tydskrif vir christelike wetenskap journal for christian scholarship

Transcription

TYDSKRIF VIR CHRISTELIKE WETENSKAP
JOURNAL FOR CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP
VHO
Die Vereniging vir
Christelike Hoër Onderwys
Jaargang/
Volume
51♦2♦2015
VHO
Die Vereniging vir
Christelike Hoër Onderwys
Tydskrif vir Christelike
Wetenskap
Journal for Christian
Scholarship
Geakkrediteer/Accredited
ISSN 1013-1116
Jg./Vol. 51♦2♦2015
i
Uitgewer/Publisher:
© Kopiereg/Copyright:
Die Vereniging vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys
BLOEMFONTEIN
Suid-Afrika/South Africa
Int. tel. +27 51 525 2267
Webblad-adres/Website @ www.cs-journal.co.za
Sabinet-geïndekseerde artikels by/
Articles indexed by Sabinet at:
http://reference.SABINET.co.za/saepublication/tcwet
onder/under ‘Religion’
Aros Uitgewery
Posbus/P.O. Box 31120, Totiusdal, 0134
PRETORIA
Tel 012 332 3227/8
Geset in 10 pt Arial
ii
Redaksie/Editorial Board
Hoofredakteur (Waarnemend)/Editor-in-Chief (Acting)
Pieter Stoker, Noordwes-Universiteit, Potchefstroom, Suid-Afrika
Redaksionele Assosiate/Editorial Associates
Roy Clouser, Trenton College, Trenton, New Jersey, United States of
America
Martin Rice (Jr.), The University of Pittsburgh, Johnston, United States of
America
Maarten Verkerk, Maastricht Universiteit/University; Eindhoven Universiteit
vir Tegnologie/University for Technology, Nederland/The Netherlands
Jeffrey Ventrella Esq., Alliance Defend Fund, United States of America
Danie Strauss, Noordwes-Universiteit, Potchefstroom, Suid-Afrika
Andries Raath, Universiteit van die Vrystaat, Bloemfontein, Suid-Afrika
Wikus Buys, Akademie Reformatoriese Opleiding en Studies, Pretoria,
Suid-Afrika
Intekengeld per jaar/Subscription rates per annum:
Suid-Afrika/South Africa Elektronies
Hardekopie/Hard copy
Individue
R40R80
Biblioteke/LibrariesR50
R100
Elders/Elsewhere
Individuals
Libraries/Institutions
Biblioteke/Instellings
Electronic
R50 (In SA currency only)
R52 (In SA currency only)
R52 (Slegs in SA geldeenheid)
Hard copy
R100
R104
R104
Bladgeld/Page fees:
Outeurs verbonde aan akademiese instellings in Suid-Afrika sal vir
bladgeld verantwoordelik wees.
Authors connected to academic institutions in South Africa will be
liable for page fees.
iii
Artikelbydraes en boekresensies in elektroniese formaat, gerig aan: Die
Hoofredakteur, Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap, moet gestuur word na
<[email protected]>.
Article contributions or book reviews in electronic format, addressed to:
The Editor-in-chief, Journal for Christian Scholarship, must be sent to
<[email protected]>.
Die Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap is van ’n Christelike grondslag.
Aritkels voorgelê moet ’n bydrae tot Christelike wetenskap maak, of met
die Christelike wetenskapstradisie in gesprek tree.
The Journal for Christian Scholarship is Christian-based. Articles
submitted should contribute towards the enhancement of Christian
scholarship, or engage into discourse with the Christian scholarly
tradition.
Menings en standpunte in artikels of ander bydraes uitgespreek is dié
van die outeur(s) en word nie noodwendig deur die redaksie of tydskrif
onderskryf nie.
Opinions and viewpoints expressed in articles or other contributions are
those of the author(s) and are not necessarily endorsed by the editorial
board or the journal.
iv
Inhoudsopgawe/
Table of contents
2de Kwartaal/2nd Quarter
– Christo Cronjé & Renato Coletto
Corporate annual reports: towards a non-reductionist
approach................................................................................. 1
Abstract..................................................................................................... 1
Opsomming............................................................................................... 2
1.Introduction.......................................................................................... 3
2. Difficulties associated with communication.......................................... 5
3. Communication-vehicles in accounting............................................... 8
4. Dooyeweerd’s theory of modal aspects............................................... 11
5. Objectivism and subjectivism in relation to accounting........................ 14
6. Statutory disclosures........................................................................... 16
7. Contextual disclosures......................................................................... 19
8. Conclusive remarks............................................................................. 22
Bibliography............................................................................................... 23
– Andries Raath & Shaun de Freitas
Samuel Rutherford and the Neo-Thomists:
Juristic corporation theory and natural law
arguments in Lex, Rex ............................................................ 27
Opsomming............................................................................................... 27
1.Introduction.......................................................................................... 28
2. The reception of juristic corporation theory and popular
sovereignty in Medieval and early modern European
political thought................................................................................... 30
3. Samuel Rutherford and the natural law theorists of the
sixteenth-century................................................................................. 44
4.Conclusions ........................................................................................ 50
Bibliography............................................................................................... 51
v
– Danie Strauss
Assessing the historical-philosophical background
of the German Staatslehre in the light of the type law
of the state.............................................................................. 55
Abstract..................................................................................................... 55
1. The focus of Staatslehre.................................................................... 57
2. The emergence of distinct designations of the state.......................... 58
3. Staatsrecht and Staatslehre............................................................... 59
4. Allgemeine Staatslehre: Did the Greek-Medieval era
know the state?.................................................................................. 60
5.From Staatswissenschaft and Staatstheorie to Staatslehre:
two opposing world views.................................................................. 60
6. Being-a-state and individual states.................................................... 61
7. Modal laws and structural principles (type laws)................................ 62
8. What is just and unjust: enabling the existence of the state ............. 64
9. Recht and Macht................................................................................ 64
10. Individualism and nominalism............................................................ 67
11. The dualism of Sein and Sollen......................................................... 67
12. Continuing the legacy of nominalism................................................. 68
13. The universal state concept, the historical state concept
and the concrete state concept.......................................................... 69
14. The sociological and juridical state concept of Jellinek...................... 69
15. Escaping from the total state?............................................................ 70
16. The way ahead................................................................................... 75
Bibliography............................................................................................... 77
– Hannes van der Walt
Educating on the basis of thin and thick value orientations..... 81
Abstract..................................................................................................... 81
1. Background and problem statement.................................................. 82
2. Aim of this article................................................................................ 83
3. Thick and thin values and pedagogical language ............................. 83
4. Two issues regarding thick and thin value language.......................... 84
5.Synthesis............................................................................................ 90
6.Conclusion......................................................................................... 91
Bibliography............................................................................................... 92
vi
– Mario Phillip
Heavenly Sanctuary Motifs in the Pauline Corpus: Explicating
their Intertexuality and Interrelatedness................................ 97
Abstract....................................................................................................97
1.Introduction.......................................................................................98
2. Exegetical and syntactical analysis...................................................100
3. Theological implications....................................................................127
4.Conclusion........................................................................................129
– Bennie van der Walt
Johan H. Bavinck in gesprek met Westerse en
Oosterse mistiek..................................................................... 131
Abstract....................................................................................................131
1. Inleidende opmerkings......................................................................132
2. Bavinck oor die hoofkontoere van mistiek in die algemeen .............137
3. Die mistiek krities beskou .................................................................139
4. Wat Christene uit die mistieke lewensgevoel kan leer .....................143
Bibliografie................................................................................................145
vii
viii
2de Kwartaal
2nd Quarter
Corporate annual reports:
towards a non-reductionist
approach
C.J. Cronjé
Research Focus Area: Interconnected Reporting
Department of Financial Governance
College of Accounting Sciences
University of South Africa
[email protected]
R. Coletto
School of Philosophy
North-West University
POTCHEFSTROOM
[email protected]
Abstract
During the 20th century, numerous philosophers of science highlighted
several problems afflicting scientific communication. Communication in
accounting is also problematic. In both cases (science and accounting)
there seems to be a tension between objectivism and subjectivism. The
former emphasizes the objects of knowledge, while the latter tends to
rely on the human subject. In science one of these approaches seems
to prevail in different periods. In accounting there seems to be an
oscillation or ambiguity between the two tendencies (subjectivism and
objectivism) which remain side by side. A polarity seems to emerge
as statutory disclosures are mainly influenced by objectivism, while
contextual disclosures are inclined towards subjectivism. With reference
to the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, subjectivism and objectivism
are interpreted as emphasizing certain modal aspects to the detriment
Journal for Christian Scholarship - 2015 (1st Quarter)
1
Corporate annual reports: towards a non-reductionist approach
of others. Although this problem can be regarded as the cause of
many challenges in preparing annual reports, this article focuses on
communication problems. It is suggested that a better (non-reductionist)
approach can be adopted by paying attention to all the modal aspects, in
particular to those which tend to be neglected under a certain approach
(objectivism or subjectivism). The final sections of this article provide a
few concrete examples to improve communication.
Keywords:
Communication; Statutory financial reporting practices; Contextual
financial reporting practices; Objectivism; Subjectivism;
Dooyeweerd’s theory of modal aspects.
Opsomming
Korporatiewe jaarverslae: op weg na ŉ nie-reduksionistiese
benadering
Gedurende die 20ste eeu het talle wetenskapsfilosowe, verskillende
probleme rakende wetenskapskommunikasie uitgewys. Kommunikasie
in die rekeningkunde is ook problematies. In beide gevalle (wetenskap
en rekeningkunde) blyk daar ŉ spanning tussen objektivisme en
subjektivisme te wees. Eersgenoemde lê die klem op die objekte van
kennis, terwyl laasgenoemde verkies om op die menslike subjek te steun.
In die rekeningkunde blyk dit dat ŉ polariteit te voorskyn tree, aangesien
statutêre openbaarmaking hoofsaaklik deur objektivisme beïnvloed word,
terwyl kontekstuele openbaarmaking tot subjektivisme geneig is. Met
verwysing na die filosofie van Herman Dooyeweerd word subjektivisme
en objektivisme vertolk as die beklemtoning van sekere modaliteite of
aspekte tot die nadeel van andere. Alhoewel hierdie probleem as die
oorsaak van baie probleme in jaarverslae beskou kan word, fokus
hierdie artikel op kommunikasieprobleme. Dit word voorgestel dat ŉ
beter benadering gevolg kan word, deur aandag te skenk aan al die
modaliteite, veral daardie wat onder ŉ sekere benadering (objektivisme
of subjektivisme) afgeskeep word. Die finale gedeeltes van die artikel
voorsien sommige konkrete voorbeelde van hoe kommunikasie in
jaarverslae verbeter kan word, deur ook die afgeskeepte modaliteite of
aspekte in ag te neem.
2
Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap - 2015 (2de Kwartaal)
Christo Cronjé & Renato Coletto
Sleutelwoorde:
Kommunikasie; Statutêre finansiële verslagdoeningspraktyke;
Kontektuele finansiële verslagdoeningspraktyke; Objektivisme;
Subjektivisme; Dooyeweerd se teorie van modaliteite.
1.Introduction
1.1 Philosophy, accountancy and communication
During the 20th century, the initial optimism concerning the possibility of
effective communication in science gradually diminished and the threat
of incommunicability was seriously debated (Popper, 1970:56; Kuhn,
1970a:150; Feyerabend, 1975:269). Communication in accounting is also a
problem and in the following pages we would like to argue that it is related to
a tension between objectivism and subjectivism.
Objectivism emphasizes the objects of scientific investigation, while
subjectivism anchors itself in the knowing subject (which can be individual
or communal)1. The objectivist believes that there is a firm grounding for
knowledge, something we can appeal to in determining the nature of reality,
rationality and truth (Bernstein, 1985:8). The subjectivist, on the other hand,
claims that what is taken to be foundational, true or right is at best only
culturally stable, certainly not eternal, indubitable, ultimate or necessary. In
other words, everything is related (hence relative) to people, time-periods and
cultures. This is why Bernstein (1985) identifies subjectivism and relativism.
In accounting, there seems to be an oscillation or ambiguity between the
two tendencies which remain side by side. As far as the most important
information products of accounting, namely corporate annual reports are
concerned, a polarization seems to emerge. In fact, the statutory financial
reporting practices (that produce statutory disclosures) seem to be influenced
mainly by objectivism, while the contextual financial reporting practices (that
produce contextual disclosures) seem to be inclined towards subjectivism.
This creates a dis-balance or tension with several negative consequences
on different levels (for example, at the ethical, economic and social levels).
For the purpose of this article, however, we will limit our focus to the content
and manner of communication in corporate annualreports, addressed to
heterogeneous users.
1 For this reason, subjectivism should not be confused with individualism.
Journal for Christian Scholarship - 2015 (2nd Quarter)
3
With reference to the philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977)
subjectivism and objectivism can be interpreted as emphasizing certain
“modal aspects” (also called “modalities” or simply “aspects” – to be
discussed below) to the detriment of others (Coletto, 2007:59). This is the
case, we will argue, also as far as communication is concerned. This article
suggests that, in so far as corporate annual reports are concerned, a better
approach can be adopted by paying attention to all the modalities, in particular
to those which tend to be neglected under a certain approach (objectivism
or subjectivism). The final sections of this article supply several concrete
examples of how to improve the content and the manner of communication
in corporate reports by taking into account several neglected modal aspects.
This is important since shareholders and other stakeholders are increasingly
demanding information on how companies manage environmental, social
and corporate governance risks.
1.2 Research problem and hypothesis
The research problem of this article is formulated as follows: Can the
communication potential of corporate annual reports be improved by
following a non-reductionist philosophical approach?
The hypothesis is the following: Statutory financial reporting practices tend
to be created by standard setters using an objectivist approach, while
contextual financial reporting practices tend to be created using a more
subjective paradigm. A non-reductionist approach could enhance both
statutory and contextual financial reporting practices thereby improving the
communication potential of corporate annual reports.
1.3 Research plan
A historical survey is undertaken focusing on the growing awareness of the
difficulties challenging scientific communication in the most authoritative
contemporary philosophies of science. This is compared with the situation
of the accounting sciences, with regard to their information products,
namely corporate annual reports. On the basis of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy
a “diagnosis” is proposed, identifying in objectivism and subjectivism the
roots of the problems affecting communication in statutory and contextual
disclosures. The “symptoms” of the disease are pointed out and a “therapy”
is suggested by indicating concrete remedies to specific problems.
As this article moves between philosophy and accounting (and will hopefully
be read by scholars from both fields) we will occasionally present information
4
which is quite “basic” for one group of academics, knowing that the other
group may not necessarily be acquainted with the specific topics.
2.
Difficulties associated with communication
2.1 Communication in science
In the 20th century, science was influenced by philosophical approaches
such as positivism, logical positivism, Popper’s philosophy, Kuhn’s and
Feyerabend’s innovations. The following historical survey demonstrates
how, during the 20th century, confidence concerning the possibility of sound
scientific communication gradually vanished and a growing awareness of
the difficulties replaced a somewhat initial and naive optimism. The purpose
of this survey is to show that problems of communication, far from being the
concern of a single discipline (in our case: accounting) have been a major
theme in 20th century philosophy of science. It will also illustrate the growing
impact of subjectivism on philosophy of science.
2.2 Positivism
Positivism was the dominant philosophy of science between 1860 and 1920.
It was based on the view that in the social as well as the natural sciences,
information derived from sensory experience, and logical and mathematical
treatments of such data, are together the exclusive sources of all authoritative
knowledge (Naicker, 2012:1). The “father” of the movement, Auguste Comte,
argued that society develops by moving through pre-determined stages,
much as the physical world is subjected to gravity and other causal laws
(Naicker, 2012:1). Positivism is an objectivist movement based on empirical
experience and concerned with methods such as verification and induction
(Buys, 2010:13). The emphasis falls on measurement, sense-experience and
empirical objects, while the person of the scientist (the subject of knowledge)
is almost irrelevant. Induction is used here to access the law-like regularities
of reality. With induction, facts and objects “come first” and determine
theories. The positivists identified verifiability with meaningfulness: linguistic
statements that are empirically non-verifiable are hence deemed devoid of
meaning (Coletto, 2008:447).
The positivists pursued a purified scientific language, not concerned with
the problems implicit in ordinary language as the latter accommodates nonscientific and “metaphysical” notions. In general, it can be said that optimism
concerning the possibility of sound communication was still at high levels.
5
2.3 Popper and Kuhn
For Popper (1970:55) too, communication in science must be possible.
Coletto (2008:447) explains Popper’s point of view: “if science is characterised
by the proposal and critical evaluation of theories, it must be possible to
communicate even among scientists of different persuasions”. In general,
Popper recognizes (more than the positivists) that scientific communication
is hampered by many difficulties. Nevertheless, he remains confident that
those problems can always be solved. Even if we speak different languages,
translation is always possible (Popper, 1970:56). He is confident that critical
discussion, refutation, corroboration of theories and finally progress will not
be prevented by simple communication problems.
Kuhn introduced the paradigm-concept. A paradigm is established when
a scientific community accepts such paradigm. The movement away from
positivism is evident, when he (Kuhn, 1970a:63) claims that the notion
of truth, at any given moment, cannot be established solely by objective
criteria, but is defined by the consensus of a scientific community. In addition,
Kuhn asserts that competing paradigms are incommensurable, in that they
are competing accounts of reality which cannot be coherently reconciled.
As a consequence, science can never rely on full objectivity (as positivism
would have it), because we must account for subjective (though communal)
perspectives as well.
The term “paradigm change” was introduced by Kuhn (1963:360). He made
several notable claims with regard to the progress of scientific knowledge
(Kuhn, 1963:353) and asserted that scientific fields undergo paradigm
changes or shifts (periodic revolutions), rather than solely progressing in a
linear and cumulative way. The direction of scientific inquiry within a particular
field is then abruptly transformed (Kuhn, 1963:358-360).
Firstly, there is the pre-paradigmatic phase, which lacks a common paradigm.
Then follows “normal science”, which puts an end to the uncertainty of the
pre-paradigm phase concerning the “fundamentals”, when scientists attempt
to “articulate” the central paradigm by “puzzle-solving” (Kuhn, 1970c:7). In
this phase a paradigm is accepted by all, and “reigns” undisputed for a period.
During this specific period one is not supposed to find other paradigms
within a disciplinary field. One paradigm dictates the rules, the acceptable
answers and suggests the instruments to be used or produced. In other
words, it determines (normal) scientific research in all respects. However,
as anomalous results accumulate, a scientific discipline might reach a phase
of crisis and subsequently might undergo a scientific revolution, at which
point a new paradigm comes into existence. The old results are rejected and
6
paradigm substitution takes place.
As a consequence, Kuhn is of the opinion that while communication is
always possible when one paradigm dominates a certain field of study in
a certain period, in times of crises or scientific revolutions, communication
becomes a serious problem. With Kuhn, the term incommensurability
(Kuhn, 1970b) becomes an established concept, indicating (amongst
others) incommunicability. The latter remains a problem affecting schools or
individuals holding to different paradigms.
2.4 Feyerabend and other postmodern thinkers
Feyerabend wants science to be more like “life” itself and consequently follows
a more relativistic approach. He is also in favour of pluralism (Feyerabend,
1975), but against rationalism. He uses rationality to undermine rationality
(Feyerabend, 1975:33). Feyerabend became famous for his purportedly
anarchistic view of science and his rejection of the existence of universal
methodological rules. He rejects the dogmatic use of rules, a position at
odds with the rationalistic trends still present in the philosophy of science of
the day.
Feyerabend (1975) furthers the shift towards relativism and pluralism.
Relativism holds that points of view have no absolute truth or validity,
having only relative, subjective value according to differences in perception
and consideration (Naicker, 2012:1). With Feyerabend, incommunicability
becomes an established concept and a real threat, which is faced with
different attitudes in postmodern times. Baudrillard (1984:129) asserts,
rather pessimistically, that communication becomes mis-information as
through its reproductions it creates the “hyper-real”. Lyotard (1984:65),
more optimistically, advocates that postmodern science should not seek to
create mutual understanding at all costs: it is rather dissensus that keeps the
“game” going and makes freedom and debate possible.
2.5 Evaluation and transition
The above survey might give the impression that, concerning philosophy
of science, communication problems intensified especially during a period
dominated by rather subjectivist philosophies. However, objectivism only
ignored and evaded such problems, without really tackling them. Its optimism
was mainly a result of naivety. In sections 5 and 6 we will see that objectivism
too harbours its own problems.
Although philosophy of science deals especially with the natural sciences,
it often reflects parallel trends, developments or problems in the social and
7
human sciences. Accounting is also regarded as a scientific discipline related
to mathematics and economics, as well as linguistics, and experiences
similar problems with communication. In the next section we will return to
accounting by pointing out a few examples of communication problems
specifically affecting this discipline. Before doing this, however, a basic
explanation of the nature and role of statutory and contextual disclosures in
annual corporate reports is provided. This might help philosophers and other
scholars who might not necessarily be familiar with accounting practices.
3.
Communication-vehicles in accounting
3.1 Historical background
Business reporting in the form of statutory disclosures over the centuries
was typified by slow, random and reactive growth. Over the centuries, mainly
external incidents, for example crashes of stock markets (Zeff, 2005:1)
or recent corporate scandals such as Enron and Worldcom, occasionally
stimulated its growth. The development focus entailed a top-down approach,
with the introduction of accounting principles and standards by accounting
regulators, and not a bottom-up approach, such as a consideration of the
needs of stakeholders (Cronjé, 2008:24). Contextual disclosures emerged
only during the 1990s The statutory and the contextual disclosures in
corporate annual reports may be defined as the information an economic
entity provides to help users of that information to make inter alia capitalallocation decisions relating to that entity (Cronjé, 2008:23; PRI, 2015).
3.2 Statutory and contextual disclosures
The traditional formal communication vehicle between a publicly listed
economic entity and its interested constituencies is the corporate annual
report (Cronjé, 2008:1). The corporate annual reports of companies consist
of statutory disclosures, generated by statutory financial reporting practices,
such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) as well as
contextual disclosures, such as forward looking information and information
about risks and strategies of entities, generated by contextual financial
reporting practices (Cronjé, 2008), as illustrated in Figure 1.
8
Figure 1: Statutory and contextual disclosures in corporate annual reports
Statutory disclosures
Contextual disclosures
Created by
• The Conceptual Framework
(IASB, 2012)
• International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS)
• Statutory regulations
Created by
• Contextual financial reporting
practices
Examples:
• Statement of financial position
and notes
• Statement of comprehensive
income and notes
• Statement of changes in equity
and notes
• Statement of cash flows
• Directors’ report
Examples:
• Disclosure of economic,
environmental and social
aspects of economic entities
•
Disclosure of key risk areas
•
Disclosure of strategies
•
Management commentary
(IASB, 2010)
•
Disclosure of forward-looking
information
Source: Adapted from Gouws & Cronjé (2008:110)
Statutory disclosures are generated by statutory financial reporting practices.
These practices are based on the rules of measurement of the elements of
financial accounting that are embodied in the Conceptual Framework of the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as well as the IFRSs. The
IASB uses the Conceptual Framework to develop IFRSs. The Conceptual
Framework focuses on the following: reporting entity, elements of financial
statements (including recognition and derecognition), measurement,
presentation and disclosure. Statutory financial reporting practices are
therefore based on the Conceptual Framework (borrowing Kuhn’s terms, we
might call the latter the “disciplinary matrix” of accounting).
Examples of contextual disclosures that appeared throughout history are
the ones dealing with corporate governance matters including sustainable
reporting; disclosure of economic, environmental and social aspects;
disclosure of key risk areas; disclosure of strategies; management
commentary and disclosure of forward-looking information.
9
3.3 Communication problems in accounting
Communication in accounting is also currently problematic. For example,
the reporting standards of the United States of America, controlled by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), often differ from the
“disciplinary matrix” of the IASB of the United Kingdom. This has an effect
on the comparability of statutory disclosures of economic entities in different
countries. Furthermore, the contextual disclosures in corporate annual
reports differ from company to company. Of course this hinders comparability
and therefore has negative effects on communication.
It would also seem that not all users understand the communication messages
compiled by preparers of corporate annual reports in the form of statutory and
contextual disclosures, due to their complexity (cf. Belkaoui, 1995:41). As
the commonality of language between the preparer and the user of corporate
annual reports is a prerequisite for conveying meaning through disclosures
in corporate annual reports, there is still room for improving the statutory
and contextual disclosures (Cronjé & Gouws, 2011:44). Belkaoui (1995:41)
is concerned about the fact that the general level of readability of accounting
messages is difficult, and the level of understandability of the meaning of
accounting messages needs improvement. This will of course depend on
who the readers of the annual reporsts are. However, a main constraint
in achieving the commonality of language goal (to enhance the conveying
of meaning) is evident in the lack of feedback by users and stakeholders
(Cronjé & Gouws, 2011:56).
Currently, new developments regarding corporate reporting are taking
place. The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) consisting of
a global coalition of regulators, investors, companies, standard setters and
the accounting profession, is of the opinion that corporate reporting needs
to evolve. The aim would be to provide a concise communication about how
an organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the
context of its external environment, lead to the creation of value over the
short, medium and long term (IIRC, 2013).
Accounting too, therefore, is affected by problems of communication. In our
opinion these problems can be related to a conflict between objectivism and
subjectivism. In order to display our diagnosis properly, however, we need
to briefly explain some traits of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, in particular his
theory of modal aspects. It is on that basis that our diagnostic analysis (see
section 5) will acquire particular depth and solidity.
10
4.
Dooyeweerd’s theory of modal aspects
The Dutch Christian philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977)
developed a non-reductionist2 ontology of “modal aspects”, concerning
diverse kinds of meaning which are disclosed in the analysis of every
existing thing. The modal aspects are the fundamental “sides” of (as well
as the fundamental ways of observing and explaining) all existing entities
(events, processes etcetera). He considers such modalities to be irreducible
to each other and yet indissolubly linked. The following example (Figure 2) is
used by Basden (2011:1) to list and explain the modal aspects (or modalities)
of temporal reality.
Figure 2: Modal aspects related to scientific disciplines
Aspects:
Example: writing a letter
15. Certitudinal
Do I believe in what I am writing? Is it important?
14. Ethical
Do I write with goodwill and generosity?
13. Legal
Am I doing justice to the topic? To the readers?
12. Aesthetic
Is my writing interesting or boring?
11. Economic
Do I have to keep to a word limit?
10. Social
What phrasing suits the intended readers better?
9. Lingual/sign
How can I best express what I want to say?
8. Historical
Do I have a plan and structure?
7. Logical
Is it clear what I want to write about?
6. Sensory
How do I feel while writing? Is the light too dim to see
what I am writing?
2 Non-reductionist means that the broad variety of modal aspects which is found in reality
is not reduced to a few modalities, as it happens, according to Dooyeweerd, in most
philosophical movements. In most cases, in fact, only a few aspects are recognized and
some of them are “absolutized”, i.e. regarded as the most important ones or even as the
sources of other aspects. From this point of view, for example, it can be said that Marx
absolutizes the economic and social aspects, Freud the sensory (psychic) modality and
Hitler the biotic aspect (related to blood and race).
11
5. Biotic
Do I write badly when ill?
4. Physical
Might the writing (ink) fade over time?
3. Kinematic
Is the writing fast or slow?
2. Spatial
How large a sheet of paper is being written on?
1. Numeric
How many words, paragraphs, sections are written?
Source: adapted from Dooyeweerd (1984) and Basden (2011)
In Figure 2 each question points towards an aspect of the writing activity
(Basden, 2011:1). The same 15 modalities are applicable in looking at any
existing entity, activity or event.3
Aspects are closely tied to the very structure of temporal reality, as spheres of
meaning and spheres of law, which makes both functioning and normativity
possible (Basden, 2011:3). Aspects are spheres of meaning, providing
different ways in which things in all temporal reality can be meaningful. This
is often referred to as aspectual meaning. Aspects are also spheres of law,
which are the foundation for functioning and normativity of and in all temporal
reality (Basden, 2011:3). This is often referred to as aspectual law.
It is important to note that no aspect can be reduced to others in terms of its
meaning and law, nor can any modality be satisfactorily explained in terms
of others. Dooyeweerd conceptually distinguishes the aspects in order to
discuss them, but he also stresses their coherence because all aspects
work together (Basden, 2011:3). In fact, each aspect contains “echoes”
of all the others, and each is involved in a mutual inter-dependency with
others (Basden & Burke, 2004:357). In other words the different aspects are
interconnected and woven together. Although the aspects are diverse, they
show coherence with each other (Hart, 1984:164). The meaning of each
one of the aspects only comes to expression in the coherence with the other
aspects (Strauss, 2009:76). A few more notes on the relationships among
modal aspects are displayed in the scheme (Figure 3) below.
3 It might be objected that while the activity of writing a letter “functions” in all the aspects, if
we observe a cat or a flower they do not seem to function in the (e.g.) linguistic or juridical
aspect. In other words cats and flowers do not speak to or sue anybody! It should be
noted, however, that in these modal aspects they have a “passive function”: for example
they still have a name and might belong to someone. Human beings function actively in all
modal aspects.
12
Figure 3: Inter-aspectual relationships
Type
Description
Order
The aspects form a sequence, not a hierarchy, because
Dooyeweerd held that all aspects are equally important,
but some must be present before others (for example
there must be organic life to experience emotions). In
this sequence, aspects refer both to earlier (foundational)
aspects, and to later (ante-cipating) aspects.
Dependency
Here aspects ‘need’ each other, differently in the
anticipatory and foundational directions. In the
foundational direction the functioning in an aspect
depends on good functioning in earlier ones. For example
social functioning depends on good lingual functioning. In
the anticipatory direction an aspect’s meaning is not fully
realised without reference to meaning of later aspects; for
example the lingual aspect is rather, though not entirely,
sterile if not used to enable social functioning.
Analogy
The meaning of each aspect is echoed in the others. For
example, we say an economy ‘grows’ (biotic analogy in
the economic aspect).
Reaching out
Functioning in one aspect always involves at least
another aspect as target or object; for example we can
have a feeling of space.
Source: Adapted from Basden (2011:4)
According to both Dooyeweerd and Basden (2011: 5), there is an order
of succession amongst the modal aspects (cf. Hart, 1984:190-198). The
suggested order does not amount to a hierarchy, but reflects an increasing
complexity of functions.
The first three – quantitative, spatial and kinematic – are what Dooyeweerd
called mathematical aspects because they are based on the numerical. The
next three – physical, biotic and psychic/sensitive – govern material, plants
and animals, though they also apply to humans. The next three – analytical,
formative and lingual - govern individual human cognition. The next three –
social, economic and aesthetic – are aspects of our living together. The final
three aspects – legal, ethical and pistic/faith – are especially important for the
good functioning of society (Basden, 2011:5).
13
In the next section the theory of modal aspects is related to objectivism,
subjectivism and to the problems that these two approaches create in
accounting.
5.
Objectivism and subjectivism in relation to
accounting
Objectivism and subjectivism can be interpreted as emphasizing certain
modal aspects to the detriment of others.4 In particular, the objectivist seems
to emphasize the modalities characterizing the (natural) objects of empirical
experience. This is the case also as far as communication is concerned.
For the objectivist, the source of all regularity and order is located in the
objects of experience (even though that source may not be directly
experienced – Clouser, 2005:247). The objectivist relies on the “facts”, which
are supposed to lead to credible and certain statements. When science is
considered, for example, the knowing subject must stay as far as possible
out of the picture. In this case no personal or group “prejudices” (for example
“metaphysical” convictions) are allowed to interfere with scholarship. The
objectivist therefore is inclined to focus on the first five or six modal aspects
(see Figure 2) which are supposed to support more reliable, credible or
certain forms of knowledge.
The statutory disclosures of corporate annual reports are for example
affected by the following consequences of objectivism. The information
appears especially in numerical form and is structured and classified. Due
to its reliance on the “external world”, the development of standards often
seems to be stimulated especially by external incidents, events or changes.
The same emphasis on the objects (the “elements”) of economic activity
causes the focus of statutory reports to be mainly on resources, materials,
assets (or liabilities) and so forth. Insistence on the first aspects of the
modal order creates an over-estimation of the foundational direction (see
Figure 3, about “order”). As a consequence, the emphasis is especially on
the past. Finally, not much use is made of graphics, colour and other forms
of representation (thus underplaying the signifying and aesthetic aspects).
Some of these issues will be explored in the various concrete examples
provided in section 6.
4 Objectivism and subjectivism can also be interpreted as focusing on what is subjected to
the law/norms (either objects or subjects) while bypassing or overlooking the normative
side of each aspect. Even from this point of view, however, a “return” to the modal aspects
as sources of modal laws and norms (as this article proposes to do) will be regarded as
beneficial.
14
With subjectivism, by contrast, scientific knowledge is anchored in the knowing
subject (and not in the objects) of knowledge. The subject is regarded as
the new locus ordinis (the foundation of order) for reality, leading (according
to Feyerabend) to a more “humanitarian” type of science. Kant maintained
that the mind of the knower or “subject” is the source of all the order of
experience. Accordingly, the subjectivist locates the source of order in (the
mind, in the language, or in the social constructs of) the knowing subject
(Clouser, 2005:247). The subjectivist therefore focuses on the “higher” modal
aspects (see Figure 2) which in his view are more rich and promising being
especially related to the cultural activities of the human subject.
The contextual disclosures of corporate annual reports are for example
affected by the following consequences of subjectivism. They are
presented in narrative form, (not always in measurable or quantifiable
terms) characterised by interpretive and hermeneutical skills. Information
is also presented in a rather “spontaneous” form, not strictly subjected to
rules of objectivity and precision. As the emphasis falls on the subjects of
the economic activity contextual disclosures insist mainly on the strategies,
future plans, expectations of the subjects of a particular economic entity.
Emphasis on the “higher” aspects of the modal order creates an overestimation of the anticipatory direction (see Figure 3, about “order”). As a
consequence, emphasis is placed on the future, for example on predictions
and anticipations. Some of these issues will be explored in the various
concrete examples provided in section 7.
At this point one might even wonder which of the two types of (mutually
exclusive) disclosures can be regarded as giving a true picture.
One could also ask whether the tension will not vanish if the two types of
disclosures are simply unified in a single disclosure product, such as an
integrated report. In our opinion the tension will not simply disappear as the
statutory disclosures, for example, deal with topics like statement of financial
position, statement of changes in equity, statement of comprehensive income
and statement of cash flows. The contextual disclosures, by contrast, deal
with topics that are not reflected by the statutory disclosures. They cater
for information on the business environment and provide an operating
and financial review, overview of strategy, forward-looking information,
key performance indicators and information on corporate governance and
strategy. In other words, the two types of disclosures deal with different
subject matters.
Integrated reporting initiated by the IIRC is a step in the right direction, but
needs to further evolve by taking all the aspects (see section 4) into account.
15
Currently, only certain information is communicated to providers of capital in
the form of a concise communication about how an organization’s strategy,
governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external
environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long
term (IIRC, 2013).
In the following section we still work with the hypothesis that separate
disclosures (statutory and contextual) are provided. The picture would of
course change if unified reports are presented. However, the examples
provided below can be useful for all types of disclosures.
6.
Statutory disclosures
6.1 Counteracting objectivism
The following section tries to identify some of the present key-characteristics
of statutory disclosures of corporate annual reports that are affected by
objectivism (see section 5 above) and therefore create some communication
problems. It also tries to identify some of the modalities that have been
neglected in order to suggest specific “remedies”. It is relevant to note that
we find these neglected modalities especially in the middle-upper section of
the modal sequence (see Figure 2).
6.2 The information appears in numerical form
The problem with information provided only in numerical form (therefore
only providing outputs – Cronjé, 2008:42-43), is that only one aspect is
referred to. More practically, property, plant and equipment are for example
reflected at monetary values on the statement of financial position at the
end of the current and the previous years, without an explanation of how
the economic circumstances of an economic entity changed. The economic
circumstances for the current and the previous years, relating to property,
plant and equipment could be expressed in narrative form, so that users of
information could make better informed comparisons from one year to the
next. Comparisons could then be made not only of the outputs (numbers),
but also of the inputs and processes.
In this case reference must be made to the lingual modal aspect as a remedy.
The entire modal structure of this aspect may simply be designated as the
sign mode (Strauss, 2009:95-96). We experience the lingual aspect intuitively
in expressing, recording and interpreting (Basden, 2011:13). A possibility
that the lingual aspect introduces into temporal reality is externalisation of
our intended meaning (Basden, 2011:13).
16
Statutory financial reporting practices could therefore make use, for example,
of narrative disclosures in order to enhance understandability. Disclosures
should be such that stakeholders can make meaningful decisions with ease.
Statutory numerical data could benefit if more use is made of descriptions
and explanations in order to faithfully represent financial phenomena and to
increase the understandability of numbers and ratios.
6.3 Information is only for investors, lenders and creditors
In this specific case (IASB, 2012), due to an objectivist approach, social norms
are under-appreciated, or accepted in a limited form. Social interaction within
human society gives expression to phenomena such as courtesy, tact and
politeness (Strauss, 2009:97). We experience the social aspect intuitively as
we, us and them: associating, agreeing and appointing (Basden, 2011:15).
The social aspect introduces the possibility of company, which is togetherness,
respect and courtesy (Basden, 2011:15). The social functioning of business
is qualified by the economic aspect. Nevertheless, economic entities have a
“social contract” with different user groups.
As entities have social responsibilities (Buys, 2008:503; Roberts, 1992:599)
towards stakeholders, financial reporting practices need to be developed to
ensure that disclosures of relevant information are useful to heterogeneous
users, for example by providing disclosure of environmental aspects. This
includes the effects that an entity’s products and/or services may have on the
environment, which may be important to environmental pressure groups. The
social aspect encompasses relationships with stakeholders other than just
the shareholders, specifically employees, customers and local communities.
Statutory reporting therefore needs to be done in such a way as to ensure
appropriate and sensitive engagement of stakeholders with the business
environment, taking into account their special needs for meaningful
information through proper feedback systems. Entities must know who their
user groups are and this can be established through tactful, emotionally
intelligent engagement with all the various role-players. Integrated reporting
could also play a major role in achieving an interactive engagement with
stakeholders, as the financial, environmental and social impact of economic
entities are displayed to different stakeholders.
Furthermore, the juridical modality could be referred to. For Basden (2011:18),
we experience the juridical aspect as pointing towards the “appropriate and
due”. The legal functioning depends on the earlier aspects, for example the
aesthetic aspect in so far as there must be a “well-balanced harmony of a
17
multiplicity of interests” (Dooyeweerd, 1984, 2:135). Legal functioning is also
related to responsibility (Basden, 2011:18).
Stakeholders (including disadvantaged stakeholders – Cronjé 2010),
have a legal right to relevant and credible statutory information, faithfully
represented and reported on time, taking into account factors such as the
cost of providing such information.
6.4 The development of reporting standards is prompted mainly
by external incidents
As from 2003/2004 there have been vast improvements in financial reporting
practices (Cronjé, 2008:24). However over the years these improvements
have been mainly influenced by external incidents (Cronjé, 2008:41-43) such
as stock market crashes and, for example, the credit crunch in 2008/2009.
In this case reference could be made to the cultural-formative modality.
Basden (2011:12) contends that we experience the formative aspect as
pointing to the deliberate creative shaping of culture, usually with some end
in mind. This includes the shaping of concepts into conceptual structures,
words into sentences, as well as activities such as forming, designing,
processing and innovating. A possibility that the formative aspect introduces
is cultural achievement and innovation (Basden, 2011:12). This aspect refers
to achievement, purpose, mastery and goal. According to Strauss (2009:95)
the meaning-nucleus of the cultural-historical aspect is designated as
“formative control” or simply as “power”.
Deliberate creative shaping of financial reporting practices to enhance
decision usefulness, is an on-going process. Much progress has been made
with the growth of information in corporate annual reports, for example,
concerning the section on management commentary (IASB, 2010). The
introduction of integrated reporting is another achievement for making
information available to heterogeneous users. Many of the financial reporting
practices that are formed by the accounting profession have symbolic value,
but this cannot be understood from the point of view of the formative aspect.
For this purpose, the perspective of the lingual aspect is required (Basden,
2011:13).
6.5 Not much use is made of graphics or colours
In corporate annual reports not much use is made of graphic or colors (Cronjé,
2008:165, 205), but a colour presentation could play an important role in
increasing the usefulness of graphical, tabular or columnar comparisons and
displays (Cronjé, 2008:205). In this instance the aesthetic modality could be
18
referred to. According to Basden (2011:17), we experience life in its aesthetic
aspect primarily in harmonising, balancing, enjoying, playing and beautifying.
Seerveld (1979:284ff.) introduced words such as allusivity and imaginativity
to explain the meaning-nucleus of the aesthetic modal aspect.
In order to make the aesthetic expression of statutory disclosures interesting,
use can be made of the expertise of graphic designers to prepare the
photographs, tables and graphs in corporate annual reports (Cronjé,
2008:205). The art of graphic design is to provide the best possible view
of any subject matter – whether it is an annual report, a brochure or a
brand concept (Cronjé, 2008:249). Care should be taken, of course, not to
create smoke and mirrors to deflect some of the negative figures and also
not to waste money un-necessarily. However, proper use can be made of
colour, photos, graphics and graphs in order to portray various aspects of
the company’s business such as industrial plants or products. By means
of imaginative ways, information can be provided succinctly, interestingly
and meaningfully to ensure that all information flows harmoniously and is
structurally sound.
Better use of graphs in the statutory section of corporate annual reports could
play an important role in illustrating relationships between figures disclosed
in the statement of financial position, the comprehensive income statement
and so on (Cronjé, 2008:161). The use of graphs, pie charts, illustrations,
visual representations, colour (an anticipation of the aesthetic aspect) and
photos and so on will enhance the meaning of financial reporting practices,
though it should not be overdone.
7.
Contextual disclosures
7.1 Counteracting subjectivism
The following section tries to identify some of the present key-characteristics
of contextual disclosures of corporate annual reports that are affected by
subjectivism (see section 5 above) and therefore create some problems
related to the disclosure of information. It also tries to identify some of
the modalities that have been neglected and to suggest several specific
“remedies”. It is interesting to note that we find these neglected modalities
especially in the bottom section of the modal sequence (see Figure 2).
7.2 The information is not always provided constantly
The problem with this rather “spontaneous” approach is that contextual
disclosures could become inconsistent (Cronjé, 2008:42) and unstable and
19
deflect negative sides by smoke and mirrors. Constancy of contextual financial
reporting practices is necessary, so that contextual financial disclosures can
be compared from year to year and also amongst different entities. Unstable
and inconsistent financial disclosures should be avoided (Buys, 2008:504).
Quite often, the meaning of these disclosures gets lost in the details.
Constancy or consistency of contextual financial reporting practices makes
comparability of financial disclosures possible. With this purpose in mind,
the kinematic aspect could be examined, which is described by Basden
(2011:7) as an intuitive experience of on-going, continuous flowing, implying
constancy. Strauss (2009:88-89) asserts that constancy (uniform motion) is
rooted in the kinematic aspect. Rubrics (reporting frameworks) of contextual
disclosures could be developed in order to enhance comparability. There are
some of these already, for example the framework of the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI:2015) and work done by the Social Return on Investment
network (SROI:2005).
7.3 All information is not necessarily measured, quantified and
audited
The problem with information that is not measured, quantified and audited
(Cronjé, 2008:43) is that such information is often less reliable and credible.
Disregarding precision and objectivity might lead to disclosures that appeal
too much to emotional responses and too little to rational decision. In this
case the quantitative modality can for example be referred to. Basden
(2011:5) asserts that we experience the quantitative aspect (as a sphere
of meaning) most intuitively and directly as “one, several and many” (cf.
Strauss, 2009:82), and “comparisons of less and more”. The quantitative
aspect introduces a fundamental structure that enables temporal reality to
exist (and mathematics to be foundational), namely reliable amount and
order.
Users need to understand the disclosures being depicted in corporate annual
reports. For this purpose use needs to be made of numerical contextual
data, although numerical data need to be complemented with descriptions
and explanations (related to the lingual mode in the anticipatory direction).
In the process, of course, the necessary precautions must be adopted.
As Basden (2011:14) clarifies, a negative direction in the lingual aspect is
caused by anything that prevents adequate expression and understanding
of what was meant, which includes unintentional problems like the inability to
express oneself and lying, obfuscation and equivocation. Misrepresentation
of events, for example where “bad news” is reported using long sentences with
20
complex grammatical structures to mask and deflect the readers’ attention
(Cronjé, 2008:206) should therefore be avoided in corporate annual reports.
7.4 The information is often future oriented
Statutory disclosures insist on certainty and accountability, cater for concrete
events, and occurrences and transactions that are matter–and-resourceflow oriented. Contextual disclosures on the other hand, possess features
which are more uncertain. They cater for “artificial” (non-) events, simulated
happenings, predictions and contingencies which are mind (i.e. subject)
oriented. At the same time, the accent is placed on the future plans, strategies
and expectations of the economic subjects. Yet, there are risks in reporting
mainly future oriented and forward-looking information (Cronjé, 2008:79).
For example, when users base their decisions on forecasts that reflected a
brighter outcome than the actual outcome, companies may be held liable for
those improper decisions (Cronjé, 2008:80).
In philosophy of science there has been an extended controversy on
whether theories should have only the task of predicting or also of explaining
phenomena. Interestingly, the “prediction-only” position is defended by
subjectivist authors holding to an instrumentalist view of theories.5 From a
Dooyeweerdian perspective, Stafleu (1987:41 ff.) suggests that explanation
should not be opposed to but should integrate prediction. This can be applied
to contextual disclosures as well and would be excellent medicine for the
problems mentioned above.
As it might be expected, explanation is also founded in one of the first
modalities in the modal order: the physical aspect (analogically related to
the rational or logical modality). In fact, explanation depends on the (logical)
“force” and “weight” of its arguments (Stafleu, 1987:51). The Explanans
(what explains a situation or phenomenon) and the explanandum (what is
to be explained) are arranged in a sequence of irreversible cause and effect
(typical of physical interactions) and this is what allows for the effectiveness
of an explanation (Stafleu, 1987:41-42).
When explanation integrates prediction, contextual disclosures would not be
exclusively oriented to the future and would acquire a more balanced scope.
At the same time they would be more “grounded” on concrete reality without
placing excessive emphasis on the subjects of economic activities.
5 Instrumentalism is an antirealist approach to philosophy of science that holds that theories
are not true or false but are merely tools for deriving predictions from observational data.
21
8.
Conclusive remarks
In this article it was shown that in contemporary philosophy of science,
pessimism concerning the possibility of sound communication in science
increased during the gradual shift from positivism to the subsequent
subjectivist philosophy of science. Likewise it was shown that communication
in accounting is also problematic. In both cases (science and accounting)
there is a tension that we have diagnosed as a conflict between objectivism
and subjectivism. In science, the predominance of one of the two approaches
takes place in different historical periods. In accounting there seems to be
an oscillation or ambiguity between the two tendencies (subjectivism and
objectivism) which remain side by side. As far as the information products of
accounting, namely corporate annual reports, are concerned, a polarization
seems to exist as statutory financial reporting practices are influenced by
objectivism, while the contextual financial reporting practices are inclined
towards subjectivism.
It was argued that subjectivism and objectivism can be interpreted as
emphasizing certain aspects to the detriment of others and that a better
communicative approach can be reached by paying attention to all the
modalities, in particular to those which tend to be neglected under a certain
approach (objectivism or subjectivism).
The strategies proposed in this article constitute only one possibility among
many others in which Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophy could be used to
improve the problems discussed. We therefore recognise the tentative and
introductory character of the attempts made in this article. They are also
limited in so far as our focus was only on communication. The same holds
for the concrete examples and strategies indicated in the final sections (6
and 7). Such examples are not proposed as exhaustive or conclusive, but as
pointing the way towards a new approach. On this basis other scholars are
invited to conduct further research on this topic.
It should be noticed, however, that our identification of lacunae and
neglected needs in corporate reports is based on an ontological analysis.
The use of proper ontological categories aims at avoiding arbitrariness and a
fragmentary understanding of the needs and problems. In fact, the selection
of problems and the proposed strategies are not based on individual or
arbitrary preferences. On the contrary, a philosophical analysis in tune with
the normative traits holding for reality was supplied.
Finally, one important question would be whether the strategies suggested in
this article might deal mainly with the “symptoms” and not with the causes of
22
the problem. After all, in Dooyeweerdian terms, objectivism and subjectivism
are themselves produced by the “ground motive” of modern culture. The
latter is based on the antithesis between “nature and freedom” (or “nature
and culture”) which posits a conflict between the human subject (looking for
autonomy and creative freedom) and an “outside world” imposing its laws,
constraints and “objective facts”. The ultimate liberation from objectivism and
subjectivism might be possible only through the rejection of such polarized
“paradigm” and its substitution with a radically new one.
Bibliography
BASDEN, A. & BURKE, M.E. 2004. Towards a philosophical understanding
of documentation: a Dooyeweerdian framework. Journal of Documentation,
60(4):352-370.
BASDEN, A. 2011. A presentation of Herman Dooyeweerd’s aspects of
temporal reality. International Journal of Multi Aspectual Practice, 1(1):1-28.
BAUDRILLARD, J. 1984. The ecstacy of communication. (In: Foster, H., Ed.
Postmodern culture. London: Pluto:126-134).
BELKAOUI, A. 1995. The linguistic shaping of accounting. Westport, CT:
Quorum Books.
BERNSTEIN, R. 1985. Beyond objectivism and relativism: science
hermeneutics and praxis. Philadelphia, Penn.: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
BUYS, P.W. 2008. In pursuit of a foundational accounting philosophy. Koers,
73(3):489-508.
BUYS, P.W. 2010. The legitimacy predicament of current day accounting
theory. Published PhD Thesis. University of the North West, Potchefstroom.
CLOUSER, R.A. 2005. The myth of religious neutrality. Notre Dame, Indiana.
University of Notre Dame Press.
COLETTO, R. 2007. The legitimacy crisis of science in late-modern
philosophy: towards a reformational response. PhD Thesis. University of the
North-West, Potchefstroom.
COLETTO, R. 2008. When the ‘paradigms’ differ: scientific communications
between scepticism and hope in recent philosophy of science. Koers,
73(3):445-467.
CRONJÉ, C.[J.] 2008. Corporate Annual Reports (CARS): Accounting
practices in transition. Saarbrüken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr Müller.
23
CRONJÉ, C.J. 2010. A more subtle set of information in corporate annual
reports for disadvantaged stakeholders. South African Journal of Economic
and Management Sciences, 13(2):222-235.
CRONJÉ, C.J. & GOUWS, D.G. 2011. Commonality between the preparer
and the user of financial information as a prerequisite for conveying meaning.
Southern African Business Review, 15(2):43-58.
DOOYEWEERD, H. 1984. A new critique of theoretical thought. 4 volumes.
Jordan Station, Ontario, Canada: Paideia Press. (Original work published
1953-1958).
FEYERABEND, P.K. 1975. Against method: outline of an anarchistic theory
of knowledge. London: New Left Books.
GOUWS, D.G. & CRONJÉ, C.J. 2008. Corporate annual reports: accounting
practices in transition. Southern African Business Review, 12(2):108-133.
GRI. 2015. The global reporting initiative. [Online] Available from: https://
www.globalreporting.org.
HART, H. 1984. Understanding our world: an integrated ontology. Lanham,
Md.: University Press of America.
IASB. 2010. IFRS Practice Statement. Management Commentary. A
Framework for Presentation. International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB). London. United Kingdom.
IASB. 2012. International Financial Reporting Practices (IFRSs). 2012:
including International Accounting Standards (IASs) and Interpretations as
at 30 September 2011. Vol. 1A London: IASB.
–
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting.
IIRC, 2013. Consultation Draft of the International <IR> Framework.
International Integrated Reporting Council.
KUHN, T.S. 1963. The function of dogma in scientific research. (In: Crombie,
A.C. Ed. Scientific change: historical studies in the intellectual, social and
technical conditions for scientific discovery and technical invention, from
antiquity to present. London: Heinemann:347-369).
KUHN, T.S. 1970a. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
KUHN, T.S. 1970b. Reflections on my critics. (In: Lakatos, I. & Musgrave,
A., Eds. Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press:231-277).
24
KUHN, T.S. 1970c. Logic of discovery or psychology of research? (In: Lakatos
I. & Musgrave A., Eds. Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press:1-12).
LYOTARD, J.F. 1984. The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
NAICKER, K. 2012. Financial reporting from positivism to relativism.
E-news. Pretoria. University of South Africa. [Online]. Available: http://staff.
unisa.ac.za/e-connect/e-news/2012/12/21/financial-reporting-from-positiv,
Accessed: 01/02/2013.
POPPER, K.R. 1970. Normal science and its dangers. (In: Lakatos I. &
Musgrave A., Eds. Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press:51-58).
PRI. 2015. Introducing responsible investment. [Online] Available from:
http://www.unpri.org/introducing-responsible-investment/.
ROBERTS, R.W. 1992. Determinants of corporate social responsibility
disclosure: an application of stakeholder theory. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 17(6):595-612.
SEERVELD, C.G. 1979 (Eds. John Kraay and Anthony Tol). Modal
aesthetics: preliminary questions with and opening hypothesis. In: Hearing
and Doing, Philosophical essays dedicated to H. Evan Runner, Toronto:
Wedge Publishing Foundation:263-294).
SROI. 2005. Social return on investment framework [Online] Available from:
http://www.Socialvalueuk.org.
STAFLEU, M.D. 1987. Theories at work: on the structure and functioning of
theories in science, in particular during the Copernican revolution. Lanham,
Md.: University Press of America.
STRAUSS, D.F.M. 2009. Philosophy: discipline of the disciplines. Grand
Rapids: Paideia Press.
ZEFF, S.A. 2005. Evolution of US generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP). Rice University. USA.
25
Samuel Rutherford and the
Neo-Thomists:
Juristic corporation theory and natural
law arguments in Lex, Rex
Andries Raath
Research Fellow
Department of Constitutional Law
and Philosophy of Law
University of the Free State
[email protected]
Shaun de Freitas
Associate Professor
Department of Constitutional Law
and Philosophy of Law
University of the Free State
[email protected]
Opsomming
Samuel Rutherford en die neo-Thomiste: Juridiese korporasieteorie en natuurreg-argumente in Lex, Rex
Die Skotse teoloog en politieke teoretikus se politikologiese werk Lex,
Rex, is sterk deur die Christelike humanisme van die sestiende en
sewentiende eeu beïnvloed. Verwysings na talle klasieke werke van
Griekse en Romeinse filosowe asook Middeleeuse bronne kom in dié
werk voor. Rutherford maak ook van talle Neo-Thomistiese bronne
gebruik by die ontwikkeling van sy standpunte oor die soewereiniteit van
die populus en sy benadering tot natuurreg en natuurlike regte. Alhoewel
27
Samuel Rutherford and the Neo-Thomists: Juristic corporation theory and natural law
arguments in Lex, Rex
Rutherford in talle opsigte van die Neo-Thomistiese teologie verskil het,
het dit hom nie verhoed om wel bepaalde politikologiese argument uit dié
bronne oor te neem, binne die konteks van sy Reformatoriese teologie
te herinterpreteer en toe te pas nie. Met dié benadering het Rutherford
daarin geslaag om standpunte te ontwikkel wat vir sowel Reformatoriese
Christene as andersdenkendes van belang is. Sy werk Lex, Rex, (Die
reg en die heerser) verkry daarmee ŉ universaliseerbare betekenis.
1.Introduction
The sixteenth-century revival of Thomism in European ecclesiastical and
legal theory carried in its wake a re-orientation of fundamental importance for
the development of the modern natural law theory of the state. The tone for
which was to become a most influential political theory was set by Francisco
de Vitoria (c. 1485-1546), a prominent Dominican. Vitoria’s ecclesiastical
school of natural law theory included amongst others Diego de Covarrubias
(1512-1577), a prominent jurist, and Dominican ecclesiastical authors like
Fernando Vasquez (1509-1566) and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560). The
Dominican views on ecclesiastical and political matters were re-interpreted
and developed by Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (1542-1611), and Spanish
Jesuits including Gregorio de Valencia (1549-1603), Gabriel Vasquez (15491604) and Francisco Suàrez (1548-1617). The turn brought about by the
Neo-Thomist writers facilitated the development of a highly influential theory
of general public law based on natural law precepts.1
The main political aim of the Dominicans and their Jesuit followers was the
refutation of the political views of the evangelical Reformation in general
and the Lutheran views on law and politics in particular. Three aspects of
Reformational thought alarmed Jesuits and Dominicans alike: firstly, the
mistaken view credited to Wycliffe and Hus that dominion is founded in
grace; secondly, the erroneous belief that civil power cannot remain in the
hands of the ruler, and thirdly, the Lutheran rejection of natural law as the
basis of the political order.2
1 Cf. Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, I, p. 36. Cf. e.g. : Franciscus Victoria
(Dominican), Relectiones tredecim (1580); Dominicus Soto (Dominican), De justitia et
jure (1556); F. Vasquez, Controversiarum illustrium aliarumque usu frequentium libri III
(1572); Gregorius de Valentia, Commentarii theologici (1592); Balthasar Ayala, De jure et
officiis belli (1597); Ludovicus Molina, De justitia et jure tomi VI (1602 & 1614); Leonardus
Lessius, De justitia et jure libri IV (1606); Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, De potestate summi
pontificis in rebus temporalibus (1610); Johannes de Lugo, De justitia et jure (1670).
2 Cf. Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, II, p. 138ff.
28
Andries Raath & Shaun de Freitas
In their refutation of the evangelical views on political society, the Thomist
authors of the sixteenth-century gathered elements of the Medieval
interpreters of Roman law concepts related to legal personality, the power
the people yield in opposing tyranny, and Marsilius of Padua’s views on
popular sovereignty, which they re-interpreted and applied to the political
environment of sixteenth-century European political thought.
Dominican and Jesuit political works in many respects popularized the
application of Roman law concepts and the idea of popular sovereignty,
and served as standard sources of reference to students of European and
English universities – influences the English and Scottish Puritans could not
escape. After 1600 students in England and Scotland were increasingly being
exposed to the writings of Jesuit and other Neo-scholastic theologians and
ecclesiastical authors on natural law. Quotations from Bellarmine, Vasquez,
Molina, Durandus, De Soto, Suàrez and other Neo-scholastics abound in
the notebooks of students from Cambridge, Oxford and Puritan colleges.3
Although the main purpose with reading these Neo-Thomistic works was
to study the aims, arguments and views of the enemies of the Reformation,
Neo-Scholastic works contained information appealing also to candidates of
Reformed persuasion and receiving tertiary education heavily influenced by
Christian humanism.4
Although the Puritan divine Samuel Rutherford (1600-1661), reacted
negatively to many aspects of Neo-Thomistic thought in his political work
Lex, Rex, he utilised a number of key-aspects associated with the rising
natural law tide in political philosophy. In answering the question as to
whether the Jesuit doctrine of lawful defence is the same as that of the
Puritans, Rutherford takes pains to explain that the doctrine that sovereignty
is originally and fundamentally located in the people, was taught by the
“fathers, ancient doctors, sound divines, lawyers, before there was a Jesuit
or a prelate whelped, in rerum natura”.5 In answer to the view that both
Jesuits and Puritans say that it was a privilege of the Jews that God chose
their king, Rutherford maintains that the Jesuits and Puritans are in opposing
camps on this issue because in post-Biblical times kings are not appointed by
extraordinary revelation from God.6 Rutherford also explicitly rejects Jesuit
teaching that man is not justified by faith only, but also by works.7 Elsewhere
3 Cf. M. Todd, Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order, p. 72.
4Todd, Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order, pp. 72-73, 76, 79.
5 Lex, Rex, Q 41, p. 206.
6 Lex, Rex, Q 5, p. 9 f.
7 Lex, Rex, Q 5, p. 9 f.
29
Rutherford accuses the Jesuits of siding with Armenians on matters of
nature and grace.8 Those who have the view that parliaments diminish the
king’s majesty, is described by Rutherford as “a faction of perjured Papists,
Prelates, Jesuits, Irish cut-throats, Strafords and Apostates; subverters of all
laws, divine, human, of God, of Church of state”.9 Rutherford is also explicitly
opposed to the view that the clergy is exempted from the laws of the civil
magistrate.10 As for Maxwell’s argument to Suàrez, who endeavoured to
prove monarchy not to be natural, but of free consent, because it varies
in different nations, Rutherford answers: “(I)t is the Jesuits’ argument, not
ours. ... Let Jesuits plead for Jesuits.”11 Rutherford also rejects the papists’
and Jesuits’ allegations that the early Protestants, Waldenses, Wycliffe, and
Huss founded dominion upon grace as its essential pillar.12
Particularly in theological matters Rutherford rejects the Jesuit teachings that
the Pope is no antichrist, that Christ locally descended to hell to free some out
of their prison, that it was sin to separate from Babylonian Rome, that men
are justified by works, that the merit of fasting is not to be condemned, that
the mass is no idolatry, and that the Church is the judge of controversies.13
However, regarding political principles Rutherford does not disagree with
the Jesuit Neo-Thomists on a number of points. Rutherford for example
does not disagree with the Jesuit doctrine that sovereignty is “originally and
radically” in the people – a view held long before the Jesuits agreed to the
same principle.14
2.
The reception of juristic corporation theory and
popular sovereignty in Medieval and early modern European political thought
2.1 Azo and the fourteenth century jurists
The twelfth century jurist Portius Azo (1150-1230) and his pupils in their
commentaries on the Roman Codex recovered from Roman legal and moral
philosophy cogent defences of civic freedom, self-government and popular
8 Lex, Rex, Q 8, p. 30 f.
9 Lex, Rex, Q 9, p. 36.
10 Lex, Rex, Q 13, pp. 50 f.
11 Lex, Rex, Q 13, p. 54.
12 Lex, Rex, Q 41, p. 205.
13 Lex, Rex, Q 41, p. 206.
14 Lex, Rex, Q 41, p. 206.
30
sovereignty. Azo and his followers made pioneering contributions to political
thought by interpreting and amplifying general concepts from Roman law
concerning the location, character, and limits of political power. Arguably the
most renowned contribution to juristic-political theory was Azo’s development
of the Roman law texts concerning iurisdictio and imperium into a concept
of sovereignty.15
In later medieval thought the juristic thought of Azo’s followers were
substantially strengthened by the ideas of republican self-government
contained in the rediscovered Aristotelian corpus – particularly notions of
civic autonomy relevant to the Italian city-republics. The juristic idiom of the
legal commentators sought to adapt the Roman law theory of imperium to
the conditions of the Italian city-republics.16 The emerging republicanism was
solidly grounded on the principle that any individual or group, once granted
sovereignty over a community will tend to promote particular interest at the
expense of the common good. Pursuing the classical republican ideas of
liberty, representation and legal personality, juristic treatises intended to
defend republican libertas against encroachments from pope and prince alike.
By the fourteenth century the jurist Bartolus and his pupils sought to defend
the refusal by Tuscany to allow external political interference by superiors in
its temporal affairs. The school of Bartolus produced a legal theory according
to which the ultimate bearer of sovereignty in any independent political entity
must be the universitas or corporation of the people as a whole.17
Justinian’s Digest was a particular fruitful source of principles which could
be re-interpreted to suit the claims of the republicans in defence of their
liberty.18 Azo applied the term universitas, a central concept in the Roman
law of corporations, to defend popular sovereignty.19 To Azo and his followers
the entire body of citizens forms a universitas; a political body possessing
legal personality and capable of forming and expressing a single unified
15 Cf. Myron P. Gilmore, Argument from Roman Law in Political Thought, 1200-1600,
Cambridge, Mass, 1941, pp. 15-36.
16Skinner, Visions of Politics, II, p. 13: “The authority chiefly invoked by the city-republics in
their earliest attempts to defend their way of life was the Codex of Roman Law. By the end
of the twelfth century, a number of Glossators were beginning to reinterpret the passages
on public law in Justinian’s Digest in such a way as to support rather than to question the
autonomy of the cities and their elective forms of government.”
17 Cf. S. De Freitas, Law and Federal-Republicanism: Samuel Rutherford’s Quest for a
Constitutional Model, p. 87.
18 The culmination of Azo’s work was his defence of the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
19Skinner, Visions of politics, II, p. 13.
31
will in political matters.20 To Azo, the consent of the body of the people (as
a universitas) is always necessary if the highest powers of governance
(imperium) and thus of jurisdiction over the realm (jurisdictio) are to be lawfully
instituted.21 From the interpretation of the Lex Regia (in Book I of the Digest),
Azo concluded that the power of the emperor to make law is only lawful to
the extent that it was assigned to him by the people in whose hands such
power must originally have vested.22 This interpretation basically amounted
to denying legitimate political authority of the ruler from the consent by the
body of the people.23 Additionally Azo argued that after instituting a ruler with
full imperium and iurisdictio, the people continued to possess it after the
transfer of power.24 Azo’s bold interpretation flowed from the principle that the
populus has the legal standing of a universitas.25 A further implication of his
juristic interpretation is that it is not the people who are excluded by the Lex
Regia from the power to make laws, but merely the individuals composing
the body of the people.26 The emperor’s power to pass legislation in thereby
relegated to ceded authority by the populous sive universitas (the ultimate
bearer of sovereignty) to pass legislation. A number of important political
consequences emanated from Azo’s juristic argumentation: 1. Rulers only
wield the power transferred to them by the people; 2. The people retain the
capacity to depose their rulers and resume the exercise of their sovereignty
should the rulers fail to discharge their duties satisfactorily; 3. The people
retain the power to establish their own forms of government.27 In brief Azo’s
argument regarding the source of sovereignty proceed as follows: all rulers
have imperium because they have iurisdictio; the right to establish law. The
source of that lawmaking right is the corpus, the universitas, the communitas;
therefore jurisdiction does not descend downward from the emperor but
20Skinner, Visions of politics, II, p. 14.
21Skinner, Visions of Politics, II, p. 15.
22 Digest, I.4.1: “quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem: utpote cum lege regia, quae de
imperio eius lata est, populous ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat.”
Cf. Johnston, “The General Influence of Roman Institutions of State and Public Law”, p. 98.
23Azo, Lectura super codicem, I, XIV, 11, 44: “potestus legis condendae ... in eum transtulit
populus.”
24Azo, Lectura super codicem, I, XIV, 11, 44: “potestas legis condendae ... si populous ante
habebat, et adhunc habebit.”
25Skinner, Visions of Politics, II, p. 15.
26Azo, Lectura super codicem, I, XIV, 11, 44: “hic non excluditur populous, sed singuli de
populo ... ideo singuli excluduntur, non universitas sive populous.”
27Azo, Lectura super codicem, I, XIV, 11 & VIII, LIII, 2, 67: “unde non est major potestatis
imperator quam totus populous, sed quam quilibet de populo.”
32
proceed upward from the corporate community.28 The implications are that the
ruler himself became a constitutional figure, “a legally defined officeholder,
whose imperium was limited by his iurisdictio (his legitimate authority).29 The
constitutional limitations of the ruler’s power also include the subject’s right
of resistance to the ruler’s wrongful commands, extending to the right and
the duty to kill a tyrant (Rex Tyrannus).
In the early stages of the fourteenth century Azo’s views of the sovereignty
of the people found support and extension in Bartolus of Sassoferato’s
formulation of the doctrine of sibi princeps; each independent civitas may
be regarded as a princeps unto itself and hence the bearer of sovereignty.30
In consequence Bartolus developed a legal theory rewarding sovereignty
in any independent city to the universitas or corporation of the people as a
whole.31
Due to metaphorical extensions of the term “persona”, the people as a “person”
acquired the legal status of corporation in the writings of the monarchomachs.
From the Bartolist theory of corporation the monarchomachs drew much of
their political inspiration.32 Bartolus’ bolstering of early fourteenth century
republican theory necessarily included discussing the concept of tyranny
and formulating the practical consequences of the abuse of power by
rulers. Bartolus’ views on tyranny became the standard points of reference
in following centuries for distinguishing between tyrants by practice from
tyrants without title.33
28 H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution, p. 292: “Jurisdiction did not descend down from the
emperor but upward from the corporate community.”
29 Henry of Bracton (early thirteenth-century English jurist) developed Azo’s view into the
principle that the law makes the king, therefore the king must make a return to the law by
subjecting himself to its rules (De Freitas, Federal-Republicanism, p. 100).
30 Skinner, Foundations, I, pp. 53-65.
31Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, pp. 93-131; Berman, Law and
Revolution, p. 292.
32Bartolus, Digestum Novum Commentaria, (1562), XLVII, XXII, p. 779: “civitates Tusciae,
quae non recognuscunt de facto in temporalibus superionem.” Skinner, Foundations,
I, p. 394; F. Calasso, I Glossatori, pp. 83-123; J.A. Wahl, “Baldus de Ubaldis and the
Foundations of the Nation-State”, pp. 8-96; J.P. Canning, “Ideas of the State in Thirteenthand Fourteenth-Century Commentators on the Roman Law”, pp. 23-27; J. Najemy, “Stato,
Commune e ‘Universitas’””, pp. 245-263.
33 Cf. Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, pp. 93-131.
33
2.2 Marsilius of Padua and the philosophical basis of popular
sovereignty
Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275-1342), a Christian Aristotelian, applied Aristotle’s
philosophy of causes, to describe the final, material, formal, and moving cause
of the commonwealth. The final cause (the purpose of the commonwealth)
is to ensure the good life, and the good life consists in being engaged in the
activity of becoming a free man. This forms the ground for the other kinds of
causes (material, formal, and moving) of the commonwealth and its parts. In
an effort to address the political challenges to the independence and political
freedom of the Italian city-republics, Marsilius proposed that the ruler should
be the whole body of the people so that no factional rifts can undermine the
libertarian aims of the city-republics.34 He equates the figure of the legislature
with the people or the whole body of citizens or the majority thereof.35 Different
to the views of Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius insists that the whole body of
citizens remains the sovereign legislature at all times, regardless of whether
it makes the laws directly by itself or entrusts the law-making function to a
specific person or persons. Marsilius also emphasizes that even if the people
agree to transfer the right to exercise their sovereignty, a supreme ruler or
magistrate, such an official can never become the legislator in the absolute
sense. The ultimate authority at all times remains in the hands of the people,
who can always check or even depose rulers if they do not act in accordance
with the limited powers entrusted to them. The consequences of Marsilius’
position on popular sovereignty vesting in the whole body of the people
had important implications for guarding civic liberty in the city-republics: 1.
Jurisdiction must always be voluntarily transferred; 2. The ruler appointed
by the people must not be allowed more than the minimum discretion in
administering the law; 3. Constitutional checks should be imposed to ensure
that rulers remain responsive to the citizens who elected them.36 This implies
that in every commonwealth, the fundamental political authority is not the
government or the ruling part but the human legislator is the people, the
whole body of the citizens; the only legitimate sovereign is the people and is
to be distinguished from the government. The government ought to be elected
by the whole citizen body and ought to be responsible to it; the government
must rule in strict adherence to the laws and if it transgresses a law it is
liable to punishment by the whole citizen body;37 the legislative power must
be entirely in the hands of the whole citizen body; the government ought to
34Skinner, Foundations, I, p. 61.
35 Cf. Skinner, Foundations, I, p. 61; De Freitas, Federal-Republicanism, p. 120.
37 Strauss, “Marsilius of Padua”, p. 256.
34
be elected by the whole citizen body and ought to be responsible to it; the
government must rule in strict adherence to the laws and if it transgresses a
law it is liable to be punished by the whole citizen body.
Marsilius’ theory of popular sovereignty provided the philosophical structure
for supporting Bartolus’ views on the juristic underpinnings of corporation
theory undergirding popular sovereignty. The consequences of the emerging
popular sovereignty underpinning the republican claims of the Italian cityrepublics in the course of the fifteenth century grew into a systematic defence
of republican liberty against tyranny and despotism.38
The pervading legacy of popular sovereignty expounded by Marsilius and
the Bartolist School of jurists was the stronger and more active involvement
of the people in the art of practical government and to prevent any individual
or faction in the commonwealth from legislating in its own selfish interests.39
2.3 Catholic Monarchomachian theories of popular sovereignty
2.3.1 Salamasius and the origins of monarchomachian political thought
The religious wars of the sixteenth century and the ensuing political
instability of European states demanded theories to preserve states
from becoming a meaningless struggle for existence. The pioneering
work Patritii Romani de Principatu (The Sovereignty of the Roman
Patriciate (1544)), a book of an unknown author, probably a Spaniard
Jesuit who wrote under the name of Marius Salamonius (c. 14501532) and designated himself as Patricius Romanus, was the
first serious effort in the genre of monarchomachial publications
to address issues related to civic freedom and faction conflicts in
the state. In this work “an essentially Bartolist theory of inalienable
popular sovereignty is presented as the most suitable form of
government for the city of Rome”.40 The work reflects influences of
Roman law, Aristotelian and Stoic political philosophy and Marsilius’
views on popular sovereignty.41 Salamonius’ work is composed of a
series of dialogues in which the participants are agreed on the validity
38 The idea of a covenant, compact or contract that bound together the people, rulers, and
God was echoed by Marsilius of Padua and Nicholas of Cusa. Cf. J. Witte, Reformation of
Rights, pp. 135-136.
41Skinner, Foundations, I, p.149, states that Salamonio “was one of the leading jurists of his
age, a famous commentator on the Digest, and a pioneer in seeking to incorporate the
historical methods of the humanists into his own legal philosophy”.
35
of divine and natural law as the ground on which the commonwealth
must be established. A central theme of the work is that a ruler is a
tyrant if he does not abide by the rules emanating from divine and
natural law sources. Salamonius proceeds to address issues related
to the ruler’s authority to make laws and the limits to his lawmaking
powers: How can the power of the ruler and the making of law be
justified? Salamonius offers the Roman construction of the Lex
Regia to answer this question.42 The ruler is an agent of the people;
his lawmaking power is delegated on certain conditions to him by the
people.43
Salamonius also introduces the Ciceronian concept of the people
as a societas, more specifically a societas civilis; the rules by which
the people are ordered in the form of laws, are a consensus in
idem, pactum et stipulation into which the members of society have
entered. By such pacts (pactiones) the individual citizens have bound
themselves to the welfare of the utilitas populi.44 From this Ciceronian
perspective, Salamonius constructs the function of rulership. The
ruler is one of the socii like the other members of the community,
bound by the same laws and obligations.45 The ruler has to perform
his functions of rulership praepositus vel institutor societatis – for
the welfare of society. The ruler is the functioning member of the
society similar to the functions and duties of a father as a functioning
member of the family. Salamonius applies the fatherly metaphor
to the lawmaking function of the prince and the coercive power he
wields.
To Salamonius lawmaking is a function of society as a whole, and laws
have the nature of agreements concluded by the whole of society in
the form of pactiones inter cives. The actual making of law, however,
is delegated to the ruler as a servant and perpetual magistrate of
society.46 The ruler, therefore, has no original lawmaking powers,
nor can the authority delegated to him be used at his personal
42Skinner, Foundations, II, pp.132-133.
43Salamonius, De Principatu, (1544), fo 59; the ruler is the minister of the people who are
said to have retained the ultimate sovereign authority over the city at all times (fos 55(a)(b) & fo 59). This also reflects a covenantal perspective. Cf. Skinner, Foundations, II, p.
133. Furthermore no prince can be said to be legibus solutus.
44Salamonius, De Principatu, (1544), fos 21(a), 28(b)-29(a).
45Skinner, Foundations, II, p.133.
46 The people is greater than the ruler whom they create (De Principatu, (1544)), fos 12(b),
17(a), 21(a).
36
discretion.47 Parallel to Marsilius’ views on legislation as the product
of the people as a whole, Salamonius states that the people are the
real legislators in the commonwealth and the ruler must not use his
delegated power beyond the limits of the delegation.48 At the heart
of the argument is the power of divine and human law from which
the pacts between the people and the delegation of power to the
ruler receive their enforcement.49 In the background of Salamonius’
argument lurks the Ciceronian conception of society as a legal
order by agreement of its members; a covenantal community bound
together by covenantal terms and agreements. The delegation of
power to the ruler in terms of the Lex Regia, the Marsilian legislator
in the form of the people and the corporational status of the populus
form three cogent principles for securing the liberty of the respublica
and limiting the powers of rulers. The implications of Salamonius’
arguments opened vistas of republican freedom to states rocked by
political power struggles between rulers and their subjects.
A most appealing idea was the notion that the members of society
form a single entity whose common welfare is not identical with the
separate welfare of its individual members and that this legal entity
can delegate its authority, while retaining its original power. These
ideas synthesised notions of the Aristotelian notion of the “good
life” with the Ciceronian views of the respublica and the juristic and
Marsilian notion of the legal sovereignty of the people and cast it
into a cogent theory of the legal rights of the people to dispose of
tyrannous rulers and to explain the original powers of the people
as a historical entity to determine its own form of government. This
implies that the ruler is the servant rather than the master of the laws,
and that it must even be possible for a law propounded by a ruler
to be abrogated in the name of justice by the sovereign people if
they subsequently discover it not conducive to stability and common
welfare.50 The monarchomachs of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries cast these ideas into a coherent system of thought which
appealed to both Protestant and Catholic subjects in their battles
against tyrannous rulers.
47Cf. De Principatu, (1544), fo 15(b) & 11(b), 17(a), 21(a).
48 Although the ruler is above each individual citizen in authority (maior singulis) he is inferior
to the populace as a whole (inferior universe populo) (fo 13(a). Whatever is done by the
ruler is in fact done by the authority of the people (fos 13(a)-(b)).
49 Cf. A. Lloyd, “Constitutionalism”, p. 260.
50De Principatu, (1544), fo 27(b).
37
2.3.2 The Catholic monarchomachs on the corporational status of the
populus and the delegation of power
2.3.2.1 The Catholic monarchomachs on the sovereignty of the people
The convergence of Ciceronian republicanism, juristic interpretations
of the Roman Lex Regia and other Roman law sources, and
Marsilian views of the sovereignty of the people contributed to
monarchomachism as a trend in political philosophy, driven by the
idea that states are autonomous polities in which the people wield
the governing power. The Jesuit political authors in particular,
contributed substantially towards this movement in explaining and
analysing the new trends in monarchomachism as a comprehensive
philosophy of law and politics towards establishing the respublica
Christiana under the spiritual headship of the Pope.51
The Jesuit writings of Soto, Molina and Suarez sought to limit the
sovereignty of the ruler by reverting to the writings of the jurists of
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the notion of popular
sovereignty in the classical Marsilian applications of the body of the
people as a corporate entity. The people as a juristic conception is
not necessarily treated as a universitas, but sometimes regarded
as a societas in the sense that it was applied by Salamonius. To
Salamonius the Civitas is the universus populus which creates the
ruler; the people itself is the sicietas and the ruler its praepositus.52
The Persona Civitatis acts through the princeps when he issues laws
or performs any other act of government.53 In this regard the view
taken of law by Salamonius appears to be precisely the same as that
of Marsilius’ Defensor Pacis of 1324.54
Soto distinguished between the people and the ruler as separate
personalities. The people have a natural right against its ruler: the
respublica by divine instruction transfers the right to rule but retains
51 Cf. Bellarmine, De Summo Pontifice, I: 449 & II, 5-167.
52 J. Marius Salamonius, De Principatu libri VII, (1578), I, pp. 16-18. At I, p. 36 Salamonius
regards the unity of the people to be a fiction although it forms a unity: “vere populous non
aliud est quam quaedam hominum multitude”). He also treats the people as a societas (De
Principatu libri VII, (1578), I: 36). To Salamonius the people is a contractually unitedbody
of persons. The civitas (as a civilis societas) presupposes binding contracts of mutual
obligation between the individual members of the people and the ruler (as praepositus) in
the societas. (Cf. Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, II, pp. 243, 256).
53 Cf. De Freitas, Federal-Republicanism, p. 77.
54 De Freitas, Federal-Republicanism, p. 77.
38
the right of deposing a monarch who has become tyrannical in the
exercise of its power. The respublica, which is the sum of its subjects,
is incapable by itself of exercising its sovereignty; only by transferring
sovereignty does it become a body which has a head and is therefore
capable of political action.55
Molina limits the very nature of the state by reserving the inalienable
and natural rights of the original sovereign people, upon such
sovereignty as had been alienated to the ruler – the collective body
of the people confronting the ruler at a number of points as the
true and proper state-personality.56 Although the existence of civil
society may be the work of individuals, the power of the associated
community over its members proceeds from God.57 Molina explains
the divine and natural law origins of the political body in typical
corporational terms. The societas politica arises from the union of
originally independent individuals which composes the reipublica.58
Sovereignty belongs to the community, whilst the community is
driven by the nature of things to transfer its original authority to a
ruler, because it cannot as a multitude exercise authority itself. Molina
adopts the view that the sovereignty of the people is the authority of
a body over its members, but the whole body is the sum of all, whilst
the transference of authority to the ruler is a command of natural law.
Molina distinguishes two persons in the state: the people and the
ruler. The people is the respublica and possesses all the authority
which it transfers secundum arbitrium and on such conditions as
it thinks fit.59 If the rulership is vacated or forfeited the respublica
recovers the authority from the ruler.60 The respublica also has a right
of resistance to tyrants; it can depose or punish the tyrant by the
express will of the whole body.61 However, the ruler is superior to the
respublica within the terms of the authority granted to the ruler.62
In his De legibus Suàrez argued that men unite by individual will
and common consent to establish a single political body, with the
55Soto, De justitia et jure, (1602), I, I, 3; I, 7, 2; IV, 4, 1-2.
56Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, I, p. 59.
57Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, I, p. 105.
58Molina, De justitia et jure, (1614), II, 22, 8-9.
59Molina, De justitia et jure (1614), II, 22, 9 & II, 23, 1.
60 De justitia et jure, (1614), V, 3.
61 De justitia et jure, (1614), II, 6; V, 3.
62 The ruler is limited by the contractual rights of the people (De justitia et jure, (1614), II, 23).
39
agreement to assist one another by establishing a human organisation
for a specific political end under one political head.63 To Suàrez the
transfer of power is not a delegation but an alienation of power.
The right of self-defence in Suàrez’s theory proceeds from natural
law and the contractual nature of society and although the power
of the people is alienated, they still retain the right to self-defence
as a natural right pertaining to all men.64 To Suàrez Bellarmine’s
views that the people never transfers its powers to the prince without
retaining it in a particular sense for use in certain circumstances, is
not a contradiction, and it does not legitimise revolutionary claims to
liberty by the people.65 The circumstances under which people may
retain power for use in certain circumstances, are to be understood
as either being conditions pertaining to the prior contract or with the
requirements of natural justice, because pacts and conventions exist
for a specific purpose. If the people therefore transferred power to
the king whilst reserving it to themselves in some grave causes and
affairs, it is lawful for them to make use of it and to preserve their
right.66
In Suàrez the theory of popular sovereignty reaches its apex in
monarchomachian politican thought with his theory of legitimate
resistance to tyranny. To Suàrez the commonwealth, similar to the
individual, has the right to preserve its life as the supreme natural
right. If a king actually attacks the commonwealth with the aim of
destroying and killing the citizens, there is an analogous right of selfdefence, which makes it lawful for the community to resist its ruler,
and even to kill him, if there is no other means of preserving itself.
Even though a community may have transferred its power to its king
in the way James I of England alleges, it nevertheless reserves the
right to preserve itself. If the king converts his power into tyranny,
then it becomes lawful for the community to make use of its natural
power to defend itself.67 The power of deposing a king can only be
wielded as a method of self-defence when it becomes vital for a
commonwealth to preserve itself against immanent destruction.
63Suàrez, Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore, (1613), III, 2, 4.
64Suàrez, Defensio fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae, (1613), III, 3, 3, 253.
65Suàrez, Defensio fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae, (1613), III, 3, 3, 253.
66 Cf. Suàrez, Defensio fidei, (1613), IV, 4, 16, 819.
67 Cf. Suàrez, Defensio fidei, (1613), III, 3, 3, 253.
40
Suàrez applied the basic tenets of Neo-Thomist political theory in his
objections to King James I’s account of his own sovereignty. In his
answer to the question as to whether the people of England are in
fact bound by their oath of allegiance to their heretical king, Suàrez
concludes that communities have rights similar to those of individuals:
just as in the case of an individual person, the right to preserve one’s
life is also the supreme right possessed by commonwealths, because
where a king attacks the commonwealth with the aim of unjustly
destroying it and killing its citizens, there must be an analogous right
of self-defence, which makes it lawful for the community to resist
its ruler, and even to kill him, if it has no other means of preserving
itself provided that self-defence is only justified if the community as
a whole is in jeopardy. In his objections to James I’s statements of
his own sovereignty, Suàrez argues that although a community may
have transferred its power to a king in the way James alleges, the
people nevertheless maintains the right to preserve themselves. If,
therefore, the king abuses his power by becoming a tyrant in such
a way that his rule threatens the safety of the entire community,
people have the right to use the power they naturally have, in order
to defend themselves. More specifically, Suàrez answers as to
whether the people of England are obliged to accept the new oaths
of allegiance, that if the life of the community is genuinely at risk,
it does become lawful for the people to resist the ruler in virtue of
the natural right they have to protect themselves. This natural right
of self-defence is exempted from the original contract by which the
community transfers its power to its king.
Whereas the state was regarded to be human structure, created by
contract in virtue of natural law, the Jesuits deemed the church to be
the higher of the two sovereignties and having spiritual sovereignty
superior to the political. Where the church touches the secular
sphere the church acts with potestas indirecta. Suàrez maintained
the superior jurisdiction of the spiritual power, having direct and
indirect power over temporal rulers. The Pope has the right to call
upon a Christian commonwealth to revolt against an oppressive ruler
and he might authorise a foreign prince to invade the realm of a king
who had been declared a heretic.68 Suàrez also maintained that the
Pope must be able to wield his indirect temporal power in such a way
as to remove a prince and deprive him of his dominion in order to
68Suàrez, Defensio fidei, (1613), VI, 4, 16, 819; Salmon, “Catholic resistance theory”, p. 240.
41
prevent him from harming his subjects and absolve his subjects from
their oaths of allegiance.
2.3.2.2 The Catholic monarchomachs on natural law and natural rights
Monarchomachian political thought reverted strongly to natural law
theory to explain the origins of civil society and the power to make
laws. Catholic thinkers like De Soto, Molina, Suàrez and others used
the hypothesis of an original condition of perfect human freedom,
equality and independence and governed by the law of nature
inscribed in the hearts of human beings as a basis to argue for the
formation of the civil state.69 The law of nature is both a dictate of
right reason and an expression of the will of God because all law
participate in the lex aeterna.70
Because to Molina the state of nature does not provide a right of
dominion and the law in the state of nature is available to all men in
every condition in which it may exist.71 To the Neo-Thomist natural
law theorists every human law must derive from the law of nature in
order to be enforceable because natural law expresses the will of
God and the divine positive law in Scripture is contained in the law
of nature.72 Both the laws contained in the Decalogue and the New
Testament is inscribed in the hearts of all human beings.73
Regarding the law of nations (ius gentium), most Neo-Thomist
authors agreed that it differs from natural law and belongs to the
category of human positive law.74 The first implication of this view is
that political society is not directly ordained by God but is set up by its
own citizens to suit their particular needs.75 The second implication is
closely attached to the first: political society does not have a natural
existence but it is the result of the choice of its citizens.76 Thirdly, the
power to make laws and the ability to establish a commonwealth,
flow from the natural state of mankind – a condition of freedom,
69 De Soto, Libri Decem de Iustitia et Jure, (1569): 17b, 18a.
70Skinner, Foundations, II, p. 157.
71 Luis de Molina, de Iustitia et Iure Libri Sex, (1659): 1689.
73Suàrez, Tractatus de legibus ac Deo Legislatore, (1872), I: 109. Cf. Skinner, Foundations,
II: 151.
75Skinner, Foundations, II, p. 155
42
equality and independence – which implies that all human beings
are born free by nature and that no person was the superior of the
others. Fourthly, human beings in the pre-civil state act as social
beings pursuing common political goals to ensure their well-being.77
Although political society has a distinct natural law origin, the needs
of human beings in the natural state demand that everybody in the
state submit to the law in order to ensure justice for all.78 Suàrez for
example states that peace and justice cannot be maintained without
convenient laws.79 Vitoria explains the transition from the natural
to the civil state as a consequence of the fact that no society can
maintain itself without laws to govern it because each person would
pursue his own interests and promote his own views.80 The power to
formalize the natural commitments of mankind flows from the will of
God. Suàrez maintains that the power to establish a commonwealth
is not immediately provided by God. This, says Suàrez, is to treat
God as both the material and the efficient cause of political society;81
God merely provided human beings with the power to create a
commonwealth for themselves, by creating the circumstances and
providing them with the capacities to erect a particular political
society. Suàrez regards political power to arise from the law of nature
but the establishment of political society through human choice.82
The transition from man’s natural state to the civil state is
accomplished by the consent of the people to transfer their powers to
a specific person for governing society for the good of the people.83
Molina maintains that the power of the ruler must be according to the
will and approbation of the people. The people transfer their powers
to someone for the good of the commonwealth. According to De Soto
the people should consent before a ruler can be instituted and the
approbation of the people is constitutive for awarding power to the
ruler.84
77 Cf. Francisco Vitoria, Relecciones, (1933-1936), p. 183; Skinner, Foundations, II, p. 155.
43
Only by consent of the people can political society be legitimately
established.85 The implication is also that if the act of consent is
absent, the ruler cannot be said to have legitimate legislative power.
The consent of the people is provided through the exercise of the
general will of the people, unified by consent, bound by bond uniting
them as a legal entity in the form of a universitas.86 Because the
rules of natural law are accessible by all human beings, all groups
of people have the ability to establish political societies.87 Therefore,
the establishment of political society is an act of providence; it has as
its basis natural law, flowing from the divine will and is accomplished
through the free consent of the people. The natural law Thomists
of the sixteenth-century could therefore be credited with providing a
strong impetus to modern democratic theory, propagating the notion
of the social contract and establishing natural law as the basis of
political society.
3.
Samuel Rutherford and the natural law theorists
of the sixteenth-century
3.1 Samuel Rutherford and the impact of Christian humanism
The importance of social humanism for Rutherford’s social theory lies in the
fact that he proposed political reform, which he, together with contemporary
Protestant and Catholic authors had derived from the Renaissance and its
classical authors. Rutherford’s political views were spawned no more from
Calvin’s Institutes (and other Reformation authors) than from Cicero’s De
Officiis (and other Stoic writers). The publication in the original vernacular
and English translations provided scholars – like Rutherford – access
to Greek and Roman authors like Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Plutarch,
Seneca, the Church fathers and Medievalists. The availability of these
works, under the inspiration of the activism of the Reformed faith, produced
specific guidelines on how social and political reform should take place. The
religious drive to criticize the status quo, to accomplish the reformation of
the social and political order and the sources generated by the Christian
humanists provided Rutherford in his social and political activism with
specific instructions as to how such reform should be accomplished. The
substrate of Christian humanism permeating social and political theory of the
44
sixteenth-century established a certain level of consensus between Puritans
and Neo-Scholastics. The Aristotelian ontology of cosmic proportion and
order provided Puritans like Rutherford with a view of the harmonious,
hierarchical order of the universe, governed by divine Providence. However,
the Bible to Rutherford was to be the “pre-eminent” guiding force behind the
drive to transform society. According to Todd the Puritans’ (like Rutherford)
regard for the Scriptures guided their extra-biblical intellectual pursuits: their
perception of a biblical concern for individual morality attracted them to the
Roman Stoics; the need to understand the Bible contextually drew them to a
study of ancient history; the need for a purified text of the Scriptures impelled
them to pursue knowledge of Greek and Hebrew and of classical grammar
and rhetoric; and the Church Fathers were revered given their proximity to
the first century, for the light they shed on the Scriptures. The text of the
Bible, however, remained of course, paramount among Christian humanist
and Puritan concerns.88
The impact of Christian humanism on Rutherford’s political thought is evident
both from his reliance on Aristotelian methodology and his references to
and quotes from a host of classical, Medieval and post-Medieval sources.
Classical sources from Greek and Roman thought are cited frequently:
Plato,89 Aristotle90 and Cicero91 are among the most frequently cited classics.
References to Beza,92 Aquinas,93 Rebuffus,94 Montanus,95 Abulens,96
Jerome,97 Athanasius,98 Milevitanus,99 Gregorius100 and Lyra101 are also
88Todd, Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order, pp. 27-33.
89 Lex, Rex, Q 44, p. 228(1).
90 Lex, Rex, Q 8, p. 31(1); Q 9, pp. 37(2), 38(1); Q 10, pp. 40(1), 45(1); Q 13, pp. 50(2), 51(1);
Q 15, p. 62(1); Q 19, p. 85(2); Q 24, p. 115(1); Q 25, p. 119(2); Q 29, p. 144(2); Q 36, p.
185(1); Q 40, pp. 198(1), 204(2).
91 Lex, Rex, Q 30, p. 178(1); Q 36, p. 193(2); Q 44, p. 233(2).
92 Lex, Rex, Q 29, pp. 148(2), 152(1); Q 30, p. 155(1); Q 33, p. 173(2); Q 39, p. 184(1); Q 41,
p. 209(1).
93 Lex, Rex, Q 18, p. 73(2); Q 41, p. 207(2).
94 Lex, Rex, Q 16, p. 68(2); Q 18, p. 72(1).
95 Lex, Rex, Q 18, p. 73(1).
96 Lex, Rex, Q 3, p. 4(1).
97 Lex, Rex, Q 3, 4(2).
98 Lex, Rex, Q 3, 4(2).
99 Lex, Rex, Q 3, 4(2).
100 Lex, Rex, Q 26, 127(2).
101 Lex, Rex, Q 29, 152(1).
45
common in Lex, Rex. Also references to the works of the Dominicans
occur frequently: Salamonius,102 Soto,103 Vasquez104 and Vitoria,105 together
with citations of Neo-Thomists like Boucher106 and Rossaeus.107 Jesuit
authors like Valentia,108 Molina,109 Bellarmine110 and Suàrez111 are also cited
frequently by Rutherford. He treats these authors within the broader context
of his Aristotelian methodology – either in support of his views or by rejecting
these as being in conflict with the Puritan perspectives on specific points.
He applies Aristotle’s theory of the four causes in a Reformational context
to state the foundational elements of political society. Rutherford states
the final cause or purpose of civil government as being the well-being of
the people by protecting them and the church so that they may attain the
highest good in the knowledge of God in Christ; it explains why government
exists. The efficient cause of government treats with the questions as to
whom or what brings government into being. Rutherford answers that God
is the primary cause who rules all things through His exalted Son and brings
government into existence by using the consent of the people as a means
(or secondary cause); God is the principle and the people the agent and it
explains how government is established. The formal cause of government
answers the question as to what is the essence of government: submission
to and embodiment of the law discovered through study and application
of his infallible Word, the Bible. The material cause of government is the
substance out of which government is composed: it is made by ordinary
sinful human beings, equal with all others by nature and each of whom is
directly accountable to the true living God.
The issues on which Rutherford was generally in agreement with the NeoThomist natural law theorists, included a number of aspects flowing from their
views on the corporate nature of the people and the natural law foundations
of the commonwealth: political society is not directly ordained by God but
is set up by its own citizens to suit their particular needs; political society
102 Lex, Rex, Q 16, 65(1); Q 26, p. 129(1); Q 31, p. 165(2).
103 Lex, Rex, Q 3, p. 3(2); Q 5, p. 13(1).
104 Lex, Rex, Q 2, p. 2(2); Q 13, p. 51(2).
105 Lex, Rex, Q 2, p. 3(1).
106 Lex, Rex, Q 41, p. 209(1).
107 Lex, Rex, Q 41, p. 209(1).
108 Lex, Rex, Q 26, p. 130(2).
109 Lex, Rex, Q 1, p. 1(2).
110 Lex, Rex, Q 3, 4(1); Q 5, p. 10(1).
111 Lex, Rex, Q 2, p. 2(1); Q 3, p. 3(2); Q 5, p. 13(1).
46
does not have a natural existence but is the result of the concerted action
of its citizens; the power to make laws and establish a commonwealth flows
from the nature of things; this state is a condition of freedom, equality and
independence implying that naturally no person was the superior of others.
3.2 Rutherford’s support of Neo-Scholastic natural law political
theory
3.2.1 Rutherford on the corporational status of the populus and the
delegation of power
3.2.1.1 Rutherford on the sovereignty of the people
To Rutherford the power of the state is from God, and particular
powers of government proceed from God.112 This power is mediated
from God through the consent of the community. Although all powers
are awarded by God it flows from the people.113 The civil office and
power are from God alone, but that one rather than another should
obtain it is from the will and choice of the people and the people
may set boundaries to the exercise of power. Human beings who
are united in a community must have the power to fend off violence
through the hands of one or more rulers. If all men are born equal
regarding civil power, yet one among them is to rule, then the power
must be the result of their united decision. By the authoritative voice
of the people a private man becomes a public person and is crowned
king.114
The consent of the people by appointing a ruler is of fundamental
importance for establishing legitimate government. If a person does
not have the approval of the people he is a usurper. Rutherford
maintains that the primary foundation of all power is the community
although the precise manifestation of power vary according to the
needs, conditions and cultures of specific peoples. Although the
community has given power into the hands of the ruler and the states
of parliament, it keeps for itself a power to resist tyranny. Because
civil power does not flow immediately from nature, subjection by the
people is rather civil than natural. Rulers are therefore established by
the free consent of the people and not by nature.115
112 Lex, Rex, Q 1, p. 1(1)-(2).
113 Lex, Rex, Q 4, pp. 6(1)-9(2).
114 Lex, Rex, Q 4, pp. 6(1)-9(2).
115 Lex, Rex, Q 9, pp. 33(1)-39(2).
47
The transfer of power from the people to the ruler takes place through
a reciprocal oath between a people and the ruler they appoint. All
contracts between men bind the responsible parties under law and
claim before men and God. This contract contains specific conditions,
and if the conditions are not fulfilled the injured party is released from
the contract. When the people appoint any one to be a ruler, the law
of nature confirms their act.116
The will of the people to appoint a ruler emanate from the people as a
single body of persons and this collectivity has more of the image of
God in a substantial sense, and they are greater than ruler because
many are more estimable than one. The people as a collective body
are also above and contain greater dignity than the ruler; therefore
the power of the people is superior to the ruler, because every
efficient and constituent cause is more consequential than the effect.
When a people place a government above themselves this does not
mean that they have relinquished all rights to the ruler. The basis of
power remains within the people, because civil power has limitations
and the foundation of all political power remains in the people as an
immortal spring.117
Although the ruler is above his subjects as individuals, he is inferior
to his subjects when observed collectively for the whole nation
because powers of sovereignty reside primarily and entirely in the
people. Rutherford cites many examples of the power that resides
in the people. All the power that the ruler has in terms of his office
derives from the people who made him ruler. In addition the people
do not have, either officially or fundamentally, an “absolute” power
to give to a ruler. All the power they have is legal and noted to guide
themselves in peace and godliness, and to save themselves from
unjust violence by the benefit of rulers.118
The ruler is not the only person with the power to make laws; the
people have some power in making laws.119 The people are not
only the fountain from which the government springs, but also of
the statutes enacted as laws. Historically, says Rutherford, the chief
purpose of civil law, which has been the foundation of all others, has
116 Lex, Rex, Q 14, pp. 54(1)-62(1).
117 Lex, Rex, Q 19, pp. 77(2)-88(1).
118 Lex, Rex, Q 19, pp. 77(1)-88(1).
119 Lex, Rex, Q 24, pp. 113(2)-119(1).
48
been the safety of the people; since the people are the author and
foundation, under God, of civil law and power, their own safety must
be the principle end for this venture.120 If a ruler becomes a tyrant, a
master, and destroyer of the people, he is subject to the power of the
laws of the land. Because law creates the office of the ruler, the holder
of that office cannot be ruler of the law.121 Rulers are, therefore, to be
honoured, revered, and obeyed for the sake of their office. However,
all subjection to higher powers is rooted in obedience to the office of
magistrates. This subjection to the lawful use of civil power and the
Scriptures give no indication that this includes abusive or tyrannical
power.122
3.2.1.2 Rutherford on natural law and natural rights
Rutherford argues that historically, natural law presupposed that
individuals would naturally join in civil society, and the manner of the
union would be a type of political body. The power of making laws
proceeds from God as an attribute flowing from nature; this power is
not different from creation, nor is it something that results from the
observation of nature. All people are naturally born equally free; all
authority of human beings over others is artificial because it is not
natural to be subject to government.123
When a community decides in the light of nature to form a government,
with the goal of defending themselves from violence, they do not
thereby agree to a specific form of government. It merely implies
that the establishment of government is natural to humanity. God
made man with a civic nature yet giving individual communities the
freedom to establish a particular form of government.124
Man is created in the image of God; man is a sacred being and, by
the law of nature, can be no more sold and bought than a religious
and sacred vessel dedicated to God. Every person is by nature born
free; this freedom is natural to all human beings with the exception
of the required subjugation to parents. Rutherford stresses the fact
that people are naturally born free because in nature no beast is
born specifically to rule. Nations and empires were established, not
120 Lex, Rex, Q 25, pp. 119(1)-125(2).
121 Lex, Rex, Q 26, 125(2)-136(2).
122 Lex, Rex, Q 9, pp. 33(2)-39(1).
123 Lex, Rex, Q 2, pp. 1(2)-3(2).
124 Lex, Rex, Q 2, pp. 1(2)-3(2).
49
by the law of nature, but by the law of nations. Therefore, no ruler
or potentate is born freer by nature than the other human beings
are and a ruler is made by the free consent of the people and not by
nature.125
The right to make and enforce laws is in the people. This right cannot
by choice or by the law of nature be relinquished to a ruler because
neither God nor natural law has given them such a power.126 Because
the right to defend one is a natural right, the people have the right to
depose tyrants who jeopardise the safety of the people. According
to Rutherford there are natural rights which no human being can
dispose of.127
4.Conclusions
Rutherford associated himself closely with aspects of Neo-Thomistic
political thought and aligned his views in Lex, Rex accordingly. Firstly,
Rutherford noted the democratic ideals contained in the political views
of the ecclesiastical jurists. The interest in the Neo-Thomist views of the
Dominicans and Jesuits was not something peculiar to Rutherford’s thoughts.
The social activism espoused by the Christian humanists and the NeoThomist natural law theorists formed part of the ongoing discourse about
social and political reform. Both classical humanist sources and the works
of the Neo-Thomist natural law theorists were reinterpreted in the light of
the Bible to accomplish the original ideals of the first and second generation
Reformers like Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon, Zwingli, Bullinger and Bucer.
To this end the methodological use of Aristotle’s philosophy served as a
catalyst/platform from which Puritan theorists formulated the basic principles
for reforming state and society. Rutherford’s Lex, Rex is a clear example of
the impact of Christian humanism, Neo-Thomistic natural law theory and
Aristotelian methodology on Puritan social and political views. In Lex, Rex
Rutherford demonstrated the selective use and application of these sources
and re-interpreted non-Biblical sources from a Scriptural perspective. The
Christian basis the Puritans shared with the Neo-Thomist philosophers
facilitated Rutherford’s reliance upon both the Dominicans and the Jesuits.
Rutherford aligned himself two aspects of the Neo-Thomist political theories
in particular: the corporate underpinnings of Neo-Thomist democratic theory
125 Lex, Rex, Q 13, pp. 50(1)-54(1).
126 Lex, Rex, Q 14, pp. 54(1)-62(1).
127 Cf. e.g. Lex, Rex, Q 24, pp. 113(2)-119(1).
50
and the natural law basis of society. These aspects are of foundational
importance for Rutherford’s political and legal thought. It is most probable
that through the works of the Dominicans and the Jesuits Rutherford gained
access to the legal and corporation theories of the medieval jurists and
political philosophers.
Although Rutherford had strong reservations about the theological
underpinnings of the Neo-Thomist political views, he incorporated aspects
of their political thought that could be re-interpreted from a Reformational
Scriptural perspective without compromising the Reformed faith. Rutherford
unhesitatingly criticized the Papist views of the Neo-Thomists but gave
credit for insights which could fruitfully be assimilated into the Reformed
perspectives on political and social reform.
Bibliography
AZO, P. 1966. Summa super codicem, Ed. M.E. Viora, Turin.
AZO, P. 1966. Lectura super codicem, Ed. M.E. Viora, Turin.
BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERRATO, 1562, Digestum Novum Commentaria,
Basel.
BELLARMINE, R. 1586. De Summo Pontifice capite militantis Ecclesia, in
Disputationes ... de Controversis Christianae Fidei, vols. I-III, Ingolstadt.
BERMAN, H.J. 1997. Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western
Legal Tradition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
CALASSO, F. 1957. I Glossatori e la Teoria della Sovranità: Studi di Diritto
Comune Publico, 3rd edn., Milan.
CANNING, J.P. 1983. “Ideas of the State in Thirteenth- and FourteenthCentury Commentators on the Roman Law”, Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society 33, 1-27.
CANNING, J.P. 1987. The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
DE FREITAS, S.A. 2014. Law and Federal-Republicanism: Samuel
Rutherford’s Quest for a Constitutional Model, unpublished LL.D.-thesis,
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein.
DE SOTO, D. 1569. Libri Decem de Iustitia et Iure, Lyons.
GIERKE, O. 1934. Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800, vols.
I & II, transl. E. Barker, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
51
GILMORE, M.P. 1941. Argument from Roman Law in Political Thought,
1200-1600, Cambridge, Mass.
LLOYD, H.A. 1996. “Constitutionalism”, J.H. Burns (Ed.), The Cambridge
History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 254-297.
MOLINA, L. 1602-1603. De iustitia et jure libri sex, vols. I & II, Mainz.
MOLINA, L. 1614. De Iustitia et Iure Libri Sex, vols. I & II, Cologne.
MOLINA, L. 1659. De Iustitia et Iure Libri Sex, vols. I & II, Mainz.
NAJEMY, J. 1994. “Stato, Commune e ‘Universitas’”, Annali dell’Instituto
Storico Italo-germanico in Trento 20, pp. 245-263.
RUTHERFORD, S. 1982. Lex, Rex, or The Law and the Prince ..., Sprinkle
Publications, Harrisonburg, Virginia.
SALAMONIUS, M. 1544. Patritii Romani de Principatu libri VII, Rome.
SALAMONIUS, M. 1578. De Principatu libri VII, Paris.
SALMON, J.H.M. 1996. Catholic resistance theory, Ultramontanism, and
the royalist response, 1580-1620, Ed. J.H. Burns, The Cambridge History of
political Thought, 1450-1700, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.
219-253.
SKINNER, Q. 1978. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. I: The
Renaissance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
SKINNER, Q. 1978, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. II:
The Age of Reformation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
SKINNER, Q. 2002. Visions of Politics, vol. II: Renaissance Virtues,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
SOTO, 1569. Libri Decem de Iustitia et Jure, Lyons.
SOTO, 1602. Libri Decem de Iustitia et Jure, Venice.
STRAUSS, L. 1972. “Marsilius of Padua”, Ed. L. Strauss & J. Cropsey,
History of political Philosophy, Rand Mcnally College Publishing Company,
Chicago, 251-270.
SUAREZ, F. 1613. Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore, Lyons.
SUAREZ, F. 1613. Defensio fidei Catholocae et Apostolicae, Coimbra.
SUAREZ, F. 1614. Defensio fidei Catholoicae et Apostolicae, Cologne.
SUAREZ, F. 1872. Tractatus de legibus ac Deo Legislatore, vols. I & II,
Naples.
TODD, M. 2002. Christian Humanism and the Puritan Social Order,
Cambridge Univeristy Press, Cambridge.
52
VITORIA, F. 1933-1936, Relecciones Teológicas de Maestro Fray Francisco
de Vitoria, Luis G. Alonso Getino (Ed.), vols. I-III, Asociación Francisco de
Vitoria, Madrid.
WAHL, J.A. 1977. “Baldus de Ubaldis and the Foundations of the NationState”, Manuscripta 21, pp. 80-96.
WITTE, J.R. 2007. The Reformation of Rights. Law, Religion, and Human
Rights in early Modern Calvinism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
53
Assessing the historicalphilosophical background of the
German Staatslehre in the light
of the type law of the state
Danie Strauss
School of Philosophy
Potchefstroom Campus
[email protected]
Abstract
In this article the contribution of the German Staatslehre towards an
understanding of the type law of the state will be assessed in terms of
various systematic distinctions and by taking into account significant
historical connections. From its inception the German Staatslehre
concerned itself with the state and its power. Since 1894 the discipline
called Allgemeine Staatslehre comprised a systematic and a historical
part. The phrase Allgemeine Staatslehre replaced its attachment to
constitutional law (Staatsrecht) and natural law. After a brief reflection on
the question if the Greek-Medieval era knew the state, the assessment of
Jellinek is mentioned, namely that the discipline Allgemeine Staatslehre is
dominated by two opposing world views, the one individualistic-atomistic
and the other one collectivistic-universalistic. This calls for an account
of the relationship between universality and what is individual against
the background of the distinction between modal laws and type-laws.
The distinction between what is just and unjust as well as that between
right and might (Recht und Macht) opens the way to paying attention to
additional features of the state as well, such as the relationship between
state sovereignty and legal sovereignty. Characterizing the state in terms
of one undifferentiated function evinces a lack of understanding for the
multi-faceted nature of the state. This presupposes a non-reductionist
55
Assessing the historical-philosophical background of the German Staatslehre in the light of the
type of law of the state
Christian ontology safeguarding theoretical thinking from one-sided
distortions (absolutizations), such as atomistic and holistic views.
Jellinek even refers to individualism and universalism as two opposing
world views. As an alternative the relationship between universality and
what is individual is employed on the way to distinguishing between
modal laws and type laws. The connection between individualism and
nominalism is highlighted and followed up by contemplating the dualism
of is and ought. The views of Jellinek and Smend are treated in some
more detail. Smend mutually separates state and law while at the same
time attempting to hold on to their inseparable connectedness. Atomistic
and organicistic theories of the state also reveal an inner conflict within
political theory. The notion of the validity of values (Werten) illegitimately
crosses the abyss between Sein and Sollen. The continued influence of
nominalism eliminated universality outside the human mind and reduced
factual reality to pure individuality. Jellinek struggled to reconcile his
sociological and juridical state concept and in the final analysis did not
succeed in avoiding the Leviathan of the total state. Ultimately this issue
raises questions concerning the limits or boundaries of the competence
(jural power) of the state and it prompted political scholars to face what
they designated as the crisis of Allgemeine Staatslehre (Smend and
Von Hippel). The legacy of an Allgemeine Staatslehre paved the way
for the next generation to develop a more comprehensive and coherent
understanding of the nature (and structural principle) of the state. Finally
a brief indication is given of key elements required in our understanding
of the type law of the state.
During the 19th century and the first halve of the 20th century the term
Staatslehre was established as the equivalent of political science or political
theory. Yet, scholars working within the domains of political theory and
the science of law attach different meanings to this term, depending upon
their respective views on the nature of the state and the nature of law. The
German legacy gave birth to the idea of the Rechtsstaat (just state) which
is unknown in England where the idea of the “rule of law” developed under
different circumstances (see Dicey,1927:179 ff. and Blaau, 1990:89 ff.).
The idea of a Rechtsstaat presupposes an insight into the structural principle
of the state, which will also be designated as the type law of the state in
this article. This study intends to investigate the historical-philosophical
56
Danie Strauss
underpinnings of those ideas which wrestle with the structural principle of the
state even though there are diverging stances within the German Staatslehre
legacy. The Allgemeine Staatslehre of Georg Jellinek provided the platform
for opposing schools of thought, such as the Berlin school and the Vienna
school. The former school includes scholars from Berlin (Rudolf Smend and
Hermann Heller), as well as from Bonn (Carl Schmitt, Gerhard Leibholz
and Leo Wittmayer), keeping in mind that they represent varying points of
view. Jellinek was a legal positivist (he studied at the University of Vienna),
reminding us of another well-known legal scholar from Vienna, Hans Kelsen,
who is a representative of the neo-Kantian Marburg school and also known
for his legal positivism.
We commence with an overview of the relevant literature and some historical
considerations (subdivisions 1-6), followed by a theoretical reflection on the
systematic issues at stake (subdivisions. 7-11), which will take us to a further
application of systematic (structural) issues (subdivisions 12-16).
1.
The focus of Staatslehre
Long before the modern state emerged, political elements permeated human
societies. The most obvious ones are displayed in relationships of superand subordination. However, the mere presence of authority structures
within human society does not ensure the existence of a genuine state.
Relationships of super- and subordination are primarily a manifestation of
various kinds of power and among them state-power is considered to be a
core element of the state. In itself this characterization, inter alia, points at
the need to explain the relationship between the state, power and law (in
the jural sense of the term). When the idea of the state is explored it should
be kept in mind that particularly within the German academia a discipline
called Staatslehre (Theory of the State) dominated the scene. It is directed
at the “essence or structure” of the state (“das Wesen oder die Struktur des
Staates”) (Vollrath, 1998:53). M. Zilnizki distinguishes between a transhistoric
universal application of the state concept and a historic understanding where
the concept of the state differentiates into a structural-historical part and a
word and concept-historical variant (“strukturgeschichtliche und eine wortund begriffsgeschichtliche Variante”) (Zilnizki 1998:1).
A structural-historical perspective does not depend on the emergence of
the meaning or the concept of a state, but rather on the development and
combination of forms of government (Herrschaftsformen) which belong to an
order designated as a “state”. Understood in this way it does not matter that
57
the literature at the time does not mention the word state. Zilnizki considers
expressions such as “civitas” (S. Pufendorf, G. W. Leibniz), “societas civilis”
(H. Conring), “res publica” (V. Gentilis, J. Lipsius), “république” (J. Bodin, J.J. Rousseau), “commonwealth” (Th. Hobbes), and “body politic” (J. Locke).
He also remarks that viewing the state as a transhistorical phenomenon
employs a universal category peculiar to Germany. During the transition from
the 18th to the 19th century the concept state, which traditionally included the
addition of peculiar meanings, now turned into an encompassing general
concept.
2.
The emergence of distinct designations of the
state
Distinct political concepts of order eventually became terms used in German
for the state, such as “polis,” “politeia” and “res publica”. This applies to
Plato’s “Politeia” as well as Cicero’s “De re publica” and for Bodin’s “Six
livres de la république” (Zilnizki, 1998:2).1 Such an encompassing term
opened the way to speak of the state of ancient Greece, the Medieval state
or the Modern state. In German the word “state” thus acquired the function
of an encompassing concept for distinct forms of societal organization or
political ordering. This development enabled prominent scholars from the
previous century to publish works with the title, Allgemeine Staatslehre
(General Theory of the State). The standard work of Georg Jellinek has
this title – the 5th print of its third edition appeared in 1928. Another wellknown legal scholar from Germany, Hans Kelsen, published the first edition
of his Allgemeine Staatslehre in 1925. Herman Heller simply used one word:
Staatslehre (1934). Of course it should not be forgotten that Fichte published
his Die Staatslehre already in 1813.
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries the development of Staatslehre
did not escape from the Kantian and neo-Kantian schools of thought.
Immanuel Kant wrestled with the problem of causality and freedom.
He assigned causality to the modern science ideal (restricted to the
“appearances”) and freedom to the personality ideal (the “Ding an sich” –
the freedom of the human soul). Kant elevated human understanding to the
level of the apriori formal law-giver of nature, where the categories of thought
serve as ordering principles.
1 This process of incorporating words within the German language is designated in German
as “Eindeutschung”.
58
Danie Strauss
According to Hermann Cohen, the founder of the neo-Kantian Marburg
school (oriented to the primacy of the science ideal), the first three categories
of Kant’s table of categories, namely unity, multiplicity and totality, specified
under “quantity”, should serve our understanding of society in such a way
that the unity and multiplicity of societal relationships must be subsumed
under the mathematical totality (all-ness) of the state (in the Table of
Categories quantity embraces “Einheit, Vielheit, Allheit” – Kant, 1787:106).
This inevitably leads to a totalitarian and absolutistic understanding of the
state,2 because within the mathematical “Allheit” no room is left for the
original spheres of competence of non-state societal entities. Hans Kelsen,
who also belongs to this Marburg school, explores this approach further in
his attempt to derive all law from his hypothetical Grundorm as the underlying
mathematical-logical unity.
3.
Staatsrecht and Staatslehre
Against the background of conceptions of natural law the expression
“Allgemeines Staatsrecht” [General Constitutional Law] already emerged
during the late 18th century. In the fourth edition of his 1787 work on
“Institutiones juris publici Germanici” (published in Göttingen), Pütter
views the discipline called Allgemeine Staatslehre as partly belonging to
philosophy and partly to natural law. According to Von Hippel the expression
“Allgemeine Staatslehre” was first employed by W.J. Behr in 1804 in his
work: “System der Allgemeinen Staatslehre” [System of a General Theory
of the State – mentioned by Von Hippel, 1963:8)]. A century later, in 1899,
Hermann Rehm interpreted this expression in a naturalistic way and at the
same time defends the view that the term Staatsrecht should be replaced
by the expression Allgemeine Staatslehre (see Von Hippel, 1963:7-8). The
factual power of the state reveals something of the empirical side of the state
while the discipline Allgemeine Staatslehre focuses on “the concept and the
essence of the state” (see Von Hippel, 1963:9). The first edition of Jellinek’s
Allgemeine Staatslehre appeared in 1900.
Jellinek identifies three elements of the state: (i) the territory of the state
(das Staatsgebiet); (ii) the nation of a state (das Staatsvolk); and (iii) state
2 When there are no political freedoms in a state (such as co-determination or coresponsibility), it is designated as absolutistic, and when civil and societal freedoms
are absent, we encounter a totalitarian situation. What is designated in German as a
Machtstaat is actually both totalitarian and absolutistic. The legal scholar Johan Van der
Vyver defines the terms absolutism and totalitarianism in the same way (see Van der
Vyver 1982:461).
59
power (Staatsgewalt) (Jellinek, 1928:394, 406, 427). Yet he distinguishes
only two main points of view (zwei Gesichtspunkten) under which the state
could be observed, respectively the state as societal structure and the state
as a juridical institution. Accordingly Staatslehre divides into a social theory
of the state (soziale Staatslehre) and the theory of constitutional law (die
Staatsrechtslehre) (Jellinek, 1928:11).
4.
Allgemeine Staatslehre: Did the Greek-Medieval
era know the state?
After Von Hippel’s Allgemeine Staatslehre appeared 1963, Krüger used the
same title, Allgemeine Staatslehre and published a book with the same title
in 1966 (1028 pages).3 Krüger points out that the history of the term “state”
has not been sufficiently investigated. He mentions that although the term
“Staat” is derived from the Latin word “status”, it does not mean that the
Romans employed the term “status” in the current sense of the term “Staat”.
They rather referred to their communal bond as the “populous romanus” or
as the “res publica”. One does find combinations such as “status republicae”,
“status imperii” or “status regni”, but the upshot is that the term “status” was
not used in the sense of a “state” during the middle ages (Krüger, 1966:9-11).
He holds that neither Antiquity nor the Medieval era has known the state in
the modern sense of the term (Krüger, 1966:9).
5.From Staatswissenschaft and Staatstheorie to
Staatslehre: two opposing world views
Sometimes the word “Staatslehre” replaces the term “Staatswissenschaft”
(Science of the State) or “Staatstheorie” (Theory of the State). Yet the
discipline of a Allgemeine Staatslehre did not leave constitutional law behind.
When the field of constitutional law (Staatsrecht) is also incorporated, the total
science of the state should be indicated, “die gesammte Staatswissenschaft”.
However, according to Jellinek, the discipline Allgemeine Staatslehre is
dominated by two opposing world views, namely an individualistic-atomistic
one and a collectivistic-universalistic world view (Jellinek, 1966:174). This
claim covers both the Greek-Medieval legacy and the post-Renaissance
developments.
3 The slow shift towards the current practice to refer to “Staatslehre” as “political
science” is reflected in the title of a work of Zippelius in 1980: Allgemeine Staatslehre
(Politikwissenschaft).
60
Danie Strauss
Since the Renaissance the atomistic world view dominated the scene,
for example in the classical mechanistic world view where the universe is
nothing but particles in motion. This inspired individualistic theories of human
society and hypothetical explanations of the emergence of the modern state
within social contract theories. The opposite view portrays the state as a
spiritual-moral organism (see Krüger, 1966:147 ff.).4 Zippelius discusses the
question whether the state is an organism [Der Staat als Organismus]. The
organic view appreciates the state as a living totality [“lebendiges Ganzheit”].
It is already found in the thought of Fichte who emphasized, in his 1796 work,
Grundlage des Naturrechts, that in an organic body every part sustains the
whole, and by doing this sustained itself – this also applies to how the citizen
relates to the state (see Zippelius, 1980:31).5
Whereas the former “world view” restricts itself to the quantitative meaning
of the one and the many, the latter chooses for the idea of an organic whole
and its parts as mode of explanation for state (and society). Historically
these two views respectively relate to the individualistic rationalism of the
Enlightenment on the one hand and the universalistic irrationalism of postKantian freedom idealism on the other. A Christian, non-reductionist ontology
will aim at avoiding the reification (absolutization) of any aspect of reality.
6.
Being-a-state and individual states
Intimately connected to reflection on the nature of the state – the search
after its typical structure – is the question of the nature of principles. This
question flows directly from the concern to gain an understanding of the
structural principle of the state. Such a structural principle must have a
universal scope since it encompasses whatever is known as a genuine
state. Heller employs the expressions “Strukturbegriff” (structure concept)
and “Gestaltbegriff” (form concept) as synonyms. Every Gestalt is general
4 Although Rousseau proceeds from an individualistic starting-point in his Contrat Social
(1762), concluding the contract immediately produces a moral collective body transforming
the former independent individuals into indivisible parts of a new whole. “Immediately
the association produces, in the place of the particular person of every participant, a
moral and collective body, composed out of just as many members as the voices of the
gathering, which derives from this act its unity, communal self, life and will.” And just
before this we read: “Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each
member as a indivisible part of the whole” (Rousseau, 1975:244). A discrete multiplicity is
turned into a whole with its parts – the switch from individualism to universalism.
5 Fichte writes: “In dem organischen Körper erhält jeder Teil immerfort das Ganze, und wird,
indem er es erhält, dadurch selbst erhalten.”
61
and particular. Through its form-laws it serves as the yardstick for other
forms, and through its individuality it is demarcated from other forms. One
can therefore say that the modern European state has particular form-laws
that are hall-marks of the (individually different) German, French and Italian
states (Heller, 1934:63).
This issue relates to a basic distinction of a non-reductionist ontology,
namely that between the law side and factual side of reality. The structural
principle (type law) holding for individual states has a universal scope and
in its orderliness (or even disorderliness) every individual state in an equally
universal way displays its subjectedness to this structural principle by
being orderly or relatively disorderly. Every state is therefore subject to the
universal law for being-a-state. Knowledge of such a universal law does not
automatically provide us with the unique forms particular states can assume.
Landmann captures this situation in a striking way where he writes: “Imagine
aristocracy according to all its predicates, and not even once will it be
possible to come up with the faintest idea of Sparta” (Landmann, 1973:81).6
7.
Modal laws and structural principles (type laws)
Is there a difference between (modal) laws and (structural) principles? The
physical laws for material entities, such as the laws of energy-constancy,
non-decreasing entropy and gravity, hold without any specification. That is
to say, they hold for all possible classes of entities. Such laws represent
instances of unspecified universality and are found within the various aspects
of reality, the ways or modes in which concrete entities exist. When these
modes of being are lifted out and distinguished from others, we encounter
modal abstraction through which modal laws could be discerned – such as
arithmetical laws, spatial laws, kinematic laws or physical laws. A typological
classification, by contrast, is directed at different kinds of entities which
presuppose kind-laws or type laws. Since the modal aspects also serve as
gateways (points of entry) to an understanding of multi-aspectual entities,
modal abstraction at once accounts for the theoretical analysis of type laws
as well.
For example, a type law has its own specified universality. The law for “beinga-state” entails that there is still an element of universality at stake, for it
applies to all states. Yet since not everything in the universe is a state it implies
6 “Denke dir die Aristokratie nach allen ihren Prädikaten, niemals könntest du Sparta
ahnen.”
62
Danie Strauss
that the universality of this type law is restricted (limited), that is to say, it is
specified to apply to states only. Every societal entity within a differentiated
society has a typical function within the various aspects of reality. However,
these typical functions do not eliminate the modal universality of the aspects
of reality, for they are merely specified. Interestingly, the well-known German
sociologist, Max Weber, is of the opinion that from a sociological perspective
the modern state could be viewed as a large business enterprise, for
essentially there is no difference between business enterprises and the state
(Weber, 1918:15). Insofar as both a business enterprise and a state function
within the economic aspect of reality they share the norming obligation to
avoid excesses by observing a frugal mode of behaviour. This remark merely
refers to the modal universality of the economic aspect. But as soon as the
typicality of state and firm is considered, the typical differences between a
firm and the state are evident. While a business enterprise cannot impose
taxes on its clients, the state can tax its citizens.
In this example a distinction is drawn between what is economic and uneconomic, thus merely pointing out that the modal universality of the
economic aspect entails that both a state and a business enterprise can
waste their money by acting un-economically and that both have to observe
the guidance of norming economic considerations of frugality.
But it is only possible to phrase these perspectives when the economic
aspect is understood in its modal universality, i.e. when the respective
typical structures of the business and the state are disregarded. Modal laws
hold universally without any specification – universities, businesses, states,
families and sport clubs all have to observe the general meaning of economic
norms in order to act in non-excessive ways.
When Breuer discusses “theories about everything” he closely approximates
what we have called modal universality. He relates universality to what
holds for the “entire material ‘world’” such that “no part of the material world
is excluded from its domain of validity” (Breuer, 1997:2). The physicist
Von Weizsäcker captures the idea of modal universality aptly where he
explains that the laws of quantum physics hold for all possible “objects”:
“Quantum theory, formulated sufficiently abstract, is a universal theory for all
Gegenstandklassen [classes of objects]” (Von Weizsäcker, 1993:128).
Whereas modal laws hold for all possible classes of (natural and societal)
entities, type laws and typical principles solely hold for a limited class of
entities, namely those belonging to that type. Note that the term “laws” may
apply to norming laws (principles) or to non-norming laws (natural laws).
63
8.
What is just and unjust: enabling the existence of
the state
An investigation of the structural principle of the state therefore may
include a helpful distinction, namely between modal jural norms (specified
or unspecified) and type laws (always manifest in the typical functions
which a particular kind of entity displays within all aspects or reality).
Heller categorically states: “Without separating what is just from what is
unjust [Recht und Unrecht] no justification of the state is possible” (Heller,
1934:218). Implicit in this remark is the distinction between the jural aspect
and the way in which the state functions within it. Heller here discusses the
state function and jural function [“Staatsfunktion und Rechtsfunktion”] (Heller
1934:216 ff.). Yet he does not realize that the jural is but one of the many
functions of the state.
9.
Recht and Macht
Throughout the history of reflection on the nature of the state (even when
designated by other terms), the presence of authority structures within human
society generated the idea of one or another form of power. Since Bodin
introduced the term sovereignty it was not only intimately connected to the
idea of power but also to the recognition of a delimited cultural area, known
as the territory of the state. By and large Theodor Litt is correct in noticing
that the history of political theories toggled between the absolute power
claim of the state and the idea that it should only protect what is right – which
underscores the importance of the simultaneous presence of might and right
(Macht und Recht – see Litt, 1948:23). However, the question is how one
should relate these various “components” of the state? Is there a difference
between state-power and jural power, or between state sovereignty and
legal sovereignty? To these one can add questions regarding government
and citizens, state organs, the territory of a state, the legal order of a state,
constitutional rights, personal freedom, and so on. Does one have to prioritize
to any one of these “factors”?
Power within the state is easily identified with the military strength at its
disposal. The earlier development of modern political theories contemplated
two extremes of popular sovereignty and the sovereignty of the monarch.
Early in the 20th century an alternative, the theory of state-sovereignty,
surfaced – compare the views of Gerber, Laband, Jellinek and Otto Von
Gierke. When the state is identified with its power, the demands of right are
64
Danie Strauss
excluded, thus turning the state into a pure power institution. Von Gierke,
for example, considers might and right as two independent and specifically
distinct sides of communal life (see Von Gierke, 1915:105). The jural is thus
turned into something completely external to the state. This raises a question
regarding the jural competence involved in the formation of law. Is it possible
for an institution that is characterized by the non-juridical feature of culturalhistorical power to play a role within the domain of law formation?
In his Staatslehre Heller holds that considering a social order within a certain
domain is still insufficient, at least if it does not include the aim to strive for a
just order: “The sanction of the state is only possible when the state function
is related to the jural function.”7 This formulation is slightly awkward insofar
as it suggests that the state only has one undifferentiated “function”, instead
of acknowledging its multiple functions within all aspects of reality. In this
context it may be helpful to refer to the integration theory of Smend since Mols
discussed the question regarding “Allgemeine Staatslehre oder politische
Theorie?” by using Smend’s integration theory as an example (see Mols,
1969). The first systematic work in which Smend explains his integration
theory was published in 1928 (Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht). In the
Evangelisches Staatslexikon (1966) Smend explains the word and concept
of integration: “The word originally means the restoration, but then as such
the regeneration or origination of a unity or totality from single elements,
such that the recovered unity is more than the sum of the united parts.”8
Badura explains that according to Smend the
constitution is the legal ordering of the state, more precisely, of the life in which
the state displays its vital reality, namely its processes of integration. The
meaning of these processes is constantly found in the restructuring of the living
totality of the state, and the constitution is the legislative norming of particular
sides of this process (Badura, 1977:319).
Kelsen points out that Smend seriously intends to transform the traditional
opposition of state and law into that between integration and law (Kelsen,
1930:62). Smend adds another step to this idea, by considering state and law
(Staat und Recht) as indivisibly connected but nonetheless self-contained
provinces of spiritual life, serving each other in the realization of particular
7 “Nur durch beziehung der Staatsfunktion auf the Rechtsfunktion ist die Sanktion des
Staates möglich” (Heller, 1934:217).
8 “Das Wort meint ursprünglich die Wiederherstellung, dann aber überhaupt die Herstellung
oder Entstehung einer Einheit oder Ganzheit aus einzelnen Elementen, so dass die
gewonnene Einheit mehr als die Summe der vereinigten Teile ist” (Smend, 1956:482).
65
value-ideas.9 On the same page Kelsen immediately highlights the fact that
the concepts “enclosed within itself” (in sich geschlossen) and inseparably
connected (zwar untrennbar verbunden) are contradictory. The connection
eliminates after all the mutual separation.
Van Ooyen remarks that Smend, in accepting “a supra-individual state
substance”, which contradicts his own intentions, demonstrates that he did
not liberate himself from the organic political theory of Von Gierke. Kelsen
rejects these universalistic stances for according to him both the organic
political theory and the integration theory fixate an understanding of the
state as a collective body which solidifies existing power relationships (Van
Ooyen, 2014).10
It is noteworthy that none of the above-mentioned authors realized that the
term integration reflects the meaning of the biotical mode of experience.
Every living entity is subject to the biotic time-order of birth, growth,
maturation, ageing and dying. Growth manifests a process of differentiation
and integration, for if a growing entity does not integrate its differentiating
life processes the living entity will disintegrate and die. Therefore the original
aspectual (modal) meaning of the term integration is found within the biotic
aspect of organic life. In aspects other than the biotic one merely encounters
analogies of this original biotic meaning of differentiation and integration.
Consequently the transition from undifferentiated to differentiated societies
analogously reflect the original biotical meaning of growth. In spite of this
similarity, there are also important differences between life in a biotic sense
and social life. To mention just one: biotic life is subject to biotic laws, whereas
social life is guided by norming principles, presupposing an accountable
free human will. When it is not realized that within the element of similarity
the difference evinces itself, human society is appreciated as an organism,
resulting in a reductionist view. This organicistic reduction is similar to the
arithmeticistic reduction present in all individualistic or atomistic orientations
– just recall the earlier mentioned way in which Jellinek opposed the two
world views, namely an individualistic-atomistic one and a collectivisticuniversalistic world view. An individualistic approach over-estimates the
numerical meaning of the one and the many and ultimately advocates a
9 According to Smend state and law are two “zwar untrennbar verbundene, aber doch je in
sich geschlossene, der Verwirklichung je einer besonderen Wertidee dienende Provinzen
des geistigen Lebens” (quoted by Kelsen, 1930:62).
10 “Wie die organische Staatslehre ist für Kelsen damit die Integrationslehre Ausdruck
autoritär fixierten, obrigkeitsstaatlichen Denkens, deren politischer Zweck es dabei sei,
über die Vorstellung vom Staat als tatsächlichem, souveränem Kollektivgebilde die
bestehenden Machtverhältnisse zu zementieren.”
66
Danie Strauss
reductionist view in which everything in the universe is reduced to a
multiplicity or to analogies of the one and the many within the non-numerical
aspects of reality.
10. Individualism and nominalism
Moreover, individualist thinkers often pursue a naturalistic epistemic ideal
with nominalistic and natural law underpinnings. Karl Bergbohm employs
physicalist terms, such as atoms and molecules, for his search after the
concept of law in a metaphoric sense applies a naturalistic concept of science,
directed to “those atoms that have to be present in every jural molecule
[Rechtsmolekül]” (Bergbohm, 1892:82). During this time the Baden school of
neo-Kantianism expanded the Kantian distinction between Sein and Sollen
(is and ought) by introducing the notion of values (Werten) within the realm
of “Sollen” (ought). Initially Rickert assigned a supra-temporal, ideal being to
these values, but historicism soon relativized this view by transforming them
into varying personal choices of the individual. But operating with distinct
“values” that apply like modal norms does not elucidate the type law of each
of societal entities. For example, Eduard Spranger, a student of Dilthey,
distinguishes the following values: the theoretical (truth); the economic (what
is useful); the aesthetic (form and harmony); the social (love); the political
(power); and the religious (unity) (see Spranger, 1914:5, 109-130). Rickert,
in turn, holds that what belongs to the realm of values is valid (Geltung). This
view shows that the validity of values disqualify them to be compared with
pre-positive principles, for the latter are not valid yet. In fact, acknowledging
modal laws and type laws presupposes the reality of ontic normativity. Ontic
normativity (pre-positive principles), in turn, entails the distinction between
pre-positive principles and the way in which a positive form is given to such
pre-positive principles in unique historical circumstances.
11. The dualism of Sein and Sollen
Pre-positive principles are universal, constant points of departure for
human action, but they are not in and of themselves valid or in force. In
order to be enforced or made valid, pre-positive principles are in need of
a competent organ, on the intervention of an accountable human subject.
In his Allgemeine Staatslehre Hans Kelsen distinguishes between natural
reality, which is causally determined (the domain of the Sein) and the state,
as a spiritual entity (belonging to the domain of the Sollen). They are two
67
mutually independent systems characterized by Kelsen as constituting
a dualism (Kelsen, 1925:14-15). Within the domain of the Sollen Kelsen
denies the difference between private law and public law. Ultimately he
resolves the concept of the state into a norm-complex of jural functions. This
view conforms to the orientation of those who separate natural causality
and normative accountability, a conception that is fairly widespread among
the neo-Kantian scholars of the Baden and the Marburg schools of thought
about one hundred years ago.
Instead of asking whether our actions are caused by our will Kelsen holds
that the human will is causally determined, that is to say, that the human
will is objectively determined by the law of causality (Kelsen, 1960:9899).11 On the basis of this (Kantian) dualism between Sein (is) and Sollen
(ought), Kelsen does not realize that the characteristic feature of normativity
introduced by him actually contradicts his restriction of the domain of Sein
to (physical) causality. The feature he introduces is “being valid” (Geltung),
which is synonymous to what is in force (in Kraft). This also applies to the
Grundnorm (basic norm), which is not identical to the sum of all positive
norms of a legal order, but the presupposed, positing ground of their validity
(“ihren Geltungsgrund darstellende, vorausgesetzte, nicht gesetzte Norm”
– Kelsen, 1960:201). The statement that a specific jural norm is in force
is equivalent to saying that it is valid.12 Consequently, the primary dualism
between (physical) causality (Sein) and normative accountability (Sollen) is
relativized by introducing within the Sollen domain the physical expressions
Geltung and being in Kraft. The irony is therefore that the aim of keeping the
domain of ought separate from the Sein is jeopardized by this employment
of physical analogies. I pointed out that the term Geltung is the equivalent of
the physical terms Kraft (German) and force (English).
12. Continuing the legacy of nominalism
The legacy of Staatslehre embraces diverging trends of thought regarding
the nature of the state. The general spirit of the late 19th and early 20th
century, its Zeitgeist, was strongly influenced by the post-Renaissance
nominalism. Nominalism denies any universality outside the human mind
11 “Mitunter leugnet man zwar nicht, daß der Wille des Menschen, wie alles Geschehen,
tatsächlich kausal bestimmt ist, …” (Kelsen, 1960:98). “Da die objective Bestimmtheit des
Willens nach dem Gesetze der Kausalität nicht geleugnet werden kann, …” (Kelsen,
1960:99).
12 “daß die Aussage: eine bestimmte Rechtsnorm ist ‘in Kraft’ (‘in force’) dasselbe bedeuted
wie: eine bestimmte Rechtsnorm steht in Geltung, …” (Kelsen, 1960:82).
68
Danie Strauss
and therefore eliminates any order for or orderliness of entities. Jellinek, for
example, positions law (das Recht) within our human representations, such
that providing a closer determination of what law is amounts to establishing
which part of human consciousness should be designated as law (Jellinek,
1966:332).
This intellectual tradition strips the concrete societal reality of the state also
of its universal side. Heller holds that owing to its universality the concept
of law cannot capture natural reality or cultural reality in its individuality.
A single leaf of a linden tree just like a specific human being or state, is
strictly individual. Since concepts aim at universal features all individuality is
“irrational”. Regardless how many Gattungsbegriffen (kind or type concepts)
through multiple concentric circles may approximate what is individual, they
will never be able to arrive at genuine knowledge of the historical, socially
individualized reality.13
13. The universal state concept, the historical state
concept and the concrete state concept
Von Hippel embarks on a slightly different path by distinguishing between
idealistic and naturalistic trends within the discipline of Allgemeine
Staatslehre – the former concerns the ought and the latter what factually
is. But the discipline itself is positioned between natural law and naturalism
(Von Hippel, 1963:5-9). His own exposition attempts to mediate between the
universal state concept, the historical state concept and the concrete state
concept (Von Hippel, 1963:10-13).
14. The sociological and juridical state concept of
Jellinek
Von Hippel opposes the approach of Jellinek in his Allgemeine Staatslehre
because he is still a victim of the positivist concept of science. Nonetheless
13 “Mit Gesetzesbegriffen wird überhaupt keine, weder eine Kultur – noch eine Naturwirklichkeit
erfasst. Denn ausnamslos ist alle Wirklichkeit Individualität, das einzelne Lindenblatt um
nichts weniger als der einzelne Mensch. Alle Individualität ist irrational und kann durch
noch so viele konzentrische Kreise von Gattungsbegriffen erfasst werden. Weil uns aber
in den Kulturwissenschaften vornehmlich die historisch-sozial individualisierte Wirklichkeit
interessiert, deshalb können Gesetze und allgemeine Gattungsbegriffe der Kultur zwar
wesentliche Voraussetzungen für eine Wirklichkeitserkenntnis bieten, eine Wirklichkeitserkenntnis durch sie bleibt aber prinzipiell ausgeschlossen” (Heller, 1934:60-61).
69
they share the rejection of an individualistic or atomistic approach. Jellinek
writes: “Whatever the original forms of human communal existence might
have been, it is not possible to find a pre-historical or historical co-existence
which is completely atomistic.”14 Yet, according to Von Hippel the positivistic
state concept of Jellinek is dualistic. It falls apart in a sociological state concept
and a juridical state concept. The former characterizes the state as the united
communal bond of settled humans equipped with original governing power.15
In spite of the scope of his encompassing work (Allgemeine Staatslehre)
Jellinek dedicates merely a couple of pages to his definition of the state in a
juridical sense. He speaks of the state as “Rechtssubjekt” (jural subject) and
combines this designation with the idea of a “body” of people (Körperschaft).
As a legal concept the state is then defined as a settled people equipped with
an original power to rule, or simply as a territorial body equipped with original
governing power.16
It is striking that the “power to rule” or “to govern” is central both to the
sociological and the juridical definitions of the state. The connection with
law – such as stating that the state is a legal subject – is merely introduced
as an addendum.
15. Escaping from the total state?
Therefore, when it comes to the demarcation of state-power, Jellinek does
not hesitate to employ well-known terms derived from Hobbes.
The state becomes the big Leviathan, absorbing all public power within itself.
… It is shown in that it claims the right to dispose, through its law, over all
governing powers on its territory. The modern state grants every individual and
every societal collectivity a legally delimited domain of freedom vis-à-vis this
state-power, an independent right to rule, although by virtue of its essence the
state cannot acknowledge any intransgressible border opposing it.17
14 “Wie immer die Urformendes menschlichen Gemeindaseins beschaffen gewesen sein
mögen, jedenfalls ist ein völlig atomistisches Nebeneinander-bestehen der Menschen
vorgeschichtlich und geschichtlich nich nachzuweisen” (Jellinek, 1966:365).
15 “Der Staat ist die mit ursprünglicher Herrschermacht ausgerüstete Verbandseinheit
seßhafter Menschen” (Jellinek, 1966:180-181).
16 “Als Rechtsbegriff ist der Staat demnach die mit ursprünglicher Herrschermacht
ausgerüstete Körperschaft eines seßhafter Volkes oder … die mit ursprünglicher
Herrschermacht ausgerüstete Gebietskörperschaft” (Jellinek, 1966:183).
17 “Der Staat wird der große Leviathan, der alle öffentliche Macht in sich erschlingt. …
Das zeigt sich darin, daß er sich das Recht zumischt, über alle Herrschaftsgewalt auf
seinen Gebiete durch sein Gesetz zu disponieren. Der moderne Staat erkannt zwar
70
Danie Strauss
This implication flows from the fact that Jellinek identifies ruling force with
state power:
Ruling is the criterion which distinguishes state power from all other powers.
Therefore when ruling power is found in collectives integrated within the state
or an individual, it is derived from state power, even when these instances of
ruling power turned into the internal law of these collectives, not original, but
derived power.18
Von Hippel is fully justified when he recognizes in the thought of Jellinek the
idea of the “total state” since the state is the “sole owner of freedom” (“Der
Staat als alleiniger Inhaber der Freiheit”) (Von Hippel, 1963:116). In relation
to the Leviathan a person is a complete subject and called to fulfil many
duties, among which the most basic one is the total call to duty flowing from
being subjected to the sovereignty of the state, which does not have any
legal boundaries (Von Hippel, 1963:117).
Since ancient Greece this view continues key elements of attempts to
delimit the jural competency of the state and state-law (see Strauss, 2012).
It also explains why various German scholars reflected on what appears
to be the crisis of political theory (Allgemeine Staatslehre). When Rudolf
Smend published his work “Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht” [Constitution
and Constitutional Law (1928)] he immediately addresses the foundation
of political theory with the heading: Die Krisis der Staatslehre [The Crisis
of Political Theory]. With Jellinek in mind he refers to the first theoretical
assumption of the largest and most successful school of political theory and
constitutional law within the German lingual domain (“staatstheoretischen
und staatsrechtlichen Schule des deutschen Sprachgebiets”), namely
that the state cannot be viewed as a part of reality [“das der Staat nicht al
sein Stück der Wirklichkeit betrachtet warden darf”]. According to him this
situation indicates a crisis, not only for Staatslehre, but also for Staatsrecht
(Smend, 1928:121). The diagnosis of a crisis is also connected to the abovementioned problem of delimiting the (jural) competence of the state.
Where Van Ooyen discusses Kelsen’s critique of Smend’s idea of the
“state as integration,” he explains that the majority vote, as parliamentary
jedem Individuum und jedem Verbande ein gesetzlich begrenztes Gebiet der Freiheit von
seiner Gewalt zu, ein selbständiges Herrscherrecht jedoch, das ihm als unübersteigliche
Schranke gegenüberstände, vermag er zufolge seines Wesens nicht anzuerkennen”
(Jellinek, 1966:431).
18 “Wo daher Herrschergewalt bei einem dem Staate eingegliederten Verbande oder einem
Individuum zu finden ist, da stammt sie aus der Staatsgewalt, ist, selbst wenn sie zum
eigenen Rechte des Verbandes geworden ist, nicht ursprüngliche, sondern abgeleitete
Gewalt” (Jellinek, 1966:430).
71
procedure through which a decision is reached, is devaluated by Smend
who views it as something merely formal. Thus the majority principle is
ultimately separated from the concept of democracy. Kelsen compares this
argumentation of Smend with that of Bolsjevist Marxism on the basis of their
shared appreciation of parliamentarianism and a dictatorship:19
… to what an extent Smend intends democracy when he refers to
parliamentarianism, shows how close he approximates the political theory of
Bolsjevism. Democracy is namely also according to Smend reconcilable with a
dictatorship (Van Ooyen, 2014:34).20
Von Hippel even wrote a book on the crisis contained in the idea of the state,
which incorporates the problem of the limits of state-power: Die Krise des
Staatsgedankens und die Grenzen der Staatsgewalt (“The Crisis of the Idea
of the State and the Limits of State-power”) (1950).
Acknowledging state-power is fine as long as it is not viewed as the exclusive
characteristic of the state, for once this is done, law becomes something
external (and different) from the state, generating the problem of “integrating”
it with the state. Kelsen highlights the vicious circle entailed in Smend’s
argumentation. Smend commences from the conviction that state is not
law because the state is integration. Also, law is not integration. Yet: law is
integration, from which it follows that law is state. Moreover, since integration
is not a value (Wert) it cannot be opposed to the jural value (Rechtswert).
Nonetheless Smend simultaneously holds that “also the judiciary should
integrate”. On the one hand he therefore says that the judiciary should
integrate and a few pages later he states that the judiciary does not serve
the integration value (Integrationswert) and then continues by saying that
the judiciary ought to integrate (see Kelsen, 1930:67)! What makes it even
more problematic is that Smend holds that the judiciary has to integrate the
legal community which in principle belongs to a sphere that differs from the
state community, although in a practical sense it may at once serve state
integration. According to Kelsen the upshot of all of this is that the state
community does integrate, through which, though only in a practical sense
19 “Hierbei würde das – für seinen Begriff einer pluralistischen Demokratie wesentliche –
Entscheidungsverfahren des (parlamentarischen) Mehrheitsbeschlusses durch Smend als
bloß formalistisch abklassifiziert, das Mehrheitsprinzip schließlich überhaupt vom Begriff
der Demokratie abgelöst. Kelsen setzt daher die in konservativen Traditionen stehende
Smendsche Argumentation in Vergleich zum Marxismus bolschewistischer Prägung – und
zwar hinsichtlich ihrer gemeinsamen Einstellung zu Parlamentarismus und Diktatur.”
20 “… wie sehr SMEND die Demokratie meint, wenn er auf den Parlamentarismus schlägt,
das zeigt, wie nahe er an die politische Theorie des Bolschewismus herankommt.
Demokratie ist nämlich auch nach SMEND mit der Diktatur vereinbar.”
72
Danie Strauss
and not in principle, the state community turns into the legal community or
vice versa.21
Dooyeweerd is equally critical when he traces the roots of the integration
theory:
And so it turns out in the end that the entire integration concept rests on the
ancient view of the state as an organized community of power. And we soon
see the adherents of the Berlin School slipping onto absolutistic paths, leaving
no room for sphere-sovereignty in non-state organized communities. The
method of the humanities, too, backed by the humanist view of reality, renders
impossible a genuine analysis of the individual meaning-structure of organized
communities. On this point the integration theorists all agree: the sovereignty of
the state is absolute as against all other organized communities” (Dooyeweerd,
2010:57-58).
The numerous works written within the tradition of an Allgemeine Staatslehre
constantly wrestled with an account of key features of the modern state:
power, law, juridical organs, constitutional law, territory, the relation of superand sub-ordination, the state as system, the legal order of the state, the state
as representation, state and civil society, the place of political parties, the
state as an organized community (Verband), the body politic, public opinion,
societal norms and many more.
In subdivision 7 the nature of modal universality was briefly explained.
It implies that the various aspects of reality, in an ontic sense, lie at the
foundation of the diverse concrete (natural and societal) entities. Therefore
the jural function belongs to reality and cannot be restricted to any entity
merely functioning in it in a typical way. It is therefore meaningless to hold
that either the state precedes law or that law precedes the state. Modal laws
and type laws are co-conditioning the existence of whatever is present within
the universe.
The (universal) conditions for being this or that type of thing or entity has to
be distinguished from the (universal) way in which particular entities evince
their conformity with these conditions (laws). In being an atom or being a
state, this or that atom or state shows that it meets the conditions (type
law) for what it is. Sometimes the word “structure” is used both for the “law
for” an entity and for the “actual (historically-situated) composition of” an
entity. The structure (composition) of the latter reveals what is correlated
with (and therefore distinct from) the order for entities. A structure for has
21 “Das heißt also: die Staatsgemeinschaft integrieren; wodurch the Staatsgemeinschaft –
zwar nicht ‘im Prinzip’, aber ‘praktisch’ – zur Rechtsgemeinschaft wird, oder umgekehrt”
(Kelsen, 1930:67).
73
the meaning of a law for, while a structure of represents the universal way
in which individual entities reveal their conformity with the given law for their
existence (also known as their law-conformity).
The type law for the state therefore incorporates both modal universality and
typicality. Marck treats this issue in a work which continues the systematic
contribution found in Cassirer’s work from 1910 on the distinction between
function concept and substance concept. The underlying issue therefore
concerns first of all the distinction between functional aspects or reality
(with their unspecified modal universality) and the diverse concrete (natural
and societal) entities. The two above-mentioned dominating world views
within the field of Allgemeine Staatslehre according to Jellinek, namely an
individualistic-atomistic world view and a collectivistic-universalistic world
view did not succeed in providing a sound account of the structural principle
of the state.
The universalistic view is also still alive in modern system theory, particularly
in the thought of Parsons and Luhmann. If the state is understood in nonjural terms, i.e., as an institute characterized by its power, then it cannot
operate within the domain of the formation of law. Parsons juxtaposes the
state (political organization) and the legal system and then has to “integrate”
the former with the latter: “Because of the problems involved in the use and
control of force, the political organization must always be integrated with the
legal system” (Parsons, 1961:47).
Luhmann’s understanding of the legal system is intimately related to his
views on law as the structure of society (see Luhmann, 1985:103 ff.). He
advocates the idea of “the institutionalization of the scheme of societal
system differentiation” and emphasizes that “law must be seen as a structure
that defines the boundaries and selection types of the societal system”
(Luhmann, 1985:105). He holds the view that the insights pertaining to selfreferential systems ought to be applicable to the legal system as one of
the differentiated functional systems distinguishable in the evolution of a
society. However, his system theoretical orientation results in a view of the
Ausdifferenzierung (differentiating out) of the legal system, lacking insight
into the original non-state spheres of law.
According to Parsons political control of power and the legal system must be
integrated: “Because the problems involved in the use and control of force,
the political organization must always be integrated with the legal system”
(Parsons, 1961:47). Without an intrinsic connection between power and law
the state lacks an original competence to form law.
74
Danie Strauss
16. The way ahead
The domain of theorizing left open to scholars within the field of political
science therefore still needs innovative developments. One may think of
explorations in the thought of thinkers such as John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas
and Herman Dooyeweerd. They generated a more comprehensive and
coherent understanding of the nature (and structural principle) of the state.
The coherence between modal aspects and multi-aspectual entities calls for
acknowledging the cultural-historical and the jural aspects of reality. They
are intrinsic to the structural principle or type law of the state. Might and
right cannot be separated for they serve as the two characteristic functions
of the structural principle of the state, of its type law. Habermas correctly
emphasises this intrinsic coherence between law (Recht) and the democraticconstitutional origination, acquisition and application of political power.22
Later, he mentions the mutually constitutive coherence between “Recht und
politischer Macht” (“law and political power” (Habermas, 1998:208)).
The classification of social forms of life with the aid of compound basic
concepts, such as specified in the distinction between societal collectivities
(Verbände), communities and coordinational relationships, does not contain
any criteria enabling the discernment of typical differences between them.
A state and business firm both display the distinctive features of societal
collectivities, namely the presence of a durable relation of super- and
subordination and a solidary unitary character. However, these two features
do not provide us with criteria to distinguish between societal collectivities as
such. The only theoretical access we have to the typical differences exhibited
by these forms of life is the point of entry provided by the meaning of distinct
sphere-sovereign modal aspects. The decisive element in applying the idea
of sphere-sovereign modal aspects to distinguish between different kinds
(types) of societal collectivities, is to realize that the foundational function
and the qualifying function of such social forms of life are mutually dependent
and co-determinative. This becomes evident as soon as one realizes that
most societal relationships have their foundational function within the
cultural-historical aspect, since most are based upon some or other type
of power formation. Without taking the qualifying function of these social
forms of life into account, it will not be possible to differentiate the types
of power formation exemplified by them. Of course this view assumes the
(ontic) modal universality of all aspects, including the jural.
22 “... der interne Zusammenhang zwischen dem Recht und der demokratisch-rechtstaatlichen
Organization der Entstehung, des Erwerbs und der Verwendung politischen Macht ...”
(Habermas, 1998:70)
75
Whereas many thinkers within the tradition of Staatslehre struggled to
account for the relationship between the state and law (the jural function
of reality), the just mentioned distinctions transcend this shortcoming.
The artificial synthesis of “state” and “law” turns out to be unnecessary
when it is realized that the modal universality of the jural aspect, due to
its ontic givenness, co-conditions the very existence of any state, making
any “synthesis attempt” redundant. The type law for being a state merely
specifies the modal universality of the jural aspect, while this aspect in turn
serves as the guiding and qualifying function of the state.
The underlying distinction concerns the dimension of natural and societal
entities and the universal modal aspects within which they function of a typical
way. Interestingly ancient Greek and Medieval philosophy were by and large
oriented to a substance perspective, whereas modern philosophy and in
particular the modern natural sciences (since the Renaissance) increasingly
switched to a functionalistic mode of thought (see the above-mentioned book
discussing this problem (Cassirer, 1910). The upshot of this legacy is that
either modal aspects (functions) were reified (“substantialized”) or entities
were functionalized (see Strauss, 2013).
Jellinek restricts the concept of substance to human beings, because
according to him the ultimate objective elements of the state is given in the
sum of particular actions in which social relationships comes to expression.
The state “is therefore in no sense a substance, but exclusively a function.
The substance laying at the foundation of this function is and remains the
human being.”23
Smend holds that insofar as the political theory of Kelsen directs itself against
the mechanical spatializing presuppositions of the formal school in modern
sociology (Simmel, Vierkandt, Von Wiese) and against every “substantializing
organology” [substanzialisierender Organology], that it should be supported
(Smend, 1928:131).
The problem of substance and function at once reintroduces the life and world
view controversy setting apart individualistic and universalistic views of society
as well as the opposition of natural-scientific and “geisteswissenschaftliche”
orientations, reflecting the ultimate driving force behind the intellectual
developments during the past five hundred years, the motive of nature and
freedom (science ideal and personality ideal) alluded to in subdivision 2
discussing the emergence of distinct designations of the state.
23 “Er [the state] ist somit nach keiner Richtung hin Substanz, sondern ausschließlich Funktion.
Die dieser Funktion zugrunde liegende Substanz sind und bleiben die Menschen” (Jellinek,
1966:174).
76
Danie Strauss
In principle a biblically informed non-reductionist ontology may guide us here
towards a meaningful and integral understanding of the state as well as its
place within human society. It may also open the way towards an alternative
view in which the shortcomings and one-sidedness present in some of
the dominant traditions within the German legacy of Staatslehre could be
overcome.
A significant step in this direction is given by Jonathan Chaplin (2011) in
a work discussing the conditions for being a state, while focusing on the
distinction between “typical laws” and modal aspects as developed in this
article, exploring further key distinctions found in the views of Dooyeweerd
(see also Strauss, 2014). It will therefore be fitting to analyse this orientation
elaborated by Chaplin in a different article.
Bibliography
BADURA, Von Peter 1977. Staat, Recht und Verfassung in der
Integrationslehre, Zum Tode von Rudolf Smend (15. Januar 1882-5. Juli
1975). In: Der Staat, Zeitschrift für Staatslehre, Offentliches Recht und
Verfassungsgeschichte, Herausgegeben von Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde,
Gerhard Oestreich, Helmut Quaritsch, Roman Schnur, Werner Weber t,
Hans J. Wolff, 16. Band 1977 (pp.305-325).
BERGBOHM, K. 1892. Jurisprudenz und Rechtsphilosophie: kritische
Abhandlungen. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
BLAAU, L.C. 1990. The Rechtsstaat idea compared with the rule of law as
a paradigm for protecting rights. The South African Law Journal, Vol. 107,
Part I (pp.76-96).
BREUER, T. 1997. Universell und unvollständig: Theorien über alles? In:
Philosophia Naturalis, 34:1-20.
BRUNNER, O. (Hrsg), CONZE, W. (Hrsg), KOSELLECK, R. (Hrsgr). 2004.
Staat und Souränität, In: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vols 1-8.
CASSIRER, E. 1910. Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. (Berlin),
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969.
CHAPLIN, J. 2011. Herman Dooyeweerd, Christian Philosopher of State and
Civil Society. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
DICEY, A.V. 1927. Law of Constitution, 8th edn. London: MacMillan Company.
DOOYEWEERD, H. 2010. The Crisis in Humanist Political Theory. Collected
Works of Herman Dooyeweerd. General Editor D.F.M. Strauss, Series B,
Volume Seven. Grand Rapids: Paideia Press.
77
FICHTE. 1976. Grundlage des naturrechts.
HABERMAS, J. 1998. Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie
des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp edition (1st edn. 1992).
HELLER, H. 1934. Staatslehre. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij.
JELLINEK, G. 1928. Allgemeine Staatslehre. Berlin: Verlag Dr. Max Gehlen.
JELLINEK, G. 1966. Allgemeine Staatslehre (Dritte Auflage). Berlin: Verlag
Dr. Max Gehlen.
KANT, I. 1787. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd edn. Hamburg: Felix Meiner
edition (1956).
KELSEN, H. 1925. Allgemeine Staatslehre. Berlin: Springer Verlag.
KELSEN, H. 1930. Der Staat als integration. Wien: Verlag von Julius Springer.
KELSEN, H. 1960. Reine Rechtslehre, Mit einem Anhang: Das Problem der
Gerechtigkeit. Vienna: Verlag Franz Deuticke.
KELSEN, Hans. 1930. Der Staat als Integration: Eine prinzipielle
Auseinandersetzung. Vienna: Springer. Reprint, Aalen: Scientia Verlag,
1974.
KRÜGER, H. 1966. Allgemeine Staatslehre. Berlin: Kohlhammer.
LANDMANN, M. 1973. Philosophie – ihr Auftrag und ihre Gebiete. Darmstadt:
Carl Habel Verlagsbuchhandlung.
LITT, Th. 1948. Staatsgewalt und Sittlichkeit. München: Erasmus Verlag.
LUHMANN, N. 1985. A Sociological Theory of Law. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
LUHMANN, N. 1986. Die soziologische Beobachtung des Rechts. Frankfurt
am Main: Metzner.
MARCK, S. 1925. Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff in der Rechtsphilosophie. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
MOLS, M. 1969. Allgemeine Staatslehre oder politische Theorie?
Interpretationen zu ihrem Verhältnis am Beispiel der Integrationslehre Rudolf
Smends. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
PARSONS, T. 1961. An Outline of The Social System. In: Theories of Society,
Vol. I. Edited by Parsons, Shills, Naegele and Pitts New York.
PARSONS, T. 1961a. Theories of Societies. Edited in colaboration with
Shills, Naegele and Pitts, New York 1961.
ROUSSEAU, J.J. 1975. Du contrat social et autres oeuvres politiques. Paris:
Editions Garnier Fréres.
78
Danie Strauss
SCHMITT, C. 1928: Verfassungslehre. 9th Impression. Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot (new edn. 1993 – fehlerbereinigter Neusatz der Erstauflage von
1928).
SMEND, R. 1928. Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht. In: Smend 1968:119276.
SMEND, R. 1956. Integrationslehre. In: Smend 1968:475-481.
SMEND, R. 1956a. Integration. In: Smend 1968:482-486.
SMEND, R. 1968. Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere Aufsätze.
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
SPRANGER, E. 1914. Lebensformen, Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie
und Ethk der Persönlichkeit. Halle: Niemeyer.
STRAUSS, D.F.M. 2012. A history of attempts to delimit (state) law. Journal
for Juridical Science, 37(2):35-64.
STRAUSS, D.F.M. 2013. Reifying things or relations: substantialism versus
functionalism. Acta Academica, 45(2):262-287.
STRAUSS, D.F.M. 2014. The genesis of a new conception of the state in
the political philosophy of Dooyeweerd. Journal for Christian Scholarship,
50(1&2):75-99.
VAN DER VYVER, J. 1982. Inleiding tot die Regswetenskap. 2nd edn., CoAuthor, F.J. Van Zyl. Durban: Butterworth.
VAN OOYEN, R.C. 2014. Integration. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-658-03662-1_2.
VOLLRATH, E. 1998. Staatslehre. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie: Staatslehre. HWPh: Vol. 10:53-62.
VON GIERKE, OTTO. 1915. Die Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts und die
neuesten Staatsrechtstheorien. Tübingen: Mohr.
VON HIPPEL, E. 1955. Geschichte der Staatsphilosophie in Hauptkapiteln.
I Band, Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain.
VON HIPPEL, E. 1963. Allgemeine Staatslehre. Berlin: Verlag Franz Vahlen.
VON WEIZSÄCKER, C.F. 1993. Der Mensch in seiner Geschichte. München:
DTV.
WEBER, M. 1918. Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland.
Munich and Leipzig: Dunkler & Humblot.
WEISSMANN, K. 2010. Smends Integrationslehre. http://www.
sezession.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Wei%C3%9Fmann_SmendsIntegrationslehre.pdf (accessed on 18-02-2015).
79
ZILNIZKI, M. 1998. Staat. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie:
Staatslehre. HWPh Volume 10:1-53.
ZIPPELIUS, R. 1980: Allgemeine Staatslehre (Politikwissenschaft).
München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
80
Educating on the basis of thin
and thick value orientations
Prof. J.L. van der Walt
Edu-HRight Research Unit
Faculty of Education Sciences
Potchefstroom Campus
[email protected]
Abstract
Some theorists about education in a multicultural society such as that
of South Africa have been propounding the notion that public (state)
education should be based on a minimum-universalistic human rights
value system, or at most a system in which such values have been
contextualized by local conditions and demands. This, they contend, is
necessary for establishing a modus vivendi. This article expounds the
view that education should rather rest on “thick” values, i.e. values filled
with life view content. The difference between a pedagogical approach
based on “thin” values (devoid of life view content) and one based on
“thick” values is highlighted with reference to respectively life view and
pedagogy related demands. Since an approach based on “thick” values
could indeed lead to conflict, there should also be a place in education
for the “thin” values that all can share.
Key concepts:
education, pedagogy, values, contextualized values, life view
81
Educating on the basis of thin and thick value orientations
1.
Background and problem statement
Du Preez and Roux (2010:12) argue “that positive discipline in multicultural
school environments partly relies on the infusion of human rights values that
are neither solely universally nor particularistically interpreted”, and took
issue with the particularistic stance assumed by Steyn and Wolhuter, and
De Klerk and Rens “who argue that acceptance of certain Christian values
could promote discipline in schools”. Du Preez and Roux base their objection
to this stance among others on “arguments about the relativity of truths, not
only between different religious beliefs, but also the varying interpretations
and truths found in one religious denomination”. (…) “A value system that is
based on only one particular religious or cultural view means that only one
narrative is taken into account. That could jeopardise the realisation of the
multicultural ideals of the democratic education system in South Africa” (Du
Preez & Roux, 2010:14-15).
The question is, does a value system based on, for instance, only a bill of
human rights not amount to the same stance as that to which Roux and
Du Preez object, namely that “it is based on only one particular religious or
cultural view”, meaning that “that only one narrative is taken into account”?
A human rights narrative may also be prone to “varying interpretations and
truths”. Attempts at avoiding controversial interpretations often result in “arid
legalistic human rights scholasticism” (Blackburn, 2009:186). Du Preez
and Roux (2010:23 et seq.) therefore rightly come to the conclusion that
“It would … be precarious to accept human rights values as univocal and
not subjected to diverse interpretation”, and hope to find a way out of this
dilemma by reverting to the views of Parekh (1999) because “his position
may assist in pursuing values … that are both contextually recognised and
justified on a universal level” (Du Preez & Roux, 2010:24). Their hope draws
attention to the matter of thick and thin pedagogical and/or value language.
Another issue complicates the matter further. As Du Preez and Roux
(2010:19-22) discovered, the teacher-participants in their study tended to
revert to their private and personal life and world view perspectives despite
the exposure that they had had to a human rights culture in the schools. The
participants showed an “intuitive preference from a particularist perspective”.
In Du Preez and Roux’s (2010:22) opinion, “this position … might lead to
the selection of a value system (italics in original) that is based on one
grand narrative to underpin disciplinary measures intended to be applied
in a multicultural school environment”. Apart from the fact, as mentioned,
that a value system based exclusively on (a particular version of) human
rights theory is itself based on only one grand narrative, the implied view that
learners and their educators should be discouraged from reverting to a grand
82
Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap - 2015 (1ste Kwartaal)
Hannes van der Walt
narrative rooted in their respective personal and social life and world views
can be problematic.
Will a value orientation based on a human rights grand narrative indeed
lead to better citizenship, greater social justice, greater tolerance and a
better multicultural society than a value system based on (for instance)
a particularistic Christian grand narrative, or will Parekh’s stance of
contextually recognising values that can be universally justified lead to the
more successful achievement of these ideals? We may never find the final
answer to this question, but we do know from the research of Du Preez
and Roux (2010:19-22) and others (Scheepers & Van der Silk, 1998:679691; Roux, 2003:131-132; Ferguson & Roux, 2004:15-16; Roux & Du Preez,
2005:279-280; Roux, 2006:1299-1300; Roux, 2006b:160) that educators on
the ground tend to spontaneously revert to the convictions and assumptions
imbedded in their personal life and world views (which does not mean
that they are averse to interacting with adherents of different other faiths
[Gilmour, 2000:231-232; Matsaung, 2003:81-82]). When actually engaging
with younger people (including learners in public “secular” schools) for the
purpose of guiding them to greater maturity, (Christian) educators tend to
revert to the thick value language of their personal religions and life and world
views. The question remains: could “thick pedagogical and value language”
when actually engaging in pedagogical work with young(er) people lead
to more effective education than education based on, for instance, a “thin”
human rights value base?
2.
Aim of this article
The rest of this article is devoted to a discussion of the problem of “thick
versus thin values language” in education in an attempt to determine, by
evaluating the views of various educators about “thick and thin” language in
education, which approach is more likely to be more effective when actually
educating, also in circumstances (schools) where different cultural and
religious narratives interact.
3.
Thick and thin values and pedagogical language
Parekh (2000:158) concludes that values formulated in universal terms are
relatively thin, and that the embodiment or contextualising of such values in
particular societies can be relatively thick. This view is consistent with Van
den Beek’s (2010:40 et seq.) that, while generally formulated metaphors at
83
first may seem the best because of their unspecific nature and their ability
to provide grounds for consensus among individuals with widely different
views and convictions, they prove to be too “thin”, i.e. devoid of life view
content. Because of this, ethicists and philosophers have begun agitating for
the use of “thick” language, language that can express the deeper content
and sentiments imbedded in, and flowing from some or other philosophical,
religious or life view tradition. In the case of moral or value education, at the
‘thin-public-minimal-narrow’ end of the continuum are those values which
may be described as ‘legal’, while at the ‘thick-private-maximal-broad’ end
of the spectrum are those values considered to be ‘personal’ standards left
to the conscience of the individual (and can be narrowly religious or even
pietistic in nature). In between these two poles are various configurations
that vary from socially acceptable values to highly contested ones (Swartz,
2006:565-566).
Van den Beek (2010:41) furthermore explains why participants such as those
in Du Preez and Roux’s study (2010) tend to revert to thick value language: it
is only natural for people to do so; it is the way people are and talk; people do
not live according to abstractions but according to the concrete contents of
their religious faith and life conceptual convictions. “Thick” language usage
is therefore truer to real life than “thin” language. It is an expression of ethical
relativity which, as Naudé (2010:11) points out, embodies the notion that
people hold different values that stem from their different cultures, religions,
life and world views, adult examples, formal education and the media.
4.
Two issues regarding thick and thin value
language
The “thin and thick” value language tension brings two issues to the fore: the
question of life orientation, and the demands of education.
4.1 Life and world view orientation
People in general, and educators (teachers and parents) in particular, can be
broadly distinguished into two groups: those that are religiously orientated in
a traditional sense, i.e. belonging to some or other (mainstream) religion or
philosophical system such as Christianity, Islam or Judaism, and those who
are more secularly inclined, in the sense of not recognising any attachment
to a (mainstream) religion, church, synagogue, temple, shrine, dogma or faith
(Mohler, 2008:29). The latter will arguably favour “thin language” with respect
to life and world view and pedagogical values, or at most values that have
been justified on a universal level as well as contextually recognised (i.e. the
84
Hannes van der Walt
intermediate position between particularism and universalism that Parekh
(1999:130-131) propounded). Educators who prefer to pertinently base
their pedagogical involvement with children on a religious grand narrative
or a set of personal life view values tend to favour “thick” pedagogical value
language. This can be demonstrated in the work of Christian educationists
such as Van Brummelen (1994:26-45).
To take a practical example: for an educator with a secular orientation,
the value “human dignity” would be important in the pedagogical situation
because it is mentioned as one of the key values in, for instance, the South
African Constitution (RSA: 1996: Section 10) as well as in the Manifesto
on Values, Education and Democracy (MoE, 2001). According to the “thin”
wording of Section 10 of the Constitution, “everyone has inherent dignity
and the right to have their dignity respected and protected”. The dictionary
explanation of “dignity” is also “thin”: it is derived from the Old French word
dignite and from the Latin word dignitas derived from dignus meaning
“worthy” (Stevenson & Waite, 2011:401). Legal explanations are somewhat
“thicker”, in the sense that they give more meaning and depth to the concept,
and contrive to explain why it has significance in human existence. According
to Smit and Oosthuizen (2011:155), for instance, since the right to human
dignity is inborn, it does not have to be earned. A synonym for human dignity
is respect; in a democracy, even the lowliest criminal or beggar is worthy of
respectful treatment. According to Currie and De Waal (2010:273), “… it is
clear that the constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge
the value and worth of all individuals as members of society. Human dignity
is the source of a person’s innate rights to freedom and to physical integrity,
from which a number of other rights flow.”
We find a detailed though still relatively “value thin” description of human
dignity in Parekh (2000:146-148):
We … rightly recognise the fact of human uniqueness and superiority and
embody it in the practice of ‘human dignity’. … Dignity is an aristocratic or
hierarchical concept in the sense that it describes a status that only makes
sense in relation to what is judged inferior. This is why every discussion of
human dignity in one way or the other compares human beings with nonhumans, and implies that they may not be treated as if they were animals or
inanimate objects. … Dignity is not an individual but a collective status, for the
individual acquires it by virtue of possessing certain species-specific capacities
and belonging to the human species. Human beings do not have dignity the
way they have eyes and ears. It is a human practice, something they choose to
confer on themselves and each other because of their mutual acknowledgement
of their uniquely shared capacities.
85
We find yet another, slightly “thicker”, explanation of what human dignity
entails in the aforementioned Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy
(MoE, 2001:13-14) because of the South African Ministry of Education’s
efforts to couch it in the African Ubuntu value system:
… there was a need in South Africa "for understanding but not for vengeance,
a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for
victimisation”. In the final Constitution [of the Republic of South Africa], the
drafters applied the notion of ubuntu by asserting that the South African state
was founded, before anything else, upon the value of "Human Dignity". Ubuntu
has a particularly important place in our value system for it derives specifically
from African mores: "I am human because you are human." Out of the values of
ubuntu and human dignity flow the practices of compassion, kindness, altruism
and respect which are at the very core of making schools places where the
culture of teaching and the culture of learning thrive …
Thin values such as respect for the dignity of the human being are universally
sanctioned (refer United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948) and, as Parekh (2000:150 et seq.) indicates, often contextually
recognised in the school or classroom in which an educator in question
teaches. However, as will be seen from a “thick” language description of
this same value (human dignity) below, a thin value approach lacks at least
two deeper perspectives, namely a transcendental view (i.e. a view about
underlying principles, assumptions and presuppositions (refer Strauss, 2009:
46 et seq.; Coletto, 2009:294 et seq.) and a transcendent perspective (i.e.
a “beyonding” view about what constitutes the religious authority on which
a person bases his or her notion of human dignity (refer Ackerley, 2008:21).
Even Parekh’s (2000:150 et seq.) five measures aimed at contextualising
the value of human dignity leaves human dignity as a value relatively thin
because he fails to assign rich content to it from a religious or life and world
view perspective; he fails to explain from a religious or life view perspective
precisely on what transcendent (“beyonding”) grounds (i.e. why) human
beings possess dignity and why it should be respected by others.
An intentionally “thick language” (particularistic) view of the same value
possesses both these attributes. This can be illustrated with a discussion of
human dignity from a Biblical (Christian) point of view. (The same point can of
course be made with reference to any other spiritual or life view orientation.)
According to the Christian view, human dignity is derived from the human
being having been created in the image of God (Gen 1:26). Human beings
are reflections of God’s glory (Life Application Study Bible (LASB), 1996:6).
Some feel that reason, creativity, speech, or self-determination is the image
of God. More likely, says the LASB, it is the human being’s entire self that
86
Hannes van der Walt
reflects the image of God. The human being will never be totally like God
because He is the supreme Creator, but human beings do have the ability to
reflect his character in their love, forgiveness, kindness and faithfulness. The
LASB (1996:6) continues:
Knowing that we are made in God’s image and thus share many of his
characteristics provides a solid basis for self-worth. Human worth is not based
on possessions, achievements, physical attractiveness, or public acclaim.
Instead, it is based on being made in God’s image.
The LASB echoes most of the ideas earlier expressed in Earle (1967:18),
except for the fact that Earle also mentioned that having been created refers
to the detail that God “formed the [human being] after the perfections of his
own nature”. God is the Fountain whence the human being issued, hence
“the stream must resemble the spring which produced it”. According to Earle,
this means:
God is holy, just, wise, good and perfect; so must the soul be that sprang from
Him: there could be in it nothing impure, unjust, ignorant, evil, low, base, mean,
or vile. It was created in the image of God; and that image, St Paul tells us,
consisted in “righteousness,” “true holiness,” and “knowledge” (Eph 4:24; Col
3:10).
It is clear, according to the Wycliffe Bible Commentary (Pfeiffer & Harrison,
1990:4), that the human being, as God made him was made distinctly different
from the animals. He stood on a much higher plateau, for God created them to
be immortal, and made them a special image of His own eternity. The human
being was a creature with whom their Maker could visit and have fellowship
and communion. The Lord could expect the human being to answer him
and be responsible to him. Mankind was constituted to have the privilege of
choice, even to the point of disobeying their Creator. They were to be God’s
responsible representatives on the earth, to work out their Creator’s will
and fulfil the divine purpose. The New Bible Commentary (Carson, France,
Motyer & Wenham, 1994:60) expands on this last point with reference to
Psalm 8: “rule” implies lordship, not exploitation. The human being, as God’s
representative, must rule his “subjects”, as God does, for his own good.
The true worth of the human being, Boice (2006:91) contends, is that he
is made in the image of God and therefore valuable to God and others.
Moreover, he says, God feels for them, identifies with them in Christ, grieves
for them, and even intervenes in history to make individual men and women
into all that He has determined they should be. They are God’s unique and
valued companions.
87
It is clear from the exposition above that this Biblical “thick”/particularistic
view of the concept and value of human dignity seems to be richer in content
and meaning than the thin approach. Whereas the “thin” views of human
dignity struggle to provide deep grounds for why human beings possess
dignity, the thick Christian approach provides a transcendent rationale,
namely that humans possess dignity because their having been created in
the image of their Creator. This finding chimes with Ramcharan’s (2008:1315) that mainstream religions and/or philosophical systems tend to assign
deeper meaning to each human rights value.
4.2 The demands of education
It follows from the foregoing that if education (pedagogy) is the leading,
guiding, equipping and enabling of a less mature person by a more
mature person, such leading et cetera will be less meaningful and hence
more superficial if based on a “thin” value orientation. Despite this, some
educators and educationists prefer the “thin” approach (refer, for instance,
Claassen, 2012:40-41), or at the very least Parekh’s approach of values that
are contextually recognised as well as justified on a universal level, for the
sake of avoiding conflict in multicultural schools and for promoting a modus
vivendi. These authors seem to argue that conflict can erupt when “thick”
values are applied; the more profound the religious and life conceptual
content in value language, the more specific and exclusive it becomes, the
greater the possibility of alienation of others holding different convictions.
Because there is no final arbitrator or objective body that can say what is
right and true, most educators prefer a thin value language approach (Van
den Beek, 2010:42). In contrast, it seems that educators opting for the “thick”
approach are less concerned about the avoidance of conflict in schools,
about a modus vivendi or the ideals of a multicultural society than with the
thick-value-based leading and guiding of the children entrusted to them
towards the love for, and service of a greater Force or divine Power, who in
the case of Christian educators is the triune God of the Bible.
This point can be illustrated with reference to the “thick” Christian approach
to education. Tripp and Tripp (2008:11) refer to the stewardship approach to
education as “shepherding the heart of the child”. Education should persuade
the heart of the child of the wisdom and truth of the ways of the God of the
Bible. The heart of the child should be guided towards delighting in God and
the goodness of his ways. God’s Word, they say (Tripp & Tripp, 2008:19),
teaches both educator and child to understand all human knowledge and
experience in the light of his existence and his involvement in this world.
The Christian educator’s objective when he or she teaches the child is not
88
Hannes van der Walt
simply to ensure that the child does not become a criminal, or “does well” in
life. Rather, they say, “our desire is that (the child) should love the Lord with
all his or her heart, soul and mind”. As parents, they insist, it is their “divinely
appointed task” to commend God’s works to the next generation (Ps 145:4).
The Christian educator sees the following words of God in Deuteronomy
32:46-47 in a serious light: “Take to heart all the words that I have solemnly
declared to you this day, so that you may command your children to obey
carefully all the words of this law … They are not just idle words – they are
your life” (emphasis Tripp & Tripp, 2008:19-20). To this they add: “The goal
of formative instruction is so that we and our children and our grandchildren
may fear the Lord and walk in his ways, enjoying a good life”.
According to the Christian approach, people have been given stewardship by
God over their time, energy, talents, values, feelings, behaviour, money and all
other things (Cloud & Townsend, 1992:73). Children and their upbringing are
also deemed to have been entrusted to them by a personal God. Educators
have to take loving care of what God has entrusted to them (in this case, the
child and its education); they should feel themselves driven by inner motives
such as religious considerations, and not out of a sense of duty. A steward
in the service of God feels committed to the task and therefore experiences
a deep sense of responsibility towards God as charge-giver. In a play on
words, Lategan (2011:87) contends that “response-ability” embodies the
notion that someone or something will not be used for personal gain, that
the creation and maintenance of relations will be to the benefit of others and
for the purpose of protecting them from harm. In the case of the nurturing
or “shepherding” (Jones, 2006:145) of the heart of a child towards God, the
purpose of the pedagogical interaction with the child is to guide the child to
self-stewardship, to learn to lovingly care for a developing self, to have a
sense of “mine” and “self” (Cloud & Townsend, 1992:73). Self-stewardship
is synonymous with taking self-control. To educate is to help the educand to
discover and reach his or her innate, God-given potential, in other words,
to actualize the self. Alongside this is the ideal of self-driven development
to become a servant of God, prepared to take up his or her calling in the
kingdom of God, redeemed by his or her Saviour Jesus Christ and sustained
in his or her efforts by the Holy Spirit of God. In this stewardship scenario,
the educator is a facilitator assisting the educand to develop according to
his or her own needs and vision of a future self in the service of God and his
kingdom.
Stewardship in the context of education also consists of caring, loving,
developing, nurturing, maintaining and protecting the child in all aspects
of his or her personhood. Stewardship is aimed at improving the wellbeing
89
of the educand. Education also entails the enabling, guiding, equipping
and discipling/disciplining of the educand (Van Dyk, 2003:155-158). The
educand must be enabled to meet the requirements of her calling or tasks
as future adult labouring in the kingdom of God. She must also be equipped
with the necessary skills for that calling or task. As the etymology of the term
“pedagogy” (derived from the Greek agein) suggests, education also entails
the leading or guiding of the educand in a desired direction, in terms of a
certain value system, a particular life view and even religious or spiritual
commitment – in this case, the Christian value system, life view and religious/
spiritual commitment. Discipling (i.e. helping the child become a follower of
Jesus Christ)/disciplining, in turn, suggests that the educator should take the
responsibility for guiding or leading the young person in a direction that the
educator herself would find appropriate for her own life and future, namely as
a steward fully committed to the service of the God of the Bible.
Spiritual, emotional and other forms of growth in the Christian religion are the
results of good stewardship. We cannot value or treasure ourselves and what
belongs to us if we had not been valued and treasured (Cloud & Townsend,
1992:281). Without such care, a person cannot shake a deep sense of being
worthless (Cloud & Townsend, 1992:282, 291).
5.Synthesis
The value language used by the above authors in connection with the Biblical
stewardship approach to education is clearly much “thicker”, richer in content
and meaning than that used by educators and educationists concerned about
education in multicultural schools for the purpose of promoting a modus
vivendi and of pursuing the ideals of multiculturalism (refer Editorial Christian
Science Monitor, 2005:8). Since this “thicker” value orientation is “deeper,”
more meaningful than the “thin” or even than Parekh’s combined approach,
the dangers of conflict, division, fundamentalism and even fanaticism may
be lurking in their application, as Parekh (2000:154 et seq.) rightly warns.
Educationists opting for thick pedagogical value language should therefore
guard against these threats. It is helpful to know, as Ramcharan (2008:15)
observed, that “the great religions and philosophical systems all emphasize
the common humanity of every person”; they explain what “the common
humanity of every person” means in the religious, philosophical or life
conceptual language of educators actually engaging in the education of less
mature people (students, learners, children).
90
Hannes van der Walt
As mentioned, educators seem to revert to the use of “thick” moral language
for pedagogical reasons. They do this for an obvious reason, as Zecha
(2007:57) contends:
The [names of values formulated in thin language] are all wonderful words
which may certainly designate important attitudes or activities; however, they
do not give a useful account of what a pupil is expected to do when he/she
has acquired clarity, communication, loyalty, empathy, respect, etc. … It is
certainly important to explore with the students what these key words (value
words) entail. … A second task in values education is focusing on how the
pupils should apply this knowledge in daily life, practice it continually, and thus
acquire the ability to actualize values. …
Nieuwenhuis (2010:15) concurs with Zecha: a value remains an empty ideal,
unless we can infuse it with meaning by basing it on certain moral principles
and empower people to take personal responsibility for doing it and applying
it in their lives, for instance when dealing with other people.
Of course, the foregoing line of thinking does not deny a place for “thin”
human rights value language in school classes (education) as well. People,
and their values, are not so different that they cannot share enough ground
to live peacefully together (Naudé, 2010:11). If any human being (in this
case, learner) were asked whether he or she would like to enjoy respect for
his or her dignity (or any other fundamental human right (i.e. thin value) such
as to be free from arbitrary and summary execution, torture, arbitrary arrest
and detention, enforced or involuntary disappearance, and persecution on
grounds of religion or belief), there can be no doubt that s/he would answer
in the affirmative. From this we may conclude that there is a basic (“thin”) set
of fundamental human rights that all human beings would claim, affirm and
defend (Ramcharan, 2008:61; refer Strietman, 2005). This is not sufficient,
however; as indicated, truly meaningful education can only be based on
content-rich (“thick”) values and pedagogical language (Van den Beek,
2010:42).
6.Conclusion
All educators and educationists tend to operate with a grand narrative, i.e. a
communal and/or personally construed account of what education in essence
is supposed to be and what it ideally should attain. This can be said not only
of the pedagogies of adherents of recognised religions or systems of thought
(hence operating with “thick” i.e. particularistic value-laden language) but
91
also those of secular orientation, such as those wishing to promote certain
universal human rights values for the sake of the well-being of humankind
and for the sake of modus vivendi in a multicultural society (hence preferring
to operate with particularistic “thin” value language).
In the end, an educator’s choice is determined by his or her personal life view
orientation. For one educator, the ideal of a modus vivendi in a multicultural
society may be more compelling than any argument centring on the idea that
a child has to be guided towards love and respect for a transcendent Deity
or Force such as the God of the Bible. For his or her (mainstream) religious
or philosophical system counterpart, such as a Christian, on the other hand,
the command to be obedient to the calling and injunctions of God overrides
all secular arguments.
In the final analysis, it seems that educators should, on the one hand,
concentrate on helping learners understand the nature of human rights as
a universal values system but, on the other, should go further than what
Parekh suggested: they should teach values that are not only locally
contextualised but that have intentionally been couched in the “thick” value
language typical of a religious or life and world view stance. This is the only
way to assign depth of significance to human rights values, and hence to
education based on such values. This approach will not necessarily lead to
conflict in classrooms but rather to a deeper understanding among learners
of what makes each one of them different from all the others and thereby to
respect for the human rights of all others.
Bibliography
ACKERLEY, B.A. 2008. Universal human rights in a world of difference.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BLACKBURN, S. 2009. The big questions / Philosophy. London: Quercus.
BOICE, J.M. 2006. Genesis: An expositional commentary. Volume 1. Grand
Rapids: Baker Books.
CARSON, D.A., FRANCE, R.T., MOTYER, J.A. & WENHAM, G.J. (Eds.)
1994. New Bible Commentary. 21st Century edn. Leicester: Inter-Varsity
Press.
CLAASSEN, G. 2012. As die klippe van die wetenskap begin uitroep…
(When the stones of science begin calling out…) In: Gaum, F. & Claassen,
G. (Reds.) God: Gesprekke oor die oorsprong en die uiteinde van alles.
(God: Conversations about the origins and the end of everything.) Cape
Town: Tafelberg. (p. 17-44).
92
Hannes van der Walt
CLOUD, H. & TOWNSEND, J. 1992. Boundaries. Grand Rapids: Sondervan.
COLETTO, R. 2009. Strateties towards a reformation of the theology-based
approach to Christian scholarship. In die Skriflig, 43(2): 291-313.
CURRIE, I. & DE WAAL, J. 2010. The Bill of Rights Handbook. Claremont:
Juta & Company.
DU PREEZ, P. & ROUX, C.D. 2010. Human rights values or cultural values.
Pursuing values to maintain positive discipline in multicultural schools. South
African Journal of Education, 30(13-26).
EARLE, R. 1967. Adam Clarke’s Commentary on the Bible. Grand Rapids:
World Publishing.
EDITORIAL 2005. The Monitor’s view. Limits of religion in public life. Christian
Science Monitor 97(150): 8. 28 June.
FERGUSON, R. & ROUX, C.D. 2004. Teaching and learning about religions
in schools: responses from a participation action research project. Journal for
the Study of Religion, 17(2):5-23.
GILMOUR, P. 2000. Educating for particularity and pluralism. Religious
Education 95(3):231-232. Summer.
JONES, T. 2006. Nurturing Your Child's Soul: 10 Keys to Helping Your Child
Grow in Faith. Washington: W Publishing Group.
LATEGAN, L.O.K. 2011. Research ethics and integrity: What should be on
the agenda? Journal for Christian Scholarship 47(2):72-89.
LIFE APPLICATION STUDY BIBLE 1996. Wheaton: Tyndale House
Publishers.
MATSAUNG, L. 2003. The teaching of religious education in multi-religious
classes: is it a problem to students? Educational Research 45(1):79-82.
Spring.
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION 2001. Manifesto on Values, Education and
Democracy. Pretoria. July.
MOHLER, R.A. 2008. Atheism Remix. Wheaton: Crossway Books.
MoE – see Ministry of Education
NAUDÉ, P. 2010. Not all cultural beliefs are universally right. Business Herald
April 12. (p. 11).
NIEUWENHUIS, J. 2010. Social justice in education revisited. Paper
presented at Őrebro-Unisa International Conference 2010. 1-3 February.
PAREKH, B. 1999. Non-ethnocentric universalism. In: Dunne, T & Wheeler,
N.J. (Eds.) Human rights in global politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
93
PAREKH, B. 2000. Non-ethnocentric universalism. In: Dunne, T & Wheeler,
N.J. (Eds.) Human rights in global politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
PFEIFFER, C.F. & HARRISON, E.F. 1990. The Wycliffe Bible Commentary.
Chicago: Moody Press.
RAMCHARAN, B.G. 2008. Contemporary human rights ideas. London &
New York: Routledge.
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. 1996. Constitution. Act 108.
ROUX, C.D. 2003. Playing games with religion in education. South African
journal of education, 23(2):130-134.
ROUX, C.D. & DU PREEZ, P. 2005. Religion in Education: An Emotive
Research Domain. Scriptura, 89(2):273-282.
ROUX, C.D. 2006. Innovative facilitation strategies for religion education.
In: De Souza, M Engebretson, K, Durka, G, Jackson, R & McGrady, A 2006.
International Handbook of the Religious, Moral and Spiritual Dimensions of
Education. Dordrecht: Springer. (p. 1293-1306).
ROUX, C.D. 2006b. Children’s spirituality in social context: a South African
example. The International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, 11(1):151-163.
RSA – see Republic of South Africa
SCHEEPERS, P. & VAN DER SILK, F. 1998. Religion and attitudes on moral
issues: Effects of individual, spouse and parental characteristics. Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religion 37(4):678-691. Dec.
SMIT, M.H. & OOSTHUIZEN, I.J. 2011. Fundamentals of human rights and
democracy in Education. Potchefstroom: Colmar.
STEVENSON, A. & WAITE, M. 2011. Concise Oxford English Dictionary.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
STRIETMAN, H 2005. Uitsluiting uitsluiten. (Avoiding isolation) Paper read
at the Christelijk Sociaal Congres Rotterdam. 18 November.
STRAUSS, D.F.M. 2009. Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines. Grand
Rapids: Paideia Press.
SWARTZ, C. 2006. A long walk to citizenship: morality, justice and faith
in the aftermath of apartheid. Journal of Moral Education 35(4): 551-570.
December.
TRIPP, T. & TRIPP, M. 2008. Instructing a child’s heart. Wapwallopen, PA:
Shepherd Press.
UNITED NATIONS 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
94
Hannes van der Walt
VAN BRUMMELEN, H. 1994. Steppingstones to curriculum. A Biblical Path.
Seattle: Alta Vista College Press.
VAN DEN BEEK, A. 2010. Is God terug? (Has God returned?) Zoetermeer:
Meidema.
VAN DYK, J. (2003). The Practice of Teaching Christianly (sic). In: Fowler,
S., Van Brummelen, H.W. & Van Dyk, J. (Eds.). Education for Freedom.
Potchefstroom: IRS. (p. 155-168).
ZECHA, G. 2007. Opening the road to values education. In: Aspin, D.N. &
Chapman, J.D. 2007. Values education and lifelong learning. Principles,
policies, programmes. Lifelong Learning Book Series 10. Dordrecht:
Springer. (p. 48-60).
95
Heavenly Sanctuary Motifs in
the Pauline Corpus:
Explicating their Intertexuality and Interrelatedness
Mario N. Phillip, PhD
Assistant Professor of New Testament Greek and Missiology
University of the Southern Carribbean
Maracas Royal Road, St. Joseph
Trinidad & Tobago
Abstract
The heavenly sanctuary motif in the Pauline epistle is not a theme that
has received rapt attention. Apart from the cursory references to the
sanctuary metaphors in Corinthians and Ephesians, much is hardly said,
if ever at all, of the development of the sanctuary motif in the Epistles.
This study endeavours to show the presence and avid awareness of the
author of the Epistles of the heavenly sanctuary motif. The reader will be
shown the depth and coherence with which the sanctuary motif is dealt
with, and the importance it played in the development of the theology and
eschatological thrust of the writings under consideration.
Key words:
heavenly sanctuary, type, prototype, metaphor, dynamic
correspondence
97
The heavenly sanctuary motif in the Pauline corpus: Explicating their intertextuality and
interrelatedness
1.Introduction
Most of the work done on the heavenly sanctuary motif/theme in scripture
has either focused primarily on the Pentateuch (Gen 11:1-9; 28:10-22; Exo
15:1-18; 24:9-11; 25:8-9, 40; 32-34, 37; Deut 26:15),1 book of Hebrews (6:19;
7:1-10:18; 8-9),2 and Revelation (3:12; 7:15; 11:1-2, 19; 14:15, 17; 15:5, 6, 8;
16:1, 17; 21:22).3 The epistles of The Epistles though heralded as the bastion
of theological insights in the New Testament (NT), a mere cursory glance
through their pages, apart from Hebrews, reveals an apparent taciturnity
on the doctrine of the sanctuary/temple (except for Hebrews, which some
dispute).4 It seems almost surprising that one whose writings constitutes
nearly half of the NT would supposedly have little to say on the heavenly
temple.
This paper therefore attempts to find motifs of the heavenly sanctuary outside
of Hebrews (and Revelation) with a view of establishing the ubiquitous usage
of the temple motif. Secondly, it endeavours to investigate the degree of
intertextuality between Paul’s theological schema, ideas or language and the
broader Judeo-christian theological assumptions.5 In other words, it seeks
1 Richard M. Davidson, “The Heavenly Sanctuary in the Old Testament,” TMs,1981,
Adventist Heritage Center, Berrien Springs, 1-29; Frank Holbrook, “The Israelite
2 Felix H. Cortez, “From the Holy to the Most Holy Place: The Period of Hebrews 9:6-10
and the Day of Atonement as a Metaphor of Transition,” JBL 125/3 (2006): 527-547. Also
George W. MacRae, “Heavenly Temple and Eschatology in the Letter to theHebrews,”
Semeia 12 (1978): 179-199; Walter E. Brook, “The Perpetuity of Christ's Sacrifice in the
Epistle to the Hebrews,” JBL 89.2 (June 1970): 205-214; William Johnson, “The Heavenly
Sanctuary-Figurative or Real?” in Issues in the Book of Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook
(Silver Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 36-51,113-19; Alwyn P. Salom,
“Sanctuary Theology,” in Issues in the Book of Hebrews, ed.Frank B. Holbrook (Silver
Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 205-17; see also M.L. Andreasen, The
Book of Hebrews (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1948), 317-416; G. J Steyn,
“On Earth as it is in Heaven…The heavenly sanctuary motif in Hebrews 8:5 and its textual
connection with the ‘shadowy copy’ of LXX Exodus 25:40,” HTS Teologiese Studies/
Theological Studies 67/1 (2011):1-6; Richard M. Davidson, “Christ Entry ‘Within the Veil’ in
Hebrews 6:19-20: The Old Testament Background,” AUSS 39/2 (2001): 175-190.
3 Richard M. Davidson, “Sancturay Typology,” in Symposium on the Revelation I, ed.
Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1992), 99-130;
Samuele Bacchiocchi “The Heavenly Sanctuary: Real Or Symbolic?” Endtime Issues 103
(September 2003): 4-5; Shirley J. Case, “The Book of Revelation II,” The Biblical World
50/4 (Oct. 1917): 257-263.
4 James Sweeney, “Jesus Paul and the Temple: An Exploration of Some Patterns of
Continuity,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 46/4 (2003): 608. Also, James
D. Dunn, The Theology of the Apostle Paul (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 721.
5 Richard Hays’s Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989. By intertextuality it is meant: [that] discourses depends upon, builds upon,
98
Mario Phillip
to find the pervading nuances by which the sanctuary motifs in the Pauline
corpus should be understood. The article will be limited to the passages
where explicit or implicit sanctuary motifs exist, namely in the Corinthian
correspondences and Ephesians.
Paul’s theological reckoning of the sanctuary was not restrictive or exclusive.
Rather, it involves an inclusive interrelatedness between the church, the
believer, and the heavenly temple. Apart from Hebrews, there are eleven
grammatical allusions of the sanctuary/temple in the writings of Paul (2 Thess
2:4; Eph 2:19, 21; 1 Cor 3:16,17; 6:19; 9:13; 2 Cor 5:1,2,4, 10). Although
current scholarship rather take an exclusive either/or position to these text, I
will seek to embrace an inclusive approach that is contextually viable, while
at the same time taking into consideration the multivalent picture held of the
sanctuary within Judaism.
In the Judeo-Christian reckoning, especially in second temple Judaism, the
temple was seen through a multi-dimensional framework, all of which was
though not mutually exclusive to the other. These include: the temple as a
heavenly/earthly reality (1 En. 6-36 [14:1-24; 24:1-25:4]; 71:5-6; 83-90; Jub.
1:24-29; T. Levi 5; Tob. 14:5, 6; 12:12,15; 3 En. 45; T. Levi 5:1, 2; 4QDibHama
1-2 iv 2-1-12; 4Q403 1 ii 10-16; 11QTa xxix 3-8; xlv 12-14; xlvii 4; liii 9-10;
lvi 5; 11QTa, 11QTb, 11QTc;1Q14 (1QpMic), 1-5; 4Q381 4QNon-Canonical
Psalms B 24 7-9; 4Q403 1 i 41-44; 4Q403 1 ii 18-29; 4Q405 19-22; 1Q14
(1QpMic), 1-5; 4Q381 4QNon-Canonical Psalms B 24 7-9; 4Q403 1 i 41-44;
4Q403 1 ii 18-29; 4Q405 19-22),6 the sanctuary as a metaphorical reality
(Jubilee 33:20; 4 Eza 13:36; 9:38-10:4; 10: 8, 25-27, 44-45; 1 Macc. 2:17;
CD-A VI, 11-14; CD-A XI, 17-21; VII, 3-4; V, 11; 1 QS viii 4; 1 QS v 5; CD iii
19; CD ii 10-13), an eschatological reality (2 Bar. 4:2-7; 59:1; 68:1; 32:2-4;
4:1-7; 6:1-9; 7:1; 80:1-7; Jub. 23:21; 1 En.89: 72-73; 90:28-29; 91:13; 89:50,
72-73; 4 Ezra 7:26; 8:52-54; Tob. 13: 1-10; 14:5-7; T. Mos. 1:5,9; 2:1,4,8-9;
modifies, and reacts to prior discourses and the prior use of words, concepts, and ideas
... every text finds its place within the context of an ongoing discourse about whatever
issues it discusses or any ideas that it is building on, responding to, or reacting against.”
For a basic introduction to issues of intertextuality and influence, see the introduction to
Udo J. Hebel, ed., Intertextuality, Allusion, and Quotation: An International Bibliography
of Critical Studies (Bibliographies and Indexes in World Literature 18; New York:
Greenwood, 1989); Thais E. Morgan, “Is There an Intertext in this Text? Literary and
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intertextuality,” American Journal of Semiotics 3/4 (1985):
1–40; Jay Clayton and Eric Rothstein, “Figures in the Corpus: Theories of Influence and
Intertextuality,” in Influence and Intertextuality in Literary History, ed. Jay Clayton and Eric
Rothstein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 3–36.
6 Cf. 3 Bar. 11-16; T. Job 17:4; T. Benj. 9:2; T. Sol. 1:3-5; 21:4; Tob. 13:1-18; 4Q271 (4QDf )
5 I 15-17 (= CD-A xi 3-xii 7); 11QTa xxix 7-10; 11QTa ii –xxix; xxx-li 10; li 11-lvi 17.
99
interrelatedness
4 Ezra 9:26-10:59; 4Q174 (4QFlor) I i 1-13; cf. 1QM ii 1-9; 1QH vi 15;
4QFlorilegium I, 1-13. 11QTem xxix. 7-10),7 a sphere of divine functions (1
En. 10:2-22; 90:16-38; 14:19; 25:3, 7; 47:3; 102:3; 4QpPsa iii 13-27; CD-A i
11; 4QDa xx 29-34; 4Q400 1 i 13; 4Q403 1 ii; 4Q405 8-9),8 and a place under
attack (T. Jos 20:2; Test. Sim. 5:3; Test. Naphtali 2:6; T. Iss. 6:1; 7:7; T. Reu.
2:1; T. Levi 18:12; CD-A v (= 4Q266 3 ii; 4Q267 2; 6Q15 2, 3) 6-7; CD-A vi
(= 4Q266 3 ii; 4Q267 2; 4Q269 4 ii; 6Q15 3, 4) 8-20; CD-A vi (= 4Q266 3
ii; 4Q267 2; 4Q269 4 ii; 6Q15 3, 4) 1-21; CD-A xii (= 4Q266 9 ii; 4Q271 5
i) 1-23).9 Paul’s temple rhetoric should not be understood in a vacuum, but
rather, must be taken into consideration vis-à-vis the varied trends in which
the temple was perceived within Judaism.
2.
Exegetical and syntactical analysis
The usage of temple rhetoric is replete throughout scripture. The explicit
language used to denote the temple, tabernacle or sanctuary in the scripture
7 Cf. Jub 16:18; 1QS ix 4-6; 1QS xi 7-9; CD-A iv 2-4; 4Q511 xxxv 2-4; 1QH ix 12-19; lQH xiv
1-36; 4Q174 (4QFlor) 1 i 21, 2; 4Q212 (4QEng ar) iv 1-10; 11Q19 (11QTa) iii-xlvii; 1Q32;
2Q24; 4Q554; 4Q554a, Q555; 5Q15; 11Q18.
8 Cf. See 4Q176a,b (= 4Q176 frags. 19-21) 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 33, 51, 53 i 1-9; 4Q405 20 ii
7-8, 21-22; 4Q403 1 ii 10-16.
9 Cf. Sib. Or. 3:63-68; Test. Dan 5:10; Sib. Or. 3:73; 4 Ezra 10:21-23; Jub. 23:17-18, 20-21;1
En. 7:1; 9:8; 10:11; 12:4; 15: 2, 4; Pss. of Sol. 1:18; 2:1-28:1-13
100
Mario Phillip
are nao,j10 skh/noj, oivkhth,rion and ièro,n.11 Conversely, the implicit allusions
include: oivki,a, oivkei/oi and βῆμα (although there are times when both oivki,a
and oivkei/oi can be understood as referring to explicit temple motifs).
1 Cor 3:16, 17
Do you not know that you are a temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwells
in you?
17
If any man destroys the temple of God, God will destroy him, for the temple of
God is holy, and that is what you are” (NASB).
16
1 Corinthians 3 falls within the response of Paul to the alledged factions
among the believers (1 Cor 1:10-4:21). Paul outlines first the facticity of
division (1:10-17), then the causes of division (1:18-4:13), finally the solution
10H. Preisker, “nao,j” Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), 4:882-83. The LXX uses the phrases nao.n qeou (1 sam
1:9; 2 Kgs 18:16;23:4) tw/| naw/| kuri,ou/ (2Kgs 24:13; Hag 2:15; Wis 3:14); to.n nao.n kuri,ou
(2 Chron 26:16;27:2;29:17; 1 Es 5:57,64; 6:18; o` nao.j tou kuriou (1 Es 5:52; 5:18); o`
naoj kuriou (Hag 2:18); o` nao.j ton qeou (Jdt 5:18); naoj kuriou (Jer 7:4) tou naou kuri,ou
(Eze 8:16); and naou kuri,ou (Jdt 4:22). These refer primarily to the physical structure of the
earthly temple, in some instances to the sphere within the temple where God’s presence
is manifested. According to BADG nao,j in general can be understood to mean a place or
structure specifically associated with or set apart for deity. However there are several strains
of meaning that has been accrued to the word naoj over time. Firstly, it can denote temples
in the general sense (Acts 17:24), used in Acts 19:24 to refer to the replicas of the temples
of Artemis at Ephesus. The phrase ièra. kai. Nao,j was used by Josephus, Philo, and in
3 Maccabees 1:10 referring to the temple and the altar. It is used by Diodorus Siculus
and Herodotus to mean a shrine where the images of the goddess stood. Secondly, it can
denote the temple at Jerusalem as attested by Justin Martyr, sibylline Oracles. Sometimes it
denoted Herod’s temple. In some instances it referred to the entire temple precincts, in other
places it is associated with Jesus and his relation to the temple. In Matt 27:51; Mk 15:38;
Lk 23:45 it is used in reference to the curtain separating the most holy place from the holy
place; other times for the paneled ceiling of the temple. Thirdly, it is used in reference to the
heavenly sanctuary. Extrabiblical wittings such as Phil Spec Leg., Testament of Levi attest
to the same. Fourthly, it can denote the human body or part thereof (a usage popularized
by the apostle Paul. Finally, it can mean the body of Christ. As to what the meaning of Paul
was in 2 Thess 2:4 it is important to bear in mind how he generally uses the term. However,
due to the genre of writing being uncharacteristic of the author, the context will have to be
made the final determiner.
11 The second most dominant word used for temple is ièro,n which is used 148 times in the
Bible, of which Paul uses it twice in 1 Cor 9:13. In practically all of the usages including that
of Paul the temple in view is in its entirety, and not any specific area as in the case of nao,j.
It can thus be concluded that although both nao,j and ièro,n refer to the temple, the former
conveys the idea of the innermost precinct of the sanctuary, while the latter denotes the
temple as a whole.
101
interrelatedness
to the division (4:14-21). The text under consideration is placed btween Paul’s
responses in rectifying a faulty view of the christan message (1:18-3:4) and
the christian lifestyle (4:6-13). In 1 Cor 3:16, 17 Paul attempts to correct an
apparent distorted view of the christian ministry and its ministers (3:5-4:5).12
Paul uses an agrarian and architectural metaphorical analogy to dispel
the distorted view held of the christian ministry. According to Aristotle, a
“metaphor is the application of strange term either transferred from the genus
and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or
from one species to another.”13 Aristotle further adds, that metaphors are not
“far-fetched” but akin to its referent, derived from things are “beautiful” both
in “sound” and “sense.”14 On the use of Pauline temple metaphors Stephen
Fai in his dissertation, Body/Temple Metaphor has noted that a metaphor
“substitutes and intersects.” It is a mere instrumentality, which conveys
from a broader field of referent. In the case of Paul, the use of the body/
temple metaphor elucidates the dynamic tension that exists between small
narratives and grand metanarratives.15 Therefore, since most of the temple
motifs discussed beneath are analogical it is important to have a broad
spectrum approach to their ultimate referent.
1 Cor 3:16 begins with the perfect oi;date “you know,” which he again
repeats in 1 Cor 6:19; 9:13. This use of the perfect tense has an aoristic or
dramatic nuance where the focus is on the event which occurred without
any concern for the present consequences.16 The emphasis here appears to
be on the certainty of previous knowledge, without necessarily affirming the
present resultative condition.17 Hunn purports further that the perfect tense
emphasizes the completed act an concomitant existent results.18
Whatever the sense in which oi;date is understood, one thing is evident,
that is, Paul is not introducing an elusive idea to the believers, but rather,
something they would have been acquainted with (cf. 2 Thess 2:5).
12 A. F. Johnson, 1 Corinthians, The IVP New Testament Commentary Series 7 (Downers
Grove, Ill: InterVarsity, 2004), 72-78.
13Aristotle Poetics (trans. W. Hamilton Fyce, Loeb Classical Library 23.21.6-14)
14Aristotle Art of Rhetoric III. 11.12-13 (trans. J. H. Freese, Loeb Classical Library 22. 359).
15 Stephen Fai, “Body/Temple Metaphor: Early Christian Reconciliation with Roman
Architecture,” PhD diss., (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2006), 23-24.
16 Daniel Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New
Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 578.
17 Ernest De Witt Burton, Syntax of the Mood and Tenses in the New Testament Greek, 3d
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987), 80,81.
18 H.P.V. Hunn, A Short Syntax of the New Testament (Cambridge University Press, 1951), 70.
102
Mario Phillip
The use of nao,j “temple” in 1 Cor 3:16 points back to oivkodomh, “God’s building”
in 1 Cor 3:9. While a casual reading of the text suggest the metaphorical
connotation of the sanctuary (the church), a closer reading of the text can
point to a broader outlook. The use of oivkodomh, in the NT either speaks of
edification (Rom 14:19; 1 Cor 14:3, 5; 2 Cor 10:8; 12:19; Eph 4:12, 16, 29),
or something existing in actuality (1 Cor 5:1; Eph 2:21). The reference in
1 Cor 3:9 attest to the latter—the church as constituting the community of
beleivers. The context also allows for oivkodomh, to be understood as denoting
the purpose of the church—edification. The subsequent use of nao,j, while it
cannot be divorced from oivkodomh,, I believe that it is meant to emphasize the
temple as a place of habitation wherein God dwells.19 This is corroborated
by the phrase to. pneu/ma tou/ qeou/ oivkei/ evn u`mi/n “the Spirit of God dwells in
you” (1 Thess 3:16b). In its metaphorical dimensions it points not only to
God dwelling within the church, it also affirms the reality of His permanent
dwelling—in the heavenly realms.
The phrases nao.j qeou/, “temple of God,” (1 Cor 3:16a), to.n nao.n tou/ qeou/, “the
temple of God” (1 Cor 3: 17), and nao.j tou/ evn u`mi/n a`gi,ou pneu,mato,j evstin oue;cete avpo. qeou/( “your [body] is the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom
you have from God” (1Cor 6:19 ) are all genitival constructions which employ
both the articular and anarthrous usages of the word nao,j. These syntactical
elements can give multiple interpretive nuances to the construction. For the
time being, the question of immediate concern is, how should the phrase
nao.j qeou/ be understood (1 Cor 3:16)?
Firstly, it can be understood as a possessive genitive—temple possessed/
created by God.20 In that sense, the temple can be seen as something
belonging to God as it's creator,21 or the place associated with His worship
or salvific functions.22 As possessor of the sanctuary God has exclusive
prerogative over its rights and functions. Secondly, the genitival constructions
can be seen attributively—the godly/divine temple. Here an innate quality is
ascribed to the head substantive (nao.j).23 In this way, the temple is qualified
19 F. F. Bruce, 1 and 2 Corinthians, New Century Bible Commentary, ed. M. Black (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971). Conzelmann agrees that the focus of Paul is on God’s dwelling
(cf. Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, Hermeneia -A Critical and Historical Commentary
on the Bible, trans. James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).
20Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 81, 82.
21 Paul Ellingworth and Howard Hatton, A Translator’s Handbook on Paul’s First Letter to the
Corinthians (London: United Bible Societies, 1985).
22 Robert G. Bratcher, A Translator’s Guide to Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians (London:
United Bible Societies, 1982).
23 Ibid., 86.
103
interrelatedness
by stating whose it is—it belongs to God. The phrase “temple of God”
therefore makes the efficacy of the temple inseparable from its creator.
Thirdly, the construction can be regarded as a genitive of source—temple
which came from God as its source. This carries the same semantic force
as a possessive genitive.24 Fourthly, it can be understood as a qualitative
genitive—temples of holiness. This implies that the Corinthians believers as
God’s temples possessed attributes that were germane to God’s archetypal
temple.25 Godet emphasizes that the qualitative genitive does not mean that
the Corinthians are the “singular” temple of God, but rather, only a mere
representation.26 This further implies that there exists a prototypical temple
to which all others correspond.
Fifthly, the construction can be interpreted as a definite-monadic
construction— temple unique in its own way. This can infer a peculiar “one
of a kind temple” that exists as a blueprint.27 Monadic realities denote things
that exist in a class by themselves.28 Therefore, the believers being God’s
temple are peculiar. The instinctive question that emerges, does God have
one temple that is reflected through its many emblematic copies, or many
temples? Finally, the construction can be understood as a qualitative-definite
phrase, based on Colwell’s rule29 and Apollonius Corollary.30 According to
Colwell’s rule in the phrase nao.j qeou/ the absence of the definite article does
not preclude definiteness or a real entity. Although it has now been found that
most preverbal anarthrous predicate nominatives are often qualitative and
sometimes definite,31 it is most congruent to accept it as referring to both a
particular trait possess, as well as to a particular existential reality.
While all of the above syntactical relationships can in some ways be
applicable to the context, the qualitative-definite relationship appears to be
the most apt contextually. There is a three-fold reason for this assumption.
24 Ibid., 109.
25 Ibid., 244.
26 F. L. Godet, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, trans. by A. Cusin (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1886; reprint, 1971).
27Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 248ff. Whereas monodic contructions are
often articular, as Lenski noted since there is only one temple, even without the article it
will still be definitive; cf. R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul’s First and Second
Epistles to the Corinthians (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1963), 146.
28 Ibid., 223.
29Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 257.
30 Ibid., 250.
31 Ibid., 262-263.
104
Mario Phillip
First, the arthrous use of the article (1 Cor 3:17; 6:19) often particularized
a substantive, or it can also categorize a substantive, making it a mere
representative within its broader domain.32 This means Paul, in referring to
the temple, can either be referring to the believers as the temple of God, or,
likewise to a higher eternal reality to which the believers correspond. These
views can be seen in tandem, and not necessarily exclusive to the other.33
Scholars agree that Paul is here focusing on the eschatological ramifications
of irresponsible actions relative to God’s temple.34
According to the Apollonius Corollary when two anarthrous nouns are
juxtaposed, they both often carry the same semantic force, that is, they are
either both definite, indefinite or qualitative.35 This means that in the case of
1 Cor 3:16 if qeou/ is taken to be someone definite, then likewise should nao,j.
In other words, the same degree of definiteness attributed to God should
likewise be accrued to the temple. Secondly, the anarthrous usage of the
article (1 Cor 3:16; 2 Cor 6:16) has both non-particularizing (qualitative) and
individualizing (particularizing) functions.36 It thus becomes evident, that
both the arthrous and anarthrous usages of the article denote a two-pronged
interpretation, which although distinct, is by no means contradictory. Thirdly,
in Jewish reckoning, especially in second temple Judaism, the concept of the
temple as a heavenly or earthly reality, or even in its metaphorical dimensions
were all held as concomitantly integrated, though distinctly unique.
As to what is meant by the appellative “temple of God” in the Pauline corpus,
especially in the Corinthian Correspondence, scholars are divided. Plummer
and Robertson see this temple as the entire church, or the individual Christian
(they believe though it speaks more of the local church).37 Meyer on the
32 Stanley E. Porter, Idioms of the New Testament Greek, 2d. (Sheffield, England: Sheffield
Academic Press, 1999), 104; for example, on the particularizing use of the article, see Jn
1:17; 1 Cor 13:13; Rom 13:7. On the categorical usage of the article, see Matt 12:35; Lk
10:7; Jn 10:11; Rom 7:1,2; 1 Tim 3:2
33 The temple in the Jewish mindset was seen as a united and integrated whole; their
understanding of the past, present and future was seen through the prism of the temple
(cf. Ezek 40–48; 1 Enoch 90:28–29; 5Q15; 11QTemple)
34 Ronald Trail, An Exegetical Summary of 1 Corinthians 1-9 (Dallas, TX: SIL International,
2008), 133.
36 Ibid., 104. For examples of the qualitative function are John 1:14; 1 Cor 5:1; Rom 8:3; for
examples on the individualizing function see Jn 4:27; Col 2:20
37 Archibald Robertson and Alford Plummer. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the
First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthian, 2d, The International Critical Commentary, ed. S.
R. Driver, A. Plummer, and C. A. Briggs (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914; reprint, 1971).
105
interrelatedness
other hand, believes that each Christian community is a spiritual temple.38
Gupta argues that the temple of God refers primarily to the individual, with
implications for the community.39 This study proposes that all of the above
can be held as viable, and not in contradiction to the others. However, it
further suggests that the primary referent from which all the above must be
understood is that of the heavenly sanctuary.
Lenski has rightly enunciated that God has only “one temple.”40 This
assertion if taken to its logical conclusion, would infer that if God has one
temple, that temple should be where He permanently resides (heavenly
abode). By implication, this can be broadened within its metaphoric domains
to include believers (both individually and corporately). Paul in his usage of
the temple language would have most probably regarded the temple (which
in all probability could have either been the declining Jerusalem temple,
the Christian church, or even the heavenly sanctuary) as a particular and
categorical reality, which simultaneously has qualitative dimensions as
reflected in the believing community.
Another point that beckons clarification pertains to whether nao.j qeou/ in 1 Cor
3:16 should be understood as definite or qualitative. According to Colwell’s
rule definite predicate nouns that precede the verb are usually anarthrous.41
The rule therefore begins on the assumption that the semantic category of
definiteness is determined. The question that must be asked at this point is,
does the noun nao,j always refer to something definite in its usage? While the
predominant usage of nao,j is no doubt definitive, it is also true that there are
qualitative connotations of nao,j especially in the NT.
In a study done by Philip Harner42 and Paul Dixon43 on anarthrous predicate
38 Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the
Corinthians. Trans. from the 5th ed. by D. Douglas Bannerman, rev. and edited by William
P. Dickson, Meyer’s Commentary on the New Testament (New York: Funk & Wagnalls,
1890), 100f.
39 Nijay K. Gupta, “Which Body is a Temple (1 Corinthians 6:19)? Paul beyond the Individual/
Communal Divide,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 72 (2010): 520-536.
40Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul’s First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians, 146.
41 For more on the rule itself see the seminal article in which the rule was espoused, E.C.
Colwell, “A Definite Rule for the Use of the Article in the Greek New Testament,” Journal of
Biblical Literature 52 (1933): 12-21.
42 Philip B. Harner, “Qualitative Anarthrous Predicate Nouns,” JBL 92 (1973): 76ff. Harner’s
assertion was further validated by C. Kuehne, “A Postscript to Colwell’s Rule and John
1:1,” Journal of Theology 15 (1975): 22.
43 Paul S. Dixon, “The Significance of the Anarthrous Predicate Nominative in John” (Th.M.
thesis, Dallas Theological Seminary, 1975).
106
Mario Phillip
nominatives, they found that most verbs in this structural relationship are
primarily definite, and some sometimes qualitative. Colwell’s rule only takes
into account definite nouns, omitting relative clauses, as well as proper
and qualitative nouns. Moreover, nouns such as qeo,j, pneu/ma and ku,rioj
(inclusive of nao,j), are of themselves regarded as definite, whether used
in an arthrous or anarthrous structure.44 Moreover, although the article is
absent in 1 Cor 3:16 (nao.j qeou/), it is used in 1 Cor 3:17 (to.n nao.n tou/ qeou/),
which presupposes that both phrases should be understood semantically
as referring to the same reality. Furthermore, the articular usage to.n nao.n in
1 Cor 3:17 confirms the definitiveness of the temple in view. Notwithstanding
the above, it is evident that there is a qualitative sense to the construction nao.j
qeou/, therefore, it is best to consider the construction as a qualitative-definite
construction. This implies that it can refer both to the heavenly archetypical
reality, which resonates in the believing community through the indwelling of
the Holy Spirit.
In 1 Cor 3:17 the present φqei,rei is juxtaposed to the future φqerei/ in a rare
apparent play on words by the author. This involves a first class conditional
clause where the condition is presumed a reality.45 According to Burton in first
class conditional clauses the protasis often refers to a general truth/principle
(not so much with events), which the apodosis merely asserts or validates.46
Paul is assuming here that God’s action is predicated on the individual
actions. Whereas the verb was relegated to the end of the previous clauses
(1 Cor 3:16,17a), in 1 Cor 3:17b the clause begins with the verb probably
to add emphasis to the assertion of the apodosis. The implications of the
grammatical structure of 1 Cor 3:17b can imply that: First, corrupting God’s
temple is an affront to God that warrants a divine response. Second, the
use of the present and future tenses together can denote the eschatological
nature of present actions. Third, defamation of the temple is contiguous with
profanation of a cult object, through either violation of sacred trust or space.
An apt example can be seen in 2 Sam 6:6 where Uzzah profaned the ark by
touching it –violating of sacred space thereby costing his life (see also Num
3:4).
44 Nigel Turner, Syntax, vol.3 of A Grammar of the New Testament Greek, by J. H. Moulton,
(Edinburg: T&T Clark, 1908-76), 174,175,184; see also H.P.V. Nunn, A Short Syntax of
New Testament Greek,56.
45 Cleon Rogers, Jr and Cleon Rogers III, The New Linguistic and Exegetical Keys to
the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 353; see also, Wallace, Greek
Grammar Beyond the Basics, 690.
46Burton, Syntax of the Mood and Tenses in the New Testament Greek, 241.
107
interrelatedness
Another important feature to note in the above passage is the use of the plural
copulative verb evste (3:16,17b) when referring to the church. This implies that
the author has a community in mind as he writes. However, the third person
singular fqei.rei (3:17a) shows that he is not only appealing to the whole, but
also to specific individuals in general. The use of nao,j in the singular denotes
the particularity, and oneness of the temple in view. The believers though
collective are not the “temples of God” but rather “God’s temple.” It cannot be
denied that the use of nao,j and its derivatives in 1 Cor 3:16,17 alluded to the
church collectively, as well as to the individual.47 According to Lenski, it's an
anomaly that although God has one temple, every believer is simultaneously
a temple.48
The antecedent of the pronoun oi[tine,j (1 Cor 3:17) also elucidate the
central message of the passage.49 According to A.T. Robertson, in most
instances the relative pronoun oi[tine,j (derivative of o[stij) often refer to a
definite person or thing, or even, to the class to which the object in question
belongs.50 Furthermore, whenever this pronoun is used it is always related to
its antecedent in gender, and its predicate in number.51 This implies that the
singular nao,j is the most likely antecedent, and the plural u`mei/j, the predicate.
The pronoun therefore serves as a bridge between the substantives nao,j and
u`mei/j, dispelling any doubt that one relates to the other.
Alternatively, oi[tine,j can also be understood as either generic or qualitative,
although neither of these fully captures the complete picture of the pronoun
in the given context. However, since oi[tine,j falls within the same semantic
range of o[j and o[stij (denotes a degree of definiteness) its meaning can be
broadened so as to include a concept that is categorical, yet qualitative.52 This
of course is in line with the precedent of the qualitative-definite constructions
47 Most scholars ascribe the primary usage of nao,j as referring to the church body in isolation
to its individual parts.
48 A. T. Robertson and A. Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First
Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (New York: C. Scribners’s Sons, 1911), 66. A similar
idea can also be found in Plato, Crat. 405. According to Robertson since believers are
God’s temples then they must guard against their consecration.
49 There are three prevalent views surrounding the interpretation of the pronoun oi[tine,j:
The first sees it as referring back to nao,j and nao,n (1 Cor 3:16,17). The second sees it as
referring to a[gio,j (3:17). Finally, as related to both (cf. Trail, An Exegetical Summary of 1
Corinthians 1-9, 136.
50 Archibald. T. Robertson, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament in Light of Historical
Research (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1934), 727.
51 Ibid., 730-31,737.
52 See Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 336; Robertson, A Greek Grammar of
the New Testament in Light of Historical Research, 730-31.
108
Mario Phillip
used in 1 Cor 3:16,17a.53 It is therefore reasonable to purport that Paul not
only had the church in mind in his usage of nao,j, but in every respect, the
individual member as well.54
1 Cor 3:16 served as a metacomment55 where the author asserts in an
indirect way the reality of the heavenly temple through his direct allusion to
the metaphorical temple. The subsequent enumeration on the destruction of
the temple therefore serves as an enumeration of the sanctuary motif earlier
elucidated. The believers are God’s temple in as much as they reflect and
correspond to the heavenly reality that exist. In 1 Cor 3:17 the judgment
motif that is constitutive of the heavenly sanctuary is transferred to the
metaphorical temple thus corroborating their synonymity at least from the
perspective of the author.
It is evident that God regarded with utmost care the sanctity of the physical
temple and likewise of the body of believers.56 In the temple cultus of Israel,
53 There are over 500 references to the temple motif in the writings of the Ante and PostNicene Fathers which provide some interesting insights into 1 Cor 3:16,17, cf. Epistles of
Cyprian, An Exhortation to Theodore After his Fall, Letter 1, ANF 5:452, trans. Alexander
Roberts and James Donaldson; Epistle to the Ephesians (ANF, 1:83,84); Athanasius
Against Arians 4.47, PNF, 4:333, trans. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson.
54 Most scholars see Paul’s usage of nao,j as either referring to the church or qualitative
traits or neither, but never are both seen as been equally viable. Thrall sees Paul as
using the analogy of the temple so as to establish a corollary between desecrating the
temple and intentional harm to the well-being of the church, see Magaret E. Thrall, 1 and
2 Corinthians, The Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1965), 33; Morris sees the focus as emphasizing the character of those who are
believers as well as on the presence of God, see Leon Morris, 1 Corinthians, Tyndale
NT Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 69 and also Frederick L. Godet,
Commentary on First Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1977), 190-93; Bruce sees Paul
as using Qumran rhetoric in referring to the believers as God’s temple, see F. F. Bruce,
ed. 1 and 2 Corinthians, New Century Bible (Greenwood, S.C: Attic Press, 1971), 45;
O’Rourke believes it relates to the holies of holies, see J. I O’Rourke, “1 Corinthians,” in
New Catholic Commentary on Scripture, ed. Reginald C. Fuller (London: Thomas Nelson
& Sons, 1975), 1117; Calvin Commentary posits that the temple represented the believers
at Corinth, see David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance, eds., The First Epistle of Paul
to the Corinthians, trans. by John W. Fraser (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960), 78-80; this
position is also taken by C.K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1968), 90-92; and W. Larry Richards, 1 Corinthians, The
Abundant Life Bible Amplifier, ed. George Knight (Nampa, Idaho: Pacific Press, 1997), 72.
55 Steven E. Runge, The Lexham High Definition New Testament: Introduction (Bellingham,
WA: Logos Bible Software, 2008), s.v. “metacomment.” See also Steven E. Runge, The
Lexham Discourse Greek New Testament (Bellingham, WA: Logos Bible Software, 2008),
s.v. “1 Cor 3:16.”
56 The idea of danger and its concomitant relationship with holiness are replete throughout
the OT, see Num. 4:5,15,19, 20; 1 Sam. 6:20; 2 Sam. 6:7; Lev.10:6; 16:2,13.
109
interrelatedness
defilement of the sanctuary was tantamount to death (cf. Lev 16; 21:12,
21-23). In like manner, God will ultimately destroy those who defile His
temple through their actions. In 1 Cor 3 there is a consecutive movement
of an agrarian (vv.6-9), to an architectural (vv.10-15), and finally to temple
imageries. The Christian ministers are first characterized as dia,konoi
(servants) and God’s co-workers (qeou/ sunergoi), while the Corinthian
believers are God’s field (qeou/ gew,rgion), God’s building (qeou/ oivkodomh) and
finally God’s temple (nao.j qeou/).57 The placement of nao.j qeou in the semantic
construct of the sentence adduces to its importance. This can be best
illustrated by applying the discourse principle of ordering restraint, and the
cline of specificity, where elements that are emphasized are ordered from
the least to the most important (ordering restraint), or where ideas that are
most pertinent are stated more prominently (cline of specificity).58 Believers
as God’s temple are thus to be understood as not merely incidental to the
pericope, but as constituting its core thrust. The fact that the temple referred
to is as definite as God Himself presupposes a temple that is as enduring
as God Himself. The reference to the believers as God’s temple therefore is
meant to establish the relationship that exists between God’s temple and His
people (emblematic temples).
The two architectural metaphors used to refer to the Corinthian church,
namely that of “God’s building” and “God’s temple” are indicative of the
continuity and interrelatedness that Paul sees between the church and the
sanctuary. Considering that at that time of writing the Jerusalem temple was
in all likelihood not yet destroyed, Paul is here seemingly transferring the
sanctity of the sanctuary to the people of God. The interrelatedness that
exists with the Corinthian church as a body of believers and the earthly
temple stands paradigmatic of inseparable corollary existing between the
various dimensions of the sanctuary. In this case, the church stands both
as representation of the earthly and metaphorical representation of the
sanctuary, which stands in relations to the heavenly sanctuary. In each case
it is the presence of the spirit of God that makes both the church and the
heavenly sanctuary holy.
57 Sweeney, “Jesus, Paul, and the Temple,” 609-13. Sweeney drew an interesting
observation with respect to Paul’s metaphoric language in 1 Cor 3:9-17. He sees a direct
parallel and continuity between Jesus’ attitude to the temple and that of Paul’s, thus
for him Jesus’ act of choosing twelve disciples corresponds to the ministers at Corinth,
whereas the Corinthian church is reflective of the new community inaugurated by Jesus
(Matt 16:13-18; Gal 2:7-8), Ibid., 614-619.
58 Bruce E. Hollenbach, “Two Constraints on Subordination in New Testament Greek,” in
Selected Technical Articles Related to Translation, ed. Bruce Moore (Dallas, TX: Summer
Institute of Linguistics, 1985), 1-2.
110
Mario Phillip
1 Cor 6:19
Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you,
whom you have from God, and that you are not your own? (NASB)
In 1 Cor 6:19 Paul posits the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as a substantial
basis for moral living,59 a theme that is prevalent throughout scripture.60 The
phrase nao.j tou/…a`gi,u pneu,mato,j can be understood as monadic much like
nao.j qeou/ in 3:16. The designation can also be taken to mean the temple that
the Holy Spirit possesses,61 where He lives,62 or a temple for the Holy Spirit.63
While the context of 6:19 points to the believer’s life being made holy by the
Spirit, the bigger picture revolves around the role of the Holy Spirit as the
agent of holiness, enabling the presence of God to be imbibed in a place, a
thing or a person.64 The presence of the Holy Spirit thus delineates a place or
person, as holy in the very same way it does for the sanctuary.
The use of the negative particle ouvk with the indicative connotes the idea of a
forceful halt to something. Also, whenever it is used interrogatively it always
anticipates an affirmative response.65 Moreover, the context further lends to
an emphatic or contrasting usage.66 This implies two things, namely that Paul
may have anticipated that the believers respond, “yes, we know that our
bodies are the temple.” Or, he might have sought to highlight the disparity
that exists between God’s temple as it should be, and as it currently exist.
Again the plural u`mw/n is used in consort with u`mi/n, e;cete and evste (3:17).
This is indicative of the continued emphasis of the church as a collective
59 Paul is not alone in this realm, extra-biblical writings reveal that other authors also share
a similar focus, see Epistle of Barnabas 4:11; 6:15; 10:7; 19:4; Hermas Mandate 4 1:1,5;
Hermas Mandate 8 1:3; Hermas Similitude 6 5:5; Didache 2:2; 3:3; Sirach 23:17, 23.
60 Some of the references outside of Corinthians include Gal 5:19; Eph 3:5; 1 Thess 4:3; Rev
2:21; 9:21.
61Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul’s First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians, 146f.
62 W. Harold. Mare, 1 Corinthians, The Expositor’s Bible Commentary, ed. Frank E.
Gaebelein, vol. 10 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976)
63Bratcher, A Translator’s Guide to Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, cited in Trail, An
Exegetical Summary of 1 Corinthians 1-9, 246.
64 The fact that Paul had no reservation in ascribing to the Holy Spirit that which he earlier
attributed to God is a clear indication of the strong Trinitarian motif that inheres his
theological framework.
65 Gordon Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1987), 146.
66Robertson, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament in Light of Historical Research, 115860.
111
interrelatedness
representation of the temple of Christ. The preceding verse (6:18) recapitulates
the dual focus of both the individual, and church being the temple of God.
He begins with the use of the plural second person plural present imperative
feu,gete which suggest that he has the church body in mind. The apostle then
went on to use a string of singular substantives (poih,sh|, a;nqrwpoj, sw,mato,j,
porneu,wn, and a`marta,nei) all of which convey the idea of individuality. The
chapter then concludes with another string of plural substantives (hvgora,sqhte,
doxa,sate, and u`mw/n) reverting back to the collective identity in view.
Paul, in challenging the Corinthians to moral conduct is recapitulating and
applying within the Christian framework the Mishna’s behavioral dictums for
temple worshippers. In Berakoth 9.5.5-6 it states:
A man should not behave himself unseemly while opposite the Eastern Gate [of
the Temple] since it faces toward the Holy of Holies. He may not enter into the
Temple Mount with his staff or his sandal or his wallet, or with the dust upon his
feet, nor may he make of it a short by-path; still less may he spit there.67
In the reckoning of Paul the same reverence that one ascribed to the earthly
temple, such is due to their bodies, which becomes the embodiment of
the new temple of God. While most commentators see in 6:19 an explicit
reference to the individual member as a temple of God, in exclusion to the
church68 this writer is of the view that Paul inseparably intertwines both since
one has a concomitant effect on the other.
Another explicit terminology used profusely in scripture although only once
by Paul (1 Cor 9:13) is that of ièro,n. The clarity in its usage means that the
text does not warrant an exegesis, sufficing to say, that the virtual absence of
its usage by the apostle can imply the spiritual insignificance attributed to the
then Jerusalem temple and its cults. On the converse, the predominant use
of nao,j especially in reference to God is a clear indication of the importance
attached to both its spiritual and material significance.
67 The Mishnah, Translated From the Hebrew with Introduction and Brief Explanatory Notes
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 9,10.
68 Some of the authors who accede to interpreting 1 Cor 6:19 as referring only to the
physical body are: C. K. Barrett, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Black’s New
Testament Commentary (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1968), 151-52; Richards, 111-12;
Lenski, 269; Fee, 263-64; R. C. Steadman, Expository Studies in 1 Corinthians (Waco,
TX: Word Books, 1981), 67; Richard Horsley, 1 Corinthians (Nashville, TN: Abingdon,
1998), 93; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, Sacra Pagina, vol.7 (Collegeville, MN:
Liturgical Press, 1999), 249; Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians, trans. by James W. Leitch
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 112; Anthony Thiselton, The First Epistle of Corinthians: A
Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).
112
Mario Phillip
2 Cor 6:16
Or what agreement has the temple of God with idols? For we are the temple of
the living God; just as God said, "I will dwell in them and walk among them; And
I will be their God, and they shall be My people. (NASB)
2 Cor 6:16 stands as a reverberation of Exod 25:8 where God promises to
dwell with His people. The LXX translates the Hebrew yTin>k;v'w> “I would dwell”
as ovfqh,somai “I will be made visible” (Exod 25:8) inferring that the wilderness
sanctuary symbolized God’s visible presence in the midst of His people. In
the same way the Corinthians as God’s spiritual temples were to be His
visible presence within the believing community. In 2 Cor 6:16 Paul utilizes
another string plural substantives (h`mei/j, evsmen,, zw/ntoj, auvtoi/j, auvtw/n, and
auvtoi) implying that the whole community is in focus.69 If the phrase nao.j qeou/
evsmen is seen through the lens of Apollonius corollary it can be understood
as qualitatively definite (corresponding to 1 Cor 3:16; 6:19). This implies that
the temple of God can be understood both as a specific entity that exists, as
well as a particular quality shared by His people. This dynamic oscillation
in ideations of the temple is characteristic of fluidity and interrelatedness
that exist between the temple as a heavenly reality and its other temporal
aspects.
The subordinating conjunction kaqw.j establishes the basis of God’s action—
because believers are His temple then He inhabits their dwelling as His did
the heavenly and earthly sanctuaries. According to NA27 2 Cor 6:16 points
back to Lev 26:11 and Eze 37:27, where God promises to dwell with His
people. The substantive zw/ntoj while it often asserts an attribute to God (Matt
16:16; 26:63; Rom 9:26; 2 Cor 3:3; 1 Tim 3:15; Heb 3:12; 10:31; 12:22; Rom
7:2; 15:7),70 here it applied to the believers. The author is seemingly ascribing
to both a commensurate degree of sacrosanctity—believers should be holy
in the same way God is holy. The believers as God’s temples thus point
not only to their resemblance to the temple itself, but also to the presence
inhabiting the temple.
69 Cf. David Abernathy, An Exegetical Summary of 2 Corinthians, 2d (Dallas, TX: SIL
International, 2008), 241. The concept of believers or the body of believers constituting the
temple is not only prevalent in extra-biblical writings, the concept is also well supported by
the biblical text, see Lev 2:11; 2 Sam 7:8; Isa 43:6; 52:11; Jer 31:9; Eze 20:34; Amos 3:13;
Jn 14:23; Acts 18:4; 19:9.
70 James A. Brooks and Carlton L. Winbery, Syntax of the New Testament Greek (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1979), 144-45.
113
interrelatedness
Exegetical synthesis
The use of nao,j in 1 Cor 3:16,17; 6:19; and 2 Cor 6:16 all share a syntactical
relationship. The above exegesis has shown that Paul’s usage of nao,j is
multi-faceted, he sees it both as a particularized entity and also as a
categorical (qualitative) reality. The fact that Paul chose to use the article
both in an arthrous and anarthrous sense is a clear indication of how closely
related he perceived the particular/definite and qualitative dimensions of the
temple. As a particular reality the temple language points to the prototypical
reality in heaven from which the earthly stands as a mere representation.
Qualitatively, it denotes the attributes possessed by the believing community.
Furthermore, as the Apollonius corollary stated with reference to anarthrous
substantives that are related to the other (1 Cor 3:16; 6:19; 2 Cor 6:16), both
should be given the same semantic force. This means, that either they are
both regarded as definite, indefinite, or qualitative. Therefore, in the case of
nao.j qeou/ (1 Cor 3:16), if qeou/ is understood as definite, then likewise should
nao,j. While this does not negate the metaphorical or qualitative nuance of
the phrase, it does allow for the phrase to be understood inclusively without
being exclusive to other dimensions—particularly the heavenly dimension of
the sanctuary.
The anarthrous usage of nao,j by itself, and in the general context of 1 Cor
3:16; 6:19; and 2 Cor 6:16, while they point to the qualitative aspects of the
temple, they also concomitantly adduce to a definite reality. This seeming
tension can be held in a meaningful balance because the concept of the
temple in Jewish reckoning can be held as both literal and symbolic with
equal profundity. Having said that, the believers are God’s symbolic temples
in the sense that they correspond to a literal entity that exist.
The use of the temple imagery in 1 and 2 Corinthians is meant to establish
in the minds of the Corinthians the unity and oneness of God which He
(God) wants to be replicated among His people through the Holy Spirit. The
Corinthians must see themselves as a spiritual habitation of Christ, wherein
His holiness, and unity preside. Moreover, they are entrusted with the sacred
responsibility of safeguarding such unity.71
71 P. W. Comfort, “Temple,” in Dictionary of Paul and His Letters, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne
Ralph P. Martin, Daniel.G. Reid (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1993), 923-924.
114
Mario Phillip
2 Cor 5:1-4
For we know that if the earthly tent which is our house is torn down, we have a
building from God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.
2
For indeed in this house we groan, longing to be clothed with our dwelling from
heaven; 3 inasmuch as we, having put it on, shall not be found naked.
4
For indeed while we are in this tent, we groan, being burdened, because we
do not want to be unclothed, but to be clothed, in order that what is mortal may
be swallowed up by life (NASB)
1
2 Cor 5:1-4 depicts the multi-dimensional view of the temple germane to
the Judeo-Christian worldview, where the temple in its earthly and heavenly
dimensions were often held in tandem. An awareness and appreciation of
this fact can aid the reader in grasping the inclusivenss of the temple motif
in the Pauline corpus.
The apostle here engages three additional terminologies that are laden
with sanctuary imagery. The first is skh/noj used in 2 Cor 5:1, 4 and also in
Wisdom 9:15. It carries a similar semantic domain like its cognate skhnh,,72
generally understood to mean tent or temporary abode.73 The second is oivkia
which the author uses eight times, six of which refers to a physical place of
abode. The third is oivkodomhn, used six times by Paul primarily in the context
of edification. Many conclude that 2 Cor 5:1-4 exemplifies the theme of the
believers’ bestowal of glorified bodies in 1 Cor 15. Thus they understand skh/
noj, oivki,a, and oivkodomhn as all referring to the human body. Can it be further
pointing to a reality that exist, in addition to the corporeal or glorified bodies?
In the genitive construction oivki,a tou/ skh,nouj “house of our tent” (2 Cor 5:1),
oivki,a is qualified by skh,nouj. This genitive of reference,74 or apposition,75 can
best be understood when viewed from its relation to oivkodomhn evk qeou/ e;comen
“we have a building from God” (2 Cor 5:1).76 The earthly house stands in a
72 The book of Hebrews has extensively used skhnh, to refer to the heavenly sanctuary. It
would suggest that by using skh/noj metaphorically in reference to the believer that the
author is no doubt using a spiritual reality to explicate his theological dogma in relation
to the qualitative aspects of the believer’s life. Skh/noj though has the added Hellenistic
metaphoric nuance of the body as a habitation of the soul (cf. Walter Bauer, A GreekEnglish Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, trans. and
adapted by William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich, 2d ed., rev. and augmented by F.
Wilbur Gingrich and Frederick W. Danker (2000), s.v. “skhnh,,” and “skh/noj.”
73 Johan Lust, Erik Eynikel, and Katrin Hauspie , A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint,
rev. ed., (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2003), “skh/noj”
74Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 127
75 Ibid., 94-99.
76Lenski, Epistles to the Corinthians, 996.
115
interrelatedness
parallel relationship to the heavenly building as an ephemeral pattern. While
the context alludes to the postresurrectional state, there is also at work here
the interplay of dual realities that are meant to be complimentary, and not
necessarily mutually exclusive to the other.
The true picture of 2 Cor 5:1-4 must be gained by understanding how the
nouns skh/noj, oivkodomhn, and oivki,a relate to each other and the broader
framework of the author’s theology. As was earlier elucidated oivkodomhn
can refer either to a finish edifice (Matt 24:1; 1 Cor 3:9), edification (Rom
14:19; 15:2; 1 Cor 14:3,5,12,26), or the individual member or community of
believers (Eph 2:21).77 Oivki,a often denotes a physical house or household,78
while skῆnoj likewise implies a habitation of some sort. While the thrust of
these nouns points to an anthropological rendering, there is also an evident
architectural imagery implied. The author in using these terminologies sets
up a mutual correspondence between temporal and eternal entities, which is
built upon the parallelism existing between the earthly tabernacle construct
and its heavenly eternal counterpart. For instance, in 2 Cor 5:1 the phrases
oivki,a tou/ skh,nouj “house of our tent” and oivki,an avceiropoi,hton aivw,nion evn toi/j
ouvranoi/j “house not made with hand eternal in the heavens,” are used where
the temporal-corporeal body is juxtaposed to the eternal heavenly body.
The definite articles in the contruction tou/ skh,nouj (2 Cor 5:1) and evn tw/| skh,nei
(2 Cor 5:4) can possibly be serving a generic function of categorizing skh,noj
as a representative within a larger domain of temple imagery.79 Or, they can
also be serving an individualizing function; distinguishing the human tent
from other temple/s.80 It is clear from the context that a parallel is drawn
between the corporeality of the human body and the eternal nature of the
heavenly body/building. Moreover, the phrase oivkodomh.n evk qeou/ e;comen (2
Cor 5:1) points back to the architectural imagery qeou/ oivkodomh, evste (1 Cor
3:9). While there exist many views as to how the expression oivkodomh.n evk qeou/
e;comen should be uderstood,81 that it can refer to a physical heavenly abode
77 Bauer, BAGD, s.v. “oivkodomh”
78 Bauer, BAGD, s.v. “oivkia.”
79 See Porter, Porter, Idioms of the New Testament Greek, 104; Wallace, Greek Grammar
Beyond the Basics, 227.
81 Some of the views held include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
It is the spiritual or resurrection body
It is the new body which is received at the parousia
It is a new body received immediately upon death
It is God’s presence which covers the believer with eternal glory immediately upon
death
116
Mario Phillip
is by no means incongruent with the context.82 Hodge enunciates that the
comparison in 2 Cor 5:1 is not between the earthly body and the heavenly,
but rather, the earthly house and the heavenly [house].83 The interrelation that
the author saw between the earthly and heavenly spheres does not negate,
but allows for the expression oivkodomh.n evk qeou/ e;comen to be understood as
referring to a heavenly reality.
The phrase oivkia tou/ skh,nouj (5:1) parallels oi;kw th/j skhn/j in 1 Chron 9:23,
which is used in reference to the tabernacle. Also, in Job 4:19 oivki,a is used
in an anthrological setting (katoikou/ntaj oivkiaj phlinaj) describing those
living in habitation of clay. Furthermore, in Jewish apocalyptic the heavenly
dwellings of both angels and the saints were described within an architectural
framework.84 Even Christ spoke of rebuilding the temple without hands (cf.
Mk 14:58). The point here is to recognize the interplay and substitution of
earthly realities with their heavenly correspondents as used in the Epistles
is not unique to the Epistles, but rather a mere continuance of a precedent
establish by other writers.
The expression oivkodomh.n evk qeou/ e;comen oivkian avceiropoi,hton can highlight
the interrelation that the author saw between the earthly and heavenly bodies
/ spheres, albeit the heavenly and earthly tabernacle. In Heb 9:11 the phrase
leiote,raj skhnh/j ouv ceiropoih,tou “perfect tabernacle not made with hands” is
used in reference to the heavenly tabernacle. Also in Heb 9:24 it is said ouv
ga.r eivj ceiropoi,hta eivsh/lqen a[gia Cristo,j “for Christ did not enter a holy place
made with hands”, another obvious reference to the heavenly sanctuary. In
the LXX ceiropoih,toj is often correlated primarily to idolatry (Lev 26:1, 30; Isa
2:18; 10:11; 19:1; 21:9; 31:7; 46:6; Dan 5:4, 23), and once to a sanctuary (Isa
16:12). In the NT ceiropoih,toj primarily refers to heavenly habitation of God
(Acts 7:48; 17:24), the heavenly sanctuary (Heb 9:11, 24), body of Christ
(Mark 14:58), human efforts (Eph 2:11), or without human effort (Col 2:11
5. It is an image for the new age to which believers belong, the new
eschatologicalJerusalem
6. It is our heavenly existence, and which corresponds to what he has already referred to
as an eternal weight of glory (cf. Abernathy, An Exegetical Summary of 2 Corinthians,
179).
7. Paul’s desire to be clothed with immortality without having to experience the
intermediate state (cf. Ralph Martin, 2 Corinthians, Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 40
(Waco, TX: Word Books, 1986), 106,107.
82 Charles Hodge, An Exposition of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (New York: A. C.
Armstrong and Sons, 1891), 112f.
83 Ibid., 113.
84Cf. I Enoch 39:2-6.
117
interrelatedness
[avceiropoi,hton]). In 2 Cor 5:1 given the congruence shared with the context
and the evidence posited thus far the oivki,an avceiropoi,hton aivw,nion evn toi/j
ouvranoi/j can point either to physical bodies not made with hands, as well as
to the heavenly habitations not made with hands. These two can be held as
equally viable without being mutually exclusive. The earthly temporal bodies
are made by human hands in the same way like the earthy tabernacle, in
contrast the heavenly glorified bodies are made without human hands in the
same manner like the heavenly sanctuary.
2 Cor 5:1-4 therefore establishes two realities, namely, the earthly corporeal
body of man, and God’s building “not made with hands.” Most scholars agree
that the context of the pericope pertains to the frailty of the earthly body.
Paul seems to be seeking to establish the disparity between the ideal to be
attained, and the reality that exists. The underlying metaphoric usages in 2
Cor 5:1-4 pertains to the strong interrelation that exists between the earthly
temporal body and the heavenly postresurrectional body, as predicated on
the relationship existing between the heavenly and earthly sanctuaries. 2
Cor 5:1-4 thus compares the temporality of the earthly metaphorical body to
the permanence of the heavenly sanctuary, and the accompanying glorified
bodies that will be adorned upon the believer. In the same way that Christ’s
body was at times equated with the earthly temple (Mark 14:58; John 2:19),
the apostle compares the believers at Corinth to the physical heavenly
construct of the sanctuary. This comparison is meant to create certitude, and
more importantly to show that the nature of the heavenly sanctuary defines
the nature of the glorified bodies of the believer, just as the nature of the
earthly sanctuary characterized the nature of temporal bodies.
2 Cor 5:10
For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that each one may
be recompensed for his deeds in the body, according to what he has done,
whether good or bad (2 Cor 5:10 NASB)
This verse brings an end to the pericope which began in 2 Cor 4 5:1-9. The
preceding context spoke of the coporeality of the present body as compared
to the immortality of the heavenly body (vv 1-4). In 2 Cor 5:10 a judgment
motif is introduced with its attendant verdict. While the historical framework
might have possibly been that of a sanhendrin or civil judgment setting, the
fact that the author coins it within an eschatological narrative suggests that
the judgment spoken of should be understood within similar context.
The language of the text points invariably to an eschatological context. The
noun bh/ma (secular origins) derived from the verb bai,nw means to “step or
118
Mario Phillip
stride as in walking.”85 In the LXX Deut 2:5 it used in reference to a footlength
of land (Deut 2:5); the platform upon which the priest stands to declare the
word of God (1 Esd 9:42; Neh 8:4); to defend a cause (2 Macc 13:26);
mode of walking (Sir 19:30; 45:9). In the NT bh/ma accrues primarily a judicail
connotation,86 except in Acts 7:5 where the original meaning “a foot-length” is
intended. Paul uses the word within an eschatological framework to describe
the ultimate judgment before God (cf. Rom 14:10, 2 Cor 5:10).87
A cursory analysis of the the grammatical functions of bh/ma can reveal that it
is often used to denote a personal being appearing before a specific place
and time. For instance the word bh/ma occurs in an adjunct relationship with
nine predicate verbs,88 which either convey the idea of either one assuming
a judicial position (Matt 27:19; Acts 12:21; 25:6; 25:17; Jn 19:13), appearing
or being led before a tribunal (Acts 18:12-13; 25:10; Rom 14:10; 2 Cor 5:10),
being chastized before or driven away from a judicial tribunal (Acts 18:16,17).
Each of the above can be understood primaily in a spatial, temporal or
locative sense, that is, relating either to a specific place or point in time.
Additionally bh/ma occurs ten times in a prepositional phrase, namely with epi.
e;mprosqen and apo. referring either to a spatial or temporal functions. Even
more, of the four instances in which bh/ma is qualified by a word or phrase
three times it involves a personal being of authority.89 The context of 2 Cor
5:1-10 can allow for a reasonable conclusion that the judgment envisioned
occurs within the framework of a particular time and place before God.90
The context of the passage points to an ultimate judicial act where
destinies are sealed, a theme which resonates throughout Paul’s epistles.91
In 2 Thess 1:6 Paul spoke of God repaying those who persecute His
85 T. McComiskey, “bh/ma,” The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed.
Colin Brown (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1971), 2:369,370.
86 Cf. Acts 18:21; 18:12,16,17; 25:6,10,17
87 cf. Sib.Or. 2.218; 7.222, 224; Pol.Phil.6.2; 1 Enoch 45:3;47:3; Matt 16:27; 19:28; 25:31-46)
88 The following are the predicate verbs: kaqi,saj (3) “having sat,” kaqhme,nou (1)“Sitting,”
evka,qisen (1) “he sat,” h[gagon (1) “led,” avph,lasen (1) “he drove off,” e;tupton (1) “beating,”
evimi (1) “I am…,” parasthso,meqa (1) “we are standing,” fanerwqh/nai (1) “to appear”
89 Cf. “kai,saro,j” (Acts 25:10), tou/ qeou/ (Rom 14:10), tou/ cristou/ (2 Cor 5:10)
90 In t both Christ and the Father are described within a judicial framework as one who
executes judgment. For instance in Rom 14:10 he used the phrases 'judgment seat of
God' whereas in 2 Cor 5:10 'judgment seat of Christ' (For more on God's judicial role, cf.
Matt 25:31,32; Rom 2:6; Gal 6:7; Eph 6:8; Eph 3:24,25; Rev 22:12)
91Martin, 2 Corinthians, 114,115.
119
interrelatedness
people,92 in Rom 2:5 the phrase “day of wrath” is juxtaposed with “judgment
of God” as synonymous expressions. Also in Rom 2:16 it is said that God will
bring all secret things into account.93 Several elements in the text beckons
a final judgment. First Paul uses the inclusive plural94 hvmaj suggesting
that he expected this judgment to include his audience (both primary and
secondary). This is preceded by the use of pa,nta which according to Porter
denotes the concept of “completeness,” “conglomeration of individual parts,”
or “undifferenciated whole.” When used in a predicate relationship such as in
2 Cor 5:10 when it is used in an arthrous first predicate structure) it denotes
extensiveness and should be translated “all”.95 Furthermore, the usage of the
present indicative dei/ which by all indication serves the function of a futuristic
present adds certainty and immediacy to the judgment.96
Also, there is the further use of the epexegetical infinitve fanerwqh/nai, used
after the verb of obligation, thus clarifying what the obligation entails.97
Although using the plurals hvmaj. pa,nta in the first instance, the author now uses
the singular e[astoj which conveys the idea that he has an ultmative climatic
“en masse” judgment in view, which will at the same time be personal.98
92 Cf. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 557, 558.. The motif of final judgment is
made clear by the use of i[na komi,shtai with the infinitive which denotes ultimate purpose
and the constative aorist e[praxen which denotes the idea of comprehensiveness.
93 Even Polycarp understood 2 Cor 5:10 within the framework of an ultimate judgment
based on deeds. In his letter to the Philippians he says, “The presbyters, for their part,
must be compassionate, merciful to all, turning back those who have gone astray,
visiting all the sick, not neglecting a widow, orphan, or poor person, but “always aiming
at what is honorable in the sight of God and of men,” avoiding all anger, partiality, unjust
judgment, staying far away from all love of money, not quick to believe things spoken
against anyone, nor harsh in judgment, knowing that we are all in debt with respect to sin.
Therefore if we ask the Lord to forgive us, then we ourselves ought to forgive, for we are
in full view of the eyes of the Lord and God, and we must “all stand before the judgment
seat of Christ,” and “each one must give an account of himself. So, then, let us serve him
with fear and all reverence, just as he himself has commanded, as did the apostles, who
preached the gospel to us, and the prophets, who announced in advance the coming of
our Lord.” (cf. M. W. Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Text and English Translation
[Polycarp to the Philippians 6.1-3] (Grand Rapids: Michigan, 1999).
95 Stanley Porter, Idioms of Greek New Testament, 119; cf. J. H. Moulton, A Grammer of
New Testament Greek Vol 3, 199, 201-205; F. Blass, A Debrunner and R. Funk, A Greek
Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature (Chicago: University
of Chicago, 1961), 275.
97 Ibid., 607
98 M. J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 405.
120
Mario Phillip
Another important feature is the use of the neuter singular adverb fau/lon
as oppose to kako,n,99 the former is used six times in the NT, often within the
context of ultimate judgment (cf Jn 3:20;5:29; 2 Cor 5:10).
In order to aid the reader to better place the judgment within its proper
eschatological parameters the choice of the verb pra,ssw over poie,w can
be insightful. The former is used over 80 times in scripture, and generally
denotes the sum of habitual actions,100 whereas, the latter refers to mere
performances.101 It seems reasonable to infer that the judgment in question
does not simply take into account individual acts, but rather a settled
consistent conduct that has been inculcated and nurtured throughout one’s
life. While some believe that the judgment mentioned here speaks more of
character, moral chastisement, than mere deeds, it might be better to see
both as not necessarily mutually exclusive.102
The logical question that ensues is which judgment according to Scripture
calls into account the character of those to be judged? All indications point
to an actual appearance before a heavenly tribunal, a scene typical of Dan
7:9-14, 26-28. Although the scene described in 2 Cor 5:10 resembles that
of an investigative judgment, since the context does not explicitly point
to that fact, it is best to characterize this judgment as the totality of God’s
eschatological judicial initiative in vindicating professsed believers, and by
implication confirming those who are lost. This judgment involves first all acts
of judgment where the deeds and character of men will be under scrutiny.
Second, it is an event taking place at a specific time and place (though not
limited by time or place). Thirdly, it is God’s comprehensive response and
annihilation of the problem of sin and its perpetrators.
The idea of judgment within the construct of the heavenly sanctuary appears
to be in view here is 2 Cor 5:10. In Scripture the heavenly sanctuary is
99 Some manuscripts such as P46 B D F G Y favored kako,n, while others such as C, 048,
0243, 33, 81, 326 among others favored fu/lon, eventually the later was decided upon by
the critical scholars.
100 For instances where pra,ssw is used to denote doing what is morally evil 2 Cor 12:21;
1 Cor. 5:2; Rom. 2:1, 2, 7:15, 19, 13:4; morally good, cf. 1 Cor. 9:17; Phil. 4:9; of doing
both morally good and evil cf. Rom. 9:11; cf. Abernathy, An Exegetical Summary of 2
Corinthians, 192.
101 Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul
to the Corinthians (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1915), 158.
102 William H. Shea, The Abundant Life Bible Amplifier: A Practical Guide to Abundant
Christian Living in Daniel 7-12 (Nampa,ID: Pacific Press, 1996), 146,147; See also E.G.
White, Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press,
1888), 483.
121
interrelatedness
depicted as the place where judgment initiates (see Dan 7:9, 13; Rev 19:111; 20:4). True to his paradigm of using an earthly reality to symbolize or
point to its heavenly prototype, it is not surprising that here the author can
also be using an earthly judicial setting to highlight a heavenly reality with the
intent of conveying a profound biblical truth, that of the imminent judgment
of God.
Although the author did not mention explicitly the timing of the judgment,
other biblical authors have filled the gaps. The idea of the judgment taking
place within the context of the heavenly sanctuary is not a foreign concept
to Scripture (Dan 7, 8; Rev 14:6, 7; 2 Thess 2:6-12), neither is the idea of
the certitude of the judgment (Matt 11:27; John 5:22-27; Acts 17:31; 1 Pet
4:5), and of that judgment involving the reckoning of deeds done in this life
(Eccl 12:13, 14; Rom 2:12, 13; 1 Cor 4:5; Jude 15; Rom 14:12; Jas 2:12,
13; 1:25; 2:10-12, Gal 6:7; Rev 22:12). It is very likely that the judgment
of 2 Cor 5:10 pertains to the great white throne judgment in the heavenly
sanctuary, where the fate of humanity will be revealed (Rev 20:10, 11; cf.
Heb 12:23, 24).103 Others further believe that although it involves believers
the time of its occurrence is indeterminate.104 The important thing here is to
see the judgment alluded to as occurring within the construct of the heavenly
sanctuary, and thus it corroborates the author’s usage of the sanctuary motif
to inform his eschatology.
Ephesians 2:6,19-22
And raised us up with Him, and seated us with Him in the heavenly places, in
Christ Jesus,
19
So then you are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are fellow citizens
with the saints, and are of God's household, 20 having been built upon the
foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus Himself being the corner
stone, 21 in whom the whole building, being fitted together is growing into a holy
temple in the Lord; 22 in whom you also are being built together into a dwelling
of God in the Spirit. (NASB)
6
103 “Judgment seat,” [2 Cor 5:10], The Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary (SDABC),
rev. ed. Francis D. Nichol (Washington, DC: Review & Herald, 1978), 6:864.
104 Daniel R. Mitchel, “I-II Corinthians,” in KJV Bible Commentary, ed Edward E. Hindson,
and Woodrow Michael (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1997), 2347-2348. John G. Butler,
Analytical Bible Expositor: I & II Corinthians (Clinton, IA: LBC, 2009), 201-202. Murray J.
Harris “2 Corinthians,” in Expositor's Bible Commentary (Abridged), ed. Kenneth L. Barker
and John R. Kohlenberger II (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1994), 677; Colin G. Kruse, 2
Corinthians: An Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale New Testament Commentaries 8
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1987), 117.
122
Mario Phillip
Outside of Corinthians one of the more explicit motifs of the temple can
be found in Ephesians 2:6,19-22. The theme of the epistle centers aroud
the organic unity that believers experience in Christ despite their ethinic or
geographic orientations. The author uses the motifs evn cristw|/ or evn kuri,w|
as the nexus around which this unity is sustained. Although the ‘in Christ’
motif resonates throughout the Pauline corpus, it receives its most replete
expression here in Ephesians.105
In Eph 2:6 the verbs sunh,geiren kai. suneka,qisen are used to describe the
believer’s status. These two compound aorist verbs are seen to express
“intimate union” and “incorporation” through a “relationship of solidarity” with
Christ as substitute for humanity.106 In Rom 6:5, 8 the believer’s resurrection is
regarded as futuristic,107 however in Eph 2:6 it is portrayed as something that
already happened. This “already but not yet” tension is pervasive throughout
the Pauline epistles (cf. Col 2:12; 3:1). The believers are seated in heaven,
but yet as the same time not there. In the same way, the temple can exist as
a heavenly reality and still be as efficious in all its varied dimensions without
compromising either aspect.
The author of the Epistles often oscillates between real events and subjective
experiences. For instance in Eph 1:20 and Col 3:1 Jesus was raised from
the dead, and is now seated in heavenly realms (literal event); the believer
on the other hand is united with Christ (experientially [cf. Rom 6:5; Eph 1:3;
2:6; Phil 3:10]).108 The aorist form of the verb sugkaq/÷/i,zw occurs twice as a
predicate verb (Lk 22:55; Eph 2:6), from which both a literal109 and figurative
interpretation can be deduced.110 Some adduce that the language of Eph 2:6
speaks of the resurrection, enthronement [as high priest] and exaltation of
105 Nichol, SDABC, 6:995
106 Andrew T. Lincoln, Ephesians, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word Books,
1990), 105.
107 Some argue that although Paul uses the future tense in Rom 6:5,8, it must be understood
as futuristic present, that is, although not yet a reality its certainty makes it a present
reality [cf G.R.Beasley-Murray, Baptism in the New Testament (London: Macmillan, 1962),
126f; C.E.B. Cranfield, Romans (Edingburg: T &T Clark, 1975, 1:299f].
108 Francis Foulkers, Ephesians, Tyndale New Testament Commenataries (Leicester,
England: Intervasity, 1978), 73.
109 Leroy Bartel, Prison Epistles: Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians and Philippians
(Springfield, MO: Global University, 2006), 77.
110 Of the six usages of sugkaq/÷/i,zw in the LXX (cf. Gen 15:11; Ex 18:13, Nu 22:27; Jer
16:18; 1 Esd 9:7,16) and the 2 in Philo (Her 243,247) there is a strong element of literality
attached to the act of seating.
123
interrelatedness
Christ.111 The fact that the motif of enthronement of Christ as high priest is
stated points evidently to the heavenly sanctuary motif as work (see Rev 4,
5). In the same way the earthly temple served as a pattern of its heavenly
prototype, the church on earth becomes paradigmatic of its heavenly origin
and the ultimate destiny.
The expression evn dexia/| auvtou/ evn toi/j evpourani,oij “at his right hand in the
heavenly places” (Eph 1:20) can further elucidate the sanctuary motif.112
The preposition evn generally denotes several nuances such as place, time,
instrumentation, accompaniment,113 standard, manner, cause, association,
or sometimes as a substitute for the preposition eivj “into.”114 The context of
Eph 2 lends to a spatial or temporal rendering, which means that a particular
place, sphere or time is in view. The phrase evn dexia/| auvtou/ can point both to
a real action at a real place, that is, a particular function being undertaken
by Christ. Clarity can be sought by looking at the usage of evn dexia/| auvtou in
Scripture.
Generally in Scripture the phrase evn dexia auvtou/ denotes assuming a position
of honor and privilege (1 Kgs 2:19), guidance (Isa 45:1), power (Exod 15:6;
Ps. 89:13; Isa 48:13), victory (Pss 20:6; 44:3; Isa 41:10), sharing God’s throne
(Rev 3:21),115 as well as His infinite glory, and majesty in heavenly sphere.116
In Eph 1:20 it is best to see the expression evn dexia/| auvtou as denoting a
sphere of function, and not necessarily a literal action of sitting at God’s side.
For example, in the book of Acts Peter exclaimed of Jesus, “therefore having
been exalted to the right hand of God, and having received from the Father
the promise of the Holy Spirit, He has poured forth this which you both see
and hear” (Acts 2:33). Here the function of Jesus at the right hand of God is
portrayed as the one responsible for pouring upon the disciples the power
of the Holy Spirit. Therefore to infer a particular function to the expression is
scripturally congruent.
111 Thomas R. Y. Neufeld, Ephesians, Believers Church Bible Commentary (Scottdale, PA:
Herald Press, 2001), 95.
112 For more on Christ sitting at the right hand of God, see Acts 2:33, 34; 5:31; 7:55; Rom
8:34; Col 3:1; Heb 1:3; 8:1; 10:12; 12:2; 1 Pet 3:22.
113 Robertson, A Greek New Testament., 586-589.
114 Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics, 372.
115 Peter T. O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, The Pillar New Testament Commentary
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 140-143. Robert G. Bratcher and Eugene Albert
Nida, A Handbook on Paul's Letter to the Ephesians (New York, NY: United Bible
Societies, 1993), 34-35.
116 R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul's Epistles to the Galatians, to the
Ephesians and to the Philippians (Columbus, OH: Lutheran, 1937), 400-401.
124
Mario Phillip
Some see the phrase evn toi/j evpourani,oij (Eph 2:6) as denoting the church
as the true representative temple of God.117 Thus, the believer who is a part
of God’s church is in actuality a member in God’s heavenly kingdom. How
can a believer on earth sit with Christ in the heavenly sanctuary? The answer
to this questions can be found in examining the earthly pattern. According
to the instruction given to Moses the priest was to carry into the sanctuary
names of the children of Israel upon his breastplate. In Exod 28 it is said,
And they shall bind the breastplate by the rings thereof unto the rings of the
ephod with a lace of blue, that it may be above the curious girdle of the ephod,
and that the breastplate be not loosed from the ephod. 29 And Aaron shall bear
the names of the children of Israel in the breastplate of judgment upon his
heart, when he goeth in unto the holy place, for a memorial before the LORD
continually. 30 And thou shalt put in the breastplate of judgment the Urim and
the Thummim; and they shall be upon Aaron's heart, when he goeth in before
the LORD: and Aaron shall bear the judgment of the children of Israel upon his
heart before the LORD continually. (Exo 28:28-30 KJV)
28
Thus in a very real way the children of Israel shared in the mediatorial work
of the priesthood (cf. Exod 19:5, 6; 1 Pet 2:9). In the same way those who are
incorporated into Christ sit with Him in the heavenly sanctuary and “share
with Him” in His mediatorial function at the right hand of God. According
to Scripture Christ is presently interceding on our behalf in the heavenly
sanctuary as high priest , and those who are incorporated in Him become
recipients of His merits (Rom 8:34; Heb 7:25). The fact that those being
interceded for can at the same time become “joint” intercessors with Christ
attest to their appropriation of His righteousness in their lives, thus enabling
them to partner with God in intercession. According to 1 Pet 2:9 believers are
now a “royal priesthood” thus enabling them to function within the framework
of the sanctuary. Believers function as intercessors not in the sense of being
able to forgive sins, but rather in the same way the earthly priest served as
mediator.
In Rev 4:4; 5:11 the twenty-four elders are seen around the throne worshipping
God; scholars believe that these elders are symbolic representation of the
fullness of all the redeemed on earth.118 Interestingly, although still on earth
they are depicted as already in heaven praising God. A similar paradigm is
in effect in Ephesians 2, the believer by being apart God’s earthly temple—
His church, instinctively participates in the heavenly corresponding reality.
117T.K. Abbott, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the Ephesians and to
the Colossians (New York: C. Scribner's sons, 1909), 50.
118David E. Aune, Revelation 1-5 WBC 52A (Dallas, TX: Word, , 2002), 288-292.
125
interrelatedness
Additionally, the believer serves as God’s sanctuary in their lives through the
indwelling of the Holy Spirit (see 1 Cor 3:16, 17; 6:19).
Whenever the adjective evpourani,oij qualifies or is qualified by another
substantive it often denotes a reality beyond that which is qualified. For
example the adjective evpourani,oij qualifies the following nouns: do,xa (1 Cor
15:40), eivko,na (1 Co 15:49), skia/| (Heb 8:5). In each case an archetypal reality
is implied. In the context of Eph 2:6 the phrase “seating in heavenly places”
may refer both to an archetypical reality as well as to its effigy. Interestingly,
of the six occurrences of evpouran,ioij with predicate verbs, twice it pertains to
seating, and once to paying homage. and to the heavenly abode (Eph 1:2021; 2:6; Phil 2:10; 2 Tim 4:18). It is reasonable to suppose that the adjective
envisions an activity/function often in a specific place.
A striking parallel is drawn in Eph 2:12 and 2:19-22. The phrases th/j politei,aj
tou/ VIsrah.l “citizenship of Israel” (v. 12), sumpoli/tai tw/n a`gi,wn kai. oivkei/oi tou/
qeou/ “but fellow-citizens of the saints, and of the household of God” (v.19).119
Here is established a parallel between the temporal and spiritual realms. The
believers “citizens of Israel” and “fellow citizens of God’s household have
both literal and spiritual application, both of which are interconnected.120
Furthermore in Gal 6:10 the phrase the noun pi,stewj is used to qualify oivkei/
oi whereas qeou/ is used in Eph 2:19. Here again the church [God’s earthly
house] is paralleled to a heavenly reality.
The author utilized a series of architectural and organic metaphors of growth
and building to denote the people of God, which eventually culminate
with an explicit reference to the temple in Eph 2:21 (this is similar to the
pattern followed in 1 Cor 3:9-16).121 First he uses oivkei/oi [household], which
expresses familial relationship (Eph 2:19). Second, evpoikodomhqevntej [built],
qemeli,w| [foundation] and avkrogwniai,ou [cornerstone] (Eph 2:20). Third, ovkodomh.
sunarmoloume,nh [building joined together] (Eph 2:21). Finally, sunoikodomei/sqe
[builded] eivj katoikhth,rion [dwelling place] (Eph 2:22). All these metaphors
points to the centrality of the architectural motifs in the author’s mind, which
finds its most replete expression in nao.n a]gion (Eph 2:21; cf. 1 Cor 3:16).
119 The metaphor of citizenship implies membership of a city (cf. Gal. 4:26) or
commonwealth (cf. Phil. 3:20).
120 Cf. P. H. Towner, “Households and Household Codes” in G. F. Hawthorne, R. P. Martin
and D. G. Reid (eds), Dictionary of Paul and his Letters (Downers Grove/Leicester: IVP,
1993), 418. According to Towner “membership of a household in Roman culture meant
identity, refuge and protection, giving the security that comes with a sense of belonging.”
121 T.R.Y. Neufeld, Ephesians, Believer's Commentary (Scottdale, PA: Herld Press, 2001),
132f.
126
Mario Phillip
There is growing acceptance in scholarship that the akvrogwniai,ou “cornerstone” (vs 20) is ideally sanctuary imagery. Some identify the cornerstone as
the top stone at the pinnacle of the temple.122 Others see it as the foundation
stone in the temple.123 Lincoln believes that the former meaning garners
more support124 [the latter however may have better contextual support].
Bruce however believes that the avkrogwniai,ou refers to Christ.125 Whichever
rendering that is accepted can be equally viable and does not necessarily
destroy the thrust of the passage. Moreover, most of the proponents of above
views agree of the overwhelming temple imagery found in Eph 2:21.
3.
Theological implications
Paul through his sanctuary motifs is by no means advocating a replacement
temple theology, rather, he is using temple imagery in a “multivalent”
context.126 In order words, Paul is not endeavouring to substitute one idea of
the temple for another, rather, he is broadening its dimensions.
His usage of temple motifs and imagery was deliberate, theological, and
concomintant to the then Judeo-christian temple worldview, which essentially
saw the earthly and heavenly temples as complimentary aspects of one
reality. Therefore, one was often seen not in contrast, but in realtion to the
other. As was illustrated, the usage of the temple even included the individual
member within the body of believers, as well as the corporate believing
community. In the writings of Paul there is a constant interplay between
these various aspects of the temple.
This study concurs with Bonnington that the temple motifs in the Corinthian
Correspondence encapsulates three dominant theological and ethical
themes: (i) the temple as a place of God’s presence and ownership; (ii)
122 Cf. Lincoln, Ephesians, 154; Joachim Jeremias, avkrogwniai,oj TDNT, ed. Gerhard
Kittel, trans. Gepffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 1:791-93; idem, TDNT,
4:268f; F. F. Bruce, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: The Corner Stone,” Expository Times 84
(1972–73), 232; 1QS 5.6; 8.4, 5)
123 R. J. McKelvey, “Christ the Cornerstone,” NTS 8 (1961–62), 352–59; idem, The New
Temple, London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 195–204.
124 Cf. Psa 118:22; 2 Kgs 25:17; Isa 28:16; Testament of Solomon 22.7–23.3; Tertullian, Adv.
Marc. 3.7
125 F. F. Bruce, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: The Cornerstone,” Expository Times 84/8
(1973): 231-235.
126 J.R. Lanci, A New Temple for Corinth: Rhetorical and Archaeological Approaches to
Pauline Imagery (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 99f.
127
interrelatedness
the temple as a place of God’s [holiness] and separateness; (iii) the temple
as a central, focused and bounded sacred space with spatial and sacral
integrity.127 While the ethical dimension of Paul’s temple imagery cannot be
ignored, it should be understood within the broader Jewish temple tradition.
The Old Testament posits God’s abode as being not only in heaven (cf. 1
Kgs. 8:39, 43, 49), but also in the earthly temple (cf. 1 Kgs. 8:13). Therefore,
when Eph 2:6 refers to believers as already raised up and seated with Christ
in the heavenly places, here earthly metaphorical temples are accrued with
the same sacrality as the heavenly sphere to the extent that through Christ
they can sit in heaven.128 In fact, in Qumran both the elect on earth and
the inhabitants of heaven are regarded as constituting God’s eschatological
temple;129 thus to see the believers on earth as encapsulating the heavenly
abode finds consonance in extrabiblical Jewish writings.
O’Brien enunciates Eph 2:20 as referring to a heavenly entity where God
dwells. However this temple is also His people within whom He dwells
through the Holy Spirit. The believers have risen and are seated with Christ
(2:4-6), and are now citizens along with the saints of the holy city (2:19). He
notes that believers have access to heaven “through Christ mediatorial work”
and the “indwelling of the Holy Spirit.”130 Hence, for Paul it can be said that
the temple becomes anywhere or anyone in which the Spirit of God dwells.
The sanctuary motif is indicative of God’s jurisdiction (divine space) where
His presence and sacred trust abounds. As shown, the temporal sanctuary
becomes an extension of the heavenly sanctuary through the indwelling of
the Holy Spirit. The individual member becomes a sacred vessel of no less
a caliber than the heavenly archetype. In the same way defiling the earthly
wilderness sanctuary evoked the staunchest judgment , the believer as
God’s temple must abstain from defiling his body lest judgemnt befall its fate.
It is therefore no wonder that God wants His people to inculcate the virtues
that are characteristic of abiding in His presence.
127 Mark Bonnington, “New Temples in Corinth: Paul’s Use of Temple Imagery in the Ethics
of the Corinthian Correspondence,” in Heaven on Earth, ed. T.D. Alexander & S. J.
Gathercole (Carlisle, England: Paternoster Press, 2004), 152.
128 David Peterson, “The New Temple: Christology and Ecclesiology in Ephesians and 1
Peter,” in Heaven on Earth, ed. T.D. Alexander & S. J. Gathercole (Carlisle, England:
Paternoster Press, 2004), 170.
129 Cf. 1QS 11:7-8
130 P. T. O'Brien, The letter to the Ephesians, The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 219f.
128
Mario Phillip
4.Conclusion
This study concludes that, first the sanctuary motifs employed by Paul
shows the interconnectedness between the heavenly and earthly realms.
Second, the church as God’s temple is emblematic of the higher reality of the
prototypical temple to which believers must pattern their lives. Third, believers
who constitute the temple through their lives can bring honor or defamation
to it, either of which has eternal consequences. Fourth, the language used to
convey the sanctuary imagery sugges that the author envisioned the temple
both as a collective and yet particularized entity. Thus the individual person
is just as much the temple, as is the church. This dual focus addresses the
division and moral laxity which beseiged the Corinthian church. Disunity and
immorality poses an affront to the holiness and sanctity of the sanctuary.
Finally, there is a pervading thread which runs through all the explicit
sanctuary motifs in the Epistles where the sancutary is seen as a single
arentity replicated through its many dimensions. The heavenly reality of
the sanctuary enables the verisimilitude of the metaphorical dimension as
is evidently seen prima facie in the Epistles. While it is true that the texts
used were not written so as to construct an apriori doctrine of the sanctuary,
it does establish a aposteriori clear existence of an overarching sanctuary
awareness in the author’s worldview—one which was congruent with his
Jewish heritage. More than that, it shows that the synergy existing between
the sanctuary, the church and the individual believer played a key factor in
the author’s use of the sanctuary motifs. The oscillation between heavenly
realities and their metaphorical counterparts attest to the fact that the
sanctary was made holy by the presence of the Holy Spirit, which also the
same can be said of the church and believer.
129
Johan H. Bavinck in gesprek met
Westerse en Oosterse mistiek
’n Boodskap vir vandag?
Bennie J. van der Walt
Skool vir Filosofie
Potchefstroomkampus
Noordwes-Universiteit
Potchefstroom
[email protected]
Abstract
Johan H. Bavinck’s dialogue with Western and Eastern mysticism.
A message for today?
For a variety of reasons all kinds of mystical writings and experiences
have again become a common phenomenon. Mysticism seems to be
like a creeper or climbing plant or even a parasite which may easily
attach itself to existing religions and worldviews, the Christian included.
Superficially viewed it may seem very attractive, in this way hiding
its deceptive nature, full of inner contradictions. Therefore, the main
question in this contribution is how one can escape from this labyrinth.
The answer to the question is given in this article by a man who personally
experienced the strong attraction of both Western and Eastern mysticism.
The Dutch theologian, Johan Herman Bavinck (1895-1964), however,
finally overcame its appeal by judging it’s tempting voice in the light of
God’s voice in the Bible about genuine godliness, piety or spirituality.
Apart from an introduction this essay firstly provides an overview of
Bavink’s description of mysticism in his different publications. In the next,
main section, it is followed by his assessment in the light of his Christian
convictions. The conclusion indicates what he regarded as the correct
substitute for mysticism.
131
Johan H. Bavinck in gesprek met Westerse en Oosterse mistiek
1.
Inleidende opmerkings
Ter aanvang iets kortliks oor (1) die woord “mistiek” en die geskiedenis
daarvan; (2) die huidige aktualiteit; (3) die plek van hierdie (eerste) artikel in
ŉ breër navorsingsprojek (4) ŉ kort motivering waarom van J.H. Bavinck se
gedagtes in dié verband nog steeds kennis geneem behoort te word.
1.1 Woord en geskiedenis
Meestal word in die literatuur daarop gewys dat die Griekse selfstandige
naamwoord mysitkos en die werkwoord myein wys op iemand wat sy oë, ore
en mond sluit. Bloot hierdie woorde dui reeds daarop dat ŉ mens in mistiek met
die misterieuse, dit wil sê met iets byna onverstaanbaar en onuitspreekbaar,
te make het. Soos nog duidelik sal blyk, impliseer ŉ mistieke lewensvisie
primêr diep belewing, warm ervaring, ŉ gevoel wat nie logies geanaliseer of
gesistematiseer kan word nie.
Oor die geskiedenis van dié verskynsel, is daar al ten oorvloede geskryf. ŉ
Mens sou die belangstelling in die onderwerp die afgelope eeu kan terugvoer
na 1911 toe Evelyn Underhill (1875-1941) se baanbrekerswerk Mysticism; a
study in the nature and development of man’s spiritual consciousness die
lig gesien het. Van Underhill (1967) se boek het in 1930 reeds ŉ twaalfde
uitgawe verskyn en dit is tot 1967 nie minder nie as nege maal herdruk!
Hierna verskyn daar ŉ stroom van publikasies waarvan sommige positief
en ander negatief is teenoor die mistieke verskynsel. (Vgl. bv. Wainwright,
1981, wat ŉ oorsig van die belangrikste diskussies gee tot ongeveer 1980.)
Intussen het werke oor dié saak eerder toe- as afgeneem. In die derde artikel
in hierdie reeks (vgl. subafd.1.3 hieronder) sal aan enkele van die meer
resente publikasies aandag gegee word.
Die saad van ŉ mistieke lewensvisie en -gevoel lê ver in die antieke verlede
en dit was reeds ŉ volgroeide plant op heidense bodem toe die Christendom
in die Weste daarmee kennis gemaak het – en dikwels daardeur verlei is.
Bavinck (bv. 1991:113) self gebruik graag die beeld dat mistiek soos ŉ
klimplant is wat soos ŉ soort parasiet sigself aan bestaande godsdienste
en lewensbeskouings vasheg en hulle identiteit verander. Ons vind dus ook
mistieke trekke in die belangrike Oosterse religieë, soos die Boeddhisme,
Hindoeïsme en by sekere groepe Moslems.
132
Bennie van der Walt
1.2 Huidige aktualiteit
Die stroom van populêre en akademiese publikasies (veral vanaf ongeveer
die sestigerjare van die vorige eeu) getuig daarvan dat mistiek in een of
ander vorm vandag weer die “in-ding” geword het en in die toekoms
heelwaarskynlik nog groter populariteit gaan geniet. Ook onder Christene
heers daar tans weer groot belangstelling hiervoor. Enkele meer resente
voorbeelde is die werke van McGinn & McGinn (2003), King (2004), Van
Schaik (2005), De Conick (2006) en Nelstrop, Magill & Onishi (2009).
Reeds vanaf die vorige eeu het verskillende vorme van Oosterse mistiek in
die Weste populêr geword. Vandag word ook weer, soos duidelik blyk uit die
herpublikasies en nuwe vertalings van hulle werke, na verskillende Westerse
mistici teruggegryp (vgl. bv. Ruh, 1990 en McGinn, 1991).
ŉ Voorbeeld ter illustrasie is die geskrifte van die bekende Middeleeuse
mistikus, Thomas à Kempis, veral sy werk De imitatione Christi (Die navolging
van Christus). Naas die Bybel is dit seker een van die mees gelese boeke,
waarvan daar letterlik duisende uitgawes in talle wêreldtale die afgelope
eeue die lig gesien het. (Vir ŉ vertaling in Afrikaans, vgl. Thomas à Kempis,
1952). Tans geniet hierdie boek, asook ander aan hom toegeskryf, weer
groot populariteit (vgl. bv. Thomas à Kempis, 2013a, 2013b en 2013c).
Die vraag waarom ŉ mistieke lewensgevoel juis in hierdie tyd weereens ŉ
grootskaalse herlewing belewe is belangrik. Hier kan egter slegs enkele
moontlike redes genoem word.
Groenewoud (1994:101; vgl. ook 1975) wys byvoorbeeld op die feit dat
die huidige verwetenskapliking en vertegnisering van die mens van ons
tyd se leefwêreld tot versaakliking en verarming lei, waarteenoor mistiek
gevoelvolle, warme ervaring aanbied. Ook die teenswoordige gejaag na
materiële welvaart kan nie die diepere behoeftes van menswees bevredig nie.
Verder leef ons tans in die irrasionalistiese klimaat van die postmodernisme
met groot klem op “spiritualiteit” (vgl. bv. Tacey, 2004 en die standaardwerk
van Waaijman, 2002). Ander skrywers vestig die aandag daarop dat mistiek
verwelkom word wanneer geloofsgemeenskappe in dooie formalisme verval
het (vgl. bv. Duquoc & Gutiérrez, 1994).
133
1.3 Die eerste van ’n reeks
Hierdie bydrae bevat die eerste gedeelte van ŉ verslag oor ŉ breër
navorsingsprojek in verband met mistieke spiritualiteit. Dit en die volgende
artikel handel oor hoe twee gereformeerde denkers uit die vorige eeu
daaroor besin het. Hulle was duidelik baie meer krities daarteenoor ingestel
as die meeste huidige Christene. In die derde artikel word na die semimistieke oriëntasie van Johannes Calvyn (1509-1564) en Abraham Kuyper
(1837-1920) gekyk. Die vierde artikel sal ŉ steekproef bevat uit ouere en
resente filosofiese navorsing oor sowel sekulêre as godsdienstige mistiek.
In die vyfde (slot) artikel sal, in die lig van voorafgaande vier bydraes, weer
teruggekeer word na die semi-mistieke denke in die huidige Christelike en
gereformeerde denkwêreld om tot finale beoordeling te bereik.
1.4 Die probleem beantwoord in die lig van ’n persoonlike
worsteling
Die twee belangrike, samehangende vrae wat hierdie reeks artikels wil
beantwoord is, eerstens, wat mistiek (ten spyte van sy talle vorme) basies
inhou en, tweedens, wat ŉ Bybel-getroue Christen se standpunt daaroor
behoort te wees.
Soos hierbo genoem, sien sommige – selfs evangeliese – Christene dit in ŉ
positiewe lig. Reeds in die vorige eeu beskou byvoorbeeld Corduan (1991)
mistiek as ŉ integrale deel van egte, Bybelse spiritualiteit. Hierdie visie het
tans feitlik ŉ algemene tendens geword (vgl. bv. Fick, 2009).
So ŉ (soms byna kritieklose) aanvaarding van ŉ mistieke geloof staan egter
in kontras met sekere gereformeerde denkers uit die vorige eeu. Twee van
hulle word in die eerste twee artikels in hierdie reeks aan die woord gestel.
Volgens hulle behels ŉ mistieke geloof nie egte vroomheid nie, maar beteken
dit eerder die dood van ware Christelike geloof. Wat hulle ook (semi-)mistiek
geskryf het, kan dus help om (in die slotartikel van hierdie reeks) ŉ meer
gebalanseerde antwoord op bogenoemde twee vrae te bied.
Hier volg ŉ kort motivering waarom die keuse vir hierdie eerste bydrae geval
het op die Nederlandse teoloog, Johan Herman Bavinck (1895-1964). Vooraf
net eers enkele bakens uit sy lewensgeskiedenis as agtergrond.
1.4.1 ŉ Kort lewenskets
Bavinck studeer teologie aan die Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam
en behaal in 1919 sy doktorsgraad in Duitsland oor die mistieke
psigologie van Heinrich von Suso. Na ŉ jaar as predikant in
134
Bennie van der Walt
Nederland (1920), word hy ook dominee vir die Nederlandse burgers
in Medan en Bandoeng (Indonesië). In 1927 is hy terug as pastor
in sy vaderland, maar vertrek in 1930 weer terug na Indonesië,
nou as sendeling onder die Javane in Surakarta en ook as lektor
by die Javaanse Teologiese Skool in Yogyakarta. Terug in Holland
was hy (vanaf 1939 tot 1954) eers professor in Missiologie aan die
Teologiese Skool van Kampen en later in Praktiese Teologie aan
die Vrije Universiteit. (Vir ŉ volledige oorsig oor sy lewe, vgl. Visser,
1997:22-85 en Holtrop 2006.)
1.4.2 Bavinck se natuurlike aangetrokkenheid tot die mistiek
Bavinck het self erken (ek vertaal): “Ek is met ŉ sterk neiging tot
identiteitsmistiek as’t ware gebore, daarom kan ek daaroor praat,
want ek moet elke dag daarteen stry”. (Vgl. Visser, 1997:37, voetnoot
86.)
ŉ Rede vir sy natuurlike belangstelling in mistiek lê heelwaarskynlik
daarin dat hy opgegroei het in ŉ gesin waarin die bevindelike
vroomheid van die Nadere Reformasie nog geleef het. (Sowel sy
oupa as sy pa was predikante en sy oom, die bekende Herman
Bavinck, professor in Dogmatiek.) Self was hy ook iemand wat uit ŉ
innige, persoonlike omgang met God geleef het (vgl. Okkema, 1984
en Visser, 1997:83).
Bavinck is (soos duidelik blyk uit sy boek van 1934 oor die Oosterse
mistiek) verder sterk beïnvloed deur die vroeëre, semi-mistieke
kerkvader, Augustinus.
Ook die destydse heersende Gereformeerde teologie het (soos
onder andere uit hulle spekulasies oor ŉ trigotomistiese antropologie
blyk) hul invloed laat geld. Bavinck self het in sy vroeëre publikasies
oor die sielkunde dan ook nog probeer om die “argitektuur” van die
menslike siel na te vors.
1.4.3 Ervaring van Oosterse en Westerse mistiek
ŉ Volgende faktor is dat hy nie net besondere belangstelling in die
Oosterse mistiek gehad het nie (vgl. weer Bavinck, 1934), maar
(soos hierbo vermeld) alreeds vroeër op ŉ diepgaande wyse met
ŉ Westerse, laat-Middeleeuse denker in gesprek getree het. Dit het
gebeur met sy proefskrif (Bavinck, 1919) oor die Christelike mistikus,
Heinrich von Suso.
135
Vollenhoven noem (reeds in 1933:225-6) die volgende drie verwante
mistieke denkers: Eckehardt (1260-1328), Tauler (1300-1361) en
Suso (1295-1366) en plaas toe reeds terselfdertyd vraagtekens by
hulle Christelike mistiek.
Later vind ons by Vollenhoven (2000:94, voetnoot 4; p. 162, voetnoot
8, en p. 157, voetnoot 7) meer besonderhede oor Meister Eckehardt
en sy twee leerlinge, Johannes Tauler en Heinrich van Suzo (Suso
of Seuse). By eersgenoemde kry ons ŉ mistieke eenwording met die
hoogste godheid. Tauler leer dat die individuele menslike bestaan
uitgaan en weer in ŉ unio mystica terugkeer na die universele syn,
wat dieselfde as God sou wees. Ook Seuse skryf van ŉ uitvloeiing uit
God en dat die “Seele” vrygemaak moet word tot ŉ “van hart tot hart”
mistieke eenwording met God. By al drie wys Vollenhoven ook op die
duidelike Platoniese invloed – ŉ tipiese kenmerk van die Westerse
(semi-)mistieke denke. (Vir verdere verhelderende opmerkings
oor die mistiek vgl. Vollenhoven, 2000:25, 336-340, 341-342 en
Vollenhoven 2005:272-273.)
Bavinck se leef- en denkwêreld word dus tipeer deur sy voortdurende
bemoeienis met die mistiek, want (op 05/10/1956) handel sy
afskeidsrede as professor in Missiologie ten slotte weer oor “Het
evangelie en het mystisch levensgevoel” (vgl. Bavinck, 1991:145
e.v.).
Tot sover enkele verduidelikings vir hierdie gereformeerde teoloog
se persoonlike – nie net akademiese nie – belangstelling in mistiek.
Op grond hiervan is die motivering vir die keuse om hom aan die
woord te stel die volgende: Johan Bavinck )(nie te verwar met die
bekende teoloog Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), Johan se oom nie))
was die eerste gereformeerde teoloog wat nie net (in sy proefskrif)
akademies met die Christelik georiënteerde Middeleeuse, Westerse
mistiek geworstel het nie. Op konkrete wyse is hy as sendeling in
Indonesië (onder die mense van Java) ook met die Oosters-heidense,
mistieke lewensgevoel gekonfronteer. Bowendien het hy sy ervaring
daarvan en kritiek daarop ook op skrif gestel – om vandag nog koers
aan te dui.
1.4.4 ŉ Helder, pakkende styl
ŉ Laaste, minder belangrike rede, maar een wat by die skrywer
hiervan ŉ rol gespeel het, was die besonder helder en tog boeiende,
meevoerende wyse waarop Bavinck kon skryf.
136
Bennie van der Walt
1.4.5 Bavinck nou ook in Engels beskikbaar
Selfs afgesien van sy nadenke oor die mistiek van Wes en Oos is
Bavinck ŉ skrywer om van kennis te neem. Gelukkig word sy werk
stadigaan weer herontdek. Van Woudenberg tree byvoorbeeld as
redakteur op vir ŉ bundeltjie met ŉ keuse uit sy nalatenskap (vgl.
Bavinck, 1991). Te min van sy werke (bv. Bavinck, 1981) het in
Engels verskyn. Daarom is die Bavinck Reader (vgl. Bavinck, 2013)
wat onlangs in die VSA gepubliseer is ŉ belangrike gebeurtenis. (Dit
bevat vertalings van sy gedagtes oor God se algemene openbaring
aan alle mense, religieuse besef en – gelukkig – ook ŉ Engelse
weergawe van Christus en de mystiek van het Oosten van 1934).
Hiermee is voldoende agtergrond gebied om na Bavinck se
beskrywing van die mees kenmerkende trekke van die mistieke
denke en lewenswyse oor te gaan.
2.
Bavinck oor die hoofkontoere van mistiek in die
algemeen
In die volgende opsigte is hierdie samevatting onvolledig. Eerstens is nie alle
geskrifte van Bavinck geraadpleeg nie. Sy proefskrif van 1919 kon ek nie
bekom nie, hoewel ek heelwat oor Suso kon nalees (o.a. in King, 2004:110
e.v.). Daar is gekonsentreer op Bavinck 1934, 1991 en 2013.
In die tweede plek is ook nie aandag gegee aan die soms groot verskille tussen
die Westerse en Oosterse mistieke denke nie. (Soms doen Bavinck self dit
ook nie, tensy hy eksplisiet op een van hulle fokus.) Die gemeenskaplike
trekke geniet ook weens die beperkte lengte van ŉ artikel hier die voorkeur.
In die derde plek word die groot hoeveelheid gegewens in Bavinck deur die
huidige skrywer verkort en gesistematiseer – wat natuurlik ook iets van ŉ
mens se eie standpunt kan verraai.
Vervolgens word dus gelet op (1) Bavinck se definisie van mistiek, (2) die
mistieke beeld van mens en God, (3) die mistieke verlossingsidee en (4)
verlossingsweg, (5) mistiek as selfveragting.
2.1 ’n Kort omskrywing
Bavinck erken dat mistiek moeilik ontleed- en definieerbaar is. Hy is nogtans
van mening dat enige mistiek ten diepste die soeke van die mens na
verlossing is. Die bevryding moet bereik word deur ŉ verborge plek in die
137
mens, wat ŉ regstreekse, dit wil sê onbemiddelde, toegang tot aanraking
met die god/godheid/God sal bied (vgl. bv. Bavinck, 1991:112).
2.2 Die menslike en goddelike in die mistiek
Volgens Bavinck is daar by alle mense ŉ inherente religieuse besef, ŉ strewe
na verlossing uit aardse ellende (vgl. Bavinck, 1949 en 2013:145-302 vir die
Engelse weergawe). Mistiek weerspieël ook hierdie algemeen-menslike trek
– dit soek na ware verlossing, bevryding uit die ondermaanse.
Om enige vorm van mistiek te probeer verstaan, moet ŉ mens volgens
Bavinck egter in gedagte hou dat daar vir die mistikus nie ŉ wesentlike,
grondige verskil – soos dwarsdeur die Bybel duidelik blyk – tussen die
aardse, menslike en bonatuurlike, goddelike werklikhede bestaan nie. Alles
wat bestaan, vorm ten diepste ŉ eenheid.
Maar tegelyk word ook erken dat die individuele mens die mikrokosmos
is, wat staan teenoor die universele makrokosmos. Die mens is, in beelde
gestel, ŉ druppel of golfie in die oseaan, ŉ vonkie van/in die goddelike vuur.
Daar is volgens die mistiek dus, hoewel nie radikale nie, tog ŉ graduele
verskil tussen iets transendent en die nie-transendente, aardse werklikheid.
2.3 Die sleutel tot mistieke verlossing
In die mistiek is die vraag nogtans nie wat die grens tussen die goddelike
en menslike is nie, maar presies waar in hierdie werklikheid onder die son
die verborge poort of skakel tussen die absolute en die mens geleë is. Waar
is die naat te vinde waar hierdie tydelike, verganklike bestaan naatloos
oorgaan in die ewige, onverganklike?
Volgens die mistiek is hierdie poort na die goddelike in die mens self te
vinde. Dit word met verskillende name aangedui, maar kom basies daarop
neer dat in die mens ŉ siel of hoëre, goddelike siel (of gees) teenwoordig is,
wat die mens aan die goddelike verwant maak. Daarin (in sy siel) ontmoet
mens en god mekaar – selfbewussyn lei tot godsbewussyn.
Wanneer op hierdie wyse die menslike, met die goddelike saamval, vind
mistieke verlossing plaas. Mistiek is basies ŉ menslike versinking in die
allesomvattende oer-ene.
2.4 Die mistieke verlossingsweg
So ŉ eenwording tussen God en mens is egter nie ŉ eenvoudige, maklike
pad nie, want om goddelik te kan word moet die mens eers van sy menswees
ontslae raak. Daarom beskryf mistici gewoonlik ŉ lang, moeisame weg met
138
Bennie van der Walt
allerlei tegnieke wat gevolg moet word om uiteindelik die hoogtepunt van ŉ
ekstatiese eenheid met die godheid te kan beleef. Ek laat die detail hier en
wys slegs waarop die proses in essensie neerkom.
2.5 Mistieke selfveragting
Volgens die mistiek is die mens se siel of gees van goddelike afkoms en
tog is hy/sy liggaamlik nie goddelik nie. Daarom moet die mens self eers
(veral liggaamlik) sterf om goddelike eenheid te kan bereik. Bavinck beskryf
meermale hierdie asketiese proses waarin die mens sy sinnelike, wêreldse
begeertes moet afsterf om by sy (semi-goddelike) innerlike sielelewe en
vandaar by die finale goddelike eenheid te kan uitkom. Hy haal byvoorbeeld
graag (vgl. bv. Bavinck, 1934:211) ŉ Moslem-mistikus aan, wat gesê het:
“Hell is where thou art, and paradise where thou art not”.
Daar bestaan dus twee rigtings: Eers moet die mistikus diep in sy eie siel
afdaal om vandaar te kan opgaan en verdrink in die godheid. Dan smelt
mens en god as’t ware saam. Die gevolg is (vgl. Bavinck, 1991:102) dat ek
nie meer ek is nie en God nie meer God nie. Ek is god en God is ek. Volgens
Bavinck is hierdie die kern-evangelie van die mistiek.
Die leser sal egter besef dat die mistieke evangelie ŉ ongelooflike
teenstrydigheid bevat: Wat is die sin daarvan vir die mens om na God te
soek as die voorwaarde is dat hy (die mens) moet verdwyn?
Na hierdie weergawe van Bavinck se eie weergawe van die basiese
kenmerke van die mistiek, kan sy kritiese, Christelike respons daarop nou
gegee word.
3.
Die mistiek krities beskou
Bavinck sê herhaaldelik in sy geskrifte dat die mistiek op die oog af na
iets mooi, edel, warm, innig en vroom lyk en daarom so ŉ besondere
aantrekkingskrag besit. Maar uiteindelik loop dit nie uit op die verlossing
wat dit beloof nie, maar is dit ŉ illusie, ŉ wensdroom – selfbedrog (vgl. bv.
Bavinck, 1991:99). Wat is sy redes vir so ŉ gevolgtrekking?
Bavinck se afwysing van die mistiek kan onder die volgende punte saamgevat
word: (1) ŉ onbybelse godsidee, (2) mensidee, (3) verlossingsidee, (4)
wêreldbeskouing, (5) idee van geskiedenis en (6) normatiewe onduidelikheid.
139
3.1 ’n Onbybelse godsidee
Volgens die mistiek is, soos al genoem, god/die godheid/goddelike ŉ deel
van die omvattende synde of bestaande en nie, soos die Skrif leer, ŉ eie
selfstandige werklikheid verhewe bo die geskape, aardse werklikheid nie.
(Daarom is dié soort god ook immanent in die menslike siel teenwoordig.)
Tussen die goddelike en menslike sou hoogstens ŉ graduele verskil bestaan,
terwyl die Bybel telkens die aandag op hulle radikale onderskeid lê.
Volgens Bavinck kan die mistiek dus nooit die ware God ontdek nie. Die
sogenaamde god wat ontdek word, is slegs ŉ projeksie van die mens –
mistiek begin en eindig by die mens self.
Wanneer ŉ mistikus dus praat van goddelike fluisteringe, openbaringe en
visioene in sy siel, is hy/sy eintlik net besig om na sy eie stem en verbeelding
te luister. Ook mistieke gebede behels niks meer as ŉ alleenspraak met
jouself nie.
Bavinck (1991:199) se finale gevolgtrekking is dat mistiek ŉ oortreding van
en dus sonde teen die heel eerste van die tien gebooie is, naamlik om nie
ander gode in die plek van die ware God te vereer nie. Meer nog: in die
mistiek het ŉ mens met die oersonde van Adam en Eva te kampe, naamlik
die hoogmoedige begeerte om soos God, self god, te wil wees.
Bavinck (1991:189) verwys na Karl Barth wat gesê het dat mistiek ŉ soort
esoteriese ateïsme is. Eintlik het mistiek nie (soos bv. in die Boeddhisme)
ŉ god nodig nie. Baie voorbeelde van sekulêre mistiek bestaan.
(Kontemporêre literatuur, waarin daar ŉ onderskeid tussen “godsdienstige”
en “ongodsdienstige” mistiek gemaak word, staaf hierdie bewering.)
3.2 ’n Onskriftuurlike mensbeskouing
Soos hierbo beskryf, ontdek die mistikus in sy eie siel of gees die geheime
naat tussen homself en die goddelike, dié poort na die absolute syn. Omdat
selfs Christene nog van mening is dat die mens uit twee afsonderlike
komponente (liggaam en siel/gees) sou bestaan, kon die mistiek maklik
by hierdie mensvisie aansluit. Die Bybel ken egter nie so ŉ tweedelige
(digotomistiese) mens nie.
Indien die mens nie ŉ afsonderlike, onsterflike, halfgoddelike siel besit nie,
waaroor gaan dit dan in die mistieke klem op die innerlike van die mens?
Dit gaan volgens Bavinck basies oor ŉ mens se gevoelslewe. Die mens se
emosionele lewe moet dus as “springplank” na die goddelike dien. Soos
reeds genoem, word egter in ŉ uitsiglose kringloop verval: Die mistieke weg
140
Bennie van der Walt
begin nie net by die mens se eie emosionele ervaringe nie, maar eindig ook
daar.
3.3 Geen werklike verlossing
Op die keper beskou, beteken mistiek dus niks anders as ŉ wanhopige
poging tot selfverlossing nie. Bowendien is die weg na eie bevryding besaai
met innerlike teenstrydighede. Een daarvan het reeds hierbo na vore gekom:
die feit dat die mens, om homself te kan verlos, homself moet vernietig.
Volgens Bavinck (1934:218) beteken die mistieke uitgaan uit jouself dus nie
selfverlossing nie, maar selfuitblussing. Die sonde teen God se eerste gebod
dra ook hier ŉ boemerang-karakter, ŉ element van selfmoord, dit bevat in
sigself al ŉ straf.
Terwyl mistiek leer dat die mens, om tot sigself te kom, een moet word
met God, merk Bavinck skerp op dat ŉ mens eers werklik tot homself kom
wanneer jy besef dat jy van die Vader geskei is (vgl. Luk. 15:17). Anders
gestel: Ware verlossing beteken nie dat ŉ mens na God moet probeer opklim
nie, maar dat Hy in Jesus Christus na ons afgekom het. Selfverlossing is ŉ
sondige droom ...
Hierbo (onder 2.1) is genoem dat Bavinck die mistiek onder meer as ŉ
regstreekse, onbemiddelde toegang tot die goddelike tipeer. Hierteenoor
is sy kritiek as Christen dat so ŉ onbemiddelde weg nie bestaan nie.
Daar bestaan geen regstreekse toegang tot die onsienlike God wat in ŉ
ontoeganklike lig woon nie, behalwe deur sy eie Middelaar, Jesus Christus.
Op die keper beskou, bring geen mistieke geloof die mens dus nader aan
die ware God nie, maar verwyder dit hom/haar eerder verder van Hom af.
Daar is egter nog meer implikasies. As die mens, in sy poging tot
vergoddeliking, homself moet vernietig, wat word dan van menslike
verantwoordelikheid?
Verder bots die mistieke poging tot selfvernietiging met die hart van die ware
Evangelie. Dit leer duidelik dat God geen begeerte het om sy skepping en
die mens te vernietig nie, maar dit wel te vernuut.
3.4 ’n Quiëtistiese wêreldbeskouing
Omdat dit na ŉ volkome, passiewe opgaan in die goddelike strewe, is mistiek
volgens Bavinck inherent quiëtisties van aard (vgl. hiervoor ook Vollenhoven,
2005:345-346). Omdat dit net in God en die eie siel geïnteresseerd is,
het dit geen behoefte om iets aan die konkrete omstandighede daarbuite
141
te verander nie. (Bavinck noem die voorbeeld van ŉ Oosterse, mistieke
priester wat die hele dag in die tempel sit en mediteer terwyl sy kinders
hongerly.) Soos hierbo reeds genoem, vernietig die mistiek dikwels menslike
verantwoordelikheid teenoor die medemens en omgewing. In die lig van
die Skrif beteken dit die dood van ware Bybelse Godsdiens: die mens se
omvattende roeping om alles wat vervorm en verval het, te hervorm en te
herstel.
3.5 ’n Onhistoriese instelling
Bavinck wys meermale daarop (bv. in 1991:113) dat tyd en dus geskiedenis
deur mistieke denkers as iets onbelangriks beskou word en dus nie ernstig
bejeën word nie. Die wêreld waarin die mistikus leef, is ŉ soort tydlose,
innerlike wêreld waarbuite feitlik niks van enige belang gebeur nie.
Die rede hiervoor is voor die hand liggend. Die mistikus is slegs geïnteresseerd
in sy eie sielservaringe. Verder streef hy na eenwording met die ewige,
tydlose Een. Bereik sy/hy wel so ŉ ekstatiese eenheid, duur dit ook slegs ŉ
enkele, tydlose oomblik.
Hierteenoor stel Bavinck die Bybelse boodskap wat op historiese feite
gegrond is. God roep gelowiges ook in ŉ spesifieke tyd en binne bepaalde
historiese omstandighede om Hom te dien.
3.6 Normatiewe vaagheid
Omdat die mens tot die goddelike verhef sou word, kom hy (die mens)
net soos die godheid as’t ware bo enige wet te staan en hoef eintlik nie
aan enige norme (behalwe natuurlik sy selfopgelegde mistieke riglyne)
gehoorsaam te wees nie. Ten spyte van mistici se gejammer oor hulle eie
armsalige geestestoestand, kan hulle gevolglik as heel besondere mense
baie hoogmoedig teenoor hulle naaste optree – ŉ duidelike voorbeeld dat
hulle selfs bokant God se sentrale liefdesgebod verhewe sou wees.
3.7 Gevolgtrekking
Saamgevat is Bavinck se konklusie dat die mistiek ŉ soort paradoksale
narkose is, wat ŉ mens aan die slaap maak en in ŉ droomwêreld laat beland.
Volgens Bavinck staan daarteenoor die ware Evangelie, wat mense werklik
uit hulle slaap wakker kan skud en laat lewe.
Wat dit beloof – ŉ lewende, vroom, innige geloofslewe in die geval van
Christelike mistiek – is in werklikheid ŉ dooie geloof. Dit is dus ŉ pypdroom dat ŉ mistieke ingesteldheid sterwende kerke sal kan laat herleef.
142
Bennie van der Walt
ŉ Herinnering aan Bavinck se beeld (hierbo) dat die mistiek soos ŉ klim- of
parasietplant is, wat sig aan enige godsdiens vasheg, is hier ter sake. Die
bekende Suid-Afrikaanse voëlent (ŉ parasietplant wat op ander plante groei)
bevorder nie die lewenskrag daarvan nie. Dit onttrek eerder die gasheerplant
se lewensmoontlikhede, sodat dit uiteindelik heeltemal doodgaan.
Uit die voorafgaande is dit baie duidelik dat Bavinck as Christen nie – soos
vandag baie algemeen die geval is – mistiek in sy Christelike geloof wou
akkommodeer nie. Hy het dit as ŉ uiters gevaarlike, onbybelse verleiding
beskou. Uit sy persoonlike betrokkenheid by die mistiek van die Weste en
die Ooste het hy egter ook geleer.
4.
Wat Christene uit die mistieke lewensgevoel kan
leer
Bavinck stel (vgl. 1991:134) ten slotte dus die vraag of ŉ blote ‟nee” teenoor
Westerse en Oosterse mistiek voldoende reaksie vir ŉ Christen is. Is daaruit
nie ook iets positiefs te leer nie?
4.1 ’n Groot leemte
Omdat hy nog steeds die begrip unio mystica gebruik, wonder ŉ mens eers
of hy nie tog maar – al is dit net gedeeltelik – voor die groot verleiding van
die mistiek geswig het nie. Hy bied egter ŉ alternatief wat nie by die mistieke
denke aanknoop nie. Want sy jarelange ervaring en kennis van die mistiek
het hom tog van ŉ leemte by die Christendom van sy tyd bewus gemaak.
Tydens Bavinck se lewe was die geweldige afmetings wat die hedendaagse
sekularisme intussen – ook in sy eie vaderland – aangeneem het nog
nie so duidelik nie. (Sekularisme beteken basies om sonder God en sy
verordeninge te lewe.) Miskien het sy sensitiewe gees egter wel reeds die
trillinge van hierdie toekomstige geestelike tsunami opgetel, want reeds
in sy eie tyd vind hy nie meer ŉ waaragtige roep, ŉ skreeu na die ware
God nie (Bavinck, 1991:143). Die gejaag na materiële welvaart het ernstige
geestelike bloedarmoede tot gevolg. Hy wys byvoorbeeld op die gebrek aan
persoonlike meditasie, die rustige bepeinsing van die ontsaglike ryk geskenk
wat gelowiges in Christus ontvang het. Ook in die kerklike lewe merk hy op
dat daar nie genoeg dankbare blydskap meer teenoor God is nie (1 Tes 5:16)
en dat oppervlakkigheid toeneem.
143
4.2 Die alternatief
Die mistieke denke herinner Bavinck aan al hierdie leemtes en spoor die
Christendom aan om dieper na God se Skrifwaarhede te luister. Op dié wyse
word mistiek egter omskep in iets heeltemal anders, naamlik waaragtige
gemeenskap met God drie-enig.
Bavinck noem dit ook ŉ vroom praktyk (praxis pietatis), praktyk van
Godsaligheid of Godsvrug. Hy plaas ook besondere nadruk daarop dat so
ŉ gemeenskap met God nie moontlik is buite Jesus Christus nie. ŉ Hele
aantal Skrifgedeeltes waarin van “in Christus” sprake is, word behandel (vgl.
Bavinck, 1991;135).
Hy verstaan hierdie tekste egter nie soos Heinrich van Suso nie. Hierdie
mistikus het met Christus probeer een word deur, soos Christus, te probeer
ly, byvoorbeeld deur homself te gesel. Nee, sê Bavinck, verlossing is nie iets
wat ŉ mens self kan skep nie, maar reeds “in Christus” ontvang het. Christus
is nie in die eerste plek ons Voorbeeld nie, maar ons Verlosser.
Christus se lyde is bowendien ŉ historiese feit (nie iets tydloos nie). Die inChristus-wees raak die mens op die diepste, innigste vlak van sy bestaan
(Bavinck, 1991:137). Dit vernuwe terselfdertyd die hele mens in alles wat
hy/sy doen, sodat hy/sy, soos Henog van ouds, elke oomblik met God kan
wandel (Gen 5.24).
4.3 Ware spiritualiteit
Moontlik kan Christene van die 21ste eeu nog steeds iets leer uit Bavinck se
persoonlike worstelinge met mistiek. Soos wat Bavinck die aantrekkingskrag
van die mistiek aan eie hart ervaar het, beleef ons vandag weer die geestelike
suigkrag van allerlei soorte spiritualiteit. Soos wat Bavinck in die vorige
eeu die verleiding van die mistiek in die lig van God se Woord oorwin het,
moet ons ook vandag weer die gees beproef (1 Joh 4:1) van die talle vroom
spiritualiteite wat op die geestelike wêreldmark aangebied word.
Die gevaar aan die meeste van hulle verbonde, is soortgelyk aan dié van
die mistiek. Die “spirituele” word beperk tot slegs een dimensie (die sg.
geestelike) van die lewe. Ongelukkig is dit presies wat die hedendaagse
sekularisme beoog en verkondig: Jou geloof is iets persoonliks, privaat, dit
het niks vir die res van jou alledaagse bestaan te sê nie.
Spiritualiteit, reg verstaan, dui op die sentrale, diepste en omvattende
religieuse dryfkrag van enige mens se hele lewe. Daar moet egter duidelik
tussen twee verskillende rigtings onderskei word. Enersyds mense wat hulle
144
Bennie van der Walt
eie spiritualiteit ontwerp en daarin hulle verlossing soek. Andersyds diegene
wat na God se Woord wil luister.
Volgens Gods Woord is ŉ spirituele mens nie iemand wat in ŉ geestelikmistieke wêreld lewe nie. Dit is die gelowige wat in alle dinge deur die Heilige
Gees gelei word om al God se verordeninge vir die lewe te gehoorsaam
(Gal 5:25). Radikaler gestel: Dit is die mens wat nie op homself gerig is nie,
maar homself – geheel en al – as ŉ lewende en heilige dankoffer aan God
wy (Rom 12:1-3).
Bibliografie
BAVINCK, J.H. 1919. Der Einfluss des Gefühls auf das Assoziationsleben
bei Heinrich von Suso. Erlangen: Universität Buchdrukerei von E.Th. Jacob.
BAVINCK, J.H. 1934. Christus en de mystiek van het Oosten. Kampen: Kok.
BAVINCK, J.H. 1949. Religieus besef en Christelijk geloof. Kampen: Kok.
BAVINCK, J.H. 1981. The church between temple and mosque. Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.
BAVINCK, J.H. 1991. Mystiek & Het Evangelie en het mystisch levensgevoel.
In: Van Woudenberg, R. (Red.), J.H. Bavinck (1895-1964); een keuze uit zijn
werk. Kampen: Kok. 110-144, 145-153.
BAVINCK, J.H. 2013. The J.H. Bavinck Reader. (Bolt, J., Bratt, J.D. & Visser,
P., Eds.) Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.
CORDUAN, W. 1991. Mysticism: an Evangelical option? Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Zondervan Pub. House.
DE CONICK, A.D. (Ed.). 2006. Paradise lost; essays on early Jewish and
Christain mystics. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
DUQUOC, C. & GUTIERREZ, G. 1994. Mysticism and the institutional crisis.
London: SCM Press.
FICK, P.H. 2009. Julianus Pomerius as mistikus; ŉ dogma-historiese studie.
Potchefstoom: Noordwes-Universiteit. (D.Phil.-proefskrif.)
GROENEWOUD, G. 1975. Middeleeuwse mystiek en hedendaagse filosofie.
Radix, I:177-186.
GROENEWOUD, G. 1994. Geloof en mystiek. In: Zijlstra, A. & Doornebal,
R.J.A. Christelike filosofie in beweging. Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperhijn.
101-110.
145
HOLTROP, P.N. 2006. Bavinck, Johan Herman. In: Biografisch Lexicon voor
de Geschiedenis van het Nederlandse Protestantisme, Deel 6. Kampen:
Kok. 27-29.
KING, U. 2004. Christian mystics; their lives and legacies throughout the
ages. London: Routledge.
MCGINN, B. 1991. The presence of God; a history of Western mysticism. (5
volumes). New York: Crossroad Pub.
MCGINN, B. & MCGINN, P.F. (Eds.). 2003. Early Christian mystics. New
York: Crossroad Pub. Co.
NELSTROP, L., MAGILL, K. & ONISHI, B.B. (Eds.). 2009. Christian mysticism;
an introduction to contemporary theoretical approaches. Farnham, Surrey:
Ashgate.
OKKEMA, J.C. 1984. Bavinck. In: De Afgescheidenen van 1834 en hun
nageslacht. Kampen: Kok. 154-170.
RUH, K. 1990. Geschichte der abenlandische Mystik. (4 bande). München:
Verlag C.H. Beck.
TACEY, D. 2004. The spirituality revolution; the emergence of contemporary
spirituality. New York: Brunner-Routledge.
THOMAS á KEMPIS. 1952. Die navolging van Christus. (Vert. deur A.S.
Geyser). Kaapstad/Pretoria: HAUM J.H. de Bussy.
THOMAS á KEMPIS. 2013a. Het leven van Jezus Christus, gebeden en
overdenkingen. (Koekoek, J., Red.) Kampen: Kok.
THOMAS á KEMPIS. 2013b. Thomas á Kempis: liefde, mystiek, levenskunst.
(Van Beusichem, M., Red.) Zoetemeer: Boekencentrum & Stichting Thomas
á Kempis.
THOMAS á KEMPIS. 2013c. The imitation of Christ. (Transl. by A. Craf, &
H. Bolton). New York: Dover Publications.
UNDERHILL, E. 1967. Mysticism; a study in the nature and development of
man’s spiritual consciousness. London: Methuen & Co.
VAN SCHAIK, J. 2005. In het hart is Hij te vinden; een geschiedenis van de
Christelijke mystiek. Zeist: Uitgeverij Christofoor.
VISSER, P.J. 1997. Bemoeienis en getuigenis: het leven en de missionaire
theologie van Johan H. Bavinck. Zoetemeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum.
VOLLENHOVEN, D.H.Th. 1933. Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de
wijsbegeerte. Amsterdam: H.J. Paris.
146
Bennie van der Walt
VOLLENHOVEN, D.H.Th. 2000. Schematische Kaarten; filosofische
concepties in probleemhistorisch verband. (Bril, K.A. & Boonstra, P.J., Reds.)
Amstelveen: De Zaak Haes.
VOLLENHOVEN, D.H.Th. 2005. Wijsgerig woordenboek. Amsterdam: De
Zaak Haes.
WAAIJMAN, K. 2002. Spirituality: forms, foundations, methods. Leuven:
Peeters.
WAINWRIGHT, W.J. 1981. Mysticism; a study of its nature, cognitive value
and moral implications. Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press.
147
Die Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap is van ’n Christelike grondslag. Artikels
voorgelê moet ’n bydrae tot Christelike wetenskap maak, of met die Christelike
wetenskapstradisie in gesprek tree.
The Journal for Christian Scholarship is Christian-based. Articles submitted should
contribute towards the enhancement of Christian scholarship, or engage into discourse
with the Christian scholarly tradition.
Christo Cronjé &
Renato Coletto
Corporate annual reports: towards a non-reductionist
approach
Andries Raath &
Shaun de Freitas
Samuel Rutherford and the Neo-Thomists: Juristic
corporation theory and natural law arguments in Lex,
Rex
Danie Strauss
Assessing the historical-philosophical background of
the German Staatslehre in the light of the type law of
the state
Hannes van der Walt
Educating on the basis of thin and thick value
orientations
Mario Phillip
The heavenly sanctuary motif in the Pauline corpus:
Explicating their intertextuality and interrelatedness
Bennie van der Walt
Johan H. Bavinck in gesprek met Westerse en
Oosterse mistiek
Die Vereniging vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys
VHO
Bloemfontein
Suid Afrika
+27 51 525 2267
www.vcho.co.za

tydskrif vir christelike wetenskap journal for christian scholarship

Transcription

Similar documents

Temple of Apollo Epicurius at Bassae 392

book reviews - Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military

Motor Theft / Hijack Form Voertuigdiefstal / Kaping Eisvorm

Temple of the Goddess 2008 Sabbat Celebrations

grand rapids, mi • van andel arena • sunday, october 16, 2016 • 6:00

http://www.crystalinks.com/gargoyles.html

Middle Temple Scholarship Fund

Art 100 The Basics of Visual Literacy 1. Description

Sign Up Today - Michigan REALTORS