The Liao-tung Campaign of 1619

The Liao-tung Campaign of 1619
by Ray Huang
The Liao-tung[ '] campaign of early 1619 brought an end to the Ming empire's unchallanged military dominance in that region, while it raised the Manchus to the stat.;.
of formidable rivals. In retrospect, it can be seen !hat as the opposing armies met, the
fate of China's millions was sealed on the battlefield, suddenly and ignominiously. For
the intensity of the engagement as weil as the decisiveness of its outcome, the event
merits a prominent position in the Chinese annuals of war. But to this date only scattered and contradictory descriptions of it exist in primary and secondary sources. This
article recounts the sequence of battles in some detail to arrive at a more roheren! picture.
This article was prepared during the summer session of the Ming History Project of 1979,
sponsored by the Bast Asian Studies of the Princeton University and the National Endowment for
the Humanities. A preliminary draft was also presented to the Traditional China Seminar of Co-
lumbia University in November 1979. The authorwishes to thank all those who have rendered to
him assistance and guidance, andin particular Professor Gari Ledyard for direction in consulting
Korean sources.
Until August 1980, the author was Professor of Chinese History at State University College,
New Paltz., New York.
The situation !hat led to the campaign is clear enough: A year earlier Nurhaci bad
ransacked the city of Fu-shun[>] and slaughtered its garrison. He then routed another
Ming army sent to chastize him, killing its commander, Chang Ch'eng-Yin[>]. He then
demanded that the Ming court redress bis "Seven Grievances", calling for concessions
of land along the empire's northeast border and indemnities tobe paid in gold, silver,
and silk brocades. This was put aside unanswered. Since the Manchu army then continued to destroy Chineseforward posts adjacent to its territories, a de facto state of war
existed between the Ming emperor and this Chien-chou[•] chieftain.
In Peking, the court organized a punitive expedition. During the summer of 1618
Yang Hao('], Vice-Minister of War and concurrently Assistant Censor-in-Chief, was
appointed Supreme Commnder. Several highly regarded generals - the best !hat the
empire could muster- were also assigned to Liao-tung. Soldiers, horses and equipment
from frontier and interior provinces as far off as Chekiang and Szechuan were assembled to build up the offensive force. When more personnel was required, recruits fiUed
the ranks. The Koreans and the Ye-ho[•], a Manchu tribe still loyal to the Ming, provided additional resistance. To meet military expenses the Wan-li Emperor authorized
a silver surcharge on land laxes in all provinces except Kweichow. Along with other
revenues, the increase was expected to provide three million taels of silver. In March
1619 all preparations had ben completed.
The total strength of Yang Hao's command remains a question. Many sources, including Manchu documents, give the figure of 200000 men. ActuaUy, the combined
Chinese forces could not have equalled half !hat numbet, and perhaps considerably less.
The above figure was calculated by adding II 0 000 men, sent as reinforcements, to the
90000 originally assigned to the Liao-tung command'. But it was general knowledge
30
map 1: Yang Hao's Offensive April 9-20, 1619
lJ
t
~ • '* <# ~ •
•
1
approx. line under chinese amtrot prior to tbe offensive
chinese fortification
(j) Ma Lin
® Tu Sung
@Li Ju-po
0
Li u T'ing
31
map 2: Battle of Sarhu Aprill4, 1619
0
I
.
::t
1
..h·
N
l
Notes on Map Sketch Z
Tu Sung crosses the Hun River, leaving battle wagons behind.
15 000 Mancbu infantrymen abandon Sarbu to take position on Girin Peak; they are surrounded by Tu Sung's mainbody, said to be 20 000 men.
® 400 Manchu cavalrymen, previously hid.ing in ravine, surprise the Chinese from their rear,
cross the Sutzu River at Jabiyan, and re-unite with tbe Manchu infantry on tbe Girin Peak.
Sarhu is also occupied by Tu Sung's forces, streogth unknown.
Nurhaci reinforces Girin Peak with 1000 mounted soldiers.
His attack in force commits five banners on tbe left.
After Tu Sung' s forces on Sarhu are routed, the entire Manchu army closes in on the east ban.k
of the Sutzu River. The three banners there are committed. Tu Sung is surrounded.
® After the victory, the Manchu pursue.
<D
®
I
32
!bat tbe field command bad not been brought up to full strengtb (or some time'. Furtbermore, due to heavy Iosses incurred the year earlier and tbe manpower needed to
guard otber sectors of Liao-tung, personnel available for the campaign probably
amounted to only a fraction of the original 90000 men. Numerous reports also suggest
!bat the reinforcements and recruits did not arrive in such numbers as officially reported'. Chinese commanders habitually inflated their troop strengthin order to obtain
extra supplies. Tbe Mancbus, subsequently being victors, of course happily endorsed
the inflated strengtb of tbeir opponents. This helped to publicize the greater magoitude
of their own military success.
Works based on Manchu sources calculate the troop strengtb ofTu Sung[' ], who led
one of Yang Hao's four routes of forces, at 60000 men 4 • But the deputy circuit intendant attached to the route as Inspector General reported its strength tobe "25 000-plus
officers and men" 5 . If tbe same ratio between the inflated strengtband actual strength
applied to all routes, a more realistic figure for Yang Hao's attacking force probably lies
somewbere close to 83000 men. Augmented by Korean and Ye-bo auxiliaries, the
combined command may bave bad 100000 men, a round figure informally appearing in
some Chinese accounts 6 •
Equally unclear is the size of Nurhaci's arrny. Thougb tbe Chien-chou chieftain repeatedly referred to his fighting hordes as " 100000 men under eight banners"', this
figure is difficult to accept as an accurate count ofhis effective combat strength. Later in
July at K'ai-yüan[•] he supposedly launcbed an attack with 40000 men', wbich gives
some indication of the extent of Mancbu mobilization. Also, after the battle Nurhaci
handed out awards to 220 niru[ 9 ] commanders9 • Since each niru contained 300 ablebndied men, 220 niru constituted a reservoir of 66 000 soldiers ' 0 . During tbe spring
campaign the Manchus fought for survival, especially on Aprill4, at Sarhu['"], where
combat mounts were committed to battle in contingents as they arrived. The mobilization on this occasion probably exceeded that for the Sattle of K'ai-yüan. Tbis evidence
suggests that at the high point Nurbaci probably brought 50000 to 60000 men to the
confrontation with Yang Hao. Nevertbeless, in overall strength the Chinese indisputably outnumbered the Manchus".
Yang Hao's battle plan requires little reconstruction . On April 4 the emperor
received a copy ofit, still extant". (see Map Sketch 1). The scheme divided the attacking
forces into four columns, caUed routes, with Ma Lin["] commanding the nortbern
route, Tu Sung tbe weslern route, Li Ju-po["] the southern route, and Liu T'ing["] the
southeastern route. Tbough not specified in the plan, Heta Ala[,.] appears tobe tbe objective. Aside from assigning defense duties to the garrison commanders at Liaoyang["] and Kuang-ning["], the operational order did not designate a strategic reserve.
From a modern army strategist's point of view, the plan incorporated several
questionable features. Jt scattered the forces over a huge arc of !50 miles without focusing the main effort. Nor did tbe plan assign intermediate targets to the advancing columns. Having released tbe order, the Supreme Commander in fact divorced hirnself
from tbe operation. As it turned out, aU he could do was to wait news of developments in
his Liao-yang beadquarters.
Yang Hao received plenty of criticism from his contemporaries. One wrote: " Tbe
Supreme Commander bad no intention of figbting. He merely pul on airs of [launching]
a ma jor offensive in the bope of senring minor victories by seizing a few nearby forts" " .
Aocording to a supervising secretary, "Yang Hao bad no assurance ofvictory. He pre33
pared for deep penetration only because of his Subordinate commanders' clarnor for
battle and pressure from above" 14• Others said tbat bis plan was outdated, tbat it might
do for inexperienced tribesmen but never against an opponent of substantial strength
and expertise " .
Yet the psychological effect of the plan warrants attention. Yang Hao may have deployed bis army to intimidate. Manchu sources indicate that before the offensive tbe
Supreme Commander sent word to Nurhaci that he was to launch a force of 470000
men under the full moon of April 28 - the date deliberately offered tbe intent of immediate action 16• But ifYang Hao hoped to gain a psychological edge over bis opponent
by such gestures, he wastobe disappointed. Nurbaci was not unfamiliar witb such maneuvers. Previously once be bad told bis subordinates not to take seriously certain
Chinese moves. The Ming forces, he explained, werein a babit of making token appearances, and then fabricated fancy tales of victory to deceive tbeir cmperor 17 .
In fairness to Yang Hao, several mitigating factors deserve consideratioo. Sending
Ma Lin to the north and Liu T'ing to the south, he apparently took care of the Ming
forces already tbere, including the Ye-ho and Korean auxiliaries, which could not effectively operate far away from tbeir bome bases. Also, in the empire's military tradition,
general practice permitted civil officials to be commissioned as supreme commanders,
but not professional soldiers to rise to tbe rank of field marshal. Usually a general officer, given tbe command of an arrny corps, bad already reached tbe pinnacle of bis
career. This applied to the four senior commanders. Roughly equal in service record
and prestige, they were not expected to serve under one another. Tbis factor alone
proved a substantial obstacle to consolidate tbe front. Even before entering Liao-tung,
one of tbe four, Liu T'ing, in factbad already memorialized tbe throne, suggested tbat
the army be divided into routes 1•. Furtberrnore, terrain decisively influenced Yang
Hao's scheme of maneuver. Routes leading to Hetu Ala from the west were limited. To
the north the Hun river[ 17] intersected all avenues of approach, while high mountains
remained serious barriers in the south 1' .
After the field order executing the aforementioned battle plan was issued, the Supreme Commander, with most officers present, officiated tbe ceremony to launch the
campaign on March 26 at Liao-yang. Commencing AprilS, tbe several columns were to
jump off on different dates, depending upon how far each was from the enemy. But a
heavy snow on March 31 made it necessary to re-set tbe date on April 9 20• From this
point on no more is said about tbe campaign until the fall of Tu Sung on April 14.
Manchu sources do not corroborate tbe Chinese claim that Nurbaci bad been inforrned of the date of Chinese offensive. They maintain tbat Yang Hao's advance was
detected on April13. Contact with Liu T'ing's forces was established during tbe day and
tbe torcb illumination of Tu Sung's march observed in the night following. On tbe
morning of April 14 tbe Chien-chou cbieftain personally decided to deal with Tu Sung
in force first. He concluded that Liu T'ing's thrust was a feint attack designed to draw bis
attention to tbe soutb. Nevertheless he dispatched 500 mounts to check tbe advance in
tbat direction. This agrees with tbe Korean account21 • By a11 appearance, Nurhaci bad
camped close to tbe day's battle scene22•
In tbe course ofthe Sattle of Sarhu, Chinesesources relate tbat Tu Sung suffered ambush rwice. Early April 14 be crossed tbe Hun river, abandoning bis battalion of
battle-wagons loaded with Iirearms on tbe northern shore. In skirmishes on the south34
em sbore he quickly eliminated two enemy barriers, capturing 14 Mancbus. Enrouraged by tbe success, he dasbed torward rigbt into tbe trap laid by Nurhaci. Soon his
forces became entangled with 30000 enemies. During tbe intense fighting Tu attempted to occupy a mountain peak, only to fall into yet anotber ambusb. Before sunset tbe
genoral bad perisbed witb bis two division commanders. Few of those who crossed the
Hun returned 23 .
Censorial officials accused Tu Sung posthumously of "greediness in seeking merit".
His misdeeds included: Advancing tbe jump-off date without authorization, abandoning firearms, crossing tbe Hun river againstthe advice of bis subordinates, and giving
battle with a span of water in bis rear. Eventually the grave responsibility of the Iailure
of tbe entire campaign feU on Tu Sung- a judgement shared by tbe emperor himself14 •
From the historian's viewpoint, botb tbe situation report and the censure Iack merit.
When Tu Sung's forces were routed, the report was romposed by a surveillance rommissioner, based exclusively on verbal accounts furnished by three soldiers on reronnaissance duty and one actuaUy engaged in combat. Later charges against tbe rommanding genoral were added to it witbout further ronfirmation, conceivably to relieve
the Supreme Commander and the censorial officials themselves. Extant records do not
indicate that an official inquiry was ever beld 15 .
The document of censure repeatedly stressed tbe importance of exercising caution; it
mentioned that the attacking forces should have held their advance once the enemy's
fronttine was overrun, so that better coordination rould take effect. But Yang Hao's order shows no such emphasis. Orcumstances suggestthat tbe Supreme Commander bimself sei a tone of haste, as bis order in part reads: "If the date of advancement should be
m.issed, it clearly ronstitutes a case of deliberate delay. The rommanding generaltogether with bis subordinates would be subject to [the death penalty by] beheading""·
And Yang bad imperial authorization to impose and carry out death sentences on the
spot. On March 26 he executed a rolonel before the assembled generals, wbo had in a
previous engagement failed to advance vigorously17• Thus the applied pressurebad already sei tbe four routes of army in a race.
The charge tbat Tu Sung bad advanced tbe jump-off cannot be substantiated. His
D-Day was April 14, and he was said to have started in tbe mid-night of April 13/ 14;
technicaUy this was not a violation. As for abandoning tbe firearms battation, even the
early report bears witness that it was tbe battalion rommander who decided to hold tbe
advance, after Tu crossed the Hun river. He testified tbat the current was too strong to
ford, ha~ing already swept away some 50 cavalrymen. Sighting enemy mounts on tbe
opposite bank, he simply ordered bisbattalion to eocamp. This was bardly justifiable,
considering that bis commanding generat bad Iaken tens of thousaods of men to the
soutb and fougbt for hours. Subsequently tbe battalion rommander said: "Crossing
would be difficult even for bare-banded soldiers. Neither the wagons nor gunpowder
could be carried along." Tu Sung might have displayed negligeoce in advanciog witbout
resolving tbe difficulty; but the firearrns commaoder did not even seek altemate solutions aod be did not report bis decisions to encamp. By exercising discretioo be tbus
abandoned bis commanding general in the thick of figbting"' .
Moreover, Tu Sung's effort to seize tbe heigbts on the soutbem bank of tbe Hun river
was tacticaUy necessary, since in a meeting engagement,the early rootrol ofthe billswas
essential to the security of bis bridgehead.
35
Chinese documents further disclose more blunders committed by the high command.
While it is not explicitly mentioned, Yang Hao obviously did not employ bis agents to
gather lield intelligence. Nor did he appear in person in the battle lield. No one else
could make tbe necessary readjustments in the lield for him, especially in matters affecting several routes. Yet bis unawareness of the Manchu troop concentration on Tu
Sung's path near Sarhu proved the most fatal oversight.
Tbe Manchu sources Iack variety. Tbey seem to have been based entirely on the annals of Nurhaci, written in old Manchu script. Later the records were transcribed into
the new script. When translated into Chinese, the entries began to take the form of traditional Veritable Records. Tbe most notable bad feature ofthose sets of documents is
their undue exaggeration. For instance, whereas they cite Chinese Iosses in battle at
100000 men, they give "fewer than 200" for the total number of Manchus killed
throughout the entire campaign 29 •
Nevertbeless tbe annals provide more depth tban Chinese records, including many
. point of technical detail. With whatever defects tbey remain the most authoritative account of the several battles. Tbe annals' credibility is enhanced by their consistent style,
which features tactical subtlety expressed with a rather simple and limited vocabulary.
As victor, Nurhaci bad fewer reasons to distort the records than the Chinese, except, as
aJready suggested, for the exaggeration ofhis success in order to attract more followers.
This source reveals that when the Chinese advanced, 15 000 Mancbu infantrymen,
scarcely armed, were constructing fortilications on the west side of Sarhu, only 400
cavalrymen were stationed with them as a security force . Apparently Nurhaci bad foreseen the strategic value of the site, and so during the battle bis forces converged readily
on the heights.
Otherwise the battle of April 14 went on more as a meeting engagement than a
large-scale ambush. Most ofthe Manchu combat units from the south, where, about ten
miles from Sarhu, they donned their armor. When they closed in, the infantry on construction duty bad already moved to the east side to take position on Girin Peak[ 11 ] (see
Map Sketch 2), where they were surrounded by Tu Sung's forces, estimated tobe 20000
men. Tbe 400 cavalrymen, having hidden themselves in the ravine of Sarhu during the
shuffle, surprised the Chinese by taking their rear. After ;nflicting casualties, they crossed the Sutzu river("] near Jabiyan['•] to reunite with the infantry on tbe heights. With
the latter's support, they executed one more downhill cbarge, killing about 100 Ming
soldiers. Presurnably, those eh arges bad delayed the Chinese attack and gained precious
time for the Manchu command. By mid-aftemoon, when Nurhaci arrived on the scene,
the mountain of Sarhu was also occupied by more of Tu Sung's men.
Tbe Chien-chou war council proposed lirst to relieve the encirclement of Girin Peak.
1000 more cavalrymen should light their way to reach the besieged troops. Tben four
banners of Manchu forces should attack Tu Sung's main body from the front, while four
other banners kept watch on the enemy on the west side of Sarhu.
Nurhaci overruled this plan, although he dispatched the 1000 mounts to Girin Peak
as it bad been suggested. His main attack would be launched from the west wing rather
than the east wing; for troop concentration he detached a banner from the east of the
Sutzu river to reinforce the west, giving it a total strengthoflive banners. Only after the
Ming forces on the Sarhu were routed would the three banners remaining on the east
side spring into action, tobe synchronized with the downhiU charges of the cavalry supported infantry from Girin Peak. Tbe exact strength of the attacking force remains un-
36
certain, as tbe banners tbemselves were receiving late-arriving mounts from tbe direction of Hetu Ala 30 • Still, it appears tbat Nurbaci always bad great numerical superiority
in any sector of beavy figbting. Deterrnined to wipe out tbe Chinese on tbe weslern
bank, tbere bis cavalry strengtb must be overwhelming. Once that sector was secured,
tbe Miog forces at tbe foothiUs of Girin Peak would bave little recourse. Surrounded,
cutoft from any orderly retreat by the Hun river and psychologically defeated , Tu Sung
would fall easily.
As planned, tbe attack went on in a fury . Mobility, te am-work, and superior striking
power provided tbe success. According to the annals, the engagementwas a typical case
of Ming resistance giving way to Manchu uphill cavalry eh arges. Not surprised, at the
beginning the Chinese arrayed their Iirearms in depth. Even though boo is mentioned,
probably without tbe battle-wagon battalion, Tu's men were firingmuskets only, not inonnceivably witb tbe Korean contingent. (See below, boo is the Mancbu word forp 'ao.)
In any case the defense proved ineffective encounterin~ a determined Manchu drive.
''In a short time all of them were annihilated," Nurhaci's annals declare succinctly, "as
(we] gaUoped our borses witbout stop to enter into their position, and kept sbooting and
chopping."
Tu Sung never bad a chance. His whereabouts is not even mentioned. The annals devote only three sentences to the extinction of bis army corps. Overpowered, the remnants of this force retreated to Sokin mountain( 21 ] where they were tightly surrounded
by the Manchus as darkness feil. What remained for the Chien-chou warriors was
merely a mopping-up action. At Ieisure they slaughtered those who tried to break away
from the closing ring.
Pursuing the defeated, the Manchus seem to have crossed the Hun river in a due north
direction, leaving Tu Sung's Iirearms battalion undisturbod. On their way in tbe nigbt of
April 14/ 15 they moved close to Ma Lin's route near Siyanggiyan( 21] , whose soldiers
beat drumsanddank gongs during the nigbt watcb, thus disclosing their positions to tbe
enemyl 1.
The appearance of Ma Lin's forces so close to tbe scene ofTu Sung's defeat involved
an irony. Aocording to a Chinese document, originally Supreme Commander Y ang Hao
bad directed Ma to advance from San-ch'a-erb-pao( 23] ; but the general besougbt permission to take the route at Cbing-an-pao( 24] , a point 30 miles farther to the nortb and
away from tbe area of action. His wish was granted. Yet on the eve of the offensivehe
reversed bimself and again requested permission toreturn to San-ch'a as planned earlier; tbis was again granted' 2 • Had be actually extended the offensive front to the oortb,
the outcome of tbe imminent battle migbt bave been different.
As it happened, the emergence of bis corps near Siyanggiyan only enabled tbe Mancbus to carry tbeir slaugbter onto the next day, Aprill5. The Chinese high comrnand
learned about tbis second disaster from soldiers patrolling tbe rear and from a messengor escaped from the encirclement. They indicated tbat tbe entire corps was surrounded by an unknown number of Mancbus. A si milar disjointed follow-up report
stated tbat P 'an Tsung-yen["], a civil official acting as Inspector General ofthe route,
feU from bis borse witb an arrow wound in bis back and died tbere. More tban 10000
Chinese cavalrymen, bowever, made tbeir way to tbe west 33 . Later official bistory attributed tbe disaster to panic amoog Ma's soldiers caused by news ofTu Sung's defeat that
bad reacbed tbem in tbe previous nigbt. Early in tbe morning of April15, a disbeartened
Ma decided to retreat. He reacbed safety; but P 'an Tsung-yen, in charge of tbe rear
37
echelon, was less fortuoate. Accordiog to the chronicle, P'an rallied several senior offi-
cers and made an heroic stand that Iasted four hours, in which they all gave up tbeir
lives~.
The story, described in the simpleS! terms, does not agree with other accounts. There
is the likelihood that by it the writer was glorifying a fallen comrade wearing the civil
service robe and assigning the role of villain to the hapless Ma Lin. Three montbs later,
it sbould be noted, Ma died in the battle of K'ai-yüan. Therefore, like Tu Sung, be could
conveniently serve as a scapegoat.
Undeniably, disorder prevailed in tbe rear ranks of Ma Lin's forces. But this must
have taken place toward the end of the day, since Manchu sources assert that the entire
Chinesecorps of 40000 met Nurhaci's forces in good order, at least in the beginning.
Nurhaci's annals state !hat in the morning Ma's troops were actually advancing. Only
upon sigbting the approaching Manchus did they move back to the site of the previous
night's bivouac, taking advantage of the trenches already in place. The corps arrayed it-
self in a square formation. Outside the trenches in the vanguard position stood a line of
musketeers, supported from behind by a line of cavalry, tbat was again backed up by
more soldiers carrying muskets and boo. Bebiod them lay three lines of trenches, some
hastily dug or deepened. Forther behind and inside tbe square oftrenches all the cavalry
squadrons bad dismounted, ready to figbt on foot 35 • Those details lend authenticity to
tbe source: Indeed the square forrnation typified Ming army tactics in the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries, as allesied in several military treatises 36 • (see Appendices 1 to 3 atthe end of this article).
Amba beile['•], Nurhaci's second son, was assembling the Manchu troops still arriving from the south. As be watched he discovered another division of Chinese troops
about 1.3 miles to the westoftbis main body, estimated tobe 10000 men. Clearly this
refers to the rear echelon led by P'an Tsung-yen. In bis field order Supreme Commander Yang Hao specified that civil offleials attached to the several routes of army as 1nspectors General bad responsibility for army logistics, in addition to matters related to
battlefield discipline and prisoners of war37 • Therefore P'an's position, as described,
was normal and proper, though it is doubtful that he actually bad 10000 troops at bis
command. Aligning the forward and rear echelons from the east to the west, the Ming
forces formed a T-sbape with the enemy, who was advancing on a soutb-to-north axis.
(see Schematic Diagram 1.) But this strange situation did not last very long.
The presence of the Chinese rear divisionwas in time reported to Nurhaci, who could
not, however, do much about it at this point, because he bad also sighted another Ming
mobile column advancing toward him, also estimated tobe 10000 men. lts exact location is not specified. Yet, its movement dictated that it must be somewbere between the
southern flank oftbe Chineseforcesand the Western flank of the Mancbus. As soon as
the situation clarified, the Chien-chou chieftain decided to eliminate this mobile column
first.
He bad 1000 cavalrymen for tbe task. Half of them dismounted to remove the barricades bastily formed by the Chinese battle-wagons and rattan shields. This was accomplished under the rain of enemy missiles. Witb the obstacle removed, the soldiers on
horseback Iook over. Typical of all Manchu chronicles of war, tbe possage on actual
fightiog is the most laconic. II is clear that the cavalry charge was effective and sbortly
before noon the Chinese mobile column ceased to exist.
38
Sdtematic Diqnm 1
.
Sattle of Siyanggiyan Apnll5 , 1619
Notes on Sehemade Diagram 1
Nurbaci eliminates Ming mobile column.
<D
® Nurbaci arrives in the east. Ma Lin's forces are routed.
® The Manchus wipe out P'an Tsung-yen's rear echelo n.
Sehemade Diagram 2:
Sattle of Niu-Mao-chai April20, 1619 (korean Sources: April17, 1619)
Notes on Scbematic Diagram 2
<D
. ..
Mongoi detacbments thrust into space between Liu Ting's forward and rear diYlSions.
mountain on the east.
His forces encircle to the west.
Hong Taiji attacks on the right.
Amba beile executes central penetration.
® Mancbus continue to wipe out Chinese resistance. Koreans surrender.
® ~ba heile occupies
~
39
By the time Nurhaci retumed to the east, Ma Lin's main hody had finally completed
its preparations for a counter-attack. Dismounted cavalrymen, combat ready, emerged
from the trenches to line up with their forward guards. Initially Nurhaci contemplated
seizing a nearby hill to execute downhill charge; but the Chinese advance left no time for
that. He then ordered bis squadrons to dismount so as to light the Ming soldiers on foot·
butthat too, would have Iet them be caught at regrouping by the Chinese. Amb~ beile:
seeing the imminent danger, sbouted wamings to bis father before galloping away with
two banners of troops directly toward the oncoming Chinese. Theoretically, cavalry
chargewas at a disadvantage in front of such an enemy, who bad with them a wall of removable barriers, still supported behind by their own cavalry of greater numbers. But in
this instance, according to the annals, the superior archery and borsemanship of tbe
Manchus prevailed, not to mention Amba beile's leadership. lnspired, the other six
banners advanced, launehing waves of devastating if improvised assaults. The final outcome was " the complete routing of 40000 Ming soldiers by fewer than 10000 Manchu
soldiers". Driven into a swampland, Chinese stragglers met a bitter end 38 .
The last organized resistance was offered by the Chinese on Biyelun (Fiyelun) mountain(21], where 10000 ofthem still maneuvered muskets and rattan shields to check the
Manchu onslaught. But by early aftemoon these "I 0000 soldiers were killed to the last
man", apparently P'an Tsung-yen included. At this point the Manchus rested 39 •
The two days engagement destroyed the entire northern sector of the Ming front,
leaving only Li Ju-po and Liu T'ing in the southern sector. Li's routewas closest to the
Manchu capital, but the difficult terrain made approach impractible, in the absence of
specially trained and speciaUy equipped units of mountain troops. Hence, when the
manchus detected Li's movement, they merely dispatched 200 mounts to watch it from
a distance 40 .
After the disastraus reports about Sarhu, Siyanggiyan, and Biyefun, Yang Hao lost
bis will to light. Accordingly he reported to the emperor !hat be was recalling the two
routes of army in the southern sector' 1• Li Ju-po received the report in time to pull out.
His remaining force intact, the commanding generalhirnself had to face the accusation
that Nurhaci spared bis command because he bad insidious connection with tbe Chienchou cbieftain. ~iu T'ing seems never to have received the directive for disengagement.
üu T'ing's distance to Hetu Ala was the longest. His jump-off date was settled on
Aptil 9. His Chinese forces, said to comprise 30000 men, were probably close to one
third of that number. Another 13 000 men were furnished by the Kingof Korea. The
Korean units crossed the Yalu on April 541 • The combined column was expected to
thrust toward the Manchu capital from the area between K'uan-tien["'] and Huaijen["] (present-day Huan-jen['0 ]) .
It may be noted that this was the only Chinese command which managed to flasb back
a few dispatches of "victories" during tbe early skirmishes. Yang Hao received one on
April14 whicb indicated that Liu's forward elements were about 45 miles from Hetu
Ala; at the time a Subordinate commander observed: " A detachment of 500 barbarian
insurgents, apparently batUe-seasoned, occupied tbe mountain peak right in front of us
to chaUenge us. They alternated retreat with enticement43." This agrees with the
Korean account and coincides with an entry in Nurhaci's annals, which reveals that the
Chien-cbou chieftain directed a force of this strength to be sent to delay Liu T'ing as
soon as bis advance in that region was observed.
40
Oftbe tbreeniru commande" with these 500 men, tbe Manchu sources furtberadmit
that two were killed in action«. But Liu T'ing's glory was short-lived. Although be did
not yet know it, the Mancbus had already achieved their purpose. They bad purcbased
the timetbat needed. Once the threat on their northem front was removed, they could
direct their blow at bim alone.
The ensuing battle, fougbt on tbe mountains called Abdari Heigbts(" ) but better
identified by the nearby town of Niu-mao-chai(ll), is presented in the Manchu annals
with Iess clarity. No parallel Chinese account exists for comparison. Entries in Korean
records differ from tbe ve"ion presented by Nurhaci's followe" on many crucial points.
The Manchus claimed that tbey fought the battle under no great pressure. The
presence of Chinese columns bad caused some anxiety, especiaUy to the women-folk at
Hetu Ala at a time when fighting took place in tbe north. But, having destroyed tbe invading forces on the Hun river, Nurhaci began to breathe easily. He dispatcbed to the
southem mountains two vanguard units made up of Mongoi components, one consisting
of I 000 cavalrymen on April 15, and another of 2000 mounts on April 16. Tbat done,
be took all tbe time to thank Heaven for bis victory, sacrificing with eight oxen at
Jabiyan. lt was only late on April16 tbat be started for tbe south. He hirnself never went
beyond Hetu Ala. During tbe nigbt of April 16/ 17 a decision was made. He would retain4000 troops witb him in tbe capital in case Li Ju-po sbould threaten it from Ya-kukuan("). The operation against Liu T'ing was directed by Amba heile, witb Amba's
cousin Amin taiji( 34) and brother Hong taiji(" ) participating.
The annals indicate that the princes Started in tbe early moming of April17 and made
contact witb Liu Ting's forces on tbe fourth day of their march, that puts tbe date of tbe
battle on April20''. As usual, the Chinese took defensive positions with their firearms.
Several Mancbu attacks failed to disturb their formation. Only after Amba heile ordered his troops to circle around to the west and occupy the hills tbere did the Ming soldie" show signs of confusion. (see Schematic Diagram 2 .) And, when Hon taiji's downhill assaults on the northern flank and Amba beile's central penetration were aided by
Mongoi units cuning off tbe Chinese rear, the Ming army corps finally lost its poise.
During the stampede Liu T'ing was captured. Contradicting all other accounts, tbe an-·
nals acknowledge tbat the general was executed after being Iaken prisoner.
Further soutb, yet anothercomposite division of Chinese-Korean forces continued its
resistance. The defende" used bamboo trees to obstruct Manchu bo=s; their firearms
were arrayed in depth topout out missiles. It is not clear how long they staUed the Manchu attack; but in tbe end wind intervened in the Manchus' favor. It blew ferociously
toward the defende" and made their canoons and muskets inoperative. The attacke"
seized tbis opportunity to overwhelm the last obstacle to tbeir complete victory. When
this composite division, said to comprise 20000 men, was finaUy routed, the Korean infantry units occupying the beights behind the battle scene gave up figbting. They
delivered the remaining Chinese soldie" to the Manchus. The carnpaign came to a
cJose46.
Korean records confirm the description that Liu T'ing's column comprised three
echelons. The forward division, consisting of Chinese units, was under the control of the
generat himself. At an undisclosed distance two regiments of Koreans followed ,
presumably witb most of tbeir musketeers, no less tban 3000 of tbem. Immediately bebind them tbe balance oftbe Korean infantry, closely controUed by Kang Hongnip[••],
formed the rear echelon. Those records further admit tbat Kang surrendered witb some
41
4000 men, aher Manchu cavalry bad routed all other battle formations in front of him.
Nonhwest wind is cited by the Koreans as a determining factor for the outcome of the
battle, corrobating the Manchu annals. The Korean writers also suhstantiate the story
that Kang Hongnip's men, while surrendering, tumed Chinese soldiers over to the victors.
But the Korean records do not give credit to Liu Ting's hard fighting. They claim that
the torward ecbelon, consisting of Chinese personnel only, was ambushed rather than
overpowered. One account assens tbat the Chinese were looting the villages wben they
feU into tbe Manchu trap. According to the Korean sources, Liu Ting was neither captured nor lcilled in action. He committed suicide. Seeing the situation untenable, be and
several otbers ignited the gunpowder to lciU themselves47• The greatest discrepaocy between the Manchu aonals and Korean sources is tbe date of tbe battle. AU Korean writers put down April17 instead of April20 as the day when the Chinese-Korean column
met its destruction.
Local conditions in the battleground give more credence to the version of the Manchus. For one thing, only on April16 bad Nurhaci cleaned up the nonhem front on the
Hun river. His assessment of the situation in the south and the redeployment of the
forces, wbich counted more than 30000 mounts according to the Kore an records, would
bave made April17 a date vinually impossible to meet, not the mention that there was
no such urgency for bis men to give battle witbin 24 bours on a new front 150 miles away
and of a different terrain from where that they bad just won difficult battles.
Circumstances thus demand the present-day reader to scrutinize the nature of the
Korean sources with great care. The account oftbe said April17 event appears basically
in two works. Kwanghaegun i/gi[l7) is a pan of the dynastic chronicle pattemed aher
Chinese Veritable Records and compiled aher King Kwanghaegun's dethronement in
1623. The entry about the battle appears under the date of Apri125. On that day a repon was eitber dispatcbed by a surveillance official from tbe P'yöngan Province[38) or ·
received by the king's court. The document is summarized in one sentence giving the
date and place ofthe defeat. The in-depth description following the entry, however, no
Ionger quotes the sam~ repon. Ratber, it is entwined with the general discussion of the
turn of events by the chronicle compilers in re!rospection. In the end they endorse the
Chinese view that the defeat was caused byTu Sung, whose premature advance soutb of
tbe Hun river bad been responsible for the annihilation of all attaclting columns under
Yang Hao's field command. It must be noted that on April25, 1619, such thought could
not have occurred to the Koreans, who were having difficulty even in assessing the situation of tbe front of their immediate concem - that of the southeastem route...
The other source citing April 17 as the date of Liu Ting's downfall is a private account, written in tbe form of a diary, but apparently based on reminiscences. Yi Minhwao[39) was the govemor of tbe P'yöngan province. When tbe campaign of 1619 was
organized, he was on the staff of the Korean Commander-in-Chief, Kang Hongnip. His
narratives, subsequently published asch'aekchung t1/ok[4<1), cover the entire expedition
from the Koreao side of view, and cite day-to-day development aher the crossing of the
Yalu49• The book describes the battle and the surrender of the Korean forces at length,
including captivity at Hetu Ala. The date of April 17 falls nicely into the sequence of
events treated by the author.
But Yi's honesty as an eyewitness cannot be passed unquestioned. His memoirs can
be said to have been written entirely as an apologia for Kang Hongnip and bimself.
42
Wben tbe surrender of tbe Korean forces was brougbt up, tbe autbor ofch'aekchung il/ok declares, be protested. When that came to no avail, he attempted suicide. But he was
saved by bis nephew and a servant, who Iook away bis sword and dagger>•. This scene is
contradicted by the entty in i/gi , wbich indicates that Yi was one person who could have
thwarted the surrender attempt and kept the Koreans fighting. He explicitly refused to
do sn. Instead, he worked for the laying down of arrns".
These aod other intriguing angles compel the military historian to review what is said
with its political context. Here a point cannot be put aside is tbat no member of the
Korean elite accepted the surrender in clear conscience. As China's protectorate, Korea
bad oow abandoned her beneficent patron. In fact, one of tbe charges against King
Kwaogbaegun brougbt up by tbe court faction wbo succeeded in dethroning him four
years later was tbat be bad instructed Kang Hongnip to sit on tbe fence during the 1619
campaign and that be made secret with Nurhaci bebind the back of the Chinese". Those
unchivalrous deeds simply degraded Korea's national character.
The state cbronicle, written undersuch influence, undoubtedly shows bias against the
deposed king. Yet the substantial entries in the records preclude all doubts that before
and after carnpaign Sino-Korean relationship was anything but cordial. The kingwas
dragged into a warthat be bad no beart to Iake part. In addition to their muffled resentmeot against the overbearing attitude of the Ming personnel, Kwanghaegun and bis
close followers also foresaw the failure and defeat of the Chinese, tbat made tbeir participation in tbe campaigo uowise. Ooly cultural usage prevented them from openly dissenting. Chinese demands were usually complied with, even though as a rule with little
enthusiasm.
Wben Yang Hao's campaign was being organized, Kingof Korea was iostructed to
fumish 10000 troops. Witb headquarters personnel, tbe number was later boosted to
13000. As commander-in-chief, Kang Hongnip took orders directly from Liu Ting,
who soon directed that aroong the number of troops 5000 must be musketeers 53 •
Another cootingent of musketeers, variously reported to be 300 aod 400 men, was requisitiooed by Yang Hao himself. They eventually saw action with Tu Sung at Sarhu;
few of them retumed 54 •
Liu Ting, a veteran commander in Korea two decades ago during the Japanese inva-
sion, was not popular with Koreans. Before them he openly disclosed that he was at
odds witb Supreme Commander Yang Hao, who would like to seebis ruinrather than
success. Korean observes also reported that Chinese units were seriously under
strength, their weapons inadequate. "Without ordnance pieces and [small] firearrns" ,
Kang Hongnip reported to bis king, "tbey rely entirely on us." A resignation of Kang's
reached the king even after he bad crossed the Yalu, whicb, of course, was promptly
turned down 55.
l<Jgistics remained anotber source of irritation. The Korean forces were supplied exclusively from tbe south of Yalu, the Chinese giving tbem no help whatsoever. This bappened at a time when the kingwas requisitiooing materials from tbe population for bis
palace construction••. Eilher due to conflict of interest or deliberate sabotage, as some
Koreans suggested, food was rarely delivered to the advancing column in time. In Yi
Minhwan's account we repeatedly see references to starving soldiers. The Koreans also
complaioed about the muddy roads, tbe roadblocks set up by the Manchus, and tbe inabitity of tbeir foot soldiers to keep pace with the Chinese troops on horseback. The
43
ch'aekchung illok presents a picture of a perturbed Lin Tingrushing the slowmoving
Koreans57 .
These factors, when pul together, give the impression that bad Liu Ting's advance
been better supported and pusbed through witb more vigor, Nurhaci could have been
forced to light a two-front war. The failure of tbe campaign, therefore, could be said to
have been caused not so much by Tu Sung's impetuosity tban by the Sino-Korean
column's tardiness. Thai being tbe case, Yi Minbwan bad plenty of reason to alter tbe
date of the battle. U the soutbeastero route bad engaged the bulk of Nurhaci's cavalry
on April 17, tbe Koreans could say tbat tbey bad done tbeir best under the circumstances. But if the engagement actually Iook place on April 20, as tbe Manchus reported, inquiry of responsibility could have led to far more complications. Had Yi,
tberefore, advanced the date of battle? Had the i/gi compilers been misled by the same
falsification? Had the story of Liu Ting's suicide been fabricated so that Kang Hongnip,
who bad held most of the Korean musketeers from the immediate line of contact and
made no attempt to revenge the Chinese commander's death, could feel less guilty?
Such questions can only be answered witb speculation. Lacl<ing hard evidence, the
historlau however must say that he has no easier and better way to resolve tbe differences between the Manchu annals and Korean records than, by logical deduction, to assume the deceit of Yi Minhwan if not that of Kang Hongnip.
The Iack of an adequate coverage of this battle in the Chinese records also deserves
criticism. Some Chinese sources insist that Liu T'ing was not whipped, but tricked. A
legend persisted that when Tu Sung's army was destroyed, tbe marked arrows tbat bis
couriers carried as credentials in order topassoral messages fell into Nurhaci's hands.
Eventually the Manchus used one to deceive Liu. A Chien-chou officer, disguised as a
messengor from Tu and bearing one of such arrows, called on Liu T'ing with an urgent
request that his column advance, Liu, misled, dispensed with all caution to move ahead,
only to fall into the Manchu trap' 8 • The story is identical to anecdotes repeatedly
appearing in classical novels. It attributes to Liu T'ing a degree of naivete which is
scarcely compatible witb bis reputation as an experienced field commander. Nor does it
coincide with the combat scene as it is described in the Manchu sources. In fact, that
such a tale could find its way into respectable Chinese bistorial records attests the information gap between the fallen general's headquarters and the high command. Had
communications between Liu T'ing and Supreme Commander Yang Hao been more effectively maintained, there were have been no grounds to construct such a story to insinuate that six days after Tu Sung fell, bis brother officer not more than 120 miles away
still believed tbat he was very much alive59• This shortcoming illustrates a fundamental
weakness of Ming operational efficiency. The high command ventured into a campaign
without making sure !hat prompt dissemination of information was essential to its success.
Thus within a weok, by delivering a series of fatal blows, Nurhaci not only eliminated
the offensive capability of the Ming, but also rendered its defe nse of Liao-tung untenable. Three months later he Iook the walled city of K'ai-yüan, killing Ma Lin. Seven
weeks after that be triumphantly entered Tieh-ling[41) . As a result, Peking finally
ordered the arrest of Yang Hao, wbo bad to endure a death sentence banging over bis
head for a decade until bis execution in 1629. Li Ju-po, who was also arrested one and a
halfyears afterbis withdrawal from the front, chose to commit suicide rathertban facing
censure and criminal prosecution60.
44
The defeat caused far greater repercussions tban tbis. ln 1619, as soon as Peking
heard tbe news about tbe setback in Liao-tung, food prices suddenly increased as resideots began to fear tbe possibility of a siege61 . In early 1620, tbe army began 10 report
unprecedented rates of desertion; sometimes units as !arge as battalions and regiments
disappeared overnight as soldiers ran away by the tbousands62• Surcbarges on tbe land
taxes, originally intended for one year only, now bad to be carried on. Of the three supreme commanders wbo in turn filled Yang Hao's position, one was kiUed in battle and
the other two were eventually beheaded on tbe emperor's orders. One of tbese two,
Hsiung Ting-pi(42] , not only lost bis life but also became a focal point of partisan controversy. The debate over bis innocence or guilt led to bitter clashes among Ming
bureaucrats that undoubtedly contributed to the dynasty's downfalL
Yet most contemporaries realized !hat the campaign of 1619 bad virtually no chance
to succeed. Not much more tban a year afterTu Sung and Liu Ting laid down tbeir lives,
a multi-volume book called Chou-Lillo Shih-hua{" ] was in print. The 589 papers
included in it, wbicb were nearly all memorials to the emperor connected witb tbe campaign and its sequel, were written by responsible officials, censors, southem govemors,
Nanking functionaries, Han-lin academicians, and even retired officers. Both the abundance of opinion in this book and the promptness of its publication were unusual. With
mucb candor and insight, tbe autbors of tbese paperspointout that govemment forces
were bastily assembled and poorly directed, tbat their personnel were untrained, the
militarylogislies unsatisfactory, tbeir equipment inferiortotbat of tbe Manchus, and
their discipline far below expectation. Perbaps tbe most eloquent of these writers was
Hsü Kuang-cb 'i(..], a future grand secretary. The following Statements of his since been
widely quoted:
Tu Sung was hit by arrows on tbe head and P'an Tsung-yen by an arrow in the back, which means
that even the commanding general and the inspector general were not protected by adequate armor. What happened, then, to the rank-and-file soldiers? Both Tu Sung and Liu T'ing moved forward with ponions oftbeir troops, and Liu Yu-cbiehl"5 ) charged with a single mount. Wasmilitary
disciptine not lacking? When [our forces] were aboul equal with the enemy in number, and were
yet divided into four routes, the enemy was enabled to attack with a constant four-to-one superiority; and we bad to meet him one against four. Was this not to ignore the principle of combination
and separation? Our technical advantage rested in firearms; yet [fireanns) were allowed to be
separated from the Fu-shun battle front by a river, and tobe deployed far away (from the lines of
cootact) at the battles of K'ai-yüan, T'ieh-ling, and K'uan-tien. Was not that a deviation from standard procedures? Forty Ii outside our line of control, there was a river that could not be forded,
mountain barriers tbatcould not be sunnounted, and ambushes beyond ourexpectation. Were not
all off these due to our neglect of the terrain and of methods of reconnaissance?
Hsü tben concluded: " Under tbese conditioos, there is no bope tbat victory can be
obtained by sbeer luck63 . "
On another occasion, Hsü indicates tbat be bad leamed from the Koreans tbat on the
north side of Nurbaci's fortress there were craftsmen specializing in tbe manufacture of
military equipment. The personnet retumed from Liao-tung told him tbat the blacksmitbs' sbops extended for miles. The helmets, breast plates, arm shields, and gauntlets
wom by tbe Mancbus were a11 ofsuperior quality. In close combat, enemy soldiers dared
to come up to remove tbe abatises placed by tbe defenders. The armor protection for ·
Ming military personne1, in contrast, consisted of " nothing but scrap iron". Mancbu arcbers usuaUy made a special effort to hit Chinese soldiers on tbe face and on the sides.
"Within five paces, any bitwas lethal64."
45
Hsü's questions seem to have provided their own answers. Yet, his charge of negligence tends to obscure the institutional causes of these failures. lt attributes them to
temporary and personal error.;. As they provide no background analysis, they do not
explain wby mistakes were repeated and equipment inadequacy remained uncorrected.
Why, we may ask, did tbe Ming generals per.;istently expose their flanks to Manchu assaults? Why, time after time, did they allow forces of small size tobe wiped out while the
main bodies ofthe anpy corps stayed idle? And wby, since tbey bad not found a tactical
counter-measure to check Mancbu cavalry charges, did they start an offensive at aU?
Perhaps no set of answers would be completely satisfactory. But if clues to a meaningful historical explanation are to be found, Ming procurement procedures, goveming
botb per.;onnel induction and the supply of materials, sbould be given every bard Iook.
Even in the early seventeentb century, the Ming army logislies still foUowed tbe fundamental design set up by the dynastic founder. In 1388, the Hung-wu[ 46] Emperor bad
per.;onally directed that 5000 taxpayer.; in the Ying-t'ien prefecture[ 47] be matcbed
witb 5000 soldier.; on duty witb the Cbin-wu Guard( 48 ] . The former's payments were
not coUected by govemmental agencies, and tbe latter ceased tobe paid by the arrny. Instead the grain supply flowed directly and automatically from civilian households to
those of army personnet Thus tbe bandling by many intermediate agencies was altogether avoided. After having been in practice for a year, tbis unorthodox procedure was
supposed to have been declared workable and extended to all army units65 • Although
we know that at no time was this order carried out to the full, it was never formally rescinded. And, during later reigns, this principle tbat business transactions were to be
carried out at tbe lowest possible Ievel was allowed to prevail. Usually a county made
deliveries to a score of army units~ each army depot in turn received material from several counties66• The substitution of silver for payments in kind altered tbe situation
somewhat ; but it could never change the basic working of the system. To integrale the
management would bave demanded substantial increases in fiscal efficiency, and tbe
addition of new service facilities, tagether with with enlargement of administrative
overhead and expansion of operating budget. The Ming govemment, committed to
homogeniety and uniformity at a technically unsopbisticated Ievel in ordertobe in tune
with agrarian simplicity, could not brook such a tumover.
As it was, the entire system contained built-in causes of deficit. Obviously, for one
reason or another and at one time or another, some of the scheduJed suppliers would be
unable to discbarge tbeir obligations, while otber units were neither required nor willing
to make up the shortfalls. The Ming govemment's Iack of functional maneuverability as
a result of this supply system bad become increasingly evident toward the end of sixteenth century. With practically every item of income disbursed before it was received,
the state bad great difficulty in meeting new areas of demand, wbich forceditto resort to
ad hoc maneuvers.
The inadequate military equipment to wbich Hsü Kuang-cb'i referred was a necessary consequence oftbis style of logistical management. As Hsü bimself proved later on,
modern gunnery could make cavalry charge virtually impossible. Without artillery sup·
port, the Manchu banners would never have fought the 1619 campaign so successfully
bad the Ming army managed to update their frrearrns.
A testimony to the institutional weakness which led to the Iailure could bave been
supplied by Cb'i Cbi-kuang[ 49] some forty years earlier. As tbe Ioremost sixteenth century Ming general to incorporate firearms into bis standard tactics, Ch'i bad left indica-
46
tions in his writiog tbat be bad neitber an ordinance officer nor a quartermaster geoeral.
His supplies, including military equipmeot, were drawn from oumerous civil sources.
Even for firearms, Cb'i hirnself could only provide prototypes for his Subordinate
generals, wbo would in turn band tbem over to their designated suppliers, usually civil
administrators at tbe county or prefecturallevel. Their manufacture tberefore could not
go mucb beyond tbe Ievel of village tecbnology. There was a geoerallack of stanardization. Cb'i complained tbat tbe missiles did not suit the calibre of tbe firearms, tbe guo
barreis bad a coostant tendency to explode, or else, tbe ignitioo wicks would not bum.
Equipped with muskets, soldiers would not dare to hold them close to themselves to
steady tbe aim, so tbeir shots usually went astray. lt took a long time to reload tbe
pieces•7. Evidently, no remedy was provided in tbe subsequent fortyyears. In 1618, the
year before the Liao-tung campaign, the army reported that their Iirearms exploded at
testing, causing casualties among users68• Only some time after tbe campaign were corrections made, wben Hsü Kuang-cb'i and Huang K'o-tsan['0 ] recruited foreign cannon
casters from Macao and the Philippines69•
Nurhaci's annals reveal that tbe Mancbus beld Chinese Iirearms in such low esteem
that they virtually disregarded tbem. They mention that some Manchus were bit many
times yet came out unscathed. Another entry testifies that the quilted portion of one
soldier's helmet was penetrated by a musket ball, yet he suffered no injury on the
skuiF0 •
In its close connection, the effectiveness of Korean muskets bas yet tobe establisbed
by historians. Unlike the Chinese make, muskets manufactured in Korea were supposed to have been standardized, under the Supervision of a general ordnance department
set up in 1615. Their quality was admired by tbe Chinese11 • But obviously they produced no decisive effect in tbe campaign. Yi Minhwan's narratives of tbe battle scene
create an impression that tbe Korean musketeers were not only held way back in Liu
T'ing's column but also scattered. When the Chinese units were overrun, the Koreans
were still undecided as to which defense positions that they should occupy. 1t is not a
surprise that " enemy mountsbad thrusted into the battle formatioo betore the firearms,
having discharged once, could be reloaded" . Yi did not cite northwest wind as an inter-
vening factor 71•
Signilicaotly, Nurbaci, a man who otherwise was not inattentive to the tecbnical aspect of warfare, did not show tbe slightest interest in firearms, either for their effective
use or for measures against them, before and after tbe Liao-tung campaign. This neglect
will eventually cost the Cbien-cbou chieftain bis life. Not a sign of lacking wisdom, bis
reaction merely reflected the futility of bis enemies that he bad no desire to irnitate.
Moreover, there is no evidence tbat during tbe Liao-tung campaign the heavy cannons available to the Chinese were ever deployed in the field. They were too cumbersome tobe transported. Forthe I6I 9 engagement, the wordp'ao["] or the Manchuboo
did not necessarily refer to tbe cannon. Ap'ao was usually a bamboo tube filled with
guopowder and pebbles, which was ignited aod tossed to the enemy by bandas shown in
illustrations13• Such a device could cause limited darnage at close range. As tbe effect
was more psychological than physical, it was not an answer to a sustained and
disciplined cavalry charge.
And the Ming army did not do better witb conventional weapons. Until tbe end ofthe
dynasty, it remaioed tbe fiscal obligation oftbe Jocal district to submit these weapons to
tbe ceotral govemment. The Iack of standardization was tbus only tobe expected. As if
47
to echo Hsü Kuang-ch'i, Nurhaci's annals state: "The lances and arrows handled by
Khan's men always make deep penetrations. Their swords also produce sbarp cuts, as if
aided by beavenly gods 74 •" Impücitly, tbis is to claim for superiority over tbe Ming arsenal. The sharper tbe Manchu blades, tbe duller by comparison were those of Chinese
make.
Similar contrasts existed in tbe quaüty of personnet and combat horses. In essence, to
supply miütary personnet and cavalry mounts was also the contributor's fiscal obligation; and the various districts and different segments of the population bad permanent
quotas assigned to tbem. The replacing of conscripts with recruits could not bave completely change the picture, because regardless of wbo actually bore arms, the financial
support bad to be extracted from taxpayers. So, men and borses were deüvered to tbe
army in a manner not fundamentally different from tbe supply of war material; it depended upon bow the program was funded . Here the roots of tbe problern in the seventeenth century rested in the fact that while tax apportionment and lax assessment settled
in tbe early years ofthe dynasty no longercorresponded to the present conditions ofthe
populace, no sweeping reformwas feasible short of a dynastic changeover. Tax administration and collection of service charges in tbese later days, tberefore, always involved
some pressure from the top, which was as a rule passed onto tbose most inarticulate and
least able to pay. It was reaDy a painstaking process of making up the numbers; quality
could no Iongerbe seriously regarded. This process produced only feeble soldiers, and
" arrows that could not be shot and horses that could not be ridden "", to quote Supreme
Commander Hsiung Ting-pi.
Aware of these weakness inberent in tbeir commands, Ming generals avoided such
impossible tasks as attempting to train tbe entire division of troops to to top rate
figbters. lnstead, eacb commander would form around bimself a battation of battleseasoned soldiers of special selection, called chia-ting[") or "housebold men". When
Liu T'ing arrived in Liao-tung, for instance, he brougbt along witb bim 736 such bousebold men 76 • They were on the commaing general's payroU and moved with him when he
changed posts. In battle, they also took bis personal orders 17• As critics pointed out,
those eüte troops constituted the only effective figbting element within the Chinese army. The thousands of other soldiers merely filled tbe ranks.
The square forroation of the Ming army using Iirearms was a legacy of Cb'i Chikuang. Pattemed in part after the Iayout of city waUs, tbis design dictated that tbe figbting units surrender tbe battlefield initiative to the enemy. Only wben the opponent arrny
bad exbausted its strengtb at assault would the defenders come out from the square to
launch a counter-attack 78 • All this reflected an unresolved organizational problem: Tbc
Chinese never built within its armed forces a cavalry whicb could carry out the function
specific tothat branch of arros. With neitber speed nor striking power,late Ming cavalry
units were usuaUy infantry on borseback, in need of barricade protection at any sbowdown . The Manchus, on tbe other band, ollen unleashed tbousands of mounted warriors in one sweep. The Ming cavalry, unable to match them, did not even once du ring
the entire 1619 carnpaign meet them voluntarily on the open field. The Iack ofsucb an
offensive arm wbithin tbe armed forces denied Ming generals many possibilities oftactical maneuver. In the end their defeose was also rondered ioeffective. The square formation in fact invited the eoemy to probe its weakoess from aveoues of approacb that
suited him, such as witb wind behind him.
48
The defense units' sluggish and half-hearted coordination further made it difficult to
counter-attack. As suggested hy the Manchu sources, at Siyanggiyan Ma Lin had an oprtunity to trap the out-numhered Manchu squadrons with a wall of barricades and
:,, soldiers. But the preparations took so long that this opportunity slipped away and
Aroby beile struck first . As mentioned earlier, the separate units oftbe Ming army were
defeated again and again by Manchu forces without friendly troops' heingable to rescue
tbem, the Jatter, too, soon feil victims to the enemy in the same fashion. Such ineptitude,
we may reiterate, was inseparable from the low quality of the imperial army's men and
material. The inferior soldiery and weaponry led to poor individual performance; it
would have been impossible for the several units to do heller at teamwork. In sum, in
spite of allthe talk about poor generalship and inadquate troop training a final solution
10 all such problems could not even he found within the army itself.
With hindersight, it may he observed that if Yang Hao's campaign bad any hope of
success at all, it lay in the chance that Nurbad would blunder. lf the Manchus divided
their forces to meet the invading columns, the outcome of tbe battles could have been
somewbal different. Or if the Chien-chou cbieftain bad comntitted the bulk of bis forces
in tbe early stage of the campaign in the southern front, Tu Sung and Ma Lin migbt bave
made some progress toward He tu Ala. Since Nurhaci did nothing oftbis sort, Yang Hao
bad practically no chance to reach his objective. The clumsiness with which he directed
the campaign, of course, quickened its collapse and intensified the seriousness of the
failure.
The Ming court's resolution to plunge into the campaign with so little assurance of
victory exposes how political requirement weighed in war decisions. Tu Sung was called
"the mad man" by Nurhaci. Yet, hot·headed as he was, he is said in some Chinese
sources to have told Supreme Commander Yang Hao that more preparation was
needed before the army could deal with the Manchus 79 • Korean sources give evidence
that Liu T'ing was also pressed by the same supreme commander with an equal sense of
urgency80• Yang himself, acco rding to consensus, had heen pressed by Grand Secretary
Fang Ts'ung-che["] 81 • Peking was compelled to act because failure to do so could Iead
to internal rebellions as weil as insurgency by other frontier tribes. Allthese supported
an ideological theme that the celestial empire, because of its moral strength, could always overcome what technical handicaps were placed on it. The adminstrators in the
capital also understood that the Ionger the fro ntier conflict dragged on, the more the
warwould cost. The financial burden, even over an additional year, would he difficult to
bear.
In tbis connection, it may he noted that even the cruel punishment of Yang Hao and
bis successors and the unfair prosecution of Li Ju-po, !hat bad so much to do in damaging the already sagging morale, were not imcompatible with the normal reaction of the
Mingbureaucracy. Under the dynasty's system, there was no such a thing as a fair trial to
separate personal negligence from institutional failures. Since everyone was expected to
perform to bis utmost, to the extent of coverlog up organizational weakness with tinesse
~d personal sacrifice, technically it would he difficult to absolve the generals and offiCJ.als nccupying key positions that were linked to a national disaster of unprecedented
dimensions, how the charges were placed being a matter of less significance.
Thus while it seemed as if suddenly an unexpected development on the battlefield in
tbe spring of 1619 bad decided, within a week andin a freakish manner, the fate of China's millions in generations to come, the sequence of events bad actually been many
49
years in the making, and for a number of reasons it was an inevitable consequence of tbe
dynasty's bureaucratic constitution and iiS standing practices.
NOTES
• Shen-uung shih-lu("] (Taipei: Chung-yang-yen-chiu-yüan("] reprint), p. 10945.
' Only in 1576, under Chang Chü-cheng's(56) direction did the total strength reacb 83,340 officers and men, still short of the 94,693 authorized. See Ta-Ming hui-tien(.S7) (Taipei: Tung-nan
shu-pao-she[") reprint), 129.13. Also see Ch'eng K' ai-hu[59], ed. Chou-Lioo shih-huo (1620
ed.), 14.20.
J For example, see Shen-tsung shih-lu, p. 10978. For the generat unsatisfactory conditions see
Huang, Ray, " Military Expenditures in Sixteenth Century Ming China," Oriens Extremus, Jg.
17, Heft 1-2 (Dez. 1970), pp. 3~2.
• Wang Hsien-cb'ienf60) n al, ed., Shih-erh-cb'ao Tung-hua-Iu[61 ] (Tainan: Ta-tung Shu-chü(U]
reprint), "T'ien-ming-ch'ao,"(" ) 1.22; Ta-Ch'ing 1"ai-tsu Kao-huong-li shih-lu(64) (Taipei:
Hua-wen Shu-chü('') reprint), 6:4 ; Ming-shih(") (Taipei: Kuo-fang-yen-cbiu-yüan(''] reprint), 239.2727.
' Chou-Liao shih-hua, 17.2.
• Ibid., 19.48; Hsü Fu-yüan(68) <1 a/., ed. Huong-Ming Ching-shih wen-pien(69) (Taipei, 1964 reprint), 488.6.
_ 1 Kuang Lu['0 J et al., trans. Ch'ing-t'ai-t.su-ch'ao LAo-Man-wen-yüan-tang[11 ] (Taipei: Sbangwu-yin-shu-kuan("], 1970-71), I. 82, 0.49; Nobuo Kanda(") et al., Irans. Mambun rötö[")
(Tokyo: Toyo Bunko[''], 1955), 1.93.
• Lao-Man~wen-yüan-tang, JI. 126; Mambun rOtO, 1.150.
9 Lao-Man-wen-yüan-tang , 11. 137. Mambun rötö , I. 159 refers to the same event, butomits tbe
220 number. An authoritative work on the subject is Fang, Chaoying, "A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu Military Forces," Harvard Journot of
Asialic Studies, vol. 13, nos. 1-2 ( 1950), pp. 192-215. Herethenumber of niru differsstight1y
from the number of companies in Fang's Table D.
10 Loo-Man-wen-yüan-tang, 11. 13; Mambun rötö , 1.55; Pa-ch'i t'ung-chih['6 J (Taipei: Hsüebsheng shu-chü(''] reprint), 1.4.
11 A contemporary Chinese observation: " Barbarian rebels have among themsclves fifty to sixty
tbousands of daring and combat seasoned troops. With twenty to thirty thousand captured
Chinese, tbey have a total strength of eighty to ninety thousand." See Chou-Liao shih-hua,
11.33.
" See Shen-rsung shih-lu, pp. 10962~.
" T'an Ch'ien[") Kuo Ch'üeh("] (Peking: Ku-chi-ch'u-pan-she(00) reprint), p. 5133
" Chou-Liao shih-hua, 18. 16
" Kuo Ch'üeh, p. 5134.
t6 Lao-Man-wen-yüan-tang, U.89; Mambun rötö, 1.119.
11 Lao-Man-wen-yüan-tang, I.86; U.59-60; Mambun rötö, 1.94.
11 Liu T'ing's memorial appears in Chou-Lioo shih-hUß, 9.22.
1 ' For terrain of the rombat zone sec Watari Yanai[' 1] et a/., ManshU rekishi chin'l 11] (Tokyo:
Maruzen Kabushiki Kaisha(83) , 1940), maps preceding p.459 and p.601.
10 SeeShen-tsung shih-lu, p.10962, 10969; Chou- Liao shih-hua, 16.31. T'an Ch'ien is mistalten
by referring the date as March 24. See Kuo Ch'üeh, p.5 131.
" Loo-MIJII-wen-yiUm-UUtg, 1.110; 0 .89--90; Mambun rötö, 1.119--20; Shih-erh-ch'ao TunghUß-lu , "T'ien-ming-ch'ao," 1.22; Ta-Ch'ing Tai-tsu Kao-huang-ti shih-lu, 6.5.
11 See Yanai, ManshU reki.shi chiri, U. 605.
" Shen-uung shih-lu, p.l0970.
14 Chou-Liao shih-hua, 17 . 1.~ ; Shen-tsung shih-lu , p.10979.
" The paper appears in Chou-Liao shih-hua, 17.1-{i.
16 Shen-tsung shih-lu, pp. 10965-66.
" Ibid., p.10966.
u Chou-Liao shih-huo, 17.2.
n Loo-Man-wen-yüan-tang, U. 111; Mambun rötö, I. 138; Shih-erh-ch'ao Tung-hua-lu,
'Tien-ming-ch'ao," I. 24; Ta-Ch'ing Tai-tsu Kao-huang-ti shih-lu, 6. 15.
30 Lao-Man-wen-yüan-tang, U.93; Mambun rOtö, I. 122. The followingentries refer to tbeforces
as six bannenon the left and two on the right. See Shih-erh-ch'ao Tung-hua-lu, "Tien-mingcb'ao," 1.22; Ta-Ch'ing Tai-tsu Kao-huang-ti shih-lu, 1.22.
3 1 Loo-Man-wen-yüan-tang, 1.115; 0 .94; Mambun rOtO, 1.123.
" Chou-Liao shih-huo, 17.5.
" lbid., 17.3-4.
" Shen-rsung shih-lu, p.10971.
35 Lao-Man-wen-yüan-tang , 1.115-16; U.95; Mambun rOtO, 1.124.
50
,. 'IboS< diagrams appear in: Ch'i Chi-kuang, L;.n-ping shih-chi[,.[ (Ts'ung-shu Chi-ch'eng["]
ed.), 6.260; Hai Juift6J, Hai Chung-chieh-kung chi["J (Taipei, 1973), 2.129; Mao Yüan-i[..],
wu-pei-chih[ 09] (K ang·hSI era ed.), 67.24.
" Shen-tsung shih-lu, p.10964.
)I
Loo-Man-wtn-yÜDII-tang, 11.98.
", ~Man-wtn-yüan-tang, ll.99; Mambun rötO, 1.127. The following entries identify the Ming
division at Biyelun as P'an Tsung-yen's rear echelon: Shih-trh-ch'ao Tung-hua-lu "T'ienming-dt.'ao," 1.23; Ta-Ch'ing Tai-t.su Kao-huang-ti shih-lu, 6.8.
'
.., JAo-Man-wen-yuan-tang, 1.112; ll.91.
•1 But y ang Hao was equivocal. He reported to the emperor that "two routes of army are forbidden to make deep penetrations". See Shen-tsung shih-lu , p.10979.
" Kwanghoegun ilgi (Chongjoksan[90] ed.), 137.10; 1wakichi 1naba["], Kökai kun jidoi no
Mon-Sen konkei["J (Seoul: Osaka-ya["], 1933), p.169.
A.l Shtn-tsung shih-lu, p.J0979; Lao-Man-wen-yüon-tang, 1.90.
... Shih-trh-ch'ao Tung-hua~lu, "Tien-~g-ch'ao, " 1.23; !a-Ch'ing Tai-tsu Kao-hUlUig-ti
shih-lu, 6.12. Korean offiaal records et~e the engagement Witb entries under the dates of April
14 and 15. 1be Manchu detachment lS referred to as " more than 300 mounts". While the
Koreans gave tbe Chine~ credit f~r tbe q~k jump over the enemy during the skirmish, tbey
aiticized tbem for spend.!ng tb~ Urne sevenng the beads offallen Manchus, leaving the bard
figbting to the Korean umts. lt JS clear that tbe Manchu detachment was not completely wiped
out. See Kwonghoegun ilggi, 138.1.
The ch'aekchung illok 'records the same April 15 engagement with two major points of
differencc. The Manchu strength is described to be between 500 and 600 mounts. Another
enemy unit of more than 1000soldiers is said to have avoidedcontact. It watched tbe figbting
on tbe mountains to the east. See Inaba, Man-Sen kankei, p.177. Thesedetails seem to contradict the later report tbat on April 17 üu T'ing's forces were ambushed.
•.s Lao-Man-wen-yüan-tang, 11.102.
" lbid., II, 103-108.
"Kwonghoegun ügi, 138.8; Mon-Sen kankei, pp. 17S-79.
., On Apri116 the Korean anny did not move; nor bad it any contact with the enemy. lltis is reoorded in Kwanghaegun ilgi , 138.3. Thereafter for nine days tbe annals fail to mention its disposition, until the defeat is mentioned in an entry under tbe date of April 25.
49 Tbc authorhas not seen tbis title. References to it aremade from quotations in Inaba'sMan-Sen
kanbi .
.sG As quoted in Man-Sen kllnkei, p.180.
" Kwonghoegun i/gi, 138.9; Mon-Sen konkei , pp. 182-83.
51 Man-Sen kankei, pp. 18~191. While tbe controversy is too complicated tobe summarized in
this article, evidences are overwhelming that lbe king, for good reasons, did not put bis hean
into the campaign. See K wanghaegun ilgi, 137.1, 2; 138.2. Nurbaci is said to have presented the
lcing with 500 sbeets of sab1e on tbe eve of the carnpaign, ibid., 137.10.
53 lbid., 137.1; Man-Sen kankei, p. 169.
" Kwonghoegunilgi, 137.2; 138.!3. Notetbatthe 1astentrydates theBattle o!Sarbu on April12;
but this is based on a straggler's account. The same entry in part quoted in Man-Sen kank.ei,
p.168.
.ss Kwanghaegun ilgi, 137.10. Kang Hongnip was then attacked by an anonymaus note, ibid,
137.9. Alsoseeibid.,137.11.
.. lbid., 137. 2, 4 ; 138.2, 4.
" Mon-Sen konkei, pp. 173-177. q. Kwonghoegun ilgi, 137.11-13; 138.1.
" Kuo Ch'iUh , p.5133; Huang-Ming ching-shih wen-pien , 502.9. Cf. Shen-tsung shih-lu,
p.11041.
"' ~ang Hao's memorial to the emperor reveals tbat be was uncertain about Liu Ting's disposi~
!IOn. See Shen-tsung shih-lu, p.J0980.
.
.
60 For tbe charges of Li family's fratemization with Nurhaca, see Shen-tsung shih-lu, PP·
11004-05, 11032. There are other stories about Li's mismanagement. One of such asserts tbat
wben twenty Manchu troops made gestures to attack, Li's army panicked, and the stampede
eaused more than 1000 so1diets tobe tramp1ed to death. See Ming-shih , 238.2718.
"Shen-tsung shih-lu, p.l1021.
" Kuo Ch'iUh , p.5147.
" Chou- Liao shih-huo, 18.25-26; Huang-Ming ching-shih wen-pien, 488.2.
: Chou-Uao shih-huo, 23.56; Huong-Ming ching-shih wen-pien , 488.13.
" 1'01-tsu shih-lu[94J (Taipei: Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan reprint), p.2871, 2!!98. .
~ Huang, Ray, Taxation and Govemmental Fintmce in 16th Centwy Mmg-Ciuna (Cam" bridge, 1974), pp.175-82.
L;.n-ping shih-chi, "tsa chi["]," 2.175; 4.199.
51
.. Chou-LU.o shih-hua, 17 .56.
69 See Hsü Kuang-cb'i's biography in Hummel, A. W., ed. Eminent Chin~e in the Ch'ing Period
(Washington, D. C., 1943-44), 1. p. 317. For Huang's artillery pieces see Hsi-tsung shih-lu(96)
(Taipei: Chung_-yan~ yen-chiu-yüan reprint), pp.046~7 . One of the guns manufactured by
Huang and haVU1g bis name mscnbed on Jt JS on ex:hib1t at the Woo1Wicb Museum in London. 1
owe this piece of information to Dr. L. Carrington Goodricb .
.10
Lao-Man-wen-yüan-tang, 0.114 .
.,, Man-Sen kankei, p.168.
" lbid., pp. 178-79.
1' The illustrations in Man-chu shih-lu[ 9 1) (Liao-hai Ts'ung-shu{ 91 ] ed.) give such an impression.
Also, in chapter 15, Tien-kung k'ai-wu[99 ), Sung Ying-hsiog[ 100) refers top'ao sometimes as a
mine or a projectile missile.
74 Lao-Man-wtn-yüan-tang, 1,58; 0. 23.
" Chou-LU>o shih-hua , 28.17.
76 Chou- Lioo shih-hua , 9.19. Liu Tingis supposed to bave told the Koreans that he brought along
"several thousand" such chia-ting. See Kwanghoegun igli, 137. 11.
77 See Chou-Lioo shih-hua , 8.41; 14. 17; 19.48; Huang- Ming ching-shih wen-pien , 488.6; Kuo
Ch'~h . p.5118; Manshü rekishi chiri, voi.II, p.549.
" Huang -Ming ching-shih wen-pien , 349.10.
.,. Kuo Ch'~h . p.5132.
10 Kwanghaegun ilji, 137.11-12.
" Kuo Ch'~h . p.5131 ; Ming-shih , 259.2929.
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Appendix I
Appendix 2
53
Appendix 3
54