AK2117-J3-18-AS6-001-jpeg - Historical Papers

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AK2117-J3-18-AS6-001-jpeg - Historical Papers
Ill
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SOUTH AFRICA
WOnK IN PROGRESS 24 - October,
1902
Cover by Kevin Humphrey
SUDSCRIDE
The nature of Work In P r o g r e a a , which la
to atlmulate debate end present cnntrovarslal
views on a wide rang* of subjects, uniura* that
the views expressed dn not necessarily reflect
the oplnlona of members of the editorial collective.
This Issue of Work In Progress edited end published
by an editorial collective of 40 Jorlssen street,
2001 braamfonteln, end printed by sached,
54 slmmonds street, 2001 Johannesburg.
STATE,
REPRESSION
AND REFORM
consldaratlons Involved hare - and that la tha
that period represented the transition rrta an ere
growing political insecurity of the present
of sporadic and uneven economic growth to one of
government.
repld end sustelned ecorne*le growth.
Ikiderlylng this insecurity - end,
therefore contributing to it - ere a number of
major soclel, economic and political changes.
|These Include
ITTiOs had a number of economic ceuses but, In
jl,
addition to these, there cen be n o doubt that the
The growing politicisation of the efrlcan
population end the resurgence of militant political
fVFn the last five years at least 2 310 people art
known to have himn detelned under South Africa's
No w these two fecors are not unreleted.
South Afrlca'a s*»aky economic performence during the
growth of popular resistance pleyed en Important pert
aotlvlty among other oppressed racial groups
in retarding economic growth, both directly through
(expressed moat clearly in tha auccasaful anti-
strlVe activity, stey-at-homes end other forme of
BAIC cemoalgn)|
eorker resistance end, Indirectly, through the affect
>2.
Tha growing militancy and orgenlaatlon of
^»lch social and political instability had on
black workers|
discouraging foreign end lorel Investment,
la aa foilnest
3.
fha continuing crisis In black education!
However, the smeshlng of the flnpuler movement
1977
299
4.
Tha failure of tha bantustan policy to eln any
changed all thetf
1970
300
1979
113
1900
9Tto
1901
630
security lava.
The m » h « r detained In aanh year
(99)
aerlous support, either emong black people in South
first, because the defeet suffered by the
Africa, or Internationally]
Congress Movement eased the pressures on the South
( ISO)
3.
African government to Introduce polltlcel democ ratic
(a«9)
South Afrlcai
Tha escalation of the guerllle war against
reforms In South Africa, apeclflcally eround the
(figures In brackets Indicate the ntawbar detained
8.
Smith Afrlca'a current economic decllnej
alogan of one-man-one-vote, and gained the
in tha bantustan*|
7.
Tha atalemete over Namibia, encouraging even
govei i— an t time to Implement Instead Its own
tha first fijur* 'nclodai tha
bantustan figure).
Ona of tha most disturbing faaturaa of thaaa
atatiatlca la that, despite much talk of reform In
deeper armed incursions Into Angola which do nothing
politically divisive end repressive solution In
to remove tha likelihood of a 0SATO government
tha form of tha bantusten policy.
coming to power in that country;
Internal opposition movement. It wes eesy for
South Africa, there la aa yat no Indication of tha
5.
rising trand in datantlona balng reversed.
coupled elth a lack of coherence In government policy.
In fact
quita tha reverse!
Tha dlssention el thin the government'a own rerfca
While this llftt Implies that government la
Without any major
opportunists Ilka Metanxlma to begin to colleborate
closely elth the government In tha hope thet thla
tha flguraa actually point to a
«
marked lncraaaa In datantlona ovar tha last two
being forced even deeper Into a crisis situation -
yaara.
and hence beccming Increasingly insecure - what
an economic level the peth was cleared to allow
suggest that thla horrifying trand way aall lncraaaa
needs to be done is to enalyse the Inter-
businessmen to reorganise their enterprises based
even furthar In tha futura.
relationship between these eight points.
Moreover, racant political developments
Ooth tha goverreient's
Only If
la clearly grasped can we
eould bring n m w credibility to the bantustan Idea.
Second, the affect of the defeet meant that at
on the relstlvely sure knowledge that tha mass of
acceptance of tha table Commission's proposals to
thet Interrelationship
tightan up and lntanalfy South Afrlca'a aacurity
come to understend the full extent of the current
and pliable.
legislation, aa wall as ita fevoureble rasponsa
crlala facing tha government,
which the South Africen economy expanded enormously*
tha labour force was now demoralised, disorganised
The era of the 1900s wes thus one in
During the mid 19T0s, for example. South Afrlca'a
to tha Otayn Craw*!salon'a proposal a for furthar
raatrlctlona on prass freedras, auggaat that tha
H I 8 T P U G A L SACKnnOUND
economic growth was the second festest In the
futura alll bring alth It avan gras tar rapraaalon
In order to do that adaquetely one needs first to
Western world.
and raatrlctlon of daaioc ratlc rights.
go back ?0-odd yaera to tha time of Oharpevllle end
encoureged a resurgence of foreign Investment
Tha quastlon ahlch naada to ba posad iat
ahyT
The weakness of bleck labour
the mess populer uprising shich wes led by the ANC
which hed fled the country en masse In the Iimmediate
Why la thara thla marked lncraaaa in tha raatrlctlona
end, to a lssasr extant, tha PAC, beneuse that
aftansath of Sttarpevl lie,
Imposed on tha paopla of thia country?
period la a eetershed in South Afrlca'a hlatory.
movement defeeted, foreign cepltal flowed back Into
I'm aura, many a n s M r a to thla quastlon, but 1 want
Mot only was It around that time that the populer
the country on en unprecedented scale, moving thla
to iaolata shat I think la ona of tha major
movement for democratic change was smashed, but also
time not only into its tredltlonel haven of mining,
Thara ara,
Noe elth tha man a
•A R e s t i t u t e s for unions, the n ee union m o v w e n t
nonetheless continued to grow through the mldseventles.
repression.
the southern Afrlcen region as a whole.
departure from e erller goverrmewit th|r*|ng and
The end
of c o l o n t a l l M In Ifcicemhtque end Angola, together
fhen, In 1*?70, tensions a«*o*xj the bleck studen^
T
This represented e significant
fro* the political changes ehlch wore occurring In
elth the collapse of IDI in Zimbabwe, not only
therefore we need to esk ehy It occurred.
A crucial point to lake eccount of here Is
end sr.honl community reached breaking point,
provided the guerilla movrment elth new end
the growing technlcel sophistication an d monopoly
culminating In the massive Downto revolt which
sympethetlc bsses frrat ehlch to operate, but also
character of Rrejth Afrlcen Industry.
rsptdly assumed nationwide proportions.
encouraged the f 1o w e r 1ng of bleck netlonelism el thin
workers now occupying Increesirgly Important
Again, the
With bleck
stats resorted to the trled-end-trusted method of
(louth Africa.
repression to q u e l 1 the revolt, end humlreds of
its cempelgn egalnst Bouth Africa in Namibia.
bleck children lpst their lives ehlls their
Oespita the lncraasa of mllltery activity against
the country, the extent of their power In Industry
orfjsnl set Ions were banned.
W W * 0 (and the Angolen g r r v e m w m t ), end despite
hed grown ertoraousl y .
the sttsmpt to undermine W A T O ’s Internal sippnrt
these workers hed rejected the fonaal systai of
Although the Initial
c euse of the uprising eas a rejection of bentu
At the same time, RWATO stepped up
skilled and soml-*fcllled positions In more
mochonlsnd end much larger fectorles throughout
Once It became clear that
education, there can b e little doubt that the
thraflh lha ereatlan of tbs OTA, It eas nleer to
enrks end l l s l s m riamalttees, many sublayers -
political mnmentiM shll'H h ed begun elth HAttt In
most observer* that South Africa could not eln tha
particularly those In lerge corporetlons - began
to negotlets with trade unions ss the mnst
the late 15G0s h ed no e produr.ed en explosion of
guerilla ear lo Namibia (though they did not seem
anger against the eystam of epertheld as a ehole.
likely to lose it elther)i
W hile the student forces sought to rally their
ever supplsnt GWAPO ss the most populsr political
promote cc^munication end stebllity elth the
black work force.
nor could tha OTA
representative mouthpiece of workwrs to try end
parents end workers to their side, seeking to
organlsatioo in the c m e t r y .
develop e mess m n v s m n t for democratic reforms
received further confirmation In the pest few days
ertKjnd the slogan of black consciousness, the other
as ths South African government hes made pleln its
need to devel r*i new forms of control that were
side of this coin aes the increasing mass rejection
Strategy of withdrawing stoport frcai tha OTA).
more cre^eitlble elth the conditions of modern
(This point hes
by blacks of the g overnment's bentustan solution.
In other words, both l n t s m a l l y add in its
The state thus found Itself in an unenvisble
foreign p olicy the South African g n v e m m a n t eas
position!
faced elth a growing black political
The ke y point here la that
menagement was beginning to cnee to terms with the
mechenloed production,
forms of direct - end
inevitably, racial - o|iprsas!on on the shr*> flnnr,
seen to b e floundering and folloelng policies
as eell as tha more pet erne 11st In approac h whldi
shlch were not only bar* nipt but were ectuelly
hed characterised small scale Industrial
eerly 1900s, to smesh these forces through
leeding to en escalation of various forms of
production, eere no longer crvspetlble elth the
repression shlle er.r.sl era ting the bentustan policy,
hostllitlss against them.
movement the state sought, as It hsd done in the
requirements of modern mechonlsed factories
ttoeever, though it aes relatively successful if)
deploying hundreds end often thousands of black
smsshlng the democratic forces of the bleck
l * i o w ncrtrm
workers In relatively fftlllsd positions.
conscloueness movement, its oen bentustan policy
However, there sas one sphere In shlch the government
were noe be^ng seen by a section' of
aes greeted eith mess rejection end the dsewind
did attsmpt to promote certain reforms - end thet
menegement - albeit reluctently - es the most
for i n t e m e l democratic reforms reesserted itself.
wis in labour,
appropriate m e n s through ehlch c remain 1cat ton elth
Faced with the state's intransigence on this issue,
recommended the legalisation and registration of
the work force could b e malntelnnd end. If possible
many young blacks began to leave the country,
trade unions for efrlcan workers - a unique develop­
throt^jh which conflict could be institutionalised m
even everted.
tlera the liehehn Cremlsslon
thus fuelling the rar*s of the externally-besed
ment in South Africa's history,
guerllls movement and, suhswouwnt1y , leeding to
concession represented a significant victory for
a n escalation in armed conflict.
afrlcan workers, It is equelly true that the ala of
Nor ees this the
only outcome of the state's intransigence!
meny
Wills this
Trade uni
Ikit If employers - particularly the lerger
employers - eere rmw less sfreld of negntletlnft
this reform ees to try end co-opt the leederehlp
elth bleck eorkera and their unions, white workwrs
of those blocks eho remained inslds South Africa
of the bleck trade union movement end to b r e *
the
were much less sure of the elsdna of this e p p m a c h .
ednptad en increasingly militant stance against
power of the rar* end file on the shop floor.
Out
Sr^e, like Arrle Paulus of the Mine Workers* Iblai,
the steta, fuelling e growing politlcisetlon among
whet is Important here Is thet for the first time
the bleck messes.
the government sought to echleve Its elms lergely
Indication thet the stete ees gredually elthdrewlr^j
through co-opt Ion rether then solsly through
the privileges ehlch had previnusly bean sffordnd
Out these processes received tremendous support
see the legalisation of black unions ss a claer
Industrial reletlons In industry.
On the other hand,
th«si restrictions on union activity have fallad to
.quail tha faars of thosa in tha white community,
be edaltted to the President's Council.
Undeniably,
actually offer those groups thet the governmen t
such a reform, If it were to be seriously Implemented, ,
hopes to eln over.
would lndicete a further shift in government
course offer both the coloured and Indian
F o r m a l l y , the reforms do of*
and a s p K l a l l y among «hlte workers, *#io faal that
thirfclng - but It is fer from fundamentel.
tha legel recognition of blank unions la a raclpa
Coloured end lndlen cammunltlee have el ways bewn In
system!
e sort of pnllticei limbo end bringing tham into
the three reclelly separate chambers that el 11 be
for long-term political disaster In
8outh
Africa.
Tha government's lettpur .roform strategy thus
The
communities eccess to the new parilamentary
they will have rwpresentetIon |n two of
the P resident's Council Is not e fundamental
creeted under the new system (the third will of
flnda itaelf caught b etween conflicting pressures,
devletlon fro* government policy.
course.be occupied by whites).
and unable for tha moment- to satisfy either side -
opening the irtilte leager a bit to absorb whet the
represented on the new President's Council which
It Is simply
They eill elso be
government hopes will be useful elites in the
will consist of 35 elected representetlves, of whom
el thin which union organisation can coneolldate end.
struggle egelnst the major threat to government
ten eill be coloured, five lndlen, end
expand.
powwr - the africen penple.
They will also be represented on the electoral
‘ yet providing the all-important political space
It la impoaslbla that the future course of
unionisation In this nnuntry ell I he asmnth nr
In nther aorrte, these an-railart refnims era
2D
shite.
rnllega irtilrh eill alert the President (the snllaga
vary fat- i-emnvsrt r*n* tha H»*4 nf h h I I M *-*1 fctangM
all I fcHHslllt nf W
which ara necassary If Booth Africa is to avoid an
Indiana).
end aa the recession Intensifies, these attitudes
inevitable drift towards Increasing conflict and
ceblnet end since there eill be no fixed raclel
will spreed to employers in other porta of tha
social Instability. Bo whwre does that leave the
composition In that body, coloured end Indian
country.
government end PW Botha In pertlcular?
parsons mmy well be msmhers of a futura South
M V
« A 11 M o r a
l« • elmtr M u h ^ h I m # h»
attltudea among employers In the e e s t e m Cape
But It ts; equally Impossible thet after
It leaves
allII as, t>*\ fenlnuretf* a>«f
Since the President eill eppolnt the
the gains that have'been mad* so fer, the process
him making tentetlve moves towards minor reforms -
African government.
of unionisation can now ba stoppad without dlra
towards broadening the base of his laager - in
cleerly is en advance on the eslstlng situation
Thus, in formel terms, there
costs for tha future of industry end for soclel
the hope that this e l 11 eln hi m more aupport
in terms of drawing coloureds end lndlens into the
end economic atablity aa a rfralt.
among the white opposition, the business community,
nee decision-making machinery.
coloured end Indian groups and, of course - end
lmportently - the l n t e m a t l o n e l community.
The important changee in the field of black labour
hopes in this way to strwngthen his polltlcel base
have not, however, been mirrored in the sphere of
end eln support for his bid to Impose e bantustan-
thet «^lte, coloured end lndlen chambers will play
political rights for blacke.
llke structure on South Africa, la to deny efrlcans
a dual rolo.
any meaningful political rights In Booth Africa.
■letters shlch the President decrees ere of Interest
In this lattar area
we have heard much grand talk of ’power whoring*,
Me
But what real powwr will these formel changes
POLITIC*. REFORM
ectuelly confer?
In terms of representetlon in
the new chambers of peri lament it should be noted
Thay will dwllberete partly on
but as yat little of aubstanr.a thet one cen point to
Yat even this tentative bid to broaden his power beae
to their communities only - end in this sense the
which suggests real change.
has cost him a aifeeble amo«»nt of support emong the
coloured end lndlen chambers will probably
In fact, g o v e r n m e n t s
reluctence to eccept the full findings of the
extreme right wing, thrwatenlng to turn him into
da Lange Commission on education, and lte
e pariah among the Afrlkeoers.
uncompromising rejection of the Buthelezl
unsure precisely h ow fer to go, while bleck
Commission Tlndlngs, coupled with its enthusiasm
opposition against him continues to mount.
for the findings of the Bteyn end t able Commissions,
suggests the very reveraet
a rejection of reform
end a'tightening up of polltlcel repression.
Yet,
80
he wavers,
But what reel chence is there that the present
emerge es no more than glorified versions of the
present CHC and SAIC.
However, where e matter is
decreed by the President to be of mutual concern
to ell three reciel groups (one wonders which matters
won't have such relevence?), it will be debated In
political reforms will succeed in widening govern­
ell three chembers and if there is dlsegrwexient
ment's social base of aupport?
among the chambers the awtter will bw rsferrwd to
This is a question
o n the other hand, we have the undenleble feet thet
ehich should not be dismissed before it has been
the President's Council.
PW Botha finally threw down the gauntlat to his
seriously considered, since the National Party
ln-built majority elth ?0 elected mamhers es
fer right wing end cast them out of the Netlonel
at leest sewms to see these reforms es having a
opposed to e combined strength of 13 for coloureds
Perty.
good chance of succeeding.
end lndlens.
Vet whet is the ostensible Issue over
irtilch this split occurred?
It is the terms over
which so-celled coloured and Indian p eople should
f
Perhaps the piece to stert in answering this
question Is to ask whet new powers these reforms
Here the ahltee have an
But will it not be possible for
some of the whites In the Council, say those «*>o ere
members of the PFP, to lir* up with the coloured
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPOSALS
AffFW lh« 10B1 genera I elect Ion revealed a rightward
awing dlaquletlng to th» government, on* newspaper
commentator auggested that It should dlaaolve the
electorate and choose another.
•uggeatIon was made In Jaat.
At the time, the
Whan the official
propoaala for a new e o n a t H u t t o n wara releeaed thla
year, however, it aeemed aa If It had been taken all
to# literally.
doubt that they are a fraud, Intendrd to postpone
Co«m»lssion, which pondered It fur two year*, only In
the democrat Isat Ion of South African society, but they
atrategy of domination which haa been followed In
South Africa aver elnre Union,
constItuttonal
they repreaent an
tha Mounting popular ehallengee to the South
composition of capital, have led tha dominant clasaea
to seek new alllancea and pollclaa to promote their
intereata, while clasaaa formerly allied to them
atruggla for a return to old atrataglaa.
Tha proceaa
of reatructuring la already well underway In a number
of area*, auch aa labour and education.
Thla year,
tha reatructurlng of tha political aystem began, aa
attempt ta enlarge and ra-eaat class alllancea which
IOHO, following the abnlltlon of the Senate, as
form the dominant bloc in South Afrlean'aoclety,
official, anil t l-rac la I advisory body on political and
replacing lower-claae whites with aupport from
aegmenta of the coloured and Indian conammltles.
economic affalra.
It la
Tba proppaa 1a , aa framed by tha Conatltutlonal
President chosen by wbltaa, a trl-cameral parliament
Progr*sslv* federal Party, and by virtually all th*
tnttlativ* la likely to auccsad, along with Its probable
mov*m*nta with any Influanca among coloured* and Indiana.
eonaequenees, and to weigh up tha Impllcatlona for
A majority of Ita *14 members wera consequently whit#
flemoeral tr political movement a,
awppnrlera af |h* Natlanal Party,
th* hope of atlmulatlng further throught and debate.
After
recapping the origina and highlights of th* constitutional
to t*»a afrlcan majority.
Liberal commentatora have
pralaed tba propoaala aa a breach In tha political
colour bar, and ana* fngllab-language newepapera bave
Joined tbelr Afrikaans counterparta In campaigning
vlgoroualy for tbalr acceptance.
Crltlea bave
focuaaed on tba aatremely cIrcumacrIbed nature of lb*
•power-aharlng' propoaed and tba aicluaion of afrleane,
along with inat1tutiona 1 laauea auch aa tha Preetdent'a
propoaed powera.
While auch an approach may be adequate for
purpoaea of public propaganda. It la no euhatltute for
The coloured and Indian minority waa comprised largely of
figures plucked from obscurity, auch aa the Port Elltabeth
social worker, and a few reliable whe*lhor**s from th*
smong whites, and th* National Party'e reaponse.
established coloured and Indian political machinery.
The
dlacussion of coloured and Indian polltlca which followa
Other membera Included crypto-Nate fro* the New Republic
augqeats that the new deal repreeenta a bid to capture
Party, a renegade e«-Prog, a coloured trad* unionist from
tha aupport of petty bourgeois leaders and thslr followers,
th* conservative Trade Union Council of SA, and a right-
and that It la likely to prove attractive to som# of them.
wing political eclentlat with curious oversees
The conclusion preaenta some of the tactical optiona In
connection*,
from its membership, it was difficult to
escape the impression It had been set up to produce a
Interested in aatabllahlng a genuinely democratic aociaty
political and Intellectual figleaf to cover the NT'a
In South Africa.
political designs.
CONTENTS Of Ttlg PffQTQSALB
the timing of it* report. According to press accounts,
The subservience of the council waa ahown even In
T>f€ EXPLOSION of anger In South Afrlca'a black communltlsa
ruling
party that soma aort of political change was necessary.
the council originally Intended bringing national
conatltutlonal proposala out only In 1903 or 19«4,
with at most a report on local government this year.
Tha Initial response of SJ Vorster's government was an
It promised to provide both In th* first half of 19S?,
unwleIdly acheme, produced In igff, for three aeparat*
only after being called eharpty to order by Chrte Heunla,
parilamenta for colourada, whltea and Indiana, each with
tha Mlnlatvr with r**ponsiblI Ity for eonatltuttonal
tbalr own Prime Mlnlatar and cabinet,
revision.
Each would have had
full leglalattve authority over their 'own* mattera,
while a
consultative council of cablneta would have
operated undsr an aaecutive President to decide 'Joint'
issues.
This Impression waa confirmed when the propoaala of
the Council's ConatI tut Inna I Committee were releaaed thla
May.
The main points included!
- The creation of a single legislature to represent
Rejection of this acheme, which would have left
control of the non-reaerva araaa overwhelmingly In white
hande, waa ao unanlmoua that the government waa forced
Into a rethink.
*
Including a r«llsetl«m
of out-to-pasture politicians, buelneesmon, and technocrat
plsns, It considers the intenslficatlon or class struggle
Including wbltaa, coloured! and Indiana, and th*
continuing denial of any aay In tha can'-.ral government
Recause It d e l u d e d afrlcan*. It
waa boycotted by the white official opposition, th*
Committee of tba President's Council and detailed
by tba government, provide for a dominant executive
an
conaequently Important to aaseaa tha degree to which thla
tha ruling party proposed a new eonat1tut Ion and under­
went a aevara split.
Issue still further.
tha President’s Council IPCI was ealabllahed In
thla paper will attempt to address these laauea, In
African atata, along with th* changing naeda and
recomm end th* creation of a P resident’s Council, as
envlaaged In John V orster’s plan, to consldef th*
The Issue was handed to th* Schlsbusch
whites, coloureds and Indiana, with afrlcan* still
voteless.
- Tranafsr of authority to an indirectly-elected
executive Treaident, with power to appoint a
Afrlkaana press (Charney, 1001(3-0).
Ihus, even before the Coneervetlve Perty break-awiy,
the National Party bad loat the support of a large
proportion - If not
the majority - of the groups which
even among thoee who did Identify with the NP, fewer
Party can no longer be certain of winning either a
than one-third eald they did eo strongly.
majority of the electorate or a majority of aeata in
After the Coneervetlve Party broke off from the NP
In February, oppoalng PW Botha*a acceptance of
a parliamentary election.
The fate of Dirk Mudge In
Namibia who deetroyed hie boa* among whltee through
*jt»ealthy power-aharing*, President's Council style, aa
reforme without gaining popularity among blecke, la
AfrIkaane-epeekl«g worker*, f a n w r a , and elvll servants,
part of NP policy, the defeat lone bereme even more
before their eyee.
especially In the Traneveel end the O range Free State*
menacing.
political eettlement In Namibia, the government la likely
Ana 1ye la of a poll taken by the Star newepoper-'ln
electorate elumped from Ite M X
three
election to 44 X In two polle taken In April, 1002
eonetltuenclee ehowed that UNr eupport wae heavily
concentrated among these group*.
It aleo euggeeted that
many NP vetera thought like MNP aupportere, but remained
bound to their old perty home only by fraying emotional
tlea (Charney, 1Q01|10,
’
10 1.
Netlonal Party eupport emong the white
level In the 1001
(Rapport, 02.09.02) 8und*y tribune, 02.09.02).
Rapport poll found the CP and W
to loee another chunk of lta aupportere.)
Nevertheleee, the Natlonallate still wleh to
evold the logical alternetlve, an alliance with the
leading the Netlonallate among Afrlkanere In the
PTP.
freneveal,
to prejudlcee, eoclallead ever Ihe deeedea
Thla conelualon wee dramatically confirmed
A new eet of
political alllencee le clearly celled for.
The
together to be
(Indeed, If It egreee to a
Much of their reluctence cen be attributed
Into
Craig C h a m e y enmmentedi
In the Aanelatan district by-election In Auguet,
The government'e timid move* toward* reform - along
with lta hlnte of othere to' follow - have threatened
the fragile proeperlty of thoee blue collar whltee
end emallholdera. A freer labour aiarket and better
black training would erode the Infleted wage* of
the white labour arletocrecy. Many wage-earning
whltee eee real wagee felling already. Ae Inflation
aprlnta ahead white employere hold back on their
Increaeee to pueh up bleck'o breadline wagee. 9"*al 1
fermere, threatened with being driven off the land,
are worried about malia price lncreacea and
government policies which Increaelngly favour the
big fermere.
where the combined right-wing vote wae comfortably
accept the need for epeclflc eoclel end economic reforme
aheed of the Nat Iona 11st'e ecore In a prevlouely
which will give blecke etreteglc poeltlone In the economy,
All theae groupa are bound together by the rigid
racism often found among those directly In the
path-of black advance.
It le thue no email wonder
thet mlnere and tleket-taker* and many othera who
k"nw they owe their livelihood to tb# colour of
their eklne are drawn by the W P ' e promise to go
beck to Verwoertf.
(Ibid, 0, 12)
Among more affluent Afrlkanere, on the other hand,
rock-solId Natlonallet eeat.
In the wake of
Qermlston district, hardly a Nat eeat In the Tranavaal
could be coneldered ’safe'.
The Coneervetlve eplit coat the
•11 elaaeea of Afrtkaane-apeakere.
Ivan though they
the Afrlkener bourgeolele and polltlcel elite romelne •
convinced thet giving them equivalent polltlcel
responsibilities will leed to cheoe (Management,
Important
Oct 1002(311.* Of course, ouch prejudlcee could be
elemente of eupport on the middle reeehee of the eoclal
u n l e e m e d If they were perceived to clash with their
ecale.
holdere*
There were major defections emong elemente of
the petty bourgeolelet
rural notablee, farmers
(especially In the Tranavaal and free State mai>e
regions), churchmen,
lntellectuele, mid-ranktng
civil eervente, etc.
The CP eucceee In rallying the
Intercuts.
However, at present the verllgto NatienAIItto
have emberked on e different etrategy to ehore up
their perty'e eegglng fortunee.
They prefer to try to
•In beck a aubetentlal ahare of the Afrlkener forming
petty bourgeole elemente tradlttonally eo lmportent
and arorklng claee elemente, rether then converting
to the NP In the north wae reflected In preee reporte
PfP eupportera, in accord with a polltlcel and economic
euggestlng It wae winning the etruggle for domlnence
approach svhlch dlffera sharply from that of the Progs.
In the Broederbond, the key network for Ideological
While liberal thinking, like that of the Progreaelvee,
alme at creetlng ■ polltlcel end economic eyetem
patience wae wearing thin with the elow pace of reform.
organleatton.
O f profeeelonal, eupervleory, end mlddle-to-upper
forming groupa aolldlfled the antl-NP trends among
accommodating enough to co-opt aaplrant bourgeole
management Afrlkanere In the 8tar poll, aome ?4\
thoee lower down the eoclel ecale.
elemente from ell recee, thu* defusing the threat
supported the PfP, against Juet W
of their lower-claeo
counterparta I Ibid, 101.
Political changee were alao underway among
In turn, lta success among theae opinion-
Now, the NP etrongeet eupport comes from the urben
by the Aflcen Netlonal Congreae, the verllgtee
•re merely eeeklng to acquire eome block elllee for a
fural bourgeoisie.
civil wer egelnet the ANC.
It le alao supported by eegmente
Engl 1ah-apeakIng whltee, after the eld United Perty
of the Intelllgentela, and the better-educeted, more
dlelntegrated under the laehlng of the erlele.
While
posed
Afrlkeene-epeaklng bourgeoisie and profeeelone, with the
Compared to liberal atrotegy,
the verllgto echeme Imp!lee much leee redletrlbutIon
eecure pert of the urben petty bourgeolale, particularly
and much more control (on both block end white oldeel.
the better-off arere draw* to the PfP, the lower-cleoo
In the private aector.
Qlven theee Ideological differences, despite the material
began to vote predomlnently Nationalist (Ibid, 101.
•killed workforce, and lta fngliah workIng-claee
convergencee. It le thue not too ourprlelng that a M*
It aleo eppeared, however, that the w o r k l n g - d a e e
supporter* though theee groups ere looking decidedly
MP hee said that hie perty 'would only conelder a
fickle.
coalition with the Prog* oe a laet desperate meeeure
fngliah vote waa 'up for grebe' on the right
1
40*
of thla group had no regular party Identlfleatlon, and
It aleo retelne part of the
All thle adde up to one c o n c l u e l o m
the Natlonel
before bowing out* (Ibid).
—
—
—
I
rnnwMin11 y (Star, 03.11.81).
1
M#*t other Indian townships,
lived through the heartbreak of earlier crackdowne, and
to a rapidly Increaelng need for supervisory manpower in
the yeare ahead, and the aoe*ewhat better educational and
at least In thi Tranevaal, have similar 'kingpin*
refuaed to be Intimidated by their eldere* feare.
flguree, while In Natal, th« patty bourgeois Pefona
19f3, the Netal Indian Congreae waa rebofn, while
Tarty ueed the Local Affaire Commltteea and the nominated
coloured youth pertlclpated vigorously
In the 1970
(compared to afrlcana) make them the moat obvious
SAIC aa Ita power baae.
uprisings In the Cape.
c
candldatee.
A variety of Indlcatlone show that theae institution*
In
eoclal backgrounds enjoyed by coloureds and Indiana
By the early 1970a, the capacity ofrthe system to
Achieving the g o v e r n m e n t s objectlvea, furthermore,
never really afforded their members a popular base in the
contain popular dlacontent In the coloured and Indian
does not require unanlmoue er even necaeaarlly majority
Indian community.
ceesnunltlea was aleo In decline.
aupport among the coloured and Indian populatlona.
Their Inability to moblllae more
than 10% to ?0* of the population to vote In LAC and
The moat Important
etreem of patronage, housing, wae drying up, aa the tiny
A recent review of aurvey data auggeata
*
make dlvlde-and-rule work, and encourage a flow of
SAIC electlone In .recent yeare la Indicative of their
limited aupport.
The
aupport of an Influential minority would be eofflclent to
up.
volunteera to Join the army, while the ahlfta in labour
The burgeoning ehortagee of housing, achool
facllltlea, and amenttlee aleo helped make many reeldente
demand will appear more the coneequence of market forcea
In favour of grouplnga working 'within the ayatem' (Peat
Intensely angry.
than af afflclal policy,
Nslil, tflifMlfHMl
Ita*
that no more than theae small proport Iona are preeently
A n |HH(| M
HR RHS
ft||al8«t|
8RM
Repression alone c ould1not hold the
fetflR Is »paak m il ,
fhHii«h tha
fm rufcm
The position waa slightly different In the coloured
fhl o h H l s M l a
8f tfcf tplatfMi* a«d
Indiana la not ont not only la It not necessary, it
them, however, their rickety atructurea sufficed.
la alao too eapenelve, given the limited reaourcea
coloured comawnlty.
available for redlstrlbutIon In terme of National
areaa, where the coloured Labour Party haa occupied an
especially among the young, aa the massive support for
Parly thinking.
leadera, It haa preaented Itself ee 'anti-apartheid*,
the 1980 eohool and unlveralty boycotta ehowed.
running In the tens of thousands, and equallelng
and it haa enjoyed a significant measure of popularity.
theae boycotta, coevnunlty organleatlone began to grow
educational e*P«ndlturea, while coping with new demand,
It won clear majorltlea of the vote In the Coloured
rapidly In the Cape Town and Durban townahlps, pressing
would preaent enormous costa, to aay nothing of attacking
Persona PepreaentatIva
clalme on local authorltlee and giving reeldenta an
ether areaa of aoclal Inequality.
awareneaa of their own power,
of unlveraal call-up for coloured end Indian youth would
ambivalent position.
Deaptte Ita petty bourgeole
Council electlone of 1089 and
1973, on turnoute of 49* and 46* respectively.
Ita
following
their Impreaelve capacity
Eliminating housing waiting llate
Llkewlee, the Impoeltlon
Intranalgent refusal to allow the Council to operate
for popular eiobl 1 iaatIon was revealed In the 1981 anti-
overetraln the training facllltlee and budget of a
smoothly eventually led the government to abolish the
SAIC campaign, which helped produce a 90* ateyesray in the
military establishment already et Ita llmlta, to aay
toothleee body, although the coup de grace came at a tls*e
SAIC electlone.
nothing of the loyalties of the young awn themselves.
when other waye to Incorporate coloureda were already
O n the part of the government, there haa been a
(In Zimhab«e, the leiposltlon of a call-up for educeted
blacke by the Mutorewa regime merely drove many of them
under conelderatlon.
However, at the local level, the Labour Party waa
outmoded, and an atteeipt Instead to win eome degree of
81nce 1978,
Into 7ANLA Instead: see Frederlkee, 198?i?33.)
Nevertheless, the new processee will probably produce
difficult to dlatlnguleh from Ita Indian counterparta,
acquiescence from colourede and Indiana.
eacept in Ita eomewhat greater political aklll and maee
the authorltlee have been aware of the growing threat
some difference* In political outcoeiea, which are likely
support.
poaed by the ANC, and they dread an alliance which
to enable the government to bid for support among the
In the coloured townehlpa, and It used their patronage
would unite eoloureds and Indiana with revolutlonary
better-off strata of the coloured and Indian .... unit lea.
powere (elong with thoee of the Coloured PepreaentatIve
afrlcsn natIona Ilata., Convereely, they are painfully
There will ba a eerles of forums where blacks discuss
Council) to eetablleh a power baee.
aware of the limited defenelve manpower available from
lssuek with whltee, euch aa the Joint coweeltteee and
a population of 9 - m whites, and they aeek to augeient
the President's Council, which will probably help blunt
It took hold of the Management Co*** It tees
In the proceee, it
earned the same eort of criticism from within the
community aa the PP had done.
These etructuree of co-optation and control began to
the ranka with 3-m coloureda and Indiana.
(The draft
call-up bill prepared by the Mlnlatry of Defence laat
•
some of the racist crudities traditionally associated
with the National Party.
Moreover, while the ultimate
control will remain In white hands. Its eaerclae will
break down aa the wounda of the 1950a and 1980a healed.
be tee*pered by the need not to force the coloured and
With time, the new communltlea began to develop a
coloured men, but was shelved until they had bean
aenaa of Identity, aa people grew uaed to the new
granted 'political righte' of some sort.)
reaidentlal patterns. ‘As these sentiments emerged,
alao importent economic consideratIons« projections by
collapse.
so too did a new generation of young people, who had not
the National Manpower Commission and other bodies point
probably allow was U l u s t r s t e d by the r e c o w n d i t l o n
There are
Indian representatIves to quit, making the whole etructure
The sort of depsrturee euch a set-up will
the electlone and demonstrate that they do not enjoy
powerfully, the new proposals could not function if
supremacy, whether the aeata won are ultimately assumed
conaent were merely orchestrated rather than fraaly
•r nst.
given on the part of co-opted elements.
writ
Thue there wilt
Democrats alao need to consider w hether (here le
In trying to wake the operation of the aystee.
he InstItutlonel opportunities for the expression of
Impossible, aa the Labour Party did with the CTC, and
reaction to the new dlspenaatIon,
Whether It might be helpful to have spokesmen In
In the form of election*
for the new parliament and poeelbly referendiime on the
parliament with the le***unltlee against banning and
new institutions themaelvee.
detention which auch positions would imply.
There will aleo necessarily
sources
Charney, C - 'Towards Rupture or Steals! An Analysis' of
igni
the 10R1 South Afrlcsn Oeneral fleet Ion'
(unpublished paper, African Rtudlea Seminar,
University of the Wltwatererand).
Charney, C - 'The wooing of big business'
ion?
October.
frederlkae, J - None but Ourselveai Masses va siedla In
100?
the making of Zimbabwe (Ravan, Johannesburg).
be a greater tolernnce of overt, peaceful political
opposition to thoae participating In these Institutions, I
participation In the new national political etructuree,
aa complete elimination of the opposition would render
building strong and effective Coweeunity organisations In
them useless as devices for building support.
the black communities remains an eeaentlal priority.
This sttitude waa already reflected by the fact
in Management,
O'Meara, 0 - 'Muldergate and the polltlca of Af
1002
Nationalism', In WIP 22 (Supplement).
Theee will be easentlal If the attempts at eowing division
that the authorities permitted the » n t l - R M C campaign,
despite ite open support for the freedom Charter,
While
At the eeme time, the new local authority echemee may
*0*1* bannlnge and detentions followed tbe campaign,
create new openings for gains by community organisations.
merely allowing auch a campaign to take place would
The blggeet problem of the new institutions will be their
have been unthinkable a decade ego, and would probably
ability to 'deliver the goods', which will alwaye be
have led to major proaecutlons.
reatrlcted by the need to limit the aacrlflcea asked
However, doing eo In the
context of the 8AIC election cempaign would have rendered
of srhltes*
the electlone an obvioue farce.
authorltlee will probably be more susceptible to preseure
Tbeae changes in the pnlltleal climate associated
possibilities for struggle, which must be debated on the
If a referendum
la held on the new prcposale, It may be wiser to campelgn
for • 'no' vote then to call for a boycott.
8ueh s ’
S A R S P U B L IC A T IO N S
(including Work In Progrots)
At the same time, however, the new local
The Southern African Reseetch Service fSARSI keeps you
le much with torrent political end economic hentk SARS
puWlrslinni contain cn*e*ee» end ansiyiii af resettlement,
henh»ilam, wroth Inf cists ectio*\ state ilretefies, trad*
unions, ttilkes, political wish end detention.
from community bodies, Since they will contain blacks
with the Introduction of the new dispensation ereate new
basis of tactics rather than prlnclplee.
SOUTHERN AFRICAN
R E S E A R C H SE R V I C E
,
themeelves.
,' • # ”
Your suhtcrlptlon to SARS publications entitles you le sN
'editions of:
• Work In Process
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• Information (hast*
The consequence la that'co*w»unlty organlsat ions
should be sble to esact a series of gains for their
residents by keeping up the pressure on the new
Institutions, while st the same time discrediting them
campaign could put a spanner In the works. If the
by continually revealing their limitations.
proposals were rejected by one or both of the black
can be pitched alwaye one etep furthen khan the authorities
comwiunltlee concerned.
are ready to go.
A response to electlone for the new chamber must
Their demands
In this race for popularity, thoae
like a runner chained to an Iron ballt the ball of white
partlclpatee, and the alternatives which appear the «oet
resistance.
effective.
'
participation, and a 'boycott ticket* which rune to
atart of a new political era for both the dominant groupa
demonstrate support but realgns If It wins sny aeata.
and the democratic opposition In BA, In which
(Such a boycott ticket waa uaed by the ANC in electlone
opportunltlee for legal, peaceful political activity which
for the Native Representative
have been abeent for two decadee are likely to re-emerge.
If only the discredited conservatlvea participate,
The Implleatlone need to receive wide debate and a
a boycott may be •'.he most useful way to demonetrate
creative response.
solidarity In opposition.
dangere, but they will alao create new poeslbllltlea.
(Or would a boycott ticket
be more useful for lte disruptive ability?)
If PFP-type
groupa conteat the election. It may be wleer to conteet
i R 7JM
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and for rates outilde South Africa contact
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Individual*. Wade «
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The new lnetltutlone will pose new
• ARf
P O Rea tS1?4
>14] Yeosllte
Booth Africa
IMtpl 1/
Other struggles In urban blank cnmmunltles ravnlvml
light the realignment of clans forces end Interests
around rising rents, housing, bus fa<cs end education.
• 1 th|n the ruling National party.
Tha restructuring of capital, combined with
B o t h Moss and
O'Meara have emphasised the reconstitution of the
Intensified class and popular struggles lad to
class alliance that had formed the basis of NP
pressures for changes ehich had become necessary
rule since 19<18.
to secure the domestic stebillty vital for
gradually lost its position in that ruling alliance.
economic growth.
'Reformists’ highlighted tha
The ehlte wording cless has
Its mmtoers heve decreased as ehlta workers hove
need to ease restrictions on the mobility, training
moved into supervisory positions.
end employment of afrlcan labour, and to reorganise
small egrIcultural Interests heve also lost nut In
the procedures for collective bargaining,
tha ruling group a s monopoly Interests begin to
they also
Under-capltelIsed,
argued that It aes necessary to create tha condition*
dominate the leadership pf the NP|
for the development of a black petty bourgeoisie or
Increasingly berimes a bourgeois political
middle H a s t ,
RRfiy r e p r e s e n t ! ^ fspltellst Interest*.
But tha raformist or m s true luring Initiatives
the party
Afrikaner business interests have pressed for
of the Botha government do not only hove their
c h a n g e s , especlelly through the mouthpiece of
origins in the changing demands of capitalist
the Haodelslostituut.
production, coupled elth intensifying olass
tendencies within the NP heve shaken the long-
struggle end resistance.
Btending class elllance *iich bound the party
Another important factor
Involves the rising dominance of tha military, end
These reformist
together, end heve resulted In the rupture
this is tha area that can no* b e examined.
ehlch led to tha format ion of the Conservative
Party.
THE RISE (F THE MILITARY IN SOUTH ATRICA
After the debecle of the 1973 Angole
The ear in Namibia has Intensified over the
pest decade.
Invasion,
and the 1970 revolts, the reformist positions of
There is presently en occupation force
the leadership of the BA0T end powerful cepltallst
of the order of 00 000 South African troops in
4
Namibia.
Tha military has rapidly become over­
alliance.
extended in its present form.
Angolan Invasion highlighted the need for restructur­
Interests began to develop into an over-closer
The protracted end
ever-escalating guerilla eer in Namibia has
The defeat of South African forces in the
ing el thin the BARF itself.
highlighted its essentially political oature.
,
It was reelIsed that
psychological , wconranlc, politico), sociological,
technological, diplomatic. Ideological,
cultural, etc. Re ere today Involved in a
war....The striving for specific aims...must
he co-ordinated elth ell the moons evelleble
to the state.®
The co-ordination of this strategy seems to be
undertaken b y the State Security Council ehlch eis
established in 1977.
on a uniried bests;
It alms to co-ordinate action
It functions to
advise the government regent Ing the formulation
of national pollry and strategy |n connection
elth the security nf the Republic, the wanner
In ehlih this pulley must he carried out, end
a policy In n v h a t any particular threat
against the serurlty pf the R e p uhl|c,,,,
fhe aspects «f national security ehleh
require attention are the following:
- Political action
- Ml 1itary/pora-ml11tary action
- Economic action
- Psychological action
- Scientific and technological action
- Religious-cultural action
- Manpower services
- Intelligence services
- Security services
- National supplies, reso'ircee and production
- Transportation and distribution services
- financial services
- Community services
g
- Tele-ccmmunlcetlon services
Tha shift in defence stretegy to include political
and ideological strategies marks the beginning of
the rapid militarisation of 8outh African society.
Re can no w e xomlne srw*w of tha arees in which
militarisation has occurred,
for convenience sake,
defence technology needed to b e Improved, end the
In response, political end ideologlcel stretegies
these have been brdten down into economic, political
hiring of mllltery technicians from other countries
simed et 'winning the h earts and minds of the
and ideological levels of society.
was stepped up.
people' heve been sought by the military.
With
In 1977, the cell up for shite males wes
tha increase In pnpuler resistance In South Africa,
extended from one to two yeera to meet the BAOf's
the R A W hes increasingly engaged in opanly
growing personnel needs.
political end ideologlcel activities.
They heve
In thla year, the
MILITARISATION AT TIC POLITIC *. LEVEL
In the eree of g o v ernment, the ceblnet end etete
bureeucrecy heve been reorganised since PW Rotha -
restructuring of Defence policy was expressed In
a long-time minister of defence - tot* office as
eanvessed for state policies eMr.h are 'militarily
a ehite paper es e 'tote! strategy' to oomhet the
prime minister.
defensible', particularly since PW Botha took office
'total ear' against South Africa.
the office of the prime minister,
es prime minister.
The openly political role of the
m ilitary hes, however, brought it into conflict
with other state apparatuses w h U h have tradltlonally
adopted repressive strategies in periods of crisis.
The restructuring of the economy end the
struggles of the domlneted classes have brought to
Tha process of ensuring end melntainlng the
sovereignty of e state's authority in a
conflict situation has, through the evolution
of warfare, shifted from e purely mllltery
to en lntegreted notional action.
Tha
resolution or e conflict In the times in shlch
we now live demands Interdrpendent end co­
ordinated action in all fields - military,
This hes concentrated power In
St* ceblnet
committees heve been entebl I *»hed ehlch ere
responsible to neither periloment nor the NP
caucus.
Each is heeded by the prime minister or h i s
nominee, covering the folloelng ereasi
Internal
affairs, social effelre, economic end financial
affairs.
These committees ere not only ctmiposed of
*
C a p rlv l s t r i p .
Council called on all states tn stop supplyl»xj anas
•
South African f o r T M ere ell aged to be training
to South Africa.
5 00 0 farmer nhodeslan auxllltarlea In tha
Germeny, Italy and larael continued to si*iply
d o one of two thinga through special programmea.
South Africa elth arms.
Flratly, It ittiapts to encourage a mllitarlatlc
northern Transvaal.
Denials of th|* Hava been
However, the IK, USA, Franca,
Anticipating an arms
M tLlTAH IflA M O N AT AN ID C.H.0DICAL L tV IL
At tha level of Ideology, ml 1itarlaetlon alma to
weakened by tha racant entry of South African tralnad
embargo, South Africa began to develop en erms
ax Ohodealana Into Zimbabwe, and tha aubsequent
lnduatry by manufacturing ammunition in 1961.
the same time appearing aa a threet to the dominated
engagement between thla group and Zimbabwean
In 1964, eith the eselatance of prlvete lnduatry,
classes.
forces.
the Armomenta Ooerd and the Armaments Development
programmes I
•
consciousness emong the dominant clasaaa while at
Thla takea place through the followlr^j
Tha Laaotho Llbaratlon Army (LLA) la ellegedly
end Production Corporation were established.
supported an d ermed by South Africa.
1977, the Armaments Development end Production Act
progremmes, veld schools)!
undertaken aaaaaalnatlona and othar attacks lnalda
combined both of these b odies into one - the
The Civil Defence programmes:
Laaotho.
Armaments Corporation (AOMSCOO).
The Increase use of armian in active roles or In
It haa
/•
South African authorltlaa, Including the SAOF,
repeatedly deny thane allegations,
Tha admitted
In .
AHVSCOn conalata of nine natlnnaliaed
• The schooling system (cedets, youth preparadneaa
auppnrt o rgan1 sat Iona,
manufacturing suhaldlarlas, and It dlstrlbutas
Rraontfly, »h» ■ U t t a r ? Hi*. to '.In th. h.arta and
Interventions In Angola end the Seychellea do not
work to over 1 POO privete industrial contractors
minds' of certain aactlona of the dominated
add credence to theae denials.
and strt)-contractors.
clesses through Civil Action Programmes.
In 1901 it eas reported ttat
it eas the lergeat underteklng in South Africa, eith
M I L 1 T W 1 S A T I 0 W AT THE ECCNCXIC LEVEL
aaaeta of 01 200-m.
Here, militarisation la reflected In
figure of 0200-m.
1.
Increasing expenditure on defence!
2.
The expanding armaments lnduatry.
In 1901 It employed 29 000 people, while 90 000
644-si In 1960, 0472-m In 1973, 01 699-m
In 1976, end 02466-m In 1961.
In the peat 10
yeera, there hee been en lncreaae of B&jji.
This steedy lncreaae In Defence expenditure
Tha school cadet system wes officially launched
in 1976 and is co-ordinated by the SAOF and the six
more were engaged in armaments production In the
South Afrlca'a Defence budget hes rlaen as
follows!
These had risen from the 1974
prlvete aectora of lnduatry.
During 1901 AfHinccn
education departments.
It aervea aa a forertww>er
to national service, promoting an Interest In
civil defence and aiming to 'stimulate in cadets
produced ni 400-m eorth of defence equipment ehlch
a loyalty to their cotxitry'.
Included guided mlaailes, aircraft, ertillery,
9
armoured vehlclaa end computera.
Tor the pest fee
being started at coloured end Indian schools. It
yeers, there have been peralatent reporta that South
to 200 000.
Africa haa exploded a nuclaer device.***
services such es housing, health aervlcea end
februery 1902 the Ster reported that a US atudy
the Civil Defence Act of 1977.
educetion.
had concluded that 6outh Africa certainly had
programme Is to
of theae aervlcea.
Government apenda 0,5J]t of the
Oroaa Domestic Product (OOP) on afrlcan housing, end
1 136)1 of COP on houting for all groupa.
Dr Michael
In
the technological and economic cepaclty to produce
nucleer weapons (Star, 09.02.6?).'
South Africa, reported to be the world'e
Sinclair, lecturer at tha Unlveralty of Wltweterarend,
tenth lergeat arma producer (Ster, 31.03.62),
ia ryuoted e a .saying that the eer in Namibia la
alao produces many othar military products such aa
coating 0 3 2 0 -m a yeer, end la Greeting e ’dearth
napalm and la preparing to produce submarines.
of funding for educetion, training end houalng
In 1979, 400 compenlea railed to a significant
at home' (np*l, 12.05.62).
extant on defence contrecte.
The srmements industry!
manufenturwra, the gnlnlng of defence contracts
Tor private
It eea during Vnr Id War 7 that South Africa began
meana securing a stable merket.
eeger to gain e ahere of the arms *ar*et.
Allied ear effort.
enuld be avan more an in a period of rereaalnn.
mi
Ourlng the 19*10a and IWVla tha
equipped primarily eith Britlah end
Amerlcen ermements.
The Civil Defence Programme eas Initiated by
The ela of tha
provide, by means of planning and provision of
emergency measures, with a view to a n emergency
situation, the 0SA end Its inhebltents elth
the grnatest measure of protection end assistance
end to curtail civilian disruption In the most
effective manner.
The local authorities beer the primary reaponalblllty
for the implementation of the programme.
They are
expected to eatabllah an affective organisation
that can
producing arms, making ahalla and bomba for the
B W
With cadet training
is anticipated that tha n a b e r of cadets eill rise
has forced the stete to cut back on soclsl
Thla reaulte In a further deterioration
This
Is especially so In arees of stratagic Importance.
Cnmnenlea ere thua
This
go over to organised action elth a view to
saving llvea, protecting property ant!
maintaining the assent, lei aervlcea neceaaery
for the survival of a civilised community.
Industries, rnmmerclet undertakings, achoola,
uolveraltlea etc ere elso expected to creete their
In Auguat 1967, the UN Security
I
i
the plight of local unionists d ates frws mld-
others.
Such intervention Is not surprising]
an eggresslve pro-Imperial Ism, which of ita nature
.'Involves intervention In the affairs of other
countries to edvence Americen ruling cleas Interests.-
’ INTRODUCTION
Tha recent visit of a n American trade union
. delegation to 8oyth Africa coold hava Important
Tha
In this content, the words of IrVing Brown,
.(the US term Is 'emerging') trede unions reached Its
peek end* InternetInnelly, the International
,labour Organisation's 1900 programme of ectlon
'/against apartheid ground slowly Into o p e r e t l w .
^
As the neely-formed Internetlonel Lebour
^Orgenlsetlon (ILO) committee etyilnst apartheid met
•lor^j-stendlng Americen lebour leader who eill feeture
( in Zemble during May lest yeer, locel unionists
'egeln end egeln in the ertlcle below, ere worth
freceived drefta of the A T L - C I O ’s own programme
■bearing In mlndl
•,of action *ln support of black trade unions In
’Why', esks Orown,
’shouldn't
rover! ant Inn ha srneptahls In paane time to try
possibility of •ucaaalva American support for
1901, as, locally, the growth of Independent .
for
.ehlle the rhetoric of the Americen union leederahlp
i
Involves a rabid e n t l - e n m w m l a m , this translates Into
!
raalfloat Inna for tha trade unlim movement,
Tha current tidal wave of American concern for
attempts to undermine soms unions *hlle supporting
TRADE UNIONS:
America steps
in
,end p revent tha possibility of e a r f
iftnuth Afrlaa',
|
The progremme Included the estehlIshment of
certain unlona may hava the affect of placing
a South Afrlcen unit In the Africen-Americen Lebour
control f lnsly In the handa of leaderahlp rather
The AFL-CIO
delegation
Centre (AALC) 'to co-ordlnete ell US labour e c t l v l t y
Tilt September 7 - 1 6
a
than rar* and file membership.
As an organiser from a Cape Towo union put it,
Although »e have agreed to meet the delegation,
•a have misgivings about the role the Ikilted
State* government plays in the AfricanAmerlcen Labour Centra.
whistle-a top tour of loosl
In support of trede union development* in South
Africa)
the programme also aimed for
a. the creation of a speciel lebour fund' to flnence
trada union activity herej
the development nf other apeclflc prngre— wea In
Its previous courses at Cornell University have
hod a corrupting Influence on South African
unionists.
Their lavlah eey of throelng
money eround Is not the eay ee believe In
running e union.
union ofricss by four offlclsls of the Americen
South Africa and the US 'for asslstence In
Tederetlon of Lebour-Congrass of Industrie!
organlalng unions, collective b argaining,
Organisations (AfL-CIO) - and the sudden flurry
leadership and cadre training'.
A Scendljiavlen trade union officlel ei§ even
which proceeded It - has yet to be edequately
of Interest In South African trade unionism
more candid:
explained.
The Amerlcens ere trevelllng erwmrt offering
money independently to trade union leeders.
That eey of buying friends, goodwill end egenta
must be directed to the upper atructure of
the national unions as the goals are mainly
p olitical.
Despite occeslonal appearences on the South
It is Obvious that the (Americen unlona)...
don't consider trada union assistance from the
point of view of giving e hand to the c rm w o n
worker*a situation, but as part of US foreign
policy.
They d o n ’t give a damn about the
common workers* altuatlon, aa you can easily
see from their training programmes.
They ere
elways geared to trede u nion leadership
training. flut If you never train the rank and
file memhera h oe eill they defend their rlghta,
especially against dishonest leederahlp.,,T
The recipients were asked to c re-ont on the
draft programme.
In October, the full ILO edopted the May
proposals for policing the entl-epertheld
African labour stage - one of them the offer of
progr a m m e , Including measures to enforce the
*lerge s i a s ' for 'properly organised black trade
polltlcel end economic Isoletion of South Africa.
unions' by Irving Brown of the AFL-CIO's Afrlcan-
A month before this decision, the ATL-CIO released
Ae*erlcan L ebour Centre to TlJCSA shortly efter the
details of Its own programme of ectlon, to be
massive l£?J atrlKes - American union leaders heve
greeted enthuslestlcelly In South Afrlce by only
shown uncharacteristic reticence towards South
Lucy M v u b e l o ’s National Ik^lon of Clothing Workers,
African labour.
and the el lied Garment Wo r k e r s ' Union.
In the 1960s end 1970s their Involvement was
Surprisingly, T U T S A ’s Arthur Grobbeleer,
limited largely, to recruitment of a handful of
previously one of the locel union leedere closest
blank unionists to their Cornell IMIveralty
to llfl unionists - MrtIA end r.llflA together ennounted
(reining programmes - compared to the tens of
for 1? of the ♦ 77 South African trainees at
thousands of l.4tln American unionists and workers -
Cornell - denounced the AfL-CIO plen ea
In Africa end Latin America lnvolvea the creetlon end
given trelnlng end flnenclal eld In the same period -
’presiasptlous', es locel trede unions bed not been
exploitation of apllts between unions, the pleylng
end e watching brief by US lebour atteche'a In
consulted.
off of union leaders against one another, end the
South Africa.
The hlatory of Americen trede union Intervention
I
*
Journalists covering the September ’82 visit
Justification fdr tht South African visit!
an
a US Marinas' sergeant-turned trade union leader,
Invitation was 'a general one, expressed over many
invitation to U S labour leeders to vlait thla
n o a head *f the AALC |
years by many unionists' fall equally flat.
country, issued on b ehalf of CUBA by Jana Hlongeena,
'Chick' Chaikin and Frederick O'Neal*
aarratary of tha titeel and Engineering Worker*'
Union of South Africa.
According to tha July
aha spoke (in tha US)....of tha urgent needa
that faca tha emerging black trade unionsi
tha need for trained personnel, transportation
for organising and recruiting purposes, funds
for legal services and office equipment.
tha esenutlva council only In February 1BB2 -
Oie possible explanation for thla la hinted at
operation elth tha International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
CUSA, a major recipient of ICFTU funds in
for tha programme (Uahomo) h a d bean appointed mora
The statement ees leced elth
for \ha Afl-CIO prnoraswa
and tha first South African member alnce the demise
,
t
(For dataila of FOTATUSA*a formation, aee tha
artlclaa ehieh folio* thla),
Tha US unlona, not normally sensitive to the
feelings of the ICFTU, had rejoined the International
1902, after an 11-year
break (brought about by George Meeny'a
accusation that tha ICFtU wae soft on communism and
run by 'falriae'), and their South African
programme enutd tharafora have to have included
towards international
participation.
Tha d elegation arrived on August 7, consisting
Irving Brown, former AALC chief, appointed two
"•onths earlier to heed AFL-CIO'a international
affaire directorate (ea auch ha la the Ufl unlona'
Tha Amerlcena were claarly treading carefully
around local union aensltlvltlee,
But fltnen, in a latar, fac«-td-f*ftW lnt«rviww
elth a smaller group, spoke aora openly ebout
the AFL-CIO'a motives,
foundation on which to build'.
declered (efter en Initial hesitancy <rf»o he was
tkiestloned on SACTU he
being esfced ebout) thet BACTU's Congrasa Alliance
paternel eld dlsappeered ea soon ea the delegation
connections linked It to en ideology 'ehlch ea
•at foot In South Africa (to be reaurrected only
abhor', end ehlch cannot 'lead to free Independent
occasionally by Brown, to the embarrassment of
unions'.
his colleagues, In prlveta interviews).
B ACTU hes polltlcel links, but rethec that the
Local
In other words. It is not the feet thet
American's don't Ilka tha sort of llr*s It has.
Tha delegatlon'a hostlly to the ANC end lta
ellled organisations was not hidden.
to their own Incompetence.
And local union sympathy was hardly unanlmoue.
Trade Unlona in South Africa (FOFATUSA) in
than a yaar pravlouely.
organisation, trained leedershlp end e solid
programme, would b e hard put to ed"lt In effact
early this year became the ICFTU'a latest affiliate -
Patrick O'Farrell, •
of their etatementa - this at a time when e director
It la our committment to see that this
union leeders, even those sympathetic to the
South Africa (reportedly H000 000 last yaar),
U r * ma n elth the ICFTU)|
'At the present moment In history, we have m epped out
our path.
Not surprisingly, this aggressive promise of
It refere to tha
programme of action being carried out in co­
oft
only come if w e 're wanted' eas the main thrust
In helping black eorkera 'achieve a measure of
earlier.
'We'll
announcement In May last yaar, it atated frer*lyt
•fernng, paIerne 11 at In m l *
sent to South African unionlata almost a year
at least a gesture
attitudes to the 'proposed' progremmet
In the AFL-CIO's initial
South African trade unionlam, and advocated a
a demonstreble untruth, in tha light of tha draft
conf ederetton tp January,
mission, Intended to feel out South African union
tha delegation.
rafarancas tcT tha tanuous, Incipient nature of
tha ATL-CIO p rogramme of action had been put befora
to point out that their trip was a fact-finding
for nothing alsa, for tha decidedly muted tones of
approach succeeds'.
Tha same edition alao carrtaa an announcement that
of the ICFTU-funded Federation of Free African
fCi\ four US d elegatee eere, however, at peine
Thwlr first prass conference eas notable, if
adltlon of ’South. African Labour Nees',
later in the name erticler
and AFL-CIO executive members
Asked by a
Journalist whether they did not thlt* they were
Bight wing and conservative group (South Afrlcen
Ignoring one of the strongest fectore in tha
Confederetlon of Lebour end TICSA) eere eery of
equetlon, namely the ANC, e delegation m m h e r
the progremme's emphaals on black unions|
responded thet he did not thlr* the ANC ees en
while
among othere, attltudaa to the visit ranged generally - from the cool to the outrlghtly hostile.
Even before their arrival, BAAWU and MACWUSA had
laportent fector.
Brown spoke edmlrlngly of Buthelefl as the
'leadar of the biggest llberetion movement here*
indicated their hostility to the visit, while
(in the George Weeny H uman Bights Award citation,
FOSATU hed publlcelly doubted the need for en
greet patne are taken to wmpHesIse thet many of
'ex t a m e 1 body'.
A Cepe Town unionist, prohebly
•peaking for many of the independent unions, seld
flatly!
'We alll meet the delwgatlon...ea mill
Irfcethe'e 'paid up membership of upwerds of
M O ntIO' tnclud.*
(■!»'* tr.i*. unlonlata').
When e front page story in the Sunday Trlbteia
certainly not egree to any Involvement In their
linked the AFL-CIO d elagatlon to the CIA, en
orog r a w m e ' .
outraged Brown - for one of the first times -
Chaikin, enswerlng questions et their first,
CerJton Hotel, preas conference, did"not help
I!
mattere by e m i t t i n g , then asked who had Invited
the delegetlon, that ha didn't know.
An attempted
rescue by O'Ferrell, to the 'effect thet the
i
'vehamently* denied such links.
Mi s usual
response fo such el legations 1* thet 'I w w l d n ' l
tell you If I was CIA*.
In a response to the Tribune story run a weak
leter. Brown demonstrated e rather eketchy knowledge
•
European representative of FTUC.
B r o w n ’a mandate Involved breaklng up cnmmunlat-
oppoae $he World federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
with Brown In aettlng up FCFATUBA, their r e la tlo n a h lp
ehich Included both corammlat and non-co«*»un|et
was eell established by 19f*3.
Brown recently told Bouth African .Journallata
lad unions In Europe - and it la claimed that this
unions.
lad to Hia Initial Involvement elth tha C IA (formed
plan gave the AR. an Important atnke In the
that Mnhomo 'haa very good prectlcal experience
in 1947).
splitting of WTTU, and the foundation of the
of the problems in developing e trade teilon
ICFTU.
because of the links he had elth FGTATU3A'.
At about thia time, tha F rench Confederation of
W F T U opposition to Amerlca'a Marahall
In the mid-1950s, the ICFTU aet up a special
Labour (COT) eaa landing a massive atrike In Parlai
Whether thla lmpllea that Mnhnmo eea Involved In
•HIla dock workere In Mediterranean porta were
S o l i d a r i t y fund' to assist elth the netting up of
forming FOFATUOA, or only eatabllehed llr*a once
rafuaing to unload Amur lean goods.
trede unions In third world countrlea - end b y 1939
h e left Bouth Africa In 1900, la not clear.
Irving Brown held the post of ICFTU - United Nations
by 1961 Mahtwo was d efinitely representing FOFATUBA
liaison officer.
In Arrtca, aa eltnessed at tha Casablanca conference.
Thomaa Bradan, haad of tha CIA*a European
cparationa frcw 19*30 to 193d, takaa up tha atoryt
This placed him in en ldeel
Into thla nrlala atappad I ovaatnne and hla
Irving ftr*s*.i..tt aaa my Irian
to give fltS 0 0 0 to Irving Brown. Ik# needed It
to pay orr bin strong-arm aqunda in
Mndltarranann porta, ao that American auppllaa
could ba unloaded against tha opposition of
Communist dock eorkers.
p n a l M o n to Intervene In International trade union
Brown'a Intarvantlon In European labour eant
oppoaltlon.
But
Whether Grown art (tally fumted the nraatlnn
of rOFAtUBA or not, II la ««sk ImprMhsbls that this
sffslrs vis his relationship elth the nnwemalgemated AFL-CIO, the ICFTU and the aolldarlty
could have taken place elthouk hla knowledge mnl
fund.
active epprovel.
The AFL-CIO atarted their flrat trede union
Broen'a paasage to the top waa not without
programma independent of ICFTU In 1961.
In 1933 the Swedlah trade unlona
further than tha financing of thugs to coerce union
complained that hla entl-communiam eaa 'phoblo',
membera Into eervlng American Intareata.
Thla waa
the Amerlcen Inatituta for Free Lebour Development
and by 1939 Brltiah auaplclona over U3 Intentlona
(AIFLO), aet up to Intervene in Let In America a f t e r
actively Involved In financing a apllt from tha
in Africa centred around Brown.
Caatro'a winning of Cuhen
COT, and aaaiated In orgnntalng an anti-communiet
Don Thomson, author of 'Share eere you, brother7*
American concern.
aaya thet in 1959 Brown waa S c a m p e r i n g off to
ATL-CIO pledge to the ICFTU not to etart
Africa representing the ICFTU and AFL-CIO end
Independent progremmas.
He waa
union g r o u p , Force Ouvrlere.
According to Braden, Brown and Loveatona
appealed to the CI A for funde to finance
apllt.
thia
'Thus began the secret funding of trade
Oesplta thla,
At the same time, the AFL-CIO kept total c o n t r o l
pledging aolldarlty fund cash without It even
of the ICFTU'a L a tin American regional elng, CniT.
being dlacussed by the ICFTU'.
AFL-CIO bosa Meeny
Broen'a actlvltlwa In Africa during thla
u n i o n s ', aaya Bradan.
Yeara later ATL-CIO president George lleeny
boasted that the apllt between tha CAT and
period remain ahrouded In secrecy I
hoeever*
one area of hla operations la eorth speculation.
Force Ouvrlere eaa engineered by American
In 1959, an attempt eaa made to apllt or weaken the
interestst
South African Congress of Trade Unions (BACTU), vHlcb .
**e financed this apllt - we paid
formed part of tha ANC-led Congress Alliance.
for it', ha aald in 1964.
Victor Beuther, who ran the CI O office in
atate power ceuaed
AIF10 eaa set up despite an
An
oppoaltlon trade union federetlon - FOFATUBA - waa
eaa, according to Don Thcweon,
ao confident about US control (of GBIT) th a t
he offered to place a Briton In tha
hi e rarchy.. .provided Irving O m e n wea g iv e n
overall responsibl1Ity for Africa....
The deal wea flatly refused.
many eurplcltma about Brown.
There were too
Three yeera later Mnany eaa to get hla my',
Europe before ita amalgamation eitb tha AFL,
formed, and the apllt between BACTU and FOTATUSA
and Brown tor* control of American lebour lntereete
admitted that pert of hie Jert> waa to keep a watoh
tended to reproduce the ANC-PAC apllt.
In Africa.
on Brown*a Europwen activitlea.
B rown
m s
lie noted that
receiving 'incredibly large funds from
FOFATUBA waa aatabllabed with FJ3 0 00 from the
ICFTU - probably from the aolldarlty fund.
In
Thia occurred irfien, In 1964, the AFL-CIO
aat up ita aecond independent p m g r e * " * , the AfrloenAmericen Lebour Centre (AALC).
Bromi waa Ita f l r a t
ao^e UB governmant aource to get European trede
later yeera, varioua ICFTU affllletee end office
director, e poaltlon he held until 1973.
unions In hla pocket*.
bearera claimed ignorance of thla grant, and there
ber.eme president.
By 1949, Western unions - Including the ATL were maetlr^j in London to form a nee International
labour body, the I n t e m e t l o n a l Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
from Inception, ICFTU
wea strongly entl-communlat, having been set up to
lleeny
la a etrong possibility thet it come from funds
As Don Thomson points out,
Brown was spreading in Africa.
A 0 1 rarre conflict of Interests than developed,
and was allowed to contln»»a.... Brown, in
a d d 1t1on to running the Independent African
progre«"e, waa still holding down the poaltlon'
of Director of the ICFTU'a New Yor* office.
The timing seems righti
Brown was In Africa
in 1939, the yeer of FOTATUGA'e creation.
And «*ille
there la no hard evidence that Mahrwo waa Involved
1963.
In 1973, after tha
m v
M e re-oppesred s year later os tha PAC
« of strike* In
Ourban, ha promised TUCSA funding for 'properly
representative oh the short-lived ANC-PAC United
organised block trade unions*.
front, at about ths same tlms SS hs sttrmptrd to eln
At tits time, sn
recognition as ths representative for the
AALC publication commented thet
Unless rssponslbls block leadership Is
e ncoursged....tbs next series of strikes
could bs dlssstsrous.
If government does not
permit blscks to form end run responsible
trsds unions, Industrial chaos end tbs
rssutttng explosion may in tbs snd destroy
the very fsbrlc or Bouth African society.
federation of free African Trade Unions of South
Africa (rOTATUBA).
This sttampt eas made st ths
founding confsrsnce of the All-Afrlcsn Trsde Ikilon
federation lo Casahlanes - and failed aftar
objections from BACTU.
Unfs/ed, Mahomo promptly Joined the Rhodesian
In 1970, Brown Invited conservstlvs TUCSA
unionists to ths AT L-CIO conference, where they
TUC dslsgstlon.
strongly opposed -0 nail for Aaiarlcen dlslnvsstment
Mahomo's sntry Into ths lshour field - he had no
In Dmilh Africa, nod renngnltlnn of RADflli
Vnoeo Ilr*s allh ffFAfllflA ehllii Inal tie flnuth Afrlrs
Mora recently ( 1 W 0 ) , Brnen urged tha ICftU
to recognlss Chlsf Gatshs Buthslerl es a 'potentially
end It is not clear eho asked him to represent
fOfATUBA st the conference.
A possible explanation for Mahomo'9 sudden
declslvs' force In Bouth Afrlcen politics, sddlng
that ha bad often championed the Chief's csusa.
Mis sppsorsncs st Csssblsncs marked
seltch from culture to lshour cams from AfL-CIO's
InternatIona1 sffalrs director Irving Brown, on
In psst statements, Brown has laid stress
on the importance or rssponslbls trsds unionism
his recent visit to Bouth Afrlco.
snd lesdsrshtp.
Mahomo's sppolntment to the Gaberone post, Brown
Mis history must raise a question
neferlng to
whether h is recent visit to Bouth Africa Is to
told Journalists that 'Mo slso had good practical
sncoursgs unions responsible to rank end file
experience of the problems In developing trede
membership, or to#the Interests of American
unions becsuse of tha links he ha d elth fOFATUSA'.
Given Irving Brown's likely participation In
foreign policy rtnd its vsrlous vehicles.
the formation of fOfATUBA (see the section In this
The Director:
Nana Mahomo
Nelson 'Nans' Mahomo, 52 year-old dlrector-deslgnsts
of the Afrlcan-Amsrlcsn Labour Centre's Gaheronebased Southern African Programme, is eell suited to
tha Job.
Lika tha organisation ho represents, his
.credential* ere d\4>lous, his motives qusstlonebla,
and his styls of operetIon st vsrlsncs eith bis
supposed allegiances.
A Bouth African by birth, Mshevwo moved through
the ANC Youth Lssgue into tha PAC to bscoms its
secretory for culture, before leevlng Bouth Africa
on P AC instructions, 24 hours befors Shsrpsvllle.
publication on Broen snd the AALC), end ths closs
.llr*s bsteesn Broen snd Mahre*o svldent by 19B3,
jit requires no greet stretch of ths Imagination
^to see Mahomo as s backroom link In ths formstlon
AALC'S NCLBON 'NANA* MAICMO - a C IA men?
iof fOfATUBA.
’
Ths Broen-Mahomo nexus eas firmly estsbllshed
b y 1963, ebon Brown helped M ahomo airlift PAC
refugees from B e c huane1and and, later that year,
,financed the sstsbllshmsnt of a training ramp In
the Congo - noe Zaire - under the Jolot command
■of Mahomo and Maiden Roberto,
leter to head the
F N L A In Angola. .
Mshomo tot* ths post without euthorlsatlon
froe the PAC leedershlp snd, ehen the camp
dlslntsgrsted Into faction fighting, left for
London ehere he to<* over the PAC's regional office.
Both Gordon Winter - in the American edition of
'Inslds B0B8' - and Miks Ikisndana, current PAC
representstlvs In London, describe Mahpato es
'a full CIA operative' by this tlms.
Mahomo soon fsll out elth P AC chairman
Potlako Labello, lsrgsly over unauthorised
activities snd unexplained use of funds - among
thess the ecceptsncs snd unexplained uss of funds
from ths AfL-CIO.
Identified as a CIA operetlva by B Barney
Dessl (formsr leeder of the coloured erm of the
Congress Alliance, who Joined PAC In exile), end
a 1 reedy in bsd odour elth PAC leadership, Mahoaio
PIIJM
BA'S TWO TRACK POLICY
ralda on both SWAPO end Angolan forces, es well
willing to g«eirentee the preserve 11 on of private
IT SfE*9 c l m r that BA la still pursuing ihat baa
es maintaining 'the Trenskel' option inside
ownership In Namibia.
been callad a 'two track policy' - that In, of
'Namibia.
Times interviee elth N u j m ,
keeping all options open for aa long as possible,
of playing along elth tha settlement negotiations
failure or the Geneva conference on the rect that
n o agende waa drawn up berorehand - as far es
maximum, while at tha
seme tlma building up tha O TA as a do facto
SWAPO eas concerned, the purpose or ao-called 'Plm*
government, on tha one hand, end on tha other,
(pre-lmplementetlan) telks wes to d lacuaa the
launching maaslve ralda into Angola in an attempt
lmplementetlon or Reaolutlon 435 of the UN plen,
to elpa out tha military aIng or tha party moat
wherees ror BA the aim was to prove the UN's
likely to eln a democratic election - 6WAP0.
Impartiality.
Probably tha most Important reason ehy SA has
±
continued to he perty to the diplomatic negotiation*
In terms or Resolution 4 3 5 or th# iff plan
however, there ere n o a priori guarantees es to the
. ruture .constitution - this la lert to the elected
conatltuent essembly to decide.
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
Since the rellure or the Geneve talka, tha Western
Flva (and the U3 in perticuler) haa sought to ensure
that economic, constitutional and other guerenteea.
the perrect loophole to bring up Issues which eould
BA, which must thererore be clinched irfiile Reagan
the Iff should heve known, they said, that SA did
hea used the bait of Improved
Geroeb
11.11.01.)
Resolution 4.19 and any other m a t t e r s ', geve SA
sabotage the negotiations.
The US
Nee York
(ehich wes to heve been discussed at Geneve),
Frontline lenders said artarwarda
ia that the Reag a n administration eill almost
The Western
Five and
Intended to keep Nnmlbla el thin the framework of
capitalism, ar e written Into tha settlement proposela.
not Intend atgning a c e e s e M r e or ecceptlng
reletlona in o rder to get 8A to give certain
10.01.01}
‘that the phrase 'to d lecuss the ImplmwentatIon or
certainly negotiate the moat revourable deal ror
ia in orrice.
In Ballsbury quoted in RDM,
Leaders of the F rontline states blamed the
but spinning them out to a
(Examples ere t
Thla was alao specifically In response to SA'*
.Resolution 435, end (the convenors) therefore
Stetement during secret telks elth the 113 in *»rll
carnaltmenta, in what haa been deacrlbed aa a 'carrota
'deliberately walked into e trep, giving SA en
1901 (the content* or ^ I c h were lweked a Tee eeeke
f
inatead of sticks' policy.
international pletrorm to make propagande ror tha
later), that SA could not live elth a SWAPO victory
internal parties'.
that 'lert SWAPO elth unchecked power*.
i-
have been aeare that ehlle BA ha a appreciatively
Moeever, even
•Africanist*' close to the neagan arfculnlstration
'
It la true thet the OTA was given a measure
'gobbled up' the Reagen Administrations 'carrota'
it haa throughout the negotiations retained the
>
t
•*
The
assumption Is, however, that SA would accept •
or International exposure not previously enjoyed
SWAPO government but only el thin the aevere
by thet organisetion, but it wes SWAPO thet emerged
conditions and restrelnt* Imposed by a neo-
s h i n t y to 'Jump orr the train onto another track
4eith the most decisive Image end who created tha
ehen it appears that the domestic political costa
most internationally Tavoureble Impression.
of a aattlement eill be too high',
Nujoma had announced hla party'a willingness to
Geneva (January,
sign a c e e s e M r e , hi* entire delegation rose end '
♦ IW moves In 7500 troops under Prem Chand
♦ to take over from the SADT end SAP end monitor
ceaserire (provisional date 30 Merch)j
(ttolen Kitchen,
director African 6tudles Progre*wne, Georgetown
University Centre for Strategic end International
saluted a* ha decleredi
Studies.
united-, representing the oppressed people or Namibia!'
Quoted
RDM,
19,bl.02.)
colonialist settlement.
Arter
'My delegation la one,
♦ SA troops are scaled down rrom 2 0 000-1 500 over
three months;
eaa conciliatory end in marked contrast to.the
BA'S TACTIC of atalling on the International
,
negntletlons firet became obvious during the
aggressive etence taken by BA.
negotiation* particularly in the pest ? years, has
to take up SWAPO* s orrer of a n immedlet* ceeseflre
'led •ome observer* to believe thet the orgaolsatlon
on the beala that the IW could not be en lmpertlel
^es abandoned ell eleaients or the progremme adopted
At the time, it eea
thought thet BA eaa atalling Tor time until
♦ the c ree 11on or e D e m | 11terlred Zona ( « / ) 50 km
elde on either aide or the Angnlen end /emblen
borders|
In rect, the
cnsprnml * log etend taken by SWAPO throughout
Geneve C o h e r e n c e In Jenuery 1901, ehen SA reTuaed
perty to the whole process.
1901) eere a* rollows:
.
During preaa interviews, the tone or GWAPO spokesmen
GENEVA
,
Tha main points or tha if* plan presented at
Reagan
j
4n
'
♦ A rour month election cempalgn, followed by UN
supervised elections (provlslonel 1 y October).
Transitional admlnlstretlon u nder the (N*a
Ahtlseerli
1970 ^ilch implied the overthroe or ^epltellem.
♦ Total elthdrewal or SA troops elthin one week
or the election result|
Whereas SWAPO then committed itaair to the aim
tor* office e week or eo later, but alnce then
of ■ 'classlese, non-exploitative society* In
events heve made It clear that BA haa round one
ehich 'all the m a jor meens of production end exchange
excuse a rter the other to delay the aattlement
would be owned by the p e o p l e * , GWAPO leadership
process, while at the seme time launching repeated
ha* in the last Tee year* repeetedly declared ltseir
i
♦ Releese or political prisoner* errf dlaermlng of
remelnlng armed groupsj
4 The constituent essemhly draws up a constitution.
»
•'
'
pnqe J 1
Military presence.
of Namibia was being drewn up by foreigners.
It
th e issue of an electoral System threatened to deadlock
Is the prerngetive of the Namibian pnnple to do
talks, elth BWAPO fevnurlng a syBtam of dlraqt
this', said one spokesman.
r eprasentatlnn end BA Insisting nn e conblrwitlon
At a Commonenalth summit
ON 19 September 1901, It wws ennnunced that both
In Melbourne In October, various countrlas
BA end the frontline States had eijrret to the 'Western
Nigeria) supported BWAPO's line epslnst tampering
assembly,
Five Pence Plon*.
elth the IW plan, Including the attempt to link
drafted proposals ehlch Included a ml«ed direct and
The ke y points were that BA
•nd GWAPO would, before elections, npree to a
(notably
of elected end eppnlnted mnmbers of a constituent
a Battlement with the presence of Cub a n s In Angola.
binding constitutional frambwork safeguarding
The roeson
y BWAPO
Aqnln pandering to BA,
Western Group
proportional system, making provision for ail
objected to guaranteeing
, parties to bo rnpresented In a constituent assembly,
individual rights (these would be entrenched In'
the rights of minorities, said Timothy Mlshongwa
via a 'national list' system, ehlle 50 % of the seats
the constitution and only amended b y a two thlrda
(BWAPO rep, Europe and Scandinavia) wns thet the
would be filled by directly elected representatives.
Majority)j
GWAPO constitution
-During tha transitional period, Angola was to
for all Namibian cltlfens - as individuals, not
proposals' put forward the Idea of 'one man - tea
guarantee that Cuban fnrnas would nn* nrnss south
as groups',
v h Ib s
of a 'red-line' In Angola, or undertake any military
said.
actlvltlesi
Then, a week later,
's« that a'11 ba nn m inor IM a s 1, ha
(BOM, 19.01.B?)
wider UN supervision)
-Th* lf| contingent would ba composed of on Idlers
The Implementation of this plan was scheduled
to start In January
190?, elth indwpendence by
While tha plan eas claimed to ba
', where path vntar would hava tan vnlas - one
constituency and the other on the basis of a local
constituency.
Members elected from either system
deal proposed s 'Bill of Bights' Instead of minority
guarentees. but the plen now el so included the use
would hava equal status In tha constituent assembly
of UB
and would drew up the constitution a fter Independence.
surveillance technology to monitor GWAPO
bases in Angola and Zaira.
largely frrw tha east.
'revised constitutional
to b e counted on the level of e single national
B y tb«r end of September, the W n s t e m packapa
-GWAPO units In Angola would be restricted to base
January , 1903.
'guarantees equal protection
GWAPO was said to
This scheme was seen es a variation of the
have conceded to BA's demand that 1 30 0 BA troops
'appointment' Bystem end rejected by GWAPO as 'non-
remain in Nnmlbla during elections (confined to
democratlo'.
beses), as eell as that the GAP end civil serveots
a compromise by proposing ■ 'one m e n - one vote'
Efforts by the Western group to reech
based on Oennlutinn 4.13 (to meet BWAPO and frontline
remain at their posts during e transitional period,
system, but elth each vota counting telce, were also
demands),It eas evidence rather of collaboration
and by mid-November BA, GWATO end the frontline
rejected as being too complicated.
between tha Ufl end BA - during tha secret discussions
States were reported to have agreed to t h e ' 1907
the seven m onth pre-election period was also not
In Prstorla (April),- Crocker had aaldt
p a c k a g e '.
enough time to drew up e constituency system.
...we believe BTO <139 is a basis for transition
to independence for Namibia, but not for
*
a full settlfwnent. We elsh to meet BA
government concerns, while taking account of
vlees wi the other sldf. We cannot scrap
<135 without great difficulty. We elsh to
supplement rather than discard i t .
The OTA, at this stage showing the strains of
This Issue seems to hove been set aside during
internal divisions, muttsred unhappily about
the negotiations this year, In order to try and
'Insufficlent c o nst1tut1o n e 1 guaraoteesi end
claiming that their objections were being Ignored,
Apart from this,
resolve other problems (the Cuban Issue tnklng
'
prominence), but latest reports seam to indicate
continued to assart the possibility of a n 'internal
that a system of 'one man - one vote* might ba
solution*.
accepted, but 'the issue of constituency or
However, during meetings between PW and
439 AND MINcniTY OUAflANTEEB
Plk Botha and tha Internal parties, tha latter eere
proportional voting wnuld bw laft to the Administrator
AS TAP as BWAPO was concerned, 4 33 waa 'non-
told that 'Phase 1* of the negntletlrms ees virtually
General to decide'. (Star, ?9.07.B?)
negotlabia* as tha basis for a settlement, and
'wrapped up*, and that Phase 2 (transition) was now
representatives of both l n t a m a l and external elngs
being, discussed.
found themselves herd-pressed to accept a plan ehlah
possibility of rlghtwlng pressurws disrupting the
PW Botha also dismissed the
THE flBBT few mnnth* of 1 W
'put the cert before the hnr*e'(TJnngnrero in
Battlement prone** «* 'the prlra of holding on tn
tha Ufl to meke a deal elth Angola concerning the
Windhoek), or 'tied the fiends of Namibians long
GWA eas too g r e e t ' .
Cubans., In Jamiary, C rocker met Angnlen government
THE ELECTORAL BYBTPI
recognition by the UB of tha Angolan g o verrewnt'.
before Independence In the exercise of dasestlo
and foreign policy* (Raroeb In N ee York).
BWAPO
THE CUBAN IOBOE
see concerted efforts by
representatives to Paris 'to explore the issue of
was 'absolutely eerlous In \tn seerch Tor paace
NEGOTIATIONS on Phase 1 -
In Namibia* but could not accept that 'the future
eera far from complete however.
the const I tutlone1 proposals In Denember 1901 '
The US eas prlvetely offering to open en Embesey in
Luanda - but a rwconcl11st Inn elth UNITA eould also
page 33
non southern end even central Angola, and that a full-
no more 'einnabla* than eas America's ear egalnat
(Allster Bperks in Boweten,
acala ear la being waged In thla region.
tha guerillas In Vietnam.
and .destroy raids, of which there eere at leest
to a
According
Europeen Economic Community (EEC) fact-rindlng
BA'a intention seems
more to keep 8WAT0'e military forces as fer north
10.09.01.)
The seerch15
in lha first 6 months of 1901, caused BWAPO to change
mission, tha BACJT aaa Involved In nearly 7 000
from the Namibian bnrdwr as possible (in order,
lta tectica - troops were segmented Into much emeller
operationa lnalda Angola during 1901 and haa maintained
perhaps, to limit the Influence BWAPO guerillas
units end elthdrewn further from the border.
a conatant Military pranenca In, and affactlva control
may have on any election process), elth a longer
|n turn resulted in SA forces penetrating deeper into
Thla
of, larga parte of tha Cunana province (Reported In
term atrategy of destsbllslng Angola so that the
Angola, air attacfcs oecnme m o r e frequent, end tha
tha London Obaarver and duoted 00M, 3.0?.0?).
MPLA government la forced into e compromise sltuetlon
pattern of esceletlon eas set.
Apart
frcm tha atatad ai m of destroying BWAPO's military
elth regard to UN1TA end the Cubans.
baaaa In Angola, B A ’s objective seems to hava been
In August 1901, Angola Installed a defensive
In this military policy BA enjoys the scarcely
much gr e a t e r ! repeated attacks In tha southern and
radar system end grnund-to-elr missiles.
Celled support of the UB eho refused to Join In W
central provinces, end on both BWAPO e nd Angolan
BA than
embarked on e m ajor expedition to d estroy the
condemnation of BA after the 'Protea* Invasion,
Installations in ehat became the biggest military
army positions, Indinata that tha Intention has bean
(lha fact that the Incursions give Angola reason
assault Into Angola since the 1975 ear - the so-called
to create a *no m a n ’a land' or
bufrer-tone where
not Just to maintain the Cuben presence but to
'Operation Protea'.
only BA end I W T A troops would be free to operate.
lncreese their numbers, la outweighed by tha
operations In the C unene province during July had
Furthermore, tha general d e s t e b l U x a t i o n of the
greater dependence on co-operation elth e e s t e m
left 114 dead, SA tanks er*d motorised lnfentry
region ensures thet the Angolen situation be llrfced
investors ehich BA aggression ensures.)
columns were reported to be 200 k m Inside Angole,
to a settlement In Namibia, la that Angola, weakened
heading for Lubango.
by constant b a l i n g raids and a deteriorating
OPERATION PnOTEA
economic situation, la forced to negotlete both the
repeated ground end eir attacka in southern Angola
has been to curb BWAPO'a mllltery strength by
continually disrupting their lines of reinforcemen t
end eupply, and by bribing both civilian (refugee)
1901,
*•
and by the end of August, SA0T sprftesmen announced
In July that BA forces were going on the offensive:
thet more than «50 5 WAP0 end FAPLA members bed been
'Our purpose Is to end the war end bring peace...
killed.
the best eay to do this Is to folloe the enemy and
figure given was 1 000 dead.
destroy hla |o his base,
from now on we ehall keep
(H O M , 31.00.81.)
this up until OWAPO's mllltery strength is broken.
JLubango
aee beloe), mllltery observers sprite of a 'ahift' in
BWAPO eas 'wlnnable'
IMOCAMEOES
V C U N E N E PROV
(tha Econcfsiat, Sunday Tribune,
30.0B.B1).
Tchibemba
BA, it eas said, had revised the assumption
that an International political eolutlon would have
Cahama
to be negotiated (since It might result in a BWAPO
victory shich* 'left BWAPO unchecked'), and was going
all out for tha 'military aolutlon'.
angongo
However, it
la tha eriter'a belief that BA military intelligence
NGIVA
la aware of the fact that (a) BWAPO'a ranks are
replenished Juet es soon es they are depleted)
(b) that they era deploying increasingly sophisticated
weapons and tactlca, end that in this sense the wnr is'
(00M, 15.09.81.)
weeks, it became cleer thet BA had been attacking
After tha maaetve lnveslon by ground end air
forces in August-September 1901 (Operetlon 'Protea* -
Teo weeks later, the
As repnrta filtered out over the ne*t fee
end military oempa.
BA strategy In terms of the belief that a ear against
Within days,
<100 k m north of tha Namibia/Angola border (see HAP),
was Major-General Charles Lloyd's announcement early
Neverthelesf, tha main Intention of BA's
(Star Pfl.00.B1.)
BAAF Jets had bombed towns as fer north es Tchlmbembe,
THE prelude to the massive strlks In August,
eithdraeal of tha Cubans and a deel elth IJNITA.
One month a fter mllltery
S W A /N A M IB IA
pogtf
C « l lad
penetrating the Tsumeh district (see MAT),
BWAPO losses Include Angolan non-combatants
fly early
wiped out tha entire Infiltrating force.
o r Namibian rafugeas, but tba Defence Foret claims
M a y , 5 civilians,
to heve kill e d 3 B M
guerllles had bsen killed In verlous cleshes elth
Intelligence reports el so led tha S W
the eecurlty forces, but ebout HO Insurgents wwre
the etteck eould be lnltleted from tba tagolsn
half of B W A P O ’s force* (according to tha previously
still being hunted In the rugged and bush-covered
coastal to*wi of Mrcamedss.
mentioned eetlmate).
mountains neer Utavl.
fact launched enre than SOO k m further to the
BWAPO Insurgents In tba past
3 years (RDM 19.04.01), ehlch would be nearly
Cither BWAPO's strength In
11 SA0F personnal and 33 of the
members at Cambena - but thay thought they had
Mn a n w h l ]«, poatwre offerlr^j
to believe
The operation was In
nurtiers le vastly underrated, or the deeth toll le
rewerds for Information leedlng to the cepture or
The force then split Into two groups, one of «hlch
eneggerated (or both), sinea BWAPO a ction during
deeth of the guerillas Indicated that for tba
was encountered at Ca«bena es they movad south-west
the past two yeers hardly lndlcatae that it la a
security forces the U f a of a SWAP 0 Insurgent was
towards the Kaokaveld.
spent force, or even draatlcally wwakenad.
worth lass than soma of his equipment: R2 000 was
of some of SWAPO's best soldiers' movad undetected
SWAPO'8 ranks are continually supplemented by
offered for the former, ehlle the capture of e SAM
into O vamboland (report from the Bter, 2A.04.82).
During this seme period, three guerillas
refugees fra* Namibia - particularly slnr.s compulsory
military service eas Introduced In the territory
in August*
1900, Causing a virtual exodus of youths,
who wsrs at one stege said to b e crossing the b order
at the rate of 100 p er eeek (lntervlee elth BWAPO
'
Tba second group 'consisting
captured In the T a a w h district during a previous
’
*ds IWIfl (T"? (•*•* •••) "
^aul* Is Bss|rt1i ilsc M lay m»att.
later rtbret Ueali Iniola
! SWIF9
(atari 10 »*♦*)
I
tatar •( ) H u l l M r s aplil a *m1e
KAVANOO
Ineuralon were convicted under tbe Terror!** Act
In the Windhoek Q u o r m m Court.
Leedlng evidence
in altlgetlon of their sentences, Prof John Ougerd
Defence Secretary, Peter Nenyemhe, Star, 28.01.01).
called for Prlsonar rtf tar ststus for BWAPO combatants,
Tha aama source estimated the number of Nemlblen
arguing that In the eye* of the InternetIof*l
r e f u s e s In Angola at 30 000, but the figure la
comftunl ty BA*a presence In Nsmlbla aes ^llegel,
noe held to b a cloaer to 70 000.
and that the act lobs 0T flWAPO guerllles wes tharefore
Although thla
would Include a greet number of women and children.
reg^nled In a leas snrdpue Light by a lerge segmant
It can reliably ba guesssd that several thousand
of tha Neatlblan popt/1 e H o n , as ewll es Internetlonally •
of these refugees are b eing trained as 8WAP0 fighters.
(htW Id.ffi.O?),
It le enrth noting that this argument
it alKller' to that presented by H enman Tolvo Je
BWAPO 1N9U1 PENCE
Tolvd «h*n ha cceetucted his own defence during the
INFILTRATION by BWAPO guerillas beck Into Namibia
Pra*orle treason t*iel In 19n0| Tolvo ees howsver
and lncldenta of aabotage continued through 1901,
sentenced to 20 years Imprisonment. wbsrees Jason
despite tha eacaletlon of BA raids Into Angola ehlch
Bagarlus, Tbanphllvs Jason and Lucius Malombo
were o stensibly to prevent thla activity.
were given 9 , 9 end 11 yeer*.
Tha main
sabotage attacks were those et Oshakatl (in f a b r u a r y ,
1901) and Okolongo (May) In Ovembolend, as well
|D»Unt« r«ff• HO)
BAOT ATfKKITJEfl
ea et tba R uecene complea, wbare e morter etteck
on the power pylons In November resulted In week-
OtfllRG the e W l y m onths of 1981, when Generals
► rom R s m T BsT ly Ball
Malen fend Lloyd Were still talking of a 'political'
long power cuts throughout Namlble.
Infiltration by groups of BWAPO guerllles Into
the shite Terming areas also Increased, particularly
In tha Tsumab-Grootfonteln eras (the so-called 'Terror
Triangle').
In April this year. In tha most concerted
thrust ever made, en elite squad of about 100
Insurgents crossed the operational area's 'red line'
and m ovad undetected Into e e s t e m Ovamboland.
Tba
g roup than split Into small bands, ona group moving
east of Tslnsabls, another eest, and the third
rather than e 'military' solution, It was announced
ground-to-air missile would fetch ns 000 (ROM 00.05.82),*
By 12 June,
190? no Incidents had been reported for
"•ore than teo weeks end It was believed that
that th« BA0F was backing Its military c*»eretlons
elth a progrsmma of 'civic action', ^ o s e purpose
was to 'win over the hearts and minds of local
Insurgents eho bad escaped tbe dragnat had found
Inhabitants end creete e positive ettltude to th*
their way back to tha border regions.
BA0F*.
In April
the 6AHF claimed that they bed knoen of BWAPO*s
plsns to leunch a major offensive - hence 'Operation
Super' during March In ehlch tba BAAT a n d 32
Batall Ion were reported to have killod 200 SWAP0
As the war sltoatlnn has Intensified,
hoeever, widespread allegations of security force
brutelltlas against civilians In tha border regions
lndlcete that tha method has been partly one of
Intlmldatlnn and force,
necent visits by clergyswn
constitution' meka provision for 1? governments in
breakaway in six months (the Labour Party, undmr
excuse' to delay negotiations wMli* BA looks for ■
the territory, elth the OTA-controlled Ministers
Ministers Council member, Joey Julius, split in
Nevertbeles*, th* Cuban Issue remains an 'ideal
way to sidestep the Implement fitIon or UN Resolution
Council at the top (but still subordinate to Pretoria
August).
439, vie by Hutting to esteblleh ■ 'more effective'
end the BA eppolnted Admlnl atrator-Oenet-el , at present
out of the OTA, teklng elth hi m the lest remnents
Interim government In the territory based on e system
Oanla Hough), end eleven 'ethnic' administrations, or
of Ovemho support for the A1llence.
of eppolnted 'ethnic' representatives.
The Implication
In Februery this year Kalangula walked
He also took
elth him his German edvlsor, lerner Neef, causing
'second-tierAuthorlties', ehlch are autonomous in
Mudga to accusa tha West German government (end
of this scenerlo is that even If the Ci*»en issue is
certeln areas - notably haalth and education.
resolved, end BA troops era In the long run withdrawn
eas Introduced by Oerrlt Vlljnen, then Attorney-
senior SAOF officials) of assisting Kalangula in
from Namibia, such e elthdraeal would not have to
General, as a comprtwlse between the NP end the OTA,
tha breakaway (ROM P6.03.BP).
Include a commitment to Internationally supervised
but because the NP eon the «*ilte administrative
formed hl a own perty,
elections nor would it Imply en end to the wer.
elections It hes had the erfect of entrenching
for Bnclal Justice' (COA), hut he has nevertheless
apertheld In certain spheres.
retained hla National Assemhly seat as eell as
n,
i n ltn N ^ L . W V t H n i : W f
- r a U U m
tm i lht loonowy
*GR
This means that not
In May,
198?, Kalangula
'Christian Democ ratic Action
chairmanship pf the sernnd-tler Dvemho authority.
only Is Mstge a 'Prime Minister without poeer',
DURING 19R1, moves to Install the 0! A as a da facto
sines the second-tier authorities heve powers
government In Namibia Increased dramatically.
cannot be tampered elth by the Ministers Council,
of the Ministers Council end the National Assembly|
February it eas announced, after talks between
but his chences of consolldatlng his power basa
several axamplas of non-elected Ministers heve even
PW Botha, members of the BA cabinet and the BWA
are slim while political groups in the territory
further diminished the credibility of these
Ministers Council, thet the latter eas to take full
see the ethnic system of government as an extension
control of executive functions in Namlble.
of BA's homelands/apartheid system.
In
By
Thus, attempts
this raises the question of the cowposltlon
instituticxis.
•
Be n AFrika is one such example -
having lost tha R aheboth election in 1979 to Hans
Olargaard ha has nevertheless steyed on es e member
August, ell executive powers except control of
to increese support for the so-called 'Interim
constitutional, security end foreign effelrs (but
goverrwwent', by wooing groups outside the National
of the Ministers Council end his perty es membsrs
including control of the civil service), had been
Assembly hove proved to be e dismal failure. Groups
i
such as BtANU, GWATO-D, the Federal Perty, the
Christie lost the election for the Damara
transferred to the Council of Ministers (referred
81mllerly, Engelherd
representative euthorlty to Justus Gnroeb's Demare
as the 'Cabinet'), end SPA was said to be on the
Namibian Independence Perty end the
•brir* of self-rule* (ROM PB.OB.Bl).
have consistently refused to be part of a system
Council, but Chrlstla remains a member of the Ministers
composed elong ethnic lines, calling i t f*repugnant *,
Council and his party member
Moeever, a crucial ecr'ponent of this strategy
Mbandaru Council
of tha National Assembly.
was that the OTA-domlnated 'interim government',
whilst other groups argue that the 1970 election
as it has come to be called, broaden Its bests of
(in which they refused to take part and which brought
support.
the OTA to power) eere never Intended for en interim
This section elll look briefly et events
ehlch have led to the steady disintegration of the OTA,
government, but merely for a constituent essembly.
eepeclelly in the last two years, as well es the
Furthermore, they argue, their entry Into the National
lncreeslng division between the ehlte parties In
Asse«4>ly would delay tha Implementation of tha IW
the territory.
plan (ROM 03.0P.B1).
These developments heva forced the
Many partlas are themselves
BA government, in its determination to find an
losing support (never mind 'lending' it to the OTA)
' l n t e m e l ' solution for the territory, to consider
as eell es running out of funds, efter nearly four
an alternative to the OTA-led National Assembly,
yeers of negotlstlons eithout a ssttlement.
At the time of erltlng, allegations by Mudga are
that tha plan involves replacing senior OT A members
of government elth representetives from the secondtier ('ethnic') edmlnlstrations (Btar 0R.09.B?).
DAMARA COUNCIL
Tha Damara Council Itself has significant support
among the estlmatad 90 0 00 Damara-speakIng people the t h l F f f - largest grouping In the territory - end
sines it swept to power in Damaraland against the
OTA-allgnad BWAPDIF , the O TA has made several
unsucessful attempts to etn its support.
the National Assembly and Ministers Council (ROM
Groups el thin the OTA heva meanwhile become
AG8, end by the
Kalangula, who Initially aligned himself
with the Ovambo-based 'Netlonel Democratic Party'
more end more dlssetisfled, particularly elth the
provisions of
Instead,
Garneb has recently celled for the dissolution of
09.03.B?).
M L A N G U L A SPLIT
of the National Assambly.
end of last yaar
after the OT A breakaway, also hoped for e unity move
between the NOP and Oamara Council, but Garoeb hes
remained eloof from any attempts at Incorporation,
AO B
there were signs that the rift between O T A President
even breaking away (in Mnrcb) from a loosa alliance
THE 1ERMS of Proclametion (AO) B of the 'interim
Kelengula and Mudga would lead to tha second OTA
elth the NNf . Garoeh has recently steted his perty's
at* wel 1 as a rapidly deteriorating economic situation,
of 1901 the cattle population was 170 000, from
exacerbated by one pf the 'worst draught* In living
?30 000 a year «4»lle the ntaxher of r\hae|i and
A a m o r y ', have contributed further to the country's
gnats declined frew G-m to <150 00 0 (flOM 23.11.01).
colootallst regime in Namibia, which would entail
B«"»r*l Instability.
Oi the whole most (white) cattle farmera have been
by-passing a tfl election end Insteed propping up
ccwoensated for their losnas by tha high price paid
ethnic leaders who would be openly revourable to BA
It 1* Ironical that flva yeers
ego, observers noted that while an
1ndepandent
In conclusion, recent events Indicate that BA
Is presently considering weys or maintaining a nao-
Namibia would not ba without problems, the fact
for beef, but siA>slstence farmers have been the worst
Interests.
that the territory wee 'mineral rich* would et least
hit, with starvation deaths being recorded In Kookotand
run, BA p roves incapable or susteinlng such a system
tide the economy over a trane111one 1 period.
■Here tha drm^jht has decimated three quarters of
In the race or mass npposltlon, and R»AP0 ccrnws to
tha livestock population (ibid).
P o w * r In Its place,
Now
even the territory's mineral wwelth In In question:
In a recent addrsns In Windhoek, Douglas Moffe
Tha fishing Industry - nrra a substantial
(chelrmen Chamber of Mlnen) dlnputed that Namibia wen
contributor to export e e m l n g s - hes also declined
'mineral r i c h ’, saying that 0 0% of the mining Industry's
dlnmelly, elth output hair whet It was six years
rnntrlbutlnn to the OOP wen from three mines - COM,
ago (four nut of eight, factories In Walvl* flay have
!staneb Corporation Ltd, and Hons lng - ami the former
closed In the last three yearn).
two were 'very old properties' (W Observer 10.00.0?)
decline has less to do with environmental factors
(suggesting perhaps that they were already 'milked'?).
It might be edded that Mosnli«f'a contribution
In this case the
and mnre to d o with grand and over-rxploltat Ionj
tha fact that the pilchards resources have been
would be e lot greater If It were not exempt Tram
completely destroyed end other fishing reserves
taxation - according to reports, flossing Uranium
seriously depleted, is largely due to the desire on
Ltd made CTvJ-m profit In 1901 (CiVl,/|-" In 1900), not
a cent of which goes to the M a t e Treasury In Windhoek
until the 'company's capital investment Is redenmed'
(ibid).
The mine produces srme 5 00 0 tons of uranium
'the struggle for control of
Namibia's future will by no meens be over.
tha Bouth Arrlcan soldier has left Nemlhlan soil'
(Otwtcao Innas 'Monopoly Capital and Booth Arrlcan
Imperialism In Namibia', Chapter V or Thasls
"Monopoly Capital and Impnrlellsm In Southern Africa:
The flole of tha Anglo American Group").
Sue Cull loan
the part of a hendful of company-nwners to realise
(and possibly before the territory became Independent).
S O U T H E R N AFfllCAN
R E S E A R C H SER V I C E
Thus, the outlook for an Independent Namibia-Is
far from optimistic.
said to egtjel that of Onudl Arabia (ll Rudolph In
the territory would have to be subsldlsod from outside
Africa Insight Vol 11 no 1 1901 p19), but whether
sources by
majority shareholders n io Tlnto /Inc el 11 be prepared
(originally expected to be the first 7 yeera of
In 1977 it was estimated that
SA R S PUBLICATIONS
Occluding Work In Proyreit)
about fl170-*» per annum nvar 1970/9-19A5/R
to renngotlete their mineral contract with e future
Independence), and an additional fll ,JM»l\\inn would
government in Namibia, remains to be seen.
have to be found.
This figure Is nnw substantially
Th# K authain A fr k a a nataareh Satvle* (S A f lS I l e n you
In touch w ith tu rra n t
el aad aconcwnic fiandt S A H S
publication* contain r iw u x j a and a n a lyih of fatatitaawnt,
hanhM lan«, w o rk ing c la n action, »tata itiata«<a«. t»*da
union*, t it Ik at, potltlcat tila h and da tan t Ion
Your wilacrlptloa to SAnS publication* antltlai you to aN
trillion* of’
present both flossing and COM claim that their
higher.
contribution - together worth R10U m - Is by wey of
that between 30-40% or skilled whltas will probably
• W w l In h # » t n
'wages and salaries, supplies end services' (W Observer
leave the country - although the UN Institute for
• lnlo>m ailon ihaatt
14.00.0?).
Namibia In Lusaka has for several years been training
However, it Is the eecond most Important feature
of the economy-cismserr.lal agriculture- which Is
Thet
struggle will Still need to be rought long arter
'immndiete profits when the Industry was at its peak
oxide per annum and Its uranium anerqy potential Is
At
Out even ir, as Is likely In the long
Other crucial factors include the expectatlpn
refugees with the aim of producing an essentlel core
• Tha Information Publication ilfkl
S A H S alio kaapa tu b trtlb a ti Info tm a d about oth** occa
ilonal publication* and n t w tlttai la tha S A R S dhiartatloa
of public service administ r a t o r s • ate.
in a state of real crisis, directly effecting one
Above all, the country's economic dependence nn
third of the economically active population, the 3 000
HA (to the extent of WTjt or the budget) In a rector
commercial fanners (mainly aHltes) and noma 100 OHO
which membership nT n W C C Is unlikely to c h a n g e .
subsistence formers.
According to W o U g n n g Thomas (et SA Institute
Terming output, which Is made
up of 5(7jt beef, 30jt kerekul pelts end wool , ""d 1!7jL
Intenwitlonal Arralrn C o h e r e n c e (?3.01.fl?) while
mutton end p m * , declinwd 37jl between 1970 end 1900
Namibia would race similar problems to Zimbabwe,
er*d Is likely to drop further.
'Its dependence on BA
The reduction or
livestock herds has been 'dramatic': at the end
tends t.o put It. morn In t»m
class or flotswana lo relation to HA'.
I
R A T E S lo r S outh African n ihtcrlha rt
IS puhtlcatlond
Individual*, If ada u n lo m . awm m w nhy wrsaahatlen* fl 7 *0
P n n o t iiih trrlp lln n t
A 19.00
le d llu lto e * and llbtarla*
a 70 00
f o r raducad rata* o n hulk o>da«i and f r m p distribution,
and for rata* o utild a S outh Africa, contact
SARS
P .O B o x 03174
1103 YaovlHa
S outh Africa
r > M r v A t t o n suqqnsted by the llnfinhn C n m w l M l o n /
not shls to prsvnnt mlnsrs frtmi rsturnlng hnms
Tl*e policy of th« Industry to reduce dependence
s»mn they wsntad to.
on Torsion workers, together elth Increased
14 months to 6 snd B month psrlods.
vlolsncs snd unrsst on ths mines during ths
Be-engagement Gusrsntss Bystem was Introduced!
1970s, Isd to the Introduction of structursl
guaranteed a miner that if ha raturnad to tha mlns
In methods or snrlel end physical co n t r o l . ^
chengaa in ths Industry.
within s spaclflo parlod, ha would ha given hack
report essentially suggested pnllcles leeding to
his Job, togsthar with s bonus payment.
the stabilisation or ths workforce on ths minss,
Sthnlc conflict', It Is svldsnt from othsr analyses
Contracts wars roducsd from
Ths Vslid
that many of ths dlsturbsncss were s result or wags
demands and the transitions from old hesvy manual
this
This
production methods, with ths accompanying adjustment
Decreasing ths psrcsntsgs of forslpn workers
system led to an Increase In the proportion of
ret Iona 11 sing or engns, end g iving
Ths policy of lncrssslng ths supply of lor.sl
man returning to the mines sftsr s contrsct period
workers s
Bouth African lshour sss f o m u l s t m f sftsr ths
hed snded.
'rixed'
larger waoe Increase.
It also s«jqgested the rederinltlon or snms Job
Ths proportion of thnse amployses cstegorlsed
Malael government stoppsd sll further recruitment
The
cstegorles.
of labour for ths Bouth African mines in 1975.
as 'speclels', holding ths Vslld na-angaqament
This or.currsd sftsr 72 contract worksrs were
Csrttflcsts, racrulted from Lesotho, incrsnned
UN inNlRATICINi
killed In nn nlrcrssh on thslr r s t u m to Mslssl.
from 31* In 1970, to B O * In 1979, to 7fVjl in ths
Tha Cham b er of Minas* p o licy
Ths sodlog of Porttiguese ruls In Mnceetolque, sod
first four months of 1900.^
In 1901, the Chamber announced that It hed formuleted
wins unrsst dnmlnsted by tssotho eorfcers ovsr ths
Ths industry expressed thsss chsngss In ths
7
following soy In 1900i
e policy regarding the unionisation or blscks on
dsfsrrsd psy clsuss - which forcsO Lssotho miners
to d sfsr 6 0 % of thslr m onthly wages to ths Lssotho
Mining |n Routh Africa Is Increasingly
H a m m i n g an sttrsctlvs csrsar for black workers,
not only becsuss wngas have Increased six­
fold In the .Isst ssven years, hut hecauss of
Improved living conditions end carssr
oppnrtunltins. Mora and mnra or ths
worfcforrs nos returns to Ihe Industry Tor
additions! contracts snd their level or
expertlss Incressss as well.
National Ranfc^- led ths Industry to r.hangn its
labour rscruitment policy.
Thsss chsngss aimed st
preventing furthsr vulnerabl 11 ty thro«*gh rnllsnr.s
on forslgn mlnewnrkers, snd Involved a n Increase
In ths supply of Routh Afrlcsn migrants.
This was
also necsssary due to ths shortsgss of undsrgrouod
lshour requlrements which sTtsr ths withdrswai of
Malawian eorkers stood at 22%.
In 1973, only 20%
of african miners wars South African.
By
1974,
WTjC wars recruited in Routh Africa, snd only <1071
wsrs forslgn.
In ordsr to attract Routh Afrlcsn
workers, ths C homhar of Mines was forcsd to Increase
wagns.
the mines.
Industrial Beletlons Quarterly, nevlew,
ths B antu Labour Act aftar a thrsst thst Routh
African noal exports to ths URA would ba prohlbltsd
frr*» sntsrlng ths country in tsrms of Amarlcsn
laglslatlnn.
This I n g l s l a M o n prohlbltsd tha
Importatloo of goods producsd uoder conditions of
indentured lshour.
Ths Routh Afrlcsn Act which msds
It a criminal offanca for a mlnsr to break contrsct
wss thsrsfora rapsslsd.
This compsllsd ths mining
industry to rsdur.s contrsct parlnds as thsy wars
1901) are
that
s
The Chamber of Minas will not negntlsts elth
unregistered trede unions;
S
Unions registered for workers In ths mining
Industry will be subject to further recognition
criterle sst by ths Chamber;
Effects of resistance
e
Extensive unrest on ths mines during ths 1970s
lodustry.
depsrtmentel Committee of Inquiry Into ths Riots
in ths Mlnss'.
This spplles to new end existing unions
seeking to represent blacks;
Of ths 41 principal gold mines
in Routh ATrlca, 22 were directly srrsctsd by unrsst
s
p r o M t s fslllng by B35-m in ths ssms psriod.
or occupations who are elreedy represented by
anothsr recognised union;
a
they are 'reglsterahla'.
living conditions snd convsnlsncss, provision of
be denied scr.ess to mlnrworkersj
It also recommended a change
a
There will be no extent Ion or the 'closed
shop' to s ny new unions;
on work sections.^
Despite th« feet thst ths report sttrlbuted
Unions reglaterebls
end unreqlsterehle trtui refuse to register el 11
marrlsd quartern, and a revision of ths industrial
unrest mainly to ths 'quality of lira' snd 'lnter-
Unions seeking to racrult mineworkers sill be
lnvestigeted by the D*amher to determine trfiether
Ths Committee recommended Imprnvements in
from housing on an ethnic basis to s system bsnad
The Chember or Mines el 11 reTuss to recognlss s
union ehlch seeks to represent workers In classss
Ths
4B 119 kllogrsms in 1974 to 44 532 in 1976, elth
rslstlons processes.
Unions el 11 heve to p rove 30jt represeotlvlty of
s certain class of emplnyee throughout the
led to s major enquiry entitled tha 'Inter-
unrsst csused gold production to si ids frcm
In ths mid-1970s, gnvsrrmient wos forcsd to rnpasl
Ths essential Teatures of this policy
(as reported In ths Anglo-American CorporatIon's
i
during ths p sriod January 1972 to June 1976.
Reduction of ths contrsct psriod
POL I C Y , PROCTDUOEB ANO ATTITUD ES
s
Cherk-orr reel II ties should not be grented to
unreglstereble trsds unions but only to those
unions which have submitted proof or their
Otnpers carry blsating cartIf1cates, and are
Till a la en essential pnsltlon In l.ha prncaes of
furthering the elms of comm»mlsm.
Hut In en
industry wharw OHfL is foreign lahnur who do
not want to become Involved In lnr.nl politics this eill make the unlnn's task more difficult*.
mining.**
Other Interviews revealed erase scepticism on
responsible for tha breaking nf ore In tha straws.
R topers aarn placa wages, and ara often
employed under contract.
the part of monegemnntt
stme felt that mlnewnrkers
mining assistant', be creeted.
After training,
auch workers wnulrt be Issued with blasting
certlflcatee nnly for the mine for which they were
Issued.
This propose I has been blocked by the
Mine Workers' Union.
Surveyors gunge tha progress nf etopers, ami
would not be as 'nmonahle tn imlimtaatlnn os fectnry
report on tha arna covered to a hlghar authority.
eorkers - this could ba because of the rural origins
repeal of this legislation, It appeers thet there
According tn the JCI spokesperson, white minora
of a large proportion of mlnaworkers end tha fact
will be no slgnlfIcent changes In this section of
fear that black aurvayora will not Maintain
that they are migr a n t s . ..coming for only 13 months.*
the Act In the near future.
accurate records.
Because of white mlnewnrker resistance to the
This, they claim, eill affect
According to Llebeoberg, It Is the
wages nf atopers, aho era paid plece-retee.
S E C T 1 W 1? Of TIC MINES ANQ WintO ACT
White mtoers' fear that the employer will
exploit the altuatlnn by emplnylng blacks at
one quarter of the pay paid to white miners;
This Act reswilna a major bona of contention for
piAMorn w o company A n n u n r o TowAnoq w u x ibation
the entire Industry.
Interviews »1th Chamber nfftrials and representatives
white enrkers as 'scheduled persons* by granting
The Act essentially prnter.ta
from the mining houses revealed thet Much attention
only them a certificate of competency, nr bleating
was being paid to tha moves being made by unionists,
certificate.
elth management quick to pnlnt nut that they were
of the mine gang, essentially controlling mnjnr
quite 'open* to unlnnlaatlon.
aspects of the production process from which blacks
The following ere
extracts from ire* of the Interviews I
are excluded.
Employerk In the m ining Industry have not
attempted to reterd the development of unions
for our labour force - our general philosophy
and policy la that It la not tha employers'
function to establish trada unlnna for black
workers - It Is obviously also not our policy
to retard the development of unions for our
lahnur fnrca.
- LlebeiJi^rg, tha Chae#»er*s Induatrlsl
Halations Qfflcar.
'
This enables a miner to be In charge
Because of a shortage of miners
holding e 'blasting certificate', there has been
cetegory of work to
black mtneenrkers.
The Act wes reviewed by the Wlehahn
Commission (part ft nf its r e p n r t ) In 1901.
Ihe
Commission recommended that tha definition of
confirmed that the Black Minaworkers’ Union had been
Hnwever, the government irfilte paper stated thet
given access to one of the mines,
while It was In principle In favour of the
fie went on to say
We know that the unlona here ere going to be
political - it is the only way In which you
can show your clout. Many of the union leaders
ara arrested not for union activity but for
wbs
shown In the dispute this year (May 190?),
increase, while the Chamber offered only *7)1.
The
stete eas forced tn intervene in the dispute,
pushing the Chamher tn raise its offer to 1?jt. 11
We want to man the mines with the best
people Irrespective nf race which means we
have to train more people and we need the right
to train them and put them in these Jobs a right shlch we don't freely have now - a
right tn utilise human resnurr.ee Irrespective
of race end sex.
'scheduled person' ba replaced by a nondlscrlmlnetory definition of 'competent person'.
I myself have bed 19 years experience of blecljr
trade unions before I came hare.
I heve no
fear of unions and nor does the ctwpany as
long aa the thing Is organised. We do not
Insist on recngnltlon (sic) at thla atage If people went to talk to us we will telk to
them.
This
when the Council of Mlolng Unions demanded a 19%
Llebeoberg, commenting on this Issue, seidt
pressure to open up this
Industrial natations Offlcsr Horton o f ‘Hand Wines
•a ere quite happy about It - we will know who
we are talking to - at the m c m n t we do not.
We have extensive coevnlttee systems but they
are not negnttatlng bodies at all.
The
committee system Is only an upward communication
system and cannnt be considered anything else.
Ikiionisation Is a natural development.
This may be e tempting Idea for managesient
as white miners demand higher and hlghar wages.
This will only take place through e gradual
process of negotlstlon. We would like to do
this without losing the existing employers
who have served us well over many years.
recommendation, this would only take place at an
j
approprlete time end in an appropriate manner.
CONTRADICTIONS AOiniNQ rnOM STABILISATION POLICIES
It left It to the discretion of the employer and
Job satisfaction
employee organisations to negotiate this within
l e reasonable time.
No legislative amendment was
The Increased percentage of miners returning to
the mines has led to demands for advancement,
proposed on this subject, and government aald
and to higher expectetIons.
this would not happen before 'e l t e m a t l v e
Chamber of Mines' research department, this Is
1 safeguard measures (for Elites) hart been effected'.
Thwre was discussion
around the granting of
According to the
placing pressure on management to open up Jobs
held by whites.
At the sa«*a time, there Is en
! blasting licences to afrlcen mlneworkers in
ettampt to Introduce new bonus schemes to alleviete
' BophuthaTswana during
thie problem.
1900.
In proposals drawn
up by an 'lnter-stete' committee of South African
and BophuthaTswanan officials, It was suggested
Indigenous recruitment
that e new category of worker, the 'licenced
According to analysts close to the industry, the
to often b e the r i m t to take t*» grl*y»rr*s, they
However, according tn Van dor Watt
could we l 1 be wery receptive to unlnnlsatIon.
It eea too big for one union to handle, and they
The
they felt that
problematic.
However, he clelmed that workers
had themselves been demendlng union recognition
fact that legislation prevents sccnmmodetlon In
attempted to find a group of uniona to move Into
through strike action.
married quarters to only 3)t of tha workforce,
tha Industry.
In principle to reglstretlnn.
The union Is not opposed
(el though encordlng to noma sources there In an
At the present time, only Chllllsn lint ha of
eppeel to ttnve thla extended), suggests that It
the Dleck Mine Work era' Union Is working closely
National iktlnn of Mlneworkera. an afflllete of
la unlikely that menagnment alll be ahla to
elth FMfCWU, end has bnen given an office by the
the C'Ninr.ll of Unions In Bnuth Afrlce (CIISA).
co-opt a battar-off, mor# skilled group.
Boilermakers'
Thla
tactic haa baan ettempted In other araaa of
Booth Africa.
Whatever minera may gain In tha long tana
thro^jh tha procaaa of unlnnlsatIon, unions alll
'Initially ba forcad to confront low wngaa,
badly daflrwd Job eetegorlaatlon, management
prnr.aduraa auch aa aa Iact Ion ami grading of
Society.
At an August 1001 conference, e decision ass
The FMTCWU represents mainly skilled coloured
taken to begin unionising mlneworkers end security
workers end hea a recognition aqreament with the
workers.
Chamber of Mlnea:
was aet up, under secretary general Cyril
thla allows them to organise
The Netlonal Union of Mlneworfcers
the seml-skllled categories of handymen, painters
Hamapo'ta.
end drlvera, ahlch Includes afrlcan workers.
Chemher, end was reluctant to comment, eoy further.
V e n d e r Wett claims that the recognition
CUSA Is presently negotiating elth the
According In Perlshae Carney, general secretary
egreemant waa finallaed nn|y because tha union
of CUBA, they decided to nrqenlse mine workers
blade mlnera, black H a t i n g and unfair
threetenad to take the nhamtier to the Industrial
becauaa of apprnarhes from m Inara themselvea.
dlamlaaala.
Court.
In addition to this, unionisation
Due to thla, Individual mining
may altar formal and informal mechenlsms of control,
hounea put pressure on the Chamber to recognise
aa wall aa m e n agement'a tactlca of foatarlng
the union, end to negntlete conditions for lta
athnlc divisions.
Ueorgina Ja ffaa
The Ikmlclpal and General Workers' U n i o n .
Ifrtlon president Oatsby Mazes I - who succeeded
APTENOIX
Joseph Mnvl after his death - announced at their
Tha Fedaratad Mining, Explosives and Chnmlcal
Wor*era Union (rMTHWU), and tha Black Mina
Workera' U n i o n .
Auguat 190? AOM that they intended to Incorporate
mine workers Into the union.
Ibis Is pert of a
general plan to recruit migrant workers.
Tha FMFCWU wns astabIIshad in 1975 aa an
Thla union was previously known as tha
of falmot of tha Ooilenaokera*
Society, a TUCS a I
Black Municipality Workers' Union, the name being
afflllata.
Boclaty waa forcad
changed In August 190? to eccomodste other mlgrent
Tha Onllarmnkara'
to traoafar thalr colourad membership to tha
F U X W U in 1975 to gain raglatratlon.
Ika van dar
w orkers.
The feet thla union
haa br»g<»n to recruit on
Watt, aacratary of both r MTCWU and nollarmakara'
the mines was confirmed by e management
Society, said that t»*e formation of FMECWU was
representative In mid-September.
undartakan with tha lntantton of the union
amalgamating jlth Onl 1e r m akera'
raglatratlon.
once It had gained
Hoeever, thla we* not legally
Black Allied Mina and Tunnel Workers' U n i o n .
Oleck Allied Wnr*ere' Union
*
of memhera tekea place melnly in Natel, eIt hough
(B A W ll).
necrultlng
elth De Beer'a, and according to Van dar Watt
they claim acme memberahlp on aome of the Tranaveel
represent (511% of the total eorkforce In the
mines.
Induatry.
With thla auccaaa at Da Baer'a, tha
union began discussions to move Into gold mining.
1.
for an analysis of compounds as structures of
domination, nee Dunbar Moodle'a 'The rules
ere here to protect tlwjse In power only'.
Iftpubl Ished semi nor paper, African Bttalles
Institute, IVilverslty of W1twatersrsnd.
Gee also
MrNamara, .IK. 'Orothera and work ms t e a ! home
friend networka In the aoclal life of bleck migrant
eorkere ln»e gold mine hostel', In P Mayer,
Black villages In en Industrial a ocletyi
e n t h r o n i n g leal pamper, t Ives on lebour migration In
South A f r i c a . IN ford, 1!»W.
Ron alao Prerson, P, 'the social structure of e
South African gold mine hostel', BA (honoura
dlaaertetlon, Unlveralty of W1tweterarand.
2.
.Johnstone, fA. Claaa, rnce end gold! a study
oF cl a ss relations and reclal discrimination
In South A f r i c a . Ihls Includes e datallad analysis
of this point.
See el so e forthcoming b w * by Innas, 0, A n g lo
American and the rise of m p d s m South AfrlcaT"
llelnemann, 1903.
3.
Hyman, B. St r i k e s , fontene/ColIIns, 1977, p 61.
4.
Bee Cooper, C, 'The mlneworkers' strike', In
Booth African Labour B u l l e t i n , 5(j), 1979.
5.
Bee Klrkaood, M, 'The mlneworkers' atruggle', in
South African Labour P u llet In, l(fl), 1975, p ?9.
Thla union, formed in 1900, la affiliated to the
poaalble, end the uniona remain aeperete.
Both unione have a recognition egreemant
NOTES
President B Khumalo seld thet the Chamber's
ettltude towards recognition procedures was
6.
Tor further Information, see Murrey, C,
'Stabilisation and unemployment', In
South African Lebour B u l letio, 6(4), 1900, p 50.
7.
Mining Survey, Number T, 1900.
Collection Number: AK2117
DELMAS TREASON TRIAL 1985 - 1989
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