THOR EMLIE foundered following an explosion 17 February 2000

THOR EMLIE foundered following an explosion 17 February 2000

The report on the loss of THOR EMILIE on 17 February
2000
Contents
1.
The Casualty………………………………………………………………….
3
2.
Summary…………………..………………………………………………….
3
3.
Ship Particulars………..……………………...…………………………….
4
4.
The Crew ……………………………………………………………………...
5
5.
Narratives……………..……………………………………………………....
6
The chartering of THOR EMILIE for the voyage concerned.……….……….….
The loading of THOR EMILIE in Dunkerque…………..……………………….
THOR EMILIE’s voyage…………………..…….……………………………....
The Master in the life raft………………………..……………………………….
The alarm call and the search…………………….……………………………....
6
6
8
9
10
6.
Further Investigations…………………….……………………………….. 11
Chartring of THOR EMILIE for the actual voyage…………….…….………….
THOR EMILIE’s cargo…………………………………………………………..
IMDG Code og Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes ……………….…
Laboratory tests of samples from THOR EMILIE’s cargo……………………....
Stability calculation……………………………………………………………….
7.
11
15
16
17
18
Comments made by the Investigation Division……………….……… 19
Concerning the ship and her crew………………………………………………..
Concerning the chartering of THOR EMILIE ……..…………………………….
Concerning the loading in Dunkerque ……………………………………………
Concerning the voyage …………………………………………………………
Concerning the explosion and the foundering…………………………………...
Concerning the alarm call and the search…….…………………………………...
Concerning the cargo…………………………………..…………………………
19
19
20
21
21
22
23
8.
Preliminary conclusion concerning the cause of the explosion…... 24
9.
Conclusions………………………………………………………………..….. 24
10. Recommendations………………………………………………….. 25
11. Annexes………………………………..……………………………. 26
2
1. The Casualty
Type of casualty:
Foundered following an explosion
Location of casualty: The Mediterranean, 37° 33’ N 002° 10’ E, at a depth of water of
approx. 2800 metres
Date and time:
17 February 2000 at 1050 UTC
Loss of lives:
6 crew members
Injuries:
The Master
2. Summary
On February 5 THOR EMILIE arrived at Dunkerque, France, from Ibswich, UK, for loading
of about 2000 tons Oxyde Zinc Ore fixed for Porto Vesme, Sardinia.
The cargo was carried to Dunkerque from a plant inland in France on board 4 river barges and
was loaded direct from the barges on to THOR EMILIE. The loading was commenced on
February 7 and was finalized on February 8 at 1900 hours. Due to bad weather THOR
EMILIE postponed sailing until February 9 at 1000 hours.
During the first part of the voyage, including the passage of the Bay of Biscay, there was still a
strong westerly wind and the ship moved a great deal in the sea. When passing Cap S. Vincent
the weather improved. From the south eastern point of Spain, Cap de Gata, the course was set
to 071° direct towards Porto Vesme.
On February 17 at 0600 the master took over as OOW. At that time the weather was clear and
calm and sunshine. Shortly before 11 o’clock the master went from the bridge to his bath
room, and while here a severe explosion happened. The master succeded in moving from the
bath room out to the boat deck, and here he realized that the ship was sinking. He was taken
by the waters and forced down under the water together with the ship. The ship sank in less
than one minute in the approximately position 37°33’ N 002°10’ E, about 70 miles south of
the island Ibiza and about 60 miles north of the Algerian coast. The master surfaced alongside
one of the liferafts from the ship, and he managed to enter the raft. The same day at 2040 UTC
he was rescued by the vessel VERDI in the position 37°32’ N 002°27’ E, about 25 n.m. east
of the position of the sinking. On February 21 the Master was landed in Piræus.
In the period from February 17 at 1204 UTC and until February 18 at 1430 UTC a search for
THOR EMILIE and its crew was carried out. Except for the master no trace were found of the
ship or the remaining 6 crew members.
3
After the founder it became clear that THOR EMILIEs cargo was not Oxyde Zinc Ore but
Zinc Skimmings, which is covered by the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes
(The Bulk Code) as a product able to evolve hydrogen and toxid gasses when in contact with
moisture or water and for which is demanded a special permission for transportation and
special equipment on board.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that THOR EMILIE foundered due to an
explosion in her cargo hold.
3. Ship Particulars
Name of Ship:
Registration No:
Home Port:
THOR EMILIE
Control No:
Call Sign:
IMO No:
D 3698
OYFD2
Type of Ship:
Dry Cargo – Boxhold
Construcion year:
1975
Tonnage:
1655 GT
Svendborg
7431674
Length/breadth/draft: 75,63 meters/11,80 meters/6,81 meters
Engine Power:
1440 kW
Crew:
7
Owner:
Thor Chartering A/S (T & C ), Svendborg
Classification
Soceity:
Germanischer Lloyd
THOR EMILIE was flagged in into DIS and to Danish ownership in May 1997. Its previous
name was LÖFTEN under St. Johns, Antigua and Bermuda register.
THOR EMILIE was an 1-hole ship with one hatch measuring 45 x 9,3 meters and MacGregor
hatch cover. The deckhouse including the bridge and the accommodation was aft the hold.
Below the accommodation, from niveau of the tweendeck, was the engine room adjoin the
hold.
4
The vessel was equipped with e.g. a lifeboat at the boat deck port side and 2 inflatable rafts,
one at each side at the boat deck aft.
The vessel was equipped with the statutory communication equipment, i.a. 2 McMurdo EPIRBs, one
portable and one hydrostatic releaseable.
On board the ship were oxygen and acetylene cylinders stored outside on the boat deck, port side. No
hard piping was fitted. For hot work it was therefore necessary to bring rubber hoses from the
cylinders to the working place.
A General Arrangement Plan for THOR EMILIE is in Annex III.
THOR EMILIE went through a main survey by the Danish Maritime Authority in the fall 1997 when
it was flagged in into DIS. On August 1999 the Authority carried out a working environment survey,
which was followed by an unannounced control survey on September 1999. At the time of the
foundering 2 of the Authority’s claims were unsettled. Those were the renewal of a flow regulator
from respiration equipment and the installation of spillage trays in the engine room.
During the period July – September 1999 THOR EMILIE has been surveyed 7 times by Port State
Control (PSC). From 3 of these controls are reports on deficiencies. The deficiencies concerned oil
record, magnetic compass, charts, nautical publications, radio communication, working lights,
protective measures in engine room, steering gear and ready approach to fire fighting equipment.
None of the deficiencies resulted in detention and the deficiencies were demanded restored within 14
days, the deficiencies concerning radio communication, however, before departure. The latest PSC
was an extended survey, which was done in Flensburg on 8 September 1999 without remarks.
The classification certificates were valid. Among others Certificate for Transportation of Cargoes in
Bulk, which i.a. exempts IMO Class 4.3 substances.
4.
The Crew
THOR EMILIE’s crew is shown in the following diagram.
Rank/Rating
Master
Chief Mate
Engineer
AB / Oiler
AB
AB
AB / Cook
Certificate/
STCW regulation
”Sætteskipper”/
STCW II/1 + II/2
STCW II/2
Skibsmaskinist 1. gr.”/
STCW III/3 + III/4
Deck watchkeeper /
STCW II/6
Deck watchkeeper /
STCW II/6
Deck watchkeeper /
STCW II/6
Deck watchkeeper /
STCW II/6
Signed on
Nationality
25.12.99
Danish
08.11.00
06.12.99
Filipino
Danish
15.12.99
Filipino
23.09.99
Filipino
22.08.99
Filipino
15.12.99
Filipino
5
The manning was in accordance with the Minimum Safe Manning Document issued by the Danish
Maritime Authority on 14 May 1997.
5.
Narratives
The chartering of THOR EMILIE for the voyage concerned.
On January 27 the brokerfirm Polyship in Marseille, on behalf of Glencore, went out on the internet
etc. requesting a vessel for a transport of about 2000 tons concentrates in bulk from Dunkerque to
Porto Vesme. THOR EMILIE was well fitted for this cargo and was in a convenient position,
Ibswich, why the T & C’s chartering manager bid for the cargo, which on January 28 was further
specified as Oxyde Zinc Ore.
On January 31 the negotiations between T & C and Polyship were concluded in a charterparty, and T
& C’s chartering manager ordered the master of THOR EMILIE to sail for Dunkerque. Further
details about the negotiations between T & C’s chartering manager and Polyship and the
communication between them are contained in this Report under the heading ”Further
investigations”.
The loading of THOR EMILIE in Dunkerque.
The Master’s statement.
THOR EMILIE had arrived Ibswich with a bulk cargo of Monoammonium Phosphate and was
discharged on February 4. The hold was thouroughly swept. In Ibswich the master received a
message from the owner about sailing for Dunkerque to load Oxyde Zinc Ore. He looked up in the
IMDG Code and also in the “Thomas Stowage” but did not find anything about this product.
THOR EMILIE arrived at Dunkerque on February 5 around noon and moored starboard side
alongside the quay of loading. During the voyage to Dunkerque the hold had been washed. The
master delivered a “notice of readiness” to the agent, Saga Termineaux Portuaires. During the weekend the hatches were opened to make sure that the hold was clean and dry for Monday morning.
The loading should commence on February 7 at 0600 and it was estimated to be terminated the same
day at 1400. The mate opened the hatch and the first barge came alongside port side. The hatch of
the barge was covered. The agent came on board at 0630. The cargo had the appearance of grey earth
and dust with lumps.
The cargo was transferred from the barges to the ship by a shore crane and grab. The first 90% of the
load of the barge was quickly loaded in the ship. For the remaining 10% was used about the same
amount of time as it had to be transferred by using shovels. The master had told the mate to see to
that the cargo was well stowed against the sides of the hold.
6
Around noon the master had a telephone conversation about the cargo with the owner’s charterer,
who had informed him that he neither could find information on Oxyde Zinc Ore, but that it probably
was able to give off toxic gasses. The master had told that the cargo was contaminated and the
chartering manager had asked him to state this on the Bill of Lading (BL). At the same day the
master had written a “letter of protest” for the agent, cf. Annex IV.
Around noon on February 7 it started raining and the master ordered the loading discontinued and
the hatches closed as he did not want a “sailing” hold. The stevedore grumbled about that. The
stevedore foreman had no knowledge about the possibility of toxic gasses.
After that the master made contact with the agent via mobile telephone and requested further
information on the cargo e.g. “angle of repose”.
At the same day at 1900, when the rain had stopped, the loading was continued until about 2200,
when the first barge and most of the second one were discharged.
On February 8 the loading was continued and THOR EMILIE was fully loaded at about 1900, when
the hatches were closed and the ship made ready for sea. The cargo was even distributed over the
whole hold. It reached to about 1 meter below the tween deck hatches. The tank top was completely
covered and the master had seen to that tops were smoothened.
At a certain time on February 8 the master received from the agent an English version of a
declaration from Metaleurope to the effect, that the cargo had been stored outside for 3 – 4 months,
and that therefore “there is no risk of toxid vapours from the Zinc Skimmings although they have
been wet by rain”, cf. Annex V. The master did not notice, that the description of the cargo had been
changed to Zinc Skimmings. Based on this declaration the master decided on February 8 to continue
the loading although lighter drizzle and also light showers occurred.
In the evening on February 8 the wind was still rather strong from west, around 20 m/sec., why the
master decided to delay the departure and wait for the forecast the following day. After 19 o’clock he
informed the agent about the delay and on this occasion the agent asked whether he could postpone
the delivery of the cargo documents until the next day, which the master accepted.
In the morning on February 9 the weather forecast said decreasing wind during the day. The weather
forecast was received at the ship’s NAVTEX. The master therefore informed the agent, that THOR
EMILIE would sail at 10 o’clock.
Before the departure the agent came on board and delivered the cargo documents, among which the
BL. In the BL was noted “clean on board”. The master made a protest against this note and he wrote
in all copies of the BL his own remark stating “cargo contaminated with pieces of plastic, paper and
wood”. The master did not notice that in the BL the cargo was described as “Zinc Skimming in
bulk”, cf. Annex VI.
During the stay in Dunkerque the master had not at any time been at the offices of the agent or the
stevedore. All communication had taken place via mobile telephone and during two visits on board
by the agent.
7
Supplementary the master has stated that he not at any time received any papers indicating the cargo
as dangerous goods. It was his experience that a certain cargo could have different names. He did not
know Zinc Skimmings, but he is in no doubt that if this appellation had been used from the start then
he himself and the owner would have noticed it in the books and would have acted accordingly.
He furthermore has stated that if it during the voyage had been made known to him that the cargo
was able to generate explosive gasses, then he would have forbidden smoking, open fire and use of
electrical tools.
THOR EMILIE’s voyage.
The Master’s statement.
THOR EMILIE departed Dunkerque on February 9 at 1000. On departure all ballast tanks were
empty. Outside the harbour the pilot took off. During the voyage via the English Channel and the
Biscay and along the shore of Portugal there was still a strong westerly wind. Due to the heavy cargo
the ship was rather stiff and rolled to some extent. Consequently the ship was navigated under
reduced speed but without any problems. The AB’s were at several occasions in the hold to check
whether the cargo had shifted. On these occasions the AB’s had had no comments. They had neither
made any remarks about the temperature in the hold nor about any special smells. There was no
mechanical ventilation of the hold.
When crossing the traffic separation scheme the master made contact with Cap Gris Nez and
continued SW in the SW-going lane.
When passing Cap S. Vincent the weather improved. From Cap de Gata, the SE most point of Spain
the course was set direct towards Porto Vesme.
On February 17 at 0600 the master took over as OOW (Officer On Watch), which was the normal
routine. The night before they had talked about the work next day. The engineer and the oiler should
change and clean some filtres in the engine room and do some general cleaning. The 2 AB’s should
carry out maintenance at the forecastle, overhaul and change of packings at hatches, doors and
valves. For this work they used a needle pistol, scrapers and angle grinders. Several times they went
from the forecastle to the workshop in the deckhouse aft. The mate was off duty and slept in his
cabin. The cook worked in the galley.
During the morning the master on the bridge was occupied by i.a. arranging papers in the ISM
Manual. He also sent a new ETA to the owner and the agent as THOR EMILIE was delayed due to
the weather. At coffee time at 10 o’clock he was on the bridge together with the Engineer, who
afterwards went back to the engine room.
Around 11 o’clock the master went for a short stay in his bathroom, on the boat deck. While here a
very great explosion took place. He was knocked against the door. The mirror was completely
shattered and the washbowl fell down. The contact with the door made him punch-drunk but he was
not knocked down. He may have been punch-drunk in some seconds but he was not unconscious.
8
The master at once realised that it was an explosion and he thought it came from the engine room.
The fire alarm sounded. Fire alarms, thermo alarms, are fitted in the engine room, the
accommodation and corridors, not in the hold.
The master first thought that somebody would have died in the engine room and that he had to go
down there. He ran from the bathroom through the cabin where everything was scattered around. He
did not notice whether the front windows were broken. When at the staircase he noticed smoke, not
black but rather grey. He therefore continued out the door, which he himself earlier on had opened,
and out on the boat deck to continue towards the outside staircase aft the deckhouse. When on the
boat deck starboard side on his way astern towards the staircase and close to the life raft a huge sea
was coming towards him. Not before then he realised that the ship was sinking. THOR EMILE sank
without any list but possibly with a minor aft trim. Shortly after he found himself lying in the water
with the life raft container close by. The life raft inflated near by and he managed to enter the raft.
The master is of the opinion that at the time of the foundering the course set was 071° and the speed
normal cruise speed, about 9,5 knots. He did not at any time after the explosion look forward on the
ship.
The master has moreover stated that he was content with the mate and the rest of the crew, who acted
in a competent manner. He also was content with the ship and its maintenance. His only remark
concerned the hooks on the hatches, some of which during the closing operation are steering the
individual sections. Those hooks had a tendency to become out of line but it was a matter only to
have the chain pull of the hatches adjusted and it had nothing to do with the final battening down of
the hatches or their watertightness.
The master has furthermore stated that the ship was equipped with equipment for hot work and with
acetylene cylinders. The cylinders were stored on the aft part of the boat deck. He was convinced
that the equipment was not in use on February 17.
The Master in the life raft.
The Master’s statement.
When the master had entered the raft he noticed only a few pieces of wood and some containers for
drinking water. The containers had been stored in a cupboard with springlock on the bridge. He also
observed the other raft inflated about 50 meters away and he paddled to it and found it empty. He
fastened the raft together with his own raft. He also got hold on the two drink water containers and
took them on board the raft. He finally observed two of the ship’s life buoys and the petrol tank from
the MOB boat.
The wind had freshened somewhat with more swells and the raft moved quite a bit. The master sat
down in the raft and he now noticed the he was bleeding from several wounds on his body,
apparently wounds caused by the explosion. The master was worried about, whether the free float
EPIRB stored at the monkey island could have been damaged by the explosion, with the result that
the ship would not be missed before the next day, Friday, or in the worst case Saturday, when THOR
EMILIE was expected to arrive Porto Vesme. The master was well aware of the facts that before the
9
foundering, the ship had passed north of the main route into the Mediterrenean and that no other
ships were in sight.
The raft was equipped with emergency ration, drinking water and pyrotechnics. He fixed the floating
anchor and inflated the bottom of the raft while he all the time looked for possible surviving crew
members.
At the end of the day the master began to freeze in his light clothes. He swept himself in the carpet
from the raft and when it darkened he closed the raft., after making sure that both lights on top of the
rafts were flashing.
About 2½ hours later the master heard the whistle from a ship and close by he saw a ship making
slow speed. He fired a hand flare, and the ship, which turned out to be the Malta registered VERDI,
succeeded in getting hold of the raft from which the master, using the pilot ladder, climbed the ship.
It was then 20.40 UTC and the position was 37°32’ N 002°22’ E.
When on the bridge of VERDI the master of VERDI requested the master to use the radio to explain
what actual had happened. The master also very soon contacted the Admiral Danish Fleet (SOK) and
explained about the foundering.
VERDI arrived at Piraeus on February 21, where the master went ashore.
The alarm call and the search.
The following is based on RCC LOGBLAD from RCC (Rescue Coordination Center) Karup and
Transcript of SAR-REPORT from SOK (Admiral Danish Fleet).
At 1121 UTC the RCC Karup received a signal via the geo stationary satellite No. 8, which
identified the transmitting EPIRB as from the Danish ship THOR EMILIE, a so called NOCR
( Notification of Country of Registration).
At 1146 RCC Karup received the signal from SARSAT No. 4, and the position was sent as
37°33,3’ N 002°10,0’ E.
At 1204 UTC SOK received the information from RCC Karup and SOK immediately tried to make
contact with the ship via INMARSAT-C, however without result.
At 1240 SOK called the owner who would attempt to contact the ship.
The given position was within the area of responsibility of RCC Algeria and SOK therefore
attempted to contact RCC Algeria, however, with negative result.
At 1322 SOK made contact with Gibraltar Radio which shortly after reported that they had given
over to MRCC Tarifa.
At 1536 MRCC Madrid reported to SOK that they had made attempt to call THOR EMILIE via their
Radio Stations and also RCC Algeria, both, however, with negative results. Shortly after MRCC
Madrid transmitted MAYDAY-RELAY.
The owner had made contact with the vessel PUMA, which were in the same area, and asked it to
call THOR EMILIE. Also Lyngby Radio attempted to contact the ship via INMARSAT-C.
10
At 1615 SOK asked MRCC Roma to call the ship on radio.
At 1656 MRCC Roma reported back that 2 civil vessels were en route towards the position. They
were 60 and 70 miles respectively from the position.
At 1725 SOK again communicated with MRCC Madrid who reported that they were not able to
scramble any aircrafts and that according to their experience MRCC Algeria did not scramble any
aircraft.
At 1732 SOK made contact with RCC Norfolk in anticipation of getting assistance from the 6.Fleet
in the Mediterranean. SOK was referred to the staff in Italy, who on their request reported, that they
did not have any aircraft ready within the next 3 hours at least.
At 1835 SOK send a fax-request to MRCC Madrid for search by aircrafts.
At 2030 MRCC Madrid reported back that at present a ship was in the position and had found 2 rafts
with persons on board. Shortly after this was verified to one person. MRCC Madrid further reported
that they were not able to scramble aircrafts due to the dark but that 2 helicopters would be
scrambled the following day and that at present 3 ships were searching the area.
At 2130 SOK spoke to the master of THOR EMILE who very shortly told about the explosion and
the subsequent quick foundering. He mentioned that he had not seen others of the crew.
At 2250 MRCC Madrid reported that the 3 civil ships in the area now had been released and that an
Algerian patrol boat was in the area.
On 18 February at 0840 MRCC Madrid reported that helicopters were searching the area.
At 1040 MRCC Madrid reported that the helicopters were returning to base for refilling and
afterwards would reassume the search.
On 19 February at 0147 MRCC Madrid reported that the search was discontinued.
6.
Further Investigations
Chartering of THOR EMILIE for the actual voyage.
The following review is based on interview of the owner’s chartering manager and the Investigation
Divisions interview in Marseille of the Polyship Broker.
The chartering manager had as a charterer been with the owner during the last 4½ years. The
organisational structure of the owner is such that the charterer who manage the chartering of a vessel
11
also is the one who see to the operational matters in relation to the actual voyage, such as
communications with the master, agents, brokers etc.
The cargo in question was broadcasted on the internet on 27 January at 1651 as:
”DUNKIRK/PORTO VESME – 1,500/2,000 wmt bulk Conc. – 7th FEB Onwards – 36hrs/36hrs –
STEMMOR83 3,75% ttl”.
As THOR EMILIE was well fitted for the offered cargo and in a favorable position the owner’s
chartering manager gave an offer via Email on 27 January at 1704 and gave a description of the ship
and about the cargo he stated: ” cgo. 2000 mts concs in bulk stw dw all lawfull, harmless and non
dangerous”.
On 28 January at 1000 Polyship acknowledged the offer and from hereon the more detailed
negotiations started via telephone and Email. During those Polyship informed, that the shipper was
the company Glencore, which was known to the chartering manager as a major international
company. Polyship also informed that the shipper wanted to use their own standard charter formular.
On 28 January at 1603 Polyship via Email sent the standard formular including details on cargo,
loading port, destination, charter hire etc. With respect to the cargo it said: ”QTY: 2,000 wmts 2pct
less upto f+c vsl’s cap. In chopt blk oxyde zinc ore, which to be loaded in accordance with IMO
regulations.”
This was the first time when the cartering manager received a more detailed description of the cargo.
He did not know the substance ”oxyde zinc ore” and found nothing about it in the IMDG Code,
neither under ”oxyde zinc ore” nor under ”zinc ore”. He was not worried by the fact, that the cargo
was to be loaded in accordance with IMO regulations, as he took this for relating to the actual
loading, stowing etc.
On 28 January at 1632 the chartering manager gave his answer via Email with further information on
owner, insurance, classification society etc. With respect to the cargo he stated: ”Cargo to be non
IMO – harmless and non dangerous”.
On 28 January at 1743 Polyship answered back via Email, in which among others were stated, that
the insertion of the chartering manager ”cgo to be non IMO …..non dangerous” should be deleted, as
”cargo is not IMO one, cargo to be loaded ”in accordance with IMO regs””.
After the week-end the negotiations were resumed on 31 January. The chartering manager sent on 31
January at 0927 an Email to Polyship, in which, besides an offer on price, one more time was stated.
”Cargo to be lawfull, harmless and non dangerous” and finally also: ”Kindly advise full desc of the
cargo, incl if any special equipment/handling needed”.
On 31 January at 1030 Polyship answered back and among others stated: ” – delete Ows’ last re:
”cargo to be …. Non dang.” – cargo to be loaded in accordance with IMO regs. (which is covering
the whole things)” and ” As per our last telcon, you have already fixed concentrates cargo, so no
special requirement/equipment …”.
12
On 31 January at 1054 the chartering manager answered back and among others stated: ” – Cargo to
be lawfull, harmless and non dangerous. Chrts to confirm that no special handling/equipment
required from vsl/owners” and finally: ”Pls advise full desc of cargo, in order to check”.
On 31 January at 1141 Polyship answered back and among others stated:” – Delete Ows’ last” cgo to
be lawfull … non dang … no spec … equipment – fyi harmless is already covered with ”in
accordance with IMO reg”, no special handling/equipment required” and finally ”For your info
above is really Chrts fixing terms (no space left for negos). As you already know cargo is not a IMO
cargo, it has only to be loaded in accordance with IMO regulations”.
On 312 January at 1203 the chartering manager accepted the terms and requested Polyship to send a
”Recap” ( a recapitulation of the up to now agreed terms).
On 31 January at 1522 Polyship sent a ”Recap” to the chartering manager in which concerning the
cargo was stated: ” – QTY: 2,000 wmts 2pct less upto f+c vsl’s cap. In chopt blk oxyde zinc ore,
which to be loaded in accordance with IMO regs.”.
On 31 January at 1535 the chartering manager sent ”Comments to recap” to Polyship and stated: ”Pls
ins – Cargo to be harmless, non IMO and no special handling/equipment required”.
On 1 February at 1648 the chartering manager sent as Email a voyage instruction to the master of
THOR EMILE, and with respect to the cargo was stated: ”2000 mts 2 pct less – or up to full cargo as
chosen by the chartere that is min. 1960 oxyde zinc ore in bulk”.
The owner’s chartering manager has subsequently and additionally informed, that his repeately
requests to the broker about the insertion of the condition ”lawfull, harmless and non dangerous” was
an attempt to maintain the assurance from the broker that the cargo was non dangerous.
With the description of the cargo as oxyde zinc ore and when he did not find it in the IMDG Code he
was not himself in any doubt that the cargo was non dangerous and that THOR EMILIE was allowed
to carry this material.
The above stipulated correspondence was confirmed, when the Investigation Division saw Polyship
in Marseille on 25 July.
During this visit the broker additional informed, that he around 27 January received a phone call
from the company Glencore’s charterer in Switzerland asking him to look for a ship for a shipment
of about 2000 mts concentrates in bulk from Dunkerque to Porto Vesme. Polyship several times had
fixed ships for Glencore, a company which Polyship took as the 3.rd largest transporter of
concentrates in the world.
The broker then made contact to several ship owners and brokers via telephone, telex, fax and Email,
and the correspondance with T&C’s chartering manager here after started.
During this correspondence Polyship retransmitted the different offers and requests back to
Glencore’s charterer, cf. Annex VII, and the broker received instructions from the charterer. A
further description of the cargo as ”oxyde zinc ore” was given via telephone on 28 January and also
13
that the cargo, as a standard clause for this type of cargo, should be loaded ”in accordance with IMO
Regulations”.
The broker had only once before handled oxyde zinc ore and he therefore looked in the Bulk Code
where he ascertained that it was not an IMO classified cargo. The broker had never fixed an IMO
classified cargo.
The broker were not surprised when the owner’s chartering maneger in the charter party wished to
have inserted ”cargo to be non IMO – lawfull, harmless and non dangerous”, because many owners
very often want that. To this he always state, that when not an IMO classified cargo the clause
”cargo to be loaded in accordance with IMO Regulations” would be sufficient.
In his Email on 31 January at 0926 the owner’s chartering manager repeated his wish about ”non
IMO ….” and asked for a specific description of the cargo and whether special equipment or
handling was necessary. The broker retransmitted this Email to Glencore’s charterer, cf. Annex VIII,
and had a following telephone conversation with the charterer. Afterwards the broker spoke to the
owner’s chartering manager where he explained that no special equipment was required for
concentrates.
According to the broker the most important with respect to such cargo is the moisture content and the
TML (transport moisture limit). If those are not within the fixed limits it can be dangerous to sail
with the cargo. Concentrates therefore should not be loaded when raining. If the cargo were loaded
in accordance with IMO Regulations it would not be dangerous, as the requirements concerning
moisture content and TNL would be fulfilled.
On 31 January at 1202 the owner’s chartering manager confirmed the terms and asked the broker to
send a recapitulation of the agreed terms (recap).
This recap was sent by the broker to the chartering manager on 31 January at 1521 and the broker
hereby considered the negotiations completed and THOR EMILIE fixed for the said voyage. He was
therefore surprised when the chartering manager came back with his wish to have inserted ”non
IMO….”.
Following another telephone contact between the broker and the chartering manager, mainly
concerning certain clauses in the standard charter party (Stenmore Charter Party (1983)), the broker
at 1749 confirmed via Email that the ship was finally fixed.
On 2 February at 1014 the broker received an Email from the owner’s chartering manager who
required the sentence ”no special handling equipment required for this cargo from owner/vsl side”
inserted in the recap. The broker was of the opinion that it had to be a forgetfulness of the chartering
manager, as this question already had been cleared, and the broker considered the chartering
completed.
On 7 February at 1109 the broker received an Email from the owner’s chartering manager stating
that the master of THOR EMILIE, in spite of several reminders to the agent, still had not received
any certification to the effect that the cargo was ”harmless”. The broker retransmitted this request to
Glencore. According to the broker it is normal practice, that such certificate is delivered in the port
14
of loading and that the certificate do not specify that the cargo is harmless but alone specify the
moisture content and the TML.
Following this there was communication between the broker and the owner about loading, arrival
time at Porto Vesme, price etc.
On 18 February Polyship was called by Glencore’s charterer, who had learned about the foundering
of THOR EMILIE and who asked the broker to seek further information from the owner.
The broker was informed by the owner, that THOR EMILIE was lost and that there was only one
survived crew member. The broker sent this information back to Glencore, which afterwards, via
Polyship, informed the owner, that Glencore held the owner responsible for all losses.
THOR EMILIE’s cargo.
THOR EMILIE’s cargo of Zinc Skimmings was sold by the plant Metaleurope to the shipper
Glencore and the two parties had entered into a contract of sale dated 31 January 2000. In the
contract of sale the product is listed as ”Approximately 1500-2000 wet metric tons of zinc
skimmings”. It is further stated, ”The zinc skimmings shall at time of loading into the carrying vessel
be suitable and safe for loading, overseas shipment and discharge in accordance with IMO Code of
Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes, shall not be in frozen condition, and shall be free from foreign
material”, cf. Annex IX.
The cargo was sold FOB Noyelles Godault, that is the cargo was owned by Glencore and at the
responsibility of Glencore from the moment when it was loaded in the barges at the plant.
Metaleurope, however, was by Glencore, and on behalf and on account of Glencore charged to
arrange the barge transport to Dunkerque.
On 3 February Metaleurope sent a fax to the agent Saga in Dunkerque with instructions from
Glencore about the Bill of Lading (BL). In this the cargo is described as Zinc Skimmings in bulk, cf.
Annex X.
On 7 February Metaleurope sent to the stevedore Sea Bulk and to the agent a fax about the non
dangerousness of the cargo. This fax was in an English translation handed over to the Master on 8
February. In this the cargo is described as Zinc Skimmings, cf. Annex V. This fax presumable was
sent because the owner’s chartering manager at the same day to the broker had pointed out, that the
master of THOR EMILIE from the agent had still not received a certificate stating that the cargo was
harmless.
On 7 February Metaleurope furthermore sent a fax to the stevedore firm. The fax contained a
Material Safety Data Sheet for Zinc Sklimmings. The document was presumable ment for the master
of THOR EMILIE, but according to the master he never saw it. A copy of the document was after
the accident found by the agent at the office of the stevedore firm and the agent did fax it to the
office of the P&I Insurance Company in Antwerpen on 21 February, cf. Annex XI.
15
The Investigation Division has in writing requested the stevedore firm for any confirmation and
documentation to the effect that the Data Sheet was handed over to the master. The Investigation
Divisions request remains unanswered.
The Product Name in the Data Sheet is stated as ”Galvanizer Fines” with the synonyms ”Zinc
Skimming, Ball Mill Ash”.
In the block ”Fire and explosion hazard data” is stated:
”Flash Point: N/A
Extinguishing Media: Dry Powder extinguisher preferred: dry chemical: AVOID WATER.
Ususal Fire Fighting Procedure:
Reacts with moisture, akalis and acids to form hydrogen, a flamable gas, with lower explosive limit
of 3,9 % in air. This limit may be reached rapidly. Heat speeds up gas formation. A small percentage
of methan (approx 1 %) may also be generated. Cloride ….. (unreadable) to produce toxic and
corrosive fumes of hydrogen chlorid”.
The cargo was from the plant carried to Dunkerque in 4 barges. For each barge was issued an ” Avis
Expedition”, dated 4 February 2000. In these ”Avis’s” the cargo is described as ”Zinc skimming, non
hazadous (Green List) GB 025” and ”Recovery of zinc metal from the skimmings. The product is
completely recyclable and it is environmently harmless, R4”.
During the days 7 – 8 February 2033,665 mts Zinc Skimmings were loaded into THOR EMILIE in
Dunkerque. During the chartering phase for this cargo the cargo was described as Oxyde Zinc Ore.
During the morning on 9 February the master of THOR EMILIE from the agent received the final
cargo documents, e.g. Bill of Lading (BL), from which it appeared that the cargo was Zinc
Skimmings, cf. Annex VI.
On 9 February at 1205 the agent via fax sent the final cargo documents to the owner’s chartering
manager. From the cover letter as well as from the cargo documents it appeared, that the cargo was
Zinc Skimmings. In an also enclosed custom paper, a so called T2 L document, the cargo, however,
was listed as Oxyde de Zinc, cf. Annex XII.
IMDG Code and Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes.
Zinc Skimmings is included in IMO’s IMDG Code – Page 4371, under Class 4.3 – UN NO 1435.
and for transportation in bulk is referred to IMO’s Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (The
Bulk Code).
In the Bulk Code Zinc Skimmings is included on page 112 under the following text:
”Properties”
In contact with moisture or water, liable to give off hydrogen, a flamable gas, and toxid gases.
Segregation and stowage requirements
Separated from ”foodstuffs and all class 8 liquids.
16
Special requirements
1. Any shipment of this material requires approval of the competent authorities of the countries of
shipment and the flag State of the ship.
2. Any material which is wet or is known to have been wetted should not be accepted for carriage.
Materials should be handled and transported under dry conditions.
3. Ventilation should be adequate to prevent hydrogen buildup.
4. All sources of ignition should be eliminated as far as practicable. This include hot work, burning,
cutting, smoking, electrical sparking, etc., during handling and transport.
Mineral concentrates are included in the Bulk Code, Appendix A (List of bulk materials which may
liquify) and in the list over known products is eg. Included Zinc Ore Concentrates and other zinc ore
products.
In SOLAS, Chapter VI (Carriage of cargoes), Part A (General provisions), Regulation 2 (Cargo
information) is eg. stated: ”The shipper shall provide the master or his representative with
appropriate information on the cargo sufficiently in advance of loading to enable the precautions
which may be necessary for proper stowage and safe carriage of the cargo to be put into effect.
For bulk cargoes is stated: ”in case of a bulk cargo, information on the stowage factor of the cargo,
the trimming procedures and, in the case of a concentrate or other cargo, which may liquify,
additional information in the form of a certificate on the moisture content of the cargo and its
transportable moisture limit”.
Laboratory tests of samples from THOR EMILIE’s cargo.
THOR EMILIE’s cargo of Zinc Skimmings was during a period of about 6 month by the plant
Metaleurope collected from different local sub-contractors and was little by little, when it was
delivered to the plant, stored outside in a pile. During the loading of the barges at the plant the
material was by a grab liftet onto lorries and driven the short distance to the plants quay, from where
it was tipped into the barges.
From the lorries samples of the material were collected for determination of eg. moisture content and
also for later tests for determination of zinc content, which was determining the sales price of the
material. Part of the collected material went through different processes and was then, after been
granulated, put into 8 envelopes, which were stored at the plant laboratorie for any later tests in the
case a commercial dispute about the character of the material should arise.
It is understood that tests done by the plant have shown a moisture content by weight of 2,77 % and
that the material contained 63,4 % zinc in different combinations, 5,5 % as zinc metal.
About 30 kg of the material, as on the lorries, were taken aside. About 10 kg here of was sent to the
receiving plant in Italy and about 20 kg were stored in a closed plastic drum at the plant laboratorie.
During a visit at the plant on 22 February the Investigation Division requested these samples or some
of them handed over. The plant would not allow that. The plastic drum and 2 envelopes were then
sealed in the presence of the Investigation Division.
17
Those samples in the envelopes had been through a granulation and some other treatments and could
consequently not be considered similar to THOR EMILIE’s cargo. The material in the drum,
however, was in a condition as taken directly from the lorries and consequently the same as was
loaded in THOR EMILIE.
The Danish Maritime Authority requested, through a French lawyer, the local French Court for a
court order, which directed the plant to deliver the samples to the Investigation Division. This
request was followed by a counter request from the plant and other parties for a complete
investigation by a French court of all the circumstances relating to the loss. The Court then declined
to direct the plant to deliver the samples to the Danish Maritime Authority, which by the Court was
not considered part in the case, before the Court had finalized its inquiry.
The inquiries in France are still ongoing and they are not supposed to be brought to a conclusion in
the nearest future.
The French Court, however, directed the plant to deliver the samples to 2 experts from the Lille
University appointed by the Court. From here 3 kg of the material from the drum on 26 April were
delivered to an expert from the English consultancy firm Burgoynes, appointed by the owner and the
owner’s P&I Insurance Company. This expert was assisted by a chemist from Butterworth
Laboratories. 3 kg of the material were delivered to an expert appointed by the shipper, 3 kg were
delivered to Metaleurope and the rest, about 11 kg, were kept by the experts appointed by the Court.
At a meeting of the experts at the Lille University on 26 April air from the head space of the sealed
drum was taken out and was analysed. The analysis by the French expert, who used an ”indirect
method”, did not prove sign of gas. The Burgoynes expert used a ”direct method” by which air from
the drum via a short needle was led direct into an explosiometer. The explosiometer did show a clear
presence of explosive gasses.
The chemist from the Butterworth Laboratories led air from the head space of the sealed drum into
two gas-proof syrings. The air was analysed at the laboratories and the analyses did show a content
by volume of respectively 6,26 % and 5,48 % of hydrogen, cf. Annex XIII.
The owner / the P&I Insurance Company and the shipper, Glencore, then came to an agreement
according to which the two parties, jointly, would carry out further tests of the samples according to
a test program agreed by the two parties. These tests have been carried out by the laboratories Alfred
H. Knight and Butterworth.
The Investigation Division has through the owner, but without result, requested the documentation
about the test program and the test reports from the two laboratories.
Stability calculation.
Following the foundering the consultative naval architects Niels Mosberg Aps, on the owner’s
request, have calculated the trim and the stability of THOR EMILIE with a cargo as the actual one
and under the imaginary conditions, where
1. the cargo hold is open to the sea
2. the engine room is water-logged.
18
In condition 1 the ship will founder immidiately. The stability programme gives no script of the
calculations because the programme discontinue the calculations, when no ”balance condition” is
found.
In condition 2 the calculations are based on an engine room completely open to the sea including the
tanks in the engine room. According to the calculations the ship will float in this condition with a
draft aft of 6,42 meters and a draft forward of 3,65 meters and with a stability nearly as good as in
intact condition.
7.
Comments made by the Investigation Division
Concerning the ship and her crew.
When flagged into DIS in the fall 1997 THOR EMILIE was approved by the Danish Maritime
Authority.
The ship carried valid classification documents.
The crew was in accordance with the Safe Manning Document issued by the Danish Maritime
Authority on 14 May 1997.
THOR EMILIE did not carry a certificate for transportation of IMO Class 4.3 products. The
contitions for obtaining this certificate is covered by Regulation 54 in Chapter II-2 in ”Meddelelser
B” issued by the Danish Maritime Authority.
According to these regulations the cargo hold of THOR EMILIE should have had the istallation for
fire reading and fire alarm, an effective and explosion-proof installation for mecanical ventilation
and also a firefighting installation. Furthermore the bulkhead between the cargo hold and the engine
room should have an A-6o insulation.
The cargo hold should have been equipped with powder extinguisher and the ship should have
carried 4 pieces of chemical protective suits and additional breathing apparatus.
According the authorizing division in the Danish Maritime Authority dispensation for these
regulations is not granted.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that THOR EMILIE, as ship and with respect of her
equipment and crew and the stowing of the cargo, was fully seaworthy on departure Dunkerque on 9
February, if the cargo had been harmless and not a dangerous cargo, for which THOR EMILIE did
not meet the requirements for transportation neither in construction nor in equipment.
Concerning the chartering of THOR EMILIE.
The negotiations between the owner’s chartering manager and the shipper’s broker started on 27
January and was completed on 31 January.
From the broker the cargo was offered as ”Bulk Concentrates” on 27 January. This was changed to
”Oxyde Zinc Ore” on 28 January, first by the shipper’s chartere and subsequently by the broker, and
the ship was finally chartered for this cargo.
19
In the sales contract between the plant Metaleurope and the shipper, Glencore, the cargo is described
as ”Zinc Skimmings”, and according to the contract overseas shipment shall be in accordance with
IMO’s Bulk Code, cf. Annex IX.
The Investigation Division therefore finds it established, that the shipper, Glencore in Switzerland,
has been fully aware of the fact, that the cargo was Zinc Skimmings.
As the matter stands for the Investigation Division, the description ”Zinc Skimmings” has not been
mentioned in the communication between Glencore in Switzerland and the broker, Polyship in
Marseille, and there was no UN – number given.
The shipper has informed, that the owner was informed of the fact, that the cargo was Zinc
Skimmings, however, not when the owner received this information.
The owner’s chartering manager during the negotiations persistently attempted to have inserted a
clause in the charter party to the effect that the cargo was ”non IMO – lawfull, harmless and nondangerous”, and he also attempted to get a further description of the cargo. The clause, however, was
never inserted in the party, and the owner’s chartering manager did not receive any real
documentation, a certificate, descriping the character and the treatment of the cargo.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that the owner’s chartering manager, either during his
negotiations with the broker or via the agent in Dunkerque, before the start of the loading, should
have insisted on receiving that cargo documentation, which the shipper is obliged to provide in
accordance with SOLAS, ChapterVI, Part A, Regulation 2.
About 2 hours after the departure of THOR EMILIE from Dunkerque the owner’s chartering
manager via fax received the cargo documents from the agent. From the cover letter as well as from
the documents it appeared, that the cargo was Zinc Skimmings, cf. Annex XII. The chartering
manager, however, did not take notice of the changed cargo description, due to the fact that he
mainly concentrated on the information on quantity and price, on which basis he should draw up the
owner’s bill.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that if the chartering manager, by a closer examination
of the cargo documents, had ascertained that the cargo now was descriped as Zinc Skimmings, he
would have had the possibility by checking in the IMDG Code to learn about the special character of
this material and about the special, obligatory regulations for its transportation.
An apparent result of such an ascertainment would have been immidiate to inform the ship in order
that the master could initiate ventilation, prohibit the use of fire and electical tools etc, and to instruct
the master to immidiately to return to Dunkerque for discharging.
Concerning the loading in Dunkerque.
The master abandoned the loading on 7 February when it started raining.
The master several times pressed the agent for cargo documentation. On 8 February the master
received a statement to the effect that ”there is no risk of toxic vapours from the zinc skimmings
although they have been wet by rain”, cf. Annex V.
This was the first time when it appeared that the cargo was Zinc Skimmings, however, the master did
not notice it.
20
Following the receipt of this statement the master accepted the continuation of the loading
irrespective light rain.
On 9 February, shortly before the departure of THOR EMILIE, the master received from the agent
the cargo documents, eg BL, on which it appeared, that the cargo was ”Zinc Skimming in bulk”, cf.
Annex VI. The master did not notice the changed cargo description.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion that the master, before starting the loading, should have
insisted on from the agent to receive that cargo documentation, which the shipper is obliged to
provide in accordance with SOLAS, Chapter VI, Part A, Regulation 2.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that the statement which the master received on 8
February can not be considered as such documentation. This statement was probably given to assure
the master that it was secure to load in rain.
The Investigation Division furthermore is of the opinion, that if the master had ascertained that the
description of the cargo, in the statement of 8 February and in the BL which he received on 9
February before departure, had been changed to Zinc Skimmings, then it would have been possible
to cancel THOR EMILIE’s transportation of this cargo.
If the master had noticed the changed cargo description an apparent result would have been, that the
master would have asked the agent for an explanation, would have made contact with the owner’s
chartering manager and would have checked in the IMDG Code and then learned about the special
condition for this material.
Concerning the voyage.
THOR EMILIE departed Dunkerque on 9 February at 1000. The loading was completed the previous
evening, after which the hatches were closed and the ship made ready for sea. During the passage
through the English Channel and during the crossing of the Biscay there was a strong westerly wind
and the ship rolled to some extent. Consequently the ship was navigated under reduced speed but
without any problems. The crew’s inspections of the cargo hold did not gave rise to remarks.
Following the passage of Cap S. Vincent, about 3 days before the foundering, it was fine weather.
The Investigation Division has no comments to THORE EMILIE’s voyage from Dunkerque to the
position of the foundering.
Concerning the explosion and the foundering.
On 17 February at about 1100, when the master was in his bath room at the boat deck, the chief
officer presumable sleeping at his room, the chief engineer and the oiler presumable in the engine
room, the 2 AB’s presumable at the deck and the cook presumable in the galley, a very great
explosion took place. The master was at the moment of the opinion that the explosion was in the
engine room.
The master ran to the staboard side of the boat deck and he was on his way towards the outdoor
staircase aft the deckhouse when the ship sank nearly even trimmed. The master did not look forward
and therefore did not see whether the hatches were blown off. The master managed to enter a raft.
THOR EMILIE sank within less than 1 minute at about 2800 meters depth of water. The master did
not at any time after the explosion see sign of the other crew members.
21
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that the explosion has been so forcefull that most of the
bottom and the sides of the ship were blown away.
An explosion in the engine room could have been in the form of a crankcase explosion or an
explosion due to a leaky acetylene installation.
In theory a crankcase explosion could have resulted in penetration of the hull of the ship, however,
local and only resulting in gradual ingress of water.
A mixture of acetylene and oxygen is extremely explosive and can give in a very high, local,
pressure resulting in a large hull damage.
According to the master no acetylene hot work was carried out on this voyage. This type of work
must be authorized by him. In order to carry out acetylene hot work in the engine room it would have
been necessary to take hoses from the cylinders at staboard side of the boat deck down to the engine
room via the outdoor staircase. According to the master there were no hoses laid out at the boat deck.
In this Report it has been stated that THOR EMILIE would be able to float with the engine room
water-logged.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that an explosion in the engine room, eg. a crankcase
explosion, would not result in a hull damage of such a dimension that the ship would sink as fast as
was the case.
The Investigation Division is furthermore of the opinion, that there is no basis for assuming that
acetylene hot work was carried out in the engine room.
Accordingly the Investigation Division is of the opinion that the explosion took place in THOR
EMILIE’s cargo hold, cf. later in this Report.
Concerning the alarm call and the search.
At 1121, about 20 minutes after the foundering, RCC Karup received a signal from THOR EMILIE’s
EPIRB.
SOK was informed at 1204.
Here after it was attempted via different channels to establish radio contact with the ship.
The given position was within the area of RCC Algeria, however, SOK could not establish contact to
RCC Algeria.
At about 1550 RCC Madrid transmitted a MAYDAY-RELAY.
At 2040 the raft was spotted by a ship, which took part in the search, and the master of THOR
EMILIE was resqued.
On 18 February in the morning MRCC Madrid initiated a helicopter search.
On 19 February at 0147 MRCC Madrid discontinued the search.
2 helicopters, 3 civil ships and an Algerian patrolboat took part in the search.
There were found no trace from THOR EMILIE or from the 6 missing crew members.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that THOR EMILIE’s EPIRB was fully functional.
The Investigation Division is furthermore of the opinion, that too much time elapsed before a real
search was initiated. This may be due to the facts, that SOK could not establish contact to RCC
Algeria and that it over a time was attempted to establish radio contact to THOR EMILIE, due to the
experience of many ”false” EPIRB alarms.
22
The Investigation Division is also of the opinion, that it is not satisfactory that a RCC with the
responsibility for such a large and busy area as the south western part of the Mediterrenean can not
be directly contacted in case of an emergency in the area.
The Investigation Division intends to take these questions on with the relevant parties.
The Investigation Division is finally of the opinion, that an earlier initiated search including an air
search at the day of the accident, may have resulted in an earlier resque of the master but, in this
accident, would probably not have changed the circumstance, that no trace was found of the ship or
the 6 missing crew members.
Concerning the cargo.
THOR EMILIE carried a cargo of 2033,665 mts Zinc Skimmings.
Zinc Skimmings is included in IMO’s IMDG Code under Class 4.3 – UN NO 1435, and according to
the Code it can give off hydrogen when in contact with moisture or water. A special approval,
special equipment and precautions on board are required for transportation of the material.
Samples of the material, which at the plant was loaded into the barges and from the barges direct into
THOR EMILIE, were collected during the loading of the barges and were stored in a plastic drum.
The drum was sealed 5 days after the foundering.
A documented analysis of air from the head space of the drum, containing samples of the cargo, has
shown a content by volumen of 5 – 6 % hydrogen, cf. Annex XIII.
The material in the drum must be considered to content less moisture than THOR EMILIE’s cargo,
as part of the loading was carried out in rain. The greater content of moisture the greater reactivity,
cf. the Bulk Code.
There is no basis for assuming that THOR EMILIE’s hatches were not normal tight.
The Material Data Safety Sheet for THOR EMILIE’s cargo, cf. Annex XI, advise against using
water for fire fighting, because the material is liable to form hydrogen, a flamble gas, with lower
explosive limit of 3,9 % in air, a limit which may be reached rapidly.
Irrespective of the fact that it has not beeen possible for the Investigation Division to receive the
reports concerning the latest analyses, the Division is of the opinion that THOR EMILIE’s cargo,
during the period of about 8 days, has formed hydrogen in such quantity, that the hydrogen in
reaction with the oxygen in the air has formed such an amount of explosive gasses, that they could be
brought to explode by an incidental source of ignition.
23
8.
Preliminary conclusion concerning the cause
of the explosion
As mentioned before in this Report it has not been possible for the Investigation Division to obtain
the documentation about the latest analyses carried out by the laboratories Alfred H. Knight and
Butterworth. The following conclusion must therefore be considered a preliminary conclusion, which
may be changed or confirmed as final conclusion, when the Investigation Division has received the
documentation requested.
The Investigation Division is of the opinion, that THOR EMILIE’s foundering in the Mediterrenean
on 17 February 2000 was caused by an heavy explosion in the cargo hold of the ship, caused by the
fact that the cargo of Zinc Skimmings, during a period of about 8 days had generated so much
hydrogen, that in reaction with oxygen in the air it formed a very explosive atmosphere, which was
ignited by electrical tools used during maintenance work at the deck.
The Investigation Division furthermore is of the opinion, that it has been a decisive contributory
cause, that the charter party was agreed on a false basis, due to the fact, as the matter stands for the
Investigation Division, that the shipper of the cargo, the company Glencore in Switzerland, to the
brokering firm, Polyship in Marseille, gave a false description of the cargo.
9.
Conclusions
The Investigation Division is of the opinion,
that the foundering occured extremely fast due to a heavy explosion/detonation in the cargo hold of
the ship,
that the master, with the knowledge about the characteristic of the cargo as understood by him,
could not anticipate, that during the voyage an explosive atmosphere could generate in the cargo
hold, and
that the master, after the explosion, did not have any possibility of initiating effective measures for
search and resque of the other crew members.
The Investigation Division is furthermore of the opinion,
24
that the brokering firm Polyship in Marseille from the shipper, Glencore in Switzerland, did not
receive information about the correct description of the cargo and its UN-number, neither before nor
during the chartering negotiations with the owner’s chartering manager,
that the master, when he did not notice the description of the cargo as Zinc Skimmings at the
statement, which he received on 8 February and at the final cago documents, which he received and
signed before departure, prevented himself from discontinuating the loading and have the ship
discharged,
that the master not at any time before or after the departure Dunkerque in a proper, secure and
justifiable manner was informed about the characteristics of the cargo and its dangerous nature, and
that the vessel, as ship and with respect of her equipment and crew and the stowing of the cargo, was
fully seaworthy, if the cargo had been harmless and not a dangerous cargo, for which THOR
EMILIE did not meet the requirements for transportation, neither in construction nor in equipment.
The Investigation Division is also of the opinion.
that the negotiations between the broker and the owner’s chartering manager could have been
discontinued, if the owner’s chartering manager had insisted upon receipt of a prober documentation
to the effect, that the cargo was non-dangerous,
that the owner’s chartering manager, when he did not notice the description of the cargo as Zinc
Skimmings at the final cargo documents, which he received about 2 hours after the departure of
THOR EMILIE, prevented himself from advising the master here about and from breaking off the
actual voyage.
The Investigation Division is finally of the opinion,
that for safe transportation of dangerous goods and dangerous materials/products it is a precondition
that the goods or the material/product in all the links of the chain of tranportation is documented and
proper described by using the real name and the associated UN-number. This is a precondition,
which to a very high degree is based on the thrustworthiness of the shipper.
10.
Recommendations
The Investigation Division recommends to the owner to establish a procedure in the ISM – system to
the effect, that it is made certain, when entering into a charter party, that the owner’s charteres
receive proper documentation of the cargo, for which the chartere bid, including an exact notification
of whether the cargo is listed under an UN – number, and if so which UN – number.
The Investigation Division furthermore recommends to the owner, that the charteres of the owner go
through a certified dangerous goods course.
25
11.
Annexes
Annex I. Map covering the western part of the Mediterennean showing the route of THOR EMILE.
Annex II. Segment of chart no. 2717.
Annex III. General Arrangement Plan for THOR EMILIE.
Annex IV. The master’s ”letter of protest” dated 7 February.
Annex V. Metaleurope’s statement concerning the harmlessness of the cargo.
Annex VI. Bill of Lading (BL).
Annex VII. Email from Polyship to Glencore 28/1.
Annex VIII. Email from Polyship to Glencore 31/1.
Annex IX. Sales contract between Mataleurope and Glencore.
Annex
X. Instruction to Saga Termineaux Portuaires concerning BL.
Annex XI. Material Safety Data Sheet.
Annex XII. Cargo documents received by the owner.
Annex XIII. Report of analyses from Butterworth Laboratories.
K. Skaareberg Eriksen
Chief of Investigation
Niels Mogensen
Deputy Chief of Investigation
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