2,1
3,9
2,7
2,3
1,4
2,5
1,2
5,5
5,8
9,8
0,9
3,2
1,8
1,7
1,0
7,0
1,7
9,2
4,4
5,9
1,2
5,9
4,2
7,7
2,1
-5,8
1,0
11,2
20,3
2,7
1,7
5,6
100,0
As is seen, the USA and China are in the front by far in
energy consumption in the world. These countries are followed by
Russia and India. China is on the first rank in the rate of increase in
148
energy demand. Turkey, India and Brazil are the countries that follow
China. These countries, at the same time, are those which have the
highest rate of growth in the term of 2009-2010.
The reserve amount of natural gas, which has an important
place in the economic relations between Turkey and Russia, is shown
on the Table 5.
Table 5. Natural Gas Reserves (trillion m3)
Reserv
Reserv
es, 2009
es, 2010
Russian Fed.
Iran
Qatar
S. Arabia
UAE
USA
Nigeria
Venezuela
Algeria
Indonesia
Norway
Turkmenistan
Australia
Malaysia
Egypt
Kazakhstan
China
Canada
Azerbaijan
Netherlands
Ukraine
UK
World
44,4
29,6
25,3
7,9
6,1
7,7
5,3
5,1
N.A
3,0
2,0
8.0
2,9
2,4
2,2
1,9
2,8
1,7
1,3
1,2
1,0
0,3
186,6
44,8
29,6
25,3
8,0
6,0
7,7
5,3
5,5
N.A
3,1
2,0
8.0
2,9
2,4
2,2
1,8
2,8
1,7
1,3
1,2
0,9
0,3
187,1
The
Share
of
Total, (%)
23,9
15,8
13,5
4,3
3,2
4,1
2,8
2,9
2,4
1,6
1,1
4.3
1,6
1,3
1,2
1,0
1,5
0,9
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,1
100,
0
Source. EPDK
Russia has about 24% of the world’s natural gas reserves.
Russia is followed by Iran and Qatar.
149
That natural gas will maintain its importance in the future and
most reserves exist in Russia, the neighbor of Turkey, promotes the
increase of the economic cooperation between the two countries.
When the production data analyzed as well as reserve, it can be seen
that Russia is an important producer.
Table 6. Natural Gas Production (billion m3)
Russia Fed.
Iran
Qatar
S. Arabia
UAE
USA
Nigeria
Venezuela
Algeria
Indonesia
Norway
Turkmenistan
Australia
Malaysia
Egypt
Kazakhstan
China
Canada
Azerbaijan
Netherlands
Ukraine
UK
World
Production,
2009
Production,
2010
Change
(%)
527,7
131,2
89,3
78,5
48,8
582,8
24,8
28,7
79,6
71,9
103,7
36,4
47,9
64,9
62,7
32,5
85,3
163,9
14,8
62,7
19,3
59,7
2.975,9
588,9
138,5
116,7
83,9
51,0
611,0
33,6
28,5
80,4
82,0
106,4
42,4
50,4
66,5
61,3
33,6
96,8
159,8
15,1
70,5
18,6
57,1
3.193,3
11,6
5,6
30,7
7,0
4,5
4,7
35,7
-0,7
1,1
14,0
2,5
16,4
5,1
3,7
2,2
3,3
13,5
-2,5
2,2
12,4
-3,8
4,3
7,3
S
hare in
Total
(%)
8,4
,3
,6
2,6
1,6
19,3
1,1
0,9
2,5
2,6
3,3
1,3
1,6
2,1
1,9
1,1
3,0
,0
,5
,2
,6
,8
00,0
R
/P
6,0
+
+
95,5
+
12,6
+
+
56,0
37,4
19,2
+
58,0
36,1
36,0
54,9
29,0
10,8
84,2
16,6
50,4
,5
8,6
Source. EPDK
According to the Table 6, Russia is again an important natural
gas producer. Reserves/ Production (R/P) rate is the important point
here. This rate shows how long the reserves will go on if the
production raises in this speed. Russia’s R/P rate is at a very high
level. The (+) value on the chart states that the reserves will go on for
150
more than 100 years.
The consumption data of natural gas according to countries is
given below.
Table 7. Natural Gas Consumption of Countries (billion m3)
USA
Russian Fed.
Iran
Canada
UK
Japan
Germany
Italy
S. Arabia
China
Ukraine
Mexico
Uzbekistan
Argentina
UAE
France
India
Netherlands
S. Korea
Turkey
Indonesia
Egypt
Pakistan
Malaysia
Australia
Algeria
Turkmenistan
Qatar
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan
Norway
World
EU
2005
2
2006
2
2007
2
2008
2
2009
2
2010
23,3
00,3
05,0
7,8
5,0
8,6
6,2
9,1
1,2
6,8
9,0
3,8
2,7
0,4
2,1
4,0
5,7
9,3
0,4
6,9
3,2
1,6
5,5
1,4
2,0
3,2
6,1
8,7
6,8
,6
,5
781,8
94,2
14,1
08,5
08,7
6,9
0,1
3,7
7,2
7,4
3,5
6,1
7,0
0,9
1,9
1,8
3,4
2,1
7,3
8,1
2,0
0,5
3,2
6,5
6,1
3,7
5,3
3,7
8,4
9,6
8,1
,1
,4
.842,4
86,9
54,0
22,1
13,0
5,2
1,1
0,2
2,9
7,8
4,4
0,5
3,2
2,8
5,9
3,9
9,2
2,4
0,1
7,0
4,7
6,1
1,3
8,4
6,8
3,4
7,6
4,3
1,3
9,3
6,4
,0
,3
.947,4
81,2
58,9
16,0
19,3
5,5
3,8
3,7
1,2
7,8
0,4
1,3
0,0
6,4
8,7
4,4
9,5
3,8
1,3
8,6
5,7
7,5
3,3
0,8
7,5
3,8
8,8
5,4
0,5
9,3
7,2
,2
,3
.026,4
89,7
46,7
89,6
31,4
4,4
6,7
7,4
8,0
1,5
8,5
9,5
7,0
6,6
3,5
3,2
9,1
2,2
1,0
8,9
3,9
5,7
7,4
2,5
8,4
3,7
0,7
7,2
9,9
0,0
4,5
,8
,1
.950,2
58,5
83,4
14,1
36,9
3,8
3,8
4,5
1,3
6,1
3,9
09,0
2,1
8,9
5,5
3,3
0,5
6,9
1,9
3,6
2,9
9,0
0,3
5,1
9,5
5,7
0,4
8,9
2,6
0,4
5,3
,6
,1
.169,0
92,5
Source. EPDK
151
Change
2
Compared
to 2009
5,6
6,3
4,2
-0,6
8,3
8,1
4,2
6,4
7,0
21,8
11,0
3,4
4,6
0,4
2,5
11,1
21,5
12,1
26,5
9,2
7,8
6,0
2,7
6,2
-1,2
6,0
13,5
2,0
2,9
-15,9
0,5
7,4
7,4
When considered the consumption of natural gas according to
countries in the term of 2005-2010, it is seen that Russia is the 2nd
most important country that consumes natural gas. Turkey has a less
amount of consumption than the European countries with similar
population. When it is taken into consideration that Turkey has just
met with natural gas comparing with European countries, Turkey can
be said to be a developing market. In this regard, Turkey can be
thought to be an important natural gas market for Russia.
As it is stated above, Turkey has just met with natural gas
comparing with European countries. Russia and Iran has an important
place in Turkey’s consumption or importation of natural gas. Turkey
tries to diversify the countries from which it buys natural gas in order
not to face with undue price demands and because of other political
and economic reasons. The purchase contracts that Turkey has signed
at various times are given on the Table 8.
Table 8. Natural Gas Contracts of Turkey
Contract
Quantity
Contract Date
Period
(Year)
Russian
Federation
(West Line)
Algeria (LNG)
Nigeria (LNG)
Iran
Russia
Federation
(Blue Stream)
Russia
Federation
(West Line)
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
6
14.02.1986
25
Years began
delivery of
gas
1987
4
1,2
10
16
14.04.1988
09.11.1995
08.08.1996
15.12.1997
20
22
25
25
1984
1999
2001
2003
8
18.02.1998
23
1998
16
6,6
21.05.1999
12.03.2001
30
15
2007
Source. EPDK
As seen on the Table 8, Turkey has signed purchase
agreements with different countries at different times. In terms of
diversification of energy, of the most important countries, from which
the energy is provided, are the two countries: Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan.
152
Despite the natural gas a relatively new source for Turkey, its
consumption is increasing. Use of energy resources in Turkey is
shown in Table 9.
Table 9. Energy Demand of Turkey (%) (1975-2010)
Natural Gas
Oil
Coal
Hydroelectricity
Other
1975
0
1,7
21,5
1,9
24,9
1
1980
,1
50,3
22,1
3,1
24,4
1
1985
,2
46
21,4
2,6
29,8
1
1990
,9
45,1
30,9
3,8
14,3
1
1995
,9
46
27,2
4,8
12,1
1
2000
7,1
40,1
30
3,3
9,5
2
2005
7,3
35,2
26,4
3,7
7,4
2
2010
1,9
26,7
30,6
4,1
6,7
Source. EPDK
According to Table 9, the demand of natural gas in Turkey
has increased quickly in the last 25-30 years. Even in 2010, the rank
of natural gas in energy consumption is in the first. Interesting results
in the table, the rank of coal in energy consumption is in the second.
Given these resources are used in the production of electricity
generation, it could be said that the main important requirement in
Turkey is the electricity generation.
The explanations given above on Turkey's natural gas needs
could be verified with the amount of natural gas Turkey imported.
Table 10. 2005-2011 Energy Import of Turkey (Million sm3)
Years
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Y
Russian
Fed.
17.524
19.316
22.762
23.159
19.473
17.576
25.406
Iran
4.248
.594
.054
.113
.252
.765
.190
Azerbaijan
0
0
1.258
4.580
4.960
4.521
3.806
Algeria
Nigeria
3.786
.132
.205
4.148
.487
906
.156
1.013
.100
.396
.017
03
.189
.248
pot
LNG
0
9
67
33
81
.079
.069
Total
26.571
0.221
5.842
7.350
5.856
8.036
3.874
Source. EPDK
According to Table 10, it is seen that the amount of Turkey's
natural gas import increases over the years. In the last six years, the
amount of imported natural gas has increased by about 60%. The one
of the countries that Turkey imports natural gas is Russia. The amount
of the imported natural gas from Iran, the second one, is about one153
2
third of the amount imported from Russia. In this context, it could be
said that Turkey mainly depends on Russia the importation of natural
gas.
In the framework of the data above from the various tables,
natural gas could be said to be an important factor between Turkey
and Russia economic relations. Indeed, Turkey depends on Russia in
natural gas imports. However, Turkey's natural gas consumption is
behind European countries with a similar population. For this reason,
it is expected that demand for natural gas will be increased rapidly in
Turkey in the future. Located in neighboring, Russia is in
advantageous situation for meeting this demand. As a result, natural
gas will become even more important in the future in terms of
economic and political relations between the two countries.
One of the important economic activities is tourism between
Turkey and Russian. The number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey
over the years is given below.
Table. 11. Number of Russian Tourists to Turkey
Years
Tourist Number
Years
Tourist Number
2000
677 152
2006
1 853 442
2001
757 121
2007
2 465 336
2002
946 494
2008
2 879 278
2003
1 257 559 2009
2 694 733
2004
1 603 372 2010
3 107 043
2005
1 864 682 2011
3 468 214
Source. Turkish Statistical Institute.
As seen in the Table 11, the number of Russian tourists to
Turkey has increased significantly.
4. 7. ENERGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Natural resources are accepted as one of the four production
factors in the economics science. In the 20th Century, energy resources
have been prominence. The importance of energy was more increased
during the oil crisis occurred in the 1970s. Since then, the energy has
been become one of the important inputs for economic growth and
development. Of the important energy resources, there are oil, natural
gas and electricity.
Classical economists accepted that the nature brings the
154
economy to the edge of a halt due to the diminishing productivity, but
they have not seen the energy as a production factor.287 Moreover,
apart from the economists, such as Jevons and Hotelling, most of the
neo-classical economists, did ignored the effect of the energy and
energy resources on the growth and did not accept the energy as a
production factor.288 There are three effective opinions over this view:
the fact that the economic growth and the technological developments
could prevent the depletion of natural resources, including energy, the
fact that the market failures could be eliminated through pricing the
costs of the natural resource, and the fact that man-made capital could
substitute unlimitedly the natural capital. 289
In the view of the second opinion, the ecological economics
and the physical production theory, which were developed with the
contribution of some economists, criticizing the fact that the energy is
not being capitalized in the economic theory in the 1970s, have been
seen the energy as the basic production factor. In this context, it has
been argued that the other factors of production cannot be effective in
the production process without the energy, that there is a
complementarily relationship between natural resources and manmade capital, that the extinction probability of the energy sources will
limit the growth, so it has been argued that the efficiency energy
policies should be implemented.290
There are six strategic points for the realization of economic
growth. These are:

the amount and quality of natural resources,

the amount of human resources and their
characteristics,

the amount of capital instruments,

the current technology,

the economy with its all resources being used
in the production process (full employment),

the efficient use of the resources in the
production process and ensuring efficiency.291
In this context, following are the objectives of the
287
ALAM, (2006)
YAPRAKLI and YURTTANCIKMAZ, (2012)
289
BARTELMUS, (2008).
290
MA and STERN, (2006).
291
McCONNELL et. al. (1999)
288
155
countries, exporting oil.

Achieving the most rapid economic growth;
this also depends on the solution of the investment
problems.

the realization of surplus revenue in high
level, which could be used in the accumulation of capital
outside of the region.

prolonging the usage time of all oil reserves.
As long as the oil crisis continues, the first aim of the oil
importing countries is to avoid an interruption of economic growth.
Following are the other objectives of the oil importing countries:

increasing the regional oil production,

developing the other energy sources that
could be used instead of petroleum,

increasing the demand for energy through the
protection,

increasing the commodity prices needed by
the oil exporting countries (especially the prices of
investment goods).292
Energy sources could be classified under two headings:
Commercial and Non-Commercial sources of energy. Commercial
energy sources include the forms of energy meeting the need of the
modern industrial economy in the international and national market.
However, it is Non-commercial energy is used by the traditional
sector of the economy energy. Oil, natural gas, hydropower and
nuclear energy are examples of commercial energy sources; on the
other hand, wood, agricultural residues, animal wastes are examples of
the non-commercial energy sources.293
The more the economy improves, the more the demand for
commercial energy sources increases and the more the production of
these energy sources increases, the less the demand for noncommercial energy sources decreases. Energy sources could be
classified as primary and secondary energy sources according to the
obtainment methods. The primary energy sources: the animal and
plant-originated fossil energies. These show significant differences
292
293
McCONNELL et. al. (1999)
BILGINOGLU, (1991).
156
from each other; such as with regards to ease of shipping, export
potential, environmental impacts, the ultimate flexibility in use and
the potential for substitution and so on. These resources are also be
called as exhausted or conventional energy sources. These are coal, oil
and natural gas. Secondary Energy Sources: These are electric,
nuclear, solar, geothermal, wind, wave and biomass energies of the
sea. It is also called renewable energy sources.294
The main advantage of renewable energies is to help protect
the environment by reducing carbon dioxide emissions. As being
domestic, they reduce the dependence on energy imports and can
contribute to the development and employment. Finally, people wish
to develop the renewable energies more than other energy sources due
to at-large extent environmental reasons.295 The energy consumption
and energy intensity per person is two important energy indicators.
Energy density is an indicator representing the amount of
primary energy consumption per Gross National Product and being
used all over the world. Firstly, this indicator increases during the
development process and then decreases. Economic growth rate and
the standard of living are two-factor determining the demand for
energy. Total energy demand growth, which is the reflective of the
changing nature of production and consumption in an economy, will
reflect energy intensity, which is changed in each final use. In
particular, while the countries are moving beyond the development
stage of industrialization, the income elasticity of energy demand is
falling.296
Causality between energy consumption and economic growth
could be evaluated in various aspects. First of all, the direction of
causality between economic growth and energy consumption could be
said to differ from country to country.297 In some countries, the
contribution of the energy consumption to the growth becomes
prominent, in some countries the contribution of economic growth to
the energy consumption is of great importance. However, some
studies have suggested that there is mutual causality between both
variables. The importance of the causality direction is seen in the
design of energy policy and in the economic policy to be applied. The
294
USLU, (2004).
AKTT, (2000).
296
MEDLOCK and SOLIGO, (2001).
297 See STERN (2000), GHOSH (2002), YOO (2005), ALTINAY and
KARAGOL (2005).
295
157
research did not reach a general result. However, in general, it is
suggested that there is causality from energy consumption to
economic growth in the less developed and developing countries; that
there is causality from economic growth to energy consumption in
developed countries.
If, there is causality from electricity consumption to economic
growth, energy-saving policies and energy scarcity will have a
negative impact on countries' economic growth.
If there is causality from economic growth to electricity
consumption, energy-saving policies and energy scarcity will not have
a negative impact on countries' economic growth.
Energy production as well as energy consumption is an
important macroeconomic variable. Indeed, countries tend to use the
abundant factors they have in production process. Size of the
economies, are evaluated by their total output. According to the theory
of economics, by directing factors to production process, the output of
goods or services is hold. The effect of energy input on the output is
not investigated for a long time in economics literature. In recent
years, academic studies related to energy are accelerated. Some of
these studies are discussed directly the relationship between energy
production or consumption and economic variables. Some studies are
interested with the relationship between energy sources such as
electricity, oil and natural gas production or consumption and
economic variables.
There are two different views about the relationship between
energy consumption and economic growth in the economics literature.
The first point of view argues that the use of energy is a
limiting factor in economic growth. The opposite view claims that
energy consumption is neutral versus economic growth. This
argument is known as the "neutrality hypothesis" in the literature.
According to neutrality hypothesis, energy costs are a small part of
GDP, and they do not affect the output significantly. In addition, the
possible effects of energy use on economic growth are depending on
structure of the country's economy and country’s economic
development level. As the economy grows, the production structure
tends progress to non-existent service varies from the industrial
production.298
Kar and Kınık have examined the effect of electric
298 MEHRARA, (2007)
158
consumption on economic growth, and they have found unidirectional
causality from electric consumption to economic growth. 299
Yamak and Gungor were estimated residential electricity
demand equation for the period 1951-1994 in their studies. Their
model covers the variables of the amount of residential electricity
consumption, real income, domestic electricity price index, price
index of fuel oil used for houses. Engle-Granger Test indicates a
cointegration relationship between the series in the long term. Error
correction medel indices that short term residential electricity demand
is inelastic to the price and household’s income While income
elasticity is statistically insignificant, price elasticity is statistically
significant. Bu the coefficient is nearly zero. In the cointegration
estimation residential electricity demand is only elastic for
household’s income. 300
In recent years, energy consumption and GDP growth rate
relation is investigated by dividing energy consumption into subcomponents such as oil consumption, electricity consumption. Ghosh
has investigated economic growth and electricity consumption of
India for the 1950-1997 periods. Ghosh reports unidirectional
causality from economic growth to electric consumption.301
Jumbe has investigated economic growth and electricity
consumption of Malawi for the 1970-1999 periods. He reports a
bilateral causality between economic growth and electricity
consumption.302
Shiu and Pun found unidirectional causality electricity
consumption to GDP for China in their study in the 1971-1990
periods.303
Mozumder and Marathe (2007), covering the period 19711999 for Bangladesh, examined the relationship between GDP per
capita and electricity consumption. They concluded that there was a
unidirectional causality.304
299
KAR and KINIK (2008)
YAMAK, R. and GUNGOR, B., (1998).
301 GHOSH, (2002)
302 GHOSH (2002)
303 SHIU ve PUN (2004)
304 MOZUMDER and MARATHE (2007)
300
159
4.
8. TESTING ENERGY PRODUCTION
ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
In testing energy production on economic growth, a dynamic
panel data model is used.
Panel Data Sets
Panel data analysis endows regression analysis with both a
spatial and temporal dimension. The spatial dimension could be
countries, states, firms etc. Temporal dimension pertains to periodic
observations of a set of variables over a particular time span. Panel
data sets generally include sequential blocks or cross-sections of data,
within each of which resides a time series. They have a crosssectional unit of observation, which in this case is country or states i.
They have a temporal reference, t, in this case the year. The error term
has two dimensions, one for the country and one for the time period. If
there are no missing values, the data set is called a balanced panel, but
if there are missing values, the data set is referred to as an unbalanced
panel. Typical panel equation might be expressed as:
Yit = β1 X1it + β2 X2it + ….+ βk Xkit + eit
i = 1,…,N t = 1,….,T
(1)
Types of Panel Data Models
Panel data models can be separated into static panel models
and dynamic panel models.
Static Panel Models
There are several types of static panel data analytic models.
These are constant coefficients models, fixed effects models, and
random effects models. Among these types of models are dynamic
panel, robust, and covariance structure models. The Constant
Coefficients Model has constant coefficients, referring to both
intercepts and slopes. In the event that there is neither significant
country nor significant temporal effects, it can be pooled all of the
data and run an ordinary least squares regression model.305 This
model is sometimes called the pooled regression model.
The Fixed Effects Model known as Least Squares Dummy
305
YAFFEE (2003)
160
Variable Model (LSDV). This type of panel model would have
constant slopes but intercepts that differ according to the crosssectional unit. Although there are no significant temporal effects,
there are significant differences among units in this type of model.
While the intercept is cross-section specific and in this case differs
from unit to unit, it may or may not differ over time. These models
are called fixed effects models.
yit  a1  a2 grup1  a2 grup2   2 x2it   3 x3it  eit
(2)
Because i-1 dummy variables are used to designate the
particular country, this same model is sometimes called the Least
Squares Dummy Variable model;
Yit = β1iD1i + β2iD2i + …. + βNiDNi + β1iX1i + β2iX2i + …. +
βNiXNi + eit
(3)
In equation (2), There are N unit and K-1 explanatory
variables.
1i
1N
=
=
1,
0,
D
Other
1,
DN
0,
Other
i=1
i=
There is another fixed effects panel model where the slope
coefficients are constant, but the intercept varies over country as well
as time. In Equation 4, a regression model with i-1 country dummies
and t-1 time dummies is shown. The model could be specified as
follows:
yit  a0  a1country1  a2 country 2   0  1Year1   2 year2  ... 
 k yeark  1 X 1i  2 X 2i  eit
(4)
Another type of fixed effects model has differential intercepts
and slopes. This kind of model has intercepts and slopes that both vary
161
according to the country. To formulate this model, we would include
not only country dummies, but also their interactions with the timevarying covariates. This is shown as Eq.5;
yit  a0  a1country1  a 2 country 2   2 X 2it   3 K 3it 
 4 * Unit 2 * X 2it   5 * Unit 3 * X 2it   6 * Unit 2 * X 3it 
 5 * Unit 3 * X 3it  eit
(5)
In this model, the intercepts and intercepts vary with the
country. The intercept for country1 would be a1. The intercept for
Unit2 would also include an additional intercept, a2, so the intercept
for Unit2 would be a1+a2. The intercept for Unit3 would include an
additional intercept. Hence, its intercept would be a1 + a3. The slope
for K2it with Unit2 would be b2 + b4, while the slope for K2it with Unit3
would be b2 + b5. One could similarly compute the slope for X3it with
Unit2 as b3 + b6. In this way, the intercepts and slopes vary with the
unit (country).306
In testing fixed effect hypothesis, it can be used the pooled
regression model as the baseline for our comparison. First it is tested
the group (country) effects. It can be performed this significance test
with an F test resembling the structure of the F test for R2 change.
(6)
In Eq.6, T is total number of temporal observations, n is the
number of groups, and K is number of regressors in the model.307
The Random Effects Model is called a regression with a
random constant term.308 One way to handle the ignorance or error
is to assume that the intercept is a random outcome variable. The
random outcome is a function of a mean value plus a random error.
306
YAFFEE, (2003)
GREENE, (2003)
308
GREENE, (2003)
307
162
But this cross-sectional specific error term vi, which indicates the
deviation from the constant of the cross-sectional unit
must be uncorrelated with the errors of the variables. Time
series cross-sectional regression model is one with an intercept that is
a random effect.
yit   0i  1 xit   2 xit  eit
 0 i   i  vi
 yit   i  1 xit   2 xit  eit  vi
(7)
Dynamic Panel Models
The basic idea is to write the regression equation as a dynamic
panel data model, take first-differences to remove unobserved timeinvariant country-specific effects, and then instrument the right-handside variables in the first-differenced equations using levels of the
series lagged two periods or more. In studying economic growth, this
procedure has important advantages over simple cross-section
regressions and other estimation methods for dynamic panel data
models. First, estimates will no longer be biased by any omitted
variables that are constant over time (unobserved country-specific or
‘fixed’ effects). In conditional convergence regressions, this avoids
the problem raised by the omission of initial efficiency. Secondly, as
we discuss below, the use of instrumental variables allows parameters
to be estimated consistently in models which include endogenous
right-hand-side variables, such as investment rates in the context of a
growth equation. Finally, again as we discuss below, the use of
instruments potentially allows consistent estimation even in the
presence of measurement error.309
A model with a lagged dependent variable and T=3:
yit = α0 + βyit-1 + αi + εit
(8)
i = 1,…,N; t = 1,3
If difference the data to remove the fixed effect:
yi3 – yi2= β(yi2 – yi1) + (εi3 – εi2)
309
BOND et.al (2001)
163
(9)
This model fails to satisfy the assumption necessary for
consistency, because
E[(εi3 – εi2)|(yi2 – yi1)] = - E[εi2|(yi2 – yi1)] ≠ 0
(10)
Need an instrument uncorrelated with (εi3 –εi2) and correlated
with (yi2-yi1). To solve this problem it can be used yi1, the dependent
variable lagged twice.
GMM is generalized version of this, and it needs more than 2
time periods and predetermined right hand side variables.
A basic dynamic panel regression can be written as follows;
yit = α0 + βxit + αi + εit
(11)
i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T
or
yit = α0 + βxit + uit
(12)
But now,
E[εit|xiT,…,xi,t+1,xit,xi,t-1,…,xi1,] ≠ 0
(13)
Although,
E[εit|xit,xi,t-1,…,xi1] = 0
(14)
Difference the model to remove the effect,
Δyit = βΔxit + Δuit
(15)
i = 1,…,N; t = 2,…,T
If x is predetermined, then we have
E[Δuit|Δxit] = E[εit-εit-1|xit-xi,t-1] ≠ 0
(16)
because of the potential correlation of εit-1 and xit . However,
164
E[Δuit|xi,t-1,xi,t-2,…,xi1] = 0
(17)
Therefore we can use all prior lags of x as instruments for the
tth equation.310
Model and Data
Following model is used for testing effect of energy
production on economic growth
y = β0 + β1L + β2K + β3E +u
(18)
Where,
g=Real GDP Growth Rate,
L= Total Population,
K=Gross Capital Formation,
E=Energy Production, kt of oil equivalent.
Data for 1990-2010 period, 104 countries including Turkey
and Russian Federation is hold. All the data is obtained from World
Development Indicators by the World Bank.
Estimation Results
GMM estimation results for effect of energy on economic
growth are given at Table 12.
Table 12. GMM Estimation Results, Dependent Variable: Δg
Coefficient
Std.Error t-value t-prob
Δg(-1)
-0.0414790
0.2106
-0.197 0.844
Δg(-2)
0.0591666
0.1673
0.354
0.724
ΔlogK
21.2083
2.801
7.57
0.000
ΔlogK(-1)
-18.1757
3.289
-5.53
0.000
ΔlogK(-2)
-8.31326
4.594
-1.81
0.071
ΔlogL
290.745
284.3
1.02
0.307
ΔlogL(-1)
-638.775
532.3
1.20
0.230
ΔlogL(-2)
357.325
324.2
1.10
0.270
ΔlogE
9.19497
4.892
.88
.060
ΔlogE(-1)
-13.3998
7.476
-1.79
0.073
ΔlogE(-2)
14.1846
11.40
1.24
0.213
Constant
-0.0841138
0.2046
-0.411 0.681
310
HALL (2003)
165
sigma
Wald (joint)
Wald (dummy)
Sargan test
AR(1) test:
AR(2) test
4.884086
267.0 [0.000] **
0.1691 [0.681]
173.5 [0.000] **
-2.328 [0.020] *
-0.8496 [0.396]
According to the estimation results, energy production affects
the growth rate positively. This effect is also statistically significant.
Population and capital formation also have positive effects on
economic growth. While effect of capital formation is statistically
significant, population is not.
166
CONCLUSION
By looking at the current developments, it can be concluded
that Turkish-Russian relations will improve in the political, economic
and security realms. However, the relations are not free from a number
of serious problems that could threaten to derail these growing ties;
both countries have converging and conflicting interests in
neighboring regions, and this status makes Turkish-Russian relations
promising yet difficult. Turkey and Russia are two influential actors in
the Eurasian geopolitics and their relations have implications for the
whole Eurasian region. Because of this, internal and external players
in Eurasian geopolitical gambling will keep an eye on this growing
relationship.
This book examines the increasing and intensified cooperation
between Russia and Turkey as a central feature of Central Eurasia's
post-Cold War restructuring, and seeks to explain their cooperation
with reference to major theories of international relations. It argues
that the diminution of the Russian threat is what allowed for the
possibility of Turkish-Russian cooperation.
Rapidly developing economic cooperation remains a
backbone of mutual relations and simultaneously, promotes political
rapprochement. With the realization of large joint projects in the
sphere of heavy industry, electric power industry, aviation and a
railway communication, food and the building industry, the military
sphere and tourism, so will a Russian influence on the Turkish
economy and foreign policy inevitably increase. Taking into account
Turkey’s rapidly growing dependence
on deliveries of Russian
natural gas and projects in the energy sphere, this influence can lead to
the changes in the political priorities of Ankara. The concept of this
Euroasian cooperation in both countries is based on economics, but it
can find also a political expression.
In such a case, if the tendency for economic rapprochement
leads to coming together political interests, Turkey will gradually and
inevitably leave the American sphere of influence. Economic
cooperation with Turkey strengthens Russian political position in the
area, particularly, in Caucasus and in Central Asia. This leads to the
concealed division of the spheres of influence between Moscow and
Ankara aimed to prevent US penetration in the region. The countries
in the area will be inevitably involved in joint Russian - Turkish
economic projects and consequently, involved into a political orbit of
167
Russian influence.
Turkey's dependence on the Russian energy carrier’s
deliveries is gradually rising. Despite the US negative attitude towards
projects of Russian oil deliveries by pipelines to Mediterranean Sea
(since it will strengthen Russia and will reduce deliveries of oil
through the BTC), Ankara is ready to participate in them.
Evidently this supports a viewpoint that Turkey hopes to take
into account the interests of its northern neighbor at the expense of the
traditional union with America. The increasing dependence of Turkey
on deliveries of Russian gas, and joint projects with Russia in the field
of energy and power will inevitably increase the growth of Ankara's
political dependence on Moscow.
At a time when Russia and Turkey are exchanging diplomatic
visits at the highest level and when mutual trade and investment
continues to grow at unprecedented levels, it is difficult to understand
how Turkey's willingness to extradite a notorious but relatively minor
Chechen figure could further improve those relations. Aside from the
occasional low-level attempt at scandal, such as the recent release of
an FSB propaganda film conveniently portraying the Turkish National
Intelligence Organization (MIT) as a candidate to replace the CIA as a
threat to Russia in the wake of Putin's support for America's war on
terrorism, Russia has not given any significant indication of
displeasure with Turkey's stance on Chechnya.
Unless Moscow chooses to pose a direct challenge to Turkish
security by, for example, reactivating contacts with the PKK, there is
no reason to expect Turkey to reverse course and begin assisting the
Chechens as it did in the first war. The September 11 attacks only
heightened the Turkish security establishment's determination to
quash Islamic radicalism, and it will continue to regard with great
suspicion all causes associated with that movement, including the
Chechen cause. Active support for Chechnya in Turkey will remain
restricted to a badly split Diaspora community, a dispirited and
embattled Islamist movement, and thoroughly marginal political
figures such as Besim Tibuk.
Given the sharply circumscribed nature of the support, the
Turkish contribution to the ability of the Chechens to resist can only
be negligible. Those who believe that Chechnya can be pacified by
cutting outside sources of supply would do well to consult the
archived debates of the Cheka, the forerunner to the KGB, regarding
its attempts to pacify Chechnya in the 1920s. While some Cheka
168
officers preferred to rage about suspected aid trickling in from
"bourgeois Georgia", others more soberly observed that the Cheka's
own brutality had given the region's inhabitants no choice but to fight.
If Russia hopes to defeat radicalism in Chechnya today, it would do
better to curb the atrocities of its own forces than fulminate about
foreign sources of aid.
Turkey and Russia are two countries have several economic
relationships come from the history. Aside from the political disputes
that arise from time to time between countries, trade and economic
relations are constantly developing. Indeed, of Turkey and the Russian
Federation are the two major trade partners. Turkey imports a
significant amount of goods from the Russian Federation. Russian
Federation is also an important export market for Turkey. In the same
way Russia is exporting a significant amount of goods and services to
the Turkey, and Turkey also imports large quantities of goods and
services.
The fact that the two countries are geographically close ranks
is an advantage in trade relations. It is important to develop trade and
economic relations between the two countries. Outside of the
traditional textile and natural resources trade, other goods and services
trade must be developed. In particular, it should be cooperate in the
fields of tourism, health, banking, and transportation. In addition, to
cooperate in terms of education will contribute to the development of
human capital in the future.
Turkey should give importance to the quality of products
which exports to the Russian Federation. In fact, Turkey is faced with
competition with its European rivals, especially in this area. Russia
should diversify their exports product to Turkey.
169
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