Wars of diplomacy: Malaya 1950–1960 and Borneo 1964–1966

FOCUS QUESTION
Why were Australians in Malaya and Borneo?
What was the nature of the experience?
ACTIVITY
11
Wars of diplomacy: Malaya 1950–1960 and Borneo 1964–1966
Your task
To list and caption 10 key items , objects or documents for
a museum display on the Australian experience of these
conflicts. For example, you might select
• a key weapon
• a map
• a soldier’s account
• a piece of uniform
which help to illustrate and explain the experience.
Background briefing
In the nineteenth century Britain claimed Malaya and parts
of Borneo as colonies. Many local Malays did not want
their country to be a colony of Britain’s but they were not
strong enough to remove the colonial power. This
continued through to World War 2, when, in 1941, the
Japanese invaded and defeated the British, and occupied
the area, ‘liberating’ it from colonialism (but in fact
imposing their own often brutal colonial rule.)
During this period the British trained and equipped
many local Malays and Malay Chinese as guerrilla groups
to fight the Japanese. The Chinese in particular hated the
Japanese because of their invasion of and brutal
behaviour in parts of China in the 1930s.
At the end of the war, the British wanted noncommunist Malays to take control – but the Malay
Chinese, many of whom were communists, wanted Malaya
to be a Communist country, so they started to fight the
British.
1957 population figures for Malaya:
Malays
3.12 million
Chinese
2.33 million
Indians
0.69 million
Others
0.12 million.
(Federation of Malaya Year Book 1959)
They had the potential support of many local Malay
Chinese – who had been badly treated by the government,
denied land rights, and were economically very poorly off
after the war. They sometimes helped, but rarely hindered,
the active Malay Communists.
On 16 June 1948 three British planters were executed
by Communist terrorists (‘CTs’) and a State of Emergency
declared by the British Government.
One early tactic of the British was to move many
Malays in fringe areas to New Villages, to keep them away
from the Malay Chinese Communist influence - and this
was initially resented, although it improved their living
conditions eventually.
From 1951 the British started a campaign to ‘win the
hearts and minds’ of the Malays, as well as defeating the
CT guerrillas. The tactic was to isolate the guerrillas from
community support, and drive them into the jungle where
existence was difficult. Patrolling would keep them on the
move, and break up their concentration of strength, wear
them down, and destroy their hidden supply and
ammunition caches. Aerial bombing would also be a part
of this continual harassment.
The Malay and British Governments asked Australia
for military support. The Australian Government was keen
to help: Communism seemed to be on the spread in Asia;
support would stabilise a friendly government in the
region; it would also maintain a traditional commitment
to Britain; it would also show that Australia was a good
ally ready to help its South East Asian Treaty Organisation
allies. It also suited Australia to meet any potential enemy
in other countries: Prime Minister Menzies said in 1955, ‘if
there is to be war for our existence it should be carried on
as far from our shores as possible’.
By 1955, when Australian troops arrived in Malaya,
the war against the CTs was being won, but needed a long
and wearying ‘cleaning up’ process – which the Australians
were part of.
Using the evidence
1 Mapping exercise
a Look at the map, Source 11.1, and highlight these
places:
Malaya, Thailand-Malaya border, Netherlands East
Indies, Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, West New Guinea.
b Look at a current atlas and give the modern name for
each of these places.
2 Malaya
a Briefly summarise what the problem was in Malaya
after 1945.
3 Look at the cartoon, Source 11.2.
a Describe what it shows.
b How can a cartoon about China help to explain why
Australia was prepared to help Malaya at this time?
c What other reasons were there for Australia being
prepared to help Malaya?
4 What was Australia’s role in the war?
5
•
•
•
How could Australian involvement be seen as helping:
Malaya
Britain?
Australia’s own interests?
6 Look at Source 11.3 to 11.6. Use them to select some
of the objects, documents or items which you might
include in your museum display.
7 Borneo
Look at Source 11.7 to 11.10. Use them to select some of
the objects, documents or items which you might include
in your museum display.
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Examining representations of history
Using the web
8 Now select, caption and plan the display of your
chosen museum pieces.
To see if you would have been a good decision-maker
at this time, look at the exercise on diplomacy during
the Confrontation with Indonesia on the ANZAC
Day Commemoration Committee of Queensland web site
http://www.anzacday.org.au
Applying issues to today
9 Is Australia justified in fighting ‘other people’s wars’?
This is a question about which you can form some
hypotheses, or tentative conclusions, but you will need to
carry out more research to test those ideas.
Here are some areas to consider:
• Australia’s place in the region
• Australia’s security
• The security of the region
• Relations with other countries – United States of
America, Great Britain, Malaysia, Indonesia
• The training of the Australian Military Forces.
You may find other aspects to investigate as well. For
example, it is not widely recognised that Australia had
training advisers in Vietnam at the same time that there
were regular forces in Malaysia and Borneo, and that many
of the first Australian combat troops sent to Vietnam were
Malayan Emergency and Confrontation with Indonesia
veterans. How did this affect their standard as troops in the
Vietnam War?
Source 11.1 Map of south-east Asia
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Source 11.2 ‘The Red River’
Source 11.4 Experiences of the war in Malaya
A David Richardson remembers
his service
I was 22 when I went to Malaya with 3 RAR in 1957
as a riflemen, for a 21 month tour of duty.
We did lots of patrol work - mainly to keep the
enemy on the move. A patrol might last 10 to 12
days, lugging heavy packs through the thick,
steaming jungle, followed by a few days of rest back
at base, then out on patrol again.
It was often tense on patrol - every now and again
the hairs on the back of your neck would stand up. It
might be because of a shadow, or a noise, or a lack
of noise. It would just be a feeling that something
was not right. The terrain was awful - really hot,
steamy jungle. Or tropical downpours.
It wasn’t glamorous or exciting, but we had a job to
do, and we did it well, even though there was nothing
spectacular or heroic about it. But I reckon a lot of
locals were sleeping better at night knowing we were
around somewhere.
Interview 1999
B Spud Spurgeon remem
bers
his service
I was a pilot in No 1 Squadron, flying
Lincoln
Bombers. I was 35 in 1956.
Cartoon by Schofield in The Bulletin, 1954
Source 11.3 The Australian commitment
to Malaya
• Lincoln Bombers from No 1 Squadron RAAF delivered
85 per cent of all bombs dropped during the campaign.
• Dakotas from No 38 Transport Squadron RAAF supplied
troops with food, ammunition and equipment, dropped
propaganda leaflets, flew paratroops in, evacuated
injured, and provided aid to people.
• Between 1955 and 1962 infantry troops from 1st,2nd
and 3rd Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment
rotated through Malaya.
• There were also artillery, engineering and signals
specialist troops as part of Australia’s commitment.
It was a funny war for us. It was safe
in that there
was no opposition from the air or the
ground, but it
was very hard to see let alone hit a targe
t. ‘Gong
hunting’, we called it. The two or two
and a half hour
flights could get pretty difficult, but that
was because
of the weather - flying in a tropical storm
can be very
scary.
We would get the word that there was
a target, then
a marker aircraft would drop smoke,
and we would
try to hit the area. Well we never were
told the result
of our raids. I don’t suppose anybody
really knew - it
was usually too hard for anyone to get
into the jungle
to see what had happened. We know
we hit an
elephant once, and destroyed plenty
of trees, but I
don’t know what else we might have
hit.
But I’m sure we had an impact - we
kept the CTs
guessing and scared and isolated, and
that was our
main task, not to kill them.
Interview 1999
• Royal Australian Navy ships involved were HMAS Anzac,
Arunta, Melbourne, Quadrant, Queenborough, Quiberon,
Quickmatch, Sydney, Tobruk, Vampire, Vendetta,
Voyager, Warramunga.
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Source 11.4 Continued
C Colin Bannister remembers his
service
D Bob Gibbs remembers
his service
Problems with mites and mosquitoes
Malaria was the main concern… On patrol in the jungle it was
sleeves down all the time and mosquito lotion sloshed on exposed
skin all the time… Mites were the carriers of unpleasant things like
typhus so anti-mite fluid …had to be rubbed into the seam of shirts
and trousers and then re-applied periodically to counter the fluid’s
dilution through rain, sweat and washing.
I joined the Navy at 17 in 1956, and
served in Malayan waters on HMAS
Quickmatch in 1956 and 1957.
The enemy (CTs)
The CT [Communist Terrorist] soldier was well used to living in the
jungle… Food and other supplies came from the jungle gardens of
the fringe squatters and surrounding kampongs [villages]. He had
jungle workshops to repair his weapons and equipment, jungle
hospitals for first aid treatment, a network of agents and
sympathisers in village, town and city, and a cowed rural population
to coerce for food, money, information and sanctuary. His
discipline, fieldcraft, navigation and minor tactics were good and
his weapon handling adequate. He relied on surprise in ‘hit and run’
tactics such as the ambush and, [initially] could be ruthlessly cruel
in murdering, mutilating or kidnapping people of influence and their
families – village headmen, teachers, local government officials.
Waiting in ambush
Squirming to get comfortable, there’s time to become familiar again
with the local vegetation as darkness descends and the mosquitoes
try to penetrate your clothes and the lotion on your skin. After a
while legs get numb, arms ache and the mind wanders. Suddenly
there’s a noise and the skin tingles and the heart thumps but no
shadowy figure comes into view and slowly you relax. Animals
were often the cause of springing of premature ambushes,
particularly at night when pigs, monkeys or deer could blunder into
the site.
Returning from patrol
But when they were home sweet home, with loving wives to greet
the returning warriors who by this time were rather hot, sweaty and
smelly warriors. Ah, the bliss the bliss of climbing out of uniform
whose starched pristineness had deteriorated into black sweat
patches and creases, to shower, change, have a drink and think
about what to do for the next few days. The [servants] would whisk
away the soiled clothes and confer with ‘Mem’ about dinner that
night while I would sit back in sheer content.
,
Colin Bannister, An Inch of Bravery. 3 RAR in the Malayan Emergency 1957–59
Directorate of Army Public Affairs, Canberra, 1994, pages 38, 50, 76, 80
70
We didn’t see action in the sense that
we
were attacked, but we were in the war
zone. There were several fatalities amo
ng
men – and these are not on the Roll
of
Honour, and I think they should be. We’l
l
keep fighting to get them on one day.
We were always busy – there were regu
lar
four-hourly watches, and then there
was
plenty of maintenance and cleaning jobs
to
carry out during other times, training
exercises with other ships, and such
. So it
could have been boring, but we were
always busy.
We did our bit – basically blockading
the
area, keeping potential enemy supplies
by
sea out of the picture, and stopping
potential disruption of the busy
commercial sea lanes by mines. We
were
unnoticed, but successful.
Interview 1999
Source 11.5 Images from the war
AWM NAVYS0327
Bob Gibbs
AWM ELL/51/283/ML
71
Source 11.5 Continued
RAAF
72
Source 11.6 Casualties Malayan Emergency
1950–1960
Casualties
Operational
Fatal
Non-Fatal
Navy
Army
Air Force All Services
–
–
13
24
2
3
15
27
Non-operational
Fatal
Non-Fatal
4
43
21
111
11
18
36
172
TOTAL
47
169
34
250
Source 11.8 Casualties during the
Confrontation 1964–1966
Casualties
Operational
Fatal
Non-Fatal
Navy
Army
Air Force
All Services
–
1
7
6
–
1
7
8
Non-operational
Fatal
Non-Fatal
2
83
10
14
4
3
16
100
TOTAL
86
37
8
131
Approximately 7000 troops served. The main causes of
death included killed in action (6), illness (7), accidental gun
shots (4), vehicle accidents (8), ground accidents on air
bases (6).
Approximately 3500 served. Causes of death included motor
vehicle accidents (3), mines (3), crushed by a falling tree
(2), crushed by a wild elephant (1), drowning (1),
electrocution (1), illness (1).
Jeffrey Grey, A Military History Of Australia,
CUP, Melbourne, 1990 page 219
Jeffrey Grey , A Military History Of Australia,
CUP Melbourne, 1990, page 228
Source 11.7 The Australian forces involved
Source 11.9 Experiences of the war in Borneo
• Royal Australian Engineers
• 3 and 4 RAR with tracker dogs and indigenous guides
• Special Air Services (SAS) – the newly formed elite
reconnaissance/patrol force
B Max Cannon remembers
his service
• Artillery support units
I was a rifleman with 3 RAR 1965 in Borneo.
• HMAS Curlew, Gull, Hawk, Ibis, Snipe, Teal, Duchess,
Vampire, Vendetta, Derwent, Parramatta, Yarra.
Our main role on patrols was ambushing, and keeping
the enemy on the move. Most ambushes didn’t catch
anyone. It was a very long and tedious process. We knew
that we were going into Indonesian territory, but had to
keep it hush hush.
A Peter Schumann remembers
his service
Peter Schuman on leading his four man SAS patrol
in Borneo
It was absolutely horrendous… The maps were
absolutely atrocious. Sometimes half the maps you
had were just white with ‘No reliable data because
of cloud cover all year round’… I travelled through
moss forests, saw packs of orang-outangs in the
wild and wild deer. It was just hard slogging – day
after day of patrolling. That was what I called the
‘loneliness time’. That was the first time that I was
a million miles away from home, all by myself, in
command – it was bloody lonely, it really was.
Winning hearts and minds
Initially we did win ‘hearts and minds’ where we
were located in small areas that included one or two
kampongs [villages] and our medics looked after
their health. We tried to get information out of them,
learnt their language, and learnt their customs. We
lived away from them but each day we would go in.
We gave them kerosene, and caught food with them
using explosives. We played cricket . . . and footy
with them. We learnt more about living in the jungle
ourselves, learnt more about them, and gained a lot
of information on the areas.
Peter Schuman in Gary McKay, Sleeping With Your
Ears Open. On Patrol with the Australian SAS.
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1999, pages 53, 55
Conditions were very hilly, very hot and humid. Conditions
differed. If we went through a recovering rice paddy,
there would be thick growth underfoot, that you would
have to hack through foot by foot, under a boiling sun. At
other times you would be going through this clear area or
even moss ground, while above would be this unbroken
jungle canopy. When it rained, you would hear the rain
hitting the canopy, but it took a long time to come
dripping through. In other areas it might be swampy, up
to your chest in water, and slipping on the slimy bottom.
We carried five days rations and ammo, easy 75–85
pound loads
We had dehydrated ration packs – but it was often hard
to get the water to add to them to cook. Clothes didn’t
last long – canvas boots with rubber soles were quiet,
but would wear out very quickly.
Few combat situations, and few combat casualties. The
most damage was done by diseases – some got malaria,
but that was pretty much under control. The worst was
scrub typhus, passed on by a bite from a mite. It brought
you out in a terrible, delirious fever, that burned you up,
caused terrible cramps and such. It took several weeks to
get over it. The other great problem was water – it was
usually contaminated, and you would get leptospirosis.
To kill the germs you had to add chlorine tablets – well
that did wonders for the taste. We’d try to find fast
running water and drink that, and take the risk.
Interview 1999
73
Source 11.10 Images from the war
Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation,
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1996
AWM LES/66/174/MC
Ryebuck Media
74