Politics in the Frontline: Local Civil

Transcription

PhilippinePolitical ScienceJournal 27 (50) 2006
Politics in the Frontline: Local Civil-Military Interactions in
Communist Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines
Rosalie Arcala Hall*
Abstract: This article examines the interaction of local army units and
town/village leaders in severalcommunist frontline communities in Southern
I/oilo, in the light of changes in the notional government's policy responSIq
after 1986. Civil-military engagement in the frontline is asymmetrical and
premised on different understandings of the nature and assessment of the
communist threat. For soldiers, the communists are embedded in the
community, and pose a serious threat. Locol leaders downplay the rebel
threat and view the communists as outsiders, but express a nuanced view of
the different roles locals ploy in the communist movement and factional
affiliation of rebels in theirarea. Except for paramilitary formation, the military
devises all counterinsurgency programs while civilian leaders and the police
are confined to implementation. The Municipal Peace and Order Councils
do not serve as institutional means for local civilian leaders to oversee
military operations, but rather as venues for local commands to obtain
logistical support. Civil-military interface on human rights concerns has
become less confrontational and oriented towards soldiers carrying firearms
in public, abuse of locol generosity particularly in quartering and food
provision, and complaints procedure for minor infractions.
Key words: counterinsurgency, civil-military relations, Philippine military,
police, communist.
Introduction
Two decades after the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, the
communist insurgency continues to plague the Philippine countryside. From
a peak of 25,000 in 1986, rebel strength declined drastically to 5,000 by
• The author acknowledges the comments of two anonymous reviewers but assumes full
responsibility for the final manuscript.
1
1992 before surging yet again to 9,000 by 1998 (Custodio 1999:28). In
2004, the number of active communist fighters is estimated at 9,000
("Manila to talk, ..", 2004). Although the communist rebels' current activity
has been confined to limited fronts, it remains the biggest threat to the
country. In.the run up to the May 2004 elections, there were various reports
that the communist rebels were charging "permit to cornpoiqn fees" in their
rural strongholds and resorting to kidnap-for-ransom tactics against local
candidates refusing to pay ("NPA P6m richer... ", 2004). Rebel attacks on
power and telecommunication facilities and sustained clashes with the
military occur simultaneously and incongruously with on-and-off peace talks
between the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's ArmyNational Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) leaders and the Philippine
government.
Crafting a policy response to tre communist insurgency issue poses
serious difficulties for the Philippine government. The danger posed by armed
rebels seeking to overthrow the government means that military action
remains a central feature of any counterinsurgency policy. At the onset, the
civilian authorities were also faced with a military which had been involved
in internal security operations for over 50 years and rather used to conducting
counterinsurgency operations with little or no civilian supervision. The
military's organization (which included the police force until 1991) and its
material capability were configured to address local insurgent threats. Their
prolonged involvement in counterinsurgency operations and attendant
development tasks, in turn has yielded politicized attitudes that feature a
strong reqord for the military's involvement in anti-insurgency decision
making, and doubts over the competence of civilian authorities (Miranda
and Ciron 1987: 27-28; Ciron 1993). Because the military's
counterinsurgency task during the Marcos era blurred distinctions between
armed and unarmed communist or leftist sympathizers, lingering suspicion
over the political credentials of post-transition civilian leaders strained civilmilitary relations.
. Military involvement in internal security tasks (including counterinsurgency
operations) is widely seen in the literature as debilitating to civilian control
because it politicizes the military and provides opportunity for role expansion
(Stepan 1986: 137; Bustamante 1998: 351; Rial 1990: 3-21). The armed
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Philippine Political Science Journal 27 (50) 2006
forces' prolonged exposure to anti-insurgent operations is argued to
engender highly critical attitudes towards the civilian government and to
nurture the idea of the military as a more competent and viable alternative
to inept and corrupt civilian rule. Rather than producing political neutrality,
internal security oriented professionalism fosters a raison d'etre and
motivation for the military to be involved in politics. The military's pronounced
presence in the countryside also gives rise to various forms of human rights
violations directed against members of the community suspected of being
insurgent sympathizers.
This paper looks into the nature and dynamics of civilian-militmy
interaction in counterinsurgency activities in twenty (20) frontline villages
on Panay lslond.' It examines the dynamics between civilian officials (mayors,
barangay captains, police chiefs) and military officers (battalion and unit
commanders) who do not have a clear institutional relationship akin to
"civilian control" but whose communities and units bear the brunt and
assume the daily risk of harm and injury on the frontline. It addresses three
broad questions: (1 )To what extent is the change in national
counterinsurgency policy reflected in local operations? (2) What is the nature
of civilian-military engagement between mayors and barangay captains,
on one hand, and frontline military officers and men, on the other? (3)
What are the implications of this local civil-military engagement to civilian
control? This paper has three parts. The first and second parts trace the
history of the insurgency problem on Panay Island in the context of changes
in national policy and military strategies to address the communist insurgency
problem. The third presents the result of a survey research on threat
perception, counterinsurgency activities and human rights.
Contextualizing the Local: Counterinsurgency Policy
from 1986 to 2004
After the democratic transition in 1986, the Philippine government
explored new approaches to dealing with its lingering communist insurgency.
These new approaches included peace talks to arrive at a diplomatic solution
to the armed conflict, as well as reconciliation measures in the form of
amnesty and livelihood packages. In a parallel fashion, the government
also strengthened its armed capacity by agreeing to deploy more paramilitary
units on the front lines.
Politics in the Frontline/Hall
3
Since 1986, the government has been conducting on-and-off peace
talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's ArmyNational Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) leaders, as well as with
communist splinter groups. However, peace talks have either been derailed
or suspended because of a failure to reach a compromise on the
communists' demand for belligerency status, and because of events
peripheral to the negotiating points which eroded confidence in the talks.
Although no conclusive agreement has been reached, the parties have
agreed on the Joint Security and Immunity Safety Guarantees (JASIG) and
the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and
International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL).2 President Estrada suspended
talks in 2000 and re-directed peace efforts towards local communist groups.
A peace agreement with the Panay and Negros islands based
Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Alex Broncayao Brigade (RPMABB) was inked later that s<;Jme year. The government's peace initiative also
included "carrots" or incentives for those who leave the communist
movement. The Aquino, Ramos and Macapagal-Arroyo administrations
provided limited-period amnesty and financial. assistance to former
communist rebels. Under the rebel-returnee program, the government
funded livelihood projects for cooperatives established by ex-rebels. Since
1994, an estimated 39,000 ex-rebels have receive 12,500 pesos for starting
a small business, one-time emergency asisstance of 4,500 pesos and
national health insurance coverage ("Ex-rebels are social welfare ... " 2003).
In addition, the government, through the military which administers the
BALIK-BARIL program, paid ex-rebels for turning in weapons.
Military combat operations remain at the centerpiece of the government's
anti-insurgency repertoire. Except for traditional suspension of hostilities
during Christmas and Lent, neither the government nor the communist rebels
halted their operations during peace talks. After the debacle of declaring a
unilateral ceasefire during the 1986-87 negotiations (which the military
argued was used by the CPP-NPA to re-group), the government has since
followed the norm of limited suspension of military offensive operations. The
government conducted major offensives against the CPP-NPA following each
collapse of the peace talks. Under President Aquino, for instance, the armed
forces conducted a "total war" against the communists from 1987 to 1992.
4
President Estrada followed the same path in 1999. President Macapagal
Arroyo similarly announced renewed military offensives (called Operation
Gordon Knot) in 2002.
The creation in 1988 and continued funding of a paramilitary wing
(named Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit or CAFGU) was central
to the government's forceful response to the insurgency problem." Despite
the infamy of antecedent paramilitary groups (which have committed
numerous human rights violations), the government approved the deployment
and funding of CAFGU units as territorial forces defending villages from
communist re-infiltration. Bowing to civil society pressure for accountability,
especially as regards human rights, the CAFGU Auxiliary Units (as well as
Special CAFGU units established and funded by landed elite against NPA
harassment) were placed under Army command and supervision.
The country's force apparatus-the military and police-also underwent
major structural transformation after the Marcos dictatorship. Given the
security umbrella provided by the presence of US military bases, the armed
forces have been historically focused on internal security rather than external
defense. Of the three services, the Army is the one more directly involved in
counterinsurgency operations. The police were merged with the constabulary
(known as Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police or PC-INP)
from 1975-1991, which in turn was part of the armed forces." The PCINP looked and operated as a military outfit, its symbols and designations
no different from the army, and was similarly engaged in counterinsurgency
operations (often in rivalry with the army). In 1991, under Republic Act
6975, the Philippine National Police (PNP) was created with the defunct
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police at its core. Unlike its
predecessor, the PNP is directly under the supervision of the civilian
Department of Interior and Local Government, and local elected officials
are involved in the selection and deployment of police forces in their areas.
Under the same law, the PNP took over the primary role in counterinsurgency
operations from the military (along with command over CAFGU units), with
exceptions." This primary role was permanently returned to the military in
1998, with the local police assisting wherever and whenever necessary as a
blocking force or as additional combat personnel.
5
There also was a parallel change in the military's communist
counterinsurgency strategy beginning 1988. Under its revised strategy
(dubbed Lambat Bitag), the military's involvement was streamlined to
"clearing" areas of insurgents while "civilian actors" - including the police,
paramilitary troops (whom they consider as civilian reserves called to duty),
local government agencies and civil society groups - were tasked with
"holding", "consolidating" and "developing" the afflicted areas (de Villa
1992: 90). Under this scheme, the military's Special Forces rooted out the
insurgents from the community while paramilitary units and the police "held"
the area by preventing re-infiltration. Local government leaders and civilian
volunteer organizations were involved in the "consolidation" phase by
delivering basic services; while civilian agencies and the private business
sector provided the necessary investment and infrastructure for economic
activities. The military also supported the "development" phase by employing
its Engineering Brigades to construct roads, bridges, water, irrigation and
sewerage systems. Subsequent campaign plans formalized and expanded
the military's development role within counterinsurgency operations. Since
the mid-1990s, the Philippine military has been involved in adult literacy
projects, and in organizing communities to es'tablish cooperatives and to
manage community forest resources (Hall 2004: 118). The revised campaign
strategy also emphasized cooperation with local elected officials and other
civilian agencies to address the insurgency issue. As a legislative mandate,
mayors and village chiefs have to request for a paramilitary unit to be
established in their locality, and volunteers have to be screened by them.
The jurisdiction over human rights cases committed by military (and
paramilitary) personnel was also transferred to civilian courts, thereby
prompting local commanders to work with human rights commissions in
investigations as well as in designing human rights manuals for military
instruction.
As the government re-tooled its response, the very nature of the
communist insurgency also underwent dramatic changes. Reformist elements
within the communist movement challenged the communist orthodoxy
resulting in a split between the reaffirmist (RA) and rejectionist (RJ) factions
in the 1990s (Abinales 1997; Kintanar 1996). The reaffirmists comprise
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its crrned wing, the New
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People's Army (NPA) which continue to adhere to the primacy of revolutionary
struggle by rural peasants. The rejectionists, meanwhile, maintain that mass
mobilization and critical collaboration with the new democratic regime
through united front politics were equally valid stroteqies." Many from the
RJ camp availed of the government's amnesty and either joined politics or
moved into the non-profit sector.' In 1998, the government repealled the
Anti-Subversion Law thereby decriminalizing membership or affiliation with
the Communist Party. Following the government's peace agreement with
the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Alex Boncayao Brigade
(RPM-ABB) in 2000, the target of military operations was further narrowed
down to the armed reaffirmist Ioction."
Although the CPP-NPA's armed strength is less than half its 1988 peak
of 25,000, the post-1986 democratic space has nevertheless given it a
renewed public image. The amount of press coverage given to CPP-NPA
leaders has been a source of consternation for the military. In a recent
move, the military supported a provision in a pending anti-terrorism bill to
censor media coverage of communist (and Islamic fundamentalist) leaders,
arguing that such coverage compromises national security ("Philippine
journalists decry... " 2005). This same democratic space has also inviqorotec
the unarmed left, which has been long suspected by the military to be
communist fronts ("Philippine military alleges ... " 6 April 2004; Bonafos
2002: 18). Leftists organizations such as Bayan, Anak Pawis and Migrante
have become legitimate political players, fielding local and national party
list candidates in the 2001 and 2004 elections. The armed forces allege
that the NPA forces residents in areas they control to vote for Bayan, Anak
Pawis, and Migrante party-list candidates, as part of the communists' revised
strategy to win the war by taking advantage of democratic tools. An alternative
view posits that the leftist groups' entry into electoral politics represent Cl
clear move away from armed towards parliamentary struggle. The unarmed
left, which experienced an ideological split in the ranks paralleling those of
the armed left, has made more inroads in setting policy on compensation to
victims of human rights violations, and on land reform. In this way, the
electoral successes of Leftist parties serve to weaken rather than strengthen
the insurgency movement because they represent a more viable alternative
path to power.
7
From Policy to the Ground: The Insurgency Issue
and Militarization from a Local Perspective
One of the major theatres of communist rebel-military confrontation is
Panay island in central Philippines. The CPP-NPA on Panay island has 4
known active fronts - Northern, Eastern, Southern and Central. The
Northern Front operates in the northern part of Antique province (in the
towns of Culasi and Pandan) and mountain borders with Aklan province.
The Central Front, meanwhile, operates in the Panay central mountains
straddling Capiz (in the towns of Tapaz and Cuartero) and Aklan provinces.
The Southern Front encompasses the southern towns of Iloilo province
including Leon, Janiuay, Maasin, Cabatuan, Oton, Tigbauan, Guimbal,
Igbaras, Tubungan, Miagao and San Joaquin as well as the border towns
of Sibalom, San Remigio, Hamtic and Anini-y in Antique province. The Eastern
Front includes Ibajay, Aklan. Following the communist split, the so-called
reaffirmists (CPP-NPA) remained strong in northern Antique, 'while the
rejectionists (RPA-ABB) are mostly found in northern and central Aklan. No
official estimates are available as to the changes in the numerical strength
of the communists on the island. In 1997, it was reported that there was a
slight increase in the number of NPA regulars on the island from 184 to
200 ("Rebel activities mounting ... " 1997).
From the late 1980s to date, four army battalions have been posted in
the island's four provinces with areas of responsibility corresponding to the
communist insurgent Ironts.? Panay island was host to 18 CAFGU
companies in 1992, but was reduced to 11 by 1997. The army also has
Special Forces, which along with the battalions and CAFGU companies are
under the island-wide command of Task Force Panay. From 1995-1998,
the police briefly took over the lead role in counterinsurgency operations in
some parts of the island, although the CAFGUs remained under the army's
control even after 1995. 10
The military in Panay has not suspended any operations from the time
"total war" was adopted as a policy at the national level in 1987. No
troops or CAFGU elements were pulled out even after the repel of the AntiSedition Law in 1992, or throughout the formal peace talks between the
8
CPP-NPA-NDF and the Ramos government from 1992 to 1996. The
military carried out sustained, often year-long, offensive operations using
ground, artillery and aerial assaults against known communist strongholds
on the island in 1986, 1988 and 1992. In 1986, Oplan Bugtuon was
focused on decimating the Northern Front in Northern Antique and bordering
villages in Aklan province. Under Operation Habagat in 1988, the military's
operation against the Southern Front took them from the towns of Sibclorn
and San Remigio in Antique province all the way to Janiuay and Maasin
towns in Iloilo province (/lMilitary operations score ... /I 1988). From 19921993, the combined forces from the 302 nd infantry brigade (including 15 1h
IB, 47 th IB and 6 1h IB) bombarded Mt. Tambara along the border of Tubungan
and Igbaras, Iloilo province for almost six-months (called Oplan Pukot) (/lTotal
war... " 1992).
The military was also involved in the government's peace and
reconciliation efforts. They ran the government's peace initiative in the region,
certifying former rebels with amnesty applications and acting as conduits of
the government's BALIK BARIL guns-for-cash program. In Leon, Iloilo, the
military spearheaded the Balikatan program - a livelihood assistance project
for rebel returnees that was government and private sector funded (Cabana
2003). The Provisional Infantry Batallion under Col. De Veyra (2003) also
participated in 3 (failed) peace talks with local insurgent leaders - twice in
Antique and once in Capiz.
The period from the late 1980s to early 1990s was the bloodiest and
perhaps most insecure period for the island. NPA assassinations of elected
officials, CAFGU members and alleged military assets in remote barangays
were rampant (/lSFGU member yields" 1992). The commanding officers of
the 12 th Infantry Battalion (IB) and 3 rd Infantry Division (ID), as well as the
two previous Chiefs of Police in the town of Igbaras (Iloilo province) were
ambushed (/INPA killer killed" 1988; Elumba 2003). CAFGU detachments
were also raided by the communist insurgents, such as the those of Brgy.
Igcadios in Leon and Brgy. Passi in Igbaras (/lEighteen CAFGUs ... /I 1989;
/lMilitary and NPA... /I 1992). From 1993 onwards, the regional office of
the Commission on Human Rights investigated a total of 74 insurgencyrelated cases throughout Panay. The bulk (40) of these cases occurred from
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1994 to 1996, and all involved killings by suspected NPA members. Most
of the incidents occurred in Antique and in Iloilo, in communities deemed
insurgent affected - Leon, San Joaquin, Tubungan, Oton, Miagao in Iloilo
province, and in Culasi, Sibalom, Hamtic and San Remigio in Antique.
Similarly, reported incidences in Capiz were also concentrated in known
insurgency hot spots like Tapaz, Dumarao and Maayon.
The military's response to this NPA activity was hard on the communities.
Reprisals and sustained military offensives in these areas spawned numerous
human rights violations. There were reports of persons missing after having
been picked up by the military, torture, verbal threats, harassment and
displacement where the military operated (mostly by l S" 18 elements)
("Military torture ... " 1988; "TFDP hits CAFGU ... " 1988; "Relatives plead ... "
1989; "More persons missing ... " 1989; "Total war... " 1992).
After the successful capture of high-profile leaders of the CPP-Panay
Regional Committee, and with the increase in the number of rebel returnees,
. the communist movement on the island was declared a spent force in 1995.
Only then were CAFGUs demobilized and a partial transfer of primary
counterinsurgency responsibility to the PNP materialized ("CAFGU units in
Aklan ... " 1995). Notwithstanding, the military maintained the 4 battalion
deployment, particularly with the seeming resurgence of NPA activity in central
Aklan province.
After 1996, the military shifted gears and moved into non-combat
activities. Patterned after the communists' strategy of community organizing,
the military pursued projects under the Army Concern on Community
Organizing for Rural Development (ACCORD), Community Assistance for
Rural Empowerment (CARES) and Army Literacy Patrol Services (ALPS)
programs. Under ACCORD, the military served as a facilitator in bringing
services by various government agencies into villages. This entailed the military
acting as liaison and facilitator - directing and bringing concerns like land
titling, birth/marriage/death registration, water and irrigation supply, and
animal vaccination to respective local government agencies. In addition to
infrastructure initiatives (e.g. building farm to market roads, constructing
water systems and toilets), the military organized village cooperatives under
the ACCORD. CARES meanwhile is a catchall initiative including social
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service delivery, value formation seminars, sports and entertainment for the
community. The 47 th IB undertook ALPS and ACCORD projects in Aklan,
while the 7 th IB and 3 rd Infantry Battalion pursued similar activities in the
Maasin, lloilo watershed (//Army as community builders ... /I 1995; //Army
group cited ... // 1999). Under an agreement with the Education Department,
some units stationed in Iloilo and Antique provinces conducted non-formal
education classes (//302 nd IB to implement... /I 1996). The military also
conducted tree-planting projects, including the Green Panay Project of
Colonel Victor Corpuz from 1992-1996 (which was a joint AFP-Capiz
province reforestation project in 26 villages) (/lSoldiers plant... // 1996).
The experiences of the southern Iloilo towns of Igbaras, Leon and Sail
Joaquin, which ere the locales of this research, strongly parallel these regional
trends. These three towns lie along a major mountain thoroughfare olonq
the Iloilo and Antique provincial borders, which is traversed and frequented
by rebels from the Southern Panay Communist Front. Igbaras borders the
Iloilo towns of Miagao, Guimbal and Tubungan as well as San Remigio,
Antique. Leon borders the towns of Alimodian, Tubungan, Tigbauan all in
Iloilo province, and San Remigio, Antique province. San Joaquin lies on the
western coastline of Southern Iloilo and borders Miagao, Iloilo and Hamtic,
Dao and Sibalom in Antique.
These three towns have a long history of military presence and reflect
similar patterns of military deployment. They had been or are current
headquarters of army infantry contingents and paramilitary companies.
Military and paramilitary units were posted in border barangays. Military
deployment varied in length of time, but in all three, the military and CAFGU
units were pulled out in the late 1990s and reestablished as recently os
2003.
In Igbaras, an army company established its headquarters on the
riverside, with detachments in Barangays Pinaopawan, Curucoan and
Mantangon in the early 1980s. The 31 sl Reconnaissance Company was
posted at Barangay 5 (Cayap) some years after. There were detachments in
Barangays Mantangon (1982-1997), Corucuan (CHDF and CAFGU
detachment from 1986-2003), Pinaopawan (CAFGU detachment from
1998-2000) and Pasong (CAFGU detachment from 1996-1997) during
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various years. CAFGU units were pulled out of lqbcros in the late 1990s.
Currently. Barangay Tabiac is host to a unit of the 32 nd Reconnaissance
Company, which established a detachment in August 2003. In addition,
the 31 sl Reconnaissance Company in Brgy. 5 remains in operation. There is
also a military outpost in Barangay Igcabugao.
The borders with Tubungan and Antique have been the site of numerous
military offensives, NPA raids and extra-judicial killings. In 1983, the NPA
raided detachments in Igbaras. In August 1992, an encounter between the
NPA and the military in Mount Tambara (which is located in the boundary
of Tubungan and Igbaras) resulted in a 3-month long military offensive
which pounded Barangay Igcabugao. In July 2003, a joint military and
police offensive in the same area resulted in the capture of the purported
leader of the NPA Panay Southern Front. In 2000, two men suspected of
being government assets were gunned down at a waiting shed in Barangay
Tabiac. Two town police chiefs and numerous policemen have also been
killed in ambushes (land mine planted by the rebels) and by assassination.
In Leon, members of the Philippine Constabulary have been on mobile
deployment in its border barangays since the 1970s. The Philippine Army's
71h Infantry Battalion followed in 1982 (they were based in another town)
and conducted reconnaissance operations from Brgy. Igpajo in Tubungan
all the way to Brgy. Bucari in Leon. Following the audacious NPA raid of the
Leon municipal hall in 1984, the l S" Infantry battalion wcs posted in the
town proper from 1984 to 1988 (after which the headquarters was moved
to Miagao town). They were joined by contingents of the 71h Infantry Battalion
in conducting cross-country operations from Antique to Brgy. Bucari, Leon
during this period. In the mountainous areas, brigades from the 12 th, 52 nd
and 11 1h IBs and oirforce conducted joint operations from 1988 to 1990.
Pcrornilitorvforces have also been organized in many Leon border
barangays during this period. For instance, there was a Civilian Home Defense
Force (CHDF) and ALSA MASA detachment in Brgy. Bayag (close to Brgy.
Calusong, Tubungan). As recounted by the OIC Police Chief Caigoy (2003L
their local police used to do rotate duties between the municipality and in
the CHDF detachment in the border barangay of Bangkal, Alimodian. After
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1986, CAFGU detachments supervised by the 9 th and l Z" CMs were
established in barangays Lonog, Odong-Odong, Mocol, Pepe, Igcadios,
Cawilihan, Bubon, Bulwang, Camandag, Isian San Victoria and Ligtos. In
addition, there were also army detachments in Barangays Tacuyong Sur
and Maliao. According to former mayor Romulo Cabana (2003), Leon
had almost 300 CAFGU members during this time. Many of these CAFGU
and army detachments, however, were pulled out in 1994. Two (in barangays
Igcadios and Maliao) were reestablished in 2000.
The late 1980s (1985-1990) were the most intensive militarization
experience for the people of Leon. NPA attacks (such as the raid of the
CAFGU detachment in Brgy. Igcadios) in 1989 invited even more forceful
retaliation by the military. A rebel returnee who was still in the movement
during this period recounts the intensive helicopter bombings during which
howitzers were fired every 3 minutes (Capirayan 2003). Former mayor
Cabana (2003) also remembers how the residents of Brgy. Danao were
displaced as a result of intensive military operations in their area.
In San Joaquin, the Philippine army began their presence with the l S"
IB in 1988 which was later replaced in the early 1990s by the 12 th lB.
According to Inspector Ciaton (2003), military outposts were situated along
the boundaries of Hamtic, Dao and San Remigio in Antique. Barangays
Iglilico, Maninila, Ulay and Dongoc were particularly mentioned. The military's
stay in these areas ranged from six months (in Barangays Camia, Igcaratong
and Matambog) to two years (in Barangay Sta. Ana from 1991-1993) and
even up to four years (in Barangay Escalantera).
Not Quite Seeing Eye to Eye: Gaps in Civilian and Mili.tary
Perceptions on the Insurgency Issue
One of the key factors affecting civilian-military dynamics is how each
understands the nature of the insurgency problem. Any meaningful
discussion of solutions necessarily stems from this fundamental
understanding. For the military, this is supplied by their doctrine of fighting
low intensity conflict, which sees the roots of insurgency as lying in the poverty
and injustice in the countryside. These poor conditions make rural people
13
more susceptible to revolutionary exhortation. As such, the insurgency issue
cannot be solved by force alone but only by addressing inequities and
providing social services to rural people (Aradanas 2002: 37-41). From
this view stems the justification for military involvement in civic action. Also
in this doctrine, the communist enemy is assumed as having both
underground (armed fighters) and above-ground elements (Bonafos
1999:32). The aboveground allies of the communists include front
organizations that carry out propaganda work and villagers who supply the
armed fighters with personnel, logistics and intelligence information. This
perspective engenders two logically incoherent attitudes towards local
civilians - one as objects of military persuasion and another as targets of
military action for collaborating with the communists.
In the study, there were several areas where civilian and military
perceptions of the insurgency issue diverged. Table 1 shows that the military
view the communists as equally being outside and within the community.
Roughly equal proportion of military respondents thought that the
communists were passers-by (34%) and residents (28%) in the village. By
contrast, most of the civilian leaders contend that the communists are
outsiders - that is, they are not members of the community. More civilians
consider the communist insurgents as outsiders who pass by (48%) rather
than members of the community (32%). Although civilians acknowledge
that there have been instances when armed men came by to propagandize
and recruit (they would call a meeting in somebody's house and instruct
attendees about the evils of government), they allege that these "visits"
were intermittent and fairly quick (they would stay over night then leave at
dawn). There had also been few cases of community members who have
joined the armed movement. There is a distinction among the civilian leaders,
moreover, between those who become "regulars" of the movement (who
abandon their families and live in the mountains) and the "supporters" "runners" who collect revolutionary taxes and "chiefs" who gather and provide
intelligence information. To them, the communists are the armed men who
visit, not the community members who more likely have become "runners"
and "chiefs" out of duress. Many of the civilian respondents have admitted
to giving food and shelter to these armed men, but argue that they did so
either because of a quaint notion of rural hospitality (pangayaw) or fear
that they will be hurt if they did otherwise.
14
,
.'
)
)
,.
j
I,
I
Table 1: Civilian vs. Military Perception of Who are Communists
Civilians
Who are communists
N
%
Outsiders who recruit
Outsiders who pass-by
Com. Members who support NPA and RPA
5
12
8
20
48
32
-
Military
N
77
71
58
%
37
34
28
--
The military officers interviewed, by contrast, identify more concretely
villages and leaders who are part of the communist organization on the
ground. They specifically single out the two village leaders in this study as
having been elected because of NPA support. Similarly, the military officers
said that community-based organizations operating within these villages
are communist fronts. There is also a latent suspicion that the human rights
groups who report on alleged military abuses are communist fronts.
The civilian leaders are cognizant of the split within the communist
movement by qualifying the communists as either NPAs and RPA-ABBs. The
NPA are active in Igbaras, while the RPA-ABBs operate in San Joaquin and
Leon. Beyond this, the village leaders show little understanding that the RPAABBs in effect are no longer insurgent enemies because of the peace
agreement between them and the national government. Nor do the local
leaders understand exactly what the terms of the peace agreement are.
Several village leaders in San Joaquin maintain that the RPA leaders are
openly active in securing peace and order in their communities, and that
there appears to be an informal agreement between NPAs (from neighboring
villages in Antique) and RPA-ABBs not to interfere in their respective "areas
of operation." The mayors of San Joaquin and Leon who have been in
meetings related to the Kalahi grant (a national-government grant for
development projects which target barangays with an insurgency problem)
also expressed surprise over RPA's involvement in the negotiations. The
military, though cognizant of the peace agreement with the RPAs, similarly
do not have clear instructions yet on how to deal with them. Some officers
admit to seeing these former rebels in the town and villages, but that they
tend to ignore them (Cadurnigara 2003; Galang 2003).
Military deployment or the creation of paramilitary outfits is determined
by the presence and gravity of the insurgency problem. But what are the
15
measures used by the military and civilian leaders to indicate that such a
problem exists? Table 2 suggests a strong parallel between the civilian and
military indicators of communist presence. The presence of heavily armed
strangers or "sightings" and collection of revolutionary taxes are two of the
most prominent markers. Both groups also mentioned military-insurgent
encounters, crimes committed against government officials, and raids as
indicators of insurgent activity.
Table 2: Civilian vs. Military Top Indicators of Insurgent Presence*
Indicators
Revolutionary tax
Presence of,strangers
Military-NPA encounters
Crimes committed against government
Municipal hall was raided
Civilian
Military
N
%
N
%
7
15
4
5
4
28
60
16
20
16
125
170
54
52
67
34
19
15
14
18
'Total not equal to 100% due to multiple responses.
While both civilians and the military may agree on the markers, assessing
how serious the insurgency problem is, is a matter of debate. The military
(and also the police) uses 3 levels of insurgent presence to indicate the
gravity of the problem - (a) insurgent infiltrated (indicated by the presence
of .cornrnunist organization on the ground); (b) insurgent-influenced
I(indicated by marked community logistical support for insurgent activities);
. and (c) insurgent affected (indicated by visits from rebels for recruitment
and for political studies) (Defensor 2003). For the civilians, the reality of an
insurgent infiltrated village is best depicted by one respondent's account of
how a "red flag flew over his village" in the 1980s. The NPA, acting as a
shadow govern.nent, assigned community members to go to town to join in
an anti-Marcos rally, and made arrangement for others to take over their
farming chores. In another grisly account, one farmer was met with rebel
justice (read: killed) for being a thief. In another illustration of insurgent
influence, the rebels established a system of food collection (every Friday) in
which a "runner" made the round in the village soliciting rice, vegetables
and fish. Military deployment tends to follow from an assessment that a
village is insurgent infiltrated, while paramilitary units will likely be put up in
those that are affected and influenced.
16
As part of the reforms carried out after the 1986 transition, the creation
of municipal Peace and Order Councils (POC) was provided under Execulive
Order 309 (1988) and adopted under Republic Act 7160 (1991). The
local POC is designed as a forum for elected civilian leaders, the police, the
military and civil society groups to collectively assess, monitor and implement
programs addressing local security concerns, including but not limited to
insurgency. I I The POCs were envisioned as an institutionalized venue for
civil-military conversation over the gravity of insurgent threat in their area.
In fact, exemptions to the transfer of counterinsurgency lead role from I·he
military to police from 1992 to 1998 was predicated upon POC requests
to the President. Officially as well, POCs also have the mandate to oversee
the establishment and operations of paramilitary units in their area. The
protocol is for the military to request for the establishment of a CAFGU unit
inasmuch as the cost of maintaining the unit will be borne out mostly by the
local government. However, army deployments to certain areas or villages
are solely their prerogative, and may be done with or without the consent of
local civilian authorities.
Table 3 presents the marked disparity in civilian and military threat
assessments. Civilian leaders in general discount the current threat posed
by the insurgents while the military thinks it is serious. While about a third
of the civilian respondents think that the communist threat is great (16%) or
very great (16%), almost a third (28%) also thought that there is no threat
at all. By contrast, half of the military respondents agreed that the threat
levels are great (26%) or very great (24%), while a minimal number assessed
that the threat is nonexistent (4%) or even very small (7%). This disparity is
best illustrated by the two contrasting cases of Leon and Igbaras. In Leon,
the municipal government thinks it is facing a serious problem in several
more villages and has put in a request for additional CAFGU units to be
established (apart from the existing two) but the military is not keen on the
idea. In Igbaras, there is a latent tension between civilian leaders and the
military over the recent army deployment in two villages. The military accuses
the civilian leaders of "denial" and "providing cover" for communists in their
village. The civilian leaders on the other hand view the posting of military
detachments in their village as unwarranted intrusion and a case of military
over reacting. Thus while the mayor and the village leaders expected that
~
7
the military deployment in their areas will be a "temporary" measure (for
only 3 months), the military was noncommittal as to how long they'll stay.
Table 3: Civilian vs. Military Assessment of Threat Degree
Threat degree
Very great
Great
Small
Very small
Civilian
Military
N
%
N
%
4
4
1
1
16
16
4
4
28
32
32
34
41
24
26
31
9
5
7
10
8
none
7
No/Multiple Answer
8
4
The military's relationship with community-based organizations is a local
f1ashpoint. The military accuses farmers' groups in somebarangays in
Igbaras and Leon as having links with the NDF and CPP. In February 2004,
the Igbaras based Alyansa sang mga Mangunguma sang Igbaras (AMI)
requested a dialogue with Iloilo governm~nt officials to demand a pull-out
of units from the 3 rd IB ("Military sweeps... " 2004). The group accused the
military of whipping up an anti-communist hysteria by putting up posters in
the town alleging a link between them and the armed left. The officers we
interviewed dismissed allegations by AMI that they have committed human
rights violations, and suggested that the barangay residents themselves were
being manipulated by outsiders, meaning non-residents like the AMI
spokesperson to manufacture charges of violation by the military as a smear
campaign (Vigo 2003).
From Combat to Community Development:
Civilian and Military Engagements in the Frontline
Table 4 presents a wide array of counterinsurgency activities the military
undertook in communities. Community meetings (pulong-pulong), medical
and dental service delivery, creation of CAFGU, combat operations and
patrols were most frequently cited. In addition, there is a wide array of noncombat activities undertaken by the military - tree planting, adult literacy,
sports contests, dance derby, mass weddings, shiatsu training, organizing
cooperatives, clean-up drives and film showings. The civilian leaders
mentioned as well that the military provides security during fiesta celebrations
18
and charity balls (bayleL although the military considers such as not part of
their mandated functions on the frontline.
The type of counterinsurgency activities undertaken, moreover, vary from
village to village. In most villages, a pulong-pulong was conducted
individually while medical/dental missions were undertaken jointly with
adjacent villages. As to the frequency of these activities, many civilian leaders
reported that these were few and far between. Five civilian leaders said thot
the military conducted a medical/dental mission only once (kaisa pa lang),
while another two said none was conducted recently. Five reported thct
pulong-pulong had been conducted twice and another two, once. For the
other activities, none was conducted recently. Most of the military noted
that they do monthly activities, but medical and dental missions they host
only once a year.
The disparity in the type and frequency of military counterinsurgency
activities could be explained by the differing threat assessments and limited
logistics. For instance, the military has put more energy into villages in Igbaras
in the past two years because of the assessment that some barangays were
insurgent affected. Throughout the course of this research, the military
conducted 2 medical and dental missions in Igcabugao village alone in
addition to the 3-month long stay of a Special Operations Team in the
area. By contrast, the village leaders in San Joaquin and Leon could only
recall military activities were conducted in the 1990s but not recently.
Civilian-military engagements at the local level are confined mostly to
the implementation of counterinsurgency activities as devised by the military. I:>
Both the civilian leaders and the military acknowledge that the former
participate by disseminating information, providing goods or services in
kind, or a modest financial contribution. It is interesting to note that none of.
the civilians mentioned providing intelligence information to the military as
a form of participation. Although the military has a budget for
counterinsurgency operations as well as for CAFGU allowances, this is often
augmented by modest contributions from the village and the town
governments, particularly in detachment construction or repair, and in
providing snacks during civic action work. Many village chiefs said that
they practice dagyaw, that is, barangay officials shoulder some of the cost
of the refreshments needed or offer rice or chicken for the troop's lunch
19
during detachment construction or medical/dental missions. The municipal
governments in Leon and Igbaras also occasionally provided sacks of rice,
canned goods and even gasoline to defray some of the cost of maintaining
the CAFGU or military troops. In Leon, the municipal government also
allocated some money for repair of the CAFGU detachments in the two
villciges.
Table 4: Military-Initiated Activities According to Civilian Leaders and the Military
"
Military
Civilian
Activity
%
N
N
%
Combat
CVAC
Create CAFGU
pulong-pulong
road construction
.tree
planting
f----~racL--.
assistance lei rebel retumees
~Qdrive
patrol.__.
oroanize coooerative
film showing
soorts contest/dance derbyImass weddingtshiatsu session
8
12
10
15
5
7
7
1
1
9
0
0
7
9.7
14.6
12.2
18.3
6.1
8.5
8.5
1.2
1.2
10.1
0
0
8.5
88
89
94
88
78
89
81
44
79
89
50
55
1
9.5
9.6
10
9.5
8.4
9.6
8.7
4.7
8.5__
9.6
5.4
5.9
0.1
Table 5 presents. the civilian actors with whom the frontline military
interacts the most. The military interacts most with barangay captains (34%),.
followed by the town mayor (23%) and the police chief (24%). Most
mentioned that these interactions occur during the undertaking of antiinsurgency related cctivities, while some mentioned they also interact when
dealing with comm~nJty problems such as illegal logging, peace and order,
corruption, etc. As far as protocol, the military informs the town mayor and
the Barangay Captain of the establishment of a CAFGU detachment or the deployment of troops in their area. In Leon, the municipal government itself
requested for the estoblishrnent of a CAFGU unit, although this was not the
case for Igbaras and San Joaquin. Usually, the commanding officer of the
military submits requests for financial assistance to the mayor. In Leon again,
the military ras a much more regularized interaction with these officials
. through the Municipal Peace and Order Council. Based on the MPOC
records obtained, the military does not participate in MPOC meetings in
Igbaras (which has only been convened several times in the past years). In
20
San Joaquin, the MPOC has never been convened under the current mayor.
The barangay captain is the civilian leader with whom the military interacts
on a daily basis. It is the barangay captain that reacts to the repercussions
of military activities or behavior in the field - ranging from citizen complaints
to requests for financial, food or services from or for the military. Their
relationship with the military is a crucial Iynchpin in counterinsurgency
operations.
Table 5: Civilian Leaders With Whom the Military Regularly Interacts
Civilian leaders interacted with on regular basis
Barangay Captain
~own mayor
Chief ofpolice
Parish priest
Head ofgovernment agencies
Municipal Councilor
Concerned Citizen
No Answer
Military
Frequency
%
86
58
60
15
19
5
1
12
34
23
24
6
7
2
0.4
4.6
Police-military engagement on the front presents interesting angles. The
police have a territorially fixed character - that is, they are based in the
town center, and rarely venture out to these insurgent affected areas, except
for crime-related investigations. By contrast, the military if deployed go right
into the village premises. In terms of jurisdiction - that is, where and under
what circumstances should the police respond to threatening situationsthe police personnel interviewed in the study made reference to a "3 kilometer
from the highway" rule. According to them, the police, given their limited
manpower and firepower, is responsible for security and protection in the
town center and within that 3 kilometer radius. If a serious insurgent-related
threat occurs beyond this demarcation (as is always the case), the military
must be called in. The military officers meanwhile debunk such 3-kilometer
rule.
The police and the military deployed in the same town operate
independently in gathering intelligence, but cooperate when needed. Each
maintains its own intelligence network and information is forwarded through
separate chains of command. This information is only shared during a
21
monthly security meeting at the regional level. In the three towns covered in
this study, it is the military (having the lead role) which decides after a threat
assessment whether offensive operations are necessary. If so, the military
has the option to ask the police for additional manpower and logistics within
the area of operation. The police may undertake its own operations (in case
of "sightings", operations to "sanitize" the area) BUT ONLY with military
clearance to avoid a misencounter. In cases of "hot pursuit" during a military
offensive, the military requests the police for clearance or for the police to
act as blocking force. For purely military offensives sans police, the police
only comes in after the fact- to collect dead bodies, to receive suspects for
filing of charges, to record injury and damages, etc.
The distinct character and roles assigned to the police and the military
partly explain their divergent perspectives towards local insurgent threats.
The police tend to discount the insurgent problem as it impacts remote
barangays, many of which they have not stepped foot in. Only in rare cases
of disruption' of life in the town proper - e.g. when the municipal hall is
raided or when large numbers of villagers are displaced because of military
operations and go to the town proper - the insurgent problem is taken
seriously. The military, on the other hand, with its long history of
embeddedness in far-flung villages during counterinsurqency operations,
has a more micro view of things. Victories are based on how many villages
are "liberated" and how many more villages remain insurgent affected. As
such, the military establishment has a tendency to inflate the insurgent
problem. .
Everyday Civilian-Military Encounters in the Frontline:
Implications for Human Rights
The gravest danger ensuing from militarization in the countryside is human
rights infractions against civilians in the villcqes. As previously discussed,
legal restrictions were putin place to deter the military from committing
human rights violations while in the field. Within the military, observance of
human rights has also become central to their training.
In the study, the military displayed a high level of cognizance of the
limits of counterinsurgency operations, including rules of engagement,
.treotrnent of captured rebels and procedures for interrogation in line with
22
,
international humanitarian law. Towards civilians, the military rules as
embodied in their "four together(s) principle" - to eat, sleep, learn and
work with the community- portray enhanced human rights sensitivity. Under
this principle, a soldier is not allowed, for instance, to accept food donations
from locals where they operate but may purchase from them (Cadurnigara
2003). In Barangay Igcabugao (Igbaras) for instance, the military had to
carry 13-months worth of canned goods, dried fish and other supplies
throughout the duration of the Special Operations Training, and enough
money to buy native chicken and vegetables from the villagers. They asked
permission from household members to borrow their cooking utensils ond
to use their kitchen, but they did the cooking themselves. There is also greoter
scrutiny and censure on overall soldier demeanor among themselves end
vis-e-vis the locals. Among the paramilitary troops, there are strict rules
against carrying firearms while off-duty. Violation of these rules metes
dismissal (Galang 2004).
This changed demeanor was acknowledged by the civilian leaders. The
village leaders recount that the Marcos-era l S" IB units were the worst
among the worse - they conducted more offensive operations without
notifying the community; they roused up residents in the dead of the night
looking for rebels; they line up the men to be individually questioned, scolded
(ginaakigan), surprised (gapanggufat) and physically abused when they hove
done something wrong (gapanakit). Those with known family members in
the movement were particularly pressured and harassed (ginabafik-bafikan).
Many were drunkards (maoy); ill-disciplined (they fought with each other)
and lazy (ordering the unarmed village police or civilian volunteer officers
to do the nightly patrols instead of them doing it). They also stole farm
animals and eggs, even things of value like appliances. By comparison, they
note that the current military and CAFGU members deployed in their area
are more disciplined and the officers and military handlers respectful of
local leaders. Several even noted that the soldiers bring their own food when
they operate, unlike the rebels who just take food from them. They also
noted that unlike before, when the military was highly dismissive of human
rights accusations, the current military makes inquiries right away if there is
a reported case of a human rights violation involving them. Except for a few
village leaders in Igbaras who claimed that the current military/CAFGU
deployed in their area are drunkards and critical (mapintas), most maintoin
that the military's attitude has improved.
23
The civilian leaders displayed a high level of understanding of their rights
(kinamatarung) and the avenues of redress for infractions. Low level
complaints (such as stealing chicken or a spat involving a civilian) are usually
~ directed towards the barangay captain, who then approaches the mayor
for assistance in bringing up the matter with the commanding officer.
Complaints, however, with regard to military or paramilitary demeanor
among themselves are directly referred to the commanding officer or handler.
High profile infractions (like physical assault or shooting), however, are
reported to the media (to Bombo Radyo, more specifically) or to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR). The civilian leaders stated that the
enhanced awareness of their rights was due to training conducted by the
CHR.
Conclusion
The local experience of militarization on Panayand in the villages covered
by the research strongly parallel shifts in the national goyernment and the
military's strategy in dealing with the communist insurgency. Renewed
'emphasis in military combat operations from the late 1980s and early 1990s
occurred with numerous CAFGU units being formed and the police being
more closely involved in counterinsurgency efforts. Local communist units
split and re-grouped along ideological lines, thereby also re-defininq the
nature of the communist enemy at that level. The military became more
actively involved in community development and organizing efforts in the
late 1990s. Except in Leon, no local peace process was initiated nor involved
the military.
The empirical evidence points to a less confrontational but uneasy
relationship between soldiers and civilian leaders. The frontline soldiers
acknowledge human rights limits, and are aware of the personal (lawsuit)
and organizational (bad image) costs to misconduct during operations.
Civilian leaders attest to the improved demeanor of soldiers deployed in
their areas. At the same time, civilian leaders are aware that human rights
abuses should not betoleroted. They are also cognizant of the informal
channels in dealing with complaints. However, civil-military ties remain
strained because of continued military suspicion of the leftist credentials of
some barangay captains, as well as of local farmer groups.
24
"
'l
,
Both civilian and military respondents also acknowledge the input of
Local Peace and Order Councils, the mayor and the barangay captains ill
the decision to put up CAFGU detachments and in choosing recruits. In
terms of military activities, the frontline military is clearly expanding into
non-combat functions. These non-combat tasks, however are qualitatively
different from the usual civic action repertoire of dispensing medical-dental
services or infrastructure. The frontline military is providing literacy services
as well as community organizing for livelihood and environmental protection
in line with new policy mandates and as part of their new strategy to weaken
communist links in the community.
Civilian-military engagement in the frontline is characterized by
asymmetry and ambiguity. Counterinsurgency activities remain, for the most
part, military instigated and conceptualized, with little participation by civilian
leaders. Neither are the barangay captains, mayor and police chief informed
beforehand of combat operations, nor are they told of the military's exit
strategy in cases of deployment. For non-combat activities, civilian leaders'
involvement lies only in implementation - providing assistance in the form
of labor and food cost sharing, allotting some money to purchase food for
the CAFGU personnel and for detachment construction/repair,
disseminating information and herding up the locals for pulong-pulong
and civic action projects. The civilian leaders are "informed" of military
activities and "invited" to participate but the determination of activities to be
undertaken in one village versus another or how frequent, is left exclusively
to the military.
There is no local civilian control on the frontlines. The military for the
most part decides and operate independently as regards army deployment,
but consults with local authorities on paramilitary creation as legally
mandated. There is no institutional means for local civilian authorities to
oversee military operations in their area. While the law created the Municipal
Peace and Order Councils (MPOC) to be the focal point for civilian leaders,
heads of government agencies, civil society groups, the police and the military
to collectively assess insurgent threat and strategize, in reality they hove little
or no importance. In the three cases, the MPOCs were either: not convened
by the mayor or when convened, lacked regular military participation. In
one case, military participation in MPOC deliberation was only for the
25
purpose of asking for some kind of monetary assistance from the town
government. The civilian leaders also rely on informal procedures when
dealing with the military. In cases of complaints, they rely on personal talks
(istoryhanay) or by bringing the issue directly to the higher level or even to
the media's attention.
The true focal point of civil-military interface is not the town, but the
barangays. The barangays are the civilian lynchpin with which the military
interacts the most. Their involvement is crucial to the success of any
counterinsurgency activity, and it is they who report firsthand any case of
human rights infraction. In the absence of any village-level institutional
mechanism with which to process divergent threat assessments, civil-military
'interaction in the frontlines therefore continue to be marred by distrust and
suspicion. The divergence in threat assessment has important implications
to civil-military dealings in addressing the insurgency problem. First, the
military's assumption about the political leanings of members of the
community, though tempered by human rights rules, does not allow for an
open and frank discussion of strategies. The civilian leaders' wariness of the
military, on the other hand, prevents meaningful debate about the merits of
counterinsurgency activities carried out. In short, the civilian leaders are
reduced to passive recipients of military ministrations. Second, while the
military considers their presence in the community as critical in addressing
the threat, the civilians see it as unwelcome intrusion into the regularity of
their daily lives. For many of the civilian leaders we interviewed, they'd much
rather be left alone both by the NPA and by the military. V
Notes
1 Twenty(20) villages were included on the following basis: (1) they having previously hosted
or are currently hosting military and/or paramilitary detachments; and (2) they are identified
by the military as having an insurgency problem. These villages are located in the towns of
Igbaras, Leon and San Joaquin in the province of Iloilo. Twosetsof subjects are featured: local
civilian leaders and the military. The civilian respondents included are 20 village leaders, 4
mayors/ex-mayors and 3 police chiefs/inspectors. The military/paramilitary respondents
included: (a) 46 paramilitary members and army handlers in Barangay Igcadios and Maliao in
Leon; (b) 57 enlisted men and officers from the 31 "Reconnaissanc~ Infantry Unit in Brgy.
Cayap and the 32 nd Reconnaissance Infantry Unit in Brgy. Tobioc both in Igbaras; (c) 11
CAFGU members and their military handlers in Brgy. Norte, San Joaquin; and (d)17 enlisted
men and officers from the Provisional Infantry Battalion (PIB) in Camp Monteclaro in Miagao,
Iloilo. Additional respondents included officers from AFP Civil Relations Services (CRS) in the
26
-1
region, chief of provincial police operations, director of the region's Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) and the commanding officer of the Provisional Infantry Battalion that supervises
the military units included in the research. All civilian respondents were interviewed (some
individually, through focused group discussions) while the military respondents were surveyed,
and their commanding officers were interviewed. The survey questionnaire and the interview
guides covered 5 areas: (a) their relevant socio-demographics including military presence in
the village or nearby; (b) threat perception; (c) community participation; (d) perception of
civilian leadership and performance; and (e) human rights. In addition, archival research of the
leading island daily newspaper, Panay News, covering insurgency-related events (ambush,
encounter, human rights violations, civic action, new military postings, amnesty, peace
negotiations) was conducted to reconstruct the history of the insurgency problem and military
presence in the island.
2 The JASIG allowed suspensionof arrest warrants for CPP-NPA members engaged as consultants
to the peace talks. The CARHRIHL outlines the limits to NPA and military conduct in warfare,
and c;ommits the government to release political prisoners and repel laws that violate human
rights. It was signed by President Estrada in 1998 but remains unimplemented.
Paramilitary groups are territorial forces composed of armed civilian volunteers who have
formal or informal links with the military. They gather intelligence and engage in combat
alongside the military if their villages are attacked by insurgents. Under Marcos, the government
paramilitary outfit was known as the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF). In addition,
private armies of local warlords and anti-communist civilian groups (mostly religious cults)
and death squads (composed of ex-criminals and ex-military officers) cooperated with the
military in counterinsurgency operations and hence, also considered paramilitary (Amnesty
International 1988).
3
The police, which previously were under the control of the local chief executives was
nationalized in 1970 (renamed Integrated National Policeor INP)and merged with the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) in 1975. Although, the PC and the INP remained organizationally distinct,
command and control was exerted by the PC Director General who was concurrently PC chief
and who in turn was under the armed forces Chief of Staff. Administrative control and supervision
were exercised by the National Police Commission (Hernandez 1988).
4
"Primary role" means that the police/military makes the final call whether or not to undertake
offensive operations, and the prerogative to solicit backup logistics and personnel from the
other organization, as needed. A "secondary role," while predicated on institutionalized
police-military consultation on threat assessment, means a back seat position. The exceptions
are those areas designated by the President as still facing serious insurgent threat (Defensor
2004).
5
The rejectionists included the Manila Rizal Regional Committee (under Popoy Lagman), the
Revolutionary Proletarian Party (under Arturo Tabara), Alex Boncayao Brigade (under Romulo
Kintanar) and other CPP units in Visayas and Mindanao. The term "rejectionists" also include
many unaffiliated rebels who have left the movement voluntarily and individually because of
opposition to the CPP-NPA's reaffirm line (Reid 2001).
6
7 The split, though fortuitous for the government, nevertheless continues to complicate the
insurgency issue. In the past years, the leaders of the RJ camp (Lagman, Kintanar and Tabara)
27
have all been summarily executed by RA aperatives ostensibly to exact "justice" for their
crimes against the communist movement. General wariness over their inclusion in the CPPNPA's order of battle (read: liquidation list), have driven many known RJ and other ex-rebels
into hiding and causing many of the government sponsored livelihood projects for them to
collapse.
The RPM-ABB units covered by the peace agreement were concentrated mainly in Negros
Occidental and Oriental and in some areas in Panay. In line with the agreement, some units
were given funding to establish cooperatives. There are allegations that the AFP entered into
joint operations with RPM-ABB units against CPP-NPA in Negros provinces.
8
These are the l S", 12th, 47 th and 6 th Infantry Battalions. The Provisional Infantry Battalion
(PIB), which was the subject of the research was establishe~ in June 2002 and disbanded in
2004. It exerted operational control over army and CAFGU companies in Culasi (Antique
province), Igbaras and San Joaquin (Iloilo province), as w'ell as in Jamindan and Cuartero (Capiz province) .
9
10 The transfer of lead role in counterinsurgency operations from the military to the police was
only effected in the island in 1995. Although the legislative mandate for the transfer was
enacted in 1992, a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the
Department of Interior and Local Government effecting the transfer of detachment contra I to
the police was signed a year after. President Ramos exempted Panay Island from the transfer
fram 1993-1995.
Under section 1 (d) of. Executive Order 309 (which was adopted in its entirety under section
116 of the Local Government Code or RA 7160), the Municipal Peace and Order Council
11
(MPOC) is to have as members: one representative from the Sangguniang Bayan; one each
from the line offices and agencies (AFP, PNp, social work, human rights, etc), and 3 representatives
from the private sector drawn from the academe, civil society and religious order. The functions
of the MPOC as listed in section 3 of EO 309 are: (1) to improve and enhance peace and
order, and public safety; (2) monitor and implement peace and order programs and projects,
and operations of the Civilian Volunteer Self Defense Organizations and other
counterinsurgency activities; (3) conduct periodic assessmentof the peace and order situation
in area of responsibility.
12 There are areas of civilian concern for which no institutional consultation with the military
exists. This includes quartering (where the unit will keep their barracks). In the experience of
the villages, the military setup camp in the village hall or in the day care center. Quartering for
CAFGU is not much of an issue because the volunteers are locals, hence they have homes to
go to.
References
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Philippines" In The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerilla Warfare and State BUilding in the
Twentieth Century, ed. Richard Stubbs. St. Martin's Press.
Aradanas, Ernesto. 2002. ''Are We Losing the War?"
28
Philippine Palitical Science Journal 27 (50) 2006
TALA Magazine. pp. 37:41.
Amnesty International. 1988. Philippines: Unlawful Killings by Military and Paramilitary Forces.
New York: Amnesty International Publications.
"Army as community builders." 1995. Panay News. 5 September.
"Army group cited for sociol services." 1999. Panay News. 1 November.
"Boyan Muna funding CPP-NPA- Gonzales." 2004. Manila Standard. 7 April.
Bonafos, John. 2002. "Implications of Boyan Muna in the AFP Internal Security Operations."
Tala Magazine. First Quarter, pp. 18-20.
Bustamante, Fernando. 1998. "Democracy, Civilizational Change and the Latin American
Military" In Faultlines of Democracyin Post Transition Latin America, eds. Felipe Aguero
and Jeffrey Stark. Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, University of Miami.
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10 October.
"CAFGU units in Aklan deactivated." 1995. Panay News. 5 September.
Capirayan, Neonita. 2003. Interview with the author. Municipal Hall, Leon, Iloilo. 30 August.
Ciaton, Antonio. 2003. Interview with the author. Municipal Hall, San Joaquin, Iloilo. 10
September.
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Officers. Quezon City, Philippines: Ph .0. dissertation, University ofthe Philippines.
Custodio, Jose Antonio. 1999. "In search of a national security strategy." OSS Digest. 3rd and
4th quarter, pp. 28-30.
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August.
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August.
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Record and Legacy of the Post-EDSA Government (J 986- J992), eds. Jose Abueva and
Emerlinda Roman. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
"Eighteen CAFGUs, soldiers killed in Leon raid-NPA." 1989. Ponay News. 8 May, pp. 1,2.
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"Ex-rebels are social welfare department's new wards." 2003. Philippine Daily Inquirer. 20
June.
Galang, Roberto. 2003. Interview withthe author. CM Charlie Company Headquarters,
Brgy. Pitogo, San Joaquin, Iloilo. 27 December.
Hall, Rosalie Arcola. "Exploring New Roles of the Philippine Military: Implications to Civilian
Supremacy" Philippine Political Science Journal 25(48)(2004): 107 -130.
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Hernandez, Carolina. 1988. "Reforming the Military and Police Agencies in the Philippines."
Philippine Journal of PublicAdministration 32(1 & 2)(January-April): 152-162.
Kintanar, Thelma.1996. Cultural Dictionary for Filipinos. Quezon City: Anvil Publishing Inc.
"Manila to talk with communists." 2004. BBCNews. January 13.
"Military and NPA..." 1992. Panay News. 11 September.
"Military operations score victories." 1988. Panay News. October 26-November 1.
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"Military torture alleged." Panay News. 1988. 11-15 October. pp. 2, 7.
Miranda, Felipe and Ruben Ciron. 1987. Development and Military in ihe Philippines: Military
Perception in a Time of Continuing Crisis. Diliman, Quezon City: Social Weather Station.
"More persons missing in San Joaquin." 1989. PanayNews. 6-9 April.
"NPA killer killed."1988. PanayNews. 3 August, pp. 1,6.
"NPA P6M richerfrom poll donors." 2004. Manila Standard. 22 April.
"Philippine journalists decry plan to curb them." 2005. International HeraldTribune. March 8,
p.3.
"Philippine military alleges election groups front for communist rebels." 2004. BBCMonitoring
International Reports. 6 April.
"Rebel activities mounting in Panay." 1997. PanayNews. 8 December, p. 1.
Reid, Ben. 2001. "Crisis in the Philippine Left: Implications for the Asia Pacific." Journal of
Contemporary Asia. 30(2): 181 - 198.
Rial, Juan. 1990. "The Armed Forcesand the Question of Democracy in Latin America." In The
Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Lat!n America. eds.
Louis Goodman et 01. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
"Relatives plead with military to produce body." 1989. Panay News. 13-15 March, pp. 1,8.
"SFGU member yields." 1992. PanayNews. 1,2-14 June.
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Stepan, Alfred. 1986. "The New Professionalism in Internal Warfare and Military Role
Expansion." In Armies and Politics of Latin America. Revised edition. eds. Abraham
Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch. New York: Holmes and Meier.
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"Total war... " 1992. Panay News. 10 November, p. 11.
30
Philippine Political Science Journal 27. (50) 2006

Politics in the Frontline: Local Civil

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