Volume 15 • Issue 4 - Vermont Journal of Environmental Law

Transcription

Rising Temps and Emerging Threats: The Intersection of Climate Change and National Security in the 21st Century Volume 15  Issue 4
Symposium Edition
VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
VERMONT LAW SCHOOL
Volume 15, Issue 4
Spring 2014
ARTICLES
Rising Temps and Emerging Threats: the Intersection of Climate Change
and National Security in the 21st Century Introduction
Molly Gray. ...............................................................................................660
Rising Temps and Emerging Threats: the Intersection of Climate Change
and National Security in the 21st Century Keynote Address
John Steinbruner .......................................................................................665
The Energy Pivot: How Military-Led Energy Innovation Can Change the
World
Siddhartha M. Velandy .............................................................................672
Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications for National Security
Michael B. McElroy and D. James Baker.................................................727
Fighting for Home in the Melting Arctic
Madeline Stano .........................................................................................744
Warm World, Cold Reception: Climate Change, National Security and
Forced Migration
Kate Jastram .............................................................................................752
Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations
Jody Prescott.............................................................................................766
Protecting People Displaced by Weather-related Disasters and Climate
Change: Experience from the Field
Alice Thomas.............................................................................................803
Vermont Law School
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VERMONT LAW SCHOOL
Volume 15, Issue 4
Spring 2014
EDITORIAL BOARD 2013–2014
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Emily Remmel
ADMINISTRATIVE EDITOR
Casey Ryder
SENIOR MANAGING EDITOR
Megan K. McLaurin
SENIOR ARTICLES EDITOR
Jacqueline Goodrum
SENIOR NOTES EDITOR
Emily Migliaccio
WEB OUTREACH EDITOR
Lara Maierhofer
SYMPOSIUM EDITOR
Molly Gray
WEB EDITOR
Marissa Meredyth
HEAD NOTES EDITORS
Jordan Asch
William Labate
Christine Mertens
Scott Seigal
Molly Armus
Colin Beckman
MANAGING EDITORS
William Bittinger
Jonathan Blansfield
Andrew Fowler
PRODUCTION EDITORS
Emily Burgis
Jared Schroder
Christopher Smith
EVENTS EDITOR
Kalika Elofson
ARTICLES EDITORS
Kate Durost
Bob Harper
Christopher Keach
Eric Mortenson-Nemore
Noah Strebler
Sam Weiman
EDITORIAL STAFF
Crystal Abbey
Megan Backsen
Robert Batten
Jacob Beckstrom
Thomas Belli
Libby Bowker
Caroline Casey
Lisa Franceware
Allison Gabala
Elijah Gleason
Thea Graybill
Benjamin Gustafson
Jack Hornickel
David Keagle
Will Kirk
Scott Lake
Andrew Minikowski
FACULTY ADVISOR
Rebecca Purdom
Kelly Nokes
Michael Ozaeta
Dan Schreiber
David Scott
Katherine Stinson
Ashley Welsch
Phoebe Youhanna
Sarah Zelcer
RISING TEMPS AND EMERGING THREATS:
THE INTERSECTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Molly Gray†
Each year, the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law (Journal), the
Journal for the nation’s top-ranked environmental law school, has the
unique opportunity to host experts from across the nation, and the world, to
debate and discuss influential and significant environmental issues. Without
exception, the Journal’s 2013 Symposium sought to reinvigorate the
nation’s climate change discourse through a robust look at the growing link
between climate change and national security. Indeed, the U.S. Department
of Defense has consistently identified climate change as one of the top
threats to U.S. national security
The Journal was not alone in its interest to draw attention to this
significant issue. In the months leading up to the 2013 Symposium,
President Obama gave a landmark climate change speech revealing that in
the last fifteen years, the United States experienced the twelve warmest
years on record; 1 U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, writing for
Foreign Policy magazine, addressed the Navy’s near “eco-arms race” to
rapidly adapt to changes in energy costs and climate demands; 2 and a
scientific paper published in Nature warned of rising greenhouse emissions
†
Symposium Editor, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law (Volume 15).
The Vermont Journal of Environmental Law would like to thank Vermont Law School faculty John
Echeverria, Patrick Parenteau, Melissa Scanlan, Laurie Ristino, Rebecca Purdom, and Janet Milne for
their tireless advice and encouragement in planning this Symposium. In particular, the Journal would
like to thank Vermont Law School Professor Stephen Dycus. Without Professor Dycus’ leadership and
expertise as a pioneer in the field of national security and the environment, this Symposium would not
have been possible. The Journal would also like to thank the Environmental Law Center at Vermont
Law School and the Office of Student Affairs and Diversity for their generous financial support.
1.
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Remarks by the President
on Climate Change at Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (June 25, 2013 1:45 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change.
2.
Ray Mabus, Green Water: Can the U.S. Navy Win the Eco-Arms Race? FOREIGN
POLICY
(Aug.
6,
2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/06/navy_energy_oil_biofuels_ray_mabus.
2014]
Climate Change and National Security in the 21st Century
661 leading to unprecedented temperature increases beyond any normal climate
variances recorded in the last 150 years.3
Over 200 students, scientists, activists, and attorneys filled the Chase
Community Center at Vermont Law School on Friday, October 25, 2013 to
hear experts discuss the growing impact of climate change on national
security. Entitled, Rising Temps and Emerging Threats: The Intersection of
Climate Change and National Security in the 21st Century, panelists
addressed issues ranging from the military’s response to warming
temperatures and sea level rise, to the growing humanitarian needs posed by
climate-based forced migration and food security.
Opening the Symposium with an overview of the latest scientific
findings, keynote speaker, John Steinbruner, Director of the Center for
International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland and chair
of the fourteen member panel of experts who conducted a study for the
National Research council entitled, Climate and Social Stress: Recent
Trends and Implications for National Security,4 warned participants, “it is
prudent to expect the social effects of climate change to be as extensive and
as consequential as the ecological effects.”
Throughout the day, panelists reflected upon the links between
climate change and armed conflict, natural disasters and food shortages and
whether current international legal frameworks properly address growing
national and international security issues. Current and former employees
from the United Nations and Refugees International spoke of the law and
policy dilemmas facing their organizations in meeting the needs of those
impacted by mass migration and global food insecurity. As a current
example, one panelist shared the history of the ongoing legal battle of the
northwest Alaska village of Kivalina, which continues to seek damages in
federal court for alleged displacement due to rising sea levels caused by
greenhouse emissions.
Panelists, including current and former members of the U.S. armed
forces, addressed the operational and security challenges facing the
military, the role of the laws of war in climate-caused conflicts, and ways in
which the U.S. military may adapt its operations to meet the needs of
vulnerable populations most impacted by climate change. U.S. government
officials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture spoke to adaptation
programs to meet national and international food security challenges caused
by severe weather events.
3.
Camilo Mora et al., The Projected Timing of Climate Departure From Recent
Variability, 502 NATURE 183–87 (2013).
4.
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, CLIMATE AND SOCIAL STRESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY
ANALYSIS (John D. Steinbruner, Paul C. Stern, & Jo L. Husbands eds.) (2013).
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[Vol. 15
The Journal is pleased to profile the scholarship and transcribed
remarks of many of the experts who participated in the October 2013
Symposium. For the remarks of those experts not included in this book, we
welcome you to visit the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law’s website
or YouTube channel.5 For ease of reference, we include a list of all of the
participating panelists.
RISING TEMPS AND EMERGING THREATS: THE INTERSECTION OF
CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Friday, October 25, 2013
WELCOME AND OPENING REMARKS
Emily Remmel
Editor-in-Chief ,Vermont Journal of Environmental Law
Marc Mihaly
President and Dean, Vermont Law School
Stephen Dycus
Professor of National Security Law, Vermont Law School
Melissa Scanlan
Associate Dean & Director, Environmental Law Program, Vermont Law
School
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
John Steinbruner
Director of the Center for International and Security Studies, University of
Maryland; Author, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security
Analysis
Melissa Scanlan (Moderator)
Associate Professor, Associate Dean & Director, Environmental Law
Program, Vermont Law School
5 The Vermont Journal of Environmental Law (2014), available at http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu; The
Vermont
Journal
of
Environmental
Law
YouTube
Channel,
available
at
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCtp-8YqefT55Vs9CA_Yqxnw (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
2014]
Climate Change and National Security in the 21st Century
663 CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: CHARACTERIZING THE
NATURE OF THE SECURITY THREAT
D. James Baker
Director of the Global Carbon Measurement Program, William J. Clinton
Foundation; Author, Climate Extremes: Recent Trends with Implications
for National Security
Geoff Dabelko
Professor and Director of Environmental Studies, Voinovich School of
Leadership and Public Affairs, Ohio University
John Steinbruner
Director of the Center for International and Security Studies University of
Maryland; Author, Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security
Analysis
Melissa Scanlan (Moderator)
Associate Dean & Director, Environmental Law Program, Vermont Law
School
ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: THE U.S. MILITARY’S RESPONSE
Siddhartha Velandy
Major, United States Marine Corps Reserve
Sarah Light
Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Wharton School of Business,
University of Pennsylvania
Jody Prescott, COL (Ret.)
U.S. Army, Senior Fellow, West Point Center for the Rule of Law
Stephen Dycus
Professor of National Security Law, Vermont Law School
William Arkin (Moderator)
Journalist; Author, American Coup: How a Terrified Government is
Destroying the Constitution
CLIMATE BASED FORCED MIGRATION: ADAPTING TO THE DISPLACEMENT
AND RESETTLEMENT OF PERSONS DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Kate Jastram
Faculty Director, Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law,
University of California, Berkeley School of Law
Alice Thomas
Climate Displacement Program Manager, Refugees International
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[Vol. 15
Agnes Hurwitz
Rule of Law Coordinator, Regional Bureau for Latin America and the
Caribbean, United Nations Development Programme
Madeline Stano
Luke Cole Memorial Fellow & Staff Attorney, Center on Race, Poverty &
The Environment
Patrick Parenteau (Moderator)
Senior Counsel, Environmental & Natural Resources Clinic; Professor of
Law, Vermont Law School
FOOD SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY: THE FUTURE OF FOOD IN THE
FACE OF CLIMATE CHANGE
William Hohenstein
Director, Climate Change Program Office , U.S. Department of Agriculture
Amy Larkin
Entrepreneur, Environmental Activist; Author, Environmental Debt: The
Hidden Costs of a Changing Global Economy
Thomas Vogelmann
Dean of the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, University of
Vermont
Jeff Taft-Dick
Former Country Director, United Nations World Food Programme
Laurie Ristino (Moderator)
Director, Center for Agriculture and Food Systems, Vermont Law School
CLOSING REMARKS
Molly Gray
Symposium Editor, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law
RISING TEMPS AND EMERGING THREATS:
THE INTERSECTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
By John Steinbruner*
Thank you for having this meeting. I’m sure the reason I’ve been
invited [here today] is to talk about the National Academy of Sciences
report “Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis.” The
thing I want to say, though, is that you cannot blame the National Academy
of Sciences for what I’m about to say. The report is the result of [work done
by] fourteen members of the committee and then vetted by eleven other
people, and everything said in it is extremely cautious. I’m going to extend
a little bit beyond the details of the report. I’ll give you my personal take on
the situation, having gone through the result of the report.
If you’re in Washington and dealing with climate issues, you hear a
lot about uncertainty, and indeed, there are a lot of uncertainties associated
[with climate issues]. But let me begin with things that are not at all
uncertain. [First], the main determinants of anthropogenic thermal impulse
are known with confidence. We know these things as well as we know
anything: the radiative forcing effect of the CO2 molecule; the atmospheric
dwell time of that molecule (more than a century); and CO2 concentrations
over time (they’ve been increasing . . . ).
The rate of change, at the moment, of CO2 concentration and
resulting radiative forcing is currently ten times greater than at any point in
the last 400,000 years (we can measure [this change] with some certainty
[because] we have annual data from the Vostock ice cores). [The current
rate of change is] ten times greater than [the] entire [400,000 year period].
And if you go back to the point at which the temperature on Earth was
recently, the greatest the rate [of change] is 20,000 times greater than the
process that generated [the most recent] thermal peak (admittedly, that went
on over a longer period of time). All of which is to say, “we are exceeding
*
Dr. Steinbruner is the director of the Center for International and Security Studies at
the University of Maryland, and author of the book Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security
Analysis.
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[Vol. 15
the speed limit.” We are outside the bounds of the entire paleoclimate
record in terms of what we can change . . . .
We know that the current sea levels—compared with a couple of
obvious historical reference points—are four to six meters below levels that
occurred during the Eemean Period (about 130,000 years ago) when the
temperature was roughly equal to current conditions. And [sea levels] are
twenty-five meters below the Pliocene Period (a couple million years ago)
when estimated deep ocean temperatures were only one degree warmer than
current conditions. We’re almost certainly going to hit that one degree
increase. [CO2 concentration and sea level changes] are about as wellknown as anything is well-known.
So what are the global implications? Well, there will ultimately be an
energy balance. We know basic physics says “when you put this kind of
thermal impulse into the system, it will be balanced in some way.” So,
either we’re looking at sea level rise more rapid than currently projected
and possibly in a nonlinear sequence, or there is some other combination of
processes that we do not yet know that is going to balance it. In other
words, we’re running behind the schedule for the historical balancing
mechanism, which is sea level rise.
The consequences [of global climate change] will certainly be
substantial. There’s no question about that. Apparently, [the consequences
will be] unprecedented, given the rate at which we’re adding [greenhouse
gases] to the atmosphere. But there is a problem with this: the scientists can
say with certainty [that consequences will be substantial, but] they cannot
tell us the character, magnitude, timing, or location of what the
consequences actually will be. There’s a lot of uncertainty about how, in
detail, this is going to work out . . . .
We’re also outside the bounds of what our sea ice models will tell us.
The arctic ice, over summer, is disappearing much more rapidly than
anybody can give an account for. And that’s a pretty stark warning of the
consequences of where we are.
Decisive mitigation of the thermal impulse is technically feasible. We
can, in principle, hold global warming to a prudent standard that would, if
you will, presumably preserve the operating conditions of human society as
we currently know it. But we’re not remotely doing that; it would take
several decades to accomplish [decisive mitigation], and we’re not on that
path. Therefore we have to anticipate, when you get to the security issues,
the extraordinary and severe burdens of adaptation [that will occur] with
increasing frequency over the next three decades.
And here’s where I am really departing from the National Academy
Report. Let me give you what that might mean. The Report says what I just
said: there will be severely increasing burdens of adaptation, and in some
2014]
Rising Temps and Emerging Threats
667 societies [the burdens] will exceed [the societies’] ability to cope . . . . My
favorite example is Pakistan. As we all know, [Pakistan] is an internally
fragile society. It has a prominent agricultural sector . . . , [and] it is highly
dependent on hydrology in the Indus River Watershed. It is a pretty
predominantly semi-arid area, and the water dependency is substantial: 30
[to] 40% of their water availability comes from the Indus River, and 30 [to]
40% of the Indus River water flow derives from glacier and snow melt.
[Pakistan is] facing very sharp allocation tradeoffs among their water
use, pinning irrigation versus power generation, and irrigation across
provinces (Punjab and Sind, in particular). There [are] divisive water
resource allocation rules favoring irrigation over power generation for,
basically, internal political reasons. [Water allocation authorities are]
favoring Punjab over Sind for the same reasons, even though the Sind is a
much more arid territory. And [the] allocation pattern is based on
unrealistically high estimates of water availability. Therefore, [water
allocation authorities are] creating a division of interest between small and
medium enterprises, which are dependent upon power and really provide.
Any hope for viable generation of the economy depends on small and
medium enterprises [who] depend on power generation. [And power
generation] is being hurt and is in competition with agriculture—which
depends on irrigation—and the growing urban areas depending upon water
resources.
This situation, for whatever cruel reason, really is being severely
exacerbated by one of the big climate effects going on at the moment: the
accumulation in the Karakoram glaciers north of Pakistan at high altitude.
Because of increased winter temperatures, it gets more snowfall up there,
and the glaciers are actually increasing at high altitude and receding at low
altitude. [Because of this,] the Indus River water flow is 30% below its
normal pattern. [Pakistan is] also getting increased precipitation in some
areas, and increasing drought in others. One of the apparent climate effects
is increases in the extremes; and increasing ambient temperatures are
interfering with the agricultural product cycle within Pakistan.
[The] bottom line is that this situation is already generating chronic
protests within Pakistan. Most of the villages and many of the cities have,
on average, power only half a day. So, one hour on, one hour off during the
day, and one hour on and four hours off during the night—routinely. That is
generating daily, or certainly many times a week, protest riots in the city.
And the Taliban has discovered that the one thing less popular than the
United States are the power stations; so they’re beginning to organize
against [the power stations]. All of which is to say, we’re already seeing
very severe internal pressure within Pakistan, and I don’t have to tell you
that Pakistan is an area of major concern.
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What are the global and security implications of this situation? I think
we have to anticipate adaptation failures in some societies, severe enough to
induce an international reaction of unprecedented magnitude. We’re going
to look at cases that are far more serious than anything we’ve seen up to
this point. In addition, globally we’re going to have to prepare and manage
what I will call “geo-engineering contingencies,” because some societies
subject to severe, immediate climate effects are going to be tempted to
fiddle with the global temperature. And [temperature engineering],
unfortunately, is technically possible to do. And then eventually we’re
going to have to, I think, anticipate a truly compelling mitigation effort. All
of these things have security implications.
So again, deriving from the Academy report, and maybe being a little
more venturesome about its implications, suggests some immediate
practical steps that really are quite urgent. First of all, we need to develop a
global monitoring system worthy of the problem. We are now watching
social and environmental dynamics in high resolution the way we could,
and the way we’ll need to if we’re going to be able to anticipate [from]
where the trouble comes. Pakistan is a very good example of where to look,
Egypt is another. I’ll talk later about Syria, but [these nations are] not
exclusive. There are [numerous] parts of the world where trouble could
occur, and we’re not watching with the kind of resolution that we need to.
[Developing a global monitoring system] will have to be a global
process. We would have to establish a continuously managed database,
prioritized for climate and social indicators, and we would have to learn
how to do stress testing for areas of the world that aren’t [already
monitored]. All of this [technology] is far from the current state-of-the-art.
We’ll also, I believe, have to establish protocol for getting solar radiation
management field trials and ultimate approval of any solar radiation
operation.
If you see what’s going on among the scientists at the moment, they
are realizing: we’re not on a course to mitigation; we are looking at severe
trouble; and we may have to have [an] emergency reaction to reduce the
average global temperature by interfering with the global climate system.
And, whether it’s fortunate or unfortunate, it is possible to [tinker with the
climate]. With putting sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere at a cost of
something like eight to ten billion dollars a year, we could reduce average
surface temperature by five degrees centigrade per year. So, we could offset
the underlying global warming effect, although we can’t change it. Several
countries are capable of doing this, and we have to worry about those
[countries] that consider themselves to be severely burdened actually
attempting to do it. I think that’s the equivalent of heroin addiction really, if
you do not accompany it with a mitigation effort. But [atmospheric
2014]
669 interference is] going to be a severe temptation. We’re going to need rules
about this, and we do not yet have them.
Finally, we need to develop prototypes for small modular nuclear
reactors with passively safe and sealed fuel design features. Simply because
if you go look at the basic numbers of the alternative technologies available
(non-carbon emitting technologies), and the amounts that we have to
produce in order to achieve a reasonable global standard, there is no way
you can get there without a dramatic expansion of nuclear power. Now that
is not a message that anybody finds welcome, but if you look at the
numbers it is unavoidable. Wind, solar, biomass, and some degree of
carbon sequestration all make some contribution, but without a dramatic
expansion of nuclear power, we’re not going to be able to do mitigation. At
the moment, currently accurate designs, current fuel cycle management
practices, and current security relationships simply will not support an
expansion of the sort required. So we’ve got a big transformation that we
need to go through.
There are conceptual designs of reactors that would be far more
appropriate than the current ones. [These designs are inherently safe and
much more resistant to proliferation [than current designs]. I’m just going
to go through a series of them. I’m not going to dwell on this, but there are
conceptual designs that are basically paper designs that people are thinking
about, and there are another four designs that are being undertaken by
various commercial ventures at the moment. But if you go through these
figures, . . . you’ll notice none of them have all the properties that we need.
You need a sealed fuel feature such that, in providing a large number of
reactors, we do not spread access to nuclear fuel and ultimately nuclear
explosive isotopes. You want to concentrate [the process], [by managing]
the reactors that are manufactured in a central location, [and are then] sent
out, plugged in, and brought back with no access to the fuel in between. So,
you need the seal fuel feature that has to last for twenty to forty years for
this concept to work. None of the [existing] prototypes yet have [the seal
fuel] feature, but you can definitely create small reactors that have [it].
Arguably, in order to prepare [for the increase in nuclear
technology]we need an investment program to develop a couple of
prototype reactor designs to the point that we could actually use them.
[Development] would probably take about ten years, and about a billion
dollars. That’s small change considering the magnitude of this problem.
Nobody is currently making those investments. We’re not even creating the
technical design that we know we’re going to need. So [creating investment
programs for the proper technology is] the first step that [must] happen.
In addition to [an investment program], we’ll also need to develop an
institutional design for global management of nuclear reactor and fuel cycle
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[Vol. 15
services. If we are going to expand nuclear power, and therefore the
fissionable isotopes that are generated (which also can be used for nuclear
weapons), we’re going to [need] an accounting system far more accurate
than the one we currently have. We need to aspire to be able to keep track
of all nuclear explosive isotopes, down to the weapons equivalent unit. We
are decades away from [this] aspiration.
There’s a dispute about whether we’ll ever get [an effective system in
place], given uncertainties about historical production. But the point is, we
do not even have the design for a system that would [accurately account for
nuclear materials], and it’s going to have to operate over several decades
before we’d have much confidence in it. So we need to get going on that.
For sure, it is technically feasible, given the information technology we
currently have, to keep track of all nuclear explosive isotopes and
fissionable isotopes, down to [an acceptable] degree of accuracy. But we
haven’t been [keeping track of these materials] that way, and [we] haven’t
played catch up. It’s going to be decades to catch it up.
We also should realize that we have to prepare for the transformation
of current security relationships among the U.S., the E.U., Russia, China,
and India, at a minimum. Those are the key players of the global warming
problem; China and India are the key venues. If we do not achieve
mitigation in those two societies, we’re not going to do it globally. They
have 40% of the world population between them, and much of the
economic growth projected to come. So we either win or lose on global
warming in those two places.
So, in order to [achieve mitigation in China and India], we’re going
to have to elevate interest in mutually protective collaboration over the
rather contentious assumptions that currently dominate our security
relationships. We’ll have to develop institutional arrangements for
financing and technical support of energy transformation, which will have
to be the main event between us, and it will have to subordinate residual
military confrontation to that purpose. A big change in attitude and a big
change in institutional arrangements will be driven eventually by the global
warming problem.
In general, it is prudent to expect that the social effects of climate
change will be as extensive and as consequential as the ecological effects.
What’s going on here is a very complicated interaction between climate
change and social dynamics. In principle, these social effects can be
constructively shaped. There’s a surmountable danger here that offers
inherent opportunity, but as we’re already realizing, it remains to be seen
how this will work out.
But the students of your generation have a lot to accomplish. We’ve
given you a legacy that [presents] big challenges out there. But the good
2014]
671 news is it’s not impossible. It’s not impossible to do this. It’s technically
feasible. The barriers are largely attitude and institutional arrangements.
THE ENERGY PIVOT: HOW MILITARY-LED ENERGY
INNOVATION CAN CHANGE THE WORLD
By Siddhartha M. Velandy*
Introduction............................................................................................... 673
I. The Unconventional Energy Arms Race ............................................... 677
A. Historical Perspective—Global Presence Fueling Innovation ........ 678
B. Today’s Force —More Fight, Less Fuel.......................................... 684
C. The Green Arms Race and the Globalization of Unconventional
Energy................................................................................................... 690
II. China—The Middle Kingdom and Its Resource Quest........................ 693
A. The Middle Kingdom—A Historical and Cultural Perspective ...... 695
B. China’s Global Resource Quest ....................................................... 700
III. The Energy Pivot ................................................................................ 706
A. Aligning Two Cultures .................................................................... 708
B. A New Framework for Cooperation ................................................ 709
C. The U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship .......................... 713
D. Towards a Lasting U.S.-China Relationship—Shared Interests
Driving Global Innovation.................................................................... 716
E. Immediate Opportunities for Collaboration ..................................... 718
1. A Smarter Grid ............................................................................. 718
2. Solar and Wind Power.................................................................. 720
3. Storage.......................................................................................... 722
IV. Continuous Innovation—Towards a Diverse Energy Future ............. 724
*
Major, United States Marine Corps Reserve. I wish to thank Saptarishi Bandopadyay,
Juan Garcia, Mark Janis, Kate Jastrom, Craig Jensen, Sarah Light, Scott Manning, Robert McFarlane,
Susan McGarvey, Siddharth Mohandas, Rico Reyes, Kurt Sanger, Jock Scharfen, Alice Thomas,
Courtney Walsh, R. James Woolsey, Michael Wu, and his wife, Erin, for their ever-helpful and patient
conversation and comments. Please note that the arguments and opinions contained herein are my own.
They do not necessarily represent the position of the United States Marine Corps, Department of the
Navy, Department of Defense, or Executive Branch.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 673 INTRODUCTION
After facing the distinct possibility of nuclear war over missiles in
Cuba, President Kennedy looked forward to a brighter future and a better
way to resolve conflicts between East and West. Kennedy used his
commencement address at American University in Washington, D.C., on
June 10, 1963, to transition and break the deadlock in negotiations with the
Soviet Union on a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests and communicate his vision
for a more peaceful world. With characteristic eloquence and idealism, the
President remarked:
Too many of us think [peace] is impossible. . . . We do not accept
that view. Our problems are manmade—therefore, they can be
solved by man. . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic
common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe
the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all
mortal.1
Fifty years have passed since this address and though much progress
has been made, Kennedy’s vision for peace remains illusive. The Soviet
Union is no more, and the United States is the “Default Power” in the
international system.2 American military and diplomatic missions preserve
regional balances and ensure global stability.3 Even so, the world is in a
state of flux,4 and the American national security picture is complex and
1.
President of the U.S. John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at the American
University
(June
10,
1963),
http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx.
2.
JOSEF JOFFE, THE MYTH OF AMERICA’S DECLINE 249–51 (2014) (noting that “[t]he
United States is the Default Power that occupies center stage because it does what other actors cannot or
will not do . . . . If it comes to collective action, this Default Power usually assumes the largest burden
and acquires most of the shares.” Id. at 250. Joffe goes on to provide examples ranging from the military
action (first Iraq War) to bundling the strands of global diplomacy (Egypt and Israel at Camp David in
1978). He also lists examples of inaction (Rwanda, Darfur, and the UN climate conferences in
Copenhagen, Durban, and Doha, and most recently in Syria), where the United States did not put its
shoulder behind action and no one else stood up to lead. Id.
3.
Id. at 253.
4.
The last quarter century has been a dynamic one for international law and global
governance. The abrupt conclusion of the Cold War in 1989 brought a wave of decolonization, the
rebirth of sovereignty, and efforts to reorganize the international system around the legal process
administered by domestic and international courts. Unfortunately, the unipolar world was not a peaceful
one. The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the terrorist attacks in other countries
that have occurred since, are again changing the architecture of the international system. Traditional
notions of state sovereignty and responsibility are in flux. Individuals have access to levers of power
traditionally reserved for nation-states and international institutions. The new world order is, indeed,
dynamic. See Press Release, Library of Congress, Jason Parker to Discuss “The Empires Who Came In
674
[Vol. 15
dynamic. It dictates paying careful attention to the quotidian places of
unrest across the globe while rebalancing resources from the Middle East
and Central Asia to the Asia-Pacific region.
The Asia-Pacific is the world’s fastest growing region and a key driver
of global politics.5 With over 4.2 billion people, the Asia-Pacific is home to
nearly sixty percent of the world’s population6 and more than half of the
global economy.7 The seas from the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of
Malacca, and the Pacific contain the world’s most vibrant trade and energy
routes. 8 In this critically important region, our allies and partners are
looking for American leadership.
In late 2011, the Obama administration announced a strategic
rebalancing of U.S. resources toward the Asia-Pacific region.9 In his speech
to the Australian Parliament, President Obama signaled this broad shift:
Here [in the Asia-Pacific region], we see the future. As the world’s
fastest-growing region—and home to more than half the global
economy—the Asia-Pacific is critical to achieving my highest
priority, and that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American
people. With most of the world’s nuclear power and some half of
humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead will
be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human
progress.10
After heavy investment over the last thirteen years in the Middle East
and Central Asia, the United States is shifting its attention east.
The interrelated issues of energy and the environment will play a key
role in this strategic rebalancing. Energy use is directly correlated to wealth.
As nations like China and India continue to grow they will seek an
increasing share of the world’s energy resources. These quests that may
range to far-flung places across the globe will cause friction as competition
for energy increases. As the world’s Default Power, the United States will
From the Cold: Decolonization and the Cold War” July 21 (June 29, 2010) (on file at
http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2010/10-158.html).
5.
Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, FOREIGN POL’Y, Nov. 2011.
6.
Social Development in Asia and the Pacific, U.N. ECON. AND SOC. COMM’N FOR ASIA
AND THE PAC., http://www.unescapsdd.org/population-dynamics/overview (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
7.
Remarks, President of the U.S. Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama to the
Australian
Parliament
(Nov.
17,
2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.
8.
Clinton, supra note 5.
9.
Remarks, supra note 7.
10.
Id.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 675 have to provide enhanced presence, mediate disputes, and find lasting
solutions to the difficult problems that will satisfy the countries in the
region.
Rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific region is affecting global energy
markets. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that China
and India will account for half the world’s total increase in energy use
through 2040. To fuel its growth, China, just as the West did during the
Industrial Revolution,11 is turning primarily to coal,12 installing more than
fifty gigawatts of coal energy capacity per year.13 Coal is cheap and, along
with other fossil fuels, provides emerging economies the surest path
towards sustained growth. This increase in the use of fossil fuels will also
have a big impact on the environment.
How the United States manages the dynamic global energy landscape
in the Pacific region and addresses the threats to our climate will be
important measures of American leadership in the years to come. If China
follows the same path towards development as the West, cutting emissions
only after growth, the results for the planet will be disastrous. Likewise, if
China and other rising Asian powers clash in a competition for resources,
the result of worldwide economic stability and the preservation of humanity
could be equally destructive.
Yet these realities, while grave, offer the United States an opportunity
to lead in a way that contributes to global stability while positively
impacting the vexing problem of environmental damage from the rapid
industrial growth in China and the Asia-Pacific region. I propose that the
United States use its strategic pivot in the Asia-Pacific region to increase
direct military-to-military interaction with China and our regional allies
specifically on the issue of energy innovation. These interactions will forge
a new energy future for the region and the world.
Energy and the environment are profound issues to U.S. national
security and foreign policy. Energy shapes interests and relations between
countries. When it is seen through the national security lens, rather than as a
fringe environmental pursuit, climate change becomes a “threat multiplier,”
and an energy policy that promotes heterogeneity and efficiency becomes a
11.
Fossil Energy Office of Commc’ns, A Brief History of Coal Use, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, http://www.fossil.energy.gov/education/energylessons/coal/coal_history.html (last updated
Feb. 12, 2013).
12.
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
CHINA––ANALYSIS,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH (last updated Feb. 4, 2014) (describing that coal
supplied 69 percent of China’s energy consumption. As a result of its incredible coal consumption,
China is the world’s leading energy-related carbon dioxide emitter. The country’s 12th Five-Year Plan
includes several measures to both curb coal use and carbon dioxide emissions.).
13.
RICHARD A. MULLER, ENERGY FOR FUTURE PRESIDENTS 126 (2014).
676
[Vol. 15
“force multiplier.”14 Further, viewing energy policy in the national security
context allows us to examine the opportunity that defense sector-led energy
innovation provides as a vehicle to engage China. Engagement on these
issues of common interest will increase regional stability. Further, with
Chinese, Indian, and other Asian partners, an unconventional energy arms
race will help change the direction of the world’s energy quest.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I of this Article explores the
Pentagon’s push to reduce its use of conventional fuels and increase its
energy efficiency. The military’s mission is driving energy innovation. This
Part will examine how successful energy technologies and effective
regulatory mechanisms that support clean energy innovation are shared
across the globe through informal networks and formal treaty mechanisms.
The defense department’s move to reduce reliance on fossil fuel and
towards increased efficiency has started a Green Arms Race15 that has the
power to not only create a stronger, more capable military, but also to align
the efforts of academics, environmentalists, warriors, and nations to alter
the future of our warming world.
To be effective, this vision for a clean energy future must be shared
with the fastest growing economies. Part II of this paper briefly examines
Chinese history and culture. Culture, which consists of shared values,
expectations, assumptions, perceptions, myths, and goals learned from
previous generations and passed on to future generations, indeed matters.
International relations are complex and even a basic understanding of the
other side’s starting point can facilitate increased cooperation and
coordination.
Using the Obama administration’s strategic rebalance of attention to
the region as a vehicle, Part III of this paper suggests the United States use
its military to engage China and demonstrate the power of clean and
efficient energy innovation. Collaboration between the United States and
China on energy and the environment is unlikely to hit politically sensitive
topics like cyberspace operations or currency manipulation and allows great
potential for cooperation and transparent conversation.
Managed effectively, the mutually beneficial dialogue through
increased military-to-military interaction between the United States and
14.
Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
May 2014) (citing THE CNA CORPORATION, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 1 (2007) & Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Dep’t of Energy and U.S. Dep’t of
Def. 2 (July 22, 2010) (on file at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Enhance-Energy-SecurityMOU.pdf)).
15.
I have written previously and in more detail on this concept. See Siddhartha M.
Velandy, The Green Arms Race: Reorienting the Discussions on Climate Change, Energy Policy, and
National Security, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 309 (2012).
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 677 China can facilitate the sharing of best practices on a range of security
issues like humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. This engagement will
also allow military leaders from both nations to develop cultural
understanding and personal relationships. These ties will not only help
avoid miscalculation and misunderstanding during times of crisis, but also
will have the power to bend the global outlook for energy demand.
Part IV concludes by discussing the impact of sustained U.S.-China
cooperation on global governance and the language of energy policy.
I. THE UNCONVENTIONAL ENERGY ARMS RACE
The United States military plays in its own league. Accounting for
close to forty percent of the world’s total military spending, the U.S.
military budget dwarfs all others. And of course, the financial ledger does
not tell the whole story. China’s People’s Liberation Army is the largest
military force in the world, with an advertised active strength of around 2.3
million personnel. 16 Even so, the ability to project power is a critical
variable. In this area, the United States has the sizable advantage.
The United States Navy is the premier vehicle of American force
projection. The Navy sails ten nuclear powered aircraft carriers, with two
more under construction.17 They are the largest ships in the world, each
designed for an approximately 50-year service life, with only one mid-life
refueling.18 As Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy, stated recently:
[T]he Founding Fathers . . . recognized that having a Navy and
Marine Corps to sail the world’s oceans and protect our commerce
and national interest was vital in making the United States a player
on the world stage. From George Washington’s first
schooners . . . the Navy was seen as important, yes in wartime, but
also in peacetime . . . that is called presence. Presence is what we
do; presence is what the Navy and Marine Corps are all about.19
16.
China’s Military Rise: The Dragon’s New Teeth, ECONOMIST (Beijing), Apr. 7, 2012,
at briefing, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21552193. By contrast, the United States
active military force numbers around 1.4 million personnel. About, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y FOR
PERS. AND READINESS, http://prhome.defense.gov/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
17.
The
Carriers:
The
List,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
NAVY,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/ships/carriers/cv-list.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
18.
U.S. Navy Fact File: Aircraft Carriers––CVN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=200&ct=4 (last updated Nov. 20, 2013).
19.
Ray Mabus, Sec’y of the Navy, at the Surface Navy Association Symposium (Jan. 14,
2014),
available
at
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/secnav/Mabus/Speech/SurfaceNavyAssociation14Jan14.pdf.
678
[Vol. 15
This global presence takes a tremendous amount of energy to fuel.
The Defense Department is the single largest energy consumer in the
nation, responsible for just under two percent of total consumption.20 In
2012, the U.S. military used 4.3 billion gallons of fuel at a cost of
approximately $20 billion.21 Oil is a globally traded commodity. Due to
spikes in the global market, in 2012 alone, the Department of Defense had
$3 billion in unbudgeted fuel costs.22
Energy is an essential element of the United States’ global presence,
and for precisely that reason, the Department of Defense is at the center of
energy innovation. Military leaders, informed by the longest sustained
conflict in American history, are finding that military forces are far more
agile as energy efficiency increases and the tether of liquid fuel diminishes.
This Defense-led energy innovation, managed effectively, can be
shared through both formal treaty mechanisms and informal networks to
globalize the demand for unconventional energy and drive the development
of new technology and effective regulation. Our allies will be strong
partners, able to localize the benefits of a more efficient and lethal military
force. The global demand and innovation will spill over into the
commercial market, making new technology available to private citizens
across the globe. This defense-led energy innovation has the power to unite
the once bespoke approaches to address climate change, energy policy, and
national security. The unconventional energy arms race will result in a more
efficient fighting force, more diverse sources of energy, and a more stable
world order.
History provides great instances of defense-driven innovation leading
greater change. The next section explores just one example.
A. Historical Perspective—Global Presence Fueling Innovation
Throughout history, great navies have been at the center of energy
innovation.23 Commanders seeking even incremental advantages on the seas
20.
Sharon Burke, Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable: Operational Security,
Energy Security and Operational Energy Needs of the Department of Defense, (Oct. 14, 2010),
available at http://www.defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/20101014_burke_transcript.pdf.
21.
Claudette Roulo, Clean Energy Tied to National Security, Official Says, American
Forces
Press
Service,
Feb.
7,
2013,
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119237.
22.
Dep't of Def. Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2013: Hearing Before the S. Select
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Leon Panetta, U.S. Sec'y
of Def.), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg29104515/html/CHRG-112shrg29104515.htm.
23.
Herodotus’ history of the Battle of Salamis is instructive. In that Battle, a vastly
outnumbered allied force of Greek triremes took on and defeated the Persian fleet using smaller, faster
ships and superior tactics. See generally HERODOTUS, THE HISTORY OF HERODOTUS (George Rawlinson
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 679 led the transitions from oar power to canvas sails, from sails to coal, from
coal to oil, and from oil to nuclear power.24 In the 1850s, it was the United
States Navy that led the transition from wind power to coal. After World
War II, Navy Admiral Hyman Rickover and his team, in just seven years,
developed the technology, engineered, and built the first nuclear submarine,
the USS Nautilus.25
Today, the U.S. Navy is again at the forefront of energy innovation,
sailing the Great Green Fleet, a carrier strike group fueled by alternative
sources of energy, including nuclear power and advanced biofuel blends.
The Great Green Fleet demonstrated its technology during the 2012 Rim of
the Pacific exercise, the world’s largest international maritime exercise. The
Navy’s quest for greater operational flexibility is lessening its reliance on
petroleum and changing the way we think about energy. As we wade into
the second decade of the 21st century, the United States Navy finds itself on
a path blazed one hundred years ago by a daring First Lord of the
Admiralty.
When Winston Churchill was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty
in 1911, one of the most important decisions he faced was how best to
position the Royal Navy to meet the challenge of an aggressive and
growing German Navy.26 Just before Churchill was appointed First Lord,
Kaiser Wilhelm, looking to secure a German position in Africa, steamed the
German naval vessel Panther into a harbor on the Atlantic Coast of
Morocco.27 Though the Panther posed no real threat, the buildup of the
German Army increased tensions in Europe. 28 It was under these
circumstances that Churchill approached his critical decision.
In the years following Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee,29 the Royal
Navy was the largest maritime force in the world and embodied Britain’s
imperial power. 30 With the benefit of a large domestic supply of coal
available in Wales and a well-established global network of coaling
stations, the Royal Navy was able to patrol the seas and touch all corners of
the Realm.31 Coal also had the advantage of being inert—shells exploding
trans., New York, D. Appleman & Co., 1885), available at http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Herosal.html
(providing a history of the Battle of Salamis).
24.
Keith Johnson, Navy Sails to Greener Future, WALL ST. J. June 14, 2012.
25.
DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD, 366–67 (2011).
26.
DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE 11–13 (1991).
27.
Id at 11.
28.
Id.
29.
JOFFE, supra note 2, at 95.
30.
YERGIN, supra note 26 at 11–12.
31.
Erik J. Dahl, Naval Innovation: From Coal to Oil, JOINT FORCES Q. 50, 50–51 (2001),
available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA524799.
680
[Vol. 15
in coal bins on board a ship or in fueling stations on shore would not ignite
the fuel.32 Coal had significant advantages for the Royal Navy.
From the moment he became First Lord, Churchill immersed himself
in his work. His formal military training and service had been in the
cavalry,33 so he endeavored to learn everything—history, strengths, flaws,
tactics, and capabilities—about the Royal Navy.34 He made the Admiralty’s
yacht, the Enchantress, his office, and in his words, “almost my home.”35
He visited every important ship, dockyard, shipyard, and naval
establishment in the British Isles and the Mediterranean.36 Showing his
leadership skill, Churchill ingratiated himself with the junior officers and
sailors, often surprising them below deck to ask them all manner of
questions.37 He brought his wife, Clementine, with him on his journeys.
Knowing that Churchill disliked meals where nothing important was
accomplished, Clementine invited guests who could be useful to the
Admiralty.
Churchill worked seven days a week. One of his advisors wrote to a
friend,
Winston stays until at least eight every day . . . . Even Sundays are
no longer my own, as I have spent three out of the last four on the
Enchantress. We have made a new commandment. ‘The seventh
day is the Sabbath of the First Lord, and on it thou shalt do all
manner of work.’38
32.
Id. at 51.
33.
WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, VISIONS OF
GLORY 1874–1932, at 424 (1984).
34.
John McCain, John McCain: Extraordinary Foresight Made Winston Churchill Great,
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/3671962/John-McCainExtraordinary-foresight-made-Winston-Churchill-great.html (“Most often, as was the case with Winston
Churchill, a man of intelligence and imagination, foresight is the result of painstaking inquiry and the
disciplined application of reason to acquired knowledge, in order to see a previously unseen pattern or
opportunity. People who have shown extraordinary foresight are often rather unconventional. They take
calculated risks. They aren’t afraid to be bold. People whom history has proclaimed as visionaries have
often appeared more reckless than their contemporaries.”).
35.
MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at 13.
36.
Id. at 424; McCain, supra note 34 (describing that Churchill learned everything from
gunnery to the moral of the force. To better understand airplanes and their potential impact on the
battlefield, he learnt, much to Clementine’s dismay, how to fly and spent countless hours learning the
instruments and crawling around gun terrets to see how they worked.); MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at
438 (describing that because of Churchill’s efforts and insights, England was the first nation to arm a
plane with a machine gun and to fire an airborne torpedo.).
37.
MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at 426 (quoting an article from the Daily Express that
reported “[h]e had a yarn with nearly all the lower deck of men of the ship’s company, asking why,
wherefore, and how everything was done. All the sailors ‘go the bundle’ on his, because he makes no
fuss and takens them by surprise. He is here, there, and everywhere.”).
38.
Id. at 425.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 681 Churchill led a Royal Navy that was critical to Britain’s survival.
Two-thirds of the island nation’s food was imported, and English merchant
vessels were responsible to move over half the world’s seaborne trade.39
Churchill made it his business to put the fleet into “a state of instant and
constant readiness for war in case we are attacked by Germany.”40 Germany
already had the most powerful land army on the continent, and its growing
naval force posed an increasing threat to Britannia.
The First Lord put the fleet on a wartime footing. From the day he
checked in, officers manned the watch twenty-four hours a day and seven
days a week.41 To mentally prepare himself and his staff for the dangers
that lurked offshore, Churchill hung a large chart of the North Sea in his
office and used it to track the location of every German warship.42 He also
explored several physical upgrades to the fleet to maintain the Royal
Navy’s advantage over the Germans.
To help guide the transformation of the fleet, Churchill brought John
Fisher, a former Admiral of the Fleet, on board as his counselor.43 Admiral
Fisher was a legend in Britain and was said to be “the greatest sailor since
Nelson.”44 Fisher was a naval genius and when combined with Churchill’s
own vision, they made a brilliant and powerful pair.45
Fisher had three primary recommendations: arm battleships with
larger guns (fifteen inch guns that could fire a 1,920 pound shell); increase
the speed of the fleet by switching from coal to oil; and reform the senior
leadership. 46 Churchill accepted all three recommendations and moved
quickly to effect the required changes. As to the first, no gun that size had
ever been used on a ship. Further, Churchill wrote, “Enlarging the guns
meant enlarging the ships, and enlarging the ships meant enlarging the
cost.” 47 Additionally, larger, heavier ships required more powerful
propulsion systems. This is where Fisher’s bold suggestion to transition
from coal to oil came in.
Churchill noted, “The advantages conferred by liquid fuel were
inestimable . . . [But] to change the foundation of the navy from British coal
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 431.
Id.
McCain, supra note 34.
682
[Vol. 15
to foreign oil was a formidable decision in itself.”48 Low cost, strategic
advantage, and a rich naval tradition49 weighed heavily against any energy
transition. “To commit the Navy irrevocably to oil was indeed ‘to take arms
against a sea of troubles.’”50 Moreover, a direct hit on an oil tank would set
it on fire, and oil storage facilities on shore would become an attractive
target.51
Against these issues, however, oil yielded many benefits. Churchill
found that oil packed twice the energy as coal, so ships of the same size
could go twice as far and faster.52 Burning oil also yielded less smoke than
burning coal, so ships would be able to sail closer to their quarry without
revealing their presence.53 Further, being a liquid, oil did not have to be
stored right next to the boilers; it could be stored anywhere on ship and
piped to the engine without the need for stokers to shovel coal into the
furnace. 54 This afforded ship designers more flexibility and allowed a
reduction in manpower on board or a redistribution of personnel towards
war-fighting functions.
So, with this all in mind, Churchill went all in and committed himself
and the future of the Empire to making the transition. At the end of 1913,
Churchill submitted his budget for the following year: £50,694,800.55 This
budget request was the largest in British history, and the largest proposed
naval expenditure in the world.56 Churchill faced another challenge: while
England enjoyed tremendous coal reserves, it at the time produced no oil.57
To overcome this, Churchill asked the government to invest £5 million in
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to ensure adequate reserves were available
for war.58 For this sum, the government would gain fifty-one percent of the
company, be allowed two directors on the board, and secure a secret
contract to provide the Admiralty a 20-year supply of oil.59
48.
Dahl, supra note 31, at 51.
49.
MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at 437 (describing that at the end of a conference on
naval strategy, one of the admiral accused Churchill for impugning the traditions of the Royal Navy. In
response, Churchill asked “And what are they? I shall tell you in three words. Rum, sodomy, and the
lash. Good morning, gentlemen.”).
50.
YERGIN, supra note 26, at 12.
51.
52.
YERGIN, supra note 26, at 12.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
See MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at 443–56 (providing a terrific discussion of the
political battle between Churchill and Lloyd George, and how the Irish Nationalist movement impacted
defense budget negotiations).
56.
Id. at 443.
57.
58.
MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at 431.
59.
Dahl, supra note 31 at 52.‎
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 683 Churchill harnessed the language of national security to make his
case to Parliament. Other nations did not need a navy like Britain did.
Churchill noted that:
[The Royal Navy’s ships] were all we had. On them, as we
conceived, floated the might, majesty, dominion, and power of the
British Empire. All our long history built up century after century,
all the means of livelihood and safety of our faithful industrious,
active population depended on them. Open the sea-cocks and let
them sink beneath the surface . . . and in a few minutes—half an
hour at the most—the whole outlook of the world would be
changed. The British Empire would dissolve like a dream; each
isolated community struggling by itself; the central power of union
broken; mighty provinces, whole Empires in themselves, drifting
hopelessly out of control, and falling a prey to others . . . .60
Churchill’s determination won the day. Parliament supported his
efforts and thus ensured Britain’s naval supremacy during the Great War.
During the conflict, the German Navy largely avoided direct conflict with
Churchill’s Grand Fleet. In 1916, during the only large-scale naval battle of
the war, the Battle of Jutland, British super-dreadnoughts, with their fifteen
inch guns and unmatched speed, forced the German fleet back to its ports in
the Baltic.61 While the battle was fought to a draw, the Germans never again
challenged Britain for control of the North Sea.62
The rest of Churchill’s history is familiar. As Prime Minister, he led
his nation through the darkest days of the Second World War. 63 His
foresight and characteristic tenacity was evidenced early in his career.
Under Churchill’s leadership, the Royal Navy’s conversion from coal to oil
took just three years and provided a quantum leap for naval technology.
The United States Navy provided the next leap in energy innovation.
In 1954, the USS Nautilus set to sea and marked a new era of naval power
becoming the first nuclear powered ship on earth.64 Today, as a result of
continued innovation and stalwart leadership, the United States Navy has
60.
61.
62.
63.
MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at 426–27.
MANCHESTER, supra note 33, at 426–27.
See generally id. (describing Churchill’s leadership as Prime Minister during World
War II).
64.
History of the USS Nautilus (SSN 571), SUBMARINE FORCE MUSEUM,
http://www.ussnautilus.org/nautilus/index.shtml?museumNautilus (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
684
[Vol. 15
taken over the task of deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the
seas.65
B. Today’s Force—More Fight, Less Fuel
“Energy choices save lives on the battlefield.”66
Both in the operational environment and on board military
installations, energy innovation has saved lives and reduced costs. In
addition to the roughly $15 billion spent on fuel, between fiscal years 2003
and 2007, in Iraq and Afghanistan, more than 3,000 Army personnel and
contractors were wounded or killed in action from attacks on fuel and water
resupply convoys.67 Further, every dollar per barrel increase in the price of
oil requires a $30 million increase in the Department of the Navy’s fuel
budget68 and a $130 million addition to the overall Department of Defense
budget. 69 Programs like the Navy’s Great Green Fleet and the Marine
Corps’ Experimental Forward Operating Base (“ExFOB”) are driving
innovation and making the Navy and Marine Corps team more mission
capable.
Just as Churchill’s Navy projected the power and glory of Britannia
across the seven seas, United States sailors and Marines constitute today’s
most formidable forward-deployed expeditionary force. The Navy-Marine
Corps team is constantly tasked with a wide-range of operations, which
could include major combat missions in Afghanistan, or immediate
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Philippines during the
aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. This global presence and engagement is
driving innovation.
Secretary Mabus has made energy a cultural issue for his
Department. The Navy must have energy to achieve its global presence.
The Navy and Marine Corps, as they have done countless times in the past,
65.
Mission
of
the
Navy,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
NAVY,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/organization/org-top.asp (last visited April 14, 2014).
66.
U.S. MARINE CORPS, EXPEDITIONARY ENERGY STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN
35
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/160/Docs/USMC%20Expeditionary%20Energy%20Strategy%20
%20Implementation%20Planning%20Guidance.pdf (quoting General James T. Conway).
67.
DEP’T OF DEF., ENERGY FOR THE WARFIGHTER: OPERATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY 4–
5 (2011).
68.
Michael Richardson, U.S. Armed Forces Wage Campaign to Go Green, STRAITS TIMES
(Jan, 30, 2012), available at http://abccarbon.com/us-uncovering-a-great-green-fleet/.
69.
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: Obama
Administration Announces Additional Steps to Increase Energy Security (Apr. 11, 2012) (on file at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/11/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announcesadditional-steps-increase-ener).
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 685 are adapting to ensure the military will be able to accomplish its mission
with “less risk and lower cost.”70 At the center of this strategy is the need
for increased energy productivity, efficiency, and heterogeneity in sources
of fuel.
The U.S. Navy demonstrated its Great Green Fleet—a carrier strike
group, including its air wing, fueled entirely by alternative sources of
energy, including nuclear power.71 The Navy sailed the Great Green Fleet
during the 2012 Rim of the Pacific exercise, which is the world’s largest
international maritime exercise. During this evolution, the Navy
successfully demonstrated the ability of drop-in replacement advanced
biofuel blends, made from used cooking oils and algae, to power systems
operating at full capacity.72
The USS Makin Island (“LHD-8”) is currently completing its sea
qualifications for her upcoming scheduled deployment.73 She is the Navy’s
first Wasp-class amphibious assault ship with an all-electric auxiliary
system and a hybrid gas turbine-electric propulsion system. 74 On her
maiden voyage, the Makin Island’s hybrid drive saved approximately one
million gallons of fuel and saved nearly half of the vessel’s $33 million fuel
bill.75 The Makin Island is expected to save more than $250 million in fuel
costs over her life.76
In addition to pure technological innovation, the Department of the
Navy is pursuing novel research and funding mechanisms to reorient the
bureaucracy towards energy innovation. The Farm-to-Fleet Program unites
the experience and interests of the Departments of Energy, Agriculture, and
the Navy in partnership with the private sector to accelerate the
development of a domestic market for advanced biofuels that are cost-
70.
Sharon E. Burke, Navy Energy Forum Remarks 3 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2010navy/BurkeS_Remarks.pdf.
71.
Great
Green
Fleet:
Overview,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
NAVY,
http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/energy/great-green-fleet/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2014) (describing that “[t]he
Great Green Fleet is named in honor of President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet, which
helped usher in America as a global power on the world stage at the beginning of the 20th Century.”).
72.
Id.
73.
USS
Makin
Island,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
NAVY,
http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/LHD8/Pages/default.aspx#.UynKG1yAeZh (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
74.
DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 67, at 9.
75.
USS
Makin
Island
(LHD
8),
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
THE
NAVY,
http://greenfleet.dodlive.mil/files/2010/04/MakinIslandEnvironmentFactsheet_v2.pdf (last visited Mar.
28, 2014); Ray Mabus, Green Water: Can the U.S. Navy Win the Eco-Arms Race?, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Aug.
6,
2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/06/navy_energy_oil_biofuels_ray_mabus.
76.
USS Makin Island (LHD 8), supra note 75.
686
[Vol. 15
competitive with traditional fuels.77 The departments pledged to invest a
combined $510 million on a one-to-one cost sharing basis with private
partners, to build multiple, geographically dispersed, commercial scale
refineries.78
Through this program, the military will not be forced to pay a
premium for biofuel. 79 Using authority in Title III of the Defense
Production Act, which supports industrialization of defense-critical
domestic industries, the Department of Defense announced an award to
three private companies to build capacity to produce 150 million gallons of
drop-in military compatible biofuels each year at an average cost of less
than $4 per gallon—a price competitive with conventional fuels. 80 The
Navy committed not to pay for operational quantities of biofuel until it was
cost-competitive with traditional fuel sources.81 With creative programs like
Farm-to-Fleet, the Navy now expects to be able to buy operational
quantities of biofuel at competitive prices by 2016.82
As the Navy demonstrates and validates advanced biofuels, prices
will fall and other industries will begin to incorporate proven technologies
into their operations. Commercial airlines have completed test flights using
biofuels and “[o]ther nations pursuing advanced biofuels like Brazil,
Australia, and Singapore create the potential for increased cooperation on
research, development, deployment, and increased security for our allies.”83
Energy innovation has made the Navy more capable and better able
to defend the United States around the globe. As with Churchill, these
changes will require and encourage changes on shore. Navy and Marine
Corps bases are also benefitting from the incorporation of efficiency
standards, smart grids, and other energy efficient upgrades.84
77.
Jim Lane, USDA, US Navy Unveil Farm to Fleet Program: Navy “Open for Business”
as
Shift
to
Biofuels
Blends
Begins,
BIOFUELS
DIGEST
(Dec.
11,
2013),
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2013/12/11/usda-us-navy-unveil-farm-to-fleet-program-navyopen-for-business-as-shift-to-biofuels-blends-begins/.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Mabus, supra note 75.
84.
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, POWER SURGE: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
LEVERAGES PRIVATE RESOURCES TO ENHANCE ENERGY SECURITY AND SAVE MONEY ON U.S.
MILITARY
BASES,
11–19
(Jan.
1,
2014),
available
at
http://www.pewenvironment.org/uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/PEWDoD_Report_2013_KS_10_020314.pdf. The Department of the Navy’s strategy has four parts: reduce
demand; increase on-site power generation with renewable energy; use smart grids and other enhanced
energy management techniques to manage energy production and demand; and, drive facility energy
innovation. Id.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 687 The Navy hosts the Defense Department’s largest renewable energy
project. Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake in California’s Mojave
Desert is home to a geothermal plant that generates 170-Megawatts of
energy, roughly half of all the military’s renewable energy. 85 With the
energy from the China Lake facility, along with the energy from a biomass
plant at its base in Norfolk, Virginia, the Navy was able to produce or
procure 20.6% of its energy in 2012 from renewable sources.86
To reduce its energy intensity, the energy used per gross square foot,
the Navy plans to utilize power purchase agreements and other innovative
instruments to invest $2.4 billion in efficiency improvements during 2012–
2017.87 Power purchase agreements allow the military to enter into longterm contracts with private developers who finance, build, and operate
renewable energy projects on military installations.88 The military saves
money by agreeing to buy the power produced by the project at a fixed
price for a set period of time up to thirty years.89 The Navy signed the
Defense Department’s first power purchase agreement to build a 13.8Megawatt solar array at China Lake. 90 This project reduced the base’s
energy needs by 30%.91 However, the Marines, not to be outdone, are
leading the charge for energy innovation.
Marines are frequently referred to as Jarheads, Teufel Hunden (Devil
Dogs), 92 and America’s 911 Force, 93 but not routinely as ardent
environmentalists. Nonetheless, energy innovation has become a cultural
issue for Marines, changing the way the “ Marine Corps employs energy
and resources to increase combat effectiveness and reduce [the] need for
logistics support ashore.” 94 The Marine Corps is a force in constant
readiness, a “middleweight force, light enough to get there quickly, but
heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating
85.
Id. at 25.
86.
Id. at 41.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 4.
89.
Id. at 15. 10 U.S. Code, Section 2922(a) provides the Department of Defense with the
authority to enter into power purchase agreements of up to thirty years with private energy-production
facilities. Id. at 14. The Department of Defense is also one of the federal agencies with the authority to
enter into enhanced use leases. Id.
90.
Id. at 41.
91.
Id. at 16.
92.
Did Marines, Not German Soldiers, Coin the Phrase ‘Devil Dogs’?, STARS AND
STRIPES (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/blogs/the-rumor-doctor/the-rumor-doctor-1.104348/didmarines-not-german-soldiers-coin-the-phrase-devil-dogs-1.130602#.UzXQQ8tOXaQ.
93.
Timothy Lenzo, Air Contingency Battalion Sets up America’s 911 Force, MARINES,
Oct.
2,
2013,
http://www.1stmardiv.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/8585/Article/151224/aircontingency-battalion-sets-up-americas-911-force.aspx.
94.
U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 66, at 13.
688
[Vol. 15
independent of local infrastructure.” 95 The current Marine Corps is
designed to be light, agile, and self-sustaining. However, the tether of fuel
provides the Marines with a heavy umbilical cord.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, tasked
his headquarters with the goals of “reducing energy demand in our
platforms and systems, increasing the use of renewable energy, and
instilling an ethos of energy and water efficiency in every Marine.” 96
General Amos further added:
Our priority is force protection—saving lives by reducing the
number of Marines at risk on the road hauling fuel and water. We
also aim to help Marines travel lighter and move faster through the
reduction in size and amount of equipment and the dependence on
bulky supplies.97
Over several years of sustained combat, the Marine Corps has
become heavier. Since 2001, a Marine Corps infantry battalion, roughly
1,000 Marines strong, has had a 300% increase in computers and other
technology and a 200% increase in vehicles.98 A company, roughly 150
Marines, uses more fuel today than a battalion used fifteen years ago.99
Each day in Afghanistan, the Marine Corps burns through about 200,000
gallons of fuel to power vehicles, provide heating and cooling, and satisfy
other needs at operating bases. 100 All this fuel comes at a steep cost.
According to a Marine Corps study, during a three-month period in 2010,
six Marines were wounded in convoys delivering water and fuel to forward
operating bases in Afghanistan that is one Marine wounded for every fifty
95.
U.S. MARINE CORPS, AMERICA’S EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN READINESS 1, 2 (2013),
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/61/MarineCorps101.pdf.
96.
JAMES F. AMOS, 2011 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
MARINE CORPS 15 (2011), available at http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/FY12%20USMC%20Posture%20Statement_Generic%5B1%5D.pdf.
97.
Id.
98.
Justin Gerdes, Marines Push to Front Lines in Renewable Energy Innovation, YALE
ENV’T
360
(Jun.
27,
2013),
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/marines_push_to_front_lines_in_renewable_energy_innovation/2667/.
99.
Id.
100.
Mark Walker, Military: Marine Corps Testing Lighter, More Self-Sufficient Hardware,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2012) http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/Sep/18/militarymarine-corps-testing-lighter-more-self/.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 689 convoys.101 The Marines found that over 70% of the supplies required to
sustain Marines on shore are liquid: fuel and water.102
To achieve greater operational reach with less risk, the Marines have
aggressively started to reduce their reliance on liquid supplies. In 2009, the
Marines founded the Experimental Forward Operating Base (“ExFOB”), to
bring together Marines, scientists, acquisition professionals, and private
industry to demonstrate commercial alternative and efficient energy
technologies..103 Commercial vendors are invited to ExFOB twice a year to
demonstrate their products.104 Marines evaluate promising technologies in
training and combat conditions, and the successful technologies are
procured for use by the operating forces.105
In 2010, Marines deployed to Sangin, Afghanistan with a suite of
renewable and efficient energy technologies developed and tested at the
ExFOB.106 This company was able to run two patrol bases entirely on solar
power.107 The Marines were also able to execute a three-week foot patrol
without battery resupply, lightening their load by 700 pounds. 108 The
systems used by this company are now available to all Marine units
deploying to combat. 109 By fielding this equipment, Marine units in
Afghanistan are putting 208 fewer trucks on the road, saving 5.4 million
gallons of gas per year.110 By investing in renewable and efficient energy
innovation, the Marine Corps is lighter, less reliant on re-supply, and is
achieving greater operational reach with less risk.111
101.
U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 66, at 7.
102.
United States Marine Corps, Initial Capabilities Document for United States Marine
Corps
Expeditionary
Energy,
Water,
and
Waste
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/160/Docs/USMC%20E2W2%20ICD.pdf.
103.
EXFOB, U.S. MARINE CORPS, http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/e2o/ExFOB.aspx (last
visited Mar. 21, 2014).
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
See Elisabeth Rosenthal, U.S. Military Orders Less Dependence on Fossil Fuels, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
4,
2010),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/science/earth/05fossil.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=mil& (discussing the
energy technologies used by company of Marines).
107.
Gerdes, supra note 98.
108.
Ray Mabus, Sec’y of the Navy, Remarks: Truman National Security Project (May 3,
2013)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/secnav/Mabus/Speech/Remarks_TrumanNSP_Delivered3May13.
pdf.).
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
See Memorandum from John R. Allen, General, U.S. Marine Corps Commander, Int’l
Security Assistance Force/U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (Dec. 11, 2011), available at
http://energy.defense.gov/Portals/25/Documents/Blog/20111211_Memo_Supporting_Mission_Operatio
nal_Energy.pdf (describing that the energy consciousness in the deployed environment extends well past
the Marine Corps. General Allen, when he was a commander to the International Security Assistance
Force and the United States Forces–Afghanistan, penned a letter to his forces on supporting the mission
690
[Vol. 15
Sailors and Marines, following a long tradition of bold innovation
stretching back to Churchill’s England, and further to the Greeks, are
showing that energy and national security are intertwined and a thoughtful
energy policy is essential to maintaining a competitive edge. This new
culture of energy-aware service members will make units and installations
more self-sufficient, safer, and ultimately, more combat effective. This
culture, bound by the mission to preserve and ensure national security is
driving global energy innovation. In conjunction with the United States
military’s global presence, this energy-aware culture has the power to affect
global change. Technology and effective regulation can be transmitted
through formal and informal trans-governmental networks. This next
section globalizes the culture of energy innovation.
C. The Green Arms Race and the Globalization of Unconventional Energy
The United States military interacts with foreign militaries in many
ways, whether through active combat operations, training exercises, foreign
military sales cases, or disaster relief and humanitarian assistance missions.
Each of these interactions creates a structured network of global
relationships. These powerful and largely anonymous structures are utilized
to transfer technology and regulation among countries in the absence of a
formal multilateral agreement. These relationships hold the key to
globalizing the demand for clean energy.
While states are still the primary actors on the international plane,
their power has been disaggregated to their constituent parts. Individuals
now can negotiate with their foreign counterparts with no need for
interstate-negotiation. Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that network
relationships are the “new world order,” stating:
Disaggregating the state into its functional components makes it
possible to create networks of institutions engaged in a common
enterprise even as they represent distinct national interests.
Moreover, they can work with their subnational and supranational
with operational energy. In it, the General stated, “I need your help with personal choices. Every light
bulb, hot water heater, and air conditioner is supplied by electricity by burning fuel. We move that fuel
through the country in a contested battlespace [sic] to hundreds of generators at forward locations. By
turning off lights, taking shorter showers, and shutting off unused air conditioners, you can help
eliminate a resupply convoy or fight. Your small choices may save someone’s life.” Allen goes on to
state, “Some have seen operational energy programs as efforts ‘just to save money.’ Not so. While we
must be good stewards of our resources, Operational Energy in the battle space is about improving
combat effectiveness. It’s about increasing our forces’ endurance, being more lethal, and reducing the
number of men and women risking their lives moving fuel.”).
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 691 counterparts, creating a genuinely new world order in which
networked institutions perform the functions of a world
government—legislation, administration, and adjudication—
without form.112
Interaction within the informal network strengthens domestic
institutions and international organizations. Direct interaction between
regulators across the globe facilitates the spread of effective regulatory
mechanisms and technology between jurisdictions. Cooperation within the
network is achieved through the convergence of best practices fostered
through repeated interaction and emulation.113 Networks provide the venue
for this interaction and the transfer of information between subject matter
experts.
Networks can establish themselves in many contexts. They can occur
formally within international organizations or through informal agreements
between interested bureaucrats themselves. 114 These networks can
encourage cooperation in the absence of a treaty, or pave the way for a new
agreement by creating convergence around successful and effective
technologies and regulatory policies.115 Most importantly for our inquiry,
networks facilitate the multilateral sharing of knowledge and ideas between
nations. Informational networks are incredibly useful for distilling best
practices to solve problems of mutual interest.116
This distillation of best practices makes domestic regulation more
efficient and international cooperation more durable. In the defense context,
efforts to better meet mission requirements and create a more efficient and
effective fighting force can be exported to our international partners
through networks. Repeated interaction between defense experts can create
“convergence through technical assistance and training.”117
The United States wields the most powerful military force on the
globe. A cultural change that makes the United States military more
efficient and capable will garner attention and have immediate credibility
among foreign experts. Changes in United States law, regulation, and
military practice can be transferred through formal alliances like NATO;
the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (“ANZUS”);
112.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., (Sept.-Oct. 1997),
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53399/anne-marie-slaughter/the-real-new-world-or.
113.
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 52 (2002).
114.
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 45 (2004).
115.
Id. at 53.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 171–72.
692
[Vol. 15
Republic of Korea Treaty; or through informal interactions and information
transfers. These interactions will also provide feedback on the United
States’ regulatory schemes and technologies, which may uncover new and
more efficient methods to facilitate energy innovation.
The Navy-Marine Corps team’s global presence is in a prime position
to promote the quest for clean energy innovation. As Navy and Marine
Corps forces operate throughout the world, whether using ExFOB fielded
technology in forward deployed areas or sailing the Great Green Fleet to
participate in disaster relief operations, this effect will be compounded.
These interactions will create global requirements and reshape military
forces around a new energy paradigm.
This new model for energy innovation has already started to spread.
As mentioned above, the Rim of the Pacific is the world’s largest maritime
exercise. It is designed to “provide a unique training opportunity that helps
participants foster and sustain cooperative relationships that are critical to
ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world’s oceans.”118
Twenty-two nations, including Canada, Australia, India, Japan, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Russia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and South Korea participated in 2012, bringing forty surface ships, six
submarines, more than 200 aircraft, and 25,000 personnel.119
During the exercise in 2012, the Royal Australian Navy (“RAN”)
signed an agreement to partner with the United States to explore the
increased use of alternative fuels. RAN Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral
Tim Barrett, AM, CSC, RAN, delivered the Statement of Cooperation to
Secretary Mabus on board the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz.120 The Fleet
Commander landed on the USS Nimitz and refueled his helicopter with a
biofuel blend.121 His flight back to his ship HMAS Darwin, after the signing
ceremony, marked the first time an RAN aircraft flew with a biofuel
blend.122
In accordance with the Statement of Cooperation, the RAN will
partner with the United States Navy and further develop alternative fuels
for use during a joint deployment in 2016.123 During this demonstration, the
118.
Home, RIMPAC 2012, http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2012/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
119.
About the Exercise, RIMPAC 2012, http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2012/about/ (last
120.
Media Release, Austl. Gov’t Dep’t of Def., Australian Navy Explores Alternative Fuel
Use with United States (July 20, 2012), http://news.defence.gov.au/2012/07/20/australian-navyexplores-alternative-fuel-use-with-united-states/.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 693 United States Navy will sail the Great Green Fleet across the Pacific to
Australia to commemorate the arrival of the Great White Fleet in Sydney
harbor in 1907.124 The Great Green Fleet will then refuel with biofuels
made in Australia for the return journey.125 Demand by two large naval
forces will send a strong signal to the emerging advanced biofuels industry.
Emerging nations, not wanting to fall behind on the future battlefield, will
work towards similar gains.
So starts the Green Arms Race.
The demand for clean energy innovation, passed through networked
interactions between defense experts, is spreading across the globe. The
United States Defense and State Departments, in their constant interactions
with their foreign counterparts, facilitate the transfer of successful efficient
energy regulation and technology. Once successful technologies and
regulatory schemes are validated by global defense interaction, they will
spill over into the commercial market. The progeny of the Green Arms
Race will be more efficient fighting forces, increased heterogeneity in the
sources of energy, and a change in direction of the global resource quest.
American leadership in clean and efficient energy innovation will
create a more stable world order and align the once disparate approaches to
climate change, energy dependence, and national security. Military energy
innovation, shared through existing and newly forming defense networks,
can reveal strong avenues for increased international military and
diplomatic interaction. To be most successful, the Green Arms Race must
involve the two largest consumers of energy on the planet.
II. CHINA—THE MIDDLE KINGDOM AND ITS RESOURCE QUEST
In 2012, Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie invited
United States Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to spend four days in Beijing
at the end of September.126 During the visit, Secretary Panetta met with
various members of the Chinese leadership and addressed the People’s
124.
Nigel Pittaway, U.S., Australian Navies to Cooperate on Biofuel Research, DEFENSE
NEWS
(Jul.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120725/DEFREG02/307250001/U-S-Australian-NaviesCooperate-Biofuel-Research.
125.
Id.
126.
Leon Panetta, Sec’y of Def., & Gen. Liang Guanglie, Minister for Nat’l Def., Joint
News
Conference
in
Beijing,
China,
Sept.
18,
2012,
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5116.
694
[Vol. 15
Liberation Army War College.127 The objective for the visit was to build
mutual trust and promote increased military-to-military relations between
the United States and China.128
In the context of the larger and emerging China and United States
collaborative partnership, the Chinese Defense Minister noted that new
defense relationships could form the foundation for a new type “of militaryto-military relationship . . . based on equality, mutual benefit, and
cooperation.” The General Liang went on to say that, “it is necessary for the
two militaries to have more dialogues, communication, to promote
understanding—good trust and deepen exchanges and cooperation so as to
constantly raise the level of development of this mil-to-mil relationship.”129
In response, Secretary Panetta spoke about the fundamental goal of
building a “U.S.-China military-to-military relationship that is healthy,
stable, reliable, continuous, and transparent.” 130 He highlighted United
States and Chinese collaboration during counter-piracy exercises in the
Gulf of Aden. To build on this momentum and cooperation, Secretary
Panetta invited China to send a ship to participate in the Rim of the Pacific
Exercise (“RIMPAC”) in 2014.131 In Secretary Panetta’s view, increased
interaction with the Chinese military would lower the risk of miscalculation
and prevent conflict by increasing cultural understanding and demonstrating
United States resolve to ensure free and open seas.132 Increased defense
collaboration with China can add a tremendous and necessary partner to
alternative energy innovation.
Over the past several years, China has, with interest, studied the
United States economy and watched the United States military’s efforts to
innovate. As the world’s most populous country and largest energy
consumer, China is pursuing a “by all means necessary”133 energy strategy
to ensure its long-term growth. In September 2013, China overtook the
United States as the largest net importer of oil.134 China’s oil consumption
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
See generally ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY & MICHAEL LEVI, BY ALL MEANS
NECESSARY: HOW CHINA’S RESOURCE QUEST IS CHANGING THE WORLD (2014) (exploring the
expansion of the Chinese economy and the global effects of its meteoric growth).
134.
Ed Crooks, China Tops US as Leading Net Oil Importer, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4aef8e74-3062-11e3-9eec-00144feab7de.html#axzz2uIdyhKJk (noting
that the United States Energy Information Administration found that the gap between oil consumption
and domestic production averaged 6.24 million barrels per day in the United States, and 6.3 million
barrels per day in China).
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 695 doubled between 1990 and 2000, and has since doubled again.135 China is
also aggressively pursuing energy alternatives, and it is the global leader in
solar technology and is making heavy investments in biofuels.136
The United States has been watching China’s reemergence carefully.
China’s resource quest is having a global impact in economic, political, and
military spheres. Most recently, tensions in the South and East China Seas
have risen; China and other regional powers like Japan, the Philippines, and
Indonesia are maneuvering to control and secure energy rich territory and
sea-lanes.
The rebalancing of attention to the Asia-Pacific region comes at
precisely the right time. This strategic shift presents a tremendous
opportunity for the United States to increase military-to-military interaction
with China and mitigate tension in the region. This interaction will help
both nations avoid miscalculation and misunderstanding, and facilitate
collaboration on operations from anti-piracy patrolling to disaster relief.
The next several paragraphs provide historical context and discuss the
opportunity to add China as a partner in energy innovation.
A. The Middle Kingdom—A Historical and Cultural Perspective
“The world order, as currently constituted, was built largely without
Chinese participation. Hence China feels less bound by rules in the creation
of which it did not participate.”137
While modern China traces its roots back to 1949, Chinese
civilization stretches so far back in history that it seems to have no
beginning. 138 At its greatest reach, Chinese civilization stretched from
Siberia to the tropical jungles of South East Asia, and from its ports in the
east to the Himalayan mountains in the west.139 With such a great reach and
diversity, China was a world unto itself.140 The Chinese emperor was said
to preside over “All Under Heaven.”141
As a result of its vast size and geography, China existed and
progressed as a nation largely apart from other civilizations. 142 It
135.
Mabus, supra note 75.
136.
Id.
137.
Henry A. Kissinger, The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations: Conflict Is a Choice, Not a
Necessity, in FOREIGN AFF. (Council on Foreign Relations 2012), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137245/henry-a-kissinger/the-future-of-us-chinese-relations (last
138.
HENRY KISSINGER, ON CHINA 5 (2011).
139.
Id. at 7.
140.
Id.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. at 8.
696
[Vol. 15
maintained trade via the Silk Road with India, but the impenetrable
Himalayan Mountains prevented casual contact.143 Central Asian deserts
separated China from the neighboring Persians, Babylonians, the Greeks,
Romans, and the rest of Europe.144
This geography and isolation led to a feeling of ambivalence towards
the world outside Chinese borders. “In the Chinese perception, China was
considered the center of the world, the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ and other
societies were assessed as gradations from it.”145 China limited access to
outsiders, who in its view would either steal China’s great secrets or dilute
its culture.146
During the Ming Dynasty, China for perhaps the first time, looked
outward and embarked on a series of naval expeditions. Admiral Zheng He
launched fleets of technologically advanced ships across to far off lands in
Java, India, the Horn of Africa, and the Strait of Hormuz.147 During these
voyages, Admiral Zheng demonstrated the Chinese emperor’s wealth by
bestowing gifts on the rulers he encountered. Interestingly, while desiring
that foreign leaders acknowledge Chinese greatness, Admiral Zheng
expressed no further territorial ambition, merely accepting tribute to the
Chinese Emperor as a sign of loyalty.148
But China’s interest in engaging the outside world quickly waned.
Subsequent rulers dismantled Admiral Zheng’s advanced Navy.149 While
continuing to engage in trade, any benefit to foreign engagement was
tempered by the fear that foreign influence would adversely influence
Chinese culture and civilization.150 Given its vast geography, population,
and resource base, the Chinese did not have to seek out foreign ports. Until
the Industrial Revolution, China was far richer than the rest of the world.
As late as 1820, China produced 30% of world GDP, which is greater than
the current GDP contributions of Europe and the United States combined.151
China was so prosperous that it became a global model for successful
development.152
China entered the nineteenth century as the wealthiest nation in the
world, assured of its greatness, and indifferent to foreign influence, trade,
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
ECONOMY & LEVI, supra note 133, at 11.
KISSINGER, supra note 138, at 11–12.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 697 and innovation. 153 From trade to tourism, the Chinese state tightly
controlled interaction with the outside world.154 However, driven by energy
innovation, and industrial and scientific advancements, a new world order
had emerged in the West. For the first time, Western technology surpassed
China’s own.155 Additionally, continuing a trend that began in the Ming
Dynasty, as China continued to grow, China began to exceed its internal
capacity to source resources, including food.156 Increasingly, China was
forced to engage the outside world.
Rather than paying tribute and bowing to state controlled trade
agreements, Western traders sought to impose their own standards of free
trade and sovereign equality on the newly opened Chinese market.157 The
notion that China was simply one state among many did not comport with
Chinese cosmology.158 Increased interaction with Western emissaries in the
Chinese capital only increased friction. The deteriorating situation of
China’s international relations finally boiled over during the Opium
Wars.159
Largely the result of black market trading from British India to
China, estimates indicate that between 4 and 12 million Chinese were
addicted to Opium by the mid-nineteenth century. 160 The British, not
wanting to give up their lucrative opium trade, clashed with the Chinese
government. In the resulting conflict, the British Army routed the
outmatched Chinese forces.161 These losses weakened China and forced the
imperial government to enter into a series of “unequal treaties,” which
provided the British, United States, and France with access to Chinese
ports, the right to travel within the country, and eased protections against
foreign involvement.162
The turn of the twentieth century looked much different than the
nineteenth; China struggled to reconcile the notion of its own singularity
with foreign technology and commerce. Foreign powers and local
businessmen had broken the monopoly previously enjoyed by the Chinese
central government. Regional powers within China fragmented the country,
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
ECONOMY & LEVI, supra note 133, at 13–14.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 45–51. The Opium Wars occurred 1839-to-1842 and 1856-to-1860. Id.
Id. at 15.
KISSINGER, supra note 138, at 53.
698
[Vol. 15
ushering in the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the rise of the “Warlord
Era.”163
It took until 1927 for China to be reunited—General Chiang Kaishek, the leader of the Nationalist Party established the Republic of
China.164 Chiang Kai-shek reasserted central control over key areas like
foreign trade and natural resource acquisition. He created the National
Resources Council (“NRC”) and tasked it with managing the China’s
industries, mines, and other enterprises.165 “By 1944, nearly 70 percent of
the total capital of public and private enterprises belonged to state-run
operations, with three-quarters of the capital going to NRC operations.”166
The Chinese Communist Party took control in 1949 and established
the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) under the command of the
Chairman, Mao Zedong.167
Domineering and overwhelming in his influence, ruthless and
aloof, poet and warrior, prophet and scourge, he unified China and
launched it on a journey that nearly wrecked its civil society. By
the end of this searing process, China stood as one of the world’s
major powers and the only communist country except Cuba, North
Korea, and Vietnam whose political structure survived the collapse
of Communism everywhere else.168
Mao immediately launched the Continuous Revolution, which he
designed to put the Chinese people in a constant state of struggle, not
allowing them to rest on their achievements.169 He continued to enforce the
notion that China had to rely on itself to fuel its growth.170 Using the Soviet
model, Mao developed a coordinated five-year plan for oil, steel, electricity,
industrial and military development.171
Mao’s notion of continuous revolution was rooted in his quest “for
the historic Chinese uniqueness.” 172 While Mao outwardly rejected the
163.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 18.
168.
KISSINGER, supra note 138, at 92.
169.
Id. at 93.
170.
171.
Id.
172.
See KISSINGER, supra note 138, at 109–10 (noting, “one objective of Mao’s Cultural
Revolution—from which indeed it derived its name—had been to eradicate precisely those elements of
modernization that threatened to involve China in a universal culture.”).
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 699 ancient Chinese Confucian tradition, he grounded the revolution in his faith
in the reliance and cohesion of the Chinese people.173
In 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, his plan to catch up
to the West industrially in a three-year period. In 1966 Mao started the
Cultural Revolution, during which leaders, professors, and other
professionals were sent to the countryside to work the land and learn from
the masses.174 Millions of Chinese died as a result of these ill conceived and
poorly executed plans.
In the international arena, Mao positioned himself as the leader of the
nonaligned movement (strictly allied with neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union during the Cold War) and of the developing world more
broadly.175 His Premier, Zhou Enlai, set forth Chinese foreign policy in the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for territorial
integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in the internal
affairs of others, equality, and mutual benefit. 176 In the 1960s, China
modified this policy slightly to support national liberation movements in
developing countries like Angola, Indonesia, and Mozambique.177
During the 1960s and 1970s, under Zhou Enlai’s leadership, Chinese
trade grew significantly, increasing twenty-five percent annually with
regional partners.178 When China was admitted into the United Nations in
1971, trade increased again as China normalized relations with many
countries throughout the world.179 Over this twenty-year period, Chinese
trade increased nearly ten-fold and China grew.180
After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping transformed China into a
modern economy. Deng embraced the Four Modernizations—agriculture,
industry, national defense, and science and technology—and opened the
country to foreign investment. 181 These reforms gradually introduced
market forces to the economy and drove a quarter-century of double-digit
Chinese economic growth.182
This double-digit growth and incredible transformation requires a
massive amount of fuel. China is now a major driver of the world economy.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
700
[Vol. 15
To ensure China’s growth continues, the Chinese are engaged in a global
quest for resources.
B. China’s Global Resource Quest
China’s resource quest is changing the world’s markets for
commodities. China’s economy is the fastest growing on the planet. 183 As
noted above, China is the largest net importer of oil,184 and its oil imports
are growing by fifty percent each year.185 Chinese state run oil companies
have rapidly expanded their global presence by investing in international oil
and gas assets in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, through direct
acquisitions of equity and development loans in exchange for oil supply.186
Through this global engagement, China is not only securing diverse sources
of liquid fuel, but is also learning and developing its own technical drilling
and mining expertise.187
China is the world’s largest power generator, with coal accounting
for two-thirds of installed electric capacity.188 While fossil fuels account for
about 80% of China’s total power generation capacity, it is expanding its
alternative and clean energy usage.189 China installed 12 gigawatts of solar
capacity in 2013, which is 50% more than any country has ever built in a
single year.190 China has a goal to produce at least 15% of its overall energy
from renewable energy sources by 2020.191 The state invested $65 billion in
2012 in renewable energy products and plans to spend another $473 billion
on similar projects by 2015. 192 China is home to the world’s largest
hydroelectric project, the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River, and is
the worlds second-largest wind producer.193 That all said, even with this
incredible growth in alternative energy, China is still adding more fossil
183.
See China: Country Analysis Brief Overview, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH (last updated Feb. 4, 2014) (stating that
China’s fast-growing economy has led it to become the largest energy consumer and producer in the
world).
184.
Zachary Keck, It’s Official: China’s the World’s Largest Oil Importer, DIPLOMAT
(Oct. 11, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/its-official-chinas-the-worlds-largest-oil-importer/.
185.
MULLER, supra note 13, at 19.
186.
187.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 12.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Brad Plumer, China Installed Record Amounts of Solar Power in 2013. But Coal is
Still
Winning,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
30,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/30/china-in...number-of-solar-panels-in2013-but-coal-is-still-winning//?print=1.
191.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 12.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 701 fuel capability than solar, wind, hydroelectric, and nuclear power
combined.194 China is the largest producer and consumer of coal in the
world, accounting for nearly half of global consumption.
Western corporations compete in global commodities markets with
China’s state-owned energy companies that enjoy ultra-cheap loans from
the Chinese government. 195 When the China National Petroleum
Corporation won a share in a project to pump oil in Kazakhstan, the
Chinese President himself travelled to the region to celebrate. 196
Kazakhstan is home to a vast new oil find, the biggest outside the Middle
East.197 When the project started pumping oil in September 2013, it was a
clear signal that China’s influence in the region was growing, commenters
noted, “that China’s influence has eclipsed even Russia’s across the former
Soviet republics of Central Asia.”198
China’s energy quest is also having strategic impact on China’s
immediate neighbors like Japan, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Driven by a
desire to secure natural resources, ensure sea lane security and national
defense, and grow national pride, China has started to flex its fledgling
naval might in the South and East China Seas.199
Estimates of the petroleum resources in the South and East China
Seas vary greatly. The U.S. Geological Survey assesses between 11 billion
and 28 billion barrels of oil and approximately 145 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas under the South China Sea. Chinese estimates assess between
213 billion and 400 billion barrels of oil (which would make it the largest
oil field in the world) and 498 trillion and 700 trillion gallons of natural
gas.200 Estimates of East China Sea oil reserves are similarly speculative,
ranging from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s numbers, 60–
100 million barrels, and China’s 70–160 billion barrels.201
Even in light of such varied estimates, the interesting conversation
revolves around ownership and control. China has laid claim to the entire
South China Sea, as did Vietnam, each country excluding only neighboring
states’ exclusive coastal areas. Of course, these claims overlap with those of
the other neighboring nations, including Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines,
194.
Plumer, supra note 190.
195.
Id.
196.
Jane Perlez & Bree Feng, China Gains New Friends in Its Quest for Energy, N.Y.
TIMES (Sep. 23, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/world/asia/china-gains-newfriends-in-its-quest-for-energy.html?_r=0.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
200.
Id. at 140–41.
201.
Id. at 141.
702
[Vol. 15
and Brunei. In the East China Sea, Japan and China are the two main
competitors, each focusing on one set of islands called the Diaoyu in China
and the Senkaku in Japan. Both nations claim ownership, the Japanese
tracing their stake back to 1895, and the Chinese, referring to documents
between envoys, tracing theirs to the Qing Dynasty.202
Recently, skirmishes have erupted between Japanese and Chinese
ships. In 2010, the captain of a Chinese fishing boat crashed his vessel into
two Japanese patrol boats near the disputed islands.203 The Japanese took
the Chinese captain into custody and held him for two weeks.204 In China,
the response was severe. Government officials condemned the Japanese
actions and suspended all high-level exchanges and threatened “strong
countermeasures” when Tokyo refused to release the Chinese mariner.205
While the Japanese eventually released the Chinese captain, tensions
remained high. In 2012, the Japanese government announced that it had
purchased the Senkaku islands from their private owner, a Japanese
citizen.206 This infuriated the Chinese, who called the maneuver “the most
blatant challenge to China’s sovereignty since the end of the second world
war.”207 In 2013, Japan accused China of locking military radar “capable of
aiding weapon strikes” on a Japanese ship and helicopter in the region, a
claim which China denied. 208 Competing resources claims are causing
similar incidents in the South China Sea.
While tensions in the East China Sea involve two nations and one set
of islands, friction in the South China Sea has many more variables. The
Sea itself spans 1.4 million square miles, 209 from Singapore and the
Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan, from the Vietnamese coast to the
Philippines, and South to Indonesia. The oil and gas reserves that lie
underneath the seabed hold the promise of economic opportunity for the
202.
Id. at 142.
203.
Justin McCurry, Japan-China Row Escalates Over Fishing Boat Collision, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/09/japan-china-fishing-boat-collision.
204.
Martin Fackler & Ian Johnson, Arrest in Disputed Seas Riles China and Japan, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/world/asia/20chinajapan.html?_r=0.
205.
Id.
206.
Julian Ryall, Japan Agrees to Buy Disputed Senkaku Islands, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 5,
2012), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/9521793/Japan-agrees-tobuy-disputed-Senkaku-islands.html.
207.
ECONOMY & LEVI, supra note 133, at 143 (quoting Associated Press, Senkaku Islands
Dispute Escalates as China Sends Out Patrol Ships (Sep. 11, 2012)).
208.
Id.
209.
David Brunnstrom, U.S. Says China’s Fishing Curbs ‘Provocative and Potentially
Dangerous’, REUTERS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/09/us-usa-china-fishingidUSBREA0817720140109.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 703 smaller regional nations and local energy security for China.210 Several
Southeast Asian nations, including China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Brunei, and the Philippines, claim title to the South China Sea’s largest
islands: the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield
Bank, and Scarborough Shoal.211
In addition to the natural resources under the seabed, the South China
Sea is home to fisheries, trade routes, and military bases.212 Nearly fifty
percent of global trade passes through the South China Sea,213 and its sea
lanes are home to three times more tanker traffic than the Suez Canal and
five times more than the Panama Canal.214 Freedom of navigation through
this region is tremendously important to the global economy.
Competing claims in the region have forced countries to pursue two
related paths. First, many countries have turned to international law to
resolve conflicts. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”) contains extensive rules on the establishment of economic
zones in international waters.215 China has submitted claims to the United
Nations (“UN”) over the Diaoyu Islands.216 Japan did the same, referring to
the disputed islands, of course, as the Senkaku.217 The Philippines also
brought their dispute with the Chinese over a territory dispute in the South
China Sea to a UN arbitration tribunal.218
Unfortunately, the rules under the UNCLOS are unclear. Often,
different parts of the UNCLOS provide justification for the arguments of
two separate countries. 219 Further, while the UN commission has the
authority to assess “the scientific validity of claims,” it does not have the
actual authority to resolve disputes. 220 So, the countries often find
themselves back where they started, settling the disputes on their own,
which leads us to their second course of action.
China, informed by its own study of history and international law,
established the “9-Dash line” to demarcate its claim to territories and waters
in the South China Sea.221 In 2009, China submitted a map to the UN that
210.
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SOUTH CHINA SEA, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics.cfm?fips=scs (last updated Feb. 7, 2013).
211.
Id.
212.
Id.
213.
214.
Id.
215.
Id. at 146.
216.
Id. at 147.
217.
Id.
218.
Id. at 148.
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
221.
Beina Xu, South China Sea Tensions, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 11, 2013),
available at http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790.
704
[Vol. 15
included the 9-Dash line, as well as included the line on the new version of
the Chinese passport. The line caused an immediate row with China’s
neighboring states.
Military activity in the South and East China Seas has increased over
the past several years.222 Vietnam and Malaysia have started building up
their military forces, and the Philippines doubled its defense budget and
began a five-year series of joint military exercises with the United States.223
The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”) is aggressively
patrolling the region. 224 This militarization of a relatively small sea
increases the chances for mishap and misunderstanding, which makes the
possibility of finding political solutions more difficult.
The Obama administration, recently, has become more involved in
these sovereignty disputes. 225 Senior administration officials have
challenged China’s claims, particularly with respect to the 9-Dash line.226 In
congressional testimony, Danny Russel, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs noted:
Any Chinese claim to maritime rights not based on claimed land
features would be inconsistent with international law. China could
highlight its respect for international law by clarifying or adjusting
its claim to bring it into accordance with international law of the
sea . . . Our view is that these actions have raised tensions in the
region and have exacerbated concerns about China’s long-term
strategic objectives.227
The Obama administration has also preemptively warned China
against establishing South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
(“ADIZ”).228 Similar warnings did not deter China from establishing an
ADIZ in the East China Sea in November 2013.229 On November 23rd, a
Chinese military spokesman announced the creation of a new ADIZ and
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
See generally id. (describing Chinese surveillance and patrolling of the South and East
China Seas).
225.
Zachary Keck, US Challenges China’s Nine-Dash Line Claim, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 12,
2014), available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/us-challenges-chinas-nine-dash-line-claim/.
226.
Id.
227.
Id.
228.
Zachary Keck, China's Drafting a South China Sea ADIZ, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/chinas-drafting-a-south-china-sea-adiz/.
229.
Mira Rapp-Hooper, East China Sea ADIZ: A Turning Point in US-China Relations?,
DIPLOMAT (Dec. 20, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/east-china-sea-adiz-a-turning-point-in-uschina-relations/.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 705 that any aircraft flying through the zone would have to identify itself and
follow the orders of Chinese air traffic controllers.230 While many nations
have ADIZs, they typically do not overlap with other countries’ territory.231
China’s unilateral actions have strengthened regional bilateral and
multilateral alliances among its smaller neighbors; polarization of the
region is a real risk. The Obama administration has strengthened ties with
the Association of South East Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), which is trying to
transform itself into a more integrated and powerful regional force. 232
Singapore and Malaysia have also expressed a desire to increase their
security cooperation programs.233
President Xi’s provocative actions certainly appeal domestically to
China’s nationalist camp.234 This regional assertiveness may also go handin-hand with growing economic power.235 It also could be a reflection of
China’s national security calculus. Since the Second World War, the United
States has underwritten the secure and free flow of trade across the globe.236
The United States Navy patrols critical sea lanes and keeps global trade
flowing, regardless of the destination of the commodities.237 However, there
is no requirement or guarantee that the United States will keep doing so. If
the United States pulls back, China might be left without reliable trade
routes and its energy supply may become more volatile.238 This, of course,
has implications for China’s economy and its resource quest, and therefore
is of critical concern to its national security.
A recent Council on Foreign Relations report examined an air war
scenario between China and Taiwan and found that fuel could pose
“significant restraints” on China and Taiwan.239 Even though China is the
230.
China, Japan and America Face-Off, ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590930-chinas-new-air-defence-zone-suggests-worryingnew-approach-region-face.
231.
Id.
232.
Beina Xu, South China Sea Tensions, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 11,
2013), http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790.
233.
Id.
234.
ECONOMIST, supra note 230.
235.
Id.
236.
237.
Id.
238.
Id. at 168.
239.
See generally ROSEMARY A. KELANIC, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., ENERGY REPORT–
OIL SECURITY AND CONVENTION WAR: LESSONS FROM A CHINA–TAIWAN AIR SCENARIO (Oct. 2013),
available
at
http://www.cfr.org/china/oil-security-conventional-war-lessons-china-taiwan-air-warscenario/p31578 (examining an air war scenario to enhance broader knowledge about fuel requirements
during time of war. During the Second World War, both Germany and Japan were forced to make
decisions based on military fuel requirements. In Germany’s case, fuel supply limitations forced them to
engage horse–drawn transportation on the Eastern Front. The desire to secure fuel in the Dutch East
Indies forced Japan to attach the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor to eliminate the threat to
706
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fourth-largest petroleum-producing country in the world, the study finds
that Taiwan could meet its fuel needs in an air war for five-months—about
three times longer than China. This sheds new light on China’s quest to
secure petroleum, diversify its supply routes, and find new sources of
energy.240
China has been exercising its naval forces in the South and East
China Seas. While the PLAN’s force projection ability is limited currently,
it is innovating. The Pentagon estimates that “by the latter half of the
current decade, China will likely be able to project and sustain a modestsized force, perhaps several battalions of ground forces or a naval flotilla of
up to a dozen ships, in low-intensity operations far from China.”241 In fact,
the PLAN has been increasing its naval deployments to the Gulf of Aden
and is partnering with the United States in counter-piracy efforts there.
While the PLAN only appears to be concerned with pirate attacks on
Chinese vessels, the deployments are a significant signal of China’s intent
to increase its presence on the seven seas.
As the United States rebalances its attention and resources to the
Asia-Pacific region, it will encounter a reemerging China that is less reliant
on American power to guarantee its economic future. As the United States
increasingly engages with the new China, energy and the environment
provide roads that both nations can walk down together.
III. THE ENERGY PIVOT
U.S.-China relations are evolving. At the conclusion of then Chinese
President Hu Jintao’s state visit to the United States, he and President
Obama released a joint statement. This statement reaffirmed each leader’s
“commitment to building a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.China relationship for the 21st Century.”242 Each country addressed the
fears of the other, saying “the United States reiterated that it welcomes a
strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world
affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that
contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.”243
their petroleum shipments. The study aimed to find whether military fuel demand could strain a nation’s
supply today. The study concludes that oil and fuel supplies could become significant constrains on
China and Taiwan in the event of war.).
240.
Id.
241.
242.
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, U.S.–China Joint
Statement (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/uschina-joint-statement.
243.
Id.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 707 Since then, both nations have set about to achieve their stated goals.
In November 2011, President Obama officially announced the strategic
rebalancing of American attention and resources from the Middle East and
Central Asia to the Asia-Pacific region. He stated:
After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in
blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the
vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region . . . Our new focus on this
region reflects a fundamental truth—the United States has been, as
always will be, a Pacific nation . . . As the world’s fastest-growing
region—and home to more than half the global economy—the
Asia-Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that’s
creating jobs and opportunity for the American people . . . I have,
therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision—as a Pacific
nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in
shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and
in close partnership with our allies and friends.244
To pursue his vision, President Obama developed a comprehensive,
multi-dimensional strategy designed to: strengthen alliances; deepen
partnerships with emerging powers; build a stable, productive, and
constructive relationship with China; empower regional institutions; and
help to build a regional economic architecture that could sustain shared
prosperity.245
The United States and China have increased their contacts and
formalized their exchanges on strategic and economic issues.246 Military-tomilitary contacts have resumed and high-level exchanges have occurred in
various venues.247 Even so, as interaction increases, so too do doubts and
suspicions.
On the American side of the Pacific, a “significant minority” 248
wonders what a strong China means for the United States. This camp sees
China as aggressively trying to displace the United States as the dominant
power in the Asia-Pacific region and form Asia into a bloc that defers to
244.
Remarks, supra note 7.
245.
Remarks, Tom Donilon National Security Advisor to the President, Remarks at the
Launch of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White
House (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/24/remarks-tom-donilonnational-security-advisor-president-launch-columbia-.
246.
KISSINGER, supra note 137.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
708
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Chinese economic and foreign policy objectives.249 On the Chinese side,
there is suspicion about whether American power will be used to help or
hurt a growing China. They view the American pivot, increased military
presence, and strengthened defense relationships with its neighbors as a
coordinated effort to encircle their nation in order to prevent it from
realizing its rightful place as Middle Kingdom.250
This Part explores the possibility of bridging the space between the
two cultures using defense-led energy innovation. In Part I, we saw how the
military’s mission is driving energy innovation and changing the very
culture of the force. In Part II, we delved briefly into China’s millennialong history and examined the remarkable growth of the Chinese economy
that is driving a worldwide resource quest that deploys whatever it needs in
the economic, political, and military spheres to secure the fuel it requires.
Now, with the stage set, we can see the effect increased military-to-military
contact between the United States and China can have on the world’s
energy future. These interactions can demonstrate the power of efficient
and clean energy innovation, further refine successful regulatory
mechanisms, and slay the two-headed dragon of Pacific instability and
environmental harm caused by the Asia-Pacific region’s rapid
industrialization.
A. Aligning the Two Cultures
In 1959, C. P. Snow delivered a lecture, “The Two Cultures,” in
which he lamented the cultural divide that separates the two areas of human
inquiry, science and the arts.251 Snow noted,
There seems . . . to be no place where the cultures meet. I am not
going to waste time saying that this is a pity. It is much worse than
that . . . [A]t the heart of thought and creation we are letting some
of our best chances go by default.”252 Snow went on to argue that
artists and scientists must build bridges between their two
disciplines to fully realize human progress.253
This cultural separation has an analogue in the energy area.
Domestically in the United States, cooperation and true progress are
249.
Id.
250.
Id.
251.
C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 4, 10–11
(Cambridge
Univ.
Press
1959),
available
at
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_5110/snow_1959.pdf.
252.
Id. at 17.
253.
Id. at 17–19.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 709 hindered by the seemingly un-crossable chasm that exists between
traditional defense hawks and those who support alternative energy. As we
saw in Part I, the military mission has fulfilled C. P. Snow’s vision and
bridged the gap between the two energy cultures by reorienting the
domestic energy discussion around national security.
In order to better achieve its mission, the Defense Department is
changing the way it uses energy on the battlefield and on board its
installations. It is becoming more efficient and secure and is proving that
energy innovation allows the force to achieve greater operational reach with
less risk. We are in the midst of a quantum leap in military achievement in
the energy area and it occurred by aligning the mission with energy
innovation. There are potentially huge gains for the environment and
military capability. With this alignment, the chasm was bridged and the
clash between the two cultures produced creative advancements.
While China and the United States have been important partners for
the last fifty years, the relationship between the two also fits rather easily
into Snow’s paradigm. At 238 years old, the United States is an infant
compared to China’s national existence. The United States is a liberal
democracy, and China is the largest communist country on earth. China
views the West with suspicion, and the West is weary of a dominant China
in East Asia. There is limited understanding of one side from the other, and
direct and transparent conversation is nearly impossible. Issues like cyber
security, currency manipulation, and human rights encounters are hotbutton topics that make meaningful, or even open, dialogue impossible.
However, seen through the lens of national security, energy aligns the
interests of the two nations on a wide range of issues—energy security,
economic growth, climate and environmental sustainability—and
tremendous progress seems possible.
B. A New Framework for Cooperation
The rise of new powers has often led to conflict with established
nations, but it does not have to. Understanding even the basics of China’s
history and culture will allow us to begin building bridges to span the
divide between East and West. Perhaps most fundamentally, China does not
see itself as a “rising” power, but as a returning power, displaced from its
position only temporarily by Western colonial intervention and meddling.254
254.
Id. In the wonderfully insightful passage that follows, Dr. Kissinger goes on to say:
“It does not view the prospect of a strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural,
political, and military affairs as an unnatural challenge to the world order, but rather as a
return to a normal state of affairs. Americans need not agree with the Chinese analysis to
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[Vol. 15
As we saw in Part II, earlier experiences with foreign intervention caused a
decidedly nationalist hue to color China’s view on international relations.
Culturally, Chinese tradition holds that the Middle Kingdom is heir to an
eastern empire that is peaceful, defense-minded, self-sufficient, and
pacifist. 255 They see Western culture as expansionist, militaristic,
shortsighted, and selfish.256
Additionally, while China has opened its economy to world markets
and embraced state capitalism, their view of the West remains informed by
Marxist political thought, which holds that capitalist nations exploit the rest
of the world.257 Also, some Chinese leaders see America’s support for
Taiwan and calls for democracy as attempts to weaken the Chinese state
and make it more pro-American.258 This will help the United States win the
perceived zero-sum quest for power and resources. The Chinese worst-case
scenario is that the American pivot represents an attempt to increase
military presence and western influence within Chinese territory.259
Neither nation has experience dealing with a country of similar
economic power, size, resources, self-confidence, or as different a culture
or political system. China’s history provides no precedent for how to relate
to a nation like the United States—a great power with a permanent Pacific
presence with universal ideals that do not necessarily comport with Chinese
conceptions.260
Continuing the evolution, at their June 2013 meeting in Rancho
Mirage, California, Presidents Obama and Xi discussed a new model for
U.S.-China relations moving forward. President Xi Jinping said:
We’re meeting here today to chart the future of China-U.S.
relations . . . . We need to think creatively and act energetically so
that working together we can build a new model of major country
relationship.261
understand that lecturing a country with a history of millennia about its need to “grow up”
can be needlessly grating.” Id.
255.
Andrew J. Nathan & Andrew Scobell, How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s
Fears, FOREIGN AFF., (Sept. 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138009/andrew-j-nathanand-andrew-scobell/how-china-sees-america.
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
258.
Id.
259.
KISSINGER, supra note 137.
260.
Id.
261.
Greg Botelho et al., Despite Tensions, U.S., Chinese Leaders talk of forging ‘new
model’ in Relations, CNN (June 9, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/07/politics/us-china-summitcyber-spying/index.html.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 711 Just as increased American military presence in the Pacific could
signal the threat of encirclement in Beijing, the flexing of Chinese muscle
in the South China Sea and in neighboring countries gives rise to the fear of
dominance in Washington. Defense energy programs provide a mechanism
through which to forge a new type of power relationship.
Luckily, the framework through which to collaborate on energy
innovation is already in place. In 1979, soon after the United States and
China opened formal relations, the two nations signed the Science and
Technology Cooperation Agreement. 262 This agreement pledges
cooperation in a diverse range of fields including physics and chemistry,
earth and atmospheric sciences, health care and disease control, and a
variety of energy-related areas.263
In the face of the global challenges of climate change and energy
security, in 2008, the United States and China entered the Ten Year
Framework on Energy and Environment Cooperation, which, as the title
suggests, facilitates exchanges between the two countries to foster energy
innovation and environmental protection. 264 In November 2009, Presidents
Obama and Hu established the $150 million U.S.-China Energy Research
Center, which facilitates joint research and development on clean energy
technology by teams of scientists from the United States and China.265
Presidents Obama and Hu, in their Joint Statement in 2011, directly
address cooperation on climate change, energy, and the environment:
The United States and China agreed to continue their close
consultations on action to address climate change, coordinate to
achieve energy security for our peoples and the world, build on
existing clean energy cooperation, ensure open markets, promote
mutually beneficial investment in climate friendly energy,
encourage clean energy, and facilitate advanced clean energy
technology development.266
Each side reaffirmed their commitment to continue exchanges on “energy
policy and cooperation on oil, natural gas (including shale gas), civilian
nuclear energy, wind and solar energy, smart grid, advanced bio-fuels,
262.
U.S.–China: Thirty Years of Science and Technology Cooperation, Fact Sheet, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/fs/2009/130625.htm.
263.
Id.
264.
U.S.- China Ten-Year Framework for Cooperation on Energy and Environment, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/tenyearframework/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
265.
U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), Welcome to the U.S.-Clean Energy
Research Center, available at http://www.us-china-cerc.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
266.
Press Release, supra note 242.
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clean coal, energy efficiency, electric vehicles, and clean energy technology
standards.”267
Cooperation between the United States and China can drive global
energy innovation. In his 2011 progress report on U.S.-China Clean Energy
Cooperation, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu noted:
Energy innovation in one country accelerates clean energy
deployment in all countries. And the combined research expertise
and market size of the U.S. and China provide an unprecedented
opportunity to develop clean energy solutions that will reduce
pollution and improve energy security while enhancing economic
growth globally . . . As the two largest energy consumers, the U.S.
and China have a shared interest in energy efficiency. Energysaving technologies deployed in one country will reduce energy
costs for the other and benefit both economies.268
The Obama administration’s strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific
is already providing increased opportunities for interaction and cooperation.
President Obama has invited China to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(“TPP”), a free-trade alliance joining the Americas with Asia. 269 The
current parties to the TPP are the United States, Canada, Mexico, Peru,
Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and
Japan. Together, this trading bloc makes up forty percent of the global
economy.270 This type of economic diplomacy is promising.
Closer military cooperation could also help strengthen the strategic
partnership between the United States and China. In May 2013, U.S.
National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon met with General Fen Changlong,
Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission.271 During their
meetings, Donilon and General Fen discussed deepening cooperation
between the U.S. and Chinese militaries on several issues like
267.
268.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S.–CHINA CLEAN ENERGY COOPERATION, A PROGRESS
REPORT BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 2, 5 (2011).
269.
China to Study Joining U.S.–Led Trade Accord After Japan Added, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(May 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-05-30/china-to-study-joining-u-s-ledtrade-accord-after-japan-added.html.
270.
Kwanwoo Jun, Seoul Affirms Interest in Joining TPP, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2014, 4:09
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/01/13/seoul-affirms-interest-in-joining-tpp-but-says-chinadeal-comes-first/.
271.
Wang Tells Donilon China Must Coordinate Its Politics with U.S., BLOOMBERG NEWS
(May 28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-27/donilon-tells-xi-the-u-s-seeks-closerchina-ties-as-talks-near.html.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 713 peacekeeping, disaster relief, and counter-piracy missions. 272 Admiral
Samuel J. Locklear III, the United States Pacific Command Commander, in
remarks in November 2014, echoed these sentiments and expressed a clear
desire to increase communication, understanding, and closer cooperation
between the United States and Chinese militaries.273
As discussed in Part II above, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta invited China to participate in the RIMPAC exercise in 2014. In
2012, twenty-two countries, including Russia, participated. 274 In 2014,
twenty-three nations are expected to attend. When asked about China’s
participation, the Commander of the U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet, Vice Admiral
Kenneth Floyd noted, “For us, it’s an opportunity to build trust and
confidence with the partners that we will work with when we’re out there.
To that extent, having the Chinese participate is very valuable to us.”275
While interaction on the operational level on disaster relief and
counter-piracy missions is incredibly useful and important, using the
military to engage China on energy innovation presents an unparalleled
strategic opportunity. In addition to providing another forum for increased
military-to-military contact, it also allows national security concerns, rather
than more abstract concepts of climate change or the environment, to drive
cooperation and investment in both countries.
C. The U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship
At the height of the Cold War, the Chinese and United States were
strategic partners and enjoyed strategic military dialogue, reciprocal
exchanges, and arms sales. 276 In response to the Tiananmen Square
Crackdown in 1989, the United States suspended military contacts with
China. In 1990, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act imposed sanctions
on arms sales and other cooperation between the United States and
China.277 This Act did allow waivers that were in the general interests of the
272.
Id.
273.
Donna Miles, Locklear Welcomes Closer U.S.-China Cooperation, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121059.
274.
Ernesto Bonilla, RIMPAC 2012 Concludes, U.S. NAVY (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=68817.
275.
Gretel C. Kovach, Carrier Reagan to Join Military Exercise: Ship Lineup for RIMPAC
2014 Off Hawaii Final in April, SAN DIEGO UNION–TRIBUNE (Feb. 12, 2014, 3:30 PM),
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/Feb/12/ronald-reagan-aircraft-carrier-rimpac/.
276.
Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, CONG. RES.
SERV.1, 1 (Jul. 25, 2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf.
277.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 901, 104 Stat, 86
(1990).
714
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United States.278 In response, China cancelled its contract with the United
States to upgrade the avionics of the F-8 fighter.279
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush, cancelled the suspended
foreign military sales cases and returned all unused Chinese funds and
military equipment.280 While President Clinton reengaged China, including
the military, exchanges with the People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) did not
regain the closeness reached in the 1980s.281
Since the 1990s, military contacts have improved and deteriorated
along with overall bilateral relations. 282 The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 2000 set parameters for contacts with the PLA. It
prohibited the Secretary of Defense from authorizing any mil-to-mil contact
with the PLA if that contact would “create a risk to national security due to
an inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to twelve delineated areas that
include nuclear operations, chemical and biological defense capabilities,
military space operations, and arms sales or military related technology
transfers, among others.283 In practice, this law does not prohibit current or
future exchanges in any meaningful way.284
While not directed specifically to China, the Arms Export Control
Act governs the transfers of defense articles and services to another
country. Section 6 of this Act prohibits sales covered by the Act to any
country that is determined by the President to be engaged in a consistent
pattern of intimidation or harassment directed against individuals in the
United States. 285 Also limiting transfers and purchases, in the National
Defense Authorization Act for 2006, Congress prohibited the procurement
from any “Communist Chinese military company,” of goods and services
on the Munitions List, with certain exceptions.
Military-to-military relationships remained limited until around 2005,
when Admiral William Fallon, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command
visited China to advance contacts between all ranks of military personnel
and cooperation in responding to natural disasters, reducing overall tensions
278.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1990 § 902.
279.
Kan, supra note 276.
280.
Id. at 2.
281.
Id.
282.
Id.
283.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–65, § 1201,
113 Stat. 512, 779–80, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ65/pdf/PLAW106publ65.pdf.
284.
DEP'T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1,
61
(2013),
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf.
285.
Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, ch. 1, § 6 (1968) (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2756 (2010)), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title22/html/USCODE2010-title22-chap39.htm.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 715 between the two nations.286 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited
China in 2005 and signaled the resumption of the formal military
relationship.
In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that he did not see
China as a “strategic adversary,” but as a partner in some respects and a
“competitor” in others. 287 In all cases, Secretary Gates stressed the
importance of engagement with the PRC “on all facets of our relationship
as a way of building mutual confidence.” 288 On his visit to China in
November 2007, Secretary Gates agreed to open a “hotline” between the
PLA and the Pentagon.289
With President Obama’s strategic rebalancing towards the AsiaPacific region, he stressed the need for increased military contacts to
diminish the possibility of disputes with China. The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 2010 expanded the required contents of the
Defense Department’s report on the Chinese military to include a section on
mil-to-mil contacts and a new strategy to increase such interactions.290
Secretary Gates, in August 2010, told Congress that “sustainable and
reliable” military-to-military ties were an important part of the overall U.S.China relationship.291 Further, he said that he sought to expand practical
cooperation in areas where U.S. and Chinese national interests converged
and to discuss candidly areas of disagreement.292
Leon Panetta, who took over as Secretary of Defense after Gates’
departure, continued to emphasize the importance of the U.S.-China
military partnership. He stated that the mil-to-mil relationship between the
United States and China was a critical part of the administration’s strategy
to shape China’s rise in a way that maximized cooperation and mitigated
risks.293
Increasing military-to-military contacts around energy would provide
a new avenue for increased dialogue. U.S. and Chinese national interests
converge around this issue. This interaction can serve U.S. interests, just
like any other military-to-military interaction, which includes conflict
avoidance and crisis management, military-civilian coordination, and
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
1246, 123 Stat.
111publ84.pdf.
291.
292.
293.
Kan, supra note 276, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–84, §
2190, 2544, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ84/pdf/PLAWKan, supra note 276, at 20.
Id.
Id.
716
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transparency and reciprocity. Conversation between the United States and
Chinese militaries on energy will also stoke the fire of the Green Arms
Race.
D. Towards a lasting U.S.-China Relationship—Shared Interests Driving
Global Innovation
During RIMPAC in 2012, the U.S. Navy demonstrated the power of
energy innovation by sailing the Great Green Fleet across the Pacific
Ocean. 294 The Chinese military leadership was intrigued and asked the
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, why they were not invited to
participate.295 The Commander looked to include the Chinese in future
humanitarian and disaster relief missions, and Secretary Panetta followed
with a full invitation to participate in the 2014 iteration of the exercise.296
As the PLAN looks to project Chinese power farther across the globe,
it will look to the United States Navy as its model. Seeing the effectiveness
of clean energy investment, China will pursue a similar strategy. The U.S.
defense and state departments, and their constant interactions with their
counterparts in China, will play a vital role as the initiators and sustainers of
a U.S.-Chinese partnership in the Green Arms Race.
Pursuing energy innovation will successfully align the domestic and
international interest of the United States and China. Local constituencies
will be able to localize the benefits of a more efficient and more capable
military and more reliable and diverse sources of energy. Defense
innovation will create new jobs and spark entrepreneurship in both
countries, and consumers will have access to spill over clean and efficient
energy technologies.
A durable partnership on energy between the United States and China
will also allow for strong leadership on climate change. As mentioned
above, the developing world, knowing that energy consumption was tied
closely to economic growth, ignored climate change and burned cheap
carbon—the West was responsible for the bulk of the problem—and should
bear the lion’s share of the cleanup.
The problem, of course, is that we all live on the same planet and
Asia now finds itself on the front lines of an increasingly malignant
problem. In a recently published article, the former President of the
294.
#GreatGreenFleet Sailing Toward SECNAV Energy Goals During RIMPAC 2012,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
NAVY
(July
16,
2012,
7:05
PM),
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=68408.
295.
Kan, supra note 276, at 14.
296.
Id. at 15.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 717 Republic of Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, and the Former President of
East Timor, Jose Ramos-Horta, called for Asian Climate Leadership.297 To
successfully reach an agreement at the next UN Climate Summit next year
in Paris, they argue that three things need to happen. First, old positions
must be abandoned and countries must work together towards a global
deal.298 Second, they urge Asian countries to build clean energy economies
to boost growth, increase wealth, and reduce pollution. They highlight the
need “[for] electricity grids that can accommodate vast quantities of
renewable energy; infrastructure that promotes green vehicles; and
regulations that encourage energy efficiency.”299 Third, they recommend
that Asian nations better protect their natural environments.
In both the United States and China, national security and mission
accomplishment are more useful drivers for domestic support than broader
and more abstract concepts like energy independence or the environment.300
In his 2012 State of the Union address, President Obama explicitly used
national security and the Defense Department to challenge legislators to
take action on climate change and energy innovation. The President said:
We can also spur energy innovation with new incentives. The
differences in this chamber may be too deep right now to pass a
comprehensive plan to fight climate change. But there’s no reason
why Congress shouldn’t at least set a clean energy standard that
creates a market for innovation. So far, you haven’t acted. Well,
tonight, I will. I’m directing my administration to allow the
development of clean energy on enough public land to power 3
million homes. And I’m proud to announce that the Department of
Defense, working with us, the world’s largest consumer of energy,
will make one of the largest commitments to clean energy in
history—with the Navy purchasing enough capacity to power a
quarter million homes a year.301
297.
Mohamed Nasheed & Josè Ramos-Horta, The Need For Asian Climate Leadership,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mohamed-nasheed/climate-changeasia_b_4814980.html.
298.
Id.
299.
Id.
300.
In the United States, several pieces of legislation, dating back to the Energy Policy Act
of 1992, address energy and national defense. See, e.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110–140, §933, 121 Stat. 1492, 1740–41; Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, §
1837, 119 Stat. 594, 1141–42; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
107–107, 115 Stat. 1012; Energy Conservation and Reauthorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–388,
112 Stat. 3477; Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat. 2776.
301.
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Remarks by the President
in State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-address.
718
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A strong U.S.-China partnership on clean and efficient energy
innovation, driven by shared interests and military requirements, could
build support domestically in both nations to bring about the very change
President’s Nasheed and Ramos-Horta seek. A secure, affordable, and clean
supply of energy is a goal that the United States and China share. Defense
collaboration on energy via regulatory, technical, and other exchanges will
increase much needed military-to-military contact between the United
States and China, which will reduce tension and risk and, over time, will
stabilize the region. By framing energy in national security terms, the
United States can galvanize global cooperation on innovation and climate
change.
E. Immediate Opportunities for Collaboration
If we’re going to get this country out of its current energy situation,
we can’t just conserve our way out. We can’t just drill our way out.
We can’t bomb our way out. We’re going to do it the oldfashioned, American way. We’re going to invent our way out,
working together.302
In this section, I want to briefly explore a few new technologies with
defense applications. Demonstrating these developments through militaryto-military engagements with China will stoke the fire of the Green Arms
Race and pull innovation in its wake.
1. A Smarter Grid
On August 13, 2003, a sagging power line hit a tree near Cleveland,
Ohio, tripping some circuit breakers.303 To compensate, power was rerouted
to another line, which overheated and hit another tree, tripping another
circuit.304 The result was a cascading blackout that affected power in eight
states in the Northeastern United States and part of Canada.305
While the official investigation discovered operator error and failing
computer systems, the root cause was the grid. The grid is the term used to
302.
Donald Sadoway, Quotes from Donald Sadoway, TED (Mar. 2012),
http://www.ted.com/speakers/donald_sadoway.
303.
Dan Bobkoff, 10 Years After the Blackout, How Has the Power Grid Changed?, NPR
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/14/210620446/10-years-after-the-blackout-how-has-thepower-grid-changed.
304.
Id.
305.
Id.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 719 describe the “system that links together large numbers of power plants,
transmission lines, transformers and users.”306 The links between numerous
power plants, when the grid is working effectively, provides reliability. If
one power plant needs to go offline or has a problem, other plants on the
grid can surge to provide power.
The grid is a demand driven system. Power plants do not store
energy. The energy that powers the light in your room was generated just
seconds ago. Power companies use historic data and the weather to predict
demand and then produce enough energy to meet usage. When you turn on
a switch, the power is there. But, if the system fails, the lights do not dim;
the power goes out.
Our current grid poses a critical vulnerability. The problems arise on
high power usage days when the system is at or close to maximum
capacity.307 When someone turns on one additional switch, the system shuts
down.308 Then, when one plant shuts down, that causes a load on the other
interconnected plants.309 If they are at maximum capacity, then they shut
down too.310
This poses a critical problem for defense installations, which require
constant power to run our nation’s military. The Department is fielding
smart grids at their bases, both in the United States, and forward deployed,
to bring energy generation and distribution into the 21st century.311
A smart grid is a system with the technology to actively monitor and
modulate the energy that utilities generate and distribute. The smart grid is
able to communicate with customers, sense and fix problems on its
network, and integrate power from solar, wind, and other energy sources to
meet demand.312 The ability to modulate energy demand also enables smart
grids to save costs.313 The control system for the smart grid is also more
resistant to cyber-attacks.
The military is deploying smaller versions of smart grids, creatively
called micro-grids, to Afghanistan. Micro-grids connect modular power
generation sources, which might include a combination of petroleum-fueled
generators, solar panels, wind, and other sources.314 This type of distributed
306.
307.
Id.
308.
Id.
309.
Id.
310.
Id.
311.
Cheryl Pellerin, Pentagon Looks to Smart Grids for Battlefield Energy, AM. FORCES
PRESS SERV. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65740.
312.
Id.
313.
Patrick Gordon, Smart Grid Energy Management Keeps the Lights On at the Right
Price, NAVY NEWS SERV. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=72776.
314.
Pellerin, supra note 311.
720
[Vol. 15
electricity generation has applications in countless arenas outside the field
of battle. China and India can use micro grids to bring reliable and efficient
power generation to the countryside. 315 They can also be deployed in
disaster relief and humanitarian response missions.
2. Solar and Wind Power
Increased demand is causing the price of solar cells to plummet. As a
result, the deployment of solar power is surging. Sunlight brings about one
kilowatt hour of power per square meter onto the surface of the East. Solar
cells, or photovoltaic cells, are thin wafers that absorb sunlight and produce
electricity using the photoelectric effect—physics discovered by a Swiss
patent clerk named Albert Einstein. As explained simply by a physics
professor:
In the photoelectric effect, an incoming particle of light known as a
photon knocks an electron away from the atoms that it is normally
associated with, and it lands on a metal electrode. When that
electron moves from the electrode onto a wire, it is electricity, and
it carries with it some of the energy of the photon of light.316
Most solar cells, at peak output, convert 15 to 20 percent of sunlight
into electricity; the best and most expensive cells (like those used on the
Mars rover) convert forty-two percent. 317 The prices of solar cells is
plunging, falling from around $7 per installed watt to $1 per installed watt
in just a few years.318 The problem, of course, is that this price is a bit
misleading. Solar cells only produce electricity when it is sunny. Even so,
as the markets expand, innovation and the price of batteries continue to fall.
Installation and maintenance also will fall, and make solar energy attractive
in areas with plenty of cheap labor, like India and China.
A few sentences on solar cell chemistry are warranted. Most cells are
made of silicon.319 It is cheap and abundant. The largest manufacturer of
315.
Martin LaMonica, Can India’s Tata Make Cheap Distributed Energy, CNET (Mar. 29,
2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-20047974-54.html. See also William Pentland, China Gets
Serious About Scaling Distributed Energy, FORBES, (Aug. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2013/08/17/china-gets-serious-about-scaling-distributedenergy/ (explaining how China can become the largest consumer market in 2018).
316.
MULLER, supra note 13, at 253 (describing that the photoelectric effect was one of the
foundations of quantum mechanics and the discovery for which Einstein received the Nobel Prize).
317.
Id. at 253.
318.
Id. at 254.
319.
Id. at 258.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 721 silicon solar cells in the world is Suntech Power in China, which produces
more than one gigawatt of solar cells every year.320
First Solar, an American company, has been experimenting with solar
cells made from a tellurium/cadmium (“CdTe”) compound.321 This CdTe
compound absorbs sunlight tremendously and can be deposited on thin,
flexible sheets. 322 First Solar is ramping up production to produce one
gigawatt per year, and says that it will hit a $0.73 price point.323 Of course,
there are problems. Tellurium is rare, only about 800 tons per year being
produced, and cadmium is highly toxic.324
Other formulations, including Copper Indium Gallium Selenide
(“CIGS”) cells overcome the toxicity problem, while maintaining the same
ability as CdTe to readily absorb sunlight.325 Indium, however, is in high
demand. It is a transparent conductor of electricity and is used in virtually
every modern television and computer sold.326 CIGS technology has a bad
name in the United States largely due to the travails of Solyndra, a CIGSbased solar company that received over $500 million worth of loan
guarantees from the United States and then went bankrupt.327 Subsidized
Chinese competition was partially to blame, but Solyndra’s complex design
also contributed.328
Competition in the solar field is driving prices down and efficiency
up. Solar technology is helping military installations striving to achieve netzero energy usage. Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-nine Palms,
California, saved $3.2 million from a 1.5 megawatt rooftop solar array.329
New wind power capacity is being installed almost as rapidly as
solar. The United States installed 5 gigawatts of wind capacity in 2010, and
has a total installed wind power of 40 gigawatts.330 In the same year, China
installed 15 gigawatts, bringing its total to 42 gigawatts of wind power; in
2011 China extended its lead, reaching 55 gigawatts of installed wind
capacity.331
World wind power capacity has been doubling every three years.
Wind turbines are inexpensive to build and require no energy to operate. On
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Pew Study, supra note 84, at 4.
Id.
722
[Vol. 15
windy days, wind farms deliver electricity for 9.7 cents per kilowatt-hour,
which is comparable to the price of electricity from coal.332 But, when the
wind stops blowing, there is no power. Advancements in battery technology
will drive the deployment of both wind and solar energy.
3. Storage
Saving solar and wind energy for use on cloudy days and days with
no wind is critically important. A true leap in battery technology would be a
rechargeable cell that does not lose capacity, that could provide grid-level
storage that can dependably store hours of energy from solar and wind
power at a very low cost.333 Such a battery would change the way we get
electricity by smoothing out the intermittency in the energy output from
wind and solar farms.334
The ability to bring stored power efficiently to the grid would allow
fossil-fueled power plants to close by easing the integration of renewable
energy technologies.335 It would also ease the volatility on the grid by
making electricity when it is available and least expensive.336 The grid will
be more reliable and provide lower-cost electricity. Until now, no one has
been able to develop a technology that can do it cheaply. A professor at
MIT is about to change the world.
Donald Sadoway has developed a battery with chemistry different
than any other battery used today, one with entirely liquid components.337
This means that the parts could last for years without losing energy storage
332.
Id.
333.
See Martin LaMonica, Ambri’s Better Battery, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 18, 2013),
http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/511081/ambris-better-grid-battery/ (discussing a new
battery technology being developed).
334.
Id.
335.
336.
Id.
337.
Ambri Brochure, AMBRI, http://www.ambri.com/storage/documents/2014-Brochurev3.pdf (last viewed Mar. 24, 2014).
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 723 capacity.338 The liquid formulation would allow the battery to tolerate the
current levels needed to store energy for the grid.339
In formulating the battery, cost was the key driver.340 Sadoway chose
magnesium and antimony because they are cheap, and separate naturally
when in liquid form—the lighter magnesium rising to the top.341 The next
layer is a liquid salt electrolyte, which lies between the magnesium and
antimony.342 The result is a three-layer cell with no moving parts. An article
from the MIT Tech describes the process from here:
When the battery is called upon to deliver power to the grid,
magnesium atoms form the top layer—the anode—give off
electrons. The resulting magnesium ions travel through the
electrolyte and react with the antimony, forming and alloy and
expanding the bottom layer of the cell—the cathode. When the
battery is charging, it acts like the smelter, liberating the
magnesium from its alloy and sending it back through the
electrolyte to rejoin the magnesium electrode. The intense flow of
current generates the heat used to keep the metals in a molten
state.343
Sadoway spun off his battery to a company he founded called Ambri.
By wiring the batteries in series, Ambri plans to put together a full sized
commercial prototype that will generate 500 kilowatts and store two
megawatt-hours—enough to power seventy U.S. homes for a full day.344
Importantly, Ambri’s battery is cheap and easy to make and has a negligible
338.
Id. The problem with most rechargeable batteries is that they lose the ability to be
recharged after a few uses. Professor Muller explains the process:
To recharge a battery, you use a generator to force the electrons to return to their original
side; when there, their negative charge will attract the positive ions to break away from the
compounds that they stuck to and drift back through the electrolyte. That’s a great idea, but
the difficulty is in the details. The ions must go back to the electrode and attach themselves
in a benign way . . . they often don’t; a persistent problem with rechargeable batteries is that
they returning ions tend to form long fingerlike structures called dendrites. If the dendrites
grow with each recharge cycle, they may eventually make the battery unusable. MULLER,
supra note 13, at 285.
339.
Ambri Brochure, supra note 337.
340.
See id. (explaining that Ambri kept costs low by using inexpensive minerals in its
battery design).
341.
Id.
342.
Id.
343.
LaMonica, supra note 333.
344.
Id.
724
[Vol. 15
fade rate (0.2% over 1,000 cycles).345 This means a retention rate of greater
than 99% of initial capacity over seven years or daily cycling.346 This is 100
times better than traditional lead-acid batteries currently in use.
Ambri’s battery could store solar and wind power when demand is
low and then sell money back to the grid when demand is high. Grid
storage could add much needed resilience and flexibility to the energy
system, providing backup power to buildings and even military bases, while
allowing grid operators to smooth out fluctuations in power supply. Sharing
these sorts of innovations with the developing world will reduce the
pressure to engage in a zero-sum global resource quest. It will also drive
down the price of clean energy technology and unlock the hold that fossil
fuels currently have over economic development.
IV. CONTINUOUS INNOVATION—TOWARDS A DIVERSE ENERGY FUTURE
This article reorients the discussion on energy and climate change
focusing it squarely around national security. Doing so allows American
ideas and innovation to lead the world towards a new energy future, one
that recognizes the benefits of clean and renewable sources of energy
alongside fossil fuels. The United States can use its “Default Power” to
ensure global stability and alter the future of our environment by engaging
the developing world with reliable and efficient solutions to their energy
concerns. The strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region provides the
perfect opportunity to increase direct military-to-military interaction with
China to encourage energy innovation to forge a clean energy future for the
region, and for the world.
The threats posed by climate change are shared by all nations.
President Obama’s National Security Strategy recognizes the “real, urgent,
and severe” threat posed by climate change and notes that “change wrought
by a warming planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources;
new suffering from drought and famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and
the degradation of land across the globe.”347
Any solution to this problem must involve global cooperation.
Sustained and meaningful cooperation on energy and the environment
345.
2014
Progress
Update,
AMBRI,
http://www.ambri.com/storage/documents/ambri_2014_progress_update.pdf (last visited Mar. 24,
2014).
346.
Id.
347.
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, 47 (May 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
2014] The Energy Pivot: How Military-Lead Energy Innovation Can 725 between the United States and China, the two biggest users and polluters on
the planet could change the trajectory of world energy consumption.
We are at a transformational moment. The military’s pursuit of energy
innovation does not reflect a fringe environmental pursuit, but rather a
necessary national security choice. Two cultures, traditionalist and
alternative, east and west, will be united in this quest. The critical issues of
energy security and climate change desperately require American
leadership and innovation. We can protect our natural environment and
produce a thoughtful energy policy that can be shared internationally
through military and diplomatic interaction.
Only by building a diverse, resilient, and efficient energy portfolio,
one that expands opportunities to develop new energy supplies of all kinds,
can the United States and China escape the short-term problems caused by
price volatility and long term problems like climate change. The Green
Arms Race provides the way. To save lives on the battlefield, better utilize
limited tax dollars, and achieve greater operational capability, the military
is leading an energy pivot towards efficiency and diversity. Technological
advancements and effective regulations are being shared through defense
networks across the globe. As the United States rebalances the force to the
Pacific, the military will increase its interactions with the Chinese and add
the world’s largest energy consumer as a partner.
On October 26, 1963, President John F. Kennedy delivered remarks
at Amherst College honoring poet Robert Frost. The President presented his
vision for the nature and strength of American power:
I look forward to a great future for America, a future in which our
country will match its military strength with our moral restraint, its
wealth with our wisdom, its power with our purpose. I look forward
to an America which will not be afraid of grace and beauty, which
will protect the beauty of our natural environment, which will
preserve the great old American houses and squares and parts of
our national past, and which will build handsome and balanced
cities for our future.348
348.
John F. Kennedy, Former President of the United States, Remarks at Amherst College
(October
26,
1963),
available
at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/AssetViewer/80308LXB5kOPFEJqkw5hlA.aspx#. President Kennedy provided these words at the
groundbreaking for the Robert Frost Library at Amherst College. Robert Frost read during President
Kennedy’s inauguration, becoming the first poet to participate in the official program at a presidential
inauguration. Frost died in January of 1963. In his remarks at Amherst, President Kennedy stressed the
importance of public service and role of the artist in a democratic society. He notes Frost’s contributions
to American culture, prestige, power, and national identity. President Kennedy famously stated, “When
power leads men towards arrogance, poetry reminds him of his limitations. When power narrows the
726
[Vol. 15
Kennedy’s vision of the future is within our grasp. Engaging the energy
pivot will continue Churchill’s determined vision that energy innovation
and thoughtful energy policy are critical elements of national security.
areas of man’s concern, poetry reminds him of the richness and diversity of existence. When power
corrupts, poetry cleanses.” Id.
CLIMATE EXTREMES: RECENT TRENDS WITH
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY*
By Michael B. McElroy and D. James Baker**
Introduction—Setting the Stage for the Symposium ................................ 727
I. Observations and the Physics of Greenhouse gases .............................. 729
II. A New Normal: Impacts and Challenges ............................................. 731
III. Implications of Changing Extremes.................................................... 734
IV. The National Security Context ........................................................... 737
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 742
INTRODUCTION—SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE SYMPOSIUM
This paper was presented at the Symposium on “Rising Temps and
Emerging Threats: The Intersection of Climate Change and National
Security in the 21st Century” that was held at the Vermont School of Law
on October 25, 2013, sponsored by the Vermont Journal of Environmental
Law. The paper was designed to set the stage for the symposium discussion
by summarizing current knowledge of weather and climate extremes in the
recent past, showing what might be expected in the near-term future (next
decade) for both urban and rural regions, and laying out the national
security implications for the most affected regions. Following the
presentations of the climate and security threats, the Symposium
participants dwelt on how the military would respond by adapting to
climate change, how society would respond with a special emphasis on
forced climate-based migration, and how food security becomes part of
national security. There was a lively discussion of these issues throughout
*
Summary of a presentation by D. James Baker at the Fall 2013 Symposium of the
Vermont Journal of Environmental Law on “Rising Temps and Emerging Threats: The Intersection of
Climate Change and National Security in the 21st Century”
**
Michael B. McElroy is the Gilbert Butler Professor of Environmental Studies at
Harvard University and D. James Baker is the Director of Forest and Land-Use Measurement at the
Clinton Foundation and a former Administrator of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. The authors would like to thank Ric Cicone, Marc Levy, and the reviewers listed in the
online version of the report.
728
[Vol. 15
the day. The other speakers and audience participants raised a number of
points that will help inform future research in both science and policy.
The Symposium presentation and this paper is a summary based on a
longer report by McElroy and Baker (2012) that examines the science
behind near-term climate extremes and analyzes implications for national
security.1 This summary, in order to be most relevant to the Symposium
discussion, focuses more on the policy implications and national security
issues rather than on the basic science context. The reader is referred to the
original report for detailed information on observations, analyses, and more
national and regional examples.
The authors of the report recognized that fundamental to all of this
discussion is an understanding of the climate and weather changes that we
have seen in the past, and therefore start by analyzing recent climate and
weather extremes. The authors then showed how these changes might be
extrapolated into the future and what the societal implications might be in
various regions around the world. The authors also examined whether the
increasing number of extreme events and manifestations of change are
rooted in human-induced climate change or whether they can be explained
as a consequence of decadal manifestations of natural weather variability.
They concluded by analyzing the national security implications for such
change.2
To make decisions, policy makers need near-term information, asking
what can happen in the next decade. Up to now, assessments of climate
impact relied on projections of climate change tuned to identify impacts
over roughly a one-century time frame. That long time frame is driven by
the nature of the questions that dominated the initial literature (e.g., what
impacts can be expected from a doubling of pre-industrial carbon dioxide).
It is also driven by the fact that global climate models are generally able to
resolve expected impacts only over large scales and the long term. 3
Examining the impacts of near-term climate change poses challenges and
requires a different assessment of climate science. The models as yet do not
provide robust regional forecasts. One must piece together from first
principles the physical dynamics that are likely to generate significant
impacts, evaluate the signals available in the observational record, and
assess plausible societal responses to such changes.4
1.
MICHAEL MCELROY AND D. JAMES BAKER, CLIMATE EXTREMES: RECENT TRENDS
WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, HARVARD UNIV. CENTER FOR THE ENVT. (October
2012), http://environment.harvard.edu/climate-extremes.
2.
Id. at 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. at 2.
2014]
Climate Extremes
729 The focus here is on information about extreme events in the next
decade that can provide useful guidance to national security planning. Will
extreme weather patterns worsen or continue to persist? Will we witness
new manifestations of extreme weather? How will these changing patterns
affect U.S. national security interests? To answer these questions, the
authors undertook a careful examination of the physical drivers that
influence weather and that underlie changes in the climate system. They
reviewed current literature, examined the record of recent observations and
model results, and consulted with scientists familiar with the dynamics of
weather, climate, and society. The authors thus combined the best insights
of natural and social scientists to examine the extent and pace of near-term
climate changes and the consequences of the resulting stresses placed on
people and nature.5
I. OBSERVATIONS AND THE PHYSICS OF GREENHOUSE GASES
The authors also commissioned an empirical analysis of open-source
temperature and precipitation data by Dr. Tom Parris. Dr. Parris provided
important insight with respect to recent decadal trends in extreme
temperature and precipitation events and their impact on fresh water
resources by examining a one-hundred-year terrestrial record of
temperature, a sixty-year record of precipitation, and a global hydrological
model. 6
The analysis of observational data shows that the climate of the past
decade has indeed been unusual. The annual global average surface
temperature for each year from 2002 through 2011 ranked among the top
thirteen in the 132-year instrumental record, which began in 1880. That
decade was also marked by a number of high-impact, weather-related
disasters that include dramatic heat waves, droughts, floods, and storms.
Naturally induced climate changes are revealed by active El Niños, large
scale changes in the Atlantic Ocean, and other regional oscillations, which
can have an effect on extremes. These phenomena are occurring at the same
time that greenhouse gases are driving climate change..
The documented empirical record thus includes both natural and
human influences. It provides evidence clarifying that the intensity of
recent unusual events exceeds normal expectations and that their extent is
worldwide, affecting people where they live, draw upon fresh water
resources, and grow food. While climate extremes are an on-going fact of
5.
6.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 3.
730
[Vol. 15
nature, the study found clear evidence that the recent prevalence of events
and conditions exceeded expectations based on the past century of
weather.7
The report reviews the observational record for surface temperatures,
precipitation events, floods, and droughts particularly focuses on trends in
the prevalence of extremes. It then reviews trends in the observed impact of
climate changes on arctic ice, permafrost, glaciers, ice caps, ice sheets, and
sea level. This gives us a basis for understanding the scale and scope of
extreme events and manifestations of changes in important physical
components of the Earth system that can affect weather patterns. In
particular, global average land surface temperature has increased by about
0.9° C since the 1950s. During the same period, the prevalence of extreme
warm anomalies increased while the prevalence of extreme cool anomalies
decreased.8
The observations indicate that there is no obvious long-term trend in
global annual precipitation over land. However, there is strong evidence
that precipitation has occurred in more extreme events for most of the
northern hemisphere. Higher temperatures combined with more extreme
precipitation, increased the prevalence of severe freshwater deficits since
about 1980. They produced a much smaller increase in freshwater surpluses
since about 1990. In the Arctic, most of the permafrost observatories in the
Northern Hemisphere show significant warming of permafrost during the
1980s. The minimum September arctic ice extent for each of the past five
years from 2007-2011 was lower during any other year in the period of
record and declines at an average rate of about 12% per decade.9
All of this information is growing evidence of human-induced
climate change. The multiple lines of observational information lead to the
conclusion that atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are
increasing and that most of this increase can be attributed to the combustion
of fossil fuels. The primary reasons are: 1) the north-south difference in
concentrations is increasing in a manner that is consistent with CO2
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, predominantly in the Northern
Hemisphere, and 2) measurements of isotopic tracers indicate fossil fuel
combustion.10
Other key evidence from routine monitoring by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) and other international
services include the facts that: 1) global average surface temperature, sea
7.
8.
9.
10.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44.
2014]
Climate Extremes
731 level, global upper ocean heat content, and specific humidity are all rising;
2) northern hemisphere snow cover and Arctic ice are decreasing; 3) the
lower stratosphere is cooling while the upper troposphere is warming; 4)
and the Arctic is warming faster than mid-latitudes and the tropics. All of
these observations are consistent with the physics of greenhouse gas
warming. The observations and the underlying physics support the view
that increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are largely
responsible for observed increases in global average surface temperature,
increases of temperatures in the upper troposphere, and decreases of
temperatures in the stratosphere. The latter two conditions taken together
may be considered as critical fingerprints of greenhouse gas-driven climate
change. We are led to the conclusion that for the future, we must consider
the forced trends from rising concentrations of greenhouse gases as well as
the natural variability of climate.11
The conventional approach to looking at the impacts of climate
change assumes they will unfold only slowly and in the distant future,
following pathways to which society can easily adapt. It seems clear that
this approach is inadequate. Now, we can see that human-driven changes in
Earth’s energy balance are producing a warmer and wetter atmosphere.
This trend superimposes on and, in some cases, magnifies natural
variability. Small positive changes in the global mean annual temperature
are causing an increased prevalence of local extreme weather conditions.
Greenhouse gas warming has given us a new climate—a new normal, if you
will—where climate disruptions are more likely.12
II. A NEW NORMAL: IMPACTS AND CHALLENGES
The new normal for climate leads to a more vulnerable world in
general. We are facing a future where the risk of major societal disruption
from weather and climate extremes such as droughts, floods, heat waves,
wildfires, and destructive storms is expected to increase. These stresses will
affect water and food availability, energy decisions, the design of critical
infrastructure, and the use of the commons. They will have large costs in
terms of both economic and human security. This new normal has the
following characteristics:13
A more vulnerable world: More prevalent extreme weather can be
expected to have a comparatively disproportionate social and economic
11.
12.
13.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
732
[Vol. 15
impact on human societies today. That is because society has changed.
Increased population; growing industrial infrastructure; urban growth and
burgeoning mega cities; increased habitation of coastal regions; and
growing dependency on water resources to satisfy agricultural, industrial,
energy, and domestic needs are all characteristics of a human society with
increasing demand on nature’s services. Without deliberate adaptation, the
human toll of extreme events will continue to mount and the escalation of
extreme events as the climate warms will only make matters worse.14
Impacts on water security: Severe weather conditions directly impact the
hydrological cycle and the availability of fresh water resources. Global
freshwater withdrawals have increased approximately eight-fold in the last
century. Water exploitation, making it unavailable for subsequent
downstream use, increased about five-fold in the last century. These trends
are projected to continue well into the 21st century. With an expected
increase in the numbers of floods and droughts, many countries important
to the U.S. could face environmental stress that may lead to responses and
adaptations that, in turn, may present opportunities or challenges to U.S
national security interests. Large scale migrations, political realignments,
increased competition over resources, changes in economic policy, price
shocks, and possible conflict over increasingly scarce water resources and
trans-boundary waters, even failure of marginal states, are all plausible.15
Challenges to food security: Food production, already in increased
demand, will suffer from more heat extremes and increased variability of
rainfall, leading to instability in the food markets. Over the past four years,
major spikes in global food prices have arisen from a perfect storm of
widespread drought in multiple major agricultural regions, diversions of
commodity grain for biofuel production, and increasing demand from
rapidly growing economies such as India and China.16
Implications for energy security: Emissions from energy-based fossil fuel
combustion are the largest human contribution to greenhouse gas
concentrations. The energy production infrastructure, requiring copious
amounts of water, is often located in regions susceptible to drought, flood,
and damaging storms that are expected to become more prevalent in the
coming decade. The infrastructure is, therefore, vulnerable to disruption due
to extreme weather. Nuclear power generation is also sensitive to heat
14.
15.
16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2014]
Climate Extremes
733 waves. During the 2012 heat wave, reactors were shut down because
incoming cooling water was too warm. Large-scale geoengineering efforts
to increase the concentration of cooling aerosols in the atmosphere and
hence counter the impact of fossil fuel emissions are being developed, but
little is known about the impacts of these efforts. There is also a notable
absence of workable mechanisms for diplomatic coordination for such
geoengineering projects.17
Threat to critical societal infrastructure: The probability of a major
storm crippling cities will increase because there will be more coastal
megacities due to population growth and increasing urbanization. Storms
will become more destructive and there will be more flooding as storm
surges increase from higher sea-levels. Critical infrastructure, including
dams, roads, bridges, ports, rail systems, and airports is engineered and
constructed to specifications based on the extremes observed under the
climate of the past century. Significant infrastructure is concentrated in
coastal zone areas that are particularly vulnerable to extreme weather and
rising sea level. In areas of permafrost, where ground stability is threatened
by warming, infrastructure such as pipelines is highly vulnerable. The
vulnerability is especially clear in our defense and maritime shipping
apparatus reliant upon coastal ports. More frequent and prevalent climate
extremes in the coming decade imply that we will likely see more frequent
infrastructure failure and growing demand for financial resources to harden
existing infrastructure.18
Impact upon the Arctic, the global commons, and natural ecosystems:
The global impact of climate change, as well as the impact on the Arctic
region, coastal zones, and critical ecological resources such as Amazonia,
will increase competition and hopefully cooperation among nations to
accommodate change. A good example is the Arctic Basin. As it loses its
summertime ice cover faster than expected, new trade routes and expanded
opportunities for oil and other mineral exploration are appearing.19
17.
18.
19.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10
Id. at 10.
734
[Vol. 15
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING EXTREMES
Global Impacts
The important security implication of global warming in the near
term is that the extremes are likely to become more prevalent and more
frequent. What was once a 1 in 100 year anomaly is likely to become a 1 in
10 or 1 in 30 year anomaly or even more frequent in the near future. Our
infrastructure and agriculture are not designed to accommodate the
increasing frequency and prevalence of such extremes. Human security and
the interests of most nations are at stake as a result of such increasing
climate stress. The potential for profound impacts upon water, food and
energy security, critical infrastructure, and ecosystem resources will
influence the individual and collective responses of nations coping with
climate change. U.S. national security interests have always been
influenced by extreme weather patterns. Now the global risks are larger and
more apparent.20
Regional Effects of Near-Term Climate Stress
Large-scale features of the climate system such as the ocean sea
surface temperatures, the atmosphere’s water vapor holding capacity, and
atmospheric circulation patterns drive regional trends. One can expect
increased warming worldwide, resulting in amplification in the Arctic, a
warmer ocean, increasing storm intensity in the tropical regions generally
drier subtropical regions, likely wetter conditions in temperate and boreal
regions with more intense and less frequent precipitation events, and an
increasing likelihood of wildfires. Regional prediction remains challenging
and will require focused efforts to maintain and enhance Earth
observations, especially of the oceans. However, all the evidence points
toward intensifying climate extremes. The effects will be worldwide. The
illustration below highlights some of the changes we expect to see in
selected regions that are highly relevant to US national security interests.
Note that the Hadley Cell referred to in the illustration is an atmospheric
circulation pattern characterized by rising warm air at the equator and
sinking cooler air further north.21
20.
21.
Id. at 5.
Id.
2014]
Climate Extremes
735 736
[Vol. 15
The McElroy and Baker report was published at the end of 2012
when the U.S. had just seen the grip of widespread and severe drought. That
drought strongly affected both energy availability and agricultural
productivity. For example, nuclear power production in the U.S. in 2012
was measured at the lowest seasonal levels in nine years as drought and
heat slowed reactor output. Of course, the United States has faced severe
climate stress before. The impact of the dust bowl in the early 1930s is
imprinted in the memory of our nation’s history. The affected areas of the
dust bowl period were widespread in the United States and Northern
Europe. The intensity and scope of the 2012 drought combined with record
high temperatures reawakened memories of the dust bowl era. Today, we
again are facing a similar problem in California with the drought of 2013
continuing into 2014. We find widespread drought in many important parts
of the world at the same time. Water resources, while already much in
demand and inefficiently used in certain critical regions, are thus further
stressed due to this extreme weather. The impact of this unfolding event on
people, and how it may echo through the world markets, has yet to play
itself out. However, it certainly bears watching, as the breadth of impacts is
much larger geographically and society is much more vulnerable today than
it was in the 1930s.22
With weather and climate extremes, as with any threat our nation
faces, there is a fundamental imperative to observe, monitor, and study
related factors to provide insight and objective analysis to our nation’s
policy makers about the implications to U.S. national security interests.
Changes of the magnitude we are witnessing have implications for food,
water, and energy security. We design our society, including its
infrastructure and its defense apparatus, around expectations, including
climate and the expectations of weather patterns and events. Climate is and
has always been a natural constraint on national power and prosperity. Up
to now, it has not been perceived as a threat, only a surrounding condition
that must be accommodated in both tactical and strategic planning.
However, we can no longer assume that climate is fixed and unchanging.
The scope of recently observed extreme events and the prospect of future
changes that could drive more extreme weather warrant close attention. We
can no longer assume that the extremes of tomorrow will resemble the
extremes of yesterday—as mentioned above, we are facing a new normal.23
22.
23.
Id. at 7.
Id.
2014]
Climate Extremes
737 IV. THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT
The national security context is changing as a result of the
environmental changes we expect to see in the coming decades. The
prospect of serious socioeconomic disruptions in response to weather and
climate related extreme events is more imminent than previously thought—
affecting society in significant ways today and through the coming decade.
It is cause for significant concern in the later part of this century. The
impact on individuals and nations will be profound.24
Much of what we assume about the future based upon our experience
with the past may be in doubt. Human population is projected to grow to
9.2 billion in 2050, an increase of more than 30% from the present. The
increase over the seventy years from 1980-2050 will exceed the increase
experienced during the 150,000 years prior to 1980. Economic activity per
person has also grown substantially. The production and consumption of
goods and services per capita grew by more than 70% between 1975 and
2010. While improvements in technology have enabled us to make more
efficient use of resources, aggregate resource use has generally outstripped
these efficiency gains due to larger, more affluent, populations. In addition,
environmental pressures such as climate change will further stress the
resource base required to sustain human development.25
As a result, we must now seriously consider futures constrained by
Earth’s continuing capacity to provide the resources to support human
society in context of social and environmental stressors. When and where
we bump up against these constraints we will need to adapt. In some cases,
these adaptations may be long anticipated, well planned, and orderly. In
other situations, they may be forced by surprises, chaotic in
implementation, and pose significant national security challenges. In some
cases, self-organizing processes such as markets will carry out adaptations
smoothly. In other cases, adaptations will require interventions. Whenever
the stakes are high, decision makers who already have robust assessments
will hold a significant advantage.26
The full report includes an analysis of the scientific basis for
expecting an increase in the frequency of extreme weather and an increase
in the total area affected by extreme weather over the next decade. The
conclusions will be controversial to some. But the evidence is inescapable
that more frequent weather extremes are having impacts that concern our
security interests today. The report warns that we can expect this to
24.
25.
26.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
738
[Vol. 15
continue. The risk is sufficient to warrant attention. It is evident that human
security and the interests of most nations are at stake. The impacts of
climate changes affect society in significant ways today and will continue
to do so through the coming decades. They pose complex questions
regarding the human dimension—the response of people, individually and
collectively, as their environment changes.27
Recent years have witnessed a marked increase in concern that
climate stress will pose significant challenges for U.S. national security.
Such concern has been reflected in scientific scholarship, publications of
policy think tanks, and high-level government publications such as the
Quadrennial Defense Review. Behind this recent thinking about climatesecurity linkages is a combination of new understanding of the vulnerability
of societies to climatic stress (underscored by a series of recent case
examples that bring these vulnerabilities into sharp relief) and a mounting
empirical record that demonstrates that weather extremes are becoming
more common. These linkages can be broadly categorized as: 1) multipliers
of political instability threats; 2) interaction of climate stress and
globalization; 3) disruption of international politics through changes in
territory and diplomacy; and 4) drivers of humanitarian crises.28
Multipliers of political instability threats
Political instability, in the form of coups, civil war, and other forms
of internal political violence constitutes a major U.S. national security
threat for which strong possible connections to climate stress have been
identified. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the rise of major security
problems linked to political instability, major resources were devoted to,
and advances were made in, understanding the causes of political
instability.29
Several key drivers of instability have clear links to climate stress.
For example, a prolonged drought in a poor, agriculturally dependent
society will generate consequences:
• Depression of livelihoods among rural societies, as herding and
farming yields decline
• Depression of government revenue, as agricultural exports decline
• Increased movement of populations in search of suitable pasture and
cropland
27.
28.
29.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
2014]
Climate Extremes
739 • Decreased perceptions of government legitimacy, if responses to the
crisis are judged inadequate.
Each of these consequences has been shown to elevate the risk of political
instability. The same dynamics contribute to the risk of humanitarian
emergencies. The genocide in Darfur was preceded by a multi-decade
drought that generated such consequences. The recent collapse of the Mali
state also was preceded by a severe drought linked to these consequences.30
In any single case it is not possible to attribute causal responsibility
for political instability to climate stress, but statistical tests can help identify
the overall pattern. Published tests clearly demonstrate that deviations from
normal climatic conditions are associated with a significant increase in the
risk of political violence (see the illustration above). Although the strength
of this proposition continues to be debated by scholars, there is no doubt
that the evidence supports heightened attention to the linkages.31
Interaction of climate stress and globalization
Political instability can also be exacerbated by climate stress that
operates through less direct means. Globalization creates patterns of
vulnerability that can be accentuated by climate shocks. The food price
spikes of 2010, generated by severe drought in key global wheat producing
regions in Eurasia, led to a sharp increase in dissatisfaction with political
leadership in several Arab countries. The combination of an acute shortage
of affordable food, deep-rooted concerns about legitimacy, and absence of
mechanisms for peaceful political contestation are some of the factors
behind the emergence of the Arab Spring in 2011.32
Another example of indirect transmission is in the area of policy
responses. In 2008 and 2010, the worldwide diversion of crop production to
biofuel contributed to sharp increases in global food prices. The biofuel
surge is largely a result of climate policies mandating increased production.
Similarly, concerns about water scarcity, in part elevated by worries over
climate change, but also prompted by economically driven increases in
consumption, have led some countries to increase construction of reservoirs
on trans-boundary rivers, or even in some cases to contemplate diversion
that harms downstream interests. Such policy responses elevated cross-
30.
31.
32.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
740
[Vol. 15
border tension in regions such as the Lancang-Mekong, GangesBrahmaputra, and Ili River (Kazakhstan-China) basins.33
A third and key category of policy response that has raised alarms is
the sharp increase in foreign land acquisitions by some countries. Several
countries that are worried about their long-term ability to meet food
security needs (driven again in part by climate change projections) have
responded by executing long-term leases and purchases of agricultural land
in poor countries. Because poor agrarian countries are often politically
fragile, the injection of contentious land politics may be destabilizing.
Indeed, the government of Madagascar fell in 2009 precisely because of a
controversy over the government’s handling of a major land deal with
South Korea.34
The vulnerabilities associated with globalization have the potential to
transmit the impacts of weather and climate extremes to the U.S. homeland.
The Thailand floods of 2011, triggered by a combination of unusually
heavy rains and land use changes in the region, shut down production of
key components for computer hard drives. This led to a global hard drive
shortage that lasted for months. The heavy concentration of critical
elements of the global supply chain in this vulnerable region could easily be
repeated elsewhere. Another possible threat to the U.S. homeland lies in the
shifting patterns of infectious disease that could be triggered by climate
change. Dengue fever, for example, has shown signs of moving into the
southern U.S. as habitat conditions for the Aedes aegypti mosquito shift.
Similarly, Vibrio bacteria, a precursor to gastrointestinal diseases such as
cholera, are now living in the Baltic Sea—a migration enabled by warmer
waters.35
Disruption of international politics through changes in territory and
diplomacy
Finally, climate change has the potential to disrupt international
politics in a way that creates national security problems for the U.S.
Reductions in Arctic sea ice have already triggered fears of a scramble for
control of shipping lanes and mineral deposits in the region. Competing
territorial claims in the region had not been associated with international
tension in the past, because there were no viable prospects for acting on
such claims. As the Arctic has been free of ice in late summer to a greater
extent and for longer periods than ever before, prospects for mineral
33.
34.
35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2014]
Climate Extremes
741 exploitation, fisheries exploitation, and shipping are now much more real.
The prospects for challenging conflicts over control are potent. A similar
dynamic has emerged in the northern border between India and Pakistan.
Unresolved territorial disputes are being exacerbated by fears that climate
change is affecting transboundary water resources of the Himalayan
glaciers and thus upsetting the fragile political equilibrium.36
Weather and climate extremes may create degraded conditions that
terrorist and criminal organizations could exploit to their advantage. The
water crisis in Yemen, for example, though largely driven by growth in
consumption in an arid region, has been augmented by rainfall shortages.
This crisis has been linked to the weakness of the regime, which in turn has
heightened concerns of a growing Al Qaeda presence. Similarly, in northern
Mali there are fears that the loss of state control has created a potential
haven for Al Qaeda and its sympathizers. The drought in Mali cannot be
blamed as the primary force behind this development, but it clearly played a
role in the history of contested control in the region. The collapse of the
Somali state was exacerbated by long-term drought in the region, and has
generated long-lasting security threats. These examples demonstrate that
weather and climate extremes can influence hostile interests in new regions
of the world.37
Drivers of humanitarian crises
Humanitarian crises with clear direct links to climatic stresses—
disasters associated with droughts, floods, severe storms, temperature
extremes, wildfires, and landslides—are growing rapidly. In addition,
complex humanitarian emergencies arise through the interaction of multiple
stresses, such as political violence, refugee flows, malnutrition, and
epidemics. Often such crises emerge in places that constitute threats to U.S.
national security because of the need to employ U.S. military resources as
part of an organized response or because of destabilizing effects in critical
regions.38
During the 20th century, patterns of interdependence and
vulnerability evolved in a way that led to a dramatic increase in the role of
socioeconomic forces in shaping U.S. national security. These processes
accelerated in the aftermath of the Cold War. Now the 21st century is
shaping up to be a period in which weather and climate extremes are
generating similar levels of security threats. Therefore, understanding the
36.
37.
38.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
742
[Vol. 15
nature of these climatic stresses, as they are likely to unfold in the near
term, is of crucial national security importance.39
CONCLUSION
In short, the observational record shows that the world has been beset
with a decade of unusual weather conditions. Droughts, stronger storms,
heat waves, floods, wildfires, and anomalous seasonal weather have been
outside historical expectations. The facts are that all of this is consistent
with a greenhouse-gas-warmed climate that is wetter in some areas and
drier in others. This warming is driven by radiative energy imbalance of the
Earth resulting from increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases. Greenhouse warming is expected to continue in the coming decades
and may in fact accelerate through the removal of cooling aerosols.
Attendant oceanic and atmospheric conditions will likely lead to persistent
and amplified extreme weather events and climatic conditions in the
coming decade, though natural variability will modulate (both worsening
and ameliorating) these conditions.40
All of the above underscores the fact that climate change is a
potential threat to U.S. national security. As an example of this, both the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2010 National Security Strategy
identify climate change as likely to trigger outcomes that will threaten U.S.
security. The analysis finds that, absent unknown or unpredictable forces,
the increase in extreme events observed in the past decade or two is likely
to continue in the next one to two decades. This increase will impact water,
energy, food security, and critical infrastructure as was discussed at the
Symposium. It brings into focus the need to consider the accelerating nature
of climate stress, in concert with the more traditional political, economic,
and social indicators.41
As the presentations and discussion at the Symposium showed, the
necessary adaptation to the stress of climate change will cut across many
sectors and will require new policy commitments and new funding.
Improved scientific understanding will be required to provide better
forecasts and both civil and military sectors will have to recalibrate their
response and plans for infrastructure. We are facing a new normal, one
whose full impacts are not yet understood. It might be useful to consider
revisiting all of these issues in another Vermont Journal of Environmental
39.
40.
41.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
2014]
Climate Extremes
743 Law Symposium, a few years from now, to assess how well society is
adapting and what changes in strategy might be needed.
FIGHTING FOR HOME IN THE MELTING ARCTIC
By Madeline Stano*
“I know we have a future somewhere. Here on the earth we can do our
best. And that’s all we can live with.”
—Andrew, Kivalina resident and whaling captain.
Scientists estimate the Alaska Native Village of Kivalina will become
uninhabitable by 2025 1 making its current residents the first climate
refugees in the United States and making the future of their unique way of
life uncertain. 2
The Village sits at the two-square mile southern tip of a six-and-a-half
mile barrier reef island between the Chukchi Sea and Wulik River some
seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle.3 Kivalina is home to four hundred
residents, ninety-seven percent of whom are Native Iñupiat.4 Iñupiat means
literally “the people” and is a term used by Natives of Northern Alaska to
describe themselves and their culture. 5 The Iñupiat in Kivalina are
descendants of the Iñupiat who lived throughout the Northwest Artic
nomadically for thousands of years.6 The modern Village of Kivalina did
not have permanent residents until 1905 when the Federal Bureau of Indian
Affairs built a school there and forcibly compelled attendance of Iñupiat
children.7
*
Luke Cole Memorial Fellow and Staff Attorney at Center on Race, Poverty & the
Environment in California.
1.
Stephen Sackur, The Alaskan Village Set to Disappear Under Water in a Decade,
BBC NEWS MAG. (July 29, 2013, 8:15 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-23346370.
2.
Id. “Climate refugees” is also a term used by the author to describe those displaced by
the environmental and political impacts of climate change.
3.
Kivalina, NANA REG’L CORP., INC., http://nana.com/regional/about-us/overview-ofregion/kivalina/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
4.
Our People, NANA REG’L CORP., INC., http://nana-dev.com/about/our_people/ (last
5.
Inapiaq, UNIV. OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS, http://www.uaf.edu/anlc/languages/i/ (last
updated Jan. 1, 2007).
6.
CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA: A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY 2 (2011).
7.
NANA REG’L CORP., INC., supra note 3.
2014]
745 Currently, Kivalina is a self-governing, federally recognized Indian
tribe 8 that practices a subsistence lifestyle like their ancestors, with
bowhead whales, seals, caribous, reindeer, and fish playing a particularly
important role.9
The residents of Kivalina face two major environmental challenges that
continue to impact their daily lives tremendously—the neighboring Red
Dog Mine10 and climate change.
The Red Dog Mine is one of the largest zinc and lead mines in the
world.11 EPA consistently ranks the Red Dog Mine as the number one
polluting facility in the country because it produces over 500 million
pounds of toxin-imbued waste rock per year.12 Kivalina residents began
working with Luke Cole 13 at the Center on Race, Poverty & the
Environment in 2002 to challenge the Mine’s illegal pollution discharges,
which jeopardized their drinking water and subsistence practices.14 In July
2006, a U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary
judgment to Kivalina, establishing 618 permit violations against the mine.15
In 2008, the Court found over 200 more violations,16 and that the company
had been out of compliance with its mine site’s National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit for twelve out of the last
8.
Status established pursuant to the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
and amended in 1936. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,328, 46,332 (July 12, 2002) (listing the “Native
Village of Kivalina” as one of the federally acknowledged tribes).
9.
See infra pp. 4–7.
10.
See Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (D. Alaska 2006); Red Dog by the Numbers, NANA REG’L CORP., INC., http://nana.com/regional/resources/red-dogmine/red-dog-faq/ (last visited May 22, 2014) (the Mine is located eighty-two miles North of Kotzebue
and discharging its effluent in the Wulik River, which is essential for Kivalina’s drinking water and
subsistence practice).
11 Understanding
the
Toxic
Inventory
Report,
RED
DOG
OPERATIONS,
http://reddogalaska.com/Generic.aspx?PAGE=Red+Dog+Site/Environmental+Pages/TRI&portalName=
tc (last visited May 22, 2014).
12.
Id.
13.
Our Founders: Luke Cole (1969–2009), CTR. ON RACE, POVERTY, AND THE ENV’T,
http://www.crpe-ej.org/crpe/index.php/about-us/who-we-are/our-founders (last visited May 22, 2014).
14.
Climate Justice in Kivalina, CTR. ON RACE, POVERTY, AND THE ENV’T,
http://www.crpe-ej.org/crpe/index.php/campaigns/climate-justice/kivalina-ak (last visited May 22,
2014).
15.
Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d at 943–44.
16.
See AM. ASS’N FOR JUSTICE, HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH: HOW THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM HOLDS CORPORATE POLLUTERS ACCOUNTABLE 11 (July 2010) (noting that in 2008 the
residents of Kivalina successfully settled with Red Dog Mine after showing they violated the Clean
Water Act a total of 800 times).
746
[Vol. 15
twelve quarters.17 Residents, some of whom work at the mine, continue to
work with Red Dog on reducing pollution near their homes.18
You may also know Kivalina from its other legal effort challenging the
largest greenhouse gas emitters in the United States for their contribution to
global warming. 19 The Alaskan Arctic is warming at twice the global
average due to climate change.20 In the twentieth century, the ice barrier
that protected Kivalina from severe storms melted significantly. 21
Throughout the Alaskan Arctic, the sea ice has shrunk by 386,000 square
miles over the last twenty years.22 In the past fifty years, Kivalina has lost
nearly thirty acres from erosion, sending about half of the livable land into
the sea.23 According to a U.S. General Accounting Office report in 2003,
residents of Kivalina are in “imminent danger” 24 due to the effects of
climate change. “It is believed that the right combination of storm events
could flood the entire village at any time . . . remaining on the island is no
longer a viable option.”25 The federal government estimated the cost of
relocating the village to be between 100 and 400 million dollars. 26
Residents did not recover these costs in court and relocation remains
unfunded.27
That is the story of Kivalina largely told throughout western
mainstream media—a village, through no fault of its own, polluted and
doomed. However, despite regulators and courts’ unwillingness to act
meaningfully to protect Kivalina, residents continue their decades long fight
for their home.
17.
Detailed Facility Report: Red Dog Operations, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
HISTORY ONLINE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa-echo.gov/echo/ (last updated Sept. 24,
2013).
18.
Featured Project: Red Dog Mine, NANA REG’L CORP., INC., http://nanadev.com/industries/mining/red_dog_mine/ (last visited May. 22, 2014).
19.
See Complaint at 1–2, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d
863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138 SBA) (seeking monetary damages from oil and energy
companies for their contributions to global warming and the negative impact their actions have had on
the village of Kivalina).
20.
SUSAN J. HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 10 (2004), available at http://amap.no/acia.
21.
SHEARER, supra note 6, at 127.
22.
Complaint, supra note 19, at 44.
23.
SHEARER, supra note 6, at 50.
24.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-142, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES:
MOST ARE AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 4
(2003).
25.
Id. at 30–32.
26.
Id. at 32.
27.
See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012)
(dismissing the case and asserting the solution to Kivalina’s eminent problem rests in the legislative and
executive branches).
2014]
747 When I traveled to Kivalina in May of 2013, I was immediately struck
not only by the reality of environmental threats they face, but by the
strength of the residents’ commitment to their community, their land, and
their sense of home. I had the opportunity to sit-down and speak with a
former client and whaling captain, Andrew, who generously introduced me
to his life and Kivalina. As national and local governments, advocates, and
communities continue to think about and hopefully plan for climate
adaptation and mitigation, it is the voices of those like Andrew and their
environmental justice communities that must lead the conversation.
[MS] You’ve lived your whole life in Kivalina. What was it like
growing up in Kivalina?
[A] For me, I enjoyed it because it was my hometown, where I
grew up. It was a good life as a young man and as an adult. I would
be able to go hunt after school. In winter time—my favorite time—
I could go ice fishing and hunt small game.
[MS] Is Kivalina different now than when you were growing up?
[A] It is very different now. The weather is different now. With
climate change, it’s a lot warmer than before and sadly we get more
bad news. We didn’t used to know much about the world outside of
Kivalina when I was younger, and now we get all the news through
the computer. Now that’s all that I can think about—the heartache
news from all over the world.
The weather makes a big difference here not only for us but for all
the animals. We can’t hunt every day because of land conditions,
low water on the river, no snow, so it’s hard to get around. It’s
really different. The migrations of many animals have changed.
The spawning of fish has changed. People used to be able to hunt
every week and now they can’t.
I can see now our snow is heading down to Minnesota and the like
and we’re not getting it. 28
28.
See Eric Roston, Why is it So Cold? The Polar Vortex Explained, THE GRID: ENERGY,
RES., AND SUSTAINABILITY, (Jan. 7, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0107/why-is-it-so-cold-the-polar-vortex-explained.html (explaining that the Polar Vortex of 2014 refers to
an arctic cold front that brings snow and unusually low temperatures to geographical areas normally
unaffected by the arctic cold).
748
[Vol. 15
[MS] How have food and eating changed in Kivalina in your
lifetime?
[A] I’ve been eating more Western food because even the greens
that grow here don’t have time to grow. The weather goes from hot
one day and cold the next—nothing can grow. Somebody is not
watching our plants. If you’re growing a plant in your house and
you’re not watching it and taking care of it you know you wouldn’t
get anything out of it. In Kivalina now it’s kind of like that. It’s also
harder to hunt and to fish which means less food.
[MS] I know you achieved great success catching a 59–foot
bowhead whale that was able to feed your whole village for quite
some time. What was your experience as a whaling captain? Why is
whaling important to the people of Kivalina?
[A] My experience as a whaling captain, catching a whale in 1987,
was a good experience. In my teen years, I worked for each captain
in Kivalina. I learned from all the different whaling captains and
appreciated them showing me their knowledge. The elders taught
me how to respect the animals—always respect what we are
hunting for. It was a gift for me to understand it’s all about hunting
for your people, I received that from our Creator and He gave us
the wisdom to say what we should do.
I’ll never deny my Creator; he teaches us what we can have.
Whaling is a spiritual thing for the people here up North. It is a
spiritual living. Catching a whale from the ice, it was a gift—the
Creator gave it to me to experience and feed the people of our
village and see what life is all about. You can see the happiness in
the people you feed.
[MS] How has whaling changed in your lifetime?
[A] It’s warmed up too much. That’s what has changed. There are
too many openings in the ice. There’s also not enough ice. Today,
it’s hard to go out at all anymore. Right now, I need hovercraft to
go out whaling. (Laughs). This year springtime, they went and
didn’t catch a whale. Only Point Hope got a few. Something deep
has changed.
2014]
749 [MS] What was your history with the Red Dog Mine? Why was it
important for you to participate in the Red Dog Mine lawsuit?
[A] I worked there at the Port Site and the mine and I became the
bear watcher—making sure the bears don’t bother workers. I was
paying attention and trying to see what was going on, what they
were doing to our river. At the same time, I used to be on the
committee for Red Dog Mine and NANA.29 We used to go to all
their meetings and hear about issues relating to the Mine and our
environment.
I became concerned about the river that we drink and the fish that
we eat. There were changes to the river and the fish. It’s like I
became part of the trout and understood how they felt about their
river. It’s not our river, it’s their river. That’s where they live and
spawn. I knew the river wasn’t safe. The mine said they’d make it
better but that wasn’t the truth. They said they’d make our water
better to drink. They were not telling the truth, it was not showing
what they said they were doing.
When we tried to ask for help from our people in Alaska, people
from the state and environmentalist people, they wouldn’t for some
reason. They weren’t really in tune. Something was different. The
State of Alaska wasn’t helping the Natives in Alaska. The people of
Alaska were all for money. They were hunting for that money,
that’s why they couldn’t help us. They weren’t getting money by
fixing our river so they were not interested.
It was good to have Luke to do something about our river, tell the
truth about what’s happening. I appreciated that man; I was telling
Luke I was going to make a statue, a monument for him here in
Kivalina.
[MS] What has your experience been in United States courts? How
did it feel to go through the process?
I really didn’t experience the court system, but the information I got
from Luke. The other side had big power; whatever we say there
29.
See SHEARER, supra note 6, at 103 (referring to the Northwest Arctic Native
Association, which was created by the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement, and focuses its efforts on
tribal economic growth).
750
[Vol. 15
was not enough power for us. We were powerless. Luke tried his
best. But there were too many Alaskan people; therefore we were
powerless to do what we wanted. They were in it for the money.
We were just trying to make sure we have good drinking water, that
the fish were safe.
[MS] Would you ever want to live somewhere else?
[A] Maybe. Every time I go out of Kivalina I miss home. Kivalina
is my hometown; my parents lived in nearby Alaskan Native
Village Point Hope for a while and came back home. And I was
happy about their coming home. They could live up further north
but they keep coming back. Kivalina is my hometown.
[MS] What makes living in Kivalina so special for you?
[A] The trout! The trout was the best. It was the best food in my
life. The trout that spawn in our rivers makes it special.
It’s not all about the fish. Also the caribou, the moose, the fur, the
wolverines, the foxes, the chickens we had, there was so much to
do here in Kivalina, so much to hunt. Even ducks, you know, every
season was good about Kivalina, and we have four seasons. You
could hunt, didn’t have to buy things out of the store, the country,
being busy every day.
That’s what is so special, the food we got out of our land instead of
store-bought. It was all about what the Creator gave us to live with
and have to enjoy. Every season that we were able to catch and
enjoy and put away for the winter.
That’s what was good about Kivalina. Do your own thing. No law.
No hunting license. The freedom that we had and enjoying it. The
best thing about freedom, our elders were telling us about respect.
Respect the animals that you catch. Don’t overdo your catch. Limit
yourself. Get what you need for our people. Listening to our elders,
they are a wise people, that’s all what made life good.
[MS] What’s your hope for Kivalina’s future?
2014]
751 [A] I don’t know how to answer that. The weather change has
become real for us; I don’t know what the weather will do for us.
The more you worship our Creator, the more good things will come
to you. It’s all up to Him. I wish it could be better, I do not know. I
know we have a future somewhere. Here on the Earth we can do
our best. And that’s all we can live with.
Andrew’s story highlights Kivalina residents’ resiliency and ability to
live their truth despite profoundly negative climate impacts. Day in and day
out for decades, with virtually no assistance from the outside world,
residents discover and implement local solutions to the various impacts of
climate change that work for their community.
As droughts, storms, wildfires, and unprecedented snowfalls become
more frequent, with the changing climate around the world, the lessons of
Kivalina’s resilience and ingenuity are essential in building solutions from
the ground up. The global problem of climate change requires solutions,
both local and international, to be firmly rooted in the leadership of
impacted communities.
Kivalina and climate refugee communities like it are also entitled and
need the support—financial, technical, legal—of state, federal,
international, and private entities as of yesterday. At any point one strong
storm could flood all of Kivalina and yet state and federal authorities
continue to idly watch. The residents of Kivalina are not responsible for the
industrial emissions causing and exacerbating the climate impacts they face,
but yet every branch of government refuses to hold anyone accountable or
offer any meaningful assistance for their survival.
The majority of residents in Kivalina are young people 30 and they
deserve an opportunity to live in their Arctic home. When I was playing tag
in the McQueen school gymnasium in Kivalina with three elementary
school students last May, I asked them what was their favorite color. The
three youth looked at me with shock and scoffed at me for asking such an
apparently obvious question in the Alaskan Arctic. In unison they
answered, “white.”
The fight against climate change is really a fight for one’s home, one’s
dignity and one’s people—communities like Kivalina are leading the way.
30.
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 2010 U.S. Census, available at
http://www2.census.gov/census_2010/03-Demographic_Profile/Alaska/ (evidencing the majority of
Kivalina’s populace is under age thirty, with a median age of twenty-one).
WARM WORLD, COLD RECEPTION: CLIMATE CHANGE,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FORCED MIGRATION
Kate Jastram*
‘No migration’ is not an option in the context of future
environmental change: migration will continue to occur in the
future and can either be well managed and regular, or, if efforts
are made to prevent it, unmanaged, unplanned and forced.1
Introduction............................................................................................... 752
I. The Basic Legal Framework for Cross-Border Movements of People . 754
II. Movements Within State Boundaries................................................... 760
III. Legal Tools Available to U.S. Policymakers in Dealing with Climate
Refugees.................................................................................................... 762
INTRODUCTION
Forced migration is an important but often overlooked element in
discussions of climate change and national security. At the global level,
there are alarming estimates of the potential scope of forced migration due
to climate change.2 This will affect hundreds of millions of people, numbers
that are difficult to imagine, much less devise policy for. 3 However,
complacency threatens to return upon recalling that most will move only
*
Lecturer in Residence and Faculty Co-Director, The Honorable G. William & Ariadna
Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law, Berkeley Law School, University of California. My
thanks to Tuong-Vi Faber for research assistance, and to the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law for
an excellent symposium.
1.
JOHN BEDDINGTON, MIGRATION AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE FUTURE
CHALLENGES
AND
OPPORTUNITIES
13
(2011),
available
at
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/11-1115-migration-and-global-environmentalchange-summary.pdf.
2.
Maxine Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized
Nationhood and the Post-Climate Era, 2 CLIMATE L. 345, 348 (2011), available at
https://www.law.hawaii.edu/sites/www.law.hawaii.edu/files/content/coliver/345-374%20Burkett.pdf.
3.
Id.
2014]
Warm World, Cold Reception
753 within their own country and not internationally. Neither panic nor calm is
yet warranted. Looking closer to home, it is instructive to consider current
United States (“U.S.”) policy toward unwanted migrants from the South
and envision the challenges of scaling up this approach in the context of
accelerating climate change.
U.S. national security concerns are already deeply embedded in our
laws and policies regarding refugees and migrants. We use our national
security apparatus, specifically, the U.S. Coast Guard, to patrol the
Caribbean and to interdict and summarily return Haitians, Cubans, and
other asylum seekers with little (in the case of Cubans) or no (in the case of
Haitians) inquiry as to whether they are actually at risk of persecution or
torture.4 The Supreme Court approved this practice in 1981,5 which has
been otherwise condemned by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”),6 scholars,7 and advocates as a
violation of our treaty obligations to protect refugees under the 1967
Refugee Protocol. The interdiction program operates outside the public eye;
there is little public awareness and even less public criticism of it. However,
to the extent that climate change will strengthen drivers of conflict and
migration, we need to be prepared to discuss if and how we will want our
military more involved in keeping more people out of the U.S. While
refugee and human rights law frame the issue as threats to people from
climate change, a national security perspective requires us to face the
uncomfortable question of threats from people due to climate change.
There is a need to identify responses to climate change-related forced
migration that are attuned to national security concerns as well as to the
human rights of the displaced themselves. In attempting this balance, the
paper proceeds in three parts. Section one sketches the basic international
legal framework for the cross-border movements of people, in order to
contextualize the challenges involved in expanding this framework to
4.
Alien
Migrant
Interdiction,
U.S.
COAST
GUARD,
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp (last visited May 22, 2014). See also Kate Jastram,
The Kids before Khadr: Haitian Refugee Children on Guantanamo, 11 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 81, 84
(2012) (tracing the use of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility to house “illegal combatants” back to
its origins as a site to detain refugees); Sonia R. Farber, Forgotten at Guantanamo: The Boumediene
Decision and Its Implications for Refugees at the Base under the Obama Administration, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 989, 990 (2010) (arguing that the Boumediene decision should apply to refugees detained at
Guantanamo).
5.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188–89 (1993).
6.
Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, No. 92–344 (2nd Cir. July
29, 1992).
7.
See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment, 6 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 103, 105 (1994) (arguing that U.S. judicial approval of the practice of returning refugees to
persecution is a domestic decision, not valid under international law).
754
[Vol. 15
include those displaced by climate change. Section two shifts the focus to
internally displaced persons, a fast evolving area of the law and a potential
point of entry for nations such as the U.S. that wish to assist people closer
to their own homes. Section three discusses the international and domestic
law tools available to U.S. policymakers in planning for and responding to
climate refugees.8
I. THE BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENTS OF
PEOPLE
“[A] more coherent and consistent approach at the international level
[is needed] to meet the protection needs of people displaced” externally due
to sudden-onset disasters.9
The international legal and institutional framework for cross-border
movements of people does not include those fleeing only from the effects of
climate change.10 A brief sketch of this framework follows in order to
understand its limitations and possibilities, including its provisions for
national security concerns, as well as to provide context for efforts to
address cross-border displacement due to sudden and slow-onset disasters.
People fleeing from persecution across national borders are covered by
a robust protection regime.11 However, this protection has strictly limited
terms. 12 States obligate themselves to protect only certain, specifically
defined people at risk, with the result that many forced migrants do not
meet the refugee definition and, therefore, international law does not cover
them.13 Perhaps the most counterintuitive example of a person who is not
considered a refugee under international law is someone fleeing from armed
conflict.14
8.
A note on terminology: scholars and practitioners are well aware there are not agreed
terms for climate change-related forced migration or the forced migrants themselves, which reflects the
migrants’ lack of legal status, the lack of certainty as to causation, and perhaps also a lack of political
will to identify them as such. For the sake of brevity, and with an intention to include the many
situations that might be encompassed, I will refer simply to climate refugees.
9.
THE NANSEN CONFERENCE, NANSEN PRINCIPLES (2011), available at
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/nansen_prinsipper.pdf.
10.
See Walter Kälin, From the Nansen Principles to the Nansen Initiative, 41 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 48, 49 (2012) (discussing the need to take regional and international action to protect
refugees from climate-related disasters).
11.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3rd. ed.,
2007.
12.
See id. at 201 (noting the basic rights of refugees under current international treaties
and laws).
13.
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Status of Refugees] (setting forth the definition of refugee).
14.
VANESSA HOLZER, 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE
FLEEING ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER SITUATIONS OF VIOLENCE 5 (2012).
2014]
755 Given the limited scope of protection for forced migrants in
international law, it is generally acknowledged that neither refugee law nor
human rights law covers people moving across borders to escape the effects
of climate change, thus States are not required to allow these individuals
entry nor are they prevented from expelling them.15 This is because the
harm these people fear is not (directly) caused by human actors, and, in the
case of refugee law, the harm is generalized and not targeted at certain
people for reasons of their religion, ethnicity, or other protected
characteristics.
In recognition of the need to develop new responses to climate
refugees, States meeting at the 2010 Cancun Climate Change Conference
invited all States Parties to enhance action on adaptation by undertaking
“measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with
regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned
relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international
levels.”16 Walter Kälin argues that the significance of this provision lies
first in its explicit recognition of the humanitarian consequences of forced
migration due to climate change; second, in its expectation that
displacement issues will become part of national adaptation plans; and
third, in its inclusion of cross-border and not just internal displacement on
the international agenda.17
The cornerstone of the refugee regime is the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.18 These treaties enjoy
widespread adherence, with 147 States Party19 to one or both instruments,
including the United States.20 The fundamental undertaking assumed by
States Party is the duty of non-refoulement, 21 or non-return, owed to
persons with a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.22 Such individuals, whether arriving singly or in groups, may not
be sent back to the frontiers of territories where their life or freedom would
15.
Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (2012).
16.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. on its 16th Sess., Nov. 29–Dec.
10, 2010, ¶ 14(f), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011).
17.
Kälin, supra note 10, at 48–49.
18.
The 1967 Protocol removes the geographic and temporal limitations included in the
1951 Convention, making it a truly universal and inclusive system of protection for those fleeing
persecution. The 1967 Protocol also incorporates all the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention,
so while many States have chosen to ratify both instruments it is actually necessary to ratify only the
1967 Protocol.
19.
This is the number of States Party as of Apr. 1, 2011.
20.
The United States has ratified only the 1967 Protocol.
21.
See Status of Refugees, supra note 13, at art. 33(1) (setting forth the duty of nonrefoulment).
22.
Id. at art. 1A(2) (setting forth the definition of refugee).
756
[Vol. 15
be threatened.23 In addition, States Party to the Convention or Protocol have
undertaken to cooperate with UNCHR and to facilitate its duty of
supervising these instruments.24
The obligation of non-refoulement is also a rule of customary
international law, binding even States that are not party to the Convention
or Protocol.25 UNHCR has an independent mandate based on its Statute of
Office to work with all UN Member States.26
National security concerns are incorporated into international refugee
law in two ways. First, war criminals and common criminals are not
included in the Convention’s remit even if they otherwise fit the wellfounded fear of persecution definition.27 Second, a country of asylum may
withdraw the protection of non-refoulement to return a refugee who poses a
danger to its national security.28 The national security concerns associated
with forced migration resulting from climate change are of a different
character, dealing with the quantity and not the quality of those seeking
refuge.29
The 1951 Refugee Convention arose from a desire to structure State
cooperation in solving the enormous tragedy of persons displaced in Europe
by the Second World War.30 In the nearly sixty-five years since then, it has
become evident that the Convention definition must be interpreted in a
manner responsive to broader developments in international law,
particularly the growth of international human rights law. As an example of
evolving interpretations of the term “refugee,” many States now recognize
that various forms of gender-based violence, such as rape, female genital
mutilation, and forced sterilization, properly fall within the notion of
persecution.31
23.
Id. at art. 33(1).
24.
Id. at art. 35(1).
25.
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of
Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INT’L LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL
CONSULTATION ON INT’L PROTECTION 87, 142 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/470a33af0.pdf.
26.
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A.
Res. 428 (V), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/428(V) (Dec. 14, 1950).
27.
Status of Refugees, supra note 13, at art. 1(F).
28.
Id. at art. 33(2).
29.
OLI BROWN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION: OBSERVATIONS,
PROJECTIONS
AND
IMPLICATIONS
5,
24
(2007–2008),
available
at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/climate_forced_migration.pdf.
30.
ANTÓNIO GUTERRES, U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL, 1 (2011).
31.
Efrat Arbel, Catherine Dauvergne, and Jenni Millbank (eds.), Gender in Refugee Law:
From the Margins to the Centre (2014).
2014]
757 From the perspective of refugee law, the problem with climate change
is causality. The Refugee Convention requires that there be a nexus
between the harm feared and one of the protected grounds, such as
religion.32 Even if one argued that the results of climate change amount to
persecution, it would be nearly impossible to show that the actions that
resulted in climate change were undertaken with the motivation of causing
harm to a person or group because of their protected characteristic.
It has also become clear that States additionally benefit from providing
a legal framework for cross-border movements of people who do not, even
under a generous reading, fit within the confines of the 1951 Convention
definition. To demonstrate this pragmatism, one can point to a variety of
legal approaches taken by States to widen UNHCR’s mandate. The United
Nations has on many occasions broadened the scope of its competence on
an ad hoc basis to include people fleeing from armed conflict and other
violations of human rights as well as to protect people displaced in their
home country for refugee-like reasons;33 it has done so in order to deploy
the resources of UNHCR, a field-based organization with offices in 125
countries.34 In addition, States have called upon UNHCR, with its extensive
logistical capacity and expertise, to be among the first responders to natural
disasters, including the Asian tsunami in 2005.35
States in several regions of the world have adopted more expansive
definitions of what it means to be a refugee and have thus obligated
themselves to protect a wider range of forced migrants.36 Although these
innovations were designed to provide protection to victims of armed
conflict, some of them could be interpreted to reach forced migration as a
result of climate change. African States led the way with the 1969
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
whose refugee definition includes those compelled to leave their country
32.
33.
GUTERRES, supra note 30, at 3.
SUSAN F. MARTIN, REVIEW OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK WHICH AFFECTS
MIGRATION, INCLUDING INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND CAPACITY, AND HOW IT IS AFFECTED BY
FUTURE
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
16–18
(2011),
available
at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121212135622/http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs
/migration/drivers/11-1183-dr13-review-legal-and-political-framework-affects-migration.pdf.
34.
Where We Work, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c206.html (last visited May 22, 2014).
35.
UNHCR Taking Rare Operational Role in Natural Disaster Response, OFF. OF THE
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Jan. 3, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/41d9772e4.html.
36.
See MICHAEL REED-HURTADO, CARTAGENA DECLARATION ON REFUGEES AND THE
PROTECTION OF PEOPLE FLEEING ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER SITUATIONS OF VIOLENCE IN LATIN
AMERICA 32 (2013), available at http://www.unhcr.org/51c800fe9.html (describing the need for broad
definitions of refugee).
758
[Vol. 15
owing to “events seriously disturbing public order.” 37 Many Latin
American States have expanded refugee definitions in their domestic
legislation, inspired by the non-binding Cartagena Declaration of 1984,
which includes as refugees people who flee their country due to “massive
violation[s] of human rights and other circumstances that seriously disturb
public order”.38 The European Union has defined a category of persons who
might benefit from a subsidiary, lesser form of protection than that afforded
to refugees, but it is basically limited to victims of armed conflict and is not
likely to help those fleeing from the effects of climate change.39
While these legal developments are significant, they have not been
universally adopted. The U.S. does not recognize those fleeing from armed
conflict as refugees under its domestic law. 40 The limited reach of
protection for victims of armed conflict bears consideration, not only as a
testament to the difficulty of amending the 1951 Refugee Convention
definition, but also because, to the extent that climate change is seen as a
precursor or contributor to armed conflict, there is still not an international
protection regime in place for those who must flee from what might be
considered as a secondary effect of climate change.
In addition to the international refugee law regime and its various
regional expansions, human rights law provides some forced migrants with
protection from return.41 However, these provisions are even less likely to
encompass forced migration related to climate change. Certain human
rights treaties, such as the Convention against Torture, specifically include
the obligation of non-refoulement for those protected by their terms,42 while
other treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, have been interpreted to encompass this protection.43 Arguments in
favor of climate refugees based on the non-refoulement provisions of
human rights treaties are difficult to make. The Convention against Torture,
for example, requires that torture be inflicted intentionally by or with the
37.
AU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa art. I(2),
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/refugee-convention/.
38.
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees art. III(3), Nov. 22, 1984. In a study of seventeen
Latin American States, seven had directly imported the Cartagena definition, while six used slightly
different wording. Reed-Hurtado, supra note 36, at 16, 29.
39.
Council Directive 2011/95, art. 15(b), 18. 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9 (EU) presents the only
other possibility, defining as serious harm “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
40.
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (omitting
people fleeing their country due to armed conflict under the definition of refugee).
41.
Jane McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (2007).
42.
U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 3(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
43.
See U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6–8, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (declaring the inherent human right to life and to be free from torture and slavery).
2014]
759 consent or acquiescence of government officials for certain specified
reasons.44
Given the limitations of existing law, there have been a number of
proposals to amend the Refugee Convention or to draft a new international
treaty. The 2008 National Intelligence Assessment predicts that “to insert a
sense of urgency” into the debate and pressure countries and international
institutions, environmental and human rights groups “may press to broaden
the definition of ‘refugee’ to include environment or climate migrants.”45
This approach was rejected as inappropriate in the U.K.’s Foresight:
Migration and Global Environmental Change.46 Jane McAdam agrees that
focusing on a new multilateral treaty may not present the most appropriate
tool to deal with climate change displacement. Among other concerns, she
notes that defining a “climate refugee” category may lead to a hardening of
the concept, while simultaneously defining groups as “in” or “out” of
need.47 McAdam instead suggests thinking in terms of crisis migration,
which allows for a broader perspective on appropriate legal and policy
responses.48
Kälin also notes the lack of political will.49 While the 2010 Cancun
Outcome Agreement, discussed above, contains encouraging language on
adaptation, States failed to follow up and make a commitment to address
the issue of cross-border climate refugees at the next major meeting of
UNHCR in December 2011.50 In response, a group of States led by Norway
and Switzerland have announced the Nansen Initiative, a state-owned
consultative process outside the U.N., to build consensus on how best to
address cross-border displacement in the context of both sudden and slowonset disasters, not only climate-related, but geophysical in nature.51 Based
on the Nansen Principles, the Nansen Initiative intends to present a
Protection Agenda in 2015. 52
44.
U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
45.
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBAL WARMING, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE TO 2030, 16
(2008) [hereinafter HOUSE COMMITTEES] (statement of Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council).
46.
BEDDINGTON, supra note 1, at 1, 17.
47.
SUSAN MARTIN ET AL., MIGRATION AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES (2014).
48.
Id.
49.
Kälin, supra note 10, at 49.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, TOWARDS A PROTECTION AGENDA FOR DISASTER-INDUCED
CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT 1 (2013).
760
[Vol. 15
II. MOVEMENTS WITHIN STATE BOUNDARIES
It is generally assumed that most people forced to move due to climate
change will not cross an international border, but will become displaced
internally within their own country. The prevalence of internal over
external displacement is true even in refugee-like situations when the
danger comes from a human actor, whether government or non-state.
Presumably, it is even more likely when the danger is from environmental
changes, and the government should be able to help or accept help from the
international community.
Although internally displaced persons are often forced to flee for the
same reasons as refugees, the fact that they do not cross an international
border means that the Refugee Convention and Protocol are not applicable.
Furthermore, the UNHCR does not take responsibility for displaced persons
unless specifically authorized to do so.53 By the late 1980s, refugee and
human rights advocates, including Norway and other sympathetic
governments, had moved the issue of climate refugees forward in the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council), latching
on to the momentum then building for a mechanism to address the problems
of internally displaced persons.54
The Commission on Human Rights responded in 1992 by creating the
mandate of the Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced
Persons.55 The first holder of the post, Francis Deng, drafted the 1998
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 56 Although internally
displaced persons had been analogized to refugees, the description
contained in the Guiding Principles also included people forced to flee as a
result of natural disasters, a striking departure from the refugee definition.57
53.
54.
Status of Refugees, supra note 13, at 1(A)(2); GUTERRES, supra note 30, at 3.
ROBERTA COHEN, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 3, 9 (2013).
55.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Internally Displaced Persons, G.A. Res. 1992/73,
U.N. Doc. 4/RES/1992/73 (Mar. 5, 1992), available at http://www.refworld.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f0e71c (last visited May 22, 2014). The name of the mandate was
changed in 2004 to the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally
Displaced Persons; it was changed again in 2010 to the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Introduction to the
Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Dr.
Chaloka Beyani, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/IDPersons/Pages/Mandate.aspx (last visited May 22,
2014).
56.
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998), available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G98/104/93/PDF/G9810493.pdf?OpenElement.
57.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
ON
INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT
1
(1998),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html.
2014]
761 The Guiding Principles are recognized in the Nansen Principles as a “sound
legal framework to address protection concerns arising from climate- and
other environmentally-related displacement.” 58 While the Guiding
Principles have not yet given rise to an international treaty or matured into
customary international law, they continue grow in acceptance and
influence, particularly in Africa.59
At the sub-regional level, the eleven states in the Great Lakes Region
have included the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in their
2006 Great Lakes Pact on Security, Stability and Development.60 The Pact
has ten protocols, including one on internally displaced persons.61 The
Great Lakes Pact is the first multilateral instrument to commit member
States to implementing the Guiding Principles, including through adopting
the description of internally displaced persons in the Guiding Principles as a
definition in their domestic legislation.62 The Annex to the Great Lakes
Protocol on Internally Displaced Persons includes the full text of the
Guiding Principles as well as model legislation.63
At the regional level, the African Union has taken the lead on internal
displacement, as it did with refugees. 64 It expanded upon the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement to form a continent-wide treaty, the
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa (“Kampala Convention”), which entered into
force in December 2012 and has now been ratified by twenty-two of the
African Union’s fifty-four member states.65 An explicit reference to climate
change-related forced migration is one example of how the Kampala
Convention has advanced the normative framework for addressing internal
displacement. Article 5(4) of the Kampala Convention obliges States to
protect and assist those who have been internally displaced due to "natural
58.
59.
THE NANSEN CONFERENCE, supra note 9.
WALTER KÄLIN, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT ANNOTATIONS VII
(2008).
60.
THE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR. AND THE INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS
INITIATIVE, THE GREAT LAKES PACT AND THE RIGHTS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE: A GUIDE FOR CIVIL
SOCIETY 4 (2008).
61.
Id. at 12.
62.
Int’l Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Pact on Security, Stability and
Development in the Great Lakes Region art. 12, Dec. 15, 2006.
63.
Int’l Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Protocol on the Protection and Assistance
to Internally Displaced Persons, Annex, Nov. 30. 2006.
64.
See African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), Oct. 22, 2009 (stating concern for the suffering and
vulnerability of internally displaced persons).
65.
OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols & Charters, http://www.au.int/en/treaties
(last visited May 29, 2014).
762
[Vol. 15
or human made disasters, including climate change." 66 The Kampala
Convention provides a natural point of entry for donor states and others
wishing to strengthen the ability of African States to prevent and respond to
climate-related displacement.
III. LEGAL TOOLS AVAILABLE TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS IN DEALING WITH
CLIMATE REFUGEES
The United States will need to anticipate and plan for growing
immigration pressures. Although sea level rise is probably a slow
and long-term development, extreme weather events and growing
evidence of inundation will motivate many to move sooner rather
than later. Almost one-fourth of the countries with the greatest
percentage of population in low-elevation coastal zones are in the
Caribbean, so assisting these populations will be an imminent
task.67
This paper uses a broad definition for national security, which is
consistent with that employed in the National Intelligence Assessment. The
Statement for the Record explained:
We first considered if the effects would directly impact the US
homeland, a US economic partner, or a US ally. We also focused
on the potential for humanitarian disaster, such that the response
would consume US resources. We then considered if the result
would degrade or enhance one of the elements of national power
(Geopolitical, Military, Economic, or Social Cohesion), and if the
degradation or enhancement, even if temporary, would be
significant. 68
Given such an expansive view of national security, it is not surprising
that the U.S. has used its immigration system as a critical component of
maintaining its security posture. While the U.S. has gone too far in the
direction of saying ‘no’ to immigration, particularly since 2001, there are,
nevertheless, possibilities in the law for dealing more constructively and
creatively with forced migrants, including climate refugees.
66.
67.
68.
Kampala Convention, art. 5(4).
HOUSE COMMITTEES, supra note 45, at 16.
Id. at 3.
2014]
763 The United States is a leader in the international refugee regime, both
as the largest single donor to UNHCR69 and by virtue of its example. The
Refugee Act of 1980 was designed to incorporate the provisions of the 1967
Protocol into the Immigration and Nationality Act. 70 The Protocol’s
definition of a refugee and its duty of non-refoulement are mirrored in U.S.
law.71 For asylum seekers at the border or within the interior, there is an
elaborate, if under-resourced, system for identifying refugees and extending
them protection, which is implemented by the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice, and the federal appellate courts. 72
Protecting people from return to a country where they face a substantial risk
of torture is also incorporated into this process pursuant to U.S. treaty
obligations under the Convention against Torture.73
In 1990, the United States created a special immigration category
known as Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) for foreign nationals in the
U.S. who were otherwise deportable, but who could not be returned to their
country of origin for certain specified reasons. 74 Temporary Protected
Status cannot be claimed by an individual in the same way that asylum
can.75 Instead, the Secretary of Homeland Security designates a country
affected by ongoing internal armed conflict or one of the other statutory
triggers. 76 The origins of TPS were the unsuccessful attempts to win
refugee status for large numbers of Salvadorans who fled their country’s
civil war in the 1980s.77 So, while the U.S. has recognized that the refugee
definition found in international and domestic law does not apply to those
fleeing armed conflict, the solution in the U.S. has been the creation of a
discretionary remedy with fewer benefits and less security than the asylum
69.
Charity Tooze, The UN Refugee Agency Thanks the United States for Generous
Humanitarian
Aid,
UNHCR,
http://www.unrefugees.org/site/c.lfIQKSOwFqG/b.8470025/k.45EC/The_UN_refugee_agency_thanks_t
he_United_States_for_generous_humanitarian_aid.htm (last visited May 22, 2014).
70.
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987).
71.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
72.
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2009)
(outlining conditions for granting asylum).
73.
See U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 3(1)–(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (“No State Party
shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
74.
Temporary Protected Status,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-departure/temporaryprotected-status (last visited May 22, 2014).
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Teresa
Castellanos,
KIN–El
Salvador,
IMMIGRANTINFO.ORG,
http://www.immigrantinfo.org/kin/elsalvador.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
764
[Vol. 15
status afforded to refugees meeting the Protocol definition.78 Furthermore, it
is important to note that TPS applies only to nationals of a given country
who are already in the U.S. when the designation is made.79 It does not
allow for the entry of subsequent arrivals from the stricken country.80
Nevertheless, Temporary Protected Status introduced an innovative
benefit, as it can also be used to suspend the return of people whose country
has suffered a natural disaster.81 The Immigration and Nationality Act lists
as examples “an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other
environmental disaster resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption
of living conditions in the area affected.”82 Of the seventeen countries that
have been designated for TPS since 1990, five have made the list for
environmental reasons, three countries for geophysical phenomena such as
earthquakes and volcanic eruption and two countries for a devastating
hurricane. 83 Temporary Protected Status is of limited value since it does
not provide protection for people fleeing the effects of climate change
unless they already happen to be in the U.S. in another immigration status
or without any legal status at all.84 Still, it is an underutilized category that
could be made more responsive to the needs of climate refugees.
A third provision of U.S. law addressed to cross-border movements of
forced migrants is the “overseas” refugee program, which allows up to
70,000 people per year to enter the U.S. already recognized as refugees so
they do not need to go through our domestic asylum adjudication process.85
The overseas refugee program, also known as the refugee resettlement
program, is based on U.S. legislation and is not required by the Refugee
Convention or Protocol.86 It stems instead from a humanitarian commitment
to assist the individual refugees chosen for entry as well as to acknowledge
that countries of first asylum, most of them in the global South, bear the
78.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 74.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
83.
See The U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Temporary Protected Status Notices,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/fedreg/tpsnet.html#tpscount, (last visited May 22, 2014) (providing links
to the Temporary Protection Status Notices for El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Montserrat, the five countries that have been designated for Temporary Protection Status since 1990 for
environmental reasons).
84.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, supra note 74.
85.
FY12 Refugee Admissions Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/206319.htm.
86.
History of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, REFUGEE COUNCIL USA,
http://www.rcusa.org/?page=history (last visited May 22, 2014).
2014]
765 brunt of the world’s refugee problem.87 The number of refugees that the
U.S. takes in from any given country of first asylum is usually not enough
to make a meaningful contribution to actually lifting the burden, but it
sends a strong political message internationally and reinforces U.S.
leadership in refugee protection.88
Most of the refugees in the overseas program are chosen from camps in
countries of first asylum, although some at-risk individuals are selected
while still in their country of origin.89 In either case, under current law, they
need to meet the essential elements of the refugee definition set forth in
U.S. and international law.90 The overseas refugee program is potentially a
valuable policy tool for protecting people displaced by climate change.
There is no reason why the program could not be re-purposed to allow the
entry of people who have crossed a border for climate-related reasons, or
indeed, people who are internally displaced for such reasons. The U.S. is
free to admit whomever it likes under its humanitarian immigration
categories, and, if the political will can be mustered, at least some of those
forced to flee as a result of climate change could find a home in the United
States.91
Given our current political paralysis on both immigration reform and
climate change, this or any other climate refugee-positive proposal may
seem unrealistic.92 However, pragmatic national security arguments may be
more persuasive than ones based on human rights. If the U.S. could make
such a gesture, it would send an important international message about
thinking broadly and creatively about national security, climate change, and
forced migration.
87.
Humanitarian, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. www.uscis.gov/humanitarian (last
visited May 22, 2014).
88.
Erin Patrick, U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Jun. 1,
2004), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-refugee-resettlement-program.
89.
Id.
90.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 6
(Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/219137.pdf. 91.
PAIGE PIPER-BACH & BRIAN PREST, IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
UPDATE
5–6
(Christine
Bogusz
et
al.
eds.,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/119xx/doc11959/12-03immigration_chartbook.pdf.
92.
See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 153738 (2009) (“American international environmental policy is typically driven
by utilitarian calculations about the national interest,” producing a “reluctance to act [that] is remarkably
powerful.”).
CLIMATE CHANGE, GENDER, AND RETHINKING MILITARY
OPERATIONS
Jody M. Prescott*
Introduction............................................................................................... 767
I. Gender-Differentiated Impacts of Climate Change............................... 769
A. Gender vs. Sex ................................................................................. 769
B. Environmental Effects of Climate Change ...................................... 771
C. Human Consequences of Climate Change....................................... 772
D. Gender Effects of Climate Change .................................................. 774
E. Summary .......................................................................................... 777
II. U.S. Military Doctrine and Interacting with the People....................... 777
A. Counterinsurgency Operations ........................................................ 778
B. Stability Operations ......................................................................... 779
C. Peace Operations.............................................................................. 783
D. Civil-Military Operations ................................................................ 783
1. The U.S. Perspective .................................................................... 784
2. A NATO Perspective ................................................................... 787
E. Summary .......................................................................................... 789
III. Military-Civilian Interaction Units ..................................................... 790
A. Provincial Reconstruction Teams .................................................... 790
B. Agriculture Development Teams ..................................................... 791
IV. ADTs and a Gendered Approach to Sustainability............................. 794
A. Female Engagement Teams and Cultural Support Teams............... 794
B. ADTs, FETs, and Women’s Initiative Training Teams ................... 797
C. Summary .......................................................................................... 800
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 800
*
Senior Fellow, West Point Center for the Rule of Law; Adjunct Professor, Department
of Political Science, University of Vermont. This article does not reflect the opinion of any U.S.
government organization.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 767 INTRODUCTION
The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically since the end
of the Cold War in the late 1980’s. General Sir Rupert Smith has coined the
phrase “war amongst the people” to describe an evolving aspect of armed
conflict in which the will of the civilian population has become both the
end object of military operations and the environment within which these
operations are conducted.1 Traditionally, industrial wars between blocs of
people, such as the two World Wars, were fought and decided primarily
during the course of set-piece battles pitting the armed forces of
technologically advanced nation-states against each other. 2 In contrast,
modern war is often characterized by efforts of the contending parties to
achieve success through influencing the attitudes of the people, and by a
lack of finality to the conflict because military operations often tend to not
be decisive of the larger confrontation between warring parties.3 Iraq is an
example of this. In the second Gulf War, the U.S. and its allies quickly
defeated Saddam Hussein’s military forces in a series of sharp, force-onforce battles. 4 Once Hussein’s regime collapsed, however, the resulting
chaos spawned a sectarian conflict that caught U.S.-led forces in the middle
of armed conflict both against the occupation and between different
religious and ethnic groups—a sectarian conflict that continues to smolder a
decade after the U.S. invasion.5
Importantly, in many areas around the world the living conditions for
the populace appear to be changing as well. In terms of habitation, the
continuing increase in population in lesser-developed nations is often
accompanied by a rapid increase in urbanization, and the growth of the
mega-city.6 Further, the explosive growth of the Internet and the leverage
afforded through use of social media have significantly impacted the
manner in which people exchange information and organize their activities
vis-à-vis conflict, as demonstrated recently by the uprisings in many Arab
1.
Toni Pfanner, Interview with General Sir Rupert Smith, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 719,
719–22 (2006).
2.
Id. at 720–22.
3.
Id. at 722–23.
4.
See, e.g., EVAN WRIGHT, GENERATION KILL: DEVIL DOGS, ICEMAN, CAPTAIN
AMERICA, AND THE NEW FACE OF AMERICAN WAR (2004) (documenting the initial invasion of Iraq
from the perspective of U.S. Marines).
5.
Quentin Somerville, Iraq Sectarian Conflict Creates Misery, BBC (Dec. 22, 2013 7:53
GMT), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25483436.
6.
THE WORLD BANK, PLANNING, CONNECTING, & FINANCING CITIES—NOW:
PRIORITIES
FOR
CITY
LEADERS
1
(2013),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSDNET/Resources/Urbanization-Planning-ConnectingFinancing-2013.pdf.
768
[Vol. 15
countries during the Arab Spring.7 Finally, and most importantly for this
article, the actual environments in many areas appear to be changing as the
prevailing climates change.
The U.S. military has recognized the operational significance of
climate change upon its activities and operations, and has concluded that it
has the potential to “spark or exacerbate future conflicts.” 8 The U.S.
Department of Defense (“DoD”) has noted that in particular, “climate
change could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world,
contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further
weakening of fragile governments,” as well as to the scarcity of food and
water, the spread of disease, and mass migration.9 Accordingly, DoD has
decided upon a two-pronged approach to deal with these new realities: first,
by adapting military installations and capabilities to withstand the physical
effects of climate change; and second, by “[w]orking closely with relevant
U.S. departments and agencies” to undertake “environmental security
cooperative initiatives with foreign militaries that represent a nonthreatening way of building trust, sharing best practices on installations
management and operations, and developing response capacity.” 10 This
approach, while positive in general, is incomplete because it does not
explicitly address the importance of the environment and gender in the U.S.
military’s interface with local civilian populations in foreign countries as a
cost-effective and efficient means to address climate change and promote
stability.
The linkages between climate change, gender, and military operations
are not necessarily immediately obvious. This article argues, however, that
a particular type of unit, the Agricultural Development Team (“ADT”),
developed and deployed to Afghanistan since 2007, has not only
demonstrated the capability to address the gender-differentiated, climate
change-related sources of insecurity at the tactical level, but that it could
7.
Natana J. DeLong-Bas, The New Social Media and the Arab Spring, OXFORD ISLAMIC
STUDIES ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/Public/focus/essay0611_social_media.html
8.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT iv (Feb. 2010)
[hereinafter 2010 QDR]. One study asserts that at least forty percent of intrastate conflicts since 1950
have been linked to natural resource disputes, and that at least eighteen “violent conflicts” have been
exacerbated by natural resource exploitation issues since 1990. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, FROM
CONFLICT TO PEACEBUILDING: THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (2009),
available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/pcdmb_policy_01.pdf.
9.
2010 QDR, supra note 8, at 85.
10.
Id. This is perhaps a complement to the current U.S. Army effort to create regionally
aligned brigades that will link units to specific areas around the world and help train host nation military
forces. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Army Hones Antiterror Strategy for Africa, in Kansas, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/world/africa/us-prepares-to-train-african-forces-to-fightterror.html?_r=0.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 769 also serve as a model to effectively factor the gender-differentiated impacts
of climate change across the broad spectrum of U.S. military operations. 11
To support this argument, this article will first explore the gender- and sexdifferentiated impacts of climate change upon populations, and why
women, particularly in developing countries, tend to be more vulnerable to
these impacts. Mindful of this operational reality for U.S. forces deployed
to these areas, this article reviews current U.S. military doctrine setting out
the means and methods by which the U.S. military interacts with local
civilian populations in foreign nations. In particular, this article further
assesses the significance of DoD’s failure to meaningfully address the
environment and gender in military-civilian operations. The third section of
this article explains the role of the ADT in the context of other types of
military-civilian interface units that the U.S. military has developed and
used in Afghanistan. In the fourth section, this article briefly describes
various ADT projects to highlight ways in which wartime missions can
mitigate climate change’s effects and enable vulnerable population cohorts
such as women to adapt to its effects. These descriptions are based in part
upon interviews with National Guard officers that recently led different
ADTs in Afghanistan. In conclusion, more fully factoring the process of
climate change and the importance of its gender-differentiated impacts into
modern military operations would help create the conditions which could
lead to sustainable social and economic stability in countries challenged by
the effects of armed conflict and climate change. Such stability is crucial
for the reestablishment and growth of the rule of law, a cornerstone of U.S.
stability and reconstruction policy.
I. GENDER-DIFFERENTIATED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Gender vs. Sex
Before launching on an examination of the gender-differentiated
impacts of climate change, it is important to first consider certain
definitions that are relevant to this task. First, particularly as the
international community has become more engaged in seeking to eliminate
11.
Although the acronym has not changed, these teams were originally called
Agribusiness Development Teams. See U.S. Army Posture Statement, Information Papers: Agribusiness
Development
Team
(ADT),
U.S.
ARMY
(2008),
http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/other/ARNG_Agribusiness_Development_Team.html;
Alexander K. Stewart, U.S. Army Agriculture Development Teams, SCI. & DIPL., (Mar. 3, 2014),
available at http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2014/us-army-agriculture-development-teams.
770
[Vol. 15
discrimination against women and girls, an academic and institutional
understanding has developed that sex and gender are two different, albeit
often closely related, concepts. “Sex” “refers to the biological and
physiological characteristics that define men and women.”12 NATO has
defined “gender” in an international military context as:
the social attributes associated with being male and female learned
through socialisation and [which determines] a person’s position
and value in a given context. This means also the relationships
between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the
relations between women and those between men. These attributes,
opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are
learned through socialisation processes. Notably, gender does not
equate to woman.13
Consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women,
Peace and Security, 14 “gender mainstreaming” is a strategy to achieve
gender equality between women and men in an organization by ensuring
that activities and operations are planned and conducted recognizing the
gender differences between women and men, and how these differences
reflect in their different needs and circumstances.15 Gender mainstreaming,
and its resulting incorporation of a gender perspective across the breadth of
an organization’s functions, is not a term that appears to have gained any
discernible traction in the U.S. military yet, despite the U.S.’s commitment
as part of NATO to this process in its operations.16
Distinguishing between sex and gender is particularly important
when discussing data collection and analysis. Data disaggregated on the
12.
What Do We Mean by “Sex” and “Gender”?, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/gender/whatisgender/en/index.html (last visited Mary 12, 2014).
13.
ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION & SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS
EUR., BI-STRATEGIC COMMAND DIRECTIVE 40-1: INTEGRATING UNSCR 1325 AND GENDER
PERSPECTIVE INTO THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE
5
(2012),
available at
http://www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/2012/20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf.
14.
See S. C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/#resolution (recognizing the important role played by
women in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, and the need for greater protection of women
and girls in armed conflict).
15.
ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION & SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS
EUR., supra note 13, at 5.
16.
But see Ambassador Verveer Travels to Brussels To Meet With NATO on Women,
Peace,
and
Security,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Sept.
15,
2012),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/197788.htm (announcing that Ambassador Verveer was
accompanied by DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary Lietzau, formerly DoD’s lead implementer of the U.S.
National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security).
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 771 basis of sex, for example, will not likely provide a decent basis for
understanding the way gender roles play out in a particular population, but
can be very important in determining whether food distribution in relief
operations, for example, is flowing equally to women and men. 17 This
article is mindful of the difference between the two, and seeks to be as
precise as possible where the two concepts are clearly distinguishable. For
the most part, however, this article will focus on gender rather than sex in
discussing both the differentiated impacts of climate change and how
military doctrine and operations might be rethought to account for this
differentiation in a practical and effective way.
B. Environmental Effects of Climate Change
The effects of climate change upon the environment will vary
depending on location. As sea levels rise, and the frequency of more severe
storms grows, island nations and those countries with significant low-lying
coastal areas face an increasing threat of storm damage and flooding.18 For
inland areas, particularly those already experiencing aridity, extreme
weather events may come in the form of more severe droughts aggravated
by lessened and more variable precipitation, and increased wildfire risks.19
These factors could lead to increased desertification and increased stress on
natural areas, forests, and the wildlife dependent on these areas for their
existence. Changing precipitation patterns and increased average
temperatures could also foster the spread of debilitating diseases and pest
infestations into areas in which they had not previously been endemic.
Moreover, changes in snowmelt patterns in mountains and polar regions
could dramatically affect the amount of fresh water available for use in
these environments, as could increased intrusion of saltwater into coastal
aquifers.20
17.
Megan Loney, Sex and Age Disaggregated Data: Solution to Lack of Gender
Mainstreaming in Food Aid Project in Complex Emergencies, 3 PEACE & STABILITY OPERATIONS J.
ONLINE 27, 28–30 (2012), pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/journal/download.cfm?; Prisca Benelli et
al., Using Sex and Age Disaggregated Data to Improve Humanitarian Response in Emergencies, 20
GENDER & DEV. 219, 221 (2012) (“[O]nce [sex and age disaggregated data] are collected, it is important
to apply a gender and generational analysis to the data.”).
18.
IDA ARABSHAHI & CHASE RAINES, ASSOC. OF CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS, DEFENSE,
NATIONAL SECURITY & CLIMATE CHANGE: BUILDING RESILIENCE AND IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES
RELATED TO WATER, ENERGY AND EXTREME EVENTS 9 (2012), available at
http://www.accoonline.org/downloads/ACCO-CCLS-June2012-Report.pdf [hereinafter ACCO].
19.
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 15 (2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf
[hereinafter
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN].
20.
ACCO, supra note 18, at 8–9.
772
[Vol. 15
C. Human Consequences of Climate Change
The impact of climate change upon humans could be profound.
Certain areas are already experiencing longer growing seasons, which could
allow for greater agricultural productivity if water is consistently
available.21 Certain areas not currently practicable for human settlement or
economic activity, such as polar and sub-polar regions, could in fact
become milder and more consistently accessible.22 However, the impacts
upon the areas that humans currently inhabit, often in high numbers, could
be detrimental. Temporary and perhaps even long-term mass migrations of
people could occur as a result of flooding of low-lying coastal areas and
islands, in order to escape both the immediate effects of severe weather
events and the austere conditions that would likely follow in the wake of
large-scale infrastructure destruction. 23 Such migrations would likely
increase the transmission of diseases such as dysentery and HIV.24 Often,
low-lying coastal or marshy areas are already considered marginal for
human habitation, and as a result their inhabitants are often poor and less
likely to be able to have the resources to find adequate refuge and then
return and rebuild.25 Those who make their livings through fishing and
aquaculture could experience large reductions in productivity because
damaged marine ecosystems repair themselves at a slow rate.26
Precipitation variability, especially prolonged drought, will likely
have significant negative effects on both pastoral ways of life and farming.
The National Intelligence Council has estimated that by 2025, thirty-six
nations, home to perhaps 1.4 billion people, will be either water or cropland
stressed. 27 Forests will likely decline due to drought and agricultural
expansion, and land use may increase the occurrence of wildfires; both of
21.
Climate Change Affecting Growing Seasons, UPI (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2013/03/11/Climate-change-affecting-growing-seasons/UPI27241363036142/.
22.
Questions and Answers About Global Warming and Abrupt Climate Change,
WORLDWATCH INST., http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3949 (last visited May 22, 2014).
23.
ACCO, supra note 18, at 9 (“[h]igher sea levels will allow storm surges to do more
damage by affecting the frequency and duration of flooding, even if sea levels do not completely
submerge an area.”).
24.
LORENA AGUILAR ET AL., INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE & U. N. DEV.
PROGRAMME, TRAINING MANUAL ON GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE 86 (2009), available at
http://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/eng_version_web_final_1.pdf [hereinafter Training Manual].
25.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., GENDER, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH 18 (2011), available
at http://www.who.int/globalchange/GenderClimateChangeHealthfinal.pdf.
26.
Id. at 16.
27.
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD 51
(2008),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2025_Global_Trends_Final_
Report.pdf.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 773 these effects would impact communities that depend on livestock that graze
in woodlands and pastures. 28 Agriculturalists would face reduced crop
yields in the face of water scarcity and face potentially degraded soil
conditions as the frequency of severe weather events could bring flooding
and erosion.29 People who rely on natural areas for hunting and gathering
wild produce and medicinal plants would potentially find fewer and lesserquality resources over time as these areas too experience water stress.30
Large-scale malnutrition could result, and would decrease these
populations’ ability to fight off disease. Finally, rural families are often
dependent upon gathered wood for their energy needs, and drought will
almost certainly impact the growth and availability of this important
resource.31
Rural populations would not be the only ones to suffer. As previously
noted, poor urban populations living in marginal areas are also vulnerable
to extreme weather events, and to the destruction of essential and often
already-inadequate infrastructure.32 The lack of freshwater would severely
impact sanitation for city dwellers and heighten their susceptibility to
disease.33 Urban populations would also be vulnerable to higher inner-city
temperatures. 34 Further, as more rural people flee deteriorating
environments to seek work or assistance in cities, their relative lack of
education and marketable skills would likely confine them to menial and
potentially dangerous jobs, 35 and degrade family and community
cohesion.36
28.
POTSDAM INST. FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH AND CLIMATE ANALYTICS & THE
WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4° C WARMER WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED 50 (2012),
available
at
http://climatechange.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/Turn_Down_the_heat_Why_a_4_degree_centrigr
ade_warmer_world_must_be_avoided.pdf [hereinafter TURN DOWN THE HEAT].
29.
See Training Manual, supra note 24, at 192–93 (noting slope steepness coupled with
high and irregular water flow led to soil acidification, gully erosion, and lack of water infiltration into
the soil).
30.
Id. at 86.
31.
Id. at 159 (In Mali, for example, firewood and charcoal represent eighty percent of the
nation’s energy consumption.).
32.
TURN DOWN THE HEAT, supra note 28, at 34.
33.
Id. at 56.
34.
Id.
35.
Namrata Chindarkar, Gender and Climate Change-Induced Migration: Proposing a
Framework for Analysis,
ENVTL. RES. LETTERS,,
1,
5
(2012),
available at
http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/2/025601/pdf/1748-9326_7_2_025601.pdf.
36.
Id. at 3.
774
[Vol. 15
D. Gender Effects of Climate Change
Importantly (and this does not always appear to be appreciated in the
discussions of climate change’s effects) the impacts of climate change are
not uniform across a population in a given area. First, even in developed
countries, it is not just the poor who are disproportionately affected, but it is
poor women who bear the brunt of the impact. 37 For example, after
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, households headed by poor women were the
most likely to not return and rebuild, because they had been unable to
afford adequate home or renter’s insurance prior to the storm. 38 In
developing countries, gender and sex-related differences appear to be much
more pronounced.39
For rural women, three primary factors of gender-based vulnerability
to climate change are: unequal access to resources; unequal opportunities to
change or improve their livelihoods; and exclusion from decision-making.40
As to unequal access to resources, rural women ordinarily perform timeconsuming, “non-mechanized, labor-intensive, non-capital intensive
activities,” such as the many tasks associated with animal husbandry.41
Further, women are often responsible for drawing water for their families’
household use, 42 and gathering energy-producing biomass. 43 Finally,
although these activities are essential for a family’s subsistence, women are
generally not paid for doing these tasks.44 Although women may in fact be
the primary users of water and land in generating agricultural production
and maintaining their households, their social and economic inequality visà-vis men may mean that they have restricted access to these resources, and
are dependent upon men in some fashion to secure these resources for
them.45
37.
Training Manual, supra note 24, at 79.
38.
Chindarkar, supra note 35, at 5.
39.
Fatma Denton, Climate Change Vulnerability, Impacts, and Adaptation: Why Does
Gender Matter?, 10 GENDER & DEV. 10, 18 (2002).
40.
THE WORLD BANK, ADAPTATION TO A CHANGING CLIMATE IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES
279 (Dorte Verner ed. 2012) [hereinafter Verner].
41.
Id. at 281.
42.
Id.
43.
LYDIA MUCHIRI, PISCES, GENDER AND EQUITY IN BIOENERGY ACCESS AND
DELIVERY IN KENYA 5 (2008), available at http://practicalaction.org/docs/consulting/pisces/gender-andequity-in-bioenergy-kenya.pdf.
44.
Verner, supra note 40, at 282.
45.
Id. In Bangladesh, for example, gendered norms regarding asset control lead to “an
assumption that women in agriculture are concerned with subsistence only,” which reinforces
institutional and policy biases that “worsen[ ] women’s disadvantages in accessing markets, credit,
technology and services, and perpetuates the lack of recognition surrounding women’s role in farming.”
Emily Hillenbrand, Transforming Gender in Homestead Food Production, 18 GENDER & DEV. 411, 413
(2010).
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 775 These gender-differentiated roles regarding resource access and use
are related to the second driver of women’s vulnerability to climate
change—their unequal opportunities to either improve their current form of
livelihood, or to change to another more beneficial form. For example,
drawing water is not just laborious; it can require a very significant amount
of time particularly when water sources are scarce. It has been estimated
that women and children (mostly girls) spend 40 billion hours a year in
Africa gathering water.46 When water is scarce, women must go farther to
draw it, and their many other chores are still waiting for them upon their
return. As a result, women have less time to put towards other endeavors,
and accordingly girls often find themselves being unable to attend school.
In addition, even the opportunities to grow certain crops might be genderdifferentiated. In developing Pacific Island states, for example, men and
women will often work with different crops on different islands.47
In the event that climate change-induced factors lead to male
members of the family migrating to cities in search of work, women will
likely find themselves picking up additional chores that the men had
previously performed; and they may risk greater chances of being expelled
from their families or suffering sexual violence. 48 Further, adaptation
measures, such as those related to anti-desertification, are often labor
intensive, and may reduce the amount of time women have to perform their
ordinary chores. 49 Finally, as the primary caregivers in rural families,
women will often find themselves taking care of family members who may
be suffering more frequent bouts of disease because of malnutrition and
greater prevalence of diseases in the climate-change impacted environment.
Without time to devote to increased agricultural production, especially
cash-generating activities, women find it difficult to improve their
economic status. Without time to devote to their studies, girls find it
difficult to get an education, and the linkages between the lack of education
and poverty are all too apparent. Particularly worrisome for purposes of this
46.
ANNE MARIE GOETZ ET AL., UNIFEM, PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN
2008/2009: WHO ANSWERS TO WOMEN? GENDER & ACCOUNTABILITY 37 (2008), available at
http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/UNIFEM/POWW08ReportFullTe
xt.pdf.
47.
Training Manual, supra note 24, at 22. In Yemen, crops such as groundnuts, pumpkins,
and leafy vegetables are considered “women’s crops,” and the role women play in selecting seeds for
the next growing season has a direct impact on the biodiversity of these food supplies. Id. at 58.
Research has shown that women in developing countries often rely upon crop biodiversity to deal with
climatic variability. Id. at 82.
48.
49.
Training Manual, supra note 24, at 86.
776
[Vol. 15
article, a lack of education has a negative impact on teaching women
sustainable practices.50
With regard to exclusion from decision-making, women who do not
or are unable to own land in their own names may face problems in
securing credit for seeds and improvements, accessing water, and acquiring
full membership in rural organizations, which “often is restricted to heads
of households and titled landowners.” 51 For example, in rural parts of
Afghanistan, the title to land may include the right to draw a certain number
of “nights” of limited irrigation water. The actual distribution of water is
often determined at the village level in meetings between male village
members and the local water official—meetings at which women are not
allowed. 52 The absence of women participants in this example is not
confined to the rural areas of a developing nation like Afghanistan—the
worldwide average of women in national legislatures was slightly less than
21 percent in 2013.53
In both rural and urban areas, severe weather events pose different
challenges for women than they might for men. For example, in societies in
which women’s mobility is constrained and gender norms tend to keep
them in their homes, women are less likely to evacuate, and thus more
likely to perish when natural disasters strike their homes.54 For example,
during the 1991 cyclone in Bangladesh, mortality rates for women were
7.1%, but only 1.5% for men.55 Those who do evacuate may not have
marketable skills they can use to help ameliorate the stresses of even local
migration. In addition, inadequate relief shelters may not provide
reproductive health services or sanitation capacities,56 or security against
50.
51.
52.
Id. at 59.
Verner, supra note 40, at 287.
Notes by author, Suri sub-district, Zabul Province, Afghanistan, 2009 (on file with
author).
53.
WOMEN
IN
NATIONAL
PARLIAMENTS,
Inter-Parlimentary
Union,
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm (last visited May 22, 2014).
54.
55.
GOTELIND ALBER, GENDER, CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE, 33 (2011), available at
http://mirror.unhabitat.org/downloads/docs/GRHS2011/GRHS2011ThematicStudyGender.pdf.
For
example, as a result of the 2004 tsunami, there were 3,972 fatalities among women in Amapura, Sri
Lanka, but only 2,124 among men.
56.
Id. (“Reproductive health issues include for instance, the need for sanitation during
menstruation and after giving birth, constrained mobility during pregnancy and higher nutritional needs
during lactation. During menstruation, women need adequate sanitation in privacy and personal safety
which is often not ensured during and after a disaster.”). Id. at 16–17. For example, after the 2005
earthquake in Pakistan, relief workers learned that local customs regarding privacy as to latrine use and
menstrual sanitation needs required that the latrines be screened so that men and women could not see
each other entering them, and that special menstrual units needed to be constructed to allow women to
clean themselves and their non-disposable sanitation supplies. Jamila Nawaz et al., Oxfam Experience of
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 777 sexual abuse or exploitation.57 Some studies have indicated that women
suffer more than men in general from the psychosocial impacts of natural
disasters, perhaps because they are responsible for looking after other
family members and dealing with the effects of broken social ties and
separated families.58 Further, depending on the situation, women may find it
difficult to access relief aid directly because they are not heads of
households.59 Lastly, because of their marginalization within households,
their nutrition may suffer as other family members are fed first.60
E. Summary
The effects of climate change could be very significant upon different
environments over time, and will likely impact populations in different
locations in different ways. These impacts, however, will also be socially
differentiated within populations depending upon wealth, education,
gender, and sex. Perhaps the most vulnerable population cohort of all would
be women in developing countries, who tend to be significantly
disadvantaged, economically and socially, relative to men in their societies.
Because of their often traditional roles in maintaining households and
caring for children, differentiated negative impacts upon women might
amplify the negative impacts upon populations in developing countries as a
whole. To what extent is this evolving operational reality reflected in U.S.
military doctrine relevant to military interaction with people in these
countries?
II. U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND INTERACTING WITH THE PEOPLE
Certain writers posit “U.S. policymakers and thought leaders seem to
be increasingly shifting from a ‘traditional’ national security framework to
a ‘human security’ approach, which includes energy, natural resource, and
environmental components.”61 However, the evidence of this shift is not
Providing Screened Toilet, Bathing and Menstruation Units in its Earthquake Response to Pakistan, 18
GENDER & DEV. 81, 83 (2010).
57.
Chindarkar, supra note 35, at 3, 5.
58.
Id. at 3.
59.
Id. Or, because of the way certain skills have been gendered in their societies, women
who are the heads of households might find themselves unable to build shelters from provided relief
supplies, and might have to exchange sex in return for men assembling their shelters. Benelli et al.,
supra note 17, at 228.
60.
Chindarkar, supra note 35, at 1–2.
61.
ARMY ENVTL. POLICY INST., ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FRAGILE STATES: EARLY
WARNING
NEEDS,
OPPORTUNITIES,
&
INTERVENTION
1–5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.aepi.army.mil/docs/whatsnew/MAN0BC2_report_combined_compressed.pdf.
778
[Vol. 15
well reflected in the current military doctrine that provides guidance on
how to conduct various types of operations. At the moment, U.S. joint
military doctrine appears to consider three primary types of operations:
“offensive,” “defensive,” and “stability.”62 Within each of these categories
there are subsets of operations, for example, humanitarian assistance
operations in response to natural disasters are considered a type of stability
operation.63 Types of operations may cross over from one category to the
next depending upon the operational environment. Stability operations can
be conducted alone, or simultaneously, or as part of counterinsurgency
operations, which themselves may be largely offensive in nature.64 Finally,
the different services of the U.S. armed forces have often developed their
own more-detailed subsidiary doctrine suitable for their particular
operations.
This section will briefly review the doctrine covering four types of
operations—counterinsurgency, stability, peace, and civil-military—that
would appear to logically lend themselves to a human security approach.
Unfortunately, this review will show the general absence from U.S.
doctrine of any consideration of the process of climate change or gender, to
say nothing of the gender-differentiated impact of climate change. There
are certain areas of U.S. doctrine, however, that could serve as loci for the
development of operationally relevant discussions of gender and climate
change.
A. Counterinsurgency Operations
Credited at the time for helping reverse U.S. military misfortune in
the violence following the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the U.S. rediscovery of
counterinsurgency (“COIN”) operations as a strategy to effectively conduct
war amongst the people is now increasingly viewed as having a mixed
legacy.65 Regardless, it is still accepted U.S. military strategy, and therefore
of continuing relevance to the issue of future U.S. military operations
abroad in conflict areas. The U.S. defines “insurgency” as “the organized
62.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07, STABILITY OPERATIONS II-14
through 15 (2011), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf [hereinafter JP 3-07].
63.
Id. at viii, xv.
64.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY xii-xiii
(2013), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf [hereinafter JP 3-24].
65.
See, e.g., Christopher Sims, Fernando Luján & Bing West, Response: Both Sides of the
COIN: Defining War After Afghanistan, FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2012), available at
http://www.twc.edu/sites/default/files/assets/academicCourseDocs/25.%20Sims,%20Both%20Sides%20
of%20the%20COIN.pdf (detailing the writings and experiences of COIN proponents and critics,
revealing the complexity of conducting successful COIN operations).
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 779 use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political
control of a region.”66 COIN is “a comprehensive civilian and military
effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and to
address its root causes.”67 U.S. COIN doctrine is “population-centric,” 68
and therefore “the population is typically the critical aspect of successful
COIN.”69
Despite this focus on the population, gender is only mentioned once
in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication JP 3-24, which notes “members of other
societies often have different notions of rationality, appropriate behavior,
level of religious devotion, political organization, social order, and norms
concerning gender.”70 Women are likewise mentioned only once, noting
that “the specific needs of women associated with insurgents and other
armed groups” need to be addressed in disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (“DDR”) efforts post conflict. 71 Although the operational
environment for COIN operations is described in a holistic fashion,
encompassing “the relevant actors and the physical areas and factors of the
physical domains and the information environment,” 72 neither climate
change nor gender are dealt with in a meaningful way.
B. Stability Operations
Stability operations are a relative newcomer among the different
doctrinal types of operations. 73 They are defined as “various military
missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination
with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe
and secure environment, provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” 74
Significantly, stability operations have been assigned equal importance with
combat operations.75 The Department of State (“DoS”) is the lead agency in
this whole-of-government approach; the “primary military contribution to
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
JP 3-24, supra note 64, at ix.
Id.
Id. at I-2.
Id. at III-4.
Id. at III-8.
Id. at VIII-13.
Id. at xii.
Ann Scott Tyson, Standard Warfare May Be Eclipsed By Nation-Building, WASH.
POST,
(Oct.
5,
2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/04/AR2008100402033.html.
74.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION 3000.5, STABILITY
OPERATIONS 1 (2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.
75.
Id. at 2.
780
[Vol. 15
stabilization is to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal
security of the people and, thus creating a platform for political, economic,
and human security.”76 Stability operations are planned and conducted with
five functions in mind, “security, humanitarian assistance, economic
stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and
participation.”77
The listing of these functions appears to reflect to a large degree the
relative importance placed by the military upon them. Not surprisingly, JP
3-07 notes that “[s]econd only to providing security as required, the major
joint force role in stabilization efforts is to help reform the [host nation]
security sector and build partner capacity to make it an enabler of long-term
stability.”78 As to humanitarian assistance, JP 3-07 separates it into two
main categories: “nation assistance” (“NA”) and “foreign humanitarian
assistance” (“FHA”). NA entails “[h]umanitarian assistance conducted as
part of programs designed to increase the long-term capacity of the [host
nation] to provide for the health and well-being of its populace.”79 The goal
of NA operations is to “support the host nation by promoting sustainable
development and growth of responsive institutions”—“thereby promot[ing]
long-term regional stability.” 80 “Joint forces normally conduct NA and
other military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities in
relatively stable states. As such, activities that foster sustainability will
dominate, though transformational activities may also play an important
role.”81 Conceivably, NA operations could be broadly interpreted to include
efforts to mitigate or adapt to climate change, but it appears the doctrinal
emphasis is on developing the host nation’s governmental agencies to
respond to immediate humanitarian crises. Although climate change could
trigger such disasters, it is not clear that NA efforts would be geared to
addressing the problem of climate change under this doctrine as currently
written.82
76.
JP 3-07, supra note 62, at vii.
77.
Id. at xv.
78.
Id. at app. C at C-1.
79.
Id. at xix–xx.
80.
Id. at I-8.
81.
Id.
82.
Although UK stability doctrine identifies climate change as a factor that may lead to
instability, it provides no meaningful detail on how to factor this into stability operations. MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE, JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-40 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY
CONTRIBUTION
8
(2009),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/jdp3_40a4.pdf.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 781 In the highest tier of subsidiary Army stability operations doctrine,
there is no mention of gender, women, or climate change.83 However, in
supplemental Army doctrine women and gender are mentioned to a degree.
Although these instances are limited, they could provide an appropriate
starting point for the further development of these topics. For example, the
stability operations doctrine notes that in DDR efforts following a conflict,
the specific needs of women who were associated with armed groups must
be considered.84 It also notes that fostering stability depends in large part
upon “advancing equity and equality of opportunity among citizens in terms
of gender, social and economic resources, political representation, ethnicity
and race,”85 and that, in the initial phase of a stability operation, supporting
economic development means “[c]reat[ing] employment opportunities for
all ages and genders.”86 Interestingly, even though it does recognize women
as a vulnerable population, and sexual and gender based violence as a likely
circumstance in these post-conflict situations, it does not discuss taking a
gendered perspective in operations. Rather, the doctrine “look[s] from
viewpoints considering the effects of both adults and children.”87
Similarly, complementary doctrine dealing with FHA also addresses
operational gender issues to a degree, and it likewise might lend itself to
further development on this topic.88 Planners of the medical care aspects of
FHA operations are advised that “[w]omen’s and children’s care is the
biggest piece of this primary care and must take special planning to ensure
the right mix of providers and medications are available including the
gender of both providers and interpreters depending on the mission.”89
Importantly, commanders are advised to “incorporate anti-TIP [trafficking
in persons] and TIP-protection measures for vulnerable populations, in
particular for women and children, into post-conflict and humanitarian
83.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ADP 3-07, C1: STABILITY iii (2013),
available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_07c1.pdf.
84.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ADRP 3-07: STABILITY 3-15 (2013),
available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_07.pdf.
85.
Id. at 2-10.
86.
Id. at 2-20.
87.
Id. at 3-20.
88.
Although UK disaster relief doctrine notes that “[o]ver the next 30 years urbanisation,
population growth and climate change are all likely to contribute to greater numbers of people
inhabiting areas that will be at significant environmental risk,” it is concerned with the environment as it
exists at the time of the operation, rather than the process of climate change. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-52, DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 1-1 (2012), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/43340/jdp3522nded.pdf.
See also id. at app. D at D-3, (including a Disaster Relief Planning Checklist assessing the environment
of disasters).
89.
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-29, FOREIGN
HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE
E-4
to
E-5
(2014),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf [hereinafter JP 3-29].
782
[Vol. 15
emergency assistance programs.” 90 “Vulnerable persons” are defined as
those “who may not have equal access to [humanitarian assistance] because
of physical, cultural, or social barriers (e.g., women, children, elderly,
disabled, ethnic minorities, and people living with an incurable virus or
disease).”91 JP 3-29 also recognizes the role of UN agencies in protecting
women and children. 92 It does not, however, deal with the process of
climate change as it relates to natural disasters that could in fact be the
reason for these humanitarian assistance missions.
Stability operations doctrine recognizes the importance of economic
development. It defines “economic stabilization” as consisting “of restoring
employment opportunities, initiating market reform,” and it defines
infrastructure restoration as including education and environmental
control.93 In terms of infrastructure, JP 3-07 somewhat paradoxically notes
that although “[r]estoration of agriculture production is an absolutely
necessary recovery activity,” the “[i]nfrastructure requirements in support
of restoring agriculture production and delivery are generally neither an
immediate nor a high priority.”94 The basis for this assertion apparently is
the assessment that “[a]griculture production is usually not badly affected
by conflict, unless there is a major population displacement or a deliberate
scorched earth campaign.” 95 This assessment appears to discount the
impacts of climate change as agents of mass migration or environmental
degradation. Further, the “environmental control” noted in the doctrine
appears to be intended to address environmental regulation by the
government, rather than actual control of the environment. Finally, stability
operations doctrine prefers projects that are “are relatively short-term,
small-scale, low cost, and rapidly implemented stabilization or development
initiatives that are designed to deliver an immediate and highly visible
impact, generally at the local provincial or community level.” 96 This
preference tends to discount the process of climate change as an operational
fact. It is likely that projects intended to mitigate climate change’s impacts
or to allow populations to adapt to them, such as watershed rehabilitation,
would be deemed too long-term for this sort of investment.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
Id. at IV-21.
Id.
Id. at app. D-5 through D-6.
JP 3-07, supra note 62, at xxii.
Id. at III-33.
Id.
Id. at III-35.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 783 C. Peace Operations
Recognized as doctrinally distinct from “Stability Operations” since
at least 1994,97 “Peace Operations” are defined as “crisis response and
limited contingency operations” which include peacekeeping operations,
peace building post-conflict actions, peacemaking processes, conflict
prevention, and military peace enforcement operations.98 Its placement in
the world of doctrine is not precisely clear. Its numbering would suggest
that it is subsidiary to stability operations, and in certain respects it might be
a bit of a doctrinal outlier. For example, stability operations doctrine notes
that stability operations play a “key role” in peace operations, but it does
not explicitly say that peace operations are stability operations. 99
Interestingly, JP 3-07.3 does contain the military’s new doctrine on Mass
Atrocity Response Operations (“MARO”), which are defined as “military
activities to prevent or halt mass atrocities categorized under an emerging
[U.S. government] interagency mass atrocity prevention and response
options construct.” 100 JP 3-07.3 describes in detail the challenges of
conducting MARO in a confusing multiparty conflict situation, and it
analyzes the importance of understanding the social factors. However, the
focus of this analysis is on “how tribal, ethnic, religious, and other
differences are being manipulated to create the conditions leading to a mass
atrocity”101 —not on the underlying causes, such as resource scarcity, that
might exacerbate this conflict, or how the gender-differentiated effects of
such violence disproportionately affect women and girls.102
D. Civil-Military Operations
Civil-Military Operations (“CMO”) support the entire spectrum of
U.S. military operations, from offensive operations to peace operations. A
more thorough analysis of these operations from the perspective of climate
97.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.3, JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
PROCEDURES
FOR
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
(1994),
available
at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/joint_staff/jointStaff_jointOperations/853.pdf.
98.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07.3, PEACE OPERATIONS I-1 (2012),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-07-3.pdf [hereinafter JP 3-07.3].
99.
JP 3-07, supra note 62, at I-6. However, it does note that as to post-conflict
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts, which sound like part of peace-building post
conflict actions, “[g]ender, ethnic, and minority issues must also be addressed in the design of” these
programs. Id. at app. C-21. No further detail is provided as to what constitutes a “gender issue.”
100.
JP 3-07.3, supra note 98, at app. B-1.
101.
Id. at app. B-4.
102.
Jody M. Prescott, NATO Gender Mainstreaming and the Feminist Critique of the Law
of Armed Conflict, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 83, 87–90 (2013).
AND
784
[Vol. 15
change and its gender-differentiated impacts is warranted because of the
CMO’s doctrinal and operational ubiquity, and because the focus of these
operations is civilian-centric. Sadly, this most civilian-centric and nonkinetic of doctrines generally does not deal with gender, the process of
climate change, or the linkages between the two. The detail in which this
doctrine is written, however, suggests that it is a prime doctrinal candidate
for the inclusion of material dealing with the operational relevance of
gender and climate change. This impression is reinforced when the U.S.
doctrine is compared to an unofficial but influential NATO version that
deals with gender and climate change in detail.
1. The U.S. Perspective
CMO activities “establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations”
between military forces and the host “governmental and nongovernmental
civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace.”103 CMOs
“facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S.
objectives.”104 This doctrine rarely mentions gender and sex as planning
considerations, and when it does, they are mentioned only in the most
general sense. In terms of logistics planning as part of CMOs, joint doctrine
(JP 3-57) notes that planning “must include logistic support that normally is
outside military logistics, such as support to the civilian populace (e.g.,
women, children, and the elderly),”105 and that “medical planners may have
to adjust typical personnel and logistics packages to care for women and
children effected in operations not originally of a humanitarian nature.”106
JP 3-57 mentions women once more, noting that in considering how to
make arrangements for meetings with local nationals, planners should ask
themselves, “[f]or example, what role do women play in the society?”107
Gender as a concept is not mentioned at all. Subsidiary doctrine used by the Marine Corps and the Army to
implement this higher-level doctrine fares little better. Higher tier Marine
Corps doctrine notes only that the Marine liaison officer to the U.S.
embassy in the host nation should develop a working relationship with the
103.
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02: DEPARTMENT
DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, 37, 168 (2010), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (defining “civil-military operations as well as
medical civil-military operations) (amended Feb 15, 2014).
104.
Id.
105.
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JP 3-57, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS III-10
(Sep. 11, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf [hereinafter JP 3-57”].
106.
Id. at Annex C, Appendix A, A-C-2.
107.
Id. at Annex B, B-14. OF
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 785 Minister of Women’s Affairs.108 Army doctrine notes that planning should
also assess “the capabilities and effectiveness of public welfare systems
regarding the most vulnerable portion of the population (mentally
handicapped, aged, infirm, women, and children) and the impact of those
systems on [CMO].”109 The current version of CMO doctrine that addresses
FHA missions does not address environmental damage, climate change, or
its gender-differentiated impacts at all. 110 Its predecessor, by contrast,
mentioned gender twice and women seven times, and it is worthwhile to
examine these earlier discussions in detail to gain a sense of the absence of
any meaningful discussion of these topics. Gender was first noted as a
factor when describing key persons in the area of operations,111 and second,
in using interpreters effectively in Muslim countries.112 The doctrine then
mentioned women in the following ways: first, that they should be
considered in assessing the social structure of the population the unit is
working with; 113 second, what portion of the available labor pool they
constitute;114 third, the female mortality rate;115 fourth, how many of the
dislocated civilians are female;116 and fifth, to use female soldiers to search
female civilians and children if possible.117 Even in this fuller discussion of
gender-related operational factors, there was no mention of the physical
environment, climate change, or its gender-differentiated impacts.
At the level of geographic combatant commands, (such as U.S.
European Command) a Civil Affairs Command provides the support of
three civil affairs functional specialty cells to the command, covering each
of six designated “functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic
stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public
108.
MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, MARINE CORPS
WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION (MCWP) 3-33.1, app. A-4 through A-5 (2011), available at
http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/STAB/MARINE%20AIRGROUND%20TASK%20FORCE%20CIVIL-MILITARY%20OPERATIONS.pdf.
109.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-57 (FM 3-05.40), CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS 2-25 (2011),
available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_57.pdf [hereinafter FM 3-57].
110.
See generally DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ATP 3-57.20/MCRP 3-33.1C, MULTI-SERVICE
TECHNIQUES FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2013), available
at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_57x20.pdf (establishing the techniques
used by individuals, teams, and units of United States Army and Marine Corps Civil Affairs forces, as
well as planners of civil-military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war).
111.
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-05.401/MCRP 3-33.1A, CIVIL AFFAIRS TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES,
AND
PROCEDURES,
app.
A-24
(2007),
available
at
http://www.tecom.marines.mil/Portals/162/Docs/MCRP%203-33.1a%20CA%20TTPs.pdf.
112.
Id. at app. C-2.
113.
Id. at app. A-3.
114.
Id. at app. A-5.
115.
Id. at app. A-24.
116.
Id. at app. A-28.
117.
Id. at app. F-23.
786
[Vol. 15
education and information.”118 At the tactical level (brigade and battalion)
there will be only the rule of law, infrastructure, governance, and public
health and welfare. Although the roles and duties of the specialist sections
are described in great detail, none of them include dealing with climate
change or its gender-differentiated impacts.119 For example, the governance
specialty area provides the supported command information on
“environmental and pollution control systems” infrastructure and personnel,
but not the impacts of climate change on the environment and the people.120
Similarly, one of the core tasks of civil affairs units is “[p]opulace
and resource control,” which includes conducting operations involving
“dislocated civilians.”121 Military doctrine describes the legal and functional
status of dislocated civilians in great detail—such as the difference between
a returnee and a resettler—but it does not mention gender.122 The civil
affairs doctrine emphasizes the importance of collecting information about
the movements of dislocated civilians and the leadership of their camps,
and “civil vulnerabilities,” but it does not mention gender.123
An important function of civil affairs units is to participate in
planning and provide the commander’s staff with pertinent information
about the area of operations. One of the products provided by the civil
affairs unit is the area study, which “presents a description and analysis of
the geography, historical setting, and the social, political, military,
economic, health, legal, education, governance, infrastructure, and national
security systems and institutions of a country.” 124 Arguably, these
categories are broad enough to include climate change and its genderdifferentiated impacts. But when the more specific products that the civil
affairs unit generates—based in large part on the country study—are
examined, they likewise are silent on these important operational factors.
For example, the focused analysis of the population tracks the “[c]urrent
social climate in the [area of operations],” “key civilian communicators”
such as figureheads, clerics and subject matter experts, and the “[r]ole of
118.
JP 3-57, supra note 105, at I-20.
119.
Id. at II-18 through II-26.
120.
GLOBAL PUB. POL. ACADEMIC GRP., CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS & THE RULE OF
LAW:
CURRICULUM
DEVELOPMENT
REPORT,
10
(2011),
available
at,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/AcademicGroups/GPPAG/Docs/PDF/general%20docs/ROL%20curric
%20development%20report%20Feb12%20web.pdf.
121.
JP 3-57, supra note 105, at II-20.
122.
JP 3-29, supra note 89, at IV-20.
123.
See generally id. (discussing dislocated civilians in the broad foreign humanitarian
assistance context).
124.
FM 3-57, supra note 109, at 4-4.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 787 religion in society and the various religious and fraternal groups”125—but
not gender or the gender-differentiated impacts of climate change.
Is it possible that DoD is simply unaware of the operational relevance
of gender in civil-military operations? In short, the answer is “no.” JP 3-57
references a joint publication of the U.S. Institute of Peace and the U.S.
Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Guiding Principles
for Stabilization and Reconstruction, which goes into great depth on the
subjects of gender awareness and the need to ensure gender equity in all
facets of stabilization and reconstruction efforts.126 Although this document
was hailed at its publication as “civilian doctrine,”127 it is not accepted
military doctrine. It could be fairly argued that merely referencing it shows
that DoD considers gender issues to be civilian operational issues in
civilian-centric military operations, and not military matters. Does this
mean these topics simply do not lend themselves to treatment in military
doctrine? Again, the short answer is “no,” and this answer is best illustrated
by looking to important doctrine-like material developed in the NATO
context.
2. A NATO Perspective
The Civil-Military Cooperation (“CIMIC”) Centre of Excellence
(“CCOE”), a NATO accredited training, education, and doctrinal
development center located in the Netherlands, has published materials that,
although not official NATO doctrine, are influential and incorporate many
of the lessons lately learned in Afghanistan. Although CCOE’s general
handbook on civil-military cooperation does not mention climate change
specifically, it does note the importance of understanding the physical
environment and ecosystems.128 It also contains a detailed section on the
importance of gender awareness in conducting civil-military operations.129
Unfortunately, the “rapid assessment templates” it provides for evaluating
food processing and consumption, water availability, and agricultural
125.
Id. at 4-8 (emphasis added).
126.
See U.S. INST. OF PEACE & U.S. ARMY PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS
INST., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (2009), available at
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/guiding_principles_full.pdf (detailing the suggested
approaches to dealing with gender issues).
127.
U.S. INST. OF PEACE, USIP, U.S. ARMY UNVEIL FIRST CIVILIAN DOCTRINE FOR PEACE
OPERATIONS (2009), available at http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-us-army-unveil-first-civiliandoctrine-peace-operations.
128.
CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, CIMIC FIELD HANDBOOK,
III-5-3 through III-5-4 (3d ed. 2012), available at http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/cfh/CIMICHandbook.pdf.
129.
Id. at III-6-1 through 6-6.
788
[Vol. 15
production do not appear designed to collect gender- and sex-differentiated
data for these important functions.130
Importantly—for the purposes of assessing the utility of U.S. doctrine
in dealing with climate change and its gender-differentiated impacts—two
documents supplement the handbook and deal with these important
operational issues in some detail. The first is a guide on operationalizing
gender in the course of civil-military interactions. This guide provides an
understanding of gender, what a gender perspective is, and how it might be
practicably used in operations. 131 It differentiates between sex and
gender, 132 and explains the importance of mainstreaming a gender
perspective in planning and operations as a way to ensure gender
impartiality.133 It also describes the use of special gender advisors to assist
commanders in bringing a gender perspective into their work and that of
their staff at all levels of command.134 Finally, it provides fairly detailed
guidance and case studies on how to integrate a gender perspective into
operations in order to improve operational efficacy.135
The second NATO handbook concerns the environment. 136 It
provides examples of how ecosystems are vulnerable to climate change,137 a
discussion of relevant international conventions on climate,138 best practices
to be employed by deployed units to avoid compromising local
environmental conditions, 139 and the holistic approach required to
implement sustainable resource use and management.140 Importantly, the
handbook explicitly links women’s roles in host nation societies to issues of
resource use and ecosystem restoration, and notes how women’s interests in
these matters is often underestimated or overlooked. 141 Further, the
handbook directs readers to the gender handbook to find useful methods for
gathering information regarding the access of women “to resources such as
130.
Id. at annexes 14, 15, 17 and 21.
131.
STEPHANIE GROOTHEDDE, GENDER MAKES SENSE: A WAY TO IMPROVE YOUR
MISSION 2 (2013), available at http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/gender_brochure_web.pdf.
132.
Id. at 15.
133.
Id. at 17.
134.
Id. at 24–27.
135.
Id. at 44–57.
136.
N. GALLAGHER & P. WIT, SOCIETY STABILIZATION BY WINNING THE ENVIRONMENT
(2012), available at http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/Ecosystems_Assessment.pdf.
137.
Id. at 27.
138.
Id. at 52–53.
139.
Id. at 54–57.
140.
See id. at 75 (describing an approach that considers “all forms of relevant
information”).
141.
Id. at 35–36.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 789 land, water and wood” so that they are not marginalized by “well intended
measures.”142
E. Summary
The degree to which current U.S. doctrine neither deals with climate
change nor gender, to say nothing of the process of climate change or its
gender-differentiated impacts, is troubling. The shortcomings in U.S.
doctrine are brought into sharp focus when one compares U.S. civil-military
affairs doctrine and the works published by the CCOE. Whereas U.S. civilmilitary affairs doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures could be fairly
described as devoid of any meaningful discussion of the environment and
the operational significance of gender, the CCOE publications not only
address these topics, but the publications explicitly recognize the linkages
between climate change and gender in a military operational context.
Review of U.S. doctrine identifies obvious areas in which these
concepts could be included, and where their inclusion would promote the
completeness and comprehensiveness of the doctrine without major
changes in the flow of the chapters or text. For instance, FHA doctrine
shows that DoD is cognizant of the need to provide women and children
with proper medical care, and of the need to prevent human trafficking.
Thus, DoD is completely capable of addressing the operational relevance of
gender in doctrine. The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and
Reconstruction, however, suggest that the U.S. military primarily views
gender as an area in which civilian agencies should operate.
Embedding gender and climate content in doctrine would require a
holistic reorientation within DoD on the operational relevance of the two.
Complicating this task, the current doctrine is not inconsistent with the
Obama Administration’s recently published Climate Change Action Plan in
this regard. For example, the Climate Change Action Plan proposes
international efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation, greater use of cleaner energies and reducing energy waste, free
trade agreements in environmental goods and services, strengthened
planning and response capacities, innovative financial risk management
tools, and the distribution of drought-resistant seeds, 143 but makes no
mention of climate change’s gender-differentiated impacts. Therefore, for
U.S. military doctrine to change, there must be a significant investment of
political capital to require DoD to take on an additional perspective that is,
142.
143.
Id. at 36.
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 19, at 17–20.
790
[Vol. 15
for DoD at least, quite different from its historical viewpoint on
operations.144
III. MILITARY-CIVILIAN INTERACTION UNITS
As important as doctrine is in terms of resource allocation within the
military,145 to rely solely upon high level doctrine to form a picture of the
U.S. military’s understanding (or lack thereof) of climate change and
gender would be unwise. Albeit authoritative, doctrine is only guidance,
and it is therefore necessary to see how the U.S. military actually
implements doctrine (or perhaps ignores it) when operating in the field and
interacting with local nationals. During the U.S. and international forces’
operations in Afghanistan, they have developed different sorts of militarycivilian interaction units. Two of these types of units—Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and Agriculture Development Teams—provide a
rich experiential basis upon which to assess how best the military might
address climate change and its gender-differentiated impacts.
A. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
Many International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) partners have
used Provincial Reconstruction Teams (“PRTs”) in Afghanistan since
2003.146 Consisting both civilian and military members, the purpose of
PRTs is to help rebuild local governance and security capacity. At the
height of the ISAF troop uplift in Afghanistan, twenty-seven PRTs from
nations including the U.S., Germany, New Zealand, and Lithuania were
deployed there. 147 Many PRTs have already discontinued operations as
international forces have withdrawn.148 From a U.S. doctrinal perspective,
PRTs are focused on the local level of government and infrastructure in
their areas of operations. In situations where the local government does not
144.
Jody M. Prescott, NATO Gender Mainstreaming: A New Approach to War Amongst the
People?,
158
RUSI
J.,
56,
59
(2013),
https://www.rusi.org/publications/journal/ref:A527240CAD9431/#.U1l5M_ldWik.
145.
See John Hazlehurst, Modern Military Needs New Strategy, COLO. SPRINGS BUS. J.,
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://csbj.com/2013/11/21/modern-military-needs-new-strategy/ (discussing the
realities of the relationships between strategy, doctrine, and dollars).
146.
Oskari Eronen, CMC FINLAND CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT STUDIES, PRT
MODELS IN AFGHANISTAN: APPROACHES TO CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION, 1, 5–6 (2008), available at
http://www.cmcfinland.fi/download/41858_Studies_5_Eronen.pdf?6d36321354f4d088.
147.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt (last visited May 22, 2014).
148.
Military Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan Closing Up Shop, STARS & STRIPES
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.stripes.com/news/military-reconstruction-teams-in-afghanistan-closing-upshop-1.192711.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 791 exist or is seen as corrupt by the people, PRTs might find themselves
conducting stability operations initially, until some local government
capacity can be built or reformed. In instances where the local government
is perceived as legitimate, but ineffective, the PRT focuses on helping the
governmental institutions build the necessary capacity to govern. PRTs may
be commanded by either a DoS or DoD official. 149 PRTs also have
agricultural experts assigned to them from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”). Unfortunately, commanders ordinarily have had
limited agricultural experience and appeared to favor visible, short-term
infrastructure projects that were often dollar-intensive. Thus, many of these
experts found themselves unable to secure funding for sustainable, longterm agricultural projects.150 Ordinarily, the military support provided to a
PRT will consist of civil-affairs assets and security, but could also include
“mobility, sustainment, administration and communication” support. 151
PRTs primarily conduct stability operations. 152 Assessments of PRT
performance have been mixed.153 Non-governmental organizations engaged
in development have criticized PRT efforts as being unsustainable and
asynchronous with their goals. 154 Some observers have also questioned
what they see as the militarization of the development effort.155 On the
other hand, ISAF partners’ national governments have generally praised the
PRTs’ effectiveness.156
B. Agriculture Development Teams
The concept of the military agriculture development team is not new.
This sort of functionality was apparently first used by the U.S. in certain
projects in Central America beginning in the 1970’s.157 In Afghanistan, the
149.
JP 3-24, supra note 64, at app. B-3.
150.
Bernard Carreau, Lessons from USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan 1 PRISM 139, 141–43
(2010), available at http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/Prism_139-150_Carreau.pdf.
151.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY B-2 (2009),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/21059227/Joint-Publication-3-24 (note that this is the old
version of JP 3-24).
152.
JP 3-24, supra note 64, at A-17.
153.
Michael J. McNerney, Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a
Model or a Muddle?, PARAMETERS, Winter 2005–2006, 32, 39–41.
154.
Eronen, supra note 146, at 17, 30–32.
155.
Id. at 31.
156.
KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30588, AFGHANISTAN: POSTTALIBAN
GOVERNANCE,
SECURITY,
AND
U.S.
POLICY
1,
36
(2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf.
157.
Rachel Knight, Missouri’s Agribusiness Development Team Ends Mission in
Afghanistan, MO. NAT’L GUARD, http://www.moguard.com/07-18-12-missouris-agribusinessdevelopment-team-ends-mission-in-afghanistan.html (last visited May 22, 2014).
792
[Vol. 15
first pilot ADT, composed of Missouri National Guard personnel, was
created and deployed in 2007.158 ADTs are unique to the National Guard—
found neither in the active U.S. Army nor in the Army Reserve.
Accordingly, their structure is not dictated by doctrine, which allows the
respective U.S. state some flexibility in selecting the personnel that
compose the teams in terms of number, rank, and expertise. The guidance
that does exist is not official doctrine, and it is both general and perhaps
slightly dated.159 Importantly, ADTs are able to collaborate with land grant
universities in their home states to receive additional agricultural training,
and to use them as reach-back assets once deployed.160 Because ADTs bring
with them their own security detachments and transportation assets, they
are able to move more freely around the countryside than the PRTs’
agricultural experts, who often depend upon maneuver units in the area for
this sort of support.161 In addition, the different state National Guards have
committed to sending ADTs to specific locations for a number of years,
which has provided a degree of continuity not generally found in other
military deployments.162 Finally (and the significance of this should not be
downplayed in military operations, even in development and aid matters),
ADTs are generally commanded by colonels that often outrank the local
PRT commanders. 163 Although there has been some criticism that the
quality of the ADTs is uneven—largely depending upon the personnel
comprising the teams,164—they have officially been assessed as successful
in conducting their missions.165
The scope of the projects individual ADTs have worked on has
depended upon the composition and expertise of the deployed personnel,
the security situation in their respective areas, and the evolution of the
mission in Afghanistan. Early ADT rotations partly focused on
158.
159.
Id.
CTR. FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT TEAMS IN
AFGHANISTAN: TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES, HANDBOOK NO. 10-10, 3–6 (2009)
[hereinafter ADT HANDBOOK], available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-10/10-10.pdf. (The
ADT HANDBOOK uses “gender” rather than the word “sex” in discussing interaction with women, and
does not deal with climate change.).
160.
Id. at 4.
161.
Telephone interview with Colonel Eric Ahlness, commander, Minnesota ADT III
(Aug. 2, 2013).
162.
Id.
163.
Carreau, supra note 150, at 146.
164.
Id.
165.
Michael D. Fortune, The Real Key to Success in Afghanistan: Overlooked, Underrated,
Forgotten, or Just Too Hard?, 65 JOINT FORCES Q., 10, 14 (2012), available at
https://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/Lessons/JFQ-65_10-16_Fortune_(30-Mar-12)-LMS797.pdf; Martin A. Leppart, Agrarian Warriors: The Quiet Success of National Guard Agribusiness
Development Teams in Afghanistan, ARMY MAG., 53, 58 (2010), available at
http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/3/documents/News/2010/Leppert_0610.pdf.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 793 technological improvements that appeared to be well suited for
Afghanistan’s climate, but were in fact not sustainable culturally or
economically without continued outside funding and support. Examples of
this include solar wells, cold storage facilities, and drip-irrigation
projects.166
As the international community began winding down its involvement
in Afghanistan, the focus of ADTs’ efforts were on sustainable projects that
Afghans could maintain and carry forward with little or no outside
support.167 Examples of these include: demonstration farms and orchards
that also serve as training centers for local villagers;168 complementing
existing agricultural practices with inexpensive and non-technology
intensive projects; 169 training Afghan government officials on both
technical aspects of food safety and leadership;170 cash-for-work programs
that funded the cleaning of karezes171 and irrigation canals;172 basic animal
husbandry and veterinary skills; 173 supporting greenhouse growers’
166.
Mike Fortune, Commander’s Corner: How and Why the ADT Mission Has Evolved, 4
MULESKINNER
REP.,
1,
1–2,
13
(Oct.
2010),
http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Features/ADT/pdf/MO_ADT_IV_Muleskinner_Report5.pdf.
167.
Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Farrell, deputy commander,
Georgia (GA) ADT II (Aug. 16, 2013).
168.
Press Release, Ark. Nat’l Guard, Arkansas Troops Developing Farm as Agriculture
Education
Center
(Nov.
19,
2010),
http://www.arguard.org/publicaffairs/index.asp?id=news/2010/11/ADT_Farm.htm; Peter Shinn, Iowa
ADT Helps Youths Get Orchard Training, DEF. VIDEO & IMAGERY DISTRIB. SYS.,
http://www.dvidshub.net/news/69395/iowa-adt-helps-youths-get-orchard-training#.UzUetV4rFXa (last
visited May 14, 2014).
169.
Afghanistan: Kentucky Guard ADT 3 Pulls Out the ‘Wood Carpet’ for Afghan
Farmers,
K Y.
NAT’L
GUARD
(Nov.
22,
2011),
available
at
http://www.arng.army.mil/News/Pages/AfghanistanKentuckyGuardADT3pullsoutthe%E2%80%98woo
dcarpet%E2%80%99forAfghanfarmers.aspx.
170.
John Paluczak, Implementing the Agriculture Extension Agent Leadership Academy, 4
MULESKINNER
REP.,
1,
7
(Oct.
2010),
available
at
http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Features/ADT/pdf/MO_ADT_IV_Muleskinner_Report5.pdf;
Afghanistan—Meat Inspection Afghanistan Style, MEAT TRADE NEWS DAILY (Dec. 17, 2011),
http://www.meattradenewsdaily.co.uk/news/141211/afghanistan___meat_inspection_afghanistan_style_
.aspx.
171.
Michael M. Phillips, Learning a Hard History Lesson in ‘Talibanistan,’ WALL ST. J.
(May 14, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124224652409516525.html (A karez is an ancient form
of underground water canal.).
172.
Raymond Legg, Agriculture Section at Work, 4 MULESKINNER REP., 5, 5–6, (Nov.
2010), https://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/Lessons/MO_ADT_IV_Muleskinner_Report6_(30Nov-10)-LMS-797.pdf.
173.
Telephone Interview with Major Cheryl Wachenheim, Director of Agriculture,
Irrigation and Livestock (“DAIL”) liaison, Minnesota ADT III (Aug. 2, 2013); Michelle Grant, The
Georgia Rhythm Section, 3 COIN COMMON SENSE, 3, 13, (2012), available at
https://ronna.apan.org/CAAT/Shared%20Documents/COIN%20Common%20Sense%20Vol%203%20Is
sue%202.pdf.
794
[Vol. 15
associations;174 and supporting local nurseries by purchasing orchard-tree
saplings and distributing them to villagers free of charge.175
Arguably, from a development perspective, these sorts of projects—
although worthwhile and perhaps novel in the military context—do not
suggest that ADTs represent a significant innovation.176 What truly sets
ADTs apart, in both a development and a military sense, is the recent use of
gendered-interaction units specifically focused on promoting sustainable
agricultural practices and projects to increase the resilience of local nations
and their environments.
IV. ADTS AND A GENDERED APPROACH TO SUSTAINABILITY
A. Female Engagement Teams and Cultural Support Teams
To better understand the ADTs’ use of gendered-interaction units, it
is helpful to first look briefly at the use of small, all-women units in
operational settings. The UN has used all-women units in peacekeeping
efforts since 2007 with notable operational success.177 For example, the UN
deployed Indian female police units in Liberia, and female Bangladeshi
units in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.178 The use of allwomen military units by the U.S. military to engage with host nation
women in kinetic operations first developed on an ad hoc basis in Iraq,179
and appears to have been introduced to the Afghan theater in early 2009 by
incoming U.S. Marine Corps units in the form of designated Female
Engagement Teams (“FETs”).180 Over time, both the Marine Corps and the
174.
Farrell interview, supra note 167. Participants in the program were able to promote a
degree of agricultural stock and product price stability in their local area by starting seedlings to sell to
farmers, growing specialty crops, and by being able to grow crops out of season. Id.
175.
Leslie Goble, Afghanistan: Kansas National Guard ADT Gives Arbor Day Gifts to
Locals,
NAT’L
GUARD
(Feb.
8,
2012),
http://www.nationalguard.mil/Features/AgriculturalDevelopmentTeams.aspx.
176.
See, e.g., the weADAPT homepage, which provides access to numerous articles,
initiatives, case studies, and training modules from across the world on the entire range of climate
change mitigation and adaptation efforts. WEADAPT, http://weadapt.org/ (last visited May 14, 2014).
177.
Bonnie Allen, Liberia: Female Peacekeepers Smash Stereotypes, IIP DIGITAL, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Sept.
10,
2012),
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2012/02/20120227163049ael0.8644155.html#axzz
2cElqsAap; U.N. DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, UN POLICE MAG. 4 (2d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_02.pdf.
178.
Women
in
Peacekeeping,
U.N.
PEACEKEEPING,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml (last visited May 14, 2014).
179.
Sahana Dharmapuri, Just Add Women and Stir?, PARAMETERS, 56, 60 (2011),
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/2011spring/dharmapuri.pdf.
180.
Matt Pottinger et al., Half-Hearted: Trying to Win Afghanistan without Afghan Women,
SMALL WARS J., 1, 1 (2010), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/370-pottinger.pdf.
The U.S. Army had for years used Human Terrain Teams (“HTTs”) in Afghanistan to gather cultural
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 795 Army began to standardize the training and use of FETs, as did the U.K.
forces.181
As the title of the unit suggests, the purpose of FETs is to interact
with host nation women. Most accounts of FET operations have been
favorable, and commanders in the field appear to value the information that
the women troops are able to obtain from their interactions with both
Afghan women and men. 182 At the height of the U.S. troop surge in
Afghanistan, all Army maneuver battalions and PRTs were required to
include FET-trained personnel in their ranks.183 Their role is not without
controversy, however, and some writers have suggested that FETs need to
become better integrated with military-civil affairs operations because they
do not receive sufficient training on host-nation culture and language.184
Others have questioned whether “engagement” as a purpose risks becoming
an end in itself, consuming resources without making a demonstrable
contribution to reducing violence and insurgency.185 Further, as will be
discussed below, it is not clear that FETs have in fact become fully
and operational information about Afghan civilians in its areas of operations, but these were mixed-sex
teams composed of civilian researchers and security personnel working together with military personnel.
Jody M. Prescott, The Development of NATO EBAO Doctrine: Clausewitz’s Theories and the Role of
Law in an Evolving Approach to Operations, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 125, 137–38 (2008). Although
the information provided by these teams was often disaggregated and operationalized on a gender and
sex basis; see David Rohde, Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html?pagewanted=all (noting that an HTT
encountered a village containing a large number of widows dependent on sons of fighting age for
support, so local Army unit focused on programs to allow the widows to generate income themselves to
help deter sons from joining the insurgency), their use was controversial on ethical and practical
grounds.; Jason Motlagh, Should Anthropologists Help Contain the Taliban?, TIME (July 1, 2010),
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2000169,00.html.
181.
See MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, Female Team Prepares to Engage with Afghanistan’s
Women, GOV.UK (Apr. 6, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/female-team-prepares-toengage-with-afghanistans-women (reporting that twenty-two female troops received FET training from
the Military Stabilization Support Group and the stabilization unit prior to Afghan deployment).
However, concerns still exist that the U.S. Army, for example, has not sufficiently standardized or
institutionalized FET training and use in the field, so that it is still not as effective as it could be. Janet R.
Holliday, Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and Employment, MILITARY
REV.,
90,
90
(2012),
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/MilitaryReview_Female%20Engagement%20Teams.pdf.
182.
Elisabeth Bumiller, In Camouflage or Veil, a Fragile Bond, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/world/asia/30marines.html?pagewanted=all.
183.
Diane R. Walker, ATN? Announces COIN, Female Engagement Team Training,
FTLEAVENWORTHLAMP.COM
(July
14,
2011),
http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/article/20110714/NEWS/307149881/0/.
184.
Julia L. Watson, Female Engagement Teams: The Case for More Female Civil Affairs
Marines,
95
MARINE
CORPS
GAZ.,
20,
23
(July
2011),
http://www.mcamarines.org/gazette/article/female-engagement-teams-case-more-female-civil-affairs-marines.
185.
See Anna C. Coll, Evaluating Female Engagement Team Effectiveness in Afghanistan
34
(2012)
(Honors
Thesis
Collection,
Wellesley
College),
available
at
http://repository.wellesley.edu/thesiscollection/2 (noting that some observers have suggested that FETs
conduct engagement merely for the sake of engagement).
796
[Vol. 15
integrated into military doctrine, 186 and their use is apparently being
curtailed as U.S. forces continue their withdrawal from Afghanistan.187
First deployed in 2011, Cultural Support Teams (“CSTs”) are small,
all-women detachments similar to FETs, except they are trained and used
specifically in support of U.S. Army Special Operations Forces missions to
conduct “medical outreach programs, civil-military operations, key leader
engagements, and searches and seizures.” 188 Special operations forces
include Special Forces, Rangers, Information Operations, and Civil Affairs
units.189 Because of the very austere conditions in which such forces often
operate, CST candidates undergo a grueling selection process, and
successful candidates receive more in-depth training in different cultures
than FETs. 190 Although little information regarding CST operations is
available in the public domain, the continuing worldwide mission of Army
special operations forces suggests that CSTs might continue to be employed
by these forces even if their use in the regular Army is reduced.191 Further,
it would be incorrect to assume too high a degree of doctrinal purity on the
part of special operations forces in the field; when CSTs were in short
supply, these forces would gratefully use available FETs to help conduct
their missions.192
186.
Ellen Haring, Female Engagement Teams: An Enduring Requirement with a Rocky
Start,
3
PEACE
&
STABILITY
OPERATIONS
J.
ONLINE
7,
7
(2012),
http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/journal/pubsreview.cfm?ID=27 (last visited May 14, 2014)
(recognizing that some argue that FETs have been an expedient measure necessary for the mission in
Afghanistan, but not necessarily elsewhere).
187.
Dan Lamothe, The End of Female Engagement Teams, MARINE CORPS TIMES, (Dec.
29, 2012), http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20121229/NEWS/212290307/The-end-femaleengagement-teams.
188.
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, About the Cultural Support Program,
http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/organization.html (last visited May 28, 2014) [hereinafter CST].
189.
U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND Headquarters Fact Sheet, About the U.S.
Army Special Operations Command, http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html
190.
Kevin Maurer, In a New Elite Army Unit, Women Serve Alongside Special Forces, but
First
They
Must
Make
the
Cut,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
27,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/in-new-elite-army-unit-women-serve-alongsidespecial-forces-but-first-they-must-make-the-cut/2011/10/06/gIQAZWOSMM_story.html; CST, supra
note 188.
191.
See Thom Shanker, Less ‘Rambo’ Seen in New U.S. Military Culture, N.Y. TIMES
(June
18,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/us/less-rambo-seen-in-new-us-militaryculture.html?_r=0 (quoting an Army General suggesting that CST members “very well may provide a
foundation for ultimate integration” of women into combat forces).
192.
Ahlness interview, supra note 161.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 797 B. ADTs, FETs, and Women’s Initiative Training Teams
Importantly for purposes of this article, recent ADT efforts have also
included a gender perspective on sustainability, using FETs or an ADT type
of unit, the Women’s Initiative Training Team (“WITT”). These are well
illustrated by the experiences of recently redeployed ADTs from the
Minnesota and Georgia National Guards. Minnesota (“MN”) National
Guard ADT III, working in Zabul Province, in deciding where to focus its
efforts to improve the value chain in food production and marketing, took
advantage of a DoS study that had identified increased production and
marketing of high value crops, such as almonds, raisins, and pomegranates,
as being feasible and sustainable.193 For example, the ADT supported a
project that hired village women to shell almonds to increase the market
value of this important crop.194 Relatedly, a project training Afghans on
beekeeping using hardy Asian honeybees proved to be suited to the Afghan
environment and to be sustainable over time.195
The experiences of MN ADT III provide valuable lessons as to the
importance of understanding local culture and economy in seeking to help
communities in developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change.
For example, because water was only seasonally available, there was a
tendency among local farmers to overwater their crops, thereby reducing
crop yield and soil fertility. However, efforts to convince the farmers to
build retention dams to secure water availability were met with resistance
because of fears that downstream users would consider such works as water
hoarding by the upstream users. 196 Similarly, grapes in Zabul were
ordinarily grown on earthen embankments, rather than the vines being
attached to trellises. Farmers were reluctant to switch to trellising because
of fears that the wind might knock over the vines and cause the loss of the
crop. 197 In addition, the lack of infrastructure impacts long-term
sustainability. For example, families often sell high-value orchard crops to
brokers on the tree. They do not have sufficient information to know
whether they are getting the best price, and their limited resources make it
hard to wait for a potentially higher price later, so they take what they can
get. If farmers had better transportation infrastructure (including security of
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
798
[Vol. 15
movement), they could use their talent of growing high-value crops to
better effect by accessing markets more easily.198
MN ADT III also worked closely with the PRT, local officials, and
Afghan government agencies like the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and
Directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
(“DAIL”). MN ADT III’s commander identified before the unit deployed
that one of its primary tasks would be to engage with vulnerable
populations, especially women.199 The women on this ADT were trained
and certified as a FET in preparation for this task and to ensure that units in
the ADT’s area of operation were conducting female engagement.200 Once
the ADT deployed, Afghan men were asked whether it was acceptable for
the FET to meet with the women of their families, and the answer was
positive most of the time.201 The FET used its meetings with women in
villages as opportunities to talk about health and raising backyard gardens.
Similarly, working with the DOWA, the FET also sought to create business
opportunities for widows by teaching them poultry husbandry skills, and
then providing them with breeding stock and feed.202 Cooperating with the
PRT, the FET also supported a program to train women in a village to set
up a yogurt business using goats’ milk. In addition, the FET sponsored a
girls’ school where the students were also trained in gardening. This style
of education leads to increased literacy, socialization, and receptiveness to
new growing methods among the students.203 The FET was even able to
help coordinate sending a local Afghan woman to receive more advanced
agricultural training at the Thunderbird School of Global Management in
Arizona.204
GA ADT II, operating primarily in Logar and Wardak Provinces,
included a WITT that was tasked to coordinate with Afghan government
agencies and women’s groups to assist Afghan women to improve their
ability to raise and market agricultural goods and preserve food, both as
individuals and collectively.205 Because the FETs in GA ADT II’s area of
operations were primarily employed by Army maneuver forces to assist in
the conduct of COIN operations, this ADT was careful to maintain space
198.
Wachenheim interview, supra note 173.
199.
200.
Id. When U.S. Special Forces in the area lacked a CST, the MN ADT III FET was able
to assist them in their operations.
201.
Id.
202.
See Hillenbrand, supra note 45, at 412 (explaining that “[h]omestead gardening has
been linked explicitly to development of sustainable livelihoods and resilient to risk, through better
year-round nutritional security and diversified income sources . . .”).
203.
204.
Wachenheim interview, supra note 173.
205.
Grant, supra note 173, at 13.
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 799 between its WITT and maneuver unit FETs in order to downplay the
WITT’s association with kinetic operations.206 Projects in which the WITT
was involved included teaching food preservation techniques and the
development of a backyard chicken coop program that would be sustainable
through the hard Afghan winter through the husbandry of breeding stock
and the sale of eggs and surplus chickens. Other projects that focused on
women included business opportunities like “food drying, beekeeping, and
poultry production.”207
One project—which trains local women on the tending of local
backyard gardens to raise saplings, which could then be sold to contractors
reforesting hillsides—stands out because of the way in which GA ADT II
integrated it into a larger project geared towards watershed restoration and
sustainability. The project began the restoration of seven watersheds using
local, low technology, and non-capital-intensive means. Local water
officials and village elders were included in the project and received
training in water management skills.208 Later, in conjunction with USDA
experts, the ADT conducted training for Afghan government officials to
increase their appreciation of the need to take a holistic approach across
government agencies to integrate water management in their different
activities. Contractors were hired to identify areas for their watershed
potential, and were required to employ local villagers in the project so they
would receive on-the-job training. Once suitable areas had been identified,
local villagers were hired to undertake simple construction efforts, such as
building stone dams and contour ditches to slow water flow, thereby
mitigating soil erosion and enhancing water infiltration.209 In addition to
working, the villagers also received two hours of daily training by the
DAIL staff; teachers and assistants hired from the local community
contributed to this training.210 Finally, saplings grown by women in their
206.
Farrell interview, supra note 167.
207.
Janet R. Holliday, Female Engagement Teams: The Need to Standardize Training and
Employment,
MILITARY
REV.
90,
91,
(2012),
available
at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/MilitaryReview_Female%20Engagement%20Teams.pdf.
See also Randall Gates, U.S. Army Helps Build Beekeeping In Afghanistan, AMERICAN BEE JOURNAL
395, 395–96 (2011).
208.
Farrell interview, supra note 167.
209.
Id.
210.
See Grant, supra note 173, at 13 (“One of the watershed projects requires its contractor
to coordinate efforts with the Director of Education to ensure ten days of watershed management
training is provided for the educational development of students at the Agricultural High School.”)
800
[Vol. 15
backyard gardens were sold to the contractors and planted in upland
portions of the watershed areas to reforest them.211
C. Summary
ADTs have the capability not just to work on projects that could
mitigate climate change and enhance adaptation, but also to specifically
engage women in developing countries in these efforts. Although
development and relief organizations have criticized military development
efforts as disruptive, poorly-focused, and non-sustainable in many cases,
the ADTs with their academic and practical agricultural expertise and their
demonstrated ability to work well in an interagency effort hold great
promise as a model for the U.S. military to consider in terms of effectively
dealing with climate change at the tactical level.212 Most importantly, the
ADTs have taken a gendered approach in working with Afghan women to
develop skills and techniques that result in more food being grown in
austere conditions, and possibly generating income as part of an integrated
approach to societal adaptation to climate change. This provides a practical
example of how to leverage the efforts of a country’s entire population in
fostering food and water security, and thereby promoting stability in
general. When Afghan men saw that women could be successful at small
business ventures, they often became more accepting of women being
involved in commerce, and sometimes even wanted to participate
themselves.213
CONCLUSION
The linkages between rule of law and stability have been recognized
as crucial in the redevelopment of war-torn nations.214 But in Afghanistan,
rule of law efforts often seem to have been focused on creating a legal
system and infrastructure that do not appear to have taken root outside
211.
Farrell interview, supra note 167; see also id. (“Some of the watershed projects
require[d] their contractors to train and organize women’s associations from villages within the project
area to create tree nurseries.”).
212.
See, e.g., Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarized Aid in
Afghanistan, OXFAM INT’L, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impact-quickcollapse-jan-2010.pdf (last visited May 14, 2014) (showing respected non-governmental organizations’
critique of U.S. military development efforts in Afghanistan).
213.
Holliday, supra note 181, at 93–94.
214.
See, e.g., Rule Of Law Crucial for Security and Stability in Kunduz, GOV’T OF THE
NETH. (June 30, 2011), http://www.government.nl/news/2011/06/30/rule-of-law-crucial-for-securityand-stability-in-kunduz.html (announcing €6.2 million investment in “legal training for police and
prosecutors, improving office facilities and professionalizing administrative systems” in Afghanistan).
2014] Climate Change, Gender, and Rethinking Military Operations 801 major cities, and will not likely be sustainable without significant continued
foreign assistance.215 In rural Afghanistan, for example, the absence of the
formal justice system administered by Kabul has created opportunities for
Taliban judges to administer expedited “justice,” and to create obligations
and relationships that make Afghan villagers beholden to them, further
eroding the rule of law.216 The people’s confidence in their government
would be enhanced by taking a broader view of the rule of law and
fostering predictability and equity in the availability and use of essential
national resources, like water and soil.217 This would help legitimize the
government in the eyes of the people, and perhaps give it an edge over its
insurgent competitor in the rule of law marketplace. Giving women a place
at the table in making resource allocation decisions, and in the economy
with goods and services that can be exchanged for hard cash, are practical
ways to tie women’s stakes in their environments to opportunities to
mitigate the impact of climate change and adapt to it.
High-level U.S. strategy and doctrine addresses the significance of
climate change as a factor in international instability, but it appears to focus
on changed environments as an operational fact rather than on climate
change as an operational process. Further, even though examination of U.S.
doctrine shows that it could easily incorporate a gendered-perspective in
terms of assessing operational facts, it largely does not. In this regard,
rather than just viewing the ADT as a specific capability provided by the
National Guard to assist in stability operations, the active military should
instead view its COIN, stability, peace, and CMO operations through the
lens of the ADT for a sense the operational relevance of gender and climate
change. The ADT, working in conjunction with interagency and host nation
partners, is not just a means to grow a bit more food—it is perhaps an
important first step for the U.S. military to bolster meaningful participation
215.
See LIANA SUN WYLER & KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41484,
AFGHANISTAN: U.S. RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE SECTOR ASSISTANCE 28–36 (2010), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R41484_11092010.pdf.
216.
Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Taliban Courts Filling Justice Vacuum in Afghanistan,
NPR.ORG (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98261034; Troy
Anderson, Insurgent Justice, 1 COIN COMMON SENSE, (July 2010), available at
http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/caat-anaysis-news/coin-common-sense-insurgent-justice.html.
217.
Frances Cleaver & Kristin Hamada, ‘Good’ Water Governance and Gender Equity: A
Troubled Relationship, 18 GENDER & DEV. 27, 27–28 (2010) (explaining that “good water governance
is seen as essential for overcoming previous shortcomings in water provision (corruption, failure to meet
the needs of poor people, lack of responsiveness and accountability)” but that “[t]here is too little
recognition of the ways in which governance systems are adapted at local levels to produce winners and
losers . . .”).
802
[Vol. 15
of women in the social and economic spheres of host nation societies and
increase sustainability in these societies as well.218
218.
Jules Pretty et al., Sustainable Intensification in African Agriculture, 9 INT’L J. OF
AGRIC. SUSTAINABILITY 5, 22 (2011). Research suggests the scaling up of sustainable intensification,
that is, the sustainable growing of more food on the same land or land that previously could not be
cropped, has as a key requirement: “a focus particularly on women’s educational, microfinance and
agricultural technology needs, and building of their own unique forms of social capital.” Id. PROTECTING PEOPLE DISPLACED BY WEATHER-RELATED DISASTERS
AND CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPERIENCE FROM THE FIELD
By Alice Thomas*
Introduction............................................................................................... 803
I. Climate Change and Human Mobility................................................... 805
A. Climate Change and the “Displacement-Migration Continuum” .... 805
B. Current Understanding of Climate Change-related Human
Movement ............................................................................................. 807
1. What We Know ............................................................................ 807
2. What We Don’t Know.................................................................. 808
II. Existing Legal and Normative Frameworks......................................... 809
A. Cross-Border Climate-Related Movements..................................... 810
B. Internal Displacement ...................................................................... 811
1. Voluntary or Forced? ................................................................... 813
2. Is the Trigger Event a “Disaster”?................................................ 815
III. Experience from the Field................................................................... 817
A. The Pakistan and Colombia Floods: Acute, Rapid-Onset Disasters 818
1. Background .................................................................................. 818
2. Operational and Institutional Gaps in the Response ............... 820
B. Erratic Rainfall and Recurrent Drought in West Africa’s Sahel...... 826
1. Rainfall Variability, Recurrent Drought, and Growing Food
Insecurity in the Sahel ...................................................................... 826
2. Need for Improved Monitoring and Understanding..................... 829
IV. Recommendations............................................................................... 831
INTRODUCTION
War and conflict are no longer the primary drivers of displacement.
Extreme weather and climate variability are increasingly playing a role. In
* Alice Thomas manages the Climate Displacement Program at Refugees International, a
non-profit organization that advocates on behalf of refugees and displaced people. 804
[Vol. 15
2012, more than 32 million people were displaced by rapid-onset natural
hazards, ninety-eight percent of which were weather-related (primarily
floods).1 Slower-onset events linked to climate change, such as drought,
changing rainfall patterns, and coastal erosion likely propelled many more
people to migrate, although exactly how many we do not know.
Problematically, the character of human movement linked to climaterelated events does not always fit well within the current legal and
institutional frameworks, leaving open the question of when, and under
what circumstances, people who move as a result of climate-related events
or changes are entitled to unique rights and protections. Significant
scholarly and public attention has focused on the glaring gap in the current
legal framework for those people who will be forced to move across
international borders as a result of extreme weather, sea level rise, and other
climate change-related effects, and who do not fall into the current
definition of refugees under international law. 2 For instance, a major
concern is the lack of a clear solution for the inhabitants of low-lying island
states who risk losing their territory altogether, as well as the question of
how to safeguard their nationhood, safety, rights, and culture.
In contrast, this article focuses on both the de jure and de facto
challenges in protecting people displaced within their own countries by
natural disasters and the effects of climate change, using examples from
developing and conflict-prone states. Internal displacement from climate
change warrants attention for two reasons. First, there is consensus among
experts that the vast majority of displacement from climate change-related
effects will be internal.3 Second, the greatest human impacts are likely to
occur in less-developed countries due not only to their pre-existing
exposure to extreme weather events like typhoons, floods, and droughts, but
also to their limited capacity to effectively prepare for, respond to, and
recover from these crises.4 Thus, the primary responsibility to assist and
protect people displaced by extreme weather and other climate changerelated effects will fall on national governments in countries that already
1.
Megan Rowling, Disasters Displaced Over 32 Mln People in 2012, Rising Trend
Forecast, REUTERS (May 13, 2013), http://www.trust.org/item/20130513114557-uo68q/.
2.
See, e.g., U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS:
UNHCR'S
PERSPECTIVE
1–2
(1995),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b31cc4.html.
3.
Richard Black et al., Migration as Adaptation, 478 NATURE 447, 447 (2011).
4.
Top rankings in various climate vulnerability indices include countries like
Bangladesh, Haiti, Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen. Climate Change and Environmental Risk Atlas 2014,
MAPLECROFT GLOBAL RISK ANALYTICS, http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2013/10/30/31global-economic-output-forecast-face-high-or-extreme-climate-change-risks-2025-maplecroft-risk-atlas/
2014]
Protecting People Displaced by Weather-related Disasters
805 face enormous challenges like poverty, environmental degradation, and
insecurity.
The first section of this article explains the ways in which more intense
weather, sea level rise, and other environmental changes linked to climate
change (hereinafter, “climate-related events”) may directly or indirectly
influence human mobility. Section two examines the current normative
frameworks for the treatment and protection of refugees and internally
displaced people and explains why they are likely to prove insufficient in
protecting those uprooted by climate-related events. Drawing from
experience from the field, section three identifies operational challenges
confronted by governments and humanitarian agencies in responding to
displacement in two very different types of disasters: acute floods in
Pakistan and Colombia in 2010 and 2011, and recurrent drought and food
crises in West Africa’s Sahel region. The fourth section concludes with a
set of recommendations for how to better prepare for, address, and manage
climate-related displacement in a manner that respects the rights and dignity
of those affected.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN MOBILITY
As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) concluded that one of the most significant impacts of climate
change could be on human mobility.5 Since then, understanding of the
various ways in which climate change and its environmental effects impact
human movement has substantially increased. The IPCC’s most recent
report draws on a new body of observational and theoretical research in the
past five years that indicates not only that climate change effects are
extremely likely to uproot increasing numbers of people in the coming
decades—particularly in poor and developing countries—but also that
migration can be an effective strategy for adapting to the impacts of climate
change.6
A. Climate Change and the “Displacement-Migration Continuum”
There are three primary ways in which climate change may affect
displacement and migration. First, climate change is anticipated to result in
an increase in the frequency and force of hydro-meteorological hazards that
5.
WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG. & U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (“UNEP”), CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE IPCC 1990 AND 1992 ASSESSMENTS 103 (1992).
6.
IPCC Working Group II, AR5, Chapter 12, available at http://ipccwg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap12_FGDall.pdf
806
[Vol. 15
force people to flee in the face of immediate, life-threatening harm (e.g.,
floods and storms). Floods in particular have the propensity to displace
large numbers of people; between 2009 and 2012, floods were the primary
driver of hazard-induced displacement.7 In many cases, people displaced by
these events are able to return once the event is over. Recent research shows
that displacement associated with sudden-onset, acute hydro-meteorological
events like floods and storms, is relatively short-term and short-distance
“depending primarily on the capacity of communities and local institutions
to provide effective coping support.” 8 However, when such events are
likely to recur, people may move in anticipation of such events in order to
avoid future harm (“anticipatory movements”), which may be permanent.
Second, slower-onset climate change-related effects, like changes in
rainfall patterns, water scarcity, and ocean acidification, will affect natural
resource availability upon which people—especially the poorest sectors of
society—rely for their livelihoods and survival (e.g., agricultural yields and
fisheries).9 These slower-onset environmental changes may cause, either
directly or indirectly, people to leave their homes in search of alternative
livelihoods. Human displacement due to these effects may be temporary or
permanent.
Third, climate change is anticipated to result in increased storm surge,
salt water inundation of fresh water sources, and sea level rise, thereby
rendering certain areas—particularly low-lying atolls or coastal areas—
uninhabitable.10 In the Arctic, which is warming at twice the rate of the rest
of the planet, increased storm surge and permafrost melt are already forcing
the relocation of dozens of indigenous Alaskan communities. 11 These
changes are likely to result in permanent displacement.12
7.
INT’L DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE (“IDMC”), GLOBAL ESTIMATES 2012—
PEOPLE
DISPLACED
BY
DISASTERS
6
(2013),
available
at
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/assets/publications/2013/2012-global-estimates-corporate-en.pdf [hereinafter IDMC].
8.
Cecilia Tacoli, Migration as a Response to Local and Global Transformations: A
Typology of Mobility in The Context of Climate Change, in THE DEMOGRAPHY OF ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE 41, 43 (George Martine & Daniel Schensul eds., 2013), available at
http://www.africa-adapt.net/media/resources/851/the-demography-of-adaptation-to-climate-change.pdf.
9.
OLI BROWN, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 16
(2008).
10.
Peter Roy & John Connell, Climatic Change and the Future of Atoll States, 7 J. OF
COASTAL RES. 1057, 1068–69 (1991).
11.
ROBIN BRONEN, CLIMATE-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT OF ALASKA NATIVE
COMMUNITIES 1 (Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, 2013), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2013/1/30%20arctic%20alaska%20bronen/30
%20climate%20alaska%20bronen%20paper.pdf.
12.
See also five scenarios for conceptualizing climate change-induced displacement
identified by the UN Secretary-General’s Representative on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons, Walter Kälin, which were subsequently adopted by the UN’s Inter-Agency Standing
Committee Working Group on Migration/Displacement and Climate Change. Representative of Sec’y
2014]
807 Taken together, the effects of climate change will cause or contribute to
a broad range of human movement (and may already be doing so) that
spans a continuum and includes: (1) internal and external (cross-border)
movement; (2) short-term, recurrent, and permanent movement; and (3)
forced, voluntary, and anticipatory movement.
B. Current Understanding of Climate Change-related Human Movement
1. What We Know
Much of the scholarly and public focus in the context of climate
displacement concentrates on the need for legal protection for people who
flee their countries as a result of climate-related events. However, empirical
research indicates that the majority of human displacement resulting from
climate-related events will occur within state borders.13 This is consistent
with migration patterns indicating that far more people migrate internally
than internationally.14
In addition, certain regions of the world are likely to experience higher
levels of climate-related population movement due to numerous factors.
First is exposure to climate change-related hazards and impacts. Certain
areas like flood-prone deltas, low-lying island atolls, and densely populated
coastal areas are particularly vulnerable. 15 Equally important are the
preexisting vulnerabilities of those affected and their ability to cope with
and adapt to these changes.16 Poor, developing and conflict-prone countries
are especially at risk: numerous studies show that state failure and violent
Gen. on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Displacement and Climate Change: Towards
Defining Categories of Affected Person (Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group on
Migration/Displacement and Climate Change, working paper, 2008); WALTER KÄLIN & NINA
SCHREPFER, PROTECTING PEOPLE CROSSING BORDERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
NORMATIVE
GAPS
AND
POSSIBLE
APPROACHES
5
(2012),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f38a9422.pdf.
13.
VIKRAM KOLMANNSKOG, CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTER, DISPLACEMENT AND
MIGRATION:
INITIAL
EVIDENCE
FROM
AFRICA
3,
16
(2009),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/4b18e3599.html; ANDRAS VAG ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED
MIGRATION SCENARIOS: PROJECT SYNTHESIS REPORT 72 (2009), available at http://seri.at/wpcontent/uploads/2010/06/EACH-FOR_Synthesis_Report_090515.pdf.
14.
Walter Kälin, Conceptualizing Climate Change-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 81, 86 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010).
15.
WORKING GRPS. I & II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5–6, 14 (Simon K. Allen et al. eds., 2012), available at
http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-SPMbrochure_FINAL.pdf.
16.
Frank Laczko & Christine Aghazarm, Introduction and Overview: Enhancing the
Knowledge Base, in MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 15
(Frank
Laczko
&
Christine
Aghazarm
eds.,
2009),
available
at
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/migration_and_environment.pdf.
808
[Vol. 15
conflict exacerbate natural hazard-related disasters and reduce people’s
adaptive capacity.17 In addition, poor countries, particularly those in which
a large portion of the population is dependent on rain-fed agriculture for
their livelihoods, have proven especially susceptible to climate-related
shocks. 18 Experts also agree that, outside the context of sudden-onset
disasters, climate-related changes often act in concert with other socioeconomic factors to drive displacement.19
For example, case studies from environmentally fragile rural areas of
Bolivia, Senegal, and Tanzania show that “precipitating events” like
unusually harsh droughts can have long-lasting impacts on local economies
and livelihoods.20 This can result in a downward spiral of emigration when
socio-economic factors limit coping strategies or limit sources of income.21
“What is crucial in making these events so catastrophic is a socio-economic
context which restricts people’s ability to rely on well-tested strategies and
diversify their activities within both the agricultural and the non-farm
sector.”22
2. What We Don’t Know
There are, however, significant gaps in the current understanding of the
problem. For example, social scientists are unable to predict the extent to
which climate change will fuel tension, social unrest, or armed conflict.23
17.
Vikram Kolmannskog, Climate Change, Human Mobility, and Protection: Initial
Evidence from Africa, 29 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 103, 108–10 (2010) (discussing how armed conflict can
exacerbate drought); TAMER AFIFI ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN MOBILITY:
PERSPECTIVES OF REFUGEES FROM THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA 13 (2012), available at
http://www.ehs.unu.edu/file/download/9951.pdf.
18.
See OXFAM, LEARNING THE LESSONS? ASSESSING THE RESPONSE TO THE 2012 FOOD
CRISIS IN THE SAHEL TO BUILD RESILIENCE FOR THE FUTURE 5 (2013), available at
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp168-learning-the-lessons-sahel-food-crisis-160413en_1.pdf (describing the effects of drought on food insecurity in the Sahel region of Africa).
19.
See generally Vikram Kolmannskog & Lisetta Trebbi, Climate Change, Natural
Disasters and Displacement: A Multi-Track Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps, 92 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 713 (2010), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2010/irrc-879kolmannskog-trebbi.pdf (explaining the many factors that influence climate change displacement);
Cecilia Tacoli, Migration, Climate Change and the Multiple Drivers of Mobility: Current Debates, Emp,
MIGRATION
CITIZENSHIP
EDU.
(Jan.
2012),
http://migrationeducation.de/fileadmin/uploads/Cecilia_Tacoli__2012.pdf (stating “[t]here is now a
broad consensus on the fact that climate change will result in increases in the numbers of people who
move—but only as a contributing factor in the context of socio-economic and political
transformations”).
20.
Tacoli, supra note 8, at 44.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN
MOBILITY:
A
HUMANITARIAN
POINT
OF
VIEW
(2009),
available
at
2014]
809 There is little empirical evidence to suggest that natural resource scarcity
will be a direct cause of armed conflict. However, there are cases in which
increased competition over natural resources contributed to pre-existing
political and social tensions, ultimately leading to armed conflict (e.g.,
Darfur).24
In addition, there is still substantial uncertainty around the potential
magnitude of the problem with a wide range of predictions on the numbers
of people likely to be uprooted in the coming decades.25 In recent years, the
initial prediction that climate change will force millions of people to flee
their countries en masse has given way to a more nuanced discussion of
how the effects of climate change and potential adaptation or mitigation
measures will interact with other socio-economic, cultural, demographic,
and political factors to shape migration and mobility.26
Environmental change is influencing, and will increasingly
influence, environmental factors that drive people to move (e.g. site
habitability; land productivity; food, water and energy security; and
exposure to hazards). At the same time it will affect other drivers
(e.g. producer prices, employment opportunities, conflicts and
insecurity), both in source and in destination areas that can have
significant mobility consequences.27
II. EXISTING LEGAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS
In recognition of their specific needs and vulnerabilities, refugees,
internally displaced persons (“IDPs”), and international migrants are
entitled to certain protections as provided under international, national, and
https://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/climate%20change/climate_change_and_human_mo
bility-en.pdf.
24.
NORA DUDWICK ET AL., CREATING JOBS IN AFRICA’S FRAGILE STATES: ARE VALUE
CHAINS
THE
ANSWER?
(2011),
available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/06/21/000442464_201306211
20627/Rendered/PDF/786810PUB0EPI10ox0377351B00PUBLIC00.pdf; Eyes of Darfur, AMNESTY
INT’L (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.eyesondarfur.org/conflict.html.
25.
ASIAN DEV. BANK, CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/11673_ClimateChangeMigration.pdf.
26.
Tacoli, supra note 8, at 41.
27.
INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, COMPENDIUM OF IOM ACTIVITIES IN DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION AND RESILIENCE 14 (2013), available at https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/WhatWe-Do/docs/IOM-DRR-Compendium-2013-partI-II.pdf.
810
[Vol. 15
regional laws and institutional frameworks.28 Problematically, the character
of human movement linked to climate-related events does not always fit
well within current legal and institutional frameworks, leaving open the
question of when, and under what circumstances, people who move in the
context of climate change are entitled to unique rights and protection.
A. Cross-Border Climate-Related Movements
Those displaced across international borders as a result of natural
disasters or the effects of climate change are unlikely to be protected under
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee
Convention” or “Convention”), which is the key legal document defining
who is a refugee, refugees’ rights, and the legal obligations of states to
protect them.29 A “refugee” as defined under the Convention is someone
who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.30
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (“Refugee Status
Handbook”) under the Convention specifically states that the Convention
“rules out such persons as victims of famine or natural disaster, unless they
also have well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons stated.”31
In a recent decision, the High Court of New Zealand rejected a Kiribati
man’s request for asylum as a “climate change refugee.”32 In this case,
Ioane Teitiota argued he should be entitled to protection as a refugee
because rising sea levels and environmental hazards caused by climate
change were endangering his life on Kiribati, a low-lying island nation in
28.
See Asylum & the Rights of Refugees, INT’L JUSTICE RES. CTR.,
http://www.ijrcenter.org/refugee-law/ (last visited May 22, 2014) (listing human rights instruments that
grant protection for refugees).
29.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 137.
30.
Id. at art. 1, A(2).
31.
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees,
U.N.
Doc.
HCR/IP/4/ENG/REV1
(Jan.
1992),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html [hereinafter Handbook on Procedures]
32.
Teitiota v. Chief Exec. of the Ministry of Bus. Innovation & Employment, [2013] NZHC
3125 (N.Z.).
2014]
811 the South Pacific.33 The Court concluded that Teitiota’s claim fell short of
1951 Refugee Convention legal criteria because he was unable to show that
by returning to Kiribati, he would suffer “a sustained and systematic
violation of his basic human rights such as right to life . . . or the right to
adequate food, clothing and housing.”34
Jane McAdam and others have extensively examined whether other
international or regional legal instruments, human rights principles, or
complementary protection mechanisms might provide grounds for
protection for those crossing an international border as a result of climaterelated events ,with unsatisfying results.35 In short, there is no international
law providing a clear and secure basis for protection for those forced to flee
their countries as a result of natural disasters or the effects of climate
change.36
B. Internal Displacement
As mentioned above, experts believe that the majority of people
displaced by climate-related events will be internally displaced, in which
case the UN Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement (“Guiding
Principles”) may provide a protection framework.37 While non-binding, the
Guiding Principles are drawn from international humanitarian, human
rights, and analogous refugee law. They provide standards for the provision
of protection and assistance to IDPs and have been incorporated into
national law in some countries.38 Under the Guiding Principles, IDPs are
defined as:
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
33.
34.
35.
Id. ¶ 13–15, 21(41).
Id. ¶ 54.
See, e.g., JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE DISPLACEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW:
COMPLIMENTARY
PROTECTION
STANDARDS,
(2011),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/4dff16e99.html.
36.
Id. at 7.
37.
KOLMANNSKOG, supra note 13, at 3, 16.
38.
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, INCORPORATING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT INTO DOMESTIC LAW: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 3–4 (Walter Kälin et al. eds., 2010),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/19%20internal%20displacement/0119_i
nternal_displacement_complete.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014).
812
[Vol. 15
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized state border.39
According to the Guiding Principles, national governments are
responsible for providing assistance and protection to IDPs in recognition
of their rights.40
Once persons have been displaced, they retain a broad range of
economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, including the
right to basic humanitarian assistance (such as food, medicine,
shelter), the right to be protected from physical violence, the right
to education, freedom of movement and residence, political rights
such as the right to participate in public affairs and the right to
participate in economic activities . . . . Displaced persons also have
the right to assistance from competent authorities in voluntary,
dignified, and safe return, resettlement or local integration,
including help in recovering lost property and possessions. When
restitution is not possible, the Guiding Principles call for
compensation or just reparation.41
There are several regional agreements that adopt the Guiding
Principles’ protection framework including the 2009 Kampala Convention
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
and the 2006 Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to
Internally Displaced Persons, both of which are legally binding for ratifying
countries and cover those displaced by natural disasters.42 In particular,
Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Kampala Convention provides that “States
Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been
39.
U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Comm. On Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998), available at http://daccessdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G98/104/93/PDF/G9810493.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter Guiding
Principles].
40.
Id.
41.
Questions
and
Answers
About
IDPs,
U.N.
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Issues.aspx (last visited May 1, 2014).
42.
See AFRICAN UNION, AFRICAN UNION CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION AND
ASSISTANCE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA (KAMPALA CONVENTION) (2009),
available
at
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_FOR_THE_PROTECTIO
N_AND_ASSISTANCE_OF_INTERNALLY_DISPLACED_PERSONS_IN_AFRICA_(KAMPALA_
CONVENTION).pdf [hereinafter KAMPALA CONVENTION]; INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE, THE
GREAT LAKES PACT AND THE RIGHTS OF DISPLACED PEOPLE: A GUIDE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY 12 (2008),
available at http://www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/2008/GLReport.Sep2008.pdf.
2014]
813 internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including
climate change.”43
1. Voluntary or Forced?
There are at least three protection gaps with respect to the applicability
of the Guiding Principles to those internally displaced as a result of the
anticipated effects of climate change. The first arises from the fact that the
Guiding Principles require that the movement be “forced.” According to the
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (“IDMC”), “[t]he non-voluntary
nature of the movement is central to the definition of displacement. It
includes people forced from their homes or evacuated in order to avoid the
effects or a threat of natural disaster.”44
However, in the context of climate-related movement, there are no
widely accepted guidelines for determining at what point such movement is
voluntary or forced. There is little dispute that in the case of acute,
immediate-onset weather events, like floods or storms, flight will be
considered involuntary, entitling those affected to protection as IDPs. This
is also true where people are prevented from returning to highly vulnerable
locations after an extreme hazard event or are resettled from hazard-prone
areas.45
The voluntariness of movement is much more difficult to decipher in
cases resulting from changes in climate that lead to loss of livelihood. The
loss of livelihood (e.g., repeated crop failures, collapse of fisheries) will
eventually motivate people to move where adaption is not possible and if
alternative livelihoods or economic opportunities are not available. This
movement will be “planned,” but not necessarily voluntary if the person has
no other option but to “leave or die here.” However, it will be difficult to
determine at what point in time the decision to move actually becomes a
last resort and can be considered involuntary or forced.
While it is easy to distinguish between internal and external
movements, the distinction between forced and voluntary
movement will become increasingly blurred with new forms and
patterns of movements emerging. The Chairperson of the 2011
43.
44.
45.
KAMPALA CONVENTION, supra note 42, at art. 5 ¶ 4.
IDMC, supra note 7, at 10.
See generally ROGER ZETTER, PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE:
DEVELOPING THE CAPACITY OF LEGAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS (2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4da2b6189.pdf (discussing the legal framework of environmentally displaced
persons).
814
[Vol. 15
Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement
acknowledged the ‘complexity of drawing a sharp distinction
between “voluntary” and “forced” migration (displacement)
spurred by environmental and development factors’ and concludes
that ‘[m]otivation is a continuum, with “voluntary” at one end of
the spectrum, in a gradual transition to “forced” at the other.’46
Although there is no widely accepted definition of involuntary
displacement in the context of slow-onset climate-related events, there is
some consensus around drawing the line between voluntary and involuntary
movement at the point in time when an area becomes uninhabitable. For
example, Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer take the position that for slowonset environmental degradation:
[s]uch deterioration may not necessarily cause displacement, but it
may prompt people to consider migration as a way to adapt to the
changing environment, and explain why people move to regions
with better living conditions and income opportunities. However, if
areas become uninhabitable over time because of further
deterioration, finally leading to complete desertification, permanent
flooding of coastal zones or similar situations, population
movements will amount to forced displacement and become
permanent.47
The World Bank takes the view that “[i]nvoluntary displacement occurs
when the decision of moving is made and imposed by an external agent and
when there is no possibility to stay.”48 This is close to Kälin’s distinction
for internal migrants who he concludes are “[t]hose who decide to leave
their homes and places of habitual residence because of effects of climate
change, such as a deteriorating environment negatively affecting the
46.
KÄLIN & SCHREPFER, supra note 12, at 22 (internal citations omitted).
47.
Id. at 14; see also ELIZABETH FERRIS, PROTECTION AND PLANNED RELOCATIONS IN
THE
CONTEXT
OF
CLIMATE
CHANGE
25
(2012),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/8/protection%20climate%20change%20f
erris/protection%20climate%20change%20ferris.pdf (concluding that classification of the movement as
forced requires an understanding of “when an area is determined to be (a) uninhabitable [or at risk of
becoming such that relocation is necessary], and (b) when the cause of the uninhabitability is the result
of the effects of climate change.”).
48.
According to the World Bank: “Involuntary displacement can be caused by
environmental degradation, natural disasters, conflicts or development projects. It is associated with loss
of housing, shelter, income, land, livelihoods, assets, access to resources and services, among others.”
Social Development Involuntary Resettlement, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/MRNITY6XN0
2014]
815 production of food, but are not forced to leave or flee as life still would be
possible there.”49
Both the “habitability” test and the “possibility to stay” test have
inherent difficulties. The “habitability” test has the advantage of focusing
on external, physical factors—like fresh water availability or hazard risk—
which tends to be more objective. The main problem with this definition of
involuntary movement is that “[u]ninhabitability may be a dynamic
continuum rather than a definitive end-state.”50
The “possibility to stay” test, on the other hand, focuses more on the
subjective situation of those affected—and what alternatives they have
available to them—making it much more difficult to draw broad
distinctions. Under the “possibility to stay” test it may be possible for some
people to find alternative livelihoods and ways to adapt due to resources
and skill levels, but not for the poorest members of the community or those
who lack skills. For example, how will slow-onset, climate-related changes
affect the ability of the school teacher to stay versus the fisherman or
farmer? The highly subjective nature of the test makes it less desirable.
Regardless of which approach is used, both risk creating a perverse policy
incentive whereby States may be willing or obligated to provide protection
and assistance to vulnerable populations only after the situation turns dire
or the harm is imminent, thereby dis-incentivizing more planned
movements that could save costs, and potentially lives.
2. Is the Trigger Event a “Disaster”?
Complicating the lack of clarity on what is meant by “forced”
displacement is the requirement in the Guiding Principles that the trigger
event be a “disaster,” which is not defined therein.51 According to the UN
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (“UNISDR”) a “disaster” is
“[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society
causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses
which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using
its own resources.”52 This definition is useful, although it may preclude
smaller-scale, recurrent, or compounding climate-related events (e.g.,
repeated flooding or poor rainfall leading to decreasing agricultural yields),
which may affect people in different ways at different times. Must a
49.
KÄLIN & SCHREPFER, supra note 12, at 26.
50.
FERRIS, supra note 47, at 25.
51.
KÄLIN ET AL., supra note 38.
52.
Terminology, U.N. INT’L STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION (Aug. 30, 2007),
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology.
816
[Vol. 15
climate-related event be declared a disaster before those displaced are
entitled to protection? Who should make this determination?
Some experts do not see the lack of a definition of “disaster” in the
Guiding Principles as a limitation. Walter Kälin, for example, concludes:
[e]ven though the Guiding Principles do not explicitly include
climate change as a cause of internal displacement, they list the
causes of internal displacement in a non-exhaustive manner. In
particular, they explicitly recognize natural and man-made disasters
as possible causes of displacement, irrespective of whether or not
they relate to changing climate patterns.53
However, the problem is that this presumes that the “changing climate
patterns” that drive displacement will always rise to the level of a
“disaster.” It is not inconceivable that situations will arise in which people
internally displaced by climate-related events and in need of protection and
assistance will not be able to access it because their predicament is not
considered acute or wide-scale enough to warrant a disaster declaration. In
the United States, for example, Native Alaskan communities threatened by
melting permafrost, increased storm surge, and rapid coastal erosion linked
to climate change have been unable to obtain government assistance under
America’s federal disaster law because their plight has not been declared a
disaster.54
3. Are Climate-related Events the Sole or Contributing Cause or Push
Factor?
A third protection gap with respect to the applicability of the Guiding
Principles to those internally displaced in the context of climate change
arises when the climate-related event is not the sole or direct cause of
human movement. It is well recognized that if a person’s decision to move
is motivated exclusively by economic considerations, he or she is
considered an economic migrant and not a displaced person or refugee.55 A
migrant is a person who:
53.
54.
KÄLIN & SCHREPFER, supra note 12, at 22.
Robin Bronen, Statutory Limits Prevent an Effective Response to Communities at
Climate
Risk,
TheGUARDIAN.COM
(May
16,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/may/16/statutory-limits-response-communities-climaterisk
55.
Handbook on Procedures, supra note 31, ¶ 62.
2014]
817 voluntarily leaves his [home] in order to take up residence
elsewhere. He may be moved by the desire for change or adventure,
or by family or other reasons of a personal nature. If he is moved
exclusively by economic considerations, he is an economic migrant
(and not a displaced person or refugee).56
Thus, in the case of slower-onset climate-related events, the question arises
regarding whether the event or change was the primary or exclusive cause
of the movement.
While the nature of the displacement-migration continuum makes it
difficult to make a clear-cut determination between climate-related
displacement and voluntary or economic migration, the Refugee Status
Handbook can serve as a useful model:
It may be assumed that, unless he seeks adventure or just wishes to
see the world, a person would not normally abandon his home and
country without some compelling reason. There may be many
reasons that are compelling and understandable, but only one
motive has been singled out to denote a refugee. The expression
‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted’—for the reasons
stated—by indicating a specific motive automatically makes all
other reasons for escape irrelevant to the definition.57
A similar argument could be made for determining status as a climaterelated displaced person. Climate-related events may not be the only factors
that contribute to mobility, but by making the same assumptions that “a
person would not normally abandon his home and country without some
compelling reason,” then those displaced by climate-related events should
not need to demonstrate that climate change was the sole cause of the flight.
III. EXPERIENCE FROM THE FIELD
Refugees International’s experience in assessing the response to
climate-related humanitarian emergencies in the past several years provides
some important contextual examples of the institutional and operational
challenges to protecting people displaced by climate-related events. The
56.
57.
Id.
Id. ¶ 39.
818
[Vol. 15
experiences below shed light on protection gaps that occurred in the
response to acute and protracted flooding in Pakistan and Colombia in 2010
and 2011, and increased rainfall variability and recurrent food crises in the
Sahel region of West Africa.58
A. The Pakistan and Colombia Floods: Acute, Rapid-Onset Disasters
1. Background
In 2010, Pakistan experienced the worst flooding in its history.59 Flash
floods in the country’s mountainous north—brought on by a massive and
unprecedented amount of rain—tore away roads, bridges, and entire
villages. As rain continued to fall over the next several months, the massive
deluge of water moved south, ultimately submerging one fifth of the
country’s land mass, an area the size of Great Britain. More than 18 million
people were affected, 9 million of whom were left homeless.60
Meanwhile, halfway across the globe, one of the strongest La Niña
episodes in a century was wreaking havoc in Colombia.61 By December
58.
The information contained in this report is based on both desk research and field visits
by Refugees International (“RI”) staff to Pakistan in September 2010 and July–August 2011, to
Colombia in March 2011 and February 2012, and to Burkina Faso and Niger in 2012. During field
visits, RI visited affected areas and conducted confidential interviews with affected individuals, and
local and international stakeholders For more information on RI’s findings, please see ALICE THOMAS &
RENATA RENDÓN, REFUGEES INT’L, CONFRONTING CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT: LEARNING FROM
PAKISTAN’S
FLOODS
6–10
(2010),
available
at
http://refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/ConfrontingClimateDisplacement.pdf;
ALICE
THOMAS, REFUGEES INT’L, SURVIVING ALONE: IMPROVING ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA’S FLOOD
VICTIMS
i–ii
(2011),
available
at
http://refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/Surviving_Alone_FINAL2.pdf;
Alice
Thomas,
Pakistan: Flood Survivors Still Struggling to Recover, REFUGEES INT’L (Aug. 31, 2011),
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/pakistan-flood-survivors-still-strugglingrecover; Alice Thomas, Colombia: Flood Response Improves, but Challenges Remain, REFUGEES INT’L
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/colombia-flood-responseimproves-challenges-remain; Alice Thomas, Sahel: Recurrent Climate Shocks Propel Migration;
Resilience
Efforts
Face
Challenges,
REFUGEES
INT’L
(Aug.
1,
2013),
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/sahel-recurrent-climate-shocks-propelmigration-resilience-efforts-face-challeng [hereinafter Sahel Report].
59.
Pakistan Floods Still Claiming Lives, Six Months On, BBC NEWS SOUTH ASIA (Jan.
28, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12308913.
60.
U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFS. (“U.N. OCHA”),
PAKISTAN
FLOOD
RELIEF
AND
EARLY
RESPONSE
PLAN—REVISION
1
(2010),
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/Revision_2010_Pakistan_FRERRP_SCREEN.pdf.
61.
See generally DARA, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INDEX—FOCUS ON COLOMBIA
(2011),
available
at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HRI2011_Focus_on_colombia.pdf (discussing the
effect of several flood events, including the 2010 La Niña floods).
2014]
819 2010, ninety-three percent of the country’s municipalities were
experiencing floods and landslides, forcing President Santos to declare a
state of emergency. 62 Repeated and heavy rains persisted through the
normally dry months. By the end of 2011, close to 5 million people had
been affected, and thousands displaced, some several times.63
In the case of humanitarian emergencies arising from climate-related
events—whether sudden or slow-onset—the most immediate way to protect
and meet the needs of those forced to flee is implementation of a timely and
effective system for responding. National governments bear the primary
responsibility for assisting and protecting their citizens when natural
disasters strike. Most governments, especially those in disaster-prone
countries, have adopted disaster response and management laws and
systems, to effectuate this responsibility, and disaster management
institutions at the national, regional, and local levels to implement these
laws and systems. Given their high exposure to frequent flooding and other
natural hazards,64 both Pakistan and Colombia have relatively advanced
disaster management laws, procedures, and institutions.
The UN has also adopted a “cluster system” for responding to
humanitarian emergencies when called upon by national governments to
assist.65 In order to ensure coordination and maximize service delivery,
clusters composed of UN agencies and national and international
nongovernmental organizations coordinate their activities around a specific
humanitarian service or “cluster” (e.g. food, water, sanitation and hygiene,
etc.).66 In each cluster, an agency is designated as the “cluster lead” to lead
coordinate programming with other humanitarian actors and the
government and collect information about the situation on the ground.67
62.
U.N. OCHA, COLOMBIA—FLOODING/WINDSTORM IN PUTUMAYO DEPARTMENT,
SITUATION REPORT NO. 1 (Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/colombiafloodingwindstorm-putumayo-department-situation-report-no-1.
63.
Id.; DARA, supra note 61, at 2, 5.
64.
Colombia is ranked 10th on the list of countries with the highest level of risk to natural
hazards, and has the highest recurrence of extreme events in South America. Colombia Dashboard,
WORLD
BANK,
http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=COL&ThisTab=
NaturalHazards (last visited May 1, 2014). Pakistan is also exposed to a number of natural hazards and
has the highest risk of floods in South Asia. Earthquakes have caused the highest number of fatalities
while floods occur most frequently and affect the largest number of people. The monsoon rains, which
occur from July through September, result in frequent and severe flooding in the Indus River Basin
where millions of people live in low-lying areas. Pakistan Dashboard, WORLD BANK,
http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=PAK&ThisTab=
NaturalHazards (last visited May 1, 2014).
65.
Cluster Coordination, U.N. OCHA, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordinationtools/cluster-coordination (last visited May 1, 2014).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
820
[Vol. 15
This information is meant to help identify and assess current needs and
gaps, agencies’ capacity to respond, and the rate of progress.68 In the case
of the Pakistan floods, the government called on the international
community for assistance, thereby activating the cluster system. In
Colombia, the national government, which felt it had the capacity to
respond effectively to the floods, took the lead and the international
community had a far more limited role.
2. Operational and Institutional Gaps in the Response
The massive and unprecedented scale of the floods in Pakistan and
Colombia would have created enormous challenges under any
circumstances. Nonetheless, in the context of sudden-onset, climate-related
disasters, three operational or institutional gaps warrant particular attention,
as they appeared to create the biggest barriers to assistance and protection.
a. Failure to Implement Disaster Management Laws and Procedures on
a Local Level
The floods in Pakistan and Colombia both exposed a serious lack of
implementation of national disaster management laws and procedures at the
local level. Given the wide geographic scope of the floods in both countries,
provincial and local disaster management bodies were invariably the first—
and sometimes the only—responders.69
In Colombia, provincial and local response authorities lacked the staff
and resources necessary to address the widespread nature of the disaster,
which, at its height, affected ninety-three percent of municipalities.70 While
local disaster response committees (“CLOPADs”) in some areas proved
successful in preparing for the floods, in many municipalities, “citizens
complained that their CLOPAD either did not exist or did not know what it
was doing.”71 Even where CLOPADs were operational, municipalities had
extremely limited funds to prepare for and respond to the floods. As a
result, they were largely dependent on outside assistance, which was
68.
Id.
69.
Undoubtedly, lack of staff and other shortcomings at the national level was a problem.
In the case of Pakistan, for example, the National Disaster Management Authority (“NDMA”) had only
twenty-one staff and a limited annual budget at the time the floods hit. JENNIFER MCKAY ET AL., NAT’L
DISASTER MGMT AUTH., PRIME MINISTER’S SECRETARIAT ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN 2010 FLOOD RELIEF:
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: OBSERVATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2011), available at
http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Documents/flood_2010/lesson_learned/Pakistan%202010%20Flood%20Relief
-Learning%20from%20Experience.pdf.
70.
SURVIVING ALONE, supra note 58, at 1, 17.
71.
Id. at 10.
2014]
821 inadequate and often extremely slow in arriving.72 This occurred despite the
fact that at the national level, the government had been quite successful in
marshaling significant funds for the response.
In Pakistan, recent changes to the disaster management system that decentralized authority had not been fully implemented. 73 The Provincial
Disaster Management Agency (“PDMA”) in the hardest hit province,
Sindh, was significantly under-resourced and unprepared, while the
PDMAs in Punjab and Baluchistan, two other heavily affected provinces,
did not yet exist.74
Given increasing evidence that floods, storms, and other hydrometeorological events are becoming more frequent and intense,
overwhelming the capacity of even the most developed countries to
respond, current disaster management laws and systems must be revised
and enhanced. In doing so, governments must ensure that disaster
management laws and procedures are fully implemented at the local and
community levels, as well as adequately funded through, for example,
mandatory disaster relief budget set-asides.
b. Slow and Insufficient Early Recovery Programs
Despite the massive scale of displacement, in both Pakistan and
Colombia, the vast majority of people returned as soon as the floodwaters
receded—and in some cases even sooner than that—in order to salvage
assets and begin rebuilding their lives.75
Returning populations faced many of the same needs and vulnerabilities
as displaced persons. Most returned to houses and belongings which were
damaged or destroyed, and were forced to live in unsafe, makeshift shelters
next to their former houses. Many lacked access to clean water and
sanitation, and children especially suffered from dehydration, diarrhea, and
72.
73.
74.
Id. at 10–11.
MCKAY, supra note 69, at 2.
ARIF AZAD & HELEN MCELHINNEY, READY OR NOT: PAKISTAN’S RESILIENCE TO
DISASTERS
ONE
YEAR
ON
FROM
THE
FLOODS
18
(2011),
available
at
http://www.oxfam.org.nz/sites/default/files/reports/bp150-ready-not-pakistan-resilience-disastersfloods-260711-en.pdf.
75.
Lindsey Brickle & Alice Thomas, Rising Waters, Displaced Lives, 45 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 34, 34 (2014). Overcrowded, unsafe, and unsanitary conditions in shelters and camps
also motivated people to return. Those who did not return voluntarily were ultimately forced to do so as
a result of government policies requiring that camps and shelters be closed after a certain period of time
following the disaster, even for those who had nowhere to go. Id.
822
[Vol. 15
other illnesses.76 The floods also destroyed crops and livestock, resulting in
increased food insecurity and loss of livelihoods.
Given the quick rate at which displaced people returned home, early
recovery programs provided an important opportunity to help them get back
up on their feet more quickly and increase resilience to future shocks. For
example, in Pakistan, a timely seed distribution program allowed millions
of affected farmers who lost crops in the floods to plant in time for the
winter harvest, thereby avoiding a food crisis. Early interventions in the
health, water, and sanitation sectors were also lauded for averting the
spread of water-borne illnesses. In addition, cash compensation and cash for
work programs provided a much-needed injection of resources that allowed
affected families to meet early recovery needs.
Yet in both countries there was insufficient funding for implementation
of early recovery programs especially in the shelter and livelihood sectors.
In Pakistan, the emergency response by the clusters tended to focus on
camps, despite the fact that large numbers of people had already returned
home.77 As one UN official noted, “[b]y the time we finished setting up the
camps, they were empty . . . . We needed a returned strategy, not a return
strategy.”78 This was due in part to the government’s decision to bifurcate
the emergency response and early recovery phases of the flood response.
When the UN Development Programme (“UNDP”), the agency that leads
the early recovery cluster, finally released the Strategic Early Recovery
Action Plan in April 2011(eight months after the floods hit),79 it failed to
garner strong financial support from either donors or the Pakistani
government, which was then emphasizing developmental interventions
instead.80
In Colombia, the slow pace of construction of transitional shelters was
of particular concern. Many families who lost homes were displaced three
or four times while awaiting completion of transitional housing. 81 In
addition, the lack of early recovery livelihood programs made it especially
difficult for poor households because the government stopped delivering
food aid to most areas at the end of 2011 despite continuing need.82
76.
See generally Haider Warraich et al., Floods in Pakistan: A Public Health Crisis, 89
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 236 (2011), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/3/10083386/en/ (discussing the health crisis associated with flooding that occurred in Pakistan in 2010).
77.
U.N. OCHA, supra note 60, at 48.
78.
Brickle & Thomas, supra note 75, at 34.
79.
Pakistan: Flood Survivors Still Struggling to Recover, supra note 58.
80.
Id.
81.
82.
Colombia: Flood Response Improves, But Challenges Remain, supra note 58.
2014]
823 While meeting the life-saving needs of those displaced by disasters
should always be a priority, experience shows that the failure to address
their recovery needs – especially for secure shelter and livelihoods -- can
prolong displacement and increase vulnerability. Especially in the context
of rapid-onset disasters where displaced populations often return as soon as
possible, humanitarian actors must increase their focus on identifying ways
to help vulnerable populations get back on their feet more quickly and
become self-sufficient. Early recovery programs must start immediately,
and early recovery must be incorporated across all clusters when identifying
and prioritizing needs. In addition, national governments and major
humanitarian donors like the U.S. should increase funding for early
recovery programs which are often the most underfunded sectors.
c. Need for a Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response
A third shortcoming in the humanitarian response to the Pakistan and
Colombia floods was the lack of a rights-based approach as outlined in the
Guiding Principles.83 As is the case with most natural disasters, the floods
in Pakistan and Colombia had a disproportionate impact on the most
vulnerable, including women, ethnic minorities, the poor, and those who
had been previously displaced by conflict. In both Pakistan and Colombia,
initial flood-relief activities failed to fully account for the vulnerabilities of
these groups, thereby creating protection risks.84
In Pakistan, women in particular struggled to access government cash
assistance through the Watan Cards, which were issued based on possession
of a Computerized National Identity Card (“CNIC”).85 Since most women
were registered in the name of a male relative, widows and female-headed
households who lacked their own CNIC cards had trouble accessing their
Watan Cards.86 Moreover, benefits were not always distributed based on
83.
KÄLIN ET AL., supra note 38. See also Garrett Bradford, Learning from Natural
Disasters, REFUGEES INT’L BLOG (June 7, 2011), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/blog/learningnatural-disasters (noting how Alice Thomas has urged a rights-based approach for Pakistan and
Colombia in relation to disasters experienced by those countries).
84.
Anastasia Moloney, Colombia Flood Victims at Risk as Rainy Season Looms,
THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2012, 7:27 PM), http://www.trust.org/item/20120323192700n1aeu; Chris Lom, Pakistan—After the Deluge, MIGRATION, Winter 2010, at 4, 5; Elaine Engeler, Mass
Communications Programme Talks & Listens to Pakistan’s Flood Victims, MIGRATION, Winter 2010, at
8, 9; SURVIVING ALONE, supra note 56, at i; PROT. THEMATIC WORKING GRP., U.N. HIGH COMM’R. FOR
REFUGEES, RAPID PROTECTION ASSESSMENT REPORT PAKISTAN FLOODS 2011 16–23 (2011), available
at http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=S2FrJAwh35U%3D&tabid=112&mid=780.
85.
RICCARDO POLASTRO, ET AL., INTER-AGENCY REAL TIME EVALUATION OF THE
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN’S 2010 FLOOD CRISIS 43 (2011), available at
http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Final-Report-RTE-Pakistan-2011.pdf.
86.
Id. at 53.
824
[Vol. 15
need, but often upon relationships with local officials or proximity to urban
areas, meaning that some of the most vulnerable groups could not access
any assistance.87
Part of the problem in Colombia was the fact that the government
instituted separate legal and institutional frameworks for responding to
displacement from man-made versus natural disasters. In the case of the
2010 floods, this meant that flood IDPs were not entitled to the same rights
and protections as those displaced by conflict because Colombia’s Internal
Displacement Law does not include those displaced by natural disasters
within the definition of “internally displaced persons” (in contrast to the
Guiding Principles which extend protection to those displaced by natural
disasters). 88 Thus, none of the existing institutions, protocols, and
procedures for responding to conflict-related displacement, which are quite
well developed and effective given the country’s long history with internal
conflict, was considered or implemented during the flood response because
they did not apply.89 Moreover, despite lack of assistance and widespread
discrimination in the provision of relief, flood IDPs did not have the same
legal recourse provided to conflict IDPs.
In contrast, Pakistan’s system relies on the same disaster management
authorities to respond to both conflict-related and natural disaster
emergencies. 90 This resulted in important operational efficiencies, most
notably in Khyber Pakhtunkwa (“KP”), a province in northwestern Pakistan
where the flash floods first hit.91 There, the PDMA had substantial prior
experience working with humanitarian agencies, as well as the Pakistani
army, in response to displacement caused by both the 2005 earthquake and
the 2008–2009 Taliban insurgency and subsequent government-led counterinsurgency.92 However, because Pakistan has not adopted any law or policy
related to the rights of IDPs, the PDMAs and the National Disaster
Management Authority (“NDMA”) are not required to implement a rights-
87.
Id. at 36.
88.
KÄLIN ET AL., supra note 38; see also L. 387, julio 24, 1997, 43,091 DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O] (Colom.) (applying protections to only those displaced by conflict).
89.
FARC-EP and PDAGs Cause Mass Displacements on Venezuela Border, MONTHLY
HUMANITARIAN BULL.: COLOM. 1, 6 (2013).
90.
91.
Id.
92.
See INT’L DEV. COMM., HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE
PAKISTAN FLOODS: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE’S SEVENTH REPORT OF SESSION
2010–12
2
(2011),
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/1435/1435.pdf (explaining how
the previous response to the 2005 earthquake strengthened the response to the 2010 floods).
2014]
825 based approach to displacement, such as the one prescribed by the Guiding
Principles, regardless of the cause. 93
Prior to the floods, both countries had large populations of people
displaced by conflict (IDPs in the case of Colombia, Afghan refugees and
IDPs in the case of Pakistan). Given their preexisting vulnerabilities—
including poverty and lack of secure land tenure in many cases—these
groups proved particularly vulnerable both in terms of exposure to the flood
hazard (many lived on marginal, flood and landslide-prone lands) and
discrimination in the response. For example, thousands of Afghan refugees
living in a settlement outside Peshawar that was decimated by the floods
were prevented from rebuilding after the flood events, ostensibly due to the
area’s susceptibility to flooding, even though they had resided there for
decades.94 However, many viewed it as an opportunity for the government
to push Afghan refugees off of the land.95
Conflict IDPs in Colombia faced similar challenges. According to the
national Ombudsman’s Office, IDPs were more susceptible to flooding to
begin with because conflict had driven them into otherwise undesirable land
in high-risk areas.96 The Colombian human rights organization CODHES
(La Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento)
estimated that four in ten people affected by the floods were conflict IDPs.97
Moreover, many live in areas of the country where the government lacks
access and control due to the presence of illegal armed groups, making it
harder for assistance to reach them.
In responding to major disasters like the floods in Pakistan and
Colombia, addressing the unique protection needs of the more vulnerable
sectors of the population is essential. Waiting until after the disaster hits
will make identifying those risks and vulnerabilities far more challenging.
Thus, national governments and others involved in the humanitarian
response must put in place laws, protocols and procedures that recognize
physical, social, and economic inequities. Moreover, ensuring that the
disaster response recognizes and prioritizes the needs of poor, marginalized,
and disenfranchised populations requires the adoption of rights-based
disaster management frameworks that treat those affected or displaced by
natural disasters as rights-holders, not as beneficiaries of disaster relief,
93.
AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, supra note 38.
94.
THOMAS & RENDÓN, supra note 58, at 12.
95.
See id. (highlighting the risk of refugees to be displaced without protective
mechanisms).
96.
SURVIVING ALONE, supra note 58, at 9.
97.
Bruno Moro, Note from the Humanitarian Coordinator in U.N. OFFICE FOR THE
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFS., EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND COLOMBIA: ANNUAL REPORT
2010 1 (2010).
826
[Vol. 15
along with accountability procedures like Ombudsmans’ offices or legal
recourse mechanisms that empower them to enforce those rights.
B. Erratic Rainfall and Recurrent Drought in West Africa’s Sahel
West Africa’s Sahel region provides a contrasting example of the way
in which slowly unfolding climate-related changes can combine with other
factors to propel human movement. Many experts have asserted that
migration can provide an important adaptation strategy for people living in
areas that become less and less habitable due to the effects of climate
change.98 This is especially true in parts of the world like the Sahel where
migration has long been used as a way for younger members of the
household to attain new skills and work opportunities offering higher wages
while sending home remittances to supplement their families’ income. Less
well understood is when migration becomes a “negative” coping strategy
that actually increases the vulnerability of households to climate-related
shocks, as described below.
1. Rainfall Variability, Recurrent Drought, and Growing Food Insecurity in
the Sahel
The Sahel is a semi-arid swath of grasslands and shrubs that borders the
Sahara Desert. It is home to many of the world’s poorest countries, and
malnutrition rates in many areas regularly exceed the emergency threshold
of 15 percent. 99 In Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad, almost fifty
percent of children below the age of five are chronically malnourished. 100
The Sahel region’s fragile environment and susceptibility to drought
contribute to the food insecurity among its people, eighty percent of whom
rely on rain-fed agriculture for their livelihoods.101
Explosive population growth means that the Sahel’s population of more
than 100 million people will double in 25 years. 102 Sahelian countries also
experience frequent political instability, with the separatist insurgency and
98.
Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to
Climate Change (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5270, 2010).
99.
Rank for Sahel Countries: Niger 186/186; Chad 184; Burkina Faso183; Mali 182; The
Gambia 165; Mauritania 155; Senegal 154; Nigeria 153; Cameroon 150. Chris Whong, Human
Development Index and its Components, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, https://data.undp.org/dataset/Table-1Human-Development-Index-and-its-components/wxub-qc5k (last updated Dec. 8, 2013).
100.
Sahel Report, supra note 58.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
2014]
827 military coup d’etat in Mali being the most recent example.103 In addition,
the historic trade routes traversing the region have proven highly vulnerable
to terrorist and criminal networks that present regional and global security
risks.104
Although the Sahel region is prone to droughts, over the past decade,
marked changes in rainfall patterns have emerged.105 By some observations,
temperatures have risen between 0.2 and 0.8 degrees Centigrade.106 Rains
have become more erratic in terms of quantity, timing, and geographic
scope,107 making droughts and poor harvests more frequent.108At the same
time, flooding has also become more acute. In 2012, severe floods in Niger
and Chad displaced more than a million people while flooding in northern
Nigeria displaced more than 6 million.109 Numerous climate experts have
attributed these changes in rainfall patterns to global warming, and there is
strong consensus that in the coming decades, the region will experience
more unpredictable weather accompanied by temperature rise in the range
of 7 to 10ᵒ Fahrenheit by mid-century.110
These changes are, in turn, having enormous impacts on the Sahel’s
livestock herders (pastoralists) and farmers who rely on crops to feed their
animals (agro-pastoralists), given their dependence on rainfall for their
livelihoods. This is especially the case for agro-pastoralists, for whom
proper forecasting of the timing, location, and quantity of precipitation is
crucial for planting. Pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities in Burkina
103.
Id.
104.
For a more thorough analysis of current governance and security challenges facing the
Sahel, see U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel Region, ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. S/2013/354 (Jun. 14, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2013/2013-0920_SG_Report_Sahel_EN.pdf.
105.
MOUSSA NA ABOU, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND FOOD INSECURITY IN
MARADI
DISTRICT–NIGER
3,
7
(2010),
available
at
http://www.africaadapt.net/media/resources/784/ICID%20Paper_MOUSSA%20NA%20ABOU%20Mamouda.pdf;
Sharon E. Nicholson, The West African Sahel: A Review of Recent Studies on the Rainfall Regime and
Its Interannual Variability, INT’L SCHOLARLY RES. NOTICES METEOROLOGY, 1, 1–2 (2013), available
at http://www.hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2013/453521/ (discussing the history of drought in the Sahel
region and a change in the region’s storm systems).
106.
BENOÎT SARR, Present and Future Climate Change in the Semi-Arid Region of West
Africa: a Crucial Input for Practical Adaptation in Agriculture, ATMOSPHERIC SCI. LETTERS 108
(2012), available at http://www.agrhymet.ne/portailCC/images/pdf/asl_368_Rev_EV.pdf.
107.
ABOU, supra note 105; Nicholson, supra note 105.
108.
MALCOM POTTS ET AL., CRISIS IN THE SAHEL—POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION 1, 14 (2013), available at http://bixby.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/potts_2013_oasis_crisis_in_the_sahel.pdf.
109.
IDMC, supra note 7.
110.
POTTS ET AL., supra note 108, at 9. Another helpful report about the information in this
paragraph is U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE AND VARIABILITY IN THE SAHEL REGION:
IMPACTS AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (2006), available at
http://www.unep.org/Themes/Freshwater/Documents/pdf/ClimateChangeSahelCombine.pdf.
828
[Vol. 15
Faso and Niger reported being highly aware of abnormal and harmful
changes in temperatures and rainfall patterns that were directly
undermining their ability to feed their families.111
In 2012, poor rains combined with high food prices across the Sahel
region resulted in a food crisis that left 18 million people without sufficient
food and put one million children at risk of starvation. 112 The crisis
followed on droughts in 2005 and 2009.113 The recurrent nature of these
shocks suggest that the poorest households are unlikely to be able to
recover in the intervening time before the next crisis hits, rendering them
more and more vulnerable and less prepared to withstand the next shock.
A recent food security trend analysis conducted by the UN World Food
Programme in Niger found that two years after the 2009 crop failure, poor
households in Niger had not recovered, despite above average crop yields in
2010. Worse yet, in roughly a third of districts, resiliency levels (measured
in terms of the extent to which households resorted to negative coping
strategies like eating less, borrowing, and selling assets) were even lower in
2010 than in 2009.114 In short, evidence suggests that it takes most poor
households more than a year to recover from a drought or other crisis, and a
single crisis can continue to have negative impacts beyond one growing
season.
All this leads to the question of the extent to which these changes are
resulting in increased levels of migration, new types of migration, or forced
migration. Interviews with affected communities in Burkina Faso and Niger
in 2013 found evidence that increased climate variability—combined with
structural factors such as smaller plot sizes, consistently high food prices,
and population growth—meant that a significant number of poor
households felt they had no other choice but to leave their villages in search
of other forms of income. 115 For example, in food-insecure villages in
northern and central Burkina Faso, many people now seek work at artisanal
111.
112.
OXFAM, supra note 18.
113.
See generally Niger Food Crisis Timeline, BBC NEWS (July 20, 2005, 12:26 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4699643.stm (discussing the timeline of drought in Niger, a country in
the Sahel); Niger: On the Front Lines of the War Against Hunger, OXFAM (July 2010),
http://www.oxfam.org/en/en/emergencies/west-africa-food-crisis/niger-front-lines-war-againsthunger?utm_source=oxf.am&utm_medium=oRh&utm_content=redirect (discussing the drought in
Niger in 2009, a country in the Sahel).
114.
World Food Programme, Measuring Household Resilience to Food Insecurity in a
Shock-Prone Environment: A trend analysis in Niger, 2006–2011 (2011) (draft) (on file with author)
[hereinafter WFP].
115.
2014]
829 gold mines. 116 Conditions at many gold mining sites are extremely
dangerous and child labor is widespread with children as young as 12
working at local mining sites.117
In these instances, family members cannot afford to migrate
internationally to countries that might offer them opportunities like new
skills or higher wages.118 Rather, as a last resort, they go to urban centers to
engage in petty trade, or in the worse cases, to beg. This distress migration
is especially widespread during crisis years. One non-government
organization in Niger estimated that during the 2005 food crisis, 80 to 90
percent of people in some hard-hit areas were forced to leave their villages
to survive. 119 But exactly how many are leaving and for how long is not
entirely clear.
2. Need for Improved Monitoring and Understanding
Two important observations can be made from what is occurring in the
Sahel. First, the extent of migration and displacement in the context of
slower-onset climate-related changes is much harder to measure and less
understood. At present, there are no global estimates for the number of
people displaced by slower-onset disasters like droughts or food crises that
may evolve over several years because there are no widely accepted
methodologies for doing so.
The annual estimates of numbers of people displaced by natural
disasters compiled by IDMC do not include individuals displaced by
slower-onset disasters like droughts or more gradual changes linked to
global warming. 120 In addition, there are insufficient analyses of how
116.
Larry C. Price, The Cost of Gold in Burkina Faso: Holes, PULITZER CTR. (Aug. 5,
2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/burkina-faso-mining-gold-child-labor-holes (interviewing
children who dream of making “enough money so that [they] do not have to do this anymore”).
117.
Burkina Faso: Gold Rush Hits Education, INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORKS (Aug.
30, 2012), http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=96210; see also PBS NewsHour: Children
in Burkina Faso Take on Dirty, Dangerous Work of Digging Up Gold (PBS television broadcast July
10, 2013), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-dec13-burkinafaso_07-10/.
118.
JULIUS HOLT, FOOD ECON. GRP., SYNTHESIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE FIELD SURVEYS
COMPLETED DURING HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY ANALYSIS TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR THE SAHEL 16
(2011), available at http://www.hea-sahel.org/documents/Autres-publications/FEG-synthesis-reportHEA-studies-in-the-sahel_7.pdf. For more information, see U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE
CHANGE, CONFLICT AND MIGRATION IN THE SAHEL 8, 57 (2011), available at
http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_Sahel_EN.pdf; Sahel Report, supra note 58.
119.
Alice Thomas, Sahel Villagers Fleeing Climate Change Must Not Be Ignored,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2013, 7:38 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/2013/aug/02/sahel-climate-change-displacement-migration; Sahel Report, supra note 58.
120.
IDMC, supra note 7, at 10.
830
[Vol. 15
closely migration trends correlate with climate-related shocks, and whether
people migrate to urban areas, gold mines, or other agricultural areas.
Another crucial data gap is the positive or negative impacts on those
migrating and those left behind, and, significantly, the new protection risks
such movement creates. In regions like the Sahel, seasonal labor migration
both internally and to other more prosperous coastal countries has long
been a way for poor families to supplement income. There is an assumption
that certain types of labor migration can improve resilience by providing
alternative sources of household income during and in the aftermath of
droughts, food crises, and other shocks. Less understood is how high levels
of out-migration—both internally and internationally—during times of
crises can erode resilience and undermine both food security and the social
and economic wellbeing of vulnerable households.
Data on household coping strategies in the Sahel region suggest that
some forms of migration can have negative impacts on household
resilience. For example, according to a recent analysis by the UN WFP of
the time it took poor households in Niger to recover from the 2009 drought,
the least resilient households resorted to the highest levels of migration—as
well as asset and livestock sales—as a way to cope during and following
the drought.121 Moreover, it took these households at least three years to
recover from the drought despite a good harvest in 2010.122 Households
resorting to lower levels of migration recovered more quickly. Other multicountry studies also indicate that migration in response to increasing
rainfall variability may not always prove an effective adaption strategy .123
Thus, key to building resilience will be an understanding of when migration
helps build household resilience as well as when and under what
circumstances it can undermine it.
People who are forced to flee their homes for any reason inevitably face
risks, including exploitation and extortion, insufficient access to
employment and public services, gender-based violence, and damage to
family and community ties. Thus, it is crucial for governments, donors who
121.
122.
123.
WFP, supra note 114.
Id.
See WARNER ET AL, WHERE THE RAIN FALLS: CLIMATE CHANGE, FOOD AND
LIVELIHOOD
SECURITY,
AND
MIGRATION
17
(2012),
available
at
http://i.unu.edu/media/unu.edu/publication/31459/WTRF_Global_Policy_Report_smaller.pdf
(“Households with more diverse assets and access to a variety of adaptation, livelihood diversification,
or risk management options—through social networks, community or government support programmes,
and education—can use migration in ways that enhance resilience. Those households which have the
least access to such options—few or no livelihood diversification opportunities, no land, little
education—use (usually) internal migration during the hunger season as a survival strategy in an overall
setting of erosive coping measures which leave or trap such households at the margins of decent
existence.”) 2014]
831 support them, and researchers to increase their understanding of how
migration in the context of slow-onset disasters can either help or hurt those
affected. Major donors such as the United States and the European Union,
along with regional governments and aid agencies, must do more to
understand and respond to climate displacement, whether it occurs in the
Sahel or other parts of the globe.
IV.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The fact that natural disasters are affecting more and more people, as
well as the likelihood that climate change will cause an increase in extreme
weather events, points to a need for national governments to reconsider
their positive obligations to protect people displaced by the events. States
should anticipate and take measures to prevent or mitigate conditions likely
to bring about displacement and threaten human rights.
Of utmost importance is the need for states to improve their laws and
institutions to enhance disaster management capacity. It is critical that
governments ensure that disaster management systems are adequately
funded and fully implemented at the local and community level. New
procedures and mechanisms must also be put in place to strengthen
accountability and oversight, allow greater input by affected communities,
and improve access to complaint mechanisms. Central to the protection of
people displaced by natural disasters is the need for states to develop and
implement rights-based disaster management frameworks that treat those
affected or displaced by natural disasters as rights-holders, not as
beneficiaries of disaster relief.
Governments must improve procedures for protecting displaced
populations both during their displacement and upon return resettlement or
relocation. Experience shows that local government-run evacuation centers
are often poorly managed and fail to effectively protect IDPs. This is
especially true where schools are used as evacuation centers—as eviction is
necessary in order to allow schools to reopen.
In countries affected both by conflict and natural disasters, a
recommended approach to disaster management is to place responsibility
for responding to both man-made and natural disasters within the same
ministry or institution—as is the case in Pakistan—thereby building
capacity, promoting accountability, and maximizing allocation of resources.
National governments, international agencies, and donors must also do
far more to ensure that early recovery programs are funded and
implemented as early on in the response as possible. Especially in the case
of sudden-onset disasters like floods and storms in which populations tend
832
[Vol. 15
to return as soon as possible, the humanitarian response must focus more on
programs that restore livelihoods and increase resilience.
Finally, a better understanding is needed as to how climate-related
changes act in concert with other factors as a driver of mobility.
Information on mobility patterns is also essential for local governments that
will need to plan for provision of local services.124 Promoting migration as a
way for vulnerable communities to adapt to climate change will be
successful only if accompanied by an improved understanding of the links
between migration and vulnerability. In any context, migration must be
promoted as a way to increase the overall resiliency of those affected—not
as just a coping strategy.
124.
See generally Tacoli, supra note 8 (discussing what policymakers should account for in
relation to migration and climate change).

Volume 15 • Issue 4 - Vermont Journal of Environmental Law

Transcription

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